Political Handbook of the Americas 2008

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAS 2008

REGIONAL POLITICAL HANDBOOKS OF THE WORLD

Political Handbook of the Americas 2008 Political Handbook of the Middle East 2008 Political Handbook of Africa 2007 Political Handbook of Asia 2007 Political Handbook of Europe 2007

Political Handbook of the Americas 2008 Editors: Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, William R. Overstreet Associate Editors: Judith Isacoff, Thomas Lansford Assistant Editor: Tony Davies Production Assistants: Thomas Scalese, Erin Stanley, Kathleen Stanley CQ Press Sponsoring Editor: Anna S. Baker Development Editor: Anastazia Skolnitsky Chief, Editorial Acquisitions, Reference Publishing: Andrea Pedolsky Managing Editor, Reference: Joan A. Gossett Production Editors: Belinda Josey, Emily Bakely Copy Editors: Elaine Dunn, Shannon Kelly, Jon Preimesberger Manager, Electronic Production: Paul P. Pressau Manager, Print and Art Production: Margot W. Ziperman Senior Vice President and Publisher: John A. Jenkins Director, Reference Publishing: Alix B. Vance President and Publisher, Congressional Quarterly Inc.: Robert W. Merry

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAS 2008

A DIVISION OF CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC. WASHINGTON, D.C.

CQ Press 2300 N Street, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202-729-1900; toll-free, 1-866-4CQ-PRESS (1-866-427-7737) Web: www.cqpress.com Copyright  C 2008 by CQ Press, a division of Congressional Quarterly Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Cover design: TGD Communications Composition: Production staff at Aptara Corp. Inc., New Delhi Maps by International Mapping Associates ∞ The paper used in this publication exceeds the requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences– 

Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992. Printed and bound in the United States of America 12

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ISBN 978-0-87289-903-2

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CONTENTS

Intergovernmental Organization Abbreviations

I INTRODUCTION

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Introduction to the Americas II GOVERNMENTS

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St. Vincent and the Grenadines 425 Suriname 431 Trinidad and Tobago 444 United Kingdom Territories 455 United States and Related Territories 467 Uruguay 501 Venezuela 514

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Antigua and Barbuda 33 Argentina 40 Aruba 61 Bahamas 65 Barbados 71 Belize 78 Bolivia 85 Brazil 103 Canada 118 Chile 137 Colombia 148 Costa Rica 167 Cuba 177 Dominica 187 Dominican Republic 194 Ecuador 204 El Salvador 225 French Territories 239 Grenada 247 Guatemala 256 Guyana 273 Haiti 284 Honduras 302 Jamaica 314 Mexico 322 Netherlands Antilles 342 Nicaragua 349 Panama 366 Paraguay 381 Peru 393 St. Kitts and Nevis 413 St. Lucia 419

III INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 533 Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) 535 Andean Community of Nations (CAN) 539 Association of Caribbean States (ACS) 544 Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) 548 Central American Common Market (CACM/MCCA) 554 Central American Integration System (SICA) 558 The Commonwealth (CWTH) 562 Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (LAES/SELA) 568 Latin American Integration Association (LAIA/ALADI) 571 Organization of American States (OAS/OEA) 574 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 582 Regional and Subregional Development Banks 586 Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) 586 Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE) 587 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 589 Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR/ MERCOSUL) 594 United Nations 599 Security Council: Peacekeeping Forces and Missions 602

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United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 602 Economic and Social Council: Regional Commissions 602 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 603

IV APPENDIXES 605 Appendix A: Chronology of Major Events in the Americas, 2007 607 Appendix B: Serials List 615 Index

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I N T E R G OV E R N M E N TA L O R G A N I Z AT I O N A B B R E V I AT I O N S

Memberships in non-UN intergovernmental organizations are listed at the end of each country’s section under Intergovernmental Representation. An asterisk indicates a nonofficial abbreviation. In the individual country sections, associate memberships are indicated by italics.

ACS ALADI BCIE CACM CAN Caricom *CWTH *IADB

Association of Caribbean States Latin American Integration Association Central American Bank for Economic Integration Central American Common Market Andean Community of Nations Caribbean Community and Common Market The Commonwealth Inter-American Development Bank

LAES Mercosur OAS OECS OPANAL

SELA SICA

Latin American and Caribbean Economic System Southern Cone Common Market Organization of American States Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean Latin American Economic System Central American Integration System

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAS

Natural and Historical Setting The Americas present two faces to the humans who have been settling there for millennia. Most of the region, which stretches out over two continents and a sea full of islands, boasts conditions inviting to human settlement. In the area on which this volume focuses, running south from the United States’ land border, and from the tip of the Florida peninsula on the Atlantic seaboard, temperature zones range from temperate to subtropical to tropical. Some of the highest mountain regions, or the deserts, or swamplands, challenge endurance, but they compensate with beauty what they lack in comfort. Counterbalancing these advantages, much of the region lies atop seismically active ground. An earthquake zone runs from Mexico down to Chile, and into the Caribbean. Tens of thousands of people have died in earthquakes in the 20th century alone. By way of compensation, the same unsteady soil holds, in several areas, silver, gold, and petroleum. The riches don’t end there. Among the other bounties: the 2.3 million-squaremile Amazon, the world’s biggest rain forest; the vast plains of Argentina and Brazil that provide some of the world’s richest farmland; and an extraordinary agricultural heritage. Maize, tomatoes, potatoes, chili peppers, chocolate, tobacco, and coca (the raw material of cocaine)—all these are native to the Western Hemisphere. They are known and savored everywhere else as a result of the arrival of the European powers—the historical event that joined the Americas to the rest of the world. The Spanish, Portuguese, French, and British all moved into the region with one major goal: to exploit the New World’s mineral and agricultural riches to the utmost. For the Iberians, transforming the Americas into a bastion of Christianity counted as nearly as an important a mission. Clearly, those two objectives collided, as one prelate saw when the Spanish conquest had barely begun. In 1511, Antonio de Montesinos, a Dominican friar from Hispaniola (an English corruption of la isla Espa˜nola, an island now shared by the Dominican Republic and Haiti), condemned as sinners those who enslaved Indians. His sermon resonated as far as the mother country, shocking even the conscience of King Ferdinand. Montesinos’s sermon certainly didn’t transform the conquest into a purely spiritual undertaking. But his insistence

that even so-called savages were full-fledged humans marks the beginning of the human rights movement in the Americas. On a practical level, Montesinos made a convert of Bartolom´e de las Casas, who joined the Dominicans and campaigned for equal rights for Indians for the rest of his life. When Montesinos unleashed his wrath on his fellow colonists, the European presence consisted of settlements on Hispaniola and Cuba. The conquest of the mainland wouldn’t begin in earnest until 1519 (although Portuguese had landed on Brazil’s coast, without realizing the magnitude of the continent beyond). Within a few decades of those early entries, Spain and Portugal had established full-fledged colonies on both continents of the New World. The independence wars that expelled the colonial powers didn’t flare up until the early 19th century—first in Haiti, against France. Hence, as of the early 21st century, all of the Americas save the United States and Canada had spent more time as colonies than as independent nations. In the Caribbean, where the conquest began, European powers still have at least formal ties to some nations. And Cuba, one of the earliest colonies, didn’t free itself of Spanish rule until the very end of the 19th century. Europe’s legacy to the New World begins with language. Spanish, Portuguese, and French—the languages of the vast majority of the 533 million people of Latin America and the Caribbean—all come from Europe (as does English, for that matter). And all of the region’s legal and political institutions owe an enormous debt to European models, whose political doctrines and parliamentary systems traveled to the former colonies. But the copies were not exact. Mexico, for example, made a point of adopting a version of the U.S. constitutional model, with a strong president elected independently of congress. Even so, the stability and prosperity that Europe achieved in the second half of the 20th century still elude the former colonies of Latin America and the Caribbean. The foundation of those achievements, the establishment of at least a minimum standard of socioeconomic equality, remains only a vision almost everywhere in the region. Costa Rica, in Central America, is the exception. The World Bank in 2003 ranked the region among the world’s most unequal, with the richest 10 percent of individuals receiving 40 to 47 percent of total income, and the poorest 20 percent receiving 2 to 4 percent (in the United

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INTRODUCTION

States, the wealthiest 10 percent earn 31 percent of total income).1 Governments, international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as the United States, have deployed numerous strategies designed to spur economic growth and lessen inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean. And citizens of the region have developed their own strategy to better their conditions: migration to the United States, Canada, and Europe. Mexicans living along the border have been working in the United States for the better part of a century. In the 1940s and 1950s migration took a more organized form, when citizens of the British West Indies flocked to Britain and then to the United States. The poverty and inequality that fostered migration developed under a long series of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes that characterized the entire region, with brief exceptions, for most of its postindependence life. Political systems began opening up toward the end of the 20th century (except in Cuba). Citizens of the Americas have come to see free and fair elections as a fundamental right. With that standard in place, the regional political class has lost its exclusive hold on the political process. To be sure, mass political involvement long existed in the Americas, but in appearance only. In some countries, political parties could put hundreds of thousands of members in the streets. However, these parties were machines to deliver enormous blocs of votes, thereby providing the illusion of democratic process. Mexico provided the classic model. Its Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Instituctional—PRI) enjoyed one of the longest-running political monopolies in the world thanks largely to its efficient stage-managing of national and local elections. As the new century began, essentially fictitious elections gave way to the real thing. In 2000 Mexican voters ended the PRI’s extraordinary 71-year-run as a state-owned party. Twelve years before that, Chileans had voted to end a military regime. One year after Chile’s electorally generated transformation, Nicaraguan voters in 1989 turned out of office a government that had seized power with most of the country’s support and then had its power ratified by voters. And in 1998, Venezuelan voters elected a charismatic ex-army officer who had tried and failed to stage a coup aimed at destroying a two-party system that had fallen into corruption and sloth. Elections channeled political turbulence but didn’t end it. No mechanism exists to calm the geological instability that underlies much of the region. During the 20th century alone, the Americas suffered 176 earthquakes at a cost of 190,000 lives. In recent decades, tens of thousands of people died in earthquakes in Peru (1970 and 2007), Nicaragua (1972), Guatemala (1976), 1 See David de Ferranti et al., “Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Breaking with History?” The World Bank, 2003, 2, http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/LAC/LAC.nsf/ECADocByUnid/ 4112F1114F594B4B85256DB3005DB262?Opendocument (accessed December 2, 2007).

Colombia (1979), Mexico (1985), and El Salvador (2001).2 Like disasters everywhere, those in the Americas have revealed enormous shortcomings by governments that left citizens defenseless in the face of predictable events. Some governments have paid the price. In Nicaragua, chaos and corruption followed a major earthquake in 1972. Simmering discontent expanded into all-out opposition to a long-reigning dictatorial dynasty that was toppled seven years later. In Mexico, government helplessness in the wake of a 1986 earthquake that leveled parts of the capital altered the country’s political dynamic. The PRI lost much of its credibility, setting the stage for the later loss of its political monopoly. Another form of disaster grows out of poverty. Rainstorms that lead to disastrous mudslides plague Central America and the Caribbean region, where torrential rains are an annual event. There and throughout the region, landless poor people build communities on unstable terrain, sometimes in ravines or on hillsides. Haiti, most of Central America, and Venezuela have experienced thousands of deaths due to major rains. Some of the rainstorms are brought by hurricanes, an annual danger in the Caribbean Basin and along the Eastern Seaboard of the United States. The word itself originated in the Caribbean: The Spaniards appropriated huracan from the Carib people, who also gave their name to the area where they flourished. As the hurricane zone crosses continental boundaries, so does the region itself. North America ends at the MexicoGuatemala border, where Central America begins. That narrow strip of countries, which bridge North and South America, leads across the Darien jungle to Colombia. East of the continents, the Caribbean Basin is dotted with 13 nation-states. Two countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, share the island of Hispaniola. And Trinidad and Tobago and St. Kitts and Nevis have formed two-island states. In South America, the equator cuts through the continent and lends its name to the Republic of Ecuador. That nation and nearly all of its South American counterparts are also divided internally by the Andes mountain range, the world’s longest. Only Brazil, Uruguay, Guyana, and Suriname are untouched by the Andes, which run north-south for nearly the entire length of the continent. As a result, divisions between highlanders and lowlanders pervade most of the region’s continental countries. Rural indigenous cultures, from Canada’s far north to the southern Andes, are persisting against a massive and irreversible trend of urbanization. To some extent, these distinctions reflect historical and cultural identities. Most Latin Americans who identify themselves as members of indigenous peoples are clustered in the Andes. Amazon tribes and the Guaran´ı people of Paraguay are among the exceptions. 2 See Matt Pritchard, “Natural Hazards: Keeping Them from Becoming Natural Disasters in Latin America,” ReVista (Winter 2007): 30–33, http://drclas.fas.harvard.edu/revista/files/ 4613c6a1bb9b7/revista winter07 web.pdf.

INTRODUCTION

Latin American societies became predominantly urban during the second half of the 20th century, with 75 percent of the region’s 500 million people living in cities by the year 2000, according to a United Nations study. Three Latin American urban centers—Mexico City, population approximately 19 million; S˜ao Paulo, 18 million; and Buenos Aires, 13 million—are among the world’s 20 “mega-cities.”3 Rapidly expanding cities, inadequate job creation, and frayed social safety nets have created a huge urban underclass throughout the region. Often residents of sprawling shantytowns, these so-called marginal citizens account for most crime victims and for the robbers, kidnappers, and drug dealers who have created a permanent crime wave in most of the region’s big cities. Journalists who have reported on organized crime in countries including Mexico and Colombia have paid with their lives. In the age of dictatorships, critical journalists were hunted by government agents, not gangsters, and crime waves were unknown. The price for freedom from nonpolitical crime was paid in massacres and death squad killings of alleged political opponents. Not surprisingly, the crime upsurge has led some to call for the old mano dura—the strong hand.

Twilight of the Caudillos The strongman, or caudillo, is a recurring figure throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Spanish political culture’s emphasis on personal leadership and disdain for democratic mechanics helped set the stage. Indeed, Spain itself didn’t grow out of the caudillo era until the death of dictator Francisco Franco in 1975. In the Americas, a constant pattern of political and social disorder that seemed to call for a strongman in charge kept the region for most of its independent life in a cycle of turbulence followed by the emergence of yet another caudillo. As that history implies, some caudillos are fondly remembered. Sim´on Bol´ıvar (1783–1830), who led the war for independence of northern South America (Jos´e de San Mart´ın and Bernardo O’Higgins commanded independence forces in the southern part of the continent), had an upper-class distrust for direct democracy. “Institutions which are wholly representative are not suited to our character, customs, and present knowledge,” he wrote in his long “Reply of a South American to a Gentleman of This Island [Jamaica]” in 1815. “As long as our countrymen do not acquire the abilities and political virtues that distinguish our brothers of the north, wholly popular systems, far from working to our advantage, will, I greatly fear, bring about our downfall.”4 Still, Bol´ıvar was not writing that Latin 3 “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision—Fact Sheet 7,” United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2006, http://www.un.org/esa/ population/publications/WUP2005/2005WUP FS7. pdf. 4 “Reply of a South American to a Gentleman of This Island [Jamaica],” September, 6, 1815, in Selected Writings of Bolivar, trans. Lewis Bertrand (New York: Colonial Press, 1951), http://

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Americans would never be ready for democracy. He might have been unhappy to learn that the reasoning he used served as a rationale for any number of 20th-century rulers who insisted that their countries weren’t prepared for truly representative government. More recently, Mexico’s L´azaro C´ardenas (1895–1970), in many respects a reformer who played something of the same role in his country’s political culture as Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States, nevertheless helped consolidate the PRI, with its deeply undemocratic system of presidents choosing their successors. Most caudillos have shown few of the benign instincts that C´ardenas displayed. Among the many 20th-century strongmen known more for repression and corruption are Augusto Pinochet (1915–2006), who headed Chile’s military junta from 1973 to 1988; Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua (1925–1980), who inherited his father’s dictatorship; and Rafael Trujillo (1891–1961) of the Dominican Republic. The latter’s rule ended with his assassination; Somoza was assassinated in exile following his overthrow; and Pinochet spent his last years fighting indictments for corruption and human rights abuse. The fates of these once all-powerful rulers make clear why the life of a strongman doesn’t beckon as brightly today as it did only a few decades ago. President Hugo Ch´avez of Venezuela began his career as leader of the failed Venezuelan coup of 1992, and then moved into electoral politics. A declared disciple of both Sim´on Bol´ıvar and Fidel Castro, Ch´avez has broken with Castro’s precedent by insisting on adherence to democratic procedures. He paid the price in December 2007, when voters rejected his proposal to amend the Venezuelan constitution to allow unlimited presidential terms. Other chief executives also have used democratic mechanisms to allow them to stay in office longer. As recently as the 1990s, the originally elected President Alberto Fujimori of Peru won voter approval of a constitutional term-succession provision, and then maneuvered parliamentary approval of a third successive term. This was before his corrupt regime collapsed; he is now on trial for human rights abuses, having fled to and been extradited from Chile. ´ But in Colombia, the enormously popular President Alvaro Uribe won parliamentary approval for a constitutional change that enabled him to run for a second successive term, which he did. Uribe’s supporters are considering allowing him a third successive term, which he may try. Uribe’s temperament verges on autocratic; he recently accused of corruption a Supreme Court justice who had ordered an investigation of Uribe’s cousin. But whatever authoritarian tendencies he may possess have been curbed by a still-powerful system of checks and balances. Further south, the forms of electoral democracy coexist with a tradition of spousally enabled continuity in office. The politically popular Argentine President N´estor Kirchner and faculty.smu.edu/bakewell/BAKEWELL/texts/jamaica-letter.html (accessed December 9, 2007).

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INTRODUCTION

his wife, Cristina, a former senator, traded places when she won election in 2007. The expectation is that N´estor Kirchner will run for office again after Cristina Kirchner’s four-year term ends. Members of a party founded by populist caudillo Juan Per´on, the Kirchners were using a method he employed under different circumstances. In 1974, when Per´on took ill, his third wife, Isabel, was sworn in as interim president, a post she kept until 1976. In Bolivia, the election of a charismatic one-time leader of coca-growing farmers—the first member of an Indian community to be elected as head of state in Bolivia’s history—has intensified the country’s bitter ethnic-tinged socioeconomic conflict. Street violence that erupted during a political battle over a new constitution led President Evo Morales to call in early December 2007 for a national vote on whether he and nine regional governors should remain in office. Six of the nine oppose him. “If the people say ‘Evo’s going,’ I’ve got no problem— I’m democratic,” Morales said in a televised speech. In earlier decades, the events might well have served to justify a military coup. Morales’s declaration made clear that that old method is no longer considered acceptable, at least for the moment. Equally noteworthy, in Guatemala’s November 2007 presidential elections, voters rejected an ex-military man—a classic would-be caudillo—who had vowed to call in the army to fight criminals who have made the country one of the most danger´ ous in the region. Instead, Guatemalans elected Alvaro Colom, a center-left president who explicitly rejected a military crackdown as a strategy out of the country’s past. A spirit of self-critical reflection has taken hold in the region casting the old traditions of strongman rule in a poor light. “We in Latin America are not trying to look for a leader,” President Luiz In´acio (“Lula”) da Silva of Brazil, a former union activist from a poor family, told the New York Times in September 2007. “We don’t need a leader. What we need to do is build political harmony because South America and Latin America need to learn the lesson of the 20th century. We had the opportunity to grow, we had the opportunity to develop ourselves, and we lost that opportunity. So we still continue to be poor countries.”5

Languages To outsiders, major divergences in political culture from country to country tend to be masked by the prevalence of one language, Spanish. In the continental region that runs southward from Mexico’s border with the United States, Spanish enjoys a near-monopoly. That linguistic presence would be a real monopoly but for the presence of another language in the region’s biggest and richest country, Brazil. Its version of Portuguese bears roughly the same relationship to Spanish as French does to Italian. Portuguese owes its presence in the Americas to the stroke of a pen. As the age of European exploration was beginning 5 Quoted in Alexei Barrionuevo, “A Resilient Leader Trumpets Brazil’s Potential in Agriculture and Biofuels,” New York Times, September 23, 3007, A12.

in the late 15th century, Pope Alexander VI decreed that Spain and its Iberian Peninsula neighbor, Portugal, had to divide the unexplored globe between them. A territorial division that the two powers agreed to in the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 effectively gave Portugal dominion over the then-unknown region that became Brazil. Portuguese and Spanish aren’t entirely alone on the South American continent. Tens of thousands of people throughout Latin America speak indigenous languages, such as Guaran´ı in Paraguay and Quechua in Bolivia, and may speak Spanish as well. The Linguistic Society of America lists more than 158 Indian languages in Brazil alone.6 English is spoken in Belize, a tiny former British possession. Further south, Guyana, formerly known as British Guiana, is also Anglophone. Purely local languages persist in some corners of the Americas that remain isolated despite the overall expansion of urban territories. The New York Times has reported the case of a tongue, Palenquero, created centuries ago by rebel ex-slaves along Colombia’s Caribbean coast. Some of their descendants in a small, hard-to-reach inland village still speak the language. One of Palenquero’s contributing strains is the Kikongo language of Congo and Angola; another is Portuguese, a reflection of the predominant nationality of 17th-century slave traders.7 Portuguese forms a strand of another language born of African slavery. Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao, self-governing Caribbean islands still part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, are home to Papiamentu. That tongue grew out of Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and West African and native Indian languages. English is the mother tongue in Jamaica and the other 14 nation-states that make up the “British West Indies,” as they are still called; 5 of them remain British possessions. In their day-to-day business most Jamaicans, and residents of some of the other Anglophone islands, speak a creole English often impossible for English speakers from elsewhere to understand. English is also an official language in Belize (formerly British Honduras) and Guyana (formerly British Guiana). In Haiti and Martinique (the latter still part of France), a similar language regime prevails. French is an official language, though in Haiti the dominant tongue is Creole (Krey`ol ), which is rooted in French and African tongues. Fluency in French is an unmistakable sign of education. Across the border from Haiti, Spanish reigns in the Dominican Republic. Cuba is also Spanish-speaking (as is Puerto Rico, a U.S. possession). Throughout the southern zone of the hemisphere, English is widely spoken among top businesspeople and, increasingly, among politicians. Maintaining business connections with the United States, earning a degree from one of its universities, and 6 See The Linguist List, Linguistic Society of America, 2008, http://www.linguistlist.org/forms/langs/find-a-language-orfamily.html. 7 See Simon Romero, “A Language, Not Quite Spanish, with African Echoes,” New York Times, October 18, 2007, A4.

INTRODUCTION

having the ability to send one’s children to its schools all mark privileged status elsewhere in the Americas. Brazil again stands out as an exception. The relative unimportance of English for Brazilians reflects their country’s sense of self-sufficiency.

Religion All Europeans arrived in the New World with at least some notion of converting indigenous peoples to Christianity. Of the colonizers, the Spanish took that mission most seriously, because the church-state link formed a crucial element of their political culture. When the Spanish explorations began, the Christian monarchs of Spain had just won a religious war, reestablishing themselves throughout Spain at the end of the 15th century, after vanquishing the last of the Muslim rulers who had governed a good part of the Iberian Peninsula for 700 years. Those circumstances lent the Spanish conquests from the start a more religious character than those of the other European powers, especially the British, whose ranks were filled with religious dissenters. For the Spanish, observed one of Mexico’s great 20th-century writers, Octavio Paz, “The conversion legitimized the conquest. This politico-religious philosophy was diametrically opposed to that of English colonizing; the idea of evangelization occupied a secondary place in England’s colonial expansion.”8 Although Spain and the other Old World empires eventually were forced out of the Americas, the religion they brought with them remained. Roman Catholicism sank deep roots in the culture of Spanish America. Above all, this development reflected the willingness of both missionaries and indigenous peoples to adapt and blend their beliefs. “Certain Indian ideas— gods sacrificing themselves for men, the need to do penance, the stoic acceptance of suffering, the evanescence and futility of earthly pleasures—resembled those of the new faith,” historian Enrique Krauze wrote about the Mexican experience, which other nations shared.9 Mexican Indians’ collective acceptance of Catholicism was consecrated by an event in 1531. The Virgin of Guadalupe, a Spanish incarnation of the Virgin Mary, was recorded as having appeared to Juan Diego, an Indian peasant, at the very place where a pre-Columbian mother-goddess, Tonantzin, had been worshipped. Over time, the Virgin became the supreme icon of Mexican popular culture, both the mother figure of Christian belief and a completely Mexican saint. That is, she represented the dual heritage at the core of Mexican identity, even though the church as an institution arrayed itself as the major opponent to construction of a secular state. That long conflict reached the point of open warfare, the only such event in the history of the Americas (a late 19th8 Octavio Paz, “Mexico and the United States,” The New Yorker, September 17, 1979, in The Labyrinth of Solitude (New York: Grove Press, 1985), 361. 9 See Enrique Krauze, Mexico Biography of Power (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997), 70.

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century conflict in Brazil’s desperately poor northeast led by a messianic prophet was more of a peasant uprising than a church-state war). In the 1920s, Mexican Catholic guerrillas, the cristeros, waged an insurgency against the central government. With the victory of the state, the Mexican Church definitively lost the political power that it had enjoyed in colonial times and the early postcolonial period. Elsewhere in the region, the Church and indigenous peoples made accommodations of belief and practice along the same lines as in Mexico. In Brazil, Cuba, and the French colony, Saint Domingue, that became Haiti, the religions of Africa that slaves brought with them also melded with Catholicism, but not completely. Slaves’ descendants kept more of the mother continent’s beliefs and practices. As a result, throughout the Afro-Americas, the African religions and Catholicism exist side-by-side, often drawing on the same pool of worshipers rather than having achieved a complete synthesis. In the 1960s, one wing of the Church emerged as a major political force. As challenges to governments and ruling classes gathered strength throughout the region, some priests and bishops aligned themselves explicitly with those demanding radical change. Colombia’s Cuban-inspired National Liberation Army (Ej´ercito de Liberaci´on Nacional—ELN) included two priests in its ranks in the 1960s, one of whom rose to command the organization until his death in 1998. Both guerrilla priests drew their initial sympathy for armed conflict from the “Liberation Theology” movement. But most adherents of this influential school of Catholicism rejected violence and Marxism-Leninism. At its simplest, Liberation Theology holds that the Church must side with the impoverished masses to the point of fighting for social justice. This means discarding charity alone as a way to help poor people. Charity, the liberationists hold, effectively maintains injustice because it seeks to alleviate immediate problems without attacking deeper conditions. Liberation theologians distilled and summarized their conclusions at a bishops’ conference in Medell´ın, Colombia, in 1968. The “institutionalized violence” of the class hierarchy, they declared, grew out of a contemporary colonial system that, “seeking unbounded profits, foment[s] an economic dictatorship and the international imperialism of money.”10 Post–World War II France had seen a similar movement. There, “worker priests” doffed their clerical garb, took jobs in factories, and joined unions, all in an effort to show workers that the Church was on their side. The Vatican shut the movement down in 1954, though it was later allowed to start again. Liberation Theology too soon found itself in trouble with the hierarchy, especially in the Vatican. Before ascending to the papacy, Pope John Paul II had shown some sympathy for the “worker priests.” But with the Latin American political environment of the 1980s polarized between left and right, there was no question which side of the divide the Liberationists 10 Quoted in Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America—the Catholic Church in Conflict with U.S. Policy (New York: Penguin, 1991), 38.

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INTRODUCTION

occupied. The Polish pope, a survivor of a totalitarian system that cloaked oppression with some of the same vocabulary the Liberationists employed, disciplined some of its leading exponents, forcing at least one of them from the Church. Sympathies for Cuba by some Liberation Theology priests was also a red line for the pope, given Castro’s alliance with the Soviet Union, oppressor of the Pope’s native Poland and the rest of Eastern and Central Europe. (Fr. Alberto Libˆanio Christo, “Frei Betto,” conducted long, sympathetic interviews with Castro that became a book in which the Cuban comandante expressed sympathy for Liberation Theology.) Some Latin American churchmen with sympathies for the movement came into conflict with their fellows over allegiance to the Cuban-inspired revolutionary model. During the Sandinista period in Nicaragua, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, archbishop of Managua, made a transition from supporter of the Sandinista insurrection to prominent opponent of the revolutionary government, a government that included four Liberation Theology–identified priests in senior positions, three of them cabinet ministers. Elsewhere in Central America, priests and nuns played major roles as human rights defenders against military counterinsurgency campaigns. In fact, much of the peasant organizing in El Salvador that large landowners and the military viewed as a gestating communist revolution began in “base communities,” prayer and study groups led by Liberation Theology priests or lay workers with liberationist training. Archbishop Oscar Romero (1917–1980) of San Salvador was assassinated as a result of his human rights advocacy; other priests in El Salvador and Guatemala met the same fate. Yet in the most dramatic illustration possible that the Church was not of one mind on sociopolitical issues, an Argentine ex-priest was convicted in 2007 of participation in seven murders, 42 kidnappings, and 31 cases of torture while serving as police chaplain during the military dictatorship of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In Haiti, a Liberation Theology priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, reached his nation’s highest office. But he resigned from the priesthood in 1994, under what he called pressure from the church hierarchy. Liberation Theology may have divided the Church against itself. But in the years since the insurgencies and counterinsurgencies of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s wound down (except in Colombia), another challenge has come to face the Church as a whole. Protestantism, specifically Pentecostalism, has made a place for itself in the Latin American religious landscape. The challenge to Catholicism arose rapidly. Despite that dramatic entrance, after more than four centuries of Catholic dominance, the chances of converting an entire country verge on nil. Since the Reformation era in Europe, times have changed sufficiently that, in the only country in which a head of government openly espoused Pentecostalism (Guatemala), his religious affiliation did not force a national religious conversion. Even so, Pentecostals now account for 75 million people in the region, about 13 percent of the total population. In a region that was close to 100 percent Roman Catholic as recently as

50 years ago, the Protestant Pentecostal surge draws on a powerful social current. Along with Guatemala, the countries where the trend has registered with greatest force are Brazil, Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. All are nations that have suffered grievously from civil conflict and class divisions. Yet other countries about which the same could be said—Bolivia, for example, or Honduras—have seen Pentecostalism gain far less ground. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life notes that Pentecostalism is also growing in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru. In most of these countries, members of Indian communities have made up major portions of the Protestant churches’ flocks.11 Questions over national receptivity aside, there is little question of Pentecostalism’s appeal on a personal level. Much credit goes to its insistence on personal discipline, a message that resounds among many poor and lower-middle-class households. Giving up drinking and smoking, remaining faithful to one’s partner—these are among the basic requirements of Pentecostal churches. Catholicism, perhaps because of its history of adapting itself to local custom, is seen as demanding less of its believers in their daily lives. But how many nominal Roman Catholics can be counted as believers? Notwithstanding the Church’s historical position and Catholicism’s cultural roots, millions of Latin Americans have little connection to the institutional Church. Edward L. Cleary, O.P., a political scientist and a Dominican priest with missionary experience in Latin America, writes that “the major sector of Catholicism affected by this shift has been that of nominal, indifferent Catholics, who have supplied most of the converts to Pentecostalism.”12 Cleary may not be an entirely disinterested observer. Nevertheless, the erosion of the institutional Catholic Church is plain to see in Latin America. To the extent that millions of people feel the need for an organized spiritual presence in their lives, the Pentecostals have been knocking on an open door.

Politics, Intellectuals, and the Media Spanish has no word for “accountability.” That facet of the major language of the Americas has become a truism of Latin American politics. But long before anyone commented on the monarchist strain still running through Spanish political vocabulary, Latin Americans knew that the inner workings of their governments, in nearly all countries, were closed to them. Throughout the region, newspaper reporting was a lowprestige, low-paid occupation. Reporters, often corrupt by 11 Figures cited from Overview Pentacostalism in Latin America, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, October 2006, http://pewforum.org/surveys/pentecostal/latinamerica (accessed December 1, 2007). 12 See Edward L. Cleary O.P., “Shopping Around: Questions about Latin American Conversion,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research, University of Texas, Religion in Latin America, http://www.providence.edu/las/Brookings.html (accessed December 1, 2007).

INTRODUCTION

sheer necessity, covered daily events, while intellectuals—who often had more freedom of maneuver—wrote analyses and commentaries. Traditionally, members of the educated classes tried to fill the vacuum with political journalism, essays, novels, and other works of art. One example among many: Mario Vargas Llosa’s Conversation in the Cathedral (1969) reveals more about the operation of Peru’s authoritarian military regime of the 1950s than newspapers of the time could publish, or than politicians could say publicly. Colombian Nobel Prize winner Gabriel Garc´ıa M´arquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude (1967) has become a common point of reference throughout the Americas for surrealism in all dimensions of life, including politics. Arguably, the book tells more about the interplay of personal honor, family ties, and the remoteness of central government than Garc´ıa M´arquez’s own political journalism, the field in which he began in the late 1940s as an editorial writer and reporter in Colombia’s Caribbean coastal region. Today’s journalists operate largely free of the state control, spoken or unspoken, that stunted the careers of so many of their professional ancestors. The legacy of journalism as instrument of big political and economic interests runs strong. Still, readers in nearly all the big cities of the region can find newspapers and magazines that have managed to carve out a space for independent and critical journalism. (Brazil, an exceptional case, has a stronger tradition of powerful but hard-hitting newspapers and magazines.) Disturbingly, censorship by government has been replaced in many countries by censorship by gangsters, especially in small towns and cities. In Colombia, traditionally one of the most perilous countries for journalists, the New York–based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that most journalists in the provinces had abandoned reporting on topics such as drug trafficking, paramilitary activities, and corruption. The dangers of pursuing such themes had become clear: The CPJ recorded 54 journalists killed in the period from 1986 to 2006, making it one of the four most dangerous countries in the world for reporters since the mid-1980s (the others are Iraq, Algeria, and the Balkans).13 In 2007, one Colombian journalist was killed, though the CPJ called the circumstances unclear. The government credited the virtual absence of assassinations to an official policy of providing armored cars, bulletproof vests, and bodyguards to threatened journalists. The CPJ countered that journalists’ self-censorship is another reason for the somewhat improved security climate.14 In any event, death threats against Colombian journalists continue. In 2007, three reporters were forced to flee Colombia because of death threats. In one case, the threats followed a 13 See “Special Report 2006” and “A New Front in Mexico,” November 7, 2007, Committee to Protect Journalists, http://cpj. org (accessed December 5, 2007). See also “Attacks on the Press in 2007—Americas,” 2008, http://cpj.org/attacks07/americas07/ col07.html (accessed March 8, 2008). 14 See “Attacks on the Press.”

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claim by President Uribe that one of the journalists had helped the ex-mistress of a slain druglord write a book that accused the president of ties to the late gangster. The journalist denied the allegation. Elsewhere, reporters have paid for their work with their lives. In 2007 alone, the committee records reporters (or, in one case, news employees) gunned down in Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay—a total of eight murders, in addition to the shooting and wounding of a Brazilian journalist and two nonfatal grenade attacks against a newspaper in the border state of Sonora, a drug syndicate center. Four of those killed were radio reporters, the backbone of journalism in smaller towns throughout Latin America. Independent journalists in Cuba face a different set of problems. Nongovernmental media don’t exist on the island, so independent journalists by definition file their reports abroad. With that practice, they have opened themselves to charges by the government that they are betraying their country. As of mid-2007, 24 Cuban journalists were imprisoned; 22 have been behind bars since a March 2003 crackdown. They were convicted of charges including acting against “the independence or territorial integrity of the state” and “the security of the state.”15 Though the written word hasn’t lost its power to provoke, the advent of private television stations throughout the region in the 1990s has shaken up the media industry. Tabloid-style news shows have proved especially popular. And secretly recorded videotape has emerged as a political weapon. The final collapse of the regime of Peruvian strongman Alberto Fujimori in 2000 began after a television station broadcasted tapes taken by his intelligence chief, showing him bribing politicians and two TV station owners on the regime’s behalf. In Mexico, two close associates of the populist Mexico City mayor were shown, respectively, gambling big money in Las Vegas and taking a bribe from a businessman. Another indicator of the decline of writing is that artists who want to shine a light on their societies are turning to film and video rather than the novel. Mexican filmmaker Daniel Sarinana takes up that very theme in a popular 1999 movie, Todo el Poder (All the Power), that shows a moviemaker turning his camera on crime bosses, at a time when rampant lawlessness had Mexicans terrified. More recently, a Brazilian filmmaker lit a firestorm of controversy in 2007 with a film, Elite Squad, on the activities of an antigang police unit that runs rampant through slum areas, torturing and killing. The film has opened a debate on the morality and efficacy of these tactics. Though the film, strictly speaking, is fictional, the unit exists; the co-screenwriter is a former member of the squad. A pioneer of the new wave of film and video social realism, Venezuelan novelist and newspaper columnist Ibsen Mart´ınez used a classic Latin American melodramatic vehicle, 15 See “Cuban Journalist Released after 15 Months in Prison,” August 21, 2007; “Cuba’s Draconian Laws,” Committee to Protect Journalists, http://cpj.org (accessed December 5, 2007).

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INTRODUCTION

the telenovela (soap opera), to attack the corruption and dishonesty of the political and economic system in the 1990s, which came to a head under President Carlos Andr´es P´erez. Por estas calles (On These Streets) became a big hit and helped rouse the civic consciousness that gave the former golpista Hugo Ch´avez his first electoral victory in 1998. “In that telenovela all the politicians were cynical, all the businessmen were for the ‘small state’ and for that reason kept corrupt officials on the payroll, and all violations of law by the down-and-out poor were justified,” Mart´ınez wrote in a recent semiconfessional essay that also shows how small the world is for Latin American intellectuals. “During the week, as scriptwriter for Por estas calles I played the part of street agitator. On Sundays, in my Sunday column in El Nacional, I quoted Alain Touraine or Pierre Bourdieu* while obnoxiously attacking the performance of P´erez’ economic cabinet members, many of them friends of mine. Being a ‘public intellectual’ in Venezuela was never as easy as it was in the ’90s.”16 Martinez, who more recently has become an ardent critic of Ch´avez, has never traded pen for government position. And in turning a critical eye on himself and his brethren, he is breaking with the custom of political intellectuals worldwide. (“The belief in the independence of intellectuals, as so much of the twentieth century proves, is nothing but a fairy tale,” writes Charles Simic, poet laureate of the United States.17 ) Latin American intellectuals, more than their counterparts elsewhere, enjoy a long tradition of serving in senior government positions. Francisco Santos, former editor of El Tiempo, Colombia’s major daily, and an ex-journalist for the leading Spanish newspaper, El Paıs, is vice president of Colombia. Jorge G. Casta˜neda, who was Mexico’s foreign minister in 2000–2003, has been otherwise engaged, more or less simultaneously, as a university professor, political activist, journalist, and author. Mario Vargas Llosa, one of a handful of Latin American novelists who has reached global literary stardom, ran for president of Peru in 1990 but lost. Teodoro Petkoff, a Venezuelan economics student-turned-guerrilla in the 1960s, then planning minister in the mid-1990s, edits Tal Cual, a newspaper that is a major voice of opposition to Ch´avez. History offers even more examples. Octavio Paz (1914– 1988), a poet and essayist who was one of the region’s Nobel laureates, was a career Mexican diplomat (he resigned in protest of a massacre of students in 1968). Mexican novelist Carlos Fuentes, an ambassador’s son, entered the diplomatic corps for a time in the 1970s. Pablo Neruda (1904–1973), another Nobel Prize–winning poet, was a member of the Chilean foreign service in the 1930s and 1940s. As a Communist Party ∗ French

sociologists and social activists. Mart´ınez, “Una Conversaci´on con Mois´es Na´ım,” Letras Libres (November 2007), http://www.letraslibres. com/index. php?art = 12459. 17 Charles Simic, “The Renegade,” New York Review of Books, December 20, 2007, 70. 16 Ibsen

member, Neruda also provided diplomatic protection for the painter David Alfaro Siqueiros following his participation in the first, failed, assassination attempt against dissident Soviet exile Leon Trotsky (1879–1940), an operation mounted by the Soviet NKVD, predecessor to the KGB.18 In the Caribbean islands, whose smaller populations make multiple careers even more common, the leading figure of Trinidad and Tobago’s independence movement and its leading postindependence leader was Eric Williams (1911–1981), an Oxford-educated historian whose books include From Columbus to Castro The History of the Caribbean. In the Americas today, a professional historian such as Williams likely would not rise to the very top of a political system. Lower-ranking members of government may have backgrounds as intellectuals, but only full-time politicians become presidents. And full-time politicians don’t have the time, apparently, for scholarship.

Relations with the United States Part I Since the 19th century, no single nation has loomed larger for Western Hemisphere countries than the United States. Like neighbors of all large countries, the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have developed complicated relationships with the presence they can’t ignore. A sometimes brutal history, the long reach of U.S. economic power, and the magnetic quality of U.S. popular culture form contributing elements. Another influence has taken hold in recent years, as millions of people from the region have moved to or visited the United States. In the past, most Latin Americans depended on what they heard about the United States. Today, residents or visitors forming their own impressions of the United States come from every class, with ordinary working folk the majority, outnumbering the privileged who have long traveled back and forth between home and the United States. But even without the benefit of travel or modern mass media, politically aware Latin Americans realized by the time the 20th century dawned that the United States was the power with which they had to reckon. In 1900, Jos´e Enrique Rod´o, a Uruguayan writer, authored an impassioned essay that served for decades as a manifesto of Latin American values to be defended from the encroaching giant to the north. Rod´o warned Latin American youth against a United States he defined as boorish, purely utilitarian, and profit-driven. Latin American civilization, by contrast, embodied a respect for art and culture inherited from Greece and Rome. “The North American has managed to acquire . . . the satisfaction and vanity of sumptuary magnificence, but has not succeeded in acquiring the chosen mark of good taste,” Rod´o 18 John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 277.

INTRODUCTION

wrote in Ariel (1900). “The ideal of beauty doesn’t strike passion in the heart of the descendant of the austere puritans. Nor does the ideal of truth.” The essay struck a chord throughout the entire Spanish-speaking world. But beginning in the 1930s, and in far greater numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, Latin Americans preoccupied with U.S. power turned from esthetics to class struggle. Marxism, with its hardheaded focus on material conditions and social justice, came closer, paradoxically, to the “North American” spirit that Rod´o found so crass. U.S. activities in a nearby area of the hemisphere during the first three decades of the 20th century did their part to inspire a tough-minded view of regional geopolitics. Panama, site of the United States-built-and-owned Atlantic-Pacific canal, became a de facto U.S. possession. Military occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic followed, as well as repeated military interventions in Nicaragua. The latter saw U.S. creation of a military force which, in 1934, murdered a popular left-wing nationalist guerrilla, Augusto Sandino. Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) opened a new chapter in hemispheric relations in 1934 with his “good neighbor” policy. Its accomplishments included a refusal to retaliate against Mexico for a 1938 nationalization of the oil industry that shut down operations of U.S. oil companies. For all of the benign aura with which Roosevelt surrounded his moves, he was a highly practical politician who was building goodwill among U.S. neighbors in anticipation of a war against distant powers. His strategic vision is summed up in a remark he is said to have made about the U.S.-sponsored dictator of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza: “He’s a sonofabitch, but he’s our sonofabitch.” The line, a version of which was first reported in 1939, most likely is apocryphal. However, some historians view it as an accurate summation of the American foreign policy establishment’s unsentimental view of foreign relations in general and Latin American affairs in particular.19 Whoever coined the remark, it anticipated Cold War attitudes. An event that occurred during the same period helped set the stage for the long United States–Soviet Union standoff: the assassination in Mexico of Trotsky, the exiled revolutionary who had become Stalin’s major enemy on the left. Trotsky had been welcomed to Mexico by President C´ardenas, but Mexican sanctuary couldn’t protect Trotsky from Stalin’s campaign to exterminate his left-wing opponents. Those who did survive were among the leading opponents of Stalin’s eventual takeover of Eastern and Central Europe, so Stalin’s strategy reflected a long-range strategy that anticipated the Cold War. Cuba became a major front in that conflict. The Cuban writer Guillermo Cabrera Infante (1929–2005), who defected from the Cuban foreign service in 1965, told this writer in 1994 that the earliest visible sign of the Soviet hand in the Cuban government was the sudden disappearance of books by and about Trotsky from Cuban bookstores. Another Cuban tie to the Trotsky assassination led to the assassin himself. Ram´on 19 William Safire traced the first reporting of the alleged remark to Time Magazine. See William Safire, “On Language: Realism,” New York Times, Sunday Magazine, December 24, 2006, 20.

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Mercader, a Spaniard partly of Cuban descent, spent his final years on the island as an honored retiree.20

Part II After World War II, with the United States and the Soviet Union locked in confrontation, Roosevelt’s successors mixed his kid-glove approach with a strong dose of raw power. Throughout the Cold War, with some exceptions, U.S. administrations of both parties supported military or militarybacked strongmen. They were virtually the only brand of politician whom Washington trusted to maintain a consistently pro-American and anti-Soviet stance. That strategy was first deployed in Guatemala. There, in 1954, the CIA overthrew an elected government on the grounds that its left-wing orientation posed a political threat to the region and an economic threat to U.S. business interests. Most important among the latter was the United Fruit Co., whose board had included CIA chief Allen Dulles. The former law firm of his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, also had represented the company in Guatemala. In place of the elected government, the CIA installed a military regime. Guatemala wouldn’t see another freely elected government until 1986. The Guatemala coup inflated U.S. confidence to the point that officials believed in their ability to shape events in Latin America at will. But the coup was followed only five years later by the Cuban revolution. The triumph of Fidel Castro and his guerrilla army in 1959 set off a chain of events that tested American officials’ belief in their omnipotence. The series of defeats that the Cuban revolutionary regime and its Soviet ally inflicted on the United States proved decisive for American policy in the region until the Cold War ended. The outcome of the Cuban revolution fulfilled American leaders’ worst expectations for political movements that promised social and economic equality. As Cuban dictator Fidel Castro consolidated his rule, he took on the role of worldclass challenger to the United States. He supplied training and other aid to Marxist guerrilla armies in the region, while denouncing the United States as the imperialist power behind oligarchic regimes. Castro’s defiance of the United States accounted for much of his appeal. Only 33 years old at his moment of victory, and surrounded by even younger comrades, he and his fellow revolucionarios—above all the Argentine Ernesto “Che” Guevara—captured the hearts and minds of young people across the region. All of that would have been dangerous enough, from the U.S. point of view. But Castro also brought to life the nightmare vision of the U.S. foreign policy establishment: Soviet expansion on America’s doorstep. Initially, the Cuban revolution prompted the John F. Kennedy administration to reexamine the U.S. role in a region characterized by social and economic injustice. In 1961 Kennedy launched the “Alliance for Progress” with the aim of 20 Mercader’s story is told in great detail in Asaltar los Cielos, a 1996 Spanish documentary. See IMDb, Internet Movie Database, www.imdb. com/title/tt0115575.

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INTRODUCTION

promoting non-Communist reform governments. The initiative could claim modest success in its early years, but old ways soon returned. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, sent U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to prevent restoration of an illegally deposed left-of-center president. By the end of the 1960s, a wave of military governments had seized power in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, with U.S. backing or implicit approval. Seemingly paradoxically, in 1961 the CIA had plotted the assassination of the brutish right-wing dictator, Rafael Trujillo, who then ruled the Dominican Republic (and who was, in fact, assassinated). During the same period, writes New York Times correspondent Tim Weiner in a history of the CIA, the spy agency and the White House discussed sponsoring the overthrow and killing of the equally malign dictator Fran¸cois (“Papa Doc”) Duvalier of Haiti.21 For the most part, though, the United States during the Cold War used its clout on behalf of right-wing political forces. Most notoriously, the Nixon administration put the CIA to work to block the election of socialist Salvador Allende as president of Chile. After he won, the CIA promoted the idea of a military overthrow. Ironically, U.S. intelligence and Allende’s many enemies in the military and business establishment got unintended help from the Castro-allied Chilean left, who urged Allende to intensify the class struggle and to arm the masses to fight off any attempted seizure of power. But the right-wing military brass deposed Allende in a bloody coup on September 11, 1973. Whether the United States directly participated, those who mounted the coup knew that the United States would welcome their move, which proved to be the case. Gen. Augusto Pinochet, who headed the military junta, ruled Chile until 1988. In that year, he lost a plebiscite that he had called. The 1977–1981 Jimmy Carter administration, with its new insistence on human rights observance, made a modest difference in U.S. policy toward a brutal military regime in Argentina, then in the midst of a “dirty war” against the left. Carter had a stronger effect in Guatemala, working with Congress to declare an arms embargo against a government whose counterinsurgency war against leftist guerrillas was turning its country into a slaughterhouse. President Ronald Reagan, upon taking office in 1981, reversed Carter’s course in Guatemala, among other countries. Nonetheless, Carter’s administration left a lasting impression in Latin America, persuading many that American power could be redirected from automatic support for military rulers. Reagan poured American aid into El Salvador, where an elected civilian government fought a well-organized Marxist guerrilla army. The guerrillas enjoyed close coordination between their military and political wings. But on the government side, civilians had little control over the U.S.-backed military, which was closely linked to death squads that murdered thousands of alleged guerrilla sympathizers. During 1980s, the Reagan administration also funneled weapons and other assis21 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 190.

tance to Nicaraguan guerrillas, known as the contras, who were trying to topple the Sandinista government. Both the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan wars grew out of longstanding internal conflicts and tensions. At the same time, the conflicts were proxy confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Reagan and his CIA chief, William Casey, saw it as their mission to help America’s friends fight America’s enemies. Indeed, while the United States was sending arms and advisers to Central America, the CIA was aiding Afghan rebels fight Soviet invaders in Afghanistan. The Afghan aid campaign enjoyed widespread political support in the United States. Not so for the U.S. role in Central America, especially the Contra war. Aid to the Nicaraguan rebels defied an explicit congressional prohibition. Top administration officials’ contempt for that law led to the “Iran-Contra” scandal, which involved selling arms to Iran—also prohibited—and using the profit to buy supplies for the Nicaraguan rebels. After the scheme came to light, the spectacle of senior administration officials being hauled before judges and congressional committees electrified spectators in Latin America. Critics of the United States had viewed its government as monolithic. The Reagan administration’s invasion of Grenada, and the invasion of Panama by Reagan’s successor, George H. W. Bush, demonstrated, however, that the era of U.S. military intervention in the region had not ended. Yet, the 1989 Panama intervention, aimed at toppling strongman Manuel Noriega and arresting him for drug trafficking, came as the Soviet empire was in the process of disintegrating. With its dissolution, the Cold War came to an end.

Part III Once the USSR collapsed, the classic justification for supporting autocrats in the Americas disappeared. Indeed, at roughly the same time as the Soviet Union was fading away, military rule in Chile ended as the result of a national plebiscite. Brazilian military rulers had anticipated the Chileans by relinquishing power in 1985. And voters in Nicaragua stunned the Sandinista government—and its leftist supporters worldwide— by voting in 1989 for a U.S.-supported politician as president. Peace accords in El Salvador and Guatemala followed. Echoing these political developments, governments almost everywhere in the region made a break from the statist economic policies that had marked virtually their entire histories, both in colonial and postcolonial times. Several trends converged to swing the biggest countries in the region toward U.S.style capitalism, the system that outlasted the Soviet Union. The Latin American dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, whether of rightist (Argentina, for example) or of rhetorically leftist (Mexico) stripe, looked increasingly incapable of managing national economies. That reality was clear to ordinary citizens of the Americas who had to cope, for instance, with state-owned telephone companies that took months to install phone lines.

INTRODUCTION

Under presidents such as Carlos Sa´ul Menem of Argentina and Gonzalo (“Goni”) S´anchez de Lozada of Bolivia, Latin America in the 1990s became the world leader in privatization, accounting for 55 percent of developing countries’ revenues from sales of government-owned businesses worldwide during that decade.22 Meanwhile, protectionism, another longstanding feature of Latin American statism, was colliding with growing consumer demand for higher-quality products made abroad—demand that couldn’t be satisfied by the region’s smugglers, ranging from airline crews bringing in items for friends or acquaintances to gangs of professional contrabandistas. Mexico, which had begun privatizing hundreds of notoriously inefficient state enterprises in the 1980s, took the most dramatic step toward opening its economy by approving the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a treaty between the three countries of North America. NAFTA took effect in 1994 following U.S. ratification. The trade deal threw open Mexico’s long-closed economy to a wave of U.S. imports. The Mexican “party-state,” the PRI, had thrown its weight behind NAFTA. But the sudden influx of U.S. companies, accompanied by a wave of privatizations of Mexican companies, eroded the party’s control of Mexico’s economy. Those economic developments hastened the collapse in 2000 of the political monopoly the PRI had enjoyed since 1929 as a result of its uninterrupted control of the presidency. The entire chain of events illustrated a paradoxical quality of relations with the United States. The PRI’s critics on the left tended to oppose NAFTA as a vehicle for putting Mexico at the service of American corporations, yet the trade agreement also helped topple the PRI. The U.S. foreign policy establishment, which had enjoyed a long relationship with the PRI, greeted its dethroning in 2000 as part of the worldwide spread of democracy and free-market capitalism. But, elsewhere in the Americas, the sudden shock of major economic policy shifts proved to be more politically volatile than supporters of the privatization and free-trade wave had anticipated. Evidence that newly privatized firms proved more efficient and profitable than they’d been in government hands did little to comfort thousands of workers who lost jobs in the process. The median privatized firm in the region fired 24 percent of its employees.23 In addition, the privatization process in some countries showed little sign of the “transparency” that officials of the United States and international organizations were preaching as a democratic free-market virtue. In Mexico, under the PRI (whose U.S.-trained technocratic wing began the privatization process in the 1980s) the sale in the early 1990s of 18 22 Alberto Chong and Florencio L´ opez de Silanes, “The Truth about Privatization in Latin America,” Inter-American Development Bank, October 2003, 8, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/ getdocument.aspx?docnum=771361 (accessed February 24, 2008). 23 Chong and L´ opez de Silanes, 15.

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banks for $12 billion to businesspeople who included cronies of high-level politicians helped fuel a financial crisis in 1994. In its wake, the government renationalized 12 banks—part of a bailout that came with a price tag of $62 billion. “Mexicans, does it seem right to you that the profits go, once again, to the few,” Andr´es Manuel L´opez Obrador, then president of the leftwing Partido de la Revolucion Democratica, said in 1998, “while the losses go, once again to the majority?”24 L´opez Obrador was part of a wave of Latin American politicians and activists who condemned the onset of “neoliberalism”— “liberal” in the European sense of open markets. In the Americas and Europe, critics of the process tended to use that term, while advocates of privatization and related measures typically favored the term “free markets.” Beneath these terminology differences lay a reality in which countries characterized by deeply rooted socioeconomic inequality arguably proved a poor environment for economic shock treatment. “Neoliberal reform takes no prisoners,” Jerry Haar, director of the Inter-American Business and Labor program at the University of Miami, told the New York Times in 1999, “and a lot of these governments have failed to provide a safety net or focus on the tax and regulatory policies necessary to make free market development work and target allocations to those in need.”25 By then, the political ripple effects were already evident with the election of Ch´avez in Venezuela. In 2002, the Latinobarometro annual survey of 17 Latin American countries reported that 68 percent of respondents found that privatization hadn’t benefited their countries.26 Over the next few years, as left-populist leaders such as Ch´avez, or social democrats in the Lula da Silva mode, rose to the presidencies of their countries, privatizations ground to a halt. Ch´avez, in fact, reversed the trend, nationalizing the country’s major electric utility as well as two oil-exploration projects owned by ExxonMobil. The United States hadn’t created the neo-capitalist trend, but U.S. officials lost no opportunities to promote and praise it. President Bill Clinton, who pushed hard for U.S. ratification of NAFTA, had described it as a template for a hemispheric trade deal, the “Free Trade Area of the Americas.” He chaired a 1994 summit meeting in Miami of political and business leaders from the Americas intended to launch a campaign for the proposed pact. “Future generations will look back on the

24 Quoted in Julia Preston and Samuel Dillon, Opening Mexico The Making of a Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 366–367. 25 Quoted in Larry Rohter, “After a Hard Year, Latin America Looks for Better Times,” New York Times, December 20, 1999, C26. 26 Cited in Jorge Carrera et al., “Privatization Discontent and Its Determinants: Evidence from Latin America,” University of La Plata (Argentina) and University of Milan (Italy), March 2005, 38, www.iadb.org/res/includes/pub hits.cfm?pub id=S500&pub file name=pubS-500.pdf (accessed February 24, 2008).

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INTRODUCTION

Miami summit as a moment when the course of history in the Americas changed for the better,” Clinton said.27 More than a decade later, prospects for the hemispheric pact are dim. And the disenchantment with, at least, the most extreme or corrupt versions of the free-market package revived skepticism and animosity toward the United States. Yet attempts to establish a radical alternative to the neoliberal model have been foundering. In Venezuela, milk and other basic foods have become unavailable while whiskey and other luxury goods abound. These results of price controls on staples help explain the defeat of Ch´avez’s proposed constitutional changes in 2007. “Official statistics show no signs of a substantial improvement in the well-being of ordinary Venezuelans, and in many cases there have been worrying deteriorations,” Francisco Rodr´ıguez, chief economist of the Venezuelan National Assembly (the country’s congress) in 2000–2004, wrote in an article published in early 2008. “The percentage of underweight babies, for example, increased from 8.4 percent to 9.1 percent between 1999 and 2006. During the same period, the percentage of households without access to running water rose from 7.2 percent to 9.4 percent, and the percentage of families living in dwellings with earthen floors multiplied almost threefold, from 2.5 percent to 6.8 percent.”28 Politically, Ch´avez’s anti-Americanism remains undimmed. But its use as a mobilizing doctrine, given the failing results of the president’s economic moves, may have its limits. Never invaded by the United States, Venezuela has never been a hotbed of opposition to the nearby superpower. Colombia provides another example of the variances in U.S. relations in the region. Most people in the region view American military might through the prism of colonial histories that inspire distrust for imperial armies. Yet a majority of Colom´ bians support a president, Alvaro Uribe, who makes his military relationship with the United States a cornerstone of his administration, as did Uribe’s predecessor. The United States is helping Colombia wage a counterinsurgency war against guerrilla armies who have been trying to topple the Colombian state since the 1960s. The guerrillas’ deep involvement in the drug trade, and their reliance on kidnapping as a fund-raising and terrorism tool, have earned them the revulsion of most Colombians. (So much so that Uribe has even been able to make a disarmament deal with antiguerrilla paramilitaries on favorable terms to them, without paying a high political cost. U.S. law enforcement and military aid to Colombia predates Uribe by decades. The assistance grows out of the “war on drugs” (a phrase first used by President Richard M. Nixon in 1971). Other countries that have received aid, sometimes in the

form of Drug Enforcement Administration agents and military trainers, include Peru, Bolivia, Haiti, and Mexico. Many commentators have likened the antidrug offensive to the Cold War. But differences outnumber similarities. Communism was seen as a threat largely because it could win the hearts and minds of people on America’s doorstep. To be sure, drug consumption has grown steadily in Latin America as well, one reason that Colombians aren’t alone in supporting some form of antidrug aid. Mexico, which is seeing horrific violence by narcotraficantes in its northern border region, has been more concerned to avoid the presence of armed Americans on Mexico soil. Some Mexicans also fear that a built-up anti–drug force could ride roughshod over human rights. Human rights activists have concluded, however, that their concerns aren’t shared by President Felipe Calder´on’s administration.

Immigration has drawn the Americas closer together socially and economically more than any policy, trend, or event ever did. The United States is home to more than 19 million people born in Latin America and the Caribbean (according to 2005 data, the most recent available).29 People born in Mexico make up the single biggest group of immigrants to the United States from the Americas, and of the entire U.S. foreign-born population. Natives of Latin America and the Caribbean region working in the United States sent a total of $45 billion to their families back home in 2006, the Inter-American Development Bank estimates (counting the contributions of those working elsewhere, remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean reached an estimated $62 billion).30 This spontaneous familyassistance program exceeds what the region receives in foreign direct investment and foreign aid combined. Naturally, Mexico is by far the biggest beneficiary ($23 billion in 2006), but every single country in Latin America and the Caribbean receives remittances that are counted in the millions of dollars. The enormity of the migration flow to the United States and, increasingly, to Canada marks a widely shared failure to provide jobs and possibilities for social advancement for those born in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. In Mexico, that failure, and the role that NAFTA may have played in encouraging Mexican workers to migrate, became major issues in the 2005 presidential campaign. As the candidates fought for power, 14 percent of the Mexican workforce was employed in the United States, according to calculations by the

27 Quoted in Tracy Wilkinson and William R. Long, “Americas Summit Ends; Clinton Hails ‘Watershed,’” Los Angeles Times, December 12, 1994, A1. 28 Francisco Rodr´ıguez, “An Empty Revolution: The Unfulfilled Promises of Hugo Ch´avez,” Foreign Affairs (March–April 2008), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87205-p0/ francisco-rodriguez/an-empty-revolution.html (accessed March 9, 2008).

29 “Foreign Born by Region of Birth: 2000 and 2005,” Pew Hispanic Center, http://pewhispanic.org/files/other/foreignborn/ Table-2.pdf (accessed December 3, 2007). 30 See “The Largest Remittances Market,” Inter-American Development Bank, March 28, 2007, http://www.iadb.org/research/ homepageDetails.cfm?language=English&conid=61&page=1& frame=1 (accessed December 6, 2007).

Migration

INTRODUCTION

nonpartisan Migration Policy Institute, a Washington thinktank.31 American candidates in the primary elections for the 2008 U.S. presidential race have followed the example of their Mexican counterparts by making immigration a major issue. Notably, politicians campaigning for the Republican presidential nomination decried the presence of millions of Latin Americans with no authorization to be in the country. The sound and fury marked a change in treatment of immigration, specifically Latin American immigration, by national politicians, including the patron saint of modern Republicanism, Ronald W. Reagan. In 1986, Reagan signed an immigration law overhaul that granted an opportunity for legal status to millions of immigrants who were in the country illegally. When that law was found to have made no provision for people from El Salvador who had fled civil war to settle in the United States, Reagan issued an order that these migrants not be deported. He acted on a plea by President Jos´e Napole´on Duarte (1926–1990) of El Salvador to grant temporary legal status to his countrymen. Duarte pointed out that El Salvador couldn’t accommodate an influx of citizens newly deported from the United States. Reagan formally rejected Duarte’s petition, but the U.S. president added, “There will be no large-scale deportations.”32 Some of today’s Republican politicians might call that presidential vow an amnesty. Duarte had told Reagan that 400,000 to 600,000 refugees, about 10 percent of El Salvador’s population, sent family members back home as much as $600 million a year. By 2005, the number of Salvadoran nationals in the United States had grown to nearly 1 million. Thanks in part to Reagan’s refusal to deport Salvadorans, total remittances to El Salvador from immigrants abroad reached $3.3 billion in 2006. Meanwhile, two decades of booming migration to the United States have forced a consensus throughout the region that no country would be capable of taking back all those who have left. A related observation that became commonplace throughout the region is that migration serves as a safety valve for social and political discontent, as well as a relief mechanism for economic stress.

Race and Class The interplay between race and class that marks U.S. society has counterparts throughout the hemisphere. Broadly speaking, “whiter” or “European” features tend to be more favored over those that show “Indian” or “African” descent. The rise of populist movements in much of the region represents a rebellion against social barriers usually expressed in racial or ethnic terms. 31 See “What Kind of Work Do Immigrants Do?” Migration Policy Institute, January 2004, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ pubs/five industry occupation foreign born.pdf. 32 Quoted in Robert Pear, “Reagan Rejects Salvadoran Plea on Illegal Aliens,” New York Times, May 15, 1987, A1.

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Class distinctions that take racial form appear even in countries that might seem, to outsiders, not to present an opportunity for color prejudice to arise. In Haiti, where the Creole word blan, which literally means “white,” signifies “foreigner,” because virtually the entire nation is black, gradations of skin tone have played a key role. The so-called mulatto elite dominated the country for much of its post-1804 independent existence (a division explicitly reinforced in the early 20th century by U.S. military occupiers). Language also works to some extent as a class signifier: All Haitians speak Krey`ol but the poorest speak nothing else. People with at least some education also speak French. The culture of the neighboring Dominican Republic, whose majority population would qualify as black by U.S. standards, also shows a preference for lighter skin and a disdain for Haitians. Dictator Rafael Trujillo actively promoted hatred of Haitians. Even worse, he ordered a 1937 massacre of an estimated 20,000 Haitians in the Dominican border region. His proteg´e and eventual successor, Joaqu´ın Balaguer, dealt with one rival’s ambitions to unseat him by spreading the word that the candidate, who was dark black, was really Haitian. Mistreatment of Haitian migrant workers and refugees is a constant feature of Dominican political life. In one Caribbean country, Cuba, the reigning ideology is explicitly egalitarian. Nearly a half-century of Communist rule hasn’t sufficed, however, to dissolve a social system of racial preferences growing out of the colonial plantation economy. Even diehard loyalists concede that the shortage of AfroCubans at the upper levels of the system is not coincidental. The imbalance has become more striking as Cuba’s black and mixed-race share of the population has grown, because those who leave Cuba legally or illegally are disproportionately white. Another twist on the race/class dynamic comes in the eastern Caribbean region. There, the major social, political, and economic divide lies between African-descended and East Indian–descended populations. The twin-island country of Trinidad and Tobago and the nearby mainland nations of Guyana have all experienced political conflicts that reflect the ethnic split in populations. Racial expression of class differences is less pronounced elsewhere in the Caribbean, where the population tends to be homogeneously of African descent. In the continental Americas, the black-white dynamic so familiar in the United States plays out most notably in Brazil, whose large black and mixed-race population—estimates vary from 40 percent to half the population—enjoys little representation at the upper levels of politics, business, and the professions but are disproportionately found among Brazil’s poorest. Easygoing personal relations between Brazilians of all colors long camouflaged a connection between class and race, one that in recent years has become an open topic. In Colombia, Afro-Colombians concentrated in communities along the Pacific coast have long complained of discrimination, but at about 4 percent of the population lack the numbers to make their grievances a national political issue.

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INTRODUCTION

In the rest of the continental Americas, the major race/class gulf lies between Indian- and European-descended populations. The nuances of these divides can be confusing. Given centuries of mixed relations—mestizaje—millions of citizens who identify with their larger societies are physically indistinguishable from members of indigenous communities, making cultural self-identification the criterion. This mixed-heritage legacy serves to increase the social premium for “European” appearance. That is even more the case in Paraguay, the landlocked country bordering Brazil, Bolivia, and Argentina. There, in a country where an estimated 90 percent of the population speaks the indigenous language, Guaranı, the vast majority of the population is of mixed ancestry. Some 75 to 80 percent of Guaran´ı-speaking Paraguayans also speak Spanish. Despite the homogeneity, communities that identified completely with the indigenous culture suffered brutal repression during the 1970s, when right-wing ideology permeated the ruling classes of the entire region, especially southern South America. Argentina paid the heaviest price for the rightist orientation of its rulers during the military dictatorship of the 1970s and early 1980s. Perversely fitting for a country so self-consciously “European” in its culture, Argentina is the only nation to suffer from Europe’s most noxious export, anti-Semitism. Hatred of Jews played a role in the “dirty war” of the 1970s and early 1980s, reflecting the Argentine security establishment’s embrace of the Old World notion that Communism and Judaism amounted to the same thing. In three Andean countries, the late 20th and early 21st centuries have been marked by assertions of political power by Indian majorities. In two of those countries, Peru and Bolivia, presidents who claimed their Indian roots as a point of pride were inaugurated in 2001 and 2006, respectively, for the first time since independence. And in Ecuador, the newly mobilized Indian population has become the key actor in the country’s political life. Social discrimination continues in those countries, however. That is the case in Guatemala as well, where the wounds of a civil war marked by guerrillas’ attempted mobilization of indigenous communities, who were then massacred by the military, still run deep. Mexico’s upper-level political and business class tends toward more European features than the country at large. Yet Mexico’s race-class dynamic varies from that of other countries where large Indian populations survived the conquest. Mexico’s independence war against the Spanish was fought largely by Indians under the banner of the Virgin of Guadalupe. And while Peru and Bolivia didn’t elect Indian-identified presidents until the early 21st century, one of Mexico’s most revered presidents, Benito Ju´arez, a Zapotec Indian from the state of Oaxaca, first took office in 1858. Mexico’s 1910 revolution led to a new social code in which the nation’s mestizo heritage became part of official political culture. In recent years, still-unresolved political tensions in the heavily Indian states of Chiapas and Oaxaca evidence the Mexican system’s failure to fully carry out the revolution’s promises.

Indeed throughout the region, the persistence of links between race or ethnicity and class serves to illustrate the gulf between dreams of just social orders and the day-to-day realities that the vast majority of the region’s citizens face.

Introduction to South America Historical Background National revolutions throughout the South American continent had by 1830 created all of the countries that exist today. Not all of them were full-fledged countries, however, and some borders have changed considerably. Over the course of the 19th century, South America entered the world economy. But it did so as an exporter of commodities—Argentina’s wheat, for example, and Bolivia’s tin. As a result, the continent became dependent on up-anddown market cycles. Above all, South America was late to develop industries that matched those of Europe, depending instead on the Old World for imports of manufactured goods. Indeed, during the 19th and early 20th centuries, South America maintained closer economic and cultural links to Europe than to the United States. Edwin Williamson of the University of Edinburgh questions whether the continent’s countries could have taken any other path of development, given their relative lack of capital and the state of their educational systems. In any event, South America imported more than products. By the end of the 19th century, the old Catholic Church–dominated ideas were fading. “The educated classes were absorbing a truly secular, materialist culture,” Williamson writes in The Penguin History of Latin America (1992). Some of these imported ideas were welcomed because they validated the high opinion of themselves that the upper levels of society already possessed. “White” peoples were superior to all others, according to the Social Darwinist doctrine, which was running strong in Europe (as well as the United States). And, Williamson says, “Strong government, even dictatorship, was necessary to contain the forces of regression while material conditions could be transformed to pave the way for genuine liberal democracy.”33 The notion that naturally disordered societies need the firm hand of the State resonated on both the left and the right throughout the 20th century, playing naturally into the cultural affinity for caudillos. Right-wing parties and politicians were more frank in their allegiance to the doctrine of authoritarian leadership. Gen. Augusto Pinochet (1915–2006), one-time military dictator of Chile, was the last—at least for now—of the South American rightist advocates of the doctrine. As export-oriented development expanded from the late 19th century and into the early 20th, this economic activity took a form that did little to encourage indigenous capitalism. To a great extent, the resources being exported were in the 33 Edwin Williamson, The Penguin History of Latin America (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 283.

INTRODUCTION

hands of foreign companies. Argentina provided a dramatic example. British companies owned essentially the entire modern sector of the Argentine economy, including the railways and the meat-packing plants that supplied the export market. There and elsewhere, a near-absence of Argentine-owned industry gave potential businesses little in the way of economic environment in which they could pursue their goals. The native upper classes, meanwhile, saw no reason to do anything with their wealth but use it for pleasure rather than for investment at home. The resentment that this frivolousness created evolved into a steadily building social pressure for social justice. Doctrines that laid the intellectual foundations for alternative social orders began to develop, partly with the help of ideologies from Europe. As early as the 1920s, efforts began to adapt left-wing ideologies to the far different conditions of South America. Peruvian political activist and writer V´ıctor Ra´ul Haya de la Torre founded the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), which melded European socialdemocratic doctrine about state ownership of the economy with Latin American ideas about the need to end the oppression of the Indian masses. APRA, which explicitly refused to subordinate itself to Soviet Communism, made deep inroads in Peruvian politics. The party remains a force; President Al´an Garc´ıa is an aprista. At the same time as Haya de la Torre was formulating his ideas, another left-wing writer and activist, Jos´e Carlos Mari´ategui, was developing a harder-line version, which drew a direct link between socialism and Indian liberation. The latter goal would be accomplished largely by restoring Indian communal ownership of their ancestral lands. “Socialism preaches solidarity with and the redemption of the working classes,” he wrote in an essay cited by Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith in Modern Latin America (1989). “Four-fifths of Peru’s working classes consist of Andean Indians. Therefore, socialism means the redemption of these Indians.”34 Mari´ategui’s linkage can be seen, in debased form, in the doctrines of Sendero Luminoso, the guerrilla army behind an insurgency in Peru in the 1980s and early 1990s, which made a practice of assassinating opponents on the left and terrorizing Indian communities into cooperation. European fascism also appeared in early 20th-century South America. The ideology’s appeal was largely confined to two countries, but they were two of the most influential countries on the continent. In Brazil, the Estado Nˆovo regime of Get´ulio Vargas, which lasted from 1930 to 1945, embodied many of the doctrines put into practice by Benito Mussolini, including state control of the economy and a virtual absence of civil liberties. These features were moderated, at least in principle, by benefits for workers. A similar model was adopted in Argentina under Juan Domingo Per´on (1895–1974), an Army colonel whose regime ran from 1943 to 1955 and again in 1973–1974. Per´on’s personal magnetism—not to mention that of his second wife and political partner, Eva—and his atten34 Quoted in Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 202.

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tion to workers’ conditions gave him lasting influence. (Eva, despite her enormous charisma, was never president, though she and her husband were contemplating running for president and vice president, respectively, when she died in 1952 at the age of 33). But, like Vargas, his regime wasn’t as successful as Mussolini’s, or that of Spain’s Francisco Franco, in establishing full control over all institutions, notably, in Per´on’s case, the Roman Catholic Church. Per´on did, however, sympathize openly with the Axis powers during World War II. Resisting U.S. pressure to side with the Allies, Argentina stayed officially neutral during the war. Brazil’s Vargas proved much more flexible, going so far as to declare war on Germany and dispatching troops to fight on the Italian front in 1944.

From Coups to Courtrooms Golpes de estado—Spanish for coups d’etat—found a welcoming climate in South America. The continent didn’t invent them, but coups proved to be an efficient way of resolving power disputes in countries with poorly developed systems of political representation, when these existed at all. For a region that welcomed caudillos, coups replaced elections as a means of political succession. One of the world’s most coup-prone countries, in fact, lies in South America. Bolivia has suffered nearly 200 coups and countercoups, by the CIA’s count, since it gained independence in 1982. That number stands out, but the penchant for coups has plagued every single country on the continent, in most cases well into the final decades of the 20th century. In the 21st century’s first decade, the collective body politic may finally have built up resistance to coups. The strongest evidence is national courts’ willingness to hold ex-dictators accountable for their crimes. Gen. Pinochet, the Chilean dictator who had taken power in a 1973 coup, spent his last years fighting off prosecution (his surviving relatives were indicted in 2007 for looting state assets). Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, who had carried out a constitutional coup to remain in office, went on trial in Lima in late 2007 on charges of human rights abuse. Argentina has been trying officers—and a priest—accused of participating in the “dirty war” against alleged leftists. Nevertheless, the absence of coups doesn’t guarantee stability. Bolivia, again, stands as the clearest example. Specifically, the country traded coups for popular uprisings—at best a form of direct, if rough, democracy; at worst, mob rule. In 2003, mass demonstrations and street violence forced President Gonzalo (“Goni”) S´anchez de Lozada to flee the country. His vice president and successor, Carlos Mesa, resigned under popular pressure. Neighboring Ecuador has seen a similar succession of sudden presidential departures. The three presidents who preceded the present chief executive, Fernando Correa, who began his term in 2007, were forced from office. As for old-fashioned golpes, the most recent one attempted as of this writing came in 2002, when oppositionists allied with a military unit toppled President Ch´avez of Venezuela. The coup collapsed in less than two days, as those who had

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INTRODUCTION

mounted it fought among themselves. A loyalist army faction freed Ch´avez to return to the presidential palace. The golpistas had accused the president of harboring dictatorial ambitions, so they did their own cause little good by adopting the standard tactic of military strongmen. To be sure, Ch´avez himself had led a failed coup attempt in 1992 before embracing electoral democracy. Countries with little experience of coups would seem to be favored by fortune. But seizures of power don’t represent the only danger. Colombia has suffered only three golpes in its history, the most recent one as far back as 1953, yet it leads the region in the frequency, durability, and savagery of its civil conflicts. From independence in 1819 until the end of the 19th century, Colombia underwent no fewer than 55 internal wars, some of them regional in scope, though no less violent. Unfortunately, the tendency to armed conflict only grew stronger in the 20th century. Equally unfortunately for those who see political parties as a countervailing force to war, virtually all of these wars were fought under the banners of the Conservative (large landowners) and Liberal (workers and small-business people) parties, though some of the conflicts were intraparty affairs. A stunningly brutal period that dates from 1948 roughly to 1958 left marks on Colombia that endure to this day. The period known simply as La Violencia lay the groundwork for an insurgency by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). That nominally Marxist guerrilla organization, founded in the mid-1960s, controls parts of several rural regions. The FARC enjoys a big enough revenue from the cocaine industry and kidnapping for ransom to endure widespread hatred in the society at large—a response that would doom any ordinary civilian. (The smaller, Cuban-influenced Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional has been more open than the FARC to disarmament talks with the government.) President Uribe’s strategic decision to eliminate the FARC once and for all as a military threat is showing results. In early March 2008, the Colombian military killed the guerrillas’ number-two commander. Less than one week later, the Colombian government announced that another senior FARC commander had been killed by one of his own men, who then surrendered to authorities. Links to the drug trade characterize not only the FARC but their opposite number, the “self-defense” (paramilitary) forces, originally formed at the behest of big landowners. The paramilitaries, now partly disarmed, worked for years in cooperation with some elements of the army. A political scandal, still under way, has produced evidence that paramilitaries exerted influence in Colombia’s congress, by way of close relations with some lawmakers. The “parapolitical” affair demonstrates the extent to which Colombian politics have been subverted by what Colombians call “armed actors.” In effect, the paramilitaries tried covertly to penetrate government institutions rather than openly take them over. At the same time, the scandal demonstrates the vigor of Colombia’s press and judiciary, which have maintained pressure on the government and political class. That effort parallels

other countries’ prosecutions of past leaders and followers of regimes born in coups. Born in barracks, golpes are being put to rest in courtrooms.

Introduction to Central America Historical Background The leaders of newly independent Central America saw the isthmus as an ideal environment for a federation of all its countries. That vision was realized relatively briefly in the years following independence from Spain. Since that interlude, however, each country has followed separate paths. The political cultures that grew out of Central American countries’ histories share some elements, but otherwise diverge sharply. Early plans for a united Central America sprang from a colonial heritage they all shared. The countries had all belonged to the Kingdom of Guatemala, itself part of New Spain, whose capital was Mexico City. Nevertheless, during the period of Spanish colonialism, today’s Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala had already established individual identities. However, today’s Mexican state of Chiapas was then part of Guatemala, as was today’s nation of Belize, and Panama was part of Colombia. After independence in 1821, some leaders of the former kingdom accepted a postcolonial version of their former arrangement, as a part of newly independent Mexico. But the latter, hearing rumbles of discontent from nationalist Central Americans, declared the isthmus countries free to establish an autonomous existence. Yet the “Federal Republic of Central America” disintegrated amid civil war in 1838. Later attempts throughout the 19th century to reunite the old kingdom also provoked armed conflicts and also failed. Central America’s early history of union and division helps explain the paradox of small, neighboring countries whose political traditions show marked differences. Resemblances do exist. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua suffered horrific armed conflict in the 1980s and into the 1990s and are experiencing alarming levels of criminal violence today. Political violence hasn’t entirely disappeared either. Honduras, which avoided most of the warfare that gripped its neighbors, has not escaped the criminal violence plague. One Central American country, however, evaded both civil war and its sequel. In this and in most other respects, Costa Rica stands as an exception in its region, and in the entire hemisphere. Costa Rica’s good fortune began in its early colonial life. Geographically more oriented toward the Pacific than the Atlantic, Costa Rica was for that reason out of Spain’s eye, and distant from the early postindependence conflicts. The caudillos who ran Costa Rica during its first century also differed from their counterparts. They favored practical measures such as establishing sound school systems and diversifying agriculture from coffee into bananas. “They turned out to be ‘progressive’ in the nineteenth-century sense, which meant that they were more than ready to use the authority of the state to

INTRODUCTION

promote economic development,” writes a longtime historian of the Americas, Lester D. Langley, then of the University of Georgia.35 By mid-20th century, Costa Rica, peaceful and democratic, had abolished its military, making it a worldwide model. In the 1980s, then-President Oscar Arias used his nation’s peaceful, democratic tradition as political capital in his efforts to encourage peace negotiations in El Salvador and Nicaragua, efforts that won him the Nobel Prize in 1987. His peace brokering was credited with playing an important role in persuading warring sides to quit fighting. The contrast with Costa Rica’s neighbors could hardly have been starker. Guatemala’s Spanish conqueror, Pedro de Alvarado, made himself notorious even in the 15th century for the violence he unleashed on the country’s original inhabitants. Hugh Thomas, a leading historian of Spain and Spanish America, writes that Alvarado’s career was characterized by “brutal . . . unconcern for human life.”36 Whether Alvarado can be blamed for Guatemala’s subsequent horrors, the least that can be said is that he got the postconquest history off to a bad start. Indeed, relations between the country’s Indian majority and its mixed-race (known in Guatemala as ladino) and Europeandescended rulers have been defined, for a longer period of time than anywhere else in the hemisphere, by the rulers’ emphasis on repression. In modern times, Guatemala’s civil conflict lasted longer than that of any other Central American country, and as long as that of any in the entire hemisphere, Colombia excepted. The toll was enormous. An estimated 200,000 people, mostly highlands Indians, died during the counterinsurgency campaigns of 1960–1996, the country’s Commission for Historical Clarification concluded in 1999. A peace agreement negotiated with the help of the United Nations created the commission. Despite the formal end of hostilities, political and criminal violence still wracks the country. And Guatemala’s tormented history bears another distinction: The 1954 CIA-managed coup that overthrew an elected left-leaning government marked a key moment in early Cold War history. Like Guatemala, El Salvador spent its formative first century under the dominion of large landowners. Until civil conflict burst into civil war in 1979, the signature event that marked the country’s political landscape was an aborted Communistled military revolt and peasant uprising in 1932, followed by a massacre of suspected communists and their sympathizers. The Salvadoran army, which had taken power in a coup, killed at least 10,000 people; the country’s total population was then 1.5 million. Salvadorans dubbed the event La Matanza (the Massacre). The massacre both prepared the ground for and foretold the savagery of the war that tore apart the country in the 1980s. At least 70,000 people, civilians, soldiers, and guerrillas, died in 35 Lester Langley, Central America The Real Stakes (New York: Crown, 1985), 112. 36 Hugh Thomas, Conquest Montezuma, Cortes, and the Fall of Old Mexico (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 595.

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that late 20th-century conflict. Paradoxically, the titular head of government for much of that time was a centrist Christian Democrat politician who represented a strain of reformism in Salvadoran politics that developed in the wake of the 1932 massacre, but couldn’t overcome the repressive impulse of the military and the business elite. Leading the insurgency was a coalition of Marxist parties who fought as allies in the Farabundo Mart´ı National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Mart´ı para la Liberaci´on Nacional—FMLN). The FMLN took its name from a young Communist militant who helped spark the failed insurgency of 1932 and was captured and executed. The FMLN did assassinate some enemies, including unarmed American State Department officials and U.S. military personnel on two occasions, showing greater ruthlessness and logistical capability than the hapless young leftists of 1932 had displayed. In the 1980s, however, assassinations were primarily a tactic of the political right. Killings of alleged leftists often were carried out by technically anonymous “death squads,” which had close ties to elements of the military. Though that connection was known to all concerned, the military wasn’t in a position to conduct formal executions. That step was presumed unacceptable to the U.S. public, hence impossible, given the indispensable military aid that the United States provided to government forces. The Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista—ARENA) a hard-right party (which has since moved toward the center) led by a former army major, Roberto d’Aubuisson, was at the center of death-squad activities. A “Commission on the Truth” established as part of the peace accord concluded that d’Aubuisson formed the death squad that committed one of the most notorious of the war’s killings of individuals, the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero. The churchman had denounced the military and its repression of leftists and liberals. Shortly after Romero’s killing, a sometimes violent political conflict devolved into full-fledged warfare. The war ground on through the entire decade of the 1980s, with guerrillas eventually controlling a swath of territory in the eastern zone of the Massachusetts-sized country. But a 1989 offensive in San Salvador that the FMLN hoped would topple the government failed to do so. The defeat pressured the guerrillas to agree to peace negotiations. United Nations–sponsored peace talks led to the signing of a peace accord in 1992. The FMLN now competes for votes as a legal political party, an outcome that seemed inconceivable during the civil war. The party’s candidates have won elections for mayor of the capital, San Salvador, and other cities, and for congress, but never the presidency. At street level, the war prompted developments that underlay the creation of a multinational street gang culture. Hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans who fled the war for the United States settled in the Los Angeles area. There, many refugees or their children found their way into a subculture of MexicanAmerican gangs that had developed over decades. When some

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INTRODUCTION

of the Salvadorans were deported to their homeland, or went back on their own, they took with them the mindset and rituals of gang life. Many of the country’s slum-dwellers, hardened by a war that had also disrupted families, proved easy recruits for gangs, which have since spread through the region, especially in Honduras and Guatemala. As war was brewing in El Salvador during the 1970s, the same process was under way in nearby Nicaragua. There, Anastasio Somoza, who had essentially inherited power from his dictator father, proved unable to meet the challenge. After years of underground organizing, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberaci´on Nacional—FSLN) adopted a new strategy of allying with members of the upper class who were alienated from the corruption of the Somoza regime. Pedro Joaqu´ın Chamorro, editor of a major newspaper, La Prensa, was a classic example. But his role as socially respectable oppositionist was apparently too much for the dictatorship: He was assassinated in 1978. All fingers pointed to the regime. Protest riots escalated into an insurrection which, by 1979, toppled the Somoza dynasty. By then, the United States, the Somoza family’s original patron, had abandoned Somoza. The Carter administration cut off all military aid following the Chamorro assassination. At a time when right-wing dictators still ruled major countries in the hemisphere, the Sandinistas found their victory against an archetypal Latin American tyranny hailed worldwide among left-wingers and liberals. Adding to their luster, they pledged to hold elections—a sign that they would not slavishly imitate the Castro government, their longtime patron. The Sandinistas’ adherence to the new worldwide minimum standard of political respectability seemed to reflect the same impulse that led them to embrace business-class opponents of Somoza. Daniel Ortega, the leading advocate of that strategy, was the Sandinista candidate for president in a 1984 election, which he won. But the Sandinistas, with their political mandate confirmed, relied on Cuban security expertise and on Soviet military aid. Those relationships, in turn, convinced an already hostile Reagan administration that the Sandinistas represented a genuine threat. Unrelenting American political and (via the Contra guerrillas) military pressure added to internal discontent. Nicaragua’s business owners, large and small, saw their country as another Cuba in the making. Many ordinary Nicaraguans came to hate the military conscription that accompanied the Contra war. And the Sandinistas legalized the expropriations of property, including luxurious villas, that followed their victory, an act that many Nicaraguans found typical of all previous rulers. Amid this political turmoil, the country held presidential elections in 1990. To the shock of the Sandinistas and their foreign supporters, they lost to Violeta Chamorro, widow of the assassinated newspaper editor whose killing had helped propel the Sandinistas into power. Strikingly, Chamorro won her victory only two months after the fall of the Berlin Wall. With that, the Soviet empire entered the period of its final collapse. The Cold War, which had proved so critical an element

in Central American politics for four decades, had ground to a halt. But with the lessening of chances for global military confrontation, the end of the Cold War also prompted a sharp drop-off in American interest in Central America. Following Chamorro’s five-year term, politics in Nicaragua reverted for a time to the unashamedly corrupt style that had marked the Somoza regime. The most blatant abuser was President Arnoldo Alem´an, who stole millions of dollars during his 1997–2002 term, including for luxury travel on government credit cards. Alem´an was sentenced to 20 years in prison but was allowed to serve it at his mansion. From there, he forged a working alliance with his one-time ideological foe, Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega, who was reelected president in 2006, bringing Nicaragua’s political course full circle.

Introduction to North America Each of North America’s three countries occupy such vast territories that the continent they occupy is rarely seen as a whole. The continent presents the sharpest contrasts in the hemisphere. In the middle lies the country frequently labeled the world’s sole remaining superpower. To its south sits Mexico, one of the giants of Latin America. Mexico now boasts the world’s richest man (telecommunications and retail magnate Carlos Slim Hel´u). But for millions of ordinary Mexicans, jobs and possibilities for social advancement are scarce enough to have sent millions of its most ambitious citizens over the border to the United States. Canada, north of the U.S. border, has virtually nothing of Mexico’s conflictive history with the United States. But surface similarities in language and culture belie a deep difference in American and Canadian political cultures. Simply put, Canada represents the European alternative to the American version of modern capitalism. Canada’s version includes universal, publicly financed health care and free higher education. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 represented a first step toward trying to link the continent’s economies. How successful the attempt has been is a question still debated in the three NAFTA countries. Mexico is at the center of the debate. As the least advanced of the three partners, it was supposed to gain the most from the agreement. For some Mexicans, imbued with the sense of tragedy evoked by an old saying attributed to a 19th-century president, Porfirio D´ıaz, the NAFTA result was no surprise. “Poor Mexico,” the saying goes, “So far from God, so close to the United States.” Thus NAFTA awakened a fear of foreign domination whose roots run deep in the history of a country that has tried, as none other in the region, to meld the cultures of the conquered and the conquerors.

Mexico: Divide and Conquer Of all the conquest histories of the hemisphere, none is as rich in characters, events, and intrigue as the expedition that marked the beginning of Spanish rule on the continent. The first

INTRODUCTION

major Spanish incursion on the mainland in 1519 culminated in the takeover of Mexico by way of the conquest of the Aztec court in Mexico City. Worthy of Shakespeare, the saga still echoes through Mexican culture. One of the major concepts to emerge from the conquest is malinchismo. The term for betrayal of one’s country is taken from the name of Malinali (or Malintz´ın or Malinche). A young woman of N´ahuatl origin—that is, the Aztec Empire’s ruling people—who had been sold as a child to Mayan Indians, she became the translator and mistress of Hern´an Cort´es, the Spaniard who conquered the vast Aztec empire with a force of only 300 men. Malinali played an indispensable role in helping forge alliances with Aztec subject peoples whose help was essential to Cort´es’s victory. Malinali’s intimate relationship with Cort´es lends a female dimension to a preference for foreigners. Hence the history of the Spanish takeover has taken the question of Mexico’s national identity to the depths of human emotion, where dramas of woman’s betrayal and man’s conquests play out in all their endless variations. On a less profound level, the conquest produced the Mexican political tenet that the country’s regions and peoples must stay united. History also teaches that the center may pay a high price for failing to attend to the needs of the provinces. The fact that Mexico was conquered as much by guile and intrigue as by force of arms showed Mexicans that diplomatic encounters may be life-and-death matters, even if they take place in palaces instead of on battlefields. Cort´es may have done as much as anyone to shape the Mexican nation. But Alan Riding, a former New York Times correspondent in Mexico, notes in a classic work of reportage that Cort´es is saluted by only one statue in all of Mexico. Mexico’s honors go to the emperor whom Cort´es dethroned, Moctezuma, but above all to his son, Cuauht´emoc, who resisted the Spaniards more bravely than his father. 37

The Long Revolution. After Mexico fought for its independence from Spain, under the initial leadership of a priest, Fr. Miguel Hidalgo, Mexico entered decades of turmoil. A picturesque general and political leader, Jos´e L´opez de Santa Anna, would embody the period. President 11 times, in most cases for less than a year, his career serves as a textbook of Mexico’s political ills. The threat of corruption, the struggle between centralism and regional autonomy, and the temptation to betray the country to stronger foreign powers form the major themes of Santa Anna’s career. He fought in the liberation war against Spain, formally ceded Texas’ independence, led troops against the United States in 1846, was toppled from power, and had his wealth confiscated on the grounds that he acquired it illegally. The definitive revolt against Santa Anna was led by one of Mexico’s everlasting heroes, Benito Ju´arez, a man of hemispheric stature. A contemporary of Abraham Lincoln, Ju´arez 37 Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors A Portrait of the Mexicans (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 22–24.

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played roughly the role in Mexico’s political heritage that Lincoln did in the U.S. tradition. But Ju´arez, who didn’t begin learning Spanish until the age of 12, arguably rose against higher odds. As a political leader, Ju´arez not only kept Mexico united but also led it in war against the French occupation of 1864–1867. Ju´arez spearheaded the writing of a republican constitution aimed at reducing the political and economic power of the Catholic Church and at imposing civilian rule on the military. Ju´arez also laid down a principle of Mexican foreign policy that later presidents invoked in setting out a national doctrine of nonintervention: “Among nations, as among individuals, peace comes from respect for the rights of others.” The dictum has become a staple of Latin American political culture. The next major president following Ju´arez was a military hero of the war against the French. Porfirio D´ıaz, he of the saying about Mexico’s distance from God, went on to rule Mexico until 1910. A dictator who professed allegiance to democratic forms, D´ıaz surrounded himself with a group of advisers, the cientıficos (scientists), an early version of technocrats. They oversaw a modernization program that included construction of railroads, but saw no great value in democracy. Social and political pressures building up beneath the surface of the tranquil social order on which D´ıaz and his advisers prided themselves burst forth in 1910. Those pressures were intense enough that the revolution launched by liberal landowners and intellectuals in that year set off a period of civil conflict, rule by regional warlords, and militarized central government that lasted until 1929. Still, the struggles for sheer power that motivated many of the main players existed alongside a vein of genuine idealism. For many Mexicans, the peasant guerrilla Emiliano Zapata embodies this dimension of the revolution. At the head of armed farmers from his state of Morelos, south of Mexico City, Zapata demanded land reform but turned down a chance to acquire personal power, refusing a role in the provisional government. Zapata and his fellow revolutionaries made another important contribution to political culture, not merely in Mexico but around the world. With their broad-brimmed hats, moustaches, and ammunition bandoliers crossed on their chests, Mexico’s irregular fighters helped create the iconic figure of what would later be called the Third World revolutionary. Their contributions in this regard would have been impossible without the work of a small group of pioneer war photographers, who themselves helped found a signature 20th-century art form. For Zapata and other radicals, Mexico’s constitution of 1917, regarded as the revolution’s embodiment, fell short of their hopes. But the constitution did mark a clear break with the past. The right to a free, secular education was guaranteed, with religious schools—meaning Catholic schools— prohibited. Priests were barred from participating in politics, including by casting ballots. The revolution’s anticlericalism sparked a three-year regional civil war in the deeply religious central zone of Mexico. Its national reverberations included the assassination of a mili´ tary strongman, ex-president Alvaro Obreg´on, in 1927, before

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INTRODUCTION

he was sworn into a second term. The killer was a Catholic activist. Mexico didn’t encounter a genuinely unifying postrevolutionary figure until the late 1930s. L´azaro C´ardenas, renowned as the president who expelled the foreign oil companies, turned the ruling party—the Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana, later renamed as the PRI—into an instrument of social peace in which the competing interests of labor and capital would be reconciled under the supervision of the party leader-president. C´ardenas, like his successors until 2000, was effectively chosen to be president by his predecessor, who named him as the ruling party candidate. In reality that dedazo, the laying-on of the finger, meant appointing him as president. Even so, C´ardenas rose to the challenges of social and economic turbulence without succumbing to demagoguery.

“The Perfect Dictatorship.” Following C´ardenas, Mexico entered into nearly six decades marked by the steady expansion of the PRI. For the first two postwar decades, the middle class grew as well, as Mexico’s closed economy and policy of import substitution, producing Mexican versions of goods that otherwise would have to be imported, delivered on its promise. Through the 1960s, the real buying power of wages increased by 6.4 percent a year.38 Economic success and political tranquility came at a price. Independent labor unions were crushed and their leaders, some of them Communist Party militants, were imprisoned. Political opposition parties were tolerated, even subsidized, as long as they made no attempt to break out of the role of permanent minority. One exception was the center-right Partido Accion Nacional, which had a strong though technically illegal connection with the Catholic Church and a solid base in the north and north-central region. The ranchers and farmers of the agricultural belt running through the states of Michoac´an, Jalisco, Le´on, Colima and Guanajuato, Chihuahua and Sonora, and the big-business community clustered in the industrial capital, Monterrey, cultivated a hostility to the centralist, statist, and rhetorically revolutionary political culture of the capital. The northerners’ hostility often came mixed with a sense of ethnic superiority. The panistas were unrelenting. For years, they kept entering candidates in elections. They were allowed to win a few mayoralties, some seats in state legislatures, and a handful of positions in the lower house of the national congress. But the senate and governorships were out of the question. As for the presidency—completely unthinkable. In 1968, the PRI-gobierno demonstrated the penalties for pushing past the system’s limits. In that year of student uprisings around the world, a student movement began calling for genuine democracy. In Mexico City, where the movement was strongest, it began attracting older members of the middle class. The movement came to an abrupt end on October 2, 1968, when plainclothes army snipers shot into a protest meeting in a large 38 See

Krauze, 681.

plaza near the city center. An estimated 300 people were killed; to this day, the exact number is unknown. A “dirty war” followed, marked by deadly repression focused on small underground guerrilla organizations. The Mexican guerrilla movement was marked by a sharp difference from its counterparts elsewhere—an absence of assistance from Cuba. Castro was repaying Mexico’s refusal to break relations with the island, as other Latin American nations did at the United States’ behest. By the late 1970s, the violence, more limited than in South America, had tapered off. The Mexican government began a period of courting the international left and buying off peaceful left-wing leaders and intellectuals. The biggest sign of change was the legalization of the Communist Party in 1978. The political system held firm through financial emergencies in the 1980s generated largely by massive borrowing in the 1970s, when oil revenues peaked. But the aftermath of the deadly Mexico City earthquake of 1985 revealed the weakness and incompetence underlying the party-government system. Still, Mexican presidents retained their power to appoint their successors. Even an increasingly discontented and vocal public found the system still impregnable. In the oft-repeated words of Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa, Mexico’s rulers had invented the “perfect dictatorship.” But by the time Vargas Llosa coined the phrase in 1990, the PRI monopoly had entered its final decade. The period of decline actually began in 1988. The chosen presidential candidate, Harvard-trained economist Carlos Salinas de Gortari, faced a nightmare opponent. Cuauht´emoc C´ardenas, son of the revered president of the 1938 oil nationalization, had abandoned the PRI and helped form a new left-wing party. The combination of C´ardenas’s ancestry, his appeal to ordinary Mexicans hardpressed by the crises of the 1980s, and the erosion of the PRI’s authority and credibility made the race the first genuine contest for president in memory. Once the ballots were in, the interior ministry announced that its vote-tallying computers had broken down. Once the allegedly broken machines were supposedly repaired, Salinas was declared the winner. Whether he really won likely never will be known. The real result can be surmised from the fact that, once Salinas became president, he ordered the paper records of the election burned. Salinas’s departure was marked by mystery as well. The man he originally picked to succeed him, Lu´ıs Donald Colosio, was assassinated in mid-campaign in 1994. A confessed gunman was convicted, but the reason for the killing is unknown. So are the identities of whoever else may have been involved. The man who replaced Colosio as the official candidate represented one of the few successes of Salinas’s administration, which was mired in scandal and murder. (Colosio’s wasn’t the only one; Salinas’s brother was involved in a bizarre drama involving the murder of a prominent politician.) The new candidate was Ernesto Zedillo. With his doctorate in economics from Yale, Zedillo seemed the archetypal cientıfico for a new age. But unlike the classic model, he took democracy seriously.

INTRODUCTION

Zedillo refused to manipulate the 2000 presidential election to ensure the PRI candidate’s victory. The result was the first victory of a non-PRI candidate since the long-ruling party’s formation as the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) in 1929. Vicente Fox, the election winner, came from the National Action Party (Partido Accion Nacional—PAN), and seemed to embody all its hallmarks. A devout Catholic from the state Guanajuato, a hotbed of the Catholic guerrilla movement of the 1920s civil war, Fox came from a farming background and spent most of his career as a sales executive for Coca-Cola. Fox left office without a cloud of scandal, but also without any major political victories. Among other things, he had promised to forge a migratory work agreement with the United States. However, the Al-Qaida attacks of September 11, 2001, ended U.S. attention to any such plan.

Introduction to the Caribbean The Caribbean as a cultural region includes parts of the mainlands of Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela, as well as Guyana (and New Orleans and Key West in the United States). But if the Caribbean is, in writer Mark Kurlansky’s term, a “continent of islands,” the islands make up the Caribbean heartland.39 That region consists of 16 independent countries; one U.S. commonwealth (Puerto Rico); one U.S. territory (U.S. Virgin Islands); two French departments, the equivalent of states (Guadeloupe, made up of six islands, and Martinique, one island of the same name); five British territories (British Virgin Islands, Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands, comprising a total of 13 islands in all); and, until December 31, 2008, a self-governing possession of the Netherlands (the Netherlands Antilles, made up of five islands; those islands will be independent nations as of January 1, 2009). Strikingly, the Caribbean islands, Europe’s gateway to the Americas, hold the region’s longest-lasting political ties to the old colonial powers. Because of the islands’ role as entry point to the New World, mistreatment of the indigenous inhabitants sparked Europeans’ first criticisms of human rights violations in the New World. By a perverse twist of events, that criticism contributed to one of history’s great tragedies. Bartolom´e de las Casas, the Spanish Dominican friar who converted to the Indians’ cause in 1511, endorsed early requests for royal permission to bring slaves from Africa to work the land. “Like all enlightened men of his time, he believed that an African enslaved by Christians was more fortunate than an African in domestic circumstances,” writes historian Hugh Thomas (Las Casas repented years later, but to no effect).40 39 Mark Kurlansky, A Continent of Islands (New York: Addison Wesley, 1992). 40 Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440–1870 (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 98.

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The enormous trade in humans grew out of the colonizer’s unending need for vast armies of laborers. The slave trade would guide the course of Caribbean history as well as that of all the Americas, directly or indirectly. The descendants of African slaves make up the overwhelming majority of the islands’ population. Hence, it is fitting that the Caribbean became the site of the world’s first slave revolution since Spartacus led an uprising against the Roman Empire. In the 1790s, Haiti’s slaves rose up and began their independence war. In 1804, after the French had been vanquished, Haitians founded the world’s first black republic. A wave of fear immediately rolled through white society in the Caribbean, and all the way to the North American mainland. But the revolution failed to spark any sequels elsewhere. Later in the century, the Cuban rebels who fought the Caribbean’s longest and most brutal war of colonial independence in 1868–1878 finally won in 1898, in large part due to black fighters and one brilliant commander, Antonio Maceo (known honorifically as the “Bronze Titan”). Though relatively late to independence, people of the Caribbean pioneered the immigration trend that has spread throughout the region. (Mexican migration to the United States began earlier but with a different character—largely as a backand-forth movement between home and work north of the border.) Mass emigration began in the Caribbean in the 1940s, expanding in the 1950s and 1960s. Jamaica and other British Commonwealth islands saw tens of thousands of citizens depart for Britain as early as the 1940s. Between 1948 and 1965 at least 300,000 citizens of the British Caribbean islands took advantage of their status as British subjects to move to England. Xenophobic reaction by white Britons eventually forced the government to cancel automatic immigration rights for “West Indians.” In the French-speaking Caribbean, doctors and other professionals, fleeing the Duvalier dictatorship in the 1950s, began settling in New York and in French-speaking Canada. During the same time, Puerto Ricans, whose American citizenship made travel as easy as stepping on an airplane, began creating a virtual second island in New York City. As on the other islands, the combination of fewer job opportunities after World War II and the postwar boom in the United States and Europe proved irresistible. Approximately 500,000 Puerto Ricans moved to the United States in the 1940s and 1950s. Puerto Ricans often still call their New York community Nuyorico. The Puerto Ricans blazed a trail for other islanders. By the mid-1960s, the United States replaced Britain as the destination of choice for Caribbean migrants. The British immigration restriction virtually coincided with enactment of a 1965 U.S. law that scrapped immigration limits imposed during the mid1950s. In the 1960s, 470,000 Caribbean immigrants entered the United States, including the tens of thousands of Cubans who fled the revolution and the Castro government.41 41 See “Caribbean Migration,” in In Motion The AfricanAmerican Experience, undated, Schomburg Center for Research in

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INTRODUCTION

Meanwhile, Canada, whose vast expanse and relatively small population made the country welcoming to immigrants, took in tens of thousands of foreign nationals. Canada shared a British cultural background with immigrants from the Englishspeaking islands, and a French heritage with immigrants from the Francophone Caribbean. By 2001, 5 percent of 5.4 million Canadian immigrants came from the Caribbean (and nearby Bermuda).42 To many who were touched by the phenomenon, the enormous dimensions of Caribbean migration seemed to mark another chapter in an epic, one that began with the forcible removal of millions of Africans from their home continent. In recent decades, members of the Caribbean community in the islands and elsewhere have been describing the migration as a diaspora, a biblical term originally applied to the far-flung Jews. The term comes up frequently in the context of plans to use immigrants’ resources to benefit home islands. In a typical example, in 2006 the Inter-American Development Bank made a $10 million loan to Haiti to recruit “diaspora professionals” to the country’s nascent civil service. On all the islands, the emigration has existed for long enough that an entire business sector catering to migrants’ needs and those of their families at home has sunk deep roots (as it has now for continental migrants). It includes remittancetransfer houses, phone cards, cable TV news from back home, as well as newspapers and radio outlets. The absence of jobs in sufficient number for the islands’ educated and ambitious was the engine of emigration. An abundance of seductively picturesque settings couldn’t compensate for insufficiently developed economies.

Overview of the English-Speaking Caribbean—the “West Indies” British heritage is the dominant political trait in the Caribbean. The British West Indies form the eastern edge of the Caribbean sea except for Jamaica, the biggest island, which lies south of Cuba and west of Hispaniola. Jamaica, whose population of 2.7 million dwarfs that of any of its Anglophone neighbors (Trinidad and Tobago has slightly more than half as many people), is the West Indies’ cultural and political powerhouse. Its problems are correspondingly big as well. Trinidad and Tobago, lying east of the Venezuelan coast, occupies a far smaller space in world consciousness but plays a greater economic role. The twin-island nation’s offshore territory enjoys the Caribbean’s biggest petroleum deposits. These are low by world standards, but high enough for Trinidad and Black Culture, New York Public Library, www.inmotionaame.org/ migrations/landing.cfm?migration=10 (accessed November 15, 2007). 42 “Immigrant Population by Place of Birth and Period of Immigration (2001 Census),” Statistics Canada, undated, http://www40.statcan. ca/l01/cst01/demo24a.htm?sdi=immigrant (accessed November 17, 2007).

Tobago to base its economy on petroleum exports. That stable, industrial foundation exists nowhere else in the Caribbean. Trinidad and Tobago does share a demographic characteristic with the nearby mainland nation of Guyana. The populations of both countries are divided roughly evenly between people of African and people of East Indian descent. And Trinidad and Tobago shares a feature of its political heritage with most of the Americas—a long period of supremacy by a charismatic figure. Eric Williams, the historian and politician who spearheaded Trinidad and Tobago’s independence, served as the country’s only prime minister for the first 18 years of its postcolonial life. He died in office in 1981. Williams founded one of the country’s major political parties, the People’s National Movement. AfroTrinidadians make up its major constituency. Williams and other proindependence activists enjoyed a political climate that differed greatly from the environment that surrounded their counterparts in Africa and Asia. There, independence came only after decades of struggle, in some cases warfare. In the Caribbean, the move toward independence was a gradual process in which the British government and island leaders cooperated. As a result, Williams and his counterparts on other islands were willing to enlist in a British project to create a federation out of the former Crown colonies. Once formed, however, the federation couldn’t bridge political differences between its members—mainly Trinidad and Tobago, on the one hand, and Jamaica, on the other. Williams and his colleagues favored, in effect, a U.S.-influenced model, with a strong central government. Jamaican leaders preferred what amounted to a European Common Market approach. Williams himself, writing in general terms, blamed, “the desire of the units to continue pursuing competitive rather than complementary strategies of economic development.”43 For Trinidad and Tobago, the economic backdrop of the dispute was its natural resource wealth and an unwillingness to subsidize poorer islands. That economic solidity has given Trinidad and Tobago the strength to weather its biggest challenge in recent years, an attempted uprising by a Muslim sect of black Trinidadians. In 1990 the group took over the parliament building and held members and the prime minister hostage. One parliamentarian was killed, but the would-be insurrectionists eventually negotiated a peaceful surrender. The brief law-and-order vacuum that followed the takeover sparked riots and looting by black Trinidadians in the island’s main city, Port of Spain. Police quickly restored order, but the episode did open a period of increased criminal violence that continues to this day. In Jamaica a steady stream of criminal violence, sometimes with political links, began earlier and has left deep wounds in the island’s society. A countervailing trend of idealism and yearning for social justice hasn’t been strong enough to prevail.

43 See Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro The History of the Caribbean (New York: Vintage, 1984), 508.

INTRODUCTION

A politician who tried to embody that strain of Jamaican culture was more successful in his international endeavors. Michael Manley (1924–1997), a charismatic speaker who had graduated from the London School of Economics, became prime minister in 1972 when his People’s National Party (PNP) won the parliamentary majority; he served until 1980, then held the office again in 1989–1992. In a career that took off at the same time as singersongwriter Bob Marley was becoming a world figure, Manley embraced the Caribbean version of Afro-consciousness, Rastafarianism, that Marley and other Jamaican artists were preaching. In his 1972 campaign, Manley made a show of carrying the “Rod of Joshua,” a staff of ebony and ivory that he said had been given to him by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, whom Rastafarians (Ras Tafari Mekonnen was the emperor’s given name) considered a holy figure. Manley’s first term in office also coincided with the height of influence of the “Non-Aligned Movement,” in theory made up of developing countries that hadn’t formally enlisted with either side in the Cold War. Among its members was Soviet ally Cuba, with whom Manley established friendly relations. Without espousing the Soviet-style system that Castro implanted, Manley made an informal alliance with the Cuban leader, whom Manley depicted as a champion of the developing world. Much of Manley’s admiration grew out of Castro’s military backing of newly liberated Angola against a 1975 invasion by South Africa, at the time ruled antidemocratically by white-minority leaders. Toward the end of his life, Manley recalled in an interview that he had rebuffed then–U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who asked for Jamaica to vote against Cuba’s presence in Angola.44 Manley may have made Jamaica a player in global affairs, but the country’s own political culture was descending into gang warfare. When the relatively conservative Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) tried to displace Manley’s PNP in elections in 1976 and 1980, gun battles erupted. (Bob Marley was nearly killed in an attack seemingly intended to prevent him playing at a government-organized concert seen by some as a PNP event.) In 1980, the preelection death toll reached 800. The JLP finally displaced the PNP in that election. As a result, JLP leader Edward Seaga served as prime minister until 1989. He tilted Jamaica’s international stance in a more proU.S. direction. Manley returned to office in 1989. For all of their ideological and stylistic differences, neither Manley nor Seaga made much of a dent in the socioeconomic inequities that pervade Jamaican society. Violence continues to plague the political scene, though its frequency has lessened. Indeed, criminal gangs often boast a connection to one of the two major parties. Only recently have Jamaican political veterans begun to admit responsibility for the country’s condition. “We are part of a failed state and as such we failed the country,” a former 44 See Manning Marable, “Michael Manley (interview),” The Progressive, July 1, 1993, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/ 1G1-13972336.html (accessed November 18, 2007).

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tourism and information minister in Seaga’s government, Anthony Abrahams, said on a talk-show program in 1999 hosted by Beverly Anderson Manley, Michael Manley’s widow. She spoke frankly as well: “How did we get into such a stage of anarchy? I knew the nature of our politics. I was married to a party leader. I couldn’t say I didn’t know.”45 Jamaica has succeeded, however, in shielding its profitable tourist industry from the effects of the country’s class divide and its sometimes-murderous politics. Elsewhere in the West Indies, political violence and a friendship with Cuba that went beyond Manley’s rhetorical declarations of solidarity led to the first, and so far the only, open combat between U.S. and Cuban troops. On the island of Grenada, a 1979 coup against a longtime strongman led to the establishment of a left-wing government that established close ties with Cuba. As the relationship deepened, Cuba dispatched hundreds of construction and other technical experts, many of them also military men. Then, the Grenadian leaders fell out among themselves in 1983. Fighting broke out, and the head of government, Maurice Bishop (1944–1983), was executed by his former comrades. Those events led President Reagan to order the Grenada invasion. The immediate rationale was the rescue of a group of young Americans who were attending medical school on the island. But Reagan had warned since taking office in 1981 that Cuba and the Soviet Union were making Grenada a beachhead for subversion in the region. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the notion of Cuba as a security threat to its Caribbean neighbors essentially disappeared as well.

Overview of the Spanish-Speaking Caribbean The Spanish Caribbean comprises the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico as well as the Dominican Republic, which occupies half the island of Hispaniola (Puerto Rico, because it is not a country, will be treated only tangentially in these pages). Though the English-speaking islands far outnumber them, one Spanish-speaking country alone far outweighs them politically. Cuba, the biggest country in the entire region, is the only Caribbean nation to have established a lasting presence on the world stage. Fidel Castro’s outsized personality partly explains Cuba’s international status. His seemingly limitless ambition found an outlet thanks to the Cold War. By transforming Cuba into a Soviet ally, one that sat practically on America’s doorstep, Castro made himself and his country major players. The political culture that Castro inherited when he appeared on the scene as a law student and apprentice politician was still emerging from Spain’s lengthy colonial domination, which ended only in 1898. Slavery had ended only in 1873, leaving 45 Both quoted in David Gonzalez, “A Killing Shocks Jamaicans into Soul-Searching,” New York Times, October 18, 1999, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 9B01E4DE1739F93BA25753C1A96F958260 (accessed November 18, 2007).

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INTRODUCTION

a linkage between race and poverty. Economically, the country depended on the volatile world markets in sugar and tobacco. “Political independence brought interludes of hectic prosperity,” writes Hugh Thomas, “never freedom from unrest.”46 Castro from the beginning of his career exploited the longstanding tie between freedom and disorder in Cuba. Since 1959, when Castro’s guerrilla forces toppled dictator Fulgencio Batista, Cuba has not held a genuine election. Except for the Catholic Church, Cuba has no independent political institutions of any kind. And Castro’s 2006 transfer of power to his slightly younger brother and lifelong comrade, Defense Minister Ra´ul Castro, as a result of his own failing health shows a dynastic strain running through the Cuban version of Soviet socialism. The elder Castro made his retirement permanent in February 2008, at the age of 81. Cuba’s National Assembly then formalized the handing over of power to 76-year-old Ra´ul, who became president. Cuba’s quasi-monarchical system has shown considerable resilience. Despite widespread expectations, it survived the Soviet Union’s demise. Before Venezuela’s President Ch´avez extended substantial economic aid to Cuba, Castro weathered the disappearance of Soviet subsidies in part by opening the economy to European and Canadian tourism operators and hotel builders—a strategy that collided with early revolutionary rhetoric decrying Cuba’s past as a playground for foreign visitors. The hard-edged realism reflected in that strategy coexists, confusingly, with a rhetoric that glorifies last stands against all odds. As the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada was getting under way, for instance, Castro ordered his 700 troops there to resist the 1,900-strong American force to the death. But the Cuban colonel in command surrendered with most of his men; all were later repatriated to Cuba. According to Brian Latell, a retired career Cuba specialist for the CIA, a furious Castro demoted all officers including the colonel, who was sent off to fight in Angola, where he was killed.47 And when the invasion loomed, Castro sent no reinforcements to the men he’d ordered not to surrender. “It is not the new Grenadan government we must think of now, but of Cuba,” he said in a comment cited by Cuba specialist Edward Gonzalez of the University of California, Los Angeles.48 Most Caribbean states supported the invasion of Grenada. But since the Soviet Union’s collapse, even staunch U.S. allies have established warm relations with Cuba. “We have to be able to strike strategic relationships with those who are willing to help us in charting a course of serious development as we confront the 21st century,” Keith Mitchell, then the prime 46 Hugh

Thomas, Cuba The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 1111. 47 See Brian Latell, After Fidel The Inside Story of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 176. 48 Edward Gonzalez, “Challenge in the Caribbean Basin,” in Cuban Communism, 7th ed., ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Transaction, 1989), 656.

minister of Grenada—a post he may not have held if the invasion hadn’t occurred—said in a 1997 interview with the New York Times. “When we look back at our relationship with Cuba, I think most Grenadians of all ages and groups agree that, over all, the Cuban role and presence here was positive.”49 Cuba itself, meanwhile, has been enjoying a new lease on economic life in the 21st century. As Venezuelan president Ch´avez has solidified his position at the helm of the region’s major oil power, he has been shipping petroleum to Cuba at subsidized prices, in return for the services of more than 20,000 Cuban doctors in Venezuela. For many observers, the Venezuelan support has ensured that Cuban communism will outlast Castro. However, the December 2007 defeat of Ch´avez’s proposed constitutional changes has introduced a note of doubt into that assessment. So did renewal of a current of critical comment from within Cuba—a trend that has appeared periodically since the revolution, only to be snuffed out. Vivid evidence of youthful dissatisfaction came in a video leaked to foreign media, which showed Cuban university students confronting veteran Cuban diplomat Ricardo Alarc´on with tough questions about why they couldn’t travel outside Cuba without authorization, or enjoy free access to the Internet, among other restrictions. Alarc´on’s responses included the comment that most Bolivians couldn’t travel either—and the world aviation system wouldn’t be able to function if everyone in the world who wanted to travel were able to do.50 Lest critics of the Cuban regime take too much encouragement from the confrontation, Cuba’s official information system released a second video in which one of the most tenacious of Alarc´on’s questioners, Eli´ecer Avila, later appeared in a state-sponsored interview, saying his questions and those of his fellow students had no rebellious purpose. “It is to build a better socialism, not to destroy it,” Avila said, prompted by an editor of a Cuban government Web site.51 Even though Cuba’s security apparatus seems to have lost none of its efficiency, the only full-fledged Soviet-style system in the region has been no better able than other Latin American countries to retain many of its inhabitants. Over the course of nearly a half-century, approximately 10 percent of the Cuban population, now about 11 million, have departed the island. That volume is not extraordinary in the Caribbean context. Nor is the sense among Cubans that emigration serves as a sociopolitical safety valve for a society unable to contain the dissatisfactions of people who find no outlet for their talents or energies at home. Whatever price Cuba has paid for the 49 Quoted in Larry Rohter, “Caribbean Nations, Ignoring U.S., Warm to Cuba,” New York Times, December 21, 1997. 50 “Alarcon y Estudiantes de la UCI, Video Completo,” February 14, 2008, http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid= 862625216710039760 (accessed March 9, 2008). 51 “Transcripci´ on de Palabras de Estudiantes Cubanos de la UCI,” February 18, 2008, http://www.cubainformacion.tv/ index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=3863&Itemid= 65 (accessed March 9, 2008).

INTRODUCTION

loss, first, of educated professionals and the business class, and, later, of numbers of independent-minded and daring citizens, the government evidently has calculated that it gains more in stability. Substantial Cuban e´ migr´e communities exist in Spain and Mexico, but the real second Cuba lies in the United States, especially Florida’s Miami-Dade County. “Miami Cubans,” in political shorthand, have made themselves a national political presence, as their electoral dominance in their population center has made up for their relatively small numbers (1.6 million, versus 28.3 million U.S. residents of Mexican origin). As a result, they play a major role in influencing U.S. policy toward Cuba. However, they aren’t all-powerful in that regard, political folk wisdom to the contrary. A U.S. policy of turning back Cuban refugees at sea is only one example of Cuban-Americans not getting their way. Yet, administrations of both parties have felt obliged to demonstrate that they take the conservative wing of the Cuban-American political establishment into account. One result is that the 1966 “Cuban Adjustment Act” remains on the books. Under the law, Cubans who reach the soil of the United States are granted virtually automatic permanent residence. The law now is benefiting Cubans who flee to Mexico and are allowed into the United States at ports of entry along the U.S. southern border. Politics, in an odd way, has kept ties strong between Cubans and Cuban-Americans. As legal residents of the United States, nearly all Cubans are eligible to make U.S.-allowed family visits back to the island (though the Bush administration has reduced their frequency from once a year to once every three years). Migrants from elsewhere don’t enjoy this advantage. Politics hasn’t played a role, since the fall of the Trujillo dictatorship, in the migration of tens of thousands of Dominicans to the United States. Their mainland presence is centered in New York, where they account for at least 400,000 residents. In the age of air travel and instant communications, the island and mainland Dominican communities are close enough that a New York–raised Dominican felt secure enough in homeland politics to run for president. Leonel Fernandez, whose image as a Dominican rooted in the island and in New York accounted for much of his initial appeal, developed a track record of stability during his first administration (1996–2000). That record was strong enough that voters brought him back for a second term in 2004, set to expire in mid-2008.

Overview of the French-Speaking Caribbean The Francophone Caribbean consists of only one fully independent country. Haiti, the first country in Latin America and the Caribbean to expel its colonial masters, has been a free nation since 1804. That brave beginning may have marked Haiti’s best moment. Since then, oppression, corruption, and steadily increasing poverty have blighted the country. Making the picture even bleaker, the French colonial islands that failed

27

to mount a revolution today enjoy a relatively prosperous and peaceful existence. However, the realities of French rule discourage any easy conclusion that Haiti would have done better to have remained a colony. Even by the standards of the time, that regime was notable for the systemic sadism with which the French administered the territory, whose sugar and cotton production were mainstays of France’s economy. Colonial rule had so deformed Haitian society that life as an independent country began with what amounted to a reimposition of slavery under the rule of Jean-Jacques Dessalines, a tyrant who had been one of revolution’s generals. The overall commander, Toussaint Louverture, had showed himself to be a more humane leader. But he fell victim to French trickery, the first of the countless tragedies that have scarred Haiti’s postrevolutionary history. French authorities invited Louverture to negotiate the terms of France’s definitive exit from the island. He was taken prisoner and spent the rest of his life in solitary confinement in a French mountain fortress. Louverture’s fate has served as a cautionary example to every Haitian in public life. The lessons are stamped indelibly on the country’s political culture: No promise of negotiations should be believed; foreign powers mean Haiti no good; a leader who trusts adversaries’ good intentions will die. In modern times, supporters of Haiti’s most charismatic and polarizing figure, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, have cast him as a modern Louverture. Aristide, the former priest who emerged as the first champion of Haiti’s impoverished majority, is seen by supporters as a victim of betrayal by the United States, aided by its friends among Haiti’s well-off. The ex-president’s detractors scoff at the notion of Aristide as a liberator, viewing him as a would-be dictator every bit as corrupt as the bourgeoisie he scorns. Each side points to a considerable body of evidence. When he emerged as a revolutionary priest, during the 1986 uprising that drove Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier from the country, Aristide helped rally Haitians to the “uprooting” (dechoukaj) of Duvalierists, including members of the feared and hated secret police force known as Tontons Macoute. In the uprooting, their homes were destroyed. Some of the Duvalierists were beaten to death. “Our consciences should be clear,” Aristide told Mark Danner of The New Yorker at the time. “These Macoutes were Satan, Satan incarnate. . . . The people must continue to show how strong they are, how strong they can be!”52 But the Duvalierists remained powerful. Haiti’s first attempt at a postdictatorship election in 1987 was stopped short by exMacoutes who rampaged through Port-au-Prince, killing people gathered at polling places—an estimated 34 in all. In 1990, when the pressure for an election proved unstoppable, Aristide was swept into office by a tidal wave of electoral 52 Quoted in Mark Danner, “Beyond the Mountains (Part I),” New Yorker, November 27, 1989, http://www.markdanner.com/ articles/show/beyond the mountains part i (accessed November 26, 2007).

28

INTRODUCTION

support. But months into his term, it was clear that his goal of a revolutionary transformation of Haiti collided with the interests of the small business class and the military men they subsidized. With rumors of a coup already flying around the capital, Port-au-Prince, Aristide gave a speech at the National Palace in which he used his gift for allusion and his grasp of popular imagery to call for what was universally understood to be the “necklacing” (placing a gasoline-soaked tire around the head) of Duvalierists who were plotting a counterrevolution: “What a beautiful tool! What a beautiful instrument! What a beautiful piece of equipment! It’s beautiful, yes it’s beautiful, it’s cute, it’s pretty, it has a good smell, wherever you go you want to inhale it.”53 For Aristide’s enemies, the speech showed conclusively that he was a tyrant in the making. His supporters called the speech a desperate attempt to rally the masses. But it failed; Aristide was overthrown. In 1994, after three years as an exile in Washington, Aristide was restored to office by a U.S. government that he still deeply distrusted. His suspicion was proved valid by the 2004 revolt that toppled him a second time. The Aristide camp views the revolt as a Bush administration production. U.S. officials have denied the accusation, though they clearly welcomed Aristide’s ouster. In any case, Haiti’s political scene had grown more complicated. The former Aristide camp had fractured, with many onetime supporters transformed into bitter opponents. And with Aristide’s departure, the United Nations established a “stabilization” mission, including about 7,000 troops. The mission’s military force commander is a Brazilian major-general, and countries that have contributed troops and police include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Grenada, Peru, and Uruguay. Their participation represents a break with a past in which Haiti’s neighbors wanted nothing to do with a country that was seen as having nothing in common with the rest of the Americas. The presence of the UN troops reflected another change in Haiti’s sociopolitical picture. The poorest of the poor were no longer a humble, unarmed population. Cite Soleil (in Krey`ol, Site Soley), a vast slum on the Port-au-Prince waterfront, came to harbor well-armed gangs who financed themselves from kidnap ransom and the drug trade. Drug smugglers have made Haiti a busy transshipment point for South American cocaine and heroin headed for the U.S. market. Stabilization force troops have had some success in lessening gang control in Cite Soleil, though for how long remains uncertain. Haiti’s future is equally unclear. Despite some improvements in infant mortality (from 150 per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 117 per 1,000 live births in 2004), the country remains the poorest in the Western Hemisphere. Life expectancy there is 52 years.

53 See “Aristide’s ‘Pe Lebrun’ speech”—President Aristide’s speech of Friday, September 27, 1991, trans. by Haiti Observateur, http://www.hartford-hwp. com/archives/43a/009.html (accessed November 26, 2007).

Conclusion As the end of the new century’s first decade approaches, most citizens of Latin America and the Caribbean face the same social and economic inequalities that propelled alternating cycles of revolution and repression for much of the past century. One difference stands out: free and fair elections have come to be seen almost everywhere as the only acceptable means of political change. In Argentina, Guatemala, and Venezuela, voters made fundamental choices in late 2007 about the directions they want their societies to take. Whether electoral politics can contain Bolivia’s interconnected regional, ethnic, and class conflicts seem less certain; at the start of 2008, four of the country’s eastern provinces were vowing to pursue their effort to secede almost entirely from the rest of the country. Ecuador is caught up in the drafting of a new constitution to replace one written in 1998. President Correa, who won a 2007 referendum on his proposal to call a constituent assembly, wants to reduce the power of Congress, a center of opposition to his administration. Venezuela’s referendum on the Ch´avez-proposed constitutional changes has sparked a debate over the president’s brand of socialism. Opposition has gone far beyond the privileged sectors whom Ch´avez depicts as his main opponents. A newly emerged student movement took to the streets to protest Ch´avez’s political plan. Gen. Ra´ul Baduel, who had been a longtime comrade of Ch´avez among left-wing officers, played a key role in rallying opposition to the Ch´avez-proposed amendments. The general may also have been among those who forced Ch´avez to accept defeat. Heinz Dieterich, a Mexico City–based political scientist and ideological mentor to many chavistas, argues in a critique on a pro-Ch´avez website that corruption, ineptitude, and intolerance were eroding Ch´avez’s administration from within. These ills, and Ch´avez’s emphasis on one-man rule, could spell doom not only for Venezuela’s incipient socialist system but also for those of Bolivia and even of Cuba, Dieterich warns. “Not only is it true that ‘the Revolution devours its children,’ but also that when revolutionary leaders transform themselves into unilateral directors, ‘they devour the Revolution.’”54 Fidel Castro made himself “unilateral director” of Cuba in the early days of the country’s revolutionary transformation. As his life enters what seems to be its final act, the path his successor would take looms as an unknown, the subject of a long-running guessing game among Cubans on the island and abroad. New president Ra´ul Castro, who took office on February 24, 2008, has been described by many as an economic pragmatist who might loosen a few of the restrictions that prohibit nearly all private business ventures outside of tiny operations such as selling produce. But Cubans on the island and in exile say they expect little else—above all no loosening of the 54 Heinz Dieterich, “Derrota Estrat´ egica en Venezuela; Peligro Mortal para Bolivia y Cuba,” December 3, 2007, www.aporrea.org/tiburon/a46125.html (accessed December 10, 2007).

INTRODUCTION

political reins. As if to demonstrate the regime’s resistance to change, the official named as first vice president is 76-year-old Jos´e Ram´on Machado Ventura, another of the shrinking circle of historicos—members of the Castro brothers’ guerrilla army. Machado Ventura’s appointment—by election of the National Assembly, technically speaking—seems designed to squelch widespread foreign speculation that Fidel Castro’s successors might undertake deeper economic and perhaps even political reform. Some analysts had said that appointment of one of the regime’s 40- and 50-year-old officials could signal such intentions. Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner began her new administration in an atmosphere of tension. U.S. arrests of men allegedly part of a scheme to deliver $800,000 in campaign cash to her from the Venezuelan government occurred only three days after she was sworn in. Kirchner characterized the charges as a move against her government. Neither she nor anyone in her administration was a target of U.S. judicial proceedings, so the effects of the criminal case, whatever they may be, will be political rather than legal. Guatemalan voters clearly rejected the old military class when they chose Alvaro Colom, a left-of-center president. But the challenge he faces from a criminal culture deeply embedded in the country’s security apparatus can’t be overstated. In Colombia, investigations into connections between lawmakers and rightist paramilitaries raise the question of whether the paras’s demobilization as a fighting force simply marks a change in the way they exert their influence. The FARC, the left-wing guerrilla force, shows no serious interest in demobilization. Like its paramilitary enemies, the FARC devotes as much or more of its energies to the drug trade as to political organization. For years, that diversification into the high-profit field of drug trafficking seemed to ensure the FARC’s longterm survival, even if its objective of seizing national power had become a mirage. However, early in 2008, the FARC’s prospects took a turn for the worse. The Colombian military, pursuing President Uribe’s strategy of crushing the FARC, zeroed in on number-two commander Ra´ul Reyes (a nom de guerre) and killed him in an air attack on an encampment on the Ecuadoran side of the border with Colombia. That violation of Ecuadoran sovereignty precipitated a brief flurry of tension between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Venezuela’s president, Ch´avez, had lately been in contact with FARC commanders to arrange the release of some of the guerrilla’s armies longtime captives. After Reyes died, Ch´avez praised him and even declared a moment of silence in his honor. President Bush, meanwhile, declared U.S. support for Colombian force’s pursuit of enemies across its border. As tensions kept rising, the Colombian government announced that Iv´an R´ıos, a senior FARC commander, had been killed by one of his own men, who then surrendered to the government. On the diplomatic front, Uribe and his Ecuadoran and Venezuelan counterparts declared their hostilities over, a move that followed Uribe’s apology for the violation of sovereignty. But, even aside from the combative personalities of the three

29

presidents, tensions could easily reemerge. Documents that the Colombian government said came from dead FARC commander Reyes’s computer showed the guerrillas in contact with Ch´avez on a plan to establish diplomatic recognition of the FARC as a legitimate combatant, instead of a terrorist force, as the organization is now classified by the United States and the European Union. However long the FARC survives, its decades of existence provide a sobering example of how drug trafficking can grow from a criminal problem into a national security threat. Mexico, where drug-trafficking gangs are expanding their power in several states, seems to be in the grip of the “Colombianization” that had long been held out as a major peril. President Calder´on’s plan to use U.S. aid to crush the regional syndicates whose power rivals the government’s has not yet begun. Of all the countries in the region, Mexico is also the nation most affected by the hardening of U.S. attitudes toward immigrants who enter or remain in the United States illegally. New U.S. laws and border-control measures may succeed in reducing the flow of migrants. An economic slowdown could yield the same result. Even so, there is little question that a substantial Latin American and Caribbean population has become a permanent part of U.S. society. Latin American leaders since Bol´ıvar have been dreaming about peoples of the Americas unifying. They are doing so in ways that weren’t predicted, and in the most unexpected of locations. Marriages between first- or second-generation immigrants from different countries of the Americas, for instance, have become commonplace in states with high immigrant populations. “If you ask an Anglo, where is your family from, they’ll say something like, my mother is Irish, my father is German and my grandfather was Norwegian,” Nestor Rodriguez, a University of Houston sociologist, told the Arizona Republic. “The same thing is happening to Latinos. One parent may be Mexican, the other Guatemalan, or Salvadoran or Honduran.”55 The migration phenomenon has also introduced a new wrinkle in U.S. policy toward the Americas. Presidents from George H. W. Bush on have been promoting the free movement of capital and goods and services between the United States and the rest of the Americas as a major strategy to promote economic growth and prosperity. Ordinary people from Latin America and the Caribbean have, by way of their unauthorized migration, effectively added free movement of labor to the list of free trade attributes. After centuries of colonialism, and postcolonial authoritarianism and instability, ordinary people from all over Latin America and the Caribbean have become agents of social and economic change. As voters and as economic migrants, they have taken their futures into their own hands. Peter Katel is a staff writer for the CQ Researcher who previously reported on Haiti and Latin America for Time and Newsweek and covered the Southwest newspapers in New Mexico. 55 Quoted in Daniel Gonzalez, “Mixed Latino Families Are New Trend,” Arizona Republic, December 24, 2007.

PART TWO

G OV E R N M E N T S

A N T I G UA A N D B A R B U D A

The Country Located in the northern part of the Caribbean’s Lesser Antilles (see map, p. 342), the islands of Antigua and Barbuda are populated largely by blacks whose ancestors were transported as slaves from western Africa in the 17th and 18th centuries. Minorities include descendants of British colonial settlers, Portuguese laborers, and Lebanese and Syrian traders. Anglican Protestantism and Roman Catholicism claim the largest number of adherents, although a wide variety of other denominations exist, and complete religious freedom prevails. Agriculture dominated the economy until the 1960s, when a pronounced decline in sugar prices led to the abandonment of most cane fields and increased reliance on tourism, which currently accounts for about 60 percent of GDP. The harbor at St. John’s, long used as a dockyard for the British Navy, is a port of call for 11 major shipping lines, while a modern air facility, featuring a Canadian-financed terminal complex, is served by 6 international carriers. Although real GDP rose by an average of 4.3 percent during 2000–2006, while inflation averaged less than 2.0 percent through the same period (the lowest in the region), the country has long faced a variety of economic problems, including high external debt and damage from a series of severe hurricanes. As a result, Antigua and Barbuda have undertaken efforts to promote agriculture, particularly livestock raising and produce cultivation; expand the fishing industry; and, most recently, develop an Internet gambling industry (see Foreign relations, below).

Government and Politics Political Background Colonized by Great Britain in the early 17th century after unsuccessful efforts by Spain and France, Antigua became a founding member of the Federation of the West Indies in 1958, following the introduction of ministerial government two years earlier. Together with its northern dependency, Barbuda, it joined the West Indies Associated States in 1969 as an internally self-governing territory with a right of unilateral termination, which it exercised

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Barbuda Codrington

VENEZUELA

Caribbean Sea

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Saint John's Bolans

Redonda

Parham

Antigua

0 0

Freetown

10 Mi 10 Km

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A N T I G UA A N D BA R BU DA

on November 1, 1981. At independence, Premier Vere C. BIRD Sr., whose Antigua Labour Party (ALP) had returned to power in 1976 and was victorious in the election of April 1980, became prime minister. In the election on April 17, 1984, the ALP swept all the Antiguan seats in the House of Representatives, with Bird forming a new government two days later. In 1987 Prime Minister Bird resisted demands that his son, Vere C. BIRD Jr., be dismissed as public works minister in the wake of an official inquiry that had charged him with conduct “unbecoming a minister of government” in connection with the funding of an airport rehabilitation project. The issue led to a split within the Bird family. The prime minister’s second son, Deputy Prime Minister Lester Bryant BIRD, joined a “dissident majority” of eight officials, including Education Minister Reuben HARRIS, who announced a campaign to rid the country of “family government.” For its part, the opposition seemed unable to capitalize on the intra-ALP cleavage. Efforts to form an antigovernment alliance before the 1989 election proved unavailing, as a result of which the ALP retained power in the March 9 vote by winning 15 of 17 legislative seats. In February 1990 Education Minister Harris continued his attack on his government colleagues by suggesting that “corrupt practices” might be involved in a scheme to lease 400 acres of land in his district to a group of Hong Kong investors for the construction of a tourist facility. Far more embarrassing was the revelation in early May that a shipment of arms that Israeli authorities said had been approved for sale to the Antiguan government had turned up at the ranch of a notorious Colombian drug trafficker. After it became known that his name was on the purchase order held by Israel, Vere Bird Jr. was obliged to leave the cabinet. In August, Lester Bird announced that the cabinet’s “deep sense of shame and outrage” had yielded agreement on a government “cleanup” and on November 13 the prime minister announced his reluctant acceptance of all major recommendations of a committee of inquiry, including the banning from public office of his eldest son, whom the re-

port had castigated as a “thoroughly unprincipled man.” In the course of a cabinet reshuffle on March 15, 1991, Prime Minister Bird assumed the finance portfolio and in a subsequent parliamentary presentation gave a summary rather than a detailed account of his budget proposals. In response, four government ministers, including Deputy Prime Minister Lester Bird, resigned after branding the action “unconstitutional,” both of the younger Birds, for quite different reasons, thus having left the government. A new scandal erupted in January 1992, when the opposition weekly Outlook accused Prime Minister Bird of having pocketed a government check for $25,000 that was to have covered unspecified “medical expenses” incurred by the cousin of a longtime live-in companion. The charges provoked a general strike as well as widespread civil unrest that included arson attacks on a number of public and private buildings. The prime minister responded with an announcement that he would not seek reelection in 1994, although Lester Bird, who had returned to the cabinet as external affairs minister, was unable to muster sufficient support at a party convention in May to stand forth as a certain successor to his father. He was, however, successful in a second leadership bid in September after gaining the support of Vere Bird Jr., who had previously endorsed his opponent. The ALP won its fifth consecutive general election in legislative balloting on March 8, 1994, albeit with a reduced majority of 11 of 17 seats. Two days later, Lester Bird announced the formation of a new government that included John ST. LUCE, his most recent challenger for the party leadership, while generating some surprise by excluding his brother Vere Bird Jr. The ALP majority in the House of Representatives increased to 12 seats in the election of March 9, 1999. Vere Bird Sr. died on June 28, 1999. In the wake of long-standing charges of corruption involving senior ministers, the ALP was decisively defeated in the election of March 23, 2004, with Lester Bird among those losing their House seats. On March 24, Winston Baldwin SPENCER,

A N T I G UA A N D BA R BU DA

Political Status: Former British dependency; joined West Indies Associated States in 1967; independent member of the Commonwealth since November 1, 1981. Area: 171.5 sq. mi. (444 sq. km.), encompassing the main island of Antigua (108 sq. mi.) and the dependent islands of Barbuda (62 sq. mi.) and Redonda (0.5 sq. mi.). Population: 77,426 (2001C); 81,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): ST. JOHN’S (22,700). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: East Caribbean Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2.70 EC dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Sir James B. CARLISLE; sworn in to succeed Sir Wilfred Ebenezer JACOBS, who retired June 10, 1993. Prime Minister: Winston Baldwin SPENCER (United Progressive Party); sworn in March 24, 2004, following election of March 23, succeeding Lester Bryant BIRD (Antigua Labour Party).

leader of the United Progressive Party (UPP) was sworn in as the new prime minister.

Constitution and Government Although the opposition Progressive Labour Movement (PLM) had campaigned for a unicameral legislature elected by proportional representation, the independence constitution retained the existing bicameral legislature composed of an appointed Senate and a House of Representatives elected from single-member constituencies (16 on Antigua and 1 on Barbuda) for a five-year term, subject to dissolution. Of the 17 senators, 11 are selected in consultation with the prime minister, 4 in consultation with the leader of the opposition, 1 on the advice of the smaller island’s Barbuda Council, and 1 at the governor general’s discretion. Executive power is exercised by a Council of Ministers headed by a prime minister and responsible to Parliament. The constitutional independence of

35

the judiciary is reinforced by the fact that Antigua and five neighboring states (Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) participate equally in a Supreme Court, which encompasses a Court of Appeal with a High Court, one of whose judges is resident in Antigua and presides over a Court of Summary Jurisdiction. District courts deal with minor offenses and civil actions involving not more than EC $500. While Antigua and Barbuda constitute a nominally unitary state, secessionist sentiment has long been pronounced on the smaller island. Premier Bird initiated, before independence, a limited devolution of powers to the Barbuda Council, which contains nine directly elected members in addition to a government nominee and the Barbuda parliamentary representative. However, in early 2000 Barbudans complained of the government’s handling their affairs through a single ministry (Home Affairs), and in March the Commonwealth appointed two members to review relations between the council and the government. Among other things, the council had called for establishment of a federal system under which Barbuda would have a legislative assembly with full authority over its internal affairs. In late 2000 the Commonwealth review commission rejected that proposal, although officials from Barbuda pledged to pursue the issue. Meanwhile, St. John’s endorsed the creation of a new joint consultative committee of representatives from both islands to oversee a proposed fiveyear development plan for Barbuda, and in 2004 the Spencer administration established a separate Barbuda ministry (Barbuda Affairs).

Foreign Relations In 1965 (then) chief minister Bird, a strong believer in regional cooperation, played a leading role in organizing the Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carifta), predecessor of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom). Upon independence, Antigua became a member of the Commonwealth and, shortly thereafter, the 157th member of the United Nations. Subsequently, St. John’s accepted observer status within

36

A N T I G UA A N D BA R BU DA

the Nonaligned Movement, viewing the latter as a “viable alternative [to] . . . confrontation between the superpowers.” However, in January 1982 the prime minister called on the United States to “protect” the Caribbean against foreign “subversive elements.” Antigua is also an active member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which provided troops in support of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983. The swing to the right continued in 1985, with St. John’s agreeing to the establishment of a U.S.-backed regional military training base on the main island and the use of existing U.S. bases for regional security exercises. In April 1999 the government announced an overhaul of its banking supervision board after foreign banks had been warned of dealing with local institutions because of money-laundering charges. In November the government said it had uncovered one such scheme and in April 2000 agreed to adopt a number of UN-sponsored measures to prevent abuses of its offshore facilities. In mid-2003 the Bird administration filed an appeal with the World Trade Organization (WTO) against restrictions on Internet gambling by U.S. consumers. Nine months later, in a landmark decision, the WTO ruled in favor of Antigua, stating that the restrictions were inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and in April 2005 the WTO ordered the United States to either lift its ban or remove a “discriminatory exemption” for horse-race betting.

Current Issues As of mid-2007 the WTO gambling controversy remained unresolved. The United States refused to comply with the WTO’s order on the ground that to do so would violate a number of state laws, and in September 2006 the U.S. Congress passed an “Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act” that specifically banned Internet horse-race betting and gambling within the United States. Washington’s truculence in the matter has been attributed largely to the fact that Antigua’s capacity to retaliate is

limited to sanctions on trade, the level of which is miniscule. Domestically, controversy has recently turned on a High Court claim by the government against nine opposition figures, including former Prime Minister Lester Bird, for allegedly misappropriating funds from government accounts in the Swiss American National Bank.

Political Parties Government Party United Progressive Party (UPP). The UPP was launched in March 1992 by merger of the Progressive Labour Movement (PLM), the United National Democratic Party (UNDP), and the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM). The action came in the wake of involvement by the three groups in antigovernment demonstrations triggered by the January corruption scandal. In power from 1971 to 1976 under its (then) leader George Walter, the PLM was organized in 1970 as the political affiliate of the Antigua Workers’ Union (AWU), which had emerged in the wake of a 1967 split in the Antigua Trades and Labour Union (AT&LU). The PLM delegation to the December 1980 independence talks in London refused to sign the conference report following rejection of proposals that included guarantees related to human rights and the right to strike, the adoption of proportional representation and a unicameral legislature, and assurances of greater local autonomy for Barbuda. In 1984 the party lost the three parliamentary seats it had won four years earlier, but with no parties other than the ruling ALP represented in the lower house, the PLM insisted that it remain the “official opposition.” The UNDP was formed in early 1986 by merger of the United People’s Movement (UPM) and the National Democratic Party (NDP). The UPM had been organized in 1982 by former PLM leader Walter, who had been forced to withdraw from active politics in February 1979 on conviction of mishandling state finances while premier from 1971 to 1976. The decision was reversed several days

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after the 1980 election, Walter subsequently accusing the new PLM leadership of efforts to exclude him. With considerable support from AWU members, who had been omitted from the PLM delegation to the independence talks, Walter announced that the UPM would be devoted to social democracy and to returning the country “to the hands of Antiguans”—a reference to extensive foreign participation in the economy. Ironically, in late 1982 a government official accused Walter of accepting financial support from Venezuela in return for a pledge of greater cooperation with Caracas should the UPM win power. The UPM secured no parliamentary representation in 1984 and Walter assumed no public role in forming the UNDP, reportedly because of the negative impact it might have in launching the new formation. The NDP was organized by a group of business leaders in early 1985. Initially perceived as a conservative alternative to both the ALP and the ACLM (below), it subsequently attempted to forge links with the leftist opposition in an effort to soften its image as a “middle-class party.” However, elements within the NDP, as well as within the ACLM, were reportedly opposed to the latter’s inclusion in the UNDP, which secured one parliamentary seat in 1989. Originally known as the Afro-Caribbean Liberation Movement, the ACLM was a “new left” organization that contested the 1980 election, winning less than 1 percent of the vote and obtaining no parliamentary seats. In 1982 ACLM accusations of government corruption in regard to the sale of passports and the alleged “disappearance” of loan funds resulted in a police raid on the offices of the party’s newspaper, The Outlet, where classified documents were discovered, in violation of the Official Secrets Act. Subsequently, party leader Tim Hector and a number of others were arrested and fined for violations of the Newspaper Registration Act and the Public Order Act. In 1985 Hector was sentenced to six months imprisonment on charges of “undermining confidence in a public official,” after publishing criticism of several government ministries; he remained free on bail while his appeal was heard, and in May 1986 his conviction

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was overturned by the High Court, which ruled the relevant section of the Public Order Act to be unconstitutional. The ACLM presented no candidates for the 1984 balloting; in 1989 it gained only 2 percent of the vote and won no seats. Hector died in November 2002. The UPP won only 4 lower house seats in 1999 but held a commanding majority of 13 seats after the 2004 balloting, with former opposition leader Baldwin Spencer being named prime minister. Leaders: Winston Baldwin SPENCER (Prime Minister), Wilmoth DANIEL (Deputy Prime Minister), Charlesworth SAMUEL (Agriculture Minister), Leon SYMISTER (Chair).

Opposition Party Antigua Labour Party (ALP). In power from 1967 to 1971 and a decisive victor in subsequent balloting in 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1989, the ALP has long been affiliated with the AT&LU. By the early 1980s, however, questions had arisen as to the viability of its grassroots linkages. In accepting redesignation as party chair in June 1984, the incumbent prime minister’s son, Lester Bird, adopted a posture of appealing over the heads of the older leadership to women’s, youth, and other groups for “modern approaches” and “a proper philosophical base” for party activity. In doing so, he appeared to be solidifying his claim to political succession, a claim strengthened in late 1989 with an agreement between rival ALP factions to rally behind the person ultimately selected by intraparty ballot to inherit the elder Bird’s mantle. In response to the corruption controversy that engulfed his administration in January 1992, the 82-year-old prime minister announced on March 30 that he would not seek reelection in 1994 but would continue in office for the balance of his existing term. Subsequently, balloting in a special ALP convention on May 24 to elect a new party leader ended inconclusively with an even split between Lester Bird and (then) information minister John St. Luce. In a second poll at the party’s annual convention on September 5–6, Bird defeated St. Luce, and he became prime minister in March 1994. He

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Cabinet As of April 1, 2007 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Winston Baldwin Spencer Wilmoth Daniel

Ministers Agriculture, Food Production, and Marine Resources Barbuda Affairs Ecclesiastical Affairs Education, Sports, and Youth Affairs Finance and Economy, Social Security, Cooperatives, Insurance and Credit Unions Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Health and 2007 Cricket World Cup Housing and Social Transformation Information, Broadcasting, and Telecommunications Justice and Public Safety, Police and Fire Division Legal Affairs and Attorney General National Security Public Utilities and Energy Public Works, and Transportation Tourism and Civil Aviation; Environment and Culture Without Portfolio

remained in office after the March 1999 poll but led his party to defeat in March 2004. Leaders: Steadroy (“Cutie”) BENJAMIN (Leader of the Opposition), Lester B. BIRD (Former Prime Minster and Former Leader of the Opposition), Vere C. BIRD Jr. (Party Chair), Adolphus Eleazer FREELAND (Former Party Chair), John E. ST. LUCE.

Other Parties National Movement for Change (NMC). The NMC was organized as an anti-Bird opposition party in March 2002. Leader: Alistair THOMAS. First Christian Democratic Movement (FCDM). The FCDM was launched in 2003. Leader: Egbert JOSEPH.

Charlesworth Samuel Winston Baldwin Spencer Winston Baldwin Spencer Bertrand Joseph Leon Errol Cort Winston Baldwin Spencer John Herbert Maginley Hilson Baptiste Edmond Mansoor Colin Derrick Justin Simon Winston Baldwin Spencer Winston Baldwin Spencer Wilmoth Daniel Harold Lovell Aziz Hadeed

Barbuda People’s Movement (BPM). The BPM is a separatist party that presently controls the local Barbuda Council. Having rejected the independence agreement, party leader Hilbourne Frank asserted in early 1982 that parliament’s passage of a bill altering land-tenure practices and permitting individual ownership “erodes the traditional, customary and constitutional authority handed down to the Council and the people of Barbuda.” Frank was elected Barbuda’s parliamentary deputy on March 9, 1989, while the BPM swept all four local Council contests at balloting on March 23 to win full control of the nine elective seats. In March 1997 the BPM won all five seats up for reelection, thereby retaining full control of the body. Leaders: Thomas Hilbourne FRANK, Fabian JONES (Chair).

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Barbuda People’s Movement for Change (BPMC). Launched in 2004 as the successor to the former Organization for National Reconstruction (ONR), the BPMC favors self-government for Barbuda. Leader: Arthur SHABAZZ-NIBBS.

The Worker’s Voice (6,000), twice-weekly organ of the ALP and AT&LU; The Outlet (5,500), ACLM weekly; The Nation (1,500), government weekly; Antigua Sun, daily; Rappore, UPP weekly.

A number of additional parties emerged prior to the 2004 election, including the Antigua Freedom Party (AFP), the Democratic People’s Party (DPP), the National Labour Party (NLP), and the Organization for National Development (OND).

There is no domestic facility. Most media rely on the regional Caribbean News Agency (CANA) for international coverage.

Legislature

Radio ZDK is a private station broadcasting from St. John’s. The government-operated Antigua and Barbuda Broadcasting Service (ABBS) transmits over one radio station and one TV facility, the latter providing the most sophisticated full-color service in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Other radio facilities include Voice of America, BBC Caribbean, and Deutsche Welle relays, plus a religious station, Caribbean Radio Lighthouse; additional television service is provided by privately owned CTV Entertainment Systems. As of 2005 there were 356 Internet users and 1,056 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

The Parliament is a bicameral body consisting of an appointed Senate and a directly elected House of Representatives. Senate. The upper house has 17 members named by the governor general: 11 (including at least 1 from Barbuda) appointed on advice of the prime minister, 4 named after consultation with the leader of the opposition, 1 recommended by the Barbuda Council, and 1 chosen at the governor general’s discretion. President: Hazelyn Mason FRANCIS. House of Representatives. The lower house has 17 members chosen every five years (subject to dissolution) from single-member constituencies, plus the attorney general, ex officio. At the most recent election of March 23, 2004, the UPP won 12 seats; the ALP, 4; and the BPM, 1 (obtained subsequently in a tie-breaker with the BPMC). Speaker: Giselle ISAAC-ARRINDELL.

News Agency

Broadcasting and Computing

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Deborah Mae LOVELL U.S. Ambassador to Antigua and Barbuda: Mary Martin QURISMAN (resident in Barbados)

Communications

Permanent Representative to the UN: John William ASHE

Freedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed. The following are published in St. John’s:

IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OECS, OPANAL, WTO

Press

A R G E N T I NA ARGENTINE REPUBLIC Rep u´ blica Argentina

The Country Second in size among the countries of South America, the Argentine Republic includes the national territory of Tierra del Fuego and claims certain South Atlantic islands (including the Falklands), as well as portions of Antarctica. The country extends 2,300 miles from north to south and exhibits a varied climate and topography, including the renowned pampas, the fertile central plains. The population is largely Caucasian but of diverse national origin. Spaniards and Italians predominate, but there are also large groups from other Western and Eastern European countries, as well as Middle Easterners of both Arab and Jewish descent. Although Spanish is the official language, English, Italian, German, and French are also spoken. More than 90 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. According to 2001 Census, literacy was over 97%. Women pursue professional careers in great numbers. With the exception of both wives of former president Per´on, women have historically been minimally represented in government, although a women’s group called Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo was at the forefront of opposition to the former military regime. In the 2007 presi´ dential election, a woman, Cristina FERNANDEZ de Kirchner, was elected president. In the Higher Chamber, 27 out of 77 members are women, and in the Lower Chamber, 99 out of 277 members are women. Argentinians have traditionally enjoyed one of the highest per capita incomes in South America but for a number of years were subject to rampant inflation that escalated to more than 1000 percent

in early 1985, necessitating a drastic currency revision by midyear as part of a series of “war economy” measures. Inflation fell to an annualized rate of 50 percent the following year but escalated to an unprecedented rate of nearly 5000 percent in 1989, despite several attempted stabilization programs. However, a currency convertibility plan introduced in March 1991 (under which the peso was pegged to the U. S. dollar) subsequently eliminated hyperinflation (which declined steadily to a remarkable low of 0.1 percent in 1996) and prompted a surge of investment. The currency change also required

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Political Status: Independent republic proclaimed 1816; under military regimes 1966–1973 and 1976–1983; current constitution adopted August 22, 1994. Area: 1,068,013 sq. mi. (2,766,889 sq. km.), excluding territory claimed in Antarctica and the South Atlantic. Population: 36,260,130 (2001C); 39,596,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): BUENOS AIRES (12,704,000), C´ordoba (1,315,000), Rosario (908,000), La Plata (581,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Peso (official rate November 2, 2007: 3.13 pesos = $1US). The peso had been at par with the dollar from 1991 to 2001, but in the wake of a severe economic crisis it was devalued for financial and international trade purposes to a rate of 1.40 pesos = $1US on January 7, 2002; concurrently, it was allowed to float for other transactions. A unified floating (albeit heavily managed) exchange rate system was introduced on February 11, 2002. ´ President: Cristina FERNANDEZ de Kirchner (Justicialist Party–Victory Front); elected on October 28, 2007 and inaugurated for a four-year term on December 10, 2007 to succeed N´estor Carlos KIRCHNER (Justicialist Party–Victory Front). Vice President: Julio C´esar Cleto COBOS (Radical Civic Union for Kirchner–Victory Front); elected on October 28, 2007, and inaugurated for a term concurrent with that of the president on December 10, 2007, succeeding Daniel Osvaldo SCIOLI (Justicialist Party).

the imposition of conservative banking measures, including higher interest rates. GDP, which had fallen by an average of 0.4 percent annually in 1980–1990, rose by an average of 5.3 percent annually during 1990–1998. However, international financial crises in 1997–1999 tested the convertibility law, and, in part due to the refusal of the government to devalue the peso, the economy subsequently suffered more than three years

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of recession, with unemployment rates ranging between 14 and 19 percent. In a move that generated substantial global attention, the government in late 2001 announced a moratorium on repayments of $155 billion of public debt. (Formal default on the debt front was averted in mid-2002 with a $550 million repayment to the Inter-American Development Bank [IADB], although no progress was registered in talks with private bondholders, to whom an overwhelming proportion of the loans was owed.) Meanwhile, the peso was devalued in January 2002 and allowed to float in February in an effort to spur growth. The economy experienced a severe decline of 11.0 percent in 2002, but it rebounded to growth of 8.8 percent in 2003 and 9.0 percent in 2004, with the government holding firm to an offer to settle on a 70 percent write-down of the privately held bonds’ nominal value. In early March 2005 agreement was reached with three-quarters of the private creditors on a write-down of approximately $100 billion, and in late December the country paid off its outstanding debt of $9.8 billion to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with the Kirchner administration concurrently declaring that it was severing relations with the fund. Significantly, growth averaged 8 percent per year in 2003–2006, and unemployment, which had been mired in double digits for nearly a decade, fell to 8.7 percent at the end of that period. However, the administration’s fiscal policies also led to rising inflation, which reached 9.8 percent in 2006, more than three times that of Brazil, Argentina’s major trading partner. When the government reported an unusually low 1.1 percent monthly rate of inflation in January 2007 (1.8 percent had been forecast), many analysts questioned the accuracy of the figures. Among those concerned over the poor quality of the official economic statistics were investors, who had also been upset the previous December by the government’s decision to extend the “economic emergency” law of 2002, which gave the government the right to freeze tariffs on utilities and to renegotiate privatization agreements. Labor leaders also charged the government with failing to bargain with them in good faith by relying on the allegedly faulty data

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in determining inflation-adjusted raises. That issue was a major factor in a three-day teachers’ strike in April.

Government and Politics Political Background Following the struggle for independence from Spain in 1810–1816, Argentina experienced a period of conflict over its form of government. The provinces advocated a federal system to guarantee their autonomy, while Buenos Aires favored a unitary state in which it would play a dominant role. A federal constitution was drafted in 1853, but Buenos Aires refused to ratify the document until its 1859 defeat in a brief war. Following a second military reversal in 1880, the territory was politically neutralized by being designated a federal district. The early years of the 20th century were dominated by the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador—PC). However, the reformist Radical Civic Union (Uni´on C´ıvica Radical—UCR) in 1912 successfully pressed for enactment of a liberal electoral law that resulted in the election of UCR leader Hip´olito IRIGOYEN as president in 1916. Faced with mounting economic problems, the Irigoyen government was overthrown and replaced by the nation’s first military regime in 1930. With the election of August´ın P. JUSTO to the presidency in 1932, a second period of Conservative rule was launched that lasted until 1943, when the military again intervened. Juan Domingo ´ Sosa was elected chief executive in 1946, PERON inaugurating a populist dictatorship that was eventually overthrown in 1955. His second wife, Mar´ıa ´ (better known as Eva Per´on Eva Duarte de PERON or Evita) was an active participant. She established the Eva Per´on Foundation with donations and funds coerced from the private sector, which helped to improve the lives of the poor. Per´on’s influence over the political arena can hardly be exaggerated, as it was during his government and through his leadership that unions were recognized as legitimate political actors and that the “masses” (known as

the descamisados or “shirtless ones”) were incorporated into political strategies. Women’s suffrage was introduced in 1951 after a strong campaign by Evita. Per´on relied more on cooptation and coercion than on democratic representation, and he struggled when economic growth slowed and the politicized masses had minimal institutional channels to accommodate them. During his term in office, a divorce law was promulgated with Per´on’s approval, an act which put him at odds with the Catholic Church, which actively campaigned for his removal. The loss of control was noted by elites, who supported the military coup that removed Per´on. Subsequent military and democratic governments attempted to “ban” peronism, but it remained the country’s most powerful ideological influence. In the March 1973 general election, the pero´ nista Dr. H´ector J. CAMPORA emerged victorious. Four months later C´ampora resigned to force a new election in which Per´on would be eligible as a candidate. The new round of balloting, held in September, returned the former president to power with an overwhelming majority after 18 years of exile. Following his inauguration, Per´on was plagued by factionalism within his movement and by increasingly widespread opposition from guerrilla groups. After his death on July 1, 1974, he was succeeded by his wife, Isabel (born Mar´ıa Estela) Mart´ınez ´ who had been elected vice president de PERON, the preceding September. Isabel Per´on’s turbulent presidency was terminated on March 24, 1976, by a three-man military junta, which on March 26 designated Lt. Gen. Jorge Rafael VIDELA as her replacement. In December 1976 General Videla stated that his government was “very close to final victory” over left-wing terrorists, most prominently the so-called Montonero guerrillas and the People’s Revolutionary Army. Earlier, in an apparent consolidation of power by Videla, a number of rightist officers were retired and replaced by moderates. On May 2, 1978, however, it was announced that while Videla had been redesignated as president for a three-year term retroactive to March 29, he would cease to serve as a member of the junta following his military retirement on August 1. The pattern was repeated

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with the retirement of Lt. Gen. Roberto Eduardo VIOLA as army commander and junta member as of December 31, 1979, and his designation to succeed Videla in March 1981. Buffeted by health problems and an inability to deal with a rapidly deteriorating economy, Viola stepped down as chief executive on December 11, and he was succeeded eleven days later by the army commander, Lt. Gen. Leopoldo Fortunato GALTIERI, who continued as a member of the junta, along with Adm. Jorge Isaac ANAYA and Lt. Gen. Basilio Arturo LAMI DOZO, commanders of the navy and air force, respectively. The region and the world were shaken by a brief but intense conflict with Great Britain that erupted in 1982 as the result of a 149-year dispute over ownership of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), located in the South Atlantic about 400 miles northeast of Tierra del Fuego. Argentina invaded the islands on April 2, prompting the dispatch of a British armada that succeeded in regaining control with the surrender of about 15,000 Argentine troops in the capital, Stanley, on July 15 (see Contested Territory, below). Branded as having “sold out” the country by his conduct of the war, Galtieri resigned on June 17 and was succeeded immediately as army commander by Maj. Gen. Cristino NICOLAIDES and on July 1 as president by Gen. Reynaldo Benito Antonio BIGNONE. In the face of an economic crisis and mounting pressure from the nation’s political parties, Bignone announced in February 1983 that elections for a civilian government would be advanced to the following October. In balloting for national, provincial, and municipal authorities on October 30, 1983, the UCR, under the leadership of Ra´ul ALFONS´IN Foulkes, scored a decisive victory, winning not only the presidency but a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Following pro forma designation by the electoral college, Alfons´ın and his vice-presidential running mate, V´ıctor MARTINEZ, were sworn in for sixyear terms on December 10. On November 3, 1985, at the first renewal of the lower house in twenty years, the UCR marginally increased its majority, largely at the expense of the

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oficialista wing of the Peronist party (see Justicialist Party [Partido Justicialista—PJ], under Political Parties, below). On September 6, 1987, on the other hand, the Radicals were reduced to plurality status, with most of the Peronist gains again being registered by the movement’s renovadores faction, whose principal leaders, Antonio CAFIERO (governor of Buenos Aires) and Carlos Sa´ul MENEM (governor of La Rioja), emerged as the leading peronista contenders for presidential nomination. In the primary balloting in July 1988, Menem and the UCR’s Eduardo C´esar ANGELOZ were formally selected as their parties’ standard-bearers for the presidential poll, which yielded a peronista victory on May 14, 1989. Although not scheduled to be inaugurated until December 10, Menem and his running mate, Eduardo Alberto DUHALDE, were sworn in on July 8, following congressional acceptance of the resignations of their predecessors. The unprecedented early transfer resulted from suddenly escalating commodity prices in late May that necessitated the declaration of a state of siege to contain widespread food riots. However, Menem’s standing in the opinion polls, which had reached a peak of 74 percent in September, plunged to a low of 31 percent by the end of the year because of his inability to halt the downward economic spiral. In early December 1990 the army responded to the country’s economic problems, as well as to the imprisonment of officers associated with the “dirty war” of 1976–1983, with its fourth revolt in three years. The government moved quickly, however, to counter the dissidents, who had seized the army headquarters in central Buenos Aires immediately prior to a state visit by U. S. President George H. W. Bush. The uprising was reported to have been staged by a nationalist military faction headed by (former) Colonel Mohamed Al´ı SEINELDIN, who was under arrest at the time. Thereafter, despite widespread popular opposition, Menem issued pardons for a number of former presidents and military leaders convicted of criminal acts during the period of military rule, as well as for former Montonero guerrilla leader Mario FIRMENICH and several others.

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Largely because of continued implementation of stringent economic reforms, including the introduction of full currency convertibility in March, inflation plunged in 1991, yielding an unexpectedly strong peronista showing in a series of provincial and federal legislative elections between August and October. One of the victors was Vice President Duhalde, who resigned his federal post on December 5 to assume the governorship of Buenos Aires province. In mid-1993 President Menem indicated that, subsequent to forthcoming congressional balloting, he might call a national referendum on constitutional reform, the most important component of which would permit him to seek reelection. However, the peronistas secured an unprecedented victory in the poll of October 3, and on November 14 Menem and opposition leader Alfons´ın concluded a “Democratic Pact” (see Constitution and Government, below) that made the referendum unnecessary. In Constituent Assembly balloting on April 10, 1994, both of the leading formations experienced setbacks. The peronistas were held to a plurality of 136 seats on a 37.7 percent share of the vote, while the UCR won 75 seats on a 19.9 percent vote share. The most striking gain was registered by the left-of-center Broad Front (Frente Grande—FG) coalition, which captured 31 seats as contrasted with only 3 Chamber seats in 1993. In the general election of May 14, 1995, Menem surpassed poll projections by easily winning direct election to a new four-year mandate on a 49.8 percent vote share—20.6 percent more than that of his nearest competitor, Jos´e Octavio BORDON, who headed a recently formed leftist coalition (the Front for a Country in Solidarity [Frente del Pa´ıs Solidario—Frepaso]), that included the FG. By contrast, the UCR candidate, Horatio MASSACCESI, came in third with 17.1 percent of the vote. The Justicialist Party (PJ), as the peronistas were formally known, also won control of a majority of lower house seats and 9 of 14 contested provincial governorships. Further rounds of regional balloting later in the year gave the PJ control of 14 of the country’s 23 provinces; 5 of the

remainder were won by the UCR and 4 by provincial parties. However, in a dramatic reversal in Buenos Aires’ first-ever mayoral election on June 30, 1996, the UCR candidate, Fernando DE LA ´ swept to victory with a 39.8 percent vote RUA share, while the incumbent, Jorge DOMINGUEZ, placed third in the four-candidate field with 18.8 percent. In nationwide balloting on October 26, 1997, the peronistas lost control of the Chamber of Deputies by winning only 51 of 127 contested seats; the opposition UCR and Frepaso secured 46 seats in a coalition and an additional 17 seats on separate lists. On October 24, 1999, opposition presidential candidate de la R´ua defeated the PJ’s Duhalde with a 48.5 percent vote share. In simultaneous balloting for 130 of 257 Chamber of Deputies’ seats, representation of the president-elect’s Alliance for Work, Justice and Education (Alianza por Trabajo, Justicia y Educaci´on—ATJE) rose to 127, which, with the support of third-party allies, gave it a working majority. In addition to continuing economic malaise, the de la R´ua administration was shaken by a bribery scandal in September 2000 that prompted a cabinet reshuffle on October 5. Protesting the retention of two ministers who had been implicated in the affair, Vice President Carlos Alberto ALVAREZ resigned the following day, his Senate presidency being assumed by the president pro tempore, Mario An´ıbal LOSADA. In the congressional balloting on October 14, 2001, the peronistas regained control of both houses, the ATJE winning only 88 of 257 Chamber and 25 of 72 Senate seats. Two months later, on December 20, President de la R´ua resigned in the face of widespread public protests over continued economic decline, and Senate President Ram´on PUERTA became his successor on an acting basis. On December 23 a special joint session of legislators and provincial governors elected the Peronist governor of San Luis, Adolfo RODR´IGUEZ Sa´a, as interim chief executive. Rodr´ıguez Sa´a was popularly applauded when he immediately declared a moratorium on the payment of Argentina’s

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international debt, but many established politicians did not back him on the measure. Rodr´ıguez Sa´a resigned on December 30, his office devolving briefly on the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Ed˜ before passing by another joint uardo CAMANO, election to former vice president Eduardo Duhalde on January 1, 2002. Duhalde quickly ended the convertibility regime and allowed the peso to float. He chose N´estor Carlos KIRCHNER, a governor from the remote province of Santa Cruz, as his preferred successor, rejecting Menem. In first-round presidential balloting on April 27, 2003, former president Menem narrowly outpolled Kirchner, a fellow peronista, with a plurality of 24.3 percent. On May 14, however, Menem withdrew from a runoff after it became apparent that Kirchner would be supported by the other minor candidates. Kirchner and his running mate, Daniel SCIOLI, were subsequently inaugurated on May 25. Before the legislative poll of October 23, 2005, Kirchner waged a bitter struggle with his immediate predecessor, Duhalde, over control of the Justicialist Party, while launching on August 24 a Victory Front grouping to contest constituencies where his supporters did not possess majorities. The strategy yielded a substantial victory for the kirchneristas, who won 69 of 127 contested seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 17 of 24 in the Senate. Although President Kirchner’s approval rating stood at 60 percent in July 2007, he declined to stand in the upcoming election, announcing on July 1 that his wife, first lady and senator Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner, would be a candidate to succeed him, fueling speculation that the presidential couple aimed to circumvent constitutional convention by holding rotating presidencies for the maximum number of terms, effectively holding collective leadership during both their tenures in the office. Other presidential candidates included former finance minister Roberto LAVAGNA, who enjoyed the backing of some Justicialist Party dissidents, including the Duhalde family, and some UCR members. Meanwhile, powerful anti-Kirchner peronistas, including former presidents Menem and

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Puerta, decided to support their own candidate, Alberto Rodr´ıguez Sa´a. In the presidential election of October 28, 2007, Senator Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner secured 44.92 percent of votes, precluding a recount by exceeding the forty percent threshold requirement to become Argentina’s first elected woman president. ´ Her nearest rival, Elisa Mar´ıa Avelina CARRIO, of the Affirmation for an Egalitarian Republic (Afirmaci´on para Una Rep´ublica Igualitaria— ARI), represented the Coalici´on C´ıvica with a 22.95 percent vote share, followed by Roberto Lavagna, of the Concertation Alliance (Alianza Concertaci´on UNA—AC), with 16.88 percent. Minor candidates included Alberto Jos´e Rodr´ıguez Sa´a, representing the Union and Liberty Party (Alianza Frente Justicia Union y Libertad—JUL), with 7.71 percent of votes, and N´estor PITROLA, representing the Worker’s Party (Partido Obrero— PO) with 6.19 percent. Legislative elections also held on October 28, 2007, returned pluralities for the Victory Front (Frente para la Victoria—FPV) (see Legislature, below).

Constitution and Government After Argentina returned to civilian rule in 1983, most of the constitutional structure of 1853 was reintroduced. The president and vice president were again designated for nonrenewable six-year terms by an electoral college chosen on the basis of proportional representation, with each electoral district having twice as many electors as the combined number of senators and deputies. The National Congress consisted of a 46-member Senate, one-third being replenished every three years, and a 254-member Chamber of Deputies, one-half being elected every two years. The judicial system encompassed a Supreme Court, federal appeals courts, and provincial structures including supreme and subsidiary judicial bodies. In 1993 President Carlos Menem negotiated an agreement (in what became known as the Olivos Pact) on constitutional change that would allow reelection of the president in exchange for reducing

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the presidential mandate from six to four years. The pact also reduced some of the powers of the president over other branches. The constitution of August 1994 provided for direct election of the president and vice president for four-year terms, with the possibility of one consecutive renewal. (First-round election requires a 45 percent majority [40 percent in the event of a gap greater than 10 percent between the two leading contenders].) Newly created was the post of cabinet chief (jefe de gabinete), a coordinating position filled by presidential appointment, subject to recall by an absolute majority of each of the legislative chambers. The number of senators from each province was increased from two to three under the 1994 basic law revisions, the added member to represent the leading opposition party or group. The senatorial mandate, on the other hand, was shortened from nine years to six, with replenishment of one-third by direct election every two years commencing in the year 2001. The Chamber of Deputies continued to be renewed by halves every two years. The 1994 basic law provided for an auditor general nominated by the largest opposition party and for a people’s defender (ombudsman) appointed for a once-renewable five-year term by a two-thirds vote of each legislative chamber. It also affirmed Argentina’s sovereignty over the Falklands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich islands. There are now 23 provinces (Tierra del Fuego having been upgraded from the status of a National Territory in 1991), plus the Federal District of Buenos Aires. The provinces elect their own governors and legislatures and retain those powers not specifically delegated to the federal government; in practice, however, there has been a history of substantial federal intervention in provincial affairs. Included in the current constitution is a provision that the mayor of Buenos Aires (formerly a presidential appointee) also be directly elected. In August 2006 the congress voted to give expanded powers to President N´estor Kirchner, including the ability to make alterations in the government budget without congressional approval and to issue executive decrees. Concurrently,

Kirchner agreed to make Supreme Court Judicial nominations more transparent and to reduce the size of the court from nine to five (reversing the Menem expansion in 1990). He also reduced the size of the Magistrates’ Council from 20 to 13 members, 5 of whom he appoints. Province and Capital Buenos Aires (La Plata) Catamarca (Catamarca) Chaco (Resistencia) Chubut (Rawson) C´ordoba (C´ordoba) Corrientes (Corrientes) Entre R´ıos (Paran´a) Formosa (Formosa) Jujuy (San Salvador de Jujuy) La Pampa (Santa Rosa) La Rioja (La Rioja) Mendoza (Mendoza) Misiones (Posadas) Neuqu´en (Neuqu´en) R´ıo Negro (Viedma) Salta (Salta) San Juan (San Juan) San Luis (San Luis) Santa Cruz (R´ıo Gallegos) Santa F´e (Santa F´e) Santiago del Estero (Santiago del Estero) Tierra del Fuego (Ushuaia) Tucum´an (San Miguel de Tucum´an)

Area (sq. mi.)

Population (2006E)

118,843 38,540 38,468 86,751 65,161 34,054 29,427 27,825 20,548 55,382 35,649 58,239 11,506 36,324 78,383 59,759 33,257 29,632 94,186 51,354 52,222

14,634,000 378,000 1,065,000 443,000 3,328,000 1,007,000 1,233,000 538,000 657,000 322,000 333,000 1,671,000 1,067,000 523,000 578,000 1,205,000 670,000 417,000 220,000 3,109,000 878,000

8,074 8,697

121,000 1,449,000

77

2,686,000

Federal District Distrito Federal (Buenos Aires)

Foreign Relations Argentina has traditionally maintained an independent foreign policy and has been reluctant to follow U. S. leadership in hemispheric and world affairs. Argentina claims territory in the Antarctic and, despite the outcome of the 1982 war with Britain, continues to assert its long-standing claim to sovereignty over the Falklands (Islas Malvinas). The latter has won support at the UN General

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Assembly, which, since the cessation of hostilities, has repeatedly called on the claimants to initiate negotiations on a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Relations with Chile became tense following the announcement in May 1977 that a panel of international arbitrators had awarded Chile the ownership of three disputed islands in the Beagle Channel, just north of Cape Horn. As in the case of the Falklands, there is evidence of petroleum in the area. The award also permitted Chile to extend its nominal jurisdiction into the Atlantic, thereby strengthening its Antarctic claims, which overlap those of Argentina. Having expected a “political” rather than a purely legal judgment, with at least one island being awarded to each country, Argentina formally repudiated the decision in January 1978. A subsequent 19-month mediation effort by Pope John Paul II resulted in a proposal that endorsed the awarding of the three islands to Chile, while limiting the assignment of offshore rights on the Atlantic side of the Cape Horn meridian. The proposal was rejected by the Argentine junta but accepted by Ra´ul Alfons´ın before his election as president of Argentina, and a treaty ending the century-old dispute was narrowly ratified by the Argentine Senate in March 1985. Additional border issues were ostensibly resolved by an agreement between presidents Menem of Argentina and Frei of Chile in 1991, but its terms drew opposition in both countries because of an “additional protocol” concluded by the two chief executives in late 1996. It was not until June 1999 that ratifications were completed on the Continental Glaciers Treaty that resolved the last remaining border dispute between the two countries. For nearly a decade Argentina was embroiled in a dispute with Brazil over water rights on the Paran´a River. In October 1979, however, both countries joined Paraguay in signing an agreement that not only resolved differences over Brazil’s Itaip´u Dam, the world’s largest, but also freed the way for cooperative exploitation of the Uruguay River. Economic linkage between the continent’s two largest states was further enhanced on December 10, 1986, with the signing by presidents Alfons´ın and Sarney of 20 accords launching an ambitious economic in-

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tegration effort. Under the plan, a customs union was established for most capital goods as of January 1, 1987, with cooperation in the exchange of food products, the promotion of bilateral industrial ventures, the establishment of a $200 million joint investment fund, and joint energy development (including a new $2 billion hydroelectric facility) to follow. President Sanguinetti of Uruguay, who was at the meeting, pledged his “determined support” for the move and agreed to a series of ministeriallevel talks designed to pave the way for his country’s participation in the integration process. The result was the signing in Asunci´on, Paraguay, on March 26, 1991, of a four-nation treaty (including the host country) providing for the formation of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Com´un del Cono Sur—Mercosur). In 1988 Argentina and Brazil agreed to cooperate in the nuclear power industry. While neither was a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (see article on the International Atomic Energy Agency), the two countries formally rejected the development of nuclear weaponry in a July 1991 accord that also banned the introduction of such arms from external sources. In addition, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, after a lengthy delay, voted in November 1993 to ratify the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (see article on the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), which bans nuclear weapons from the continent. Although insisting during the 1989 presidential campaign that Argentina would recover the Falklands “even if blood has to be spilled,” Menem subsequently indicated that he was prepared to engage in a “civilized dialogue” with Britain, particularly if the latter were to abandon its economic zone around the islands. In mid-October the first direct talks between the two countries in five years were held in Madrid, Spain. At the conclusion of a second round of talks in Madrid on February 15, 1990, an agreement was reached to restore full diplomatic relations. By contrast, fresh tension erupted in August 1993 as the result of a suggestion that the Falkland Islanders be given cash awards by Buenos Aires to

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reduce their opposition to Argentine sovereignty claims, coupled with the introduction by Britain of a new fishing license regime for the waters around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. No sooner was an agreement reached in settlement of the latter controversy than a British geological survey suggested that the undersea oil potential in the Falklands area appeared to be substantially greater than in Britain’s North Sea fields. The result was a major agreement signed in New York in September 1995 for joint oil and gas exploration in a 7,000-square-mile area southwest of the disputed islands (see Contested Territory, below). In October 1998 President Menem traveled to Britain for the first such visit by an Argentine chief executive in four decades. Although he insisted during his stay that the question of sovereignty over the Falklands remained nonnegotiable, tension between the former combatants manifestly eased, and in mid-December the administration of Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that the British arms embargo would be relaxed, save for materiel that would put the disputed territory at renewed risk. In mid-1999 an agreement was reached on the restoration of air traffic with the mainland and a resumption of visits to the territory by Argentinians. However, the dispute over sovereignty remained unresolved and the issue was not discussed during a visit by Blair (the first by a British prime minister) in August 2001. The Argentinian hard line continued under President Kirchner, who, in April 2005, emphasized his government’s commitment to “full recovery” of the islands, albeit “through dialogue and peace.” Relations with Brazil were at their warmest with a state visit by Brazilian President Lula da Silva in October 2003 but declined thereafter. With growth in Argentine exports to Brazil in 2003–2004 scarcely more than 10 percent of Brazil’s to Argentina, Buenos Aires complained of Mercosur’s “economic asymmetries”; Argentina also objected to Brazil’s posture as regional leader in its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council. BrazilianArgentine relations subsequently continued to decline as Argentina turned much of its trade attention toward Venezuela, with whom Kirchner, as a

“progressive Peronist,” desired closer ties. Argentina and Venezuela became involved in the proposed development of a South American development bank that would be an alternative to the U. S.-dominated IADB; the two countries also urged the creation of an organization of petroleum- and gas-producing countries in South America. Concurrently, Venezuela agreed to supply lower-priced oil to Argentina, and the Venezuelan government bought $3.1 billion of Argentine bonds. The ties between the two administrations negatively affected U. S.-Argentine relations, especially after the Argentine government hosted Venezuelan President Ch´avez in Buenos Aires for a “counter rally” to the simultaneous visit of U. S. President George W. Bush to Uruguay. Despite hopes that relations could improve under the new president, U. S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pointedly skipped Argentina in a regional tour during March 2008. Relations have also worsened quite significantly with Uruguay recently as a result of Argentine opposition to the decision of a Finnish company (Botnia) to invest in a pulp mill along the Uruguay River. (The project was supported by a $100 billion loan from the World Bank.) Argentine protestors insisted that the mill would bring pollution and that Argentina should have been consulted on the project. Protests included the blockade of bridges between the two countries. The Spanish company Ence subsequently decided to move a related project to a less controversial section of Uruguay, but Botnia and Uruguayan president Tabar´e Vazquez did not appear willing to back down. President N´estor Kirchner, his wife, president-elect Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner, Tabar´e Vazquez, and the King of Spain met in Santiago, Chile, the first week of November 2007 to discuss the pulp mill on the banks of the River Uruguay. The following week, the president of Uruguay closed the border with Argentina. While they were negotiating in Chile, Vazquez gave the green light for the inauguration of the mill. Upon learning of the decision, the Argentine government left the negotiating table. Relations between Venezuela and Argentina took a slight, but brief, turn for the worse on

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November 18, 2006, when an Argentine judge issued warrants for Akbar Rafsanjani (Iranian president in 1989–1997) and eight other former Iranian officials for an alleged background role in an attack on a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994, that killed 85 people. The judge argued that the Lebanese group Hezbollah had been implicated in the bombing and that the Iranian officials were potentially liable because of their financial support of Hezbollah. Ch´avez’s unwavering support for the Iranian republic led Kirchner’s housing secretary, Luis D’EL´IA, considered pro-Ch´avez, to critique the warrant as “an American-Israeli military aggression against the Islamic republic.” D’El´ıa was subsequently sacked.

Current Issues In addition to fostering economic recovery, President N´estor Kirchner was widely credited with challenging the “impunity” granted by the Menem administration to those involved in the authoritarian excesses during the 1976–1983 junta rule. The president called for the prosecution of numerous officials who had been covered by the previous amnesty agreement, while in 2005 the Supreme Court annulled several amnesty laws that had protected low-ranking officers who had argued they had acted in “due obedience” during the “dirty war.” That decision led to many trials, including ´ a former police sergeant, who that of Julio SIMON, was sentenced to 25 years in prison for kidnapping and torture. Problems arose in the case of Miguel ETCHECOLATZ, police commissioner in Buenos Aires province during the period in question. He was sent to prison for life on the evidence provided by more than 130 people. However, on the day before his testimony, a witness for the prosecution went missing and was presumed dead, leading many to question the accountability of the current police force. Kirchner was subsequently perceived as being less successful in dealing with impunity in regard to current malfeasance than in regard to earlier actions. The challenge to impunity most prominently led to the overturning of pardons of Jorge VIDELA,

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the first leader of the military junta, and Albano HARGUINDEGUY and Jos´e Mart´ınez de HOZ, former interior and economic ministers, respectively. About 200 other people had been arrested and were scheduled to be tried for crimes related to the military period, and Kirchner had clearly decided that the legacy of justice would be central to his administration. However, critics of Kirchner pointed to the “lopsided” direction of prosecutions, noting that Montoneros and other leftist revolutionaries remained protected from arrest. (Kirchner was close to several ex-Montoneros, as were other members of his administration.) Meanwhile, in a more surprising move, Argentine officials asked Spanish authorities to detain former president Mar´ıa Estela de Per´on for human rights investigations. She has been largely perceived to have had no control over the government when she was president from 1974 to 1976, and she has denied any knowledge of the activities under investigation. By mid December 2007, the former commander of the Army, Cristino Nicolaides, received 25 years in prison. Another seven members of the same battalion received between 20 and 25 years in prison for kidnapping and torture during the “dirty war.” On August 4, 2007, Guido Alejandro Antonini Wilson, a businessman holding joint U.S.Venezuelan citizenship, arrived in Buenos Aires with $800,000 in his suitcase. He traveled on a private jet chartered by Enarsa, an oil company owned by the Argentine government, and was accompanied by the company president and representatives of the Venezuelan state oil company, PDVSA (Petr´oleos de Venezuela, S.A.). By the time this trip was made public, Wilson had already returned to Miami. Investigators suspected that the money was destined for use as bribe payments or to fund groups sympathetic to Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez. On December 12, four Venezuelans and a Uruguayan were charged in Miami with acting illegally as agents of the Venezuelan government by allegedly attempting to pressure Antonini to cover up the source and destination of the money. According to FBI records, the money was earmarked for Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner’s campaign, a charge denied by the Argentine government.

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In an effort to promote investment in Argentina, Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner traveled to Germany and Austria in the run-up to the presidential election, and visited the U. S. after winning the presidency. She also met with the presidents of Brazil, Venezuela and Bolivia during the campaign, burnishing her credentials as the candidate best placed to conduct foreign policy. Following his wife’s election, former president N´estor Kirchner announced his candidacy for president of the Justicialist Party in late January 2008. In an unrelated development, mainstream Argentine press sources published articles early in the year which questioned his increase in assets while in office, focusing particularly on his acquisitions in real estate following earlier discussions which had been intensified following the Kirchners’ submission of their annual report on personal finances. The opposition Civic Coalition (Coalici´on C´ıvica—CC) said that it was considering setting up a commission to further investigate the Kirchners’ holdings. In another confirmation that the new president’s honeymoon would be brief, the government faced a challenge in early 2008 when Bolivian President Evo Morales confirmed that Bolivia would not be able to provide the gas supplies mandated in contracts between Argentina and Brazil. While Morales said Bolivia would try to find an “equilibrium” in the dispatch of gas to avoid further shortages, his hydrocarbons minister asserted that domestic demand would take priority, with prospects for increased exports bleaker due to slackened production and investment. In January, President Fern´andez de Kirchner met with Morales to discuss an agreement to invest $1.8 billion to build a Pipeline of Argentine North East (Gasoducto del Noreste Argentino [GNEA]) that would transport 20 million cubic meters of Bolivian gas to Argentina daily.

Political Parties A ban on political activity, imposed by the military on its return to power in March 1976, was formally lifted by President Bignone at his inau-

guration on July 1, 1982, and more than 300 national and regional groups participated in the general election of October 30, 1983. However, two formations, the Radical Civic Union and the Justicialist Liberation Front (Peronist) shared 92 percent of the vote. In the legislative balloting of November 3, 1985, the combined vote share of the UCR and peronistas dropped to 77 percent, with “orthodox” and “renewing” factions of the latter (alone or in alliance with smaller parties) presenting separate lists in most districts. In the midterm lower house poll of September 6, 1987, the two major groups drew more than 79 percent of the vote, although the UCR slipped from majority to plurality status by retaining only 117 of 254 seats. The combined vote of the two parties in the presidential balloting of May 14, 1989, was a little more than 84 percent, with the peronistas outpolling the UCR in 23 of 24 electoral districts. (The UCR has been affiliated with the Socialist International since 1996.) On August 3, 1997, the two main opposition parties (the UCR and Frepaso, below) announced an Alliance for Work, Justice, and Education (Alianza por Trabajo, Justicia y Educaci´on—ATJE) for the October legislative poll and the 1999 presidential balloting. Although the ATJE was received with varying degrees of enthusiasm by provincial leaders, it outpolled the peronistas by nearly 10 percent in the 1997 election, depriving the latter of their legislative majority. In addition to winning the presidency in 1999, the ATJE secured a near majority of lower house seats with the absence of upper house balloting, leaving Justicialista control of the Senate undisturbed. Since then, however, the peronistas have been dominant, particularly the Victory Front (FPV), the “kirchenismo” wing founded in 2003 to sustain the presidential candidacy of N´estor Kirchner, which also attracted the support of the “K Radicals”—those UCR members who supported Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner in the 2007 presidential elections. The former governor of Mendoza, Julio C´esar Cleto COBOS, one of five UCR-affiliated governors who declared their support for Kirchner, ran in the ticket with Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner under UC for K–Victory Front, becoming vice president after the election.

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Cobos, together with four other governors, was subsequently expelled from the UCR. Cobos was slated to lead the talks between the dissident governors and the UCR, which maintained that the proKirchner expellees would have to resign from any government posts before being admitted back into the party (see UCR, below).

Federal Parties with Legislative Seats as of January 2008 Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista— PJ). What was formerly the Justicialist Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Justicialista—MNJ) grew out of the extreme nationalist peronista (also known as laborista) movement led by General Per´on from 1946 to 1955. Formally dissolved after its leader went into exile, the peronistas regrouped, in alliance with a number of smaller parties, as the Justicialist Liberation Front (Frente Justicialista de Liberaci´on—Frejuli) before the 1973 election. Frejuli’s victorious candidate, H´ector C´ampora, subsequently resigned to permit the reelection of Per´on, who had returned in 1972. The movement’s nominal leader, Isabel Per´on, who was ousted as her husband’s successor in 1976 and confined to prison and house arrest for five years thereafter, was permitted to go into exile in July 1981. The peronistas (as they are still popularly known) have experienced a number of internal cleavages, including one occasioned by the corrientes renovadoras (“current of renewal”), which was initially launched by a group of moderate trade unionists and students calling for a more democratic party structure. Although both factions asserted their allegiance to Isabel Per´on at separate congresses in February 1985, she withdrew as MNJ leader: subsequently, dissent within the renovadores faction led to their defeat at a unified party congress in July, which ignored her resignation and reelected her as titular president. For the 1985 legislative balloting, the two factions presented separate lists in alliance with smaller parties in most districts. The oficialistas revived Frejuli in coalition with a number of mi-

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nor formations. In critical Buenos Aires province they were, however, substantially outpolled by the Front of Renewal, Justice, Democracy, and Participation (Frente Renovador, Justicia, Democracia y Participaci´on—Frejudepa), an alliance of renovadores and Christian Democrats; in the federal capital, they won no seats, as contrasted with four captured by a renovador formation that had campaigned as the Justicialist Party. Senator Vicente Saadi, an oficialista, resigned as MNJ first vice president following the 1985 election, reportedly because of the movement’s poor showing. On December 10, 1985, Herminio Iglesias, also an oficialista, stepped down as secretary general, while the renovadores, 11 days later, appointed a leadership of their own, headed by Antonio Cafiero, Carlos Grosso, and Carlos Sa´ul Menem. In November 1986 the renovadores boycotted the movement’s national congress, at which Isabel Per´on and Senator Saadi were elected honorary and “effective” presidents, respectively. However, a cleavage subsequently developed within the dissident troika, Cafiero boycotting a renovador congress in Tucum´an, while Grosso withdrew from the meeting because of a dispute over the timing of internal party elections in C´ordoba and Buenos Aires provinces. Following a relatively poor showing by oficialistas at the 1987 election, Senator Saadi resigned as Justicialista president, paving the way for a “unity slate” that awarded the group’s presidency and vice presidency to Cafiero and Menem, respectively. Menem defeated Cafiero as the party’s 1989 standard-bearer in an MNJ presidential primary on July 9, 1988, and led the party, campaigning with minor party allies as the Justicialist Front of Popular Unity (Frente Justicialista de Unidad Popular—Frejupo), to a conclusive victory in the nationwide balloting of May 14, 1989. On August 6, 1990, Cafiero resigned as party president, being succeeded four days later by Menem. Concurrently, the president’s brother, Eduardo Menem, was named party vice president, while the subsequent designation of Munir Menem as secretary general made the leadership essentially a “family affair.”

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The party contested the partial legislative elections of 1991, 1993, and 1995 under the Partido Justicialista rubric, although the total number of “Justicialista” seats resulting from each poll included seats held by affiliated peronista groups. In 1995 President Menem secured reelection to a foreshortened term of four years on a 49.8 percent vote share while the PJ won its first absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1997 the party’s lower house representation was reduced to 118 of 257 seats. With Menem ineligible to run for a third term, the party lost the presidency in 1999 and was reduced to second place in the Chamber of Deputies with 110 seats. It recovered its majority in both houses on October 14, 2001, despite its leader’s arrest, four months earlier, on charges of UN arms embargo violations. Menem secured a plurality in the 2003 presidential poll, but he withdrew from a runoff when it became apparent that he could not defeat N´estor Kirchner in a two-man race. Late in the year, after taking up residence in Chile, Menem was charged with tax fraud; however, the case was dismissed in May 2004. Menem returned to Argentina in December 2004, secured election to the Senate on a “best loser” basis in October 2005, and vowed to contest the 2007 presidential election. Before the 2005 congressional balloting, the PJ split into two principal factions, a Victory Front (Frente para la Victoria—FPV), launched by President Kirchner, and a Federal Peronist (Peronismo Federal—PF) grouping headed by former president Duhalde. In addition, former presidents Menem and Rodr´ıguez Sa´a campaigned as leaders of a distinctly minor Justicialist Loyalty and Dignity (Lealtad y Dignidad Justicialista—LDJ). After the next electoral cycle in 2007, Menem took office as the only senator under the Federalism and Liberation (Federalismo y Liberaci´on—FL) designation within the PJ, while Rodr´ıguez Sa´a was sworn in as part of the Justicialist Front (Frente Justicialista—FJ) grouping, an offshoot party that claimed 3 seats in the senate as of January 2008. Several members of the UCR formed a coalition with the FPV for the 2007 elections. The PJ–FPV ballot secured 42 Senate and 129 Cham-

ber seats after the election. The president-elect, Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner, received 44.92 percent of the votes. The party has smaller regional chapters, including the Santa Cruz Victory Front (Frente para la Victoria Santacrucena). Leaders: Cristina Fern´andez de KIRCHNER (President of the Republic, PJ–FPV), N´estor Carlos KIRCHNER (Former President of the Republic, PJ–FPV), Eduardo Alberto DUHALDE (Former President of the Republic, PF), Carlos Sa´ul MENEM and Adolfo RODR´IGUEZ Sa´a (Former Presidents of the Republic, LDJ). Civic Coalition (Coalici´on C´ıvica—CC). The CC, a coalition of political parties, non-government organizations, and public personalities, was created ´ The coalion April 11, 2007, by Elisa CARRIO. tion includes the ARI, Union for Everybody (Uni´on por Todos—UPT), some members of the Socialist Party, and the UCR. The Coalition secured two seats in the upper house and eighteen in the lower house. ´ (2000, 2003 and 2007 Leaders: Elisa CARRIO presidential candidate) and Patricia BULLRICH (President) Radical Civic Union (Uni´on C´ıvica Radical—UCR). The UCR, whose history dates from the late 19th century, represents the moderate left in Argentine politics. In the period following the deposition of Juan Per´on, the party split into two factions, the People’s Radical Party (Uni´on C´ıvica Radical del Pueblo—UCRP) and the Intransigent Radical Party (Uni´on C´ıvica Radical Intransigente—UCRI), led by former presidents Arturo Ill´ıa and Arturo Frondizi, respectively. The UCR reemerged following the legalization of parties in 1971 and remained relatively unified during the 1973 presidential candidacy of Dr. Ricardo Balb´ın but suffered a number of internal cleavages thereafter. Balb´ın was instrumental in organizing the 1981 fiveparty alignment to press for a return to civilian rule but died on September 9, leaving the party without a unified leadership. Largely because of the personal popularity of its presidential candidate, Ra´ul Alfons´ın, the party led the

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1983 balloting with 51.8 percent of the vote, winning, in addition to the presidency, a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Subsequently, internal dissention diminished, the balbinista faction concluding a late 1984 alliance with leftleaning elements, while the long-standing policy of incompatibility between government and party roles was abandoned with the designation of President Alfons´ın as ex officio party leader. In early 1986, as the issue of presidential succession loomed, a new rivalry emerged between former labor minister Juan Manuel Casella, the apparent alfonsinista front-runner, and the influential governor of C´ordoba province, Eduardo Angeloz, with the latter being designated the UCR candidate in internal party balloting in July 1988, but losing to the MNJ’s Carlos Menem in May 1989. In October 1991, following the poor showing of candidates he had endorsed for recent provincial elections, Alfons´ın submitted his resignation as party president, while announcing the formation of an internal faction, the Movement for Social Democracy (Movimiento por la Democracia Social—MDS), devoted to defending traditional UCR “social-democratic” principles. He was reelected party leader by an overwhelming margin in November 1993. In the 1995 presidential poll, UCR nominee Horatio Massacessi placed a distant third, with a 17.1 percent vote share; in the legislative balloting the party retained second rank, though its representation fell from 83 to 69 seats. Alfons´ın again resigned on September 27, 1995, and was replaced on November 17 by Rodolfo Terrango. For the legislative election of October 26, 1997, an alliance with a left-of-center electoral coalition styled the Front for a Country in Solidarity (Frente del Pa´ıs Solidario—Frepaso) yielded 46 of 127 contested seats, while the UCR secured 12 seats running separately. The alliance candidate, Fernando De La R´ua, won the presidency in 1999, but he resigned in December 2001 because of the economic crisis. The UCR’s share of the presidential vote plummeted to 2.3 percent in 2003. It remained the second-ranked

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congressional party after the 2005 balloting, albeit with only 39 of 257 lower house seats. The centralization of power in the hands of president Kirchner, his increased ability to control governors, and his progressive politics made him very popular among so-called “K Radicals” in the UCR. Others in the party preferred either supporting Roberto Lavagna (apparently still formally a member of the PJ) in the 2007 presidential balloting or presenting a candidate from the UCR ranks. After considerable negotiation, it was determined that Lavagna would run as a candidate of the UCR in an alliance with Just Society Peronists (Duhalde). Within the UCR, Lavagna had strong support from former president Alfons´ın, though five of six Radical governors supported Kirchner. The UCR decided not to run its own candidate for president and ultimately coalesced behind Roberto Lavagna, who received 16.88 percent of the votes. The party lost 5 seats in the Senate and 16 in the Chamber of Deputies, leaving it with 8 senators and 24 deputies in the lower house. The UCR expelled Julio Cobos and the four other governors who supported Kirchner in the elections. On March 15, 2008, under the banner of Radicals K, Cobos urged like-minded politicians to join an Official National Concertation (Concertaci´on Nacional Oficial) and persuade the UCR leadership not to expel them, but to instead support formation of a new Radicals for Concertation grouping. Cobos was expected to take the lead in talks aimed at convincing the UCR leadership to accept him and his fellow pro-Kirchner governors (see Political Parties, above). Leaders: Angel ROZAS, Dr. Ra´ul ALFONS´IN Foulkes (Former President of the Republic and of the Party), Mario LOSADA (Former President of the Party), Leopoldo Ra´ul Guido MOREAU (2003 presidential candidate). Affirmation for an Egalitarian Republic (Afirmaci´on para Una Rep´ublica Igualitaria— ARI). The ARI was organized in mid-2000 by the left-wing UCR defector, Elisa Carri´o.

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Affiliating with the new formation, which secured 1 Senate and 31 Chamber seats in October 2001, was the Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democr´atico—PSD), Carri´o ran fourth in the 2003 presidential election, with a 14.2 percent vote share, and second in the 2007 presidential election, with a 23 percent vote share. The ARI was decimated in the 2003 congressional poll but recovered marginally to win eight lower house seats in 2005. In 2007 the ARI formed a coalition with the PS (below). Some members ran under ARI, securing 2 Senate and 9 Chamber seats. ´ (2000, 2003 and Leader: Elisa CARRIO 2007 presidential candidate). Union for Everybody (Uni´on por Todos— UPT) was founded in 2002 by Patricia Bullrich, a former minister who held the social security portfolio in 2000 and the labor portfolio in 2001.The party joined the Civic Coalition for the 2007 election. Leader: Patricia Bullrich (President) Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS). The PS was launched in 2003 by a merger of the PSD (under ARI, above) and the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular— PSP), which had been reorganized as the Argentine affiliate of Socialist International. Rub´en H´ector GIUSTINIANI ran on the ticket with Elisa Carri´o in 2007, while the PS presented a separate, independent ballot for the legislative polls that year, securing 10 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Leaders: Rub´en H´ector GIUSTINIANI (PSP), Hermes Juan BINNER. Republican Proposal (Propuesta Republicana—PRO). A center-right group based in Buenos Aires, PRO was launched before the 2005 election by businessman Mauricio Macri. It was able to capitalize on a center-left cleavage between the FPV and ARI to win 34 percent of the vote in the federal capital. In the 2007 balloting, Macri was elected Mayor of Buenos Aires.

The PRO and RECREAR (below) signed a political alliance ahead of the 2007 elections, adopting the Republican Proposal designation. Ricardo L´opez Murphy, the party’s candidate for president in the 2007 election, received less than a 2 percent vote share, while the party lost 2 of its 11 Chamber seats in that year’s legislative balloting. Leader: Mauricio MACRI. Recreate for Growth Party (Partido para Recrear el Crecimiento—RECREAR). RECREAR is a conservative formation that contested the 2003 election in an alliance with a number of provincial parties styled the Movimiento Federal para Recrear el Crecimiento—MFRC (Federal Movement to Recreate Growth) that continued into the 2005 poll. The movement’s leader, Ricardo L´opez Murphy, formerly a right-wing member of the UCR, placed third in the 2003 presidential balloting. RECREAR entered a political alliance with PRO ahead of the 2007 polls. Leaders: Ricardo L´opez MURPHY (President), Ricardo URQUIZA (Secretary). Action for the Republic–New Direction (Acci´on por la Rep´ublica–Nueva Direcci´on— AR–ND). The AR–ND was formed in 1997 as an electoral alliance of the AR, which had been launched by former economic minister Domingo Cavallo in support of his bid for a congressional seat, and the ND, a Buenos Aires–based party founded in 1996. The grouping won 9 lower house seats in 1997 and 12 in 1999, only one of which it retained in 2005. Leaders: Armando Caro FIGUEROA (AR), ´ Gustavo BELIZ (ND), Domingo CAVALLO (1999 presidential candidate). Republican Force (Fuerza Republicana— FR). The FR was organized before the 1989 national balloting by a retired army general, Antonio Domingo Bussi, who hoped to convert the formation into “a great national party” before the expiration of Carlos Menem’s term in 1995. The party won three lower house seats from the northwestern province of Tucum´an in October 1993 and added a fourth in May 1995. In July 1995 Bussi won the

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Tucum´an governorship, but he was suspended in April 1998 when confronted with impeachment proceedings because of an undeclared foreign bank account. The vote against removal subsequently fell short, and Bussi was reinstated. The party’s lower house representation was reduced to two in 1997, with the same number (elected in 2003) remaining in 2005. Leader: Gen. (Ret.) Antonio Domingo BUSSI (Former Governor of Tucum´an).

Regional Parties with Legislative Seats as of January 2008 Regional groups winning congressional representation in 2007 included the Concertation Alliance (Alianza Concertaci´on UNA—AC), 10 seats; the Civic Front for Santiago (Frente C´ıvico por Santiago—FCS), 8 seats; the Justice, Union and Liberty Front (Frente Justicia, Uni´on y Libertad—FJUL), 6 seats; the Popular Social Encounter (Encuentro Popular y Social), 4 seats; the New Front (Frente Nuevo—FN), including the C´ordoba-based New Party against Corruption, for Honesty and Transparency (Partido Nuevo contra la Corrupci´on, por la Honestidad y la Transparencia—PNCHT) and others, 4 seats; the Buenos Aires-based Blue and White Union (Uni´on Celeste y Blanca—UCB), 4 seats; the Neuqu´en Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Neuquino—MPN), 4 seats; the Justicialist affiliate Salta Renewal (Renovador de Salta— RS), 3 seats; the Corrientes–based Front for Everybody (Frente de Todos—FT), 2 seats; the San Luis–based Production and Labor Front (Frente Producci´on y Trabajo—FPT), 2 seats; the Buenos Aires-based Recreate for Growth (Recrear Para el Crecimiento—RPC), 2 seats; Democratic Mendoza (Dem´ocrata Mendoza—DM), 1 seat; Buenos Aires for Everybody in Southern Project (Buenos Aires Para Todos en Proyecto Sur—BATPS), 1 seat; the Catamarca-based Civic and Social Front (Frente C´ıvico y Social—FCS), 4 seats; the Viable Santiago Movement, 1 seat; the Buenos Aires city–based Dialogue for Buenos Aires (Di´alogo por Buenos Aires—DPBA), 1 seat;

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the Entre R´ıos–based Entrerian Concertation (Concertaci´on Entrerriana—CE), 1 seat; the Buenos Aires province–based Federalist Unity (Unidad Federalista—UF), 1 seat; the Catamarcabased For the Truth (Por la Verdad—PLV), 1 seat; the Buenos Aires-based Independent Movement (Movimiento Independiente—MI), 1 seat; Liberal Party of Corrientes (Partido Liberal de Corrientes—PLC), 1 seat; the C´ordoba-based Memory and Democracy (Memoria y Democracia—MD), 1 seat; the Buenos Aires-based National Justicialist (Justicialista Nacional—JN), 1 seat; the Buenos Aires-based National Union (Nacional Sindical—NS), 1 seat; the Misiones-based Peronist Dignity (Dignidad Peronista—DP), 1 seat; and the Buenos Aires-based Peronist Guard (Guardia Peronista—GP), 1 seat.

Other Parties A number of additional parties have been active in recent years, but the current status of most is unclear. See earlier editions of the Handbook for listings.

Legislature Argentina’s bicameral National Congress (Congreso Nacional) was dissolved in March 1976 and reconstituted after the election of October 30, 1983. Senate (Senado). Before adoption of the 1994 constitution, the upper house consisted of 2 senators elected for nine-year terms by each of the 23 provincial legislatures, plus 2 from the federal district named by an electoral college, the body being replenished by thirds every three years. The 1994 basic law increased the membership to 72 (3 from each of the 23 provinces and 3 from the federal district of Buenos Aires). Since 2001, one-third of the seats have been renewed every two years for six-year terms. After the elections of October 28, 2007, the Justicialist Party–Victory Front and its affiliates had 42 seats (Justicialist Party–Victory Front, 37; Concordia Renewal, 2; Salta Renewal, 1; and the

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Cabinet As of July 22, 2007 President Vice President Chief of Cabinet

Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner [f] Julio C´esar Cleto Cobos Alberto Angel Fern´andez

Ministers Defense Economy and Production Education, Science, and Technology Federal Planning and Public Investment Foreign Relations, International Trade, and Worship Interior Justice, Security, and Human Rights Labor, Employment, and Human Resources Public Health Social Development and Environment Science and Technology

Nilda Garr´e [f] Mart´ın Lousteau Juan Carlos Tedesco Julio Miguel de Vido Jorge Enrique Taiana An´ıbal Florencio Randazzo An´ıbal Domingo Fern´andez Carlos Alfonso Tomada Graciela Oca˜na [f] Alicia Kirchner [f] Lino Bara˜nao

Secretaries Secretary General of the Presidency Secretary of State Intelligence Legal and Technical Secretary Military House (Casa Militar) Secretary of Culture Secretary of Tourism Secretary of Prevention of Drug Addiction and Battle against Drug-Trafficking Secretary of Communication Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development

Oscar Parrilli Hector Icazuriaga Carlos Alberto Zannini Col. Alejandro Guillermo Graham Jos´e Nun Carlos Enrique Meyer Jos´e Ram´on Granero Enrique Ra´ul Albistur Romina Picolotti [f]

[f] = female

pro-Menem Federalism and Liberation, 1); the Radical Civic Union, 9; the Justicialist Front, 3; the Affirmation for an Egalitarian Republic, 2; the Civic Coalition, 2; the Civic Front for Santiago, 2; the New Front, 2; the Civic and Social Front, 2; the Republican Force, 2; Concertation for Development, 1; Federalist Unity, 1; the Neuqu´en Popular Movement, 1; Production and Labor Front, 1; the Socialist Party, 1; and the Viable Santiago Movement, 1. President: Julio C´esar Cleto COBOS.

Chamber of Deputies (C´amara de Diputados). The lower house currently consists of 257 deputies, directly elected for four years, with approximately one-half reelected every two years. After the 2007 elections, the Justicialist PartyVictory Front and its allies had 129 seats; the Radical Civic Union, 24; the Civic Coalition,18; Socialist Party, 10; the Concertation Alliance, 10; Republican Proposal–Recreate for Growth Party, 11(Republican Proposal, 9; Recreate for Growth, 2); the Affirmation for an Egalitarian Republic

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(autonomous), 9; the Civic Front for Santiago, 6; the Justice, Union and Liberty Front, 6; Popular Social Encounter, 4; the Blue and White Union, 4; the Neuqu´en Popular Movement, 3; the New Front, 2; Salta Renewal, 2; Civic and Social Front, 2; Front for Everybody, 2; National Justicialist, 1; Democratic Mendoza, 1; Entrerian Concertation, 1; Memory and Democracy, 1; Production and Labor Front, 1; Dialogue for Buenos Aires, 1; Peronist Dignity, 1; Peronist Guard, 1; National Union, 1; Independent Movement, 1; Federalist Unity, 1; For the Truth, 1; Buenos Aires for Everybody in the Southern Project, 1; the Liberal Party of Corrientes, 1; and independents, 1. Realignments have made assessments of party strength difficult. President: Eduardo FELLNER.

Communications The impact of Argentina’s traditionally influential news media has been substantially reduced in recent years. There were numerous newspaper closings during the Peronist revival, while official censorship and personal attacks on journalists further inhibited the media before the restoration of civilian rule in 1983. Before the October 1993 legislative election, attacks on journalists had become increasingly prevalent, while economic difficulties had drastically curtailed the circulation of virtually all leading papers, except for Clar´ın, which, having diversified into radio and television, had emerged as the country’s foremost media power.

Press Unless otherwise noted, the following are Spanish-language dailies published in Buenos Aires: Clar´ın (700,000 daily, 1,000,000 Sunday), reportedly the world’s largest-selling Spanishlanguage paper; La Naci´on (630,000 daily, 835,000 Sunday), founded 1870; Cr´onica (330,000 daily, 450,000 Sunday); P´agina 12 (280,000), highly regarded investigative paper launched in 1987; Diario Popular (140,000); El Cronista Comercial (63,000); La Raz´on (60,000); La Prensa (50,000),

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founded 1869; Buenos Aires Herald (22,500), in English.

News Agencies The domestic agencies include Diarios y Noticias (DyN), Noticias Argentinas (NA), and the official Agencia TELAM. There are also a number of foreign agencies with bureaus in Buenos Aires.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is supervised by the Secretar´ıa de Communicaciones and the Comit´e Federal de Radiodifusi´on (Comfer). Nearly two-thirds of the more than 120 radio stations and 29 of the 44 television stations are privately owned. Radio Nacional is an official government service providing local, national, and international programming. Government-owned commercial radio and television stations are grouped under the Direcci´on General de Radio y Televisi´on, while most privately owned stations belong to the Asociaci´on Radiodifusoras Privadas Argentinas (ARPA) and the Asociaci´on de Teleradiodifusoras Argentinas (ATA). As of 2005 there were approximately 83.7 personal computers and 178 Internet users per 1,000 people. As of the same year there were about 574 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: H´ector TIMERMAN U.S. Ambassador to Argentina: Earl Anthony WAYNE Permanent Representative to the UN: Jorge ¨ ARGUELLO IGO Memberships (Non-UN): AfDB, ALADI, BCIE, BIS, CAN, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

Contested Territory Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). First sighted by an English vessel in the late 11th century and

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named after the incumbent treasurer of the Royal Navy, the Falkland Islands were later styled Les Malouines (from which the Spanish Las Malvinas is derived) by a group of French settlers who transferred their rights to Spain in 1766. A British settlement, recognized by Spain in 1771, was withdrawn in 1774, the islands being uninhabited at the time of Argentine independence in 1816. The new government in Buenos Aires claimed the territory by right of colonial succession in 1820, although a group of its nationals were forcibly expelled in 1832, before a reaffirmation of British sovereignty in 1833. Argentine claims to the smaller South Georgia and South Sandwich islands, several hundred miles to the southeast, were not formally advanced until 1927 and 1948, respectively. The question of the legal status of the territories, collectively encompassing about 6,000 square miles (16,058 sq. km.), became the subject of extensive negotiations initiated under UN auspices in 1966 and extending to early 1982. The British claim is based on continuous occupation since 1833 and the manifest sentiment of the 2,900 inhabitants (primarily

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ATLAN TI C O CEAN

Falkland Islands (U.K.)

Port Howard Goose Green

West Falkland

Stanley

East Falkland

Falkland Islands (U.K.)

0 0

50 Mi 50 Km

ATLAN TI C O C E A N

sheepherders domiciled on East and West Falkland) to remain British subjects. The immediate precipitant of the 1982 conflict was the arrival in South Georgia on March 19 of a group of workers to dismantle an old whaling station, in the course of which the Argentine flag was raised. Following a British protest to the UN Security Council, Argentinian troops landed on the Falklands on April 2 and quickly overcame resistance by a token force of Royal Marines. South Georgia and South Sandwich were seized on April 3. Two days later the lead ships of a British armada sailed from Portsmouth, England, participating in the recovery of South Georgia on April 25 and 26. On May 21 about 5,000 British troops began landing at San Carlos Bay on the northwestern coast of East Falkland, initiating an operation that culminated in the surrender of the main Argentine force in Stanley on June 14. Overall, the campaign cost 254 British and 750 Argentinian lives and heavy material losses, including that of Argentina’s only heavy cruiser, the General Belgrano, and, on the British side, of two destroyers and two frigates. Subsequently, Argentina and 19 other Latin American countries submitted the Falkland issue to the UN General Assembly, although no de jure resolution of the sovereignty issue has yet been forthcoming. During 1985 President Alfons´ın repeatedly expressed alarm at the construction of an airport (approximately the size of that at Point Salines in Grenada) on Mount Pleasant and named as his government’s priority “the demilitarization of the South Atlantic.” A more serious problem arose in 1986 with a British announcement in late October that it would establish a 200-mile “exclusive economic zone,” measured from the shore of the islands, as of February 1, 1987, thereby overlapping a 200-mile zone previously claimed by Argentina off its continental mainland. However, the effect of the action was subsequently diluted by a British foreign ministry declaration that it would police the new zone (impinging largely on fishing) only up to the limit of the previously established 150-mile Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and Management Zone (FICZ), measured from the center

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of the islands. As part of the agreement concluded in Madrid in February 1990, Britain also yielded (save for fishing) on the 150-mile zone, allowing Argentine ships and planes to approach within 50 and 75 miles, respectively, of the islands without prior permission. (For additional details, see United Kingdom: Related Territories.) In April 1990 the Argentine Congress, in what was termed a “purely symbolic act,” approved the inclusion of the Falklands in the (then) national territory of Tierra del Fuego. Subsequently, a series of “technical” discussions were held between Argentine and British representatives to prevent overfishing in the waters surrounding the islands. The Falklanders protested their exclusion from the talks, which yielded an agreement in December on a third-party fishing ban in the portion of the 200-mile economic zone that did not overlap the corresponding Argentine limit. Argentina and Britain in September 1991 reached new accords that liberalized military restrictions imposed by Britain in the aftermath of the 1982 conflict; Argentine authorities insisted, however, that the action should not be construed as implying relinquishment of their country’s claim to the islands. Thus in early January 1992 President Menem proposed that the jurisdictional conflict be settled through international arbitration, in much the same manner as the earlier border dispute with Chile. However, despite an assertion in May 1993 that recovery of the islands remained a “strategic” part of Argentinian foreign policy, he appeared unwilling to press the matter, lest it reverse the recent improvement in relations with London. Following the Argentine reaffirmation of sovereignty over the Falklands in its 1994 constitution, Britain began patrolling the nonoverlap portion of the “gap” between the 150- and 200-mile zones. British authorities responded to Argentine complaints that the new policy was an act of “reprisal” for the constitutional claim by insisting that they were simply attempting to deny unlicensed fishing vessels a staging area for intrusion into British- and Argentine-controlled areas.

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During 1995 the question of oil rights supplanted that of fishing. On September 27, following a meeting between Argentine and British representatives in Madrid, the two countries signed an agreement in New York on the extraction of oil in waters surrounding the archipelago. Under the accord, Britain would earn two-thirds and Argentina one-third of the royalties from drilling east of the islands, while the two would share equally in the yield from extraction off the Argentine coast in the west. UCR legislators immediately charged that the Menem government had “ceded a measure of sovereignty” by agreeing to the lower share in the east, while the government insisted that its participation implied recognition of the Argentinian claim. In May 1996 Foreign Minister Guido DI TELLA announced that Argentina would “never consent” to the Falklands becoming an independent state. The declaration came after Britain and the Falkland Island Council had urged the UN Special Committee on Decolonization to adopt a resolution on selfdetermination for the territory (an action that the UN body has been unwilling to pursue). In mid1997 the committee cited its long-standing opposition to the “colonial situation” in the islands by reissuing an appeal to the two governments to resolve the dispute by peaceful negotiations. In July 1999 Britain agreed to lift restrictions on travel by Argentine citizens to the islands and to reestablish Chilean flights to the mainland, which had been suspended by Santiago following the March detention in London of its former president Augusto Pinochet. In a further sign of improved relations, the British and Argentine navies conducted in November their first joint naval exercise since the 1982 war. On July 19, 2000, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, dismissed as too late a lawsuit by Argentinians seeking compensation from Britain for the deaths of relatives killed when British forces sank the cruiser General Belgrano. Lawyers for the plaintiffs stated that they would pursue the matter at the World Court in The Hague, Netherlands. As part of the suit, the plaintiffs had sought the extradition of former British

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prime minister Margaret Thatcher to stand trial for “aggravated homicide and war crimes.” Subsequently, in a mark of improved relations, Argentina and Britain signed an agreement in early 2001 that permitted Argentinian planes to fly to the islands for the first time in nearly two decades. In April 2004 Argentinian President Kirchner reaffirmed his government’s commitment to regaining sovereignty over the islands through “dialogue and peace.” The administration in 2005 also criticized the inclusion of the islands in the proposed new European Union (EU) constitution, arguing that the sovereignty question remained unsettled. During events in 2007 commemorating the 25th anniversary of the 1982 war, Argentinian officials again accused the UK of “illegitimate occupation”

of the islands. Perhaps in view of upcoming elections, President Kirchner appeared to adopt a hard line, unilaterally canceling some previous oil exploration agreements with the UK and revoking charter flights from the islands to the mainland. Meanwhile, although the issue of sovereignty remained nonnegotiable, the UK administration called for “constructive ties” in the hope of resolving “lingering hostility.” Popular opinion in Argentina remained highly supportive of Kirchner’s position, although the inhabitants of the islands reportedly continued to evince no opposition to their UK status. (One recent report estimated that the islanders enjoyed an annual GDP per capita of approximately $50,000 [one of the highest in the world], based to a large extent on the sale of licenses for fishing and oil exploration.)

ARUBA

The Country Aruba is a Caribbean island situated approximately 16 miles off the northeast coast of Venezuela and 50 miles west of Cura¸cao. Like other former Dutch dependencies in the area, its population is largely of mixed African ancestry, with minorities of Carib Indian and European extraction. Roman Catholicism is the dominant religion. Tourism is presently of primary economic importance. The island’s only oil refinery, owned by a subsidiary of the U.S. oil giant Exxon Mobil, was closed down in March 1985. However, it was rehabilitated by a subsidiary of the U.S. Coastal Corporation later in the decade and remains a significant source of income, as does transshipment of petroleum. Economic growth averaged greater than 4 percent annually in 1996–1999, with annual inflation averaging about 0.7 percent. A downturn began in 2000, with growth for the year declining to 2.5 percent. In 2001 the tourism sector was adversely affected by the September terrorist assaults on the United States, which contributed to a 4 percent decline in GDP for the year. A further decline in tourism resulted from publicity surrounding the disappearance of American Natalee Holloway in May 2005 (see Current issues, below).

However, a majority of the islanders disliked what was perceived as both political and economic domination by Cura¸cao and entered into lengthy discussions with Dutch authorities that resulted in the achievement of formal parity with the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles, under the Dutch crown, on January 1, 1986. Upon the assumption of domestic autonomy, the assets and liabilities of Aruba and the five remaining members of the federation were divided in the ratio 30–70, Aruba agreeing to retain economic and political links to the Netherlands Antilles at the ministerial level for a ten-year period. (Full independence was initially projected for 1996 but tentative agreement was reached in July 1990 for the island to maintain its

Caribbean Sea

Noord

Oranjestad

Aruba

(NETHERLANDS)

Santa Cruz

Government and Politics Political Background Like Cura¸cao and Bonaire, Aruba became a Dutch possession in 1634 and remained so, save for a brief period of British control during the Napoleonic wars, until participating in constitutional equality with the Netherlands as part of the Netherlands Antilles in 1954.

Caribbean Sea 0 0

4 Mi 400 Km

Sint Nicolaas

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ARUBA

current status indefinitely rather than move on to independence. References to the 1996 independence date were removed from the related constitutional documents completely in April 1995.) Pre-autonomy balloting on November 22, 1985, yielded victory for a four-party coalition headed by J. H. A. (Henny) EMAN of the center-right Aruba People’s Party (AVP) over the People’s Electoral Movement (MEP), then led by “the architect of Aruba’s transition to . . . eventual independence,” Gilberto (Betico) CROES. Following the election of January 7, 1989, a three-party government was formed, led by the MEP’s Nelson ODUBER. The coalition continued in office after the election of January 8, 1993, although the AVP outpolled the MEP. Oduber resigned on April 17, 1994, after disagreements with his coalition partners, and Eman returned as head of a new government coalition that included the small Aruban Liberal Organization (OLA) following a general election on July 29. The legislature was dissolved on September 15, 1997, in the wake of a dispute between the AVP and its coalition partner, with the OLA offering to form a caretaker coalition with the MEP. However, the governor general refused the request. A general election on December 12 failed to resolve the impasse, the parliamentary distribution remaining unchanged. Subsequent negotiations continued until April 16, 1998, when the former coalition partners reached agreement on a new government. The AVP/OLA government again collapsed in June 2001 when the two OLA members resigned after voicing objections to the AVP’s plan to convert the tourism ministry into a semiprivate agency. Early elections were therefore held on September 28, with the MEP winning a majority of 12 seats, setting the stage for the return of MEP leader Oduber to the prime minister’s post on October 30. Oduber remained in office following the election of September 23, 2005, at which the MEP moved, by 1 seat, to a plurality of 11.

Domestic affairs are the responsibility of the prime minister and other members of the Council of Ministers, appointed with the advice and approval of a unicameral Staten (legislature) of 21 deputies. Control of foreign affairs and defense is vested in the Council of Ministers at The Hague, with an Aruban minister plenipotentiary sitting as a voting member in matters affecting the island. Judicial authority is exercised by a local court of first instance, with appeal to a joint Court of Appeal of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, and ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands at The Hague.

Constitution and Government

Leading Parties

The Dutch sovereign is titular head of state and is represented in Aruba by an appointed governor.

People’s Electoral Movement (Movimento Electoral di Pueblo—MEP). Founded in 1971 and a

Current Issues Aruba’s tourist industry, already depressed by U.S. travelers’ concern over terrorism, was further weakened by the disappearance in May 2005 of 18-year-old Holloway, who was with a group from Alabama celebrating their high school graduation. Three men seen leaving a bar with her were arrested on June 23 but were subsequently released. Publicity over the matter was unabated, in part because of a number of trips to the island by the missing girl’s mother, who accused local authorities of inept handling of the case. Unable to bring the matter to a successful conclusion, the Oduber administration in early 2007 asked the Netherlands to assume responsibility for further inquiry, with Dutch officers given full investigative powers. Earlier Aruba had joined the Netherlands Antilles in opposing a proposal by the Dutch immigration minister that would sanction the return of lawbreakers to the islands, arguing that it would run counter to the European Human Rights Treaty. Aruba also joined with its neighbor in complaining of Venezuela’s arms buildup at a time of growing tension between Venezuela and the United States.

Political Parties

ARUBA

Political Status: Formerly part of the Netherlands Antilles; became autonomous in internal affairs on January 1, 1986. Area: 74.5 sq. mi. (193 sq. km.). Population: 90,508 (2000C); 102,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): ORANJESTAD (30,000). Official Language: Dutch. English, Spanish, and Papiamento (an Antillean hybrid of mainly Portuguese and Spanish that is common to the Leeward Islands) are also spoken. Monetary Unit: Aruban Guilder (official rate November 2, 2007: 1.79 guilders = $1US). The guilder (also called the florin) is at par with the Netherlands Antilles guilder, both currencies being pegged to the U.S. dollar. Sovereign: Queen BEATRIX Wilhelmina Armgard. Governor: Fredis P. (Freddy) REFUNJOL; invested on May 7, 2004, succeeding Olindo KOOLMAN. Prime Minister: Nelson Orlando ODUBER (People’s Electoral Movement); sworn in on October 30, 2001, following the election of September 28, succeeding Jan Hendrik Albert (Henny) EMAN (Aruban People’s Party); reappointed following election of September 23, 2005.

member of the Socialist International, the MEP was in the forefront of the struggle for self-government. It won a plurality of 10 Staten seats in 1989. Two were lost in 1993, but the MEP was able to form a governing coalition with the NDA and APP prior to the withdrawal of both in April 1994. In the 2001 election the MEP won 12 seats, 1 of which was lost in 2005. Leaders: Nelson Orlando ODUBER (Prime Minister and Leader of the Party), Hyacintho R. (Rudy) CROES. Aruban People’s Party (Arubaanse Volkspartij—AVP/Partido di Pueplo Arubano— PPA). Like the MEP, the AVP advocated separation

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of Aruba from the Netherlands Antilles. A member of the Christian Democrat International, it formed a coalition government that included the APP and NDA after the 1985 balloting but was forced into opposition in 1989. It increased its vote share by 23 percent in 1993, exceeding that of the MEP, but could do no better than to tie its opponent’s nine seats. It formed a new government in coalition with the OLA after the 1994 election, which was revived in May 1998 but fell in June 2001. In the September election it won six Staten seats, adding two more in 2005. Leaders: Jan Hendrik Albert (Henny) EMAN (Former Prime Minister), Michiel Godfried EMAN. Aruban Patriotic Party (Arubaanse Patriottische Partij—APP/Partido Patri´otico Arubano— PPA). Organized in 1949, the APP has opposed full independence for the island. It won two parliamentary seats in 2001, both of which were lost in 2005. Leader: Benedict (Benny) Jocelyn Montgomery NISBETT. Aruban Liberal Organization (Organisatie Liberaal Arubaanse/Organisacion Liberal Arubano/Organisashion pa Liberashou di Aruba— OLA). The OLA won two Staten seats in 1994, thereupon joining the government as the AVP’s junior partner in a coalition that was formally terminated in September 1997 but revived in April 1998. In the 2001 election the OLA won one seat, which it lost in 2005. Leader: Glenbert Fran¸cois CROES (Former Deputy Prime Minister). Also winning seats in the 2005 election were the Network of Eternal Democracy (Red Eternal Democratico—RED) and the Aruban Patriotic Movement (Movimento Patriotico Arubana— MPA), led by Monica Kock ARENDS, who was described as Aruba’s first female party leader. The Real Democratic Party (Partido Democracia Real—PDR) failed to secure representation in 2005, although it came within 20 votes of success in one district.

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ARUBA

Cabinet As of June 1, 2007 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Nelson Orlando Oduber Marisol Tromp-Lopez [f]

Ministers Administrative Affairs Education Finance and Economic Affairs General Affairs and Utilities Justice Public Health and the Environment Social Affairs and Infrastructure Sports, Culture, and Labor Tourism and Transportation Minister Plenipotentiary to the Hague

Candelario A. S. D. (Booshi) Wever Marisol Tromp-Lopez [f] Nilo J. J. Swaen Nelson Orlando Oduber Hyacintho Rudy Croes Candelario A. S. D. (Booshi) Wever Marisol Tromp-Lopez [f] Tai Foo Ramon Lee Edison (Eddy) Briesen Francisco (Fredo) W. Croes

[f] = female

Legislature The unicameral States (Staten) consists of 21 members elected for four-year terms, subject to dissolution. At the most recent balloting, held on September 23, 2005, the People’s Electoral Movement won 11 seats; the Aruban People’s Party, 8; the Aruban Patriotic Movement and Network of Eternal Democracy, 1 each. President: Mervin Glorinda RAS.

Communications Press The following are dailies published in Oranjestad: El Diario (17,000), in Papiamento; Amigoe di Aruba (12,000, including Netherlands Antilles), in Dutch; The News (10,000), in English; Aruba Today/Bon Dia Aruba (10,000), in English and Papiamento.

News Agencies The Netherlands News Agency (Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau—ANP) and the Associated Press (AP) maintain offices in Oranjestad.

Broadcasting There are nine privately owned radio stations (one devoted to evangelical and cultural broadcasting), with television provided by the commercial Tele-Aruba. As of 2005 there were approximately 80 personal computers and 1,351 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Foreign relations are conducted through the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague, although there is a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Netherlands Embassy in Washington. IGO Membership (Non-UN): ACS, Interpol

BAHAMAS COMMONWEALTH

OF THE

BAHAMAS

The Country The Commonwealth of the Bahamas encompasses a group of about 700 flat, coral islands stretching from the western Atlantic near Florida to the Caribbean Sea. Geomorphically an extension of the Little and Great Bahama banks, the archipelago features as its principal components New Providence and Grand Bahama. The islands have a temperate climate with modest rainfall but lack sufficient fresh water, much of which must be imported. Most Bahamians (85 percent) are descendants of former slaves. The most important religious denominations are Anglican, Baptist, Methodist, and Roman Catholic. Banking and tourism have long been mainstays of the Bahamian economy. One of the first—and the largest—of the offshore “tax havens,” the country has more than 300 financial institutions, including more than 100 Eurocurrency branches of foreign banks; there are currently no corporate, capital gains, or personal income taxes. Extensive resort facilities typically attract in excess of 2.5 million tourists annually, while oil refining and transshipment has emerged as an important industry. During 1990–1993, on the other hand, tourist bookings and sugar production declined sharply, with the economy contracting by 2 percent in 1992 and 1993; further declines in 1994 and early 1995 were attributed primarily to fewer calls by cruise ships, although arrivals by air set a new record in 1995. Real GDP grew by 5.9 percent in 1999, before dropping to 1.9 percent growth in 2000 and collapsing to –0.8 percent in 2001, with modest recovery thereafter to an estimated 3.5 percent in 2005, despite a severe blow to the economy in September 2004 when

Hurricane Frances caused more than $200 million in damage.

Government and Politics Political Background A landfall of Columbus in 1492 and subsequently inhabited by a variety of private settlers, the Bahamas suffered harassment by the Spanish and by pirates until becoming a British Crown Colony in 1717. During the U.S. Civil War the islands enjoyed a degree of prosperity as a base for

0

Grand Bahama Florida (U.S.)

Freeport

Eleuthera

New Providence Andros Island

S ea

Cat Island

THE BAHAMAS Great Exuma

CUBA

100 Km

AT LANT IC O CEAN

Abaco

Nassau

C aribbean

100 Mi

0

Long Island

Great Inagua Matthew Town

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blockade runners. Similar periods of prosperity occurred during the U.S. prohibition era and following World War II. After more than two centuries of colonial rule, constitutional changes were negotiated in 1964 that called for the establishment of internal self-government with a bicameral legislature and a prime minister. These changes were implemented following an election in 1967 that resulted in a victory for the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) under the leadership of Lynden O. PINDLING. Local government authority was broadened in 1969, and independence, which was not supported by the opposition Free National Movement (FNM), was formally granted on July 10, 1973. In the parliamentary elections of 1982 and 1987, the PLP retained control of the House of Assembly, although falling short of the three-fourths majority it had previously enjoyed. The quarter-century Pindling era came to an end in the balloting of August 19, 1992, with the FNM, led by Hubert A. INGRAHAM, winning 33 of 49 lower house seats. The FNM retained control by a substantially wider margin on March 14, 1997, winning 34 seats in a reduced House of 40 members, with an additional seat added at a byelection in September. However, the FNM suffered a decisive reversal in the May 2, 2002, balloting, winning only 7 seats compared to 29 for the PLP, led by Perry G. CHRISTIE. The FNM returned to power after the election of May 2, 2007, at which, for the first time, a governing party was ousted after only one five-year term.

Constitution and Government Under the 1973 constitution, executive authority is vested in the queen (represented by a governor general with largely ceremonial powers) and the prime minister, who serves at the pleasure of the elective House of Assembly, in which legislative authority is concentrated; the appointive upper house (Senate) of the bicameral Parliament has limited functions. Internal administration is based on the natural division into island groupings. Islands other than

New Providence and Grand Bahama are administered by centrally appointed commissioners, although a program was launched in early 2000 to transfer authority in the smaller entities to elected local officials. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and a Court of Appeal, although certain cases may be appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London; there also are local magistrates’ courts. On the outer islands the local commissioners have magisterial powers. In March 2006 British law lords invalidated Bahamian capital punishment as inhuman and degrading. But with polls showing overwhelming public support for executing convicted murderers, the action was seen as likely to trigger debate over retention of the Privy Council as the country’s court of final appeal.

Foreign Relations Bahamian foreign relations have been determined in large part by the islands’ proximity to Cuba, Haiti, and the United States. A long-standing dispute with Cuba over territorial fishing rights led in May 1980 to a Cuban MiG aircraft sinking a Bahamian patrol vessel that had apprehended two Cuban fishing boats for poaching. Havana subsequently agreed to pay compensation of $5.4 million and apologized for the “involuntary violation” of Bahamian sovereignty. In regard to Haiti, the Pindling government periodically attempted to deport illegal aliens, who were estimated to constitute more than 10 percent of the resident population; progress was reported to have been made with Port-au-Prince on the issue before the fall of the Duvalier regime, although criticism of treatment accorded the aliens continued thereafter. In May 1994 a group of 239 Haitians were returned to Haiti after being declared “economic refugees,” while 17 listed as “political refugees” were refused entry for “national security” reasons. Terming illegal immigration as “the single greatest threat to our system of orderly development,” the government declared an amnesty for the illegal residents in

BAHAMAS

Political Status: Independent member of the Commonwealth since July 10, 1973. Area: 5,380 sq. mi. (13,935 sq. km.). Population: 303,611 (2000C); 328,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): NASSAU (227,000). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: Bahamian Dollar (principal rate November 2, 2007: 1.00 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Arthur Dion HANNA; inaugurated on February 1, 2006, succeeding Dame Ivy DUMONT. Prime Minister: Hubert Alexander INGRAHAM (Free National Movement); served as prime minister 1992–1997; returned to office on May 4, 2007, in succession to Perry G. CHRISTIE (Progressive Liberal Party), following election of May 2.

October and November, during which about 2,000 registered for government-assisted repatriation. An agreement with the Haitian government in January 1995 provided for the return of several thousand additional aliens of whom about 1,200 had departed (most involuntarily) by mid-February. The influx of illegal residents nonetheless continued, with more than 1,000 being deported in 1997. In March 1998 more than 150 Cuban detainees went on a hunger strike to protest alleged favorable treatment accorded four expatriate baseball players and their coach. In June, on the other hand, the government concluded an agreement with Cuba on the repatriation of unauthorized immigrants. In May 1997, citing the “overwhelming size, economic strength, and expanding political influence” of mainland China, diplomatic relations were transferred from Taipei to Beijing, although an embassy in the Chinese capital was not opened until January 2006. Relations with the United States have been generally cordial although periodically strained by U.S. accusations of high-level Bahamian participation in drug trafficking.

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The Bahamas is a member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the Organization of American States. It participates in the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) as a member of the Community but not the Common Market. Thus, it elected not to join the more integrated Caricom Single Market (CSM) at the latter’s launching on January 30, 2006.

Current Issues In early 2004 the U.S. government approved one of three proposals for a liquified natural gas (LNG) pipeline from Freeport, Grand Bahama, to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The action came despite long-standing concern by environmentalists that construction would pose a threat to fragile coral reefs. In protests that continued into early 2007, environmentalists also expressed concern about locating an LNG facility within the Bahamas. In a move coincident with, but not directly linked to the Privy Council’s abolition of the death penalty (see Constitution and government, above), a Constitutional Commission recommended in March 2006 that the British monarch be replaced as head of state by a Bahamian selected by the two legislative chambers. In the run-up to the 2007 election, both the FNM and PLP pledged to curb illegal immigration and fight crime; however, a major issue for Ingraham was his contention that the Christie government had been selling too much land to foreign investors. Also damaging to the Christie campaign was the resignation of Immigration and Labour Minister Shane GIBSON, who had been accused of rushing through a residency permit for the subsequently deceased Anna Nichol Smith in return for sex and gifts.

Political Parties Government Party Free National Movement (FNM). The FNM was founded in 1972 by amalgamation of the

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Cabinet As of June 1, 2007 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Hubert A. Ingraham Brent Symonette

Ministers Agriculture and Marine Resources Education, Youth, Sports, and Culture Finance Foreign Affairs Health and Social Development Housing and National Insurance Lands and Local Government Legal Affairs Maritime Affairs and Labor National Security and Immigration Tourism and Aviation Works and Transport Attorney General

Lawrence Cartwright Carl Bethel Hubert A. Ingraham Brent Symonette Hubert A. Minnis Kenneth Russell Sidney S. Collie Claire L. Hepburn [f] Dion Foulkes Orville A. T. (Tommy) Turnquest Neko Grant Earl Deveaux Claire Hepburn [f]

Ministers of State Culture Finance Immigration Legal Affairs Public Utilities Social Development Tourism and Aviation Youth and Sports

Charles Maynard Zhivargo Laing Elma Campbell [f] Desmond Bannister Phenton Neymour Loretta R. Butler-Turner [f] Branville McCartney Byran Woodside

[f] = female

United Bahamian Party (UBP) and a number of anti-independence dissidents from the PLP. In 1979 it was reconstituted as the Free National Democratic Movement (FNDM) by merger with the Bahamian Democratic Party (BDP), which had been organized in late 1976 when five FNM parliamentary deputies withdrew from the parent group. Before the 1982 election, which it contested under its original name, it was joined by the two remaining representatives of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which had been founded by BDP dissidents

in late 1979 and had been recognized thereafter as the official opposition. Following the 1987 balloting, Kendal G. L. ISAACS resigned as parliamentary leader, the party’s chair (and founder), Sir Cecil Wallace-Whitfield, being designated his successor; Sir Cecil, who died in May 1990, was in turn succeeded by Hubert A. INGRAHAM, a former independent MP who had joined the party only a month before. Isaacs died in May 1996. Sir Orville A. T. (Tommy) Turnquest was elected “leader-designate” of the FNM in August 2001,

BAHAMAS

Ingraham having previously announced his plans to retire from politics following the general election in 2002, at which time the party lost its majority and went into opposition. Ingraham returned to politics in mid-2005 and was designated opposition leader in the House of Assembly before returning as prime minister in May 2007. Leaders: Hubert A. INGRAHAM (Prime Minister and Party Leader), Brent T. SYMONETTE (Deputy Party Leader).

Opposition Party Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). A predominantly black-supported party, the PLP was formed in 1953 in opposition to the policies of business interests who then controlled the government. It was a leading supporter of the independence movement and endorses policies promoting tourism and foreign investment while at the same time preventing land speculation and providing more opportunity for indigenous Bahamians. Although subject to some internal dissent, the party secured commanding parliamentary majorities in 1972, 1977, 1982, and 1987 but lost by a better than two-to-one margin in 1992. Following the further loss of all but six seats on March 14, 1997, Lynden PINDLING resigned as party leader and on July 7 announced his retirement from parliamentary politics (he died in August 2000). The party returned to power under Perry G. Christie in the election of May 3, 2002, before losing to the FNM in 2007. Leaders: Perry G. CHRISTIE (Former Prime Minister and Leader of the Party), Raynard S. RIGBY (Chair).

Other Groups Coalition Plus Labour (CPL). The CPL was formed before the 2002 election as an alliance of three recently organized small groups: the Bahamas Freedom Alliance (BFA), led by D. Halston MOULTRIE; the Coalition for Democratic Reform (CDR), led by Bernard NOTTAGE; and the People’s Labour Movement (PLM). It failed to secure legislative representation.

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Legislature The Parliament consists of an appointed Senate with limited powers and a directly elected House of Assembly. Senate. The upper house consists of 16 members, 9 of whom are appointed on the advice of the prime minister, 4 on the advice of the leader of the opposition, and 3 on the advice of the prime minister and others whom the governor general may wish to consult. President: Lynn HOLOWESKO. House of Assembly. The lower house presently consists of 41 members directly elected on the basis of universal suffrage for five-year terms (subject to dissolution). In the most recent election of May 2, 2007, the Free National Movement won 23 seats and the Progressive Liberal Party, 18. Speaker: Alvin SMITH.

Communications Press The following are published daily in Nassau, unless otherwise noted: Nassau Guardian (14,100); Nassau Daily Tribune (12,000); Freeport News (Freeport, 4,000); Bahama Journal; Official Gazette, a weekly government publication. In August 1998 the Tribune concluded a partnership agreement with the Miami Herald to produce a combined edition of the two papers.

Broadcasting and Computing The government-owned Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas operates two commercial radio stations in Nassau and one in Freeport. Bahamas Television began broadcasting from Nassau in 1977, while the Canadian-owned Cable Bahamas commenced cable TV transmission in March 1995; the nation also receives U.S. television direct from Florida. As of 2005, there were approximately 319 Internet users per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 584 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

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Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: (Vacant) U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas: (Vacant)

Permanent Representative to the UN: Paulette BETHEL IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, SELA, WCO

BARBADOS BARBADOS

Note: Prime Minister Owen Arthur of the Barbados Labour Party was ousted after 13 years in a snap legislative election on January 15, 2008, with the BLP retaining just 10 of 30 seats. The new prime minister-elect, David Thompson, was sworn in on January 16, and led his Democratic Labour Party back into government, securing the remaining 20 legislative seats.

The Country Geographically part of the Lesser Antilles, Barbados also is the most easterly of the Caribbean nations (see map). The island enjoys an equable climate and fertile soil, approximately 85 percent of the land being arable. Population density is among the world’s highest, although the birth rate has declined in recent years. Approximately 80 percent of the population is of African origin, and another 15 percent is of mixed blood, with Europeans representing only 5 percent of the total; nonetheless, there is a strong and pervasive sense of British tradition and culture. The Anglican Church enjoys official status, but other Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish groups are active. The island historically has been dependent on sugar, which still is a major contributor to the economy. Tourism is the leading source of foreign exchange, while manufacturing, especially that geared toward fellow members of the Caribbean Community, also is an important source of income. After modest advances in 1988 and 1989 the economy was buffeted by the onset in 1990 of a series of reversals that led to a 4 percent decline in real GDP during 1992. In 1993 unemployment soared to 25.5 percent (the highest in 15 years), although GDP registered a healthy advance of more than 3.0 percent. In 1998 GDP growth increased further to 4.2 percent, before falling to 3.2 percent in 1999 and a record low of –3.4 percent in 2001 before recovering to

an average of 2.8 percent for 2002–2006, with 4.0 to 4.5 percent projected for 2007. In a 2003 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report, Barbados retained its status as the highest-ranked developing country in the world, with a Human Development Index (HDI) score close to that of several developed nations.

BARBADOS VENEZUELA

Speightstown Bathsheba

AT LA N T IC OCEA N

Holetown

BARBADOS

Carlisle Bay

The Crane

Bridgetown

Car i bbean S ea 0 0

5 Mi 5 Km

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Government and Politics Political Background Historically a planter-dominated island, and often called the “Little England” of the Caribbean, Barbados has been molded by a British tradition extending back to 1639. In 1937 economic problems caused by the fluctuating price of sugar led to demonstrations in Bridgetown, which resulted in the establishment of a British Royal Commission to the West Indies. The commission proved instrumental in bringing about social and political reform, including the introduction of universal adult suffrage in 1951. The island was granted full internal sovereignty ten years later. Barbados played a leading role in the shortlived West Indies Federation (1958–1962) and supplied its only prime minister, Sir Grantley ADAMS. The collapse of the federation and the inability of Barbadian leaders to secure the establishment of an Eastern Caribbean Federation as a substitute left independence within the Commonwealth, which was achieved on November 30, 1966, as the only viable alternative. An election held November 3, 1966, confirmed the dominant position of the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), whose leader, Errol Walton BARROW, had been named premier in 1961 and was reappointed prime minister in 1971. In an election held September 2, 1976, the opposition Barbados Labour Party (BLP) upset the DLP, and Barrow’s 15-year rule ended the following day with the designation of Sir Grantley’s son, J. M. G. M. (“Tom”) ADAMS, as prime minister. In voting that was extremely close in many constituencies, the BLP retained its majority on June 18, 1981. Adams died in March 1985 and was succeeded by his deputy, H. Bernard ST. JOHN, who was unable to contain deepening fissures within the party. As a result, the DLP won a decisive legislative majority of 24–3 in balloting on May 28, 1986, with a new Barrow administration being installed the following day. Barrow died suddenly on June 1, 1987, and was succeeded on the following day by Lloyd Erskine SANDIFORD, who led the party to victory

on January 22, 1991, with a reduced margin of ten seats in the lower House of Assembly. After losing a legislative confidence vote on June 7, 1994, over his appointment of a new chief executive of the Barbados Tourism Authority (BTA), Sandiford dissolved the House of Assembly and called for a premature general election on September 6. The result was an overwhelming defeat for the DLP, with the newly installed BLP leader, Owen S. ARTHUR, being named to head a government that was sworn in on September 12. The BLP inflicted a shattering 26–2 defeat on its opponent in the election of January 20, 1999, with analysts crediting the victory to a buoyant economy. Riding a wave of favorable public opinion, Arthur was elected to a third term at an early vote on May 21, 2003.

Constitution and Government The Barbados governmental structure is modeled after the British parliamentary system. The queen remains titular head of state and is represented by a governor general with quite limited functions. (The establishment of a republican form of government, in which the queen would be replaced as head of state by a president, is currently under consideration [see Current issues, below].) Executive authority is vested in the prime minister and his cabinet, who are collectively responsible to a bicameral legislature. The upper house of the legislature, the Senate, is appointed by the governor general after consultation with the government, the opposition, and other relevant social and political interests. The lower house, the House of Assembly, sits for a maximum term of five years. The franchise is held by all persons over the age of 18, and voting is by secret ballot. The judicial system embraces lower magistrates, who are appointed by the governor general with the advice of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission, and a Supreme Court, encompassing a High Court and a Court of Appeal. The chief justice is appointed by the governor general on the recommendation of the prime minister after consultation with the leader of the opposition.

BARBADOS

Political Status: Independent member of the Commonwealth since November 30, 1966. Area: 166 sq. mi. (431 sq. km.). Population: 250,010 (2000C); 273,000 (2006E). The 2000 figure does not include an adjustment for underenumeration. Major Urban Center (2005E): BRIDGETOWN (urban area, 142,000). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: Barbados Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2.00 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Sir Clifford HUSBANDS; named to succeed Dame Ruth Nita BARROW, who died December 19, 1995. Prime Minister: (See headnote.) Owen Seymour ARTHUR (Barbados Labour Party); appointed September 7, 1994, to head cabinet, sworn in September 12, in succession to Dr. Lloyd Erskine SANDIFORD (Democratic Labour Party), following election of September 6; formed new government on January 25, 1999, following election of January 20, and on May 26, 2003, following election of May 21.

Previously elected local government bodies were abolished in 1969 in favor of a division into 11 parishes, all of which (in addition to the municipality of Bridgetown) are now administered by the central government.

Foreign Relations Barbados has pursued an active, but nonaligned, posture in United Nations, Commonwealth, and hemispheric affairs. After participating for some years in the Organization of American States (OAS) ostracism of Cuba, Barbados reestablished relations with Havana in 1973, although still enjoying cordial relations with the United States. In December 1979, in a move characterized by Prime Minister Adams as an act of “East Caribbean defence cooperation,” Barbados dispatched troops to St. Vincent to help maintain order while St. Vincent police were deployed in containing an uprising on the Grenadines’ Union Island. Relations with

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neighboring Grenada, on the other hand, deteriorated following installation of the leftist regime of Maurice Bishop in St. George’s in March 1979, and the Adams government participated in the U.S.-led invasion precipitated by the coup of October 1983. This action, while strengthening Bridgetown’s relations with Washington, strained its links with United Kingdom and, perhaps more seriously, with Trinidad, which claimed that the operation was undertaken without properly consulting all members of the Caribbean community. Despite his government’s difficulties, Prime Minister Adams was widely perceived as a regional leader, his death being described as “leaving a power vacuum in the Caribbean.” Subsequently, Barbados moved even closer to the United States. Despite outspoken dissatisfaction with the level of aid provided by the U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative, the island was designated in early 1985 as the center of the U.S.-funded Regional Security System (RSS), which conducted military maneuvers in the eastern Caribbean the following September. Even before Adams’s death, however, the idea of providing the RSS with a 1,000man rapid deployment force had quietly been dropped. Following the DLP’s 1986 victory, Prime Minister Barrow joined James Mitchell of St. Vincent in opposing the conclusion of a formal RSS treaty, stating in a letter to six regional chief executives that his government would rely instead on a 1982 memorandum of understanding that provided for cooperation in a number of nonmilitary activities such as drug control, prevention of smuggling, and maritime conservation and training. In August 1998 the government announced that henceforth it would place more emphasis on its relations with Asia and the Pacific. Concurrently, indicating that the “basic focus” of its foreign policy would be economic, Barbados established a consular office in Geneva to coordinate relations with the World Trade Organization. Indicative of a shift from Washington to Havana, Prime Minister Arthur signed a number of economic accords with Cuba in mid-1999, while accepting Cuba’s highest decoration, the Jos´e Mart´ı

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award, for opposing the continued U.S. blockade of the Castro regime. In mid-2005 Barbados had a falling out with St. Vincent over inter-island drug traffic, Prime Minister Arthur suggesting that the Kingstown administration was doing little to curb the illegal trade. He appeared to draw support from BBC Caribbean Radio, which commented that the Vincentian police regarded traffickers as “responding to economic circumstances rather than having a purely criminal intent.”

Current Issues In May 1995 Prime Minister Arthur appointed a ten-member Constitutional Review Commission to propose reforms aimed at building a “new, just and humane society,” and in July 1996 the commission began a review of issues that included maintenance of the link to the British Crown. Underlying the inquiry was rising concern over the role of Britain’s Privy Council, which had recently tightened procedures for executions in capital cases, with both parties adopting an essentially republican posture during the 1994 electoral campaign. Assembly debate began in mid-2000 on the commission’s report, which recommended a move to republic status, under which an indirectly elected president would serve as head of state while most governmental authority would remain with the prime minister. In early 2005 Arthur pledged that a referendum (endorsed by his party’s 2003 election manifesto) would be held on the matter. The pledge was reiterated in December, although a promised referendum on the issue had not been scheduled by mid-2007. In 2004 the Arthur administration reiterated its long-standing objection to a maritime treaty between Trinidad and Venezuela that purportedly assigned to the signatories “an enormous part of Barbados’ and Guyana’s maritime territory” and declared that it would follow Guyana in taking the dispute to the United Nations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The action came after the arrest of two Barbadian fishermen in what were alleged to be Trinidadian waters

and appeared linked to the allocation of regional offshore oil and gas exploration blocks. The dispute was ultimately resolved in early 2007, following a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, which established a maritime boundary roughly halfway between the two countries.

Political Parties For most of the period since independence, the Barbados Labour Party and the Democratic Labour Party exhibited similar labor-oriented philosophies with political contests turning mainly on considerations of personality. Recently, however, the DLP has adopted a somewhat right-of-center posture that appears to have influenced the launching of the National Democratic Party (below) as a third force in island politics.

Government Party Barbados Labour Party (BLP). Founded in 1938, the BLP is the oldest of the leading parties. After dominating Barbadian politics in the 1950s under the leadership of Sir Grantley Adams, it went into opposition, winning nine seats in 1966, three of which were lost in 1971. It returned to power in 1976 under Sir Grantley’s son, J. M. G. M. (“Tom”) Adams, and retained its majority in the election of June 18, 1981. The party split into a number of factions after the death of the younger Adams in 1985, thereby contributing to the defeat of the St. John government a year later. Former foreign minister Henry FORDE, named to succeed St. John as parliamentary leader in October 1986, declared that the party would have to be rebuilt as a “highly decentralized” organization featuring “mass democracy in the formation of policy.” Forde was succeeded in July 1993 by Owen Arthur, who led the party to victory 14 months later. The BLP retained power in an electoral landslide on January 20, 1999, winning 26 of 28 lower house seats, 3 of which were lost in 2003. Leaders: Owen Seymour ARTHUR (Prime Minister and Party Chair), Mia MOTTLEY (Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of Government

BARBADOS

Business in the House), William DUGUID (General Secretary).

Opposition Parties Democratic Labour Party (DLP). A moderate party founded in 1955 by dissident members of the BLP, the DLP has, for most of its existence, been closely allied with the country’s principal labor group, the Barbados Workers’ Union. In the 1971 election the party obtained 18 of 24 legislative seats, but it retained only 7 in 1976; its representation rose to 10 in 1981. Former prime minister Errol W. Barrow resigned as DLP leader following the 1976 reversal but returned to the party presidency in mid-1980. After the 1981 defeat, he again stepped down as president while remaining in Parliament as leader of the opposition. In 1985, in the wake of Tom Adams’s death, continued recession, and the likelihood of an early election, Barrow advanced an essentially conservative program including privatization of state enterprises, cutbacks in public works, sale of the government’s share in a number of corporate sectors, and the introduction of business incentives. However, the new platform also deplored Bridgetown’s involvement in U.S. strategic interests and called for dissolution of the RSS. Barrow returned as prime minister in 1986, but he died the following year; his deputy, Erskine Sandiford, assumed leadership of the government and the party. Former finance minister David Thompson was named to succeed Sandiford after the party’s electoral loss in September 1994. The party’s legislative representation plummeted to two seats in January 1999. Thompson resigned as party president in September 2001; he was succeeded by Clyde MASCOLL, an economist, who was not a member of the Assembly. The party continued in opposition after the 2003 poll, with a net gain of five House seats and Mascoll assuming the opposition leadership in the lower house. In August 2005 Thompson returned to the party presidency, defeating the incumbent, Sen. Freundel Stuart, by an Annual Conference vote of 345–164. He was reconfirmed be a party poll in November,

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after some members had indicated a preference for Mascoll. Mascoll reacted to his defeat by resigning from the party in January 2006, and he was promptly named to a BLP cabinet post, Thompson succeeding to his role as opposition leader. Leaders: David THOMPSON (President of the Party and Leader of the Opposition), Sen. Freundel STUART (Former President of the Party). National Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP was launched on February 1, 1989, following the withdrawal of former finance minister Richie Haynes and three other MPs from the DLP. Haynes, who had earlier criticized the Sandiford administration for raising taxes in violation of a 1987 campaign pledge, declared that the new party would strive for a “just and caring society” with “efficiency and integrity in public affairs.” The NDP lost all four of its seats in January 1991; one that was regained in September 1994 was lost in January 1999. In mid-1997 several NDP figures rejoined the DLP, although most of its founding members indicated that they would remain with the dissident formation. Leaders: Dr. Richard (Richie) HAYNES (Former Leader of the Opposition), Edgar BOURNE, Richard BYER. Minor parties include the People’s Progressive Movement (PPM), founded in 1979 and led by Eric SEALY; the left-wing Workers’ Party of Barbados (WPB), founded in 1985 by Dr. George BELLE; and the leftist People’s Empowerment Party (PEP), launched in 2006 by Robert (Bobby) CLARKE, former leader of the Movement for National Liberation (Monali).

Legislature The bicameral Parliament consists of an appointed Senate and an elected House of Assembly. Senate. The Senate consists of 21 members appointed by the governor general; 12 are appointed on advice of the prime minister, 2 on advice of the

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Cabinet As of May 1, 2007 see headnote Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Owen S. Arthur Mia Mottley [f]

Ministers Agriculture and Rural Development Commerce, Consumer Affairs, and Business Development Defense and Security Economic Affairs and Development Education, Youth Affairs, and Sports Energy and Environment Finance and Social Security Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Health Home Affairs and Attorney General Housing and Lands Immigration Information and Broadcasting Labour and Civil Service Public Works Social Transformation Tourism and International Transport Town and Country Planning

Erskine Griffith Lynette Eastmond [f] Owen S. Arthur Mia Mottley [f] Anthony Wood Elizabeth Thompson McDonald [f] Owen S. Arthur Billie Miller [f] Jerome Walcott Dale Mashall Reginald Farely Owen S. Arthur Owen S. Arthur Rawle Eastmond Gline Clarke Trevor Prescod Noel Anderson Lynch Owen S. Arthur

Ministers of State Prime Minister’s Office Education, Youth Affairs, and Sports Finance Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade

Joseph Atherley Cynthia Forde [f] Clyde Mascoll Kerrie Symmonds

[f] = female

leader of the opposition, and 7 to represent social, religious, and economic interests. President: Sir Fred W. GOLLOP. House of Assembly. The House currently consists of 30 members elected for five-year terms by direct popular vote. In the most recent election of May 21, 2003, the Barbados Labour Party won 23 seats, and the Democratic Labour Party, 7. Speaker: Ishmael A. ROETT.

Communications All news media are free of censorship and government control.

Press The following are privately owned and published in Bridgetown: Daily Nation (32,000 daily; 52,000 Sunday, published as Sunday Sun); The Beacon (15,000), weekly BLP organ; Barbados

BARBADOS

Advocate (15,000 daily; 21,000 Sunday), independent; Action, weekly. In addition, an Official Gazette is issued on Monday and Thursday.

News Agencies The regional Caribbean News Agency (Cana) is headquartered in St. Michael; Spain’s Agencia EFE also is represented in Barbados.

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multidenominational religious system has sought licensing. The CBC operates the only television service, apart from two cable channels. As of 2005, there were approximately 595 Internet users and 149 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 767 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation

Broadcasting and Computing

Ambassador to the U.S.: Michael Ian KING

Barbados Rediffusion Service, Ltd., has operated a wired radio system since the 1930s, and the government-owned Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) has offered a wireless system since 1963. The Voice of Barbados, privately owned, began broadcasting in 1981, while Barbados Broadcasting Service (BBS), also private, began transmission in late 1982. In addition, a

U.S. Ambassador to Barbados: Mary Martin OURISMAN Permanent Representative to the UN: Christopher Fitzherbert HACKETT IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, IADB, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, SELA, WCO, WTO

BELIZE BELIZE

Note: In the snap legislative polls on February 7, 2008, the United Democratic Party (UDP) won 25 of 31 legislative seats, led by the newly elected prime minister, Dean Barrow. The People’s United Party of former Prime Minister Said Musa secured the remaining 6 seats. The new government was sworn in on February 8.

The Country Located on the Caribbean coast of Central America, bordered by Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula on the north and by Guatemala on the west and south, Belize is slightly larger than El Salvador but with less than 3 percent of the latter’s population. Most of the inhabitants are of mixed ancestry. Mestizos of Spanish and Mayan Indian derivation comprise the largest part of the population (43.6 percent), while Creole descendants of African slaves and English settlers form the second largest group (29.8 percent). Other smaller ethnic groups include Amerindians (mainly Mayans), Carib Blacks (Garifunas), Asians, German Mennonites, and others of European descent. Roman Catholics constitute the largest religious group (60 percent), with roughly equal numbers (14 percent each) of Anglicans and Methodists. Approximately three-quarters of the country are forested, but the quality of its timber has been depleted by more than two centuries of exploitation by British firms, and in 1992 the government banned the export of ziricote and rosewood in lumber form. Less than a fifth of the country’s arable land, located primarily in the south, is under cultivation. The principal export commodities are sugar, molasses, fruit, and fish, with the economy subject to chronic trade deficits. Although living conditions in Belize City, which contains nearly one-quarter of the population, are poor, school attendance is high and adult literacy is more than 90 percent.

Average income is little more than $1,000 a year, in part because of widespread unemployment that has induced tens of thousands of Belizeans to emigrate, principally to the United States. Economic growth, as reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), averaged 2.9 percent during 1993– 1998, before rising to 6.5 percent in 1999 and 10.4 percent in 2000. After several years of deflation

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Gu l f o f Ho n du r as HONDURAS

BELIZE

Political Status: Former British dependency; became independent member of the Commonwealth on September 21, 1981. Area: 8,867 sq. mi. (22,965 sq. km.). Population: 240,204 (2000C); 302,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): BELMOPAN (13,600), Belize City (62,300). Official Language: English. Spanish is the country’s second language, and a form of English Creole is widely spoken. Monetary Unit: Belize Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 1.95 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Sir Colville YOUNG; sworn in November 17, 1993, following the resignation of Dame Minita Elvira GORDON. Prime Minister: (See headnote.) Said MUSA (People’s United Party); sworn in on August 28, 1998, in succession to Manuel A. ESQUIVEL (United Democratic Party), following legislative election of August 27; formed new government on September 1, 1998; reinvested on March 7, 2003, following election of March 5.

(averaging 0.8 percent in 1997–1998), inflation of 1.0 percent was recorded in 2000. The economy was severely battered by a hurricane in October 2001. GDP growth in 2005 receded to 3.0 percent despite the discovery of an oil field in Spanish Lookout in western Belize but rebounded to 5.3 percent in 2006. The IMF credited the improvement to a reduction in the trade imbalance, an increase in tourism, and the outset of crude oil exports. However, the IMF called the outlook for 2007 “worrisome” because of high scheduled debt obligations and predicted GDP growth of only 2.6 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background Initially colonized in the early 17th century by English woodcutters and shipwrecked sailors, the

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territory long known as British Honduras became a Crown dependency governed from Jamaica in 1862 and a separate colony in 1884. The country’s western boundary was delineated in an 1859 convention that was repudiated by Guatemala in 1940 (see Foreign relations, below). Internal selfgovernment was granted under a constitution effective January 1, 1964, and the official name was changed to Belize in June 1973. Although the dispute with Guatemala remained unresolved, independence was granted on September 21, 1981, with Great Britain agreeing to provide for the country’s defense “for an appropriate period.” At independence, George Cadle PRICE, who had served continuously in an executive capacity since his designation as first minister in 1961, was named prime minister. At the country’s first postindependence election on December 14, 1984, the electorate expressed its apparent weariness of more than three decades of rule by Price’s People’s United Party (PUP), turning by a substantial margin to the more conservative United Democratic Party (UDP) led by Manuel A. ESQUIVEL. However, at balloting on September 4, 1989, PUP returned to power, winning 15 of 28 legislative seats in a narrow electoral victory (50.3 to 48.4 percent) over the incumbent UDP. The UDP’s loss was linked, in part, to popular disenchantment with its economic policies, which Price had castigated as “savage economic liberalism.” Buoyed by sweeping victories in a 1993 parliamentary by-election in January and local government balloting in April, Prime Minister Price called a snap Assembly election for June 30. This proved a mistake, as the opposition UDP captured 16 of 29 seats, returning Esquivel to government leadership. However, PUP swept municipal balloting on March 11, 1997, winning all seven town boards, and went on to a conclusive victory at the Assembly poll of August 27, 1998, winning 26 of 29 seats. Shortly thereafter Said MUSA was named to succeed Esquivel as prime minister, and he remained in office following the election on March 5, 2003, at which time PUP representation declined marginally to 22 seats.

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Constitution and Government With modifications appropriate to Britain’s yielding of responsibility in the areas of defense, foreign affairs, and the judiciary, Belize’s 1981 constitution is structured after its 1964 predecessor. The Crown is represented by a governor general of Belizean citizenship who must act, in most matters, on the advice of a cabinet headed by a prime minister. The National Assembly, with a normal term of five years, is a bicameral body currently encompassing a 29-member House of Representatives elected by universal adult suffrage, plus the speaker, if not an elected member, and an appointed Senate of 13 members. Cabinet members may be drawn from either house, except that the finance minister must sit in the House of Representatives, where all money bills originate. The governor general is empowered to appoint a 5-member Elections and Boundaries Commission and, on the advice of the prime minister, 8 members of a 13-member Public Services Commission (the remaining members serving ex officio). The judicial system includes a Supreme Court as superior court of record, whose chief justice is appointed on the advice of the prime minister after consultation with the leader of the opposition; and a Court of Appeal, from which final appeal may, in certain cases, be made to the Judicial Committee of the UK Privy Council. (In early 2004 the government indicated that it would seek to amend the Constitution to make the Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ] the country’s final court of appeal.) There also are courts of summary jurisdiction and civil courts in each of the six districts into which the country is divided for administrative purposes.

Foreign Relations Belize became a full member of the Commonwealth upon independence and was admitted to the United Nations in September 1981, despite a Guatemalan protest that the “unilateral creation” of an independent state in disputed territory constituted “an invitation to third powers to become protectors of Belize” and thus make Central America “an area for ambitions and confrontation.” Although it formally requested membership in the

Organization of American States (OAS) in October, the Price government indicated its willingness to have action on the matter deferred in view of an OAS rule prohibiting the admission of a state involved in territorial disputes with existing members. Guatemala had long contended that its dispute was with Britain, not with Belize. Guatemalan leaders claimed that their country’s repudiation in 1940 of the Belizean boundary set forth in the 1859 convention was justified because of Britain’s failure to fulfill certain treaty obligations, including a commitment to construct a road from Belize City to the border to provide northern Guatemala with access to the Caribbean. Thus, under its 1945 constitution, Guatemala claimed British Honduras, as Belize was first known, as part of its national territory. Progress toward resolution of the problem was attempted in a tripartite “Heads of Agreement” document drafted in London on March 11, 1981, with Guatemala yielding on the territorial issue and Belize abandoning certain maritime claims as a means of granting Guatemala “permanent and unimpeded access” to its relatively isolated port of Puerto Barrios on the Gulf of Honduras. However, the agreement angered elements within both Belize and Guatemala, as well as serving to revive a long-standing Honduran claim to the Sapodilla Cay group. Further talks held in New York in late May 1981 were reported to have “succeeded in turning a large bulk of the . . . agreement into treaty language,” but Guatemalan intransigence thereafter led to a British announcement that it would proceed with independence on September 21 despite the lack of formal settlement. The immediate postindependence period yielded further negotiations between the three countries and an increase in external support for Belize. In 1982 Guatemala called for renewed discussions with Britain, and tripartite talks were reopened in January 1983 but broke down immediately because of Belize’s continued refusal to cede any territory. More inconclusive discussions were held in Miami, Florida, in April 1987. In May 1988 a Joint Permanent Commission was established, with Guatemala appearing to yield in

BELIZE

its demand for a land corridor across Belize in return for the right of free transit and guaranteed access to Belizean waters. Collaterally, British aid for road improvements on the Guatemalan side of the border was seen as a means of securing token compliance with the 1859 treaty, which lay at the heart of the dispute. The commission subsequently held a number of “positive and cordial” meetings, including a session in Miami on February 1–3, 1989, which concluded with a call for talks “at a higher level” to settle on the details of a draft treaty. In May 1990 tension again flared in the form of a clash between residents of Belize’s Toledo district and Guatemalan agricultural workers who had unknowingly planted crops on the Belizean side of the border. The incident prompted a meeting between Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo Ar´evalo and Prime Minister Price on the Honduran island of Roat´an on July 9, at the conclusion of which “significant progress” was reported in reaching a solution to the lengthy impasse. In January 1991 Belize was admitted to the OAS after the Guatemalan president-elect, Jorge Serrano El´ıas, indicated that his administration would continue talks aimed at settling the controversy. One month after his inauguration, Serrano asserted that “Belize has the recognition of the international community” and again committed himself to resolution of the “sterile dispute.” Shortly thereafter, however, his foreign minister, Alvaro Arz´u, insisted that Guatemala did not recognize Belize’s independence and continued to lay claim to the territory. Less than six months later Serrano overruled Arz´u by announcing that his administration recognized “the right of the Belizean people to self-determination” and on September 5 extended diplomatic recognition to Belmopan. Termination of the lengthy dispute was reinforced in November 1992 by the Guatemalan Constitutional Court, which upheld Serrano’s action in a 4–3 vote, and on April 16, 1993, the two countries reached agreement on a nonaggression pact during a meeting in Miami. On May 13 the United Kingdom announced that its army garrison and jet aircraft would be withdrawn by August 1994. The rapprochement with Guatemala came after Belize had agreed to reduce its southern territorial

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limit to three miles and to grant its neighbor access to the sea from the northern department of Pet´en. Belize also ceded the use of port facilities at Stann Creek and the right to participate in offshore ventures, such as oil exploration, in Belize’s 12-mile economic zone. Criticism of the accord ensued in both countries: Guatemalan foreign minister Arz´u resigned after insisting that Serrano’s action was unconstitutional, while a faction of the Belizean UDP (see NABR, below) distanced itself from the parent group on the grounds that the maritime provisions would have adverse consequences, particularly for fishermen. During another round of territorial negotiations in Miami on November 20, 1998, the Belizean delegation rejected a Guatemalan proposal that the underlying dispute be resolved by an international court, but the two governments did agree to establish a mixed commission to deal with a variety of issues concerning the rights of their respective citizens. Following a number of border incidents, agreement was reached in September 2002 to deploy OAS observers to the disputed area pending the holding of a referendum on the issue in both countries. However, the accord was repudiated by Guatemala in August 2003, and in May 2004 new discussions were launched at OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C., to find an “equitable and permanent solution” to the controversy. After lengthy negotiations, an Agreement on a Framework of Negotiations and Confidence Building Measures between Belize and Guatemala was signed on September 8, 2005. The document provided for a bilateral commission to undertake cooperation projects and develop a solution to the territorial dispute. On November 23, at the conclusion of its first meeting, the commission announced that it had discussed “issues of fact and law” on which subsequent negotiations would be based. Evidence of the thaw in relations was provided in October 2005 by the conclusion of the first bilateral trade accord between the two countries and again in July 2006 when they endorsed a preliminary trade agreement that would allow 150 products to be traded duty-free. Despite these positive steps, in January 2007 Prime Minister Musa called for an independent international tribunal to resolve

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the territorial dispute, agreement having reportedly been reached on both sides that the current negotiations under OAS auspices did not appear headed toward resolution.

Current Issues As of early 2006 no consensus had been reached on a long-standing proposal that Belize should become a republic, although some progress had been made in normalizing the country’s relations with Guatemala (see Foreign relations, above). Meanwhile, with Prime Minister Musa’s popularity plummeting to a low of 16 percent, opposition leader Dean BARROW announced that he would step down if the UDP lost in local elections on March 1. The party responded by handing PUP its first defeat in a decade by winning a landslide 64 of 67 contests and 60 percent of the votes. Also in March, government officials announced that the oil field discovered in the Spanish Lookout district contained an estimated 6–10 million barrels. In an apparent effort to capitalize on the nation’s first significant oil find, the government announced plans to raise the oil income tax from 25 percent to 40 percent. In response, the Belize National Energy (BNE) company, the primarily private group that had conducted the exploration, threatened to leave the country if its profits were threatened too heavily by government policies. Meanwhile, the people of Belize reportedly harbored considerable doubt that they would benefit from the oil discovery. In October 2006 the United States removed Belize from the list of countries failing to meet minimum standards of fighting trafficking in persons. Attention in early 2007 focused on the government’s apparently successful efforts to reschedule payments on more than half of its external debt.

Political Parties Government Party People’s United Party (PUP). Founded in 1950 as a Christian Democratic group, PUP has

been dominant for most of the period since the achievement of internal self-government in 1964. After 34 years in office (largely under colonial administration), PUP was decisively defeated at the December 1984 election, and former president and party leader George C. Price was among those losing their legislative seats. Following the election, (then) PUP chair and right-wing faction leader Louis SYLVESTRE resigned from the party. At a January 1986 “Unity Congress,” the leader of the left-wing faction, Said Musa, was elected party chair, while the leader of the rump right-wing faction, Florencio MARIN, was elected deputy chair. Utilizing promises of a liberalized media policy and an expanded state role in the economy, PUP regained legislative control at the September 1989 election, before again losing it at the early vote of June 1993. In May 1996 deputy chair Mar´ın resigned, prompting speculation that he was positioning himself for a power struggle with Musa for the party leadership post held by the aging Price. In midOctober Price resigned, and at balloting at the party’s national convention on November 10 Musa outpolled Mar´ın, 358 to 214, to capture the top PUP slot. Musa became prime minister following the party’s landslide victory on August 27, 1998. Leaders: Said MUSA (Prime Minister and Party ˜ (Deputy Prime Minister Leader), John BRICENO and Deputy Party Leader).

Opposition Parties United Democratic Party (UDP). The UDP was formed in 1974 by merger of the People’s Democratic Movement, the Liberal Party, and the National Independence Party. A largely Creole grouping, the party boycotted the preindependence constitutional discussions and the independence ceremonies on the grounds that assurances of continued support by Britain were “vague and uncertain.” The UDP includes an extremist youth wing, the Belize Action Movement, whose adherents engaged in numerous clashes with

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Cabinet As of March 1, 2007 see headnote Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Said Musa (PUP) John Brice˜no (PUP)

Ministers Agriculture and Fisheries Culture Defense Education and Labor Finance Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Health Home Affairs and Public Utilities Housing Human Development Local Government National Development and Investment Natural Resources and Environment Public Service Tourism, Information, and National Emergency Management Transport and Communication Youth and Sports Attorney General

Vildo Marin Mark Espat Cordel Hyde Francis Fonseca Said Musa Eamon Courtenay Jos´e Coye Ralph Fonseca Cordel Hyde Sylvia Flores [f] Jos´e Coye Mark Espat John Brice˜no Said Musa Godfrey Smith Jos´e Coye Cordel Hyde Francis Fonseca

[f] = female

police during the pre-independence period. In January 1983 Manuel Esquivel was named party leader in succession to Theodore Aranda, who withdrew from the UDP while retaining his parliamentary seat. Aranda later formed the center-right Christian Democratic Party before joining PUP in mid-1987. After securing an unexpectedly lopsided victory at the balloting of December 14, 1984, Esquivel became head of the first non-PUP government since independence. In December 1986 the UDP triumphed again, winning all nine seats on the Belize City Council. Hampered by opposition criticism of its economic policies, it lost its legislative majority at the September 1989 balloting and failed to retain a single council seat the following December.

Most of the UDP leadership, including Esquivel, supported the 1991 settlement with Guatemala, although a minority led by Philip GOLDSON (who resigned from his position as deputy secretary general in mid-November) did not, and, after leaving the party, helped launch the NABR (below). The UDP won only 3 of 29 seats at the election of August 27, 1998, and on March 1, 2000, lost all 7 seats in Belmopan’s first municipal poll, while retaining control in only one of seven other municipalities. Although losing to PUP by a wide margin in March 2003, it secured an overwhelming victory in the municipal poll of March 2006 when it won 64 of 67 seats. Leaders: Dean BARROW (Party Leader), Douglas SINGH (Chair).

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National Alliance for Belizean Rights (NABR). The NABR was organized in February 1992 by a group of UDP dissidents who strongly believed maritime concessions to Guatemala were an abridgement of Belizean sovereignty. In November the Supreme Court issued a bankruptcy order against (then) NABR chair Derek AIKMAN, thus setting the stage, under Belizean law, for his expulsion from the House of Representatives. Despite the circumstances of its launching, the NABR campaigned with the UDP in 1993 and subsequently joined the Esquivel government. Leader: Philip S. W. GOLDSON (National Coordinator).

Legislature The Belize National Assembly is a bicameral body consisting of an appointed Senate and a directly elected House of Representatives, both serving five-year terms, subject to dissolution. Senate. The upper house currently has 12 members, plus the Senate president. Six of the members are appointed by the governor general on the advice of the prime minister, 3 on the advice of the leader of the opposition, and 3 on the advice of various sectors of society. President: Philip ZUNIGA. House of Representatives. The lower house currently has 30 members, 29 elected by universal adult suffrage, plus the speaker. At the election of March 5, 2003, the People’s United Party won 22 seats, while the United Democratic Party won 7. Speaker: Elizabeth ZABANEH.

Communications Press Freedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed. The following are weeklies published in Belize City: Amandala (40,000), independent; The Reporter (7,000), pro-UDP; The Belize Times (6,000), PUP organ; People’s Pulse (5,000), UDP organ; Government Gazette.

Broadcasting and Computing The Belize Broadcasting Network (BBN) provides daily programming on a semicommercial basis in English and Spanish; formerly governmentoperated, the BBN was privatized in November 1998. In mid-1986 the government issued licenses to eight operators for 14 privately owned television channels retransmitting U.S. satellite programs, all of which technically had been operating illegally previously. Two additional licenses for the operation of nationwide television services were issued in late 1994. As of 2005, there were approximately 141 Internet users and 443 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: (Vacant) U.S. Ambassador to Belize: Robert Johann DIETER Permanent Representative to the UN: (Vacant) IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WTO

BOLIVIA REPUBLIC

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Potosi

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CHILE

ay

Tarija

Paragu

A country of tropical lowlands and pampas flanked by high mountains in the west, landlocked Bolivia is noted for a high proportion of Indians (predominantly Aymar´a and Quechua), who constitute more than 60 percent of the population, although their integration into the country’s political and economic life progressed slowly until recently. Women constitute approximately 39 percent of the labor force, with roughly equal numbers in agricultural, manufacturing, clerical, and service activities. Spanish, the sole official language until 1977, is the mother tongue of less than 40 percent of the people, while Roman Catholicism is the predominant religion. Although providing only one-sixth of Bolivia’s gross national product, agriculture employs about half the population, mostly on a subsistence level. The main crops are soybeans, cotton, coffee, sugar, wheat, barley, and corn. According to recent estimates, only 10 percent of the nation’s farming families own 90 percent of arable land, a situation the current administration plans to alter through a controversial land distribution plan (see Current issues, below). Tin mining has been a traditional mainstay of the economy, although the state-owned mines have long been wracked by labor difficulties. Other significant metal exports include silver, zinc, and tungsten. Bolivia also reportedly controls one of the world’s largest unexploited reserves of iron ore, while the nation’s first gold mine was scheduled to begin operation in 2007. Natural gas surpassed tin as the leading export commodity in 1982. Gas reserves (estimated as

the second largest in Latin America) are located primarily in the eastern lowlands, exacerbating a long-standing divide between the poorer western highlands (populated mainly by Indians) and the richer east (populated mainly by people of European descent and mestizos). Based on the rapidly growing gas and agricultural sectors, the department of Santa Cruz and other lowland departments have served as the country’s “economic engine” for several decades. Petroleum production peaked in 1974.

PA CI F I C OCEAN

The Country

ARGENTINA

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A leading contributor to the underground economy has long been coca leaf production, with the overwhelming proportion of annual output entering the cocaine trade. In the late 1980s, about 400,000 persons in the Chapare region alone were engaged in coca cultivation, with total income from drug trafficking estimated at more than $2.5 billion. U.S.-backed efforts at coca eradication, chiefly by means of crop substitution, fluctuated thereafter. Inflation reached a world record of 24,000 percent in 1985 before falling steadily to 6.5 percent in 1998 under the influence of a sustained austerity program. The economy consistently expanded for most of the 1990s, although unemployment, exacerbated by austerity measures, remained exceedingly high at 25 percent and a majority of the population continued to live in poverty. Growth rates decreased in 1999–2003 under the influence of political turmoil and growing social tensions. GDP growth recovered to more than 4 percent in 2005, 2006, and 2007 due to sharp increases in revenue from hydrocarbon and other mineral exports. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while citing Bolivia’s “macroeconomic stability,” noted in 2006 and 2007 that economic advancement had only marginally assisted the poor. The new leftist government announced a massive poverty-reduction program designed, among other things, to create jobs and provide better public services. (Government spending was expected to grow by nearly 30 percent in 2007.) The administration rebuffed an IMF recommendation to increase privatization and instead embarked on a controversial program of partial nationalization of the gas and mining sectors (see Current Issues, below).

Government and Politics Political Background Bolivia’s history since its liberation from Spanish rule in 1825 has been marked by recurrent domestic instability and frequent conflicts with neighboring states, especially Chile, Peru, and Paraguay. Increased unrest in the mid-20th century

prompted a seizure of power in April 1952 by the reform-minded Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario— MNR), which proceeded to carry out a thoroughgoing social and political revolution under the leadership of presidents V´ıctor PAZ Estenssoro and Hern´an SILES Zuazo, who alternately dominated the political scene in four-year terms from 1952 to 1964. MNR rule was cut short in November 1964, when the vice president, Gen. Ren´e BARRIENTOS Ortun˜no, acting in the midst of widespread disorder, assumed power by a military coup. After serving with Gen. Alfredo OVANDO Cand´ıa as copresident under a military junta, Barrientos resigned to run for the presidency and was elected in July 1966. Supported by the armed forces and a strong coalition in Congress, his regime encountered intense opposition from the tin miners, who charged repression of workers’ unions. A southeastern jungle uprising led by Castro-ite revolutionary Ernesto “Ch´e” GUEVARA in 1967 resulted in Guevara’s death at the hands of government troops and the capture of guerrilla ideologist R´egis DEBRAY. President Barrientos was killed in a helicopter crash in April 1969, and Vice President Luis Adolfo SILES Salinas succeeded to the presidency. Siles was deposed the following September by the military, which installed Barrientos’s former copresident, Ovando Cand´ıa, as chief executive. Backto-back coups occurred in October 1970, the first led by Gen. Rogelio MIRANDA and the second by Gen. Juan Jos´e TORRES. The Torres regime came to power with the support of students, workers, and leftist political parties. It was accompanied by continuing instability, the nationalization of properties (both foreign and domestic), and the creation in 1971 of an extraconstitutional “Popular Assembly” of trade-union leaders, Marxist politicians, and radical students led by Juan LECHIN Oquendo of the tin-miners’ union. In August 1971 the armed forces, in alliance with the MNR and the Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange Socialista Boliviana— FSB), deposed Torres and appointed a govern´ ment under (then) Col. Hugo BANZER Su´arez. Two years later the MNR withdrew from the

BOLIVIA

Political Status: Independent republic proclaimed 1825; civilian government reestablished in October 1982 after virtually constant military rule since September 1969. Area: 424,162 sq. mi. (1,098,581 sq. km.). Population: 8,280,184 (2001C); 9,915,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): LA PAZ (administrative capital, 826,000), Sucre (judicial capital, 231,000), Santa Cruz (1,337,000), Cochabamba (583,000), Oruro (209,000). Official Languages: Spanish, Aymar´a, Quechua (Aymar´a and Quechua were adopted as official languages in 1977). Monetary Unit: Boliviano (market rate November 2, 2007: 7.64 bolivianos = $1US); the peso was replaced by the boliviano in February 1987 at a ratio of 1,000,000:1. President: Evo MORALES (Movement to Socialism); elected December 18, 2005, and inaugurated January 22, 2006, for a five-year term, succeeding Interim President Eduardo RODR´IGUEZ Velts´e (Nonparty). ´ Vice President: Alvaro GARC´IA Linera (Movement to Socialism); elected December 18, 2005, and inaugurated January 22, 2006, for a term concurrent with that of the president. (The office had been vacant since assumption of the presidency by Carlos Diego MESA Gisbert on October 17, 2003.)

coalition, and, after an abortive revolt the following November, B´anzer rescinded an earlier pledge to return the nation to civilian rule in 1975. In November 1977 President B´anzer again reversed himself, announcing that a national election would be held on July 9, 1978. After balloting marked by evidence of massive fraud, the military candidate, Gen. Juan PEREDA Asb´un, was declared the winner over his closest competitor, former president Siles Zuazo. However, faced with a suddenly unified opposition, Pereda was forced to call for an annulment. President B´anzer then declared that he would not remain in office be-

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yond August 6, and on July 21 Pereda was installed as Bolivia’s 188th head of state. Pereda was himself ousted on November 24 by Brig. Gen. David PADILLA Arancibia, who promised to withdraw following an election on July 1, 1979. In the 1979 election, Siles Zuazo, the nominee of a center-left coalition, obtained a bare plurality (36.0 percent to 35.9 percent) over former president Paz Estenssoro, who headed a new MNR coalition that included a number of leftist groups. Called on to decide the outcome because of the lack of a majority, the Congress was unable to choose between the front-runners and on August 6 designated Senate President Walter GUEVARA Arce to serve as interim executive pending a new presidential election in May 1980. Guevara was ousted on November 1, 1979, in a military coup led by Col. Alberto NATUSCH Busch, who was himself forced to resign 15 days later in the face of widespread civil disorder, including a paralyzing general strike in La Paz. On November 16 the Congress unanimously elected the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Lidia GUEILER Tejada, to serve as the country’s first female executive for an interim term expiring August 6, 1980. In the national election on June 29, 1980, Siles Zuazo again secured the largest number of votes while failing to win an absolute majority. As a result, before the new Congress could meet to settle on a winner from among the three leading candidates, the military, on July 17, once more intervened, forcing the resignation of Gueiler the following day in favor of a “junta of national reconstruction” that included Maj. Gen. Luis GARCIA MEZA Tejada (sworn in as president on July 18), Maj. Gen. Waldo BERNAL Pereira, and Vice Adm. Ramiro TERRAZAS Rodr´ıguez. During the following year the regime was divided because of differences within the military and internationally isolated because of charges that certain of its members were actively engaged in the drug trade. In early 1981 revolts broke out at the military academy in La Paz and in Cochabamba, southeast of the capital, while former presidents Natusch and B´anzer were both exiled in mid-May

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for plotting against the government. On May 26 Garc´ıa Meza resigned as army commander and as junta member, naming Gen. Humberto CAYOJA Riart as his successor in both posts; three days later Admiral Terrazas resigned as navy commander and junta member in favor of (then) Capt. Oscar PAMMO Rodr´ıguez. On June 27 General Cayoja was arrested for involvement in a plot to remove Garc´ıa Meza from the presidency, Brig. Gen. Celso TORRELIO Villa being designated his successor. On August 4, following a rebellion in Santa Cruz, the president resigned in favor of General Bernal, who, in turn, yielded the office of chief executive to General Torrelio on September 4. Amid growing economic difficulty, labor unrest, pressure from the parties, and lack of unity within the military, President Torrelio announced that a constituent assembly election would be held in 1984. The increasingly beleaguered government issued a political amnesty in late May 1982 and authorized the parties and trade unions to resume normal activity. On July 19 General Torrelio was ousted in favor of Gen. Guido VILDOSO Calder´on, who announced, following a meeting of armed forces commanders on September 17, that the Congress elected in 1980 would be reconvened to name a civilian president. The lengthy period of military rule formally ended on October 10 with the return to office of Siles Zuazo and the concurrent installation of Jaime PAZ Zamora as vice president. During the ensuing two years, numerous government changes proved incapable of reversing steadily worsening economic conditions, and in November 1984 Siles Zuazo announced that he would retire from the presidency following a general election in mid-1985. In the balloting on July 14, 1985, former president B´anzer of the right-wing Nationalist Democratic Action (Acci´on Democr´atica Nacionalista—ADN) obtained a narrow plurality (28.6 percent) of the votes cast, while the MNR of runner-up Paz Estenssoro won a plurality of congressional seats. In a second-round poll in Congress on August 5, Paz Estenssoro secured a clear majority over his ADN competitor. He was inaugurated for his fourth presidential term on

August 6 in the country’s first peaceful transfer of power since his succession of Siles Zuazo exactly 25 years earlier. While successful in virtually eliminating one of history’s highest rates of inflation, the new administration proved unable to resolve a wide range of other economic difficulties that included massive unemployment (generated, in part, by a crippling decline in world tin prices) and an illegal cocaine trade that provided half the country’s export income. The public responded on December 6, 1987, by rejecting most government candidates in municipal balloting that yielded impressive gains for both the rightist ADN and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR). As in 1985 the results of the nationwide balloting of May 7, 1989, were inconclusive. MNR candi´ date Gonzalo (“Goni”) SANCHEZ DE LOZADA Bustamente obtained a slim plurality (23.1 percent) in the presidential poll over the ADN’s B´anzer (22.7 percent) and the MIR’s Paz Zamora (19.6 percent). A period of intense negotiation ensued that yielded a somewhat improbable pact of “national unity” between the right-wing ADN and the leftof-center MIR on August 2 and the congressional selection four days later of Paz Zamora to head an administration in which 10 of 18 cabinet posts were awarded to the ADN. The unusual accord (which excluded the MNR) was seen, in part, as a continuation of long-standing personal animosity between former president B´anzer and MNR leader S´anchez de Lozada. B´anzer claimed as his reward the chair of an interparty Political Council of Convergence and National Unity (Consejo Superior de Unidad y Convergencia), which some interpreted as the effective locus of power within the MIR–ADN coalition. In the nationwide poll of June 6, 1993, S´anchez de Lozada again defeated B´anzer, this time by a sufficiently impressive margin to ensure designation by Congress under a new procedure that confined its options to the two front-runners. In the legislative balloting, the MNR obtained an equally improved plurality (69 of 157 seats overall) that yielded a preinaugural governing pact between the

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MNR, the rightist Civic Solidarity Union (Uni´on C´ıvica Solidaridad—UCS), and the leftist Free Bolivia Movement (Movimiento Bolivia Libre— MBL). The UCS withdrew from the coalition in September 1994, apparently because of government concessions to labor in furtherance of its antidrug campaign; however, the party rejoined the coalition in June 1995. The 1997 candidacy of the ADN’s B´anzer was aided by the withdrawal of the highly respected Ren´e BLATTMANN Bauer, in favor of the relatively colorless Juan Carlos DURAN. Despite his advanced age of 71 and former role as a military dictator, B´anzer led the June 1 poll with 22.3 percent of the vote and ensured his congressional designation by entering into a postelection coalition with the MIR, the UCS, and the fourth-ranked Conscience of the Fatherland (Conciencia de Patria— Condepa). Overall, the group controlled 96 of 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 24 of 27 in the Senate. Following a leadership dispute within Condepa in mid-1998, its two cabinet members resigned, and B´anzer dropped the party from the ruling coalition. An ailing B´anzer resigned on August 7, 2001, and was succeeded by Vice President Jorge Fern´ando QUIROGA Ram´ırez to serve for the balance of the presidential term to August 2002. In the election of June 30, 2002, the MNR, in alliance with the MBL, won pluralities of 11 Senate and 36 Chamber seats, while S´anchez de Lozada outpolled Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS) leader Evo MORALES by a bare 1.5 percent margin in presidential balloting and was reappointed by Congress on August 4. The ensuing year was marked by turmoil on a number of fronts, including opposition to the U.S.-backed coca eradication program, anger at the plight of the landless, objections to the export of natural gas to Chile, and discontent with tax increases and a number of recent privatizations. On October 13, 2003, Vice President Carlos MESA Gisbert withdrew his support for the president, and on October 17, amid widespread clashes between security forces and demonstrators, S´anchez de Lozada was forced to resign and flee the country. Mesa assumed

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the presidency, naming a new and formally nonpartisan cabinet. President Mesa resigned on June 6, 2005, in the wake of widespread unrest over the nation’s hydrocarbon policies and related autonomy pressure in several regions, most notably Santa Cruz. After the president of Congress and the president of the Chamber of Deputies had removed themselves from the official line of succession to permit a compromise with the MAS (the party most directly involved in the protests), Supreme Court Justice Eduardo RODR´IGUEZ Velts´e was named interim president by the Congress. Rodr´ıguez promptly announced an interim cabinet and launched negotiations for a new election schedule that would fill the presidential and vice-presidential vacancies and select a new Congress. However, a dispute erupted over a constitutionally mandated redistribution of seats to reflect demographic changes recorded by the 2001 census. A congressional effort to sidestep the redistricting issue by decreeing that elections called for December 4 would be based on the 1992 census was voided by the Constitutional Court on September 22, 2005. On November 1, Rodr´ıguez issued a constitutionally questionable decree redistricting the legislative seats, and on December 18 MAS leader Morales won the presidency, defeating his closest competitor, former president Quiroga, by securing an unanticipated 53.7 percent of the vote. (Morales was the first presidential contender since the end of military rule in 1982 to gain a majority in the national poll and thereby secure victory without congressional action.) In the congressional races, the MAS won control of the lower house with a 72-seat majority, while running a close second to Quiroga’s Social Democratic Power (Poder Democr´atico Social—Podemos) in the Senate. However, the MAS won the prefectures (governorships) in only three of the nine departments in concurrent balloting. As requested by the Morales administration, Congress in March 2006 authorized the election of a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution. In balloting on July 2, the MAS secured 137 of 255 seats in the assembly, while in

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concurrent balloting on a referendum regarding proposed greater regional autonomy, the five western departments (La Paz, Oruro, Potosi, Chuquisaca, and Cochabamba) voted no and the four eastern departments (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando) voted yes. Autonomy was thereby not granted to any of the departments, the National Elections Court (Corte Nacional Electoral—CNE) having previously ruled (much to the consternation of the easterners) that a majority of voters nationwide needed to approve the measure for it to be adopted in any department. (The national “no” vote totaled 57 percent.) President Morales appointed a new cabinet with a “distinct leftist tilt” on January 24, 2007, in the midst of a severe east/west schism regarding constitutional revision and other issues (see Current Issues, below). The Senate was dissolved following the Constituent Assembly’s approval of a new charter in December 2007, and the president reshuffled the cabinet on January 24, 2008.

Constitution and Government The constitution of February 1967 was Bolivia’s sixteenth since independence. It vested executive power in a popularly elected president and legislative authority in a bicameral Congress. Suspended in 1969, it was reinstated in 1979, the country having been ruled during the intervening decade by presidential decree; the constitution remained technically in effect following the 1980 coup, subject to military contravention of its terms, and was restored to full force upon the return to civilian rule in October 1982. Under the 1967 basic law the president was directly elected for a four-year term if the recipient won an absolute majority of votes; otherwise, Congress made the selection from among the three leading candidates. However, given the selection in 1989 of the third-ranked contender, congressional leaders in mid-1990 agreed on a revision that limited Congress to choosing between the plurality candidate and the runner-up. In 1997 the term of office was extended to five years, with a limit of only one term.

The bicameral legislature consists of a 27member Senate and a 130-member Chamber of Deputies, both directly elected for five-year terms. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court whose 12 members divide into four chambers: two for civil cases, one for criminal cases, and one for administrative cases. There is a District Court in each territorial department, as well as provincial and local courts to try minor offenses. There are nine territorial departments, each administered by a prefect (governor), who was appointed by the central government until first-ever direct elections were held for the posts in December 2005. Although the 1967 constitution called for the biennial election of municipal councils (empowered to supplant the president in the designation of mayors), implementing legislation was deferred until 1986, with local balloting being conducted in December 1987 for the first time in 39 years. In July 1996 the government secured approval from the Chamber of Deputies for a constitutional amendment on redistribution of seats in the Chamber, giving added representation to the more populous and powerful departments of La Paz and Santa Cruz at the expense of the peripheral departments of Chuquisaca, Pando, and Potosi. Agreement also was reached on the first-ever introduction of singlemember constituencies. Congress, under pressure from the Morales administration, passed a resolution in March 2006 calling for a 255-member elected constituent assembly to rewrite the Bolivian constitution beginning August 6, 2006, following direct elections on July 2, 2006, for the assembly delegates. The assembly was given a one-year mandate, after which its proposals were to be presented for a national referendum. Little progress was reported within the assembly throughout most of 2007, as government and opposition members argued over procedures. The Morales administration was pursuing, among other things, revisions to basic law that would permit presidents to serve more than one term, as well as codification of the government’s plans to redistribute land to the benefit of the Indian population and to give indigenous populations the power to conduct political and economic affairs according

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to their traditions. Meanwhile, opposition parties (dominant in the resource-rich eastern lowlands) called for greater regional autonomy, the establishment of elected regional legislatures, and other decentralization measures that would weaken the power of the president. On December 9, 2007, the Constituent Assembly approved a new charter that would be subject to national referendum in 2008.

Foreign Relations Throughout most of the modern era, Bolivia’s relations with its immediate neighbors have been significantly influenced by a desire to regain at least a portion of the maritime littoral that was lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879–1884). In February 1975 relations with Chile were resumed after a 12-year lapse, Chile announcing that an “agreement in principle” had been negotiated between the two countries whereby Bolivia would be granted an outlet to the sea (salida al mar) along the Chilean-Peruvian border in exchange for territory elsewhere. However, definitive resolution of the issue was complicated in late 1976 by a Peruvian proposal that the corridor from Bolivia be linked to an area north of the city of Arica (obtained by Chile as a consequence of the war) that would be under the three nations’ joint sovereignty. The proposal was based on a 1929 treaty that provided that any cession of former Peruvian territory must be approved by Peru. (For developments from 1976 to 1994, see the 2007 Handbook.) In 2006, Evo Morales became the first president-elect in more than half a century to invite Chile’s president to attend his inauguration, while insisting that restoration of full diplomatic relations would be contingent on Chile’s acceding to Bolivia’s demand for a sovereign corridor to the sea. During July of that year, Morales and Chilean President Bachelet reached agreement on an “agenda” for resolving the territorial issue, and by early 2007 it was reported that the “cold war” between the two countries had clearly been replaced by a period of confidence building. Under the B´anzer dictatorship, Bolivia pursued an anti-Communist and pro-U.S. line in inter-

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American affairs, although links with the United States were tenuous during most of the period of military rule because of the alleged involvement of senior officials in the cocaine trade. Relations with Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela were severed after the 1980 coup. In July 1992 Bolivia applied for membership in the recently launched Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), while indicating that it wished to retain the membership in the Andean Pact. Subsequently, the S´anchez de Lozada administration endorsed a proposal to construct a 1,360-mile natural gas pipeline from Santa Cruz to S˜ao Paulo, Brazil, as well as a joint venture with Paraguay to develop a waterway for oceangoing ships from Bolivia to the Atlantic. While flow through the gas line following its inauguration in mid-1999 was far less than anticipated, talk of a second line arose in the wake of additional gas discoveries in Bolivia and a substantial increase in projected Brazilian demand. Meanwhile, the route of a pipeline to the coast to permit gas exports to Mexico and the United States became a major factor in domestic politics. In an elaborate demonstration of reconciliation that included an exchange of trophies between opponents in the bloody Chaco War of 1932–1935, President Wasmosy of Paraguay visited La Paz in August 1994. Subsequently, at the conclusion of a Rio Group meeting on September 10, S´anchez de Lozada signed a free-trade agreement with Mexican President Salinas de Gortari. In 1996 Bolivia and the United States issued seemingly divergent assessments of the coca eradication campaign, the former insisting that a targeted reduction of 5,000–8,000 hectares for the year would be reached, and the latter claiming that the area under cultivation had remained constant during an eight-year period. (The statements were not incompatible, as land taken out of production could have been offset by new plantings elsewhere.) A revised U.S. estimate in mid-1997 contended that the total area under cultivation had increased by 27 percent during the preceding decade, and under a new cooperation agreement signed in late August the United States cut its farmer compensation funding by half. In September 2001 Bolivia conceded

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that claims by former president B´anzer that most illegal plantations had been eradicated were in error and that about 6,000 hectares (rather than 600) remained under cultivation. In late 2002, amid reports that new plantings were far outstripping eradication, U.S. satellite imagery placed the figure at 24,400 hectares. President Morales, while urging decriminalization of coca cultivation and its removal from the UN list of banned substances, indicated in 2006 that he opposed both processing the leaf into cocaine and trafficking in the drug. Before his inauguration, Morales embarked on a whirlwind international tour that took him to ten countries, including Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, China, and Spain. Warmly greeted in Cuba and Venezuela for his stand against “American imperialism,” he was coolly received in Spain, whose officials were uneasy about his plans for greater control of the energy industry. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in early 2006 described the election of Morales, whose campaign had showcased anti–United States rhetoric, as “clearly worrisome,” and the United States quickly announced plans to reduce military aid to Bolivia. However, any potential gap from that decision was apparently resolved by Bolivia’s conclusion of a military agreement with Venezuela, which was reportedly greeted with concern in neighboring Peru and Paraguay. Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez, of whom Morales was considered a close ally, also pledged massive aid to Bolivia for the construction of hospitals and other social needs. In addition, Morales and Ch´avez negotiated a “people’s trade area” with Cuba. On the other hand, Morales, revealing a pragmatic approach that his critics had not anticipated, declined to follow Ch´avez’s decision to withdraw from the Andean Community of Nations. He also toned down his criticism of the United States.

Current Issues Few countries have matched Bolivia’s unhappy record of political instability, which yielded nearly

200 chief executives in its first century and a half of independence. There were 13 presidents from 1969 to 1982 alone, the most durable incumbency being that of General B´anzer (1971–1978), while eight more followed in 1983–2006. Given the magnitude of his victory, there was hope that the pattern might be broken with the 2006 election of Evo Morales as the first indigenous chief executive. President Mesa won approval of a somewhat ambiguous five-part hydrocarbons referendum in July 2004 that called for “using gas as a strategic resource to recover sovereign and viable access to the sea” (a reference to the dispute with Chile; see Foreign relations, above). Also approved were recovery “over all hydrocarbons at the wellhead” and the levying of taxes up to 50 percent on oil and gas production. The referendum, as presented, had been opposed by the western, oil-producing department of Santa Cruz. The cruce˜nos, who included most of the country’s European descendants, contrasted their region of “productive Bolivia” with the Incadominated “conflictive Bolivia” of the western highlands; by mid-2004 they were calling for regional autonomy, if not secession. In January 2005 Santa Cruz announced the formation of an autonomous regional government. President Mesa responded by terming the unconstitutional action as presenting “one of the gravest and most difficult situations that Bolivia has ever had to face.” In 2006 President Morales attempted to defuse the divisive hydrocarbon issue (the oil-producing department of Santa Cruz had announced formation of an autonomous regional government in 2005 to lay claim to its resources following a 2004 referendum that approved the use of gas as “strategic resource” for the entire country, among other things). Morales endorsed nationalization while insisting that it did not mean “confiscation or exportation,” only that “control of the resources at the wellhead” would no longer be retained by private companies. In May 2006, Morales sent soldiers to occupy 32 privately owned oil and gas fields. Arguing that foreign corporations had been plundering what

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rightfully belonged to the Bolivian people, Morales gave the companies six months to renegotiate their contracts or face eviction. Instead of the 50 percent return that he had campaigned on in 2005, Morales now wanted foreign corporations to return 82 percent of their oil and gas revenue to Bolivia. Morales’s bid to nationalize Bolivia’s energy industry stirred anguish among the country’s private developers, especially those in neighboring Brazil, whose state company Petrobras was the largest foreign investor in Bolivia. However, within weeks Brazilian President Luiz da Silva and Morales agreed to resolve the issue “rationally.” (In 2007 Petrobras agreed to sell its two refineries in Bolivia to the Bolivian government for $112 million.) During this same period in 2006, Morales announced a plan for wide-scale land reform and redistribution to the country’s indigenous rural workers, an issue even more divisive within the eastern regions of the country than the nationalization of natural gas and oil. Under the plan, 12 million state-owned acres would be redistributed initially, followed by the seizure and redistribution of privately owned land deemed “unproductive” because it was not used for farm production. The government contended that the legal ownership of much of the eastern lowlands under consideration was dubious because it had been acquired illegally by wealthy landowners under the B´anzer dictatorship. Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera attempted to assuage fears among Santa Cruz landowners by giving them the opportunity to legalize their deeds and retain property that was under cultivation. Ultimately, the government’s plan called for about 48 million acres to be redistributed by 2011, with limits to be placed on the size of private holdings. Despite their initial outcries over the new hydrocarbon proposals and threats to withdraw from Bolivia, the foreign energy companies in October 2006 negotiated agreements whereby they would continue their activities while ceding a much larger share of the profits to the government. Although Bolivia’s state-owned energy company was given

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formal control of hydrocarbon operations, it was widely agreed that it lacked the resources to develop the gas sector on its own. In addition, soaring global gas prices made it much easier for both sides to reach agreement on the allocation of revenues. President Morales was credited with having adopted a more pragmatic approach toward this issue than originally anticipated in many quarters, a development that prompted criticism from the far left. Meanwhile, Morales pledged that nationalization of a sort would proceed in the mining, telecommunications, and other sectors, although deadlines were not imposed as the government sought additional foreign investment. The president’s other proposed major policy thrust—land redistribution—was one of the main topics of discussion in the Constituent Assembly that was elected in mid-2006 with a mandate to draft a new constitution (see Constitution and Government, above). The assembly did not begin work in earnest until spring 2007 because of the insistence of MAS, Morales’s party, that individual components of the draft constitution be approved by majority vote in the assembly rather than the two-thirds vote demanded by the opposition. (Morales lost that battle.) The assembly also grappled with the complicated issue of greater regional autonomy, which agribusiness leaders in the eastern lowlands had demanded. Much of the population in the eastern departments appeared to support increased autonomy, particularly because it would mean greater local control of resource revenues. (Large-scale anti-Morales demonstrations had broken out in several cities earlier in the year.) Due to the contentiousness of the issues, the assembly was unable to meet its August deadline and its mandate was extended until December. (Tensions resulting from the polarization of the country were heightened throughout the latter part of the year as the homes of politicians aligned with Morales, trade unions, and other public offices were the targets of bomb attacks.) On December 9, 2007, despite a boycott by the opposition Podemos, the Constituent Assembly approved a new charter. However, one key article

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failed to garner the required two-thirds vote—a provision defining the “unproductive land holdings” that were key to the president’s controversial redistribution plan. That article was to be the subject of a referendum in 2008 and, if approved, the entire proposed constitution would then have to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly and another referendum held on the entire charter, also in 2008. Articles approved in the charter included those allowing two consecutive presidential terms of five years each; increased power for the indigenous people; abolition of the Senate; and greater state control over natural resources. Days later, thousands of supporters of Morales demonstrated in favor of the new charter, while thousands in opposition—including those allied with the country’s four wealthiest provinces, which had declared their autonomy—protested in the streets. The regions declaring autonomy, in addition to the eastern province of Santa Cruz, included three other provinces rich in natural resources, also in the eastern lowlands. In January 2008 Morales met with the opposition governors in an effort to overcome the impasse, though the four provinces were scheduled to hold local balloting on the autonomy measures sometime in 2008. No election dates had been set by early 2008 as Morales continued to seek reconciliation. However, chances for rapprochement between the government and its opposition were undermined February 28, as referendum supporters blocked opposition legislators from entering Congress to vote on the referendum date, which was subsequently slated for May 4.

Political Parties Of approximately 60 political parties in Bolivia, the leading contenders in 1985 were the MNR and the ADN, with the MIR emerging as a threat to both in 1989. The MIR joined with the ADN in a Patriotic Accord (Acuerdo Patri´otico—AP) electoral coalition in 1993. In 1997 the MIR, UCS, and Condepa formed an alliance with the ADN that yielded the designation of Hugo B´anzer Su´arez as president. The 2002 poll was narrowly won by an

alliance of the MNR and five minor parties. In 2005 most of the traditional parties were eclipsed by the triumph of Morales’s MAS.

Government and Government-Supportive Parties Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS). Traditionally a minor leftist grouping, the MAS contested the 1997 election as a component of the United Left (below). In 2002 it emerged as the leading opposition group with 8 Senate and 27 Chamber seats. Militant cocagrower leader Evo Morales, an Aymara Indian, was “adopted” by the MAS for the 2002 presidential campaign, placing second to the MNR’s S´anchez de Lozado. The party led all others in the 2004 municipal elections, winning 13 departmental capitals. Morales won the presidency with 53.7 percent of the vote in 2005, and the MAS secured a comfortable majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The party also won the prefectures of the departments of Chuquisaca, Oruro, and Potosi. The MAS won a majority in the July 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly established to propose constitutional revision and subsequently established ties with the MBL (below) and other small parties to extend its influence in that assembly. Leaders: Evo MORALES (President of the Re´ public), Alvaro GARC´IA Linera (Vice President of the Republic), Silvia LAZARTE (President of the Constituent Assembly), Gerardo GARC´IA, Roman LOAYZA. Free Bolivia Movement (Movimiento Bolivia Libre—MBL). A breakaway faction of the MIR, sometimes styled the Leftist Revolutionary Movement–Free Bolivia (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria–Bolivia Libre—MIRBL), the MBL was formed in January 1985. It was a member of the IU before the municipal elections of December 1989. The party secured four lower house seats in 1997. In 2002 it entered into an electoral alliance with the MNR.

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The MBL, centered in the department of Cochabamba, cooperated with the MAS in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly, securing eight seats. Leaders: Frank BARRIOS, Orlando CEVALLOS.

Opposition Parties Social and Democratic Power (Poder Democr´atico Social—Podemos). The right-wing Podemos was launched in 2005 under the leadership of former president and former ADN leader Jorge Quiroga before the December 2005 balloting, at which it won a plurality of Senate seats and placed second to the MAS in the Chamber of Deputies. Quiroga, who enjoyed strong support within the business community, also finished second in the concurrent presidential race with 28.6 percent of the vote, while Podemos won the prefectures of the departments of La Paz, Beni, and Pando. Podemos, in many respects considered an “extension” of the ADN, won 60 seats in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly, calling for constitutional change that would strengthen the legislature at the expense of the president and provide for the direct election of more officials. In 2007 Quiroga accused the Morales administration of “undemocratic behavior.” Leaders: Jorge Fern´ando QUIROGA Ram´ırez (Former President of the Republic), Fernando MESSMER, Rub´en DAR´IO Cu´ellar, Carlos Alberto GOITIA. National Unity Front (Frente Unidad Nacional—UN). The UN was launched in late 2003 by cement magnate Samuel Doria Medina, a defector from the MIR (below), who called for equal representation of men and women in the new group and economic policies favoring “those entrepreneurs who generate employment and are absent from national decision-making.” Doria Medina ran third in the 2005 presidential poll with 7.8 percent of the vote. The UN won eight seats in the 2005 balloting for the Chamber of Deputies and the

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same number in the 2006 poll for the Constituent Assembly. Leaders: Samuel DORIA Medina, Jos´e VILLAVICENCIO (Former President of the Senate), Ricardo POL. Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR). Founded in 1941 by V´ıctor Paz Estenssoro, the original MNR ruled from 1952 until 1964 but was outlawed for a time after the 1964 coup. It joined with the FSB (see ADN, below) and others in a National Popular Front in support of the B´anzer coup in 1971 but withdrew two years later. The MNR spawned a number of other parties as a result of leadership disputes and contested the 1978 election as the leading component of an electoral coalition styled the Historic Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Hist´orico—MNRH), after failing to negotiate an accord with the moderately leftist Democratic and Popular Union (UDP, under MNRI, below). The MNRH in turn contested the 1979 and 1980 elections as the core party of the Alliance of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Alianza de Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—A–MNR). Although tendered left-wing congressional support in defeating General B´anzer for the presidency in August 1985, Paz Estenssoro subsequently concluded a political accord with the ADN (below) to facilitate implementation of a hard-line economic stabilization program. The MNR was decisively defeated in most of the municipal contests of December 6, 1987, and was unable to retain the presidency despite recovery to marginal front-runner status in the general election of May 7, 1989. Three months later Paz Estenssoro, who had been living in the United States since the inauguration of his nephew as president of the republic, announced that he was resigning the party leadership. The decision was formalized at a party congress in mid-1990 by the election of Gonzalo S´anchez de Lozada as his successor. During the congress the 84-year-old MNR founder attempted to heal a breach between

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a group of “renewalists” headed by S´anchez de Lozada and a “traditionalist” faction led by former vice president Julio GARRET. (Paz Estenssoro died on June 7, 2001.) On October 27, 1992, S´anchez de Lozada resigned as MNR president and withdrew from the 1993 presidential election campaign after reportedly receiving a death threat from an MNR congressional deputy. However, he resumed both activities on November 20 and subsequently served as chief executive from 1993 to 1997. Reelected in 2002, he was forced to resign in October 2003. The party was virtually annihilated in the 2004 municipal balloting. In the December 2005 poll it secured one Senate and seven Chamber seats, while its presidential candidate secured 6.5 percent of the vote. The MNR, currently described as a “traditionalist” and right-wing grouping, won eight seats on its own in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly and apparently shared ten other seats in alliance with other parties. Leaders: Michiaki NAGATANI Morishita ´ (2005 presidential candidate), Eduardo YANEZ, Mirtha QUEVADO Acalinovic.

Other Parties that Contested Recent Elections New Republican Force (Nueva Fuerza Republicana—NFR). The NFR is a group led by Manfred Reyes Villa, who supported B´anzer in 1997. It elected 2 senators and 25 deputies in 2002 but fared poorly in the 2004 municipal balloting and elected none of its congressional candidates in 2005, its presidential candidate in the latter year securing only 0.7 percent of the vote. Reyes Villa was elected prefect of the department of Cochabamba in 2005 under the banner of the National Union Alliance (Alianza de Unidad Nacional—AUN), which also won eight seats in the 2006 Constituent Assembly balloting. Leaders: Manfred REYES Villa (2002 presidential candidate), Adm. (Ret.) Gildo ANGULA Cabrera (2005 presidential candidate). Pachakuti Indigenous Movement (Movimiento Ind´ıgena Pachakuti—MIP). The MIP was

formed before the 2002 poll by Felipe Quispe (“Mallku”), executive secretary of the United Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (Confederaci´on Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia—CUTCB) and a former member of the EGTK (below). Quispe won 2.2 percent of the vote in the 2005 presidential balloting. Leader: Felipe QUISPE Huanca (“Mallku”). Civic Solidarity Union (Uni´on C´ıvica Solidaridad—UCS). The UCS is an outgrowth of the National Civic Union (Uni´on C´ıvica Nacional— UCN), founded in 1988 to promote the presidential aspirations of right-wing industrialist Max ´ FERNANDEZ Rojas. The group was first registered under its present name for the December 1989 municipal balloting, at which it ran a surprising third, winning 22.8 percent of the vote. The party also ran third in the June 1993 national poll with 13.1 percent. In May 1994 continuance of the UCS as an MNR government partner appeared threatened by an unheralded pact concluded by the president with Julio MANTILLA and Ivo KULJIS, the leaders, respectively, of two UCS splinters, the Popular Patriotic Movement (Movimiento Popular Patri´otico— MPP) and the Unity and Progress Movement (Movimiento de Unidad y Progreso—MUP). Four months later, in what was interpreted as a reaction to the administration’s pact with the Bolivian Workers’ Confederation, Fern´andez announced that the UCS was withdrawing from the government coalition. However, a group of dissidents led by Edgar Talavera refused to join in the walkout, and in June 1995 the party rejoined the coalition. Fern´andez died in a plane crash the following November. The party backed Kuljis for president in 1997 because Johnny Fern´andez, one of the party’s founders, was too young to stand as a candidate. Immediately before the 2002 election, the Constitutional Tribunal overturned an Electoral Court ban on Fern´andez’s presidential candidacy because of tax arrears. The party’s future is currently in doubt because of its inability to win any municipal council seats in 2004, to secure legislative representation in 2005,

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or to gain seats in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly. ´ Leader: Johnny FERNANDEZ Saucedo (2002 presidential candidate). Nationalist Democratic Action (Acci´on Democr´atica Nacionalista—ADN). The ADN was formed in early 1979 by Hugo B´anzer Su´arez under the slogan “peace, order, and work.” B´anzer ran third in presidential balloting in both 1979 and 1980. He secured a plurality of the popular vote in 1985 but was defeated by Paz Estenssoro in a congressional runoff. Following the election, the ADN concluded a somewhat fragile legislative alliance, the Democratic Pact (Pacto pour la Democracia) with the MNR, which was reaffirmed after both parties had experienced losses in municipal balloting in December 1987. The alliance was broken by the ADN in early February 1989 to permit the party to campaign separately in the run-up to the May balloting, in which B´anzer ran a close second in the presidential race. In August the party concluded a “national unity” pact with the MIR (below), being awarded 10 of 18 cabinet posts in the Paz Zamora administration. Subsequently, the ADN, the MIR, and the PDC (below) jointly contested the December 1991 municipal elections under a Patriotic Agreement (Acuerdo Patri´otico— AP) rubric, after having announced their support of B´anzer as their 1993 presidential candidate. The FRI (below) joined the AP for the June 1993 balloting, in which the former chief executive again placed second. The AP was dissolved in August 1993, while in November B´anzer resigned as ADN leader and announced his retirement from public life. However, in February 1995, shortly after Paz Zamora of the MIR had ended his withdrawal from politics, B´anzer followed suit. He won a plurality in the balloting of June 1997 and was returned to the presidency with the support of the MIR, the UCS, and Condepa. In mid-1999 Otto RITTER, leader of the Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange Socialista Boliviana—FSB), a minor ADN ally, stated that B´anzer was unfit to rule and called for his res-

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ignation. As a result, the FSB’s sole congressional deputy (elected on the ADN list) was expelled from the alliance. B´anzer resigned the presidency on August 7, 2001, and died on May 5, 2002. Before the 2005 election, former president Jorge Fern´ando Quiroga, an ADN leader, withdrew from the party to form Podemos (above), taking many of the ADN members with him. (Quiroga had reportedly concluded that the ADN rubric was too closely associated in the public consciousness with B´anzer.) The rump ADN failed to secure representation in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly. Leaders: Ronald MACLEAN (2002 presidential candidate), Mauro BERTERO. Patriotic Democratic Transformation (Transformac´ıon Democr´atica Patri´otica—Tradepa). Tradepa was launched in August 2005 to represent retired military officers. It failed to secure representation in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly. Leader: Luis GEMIO. Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR). Affiliated with the Socialist International, the MIR is a non-Communist Marxist party that organized as a splinter of the PDC and has a history of cooperation with the MNRI. It joined the UDP coalition before the 1978 election, its leader, Jaime Paz Zamora, running for the vice presidency in 1979 and 1980, and assuming the office in 1982. The MIR withdrew from the government in January 1983 but returned in April 1984. In mid-December Paz Zamora resigned as vice president to qualify as a presidential candidate in 1985. In addition, several members left the MIR in 1985 to form the MBL (above), Paz Zamora’s supporters subsequently referencing themselves as the MIR–New Majority (MIR–Nueva Mayor´ıa—MIR–NM). The MIR was surprisingly successful in the December 1987 municipal balloting and, although running third in the national poll of May 1989, was awarded the presidency as the result of its “national unity” pact with the ADN. The party supported the ADN’s B´anzer

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as a member of the AP in 1993. Paz Zamora entered into “permanent retirement” in March 1994 but returned to public life less than a year later, following the December 1994 arrest on drugtrafficking charges of the MIR’s (then) secretary general, Oscar Eid Franco. The MIR–NM won one seat in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly. Leader: Jaime PAZ Zamora (Former President of the Republic and 1997 and 2002 presidential candidate). Left Revolutionary Front (Frente Revolucionario de Izquierda—FRI). The FRI is led by Oscar Zamora Med´ınaceli, who once headed the Marxist-Leninist Bolivian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Boliviano Marxista-Leninista— PCB–ML), a pro-Communist China offshoot of the PCB, and was subsequently a founder of the MIR. For the 1985 elections Zamora Med´ınaceli formed an alliance with the MNR and was rewarded with the Senate presidency. In 1989 he backed the MIRADN coalition and was named labor minister in the government of his nephew, Paz Zamora. He resigned the labor portfolio in November 1992, ostensibly to campaign for president in 1993, but instead he accepted the vice-presidential slot on the ticket headed by the ADN’s B´anzer. Subsequently, he became mayor of Tarija. An MNR–FRI alliance won eight seats in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly. Leaders: Oscar ZAMORA Medinacelli, Dr. Manuel MORALES D´avila. Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC). The PDC is a somewhat left-of-center Catholic party, a right-wing faction of which supported the B´anzer regime. It joined the A–MNR before the 1979 election. In early 1982 (then) PDC leader Benjam´ın Miguel Harb, in an apparent reference to right-wing elements within the MNR, indicated that the party would henceforth refuse to cooperate with other parties that “lack a democratic vocation.” In November the party joined the UDP coalition, one of its members accepting the housing portfolio in the Siles Zuazo government. However, the PDC withdrew from the coalition in October 1984.

Although the party won no legislative seats as an ally of the ADN in May 1989, its 1985 presidential candidate, Dr. Luis Ossio Sanjin´es, was elected vice president of the republic as a result of its adherence to the ADN–MIR pact in August. The party campaigned as a member of the AP in 1993. It was reported in 2005 that the PDC was one of the founding components of Podemos, although details were limited. Leader: Jorge SUAREZ Vargas. Other parties and groups active in recent elections include the 21st Century Alliance ˜ (Alianza Siglo XXI), led by Pablo Mauricio IPINA Nagel; the Agrarian Patriotic Front of Bolivia (Frente Patri´otico Agropecuario de Bolivia— FrePAB), whose presidential candidate, Eliceo RODR´IGUEZ Pari, won 0.3 percent of the vote in 2005; Autonomy for Bolivia (Autonom´ıa para Bolivia—APB), which won the prefecture of the department of Santa Cruz in December 2005 and three seats in the 2006 Constituent Assembly elections; the AYRA Movement (Movimiento AYRA), which secured two seats in the Constituent Assembly in 2006; the Citizens Action Movement (Movimiento de Acci´on Ciudadana—MAC), which ran unsuccessfully in the Constituent Assembly balloting; Citizens Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democr´atica Ciudadana— CDC), which ran unsuccessfully in the 2006 elections for the Constituent Assembly; Local Autonomy (Autonom´ıa Vecinal—AVE), a Beni-based grouping led by Erwin Rivero ZIEGLER; the Movement for Bolivian Integration (Movimiento de Integraci´on Boliviana—MIBOL); the Movement of Patriotic Social Union (Movimiento de Unidad Social Patri´otica—MUSPA), led by Juan Gabriel BAUTISTA; the National Concertation (Concertaci´on Nacional—CN), a Christian evangelical grouping founded in 2005 under the leadership of Antonio FANOLA Aliaga that secured five seats in the 2006 Constituent Assembly elections; the Original Popular Movement (Movimiento Originario Popular—MOP), which won three seats in the Constituent Assembly from the department of Podosi; the Path to Change (Camino al Cambria—CC), which won the

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prefecture of the department of Tarija in 2005; the Progress Plan (Plan Progresso—PP), which had initially been reported as a component of Podemos but was subsequently ruled by the election commission not to have participated officially in that grouping; the Regional Autonomy Movement (Movimiento Aut´onomo Regional—MAR), which failed to gain representation in the 2006 Constituent Assembly elections; the Social Alliance (Alianza Social—AS), a Potosi-based grouping that won six seats in the 2006 balloting for the Constituent Assembly; the Social Union of the Workers of Bolivia (Uni´on Social de Trabajadores de Bolivia—USTB), whose presidential candidate, Nestor GARC´IA Rojas, won 0.3 percent of the vote in 2005; and the Without Fear Movement (Movimiento Sin Miedo—MSM), a “progressive” grouping led by Juan DEL GRANADO Cos´ıo.

Other Parties Leftist Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda—MNRI). An offshoot of the MNR, the MNRI was the principal element in the organization of the center-left Democratic and Popular Union (Uni´on Democr´atica y Popular—UDP) before the 1978 balloting. Its presidential candidate, Hern´an Siles Zuazo, obtained electoral pluralities in 1979 and 1980 and returned as the country’s chief executive in October 1982. Faced with insurmountable economic problems, the president announced in November 1984 that he would cut short his term by one year. The party, which had suffered the defection of its secretary general three months earlier, split into a number of factions, including the center-right Nationalist Revolutionary Movement–April 9 Revolutionary Vanguard (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario– Vanguardia Revolucionaria 9 de Abril—MNRV) and the Leftist Nationalist Revolutionary Movement–One (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Izquierdo–Uno—MNRI–1), each of which campaigned separately thereafter. Leaders: Dr. Hern´an SILES Zuazo (Former President of the Republic), Federico ALVAREZ Plata (Secretary General).

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Conscience of the Fatherland (Conciencia de Patria—Condepa). Condepa was formed in 1988 by popular singer and La Paz broadcast personality Carlos PALENQUE Avil´es, who attracted widespread notoriety in November of that year by airing a “friendly” interview with the “king of co´ caine,” Roberto SUAREZ. The party’s ten-member congressional delegation supported Paz Zamora’s selection as president in August 1989. Condepa won a plurality of votes in the 1989 municipal balloting in La Paz but was denied the mayoralty when the MNR cast two swing council votes for the ADN–MIR candidate. It ran fourth in the 1991 municipal poll, winning overall 12.5 percent of the vote but scored a victory in La Paz, with 26.4 percent. It placed fourth in the 1993 legislative balloting, winning an overall total of 14 seats, which increased to 17 in 1997. Palenque Avil´es died on March 8, 1997; his successor as party leader, Remedios Loza, was the first Indian woman to run for president. Condepa participated in the B´anzer coalition government until August 6, 1998, when, in the wake of the withdrawal of its two ministers, it was expelled because of what the president termed internal strife that detracted from “the image a serious administration must have.” Leaders: Remedios LOZA (1997 presidential candidate), Nicolas Felipe VALDIVA Almanza. United Left (Izquierda Unida—IU). The IU advanced Ramiro Velasco of PS–1 as its presidential candidate in the 1993 balloting, at which it lost all ten of its existing legislative seats; it regained four in 1997. The IU long had a substantial following in the extra-legislative Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (Asamblea por la Soberan´ıa del Pueblo—ASP), led by Evo MORALES, who was presented as a 2002 presidential candidate by the MAS (above). Leaders: Alejo VELEZ (1997 presidential candidate), Germ´an GUTTIEREZ, Marcos DOMIC (1997 vice-presidential candidate and IU coordinator). Patriotic Alliance (Alianza Patri´otica— AP). The AP (not to be confused with the Acuerdo Patri´otico, above, under ADN) is an

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outgrowth of the former Workers and Masses Front (Frente Obrero y de Masas—FOM), a dissident MIR group also referenced as MIR–Masas and long linked to the Bolivian Workers’ Central. It was launched as an electoral coalition in the late 1980s by a number of leftist groups, including the Patriotic Axis of Convergence (Eje de Convergencia Patri´otica—ECP), which remained active in 1998. Leader: Walter DELGADILLO Terceros. Socialist Party–One (Partido Socialista– Uno—PS–1). The PS–1 was organized in 1971 by a group seeking a return to the policies of former president Ovando Cand´ıa. A relatively small party, it nonetheless obtained about 7 percent of the vote in 1979 and 8 percent in 1980. Its presidential candidate on both occasions, Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, was murdered during the 1980 coup. It won five congressional seats in 1985, although being credited with only 2.2 percent of the vote. There also is a dissident Partido Socialista–Uno–Marcelo Quiroga, led by Jos´e Mar´ıa PALACIOS. Leaders: Ramiro VELASCO (1985 and 1993 presidential candidate), Roger CORTEZ, Walter VAZQUEZ. Bolivian Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Bolivia—PCB). A group with ties to the former Soviet Union formally organized in 1952, the PCB lost much of its influence because of a failure to support the guevarista insurgents in the mid-1960s. Subsequently, it joined the UDP coalition, losing further support within the labor movement because of its participation in the Siles Zuazo government. At a contentious party congress in February 1985, Sim´on Reyes Rivera was named to succeed Jorge Kolle Cueto as PCB secretary general. Shortly thereafter a minority faction, also styling itself the Partido Comunista de Bolivia, split from the parent group under Carlos Soria Galvarro. Leaders: Sim´on REYES Rivera (Former Secretary General), Marcos DOMICH (Secretary General), Carlos SORIA Galvarro (minority faction leader).

Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS). A PCB splinter, the PS was launched in 1989 as the Socialist Vanguard of Bolivia (Vanguardia Socialista de Bolivia—VSB), which obtained 1.4 percent of the presidential vote in 1997. It secured one lower house seat in 2002. Leader: Jeres JUSTINIANO (1997 presidential candidate). Tupaj ´ Katari Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario T´upaj Katari— MRTK). Formerly a member of the A–MNR, the MRTK is one of several small campesino formations, including the splinter MRTK–L and the guerrilla EGTK (below). Leaders: Juan CONDORI Uruchi (President), Genaro FLORES Santos (1985 presidential candidate). Tupaj ´ Katari Revolutionary Movement– Liberation (Movimiento Revolucionario T´upaj Katari–Liberaci´on—MRTK–L). The MRTK–L outpolled its parent party in 1985, winning two congressional seats, both of which were lost in 1989. In late 1992 the MNR sought to “balance” its 1993 presidential ticket by selecting the MRTKL’s V´ıctor Hugo C´ardenas as Gonzalo S´anchez de Lozada’s running mate. ´ Leaders: V´ıctor Hugo CARDENAS Conde (Former Vice President of the Republic), Norberto ´ PEREZ Hidalgo (Secretary General). Revolutionary Vanguard of 9 April (Vanguardia Revolucionaria 9 de Abril—VR–9). The VR–9 is a small grouping formed following the fractionalization of the MNRI (above). The party was highly critical of the ADN–MIR policies (particularly the coalition’s effort to seek a postponement of the 1989 municipal balloting). Leaders: Dr. Carlos SERRATE Reich, Roberto CROFF Centeno (Secretary General).

Other Groups Tupaj ´ Katari Guerrilla Army (Ej´ercito Guerrillero T´upaj Katari—EGTK). Not to be confused with either the MRTK or MRTK–L, the EGTK was a terrorist group believed to be

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Cabinet As of February 1, 2008 President Vice President

Evo Morales ´ Alvaro Garc´ıa Linera

Ministers Defense Education and Culture Finance Foreign Affairs Health and Sport Hydrocarbons Interior Justice Labor Mining and Metallurgy Planning and Sustainable Development Presidency Production and Micro-enterprise Public Services and Public Works Rural Development and Agriculture Water

Walter Rodr´ıguez San Miguel Magdalena Cajias de la Vega [f] Luis Alberto Arce Catacora David Choquehuanca Cespedes Walter Selum Carlos Villegas Quiroga Alfredo Octavio Rada V´elez Celima Torrico Rojas [f] Walter J´uvenal Delgadillo Albert Echazu Graciela Toro [f] Juan Ram´on Quintana Taborga Angel Gonzalo Hurtado Oscar Coca Antezana Susana Rivero Guzm´an [f] Walter Valda

[f] = female

responsible for more than 30 bombings, as well as the assassination of an ADN member of Congress in November 1992. Three months earlier its leader, Felipe Quispe Huanca, had been apprehended by police. In November 1995 a “manifesto” purportedly issued jointly by the EGTK and the Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (Comisi´on N´estor Paz Zamora—CNPZ), which had been identified with the celebrated kidnapping of businessman Jorge LONSDALE in 1990, claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of former planning minister Samuel ´ DORIA Medina. However, Raquel GUTIERREZ, an imprisoned EGTK leader, insisted that her group had abandoned armed activity in 1992 and had no links to the CNPZ. The government last reported alleged EGTK activity in 1997, and

the group has been considered defunct since at least then. Alvaro Garc´ıa Linera, elected vice president of the republic in 2005, was once an EGTK member, having served five years in prison in the 1990s for guerrilla activity. Several former EGTK members were reportedly involved in radical leftist political action in the department of Cochabamba in early 2007. Camba Nation (Naci´on Camba). Formed in the early 2000s in support of autonomy (if not independence) for Santa Cruz and other eastern departments, Camba Nation (“camba” is a nickname for residents of Santa Cruz or, more broadly, “lowlanders”) currently claims a membership of about 40,000. The government alleges that the group has

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armed itself for possible military confrontation, but Camba leaders insist they are committed to pursuit of their goals through peaceful means only. Leader: Sergio ANTELO.

past military governments, Bolivia currently rates among the highest for countries in Latin America in various press freedom indexes.

Press

Legislature The bicameral Bolivian Congress (Congreso) currently sits for five years. The most recent election was held on December 18, 2005. Senate (Senado). The upper house consists of 27 members, 3 from each department, elected for terms concurrent with those of the Chamber of Deputies. In each department delegation, 2 seats are held by the majority party or group, while 1 is reserved for the minority. After the 2005 election, Social and Democratic Power held 13 seats; the Movement to Socialism, 12; the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, 1; and the National Unity Front, 1. ´ President: Alvaro GARC´IA Linera. Chamber of Deputies (Camara de Diputados). The lower house currently consists of 130 members elected in a mixed majoritarian/proportional system by universal and direct suffrage for five-year terms from 70 single-member constituencies and 9 multimember constituencies. Following the 2005 election, the Movement to Socialism held 72 seats (45 majoritarian, 27 proportional); Social and Democratic Power, 43 (22, 21); the National Unity Front, 8 (1, 7); and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, 7 (2, 5). President: Edmundo NOVILLO Aguilar.

Communications All news media are privately owned. Although strict censorship was often enforced under

The following papers are published daily in La Paz, unless otherwise noted: El Diario (55,000); La Raz´on (35,000); Los Tiempos (Cochabamba, 19,000), independent; El Mundo (Santa Cruz, 15,000), business oriented; Jornada (12,000), independent; El Deber (Santa Cruz); La Prensa; El Nacional.

News Agencies The domestic facility is the Agencia de Noticias Fides (ANF); a number of foreign agencies, including AFP, ANSA, and AP, maintain bureaus in La Paz.

Broadcasting and Computing Bolivia has numerous radio and television outlets. As of 2005, there were approximately 52 Internet users and 23 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 264 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Gustavo GUZMAN Saldana U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia: Philip S. GOLDBERG Permanent Representative to the UN: Hugo SILES ALVARADO IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ALADI, CAN, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

BRAZIL FE D E R A T I VE R E P U BL I C

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The population of South America’s largest country, which occupies nearly half the continent, is approximately 55 percent Caucasian, with at least 35 percent of mixed blood and less than 0.5 percent pure Indian. The Caucasians are mainly of Portuguese descent but include substantial numbers of Belgian, Dutch, German, Italian, and Spanish immigrants. There are also small Arab, Japanese, and Chinese minorities. Roman Catholicism is by far the predominant religion (73 percent), but other faiths are permitted, and evangelical Protestantism is making substantial gains. Women make up 35 percent of the paid labor force, a majority in domestic service, with one-quarter estimated to be unpaid agricultural workers. Although women have been minimally represented in political life, a few from powerful families have managed to occupy highlevel government and party positions. The Brazilian economy was traditionally based on one-crop agriculture under the control of a landed aristocracy. In recent years, however, substantial diversification has occurred, with coffee, which once accounted for 50 percent of the nation’s exports, falling to a low of 2.7 percent in 1992 before recovering to 6.3 percent in 1995. Soybeans, cotton, sugar, and cocoa are other important commodities. In industry, textiles remain important, while iron, steel, petroleum, and paper production have grown significantly; in addition, Brazil’s arms industry is now an important source of export income. Numerous minerals are mined commercially, including quartz, chromium, manganese, gold, and silver.

In the 1980s, due to depressed commodity prices, government stabilization programs were unable to reduce high levels of inflation and external debt (in excess of $100 billion). By January 1987 inflation had spiraled to an annualized rate of 500 percent, and in late February the government suspended foreign debt payments. The moratorium ended with a highly favorable refinancing agreement in November 1988, but by March 1990 prices had risen by more than 3,900 percent during the preceding 12 months, prompting incoming President Fernando COLLOR de Mello to advance a

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radical fiscal package designed to bring inflation under control. The short-term result was dramatic: a single-digit monthly rate by May. However, by July double-digit figures had returned, continuing into 1991, and yielding an increase for the year of more than 480 percent, followed by further escalation to 1,128 percent in 1992 and 2,600 percent in 1993. Following the adoption of an economic stabilization program and introduction of another new currency (the real) in mid-1994, inflation for the year fell to about 24 percent with economic growth registering 5.7 percent, the highest since 1986. The architect of the “Real Plan”—Finance Minister Fernando Henrique CARDOSO—was elected president in 1994 and reelected in 1998, largely as a result of his success in stabilizing the economy, based primarily on linking the real’s value to the dollar. Turbulence in international financial markets forced a costly devaluation in 1999, but Brazil’s economy recovered relatively quickly. Growth during the first da Silva administration (2003–2007) averaged approximately 2.5 percent annually, lower than the Latin American average. However, price stability and the direct transfer of government resources to the poor were widely considered to have reduced the maldistribution of wealth.

Government and Politics Political Background Ruled as a Portuguese colony from 1500–1815, Brazil retained its monarchical institutions as an independent state from 1822 until the declaration of a republic in 1889. The constitution was suspended in 1930 as the result of a military coup d’´etat led by Get´ulio VARGAS, whose dictatorship lasted until 1945. Enrico DUTRA, Vargas, Juscelino KUBITSCHEK, and Jˆanio QUADROS subsequently served as elected presidents. In 1961 Quadros resigned and was succeeded by Vice President Jo˜ao GOULART. Goulart’s leftist administration, after being widely criticized for inflationary policies, governmental corruption, and prolabor and alleged pro-Communist tendencies, was

overturned by the military in March 1964. Marshal Humberto de Alencar CASTELLO BRANCO, who served as president from 1964 to 1967, vigorously repressed subversive and leftist tendencies, instituted a strongly anti-inflationary economic policy, and reestablished governmental authority on a strictly centralized basis. Brazil’s 13 political parties were dissolved in 1965, and political freedom was drastically curtailed by an “institutional act” whose main provisions were later incorporated into a constitution adopted under presidential pressure in 1967. Direct presidential elections were abolished, the president was given sweeping powers to regulate the press, and formal political activity was limited to two newly authorized parties—the progovernment National Renewal Alliance (Alian¸ca Renovadora Nacional— Arena) and the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democr´atico Brasileiro— MDB). The policies of Castello Branco were continued under Artur da COSTA E SILVA (1967–1969) and Em´ılio Garrastaz´u MEDICI (1969–1974), rising political dissatisfaction with authoritarian rule being countered in December 1968 by the president’s assumption of virtually unlimited powers that were retained for nearly a decade thereafter. Despite periodic disturbances, the ease with which power was passed to President Ernesto GEISEL in early 1974 suggested that the military and its allies were still firmly in control. However, at a legislative election in November the opposition MDB obtained approximately one-third of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 16 of 20 seats that were up for election in the Senate. Four years later the MDB won a clear majority of votes cast but failed to capture either house because of electoral arrangements favoring the government party. On March 15, 1979, Jo˜ao Baptista FIGUEIREDO was sworn in for a six-year term as Geisel’s hand-picked successor, after electoral college designation five months earlier by a vote of 355–226 over the MDB candidate, Gen. Euler Bentes MONTEIRO. In November Arena and the MDB were dissolved under a policy of political

BRAZIL

Political Status: Independent monarchy proclaimed 1822; republic established 1889; current constitution promulgated October 5, 1988. Area: 3,286,470 sq. mi. (8,511,965 sq. km.). Population: 169,799,170 (2000C); 186,819,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): BRASILIA (federal district, 2,231,000), S˜ao Paulo (10,278,000), Rio de Janeiro (6,094,000), Salvador (2,673,000), Belo Horizonte (2,375,000), Recife (1,501,000), Bel´em (1,397,000), Pˆorto Alegre (1,387,000). Official Language: Portuguese. Monetary Unit: Real (market rate November 2, 2007: 1.76 reals = $1US). President: Luiz In´acio (“Lula”) DA SILVA (Workers’ Party); elected in runoff of October 27, 2002, and inaugurated on January 1, 2003, for a four-year term, succeeding Fernando Henrique CARDOSO (Brazilian Social Democratic Party); reelected in runoff of October 29, 2006, and inaugurated for another four-year term on January 1, 2007. Vice President: Jos´e ALENCAR (initially elected as a member of the Liberal Party; currently a member of the Brazilian Republican Party); elected in runoff of October 27, 2002, and inaugurated on January 1, 2003, for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding Marco Antˆonio de Oliveira MACIEL (Liberal Front Party); reelected in runoff of October 29, 2006, and inaugurated for another term concurrent with that of the president on January 1, 2007.

relaxation (abertura) that permitted the emergence of a more broad-ranged party spectrum. Despite electoral procedures that favored its newly established Social Democratic Party (Partido Democr´atico Social—PDS), the government failed to gain a majority of lower house seats at the legislative poll of November 15, 1982. Subsequently, Tancredo NEVES of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Partido do Movimento Democr´atico Social—PMDB) de-

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feated PDS nominee Paulo MALUF in the electoral college balloting of January 15, 1985, but was unable to assume office because of illness. His vice-presidential running mate, Jos´e SARNEY Costa of the Liberal Front Party (Partido dˆa Frente Liberal—PFL), became acting president on March 15 and succeeded to the presidency at Neves’s death on April 21. Sarney negotiated a somewhat fragile coalition between the PMDB and the PFL, the former securing a 53 percent majority and the coalition 77 percent of lower house seats in the legislative election of November 15, 1986. During the ensuing three years, despite promulgation of a new, substantially liberalized constitution in October 1988, Sarney’s popularity eroded sharply, with leftist parties registering significant gains in municipal elections in November. In early 1989 Fernando COLLOR de Mello, the young and relatively obscure governor of Alagoas, the country’s second-smallest state, presented himself as presidential candidate of the newly launched National Reconstruction Party. Running on a free enterprise platform, Collor won a plurality in a field of 24 contenders in first-round balloting on November 15 and obtained a 53 percent vote share to defeat Luiz In´acio (“Lula”) da SILVA, leader of the socialist Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores— PT), at a runoff on December 17. In April 1992 President Collor reshuffled his cabinet, dismissing a number of ministers accused of corrupt practices. A month later the president came under fire as the result of charges by his younger brother, Pedro de MELLO, that his former campaign manager, Paulo C´esar Cavalcante FARIAS, had operated a vast extortion network, part of the proceeds of which were intended to finance a reelection bid. On August 26 a lengthy congressional probe concluded that the president knew of the $330 million “PC scheme” (“esquema PC ”) but had done nothing to deter it. As a result, the Chamber of Deputies on September 29 voted 441–38 to impeach Collor, with Vice President Itamar Augusto Cautiero FRANCO being sworn in as his acting successor on November 2. Ten days later Collor was indicted on criminal charges, and on December 29 he resigned in favor of Franco, who

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was immediately invested for the remaining two years of the presidential term. During 1994 the poll ratings of presidential candidate Fernando Henrique CARDOSO proved inversely proportional to a decline in inflation, for which he, as former finance minister, was given credit. Thus, Cardoso, who had trailed his principal opponent, Luiz da Silva, by 22 percentage points in early July, gradually overtook the PT leader to win the presidential vote on October 3 with an absolute majority of 54.3 percent. Concurrently, Cardoso’s Brazilian Social Democratic Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasiliera— PSDB) and its coalition partners (PFL, the Brazilian Labor Party [Partido Trabalhista Brasiliero— PTB], and the Liberal Party [Partido Liberal—PL]) won congressional pluralities of sufficient magnitude to give the new president broad support for a constitutional reform program. In mid-December 1994 the Supreme Court acquitted Collor of personal involvement in the illegal financial scheme that had forced him to resign in 1992. In the wake of the ruling, Brazil’s attorney general announced that he would bring unrelated charges of embezzlement against the former president. For his part Collor indicated that he viewed the court’s action as total vindication and vowed to reenter politics at the conclusion of an eight-year ban from public office. (Collor was acquitted of the new charges in January 1998. He was elected to the senate in 2006.) Following his inauguration on January 1, 1995, President Cardoso appointed members of four parties (the PSDB, PFL, PTB, and PMDB) to his cabinet, and he pledged to move forward on a number of policy fronts that included the breakup of the state’s oil and telecommunications monopolies, civil service and land reform, and a series of fiscal measures that included deindexation of wages and revision of the tax system. Despite substantial opposition from a variety of affected interests, Cardoso, on June 4, 1997, was able to secure final legislative approval of a constitutional amendment permitting him to seek reelection in 1998. On October 4, 1998, Cardoso became the first Brazilian president to win a second term. In addi-

tion, his five-party coalition (which now included the Brazilian Progressive Party [Partido Progressista Brasiliero—PPB]) won 377 of 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, thereby gaining the minimum three-fifths majority needed for constitutional revision, while losing only 1 of 69 seats previously held in the Senate. Cardoso named a new cabinet on January 1, 1999, which included the five parties in the previous government and the addition of the small Popular Socialist Party (Partido Popular Socialista—PPS). However, the PTB resigned from the government in March when its sole representative was replaced as budget minister amid severe economic turmoil. During 2000 the country was threatened by a wave of political scandals. Adding to President Cardoso’s woes was an energy crisis in early 2001 that necessitated power rationing; by midyear his successor, Jos´e SERRA, the PSDB’s candidate, claimed a poll rating of only 4.2 percent, as opposed to 31.3 percent for the PT’s Luiz da Silva. In first-round presidential balloting on October 6, 2002, da Silva won 46.4 percent of the vote, and he went on to defeat Serra in an October 27 runoff with 61.4 percent. During the ensuing two years, the president countered most regional critics by retaining broad public support, while the PT increased the number of cities under its control from 187 to 411 in municipal elections in October 2004. President da Silva was reelected in secondround balloting on October 29, 2006, securing 60.8 percent of the vote versus 39.2 percent for Geraldo ALCKMIN of the PSDB. Alckmin, a former governor of S˜ao Paulo, had campaigned on an anticorruption platform. Meanwhile, the PMDB overtook the PT in the October 1 elections to the Chamber of Deputies, and da Silva again had to rely on a broad coalition of parties (including the PMDB) for legislative support. Some two-thirds of the governors elected on October 1 were reportedly supportive of the da Silva administration. In what was hailed as a landmark decision in October 2007, the supreme court ruled that lawmakers could change party affiliation only under specific, limited circumstances

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(i.e., if a party changed its ideology), which was seen as an effective curb to lawmakers’ propensity to change affiliation with some frequency.

Constitution and Government On September 2, 1988, after 19 months of sharp disputes and major shifts in party alliances, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, approved a new basic law encompassing 246 articles covering a wide range of social and economic issues, including a 40-hour work week, minimum wage, health and pension benefits, access to education, maternity and paternity leave, labor autonomy and the right to strike, Indian rights, and protection of the environment. The 1988 document provided for a president to be directly elected for a nonrenewable five-year term (reduced to four years in May 1994), with Brazilians in an April 1993 plebiscite decisively rejecting a return to either a parliamentary or monarchical form of government. In addition, provisions for referenda and “popular vetoes” on proposed and enacted legislation, respectively, were introduced, as well as provisions for “popular initiatives” of draft bills for congressional consideration. An amendment ratified on June 5, 1997, authorized reelection of the president, as well as of state governors and mayors. The existing bicameral National Congress, consisting of a Senate and Chamber of Deputies, was retained, with the Congress gaining added power in regard to budget preparation, foreign debt agreements, and the drafting of legislation. The judicial system, headed by a Supreme Court whose members must be approved by the Senate, gained substantial administrative and financial autonomy. There are also federal courts in the state capitals, a Federal Court of Appeals, and special courts for dealing with military, labor, and electoral issues. Brazil is divided into 26 states and the Federal District of Bras´ılia. The states, which have their own constitutions, legislatures, and judicial systems, may divide or join with others to form new states. Thus the former state of Guanabara merged with Rio de Janeiro in 1975, the new state of Mato

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Grosso do Sul was formed out of the southern part of Mato Grosso in 1979, and the former territory of Fernando de Noronha was included in Pernambuco under the 1988 constitution. Province and Capital Acre (Rio Branco) Alagoas (Macei´o) Amapa (Macap´a) Amazonas (Manaus) Bahia (Salvador) Cear´a (Fortaleza) Esp´ırito Santo (Vit´oria) Goi´as (Goiˆania) Maranh˜ao (S˜ao Lu´ıs) Mato Grosso (Cuiab´a) Mato Grosso do Sul (Campo Grande) Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte) Par´a (Bel´em) Para´ıba (Jo˜ao Pessˆoa) Paran´a (Curitiba) Pernambuco (Recife) Piau´ı (Teresina) Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro) Rio Grande do Norte (Natal) Rio Grande do Sul (Pˆorto Alegre) Rondˆonia (Pˆorto Velho) Roraima (Boa Vista) Santa Catarina (Florian´opolis) S˜ao Paulo (S˜ao Paulo) Sergipe (Aracaj´u) Tocantins (Miracema do Tocantins)

Area (sq. mi.)

Population (2006E)

59,343 11,238 54,965 605,390 218,912 56,253 17,658 131,339 127,242 348,040 138,021

695,000 3,056,000 622,000 3,323,000 13,969,000 8,237,000 3,474,000 5,745,000 6,198,000 2,867,000 2,303,000

226,496 481,404 20,833 76,959 39,005 97,017 16,855 20,528 108,369 92,039 86,880 36,802 95,852 8,441 107,075

19,518,000 7,138,000 3,627,000 10,408,000 8,517,000 3,041,000 15,589,000 3,050,000 10,981,000 1,568,000 406,000 5,975,000 41,162,000 2,007,000 1,338,000

2,237

2,394,000

Federal District Distrito Federal (Bras´ılia)

Foreign Relations Long a leader in the inter-American community, Brazil has traditionally been aligned in international affairs with the United States, which is its major trading partner. However, the conclusion of a 1975 nuclear-plant agreement with West Germany in the wake of the Geisel government’s refusal to sign the 1968 UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), coupled with

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problems arising from increased coffee prices and the stand on human rights by the administration of President Jimmy Carter, led to a degree of estrangement between the two countries. In March 1977, largely in reaction to the human rights criticism, Brazil canceled a 25-year-old military assistance treaty with the United States. As a result, Brazil’s arms industry became one of the fastest-growing sectors of the economy, with customers including Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. While improved Washington-Bras´ılia relations during the administration of President Ronald Reagan led to the signing of a military cooperation agreement in February 1984, controversy continued over an “understanding” that Washington would be allowed to monitor the sale of Brazilian arms using U.S. technology. Subsequently, differences arose over Brazilian import restrictions on U.S. computer software, which Washington charged as encouraging piracy of the programs, while in mid-1988 Reagan announced a projected $200 million in trade sanctions because of Brazil’s refusal to accord patent protection to U.S. pharmaceutical and chemical products. On July 3, 1978, a Treaty of Amazon Cooperation (Amazon Pact) was signed with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela. The pact was criticized as lacking in detail on substantive development of the Amazon basin. In turn, Brazil has strongly objected to “foreign meddling” in the region. Relations with Argentina, which had been strained because of a series of disputes over the development of the hydroelectric potential of the Paran´a River, improved in late 1979 with the conclusion of a tripartite accord involving the two countries and Paraguay. More conclusive evidence of realignment within the Southern Cone was provided by a visit of President Figueiredo to Buenos Aires in May 1980 (the first by a Brazilian head of state in 30 years), during which a total of ten intergovernmental agreements were signed, embracing such traditionally sensitive areas as arms manufacture, nuclear technology, and exploitation of the hydroelectric resources of the R´ıo Uruguay. During the 1982 Falkland Islands war Brazil joined with its regional neighbors in supporting Argentina, while

the Brazilian embassy in London represented Argentine interests in the British capital. However, its posture throughout was distinctly muted, partly because of traditional rivalry between the continent’s two largest countries and partly because of an unwillingness to offend British financial interests, which were viewed as critical to resolution of Brazil’s foreign debt problems. The 1983 election of Raul Alfons´ın to the Argentine presidency served to dampen rapprochement with Buenos Aires because of the new chief executive’s well-publicized links to Brazilian opposition leaders; however, by mid-1984 the situation had improved and a number of trade and cooperation agreements were concluded after Brazil’s return to civilian rule in early 1985. Economic ties were further enhanced on December 10, 1986, with the signing by presidents Sarney and Alfons´ın of 20 accords launching an ambitious integration effort intended to eventuate in a Latin American common market. Under the plan, a customs union was established for most capital goods as of January 1, 1987, with cooperation in the exchange of food products, the promotion of bilateral industrial ventures, the establishment of a $200 million joint investment fund, and joint energy development (including a new $2 billion hydroelectric facility) to follow. In 1988 Brazil and Argentina agreed to cooperate in the nuclear power industry, although (without endorsing the NPT) formally rejecting the development of nuclear weaponry in a July 1991 accord that also banned the introduction of such arms from external sources. In mid-1990 they responded positively to U.S. President George H. W. Bush’s call for a regional free trade zone and announced that an Argentine-Brazilian common market would be launched by December 1994. The latter initiative was broadened to include Paraguay and Uruguay in a treaty concluded in March 1991 to create, by the original target date, a Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Com´un do Cono Sur—Mercosur). Diplomatic relations were restored with Cuba in June 1986, after a 22-year rupture, and in July 1988, during a five-day official visit to China by President Sarney, a number of bilateral agreements were

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announced, including a $150 million joint venture to launch two low-orbit sensoring satellites by 1994. In January 1992 gold miners along the sparsely populated border of Brazil and Venezuela sparked a flare-up between the two countries. Several months earlier a government drive to clear the area for a planned Yanomami Indian homeland caused many of the miners to cross into Venezuela, where a number of jungle airstrips were created that were subsequently attacked by Venezuelan aircraft. On June 3–14, 1992, Brazil drew international attention by hosting the largest gathering of world leaders in history for the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (sponsored by the United Nations Environment Programme, a special body of the UN General Assembly). In May 1994 Brazil extended its 1991 nuclear accord with Argentina by signing an amended version of the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty proscribing the use of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (see IGO entry under OPANAL). During 1997 a number of trade problems emerged with fellow Mercosur member Argentina, including the imposition by the Argentine Senate in early September of a 20 percent import tax on Brazilian sugar. Nonetheless, U.S. President Bill Clinton hailed Mercosur as a stepping-stone to a Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) during a visit to Brazil in mid-October. In what was billed as a “mini-Maastricht” pact, Brazil and Argentina agreed in mid-1999 to adopt mutually compatible mechanisms of fiscal restraint, with a view to moving toward a common currency within Mercosur. In March 2000 Brazil went further by calling for early negotiation of a South American Free Trade Agreement during an economic summit in Bras´ılia in late August. However, the meeting became preoccupied with concerns over U.S. military policy toward Colombia. Given the oil wealth of Venezuela and President Hugo Ch´avez’s criticism of ethanol, President da Silva has often been at loggerheads with the Venezuelan president. Brazilian relations with Bolivia have also suffered due to Ch´avez’s support for

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Bolivian president Evo Morales. In 2006, Morales’s bid to nationalize Bolivia’s energy industry stirred anguish among the country’s private developers, especially those based in Brazil, whose state company, Petrobras, was the largest foreign investor in Bolivia. However, within weeks da Silva and Morales had met and agreed to resolve the issue “rationally.” Various international agencies increased pressure on Brazil in 2007 to halt the deforestation of rainforests in the Amazon. Meetings between U.S. President George W. Bush and da Silva in March 2007 concentrated on promoting ethanol and reducing tariffs in the United States. At a South American energy summit on April 15, Ch´avez backed away from criticism of ethanol, but Brazil was stung by a Venezuelan-Bolivian-Argentine proposal for an Organization of Gas Producing and Exporting Countries of South America.

Current Issues At his inauguration in 2003, President da Silva pledged that ending hunger, poverty, and corruption would be his top priorities. However, his administration was embarrassed by a series of fiscal scandals, and was racked in 2005 by a corruption scandal when the PTB’s Roberto JEFFERSON led his party out of da Silva’s coalition government after accusing senior PT officials of accepting bribes in exchange for political support. On June 16 cabinet chief Jos´e DIRCEU resigned to defend himself and his colleagues against those and subsequent charges. Additional cabinet changes followed, along with the resignation of the president of the Liberal Party, Valdemar da Costa NETO, who confessed to a role in the affair in 2005. The president of the Chamber of Deputies, Severino CAVALCANTI of the PPB, also resigned after being charged with accepting a bribe. Considering the corruption problems and the outbreak of gang violence in S˜ao Paolo in midMay 2006 (see the 2007 Handbook for details), some observers predicted that da Silva would face difficulties in his 2006 reelection bid. However, his administration was successful, having been

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credited with reducing inflation, maintaining economic stability, and fostering the direct transfer of government resources to some 11 million of Brazil’s poorest families. Corruption charges continued to plague the government, however, and prompted thousands to demonstrate against da Silva in early August 2007. That same month, the Supreme Court indicted a dozen politicians, including Dirceu, and Jos´e GENOINO, former PT president, and in September the Senate narrowly rejected a call by a congressional ethics committee to expel Senate president Renan CALHEIROS. Calheiros, a close ally of da Silva, said in October that he would take a leave of absence in the wake of the widening corruption scandal, though he denied all charges. He subsequently resigned the post on December 4 but retained his Senate seat. In November, the PT was cited by investigators for having used public funds for election campaigns of political supporters, and other fraudulent schemes brought down Finance Minister Antonio PALOCCI and Ricardo BERZIONI, among others who were close to da Silva. On a more positive note, the government in 2007 announced a stimulus package that included new tax cuts and the promotion of ethanol as a substitute for petroleum-based fuel to help reduce dependence on Bolivian gas. In December, however, observers said da Silva was dealt a political blow when lawmakers, after months of debate, narrowly refused to approve an extension to the financial transaction tax that the government had been using to pay for antipoverty programs.

Political Parties All of Brazil’s parties were dissolved by decree in 1965, clearing the way for establishment of a single government party, the National Renewal Alliance (Alian¸ca Renovadora Nacional— Arena), and a single opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democr´atico Brasileiro—MDB), which began organizing in 1969. In the November 1978 election Arena retained control of both houses of Congress but

was substantially outpolled in the popular vote by the MDB. Both groups were formally dissolved on November 22, 1979, after enactment of legislation sanctioning a more liberal party system. Under the new arrangement, parties were required to swear allegiance to the “democratic system,” give six months’ prior notice of a national congress, and win 5 percent of the total vote to retain legal status. For the indirect presidential balloting in 1985, a Democratic Alliance (Alian¸ca Democr´atica) was formed, composed of the PFL and PMDB (below), in support of the candidacy of Tancredo Neves. However, neither Alliance partner was firmly committed to the leadership of Neves’s successor, while President Sarney called for a “National Pact” centered on the non-Malufista wing of his preelection Social Democratic Party (PDS). On May 9, 1985, Congress enacted a bill that restored direct presidential elections and legalized all political parties, a move presumed to be directed mainly at the theretofore proscribed Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasiliero—PCB), which had been publicly running candidates under the PMDB banner. On the other hand, a law passed before the 1990 balloting required that a party have at least 300,000 members to qualify for formal registration.

Government Parties Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—PT). Long endorsing “a pure form of socialism” that rejected orthodox Marxism, the PT made important gains in the 1985 municipal balloting, electing Maria Luisa FONTONELLE as one of the country’s first two women mayors in Cear´a’s capital, Fortaleza, and winning 20 percent of the vote in S˜ao Paulo. It increased its lower house representation from 14 to 19 in 1986, while retaining its single Senate seat. During the 1987–1988 controversy over the duration of President Sarney’s mandate and the possible introduction of a parliamentary system of government, the PT came out strongly in favor of immediate presidential elections with the avowed intention of running PT

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president Luiz da Silva as its candidate. The party registered significant gains in the November 1988 municipal balloting, securing, most notably, the election of Luiza Erundina as S˜ao Paulo’s first woman mayor. In late 1991, at the party’s first congress since its founding a decade earlier, the da Silva-led majority voted to abandon its former advocacy of “democratic socialism” and the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in favor of coexistence (not excluding cooperation) with other groups, both socialist and nonsocialist. Luiz da Silva was runner-up to Collor de Mello in the 1989 presidential poll and placed second behind Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994. Failing again in 1998, he was victorious in 2002, although the PT was held to a 91-seat plurality in the Chamber of Deputies. The PT encountered a crisis in 2005 because of a corruption scandal, with a number of individuals replaced in leadership roles. Nevertheless, da Silva was reelected in 2006, and PT deputies under investigation were reelected in concurrent legislative elections. The PT trailed the PMDB in number of legislative seats held following the elections. Leaders: Luiz In´acio (“Lula”) DA SILVA (President of the Republic), Ricardo BERZOINI (President of the Party), Marco Aur´elio GARCIA (Vice President of the Party). Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Partido do Movimento Democr´atico Brasiliero— PMDB). Rejecting government strictures against the adoption of names implying continuity with earlier party groups, the PMDB was launched in 1979 by about 100 federal deputies and 20 senators representing the more moderate elements of the former MDB. In late 1981 it was enlarged by merger with the Popular Party (Partido Popular— PP), a center-right grouping, most of whom had also been affiliated with the MDB. As the party reorganized to prepare for the 1986 congressional balloting, a conservative faction, Grupo Unidade, insisted that PP elements (which opposed recent PMDB initiatives for land reform and tax revision) were underrepresented in the party and issued an ˜ unsuccessful challenge to Ulysses GUIMARAES

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for the party presidency. The PMDB won a majority in both houses of congress and 22 of 23 state governorships in the November 1986 election. The party became increasingly divided in 1987, with leftists, organized as the Progressive Unity Movement (Movimento da Unidade Progressiva— MUP), proposing a “grand leftist front” that would include “nonradicalized” factions of the PT and the PDT (below) to campaign for truncation of Sarney’s term and an immediate presidential election. By early 1988 the hist´oricos (constituting a majority within the party, but not within the Constituent Assembly) were also pressing for a break with the Sarney government; in June most of the dissidents withdrew to form the PSDB (below). Following the October 1990 balloting the PMDB held plurality status in both the senate and chamber with 26 and 109 seats, respectively. In March 1991 the 20-year party leadership of Ulysses Guimar˜aes came to an ´ end with the election of Orestes QUERCIA to succeed him as president. Guimar˜aes was killed in a helicopter crash on October 12, 1992. Qu´ercia resigned on April 26, 1993, in response to allegations of corruption during his recent term as governor of the state of S˜ao Paulo, although subsequently he presented himself as a candidate for the federal presidency in 1994. The largest single contributor to the Franco coalition, the PMDB in 1994 won 9 of 26 gubernatorial contests and secured a plurality of seats in both houses of Congress. Retaining its preeminence in the senate, it fell to third place in the chamber in 2002. It participated in the da Silva government until its withdrawal in late 2004, although its cabinet representatives chose to remain in office. The party held a plurality in the chamber following the 2006 election, and was brought back into government in 2007, having been given several ministries. Considerable opposition was reported within the PMDB to this arrangement, but overall the party’s “amorphous” ideology and preference for being in office allowed continued support for the da Silva government. Leaders: Michel TEMER (President), Itamar FRANCO (Former President of the Republic), de ´Iris ARAUJO ´ (First Vice President of the Party),

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Anthony GAROTINHO, Garibaldi ALVES Filho (President of the Senate), Mauro LOPES (Secretary General). Progressive Party (Partido Progressista— PP). The PP designation was adopted in 2003 by the former PPB, which had been launched on September 14, 1995, as a merger of the Progressive Renewal Party (Partido Progressista Reformador—PPR), led by Paulo Salim Maluf, then mayor of S˜ao Paulo; the Progressive Party (Partido Progressista—PP), led by Alvaro DIAS; and the Progressive Republican Party (Partido Republicano Progressista—PRP). The party, which favors economic reform, secured a seat in the Senate following the 2006 election, while its representation in the chamber fell from 49 to 42 seats. Party president Pedro Corr´ea, accused in a votebuying scandal, was expelled from his chamber seat in March 2006. Four members of the PP were among 12 people indicted on corruption charges by the Supreme Court in August 2007. ´ (President), Paulo Leaders: Pedro CORREA Salim MALUF, Leodegar TISCOSKI (Secretary General). Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro—PSB). The PSB, which has been described by observers as more pragmatic than other socialist parties in the country, withdrew from the Franco government coalition in August 1993. It won two state governorships in 1994 and that same year was part of a broad coalition that supported da Silva’s presidential bid. Former party president Miguel ARRAES died in 2005. Leaders: Eduardo CAMPOS (President of the Party), Roberto AMARAL (Vice President), Ciro GOMES, Renato CASAGRANDE (Secretary General). Brazilian Republican Party (Partido Republicano Brasileiro—PRB). The PRB was formed in 2005 as a successor to the Municipal Renewal Party (Partido Municipalista Renovador—PMR), which was established following the 2005 cor-

ruption scandals by Brazil’s leading evangelical group, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus—IURD). The IURD is a well-known Pentecostal group, with branches in 172 countries, headed by an entrepreneurial “bishop,” Edir Macedo. The PRB, however, has been described as being more driven by pragmatism than by ideology, though a party that defends the interests of the church. The PRB has supported the da Silva presidency on the basis of its concern for social democracy and eliminating inequality. Leaders: Jos´e ALENCAR (Vice President of the Republic), Edir MACEDO (IURD leader), Jorge PINHEIRO (Coordinator). Green Party (Partido Verde—PV). Organized largely by a group of PMDB deputies, the PV was legalized in 1988. Its former president, Fernando Gabeira, a former guerrilla who campaigned for mayor of Rio de Janeiro in 1986 under the PT banner, left the group in 2002 to join the PT, but returned to the PV in 2006. The party, which primarily promotes sustainable development, more than doubled its chamber representation in 2006 over 2002, when it had held five seats. Leaders: Alfredo SIRKIS (President of the Party), Fernando GABEIRA, F´abio FELDMAN. Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil—PCdoB). An offshoot of the PCB, the PCdoB was formed in 1961 as a Maoist group in support of rural guerrilla operations against the military. In August 1978 it publicly expressed its support for the Albanian Communist Party in its break with the post-Maoist Chinese leadership. In the mid-1980s, the party was instrumental in promoting huge demonstrations against the military regime. In 1994 the PCdoB endorsed da Silva in his initial bid for the presidency, and has continued to support him since. The party, whose platform calls for a socialist Brazil that is “truly democratic and sovereign,” gained a chamber seat in 2006, following the 12 seat allocation it secured in 2002. Leader: Renato REBELO (President).

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Democratic Labor Party (Partido Democr´atico Trabalhista—PDT). The PDT is a left-wing party organized by Leonel da Moira BRIZOLA, who served as governor of Rio Grande do Sul and leader of the pre-1965 Brazilian Labor Party, following his return on September 5, 1979, after 15 years in exile. In the 1982 balloting Brizola, a man of known presidential aspirations, won the state governorship of Rio de Janeiro; before Neves’s election, he attempted unsuccessfully to form a new socialist party and after the president-elect’s death led the campaign for direct presidential balloting in 1988. In the November 1985 municipal balloting, the PDT won mayoralties in Pˆorto Alegre and, more importantly, Rio de Janeiro, while Brizola regained the state governorship in 1990. Brizola waged losing battles for president in 1989 and 1994, and was da Silva’s running mate in the 1998 contest. He died on June 21, 2004. The PDT has opposed President da Silva’s perceived lack of accountability in federal transfers. The PDT’s 2006 presidential candidate, Cristovam Buarque, received 2.6 percent of the vote in the first round of balloting. Leaders: Carlos LUPI (President), Cristovam BUARQUE (2006 presidential candidate), Manoel DIAS (Secretary General). Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro—PTB). The PTB was organized in 1980 by a niece of former president Get´ulio Vargas. It attained a degree of visibility in 1985 by supporting Quadros in his successful mayoral bid. The PTB was a member of the Cardoso coalition government installed in 1994 but withdrew from the cabinet in March 1999. It withdrew from the da Silva administration in June 2005 when its leader, Roberto Jefferson Monteiro Francisco, initiated the charges of high-level corruption. Jefferson was later forced to step down as party president in the wake of his expulsion from congress for attacking colleagues “without proof.” He faced charges in 2007 in connection with the alleged vote-buying scandal two years earlier. Meanwhile, Walfrido dos Mares GUIA, a key minister who was the president’s liaison with congress, resigned in

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November 2007 in the wake of a money-laundering investigation. ´ Leaders: Jos´e MUCIO Monteiro, Luis Antˆonio FLEURY Filho, Fernando COLLOR de Mello, Antˆonio Carlos De Campos MACHADO (Secretary General).

Opposition Parties Brazilian Social Democratic Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira—PSDB). The PSDB was launched in June 1988 by a number of center-left congressional deputies from the PMDB’s hist´orico faction, plus others from the PDS the PFL, and the PTB and PSB (below). The new alignment issued a manifesto calling for social justice, economic development, land reform, and environmental protection. In addition, it pledged to call for a plebiscite on establishment of a parliamentary system within the next four years. In 1994 and 1998 it joined with the PMDB, the PFL, and the PTB and PL (below), in supporting the successful presidential bids of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The PSDB has suffered since the Cardoso administration in terms of finding a presidential candidate who could unify the party. Lackluster party support for Jos´e Serra in 2002 and Geraldo Alckmin (a former governor of S˜ao Paulo) in 2006 was a major problem. Among other divisive factors, party president Tasso Jereissati, former party president Eduardo AZEREDO, and party official A´ecio Neves have criticized the party as being too centered on S˜ao Paulo. The internal divisions and da Silva’s shift toward pro-S˜ao policies have made it difficult for the PSDB to mount an effective opposition effort. In 2007 Azeredo was implicated in a fraudulent campaign finance scheme. Leaders: Tasso JEREISSATI (President), Fernando Henrique CARDOSO (Honorary President and Former President of the Republic), Jos´e SERRA (Governor of S˜ao Paulo), A´ecio NEVES (Governor of Minas Gerais), Geraldo ALCK˜ MIN (2006 presidential candidate), Eduardo PAES (Secretary General).

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Democrats (Democratas). The Democrats is the name adopted in 2007 by the Liberal Front Party (Partido da Frente Liberal—PFL), which contested the 2006 elections under the PFL rubric. The PFL was formed in 1984 as a faction within the PDS that was opposed to the presidential candidacy of Paulo Maluf (later, of the PP). The PFL organized as a separate entity before the 1985 electoral college balloting, at which it supported Tancredo Neves as a member of the Alian¸ca Democr´atica. In the 1986 balloting it became the second-largest party in Congress. In September 1987 the PFL announced its withdrawal from the alliance, thus formally terminating its link with the PMDB, although it decided the following month to continue its support of party cofounder, then-President of the Republic, Jos´e Sarney, until after approval of the new constitution. As of early 1992 it was the largest progovernment formation in the Chamber of Deputies and subsequently became the largest component of the Cardoso coalition. The PFL withdrew from the coalition government in March 2002 to protest an official investigation into the business dealings of Roseana SARNEY, the PFL’s 2002 presidential candidate. Sarney withdrew from the race in April, and the PFL subsequently threw its support behind Ciro GOMES, then of the PPS (below). The PFL supported the PSDB’s Geraldo Alckmin in the 2006 presidential balloting. In 2007 the PFL, now the Democrats, revised its leadership structure to address a “new Brazil.” The Democrats have favored a more “balanced” and moderate form of government versus the da Silva administration’s move toward populism. Leaders: Rodrigo MAIA (President), Antonio ˜ Carlos MAGALHAES Neto, Marco MACIEL, Jorge BORNHAUSEN, Jayme CAMPOS (Secretary General). Socialist Peoples Party (Partido Popular Socialista—PPS). The PPS was launched in January 1992 as successor to the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro—PCB), which had been formed in 1922, but enjoyed only nine years of legal existence thereafter. In

June 1991 the PCB elected a “renewalist” leadership and argued that it was “no longer necessary [for] a Marxist to be a Communist.” In furtherance of this posture, the party voted to confine Marxism-Leninism to the status of “historic relevance” and authorized the pursuit of socialism by democratic means. In 2004 the party withdrew from the governing coalition and subsequently expelled party leader Ciro Gomes, who had decided to remain in his cabinet post. Gomes then joined the PSB. Leaders: Roberto FREIRE (President), Rubens BUENO (General Secretary). Christian Social Party (Partido Social Crist˜ao—PSC). The PSC was launched in 1970 as the Democratic Republican Party (Partido Democr´atico Republicano—PDR); it adopted the PSC rubric in 1985. Leader: V´ıtor Jorge Abdala NOSSIES (President). Socialist and Liberty Party (Partido do Socialismo e da Libertade—PSOL). A far-left formation, the PSOL was launched in June 2004 by Helo´ısa Helena, who had been expelled from the PT in late 2003 for voting against the government. She was subsequently joined by a number of other PT defectors. The PSOL follows an ideology similar to that of the PCdoB and the PSTU. It has benefited from the public perception that its members have been considered “honest politicians.” Helena secured 6.8 percent of the vote in the first round of the 2006 presidential balloting. Leader: Helo´ısa HELENA (2006 presidential candidate). Liberal Party (Partido Liberal—PL). The PL was a tradesmen’s party committed to free enterprise and a “more just” wages policy. In 2005 party president Valdemar da Costa Neto resigned from congress after he acknowledged his role in a corruption scandal, though he denied accepting bribes. In 2007, however, several members of the PL were accused of taking bribes in exchange for political support in congress. Leader: Luciano CASTRO.

BRAZIL

Party for the Rebuilding of the National Order (Partido de Reedifica¸ca˜ o da Ordem Nacional—PRONA). PRONA is a far-right grouping founded in 1989 by a S˜ao Paulo cardiologist, En´eas Ferreira Carneiro, who was the party’s candidate in the country’s first presidential election that year. He ran for various offices over the years and in 2006 was elected as a deputy, securing one of his party’s two seats. He died in May 2007. The party reportedly disbanded in 2007 and joined members of the Liberal Party to form the Party of the Republic (Partido da Rep´ublica—PR), led by Sergio TAMER. Other parties represented in the legislature are the National Mobilization Party (Partido da Mobiliza¸ca˜ o Nacional—PMN), led by Oscar Noronha FILHO; the Humanist Party of Solidarity (Partido Humanista da Solidariedade—PHS), led by Paulo Roberto MATOS; the Party of the Nation’s Retirees (Partido dos Aposentados da Na¸ca˜ o—PAN), led by Dreyfus Bueno RABELLO; the Christian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Crist˜ao—PTC); the Labor Party of Brazil (Partido Trabalhista do Brasil– PtdoB), led by Luis Henrique de Oliveira RESENDE; and the Renewed Brazilian Workers Party (Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro—PRTB), led by Jos´e Levy Fidelix DA CRUZ.

Other Parties Other parties that contested the 2006 elections include the Socialist Party of Unified Workers (Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado— PSTU), led by Jos´e Maria DE ALMEIDA; the Christian Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata Crist˜ao—PSDC), led by Jos´e Maria EYMAEL (2006 presidential candidate); the Social Liberal Party (Partido Social Liberal PSL), led by Luciano Caldas BIVAR (2006 presidential candidate); the Progressive Republican Party (Partido Republicano Progressista— PRP), led by Ovasco Roma ALTIMARI and Ana Maria RANGEL (2006 presidential candidate); the National Workers Party (Partido Trabalhista Nacional—PTN), led by Jos´e Masci DE ABREU; and the Workers’ Cause Party (Partido da Causa

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Oper´aia—PCO), led by Rui Costa PIMENTA (2006 presidential candidate).

Legislature The bicameral National Congress (Congresso Nacional) consists of a Federal Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, both of which are directly elected by universal suffrage. The two houses, sitting together, form a Constituent Assembly for purposes of constitutional revision. Federal Senate (Senado Federal). The upper house currently consists of 81 members (3 for each state, plus 3 for the Federal District) elected for eight-year terms, with one-third and two-thirds, respectively, elected every four years. Senators are elected in single-round plurality voting. Voters vote for one candidate when one-third of the membership is renewed, two candidates when two-thirds of the membership is renewed. Following the balloting of October 1, 2006, for one-third of the seats, the distribution of seats in the full senate was the Liberal Front Party, 18 (6 won in 2006); the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, 15 (4); the Brazilian Social Democratic Party, 15 (5); the Workers’ Party, 11 (2); the Democratic Labor Party, 5 (1); the Brazilian Labor Party, 4 (3); the Brazilian Socialist Party, 3 (1); the Liberal Party, 3 (1); the Communist Party of Brazil, 2 (1); the Progressive Party, 1 (1); the Socialist Peoples Party 1(1); and the Renewed Brazilian Workers Party, 1 (1). President: Garibaldi ALVES Filho. Chamber of Deputies (Cˆamara dos Deputados). Seats in the lower house are allocated on a population basis, their 513 current occupants serving four-year terms. Members are directly elected via party-list proportional balloting from 27 multimember constituencies (1 for each state and 1 for the Federal District). In the most recent balloting on October 1, 2006, the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement won 89 seats; the Workers’ Party, 83; the Brazilian Social Democratic Party, 65; the Liberal Front Party, 65; the Progressive Party, 42; the Brazilian Socialist Party, 27; the Democratic Labor Party, 24;

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BRAZIL

Cabinet As of February 1, 2008 President Vice President Chief of Civilian Cabinet Secretary General of the Presidency

Luiz In´acio (“Lula”) da Silva (PT) Jos´e Alencar (PRB) Dilma Rousseff (PT) Luiz Dulci (PT)

Ministers Agrarian Development Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply Cities Communications Culture Defense Development, Industry, and Commerce Education Environment Finance Foreign Affairs Health Justice Labor and Employment Mines and Energy National Integration Planning, Budget, and Management Science and Technology Social Development and the Fight against Hunger Social Security Sport Tourism Transport

Guilherme Cassel (PT) Reinhold Stephanes (PMDB) M´arcio Fortes (PP) H´elio Costa (PMDB) Gilberto Gil (PV) Nelson Jobim (PMDB) Miguel Jorge (ind.) Fernando Haddad (PT) Marina Silva (PT) [f] Guido Mantega (PT) Celso Amorim (ind.) Jos´e Gomes Tempor˜ao (PMDB) Tarso Genro (PT) Carlos Lupi (PDT) Edison Lob˜ao (PMDB) Geddel Vieira Lima (PMDB) Paulo Bernardo (PT) S´ergio Rezende (PSB) Patrus Anan´ıas (PT) Luiz Marinho (PT) Orlando Silva J´unior (PCdoB) Marta Suplicy (PT) [f] Alfredo Nascimento (PRB)

Secretaries with Ministerial Status Agriculture and Fisheries Human Rights Institutional Relations Institutional Security in the Office of the President Policies to Promote Racial Equality Social Communication Strategic Affairs in the Office of the President Women’s Rights [f] = female

Altemir Gregolin (PT) Paulo de Tarso Vannuchi Jos´e M´ucio Monteiro (PTB) Gen. Jorge Armando Felix (ind.) Martvs das Chagas (PT) [f] Franklin Martins (ind.) Roberto Mangabeira Unger Nilc´ea Freire (PT) [f]

BRAZIL

the Liberal Party, 23; the Brazilian Labor Party, 22; the Socialist Peoples Party, 21; the Green Party, 13; the Communist Party of Brazil, 13; the Christian Social Party, 9; the Christian Labor Party, 4; the Socialist and Liberty Party, 3; the National Mobilization Party, 3; the Humanist Party of Solidarity, 2; the Party for the Rebuilding of the National Order, 2; the Labor Party of Brazil, 1; the Brazilian Republican Party, 1; and the Party of the Nation’s Retirees, 1. (Changes in memberships have traditionally been known to occur with some frequency. ´ President: Arlindo Chignalia JUNIOR.

Communications Brazil has a vigorous and extensive news media network, which was subject to censorship, though somewhat relaxed after 1978, during the period of military rule. The Sarney government announced the end of political constraints in March 1985 and virtually all forms of media control have been banned under the 1988 constitution. However, in 2007, violence against journalists seemed to be surging, with the fatal beating of a journalist who reported on allegations of financial irregularities, and the attempted murder of a radio broadcaster. The watchdog group, Reporters Without Borders, reported, however, that President Lula da Silva continued to back laws promoting freedom of the press.

Press No Brazilian newspaper enjoys truly national distribution. The following are Portugueselanguage dailies, unless otherwise noted: O Estado de S˜ao Paulo (S˜ao Paulo, 491,000 daily, 460,000 Sunday), independent; O Globo (Rio de Janeiro, 350,000 daily, 600,000 Sunday), conservative; Fˆolha de S˜ao Paulo (S˜ao Paulo, 320,000 daily, 500,000 Sunday); O Dia (Rio de Janeiro, 250,000 daily, 500,000 Sunday), popular labor; Not´ıcias Populares (S˜ao Paulo, 150,000); Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 107,000 daily, 145,000 Sunday), Catholic conservative; Ultima Hora (Rio de

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Janeiro, 57,000); Di´ario de Pernambuco (Recife, 31,000), oldest paper in Latin America (founded 1825), independent.

News Agencies There are a number of domestic agencies, including Agˆencia Globo and Agˆencia Jornal do Brasil, both headquartered in Rio de Janeiro; Agˆencia ANDA, headquartered in Bras´ılia; and Agˆencia o Estado de S˜ao Paulo and Agˆencia Fˆolha de S˜ao Paulo. Numerous foreign agencies also maintain bureaus in Bras´ılia, Rio de Janeiro, and S˜ao Paulo.

Broadcasting and Computing The government’s National Telecommunications Department (Departamento Nacional de Telecomunica¸co˜ es—Dentel) oversees television and radio broadcasting. Most of the country’s nearly 3,000 radio stations are commercial, but several are owned by the government or the Catholic Church. Most of the more than 260 television stations are organized into a national association, Associa¸ca˜ o Brasileira de Emissoras de R´adio e Televis˜ao (ABERT), and a number of regional groups. Among the television networks, TV Globo dominates with an audience share of about 70 percent. As of 2005, there were approximately 172 Internet users and 161 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 463 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Antonio de Aguiar PATRIOTA U.S. Ambassador to Brazil: Clifford M. SOBEL Permanent Representative to the UN: Maria Luiza Ribiero VIOTTI IGO Memberships (Non-UN): AfDB, ALADI, BIS, CAN, CPLP, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

C A NA DA

The Country Canada, the largest country in the Western Hemisphere and the second largest in the world (after Russia), extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the Arctic to a southern limit near Detroit, Michigan. Because of its northerly location, severe climate, and unfavorable geographic conditions, only one-third of its total area has been developed, and more than two-thirds of its people inhabit a 100-mile-wide strip of territory along the U.S. border. Colonized by both English and French settlers, it retained throughout a long period of British rule a cultural and linguistic duality that continues as one of its most serious internal problems. Of the more than 6.7 million Canadians who claim French as their mother tongue, approximately 86 percent are concentrated in the province of Quebec, where demands for political and economic equality (or even separation from the rest of Canada) persist. A major step toward linguistic equality was taken in 1969 with the enactment of an official-languages bill that provided for bilingual districts throughout the country. Nevertheless, Quebec enacted legislation establishing French as its sole official language in 1977, although a series of court rulings from 1984 to 1988 voided some provisions of the act. In early 1987 the Inuit, an Eskimo people accounting for about 17,000 of the sparse overall population of 51,000, won tentative agreement to the formation of their own territory (Nunavut) in the larger, eastern portion of the vast Northwest Territories; the smaller western region is home to a more varied population that includes Western Arctic (Inuvialuit) Eskimos, Yukon Indians, Athapaskanspeaking D´en´e Indians, and M´etis (mixed Indian and European), but with a narrow white majority. The creation of Nunavut was eventually ap-

proved in 1992 (see Constitution and government, below), and the new territory was formally founded on April 1, 1999. Women constitute approximately 47 percent of the Canadian labor force, concentrated largely in service (particularly health care and social assistance), sales, and teaching. Women currently occupy 6 of 27 cabinet positions, 34 of 93 occupied Senate seats, and 21 percent of the seats in the House of Commons. Women also have long taken an active role in political party affairs, and several hold portfolios in the current federal cabinet. As of mid-2007, 5 of 13 provincial lieutenant governors and territorial commissioners, but no provincial or territorial premiers, were women.

ARCTIC OCEAN RUSSIA ICELAND

Greenland (DENMARK)

Alaska (U.S.)

Beaufort Sea

Whitehorse

Baffin Bay

CANADA

Iqaluit

Hudson Bay

Edmonton Vancouver

Calgary

Winnipeg Quebec Ottawa Toronto

UNITED STATES 0 0

800 Mi 800 Km

Montreal

Hamilton ATLANTIC OCEAN

CANADA

Political Status: Granted Dominion status under British North America Act of 1867; recognized as autonomous state within the Commonwealth in 1931; constitution “patriated” as of April 17, 1982. Area: 3,855,081 sq. mi. (9,984,670 sq. km.), including inland water. Population: 31,612,897 (2006C); 32,777,304 (2007E). The 2006 figure is unadjusted for underenumeration. (The unadjusted number in 2001 rose by 3.1% after adjustment.) The 2007 estimated figure is the government’s official population count, including adjustment for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (urban areas, 2006C): OTTAWA (1,130,761), Toronto (5,113,149), Montreal (3,635,571), Vancouver (2,116,581), Calgary (1,079,310), Edmonton (1,034,945), Quebec (715,515), Winnipeg (694,668), Hamilton (692,911). Official Languages: English, French. Monetary Unit: Canadian Dollar (market rate November 2, 2007: 1 dollars = $1.07US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Micha¨elle JEAN; appointed by Queen Elizabeth II on the advice of the prime minister and installed for a five-year term on September 27, 2005, succeeding Adrienne CLARKSON. Prime Minister: Stephen HARPER (Conservative Party of Canada); asked by the governor general on January 24, 2006, to form a new government following the general elections of January 23 and inaugurated with new government on February 6 in succession to Paul MARTIN (Liberal Party of Canada).

For many decades the economy relied on foreign investment capital, primarily from the United States, to finance development, and industry still has a high proportion of foreign ownership. However, the country’s resultant prominence among the world’s manufacturing and trading nations has more recently permitted Canada, in turn, to become a major investor abroad, with investment outflow exceeding inflow. The economy’s health contin-

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ues to depend highly on trade, especially with the United States, which absorbed 83 percent of Canadian exports in 2003. Having concluded a free trade agreement in 1988, Canada and the United States subsequently joined Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force in 1994. (Notably, imports from the United States slid from 77 percent of total imports in 1998 to 70 percent in 2003.) The once-dominant agricultural sector (including fishing and forestry) now employs only 3 percent of the workforce while contributing about 2.2 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, Canada’s farms and ranches continue to produce vast quantities of wheat and beef, substantial portions of which are available for export. In addition, Canada ranks first among world exporters of wood pulp, paper, and fish. Industry as a whole, including mining, constitutes about 30 percent of GDP and employs about 22 percent of the labor force. In addition to processed foods, paper, and wood products, leading manufactures include automobiles and auto parts (roughly one-fourth of the country’s exports), fabricated metals, and electrical and electronic products. Mineral wealth also plays an important role. Possessing significant petroleum reserves, Canada is additionally a major source of cobalt, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, molybdenum, nickel, platinum, silver, uranium, and zinc. Mineral products make up about 15 percent of exports. Following a slow recovery from the international recession of the early 1990s, Canada saw its GDP rise at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent from 1994 to 1997, easily outpacing the average for the Group of Seven (G-7) leading industrial states. Despite adverse world commodity prices and the negative effect of an Asian financial crisis, GDP rose 3.1 percent in 1998. At the same time, unemployment continued its decline from more than 11 percent in 1993 to 8.3 percent, while core consumer price inflation stood at 1.2 percent. Aided by the buoyant U.S. economy, GDP growth reached more than 5 percent in 2000, marking the country’s longest uninterrupted expansion in more than three decades. However, growth dropped to 1.8 percent in 2001 and 2003 before recovering to nearly

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CANADA

3 percent in 2004 and 2005. Unemployment fell to 6.8 percent in 2005, while inflation stood at 2.2 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background United under British rule in 1763 following France’s defeat in the Seven Years War, Canada began its movement toward independence in 1867 when the British North America Act established a federal union of the four provinces of Quebec, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. The provinces reached their present total of ten with the addition of Newfoundland in 1949. Under the 1867 act, executive authority was vested in the British Crown but was exercised by an appointed governor general; legislative power was entrusted to a bicameral Parliament consisting of a Senate and a House of Commons. Canada’s growing capacity to manage its affairs won formal recognition in the British Statute of Westminster of 1931, which conferred autonomous status within the Commonwealth. With a political system and institutional structure closely modeled on British precedents, the country was for all practical purposes governed for more than a century by alignments equivalent to today’s Liberal and Conservative parties. Liberal governments, headed successively by W. L. MacKenzie KING and Louis ST. LAURENT, were in office from 1935 to 1957, when the Conservatives (named Progressive Conservatives of Canada [PCP] in the 1940s and the Conservative Party of Canada [CPC] in 2003 following the PCP’s merger with the Canadian Alliance) returned to power under John DIEFENBAKER, prime minister from 1957 to 1963. Lester B. PEARSON, leader of the Liberal Party, headed minority governments from 1963 until his retirement in 1968, when he was succeeded by Pierre Elliott TRUDEAU. The new prime minister secured a majority for the Liberals in the election of June 1968 and was returned to power with a reduced majority in October 1972. Contrary to preelection forecasts, the Trudeau gov-

ernment won decisive control of the House of Commons in July 1974. In May 1979 the 16-year Liberal reign ended when the PCP won 136 of 282 seats in the newly expanded House. Although his party remained 6 seats shy of an absolute majority, the PCP’s Charles Joseph CLARK was sworn in as prime minister in June, Trudeau becoming leader of the opposition. In December, however, the Clark government experienced a stunning parliamentary defeat in an effort to enact a series of stringent budgetary measures, necessitating a dissolution of the House and the calling of a new election for February 1980. Given an evident resurgence of Liberal popularity, Trudeau agreed to withdraw his November 1979 resignation as party leader and returned to office in March as head of a new Liberal government that commanded a majority of 6 seats in the Commons. As a French Canadian, Trudeau deployed his political weight against the pro-independence Quebec Party (Parti Qu´eb´ecois—PQ), which had come to power in the province in 1976, thereby helping to defeat the PQ government’s “sovereigntyassociation” plan in a Quebec referendum in May 1980. However, continued economic difficulties combined with accusations of political patronage began to erode the Trudeau administration’s popularity. In February 1984 Trudeau again resigned the leadership of his party; he was replaced at a party convention in June by John Napier TURNER, who had served as finance minister from 1972 to 1975. Heartened by polls indicating that the transfer of power had aided his party’s popularity, newly installed Prime Minister Turner called a general election for September, but the balloting produced a decisive reversal: the PCP won 211 of 284 House seats, and PCP leader Brian MULRONEY took office as prime minister. During the ensuing four years the Mulroney administration encountered widespread resistance to its fiscal and defense policies, was embarrassed by a series of scandals involving cabinet officials, and encountered strong opposition to the Meech Lake constitutional reform proposals (see Constitution and government, below). Nonetheless, in an early general election in November 1988, the PCP

CANADA

retained control of the Commons by capturing 170 of 295 seats. The future of the country’s de facto two-party system was challenged by a devastating Liberal loss to the New Democratic Party (NDP) in Ontario provincial elections on September 6, 1990, followed by a third-place Liberal finish behind the NDP in Manitoba five days later. The NDP further asserted itself in October 1991 by toppling a Social Credit (Socred) administration in Saskatchewan and a Conservative government in British Columbia. His party’s standing in the opinion polls having plummeted to an unprecedented low, Mulroney resigned as prime minister and PCP leader on June 23, 1993, in favor of Kim CAMPBELL, who proved unable to reverse the antiConservative tide. On October 25 the PCP suffered the most punishing blow to any ruling party in Canadian history, with its parliamentary representation plunging from 153 to 2. Installed as prime minister on November 4, Liberal leader Jean ´ CHRETIEN faced major challenges from both the separatist Quebec Bloc (Bloc Qu´eb´ecois—BQ), led by Lucien BOUCHARD, and the western populist Reform Party, the former becoming the official opposition. A renewed threat to the Canadian federation resulted from provincial elections in Quebec on September 12, 1994, when the PQ, after nine years in opposition, defeated the incumbent Liberals by a decisive seat margin of 77 to 47. A PQ government committed to taking Quebec to independence was installed on September 27 under the premiership of Jacques PARIZEAU. In December 1994 Parizeau introduced detailed independence proposals and launched a “consultation” process aimed at securing referendum endorsement of Quebec’s “sovereignty” by the end of 1995. The Chr´etien federal government, initially relaxed about the referendum initiative, became more concerned when the small pro-autonomy Democratic Action of Quebec (Action D´emocratique du Qu´ebec—ADQ), potentially commanding the swing vote in Quebec, endorsed the proposal. When the highly able Bouchard took over the leadership of the PQ’s cam-

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paign from Parizeau, the Chr´etien administration launched a major drive against separation. The effort succeeded by the barest of margins: in a turnout of 93 percent on October 30, 1995, 2,308,028 votes (49.4 percent) were cast in favor of the proposition and 2,361,526 (50.6 percent) against. In January 1996 Parizeau was succeeded as provincial premier and PQ leader by Bouchard, who recommitted the PQ to the goal of independence for Quebec but declared that his more immediate aim was the province’s economic revival. In a daring move, Prime Minister Chr´etien announced on April 27, 1997, that new elections would be held in June (17 months earlier than required), following the shortest campaign in Canadian history. Chr´etien’s decision was apparently influenced by the Liberals’ large lead in public opinion polls and a desire to solidify the government’s toughened position against unilateral separation by Quebec. The June 2 balloting kept the Liberal Party in power, albeit with Canada’s smallest-ever majority, 155 seats out of 301 total. Having won 60 seats, the Reform Party replaced the BQ (38 seats) as the official opposition. In general, Canada’s electorate fragmented along regional lines, and only the small NDP (21 seats) could claim a national representation (a seat in three different regions). In the Quebec provincial election of November 1998, Premier Bouchard was reelected, although the PQ’s support softened as the Liberals edged the secessionists by 1 percent in the popular vote. During his campaign Bouchard said he would not seek another referendum on independence until “winning conditions” were clearly in place. Three months earlier, on August 20, the Supreme Court had ruled that Quebec could secede, but only with the agreement of the federal government and the other provinces on such questions as settlement of national debt and continued use of a common currency. Despite strong objections from the BQ, in March 2000 the House of Commons passed a controversial “clarity” provision that outlined procedures for secession. Passed into law by the Senate in July, the bill authorized the House to determine whether the wording of future independence referendums is sufficiently clear.

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CANADA

On October 22, 2000, five days after a cabinet reshuffle, Prime Minister Chr´etien called a federal election for November 27, 19 months before the expiration of his mandate. Buoyed by Canada’s healthy economy, the Liberals won 172 seats in the House of Commons, while the new Canadian Alliance—in large part a right-wing successor to the Reform Party—won 66 seats. The BQ, the NDP, and the PCP all saw their federal representation decline in the election that again confirmed the country’s regional divide. In June 2002 Chr´etien sacked Paul MARTIN (Chr´etien’s chief Liberal rival) after nine years as finance minister, apparently because Chr´etien believed Martin had begun his campaign to be the next prime minister too early. However, Martin was subsequently elected as the new Liberal leader (see Political Parties, below, for details), and on December 12, 2003, he succeeded Chr´etien as prime minister, appointing a new cabinet on the same day. Faced with a rapidly developing financial scandal, Martin called early elections for June 28, 2004, at which the Liberals were able to secure only a plurality of 135 of the 308 seats in the House of Commons. Martin formed a new minority government on July 20. However, the ongoing scandal and the Liberals’ weak parliamentary position continued to plague the Martin government (see Current issues, below). On November 24, 2005, Conservative Party leader Stephen HARPER introduced a no-confidence motion, which passed 171–133 on November 28. The following day Martin asked Governor General Micha¨elle JEAN to dissolve Parliament and call new elections. In the election on January 23, 2006, the Conservatives secured a plurality of 124 seats compared to 103 seats for the Liberals. Consequently, Harper was sworn in as the head of the minority Conservative government on February 6. The cabinet was reshuffled in January and August 2007.

Constitution and Government From 1867 until 1982 the British North America Act served as Canada’s basic law. A lengthy effort by Prime Minister Trudeau to “patriate” a purely

Canadian constitution generated considerable controversy in the provinces and met with mixed judicial construction, which led to a September 1981 determination by the Supreme Court that the government’s effort was legal but that it offended “the federal principle” by proceeding without overall provincial consent. Trudeau responded by convening a meeting with the provincial premiers in early November, at the conclusion of which all but Que´ bec’s Ren´e LEVESQUE agreed to a compromise that included an amending formula and permission for the provinces to nullify bill-of-rights provisions within their boundaries, should they so wish. On this basis, the Canada Bill (the Constitution Act 1982) was approved by the British Parliament in March 1982 and formally signed by Queen Elizabeth II in a ceremony in Ottawa on April 17. The document did not, however, secure final Canadian parliamentary approval until June 22, 1988, after the Mulroney administration (in the Meech Lake Accord of April–June 1987) had agreed to recognize Quebec as a “distinct society.” The concession, which required the approval of all ten provinces, was bitterly opposed by a number of prominent Canadians, including former prime minister Trudeau, who had long been committed to a bilingual country of politically equal provinces and who argued that the distinct-society clause would open the door to Quebec’s eventual departure from the federation. The latter prospect was by no means precluded when the deadline for approval of the accord expired on June 22, 1990, after cancellation by Newfoundland of a scheduled ratification vote. In June 1991 a Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s Future that had been established by Ottawa in late 1990 submitted a report urging recognition of Quebec as a unique entity within the federal system, the introduction of self-government for aboriginal peoples, and restructuring or abolition of the Canadian Senate. Mulroney responded to the proposals in late September by placing before the House of Commons a document titled “Shaping Canada’s Future Together” that again would recognize Quebec as a “distinct society,” while transferring a number of federal functions, particularly in the area of

CANADA

culture, to provincial administrations. The document also called for granting indigenous inhabitants self-government within ten years, removing a number of restrictions on trade between the provinces and territories, and establishing an elective Senate. Following a series of national “consultations” on the Mulroney proposals, political agreement on a new reform plan was achieved at a conference of federal, provincial, territorial, and native leaders in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, held August 18–23, 1992. However, on October 26 voters decisively rejected the accord in a nationwide referendum (only the third in Canada’s history), opposition being strongest in Quebec, where radical separatists regarded its provisions as insufficient, and in the western provinces, where the concessions to Quebec were seen as overly generous (see Current issues, below, for subsequent developments). Meanwhile, on December 16, 1991, the government had announced formal agreement with Inuit representatives on formation of the Nunavut (“Our Land” in Inuktitut, the Inuit language) territory, subject to approval by voters in the existing Northwest Territories (NWT), from which the new entity would be detached. Under the accord, the Inuit would be granted self-government (not independence, as some had demanded) and a share in mining and oil proceeds from lands that would remain largely under federal ownership. In addition, a wildlife management board would be established to regulate hunting and trapping, while a fund of approximately US $653 million would be set up to assist in implementation of the homeland by 1999. The agreement was ratified on May 4, 1992, by a NWT majority of 54 percent (90 percent in the east) and on November 3–5 by 69 percent of about 8,000 participants in an Inuit referendum. The autonomous territory of Nunavut was founded on April 1, 1999. Under the present constitution, the British monarch, as sovereign, is represented by a governor general, now a Canadian citizen appointed on the advice of the prime minister. The locus of power is the elected House of Commons, where the leader of the majority party is automatically designated by

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the governor general to form a cabinet and thus become prime minister. The House may be dissolved and a new election called in the event of a legislative defeat or no-confidence vote. The Senate, appointed by the governor general (on the advice of the prime minister) along both geographic and party lines, also must approve all legislation but tends largely to limit itself to the exercise of a secondary, restraining influence. It is prohibited from introducing financial legislation. Provincial governments operate along comparable lines. Each of the provinces has its own constitution; a lieutenant governor appointed by the governor general; a Legislative Assembly whose principal leader is the provincial premier; and its own judicial system, with a right of appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Municipalities are governed by elected officials and are subject to provincial rather than federal, authority. The Yukon is governed by a premier and a popularly elected Council. The Northwest Territories are governed by a premier and a popularly elected Legislative Assembly. Nunavut is governed by a premier and a 19-member popularly elected legislature. (The legislative bodies elect the premiers in the territories.) Area (sq. mi.)

Population (2006C)

255,540 364,762 250,114 28,150 156,452

3,290,350 4,113,487 1,148,401 729,997 505,469

21,345 415,596 2,185

913,462 12,160,282 135,851

595,388 251,365

7,546,131 968,157

Northwest Territories 519,732 (Yellowknife) Yukon Territory (Whitehorse) 186,271 Nunavut (Iqaluit) 808,181

41,464

Province and Capital Alberta (Edmonton) British Columbia (Victoria) Manitoba (Winnipeg) New Brunswick (Fredericton) Newfoundland and Labrador (St. John’s) Nova Scotia (Halifax) Ontario (Toronto) Prince Edward Island (Charlottetown) Quebec (Quebec) Saskatchewan (Regina) Territory and Capital

30,372 29,474

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Foreign Relations Canadian foreign policy in recent decades has reflected the varied influence of historic ties to Great Britain, geographical proximity to the United States, and a growing national strength and selfawareness that made the country one of the most active and influential “middle powers” of the post– World War II period. Staunch affiliation with the Western democratic bloc and an active role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other Western organizations have been accompanied by support for international conciliation and extensive participation in UN peacekeeping ventures and other constructive international activities. While maintaining important joint defense arrangements with the United States, Canada has shown independence of U.S. views on a variety of international issues. In addition, anti-U.S. sentiment has been voiced in connection with extensive U.S. ownership and control of Canadian economic enterprises and pervasive U.S. influence on Canadian intellectual and cultural life. Thus, a general review of Canada’s international commitments begun in the late 1960s resulted in diversification of the nation’s international relationships. In line with this trend, Canada reduced the number of troops committed to NATO, and Prime Minister Trudeau made state visits to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. In the face of a substantially reduced threat from Eastern Europe, the NATO commitment was further curtailed in September 1991, while the Mulroney government’s pledge in February 1992 that for budgetary reasons all Canadian combat troops would be withdrawn from Europe by late 1994 was in fact accomplished by late 1993. While disputes with the United States over fishing rights and delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Maine were largely resolved following a decision of the International Court of Justice in October 1984, the effects of U.S.-produced “acid rain” on Canadian forests remained an area of contention between the two countries. However, immediately before the third annual U.S.-Canadian summit in April 1987, President Ronald Reagan

announced that his government would spend $2.5 billion over five years on demonstration projects aimed at cleaner coal burning, while President George H. W. Bush in early 1989 promised that he would seek prompt approval of additional “clean air” legislation. In another area of contention with Washington, the Canadians hailed the conclusion in early 1988 of an agreement on Arctic cooperation, although the pact did not include U.S. recognition that waters adjacent to the Arctic archipelago are subject to Canadian sovereignty. In September 1996 Ottawa hosted the inauguration of the eightnation Arctic Council, established on Canada’s initiative to promote cooperation between states with Arctic territories (see article on Arctic Council). While France has been careful not to become overtly involved in the Quebec separatist issue since a controversial visit to the province by President Charles de Gaulle in 1967, a maritime controversy erupted between Ottawa and Paris following Canada’s declaration of a 200-mile economic zone in 1977. France responded by claiming a similar zone around the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which are located only a few miles off the coast of Newfoundland. Eventually, the two parties agreed to submit the dispute to binding arbitration, the outcome of which in June 1992 limited France to a 12-mile zone around the two islands, save for a 10.5-mile-wide corridor running south for 200 miles to international waters. In December 1994 the two sides concluded a ten-year agreement on allowable catch quotas in the area. On January 1, 1990, Canada became the 33rd member of the Organization of American States (OAS). It had held observer status with the hemispheric body since 1972 but had been reluctant to become a full member of a grouping perceived as being dominated by the United States. Despite its historic sensitivity over trade with the United States, Canada participated in extension of the 1988 U.S.-Canadian free trade agreement to include Mexico. Initialed on August 12, 1992, and subsequently ratified by all three parties, NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994. It was the first such accord to link two industrialized powers with a developing state.

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Relations in general with the United States remained strong even when Canada’s trade and cultural ties with Cuba became a source of friction after the U.S. Congress in March 1996 passed the Helms-Burton Act, which strengthened the U.S. embargo of the island. More recently, Canada’s relations with Cuba have cooled over Havana’s human rights record. Canada’s long-standing sensitivity to cultural domination by imports of American songs, films, magazines, and other products resurfaced in 1998 as members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reached an impasse in April on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which is intended to encourage direct, cross-border investments. Canada, differing with the United States, wanted cultural industries excluded. Ottawa and Washington also were divided over whether NAFTA provisions exempt culture and therefore permit the Canadians to restrict U.S. media. From April 20 to April 22, 2001, Quebec City hosted the third “Summit of the Americas,” which was attended by the heads of state and government from 34 hemispheric countries. Approximately 30,000 protesters, most of them opposing globalization, threatened to disrupt the meeting, leading to tight security and several hundred arrests. Following the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, Ottawa concluded a number of agreements with Washington providing for increased cooperation in the areas of intelligence and security, designed, among other things, to monitor border crossings more effectively. Canada also adopted stronger domestic antiterrorism legislation. (In October 2006 the courts struck down four provisions of the law, including its definition of terrorism. In February 2007 Parliament allowed the controversial provisions for holding suspects without charges and compelling testimony to expire.) Despite these new accords, relations between Canada and the United States subsequently grew colder, if not more contentious. Facing declining public support for going to war in Iraq and considerable opposition within his Lib-

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eral Party, Prime Minister Jean Chr´etien declared in March 2003 that, in the absence of UN authorization, Canada would not participate in the invasion of Iraq. Members of the U.S. and Canadian administrations subsequently traded criticisms, including the comment by one of Chr´etien’s cabinet members referring to President George W. Bush as a “moron.” Expectations of improved relations were raised when Paul Martin became prime minister in December 2003, but tensions continued over defense and trade issues. During a visit by President Bush in November 2004, Martin’s administration continued to press for the end of the ongoing U.S. ban on Canadian beef imports because of mad cow concerns raised in 2003 and the 27 percent tariff that the Bush administration imposed on Canadian softwood lumber imports in 2001. In February 2005 Martin declared that Canada would not participate in the development of the U.S.-led missile defense program. By the end of 2004 Canada’s economic relations with China had deepened as Chinese energy companies discussed ambitious deals for petroleum development in the province of Alberta. China’s rapidly growing energy needs had already driven world petroleum prices higher and were beginning to cause increased competition over Canadian supplies, one of the largest sources of petroleum imports for the United States. In the period following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, Canada evolved a “human security” program as a central component of its foreign policy, covering five areas: protecting civilians, peace support operations, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and public safety. Specific projects have ranged from a concerted effort to promote acceptance of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), to peacekeeping duties in Afghanistan, to reform and reconstruction efforts in Haiti after the departure of Jean Bertrand Aristide in February 2004. Following the installation of the Harper administration in February 2006, expectations rose for a closer Canadian relationship with the United States. Among other things, Harper, widely

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perceived as a strong supporter of U.S. President Bush, promised a legislative vote on whether Canada would become involved in the proposed NATO missile defense plan. Concurrently, Harper announced that an agreement had been reached on softwood lumber trade, and in May the House of Commons voted to extend Canada’s mission in Afghanistan until 2009. Harper also aligned himself with U.S. foreign policy by defending Israel during its conflict in the summer with Hezbollah in Lebanon. On the other hand, Harper subsequently announced that Canada would not participate in the U.S. missile defense program.

Current Issues One perplexing and difficult current issue for Canada remains national unity, in particular the will of a provincial population versus the constitutional integrity of Canada. Few countries in the world allow unfettered departure of a part of national territory, and none without the approval of some central authority. The continuing question of Quebec sovereignty, which never disappears from the headlines, took an unexpected turn in January 2001 with a surprise resignation announcement by Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard, who acknowledged his failure to make progress on the issue. According to reports, Bouchard had also grown weary of fending off party militants, who insisted, for example, on instituting stiffer French-language laws and scheduling another independence referendum. His successor, Bernard LANDRY, although a somewhat more ardent champion of separation, could hardly ignore a May 2000 opinion poll that registered only 43 percent support for independence among Quebec’s residents. (In November 2006 Prime Minister Harper, facing a proposed motion from the BQ that would have declared Quebec as a “nation,” offered his own motion recognizing Quebec as a “nation within a united Canada.” Harper’s motion, which had prompted the resignation of Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs Michael Chong [who opposed Harper’s language and described Canada as “undivided” and “one nation”], was approved by

the House of Commons on November 27 by a 266– 16 vote.) In recent years Canada has taken historic steps to grant self-government to native peoples. April 1, 1999, marked the division of the Northwest Territory and the founding of Nunavut, a territory considerably bigger than Alaska (or western Europe) that is now governed to a large extent by the Inuit. Earlier, in November 1998, after 20 years of negotiations, the Nisga’a Indians ratified a treaty giving them 745 square miles of British Columbia, the first comprehensive land settlement made by the province in the 20th century. With dozens of other Indian bands also pressing their case in the province, in April 1999 the Nisga’a agreement received the approval of the provincial assembly. In December the House of Commons passed the agreement despite opposition from the Reform Party, which argued that the precedent would endanger Canada’s constitutional integrity. Passage through the Senate followed in April 2000, with the treaty then receiving royal assent from the governor general and entering into force on May 11. It remained subject to a number of lawsuits, however, including some brought by other native bands. On March 10, 2001, the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council, representing about 7,000 Indians in 12 bands, also signed a treaty agreement with federal and provincial officials. The agreement, which awaits approval by the individual bands and the federal and provincial legislatures, includes provisions on self-rule and shared control of old-growth forests and other natural resources contained in about 260 square miles of Vancouver and Meares islands. In 2000 Jean Chr´etien, 66, became the first prime minister to win three consecutive parliamentary majorities since Mackenzie King in 1945. He undoubtedly benefited from Canada’s strong economy, which enabled him to cut income and other taxes in 2000 while keeping the federal budget in surplus, thereby exploiting what had traditionally been Conservative issues. He also benefited from the Alliance’s inability to attract more Progressive Conservatives into the new party, which left the right wing split, and from divisions in Quebec over how and when to pursue greater regional autonomy.

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Chr´etien’s success was made more remarkable by the fact that, earlier in the year, he had overcome calls from within his party for him to step down in favor of a younger leader. After assuming the premiership in December 2003, Paul Martin had only a brief “honeymoon” before a financial scandal roiled the government. (A February 2004 audit accused the federal government of “blatant misuse” of about $190 million in various promotional activities.) The Liberals clearly suffered from a loss of popular support as a result of the scandal in the June 2004 balloting for the House of Commons. At the same time, most observers described the performance of the new Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) as worse than had been expected. Stephen Harper, the leader of the CPC, had pledged to increase military spending and reduce taxes, earning him criticism as a “right-winger” from the Liberals and the NDP. A December 2004 Supreme Court ruling that the government could expand marriage rights to gays and lesbians caused splits within both major parties. Meanwhile, Canada had continued toward decriminalization of marijuana use, a trend that had contributed to tension with the United States. The flow of an estimated $7 billion worth of marijuana into the United States had, among other things, prompted the governors of U.S. states adjoining Canada to call for greater U.S. federal border enforcement, also an issue in regard to illegal immigration and the potential entrance of terrorists into the United States. Prime Minister Martin announced in April 2005 that he would ask for dissolution of Parliament within a year, a timetable that was initially accepted by the NDP, on whom the Liberals were relying for support. However, the minority Liberal government remained fragile, even though the opposition parties offered no coherent policies on which they might form a majority administration. Underscoring the administration’s tenuous status, its budget legislation passed in May only because of a tiebreaking vote by the speaker. The Gormery Commission (changed with investigating the “sponsorship” scandal uncovered in 2004) issued its first report in early Novem-

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ber 2005. The commission exonerated Martin but found fault with the administration of former prime minister Chr´etien for ignoring procedural safeguards that might have prevented the abuses. Although Martin avoided being directly criticized, the report reportedly raised concerns within the NDP about the Liberals and provided Harper with a context for the no-confidence motion that brought down the government in late November. (The motion, which was supported by all members of the opposition parties, was the first successful noconfidence motion conducted outside the area of a substantive policy issue.) In their successful campaign for the January 2006 elections, the Conservatives proposed five major initiatives: a reduction in the goods and service tax, tougher criminal penalties, stricter accountability for politicians and civil servants, a child care subsidy, and a maximum waiting time for surgery. Initial aspects of the tax reduction, child care, and accountability legislation were approved by the House of Commons in June, and pilot projects regarding waiting time for surgery were subsequently launched, some in association with provincial governments. Meanwhile, various proposals for stricter criminal laws remained under consideration. However, Harper’s proposal to ban same-sex marriage was defeated in December by a vote of 175–123, and Harper announced he would not revisit the issue. Controversy continued in the second half of 2006 regarding environmental issues, as the Harper administration declared the goals and timetables in the global Kyoto Protocol to be unrealistic. The government prepared an alternative plan, which was broadly derided at the Group of Eight (G8) meeting in Germany in 2007. Meanwhile, in April 2007 Environmental Minister John BAIRD announced that Canada would not be able to meet its Kyoto goals until at least 13 years after the proposed target date.

Political Parties Canada’s traditional two-party system diversified in the 1930s, and the process gathered pace in

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the 1980s. The Liberals were the only party to win more than 20 percent of the national vote in 1993 (when the Quebec Bloc [QB] first appeared and the political right split between the Reform Party and Progressive Conservatives) and again in 1997 (when the split on the right was maintained and the QB retained influence). However, in the 2000 election the right began to coalesce once again, and the 2004 and 2006 elections featured the return of a two-party dominant national political scene, centered on the Liberals and Conservatives. In the 2006 balloting for the House of Commons, the Conservatives won a nationwide plurality of votes and seats (124), winning all 28 seats in Alberta, 12 of 14 in Saskatchewan, and majorities in the other two western provinces—British Columbia and Manitoba. The Liberals won seat majorities in five of six eastern provinces, the exception being Quebec, where the QB won 51 of 75 seats. Overall, the second-place Liberals won 103 seats in 2006, similar to the 99 seats won by the second-place Conservatives in 2004. The second-place totals in 2004 and 2006 were considerably higher than the second place totals of 1993 (54, by the QB, which therefore formed the Official Opposition), 1997 (60, by the Reform Party), and 2000 (66, by the Alliance). Provincial elections since 2001 have witnessed considerable turnover of the governing parties. The Liberals won British Columbia from the NDP in 2001 and held their majority there in 2005. Moreover, the Liberals won the critical province of Ontario from the PCP in 2003 and also took control of New Brunswick in 2006 and Prince Edward Island in 2007. On the other hand, the PCP won Newfoundland and Labrador from the Liberals in 2003. In Quebec the Liberal Party of Quebec took over from the Parti Qu´eb´ecois in 2003. (In 2007 the Liberals retained control of Quebec, but only through a minority government, as the ADQ surged into status as official opposition in the province.) The PCP fell from majority to minority control in Nova Scotia in 2003, a position the PCP maintained in 2006. However, the PCP continued its majority control in Alberta in 2004. The NDP won slim majority control in Saskatchewan in 2003, ending the existing

NDP–Liberal coalition formed in 1999. In 2007 the NDP maintained its sizable majority in Manitoba. The resurgent Yukon Party pushed the Liberals out of power in the Yukon Territory in 2002 and retained its majority status in 2006. Meanwhile, the Assembly of the Northwest Territories consists entirely of independent members (candidates do not contest elections under party labels), and there are no political parties in Nunavut.

Governing Party Conservative Party of Canada (CPC). The CPC is the result of the 2003 merger of Canada’s two leading conservative parties—the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance (Canadian Alliance) and the Progressive Conservative Party (PCP). The Canadian Alliance traced its origins to a September 1998 convention called to discuss formation of a “national, broad-based, democratic conservative movement.” The effort was spearheaded by Preston Manning and other leaders of the Reform Party of Canada, who hoped to convince other conservatives, particularly those in the PCP, to participate. Following up on the initial meeting, a United Alternative Convention convened in February 1999, with a number of United Alternative Action Committees then being established in the fall to draft a platform and a constitution for the new organization. A second convention was held in January 2000, at which time the organization’s name and founding documents were approved. Party tenets include lowering and simplifying taxes; paying down the national debt; making balanced federal budgets mandatory; increasing defense spending; downsizing government; furthering free and open trade; eliminating public funding of multiculturalism; and reemphasizing the role of the provinces in setting social policy with regard to health, education, housing, and related areas. On March 27, 2000, the Canadian Alliance became the official opposition party in the House of Commons, about 92 percent of the Reform Party’s membership having voted in favor of merging into the new formation.

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A right-wing populist group, the Reform Party had been launched in Alberta in 1988 but subsequently attracted broad western support. The party strongly opposed the Charlottetown agreement in the October 1992 referendum and also opposed new federal proposals for constitutional accommodation with Quebec after the October 1995 independence referendum. It finished third in federal representation following the 1993 vote and in March 1996 sought, without notable success, to extend its power base by presenting candidates in a series of federal by-elections in the eastern provinces. In the federal election of June 1997 the party won 60 seats and thereby became the official opposition party. After formation of the Canadian Alliance, Manning was soon challenged for the leadership by Stockwell DAY, a conservative populist and Alberta’s treasurer. Day, an opponent of abortion and gay rights, secured the leadership position in second-round balloting in July 2000. In the November 2000 House of Commons election the Canadian Alliance won 25.5 percent of the national vote and 66 seats, all but 6 of them in Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan, and thereby retained its status as the official opposition. In May 2001 dissatisfaction with Day’s leadership reportedly led a number of members to leave the party. Day resigned in December in preparation for another leadership election in 2002, John REYNOLDS succeeding him on an interim basis. In balloting on March 20, 2002, economist Stephen Harper defeated Day and two minor candidates for the alliance’s leadership post. Harper won a by-election for a House of Commons seat from Calgary on May 13 (neither the Liberal Party or the PCP offered an opponent), thereby gaining access to the position of leader of the opposition. The PCP was more nationalistic in outlook and traditionally less willing to compromise with the Quebec separatists than the Liberals. It also placed greater emphasis on Canada’s British and Commonwealth attachments while actively promoting programs of social welfare and assistance to farmers. Following the replacement of Charles Joseph Clark by Brian MULRONEY as party leader in

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June 1983, the PCP climbed steadily in the polls before winning decisive control at the federal level in September 1984. Although losing 41 seats in November 1988, the PCP became the first party to win a second consecutive term since 1953 and claimed that securing representation in nine of the ten provinces was a sign of “national unity.” However, by the end of 1990 Prime Minister Mulroney’s rating in the public opinion polls had fallen to a low of 12 percent. The voters’ rejection of the Charlottetown constitutional reform agreement in October 1992 caused further problems for Mulroney, who announced on February 24, 1993, that he would not lead the PCP in the forthcoming general election. His successor, Kim CAMPBELL, served as prime minister for only 134 days before the party’s crushing defeat on October 25, only 2 seats being retained. On December 13 Campbell stepped down as party leader in favor of Jean J. CHAREST. The PCP launched a comeback by scoring a stunning victory on June 8, 1995, in provincial balloting in Ontario, Canada’s most populous province, where the party had been in opposition since 1985 (most recently to the NDP). Standing on a populist, antiwelfare ticket, new provincial PCP leader Mike HARRIS, a former golf professional and ski instructor, led the party to an overall majority of 82 seats out of 130 on a 45 percent popular vote share. Charest quit as party leader in March 1998 and was succeeded by Joe Clark, former federal prime minister, who rejected efforts by the Reform Party to bring the PCP into what became the Canadian Alliance. Meanwhile, the party continued to fare well at the provincial level. In Ontario the PCP and Harris were returned to office in June 1999 despite Liberal gains. The PCP also assumed control of the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia governments in 1999 but lost Manitoba to the NDP. Having suffered several parliamentary defections to the Liberals and the Alliance in 1999 and 2000, the PCP saw its representation in the House decline to 12 in November 2000, down from the 20 seats won in 1997. Clark announced in August 2002 that he would resign as PCP leader by mid2003, thereby setting the stage for renewed efforts

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to merge the PCP with the Canadian Alliance. In the run-up to new elections for the PCP leadership, and amid speculation of a merger with the alliance, leadership hopeful David Orchard agreed to support rival Peter Mackay on the condition that he would not pursue merger talks. Nonetheless, after winning, Mackay agreed to merge with the Canadian Alliance in October 2003 and became deputy leader of the CPC. The CPC represented an attempt to “unite the Right” around a Conservative platform that advocated strong national defense, personal tax reduction, retirement savings accounts, support for ranchers in western provinces, and opposition to gun registration and gay marriage. Other less traditionally Conservative policy positions included support for a massive infusion of funds in the national health care system and a pledge not to legislate on abortion. Stephen Harper resigned his Canadian Alliance post as Leader of the Opposition on January 12, 2004, to run for leader of the CPC. On March 20, 2004, he easily defeated two other leadership candidates on the first ballot. In the June 2004 election, the CPC gained 27 seats for a total of 99 seats, but its 29.6 percent of the vote was 8.1 percentage points below the combined totals received by the Canadian Alliance and the PCP in November 2000. Nevertheless, the CPC’s second-place finish gave it the position of official opposition in the House of Commons. In the January 2006 balloting the CPC won 36.3 percent of the vote and 124 of 308 seats. The CPC subsequently formed a minority government under the premiership of Harper, who was sworn in on February 6. The CPC’s success was attributed to Harper’s ability to quell doubts about his earlier strongly conservative positions on social matters, a moderated perception of the party in general, and the late December 2005 official announcement of alleged financial misdeeds by the Liberals’ finance ministry. Leaders: Stephen HARPER (Prime Minister), Peter VAN LOAN (Leader of the Government in the House), Marjorie LEBRETON (Leader of the Government in the Senate), Michael D. DONISON (Executive Director).

Opposition Parties Liberal Party of Canada. Historically dedicated to free trade and gradual social reform, the Liberal Party is sometimes regarded as the “natural party of Canada” because it has formed the government for most of the past century. Recently, it has promoted federal-provincial cooperation and an international outlook favoring an effective United Nations, cooperation with the United States and Western Europe, and a substantial foreign economic aid program. The Liberal Party was in power in all but two years from 1963 to 1984, mostly under the premiership of Pierre TRUDEAU. Shortly after Trudeau retired in June 1984, the new Liberal leader and prime minister, John TURNER, called a September election that produced the Liberals’ worst defeat in history, as they won just 28 percent of the vote and 40 seats. Subsequent battling over his ability to return the party to power forced Turner to fend off three ouster attempts. Despite the turmoil, Turner was credited with leading an effective albeit losing campaign in November 1988 that yielded a doubling of Liberal parliamentary representation. In February 1990 Turner resigned as opposition leader, with Jean Chr´etien, a former Trudeau aide, being elected his successor on June 23 and steering the party to victory in October 1993. The Liberals won again, with a smaller majority of 155 seats (22 less than in 1993), in June 1997. In the November 2000 election the party won 40.9 percent of the vote and 172 seats, making Chr´etien the first prime minister since 1945 to win parliamentary majorities in three consecutive elections. Nevertheless the party entered a period of turmoil when increasing competition for party leadership from Finance Minister Paul Martin caused Chr´etien to sack him from the cabinet in June 2002. Martin’s dismissal apparently involved his perceived unofficial campaign to succeed Chr´etien, the prime minister having directed that no campaigning or fund-raising be conducted until a party convention scheduled for February 2003. In August 2002 Chr´etien announced that he would not seek another term as prime minister, and a party convention in November 2003

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overwhelmingly elected Martin as the new party leader. Chr´etien then moved his retirement (scheduled for February 2004) up to December 12, 2003, on which date he was succeeded by Martin as prime minister. Martin led the party in the June 28, 2004, election when it lost its majority status but won a plurality of votes and seats. It subsequently formed a minority government. In May 2005 the Liberals barely survived a budget battle that could have turned into a vote of no confidence only to lose a similar vote six months later. The January 2006 election saw the Liberals’ vote fall by 6.5 points, to 30.2 percent, and its seats reduced to 103. Following the defeat, Martin resigned as leader on February 1. Bill Graham replaced him as interim leader of the party and leader of the opposition. Michael Ignatieff, a well-known academic who had lived in either the United Kingdom or the United States for several decades until 2005, was considered the early favorite among eight candidates in December 2006 balloting for the party leader’s post. Although he led the first two ballots, Ignatieff lost the fourth and final ballot to St´ephane Dion, who had received the support of Gerard KENNEDY (the third-place finisher in the second ballot). Leaders: St´ephane DION (Leader of the Opposition), Michael IGNATIEFF (Deputy Leader), Ralph GOODALE (House Leader), Lucienne ROBILLARD (Deputy House Leader), Karen REDMAN (Whip), Marcel PROULX (Deputy Whip), C´eline HERVIEUX-PAYETTE (Leader of the Opposition in the Senate), Jamie CARROLL (National Director). Quebec Bloc (Bloc Qu´eb´ecois—BQ). The BQ is a francophone grouping organized by former Liberal environment minister Lucien BOUCHARD and six defectors from other parties after the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord in mid-1990. Although presenting candidates only in Quebec Province, it became the secondranked federal party in October 1993, Bouchard thereby becoming leader of the opposition. Operating as the Ottawa representative of Quebec separatism, the BQ backed the provincial Quebec Party

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(PQ, below) in its declared aim of independence for Quebec following the September 1994 balloting, subject to the creation of a two-state institutional framework covering political and economic relations. Bouchard’s popular standing increased by late 1994 as he led the separatist movement in the national capital. A year later, after the failure of the sovereignty referendum in 1995 and the subsequent resignation of Quebec’s Premier Jacques Parizeau, Bouchard left federal politics to become premier of Quebec and leader of the PQ. The BQ was the third-ranked party, with 44 seats, after the 1997 federal election and retained that position in November 2000 despite dropping to 38 seats in the House of Commons, based on a provincial vote share of 39.9 percent. In the 2004 elections the BQ retained its third-place ranking, but it increased its seat total to 54 in the House of Commons. In 2006 its seat total fell slightly, to 51, again making it the third-largest parliamentary party. Leaders: Gilles DUCEPPE (Leader), Michel GUIMOND (Leader in the House), Monique GUAY (Deputy Leader in the House), Michel GUIMOND (Whip), Pauline PICARD (Deputy Whip), Louis PLAMONDON (Caucus Leader). New Democratic Party (NDP). A democratic socialist grouping founded in 1961 by merger of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and the Canadian Labour Congress, the NDP favors domestic control of resources, a planned economy, broadened social benefits, and an internationalist foreign policy. Traditionally strong in the midwest prairie provinces, the NDP long played the role of third party in relation to the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives, its lower house representation rising to 43 in the election of November 1988. Its highly respected leader, John Edward BROADBENT, retired in 1989 and was succeeded by Audrey McLAUGHLIN (the first woman to lead a significant North American party). In September 1990 the party won a spectacular victory by defeating the incumbent Liberal administration of Ontario. It scored equally impressive victories in October 1991 by ousting a Social Credit administration in British Columbia

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and the Conservative government in Saskatchewan (an NDP stronghold), although in October 1992 it lost control of Yukon Territory. Its momentum was more decisively reversed a year later when its representation in the Commons plunged from 43 members to 9. In September 1995 McLaughlin was succeeded as NDP federal leader by Alexa McDonough. In the 1997 federal election the NDP recovered somewhat, winning 21 seats, but its total fell again, to 13, in November 2000, when it captured only 8.5 percent of the national vote. McDonough announced in June 2002 that she would retire from her NDP leadership post at the convention scheduled for late in the year. In the June 2004 federal election, the NDP recovered somewhat by securing 19 seats in the House of Commons under the leadership of Jack Layton. In January 2006 the party rebounded further, having its best results since 1988, winning 17.5 percent of the vote and 29 seats. Leaders: Jack LAYTON (Federal Leader), Bill BLAIKIE (Deputy Leader), Libby DAVIES (House Leader), Yvon GODIN (Whip), Judy ´ WASYLYCIA-LEIS (Caucus Chair), Eric ´ HEBERT-DALY (Federal Secretary).

Other Parties Other parties participating unsuccessfully in the January 2006 election included the Animal Alliance Environment Voters Party (AAEV), which, led by Liz WHITE, presented one candidate in a Toronto constituency (72 total votes) and elsewhere often promoted NDP candidates; the Canadian Action Party, which, led by Constance FOGAL, took 0.04 percent of the 2006 vote; the Christian Heritage Party of Canada, led by Ronald O. Gray (0.19 percent); the Communist Party of Canada, which dates from 1921 and is led by Miguel FIGUEROA (0.02 percent); the First Peoples National Party (FPNP), which, under interim leader Barbara WARDLAW, advocates aboriginal rights (0.01 percent); the Green Party of Canada, led by Elizabeth MAY (4.49 percent); the Libertarian Party of Canada, led by Jean-Serge BRISSON (0.02 percent); the Marijuana Party,

led by Blair T. LONGLEY (0.06 percent); the Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada, led by Sandra SMITH (0.06 percent); the Progressive Canadian Party (PC), led by Tracy PARSONS (0.10 percent); and the Western Block Party (WBP), led by Douglas H. CHRISTIE, who also heads the separatist organization Western Canada Concept Party (0.01 percent). An eligible party not participating in the 2006 election was the People’s Political Power Party of Canada, led by Roger Poisson. The Natural Law Party, led by Ashley Deans, voluntarily deregistered as a federal party in 2004. Perhaps of greatest historical significance is the Social Credit Party (Socred), which controlled Alberta from its founding in 1935 until 1971 and which governed British Columbia from 1975 until 1991. It has not been represented at the federal level since 1980.

Regional Parties Quebec Party (Parti Qu´eb´ecois—PQ). The PQ was founded in 1968 by the journalist Ren´e LEVESQUE. Running on a platform of French separatism, it won control of the provincial assembly from the Liberals in the election of November 1976, L´evesque becoming premier. In a referendum held in May 1980, however, it failed to obtain a mandate to enter into “sovereignty-association” talks with the federal government. In April 1981 it increased its majority in the 122-member assembly to 80. In 1985 the party was weakened by the defection of a militant group to form the Democratic Rally for Independence (Rassemblement D´emocratique pour l’Ind´ependance—RDI). In October 1985 Pierre-Marc JOHNSON was sworn in as provincial premier in succession to L´evesque, who was in poor health and whose influence had waned because of divisiveness over the sovereignty issue. However, neither Johnson’s conciliatory posture on federalism nor an emerging conservatism on economic issues averted a crushing defeat in provincial balloting in December, when the PQ obtained only 23 seats to the Liberals’ 99.

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L´evesque died in November 1987. Ten days later, amid a resurgence of pro-independence sentiment, Johnson stepped down as party president. His successor, Jacques PARIZEAU, promised a return to the PQ’s separatist origins, and in provincial elections on September 12, 1994, the PQ won a commanding majority of 77 of the 125 legislative seats. On being inducted as premier, Parizeau pledged that a referendum on the independence question would be held in 1995. The vote on October 30 yielded a margin of less than 1 percent against separation and the resignation of Parizeau as PQ leader and Quebec premier. He was succeeded in January 1996 by Lucien Bouchard, theretofore leader of the federal BQ. The PQ won 75 seats in the provincial election of November 30, 1998, although observers attributed the victory more to the moderate Bouchard’s successes in the economic sphere than to his gradualist approach toward the sovereignty issue. At a party convention in May 2000, 91 percent of the delegates endorsed his leadership. In January 2001, however, a series of developments, including continuing pressure from adamant separatists (many of whom want more stringent French-language laws and less attention to minority rights), led Bouchard to announce his surprise resignation from party and government offices, effective upon designation of a successor. In February Quebec Finance Minister Bernard Landry assumed the party leadership, promising to reinvigorate the separatist cause upon becoming premier in early March. Despite Landry’s pledge, the PQ lost control of the provincial government to the rival Liberal Party of Quebec (Parti Lib´eral du Quebec—PLQ) in the 2003 balloting, securing only 45 of 125 seats. Landry announced in late summer 2004 that he would stay on as leader. However, after a vote on his leadership in June 2005 fell short of the endorsement he was seeking, he was replaced on an interim basis by Louise HAREL and then, in the November leadership election, by Andre BOISCLAIR. Harel stayed on as leader of the opposition in Quebec, because Boisclair did not hold an assembly seat. The PQ’s electoral fortunes declined further in the March 2007 provincial balloting, at which it

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finished third with only 36 seats on a vote share of 28.3 percent and lost its position as official opposition in the province to the ADQ (see below). (The PLQ led all parties with 48 seats to retain control of the provincial government.) Boisclair announced his resignation in May, and he was succeeded in late June by Pauline Marcis, the only announced candidate for the post. Leaders: Pauline MARCIS (Leader), Monique RICHARD (Party President), Fran¸cois REBELLO (First Vice President), Philippe-Edwin ´ BELANGER (Second Vice President), Farouk KARIM (Third Vice President).

Democratic Action of Quebec (Action D´emocratique du Qu´ebec—ADQ). The ADQ’s founding congress took place in March 1994. The party was launched by former Liberals who wanted Quebec to remain within a Canadian confederation but with substantially greater autonomy. It won 6.5 percent of the vote and one seat (taken by its leader) in the September 1994 provincial election, thereafter increasing its opinion poll support to around 15 percent. Its endorsement of the June 1995 PQ–BQ pact on postindependence economic and political links with Canada was accordingly seen as boosting the prospects of a “yes” vote in the planned referendum. By negotiating both sovereignty and “association” (with Canada) as part of the tripartite agreement among the ADQ, the PQ, and the BQ, leader Mario Dumont led the partners to accept a role for Canada in the social and economic development of an independent Quebec. In the provincial election of November 1998, the ADQ almost doubled its share of the popular vote, gaining 11.8 percent, although it still won only one seat. In the 2003 provincial elections the ADQ secured four seats on an 18.2 percent vote share, and it continued to gain strength in the 2007 provincial balloting, at which it finished second with 41 seats on a 30.8 percent vote share and became the official opposition to the PLQ’s minority provincial government. Leaders: Mario DUMONT (Leader), Gilles TAILLON (President).

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Saskatchewan Party (SP). The SP was established in August 1997 and held a leadership election in April 1998 that was won by a former Reform Party MP, Elwin Hermanson. Contesting the provincial election of September 1999 on a platform that called for lower taxes, better health care, and improved highways, the SP finished a surprising second, capturing 26 of the 58 seats in the Legislative Assembly. In the November 2003 provincial balloting the SP improved to 28 seats on a 39 percent vote share. Leaders: Brad WALL (Leader of the Official Opposition and Party Leader), Michelle HUNTER (President). Yukon Party (YP). A newly formed group, the YP won a plurality in Yukon territorial elections on October 19, 1992, thus ousting the NDP from the territorial government. Holding 7 of the 17 seats, it subsequently formed a minority administration under John OSTASHEK. In the 1996 election the party retreated to 3 seats as the NDP surged, while in April 2000 the YP captured only 1 seat in the territorial legislature as the Liberal Party won control. When early elections were called in 2002, voters reportedly angry at having to vote after only two years gave the YP an overwhelming victory with 12 of the 18 legislative seats. Resignations reduced the YP majority to 10 seats as of May 2006. The YP retained its 10-seat majority in the October 2006 territorial elections, followed by the Yukon Liberal Party (5 seats) and the Yukon New Democratic Party (3 seats). Leaders: Denis FENTIE (Premier and Party Leader), Dan MACDONALD (President). Dozens of additional provincial parties exist— more than 30 are officially registered in British Columbia, for example, counting regional branches of national parties—but none currently holds seats in any provincial or territorial legislature.

Legislature Influenced by British precedent (although without its own peerage), Canada’s bicameral

Parliament consists of an appointed Senate and an elected House of Commons. Senate. The upper house consists of individuals appointed to serve until 75 years of age by the governor general and selected, on the advice of the prime minister, along party and geographic lines. Its current and normal size is 105 senators, although under a controversial constitutional provision successfully invoked for the first time by Prime Minister Mulroney in 1990, it can, with the queen’s assent, be increased to no more than 112. Senate reforms remain under consideration. Among other things, Prime Minister Harper has promised to recommend the appointment of senators who have been chosen by unofficial popular referendums in the provinces. In the first action in that regard, Harper in 2007 successfully recommended the appointment of an Albertan who had won a plurality of votes in an election in Alberta in 2004 and had since then been known as a “senator in waiting.” In a September 2007 speech Harper argued that the Senate must be reformed or “vanish.” As of July 1, 2007, the distribution of seats was as follows: the Liberal Party of Canada, 61; the Conservative Party of Canada, 24; the Progressive Conservative Party, 3; the “Independent New Democratic Party,” 1 (although this member claims affiliation with the New Democratic Party [NDP], the NDP does not recognize appointments to the Senate); independents, 4; vacant, 12. Speaker: No¨el KINSELLA. House of Commons. The lower house currently consists of 308 members elected for five-year terms (subject to dissolution) by universal suffrage on the basis of direct representation. In the election on January 23, 2006, the Conservative Party of Canada won 124 seats; the Liberal Party of Canada, 103; the Quebec Bloc, 51; the New Democratic Party, 29; and independents, 1. Speaker: Peter Andrew Stewart MILLIKEN. All of the above are members of the Conservative Party of Canada.

CANADA

Cabinet As of September 1, 2007 Prime Minister

Stephen Harper

Ministers Agriculture and Agri-Food Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency Canadian Heritage and Status of Women Canadian Wheat Board Citizenship and Immigration Democratic Reform Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec Environment Federal Economic Development Initiative for Northern Ontario Finance Fisheries and Oceans Foreign Affairs Health Human Resources and Social Development Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for M´etis and Non-Status Indians Industry Intergovernmental Affairs International Cooperation International Trade Justice and Attorney General La Francophonie and Official Languages Labor National Defense National Revenue Natural Resources Pacific Gateway and the Vancouver-Whistler Olympics Public Safety Public Works and Government Services Transport, Infrastructure, and Communities Veterans Affairs Western Economic Diversification Government Leader in the House Government Leader in the Senate President, Queen’s Privy Council for Canada President, Treasury Board [f] = female Note: All of the above are members of the Conservative Party of Canada.

Gary Ritz Peter Gordon MacKay Jos´ee Verner [f] Gary Ritz Diane Finley [f] Peter Van Loan Jean-Pierre Blackburn John Baird Tony Clement James Michael Flaherty Loyola Hearn Maxime Bernier Tony Clement Monte Solberg Charles Strahl Jim Prentice Rona Ambrose Beverley Oda [f] David Emerson Robert Douglas Nicholson Jos´ee Verner [f] Jean-Pierre Blackburn Peter Gordon McKay Gordon O’Connor Gary Lunn David Emerson Stockwell Day Michael Fortier Lawrence Cannon Gregory Francis Thompson Rona Ambrose [f] Peter Van Loan Marjory LeBreton [f] Rona Ambrose [f] Vic Toews

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Communications News media are free from censorship or other direct government control.

Press Until the start of The National Post in October 1998, there were no national press organs; of the roughly 1,200 newspapers, about 100 are dailies, most of them owned by ten publishing chains. The following are English-language dailies, unless otherwise noted: Toronto Star (Toronto, 441,000 daily, 661,000 Saturday); Globe and Mail (Toronto, 314,000 morning, 395,000 Saturday); Le Journal de Montr´eal (Montreal, 267,000 morning, 325,000 Sunday), in French; National Post (Toronto, 247,000 morning, 270,000 Saturday); Toronto Sun (Toronto, 208,000 morning, 369,000 Sunday); La Presse (Montreal, 190,000 morning, 278,000 Saturday), in French; Vancouver Sun (Vancouver, 180,000 morning, 238,000 Saturday); The Province (Vancouver, 160,000 morning, 196,000 Sunday); The Gazette (Montreal, 144,000 morning, 168,000 Saturday), the oldest Canadian newspaper, founded 1788; Ottawa Citizen (Ottawa, 137,000 morning, 172,000 Saturday); Edmonton Journal (Edmonton, 132,000 morning and Sunday); Winnipeg Free Press (Winnipeg, 119,000 evening, 169,000 Saturday); Calgary Herald (Calgary, 114,000 morning, 126,000 Sunday); The Spectator (Hamilton, 106,000 morning, 123,000 Saturday); London Free Press (London, 92,000 morning, 113,000 Saturday); Financial Post (Toronto, 90,000 morning); Le Soleil (Quebec, 83,000 morning, 117,000 Sunday), in French; Windsor Star (Windsor, 75,000 morning, 85,000 Saturday), Edmonton Sun (Edmonton, 71,000 morning, 99,000 Sunday).

News Agencies In January 1985 the Canadian Press, a cooperative of more than 100 daily newspapers, became Canada’s only wire service after buying out its only competitor, United Press Canada. Numerous foreign agencies maintain offices in the leading cities.

Broadcasting and Computing Radio and television broadcasting is supervised by the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), which was formed by the 1968 Broadcasting Act. The publicly owned Canadian Broadcasting Corporation/Soci´et´e Radio Canada (CBC/SRC) provides domestic radio and television service in English, French, D´en´e, and Inuktitut. Most major television stations not associated with the CBC are affiliated with the CTV Television Network, Ltd., although there are several other smaller services, some emphasizing Frenchlanguage and/or educational programming. As of 2005 there were approximately 679 Internet users and 698 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 525 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Michael WILSON U.S. Ambassador to Canada: David Horton WILKINS Permanent Representative to the UN: John McNEE IGO Memberships (Non-UN): AC, ADB, AfDB, APEC, BIS, CDB, CWTH, EBRD, G-10, G-7/G-8, IADB, IEA, Interpol, IOM, NATO, OAS, OECD, OIF, OSCE, PCA, WCO, WTO

CHILE REPUBLIC

OF

CHILE

Rep u´ blica de Chile

The Country

PERU

BOLIVIA BRAZIL

PA RA

Antofagasta

Y UA G

Occupying a narrow strip along about 2,700 miles of South America’s west coast, the Chilean national territory also includes Easter Island, the Juan Fern´andez Islands, and other smaller Pacific territories. The population is predominantly mestizo (mixed Spanish and Indian) but also includes German, Italian, and other foreign groups. Roman Catholicism, which was disestablished in 1925, is the religion of 85 percent of the people. Women constitute about 33 percent of the paid labor force, a majority in domestic service with the rest concentrated in agriculture, education, and health care. Save during the Allende regime of 1970–1973, when women were prominent both in government and the opposition, female political representation was minimal until 1999, when women were awarded nearly one-third of ministerial appointments. Chile is the world’s leading copper producer, the commodity accounting for more than two-fifths of export earnings, although reserves are expected to be exhausted within 20 years. Other commercially mined minerals and products include gold, silver, coal, and iron. In addition, there are extensive nitrate deposits in the north and some oil reserves in the south. Since World War II, the country has suffered from lagging agricultural production, with a reliance on food imports contributing to record balance-of-payment deficits in the early 1980s. From 1985 to 1997 the economy grew at an average rate of 6.4 percent a year, with deceleration thereafter to –1.1 percent in 1999 before a gradual rise to 6 percent in 2004 and 2005. Inflation, which had

crested at 505 percent in 1974, declined to 2.3 percent in 1999, and then nearly doubled to 4.5 percent in 2000 before falling again to an average of 2.3 percent from 2001 to 2005. According to government sources, inflation rose again to 7.8 percent in 2007, prompting a sharp increase in produce prices. Annual GDP growth of 4.2 percent was recorded in 2006, with growth of about 5.5 percent projected for 2007. As unemployment reached nearly 8 percent, the government in 2007 announced tax cuts and other stimulus measures designed to promote small- and medium-sized businesses.

CHILE PA C IF IC OCEAN

Viña del Mar Valparaíso

Santiago Puente Alto

URUGUAY

Concepción

AT L A N T IC OCEAN

Falkland Is.

(UNITED KINGDOM)

0 0

300 Mi 300 Km

Punta Arenas

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CHILE

Government and Politics Political Background After winning its independence from Spain from 1810 to 1818 under the leadership of Bernardo O’HIGGINS, Chile experienced a period of alternating centralized and federal constitutions. The political struggles between conservative and liberal elements culminated in the civil war of 1829–1830, the conservatives emerging victorious. Conflicts with Peru and Bolivia from 1836 to 1839 and 1879 to 1884 (the War of the Pacific) resulted in territorial expansion at the expense of both. Liberal elements prevailed in the presidential balloting following World War I. The election of Arturo ALESSANDRI Palma in 1920 was a victory for the middle classes, but the reforms he advocated were never implemented because of parliamentary intransigence. Left-right antagonism after World War II occasioned widespread fears for the future of the democratic regime, but the election in 1964 of Eduardo FREI Montalva initially appeared to open the way to fundamental economic and social reforms. The failure of the Frei regime to accomplish these goals led to the election of Salvador ALLENDE Gossens in 1970, Chile thus becoming the first republic in North or South America to choose an avowedly Marxist president by constitutional means. Allende immediately began to implement his openly revolutionary “Popular Unity” program, which included the nationalization of Chile’s principal foreign-owned enterprises, a far-reaching redistribution of social benefits, and the pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. Despite the very real benefits that began to accrue to the lower classes as a result of these and other policies, Allende gradually alienated the middle class, a sizable portion of the legislature, the judiciary, and finally the military. He died (subsequent evidence indicating suicide) during a right-wing coup on September 11, 1973, which resulted initially in rule by a four-man junta. On June 26, 1974, Maj. Gen. Augusto PINOCHET Ugarte was designated head of state, the other junta members assuming subordinate roles.

Proclaimed president on December 17, 1974, Pinochet governed on the basis of unwavering army support, despite widespread domestic and foreign criticism centering on human rights abuses, including the “disappearance,” arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and exiling of opponents. Citing the need for harsh measures to combat communism, the Pinochet regime typically operated under either a state of siege or a somewhat less restrictive state of emergency. In a national referendum on January 4, 1978, Chileans were reported, by a 3-to-1 majority, to have endorsed the policies of the Pinochet government. However, the significance of the poll was lessened by the inability of opposition groups to mount an effective antireferendum campaign. On September 11, 1980, the electorate, by a 2to-1 margin, approved a new constitution designed over a nine-year period that commenced March 11, 1981, to serve as the framework for “slow and gradual evolution” toward a democratic order. In a plebiscite of October 5, 1988, 54.7 percent of the participants rejected a further eight-year term for General Pinochet. As a result, he continued in office only until March 11, 1990, when Patricio AYLWIN Az´ocar, a Christian Democrat who had led a Coalition of Parties for Democracy (Concertati´on de los Partidos por la Democracia—CPD) to a 53.8 percent vote share in presidential balloting on December 14, 1989, was sworn in as his successor. In the general election of December 11, 1993, Eduardo FREI Ruiz-Tagle (Frei Montalva’s son) secured a remarkable 58 percent majority in a field of seven presidential contenders. The CPD was equally successful, retaining its majorities of elected senate and chamber members. However, the coalition failed to gain control of the upper house because of unelected senators named to eight-year terms by the Pinochet administration in 1989. The legislative balance was essentially unchanged after the election of December 11, 1997, with rightist forces continuing to control the senate and the chamber limited to passage of a nonbinding motion “rejecting and repudiating” Pinochet’s scheduled congressional seating, which, preferring to remain as army commander, he subsequently

CHILE

Political Status: Independent republic since 1818; present constitution approved September 11, 1980 (with effect from March 11, 1981), partially superseding military regime instituted in 1973; fully effective as of March 11, 1990. Area: 292,256 sq. mi. (756,945 sq. km.). Population: 15,116,435 (2002C); 16,318,000 (2006E). The 2002 figure lacks an adjustment for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (2005E): SANTIAGO (4,771,000), Puente Alto (602,000), Antofagasta (306,000), Vi˜na del Mar (288,000), Valpara´ıso (260,000), Concepci´on (215,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Peso (market rate November 2, 2007: 497.95 pesos = $1US). President: Michelle BACHELET (Socialist Party of Chile); elected in runoff balloting on January 15, 2006, and inaugurated on March 11 for a four-year term, succeeding Ricardo LAGOS Escobar (Party for Democracy).

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vation (Renovaci´on Nacional—RN) as the dominant component of the opposition alliance. Except for the elimination of nonelective senators, the legislative distribution was relatively unchanged after the election of December 11, 2005. The CPD displayed marginal improvement in the Chamber of Deputies, winning 65 of 120 seats, while retention of its existing 20 seats yielded a majority in the now wholly elective Senate. In the presidential race on December 11, 2005, and runoff balloting on January 15, 2006, Michelle BACHELET of the CPD’s Socialist component outpolled her competitors but failed to win an absolute majority. In runoff balloting on January 15, however, she de˜ feated Sebasti´an PINERA Echenique of the rightwing Alliance for Chile 53.5 percent to 46.5 percent to become the country’s first elected woman president. The cabinet was reshuffled on March 27, 2007, and again on January 8, 2008.

Constitution and Government

deferred until March 1998. In a related action the Communist Party of Chile filed an unsuccessful suit in the Santiago Court of Appeals attempting to block Pinochet’s move to the Senate for having engaged in “genocide, kidnapping, and illegal burying of bodies” during his tenure as president. In the first round of presidential balloting on December 12, 1999, CPD candidate Ricardo LAGOS bested his right-wing opponent, Joaqu´ın LAV´IN Infante, by less than 1 percentage point, necessitating the first runoff in Chilean history. Despite a marginally improved victory in the second round on January 16, Lagos, a former Socialist, faced formidable opposition from a congress whose designated senators contributed to a rightist majority in the upper house. In the legislative election of December 16, 2001, the CPD retained its lower house majority by a greatly reduced margin, while the right-wing Independent Democratic Union (Union Dem´ocrata Independiente—UDI) supplanted National Reno-

The basic law drafted by the former Council of State and adopted by popular vote in September 1980 provided for a directly elected president serving a nonrenewable eight-year term, in the course of which he or she would be permitted one legislative dissolution. It also called for a bicameral National Congress encompassing a Senate of 26 elected and 9 designated members (exclusive of former presidents) and a 120-member Chamber of Deputies sitting eight and four years, respectively, subject to dissolution. In an unusual electoral requirement, political lists or coalitions must double their rivals’ votes to secure both parliamentary seats in any district. In a plebiscite on July 30, 1989, the term of the next president (but not those of his successors) was reduced to four years, and the number of directly elected senators was increased to 38; in addition, the congressional majority needed for constitutional amendment was reduced from threequarters to two-thirds, and the ban on Marxist parties was replaced by a clause calling for “true and responsible political pluralism.” By constitutional

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amendment in January 1994 Congress approved a new presidential term of six years. In November 2004 the presidential term was again reduced, to four years, with simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. The 2004 changes also eliminated life-time seats (thus ensuring that all future senators would be popularly elected) and restored the president’s authority to remove military commanders. The double-your-rival provision was retained, but failing approval in the Senate was a provision calling for the Congress to elect a presidential successor should the incumbent die or become incompetent. In 1975 the country’s 25 historic provinces were grouped into 12 regions plus the metropolitan region of Santiago, each headed by a governor (governador), and were further subdivided into 40 new provinces and more than 300 municipalities, headed by intendents (intendentes) and mayors (alcaldes), respectively.

Foreign Relations Chile has traditionally adhered to a pro-Western foreign policy, save for the Allende era, when contacts with Communist states were strengthened, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba. Concomitantly, Chilean relations with the United States cooled, primarily as a result of the nationalization of U.S. business interests. Following the 1973 coup, relations with the U.S. improved, diplomatic ties with Cuba were severed, and links with other Communist-bloc nations were curtailed. However, the assassination in Washington, D.C., on September 21, 1976, of Orlando LETELIER del Solar, a prominent government official under the Allende regime, became a festering bilateral issue. In May 1979 the Chilean Supreme Court refused a U.S. Justice Department request for the extradition of three army officers who had been charged in the case, including the former chief of the Chilean secret police, and Washington moved to curtail diplomatic, economic, and military relations with Santiago after the Court-ordered closure of investigations into possible criminal charges against the three in Chile. A Chilean court reopened the case in mid-1991, only weeks before expiration of a

statute of limitations, and indictments were subsequently handed down for two of the three men (the third having confessed his involvement after voluntarily surrendering to U.S. authorities in 1987). In January 1992 an international tribunal awarded noncontestable damages of $1.2 million to the Letelier family, plus damages of $815,000 to the family of an aide who had also been killed, while the two officers indicted in Santiago—generals Manuel CONTRERAS Sep´ulveda and Pedro ESPINOZA Bravo—were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms of seven and six years, respectively, in November 1993. In June 1994 Chile’s Supreme Court ruled that a 1978 amnesty law did not apply to the convicted Letelier killers, and on May 30, 1995, the court upheld the convictions. In March 1978 Bolivia severed diplomatic relations with Chile because of its alleged inflexibility in negotiations in regard to Bolivia’s long-sought outlet to the Pacific (see Bolivia: Foreign relations). Further inflaming tensions were two Bolivian military incursions into Chile in May 2004 and Peru’s claim in October 2005 to about 70,000 square miles of ocean controlled by Chile under treaties concluded in 1952 and 1954, which Lima insisted referenced only fishing rights. (In 2008 Peru sued Chile in the International Court of Justice over the unresolved water rights.) In 1992 Lima concluded a treaty with La Paz whereby Bolivia was accorded unrestricted access to two free zones in the Peruvian port of Ilo. A lengthy dispute with Argentina over the ownership of three islands in the Beagle Channel north of Cape Horn was technically resolved in May 1977, when a panel of international arbitrators awarded all three islands to Chile. However, the award was repudiated by Argentina, as it permitted Chile to extend its territorial limits into the Atlantic, thereby strengthening its claims to contested territory in the Antarctic. Mediation initiated by Pope John Paul II in 1981 yielded an agreement in 1984 under which Chile still received the islands but claimed only Pacific Ocean territory, conceding all Atlantic rights to Argentina. In August 1991, presidents Aylwin of Chile and Carlos Menem of Argentina reached accord on all but one of 23 other boundary disputes that had

CHILE

long plagued relations between their countries, but it was not until June 1999 that ratifications were completed on a Continental Glacier Treaty that resolved the last remaining border controversy. At the conclusion of the 1991 state visit to Argentina (the first by a Chilean president in 38 years), Aylwin and Menem also signed a number of accords dealing with investment and transportation, including access to Pacific port facilities for Argentine exporters. During the Summit of the Americas in Miami in December 1994, Chile was invited to become the fourth nation to join the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The action came six months after Santiago had announced that Chile intended to join Mercosur as an associate member, an agreement that was signed on June 25, 1996. Five months later, Chile responded to the effective U.S. obstruction of Chilean membership in NAFTA— the Clinton administration had failed to persuade the U.S. Congress to pursue “fast track” approval— by concluding a bilateral free-trade agreement with NAFTA member Canada, complementing an earlier commercial accord with Mexico. It was not until late 2002 that the pact with the United States was finalized. Tension with Britain arose in October 1998 over the arrest of General Pinochet at a London medical clinic on a Spanish warrant alleging “crimes of genocide and terrorism” against Spanish nationals during his presidency. On October 28 the British High Court quashed the warrant on the ground that Pinochet was entitled to sovereign immunity while serving as head of state. The decision was reversed by the House of Lords on November 25, and on December 9 Chile recalled its ambassador to London. In March 1999 a panel of law lords upheld the legality of Pinochet’s detention, although it ruled that 27 of the 30 charges filed by the Spanish prosecutor were invalid because they involved events before 1988, the year the International Convention Against Torture was implemented in the United Kingdom. After 16 months of house arrest, Pinochet was released on grounds of mental and physical infirmity, and on March 3, 2000, he returned to Santiago to face a variety of domestic charges (see Current Issues, below).

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A recent destabilizing regional factor has been the foreign policy of Venezuela’s President Hugo Ch´avez and its polarizing effect within the CPD government. In 2006, when Venezuela and Guatemala competed for a seat on the UN Security Council, Bachelet initially indicated solidarity with Ch´avez. However, her foreign minister, Christian Democrat Alejandro FOXLEY Rioseco, was very much against the Venezuelan leader. Over time, the Chilean government became less sympathetic to Ch´avez’s “Bolivarianism” and more firm in its defense of market-based, social-democratic policies, as evidenced by Bachelet’s meeting with Mexican president Felipe Calder´on in 2007. While there was sympathy within the more left-leaning parties in the CPD for Ch´avez’s anti-imperialist rhetoric, if not his policies, Chile, along with Brazil, remained uncomfortable with subordinating its foreign policy agenda to Ch´avez’s or turning Mercosur into a larger platform for Ch´avez.

Current Issues At the time of Pinochet’s return to Chile in 2000, more than 100 actions had been filed against him, most on behalf of the more than 3,000 people who had died or disappeared during his tenure. However, his health issue aside, a major hurdle to legal action was Pinochet’s senatorial immunity as an ex-president. Thus, the prosecutor investigating charges against the former dictator applied to have the privilege removed, and in May 2000, contrary to most expectations, the Chilean Court of Appeals complied. Then, in a complicated scenario, the Appeals Court suspended proceedings against Pinochet in July 2001 on the ground that he was suffering from “moderate dementia.” The decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on July 1, 2002, which appeared to void further prosecution by ruling that the dementia was irreversible, and on July 4 Pinochet resigned as senator-for-life. However, in May 2004 the Appeals Court removed Pinochet’s immunity from prosecution, and on December 13 the former dictator was indicted on charges of kidnapping and murder, an action that was upheld by the Supreme Court on January 4, 2005. Further legal proceedings culminated in a Supreme Court

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ruling on December 26 that Pinochet was mentally fit to stand trial. Michelle Bachelet’s presidential victory in January 2006 was attributed to the continued popularity of her CPD predecessor, her success in retaining the support of most of the PDC’s conservative faction, and a rightist split between runner-up Pi˜nera and former contender Joaqu´ın Lav´ın. Earlier, Lav´ın’s UDI had split with Pi˜nera’s RN by refusing to accept constitutional rights for Chile’s indigenous communities. Having campaigned on a pledge that she would govern differently than previous politicians, President Bachelet chose a cabinet equally divided between men and women, raised pensions, increased the number of state-run nurseries, and adopted other progressive policies. However, a public relations disaster erupted in April 2006 when students went on strike over an increase in bus fare. Some 600 students were arrested, and in May an estimated 500,000 protesters demonstrated in Santiago. Bachelet subsequently added $200 million to the education budget. The administration was also heavily criticized for myriad problems in its initiative to modernize the Santiago public transportation system. General Pinochet died on December 10, 2006, and his legacy became the dominant topic of discussion. Though he had always been a polarizing figure, his support among many sectors had waned since inquiries regarding torture and foreign bank accounts appeared in the past six years. Particularly galling for many was evidence that he held some $27 million in foreign accounts under different names. Throughout December, some 65 demonstrations (some in mourning, some in celebration) were held in 25 cities across the country. Nevertheless, scores of protesters, many of them students, clashed with police in the capital in April 2007, during demonstrations against an extensive overhaul of the public transportation system, criticized as inequitable and inefficient. Growing unrest over perceived social inequality resulted in more widespread and violent demonstrations by labor groups in August, despite the president’s apology in May for failing to fix the transportation problem and her pledge to rectify the situation. The

president also promised to reduce the budget surplus by spending more money on education, and in November she signed into law a consensus bill on education reform. Meanwhile, rifts in the CPD began to undermine the governing coalition’s control, as the coalition lost its majority in the lower Chamber of Deputies in 2008 for the first time since Chile’s return to democracy. After a PDC member was expelled in late 2007 for voting against the government on the transportation issue, five PDC members resigned in protest in January 2008, leaving the governing coalition with only 57 of 120 seats. President Bachelet subsequently reshuffled the cabinet on January 8, maintaining a balance among the four parties in the coalition. Observers said the cabinet reorganization was not expected to “herald major changes in government policy.” In early 2008, violence erupted in the Araucania region, where indigenous Mapuche residents had set fire several times to equipment owned by logging and agribusiness firms. The Mapuche claimed that the land being used for commercial purposes belonged to them. Clashes with police followed, killing at least one Mapuche activist. Meanwhile, a non-indigenous woman prisoner staged a 111day hunger strike on behalf of the Mapuche cause, bringing international attention to the claims of disenfranchisement by the Mapuche. The upheaval prompted President Bachelet to create a special commission for indigenous affairs. She also offered prison benefits as a concession to the activist, who then ended her hunger strike for a brief period, reportedly resuming it in early March.

Political Parties and Groups Chile’s traditional multiparty system ran the gamut from extreme right to extreme left, and parties have historically played an important role in the nation’s political life. In the wake of the 1973 coup, however, the military government, declaring party politics to be inappropriate, outlawed those groups that had supported the Allende government and forced the remainder into “indefinite recess.” In 1977, following the alleged discovery of a “subversive plot” by the Christian Democrats, Chile

CHILE

formally dissolved all of the existing parties and confiscated their assets. In the early 1980s, as opposition to the Pinochet regime crystallized, the traditional formations resurfaced, most of them, although still illegal, being tolerated by the government within unstated but generally understood limits. A number of somewhat fluctuating coalitions followed, and in March 1987 legislation was approved that permitted the reregistration of most groups, save those of the far left. A large number of parties contested the postPinochet balloting of December 11, 1989, the principal contenders on the right being the PRN and UDI (below), both of which supported the presi¨ dential candidacy of Hern´an BUCHI Buc against the centrist Coalition of Parties for Democracy (CPD), then a 17-member grouping that endorsed Patricio Aylwin Az´ocar (for more detailed coverage of pre-1990 alignments, see the 1992 Handbook, pp. 147–149). By 1993 the CPD had become the somewhat less inclusive formation referenced below, while the PRN and UDI had joined with the smaller UCCP in the right-wing Union for Progress of Chile (UPC), subsequently the Alliance for Chile (AC). As of 2007 the party system appeared to be moving back to its pre-Pinochet structure with a wide range of ideologies supported by political groups.

Governing Coalition Coalition of Parties for Democracy (Concertaci´on de los Partidos por la Democracia— CPD). The CPD had its origins in the anti-Pinochet Multipartidaria, which was formed in early 1983 and months later became the Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democr´atica—AD). In 1987 the Christian Democratic core of the AD endorsed “singleparty” opposition to the regime that would include right-centrist and moderate-leftist formations, while excluding groups advocating the use of violence. The result was the formation of the CPD, which successfully supported Aylwin Az´ocar’s bid for the presidency in 1989 and was equally successful in backing the 1993 candidacy of Frei RuizTagle.

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The Democratic Left Participation (Participaci´on Democr´atica de Izquierda— PDI), a coalition member formed in 1991 by a group of former Communist Party of Chile human rights activists, was dissolved in November 1994, after having failed to gain the required minimum vote share of 5 percent in the 1993 election. PDI leader Fanny POLLAROLLO joined the Socialist Party of Chile, while PDI secretary general Antonio LEAL joined the Party for Democracy. The CPD won 70 Chamber seats in 1993 and a similar number in 1997, fell to 62 in 2001, and recovered marginally in 2005. Leaders: Michelle BACHELET (President of the Republic), Ricardo LAGOS Escobar and Eduardo FREI Ruiz-Tagle (Former Presidents of the Republic). Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC). Founded in 1957, the PDC is currently Chile’s third-strongest party, although long divided into right-, center-, and left-wing factions. It obtained 39 lower house seats in 1997, 24 in 2001, and 20 in 2005. The PDC reportedly considered leaving the CPD in late 2006 to protest apparent corruption in government ministries. In 2007 party rifts developed, and in January 2008, five PDC deputies resigned their chamber posts in protest over the party’s dismissal in December 2007 of Senator Adolfo ZALDIVAR, who had refused to support financing for the administration’s transportation initiative. Zaldivar also had clashed with other party leaders, most notably Soledad ALVEAR, who replaced him as party president. With chamber representation reduced to 57 seats following the resignations, coupled with resignations from the PPD (below), the CPD was seen as losing significant political influence. Leaders: Soledad ALVEAR (President of the Party), Sergio MICCO (First Vice President), Eduardo FREI Ruiz-Tagle (Former President of the Republic and President of the Senate), Patricio AYLWIN Az´ocar (Former President of the Republic), Andr´es ZALDIVAR Larra´ın (Former President of the Senate), Jaime MULET Mart´ınez.

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Socialist Party of Chile (Partido Socialista de Chile—PS or PSCh). Founded in 1933, the PSCh was long split into a number of factions that reunited in late 1989 under the presidency of Clodomiro ALMEYDA Medina, with Jorge Arrate MacNiven as general secretary. Subsequently, Arrate succeeded Almeyda as president, and yielded the position in November 1991 to Ricardo Nu˜nez. Almeyda died on September 25, 1997. In the run-up to the 2001 congressional poll, the PS split with the PDC in asserting that it would support Communist candidates in two constituencies; however, it subsequently reversed itself and agreed to support CPD nominees. In recent years, the party has been described as becoming more centrist. Leaders: Michelle BACHELET (President of the Republic), Camilo ESCALONA (President of the Party), Ricardo Solari SAAVEDRA (Vice President), Marcelo SCHILLING Rodriguez (Secretary General). Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia—PPD). The PPD was organized in 1987 by a group of Socialist Party dissidents under Ricardo Lagos Escobar, who was succeeded as president by Eric Schnake in mid-1990. The PPD and the PSCh formed a subpact for the June 1992 municipal poll, and both endorsed Lagos Escobar for the presidency in 1993. The PPD was rattled in 2006 by a corruption scandal involving allegations dating back to the Lagos administration. Several prominent leaders subsequently left the party, including former PPD president Jorge SCHAULSOHN, who said there was an “ideology of corruption” within the CPD. The dissidents launched a splinter centrist group, Chile First (Chile Primero), in advance of the 2009 presidential election to promote education and combat poverty (see below). Leaders: Sergio BITAR (President of the Party), Ricardo LAGOS Escobar (Former Pres´ Morales ident of the Republic), Carolina TOHA (Vice President), Pepe Auth STEWART (Secretary General).

Social Democratic Radical Party (Partido Radical Social Dem´ocrata—PRSD). The oldest of Chile’s extant parties, the Radical Party (Partido Radical—PR) was founded in 1863, but appeared, according to the Latin American Weekly Report, to be “headed for extinction” as the result of its extremely poor showing in the 1993 balloting. In an effort to revamp its image, the party adopted its present name in 1994. It increased its chamber representation from two seats to four in 1997, to six in 2001, and to seven in 2005. PRSD president Anselmo SULE Candia died on June 7, 2002. ´ Leaders: Jos´e Antonio GOMEZ (President), Luis ESCOBAR Cerda, Ernesto VELASCO Rodriguez (Secretary General).

Opposition Groups Alliance for Chile (Alianza por Chile—AC). A coalition of Chile’s leading rightist groups, the Alliance was launched before the 1997 election as the Union for Chile (Uni´on por Chile) in emulation of its 1993 predecessor, the Union for the Progress of Chile (Uni´on por el Progreso de Chile—UPC). It adopted its present name in 1999. Leader: Joaqu´ın LAV´IN Infante. National Renovation (Renovaci´on Nacional—RN). The RN, then most commonly referenced as the National Renovation Party (PRN or Parena), was formed in 1987 by merger of the Movement for National Union (Movimiento de Uni´on Nacional—MUN), led by Andr´es Allamand Zavala; the National Labor Front (Frente Nacional del Trabajo—FNT), led by Sergio Onofre Jarpa Reyes; and the UDI (see below), with whom it split over the 1988 plebiscite. Jarpa withdrew as a presidential candidate in August 1989, and the coalition subsequently joined the UDI in supporting the candidacy of Hern´an B¨uchi. The RN’s long-standing support of the military eroded in late 1992 when two of its leaders, Evelyn MATTHEI and Sebasti´an Pi˜nera, were forced to withdraw as presidential hopefuls in the wake of a wiretapping incident involving the army’s telecommunications battalion. Pi˜nera

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subsequently ran in 1993 as an independent, and in 1999 as the candidate of the alliance. Recently the RN has been perceived as separating itself from the legacy of General Pinochet and adopting a more centrist position. In 2005, Pi˜nera, one of the wealthiest men in Chile, lost his presidential bid by a narrow margin in a runoff election with Michelle Bachelet. Leaders: Carlos LARRAIN (President), ˜ Sebasti´an PINERA Echenique (1999 and 2005 presidential candidate), Andr´e ALLAMAND, ´ Cristian MONCKEBERG Brunett, Lily PEREZ (Secretary General).

ident, criticizing the approach of the leading parties as populist, ineffective, and overly encumbered by Chile’s history. Its manifesto emphasized the need to pragmatically address income inequality, access to technology, and Chile’s global competitiveness. Leader: Fernando FLORES.

Independent Democratic Union (Uni´on Dem´ocrata Independiente—UDI). The UDI joined in the formation of Parena but withdrew following the expulsion in April 1988 of its founder, Jaime GUZMAN Err´azuriz, from the coalition leadership. Previously a legal adviser to General Pinochet, Guzman organized a “UDI pour el S´ı ” campaign on Pinochet’s behalf in October 1988. He was assassinated, with the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) claiming responsibility, on April 1, 1991. The UDI won pluralities of 33 chamber and 9 senate seats in the 2005 election, making it the single party holding the most legislative seats. The conspicuous absence of the UDI’s Jaoqu´ın Lav´ın from Pinochet’s funeral in 2006, and his earlier offer to assist president Bachelet with the student strike appeared to reveal an effort by L´avin to move from the right toward the center, possibly with the goal of appealing to Christian Democrats, according to observers. Leaders: Hern´an LARRAIN (President), Andr´es CHADWICK (Vice President), Jovino NOVOA Vasquez, Joaqu´ın LAV´IN Infante (1999 and 2005 presidential candidate), Dario PAYA (Secretary General).

Communist Party of Chile (Partido Comunista de Chile—PCC or PCCh). Founded in 1922 and a participant in the Allende government of 1970–1973, the PCCh was proscribed during the Pinochet era. In January 1990 the party renounced its policy of “armed popular rebellion” and secured legal recognition the following October. Ten months later its (then) president, Volodia Teitelboim, declared that Marxism-Leninism was a “narrow formula” and that the dictatorship of the proletariat was “reductionist.” In 1991 the PCCH was the core party in formation of the Movement of the Allendist Democratic Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Democr´atica Allendista—MIDA). MIDA leader Andr´es Pascal Allende, a nephew of the former president, had led the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR), a quasi-guerrilla organization formed by PCCh elements in the 1960s, before returning secretly from exile in August 1986. MIDA secured a vote share of 6.6 percent in the June 1992 municipal balloting, with its presidential candidate securing only 4.7 percent in 1993. The PCCh ran on its own in 1997, winning four Senate seats. The party secured no congressional representation thereafter. Its former president and 1999 candidate for president of the republic, Gladys MARIN Millie, died in March 2005. Leader: Guillermo TEILLIER (President).

Other Parties Chile First (Chile Primero). Chile Primero is a splinter centrist group launched in 2007 by PPD dissidents, including Senator Fernando FLORES, in advance of the 2009 presidential election. The party planned to present its own candidate for pres-

Wallmapuwen. Wallmapuwen was launched in February 2006 to represent the indigenous Mapuche people located largely in the Araucan´ıa region of southern Chile. Leaders: Pedro Gustavo QUILAQUEO, Pedro ´ Claudio CURIHUENTRO. MARIMAN,

Groupings affiliated with the PCCh following the demise of the MIDA included the Chilean Christian Left Party (Partido Izquierda Cristiana

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CHILE

Cabinet As of February 1, 2008 President

Michelle Bachelet (PS) [f]

Ministers Agriculture Culture Defense Economy Education Energy Environment Finance Foreign Relations Health Housing and Urban Development Interior Justice Labor and Social Welfare Mining National Assets National Service for Women Planning and Cooperation Presidency Public Works Transport and Communications Secretary General of Government

Marigen Hornkohl (PDC) [f] Paulina Urrutia (ind.) [f] Jos´e Go˜ni Carrasco (PPD) Hugo Lavados (PDC) Yasna Provoste Campillay (PDC) [f] Marcelo Tokman (PPD) Ana Lya Uriate (PS) [f] Andr´es Velasco Bra˜nes (ind.) Alejandro Foxley Rioseco (PDC) Maria Soledad Barr´ıa (PS) [f] Patricia Poblete Bennett(PDC) [f] Edmundo Perez Yoma (PDC) Carlos Maldonado Curti (PRSD) Osvaldo Andrade Lara (PS) Santiago Gonzalez (PRSD) Romy Schmidt Crnosija (PPD) [f] Laura Albornoz Pollmann (PDC) [f] Paula Quintana (PS) [f] Jos´e Antonio Viera-Gallo (PS) Sergio Bitar (PPD) Ren´e Cort´azar Sanz (PDC) Francisco Vidal (PPD)

[f] = female

de Chile); the Socialist Alternative Party (Partido Alternativa Socialista); and the New Popular Alliance Party (Partido Nueva Alianza Popular). Humanist Party (Partido Humanista—PH). Formerly a member of the CPD, the PH joined with the Greens (below) in a Humanist-Green Alliance (Alianz Humanista–Verde—AHV) for the 1993 presidential campaign in support of Cr´ısti´an REITZE. It campaigned as an ally of the PCCh in 2005 but secured no congressional representation. Leaders: Efren OSORIO (President), Marilen CABRERA Olmos (Secretary General). The Greens (Los Verdes). The Greens joined their former PH partner in the AHV for the 1993

campaign. They have no current representation. The party reportedly renewed itself as the Ecology Party (Partido Ecologista) in January 2008, with environmentalist Sara Larrain as party president. The party’s stated goal was to be a “distinct alternative.” Leaders: Sara LARRAIN (President of the Party and 1999 presidential candidate), Manuel BAQUEDANO, Isabel LINCOLAO.

Legislature The bicameral National Congress (Congreso Nacional) established under the 1980 constitution encompasses a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies,

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elected for terms of eight and four years, respectively, subject to a one-time presidential right of dissolution. Senate (Senado). The upper house currently consists of 38 directly elected members, with half of the members renewed every four years. The alliance/party distribution of seats following the December 11, 2005, election was as follows: Coalition of Parties for Democracy, 20 (Socialist Party of Chile, 8; Christian Democratic Party, 7; Party for Democracy, 3; Social Democratic Radical Party, 2); Alliance for Chile, 17 (Independent Democratic Union, 9; National Renovation Party, 8); independent, 1. President: Eduardo FREI Ruiz-Tagle. Chamber of Deputies (C´amara de Diputados). The lower house consists of 120 directly elected members. In the most recent election on December 11, 2005, the Coalition of Parties for Democracy won 65 seats (Party for Democracy, 21; Christian Democratic Party, 20; Socialist Party of Chile, 15; Social Democratic Radical Party, 7; allied independents, 2); the Alliance for Chile, 54 (Independent Democratic Union, 33; National Renovation Party, 19; allied independents, 2); independent, 1. President: Patricio WALKER Pietro.

Communications Until 1973 the Chilean news media enjoyed freedom of expression and were among the most active on the South American continent. Subsequently, policies adopted by the military junta severely depleted the ranks of both press and broadcasting facilities while sharply curtailing the freedom of those that remained. Most press restrictions were lifted before the December 1989 balloting, but press offenses have not been decriminalized. According to the watchdog group Reporters Without Borders, five journalists were stoned and beaten by police and three others were arrested during a demonstration in May 2007.

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Press The following are published in Santiago: La Tercera (200,000); Las Ultimas Noticias (150,000 daily, 130,000 Sunday); El Mercurio (120,000 daily, 280,000 Sunday), world’s oldest Spanishlanguage paper (founded 1827), conservative; La Naci´on (45,000), financial; La Segunda (40,000); Qu´e Pasa? (30,000), weekly; Diario Oficial (10,000). El Siglo, a Communist Party fortnightly, claimed a clandestine circulation of 25,000 until September 4, 1989, when it resumed legal publication.

News Agencies The domestic facility is Orbe Servicios Informativos; a number of foreign bureaus, including ANSA, AP, Reuters, TASS, and UPI, maintain offices in Santiago.

Broadcasting and Computing Radio Nacional de Chile is a governmentoperated network; the owners of more than 300 private stations are members of the Asociaci´on de Radiodifusores de Chile (ARCHI). Televisi´on Nacionale de Chile has more than 150 outlets; there also are a number of private facilities. Four of the country’s universities offer noncommercial TV programming. As of 2005 there were approximately 289 Internet users and 148 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 678 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation ´ Ambassador to the U.S.: Mariano FERNANDEZ Amunategui U.S. Ambassador to Chile: Paul SIMONS Permanent Representative to the UN: Heraldo ˜ MUNOZ IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ALADI, APEC, BIS, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

COLOMBIA REPUBLIC

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COLOMBIA

Rep u´ blica de Colombia

Note: Colombian security agents entered Ecuador in pursuit of FARC rebels on March 2, 2008, killing Raul Reyes, a key FARC leader, sparking a regional crisis which threatened to turn violent as Ecuador and Venezuela curtailed diplomatic relations and mobilized troops on Colombia’s borders. While Colombia apologized for the border raid, it maintained its right to pursue individuals whom it believed undermined national security, citing the failure of neighboring governments to control rebels within their borders. The crisis abated following dialogue between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela at the Rio Grupo conference in El Salvador on March 7, during which Venezuela agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Colombia.

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Situated at the base of the Isthmus of Panama, with frontage on both the Caribbean and the Pacific, Colombia is divided geographically into three main regions defined by ranges of the Andes Mountains: a flat coastal area, a highland area, and an area of sparsely settled eastern plains drained by tributaries of the Orinoco and Amazon rivers. In terms of population, Colombia is more diverse than most other Latin American countries. About 75 percent of Colombians are of mixed blood, including both mestizos and mulattoes; ethnically pure (Spanish, Indian, Negro) groups are quite small. Spanish is the language of most people, except for isolated Indian tribes. Women constitute approximately 40 percent of the official labor force, with a substantial additional proportion engaged in unpaid agricultural labor; in the urban sector, women are concentrated in domestic service and informal trading. Overall, female participation in government is minor, although three women held cabinet posts as of mid-2007. Colombia’s economy is diverse and includes large manufacturing, agriculture, and mineral sectors, as well as sizable public and private-service

sectors. Petroleum products, chiefly fuel oil, rank second among official exports, while efforts to develop agricultural alternatives—cotton and sugar,

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COLOMBIA

Political Status: Independent Gran Colombia proclaimed 1819; separate state of New Granada established 1831; republican constitution adopted 1886; bipartisan National Front regime instituted in 1958 but substantially terminated in 1974; current constitution promulgated July 5, 1991. Area: 439,734 sq. mi. (1,138,914 sq. km.). Population: 37,664,711 (1993C); 46,844,000 (2006E). The 1993 figure includes an adjustment for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (urban areas, 2005E): ´ (formerly Bogot´a, SANTAFE´ DE BOGOTA 8,350,000), Medell´ın (3,450,000), Cali (2,700,000), Barranquilla (1,925,000), Cartagena (1,075,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Peso (principal rate November 2, 2007: 2,017.90 pesos = $1US). ´ President: Alvaro URIBE V´elez (Independent); elected May 26, 2002, and inaugurated August 7 for a four-year term, succeeding Andr´es PASTRANA Arango (Conservative Party); reelected May 28, 2006, and inaugurated August 7, 2006, for a second four-year term. Vice President: Francisco SANTOS Calder´on (Independent); elected May 26, 2002, and inaugurated August 7 for a term concurrent with that of the president; reelected May 28, 2006, and inaugurated August 7, 2006, for a term concurrent with that of the president.

in particular—have been partially successful. Coffee, cut flowers, and bananas are the most important agricultural exports. While the 1990s ended with a contraction of the economy, the first decade of the 2000s has seen recovery and growth. GDP has grown steadily since 2001, topping 5.1 percent in 2005, and estimates range from 6.3 to 6.8 percent for 2006; the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects a growth rate of 5.5 percent for 2007. Inflation, which was in the double digits at the start of the decade, slowed to 5.0 percent in 2005 and 4.5 percent in 2006 and was projected to be 4.2 percent in 2007. Unemployment, which was at 20 percent in

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2000, fell to 12 percent in 2005 but was up to 12.8 percent in 2006. Also important, but difficult to quantify in terms of the official economy, is the production and trafficking of drugs including cocaine, heroin, and (to a lesser degree) marijuana.

Government and Politics Political Background Colombia gained its independence from Spain in 1819 as part of the Republic of Gran Colombia, which also included what is now Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. In 1830 Ecuador and Venezuela separated, the remaining territory, New Granada, being designated the Granadan Confederation in 1858, the United States of Colombia under a federal constitution promulgated in 1863, and the Republic of Colombia under a unitary constitution adopted in 1886. Panamanian independence, proclaimed in 1903, was not recognized by Bogot´a until 1909. The critical 19th-century issues of centralism versus federalism and the role of the Catholic Church gave rise to the Liberal (Partido Liberal Colombiano—PL) and Conservative (Partido Conservador Colombiano—PC) parties, which remain critical, if no longer exclusive, determinants of Colombian politics. Relative calm extended from 1903 to the early 1940s, when domestic instability emerged, culminating in a decade (1948–1958) of internal violence (la Violencia) that may have taken as many as 300,000 lives. This period included a coup d’´etat in 1953 that yielded a four-year dictatorship under Gen. Gustavo ROJAS Pinilla. To avert a resumption of full-scale interparty warfare after the fall of Rojas, the two major parties agreed in the so-called Pact of Sitges, concluded in July 1957, to establish a National Front (Frente Nacional) under which they would participate equally in government until 1970. However, the front’s existence was extended to 1974 by a constitutional reform of December 1968 that provided for its gradual dismantling, beginning at the local and subsequently extending to the national level, with the partial exception of the executive

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branch (see Constitution and government, below). Thus Misael PASTRANA Borrero in 1970 was the last president to have won under the National Front rules. The 1970 elections were also noteworthy for the allegations of electoral fraud from supporters of former dictator Rojas, who ran as a dissident Conservative candidate. (The subsequent guerrilla movement known as M-19 [see Political parties, below] took its name from the date of the election— April 19.) Electoral competition for the presidency re´ sumed, in 1974, with Alfonso LOPEZ Michelsen ´ representing the Liberals and lvaro GOMEZ Hurtado representing the Conservatives. L´opez captured 56 percent of the vote, Liberals and Conservatives together securing 90 percent of the legislative seats. The presidential election of June 4, 1978, was much closer, with the Liberal candidate, Dr. Julio C´esar TURBAY Ayala, defeating his Conservative opponent, Dr. Belisario BETANCUR Cuartas, by a paper-thin margin. In view of the outcome, Turbay, adhering to a continuing vestige of the Frente Nacional, awarded 5 of 12 cabinet posts to the Conservatives, with whom a formal leadership pact (opposed by dissident factions within both parties) was concluded in May 1979. In a March 1982 legislative election the Liberals captured a majority of lower house seats; however, an intraparty dispute between orthodox and New Liberalism (Nuevo Liberalismo—NL) factions resulted in the nomination of ex-president L´opez by the former and of Dr. Luis Carlos GALN Sarmiento by the latter for the presidential balloting on May 30. As a result of the Liberal split, Betancur, who had been renominated by the Conservatives, emerged as the victor with 46.8 percent of the valid votes and was inaugurated as the new chief executive on August 7. The Liberal cleavage proved less costly in the legislative balloting of March 7, 1986, the mainstream group securing a majority in both houses. As a result, Gal´an, who had been renominated by the NL, withdrew from the presidential election of May 25, at which Virgilio BARCO Vargas decisively defeated the Conservatives’ 1974 nominee, G´omez.

Gal´an, an unswerving critic of the Medell´ın and Cali drug cartels, resurfaced in 1989 as the Liberals’ leading presidential candidate but was assassinated on August 18. His equally outspoken successor, C´esar GAVIRIA Trujillo, easily defeated G´omez (now running as a candidate of his party, the National Salvation Movement [MSN]) in the May 1990 presidential election, with the official Conservative, Rodrigo LLOREDA Caicedo running fourth behind Antonio NAVARRO Wolff, who had become the candidate of the recently legalized April 19 Movement (M-19, see below) following the assassination of Carlos PIZARRO Le´onG´omez on April 26. While M-19 secured only one seat in the legislative poll of March 11, 1990, it captured second place (only five seats behind the Liberals) at Constituent Assembly balloting on December 9, suggesting that the traditional bipartisan era might have run its course. Subsequently, after six months of debate a new constitution (see below) was adopted and the existing Congress dissolved, with quasi-legislative functions assigned to a presidential advisory commission of 18 members drawn proportionally from the parties represented in the Constituent Assembly. Meanwhile, the drug problem, increasingly involving the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombian (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla groups (see below), drained government resources. The Liberals retained control at legislative and gubernatorial balloting on October 27, 1991, winning majorities in both houses of Congress and capturing 15 of 27 governorships, while leftist parties suffered a major defeat in the legislative poll of March 13, 1994, the voters, in effect, endorsing a return to the historic dominance of Liberals and Conservatives. Subsequently, the narrow victory of the Liberal candidate, Ernesto SAMPER Pizano, in the second-round presidential balloting on June 19, accompanied by a remarkably low voter turnout of only 35 percent, was attributed to the basic similarity of the leading party programs. On December 2, 1993, the head of the Medell´ın drug cartel, Pablo ESCOBAR, who had escaped from confinement in mid-1992 after having

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surrendered to authorities a year earlier, was killed by security forces. President Gaviria immediately proclaimed the “dismemberment” of the Medell´ın group, while indicating that the drug problem would remain, pending destruction of the more sophisticated cartel in the southwestern city of Cali. The latter effort yielded significant results during the first half of 1995. In April Eli´eur RODR´IGUEZ Orejuela, the younger brother of Cali kingpins Gilberto and Miguel RODR´IGUEZ, was arrested; in June Gilberto and Henry LOAIZA Ceballos, the cocaine cartel’s “minister of war,” were apprehended, as was Miguel Rodr´ıguez in early August. However, four months earlier the ruling Liberal Party had been plunged into crisis over alleged links of nine of its legislators to the cartel. On July 27 Santiago MEDINA, the president’s 1994 campaign treasurer, was arrested on charges of having accepted contributions from the Cali drug lords. Accused by Medina of involvement in the affair was Defense Minister Fernando BOTERO Zea, who resigned on August 8 and was arrested a week later amid allegations that Samper himself was aware of the funding source. On August 16, in what some branded as an effort to divert attention from the scandal, Samper declared a “state of internal commotion,” or state of emergency, which was ruled invalid, however, by the Constitutional Court on October 18. In early 1996 public opinion, which had initially supported the president against his accusers, appeared to have turned decisively against him; nonetheless, Samper, benefiting in part from an upsurge in anti-U.S. sentiment over the drug issue, succeeded in rallying a majority of the lower house to his side in late May, thus averting a threat of impeachment. In mid-January 1997 President Samper declared a state of economic emergency, which failed judicial scrutiny a month later. Earlier, it had been reported that guerrilla strength, unlike the trend elsewhere in the region, had risen, by army estimates, to control two-fifths of the country’s municipalities. In the 1998 presidential election the Liberals were badly split between pro- and anti-Samper fac-

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tions, many of the latter supporting the PC nominee, Andr´es PASTRANA Arango, who defeated his Liberal opponent, Horacio SERPA Uribe, by half a million votes in the second-round balloting on June 21. The Liberals, however, retained decisive legislative majorities (56 percent of seats in the Senate and 60 percent in the Chamber of Representatives). Despite the introduction of an ambitious “Plan Colombia,” designed to defeat the drug traffickers with the massive infusion of $1.3 billion in U.S. aid, President Pastrana’s popularity plummeted to a low of 20 percent by September 2000. On October 29, in municipal balloting that was termed a “punishment vote” against the administration, Conservatives won only 2 of 30 gubernatorial races and an equal number of mayoralties in departmental capitals. In the presidential election of May 26, 2002, ´ independent Alvaro URIBE V´elez, with Conservative support, easily defeated the Liberals’ official candidate, Serpa Uribe. A hard-liner, Uribe V´elez benefited from his predecessor’s failed efforts at negotiating an end to the country’s 30 years of internal conflict. Earlier, on March 10, both of the traditional parties were outpolled in legislative balloting by an unprecedented aggregate of minor candidates, although most legislators declared their support for the new chief executive. Uribe’s efforts to end both rightist and leftist insurgencies (including the passage of a “justice and peace” law in 2005 establishing the conditions for demobilizing the country’s insurgents), yielded unusually high approval ratings during the ensuing three years, paving the way for a reelection bid in May 2006. In 2006 the two leading left-of-center parties announced that they would merge to form an Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democr´atico Alternativo—PDA, see under Political parties, below) to contest the legislative and presidential elections. The legislative elections on March 12, 2006, gave the Liberal Party, in opposition to President Uribe along with the PDA, a small plurality, but ultimately a majority of seats once more was won by an aggregate of parties and candidates allied with the president. In first-round presidential balloting

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on May 28, Uribe won reelection by winning 62 percent of vote (with 45 percent voter turnout), well above the 50 percent necessary to avoid a second-round runoff. Sen. Carlos Gaviria of the PDA placed second with 22 percent of the vote. Liberal candidate Horatio Serpa Uribe placed third with 11.8 percent. None of the other four candidates won more than 1 percent.

Constitution and Government The 1886 constitution, one of the world’s oldest, had been extensively revised before its replacement in 1991. The most notable amendment had been that of 1957, which instituted the Frente Nacional, under which the presidency alternated between Liberals and Conservatives, with equal numbers of offices held by members of the two parties. The parity rule also applied to the legislative and judicial branches until 1974, when a new president and all legislative bodies were elected on a nonrestrictive basis. The rule continued for local, departmental, and national executive offices until 1978, after which the president was mandated to name members of the leading nonpresidential party to administrative positions on an “equitable basis.” Most notable among the 1991 reforms were changes affecting Congress and the judiciary. The Senate was reduced from 114 seats to 102 (including 2 for indigenous communities), with senators elected nationally rather than by department. The Chamber of Representatives was reduced from 199 members to 161, each department or territory electing at least 2 representatives, with additional seats allotted on a population basis. In addition, up to 5 special seats could be assigned to minority groups or citizens living abroad. The earlier Napoleonic judicial system was supplanted by an essentially accusatory U.S. system. An office of general prosecutor (fiscal´ıa general) was established to investigate and charge offenders; in addition, a people’s defender (defensor del pueblo) must oversee the fiscal´ıa and ensure the protection of human rights, while a judicial council (consejo de judicatura) reviews the professional qualifications of the judiciary. Finally, a corte con-

stitucional interprets the constitution, leaving to the Supreme Court the sole responsibility of serving as the highest court of appeal. In October 2003 a referendum on a number of constitutional reforms sought by President Uribe (including a further reduction in the number of legislative seats) failed because the electoral turnout fell short of a mandated 25 percent. In December 2004, however, Congress gave formal approval to an amendment permitting presidential reelection, which was affirmed by the Constitutional Court in late 2005 (procedural issues had been raised). Another significant reform that came into effect in 2006 required political parties to offer only one list of candidates per office. Before 2006 parties could offer as many lists as they wanted, which created a structural advantage to the larger parties, especially the Liberal Party (see below). The new rules benefited newer parties in the 2006 legislative elections. Colombia is divided into 32 departments plus the Federal District of Santaf´e de Bogot´a. Before 1991 there were 23 departments and 9 national territories, but the 1991 constitutional reforms converted the territories into departments. Since 1991 the governors of the departments have been popularly elected. (The president had appointed the governors under the 1886 constitution.) Reform in 1988 allowed for the popular election of mayors (akin to county administrators in all but large urban areas).

Foreign Relations Apart from cooperation with the United States in attempts to limit the drug trade, Colombia’s activity on the international scene has recently centered on regional affairs. An active member of the Andean Pact, Colombia in 1976 became the first Latin American country to forgo all U.S. economic assistance. Relations with Nicaragua, already strained because of deportations of Colombian migrant workers, were further exacerbated in late 1979 by Managua’s decision to revive a series of long-standing claims to the Caribbean islands of San Andr´es and Providencia, both acquired by

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Colombia under a 1928 treaty, and the uninhabited cays of Quita Sue˜no, Roncador, Serrana, and Serranilla, which were assigned to Colombia under a 1972 agreement with the United States. In February 1980 Nicaragua formally denounced the 1928 accord as having been concluded under U.S. military occupation, while arguing that the cays were located on its continental shelf and thus constituted part of its national territory. (Honduras, which had also been a party to the dispute, recognized Colombia’s claim to the islands in an accord concluded in August 1986 but not ratified by the Colombian Congress until December 1999.) Since 1979 relations with Venezuela, the country’s northeastern neighbor, have also been strained because of a dispute involving the maritime boundary through the Gulf of Venezuela; little progress was registered in resolving the latter until February 1989, when the two parties agreed to the appointment of a Conciliation Commission chaired by former Spanish prime minister Adolfo Su´arez. Two years earlier talks had been initiated on issues involving contraband trade and the containment of guerrilla activity along their common border. The problem intensified in February 1995 as the result of a cross-border raid by guerrillas of the ELN that resulted in the death of eight Venezuelan marines. President Samper then proposed that a joint force be created to patrol the area while rejecting Venezuela’s claim to a right of “hot pursuit” of intruders. In November, following an incursion of Venezuelan troops into Colombia, the two countries announced the appointment of a bilateral commission to delineate the border more accurately as a means of preventing the recurrence of such incidents. In a subsequent flare-up, Venezuela closed the border to heavy goods shipments in May 1999 because of alleged unfair competition from Colombian truckers. More recently, Bogot´a lodged a diplomatic protest in mid-2002 over a Venezuelan plan to auction offshore oil leases in waters claimed by Colombia, while border issues continued to disrupt relations into 2005. A serious row with Venezuela erupted in late 2004 with the kidnapping in Caracas of FARC “foreign minister” Rodrigo GRANDA (a.k.a.

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Ricardo GONZALEZ), who was transported to the border and handed over to Colombian agents. In mid-January 2005, after Venezuela had threatened to break relations, Colombia admitted that it had paid bounty hunters for the abduction. Relations with Venezuela remain strained, including the withdrawal of Venezuela from the Andean Community (CAN—see separate entry) over, among other things, a free trade pact negotiated between Colombia and the United States. Relations improved in 2007 when Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez visited President Uribe in Bogot´a on August 31, 2007, with an offer to mediate negotiations with the FARC for a release of hostages (see Current issues, below). Relations with the United States have long been shaped by the drug issue. On balance, Colombian administrations have been cooperative with Washington on this subject, with the Uribe administration being perhaps the most cooperative ever. If Uribe is the high point of U.S.-Colombian relations, then the Samper administration (1994–1998) was the low point. In mid-1996 Washington announced the cancellation of Samper’s U.S. visa as the result of accusation of linkages between Samper and the Cali Cartel; four months earlier the administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton had “decertified” Colombia for insufficient antidrug efforts, an action that was repeated in February 1997, despite ongoing cooperation between the two countries’ military establishments. The United States continued to be displeased by the Colombian Congress’s final vote in November 1997 on revocation of its ban on extradition; while the change was approved, it was made nonretroactive, thus precluding the extradition of Cali cartel kingpins for trial in U.S. courts. Extraditions (the first in nearly a decade) were resumed in late 1999 as the U.S. Congress moved to approve a $1.36 billion antidrug package. Under the Uribe administration extradition of drug traffickers has resumed. On August 30, 2000, Clinton strongly endorsed President Pastrana’s commitment to coca eradication in a one-day visit to Cartagena. On November 22, 2004, President George W. Bush also visited Colombia, where he praised Uribe’s anti-insurgent efforts and indicated that he

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would ask the U.S. Congress to augment the more than $3.3 billion spent from 2000 to 2004 with additional funding to eradicate coca production. Bush returned in 2007 becoming the first U.S. president to visit Bogot´a since Ronald Reagan did so in 1982. The Bush administration signed a bilateral free trade pact with Colombia in November 2006 (the United States is Colombia’s largest trading partner), along with similar agreements with Colombia’s Andean neighbors, Peru and Panama. President Uribe in turn visited Washington, D.C., in May 2007 to lobby the U.S. Senate for ratification of the United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement and for the release of $55 million in frozen U.S. aid to Colombia. The Colombian government sought additional funding for a phase II of Plan Colombia that would focus more on economic development. Both actions were tabled by congressional leaders pending action from the Uribe government to quell internal violence and to advance investigations into the murder of Colombian trade union leaders by right-wing paramilitary forces. Colombia is currently the fifth-largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid.

Current Issues Recent years have witnessed a three-cornered struggle among government, far-right paramilitary groups, and left-wing armed forces, the last two having largely abandoned ideology in a contest over control of the drug trade. Following his inauguration on August 7, 2002, President Uribe moved energetically to counter the insurgencies that had plagued his predecessors (see Political Handbook of the World 2007), albeit with somewhat greater success in right-wing, rather than left-wing, demobilization. In December 2002 the main components of the rightist paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia—AUC, see Rebel and Clandestine Groups, below) agreed to demobilize within a year, although they did not begin to do so until November 2004. The process commenced after three paramilitary leaders had

been granted safe-conduct passes for a remarkable appearance before Congress to plead their “irreversible mission of peace.” However, progress in implementing complete AUC demilitarization remained elusive until 2006–2007. In his campaign against the left-wing guerrilla group FARC, Uribe launched a number of strategies, including a “humanitarian” exchange of prisoners, the pardoning of noncriminal imprisoned guerrillas, and the withholding of extradition to the United States of drug traffickers who agreed to participate in a “social reinsertion” program. Meanwhile, with abductions and murders significantly reduced, drug seizures multiplying, and the economy improving, Uribe continued to be accorded a remarkable approval rating of between 70 and 80 percent—the highest of any Latin American leader—on the strength of his justice and peace law and internal “democratic security” policies. Increasingly, however, there were concerns about the personal safely of a chief executive who had theretofore survived at least 13 assassination attempts. By early 2006 President Uribe had been cleared for a reelection bid, and exploratory disarmament talks had been launched with ELN representatives in Havana, Cuba, while France, Spain, and Switzerland had offered to broker similar talks with the FARC. However, FARC leaders were unresponsive, and the extent of AUC demobilization was unclear. Nonetheless, the March 2006 legislative elections gave the pro-Uribe parties a majority of seats in the Congress, a strong signal that Uribe would win reelection. In peaceful first-round balloting on May 28, 2006, Uribe won convincingly—the first time an incumbent Colombian president had been reelected in more than a century. Some observers attributed the win to the surging economy and Uribe’s partial success in curbing the violence and crime that has long plagued the nation. The most significant challenge at the beginning of Uribe’s second term was the political fallout from the “parapol´ıtca” situation that focused public attention on the connection of the right-wing paramilitaries to mainstream politicians. While there had been accusations in the past of collusion

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between mainstream politicians and paramilitaries, the recent public revelations from a laptop computer owned by former paramilitary leader Rodrigo Tovar Pupo (a.k.a. “Jorge 40”, leader of the Northern Bloc paramilitary group) and the public confessions of Salvatore MANCUSO G´omez (former leader of the AUC) led to dramatic evidence of electoral manipulation and intimidation in Colombian departments where the right-wing paramilitaries, with their drug trafficking and death squad activities apparent to all Colombians, have long operated freely. Mancuso’s revealing testimony, given under arrangements for leniency under the justice and peace law, brought to light the existence of a political agreement signed by AUC leaders and nearly 30 legislators in Santa Fe de Ralito in July 2001 (the “Ralito pact”). In that pact AUC leaders and politicians pledged to cooperate closely in “constructing a new Colombia” by “refounding our country and signing a new social contract” and working to “restore order.” The existence of the agreement, signed by some members of the new Congress, shed more light on the paramilitary groups’ project to extend their control into the Congress during the 2002 legislative elections, in part to make it easier to pass legislation to ban extradition of drug kingpins, thus giving them more insulation from international efforts to dismantle the Colombian nacrosyndicates. Both sources also confirmed long-held suspicions that military leaders and police were cooperating with the right-wing paramilitaries against the left-wing armed groups and leftist political enemies. By late September 2007 the scandal resulted in the supreme court launching an investigation of 113 national and departmental politicians and the arrest of more than 50 politicians, including 15 sitting members of the Congress. The most ´ high-profile arrest was that of Senator Alvaro ´ ARAUJO Castro and his father (an ex-senator) ´ ´ Alvaro ARAUJO Noguera—the brother and father respectively of the Foreign Minister Maria Con´ suelo ARAUJO, who resigned her post in March of 2007 in the wake of the scandal. Also arrested was Jorge NOGUERA, the former head of the Colombian secret police and internal security apparatus,

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who after signing the Ralito pact, was alleged to have supplied the AUC with the names of leftwing activists, including trade union leaders and human rights activists, who were later murdered by paramilitaries. A leaked U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report also implicated Gen. Mario Montoya, the commander of the Colombian army, alleging extensive collaboration between Montoya and AUC leaders in operations against FARC. In a move that international observers and domestic critics and supporters alike found puzzling, President Uribe on May 25, 2007, unilaterally offered to release hundreds of FARC prisoners (setting June 7 as the release date); his expressed goal was to facilitate the release of hostages held by FARC, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and a dozen deputies from the Valle departmental legislature. This sudden move represented a dramatic shift from Uribe’s previous strategy of pursuing a military solution to the left-wing insurgency. Some observers viewed the move as a cynical ploy to distract attention away from the parapolitical scandal, while others viewed it as intended to bolster Colombia’s human rights record in the eyes of the U.S. Congress to help secure ratification of the free trade pact. Uribe may also have been seeking either to force the FARC to engage in humanitarian exchanges, or, by refusing a reciprocal hostage release, to put FARC on the defensive, thus rendering renewed government military operations more legitimate. Uribe’s gesture also appeared to be motivated by a desire to appease the newly elected French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who stepped into the conflict to seek the release of Betancourt, a dual citizen of Colombia and France, via an exchange rather than by military force. At Sarkozy’s suggestion, Uribe included in the first release of prisoners the FARC “foreign minister” Rodrigo Granda, who had been seized by bounty hunters in Venezuela and delivered to Colombian authorities in 2004 (see Foreign relations, above). The unilateral release of several dozen FARC insurgents did not inspire reciprocity, however, as FARC spokesperson Raul Reyes tied a release of the 50– 45 “exchangeable” hostages to its long-standing

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condition for peace: the creation of a demilitarized zone (despeje) in the southwestern region of Valle department centered on the towns of Pradera and Florida. The situation became grim when 11 of the 12 Valle deputies held hostage by FARC were reported killed after an armed attack on a FARC position by an unidentified group or force on June 18. The FARC claimed the 11 were victims of crossfire during the attack; the government claimed the FARC shot the captives to prevent their escape. Public reaction to the killings was massive: nearly 1 million Colombians demonstrated across the country against the killings on July 5. In August 2007 President Uribe met with the father of a hostage held by FARC in a public event in the main square of Bogot´a, following the man’s 46-day and 500-mile walk seeking his son’s release. After the encounter, which was broadcast across Colombia, Uribe repeated his refusal to grant FARC’s demands for a demilitarized zone or the return and release of FARC leaders extradited to the United States, but he offered to create a 90-day encounter zone for a hostage release as a compromise gesture, which the FARC subsequently rejected. Meanwhile, the government moved to purge some military and top police officials in July and August 2007 after revelations that the highest military echelons had been compromised by both drug traffickers with links to right-wing paramilitaries as well as by FARC, and that the police had been illegally wiretapping suspects, prisoners, politicians, and journalists for more than two years. Soon after the military purges the government was able to seize Diego Montoya, a high-profile fugitive who headed Norte del Valle, one of the country’s largest drug syndicates, in a highly publicized military operation in September. In another surprising development in the FARC prisoner exchange situation, President Uribe accepted Venezuelan President Ch´avez’s offer in midAugust to mediate talks between the government and FARC, and Uribe even extended the invitation to include the stalled negotiations with the ELN in Cuba over a ceasefire. Ch´avez’s participation brought a new dynamic to the peace process: He was respected by the FARC and the ELN leader-

ship, and his high profile in the region put pressure on FARC to show some flexibility over the conditions for a prisoner exchange. The August 31 summit between Ch´avez and Uribe in Bogot´a ranged beyond the FARC mediation to include the possibility of Venezuela rejoining CAN. Subsequent to the summit, Uribe gave permission for a senior FARC leader to travel to Caracas to meet with Ch´avez, but Uribe declined Ch´avez’s offer in September to travel to the Colombian jungle to meet with FARC leaders in their own backyard. (See headnote.) Regional elections were scheduled for October 28, 2007; 16 political parties and more than 240 citizens’ movements had registered to field candidates for governor, deputy, and mayor across the 32 departments.

Political Parties The Liberal and Conservative parties have traditionally dominated Colombian politics and from 1958 to 1974 shared power under the National Front system, with the leading minority group remaining entitled to representation in the executive branch until adoption of the 1991 constitution. The Conservatives have been waning since the early 1990s and the Liberals, once thought to be a permanent majority party, have seen their electoral fortunes diminish in recent cycles and now are part of the opposition countering the various parties and factions that make up the “uribistas” in support of the Uribe government. The party system is currently in a state of evolution.

Government–Supportive Parties Social Party of National Unity (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional—PSUN) or, as more commonly referenced, the Party of the U (Partido de la U). PSUN is a new pro-Uribe party formed of former members of the PL and miscellaneous small parties. The party’s 2006 legislative results changed the balance of power in Congress as the PSUN candidates won 30 seats in the Chamber on a national vote share of 16.7 percent (making them the second largest voting bloc in the lower house and the

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largest bloc of votes supporting the Uribe government) and won the plurality of seats in the Senate in 2006 (20 seats and 17.5 percent of the vote), thus disrupting the usual balance of power amongst the traditional rivals, the PL and the PC. Leaders: Carlos GARC´IA Orjuela (President), Luis GUILLERMO Giraldo (Secretary General). Colombian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Colombiano—PC). A traditional party formerly based in the agrarian aristocracy, the Partido Conservador was long divided between National Front conservatives and an independent faction composed of followers of the late president Laureano G´omez. The essentials of the split continued until November 1981, when the ospina-pastranistas, led by Dr. Misael Pastrana Borrero (president, 1970–1974), concluded an ´ agreement with the alvaristas, led by Dr. Alvaro G´omez Hurtado (unsuccessful 1974 candidate) that set the stage for the 1982 upset victory of Dr. Belisario Betancur Cuartas, a party moderate who had failed in a challenge to National Front candidate Pastrana in 1970. In 1986 Dr. G´omez Hurtado was presented as the Conservative nominee but was decisively beaten by the PL’s Barco, in part because of close association with his dictatorial father, Laureano, during the period of la Violencia. For the 1990 campaign the party was again split, the official candidate, Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, being outpaced by G´omez Hurtado, who, as candidate of a dissident National Salvation Movement (Movimiento de Salvaci´on Nacional—MSN), was decisively defeated by the PL’s Gaviria Trujillo in the May balloting. (From 1987 to 1992 the party operated under the name Social Conservative Party [Partido Social Conservador—PSC], although it then reverted back to the PC rubric.) In 1994 Andr´es Pastrana Arango (running as an independent with PC endorsement) lost to the PL’s Samper Pizano by a mere 0.8 percent of the second-round vote. Before accepting the PC nomination, Pastrana Arango, a former mayor of Bogot´a, headed a dissident conservative group, the New Democratic Force (Nueva Fuerza Democr´atica—NFD), which secured eight Senate seats in 1991 (only one less than the mainline PC) but only one upper house

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seat in 1998. Pastrana defeated the PL’s Horatio Serpa Uribe in second-round presidential balloting on June 21, 1998. For the 2002 campaign a largely disoriented PC endorsed the former Lib´ eral, Alvaro Uribe, for president (after their candidate withdrew from the contest). Carlos HOLGUIN Sardi resigned as PC president following his party’s poor showing in the March legislative poll. Following the March 2006 legislative elections the PC secured 29 seats in the Chamber of Representatives with a 15.8 percent national vote share and had 18 seats in the Senate with 16 percent of the vote. Leaders: Efra´ın Jos´e CEPEDA Sarabia (President), Myriam Alicia PAREDES Aguir and Ciro RAM´IREZ Pinz´on (Vice Presidents), Benjam´ın HIGUITA Rivera (Secretary General). Radical Change (Partido Cambio Radical— CR). Founded in 1997 by a group primarily made up of dissident Liberals, the party supported Uribe in the 2002 election and in 2006 became one of several medium-sized parties to form a pro-Uribe legislative bloc. The CR’s platform emphasizes commitments to democracy, security, and economic fairness and progress for Colombians while promoting social policies that seek enhanced income and health security, land reform, transportation improvements, and support for education. The party also puts government transparency, decentralization, and greater independence for the judiciary as top priorities for public-sector reform. Its electoral strength is concentrated around Bogot´a and the departments of Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Valle, Boyac´a, and Tolima. The CR secured 20 Chamber seats and a 10.7 percent vote share in the 2006 legislative elections, which combined with its 15 seats in the Senate (13.4 percent of the vote) made the CR the fourthlargest bloc in both the upper and lower houses. Leaders: Germ´an VARGAS Lleras (President), ´ Antonio ALVAREZ Lleras (General Secretary), Federico ECHAVARR´IA Olarte (Supervisor). Citizens’ Convergence Party (Partido Convergencia Ciudadana—CC). Formed in 1997 by Luis Alberto Gil Castillo (former teacher’s union

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leader and M-19 member) and Jairo C´espedes Camacho, this leftist party’s strength lies in the Santander department, where it was founded. In the 2006 legislative elections the CC secured a 4.6 percent share of the national vote and eight seats in the lower house; the party won seven seats in the Senate with 6.3 percent of the vote. Leaders: Luis Alberto GIL Castillo (President), Miguel Jes´us ARENAS Prada (Vice President), ´ Jairo CESPEDES Camacho (Secretary General), ´ Edgar ESP´INDOLA Ni˜no. Wings–Team Colombia Movement (Movimiento Alas–Equipo Colombia—MAEC). The party formed in anticipation of the 2006 elections from the merger of Partido ALAS and the Movimiento Equipo Colombia, the later of which first contested national elections in 2002. The party’s ideological orientation follows the outlines of Christian social democracy parties elsewhere, emphasizing divinity, human rights, social unity and the sanctity of the family unit, and a mixedmarket economy with concern over fair and sustainable socioeconomic development. In the 2006 legislative elections MAEC received 4.3 percent of the national vote, securing eight seats in the Chamber of Representatives and five seats in the Senate (4.7 vote percentage), both blocs ranking MAEC seventh in the respective chambers. Leaders: Jaime ARIAS Ram´ırez (President), Luis Alfredo RAMOS Botero (Director), Javier PINILLA Palacio (Secretary General).

Opposition Parties Colombian Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Colombiano—PL). A traditional party that tends to reflect the interests of the more commercialized and industrialized sector of the electorate, the PL (not abbreviated as PLC) has endorsed moderately paced economic and social reform (and has observer status in the Socialist International). In May 1979, following the conclusion of a sevenpoint agreement between the majority (Grupo de los 90) faction headed by President Turbay Ayala and the Conservative Party leadership, a formal opposition movement, the Uni´on Liberal Popular

(ULP), was launched within the party, with the dissident Democratizaci´on Liberal faction of former president Lleras Restrepo at its center. At a party convention in September 1981, former chief executive L´opez Michelsen was designated Liberal candidate for the presidency in 1982, as a result of which his archrival, Lleras Restrepo, and another former president, Alfonso Lleras Camargo, threw their weight to an independent center´ left campaign launched by Dr. Luis Carlos GALAN Sarmiento of the then newly organized New Liberalism (Nuevo Liberalismo—NL). Running on a platform that called for abandonment of the de facto two-party system and of the constitutional provision permitting ex-presidents to seek reelection after only four years out of office, Gal´an drew enough Liberal votes from L´opez Michelsen to throw the May presidential election to the Conservative candidate, Belisario Betancur. For the 1986 campaign the mainstream leadership, including the still-influential Lleras Camargo, joined in supporting the former mayor of Bogot´a, Virgilio Barco Vargas, a political centrist, whose capture of the presidency on May 25 was preceded by a PL victory in the legislative poll of March 9. Having fared poorly in the 1986 legislative balloting, the NL reentered the parent party in mid-1988 to bolster support for President Virgilio Barco. Gal´an Sarmiento, who had emerged as the leading Liberal candidate for the presidency in 1990, was assassinated on August 18, 1989. Subsequently, at an unprecedented primary poll conducted in conjunction with legislative and municipal balloting on March 11, 1990, C´esar Gaviria Trujillo was formally selected as the new PL nominee and went on to defeat his closest competitor, Conservative dissident G´omez Hurtado, by a near two-to-one margin. In the legislative and gubernatorial elections of October 27, 1991, the Liberals retained their majorities in both houses of Congress. In April 1992 L´opez Michelsen resigned as party leader, ushering in a period of factional infighting that yielded four leadership changes in as many months. The PL’s presidential candidate in 1994, Ernesto Samper Pizano, was from the Nuevo Liberalismo,

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while his running mate was drawn from the party’s right wing. Although outpolling the Conservatives by a more than two-to-one margin in firstround balloting on March 8, 1998, the PL’s Horatio Serpa Uribe lost the presidency to the independent (and PC-endorsed) candidate Andr´es Pastrana in second-round balloting on June 21. Returning as his party’s nominee in 2002, Serpa Uribe ran ´ second to Alvaro Uribe V´elez, a former PL conservative. In 2006 Serpa was again the PL presidential nominee and came in third behind President Uribe and the PDA candidate, Carlos Gaviria D´ıaz. Serpa polled less than 12 percent in the election—easily the worst showing by a Liberal candidate in the modern era. The PL won a plurality in the legislative elections, however, with 35 seats in the Chamber of Representatives and a national vote share of 19 percent. It tied with the longtime rival PC for second-largest bloc of Senate seats at 18 seats with 15.5 percent of the votes. In the parapolitical scandals that surfaced after the elections, Juan Manuel L´opez, a Liberal senator from C´ordoba, was identified as one of the politicians who signed the pact of Railto with the AUC. After meeting with Liberal leader C´esar Gaviria, L´opez distanced himself from the party in 2007. C´esar Gaviria was reelected party director with 80 percent of the party delegate votes at a May 2007 party conference. Leaders: C´esar GAVIRIA Trujillo (Director and Former President of the Republic), Jose Noe RIOS Mu˜noz (Secretary General), Horacio SERPA Uribe (1998, 2002, and 2006 presidential candidate), ´ Ernesto SAMPER Pizano, Dr. Alfonso LOPEZ Michelsen, (Former President of the Republic), Hernando DURAN Luss´an, Miguel PINEDO. Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democr´atico Alternativo—PDA). The left-of-center PDA was launched in late 2005 by merger of the Independent Democratic Pole (Polo Democr´atico Independiente—PDI) and the Democratic Alternative (Alternativa Democr´atica—AD) and contains elements of a number of far-left parties like the Communist Party of Colombia

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(Partido Comunista de Colombia—PCC) and the Independent and Revolutionary Labor Movement (Movimiento Obrero Independente y Revolucionario—MOIR). Consisting largely of M-19 dissidents, the PDI had been formed in July 2003 by Luis Eduardo (“Lucho”) GARZON, who argued that President Uribe’s policy of “democratic security” had accorded the emphasis to the second component of the slogan to the detriment of the first and in 2004 was elected as the first leftist mayor of Bogot´a. The AD had been organized in November 2003 by a group of minor left-wing parties equally opposed to the president’s policies. The PDA won 10 Senate with 9.7 percent of the vote and eight Chamber seats in 2006 on the strength of 8.2 percent of the national vote. The PDA presidential nominee Carlos Gaviria D´ıaz placed second in the national presidential balloting. Its electoral strength primarily comes from Bogot´a and the more populous coastal and northern departments. As the parapolitics scandal reached its zenith in March and April of 2007, PDA senator (and former M-19 member, see below) Gustavo Petro launched a rheotical attack on President Uribe, attempting to tie Uribe to the paramilitaries in his activities as governor and later as president. Petro also drew attention when he criticized the PDA leadership in July for not being more openly critical of the FARC, especially in the wake of the deaths of the 11 provential deputies held hostage by FARC. Petro’s remarks drew the ire of the party’s leadership, who met to consider sanctioning him, and abstained from any public defense of his remarks. Leaders: Samuel MORENO Rojas (President), Antonio NAVARRO Wolff (General Secretary), Carlos GAVIRIA D´ıaz (2006 presidential candidate).

Other Legislative Parties Smaller parties receiving less than 3 percent of the vote for either house but nonetheless gaining legislative representation in 2006 included

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the Afro-Colombian Social Alliance (Movimiento Alianza Social Afrocolombiana—ASA), led by Josefina VILLARREAL Sanchez; the “Afrounincca” Political Movcement (Movimiento Pol´ıtico “Afrounincca”); the Democratic Colombia Party (Partido Colombia Dem´ocrata—PCD), led by Mario URIBE Escobar (a cousin of President Uribe); For the Country of Our Dreams (Por el Pais que So˜namos—PePqS), led by Enrique ˜ PENALOSA Londo˜no; the Green Party Center Option (Partido Verde Opci´on Centro—OC), led by H´ector El´ıas PINEDA Salazar; the Huila New and Liberalism (Huila Nueva y Liberalism— HNL), a regional party from Huila department; the Indigenous Authorities of Columbia Movement (Movimiento Autoridades Ind´ıgenas ˜ de Colombia—AICO), led by Yesid BRINEZ Poloche, with one seat in the Senate; the Indigenous Social Aliance (Movimiento Alianza Social Ind´ıgena—MASI), led by Marco AVIRAMA, with one seat in the Senate; the Liberal Opening (Movimiento Apertura Liberal— MAL), formed in 1993, currently led by Miguel ´ ´ Angel FLOREZ Rivera; the Mira Movement (Movimiento MIRA—MM), an evangelical Christian party led by Alexandra MORENO Piraquive; the National Movement (Movimiento Nacional— MN), led by Gustavo RODR´IGUEZ Vargas; the National Salvation Movement (Movimiento de Salvaci´on Nacional—MSN), led by Eduardo JARAMILLO Hoyos; the People’s Participation Movement (Movimiento de Participaci´on Popular—MPP), led by Gustavo CASTELLANOS Pulido; the Progressive National Movement (Movimiento Nacional Progresista—MNP), led by Guillermo RODR´IGUEZ Daza; the Regional Integration Movement (Movimiento Integraci´on Regional—MIR), led by Dorky JAY Julio; the Renovation Movement Labor Action (Movimiento Renovaci´on Acci´on Laboral—MORAL), led by Mercedes CAMPO de Pinedo; the Social Action Party (Partido Acci´on Social—PAS), led by Alfonso ANGARITA Baracaldo; the United People’s Movement (Movimiento Popular Unido—MPU), led by Alberto MACHADO Ceballos; and the Viva Colombia Movement (Movimiento Colom-

bia Viva—MCV), a Christian democracy party led by Jairo Enrique MERLANO Fern´andez.

Other Parties and Non-Rebel Groups Democratic Alliance/April 19 Movement (Alianza Democr´atica/ Movimiento 19 de Abril— AD/M-19). Initially a self-proclaimed armed branch of the National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular—Anapo) that shocked the military establishment by a daring raid on an army arsenal north of the capital in January 1979, M-19 was subsequently responsible for the two-month occupation of the Dominican Embassy in Bogot´a in early 1980 and the 27-hour seizure of the Palace of Justice at the capital in November 1985, during which more than 100 people were killed. In 1981 it appeared to have split into two factions: a moderate group led by Jaime BATEMAN Cay´on, who announced in January that he favored a legal role for the organization, and a hard-line faction styling itself the Coordinadora Nacional de Bases (CNB), which advocated continued armed resistance and was reported to have established operational links with FARC (see below). Before his death in a plane crash in April 1983, Bateman repudiated a truce agreement concluded six months earlier; a new dialogue with the government, undertaken by his successors in 1984, was repudiated in mid-1985. Carlos PIZARRO Le´on-G´omez, commander of the Batall´on Am´erica (see under Rebel and Clandestine Groups, below), became head of the M-19 in March 1986, following the killing by government forces of its two principal leaders, Iv´an Marino Os´ pina and Alvaro Fayad; in August 1986 the group’s new second-in-command, Gustavo Londo˜no Arias, was also killed. In early 1990 M-19 agreed to lay down its arms and joined with several small groups in forming a Nationalist Action for Peace (Acci´on Nacionalista por la Paz—ANP) that succeeded in outpolling the UP (see below) in the legislative and municipal balloting of March 11. Pizarro was assassinated on April 26 and was succeeded as M-19 leader by Antonio Navarro Wolff, who ran a surprising third in the presidential election of May 27 as the candidate of a 13-member leftist coalition

COLOMBIA

styled the Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democr´atica—CD). Following the May election the Navarro Wolff grouping operated as AD-M19, which more than doubled its vote share to nearly 27 percent at the December Constituent Assembly election before slipping to 10 percent in October 1991. It declined further to a meager 3.8 percent in the first-round presidential balloting of May 30, 1994, with Navarro Wolff subsequently joining the PDI (see under PDA, above). A dissident faction headed by Carlos Alonso Lucio, a former guerrilla commander, has blamed the M-19’s declining strength on an abandonment of “revolutionary principles.” As an electoral group, the AD/M-19 is moribund, with its more significant members (e.g., Navarro and Senator Gustavo Petro) now affiliated with the PDA (see above). ˜ Cuellar, Carlos Leaders: Diego MONTANA Alonso LUCIO (dissident faction). Patriotic Union (Uni´on Patri´otica—UP). The UP was formed in May 1985 as the reputed political arm of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, see below), which had itself been viewed as the paramilitary wing of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC, see Political Handbook of the World 2007). Advancing a program that included political and trade union freedom, agrarian reform, and opposition to U.S. interference in Latin America, the UP won one Senate and ten Chamber seats in March 1986. It mounted a major effort on behalf of its initial presidential nominee, FARC leader Jacobo ARENAS, although Arenas withdrew his candidacy in January following the alleged discovery of a plot to assassinate him. A number of UP leaders were subsequently murdered (reportedly by paramilitary police units), including the organization’s president, Jaime PARDO Leal, on October 11, 1987. The UP performed poorly in the March 1990 balloting, partly because of competition from the recently launched ANP and partly because of a lengthy “dirty war” against it that cost the lives of more than 1,000 of its members in 1989 alone. Before the 1990 presidential poll, its candidate, Bernardo JARAMILLO Ossa, was assassi-

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nated, reportedly by order of the Medell´ın cartel. In 1994, after deaths of its members had risen to more than 2,300, the party declined to advance a presidential candidate, its principal leader (recently returned from exile in Switzerland) declaring simply that “he would be killed.” Another leader, Manuel CEPEDA Vargas, who represented both the UP and the Communists in the Senate, was assassinated in August 1994. The group participated in the 1998 balloting but secured no representation. UP president Aida Abella was reportedly in exile in 1998 after receiving death threats. Leaders: Ern´an PASTRANA (President), Ovidio SALINAS (Executive Secretary).

Rebel and Clandestine Groups In 1985 the two groups immediately following (ELN and FARC) joined with M-19, Hope, Peace and Liberty (Esperanza, Paz y Libertad—EPL), the Quint´ın Lame Commando (Comando Quint´ın Lame) and Free Homeland (Patria Libre) formations operating in Cauca and Sucre departments, respectively, and the Workers’ Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores— PRT) in forming a National Guerrilla Coordination (Coordinadora Guerrillera Nacional—CGN). The name was changed to National Guerrilla Coordination Sim´on Bol´ıvar (Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera Sim´on Bol´ıvar—CNGSB) in the wake of a 1986 agreement with guerrillas in Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela to launch a Batall´on Am´erica as the projected core of a Bolivarian army (ej´ercito bolivariano) composed of rebels from the countries freed by Sim´on Bol´ıvar in the early 19th century. Quint´ın Lame and the PRT laid down their weapons in 1991, with the CNGSB becoming defunct after a breakdown in talks on demobilization of the remaining rebel units. The EPL was dealt a near fatal blow when the faction lead by Oscar William Calvo that operated in Antioquia, Caldas, and Risaralda departments surrendered to government forces in July 2006. By 2007 the FARC and ELN no longer coordinated their efforts but were instead rivals. (For recent demobilization developments, see Current issues, above.)

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National Liberation Army (Ej´ercito de Liberaci´on Nacional—ELN). Once the largest and most militant of the insurgent organizations, the Cuban-line ELN was responsible for the November 1983 kidnapping of the (then) president’s brother, Dr. Jaime Betancur Cuartas, but released him after Cuban President Fidel Castro characterized the act as “unrevolutionary.” Alleged to have links with guerrilla forces in El Salvador, Peru, and Venezuela, the group’s leadership has consistently termed offers of amnesty a “sham,” although some of its rank and file are reported to have accepted the government’s terms. In a type of guerrilla activity termed petroterrorismo, the ELN has mounted more than 100 attacks on the country’s oil pipelines, causing losses estimated at more than $1 billion. In mid-1993 the government reported that 193 ELN fighters had been killed during the previous six months. Subsequently, it appeared that the organization split into three factions, a hard-line Frente Domingo La´ın tendency of about 1,000 rebels operating along the Venezuelan frontier; a 2,000-strong “centrist” group loyal to the Spanish-born former priest Manuel P´erez; and a “moderate” breakaway group, the Socialist Renovation Current (Corriente de Renovaci´on Socialista—CRS), which had appeared on the verge of demobilizing its forces before the murder of two of its negotiators in September and eventually agreed to sign a final peace agreement in April 1994. ELN guerrillas used terror to disrupt local elections in October 1997, and in a widely publicized propaganda victory used the November 1 release of two captured members of an Organization of American States (OAS) team to reiterate their demand for a constituent assembly as a condition for laying down their arms. Longtime ELN leader Gregorio Manuel PEREZ Mart´ınez died on February 14, 1998. Peace talks with ELN representatives and the Pastrana government were opened at an undisclosed northern location in late December 1999 but proved unproductive. The talks were re-

sumed in August 2001 after a four-month hiatus, but were suspended within a week, following reports of a split within the ELN leadership. ELN leader and spokesperson Gerardo Bermudez, known as Francisco Gal´an, was released conditionally from prison in January 2007 after serving 15 years of a 30-year sentence. Gal´an’s release was intended to further progress in peace talks between the government and the ELN in Havana, Cuba (see Current issues, above), but Gal´an refused to renounce membership in the ELN in exchange for an unconditional release. The ELN’s top command structure (Coce) has been weakened by the government’s military campaigns, and ELN forces have been on the short end of armed confrontations with the FARC in Arauca and Nari˜no departments over oil profits and drug smuggling routes in late 2006 and early 2007. So far the ELN has refused to demobilize under the terms of the justice and peace law, however, and has reiterated the demand for a constituent assembly for formulating social and economic reforms as a precondition. In the sixth round of negotiation in Havana, the ELN also stipulated that a ceasefire would require ending the free trade pact with the United States, a freeze on privatization of state-owned companies, and a minority stake in the state oil company. One small splinter group of the ELN known as the Ej´ercito Revolucionario del Pueblo— ERP, operating in Bol´ıvar department, demobilized in April 2007. Leaders: Gerardo BERMUDEZ (a.k.a. Francisco Gal´an), Jos´e Nicol´as RODRIGUEZ Bautista (a.k.a. Gabino, Political Commander), Antonio GARCIA (Military Commander), Fabio VASQUEZ Casta˜no, Pablo BELTRAN, Juan Carlos CUELLAR. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC). FARC was long a Moscowline guerrilla group affiliated with the now moribund Communist Party of Colombia (Partido Comunista de Colombia—PCC). In late 1983

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it indicated a willingness to conclude a ceasefire agreement, which was formalized in March 1984. The agreement was renewed on March 2, 1986, in return for which the Betancur government guaranteed (without conspicuous fulfillment) the safety of electoral candidates advanced by FARC’s alleged political wing, the Patriotic Union (see above). A dissident FARC group, the Ricardo Franco Front (Frente Ricardo Franco), led by Javier DELGADO and Jos´e FEDOR Rey, refused to participate in the accord, and by late 1987 FARC itself was reported to have returned to a posture of “total insurrection.” Inconclusive peace talks with the government were resumed in late 1989, with the group formally joining the CNGSB a year later, shortly after the death of its cofounder, Luis Alberto Morantes (a.k.a. Jacobo Arenas). In January 1995 about two dozen FARC guerrillas wearing army uniforms raided a prison in southern Colombia, freeing 93 inmates, and in August FARC was accused of killing 16 members of the EPL (see above). FARC’s urban wing is known as the Bolivarian Militias (Milicias Bolivarianas), two of whose commanders were reported to have been apprehended in Bogot´a in November 1995. On February 9, 1996, 5 army soldiers were killed and 11 injured in two clashes with FARC guerrillas in the department of Antioquia. Sporadic attacks in succeeding months proved to be a prelude to the most deadly FARC action for decades at the end of August, when approximately 60 soldiers and policemen were killed, at least 27 of them when 500 guerrillas overran Las Delicias army base in the southwestern Putumayo region. In mid-1997 FARC was credited with launching the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia (Movimiento Bolivariano por una Nueva Colombia—MBNC), which won a lower house seat in October 1998. In July 1998 President-elect Pastrana held an unprecedented jungle meeting with FARC commander Manuel MARULANDA V´elez, after which Pastrana declared that he would com-

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ply with the rebels’ demands for withdrawal of government forces from five southern municipalities as a precondition for peace talks that would commence subsequent to his August inauguration. On November 7, despite an upsurge in FARC attacks, it was announced that the military withdrawal had been completed, and on January 7, 1999, Pastrana participated in a ceremonial launching of the talks in San Vincente del Cagu´an. Although Marulanda failed to appear because of alleged threats against his life, Pastrana insisted that his absence would not derail the peace process. However, the FARC withdrew from the peace negotiations temporarily later in the month in the wake of increased activity by the AUC. The FARC demanded government action against the AUC “death squads” and other right-wing paramilitary groups as a precondition for its return to the negotiating table. Although the government announced the formation of a special unit for that purpose, intensive military campaigns were also reported in February and March against both the FARC and the ELN (see above). The talks with the FARC were resumed in the rebel-held town of La Uribe in October 1999 but were unproductive; the FARC dialogue being suspended in May 2000 in the wake of a “necklace bomb” murder incident that generated widespread notoriety. In early 2000 it was reported that there had been 2,663 kidnappings in 1999, exceeding the 2,216 reported in 1998. The violence continued throughout 2000, with 20 mayoral candidates being killed and 24 withdrawing from contention because of intimidation before the municipal balloting in late October. In early 2001 agreement was reached for renewed talks with the FARC, but little was accomplished before the group’s withdrawal in October because of the government’s rejection of a number of demands, including autonomy for a rebel-held “demilitarized zone” until the end of Pastrana’s term in 2002. The FARC was deeply opposed to the U.S.-backed “Plan Colombia,” and charged collusion between government

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forces and right-wing paramilitaries (see Current issues, above). Luis Eduardo Diaz, the FARC intelligence chief, was reported killed on May 29, 2006, by security forces in the southern department of Putumayo. Leaders: Pedro Antonio MARIN (“Torofijo,” a.k.a. Manuel MARULANDA V´elez), Guillermo Le´on SAENZ Vargas (a.k.a. Alfonso CANO), Luis Eduardo DEVIA (a.k.a. Mono JOJOY), Ra´ul REYES (Peace Negotiator), Iv´an M´arquez. The most prominent right-wing paramilitary grouping has long been the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia—AUC), which was organized in 1996 to coordinate the activity of about 20 smaller organizations. Until recently, the leader of the AUC had ˜ who had earlier formed been Carlos CASTANO, the Cordoba and Uraba Self-Defense Union (Autodefensas Unidas de C´ordoba y Urab´a—AUCU) following the death of his father, a wealthy landowner, at the hands (reportedly) of leftist guerrillas. The AUC engaged in several clashes with the FARC in late 1998 and early 1999, in part, according to some observers, in an effort to gain representation in the current peace negotiations. In mid-2001 the AUC claimed that 5,000 new recruits had joined its ranks, bringing their total to 13,000. Shortly thereafter Casta˜no resigned his AUC post to lead a political affiliate, the National Democratic Movement (Movimiento Nacional Democr´atico—MND). In April 2004 he was reported to have disappeared, leading to speculation that he may have been murdered. In early 2005 Casta˜no’s successor, Salvatore MANCUSO G´omez, accepted demobilization and was replaced by Ram´on ISAZA; Mancuso continued, however, as the group’s lead negotiator with the government, and in 2006 and 2007 as a key witness in investigations of ties between public officials and the AUC, thus avoiding deportation to the United States, where he was sought on drug charges (see Current issues, above).

The Organization of American States Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (OASMAPP) released a report in July 2007 that raised red flags about the success of the demobilization of the AUC and other right-wing paramilitary groups under the justice and peace process. The report warned that elements of the junior leadership had so far refused to participate in the demobilization process and were still heavily involved in drug trafficking. Moreover, demobilized members who soured on the peace process were joining the holdouts and resuming paramilitary activities.

Legislature The Colombian Congress (Congreso) is a bicameral legislature consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Representatives, each elected for a four-year term. From 1958 to 1974 both houses were theoretically divided equally between Liberals and Conservatives, although members of other groups could run as nominal candidates of one of the two major parties and thus gain representation. At each of the seven regular elections before 2002, the Liberals obtained majorities in both houses. The election of March 10, 2002, was highly fractionalized, although support for President Uribe was subsequently credited as overwhelming in both Senate and Chamber. Senate (Senado de la Rep´ublica). The upper house is presently composed of 102 members, including 2 elected to represent indigenous communities. Following the election of March 12, 2006, the Social Party of National Unity held 20 seats; the Colombian Conservative Party, 18; the Colombian Liberal Party, 18; the Radical Change, 15; the Alternative Democratic Pole, 10; the Citizens’ Convergence, 7; the Wings-Team Colombia Movement, 5; the Democratic Colombia Party, 3; the Mira Movement, 2; the Viva Colombia Movement, 2; the Indigenous Authorities Movement, 1; and the Indigenous Social Alliance, 1. ´ President: Nancy Patricia GUTIERREZ.

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Cabinet As of September 1, 2007 President Vice President

´ Alvaro Uribe V´elez Francisco Santos Calder´on

Ministers Agriculture and Rural Development Communications Culture Education Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development Finance and Public Credit Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade, Industry, and Tourism Interior and Justice Mines and Energy National Defense Social Protection Transport

Andr´es Felipe Arias Leyva Mar´ıa del Rosario Guerra de la Espriella [f] Paula Marcela Moreno [f] Cecilia Mar´ıa V´elez White [f] Juan Francisco Lozano Ram´ırez (CR) ´ Oscar Iv´an Zuluaga (PSUN) Fernando Ara´ujo Perdomo (PC) Luis Guillermo Plata P´aez Carlos Holgu´ın Sardi (PC) Hern´an Mart´ıinez Torres Juan Manuel Santos (PSUN) Diego Palacio Betancourt Andr´es Uriel Gallego Henao

[f] = female

Chamber of Representatives (C´amara de Representates). The lower house currently has 166 members with each department being entitled to at least 2 representatives and 5 seats being set aside for special representation (2 for blacks, 1 for indigenous persons, 1 for Colombians living abroad, and 1 for political minorities). In the election of March 12, 2006, the Colombian Liberal Party secured 35 seats; the Social Party of National Unity, 30; the Colombian Conservative Party, 29; the Radical Change, 20; the Alternative Democratic Pole, 8; the Civic Convergence, 8; the Wings-Team Colombia Movement, 8; the Liberal Opening, 5; the Regional Integration Movement, 4; the Democratic Colombia Party, 2; the Huila New and Liberalism, 2; the National Movement, 2; the United People’s Movement; 2; For the Country of Our Dreams, 2; the Mira Movement, the National Salvation Movement, the People’s Participation Movement, the Progressive National Movement, the Renovation Movement Labor Action, the Social Action Party,

the Center Option Party, the Afro-Colombian Social Aliance, and Afrounincca, 1 each. President: Oscar Alberto ARBOLEDA Palacio.

Communications Press The press in Colombia is privately owned and enjoys complete freedom. Most newspapers function as the organs of political parties or factions. The following are dailies published in Bogot´a, unless otherwise noted: El Tiempo (270,000 daily, 550,000 Sunday), llerista Liberal; El Espacio (160,000), turbayista Liberal; El Colombiano (Medell´ın, 90,000), Conservative; El Heraldo (Barranquilla, 70,000), turbayista Liberal; El Nuevo Siglo (68,000), alvarista Conservative; El Pa´ıs (Cali, 60,000 daily, 110,000 Sunday), ospinapastranista Conservative; La Rep´ublica (55,000),

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ospina-pastranista Conservative; La Patria (Manizales, 22,000), Conservative; Occidente (Cali, 25,000), ospina-pastranista Conservative. Colombia’s oldest daily, the financially ailing El Espectador, which was launched in 1887, was converted into a Sunday weekly in August 2001.

News Agencies The domestic facility is the National News Agency “Colprensa” (Agencia Nacional de Noticias “Colprensa”); in addition, a number of foreign agencies maintain offices in Bogot´a.

Broadcasting and Computing The 11 major radio networks, of which only Radiodifusora Nacional is publicly owned, service more than 500 stations. The country’s three national television channels are controlled by the Instituto Nacional de Radio y Televisi´on, although broadcasting time is distributed among private

production companies. There are also six regional channels; cable service for Bogot´a was introduced in 1985. As of 2005, there were approximately 104 Internet users and 42 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 479 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Carolina BARC O Isakson U.S. Ambassador to Colombia: William R. BROWNFIELD Permanent Representative to the UN: Claudia BLUM de Barberi IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, ALADI, BCIE, CAN, CDB, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

C O S TA R I C A REPUBLIC

OF

COSTA RICA

Rep u´ blica de Costa Rica

One of the smallest of the Central American countries, Costa Rica lies directly north of Panama and combines tropical lowland, high tableland, and rugged mountainous terrain. Its people, known as Costarricenses, are overwhelmingly of European (predominantly Spanish) descent. This unusual homogeneity is broken only by mestizo and Negro minorities, which are concentrated in the provinces of Guanacaste and Lim´on, respectively. More than 90 percent of the population adheres to Roman Catholicism, the state religion, but other faiths are permitted. The country’s 93 percent literacy rate is the highest in Central America. Women constituted 34 percent of the paid workforce in 2006. They are employed mainly in administrative positions, human resources, and customer services and reportedly earn 50 percent less than their male counterparts. In the current legislature 22 of 57 members are female, and there are 5 women in the cabinet. In 1948 Costa Rica embarked on the establishment of what became one of the world’s most progressive welfare states, providing a universal program of health care and education for its citizens that contrasted with regressive systems elsewhere in Latin America. Substantial economic growth, yielding one of the region’s highest standards of living, continued through most of the 1970s before giving way to depressed prices for coffee, beef, bananas, and sugar exports, accompanied by increased oil import costs. By the early 1980s the country was experiencing deep recession, marked by high inflation, unemployment, budget deficits,

and trade imbalances. Bankruptcy was averted by means of aid from the United States, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), although several IMF agreements were compromised by Costa Rica’s inability to meet fund conditions. By 1994 more than half of the country’s economic activity had become service-based, with tourism its most important component. Concurrently, the proportion of families living in poverty had risen to an estimated 30 to 38 percent, with nearly one-quarter of workers engaged in the “informal sector.” By 1996 GDP growth had receded

NICARAGUA Lake Nicaragua

Caribbe an Se a

Liberia Nicoya

C O S TA R I C A

Puntarenas

Alajuela San Francisco San José

Limón

San Isidro

PACIFIC O CE A N

0 0

60 Mi 60 Km

Golfito

PANAMA

The Country

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steadily to less than 1.0 percent, but by 1999 it was the highest in Latin America, at 8.3 percent. A rapid reversal in 2000, when GDP expanded by only 1.4 percent, was largely attributed to higher prices for imported petroleum and lower earnings from exports. Improvement thereafter culminated in GDP growth of 5.6 percent in 2003, 4.0 percent in 2004, and 5.9 percent in 2005. The IMF predicted GDP growth of 6.5 percent for 2006 and inflation of 11 to 12 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background Costa Rica declared its independence from Spain in 1821 but accepted inclusion in the Mexican Empire of 1822–1823. It was a member of the United Provinces of Central America from 1824 to 1839, when its autonomy was reestablished. A republic was formally declared in 1848 during a period characterized by alternating political conflict and rule by the leading families, who monopolized the indirect electoral system. In 1897 Costa Rica joined El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua in the Greater Republic of Central America, but the federation was dissolved in 1898. A year later, President Bernardo SOTO sponsored what is considered to be the Costa Rica’s first free election, inaugurating a democratic process that has survived with only two major interruptions, one in 1917 and the other in 1948. Since the uprising led by Jos´e FIGUERES Ferrer, following annulment of the 1948 election by President Teodoro PICADO, transfer of power has been accomplished by constitutional means, further securing Costa Rica’s reputation as what has been called “perhaps the most passionately democratic country in Latin America.” In the election of February 6, 1994, Figueres Ferrer’s son, Jos´e Mar´ıa FIGUERES Olsen of the National Liberation Party (Partido de Liberaci´on Nacional—PLN), with 49.6 percent of the vote defeated Miguel Angel RODR´IGUEZ of the Social Christian Unity Party (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana—PUSC), who took 47.5 percent. However, Rodr´ıguez was elected president at balloting

on February 1, 1998, with 46.9 percent versus 44.4 percent for the PLN’s Jos´e Miguel CORRALES. In concurrent legislative balloting the PUSC reversed the tables on the PLN (the leading party in the previous assembly) by securing 27 of the 57 seats. The PUSC lost 8 of its seats in the legislative balloting on February 3, 2002, although it retained a 2-seat plurality over the PLN. Meanwhile, the PUSC’s presidential candidate—Abel PACHECO—led a field of 13 in the concurrent first round of presidential balloting, with Rolando ARAYA Monge finishing second with 31 percent. Pacheco won the second round over Araya by 58 to 42 percent. Prior to the 2006 election, the PLN’s Oscar ARIAS S´anchez appeared to have a decisive lead in public opinion polls over his main opponent in a field of 14 candidates—Ott´on SOL´IS Fallas of the Citizen’s Action Party (Paratido Acci´on Ciudadana—PAC). However, on February 5 Arias garnered only a thin margin of 40.9 percent of the votes to 39.8 percent for Sol´ıs. In the concurrent legislative poll the PLN was confined to a plurality of 36.4 percent of the vote and 25 of 57 seats. However, Arias subsequently achieved sufficient legislative support for his new government (installed on May 8) by reaching accommodation with the centrist Libertarian Movement Party (Partido Movimiento Libertario—PML), which held 6 legislative seats. In the December local elections, the PNL won control of nearly three-fourths of the municipalities, including the mayorship of San Jos´e.

Constitution and Government The 1949 constitution provides for three independent branches of government: legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative branch enjoys genuinely coequal power, including the ability to override presidential vetoes. The president serves as chief executive and is assisted by two elected vice presidents in addition to a cabinet selected by the president. By Latin American standards the president’s powers are limited, and a 1969 constitutional amendment prohibited the reelection of all previous incumbents. However, in an unexpected and controversial ruling in April 2003, the Supreme

C O S TA R I C A

Political Status: Part of the Captaincy General of Guatemala that declared independence from Spain in September 1821; member of the United Provinces of Central America that was launched in 1824; autonomy reestablished in 1839; republic declared in 1848; democratic constitutional system instituted in 1899. Area: 19,575 sq. mi. (50,700 sq. km.). Population: 3,810,179 (2000C); 4,276,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): SAN JOSE´ (344,000), Lim´on (62,000), Alajuela (49,000), San Francisco (46,000). Principal Language: Spanish (there is no “official” language). Monetary Unit: Col´on (market rate November 2, 2007: 518.97 col´ones = $1US). President: Oscar ARIAS S´anchez (National Liberation Party); elected on February 5, 2006, and inaugurated for a four-year term on May 8, succeeding Abel PACHECO de la Espriella (Social Christian Unity Party). First Vice President: Laura CHINCHILLA (National Liberation Party); elected on February 5, 2006, and inaugurated on May 8 for a term concurrent with that of the president, ´ succeeding Lineth SABORIO Chaverri (Social Christian Unity Party). Second Vice President: Kevin CASAS Zamora (National Liberation Party); elected on February 5, 2006, and inaugurated on May 8 for a term concurrent with that of the president, the office having been vacant following the resignation of Luis FISHMAN (Social Christian Unity Party) on January 27, 2005.

Court declared the amendment invalid (see Current issues, below). A proposed amendment that would extend the presidential and legislative terms to five years had been under consideration since 1994 but was not adopted before the 2006 vote. The judicial branch is independent of the president, its members being elected for eight-year terms by the legislature. The judicial structure encompasses the Supreme Court of Justice, which may rule on the constitutionality of legislation; four

169

courts of appeal; and numerous local courts distributed among the judicial districts. One unique feature of the Costa Rican governmental system is the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones), an independent body of three magistrates and three alternate magistrates elected by the Supreme Court of Justice for staggered six-year terms. The Tribunal oversees the entire electoral process, including the interpretation of electoral statutes, the certification of parties, and the adjudication of alleged electoral irregularities. For administrative purposes the country is divided into 7 provinces and 81 municipios, the former administered by governors appointed by the president. The latter are governed by councils that have both voting and nonvoting members and by executive officials appointed by the president. The executive officers may veto council acts, but all such vetoes are subject to judicial review. Costa Rica is one of only a handful of countries that constitutionally prohibit the raising of a national army, except under strictly limited circumstances of public necessity. The proscription has, however, yielded a proliferation of legally sanctioned armed groups, including private “auxiliary police” units and separate police forces for virtually every government ministry, most of which are beyond the control of the ministry of public security.

Foreign Relations A founding member of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States (OAS), Costa Rica has typically been aligned with the liberal, democratic wing in Latin American politics and has opposed dictatorships of both the right and the left. In May 1981 it broke relations with Cuba after a protest regarding the treatment of Cuban political prisoners had elicited an “insulting” response by Cuba’s representative to the United Nations. The principal external concern for the remainder of the decade was the Nicaraguan sandinista-contra conflict and the associated U.S. involvement in regional affairs. Although formally neutral on the issue, Costa Rica strongly criticized Nicaragua’s post-Somoza Marxist orientation, while accepting

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more than $730 million in economic aid from the United States. In early 1987 President Arias introduced a peace plan that served as the basis of intensive effort to negotiate an end to fighting in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. The initiative earned him the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize, while his reputation was further enhanced by brokering the sandinista-contra cease-fire in March 1988. In early 1991 President Rafael Angel ´ CALDERON Fournier concluded a free trade agreement with Venezuelan President Carlos P´erez and subsequently became the first Central American chief executive to negotiate a similar agreement with Mexico, which he hoped would pave the way to membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, when the latter accord came into effect on January 1, 1995, there was concern that Costa Rica would be adversely affected by the recent devaluation of the Mexican peso. Meanwhile, Costa Rica had failed to ratify the Central American Parliament treaty, arguing that the institution would be a threat to its sovereignty and insisting that its neighbors had made insufficient progress in the implementation of domestic democratic processes. In June 1995, on the other hand, Costa Rica formally ratified the December 1991 Tegucigalpa Protocol establishing the Central American Integration System as a means of promoting regional economic integration. In March 2004 it also signed the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States (see Current issues, below, for subsequent developments). In a move that some viewed as an attempt to reduce unemployment among Costa Ricans, the government in late 1993 launched a campaign to deport an estimated 2,000 undocumented Nicaraguans. The action, which came in the wake of two highly publicized kidnappings by Nicaraguans, exacerbated a long-standing dispute over navigation rights and demarcation of the border along the San Juan River. While an 1858 treaty had granted Nicaragua sovereignty over the river, it guaranteed both parties “free navigation” for commercial purposes, which Nicaragua interpreted to exclude tourism. A further problem stemmed from Costa

Rica’s issuance in 1979 of land deeds to campesino settlers on a tract of land south of the river that later proved to be Nicaraguan territory. On June 26, 1995, despite a long-standing Costa Rican offer of relocation to its side of the border, the settlers proclaimed the independence of the “Republic of Airrec´u” (a word meaning “friendship” in the local Maleku language), thereby provoking the dispatch of Nicaraguan troops to evict them. In July 1998 the two countries concluded an agreement to make the treaties governing navigation on the San Juan “more functional,” including a provision that army vessels could accompany Nicaraguan police patrols along the river. The agreement was, however, rescinded by Nicaragua less than a month later. During the 1980s thousands of Nicaraguans fled domestic insurrection to the relative safety of Costa Rica. Subsequent underemployment in Nicaragua served to maintain the flow, with 300,000 to 500,000 estimated to have crossed the border by 1996. In October 1999 about 160,000 of the migrants were reported to have availed themselves of an amnesty declared by Costa Rica after Hurricane Mitch had devastated their homeland, although Nicaragua continued to insist that they were being mistreated. Tension over the river dispute was partially abated by an agreement in mid-2000 that restored Costa Rica’s right to armed patrols as long as Nicaragua received prior notification of their movements. The river controversy appeared to be further abated in September 2002 by an agreement on bilateral talks over a three-year period. However, soon thereafter Nicaraguan President Enrique Bola˜nos ordered the interdiction of Costa Rican police boats “under any circumstances,” and in September 2005, after Costa Rica had submitted the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), he announced that henceforth all vessels navigating the river would be obliged to fly the Nicaraguan flag.

Current Issues Once considered the democratic jewel of Central America, Costa Rica has recently been beset with political infighting and allegations of

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corruption that have embroiled three former presidents and tainted current President Arias, despite his status as a Nobel laureate. The 2003 Supreme Court validation of presidential reelection (see Constitution and government, above) overturned a 2000 ruling that the court lacked constitutional authority in the matter. The action generated intense debate, with the opposition PAC insisting that the ban did not violate the country’s basic law and arguing that an issue of such importance should be decided by elected, rather than by nonelected, officials. By seeking a second term, Arias not only appeared to flaunt the constitution but also, as a neoliberal, generated controversy within the PLN, a traditionally left-of-center group that held Costa Rica’s membership in the Socialist International. A number of displeased high-ranking members left the party, including its secretary general, Luis Guillermo SOL´IS, and former president Luis Alberto MONGE. For his part, Arias, following his narrow victory in the February 2006 elections, pledged to maintain the PLN’s social-democratic thrust, despite opening up state monopolies. He also remained committed to CAFTA membership (a prominent element of his campaign platform), which drew criticism from unionists and students. Arias initially anticipated that CAFTA ratification would be achieved by a vote in the assembly. However, in April 2007 the Supreme Electoral Tribunal ruled that the opposition had the right to seek a national referendum on the matter. Arias subsequently announced he would welcome such a vote, and a national referendum on October 7 resulted in a 51.6 percent “yes” vote, sufficient for ratification. Costa Rica’s entry into CAFTA was expected to be formalized in March 2008.

Political Parties Government and Government-Supportive Parties National Liberation Party (Partido de Liberaci´on Nacional—PLN). Founded by former president Jos´e Figueres Ferrer in the aftermath of

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the 1948 revolution, the PLN has traditionally been the largest and best organized of the Costa Rican parties and is a classic example of the democratic left in Latin America. Affiliated with the Socialist International, it has consistently favored progressive programs. In July 1976 President Figueres precipitated a crisis within the party leadership by calling for revocation of the constitutional requirement that a president may not serve more than one term, thereby contributing to the defeat of Luis Alberto Monge as PLN presidential candidate in 1978. Subsequently, the cultivation of a network of predominantly regional and local support, coupled with a “return to the land” (volver a la tierre) campaign slogan, enabled Monge to secure a decisive victory in 1982. Although Oscar Arias S´anchez won a primary election over the more conservative Carlos Manuel CASTILLO in early 1985 (subsequently serving as president from 1986 to 1990), disagreement between their supporters, largely abated during the 1986 campaign, continued in the assembly. Castillo was the party’s nominee to succeed Arias in 1990 but fell short by obtaining only 48 percent of the vote. Longtime party leader Figueres Ferrer died on June 8, 1990. The PLN’s Jos´e Mar´ıa Figueres captured the presidency in 1994, but the party failed to retain either that office or a legislative plurality in 1998 or 2002. The membership of the party’s 2002 presidential candidate, Rolando ARAYA Monge, was suspended for six months in March 2003 for dubious electoral financing. Arias S´anchez’s return to candidacy in 2005 generated intraparty conflict (see Current issues, above), although the second-term effort succeeded by a narrow margin. Leaders: Oscar ARIAS S´anchez (President of the Republic); Francisco Antonio PACHECO Fern´andez (President of the Party); Jos´e Mar´ıa FIGUERES Olsen and Daniel ODUBER Quir´os (Former Presidents of the Republic); Oscar ˜ NUNEZ Calva (Secretary General). Libertarian Movement Party (Partido Movimiento Libertario—PML). Launched in early

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1995, the PML is a centrist group that opposes state interventionism and policies that constrain individual liberties. The PML sharply improved its legislative representation from one seat to seven seats in February 2002, winning 9.3 percent of the vote, although its candidate took only 1.7 percent in the first round of presidential balloting. The party fell to six legislative seats in 2006, its leader placing third in the presidential poll. The PML subsequently agreed to support the PLN government in the legislature in return for the PLN’s pledge to pursue reforms designed to promote business “competitiveness” and to make it easier for people in border regions and “marginal” urban areas to gain property rights. Leaders: Otto GUEVARA Guth (President and 2002 and 2006 presidential candidate), Ronaldo ALFARO Garc´ıa (Secretary General).

Opposition Parties Citizens’ Action Party (Partido Acci´on Ciudadana—PAC). Launched in early 2001 by, among others, PLN defector Ott´on Sol´ıs Fallas, the PAC ran in the 2002 election on a populist platform promising to combat corruption and to help farmers and traditional industries that had been weakened by recent market reforms. Sol´ıs finished a surprisingly strong third in the first round of presidential balloting in February 2002 with 26 percent of the vote, while the PAC garnered 13 seats in concurrent legislative balloting. A year later, six PAC members withdrew to form a Patriotic Bloc (Bloque Patriotico—BP). In his 2006 campaign for the presidency, Sol´ıs lost to the PLN’s Arias S´anchez by about 1 percent of the vote. The PAC garnered 17 seats in the concurrent legislative election. Leaders: Ott´on SOL´IS Fallas (2002 and 2006 presidential candidate), Epsy Campbell BARR (President), Sadie BRAVO P´erez, Teresita AGUILAR Mirambell (Secretary General). Social Christian Unity Party (Partido Unidad Social Cristiana—PUSC). A loose alliance of the essentially conservative parties, listed imme-

diately below, plus the former Democratic Renovation Party (see National Union Party, below), the PUSC campaigned before the 1978 election as the Partido Unidad Opositora (PUO) and as the Coalici´on Unidad in 1978, adopting its present name in December 1983. Partly because of conflict within the PLN leadership, the party won the presidency in 1978 but was defeated in both 1982 and 1986. The PUSC returned to power with a 52 percent presidential mandate in 1990 before losing a close race in May 1994. It regained the presidency in 1998, retained it in 2002, but wound up in fourth place in the 2006 presidential balloting, amid allegations of corruption against the administration of retiring president Abel Pacheco. Leaders: Abel PACHECO de la Espriella, Miguel Angel RODR´IGUEZ, Rafael Angel CAL´ Fournier, and Rodrigo CARAZO Odio DERON (Former Presidents of the Republic), Luis Fishman ZONZINSKI (President of the Party), Ricardo Jaime TOLEDO Carranza (2006 presidential candidate), Lorena VASQUEZ Badilla, Xinia CARVAJAL Salazar (Secretary General). Calderonist Republican Party (Partido Republicano Calderonista—PRC). Named after former president Rafael Angel Calder´on Fournier, the PRC was formed in 1976. ´ FourLeaders: Rafael Angel CALDERON nier (former President of the Republic), Alvaro CUBILLO Aguilar (President of the Party), Gerardo BOLANOS Alpizar (Secretary). Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC). The PDC is a traditional Christian Democratic group formed in 1962. Leaders: Rafael Alberto GRILLO Rivera (President), Claudio GUEVARA Barahona (Secretary). Popular Union Party (Partido Uni´on Popular—PUP). The PUP is a coalition of rightwing interests. Leaders: Cristi´an TATTENBACH Yglesias (President), Juan Rafael RODRIGUEZ Calvo (Secretary).

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National Union Party (Partido Uni´on Nacional—PUN). The PUN was formed in April 1985 by the leader of the previously PUSC-affiliated Democratic Renovation Party (Partido Renovaci´on Democr´atica—PRD), Oscar AGUILAR Bulgarelli, who opposed Rafael Calder´on’s “absolute and antidemocratic control” of the parent coalition, including an alleged effort to change its posture from social democratic to liberal. The PUN won one legislative seat in the 2006 election. Leaders: Jos´e Manuel ECHANDI Meza (2006 presidential candidate), Arturo ACOSTA Mora (President of the Party), Hern´an Ricardo ZAMORA Rojas (Secretary General). Accessibility Without Exclusion Party (Partido Accesibilidad Sin Exclusi´on—PACE). This San Jos´e–based party was formed in 2005 as a voice against the free-trade agreement and against discrimination toward the disabled, senior citizens, and their families. The new party won one seat in the 2006 assembly poll. ´ Leaders: Oscar Andr´es LOPEZ Arias (President), Victor Emilio GRANADOS Calvo (Secretary). Broad Front (Frente Amplio). This group, which promotes “more participative and direct forms of democracy,” won one seat in the 2006 assembly elections. Leaders: Jos´e MERINO del R´ıo (President), ´ Enid GONZALEZ Rojas (Secretary). National Restoration Party (Partido Restauraci´on Nacional). A San Jos´e–based provincial party, this grouping won one seat in the 2006 assembly poll with 2 percent of the vote. ˜ Calvo (PresLeaders: Carlos luis AVENDANO ˜ ident), C´esar Alexander ZUNIGA Ram´ırez (Secretary General).

Other Parties that Contested the 2006 Legislative and/or Presidential Elections Costa Rican Renewal Party (Partido Renovaci´on Costarricense—PRC). A small conserva-

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tive party, the PRC won a single seat in the February 2002 legislative poll, while its candidate secured 1.1 percent of the vote in the first round of presidential balloting. Leaders: Bolivar SERRANO Hidalgo (2006 presidential candidate), Gerardo Justo OROZCO Alvarez (President of the Party and 2002 presidential candidate), Jimmy SOTO Solano (Secretary). Homeland First Party (Partido Patria Primero—PPP). The PPP was launched before the 2006 elections, in which its presidential candidate captured 1.1 percent of the vote and the party 1.6 percent of the legislative vote. Leaders: Juan Jos´e VARGAS Fella (President and 2006 presidential candidate), Wilberth ´ HERNANDEZ Vargas (Secretary). National Integration Party (Partido Integraci´on Nacional—PIN). The PIN was launched in 1996 but won no representation in 2002 or 2006. ˜ Leaders: Dr. Walter MUNOZ C´espedes (President of the Party and 2006 presidential candidate), ˜ Valverde (Secretary General). Marlyn BENDANA National Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democr´atica Nacionalista—ADN). The AND’s presidential candidate in 2006 captured 0.2 percent of the vote. Leaders: Jose Miguel VILLALOBOS Uma˜na (President of the Party and 2006 presidential candidate), Emilia Maria RODR´IGUEZ Arias (Secretary General). Democratic Force Party (Partido Fuerza Democr´atica—PFD). The PFD was launched before the 1994 election as the Fuerza Democr´atica (FD), a leftist coalition that included the two parties below as well as the Ecological Humanist Movement (Movimiento Humanista Ecologista—MHE), the Progress Party (Partido del Progreso—PP), and the subsequently dissolved Costa Rican Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Costarricense—PSC).

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The PFD candidate for president in 2006 secured less than 0.2 percent of the vote. Leaders: C´elimo GUIDO (Party Leader), Manuel Vladimir DE LA CRUZ de Lemos (Secretary General and 1994 and 2006 presidential ˜ candidate), Marco NUNEZ Gonz´alez (President).

placed 12th in the 2006 presidential balloting with less than 0.2 percent of the vote. Leaders: Fabio Enrique DELGADO Hern´andez (President), Alvaro Eduardo MONTERO Mejia ´ (2006 presidential candidate), Alejandro LOPEZ Mart´ınez (Secretary General).

Workers’ Party (Partido de los Trabajadores—PT). The PT has long been the political wing of the Revolutionary People’s Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo— MRP), a Maoist extremist group that endorsed revolutionary activity in 1978–1980, although its leadership appeared to moderate its position in mid-1981, declaring that “popular struggles can . . . be waged [in Costa Rica] without the unjust violence of terrorist actions.” It was a member of the PVP-led PU in 1978 and 1982. Leaders: Jos´e Francisco ARAYA Monge (President), Ilse ACOSTA Polonio (Secretary).

Coalition of the United Left (Coalici´on Izquierda Unida—IU). An alliance of the PVP and the Revolutionary Party of Workers (Partido Revolutionario de los Trabajadores), the IU won 0.4 percent of the legislative vote in 2006. Leader: Humberto Elias VARGAS Carbonel (2006 presidential candidate). Popular Vanguard Party (Partido Vanguardia Popular—PVP). Founded in 1931 as the Costa Rican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Costarricense—PCC), the PVP adopted its present name in 1943 and regained legal status in 1975, following the lifting of a longstanding proscription of nondemocratic political organizations. During the 1978 and 1982 campaigns, it participated in a People United (Pueblo Unido—PU) coalition that included the PSC and PT (see above). In 1983 a struggle erupted between the essentially moderate “old guard” leadership and a younger hardline group. In 1985 the PPC and its allies were permitted to register under the PU label. As a result, the PVP formed a coalition for the 1986 campaign styled the Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular—AP), with the former ´ PU standard bearer, Dr. Rodrigo GUTIERREZ S´aenz, as its presidential candidate, securing one legislative seat. In 1995 the PVP, while retaining its separate identity, joined with a group of independents to form the People’s United Party (Partido Pueblo Unido—PPU). Manuel MORA Valverde, the founder of the PPC and a leader of the 1948 civil war, died in 1994. Leaders: Trino BARRANTES Araya (President), Humberto El´ıas VARGAS Carbonell (Secretary General).

National Rescue Party (Partido Rescate Nacional—PRN). Organized in 1996, the PRN

Union for Change (Uni´on Para el Cambio— UPC). The UPC is a small formation launched

Costa Rican People’s Party (Partido del Pueblo Costarricense—PPC). The PPC originated as a Havana-oriented Popular Vanguard splinter led by Manuel Mora Valverde; the group initially presented itself as the “real” PVP but was rebuffed in February 1984 when the Civil Registry recognized the mainstream (Vargas-Ferreto) faction as being in legitimate possession of the traditional party name. In 1984 the party joined a number of other groups as the Patriotic Alliance (Alianza Patri´otica) before being accorded official registration under the Pueblo Unido rubric. In 1986 the PU and the PVP-led Alianza Popular captured one legislative seat each. Of four leftist parties running separately in 1990, only the PPC won representation. Leaders: Daniel CAMACHO (1990 presidential candidate), Manuel Enrique DELGADO Cascante, Len´ın CHACON Vargas (Secretary General), Eduardo MORA Valverde (Undersecretary General).

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Cabinet As of May 1, 2007 President First Vice President Second Vice President

Oscar Arias S´anchez Laura Chinchilla [f] Kevin Casas Zamora

Ministers Culture Education Environment and Energy Finance Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade Health Housing and Fight Against Poverty Justice Labor Planning and Economic Policy Presidency Production Public Works and Transport Science and Technology Security Tourism Without Portfolio

Mar´ıa Elena Carbello [f] Leonardo Garnier Roberto Dobles Guillermo Zu˜niga Bruno Stagno Marco Vinicio Ruiz Dr. Mar´ıa Luisa Avila [f] Fernando Zumbado Laura Chinchilla [f] Francisco Morales Kevin Casas Rodrigo Arias S´anchez Alfredo Volio Karla Gonz´alez [f] Eugenia Flores [f] Fernando Berrocal Carlos Ricardo Benavides Mario Vargas

[f] = female

before the 2006 election. It presidential candidate secured 2.4 percent of the vote in 2006. ´ Leaders: Antonio ALVAREZ Desanti (President and 2006 presidential candidate), Roberto Javier GALLARDO Nu˜nez (Secretary). Patriotic Union Party (Partido Uni´on Patrio´ tica—PUP). The PUP candidate for president in 2006 received 0.1 percent of the vote, while the party secured 0.5 percent of the legislative vote. Leaders: Jos´e Miguel CORRALES Bola˜nos (President), Jos´e Humberto ARCE Salas (Vice President and 2006 presidential candidate), Rafael Angel VARELA Granados (Secretary General).

Provincial parties that contested the 2006 elections unsuccessfully included the Agricultural Force Party of the Cartagonians (Partido Fuerza Agraria de los Cartagineses—PFAC), led by Alicia SOLANO Bravo; the Agricultural Labor Action Party (Partido Acci´on Laborista Agr´ıcola—PALA) of Alajuela, led by Eli´ecer RODR´IGUEZ; the Alajuelan Democratic Action (Acci´on Democr´atica Alajuelense—ADA), led by Esli Antonio VEGA Alvarado; the Authentic Heredian Party (Partido Autentica Herediano) of Heredia, led by Jos´e Francisco SALAS Ramos; the Cartagen Agricultural Union Party (Partido Uni´on Agr´ıcola Cartaginesa—PUAC), led by Juan Guillermo BRENES Castillo; the Green

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Ecologist Party (Partido Verde Ecologista) of Cartago, led by Rodrigo Jos´e ARIAS Gutti´errez; the Independent Guanacaste Party (Partido Guanacaste Independiente—PGI), led by Jos´e Angel JARA Chavarria; the Movement of Workers and Peasants (Movimiento de Trabajadores y Campesinos—MTC) of Lim´on, led by Orlando BARRANTES Cart´ın; the New Feminist League (Nueva Liga Feminista) of San Jos´e, led by Ana Felicia TORRES Redondo; and the Provincial Integration Party “Three” (Partido Integraci´on Provincial “Tres”—PIP3), led by Isabel Cristina ARIA Calder´on.

Legislature The Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) is a unicameral body whose 57 members, representing the provinces in proportion to population, are elected under a proportional representation system for four-year terms by direct popular vote and may not be immediately reelected. In the most recent election of February 5, 2006, the National Liberation Party won 25 seats; the Citizens’ Action Party, 17; the Libertarian Movement Party, 6; the Social Christian Unity Party, 5; and Accessibility Without Exclusion Party, the Broad Front, the National Restoration Party, and the National Union Party, 1 each. President: Francisco Antonio PACHECO Fern´andez.

Communications All news media are free of censorship, subject to limitations such as the abuse of public officials. In recent years journalists have complained about threats, intimidation, and inadequate press protections.

Press The following are Spanish dailies published in San Jos´e: La Naci´on (125,000), conservative;

Diario Extra (120,000), independent; La Rep´ublica (60,000), independent; La Prensa Libre (50,000), independent; The Tico Times (15,000), independent English weekly.

News Agencies The regional Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias (ACAN) serves in lieu of a domestic facility. Agence France-Presse, Deutsche PresseAgentur, Prensa Latina, and Tass maintain offices in San Jos´e.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is supervised by the government’s Departamento Control Nacional de RadioTelevisi´on. Television and radio stations are commercial, except for several offering religious or cultural programming. The Sistema de Radio y TV Cultural (SINART) network was organized by the government in 1978 to transmit news and cultural programs, while U.S.-based Cable Network News (CNN) is available by subscription. As of 2005 there were approximately 213 Internet users and 231 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 255 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation ˜ Ambassador to the U.S.: Tomas DUENAS U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica: Mark LANGDALE Permanent Representative to the UN: Jorge URBINA IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, BCIE, CACM, IADB, Interpol, IOM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WCO, WTO

CUBA REPUBLIC

OF

CUBA

Rep u´ blica de Cuba

Note: After almost five decades, President Fidel Castro resigned on February 19, 2008. His brother, acting president Raul ´ Castro, was officially installed during a National Assembly meeting February 24, in which other regime veterans assumed major posts, dispelling speculations that immediate changes were forthcoming.

The Country The largest of the Caribbean island nations, Cuba lies at the western end of the Greater Antilles, directly south of Florida. Its varied terrain, with abundant fertile land and a semitropical climate, led to early specialization in the production of sugar as well as tobacco, coffee, and other crops. Its ethnic composition is a mixture of Caucasian and Negro. The vast majority of the population is Roman Catholic, although the Church’s mainstream is increasingly being challenged by santer´ıa, which features a substantial component of African animism. In addition there are more than 50 registered Protestant denominations, nearly half of which are joined in a largely regime-supportive Ecumenical Council of Cuba (Consejo Ecum´enico de Cuba). Women constitute nearly 40 percent of the labor force and provide close to half of the country’s administrators. The Cuban economy faced great difficulty following the 1959 revolution. Production lagged, dependence on foreign assistance (mainly from the Soviet Union) increased, and real per capita income declined. Despite sporadic attempts at industrialization, the Castro regime emphasized agricultural development, and sugar remained the principal export. The nearly three decades of economic adversity was followed by a degree of recovery in 1988– 1989, generating expectations that renegotiation of

the country’s $6.4 billion external debt might be imminent; however, political developments within the “socialist camp” in 1989–1990 resulted in the effective loss of Cuba’s leading trade partners and a need to place the domestic economy on a near-wartime footing, including an expansion of rationing to include virtually all consumer goods. In May 1991, following a five-month suspension AT L A N T IC OCEAN

UNITED STATES

Gu l f o f Mexico

THE BAHAMAS

Havana

Matanzas Santa Clara

Pinar del Río

CUBA Camagüey

Holguín Guantánamo

Caribbean

Cayman Islands (U.K.)

Sea

Santiago de Cuba JAMAICA

0 0

100 Mi 100 Km

HAITI

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in food shipments from the Soviet Union, it was agreed that such shipments would thenceforth be made only on a barter basis; concurrently, it was announced that as of 1992 hard currency valuation would be required for Soviet oil. As a result, the government mounted a drive to achieve selfsufficiency in food production, coupled with an effort to augment foreign reserves by enhancing tourism and the export of pharmaceuticals. The opening of farmers’ markets on October 1, 1994, led to a substantial decline in domestic prices and in the black market rate for U.S. dollars. By December 1 the government had opened markets for consumer goods at deregulated prices. After suffering contraction of 40 percent from 1989–1994, the GDP grew, according to government figures, by an average of 4.7 percent annually during the next five years and expanded by 5.6 percent in 2000, before declining to 2.6 percent growth in 2003. Meanwhile, unemployment, although showing signs of recent improvement, was officially reported to be 32 percent in late 2003. Much of the difficulty stems from a long-standing U.S. trade embargo, which has left Cuban citizens facing what one New York Times reporter described as an “unending scramble to make ends meet.” Arguing that wages alone did not indicate “true purchasing power,” Cuba in 2005 adopted a new measure of economic growth that included free services to its citizens. The result was a surge in reported GDP, which precluded meaningful comparison with other developing economies.

Government and Politics Political Background Liberated from Spanish rule as a result of the Spanish-American War of 1898, Cuba was established as an independent republic on May 20, 1902, but remained subject to U.S. tutelage until abrogation of the so-called Platt Amendment in 1934. Subsequent political development was severely limited by the antidemocratic influence of Fulgencio BATISTA, who ruled the country directly or indirectly from 1933 to 1944 and maintained a repressive dictatorship from 1952 to 1959.

On January 1, 1959, a revolutionary movement under Fidel CASTRO Ruz, who had commenced guerrilla operations in 1956, overthrew Batista’s regime, which had been weakened by army and middle-class disaffection. After a brief period of moderation, the Castro government embarked on increasingly radical internal policies, which gradually developed into a full-scale social revolution purportedly based on the adaptation of Marxist-Leninist ideas to Latin American conditions. Relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly as the result of Castro’s strident anti-Americanism, yielding in October 1960 the expropriation of all U.S. business interests. The United States responded by severing diplomatic relations, imposing a trade embargo, and supporting an ill-fated invasion by anti-Castro Cuban exiles (at the Bay of Pigs) in April 1961. Coincident with the decline in U.S.-Cuban relations, Castro cultivated increasingly close ties with the Communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, whose emplacement of offensive missiles in Cuba precipitated the U.S.-Soviet “missile crisis” of October 1962. Thereafter, the Castro government consolidated its internal authority, aided in part by the departure of thousands of disaffected Cubans, most of whom settled in the United States. In the fifth general election on April 30 and May 7, 1989, 14,246 delegates were elected to local municipal bodies, with subsequent indirect election to provincial and national assemblies. Thereafter, at a party Central Committee meeting in January 1990, it was decided that the responsibilities of the municipal and provincial assemblies would be strengthened and that the National Assembly would be converted from a largely ceremonial body into a genuine parliament. Thus, on February 24, 1993, the National Assembly was for the first time directly elected, although the sole antiregime option (exercised by 11.6 percent of the participants) was to vote against the nominees, all of whom were elected. Heightened isolation and economic distress prompted a series of major policy changes in 1993. On July 26 the government announced that Cuban citizens would thenceforth be allowed to possess

CUBA

Political Status: Independent republic founded in 1902; under Marxist-inspired regime established January 1, 1959; designated a Communist system in December 1961; present constitution adopted February 16, 1976. Area: 42,803 sq. mi. (110,860 sq. km.). Population: 9,723,605 (1981C); 11,249,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): HAVANA (2,244,000), Santiago de Cuba (434,000), Camag¨uey (311,000), Holgu´ın (285,000), Santa Clara (216,000), Guant´anamo (215,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Peso (official rate November 2, 2007: approximately 1 pesos = $1.22US). There are two pesos used in Cuba. One, the “regular” peso, is used for state salaries and government goods and services. The “convertible peso” is used by visiting foreigners and by Cubans for most goods and services. It had been pegged at 1.00 convertible peso = $1US for many years until the government announced two revaluations in the first half of 2005 (2006 exchange rate quoted above). The regular peso as of November 2, 2007, was trading at approximately 25 regular pesos = 1 convertible peso. Meanwhile, the dollar, which had been permitted to circulate since 1993, had ceased being accepted as legal tender as of November 8, 2004, by order of President Castro.

and spend U.S. dollars and other convertible currencies. Two days later, restrictions on exile visitations were ended, and on September 9 selfemployment in 117 occupations, encompassing individuals such as computer programmers, hairdressers, taxi drivers, and sellers of farm products, was legalized. In late October the new self-employed sector was declared “subject to progressive taxation, based on income” as part of a new revenue system designed to “re-establish order” in the state’s finances. One indicator of such a need was a sharp decline in the sugar harvest (an estimated 4.2 million tons, as contrasted with 7.0 million tons in 1992), which had forced suspension of sugar exports for a six-week period at midyear.

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President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers, and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba: (See headnote.) Fidel CASTRO Ruz; assumed office of Prime Minister in 1959; became First Secretary of the Communist Party on October 2, 1965; named President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers by the National Assembly on December 2, 1976; reappointed in 1981, 1986, 1993, 1998, and on March 16, 2003. Acting President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers: (See headnote.) Gen. Ra´ul CASTRO Ruz; designated First Vice President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers by the National Assembly on December 2, 1976; reappointed in 1981, 1986, 1993, 1998, and on March 16, 2003; named Acting President on July 31, 2006, following incapacitation of the president. Vice Presidents of the Council of State: Juan ALMEIDA Bosque, Corps Gen. Abelardo COLOME Ibarra, Carlos LAGE D´avila, Juan Esteban LAZO Hern´andez, Jos´e Ram´on MACHADO Ventura. Almeida has served since 1976; Machado was designated in December 1986; Colom´e, Lage, and Lazo were appointed on March 15, 1993, to replace Osmany CIENFUEGOS Gorriar´an, Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ Rodr´ıguez, and Pedro MIRET Prieto. All five incumbent vice presidents were reappointed on February 24, 1998, and on March 16, 2003.

The first major antigovernment riot in 35 years erupted on August 5, 1994, after police in Havana had intervened to prevent would-be emigrants from seizing a ferry and sailing it to Florida. (For a summary of the 1994 emigration crisis, see Foreign relations, below.) However, by mid-1995, in the wake of modest economic recovery, domestic opposition to the regime appeared to have waned. The second election to the National Assembly was held on January 11, 1998, with the 601 candidates approved by the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) again facing a “yes or no” decision from the voters. All of the candidates received the required 50 percent endorsement in what was officially reported as a 98 percent turnout. (President Castro hailed the election as a “vote of unity” by his

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country.) On February 24 the new assembly reappointed Castro to another five-year term as President of the Council of State. All six incumbent vice presidents were also reappointed (including Castro’s brother, First Vice President Ra´ul CASTRO Ruz, who had reportedly been exercising growing governmental influence), although some new members were included in the rest of the Council. The third direct election of assembly deputies was held on January 19, 2003. The results were identical to those of 1998, except that the number of members had been increased to 609. Following the poll, President Castro and all six incumbent vice presidents were again reappointed. On July 31, 2006, President Castro was hospitalized for an undisclosed but obviously serious internal illness, and he ceded power, on a provisional basis, to his brother Raul.

Constitution and Government A revised basic law, which had been under preparation for nearly a decade, was approved at the first PCC congress in December 1975, adopted by popular referendum on February 16, 1976, and declared in effect eight days later, on the anniversary of the commencement of the 1898 war of Cuban independence. It provided for an indirectly elected National Assembly, which, under a 1991 amendment, was changed to a directly elected body. The Assembly designates a Council of State from among its membership. The Council of State appoints a Council of Ministers in consultation with its president, who serves as head of state and, in his role of president of the Council of Ministers, as chief of government. The judiciary consists of a People’s Supreme Court in addition to intermediate and local courts. Members of the judiciary (as well as of the state council and cabinet) are subject to legislative recall. Under the 1976 constitution, Cuba’s 6 traditional provinces were abandoned in favor of a 14-province structure, with provincial assemblies designed to encourage greater popular involvement in government. Members of the provincial assemblies are drawn from 169 popularly elected municipal as-

semblies, an earlier provision for intraprovincial regional assemblies having been dropped following a “popular power” experiment in Matanzas Province in June 1975. Members of the municipal and provincial assemblies serve for terms of twoand-one-half years, while the National Assembly sits for five years. In mid-1991 the existing terms of both the national and subnational assemblies were extended, with municipal elections being held on December 20, 1992, and provincial and national assembly balloting taking place on February 24, 1993. The 1991 adoption of direct and secret balloting did not authorize opposition formations, and “the final objective of building a Communist society” was reaffirmed. However, in calling for socialist ownership of the means of production, the wording was revised to “basic means of production,” while (then) National Assembly president Juan ESCALONA Reguera subsequently declared that retention of the one-party system was necessary because of the U.S. economic blockade. In other changes, all references to the Soviet Union were deleted, the state’s religious orientation was characterized as laical rather than atheistic, and the sanctioning of “mixed enterprises” opened the door to joint ventures with foreign investors. In September 1995 investment rules were further relaxed to permit 100 percent foreign ownership, equality of opportunity for e´ migr´e investors, and free remittance abroad of profits and capital.

Foreign Relations Partly because of its attempt to promote Castrotype revolutions throughout Latin America, Cuba was for a number of years ostracized by most other Latin American governments. It was excluded from participation in the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1962, and the OAS imposed diplomatic and commercial sanctions in 1964. However, following the 1967 death in Bolivia of the Argentine-born revolutionary Ernesto (“Ch´e”) GUEVARA, the Castro regime scaled down its support of external guerrilla activity, and by 1974 a number of OAS states had moved to

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reestablish relations. In July 1975 the OAS itself, while not formally lifting the sanctions, adopted a resolution stating that its members would thenceforth be “free to normalize” relations with Havana. Although Cuba no longer stands out as a selfproclaimed nemesis of other Latin American governments, its foreign relations were long shaped by an ingrained hostility toward the United States and other established governments in the Americas, and by a corresponding affinity for revolutionary movements around the world. In March 1969 it became the first country to accord formal recognition to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and during 1975 initiated a major program of military assistance to the Soviet-backed regime in Angola. As host of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State of the Nonaligned Movement in September 1979, it sought, with some success, to identify the “socialist camp” as the “natural ally” of the third world movement. Subsequently, Havana served as a conduit for the flow of military and other assistance to the sandinista government of Nicaragua. During 1981 Havana’s international posture was dominated by a massive emigration of Cuban citizens after President Castro had indicated that Cuban exiles in the United States would be permitted to pick up anyone who wished to leave from the port of Mariel. Subsequently, more than 114,000 Cubans departed by boat for Florida. In the wake of the Grenada crisis in October 1983, Cuban relations with the United States and the region at large fell to their lowest ebb in years, Cuba being placed in a “state of national alert.” Although there were indications of a thaw in 1984, with formal talks on the status of the Mariel refugees leading to a December 1984 immigration agreement, the accord was suspended by Havana in May 1985 after Radio Mart´ı, an “alternative” radio station directed at Cuba, had commenced transmissions from Florida. Five years later, following the U.S. launching of a companion TV Mart´ı, the government initiated 24-hour jamming of the broadcasts. A major foreign policy development in 1988 stemmed from a series of U.S.-mediated discussions among Cuban, Angolan, and South African

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representatives that commenced in London in May and concluded at UN headquarters in New York on December 22 with the signing of an accord for the withdrawal of an estimated 40,000–50,000 Cuban troops from Angola, coupled with South African acceptance of a 1978 Security Council resolution demanding UN-supervised elections for an independent Namibia. Under the agreement, which followed the departure of South African forces from Angola in September, Cuba pledged to withdraw its troops during a 30-month period. A similar pullout from Ethiopia (where nearly 15,000 Cubans had been deployed at the height of the Ogaden war) was completed in September 1989. In September 1991 Havana, reeling from the withdrawal of Soviet economic support (the Soviet Union would dissolve officially on December 31, 1991), reacted angrily to Moscow’s unilateral declaration that it would soon remove all of its military personnel from the island. It termed the announcement, made without reference to the presence of U.S. troops at Guant´anamo Bay, an “unconditional concession” that provided the United States with a “green light to go ahead with its aggressive plans against Cuba.” Nonetheless, the two governments agreed in September 1992 that the former Soviet military brigade that had been on the island since the 1962 missile crisis would be withdrawn by mid-1993. Earlier, in mid-August, a foreign office spokesperson indicated that Cuba was prepared to accede to the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty (see OPANAL, under Intergovernmental Organizations), a pledge that was fulfilled in March 1995. In October 1992 U.S. President George H. W. Bush signed the Cuban Democracy Act (popularly known as the “Torricelli Law”), which tightened the U.S. economic embargo by making it illegal for overseas subsidiaries of U.S. firms to trade with Cuba. In an unusually strong response, the UN General Assembly voted 59 to 3, with 92 abstentions, to support repeal of the measure, reflecting a steady erosion of the U.S. position. A similar vote in November 1995 yielded a drastically enhanced majority of 117–3–38, while the 14th such poll in 2005 was 182–4–1, with the Marshall Islands and Palau joining the United States and Israel in

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opposition. In actions reflecting Washington’s lack of political consensus, President Bill Clinton in October 1995 eased a number of constraints, including certain impediments to travel and communication, despite the approval, only days before, of a congressional bill to tighten the embargo. Earlier, a crisis had arisen over Cuban “boat people.” Castro, in evident frustration with U.S. intransigence over the embargo, announced in August 1994 that Cubans would no longer be prevented from leaving. More than 13,000 promptly did so (more than the total for the preceding decade). President Clinton reacted by declaring that Cubans arriving in Florida would be accorded the same treatment as Haitians in being denied automatic refugee status. The crisis eased late in the month when Clinton endorsed bilateral talks on “legal, orderly, and safe migration,” and on September 9 an agreement was concluded whereby Havana would reintroduce restrictions on “unsafe departures,” while the United States would move toward compliance with a 1984 agreement to issue up to 20,000 entry visas a year. The status of about 22,000 Cubans being held at Guant´anamo was eventually resolved in early May 1995, with Washington agreeing to admit them to the United States, while Havana agreed to accept the return of any further migrants attempting to reach the United States by sea. During 1998 the Castro regime participated in a number of initiatives designed to end its diplomatic isolation. In March Havana announced that it would launch negotiations to become the 16th member of Caricom and expressed an interest in becoming a member of the EU-affiliated African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. In early April Spain restored relations that had been severed 16 months earlier over the issue of Cuban dissidents at its embassy, and later in the month Jean Chr´etien made the first visit to Cuba by a Canadian prime minister. In mid-June a repatriation agreement was concluded with the Bahamas, while President Castro embarked on state visits to Jamaica, Barbados, Grenada, and the Dominican Republic during July and August. Thereafter, in what was viewed as a harbinger of “return” to the regional community,

Cuba on November 6 was admitted to full membership in the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI). Relations with the United States in late 1999 and the first half of 2000 were dominated by a custody battle over Eli´an GONZALEZ, whose mother and stepfather were among 11 Cuban nationals who drowned in an attempt to reach Florida on November 25, 1999. Despite demands by his natural father, Juan Miguel GONZALEZ, that Eli´an be returned to Cuba, family relatives in Miami obtained a temporary custody order. In March 2000 a federal court effectively upheld a decision by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to send the boy back to Cuba, and on April 6 Juan Miguel arrived to claim his son. The two were reunited after INS agents had forcibly seized Eli´an in the early morning of April 22 and remained secluded thereafter in Washington, D.C., until June 28, when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to preclude their embarking for Havana. On April 12, 2000, President Castro called for abolition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in an attack on the global capitalistic system during a Group of 77 summit in Havana. Fifteen days later, Cuba withdrew its ACP application after the European Union had voted with the United States in favor of a UN resolution that criticized Cuba’s record on human rights. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Havana in December 2000, the first such visit by a Russian leader since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The trip was described as an effort to “mend the ravaged relations” between the two countries, and several cooperation agreements were signed. Diplomatically, little reference was made to the estimated $20 billion Soviet-era debt still owed by Cuba, although several partially completed projects envisioned by the earlier lending were reportedly scrapped. At the United States’ insistence, Cuba was excluded from the Summit of the Americas held in Quebec, Canada, in April 2001, which endorsed establishment of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), in which Cuba was also not permitted to participate. When former U.S. President

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Jimmy Carter traveled to Cuba in May 2002, the U.S. administration of President George W. Bush criticized Carter for his suggestion that Washington consider ending the embargo. Among other things, Carter met with Cuban dissident Oswaldo PAYA, who had attracted international attention by submitting a petition to the National Assembly calling for a national referendum on the extension of political freedom. Relations with the United States deteriorated in 2003, even though U.S. food sales to Cuba surged and, despite retention of the embargo for most commodities, the United States by early 2004 had become Cuba’s seventh-largest trading partner. In June 2004 the Bush administration announced a series of measures drastically increasing restrictions on travel to the island. Under the new rules, CubanAmericans could visit only once every three years, instead of once a year, and more stringent limits were imposed on the amount of cash and baggage that could be carried. By contrast, a number of U.S. congressional delegations have traveled to Cuba, the largest a tenmember bipartisan group headed by U.S. Representative Jeff FLAKE that visited Havana on December 15–17, 2006. Upon his return, Flake asserted that Castro’s illness was an opportunity for the two countries to become reengaged, while warning that in the event of the Cuban leader’s death, “the chaos that many [have] predicted isn’t going to happen.” In a slap at the United States, Cuba in early 2006 won a seat on the recently launched UN Human Rights Council, formed as successor to the discredited UN Commission on Human Rights, which in April 2004, by a margin of one vote, had approved a motion censuring Cuba for human rights abuses.

Current Issues By early 2007 the dominant issue in Cuban affairs was Fidel Castro’s condition. Before entering the hospital, the Cuban leader said that relinquishing authority to his brother was “provisional” and requested that celebrations planned for his 80th birthday be deferred until the 50th Anniversary of the Revolutionary Armed Forces on December 2.

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However, he remained a hospital patient, with medical reports largely unavailable, except for assurances that, while afflicted with internal bleeding, he did not have cancer. Meanwhile, Ra´ul Castro displayed what appeared to be a new, if somewhat enigmatic, leadership style. While sharing Fidel’s deep-rooted antiAmericanism and opposition to political democracy, he was seen by some as favoring the Chinese example of opening up the economy, including lifting restrictions on foreign investment. Fueling such speculation was the fact that he had made a number of trips to China, whose trade with Cuba more than doubled to US$1.8 billion in 2006. On the other hand, National Assembly President Ricardo ALARCON de Quesada insisted in January 2007 that Cuba was not China and Ra´ul was not “Cuba’s Deng Xiaoping.” He went on to report that Fidel remained “very involved, very connected, very active in all manner of important decisions,” although not in “the same way he did before, because he has to dedicate a good part of his time to recuperating physically.” Gradual improvement in the stricken leader’s condition was subsequently reported, and in mid-April Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez, a close friend and ally, insisted that, although remaining hospitalized, Castro had “almost totally recovered” and had “reassumed a good part of his duties.”

Political Parties Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista Cubano—PCC). The country’s only authorized political party, the PCC is a direct descendant of the Rebel Army and the 26th of July Movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio), which constituted Fidel Castro’s personal political following during the anti-Batista period. The organizational revolution began in 1961 with the formation of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas—ORI), which included the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular—PSP), the 26th of July Movement, and the Revolutionary Directorate (Directorio Revolucionario—DR). The ORI was

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transformed into the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution (Partido Unido de la Revoluci´on Socialista Cubana—PURSC) in 1963, the latter being redesignated as the Communist Party of Cuba in 1965. The first PCC congress was held December 17–22, 1975, and the second December 17–20, 1980. The third congress, which held its first session February 4–7, 1986, reconvened November 30–December 2, primarily to discuss a campaign aimed at the “rectification of mistakes and negative tendencies” that had been launched by President Castro in July. The rectification campaign received added emphasis at an extraordinary plenum on February 16, 1990, during which the Central Committee reiterated its commitment to one-party MarxismLeninism, which should, however, be “adapted to Cuban mentality, history and traditions.” During its fourth congress, held in Santiago de Cuba October 10–14, 1991, the PCC endorsed direct election to the National Assembly, dropped a requirement that only atheists could become party members, abolished the party Secretariat and the appointment of alternates to other party organs, and approved a substantially restructured Politburo from which five existing members were excluded. In July 1994 numerous changes in provincial leaders were announced as part of a revamping of political cadres. The party’s fifth congress was held in Havana October 8–10, 1997. At a Plenary Party Meeting on July 1, 2006, a new 12-member Executive Committee was launched, seemingly as a resuscitation of the former Secretariat. In addition, seven additions to the Central Committee were announced, including Fran´ Vald´es, president of the National cisco SOBERON Bank, and six provincial first secretaries. First Secretary: Dr. Fidel CASTRO Ruz (President, State Council and Council of Ministers). Acting First Secretary: Gen. Ra´ul CASTRO Ruz (Acting President, State Council and Council of Ministers). Other Members of Politburo: Ricardo ALARCON de Quesada (President of National Assembly), Juan ALMEIDA Bosque (Vice President, State Council), Jos´e Ram´on BALAGUER

Cabrera (International Relations Chief, Central Committee), Concepci´on CAMPA Huergo (Director of Finlay Institute), Miguel Diaz CANEL Berm´udez (First Secretary, Villa Clara Provincial Committee), Lt. Gen. Julio CASAS Regueiro (First Deputy Minister, Revolutionary Armed Forces), Gen. Leopoldo CINTRA Fr´ıas (Chief, Western Army), Gen. Abelardo COLOME Ibarra (Vice President, State Council, and Interior Minister), Misael ENAMORADO Dager (First Secretary, Las Tunas Provincial Committee), Gen. Ramon ESPINOSA Mart´ın (Chief, Eastern Army), Alfredo ´ Morales (former Agriculture Minister), JORDAN Carlos LAGE D´avila (Vice President, State Council and Secretary, Council of Ministers), Esteb´an LAZO Hern´andez (Vice President, State Council), Jos´e Ram´on MACHADO Ventura (Vice President, State Council), Abel Enrique PRIETO Jim´enez (Culture Minister), Juan Carlos ROBINSON Agramonte (First Secretary Santiago de Cuba Provincial Committee), Lt. Gen. Ulises ROSALES del Toro (Sugar Minister), Pedro ROSS Leal (Secretary General, Confederation of Cuban Workers), Pedro SAEZ Montejo (First Secretary, Havana City Provincial Committee), Jorge Luis SIERRA Cruz (First Secretary, Holgu´ın Provincial Committee).

Dissident Groups There are numberous dissident groups that tend to fluctuate, in part as their leaders are jailed or released. Many have appealed, without success, for official recognition. As of early 2007 about 365 such groups had joined an Assembly to Promote the Civil Society in Cuba (Asamblea para Primover la Sociedad Civil en Cuba), led by Martha Beatriz ROQUE Cabello.

Legislature A unicameral National Assembly of People’s Power (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular) was convened, with a five-year term, on December 2, 1976, following elections (the first since 1958) to municipal assemblies, which in turn had elected delegates to both provincial and national legislative

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Cabinet As of May 1, 2007 see headnote President, Council of Ministers

Fidel Castro Ruz

Ministers Acting President, Council of Ministers Vice President, Council of Ministers Executive Committee Vice Presidents, Council of Ministers

Gen. Ra´ul Castro Ruz Jos´e Ramon Fern´andez Alvarez Osmany Cienfuegos Gorriar´an Carlos Lage D´avila Gen. Pedro Miret Prieto Jos´e Luis Rodr´ıguez Garci´a

Ministers Agriculture Auditing and Control Basic Industry Computer Science and Communications Construction Culture Domestic Trade Economy and Planning Education Finance and Prices Fishing Industry Food Industry Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation Foreign Relations Foreign Trade Higher Education Interior Iron, Steel, and Engineering Industry Justice Labor and Social Security Light Industry Public Health Revolutionary Armed Forces Science, Technology, and Environment Sugar Industry Tourism Transportation Without Portfolio President, National Bank of Cuba Secretary, Council of Ministers Executive Committee [f] = female

Maria del Carmen P´erez Hern´andez (Acting) [f] Gladys Maria Bejarano Portera [f] Yadir´a Garc´ıa Vera [f] Ramiro Valdes Mendez Fidel Fernando Figueroa de la Paz Abel Enrique Prieto Jim´enez Marino Murillo Jorge Jos´e Luis Rodr´ıguez Garc´ıa Luis Ignacio G´omez Guti´errez Georgina Barreiro Fajardo [f] Alfredo L´opez Vald´es Alejandro Roca Iglesias Marta Lomas Morales [f] Felipe Ram´on P´erez Roque Ra´ul de la Nuez Ram´ırez Juan Vela Valdes Gen. Abelardo Colom´e Ibarra Fernando Acosta Santana Roberto D´ıaz Sotolongo Alfredo Morales Cartaya Estela Martha Dom´ınguez Ariosa [f] Jos´e Ram´on Balaguer Cabrera Gen. Ra´ul Castro Ruz Fernando Mario Gonz´alez Berm´udez (Acting) Gen. Ulises Rosales del Toro Col. Manuel Marrero Cruz Jorge Luis Sierra Ricardo Cabrisas Ru´ız Wilfredo L´opez Rodr´ıguez Francisco Sober´on Vald´es Carlos Lage D´avila

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bodies. A similar procedure was used to elect assemblies that convened in December 1981 and December 1986. In July 1991 the assembly voted to extend its existing mandate by one year to consider reform proposals within the one-party context. The second direct election to the nationwide body was held on January 11, 1998, coincident with replenishment of the provincial assemblies. All 601 candidates approved by the Communist Party of Cuba received the 50 percent favorable vote required for election. (The assembly had been enlarged from 589 to 601 members for the balloting; however, when the new body convened, its membership was reported to be 595.) The most recent poll, for 609 members, was held on January 19, 2003. President: Ricardo ALARCON de Quesada.

Communications The press is censored and all channels of communication are under state control.

Press The following newspapers are published in Havana, unless otherwise noted: Granma, official PCC organ, morning and weekly editions; Juventud Rebelde, organ of the Communist Youth; Los Trabajadores, labor oriented; Tribuna de la Habana; Adelante (Camag¨uey); Sierra Maestra (Santiago de Cuba); Vanguardia (Santa Clara). Circulation figures are currently unknown because of the introduction of restrictions in the availability of newsprint to all papers (including party organs) in late 1990. In addition, it was announced in February 1991 that Granma would thenceforth be issued only from Tuesday to Saturday, while Juventud Rebelde and Los Trabajadores would appear only on Sunday and Monday, respectively.

News Agencies The domestic facilities are the governmentcontrolled Prensa Latina and Agencia de Informa-

ci´on Nacional (AIN). A large number of foreign agencies maintain offices in Havana.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is controlled by the Ministry of Communications and the Instituto Cubano de Radio y Televisi´on. There are five national radio networks (classical music, instrumental music, general entertainment, music and sports, 24-hour news) in addition to short-wave service provided by Radio Habana, Cuba; about 50 TV stations operate throughout the country. As of 2005 there were approximately 17 Internet users and 34 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 255 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people. In March 1994 an independent panel established by the U.S. Congress recommended changes in television broadcasts to Cuba, including conversion of TV Mart´ı transmissions from VHF (confined to predawn hours because of a requirement under international law not to interfere with local programming) to UHF (thus affording prime-time programming because Cuba did not use the latter channels).

Intergovernmental Representation There are, at present, no diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States. On September 1, 1977, however, a U.S. interest section was established in the Swiss Embassy in Havana; concurrently, a Cuban interest section was established in the Czech Embassy in Washington, which moved to the Swiss Embassy after the post-Communist Czech government announced in early 1990 that it no longer wished to serve as Havana’s “protecting power” in the United States. Permanent Representative to the UN: Rodrigo MALMIERCA D´IAZ IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, ALADI, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

DOMINICA COMMONWEALTH

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DOMINICA

The Country The largest of the West Indies Associated States as constituted in 1967, Dominica is located between Guadeloupe and Martinique in the Windward Islands of the eastern Caribbean. Claimed by both France and Great Britain until coming under the latter’s exclusive control in 1805, the island continues to reflect pronounced French influence. Most of its inhabitants are descended from West African slaves who were imported as plantation laborers in the 17th and 18th centuries, although a few hundred members of the Carib Indian tribe, which once controlled the entire Caribbean and gave the area its name, remain. Roman Catholicism is the dominant religion, but there are also long-established Anglican and Methodist communities. One of the poorest and least developed of third world countries, Dominica was devastated by hurricanes in 1979 and 1980, which virtually destroyed the economy. Particularly hard hit was banana production, which typically accounts for about 70 percent of the country’s exports. An increase in tourist arrivals, some inflow of foreign capital in support of labor-intensive export industry, and improved banana output subsequently yielded a measure of economic recovery, although sustained development has been hindered by poor infrastructure, including an inadequate road system, and the ravages of further major hurricanes (notably Hugo in September 1989 and Luis in September 1995). Real GDP growth in 1994 was reported to be 2.1 percent, as contrasted with 6.6 percent in 1990, while unemployment was approximately 23 percent. The growth rate fluctuated thereafter, despite good showing by tourism and nonbanana agriculture, because of hurricane-induced banana losses,

registering an estimated 3.5 percent in 1998 but dropping to 0.3 percent in 1999. It declined further to –5.2 percent in 2002 but revived thereafter, reaching 3.1 percent in 2005.

Government and Politics Political Background An object of contention between Britain and France in the 18th century, Dominica was administered after 1833 as part of the British Leeward Islands. In 1940 it was incorporated into the Windward Islands, which also included Grenada,

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St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. It participated in the Federation of the West Indies from 1958 to 1962 and became one of the six internally self-governing West Indies Associated States in March 1967. The West Indies Act of 1966 stipulated that the islands’ external dependency on Britain was completely voluntary and could be terminated by either party at any time. Thus, having failed to agree on a plan for regional unity, the Associated States declared in December 1975 that each would separately seek full independence. The details of an independence constitution for Dominica were discussed at a London conference in May 1977, and in July 1978 both houses of Parliament approved an Order in Council terminating the association as of November 3. Pending a new election, the existing premier, Patrick Roland JOHN, was designated prime minister, while the incumbent governor, Sir Louis COOLS-LARTIQUE, continued as interim chief of state. Following government rejection of an opposition nominee for president, the speaker of the House, Fred E. DEGAZON, was elected to the largely ceremonial post by the legislature and was sworn in December 22, 1978. Subsequently, in the wake of an extended general strike and a series of opposition demonstrations in Roseau, President Degazon retired to Britain, his successor, Sir Cools-Lartique, also being forced to resign only 24 hours after his return to office on June 15, 1979. On June 21 Prime Minister John was obliged to step down after a number of his legislative supporters had moved into opposition, the interim president, Jenner ARMOUR, designating former agriculture minister Oliver James SERAPHINE as his successor. In the legislative balloting on July 21, 1980, both Seraphine and John were denied reelection, and Mary Eugenia CHARLES of the victorious Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) was asked by President Aurelius MARIE (who had succeeded Armour in late February) to form a new government. There were two attempts by supporters of former prime minister John to overthrow the government in 1981, the second of which included an effort to free him from a jail term that had been imposed

under a state of emergency. Following his acquittal and release from prison in June 1982, John moved to reunify the opposition Democratic Labour Party (DLP), from which Seraphine had withdrawn in 1979. The effort succeeded in mid-1983, Seraphine being designated DLP leader and John his deputy. In early 1985 opposition forces further closed ranks as the DLP absorbed the United Democratic Labour Party (UDLP) and the Dominica Liberation Movement Alliance (DLMA), although the enlarged group failed to oust the DFP in the parliamentary election of July 1. Subsequently, John was convicted on retrial of the 1981 conspiracy charge, being sentenced in October to 12 years in prison; he was released on May 29, 1990, after having served only four and one-half years of his sentence and in late 1991 was appointed general secretary of the National Workers’ Union. Prime Minister Charles remained in office following the May 1990 election, at which the DFP retained a bare one-seat majority of Assembly seats. While continuing as prime minister, Charles stepped down as party leader on August 14, 1993, in favor of Brian ALLEYNE. However, Alleyne proved unable to prevent a one-seat victory on June 12, 1995, by the United Workers’ Party (UWP), whose leader, Edison JAMES, was named to form a new government. Since the DFP and DLP had each won five seats, Alleyne accepted appointment as leader of the opposition with the understanding that he would withdraw after one year in favor of the DLP’s Roosevelt (Rosie) DOUGLAS; however, the change was mandated only a month after the election when a DFP victor was declared ineligible for parliamentary service (although subsequently reinstated). In August 1996 Alleyne resigned his parliamentary seat to accept a judicial appointment in Grenada, the DFP again being reduced to thirdparty status by losing the ensuing by-election. The DLP won 10 of 21 elective Assembly seats in the election of January 31, 2000, Douglas being named prime minister as head of a coalition with the DFP on February 3. Following Douglas’s death on October 1, the deputy DLP leader, Pierre CHARLES, was sworn in as his successor.

DOMINICA

Political Status: Former British dependency; joined West Indies Associated States in 1967; independent member of the Commonwealth since November 3, 1978. Area: 290.5 sq. mi. (752.4 sq. km.). Population: 71,727 (2001C); 69,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): ROSEAU (14,000). Official Language: English (a French patois is widely spoken). Monetary Unit: East Caribbean Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2.70 EC dollars = $1US). President: Nicholas LIVERPOOL; elected by the House of Assembly on October 2, 2003, and inaugurated for a five-year term on October 6, succeeding Vernon SHAW. Prime Minister: Roosevelt SKERRIT (Dominica Labour Party); sworn in January 8, 2004, to succeed Pierre CHARLES (Dominica Labour Party), who died on January 6; remained in office following election of May 5, 2005.

No major government changes were made at that time, although a downsized and reshuffled cabinet was announced in June 2001. Charles died on January 6, 2004, and was succeeded two days later by Roosevelt SKERRIT, who, at age 31, became the world’s youngest head of government and remained in office following the election of May 5, 2005. Subsequently, September 6 marked the death of the “Iron Lady of the Caribbean” and the region’s first female prime minister, Dame Mary Eugenia Charles.

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agreement between the two. The president may not hold office for more than two terms. Parliament consists of the president and a House of Assembly, which includes one representative from each electoral constituency (as defined by an Electoral Boundaries Commission) and nine senators who, according to the wishes of the legislature, may be either elected or appointed (five on the advice of the prime minister and four on the advice of the leader of the opposition). The term of the House is five years, subject to dissolution. The president appoints as prime minister the elected member who commands a majority in the House; in addition, he may remove the prime minister from office if, following a no-confidence vote, the latter does not resign or request a dissolution. Provision is made for a Public Service Commission to make appointments to and exercise disciplinary control over the public service, as well as for a Police Service Commission and a Public Service Board of Appeal. The court system embraces the Supreme Court of the West Indies Associated States (redesignated, in respect of Dominica, as the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court), courts of summary jurisdiction, and district courts (the latter dealing with minor criminal offenses and civil cases involving sums of not more than $EC500). In late 2004 Parliament approved legislation for Dominica’s participation in the Trinidad-based Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), replacing the London-based Privy Council as the country’s final court of appeal. Partially elected local government bodies function in the principal towns and villages, with Roseau and Portsmouth controlled by town councils consisting of both elected and nominated members.

Constitution and Government Under the constitution that became effective at independence, the Commonwealth of Dominica is a “sovereign democratic republic” based on a respect for the principles of social justice. The head of state is a president who is elected for a fiveyear term by the legislature after joint nomination by the prime minister and the leader of the opposition, or by secret ballot in the event of dis-

Foreign Relations Although Dominica was admitted to the Commonwealth at independence and to the United Nations shortly thereafter, its diplomatic ties are extremely limited. It maintains only token representation in Washington, most official contacts with the United States being maintained through the U.S. ambassador to Barbados, who is also accredited

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to Roseau. Regional memberships include the Organization of American States (OAS) and various Caribbean groupings, including the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). Closely allied with the United States, upon which it relies heavily for foreign aid, Dominica joined the multinational force that participated in the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada in October 1983 (see article on Grenada), and endorsed the U.S. bombing of Libya in April 1986. However, formal diplomatic ties were established between Dominica and Libya in early 2001, prompting Tripoli to promise significant development aid. Dominica also signed several social and economic cooperation agreements with Cuba in 2001. More importantly, it switched relations with Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China in early 2004, after China had offered a $12 million aid package. Prime Minister Charles supported an effort by St. Vincent’s James Mitchell to persuade the seven OECS members to form a unitary government. Given no discernable progress in the matter, Dominica joined with its Windward Island neighbors to launch a four-member grouping. During the third meeting of a Regional Constituent Assembly in Roseau, Dominica, in September 1991, agreement was reached on a federal system with a common legislature and executive. However, no further action on the less inclusive structure has yet taken place. A long-standing dispute has centered on the status of tiny Bird Island (Isla de Aves), 70 miles west of Dominica but controlled by Venezuela, some 350 miles to the south. In 2001 Dominica asked its Caribbean neighbors for support in pursuing its claim to the island, which falls within competing maritime economic zones. The action was sharply rebuffed by Venezuela, which in 2005 established a naval base on the island. In June 2006 Prime Minister Skerritt conceded that the international community recognized Venezuelan sovereignty over the island and announced that a bipartisan commission would be established to delineate the maritime boundary. Concurrently, it was announced that the two countries had concluded a joint energy agreement to supply oil byproducts to Dominica.

Current Issues Dominca’s small size has made it extremely vulnerable to external pressures, including, most importantly, those from Venezuela, which manifestly used “oil diplomacy” in gaining its way on the Bird Island dispute. In September 2006, two months after Skeritt’s reversal on the issue, Venezuela agreed to provide Dominica with up to 1,000 barrels of fuel oil per day under low-interest financing and to join a feasibility study on the construction of a smallscale refinery to supply oil to other Caribbean countries. Earlier, President Liverpool had broached a number of constitutional reforms, including direct election of the president to serve for a five-year term as both head of state and head of government.

Political Parties The Dominican party system has been in a state of considerable flux since independence. In early 1979 a number of parliamentary members of the original Dominica Labour Party (DLP) withdrew under the leadership of Oliver Seraphine to form the Democratic Labour Party (subsequently the Dominica Democratic Labour Party—DDLP), while the cabinet named by Seraphine on June 21 drew on a recently organized Committee of National Salvation (CNS)—an alliance of former opposition groups that included the Dominica Freedom Party (DFP), headed by Eugenia Charles. The CNS was, however, divided between a leftwing faction, representing trade-union interests, and the traditionally conservative DFP. Another component of the CNS, the National Alliance Party (NAP), had recently been formed by Michael A. DOUGLAS, who subsequently became finance minister in the Seraphine government. The 1980 election was contested by a rump of the DLP, led by Patrick John; the DDLP; the DFP; and a recently organized Dominica Liberation Movement Alliance (DLMA). The principal contenders in 1985 were the DFP and the Labour Party of Dominica (LPD), with the recently formed United Workers’ Party (UWP) becoming a serious

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contender in 1990 and securing a legislative majority in 1995. In 2000 the DLP won a plurality and formed a coalition government with the DFP as its junior partner.

Government Parties Dominica Labour Party (DLP). The present DLP was formed in early 1985 by merger of the preexisting Dominica Labour Party (DLP), the United Dominica Labour Party (UDLP), and the Dominica Liberation Movement Alliance (DLMA). The dominant party after the 1975 election, the DLP was weakened by the defection of Oliver Seraphine and others in 1979 as well as by a variety of charges against party leader Patrick John, including an allegation that, as prime minister, he had attempted to secure South African backing for a number of developmental projects. The DLP won no seats in the 1980 election, and John was subsequently charged with attempting to overthrow the government. After leaving the DLP, Seraphine launched the Democratic Labour Party, restyled the Dominica Democratic Labour Party (DDLP) before the 1980 election, at which it secured two Assembly seats without, however, returning its leader. In late 1981 the opposition parliamentarian, Michael Douglas, who claimed to have been designated DDLP leader at a meeting in September, was expelled from the party and organized the UDLP, while Seraphine brought the DDLP back into the DLP in mid-1983. A self-proclaimed “new left” grouping, the DLMA was organized by Atherton MARTIN following his dismissal from the Seraphine government in October 1979, allegedly for advocating closer links to Cuba. In January 1984 an investigation was launched into the activities of the group’s general secretary, William REVIERE, following the discovery, during the Grenada invasion, of letters from him requesting aid from Eastern-bloc countries. In a contest for the DLP leadership, Douglas defeated Seraphine at a merger conference by a vote of 12–3, Seraphine and Henry Dyer, former minister of communications and works in the Charles

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government, being elected deputy leaders. Concurrently, John was named DLP general secretary, a post that he was obliged to vacate, along with his Assembly seat, when he was reimprisoned in October. (John resigned from the party in September 1987 in a move that was interpreted as aimed at securing his freedom.) Despite a dispute as to who would stand in a by-election to replace John, Douglas was reelected party leader at an August 1986 DLP convention; in March 1992 he was reported to be terminally ill with inoperable cancer and on November 29 the annual party convention elected his brother, Rosie Douglas, as his successor. In June 1995 the DLP won five House seats on a third-place vote share of 29.6 percent. Its leader succeeded Brian Alleyne as leader of the opposition when a DFP seat was vacated in July 1995. He became prime minister following the election of January 31, 2000. Douglas died on October 1, 2000, and was succeeded by his (then) deputy party leader, Pierre Charles. Charles died on January 6, 2004, and was succeeded by Roosevelt Skerrit. Leaders: Roosevelt SKERRIT (Prime Minister and Party Leader), Ambrose GEORGE (Deputy Leader), Peter ST. JEAN (Party President). Dominica Freedom Party (DFP). A right-ofcenter grouping long associated with propertied interests in Roseau, the DFP won 17 of 21 elective House of Assembly seats in 1980, 15 in 1985, and a bare majority of 11 in 1990. In August 1993 the party elected Foreign Affairs Minister Brian ALLEYNE to succeed Dame Eugenia Charles as DFP leader after the prime minister’s retirement before the next election. The DFP won a plurality of 35.8 percent of the votes in the balloting of June 12, 1995, but captured only 5 of 21 house seats, one of which was briefly vacated in July 1995 by the High Court, which ruled that the incumbent was a public service employee. In April 1996 Charles Savarin, Dominica’s former ambassador to the European Union, was elected party leader, in succession to Alleyne, who had resigned for “personal and professional reasons.”

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Cabinet As of April 1, 2007 Prime Minister

Roosevelt Skerrit (DLP)

Ministers Agriculture, Fisheries, and Environment Caribbean Affairs and Overseas Nationals Community Development and Gender Affairs Economic Development and Planning Education, Sports and Youth Affairs, and Human Resource Development Energy and Ports Finance and Economic Planning Foreign Affairs and Trade Health and Social Security Housing and Lands Immigration Information and Culture Labor and Public Service Legal Affairs and Attorney General National Security Prime Minister’s Office Telecommunications Tourism, Industry, and Private Sector Relations

Collin McIntyre (DLP) Roosevelt Skerrit (DLP) Matthew Walter (DLP) Julius Timothy Vince Henderson (DLP) Reginald Austrie (DLP) Roosevelt Skerrit (DLP) Charles Savarin (DFP) John Fabien (DFP) Reginald Austrie (DLP) Ian Douglas (DLP) Matthew Walter (DLP) Charles Savarin (DFP) Ian Douglas (DLP) Roosevelt Skerrit (DLP) Rayburn Blackmore (DLP) Reginal Austrie (DLP) Yvor Nassief (DFP)

Junior Ministers Caribbean Affairs Public Works and Public Utilities Tourism and Industry

The DFP won two legislative seats in January 2000, thereafter joining the DLP in a government coalition. Leaders: Charles SAVARIN (Foreign Affairs Minister and Party Leader), Vanoulst Jno CHARLES (President of the Party).

Opposition Party United Workers’ Party (UWP). The UWP was launched in July 1988 by the former general manager of the Dominica Banana Marketing Corporation to “promote sound and orderly development” in the face of an “erosion of basic democratic rights” and a “state of fear in the nation.” The party

Kelly Graneau (DLP) Ambrose George (DLP) Loreen Bannis-Roberts

won six House seats in the 1990 election, supplanting the DLP as the principal opposition grouping. In 1995 it secured a narrow majority of 11 seats on a second-place vote share of 34.4 percent; its margin was strengthened by the acquisition of an additional seat in a by-election in August 1996. It returned to opposition after winning only nine Assembly seats in January 2000, one of which was lost in 2005. Leaders: Earl WILLIAMS (Leader of the Opposition), Ron GREEN (President). Also active are the Dominica Progressive Party (DPP), led by Leonard (Pappy) BAPTISTE; A Righteous Kingdom Party (ARKP), launched

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in early 2005 by Hermina VALENTINE as Dominica’s first Christian party; and the People’s Democratic Movement, formed by William Pava RIVIERE in mid-2006.

Legislature Parliament consists of the president, ex officio, and a House of Assembly that sits for a five-year term and encompasses 21 elected representatives and 9 senators who, at the discretion of the House, may be either appointed or elected, in addition to the speaker and the attorney general. Following the election of May 5, 2005, the Dominica Labour Party held 13 representative seats; and the United Workers’ Party, 8. Speaker: Alix BOYD-KNIGHT.

Communications Press The following are published in Roseau: New Chronicle (3,000), independent weekly; The Trop-

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ical Star (3,000), weekly; Official Gazette (550), weekly.

Broadcasting and Computing The government-operated Dominica Broadcasting Corporation (DBC) provides radio service in English and French patois; two independent subscription services, Marpin Television and Video One, offer cable programs from the United States. As of 2005 there were approximately 182 personal computers and 12 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: (Vacant) U.S. Ambassador to Dominica: Mary Martin OURISMAN (resident in Barbados) Permanent Representative to the UN: Crispin S. GREGOIRE IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OECS, OIF, OPANAL, WTO

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC R E P U´ B L I C A D O M I N I C A N A

The Dominican Republic occupies the eastern two-thirds of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, which it shares with Haiti. The terrain is varied, including mountains, fertile plains, and some desert. About 70 percent of the population is of mixed ancestry, both mestizo and mulatto, with small minorities (about 15 percent each) of pure Caucasian (Spanish) and Negro origin. The cultural tradition is distinctly Spanish, with 98 percent of the people professing allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church. In 2000, not counting unpaid agricultural family workers, 31 percent of the adult female population was in the official labor force. Female representation in government has long been virtually nonexistent, although President Fern´andez named two women to cabinet posts during his first term and three in his second. The Dominican Republic’s economy is primarily agricultural, the leading cash crops being sugar, coffee, cocoa, and tobacco. The agricultural sector employs nearly 50 percent of the labor force and accounts for nearly half of the country’s foreign exchange earnings. Manufacturing is largely oriented toward agricultural processing, but deposits of gold, silver, ferronickel, and bauxite contribute significantly to export earnings. In the 1980s spiraling foreign indebtedness and plummeting commodity prices severely crippled the economy, with austerity measures further inhibiting the capacity of most individuals to meet basic food and shelter needs. During the period unemployment was consistently in excess of 20 percent, with inflation soaring to more than 60 percent in 1989. Partially offsetting a decline in world commodity prices was a surge in tourism, which gave rise to an increas-

ingly active service sector. As a result, economic growth rose to 8.3 percent in 1999 (one of the world’s highest such increases), with inflation dropping to less than 6.0 percent. By 2003, however, the country again faced economic crisis, with mounting public debt, surging inflation, and economic contraction of –1.0 percent. Thereafter, a series of comprehensive macroeconomic policies by President Fern´andez generated another resurgence, with 2005 showing a 7.0 percent increase in GDP, a decline in inflation to 7.4 percent, and a reduction in unemployment to 17 percent. Further growth of 10.7 percent in 2006, with inflation at 5.0 percent,

AT L A N T IC O C E A N Monte Cristi

Puerto Plata Santiago de los Caballeros

HAITI

The Country

San Francisco de Macorís

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Santo Domingo

San Pedro de Macorís

Barahona Pedernales Caribbean

0 0

80 Mi 80 Km

Sea

Higüey

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was termed “extraordinary” by a U.S. investment analyst.

Government and Politics Political Background Since winning its independence from Spain in 1821 and from Haiti in 1844, the Dominican Republic has been plagued by recurrent domestic conflict and foreign intervention. Administered by a U.S. military governor from 1916 to 1924, the country entered into a 30-year period of control by Gen. Rafael Leonidas TRUJILLO Molina in 1930. Trujillo ruled personally from 1930 to 1947 and indirectly thereafter until his assassination in 1961, his death giving rise to renewed political turmoil. An election in December 1962 led to the inauguration of Juan BOSCH Gavi˜no, a left-ofcenter democrat, as president in February 1963. Bosch was overthrown in September 1963 by a military coup led by (then) Col. El´ıas WESSIN y Wessin. Subsequently, the military installed a civilian triumvirate that ruled until April 1965, when civil war erupted. U.S. military forces—later incorporated into an Inter-American Peace Force sponsored by the Organization of American States (OAS)—intervened on April 28, 1965, and imposed a truce while arrangements were made to establish a provisional government and prepare for new elections. Dr. Joaqu´ın BALAGUER Ricardo, a moderate who had been president at the time of Trujillo’s assassination, defeated Bosch at an election held in June 1966. Emphasizing material development and political restraint, Balaguer was reelected in 1970 and successfully dealt with an attempted coup in 1971. In 1974 he was virtually unopposed for election to a fourth term, all of his principal opponents having withdrawn in anticipation of election irregularities. After the election Silvestre Antonio GUZMAN Fern´andez, speaking on behalf of the opposition coalition, demanded annulment of the results; however, he agreed not to press the demand after securing Balaguer’s assurance that he would not seek further reelection in 1978. Despite his pledge, Balaguer contested the 1978 election

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but lost to Guzm´an Fern´andez by a three-to-two majority. The inauguration of the new president on August 16 was the first occasion in Dominican history that an elected incumbent had yielded power to an elected successor. In late 1981 four-time former chief executive Balaguer surprised many observers by announcing that he would seek to regain the presidency in 1982, despite his age at 74 and failing eyesight. The announcement came in the wake of mounting economic problems and a significant weakening of President Guzm´an’s influence within the ruling Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). At midyear, Guzm´an declared that he would not seek reelection and formally endorsed Vice President Jacobo MAJLUTA Azar as his successor. However, at a PRD convention in November Majluta was decisively rejected in favor of Guzm´an’s arch rival, Salvador JORGE Blanco, who had been defeated for the 1978 nomination and whom Guzm´an had succeeded in ousting from the party presidency in late 1979. In the May 1982 election, Jorge Blanco defeated Balaguer by a 10 percent margin, while the PRD retained its majority in both houses of Congress. On July 4 President Guzm´an died of an apparently self-inflicted gunshot wound, being succeeded on an acting basis by Majluta Azar until Jorge Blanco’s inauguration on August 16. In the vote on May 16, 1986, Balaguer was elected to a fifth term, narrowly defeating Majluta after the PRD had succumbed to severe internal friction attributed primarily to a left-wing faction ˜ G´omez. led by Jos´e Francisco PENA Announcement of the 1990 presidential outcome was delayed for nearly a month, with Balaguer being credited in mid-June with a 14,000vote victory over former president Juan Bosch. The paper-thin victory was equaled in the Senate, with Balaguer’s Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC) retaining control by a margin of only one seat; by contrast, the opposition secured an overwhelming majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Balaguer was initially declared the winner of the May 1994 presidential race by fewer than 30,000 votes. However, only three weeks before the

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Political Status: Independent republic established in 1844; under constitutional regime reestablished July 1, 1966. Area: 18,816 sq. mi. (48,734 sq. km.). Population: 8,562,541 (2002C); 9,196,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): SANTO DOMINGO (1,922,000), Santiago de los Caballeros (526,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Peso (market rate November 2, 2007: 33.70 pesos = $1US). ´ President: Leonel Antonio FERNANDEZ Reyna (Dominican Liberation Party); served as President 1996–2000; reelected on May 16, 2004, and inaugurated on August 16 for a four-year term, succeeding Rafael Hip´olito MEJ´IA Domingues (Dominican Revolutionary Party). Vice President: Rafael ALBURQUERQUE (Dominican Liberation Party); elected on May 16, 2004, and inaugurated on August 16, for a term concurrent with that of the President, succeeding Milagros ORTIZ Bosch (Dominican Revolutionary Party).

August 16 constitutional deadline for swearing in a new president the Santo Domingo electoral board responded to numerous complaints by voiding the results (40 percent of the total) at the capital. On August 2 the Junta Electoral Central (JCE) ignored a report by its electoral committee in overruling the Santo Domingo body. However, the action drew intense opposition, including a threat of military intervention, and on August 10 Balaguer concluded a “Pact for Democracy” (“Pacto por la Democracia”) with Jos´e Pe˜na G´omez, who had succeeded Majluta as PRD leader, to foreshorten the presidential term to 18 months, with new balloting on November 16, 1995. While Bosch’s Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) also supported the accord, it subsequently reversed itself and joined with the PRSC in endorsing a two-year term. On August 14 a constitutional amendment to such effect was hurriedly approved by Congress, along with

amendments banning future presidents from serving consecutive terms, reforming the JCE, creating a National Judiciary Council to ensure the independence of the judiciary, and establishing dual citizenship for Dominicans living outside the country. The PRD responded to revision of the August 10 agreement by withdrawing from the congressional session and boycotting Balaguer’s inauguration of his seventh term. At first-round presidential balloting on May 16, 1996, the PRD’s Pe˜na G´omez was accorded a 45.9 percent plurality, substantially outdistancing the ´ PLD’s Leonel FERNANDEZ Reyna (38.9 percent) and Vice President Jacinto PEYNADO Garrigoza of the PRSC (15.0 percent). Before the second round on June 30, President Balaguer joined with the leaders of a number of small right-wing groups in endorsing Fern´andez, who won a narrow (51.3 to 48.8 percent) victory over Pe˜na G´omez and was installed as Balaguer’s successor on August 16. Despite the death of Pe˜na G´omez on May 10, 1998, the PRD won a sweeping legislative victory (83 seats in an enlarged 149-seat body) on May 16, while gaining control of about 90 percent of the island’s 115 municipalities. By contrast, President Fern´andez’ PLD won only 49 seats. In the May 2000 presidential election, the PRD’s Hip´olito MEJ´IA received a near majority of 49.86 percent and was declared the winner when his opponents withdrew from runoff contention. In congressional balloting on May 16, 2002, the PRD lost its lower house majority, although it retained a plurality and increased its Senate representation. Seeking reelection in 2004, President Mej´ıa faced opposition within his party. In addition, his administration was buffeted by numerous problems, including rampant inflation, a breakdown in electrical-generating capacity, and the collapse of the nation’s second largest bank. The result was a landslide victory for the PLD’s Leonel Fern´andez, who avoided a runoff by securing 57.1 percent of the first-round vote. For the first two years of his restored mandate, Fern´andez faced a legislature dominated by the PRD. However, on May 16, 2006, Mej´ıa’s party suffered a massive defeat, with the PLD securing

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overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress (see Legislature, below).

Constitution and Government The constitution of November 28, 1966, unchanged in its structural components by a 1991 successor, established a unitary republic consisting of 26 (later 32) provinces and a National District. Executive power is exercised by the president, who is elected (together with the vice president) by direct vote for a four-year term, save for the truncated two-year mandate imposed in 1994. Members of the bicameral Congress of the Republic, consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, are likewise elected for four-year terms. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court of Justice, which consists of at least nine judges elected by the Senate. The Supreme Court appoints judges of lower courts operating at the provincial and local levels. All three branches of government participate in the legislative process. Bills for consideration by the legislature may be introduced by members of either house, by the president, and by judges of the Supreme Court. In July 2002 a Special Constituent Assembly reversed a requirement that the president be limited to a single term. For administrative purposes the provinces are divided into 95 municipalities and 31 municipal districts. Provincial governors are appointed by the president, while the municipalities are governed by elected mayors and municipal councils.

Foreign Relations A member of the United Nations and most of its Specialized Agencies, the Dominican Republic also participates in the OAS. Traditionally it maintained diplomatic relations with most Western but not communist countries, although in response to a 1986 cut in the U.S. sugar import quota, President Balaguer announced in mid-1987 that his government intended to restore trade links with Cuba after a 26-year hiatus. Relations with the United States were long strained by the latter’s history of intervention, but they substantially improved with the reestablishment of constitutional government

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in 1966. Recurring tensions and frontier disputes with Haiti have also influenced Dominican external affairs, periodically resulting in closure of the 193mile common border. In June 1991 the Dominican government launched a systematic expulsion of illegal Haitian residents, most of whom had been working on sugarcane plantations (some for several decades). The deportations were seen, in part, as a response to foreign allegations that child laborers were being inhumanely treated on state-owned plantations. The expulsions escalated in early 1997, about 15,000 Haitians being deported in late January and the first half of February. Shortly thereafter, at a summit of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) on February 20– 21, President Fern´andez reached an agreement with Haitian President Pr´eval to halt large-scale repatriations while securing acknowledgment of his country’s right to expel illegal immigrants. However, a new wave of expulsions in November 1999 further exacerbated relations between the two countries. Tensions again eased in February 2002 during a visit by Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide that yielded an agreement to provide jobs for Haitians at the countries’ common border. The cyclical pattern resumed in mid-2005 with the recall of the Haitian ambassador after the lynching of three Haitians in Santo Domingo. The Fern´andez administration responded by deporting 1,000 illegal residents on August 15 and shortly thereafter 1,000 more of the estimated 1 million Haitians said to be living in the country. In November 2006 the government reiterated a long-standing contention that it did not mistreat Haitians but indicated that it would continue to deport illegal immigrants and, in a position that had drawn international criticism, would refuse to grant citizenship to Haitian offspring born within its borders. Although not a member of Caricom, the Dominican Republic concluded a free trade agreement with the organization. A similar pact with the United States was proposed in mid-2002 by President Mej´ıa, and in early 2004 his administration conducted negotiations for accession to the trade pact between the United States and the recently

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launched Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The CAFTA-DR accord provided for immediate elimination of 80 percent of intragroup tariffs, with the remaining tariffs to be phased out over a ten-year period. However, for a number of technical reasons, the agreement, signed on August 5, 2006, did not come into effect until March 1, 2007.

Current Issues Upon returning to office in 2004, President Fern´andez promised to mount a “democratic revolution” that would involve both political and economic reforms. Backed by widespread popular support and a substantial congressional majority, he sought to revise the electoral cycle to align presidential and legislative balloting. Meanwhile, continued economic growth provided an opportunity for the Fern´andez administration to comply with the mandate of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce the nation’s debt: The government in 2007 raised taxes for the third consecutive year. Not surprisingly, the opposition insisted that the government should first attempt to curtail its “wasteful spending,” but the president insisted that CAFTA-DR, while a boon to the business sector, would bring in less customs income, necessitating the new levies.

Political Parties The shifting political groupings that have appeared in the Dominican Republic since the fall of Trujillo reflect diverse ideological viewpoints as well as the influence of specific personalities. Party divisions and splinter groups are common with a total of 23 parties and coalitions registered for the May 2002 legislative election.

Presidential Party Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de la Liberaci´on Dominicana—PLD). A breakaway faction of the PRD (see below), the PLD was organized as a separate party under PRD founder Juan BOSCH Gavi˜no during the 1974 campaign. Bosch

ran unsuccessfully as PLD presidential candidate in both 1978 and 1982, securing 9.8 percent of the vote on the latter occasion. Subsequently, he was highly critical of the Blanco regime’s economic policies as well as its often harsh antiprotest tactics. Although popular opinion polls showed Bosch running second to Balaguer in late 1985, the PLD nominee placed third, with 18.4 percent of the vote, in the 1986 presidential balloting; in an extremely close contest, he ran second to Balaguer in 1990. In March 1991 Bosch stepped down as PLD leader and withdrew from party membership to protest deep-rooted animosity between right- and left-wing factions; he reversed himself two weeks later in response to appeals from his colleagues. In April 1992 the PLD experienced a severe crisis when 47 of its left-wing members, including one senator and ten members of the Chamber of Deputies, resigned in protest at the expulsion of a popular trade unionist, who had criticized the party’s position on a proposed new labor code. The intraparty split had first emerged at a PLD congress in February 1991, when a right-wing group under Chamber president Jorge Botello had won control of the governing Political Committee. In May a number of additional persons were expelled from the party, including its former vice-presidential candidate, Jos´e Francisco Hern´andez Castillo, the mayor of San Pedro de Macor´ıs, Manuel Rodr´ıguez Robl´es, and three deputies, all of whom, characterized by Juan Bosch as “rotten mangos,” subsequently participated in organization of the APD (below). Bosch, with the support of the right-wing Progressive National Force (Fuerza Nacional Progresista—FNP), headed by Marino Vinicio (Vincho) CASTILLO, ran a distant third in the presidential balloting of May 16, 1994, and on June 19 announced his resignation as PLD president. He died on November 1, 2001, at the age of 92. Although the PLD held only 12 of 120 lower house seats, its candidate, Leonel Fern´andez Reyna, secured a narrow victory in second-round presidential balloting on June 30, 1996, with the support of former president Balaguer. It ran

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second to the PRD in the 1998 legislative and 2000 presidential polls. It continued as runner-up to the PRD in the 2002 Chamber elections, while losing three of its four Senate seats. Fern´andez Reyna was elected to a second presidential term in 2004, and the PLD won majorities in both legislative houses in 2006. ´ Leaders: Leonel FERNANDEZ Reyna (President of the Republic and President of the Party), Rafael ALBURQUERQUE (Vice President of the Republic), Reinaldo PARED P´erez (Secretary General).

Other Legislative Parties Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano—PRD). Founded as a left-democratic grouping by former president Juan Bosch Gavi˜no in 1939, the PRD has rejected both communism and Castroism but has been critical of U.S. “imperialism” and “neo-colonialism.” A member of the Socialist International since 1966, the party boycotted both the 1970 and 1974 elections but won the presidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies under the relatively conservative leadership of Antonio Guzm´an Fern´andez in 1978, repeating the performance under Salvador Jorge Blanco in 1982. A three-way split within the PRD in the run-up to the 1986 election raised two distinct possibilities: that former vice president Majluta Azar might compete as the nominee of his right-wing La Estructura faction, and that Blanco supporters, unhappy with the president’s endorsement of left-leaning Jos´e Pe˜na G´omez, would rally for reelection of the incumbent. In July 1985 Majluta registered La Estructura as a separate party, but in January 1986 was named the PRD candidate with Pe˜na G´omez succeeding him as party president. Majluta attributed his defeat in the May balloting to Pe˜na G´omez, many of whose followers were reported to have supported Juan Bosch of the PLD. Lacking a congressional majority after the election, President Balaguer named a number of PRD/La Estructura members to the cabinet formed in late August. In 1990 Majluta and his associates ran separately (see PRI, below).

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In July 1993 the PRD nominated Pe˜na G´omez as its 1994 presidential candidate; supporters of President Balaguer then launched an intense personal attack against Pe˜na G´omez who was Black and of Haitian extraction. For the 1994 campaign, the PRD concluded pacts with a number of minor parties, including the Democratic Assembly (Concertaci´on Democr´atica—CD); the Democratic Unity (Unidad Democr´atica—UD), and the PTD (under PRSC, see below). However, the UD, which was awarded three upper and seven lower house seats, refused to support the PRD’s postelectoral boycott, thus substantially reducing the effectiveness of the action. In August 1995 the PRD concluded a 1996 electoral pact with three parties that had formerly supported the PRSC: the PQD (see below), the Institutional Democratic Party (Partido Democr´atico Institucional—PDI), and the National Party of Civil Veterans (Partido Nacional de Veteranos Civiles—PNVC). PRD candidate Pe˜na G´omez led the first-round presidential poll on May 16, 1996, with 45.8 percent of the vote but was defeated in the June 30 runoff after the PRSC’s Balaguer had endorsed the PLD’s Fern´andez. Gravely ill, Pe˜na G´omez announced his retirement from politics in April 1997 and died on May 10, 1998. Having won control of both houses of Congress in May 1998, the PRD completed its sweep with the election of Hip´olito Mej´ıa as president two years later. However, in 2002 it lost its majority in the Chamber, securing instead a plurality of 73. In 2004 the party was divided as to whether President Mej´ıa should run for reelection; he was, however, nominated and overwhelmingly defeated by former president Fern´andez Reyna in the balloting of May 16. In the 2006 legislative poll, the PRD ran a poor second to the resurgent PLD, falling from 29 seats to 6 in the Senate and from 73 to 60 in an enlarged chamber of Deputies. Leaders: Hip´olito MEJ´IA Domingues and Salvador JORGE Blanco (Former Presidents ´ of the Republic); Vincent SANCHEZ Baret (Chair); Miguel VARGAS (2008 presidential candidate); Rafael SUBERVI Bonilla (2004

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vice-presidential candidate and Secretary General of the Party). Social Christian Reformist Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano—PRSC). Created in 1963 by Joaqu´ın BALAGUER, the PRSC stresses a policy of economic austerity, national reconstruction, and political consensus. Drawing heavily on peasant and middle-class support, it won the elections of 1966, 1970, and 1974, but lost in 1978 after its leader had withdrawn a pledge not to become a candidate for another term. It lost again in 1982, Balaguer being defeated in the presidential election by a 37 to 47 percent margin; however, public recollection of a strong economy under Balaguer gave the ex-president a narrow victory over his PRD opponent in May 1986; his margin of victory was even narrower (0.7 percent) in winning a sixth term in May 1990, while the PRSC lost its former plurality in the Chamber of Deputies. In the 1990 election the PRSC was allied with two minor parties, the Dominican Workers’ Party (Partido de los Trabajadores Dominicanos—PTD), led by Jos´e GONZALEZ Espinosa, and the Socialist Block (Bloque Socialista—BS). Balaguer resigned as PRSC party president in February 1991, citing the time-consuming nature of government leadership; he won a seventh presidential term in 1994, which was shortened to two years. In 1996 he offered only lukewarm first-round support to his party’s presidential nominee and backed the PLD’s Leonel Fern´andez in the second round. He ran for an unprecedented eighth term in the balloting of January 2000, gaining third place on a 24.6 percent vote share. The 95-year-old former president died on July 14, 2002. Leaders: Eduardo ESTRELLA (2004 presidential candidate), Rafael BELLO Andino (President of the Party).

Other Parties Independent Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Independiente—PRI). The PRI was launched before the 1990 election by Jacobo MAJLUTA Azar, the leader of the PRD’s La Estructura faction, after he had been defeated for con-

trol of the party by Jos´e Pe˜na G´omez. Before his death on March 2, 1996, Majluta committed the PRI, which had no congressional representation but voting strength of about 100,000, to the support of the PRD’s Pe˜na G´omez in the 1996 presidential race. In December 2001 President Mejia accepted the honorary presidency of the PRI, and the party secured congressional representation in May 2002 by running candidates under the PRD banner. Leaders: Trajano SANTANA (2004 presidential candidate), Jos´e Rafael MOLINA Ure˜na (President of the Party), Stormi REYNOSO (Secretary General). Liberal Party Structure (Partido Liberal la Estructura—PLE). An autonomous component of the PRI, the PLE joined the Liberal International in 1986. It endorsed former president Joaqu´ın Balaguer as its candidate for the 2000 race. Leader: Andr´es VAN DER HORST. Quisqueyan Democratic Party (Partido Quisqueyano Dem´ocrata—PQD). A right-wing group, the PQD was formed by Gen. El´ıas Wessin y Wessin following his departure into exile in the United States after the civil disturbances of 1965; two years earlier, the general had led the military coup that overthrew President Juan Bosch. The PQD supported Wessin y Wessin in the 1970 presidential campaign and participated in the coalition which boycotted the 1974 election. In September 1977 General Wessin announced his candidacy for the 1978 presidential election but subsequently withdrew in favor of MID candidate Francisco Augusto Lora. Wessin ran a distant fourth in the 1982 presidential balloting. In November 1986 he was named interior minister in the Balaguer administration, to which the armed services portfolio was added in June 1988; he continued as armed services minister after a cabinet reshuffle in August 1989, with the PQD being credited with Balaguer’s margin of victory in May 1990. Leaders: Pedro BERGES (President), Dr. El´ıas WESSIN Ch´avez (Secretary General).

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Alliance for Democracy (Alianza por la Democracia—APD). Launched in mid-1992 by a group of left-wing PLD dissidents, the APD indicated a willingness to join in a broad front in 1994 to prevent the reelection of President Balaguer. However, in April 1993 it split into two factions led, on the one hand, by Sen. Max Puig and former PLD vice-presidential candidate Jos´e Francisco Hern´andez, and, on the other, by economist Vicente Bengoa and union leader Nelsida Marmolejos. The latter group, which sought to forge an alliance with the PRD, was suspended for six months by an “emergency secretariat” organized by the Puig/Hern´andez faction. Leaders: Jos´e Francisco HERNANDEZ Castillo (former PLD vice-presidential candidate), Sen. Max PUIG, Manuel RODRIGUEZ Robl´es, Nelsida MARMOLEJOS (dissident faction), Vicente BENGOA (Secretary General). Democratic Integration Movement (Movimiento de Integraci´on Democr´atica—MID). Organized as the Movimiento de Integraci´on Nacional in support of the 1970 presidential candidacy of Francisco Augusto Lora, the rightwing MID was joined by several other parties in promoting Lora’s candidacy in 1978. Leader: Dr. Francisco Augusto LORA. Movement of National Conciliation (Movimiento de Conciliaci´on Nacional—MCN). Formed in late 1968 to sponsor the presidential candidacy of H´ector GARCIA Godoy, former Dominican ambassador to the United States and provisional president of the Republic after the 1965 revolution, the MCN also boycotted the 1974 election and joined the coalition supporting Francisco Augusto Lora in 1978. Leaders: Dr. Jaime M. FERNANDEZ (President), V´ıctor MENA (Secretary). Revolutionary Social Christian Party (Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano—PRSC). A party of the democratic left that rejects both capitalism and communism, the PRSC is patterned after other Christian Democratic parties of Latin America and draws most of its supporters from young

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professionals as well as from youth and labor. Its youth wing is considerably more radical in its approach than is the party mainstream. Leaders: Dr. Claudio Isidoro ACOSTA (President), Alfonso Moreno MARTINEZ, Dr. Alfonso LOCKWARD (Secretary General). Revolutionary Force (Fuerza de la Revoluci´on—FR). The FR was launched in 2000 by merger of the former Dominican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Dominicano—PCD) with a number of other leftist groups. Leaders: Rafael FLORES Estrella (2004 presidential candidate), Secundino PALACIO (2004 vice-presidential candidate). Dominican Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Dominicano—MPD). Organized in 1965 as a pro-Peking extremist group, the MPD subsequently assumed a measure of respectability as part of the coalition that attempted to prevent President Balaguer from winning a third term in 1974. ˜ Vald´es. Leader: Julio de PENA Joining the PRSC, PLD, PQD, and PCD in presenting presidential candidates in recent elections have been the Christian Popular Party (Partido Popular Cristiano—PPC), backed by representatives of the Unification Church; the rightwing National Progressive Force (Fuerza Nacional Progresivo—FNP), led by Dr. Marino VINICIO Castillo; the New Power Movement (Movimiento Nuevo Poder—MNP), led by Antonio REYNOSO; and the Dominican Social Alliance (Alianza Social Dominicana—ASD), whose presidential candidate, Carlos RAMON Bencosme, also ran in 2004. Other minor parties and their candidates in 2004 included the National Solidarity Movement (Movimiento Solidaridad—MSN), led by Ramon Emilio CONCEPCION; the New Alternative Party (Partido Nueva Alternativa— PNA), led by Ramon Mar´ıa ALMANZAR; and the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Popular—PDP), led by Ramon Nelson DIDIEZ.

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Cabinet As of April 1, 2007 President Vice President

Leonel Fern´andez Reyna Rafael Alburquerque

Secretaries of State Agriculture Armed Forces Culture Education Environment Finance Foreign Relations Higher Education Interior and Police Labor Presidency Public Health Public Works Sports Tourism Trade and Industry Without Portfolio Women’s Affairs Youth Attorney General Administrative Secretary of the Presidency Technical Secretary of the Presidency

Salvador Jim´enez Gen. Ram´on Aquino Garc´ıa Jos´e Rafael Lantigua Alejandrina German [f] Maximiliano Puig Vicente Bengoa Carlos Morales Troncoso Ligia Amada de Melo [f] Franklin Almeyda Jos´e Ramon Fadul Danilo Medina Bautista Rojas G´omez Manuel de Jes´us P´erez Felipe Jay Payano F´elix Jim´enez Francisco Javier Garc´ıa Miguel Mej´ıa Eduardo Selman Flavia Garc´ıa [f] Manuel Crespo Radhames Jim´enez Luis Manuel Bonetti Veras Juan Temistocles Montas Dom´ıguez

[f] = female

Legislature The Congress of the Republic (Congreso de la Republica) consists of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, both directly elected for four-year terms. Senate (Senado). The Senate currently consists of 32 members, 1 from each province and the National District. Following the election of May 16, 2006, the Dominican Liberation Party held 22 seats; the Dominican Revolutionary Party, 6; and the Social Christian Reformist Party, 4.

President: Reinaldo PARED P´erez. Chamber of Deputies (C´amara de Diputados). The Chamber presently consists of 178 members elected on the basis of 1 deputy for every 50,000 inhabitants, with at least 2 from each province. As a result of the election of May 16, 2006, the Dominican Liberation Party held 96 seats; the Dominican Revolutionary Party, 60; and the Social Christian Reformist Party, 22. President: Julio C´esar VALENT´IN.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Communications Press The following privately owned newspapers are published in Santo Domingo, unless otherwise noted: List´ın Diario (85,000), moderate independent; Ultima Hora (50,000); El Nacional (45,000), leftist nationalist; Hoy, (40,000); El Caribe (30,000), moderate nationalist; La Noticia (18,000); La Informaci´on (Santiago de los Caballeros) (15,000); and El Siglo.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility; several foreign agencies maintain bureaus at Santo Domingo.

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cial television networks, two of which also offer educational programming. As of 2005 there were approximately 168 Internet users and 23 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 407 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Flavio DARIO Espinal U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic: (Vacant)

Broadcasting and Computers

Permanent (Vacant)

Representative

to

the

UN:

Broadcasting is supervised by the Direcci´on General de Telecomunicaciones. There are more than 140 radio stations as well as seven commer-

IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WCO, WTO

E C UA D O R REPUBLIC

OF

ECUADOR

Rep u´ blica de Ecuador

Note: After an attack on March 2, 2008 (see note in Colombia entry), by Colombian security forces on a Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) camp based in Ecuador, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa protested that Colombia had undermined Ecuador’s sovereignty. Colombia apologized, but asserted its need to pursue the rebels. Ecuador and its ally Venezuela suspended diplomatic links with Colombia and massed troops on its borders, but a conference between the three states on March 7 eased tensions, calming the region’s worst rift in recent years.

The Country

COLOMBIA Esmeraldas Pu

South America’s fourth-smallest republic has four main geographic regions: the Pacific coastal plain (Costa), the Andes highlands (Sierra), the sparsely populated eastern jungle (Oriente), and the Gal´apagos Islands (Archip´elago de Col´on) in the Pacific. The population is roughly 40 percent Indian, 40 percent mestizo, 10 percent white, and 10 percent black. Although Spanish is the official language, numerous Indian languages are spoken, the most important of which is Quechua. Approximately 90 percent of the population professes Roman Catholicism, but other religions are practiced, including tribal religion among the Indians. According to the World Bank, 27 percent of the labor force is female, primarily in domestic service, market trade, and transient agricultural labor; female participation in government had been quite limited, but in 2007 there were seven women members in the cabinet. Adverse climate, jungle terrain, volcanic activity, and earthquakes limit the country’s habitable area and have slowed its economic development. The economy is primarily agricultural, with approximately one-half of the population engaged in farming, mainly on a subsistence level. The most important crops are bananas (of which Ecuador is

the world’s largest exporter), coffee, and cocoa. Following the lowering of tariff barriers for exports to the United States, cut flowers, broccoli, and mangoes emerged as important cash crops. Hardwoods and balsa are harvested from the forests,

tu

PACIFIC OCEAN Manta

yo

Nueva Loja

Quito

R.

ECUADOR Portoviejo

La Libertad

ma

Riobamba

Ambato Puyo

Guayaquil Cuenca Machala

PERU

Loja 0 0

80 Mi 80 Km

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Political Status: Gained independence from Spain (as part of Gran Colombia) in 1822; independent republic established in 1830; present constitution approved by a constituent assembly elected November 30, 1997, and in effect from August 10, 1998. Area: 109,482 sq. mi. (283,561 sq. km.), excluding the region previously in dispute with Peru, but including the Gal´apagos Islands. Population: 12,922,474 (2001C); 13,765,000 (2006E). Both figures include adjustments for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (2005E): QUITO (1,526,000), Guayaquil (2,194,000), Cuenca (315,000), Ambato (166,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: United States Dollar. The dollar was phased in from January 2000 to March 2001 to replace the sucre as Ecuador’s legal tender. President: Rafael CORREA Delgado (Country Alliance); elected in second-round balloting on November 26, 2006, and inaugurated January 15, 2007, for a four-year term, succeeding Alfredo PALACIO Gonz´ales (independent). Vice President: Lenin MORENO Garc´es (Country Alliance); elected in second-round balloting on November 26, 2006, and inaugurated January 15, 2007, for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding Alejandro SERRANO Aguilar.

while Ecuadorian Pacific waters are a prime tunafishing area. Gold, silver, and copper continue to be mined, and production from Amazonian oil fields has placed Ecuador fifth among South American countries in petroleum output (Ecuador has the second largest oil reserves in South America) and second among the continent’s suppliers of crude oil to the United States. Other energy resources include natural gas deposits in the Gulf of Guayaquil and considerable hydroelectric potential. The economy experienced severe recession during the mid-1980s. Some recovery was registered in 1988, although inflation of nearly 75 percent

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was recorded by late 1989. The Gulf crisis in August 1990 yielded a surge in oil revenue, with the government disappointing creditors by electing to use the windfall for social programs rather than debt. Overall, annual GDP rose by an average of 2.9 percent during 1991–1998 before declining significantly in 1999 due to the collapse of Ecuador’s currency. Further, in mid-1999 a proposed round of austerity measures as preconditions for a $400 million International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan generated strikes and protests that led to the retraction of a government-promised price freeze. As a result, Ecuador became the first country to default formally on a series of so-called U.S. “Brady” bonds by failing to pay $44 million in interest. A month later it announced that it would also default on $500 million in outstanding Eurobonds. Following the adoption of the dollar as the medium of exchange in 2000, inflation declined and stable growth resumed due, in large part, to the strength of high worldwide oil prices. GDP growth of 4.7 percent was recorded in 2005, and 4.1 percent in 2006. Growth slowed to just under 2 percent in 2007, due to disruptions in oil production, but it was projected to increase to about 4 percent in 2008. Remittances to family members from some two million Ecuadorians who have emigrated to the United States and Europe (primarily Spain) in recent years have amounted to a significant revenue stream of about $2.5 billion a year.

Government and Politics Political Background Charismatic individuals rather than political platforms have dominated Ecuador’s political life through most of the period since the country’s liberation from Spanish rule in 1822 and its establishment as an independent republic in 1830. A historic division between conservatives and liberals (now of little practical significance) emerged in the 19th century, the conservatives being based in the highlands and the liberals on the coast. More recently, Ecuador has experienced tremendous

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political instability, with eight chief executives within 11 years, politicized high courts, and little popular support for the legislature. The country is on the verge of adopting its 19th significant constitutional revision since it became an independent republic. A bright spot in Ecuadorian political life occurred in 1948 with the election of Galo PLAZA Lasso as president. The first chief executive since 1924 to complete his full term, Plaza created a climate of stability and economic progress, while his successor, Jos´e Mar´ıa VELASCO Ibarra, stood out in a lengthy catalog of interrupted presidencies and military juntas. Before his election in 1952 (his only full term), Velasco had served twice as president, in 1934–1935 and in 1944–1947. He was subsequently elected in 1960 and in 1968, but coups ended both terms prematurely. His 1961 successor, Carlos Julio AROSEMENA Monroy, also was ousted by a military junta in July 1963. During his last term in office, Velasco in mid-1970 dissolved the National Congress and assumed dictatorial powers to cope with a financial emergency. He was deposed for a fourth time in February 1972, the stimulus to military intervention being the approach of a presidential election in which Assad BUCARAM Elmhalim, a populist politician, appeared the likely winner. The military leadership, under Gen. Guillermo RODRIGUEZ Lara, canceled the election, nominally restored the Liberal constitution of 1945, and advanced a “nationalist, military, and revolutionary” program emphasizing the objectives of social justice and popular welfare. In December 1975 President Rodr´ıguez announced his intention to make way for a return to civilian rule, but his actual departure in January 1976 was precipitated by a government crisis during which the entire cabinet resigned. A three-man junta headed by Vice Adm. Alfredo POVEDA Burbano succeeded Rodr´ıguez, declaring that the 1972 program of the armed forces would be honored and that the nation would be returned to civilian leadership within two years; however, it was not until July 16, 1978, that a presidential election, in which no candidate obtained a majority of votes, was

held. At a runoff on April 29, 1979, the center-left ´ Aguilera, defeated his candidate, Jaime ROLDOS ´ ´ conservative opponent, Sixto DURAN-BALL EN C´ordovez, by a more than two-to-one majority and was inaugurated, without incident, on August 10. Rold´os, his minister of defense, and a number of others were killed in a plane crash on May 24, 1981, and the Christian Democratic vice president, Osvaldo HURTADO Larrea, was immediately sworn in to complete the remainder of Rold´os’s five-year term. On June 2 the late president’s brother, Le´on ´ Aguilera, by a legislative margin of one ROLDOS vote, was elected to the vice presidency. A dispute between the president and vice president in early 1982, ostensibly over rapprochement with neighboring Peru (see Foreign relations, below), led to the resignation of two Roldosista ministers and, amid mounting economic problems, a period of uncertain legislative support for Hurtado, who was constitutionally precluded from reelection in 1984. In the balloting on January 29, with 17 parties competing, the opposition Democratic Left (Izquierda Democr´atica—ID) won 24 of 71 legislative seats, while its presidential candidate, Rodrigo BORJA Cevallos, obtained a slim plurality. However, at a second-round poll on May 6, Borja was narrowly defeated by the nominee of the conservative National Reconstruction Front (Frente de Reconstrucci´on Nacional—FRN), Le´on FEBRES Cordero. Subsequently, a major constitutional struggle erupted between the executive and legislative branches over control of the judiciary, with the president refusing to recognize a new Chamber-appointed Supreme Court. The issue was eventually resolved in December, when the Chamber agreed to the resignation of both judicial panels and the appointment of a new court composed of progovernment and opposition members. In June 1985 two ID deputies joined five members of the independent Radical Alfarista Front (Frente Radical Alfarista—FRA) in shifting their allegiance to the president, thereby, with the support of the Concentration of Popular Forces (Concentraci´on de Fuerzas Populares—CFP), providing the government with its first legislative majority since the 1984 election. However, the

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fragility of the president’s legislative support led him to issue a call in February 1986 for a June constitutional plebiscite on whether independent candidates should be permitted to stand for elective office. The government was shaken in midMarch 1986 as the result of a brief revolt led by Lt. Gen. Frank VARGAS Pazzos, who had been dismissed as armed forces chief of staff after demanding the discharge and imprisonment of Defense ˜ Minister Luis PINEIROS Rivera and army commander Gen. Manuel ALBUJA for alleged misuse of public funds. Although both submitted their resignations, forces loyal to Vargas subsequently occupied the Quito air base, claiming that the government had broken an agreement to place the two under arrest. In midterm legislative balloting in June 1986 (postponed from January to allow for voter recertification), the progovernment parties again lost control of the Chamber by a decisive margin of 27–43, while the referendum on independent candidacies was defeated by an even more impressive 25.2 to 58.8 percent vote. The result was a renewal of friction between the two branches, with the president rejecting a congressional amnesty granted to General Vargas in September. On January 16, 1987, Febres was kidnapped by dissident paratroopers at Taura air base and held for 11 hours, until agreeing to the release of Vargas. The legislature then approved a nonbinding resolution calling on the president to resign. The chief executive responded by declaring that he intended to remain in office until the expiration of his term in August 1988. In the general election of January 31, 1988, Social Christian (Partido Social Cristiano—PSC) ´ ´ presidential candidate Sixto DURAN-BALL EN ran a poor third to the ID’s Borja Cevallos and Abdal´a BUCARAM Ortiz of the Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano— PRE). Buttressed by a comfortable legislative majority, Borja defeated Bucaram in runoff balloting on May 8 and formed a largely ID administration following his inauguration on August 10. The president’s legislative supporters were reduced to a minority in the biennial election of

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January 31, 1990, with Averroes BUCARAM Saxida (a cousin of Abdal´a) being elected Chamber president. In late October, however, with the creation of a “Political Ethics Bloc” (Bloque de Etica Pol´ıtica), the body tilted briefly in favor of Borja, who was thereby able to secure Bucaram’s ouster as presiding officer. Subsequently, legislative control again passed to the opposition, which displayed its hostility toward the president by impeaching no less than six of his ministers by mid-1991. At second-round presidential balloting on July 5, 1992, Dur´an-Ball´en, who had been denied renomination by the PSC, defeated his former party’s candidate, Jaime NEBOT Saadi, by sweeping 19 of the country’s 21 provinces. The PSC had, however, secured a legislative plurality, with Dur´an-Ball´en’s recently organized Republican Unity Party (Partido Unidad Republicano— PUR) in third place after the PRE. The most conspicuous loss in the presidential election was the formerly dominant ID, whose candidate attracted a vote share of only 8.2 percent. In the midterm legislative election of May 1, 1994, the PSC won 22 of the 65 contested seats, while Dur´an-Ball´en’s PUR plummeted from 12 seats to 3. The result was an intensification of the long-standing legislative-executive rift, with the Chamber forcing changes in most leading ministries either by impeachment or the threat of impeachment. In August 1995 Vice President Alberto DAHIK became the center of a corruption scandal. In the wake of imperfectly validated suggestions by the vice president that the government had made payments to members of the legislature and judiciary to ensure favorable treatment of economic reform measures, Dahik himself was accused of illegal use of “discretionary funds” kept in the personal accounts of two of his secretaries. Among the alleged uses of the funds was a down payment on the purchase of a radio station by former foreign minister Diego PAREDES Delgado, who, along with Dahik’s secretaries, went into hiding. In late September President Dur´an-Ball´en urged Dahik to resign. He refused and in early October escaped dismissal by the failure of a legislative vote of

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impeachment. However, also facing charges by the Supreme Court, he resigned on October 11 and fled to Costa Rica, where he appealed for political asylum. A week later the president secured approval for the naming of former education minister ˜ Trivi˜no as Dahik’s successor. The Eduardo PENA Dur´an-Ball´en administration suffered a further embarrassment when all 11 of its latest constitutional reform proposals were rejected in a plebiscite on November 26 (see Constitution and Government, below). In the first-round presidential poll of May 19, 1996, the PSC’s Jaime Nebot and the PRE’s Abdal´a Bucaram qualified for runoff balloting with vote shares of 27.4 and 25.5 percent, respectively. In the second round on July 7, the populist Bucaram confounded earlier opinion polls by easily defeating his opponent (54.3 to 45.7 percent) and was sworn in on August 10. However, the PRE held only 19 of 82 legislative seats, leaving Bucaram, like his predecessor, with the difficult task of seeking support from a deeply divided Chamber of Representatives. Following his inauguration, President Bucaram abandoned most of his populist campaign promises and advanced an economic reform program that included privatization of state-owned enterprises, elimination of guaranteed job security, and devaluation of the Ecuadorian sucre from approximately 3,500 to 4 per U.S. dollar. The result was a wave of domestic unrest amid plummeting presidential popularity. On February 6, 1997, the National Chamber of Representatives ousted Bucaram because of “mental incapacity” and designated its ´ Rivera, as his presiding officer, Fabi´an ALARCON successor. Two days later it yielded to the constitutional claim of Vice President Rosal´ıa ARTEAGA Serrano, electing her interim president. On February 11 Arteaga submitted her resignation, and Alarc´on was reinstated as chief executive for an 18-month term, with new elections scheduled for May 1998. Alarc´on’s incumbency was endorsed by 65 percent of those participating in a May 25 referendum, the voters also approving a call for a constituent assembly that was elected on November 30 with a party distribution not significantly different

from that of the National Chamber. The assembly’s principal output was a new set of electoral rules that included an increase in the number of legislative seats from 82 to 121 and the abolition of midterm replenishment. In a nationwide election on May 31, 1998, the Popular Democracy (Democracia Popular—DP), a restyled Christian Democratic grouping, won a plurality of Chamber seats, while its presidential nominee, Jamil MAHUAD Witt, bested five opponents with a 35 percent vote share. In a second-round contest on June 12, Mahuad secured 51.3 percent of the vote, defeating the Roldosista runner-up, Alvaro Fernando NOBOA Pont´on. President Mahuad assumed office in August 1998 amid severe economic problems, including the effects of El Ni˜no–induced flooding the previous winter that had caused more than $2.5 billion in damage to coastal regions. Falling oil prices in 1998 exacerbated the situation. The new government proposed austerity measures in January 1999 designed to reduce the budget deficit, but it was forced to abandon planned increases in taxes and fuel prices at the insistence of the PSC, on which the DP was relying for a legislative majority. By August 1999 President Mahuad’s popularity had declined from 68 percent to 12 percent, and by January 1, 2000, had plummeted further to an unprecedented 2 percent in the wake of a debt-restructuring effort that generated a new wave of protests. The president responded by declaring a state of emergency and adopting the dollar as the Ecuadorian currency. On the streets, the native Confederati´on de Nacionalidades Ind´ıgenas del Ecuador (Conaie) launched a campaign to oust not only Mahuad but also members of Congress and the Supreme Court in favor of a “patriotic government of national unity.” On January 21 Mahuad was overthrown in a coup led by a group of colonels who had joined forces with Conaie leaders. However, Gen. Carlos MENDOZA, who had been installed with Conaie president Antonio VARGAS and former Supreme Court president Carlos SOLORZANO as a ruling triumvirate, promptly mounted a countercoup that endorsed the

E C UA D O R

“constitutional” elevation of Vice President Gustavo NOBOA Benjarano to the post that Mahuad had ostensibly “abandoned.” Conaie responded by charging the military with “betrayal” and called for a plebiscite to remove legislative and judicial incumbents, reverse the dollarization policy, end the U.S. military presence in Ecuador, and secure amnesty for those participating in the January 21 uprising. ´ On November 24, 2002, Lucio GUTIERREZ Borb´ua, a retired colonel who had participated in the ouster of Mahuad (an event commemorated in the full title of his small group, the Patriotic Society Party of January 21 [Partido Sociedad Patri´otica 21 de Enero—PSP]), defeated Alvaro Noboa Pont´on, now running as leader of the Institutional Renewal Party of National Action (Partido Renovador Institucional de Acci´on Nacional—PRIAN), in second-round presidential balloting. Nine months later, in the wake of an apparent shift to the right after Guti´errez had attempted to introduce a number of IMF-mandated economic reforms, his administration was severely weakened by the withdrawal of the Conaie-based New Country–Pachakutik Movement (Movimiento Nuevo Pais–Pachakutik—MNPP). The president then entered briefly into an implausible alignment with the two leading legislative parties, the centerright PSC and the center-left ID. The effort soon failed, with both of the erstwhile allies joining an opposition drive for his impeachment. By mid2004 poll results showed 68 percent of the public felt Guti´errez should resign. However, he persevered by courting the Roldosistas. Although having earlier opposed the return of Abdal´a Bucaram, he met with the former president on September 1. Less than three months later, he deflected impeachment by negotiating a “new majority” that included the far-left Democratic Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Democr´atico—MPD), the right-wing PRIAN, and the PSP, the PRE, and the CFP. Emboldened by an opposition suddenly in disarray, Guti´errez recalled Congress in early December and pushed through a constitutionally questionable measure that removed all 31 Supreme Court justices. This allowed new appointees who

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would clear the way for former president Bucaram’s return by dismissing the charges against him. On March 31, 2005, the charges were annulled and Bucaram returned on April 2. These maneuvers aroused the public, and a wave of demonstrations in Quito, including an incursion of rioting students into the congressional building, yielded a 60–2 legislative vote on April 20 to remove Guti´errez in the wake of a spurious finding that he had “abandoned” his post. Also purged were all 31 members of the Supreme Court. Vice President Alfredo PALACIO Gonz´ales, assuming the presidency after election by Congress on the same day in 2005 that Guti´errez was removed, encountered an equally intractable legislature. In June 2005 he called for a referendum to establish “more democratic representation” by breaking with party-controlled electoral lists in favor of constituency-specific candidates (singlemember districts) but was rebuffed by Congress. On October 4, 2005, Guti´errez returned from exile and was arrested on charges of attempting to destabilize the government by not recognizing the legitimacy of Palacio as his successor. Members of the country’s third Supreme Court in less than a year were installed on November 30. Guti´errez was released by judicial order in March 2006 after a high court ruling that Guti´errez’s conspiracy accusations against Palacio were not a violation of law and his actions did not threaten national security. Palacio’s government was plagued by civil unrest in the first half of 2006 (see Current Issues below) and a constant stream of cabinet reshuffling during his tenure in office; at least 55 ministers served from April 2005 until the swearing in of his successor in January 2007. First-round balloting for president on October 15, 2006, resulted in a runoff from an original list of 13 candidates between Alvaro Noboa Pont´on of the PRIAN, a right-of-center populist millionaire, and Rafael CORREA Delgado, leader of a new leftwing bloc, the Country Alliance (Alianza Pa´ıs— PA´IS), an economist and former finance minister. Correa was elected in the second round on November 26, having prevailed in a particularly bitter

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campaign in which Noboa won the first-round. Noboa challenged the final results, which gave Correa 57.07 percent of the vote to Noboa’s 42.96 percent, and refused to concede, despite validation by the electoral commission and international organizations. Correa was inaugurated on January 15, 2007, and formed a new government, drawn mostly from PA´IS members, the same day. Legislative elections concurrent with the 2006 presidential election gave the PRIAN a plurality in Congress, with nine other parties also holding seats. The cabinet was reshuffled in June 2007, when three ministers stepped down to register as candidates for the constituent assembly. In a second reshuffling in July, finance minister Ricardo ˜ was reassigned in the wake of a scandal PATINO involving alleged manipulation of the bond markets for Ecuadorian debt.

Constitution and Government In a referendum held January 15, 1978, Ecuadorians approved a new constitution that came into force with the retirement of the military junta and the inauguration of Jaime Rold´os Aguilera in August 1979. The new basic law provided for a unicameral legislature and a single four-year presidential term, extension of the vote to illiterate citizens (presumed to be about 30 percent of the population), and establishment of a framework of social rights for citizens. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court, which is responsible for supervising superior courts. The superior courts in turn supervise lower (provincial and cantonal) courts. On March 1, 1994, President Dur´an-Ball´en launched a program of constitutional reform by announcing an eight-part plebiscite coincident with the May 1 congressional poll that included provisions for presidential reelection, compulsory voting, creation of an upper legislative chamber, and four-year terms for all representatives. However, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral or TSE) immediately struck down the proposal as “illegal and impractical.” The TSE also

rejected a call on June 10 for a July 31 plebiscite on formation of a constituent assembly to consider the changes, with the president insisting that the TSE’s action was itself illegal since he had the right to “consult the people” on any matter that he wished. Subsequently, a scaled-down plebiscite was held on August 28, following the August 10 commencement of a new congressional session. An unusually low turnout of voters by a 2–1 majority approved most of the package, including a limitation on congressional power to determine public spending, authorization for nonparty candidates to stand for elective posts, and reelection of elected officials, including the president. A second set of reform measures was rejected by approximately 56 percent of the participants in a plebiscite on November 26, 1995. Among the proposals were election of all legislators from single-member constituencies for four-year terms, presidential authority to dissolve the legislature, a ban on public service strikes, administrative decentralization to the provinces and municipalities, and partial privatization of the social security system. The constituent assembly elected in 1997 redrafted the constitution; the changes, which went into force on August 10, 1998, provided for a National Congress of a size (currently 100) determined by a somewhat complex population-based formula, with members sitting for four-year terms; it also lowered the first-round cutoff for presidential balloting to 45 percent, with the victor serving a four-year term. In 2007 President Correa launched yet another initiative for constitutional reform; after his inauguration he issued a decree providing for a national referendum to call a constituent assembly with the power to draft a new constitution. Eighty percent of voters approved the ballot measure on April 15, 2007, to form a constituent assembly. Elections for delegates to the constituent assembly were held on September 30, 2007. Administratively, the country is divided into 22 provinces (the 22nd province, Santa Elena, previously a part of Guayas, was added in 2007), including the Gal´apagos Islands. The provinces are subdivided into municipalities.

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Foreign Relations The most enduring foreign-affairs issue for many years was a boundary dispute with Peru that dates to the 16th century and involves a 125,000square-mile tract of land between the Putumayo and Mara˜no´ n rivers, both tributaries of the upper Amazon. The dispute resulted in periodic conflict and a number of agreements, including the Rio Protocol of January 1942, which awarded the greater part of the area to Peru and was formally repudiated by Velasco Ibarra in 1960 on the ground that Ecuador had been pressured into acceptance of its terms by the guarantor states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States). The frontier established by the Rio Protocol was itself never fully delineated, a 50-mile stretch in the vicinity of the Condor Mountains remaining to be charted along the presumed watershed of the Zamora and Santiago rivers, in an area where a new tributary of the Mara˜no´ n was subsequently discovered. In January 1981 Ecuador and Peru engaged in five days of fighting in the Condor region, while representatives of the guarantor states convened in Bras´ılia, Brazil, for negotiations on a cease-fire that was accepted by the combatants on February 2. However, it was not until March 17 that the two sides began to withdraw their forces from the disputed area. The dispute flared up again in August 1991, when Peruvian border units reportedly discovered Ecuadorian troops clearing woods for cattle raising inside Peruvian territory. Subsequently, Ecuador reiterated its rejection of the Rio Protocol, while the Peruvian popular press headlined the incident as a full-scale invasion by its neighbor. In October 1993 a suggestion by Foreign Minister Paredes Delgado at the United Nations that Ecuador would seek an accord with Peru not to resort to force over the territorial issue prompted a “clarification” by Quito that it was not proposing a nonaggression pact with its neighbor. Two months earlier President Dur´an-Ball´en had announced that he would “repay the compliment” of three visits to Ecuador by Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori in 1992 by embarking on the first state visit by an

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Ecuadorian president to Lima, Peru. However, in the wake of widespread criticism within Ecuador, the trip had not materialized by late January 1994, when troops, tanks, and fighter planes massed on both sides of the border. While Peruvians outside the contested area were reported to be largely indifferent to the latest confrontation, Ecuador charged its neighbor with “launching a massive offensive” and vowed a “fight for the fatherland.” Despite the announcement of a cease-fire on February 1, 1995, renewed fighting erupted the following day, with peace talks in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, being broken off on February 5. Thereafter, in another about-face, the two sides signed a peace agreement in Bras´ılia on February 17. Under the socalled Itamaraty Declaration, the guarantor states would dispatch a team of observers on a renewable 90-day mission to oversee a “gradual and mutual demobilization” of the area and initiate talks aimed at resolving the long-standing dispute. It was not until July 25 that the two sides accepted full demilitarization in a further agreement that did not, however, settle the central issue of border demarcation. In a remarkable display of warmth accompanying the July accord, Dur´an-Ball´en congratulated his Peruvian counterpart on his reelection, while Fujimori indicated that he would attend a Rio Group summit in Quito in early September. Although the two did not formally meet on the latter occasion, Fujimori stated that their countries were undergoing a “recovery of mutual trust” and extended an invitation to Dur´an-Ball´en to reinstate his earlier intention to visit Lima. Tension again flared in late 1995, when Peru learned that Ecuador was about to take delivery of four military aircraft from Israel in a deal approved by the United States, despite its status as a guarantor of the Rio Protocol. A number of border incidents ensued, with Israel declaring on January 1 that it would not proceed with delivery of the planes until peace negotiations had been concluded. An easing of relations, if not a resolution of the dispute, was evidenced by a symbolic embrace between the chairs of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian joint chiefs of staff in the frontier region on February 11. The two generals subsequently held meetings in Quito

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on March 1 and in Lima on March 4, while a further series of meetings occurred in Bras´ılia in 1997. Finally, on January 19, 1998, agreement was reached in Rio de Janeiro on a timetable leading to a peace treaty. Under the accord, four commissions dealing with major aspects of the controversy would be established, including one dealing with the thorniest issue: border demarcation. The lengthy dispute was formally settled with a “global and definitive” accord signed by presidents Mahuad and Fujimori in Bras´ılia on October 26, 1998. While the disputed territory was awarded to Peru, control (but not sovereignty) of the principal town of Tiwintza, in addition to a corridor from the border, was assigned to Ecuador, which was also granted free navigation rights along the Amazon and the right to establish two port facilities within Peruvian territory. Provision was also made for linkup between the two countries’ electrical grids and oil pipelines. Resolution of the lengthy controversy appeared to be confirmed by the presence of the two countries’ chief executives at a frontier marker ceremony on May 13, 1999. During a ministerial meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on September 16, 1992, Ecuador announced its withdrawal from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in protest over the high annual membership fee of US $2 million and an inability to gain approval for increasing its production quota. However, it maintained linkage with the group as a nonvoting associate member. (Ecuador rejoined OPEC as a full member in October 2007 for “strategic reasons.”) Regionally, Ecuador and Chile signed a free trade agreement in December 1994 designed to liberalize 90 percent of their bilateral trade by 1997. However, recent relations with Colombia have been mixed. In September 2005 Ecuador and Chile became involved in controversy over whether the Colombian guerrilla group, the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), should be considered a “terrorist” organization, as claimed by Colombia, or an “irregular armed group,” as defined by Ecuador. The Palacio administration agreed in January 2006 to let the border area serve as an “anvil”

against which the Colombian military could “hammer” the guerrillas, but did not fundamentally alter Ecuador’s long-standing policy of nonintervention in Colombia’s domestic conflict. Less than two weeks later, however, relations again soured in the wake of an incursion by Colombia in pursuit of rebel forces. Nonetheless, Ecuadorian army units were deployed in February to disrupt FARC activities in the eastern Amazonian provinces, where they found and destroyed several FARC bases and captured several guerrillas. Similar activity by Ecuadorian troops in May demonstrated that despite the noninterference rhetoric, FARC activities were receiving greater attention. Ecuador’s relations with Europe have largely revolved around trade issues (particularly banana exports to the European Union [EU]) and of late on the growing number of Ecuadorian e´ migr´es in the region. In November 2006 Ecuador renewed its complaints against the EU’s import restrictions on its banana exports. Ecuador’s suit before the World Trade Organization claimed that the EU banana import tariff introduced in January 2006 was discriminatory and had the effect of reducing its market share vis-`a-vis the shares of African and Caribbean former colonies, contrary to a 2001 agreement guaranteeing Ecuador’s share of the EU banana trade. By 2006 Ecuador’s relations with Peru had improved, with the two countries finalizing a deal for electricity from Peru to help Ecuador supplement its hydroelectric power generation deficit. Also, Ecuador’s military redeployed troops that had been on the border with Peru to the Colombian border, closing down the bases left behind. Like its Andean neighbors Colombia and Peru, Ecuador pursued negotiations with the United States over a bilateral free trade agreement in 2006. The agreement was meant to codify and extend trade preferences granted to Ecuador under the U.S. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), but the negotiations broke down in April and May following the passage of a windfall profit tax on oil revenues earned by foreign energy firms and the seizure of one U.S.-based energy firm’s Ecuadorian assets (see Current Issues,

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below). The government then announced it would seek to enhance commercial links with Chile and Mexico and to work out trade agreements with Central American neighbors who have bilateral free trade agreements with the United States. The United States, for its part, claimed that Ecuador acted in violation of the bilateral investment treaty between the two nations and warned that it might end Ecuador’s preferential treatment under ATPDEA. The Correa administration declined to renew the military base access agreement with the United States that allowed U.S. forces access to the Pacific coast base at the port of Manta, primarily for counternarcotics operations. The agreement is now set to expire in 2009. Ecuador turned to Venezuela for energy cooperation and assistance after the cancelation of the Occidental Petroleum contract, signing an agreement to cooperate broadly across energy production and petrochemical sectors and for the initiation of joint enterprises between the state petroleum companies in May 2006. Ecuador also considered an arrangement to have Venezuela refine a portion of its oil output for domestic use, an arrangement with favorable terms that was expected to save Ecuador hundreds of millions of dollars. Given the tense relations between the United States and Venezuela, however, the Palacio government announced less extensive strategic alliances with Brazilian and Argentine state-owned oil companies, thus avoiding the appearance of being too friendly with Venezuela’s president Hugo Ch´avez. While Correa has what observers describe as an “amiable” relationship with Ch´avez, he is not characterized as following an identical political model, though he did mandate nationalization of Ecuador’s resources. In early 2008, Ecuador and Venezuela announced plans to build a huge oil refinery in the coastal province of Manabi, Ecuador.

Current Issues During his brief tenure in office, President Alfredo Palacio’s government was beset by a series of public protests, led by oil workers, university students, labor unions, and indigenous groups, over

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the status of a foreign oil company operating in Ecuador and the government’s negotiations over a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States. The unrest began with a violent protest in Napo province in February 2006 that disrupted the flow of oil to pipelines, spurring Palacio to declare a state of emergency and arrest several public officials sympathetic to the protesters (who sought action on promises by the government to fund the construction of local transportation infrastructure projects). Additional protests erupted in March, followed by a general strike organized by the largest labor syndicate in opposition to the free trade negotiations. Soon, larger-scale unrest, coordinated by the indigenous group Conaie, spread more broadly in protest of the trade negotiations and the government’s reluctance to cancel an oil production contract with Occidental Petroleum. Tens of thousands of protesters disrupted much of the nation’s transportation and commerce as Conaie organized highway barricades in half of the nation’s provinces. Palacio appealed for calm, declared a broader, more sweeping state of emergency, and dispatched his ministers to demobilize some of the protests with promises of government investment in local projects, but he nevertheless vowed to continue negotiations over the trade agreement. In March, the Congress passed legislation that imposed a higher tax on foreign oil companies, increasing the windfall profit tax rate from 30 percent to 60 percent. Palacio then moderated his position on the free trade issue in April, announcing that the agreement would be adopted only if it was in the country’s best interest. Palacio subsequently vetoed the oil windfall profit tax provision that set the tax rate, substituting instead a 50 percent rate, which Congress ratified on April 19. In reaction to the windfall profit tax, the United States halted negotiations on the trade agreement. In May public pressure ratcheted up, as Conaie and other groups urged the government again to cancel the Occidental Petroleum contract (though the company had offered to pay a $20 million penalty and to pay windfall profit taxes). On May 15 the energy minister ruled that the contract was canceled. In response, the United States formally

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suspended negotiations over the free trade agreement. Subsequently, Occidental filed suit with the World Bank Group’s investment dispute settlement agency (which ruled in Ecuador’s favor on preliminary issues in August 2007). By late July 2006 most of the political activity in Ecuador was directed toward the October presidential and legislative elections, as 13 candidates registered to run for the presidency. Le´on Rold´os Aguilera, a former vice president of the republic, and a center-left leader of a new party, Ethics and ´ Democracy Network (Red Etica y Democracia— RED), emerged as the front-runner in opinion polls during the early months of the campaign. However, by September, Rold´os’s stiff campaigning style and his close ties to the ID/RED alliance’s congressional candidates (at a time when public regard for the Congress was low) eroded his support. By early October the new front-runners were two populists: Alvaro Noboa Pont´on, of the recentlyformed PRIAN, and Rafael Correa Delgado, leader of the new far left-wing alliance PA´IS. Noboa won the first-round balloting with 26.8 percent of the vote over Correa’s 22.8 percent. Gilmar Guti´errez, the PSP candidate and brother of former president Lucio Guti´errez, ran a strong third with 17.4 percent. Rold´os placed fourth with 14.8 percent. Each of the remaining candidates received less than 10 percent of the vote. Prior to the second round of presidential balloting in November, Noboa portrayed his runoff opponent, Correa, as a radical, a communist, and a lackey of Venezuelan president Hugo Ch´avez. Correa, for his part, accused Noboa, a banana magnate, of seeking to run the country for his own personal gain. Noboa advocated a diplomatic distance from Venezuela’s President Ch´avez and Cuba, offering instead to embrace closer ties with the United States and a resurrection of the free trade agreement. Correa’s election platform drew on themes from the anti-U.S. Andean leftist populism (typified by Venezuela’s Ch´avez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales). Correa called for an increase in social spending, the suspension or restructuring of repayment on foreign debt, a renegotiation of investment contracts with foreign oil companies, and nonrenewal of the agreement for the U.S. military

base. He opposed the U.S. free trade agreement, suggesting that it would hurt the small agricultural producers. Correa’s victory in the 2006 presidential election set up yet another showdown between the executive and legislature. Having shunned putting forward legislative candidates, Correa’s PA´IS had no dedicated support in Congress other than from the small number of seats won by the radical, left-wing MPD, and from the MNPP. The largest parties in Congress, the PRIAN, PSP, and PSC, were positioned to take advantage of any alliance they might form to leverage control. Correa issued a decree immediately after his inauguration in 2007 calling for a national referendum on a constituent assembly with power to rewrite the constitution. Following a ruling by the TSE that the decree was subject to approval by Congress, Correa reached an accord with the opposition PSP and the PRE to support the referendum. Congress passed the measure on February 13, two weeks after proreferendum protesters forced the evacuation of the legislative chamber. The TSE then set the referendum for April, but later crafted the ballot question in such a way as to grant a constituent assembly plenipotentiary powers, including the power to dissolve the Congress. This move provoked opposition deputies in Congress to accuse the TSE of acting unconstitutionally (claiming only the Congress could authorize such powers). Five deputies filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the referendum; another 52 deputies voted with the original 5 for the removal of the TSE’s president. The TSE ordered the removal of these 57 legislators for one year, on grounds of obstruction. Congress was unable to reconvene with the necessary quorum until March 20, when 21 alternates arrived under armed guard. In the interim some of the dismissed legislators had tried to reenter Congress to retake their seats; in the violence and chaos that ensued, 2 legislators were shot and injured. The 21 alternate deputies formed a bloc, the Dignidad Nacional, of 9 PRIAN, 9 PSP, and 3 PSC alternates who supported conferring plenipotentiary powers on a constituent assembly.

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In the referendum of April 15, 2007, the measure passed overwhelmingly, with 80 percent of voters in favor of calling a 130-member constituent assembly. A week later the TSE ruled for the reinstatement of 50 of the dismissed legislators; the next day the Congress, without the expunged legislators, voted to dismiss the TSE judges. On April 24 an arrest warrant was issued for two dozen of the dismissed legislators, accusing them of sedition. More than a dozen of them briefly fled to Colombia, requesting asylum and seeking international intervention. Ultimately, the crisis abated as the Congress continued to operate without the suspended legislators. Though President Correa had threatened to suspend Ecuador’s payments on its foreign debt, the finance ministry paid off all outstanding debt to the IMF in early 2007 and vowed to end dealings with it. In February, however, Correa and his finance minister, Ricardo Pati˜no, began threatening not to make a scheduled interest payment to Ecuador’s foreign creditors and bond markets, in order to shift priorities to spending on education and antipoverty programs. The government paid the interest on February 14, but warned that it reserved the right to default on future payments and would be looking to restructure its payment terms. In May a videotape emerged showing Pati˜no discussing manipulation of bond markets with representatives of two U.S. securities brokerage firms just two days before the interest payment. Ecuadorian legislators alleged that Pati˜no had deliberately manipulated prices for Ecuadorian government bonds for personal gain and called for his dismissal. Correa resisted until late July, when Pati˜no was reassigned to a new department overseeing the coastal provinces. In mid-2007 attention turned to political maneuvering in anticipation of the constituent assembly election on September 30. Correa’s PA´IS won decisively with 69.5 percent of the vote and 80 of the 130 seats. The closest competitor was the PSP, with just under 7.3 percent of the vote and 18 seats. Following the assembly’s first meeting on November 29, delegates overwhelmingly voted to declare the opposition-controlled Congress in re-

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cess without pay until approval of a new constitution in a referendum to be held in 2008. The assembly then assumed the powers of Congress. Critics blasted the assembly’s action, claiming that it was giving too much power to the executive branch, particularly after the attorney general, the banking chief and other top officials were suspended. In a symbolic gesture, Correa declined to step down. The assembly was expected to meet for at least six months. On the economic front, the president decreed an increase in the state’s share of windfall oil profits from 50 percent to 99 percent in October 2007. The increase affected foreign companies operating in Ecuador that had previously seen extraordinary profits as a result of high international oil prices.

Political Parties Historically dominated by the conservative and liberal parties and long complicated by pronounced personalist tendencies, the Ecuadorian party system has recently been in a state of considerable flux. Many of the traditional parties have been built around particular candidates or families, consistent with the elite character of the country’s political culture for many generations. Party organizations have therefore been weak. Party alliances and coalitions have tended to form to win particular election contests or deal with immediate crises, then dissolve after the elections or crises have receded. The principal coalitions formed for the 1984 elections were a right-of-center National Reconstruction Front (Frente de Reconstrucci´on Nacional—FRN), which supported the presidential candidacy of Febres Cordero, and a left-ofcenter Progressive Front (Frente Progresista—FP). Both groups subsequently underwent a degree of restructuring, ultimately constituting a minority presidential bloc and a majority opposition bloc after the midterm congressional balloting of June 1986. In the second-round presidential balloting of May 1988, Rodrigo Borja was supported by the ID, DP, CFP, FRA, FADI, and MPD, which had collectively obtained a majority of legislative seats

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in January. By contrast, Borja’s ID lost more than half of its seats in the June 1990 legislative election, giving an opposition grouping led by the PSC and PRE a slim majority that the president was able to reverse in late October by concluding a fragile alliance of deputies ranging from communists to conservatives. By early 1991 the unlikely accord had dissipated, with legislative-executive conflict persisting for the remainder of Borja’s term. Shifts in the balance of legislative power have by no means been confined to electoral outcomes. During Dur´an-Ball´en’s first year in office (1992– 1993), no fewer than 22 of the Chamber’s then 77 representatives were officially reported to have changed their party affiliations. The fluidity was responsible, in part, for the downfall of presidents Bucaram in 1997, Mahuad in 2000, and Guti´errez in 2005.

Presidential Party ´ The Country Alliance (Alianza Pa´ıs—PAIS). ´ is a loose collection of socialist organizations PAIS and left-of-center personalities organized in 2006 largely by Rafael Correa, its presidential candidate. Correa chose not to participate in the presidential primaries sponsored by Conaie (below), instead forming alliances with the PS-FA, PSP, and the MNPP, among others, for support in the second round of balloting. During his 2006 campaign, Correa had targeted for radical reform what he labeled the “partidocracia” of traditional parties that had long controlled the National Congress and that brought down or crippled successive presidential administrations. Subsequently, the PA´IS refused to field candidates in the 2006 legislative elections, amid corruption allegations among various parties. After winning the election, President Correa successfully steered the PA´IS toward its goal of winning the constituent assembly election on September 30, 2007. He rejected an attempt by some close advisers to launch a party whose acronym would match his initials, deriding this as another example of the destructive pattern of personalization of politics in Ecuador.

The party was fined close to $1 million by the TSE in August 2007 for concealing campaign spending from the November 2006 presidential runoff, but the TSE backed away from that decision amid allegations by Correa that the investigation unit had not treated PA´IS and the opposition PRIAN equally with regard to overspending. Leaders: Rafael CORREA Delgado (Leader of the Alliance and President of the Republic), Lenin MORENO Garc´es (Vice President of the Republic).

Government-Supportive Parties Socialist Party–Broad Front (Partido Socialista–Frente Amplio—PS–FA). A long-established leftist formation (its founder, Ricardo PAREDES, having broken away to found the Ecuadorian Communist Party in 1931), the PS formed a coalition with the FA that secured three Chamber seats in 2002. For the 2002 presidential campaign, the coalition joined with the DP and the CFP in supporting former vice president Le´on Rold´os Aguilera, who finished third on a 15.5 percent vote share. The FA is a six-party formation whose core group has long been the Ecuadorian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Ecuatoriano—PCE). The other parties are the Committee for the People (Comit´e del Pueblo—CDP), a splinter group of the Maoist Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (Partido Comunista Marxista-Leninista—PCML); the Socialist Revolutionary Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario—PSR), a pro-Cuban group that withdrew from the Socialist Party in 1962; the Revolutionary Movement of the Christian Left (Movimiento Revolucionario de Izquierda Cristiana—MRIC), supported by a number of leftwing Catholics; the Movement for Leftist Unity (Movimiento por la Unidad de la Izquierda— MUI); and the Second Independence Movement (Movimiento Segunda Independencia—MSI). In 1988 the FA supported General Vargas in the first presidential round and Borja Cevallos in the runoff; it supported Gustavo ITURRALDE in 1992.

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The PS–FA allied itself with Rafael Correa and the Alianza Pa´ıs for the 2006 elections. Like Correa’s party, the PS–FA boycotted the legislative elections, offering no candidates on its list, and it endorsed Correa for president. PS–FA party leader Guadalupe Larriva was selected by Correa to be his first defense minister, becoming the first woman named to the post. She was killed in a helicopter crash on January 24, 2007. The PS–FA formed an alliance with the MNPP to contest the constituent assembly election in September 2007, but the alliance secured less than 1 percent of the vote. Leaders: Gustavo AYALA Cruz (President), Gonzalo AGUILAR (Vice President), Tito ´ GOROZABEL, Fausto DUTAN (Executive Secretary). New Country–Pachakutik Movement (Movimiento Nuevo Pais–Pachakutik—MNPP). The New Country Movement (Movimiento Nuevo Pais—MNP) was launched as an antiestablishment grouping that backed TV journalist Freddy Ehlers, who had entered the 1996 presidential race in February as an independent candidate on an anticorruption, environmentalist platform. After declaring his candidacy, Ehlers moved quickly to second place in the opinion polls, ahead of the ultimate victor, Abdal´a Bucaram. While proving attractive as a political “outsider,” Ehlers was hindered by having served as a member of the Andean Pact secretariat in Lima, Peru, where he married a Peruvian national. Even more damaging was his selection of a running mate, Rossana VINUEZA, who, although a prominent environmentalist, was linked to the Conservative Party through the rightwing Catholic organization, Opus Dei. As a result, Ehlers finished with a third-place 21 percent vote share in the first-round presidential balloting. Subsequently, he insisted that the Nuevo Pa´ıs was the “real winner” because it had led in the 11 highland provinces and predicted that the group would prevail over the “old country” parties in the year 2000. In 1998 the MNP joined with Pachakutik, the political wing of the 2.5 million strong Conaie, in

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a coalition styled the MNPP that supported Lucio Guti´errez for president but went into opposition in August 2003. Most of the MNPP’s electoral strength is based in the Andean highlands and Amazonian provinces, where the 11 indigenous and ethnic groups it represents are concentrated. In 2006 the party’s presidential candidate, Luis Macas, finished a distant sixth in the first-round balloting, with 2.2 percent of the vote. The party secured 3 percent of the vote in the legislative balloting on the same day. Its alliance with the PS–FA to contest the constituent assembly elections netted less than 1 percent of the overall vote. Leaders: Victor GRANDA (President), Guilberto TALAHUA, Belisario DAHUA, Freddy EHLERS Zurita (1996 and 1998 presidential candidate). Democratic Popular Movement (Movimiento Popular Democr´atico—MPD). Although initially banned from participation in the 1978 election, the TSE subsequently acknowledged the party’s legitimacy. Drawing much of its support from trade union members and teachers, the MPD, described as a far-left party, has since been represented in the Congress. In 1996 it lost 9 seats, leaving it with a total of 2, which the MPD retained in 1998. It secured an additional seat in 2002. In 2004 the MPD was part of President Lucio Guti´errez’s “new majority” that helped him deflect impeachment and push through a measure that removed all 31 Supreme Court justices. In 2006 the MPD’s presidential candidate, Luis Villacis, won only 1.3 percent of the vote in firstround balloting. Subsequently, the MPD supported Correa. In the September 30, 2007, constituent assembly elections the MPD won just over 1.7 percent of the vote. Leaders: Luis VILLACIS (National Party Director and 2006 presidential candidate), Eduardo MEDINA (Second Assistant Director), Maria Eugenia LIMA (1998 presidential candidate), Juan Jos´e CASTELLO (1996 presidential candidate).

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Other Parties That Contested the 2006 Elections Democratic Left (Izquierda Democr´atica— ID). The ID, a moderate social democratic party, named Rodrigo Borja Cevallos as its presidential candidate in 1978, endorsed Rold´os Aguilera in the 1979 runoff, and offered partial support to the Hurtado Larrea government after Rold´os’s death. It narrowly lost the presidency in the May 1984 runoff after having captured a substantial legislative plurality in January. Borja Cevallos was the front-runner in the first-round presidential balloting in January 1988 and defeated Abdal´a Bucaram of the PRE in a runoff on May 8. By contrast, its 1992 candidate, Ra´ul Baca Carbo, ran a distant fourth in the first-round vote. In 1996 the party’s legislative representation plummeted from 8 to 4, but it recovered to 17 in 1998, losing an additional seat for a total of 16 in 2002. The ID joined forces with Leon Rold´os’s RED party to contest the 2006 presidential elections, endorsing Rold´os as the presidential candidate. For the September 2007 constituent assembly elections the ID formed an alliance with other small left-wing parties, but the coalition won only 0.5 percent of the vote. ´ Leaders: Andr´es PAES (President), Agustin Ortiz (Vice President), Rodrigo BORJA Cevallos (Former President of the Republic, 1998 and 2002 presidential candidate), Luis PARODI Valverde (Former Vice President of the Republic), Ra´ul BACA Carbo (1992 presidential candidate). ´ Ethics and Democracy Network (Red Etica y Democracia—RED). Formed in January 2005 by its leader and former vice president of the republic Le´on Rold´os Aguilera, the social democratic party focused on reform of the constitution to create a bicameral legislature with elements of party-list proportional representation and geographic constituencies, greater autonomy for local and regional authorities, eradication of political corruption, and reform of the education system. RED formed an alliance for the presidential election with the ID, with Rold´os standing as the coalition’s presidential candidate. In the early

stages of the election, Rold´os led opinion polls, but his early strength dwindled as a large number of voters remained undecided. As the campaign heated up in late summer 2006, Rold´os fell behind PRIAN’s Alvaro Noboa and PA´IS coalition candidate Rafael Correa, with the latter emerging as the candidate with the most support from centerleft voters. Rold´os seemed to bolster the attacks on Correa by Noboa and other candidates from the right, claiming that Correa’s high-profile campaign advertising was financed by Venezuelan president Hugo Ch´avez. To shore up support on the left, Rold´os promised not to accept assistance from the IMF if elected. RED occupied 6 of the 10 seats won by the ID/RED alliance in the 2006 legislative elections. In the September 30, 2007, constituent assembly elections, RED, no longer in alliance with the ID, won just over 2 percent of the vote. ´ Aguilera (President Leaders: Le´on ROLDOS of the Party, Former Vice President of the Republic, and 2006 presidential candidate), Dolores PADILLA (Vice President), Ney BARRIONUEVO (Second Vice President), Carlos AGUINAGA (Secretary General). Institutional Renewal Party of National Action (Partido Renovador Institucional de Acci´on Nacional—PRIAN). The PRIAN is a center-right party, launched by former Roldosista Alvaro Noboa Pont´on, reportedly Ecuador’s wealthiest man, to support his presidential bid in 2002 after the former Roldosista member was defeated in 1998. In July 2006 the PRIAN and PSP forged an alliance to contest the presidential election, with Noboa as the presidential candidate, despite his earlier statements that he would not run. The PRIAN won 24.5 percent of the national vote in legislative elections of 2006, displacing the PSC (below) as the largest bloc in the chamber. Despite its opposition to Correa’s proposed constituent assembly, the PRIAN fielded candidates for the assembly election in 2007, winning 6.6 percent of the vote, with Alvaro Noboa elected as a delegate. Jorge Cevallos Mac´ıas, president of the

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National Congress, was expelled from the party in June, reportedly because he “broke from the party line” and rejected the dismissal of 57 lawmakers as the TSE had mandated. ´ Leaders: Wilson SANCHEZ (President), Vicente TAIANO (National Director and 2006 vice presidential candidate), Alvaro NOBOA Pont´on (2002 and 2006 presidential candidate), Sylka ´ SANCHEZ, Gloria GALLARDO. Patriotic Society Party of January 21 (Partido Sociedad Patri´otica 21 de Enero—PSP). Launched before the 2002 election, the PSP was joined by the MNPP in supporting the successful candidacy of Lucio Guti´errez, the PSP’s charismatic founder and leader, whose platform emphasized anticorruption measures and support for the poor. After Guti´errez was removed from the presidency by the Congress in April 2005, he fled the country. He returned in October but was arrested on sedition charges and jailed. The courts ordered his release and dismissal of the case in March 2006. Two months prior to his release, Guti´errez was nominated by the PSP as their presidential candidate for the October 2006 election. Guti´errez’s major election plank was the promise to call a constituent assembly to reform the dysfunctional political system. His candidacy was disallowed, however, by a TSE ruling in May 2006 that barred Guti´errez from standing for election for two years because of a campaign finance violation. Guti´errez continued to campaign in defiance of the TSE ruling. In late July 2006 the PSP announced that it would join forces with PRIAN for the presidential election, with PRIAN’s Noboa running for president and Gilmar Guti´errez (the brother of Lucio) as the vice presidential candidate. By September, however, the parties had gone their separate ways, with Gilmar Guti´errez registering as a candidate for president under the PSP banner. Guti´errez came in third in the first round of balloting with 17.4 percent of the vote. The PSP list won 17.5 percent of the vote in the legislative election, giving it the second largest bloc of seats in the Congress. The PSP renewed its loose alliance with the PRIAN for

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the November 26 presidential runoff, supporting Noboa in exchange for promises that a Noboa government would prosecute perpetrators of the 2005 “coup” against Lucio Guti´errez. After its defeat in the presidential elections, the PSP eventually agreed to support a constituent assembly referendum. Soon thereafter some PSP legislators joined other opposition members in voting to dismiss the TSE chief after a dispute over the power that would be vested in the assembly, and the lawmakers were subsequently dismissed. In the 2007 constituent assembly elections, the PSP won 7.3 percent of the vote, with Gilmar Guti´errez elected a delegate. ´ Leaders: Col. (Ret.) Lucio Edwin GUTIERREZ Borb´ua (Former President of the Republic), Gilmar ´ GUTIERREZ Borb´ua (National Director and 2006 ´ (Secretary presidential candidate), Carlos TERAN ´ General), Fidel ARAUJO. Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano—PSC). Moderately right-of-center, the PSC was launched in 1951 by former president Camilo PONCE Enr´ıquez. Subsequently, it served in coalition with the PCE and the Ecuadorian Nationalist Revolutionary Action (Acci´on Revolucionaria Nacionalista Ecuatoriana—ARNE), a rightist group that was denied electoral registration in 1978 and thereafter dissolved. Sixto Dur´an-Ball´en, the PSC’s 1988 presidential candidate who failed to secure sufficient votes in first-round balloting, eventually embarked on an ultimately successful race for the presidency as the PUR nominee. The PSC’s legislative representation increased from 9 seats in 1988 to a plurality of 16 in 1990; it retained its plurality in 1992 by capturing 21 seats. In 1996 the PSC held 27 seats. In 2006, PSC presidential candidate Cynthia Viteri won 9.6 percent of the vote in the first round. In the legislative election held on the same day the PSC list won 13.5 percent of the vote. The PSC won just under 4 percent of the vote in the constituent assembly election in 2007. Leaders: Pascual DEL CIOPPO Aragundi (President), Pedro Carlos FALQUEZ Batallas (Vice President), Cynthia VITERI (2006 presidential

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candidate), Antonio Xavier NEIRA Menendez (2002 presidential candidate), Jaime NEBOT Saadi (1996 presidential candidate), Le´on FEBRES Cordero Rivadeneira (Former President of the Re´ Carrera (Secpublic), Xavier Eduardo BUITRON retary General). Christian Democratic Union (Uni´on Dem´ocrata Cristiana—UDC). In late 1977 the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano— PDC) joined with the Progressive Conservatives in organizing the Popular Democratic Coalition (Coalici´on Popular Democr´atica), which, having been denied separate registration by the TSE, joined with the CFP in supporting the 1978/1979 presidential candidacy of Jaime Rold´os Aguilera. In August 1981 the Popular Democratic legislative group (subsequently identified as the Democr´acia Popular—DP) joined with a number of other members in a government-supportive alliance styled the Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democr´atica). During the 1984 presidential race, the group (also identified as Democracia Popular– Uni´on Dem´ocrata Cristiana) campaigned under the Popular Democracy label in support of former PCP leader Julio C´esar TRUJILLO. It supported Borja Cevallos in second-round balloting in May 1988. At a meeting of the party’s national junta on July 3, 1989, which was boycotted by aliancista members, a pro-Hurtado rupturista faction secured approval of a motion to withdraw from the executive (but not the legislative) partnership with the ID. In early August, however, the decision was reversed, with the ID agreeing to support the reelection of Christian Democrat Wilfredo Lucero as president of the Congress. The party fared poorly in both the presidential and legislative elections in 1992 and held only 4 Chamber seats after the 1994 balloting. In 1996 the party tripled its Chamber seats to 12. In 2002 former president Hurtado participated in the formation of a youth-oriented United Fatherland (Patria Solidaria—PS), becoming that party’s presidential candidate. By 2006, the DP name had disappeared from national election campaigns; the UDC, however,

won 8.1 percent of the legislative vote, securing 5 seats in Congress. In the constituent assembly elections in September 2007, the UDC won 0.4 percent of the vote. Leaders: Carlos LARREATEGUI (President), Ord´on˜ ez DIEGO Guerrero, Jamil MAHUAD Witt and Osvaldo HURTADO Larrea (Former Presidents of the Republic), Wilfredo LUCERO Bola˜nos, Dario FLORES Rubio (Secretary General). Concentration of Popular Forces (Concentraci´on de Fuerzas Populares—CFP). Formed in 1946 by Carlos Guevara Moreno, the CFP is committed to broad-based socioeconomic change. Its longtime leader, Assad Bucaram, was the frontrunner in the abortive 1972 presidential campaign and was considered the leading contender in 1978 until being declared ineligible on the basis of foreign parentage. Bucaram’s prot´eg´e and nephewin-law, Jaime Rold´os Aguilera, the candidate of a coalition of the CFP and Popular Democrats, obtained a plurality of ballots cast on July 16 and defeated Dur´an-Ball´en in a runoff on April 29, 1979. Following the CFP victory, a pronounced breach emerged between Rold´os and his former mentor, most party leaders remaining loyal to Bucaram. In 1980 Rold´os formally broke with the CFP, organizing a group called People, Change and Democracy (Pueblo, Cambio y Democracia—PCD). Further defections occurred, and on November 6, 1981, Bucaram died, leaving the rump CFP with no firm leadership. The party’s Chamber representation fell from 6 seats in 1988 to 3 in 1990; it plunged further to a single national constituency seat in 1992, which was lost in 1994, regained in 1996, and again lost in 1998. In 2002 it joined with the PS–FA in endorsing the presidential candidacy of Le´on Rold´os Aguilera while continuing to lack Chamber representation. The CFP’s 2006 presidential candidate, Jaime Damervil Martinez, secured less than 0.5 percent of the vote in first-round balloting. Leaders: Averroes BUCARAM Saxida (1992 presidential candidate), Jaime DAMERVIL Mart´ınez (2006 presidential candidate), Galo VAYAS (Director).

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Other parties that participated in the 2006 elections were the Revolutionary Movement of Popular Participation (Movimiento Revolucionario de Participaci´on Popular—MRPP), led by Lenin TORRES; the Alfarista National Integration (INA), led by Carlos Francisco Sagnay de la BASTIDA; the Movement for Democratic Renovation (Movimiento de la Renovaci´on Democr´atica—MRD), led by Marco Proa˜no MAYA; and the Alliance of the Third Republic (Alianza Tercera Republica—ATR), led by Marcelo LARREA Cabrera.

Other Parties Alfarist Radical Front (Frente Radical Alfarista—FRA). The FRA was founded by Abd´on ´ Mu˜noz, a maverick Guayaquil busiCALDERON nessman who was assassinated on November 29, 1978. The party’s legal recognition was withdrawn in early 1979, after which its supporters were reported to have joined the Democratic left to participate in the congressional election of April 29. Its legal status restored, the FRA made an unexpectedly strong showing in local and provincial elections in December 1980, winning more than 20 percent of the national vote, but by 1998 was reduced to only 3 Chamber seats, all of which were lost in 2002. FRA leader Fabi´an Alarc´on Rivera, president of the republic from February 1997 to August 1998, was arrested on corruption charges in March 1999, his supporters describing the action as motivated by politics. There has been little party activity reported since 2002. Leaders: Fabi´an ALARCON Rivera (President of the Party and Former President of the Republic), C´esar VERDUGA V´elez, Iv´an CASTRO Pati˜no. Ecuadorian Popular Revolutionary Action (Acci´on Popular Revolucionaria Ecuatoriana— APRE). Formerly styled the Ecuadorian Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Ecuatoriana), APRE resulted from a rivalry within the Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP, above) in the 1950s between a majority faction led by Assad BUCARAM and a leftist minority led by Jos´e HANNA Musse. In 1958 Hanna Musse formally broke with the CFP, his new organization

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being known until 1978 as the National Guevarista Party (Partido Nacional Guevarista). APRE supported General Vargas for president in 1988 and 1992, winning one legislative seat on the latter occasion and adding another in 1994, by which time Vargas had become its acknowledged leader. Leader: Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Frank VARGAS Pazzos (1988, 1992, and 1996 presidential candidate). Independent Movement for an Authentic Republic (Movimiento Independiente para una Rep´ublica Aut´entica—MIRA). MIRA was launched in 1996 by Vice President Rosal´ıa Arteaga. Leader: Rosal´ıa ARTEAGA Serrano (Former Vice President of the Republic and 1998 presidential candidate). Radical Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Radical Ecuatoriano—PLRE). The PLRE is the principal heir to the traditional Liberal Party (Partido Liberal—PL), which was dominant in Ecuadorian politics for a half-century after 1895 but subsequently split into a number of factions. It lost its only legislative seat in May 1996. Leaders: Ivonne Leyla JUEZ Abuchakra (2002 presidential candidate), Blasco Manuel ˜ PENAHERRERA Padilla (Former Vice President of the Republic), Julio PONCE Arteta (Director), Alejandro LASSO de la Torre (Secretary General). Ecuadorian Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Ecuatoriano—PCE). Formed in 1855, the PCE is Ecuador’s oldest political party. It is based on a traditional alliance between church and state and has historical roots in the Andean highlands. In early 1976 the party split into rightand left-wing factions, the latter subsequently organizing as the Progressive Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Progresista—PCP), which joined with a number of other parties, including the Christian Democrats (see Christian Democratic Union, above), in a 1978 alliance styled the Popular Democratic Coalition that supported the presidential candidacy of Jaime Rold´os Aguilera. By 1986 its Chamber representation had been reduced to a single seat, which it retained in 1988 before recovering to three in 1990 and six in 1992, all of

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which were retained in 1994. The party fell back to two legislative seats in 1996 (both retained in 1998), even though it had absorbed (then) President Dur´an-Ball´en’s Republican Unity Party (Partido Unidad Republicano—PUR) in 1995. (A PSC splinter, the PUR was registered in October 1991 as a 1992 campaign vehicle for Sixto Dur´an-Ball´en, who had run as a PSC candidate in 1978 and 1988. Following Dur´an-Ball´en’s inauguration, the PUR experienced internal rancor, culminating in mid-1993 with the withdrawal of former president Carlos Julio AROSEMENA, who insisted that the group lacked leadership and direction.) The party still has some support in the provinces of Carchi and Imbabura, where it cooperates with the PSC. ´ ´ Leaders: Sixto DURAN-BALL EN (Former President of the Republic), Alberto DAHIK Garzoni (Former Vice President, currently in exile). Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata—PD). The PD was organized in 1981, initially as the Radical Democratic Party (Partido Radical Dem´ocrata—PRD), by a number of dissident Liberals, including Francisco Huerta Montalvo, who had been the PLR presidential candidate before his disqualification in 1978 because of alleged financial irregularities. The PD was joined by deserters from other parties, including Le´on Rold´os Aguilera. Before the 1984 election Rold´os joined the People, Change and Democracy (under CFP, above). The PD won five Chamber seats in 1984, one in 1986, and none thereafter. Leaders: Dr. Francisco HUERTA Montalvo (1984 presidential candidate), Luis PIANA. In anticipation of the September 2007 constituent assembly election, several new parties emerged, including the National Honesty Movement (Movimiento Honradez Nacional—MHN), ´ led by Ximena BOHORQUEZ, which won 0.7 percent of the vote, and A New Option (Una Nueva Opcion—UNO), which won 1.1 percent.

Indigenous Organizations Confederation of Ecuadorian Indigenous Nationalities (Confederaci´on de Nacionalidades

Ind´ıgenas del Ecuador—Conaie). The confederation serves as an umbrella organization for nearly a dozen indigenous groups. It has advanced claims to most of the Andean province of Pastaza. To reinforce their demands, which included administrative autonomy and control of natural resources, including oil, the Indians mounted a brief insurrection in June 1990 and staged a protest march in Quito in April 1992. They were instrumental in forcing the ouster of President Mahuad in January 2000. With nearly 2.5 million members, the organization has proved a powerful political force. Antonio VARGAS, the former president of Conaie, hoped to be the 2002 presidential candidate of Conaie and its political arm, the Pachakutik Movement (see under MNPP, above), but he resigned as president of the confederation because of a scandal involving signatures on a referendum petition. In 2006 Conaie played a major role in organizing and staging the March protests against the free trade agreement negotiations with the United States and against any accommodation for Occidental Petroleum with regard to the breach of its oil production contract with Ecuador. Conaie also appealed to the UN and human rights groups to monitor the situation in Ecuador to safeguard against excessive use of force to stop the protests. Conaie proposed a single primary in late July for all of the left-of-center parties to select a candidate for the October 2006 elections. Its leader, Luis Macas, secured the nomination under the MNPP banner and won 2.19 percent of the votes. Leaders: Luis MACAS (President of the Party and 2006 presidential candidate), Santiago DE LA CRUZ (Vice President). Federation of Indigenous People, Peasants and Negroes of Ecuador (Federaci´on de Pueblos Ind´ıgenas, Campesinas y Negros del Ecuador— Fedepicne). Fedepicne was launched in 1996 by a group of Conaie dissidents. In 2005, former party president Marco MORILLO was identified as a member of the ID. Leaders: Luis PACHALA (President), Ricardo GUMABO, Pedro GUAMBO.

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Cabinet As of February 1, 2008 President Vice President

Rafael Correa Delgado Lenin Moreno Garc´es

Ministers Agriculture and Fisheries Coastal Affairs Coordinating Minister of the Economy Coordinating Minister of Internal and External Security Coordinating Minister of Politics Coordinating Minister of Production Coordinating Minister of Social Development Coordinating Minister of Strategic Sectors Cultural and Natural Heritage Coordination Culture Economic and Social Inclusion Economy and Finance Education Electricity and Renewable Energy Environment Foreign Relations, Commerce, and Integration Government and Police Industry and Competitiveness Justice and Human Rights Labor and Employment Petroleum National Defense Public Health Sport Tourism Transportation and Public Works Urban Development and Housing

Walter Poveda Ricaurte Carolina Portalupi [f] P´edro P´aez Gustavo Larrea Ricardo Pati˜no Susana Cabeza de Vaca [f] Nathalie Cely [f] Derlis Palacios Guerrero Doris Solis Carri´on [f] Antonio Preciado Bedoya Jeannette S´anchez Zurita [f] Fausto Ortiz de la Cadena Ra´ul Vallejo Coral Alecksey Mosquera Marcela Agui˜naga [f] Mar´ıa Isabel Salvador Crespo[f] Fernando Bustamante Ra´ul Sagasti Lupera Gustavo Jalkh Antonio Gagliardo Valarezo Galo Chiriboga Zambrano Wellington Sandoval C´ordova Caroline Chang [f] Ra´ul Carri´on Fiallos Ver´onica Si´on [f] Jorge Mar´un ´ Mar´ıa de los Angeles Duarte [f]

[f] = female

Legislature The current legislature is a unicameral National Congress (Congreso Nacional) of 100 members, popularly elected (via proportional representation in 22 constituencies [1 for each province]), serving four-year terms. In the most recent election on October 15, 2006, the Institutional Renewal Party of National Action won 27 seats; the Patriotic Society

Party, 23; the Social Christian Party, 12; the Democratic Left/Ethics and Democracy Network, 10; the Ecuadorian Roldosist Party, 6; the New Country– Pachakutik Movement, 6; the Democratic Popular Movement, 3; the Christian Democratic Union, 2; others, 11. (As has been commonplace in Ecuador, the number of seats held by parties subsequently

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changed as a result of defections on the part of individual legislators.) President: Jorge Jos´e CEVALLOS Mac´ıas.

Communications Ecuador’s Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, and journalists have normally been able to do their work unhindered. However, in recent years, the watchdog group Reporters Without Borders noted that press freedom had deteriorated under the administrations of President Lucio Guti´errez Borb´ua and President Rafael Correa. In 2007, Correa reportedly stopped holding news conferences in response to perceived hostility from journalists. Also in 2007, a journalist received a 60-day prison sentence for criticizing a politician.

Press The following are daily newspapers published in Guayaquil, unless otherwise noted: El Universo (143,000), independent conservative; El Comercio (Quito, 100,000), independent conservative; Ultimas Noticias (Quito, 60,000), evening counterpart of El Comercio; Hoy (Quito, 72,000), center-left; El Tel´egrafo (60,000 daily, 55,000 Sunday), liberal; El Expreso (60,000), center-right; El Tiempo (Quito, 35,000), independent conservative; La Raz´on (28,000), liberal; and La Hora.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility. A number of foreign agencies maintain bureaus in either Quito or Guayaquil.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is supervised by the nongovernmental Asociaci´on Ecuatoriana de Radiodifusi´on (AER) and the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones (Ietel). Of the more than 300 radio stations (the most numerous, on a per capita basis, in Latin America), about two dozen are facilities of the religious La Voz de los Andes. There are 14 television stations, most of which are commercial. There were approximately 65.5 personal computers and 73 Internet users per 1,000 people in 2005. As of that same year there were about 472 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Lu´ıs Benigno GALLEGOS Chiriboga U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador: Linda JEWELL Permanent Representative to the UN: Diego CORDOVEZ IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ALADI, CAN, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, OPEC, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

E L S A LVA D O R REPUBLIC

OF

EL SALVADOR

Rep u´ blica de El Salvador

The Country The smallest of the Central American countries and the only one whose territory does not touch the Caribbean Sea, El Salvador is oriented geographically and, to some extent, psychologically toward the Pacific and the other isthmus countries. Its population density is the highest in the Americas, while its per capita income is among the lowest. Although there is a small Indian minority, the people are largely of mixed Spanish and Indian descent, with 90 percent classified as mestizo. The Catholic Church is predominant, but Protestant and Jewish faiths are represented. Women constitute approximately 35 percent of the paid labor force, concentrated largely in domestic and human service sectors and in manufacturing; female participation in government is minimal. Traditionally dependent on agriculture, with coffee as the primary cash crop, El Salvador— before the domestic instability generated by the coup of October 1979—had become the region’s leading exporter of manufactured goods. The industrial sector as a whole now accounts for about 30 percent of GDP, while agriculture contributes 10 percent (down from nearly 40 percent in 1980). Most external sales are made to the United States and neighboring Central American nations. During 1979–1989 all major economic indicators steadily declined, counterinsurgency being described by one analyst as the country’s “only growth sector.” Most severely affected was agriculture, with production of coffee, cotton, and sugar each falling by approximately 50 percent from 1979– 1982 and capital flight reported at more than $1

billion through the period. More than half the population remained below the national poverty line, and much of the workforce was under- or unemployed; in addition, despite land-redistribution efforts in the early 1980s, no more than 15 percent of the rural population currently holds land title. In mid-1989 the Cristiani administration announced a “National Rescue Plan” that called for government spending cuts, the lifting of price controls, and the privatization of state-run industries (including coffee plantations) in order to reduce budget deficits and external debt arrears. The effort yielded

GUATEMALA

HONDURAS

Santa Ana

E L S A LVA D O R Mejicanos Acajutla

San Salvador

Soyapango

San Miguel La Unión Golfo de Fonseca

PAC IF IC 0 0

30 Mi 30 Km

OC EAN

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measurable results by 1992 with real GDP growth of 4.6 percent and a halving of inflation to 11.2 percent. Annual growth for the 1990s as a whole averaged 4.7 percent, but by 2001 expansion had slowed to 1.7 percent. In 2001 El Salvador adopted the U.S. dollar as its currency in an effort to stabilize exchange rates and attract foreign investment. However, growth showed little improvement until 2005, when it increased marginally to 2.8 percent, with inflation of 4.4 percent. In 2006 GDP grew by 3.5 percent, with inflation of 4.1 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background After the colonies comprising the Captaincy General of Guatemala declared their independence from Spain in 1821, a period of conflict ensued with Mexico over perceived Mexican domination efforts. El Salvador subsequently joined Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in forming the United Provinces of Central America in 1823. In the wake of the collapse of that star-crossed federation into civil war in 1838, El Salvador formally declared its status as an independent entity in a constitution adopted in 1841. Many constitutional revisions were subsequently enacted during ongoing political turbulence throughout the rest of the 1800s, which also included several abortive attempts to reform a Central American Federation. However, El Salvador enjoyed periods of relative calm during the first three decades of the 20th century and again from 1950 to 1960. Lt. Col. Oscar OSIRIO ruled from 1950 to 1956 and was succeeded by an elected president, Lt. Col. Jos´e Mar´ıa LEMUS, but a coup d’´etat in 1960 overthrew Lemus and inaugurated a period of renewed instability. A new constitution was promulgated in January 1962 and an election was held the following April, although the opposition did not participate. Col. Julio Adalberto RIVERA, candidate of the recently organized National Conciliation Party (Partido de Conciliaci´on Nacional—PCN), was certified as president and served a five-year

term. Subsequent PCN victories brought Gen. Fidel ´ SANCHEZ Hern´andez and Col. Arturo Armando MOLINA Barraza to power in 1967 and 1972, respectively, but announcement of the 1972 results provoked an unsuccessful coup by leftist forces, in the wake of which their candidate, Jos´e Napole´on DUARTE Fuentes, was exiled. Following the election of February 20, 1977, the PCN candidate, Gen. Carlos Humberto ROMERO Mena, was declared president-elect with a majority of 67 percent of the votes cast, although the opposition, as in 1972, charged the government with massive electoral irregularities. The PCN won 50 of 54 seats in the legislative election of March 18, 1978, which was boycotted by most of the opposition because of inadequate assurances that the tabulation of results would be impartial. In the wake of rapidly escalating conflict between right- and left-wing groups, General Romero was ousted on October 15, 1979, in a coup led by ´ Col. Jaime Abdul GUTIERREZ and Col. Adolfo Arnoldo MAJANO Ramos, who were joined by three civilians on October 17 in a five-man ruling junta. While appealing to extremist forces to respect “the will of the majority” and aid in the installation of a “true democracy,” the junta was actively opposed by leftist elements protesting military rule, and a state of siege, lifted on October 23, was reimposed three days later. Two of the three civilian members of the junta, as well as all civilian cabinet members, resigned on January 3, 1980, in protest at a “swing to the right” for which the remaining civilian junta member, Mario Antonio ANDINO, was allegedly responsible. Andino himself resigned the following day, three prominent members of the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC) joining the junta on January 9 after obtaining assurances that rightist influence would be contained and a dialogue initiated with leftist organizations. One of the three, H´ector DADA Hirezi, withdrew on March 3 and was replaced by former PDC presidential candidate Jos´e Napole´on Duarte, who had returned from exile after the October coup. The most widely publicized terrorist act of the year was the assassination of the liberal Msgr. Oscar

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Political Status: Part of the Captaincy General of Guatemala that declared independence from Spain in September 1821; member of the United Provinces of Central America that was launched in 1823; status as independent political entity formalized in constitution of 1841; Republic of El Salvador formally established in constitution of 1859; constitution of 1962 suspended following military coup of October 15, 1979; provisional government superseded following promulgation of new constitution on December 20, 1983; peace treaty with FMLN guerrillas (effective February 1) signed January 16, 1992. Area: 8,124 sq. mi. (21,041 sq. km.). Population: 5,118,599 (1992C); 6,996,000 (2006E). The 1992 figure is unadjusted for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (2005E): SAN SALVADOR (508,000), Soyapango (295,000), Mejicanos (189,000), San Miguel (183,000), Santa Ana (179,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Effective January 1, 2001, El Salvador adopted the U.S. dollar as its currency. President: El´ıas Antonio (“Tony”) SACA Gonz´alez (Nationalist Republican Alliance); elected on March 21, 2004, and inaugurated for a five-year term on June 1, succeeding Francisco Guillermo FLORES P´erez (Nationalist Republican Alliance). Vice President: Ana Vilma ALBANEZ de Escobar (Nationalist Republican Alliance); elected on March 21, 2004, and inaugurated on June 1 for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding Carlos QUINTANILLA Schmidt (Nationalist Republican Alliance).

Arnulfo ROMERO y Galdames, archbishop of San Salvador, on March 24. While the junta initially blamed leftist forces for the act, the actual perpetrators were widely assumed to be rightist elements. Earlier, three major mass organizations, in concert with the Salvadoran Communist Party, had announced the formation of a Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses (Coodinadora Revolucionario

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de Masas—CRM) to oppose the PDC-military coalition. In April 1980 the CRM was superseded by the Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Democr´atico Revolucionario—FDR), a coalition of 18 leftist and far-leftist groups, including a dissident faction of the PDC. Subsequently, the major guerrilla organizations formed the Farabundo Mart´ı National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Mart´ı para la Liberaci´on National—FMLN) to serve as the FDR’s military affiliate. In the wake of these and other developments, including the apparent complicity of government security forces in the murder of three American nuns and a lay worker on December 2, the junta was reorganized on December 3, with Duarte and the increasingly hard-line Guti´errez being sworn in as its president and vice president, respectively, on December 22. Although FMLN activity was widespread by early 1981, President Duarte on March 5 named a three-member commission to update electoral registers for Constituent Assembly balloting in March 1982. By midyear the PDC and four rightist parties had been registered, subsequently being joined by the Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista—Arena) of former army major Roberto D’AUBUISSON Arrieta, who was reported to have been implicated in the murder of Archbishop Romero. The FDR, on the other hand, refused to participate, continuing efforts initiated in January to secure external support for its revolutionary program. In the election of March 28, 1982, the Christian Democrats secured the largest number of seats (24) in the 60-member Assembly. However, four rightwing parties collectively constituted a majority and refused to permit Duarte to continue as president. The ensuing interparty negotiations resulted in a deadlock, with the Christian Democrats insisting on representation in the new government proportional to their share of the vote. On April 22 the Assembly convened for its first session and elected Major d’Aubuisson as its president by a vote of 35– 22. After further negotiations that were reportedly influenced by pressure from the United States, the armed forces presented the Assembly with a list of

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individuals whom it considered acceptable as candidates for provisional chief executive, pending a direct presidential election. One of those listed, the ˜ Borja, was acindependent Dr. Alvaro MAGANA cepted by the Assembly on April 29 and sworn in on May 2 together with three vice presidents representing the PDC, the PCN, and Arena. Two days later a tripartite administration was formed. The move toward democracy generated no reprieve from insurgent activity. Nonetheless, the five parties represented in the Constituent Assembly agreed in August 1983 to establish a multiparty commission to prepare a timetable for new elections. Following promulgation of a revised constitution on December 20, the Assembly approved presidential balloting for March 1984 and legislative and municipal elections for March 1985. The 1984 election was contested by eight candidates, the acknowledged front-runners being d’Aubuisson and Duarte, neither of whom secured a majority. At a runoff on May 6, Duarte emerged the clear winner, with 53.6 percent of the vote, and was inaugurated on June 1. The FDR-FMLN, refusing to participate in the presidential campaign, stepped up its military activity, although agreeing to peace talks with Duarte in late 1984. The talks, held in the guerrilla-held town of La Palma on October 15, were hailed as “historic,” but FMLN insistence on “purification” of the armed forces through the integration of guerrilla elements proved a stumbling block for future talks, which were suspended altogether in January 1985. In something of a surprise victory, the Christian Democrats swept the March 1985 election, winning 33 seats in the National Assembly and control of 200 of the country’s 262 municipalities. The defeat of Arena, which had inhibited land reform measures and blocked Duarte’s efforts in the areas of human rights and peace negotiation, was taken as evidence that traditional rightists in the business sector and the military had shifted to the PDC, the former heartened by negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the latter welcoming U.S. military aid funds and training that had

measurably enhanced the armed forces’ firepower and counterinsurgency capability. Duarte, viewing the election results as a “mandate for peace,” pledged to reopen negotiations with the insurgents while rebuilding the collapsed Salvadoran economy. Within a year of the election, however, efforts at negotiation had largely been abandoned; economic measures had managed to alienate both the business community and Duarte’s traditional grassroots and trade union support; and the military stalemate which had prevailed since 1981 (in the words of a U.S. observer, “due to the high quality and dedication of both sides”) continued to sap the country’s economy and infrastructure. The rebels’ capacity to act with relative impunity was dramatized by the kidnapping of the president’s daughter, In´es Guadalupe DUARTE Dur´an, by FMLN-affiliated forces in September 1985. The bombardment of insurgent areas was suspended while the bishop of San Salvador negotiated the release of Duarte’s daughter and a group of abducted bureaucrats in exchange for 34 political prisoners, including a number of guerrilla commanders, with 98 wounded insurgents given safe passage to Mexico City. The agreement provoked resentment on the part of the armed forces, as well as a widespread perception that only In´es Duarte’s abduction had prevented the indefinite detention of the kidnapped officials. Public discontent was further fueled by the government’s 1986 economic austerity plan, which included a 100 percent currency devaluation, limited wage concessions, tax increases, and a doubling of gasoline prices. Business leaders charged Duarte with “bowing to the dictates of the IMF,” while labor unrest intensified. On February 21 thousands marched in San Salvador to protest sharp increases in the cost of living, which had risen by more than 125 percent since 1980. Through the mediation of Peruvian President Alan Garc´ıa, the first meeting in more than a year between government and rebel representatives was held in Lima in May 1986. However, Duarte’s close advisor, Minister of Culture Julio REY Prendes, insisted that the administration had been “deceived” into believing that the opposition leaders would be

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speaking for their individual parties rather than on behalf of the FMLN, and the talks were quickly suspended. On the basis of a peace plan advanced by the five Central American presidents in August 1987, discussions with FDR-FMLN representatives resumed in San Salvador in early October. However, the government insisted that the rebels lay down their arms as a precondition for inclusion in the “democratic” process and the talks again foundered. Subsequently, at legislative balloting in March 1988, Arena won a near majority of 30 seats, with the PDC and PCN winning 23 and 7, respectively. Two months later Arena secured an absolute majority as the result of a PCN crossover. Earlier, in November 1987, Dr. Guillermo UNGO and Rub´en ZAMORA Rivas, leaders, respectively, of the National Revolutionary Movement and the Popular Social Christian Movement had announced the formation of a leftist Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democr´atica— CD), with the declared aim of seeking a resolution to the conflict through electoral participation. Since the two also served as president and vice president of the FDR, the action provided a linkage between the legal political process and the insurgency. Following the 1988 legislative elections (for which the CD did not present candidates), it was announced that the new grouping would participate in the 1989 presidential campaign. In early 1989 the FMLN leadership advanced a plan whereby the rebels would lay down their arms if the government would agree to a number of stipulations, including a six-month delay in the balloting scheduled for March 19. While rejecting the plan as unconstitutional, the government (responding in part to intense U.S. pressure) agreed to participate in formal talks with the insurgents that commenced February 22 in Qaxtepec, Mexico. Four days later President Duarte offered to postpone the first-round voting until April 30, leaving sufficient time for a second round, if necessary, before the June 1 expiration of his five-year term. However, the proposal was rejected by both the rebels and Arena, with Arena candidate Alfredo CRISTIANI Burkard securing the presidency on the basis of a 53.8 to 36.6

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percent single-round victory over the PDC nomi´ nee, Fidel CHAVEZ Mena. Protracted negotiations over the next two years, punctuated by a series of rebel offensives, culminated in a meeting in Mexico City (the first to be attended by FMLN field commanders) held April 4–27, 1991, that yielded agreement on a tentative package of constitutional amendments. During further talks in Caracas, Venezuela, in late May the two sides endorsed the formation of a human rights monitoring team, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, whose initial contingent was deployed on July 26. Two months later, during a New York meeting on September 25, Cristiani and FMLN representatives reached general agreement on a permanent ceasefire to end the bloody 12-year-old conflict. On January 16, 1992, a treaty (incorporating a formal cessation of hostilities on February 1) was signed in Mexico City. The document provided for UN supervision of the cease-fire while rebel forces disbanded over a nine-month period; purchase by the government of land for distribution to peasants in rebel-held areas; a blanket pardon for all combatants; “purification” of the government’s officer corps; absorption of the infamous national guard and treasury police by the regular army; dissolution of the military’s intelligence, civil defense, and counterinsurgency units; and the creation of a new civil police force. Despite setbacks that delayed completion of the peace process by two months, demobilization of both rebel units and the government’s notorious Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalions was completed on December 15, 1992, at which time the war was declared at an end and the FMLN legally certified as a political party. Heading a leftist coalition, Rub´en Zamora was defeated in second-round presidential balloting on ´ April 24, 1994, by Arena’s Armando CALDERON Sol. Subsequently, splits within both Arena and the FMLN led to withdrawals and the formation of new parties by the dissidents (see Political Parties, below). At the legislative balloting of March 16, 1997, Arena barely outpaced the FMLN, while in

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local contests leftists captured most of the country’s major cities, including the capital, San Salvador. However, the leftist surge subsequently lost momentum, and Arena’s Francisco FLORES easily outpolled six challengers to win the presidential poll of March 7, 1999, his nearly 52 percent of the vote precluding the need for runoff balloting. In the legislative election of March 2000, the FMLN captured a slim plurality of seats, but not enough to take control from the allied conservative forces of Arena, the Christian Democrats, and the PCN. The result was the same in March 2003, while Arena retained the presidency with the election of Antonio (“Tony”) SACA on March 21, 2004. The legislative distribution was not radically altered in the triennial balloting of March 12, 2006, although Arena replaced the FMLN as the plurality grouping by a gain of six seats (see Legislature, below).

Constitution and Government The constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly on December 6, 1983, provides for a president and vice president, both elected by direct popular vote for five-year terms, and for a unicameral National Assembly elected for a three-year term. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court, whose 13 members are elected by the Assembly. The country’s 14 departments are headed by governors appointed by the chief executive.

Foreign Relations El Salvador belongs to the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and their subsidiary bodies. It is an active member of the Organization of Central American States, whose secretariat is located in San Salvador, and of other regional institutions. In the early 1980s, following allegations of aid to the FMLN by the sandinista regime in Nicaragua, cooperation between El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras increased. In October 1983, at the urging of the United States, a revival of the Central American Defense Council (Condeca), originally a four-member group that included Nicaragua, was

announced in support of a joint approach to “extracontinental aggression of a Marxist-Leninist character.” Although no formal action was undertaken by the truncated Council, San Salvador and Tegucigalpa cooperated during U.S. military maneuvers in the region in 1983–1984, as well as in attempts to interdict Nicaraguan arms shipments to Salvadoran rebel forces. On November 26, 1989, Cristiani severed diplomatic relations with Managua after a Nicaraguan-registered plane, loaded with Soviet SAM-7 missiles allegedly consigned to the FMLN, crashed in El Salvador. Eleven months later a number of SAM-7 and SAM-14 missiles, reportedly supplied by dissident sandinistas, were handed over by the FMLN to Nicaraguan authorities. The action came in the wake of an unprecedented joint appeal by Moscow and Washington for political settlement of the Salvadoran conflict. During 1987–1988 El Salvador came under increasing criticism for the alleged misuse of U.S. aid funds, the economic and military components of which totaled more than $400 million in 1987 alone. Relations were further complicated by a U.S. district court ruling in April 1988 that a longstanding exodus of Salvadorans to the United States consisted largely of economic (hence illegal) entrants, rather than of political refugees. In October 1990 the U.S. Senate voted to withhold half of an $85 million military aid appropriation for El Salvador until the Cristiani government “demonstrated good faith” in talks with the FMLN, curbed military assassinations and abductions, and mounted a meaningful inquiry into a number of murders, including those of six Jesuit priests a year earlier. The funds were finally released by President George H. W. Bush following the killing of two U.S. airmen by rebels in January 1991. In September 2 of 11 military personnel (a colonel and a lieutenant) were convicted of the Jesuit massacre. While most foreign observers were disappointed at the number of those exonerated (some of whom had confessed to complicity in the affair), others felt that even two convictions represented “an historic achievement.” In September 1992 a long-standing territorial dispute that had provoked a brief war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 was resolved

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by a World Court judgment. In addition to ruling on control of a number of coastal land “pockets” (bolsones), two-thirds of which were awarded to Honduras, the Court decided that the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca were not international, but a closed condominium of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which benefited Honduras by providing it with access to the Pacific Ocean. In September 1995 a Bi-National Commission set up to implement the judgment agreed that residents of the territory could choose either Salvadoran or Honduran nationality. In February 1998 Honduran and Salvadoran representatives signed two treaties on demarcation of their borders, about 70 percent of which remained in dispute. However, approval of the treaties by Honduras was not immediately forthcoming because of opposition objections to their terms. Claiming that the Goascoran River, used to define the border, had changed its course over the past 200 years, El Salvador in late 2002 appealed the 1992 ruling, but the bid was unsuccessful. In June 1997 President Calder´on met with U.S. legislators in Washington to seek relief from tough new immigration laws under which more than 300,000 undocumented Salvadorans could be subject to deportation. In addition to hardship for the expatriates, El Salvador could have lost up to $1 billion a year in remittances (60 percent of export earnings and 15 percent of the country’s GDP). A year later Washington expressed its displeasure over the release of three of five Salvadoran national guardsmen who had received 30-year prison sentences in 1984 for the 1980 rape and murder of three American nuns and a lay worker. In March 1999 U.S. President Bill Clinton visited El Salvador as part of a tour designed to highlight Washington’s financial support to assist Central American recovery from the devastating effects of Hurricane Mitch in late 1998. Clinton also took the opportunity to comment on U.S. support for the government in the 1980s in its campaign against leftist insurgents. He noted that U.S. policy had caused “deep divisions” in U.S. society and pledged that the “mistakes” of the past would not be repeated.

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In 1996 El Salvador and Guatemala, with a combined 60 percent of Central America’s GDP, agreed to combine their customs agencies. In early 2000 the accord was amplified by the signing of an Investment and Service Trade Treaty, with a free flow in goods and services expected by 2002. In March 2000 the Flores government came under attack for agreeing to let the United States set up a logistics base for its war on drugs at a military sector of the international airport in Comalapa, 20 miles from the capital. The Legislative Assembly approved the pact on July 7 by a 49–35 vote, despite objections by the FMLN, which insisted that a three-quarters majority was necessary because the issue impinged on the nation’s sovereignty. In December 2004 El Salvador became the first Central American country to ratify the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States. Salvadoran agricultural exports to the United States fell 3.7 percent in 2006, while imports from the United States grew by 17 percent. In April 2006 the presidents of Honduras and El Salvador signed documents marking the end of 26 years of border demarcation dispute and announced they would reactivate the plan to build the joint El Tigre hydroelectric power plant on the Honduras side of the river. In November 2006 the United States approved the Millenium Challenge Account for El Salvador, which would provide $460 million for improvements in transportation, expansion of running water and electricity, formal and informal education, and assistance to agricultural producers. In a possibly related vein, El Salvador has been the only Latin American country to send troops in support of the U.S.-led initiative in Iraq.

Current Issues During 2005 President Saca’s principal problem was a soaring crime rate, prompting, in late May, an order—unprecedented since the end of the rebellion in 1992—authorizing house searches by security forces. In early September 2005 El Salvador joined the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras in a joint operation against so-called

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Mara Salvarucha gangs, arresting nearly 700 individuals, and in late November the government ordered military deployment against the 10,000 Maras estimated to be active in the country. In December 2006 Saca reinstated the ministry of public security and justice (previously under the interior ministry) in an effort to improve the security situation. In early 2007 U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales met with Saca at a regional conference in San Salvador on the Mara gangs. The United States subsequently announced it would assist the Salvadoran police in combating the Maras, with the intention of using “aggressive” tactics rather than a “rehabilitation” approach.

Political Parties The principal contenders in the 1989 presidential and 1991 legislative elections were the rightwing Nationalist Republican Alliance (Arena) and the basically centrist Christian Democrats, with the conservative National Conciliation Party (PCN) running a distant third and the pro-insurgent Democratic Convergence (CD) consigned to fourth place on both occasions, although the vote share for the CD in 1991 exceeded that of the PCN by more than one-third. In 1994 the recently legalized Farabundo Mart´ı National Liberation Front (FMLN) emerged as runner-up to Arena and fell only one seat short of a tie with the latter in 1997. In the March 1999 presidential election Arena’s Francisco Flores defeated the FMLN candidate, resulting in a movement toward a more traditional hard-line posture on the part of the government. In legislative polls of March 12, 2000, and March 16, 2003, the FMLN won a plurality of seats; Arena, however, retained control by means of rightwing coalitions with the PCN and the Christian Democrats (PDC). After retaining the presidency in 2004, Arena in 2006 wrested a legislative plurality legislative from the FMLN by two seats.

Presidential Party Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista—Arena). Arena was

launched in 1981 as an outgrowth of the Broad National Front (Frente Amplio Nacional—FAN), an extreme right-wing grouping organized a year earlier by ex-army major Roberto d’Aubuisson. D’Aubuisson was arrested briefly in May 1980 as the instigator of an attempted coup against the junta, which he had accused of “leading the country toward communism.” Runner-up in the 1982 election with 19 Assembly seats, the Alliance formed a conservative bloc with the PCN, which succeeded in scuttling most of the postcoup land-reform program and secured the appointment of a right-wing judiciary. Although remaining second-ranked in the March 1985 balloting, Arena’s legislative representation dropped to 13 seats on the basis of a 29 percent vote share. Amid mounting evidence that his leadership and reputation had become a liability to the group, d’Aubuisson formally resigned as secretary general in September, holding thereafter the title of honorary president until his death in February 1991. Arena secured a 53.8 percent popular vote victory at presidential balloting in March 1989 but slipped to a plurality of 44.3 percent in 1991 that gave it only 39 of 84 legislative seats; the party’s legislative representation was unchanged in 1994, although Armando Calder´on Sol defeated the FMLN’s Rub´en Zamora Rivas by a better than two-to-one margin in the second round of the presidential race. In 1997 a number of prominent Arena members defected to the PCN (below), with the party benefiting, in turn, by desertions from the PDC (below). The net result in the March balloting was a 1-seat Arena plurality over the FMLN. As its 1999 presidential candidate, Arena chose Francisco Flores, a 39-year-old economist who had held several ministerial posts and most recently had served as president of the Legislative Assembly, where he had earned a reputation as a skillful negotiator based on what Central America Report described as a “calm and balanced approach to politics” (in contrast to some previous Arena leaders). Flores easily outdistanced six other candidates to win the March 1999 presidential poll with nearly 52 percent of the vote. His successor,

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Antonio (“Tony”) Saca, also won easily in March 2004, with a 57.7 percent vote share. Theretofore second-ranked, Arena gained plurality status in the 2006 legislative poll with 34 seats. It also won a plurality of municipalities in the 2006 local balloting. In February 2007 three Arena members (including a son of the late Roberto d’Aubuisson) were murdered in Guatemala. The motive for the murders was unclear. Leaders: El´ıas Antonio (“Tony”) SACA (President of the Republic); Francisco Guillermo FLO´ Sol, Alfredo RES P´erez, Armando CALDERON F´elix CRISTIANI Burkard (Former Presidents of the Republic).

Other Parliamentary Parties Farabundo Mart´ı National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Mart´ı para la Liberaci´on Nacional—FMLN). The FMLN was organized in October 1980 as the paramilitary affiliate of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Democr´atico Revolucionario—FDR), an umbrella formation of dissident political groups. Headed by a National Revolutionary Directorate (Direcci´on Revolucionaria Nacional—DRN) composed of representatives of participating armed units, the FMLN was in active rebellion until the late 1991 agreement that led to a formal cessation of hostilities on February 1, 1992. During ensuing months the Front engaged in a process of phased disarmament and on December 15 was recognized by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) as a legal political party. Demobilization rendered the DRN participants superfluous, while the FDR became redundant upon transformation of the FMLN. At its first National Convention on September 6, 1993, the FMLN endorsed Rub´en Zamora of the Democratic Convergence (below) as its 1994 presidential candidate. Following the election an internal split emerged between the People’s Renewal Expression (ERP) and the National Resistance (RN; see both under PD, below), on the one hand, and the Salvadoran Communist Party (Partido Comunista Salvadore˜no—PCS), the Popular Libera-

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tion Forces (Fuerzas Populares de Liberaci´on— FPL), and the Central American Workers Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos—PRTC), on the other. While surfacing as a dispute over the selection of legislative officers, a major factor of the split appeared to be resistance by the tripartite group to the ERP leader’s advocacy of a departure from Marxism-Leninism, and in December 1994 both the ERP and RN left the Front, save for a rump RN faction headed by Eugenio CHICA ´ and Marco JIMENEZ. In early 1995 the remaining FMLN components agreed to changes designed to yield a unitary organization and by midyear had begun to dissolve their respective party structures to become “currents” or “tendencies” within the revamped larger grouping. The PCS was formerly a pro-Moscow group that was repudiated by most mass and guerrilla organizations for its “revisionist” outlook. In early 1980 it adopted a more militant posture, becoming under its secretary general, Schafik Jorge Handal, a de facto component of the FMLN. Following his party’s break with the UDN (under CD, below), Handal became official coordinator and subsequently coordinator general of the legitimized FMLN. The FPL was previously the FMLN’s largest military component. In May 1993 a scandal erupted as the result of an explosion at a clandestine FPL arsenal in Managua, Nicaragua, of arms that were supposed to have been turned over to ONUSAL (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador) for destruction. A number of other such caches were subsequently discovered, tarnishing the credentials of the FMLN as a legal party. The PRTC was a small FMLN component. One of its leaders, Francisco VELIS, was assassinated in October 1993. Having gained as much public support as the governing Arena Party in the 1997 legislative poll, the FMLN held high hopes of achieving government control in the March 1999 presidential balloting. However, friction between orthodox Marxists and the modernist wing (“renovators”) caused sustained difficulty in choosing a candidate. The

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ultimate selection, Facundo GUARDADO, a former guerrilla leader supported by the “renovators,” generated little enthusiasm among the non-FMLN voters and won only 28.9 percent of the vote. Having failed even to force a runoff ballot, Guardado resigned as the FMLN’s general coordinator on March 15, with his successor, Fabio Castillo, heading a new leadership in which traditional Marxists held a slim majority. The FMLN rebounded to win a legislative plurality in March 2000 but was unable to gain control in the face of an Arena-led conservative coalition. It did, however, capture 8 of the 14 provincial capitals, including San Salvador, whose mayor, H´ector SILVA Arguello, was reelected. Thereafter, the sharp division between the orthodox and reform wings persisted, and in October 2001 it was reported that Guardado had been “expelled,” although he announced he would continue to participate in FMLN activity. Hard-liner Salvador S´anchez Cer´en was elected as the new general coordinator in November. Subsequently, in early 2002, it was reported that a group of reformist FMLN legislators had left the party’s parliamentary bloc, including H´ector Silva, who stood for president in 2004 as the candidate of a PDC/CDU coalition (see under PDC, below). Although retaining its legislative plurality of 31 in March 2003, the FMLN, led by Schafik Jorge Handal, was again rebuffed in its bid for the presidency in March 2004. In March 2005 the party was weakened by the withdrawal of seven of its legislative deputies who joined with other FMLN dissidents to form a new Democratic Revolutionary Front (see FDR, under CD, below). Subsequently, the death of Handal on January 24, 2006, appeared to provide an opening for reconciliation between his supporters and the FDR; however, his hard-line deputy, S´anchez Cer´en, was named to head the FMLN legislative bloc, and in the March 12 election the party, while gaining one slot, lost its plurality to Arena. The FMLN performed well in San Salvador in the 2006 municipal balloting. ´ Leaders: Salvador SANCHEZ Cer´en (Leader of Legislative Bloc), Jos´e Luis MERINO

(PCS), Jos´e MANUEL Melgar (PRTC), Fabio CASTILLO (Former General Coordinator), ´ Medardo GONZALEZ (General Coordinator). National Conciliation Party (Partido de Conciliaci´on Nacional—PCN). At the time of its founding in 1961 the PCN enjoyed a fairly broad range of political support and displayed some receptivity to social and economic reform. Over the years, however, it became increasingly conservative, serving the interests of the leading families and the military establishment. Following the declared willingness of its leadership to support peace talks with the rebels in mid-1982, 9 of its 14 Assembly members withdrew to form Paisa. The PCN’s Francisco GUERRERO, running as a candidate of moderation, placed third in the March 1984 presidential balloting, and his refusal to back d’Aubuisson in the runoff was considered crucial to Duarte’s victory. The party won 12 legislative seats in March 1985, 5 of which were lost in the 1988 poll. Its 1989 presidential candidate, Rafael MORAN Caste˜neda, ran third in the March 19 balloting, winning only 4.2 percent of the vote. Its legislative representation rose from 4 to 11 seats in 1997, when it also performed well in mayoralty races. However, PCN Co-Secretary General Rafael Hern´an Contreras finished fifth in the March 1999 presidential poll, his 3.8 percent of the vote just barely surpassing the required 3 percent for continued party registration. The party won 16 legislative seats in 2003 but placed fourth, with 2.7 percent of the vote, in the 2004 presidential race. It won 10 Assembly seats in 2006. Leaders: Jos´e Rafael MACHUCA Zelaya (2004 presidential candidate), Ciro Cruz ZEPEDA (Secretary General). Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC). An essentially centrist grouping, the PDC was the core component of the National Opposition Union (Uni´on Nacional Opositora—UNO), which won 8 legislative seats in 1972 and 14 in 1974 but boycotted the 1976 and 1978 balloting. Its best-known figure, Jos´e Napole´on Duarte, returned from exile following

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the October 1979 coup, joined the junta on March 3, 1980, and became junta president on December 22. He was succeeded by Provisional President Alvaro Maga˜na in May 1982 after the PDC had failed to secure a majority at the March Constituent Assembly election. Although Duarte continued as president under the new constitution in May 1984, the PDC did not win legislative control until March 1985; it returned to minority status as a result of the 1988 legislative balloting (an outcome attributed, in part, to intraparty bickering) and lost the presidency in 1989. For the 1991 election the party appealed to the left by forming an alliance with two labor-based groups, the National Union of Peasant Labor (Uni´on Nacional Obrera Campesina—UNDC) and the Salvadoran Workers’ Central (Central de Trabajadores Salvadore˜nos—CTS). Duarte died on February 23, 1990. Two leading factions, led by Fidel Ch´avez Mena and Abraham RODR´IGUEZ, competed for the party’s presidential nomination in 1994, Ch´avez Mena (the 1989 nominee) receiving the designation and finishing third in the March first-round balloting. Subsequently fidelista legislators were charged with having sold out to Arena, while the abrahamistas were accused of aligning with the FMLN. At a national party convention in late November the party elected a fidelista directorate and on December 11 dissident abrahamistas withdrew to form the PRSC. The election of Ronald Uma˜na, representing a relatively young “new guard” or “new political class,” as secretary general at the 1995 convention yielded a dispute with long-time “old guard” leader Julio Samayoa, who succeeded in forcing his opponent’s expulsion from the party. In March 1996 the TSE confirmed the dismissal of Uma˜na and six associates, who promptly challenged the ruling’s legality, and in December the TSE reinstated Uma˜na. For some constituencies in the March 1997 balloting, the PDC formed a “Great Center Coalition” with the Democratic Party (PD, below), which elected three deputies as compared with seven elected by the PDC outright.

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Indicative of recent internal problems within the PDC was its replacement in January 1998 of Secretary General Ronald Uma˜na by Horacio TRUJILLO only to have Uma˜na reinstated in March by the TSE. Rodolfo Parker, former legal adviser to the military during the civil war, was the PDC standardbearer in the March 1999 presidential campaign, during which the PDC attacked what it perceived as widespread corruption in the Arena governments of the 1990s. Parker secured 5.8 percent of the vote, thereby dropping the PDC to fourth place behind the newly formed CDU (below) in party rankings. For the 2004 presidential race the PDC joined with the CDU in sponsoring former FMLN leader H´ector Silva Arguello; however, Silva’s vote share of 3.9 percent was less than the joint minimum required to maintain the parties’ registrations. In 2005 three PDC legislators left the party to help form the new Popular Social Christian Party (Partido Popular Social Cristiano—PPSC) under the leadership of former PDC secretary general Ren´e AUILEZ. Those legislators subsequently joined with members of the newly formed FDR and the UDC to create a bloc of 14 legislators known as the G-14. However, G-14 influence declined substantially following the 2006 assembly poll, when most of its members ran under the CD banner. Meanwhile, the PDC won six assembly seats in 2006, one more than in 2003. Leaders: Rodolfo Antonio PARKER Soto (1999 presidential candidate and Secretary General of the Party), Dr. Fidel CHAVEZ Mena (1994 presidential candidate and Former Secretary General of the ˜ (Former Secretary GenParty), Ronald UMANA eral). Democratic Change (Cambio Democr´atico—CD). The CD was launched before the 2006 election as an alliance of the CDU, FDR, and other members of the G-14 (see PDC, above). Contrary to expectations, the coalition won only two legislative seats as contrasted with the five obtained by the CDU alone in 2003. Leaders: Carlos RIVAS Zamora (FDR), Vinicio ˜ PENATE (CDU). H´ector DADA Hirezi (Secretary General)

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United Democratic Center (Centro Democr´atico Unido—CDU). The CDU was launched in October 1998 as an electoral coalition of the two parties below, plus a number of smaller groups including the Popular Labor Party (Partido Popular Laborista—PPL) and a PDC faction styled the Christian Democratic Unification Movement (Movimiento Unificado Democr´atico Cristiano— MUDC). CDU leader Rub´en Zamora Rivas, who had run as the presidential candidate of the FMLN in 1994 but had subsequently distanced himself from that grouping, contested the March 1999 poll on a “center-left” platform. He secured 7.6 percent of the vote. Leaders: Dr. Rub´en Ignacio ZAMORA Rivas (Secretary General and 1999 presidential candidate), Ana Guadalupe MART´INEZ. Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democr´atica—CD). The CD (not to be confused with Cambio Democr´atico) was organized in November 1987 as an alliance of the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Dem´ocrata—PSD), a left-wing grouping formed in 1987 by Mario Reni Rold´an; the Popular Social Christian Movement (Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano—MPSC), a founding component of the FDR (see under FMLN, above); and the MNR (see under PD, below). The new coalition, characterized as part of an effort by the theretofore clandestine formations to resume open political activity within El Salvador, was ranked third (behind Arena and the PDC) in a public opinion poll conducted before the 1988 balloting, at which it did not attempt to present candidates. In 1989 the CD supported the presidential candidacy of Guillermo Manuel Ungo, who ran fourth with a 3.2 percent vote share. Following the election Ungo and Dr. Rub´en Zamora Rivas served as guerrilla spokespersons, and as the result of an increase in death squad activity in late November were forced to go underground. Ungo died in Mexico City in February 1991, with Zamora effectively succeeding him as leader of the newly legalized left. In early 1992 V´ıctor Manuel VALLE of the MNR announced his organization’s withdrawal from the CD on the ground that the rationale for it “no longer

exists.” However, Valle’s action appeared to have been prompted by Zamora’s attempt to secure sole leadership of the coalition and obtain for it membership (also sought by the MNR) in the Socialist International. In September 1993 the CD, which had been augmented by the addition of the Democratic Nationalist Union (Uni´on Dem´ocrata Nacionalista— UDN), a group that had served from 1979 to 1992 as a legal front for the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS, under FMLN, above), declared that it was ceasing to exist as a coalition and was reforming as a unified party. Concurrently, it designated MPSC leader Rub´en Zamora Rivas as its 1994 presidential candidate. Leaders: Mario RENI Rold´an (PSD), Dr. Rub´en Ignacio ZAMORA Rivas (MPSC), Vinicio ˜ PENATE (Secretary General).

Democratic Party (Partido Democr´atico— PD). The PD was launched on March 28, 1995, by former guerrilla leader Joach´ın VILLALOBOS following the departure of the People’s Renewal Expression (Expresi´on Renovadora del Pueblo— ERP), led by Villalobos, and the National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional—RN), led by Eduardo SANCHO (a.k.a. Ferm´an CIENFUEGOS), from the FMLN in December 1994. Also joining the new grouping, in addition to the centrist National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario—MNR), were a number of PDC dissidents. Then styled the People’s Revolutionary Army (Ej´ercito Revolucionario del Pueblo), the ERP was the second-largest military component of the FMLN. Under its subsequent name (chosen to retain the ERP initials) it announced on September 28, 1993, that it had abandoned Marxism-Leninism in favor of a social democratic posture and on December 6, 1994, formally withdrew from the FMLN. A month earlier ERP leader Joaqu´ın Villalobos had been arrested on a defamation charge for having suggested that a noted businessman had been linked to right-wing death squads, a charge that subsequently appeared to be substantiated by

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2007 President Vice President

El´ıas Antonio (“Tony”) Saca Gonz´alez Ana Vilma Albanez de Escobar [f]

Ministers Agriculture and Livestock Defense Economy Education Environment and Natural Resources Foreign Affairs Housing Interior Labor Public Health and Social Security Public Security and Justice Public Works Tourism

Mario Salaverria Nolasco Gen. Otto Romero Orellana Yolanda Mayora de Gavidia [f] Darlyn Meza [f] Carlos Jos´e Guerrero Francisco La´ınez Rivas William Jacobo H´andal Juan Miguel Bola˜nos Jos´e Roberto Espinal Escobar Dr. Jos´e Guillermo Maza Brizuela Ren´e Mario Figueroa Jorge Isidro Nieto Men´endez R´uben Rochi Parker

[f] = female

press reports based on declassified U.S. government documents. The RN was formerly styled the Armed Forces of National Resistance (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional—FARN). Its leader was FMLN representative at the La Palma talks in October 1984. On December 14, 1994, it joined the ERP in withdrawing from the FMLN. The MNR was a sociodemocratic formation that participated in the Uni´on Nacional Opositor from 1972 to 1978. It was a founding member of the FDR following the resignation of Guillermo Ungo from the junta in January 1980 and in 1987 helped launch the CD, from which it withdrew in early 1992. The PD retained its legal standing after the 1997 balloting because of votes garnered in seven departments in coalition with the PDC. Subsequently, Villalobos resigned from the party, leaving a truncated leadership under Ana Guadalupe Mart´ınez. Leader: Ana Guadalupe MART´INEZ.

Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Democr´atico Revolucionario—FDR). Named after its revolutionary predecessor, the current FDR was launched by a group of reform-oriented FMLN dissidents, including some seven legislators, in June 2005. Although allied with the UDC as a component of the CD in the 2005 legislative elections, the FDR failed to draw significant electoral support from FMLN voters. Leaders: Carlos RIVAS Zamora (Former Mayor of San Salvador), Ilena ROGEL, Jorge ESCOBAR, ´ Nicol´a GARC´IA, Julio HERNANDEZ (Secretary General). (For information on a number of other parties and groups that were active in the 1990s, see the 2007 Handbook.)

Legislature Formerly a 60-member body, the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) currently

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consists of 84 legislators, 64 elected from multimember constituencies and 20 by proportional representation, serving three-year terms. In the most recent election of March 12, 2006, the Nationalist Republican Alliance won 34 seats; the Farabundo Mart´ı National Liberation Front, 32; the National Conciliation Party, 10; the Christian Democratic Party, 6; and the Democratic Change, 2. President: Rub´en ORELLANA.

Communications News media, with the exception of one official journal and certain broadcasting facilities, are nominally free of censorship and government control. Most commercial media are, however, owned by right-wing interests.

Press The following newspapers are published daily in San Salvador: El Diario de Hoy (100,000 daily, 96,000 Sunday), ultraconservative; La Prensa Gr´afica (98,000 daily, 116,000 Sunday), conservative; El Mundo (58,000 daily, 63,000 Sunday); La Noticia (30,000); Diario Latino (20,000); Diario Oficial (2,100), government-owned.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility, the media relying primarily on the government’s National

Information Center (Centro de Informaci´on Nacional—CIN) and the regional Central American News Agency (Agencia Centroamericana de Not´ıcias—ACAN).

Broadcasting and Computing The former Administraci´on Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Antel) was divested in 1998. Virtually all of the licensed radio stations are now commercial, one exception being the cultural Radio Nacional de El Salvador. Of San Salvador’s 11 television channels, 2 feature educational programming and are government operated. As of 2005 there were approximately 93 Internet users and 51 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 351 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Ren´e Antonio Rodr´ıguez LEON U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador: Charles L. GLAZER Permanent Representative to the UN: Carmen Mar´ıa GALLARDO Hern´andez IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, BCIE, CACM, IADB, Interpol, IOM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WTO

FRANCE FRENCH REPUBLIC R´e publique Fran¸c aise

Related Territories The former French overseas empire entered a state of constitutional and political transformation after World War II, as a majority of its component territories achieved independence and most of the others modified their links to the home country. The initial step in the process was the establishment in 1946 of the French Union (Union Fran¸caise) as a single political entity designed to encompass all French-ruled territories. As defined by the constitution of the Fourth Republic, the French Union consisted of two elements: (1) the “French Republic,” comprising metropolitan France and the overseas departments and territories, and (2) all those “associated territories and states” that chose to join. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia became associated states under this provision; Tunisia and Morocco declined to do so. The arrangement proved ineffective, however, in stemming the tide of nationalism, which led within a decade to the independence of the Indochinese states, Tunisia, and Morocco; the onset of the war of independence in Algeria; and growing pressure for independence in other French African territories. In a further attempt to accommodate these pressures, the constitution of the Fifth Republic as adopted in 1958 established the more flexible framework of the French Community (Communaut´e Fran¸caise), the primary purpose of which was to satisfy the demand for self-government in the African colonies while stopping short of full independence. Still composed of the “French Republic” on the one hand and a group of “Member States” on the other, the community was headed by

the president of the French Republic and endowed with its own Executive Council, Senate, and Court of Arbitration. Initially, 12 French African territories accepted the status of self-governing member states, with only Guinea opting for complete independence. In response to the political evolution of other member states, the French constitution was amended in 1960 to permit continued membership in the community even after independence, but no previously dependent territory elected to participate. The community’s Senate was abolished in 1961, at which time the organization became essentially moribund. As a consequence of constitutional changes instituted in March 2003 and legislation passed in February 2007, the present French Republic encompasses, in addition to mainland France and Corsica, four overseas departments, six overseas collectivities, and two overseas collectivities sui generis, each of whose history and present status is discussed below.

Overseas Departments The overseas departments (d´epartements d’outre-mer—DOM) all have similar political institutions. Like the metropolitan departments, their chief administrative officers are commissioners of the republic or prefects, appointed by the French Ministry of the Interior. Unlike the metropolitan departments, which are grouped into regions, each overseas department is geographically coterminous with an overseas region (r´egion d’outremer—ROM). Each overseas department elects a General Council (Conseil G´en´eral) to which

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many of the earlier day-to-day prefectural powers, particularly in financial affairs, were transferred in 1982. General councilors are elected to represent individual districts (cantons). Voters also elect, from party lists, a Regional Council (Conseil R´egional) to which enhanced policy and planning powers in economic, social, and cultural affairs were accorded in 1983. In addition, there are directly elected mayors and municipal councils for the various townships (communes). French Guiana (Guyane). Situated on the east coast of South America between northern Brazil and Suriname, French Guiana became a French possession in 1816, after two centuries of strife involving, at various times, most of the Western European sea powers. It was ruled as a colony until 1946, when it became a department. From 1852 to 1947 it was utilized as a penal colony, includˆ du Diaing, most notoriously, Devil’s Island (Ile ble, one of the Salut group), where political prisoners were incarcerated. In 1968 a major rocketlaunch facility was established in Kourou, from which the European Space Agency has launched

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SaintGeorge R.

Maripasoula Saül

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satellites and space probes since 1983. The economy is heavily dependent on French subsidies and on the European Space Center, which contributes about one-quarter of the department’s GDP. Fishing and tourism also contribute to the economy. Among the largely undeveloped natural resources are significant gold deposits. The department covers an area of 35,135 square miles (91,000 sq. km.). Of its population (2006E) of 200,000, some 90 percent inhabit the coastal region and are mainly Creoles, interspersed with Chinese, Lebanese, Brazilians, Haitians, Surinamese, and others, while the 10 percent living in the interior are largely Indian and Noir Marrons (descendants of fugitive slaves). The capital, Cayenne, had an estimated population of 57,100 in 2005. The department elects two deputies to the French National Assembly and, from September 2008, two senators instead of one to the Senate. Local government is based on 2 districts, comprising 19 cantons and 22 communes. The two main parties are the local branch of the Gaullist Union for a Popular Movement (UPM) and the Guianese Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Guyanais—PSG), an affiliate of the French Socialist Party whose longtime advocacy of internal self-rule was recently augmented by a demand for autonomy as a “necessary and preparatory stage” for full independence. Three candidates of the proindependence Movement for Decolonization and Social Emancipation (Mouvement pour ´ la D´ecolonisation et l’Emancipation Sociale— MDES) were elected to the Regional Council in March 1998, although the PSG maintained a plurality and retained the presidency of the council. The PSG secured only 5 of 19 seats in the subsequent election for the General Council, with left-winger Andr´e LECANTE of the Guianese Democratic Action (Action D´emocratique Guyanaise—ADG) being elected as that council’s president. He was succeeded in March 2001 by Joseph HO-TENYOU, who had been elected as a Divers Gauche (Diverse Left) candidate. Pressure from government and political leaders within the department for increased autonomy led to a meeting in Paris in December 2000

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between recently installed Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories Christian Paul and leaders of the PSG, the RPR (the predecessor of the UMP), the Guiana Democratic Forces (Forces D´emocratiques Guyanaises—FDG) of Sen. Georges OTHILY, and the leftist Walwari movement (but not the MDES, which had refused an invitation). In November 2001 the French government endorsed a series of locally drafted autonomy proposals, which included greater legislative and administrative control. In an unprecedented development, longtime Guianese politician Christiane TAUBIRA, founder of Walwari, ran for the French presidency in 2002 as the nominee of the PRG. She won 2.3 percent of the national vote in the first round. At the June National Assembly election French Guiana’s two seats were filled by Taubira, who was running for reelection with the endorsement of the Socialist Party as well as the PRG and Walwari, and another incumbent, L´eon BERTRAND, now of the UPM. Bertrand was subsequently named head of tourism in the Raffarin administration and was succeeded in the assembly by Juliana RIMANE (UMP). In the Regional Council election on March 21 and 28, 2004, the PSG, headed by Council President Antoine Karam, won 17 seats, with the UMP and an FDG-Walwari joint list splitting the other 14 seats. The outcome of balloting for the General Council was less conclusive, leaving the body with no clear majority. After the election Divers Gauche members held 9 seats, compared to 3 each for the UMP and the Divers Droite group, with the PSG claiming 2; the MDES, 1; and an independent, 1. Following the election, Pierre D´esert (Divers Gauche) was named president of the General Council. In October 2006 the French government suspended authorization for development of an open-cast gold mine near Cayenne. Opponents of the facility had convinced Paris that pollution from the mine would cause significant harm to an adjacent nature preserve. Exploitation of the department’s gold reserves remains a contentious issue, however, especially in the south, where “informal

gold mining” is largely conducted by miners who have illegally crossed the border. Illegal immigration from Suriname and Guyana remains a significant issue, as does smuggling. In February 2007 France established by decree the French Guiana Amazonian Park. Encompassing some 3.4 million hectares in the south, the new national park includes 2 million hectares of primary rainforest. The June 2007 National Assembly election concluded with Taubira having won reelection but with L´eon Bertrand losing to the PSG’s Chantel BERTHELOT. ` Prefect: Jean-Pierre LAFLAGUIERE. President of the General Council: Pierre ´ DESERT (Diverse Left). President of the Regional Council: Antoine KARAM (PSG). Guadeloupe. Situated in the Lesser Antilles southeast of Puerto Rico, Guadeloupe encompasses the main islands of Basse-Terre and adjacent Grande-Terre as well as a number of the smaller

Guadeloupe Passage

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GrandeTerre

La Désirade

GrandAnse

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Marigot

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(FRANCE) Basse-Terre

GrandBourg

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islands, including Marie-Galante, La D´esirade, Les Saintes (Terre-de-Haut and Terre-de-Bas), and the uninhabited ˆIles de la Petite Terre. (The island of Saint Barthelemy and the northern half of Saint Martin were separated from Guadeloupe in 2007—see separate write-ups, below.) Guadeloupe was first occupied by the French in 1635, was annexed as a colonial possession in 1815, and became a French department in 1946. It has an area of 630 square miles (1,632 sq. km.) and a population (2006E) of 473,000, of whom approximately 12,000 are residents of the capital, Basse-Terre. The largest town is Les Abymes (63,000E).Guadeloupians are predominantly black and mulatto, with a few native-born Caucasians and many metropolitan French. The department’s economy is based principally on tourism and the export of bananas, sugar, and rum. High unemployment remains a perpetual problem. The department elects four deputies to the French National Assembly and three senators to the Senate. Local administration is based on 2 districts, divided into 40 cantons and 32 communes. Long-simmering aspirations on the part of leftist organizations erupted in a series of bombings in the 1980s but gave way, by the 1990s, to calls for greater autonomy. At present, the leading parties are branches of PS and the UPM, plus the Guadeloupian Democratic and Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste D´emocratique Guadeloup´een—PPDG), which was formed in the early 1990s by dissidents from the Communist Party of Guadeloupe (Parti Communiste Guadeloup´een— PCG). At local elections in 1992 the PS retained control of the General Council, but the Guadeloupe Objective (Objectif Guadeloupe—OG), an electoral alliance led by Lucette MICHAUX-CHEVRY of the RPR (the predecessor of the UMP), gained 15 of 41 Regional Council seats. With the support of 6 dissident Socialists, Michaux-Chevry won the Regional Council presidency. The 1992 results were subsequently invalidated on the ground of irregularity, but the OG gained an absolute majority of 22 seats at a reelection in January 1993. The Socialists

retained local control in the General Council poll of 1994. Center-right parties secured a majority in the Regional Council election in March 1998, Michaux-Chevry being reelected as council president despite reportedly being the target of a corruption investigation that she described as “politically motivated.” The left continued to control the General Council. In January 1999 the department’s treasurer resigned, describing Guadeloupe as riddled with corruption and stuck in an economic and political “coma.” In March 2001 Jacques Gillot of the United Guadeloupe, Socialism and Reality (Guadeloupe Unie, Socialisme et R´ealit´e—GUSR), a PS offshoot, defeated the incumbent, Marcellin LUBETH of the PPDG, for the presidency of the General Council. In the 2002 National Assembly election the new Union for the Presidential Majority (precursor of the current UMP) won 2 seats; the PS, 1; and Divers Droite, 1. In the second round of Regional Council balloting on March 28, 2004, the UMP-led rightist list headed by Guadeloupe’s “Iron Lady,” MichauxChevry, was handily defeated by a La Guadeloupe pour Tour list that brought together the PS, PPDG, GUSR, and other leftists. Led by Victorin Lurel of the PS, the left won 29 of 41 seats, ousting Michaux-Chevry after 12 years in power. At the same time, the left easily retained control of the General Council. The March 2004 election was viewed as confirmation of a December 7, 2003, referendum in which opponents of decentralization, led by the left, defeated a UMP-backed proposal to replace the Regional and General Councils with one assembly. The 73 percent “no” vote, which came despite support from both existing councils, appeared to reflect fear that greater autonomy would ultimately lead to reduced funding from Paris. In December 2005 Minister of State Nicolas Sarkozy postponed a scheduled trip to Guadeloupe and Martinique in response to protests over a recent French law requiring public schools to teach the “positive” aspects of French colonial rule. The

FRANCE

visit was to have focused on illegal immigration and drug-trafficking. In the June 2007 election for the National Assembly two seats were won by Divers Gauche candidates (Eric JALTON and Jeany MARC), one by the UMP’s Gabrielle LOUIS-CARABIN, and one by the PS’s Victorin Lurel. Lurel was elected from the fourth district, which at the time still included St. Barth and St. Martin. Accordingly, he will continue to represent both new overseas collectivities until the next National Assembly election. The department’s senators are Lucette MichauxChevry (UMP), Jacques Gillot (GUSR), and Daniel MARSIN of the Socialist Renewal (Renouveau Socialiste/Divers Gauche). Prefect: Jean-Jacques BROT. President of the General Council: Jacques GILLOT (GUSR). President of the Regional Council: Victorin LUREL (PS). Martinique. Occupied by the French in 1635, the Lesser Antilles island of Martinique was an-

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nexed as a colonial possession in 1790 and became a department in 1946. It has an area of 425 square miles (1,100 sq. km.). Its population of 403,000 (2006E) is predominantly black, with a small number of native-born Caucasians and many metropolitan French. The capital, Fort-de-France, had an estimated population of 92,000 in 2005. The economy, based largely on sugarcane, bananas, and rum, is, like that of the other overseas departments, heavily dependent on direct and indirect subsidies from the French government. Martinique is represented in the French Parliament by four deputies and two senators. Local administration encompasses 4 districts, divided into 45 cantons and 34 communes. The leading parties include the PS-affiliated Socialist Federation of Martinique (F´ed´eration Socialiste de la Martinique—FSM); the Martinique Forces of Progress (Forces Martiniquaises de Progr`es—FMP), which in 1998 replaced the departmental UDF affiliate; and UPM, successor to the RPR. There also is a Martinique Communist Party (Parti Communiste Martiniquais— PCM). In local politics, however, the most successful parties have recently been the separatist Martinique Independence Movement (Mouvement Ind´ependantiste Martiniquais—MIM) and the leftist Martinique Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Martiniquais—PPM). The RPR retained 2 seats in the 1997 French National Assembly vote, while the PPM incumbent also was reelected. The fourth seat was won by Alfred Marie-Jeanne, a leader of the MIM and mayor of Rivi`ere-Pilote. Marie-Jeanne also was elected president of the Regional Council following the March 1998 election, in which the MIM led all parties by winning 13 of the 41 seats. He was subsequently described as the first proindependence leader of a French regional body. In the March 2001 local elections, the PPM kept its control of most municipalities, and the PPM’s Claude Lise was reelected to lead the General Council. In the 2002 National Assembly election the FSM/PS gained a representative, LouisJoseph MANSCOUR, while Alfred ALMONT

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of the new Union for the Presidential Majority (predecessor of the current UMP) held his RPR district. The other two seats were won by the MIM’s Marie-Jeanne and Pierre-Jean SAMOT (Divers Gauche) of the new, leftist Build Martinique (Bˆatir le Pays Martinique—BPM). In March 2003, however, the Constitutional Council ruled that Samot had improperly received campaign funds from his unregistered party, forcing a by-election that was won by the BPM’s Philippe EDMONDMARIETTE. A December 7, 2003, referendum on replacing the Regional Council and General Council with a single body was narrowly defeated. The election of March 21 and 28, 2004, saw the proindependence Martinique Patriots (Patriotes Martiniquais) list, led by the MIM and the National Council of Popular Committees (Conseil National des Comit´es Populaires—CNCP), win 28 of the Regional Council’s 41 seats. The leftist Martinique Convergences (Convergences Martiniquaises), a list headed by the PPM, won 9 seats, while the FMP claimed 4 seats. Balloting for 23 of the General Council’s 45 seats saw the left increase its majority by 2. The June 2007 National Assembly election saw three incumbents returned, but Edmond-Mariette lost in the second round to the PPM’s Serge LETCHIMY. The department is currently represented in the Senate by Claude Lise (PPM) and Serge LARCHER (Divers Gauche). Prefect: Yves DASSONVILLE. President of the General Council: Claude LISE (PPM). President of the Regional Council: Alfred MARIE-JEANNE (MIM). Saint Barthelemy (Saint-Barth´elemy). Lying east of the Virgin Islands in the Leeward Islands of the Lesser Antilles, with St. Martin to the northwest and St. Kitts and Nevis to the South, St. Barth (also St. Bart, St. Barts, St. Barths) came under French control in 1648, was sold to Sweden in 1784, and was sold back to France in 1878, at which time it was administratively linked to Guadeloupe. On February 21, 2007, President Chirac signed into

law legislation converting the island from a commune of the Department of Guadeloupe to a separate overseas collectivity. The relevant laws entered into effect upon publication in the official register on February 22, but Saint Barthelemy was not fully established as a collectivity until its first Territorial Council convened on July 15. The process of amicable separation from Guadeloupe had been put in motion by passage of a referendum on December 7, 2003, in which 96 percent of those voting approved becoming a collectivity. St. Barth is France’s smallest overseas collectivity, with an area of 9 square miles (24 sq. km.) and a population of 6,850 (2006E). The seat of government and largest town is Gustavia (named after a Swedish king). The vast majority of the population is Caucasian, and although French is the official language, English is also widely spoken. With no natural resources to exploit and virtually no arable land, the economy depends heavily on high-end tourism. The government of St. Barth combines aspects of a commune, a department, and a region.

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The representative of the French government is a deputy prefect. The Territorial Council comprises 19 members serving five-year terms. The council elects from its membership a president and a 6-member Executive Council. In the new collectivity’s first election, held July 1, 2007, the St. Barth First (St.-Barth d’Abord) list, headed by Bruno MAGRAS (UMP), the communal mayor, won an easy victory, taking 72 percent of the vote and 16 council seats. The other 3 seats were split among the other three competing lists: Together for Saint Barthelemy (Ensemble pour Saint-Barth´elemy), headed by Benoˆıt CHAUVIN (MoDem and Cap 21); All United for Saint Barthelemy (Tous Unis pour Saint-Barth´elemy), led by Karine MIOT; and Action-BalanceTransparency (Action-Equilibre-Transparence), led by Maxime DESOUCHES. Magras was elected president by the council when it convened on July 15. Pending election of its own National Assembly deputy at the next French general election (no later than 2012), St. Barth will continue to be represented by Guadeloupe’s Victorin Lurel (PS), whose district included St. Barth at the time of the June 2007 election. The island’s senator is to be elected in September 2008. Deputy Prefect: Dominique LACROIX. President of the Territorial Council: Bruno MAGRAS (UMP). Saint Martin (Saint-Martin). Lying east of the Virgin Islands in the Leeward Islands of the Lesser Antilles, with Anguilla to the north and Saint Barthelemy to the southeast, the island of St. Martin is divided roughly in half, with the French overseas collectivity of Saint-Martin in the north and the Dutch dependency Sint Maarten in the south. First claimed by Spain following the early voyages of Christopher Columbus (who, despite legend, neither named nor made explicit reference to the island), Saint Martin was partitioned by the Dutch and French in 1648, although up until 1815, as a consequence of various European wars, the French sector repeatedly fell under Dutch or English control. During this period the island’s

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economy was based on the extraction of salt from salt ponds and the cultivation of cotton, tobacco, and, from the late 1700s, sugarcane, which led to the importation of African slaves far in excess of the Caucasian population. Emancipation came in 1848, after which sugar declined in importance. From 1946 the French half of the island comprised two communes in the Department of Guadeloupe. Seventy-six percent of St. Martin’s voters approved establishment of a separate overseas collectivity in a referendum held on December 7, 2003. On February 21, 2007, President Chirac signed the necessary legislation, which accorded the same collectivity status to nearby Saint Barthelemy, effective February 22. However, St. Martin was not fully established as a collectivity until its first Territorial Council convened on July 15, 2007. The overseas collectivity of St. Martin encompasses about 20 square miles (53 sq. km.) and has a population of 35,000 (2006E). The administrative center and largest community is Marigot. The population is primarily of African, British, Dutch, French, and Creole ancestry. French is the official language, but English is spoken universally. Today, the economy largely depends on tourism, followed by trade and offshore financial services. Representing the French government is a deputy prefect. Local legislative responsibility is held by the Territorial Council, which comprises 23 members serving five-year terms. The council elects from its membership a president and an Executive Council. Five lists competed in the collectivity’s first election, held July 1 and 8, 2007: the Union for Progress (Union pour le Progr`es—UPP), led by Louis Constant-Fleming (UMP), which won 40 percent of the first-round vote; Togetherness, Responsibility, Success (Rassemblement, Responsabilit´e, R´eussite—RRR), led by Alain RICHARDSON (32 percent); Succeed Saint-Martin (R´eussir Saint-Martin—RSM), led by Jean-Luc HAMLET (11 percent); Alliance for the Overseas Collectivity of Saint Martin (Alliance pour le COM de Saint-Martin), headed by Dominique RIBOUD (9 percent); and the Democratic Alliance for Saint Martin (Alliance D´emocratique pour le Saint-

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Martin), led by Wendel COCKS (8 percent). The first three proceeded to the second round, at which the UPP won 16 seats, to 6 for the RRR, and 1 for the RSM. Constant-Fleming was elected president when the Territorial Council convened on July 15. Until the next French general election (no later than 2012), St. Martin will be represented in the

National Assembly by Guadeloupe’s Victorin Lurel (PS), whose district included St. Martin at the time of the June 2007 election. St. Martin is scheduled to elect its first senator in September 2008. Deputy Prefect: Dominique LACROIX. President of the Territorial Council: Louis CONSTANT-FLEMING (UMP).

G R E NA DA STATE

OF

GRENADA

The Country Grenada, located close to St. Kitts-Nevis, encompasses the southernmost of the Caribbean’s Windward Islands, about 90 miles north of Trinidad (see map, p. 511). The country includes the main island of Grenada, the smaller islands of Carriacou and Petit Martinique, and a number of small islets. The population is approximately 75 percent black, the balance being largely mulatto, with a small white minority. English is the official language, while a French patois is in limited use. Roman Catholics predominate, with Anglicans constituting a substantial minority. Grenada’s economy is based on agriculture; bananas, cocoa, nutmeg, and mace are its most important products. Tourism, an important source of foreign exchange, declined substantially in the mid1970s but subsequently revived. Unemployment has long been a major problem, encompassing upwards of 40 percent of the adult population in 1994 before dropping to a reported 21 percent in November 2003. Structural reform goals in the early 1990s included liberalization of trade regulations, civil service streamlining, and privatization of state-run enterprises. GDP grew steadily from 3.5 percent in 1996 to 6.0 percent in 1998. Meanwhile, inflation remained low (1.4 percent in 1998), although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned that Grenada’s “public finances” had deteriorated under the effect of tax cuts, which had contributed to, among other things, a growing budget deficit that threatened to serve as a brake on future economic development. The 1999 and 2000 growth figures were 7.5 and 6.5 respectively; however, the economy was buffeted by a decline in tourism following

the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and real GDP registered –3.3 for the year, with marginal improvement in 2002 despite extensive damage from a tropical storm in September. Far more devastating was Hurricane Ivan, which on September 7, 2004, destroyed 90 percent of the country’s buildings, with damages estimated in excess of US $2 billion and economic contraction of at least 3.5 percent. A marginally less severe hurricane in July 2005 yielded additional destruction estimated at $200 million.

GRENADA

Petit Martinique

Hillsborough

Carriacou I.

VENEZUELA

Frigate I.

Large I.

Caribbean Sea Diamond I.

Ronde I.

Les Tantes Caille I.

GRENADA Sauteurs

AT L A N T IC

Tivoli

OCEAN

Grand Roy St. George's

Marquis Saint David's

Calivigny 0 0

10 Mi 10 Km

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GRENADA

Government and Politics Political Background Discovered by Columbus on his third voyage in 1498, Grenada was alternately ruled by the French and British until 1783, when British control was recognized by the Treaty of Versailles. It remained a British colony until 1958, when it joined the abortive Federation of the West Indies. In 1967 Grenada became a member of the West Indies Associated States, Britain retaining responsibility for external relations. Eric M. GAIRY, who had been removed from office by the British in 1962 for malfeasance, was redesignated prime minister upon the assumption of internal autonomy. On February 7, 1974, Grenada became an autonomous member of the Commonwealth, two years after an election that the British interpreted as a mandate for independence. Many Grenadians, however, were opposed to self-rule under Gairy, whom they compared to Haiti’s “Papa Doc” Duvalier. United primarily by their dislike of Gairy, the nation’s three opposition parties—the Grenada National Party (GNP), the New Jewel Movement (NJM), and the United People’s Party (UPP)— contested the election of December 7, 1976, as a People’s Alliance. Although failing to defeat the incumbent prime minister, the Alliance succeeded in reducing the lower house strength of Gairy’s Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) to 9 of 15 members. In the early morning of March 13, 1979, while the prime minister was out of the country, insurgents destroyed the headquarters of the Grenada Defense Force, and a People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) was proclaimed by opposition leader Maurice BISHOP. Joining Bishop in the new government were 11 other members or supporters of the NJM plus two members of the GNP. In September 1983 disagreement arose between Bishop (who reportedly favored rapprochement with the United States) and Deputy Prime Minister Bernard COARD (who sought a clear-cut alignment with the Soviet bloc), Bishop being forced to accept an NJM Central Committee decision call-

ing for joint leadership. On October 13 Bishop was removed from office and placed under house arrest by Gen. Hudson AUSTIN, commander of the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA). Six days later, after having momentarily been freed by rioting supporters, Bishop was recaptured and executed, with General Austin being installed as head of a 16member Revolutionary Military Council (RMC). On October 25, after the governor general, Sir Paul SCOON, had requested the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to intervene and restore order, U.S. military forces, with OECS endorsement and limited personnel support, invaded the island, seizing Austin and others involved in the coup. Subsequently, a provisional administration under Nicholas A. BRATHWAITE was established, which held office until the installation of Herbert A. BLAIZE as prime minister of a new parliamentary regime on December 4, 1984. In an unusual development, the allegedly “authoritarian” Blaize lost the leadership of the New National Party (NNP) to Dr. Keith MITCHELL at a party convention held January 21–22, 1989. Six months later Blaize dismissed Mitchell from the cabinet and announced the formation of a new grouping, the National Party (NP). Faced with the certainty of an adverse confidence vote, the prime minister prorogued the legislature on August 23. After a long illness, Blaize died on December 19 and was immediately succeeded by his deputy, Ben JONES, who dissolved Parliament in anticipation of an election that was constitutionally mandated by March 1990. The election of March 13, 1990, yielded a plurality of seven legislative seats for the National Democratic Congress (NDC), whose leader, Brathwaite, formed an administration that moved from minority to majority status with the May 7 defection to the NDC of a GULP representative. Prime Minister Brathwaite, whose government had encountered criticism over its structural adjustment policies, resigned as NDC leader in July 1994 and was succeeded in the latter capacity by Agriculture Minister George BRIZAN on September 4. Brathwaite, who had reportedly become disenchanted with party politics, continued as prime

GRENADA

Political Status: Independent member of the Commonwealth since February 7, 1974; constitution suspended following coup of March 13, 1979; restored November 9, 1984. Area: 133 sq. mi. (344 sq. km.). Population: 100,895 (2001C); 106,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): ST. GEORGE’S (3,600). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: East Caribbean Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2.70 EC dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Sir Daniel WILLIAMS; assumed office on August 8, 1996, upon the retirement of Sir Reginald Oswald PALMER. Prime Minister: Dr. Keith C. MITCHELL (New National Party); sworn in on June 22, 1995, to succeed George BRIZAN (National Democratic Congress), following legislative election of June 20; reappointed following elections of January 18, 1999, and November 27, 2003.

minister until February 1, 1995, when Brizan also became head of government. However, despite a nearly five-month run-up, Brizan was unable to lead the NDC to a legislative victory on June 20, being obliged to step down in favor of Mitchell, whose NNP had captured 8 of 15 lower house seats. The NNP won all 15 seats in the election of January 1999 but was reduced to a narrow 1-seat margin in November 2003.

Constitution and Government Grenada’s constitution, originally adopted in February 1967 and modified only slightly on independence, was suspended following the March 1979 coup, but restored in November 1984, the legitimacy of laws enacted in the interim being confirmed by Parliament in February 1985. The British monarch is the nominal sovereign and is represented by a governor general. Executive authority is exercised on the monarch’s behalf by the prime minister, who represents the majority party

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in the House of Representatives, the lower house of the bicameral legislature. The House is popularly elected for a five-year term, while the upper chamber, the Senate, consists of 13 members appointed by the governor general: 10 on the advice of the prime minister (3 to represent interest groups) and 3 on the advice of the leader of the opposition. The judicial system includes a Supreme Court composed of a High Court of Justice and a two-tiered Court of Appeal, the upper panel of which hears final appeals from the High Court. There are also eight magistrates’ courts of summary jurisdiction. Grenada is administratively divided into six parishes encompassing 52 village councils on the main island, with the minor islands organized as separate administrative entities.

Foreign Relations The United Kingdom and the United States recognized the Bishop government in March 1979, but relations subsequently deteriorated, with Washington condemning St. George’s midsummer signing of a two-year technical-assistance pact with Cuba, and London deploring “the unattractive record of the Grenada government over civil liberties and democratic rights.” Relations with Washington worsened further in the wake of U.S. and North American Treaty Organization (NATO) naval maneuvers off Puerto Rico in July 1981, Grenada branding the exercises as a rehearsal for invasion of its territory. Nine months later, after Grenada had become the only English-speaking Caribbean state to declare its support for Argentina in the Falkland Islands war, U.S. President Ronald Reagan opened a four-day visit to nearby Barbados by charging that St. George’s had joined with Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union in an effort to “spread the virus of Marxism” in the area. Regional reaction to the Bishop regime was initially somewhat mixed, but by mid-1982 all of the other six members of the OECS (Antigua, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) were generally hostile, although the most vocal regional criticism of the PRG came from Prime Minister Adams of Barbados. Bishop’s

250

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murder provoked even more widespread condemnation, including that of the Cuban government, which announced on October 20, 1983, that “no position claimed as revolutionary . . . can justify savage methods such as the elimination of Maurice Bishop and the outstanding group of honest and moral leaders who died.” The ensuing military intervention by U.S. and Caribbean forces, coupled with Reagan’s assertion that Grenada had become “a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied for use as a major military bastion to export terror,” left little opportunity for an improvement in relations between St. George’s and Havana under either the interim administration of Nicholas Brathwaite or the restored parliamentary government of Herbert Blaize. Thus, the last Cuban diplomat remaining in Grenada (a charg´e d’affaires) departed in March 1984, with relations between the two countries being further strained during the ensuing year by Havana’s attempt to recover $6 million for equipment used to construct an airport at Port Salines that the United States had earlier characterized as a military threat to the region. Subsequently, Grenada participated in the U.S.-backed regional security plan designed to avert future leftist takeovers, Prime Minister Blaize remaining one of the strongest supporters of U.S. Caribbean policy until his death in December 1989. President Reagan was warmly received during a visit on February 20, 1986, which included a “minisummit” with other English-speaking Caribbean leaders. Earlier, on October 31, 1985, Queen Elizabeth II was reported to have been given a “subdued welcome” because of Britain’s failure to assist in the 1983 intervention and the relatively modest dimensions of its subsequent aid program. Following an inconclusive response to an appeal by Vincentian prime minister James Mitchell to convert the seven-member OECS into an integrated regime, Grenada joined in 1991 with its Windward Island neighbors to launch a less inclusive four-member grouping. During the third meeting of a regional Constituent Assembly at Roseau, Dominica, in September, agreement was reached on a federal system with a common legislature and executive; however, opposition was voiced to the

proposal, which is yet to be submitted to preliminary referenda in the four constituencies. Earlier, Prime Minister Brathwaite had met with Cuba’s deputy foreign affairs minister at a July Caricom summit in St. Kitts to work out the “modalities” for resuming diplomatic relations. The way to rapprochement had been paved by Havana’s withdrawal of the Port Salines compensation claim. In May 1997 Prime Minister Mitchell made a visit to Cuba, the first by a Grenadan government head since 1983. During the visit an economic cooperation agreement was signed; concurrently, the Cuban state airline became the first foreign air carrier to schedule service to the Port Salines airport. On August 1, 1998, nearly 15 years after the U.S. intervention, Cuba’s Fidel Castro arrived for a state visit. While many did not approve of the trip, Prime Minister Mitchell insisted that it would aid in the achievement of national reconciliation, and diplomatic relations were formally reestablished on December 1, 1999. A number of additional cooperation agreements were signed in 2000 and in May 2004 the National Democratic Party (NDP, under NNP below) joined with the NDC and the People’s Labour Movement (PLM, below) in protesting the “inhumane and immoral blockade” of Cuba by the United States. In late May 1996 the government signed two treaties with the United States involving mutual legal assistance and extradition. The latter, replacing a 1931 treaty between Washington and London, was advanced as part of a campaign to curb drug trafficking in the region. A year later, the presence of a detachment of U.S. Marines to aid in the construction of a Grenadan coast guard facility on the northern island of Petit Martinique generated strong opposition from the island’s 800 inhabitants, who viewed the installation as a threat to trading in forms of contraband not considered illegal and which had long been a mainstay of the local economy. In December 2004 Prime Minister Mitchell visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC) seeking aid for damage caused by Hurricane Ivan, and shortly thereafter his administration shifted diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the PRC.

GRENADA

Current Issues The main issue in 2006 and early 2007 concerned the continued incarceration of individuals given lengthy sentences for involvement in the 1983 killing of Maurice Bishop. On July 6 the UK Privy Council rejected an appeal that the manslaughter convictions of three of the “Grenada 17” be set aside on procedural grounds. The ruling notwithstanding, the three were released on December 3, after having served 23 years of 30-year sentences, with the Privy Council ordering that the others be resentenced. Defense lawyers were then expected to seek release of the remaining prisoners, although no official decision in the matter was immediately forthcoming. In March 2007 Prime Minister Mitchell defended economic aid from Venezuela as reflective of an “honorable” relationship between the two countries, although Sir James Mitchell, the former Vincentian leader, advised the Grenadan administration to “beware of Greeks bringing gifts.”

Political Parties Before the 1979 coup, Eric Gairy’s Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) had consistently dominated the country’s politics, although its majority in the House of Representatives was substantially reduced in the election of December 1976, which the leftist New Jewel Movement (NJM), the centrist United People’s Party (UPP), and the conservative Grenada National Party (GNP) contested as a People’s Alliance. For the 1984 balloting, only the GULP campaigned under its original name. The recently formed New National Party (NNP) secured an overwhelming majority in 1984, a much slimmer margin in 1995 after a period of ascendancy by the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and total control in 1999.

Government Party New National Party (NNP). The NNP was launched in August 1984 as an amalgamation of the Grenada National Party (GNP), led by Herbert Blaize; the National Democratic Party (NDP), led

251

by George Brizan and Robert Grant; the Grenada Democratic Movement (GDM), led by Dr. Francis Alexis; and the Christian Democratic Labour Party (CDLP), led by Winston WHYTE. The center-right GNP, founded by Blaize in 1956, had been essentially moribund during its leader’s retirement from politics after the 1979 coup. The NDP, organized in early 1984, became the most liberal component of the NNP. The GDM was formed in 1983 by a group of right-wing exiles resident in Barbados and elsewhere, who reportedly benefited from substantial U.S. support. The CDLP (see under NDC, below) withdrew from the coalition in September 1984, after a series of policy disputes with the other groups. In its 1984 campaign manifesto, the NNP formally endorsed the 1983 military intervention and urged that foreign military and police units not be withdrawn. It dominated the elections of December 3, winning 14 of 15 lower house seats. However, by mid-1985 the coalition was in substantial disarray, GNP elements holding most of the government portfolios. Infighting continued throughout 1986, Brizan and Alexis reportedly mounting an unsuccessful challenge to Blaize’s leadership before a December convention at which the GNP faction gained virtually complete control, with Ben Jones, seemingly the prime minister’s heir apparent, defeating Brizan for the post of deputy leader. In April 1987 Brizan and Alexis left the government and moved into opposition, leaving the NNP little more than a “reborn GNP,” with a diminished legislative majority of nine members. A far more critical cleavage was revealed in January 1989 when (theretofore) General Secretary Keith Mitchell, who had previously criticized Blaize for contributing to a “lack of camaraderie” among senior members, defeated the prime minister for the party leadership. Despite the action, Mitchell asserted that because of his “tremendous respect and admiration” for Blaize he would not seek the latter’s removal from government office before the next election. Dismissed from the cabinet on July 21, Mitchell joined with Brizan in filing a motion of nonconfidence that failed to be voted upon because of the legislative prorogation of August 23. Mitchell was named prime minister following the

252

GRENADA

NNP victory of June 20, 1995. The NNP swept all of the 15 parliamentary seats on January 18, 1999, 7 of which were lost on November 27, 2003. Leaders: Dr. Keith MITCHELL (Prime Minister and Party Leader), Sen. Gregory BOWEN (Deputy Leader), Lawrence JOSEPH (Chair).

Other Parties National Democratic Congress (NDC). The NDC was launched in April 1987 by George BRIZAN and Francis Alexis, who had defected from the NNP and were subsequently joined by a variety of anti-Blaize figures, including leaders of the Grenada Democratic Labour Party (GDLP) and the Democratic Labour Congress (DLC). Launched in March 1985 by (then) opposition leader Marcel PETERS, the GDLP had expressed concern about unemployment, a lack of “Christian values,” and Grenada’s security in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. The DLC had been formed in August 1986 by Kenny LALSINGH, a legislative representative who had left the NNP earlier in the year, in a realignment that included the former Christian Democratic Labour Party (CDLP), a centrist formation of ex-UPP members that competed unsuccessfully in the 1984 election. The NDC held its inaugural conference on December 18, 1987. In January 1989 Brizan stepped down as opposition leader in favor of Nicholas Brathwaite, who had served as head of the 1983–1984 provisional administration, and who became prime minister following the election of March 13, 1990. In March 1991 party chair Kenny Lalsingh resigned as minister of works and communications after being accused of improperly importing transmitting equipment for use by the operator of an unlicensed radio station. In July 1994 Prime Minister Brathwaite resigned as party leader; at the NDC’s annual convention on September 4 Brizan was elected his successor, although not replacing Brathwaite as prime minister until February 1, 1995. Four months later the NDC retained only 4 of 15 legislative seats, thereby becoming the opposition party. Brizan was given a one-month suspension from the House of Representatives on August 27, 1997, for criticizing

the appointment of Daniel Williams as governor general. Before the January 1999 legislative vote, Brizan announced that, because of his declining health, Deputy Chair Joan Purcell would serve as the NDC standard-bearer. The party reportedly attempted to negotiate a formal electoral alliance with the GULP, DLP (see under PLM, below), and NP; however, agreement could not be reached on seat allocation or leadership. The NDC consequently presented its candidates (including Brizan and Purcell), although informal agreement was reported between the NDC and the GULP/United Labour not to challenge each other’s strongest candidates. The party lost all of its seats (on a vote share of 25 percent), and Brizan subsequently announced his retirement from active politics. Tillman Thomas, a former minister of tourism, was elected party leader in October 2000. Leaders: Tillman THOMAS (Party Leader), George PRIME (Deputy Leader), Joan PURCELL, Peter DAVID (General Secretary). Grenada United Labour Party (GULP). The GULP was founded in 1950 as the personal vehicle of Eric M. Gairy, who headed governments from 1951 to 1957, 1961 to 1962, and 1967 to 1979. Having acquired a reputation for both corruption and repression while in office, Gairy did not present himself for election in 1984, when the GULP secured 36 percent of the popular vote compared to the NNP’s 59 percent. The party’s only successful candidate, Marcel Peters, after being formally designated leader of the opposition, announced his withdrawal in protest at alleged electoral irregularities, but he later reversed himself and secured the appointment of three associates as opposition senators. In early 1985 Peters formed the GDLP (see under NDC, above) after being expelled from the GULP, which was thus left with no parliamentary representation. Although Sir Eric had announced in December 1987 that he was retiring from politics, he faced no opposition in reelection as GULP president at the party’s annual convention in December 1988. The party was runner-up to the NDC in the balloting of

GRENADA

March 1990, winning four legislative seats, Gairy being among those defeated. Following the election, one of GULP’s representatives defected to the NDC, while a second defected in the interest of “national unity” after an April 27 fire that destroyed a government complex at St. George’s. A third resigned from the party in May 1991, after having been characterized by Gairy as a “recalcitrant schoolboy.” The last of the four elected in 1990, Leader of the Opposition Winifred STRACHMAN, was expelled by the party’s Executive Council in March 1992 on grounds that included “blatant disloyalty” and a “substandard, negligible and disappointing” performance as an MP. The GULP won two legislative seats in June 1995, with Gairy again among the losers. Sir Eric died after a lengthy illness on August 23, 1997. After failing to negotiate a more inclusive electoral alliance (see NDC, above), the GULP contested the January 1999 legislative poll jointly with the DLP, the ticket being known as GULP/United Labour. However, discord was reported within the GULP over the reemergence of Raphael Fletcher as the party’s standard-bearer. Fletcher had been suspended from the GULP in 1988 because of his links to Libya and had subsequently defected to the NNP and served in the Mitchell administration. Fletcher returned to the GULP in late 1998 after his departure from the government and the NNP had triggered early elections. The GULP/United Labour secured only 12 percent of the vote (and no seats), despite the support of Marcelle GAIRY (the daughter of Eric Gairy), who resigned as Grenada’s high commissioner to London to participate in the campaign. Leaders: Wilfred HAYES (President), Gloria PAYNE-BANFIELD (Party Leader). People’s Labour Movement (PLM). The PLM was initially launched as the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) in December 1995 by four NDC dissidents led by former attorney general Francis Alexis, who had resigned in July from the parent party claiming it was “finished and done with.” It competed in the January 1999 legislative poll in alliance with the GULP (above).

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Leaders: Dr. Francis ALEXIS (Leader), Wayne FRANCIS (Deputy Leader), Dr. Terrance MARRYSHOW (President). National Party (NP). The NP was organized in July 1989 by Prime Minister Blaize, who had been deposed in January as leader of the NNP. Since the NP did not command a majority of lower house seats, Blaize prorogued the body on August 23, pending an election that was expected to be held late in the year. Immediately following Blaize’s death on December 19, the governor general appointed Deputy Prime Minister Ben Jones as his acting successor, despite the party’s continued minority status. The NP’s legislative representation dropped from five to two in March 1990. In December the party offered its support to the Brathwaite administration, with Jones returning to his former post as external affairs minister; however, on January 5, 1991, Jones resigned after his party had returned to opposition in a dispute over the 1991 budget. The NP won no legislative seats in 1995 and did not present candidates in 1999 or 2003. Leaders: Ben JONES (Former Prime Minister), George McGUIRE (Chair), Paul LANDER (Secretary). United Republican Party (URP). The URP was formed in 1993 by a group of New York–based Grenadians. It contested the 1995 election without success. Leader: Antonio LANGDON. Grenada Progressive Party (GPP). The GPP was organized by a former teacher in June 1997 with the avowed aim of appealing to women and young people. Leader: Prescott WILLIAMS. Good Ole Democracy (GOD). The GOD offered three candidates in the 1999 election, capturing a minuscule 0.2 percent of the total vote that was, nevertheless, an improvement over its 1995 vote share. It contested only two constituencies, without success, in 2003. Grenada Renaissance Party (GRP). The GRP is a small formation that failed to elect its sole candidate in 2003.

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Cabinet As of May 1, 2007 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Dr. Keith C. Mitchell Gregory Bowen

Ministers Agriculture, Forestry, Lands, and Fisheries Agriculture, Forestry, Lands, and Fisheries (Second Minister) Business and Private Sector Development Carriacou and Petit Martinique Affairs Communications, Works, and Transport Education and Labour Finance, Trade, Industry, and Planning Foreign Affairs and International Trade Gender and Family Affairs, Housing, and Social Services Health, Social Security, Environment, and Ecclesiastical Relations Human Resource Development Information and Communication Technology Legal Affairs and Attorney General Marketing and National Importing Board National Security Public Utilities and Energy Sports, Community Development, and Cooperatives Tourism, Civil Aviation, Culture, and Performing Arts Youth Development

Gregory Bowen Roland Bhola Dr. Keith C. Mitchell Elvin Nimrod Clarice Modeste-Curwen [f] Claris Charles [f] Anthony Boatswain Elvin Nimrod Yolande Bain Joseph [f] Ann David Antoine [f] Dr. Keith C. Mitchell Dr. Keith C. Mitchell Elvin Nimrod Gregory Bowen Dr. Keith C. Mitchell Gregory Bowen Adrian Mitchell Brenda Hood [f] Dr. Keith C. Mitchell

Ministers of State Prime Minister’s Office with Responsibility for National Security, Business, and Private Sector Development Prime Minister’s Office with Responsibility for Youth Development

Einstein Louison Emmalin Pierre [f]

[f] = female

Legislature The bicameral Parliament, embracing an appointed Senate of 13 members and a popularly elected 15-member House of Representatives, was dissolved by the People’s Revolutionary Government following the March 1979 coup. It reconvened on December 28, 1984, following a general election on December 3.

Senate. Of the 13 members of the upper house, 10 are nominated by the government and 3 by the leader of the opposition. President: Kenny LALSINGH. House of Representatives. In the most recent election of November 27, 2003, the New National Party won 8 seats and the opposition National Democratic Congress, 7. Speaker: Lawrence JOSEPH.

GRENADA

Communications Press There are no daily newspapers. The Grenada Informer (6,000) is a general-interest weekly; other weeklies include the Grenadian Voice (3,000), independent right-wing; the Grenada Guardian, a GULP publication; and Grenada Today. The West Indian is a government-owned biweekly. An opposition Grenadian Tribune was launched in June 1987. Strain has been reported in recent years between the media and the Mitchell government, which, among other things, has proposed a code of ethics for journalists.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility; for international news the media rely primarily on the regional Caribbean News Agency (CANA).

Broadcasting and Computing In October 1990 legislation was approved to end direct government control of the Grenada

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Broadcasting Corporation (GBC). Under the new arrangement broadcasting was to be supervised by a statutory board containing private sector representatives, with TV facilities to be readied for privatization. Full divestiture was achieved in 1997. As of 2005 there were approximately 186 Internet users and 157 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 424 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Denis G. ANTOINE U.S. Ambassador to Grenada: Mary Martin OURISMAN (resident in Barbados) Permanent Representative to the UN: Angus FRIDAY IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OECS, OPANAL, WTO

G UAT E M A L A REPUBLIC

OF

GUATEMALA

Rep u´ blica de Guatemala

´ Note: In balloting on November 4, 2007 (at which turnout was less than 50 percent), Alvaro Colom Caballeros of the National Union for Hope (UNE) was elected president with 52.8 percent of the vote over Otto P´erez Molina of the Patriotic Party. Colom and the new vice president, Dr. Rafael Espada (also of the UNE), were scheduled to be inaugurated on January 14, 2008, after which a new cabinet was to be installed.

The Country

Paxbán

MEXICO

Us

um

a

in

c

BELIZE

Flores ta

La Libertad Ri

er

v

The northernmost of the Spanish-speaking Central American countries, Guatemala is also the most populous, with an annual population growth rate close to 3 percent. The population, which is noted for its high proportion (65 percent) of Indians, is concentrated in the southern half of the country. The other major population group, the ladinos, is composed of mestizos and assimilated Indians. Although Spanish is the official language, about two dozen Indian languages are spoken, of which the most important are Cakchiquel, Caribe, Chol, Kekchi, Mam, Maya, Pocoman, and Quich´e. The dominant religion is Roman Catholicism, although recent inroads by Pentecostal Protestantism have prompted Guatemalan bishops to take a new look at “the discovery of America” and issue calls for a “new evangelism” capable of incorporating indigenous rites and rituals. Women constitute approximately 27 percent of the official labor force, not including subsistence farming and unreported domestic service; employed women are concentrated in sales, clerical, and the service sector, and make up 40 percent of professionals. Female participation in government has traditionally been virtually nonexistent, although three women held ministerial portfolios in the de Le´on Carpio administration and four in the Berger cabinet; in addition,

a woman served as president of Congress during the Arzu tenure. At the 2003 election, 15 of 158 seats (19.4 percent) were won by women. The Guatemalan economy is still largely agricultural and coffee remains by far the single most important source of foreign revenue; cotton,

Gulf of Honduras

Huehuetenango

Cobán

Lago de Izabal

Puerto Barrios

G U AT E M A L A

Quetzaltenango Mazatenango

Motagua River

Zacapa

Mixco Guatemala City Champerico Villa Nueva Escuintla San José PA C I F I C O C E A N

0 0

50 Mi 50 Km

HONDURAS

EL SALVADOR

G UAT E M A L A

Political Status: Independent Captaincy General of Guatemala proclaimed 1821; member of United Provinces of Central America, 1824–1838; separate state established 1839; most recent constitution (adopted May 31, 1985, with effect from January 14, 1986) amended by referendum of January 30, 1994. Area: 42,042 sq. mi. (108,889 sq. km.). Population: 11,237,196 (2002C); 12,911,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): GUATEMALA CITY (991,000), Mixco (307,000), Villa Nueva (237,901), Quezaltenango (114,000), Escuintla (72,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Quetzal (market rate November 2, 2007: 7.68 quetzales = $1US). Since May 1, 2001, foreign currencies have been permitted to circulate and may be used in business transactions. President: (See headnote.) Oscar Jos´e BERGER Perdomo (Grand National Alliance); elected in second-round balloting on December 28, 2003, and sworn in for a four-year term on January 14, 2004, succeeding Alfonso Antonio PORTILLO Cabrera (Guatemalan Republican Front). Vice President: (See headnote.) Eduardo STEIN Barillas (Grand National Alliance); elected on December 28, 2003, and sworn in for a term concurrent with that of the President on January 14, 2004, succeeding Juan Francisco REYES L´opez (Guatemalan Republican Front).

bananas, and sugar are also exported. Significant progress is currently being registered in manufacturing, which, like commercial farming, is predominantly in the hands of ladinos and foreign interests. The latter, including investors from the United States, Europe, and the “Four Tigers” (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), are deeply involved in the maquiladora, virtual sweatshop industries that turn imported materials into finished products (such as textiles) for export.

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Severe budgetary difficulties have persisted since the early 1980s, and both poverty and income inequality remain fundamental problems, with up to 60 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Real GDP growth averaged about 4.0 percent from 1992 to 1997, peaked at 5.0 percent in 1998, then declined steadily to 1.5 percent in 2004 before rising to an estimated 3.2 percent in 2005, albeit with inflation at 6.0 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background Guatemala, which obtained its liberation from Spanish rule in 1821 and its independence as a nation from the breakup of the United Provinces of Central America in 1839, has existed through much of its national history under a series of prolonged dictatorships, including that of Gen. Jorge UBICO from 1931 to 1944. The deposition of Ubico in 1944 by an alliance of students, liberals, and dissident members of the military known as the “October Revolutionaries” inaugurated a period of reform. ´ Led initially by President Juan Jos´e AREVALO and then by Jacobo ARBENZ Guzm´an, the progressive movement was aborted in 1954 by rightist elements under Col. Carlos CASTILLO Armas. The stated reason for the coup was the elimination of Communist influence, Castillo Armas formally dedicating his government to this end until his assassination in 1957. Still another coup in 1963 overthrew the government of Gen. Miguel YDIGORAS Fuentes. A new constitution drawn up under Yd´ıgoras’s successor, Col. Enrique PERALTA Azurdia, paved the way for the election in 1966 of a ´ civilian president, Julio C´esar MENDEZ Montenegro, and the restoration of full constitutional rule with his inauguration on July 1. M´endez was succeeded as president by (then) Col. Carlos ARANA Osorio in an election held March 1, 1970, amid widespread terrorist activity that included the kidnapping of the nation’s foreign minister. The 1974 presidential and legislative balloting presented a confusing spectacle of charges and countercharges. Initially, it appeared that

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Gen. Efra´ın R´IOS Montt, the candidate of the National Opposition Front (a coalition of the Christian Democrats and two minor parties) had placed first in the presidential race by a wide margin. Subsequently, however, the government declared that Gen. Kjell Eugenio LAUGERUD Garc´ıa, the candidate of the ruling right-wing coalition, had obtained a plurality of the votes cast. Since neither candidate was officially credited with a majority, the Congress, controlled by the conservatives, was called on to designate the winner and named General Laugerud. Similar confusion prevailed at the election of March 5, 1978, evoking numerous allegations of fraud and threats of violence during a five-day period of indecision by the National Electoral Council, which eventually ruled that the center-right candidate, Maj. Gen. Fernando Romeo LUCAS Garc´ıa, had narrowly outpolled his right-wing opponent, Colonel Peralta Azurdia. In the election of March 7, 1982, Gen. Angel An´ıbal GUEVARA, the candidate of a new centerright grouping styled the Popular Democratic Front, was declared the victor over three opponents representing far-right, centrist, and center-left interests, respectively, with no far-left organizations participating. Two days later the defeated candidates joined in a public demonstration protesting the conduct of the election and calling for annulment of the results. The appeal was rejected by outgoing President Lucas Garc´ıa and on March 23 a group of military dissidents seized power in a bloodless coup aimed at the restoration of “authentic democracy.” On March 24 formal authority was assumed by a three-member junta consisting of General R´ıos Montt, Brig. Gen. Horacio Egberto MALDONADO Schaad, and Col. Francisco Luis GORDILLO Mart´ınez. Subsequently, on June 9, R´ıos Montt dissolved the junta and assumed sole authority as president and military commander. Although taking office with strong military and business support, R´ıos Montt became increasingly estranged from both by a series of anticorruption and economic reform proposals, while incurring mounting opposition from the Catholic Church because of overt proselytizing by a U.S. Protestant sect to which he belonged. Following a number of

apparent coup attempts, he was ousted on August 8, 1983, by a group of senior army officers under Brig. Gen. Oscar MEJ´IA V´ıctores, who promised that an election would be held in 1984 to pave the way for “a return to civilian life.” The balloting of August 1, 1984, in which 17 parties participated, was for a National Constituent Assembly, which drafted a new basic law (adopted on May 31, 1985) modeled largely on its 1965 predecessor. In the subsequent general election of November 3, 1985, the Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party (PDCG) obtained a slim majority of legislative seats and in a runoff presidential poll on December 8, its candidate, Marco Vinicio CEREZO Ar´evalo, defeated the National Center Union (UCN) candidate, Jorge CARPIO Nicolle, with a 68–32 percent margin. Assuming office on January 14, 1986, Cerezo Ar´evalo became the first civilian president of Guatemala since the incumbency of M´endez Montenegro from 1966 to 1970. From the early 1960s Guatemala was beset by guerrilla terrorism. Initially, two groups, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the 13th of November Movement (M-13), operated in the country’s rural northeast. After 1966 counterinsurgency actions drove the guerrillas into the cities, generating urban violence that claimed the lives of many Guatemalans as well as some members of the foreign diplomatic community. In 1976 a new leftwing group, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), claimed credit for a wave of increased terrorism following a devastating earthquake in February. Both left- and right-wing extremism intensified after the 1978 balloting, with the principal leftwing groups forming in January 1981 a unified military command called the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (see URNG under Political Parties and Groups, below). In August 1982 R´ıos Montt established the most extensive Civil SelfDefense Patrol (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil— PAC) network in the world, encompassing virtually every adult male in the countryside and eventually constituting a counter-guerrilla force of nearly 1 million men. The rebels responded by attempting to establish a “liberated corridor” from Guatemala City to the Mexican border, populated by Indians

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fleeing army resettlement into “protected” villages. Despite such efforts, vigorous offensive action by the government was reported by late 1983 to have substantially weakened guerrilla operations. In October 1986 President Cerezo signaled his willingness to enter into peace talks with the country’s rebel organizations, including the URNG. However, no formal contacts were made with the insurgents before a series of “exploratory talks” in Madrid under Spanish government auspices in October 1987. In January 1988 the country’s six leading labor organizations joined peasant and student groups in forming a Popular Labor Action Unity (Unidad de Acci´on Sindical y Popular—UASP) with which, following protest rallies in the capital, President Cerezo concluded a “social pact” that called for cutbacks in recent price increases and salary adjustments for state workers. However, in June the president, faced with a severe foreignexchange shortfall, breached the agreement by unifying the country’s exchange rates and freeing fuel and food prices, which triggered an inflationary surge. In August, following renewed UASP agitation, Cerezo Ar´evalo was forced to issue a series of “corrections” to the June package. Meanwhile, although the ruling Christian Democrats had won a majority of municipal elections in late April, military unrest was evidenced by a failed coup in mid-May and the administration was forced to cancel a meeting in Costa Rica between the National Reconciliation Commission (Comisi´on de Reconciliaci´on Nacional—CRN) and representatives of the URNG guerrillas. By fall, with the ranks of the insurgents reportedly reduced to little more than 10 percent of their earlier strength, the president faced mounting opposition from both rightwing extremists buoyed by the recent electoral success of anti-Duarte forces in El Salvador and the human rights Mutual Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo—GAM), which had long campaigned for the appointment of an independent body to inquire into the fate of the country’s missing persons. The leading presidential contenders in the runup to nationwide balloting in November 1990 appeared to be former president R´ıos Montt, heading

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a “No Sell-Out” (No-Venta) coalition of right-wing parties, and Carpio Nicolle of the UCN. In late October, however, the Court of Constitutionality vacated R´ıos Montt’s final appeal against disqualification because of his involvement in the 1982 coup. Thereafter, Carpio’s failure to secure a majority on November 11 forced a runoff on January 6, 1991, which Jorge SERRANO El´ıas of the recently organized Solidarity Action Movement (Movimiento de Acci´on Solidaria—MAS), with substantial backing from No-Venta supporters, won by a better than two-to-one margin. Following his inauguration President Serrano faced four major problems: the fragile state of the nation’s economy, an unenviable panorama of human rights abuses by the military, a surge in drug trafficking, and the inconclusive status of negotiations with the URNG on the guerrilla insurgency. In early February the three leading union federations indicated that they would not join in a new “social pact” before the reversal of a number of government economic policies that included the recent abandonment of price controls and largescale layoffs of public-sector employees. Concurrently, an official commission reported that there had been 304 killings by “death squads” and 233 “disappearances” in 1990, with Guatemala ranked third, worldwide, in the latter regard. For its part, the United States announced a suspension of military aid in December because of the government’s failure to “criticize or exhaustively investigate” those chargeable with human rights abuses. Earlier, Guatemalan Treasury police revealed that a total of 4,770 kilos of cocaine had been seized in 1990, most of it originating in Colombia, with Guatemala serving not only as a bridge for shipments to the United States, but also as a major money-laundering center. In March and October 1990 the third and fourth rounds of negotiation with URNG representatives were held in Oslo, Norway, and Metepec, Mexico, respectively. The talks proved unproductive because of the Guatemalan military’s insistence that it would join in a “dialogue with the subversive delinquents” only after they had laid down their arms. However, the army reversed itself in early 1991, agreeing, for the first time, to

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participate in a new round of talks launched in Mexico City in late April. The 1991 talks continued in Cuernavaca, Mexico, in June, and in Queretaro, Mexico, in July, where agreement was reached on the need for “a negotiation process [having] as its final objective the search for peace through political means.” A further meeting in Mexico City in September yielded a series of rebel demands, including abolition of the PAC units and an end to military conscription; however, no substantive results were reported apart from a number of “approximations” (incremental advances) in regard to human rights issues. A round of talks that concluded in late February 1992 also failed to yield a breakthrough, despite pressure on both sides stemming from formal settlement in mid-February of the conflict in neighboring El Salvador. In August a compromise was reached on the Civil Self-Defense Patrols, the URNG dropping its demand for their immediate dissolution and the government agreeing not to expand them. In October an agreement (subsequently formalized in a tripartite accord involving the UN High Commissioner for Refugees—UNHCR) was concluded on the return of approximately 43,000 Guatemalan refugees, many of whom had spent upwards of a decade in camps on the Mexican side of the border. By early 1993, however, the parties had become deadlocked over a timetable for implementation of human rights guarantees and the establishment of a “truth commission” to investigate human rights violations during the lengthy armed conflict. On May 25, 1993, scarcely more than two weeks after the ruling MAS had registered a sweeping victory in municipal balloting, President Serrano attempted to assume near-dictatorial powers that included dissolution of the Congress and dismissal of the Supreme Court. Initially, the action appeared to be supported by the military, but on June 1 the defense minister, Gen. Jos´e Domingo GARC´IA Samayoa, responded to widespread popular protests by announcing that both Serrano and Vice President Gustavo ESPINA Salguero had resigned and that Congress would reconvene to select a successor to the ousted head of state. However,

the president of the Supreme Court concurred with Espina’s contention that he had remained in office and the military indicated that on constitutional grounds they would accept him as the new chief executive. A National Consensus Petition (Instancia Nacional de Consenso) was then advanced by an unlikely grouping of business, labor, and other leaders, contending that Esp´ına was barred from office because he had supported Serrano’s autogolpe. The Constitutional Court agreed, and on June 5 the Congress, in a surprising move, selected the coun´ try’s human rights ombudsman, Ramiro DE LEON Carpio, to serve the balance of Serrano’s presidential term. The new chief executive proceeded to exercise his reformist credentials by insisting that Congress purge itself of unsavory elements, particularly 16 deputies whose votes were alleged to be for sale on a regular basis. Securing no response, de Le´on called in late August for the resignation of all 116 deputies, as well as of the 9 Supreme Court justices. Although 76 deputies agreed to step down, none of the 16 targeted members did so, and on September 27 the president called for a national referendum to settle the matter. Meanwhile, he had offered the URNG rebels a “two track” peace plan that called for the establishment of a representative forum within Guatemala to discuss resolution of the issues that had provoked the conflict, in addition to revival of the talks with rebel leaders in Mexico City. However, the insurgents rejected the overture, as well as a substantially modified plan tendered in early October. In mid-October 1993 the Supreme Court issued a temporary injunction against the referendum but immediately excused itself from further action, since it was a party to the case. The way was thus cleared for a Constitutional Court ruling in the government’s favor on October 21; however, on November 11 it reversed itself by upholding a claim that the vote would cause “irreparable damage to the institutional order.” Six days later the president moved to defuse the crisis by concluding a “Contract for the Restructuring of the State” with Congress, whereby the referendum would be revised to encompass a series of constitutional

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reforms, including the shortening of congressional and judicial mandates; an increase in the size of the Court to 13 members; the review of parliamentary immunity cases by the Court, rather than by Congress; increased autonomy for the attorney general and comptroller general; and limitations on the discretionary appointive powers of both president and Congress. The proposals were approved by a 67.9 percent popular majority on January 30, 1994. However, the turnout was only 16.1 percent, meaning that passage involved only 10.9 percent of the electorate. Despite such dubious authorization, the reforms became law on April 8, paving the way for election of a new Congress on August 14. An agreement with URNG representatives on January 10, 1994, to reopen peace talks led two months later to a Global Human Rights Accord and a timetable for continued negotiations. Subsequently, during a UN-mediated meeting in Oslo the two sides agreed to set up a three-member commission to look into Guatemala’s unhappy record of human rights violations and acts of violence. In the August 1994 balloting for a truncated congressional term (to January 1996), a turnout of scarcely more than 20 percent of the registered voters gave an unexpected plurality to former president R´ıos Montt’s Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG). Initially outmaneuvered by a coalition of other rightist groups that included the second-ranked National Advancement Party (PAN) in being excluded from the new congressional directorate, the FRG eventually succeeded in forging an alliance with the PDCG and UCN that yielded the designation of R´ıos Montt as legislative president on December 2. During the first half of 1995 the FRG waged a strenuous campaign to overcome R´ıos Montt’s disqualification as a presidential candidate on November 12. In mid-February the Constitutional Court, on technical grounds, rejected a series of r´ıosmontista electoral reforms, with the FRG, despite retention of a slim legislative majority, subsequently losing ground on the issue. On August 9, in the wake of a final ruling by electoral authorities, the general’s wife, Teresa Sosa DE R´IOS, requested

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inscription as the FRG candidate for the November poll, but she was also rejected on constitutional grounds a week later. On August 22 the URNG announced a temporary cease-fire to facilitate electoral participation, while declining to endorse any of the contestants. After failing to win a majority in presidential balloting on November 12, 1995, the PAN’s ´ Irigoyen narrowly deAlvaro Enrique ARZU feated the FRG’s Alfonso PORTILLO Cabrera in a second-round vote on January 7, 1996. Earlier, the PAN had secured outright control of the National Congress by winning 43 of its 80 seats. Skirmishes with the URNG resumed only two days after Arz´u’s inauguration on January 14, 1996. Talks with rebel leaders did, however, resume in Oslo on February 6 and in Rome on February 12. Two weeks later the president, in a bold move, traveled to Mexico for a secret meeting with URNG representatives. The action led to a cease-fire on March 20 and formal negotiations that yielded an agreement on socioeconomic and agrarian affairs on May 6. Earlier, the Guatemalan defense minister, Gen. Julio BALCONI Turcios, had declared that the conflict was over, while the president of the government’s peace commission, Presidency Secretary Gustavo PORRAS, expressed his confidence that a definitive peace agreement would be signed by mid-September. However, such a target became increasingly problematic because of heightened hard-line activity within the military by a group styling itself Reclaiming the Guatemalan Army (PREGULA), which on August 12 issued a document charging 16 civilians and 57 military officers with treason for their support of the peace negotiations. On the other hand, tangible progress in negotiations with the rebels culminated in the signing in Mexico City on September 19 of a UN-mediated agreement, under which the Guatemalan military undertook to reduce its 46,000-strong complement by onethird in 1997 and to concentrate on defending the country’s borders rather than on internal security. Another cease-fire on December 4 was followed by a formal peace accord on December 29 that laid

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out procedures for reincorporating the guerrillas into civilian life and legalizing the URNG, while providing amnesty for a wide range of civil rights violations on both sides of the conflict. In a May 16, 1999, referendum, an extremely low turnout of voters (18 percent) rejected about 50 constitutional reforms mandated, in large part, by the 1996 accord. As a result, completion of the peace process was substantially imperiled. Earlier, on February 26, an independent Historical Clarification Commission that had been established with UN backing submitted an unexpectedly severe assessment of the 36-year civil war. In addition to concluding that the military had committed “acts of genocide” against the Mayans, it confirmed earlier reports that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had provided both money and training in support of the government effort. At first-round presidential balloting on November 7, 1999, Alfonso Portillo Cabrera secured 47.8 percent of the vote and went on to defeat the PAN’s Oscar BERGER Perdomo by a two-to-one majority in a December 26 runoff. The FRG also won a majority of legislative seats and 147 of 330 municipal contests. At the subsequent balloting of November 9, 2003, Oscar Berger’s recently organized Grand National Alliance (Gana) won a plurality of 49 legislative seats, while Berger himself led in the presiden´ tial race and went on to defeat Alvaro COLOM Caballeros of the center-left National Unity for Hope (UNE) in a runoff on December 28. Guatemalan presidential politics were complex before and after Oscar Berger’s inauguration in January 2004. In mid-2003 the Constitutional Court ruled that R´ıos Montt could contest the November poll, observing that a ban on persons who had participated in a coup could not be applied retroactively. However, a third-place finish in the first round precluded his involvement in the December runoff. Subsequently, in March 2004 the former president was charged with criminal behavior during disturbances leading up to the Court’s decision, and he was placed under house arrest to prevent his leaving the country. His legal problems notwithstanding, the FRG leader remained

politically influential, and in May one of Gana’s constituent parties withdrew from the governing Alliance because President Berger had sought R´ıos Montt’s support for his fiscal reform program. Meanwhile, Berger’s predecessor, Alfonso Portillo, fled the country in the face of charges that he had participated in embezzlement and money laundering. Gana fell to second place in the September 9, 2007, legislative poll behind the UNE. Concurrently, the UNE’s Colon finished first among some 14 candidates in the first round of presidential balloting. (See headnote.)

Constitution and Government The 1985 constitution, as amended, mandates the direct election for four-year, nonrenewable terms of a president and a vice president, with provision for a runoff between the two leading slates in the absence of a majority. The president is responsible for national defense, security, and naming a cabinet. Legislative power is vested in a unicameral Congress of 158 members serving four-year terms. The 13 members of the Supreme Court are selected by the Congress, with the president of the Court supervising the judiciary throughout the country; the Supreme Court head also presides over a separate Constitutional Court. Local administration includes 21 departments and the municipality of Guatemala City, each headed by a governor appointed by the president. In December 1986 Congress approved legislation organizing the departments into eight regions.

Foreign Relations The principal focus of Guatemalan foreign affairs has long been its claim to Belize (formerly British Honduras), which became independent in 1981. Guatemalan intransigence in the matter not only delayed Belizean independence but adversely affected relations with the United Kingdom, which dispatched military reinforcements to the area in 1975 after receiving reports that Guatemala was massing troops at the border. Despite talks in 1975 and 1976 and a joint commitment in 1977 to a

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“quick, just, and honorable solution” to the controversy, no agreement was reached. Thus, when the United Kingdom granted independence to Belize in September 1981 the Lucas Garc´ıa government severed all diplomatic ties with London and appealed unsuccessfully to the UN Security Council to intervene. In August 1984 representatives of the three leading groups offering presidential candidates for the forthcoming election met in Washington, D.C., with U.S. officials to formulate a policy that would permit formal recognition of Belize and withdrawal of the British “trip wire” force. While no immediate results were forthcoming, the conciliatory posture was continued by the Cerezo Ar´evalo administration, and direct discussions were held with Belizean representatives in Miami, Florida, in 1987. Meanwhile, consular relations with the United Kingdom were resumed in August 1986, with full diplomatic ties restored the following January. In May 1990 tension with Belize again flared after it was revealed that Guatemalan agricultural workers had unknowingly planted crops across the border in Belize’s Toledo district. The incident prompted a meeting between President Cerezo and Belizean Prime Minister George Cadle PRICE on the Honduran island of Roat´an on July 9, although settlement of the lengthy impasse did not occur until the installation of President Serrano in January 1991. In mid-February Serrano asserted that “Belize has the recognition of the international community” and seven months later overruled his foreign minister (who resigned over the issue) by extending diplomatic recognition to the country. Amid continued domestic controversy the Guatemalan Constitutional Court ruled by a narrow margin in November 1992 that the recognition of Belize was valid, subject to approval by a popular referendum. Belize was not a major issue during the de ´ Le´on Carpio administration. However, Alvaro Arz´u revived Guatemala’s claim to Belizean territory, while insisting that he was committed to reaching a peaceful settlement. Concurrently, his newly installed foreign minister, Eduardo STEIN, indicated that he was weighing the rela-

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tive benefits of further negotiations or international arbitration. In June 1999 a Guatemalan peasant who had apparently strayed across the border was killed by a Belizean military patrol. In October, Belizean authorities arrested four Guatemalans on murder and weapons charges and in February 2000, after another Guatemalan farmer had been killed, Guatemala arrested three Belizean soldiers and a police officer. Insisting that the seizure had occurred on its side of the border, Belize branded the action as a “kidnapping” and withdrew from further talks with its neighbor until the four had been released. A July meeting between Foreign Minister Gabriel ORELLANA Rojas and Belizean Prime Minister Said MUSA led to an agreement on a mechanism for resolving further border and territorial disputes, but incidents involving Guatemalan peasant squatters continued into mid2001. Agreement was reached in September 2002 on the deployment of Organization of American States (OAS) observers to the disputed area pending the holding of referenda on the issue in the two countries. However, the accord was repudiated by Guatemala in August 2003, and in May 2004 new discussions were launched at OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C., on finding an “equitable and permanent solution” to the longstanding controversy. The talks yielded an agreement in early 2006 to invite a “recognized expert on the Law of the Sea” to help settle maritime aspects of the dispute. Generally cordial relations with the United States yielded crucial military and other aid that supported relatively successful counterinsurgency efforts during the late 1960s. Subsequently, however, the United States evidenced concern over the diminishing effectiveness of such assistance in a context of increased polarization between right and left. In March 1977 Guatemala repudiated U.S. military support after the Carter administration had announced that human rights considerations would be used in setting allocation levels. Although military and economic assistance was resumed under the Reagan administration, all aid (except for cash sales) was suspended by Congress in November 1983 following publication of the Kissinger

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Commission report on Central America, which attributed thousands of recent civilian deaths to “the brutal behavior of the security forces.” The program was again reinstituted in mid-1984, although Guatemalan officials complained that “the most important country in Central America” was receiving a fraction of the aid given to Honduras and El Salvador because of its posture of neutrality in intraregional conflicts. In December 1990 the U.S. Congress imposed a new ban on military assistance and in June 1991 extended it to most categories of economic aid, pending evidence of “progress [in] eliminating human rights violations and in investigating and bringing to trial those responsible for major human rights cases.” In May 1993 the United States joined other foreign governments in condemning Serrano’s bid for full power and helped set in motion OAS procedures that may have influenced the military’s about-face in the matter. In August 1994, a week before leaving office, Panamanian President Guillermo Endara rejected a request for the extradition of Serrano El´ıas, on the ground that the accusations against the former Guatemalan chief executive were political in nature. Endara’s decision was upheld by his successor, Ernesto P´erez Balladares, whose September 1 inauguration was boycotted by his Guatemalan counterpart. A third extradition request was rejected by Panama in February 1998. On September 19, 1994, the UN General Assembly announced the establishment of a Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA). The Mission began its work on November 21 with a staff of 200 foreign human rights observers, 60 police officers, and 10 military officers to monitor compliance with the human rights agreement signed by the government and the URNG on March 29. However, the level of violence continued, prompting MINUGUA to warn in late 2002 of a breakdown of law and order in several regions of the country. Meanwhile, drug trafficking continued unabated, and in early 2003 the United States “decertified” Guatemala for having “failed demonstrably” to meet its obligations under international counter-narcotics agreements.

Despite widespread opposition, Congress approved the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States on March 10, 2005, by a vote of 126–12. Entering into force on July 1, 2006, CAFTA eliminated customs tariffs on a number of goods and created clear enforceable regulations for all aspects of cross-border trade, including investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, electronic commerce, and the use of sanitation to protect public health. In late 2005 the government was obliged to cooperate with U.S. authorities in arranging for Adan CASTILLO, the head of its Anti-Narcotics Analysis and Investigation Service (SAIA), to attend an antidrug training course in Virginia, where he was arrested for complicity in cocaine trafficking. The Berger administration pledged to cooperate with representatives of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in overhauling the SAIA. Calls to regulate the movement of drugs in the Americas increased in 2007, as did demands for improved regulation of Guatemala’s private adoption agents, due to the high number of Guatemalan babies being adopted by U.S. couples. While the government attempted to increase the transparency of the process, critics, and some parents, charged that children were being unlawfully taken from their parents to meet U.S. demand. Meanwhile, the extradition process of former president Alfonso Portillo, who had been in exile in Mexico for over three years, was suspended in mid-2007 when Mexican courts declared that Guatemala’s extradition request was “irregular.”

Current Issues In the wake of his 2003 election, President Berger reportedly had an exceptionally high approval rating of 89 percent. However, by early 2006 it had plummeted to a mere 25 percent, in large part because of a soaring crime rate by socalled mara street gangs that had become powerful enough to challenge the drug cartels for control of the retail drug trade. The impact of gang violence was illustrated by Guatemala’s murder rate,

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which at 47 per 100,000 was second only to Colombia in 2006. Women made up an increasing proportion of the victims, often suffering torture and sexual abuse by gang members before their deaths. Guatemalans partly attributed the large proportion of unpunished criminals to an overwhelmed police force, which was often subject to corruption. Politicians, as well as members of the public, were subject to increased violence in the run-up to the September 2007 elections. In February three Salvadoran members of the Central American Parliament (based in Guatemala) and their driver were murdered. Four police officers were arrested as suspects and shot in their cells a few days later, forcing the resignation of the interior minister. Subsequently, two party coordinators for the center-left UNE were murdered by hired killers after leaving a political gathering near the border with El Salvador in April. Vice President Stein and the Catholic Church warned in early 2007 that organized crime could potentially impact the upcoming elections. Two additional political murders were perpetrated by the end of May: a mayoral candidate backed by the Encounter for Guatemala party and an activist for the FRG were killed in two separate attacks. Public frustration was evidenced by growing support for a revived death penalty, promoted by UNE presi´ dential candidate Alvaro Colom, as well as PP pres´ idential candidate Otto PEREZ Molina. P´erez’s slogan, “A strong hand now!” (mano dura) highlighted crime control as the centerpiece of his platform. Likewise, Colom promised to strengthen the attorney general’s office and the National Civil Police (Polic´ıa Nacional Civil) to curtail the violence that prompted public disenchantment with traditional parties. Guatemala has not returned a ruling party to power since 1986, and electoral returns on September 9, 2007, followed that pattern. Its support undercut by the public’s apparent perception that the ruling alliance was unable to curb corruption, violence, and poverty, Gana lost its top position in the legislature, coming second to UNE, while its presidential candidate, Alejandro GIAMMATTEI, failed to advance beyond the first round. The two

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remaining candidates, Colom and P´erez, had electoral strengths in rural areas and Guatemala City, respectively. Colom’s emphasis on social justice resonated in regions plagued with unemployment, while P´erez’s tough stance on crime appealed to residents hounded by violence in a city where the murder rate is even higher than in the country overall. (See headnote.)

Political Parties and Groups Political power in Guatemala has traditionally been personal rather than institutional, with parties developing in response to the needs or ambitions of particular leaders. In a late 2005 survey, a remarkable 84.3 percent of respondents said they sympathized with none of them. Under current law, parties must maintain a minimum vote share to retain legal status; however, unrecognized groups may, upon petition by a sufficient number of signatories, secure recognition before any given election. In 1995, 14 of 23 participating groups failed to qualify for continued registration. Of the 9 that survived, only incoming President Arz´u’s PAN, R´ıos Montt’s FRG, and the left-of-center FDNG were viewed as fully viable formations. The leading parties in 1999 were the FRG and PAN, with the recently formed New Nation Alliance (ANN) a distant third. In 2003 Oscar Berger’s Grand National Alliance (Gana) led a field that included Alvaro Colom’s National Union for Hope (UNE), the FRG, PAN, and the ANN.

Legislative Groups (Following the September 2007 Elections) National Union for Hope (Uni´on Nacional de Esperanza—UNE). The center-left UNE, also known as the National Unity for Hope (Unidad Nacional de Esperanza), was launched in 2001 ´ by PAN secessionist Alvaro Colom Caballeros. It won 30 congressional seats in 2003, with Colom, runner-up in the first-round presidential balloting, losing to Berger in the second round on December 28. Colom, who promised an improved justice system and increased social expenditures if elected,

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finished first in the first round of presidential balloting in September 2007 with 28.3 percent of the vote. The UNE also led all parties in the concurrent legislative poll by winning 48 seats. ´ Leaders: Alvaro COLOM Caballeros (2003 and 2007 presidential candidate), Dr. Rafael ESPADA (2007 vice-presidential candidate). Grand National Alliance (Gran Alianza Nacional—Gana). Launched in early 2003, Gana is a center-right grouping that presidential aspirant Oscar Berger joined at midyear following his defection from PAN (below). Its founding parties included the Guatemalan Reform Party (Partido Reformador Guatemalteco—PRG), also known as the Reform Movement (Movimiento Reformador—MR), and the Party of National Solidarity (Partido Solidaridad Nacional—PSN), as well as the PP (below). Gana secured a plurality of 49 seats in the November 2003 legislative elections, and Berger won the December presidential runoff to secure political dominance for the group. However, Gana lost 7 of its legislative seats when the PP withdrew in May 2004 to protest an apparent rapprochement between President Berger and former president R´ıos Montt. Following a campaign season marked by violence, Gana lost its legislative plurality in the September 2007 balloting, finishing second to the UNE with 37 seats. In addition, Gana’s candidate, Alejandro Giammattei, finished third in the concurrent first round of presidential elections with 17.1 percent of the vote. Several Gana mayors re´ portedly backed UNE candidate Alvaro Colom for the upcoming presidential runoff, although the party refrained from formally endorsing either candidate. Leaders: Oscar Jos´e BERGER Perdomo (President of the Republic), Eduardo STEIN Barillas (Vice President of the Republic), Alejandro GIAMMATTEI (2007 presidential candidate). Patriotic Party (Partido Patriota—PP). Founded in 2002 and initially part of Gana, the PP withdrew from the presidential alliance in May 2004. One of its most prominent members, Rodolfo CASTELLANOS, was murdered in March 2006. The party continued to advance,

however, with its 2007 presidential candidate, Otto P´erez Molina, responding to public discontent over violence by promising to expand the police force and revive the death penalty if elected. The PP won 30 seats in the September 2007 legislative election, and P´erez Molina finished second in the concurrent first round of presidential balloting with 23.6 percent of the vote. Aura Marina SALAZAR Cutzal (secretary of the PP’s congressional delegation and an assistant to P´erez Molina) and her bodyguard were shot in early October 2007. P´erez Molina blamed organized crime for the killings. ´ Leader: Otto PEREZ Molina (Secretary General and presidential candidate). Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco—FRG). A right-wing formation launched in 1988, the FRG participated in R´ıos Montt’s No-Venta coalition for the 1990 campaign. Deregistered thereafter, its legislative members joined the government grouping as an independent bloc that was awarded the leadership of four congressional commissions. In late 1993 the party failed to secure legislative approval for revocation of the constitutional provision banning heads of state who had participated in coups from running for the presidency. It registered a dramatic victory in the 1994 legislative contest, winning 32 seats, with R´ıos Montt subsequently being named congressional president. In 1999 the party won the presidency and a majority of congressional seats. However, by mid2001 factional differences erupted, with supporters of President Portillo aligned against those loyal to R´ıos Montt and Vice President Reyes L´opez. During 2003, allegations of corruption were made against Portillo, and in early 2004 he left the country. The party received 15 legislative seats in the September 2007 elections and its presidential ´ finished fifth in the candidate, Luis RABBE, concurrent first round of presidential balloting with 7.3 percent of the vote. Leaders: Gen. (Ret) Jos´e Efra´ın R´IOS Montt (Former President of the Republic, Former President of Congress, and 2003 presidential candidate),

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Juan Francisco REYES L´opez (Former Vice President of the Republic), Luis RABBE´ (2007 presidential candidate). Unionist Party (Partido Unionista—PU). The PU was organized by former president Alvaro Arz´u in the wake of inconsistent support for his policies within the PAN. Subsequently eclipsed within the new party by leftist-oriented Gustavo PORRAS, Arz´u eventually regained control and succeeded in having Guatemala City’s center-right mayor, Fritz GARC´IA-Gallout, named the PU secretary general and standard-bearer for the 2003 presidential campaign. Garc´ıa-Gallout placed fifth in the November poll, with a 3.0 percent vote share. In 2007 Garc´ıaGallout again finished out of the running in the first round of presidential balloting with 2.9 percent of the vote. ´ Irigoyen (ForLeaders: Alvaro Enrique ARZU mer President of the Republic), Fritz GARC´IAGallout (Former Mayor of Guatemala City and presidential candidate in 2003 and 2007). Center of Social Action (Centro de Acci´on Social—CASA). The CASA was launched in 2003 to represent the interests of indigenous peoples. The CASA won five legislative seats during the September 2007 parliamentary poll, and its presidential candidate, Eduardo Suger, finished fourth in the concurrent first round of presidential balloting with 7.4 percent of the vote. Leaders: Rigoberto QUEME´ Chay, Eduardo SUGER (2007 presidential candidate). Union of Nationalist Change (Union del Cambio Nacionalista—UCN). The UCN advocates a constitutional, democratic, and republican regime focused on uniting the country. The party, whose slogan was “better times” (tiempos mejores), campaigned for the September 2007 elections on a platform that pledged to advance women’s and workers’ rights and to limit corruption and social and economic polarization. The UCN presidential candidate, Mario Estrada, finished sixth in the first round of the 2007 presidential balloting with 3.2 percent of the vote. Leaders: Sydney Shaw ARRIVILLAGA (Secretary General), Mario Amilcar ESTRADA Orellana (2007 presidential candidate).

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National Advancement Party (Partido de Avanzada Nacional—PAN). PAN was organized before the 1990 election by the former mayor of Guatemala City, Alvaro Arz´u Irigoyen, who placed fourth in the presidential poll and entered the Serrano El´ıas cabinet as foreign minister. Arz´u resigned from his ministerial post in September 1991 after disagreeing with the president over recognition of Belize, thereby shattering the existing governmental coalition. The party was runner-up to the FRG in 1994, winning 24 congressional seats; it secured a legislative majority in 1995, with Arz´u winning the presidency in second-round balloting on January 7, 1996. By late 1997 three factions were reported to have emerged within the party: one led by congressional president Arabello Castro and backing Interior Minister Rodolfo MENDOZA for president in 1999, one united behind Guatemala City mayor Oscar Berger, and one loyal to President Arz´u. Berger won the party’s presidential nomination in early 1999 but was severely beaten by the FRG’s Portillo Cabrera in the November runoff. Dissension within the party led 15 PAN deputies to announce in June 2000 that they intended to sit as independents. At the time, the party was severely split by a leadership struggle between two factions—one loyal to former president Arz´u and Rodolfo Mendoza, and the other headed by Oscar Berger and Leonel L´opez, the recently elected secretary general. A principal dispute concerned L´opez’s support for an FRG bill that permitted the reelection of R´ıos Montt as legislative president. Berger defeated L´opez for Pan’s 2003 presidential nomination; the two then had a falling out, with Berger and nine other legislators leaving the party to join Gana. L´opez thereupon became the PAN standard-bearer, placing fourth in November’s first-round balloting. The original 2007 presidential candidate was Francisco ARREDONDO. However, Arrendondo refused to accept the PAN nominee for vice president, Oscar Rodolfo Casta˜neda, as his running mate. The party executive ultimately removed Arredondo from the ballot, nominating Casta˜neda for president. Casta˜neda finished ninth in the first

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round of the presidential poll with 2.6 percent of the vote. ´ Leaders: Leonel Eliseo LOPEZ Rodas (2003 presidential candidate), Rub´en Dar´ıo MORALES ˜ (Secretary General), Oscar Rodolfo CASTANEDA (2007 presidential candidate). Encounter for Guatemala (Encuentro por Guatemala—EG). The left-wing EG was organized in 2006 by Nineth Varenca Montenegro Cottom (a member of Congress) and C´esar Montes, who had recently resigned from the ANN along with several other legislators. In February 2007 the EG reached an agreement with the indigenous grouping Winaq (below) that guaranteed Winaq a 50 percent share of the EG’s legislative and mayoral candidates for the September election. Winaq leader Rigoberta Mench´u finished seventh as the EG’s candidate in the first round of the 2007 presidential balloting with 3.1 percent of the vote. Leaders: Nineth Varenca MONTENEGRO Cottom (General Secretary), C´esar MONTES, ´ (2007 presidential candiRigoberta MENCHU date). Winaq. An indigenous grouping founded in 2005 by Rigoberta Mench´u, the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Winaq gets its name from a Mayan word that means “the wholeness of the human being.” Since Winaq is not recognized as a party, Mench´u represents the EG. ´ Leader: Rigoberta MENCHU. Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca—URNG). The URNG was formed in January 1981 as a largely exile-based umbrella organization designed to provide various guerrilla groups with a unified military command, which was never fully implemented. Its political wing, led by Ra´ul MOLINA Mej´ıa, was styled the United Representation of the Guatemalan Opposition (Representaci´on Unitaria de la Oposici´on Guatemalteca—RUOG). In October 1987 inconclusive “low-level” talks aimed at seeking “peace and democracy” were held with government representatives in Madrid, Spain.

A significant increase in URNG activity was reported during late 1989 and early 1990, while another inconclusive round of talks with government representatives was held in Oslo, Norway, during March and April 1990. Seemingly more fruitful discussions were held in Madrid in June, with the URNG and political party representatives agreeing on the need for elections to a constituent assembly in 1991 in which the guerrillas could participate. After having urged Guatemalans since its formation not to participate in elections, the URNG appealed in May 1995 for a voter turnout in favor of “alternative candidates.” The organization did not, however, indicate who the candidates in question might be. A definitive cease-fire was signed by government and URNG representatives in Oslo on December 4, 1996, paving the way for conclusion of a formal peace accord on December 29 (see Political background, above). The URNG’s longtime leader and former secretary general, Ricardo Arnoldo RAM´IREZ de Le´on ´ (a.k.a. Rolando MORAN), died on September 4, 1998. On October 19 the URNG formally filed for registration as a legal party. The URNG participated in the 1999 and 2003 balloting as a member of the ANN (below), but that alliance appeared to have splintered by 2007 when the URNG won two seats in the September legislative poll, while Miguel Angel Sandoval won 2.1 percent of the vote as the URNG candidate in the concurrent first round of presidential balloting. Leaders: Alba Estela MALDONADO Guevara (Secretary General), Miguel Angel SANDOVAL (2007 presidential candidate), Rodrigo ASTURIAS Amado (2003 presidential candidate). Democratic Union (Uni´on Democr´atica— UD). Launched before the 1994 election, the UD campaigned vigorously as a party “without a past.” However, despite a nationwide campaign that relied heavily on television ads, it secured only one congressional seat in both 1995 and 1999, in coalition, in the latter occasion, with the Greens (LOV), below. The party won two seats in 2003, while supporting Gana’s Berger for the presidency.

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The UD secured one legislative seat in the September 2007 elections, while its presidential candidate, Manuel Conde Orellana, received 0.8 percent in the first round of presidential balloting. Leaders: Gen. Rodolfo Ernesto (Fito) PAIZ Andrade (Secretary General), Manuel CONDE Orellana (2007 presidential candidate).

Other Parties New Nation Alliance (Alianza Nueva Nacio´ n—ANN). The ANN was formed in February 1999 as a left-of-center electoral alliance of the URNG, DIA, and a number of smaller groups. Its 2003 presidential candidate, Rigoberto QUEME, withdrew in September after an internal dispute over candidacies, prompting its principal components, the URNG and DIA, to compete separately from the party in the presidential race. The Alliance won seven legislative seats in 2003, two less than in 1999. The ANN presidential candidate, Pablo MONSANTO, received 0.6 percent of votes in the initial round of the 2007 presidential contest, as the URNG and DIA each presented its own candidate. Leaders: Alfonso BAUER Paiz (Secretary General), Pablo MONSANTO (2007 presidential candidate). Authentic Integral Development (Desarollo Integral Aut´entico—DIA). The DIA was formerly known as the Authentic Comprehensive Development (Desarollo Inclusivo Aut´entico). The party’s 2007 presidential candidate, H´ector Rosales,was shot at while campaigning In August in a rural area close to the town of Cunen. Rosales won 0.6 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential poll. Leaders: Jorge Luis ORTEGA Torres (Secretary General), H´ector ROSALES (2007 presidential candidate). Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca— PDCG). Founded in 1955 as a centrist party of liberal and reformist views, the PDCG secured a majority of 51 congressional seats in 1985, with its longtime leader, Vinicio Cerezo Ar´evalo, defeating the UCN’s Carpio Nicolle in a runoff for

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the presidency. Its 1990 standard-bearer, Alfonso Cabrera Hidalgo, withdrew from candidacy in late October, ostensibly because of failing health, but was nonetheless credited with a third-place finish. Its congressional representation fell from 28 to 13 seats in 1994. In April 1995 the PDCG formed an electoral coalition styled the National Alliance (Alianza Nacional—AN) with the UCN and PSD, below. With the formation of the AN, nine PDCG members of Congress resigned their party memberships and set themselves up as an independent bloc to protest an Alliance decision to support the presidential candidacy of Andrade D´ıaz Dur´an. The party’s representation dwindled to three congressional seats in 1995 and in 1999 fell to two, both of which were retained in 2003. After the September 2007 legislative election, the party lost its registration due to its failure to meet the vote threshold. Meanwhile, its presidential candidate, Vinicio Cerezo Bland´on, won 0.8 percent of votes in the first round of balloting. Leaders: Marco Vinicio CEREZO Ar´evalo (Former President of the Republic), Ana Catalina Reyes SOBERANIS (Former President of the National Congress), Dr. Francisco VILLAGRAN Kramer (Former Vice President of the Republic and ´ Leader of the right-wing faction), Ren´e DE LEON Schlotter (Leader of the left-wing faction), Vinicio CEREZO Bland´on (2007 presidential candidate), Jacobo ARBENZ (2003 presidential candidate). National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberaci´on Nacional—MLN). The origins of the MLN date back to the “Liberation Movement” headed by Carlos Castillo Armas, which ousted the Arbenz government in 1954. Reflecting its early anti-Communist orientation, it favors close ties with the Roman Catholic Church but disclaims a reactionary philosophy, despite links to El Salvador’s Nationalist Republican Alliance (Arena). MLN leader Mario Augusto SANDOVAL Alarc´on was officially declared the runner-up in the 1982 presidential balloting; in 1984 the party formed an alliance with the CAN (below), which obtained a plurality in the Constituent Assembly. In 1990

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it campaigned with the National Advancement Front (Frente de Avance Nacional—FAN) in an alliance that obtained four congressional seats. The party secured two seats in its own right in 1994, none thereafter. Mario Sandoval Alarc´on died in April 2003. Leader: Ulysses Charles DENT Weissenberg (Secretary General). Nationalist Authentic Central (Central Aut´entica Nacionalista—CAN). Formerly known as the Organized Aranista Central (Central Aranista Organizada—CAO), the CAN is a right-wing group that emerged as a significant political force by electing 35 mayors—more than any other party—in the municipal balloting in April 1980, although running a distant fourth in the 1982 presidential race. It contested the 1984 Assembly election in coalition with the MLN; a single congressional seat won in 1985 was lost in 1995. Leaders: Lionel SISNIEGA (1995 presidential candidate), H´ector MAYORA Dawe, Jorge Roberto ARANA Espa˜na (Secretary General). Social Democrat Party (Partido Social Dem´ocrata—PSD). Formerly known as the Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democr´atico), the PSD is a center-left grouping affiliated with the Socialist International, which had gone underground in 1979 after the murder of many of its leaders. The PSD did not participate in the 1984 Assembly election. It won two congressional seats in 1985 and one in coalition with the Popular Five Alliance (Alianza Popular Cinco—AP5) in 1990. In a largely futile effort to appease the unions, PSD Secretary General Mario ´ SOLORZANO Mart´ınez was named labor minister by Serrano El´ıas. Hurt by its 1991–1993 alliance with the Serrano El´ıas government, the PSD failed to secure legislative representation in 1994 or thereafter. Leader: Sergio Alejandro PEREZ Cruz (Secretary General). New Guatemala Democratic Front (Frente Democr´atico Nueva Guatemala—FDNG). The

FDNG was launched in July 1995 as a progressive formation designed to unite a broad range of political movements, parties, and individuals around a common program. However, a number of its founding groups, including the PSC and URS, along with a number of PDCG and PSD dissidents, soon withdrew, virtually annihilating its electoral prospects. One of the Front’s leaders, Luis YAT Zapeta, was assassinated in May 1998 and another, Roberto GONZALEZ, met the same fate in May 1999. The FDNG was a founding member of the New Nation Alliance (ANN) in February 1999 but withdrew in July because of a dispute over congressional candidacies. ´ Leaders: Jorge Luis GONZALEZ del Valle (1995 presidential candidate), Juan Le´on ALVARADO (1995 vice-presidential candidate), Rafael ARRIAGA Mart´ınez (Secretary General). The Green Organization (La Organizaci´on Verde—LOV). LOV is a coalition of several small groups, including the Democratic Union (Uni´on Democr´atica—UD) and the Social Democratic Unity (Unidad Social Dem´ocrata—USD). Leaders: Rodolfo ROSALES Garc´ıa Salas (2003 presidential candidate), Marcos Emilio RECINOS Alvarez (Secretary General).

Clandestine Right-Wing Groups Anti-Communist Secret Army (Ej´ercito Secreto Anticomunista—ESA). A right-wing group presumed to be an outgrowth of the former White Hand (La Mano Blanca), the ESA is reportedly linked to the more extreme faction of the MLN. It is known to maintain a “death list” of numerous left-wing activists and has been prominently involved in the escalation of political assassinations that began in late 1978. In early 1980 it threatened to kill 20 leftists for each assassination of a rightist and in mid-1988 issued a communiqu´e stating it would ensure that “Communist” journalists “either leave the country or die inside of it.”

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Cabinet As of July 1, 2007 see headnote President Vice President

Oscar Berger Perdomo Eduardo Stein Barillas

Ministers Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Communications and Public Works Culture Defense Economy Education Energy and Mines Environment and Natural Resources Foreign Affairs Interior Labor and Social Security Public Finance Public Health and Social Welfare Chair, Human Rights Committee Head, Peace Secretariat

Bernardo de Jes´us L´opez Figueroa Francisco Unda Toriello Manuel de Jes´us Salazar Tetzahuic Ronaldo Cecilio Leiva Rodriguez ´ Luis Oscar Estrada Burgos Maria del Carmen Ace˜na Villacorta de Fuentes [f] Carmen Urizar [f] Juan Mario Dary Fuentes Gert Rosenthal Koenigsberger Adela Camacho de Torrebiarte [f] Rodolfo Colmenares Arandi Hugo Beteta Alfredo Antonio Privado Medrano Frank La Rue Norma Quixt´an Argueta [f]

[f] = female

Other extreme right-wing formations include the Squadron of Death (Escuadr´on de la Muerte—EM) and the Officers of the Mountain (Oficiales de la Monta˜na—OdeM).

Legislature Guatemala’s legislative body is a unicameral Congress of the Republic (Congreso de la Rep´ublica) that currently consists of 158 members elected for four-year terms. According to initial results, in the most recent election of September 9, 2007, the National Union for Hope won 48 seats; the Grand National Alliance, 37; the Patriotic Party, 30; the Guatemalan Republican Front, 15; the Unionist Party, 8; the Center of Social Action, 5; the Union of Nationalist Change, 4; the Encounter for Guatemala, 4; the National Advancement Party,

4; the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, 2; and the Democratic Union, 1. ´ President: Jorge MENDEZ Herbruger.

Communications In mid-1991 the Central America Report cited an international team of observers to the effect that in Guatemala “freedom of expression is severely restricted by direct violence targeted at journalists and by an ever-present climate of fear and repression.” The study indicated that from 1978 to 1985, 47 Guatemala journalists had been killed and that by 1983 at least 100 had been forced into exile. In August 1991 the Mexican news agency Notimex closed its Guatemala City bureau after its offices had been ransacked, while the Britishbased Reuters announced the temporary closure

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of its facility because of a lack of security. Two months earlier La Epoca, a left-wing weekly whose premises had been fire-bombed as it commenced publication in early 1988, had been shut down in the wake of another such attack.

Press The following newspapers, all published in Guatemala City, are privately owned Spanish dailies, unless otherwise noted: Prensa Libre (110,000); Siglo Veintiuno (56,000); La Hora (18,000); Diario de Centroam´erica (15,000), official government publication; Central America Report, English-language weekly.

News Agencies The only domestic facility is the indepe ndent Inforpress Centroamericana; a number of foreign agencies maintain bureaus in Guatemala City.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is supervised by the government’s Direcci´on General de Radiodifusi´on y Televisi´on

Nacional. Of the approximately 140 radio stations, 5 are government-operated and 6 offer educational programming. There are 6 commercial television stations, in addition to a government educational outlet, a religious station, and a station devoted largely to music and entertainment. In 2005 for every 1,000 Guatemalan residents there were 18 personal computers and 79 internet users. In that same year there were 358 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Jos´e Guillermo CASTILLO Villacorta U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala: James M. DERHAM Permanent Representative to the UN: Jorge ´ SKINNER-KLEE IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, BCIE, CACM, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WCO, WTO

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a reversal of the trend began. Since 1975 Guyana has experienced severe economic difficulty, with falling export prices generating large balance-ofpayments deficits and shortages of basic commodities creating a vast underground economy supported by widespread smuggling. In 1986 Prime Minister Hoyte attempted to alleviate the situation by launching a “reconstructive” liberalization program that departed significantly from his predecessor’s socialist policies. Despite a 70 percent currency devaluation in April 1989 and the removal of most trade restrictions and price controls, lengthy talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) failed to yield agreement on standby and structural

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Noted for its dense forests and many rivers, Guyana, whose name is an Amerindian word meaning “land of many waters,” is situated on the northern Atlantic coast of South America, with Venezuela and Suriname on the west and east, respectively, and Brazil on the south and southwest. Its inhabitants are concentrated along a narrow coastal belt, the only area suitable for intensive agriculture. Most of their ancestors arrived during the centuries of British colonial rule: African slaves before 1800 and East Indian plantation workers during the nineteenth century. At present about 50 percent of the population is of East Indian origin, mainly engaged in agriculture; 35 percent is African, encompassing most civil servants; 7 percent is of mixed blood; 7 percent is indigenous Indian; and the remainder is European or Chinese. The principal religions are Christianity (50 percent), Hinduism (30 percent), and Islam (15 percent). In 1997, 33 percent of adult women were in the paid labor force, mainly concentrated in agriculture and cottage industry; female participation in national government was close to 20 percent, with substantially less representation at the local level. The Guyanese economy is based primarily on agriculture, with sugar and rice being the principal crops, although exploitation of mineral resources, including bauxite, alumina, gold, diamonds, and manganese, has become increasingly important. Bauxite mining and the sugar industry were nationalized in the mid-1970s and about 80 percent of the country’s productive capacity was within the public sector (with cooperatives accounting for another 10 percent) by 1982, when

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adjustment facilities until mid-1990, in the wake of another devaluation of 26.7 percent. For 1990 as a whole, the GDP declined by 3.9 percent, as contrasted with a targeted increase of 3.1 percent, and in early 1991 a further devaluation of 55.8 percent was announced. A year later it was reported that unemployment stood at 13.5 percent and inflation at 75 percent, although a 6.1 percent increase in real GDP during 1991 represented the indicator’s first gain since 1984. GDP continued to grow at an average of 6 percent through 1997, followed by a 1.8 percent decline triggered by bad weather and export contraction in 1998. GDP rose by 3.0 percent in 1999 but displayed little or negative growth thereafter until 2004, when a marginal increase was recorded. It declined again by 2.8 percent in 2005 before rising (by government report) to 4.7 percent in 2006.

Government and Politics Political Background Guyana’s political history during its first decade of independence was largely determined by an unusual ethnic structure resulting from the importation of African slaves and, subsequently, of East Indian laborers to work on the sugar plantations during the centuries of British colonial rule. The resultant cleavage between urbanized Africans and rural East Indians was reflected politically in an intense rivalry between the Communist-led, East Indian–supported People’s Progressive Party (PPP) of Dr. Cheddi B. JAGAN and the African-backed People’s National Congress (PNC), led by Linden Forbes BURNHAM, a former PPP leader who broke with Jagan in 1955. Jagan’s party, with a numerically larger constituency, came to power in British Guiana under a colonial constitution introduced in 1953 but was removed from office later that year because of British concern over a veer toward communism. Jagan’s party again emerged victorious in general elections held in 1957 and 1961 but was defeated in 1964, when the introduction of a new system of proportional representation made possible the formation of a coalition gov-

ernment embracing Burnham’s PNC and the small United Force (TUF). In spite of earlier internal disorders, Burnham’s administration successfully negotiated with the British for independence and remained in office following the achievement of full Commonwealth status in 1966 and the adoption of a republican form of government in 1970. However, the PNC’s continued dominance in 1968 and 1973 generated widespread controversy. Contributing to opposition charges of fraud and withdrawal of the TUF from the governing coalition was a revision of the electoral law to allow Guyanese residing overseas to vote. The 1970 redesignation of Guyana as a “cooperative republic” attested to the ruling party’s increased commitment to socialism. In his “Declaration of Sophia,” published on the tenth anniversary of his premiership, Burnham referred to the PNC as a “socialist party” committed to government land control, the nationalization of foreign business interests, and a domestic economy of three sectors, “public, cooperative, and private,” with the cooperative sector predominant. He also called for revision of the nation’s constitution to expunge the “beliefs and ideology of our former imperialist masters.” Subsequently, in a referendum held July 10, 1978, more than 97 percent of those voting were said to have approved extension of the legislature’s term beyond its July 23 expiration date so that the PNC-dominated National Assembly could serve, additionally, as a constituent body to consider a series of drastic changes in the nation’s basic law. World attention focused on Guyana in late 1978 with the bizarre suicide-murder of more than 900 members of the People’s Temple commune in Jonestown following an investigation by U.S. Representative Leo J. Ryan, whose party was ambushed by cult members as it prepared to enplane at a northwestern airstrip on November 18. Subsequent reports indicated that the Burnham government had been unusually hospitable to a variety of dissident religious sects, including the House of Israel, a 7,000-member group of Black converts to Judaism headed by David HILL (known locally as “Rabbi Washington”).

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Political Status: Formerly the colony of British Guiana; independent member of the Commonwealth since May 26, 1966; under republican regime instituted February 23, 1970; present constitution approved February 11, 1980, with effect from October 6. Area: 83,000 sq. mi. (214,969 sq. km.). Population: 701,704 (1991C); 753,000 (2006E). The 1991 figure (reflecting possible underenumeration) was substantially lower than that of 1980 (758,619). Major Urban Center (metropolitan area, 2003E): GEORGETOWN (231,000). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: Guyana Dollar (market rate November 2, 2007: 204.20 dollars = $1US). President: Bharrat JAGDEO (People’s Progressive Party); sworn in August 11, 1999, to succeed Samuel A. (Sam) HINDS (Civic), who had been elevated from Prime Minister to Provisional President upon the resignation of Janet JAGAN (People’s Progressive Party) for health reasons on August 1; sworn in for a second term on March 31, 2001, following legislative election of March 19; sworn in for a third term on September 2, 2006, following legislative election of August 28. Prime Minister: Samuel Archibald Anthony (Sam) HINDS (Civic); sworn in December 19, 1997, succeeding Janet JAGAN (People’s Progressive Party); reappointed by President Jagdeo on August 11, 1999, April 4, 2001, and on September 4, 2006.

Guyana’s new constitution was declared in effect on October 6, 1980, with Burnham assuming the office of executive president and designating Ptolemy A. REID as prime minister. On December 15, in an election branded by an international team of observers as “fraudulent in every possible respect,” the PNC was credited with an overwhelming popular mandate, and on January 1, 1981, the government was substantially expanded to include five vice presidents and additional ministers. In the wake of worsening fiscal conditions, the regime faced mounting internal and external polit-

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ical challenges, culminating in the arrest by Canadian authorities in December 1983 of six persons, including a member of the Toronto-based rightwing Conservative Party of Guyana, who were charged with plotting to assassinate Burnham and other key officials. A number of subsequent leadership changes included the appointment in August 1984 of Vice President Hugh Desmond HOYTE to succeed the reportedly ailing Reid as first vice president and prime minister. President Burnham died on August 6, 1985, while undergoing surgery in Georgetown, and was succeeded by Hoyte, who was accorded a regular five-year mandate on December 9 in balloting that, as in 1980, yielded allegations of widespread fraud. Elections that should have been held in late 1990 were postponed to permit the compilation of new electoral rolls, with the life of the National Assembly (due to expire on February 2, 1991) being accorded a series of two-month extensions before formal dissolution on September 28. On November 10 President Hoyte announced that the longdelayed balloting would take place on December 16; on November 22, however, he responded to continued domestic and international criticism of the voter registration procedure by again postponing the poll. The action was validated by the Assembly in December after its having been reconvened under a state of emergency decree, with the parliamentary session prolonged to September 30, 1992. The balloting on October 5, 1992, in contrast to its two predecessors, was characterized by a team of 100 foreign observers as largely fair and impartial; the PPP, in alliance with Civic (C), a small social and political group of business owners and professionals, won a majority of the popular vote. Dr. Jagan was installed as president four days later and his party, after lengthy negotiations with TUF and another small formation, the Working People’s Alliance (WPA), secured control of the National Assembly and approval for a government headed by Civic leader Samuel A. (Sam) HINDS. The PPP and its allies won 48 of 65 Neighborhood Democratic Councils (NDCs) and three of six municipalities in local government elections on August 8, 1994. The principal loss was in the

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capital, where 12 of 30 seats were captured by Good and Green Georgetown, a new formation led by former prime minister Hamilton Green, who served a one-year term as the city’s mayor, before being defeated in August 1995, then reelected in 1996. President Jagan suffered a fatal heart attack on March 6, 1997, and was immediately succeeded, for the balance of his term, by Prime Minister Hinds, who also held the post of vice president. On March 17 Hinds appointed his predecessor’s wife, Janet JAGAN, as first vice president and prime minister, additionally naming Agriculture Minister Reepu Daman PERSAUD as second vice president. Mrs. Jagan was named to succeed her husband in the general election of December 15, 1997 (which yielded a largely unchanged distribution of legislative seats), thereafter naming Hinds as first vice president and prime minister, and Bharrat JAGDEO as second vice president. The election generated intense controversy, however, and the PNC did not agree to take up its Assembly seats until mid-1998. Mrs. Jagan resigned for medical reasons on August 1, 1999, and a somewhat complicated scenario ensued. As constitutionally prescribed, Prime Minister Hinds again assumed the presidency on a provisional basis. He then named Jagdeo as first vice president and prime minister and resigned in the latter’s favor. Following his installation as president, Jagdeo reappointed Hinds as prime minister, who proceeded to name a cabinet virtually identical with its predecessor. In January 2001 a Guyanese Supreme Court judge declared the 1997 election null and void because of the introduction of voter identification cards. However, in a March 1 “clarification” the judge ruled that the Jagdeo government was not illegitimate, even though installed under unconstitutional legislation. Shortly thereafter, the issue became moot with the March 19 victory of the PPP/C (characterized by international observers as “basically fair”) and the incumbent’s reinstallation. Jagdeo continued in office following the election of August 28, 2006, at which the PPP/C increased its parliamentary majority by two seats.

Constitution and Government The 1966 constitution established Guyana as a parliamentary member of the Commonwealth under the sovereignty of the British queen. The monarchical structure was abandoned in 1970 in favor of a titular president elected by the National Assembly. The 1980 constitution provided for a president who is selected each time voting occurs (normally every five years) for a new National Assembly. (The successful presidential candidate is the nominee of the party that receives the most votes in the legislative balloting.) The president’s extensive powers include the authority to appoint and dismiss an unspecified number of vice presidents and a prime minister, to dissolve the legislature, and to veto all legislative enactments. The National Assembly includes 53 popularly elected members plus 12 members designated indirectly to represent regional and local interests; its normal term is five years. In an unusual procedure, voters cast their ballots for party slates, with selection of those to enter the assembly being a postelectoral internal party matter. The judicial system consists of ten magistrates’ courts, one for each judicial district, and a Supreme Court, encompassing a High Court and a Court of Appeal; however the National Assembly in November 2004 approved a bill transferring jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as of launching of the Trinidad-based regional body in March 2005. There are elected councils in the country’s ten regions, in addition to municipal administrations in Georgetown and four towns, although the balloting of August 1994 was their first replenishment since 1970. Local councilors elect from their membership a National Congress of Local Democratic Organs, which, together with the National Assembly, constitutes a deliberative body known as the Supreme Congress of the People of Guyana. Constitutional amendments must be approved by the Assembly and, if not endorsed by a twothirds majority, submitted to a popular vote (the

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legislative extensions of 1991 being technically in the form of constitutional amendments carried by the PNC’s [then] overwhelming Assembly majority).

Foreign Relations Guyana’s major foreign policy problems stem from boundary disputes with both its eastern and western neighbors. The disagreement with Suriname centers on the delineation of a riparian boundary between the two countries: Guyana claims that the boundary follows the Corentyne, while Suriname claims it follows the New River. The dispute with Venezuela is the most serious: Venezuela has long claimed all territory west of the Essequibo River, which amounts to more than half of Guyana’s total area (see map). In 1966 the two countries agreed to settle the issue by diplomatic means, while in 1970, after talks had failed, Venezuela agreed to a 12-year moratorium on its claim. The 1970 protocol provided that if the dispute was not resolved by September 18, 1982, it would be referred to an “appropriate international organ” or, failing agreement on such an organ, to the secretary general of the United Nations. In the wake of a series of border incidents that accompanied expiration of the moratorium, Venezuela rejected a Guyanese request to seek a ruling from the International Court of Justice and formally requested the mediation of UN Secretary General Javier P´erez de Cu´ellar. In March 1983 Venezuela announced that Guyana had acquiesced in the action, but no further progress was reported until February 1985, when the Venezuelan foreign minister indicated that his government was prepared to adopt a conciliatory attitude in furtherance of a “new spirit of friendship and cooperation” between the two countries. Following a November 1989 meeting in Caracas with Venezuelan President Carlos Andr´es P´erez, President Hoyte announced that the two governments had agreed to seek the “good offices” of the vice chancellor of the University of the West Indies, Alister McIntyre, in formulating a resolution of the long-standing dispute. Evidence of

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the changed climate was provided by Guyana’s admission to the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1991, after Venezuela had withdrawn an objection stemming from the boundary issue. The Essequibo dispute was rekindled in October 1999 after Guyana had awarded offshore oil concessions in waters claimed by Venezuela to three foreign firms. The Guyanese foreign minister pointed out that the contested territory had been awarded to Guyana under an 1899 arbitration award and was “internationally accepted” thereafter. A constituent assembly, then considering changes in the Venezuelan constitution, responded by insisting that it would reject any modifications to the original Captaincy-General of Venezuela that had been “vitiated by nullity.” A subsequent agreement to accept a Barbadian diplomat as mediator proved unproductive. Tension increased even further in mid-2000 when a Texas firm, Beal Aerospace, announced plans to erect a $100 million rocket facility in the region claimed by Venezuela, which Caracas argued could serve as a cover for a U.S. military installation. For its part, Georgetown promoted the initiative as the country’s biggest development effort to date and extolled its potential in attracting tourists. However, in October Beal announced it was withdrawing from the project on the ground that U.S. federal support for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had made it impossible for the firm to compete effectively in the rocket-launching business. Meanwhile, the dispute with Suriname had continued to simmer. In June 2000 Surinamese gunboats evicted a Canadian-owned oil rig from an offshore concession granted by Guyana in 1998; four months later, it was reported that Surinamese forces had crossed the Corentyne and fired on a Guyanese vessel. With no resolution forthcoming, Guyana referred the matter to arbitration under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in February 2004. Suriname filed a counterclaim in March, and in June the case was assigned to a UN tribunal in Hamburg, Germany, which was expected to issue a decision in 2007 or 2008.

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Earlier, another threat to Guyana’s national identity loomed from Brazil, which had begun paving a 60-mile highway between its northern state capital of Boa Vista and the Guyanese town of Lethem (see map). The new road was expected to open up Guyanese gold mines to Brazilians, who already accounted for nearly 10 percent of the smaller country’s population.

Current Issues A new election had been anticipated in March 2006. However, the Guyana Election Commission announced that because of difficulties in assembling a valid electoral list the balloting would be delayed beyond the constitutional deadline of August 4. Nine days later, on April 22, a shockwave was generated by the assassination of Agriculture Minister Satyadeow SAWH by a group of masked gunmen, who also murdered Sawh’s brother and sister, in addition to a security guard. While the police report indicated that the motive was robbery, President Jagdeo suggested that the perpetrators were attempting to disrupt the election, which was ultimately held on August 28. Because of the delay, the new National Assembly did not convene until September 28, more than three weeks after the constitutionally mandated date of September 2 (four months after the May 2 dissolution). The opposition immediately argued that the deferral would require a constitutional amendment, but a writ to such effect was dismissed by the chief justice; the PNC/R thereupon indicated that it would appeal the decision to the Caribbean Court of Justice. Earlier in 2006, in an address May 25 at Guyana’s 40th anniversary of independence, President Jagdeo asserted that the greatest threat to the country came “from the enemy within,” comprised of drug lords and armed gangs that had been held responsible for the theft in February of high-powered weapons from the Guyana Defence Force and the assassination of Agriculture Minister Sawh. Concurrently, guerrilla activity loomed by a group styling itself the Guyanese Armed Resistance (AGAR).

The issue of internal turmoil was highlighted by the arrest and conviction in New York of Roger KHAN, an alleged Guyanese drug trafficker, who opposition leaders insisted had been given a “shield of protection” by the Hinds administration. Khan had been apprehended on June 26, 2006, and expelled to Trinidad and Tobago, where, on June 29, he was handed over to U.S. law enforcement officials. Criticism of the transaction came from within the PPP, former president Janet Jagan joining with others in accusing the Suriname government of playing “stooge to the USA” by allowing Khan’s seizure and deportation.

Political Parties Government Party People’s Progressive Party (PPP). Launched in 1950 by Dr. Cheddi B. Jagan and his wife, Janet Jagan, the PPP began as an anticolonial party speaking for the lower social classes but subsequently came to represent almost exclusively the large East Indian racial group. It long adhered to a pro-Soviet line, and at a June 1969 Moscow meeting Dr. Jagan formally declared the PPP to be a communist party. While the PPP and other opposition groups charged that the PNC fraudulently manipulated the overseas vote in the 1973 election, Dr. Jagan offered his “critical support” to the PNC in August 1975. The PPP Central Committee narrowly approved participation in the December 1980 legislative balloting, at which the party was officially credited with winning ten seats. It was awarded eight seats in 1985. In June 1991 Jagan retreated from his earlier insistence on state ownership by saying that the PPP would “critically examine” enterprises in the public sector and consult with both business and labor “as to the best means of insuring their viability.” Dr. Jagan died on March 6, 1997. Under the leadership of his wife, the PPP won a majority of directly elected legislative seats in the balloting of December 15, 1997. Janet Jagan resigned the presidency for medical reasons on August 1, 1999.

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In Georgetown, the PPP is allied with a Civic movement of local business owners and professionals headed by former interim president and current prime minister Samuel HINDS. Leaders: Bharrat JAGDEO (President of the Republic), Janet JAGAN (Former President of the Republic), Donald RAMOTAR (General Secretary).

Principal Opposition Group People’s National Congress (PNC). The PNC was created by Linden Forbes Burnham in 1957 after he had broken with PPP leader Cheddi Jagan. Primarily an urban-based party, it represents the African racial bloc of about one-third of the population, including most of the nation’s intellectuals. Initially, it advocated a policy of moderate socialism, anticommunism, and hospitality to private investment, but a swing to the left, culminating in Prime Minister Burnham’s 1974 “Declaration of Sophia” (see Political background, above), brought the PNC close to the opposition People’s Progressive Party on most domestic issues. In 1987 President Hoyte rejected allegations of a shift to the right, insisting that the PNC remained committed to socialism, while arguing that the latter, given local conditions, must follow an “innovative course.” The PNC drew heavily on the overseas vote in securing a two-thirds legislative majority in 1973 and was accused of massive fraud in obtaining better than three-quarter majorities in 1980 and 1985. It was runner-up to the PPP in 1992, winning 27 Assembly seats with 43.6 percent of the vote. Severe intraparty differences that had broken out before the 1992 election continued thereafter, with former Prime Minister Green, Viola BURNHAM (widow of the former president), and 13 other ex-ministers being dropped from the PNC’s new parliamentary delegation. In February 1993 Green was expelled from the party following a disciplinary inquiry into misconduct charges that had been filed against him. He then filed a High Court writ against Hoyte and other PNC leaders, claiming violation of constitutional rights, and in May announced that he would stand for election as

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mayor of Georgetown later in the year. Although subsequently identified with a group styled the Forum on Democracy, Green stated that his objective was not to form a new party, but “to capture the PNC and bring it back to the people.” He captured the Georgetown mayoralty in September 1994 as leader of the Good and Green Georgetown (GGG, below). Despite Hoyte’s 1987 position, the PNC at its biennial congress in May 1994 adopted a new constitution that omitted reference to it as a “socialist” party, the former prime minister describing the word as a “chameleon term” endorsed by a variety of groups that had “only a ritual jargon in common.” For the 2001 legislative balloting the PNC was aligned with Reform, a movement comprising a number of prominent business owners and professionals, one of whom, Stanley MING, was slated to be named prime minister if the PNC/R had prevailed in the election. The coalition continued for the 2006 poll, at which (running under the rubric People’s National Congress/One Guyana—PNCR/1G) it failed to oust the PNC. Former president Hoyte died on December 22, 2002; Viola Burnham died on October 10, 2003. Leaders: Robert H. O. CORBIN (Leader of the Opposition and Party Leader), Vincent ALEXANDER (Chair), Oscar E. CLARKE (General Secretary).

Other Parties Alliance for Change (AFC). The AFC was launched in October 2005 by Khemraj Ramjattan (a legislator who had been expelled from the PPP in 2004 for having made allegations of corruption within the PPP leadership) and Raphael Trotman (a PNC legislator). Former members of the WPA (below) and GAP (below) also reportedly joined the new formation, which argued that the Guyana people were eager to support a “racially integrated party” after so many years of conflict between the nation’s racially divided major parties. The AFC pledged to pursue higher living standards in Guyana based on free-market

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policies, which led some observers to suggest that it enjoyed background support from the United States. Leaders: Khemraj RAMJATTAN, Raphael TROTMAN. Guyana Action Party (GAP). The GAP was launched in January 1989 as the Guyanese Action for Reform and Democracy (Guard). A self-described civic movement that did not seek power as a political party, Guard organized a series of public rallies on behalf of political (particularly electoral) reform in mid-1990. A charge by President Hoyte that the formation was “a political party masquerading as a nonpolitical, apolitical faction” appeared to be substantiated by the issuance of a statement in November that it might take part in a “third slate” involving the URP (below). The situation was further clouded in December, when businessman Sam Hines resigned as Guard chair to accept designation as PPP shadow prime minister. While continuing to emphasize the need for reform, Guard announced in August 1991 that it would contest the forthcoming election with Nanda K. Gopaul, a former trade union official, as its presidential candidate. However, in early 1992 Gopaul emerged as the founder of the Guyana Labor Party (GLP). Under the GAP rubric, the formation won two legislative seats in 2001 as a partner of the WPA and retained one in 2006 in alliance with Roar (below). Leader: Paul HARDY. Rise, Organize, and Rebuild (Roar). A small grouping launched in 1999 to promote the rights of the indigenous Indian population, Roar won one legislative seat in 2001 and retained it in 2006 in coalition with the GAP. Leader: Ravi DEV. The United Force (TUF). A small party that represents conservative business and other interests, TUF favors racial integration and has found support from white, Amerindian, and other minority groups. Its programs have favored economic orthodoxy, closer ties to Western nations, and en-

couragement for private investment and foreign loans. TUF withdrew from the governing coalition in 1968 to protest the enfranchisement of the overseas voters. A single legislative seat won in 1992 was retained in 1997 and 2001. Its leader became an “opposition” participant in the Hinds government in 2001 and continued in that capacity after the 2006 election. Leader: Manzoor NADIR (2001 presidential candidate). Working People’s Alliance (WPA). The WPA was organized in late 1976, following the tender of PPP support to the (then) ruling PNC, as a coalition of left-wing groups that included the African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA), founded by Eusi Kwayana during his affiliation with the PNC. Three of its principal leaders, Dr. Omawale, Dr. Rupert Roopnaraine, and Dr. Walter Rodney, were indicted on arson charges in July 1979, the last being killed by a bomb explosion in June 1980. The party has been described as having “the appearance of a genuine bridge across the racial barrier in Guyana” in that its membership is drawn from both the African and Indian ethnic communities. It refused to participate in the December 1980 election on the ground of anticipated irregularities. It won one seat in 1985 and two in 1992. In January 1994, following a week-long public fast by Walter Rodney’s son Shaka, the government announced that a special committee would be appointed to review the files on the 1980 bombing, for which, despite a 1988 ruling of death by “accident or misadventure,” the PNC was widely believed to have been responsible. The inquiry led in June 1996 to the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of a former Guyana Defense Force sergeant, Gregory SMITH, who had been living in French Guiana since the 1980 assassination. A consultative member of the Socialist International, the party contested the 1997 election as the Alliance for Guyana (AG), reverting to its original name for the 2001 campaign, at which it won only two legislative seats in conjunction with the Guyana Action Party (GAP, above).

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The party has recently been in decline (in part because of the defection of one of its legislators to the AFC in 2005), and it secured no assembly representation in 2006. Leaders: Dr. Rupert ROOPNARAINE (Chair), Dr. Clive THOMAS (1992 presidential candidate), Nigel WESTMAAS (Secretary), Bonita HARRIS, Eusi KWAYANA, Wazir MOHAMED. Justice for All Party (JFAP). Led by C. N. Sharma, a local television station owner, the JFAP claimed that electoral irregularities cost it a seat in the 2001 legislative balloting; it was also unsuccessful in 2006. Leader: Chandranarine SHARMA. Guyana Democratic Party (GDP). The GDP was launched in July 1996 by Dr. Asgar Ally, who had resigned as finance minister in May 1995. Leaders: Dr. Asgar ALLY (1997 and 2001 presidential candidate), Nanda K. GOPAUL (prime ministerial candidate). United Party (UP). The UP was launched in early 2005 by Cheddi Jagan Jr., after a dispute with the leadership of his parents’ PPP. Leader: Cheddi JAGAN Jr. Good and Green for Guyana (GGG). The GGG was formed as the Good and Green for Georgetown before the 1994 Georgetown municipal campaign by former prime minister Hamilton Green, who had been expelled from the PNC in February 1993. The new party won a plurality of 12 of 30 seats in the September 1994 election, with its leader, now Georgetown mayor, signaling a return to national politics under the more inclusive rubric in mid-December. In August 1995 a coalition of PNC and PPP/C councilors succeeded in denying Green election to an additional one year as mayor; however, he was reelected to the post in August 1996. Leaders: Hamilton GREEN (Former Mayor of Georgetown), Ramesh KISSOON (Former Deputy Mayor of Georgetown). Democratic Labour Movement (DLM). Affiliated with the Christian Democrat International, the DLM was founded in 1982 as a largely

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centrist affiliate of the small National Workers’ Union. Leaders: Paul Nehru TENNASSEE (1992 presidential candidate), Jainarayan SINGH (General Secretary). People’s Democratic Movement (PDM). The PDM is a small centrist group founded in 1973. Leader: Llewellen JOHN. United Republican Party (URP). A rightwing group, the URP was launched in 1985 by Robert GANGADEEN, a U.S.-based former member of the UF, who returned to Guyana in 1989 to urge the adoption of free enterprise economics as the only remedy for the country’s problems. Gangadeen was ousted at the party’s second biennial conference in April 1990 and promptly announced the formation of a new group, the National Republican Party (NRP). Leader: Dr. Leslie RAMSAMMY (President of the Party and 1992 presidential candidate). Three other parties—the Guyana National Congress; the long-standing National Democratic Front, led by Joseph BACCHUS; and the People’s Republic Party, led by Harry DAS—have contested only regionally.

Legislature National Assembly. The unicameral legislature, which sits for five years barring dissolution by the president, currently consists of 65 elected members. Before 2001, 53 members were directly elected on a proportional basis, 10 were selected by the regional councils (1 by each of the 10 councils), and 2 were designated by the National Congress of Local Democratic Organs, to which each regional council had elected two members. Constitutional amendments in early 2001 provided for direct election of all 65 members, 40 on a proportional basis from national lists and 25 on a “geographic” basis that assigned from 1 to 7 seats to each of the ten regions. Following the election of August 28, 2006, the People’s Progressive Party/Civic held 36 seats; the People’s National Congress/Reform, 22;

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Cabinet As of June 1, 2007 Prime Minister

Samuel A. Hinds

Ministers Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, Crops, and Livestock Amerindian Affairs Culture, Youth, and Sports Education Finance Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade and International Cooperation Health Home Affairs Housing and Water Human Services and Social Security Labour Legal Affairs and Attorney General Local Government and Regional Development President’s Office (Parliamentary Affairs) Public Service Tourism, Industry, and Commerce Transport and Hydraulics Head, Presidential Secretariat

Robert Montgomery Persaud Carolyn Rodrigues [f] Frank Anthony Shaik K. Z. Baksh Desrey Fox (second minister) [f] Ashni Kumar Singh Jennifer Webster (second minister) [f] Samuel Rudolph (Rudy) Insanally Henry Jeffrey Dr. Leslie Ramsammy Bheri Ramsarram (second minister) Clement Rohee Harrinarine Nawbatt Priya Manichand [f] Manzour Nadir Doodnauth Singh Kellewan Lall Reepu Daman Persaud Dr. Jennifer Westford [f] Manniram Prashad Robeson Benn Roger Luncheon

[f] = female

the Alliance for Change, 5; The United Force, 1; and a coalition of the Guyana Action Party and Rise, Organize, and Rebuild, 1. Speaker: Hari Narayen (Ralph) RAMKARRAN.

Communications Press Newspapers are indirectly censured through government control of newsprint, which was relaxed somewhat in 1986. The following are published in Georgetown: New Nation (26,000), PNC

weekly; Mirror (25,000), twice-weekly PPP organ; Guyana Chronicle (23,000 daily, 45,000 Sunday), state-owned; Stabroek News (22,000 midweek, 28,000 weekend), independent; The Catholic Standard (10,000), weekly; Dayclean, WPA weekly.

News Agencies The state-owned Guyana News Agency (GNA) was established in 1981, following termination of an agreement with the Barbados-based Caribbean News Agency. A number of foreign agencies maintain bureaus at Georgetown.

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Broadcasting and Computing Until recently, radio broadcasting was controlled by the Guyana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC), which was formed from the Guyana Broadcasting Service and Radio Demerara (a local affiliate of Rediffusion, Ltd. London) when the government took over the latter’s assets in 1979. In March 2004 the GBC and the Guyana Television and Broadcasting Company (GTV) merged to form a National Communications Network (NCN). More than a dozen television outlets have been operating under government license since 2001; in addition, two private stations relay TV programming from the United States. As of 2005 there were approximately 213 Internet users and 39 personal

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computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 375 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Bayney Ram KARRAN U.S. Ambassador to Guyana: David M. ROBINSON Permanent Representative to the UN: Samuel Rudolph INSANALLY IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, IADB, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OIC, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

HAITI REPUBLIC

OF

HAITI

R´e publique d’Ha¨ıti

The poorest country, on a per capita basis, in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti occupies the western third of the mountainous Caribbean island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. Approximately 95 percent of the largely illiterate population is of pure African descent, with a small percentage of mulattoes and whites. Roman Catholicism, which coexists with a folk cult based on various voodoo practices, is the official religion, but other faiths are permitted. Women constitute close to 50 percent of the agricultural labor force and 60 percent of the urban workforce, concentrated in domestic service and manufacturing; female representation under the Duvalier regime was minimal, save for the reputed influence of Jean-Claude DUVALIER’s wife, Mich`ele; by contrast, the short-lived Pr´eval government of 1991 included four women of ministerial rank. A female prime minister, Claudette WERLEIGH, served from October 1995 to February 1996. The economy has long been handicapped by an underdeveloped social infrastructure and a paucity of mineral resources, the extraction of limited amounts of bauxite having ceased in 1983. While the manufacturing sector has grown, with an emphasis on plants for assembly and reexport of imported components, agriculture remains the country’s economic mainstay, although contributing only about 30 percent to GDP. Important crops include sugarcane, cacao, sisal, and especially coffee, the principal commodity, which accounts for about 30 percent of export earnings. Before the

1991 coup, unemployment exceeded 50 percent, while declining coffee revenues had strained finances in a country in which much of the annual budget was normally derived from foreign aid; subsequently, the economy came to a virtual standstill because of trade and financial embargoes during the exile of President Aristide in 1991–1994. The growth in real GDP was estimated at 2.9 percent in 1996 after having averaged –5.2 percent in 1985–1995. Growth of 2.2 percent was achieved in 1998, 2.7 percent in 1999, and 0.9 percent in 2000. However, because of a sustained period of

AT L ANT I C CUBA

OCEAN

Île de la Tortue Windward Passage

Cap-Haïtien

Port-de-Paix

Gonaïves Golfe de le Gonâve

Grande Cayemite

Saint-Marc

HAITI

Île de la Gonâve

Jérémie Les Cayes

Port-au-Prince Carrefour Miragoâne Île à Vache

Caribbean Sea 0 0

60 Mi 60 Km

Hinche

Jacmel

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Country

HAITI

Political Status: Independent state proclaimed in 1804; republic since 1859; military-backed regime installed following coup of September 30, 1991; constitutional government reinstated on November 8, 1994. Area: 10,714 sq. mi. (27,750 sq. km.). Population: 7,929,048 (2003C); 8,589,000 (2006E). The 2003 figure does not include an adjustment for undernumeration. Major Urban Centers (2005E): PORT-AU-PRINCE (1,249,000), Carrefour (446,000), Cap-Ha¨ıtien (112,000). Official Languages: French, Creole. Monetary Unit: Gourde (market rate November 2, 2007: 35.90 gourdes = $1US). ´ President: Ren´e PREVAL (Front for Hope); elected on February 7, 2006, and sworn in on May 14, succeeding acting President Boniface ALEXANDRE (Independent). ´ Prime Minister: Jacques-Edouard ALEXIS (Front for Hope); nominated by the president on May 22, 2006, and sworn in on June 9, succeeding G´erard LATORTUE (Independent).

severe political turmoil (see Political background and Current issues, below), GDP began to contract, dropping from –1.1 percent in 2001 to –3.8 percent in 2004, with inflation reaching nearly 20 percent. Observers estimated current unemployment ranging from 60 to 80 percent, with less than half of school-age children attending primary school, the maternal mortality rate the highest in the Western Hemisphere, and more than three-quarters of the population living under conditions that have been termed “worse than Darfur.” At the opposite pole, 1 percent of the population controls most of the country’s wealth.

Government and Politics Political Background Since a slaves’ revolt that established Haiti in 1804 as the first independent republic in Latin America, the nation’s history has been marked by

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violence, instability, and mutual hostility between blacks and mulattoes. After a period of U.S. military occupation (1915–1934), mulatto presidents held office until 1946, when power passed to a ´ His moderblack president, Dumarsais ESTIME. ate administration was terminated in 1950 by an army coup that prepared the way for the regime of another black, Gen. Paul MAGLOIRE, who was also overthrown, in December 1956. Five interim regimes followed before Fran¸cois DUVALIER won the presidency in the election of September 1957. Contrary to expectations, the Duvalier administration quickly degenerated into a dictatorship, with Duvalier forcing an unconstitutional reelection in 1961 and being designated president for life in May 1964. Throughout his incumbency Duvalier maintained a tight grip over the country. With most opponents in exile, the regime maintained a balance of terror using a blend of persuasion, voodoo symbolism, and a personal army of thugs and enforcers, the so-called Tontons Macoutes (Creole for bogeymen). In early 1971 Duvalier had the constitution amended to allow him to designate a successor; his son, Jean-Claude DUVALIER, was promptly named to the position and assumed the presidency following his father’s death on April 21. Beginning in mid-1977 the younger Duvalier appeared to yield somewhat under continuing U.S. pressure to ameliorate the more corrupt and repressive aspects of his family’s two decades of rule. Thus in November 1978, in return for substantially increased U.S. aid, he ordered a series of budgetary and ministerial reforms. In the election of February 11, 1979, an independent candidate running on a human rights platform (despite offering “critical support” for the regime) won an overwhelming victory against a government-endorsed opponent, while in an unprecedented act of public defiance, about 200 intellectuals issued a manifesto in June protesting censorship of plays and films. Most startling of all was the appearance at midyear of three new political parties (see Political Parties, below) after publication of a book by ` Gr´egoire EUGENE, a law professor, which pointed

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out that such organizations were technically permissible under the Haitian constitution. By the end of the year, however, the period of liberalization appeared to have ended with the passage of a repressive press law and increased attacks on dissidents by former members of the Tontons Macoutes. The first municipal elections in 26 years were held in mid-1983. No opposition candidates presented themselves, several potential nominees having disappeared before the balloting. In August the national legislature dissolved itself after accepting a new, presidentially drafted constitution. While balloting for a new chamber on February 12, 1984, resulted in the defeat of numerous Duvalierists, foreign observers were convinced that the government, wishing to create the appearance of change, had asked incumbents not to campaign vigorously. Six months later, a regime-supportive Progressive National Party (PNP) was launched under legislation permitting partisan activity by groups agreeing to accept the life presidency. Earlier, extensive rioting had erupted in response to government misuse of food aid and manifest police brutality, yielding a press crackdown and the detention of several opposition politicians. In November the government announced the discovery of a “communist” plot against the regime, in what was widely perceived as a bid for support from anticommunist donor nations, particularly the United States. In early 1985, under visible pressure from both the United States and France (another substantial aid donor), the government released a number of political prisoners, and in April President Duvalier announced a series of “democratic” reforms. These included the legalization of political parties, increased power for the National Assembly, and provision for a new post of prime minister, to be filled by presidential appointment from the parliamentary majority. However, restrictions on party registration ensured the exclusion of known regime opponents, while the life presidency remained intact. Renewed rioting broke out in November 1985 in response to the killing of several teenagers during an antigovernment demonstration in Gona¨ıves,

and in December a government reshuffle was announced that suggested a shift in the balance of power to an inner circle of Duvalierist hardliners. On January 8, 1986, all schools and universities were closed in response to a widespread student boycott, while the first major protest demonstration at the capital was dispersed by police ten days later. However, the disturbances intensified, and on February 7 Duvalier, with an entourage of family and close associates, departed on a U.S. plane to France. The army chief of staff, Gen. Henri NAMPHY, immediately assumed power as head of a five-member National Council of Government (Conseil National du Gouvernement—CNG) that included two other officers and two civilians. On February 10 a 19-member provisional government was announced that, however, contained a number of leading Duvalierists. On March 20 the one prominent anti-Duvalierist in the new administration, Haitian human rights leader G´erard GOURGUE, resigned from both the CNG and the justice ministry, alleging “resistance” to liberalization. General Namphy responded by excluding the Duvalierists from a reconstituted Council that included himself, (then) Col. Williams REGALA (the interior and defense minister), and Jacques FRANC¸OIS (succeeded as foreign minister in a cabinet reshuffle on March 24 by retired general Jean-Baptiste HILAIRE). In the face of continued unrest that, in the words of General Namphy, left the country “on the verge of anarchy . . . and civil war,” it was announced in June 1986 that municipal elections would be held in July 1987 and that a new government would be installed in February 1988, following presidential and legislative balloting the preceding November. In September an election was held for 41 of 61 members of a Constituent Assembly charged with drafting Haiti’s 23rd constitution since independence. The new basic law, incorporating a number of safeguards to prevent the return of a Duvaliertype dictatorship, was overwhelmingly approved by a referendum on March 29, 1987. By mid-1987 the Namphy regime had proven to be unwilling or unable to curb a mounting campaign of terror by disbanded Tontons Macoutes and

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the promised local elections were postponed. Presidential and legislative balloting commenced on the morning of November 29 but within hours was also called off because of widespread violence and voter intimidation. The four principal opposition leaders thereupon withdrew as presidential candidates, and Leslie MANIGAT, a self-proclaimed “democratic centralist” who was widely believed to have the backing of the CNG, emerged from the rescheduled poll of January 17, 1988, with a declared majority of 50.3 percent. On June 17, 1988, President Manigat attempted to remove General Namphy as army commander but was himself overthrown by a military coup two days later. On June 20 Namphy announced the formal deposition of the Manigat administration, declaring that he would thenceforth rule by decree as the country’s chief executive. Less than three months thereafter, a revolt by noncommissioned officers of the Presidential Guard, led by Sgt. Joseph HEBREUX, resulted in Namphy’s ouster, with power passing to Lt. Gen. Prosper AVRIL on September 18. Subsequently, Avril successfully resisted countercoup efforts by army units on April 2 and 5, 1989, and on September 24 announced that a series of local, national legislative, and presidential elections would be held in 1990. Following the assassination of a Presidential Guard colonel on January 19, 1990, General Avril declared a nationwide state of siege and a roundup of opposition leaders, some of whom were deported after being brutalized by police. While the emergency decree was rescinded on January 30, popular unrest continued, forcing the general’s resignation on March 10. His acting successor, Army Chief Staff Herard ABRAHAM, promised to remain in office for no more than 72 hours and on March 13 Supreme Court justice Ertha PASCALTROUILLOT was sworn in (also on an acting basis) as the country’s first female president and its fifth chief executive since the Duvalier ouster. Presidential and legislative elections, initially scheduled for September 1990, were postponed until November 4 because of problems in voter registration and deferred again until December 16, when Fr. Jean-Bertrand ARISTIDE, a radical Catholic

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priest who had been expelled from his order two years earlier, won a landslide victory with 67 percent of the vote. However, Aristide’s somewhat hastily organized National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD) was able to nominate only 50 candidates for 110 seats in the two legislative houses and, following his inauguration on February 7, 1991, the new head of state was obliged to settle for his second choice, the politically inexperienced ´ Ren´e PREVAL, as prime minister on February 13. On September 30, 1991, scarcely more than seven months after his installation as Haiti’s first democratically elected chief executive, Aristide was ousted and sent into exile in a bloody coup headed (although reportedly not instigated) by the armed forces commander, Brig. Gen. Raoul ´ CEDRAS. On October 8 a rump group of senators was induced to declare the presidency vacant and approve the installation of Supreme Court president Joseph NERETTE as interim head of state. Nerette, in turn, named Jean-Jacques HONORAT, a former diplomat and government official who had been exiled by the younger Duvalier in 1981, to head a government formed on October 16. On October 29, 1991, the United States imposed strict economic sanctions, which induced the military-backed regime to enter into negotiations with a mission from the Organization of American States (OAS) aimed at restoring Aristide to office. By late November the talks were at an impasse, with the Haitians demanding an end to the embargo but refusing to reinstate the ousted president. Honorat then challenged the OAS by announcing that new elections would be held in early January, although most of December was spent in an effort to find a prime ministerial candidate that would be acceptable to Aristide, C´edras, and Haitian political and business leaders. In January 1992 a compromise reached in Caracas, Venezuela, that called for the appointment of Ren´e THEODORE, secretary general of the Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH), as prime minister was repudiated by the military leadership. In a similar understanding reached in Washington, D.C., on February 23 among Aristide, Theodore, and a Haitian parliamentary

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delegation, Aristide dropped a demand for C´edras’s removal and offered immunity from prosecution for all those involved in the coup. Subsequently, however, he withdrew the pledge, while the military-dominated National Assembly refused to endorse the plan after Nerette had characterized it as “unconstitutional.” On May 9, 1992, military, government, and legislative leaders in Port-au-Prince proposed the appointment of a new government and Nerette’s resignation “at a suitable moment,” with no mention of a successor. Pro-Aristide deputies succeeded in blocking passage of the unilateral scheme, but a more specific version was approved on May 20 that provided for Nerette’s departure on the installation of a new administration, with no presidential replacement until an overall political solution had been reached. Accordingly, Nerette on June 2 named conservative businessperson and former World Bank official Marc Louis BAZIN to head a government that was installed on June 19. In early July 1992 Aristide demanded a UN presence in Haiti and declared that he would meet with Bazin only after the latter had relinquished office. On the other hand, the head of Aristide’s “presidential commission,” Rev. Antoine ADRIEN, and Bazin’s foreign minister, Fran¸cois BENOIT, met in Washington, D.C., on September 1, with the Haitian regime agreeing on September 12 to the deployment of 18 human rights observers (3 per department, as contrasted with 18 per department sought by Aristide). However, in mid-December, after being permitted only one brief probe beyond Port-au-Prince, the UN team was charged by the Bazin government as having “no legal basis” to continue its activities. Subsequently, under strong pressure from both the United States and the UN, the government reversed itself, and in mid-March the first of several hundred civil rights observers arrived under the leadership of UN mediator Dante CAPUTO. In mid-April 1993 Caputo left Port-au-Prince after failing to obtain General C´edras’s assent to a UN/U.S. plan to step down in return for an amnesty for his involvement in Aristide’s ouster.

The regime’s intransigence was further reflected by its refusal on May 24 to accept a multilateral military force to supervise the former incumbent’s return to office. On June 15 the Haitian legislature agreed to Aristide’s reinstatement as president but set no date for his return and attached conditions (including a general amnesty for his military opponents) that he had long declared unacceptable. Shortly thereafter the army agreed to “proximity talks” between General C´edras and Aristide, which began on June 27 in New York. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Bazin was obliged to submit his resignation after four of his ministers refused to step down in what appeared to be a failed autogolpe (self-coup). The New York meeting yielded an agreement that provided for Aristide’s return to Haiti on October 30, assuming the following sequence of events: (1) a “dialogue” under UN and OAS auspices of Haiti’s parties, leading to the annulment of a partial senatorial election that had been conducted, despite an opposition boycott, in January; (2) the naming by Aristide of a prime minister; (3) acceptance of the nominee by the “normalized” Haitian parliament; (4) the lifting of UN and OAS sanctions against Haiti; (5) the modernizing of Haiti’s armed forces with the assistance of a 2,000-member international force (half from the United States); (6) an amnesty for those involved in the 1991 coup; (7) the creation of a new police force under an Aristideappointed commander; and (8) General C´edras’s “early retirement.” On August 3, 1993, it was announced that Robert MALVAL, a wealthy Port-au-Prince businessman, had been asked by President Aristide to become the next prime minister. Malval, characterized as a “profoundly reluctant public figure,” was reported to have accepted the job on condition that he play a purely transitional role and be replaced by a permanent successor no later than December 15. On August 25 the Haitian parliament, after extensive wrangling between pro- and anti-Aristide blocs, approved the appointment of Malval, who was sworn in by the exiled president five days later at the Haitian embassy in Washington. However, the military, headed by General C´edras but

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apparently under the effective control of police chief Michel FRANC¸OIS, mounted a concerted effort to block Aristide’s return. Perhaps most importantly, it refused to counter a wave of domestic violence by thousands of armed military “attach´es” modeled after the Tontons Macoutes militia. On October 15, 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton dispatched a flotilla of six warships to Haitian waters to enforce an oil and arms embargo ordered by the UN Security Council after a contingent of American and Canadian advisors for a UN peacekeeping force had been prevented from disembarking in Port-au-Prince. The military responded by pressing for completion of the first major highway linking Haiti to the neighboring Dominican Republic. Prime Minister Malval’s formal resignation on December 15, 1993, coincided with the conclusion of a two-week foreign trip, during which he failed in an attempt to mount a national conference to break the country’s political stalemate. Although initially supporting the initiative during a meeting with Malval and President Clinton at the White House, Aristide subsequently reversed himself, thereby drawing from Malval the criticism that he possessed “a serious ego problem.” Malval went on to characterize the impasse between C´edras and Aristide as involving “a man who refuses to resign and a man who has made a choice to remain abroad as a sort of flag bearer, a mystic symbol.” On January 11, 1994, anti-Aristide upper house members attempted to dismiss the Senate president by lowering the number required for a quorum from 11 to 9. Two days later the Chamber of Deputies employed less questionable procedure in dismissing its pro-Aristide speaker, Antoine JOSEPH, in favor of Frantz Robert MONDE, a former Tontons Macoutes leader. On February 15, 1994, Aristide rejected a new U.S.-backed peace plan that called for the appointment of a broad-based government without setting dates for the exiled president’s return or a military stepdown. Another U.S. plan in late March that called for C´edras’s removal, but not that of Fran¸cois, was also rejected by Aristide. Washington then called for a global trade embargo of Haiti,

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which, along with a freeze on the foreign assets of about 600 army officers, was approved by the UN Security Council, effective May 22. Meanwhile, anti-Aristide legislators had on May 11 declared the presidency vacant, thus permitting the 80-year-old president of the Supreme Court, Emile JONASSAINT, to assume the office on a “provisional” basis. On June 24 direct flights to and from the United States were terminated, with all international commercial flights ending on July 30. Finally, on July 30 the Security Council authorized a U.S.-led invasion if Haiti’s military attempted to continue in office. On September 17, 1994, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, U.S. Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Colin Powell, and Sen. Sam Nunn flew to Port-au-Prince for a “last best effort” meeting with C´edras and Jonassaint. The talks yielded an agreement signed by Carter and Jonassaint the following day that provided for the “honorable retirement” of “certain military officers of the Haitian armed forces,” the approval of a general amnesty by the Haitian parliament, the lifting of economic sanctions “in accordance with United Nations resolutions” (which required President Aristide’s return), coordination by U.S. and Haitian military units, and formal approval of the accord by the U.S. and Haitian governments. On September 19, 1994, an initial contingent of 2,000 U.S. troops landed without incident on Haitian soil. On October 10 General C´edras resigned his command and flew to exile in Panama three days later. On October 15 President Aristide received an exuberant welcome on his return to Haiti and on October 18 appointed wealthy U.S.-educated businessman Smark MICHEL as prime minister. A new government was named by Michel on November 6 and sworn in November 8 amid pledges to revitalize the economy, in part by privatizing most large industries. Other objectives included “relaunching” the agricultural sector, improving tax collection, creating an autonomous university, and establishing a “truth commission” to investigate human rights abuses during the period of military-backed rule. For his part, President Aristide, bowing to pressure from the Catholic

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hierarchy, agreed on November 16 to leave the priesthood. In two-stage balloting for partial Senate replenishment and a new Chamber of Deputies (originally scheduled for June 4 and 25, 1995, but not completed until September 17), President Aristide’s Lavalas Political Organization gained control of both houses by wide margins. By mid-1995 Prime Minister Michel was warning of “drastic consequences” if the economic program backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should fail and reportedly had complained of President Aristide’s lack of support for one of its crucial components: the privatization of nine state enterprises. Michel resigned on October 16, 1995, and was succeeded by the (then) foreign minister, Claudette Werleigh, who was believed to share the president’s doubts about divestiture, particularly in view of the anticipated loss of 6,000 jobs. Despite considerable uncertainty as to his intentions, President Aristide on November 30, 1995, reiterated an earlier pledge that he would not attempt to extend his term to discount his years in exile, and on December 17 the Lavalas candidate, Ren´e Pr´eval, secured an overwhelming mandate, albeit on a turnout of substantially less than half of the electorate, as Haiti’s next head of state. Although Pr´eval reportedly favored the installation of former Lavalas leader G´erard PIERRECHARLES as prime minister, the selection was vetoed by the outgoing president, who preferred retention of the incumbent. It was not until March 6 that Rosny SMARTH, having secured legislative approval, was sworn in as the new head of government. Subsequently, a rift emerged between the essentially populist Aristide and Prime Minister Smarth, who sought to implement an IMF-approved structural adjustment program that included substantial privatization. In November 1996 the former president broke with the existing Lavalas organization by forming a competing Lavalas Family movement that applied for registration as a party in early 1997. While Smarth survived a “no confidence” vote on March 27, he felt obliged to submit

his resignation on June 9, amid a mounting wave of strikes and demonstrations against his policies. On June 25 President Pr´eval named an economist, Eric PIERRE, as Smarth’s successor. Pierre failed, however, to secure legislative approval, and on August 20 Smarth announced that he would no longer continue in a “caretaker” capacity. On November 3 Pr´eval nominated another economist, Herv´e DENIS, as the next prime minister, but Denis was also rejected by the legislature on December 23. A third nominee, Jacques Edouard ALEXIS, was declared eligible by the two houses of Parliament in December 1998, but he fell two votes short of approval by the Chamber of Deputies in early January 1999. On January 12, 1999, President Pr´eval ruled that the term of office of nearly all members of the National Assembly (as well as those of mayors and many other municipal officers) had expired the previous day under the law governing the 1995 election. He therefore declared the Assembly dissolved and announced he would rule by decree, with Alexis serving as prime minister pending negotiations with various political groups regarding new elections. Discussions with opposition parties yielded an agreement in early March on a transition government, which was sworn in on March 26 under the leadership of Alexis, and establishment of a nine-member Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to oversee balloting that the government hoped to conduct before the end of the year. In June 1999 the CEP set aside the 1997 legislative election results and called for a new poll the following November. The date was subsequently changed to March 21, 2000, then to April 9, and finally to May 21, at which time first-round balloting was conducted for municipal councils, the full Chamber of Deputies, and 19 Senate seats. Opposition parties, many having coalesced under the banner of the Democratic Convergence (Convergence D´emocratique—CD), charged the government with fraud in counting the votes from the May 21 balloting and called for a boycott of secondround balloting on July 9, arguing that only complete new elections would expunge the irregularities. Meanwhile, on June 17 the CEP president,

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Leon MANUS, fled the country because of alleged threats over his refusal to certify the May 21 results. On August 16, 2000, the CEP announced that the Lavalas Family had won 72 of the lower house seats, 18 of the contested Senate seats, and about 80 percent of the municipal seats. The CD-led opposition also boycotted the presidential balloting of November 26, at which Aristide was credited with 92 percent of the vote over six other candidates. Following his inauguration on February 7, 2001, Aristide appointed Jean-Marie CHERESTAL, a former finance minister and trade negotiator, to form a new government, which was installed on March 2. However, in light of the continued debilitating impasse with the opposition and rapid economic decline, Ch´erestal in January 2002 announced his intention to resign as prime minister. He was succeeded on March 14 by Yvon NEPTUNE, theretofore president of the Senate. During the ensuing two years, the Aristide regime encountered a mounting wave of strikes and mass protests, culminating in an armed uprising that yielded the fall of Haiti’s fourth largest city, Gonca¨ıves, to insurgents on February 5, 2004. On February 22, Haiti’s second city, Cap-Ha¨ıtien, also fell. With rebel forces led by Guy PHILIPPE and Louis-Jodel CHAMBLAIN approaching the capital, President Aristide resigned on February 29 and was flown into exile (under duress, he subsequently maintained) on a U.S. aircraft. Concurrently, U.S. President George W. Bush ordered the dispatch of 500 marines to Port-au-Prince, with France announcing that 200 of its troops would be similarly deployed and the UN Security Council authorizing the formation of a multinational interim peacekeeping force. In the wake of Aristide’s departure, his constitutionally designated successor, Supreme Court President Boniface ALEXANDRE, was sworn in as acting head of state on March 8, 2004. On March 9 a U.S.-backed Council of Elders announced that it had appointed as interim prime minister G´erard LATORTUE, who proceeded to name a largely nonpartisan cabinet. On December 9 Latortue stated that he would not contest the pres-

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idential balloting originally scheduled for November 2005. After four postponements, presidential and legislative elections were held on February 7, 2006, with former president Ren´e Pr´eval narrowly avoiding a runoff with an announcement on February 16 that he had secured 51.2 percent of the vote. However, his installation was delayed until May 14 because of inconclusive legislative results that necessitated a runoff poll on April 21 in which a mere 15–20 percent of eligible voters were reported to have participated.

Constitution and Government The 1987 constitution, repudiated by General Namphy in July 1988, was restored by President Pascal-Trouillot in 1990 and remained nominally intact after the 1991 coup. It provides for a directly elected president, who may serve no more than two nonsequential five-year terms, and a prime minister, who is responsible to a legislature composed of a Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The president negotiates and signs all treaties and presides over the Council of Ministers; the prime minister must come from the legislative majority or, if there is none, be appointed after consultation with the chamber presidents, subject to parliamentary endorsement. Constitutional amendments, which must be supported by a two-thirds majority in each house and approved by a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast in a joint legislative sitting, can come into effect only after the installation of the next elected president. The judiciary encompasses a Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation), whose president serves as acting head of state in the event of a vacancy; courts of appeal; courts of first instance; courts of peace; and special courts as prescribed by law. The 1987 basic law divided the traditionally monolithic armed forces into distinct military and police components; accorded the universally spoken Creole language official status in addition to French; banned Duvalierists from public office for ten years; authorized an independent commission to supervise elections; asserted the

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previously nonexistent rights of free education, decent housing, and a fair wage; and eliminated sanctions (theretofore largely ignored) against the practice of voodoo. Haiti is presently divided into nine departments, each headed by a presidentially appointed prefect and subdivided into arrondisements and communes.

Foreign Relations Despite its membership in the United Nations and a number of other international bodies, Haiti has avoided close ties with neighboring countries and before joining the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) had distanced itself from most moves toward Caribbean economic and political integration. Its historically most sensitive foreign affairs issue, the border relationship with the Dominican Republic, has been periodically aggravated by activities of political exiles from both countries. Relations with the United States, which were briefly suspended in 1963, have fluctuated, the Duvalier government frequently using its votes in international bodies to bargain for increased foreign assistance from Washington. In early 1983 long-standing litigation regarding the rights of Haitian refugee “boat people” being detained in Florida was resolved by a U.S. landmark decision, which allowed about 1,700 detainees to apply for political asylum while establishing constitutional protection for those remaining incarcerated. In September 1985 Haiti concluded an agreement with the Bahamas that would require all illegal immigrants to register with Bahamian authorities, with only those resident in the islands before December 30, 1980, married to Bahamians, or owning real estate being permitted to remain. In the wake of President Aristide’s initial ouster a new wave of Haitians attempted to flee by boat to the United States. By early 1992 several thousand had been picked up at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard and accorded temporary refuge at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. By midyear the exodus had largely ended in the wake of an order by President

George H. W. Bush on May 24 that all Haitians intercepted at sea be returned immediately to their homeland without determination of whether they qualified for political asylum. The order was overturned on July 26 by a New York appeals court but upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court on August 1. In early 1993 it was estimated that of more than 40,000 Haitians attempting to reach the United States since the 1991 coup, nearly three-quarters had been returned by the U.S. Coast Guard. By mid1994 the Clinton administration had demonstrated considerable ambivalence in the matter, initially adhering to the Bush policy of repatriation, then supporting ship-based processing of refugees for possible transfer to third countries. However, a lessthan-enthusiastic response to the latter, particularly from Panama, led, in early July, to an announcement that the processing facilities at Guantanamo would be reactivated. Thus, despite the ease with which Cubans had thenceforth been able to claim eligibility for asylum in the United States, the number of Haitians that could look forward to such status was held to approximately 5 percent. The United States, which had manifestly favored the conservative Bazin in the 1991 presidential poll, joined the OAS embargo against the militarybacked government and was a prime mover in the June 1993 talks that established the original timetable for Aristide’s return to office. By the end of September 1994 the U.S. military intervention involved 20,000 troops, with their eventual replacement, a 6,900-member UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) being assembled in Puerto Rico. By late December the U.S. contingent had been reduced to approximately 9,000 personnel, of whom only 5,000 remained upon transfer of responsibility for Haitian security to the UNMIH on March 31, 1995. The balance of the U.S. force, apart from about 200 noncombatant personnel, withdrew on January 18, 2000. The UNMIH mandate was extended for six months from March 1, 1996, albeit only after China (which objected to Haitian relations with Taiwan) had insisted on a reduction to 1,200 troops; however, Canada announced that it would provide an additional 700 personnel at its own expense to bring

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the total up to the Security Council’s target of 1,900. The peacekeeping mission was renewed for an additional five months on July 1 (and renamed the UN Support Mission in Haiti, or UNSMIH), after China had dictated a new cut to 600 (exclusive of 700 from Canada, Pakistan, and Bangladesh funded jointly by Canada and the United States). In early December the Security Council voted to extend UNSMIH until May 31, 1997, subject to renewal at that time for two additional months. Although it had been agreed that the Mission would not continue past July 31, the mandate was further extended to November 30, with the last UN troops departing during the ensuing month save for a 300member police monitoring unit (the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti/Mission de Police Civile des Nations Unies en Ha¨ıti—MIPONUH) that was to remain for another year. In March 1996 President Pr´eval met with his counterpart from the Dominican Republic in the first visit by a Haitian president to the neighboring state in more than six decades. Despite the rapprochement, more than 15,000 Haitians were expelled from the Dominican Republic in late January and early February 1997. In an effort to avert a crisis, the two presidents agreed during a summit of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) on February 20–21 to an immediate halt to large-scale repatriation, while acknowledging the right of the Dominican Republic to deport illegal immigrants. Despite the accord, Haitian officials claimed in November that as many as 40,000 Haitians (of an estimated 500,000 without legal status) had been forced to leave the Dominican Republic during the year. Reciprocating Pr´eval’s 1996 visit to the Dominican Republic, Leonel Fern´andez on June 18–20, 1998, became the first Dominican head of state to visit Haiti since Rafael Trujillo in 1936. A meeting of the two presidents was preceded by a session of a joint Dominican-Haitian commission, which reached agreement in a number of areas without resolving such major issues as migration and trade. Despite the rapprochement, further border incidents occurred, followed by discussions on December 1–2, 1999, that yielded a protocol limiting the

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hours of deportation from the Dominican Republic and providing for Haitian migration inspection at border crossing points. The U.S. military presence in the wake of Aristide’s second departure from office in 2004 quickly grew to a 3,600-member force, which on June 1 formally transferred its peacekeeping mandate to a UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which had 7,413 troops and civilian police deployed as of April 2005. The mandate was renewed in February and August 2006, and again in March 2007. Tension with the Dominican Republic reescalated in mid-2005 with the withdrawal of the Haitian ambassador after the lynching of three Haitians in Santo Domingo. The Dominicans responded by deporting 1,000 illegals on August 15 and, shortly thereafter, 1,000 more of an estimated 1 million Haitians said to be living in the country. In March 2007 Venezuela and Cuba announced the creation of a $1 billion fund to aid Haiti, while Venezuelan President Ch´avez, during a visit to Port-au-Prince, promised additional assistance, including an increase in oil shipments from 3,000 to 14,000 barrels per day.

Current Issues Ren´e Pr´eval was accorded a narrow first-round victory in the 2006 presidential race only after the CEP, on somewhat dubious legal ground, had eliminated about 85,000 blank ballots from the tabulation. The move drew intense opposition criticism, even though the second-place contender, former president Leslie Manigat, secured only 12.4 percent of the vote. Not surprisingly, the CEP head, Jacques BERNARD, emulated his 1999 predecessor by fleeing the country in the wake of the action. While Pr´eval’s Lespwa formation won only 22 of 99 lower house seats, the new president was able to secure support from other parties for the designation of a prime minister and legislative officers. Pr´eval’s return to office left Aristide’s status uncertain. The Fanmi Lavalas had been divided over support for the former president’s one-time prot´eg´e, while Pr´eval himself hedged on Aristide’s

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return, stating only that the constitution did not allow for the banishment of any Haitian. In late 2006 the Berlin-based Transparency International cited Haiti as “the most corrupt country in the world.” Prime Minister Alexis responded by challenging the group’s methodology, noting that “the figures used for [the] report were from 2004 and 2005 and didn’t result from the government over which I preside.”

Political Parties All parties were outlawed during the first six years of the Fran¸cois Duvalier dictatorship. In 1963 a regime-supportive National Unity Party (Parti de l’Unit´e Nationale—PUN) was organized with an exclusive mandate to engage in electoral activity. Its Jean-Claudiste successor, the National Progressive Party ( Parti Nationale Progressiste—PNP), was launched in September 1985. Six years earlier, three unofficial groups had surfaced: the PSCH and PDCH (below), plus a Haitian National Christian Party (Parti Chr´etien National d’Ha¨ıti—PCNH) organized by Rev. Ren´e des RAMEAUX; all three were subjected to intermittent repression for the remainder of the Duvalier era. In March 1987 it was reported that more than 60 new parties had been formed. Two months earlier, a National Congress of Democratic Movements (Congr`es National des Mouvements D´emocratiques—CNMD/Konakom) had been organized in opposition to the Namphy regime by delegates from nearly 300 political groups, trade unions, peasants’ and students’ organizations, and human rights associations. Subsequently, the CNMD became the core of a loosely organized “Group of 57” that organized a variety of antigovernment protests (including a general strike in Portau-Prince on June 29) before being amalgamated into a National Front for Concerted Action (Front National de Concertation—FNC) in September. The FNC joined the PDCH in boycotting the election of January 1988. Although a large number of groups participated in the December 1990 balloting, the FNCD (under Alyans, below), Panpra (under PFSDH, below),

and the MIDH (below) emerged as the principal formations. By 1995 the PPL (under OPL, below) had become the dominant group, most opposition groups boycotting the legislative balloting of June– August and the December presidential poll; in late 1997, however, the PPL’s dominance was challenged by The Lavalas Family (La Fanmi Lavalas), a new formation launched by former president Aristide. Following the disputed first-round elections of May 21, 2000, about 15 opposition parties formed the Democratic Convergence (Convergence D´emocratique—CD), which became the primary anti-Aristide coalition. United primarily (if not solely) by their “common hatred” of Aristide, the CD parties boycotted the second round of balloting on July 3 as well as the presidential and Senate polls on November 26. Calling the Aristide government “illegitimate,” the CD in February 2001 announced that it had named G´erard GOURGUE of the FNC (below) as “alternative president.” The CD declined an offer to join the government of Prime Minister Neptune in March 2002, demanding instead the installation of a “consensus” administration to oversee new presidential and legislative elections. About 70 political groups existed before the 2006 elections, of which 10–50 were active in the run-up to the first-round poll on February 7, with numerous changes occurring before the secondround legislative balloting on April 21.

Legislative Parties Front for Hope (Fwon Lespwa/Front de l’Espoir—Lespwa). Lespwa was launched by Ren´e Pr´eval (theretofore a member of Lavalas) in his successful bid for a second presidential term in 2006. Upon completion of the legislative balloting in December, it held a plurality of 22 seats. ´ Leader: Ren´e PREVAL (President of the Republic). Haitian Social-Democratic Fusion Party (Parti Fusion des Sociaux-D´emocrates Ha¨ıtienne—PFSDH or Fusion). Fusion was launched before the 2006 elections by Serge

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Giles, who had previously led the Nationalist Revolutionary Progressive Party (Parti National Progressiste R´evolucionnaire—Panpra) that in 1989 became the first Haitian Party to be admitted to the Socialist International. In 2004 Giles organized the Haitian Socialist Grand Party (Grand Parti Socialiste Haitien—GPSH), which became a component of Fusion. Fusion was runner-up to Lespwa in the 2006 Chamber of Deputies balloting. Leader: Serge GILES (2006 presidential candidate). Democratic Alliance Party (Alliance D´emocratique—AD/Alyans). Alyans was organized before the 2006 election by Evans Paul, former leader of the National Front for Change and Democracy (Front National pour le Changement et la Democratie—FNCD), which had been formed in late 1990 as an alliance of more than a dozen left-of-center groups supporting Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In 1999 Paul launched the Harmonious Space for Preservation of Democracy (Espace de Concertation pour la Sauvegarde de la D´emocratic— EC, also referenced as Espace) as an alliance of the FNCD and other groups to contest the legislative balloting that was eventually conducted on May 21, 2000. Alyans placed third in the 2006 lower house poll. Leader: Evans PAUL (Former Mayor of Portau-Prince). Organization of the Struggling People (Organisation du Peuple en Lutte—OPL). The current OPL is an offshoot of the center-left Lavalas Political Organization (Organisation Politique Lavalas—OPL), which emerged after its founding in 1991 as the principal pro-Aristide formation. In 1995 the latter group launched the Lavalas Political Platform (Plateforme Politique Lavalas— PPL) as an alliance that also included the PLB (below) and the Movement for the Organization of the Country (Mouvement d’Organisation du Pays— MOP), a center-right formation whose leader, Jean MOLIERE, had been the third-ranked presidential candidate in 1988.

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In 1996 the original OPL split into two groups— the pro-Aristide FL (below) and the Organization of the Struggling People, which retained the OPL abbreviation and subsequently became a “bitter opponent” of Aristide and a leading rival of the FL. The OPL initially participated as part of the Democratic Consultation Group in negotiations with President Pr´eval in February 1999. However, it withdrew from the Group following the assassination of OPL Senator Jean-Yvon TOUSSAINT in early March, demanding that the crime be solved as prerequisite to the party’s return to discussions with the government. Consequently, the OPL was not represented in the new cabinet installed in late March. The OPL was one of the leading parties in the election originally scheduled for late 1999 but postponed to May 21, 2000. Leader: Paul DENIS. The Lavalas Family (La Fanmi Lavalas— FL). The Lavalas Family was launched by former president Aristide in November 1996. While Aristide denied that the new group was intended as an “instrument of division,” it reflected his growing disenchantment with President Pr´eval’s economic policies and served as a vehicle for his return to the presidency in November 2000. Yvon Neptune, a former senator and talk show host, was named prime minister by Aristide in March 2002, but he was subsequently imprisoned by the Latortue administration for allegedly inciting a massacre during the 2004 uprising. With no formal charges being lodged against him, Neptune termed his incarceration a “political witch hunt” and went on a prolonged hunger strike. G´erard Jean-Juste, the FL’s initial 2006 presidential candidate, was disqualified by the CEP for not personally submitting his registration by the deadline (an impossibility because he was imprisoned at the time). The party formally boycotted the election, although a portion of its membership endorsed Pr´eval. Leaders: Jean-Bertrand ARISTIDE (Former President of the Republic, in exile), G´erard JEAN´ JUSTE, Luis GERARD-GILES (2006 presidential candidate).

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National Christian Union for the Reconstruction of Haiti (Union National Chr´etienne pour la Reconstruction d’Ha¨ıti—UNCRH). The UNCRH candidate, Jean Chevannes Jeune, placed fourth in the 2006 presidential balloting with a vote share of 5.6 percent. Leader: Jean Chevannes JEUNE (2006 presidential candidate). Mobilization for Haiti’s Development (Mobilization pour le Developpement d’Haiti— MPDH). The MPDH won four lower house seats in 2006. Leader: Samir Georges MOURRA. Rally of Progressive National Democrats (Rassemblement des D´emocrates Nationaux Progressistes—RDNP). The RDNP was organized by Leslie Manigat while an exile in Venezuela during the 1970s. Strongly anti-Communist, Manigat called in mid-1986 for a “solidarity pact” between centrist parties. The lack of an effective response was attributed, in part, to Manigat’s reputation as a noiriste, hence a threat to the country’s powerful mulatto elite. He was credited with securing a bare majority of the presidential vote in the highly controversial balloting of January 17, 1988, but was ousted in a coup on June 19. He returned from exile in 1990 but was barred from another presidential bid. In 2002, Manigat was reported to have organized a four-party opposition coalition styled the Patriotic Union (Union Patriotique—UP) that was followed in 2004 by a National Democratic Progressive Coalition (Coalition des D´emocrates Nationaux Progressistes—CDNP). Manigat placed second in the 2006 presidential race, with 12.4 percent of the vote. Leader: Leslie Fran¸cois MANIGAT (Secretary General). Standard-Bearer in Action (Latibonit an Aksyon/l’Arbonite en Action—LAAA). The LAAA was formed prior to the 2006 poll, at which it won two senate and four chamber seats. Leader: Youri LATORTUE. Christian Movement for a New Haiti (Mouvement Chr´etien pour une Nouvelle Ha¨ıti—

Mochrena). A center-right party formed in 1991 by evangelical Protestant churches (reportedly with financial support from their U.S. counterparts), Mochrena won three seats in the 2000 balloting for the Chamber of Deputies, all of which were retained in 2006. Its 2006 presidential candidate placed fifth on a 3.4 percent vote share. ´ Leaders: Luc MESADIEU (2006 presidential candidate), Gilbert N. LEGER. Cooperative Action to Build Haiti: (Konbit pou Bati Ayiti —Konba). Konba, which means “fight” or “combat” in Creole, won three lower house seats in 2006. Leader: Chavannes JEAN-BAPTISTE. National Reconstruction Front (Front de la Reconstruction Nationale—FRN). The FRN was launched in late February 2004 by a group of former rebels led by Guy Philippe, who has insisted that all white forces must leave the country. Leaders: Buteur METAYER (President), Guy PHILIPPE (Secretary General). Bridge (Pont). The Bridge party won two Northwest Senate in 2006. Leader: Evalli`ere BEAUPLAN. Movement for National Reconstruction (Mouvement pour la Reconstruction Nationale— MRN). Launched in 1991 by Ren´e Th´eodore, the leader theretofore of the Unified Party of Haitian Communists (Parti Unifi´e des Communistes Ha´ıtiens—PUCH), the MRN was prohibited from participating in the 1995 elections, ostensibly because of a dispute as to whether Th´eodore or Jacques Rony MODESTIN (also of the MRN) controlled the party name. Subsequently, Th´eodore, once an Aristide ally, called for annulment of the election results. The party secured one lower house seat in 2006. Leaders: Ren´e THEODORE, Jean-Enol BUTEAU. Heads Together (T`et Ansanm). T`et Ansanm won a lower house seat in 2006, although the Electoral Council rejected the candidacy of its leader on the ground that he was a U.S. citizen. ´ Leader: Dumarsais SIMEUS.

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Other groups winning one lower house seat each in 2006 were the Haitian Democratic and Reform Movement (Mouvement D´emocratique et Renovateur d’Ha¨ıti—Modereh), led by Dany TOUSSANT and Prince Pierre SONSON, the Independent Movement for National Reconciliation (Mouvement Ind´ependent pour la R´econciliation Nationale—MIRN), led by Luc FLEURINORD; the Justice for Peace and National Development (Justice pour la Paix et le D´eveloppement National—JPDN), led by Rigaud DUPLAN; the Liberal Party of Haiti (Parti Liberal Ha¨ıtien—PLH), led by Gehy MICHELL; and the Union of National and Progressive Haitians (UNITE), led by Edouard FRANCIQUE.

Other Parties Respect (Resp`e/Respect). Respect is a small group launched before the 2006 presidential poll, at which its leader won third place with 8.2 percent of the vote. Leader: Charles Henri BAKER (2006 presidential candidate). Open the Gate Party (Pati Louvri Barye— PLB). Originally launched as a pro-Aristide party in mid-1992, the PLB won two seats in the 2000 balloting for the Chamber of Deputies. It was subsequently perceived as adopting a middle ground in the nation’s political impasse, calling for negotiations between the FL and CD. Leaders: Renaud BERNARDIN, Fran¸cois PIERRE-LOUIS (Secretary General). Movement for the Installation of Democracy in Haiti (Mouvement pour l’Instauration de la D´emocratie en Ha¨ıti—MIDH). The MIDH was founded in 1986 by the conservative Marc Bazin, a former World Bank official, who participated in the 1988 boycott. As the 1990 presidential candidate of the National Alliance for Democracy and Progress (Alliance Nationale pour la D´emocratie et la Progr`es—ANDP) that also included Panpra, Bazin was runner-up to Aristide with a 15 percent vote share, while the ANDP ran second to the FNCD in the legislative poll. Bazin subsequently endorsed the September 1991 coup that resulted

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in Aristide’s ouster and was named prime minister by Interim President Nerette on June 2, 1992. He resigned from the position on June 8, 1993. The MIDH boycotted the 1995 legislative poll but participated (unsuccessfully) in the 2000 balloting. Leader: Marc Louis BAZIN (Former Prime Minister). Patriotic Movement for National Salvage (Mouvement Patriotique pour le Sauvetage National—MPSN). The MPSN was formed in 1999 as a coalition of right-wing groups led by the Duvalierist head of the MDN. The MPSN participated unsuccessfully in the 2000 legislative balloting, subsequently decrying the government’s inappropriate “control” of the electoral process. Leader: Hubert de RONCERAY. Mobilization for National Development (Mobilisation pour le D´eveloppement National—MDN). The runner-up to Manigat in the 1988 presidential balloting and subsequently one of the most outspoken critics of General Avril, MDN leader Hubert de Ronceray was among those expelled from the country in January 1990. He supported Aristide’s ouster in 1991, and the MDN became prominent in the opposition following his return in 1994. In August 1996 two leading MDN members were shot dead in Port-au-Prince by unknown assailants. De Ronceray again went into temporary exile in October 1997 following the assassination of MDN deputy leader Pastor Antoine LEROY in late August. Leaders: Hubert de RONCERAY (President), Max CARRE (Secretary General). Haitian Social Christian Party (Parti Social Chr´etien d’Ha¨ıti—PSCH). The PSCH was launched on July 5, 1979, as one of two parties styling themselves the Haitian Christian Democratic Party (see PDCH, below). Subsequently it added the issue date of its manifesto, becoming known as the PDCH-27 Juin, before being more commonly identified by the Social Chris` tian label. Its leader, Gr´egoire EUGENE, was deported to the United States in December 1980 and

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prohibited from returning until after the February 1984 election, when he resumed his position as professor of Constitutional and International Law at Haiti University. For the remainder of the Duvalier era, he and his daughter, Marie, were sporadically subjected to either detention or house arrest. Eug`ene was credited with running fourth in the 1988 presidential poll. The party is now led by Eug`ene’s son. ` Leader: Gr´egoire EUGENE Jr. Haitian Civic and Political Front (Front Civique et Politique d’Ha¨ıti—Frontciph). Frontciph was launched in September 1999 as an electoral alliance of the PDCH and PAIN, below, and about 30 other parties and civic organizations, including the National Cooperative Movement (Mouvement Koumbite National—MKN), led by Volvick R´emy JOSEPH and the National Party of Labor (Parti National du Travail—PNT), led by Thomas ´ DESULME. Haitian Christian Democratic Party (Parti D´emocratique Chr´etien d’Ha¨ıti— PDCH). The PDCH was formed on July 5, 1979, by Silvio CLAUDE, who had been arrested and deported to Colombia after standing unsuccessfully for election to the legislature in February. Rearrested on his return to Haiti, he was sentenced in August 1981 to a 15-year prison term for attempting to create “a climate of disorder.” Although the sentence was annulled in February 1982, periods of arrest and/or detention continued for the remainder of the Duvalier era. The PDCH refused to participate in the election of January 1988, while its leader placed fourth in the 1990 presidential balloting. A forceful critic of Aristide, Claude was killed in an act of apparent retribution by followers of the ousted president during the 1991 coup. Leaders: Osner FEVRY, Joachim PIERRE. National Agricultural and Industrial Party (Parti Agricole et Industriel National— PAIN). PAIN was formed by Louis D´ejoie, the son of a prominent Duvalier opponent, who participated in the 1988 boycott. In late 1989

it was reported to have joined with the MDN and PSCH in a conservative coalition, no name for the alliance being announced. D´ejoie ran third in the 1990 presidential race with a 5 percent vote share. Although PAIN endorsed the overthrow of the Aristide government in 1991, ´ its leader, Louis DEJOIE II (D´ejoie’s son) was named Malval’s minister of commerce and industry in September 1993. The elder D´ejoie died in early 1998. Leader: Toussaint DESROSIERS (Spokesperson). National Front for Concerted Action (Front National de Concertation—FNC). The FNC was organized in September 1987 by merger of the “Group of 57” with a number of other moderate left-wing formations. Led by G´erard Gourgue, a prominent human rights lawyer who had resigned as minister of justice in the Namphy administration in March 1986, the party joined the PDCH in boycotting the January 1988 balloting. It was subsequently affiliated loosely with Konakom. Leader: G´erard GOURGUE. Other parties and groups include the Alliance for the Liberation and Advancement of Haiti (Alliance pour la Lib´eration et l’Advancement d’Ha¨ıti—ALAH), led by Reynold GEORGES; the Alternative for Change ( L’Alternative pour le Changement—AC), led by G´erard BLOT; the Alternative for the Development of Haiti Party (L’Alternative pour le D´eveloppement d’Ha¨ıti— ADH), led by attorney Gerard DALVIUS; Credo, a right-wing party led by Prosper AVRIL; Democratic Action to Build Haiti (L’Action D´emocratique de Bˆatir Ha¨ıti—Adebha), led by Ren´e JULIEN; the Democratic Revolutionary Party of Haiti (Parti R´evolutionnaire D´emocratique d’Ha¨ıti—PRDH), led by Fran¸cois LATORTUE; Effort of Solidarity to Build a National and Popular Alternative (Effort de Solidarit´e pour la Construction d’une Alternative Nationale et Populaire—ESCANP), a party based in the western region of Grand-Anse that cooperates with the influential grassroots group called the Resistance Committee of Grand-Anse (Komite Reziztans Grand-Anse—KOREGA); the Grand Rally

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for the Evolution of Haiti (Grand Rassemblement ´ pour l’Evolution d’Ha¨ıti—GREH), led by Himmler REBU; the anti-LF Haitian Democrats’ Party (Parti des D´emocrates Ha¨ıtiens—PADEMH), led by Jean-Jacques Clark PARENT; the far-left Haitian National Popular Party (Parti Populaire National Ha¨ıtien—PPNH), a pro-Aristide group formerly led by Bernard SANSARICQ (who narrowly escaped death in a shooting incident with government troops in August 1987) and now led by Ben DUPUY, the editor of the weekly Haiti Progress; the Konbit National Movement ( Mouvman Konbit Nasyonal—MKN), led by Volvick Remy JOSEPH; the Movement for the Advancement, Development, and Innovation of Democracy in Haiti (Mouvement pour l’Avancement, le D´eveloppement, et l’Innovation de la D´emocratie en Ha¨ıti—MADIDH), led by Marc Antoine DESTIN; the National and Patriotic Movement of November 28 (Mouvement Nationale et Patriotique du 28 Novembre—MNP-28), led by former ´ Senate president D´ejean BELIZAIRE; the antiFL National Progressive Democratic Party of Haiti (Parti National D´emocratique Progressiste d’Ha¨ıti—PNDPH), led by Turneb DELPE; the National Unity Movement (Mouvement d’Unit´e National—MUN), led by Georges SAATI; the Organization for the Advancement of Haiti and of Haitians (Organisation pour l’Avancement d’Ha¨ıti et des Ha¨ıtiens—OLAHH), led by Joel BORGELLA; the extreme-right Organization for Democracy in Haiti (Organisation pour la D´emocratie en Ha¨ıti—OPDH), whose leader, Carl DENIS, was arrested in August 1995 for allegedly plotting against the government; the Papaye Peasants Movement (Mouvement Paysan de Papaye— MPP), described as the nation’s largest peasant organization and a member, under the leadership of former Aristide supporter Chavannes JEANBAPTISTE, of the CD; the Party for a Development Alternative (Parti pour un D´eveloppement Alternatif—Pada), led by Gerard DALVIUS; the Party of Haitian Manufacturers, Workers, Merchants and Development Agents (Parti des Industriels, Travailleurs, Commercants et Agents du D´eveloppement d’Ha¨ıti—PITACH), led by Jean Jacques SYLVAIN; the Party for the National

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´ Evolution of Haiti (Parti pour l’Evolution Nationale d’Ha¨ıti—PENH), led by Yves SAINTLOUIS, the Party of the Patriotic Camp and of the Haitian Alliance (Parti du Camp Patriotique et de l’Alliance Ha¨ıtienne—Paca-Palah), led by Franck Fran¸cois ROMAIN; Popular Star, a “people’s organization” led by Alexis CLAIRIUS, a supporter of the CD; the Rally of Christian Democrats (Rassemblement des D´emocrates Chr´etiens—RDC), led by Eddy VOLEI; the Social Renovation Party ( Parti Social R´enovation— PSR), led by Fran¸cois PIERRE-LOUIS; the Union for National Reconstruction (Union pour la Reconstruction Nationale—URN), led by neoDuvalierist Evans NICOLAS, a presidential candidate in 2000; and the Union of Democratic Patriots (Union des Patriotes D´emocratiques—UPD), led by Rockefeller GUERRE.

Legislature The present Legislature (Corps L´egislatif) or Parliament ( Parlement) is a bicameral body, which when meeting as a whole for such purposes as constitutional amendment is styled the National Assembly (Assembl´ee Nationale). On January 11, 1999, President Pr´eval declared that the terms of most legislators had expired and that the Assembly was therefore dissolved. Under arrangements negotiated by Pr´eval with several political parties in March, new legislative elections were expected by the end of the year; however, the first round was not held until May 21, 2000, with a disputed second round held on July 9. The terms of the members thus elected expired on January 11, 2004, with a subsequent announcement that new elections would be forthcoming in September 2005. However, it was not until February 7, 2006, that presidential and first-round legislative balloting took place, with a second legislative round scheduled for March 19 but postponed until April 21. Senate (S´enat). The upper house is currently a 30-member body (three senators per department), designated for election to six-year terms with rotation of one-third of its members every two years.

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Cabinet As of June 1, 2007 Prime Minister

´ Jacques-Edouard Alexis (Lespwa)

Ministers Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development Commerce and Industry Culture and Communication Environment Finance and Economy Foreign Affairs and Religious Affairs Haitians Living Abroad Interior and Territorial Collectives Justice and Public Security National Education and Professional Training Planning and External Cooperation Prime Minister’s Office in Charge of Relations with Parliament Public Health and Population Public Works, Transport, and Communication Social Affairs Tourism Women’s Affairs and Women’s Rights Youth, Sport, and Civil Action

Fran¸cois S´ev´erin (Lespwa) Maguy Durce (Alyans) Daniel Elie Jean-Marie Claude Germain (UNCRH) Daniel Dorsainvil Jean R´enald Cl´erism´e Jean G´en´eus Paul Antoine Bien-Aim´e Ren´e Magloire Gabriel Bien-Aim´e (OPL) Jean-Max Bellerive (FL) Joseph Jasmin (Lespwa) Robert Auguste (Fusion) Frantz Verela G´erald Germaine Patrick Delatour Marie-Laurence Jocelyn Lass`eque [f] Fritz B´elizaire

[f] = female

However, balloting was erratic in the 1990s due to the nation’s political turmoil, and the 1997 election results were set aside by the provisional Electoral Council. Consequently, new elections for 19 seats were conducted on May 21 and July 9, 2000. However, most opposition parties boycotted the secondround voting to protest perceived improper calculation of first-round results by the government. The Lavalas Family (FL) was credited with winning 18 of the seats, with 1 going to an independent. The FL was also declared the winner of 8 additional seats contested on November 26, 2000, in a contest boycotted by the major opposition parties. Following a second round of balloting on April 21, 2006, coupled with deferred voting for 3 seats on December 3, the Front for Hope held 11 seats; the Haitian Social-Democratic Fusion Party, 5; the Organization of the Struggling People, 4; The

Lavalas Family, 3; the Bridge Party, 2; the National Christian Union for the Reconstruction of Haiti, 2; the Standard-Bearer in Action, 2; and the Democratic Action Party, 1. President: Joseph LAMBERT. Chamber of Deputies (Chambre des D´eput´es). The lower house is currently composed of 99 members, elected for four-year terms. Following second round of balloting on April 21, 2006, coupled with deferred voting for 11 seats on December 3, the Front for Hope held 22 seats; the Haitian Social-Democratic Fusion Party, 16; the Democratic Alliance Party, 11; the Organization of the Struggling People, 10; The Lavalas Family, 6; the National Christian Union for the Reconstruction of Haiti, 6, the Mobilization for Haiti’s Development, 4; the Rally of Progressive National Democrats,

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4; the Standard-Bearer in Action, 4; the Christian Movement for a New Haiti, 3; the Cooperative Action to Build Haiti, 3; the National Reconstruction Front, 2; and the Haitian Democratic and Reform Movement, Heads Together, the Independent Movement for National Reconciliation, the Justice for Peace and National Development, the Liberal Party of Haiti, the Movement for National Reconstruction, and the Union for National and Progressive Haitians, 1 each, with 1 vacancy. President: Pierre Eric JEAN-JACQUES.

Communications Press The following are French language dailies published in Port-au-Prince, unless otherwise noted: L’Union (7,000); Le Nouvelliste (6,000); Le Matin (5,000); Le Moniteur (2,000), twice-weekly official gazette; Le Septentrion (2,000), weekly.

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Broadcasting and Computing Before President Aristide’s ouster, government, commercial, and religious radio facilities included approximately 40 stations (counting relays). T´el´e Ha¨ıti, a private commercial company, broadcasts over 13 channels in French, Spanish, and English. In addition, the government-owned T´el´evision Nationale d’Ha´ıti offers cultural programming over 4 channels in Creole, French, and Spanish. As of 2005 there were approximately 70 Internet users per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 49 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Raymond Alcide JOSEPH U.S. Ambassador to Haiti: Janet Ann SANDERSON

News Agencies

Permanent Representative to the UN: L´eo ´ ` MEROR ES

A Haitian Press Agency (Agence Ha¨ıtienne de Press—AHP), to operate in collaboration with Agence France-Presse, was launched in 1981.

IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, IADB, Interpol, IOM, OAS, OIF, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

HONDURAS REPUBLIC

OF

HONDURAS

Rep u´ blica de Honduras

Honduras, the second largest of the Central American republics, is mountainous, sparsely inhabited, and predominantly rural. Approximately 90 percent of the population is racially mixed; Indians constitute about 7 percent, blacks and whites the remainder. Roman Catholicism is the religion of more than 95 percent of the people, three-quarters of whom are functionally illiterate. Women constitute about 7 percent of the rural labor force, exclusive of unpaid family workers, and 32 percent of the urban workforce, primarily in domestic service; departing from tradition, each of the last six governments has contained at least one female cabinet member. The nation’s economy traditionally depended on agriculture, and coffee, bananas, and shrimp remain important exports. However, industry, with an emphasis on nondurable consumer goods, now accounts for a higher share of GDP (32 percent versus 15–20 percent for agriculture), largely because of the growth during the 1990s of foreign-owned maquila companies, which produce garments and other goods for export using materials imported on a virtually duty-free basis. GDP growth during the 1990s averaged 3.2 percent, although the economy contracted by 1.9 percent in 1999 because of severe damage to crops and infrastructure caused by Hurricane Mitch in October 1998. Growth for 2006 was estimated at 5.5 percent, while consumer price inflation was 5.3 percent. In 2006 family remittances (chiefly from some 900,000 Hondurans living in the United States) were estimated to be $2.3 billion, which repre-

sents 15 percent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings and more than 25 percent of its GDP. In 2007 the revenues were expected to be $3 billion. Concurrently, Honduras remained one of the leastdeveloped countries in the region, with as much as half the population living below the poverty line.

Government and Politics Political Background in

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HONDURAS

Political Status: Part of the independent Captaincy General of Guatemala, 1821; member of United Provinces of Central America, 1824–1838; separate republic established 1839; present constitution promulgated January 20, 1982, following a decade of military rule. Area: 43,277 sq. mi. (112,088 sq. km.). Population: 6,535,344 (2001C); 7,376,000 (2006E). The 2001 figure does not include an adjustment for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (2005E): TEGUCIGALPA (857,000), San Pedro Sula (510,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Lempira (market rate November 2, 2007: 18.90 lempiras = $1US). President: Jos´e Manuel (Mel) ZELAYA Rosales (Liberal Party); elected on November 27, 2005, and inaugurated for a four-year term on January 27, 2006, in succession to Ricardo MADURO Joest (National Party). First Vice President: Elvin Ernesto SANTOS (Liberal Party); elected with the president on November 27, 2005, and sworn in for a concurrent term on January 27, 2006, succeeding Vincente WILLIAMS Agasse (National Party).

Guatemala. After a brief period of absorption by Mexico, the states of the Captaincy General in 1824 organized as the Central American Federation, which broke up in 1838. Decades of instability, revolution, and governmental change followed, with Honduras experiencing 67 different heads of state between 1855 and 1932, and U.S. military forces intervening on three occasions between 1912 and 1924. A measure of internal stability, accompanied by a minimum of reform and progress, was achieved between 1932 and 1954 under the presidencies of Tiburcio CARIAS Andino and Juan Manuel GALVEZ. Three years after a military coup in 1954, Ram´on VILLEDA Morales was installed as constitutional president and served until his 1963 overthrow in another military action

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´ mounted by (then) Col. Oswaldo LOPEZ Arellano. Subsequently, a Constituent Assembly, with a National Party (Partido Nacional—PN) majority, approved a new constitution and designated L´opez Arellano as president. Immediately before the 1971 election, L´opez Arellano organized the framework for a new government under a Pact of National Unity, which called for the sharing of governmental posts by the two major parties. Although similar to the National Front arrangement in Colombia, the pact was not nearly as successful. After 18 months in office, the administration of President Ram´on Ernesto CRUZ was overthrown by the military under former president L´opez Arellano, who served the remainder of Cruz’s presidential term. On March 31, 1975, Arellano was replaced as military commander in chief by (then) Col. Juan Alberto MELGAR Castro after a group of dissident junior officers had seized control of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and on April 22 he was further supplanted by Melgar Castro as head of state. The new president was in turn ousted on August 7, 1978, by a three-man junta headed by Brig. Gen. Policarpo PAZ Garc´ıa. On July 25, 1980, a Constituent Assembly that had been elected on April 20 named Paz Garc´ıa to serve as sole executive pending adoption of a new basic law and the popular election of a successor. Dr. Roberto SUAZO C´ordova led the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal—PL) to a surprisingly conclusive victory in nationwide balloting on November 29, 1981, and assumed office on January 27, 1982, promising “a revolution of work and honesty.” At his inauguration, President Suazo C´ordova referenced the Honduran record of 16 constitutions, 126 governments, and 385 armed rebellions in 161 years of independence and declared that “the time had come for rectifications.” However, it was obvious that the recent peaceful transition had been achieved by mortgaging the incoming administration to an “iron circle” of military hard-liners headed by Gustavo ALVAREZ Mart´ınez, who was promptly promoted from colonel to general. On March 31, 1984, General Alvarez was dismissed and sent into exile, following charges of plotting a coup and misappropriating government

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funds. The latter allegations turned largely on the activities of the Association for the Progress of Honduras (Asociaci´on para el Progreso de Honduras—APROH), a right-wing grouping of military and business leaders that, a year earlier, had accepted a $5 million contribution from the intensely anti-Communist Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon for the purpose of countering Honduran “subversives.” APROH, which was formally outlawed in November 1984, had also advocated direct U.S. military intervention against the Nicaraguan sandinistas as a necessary precondition of regional economic development. In late 1984, amid deepening fissures within the ruling PL, President Suazo C´ordova endorsed the former interior minister, Oscar MEJ´IA Arrellano as the party’s 1985 presidential candidate. However, a majority of the party’s congressional delegation backed Chamber president Efra´ın BU Gir´on, leaving the chief executive with the minority support of only 29 deputies. The split yielded a constitutional crisis in early 1985, with Congress removing five of the nine Supreme Court justices on grounds of corruption and the president responding by ordering the arrest of the new chief justice. In April the “old” court was reinstalled after the leading parties agreed to an “open contest” in the forthcoming presidential balloting that would permit any faction of a recognized party to present a presidential candidate; an electoral change approved later in the year declared that the winner would be the leading candidate within the party that secured the most votes. Under the new arrangement, Jos´e Sim´on AZCONA del Hoyo, an antisuazocordovista Liberal, was declared presidentelect after the election of November 24, despite placing second to the leading National Party nominee, Rafael Leonardo CALLEJAS Romero. Azcona’s victory yielded the first transition involving elected civilians in more than half a century. However, because of party fissures, he could look forward to controlling only 46 of 132 legislative seats. As a result, before his inauguration on January 27, 1986, the incoming chief executive concluded a “National Accord” (an echo of the 1971 pact) with the Nationalists that gave the

opposition effective control of the judiciary and representation in the cabinet and other influential bodies, thus dimming prospects for major policy changes, including meaningful land reform. Although the accord subsequently deteriorated (see PN under Political Parties, below), PL-PN cooperation at midyear yielded the indefinite suspension of municipal elections scheduled for November, neither party apparently favoring a public test before the presidential and legislative balloting scheduled for 1989. In the November 1989 election, PN candidate Callejas secured 50.2 percent of the presidential vote, and his party returned to power after 18 years. The new president named two Liberals to cabinet posts and appointed a Christian Democrat to oversee agrarian reform as head of the National Institute of Agriculture. Oswaldo RAMOS Soto secured the National Party presidential nomination in 1993 but went on to lose by a wide margin to the Liberal nominee, Carlos Roberto REINA Idi´aquez. The Liberals also won decisively in the legislative balloting, defeating the nacionalistas by 71 seats to 55 (a mathematical reversal of the 1989 results). At the balloting of November 30, 1997, the Liberal presidential nominee, Carlos Roberto FLORES Facuss´e won with nearly 53 percent of the vote. The Liberals also retained control of the National Assembly by a reduced majority of 67 seats. Flores was inaugurated on January 27, 1998, at which time he appointed a cabinet that included only one incumbent minister. At the president’s request, the Assembly on September 18, 1998, passed a number of constitutional amendments designed to bring the military under civilian control. The administration’s efforts to implement the changes, including the abolition of autonomous military spending and designation of the nation’s first civilian defense minister, triggered an apparent coup attempt on July 30, 1999. The PN’s Ricardo MADURO Joest defeated the PL’s Rafael PINEDA Ponce in the election of November 25, 2001, although the incoming president’s party was limited to a plurality (61 of 128 seats) in the National Assembly. Widespread

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crime, which included the reported murder of 820 “street children” and the assassination of a legislative candidate, was a major issue in the 2001 election. Maduro, whose son had been killed in 1997, pledged “zero tolerance” for criminals during the presidential campaign and maintained a hard line against street gangs after assuming office, reportedly securing a 60 percent reduction in the crime rate. The 2005 election was reminiscent of 1993. The Liberals, led by Manuel (Mel) ZELAYA, turned back a nacionalista effort to retain the presidency, while winning a legislative plurality that was close to being a mathematical reversal of the 2001 result (see Political Parties, below). The Zelaya government maintained its predecessor’s focus on curbing crime (see Current issues, below).

Constitution and Government The current constitution provides for a directly elected president, who may serve for only one term, and a unicameral legislature whose members serve four-year terms concurrent with that of the chief executive. The judiciary includes a Supreme Court and five courts of appeal, each of which designates local justices within its territorial jurisdiction. Internal administration is based on 18 departments headed by centrally appointed governors. The departments are subdivided into a total of 283 municipalities, each with an elected mayor and municipal assembly (including the capital, which for most of the half-century prior to 1985 had been denied local government status). In October 1994 the National Assembly indicated a willingness, for cost-cutting purposes, to reduce the number of legislative seats from 128 (the highest in the region) to 80. Constitutional amendment bills to such effect passed two readings in 1997 but did not secure necessary approval in 1998.

Foreign Relations A member of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations, Honduras has long inclined toward a conservative position

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in inter-American and world affairs. It joined in founding the now-inactive Organization of Central American States in 1951 and the Central American Common Market (CACM) in 1960. In 1982 Honduras participated in the U.S.-sponsored formation of a Central American Democratic Community (Condeca), which included Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala, while excluding Nicaragua; however, the alliance quickly became moribund. In May 1986 Honduras joined with the other four CACM countries in endorsing the creation of a Central American Parliament (Parlamento Centroamericano—Parlacen), although neither Costa Rica nor Nicaragua were represented at Parlacen’s October 1991 inauguration. In May 1992 the three Parlacen countries announced the formation of a Northern Triangle (Tri´angulo Norte) for trade, which became the Central American Group of Four (Grupo Am´erica Central 4—AC4) with the addition of Nicaragua in April 1993. Meanwhile, at a Tri´angulo Norte summit in October 1992 its presidents called for a new effort to establish a regional political grouping in the form of a Central American Federation, with Parlacen as its legislative forum. The projected Federation was advanced as an outgrowth of a System of Central American Integration that had been supported by all five regional executives during a December 1991 meeting in Honduras, although subsequently ratified only by Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. A series of disagreements with neighboring El Salvador in 1969 led the two countries to an undeclared “soccer” war, during which invading Salvadoran forces inflicted hundreds of casualties. A cease-fire was arranged by the OAS on July 18. Renewed hostilities broke out in July 1976, and it was not until October 30, 1980, that a formal peace treaty was signed in Lima, Peru. Despite the treaty, relations remained tense because of a border controversy and continuing clashes between Salvadoran government forces and guerrilla groups operating from sanctuaries in the ostensibly demilitarized territorial pockets (bolsones territoriales). The boundary dispute centered on claims by Honduras that El Salvador (and, to a lesser extent,

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Nicaragua) had attempted to block its access to the Pacific Ocean by controlling egress through the Gulf of Fonseca. Unable to come to a resolution, Honduras and El Salvador agreed in 1986 to submit the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), with Nicaragua participating as a limited observer. In a decision handed down in September 1992 the court awarded most of the disputed territory to Honduras, while ruling that the Gulf waters were not international but a closed condominium of the three countries that, in effect, guaranteed Honduras its long sought access to the Pacific. On the other hand, the Honduran territorial gains stimulated widespread protests by Salvadoran settlers, who insisted that the transferred areas be declared “peace zones,” free of Honduran government or military control. In response, the Honduran foreign ministry affirmed that the territories were Honduran. In September 1995 a Bi-Zonal Commission set up to implement the 1992 judgment agreed that residents of the territory could chose either Honduran or Salvadoran nationality. Further moves to alleviate border tensions were undertaken by the two countries’ foreign ministers in late 1996, and in January 1998 the countries’ presidents met in Tegucigalpa to sign an accord finalizing the border demarcation. Nonetheless, El Salvador sought to reopen the issue in early 2002 by requesting a review of the boundaries established by the 1992 decision. At issue was delineation of the last 4 miles of the 145-mile border, which was settled during a meeting of Honduran president Manuel Zelaya and Salvadoran president Tony Saca on April 18, 2006, thus terminating the 37-year-old controversy. Conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua arose in early 1995 in the form of a “shrimp war” in the Gulf of Fonseca, the Nicaraguans contending that Honduran vessels had repeatedly destroyed boundary markers and then crossed over into the more fertile shrimp beds in their territory. In late January 1996 the controversy appeared to have been defused by agreement on an “area of tolerance” within which vessels from both countries could operate pending a World Court decision on maritime demarcation. However, Nicaraguan efforts shortly thereafter to establish a further “cushion” led to re-

newed tension, while new flare-ups in May and August 1997 stemmed from the seizure of numerous Honduran fishing boats that had reportedly strayed out of their national waters. A new crisis with Nicaragua erupted in November 1999 following ratification by the Honduran Congress of a 1986 maritime border treaty with Colombia that involved some 50,000 square miles of coastal waters, portions of which were alleged to have been forcibly ceded to Colombia during the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua in the 1920s. In reprisal, Nicaragua imposed a 35 percent duty on all goods imported from Honduras. In January 2000 the two countries agreed to submit the dispute to another World Court ruling; however, less than a month later peace in the Gulf of Fonseca was again threatened by an exchange between Honduran and Nicaraguan patrol boats, each claiming that it had been attacked by the other. In April 2001, following the intervention of Spanish Prime Minister Jos´e Mar´ıa Aznar, Honduras and Nicaragua, plus El Salvador, agreed to consult more closely and exchange information on military matters in an effort to prevent incidents and maintain the current military balance. But the friction continued into 2002, with periodic seizures of Honduran boats accused of illegally fishing in Nicaraguan waters and Nicaragua authorizing oil prospecting in the region. On November 28, 2006, the Nicaraguan president-elect, Daniel Ortega, offered President Zelaya a partnership agreement including proposals to end the border dispute, reduce poverty, and minimize military presence. The proposal was met with hostility in both countries. A final border demarcation set by the ICJ was agreed to by both countries in October 2007. In January 2002 outgoing President Flores reestablished relations with Cuba, which had been suspended since 1961. Seemingly prompted by Cuban aid after the 1974 and 1998 hurricanes, the new Maduro administration faced mixed reactions to its rapprochement with the Marxist regime but made no attempt to rescind the action. In October 2007 Zelaya became the first Honduran president to visit Cuba, meeting with interim leader Ra´ul Castro.

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Despite its rejection of the U.S. position on Cuba and tension caused by warming Honduran relations with Venezuela, Honduras participated in the conclusion of negotiations on establishment of a Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in December 2003, Under the U.S.-sponsored initiative, most intraregional trade would, over time, become tariff free. The treaty was formally launched on April 1, 2006. In May 2007 the U.S. government granted an 18-month extension of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) from September 2007 to March 2009, affecting 78,000 Hondurans, 230,000 Salvadorans, and 4,000 Nicaraguans. The TPS allows foreign nationals whose homeland conditions are recognized by the U.S. government as being temporarily unsafe to continue residing in the country but precludes their acquisition of permanent resident status.

Current Issues Crime remains the dominant challenge for the Honduran government. Upon taking office in 2006, President Zelaya announced that he would substitute a policy of “dialogue” with gang members who agreed to lay down their arms, while insisting that most of the homicides were attributable to turf wars between drug groups “financed from abroad.” Thus, in March 2006 a special military unit was created to serve as backup for the police. Three months later, Zelaya asked U.S. President George W. Bush for special forces personnel to contend with trafficking in U.S.-bound drugs in the country’s eastern Mosquita coast region. Some progress was registered during the new president’s first 100 days in areas such as education reform and forest management, although major environmental problems, including high levels of air and water pollution due to urban overpopulation, were unaddressed. Illegal logging remained a problem for rural agricultural communities, and President Zelaya highlighted the risks posed by deforestation. (The forests in Honduras were subsequently credited with curbing some of the damage wrought by Hurricane Felix in September 2007.)

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In late February 2007, after four directors of the state power company had come and gone, President Zelaya named himself the director of the company, proposing a recovery plan to stop the “energy emergency” by modernizing infrastructure and management practices, and by cutting power for delinquent customers. (The company had been suffering losses of US$160 million a year, due in part to a 49 percent electricity tax, which exacerbated bill evasion.) Following continued problems after the state takeover, Zelaya put administration of the company under control of military commanders. While a proponent of regional free trade, Zelaya’s energy approach was more interventionist in the domestic context, commanding oil storage terminals to counter the “energy terrorism” of foreign firms. President Zelaya proved aggressive with the media as well, mandating ten two-hour series of government-produced television coverage to counter what he saw as negative or incomplete reporting by Honduran journalists, particularly in reviewing his crime policies. The initiative was legal under Honduran law (see Communications, below) but attracted sharp criticism. While the president later softened his demands, he remained critical of any coverage he perceived as undermining his administration.

Political Parties Under the Pact of National Unity concluded before the 1971 election, the country’s two major political parties, the National Party and the Liberal Party, agreed to put up separate candidates for the presidency but to accept equal representation in the Congress, the cabinet, the Supreme Court, and other government organs. The pact became moot upon the resumption of military rule in late 1972 and was not renewed for the election of November 1981, at which the two traditional parties shared 94.2 percent of the vote. At the 1985, 1989, and 1993 balloting continuance of an essentially twoparty system was reaffirmed, the smaller parties collectively being limited to less than 7 percent of the vote on each occasion.

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In a move reminiscent of the Pact of National Unity, the PL and PN joined with PINU and the PDCH (below) in organizing a National Council of Convergence (Consejo Nacional de Convergencia—Conacon) in September 1995 to promote consensus on social, economic, and political issues. Excluded from the grouping, the Democratic Unification Party (PUD, below) charged that it was launched in an effort to preserve the dominance of the traditional parties. In the 1997 election the PL won the presidency and a slim majority of legislative seats, in 2001 the PN won the presidency and a plurality of 61 Assembly seats, and in 2005 the PL regained the presidency and a plurality of 62 legislative seats.

Government Party Liberal Party (Partido Liberal—PL). Tracing its political ancestry to 1890, the PL is an urban-based, center-right grouping that has historically favored social reform, democratic political standards, and Central American integration. With the active support of a social-democratic faction, Alipo (below), it secured an impressive victory over the Nationalists in the 1981 balloting, winning the presidency and a clear majority in the National Assembly. Following the inauguration of President Suazo C´ordova in January 1982, Alipo influence waned, while the non-alipista group split into an “old guard” rodista tendency (named after former Liberal leader Modesto Rodas Alvarado), composed primarily of traditionally antimilitarist conservatives, and a presidential tendency (suazocordovistas), encompassing right-wing technocrats with close links to the business community and the armed forces. The latter cleavage resulted in the president’s loss of legislative support in early 1985 and the generation of a major constitutional crisis (see Political background, above). One of four PL candidates, Jos´e Azcona Hoyo, with partial rodista and Alipo support, won the presidency in 1985 without the backing of Suazo C´ordova, who, with the remaining rodistas, supported Oscar Mej´ıa Arellano. In 1987 rightist

Carlos Flores Facuss´e, a strong supporter of U.S. policy, was elected PL president and in 1989 was runner-up to the PN’s Callejas for the national presidency, a position that he won in 1997. After losing to the nacionalistas in 2001, the PL regained power in 2005. PL candidate Manuel Zelaya narrowly won the presidency by 3.7 percent, assuming the position in January 2006 after campaigning on a slogan of “citizen power” (poder ciudadano), which stressed a more responsive government and wider participation in civil society. Although the PL continues to be center-right, Zelaya’s overtures toward “Bolivarian” regional leaders critical of neoliberal globalization have shifted the party’s emphasis. While the ruling party, the PL remains dependent on other parties to pass legislation, at times coordinating with the National Party, Honduras’ other perennial power broker. Leaders: Manuel (Mel) ZELAYA (President of the Republic and leader of the Liberal Hope Movement [Movimiento Esperanza Liberal—MEL]), Dr. ˜ Rafael PINEDA Ponce (leader of Pinedista Movement [Movimiento Pinedista—MP] and 2001 presidential candidate), Patricia RODAS (President of the Party), Jaime ROSENTHAL Oliva (Secretary General and leader of Liberal Movement of Renewal [Movimiento Liberalismo Renovador— MLR]).

Other Legislative Parties National Party (Partido Nacional—PN). Created in 1923 as an expression of national unity after a particularly chaotic period, the PN is a right-wing party with close ties to the military. While traditionally dominated by rural landowning interests, it has, in recent years, supported programs of internal reform and favors Central American integration. Factionalism within the PN was evidenced in the wake of November 1982 balloting for the party executive, former president Gen. Juan Melgar Castro accusing the oficialista faction, led by former president Ricardo Z´un˜ iga, of perpetrating a “worthless farce.” In July 1983 two separate PN conventions

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were held, and three presidential candidates were nominated in 1985. Rafael Leonardo Callejas, supported by most of the party, led all contenders in the 1985 balloting with 43 percent of the total votes. However, the other two PN candidates garnered less than 2 percent each. As a result, under existing electoral procedure, the presidency was awarded to the Liberals, whose nominees had collectively obtained a 51 percent vote share. The PN quickly reached a power-sharing agreement with the PL, but Callejas, after declaring the accord’s commitments no longer binding, announced in January 1987 that the PN would move into “more critical” opposition. The PN won the 1989 presidential race with a slight majority of the popular vote but lost in 1993 under the candidacy of former Supreme Court President Oswaldo Ramos Soto. As in the case of the PL, the party contains a number of internal factions. In the 1997 election, the PN legislative delegation declined by 1 to 54, although C´esar CASTELLANOS narrowly defeated his Liberal opponent to win the Tegucigalpa mayoralty. Castellanos, considered a potential presidential candidate, was killed in a helicopter crash in late 1998. In November 2001 PN candidate Ricardo Maduro won the presidency with a 53 percent vote share, although the party failed to secure a legislative majority. The PN lost the presidency and dropped to second in the legislative balloting in 2005 and has since cooperated intermittently in the passage of PL-sponsored legislation. Capitalizing on public frustration with the ruling party, the PN led thousands in a Tegucigalpa march aimed at pressuring the government to control rising crime rates in April 2007. Leaders: Porfirio (“Pepe”) LOBO Sosa (Former President of the National Assembly, President of the Party and 2005 presidential candidate), Ricardo MADURO Joest (Former President of the Repub´ NIGA ˜ lic), Ricardo ZU Augustinus (Former President of the Republic), Gen. Juan Alberto MELGAR Castro (Former President of the Republic), Oswaldo RAMOS Soto (1993 presidential candidate and leader of Oswaldista movement), Nora

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GUNERA de Melgar (Former Mayor of Tegucigalpa and 1997 presidential candidate), Rafael Leonardo CALLEJAS Romero (Former President of the Republic). Democratic Unification Party (Partido Unificaci´on Democr´atica—PUD). The PUD was launched in September 1993 by merger of four leftwing groups drawn, at least in part, from demobilized elements of the MRH, below: the Honduran Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Hondure˜no—PRH), the Morazanista Liberation Party (Partido Morazanista de Liberaci´on—PML), the Party for the Transformation of Honduras (Partido para la Transformaci´on de Honduras—PTH), and the Patriotic Renovation Party (Partido Renovaci´on Patri´otica—PRP). In its 1994 legalization of the new formation, the National Assembly ruled that it could not engage in electoral activity until 1997. In late 1994 the party called for “the overthrow of [President] Reina and his family” as a means of averting “total disaster.” Its founder secured an Assembly seat in 1997, while PL defector Filiberto ISAULA captured the mayoralty of La Paz, the stronghold of former Liberal President Suazo C´ordova. It won five assembly seats in 2001, all of which were retained in 2005. ´ Leaders: Juan Angel ALMENDARES Bonilla (2005 presidential candidate), Mat´ıas FUNES Valladares (President of the Party and 1997 and 2001 presidential candidate), C´esar HAM (Former President of the Party). Christian Democratic Party of Honduras (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano de Honduras— PDCH). The PDCH, a small centrist party with some trade union support, was accorded legal recognition by the Melgar Castro government in December 1977. The action was reversed in November 1978 after complaints by the PN that it had broken the electoral law by receiving funds from abroad. The party was permitted to contest the 1981 election, at which it ran fourth, with 1.6 percent of the vote. In 1985 it barely secured the 1.5 percent vote share needed to maintain registration; in 1997 it drew only 1.25 percent. Its legislative

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representation rose from two seats to three in 2001 and to four in 2005. Leaders: Juan Ram´on MART´INEZ (2005 presidential candidate), Arturo CORRALES Alvarez (1997 and 2001 presidential candidate), Dr. Hern´an CORRALES Padilla (President of the Party and 1985 presidential candidate).

sized military activity in favor of an anti-U.S., anti-contra political platform. It was dissolved in 1990 and merged into Patriotic Renovation Party (Partido Renovaci´on Patri´otica–PRP). (See PRP in PUD profile, above.) Rigoberto Padilla Rush died in October 1998. Leader: Mario SOSA Navarro.

Innovation and Unity Party (Partido Innovaci´on y Unidad—PINU). Another centrist group, PINU was granted legal status in 1977. It ran third in the 1981 balloting, although securing only 2.5 percent of the vote, and was fourth in 1985 with 1.9 percent. In mid-1986 the party announced that it had become a social democratic formation, although several other groups indicated that they intended to seek formal recognition under the rubric, including one launched the following October as the PSDH. The party increased its legislative representation from two seats to three in 1997 and to four in 2001, only two of which were retained in 2005. Leaders: Carlos SOSA Coello (2005 presidential candidate), Olban VALLADARES Ordo˜ne´ z (President of the Party and 1993, 1997, and 2001 presidential candidate).

Popular Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal del Pueblo—Alipo). Technically a left-of-center tendency within the PL, Alipo has a separate organizational structure but is itself divided into a number of factions, the most important of which are a financial and agro-export oriented tendency led by Edmond Bogran, and a strongly antimilitary tendency, also known as the Revolutionary Liberal Democratic Movement (Movimiento Liberal Democr´atico Revolucionario—M-L´ıder), led by former president Carlos Roberto Reina Idiaquez, who committed suicide in August 2004. Leaders: Edmond BOGRAN, Jorge BUESO Arias, Gustavo GOMEZ Santos, Jorge Arturo REINA.

Other Parties and Groups Communist Party of Honduras (Partido Comunista de Honduras—PCH). Originally formed in 1927 and reorganized in 1954, the PCH was traditionally a Moscow-oriented group. Outlawed in 1957, it regained legal status in 1981 but two years later was again functioning as a clandestine formation. In 1984 Rigoberto Padilla Rush, PCH secretary general although resident in Cuba since 1982, was officially expelled from the Central Committee. However, he continued to lead a radical external wing, which advocated revolutionary violence, while a more moderate faction, headed by Mario Sosa Navarro, dominated PCH activity within Honduras. The split was apparently healed at the Fourth Congress (the first since 1977), held “in conditions of clandestinity” in January 1986, at which Padilla was reelected to his former post. Resolutions approved by the Congress deempha-

Patriotic Action (Acci´on Patri´otica—AP). The AP was launched in March 2006 by a group of left-leaning politicians and trade union leaders, who felt that the PUD had failed to live up to its early promise to end the “political duopoly” of the PL and PN. Leaders: Agapito ROBLEDA (PUD dissident), Israel SALINAS (President of the United Confederation of Honduran Workers [Confederaci´on Unitaria de Trabajadores de Honduras—CUTH]).

Extremist Groups Honduran Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Hondure˜no—MRH). Although refusing to present a presidential candidate, the principal leftist coalition during the 1981 electoral campaign was the Honduran Patriotic Front (Frente Patri´otico Hondure˜no—FPH), an alliance of some 30 small groups that included the Communist Party of Honduras and the Communist Party of Honduras–Marxist-Leninist (Partido Comunista de Honduras–Marxista-Leninista—PCHML), which had been organized some years earlier

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by a number of Maoist-oriented PCH dissidents. In April 1983 the PCH joined with a number of guerrilla organizations, exclusive of the PCHML, to form the MRH, under a National Unified Directorate-Movement of Revolutionary Unity (Directorio Nacional Unificado–Movimiento de Unidad Revolucionaria—DNU-MUR) to coordinate “the struggle for national liberation” in Honduras. Talks between Honduran officials and MRH representatives were initiated during the Central American presidential summit in Managua, Nicaragua, in April 1990 and continued for the remainder of the year. In January 1991, having received government assurances that they could “safely incorporate [themselves] into Honduran society,” four DNU-MUR members, including the PCH’s Rigoberto Padilla, elected to return from exile “without abandoning [their] revolutionary positions.” Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement (Movimiento Popular de Liberaci´on Cinchonero— MPLC). Formed in 1978, the Marxist MPLC was responsible for the hijacking of a Honduran airliner in March 1981 as well as a hostage seizure in San Pedro Sula in September 1982 of more than 100 prominent business and government leaders, all of whom were subsequently freed. In April 1991 the group caused extensive damage to PN offices in San Pedro Sula while President Callejas was visiting the city. In May 1991 four Cinchonero commanders returned from exile in Nicaragua, saying that they wished to join mainstream political activity; however, rather than being joined by others, they were promptly branded as “traitors” and expelled from the organization. Following an assassination attempt on the life of one of the four, the armed forces announced that they would provide security for Cinchoneros who surrendered. ´ Leader: Ra´ul LOPEZ. Lorenzo Zelaya People’s Revolutionary Front (Frente Popular Revolucionario–Lorenzo Zelaya—FPR-LZ). Allegedly linked to the Nicaraguan sandinistas, the FPR-LZ claimed responsibility for shooting two U.S. military

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advisors at the Tegucigalpa airport in September 1981. In March 1987 the government reported that security forces had killed two of its leaders in San Pedro Sula. In April 1991 the Front announced that it would be willing to abandon armed resistance if offered guarantees of safety and subsequently appeared to have done so under the general amnesty of July 11, 1991. Leader: Efra´ın DUARTE. Morazanista Front of Honduran Liberation (Frente Morazanista de Liberaci´on Hondure˜na— FMLH). Reportedly organized in 1979, the FMLH is named after Francisco Morazan, a 19th-century revolutionary leader. In September 1984 members of the group, after planting a number of bombs about the city, seized a Tegucigalpa radio station to denounce the Suazo government as “treacherous and corrupt.” Despite the wounding of seven U.S. servicemen in a northern Honduran bus attack in early 1990, the organization’s founder, Gustavo Garc´ıa Espa˜na, was reported to have announced in May that there was no longer a place for “leftwing . . . armed struggle . . . in Honduras” and that he and other FMLH leaders wished to return from residence in Nicaragua to engage in legal political activity. However, in light of a claim of responsibility for a June 1991 attack on a UN peacekeeping office in Tegucigalpa, the Front appeared to have remained active as a clandestine formation. More recently, the explosion of a parcel bomb in the Economic Ministry building in Tegucigalpa in August 1994 in protest at the government’s structural adjustment plan was described as coming from the FMLH. Some members later opted to work through the political process, leaving the group to join the PUD. Leaders: Gustavo GARCIA Espa˜na, Fernando LOPEZ, and Octavio PEREZ (both of the latter names are reportedly aliases).

Legislature Under the 1982 constitution the former Congress of Deputies has been replaced by a National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional) that

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Cabinet As of October 1, 2007 President First Vice President

Jos´e Manuel Zelaya Rosales Elvin Ernesto Santos

Ministers Agriculture and Livestock Communications Culture, Arts, and Sports Education Finance Foreign Affairs Government and Justice Housing Industry and Commerce Interior and Justice International Cooperation Investments Labor National Defense National Institute for Women’s Affairs (INAM) Natural Resources and Environment Presidency Public Health Public Works and Transportation Science and Technology Technology and International Cooperation Security Tourism

Hector Hern´andez Amador Alejandro Villatoro Rodolfo Pastor Fasquel Marlon Brev´e Reyes Patricia Rebeca Santos Rivera [f] Milton Jim´enez Puerto Edmundo Orellana Hector Briceno Miriam Elizabeth Mej´ıa [f] Jorge Arturo Reina Brenie Liliana Matute (Alas) [f] Leo Starkman Rixi Moncada [f] Ar´ıstides Mej´ıa Zelma Estrada Ucles [f] Mayra Mej´ıa del Cid [f] Yani Rosenthal Hidalgo Orison Vel´asquez Garc´ıa Jos´e Rosario Bonanno Miriam Elizabeth Mej´ıa [f] Karen Zelaya [f] Gen. (Ret.) Alvaro Antonio Romero Salgado Ricardo Mart´ınez

Directors Bank for Production and Housing (BANPROVI) Honduran Fund for Social Investment (FHIS) Honduran Institute for Social Security (IHSS) Honduras Telecommunications Company (Hondutel) Institute of Retirements and Pensions for Public Employees (INJUPEMP) Merchant Marine National Electric Energy Company (ENEE) National Institute of Agriculture (INA) National Institute for Vocational Training (INFOP) Head of Treasury Legal Advisor to the Government President, Central Bank President, National Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA) Presidential Chief of Staff Private Secretary to the President [f] = female Note: All ministers are members of the Liberal Party.

Julio Quintanilla C´esar Salgado Efrain Bu Figueroa Jacobo Regalado Lucio Izaquirre Vera Sofia Rubi [f] President Zelaya Francisco Funez Leonor Meza [f] Marion Breve Enrique Flores Lanza Gabriela N´un˜ ez de Reyes [f] Jorge Segovia Inestroza Roberto Bab´un Ra´ul Valladares

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currently consists of 128 members elected for fouryear terms. At the most recent election of November 27, 2005, the Liberal Party won 62 seats; the National Party, 55, the Democratic Unification Party, 5; the Christian Democratic Party of Honduras, 4; and the Innovation and Unity Party, 2. President: Roberto MICHELETTI Ba´ın.

Communications In September 1993 the Honduran legislature gave the government the right to censor all media material, including films and novels, found to “offend [Honduran] culture, morality, family unity, and traditions.”

Press Except as noted, all newspapers are privately owned and published daily in Tegucigalpa: La Tribuna (60,000); La Prensa (San Pedro Sula, 60,000); Tiempo (San Pedro Sula, 50,000), leftof-center; El Heraldo (45,000); El Nuevo D´ıa (San Pedro Sula, 20,000); La Gaceta (3,000), official government organ.

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addition, Britain’s Reuters, Germany’s Deutsche Presse-Agentur, and the Spanish Agencia EFE maintain offices in Tegucigalpa.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is under the supervision of the Empresa Hondure˜na de Telecomunicaciones (Hondutel). Many of the more than 280 radio stations are operated by religious groups. Commercial television is dominated by Telesistema Hondure˜no and Compa˜n´ıa Televisora Hondure˜na, both owned by Emisoras Unidas. There were approximately 674,000 television receivers in 2003. In 2005 for every 1,000 Honduran residents there were 16 personal computers and 36 Internet users. In that same year there were an estimated 178 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Roberto Flores BERMUDEZ U.S. Ambassador to Honduras: Charles A. FORD

News Agencies

Permanent Representative to the UN: Iv´an ROMERO-MART´INEZ

There is no local facility, most media relying on the regional Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias (ACAN) and U.S. news services. In

IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, BCIE, CACM, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WTO

JA M A I C A

Note: In snap parliamentary polls on September 3, 2007, the Jamaica Labour Party won 32 of 60 seats, returning to government under prime minister-elect Bruce Golding. The party of incumbent Prime Minister Portia Simpson-Miller, the People’s National Party, captured the remaining 28 seats and 49.8 percent of the vote.

The Country Jamaica, whose name is derived from the Arawak Indian word Xaymaca, is a mountainous island located 90 miles south of Cuba. The thirdlargest island in the Caribbean, it is the largest and most populous of the independent Commonwealth nations in the area. About 77 percent of the population is of African descent; another 15 percent is of mixed Afro-European heritage. Population density is high, particularly in metropolitan Kingston, which contains more than 30 percent of the national total. The Anglican and Baptist creeds claim the most adherents, but numerous other denominations and sects are active. Women constitute approximately 46 percent of the official labor force, concentrated in agriculture and civil service, with a large proportion of the remainder serving as unpaid agricultural workers. As a consequence of male urban migration, more than one-third of all households are headed by women, with 70 percent of all children being born to single mothers. The Jamaican economy is based on sugar, bauxite mining, and tourism, the last being the leading earner of foreign exchange. Important agricultural products also include rum, molasses, bananas, and citrus fruits. Remittances from Jamaicans abroad (an estimated one-quarter to one-third of the total Jamaican population) also underpin the economy, as does a thriving informal sector based primarily on the illegal production and export of marijuana and, in recent years (according to some analysts), the transshipment of cocaine from South America to North America and Europe.

Since the mid-1970s the country has experienced severe economic difficulty, marked by high inflation, pervasive unemployment, a stifling foreign debt, and depression of the bauxite and sugar industries. Even before widespread devastation caused by Hurricane Gilbert in September 1988, the Seaga administration’s acceptance of IMFmandated austerity had fueled growing public dissatisfaction with loss of services and decreased buying power. By late 1990 the one promising sector was the bauxite industry, which had launched

CUBA

Car i bbean

S ea

JAMAICA

Montego Bay

Negril

Ocho Rios

Montego Bay

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Bluefields Bay

May Pen Alligator Pond

Car i bbean 0 0

30 Mi 30 Km

Spanish Town Kingston

Portland Bight

S ea

Port Antonio

Morant Bay

JAMAICA

Political Status: Independent member of the Commonwealth since August, 1962; under democratic parliamentary regime. Area: 4,411 sq. mi. (11,424 sq. km.). Population: 2,607,632 (2001C); 2,671,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): KINGSTON (575,000). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: Jamaican Dollar (market rate November 2, 2007: 71.13 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Kenneth Octavius HALL; sworn in February 15, 2006, succeeding Sir Howard Felix Hanlan COOKE. Prime Minister: (See headnote.) Portia SIMPSON MILLER (People’s National Party); named party president on February 25, 2006, and succeeded Percival James PATTERSON (People’s National Party) as prime minister on March 30.

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resolving widespread social problems such as income inequities, high illiteracy (30 percent), and rising crime and violence (linked to the drug trade as well as political turbulence [see Current issues, below]). In addition, the economy was significantly affected by the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001. The resulting drop in tourism revenues (normally second only to remittances in foreign exchange earnings), coupled with the impact of hurricanes as well as continuing crime and violence, led the IMF and the government in January 2002 to revise the country’s development targets. GDP growth for 2001 was only 1.0 percent, rising marginally thereafter to approximately 2.7 percent in 2006, with inflation at 5.9 percent (albeit substantially less than the 12.9 percent registered in 2005).

Government and Politics Political Background

a major expansion in both mining and refining because of increasing demand for aluminum. Subsequently, currency depreciation caused by deregulation of the foreign exchange market in September 1991 provoked a wave of protest by public-sector unions. Inflation surged from 8.4 percent in 1987 to 80.2 percent in 1991 before receding to 30.0 percent in mid-1992. After some easing in early 1993, the latter rate returned late in the year, before declining thereafter to single digits in 1996–1999. However, the economy otherwise remained severely distressed; GDP declined in real terms by 2.4 percent in 1997, 0.8 percent in 1998, and 0.4 percent in 1999, while unemployment was reported to be about 16 percent in early 1999. The Caribbean Development Bank reported growth of 0.5 percent for the Jamaican economy in 2000 (the first expansion in five years) based on increased tourism and demand for bauxite. Inflation remained steady at about 6.1 percent. However, it was widely conceded that development prospects remained dim, particularly in view of the extraordinarily high public debt, which appeared to preclude significant government investment in

A British colony from 1655 to 1962, Jamaica developed a two-party system before World War II under the leadership of Sir Alexander BUSTAMANTE and Norman W. MANLEY, founders, respectively, of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP). A considerable measure of self-government was introduced in 1944, but full independence was delayed by attempts to set up a wider federation embracing all or most of the Caribbean Commonwealth territories. Jamaica joined the now defunct West Indies Federation in 1958 but withdrew in 1961 because of disagreements over taxation, voting rights, and location of the federal capital. Bustamante became the nation’s first prime minister at independence in 1962 and on his retirement in 1967 was succeeded by Donald SANGSTER, who died within a few weeks. His replacement, Hugh L. SHEARER, led the country until the 1972 election gave a majority to the PNP for the first time since independence and permitted Michael Norman MANLEY, son of the PNP’s founder, to become prime minister. Manley remained in office following an impressive PNP victory at the

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election of December 1976, but when confronted by an economic crisis and mounting domestic insecurity, he was forced to call an early election in October 1980 that returned the JLP to power under the conservative leadership of Edward SEAGA. Benefiting from a surge of popularity occasioned by Jamaican participation in the invasion of Grenada, Seaga called an early parliamentary election for December 15, 1983, at which the JLP swept all seats in the wake of a PNP boycott occasioned by outdated voter rolls that allegedly favored the government party. In the face of highly adverse opinion poll results, the prime minister cited emergency conditions caused by Hurricane Gilbert to extend the parliamentary term beyond its normal five-year mandate but was unable to avert Manley’s return to office in February 1989. A little more than a year later, opposition hopes that local balloting could be converted into a referendum against the administration were dashed as the PNP captured 11 of 12 disputed parish councils. On March 15, 1992, Prime Minister Manley, who had been in poor health for several years, announced his retirement, effective March 23, at which time he was succeeded by his longtime deputy Percival (P. J.) PATTERSON. The PNP under Patterson won again in March 1993 and in December 1997 became the first Jamaican party to win a third consecutive term. At local elections in September 1998 the PNP won control in all 13 parish councils by taking 170 of 227 seats overall. Despite a significant reduction in its vote share and seats, the party maintained a majority in the legislative election on October 16, 2002, and Patterson formed a new cabinet on October 25. Patterson retired on March 30, 2006, and was succeeded by Portia SIMPSON MILLER, who had been elected PNP leader on February 25.

Constitution and Government Under the 1962 constitution, the queen is the titular head of state. Her representative, a governor general with limited powers, is advised, in areas bearing on the royal prerogative, by a six-member

Privy Council. Executive authority is centered in a cabinet of no fewer than 12 members (including the prime minister), who are collectively responsible to the House of Representatives, the elected lower house of the bicameral Parliament; the upper house (Senate) is entirely appointive. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court with both primary and appellate jurisdiction. Judges of both the Supreme Court and a Court of Appeal are appointed by the governor general on the advice of the prime minister. There are also several magistrates’ courts. For administrative purposes Jamaica is divided into 13 parishes and the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation, a special administrative entity encompassing the principal urban areas. In May 1991 Prime Minister Manley revealed that the government had mounted a constitutional review, including implementation of a change to republican status. The two leading parties had long agreed in the matter, the principal issue being whether the governor general should be replaced by a president with executive or ceremonial powers. In September 1994 the search for an all-party consensus on constitutional reform foundered over a new issue: the PNP’s move to dispense with the Privy Council as Jamaica’s final court of appeal in favor of participation in a projected Caribbean Court of Appeal, the government arguing that the existing method of appeal was “culturally inappropriate and inconsistent” with Jamaica’s sovereign status. Pressure for the change, which had been under discussion for some years, had intensified after the Privy Council had recommended that two individuals who had been under sentence of death for 14 years should, because of the lengthy delay, have their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. Prime Minister Patterson had responded that his administration was “unwavering” in its determination to execute convicted murderers. For its part, the opposition appeared to differ largely on procedural grounds, arguing that the government wished to alter the appellate process by simple legislative action without reference to the larger “package” of amendments that included

JAMAICA

a JLP-backed proposal for an independent police services commissioner. In March 1997 opposition leader Seaga declared that a future JLP government might withdraw from the Caribbean appellate body on the ground that its members’ appointments had been politically biased. In September 2004 Prime Minister Patterson announced that a referendum on republican status would be held by March 2005. The opposition JLP responded that it would not support the move unless the abandonment of judicial appeals to the Privy Council was also submitted to the voters, and the referendum remains in abeyance.

Foreign Relations Jamaica is a member of the United Nations and the Commonwealth as well as a number of regional organizations. Previously cordial relations with the United States were marred in July 1973 by Prime Minister Manley’s declaration of U.S. Ambassador Vincent W. de Roulet as persona non grata. They were further exacerbated by Jamaican support for Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975 and by subsequent allegations of U.S. involvement in “destabilization” activities similar to those that had led to the ouster of the Allende regime in Chile. The designation of Edward Seaga as prime minister in November 1980 signified a return to a proU.S. posture, the Cuban ambassador, in turn, being declared persona non grata and departing the country four days before the formal installation of the new government. Seaga was widely regarded as a prime mover behind the Reagan administration’s 1981 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), and ties to Washington were further strengthened by Jamaica’s participation in the U.S.-led action in Grenada in October 1983. In contrast, Prime Minister Manley moved in late 1989 to reestablish relations with Havana. In June 1994 Jamaica agreed to the anchoring of U.S. ships in its waters to determine if Haitian expatriates could qualify as refugees, and in May 1997 an agreement was announced that would permit U.S. drug enforcement agents to pursue suspected

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traffickers into Jamaican airspace and territorial waters. Relations with Haiti were suspended in March 2004 because of the presence of former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had initially sought refuge in the Central African Republic and subsequently departed for exile in South Africa.

Current Issues Both street crime and interparty flare-ups have long been major problems for Jamaica, although the level of violence subsided measurably in the run-up to the October 2002 election, primarily because of a code-of-conduct agreement among the leading contenders. Thereafter, the violence intensified, leaving 1,669 dead in 2005, nearly double the number of 2003. Most of the killings were attributed to the drug traffic, against which the incoming prime minister, Portia Simpson Miller, pledged strong action in 2006. Known affectionately as “Mama Portia” or “Sister P,” Simpson Miller commanded widespread popular support at her inauguration. However, a major scandal in October 2006 left the two major parties in a virtual dead heat in advance of an election mandated in 2007. The affair involved a sizeable payment by Trafigura Beheer, a Dutch energy company whose contract with Jamaica’s state oil company was up for renewal, into an account controlled by Development Minister and PNP General Secretary Colin CAMPBELL. Although the government survived an ensuing nonconfidence motion, the damage had been done. Campbell was obliged to resign from both his ministerial and party posts, with Simpson Miller ordering return of the funds to Trafigura.

Political Parties Jamaica’s two leading parties, the People’s National Party and the Jamaica Labour Party, have similar trade union origins. Both are well organized and institutionalized, but personal leadership within them remains very important.

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Government Party People’s National Party (PNP). Organized in 1938 by Norman W. Manley, the PNP became affiliated in 1943 with the Trade Union Council. After losing elections in 1945 and 1949 but winning those of 1955 and 1959, it came to power for the first time since independence in March 1972, following ten years in opposition. Headed until 1992 by Michael MANLEY (son of its late founder), the PNP is based on the National Workers’ Union and draws its principal support from middle-class, intellectual, and urban elements. Committed to a program of “democratic socialism,” the party was decisively defeated at the October 1980 election. In recent years it has moved toward the center, its leadership eliminating the word “socialism” from its manifesto for the 1986 municipal elections and rejecting a future electoral alliance with the WPJ (below). Following its boycott of the 1983 balloting, the party functioned as an extraparliamentary opposition; initially eschewing mass demonstrations in favor of “public forums,” the PNP claimed a major role (along with the WPJ) in the unrest over fuel prices in January 1985, which was followed by mass PNP rallies in tourist areas and a successful campaign for the preparation of revised voter lists. The party won control of 11 of 13 parish councils in July 1986 (securing 126 of 187 seats overall) and decisively defeated the JLP at the parliamentary balloting of February 9, 1989, with a 56.7 percent vote share; it performed even better at the early election of March 30, 1993, winning 52 of 60 seats on a 60 percent vote share. In May 1995 the PNP suspended the operations of its youth wing and called for the resignation of its general secretary following allegations of leadership involvement in a scheme to sell illegally obtained U.S. visas. Former prime minister and PNP leader Michael Manley died on March 6, 1997. On December 18 his successor, P. J. Patterson, led the party to its third consecutive legislative victory with a marginal loss of two seats. Patterson managed to win a fourth victory for his party in legislative balloting in October 2002, although the PNP lost even more seats

to the JLP. Reportedly because of the decreasing vote share of his party, Patterson subsequently declared that his current term would be his last, and he stepped down in favor of Portia Simpson Miller in March 2006; concurrently, Patterson announced his retirement from politics. Leaders: Portia SIMPSON MILLER (Prime Minister and President of the Party); Dr. Karl BLYTHE, Dr. Peter PHILLIPS, and Dr. Paul ROBERTSON (Vice Presidents); Donald BUCHANAN (General Secretary).

Opposition Parties Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). Founded in 1943 by Alexander Bustamante, the JLP originated as the political arm of his Bustamante Industrial Trade Union. The more conservative of Jamaica’s two leading parties, the JLP supports private enterprise, economic expansion, and a generally proWestern international stance, but the party also identifies with Black African and other third world nations. Opposition to Prime Minister Seaga’s leadership, particularly in regard to economic policy, contributed to the party’s defeat at local elections in 1986, at the parliamentary poll of February 1989, and at municipal balloting in March 1990, with dissidents advancing the slogan “Three in a row, time to go.” Seaga’s principal opponents, a so-called “gang of five” led by Pearnel CHARLES, were unable to dislodge the JLP leader at the party’s annual conference in June and were removed from the shadow cabinet during September and October. By late November all five had secured court injunctions banning the JLP executive from expelling them from membership in the party and deletion from its future candidate lists. Somewhat unexpectedly, Charles reasserted his loyalty to Seaga in July 1991, eliciting a bitter response from the party leader that he would be put on “probation.” In March 1992 one of the dissidents, Karl SAMUDA, joined the PNP, while Charles was denied election to a deputy leadership post at the party’s annual conference in July. Significantly, Charles and two of the other three remaining dissidents lost their seats at the March 1993 election. In September

JAMAICA

1995 Samuda resigned from the PNP and was readmitted to the JLP a month later. Although under attack by party opponents, Edward Seaga was reelected JLP leader on March 26, 1995. A month earlier Bruce Golding, the shadow finance minister and long considered Seaga’s successor, had resigned as chair, reportedly after his supporters had asked Seaga to step down; subsequently Golding formed the rival NDM (below). Seaga was again confirmed as JLP leader at the party’s annual conventions in 1999 and 2000. The party was runner-up to the PNP at the election of December 18, 1997, winning only ten House seats. Although the JLP increased its vote share and gained a total of 26 seats in legislation balloting in October 2002, the party’s failure to displace the PNP as the ruling party reportedly prompted increasing internal criticism of Seaga. In mid-2004, Seaga announced that he would step down as JLP leader in November, and Golding (who had returned to the party) was elected his successor at a convention on February 20, 2005, and sworn in as Leader of the Opposition on April 21. Leaders: Orrett Bruce GOLDING (Leader of the Opposition); Karl SAMUDA (General Secretary). National Democratic Movement (NDM). The NDM was launched on October 29, 1995, by former JLP chair Bruce Golding, who had resigned in early September as opposition finance spokesperson. Golding, who had indicated earlier that he might challenge Seaga for leadership of the JLP at its annual conference in November, declared that the new formation was needed to generate the “long-range stability without which there [could] be no significant investment and growth.” Public opinion polls indicated that the NDM could attract 20 percent of the vote, as contrasted with 21 percent for the PNP and 18 percent for the JLP. However, it lost all of its existing five seats at the legislative balloting of December 18, 1997. Golding stepped down from his leadership post in March 2000, and a May NDM conference selected as his successor Hyacinth Bennett, who thereby became the first

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woman to head a Jamaican party. Before the legislative balloting in October 2002, the NDM initiated the formation of an electoral coalition called the New Jamaica Alliance (NJA) that also included the Republican Party of Jamaica (RPS), led by Denzil TAYLOR; and the Jamaica Alliance for National Unity (JANU), which had been launched the previous March by a church and civic group led by Rev. Al MILLER. The NJA failed to win any seats in legislative balloting. In February 2005, Golding, who had returned to the JLP, was designated Seaga’s successor and became Leader of the Opposition after winning a by-election on April 13. Leaders: Hugh THOMPSON (Chairman); Michael WILLIAMS (General Secretary).

Minor Parties In May 1986 a Jamaica-American Party was launched by businessman James CHISHOLM, with the goal (unsupported by discernible public opinion) of making Jamaica the 51st U.S. state; two years later an African Comprehensive Party was organized by Abuwa Stedwick WHYTE, a Rastafarian religious leader, while the formation of a United Progressive Movement was announced in late 1993. A Natural Law Party (NLP), led by Dr. Leo CAMPBELL, was launched in 1996. The Workers’ Party of Jamaica (WPJ), a communist group formed in 1978 but which in 1990 rejected its commitment to “democratic centralism,” was characterized in late 1995 as “defunct,” with its longtime leader, Dr. Trevor MUNROE, reportedly joining the NDM. In August 2000 a United People’s Party (UPP) was launched by Antoinette HAUGHTONCARDENAS, an attorney and former talk show host, in support of “family values” and “spiritual rebirth towards collective nation-building.” The UPP contested the legislative elections in October 2002 but failed to win any seats. Among the other minor parties that ran in the 2002 balloting was the Imperial Ethiopian World Federation Incorporated Political Party (IEWFIPP), led by Ascento FOXE. The IEWFIPP, reportedly launched in 1997,

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Cabinet As of May 1, 2007 see headnote Prime Minister

Portia Simpson Miller [f]

Ministers Agriculture and Land Culture, Tourism, and Entertainment Defense Education and Youth Finance and Planning Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Health Industry, Commerce, Science, and Technology Information and Development Justice and Attorney General Labor and Social Security Local Government and Environment National Security Transportation, Water, Housing, and Works

Roger Clarke Aloun Angela N’dombet Assamba [f] Portia Simpson Miller [f] Maxine Henry-Wilson [f] Sen. Omar Davies Anthony Hylton Horace Dalley Phillip Paulwell Donald Buchanan Arnold J. Nicholson Derrick Kellier Dean Peart Dr. Peter Phillips Robert Pickersgill

[f] = female

was described as a “Rastafarian” formation espousing “modern Ethiopianist” ideology.

Legislature The bicameral Parliament consists of an appointed Senate and an elected House of Representatives. All money bills must originate in the lower chamber. Senate. The upper house presently consists of 21 members appointed by the governor general; 13 are normally appointed on advice of the prime minister and 8 on the advice of the leader of the opposition. After the 1983 election, however, the PNP refused to nominate opposition senators and expelled 2 party members who had accepted such appointment from Prime Minister Seaga as a means of protesting alleged electoral irregularities. The JLP adopted the same posture in the immediate wake of the 1993 poll.

In January 1994 a joint parliamentary committee recommended that the size of the house be enlarged to 30–36 senators; however, the enlargement was never implemented. President: Syringa MARSHALL-BURNETT. House of Representatives. The lower house is now at its constitutional limit of 60 members, all of whom are elected by universal adult suffrage for five-year terms, subject to dissolution. At the most recent election of October 16, 2002, the People’s National Party (PNP) won 34 seats and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), 26. Speaker: Michael PEART.

Communications Press The press has traditionally been free of censorship and government control, although the financially troubled News, which had come under state

JAMAICA

ownership, was closed down in April 1983 after the government had rejected a purchase tender from a cooperative of its employees. The following are published in Kingston: Jamaica Gleaner (250,000 daily, 900,000 Sunday); Daily Star (50,000 daily, 60,000 weekend); Jamaica Herald.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility; AP, the Caribbean News Agency, and Reuters are among those with bureaus in Kingston.

Broadcasting and Computing The government-owned Television Jamaica Limited (formerly the Jamaica Broadcasting Company) controls the island’s television facilities, while the Educational Broadcasting Service of the Ministry of Education provides radio and television service for the public schools. In mid-1989 the Manley administration scrapped its predecessor’s

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plan to divest most JBC functions, while announcing that private interests would be permitted to operate a national TV channel and a national radio station. As of 2005 there were approximately 399 Internet users and 62 personal computers per 1,000 people. As of that same year there were about 1,058 cellular mobile subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: (Vacant) U.S. Ambassador to Jamaica: Brenda LaGrange JOHNSON Permanent Representative to the UN: Raymond O. WOLFE IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, SELA, WCO, WTO

MEXICO UNITED MEXICAN STATES Estados Unidos Mexicanos

The Country

UNITED STATES

Tijuana Ciudad Juárez Chihuahua

lf Gu

C of n or ia

La Paz

Gulf of Me x i c o

Monterrey

f ali

Extending southeastward from the U.S. border to the jungles of Yucat´an and Guatemala, Mexico ranks third in size and second in population among North American countries and holds comparable rank among the countries of Latin America. Its varied terrain encompasses low-lying coastal jungles, a broad central plateau framed by high mountain ranges, and large tracts of desert territory in the north. The people are mainly of mixed Indian and Spanish (mestizo) descent, with minority groups of pure Indians and Caucasians. Despite the predominance of Roman Catholicism, constitutional separation of church and state has prevailed since 1857, with links to the Vatican in abeyance until 1992 (see Foreign relations, below). About onefourth of the population is still engaged in agriculture, which now contributes less than 6 percent of GDP. In 2000 women constituted 37 percent of the nonagricultural labor force, concentrated mainly in trade, manufacturing, and domestic service; in the export-oriented border factories (maquiladoras), more than 80 percent of the workforce is female. Women’s participation in national and local government ranges from zero to 20 percent, although Amalia GARC´IA (who, as a former Democratic Revolutionary Party president, had been the first woman to head a Mexican party) won the governorship of Zacatecas in mid-2004, while former ´ President Fox’s wife, Marta SAHAGUN, was an on-again, off-again candidate for president in 2006. Industrialization has been rapid since World War II, but its benefits have been unevenly distributed, and much of the rural population remains substan-

tially unaffected. The GNP grew by a yearly average of 16 percent during 1972–1975, with the growth rate declining to a still-impressive 8 percent in 1978–1981. Subsequently, the economy fell into deep recession, with an unserviceable foreign debt, massive capital flight, widespread unemployment, and rampant inflation. Successive International Monetary Fund (IMF) interventions slowed the decline in 1983–1984, but by mid-1986, in the wake of a disastrous earthquake in Mexico City the preceding September and a collapse in oil prices, crisis conditions had returned, with inflation

MEXICO

Guadalajara León Puerto Vallarta Mexico City

Mérida Heróica Puebla de Zaragoza

Acapulco PA CIFIC O CE A N

0 0

400 Mi 400 Km

GUATEMALA

´ Cancun BELIZE HOND EL SALV.

MEXICO

Political Status: Independence originally proclaimed 1810; present federal constitution adopted February 5, 1917. Area: 761,600 sq. mi. (1,972,544 sq. km.). Population: 97,483,412 (2000C); 107,659,000 (2006E). Provisional results of a 2005 census carry a total population of 103,088,021, which is substantially less than recent official estimates. Major Urban Centers (2005E): MEXICO CITY (Federal District, 8,795,000), Guadalajara (1,645,000), Tijuana (1,474,000), Ciudad Ju´arez (1,454,000), Heroica Puebla de Zaragoza (1,428,000), Le´on (1,183,000), Monterrey (1,132,000), Chihuahua (743,000), Acapulco (682,000), Mexicali (616,000), Veracruz (481,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: New Peso (market rate November 2, 2007: 10.70 pesos = $1US). ´ Hinojosa President: Felipe CALDERON (National Action Party); elected July 2, 2006, and inaugurated on December 1 for a six-year term, succeeding Vicente FOX Quesada (Nacional Action Party).

surging to more than 140 percent in 1987. The government responded late in the year with a number of initiatives, including an innovative buy-back plan for foreign debt and an Economic Solidarity Pact (Pacto de Solidaridad Econ´omica—PSE) among government, management, and labor to hold down prices and wages. Bolstered by a dramatic decline in inflation to less than 20 percent in 1989, coupled with modest GNP growth, the Salinas administration sought a reported $1 billion from its international lenders in 1990 for oil, electric power, and communications development. Further invigorating Salinas’s economic agenda were windfall oil revenues from the Persian Gulf crisis ($3 billion) and anticipated income from the privatization of telecommunications, banking, and the iron and steel industries ($3–$5 billion in the short term, plus the potential repatriation of an estimated $50

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billion that reportedly went overseas during earlier nationalization schemes). An economic growth rate of 3.6 percent in 1991 was considered highly satisfactory, given a 2.2 percent growth in population and a recession in the United States; however, the rate receded to 2.6 percent in 1992 (albeit with a further decline in inflation to 15.5 percent) and to less than 1 percent in 1993. During 1994 inflation declined further to 7.1 percent, while economic growth was estimated at 3.3 percent. In December the country was engulfed by a fiscal crisis that prompted a $50 billion U.S.-led rescue package in January 1995. By late 1995 it was evident that the slump would be far worse than in 1982, with a decline of between 3.5 and 5 percent in GDP, inflation of more than 40 percent, and a doubling of official unemployment to 6.6 percent (as contrasted with a business association figure of 10.4 percent and union estimates as high as 35 percent). GDP showed a gain of 5.2 percent for 1996, with inflation dipping to under 30 percent for the year. GDP growth continued strong during the next two years, at 7 percent in 1997 and 4.8 percent in 1998, but inflation remained high at more than 18 percent. The economy grew by 3.7 percent in 1999 and then soared by 6.9 percent in 2000. In early 2001, however, growth stalled, in large part because of weakness in the U.S. economy but also because of a decline in maquiladora activity as the result of Chinese competition. By mid-2001 the inflation rate had dropped below 7 percent, but GDP contracted by 0.3 percent before improving by 0.7 percent in 2002, 1.3 percent in 2003, and 4.4 percent in 2004. In 2005 GDP declined by 3 percent, but more surprising was that year’s inflation rate of 3.3 percent, which was the lowest since such records began 36 years earlier. Inflation rose to 4.1 percent in 2006, with GDP growth standing 4.8 percent for the same year.

Government and Politics Political Background Conquered by Spain in the 16th century, Mexico proclaimed its independence in 1810 and the

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establishment of a republic in 1822. The country was ruled by Gen. Antonio L´opez de SANTA ANNA from 1833 to 1855, a period that encompassed the declaration of Texan independence in 1836 and war with the United States from 1846 to 1848. Archduke MAXIMILIAN of Austria, installed as emperor of Mexico by Napoleon III in 1865, was deposed and executed by Benito JUAREZ in 1867. The dominant figure during the latter years of the nineteenth century was Gen. Porfirio D´IAZ, who served as president from 1877 to 1910. Modern Mexican history dates from the Revolution of 1910, which shattered an outmoded social and political system and cleared the way for a generally progressive republican regime whose foundations were laid in 1917. From 1928 political life was dominated by a nationwide grouping known since 1946 as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional— PRI), which purported to carry forward the work of the 1917 constitution. Luis ECHEVERR´IA Alvarez, who assumed the presidency in 1970, adopted the slogan “Upward and Forward” (“Arriba y Adelante”) as a rallying cry for his program of reform, which sought to overcome inequitable distribution of income, widespread alienation and unrest, scattered urban and rural violence, and a visible erosion in the prestige, if not the power, of the PRI. Echeverr´ıa’s efforts were opposed both by the right, because of a feeling that the traditional favoritism shown to business interests was waning, and by the left, because of a conviction that the reform was a sham. In the presidential election of July 4, 1976, Fi´ nance Minister Jos´e LOPEZ Portillo, running as the PRI candidate, obtained 94.4 percent of the popular vote against a group of independents, no opposition party having presented an endorsed candidate. Soon after his inauguration on December 1, the new chief executive introduced a far-reaching program of political reform that resulted in three previously unrecognized parties, including the Mexican Communist Party, being conditionally legalized prior to the legislative election of July 1979, after which

all three were granted seats in the Chamber of Deputies according to their vote totals. A left-wing coalition, the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (Partido Socialista Unificado de M´exico—PSUM), formed in November 1981 by the Communists and four smaller parties, failed to gain ground against the entrenched PRI in the July 1982 balloting. The ruling party captured all but one elective congressional seat and saw its presidential candidate, former minister of programming and budget Miguel de la MADRID Hurtado, win 74.4 percent of the vote in a field of seven nominees. During the ensuing four years the PRI was buffeted by an unprecedented, if minor, set of electoral losses to the rightist National Action Party (Partido Acci´on Nacional—PAN). In the lower house election of July 1985 PAN won nine elective seats, while in a supplementary distribution under proportional representation the leftist parties gained substantially more seats than in 1982. At a congress in October 1987 the PRI ratified the selection of former planning and budget minister Carlos SALINAS de Gortari as its 1988 presidential candidate. Although seemingly assured of victory, Salinas was credited with a bare 50.4 percent vote share in the balloting of July 6, 1988. His three competitors, ´ Cuauht´emoc CARDENAS Sol´orzano of the leftist National Democratic Front (Frente Democr´atico Nacional—FDN), PAN’s Manuel CLOUTHIER, and Rosario IBARRA de la Piedra of the farleft Revolutionary Workers’ Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—PRT), immediately brought charges of widespread fraud, which in September were rejected by the Congress sitting as an electoral college to review the results. In the legislative and gubernatorial elections of August 18, 1991, the PRI won 31 of 32 available Senate seats and 290 of 300 directly contested Chamber seats. It was also declared the winner in all six state governorship contests, although two of the victors were forced to withdraw because of manifest voting irregularities. Subsequent gubernatorial, state, and municipal elections in 1992– 1993 showed a pattern of eroding PRI support,

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occasional opposition successes, frequent violence, and continual opposition charges of fraudulent electoral practice. Following disclosures that the PRI had received large financial donations from the beneficiaries of privatization, party chair Genaro BORREGO Estrada in March 1993 announced a limit on individual contributions; later that month he was removed from office by President Salinas. The president, seeking to respond to domestic and international criticism of Mexican political practice, then initiated other PRI leadership changes and introduced electoral reform measures that were approved by Congress in September (see Constitution and government, below). Meanwhile, the government had come under strong censure for its unconvincing response to the killing on May 25 of the archbishop of Guadalajara, Cardinal Juan Jes´us POSADAS Ocambo, who was caught in an apparent shootout between rival drug gangs at the city’s airport. In November 1993 the PRI leadership endorsed Luis Donaldo COLOSIO Murrieta, the social development secretary and a Salinas loyalist, as the party’s presidential candidate for the 1994 election. However, a state of crisis generated by the eruption of a major insurgency in the southern state of Chiapas in January 1994 was compounded by the assassination of Colosio in the northern border city of Tijuana on March 23. The replacement PRI candidate, Ernesto ZEDILLO Ponce de L´eon (another Salinas loyalist but regarded as more conservative than Colosio), was duly elected president on August 21, but with the PRI’s lowest-ever share of the popular vote, while simultaneous congressional elections yielded significant gains for opposition parties. Even more ominous for the PRI was a near sweep by PAN of executive and legislative races in the state of Jalisco on February 12, 1995, and the party’s capture of the Guanajuato governorship on May 28. Meanwhile, the assassination of PRI Secretary General Jos´e Francisco RUIZ Massieu on September 28, 1994, had prompted an ever-widening inquiry into possible linkage with the Colosio killing and speculation as to ties between political figures and drug traffickers.

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On February 28, 1995, Ra´ul SALINAS de Gortari, the former president’s older brother, was arrested for allegedly masterminding the Ruiz Massieu killing, with Carlos Salinas announcing a brief hunger strike two days later in defense of his “personal honor” before departing for what appeared to be voluntary exile in the United States. Subsequently, additional questions arose as to the activities of the dead man’s brother, Mario RUIZ Massieu, who submitted his resignation as deputy attorney general after accusing senior PRI officials of hindering an investigation into the affair. He was arrested in Newark, New Jersey, on March 3 as he attempted to board a plane for Spain. Mexican authorities stated that almost $7 million had been credited to his account in various U.S. banks and charged him with falsifying evidence regarding the murder to protect Ra´ul Salinas. During ensuing months Mexico sought unsuccessfully to secure extradition of the ex-prosecutor, a fourth and final appeal being rejected by a U.S. magistrate on December 22, even though Washington sought his deportation as an undesirable alien. (He committed suicide in September 1999 immediately prior to a scheduled federal court appearance on drug and wiretapping charges.) The scandal widened on November 15, 1995, when Swiss officials arrested Ra´ul Salinas’s wife for using a fraudulent power of attorney in an attempted withdrawal from accounts, opened by her husband under an assumed name, that reportedly totaled $84 million. In a faxed message to a number of news organizations, Carlos Salinas expressed “amazement,” insisting that he had known nothing about the stash, which prompted new charges of illegal enrichment against his brother. In a bizarre twist to the affair, billionaire businessman Carlos PERALTA Quintero entered a claim for $50 million of the frozen fund, insisting that it had been intended as an investment (albeit undocumented) in a projected real estate venture. In December 1996 Carlos Salinas, by then resident in Ireland (which had no extradition arrangement with Mexico), was interviewed via electronic transmission from the Mexican embassy in Dublin by prosecutors in both the Colosio and Ruiz Massieu cases.

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Earlier, the PRI’s electoral fortunes had shown scant signs of recovery. In August 1995 PAN retained control of Baja California (where the PRI in 1988 had experienced its first state-level defeat), its third victory of the year out of four such contests. By mid-November both PAN and the leftist Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido de la Revoluci´on Democr´atica—PRD) had substantially increased their local representation, although the PRI succeeded in retaining the governorship of Michoac´an, a PRD stronghold. The ruling party was subsequently embarrassed in the state of Guerrero, whose governor, Rub´en FIGUEROA Alcocer, was obliged to resign on March 12, 1996, after being accused of attempting to cover up a police massacre of 17 opposition peasants. Meanwhile, PAN had pulled out of electoral reform talks with the PRI, although the PRD, which had earlier withdrawn from the discussion, returned to the negotiating table, paving the way for a tentative agreement on April 15 by parties holding 70 percent of federal legislative seats. Meanwhile, the outbreak of insurgent activity in the southernmost state of Chiapas continued under the direction of an indigenous formation styling itself the Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ej´ercito Zapatista de Liberaci´on Nacional—EZLN). Led by a charismatic mestizo using the alias “Subcomandante Marcos,” the group issued a “Declaration of the Lacandona Jungle” that sought redress from “a dictatorship of more than 70 years.” Discussions with the rebels yielded a cease-fire agreement on March 2, in which the government pledged improvements in housing, water, electricity, health care, communications, and education. However, clashes continued, and in December the insurgents set up a ˜ “parallel government” under Amado AVENDANO Figuera, who had contested the governorship in August as the candidate of the left-wing PRD. The Zedillo administration responded by establishing a National Commission of Intermediation (Comisi´on Nacional de Intermediaci´on—Conai) that resumed negotiations with the rebels in mid-January 1995. However, the talks quickly bogged down, and in early February Zedillo ordered a new offensive by

army and police units. Substantive talks resumed in late April but reached a stalemate in mid-May, with the EZLN representatives demanding national reforms, and the government insisting that any changes be restricted to Chiapas. In early September a special congressional commission proposed that the Zapatistas be allowed to participate in allparty discussions on electoral and other reforms. Several days later the rebels agreed to join the national talks while engaging in parallel negotiations on local issues. On January 1, 1996, the Zapatistas announced the creation of a Zapatista National Liberation Front (Frente Zapatista de Liberaci´on Nacional— FZLN), which was characterized as “a new political force with its base in the EZLN” that would work for the “transforming of Mexico.” A month later the government and the EZLN reached agreement on a draft charter expanding the rights of Indians, thus clearing the way for a peace accord. However, the pact was threatened in late May, when the Zapatistas declared a “red alert” in areas under their control because of alleged military provocations by the government. The rebels again withdrew from the peace process but agreed on June 10 to return following the release of two high-ranking Zapatista leaders who had been captured in February. Meanwhile, an even more radical Popular Revolutionary Army (Ej´ercito Popular Revolucionario— EPR) had emerged in the southern state of Guerrero. With no apparent links to the EZLN, EPR guerrillas mounted an attack on police and military installations in four Mexican states on August 28 that left 13 dead and 23 wounded. On September 1 President Zedilla pledged to combat the new rebel force with the “full force of the state.” By late 1996 the government also faced continued erosion in its political strength in the rest of the country. PAN and the PRD both made significant inroads against PRI dominance in elections held in the states of Coahuila and M´exico, winning a number of mayoralties. In addition, public opinion polls indicated that the PRI faced a genuine challenge in retaining its legislative majority in the national elections scheduled for mid-1997 and could also lose the concurrent first-ever direct

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balloting for mayor of Mexico City (considered the second-most influential office in the country). On July 6, 1997, the PRI retained only 238 of 500 lower house seats and yielded the Mexico City mayoralty to the PRD’s C´ardenas Sol´orzano. Following the election, the PRD, PAN, and two smaller legislative groups, the Labor Party (Partido del Trabajo—PT) and the Mexican Green Ecologist Party (Partido Verde Ecologista de M´exico— PVEM), formed a working majority to constrain the PRI’s theretofore unchallenged domination of the lower house, particularly in regard to the allocation of committee chairmanships. While the right-wing PAN subsequently insisted that its participation in the alliance was tactical, not strategic, it joined with the other opposition members in a semiformal Grupo de los Cuatro in mid-October. Mexico was stunned on December 22, 1997, by the attack of a band of gunmen on a small village in Chiapas that caused the death of 45 Indians, including 15 children. While President Zedillo branded the attack as “a cruel, absurd, and unacceptable criminal act,” its perpetrators were reportedly PRI adherents. In the following year contacts with the EZLN were distinctly uneven. Despite a number of peace initiatives by both federal and state authorities, talks were essentially stalled, and on June 8 a key figure, Bishop Samuel RUIZ, resigned as the head of Conai, which declared its dissolution the same day. However, on October 18 the EZLN announced that it would return to the bargaining table, albeit only to talks involving a parliamentary Commission of Concord and Pacification (Comisi´on de Concordia y Pacificaci´on—Cocopa), originally set up parallel to Conai, that had no executive representation. The PRI closed out 1998 with a record of seven victories in ten governors’ races, thus reversing a three-year decline that had cast doubt on its electoral appeal. In a remarkable verdict handed down on January 21, 1999, Ra´ul Salinas was convicted of ordering the 1994 Ruiz Massieu assassination and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment (subsequently reduced to 27.5 years). In February state elections the PRI held three additional governorships but lost Baja California Sur to the PRD, while

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in March about 90 percent of the 3 million voters participating in the Indian rights plebiscite (the “Consultation for the Recognition of the Rights of Indian Peoples and the End of the War of Extermination”) voiced support for the Zapatista program, including explicit constitutional recognition of Indian rights. The election of July 2, 2000, was a watershed event in Mexican political history. Although consistently trailing in the public opinion polls, Vicente FOX Quesada of the right-wing PAN, in a coalition with a number of smaller parties called Alliance for Change, succeeded in defeating the PRI nominee, Francisco LABASTIDA Ochoa, 43 percent to 36 percent. In the 500-member Chamber of Deputies, the Alliance for Change won a substantial plurality of 223 seats, and in the 128member Senate the PRI’s former majority of 77 seats was reduced to a plurality of 60, with the Alliance for Change gaining a close second at 51. The PRD, heading a six-member Alliance for Mexico City, retained control of the capital, electing Andr´es ´ Manuel LOPEZ Obrador to the office from which C´ardenas had resigned to run for the presidency. President Fox’s initial high approval rating of 79 percent had declined to 48 percent by January 2002 and to 30 percent by January 2004. The effect of a downturn in the U.S. economy, together with increased competition from Chinese manufacturing, posed great obstacles to the Fox administration. In addition, a highly touted tax reform package, which was expected to raise overall revenues, met immediate opposition. In his dealings with the legislature, observers argued that President Fox, while effective at promoting his goals, had displayed a lack of political skill in nurturing them to fruition. The most notable achievement of President Fox’s first year in office was the passage of an Indigenous Rights Bill. Fox had began his tenure by offering concessions to the Zapatistas, including the closure of military bases in Chiapas. Subcomandante Marcos and 23 other members of the EZLN “General Staff” responded with a march on Mexico City, where they lobbied for the enactment of the proposed legislation and sent EZLN leaders to address the Congress on March 28, 2001 (despite

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the opposition of Fox’s party). The bill, passed in late April, authorized constitutional changes prohibiting discrimination based on factors including race, religion, or gender; permitting election of indigenous officials by standard electoral practices; guaranteeing the right to preserve Indian languages and cultures; and offering indigenous peoples preferential use of such natural resources as wood and water within their territories. As a consequence of PAN-supported amendments, the legislature frustrated the expectations of the Zapatistas and other indigenous groups by limiting their legal control over land and giving states authority to specify conditions of such control. “Subcomandante Marcos” labeled it a “grave insult” that “sabotages the process of reconciliation” and the EZLN refused to resume peace talks with the government. In late 2003 they declared political autonomy in 30 of their indigenous municipalities. In addition to developments in the municipalities, the 2003 general congressional balloting yielded significant changes in the political landscape. The PAN representation plummeted, while that of the PRI rose to just short of a majority. The biggest surprise, however, was the success of the PRD in nearly doubling its contingent from 52 to 95, thereby generating a de facto three-party system while enhancing L´opez Obrador’s presidential prospects. Although the front-runner during much of the 2006 presidential campaign, PRD presidential candidate L´opez Obrador faltered, narrowly losing the ´ HinoJuly 2 poll to the PAN’s Felipe CALDERON josa by 0.6 percent of the vote. L´opez Obrador immediately disputed the close election (Calder´on’s margin of victory was less than 250,000 votes), demanded a national recount of the ballots, and alleged widespread election irregularities. The allegations were brought to the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), Mexico’s highest court for election disputes, for a ruling. On July 6, 2006, the Institute de´ Hinojosa the winner. clared Felipe CALDERON

Constitution and Government Under its frequently amended constitution of February 5, 1917, Mexico is a federal republic con-

sisting of 31 states (each with its own constitution, elected governor, and legislative chamber) plus a Federal District, whose chief executive (formerly appointed, but elected as of 1997) is advised by 365 elected councilors. The president is directly elected for a single six-year term. Since 2000, only one, rather than both, parents of presidential contenders must be native-born Mexicans. There is no vice president and, somewhat surprisingly, Mexico has no constitutionally defined line of succession should the president resign or become incapacitated. The bicameral Congress, consisting of an elected Senate and Chamber of Deputies (both under a mixed direct and proportional system), was long confined by the party system to a secondary role in the determination of national policy; at present, however, with different parties controlling the legislative and executive branches, its influence has drastically increased. The judicial system is headed by a 21-member Supreme Court, which has four divisions: administrative, civil, labor, and penal. The justices of the Supreme Court are appointed for life by the president with the approval of the Senate. Lower courts include collegiate and single-judge circuit courts, district courts, and jury courts. The basis of local government is the municipality (municipio). State and Capital Aguascalientes (Aguascalientes) Baja California Norte (Mexicali) Baja California Sur (La Paz) Campeche (Campeche) Chiapas (Tuxtla Guti´errez) Chihuahua (Chihuahua) Coahuila (Saltillo) Colima (Colima) Durango (Durango) Guanajuato (Guanajuato) Guerrero (Chilpancingo) Hidalgo (Pachuca) Jalisco (Guadalajara) M´exico (Toluca) Michoac´an (Morelia) Morelos (Cuernavaca) Nayarit (Tepic)

Area (sq. mi.)

Population (2006E)

2,112 26,997 28,369 19,619 28,653 94,571 57,908 2,004 47,560 11,773 24,819 8,036 30,535 8,245 23,138 1,911 10,417

1,091,000 2,898,000 532,000 768,000 4,372,000 3,280,000 2,536,000 573,000 1,521,000 4,942,000 3,122,000 2,369,000 6,841,000 14,196,000 3,962,000 1,625,000 956,000

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State and Capital Nuevo Le´on (Monterrey) Oaxaca (Oaxaca) Puebla (Puebla) Quer´etaro (Quer´etaro) Quintana Roo (Chetumal) San Luis Potos´ı (San Luis Potos´ı) Sinaloa (Culiac´an) Sonora (Hermosillo) Tabasco (Villa Hermosa) Tamaulipas (Ciudad Victoria) Tlaxcala (Tlaxcala) Veracruz-Llave (Veracruz) Yucat´an (M´erida) Zacatecas (Zacatecas)

Area Population (sq. mi.) (2006E) 24,792 36,275 13,090 4,421 19,387 24,351 22,486 70,291 9,756 30,650 1,511 27,683 14,827 28,283

4,726,000 3,521,000 5,446,000 1,640,000 1,196,000 2,433,000 2,618,000 2,432,000 2,010,000 3,081,000 1,092,000 7,151,000 1,853,000 1,371,000

579

8,744,000

Federal District Ciudad de M´exico

Foreign Relations A founding member of the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and related organizations, Mexico has generally adhered to an independent foreign policy based on the principles of nonintervention and self-determination. One of the initiators of the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), it is the only non–South American member of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and the only OAS state to have continually maintained formal relations with Cuba. In return, Mexico was the only major Latin American country for which Castro refused to train guerrillas. In late 1998 the Cuban leader did, however, condemn Mexican membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (see below), although he subsequently retreated from the position following the momentary withdrawal of Mexico’s ambassador to Havana. Under President de la Madrid the country continued to exercise a leadership role in the region, despite a diminution of influence because of its economic difficulties. As a participant in the Contadora Group, which also included Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela as original members, Mexico took the group’s agenda for regional peace to both South America and the United States. While Washington

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endorsed the group’s negotiating proposals in August 1983, U.S. military policy in Central America continued to be a major source of strain in the traditionally cordial relationship between Mexico and its northern neighbor, with the Mexican chief executive tending to emphasize socioeconomic bases of regional instability, and President Ronald Reagan citing “Soviet-Cuban terrorism” as the source of difficulty. Other disagreements between the two countries have centered on border issues, such as air pollution, drug trafficking, U.S. efforts to control illegal immigration, and the passage in November 1994 of California’s Proposition 187 which, until largely invalidated a year later, called for the withholding of social and health benefits from undocumented immigrants. In 1988–1989 the United States pledged to support Mexico’s efforts to enact economic reforms and negotiate a debt reduction agreement, with Washington describing the results of both as “models” for debtor nations. Meanwhile, U.S.Mexico commercial relations continued to expand; in November 1989 the leaders of the two nations signed a trade accord, and in September 1990 Mexico, in a dramatic reversal of its traditional posture, formally requested the opening of free trade talks. Thereafter, Canada, which had concluded a free trade agreement with the United States in December 1989, was invited to participate in the discussions, which commenced in mid-1991 and concluded with agreement on the precedent-shattering NAFTA on August 11–12, 1992. In August 1993 certain contentious labor and environmental subclauses were clarified by further agreement, enabling NAFTA to secure ratification by the Mexican Congress in December and to come into effect on January 1, 1994. (Benefits from NAFTA have recently disappointed expectations due to U.S. strategic concerns regarding terrorism and illegal immigration.) In late 1993 Mexico also joined with Colombia and Venezuela (the so-called Group of Three) in a regional trade pact intended to create an economic market encompassing some 145 million people. In December 2000 the Mexican Senate ratified a free trade agreement with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador that had been concluded six months earlier.

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During a European tour in mid-1991, President Salinas had an unprecedented audience with Pope John Paul II that led to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican on September 21, 1992, after a 126-year hiatus. The action came after a series of amendments to Mexico’s 1917 constitution that voided a long-standing ban on religious bodies and conferred new rights in such matters as dress and voting by church officials. In January 1999 the Pope paid his fourth visit to Mexico, despite tension over the government’s birth control policies and handling of the Chiapas insurgency. While the United States in early 1996 “certified” Mexico as cooperating with the U.S. antidrug campaign, an accompanying report indicated that the country continued to be a major link in the illegal trade and that its financial community was deeply involved in the laundering of drug proceeds. A year later Mexico was recertified, even though ´ the head of its antidrug agency, Jes´us GONZALEZ Rebollo, had been arrested on charges of collusion with traffickers. In the wake of the U.S. action, opposition legislators charged the Zedillo administration with sacrificing Mexican interests to Washington’s agenda, with the government issuing a vaguely worded statement “rejecting the validity” of the certification process. Further fueling the controversy was the charge by a high-ranking U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency official in mid-1997 that Colombian drug activities had been “eclipsed” by those of the Mexican cartels. Eight months later an assessment by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) also criticized Mexico’s antidrug effort, while a failed “sting” operation by U.S. law enforcement agents in June 1998 imperiled further cooperation against the drug cartels. Mexico was again certified in 1999, the Zedillo administration having announced on February 4 a “total war against drug trafficking” that would include a new, technologically upgraded antinarcotics strategy. President Fox had consistently refused to back U.S. policy in Iraq, while opposing, as “inadequate,” most overtures by President George W. Bush on resolving the status of Mexican nationals in the United States (who were said to account

for approximately 60 percent of all illegal immigrants). President Calder´on later indicated that he would implement the outgoing president’s policy affecting all Mexican citizens facing criminal charges in the U.S.: they would be subject to extradition orders, regardless of whether they had faced a Mexican Court. In 2006 Mexico extradited 60 people to its northern neighbor. In the first two months of 2007, 17 more were sent. Motions for increased cooperation between the neighbors continued as President Bush visited Mexico in March 2007 at the conclusion of his five country tour of Latin America. At his press conference, the president pledged to push the Congress to approve a comprehensive immigration reform package (see article on America in the 2008 Handbook); to increase efforts to stem demand for illegal drugs in the U.S. as well as restricting supplies from Latin America; and to combat arms trafficking from the U.S. to gangsters in Mexico and Central America. Following Bush’s visit, the (outgoing) president of Argentina, N´estor Kirchner and his wife Cristina Fern´andez (the president-elect following Argentina’s October 2007 poll) visited Mexico in July 2007, extending an invitation to Mexico for full membership in Mercosur, the South American customs union of which Mexico is currently an associate partner. The president of Brazil, Lula da Silva, followed with the same offer. President Calder´on and President da Silva signed several commercial agreements to advance bilateral trade. Venezuela and Mexico have been trying to repair the diplomatic breach that led to the withdrawal of their respective ambassadors in 2005. In August 2007 the Venezuelan president, Hugo Ch´avez, nominated Roy Chaderon as Venezuela’s ambassador to Mexico. President Calder´on was expected to nominate a new Mexican ambassador to Venezuela by the end of 2007.

Current Issues Following the unilateral declaration of municipal autonomy by EZLN in 2003, the movement launched a second march on Mexico City on

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January 1, 2006 in what Marcos termed “The Other Campaign” (La Otra Campa˜na). Its goal was to generate massive abstentions from the July 2 elections. The effort appeared to have little impact, with the EZLN’s public image visibly diminished as a result. However, the disputed presidential election on July 2, 2006, led to massive protests throughout July, as presidential candidate and Mexico City mayor L´opez Obrador and his partisans implored supporters to take to the streets of Mexico City. The crisis deepened at the beginning of August after L´opez Obrador stepped up his charge that the election was “fraudulent” and urged his hundreds of thousands of supporters to begin “pacific civil resistance” by setting up camps throughout Mexico City’s main square (Z´ocalo) to “occupy permanently” the central city. However, support for L´opez Obrador waned as President Calder´on assumed greater prominence in office. Calder´on’s first major initiatives since taking office were in law enforcement, with the launch of a major offensive in Michoac´an against the drug trade meeting partial success. Soon afterward, the president’s budget initiative detailing initiatives for increased revenue was approved by the lower Chamber of Deputies in record time with the support of all major parties, followed with approval in the Senate. Budget prospects were dampened in part by energy disruptions. Early in September 2007, a series of explosions cut natural gas supplies, causing stoppages in 60 percent of Mexico’s steel production and the shutdown of two major auto plants the next day. The state oil company Pemex announced that the attacks would cause hundreds of millions of dollars in production losses. A rebel group claimed responsibility for the blasts. The government’s “war on crime” continued with moderate success, generating goodwill among the electorate. At the end of May 2007, Calder´on’s approval rating stood at 68 percent, almost double his vote share in the 2006 presidential election.

Political Parties Mexican politics for more than seven decades after the late 1920s featured the dominance of a

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single party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which for much of the period enjoyed virtually unchallenged control of the presidency, the Congress, and the state governments. The situation changed dramatically, however, as a result of the election of July 2, 2000. Parties must now capture a mandated minimum of 2 percent of the total vote in a national election to maintain their registrations. In 2006 eight additional parties were recognized by the Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral-IFE) after crossing the vote share threshold.

Presidential Party National Action Party (Partido Acci´on Nacional—PAN). Founded in 1939 and dependent on urban middle-class support, the long-time leading opposition party has an essentially conservative, proclerical, and probusiness orientation, and favors limitations on the government’s economic role. Largely because of fragmentation within the leftist opposition, PAN was, until recently, the main beneficiary of erosion in PRI support. In 1982, despite losing all but one of its directly elective Chamber seats, the party’s proportional representation rose from 39 to 54, with party spokespeople claiming that they had been denied a number of victories as the result of PRI electoral fraud. Similar claims were made after the 1985 election, in which PAN gained 9 directly elective Chamber seats and a number of mayoralties, and was widely acknowledged to have gained the majority of votes in two gubernatorial races awarded to the PRI. The party ran third in both the presidential and legislative balloting of July 1988. On July 2, 1989, Ernesto RUFFO Appel, PAN’s Baja California Norte gubernatorial candidate, captured the party’s first governorship. Nevertheless, party dissension surfaced in November when PAN militants (neopanistas) objected to a leadership decision to support PRI electoral legislation. At PAN’s general assembly meeting in March 1990 Luis H´ector ALVAREZ, who had supported the controversial measure, succeeded in retaining the party presidency despite a strong challenge by the neopanista candidate, Enrique Gabriel

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´ JIMENEZ Remus. Further fractionalization was averted in September 1990, when the neopanistas, who controlled the party’s 25-member National Executive Committee, agreed to increase tradicionalista representation on the Committee. In November PAN again accused the PRI of fraud after it had secured landslide victories in state and local balloting. The party secured its first Senate seat in the August 1991 balloting, despite a drop in Chamber representation from 101 to 99. The most startling development, however, was in the Guanajuato gubernatorial race, where the official victor, a PRI hardliner, was induced to defer to the interim incumbency of PAN’s Carlos MEDINA Plascencia. The party registered another notable gain by winning the state governorship of Chihuahua in July 1992. However, a number of influential party dissidents insisted that the victories were achieved through a policy of rapprochement with the PRI and vowed to respond to the “salinista” drift by formation of a breakaway party. In the August 1994 presidential balloting the PAN candidate came in second with 25.9 percent of the popular vote, while PAN representation in the Chamber rose to 119 seats and in the enlarged Senate to 25. Far more impressive was the stunning defeat inflicted on the PRI in Jalisco on February 13, 1995, with PAN capturing the governor’s office, the Guadalajara mayoralty, and an overwhelming majority of state legislative seats. In mid-March Secretary General Felipe Calder´on Hinojosa defeated Ruffo Appel in a contest to succeed Castillo Peraza as party president. Calder´on Hinojosa was himself succeeded on March 6, 1999, by Luis BRAVO Mena. PAN contested the 2000 election in a coalition with the Mexican Green Ecologist Party (PVEM, below) styled the Alliance for Change (Alianza por el Cambio), which succeeded in winning the presidency and a plurality of 223 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In the following year the party won several additional governorships, a number of which were lost in 2004. In July 2006 Calder´on Hinojosa, a member of the party’s conservative wing, defeated the PRD’s

L´opez Obrador for the presidency by the narrowest of margins ( 35.9 to 35.4 percent). Despite the party’s good fortune in the previous election, the grouping’s viability has been threatened by tension between Calder´on and the party president, Manuel ESPINO Barrientos. Espino has pushed for Mexican membership in the Christian Democratic Organization of America (Organizaci´on Dem´ocrata Cristiana de Am´erica), of which he is also president, and recently attracted Cuban protests for his overtures to the Cuban community in Miami. ´ Hinojosa (PresLeaders: Felipe CALDERON ident of Mexico), Manuel ESPINO Barrientos (President of the Party), Vicente FOX Quesada (Former President of Mexico).

Other Congressional Parties Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional—PRI). Founded in 1929 as the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario—PNR) and redesignated in 1938 as the Mexican Revolutionary Party (Partido de la Revoluci´on Mexicana—PRM), the PRI took its present name in 1946. As a union of local and state groups with roots in the revolutionary period, it was gradually established with a broad popular base and retains a tripartite organization based on three distinct sectors (labor, agrarian, and “popular”), although in 1978 it was officially designated as a “workers’ party.” While the PRI’s general outlook may be characterized as moderately left-wing, its membership includes a variety of factions and outlooks. Since the early 1980s controversies surrounding electoral outcomes have led to internal turmoil, which in late 1986 resulted in the formation of the Democratic Current (Corriente Democr´atica—CD) faction under the leadership of Cuauht´emoc C´ardenas Sol´orzano and former party president Porfiro Mu˜noz Ledo, which called for more openness in PRI affairs, including the abolition of secrecy (tapadismo) in the selection of presidential candidates. In June 1987, five months after a shake-up in which half of the party’s 30member Executive Committee was replaced, the

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PRI withdrew recognition of the CD and in 1988 C´ardenas accepted the presidential nomination of the National Democratic Front (FDN; see under PRD, below), prior to organizing the PRD. The precipitous decline of the PRI’s presidential vote (94.4 percent in 1976, 71.0 in 1982, 50.4 in 1988), coupled with diminished congressional representation, prompted Carlos Salinas in the wake of the 1988 campaign to pledge thorough reform of the party apparatus, which Secretary General Manuel CAMACHO Sol´ıs characterized as being ridden by “bureaucratization, autocracy, [and] corruption.” The issue intensified in the wake of charges that the central government had provided upward of $10 million to finance the PRI’s unsuccessful Baja California Norte gubernatorial campaign in 1989. Thus, during the party’s 14th National Assembly in Mexico City in September 1990, Salinas persuaded the delegates to adopt a series of measures that included direct and secret balloting for most leadership posts and the selection of a presidential candidate by a democratically elected convention rather than by the outgoing chief executive. Representatives of the PRI’s largest dissident factions, the Critical Current (Corriente Cr´ıtica—CC), led ´ by Rodolfo GONZALEZ, and the Movement for Democratic Change (Movimiento por el Cambio ´ Democr´atico—MCD), led by Julio HERNANDEZ L´opez, attended the Assembly, but the CC refused to participate in discussions, and MDC members who did were reportedly harassed; on September 13 the CC’s Gonz´alez resigned from the PRI, branding the Assembly a “masquerade.” In March 1993 controversy over donations to the PRI from newly privatized enterprises led to the appointment as party chair of Fernando ORTIZ Arana, who the following month dismissed six of the seven PRI Executive Committee members. Notwithstanding the 1990 Assembly decisions, the PRI’s first 1994 presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo COLOSIO Murrieta, was effectively chosen by Salinas, as was Ernesto ZEDILLO Ponce de Le´on, following Colosio’s assassination in March 1994. This continuance of the so-called destape (“uncovering”) tradition of nomination by the pres-

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idential incumbent was condemned by the PRI’s Democracy 2000 (Democracia 2000) faction but did not prevent Zedillo from being elected in August, albeit with a record low share (48.8 percent) of the popular vote. On September 28 the PRI’s newly appointed secretary general, Jos´e Francisco RUIZ Massieu, was assassinated in Mexico City. A little over a year later, on October 13, 1995, a disaffected Camacho Sol´ıs, who had been passed over as the PRI’s 1994 presidential nominee, quit the party to work for “real political change.” In the election of July 6, 1997, the PRI, for the first time, lost control of the Chamber of Deputies and also failed to capture the newly elective mayoralty of Mexico City. On March 17, 1999, the party’s president, Mariano PALACIOS Alcocer, and its secretary general, Carlos ROJAS Guti´errez, both resigned, ostensibly to reduce the role of the party hierarchy in selecting its 2000 presidential candidate. Earlier, President Zedillo had announced that he would break tradition by not designating his successor, proposing instead an open primary in fall 1999. On March 30 Jos´e Antonio ´ GONZALEZ Fern´andez, who had resigned as labor and social welfare secretary on March 18, was elected party president following the withdrawal from the race of Rodolfo ECHEVERR´IA Ruiz, who complained of favoritism toward his opponent by senior party members. Following Vicente Fox’s stunning defeat of Francisco LABASTIDA Ochoa on July 2, 2000, Dulce Mar´ıa SAURI Riancho, who had been appointed in November 1999 to succeed Gonz´alez as party president, submitted her resignation, but she was persuaded to stay on pending the designation of a successor. In the next year the PRI lost several governorships, and by November 2001 it held only 17 of 31. Meanwhile, it was facing an internal leadership struggle pitting its traditionalists (dubbed the dinosaurios by opponents and the media) against a reform-oriented wing (the t´ecnicos). In April 2001 several prominent PRI members, including former party president Genaro BORREGO Estrada, announced that they were considering forming a new party, the “Renaissance Movement” (Movimiento Renacimiento), later in the year. An

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open election for the PRI presidency was held in February 2002, with Roberto MADRAZO Pintado, a former Tabasco governor, narrowly defeating Beatriz PAREDES Rangel, then president of the Chamber of Deputies. A serious intraparty row erupted in late 2003 between Madrazo and the party’s secretary general, Elba Esther Gordillo, who also served as bloc leader in the Chamber of Deputies, albeit as an advocate of cooperation with the PRN. As a result of the dispute, Gordillo lost her Chamber leadership, and she subsequently withdrew to launch her own formation, the New Alliance Party (below). The PRI contested the 2006 election in a coalition with the PVEM (below) styled the Alliance for Mexico (Alianza por M´exico). Leaders: Beatriz PAREDES Rangel (President of the Party), Roberto MADRAZO Pintado (Former President of the Party and 2006 presidential candidate), Emilio CHUAYFFET (Bloc Leader in the Chamber of Deputies). Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido de la Revoluci´on Democr´atica—PRD). The PRD was launched in 1988 by Cuauht´emoc C´ardenas, who had previously led the dissident Democratic Current (CD) within the PRI and had placed second in the July presidential balloting as standard-bearer of the National Democratic Front (Frente Democr´atico Nacional—FDN) coalition. Other participants in the FDN included the PVE (see PVEM), PARM, and PPS (below), the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Dem´ocrata—PSD), the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS), and the Mexican Socialist Party (Partido Mexicano Socialista—PMS). The PMS had been launched in March 1987 by merger of Mexico’s two principal leftist groups, the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (Partido Socialista Unificado de M´exico—PSUM) and the Mexican Workers’ Party (Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores—PMT), and three smaller formations. Recognized by the Soviet Union as the country’s official Communist Party, the PSUM dated from the November 1981 merger of the Mexican

Communist Party (Partido Comunista Mexicano— PCM) with four smaller groups. (The PCM, formed in 1919, was accorded legal recognition from 1932 to 1942 and was thereafter semiclandestine until returned, conditionally, to legal status in 1978.) Having survived intense leadership disputes that followed the 1981 merger, the mainstream faction of the PSUM led an electoral front for the July 1985 balloting that included among its participants the PMT and the Popular Socialist Party (PPS, below). None won directly elective Chamber seats, although the PSUM was awarded 12 proportional seats; the PPS, 11; and the PMT, 6. Following the 1987 launch of the PMS, discussions with the FDN during the latter half of the year failed to yield agreement on a joint candidate for the 1988 presidential election. As a result, the PMS nominated Herberto CASTILLO of the PMT. It was not until early June 1988 that Castillo withdrew in favor of the FDN’s Cuauht´emoc C´ardenas, by which time the electoral ballots had been printed. Formation of the PRD as a unified party followed, with a variety of additional political and social organizations joining the CD, PMS, and MAS. The newly formed PRD’s July 1989 loss to the PRI in the Michoac´an gubernatorial balloting was widely viewed as the result of fraudulent vote tallying. Subsequently, PRD members occupied municipal buildings and commandeered public roads, leading to clashes with PRI adherents and government forces that continued into 1990. Meanwhile, the party, which had been denied legalization on a national basis in June, sought international assistance in investigating the alleged political assassination of some 60 of its members since 1988. In early 1990 the PRD accused PRI “reactionaries” of kidnapping prominent party member Leonel GODOY and threatening Jorge CASTANEDA, C´ardenas’s son. In November, defying a new law criminalizing false “fraud” accusations, it claimed that the PRI had employed “all known forms of violating the vote” in capturing elections in M´exico and Hidalgo states. The PRD’s M´exico state vote fell from 1.2 million for C´ardenas alone in 1988 to 200,000 for all PRD candidates in 1990.

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Thereafter, the PRD invited Canadian officials to oversee Morelos state elections as part of an effort to convince Canada and the United States to “link reforms” with proposed free trade talks. Meanwhile, observers described the January 1991 resignation of a PRD leader, Jorge ALCOCER, who accused C´ardenas of being “authoritarian and intolerant,” as symptomatic of the dissension that had wracked the party since the 1988 balloting. In the August 1994 presidential balloting C´ardenas came in third with 16.6 percent of the popular vote, while PRD representation in the Chamber rose to 71 seats and in the enlarged Senate to 8 seats. In June 1996 the PRD became the first Mexican party not only to place selection of its leadership in the direct vote of its members but also to confer the franchise on all registered voters who opted to join on polling day. Andr´es Manuel L´opez Obrador, PRD leader in Tabasco, defeated two other candidates for the party presidency in July. At the election of July 6, 1997, the PRD placed second in the Chamber of Deputies, with 125 seats, while C´ardenas Sol´orzano became the first elected mayor of Mexico City. In February 1999 the PRD claimed its third governorship, winning Baja California Sur from the PRI. For the 2000 election, C´ardenas Sol´orzana resigned his mayoralty for a renewed presidential bid, but he ran a distant third as head of a multiparty Alliance for Mexico (Alianza por M´exico), which included the Labor Party, Democratic Convergence, Nationalist Society Party, and Social Alliance Party (all below). For the Mexico City race the five were joined by the PCD in an Alliance for Mexico City (Alianza por la Ciudad de M´exico). The PRD, which had been supportive of the Fox regime, severed its links with the federal government in early 2004 because of its conviction that the administration had been orchestrating charges of corruption in the capital to damage the presidential prospects of its popular incumbent mayor, L´opez Obrador (who was elected mayor in December 2000). Following massive popular demonstrations in support of L´opez Obrador, President Fox, in April 2005, suspended charges against the mayor, who, at the conclusion of a bitterly contested

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campaign, was narrowly defeated by the PAN’s Calder´on Hinojosa in the July 2006 presidential poll. For the 2006 campaign, the PRD formed a grouping with the PT and CD (below) styled the Coalition for the Good of All (Coalici´on por el Bien de Todos). ´ Leaders: Andr´es Manuel LOPEZ Obrador (Former Mayor of Mexico City and 2006 presidential candidate), Leonel COTA Monta˜no (President of the Party), Carlos NAVARRETE Ruiz (Secretary General). New Alliance Party (Partido Nueva Alianza— Panal). Panal was launched in 2005 by former PRI secretary general Elba Esther Gordillo, with the backing of the National Education Workers’ Syndicate (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educaci´on—SNTE). ´ Leaders: Sonia RINCON Chanona (Secretary General), Elba Esther GORDILLO (Former PRI Secretary General and Former Secretary of Education), Jorge KAHWAGI (President of the Party), Roberto CAMPA Cifri´an (2006 presidential candidate). Mexican Green Ecologist Party (Partido Verde Ecologista de M´exico—PVEM). An outgrowth of the National Ecologist Alliance (Alianza Ecologista Nacional), Mexico’s Greens initially adopted the name Green Ecologist Party (PVE) upon formally entering the political arena in 1987. Having failed to obtain registration in time for the 1988 election, the PVE participated in the FDN. A dispute over the party name led to its registration as the Ecologist Party of Mexico (PEM) for the 1991 election, but the party narrowly failed to secure the minimum necessary to gain full legal status. It assumed its present name in 1993. The PVEM president received 0.9 percent of the vote in the August 1994 presidential poll and failed to win congressional representation. However, it won six Chamber seats in 1997, on a vote share of 4 percent. The party went on to secure 5 Senate and 15 Chamber seats as an ally of PAN in 2000, although its leadership had come under fire from like-minded groups for abandoning environmental

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issues in its pursuit of electoral success. It won 2 additional lower house seats in 2003, but in early 2004 became entangled in a bribery scandal stemming from a tape-recorded solicitation by its president, Jorge Emilio Gonz´alez. The PVEM contested the 2006 election in a coalition with the PRI styled the Alliance for Mexico (Alianza por M´exico). ´ Leaders: Jorge Emilio GONZALEZ Torres (President of the Party and 1994 presidential candidate), Bernardo de la GARZA Herrera (Congressional Leader), Roberto MADRAZO Pintado (2006 presidential candidate). Labor Party (Partido del Trabajo—PT). A moderate leftist formation founded in 1990 by a number of organizations, the PT won 1.2 percent of the vote in the 1991 congressional poll. In the August 1994 presidential contest Cecilia SOTO Gonz´alez fought a vigorous campaign that drew support away from the more established PRD and gave her 2.7 percent of the national vote. Ten PT candidates were elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1994, 7 in 1997, 8 in 2000, and 6 in 2003. In 2006 the PT joined the CD (below) in a grouping with the PRD styled the Coalition for the Good of All (Coalici´on por el Bien de Todos). Leaders: Alberto ANAYA Guti´errez (Congressional Leader), Sen. Marcos CRUZ Mart´ınez. Democratic Convergence (Convergencia por la Democracia—CD). Now generally referenced simply as Convergencia following a party assembly held in 2002, the CD began in 1997 as a civil association with a social democratic orientation. It was registered as a “Partido Pol´ıtico Nacional” in June 1999 under former Veracruz governor Dante Delgado and other PRI dissidents. In the 2000 election it ran as part of the earlier Alliance for Mexico, winning one Senate and two Chamber seats. It won five lower house seats in 2003. In 2006 the CD participated in the Coalition for the Good of All (Coalici´on por el Bien de Todos) with the PT and PRD (both above). Leaders: Luis MALDONADO Venegas (President of the Party), Dante DELGADO Rannauro

(Former President of the Party), Cuauht´emoc VELASCO Olivia (President of the National Council), Alexandro CHANONA Burguete (Secretary General). Social Democratic Alternative Party (Partido Alternativa Socialdem´ocrata—PAS). PAS was founded in 2006 and participated in the 2006 election under the name of Social Democratic and Farmer Alternative Party (Partido Socialdem´ocrata y Campesina—PASC). PAS obtained 2.7 percent of the votes, securing four congressional seats. In May 2007 PAS dropped Farmer (Campesina) from its title. A self-styled moderateleft (nueva izquierda) party, PAS platform issues include clean air, minority rights, and a free market that is socially sensitive to the challenges of globalization. Leaders: Patricia MERCADO (founder of the Party), Alfredo BEGNE´ Guerra (President of the Party), Marina ARVIZU Rivas (Congresswoman and leader of the bloc).

Other Parties Nationalist Society Party (Partido de la Sociedad Nacionalista—PSN). A self-described defender of the middle class, in the 2000 balloting the PSN won three proportional seats in the Chamber of Deputies as part of the Alliance for Mexico. Leaders: Gustavo RIOJAS Santana (President of the Party), Bertha A. SIMENTAL Garc´ıa (Secretary General). Social Alliance Party (Partido Alianza Social—PAS). The PAS was established following the October 1997 decision of the Mexican Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Mexicano—PDM) to dissolve. (The PDM, with roots in the conservative Roman Catholic Sinarquista movement of the 1920s, had been launched in 1971; it reached its apex in 1985, when it won 12 proportional lower house seats.) The PAS began to take shape in March 1998, when a National Constituent Assembly was held, with a Constitutive Assembly then convening in January 1999. Legal registration followed in August.

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At the July 2000 elections the PAS joined the PRD in the Alliance for Mexico, winning 2 proportional seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The PAS became inactive after 2003. ´ Cardoso Leader: Jos´e Antonio CALDERON (President of the Party). Mexican Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Dem´ocrata Mexicano—PSDM). The PSDM is a 1998 redesignation of the Mexican Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Mexicano—PDM), a right-wing grouping founded in 1971 as heir to the ultra-Catholic National Synarchist Union (Uni´on Sinarquista Nacional—USN) of the 1930s. Leader: Baltasar Ignacio VALADEZ Montoya (President of the Party). Popular Socialist Party (Partido Popular Socialista—PPS). Led by Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano until his death in 1968, the PPS is Marxist in orientation and draws support from intellectuals, students, and some labor elements. In the election of July 1976, PPS leader Jorge CRUIKSHANK Garc´ıa became the first opposition candidate to win a Senate seat since 1929. In the wake of charges that a “deal” had been made concerning the seat, a majority of the party voted, at the annual PPS Congress in December, for more forceful opposition to the PRI. Nevertheless, the Socialists failed to present a presidential candidate in 1982, choosing instead to support PAN’s nominee; in legislative balloting the PPS lost its Senate seat but retained its 11 proportionally awarded Chamber seats. In 1983 the party won a number of state legislative seats from the PRI and in 1985 was again awarded 11 Chamber seats, on a proportional basis, as part of the PSUM-led alliance (see under PRD, above). It supported C´ardenas as a member of the FDN alignment in 1988 and obtained 12 lower house seats in the 1991 proportional allocation. In August 1994 the party’s Marcela LOMBARDO Otero received only 0.5 percent of the presidential vote, and the party subsequently failed to win congressional representation. In 1997 the PPS lost its registration as a national political party, but is currently registered as

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a national political association under the Popular Socialist (Popular Socialista) designation. ´ Leader: Jes´us Antonio Carlos HERNANDEZ (Secretary General). Revolutionary Workers’ Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—PRT). Founded in 1976, the Trotskyite PRT failed to win legislative representation in July 1982, its candidate for the presidency, Rosario IBARRA de la Piedra (the first woman ever to seek the office), capturing only 1.9 percent of the vote. Excluded from the PSUMled electoral front in July 1985, the PRT allied itself with a number of state-level leftist groups, including the League of Marxist Laborers (Liga Obrera Marxista—LOM), and was awarded six Chamber seats by proportional representation; in May 1987 the two were reported to have merged under the PRT title. The party refused to join the FDN in 1988 and ran last as a 1991 contender with a 0.6 percent vote share. For the 1994 and 1997 elections the PRT was allied with the PRD. A faction led by Sergio RODRIGUEZ joined the FZLN (see EZLN, below) in 1997. Leaders: Edgar SANCHEZ Ramirez, Rafael TORRES Vargas. In 2003 the first self-proclaimed indigenous party, the Popular Unity (Unidad Popular—UP), led by Heriberto PAZOS, was registered in the southern state of Oaxaca. In 2005 in addition to the New Alliance Party, above, a Social Democratic and Farmer Alternative Party (Partido Alternativa Socialdem´ocrata y Campesina—PASC) was launched (see above).

Paramilitary Groups Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ej´ercito Zapatista de Liberaci´on Nacional— EZLN). Initial accounts of the January 1994 uprising in Chiapas (see Political background, above) suggested that the rebels numbered upward of 1,000 men seeking economic relief for Mexico’s “dispensable” indigenous groups. Ideologically, the EZLN appeared somewhat unique in not invoking traditional leftist (Marxist-Leninist)

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jargon. In early 1996 the group announced the launching of a “sister organization,” the Zapatista National Liberation Front (Frente Zapatista de Liberaci´on Nacional—FZLN), which was not, however, to be construed as a “formal” political party and would not contest elections; the latter group staged a peaceful, unarmed march in Mexico City on September 12, 1997. A march by EZLN leaders to Mexico City in February–March 2001 culminated in a controversial invitation to address the Congress of Deputies on March 28. The EZLN speakers urged passage of the Indigenous Rights Bill, although the Zapatistas ultimately rejected the version of the bill that passed in late April as offering insufficient autonomy and land rights. As a consequence, the EZLN refused to negotiate with the Fox government. In late 2003 “Subcomandante Marcos” was reported to have resigned as rebel representative, although appointed co-leader of a Chiapas “good government” municipal board. The former spokesman later led a tour of various Mexican cities in 2006 to generate popular support ahead of the elections. Leaders: “Subcomandante MARCOS,” Javier ELORRIAGA (FZLN). During 1994 three additional guerrilla groups were reported to have been spawned by the Chiapas rebellion: the Mexican Peasant Worker Front of the Southeast (Frente Campesino Obrero Mexicano del Sureste—FCOMS), the Popular Movement of National Liberation (Movimiento Popular de Liberaci´on Nacional—MPLN), and the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of the Southeast (Ej´ercito Insurgente Revolucionario del Sureste— EIRS). They were joined in 1996 by two peasant organizations, the Democratic Revolutionary Popular Party (Partido Popular Revolucionario Democr´atico—PRPD) and the Emile Zapata Eastern Democratic Front of Mexico (Frente Democr´atico Oriental de M´exico Emiliano Zapata—FDOMEZ). In March 1999 two additional, Guerrero-based groups announced their formation: the Indigenous and Peasant

Revolutionary Army of National Liberation (Ej´ercito Revolucionario Ind´ıgena y Campesino de Liberaci´on Nacional—ERIC-LN) and the Insurgent Peasant Command (Comando Campesino Insurgente—CCI). Popular Revolutionary Army (Ej´ercito Popular Revolucionario—EPR). The EPR was apparently launched in 1994 as a coalition of a dozen-odd minor leftist factions allied with the peasant-based Revolutionary Workers’ Party and Clandestine Popular Union–Party of the Poor (Partido Revolucionario Obrerista y Clandestino de Uni´on Popular–Partido de los Pobres—PROCUPPDLP). PROCUP was founded in the 1970s by radicals under the leadership of Oaxaca University rector Felipe MART´INEZ Soriano, who has been imprisoned since 1990 for involvement in the killing of two security guards at a Mexican newspaper office. The PDLP, dating from 1967, was a largely moribund clandestine formation before being revived by merger with PROCUP. In 1991 PROCUP claimed responsibility for a series of bombings of the Mexico City offices of a number of international corporations and was charged in 1994 with the kidnapping of Alfred Harp Helu, the chair of Mexico’s largest bank, for whose release his family paid a $30 million ransom. During 1996 the ERP was reported to have killed 26 soldiers or police officers while extending its activities into more than half of Mexico’s 31 states. At a secret press conference in August 1996 it announced formation of a 14-organization Popular Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido Democr´atico Popular Revolucionario—PDPR) that would serve as its political wing. Three months earlier the PROCUPPDLP reportedly had dissolved. Relatively quiescent after 1997, the ERP resurfaced in May 2002 when it appeared responsible for the killing of two police officers 95 miles east of Acapulco. More recently, President Fox indicated in mid-2004 that the group was still active, while media reports suggested that it had spawned a number of splinter formations, particularly in the south.

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Insurgent People’s Revolutionary Army (Ej´ercito Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente— ERPI). The ERPI broke from the EPR\PDPR in early 1998, apparently favoring armed insurrection rather than the EPR’s strategy of a longerterm popular war. Like the EPR, it mainly operates in the states of Guerrero and Oaxaca. In February 1999, responding to the narrow victory of the PRI candidate for governor in Guerrero, the ERPI called for measures to prevent his taking office. ERPI leader Jacobo Silva Nogales was arrested in October 1999. Leader: Jacobo SILVA Nogales (“Comandante Antonio”). Popular Insurgent Revolutionary Army (Ej´ercito Revolucionario Insurgente Popular— ERIP). The formation of the ERIP was announced in November 1996 by a group claiming to represent “peasants, Indians, workers, and businesspeople.” The ERIP, which called for the resignation of the Zedillo administration and the convening of a national congress to draft a new constitution, said it would operate in northern and central Mexico as a “complement” to the southern-based EZLN and EPR. Other paramilitary formations have included the Army of the Poor (Ej´ercito de los Pobres— EP), a remnant of the PDLP; the Emile Zapata Oriental Democratic Front of Mexico (Frente Democr´atico Oriental de M´exico Emiliano Zapata—FDOMEZ); and a right-wing terrorist group, Los Tecos, which has been relatively quiescent in recent years.

Legislature The Union Congress (Congreso de la Uni´on) consists of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, both elected by popular vote. When Congress is not in session, limited legislative functions are performed by a Permanent Committee of 18 senators and 19 deputies elected by their respective houses. Legislators cannot serve consecutive terms. Senate (C´amara de Senadores). The upper chamber contains 128 members, the number hav-

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ing been doubled with the election, for six-year terms, of 96 senators in 1994. In 1997, 32 senators were elected for three-year terms. In 2000 all 128 seats were renewed for the first time, half by majority vote in each state and the Federal District, one-quarter by assignment to the leading minority candidate in each of the 32 jurisdictions, and one-quarter by national proportional representation. Following the election of July 2, 2006, the National Action Party held 52 seats; the Institutional Revolutionary Party, 33; the Democratic Revolutionary Party, 26; the Mexican Green Ecologist Party, 6; the Labor Party, 5; the Democratic Convergence Party, 5; Independent, 1. The Senate presidency changes monthly. Chamber of Deputies (C´amara de Diputados). The lower chamber presently contains 500 members elected for three-year terms, including 200 seats distributed on a proportional basis among parties winning more than 2.0 percent of the vote nationwide. Following the election of July 2, 2006, the National Action Party held 207 seats; the Institutional Revolutionary Party, 106; the Democratic Revolutionary Party, 127; the Mexican Green Ecologist Party, 17; the Democratic Convergence Party, 17; the Labor Party, 11; New Alliance, 9; the Social Democratic and Farmer Alternative Party, 5; Independent, 1. ´ President: Alvaro El´ıas LOREDO.

Communications Most press and broadcasting media are privately owned but operate under government regulation.

Press The print media were traditionally subsidized, directly and indirectly, by the government. In addition to deriving 60–80 percent of their advertising revenue from official sources, newspapers and magazines commonly published, without attribution, materials prepared by public officials. Moreover, the low salaries paid reporters reflected an understanding by management that incomes were typically supplemented by officeholders.

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Cabinet As of September 1, 2007 President

Felipe Calder´on Hinojosa

Secretaries Agrarian Reform Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fishing, and Food Communications and Transport Economy Energy Environment and Natural Resources Finance and Public Credit Foreign Affairs Health Interior Labor and Social Welfare National Defense Navy Public Education Public Safety Public Service Social Development Tourism Attorney General

Abelardo Escobar Prieto Alberto C´ardenas Jim´enez (PAN) Luis T´ellez Kuenzler Eduardo Sojo Garza-Aldape Georgina Kessel Mart´ınez [f] Juan Rafael Elvira Quezada Agust´ın Carstens Carstens (PAN) Patricia Espinosa Castellano [f] ´ Jos´e Angel C´ordova Villalobos (PAN) Francisco Javier Ram´ırez Acu˜na (PAN) Javier Lozano Alarc´on (PAN) Guillermo Galv´an Galv´an Mariano Francisco Saynez Mendoza Josefina V´azquez Mota (PAN) [f] Genaro Garc´ıa Luna Salvador Vega Casillas (PAN) Mar´ıa Beatriz Zavala Peniche (PAN) [f] Rodolfo Elizondo Torres (PAN) Eduardo Medina-Mora Icaza

[f] = female Note: Calder´on appointed a number of independent specialists to his cabinet. All ministers known to be members of a party are identified above.

In 1982, however, the government introduced legislation making such payments to reporters a criminal offense while substantially reducing official advertising; the loss of advertising revenue, coupled with increases in the price of newsprint, resulted in the closure of nearly three dozen papers during the recession of the mid-1990s. The most important dailies, published in Mexico City unless otherwise noted, are the following: El Heraldo de M´exico (374,000), conservative; Esto (350,000); La Prensa (208,000 daily, 172,000 Sunday), liberal; Exc´elsior (200,000), conservative; El Financiero (135,000), financial; El Norte (Monterrey, 134,000 daily, 155,000 Sunday); Ovaciones (130,000 morning, 100,000 evening); El Universal

(94,000 daily, 136,000 Sunday), center-left; El Sol de Tampico (Tampico, 77,000); El Sol de M´exico (76,000); Diario de M´exico (76,000); Uno M´as Uno (60,000), left-wing; El Occidental (Guadalajara, 49,000); Novedades (43,000 daily, 44,000 Sunday), independent.

News Agencies AMI (Agencia Mexicana de Informaci´on), Notimex (Noticias Mexicanas), Notipress (Noticias de Prensa Mexicana), and Noti-Acci´on are the principal Mexican news agencies. A number of foreign agencies maintain bureaus in Mexico City.

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Broadcasting and Computing Radio and television are privately owned but operate under the supervision of several governmental regulatory bodies. Of the more than 750 TV stations (including cable outlets), the progovernment Televisa reaches virtually the entire country and dominates the ratings, although an independent challenger, Televisi´on Azteca, was launched in 1993. In 2005 there were 131 personal computers and 169 Internet users per 1,000 Mexican residents. In that same year there were 440 mobile cellular subscribers per 1,000 people.

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Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Arturo Saukhan CASAMITJANA U.S. Ambassador to Mexico: Antonio O. GARZA Jr. Permanent Representative to the UN: Claude HELLER IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, ALADI, APEC, BCIE, BIS, CDB, EBRD, IADB, Interpol, IOM, OAS, OECD, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES DE NEDERLANDSE ANTILLEN

The Country The Netherlands Antilles currently consists of one group of two islands and another of three islands, located 500 miles apart in the eastern Caribbean. The southern islands of Cura¸cao and Bonaire lie off the northwest coast of Venezuela, while the northern (Leeward) islands of Sint Maarten (the northern portion of which is part of the French department of Guadeloupe), Sint Eustatius (also known as Statia), and Saba are some 200 miles east of Puerto Rico. Approximately 85 percent of the population is of mixed African ancestry, the remainder being of Carib Indian and European derivation. Roman Catholicism is dominant in the southern islands and Saba, while Protestantism is most prevalent on Sint Eustatius and Sint Maarten. The economy has long been dependent on the refining of crude oil from Venezuela and Mexico, although most installations (centered in Cura¸cao) have recently been operating at less than 50 percent capacity; as a result, tourism and offshore banking activities are of increasing importance. Agriculture is relatively insignificant because of poor soil and little rainfall. Hurricane Luis in September 1995 devastated the Leeward Islands, particularly Sint Maarten, where an estimated three-quarters of the buildings were destroyed. The related loss of hotel accommodations contributed to a 14.5 percent decline in tourist arrivals in 1995, during which GDP grew by 1.3 percent, inflation rose further to 2.8 percent, and unemployment was virtually unchanged. GDP declined slightly in 1996 and 1997 and increased by only 0.4 percent in 1998; meanwhile,

unemployment rose to 16.7 percent in 1998, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) blaming the poor economic performance on the government’s failure to reduce its budget deficit or enact other reforms envisioned in an IMF-endorsed reform package discussed in 1997. The economy contracted by 2.7 percent in 2000, prompting the government to slash spending in 2001, with the cuts becoming a major issue in the January 2002 legislative election. By 2003 growth was barely positive at an estimated 1.4 percent, remaining relatively constant thereafter.

Anguilla (U.K.) St. Martin (FRANCE) St.-Barthélemy (FRANCE)

St. Maarten (NETH.)

Netherlands Antilles (NETHERLANDS)

Caribbean Se a

Saba I. St. Eustatius ST. KITTS & NEVIS

Westpunt

Netherlands Antilles (NETHERLANDS)

Curaçao

Bonaire Kralendijk

Willemstad 0 0

20 Mi 20 Km

Klein Curaçao

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Political Status: Former Dutch dependency; became autonomous in internal affairs under charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, effective December 29, 1954. [Note: by December 15, 2008, the Netherlands Antilles, as presently constituted, was scheduled to cease to exist. See Constitution and government, below.] Area: 309 sq. mi. (800 sq. km.), encompassing Cura¸cao (171 sq. mi.), Bonaire (111 sq. mi.), Sint Maarten (Dutch portion, 13 sq. mi.), Sint Eustatius (8 sq. mi.), Saba (5 sq. mi.). Population: 175,653 (2001C), excluding Aruba; 189,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): WILLEMSTAD (urban area, 76,000). Official Language: Dutch and Papiamento (an Antillean hybrid, principally of Portuguese and Spanish, that is common in the Leeward Islands). English and Spanish are also widely spoken. Monetary Unit: Netherlands Antilles Guilder (official rate November 2, 2007: 1.79 guilders = $1US). Sovereign: Queen BEATRIX Wilhelmina Armgard. Governor: Dr. Fritz M. de los SANTOS; invested on July 1, 2002, to succeed Dr. Jaime M. SALEH. Prime Minister: Emily DE JONGH-ELHAGE (Antillean Restructuring Party); sworn in March 26, 2006, succeeding Etienne YS (Antillean Restructuring Party), following election of January 27.

Government and Politics Political Background The Leeward Islands (including Aruba, see previous article) became Dutch possessions in 1634, while the Windward Islands passed to uninterrupted Dutch control in the early 19th century. Long administered as a colonial dependency, the (then) six-island grouping was in 1954 granted

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constitutional equality with the Netherlands and Suriname (which became independent in 1975) as an autonomous component of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Given the geographical range of the grouping, political differences have traditionally been islandbased, necessitating highly unstable coalition governments. Thus, Prime Minister Silvio ROZENDAL, installed following an election in June 1977, was forced to resign in April 1979, in the wake of a legislative boycott by Aruban representatives. After balloting in July, a new three-party government was formed by Dominico MARTINA of the Cura¸cao-based New Antilles Movement (Movimentu Anti´a Nobo—MAN), but in September 1981 the People’s Electoral Movement (MEP) of Aruba again withdrew its support, as talks began in The Hague concerning the island’s constitutional future. A governmental stalemate ensued that was not resolved by a general election in June 1982, although Martina remained in office until redesignation as head of a five-party coalition that excluded the MEP the following October. In March 1983 agreement was reached on the assumption of Aruban status aparte in January 1986, with full independence in 1996, but the Martina government was weakened by the withdrawal of the conservative National People’s Party (Partido Nashonal di Pueblo—PNP) in August and eventually collapsed in June 1984. On September 20 the NVP’s Maria LIBERIA-PETERS, heading another fiveparty coalition that included neither the MAN or MEP, became the islands’ first female prime minister. However, she was defeated in an election held November 22, 1985, in preparation for Aruba’s departure on January 1, with a new Martina administration thereupon being formed. In December 1987 Claude WATHEY, leader of the Democratic Party of Sint Maarten (Demokratiko Partido–Sint Maarten—DP-StM), resigned from the government over the issue of island independence, and two months later the two remaining DP-StM members also departed, leaving Martina with a 1-seat legislative majority in the Staten. In March 1988 a representative of the Workers’

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Liberation Front (Fronte Obero de Liberashon— FOL) withdrew his support because of a proposed layoff of 1,400 public-sector employees, and the prime minister was again forced from office in favor of Liberia-Peters, who returned on May 17 as head of a new coalition that claimed the support of 13 of 22 Staten members. Following a failed referendum on autonomy for Cura¸cao in 1993 (see Constitution and government, below), two of the PNP’s non-Cura¸cao partners withdrew from the government coalition, reducing the latter’s Staten representation to nine and forcing Liberia-Peters’s resignation on November 25. On November 26 the justice minister, ¨ Suzanne CAMELIA-ROMER, took over as acting prime minister. On December 28 Alejandro Felippe PAULA, a professor of sociology at the University of the Netherlands Antilles, was in turn named Camelia-R¨omer’s interim successor, pending a general election on February 25, 1994. At the February poll, the recently organized Antillean Restructuring Party (Partido Anti´a Restruktur´a— PAR), led by Miguel POURIER, secured an eightmember plurality of Staten seats and on March 31 formed a broad-based coalition government. Although the PAR maintained a plurality in the balloting for a new Staten on January 31, 1998, it lost four of its eight seats on a vote share that fell from nearly 40 percent to less than 19 percent. Pourier was invited by the governor on March 19 to form a new government but was unable to attract the necessary support from the ten other groups that had secured legislative representation. Consequently, while Pourier and his government continued in a caretaker capacity, lengthy negotiations were launched on a variety of alternatives, which on June 1 yielded a six-party coalition headed by the PNP’s Camelia-R¨omer. The Camelia-R¨omer government collapsed in October 1999 amid a dispute concerning a national recovery plan introduced a year earlier that would have entailed substantial civil service cuts, and Pourier formed a new coalition government on November 8. In view of continued economic difficulties, the FOL led all groups in the Staten balloting on January 18, 2002, winning five seats.

However, the six-party cabinet that was finally installed on June 3 under the leadership of Etienne YS of the PAR did not include the FOL. Prime Minister Ys resigned in late May 2003 to permit the formation of a new government that would include the FOL. However, the FOL leader, Anthony GODETT, could not be named prime minister because he was under indictment for corruption. Ben KOMPROE was sworn in as prime minister on an acting basis on July 22; and on August 11 Mirna Luisa GODETT, Anthony’s sister, was, in turn, sworn in as Komproe’s acting successor. In December 2003 Anthony Godett was convicted of forgery, bribery, and money laundering, and sentenced to 12 months of imprisonment. Two of the FOL’s partners thereupon withdrew from the government, leaving the coalition temporarily without a majority in the Staten; however, the coalition revived shortly thereafter with the addition of the Democratic Party of Bonaire (PDB) and the National Alliance. On April 6, 2004, the government again collapsed, when the PNP refused to continue with Komproe as justice minister. On April 11 Mirna Godett resigned, with Etienne Ys returning as prime minister on June 3. At the election of January 27, 2006, the PAR won five seats and the MAN, three, with the PAR’s Emily DE JONGH-ELHAGE being sworn in as prime minister on March 26.

Constitution and Government The Dutch sovereign is titular head of the present five-member state and is represented in the Antilles by an appointed governor. Domestic affairs are the responsibility of the prime minister and other members of the Council of Ministers, appointed with the advice and approval of a unicameral Staten (legislature) of 22 deputies (14 from Cura¸cao, 3 each from Bonaire and Sint Maarten, and 1 each from Sint Eustatius and Saba). Elections to the Staten are held every four years, subject to dissolution. In the islands represented by more than one deputy, balloting is by proportional representation. Control of foreign affairs and defense is vested in the Council

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

of Ministers in The Hague, with an Antillean minister plenipotentiary sitting as a voting member in matters dealing with “joint affairs of the realm.” Judicial authority is exercised by a Court of Appeal in Willemstad, whose members are appointed by the queen in consultation with the Antilles government and who sit singly in island courts of first instance. Ultimate appeal is to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in The Hague. Each of the island territories elects an Island Council, which sits for four years and is responsible for enacting legislation regarding local affairs. A lieutenant governor is appointed by the queen for a six-year term and sits with deputies named by the elected council as an island Executive Council. In a referendum on November 19, 1993, 73 percent of Cura¸cao voters rejected a governmentbacked-proposal that the island seek special autonomy status similar to that of Aruba, with 8 percent favoring incorporation into the Netherlands and only 1 percent endorsing full independence. On October 14, 1994, voters on Sint Eustatius, Saba, and Sint Maarten endorsed the status quo by votes of 91 percent, 86 percent, and 60 percent, respectively, with Bonaire following suit on October 21 by a vote of 88 percent. By contrast, in a referendum on April 8, 2005, 68 percent of Cura¸cao voters endorsed autonomous status for the island within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, while in a separate poll 76 percent of Sint Eustatius voters rejected autonomous status. As a result, under a new structure approved in December, Cura¸cao and Sint Maarten will become separate, autonomous members of the kingdom, while Bonaire, Saba, and Sint Eustatius will become “Kingdom Islands” (Koninkrijkseilanden) with the status of municipalities within a yet-to-be specified Dutch province.

Current Issues In November 2006 Cura¸cao’s Island Council voted to reject the 2005 agreement, under which The Hague would retain control of defense, foreign policy, and law enforcement. As a result, the date for its implementation was advanced to December

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15, 2008, to permit reevaluation of the objectionable provisions. While opposition on Sint Maarten also voiced objections, particularly in regard to banking regulations, the other four islands were, in general, satisfied with the proposed restructuring. Meanwhile, both Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles had complained of a proposal by the Dutch immigration minister to force legal offenders to be returned to the islands, even if holding Dutch citizenship, arguing that it ran counter to the European Human Rights Treaty. Earlier, the islands had criticized Venezuela’s arms buildup amid growing tensions between Venezuela and the United States.

Political Parties Legislative Parties Restructured Antilles Party (Partido Ant´ıa Restruktur´a—PAR). The PAR is a Cura¸cao-based, social-Christian formation launched in the wake of the November 1993 referendum. It became the leading party of the government coalition formed after the 1994 election, at which it won 8 of 22 Staten seats. It was reduced to a minority of 4 seats in 1998 and secured the same number in 2002, with 1 additional seat added in 2006. Leaders: Emily DE JONGH-ELHAGE (Prime Minister), Etienne YS, Miguel A. POURIER (Former Prime Minister), Pedro J. ATACHO (Secretary). New Antilles Movement (Movishon Anti´a Nobo/Movimentu Antiyas Nobo—MAN). The MAN is a left-of-center member of the Socialist International that served as the core of the Martina administrations of 1982–1984 and 1985–1988, although holding only four Staten seats on the latter occasion. Its representation dropped to two seats in 1990, both of which were retained in 1994 and 1998. The party failed to gain representation in 2002 but was second-ranked with three seats in 2006. Leader: Dominico F. (Don) MARTINA (Former Prime Minister).

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National People’s Party (Nationale Volkspartij—NVP/Partido Nashonal di Pueblo—PNP). The NVP/PNP is a right-of-center Cura¸cao-based party that served as the core of the governing coalition from 1988 to 1993. Its leader, Maria Liberia-Peters, was obliged to step down as a result of the November 1993 referendum result, and its Staten representation dropped from seven to three seats in February 1994, before rising to four in January 1998. It secured three seats in 2002, one of which was lost in 2006. ¨ Leaders: Suzanne (Suzi) CAMELIA-ROMER, Maria Ph. LIBERIA-PETERS (Former Prime Ministers). Bonaire Patriotic Union (Uni´on Patriotiko Bonairiana/Union Patri´otico Bonairiano—UPB). The Christian-Democratic UPB won all three of the Staten seats from Bonaire in 1990, two of which were lost in 1994. It retained the remaining seat in 1998 and 2002, to which one more was added in 2006. Leaders: Ramonsito T. BOOI, C. V. WINKLAAR (Secretary General). Workers’ Liberation Front of 30 May (Frente Obrero di Liberashon 30 di Mei—FOL). The FOL is a Marxist group based on Cura¸cao. For the 1990 balloting it entered into a coalition with the Independent Social (Soshal Independiente— SI), which had been formed in 1986 by a group of PNP dissidents led by George HUECK. The two groups also presented joint candidates in the January 1998 balloting (under the rubric of Social Independence–Workers Liberation Front— SIFOL), winning two seats. The FOL left the government coalition in mid-2001 as the result of tension between FOL leader Anthony Godett and the administration regarding budget cuts. The FOL (again sometimes referenced as the SIFOL) was the top vote-getter in the 2002 balloting, winning five legislative seats on a vote share of 23 percent. Its leader, Anthony Godett, was precluded from installation as prime minister in 2002 because of indictment (later conviction) for bribery, fraud, and money laundering. In September 2005 the High

Court in The Hague upheld a 15-month prison sentence for Godett. The party won two Staten seats in 2006. Leaders: Anthony GODETT, Mirna Luisa GODETT (Former Acting Prime Minister), Ben KOMPROE (Former Justice Minister). Sint Maarten Patriotic Alliance —SPA. The SPA was launched in 1990, initially as a loose grouping in opposition to the DP-StM on Sint Maarten. Its organizing component was the Sint Maarten People’s Movement (SPM), which at the 1990 Staten poll captured one of the three seats theretofore held by the DP-StM (below). In Island Council balloting in April 1991 the SPA doubled its representation from two of nine seats to four. On July 7 it formed an island government in coalition with the recently organized PDP (below), which, however, collapsed on August 27 when its partner withdrew. It increased its Staten representation to two seats in 1994, one of which was lost in 1998. For the 2002 balloting the SPA joined with the National Progressive Party in a National Alliance (NA), which secured one seat under the leadership of William MARLIN. In 2006 the Alliance increased its representation to two seats. Leaders: Leo CHANCE (President), Vance JAMES Jr. Upwards Cura¸cao (Forsa K`orsou). Forsa K`orsou is a recently launched Cura¸cao formation that won two Staten seats in 2006. Leader: Nelson NAVARRO. Democratic Party–Sint Maarten (Demokratiko Partido–Sint Maarten/Democratische Partij– Sint Marten—DP-StM). Technically, the DP-StM is an English-speaking branch of the DP-C (below). One of its leaders, Louis C. GUMBS, resigned from the government and the party in March 1991 to stand for an Island Council seat on Sint Maarten as a candidate of the PDP (below), which had recently been launched by a group of DP-StM dissidents. In November 1993 Gumbs was found not guilty of bribery and perjury charges that had been brought against him. One month earlier DPStM leader Claude WATHEY had been arrested

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

in connection with an investigation of financial irregularities on the island. The party lost one of its two Staten seats in 1994, its leadership passing thereafter from Wathey to Sarah Westcott-Williams (formerly of the PDP). Its representation fell from two seats in 2002 to one in 2006. Former party leader Claude Wathey died on January 9, 1998. Leader: Sarah WESTCOTT-WILLIAMS. Democratic Party–Statia/Democratic Party– Sint Eustatius (Democratische Partij–Statia/ Democratische Partij–Sint Eustatius—DP-S/DPStE). Like the DP-StM, technically a branch of the DP, the DP-S also supported the Liberia-Peters government. The party lost its single Staten seat in 1998 but won it back in 2002 and retained it in 2006. Leaders: Kenneth van PUTTEN, Nora Sneek GIBBS. Democratic Party–Bonaire (Democratische Partij–Bonaire—DPB/Partido Democratico Bonairano—PDB). Unrepresented in the Staten before the February 1994 poll, the PDB currently holds one seat. Leader: Jopie ABRAHAM. Windward Islands People’s Movement — WIPM. Formerly known as the West Indian People’s Movement, the WIPM won the seat from Saba in the 1985 and 1990 elections. At Island Council balloting in April 1991 the WIPM won four of five seats from the incumbent SDLP (below) but retained only two in May 1995. A single Staten seat won in 1990 was retained thereafter through 2006. Leaders: Will JOHNSTON (Chair), Ray HASSEL, Dave LEVENSTONE (Secretary General).

Other Parties Labor Party Popular Crusade (Partido Laboral Krusada Popular—PLKP). A trade unionbased group launched in 1997, the PLKP won three seats in the January 1998 legislative elections. It joined the subsequent cabinet led by the PNP’s Suzanne Camelia-R¨omer but withdrew from the coalition in 1999 and was not included in the PAR-led cabinet of November 1999. The PLKP

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rejoined the government in June 2002, having secured 12.1 percent of the vote (and two seats) in the January legislative poll, both of which were lost in 2006. Leader: Errol COVA (Former Deputy Prime Minister). Saba United Democratic Party—SUDP. The SUDP was originally known as the Saba Democratic Labour Movement (SDLM), which became Saba’s ruling party on May 12, 1995, by winning three of five Island Council seats, before losing all but one in 1999. Leader: Steve HASSELL. Democratic Party–Cura¸cao (Democratische Partij–Cura¸cao—DP-C). Prior to the 1985 election the DP was primarily Cura¸cao-based, with a Dutchspeaking branch on Bonaire and English-speaking branches on Sint Maarten and Sint Eustatius. Leader: Raymond BENTOERA. Progressive Democratic Party—PDP. Also referenced as the People’s Democratic Party, the PDP was organized by a group of DP-StM dissidents who won two Sint Maarten Council seats in April 1991 and joined the SPA in forming a coalition administration two months later. The group withdrew in August, forcing the government’s collapse, and subsequently entered into a ruling coalition with its parent party. Leader: Millicent de WEEVER. United People’s Labour Party—UPLP. The UPLP was launched in March 2003 as a “working class” party to contest forthcoming local elections in Sint Maarten. Leaders: Edwin MADURO, Bienvenido RICHARDSON.

Legislature The unicameral States (Staten) presently consists of 22 members elected for four-year terms, subject to dissolution. At the most recent balloting of January 27, 2006, the Restructured Antilles Party won 5 seats; the New Antilles Movement, 3; the Bonaire Patriotic Union, 2; the

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Cabinet As of June 1, 2007 Prime Minister

Emily de Jongh-Elhage (PAR) [f]

Ministers Constitutional and Home Affairs Economic Affairs Education, Culture, Youth, and Sports Finance Health and Social Development Justice Plenipotentiary to The Hague Transportation and Communication Without Portfolio

Roland Duncan (NA) Burney Elhage (UPB) Omayra Leeflang (PAR) [f] Ersilia T. M. de Lannoy (PNP) [f] Sandra Smith (MAN) [f] David Dick (PAR) Paul R. J. Comenencia (PAR) Kenneth Glisbertha (MAN) Hubert Martis (UPB) Shamara Nicholson (WIPM) [f] Alex Rosaria (PNP) Ernie Simmons (DP-S)

State Secretaries Deputy Minister Plenipotentiary Health

Mavis Brooks-Salmon (NA) [f] Rudolph Samuel (NA)

[f] = female

National Alliance, 2; the National People’s Party, 2; Upwards Cura¸cao, 2: the Worker’s Liberation Front, 2; and the Bonaire Democratic Party, the Democratic Party–Sint Eustatius, the Democratic Party–Sint Maarten, and the Windward Islands People’s Movement, 1 each. Speaker: Dudley LUCIA.

Communications Press The following are dailies published in Willemstad, unless otherwise noted: Extra (23,000), in Papiamento; La Prensa (14,000), in Papiamento; Nobo (12,000), in Papiamento; Amigoe (10,000), in Dutch; Beurs-en Nieuwsberichten (9,000), in Dutch; The News (Sint Maarten, 7,500), in English; Saba Herald (Saba, 500) monthly WIPM organ, in English; Ultimo Noticia, in Papiamento.

News Agencies The Dutch Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau (ANP) and the U.S. Associated Press (AP) maintain offices in Willemstad.

Broadcasting There are a number of privately owned radio stations in operation in Cura¸cao, Bonaire, Sint Maarten, and Saba; commercial television service is provided in Willemstad by Tele-Cura¸cao. In 2005 there were approximately 901 mobile cellular subscribers per 1,000 residents.

Intergovernmental Representation Foreign relations are conducted through the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague. IGO Membership (Non-UN): ACS, Interpol, WCO

N I C A R A G UA REPUBLIC

OF

NICARAGUA

Rep u´ blica de Nicaragua

Note: During the regional crisis that stemmed from Colombia’s breach of the Ecuadorian border in pursuit of FARC rebels, Ecuador and Venezuela ceased diplomatic relations with Colombia, massing troops on its borders. Nicaragua, an ally of Venezuela, briefly broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia on March 6, restoring them on March 12, following a relaxation of tensions after a conference between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela on March 7.

The Country Bounded by Honduras on the north and west and by Costa Rica on the south, Nicaragua is the largest but, apart from Belize, the least densely populated of the Central American states. Its numerous mountains are interspersed with extensive lowlands that make it a potential site for an interoceanic canal. The population is predominantly (69 percent) mestizo (mixed Indian and European), with smaller groups of whites (17 percent), blacks (9 percent), and Indians (5 percent). Although freedom of worship is constitutionally recognized, 95 percent of the inhabitants adhere to Roman Catholicism. Making up 36 percent of the paid labor force in 2000, women were concentrated in domestic service, teaching, and market vending; in recent years, female participation has greatly increased, particularly in agriculture (under the sandinista regime women also constituted 30 percent of the armed forces and nearly half of the civil militia). As of late 2007, 17 percent of the country’s legislators and 41 percent of its cabinet members were women. About one-third of Nicaragua’s GDP continues to be agricultural, with coffee and seafood constituting the leading exports. The extraction of mineral resources (including silver, gold, lead, gypsum, and zinc) is also important, while efforts to promote economic growth have centered on

agricultural diversification and the stimulation of industries supporting agriculture and making use of local raw materials. A disastrous earthquake that struck Managua in December 1972 severely disrupted development, as did the concluding phase of the anti-somocista rebellion in 1978–1979. After

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a period of recovery the economy again declined because of border insurgency, floods in 1982 that devastated the cotton and coffee crops, and U.S. blockage of an estimated $55.6 million in international development aid and sugar revenue. By early 1985 a growing fiscal crisis had prompted an 80 percent currency devaluation and the elimination of most food subsidies; following three years of negative economic growth, an even more massive devaluation of more than 99 percent was ordered in February 1988, with the plunge continuing unabated into early 1991, when a further devaluation of 80 percent was ordered. With substantial foreign assistance, conditions improved dramatically during the remainder of the year. After several years of decline, real GDP grew marginally in 1992 and then more rapidly (after another downturn in 1993), peaking at 7.4 percent in 1999 as the economy recovered from the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch in October 1998: more than 4,000 people died in the storm, which destroyed or damaged about 36,000 homes. Growth dropped off to 4.3 percent in 2000, rose to 10.7 percent in 2001, then receded to an annual average of 3.9 percent in 2002–2006.

Government and Politics Political Background Nicaraguan politics following the country’s liberation from Spanish rule in 1821 was long dominated by a power struggle between leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties, punctuated by periods of U.S. intervention, which was virtually continuous during 1912–1925 and 1927–1933. A Liberal Party victory in a U.S.-supervised election in 1928 paved the way for the assumption of power by Gen. Anastasio SOMOZA Garc´ıa, who ruled the country as president from 1937 until his assassination in September 1956. Political power remained in the hands of the Somoza family under the Liberal Party presidencies of Luis SOMOZA Debayle, the dictator’s elder son (1956–1963); Ren´e SCHICK Guti´errez (1963– 1966); Lorenzo GUERRERO Guti´errez (1966–

1967); and Gen. Anastasio SOMOZA Debayle (1967–1972), the younger son of the late dictator. Constitutionally barred from a second term, Somoza Debayle arranged an interim collegial executive (consisting of two members of the Liberal Party and one member of the Conservative Party) that oversaw the promulgation of a new constitution and administered the nation until the election of September 1, 1974, when he was formally returned to office by an overwhelming margin. The stability of the Somoza regime was shaken by the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN), which launched a series of coordinated attacks throughout the country in October 1977 in an effort to instigate a general uprising. While the immediate effort failed, far more serious disturbances erupted in 1978, including occupation of the National Palace in Managua by FSLN rebels on August 22 and a major escalation of the insurgency in early September. During the first half of 1979 the tide turned decisively in favor of the sandinistas, who by the end of June controlled most of the major towns as well as the slum district of the capital. Despite 12 days of intense bombardment of FSLN positions within Managua, government forces were unable to regain the initiative, and on July 17 General Somoza left the country after resigning in favor of an interim president, Dr. Francisco URCUYO Malia˜nos. Confronted with a bid by Urcuyo to remain in office until the expiration of his predecessor’s term in 1981, three members of the FSLN provisional junta flew from Costa Rica to Le´on on July 18 and, amid some confusion, accepted the unconditional surrender of the National Guard commander in Managua the following day. Daniel ORTEGA Saavedra, the leader of the five-man junta and of the FSLN’s nine-member Directorate, announced in August 1980 that the FSLN would remain in power until 1985, with electoral activity to resume in 1984. In addition to Ortega, the original junta included Violeta Barrios de CHAMORRO, Mois´es HASSAN Morales, Sergio RAM´IREZ Mercado, and Alfonso ROBELO Callejas. On May 18, 1980, Rafael CORDOVA Rivas and Arturo Jos´e CRUZ Porras were named to succeed Chamorro and Robelo, who had resigned

N I C A R AG UA

Political Status: Independence originally proclaimed 1821; separate republic established 1838; provisional junta installed July 19, 1979; present constitution adopted November 19, 1986, in effect from January 9, 1987. Area: 50,193 sq. mi. (130,000 sq. km.). Population: 4,357,099 (1995C); 5,925,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): MANAGUA (1,166,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: C´ordoba oro (principal rate November 2, 2007: 18.76 c´ordobas = $1US). President: Daniel ORTEGA Saavedra (Sandinist National Liberation Front); served as president 1985–1990; reelected on November 5, 2006, and inaugurated for a five-year term on January 10, 2007, succeeding ˜ Enrique BOLANOS Geyer (Grand Liberal Union). Vice President: Jaime MORALES Carazo (Sandinist National Liberation Front); elected on November 5, 2006, and inaugurated for a term concurrent with that of the president on January 10, 2007, succeeding Alfredo ´ GOMEZ Urcuyo (nonparty).

on April 19 and 22, respectively. On March 4, 1981, Hassan and Cruz also resigned, Ortega being named “coordinator” of the remaining threemember group. On September 17, 1980, former president Somoza was assassinated in a bazooka attack on his limousine in central Asunci´on, Paraguay. (In early 1999 the former chief of state security during the sandinista regime reportedly acknowledged his agency’s responsibility for the attack.) In early 1984, under diplomatic pressure from Western countries and military pressure from U.S.-backed insurgent (contra) forces, the junta adjusted its electoral timetable to permit both presidential and legislative balloting the following November. Although attempts by the regime to reach procedural agreement with the opposition failed (most of the latter’s larger parties withdrawing from the campaign), the November 4 election

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was contested by a number of small non-sandinista groups. In balloting described as exemplary by international observers (who nonetheless objected to preelection censorship and harassment of opposition candidates), Ortega won 67 percent of the presidential vote, while the FSLN gained a similar percentage of seats in a National Constituent Assembly, which approved a new basic law on November 19, 1986. After extensive negotiations, a preliminary peace agreement for the region, based in part on proposals advanced by President Oscar Arias S´anchez of Costa Rica, was approved by the five Central American chief executives in Guatemala City, Guatemala, on August 7, 1987. In accordance with the agreement, talks between the sandinista government and contra leaders were initiated in late January 1988 that failed to yield a definitive cease-fire agreement, although most of the rebel forces had quit Nicaragua for Honduras by midAugust because of a failure to secure further military aid from the United States. Subsequently, the Central American presidents, during a meeting in Tesoro Beach, El Salvador, on February 13–14, 1989, agreed on a program of Nicaraguan electoral reform that would permit opposition parties unimpeded access to nationwide balloting no later than February 25, 1990, while the U.S. Congress in mid-April approved a $49.7 million package of nonlethal aid for the contras over the ensuing 10 months. Although public opinion polls had suggested that the FSLN enjoyed a substantial lead in the 1990 elections, Chamorro, heading a National Opposition Union (UNO) coalition, defeated Ortega by a 15 percent margin in the February presidential poll, with the UNO capturing 51 of 92 assembly seats. Following her inauguration in April, President Chamorro was confronted with a perilously weak economy reeling from numerous clashes between peasants who had benefited from the sandinista land policies and demobilized contras pressing for promised land and monetary compensation. Chamorro responded by naming a number of influential contras to government positions, while retaining her predecessor’s brother, Cdr. (thereafter

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Gen.) Humberto ORTEGA Saavedra as chief of the armed forces. These actions, in addition to continuance of a social pact (concertaci´on) with the FSLN led Vice President Godoy’s conservative UNO bloc to adopt a posture of de facto opposition. The complexity of the new alignment was evidenced by the January 1991 balloting for president of the National Assembly: former contra leader and presidential advisor Alfredo CESAR Aguirre, with the backing of both sandinista and moderate UNO members, defeated incumbent M´ıriam ARGUELLO Morales, a hard-liner supported by Godoy. In June 1991 the FSLN withdrew its 39-member delegation from the assembly after right-wing members, led by Godoy, had proposed the revocation of land and property redistribution legislation enacted by the previous administration during its waning days in office. The action had long been controversial because, in addition to benefiting the landless, it had enabled sandinista leaders to acquire expensive homes, cars, and other property that had been confiscated from their previous owners; thus it was popularly styled the pi˜nata, after a container of sweetmeats traditionally broken in preLenten festivities. By midyear, pressure to revoke the pi˜nata had stimulated raids by bands of newly rearmed contras in the north and the repeal bill was approved on August 23. While Chamorro vetoed most of the bill’s content on September 11, active battle lines were again formed between the country’s longtime adversaries, with a variety of sandinista units (styled recompas) being launched to combat rearmed contras (recontras). On November 9 unrest intensified with the bombing in Managua of the tomb of FSLN founder Carlos FONSECA. By mid-February 1992 about 13,000 recontras and 9,000 recompas, in addition to their respective high commands, had been demobilized. Subsequently, however, members of both groups criticized the government for its failure to make good on land redistribution and, in a remarkable move, organized an armed force of 4,000 revueltos (“those mixed together”) in collective opposition to the Chamorro administration. Meanwhile, 12 of the UNO’s 14 constituent parties had joined Vice Pres-

ident Godoy Reyes in criticizing the government’s “acquiescent” attitude toward the FSLN and the “immoral marriage” between President Chamorro and her sandinista predecessor. On September 2, 1992, in the wake of one of the most devastating tidal waves in Nicaraguan history, C´esar Aguirre refused to declare a suspension of legislative activity and a number of UNO centrists joined all of the sandinista representatives in walking out. Despite the lack of a quorum, which yielded a Supreme Court order declaring the session illegal, C´esar issued a call for legislative alternates, which was heeded by those (more sympathetic to C´esar than the ones they succeeded) from the UNO. On September 9 the reconstituted body approved a measure giving its leadership the authority to name substitutes for legislators who failed to appear for a vote and to effectively block the return of members absent for six months. On December 30 President Chamorro responded by issuing a decree that charged C´esar with contempt of court for ignoring the September ruling and ordered a military takeover of the assembly building. On January 9, 1993, a cabinet reshuffle was announced that for the first time awarded a portfolio (tourism) to a sandinista, while a new assembly, dominated by sandinistas and an ex-UNO Center Group, was convened, which proceeded to elect Gustavo TABLADA Zelaya, a former Communist, as its presiding officer. By now the breach between Chamorro and her former coalition supporters was such that some UNO leaders called for shortening her term of office, and in late February General Ortega charged Vice President Godoy and former assembly president C´esar with encouraging recontra activity in the north to create sufficient unrest to cause the government’s collapse. The UNO hardliners responded by organizing a series of mass demonstrations against the president’s “cogovernment” with her former adversaries. Following an abortive effort by Chamorro to launch a National Dialogue on the issues dividing the country, a remarkable series of “tit-for-tat” military actions erupted. On July 21–22, 1993, nearly 50 people were killed when a group of 150 recompas rebels seized control of the northern town of

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Estel´ı, plundering three local banks before being routed by government troops. On August 19 rightwing recontras took 42 hostages in an attack on another northern town, El Z´ungana; in retaliation a recompas unit stormed the Managua offices of the UNO, taking captive an equal number of individuals, including Godoy and C´esar. All of the hostages were released within days, following intervention by the Organization of American States (OAS). On September 2, 1993, President Chamorro angered her FSLN supporters by announcing that General Ortega would be removed as military chief in 1994; the pledge did not, however, mollify her UNO critics, who called for his immediate dismissal. During the following week General Ortega and Vice President Godoy held two private meetings that led to an unprecedented series of talks between FSLN and UNO representatives in October and November on proposals for constitutional reform. By early 1994 a new legislative majority had emerged in the form of a working alliance between the FSLN, the Center Group, and the Christian Democratic Union (UDC), which advanced the process of constitutional revision by lifting a requirement that amendments be approved by two successive assembly sessions. Subsequently, General Ortega, in response to continuing pressure to step down, indicated that he would not do so until a new military statute had been enacted that placed nomination to his office in the hands of a Military Council (Consejo Militar). On May 18 President Chamorro stated that Ortega would retire on February 21, 1995. The announcement came one day before submitting to the assembly her proposals for military reform, which did not call for subordination of the military to civilian control and did not provide for a ministry of defense. Meanwhile, the FSLN had encountered an identity crisis because of Ortega’s continuing governmental role. The sandinista dilemma became clear after the general had presented the armed forces’ highest award, the “Camilio Ortega” gold medal to the U.S. embassy’s defense attach´e on January 21, 1993, “in recognition of his outstanding work in strengthening professional relations between the

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Nicaraguan and U.S. armed forces.” The fact that Ortega was seen as moving to the right in a possible bid to gain the presidency in 1996 led to the formation of a “centrist” faction within the FSLN National Directorate that, while distancing itself from a “hard-line leftist minority,” sought “a basic reordering of the economy” along genuinely socialdemocratic lines. Disarray within the sandinista leadership was also seen in a growing cleavage between Ortega and the party’s relatively moderate legislative leader, former vice president Sergio Ram´ırez. Significantly, one of the constitutional reforms endorsed by Ram´ırez would restrict a president to a single term, which would deny the former chief executive an opportunity to vindicate himself for his 1989 loss to Chamorro. Ortega subsequently repositioned himself at the left of his party’s mainstream, urging opposition to economic restructuring and occasionally endorsing violence to oppose privatization by the Chamorro administration. His new hard-line posture won the day at an extraordinary FSLN congress in May 1994 and secured the dismissal of Ram´ırez as FSLN legislative leader in September. However, Ortega was unable to prevent the election of another moderate, Dora Mar´ıa TELLEZ, as Ram´ırez’s Assembly bloc successor. On September 2, 1994, a new military code was approved that limited the armed forces chief to a single five-year term and prohibited appointment of relatives of the president to the post. On the other hand, the military would continue to nominate its commander. Subsequently, the Military Council proposed Maj. Gen. Joaqu´ın CUADRA Lacayo to succeed Gen. Humberto Ortega on February 21, 1995. In November 1994 the National Assembly approved a lengthy series of constitutional amendments (see Constitution and government, below), significantly altering the distribution of power between the executive and legislative branches in favor of the latter. The changes were strongly opposed by President Chamorro and by the orthodox wing of the sandinistas, which supported a new effort by M´ıriam Arg¨uello to recapture the assembly presidency in January 1995. Arg¨uello was, however, unable to deny reelection to the reformist Luis

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´ and on February 17 the asHumberto GUZMAN, sembly published the constitutional revisions after Chamorro had refused to do so. The conflict intensified further on April 6, when the legislature named 5 new Supreme Court justices (2 to replace members whose terms had expired and 3 to expand the size of the Court from 9 to 12 under a provision of the amended basic law). On May 8, following presidential repudiation of the appointments, the court, without ruling on the substance of the constitutional changes, declared the amendments null and void in the absence of executive promulgation. However, on June 15, in the wake of mediation by the archbishop of Managua, Cardinal Miguel OBANDO y Bravo, the lengthy impasse was broken with Mrs. Chamorro’s acceptance of the constitutional reform package, which was promulgated on July 4. An agreement on the new Supreme Court justices followed on July 21. By early 1995 campaigning for the 1996 election by Nicaragua’s more than two dozen parties was effectively under way. One of the leading candidates, Presidency Minister Antonio LACAYO Oyanguren, indicated that he might divorce his wife, Cristiana CHAMORRO, so as to comply with the new constitutional requirement that blood and marriage relatives serving heads of state be disqualified. Other likely contenders were Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ram´ırez of the deeply divided FSLN and, on the right, Managua Mayor Arnaldo ´ Lacayo, representing the largely reALEMAN united Liberals. On December 6, 1995, legislative passage of a new general election law included a provision for a presidential runoff if no candidate gained at least 45 percent of the vote. On July 6, 1996, the Supreme Electoral Council (Consejo Supremo Electoral—CSE) formally declared Antonio Lacayo ineligible for the presidency; the council also disqualified Alvaro ROBELO of the conservative Nicaraguan Alliance (AN) and Ed´en PASTORA G´omez of the Democratic Action Party (PAD) for having acquired, respectively, Italian and Costa Rican citizenship. In the balloting of October 10, 1996, Alem´an Lacayo emerged as the clear victor in the presidential race, although the FSLN insisted that his official tally of 51 percent was fraudulently inflated. The

legislative outcome was far less simple, Alem´an’s Liberal coalition being held to a plurality of 42 seats, while the runner-up FSLN gained 36. With Alem´an ineligible for reelection in 2001, ˜ Enrique BOLANOS Geyer, who had resigned as vice president in October 2000 to qualify as a presidential candidate, won the PLC nomination and garnered 56.1 percent of the vote to defeat Daniel Ortega in the FSLN leader’s third nationwide effort on November 4. Alem´an supporters subsequently secured his election as president of the National Assembly, a post that he was obliged to relinquish on September 19, 2002, amid mounting evidence of corruption during his tenure as chief executive. Fifteen months later, on December 7, 2003, Alem´an was convicted of fraud, money laundering, and the theft of state funds and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. In late 2003 Alem´an, who continued as Liberal leader despite his imprisonment, joined forces with Ortega, thus splitting the party into pro-and anti-Bela˜nos factions. The president responded by forming a new party, the Grand Liberal Union (GUL), which joined with five minor groups in an Alliance for the Republic (APRE, under Political Parties, below) to contest the November 2004 municipal elections. The FSLN swept the November 7, 2004, local balloting, winning more than 90 of 152 mayoralties, including 15 of 17 capitals, on a 45 percent vote share. The PLC won 41 mayoralties and only 1 capital, while the APRE took 5 mayoralties and 1 capital. Following the election, the FSLN and PLC concluded a power-sharing pact under which the two would alternate the presidency, beginning with whoever won the next election, with guarantees to the other of a share of high-level government positions. The FSLN secured a plurality of 38 legislative seats in 2006, with Ortega regaining the presidency on a vote share of 38.1 percent.

Constitution and Government The constitution approved by a National Constituent Assembly in November 1986 provided for a president, vice president, and National Assembly

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elected for six-year terms. The assembly contains 90 members directly elected by proportional balloting in regional districts, with additional seats for unsuccessful presidential candidates securing a minimum number of votes. The assembly may be expanded in accordance with population growth, while its acts may be vetoed, in whole or in part, by the president within 15 days of their approval. The judiciary encompasses a Supreme Court of at least seven judges elected for six-year terms by the National Assembly, in addition to appellate and municipal courts. The country is divided into 15 departments and two largely indigenous areas, the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) and the South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS). Municipalities are governed by elected councils. On November 24, 1994, the assembly approved a series of constitutional amendments that provided for increased legislative authority vis-`a-vis the president, whose term was reduced from six years to five, with a ban on relatives of a serving president standing for the office. In addition, both the president and National Assembly were authorized to introduce tax measures and to share responsibility for appointing Supreme Court justices, the comptroller general, and the president and vice president of the national bank. Other provisions guaranteed the rights of primary and secondary education and free health care for all citizens, provided greater independence for the judiciary, increased civilian control over the military, eliminated conscription, and recognized the rights of indigenous populations on both the east and west coasts. In late January 2000 President Alem´an signed into law another round of constitutional changes, including a reduction from 45 to 35 percent in the vote share required for presidential election; legislative life tenure for himself, with a two-thirds vote required for removal of immunity from prosecution; the appointment of five permanent members of the State Comptroller’s Office from a list approved by the president and Congress; an increase in the number of Supreme Court justices to 16 from 12; an increase in the membership of the Supreme Electoral Council to seven from five; and the deregistration of political parties securing

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less than 4 percent of the vote. In addition, President Alem´an advocated holding a constitutional assembly election in place of the presidential poll scheduled for 2001, but failed to secure sufficient legislative support for the proposal. In late 2004 the National Assembly approved a new package of constitutional reforms that included legislative ratification of ministerial and ambassadorial appointments and lowered to a simple majority (from two-thirds) the vote needed to overturn a presidential veto. The package was struck down by the Central American Court of Justice on March 29, 2005, on the ground that it should have been submitted to a constituent assembly. However, Nicaragua’s Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) approved the changes on March 30, arguing that the regional court lacked jurisdiction because of a protocol approved by the Central American presidents in December that banned it from intervening in intrapower disputes in member states.

Foreign Relations The conservative and generally pro-U.S. outlook of the Somoza regime was reflected in a favorable attitude toward North American investment and a strongly pro-Western, anti-Communist position in the UN, OAS, and other international bodies. Washington, for its part, did not publicly call for the resignation of General Somoza until June 20, 1979, and subsequently appealed for an OAS peacekeeping presence to ensure that a successor government would include moderate representatives acceptable to “all major elements of Nicaraguan society.” Although the idea was rejected by both the OAS and the FSLN, the United States played a key role in the events leading to Somoza’s departure, and the administration of President Jimmy Carter extended reconstruction aid to the new Managua government in October 1980. By contrast, President Ronald Reagan was deeply committed to support of the largely Honduran-based rebel contras, despite a conspicuous lack of enthusiasm for such a policy by many U.S. members of Congress. Regional attitudes toward the contra insurgency were mixed, most South American countries

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professing neutrality, although Managua-Quito relations were broken in 1985 after (then) Ecuadorian President Febres Cordero called Nicaragua “a bonfire in Central America.” Subsequently, members of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela) and the Lima Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay) met intermittently with Central American leaders in an effort to broker the conflict, although neither bloc directly influenced the accords of August 1987 and February 1989. In April 1991 President Chamorro became the first Nicaraguan head of state in more than 50 years to make an official visit to Washington, where she was warmly received and addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress. In sharp contrast, an August 1992 report issued by a top aide of U.S. Senator Jesse Helms charged the Chamorro government with being controlled by “communists, terrorists, thugs, robbers and assassins” and recommended the discontinuance of aid to Nicaragua pending a number of changes, including the replacement of all sandinista army and police personnel by former contras and the return of properties belonging to Nicaraguans living in the United States (many of whom were supporters of the former Somoza regime). The report, which also contained the erroneous charge that Nicaragua was “the most heavily militarized state in Central America,” was dismissed by Managua as “ludicrous.” Regionally, Nicaragua called in May 1991 for deferment on formal admission to the new Central American Parliament (Parlacen) on the ground that it lacked the resources for an early referendum on the matter. In October 1992 Nicaraguan authorities accused Costa Rica of contaminating the San Juan River by sanctioning the use of highly toxic pesticides on its banana plantations. A month later, in the first such meeting since the end of the sandinista-contra war, General Ortega traveled to Honduras, where he conferred with his counterpart, Gen. Luis Alonso Discua Elvir, on collaborative efforts to limit the use of their countries “for illegal drug, arms, cattle or fish trafficking.” During a summit meeting in Managua on April 22, 1993, Nicaragua joined its three northern

neighbors (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), who had previously undertaken a Tri´angulo Norde free trade initiative, in launching the Grupo Am´erica Central 4 (AC-4), which was viewed as paving the way for a free trade zone throughout the isthmus. The process was further advanced during a five-member regional summit in Guatemala City on October 27–29, 1993, following inauguration of the headquarters of the Central American Integration System (SICA, under the Central American Common Market—CACM). A long-dormant territorial dispute with Colombia was rekindled in April 1995 with Nicaragua’s seizure of two Colombian fishing vessels and the alleged violation of its airspace by three Colombian aircraft. At issue was Nicaragua’s 1980 revocation of a 1928 treaty, by which Nicaragua, under reported U.S. pressure, ceded ownership of certain Caribbean islands to its neighbor in compensation for construction of the interocean canal through Panama. In November 1995 Nicaragua and Costa Rica agreed to regularize the status of 50,000 Nicaraguans working illegally in Costa Rica. Under the accord, the workers would be given special Nicaraguan passports, while work permits would be issued by Costa Rican authorities once their employment had been certified. In August 1998 Nicaragua rescinded an agreement that had been concluded only a month earlier with Costa Rica for free navigation, including police patrols, along the San Juan River because of opposition charges that it had “ceded sovereignty” to its neighbor. The dispute was eventually abated by a new agreement in mid-2000 that restored Costa Rica’s right to the patrols as long as Nicaragua received prior notification of their movements. Costa Rica, however, did not abandon its claim to full navigational rights and filed a claim to such effect with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in late 2005. In recent years, Nicaragua and Costa Rica have also been locked in a dispute over a 170-squaremile strip of poorly demarcated swampland on the southern shore of Lake Nicaragua. For their part, the 5,000 impoverished residents of the area have rejected the claims of both governments,

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seeking instead an independent “Republic of Airrec´u.” Relations with Honduras, complicated during the 1980s by the presence of several thousand (mainly somocista) exiles in Honduran border camps, were exacerbated in early 1995 by the eruption of a “shrimp war” in the Gulf of Fonseca. New flare-ups resulted in May and August 1997 from the Nicaraguan navy’s seizure of numerous Honduran fishing boats that had reportedly strayed out of their own national waters. A new crisis with Honduras erupted in November 1999, following ratification by the Honduran Congress of a 1986 maritime border treaty with Colombia that involved 50,000 square miles of coastal waters, portions of which were alleged to have been forcibly ceded to Colombia during the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua in the 1920s. In reprisal, Nicaragua imposed a 35 percent duty on all goods imported from Honduras. In January 2000 the parties agreed to submit the dispute to a ruling by the World Court; however, less than a month later peace in the Gulf of Fonseca was again threatened by an exchange between Nicaraguan and Honduran patrol boats, each claiming that it had been attacked by the other. In March 2000 the controversy was brought closer to resolution by an agreement that called for placement of marker buoys and the use of joint naval patrols, but a year later procedures for the patrols had not yet been completed. Moreover, in February 2001 Nicaragua had accused Honduras of not living up to an agreement on demilitarizing their land border. A March meeting in Washington, D.C., served to ease tensions, and in June the two countries accepted an OAS-brokered pact that included provisions for OAS observers to monitor activities along both land and marine borders. But the friction continued into 2002, with periodic seizures of Honduran boats in alleged Nicaraguan waters and Nicaragua authorizing oil prospecting in the region. While the maritime issue continued unresolved, the Nicaraguan Congress in March 2003 suspended the 35 percent tariff, which had cost Honduran exporters losses of more than $210 million during the previous three years.

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After a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in November 2004, President Bola˜nos announced that all surface-to-air (SAM) missiles remaining in Nicaragua (1,334) would be destroyed over the next year-and-a-half. However, the military was unhappy with the decision, and in February 2007 President Ortega announced that he would not accede to his predecessor’s agreement on the ground that U.S.-backed militarization in the region was “a reality.” In mid-2007 Ortega condemned the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for their “criminal work in privatizing public entities” but gave no indication of a desire to sever links with either. That same year Ortega welcomed the promise of a Venezuelan-financed $2.5 billion oil refinery during a visit by Venezuela’s president Hugo Ch´avez in March 2007 while showing his willingness to bury his long-standing animosity with Oscar Arias by meeting with the Costa Rican president in August. Thus, in the words of one observer, Ortega seemed to be striving “to keep a foot in both foreign camps.”

Current Issues The election of November 4, 2001, was preceded by a bitter struggle within the PLC between President Alem´an and the party’s presidential nominee, Enrique Bola˜nos, who pledged to root out corruption attributed to the incumbent. Following the election, Alem´an secured temporary immunity from prosecution as assembly president, but he was forced out of the post ten months later by a coalition of PLC dissidents and sandinistas, who named a commission to look into possible prosecution of the former president and his daughter, Amelia ´ for embezzlement of state funds. ALEMAN, Alem´an’s conviction and sentencing to 20 years’ imprisonment in late 2003 by no means terminated his political influence, as his legislative followers joined with sandinistas in issuing charges of fraud against associates of his reputedly “clean” successor. By late 2004, as reflected by his alliance’s third place showing in the municipal poll, President Bola˜nos’s popularity had shrunk from a 2002

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high of 58 percent to a low of 18 percent. Ironically, former president Alem´an’s appeal, despite his imprisonment, had risen in the same period from 20 percent to 43 percent. Subsequently, Alem´an’s confinement was reduced to house arrest, and in August 2005 the CSJ overturned a lower court ruling and ordered his release. In July 2007 the two leading Liberal formations, the PLC and the ALN (below), concluded an alliance for the 2008 municipal elections. However, the pact subsequently foundered over fallout from the 2004 power-sharing pact between Alem´an and Ortega, which the PLC was reluctant to disavow. Meanwhile, the first 100 days of Ortega’s return to the presidency yielded mixed reactions. While praised for macro-economic policies essentially similar to those of his predecessor, Ortega was criticized for an avowedly “authoritarian” style of government, including using measures to strengthen control of the army and police. Concurrently, the Liberal legislative groups combined to rule out links to the government by projected citizen power councils, which the FSLN had long sought to establish as a means of popular political participation.

Political Parties and Groups Historically, the Liberal and Conservative parties dominated Nicaraguan politics in what was essentially a two-party system. During most of the Somoza era, the heir to the liberal tradition, the Nationalist Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Nacionalista de Nicaragua—PLN), enjoyed a monopoly of power, while in mid-1978 the Nicaraguan Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Nicarag¨uense—PCN) joined other opposition groups in a Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio de Oposici´on—FAO) that called for the president’s resignation and the creation of a government of national unity. In addition to the PCN, the FAO included the Independent Liberal and Nicaraguan Social Christian parties (see below); the Democratic Liberation Union (Uni´on Democr´atica de Liberaci´on—Udel), organized in 1977 by former PCN leader and newspaper editor Pedro Joaqu´ın Chamorro Cardenal, who was as-

sassinated in January 1978; and the Group of 12 (Movimiento de los Doce), a pro-sandinista organization of businesspeople, academics, and priests that withdrew from the FAO in October 1978 because of a proposal to include members of the PLN in a future coalition government. Following the sandinista victory, the principal internal groupings were the FSLN-led Patriotic Front for the Revolution (Frente Patri´otico para la Revoluci´on—FPR) and the opposition Nicaraguan Democratic Coordination (Coordinadora Democr´atica Nicarag¨uense—CDN). However, by 1984 the Patriotic Front had effectively dissolved, most of its non-FSLN components having chosen to contest the November balloting as separate entities, while the Coordinadora, technically reduced to the status of a “citizens’ association” because of its electoral boycott, was declared to have become “inoperative” in 1985 after several of its leaders had entered into agreements with contra units that included appeals for a “national dialogue.” The 14-member National Opposition Union (Uni´on Nacional Opositora—UNO) was formally registered as a political coalition in September 1989 with Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, who declined to affiliate with any specific party, as its presidential candidate for the February 1990 election. Thereafter, coalition members tended to divide on many issues between a dominant faction loyal to the president, who sought to cultivate linkages with the FSLN, and a conservative group (PLI, below) led by Vice President Godoy Reyes; by early 1992 most UNO legislators had shifted their allegiance to Godoy, although the government retained a legislative majority in the form of a de facto alignment between sandinista and UNO “centrist” deputies. In early 1993 the latter, after formally organizing as the Center Group (Grupo de Centro—GC), were expelled from the UNO, which proceeded to change its name to the Opposition Political Alliance (Alianza Politica Opositora—APO). In the wake of further cleavages the APO was reduced to only four members by mid-1994, while the FSLN was subjected to an internal rift that was far from resolved by the victory of Daniel Ortega’s “orthodox” faction at the party’s May 1994 congress.

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The major contenders at the 1996 election were the FSLN and a coalition styled the Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal—AL), which included the PLN; the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal—Pali), launched in 1983 by a right-wing group of PLI dissidents; the Independent Liberal Party of National Unity (Partido Liberal Independiente de Unidad Nacional—PLIUN), formed by a group that withdrew from the PLI in 1988 and that, in 1996, spawned a dissident formation of its own, the Liberal Convergence (Convergencia Liberal— CL); the Central American Unionist Party (Partido Unionista Centro Americano—PUCA), the regional integrationist parent of the PIAC (below); and, as its leading component, the PLC (below). The principal contestants in 2001 were the FSLN and the PLC, while those in 2006 were the FSLN, the PLC, and the ALN (below). Note: In recent years, Nicaraguan parties have been in considerable flux. For a list of other groups active prior to the 2006 elections, see the 2006 edition of the Handbook. Groups Gaining Legislative Representation in 2006.

Sandinist National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberaci´on Nacional—FSLN). The FSLN was established in 1961 as a Castroite guerrilla group named after Augusto C´esar Sandino, a prominent rebel during the U.S. occupation of the 1920s. The FSLN displayed a remarkable capacity for survival, despite numerous “eradication” campaigns during the later years of the Somoza regime, in the course of which much of its original leadership was killed. In 1975 it split into three “tendencies”: two small Marxist groupings, the Protracted Popular Warfare (Guerra Popular Prolongada—GPP) and the Proletarian Tendency (Tendencia Proletaria), and a larger, less extreme Third Party (Terceristas), a nonideological, antiSomoza formation supported by peasants, students, and upper-class intellectuals. The three groups coordinated their activities during the 1978 offensive and were equally represented in the ninemember Joint National Directorate. Although the July 1979 junta was largely tercerista dominated, the subsequent withdrawal of a number of moderates yielded a more distinctly leftist thrust to

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the party leadership, hard-liner Bayardo ARCE reportedly characterizing the November 1984 balloting as “a bother.” In an August 1985 reorganization of the Directorate, its Political Commission was replaced by a five-member Executive Commission, chaired by Daniel Ortega, with Arce as his deputy. Following the unexpected sandinista defeat in February 1990, Ortega pledged to “obey the popular mandate” and participated in the inauguration of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro on April 25. In conformity with a postelectoral agreement precluding the holding of party office by military personnel, his brother Gen. Humberto Ortega withdrew as a member of the FSLN Executive after being redesignated armed forces commander by the new president. The 581 delegates to the first FSLN congress on July 19–21, 1991, reaffirmed the Front’s commitment to socialism, while confessing to a variety of mistakes during its period of rule. Former president Ortega was elected to the new post of general secretary, while seven former comandantes of the previous leadership were elected to a new ninemember National Directorate that also included former Nicaraguan vice president Sergio Ram´ırez Mercado. A pronounced intraparty split had emerged before an extraordinary FSLN congress on May 20– 22, 1994, the reflection primarily of an “orthodox” faction headed by Ortega and a moderate “renewalist” faction headed by Ram´ırez, with party treasurer Henry RUIZ Hern´andez leading an avowedly “centrist” unity grouping. The Ortega faction emerged victorious at the congress, gaining eight seats on an expanded Directorate, against four for the “renewalists” and three for the “centrists.” However, public opinion polls had shown Ram´ırez to be much stronger than Ortega as a potential presidential candidate. Ram´ırez served in the National Assembly as Ortega’s alternate; thus, in September 1994, the former president was able to oust him as legislative bloc leader by reclaiming the seat. However the FSLN delegation proceeded to elect a moderate, Doria Mar´ıa T´ellez, as its new leader rather than

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Ortega, thus formalizing a cleavage between the Front’s legislative members and its National Directorate. In early 1995 Ram´ırez, T´ellez, and approximately three-quarters of the sandinista legislative delegation withdrew from the FSLN to form the MRS (below). In November 1995 Ortega surprised observers by announcing that he would seek his party’s nomination for reelection to the post that he had lost to Chamorro five-and-a-half years earlier. At the October 1996 balloting he lost to the AL’s Alem´an Lacayo by more than 13 percent of the popular vote. Ortega was reelected FSLN general secretary at a party Congress in May 1998, and on January 21, 2001, defeated two other candidates, Alejandro MARTINEZ Cuenca and V´ıctor HUGO Tinoco, for the party’s 2001 presidential endorsement. Defeated in his third presidential bid on November 4, 2001, Ortega nonetheless retained leadership of the FSLN at its third Congress in March 2002, during which the group’s 205-member assembly was supplanted by a 40-member Board of Directors headed by an 8-member Executive Commission. The move was seen as concentrating power among Ortega supporters, thus limiting intraparty dissent. In late 2004 the FSLN concluded a powersharing pact with the PLC (see Political background, above). However, the prospect of an FSLN victory in the 2006 balloting was seemingly diminished by the expulsion from the party in February 2005 of Ortega’s leading rival, former Managua Mayor Herty Lewites, who had been leading Ortega in the opinion polls (see MRS, below). His critics notwithstanding, Ortega was returned to the presidency after a 16-year hiatus on November 6, 2006. Leaders: Daniel ORTEGA Saavedra (President of the Republic and FSLN General Secretary), Tom´as BORGE (Deputy General Secretary). Constitutionalist Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista—PLC). The PLC originated in 1968 as a spin-off of the Somoza-era PLN. It was subsequently affiliated with the UNO and in 1996 constituted the core of the AL.

Although retaining the presidency and securing a majority of legislative seats in 2001, the party became deeply divided between supporters of President Bola˜nos and former president Alem´an, as a result of which Bola˜nos launched a separate grouping, the Grand Liberal Union (GUL) in early 2004. Following his imprisonment in late 2003, Alem´an delegated the party presidency to his wife, Mar´ıa Fern´anda Flores. Reacting to the move, three members of the party directorate, including National Secretary Ren´e HERRERA, resigned in protest. In January 2005 Eduardo Montelegre Rivas (see under ALN, below) was expelled from the party for refusing to resign his cabinet post as secretary to the presidency after President Bola˜nos had endorsed corruption proceedings against his predecessor. The PLC placed third in the 2006 balloting. ´ Lacayo (ForLeaders: Dr. Arnoldo ALEMAN mer President of the Republic), Jos´e RIZO Castell´on (Honorary President of the Party and ´ 2006 presidential candidate), Mar´ıa FERNANDA ´ Flores, Dr. Noel RAMIREZ S´anchez (National Secretary). Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal Nicarag¨unse—ALN). The ALN was formed under the leadership of Eduard Montelegre Rivas after his departure from the PLC. Montelegre placed second in the 2006 presidential poll, with 29 percent of the vote. The party secured 24 legislative seats, including one for Montelegre as presidential best-loser and one for outgoing president Bola˜nos, who had launched a short-lived Grand Liberal Union (Gran Uni´on Liberal—GUL) in the wake of his departure from the PLC that had served as the core of an Alliance for the Republic (Alianza por la Republica—APRE) at the November 2004 municipal elections. Leader: Eduardo MONTELEGRE Rivas. Sandinista Renewal Movement (Movimiento Renovaci´on Sandinista—MRS). The MRS was launched in January 1995 by former sandinista legislative leader Sergio RAMIREZ Mercado and the “renewalist” majority of the FSLN National Assembly delegation. Members of the MRS strongly

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opposed Chamorro’s efforts to secure an enhanced role for the presidency in the 1995 constitutional reforms. Ram´ırez Mercado, the party’s 1996 presidential candidate, subsequently withdrew from an active role in partisan politics and was highly critical of a 2001 electoral alliance with the FSLN. In early 2006 the MRS announced FSLN dissident Herty LEWITES as its candidate for the upcoming presidential election. However, Lewites, considered one of the top three presidential contenders, died in early July. ´ Leaders: Dora Mar´ıa TELLEZ (President of the Party), Edmundo JARQU´IN Calder´on (2006 presidential candidate), V´ıctor Hugo TINOCO (Congressional Leader).

Other Parties Conservative Party of Nicaragua (Partido Conservador de Nicaragua—PCN). Formed in emulation of Nicaragua’s historic Conservative Party, the current PCN resulted from a 1992 merger of the Democratic Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Dem´ocrata—PCD) with two smaller formations, the Conservative Social Party (Partido Social Conservador—PSC) and the Conservative Party of Labor (Partido Conservador Laborista— PCL). Launched in 1979 by supporters of the traditional PCN, the PCD had long been deeply divided, with one of its leaders, Rafael Cordova Rives, joining the junta in May 1980 while most others were in exile. The party was a surprising first runnerup in the 1984 balloting, winning 14 legislative seats and a 14 percent vote share for its presidential candidate; rent by further defection, including formation of the PANC (below), the party secured no representation in 1990 but won three seats on a fifth-place finish in 1996. The Conservatives, who have recently undergone several changes in their top leadership, including the February 2001 resignation of Pedro SOLORZANO Castillo as president, saw their poll numbers diminish in the run-up to the November 2001 elections when their presidential nominee, Noel VIDAURRE Arg¨uello, and his running

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mate, Carlos TUNNERMAN Bernheim, withdrew on July 18 because of policy differences with other party leaders. Earlier in the year, the PCN’s initial choice for the vice presidency, former defense minister Jos´e Antonio ALVARADO, had withdrawn because of continuing controversy over his citizenship. On July 31 the party announced a new ticket headed by Alberto Sabor´ıo Morales, whose standing in the polls fell below 5 percent in September. He won only 1.4 percent of the vote on November 4, while the party’s legislative representation dropped from three to two. For the 2006 campaign, the PCN joined in supporting the presidential candidacy of PLC dissident Eduardo Montelegre Rivas under a grouping styled the Liberal Nicaraguan–Conservative Party Alliance (Alianza Liberal Nicarag¨uense–Partido Conservador—ALN-PC). Leaders: Mario RAPPACCIOLI McGregor (President of the Party), Alberto SABORIO Morales (2001 presidential candidate), Consuelo SEQUEIRA (2001 vice-presidential candidate). Nicaraguan Party of the Christian Road (Partido Camino Cristiano Nicaragu¨ense— PCCN). The PCCN is an evangelical Christian political formation launched immediately before the 1996 balloting, in which it did remarkably well. Its presidential candidate, Guillermo Osorno, placed third with 4 percent of the vote; in the legislative arena the party also captured third place, winning four seats, all of which were lost in 2006. Leaders: Guillermo Antonio OSORNO Molina (President of the Party and 1996 presidential candidate), Roberto RODRIGUEZ (1996 vicepresidential candidate), Delia ARELLANDO. Alternative for Change (Alternativa por el Cambio—AC). Founded by a group of PCCN dissidents, the AC endorsed as its 2006 presidential candidate former Sandinista-turned-contra Ed´en PASTORA G´omez, who had been a contender in 1995 but was disqualified because of a renunciation of his citizenship while in Costa Rican exile. As AC standard-bearer, Pastora won only 0.03 percent of the vote. Leader: Orlando TARDENCILLA.

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Nicaraguan Resistance Party (Partido de la Resistencia Nicarag¨uense—PRN). The PRN was launched by a number of former contra commanders on October 6, 1991, its links, if any, to recontra formations (see under Insurgent Groups, below) not being readily apparent. The party was legally registered in May 1993. Leaders: Salvador TALAVERA Alaniz (Presi´ dent of the Party), H´ector SANCHEZ, Luis Angel ´ LOPEZ Espinoza (“Leonel”), Luis FLEY (“Johnson”), Joel VALDEZ (“Brac”). Nicaraguan Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano Nicarag¨uense—PSCN). A strongly anti-somocista group founded in 1957, the PSCN joined the precoup Broad Opposition Front but refused a Council of State seat in 1980. It has links both to Venezuela’s COPEI and the Christian Democratic International, describes itself as “centrist,” and is supported by trade and farm union affiliates. It secured one assembly seat in 1990, none thereafter. Leaders: Germ´an ALFARO Ocambo (President of the Party), Erick RAM´IREZ Benevente (1990 presidential candidate), Dr. Luis VEGA Miranda (General Secretary). Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Dem´ocrata—PSD). Founded in 1979 as a splinter of the PSCN, the PSD was prohibited from calling itself the Partido Social dem´ocrata Sandinista on the ground that it had played no part in the sandinista revolution. Although claiming to be a party of “moderation,” it was denied admission to the Socialist International after having accused the FSLN of wishing to establish a “totalitarian” government. In early 1985 the PSD repudiated Coordinadora links to the contra insurgents, thus contributing to the demise of the alliance. The PSD secretary general, Perfecto GUTIERREZ, was assassinated on February 14, 1994. Leaders: Adolfo JARQUIN Ortez (President of the Party), Luis RIVAS Leiva, Dr. Jos´e PALLAIS Arana (Secretary General). Independent Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Independiente—PLI). Organized in 1944 by a nonsomocista group calling for a return to the tradi-

tional principles of the PLN, the PLI participated in the Broad Opposition Front before the 1979 coup. Subsequently led by postcoup labor minister Virgilio Godoy Reyes, it was a member of the Patriotic Front, but following Coordinadora’s withdrawal became the most vocal opposition formation of the 1984 campaign. The party was a founding member of the UNO in 1989, Godoy Reyes becoming its most conspicuous leader. Having endorsed Godoy Reyes as its 1996 presidential candidate, the PLI was the only Liberal group not to have joined the AL before the October poll. Leaders: Julia MENA (President of the Party), Virgilio GODOY Reyes (Former Vice President of the Republic and Secretary General of the Party), Anibal MART´INEZ Nu˜nez, Dr. Wilfredo NAVARRO Moreira, Pedro REYES Vallejos. Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democr´atico Nicarag¨uense—MDN). A small left-of-center party formed in 1978, the MDN cooperated initially with the sandinistas but was subsequently led by contra leader Alfonso Robelo Callejas. It was a member of the original UNO. Leaders: Roberto SEQUEIRA G´omez, Roberto URROZ Castillo. Christian Democratic Union (Uni´on Dem´ocrata Cristiana—UDC). The UDC was formed in early 1993 by merger of two former UNO members, the Social Christian Popular Party (Partido Popular Social-Cristiano—PPSC) and the Democratic Party of National Confidence (Partido Dem´ocrata de Confianza Nacional—PDCN), both of which had been formed (in 1976 and 1988, respectively) by dissidents from the PSCN. Leader: August´ın JARQUIN Anaya (President of the Party). New Liberal Party (Partido Neo-Liberal— Pali). Pali is a small formation launched in 1986. Leader: Dr. Ricardo VEGA Garcia (President of the Party). Conservative Popular Alliance Party (Partido Alianza Popular Conservadora—PAPC). Founded in 1985 and subsequently a member of the UNO, the PAPC is reportedly well organized throughout Nicaragua. In a close vote, its leader,

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M´ıriam Arg¨uello, defeated a Chamorro nominee for the assembly presidency during the 1990 legislative session, but he failed in a bid for reelection to the post in January 1991. As an “antireform” Chamorro ally, Arg¨uello failed again in January 1995. Leaders: Eduardo PALADINO Cabrera (President of the Party), M´ıriam ARGUELLO Morales (Secretary General and 1996 presidential candidate). Central American Integrationist Party (Partido Integraci´onalista de la Am´erica Central— PIAC). The PIAC was founded in August 1989 as an offspring of PUCA, above. Leader: Sergio MENDIETA Castillo (President of the Party). National Unity Movement (Movimiento Unidad Nacional—MUN). The MUN was formed in June 1999 by Gen. Joaqu´ın Cuadra Lacayo, a former commander-in-chief of the Army. Leader: Gen. Joaqu´ın CUADRA Lacayo. Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Nicarag¨uense—PSN). The PSN was organized in 1937 as a Moscow-oriented Communist party that subsequently shifted to a social-democratic posture. ´ Leaders: Domingo SANCHEZ Salgado, Luis ´ SANCHEZ Sancho, Dr. Gustavo TABLADA Zelaya (Secretary General). Essentially local groups active in the Atlantic Coast regions include Misat´an, a pro-sandinista Indian movement led by Rufino Lucas WILFRED; the northern-based Y´atama, a former contra group led by Brooklyn RIVERA Bryan, who was named by President Chamorro as cabinet-level head of a new Institute for the Development of the Autonomous Regions of the Caribbean Coast; the right-wing Coastal Democratic Alliance, led by RAAS coordinator Alvin GUTHRIE; the Multiethnic Indigenous Party (Partido Indigenista Multi´etnico—PIM), led by Carla WHITE Hodgson, which won third place in coastal region elections in February 1998; the Multiethnic Party for Coast Unity; the Union of Nicaraguan Coastal Indians (KISAN), led by Roger GERMAN; the

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Coastal Authentic Autonomy Movement; and the Corn Island–based Island Youth Movement.

Insurgent Groups: During the period of sandinista rule, the most numerically significant insurgent groups were the contra formations, most of which were disbanded, by agreement with the Chamorro government, before June 10, 1990 (for details regarding these forces see the 1989 edition of the Handbook). Longtime contra leader Enrique BERMUDEZ Varela was assassinated in Managua on February 16, 1991, the sandinistas denying any complicity in the act. In mid-1991 a group of rearmed contra rebels, styled recontras, emerged under the leadership of Jos´e Angel MORAN Flores (“Comandante Indomable”). The group claimed that many of their former colleagues were being killed by sandinista army and police units and demanded money and land promised them under an OAS resettlement plan. In September 1991 Mor´an was reportedly replaced as recontra leader by Encarnaci´on VALDIVA. Subsequently, a number of armed sandinista formations, known collectively as recompas after the sandinista short-form for compa˜neros (comrades), emerged to combat the recontras. By November 1991 there appeared to be at least eight such groups, but in November 1997 the government concluded a disarmament agreement with what was described as the last such formation, the Andres Castro United Front (Frente Unida Andr´es Castro— FUAC), led by Camilo TURCIOS.

Legislature The previously bicameral Congress (Congreso) was dissolved following installation of the provisional junta in July 1979. A 47-member Council of State (Consejo de Estado), representing various sandinista, labor, and other organizations, was sworn in May 4, 1980, to serve in a quasi-legislative capacity. A new National Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente), charged with both ordinary and constitutional lawmaking functions, was elected on November 4, 1984. The

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Cabinet As of October 1, 2007 President Vice President

Daniel Ortega Saavedra Jaime Morales Carazo

Ministers Agriculture and Forestry Communication Development, Industry, and Commerce Education, Culture, and Sports Energy and Hydrocarbon Environment and Natural Resources Family Affairs Finance and Public Credit Foreign Affairs Health Interior Labor Transportation and Infrastructure President, Central Bank Secretary General of Defence Ministry

Ariel Bucardo Rocha Rosario Murillo [f] Horacio Manuel Brenes Icabalceta Miguel de Castilla Emilio Rapacciolli Amanda del Rosario Lor´ıo Arana [f] Glenda Auxiliadora Ram´ırez Noguerra [f] Alberto Jos´e Guevara Obreg´on Samuel Santos L´opez Juana Maritza Quant Machado [f] Ana Isabel Morales Maz´un [f] Jeannette Ch´avez G´omez [f] Pablo Fern´andez Mart´ınez Espinosa Antenor Rosales Ruth Tapia Roa [f]

[f] = female

most recent balloting for the unicameral National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional), currently a 92member body (including one seat for the runnerup in the most recent election and one for the immediate past president) which serves a five-year term, was conducted on November 6, 2006, with the following results: Sandinist National Liberation Front, 38; Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance, 24;. Constitutionalist Liberal Party, 25; Sandinista Renewal Movement, 5. ´ NEZ ˜ President: Ren´e NU T´ellez.

Communications The Somoza regime severely constricted the media, particularly La Prensa, whose former principal editor, Pedro Joaqu´ın CHAMORRO Cardenal, had received international recognition for his op-

position to government policies before his assassination on January 10, 1978. Not surprisingly, La Prensa was the first Somoza-era daily to reemerge under the junta, while the extreme leftist El Pueblo was suspended by the new government in late July after accusing the Sandinists of “selling out the revolution” to “bourgeois groups,” and in January 1980 was closed down permanently. Despite its anti-Somoza record, La Prensa was banned from June 1986 to October 1987, when it resumed publication after receiving government assurances that it would not have to submit to prior censorship.

Press Acceding to opposition demands, a press law stipulating that all printed matter must reflect “legitimate concern for the defense of the conquests of the revolution” was rescinded before

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President Ortega’s departure from office. The following are published daily in Managua: El Nuevo Diario (40,000), founded 1980 by a pro-sandinista group of former La Prensa employees; La Prensa (35,000), pro-Liberal; Avance (10,000), leftist organ. In March 2000 Barricada, a former FSLN organ that declared bankruptcy and ceased publication in 1998, was revived as a weekly with a circulation of 20,000.

shut down twice between 1986 and 1988. Sistema Nacional de Television, one of seven TV groups, operates three regional channels. There were approximately 38 personal computers and 24 Internet users for every 1,000 residents in 2005. In that same year, there were an estimated 192 mobile cellular subscribers for every 1,000 inhabitants.

News Agencies

Ambassador to the U.S.: Arturo Jose Cruz SEQUEIRA

An official Agencia Nicarag¨uense de Noticias (ANN) was launched in September 1979; in addition, a number of foreign bureaus maintain offices in Managua.

Intergovernmental Representation

U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua: Paul A. TRIVELLI

Broadcasting and Computing

Permanent Representative to the UN: Mar´ıa RUBIALES DE CHAMORRO

There are more than 50 radio stations, including the government-controlled Radio Nicaragua and the church-controlled Radio Cat´olica, which was

IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, BCIE, CACM, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WCO, WTO

PA N A M A REPUBLIC

OF

PANAMA

Rep u´ blica de Panam a´

The Country Situated on the predominantly mountainous isthmus that links America’s northern and southern continents, Panama has the second-smallest population of any Latin American country but ranks comparatively high in per capita wealth and social amenities, due mainly to the economic stimulus imparted by the Panama Canal, the interoceanic canal built in 1904–1914 that cuts across its waist. Population density is not high, although nearly a fourth of the people live in Panama City and Col´on. About 70 percent of the populace is of mixed Caucasian, Indian, and African derivation; pure Caucasian is estimated at 9 percent and pure African at 14 percent, the balance being of Indian and other origins. Roman Catholicism is professed by approximately 90 percent of the people, but other faiths are permitted. In 1997 about 34 percent of adult women worked outside the home, primarily in clerical work and domestic service; female participation in government has traditionally been minimal, although the president in 1999–2004 was a woman (the first in the nation’s history). Panama’s shipping fleet is the largest in the world by virtue of flag-of-convenience registrations; not surprisingly, it is one of the world’s most important centers of entrepˆot activity, its economy being heavily dependent on international commerce and transit trade. Since 1970, when a new banking law went into effect, it has also become a leading Spanish-language and offshore banking center. The service sector now accounts for 80 percent of GDP and employs more than 60 percent of the workforce. Bananas remain the most important export,

followed by shrimp and other seafood, clothing, sugar, and coffee. The GDP was reported to have shrunk by at least 20 percent in 1988 as a result of the political crisis that began in mid-1987, yielding a suspension of U.S. aid, a court order freezing all government funds on deposit in U.S. banks, massive capital flight, and a surge in unemployment to more than 25 percent from 10.2 percent in late 1986. Even greater adversity, in at least the short term, resulted from the U.S. invasion of December 1989, which yielded extensive property damage

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Political Status: Became independent of Spain as part of Colombia (New Granada) in 1819; independent republic proclaimed on November 3, 1903; present constitution, adopted on September 13, 1972, substantially revised on April 24, 1983. Area: 29,208 sq. mi. (75,650 sq. km.). Population: 2,839,177 (2000C); 3,229,000 (2006E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): PANAMA (also known as Panama City, 419,000), San Miguelito (323,000), David (83,000), Col´on (23,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Balboa (official rate November 2, 2007: 1.00 balboas = $1US). The U.S. dollar is acceptable as legal tender. President: Mart´ın TORRIJOS Espino (Democratic Revolutionary Party); elected on May 2, 2004, and inaugurated on September 1 for a five-year term, succeeding Mireya Elisa MOSCOSO de Gruber (Arnulfist Party). First Vice President: Samuel Lewis NAVARRO (Democratic Revolutionary Party); elected on May 2, 2004, and inaugurated on September 1 for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding Arturo Ulises VALLARINO Bartuano (Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement). Second Vice President: Ruben Arosemena VALDES (Democratic Revolutionary Party); elected on May 2, 2004, and inaugurated on September 1 for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding (Dominador) Kaiser Baldonero BAZAN (National Renovation Movement).

and widespread looting. Signs of recovery were evident in 1990 with a substantial GDP increase of 3.4 percent, although unemployment remained high at 18.1 percent. In 1994 GDP grew by an estimated 4.7 percent (down from a remarkable 8.6 percent in 1992), while unemployment was officially reported to have declined to 14.0 percent, although more than half of the population was listed as living in poverty, as contrasted with 44 percent

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in 1989. The economy performed poorly in 1995, a meager GDP increase of 1.9 percent (the lowest in the region) yielding a decline in per capita terms. A marginally stronger GDP showing of 2.5 percent in 1996 was enhanced by the region’s lowest inflation rate of 1.3 percent. Growth thereafter was mixed, declining from 4.4 percent in 1998 to 0.6 percent in 2001, before rising to a regional high of 6.0 percent in 2005. On the surface, a growth rate of 8.1 percent in 2006 was even more impressive than previous boosts. The increase, however, was attributable almost entirely to the government’s concentration on the service sector, with little improvement in agriculture, fishing, or industry. Furthermore, economic indicators continue to obscure the fact that Panama displays extreme inequality in wealth, with more than 95 percent of the indigenous population and 40 percent of the overall population living below the poverty line.

Government and Politics Political Background Although renouncing Spanish rule in 1821, Panama remained a part of Colombia until 1903, when a U.S.-supported revolt resulted in the proclamation of an independent republic. Shortly thereafter, Panama and the United States signed a treaty in which the latter guaranteed the independence of Panama while obtaining “in perpetuity” the use, occupation, and control of a zone for the construction, operation, and protection of an interoceanic canal. Panama also received a down payment of $10 million and subsequent annual payments of $250,000. In the absence of strongly rooted political institutions, governmental authority was exercised in the ensuing decades by a few leading families engaged in shifting alliances and cliques. Following World War II, however, Panamanian politics were increasingly dominated by nationalist discontent growing out of continued U.S. control of the canal and the exclusive jurisdiction exercised by the United States in the Canal Zone. Despite increases

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in U.S. annuity payments and piecemeal efforts to meet other Panamanian complaints, serious riots within the Zone in January 1964 yielded a temporary rupture in diplomatic relations with Washington. Following their restoration in April, the two countries agreed to renegotiate the treaty relationship, but progress was impeded by internal unrest in Panama as well as by political opposition within the United States. In early 1968 the outgoing president, Marco A. ROBLES, became involved in a major constitutional conflict with the National Assembly over his attempt to designate an administrative candidate, David SAMUDIO, for the presidential election of May 12. Samudio was defeated in the voting by Arnulfo ARIAS Madrid, a veteran politician who had already been twice elected and twice deposed (in 1941 and 1951). Inaugurated for the third time on October 1, Arias initiated a shake-up of the National Guard, a body that served both as an army and police force, and he was again overthrown on October 11–12 by Guard officers who felt threatened by his policies. Col. Jos´e Mar´ıa PINILLA and Col. Bol´ıvar URRUTIA Parilla were installed at the head of a Provisional Junta Government, which suspended vital parts of the constitution and normal political processes, promised a cleanup of political life, and indicated that a new election would be held without military participation in 1970. Real power, however, was exercised by the high command of the National Guard under the leadership of (then) Col. Omar TORRIJOS Herrera and Col. Boris N. MART´INEZ, his chief of staff. Mart´ınez was relieved of his command and exiled in February 1969, leaving Torrijos in undisputed control of the military. In December 1969 Pinilla and Urrutia attempted to purge Torrijos; they failed, however, and were subsequently replaced by two civilians, Demetrio Rasilio LAKAS Bahas and Arturo SUCRE Pereira, as president and vice president. On July 15, 1975, Sucre resigned for reasons of health and was succeeded by Gerardo GONZALEZ Vernaza, the former minister of agricultural development. Politics in the wake of the 1968 coup focused primarily on two issues: renegotiation of the Canal

Zone treaty and the long-promised reactivation of normal political processes. Nationalist sentiments put increasing pressure on the United States to relinquish control over the Canal Zone, while a partial return to normalcy occurred in 1972 with the nonpartisan election of an Assembly of Community Representatives. The Assembly’s primary function was to legitimize existing arrangements, and one of its first acts was the formal designation of General Torrijos as “Supreme Leader of the Panamanian Revolution.” Following a legislative election on August 6, 1978, General Torrijos announced that he would withdraw as head of government and would refrain from seeking the presidency for the 1978– 1984 term. On October 11 the National Assembly designated two of his supporters, Ar´ıstides ROYO and Ricardo de la ESPRIELLA, as president and vice president, respectively. During 1979 political parties were authorized to apply for official recognition, although the leading opposition party and a number of smaller groups refused to participate in balloting on September 28, 1980, to elect one-third of an expanded Legislative Council (theretofore primarily identifiable as a nonsessional committee of the National Assembly). General Torrijos was killed in a plane crash on July 31, 1981, and on August 1 was succeeded as National Guard commander by Col. Florencio FLORES Aguilar. On March 3, 1982, Colonel Flores retired in favor of Gen. Rub´en Dar´ıo PAREDES, who was widely regarded as a leading presidential contender and who was due to retire from the military on September 11. Under pressure from Paredes, President Royo resigned on July 30, allegedly for reasons of health, in favor of Vice President de la Espriella, who reaffirmed an earlier pledge that “clean and honest” elections would be held in 1984. On September 6 it was announced that Paredes had acceded to requests from the president and the military high command to remain in his post beyond the mandated retirement date. On April 24, 1983, a series of constitutional amendments (see below) were approved in a national referendum, paving the way for a return

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to full civilian rule, and on August 12 General Paredes retired as military commander in favor of Gen. Manuel Antonio NORIEGA Morena to accept presidential nomination by the torrijista Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). Because of widespread opposition to his candidacy, he was, however, forced to step down as PRD standardbearer in September. On February 13, 1984, following designation of Nicol´as ARDITO Barletta as the nominee of a PRD-backed electoral coalition called the National Democratic Union (Unade), President de la Espriella was obliged to resign in a second “constitutional coup.” He was succeeded by Vice President Jorge ILLUECA, who was identified with more leftist elements within the PRD. On May 6, 1984, Panama conducted its first direct presidential balloting in 15 years. From a field of seven candidates, Unade’s Ardito Barletta narrowly defeated former president Arias Madrid amid outbreaks of violence and allegations of vote rigging. The new chief executive assumed office on October 11, pledging to alleviate the country’s ailing economy, expose corruption, and keep the military out of politics. The legislative election, held concurrently with the presidential poll, also yielded victory for the six-party Unade coalition, which took 40 of the 67 National Assembly seats. In the second such action in 18 months Ardito Barletta resigned on September 27, 1985, being succeeded the following day by First Vice President Eric Arturo DELVALLE Henr´ıquez. The move was reportedly dictated by General Noriega, who had warned a month earlier that the country’s political situation was “out of control and anarchic.” During his year in office, Ardito had drawn criticism for a series of economic austerity measures, although the more proximate cause of his downfall appeared to be an effort by the military to deflect attention from the “Spadafora scandal,” involving the death of former minister of health, Hugo SPADAFORA, whose decapitated body had been found near the Costa Rican border on September 14. After leaving the government in 1978, Spadafora had joined the sandinista forces opposing Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza but subsequently shifted his

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allegiance to the contra group led by Ed´en Pastora. Spadafora had publicly accused General Noriega of involvement in the drug trade, and opposition groups charged that the president’s resignation had been forced in the wake of a decision to appoint an independent investigative committee to examine the circumstances surrounding the murder. In June 1986 the New York Times published a series of reports that charged General Noriega with electoral fraud, money-laundering, drug trafficking, clandestine arms trading, and the sale of high-technology equipment to Cuba. Noriega vehemently denied the charges and insisted that they were part of a campaign aimed at blocking Panama’s assumption of control of the Panama Canal in the year 2000. A year later, in apparent retaliation for his forced retirement as military chief of staff, Col. Roberto D´IAZ Herrera issued a barrage of accusations in support of the Times allegations, in addition to charging his superior with complicity in the 1981 aircraft death of General Torrijos. The action prompted widespread popular unrest generated, in part, by the National Antimilitarist Crusade (Cruzada Civilista Nacional— CCN), a newly formed middle-class group with opposition party and church support. In July Vice President Roderick ESQUIVEL joined in an opposition call for an independent commission to investigate D´ıaz Herrera’s claims. Although D´ıaz issued a retraction late in the year, a U.S. federal grand jury handed down indictments on February 4, 1988, charging Noriega and 14 others with drug trafficking. On February 25 President Delvalle, who had previously supported Noriega, announced his intention to dismiss the general, but the following day, on the ground that he had exceeded his constitutional authority, he was himself dismissed by the National Assembly, which named Education Minister Manuel SOLIS Palma as his acting successor. Delvalle, whom the United States and a number of Latin American countries continued to recognize as chief executive, escaped from house arrest, went into hiding, and announced that he would continue to struggle against the Noriega “puppet regime.” Subsequently, Panamanian assets in U.S. banks were frozen, further exacerbating a financial

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crisis stemming from the fact that the U.S. dollar was, for all practical purposes, the only circulating currency. On March 16 Noriega’s forces repulsed a coup attempt by middle-ranking dissident officers, while a general strike called by the CCN five days later collapsed following the arrest of numerous opposition leaders and journalists on March 29. Despite internal political resistance and continued economic pressure by the United States, Noreiga clung to power during the ensuing year, amid preparations for national elections on May 7, 1989, at which, contrary to expectations, the general did not present himself as a contender. In the wake of the balloting, despite evidence of massive government fraud, it became clear that the regime’s nominee, Carlos DUQUE Ja´en, had been substantially outpolled by the opposition candidate, Guillermo ENDARA Galimany (Arias Madrid having died the previous August), and on May 10 the Electoral Commission nullified the results because of “obstruction by foreigners” and a “lack of . . . voting sheets [that] made it impossible to proclaim winners.” On September 1, 1989, when Delvalle’s term would have ended, Francisco RODRIGUEZ, a longtime associate of General Noriega, was sworn in as president after designation by the Council of State, a body composed of senior military and civilian officials. Little more than a month later, on October 3, Noriega succeeded in suppressing a violent coup attempt led by Maj. Mois´es GIROLDI Vega, who, with a number of fellow conspirators, was summarily executed. On December 15 a revived National Assembly of Community Representatives elevated Noriega to the all-inclusive title conferred earlier on General Torrijos and accorded him sweeping powers to deal with what was termed “a state of war” with the United States. Washington responded on December 20 with an armed assault on Panamanian defense forces in Panama City and elsewhere, forcing Noriega to take refuge in the Vatican Embassy, from which he voluntarily emerged on January 3, 1990. Immediately taken into custody, he was flown to the United States for trial on drug trafficking and other charges for

which he was ultimately convicted on April 9, 1992. Meanwhile, on December 21, 1989, Guillermo Endara, head of the four-party Democratic Alliance of Civil Opposition (ADOC) that included the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the National Republican Liberal Movement (Molirena), the Authentic Liberal Party (PLA), and his Arnulfist Party (PA), had been declared the winner of the May 7 election and was formally invested as Panamanian chief executive. Concurrently, the PDC’s Ricardo ARIAS Calder´on and Molirena’s Guillermo FORD Boyd were reconfirmed as first and second vice presidents, respectively. During 1991 President Endara’s political influence eroded dramatically. In April Vice President Arias and four other PDC ministers left the government after being charged by Endara with a variety of hostile acts, including the operation of a domestic spy operation with the help of former Noriega supporters. Subsequently, Arias (who retained his elective post) branded the government’s increasingly unpopular austerity measures as “senseless,” although he refused to endorse a plebiscite on continuance of the Endara presidency on the ground that it would “weaken the democratic process.” On September 1 the PLA’s Arnulfo ESCALONA lost a bid for the Assembly presidency to fellow PLA member Marco AMEGLIO, who had aligned himself with the opposition. However, the most embarrassing reversal for Endara came on September 30, when Mireya MOSCOSO de Gruber, the widow of former president Arias Madrid, defeated Endara’s candidate, Francisco ARTOLA, for the presidency of the Arnulfista Party. The election of May 8, 1994, consisted largely of a contest between a United People (Pueblo Unido) coalition of the PRD plus two minor parties, and a similar three-party Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democr´atica) led by the PA. In the presidential race ´ the PRD’s Ernesto PEREZ Balladares defeated the PA’s Moscoso de Gruber by an unexpectedly close vote margin of 3.7 percent, while the PRD won a plurality of 31 Assembly seats to the PA’s 15. The new president’s cabinet, sworn in with P´erez on September 1, was PRD-dominated but included a number of independents and opposition figures

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in accordance with a campaign pledge to form a coalition administration. With President P´erez excluded from seeking a second term, Mart´ın TORRIJOS Espino, Omar Torrijos’s son, won a PRD presidential primary on October 25, 1998, but he was defeated on May 2, 1999, by Mireya Moscoso at the head of an arnulfista-led populist coalition that included Molirena, the National Liberation Movement (Morena), and the recently registered Democratic Change (CD). The PA-led alliance failed, however, to capture a majority in simultaneous balloting for the Legislative Assembly, where the PRD-led New Nation coalition won 41 seats. Thus, Moscoso courted additional support from the PDC and two erstwhile New Nation organizations, the Solidarity Party (PS) and the National Liberal Party (PLN). By her September 1 inauguration she had cobbled together a working parliamentary majority of one seat, but it lasted only until August 2000, when the PRD and the PDC (subsequently renamed the Popular Party) agreed to cooperate in the Assembly. With the further addition of two PS legislators, the opposition controlled 38 seats by September 2001. At the election of May 2, 2004, Mart´ın Torrijos led the PRD to a landslide victory on a 47.4 percent vote share. In addition to winning a substantial legislative majority, the PRD won control of most municipalities (including the country’s five largest) and an overwhelming majority of communal assemblies. The most surprising result of the 2004 poll was the second-place finish (30.9 percent) of the Solidarity Party under the leadership of former president Endara, who had left the PA in the wake of Moscoso’s ascendancy. By contrast, the PA candidate, Jos´e Miguel ALEMAN, captured only 16.4 percent of the vote.

Constitution and Government The constitutional arrangements of 1972 called for executive authority to be vested in a president and vice president designated by a popularly elected Assembly of Community Representatives

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for terms concurrent with the latter’s six-year span. Under a series of amendments approved by national referendum on April 24, 1983, the 1972 document was substantially revised. The major changes included direct election of the president for a fiveyear term, the creation of a second vice presidency, a ban on political activity by members of the National Guard, and abolition of the National Assembly of Community Representatives in favor of a more compact Legislative Assembly (see Legislature, below). Under an earlier amendment introduced by General Paredes in October 1982, provincial governors and mayors, all theretofore presidential appointees, were made subject to popular election. Headed by a nine-member Supreme Court, the judicial system embraces Superior District tribunals and Circuit and Municipal courts. The country is divided into nine provinces and one special (Indian) territory, the smallest administrative units, corregimientos, forming the basis of the electoral system. In September 1983 the National Guard was merged with other security units to form the Panamanian Defense Forces (FDP). Dissolved in the wake of the U.S. invasion, the FDP was replaced by a new Public Force (FP) that encompassed the National Police, National Air Service, and National Maritime Service. Unable to cope with mounting lawlessness, the FP was supplemented in early 1991 by Technical Judicial Police (PTJ) under the control of the nation’s General Ombudsman but responsible to both executive and judicial authorities. In addition, President Endara announced that he would appoint a supervisory “coordinating committee against crime,” which critics charged as heralding de facto resurrection of the FDP. Seemingly concerned at such a prospect, the Legislative Assembly on June 17, 1992, endorsed the constitutional abolition of an armed defense force, an action that was reversed by popular referendum on November 15, but revived by Endara (with the reported endorsement of President-elect P´erez Balladares) in August 1994 and accorded formal ratification by the post-Endara Assembly on October 4.

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A package of constitutional reforms backed by President-elect Torrijos were given legislative assent in mid-2004; included were limitation of the transitional period between governments to two months and a third procedure for constitutional revision (a Constituent Assembly parallel to the Legislative Assembly, as contrasted with one superseding the legislature or action by the legislature in two consecutive sessions).

Foreign Relations Panama is a member of the United Nations and many of its Specialized Agencies as well as of the Organization of American States (OAS) and other regional bodies. Though not a member of the nowmoribund Organization of Central American States (ODECA), Panama has been active in some of the organization’s affiliated institutions and has participated in a number of regional peace initiatives sponsored by the Contadora Group, of which it was a founding member. However, the present government, expressing an interest in joining the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has rejected economic integration with its neighbors and collaterally has not applied for membership in the recently launched Central American Parliament (Parlacen). The country’s principal external problems have traditionally centered on the Canal Zone and its complex and sensitive relationship with the United States because of the latter’s presence in the zone (see Panama Canal Zone, below). This relationship, which eased on conclusion of the canal treaties, was again strained in 1987 as the Reagan administration committed itself to the support of Noriega’s domestic opponents—a policy complicated by evidence that the general had previously been associated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a variety of clandestine operations. The United States refused to recognize the appointment of Sol´ıs Palma as acting president in February 1988 or of Rodr´ıguez in September 1989 and intervened militarily to oust the Panamanian dictator the following December (see Political background, above). Subsequently, it strongly supported the re-

construction efforts of the Endara administration, although the $420 million aid package approved by the Congress in May 1990 was estimated to be substantially less than half of the loss attributable to the invasion. As a result, an OAS body, the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission (IAHRC), agreed in October 1993 to look into compensation claims of $1.2 billion advanced by 285 Panamanian families. However, the action was complicated by the fact that the United States, while a member of the OAS, had not ratified the IAHRC accord and hence remained technically outside its jurisdiction. During 1998 extensive discussions with the United States focused on an idea, initially advanced by President P´erez more than two years earlier, for the creation of an international antidrug center at Howard Air Force Base in Panama City. Washington, however, sought a 12-year agreement (rather than the 3 years proposed by P´erez), with center personnel under U.S. control and enjoying diplomatic immunity. The talks were ultimately broken off in September, in part because of charges that the facility would be a challenge to Panamanian sovereignty. Opposition concern about Panama’s international standing was again voiced following the February 2002 conclusion of an agreement authorizing U.S. participation in maritime patrols, the target being drug traffickers. During 1996 Panama became increasingly concerned about an influx of Colombians, including left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries, in the remote Dari´en region. In mid-July 1,300 troops were dispatched to curb unrest in the area, which had been infiltrated by both Colombian rebels and drug traffickers, in addition to serving as a sanctuary for what a UN report had termed bona fide refugees from repression in their homeland. Subsequent incursions by members of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and paramilitary groups pursuing them prompted demands that the border area be militarized. By late 1999 the escalating violence led President Moscoso to announce the formation of a State Security Commission to develop a plan for public security, including defense of the canal.

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In August 2004 both Cuba and Venezuela broke relations with Panama, after departing president Moscoso had pardoned four persons convicted of plotting to assassinate Cuba’s President Fidel Castro. She justified the release by saying that the men (one of whom had been convicted of counterrevolutionary activity in Venezuela) would be executed if they were extradited. At his inauguration, President Torrijos said that he disagreed with his predecessor’s action, and at an August 2005 meeting in Havana with Castro relations with Cuba were restored. During 2007 Panama and the United States failed to reach agreement on the status of former dictator Manuel Noriega, who was scheduled for release, with time off for good behavior, on September 9. Panama wanted him returned as a prisoner of war (POW), while Washington, feeling that he would be accorded light treatment in his homeland, preferred extradition to France, where he had earlier been convicted of a number of criminal offenses. Following the lifting of a judicial ban on transfer to French jurisdiction in early September, it was announced that Noriega would remain in U.S. custody until all appeal routes had been exhausted. On a more positive note, Panama on December 19, 2006, concluded a free trade agreement, called the Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA), with the United States after two years of negotiations. While Trade Minister Alejandro Ferrer insisted that Panama had achieved “the best treaty possible with the U.S.,” critics complained of unfair competition that would result from U.S. government subsidies, particularly for U.S. rice producers, as contrasted with their Panamanian counterparts.

Current Issues Two months after his election, President Torrijos was accorded an unusually high 80 percent approval rating, despite a variety of problems, including long-needed action on canal modernization (see Panama Canal Zone, below), an inflated state payroll, a surge in fuel prices, and a social security crisis. Less controversial were constitutional re-

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forms that revoked certain fee exemptions for highranking officials, revised the corporate tax code, and proposed a reduction in public-sector employment. However, continued widespread inequality (coupled with a failure to curtail high unemployment), a steadily worsening crime rate (much of it drug-related), and ongoing charges of official corruption remained of serious concern. Subsequently, despite a preelection promise by Torrijos to mount a “zero corruption” campaign, little was done to investigate and punish those responsible for high-level criminal activity. Thus, a Transparency International (TI) report in late 2006 revealed a steady decrease in Panama’s corruption status, while the country’s National Transparency Council joined with the InterAmerican Development Bank in reporting “sound management practices” in only 5 of 20 government bodies examined. Ironically, with Panama on the verge of a major canal improvement project (see Panama Canal Zone, below), an array of new opportunities for corruption appeared on the horizon.

Political Parties Political parties in Panama have traditionally tended to be personalist rather than ideological in nature. All of the ten legal parties that participated in the 1968 balloting were suspended by the ruling junta in February 1969. The ban was relaxed before the 1978 election, although no candidates were allowed to run on party tickets. In late 1978 the government announced that legal recognition would be accorded parties with a minimum of 10,000 members; groups meeting this criterion were permitted to participate in the national and municipal elections of 1989. In February 1991 the government withdrew recognition from eight participants in the 1989 poll for failing to secure minimum vote shares. Four of the 13 parties that secured legislative representation in May 1994 failed to secure the 5 percent vote shares needed to retain official status (see Libre and Pala under PRD, and PLA and UDI under Partido Panema˜nista, below). A

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number of other parties were also deregistered after the election. A total of 12 parties were officially recognized for the 1999 balloting and 4 (including two coalitions) in 2004.

Legislative Parties and Groups New Nation (Patria Nueva—PN). Reconstituted from a similarly styled grouping in 1999 that encompassed the PRD, PS, and PLN, the New Nation won a majority of 42 legislative seats in 2004. Leader: Mart´ın TORRIJOS Espino (President of the Republic). Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Democr´atico—PRD). The PRD was initially a left-of-center torrijista group organized as a government-supportive party in 1978. It obtained 10 of 19 elective seats at the 1980 Legislative Council balloting. In May 1982 the PRD secretary-general, Gerardo Gonz´alez Vernaza, was replaced by Dr. Ernesto P´erez Balladares, a former financial advisor to General Torrijos. In November P´erez Balladares resigned in the wake of a dispute between left- and right-wing factions within the party, subsequent speculation being that General Rub´en Paredes, commander of the National Guard, would be the country’s 1984 presidential candidate. Paredes announced as a candidate in mid-1983, before accepting retirement from military service, and was reported to have been nominated by the party in August. In the face of opposition to his candidacy, he announced his withdrawal from politics in September but later ran as a nominee of the National People’s Party (Partido Nacionalista Popular—PNP), which was deregistered in late 1984. The PRD named Nicol´as Ardito Barletta, (then) World Bank regional vice president for Latin America, as its candidate after formation of the progovernment Unade coalition in February 1984. Elected chief executive in May 1984, Ardito Barletta resigned on September 27, 1985, and was succeeded by First Vice President Eric Delvalle, who was himself dismissed by the Legislative Assembly in February 1988.

In early 1990 a new group of PRD leaders emerged, distancing themselves from Noriega, praising the country’s commitment to democracy, and offering themselves as a “loyal opposition” to the Endara regime, which it nonetheless characterized as being responsible for the U.S. invasion. As the party’s nominee in 1994, P´erez Balladares captured the presidency on a 33.2 percent vote share, while the PRD won a plurality of 31 legislative seats at the head of a United People (Pueblo Unido) coalition that also included the Republican Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Republicano—Libre) and the right-wing Labor Party (Partido Laborista—Pala), both of which were later deregistered for failing to meet a 5 percent vote threshold. At primary balloting on October 25, 1998, the PRD named Mart´ın Torrijos Espino, the 35year-old son of Gen. Omar Torrijos, as its presidential standard-bearer in 1999. However, he gained only 38 percent of the popular vote in losing by a seven-point margin to Mireya Moscoso on May 2, 1999. It secured the presidency under Torrijos by a substantial plurality in 2004. Leaders: Mart´ın TORRIJOS Espino (1999 President of the Republic and Secretary General of the Party), Hugo H. GIRAUD (President of the Party). Popular Party (Partido Popular—PP). The PP adopted its current name in 2001, having previously been called the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC). In what its leadership termed a “training exercise,” the PDC participated in the 1980 balloting, winning two Council seats. Named a vicepresidential candidate in 1984, PDC leader Ricardo Arias Calder´on was viewed as a likely successor to Arias Madrid as principal spokesperson for the opposition and was ADOC vicepresidential candidate in 1989. Possessing a plurality within the legislative Assembly, the PDC was estranged from its coalition partners in September 1990, when the latter joined with the opposition PRD to reject its nominees for chamber officials; despite the rebuff,

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the party stayed within the ADOC until April 1991, when its ministerial delegation was ousted by President Endara for displaying “disloyalty and arrogance.” In a move that was seen as reflecting a desire to distance himself from President Endara in the run-up to the 1994 election, Arias Calder´on resigned as first vice president of the republic in December 1992. The party secured only one Assembly seat in 1994. With Alberto Vallarino, a prominent banker who had run in the 1994 presidential race again serving as its standard-bearer, the PDC contested the May 1999 elections in an Opposition Action (Acci´on Opositora) coalition that included the Civil Renovation Party (Partido Renovaci´on Civilista—PRC), which secured one of the group’s five seats, and the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal—PL) and Popular Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Popular— PNP), neither of which won representation. As the junior partner in Torrijos’s 2004 coalition, the PP obtained two Assembly seats. Leaders: Rub´en AROSEMENA Vald´es (Second Vice President of the Republic and President of the Party), Jos´e DOMINGO Torres (Secretary General). Vision of the Country (Visi´on de Pa´ıs). Visi´on was formed before the 2004 balloting (at which it won a total of 24 legislative seats) by the parties below. Panamenian Party (Partido Panema˜nista—PP). Legalized in 1990 as the Arnulfist Party (Partido Arnulfista—PA), the PP participated under that rubric as a Visi´on component in the 2004 poll. The party originates from the mainstream of the Authentic Panamanian Party (Partido Panema˜nista Aut´entico—PPA), itself an outgrowth of the earlier Partido Panema˜nista that supported the three abortive presidencies of Arnulfo Arias Madrid. Following Arias’s death in August 1988, the PPA split into factions, a minority headed by (then) Secretary General Hildebrando Nicosia (which was awarded legal title to the party name in early 1989) seeking

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to achieve a “national union” with the Noriegabacked regime. For the 1994 elections the PA formed a Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democr´atica) with two minor parties, the Authentic Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Aut´entico—PLA) and the Independent Democratic Union (Uni´on Democr´atica Independiente—UDI). The PA won 15 of the alliance’s 20 legislative seats, while its presidential candidate, Mireya Moscoso de Gruber, finished a close second. (The PLA and UDI were subsequently deregistered for failing to obtain at least a 5 percent vote share in the legislative balloting.) In mid-1996 the PA was reported to have formed a “strategic alliance” with Molirena, Morena, and the PDC to oppose what they termed the government’s lack of leadership. At a September 1996 PA conference Mireya Moscoso de Gruber, the widow of former president Arias, was reelected president of the party. In September 1997 the PA, Molirena, PDC, Morena grouping was expanded to include the PRC, the Gloria Young faction of Pap´a Egor´o (below), and the PNP in a National Front for the Defense of Democracy (Frente Nacional por la Defensa de Democracia—FNDD) to oppose a reelection bid by President Per´ez Balladares. PA President Moscoso de Gruber won the national presidency in 1999, but her party’s candidate, Jos´e Miguel ALEMAN, ran a poor third in 2004. In January 2005 the party dropped its PA designation in favor of the historic PP label, and in March Moscoso de Gruber was forced to resign as its leader, ostensibly because of the party’s poor showing in the 2004 balloting, but in the wake of corruption charges that had recently been brought against her. Leaders: Marco AMEGLIO (President of the Party), Carlos Ra´ul PIAD (Secretary General). Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement (Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista—Molirena). Molirena is a relatively small conservative grouping that was legally recognized in 1981. Its legislative representation

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rose from 14 to 16 as a result of the partial election of January 27, 1991, but fell to 5 in 1994 and to 3 in 1999. It secured 4 seats as a member of the Visi´on coalition in 2004. Leaders: Arturo Ulises VALLARINO (Former First Vice President of the Republic), Jes´us Lis´ımaco ROSAS Abrego (President of the ´ Party), Miguel CARDENAS Sandoval (Secretary General). National Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Nacional—PLN). A member of the Liberal International, the PLN was formed in 1979. It won three Assembly seats as a member of Visi´on in 2004, but An´ıbal GALINDO resigned as party president following the coalition’s third place finish in the presidential race. Leaders: Ra´ul ARANGO Gasteazoro (1999 candidate for first vice president), An´ıbal GALINDO (President of the Party), Abraham WILLIAMS (Secretary General). Solidarity Party (Partido Solidaridad—PS). Registered in 1993, the PS won two Assembly seats in 1991 and four in 1999 as a member of Nueva Naci´on. After the 1999 balloting the PS agreed to join President Moscoso’s majority, but two representatives—Laurentino CORTIZO (the party’s 1999 candidate for second vice president) and Alberto MAGNO Castillero—subsequently bolted to the opposition. The party ran independently in 2004, gaining second place in the presidential poll with former president Endara as its standard-bearer and winning nine Assembly seats. Leaders: Samuel LEWIS Galindo (Honorary President of the Party), Abraham MARTINEZ (President of the Party), Jorge Ricardo FABREGA (Secretary General). Democratic Change (Cambio Democr´atico— CD). The CD was initially registered in 1998. Running as the Democratic Party, it won two legislative seats in 1999. It won three seats in 2004 under its original name. Leaders: Ricardo MARTINELLI Berrocal (President of the Party and 2004 presidential candidate), Giacomo TAMBURELLI (Secretary General).

Other Groups Motherland Movement (Movimiento Pap´a Egor´o—MPE). Pap´a Egor´o (“Motherland” in a local Indian dialect) was launched in November 1991 by film star, salsa singer, and lawyer Rub´en Blades, who in early 1992 headed a poll of popular choices for the presidency in 1994. Blades subsequently departed on a foreign promotional tour, generating speculation that his presidential availability might have been advanced to further his professional career. Despite the defection of a number of key supporters, Blades nonetheless returned to register his party, although declaring on February 9 that he was really “not interested in the presidency.” He remained the leading presidential prospect in a poll conducted in September 1993 but ran third in the May 1994 balloting. In June Blades returned to California to continue his stage career, but in August 1997 he resumed the presidency of the party following a series of intraparty disputes that led to the formation of a dissident faction (led by Rafael RUILOBA) called the Good Seed and the departure of former MPE President Gloria Young to the PA (above). Rebuffing Blades in January 1999, the MPE’s National Directorate endorsed the PRD’s Mart´ın Torrijos for the state presidency in 1999. However, factions within the rank-and-file were subsequently reported to be backing other candidates. Failing to muster 5 percent of the vote in 1999, the party lost its registration and the availability of future funding from the Electoral Tribunal. Leaders: Rub´en BLADES (President of the Party and 1994 presidential candidate), Mariela SAGEL, Marcel SALAZAR. Social Christian Movement (Movimiento Social Cristiano—MSC). Formation of the MSC was announced in September 1993 by former PDC vice president Gloria Moreno de L´opez and three Assembly colleagues who had been expelled from the parent group for a breach of party discipline in negotiating with the ruling coalition on legislative commission assignments. The four had belonged to an anti-Arias faction of the PDC styled the chocolates. Leader: Gloria MORENO de L´opez.

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Cabinet As of October 1, 2007 President First Vice President Second Vice President

Mart´ın Torrijos Espino Samuel Lewis Navarro Rub´en Arosemena Vald´es

Ministers Agriculture Development Canal Affairs Commerce and Industry Economy and Finance Education Foreign Relations Health Housing Interior and Justice Labor and Social Welfare Presidency Public Works Social Development Tourism and Culture Yough, Women, Family, and Children

Guillermo Salazar Nicolau Dani Kuzniecky Alejandro Ferrer L´opez H´ector Alexander Belgis Castro Herrera Samuel Lewis Navarro Dr. Rosario Turner [f] Balbina Herrera Ara`uz [f] Daniel Delgado Diamente Edwin Salam´ın Rub´en Arosomena Vald´es Benjam´ın Colamarco Maria del Carmen Roquebert Le´on [f] Rub´en Blades Leonor Calder´on [f]

[f] = female

Legislature Before 1984 the Panamanian legislature consisted of an elected 505-member National Assembly of Community Representatives (Asamblea Nacional de Representantes de Corregimientos), which met on an average of only one month a year, and a de facto upper house, the National Legislative Council (Consejo Nacional de Legislaci´on), consisting of 19 elected members and 37 appointed from the Assembly. Under a constitutional revision approved in April 1983, the Asamblea Nacional was abolished, while the Council was converted into a smaller, fully elected Legislative Assembly. Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa). The present Assembly consists of 78 members elected for five-year terms. Following the May 2, 2004, balloting the distribution of seats was as follows: New Nation, 42 (Democratic Revolutionary

Party, 41; Popular Party, 1); Vision of the Country, 24 (Arnulfist Party, 17; Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement, 4; National Liberal Party, 3); Solidarity Party, 9; Democratic Change, 3. ´ President: Pedro Miguel GONZALEZ.

Communications Press In early 1990 several papers, including the influential La Prensa, that had been forced to close under the Noriega regime, resumed publication. The following are Spanish dailies published in Panama City, unless otherwise noted: Cr´ıtica (60,000), right-wing; La Prensa (50,000), independent centrist; Diario El Siglo (48,000), sensationalist; El Panam´a Am´erica (30,000), rightwing; La Estrella de Panam´a (21,000 daily, 25,000 Sunday), center-right; Star and Herald (11,000

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daily, 14,000 Sunday), oldest English-language paper; El Peri´odico, pro-PRD; Primera Plana, right-wing.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility; several foreign bureaus maintain offices in Panama City.

Broadcasting and Computing There are more than 200 radio stations, most operated on a commercial basis; the most influential of the several television outlets is Canal 4. In 2005 there were approximately 46 personal computers and 64 Internet users for every 1,000 inhabitants. In that same year there were 419 mobile cellular subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Federico Antonio HUMBERT Arias U.S. Ambassador to Panama: William Alan EATON Permanent Representative to the UN: Ricardo Alberto ARIAS IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, IADB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, SICA, WCO, WTO

Panama Canal Zone Bisecting Panama in a southwesterly direction from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the Canal Zone served historically for the protection of the interoceanic waterway completed by the United States in 1914. Occupation, use, and control of a 553-squaremile area extending about five miles on either side of the canal were granted to the United States in perpetuity by Panama in a treaty concluded in 1903. Following nationalist riots within the Zone in 1964, the two countries in 1967 negotiated a new draft treaty that would have replaced the 1903 accord, recognized Panamanian sovereignty in the Zone, and enabled Panama to participate in the manage-

ment of the canal. In 1970, however, following a change in government, Panama declared the draft to be unacceptable. After further extended negotiations, U.S. and Panamanian representatives reached agreement on an amended accord that was incorporated into two treaties signed in Washington, D.C., on September 7, 1977. Endorsed by Panama in a plebiscite on October 23, the treaties were barely approved by the U.S. Senate on March 16 and April 18, 1978. Documents of ratification were subsequently exchanged during a state visit to Panama by U.S. President Jimmy Carter on June 16. The first treaty provided for a phased assumption of control of the canal and the Canal Zone by Panama, beginning six months after ratification and concluding in the year 2000. Panama would assume general territorial jurisdiction, although until December 31, 1999, the United States would maintain control of all installations needed to operate and defend the canal. Until 1990 the canal administrator would be American, while his deputy would be Panamanian; from 1990 to 1999, the administrator would be Panamanian, with an American deputy. The second treaty declared that “the canal, as an international transit waterway, shall be permanently neutral.” It also provided that “tolls and other charges . . . shall be just, reasonable and equitable” and that “vessels of war and auxiliary vessels of all nations shall at all times be entitled to transit the canal, irrespective of their internal operation, means of propulsion, origin, destination, or armament.” Implementation of the treaties was delayed because of a U.S. Senate stipulation that ratification would not be deemed complete until the passage of enabling legislation by the Congress or until March 31, 1979, whichever came first. Thus it was not until October 1, 1979, that the American flag was lowered within the Canal Zone and administrative authority for the canal formally transferred to a binational Panama Canal Commission. In early 1980, despite a significant increase in revenue accruing to Panama under the new arrangement, President Royo formally complained to the United States about a “unilateral” provision of

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the enabling legislation that effectively brought the commission under the control of the U.S. Defense Department. Subsequently, in the wake of an assessment that the existing facility, which was unable to offer transit to vessels in excess of 75,000 tons, would be obsolete by the year 2000, Royo and a group of high-level advisers visited Japan to discuss the possibility of Japanese involvement in the building of a new sea-level waterway. During a meeting in Panama City in December 1982, the feasibility of a new waterway was further discussed by Panamanian, Japanese, and U.S. representatives. Earlier, a 9.8 percent increase in canal tolls had been agreed on to offset an anticipated shortfall of up to $5 million a month after the opening of a new trans-isthmian oil pipeline. In mid-1984 the canal again became the focus for anti-U.S. sentiment, following Washington’s expressed reluctance to provide a major portion of the $400–600 million needed to widen the waterway on the ground that it would be unlikely to recover its investment before full reversion in the year 2000. Late in the year, however, the United States and Japan agreed to a four-year program to consider canal improvements, not excluding the possibility of constructing a new facility to accommodate ships of up to 300,000 tons. In June 1986 a tripartite commission, composed of Panamanian, Japanese, and U.S. representatives, began a projected four-year study on the feasibility of measures to upgrade or augment the existing facility, including improved pipeline, highway, and rail transport across the isthmus. The commission was also charged with undertaking an analysis of world shipping requirements in the 21st century and drafting recommendations on U.S.Panamanian relations on expiration of the present canal treaties. In July 1988 Panama refused to send delegates to a scheduled Canal Commission board meeting because of U.S. economic pressure against the Noriega regime and the U.S. rejection of representatives appointed by the Solis Palma administration. However, the problems were resolved by the overthrow of Noriega in December 1989 and the longtime Panamanian deputy administrator, Fernando

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Manfredo BERNAL became acting administrator on January 1, 1990. On April 30, during a visit by President Endara to Washington, D.C., President George H. W. Bush endorsed the appointment for a regular term of Gilberto GUARDIA F´abrega, who was formally approved by the U.S. Senate on September 11. Meanwhile, doubts arose as to the Panamanian government’s ability to administer and defend the canal after December 31, 1999, (then) Government and Justice Minister Ricardo Arias Calder´on having conceded in August that “a military defense [of the waterway] similar to the proportions of the U.S. is outside the practical and economic scope of Panama.” In early 1993 the Panamanian Legislative Assembly approved the establishment of an autonomous Interoceanic Region Authority (Autoridad de la Regi´on Interoce´anica—ARI) to administer canal-related property acquired from the United States under the 1977 treaties. However, its future was clouded in late 1994 by a proposed constitutional amendment that would create a new Panama Canal Authority (Autoridad del Canal de Panama—ACP). Critics charged that the move was linked to a proposal before the U.S. Senate authorizing the formation of a corporation to administer the canal as a private undertaking. In April 1995 the Pentagon announced that the U.S. Armed Forces’ Southern Command would complete a withdrawal from Panama to a new site near Miami, Florida, in late 1998. The notice came after a U.S. request for extension of its military presence beyond 1999 elicited a cool response from Panamanian authorities. Thus in early September 1995 the Southern Command officially turned over two of its bases, Fort Davis and Fort Gulik, to the government of Panama. However, the Panamanian response shifted shortly afterward. ” On September 6 P´erez Balladares met with U.S. President Bill Clinton in Washington, D.C., to “explore” the possibility of “maintaining some degree of U.S. military presence after the year 2000.” A month later, in sharp contrast to pre-Treaty rhetoric, an opinion poll indicated that 86 percent of Panamanians, which fell to a still high 72 percent in March 1997, wanted at least some bases to remain under

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U.S. control. Part of the change in attitude appeared to be economic, particularly regarding the substantial infusion of money from U.S. service personnel and their dependents. On September 25, 1997, the U.S. Southern Command quit Panama one year early, leaving five of eight bases to be turned over to Panama (two more bases were relinquished in 1998). Meanwhile, representatives of 30 countries attended a Universal Canal Congress called by President Balladares on September 7–10. However, the United Nations withdrew promised funding, and most heads of state were absent because of the participation of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui. During 1998 labor unions expressed concern over “the imminent privatization” of canal services, with attendant job losses, while opinion polls indicated that nearly three-quarters of Panamanians supported the continued presence of the U.S. military. In addition, opposition legislators charged government officials with profiting from the handover by acquiring cheap homes at a base returned to Panama in 1997. These problems notwithstanding, the United States formally handed over administration of the canal to Panama in December 1999, the last U.S. installation (Howard Air Force Base) having been vacated early in the month. Five

months later, the canal administrator announced that technical proposals for constructing a new set of locks to accommodate ships up to 150,000 tons would be presented by the ACP to a canal advisory group representing 12 of the waterway’s principal users. While the cost of the upgrade was estimated at $3 to $6 billion, experts insisted that by the year 2010 demand will have outstripped the capacity of the existing system. By mid-2003, estimates of canal expansion costs had risen to $4 to $8 billion, with no decision as to which of several options might be adopted. The most viable, large-scale widening of the facility was bitterly opposed by campesinos on both shores, while funding sources were far from clear. In April 2006 the government announced its intention to invest $5.2 billion, obtained largely from increased toll charges, in an eight-year project to expand the canal and construct a new set of locks 40 percent wider and 60 percent longer than the existing locks. The undertaking, approved in a national referendum on October 22, 2006, was officially launched on September 3, 2007, and was expected to be completed by 2014. Panama Authority Chair: Carlos VALLARINO. Panama Canal Administrator: Alberto ALE´ Zubieta. MAN

PA R A G U A Y REPUBLIC

OF

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Rep u´ blica del Paraguay

The Country A landlocked, semitropical country wedged between Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay takes its name from the river that divides the fertile grasslands of the east (“Oriental”) from the drier, less hospitable Chaco region of the west (“Occidental”). The population is 95 percent mestizo, mainly of Spanish and Indian origin, although successive waves of immigration have brought settlers from all parts of the globe, including Japan and Korea. Spanish is the official language; however, 90 percent of the population also speaks Guaran´ı, the language of most of the indigenous inhabitants. Roman Catholicism is the established religion, but other faiths are tolerated. Women constitute approximately 29 percent of the paid labor force, concentrated primarily in manufacturing and domestic service; female participation in politics is virtually nonexistent. With 80 percent of the land owned by 1 percent of the population and without an adequate transportation network, Paraguayan development has long been impeded. Cattle-raising, agriculture, and forestry constitute the basis of the economy; cotton, timber, soybeans, and vegetable oils are the main exports. Industry is largely confined to processing agricultural, animal, and timber products, but there is a small consumer-goods industry. The government is presently embarked on exploitation of the vast hydroelectric potential of the Paraguay and Paran´a rivers; the Itaip´u Dam, six times the size of Egypt’s Aswan Dam and jointly constructed with Brazil, was opened in November 1982. As a result, Paraguay is expected to become one of

the world’s leading exporters of electricity, substantially reducing—if not reversing—an adverse balance of trade that has persisted since 1973. During the last years of the Stroessner presidency, with the Itaip´u construction completed and work on the even larger Yacyret´a complex inhibited by fiscal adversity in Argentina, economic indicators fell off. Between 1983 and 1989 the purchasing power of the guaran´ı declined by nearly 50 percent, and inflation reached nearly 30 percent by the end of the period. By late 1990 the economy was responding positively to a “free-market” initiative by the Rodr´ıguez administration, with

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real GDP growth increasing to a rate of 4.2 percent. Thereafter, however, growth was uneven, and unemployment in the latter half of the 1990s surged from 5 percent to double-digit levels. In the context of a major banking crisis, the rate of expansion fell to 1.3 percent in 1996. Following an upturn to 2.6 percent in 1997, GDP declined by 0.4 percent in 1998. A 0.5 percent gain in 1999 was followed by another marginal downturn in 2000 and a steep decline by 4.4 percent in 2002, which had recovered to an average improvement of 2.8 percent during 2003–2005. In 2006 growth was being recorded at 4 percent, with estimate growth rates for 2007 registering the same.

Government and Politics Political Background Paraguay gained independence from Spain in 1811 but was slow to assume the contours of a modern state. Its initial years of independence were marked by a succession of strong, authoritarian leaders, the most famous of whom was Jos´e Gaspar RODRIGUEZ de Francia. Known as “El Supremo,” Rodriguez ruled Paraguay from 1814 until 1840, during which time he sought to isolate the country from the outside world by expelling foreigners and cutting off communications. In 1865– 1870 Paraguay fought the combined forces of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the War of the Triple Alliance, which claimed the lives of approximately half of the country’s population and the vast majority of its males. From 1880 to 1904 the country was ruled by a series of Colorado Party (Partido Colorado—PC) presidents, while the Liberals ruled for most of the period 1904–1940. A three-year war against Bolivia over the Chaco territory ended in 1935, with Paraguay winning the greater part of the disputed region. For more than half a century two men dominated the political scene: the dictatorial Gen. Higinio MOR´INIGO (1940–1947) and the equally authoritarian Gen. Alfredo STROESSNER, who came to power in 1954 through a military coup against Pres´ ident Federico CHAVEZ. Initially elected to fill

the balance of Ch´avez’s unexpired term, Stroessner was subsequently reelected to successive five-year terms, the last on February 14, 1988. Stroessner was overthrown on February 3, 1989, in a coup led by Gen. Andr´es RODRIGUEZ Pedotti, who was elected on May 1 to serve the balance of the existing presidential term. In simultaneous balloting, the Colorados retained their existing majorities in both houses of Congress. At municipal balloting on May 26, 1991, the Colorados lost the race for the Asunci´on mayorship to the labor-backed Asunci´on for All (Asunci´on para Todos), while their traditional liberal opponents won in 14 other municipalities. The factionridden ruling party recovered to win 123 of 198 National Constituent Assembly seats on December 1. After six months of extensive debate, the assembly produced the draft of a new basic law, which became effective on its acceptance by the president on June 22, 1992. Despite a heated challenge for the 1993 Colorado presidential nomination from Dr. Luis Mar´ıa ˜ ARGANA, Juan Carlos WASMOSY was named the party’s standard-bearer at a convention in February and won the election on May 9 . The party, however, fell short of winning a majority in either house of Congress. In early 1995 a rift developed between President Wasmosy and the self-styled military “strongman,” Gen. Lino C´esar OVIEDO Silva. In April the general’s supporters were unable to secure the election of a pro-Oviedo Supreme Court, and in midMay Oviedo was induced to join Wasmosy in an agreement with the congressional opposition that provided for the “temporary suspension” of party memberships held by army and police personnel (an earlier measure banning such personnel from becoming party members had been held not to be retroactive). In late April 1996 General Oviedo was obliged to resign from the army for violating a constitutional ban on its members’ involvement in politics. His departure from the military came after the president had agreed to name him defense minister. However, the appointment was canceled because of overwhelming congressional opposition,

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Political Status: Independent since 1811; under presidential rule established in 1954; present constitution promulgated on June 22, 1992. Area: 157,047 sq. mi. (406,752 sq. km.). Population: 5,206,101 (2002C), excluding adjustment for underenumeration; 6,304,000 (2006E). ´ Major Urban Centers (2005E): ASUNCION (517,000), Ciudad del Este (247,000), San Lorenzo (230,000). Official Languages: Spanish, Guaran´ı. Monetary Unit: Guaran´ı (market rate November 2, 2007: 4,795 guaran´ıes = $1US). President: Nicanor DUARTE Frutos (Colorado Party); elected on April 27, 2003, and sworn in on August 15 for a five-year term, succeeding ´ Luis GONZALEZ Macchi (Colorado Party). Vice President: Vacant; awaiting successor following the resignation of Luis Alberto CASTIGLIONI Soria (Colorado Party); elected on April 27, 2003, and sworn in on August 15 for a term concurrent with that of the president.

and the former general, as a civilian, was powerless to respond. Wasmosy then initiated a purge of officers loyal to Oviedo, who signaled his presidential ambitions by forming his own Colorado Party faction (see Political Parties, below). On June 13 Oviedo was arrested on charges of insurrection and insubordination, but he was released on August 7 after an appeals court ruled that he had voluntarily terminated his resistance to presidential authority. Municipal elections conducted on November 17, 1996, produced generally mixed results, the most significant of which was the success in the race for mayor of Asunci´on of an opposition candidate from the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA). Meanwhile, relations between President Wasmosy and Vice President Angel Roberto SEIFART had deteriorated sharply, with Seifart castigating the president for remaining neutral in an internal election that had yielded the designation of Arga˜na as party leader.

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In early 1997, having successfully overcome most (but not all) of the charges stemming from his alleged coup attempt, General Oviedo declared his candidacy for the presidency, and by mid-April he had outpaced numerous competitors in a major opinion poll with a remarkable 25.1 percent showing. Arga˜na, who had been abandoned by Wasmosy in favor of (then) Finance Minister Carlos Alberto FACETTI, placed third with 14.7 percent. Thereafter, the Colorado executive board recommended on August 21 that Wasmosy be impeached for seeking to mount a fujimorazo (presidential self-coup), while the tally of a September 7 primary that appeared to have awarded the party’s 1998 nomination to Oviedo was suspended following arga˜nista complaints of fraud. On October 3, Wasmosy ordered Oviedo’s arrest because of “accusations made against the president,” including the charge that under his rule Paraguay had become “the most corrupt country on earth.” In early December 1997 Wasmosy failed in an attempt to secure postponement of the poll scheduled for May 10, 1998, and on December 12 Oviedo turned himself in to serve the 30-day sentence ordered by the president. Although Oviedo on December 29 became the legally recognized Colorado standard-bearer, a special military tribunal ordered that his incarceration continue indefinitely, pending further investigation of the abortive 1996 coup. On April 17, 1998, the Supreme Court upheld a second sentence of ten years imposed on Oviedo in March, and his registration as Colorado standard-bearer was nullified the next day. His vicepresidential running mate, Ra´ul CUBAS Grau, was subsequently named his successor and went on to defeat opposition candidate Domingo LA´INO in presidential balloting on May 10. Following the election, Cubas indicated that he would give Oviedo a presidential pardon; however, a majority of legislators, including members of the ruling Colorado Party led by Vice President–elect Arga˜na, warned Cubas that they would initiate impeachment proceedings if he issued the pardon, and in mid-June they approved a law precluding any such action before completion of at least half

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of the beneficiary’s term. Thereafter, the arga˜nista faction forged an agreement with the opposition Democratic Alliance of the PLRA and the National Encounter Party (PEN) that left Cubas without a legislative majority. On September 23, 1998, the Supreme Court reconfirmed its ruling on Oviedo’s imprisonment. Cubas responded by freeing Oviedo on a legal technicality: commutation of his sentence, rather than a pardon. However, the Court annulled the action and on December 2 ordered that Oviedo be returned to jail. Cubas, charging the Court with trying to usurp presidential authority, responded several days later with another decree in defiance of the ruling. The Court, again unsuccessfully, directed Cubas to order Oviedo back to jail in February 1999, and Congress held preliminary discussions on impeachment proceedings. Although some observers initially believed Cubas might survive a congressional vote, the political landscape was dramatically altered on March 23 when Arga˜na was shot to death in Asunci´on by men in military uniforms. Suspicion of possible involvement immediately fell on Oviedo and Cubas, and demonstrators poured into the streets of the capital to demand the president’s resignation. Several days of battles between the arga˜nistas and the oviedistas culminated in the death of a number of antigovernment demonstrators by sniper fire, and the country appeared perilously close to political collapse. Under intense international pressure, Cubas resigned on March 28, 1999, only hours before the Senate was set to vote on his possible removal. He ´ was succeeded within hours by Luis GONZALEZ Macchi, the arga˜nista president of the Senate. On March 30 Gonz´alez Macchi appointed a “national unity” government, which included two members each from the PLRA and the PEN. Meanwhile, Oviedo fled to Argentina and Cubas to Brazil. In late April the Supreme Court ruled that Gonz´alez Macchi was entitled to serve out the remainder of Cubas’s term (until 2003) and directed that a new vice president be elected later in the year. In July 1999 the Supreme Electoral Court announced postponement of the vice-presidential election to August 13, 2000. Subsequently, the

Colorados indicated that they would contest the poll, despite a national unity agreement that the post be awarded to the opposition. As a result, the PLRA withdrew from the ruling coalition in February 2000, depriving the government of its legislative majority. Liberal candidate Julio C´esar FRANCO narrowly bested the Colorado nominee, ˜ (son of the former vice president), F´elix ARGANA in the August balloting, and the PLRA immediately launched an effort to impeach Gonz´alez, which failed in early 2003. In the election of April 27, 2003, the Colorado Party continued its 56-year domination of the presidency by electing Nicanor DUARTE Frutos on a 37.3 percent vote share. Those defeated included the PLRA’s Julio C´esar Franco, 24.1 percent; Catholic businessman Pedro FADUL Niella of the recently created Beloved Homeland Move´ ment, 21.4 percent; and Guillermo SANCHEZ. Guffanti, named standard-bearer for the oviedista National Union of Ethical Citizens after the general had been declared ineligible, 13.53 percent; while PEN’s Diego ABENTE Brun scored a minuscule 0.6 percent. But despite the presidential victory, the Colorados secured only pluralities in the Senate (18 of 45 seats) and the Chamber of Deputies (43 of 80 seats).

Constitution and Government The revised constitution of 1967 provided for executive dominance, while conferring carefully circumscribed powers on an expanded, twochamber legislature and the judiciary. The president was to be popularly elected for a five-year term, as were members of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. During the legislature’s annual three-month recess, the president was empowered to rule by decree through the Council of State, a body composed of government ministers plus representatives from education, business, the religious community, and the military. The judicial system was defined as encompassing justices of the peace, courts of the first instance, appellate courts, and, at the apex, the Supreme Court of Justice. Most leading provisions of the 1967 document were retained in its 1992 successor. The

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principal changes were the introduction of the post of vice president, to be elected, like the president, by simple plurality (thus denying the opposition an opportunity to join forces in a runoff); limiting the president to a single five-year term; and (in a rebuff to the military) prohibiting the chief executive from transferring his powers as commander-inchief to another. A section on the media guaranteed “the free expression and publication of thought and opinion without censorship of any kind” but went on to assert the citizens’ right to “receive truthful, responsible and balanced information.” For administrative purposes Paraguay is divided into 19 departments (exclusive of the capital), which are subdivided into districts and municipalities.

Foreign Relations A member of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Latin American Integration Association, and other regional organizations, Paraguay traditionally maintained a strongly antileftist foreign policy, including a suspension of relations with Nicaragua in 1980 following the assassination in Asunci´on of former Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Despite periodic tensions with Argentina and Brazil over hydroelectric issues, relations with neighboring regimes have been relatively cordial, and in March 1991 Paraguay joined Uruguay in an expansion of a 1990 pact between the larger states into a treaty for full implementation of a Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Com´un del Cono Sur—Mercosur). During the Stroessner era relations with the United States, a primary source of foreign investment, were strained by allegations of high-level Paraguayan involvement in narcotics trafficking. On the other hand, improved relations with Washington had by mid-2005 generated complaints by both Brazil and Argentina that Paraguay might withdraw from Mercosur. President Duarte insisted, however, that his administration had no intention of seeking more than a readjustment of preferences that would enhance beef sales to the United States.

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A point of concern for Paraguay and its neighbors is the unruly region at the shared borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, viewed as a haven for money laundering, arms and drug trafficking, and Islamist militants. In response, the United States has provided Paraguay with technical assistance, equipment, and training to strengthen counternarcotics and to assist in the development and implementation of legislation to counter money laundering and terrorism.

Current Issues For several years, Paraguayan domestic politics have turned largely on the oviedistas and rivals jostling for access to presidential power amid allegations of corruption and conspiracy. In 2002 the oviedistas withdrew from the PC, with Oviedo announcing from Brazil, where he was then under detention, that he intended to return to Paraguay and seek the presidency in 2003. Meanwhile, opposition pressure against Gonz´alez Macchi continued, fueled in part by the filing in April of formal charges against him for the diversion of about $16 million in public funds into a U.S. bank account. In addition to having immunity from prosecution while in office, the president retained enough support in the Chamber of Deputies to prevent the two-thirds vote needed to impeach him. Over the next six months, however, a series of sometimes violent antigovernment, anticorruption demonstrations took place, with supporters of Gonz´alez Macchi insisting that they were orchestrated by Oviedo and Vice President Franco. In 2006, Gonz´alez Macchi was sentenced to eight years in prison. Following the surprisingly poor oviedista showing in the 2003 presidential poll, General Oviedo returned from his five-year exile and was immediately imprisoned to face the variety of charges that had accumulated against him. In October 2004 he was acquitted of responsibility for the 2000 coup attempt, while an arms cache charge against him was dismissed in January 2005. His involvement in the 1996 action against former president Wasmosy had yet to be reviewed. In February 2006 President Duarte resumed formal leadership of the Colorados, arguing that a

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constitutional ban on his holding any office other than the presidency applied only to governmental posts. Concurrently, however, he indicated that he would seek a Constitutional Court ruling validating the action. In the meantime, he delegated interim leadership of the party to Jos´e Alberto ALDERETE. Three months earlier, Duarte had appealed for constitutional reform in a move widely interpreted as clearing the way for a reelection bid by revoking the one-term limitation. His congressional critics responded with a threat of impeachment led by the PLRA, but they clearly lacked the required two-thirds majority in both chambers. In May 2007 President Duarte announced that he had given up on his effort to challenge the one-term limitation, therefore abandoning his plans to run in 2008. Much of Duarte’s political success has been based on opposition to the privatization of stateowned enterprises and support for land reform legislation. Thus, in July 2005 his supporters blocked reactivation of a privatization bill that had been dormant since 2002, and in early August they approved the expropriation for redistribution of 52,000 of about 600,000 hectares of land owned by affiliates of Rev. Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church. With Duarte seemingly out of the race, Oviedo remained fixated on the presidency. In September 2007, Oviedo’s lawyers began to lobby the Supreme Court, on constitutional grounds, to overturn two charges against him which currently preclude him from seeking the presidency in April 2008. Under the revised penal code of 1998, if charges are not brought to trial within four years they become invalid. In a related presidential development, Vice President Luis Castiglioni presented his resignation on October 3, 2007, in order to run as a presidential candidate in 2008.

Political Parties Paraguay’s two traditional political organizations were the now-divided Liberal Party, which was last in power in 1940, and the National Republican Association (Colorado Party), which domi-

nated the political scene from 1947 and sponsored the successive presidential candidacies of Gen. Alfredo Stroessner. Prone to factionalism, the Colorados suffered the loss of Gen. Lino Oviedo’s supporters in 2002. In August 1981 the electoral law was amended to forbid the presentation of presidential nominees by party coalitions. In addition, the Communist Party and others with “similar aims” as well as those promoting “hatred among Paraguayans” continued to be outlawed until after the deposition of Stroessner in 1989.

Major Parties National Republican Association–Colorado Party (Asociaci´on Nacional Republicana– Partido Colorado—ANR-PC). Originating in the late 19th century, the mainstream of the Colorado Party has long been conservative in outlook and consistently supported General Stroessner for more than three decades after his assumption of the presidency in 1954. The party has, however, been subject to factionalism (for a discussion of its shifting “currents” before 1991, see the 1990 edition of the Handbook). During the run-up to municipal elections in May 1991 the principal internal groupings were three tradicionalista alignments: the highly conservative Tradicionalistas Aut´onomos, led by (then) ˜ acting party president Dr. Luis Mar´ıa ARGANA; the moderately liberal Movimiento Tradicionalista Democr´atico, led by Bl´as Riquelme; and the centrist Tradicionalismo Renovador, led by Angel Roberto Seifart. Following the municipal balloting the democr´aticos and the renovadors joined forces as the Tradicionalismo Renovador Democr´atico (Trardem), which commanded a majority at an extraordinary party convention on July 15–19. Subsequently, Trardem and the aut´onomos ran joint lists in Colorado balloting on October 6 to pick candidates for the forthcoming Constituent Assembly elections, winning all of the contests. Other party factions included the Frente Democr´atico (FD), led by Waldino Ram´on LOVERA; the strongly renewalist Coloradismo

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Democr´atico (Codem), led by Miguel Angel GONZALEZ Casabianca; and the youthful Nueva Generaci´on (NG), led by Enrique RIERA Jr. In 1993 a Colorado dissident, Leandro PRIETO Yegros, attempted to campaign for the presidency under the banner of a Progressive Social Movement (Movimiento Social Progresista— MSP), but the electoral tribunal rejected his candidacy. At an extraordinary Colorado convention in February 1993 the military-backed Juan Carlos Wasmosy defeated Arga˜na for the party’s presidential nomination. While Arga˜na did not carry out a threat to challenge the outcome in the courts, he campaigned against Wasmosy; concurrently, his supporters split the senatorial races evenly with wasmosistas and gained a majority of the party’s seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Following the election, Arga˜na’s faction, now styled the Colorado Reconciliation Movement (Movimiento Reconciliaci´on Colorada—MRC), formed a legislative bloc with the PLRA and PEN. In late 1994, after three generals had accused Wasmosy of intraparty vote rigging, arga˜nistas formally challenged the validity of the president’s incumbency by calling for his impeachment. In early 1995, as tension developed between President Wasmosy and Army Commander Lino Oviedo, an alliance was formed between the arga˜nistas and oviedistas that made overtures to the exiled Alfredo Stroessner, prompting the revival of a stronista faction within the Colorado Party styled the Colorado Institutional Movement (Movimiento Institucionalista Colorado—MIC), led by Sen. Enrique REVERCHON. However, in April the intraparty opposition was unable to prevent the election of a new anti-Oviedo Supreme Court by a majority alignment of wasmosistas and seifaristas styled the United Colorados (Coloradismo Unido). In May 1996, following his forced retirement from the army, Oviedo launched a PC faction styled the National Union of Ethical Colorados (Uni´on ´ Nacional de Colorados Eticos—Unace). He was, however, unable to avert arrest in mid-June on charges of insurrection (see Political background, above). Meanwhile, in an April 28 election for the

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party leadership, Arga˜na secured an easy victory of 55 percent over Seifart (35 percent) and Riquelme (8 percent). Despite his status as a coup suspect, General Oviedo was elected Colorado presidential candidate in September 1997, with runner-up Arga˜na accusing his opponent of massive fraud. Following Oviedo’s preclusion from the 1998 presidential poll by the Supreme Court, he was replaced as the Colorado standard-bearer by Ra´ul Cubas Grau, previously the vice-presidential candidate and a close ally of Oviedo. Arga˜na became the vice-presidential candidate. Despite the success of the Colorado ticket, intense conflict subsequently persisted between the arga˜nistas and the Cubas/Oviedo faction, particularly after Cubas, shortly after his inauguration, ordered Oviedo released from jail. In mid-March the oviedistas took control of the Colorado headquarters in Asunci´on after the arga˜nistas had postponed the scheduled election of new party leaders. Shortly thereafter, Arga˜na was assassinated, leading to the ouster of President Cubas and elevation of Luis Gonz´alez Macchi, an Arga˜na supporter, to the national presidency. Gonz´alez was succeeded by Nicanor Duarte Frutos in April 2003. On February 19, 2006, an internal party election was held. Duarte was challenged by Osvaldo DOMINGUEZ Dibb, who represented the faction of the party loyal to Stroessner, but Duarte won convincingly. Alfredo Stroessner died in Brazil later that year on August 16. His grandson, Alfredo (Goli) DOMINGUEZ Stroessner, who prefers to be known as Alfredo STROESSNER, now leads the neostronista faction within the Colorado Party together with his uncle, Osvaldo Dominguez. In 2007, Duarte announced he would not run in the following year’s presidential election, backing the former education minister, Blanca OVELAR, after which divisions within the party became more visible. Vice President Castiglioni, a rival of Ovelar and critic of the president, resigned his post October 3 to contest the 2008 elections. Leaders: Nicanor DUARTE Frutos (President of the Republic), Jos´e Alberto ALDERETE ´ (President of the Party), Herminio CACERES

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(Former President of the Party), Ra´ul CUBAS (Former President of the Republic, in exile), Juan Carlos WASMOSY (Former President of the Republic and Leader of Acci´on Democr´atica Republicana), Angel Roberto SEIFART (Former Vice President of the Republic and Leader of Coloradismo Unido), Carlos Alberto FACETTI Masulli (Acci´on Democr´atica Republicana), Sen. Blas RIQUELME (Leader of Coloradismo Democr´atico). National Concertation Concertaci´on Nacional—CN). The CN was formed in September 2006 with the aim of ending the Colorado Party’s 60-year dominance of Paraguayan politics. The alliance included the PLRA, the PPS, the PEN, the PPQ, the Unace (see below), as well as additional leftist and civil organizations. A new group, Resistencia Ciudadana Nacional (RCN), was created in March 2006 (see below). Other leftist groupings included the Broad Front (Frente Amplio—FA), Progressive Democracy (Dem´ocrata Progresista—DP), and the Movement for Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MaS). Ex-bishop Fernando Lugo, whose populism earned him the nickname “Red Bishop,” coordinated the opposition movement and is a presidential nominee for 2008. Lugo renounced his clerical position on December 21, 2006, in order to be eligible for the next presidential ballot. Each major party nominated candidates to run in the local elections of November 19, 2006, held in 227 municipalities. As expected, the Colorado Party won convincingly in the most populous cities, while three of the original CN members defected to join Lino Oviedo’s faction. Leader: Fernando LUGO. Authentic Radical Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Radical Aut´entico—PLRA). Paraguay’s historic Liberal Party (Partido Liberal—PL) of the 19th and early 20th centuries was dissolved in 1942. The formation was reestablished in 1961, but most of its members left in the same year to form the Radical Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Radical—PLR). In 1977 a majority of PL and PLR members withdrew from

their organizations to form the Unified Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Unificado—PLU). The government, however, refused to legalize the new grouping, continuing instead to recognize a rump of the PLR. The PLRA was formed in 1978 by a group of center-left PLU dissidents, many of whom had been subjected to police harassment after the 1978 election. Although its leaders were periodically incarcerated, the PLRA subsequently grew in strength. Its president, Dr. Domingo La´ıno, was permitted to return from exile in April 1987 and was runner-up to General Rodr´ıguez in the presidential poll of May 1989, with 20 percent of the vote. In May 1990 what remained of the PL (whose vote share of 3 percent in 1988 had plunged to a minuscule 0.3 percent in 1989) and of the PLR (whose vote share had dropped from 7 percent in 1988 to 1 percent in 1989) merged with the PLRA, which ran second, with 27 percent of the vote, at the Constituent Assembly balloting of December 1, 1991. Dr. La´ıno placed second in the 1993 presidential contest, with a 32.1 percent share of the vote, while the party was runner-up in both the Senate and Chamber races. In November 1996 the PLRA’s Mart´ın BURT, running with the support of PEN (below), was elected mayor of Asunci´on. He subsequently heralded that outcome as an example of how cooperation between the two leading opposition parties might defeat the Colorados in 1998, and in August 1997 the PLRA joined with PEN in a Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democr´atica— AD) to contest the general election of May 1998. The PLRA was awarded two seats in the national unity government installed in March 1999. It withdrew from the Gonz´alez administration on February 6, 2000. In March 2002 the party’s president, former foreign minister Miguel Abd´on Saguier, was ousted in favor of legislator Oscar Denis. Having won the vice presidency in August 2000, Julio C´esar Franco resigned the office in October 2002 to meet a legal requirement that presidential candidates vacate their governmental positions six months before the

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scheduled balloting. With a view toward legislative elections as well as the presidential contest, the PLRA attempted to fashion an opposition Power Front 2003 (Frente Poder 2003) alliance which, however, did not materialize. Equally unavailing were attempts to form alliances with the oviedista Unace (below) and Pedro Fadul’s PPQ (below). Obliged to run alone, the PLRA finished second in both the presidential and legislative races. In October 2005 longtime party icon Domingo La´ıno and a number of others were expelled from the PLRA for actions that appeared to make them de facto allies of the ruling Colorados. It is the second largest party in the parliament, as well as the principal opposition party. Leaders: Blas LLANO (President of the Party), Julio C´esar (“Yoyito”) FRANCO ´ GOMEZ (Former Vice President of the Republic, 2003 presidential candidate, and Former President of the Party), Oscar DENIS (Former President of the Party), Miguel Abd´on SAGUIER (Former President of the Party). Beloved Homeland Party (Partido Patria Querida—PPQ). The PPQ was launched in early 2002 by Catholic businessman Pedro Fadul Niella, who ran third in the presidential balloting on an anticorruption platform. In 2003, Fadul received 21.3 percent of the votes, taking ten from Congress and seven from the Senate. Fadul initiated the abortive call for President Duarte’s impeachment in November 2005. Leader: Pedro FADUL Niella (2003 presidential candidate and President of the Party). National Union of Ethical Citizens (Uni´on ´ Nacional de Ciudadanos Eticos—Unace). The present Unace (sometimes identified as the UNACE Party, or PUNACE) began as the ANR´ PC’s Uni´on Nacional de Colorados Eticos faction, which Lino Oviedo had launched in 1996. In March 2002, while under arrest in Brazil, Oviedo announced that he intended to sever his faction’s links to the Colorados, return to Paraguay, and establish a new party as a vehi-

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cle for a presidential bid in 2003. However, the Supreme Court invalidated any candidacy by the general. His surrogate, Sen. Guillermo S´anchez Guffanti, received 13.5 percent of the popular vote. In September 2007, Oviedo appealed to the Supreme Court to remove two charges that prevented him from seeking election in 2008 (see Current issues). Leaders: Gen. (Ret.) Lino C´esar OVIEDO Silva (conditional freedom since September 6, ´ 2007), Enrique GONZALEZ Quintana (President). National Encounter Party (Partido Encuentro Nacional—PEN). The PEN was organized in mid-1992 as a somewhat loose alignment of supporters of independent presidential candidate Guillermo Caballero Vargas, who consistently led in the public opinion polls until the eve of the 1993 balloting. The group, which included elements of the PRF and PDC (below), as well as Carlos Filizzola’s CPT (see PPS, below), won eight seats in each legislative house and subsequently entered into an opposition pact with the Liberals, which was reaffirmed for Asunci´on’s mayoral contest in November 1996. In the latter balloting PEN agreed to support the PLRA candidate after public opinion polls showed him ahead of the other contenders. PEN accepted two cabinet posts in the national unity government installed in March 1999. A week earlier Filizzola had lost the party presidency to Euclides Acevedo. PEN’s Diego Abente Brun ran a distant fifth in the 2003 presidential race, while none of the party’s candidates won congressional representation. Leaders: Luis Torales KENNEY (President), Sen. Euclides ACEVEDO (Former Industry and Commerce Minister), Guillermo Caballero VARGAS (1993 presidential candidate), Diego ABENTE Brun (2003 presidential candidate). National Citizen Resistance (Resistencia Ciudadana Nacional—RCN). The RCN was created in March 2006 by a group of social and political opposition groups. Their aim was to promote a political change that would improve

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the country’s economy. The popular Catholic exbishop, Fernando Lugo, stepped down from the party leadership shortly after its formation but remained very much involved. Leader: Marcio SCHUSSMULLER.

the Constituent Assembly balloting of December 1991 but has subsequently been unrepresented at the national level. Leaders: Oscar MONTIEL Galv´an (President), ´ Mirta TORRES ANTUNEZ (Vice President), V´ıctor SANCHEZ Villagra (Former President).

Other Parties and Groups Country in Solidarity Party (Partido Pa´ıs Solidario—PPS). The opposition PPS was formed in 2001 by Carlos Filizzola, who had led PEN from its formation until losing a leadership election in March 1999. Earlier, he had headed the Asunci´on for Everybody (Asunci´on para Todos— APT), winning the capital’s mayoralty in 1991, and then the Constitution for Everybody (Constituci´on para Todos—CPT), which ran third, with 11 percent of the vote, in the Constituent Assembly balloting in December 1991. A joint secretary of the labor confederation Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, he had been imprisoned several times by the Stroessner regime for supporting peasant land seizures. Filizzola lost the Asunci´on mayoral election of November 2001 despite PLRA support. The party won two Senate and two Chamber seats in 2003. Leaders: Dr. Carlos Alberto FILIZZOLA Pallar´es (President), Jorge GIUCICH (Vice President), Jos´e Nicol´as MOR´INIGO Alcaraz (Leader of the Senate). February Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Febrerista—PRF). Initially organized by a group of Chaco War veterans, the PRF now stands substantially to the left of the Colorados in its espousal of social and agrarian reform and is affiliated with the Socialist International. Although legally recognized, the party boycotted all national and local elections from 1973 through 1988. Meanwhile, a discernible ideological shift occurred within the PRF leadership, the party’s 1985 congress replacing President Euclides ACEVEDO Candia with the more moderate Fernando VERA, formerly an economist for the International Monetary Fund; before the 1989 balloting, on the other hand, Acevedo returned briefly to the presidency. The party secured one seat in

Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC). The PDC, which was refused recognition by the Electoral Commission from 1971 through 1988, is one of the smallest of Paraguay’s political parties. The furthest left of the non-Communist groupings, it exercises considerable influence among the more progressive youth. In March 1986 the government lifted an order under which PDC founder Luis Alfonso RESCK had been forced into exile five years earlier. The party surprised observers by winning only 1 percent of the vote in 1989. It secured one Constituent Assembly seat in 1991, and none thereafter. The former president, Luis Manuel ANDRADA, resigned from the party on March 2, 2007. ´ (President), Dr. Jos´e Leaders: Geraldo ROLON V. ALTAMIRANO (Vice President). Paraguayan Communist Party (Partido Comunista Paraguayo—PCP). The PCP was outlawed for most of the period 1928–1989. Its exiled membership of approximately 5,000 was divided into three main groups: a Buenos Aires–based Miguel SOLER faction, which traditionally endorsed the Soviet line; a Montevideo-based Oscar CREYDT faction, which championed the Chinese viewpoint; and an Obdulio BARTHE faction, composed of Creydt faction dissidents, which termed itself the Paraguayan Leninist Communist Party (Partido Comunista Leninista Paraguayo—PCLP). Barthe was reported to have been designated PCP president at a secret Central Committee meeting in June 1978. In late 1979 Amnesty International asserted that former secretary general Miguel Soler had died while in police custody in 1975. The party’s first secretary, Antonio Maidana, was arrested by Argentine authorities in 1980 and subsequently imprisoned in Paraguay.

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The PCP sought, without success, to gain access to the Acuerdo Nacional in the hope of converting it into an instrument of active resistance to the Stroessner regime within Paraguay. The party was legalized following the former president’s ouster in February 1989, its secretary general returning from exile in December. The former chair of the PCP, Julio ROJAS, who was released from 20 years’ imprisonment in 1978, died in March 1990. More recently, the PCP joined three other leftist parties (the PDP, MPRPP, and MPL, below) in forming the now-defunct Coordination of the Left (Coordinadora de Izquierda—CI). No developments have been recorded since 2002, when the PCP left the United Left (Izquierda Unida—IU), of which it was a founding member. Leader: Anan´ıas MAIDANA (General Secretary). Four small groups participated in recent elections without success: the Democratic and Social Assembly (Concertaci´on Democr´atica y Social), led by Ricardo CANESE; the Humanist Party (Partido Humanista—PH), led by Nicol´as SERV´IN; the Socialist National Party (Partido Nacional Socialista—PNS), led by Juan Carlos BADER; and the Unified Radical Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Radical Unificado—PLRU). Among recently organized leftist groups are the Free Fatherland Movement (Movimiento Patria Libre—MPL), a Guevarist organization and CI participant; the Paraguayan Liberation Movement (Movimiento Paraguayo de Liberaci´on—Mopali); the Paraguayan Peasant Movement (Movimiento Paraguayo del Campesino—MPC); the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Democr´atico Popular—PDP), an amalgamation of the People’s Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democr´atico del Pueblo—MDP) and several other small groups; the Popular Revolutionary Movement Paraguay Pyahur´a (Movimiento Popular Revolucionario Paraguay Pyahur´a—MPRPP), led by Hermo RODRIGUEZ; and two Trotskyist formations, the Workers’ Party (Partido de los Trabajadores— PT), led by Mar´ıa Herminia FELICIANGELI, and the Workers’ Socialist Party (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores—PST).

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Legislature The bicameral National Congress (Congreso Nacional) currently consists of a 45-member Senate and an 80-member Chamber of Deputies, both elected concurrently with the president for fiveyear terms. Senate (C´amara de Senadores). In the election of April 27, 2003, the Colorado Party won 18 seats; the Authentic Radical Liberal Party, 12; the Beloved Homeland Movement, 7; the National Union of Ethical Citizens, 5; the Country in Solidarity Party, 2; National Encounter Party, 1. ´ President: Saguier Carmona Miguel ABDON. Chamber of Deputies (C´amara de Diputados). In the election of April 27, 2003, the Colorado Party won 43 seats; the Authentic Radical Liberal Party, 21; the Beloved Homeland Movement, 9; the National Union of Ethical Citizens, 5; the Country in Solidarity Party,1; independent, 1. ´ President: Oscar Rub´en SALOMON

Communications Press Newspapers did not enjoy complete freedom of the press, and a number ceased publication during the Stroessner era, including the leading daily, ABC Color, and the opposition weekly, El Pueblo, which were shut down in April 1984 and August 1988, respectively, but resumed publication on February 7, 1989. The following are published daily in Asunci´on: Diario Popular (125,000); ABC Color ´ (75,000), independent; Ultima Hora (45,000), liberal Colorado; El Diario Noticias (35,000 daily, 45,000 Sunday), independent; El D´ıa (15,000); Patria (8,000), Colorado Party organ.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility, although several foreign bureaus maintain offices in Asunci´on.

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Cabinet As of November 1, 2007 President Vice President

Nicanor Duarte Frutos Vacant

Ministers Agriculture and Livestock Education and Culture Finance and Economy Foreign Relations Industry and Trade Interior Justice and Labor National Defense Public Health and Social Welfare Public Works and Communications Secretary General to the Presidency

Alfredo Silvio Molinas Maldonado Mar´ıa Ester Jim´enez [f] C´esar Barreto Otaz´u Ruben Ram´ırez Lezcano Jos´e Mar´ıa Ib´an˜ ez Guillermo Delm´as Frescura Derlis Alcides C´espedes Aguilera Roberto Eudez Gonz´alez Segovia Oscar Mart´ınez Dold´an Rogelio Raimundo Ben´ıtez Vargas Arm´ın D´ıez P´erez

Executive Secretaries Children and Adolescents Civil Service Environment Planning and Social and Economic Development Repatriation and Refugees Social Action Tourism Women’s Affairs

Victorina Esp´ınola de Ruiz D´ıaz [f] Carlos Miguel Goiburu Carlos Antonio L´opez Dose Miguelina G´omez de Mart´ınez [f] Nicasia Maldonado Viuda de Solaeche [f] Judith Liduvina Andraschko Unzain [f] Liz Rossana Cr´amer Campos [f] Mar´ıa Jos´e Arga˜na de Mateu [f]

[f] = female

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is under the supervision of the Administraci´on Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Antelco). All radio stations, with the exception of the government station, Radio Nacional, are com˜ mercial, one of them, Radio Nandut´ ı, being periodically shut down during 1984–1988 for broadcasting interviews with opposition politicians and reporting on differences within the ruling party. As of 2005 there were approximately 75 personal computers and 33 Internet users per 1,000 people. In that same year there were 306 mobile cellular subscribers for every 1,000 inhabitants.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: James Spalding HELLMERS U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay: James Caldwell CASON Permanent Representative to the UN: Eladio LOIZAGA IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ALADI, CAN, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

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The third-largest country in South America and the second after Chile in the length of its Pacific coastline, Peru comprises three distinct geographical areas: a narrow coastal plain; the high sierra of the Andes; and an inland area of wooded foothills, tropical rain forests, and lowlands that include the headwaters of the Amazon River. While it contains only 30 percent of the population, the coastal area is the commercial and industrial center. Roman Catholicism is the state religion, and Spanish has traditionally been the official language, although Quechua (recognized as an official language in 1975) and Aymar´a are commonly spoken by the Peruvian Indians. Of Inca descent, Indians constitute 46 percent of the population but remain largely unintegrated with the white (10 percent) and mestizo (44 percent) groups. Women constitute approximately 30 percent of the labor force, primarily in agriculture, with smaller groups in domestic service and the informal trading sector; female participation in government is minimal, save at the national level, where women constituted 35 of the 120 legislators elected in 2006, including the second vice president, and 5 of 16 cabinet ministers. The Peruvian economy depends heavily on the extraction of rich and varied mineral resources, the most important being copper, silver, zinc, lead, and iron. Petroleum, which was discovered in the country’s northeastern jungle region in 1971, is being extensively exploited. The agricultural sector employs approximately 40 percent of the labor force and embraces three main types of activity: commercial agriculture, subsistence agriculture, and fish-

ing. The most important legal commodities are coffee, cotton, sugar, fish, and fishmeal, with coca production the major component of the underground economy. Like most of its neighbors, Peru faced economic adversity in the 1980s, including flagging output in the agricultural and industrial sectors, a massive foreign debt, and inflation that reached a (then) record 163 percent in 1985. In August 1985 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) declared the government ineligible for further credit after it had embarked on a somewhat unorthodox recovery

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program that yielded a limited degree of success by late 1986 (see Political background, below). A return to fiscal difficulty in 1987 gave way to crisis conditions in 1988, with inflation (after a series of devaluations) escalating to an annualized rate of more than 3,300 percent in 1989 and 7,400 percent in 1990. In March 1993 government officials declared that the recession had bottomed out, and what was termed an economic “miracle” subsequently yielded a real GDP gain for the year of 6.8 percent. A further increase to 12.7 percent (the highest in the world) occurred in 1994. Overall, the period 1993–1997 saw an average annual gain of about 7 percent, although high unemployment and widespread poverty showed little improvement. For 1998–2001 adverse trade conditions, the slow pace of structural reform, and domestic instability combined to slow real GDP growth to only 1 percent annually. Thereafter, it rose to a region-high 5.2 percent in 2002, dipped to 4.0 percent in 2003, and then rose again to 5.1 percent in 2004, 6.4 percent in 2005, and 8.0 percent in 2006. The Lima Chamber of Commerce expects GDP growth to total 7.3 percent in 2007.

Government and Politics Political Background The heartland of the Inca empire conquered by Francisco Pizarro in the 16th century, Peru held a preeminent place in the Spanish colonial system until its liberation by Jos´e de SAN MARTIN and Sim´on BOLIVAR in 1821–1824. Its subsequent history has been marked by frequent alternations of constitutional civilian and extraconstitutional military rule. The civilian government of Jos´e Luis BUSTAMANTE, elected in 1945, was overthrown in 1948 by Gen. Manuel A. ODRIA, who held the presidency until 1956. Manuel PRADO y Ugarteche, elected in 1956 with the backing of the left-ofcenter American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), presided over a democratic regime that lasted until 1962, when a new military coup blocked the choice of Aprista leader V´ıctor Ra´ul

HAYA DE LA TORRE as president. An election in 1963 restored constitutional government under ´ Fernando BELAUNDE Terry of the Popular Action (AP) party. With the support of the now-defunct Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Bela´unde implemented economic and social reforms, although hampered by an opposition-controlled Congress and an economic crisis at the end of 1967. Faced with dwindling political support, his government was ousted in October 1968 in a bloodless coup led by Div. Gen. Juan VELASCO Alvarado, who assumed the presidency, dissolved the Congress, and formed a military-dominated leftist administration committed to a participatory, cooperativebased model that was known after mid-1974 as the Inca Plan. Formally titled the Plan of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, it aimed at a “Social Proprietorship” (Propiedad Social) in which virtually all enterprises—industrial, commercial, and agricultural—would be either state- or worker-owned and would be managed collectively. Amid growing evidence of discontent within the armed forces, Velasco Alvarado was himself overthrown in August 1975 by Div. Gen. ´ Francisco MORALES BERMUDEZ Cerruti, who had served as prime minister since the preceding February and initially pledged to continue his predecessor’s policies in a “second phase of the revolution” that would make the Inca reforms “irreversible.” Despite the existence of well-entrenched rightist sentiment within the military, Div. Gen. Oscar VARGAS Prieto, who had succeeded Morales Berm´udez as prime minister in September 1975, was replaced in January 1976 by a leftist, Gen. ´ Jorge FERNANDEZ Maldonado, who was put forward as a figure capable of maintaining the policies of the revolution in the midst of growing economic difficulty. Under the new administration, Peru’s National Planning Institute (INP) prepared a replacement for the Inca Plan known as the Plan T´upac Amaru. The document was, however, considered too radical by rightist elements. Its principal authors were deported as part of a move to clear the INP of “left-wing infiltrators,” and Fern´andez Maldonado was replaced in July 1976 by the

PERU

Political Status: Independent republic proclaimed 1821; military rule imposed on October 3, 1968; constitutional government restored on July 28, 1980; national emergency declared in wake of army-backed “presidential coup” on April 5, 1992; present constitution effective from December 29, 1993. Area: 496,222 sq. mi. (1,285,216 sq. km.). Population: 22,566,492 (1993C), including an adjustment of 2.4 percent for underenumeration; 28,363,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): LIMA (metropolitan area, 8,550,000). Official Languages: Spanish, Quechua. Monetary Unit: New Sol (market rate November 2, 2007: 3 new sols = $1US). President: Alan GARC´IA P´erez (Peruvian Aprista Party); served as president 1985–1990; returned to office in second-round balloting on June 4, 2006, and sworn in for a five-year term on July 28, succeeding Alejandro TOLEDO Manrique (Peru Possible). First Vice President: Luis GIAMPETRI (Peruvian Aprista Party); elected in second-round balloting on June 4, 2006, and sworn in on July 28 for a term concurrent with that of the president, the office having been vacant following the resignation of Ra´ul Diez CANSECO (Peru Possible) on January 30, 2004. Second Vice President: Lourdes MENDOZA del Solar (Peruvian Aprista Party); elected in second-round balloting on June 4, 2006, and sworn in on July 28 for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding David WAISMAN (Peru Possible). President of the Council of Ministers: (Prime Minister): Jorge Alphonso Alejandro DEL CASTILLO G´alvarez (Peruvian Aprista Party); appointed by the president on July 28, 2006, and sworn in the same day, succeeding Pedro Pablo KUCZYNSKI (Peru Possible).

´ Galliani, conservative Gen. Guillermo ARBULU following the declaration of a state of emergency to cope with rioting occasioned by a series of austerity measures.

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Gen. Oscar MOLINA Pallochia was designated to succeed Arbul´u Galliani after the latter’s retirement in January 1978, while on June 18, in Peru’s first nationwide balloting in 15 years, a 100member Constituent Assembly was elected to draft a new constitution. The Assembly completed its work in July 1979, paving the way for presidential and congressional elections in May 1980, at which Bela´unde Terry’s Acci´on Popular scored an impressive victory. By 1985 economic conditions had plummeted, yielding massive inflation, underemployment estimated to encompass 60 percent of the workforce, and negative growth in GNP per capita. Even the Christian People’s Party, the AP’s right-wing partner, had indicated that it was “profoundly worried” at implementation of the government’s public investment program as well as by lack of success in quelling insurgency by Sendero Luminoso guerrillas (see Political Parties and Groups, below) in the southern department of Ayacucho. As a result, the AP was decisively defeated in the election of April 14, Alva Orlandini running fourth behind APRA’s Alan GARC´IA P´erez; Alfonso BARRANTES Ling´an, the popular Marxist mayor of Lima; and Luis BEDOYA Reyes, of the recently organized Democratic Convergence (Conde). APRA fell marginally short of a majority in the presidential poll, but second-round balloting was avoided by Barrantes’s withdrawal, and Garc´ıa was sworn in on July 28 as, at age 36, the youngest chief executive in Latin America. In May 1986 the Garc´ıa administration reversed an earlier position and agreed to pay IMF arrears, but after unilaterally rolling over repayment of approximately $940 million in short-term debt, the country was cut off from further access to IMF resources. Concurrently, intense negotiations were launched with the country’s more than 270 foreign creditor banks to secure 15- to 20-year refinancing on the basis of a medium-term economic program intended to reduce the country’s dependence on food imports and restructure Peruvian industry, in a manner reminiscent of the Inca Plan, toward basic needs and vertical integration. The audacious effort was buoyed by short-term evidence of

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recovery. Aided by the upswing, APRA secured an unprecedented 53 percent of the vote at municipal elections in November 1986, winning 18 of 24 departmental capitals. By mid-1987 the recovery had run its course, with increased inflationary pressure and a visible slackening of the 8.5 percent GDP growth registered in 1986. On June 29 Garc´ıa’s second vice president, Luis ALVA Castro, who had served additionally as prime minister, resigned the latter post in the wake of a well-publicized rivalry with the president, leaving economic policy in the hands of the chief executive and a group styled “the bold ones” (los audaces), who in late July announced that the state would assume control of the country’s financial system. Although bitterly condemned by the affected institutions and their right-wing political supporters, a somewhat modified version of the initial expropriation bill was promulgated in October. The action was followed by a return to triple-digit inflation, and in mid-December the government announced a currency devaluation of 39.4 percent. During 1988 virtually all efforts by President Garc´ıa to reverse the country’s plunge into fiscal chaos proved fruitless. An attempt at midyear to formulate an agreement (concertaci´on) between business and labor (and subsequently with rightist and leftist political opponents) elicited scant response, and in September the administration introduced a “shock program” that included a 100 percent currency devaluation, a 100–200 percent increase in food prices, and a 120-day price freeze in the wake of a 150 percent increase in the minimum wage. However, the inflationary surge continued, necessitating a further 50 percent devaluation and the appointment in December of the government’s fifth finance minister in less than four years. On several occasions there was evidence of Garc´ıa’s desire to abandon the presidency, including indications that he might not be adverse to military intervention—a prospect that the armed forces, with no apparent solution to the nation’s problems within their grasp, seemed unwilling to implement.

Events continued on an erratic course during 1989. The leftist alliance virtually collapsed, with the popularity of the fledgling right-wing contender, novelist Mario VARGAS Llosa, far outdistancing that of its leading aspirant, Barrantes Ling´an, by early May. Despite a clear lead in opinion polls for most of the year-long campaign, Vargas Llosa failed to gain a majority at presidential balloting on April 8, 1990, and was defeated in a runoff on June 10 by a late entrant, Alberto Keinya FUJIMORI, of the recently organized Change 90 (Cambio 90) movement. Assuming office on July 28, 1990, Fujimori startled both domestic and foreign observers by a series of initiatives that were at once wide-ranging and controversial. He installed a supporter of Vargas Llosa, Juan Carlos HURTADO Miller, as both prime minister and finance minister, and embarked on an austerity program that was not only at variance with his campaign promises, but more severe than that advocated by his opponent. His cabinet included two active-duty army officers (appointed after the virtually unprecedented cashiering of both the air force and navy commanders), three leftwingers (one of whom resigned in late October), and a number of independents. He instituted corruption proceedings against 700 members of the judiciary, discharged 350 police officers, and publicly disagreed with the United States on antidrug policy (insisting on free-market enticement of farmers away from coca production rather than crop eradication). By mid-November his audacity had reaped visible benefits: the army appeared to be a staunch ally; triple-digit monthly inflation had eased dramatically; a near-empty treasury had been replenished with reserves of about $500 million; payment on portions of the foreign debt had been resumed; and in his attitude toward the church and judiciary, Fujimori, according to a Washington Post report, had “taken positions that [struck] a chord in a society long disenchanted with institutional failures.” In April 1991 the Sendero Luminoso launched a new wave of guerrilla attacks, and Fujimori felt obliged to replace his interior minister, Gen. Adolfo

PERU

ALVARADO, whose anti-insurgency policies had drawn increasing criticism. Concurrently, the administration announced that it planned a fourfold increase in the number of its rural self-defense patrols (rondas campesinas) while moving to establish similar units in urban areas (rondas urbanes civiles). In June 1991 Congress granted the president emergency powers to deal with the escalating guerrilla activity as well as drug-related terrorism, and in July Fujimori felt obliged to reverse himself and conclude an antidrug accord with the United States. On April 5, 1992, after what appeared to have been extensive consultation with the military, Fujimori seized extraconstitutional power in a dramatic self-coup (autogolpe). Announcing the formation of an Emergency Government of National Reconstruction, the president dissolved Congress, launched a reorganization of the judicial and penal systems, and declared that he would take “drastic action” against both the Sendero Luminoso and drug traffickers. In response to the coup a number of senior officials resigned, with Education Minister Oscar DE LA PUENTE Raygada being named prime minister. On November 13, three retired army generals who had served in the military household of the Garc´ıa administration mounted an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Fujimori and hand over the presidency to First Vice President M´aximo SAN ´ Caceras. ROMAN With most major opposition groups as nonparticipants, Fujimori supporters captured a majority of seats in balloting on November 22, 1992, for a Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD), which was charged with drafting a new basic law. Earlier, the president had indicated that the CCD would not be superseded by a democratically constituted successor in April 1993, as initially announced, but would remain in office for the duration of his term (that is, to mid-1995). Municipal elections (postponed from October 1992) were, however, held on February 7, 1993, with both the regime and the traditional parties losing ground to locally based independent movements.

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Meanwhile, on September 12, 1992, Peru’s most celebrated outlaw, Sendero Luminoso leader ´ Reinoso, was capManuel Abimael GUZMAN tured in Lima after a 12-year national search. On October 17 five other members of the organization’s Central Committee were also apprehended, offering hope that the antirebel campaign might be drawing to a conclusion. Approval of the new constitution in December 1993 made it possible for Fujimori to present himself as a candidate for reelection in 1995. Given the success of his economic policies, he appeared to be an odds-on favorite before indications in early ´ 1994 that he might be opposed by Javier PEREZ de Cu´ellar. Initially, polls showed the former UN secretary general leading Fujimori, but by not announcing his candidacy until late August, Perez de Cu´ellar gradually fell behind by about 15 percentage points. With an ease that reportedly surprised the incumbent himself, Fujimori won nearly two-thirds of the valid votes at presidential balloting on April 9, 1995. Equally surprising was the showing of his ruling coalition (Cambia 90–Nueva Mayor´ıa), which won 67 of 120 congressional seats on a 51.5 percent of the vote, humbling the leading “traditional” parties, none of whom surpassed the 5 percent threshold needed to retain legal registration. Growing concern about Peru’s economic future, stemming in part from a proposed privatization of the state oil company, Petroper´u, led to a decline in the president’s popularity to 60 percent by late February 1996. On May 31 Petroper´u was formally put up for sale, with the president’s rating reportedly dropping to less than 56 percent shortly thereafter. Nevertheless, the Congress on August 23 paved the way for Fujimori to stand for a third term by voting, after a heated debate, that his initial incumbency was excluded from an existing two-term limit since it began under the previous constitution. On December 17, 1996, about 25 members of the T´upac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA, below) stormed a reception at the Japanese embassy in Lima, taking nearly 600 guests

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prisoner. In the course of intense negotiations all but 83 were released by the end of the month. However, Fujimori rejected concessions in the form of economic policy changes and the release and safe passage out of the country of imprisoned MRTA members. As a result, the siege continued for 126 days, the longest in Latin American history, ending with an assault on the complex by Peruvian commandos April 22, 1997, during which all of the rebels were killed. In the wake of the crisis Fujimori’s popularity, which had crested at 70 percent, plummeted to a low of 27 percent, in part because of a move by the government-controlled Congress to dismiss three members of the Constitutional Tribunal who had voted against the president’s bid to seek a third term; by midyear his popularity had declined even further because of unsubstantiated charges that Fujimori had been born in Japan, rather than in Peru, as had long been alleged. On June 4, 1998, Alberto PANDOLFI Arbul´u resigned as prime minister and, somewhat surprisingly, was succeeded by Javier VALLE Riestra, a prominent defender of human rights who had publicly opposed Fujimori’s reelection. Punctuated by clashes with military and governmental hard-liners, Valle Riestra’s tenure lasted only two months, his predecessor, Pandolfi Arbul´u, being reinvested as prime minister on August 21. Pandolfi Arbul´u again resigned on January 4, 1999, V´ıctor JOY WAY Rojas, the president of Congress and a trusted Fujimori lieutenant, being named his successor. The cabinet resigned en masse on April 14 after the new labor and social promotion minister charged that corruption was rife in the customs system. Many of the ministers were reappointed the following day, although the one who made the accusations and four of his “technocrat” colleagues did not return. On October 8 Joy Way stepped down as prime minister to stand for reelection to Congress and was succeeded by Alberto BUSTAMANTE Bela´unde. In late December 1999 the National Election Board accepted Fujimori’s argument that he was not bound by the two-term limit because he had assumed office before adoption of the current con-

stitution. In mid-March 2000, despite remarkable polling gains, the leading opposition candidate, Alejandro TOLEDO Manrique, threatened to withdraw from presidential contention because of anticipated fraud. However, he remained in the race and at first-round balloting on April 8 was officially credited with a vote share of 40.3 percent, as contrasted with 49.8 for the incumbent. Unable to secure postponement of the runoff scheduled for May 28, Toledo pulled out, urging his followers to abstain. The appeal was only partially successful: Fujimori won 50.3 percent in the “uncontested” second poll and Toledo 16.2 percent, with 32.5 percent of the ballots nullified. The concluding months of 2000 yielded a remarkable turnabout in Peruvian politics. On September 16 a videotape surfaced that allegedly showed Fujimori’s intelligence chief, Vladimiro MONTESINOS, offering a bribe to an opposition member of Congress. Two days later, Fujimori announced that he would call for a new presidential poll, at which he would not stand as a candidate. Collaterally, defections from Fujimori’s Peru 2000 coalition cost him his legislative majority. On September 25 Montesinos flew to Panama, and on October 12 the government ordered that the National Intelligence Service be disbanded. On November 20 Fujimori, who had taken up residence in Japan, tendered his resignation. However, the Congress countered with a declaration that the office was vacant because the president had become “morally unfit.” Meanwhile, both the first and second vice presidents had resigned, and on November 22 the recently installed congressional president, Valent´ın PANIAGUA Corazo, was sworn in as interim chief executive. On November 23, a new cabinet took office with Javier P´erez de Cu´ellar as prime minister. In the first-round presidential poll of April 8, 2001, Toledo again failed to secure a majority but went on to defeat former president Alan Garc´ıa P´erez by a narrow margin (53.1 percent to 46.9 percent) in a runoff on June 3. Subsequently, he ˜ named Roberto DANINO to head a cabinet composed, with one exception, of members from his

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Peru Possible grouping, which had won a plurality of 45 legislative seats in April. On July 12, 2002, with the government ministers divided over privatization policy, Toledo shuffled the cabinet, replacing Da˜nino with Luis SOLARI de la Fuente. Solari lasted until June 2003, after widespread public disturbances in the wake of a teachers’ strike had led Toledo to proclaim a state of emergency. He was succeeded by Beatrix MERINO Lucero, a highly popular and seemingly incorruptible tax lawyer, who held office for only six months before succumbing to a whispering campaign that involved rumors of influence peddling as well as supposed homosexuality. She was followed on December 15 by Carlos FERRERO Costa, who, after having served as president of Congress, became Toledo’s fourth prime minister in 30 months. In the wake of ordinances by two regional governors legalizing coca cultivation, Ferrero himself resigned on August 11, 2005, and was succeeded by Economy Minister Pedro Pablo KUCZYNSKI. The Toledo presidency was characterized by relative social peace and higher economic growth rates than Peru had seen since the 1970s. The president himself, however, consistently rated among Latin America’s least popular; Toledo spent many of his years in office with an approval rating at or below 20 percent. The president’s inner circle was hit by corruption allegations, while poll respondents generally regarded Toledo as lacking a work ethic as well as an awareness of voters’ priorities. Leading the list of these concerns were corruption, steadily rising crime rates, and frustration with the unequal distribution of wealth generated by recent economic growth. Discontent was plainly visible in the 2006 presidential campaign. The candidate who most closely identified herself with Toledo’s policies, conservative one-time front-runner Lourdes FLORES Nano, finished third in first-round balloting on April 9. The first-round winner was Ollanta HUMALA, an intensely nationalistic retired army officer, who led the field with 30.6 percent of the vote. Humala, however, was defeated (44.5 to 55.4 percent) by former president Garc´ıa in a runoff

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on June 4. Nonetheless, Humala’s Union for Peru (UPP) won a plurality (45 of 120) of legislative seats. Five months later, on November 19, 2006, Garc´ıa’s Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP) was trounced in municipal and regional elections, winning only 2 (down from 12) of the country’s 25 regional governments. The PAP also failed to unseat ˜ Lima mayor Luis CASTANEDO Lossio of the National Unity (UN) coalition. The only consolation the PAP could take from the voting was that no other party fared better, including Humala’s UPP/PNP, which failed to win a single regional presidency. “Independent” candidates, many of them powerful local political bosses, won 20 of the regional presidencies, along with 112 of 195 provinces.

Constitution and Government On December 29, 1993, the “Fujimori constitution,” which had been approved by a slim 52.2 percent in an October 31 referendum, came into effect. The principal departures from its 1979 predecessor were supersession of the former bicameral legislature by a unicameral body and the lifting of a ban on presidential reelection. (Although the new basic law provided for only one five-year renewal, it was subsequently argued that Fujimori’s incumbency could extend to 2005, as his previous election was under the old constitution.) In addition, the president’s authority was significantly enhanced, including the redesignation of control over military appointments as an executive rather than a legislative prerogative. The death penalty was restored for convicted terrorists, although assumed not to be applicable to persons currently incarcerated, while a number of social amenities were abolished, including free university education and a right to job security. In April 2003 Congress overwhelmingly endorsed restoration of the country’s two-chamber legislature, composed of a 150-member lower house and a 50-member Senate. It was argued that the lower chamber would cater to the interests of the various departments and the upper would

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focus on issues of national concern. The action was never implemented; in 2005 Toledo tried to restore the Senate but lacked the necessary two-thirds majority. In mid-2007 the legislature’s constitutional committee approved a proposal to leave the lower house at 120 members and add a 50-member Senate. This proposal enjoyed broader support and was expected to pass. The country’s judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and includes 18 district courts, in addition to a nine-member Constitutional Court and a National Council for the judiciary. In March 1987 President Garc´ıa promulgated legislation that divided the country’s 25 departments into 12 regions, each with an assembly of provincial mayors, popularly elected representatives, and delegates of various institutions.

Foreign Relations Peruvian foreign policy stresses protection of its sovereignty and its natural resources. After the 1968 coup, the military government expanded contacts with Communist countries, including the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and Cuba. Its relations with neighboring states, though troubled at times by frequent regime changes, are generally equable, apart from a traditional suspicion of Chile and a long-standing border dispute with Ecuador that yielded overt conflict in January– February 1981 and a renewed flare-up in late January 1995, when its neighbor charged Peru with “launching a massive offensive.” The latter gave way to a cease-fire on February 13, after a Peruvian announcement that it had recaptured the last Ecuadorian outpost on its territory, and to another on March 1, following a brief, but intense, resumption of fighting. On July 26 the two countries agreed to demilitarize more than 200 square miles of the disputed territory, while President Fujimori attended a Rio Group (Grupo de Rio) summit in Quito, Ecuador, in September, during which he surprised observers by extending an unofficial invitation to Ecuadorian President Sixto Dur´an-Ball´en to visit Peru.

Renewed tension erupted in late 1995 when Lima learned that Ecuador was about to take delivery of four K-Fir military aircraft from Israel in a deal endorsed by the United States, despite its role as a guarantor of the 1942 Rio Protocol. Subsequently, a symbolic frontier embrace by the chairmen of the two countries’ joint chiefs of staff, plus two meetings of their foreign ministers, yielded an agreement to hold a series of confidencebuilding talks during the second half of 1996. However, formal settlement was set back by a Peruvian announcement that it had agreed to purchase 12 Russian-built MIG-29 fighters, with Ecuador expressing concern over a budding “arms race.” Hopes for peace were again raised in January 1997 by a three-day visit to Peru by Abdal´a Bucaram— the first by an Ecuadorian head of state—at the conclusion of which Bucaram invited Fujimori to make his fourth visit to Ecuador. A seemingly more definitive event was an agreement reached in Rio de Janeiro on January 19, 1998, on a timetable for a peace treaty. The accord called for the establishment of four commissions dealing with major aspects of the controversy, including one centering on the thorniest issue: border demarcation. The lengthy dispute was formally settled with a “global and definitive” accord signed by Fujimori and his Ecuadorian counterpart in Bras´ılia on October 26, 1998. While the disputed territory was awarded to Peru, control (but not sovereignty) of the principal town of Tiwintza, in addition to a corridor from the border, was assigned to Ecuador, which was also granted free navigation along the Amazon and the right to establish two port facilities within Peruvian territory. Provision was also made for linkup between the two countries’ electrical grids and oil pipelines. The two presidents attended a ceremony marking ceremonial resolution of the controversy on May 13, 1999. On June 1, 2007, President Garcia met Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa in the northern Peruvian town of Tumbes. Garcia said that Peru had “no territorial or maritime claim to make with Ecuador,” and Correa described relations as the “best . . . in the history of the two countries.”

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Long-standing differences with Chile were largely resolved in November 1999 during a state visit by Fujimori to Santiago (the first by a Peruvian leader since the war of the Pacific in 1879– 1883). However, a new flare-up occurred in early 2004 with the killing by Chilean marines of a Peruvian national after Chile had heightened border security against illegal immigrants seeking Chilean employment. Relations chilled further in November 2005, when the Peruvian Congress passed a bill claiming sovereignty over 15,000 square miles of Pacific waters controlled by Chile. The maritime border dispute appears likely to go to the World Court in The Hague. From the opposition, Ollanta Humala has been very vocal on this issue. In addition, since 2005 Lima had been frustrated by its inability to secure the extradition of former president Fujimori, who had been arrested in Chile in November 2005 after his return from Japan to seek recovery of the Peruvian presidency. Under house arrest, Fujimori’s fate was determined by Chile’s Supreme Court, which heard his case in August 2007 and extradited him to Peru on September 22, based on 7 of the original 13 charges. Peru’s relations with Venezuela have been particularly troubled since the 2006 presidential campaign, when the Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez was widely accused of interference in internal affairs with his vocal endorsements of Humala. Opponents alleged that Humala’s campaign was receiving financial support from Caracas, which he denied. The two countries recalled their ambassadors in April 2006, only to restore them in March 2007 amid a general relaxing of enmity. Peruvian sensitivity to perceived Venezuelan meddling has remained high, however. Strong concerns have been raised about the opening of offices of the Venezuelan-supported ALBA movement (Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America) in several regions of Peru. Following a devastating earthquake in the southern Pisco region in August 2007, the appearance among relief supplies of tuna cans bearing Chavez’s and Humala’s likenesses caused an uproar. The Venezuelan government denied any knowledge of the cans’ origin.

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Relations with the United States have been strained by recurrent controversies over the expropriation of U.S. businesses, the seizure of U.S. fishing boats accused of violating Peru’s territorial waters, and the degree of U.S. involvement in combating the narcotics trade. The perils of the interdiction effort were vividly illustrated in April 2001 by a Peruvian jet’s downing of a civilian aircraft carrying U.S. missionaries, after a CIA-contracted surveillance plane had mistakenly identified it as engaged in drug smuggling. Two of the occupants, a woman and her infant daughter, were killed in the attack. International attention has also been drawn to the case of a U.S. journalist, Lori BERENSON, who was convicted in 1996 of aiding the MRTA guerrillas. Initially sentenced to prison by a secret military court, Berenson was reconvicted by a civilian court in June 2001, with an appeal rejected by the Supreme Court in February 2002. In addition to continuing differences over the efficacy of Peru’s coca eradication effort, relations with the United States were jarred in August 2003, when the U.S. Export-Import Bank refused, on environmental grounds, to issue loan guarantees for a controversial trans-Amazon natural gas pipeline; however, in September the Inter-American Development Bank, with the U.S. representative abstaining, approved a loan package for the project, which was then 70 percent completed. Peru remains the world’s second-largest producer after Colombia of coca, the plant used to make cocaine. Police estimate that about thirty narco-trafficking organizations, most with ties to Mexican cartels, operate in Peru. Though U.S. and UN measurements have found coca cultivation in Peru to be increasing slightly since 2000, Washington has generally praised Lima’s commitment to eradication and interdiction. In May 2007, in part to placate the U.S. government, President Garc´ıa fired his agriculture minister, Juan Jos´e SALAZAR, who had taken a conciliatory attitude toward the country’s organized coca-growers’ organizations who, like their counterparts in Bolivia, wish to see eradication replaced by assistance in marketing the leaf for legal purposes.

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President Garc´ıa has sought to court the favor of the U.S. government, even presenting himself as a pro-American alternative to Venezuelan Ch´avez and his regional allies. Garc´ıa has traveled to the United States on several occasions to urge the Democratic Party leadership in the U.S. Congress to ratify a free trade agreement that President George W. Bush and the Toledo government signed in April 2006. Top Democrats have indicated that the Peru FTA is likely to be approved by the U.S. Senate before the 2007 legislative session ends.

Current Issues The return of Alan Garc´ıa to the Peruvian presidency was surprising, in view of the disastrous outcome of his previous incumbency. Equally surprising was the emergence of Ollanta Humala as his principal rival. Humala, who sought to emulate the success of Evo Morales, his ethnically based Bolivian counterpart, had difficulty in distancing himself from the shadow of Hugo Ch´avez, while Garc´ıa’s victory would not have been possible without the support of the third-ranked contender, Lourdes Flores. Overall, Garc´ıa won only 9 departments, compared to his opponent’s share of 15, although most of the latter were in the impoverished central and southern highlands, where Humala had hoped to launch his “great transformation.” Significantly, Keiko FUJIMORI, the daughter of the former president, won election to Congress in 2006, winning more votes than any other candidate. Even as the ex-president neared an extradition decision in Santiago, Garc´ıa’s Aprista bloc entered into what some regarded to be an “unofficial alliance” with the pro-Fujimori political movements. Fujimori’s Alliance for the Future Party was the only one to join in Garc´ıa’s failed attempt, in late 2006 and early 2007, to institute the death penalty in terrorism cases. Human rights defenders argued that both political blocs wished to use the measure to force Peru’s exit from the Inter-American Human Rights Court, a body of the Organization of American States (OAS) that, on two occasions, has required the Peruvian government to pay damages

to the relatives of massacred Shining Path guerrillas and sympathizers. The PAP and pro-Fujimori blocs also collaborated in late 2006 on controversial legislation that placed strict regulations on the financing and activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). During his first year in office Garcia’s approval ratings consistently hovered around 50 percent. He commanded greater popularity in coastal and urban areas, as opposed to the highlands and countryside where Humala scored his greatest electoral successes in 2006. Public security became a principal topic of concern in 2007; in April an Apoyo poll of citizens residing in Peru’s four largest cities found 92 percent believed that common crime had increased in the previous year. Meanwhile, remnants of Shining Path and other narco-criminal gangs were responsible for sporadic acts of violence in the countryside, including ambushes that killed police and coca-leaf regulation officials in December 2006 and April 2007. In April 2007 President Garc´ıa chose a hard-line response to disputes with coca farmers in the highlands, who had organized strikes and blockades to protest the forcible eradication of their crops. With much of the chamber abstaining on April 26, 2007, the Congress gave the president the authority to rule by decree on issues relating to drug trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime. Human rights defenders assailed the decrees, which included a prohibition on local officials participating in strikes and an automatic pardon for security personnel who injure or kill strikers while “fulfilling their duty.” On August 15, 2007, an 8.0 magnitude earthquake devastated a region in southern Peru centered on the city of Pisco, killing more than 500 people. President Garc´ıa received high marks for his personal, highly visible response to the disaster, though many voiced discontent at the confused, improvised nature of the rescue and rebuilding efforts he was leading.

Political Parties and Groups Most of the political parties active before the 1968 coup were of comparatively recent vintage,

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the principal exception being the Peruvian affiliate of APRA (PAP, below), which was alternately outlawed and legalized beginning in the early 1930s. While failing to capture the presidency until 1985, it contributed to the success of other candidates and was the nucleus of a powerful opposition coalition that controlled both houses of Congress during Bela´unde’s 1963–1968 presidency. During the decade after 1968, the status of the parties fluctuated, many being permitted a semilegal existence while denied an opportunity to engage in electoral activity. Most, except those of the extreme left, were allowed to register before the Constituent Assembly election of June 1978, with further relaxation occurring before the presidential and legislative balloting of May 1980, in which 20 groups participated. By contrast, only 9 groups presented candidates in 1985, with the PAP, the IU, the Democratic Convergence, and the AP collectively capturing 96.9 percent of the valid votes. Virtually all of the major opposition parties either boycotted or failed to qualify for the Democratic Constituent Congress election of November 22, 1992, at which the regime-supportive C-90– NM won a majority of seats, with the remainder scattered among eight other parties. Subsequent elections were held in 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2006, with 24 parties or party coalitions participating on the latter occasion.

Presidential Party Peruvian Aprista Party (Partido Aprista Peruano—PAP). The PAP was launched in 1930 as the Peruvian affiliate of the region-wide American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana—APRA), formed six years earlier in Mexico. APRA was initially a radical left-wing movement that attracted substantial mass support. Its Peruvian branch (also frequently referenced as APRA) was not legalized until 1945. Subsequently, it mellowed into a mildly left-ofcenter, middle-class grouping with a strong labor base. Despite long-standing antagonism between the PAP and the military, its principal figure, V´ıctor

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Ra´ul Haya de la Torre, was permitted to return from exile in 1969 and was designated president of the Constituent Assembly after the party had won a substantial plurality in the election of June 18, 1978. Following his death in August 1979, Haya de la Torre was succeeded as party leader by Armando Villanueva del Campo. Decisively defeated in the 1980 balloting, the party subsequently split into a left-wing faction headed by Villanueva and a right-wing faction headed by second vice-presidential candidate Andr´es TOWNSEND Ezcurra, who was formally expelled from the party in January 1981 and later formed the Hayista Bases Movement (Movimiento de Bases Hayista—MBH). While he remained an influential party figure, Villanueva’s control of the organization ended in 1983, with the rise of Alan GARC´IA P´erez, a centrist, who in 1985 became the first Aprista leader to assume the presidency of the Republic. His widespread popularity was viewed as the principal reason for the party’s unprecedented sweep of municipal elections in November 1986. Unable to resolve the country’s burgeoning economic problems, Garc´ıa suffered a dramatic loss in popular support during 1988 and resigned the party presidency at a congress in late December, with the office itself being abolished. The delegates then voted to install his rival, former prime minister Luis Alva Castro, as general secretary. Alva Castro placed third in the 1990 presidential race. Following the 1992 coup, former president Garc´ıa was granted political asylum in Colombia, which in early 1993 rejected a request by the Fujimori government that he be extradited to face charges of personal enrichment while in office. Shortly thereafter the Aprista leadership stripped Garc´ıa of his position as secretary general, granting him the honorary title of “secretary general in exile.” It then proceeded to name a tripartite interim secretariat consisting of an alanista, former prime minister Villanueva; a Garc´ıa opponent, Alva Castro; and an “equidistant” chair, ´ Luis Alberto SANCHEZ S´anchez. However, this did not satisfy the more radical Generaci´on en

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Marcha “renewalist” and Nueva Generaci´on leaders, who pressed for a party plenum to elect new officials. In November 1993 Garc´ıa announced that he had applied for Colombian citizenship, and in August 1994, following the discovery of a secret Cayman Islands bank account in the name of a fugitive businessman to whom he was linked, he reportedly resigned from the party. However, Agustin MANTILLA Campos, elected secretary general in August 1994, and Mercedes Cabanillas, the party’s 1995 standard-bearer, were both alanistas. By plunging to less than 5 percent of the vote in April 1995, the party faced the loss of its registration and the humiliating need to collect 100,000 signatures in support of relegalization. It responded by appointing Germ´an PARRA Herrera as head of an “action command” charged with reorganizing the party. He later resigned in October, claiming that other party members were refusing to recognize the gravity of the crisis. The party leadership subsequently reverted to Alva Castro, assisted by a political commission. In early 2001 the Supreme Court revoked a sentence for corruption that had been passed against Garc´ıa in absentia, saying that the Statute of Limitations had run its course. The former president subsequently returned for a reelection bid, losing to Alejandro Toledo of Peru Possible (below) in the second-round poll of June 3. At the first-round presidential poll of April 19, 2006, Garc´ıa placed second with a 24.3 percent vote share but went on to defeat Ollanta Humala of the UPP (below) in a runoff on June 4. The PAP received the second-largest vote percentage in the 2006 legislative elections, with 20.6 percent of the total valid votes cast, only 0.6 percentage points behind the UPP. Its legislators hold 36 congressional seats. The PAP fared poorly in November 2006 municipal and regional elections, but the party maintained the presidency of Peru’s Congress in 2007, with support from the pro-Fujimori Alliance for the Future and Humala’s UPP. Leaders: Alan Gabriel Ludwig GARC´IA P´erez (Former and Current President of the Republic),

Mercedes CABANILLAS (President of Political Committee).

Other Legislative Parties Nationalist Union Party for Peru (Partido Nacionalista Uni´on por el Per´u—PNUP). The PNUP was launched by Ollanta Humala in late 2005 as a coalition of the two parties below. Thereafter, it was frequently referenced as the UPP or the UPP/PNP rather than the PNUP. Leader: Lt. Col. (Ret.) Ollanta HUMALA Tasso (2006 presidential candidate). Union for Peru (Uni´on por el Per´u—UPP). The UPP was formed as a campaign vehicle for Javier P´erez de Cu´ellar following the announcement by the former UN secretary general on August 18, 1994, that he would stand for the presidency in 1995. By capturing 21.8 percent of the vote on April 9 of that year, the UPP candidate ran a distant second to Fujimori. Although the party’s vote share plummeted to 0.3 percent in the presidential election of April 2000, P´erez de Cu´ellar was named prime minister in the Paniagua administration of November 2000. P´erez de Cu´ellar withdrew from the party following the designation of Humala as its 2006 standard-bearer. The UPP received the largest percentage of voting in 2006 legislative elections, with 21.2 percent of the total valid votes cast. In 2007 it controlled 45 seats in the 120person Congress. Leaders: Lt. Col. (Ret.) Ollanta HUMALA Tasso, Aldo Vladimiro ESTRADA Choque. Peru Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Peruano—PNP). The PNP is the political arm of the Eihnocacerista Movement (Movimiento Etnocacerista—ME), founded by former army major Antauro Humala, who participated in an abortive uprising against former President Fujimori. The ME is an openly racist, antiwhite formation claiming to reflect the Incan moral code of Marshal Andr´es CACERES, a hero of the 19th-century war with Chile. Antauro Humala is Ollanta’s (UPP) younger

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brother. It has grown distant from the UPP, which has been more moderate in its opposition to the Garc´ıa government. Leader: Maj. (Ret.) Antauro HUMALA Tasso. National Unity (Unidad Nacional—UN). Formed before the 2001 campaign as a coalition to support the presidential effort of Lourdes Flores Nano, the UN performed the same role in 2006. Although its candidate finished third on both occasions, she led the preelection polls in late 2005 and early 2006. The UN finished third in voting in the 2006 legislative elections, with 15.3 percent of total valid votes cast and 17 seats. It was the only party that made a strong showing in the November 2006 local elections, which heavily favored independent candidates. Lima Mayor Luis Casta˜neda Lossio of the PSN won reelection to a second term. The UN includes the two groups immediately below, plus the smaller National Renewal (Renovaci´on Nacional—RN). Leader: Lourdes FLORES Nano (2006 president candidate). Christian People’s Party (Partido Popular Cristiano—PPC). The PPC was formed in the wake of a 1967 split in the PDC (below), Luis Bedoya Reyes leading a conservative faction out of the parent group. The party was runner-up to the PAP in the Constituent Assembly election of June 1978 and placed third in the 1980 presidential and legislative races, after which it joined the Bela´unde government by accepting two ministerial appointments. For the 1985 balloting it formed an alliance with Townsend Ezcurra’s MBH styled the Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democr´atica—Conde), which secured 7 Senate and 12 Chamber seats. It participated in the 1990 campaign as a member of Fredemo, which won a plurality of one-third in each house of Congress. Initially endorsing its secretary general for the 1995 presidential race, it subsequently backed the UPP’s P´erez de Cu´ellar. In the congressional poll it won only 3 seats, none

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of which was retained in 2000. For the 2001 campaign it served as the core of the UN grouping that secured 15 congressional seats, while its leader, Lourdes Flores Nano, ran third, with 24 percent of the vote, in the presidential race. Led by Flores, the PPC again participated in the UN coalition in 2006, with Flores finishing third in the first round of presidential voting. Leaders: Lourdes FLORES Nano (President of the Party and 2001 and 2006 presidential candidate), Dr. Antero FLORES Ar´aoz (Former President of Congress and Former President of the Party). National Solidarity Party (Partido de Solidaridad Nacional—PSN). Formally registered in early 1999, the PSN served in 2000 as the vehicle for the presidential campaign of Lu´ıs Casta˜neda Lossio, former head of the social security system. During the 2001 campaign, Casta˜neda withdrew in favor of the UN’s Flores Nano. In October 2005 Casta˜neda announced he would not contend for the position in 2006. That year, he was easily reelected as mayor of Lima. ˜ Leader: Lu´ıs CASTANEDA Lossio (Mayor of Lima and 2000 presidential candidate). Alliance for the Future (Alianza por el Futuro—AF). The AF was formed in 2005 as a coalition of the two pro-Fujimori groups below, in anticipation that the former president’s effort to reenter the country and seek reelection as head of his party (see Si Cumple, below) would be denied. With 13.1 percent of all votes cast, the group won 13 legislative seats in 2006, including 1 by the former president’s daughter, Keiko, who received more votes than any other single legislative candidate. The AF bloc in the Peruvian Congress exerts power beyond its small size, as its cooperation is usually necessary in order to gain a majority. This power has made Alberto Fujimori’s extradition an uncomfortable topic for Peruvian politicians whose agendas at times require AF support. Leaders: Pablo CORREA (C90), Jaime ´ Yoshiyama TANAKA (NM), Martha CHAVEZ

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Cossio (NM, 2005 presidential candidate), Keiko FUJIMORI. (S´ı Cumple). Change 90 (Cambio 90—C90). Cambio 90 was organized before the 1990 campaign as a political vehicle for Alberto Fujimori. While Fujimori secured a majority of second-round presidential votes, C90 ran third in both upper and lower house legislative contests. Before the 1992 election it formed a coalition with the Nueva Mayor´ıa (below) that won a 55 percent majority of CCD seats on a vote share of 38 percent. In 1995 Fujimori was reelected with 64.3 percent of the vote, while the ruling coalition decimated the traditional parties by securing 51.4 percent of the valid ballots. For the 2000 balloting, C90 headed a coalition styled Per´u 2000, which included Vamos Vecino (under Si Cumple, below) and was credited with winning 52 of 120 congressional seats. It was reduced to 3 seats in 2001. Leader: Andr´es REGGIARDO Say´an. New Majority (Nueva Mayor´ıa—NM). The Nueva Mayor´ıa was launched in 1992 by a group of independents who presented a joint list with Cambio 90 for the 1992 and 1995 polls, participated in Per´u 2000, and remained allied with C90 in 2001. ´ Leader: Martha Gladys CHAVEZ Cossio. He Delivers (Si Cumple). Si Cumple was founded by former president Alberto Fujimori in 1998 as Vamos Vecino (Let’s Go Neighbor), adopting its current name in 2005. In 2000 the party joined with C90 and the NM in a Peru 2000 Alliance to support Fujimori’s reelection. In 2005 the group again joined with C90 and NM in an Aliaga S´ı Cumple, but the action was rejected by the National Jury of Elections, the other two groups contesting the 2006 poll as the Alliance for the Future (above). Leaders: Alberto FUJIMORI (Former President of the Republic, extradited to Peru and facing trial), Absal´on VASQUEZ, Carlos ORELLANA Quintanilla (Secretary General).

Center Front (Frente del Centro—FC). The FC was formed before the 2006 election as a coalition of the three groups below. Its candidates received 7.1 percent of votes cast in the 2006 legislative elections, winning five seats. Paniagua, well regarded for his tenure as interim president after Fujimori’s departure, died on October 16, 2006. As a temporary electoral alliance, the FC was formally dissolved after the 2006 elections. However, its legislative bloc remains united under the name Parliamentary Alliance (Alianza Parliamentaria). Leaders: Drago Guillermo KISIC Wagner; Alberto ANDRADE Carmona (2006 first vicepresidential candidate, SP); Gonz´alo AGUIRRE Arriz (2006 second vice-presidential candidate, CNI). Popular Action (Acci´on Popular—AP). ´ Founded by Fernando BELAUNDE Terry in 1956, the moderately rightist AP captured the presidency in 1963 and served as the government party until the 1968 coup. Democratic, nationalist, and dedicated to the extension of social services, AP sought to mobilize public energies for development on Peru’s terms. After the 1968 coup the party split, a mainstream faction remaining loyal to Bela´unde and another, headed by former vice president Edgardo SEONE Corrales, collaborating with the military junta. Bela´unde was returned to office in the 1980 election, winning 45.4 percent of the votes cast, while the AP captured 98 of 180 Chamber seats and 26 of 60 seats in the Senate. However, in a massive voter reversal, the party won only one provincial city in municipal elections in November 1983 and ran fourth in the 1985 balloting, obtaining only 10 Chamber and 5 Senate seats. The party supported Vargas Llosa for the presidency in 1990 as a member of the Democratic Front. A shadow of its former self, the AP won only 4 congressional seats in 1995, while its presidential candidate, Ra´ul Diez Canseco, drew a vote share of 1.6 percent. In April 2000 AP presidential candidate V´ıctor Andr´es Garc´ıa Bela´unde secured a minuscule 0.4 percent of the vote, while the party’s

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legislative representation dropped to three seats. It won an equal number in 2001. Bela´unde Terry died in June 2002. Popular Action candidates accounted for four of five seats won by the Center Front coalition in the 2006 legislative elections. Leaders: Fernando SCHWALB L´opez Aldana (Former First Vice President of the Republic), Victor Andr´es GARC´IA Bela´unde (President of the Party), Dr. Manuel ULLOA El´ıas (Former Prime Minister). We Are Peru (Somos Per´u). Somos Per´u is an outgrowth of the Somos Lima movement organized by former independent Alberto Andrade after his capture of the Lima mayorship in November 1995. The party’s supporters include some former members of the defunct right-wing Solidarity and Democracy (Solidaridad y Democracia—Sode), which had been led by Javier SILVA Ruete. In early 1999 Andrade led public opinion polls for the 2000 presidential election but dropped to a distant third in the balloting of April 2000. For the 2001 presidential poll, it joined with the CD in supporting the candidacy of Jorge Santistevan. Andrade is the only We Are Peru member of Peru’s Congress. Leaders: Alberto ANDRADE Carmona (2000 presidential candidate), Eduardo CARHUARICRA Meza (Secretary General). National Coordination of Independents (Coordinadora Nacional de Independientes— CNI). The CNI is a recently organized grouping of independents. The CNI failed to see any of its candidates elected to Peru’s Congress in 2006. Leaders: Drago Guillermo KISIC Wagner, Gonz´alo AGUIRRE Arriz. Peru Possible (Per´u Posible). Per´u Posible leader Alejandro Toledo entered the 1995 presidential race as organizer of a group styled Possible Nation (Pa´ıs Posible) that joined with the Democratic Coordination (Coordinadora Democr´atica—Code) in an alignment registered as Code–Pa´ıs Posible. The renamed formation was

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credited with a second-place legislative finish (29 seats) in 2000, Toledo himself withdrawing from the presidential runoff of May 28 because of anticipated fraud. He secured a 53.1 percent victory at second-round balloting on June 3, 2001. A group of Per´u Posible dissidents subsequently organized as Peru Now (Per´u Ahora). The party fared poorly in the 2006 elections; it decided to run no presidential candidate, and its candidates for the legislature received only 4.1 percent of votes cast, and captured only 2 seats. The party made a similarly poor showing in the 2006 municipal and regional elections. Leaders: David WAISMAN (Former Second Vice President of the Republic), Alejandro TOLEDO Manrique (Former President of the Republic), Luis SOLARI de la Fuente (Former Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Party). National Restoration (Restauracion Nacional—RN). The RN is a small formation led by evangelicals. It won two legislative seats in 2006, with 4.0 percent of votes cast. Its two members of Congress have joined with the Parliamentary Alliance legislative bloc, made up of legislators from the Center Front coalition. After a poor showing in 2006 local elections—during which several of the party’s few winning candidates were not from an evangelical background—the party has experienced internal turmoil, expelling leader Humberto LAY SUN in early 2007. No new leadership has clearly emerged.

Other Parties Participating in 2006 Election Independent Moralizing Front (Frente Independiente Moralizador—FIM). The FIM was launched before the 1995 election by Fernando Olivera, a former investigator for the state prosecutor’s office who had pursued a six-year crusade to bring former president Alan Garc´ıa to trial for alleged misdeeds while in office. The party won 6 congressional seats in 1995, 9 in 2000, and 11 in 2001. Olivera finished fourth, with 9.9 percent of the vote, in the 2001 presidential balloting. The party briefly endorsed Peru Possible candidates in

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2006, then chose to run its own candidates. Olivera ultimately dropped out of the presidential balloting in order to focus on the legislative campaign. Neither he nor other FIM candidates won any seats. Leader: Luis Fernando OLIVERA Vega (2001 presidential candidate). Decentralizing Coalition (Concertaci´on Decentralista—CD). The center-left CD was formed before the 2006 election as a coalition of the Party for Social (Partido por la Democracia Social– Compromiso Per´u) and the Peruvian Humanist Movement Party (Partido Movimiento Humanista Peruano—PMHP). The party has since been inactive. ´ Leader: Susana Mar´ıa del Carmen VILLARAN de la Puente (2006 presidential candidate). Democratic Force (Fuerza Democr´atica— FA). The FA was launched in 1998 to compete at the municipal level. It won a small number of local positions in 2006, mainly in Peru’s remote Amazon basin region. Leader: Alberto BOREA. Popular Agricultural Front of Peru (Frente Popular Agr´ıcola del Per´u—Frepap). In the 1995 election Frepap was known as the Peruvian Agricultural and Popular Front (Frente Agr´ıcola y Popular del Per´u—FAPP). It won two congressional seats in 2000 and none in 2001 or 2006. ´ Leader: Alfredo GALVEZ (2006 presidential candidate). Country Project (Proyecto Pais—PP). The PP is a “law and order” group founded in 1998 by Marco Antonio ARRUNATEGUI. Leader: Marco Antonio ARRUNATEGUI Cevallos (2001 and 2006 presidential candidate). Andean Renaissance (Renacimiento Andino —RA). The RA was launched in 2001 by Ciro Alfredo G´alvez, who won less than 1 percent of the vote that year. It withdrew from the 2006 presidential election in order to avoid drawing support from Lourdes Flores. ´ Leader: Ciro Alfredo GALVEZ Herrera (2001 and 2006 presidential candidate).

Socialist Party of Peru (Partido Socialista del Per´u—PSP). The PSP is a left-wing party organized in 1979. It ran in 1995 under an Opening for a National Development–Socialist Party (Apertura para el Desarrollo Nacional–Partido Socialista) list but won only 0.3 percent of the legislative vote. During the 1990s, PSP leader Javier Diez Canseco was a vigorous opponent of the Fujimori regime and, as a member of Congress, participated in investigations of alleged human rights violations by members of both the Shining Path and the Peruvian Armed Forces. Leaders: Javier DIEZ Canseco (2006 presidential candidate), Julio Sergio CASTRO Gomez. Also participating in the 2006 poll were the Alliance for Progress (Alianza para el Progresso— ˜ Peralta; the New Left APP), led by C´esar ACUNA Movement (Movimiento Nueva Izquierdo—MNI), led by Alberto MORENO; the With Force Peru (Con Fuerza Per´u—CFP), led by Pedro KOECHLIN Von Stein; the Democratic Reconstruction (Reconstrucci´on Democr´atica—RD); the Peruvian Resurgence (Resurgimiento Pervano—RP); the And It’s Called Peru (Y se llama Per´u); and the Let’s Make Progress Peru (Progresemos Per´u— PP).

Groups Not Competing in 2006 Not competing in 2006 were two minor groups that won single legislative seats in 2001: All for Victory (Todos por la Victoria—TV), led by Ricardo Manuel NORIEGA Salaverry and Mario MOLINA Almanza, and the Popular Solution ˜ (Soluci´on Popular—SP), led by Carlos BOLONA ´ Behr and Alfredo GONZALEZ Salazar.

Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso). The Sendero Luminoso (also translated as Luminous Path) originated at Ayacucho University as a small Maoist group led by a former philosophy instructor, Dr. Manuel Abimael Guzm´an Reinoso. During 1980 it was involved in a number of

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bombings in Lima, Ayacucho, Cuzco, and other provincial towns in southern Peru, causing property damage only. About 170 of its followers were arrested in October 1980 and January 1981, but most were freed in a daring raid on the Ayacucho police barracks in March 1982. Thereafter, guerrilla activity in the region intensified, including the assassination of a number of local officials and alleged police informants. While the insurgency appeared to remain localized (apart from sporadic terrorist attacks in Lima), the government felt obliged to order a major sweep through the affected provinces by 1,500 military and police units at the end of the year. Subsequently, the rebellion showed no sign of diminishing, despite the imposition of military rule in the departments of Ayacucho, Apur´ımac, Huancavelica, Hu´anuco, and part of San Mart´ın. By late 1987 more than 10,000 deaths, on both sides, had been reported since the insurgency began, and the organization, estimated to encompass at least 3,000 members, had become increasingly active in urban areas. Its reputed second-in-command, Osman MOROTE Barrionuevo, was captured by Lima police in June 1988 and subsequently sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The insurgency intensified during 1989 as the nation’s economy approached collapse; however, its adherents were surprisingly unsuccessful in a campaign to limit participation at municipal elections in November. Guzm´an himself was captured in Lima on September 12, 1992, and sentenced by a secret military tribunal to life imprisonment, while his principal deputy, Edmundo Daniel Cox Beauzeville, was apprehended in August 1993. In January 1994 it was reported that Sendero Luminoso had split into two factions, one loyal to the imprisoned Guzm´an and another, styled the Red Path (Sendero Rojo), committed to continuing the rebellion under the leadership of Oscar Ram´ırez Durand (a.k.a. “Camarada Feliciano”). By March, however, nearly 4,100 alleged senderistas had surrendered under a 1992 “Repentance Law,” while a number of Ram´ırez’s lieutenants were apprehended during the ensuing three months. By midyear, while 66 of the country’s 155 provinces remained under a state of emergency, guerrilla

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activity was reported to be confined largely to three areas: some marginal districts of the capital, the highlands of Lima department, and the Huallaga valley jungle region. In August 1997 Sendero Luminoso guerrillas captured about 30 oil workers in a remote jungle area 200 miles east of Lima; two days later the hostages were released after their French-based employer sent supplies of food, medicine, and clothing. The deputy leader of Sendero Rojo, Pedro Domingo QUINTEROS Ayll´on (a.k.a. “Camarada Luis”), was captured in April 1998, while the senior military leader, Juan Carlos RIOS, was arrested in December, by which time the grouping was described as “largely impotent” as the result of the government’s campaign. Ram´ırez Durand, the formation’s last major leader, was captured in July 1999 and sentenced to life imprisonment. More recently, bomb attacks in March 2002, preceding a visit to Lima by U.S. President Bush, were attributed to a Shining Path faction, while renewed Sendero activity was reported from mid-2003 onward by what appeared to be drastically depleted guerrilla units. In November 2004 a retrial of Guzm´an and his lieutenants was launched, after a constitutional tribunal had overturned their original convictions on the ground that they should have been tried in a civilian rather than a military court. However, the proceedings collapsed when two of the three presiding judges stepped down because of involvement in earlier rulings, with a second retrial opening in Lima in September 2005. On October 13, 2006, Guzm´an and several lieutenants were sentenced to life in prison for “aggravated terrorism.” Sendero activity continued at a low level in late 2006 and early 2007, including two ambushes that took the lives of police and civilian coca-regulation authorities. Most analysts believe the group has less than 500 members and now depends almost entirely on the cocaine trade for its livelihood, both by protecting narco-traffickers and by engaging in the business directly. In November 2006 “Comrade Artemio,” whom the BBC identified as “the only active leader” of Sendero, offered a truce in

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exchange for amnesty, which the government did not accept. ´ Leaders: Dr. Manuel Abimael GUZMAN Reinoso (imprisoned), Edmundo Daniel COX Beauzeville (imprisoned), Margie Evelyn CLAVO Peralta (imprisoned), Oscar RAMIREZ Durand (Sendero Rojo, imprisoned). Tupac ´ Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario T´upac Amaru— MRTA). Launched in 1983 by Victor Polay Campos (a former college roommate of Peru’s centerleft president Alan Garc´ıa), the Marxist MRTA took its name from T´upac Amaru, an 18th-century Indian rebel who was killed by the Spaniards. The group was considered responsible for a number of bomb attacks in Lima in 1984, but it suspended guerrilla activity after Garc´ıa’s election in 1985 to give the new president an opportunity to carry out his pledges to address the needs of the nation’s poor. However, the MRTA terminated the “truce” in August 1986 and subsequently was accused of several assassinations and bombings in the late 1980s, having established ties with a number of other guerrilla movements in Latin America. (Although considered “less indiscriminate” than the Sendero Luminoso in its attacks, the MRTA was nevertheless reported to have earned the “undying enmity” of the Peruvian military because of the assassination of Defense Minister Gen. Enrique L´opez Albujar in 1989.) As was the case with many regional guerrilla groups, the MRTA appeared to lose strength concurrent with the demise of communism in the early 1990s. Polay, who had been arrested in February 1989 only to escape in a dramatic July 1990 jailbreak, was recaptured in June 1993 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The MRTA’s secondin-command, Miguel Rinc´on Rinc´on, was captured in November 1995. Also attracting attention at that time was the arrest of about 20 guerrillas on charges of plotting to invade the Peruvian Congress to take hostages. Lori Helene Berenson, a U.S. citizen, was charged with assisting in the plot and was sentenced in January 1996 to life imprisonment, her case subsequently drawing

international scrutiny to Peru’s notorious prison conditions. By mid-1996 some observers considered the MRTA “close to annihilation” and possibly open to a negotiated settlement that might permit it to join the legal political process. However, in December a group of T´upac Amaru rebels took control of the home of the Japanese ambassador in Lima during a formal reception, seizing more than 600 hostages. The MRTA’s demands included the release of Polay, said to be confined in “tomb-like” conditions, and more than 400 other members in Peruvian jails as well as a number of rebels in Bolivian custody since the 1995 kidnapping of a Bolivian businessman. The MRTA remained in control of the ambassador’s residence until government forces stormed the facility on April 22, 1997 (see Political background, above). In September 2003 Polay Campos issued a statement conceding that the MRTA had been defeated and urging his supporters “to continue our struggle using the democratic paths.” Subsequently, in March 2005 he and Rincon were sentenced in a civilian retrial of their cases to 32 years’ imprisonment. Leaders: V´ıctor POLAY Campos and Miguel RINCON Rinc´on (imprisoned in Peru), Juan Carlos CABALLERO Vel´asquez (imprisoned in Bolivia).

Legislature The bicameral Congress (Congreso), established under the 1979 constitution, encompassed a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, both elected for five-year terms by universal adult suffrage. The Congress elected in 1990 was declared by President Fujimori to have been dissolved, as of April 6, 1992. In its place a unicameral Democratic Constituent Congress (Congreso Constituyente Democr´atico— CCD) was established, elections to which were conducted on November 22, 1992. The CCD gave way, in turn, to a new unicameral Congress elected on April 9, 1995. Subsequent elections were held on April 9, 2000, on April 8, 2001 (following a premature dissolution), and on April 9, 2006.

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Cabinet As of September 1, 2007 President of Council of Ministers

Jorge Alphonso Alejandro Del Castillo G´alvez (PAP)

Ministers Agriculture Defense Economy and Finance Education and Culture Energy and Mines Foreign Relations Foreign Trade and Tourism Housing, Construction, and Sanitation Interior Justice Labor and Employment Production Public Health Transport and Communications Women’s Affairs and Social Development

Ismael Benavides Ferreyros (AP) Allan Wagner (ind.) Luis Carranza (ind.) Jos´e Chang (ind.) Juan Valdivia (PAP) Jos´e Antonio Garc´ıa Belaunde (ind.) Mercedes Ar´aoz (ind.) [f] Hern´an Garrido Lecca (PAP) Luis Alva Castro (PAP) Mar´ıa Zavala (ind.) [f] Susana Pinilla (ind.) [f] Rafael Rey (PRN) Carlos Vallejos (ind.) Ver´onica Zavala (ind.) [f] Virginia Borra (PAP) [f]

[f] = female

Congress (Congreso). The present Congress has 120 members, who, before 2001, were selected by proportional vote from a single national list but now represent geographic constituencies. The composition of the Congress after the 2006 balloting was as follows: Union for Peru, 45 seats; Peruvian Aprista Party, 36; National Unity, 17; Alliance for the Future, 13; Center Front, 5; National Restoration, 2; Peru Possible, 2. President: Mercedes CABANILLAS.

Communications In the decade following the 1968 coup, the government assumed control of most media; it confiscated Lima’s seven leading newspapers and redesignated each as spokesperson for an “organized sector of the community.” In July 1980 President Bela´unde announced return of the newspapers to their former owners, who were subsequently

awarded partial recompensation for their financial losses. Safety for members of the media has been a recent concern. Reporters without Borders (RSF) reported that 100 journalists had been attacked in Peru from September 2006 to September 2007, with observers charging that the government was complicit in repressing its critics.

Press The following are published daily in Lima, unless otherwise noted: Ojo (150,000), proPPC conservative; El Comercio (120,000 daily, 220,000 Sunday), pro-PPC conservative; Extra (80,000), evening edition of Expreso; El Expreso (75,000), progovernment conservative; La Rep´ublica (50,000), left-wing; El Correo (Arequipa, 40,000); La Industria (Chiclayo, 30,000); El Peruano (27,000), official government publication; Unidad (20,000), PCP weekly.

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News Agencies There is a government facility, the Andean News Agency (Agencia de Noticias Andina); numerous foreign agencies maintain bureaus in Lima.

Broadcasting and Computing The government’s Radio y Televisi´on Peruana operates several dozen radio and television stations. The overwhelming majority of the more than 1,300 radio and television outlets are, however, privately owned. There were approximately 4.7 million television receivers in Peru in 2003. In 2005 there were 100 personal computers and 165 Internet users per 1,000 Peruvian residents. In that same

year there were 200 mobile cellular subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Felipe ORTIZ DE ZEVALLOS Madueno U.S. Ambassador to Peru: Peter Michael MCKINLEY Permanent Representative to the UN: Jorge VOTO-BERNALES IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ALADI, APEC, CAN, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

S T. K I T T S A N D N E V I S FE D E R A T I O N

OF

SAINT KITTS

NEVIS

AND

Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis

Note: Both versions of the name are official, although “Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis” is preferred.

The Country Conventionally styled St. Kitts-Nevis, Saint Christopher and Nevis form part of the northern Leeward Islands group of the Eastern Caribbean. The population is largely of African descent and the religion primarily Anglican. The economy is dependent on tourism, with several hotels currently under construction; agriculture on the large island is devoted primarily to sugarcane and its derivatives, and on Nevis to coconuts and vegetables. Recent economic planning has focused on the promotion of small-scale local industry and agricultural diversification to reduce the islands’ dependence on food imports and fluctuating sugar prices, which by 1983 had fallen to less than half the cost of local production. Subsequently, both sugar and tourist income rose substantially, with overall GNP growth from 1985 to 1992 averaging 5.3 percent per annum, then declining steadily to 2.0 percent in 1995 with higher rates of 4.8 in 1996 and 3.0 in 1997. In October 1993 Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds reported that because of the health of its economy St. Kitts-Nevis was being “graduated” from concessionary loan financing by the World Bank, with future loans to be at commercial rates; on the other hand, the islands were dealt serious blows by Hurricane Lu´ıs (September 1995) and Hurricane George (September 1998), which caused damage estimated at $100 million and $450 million, respectively. GDP growth of 7.5 percent was reported for

2000, spurred by construction related to the tourism sector. However, the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 significantly depressed the tourism sector in St. Kitts-Nevis. Real GDP, also negatively affected by problems in the sugar industry, only grew 2.3 percent for 2001 before decelerating to 0.8 percent in 2002. Thereafter, GDP growth reached 7.3 percent in 2004 before falling

ST. KITTS AND NEVIS

Sadlers

VENEZUELA

Cayon

Sandy Point Town

St. Kitts

Car i bbean Sea

Basseterre

S T. K I T T S AND NEVIS e Th

Car i bbean S ea

0 0

4 Mi 4 Km

Charlestown

ws

rro

Na

Newcastle

Nevis

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S T. K I T T S A N D N E V I S

back to 4.1 percent in 2005 and registering 4.5 percent in 2006, with inflation hovering at 2.0 percent. In July 2005 the 300-year-old sugar industry closed down because of recurring losses; however, continued GDP growth in excess of 4.0 percent was projected for 2007 because of ongoing construction projects and activity related to the Cricket World Cup, which was scheduled for a number of regional venues, including St. Kitts.

Government and Politics Political Background Although one of the smallest territories of the West Indies, St. Kitts was Britain’s first colony in the region, settled in 1623. Ownership was disputed with France until 1783, when Britain acquired undisputed title in the Treaty of Versailles. The tripartite entity encompassing St. Kitts, Nevis, and the northern island of Anguilla entered the West Indies Federation in 1952 and was granted internal autonomy as a member of the West Indies Associated States in February 1967. Three months later Anguilla repudiated government from Basseterre and in 1976 was accorded a separate constitution that reconfirmed its status as a dependency of the United Kingdom (see United Kingdom: Related Territories). The parliamentary election of February 18, 1980, yielded the first defeat of the St. Kitts Labour Party (SKLP) in nearly three decades and the formation of a government under Dr. Kennedy A. SIMMONDS of the People’s Action Movement (PAM), with the support of the Nevis Reformation Party (NRP). Despite protests by the SKLP, which insisted that the coalition did not have an independence mandate, the Simmonds government issued a white paper on a proposed federal constitution in July 1982. A revised version of the document formed the basis of discussions in London the following December, was endorsed by the St. Kitts-Nevis House of Assembly in March 1983 and secured the approval of the British Parliament in early May. Formal independence followed on September 19.

The PAM/NRP coalition increased its legislative majority in the early election of June 21, 1984, the PAM winning six of eight seats on St. Kitts and the NRP capturing all three seats on Nevis; one of the NRP seats was lost on March 21, 1989. The election of November 29, 1993, yielded four seats each for the PAM and SKNLP (Nevis having been added to the opposition party’s name), with the NRP losing one of its remaining seats to its Nevis-based opponent, the Concerned Citizens’ Movement (CCM). After the CCM had refused to form a majority coalition with either the PAM or the SKNLP, the governor general on December 1 asked Simmonds to continue as head of a PAM-NRP minority government. On December 3 SKNLP leader Denzil DOUGLAS insisted that talks between himself and Simmonds had yielded agreement on a caretaker administration for a six-month period, after which a new election would be held. However, the prime minister subsequently accused his opponent of torpedoing the negotiations by announcing an accord before its finalization. Following an outbreak of what appeared to be drug-related crime in October 1994, political, religious, business, and labor leaders agreed at a “forum for national unity” on November 12 that all parties represented in the National Assembly would be permitted to participate in key government decisions and that the next general election would be held by November 1995, three years ahead of schedule. However, Prime Minister Simmonds scheduled the poll even earlier, on July 3, his seat being lost in a seven-to-one SKNLP victory on St. Kitts; consequently, Denzil Douglas was installed as head of a new government on July 7. Douglas retained office in an early election on March 6, 2000, the SKNLP gaining an additional legislative seat for a majority of eight. On October 7, 2004, Prime Minister Douglas called early elections for October 25, at which time the SKNLP majority declined to seven seats. The cabinet appointed on October 30 contained most of the incumbent ministers but in reshuffled portfolios.

S T. K I T T S A N D N E V I S

Political Status: Former British dependency; joined West Indies Associated States in 1967; independent member of the Commonwealth since September 19, 1983. Area: 101 sq. mi. (262 sq. km.), encompassing Saint Christopher (65∼sq.∼mi.) and Nevis (36 sq. mi.). Population: 45,841 (2001C); 50,100 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): BASSETERRE (Saint Christopher, 14,000). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: East Caribbean Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2.70 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Sir Cuthbert Montroville SEBASTIAN; took office January 1, 1996, succeeding Sir Clement Athelston ARRINDELL. Prime Minister: Dr. Denzil Llewellyn DOUGLAS (St. Kitts-Nevis Labour Party); sworn in on July 7, 1995, to succeed Dr. Kennedy Alphonse SIMMONDS (People’s Action Movement) following election of July 3; retained office following elections of March 6, 2000, and October 25, 2004. Premier of Nevis: Joseph PARRY (Nevis Reformation Party); named to succeed Vance W. AMORY (Concerned Citizens’ Movement) following election of July 10, 2006.

Constitution and Government The 1983 constitution describes St. Kitts-Nevis as a “sovereign democratic federal state” whose ceremonial head, the British monarch, is represented by a governor general of local citizenship. The governor general appoints as prime minister an individual commanding a parliamentary majority and, on the latter’s advice, other ministers, all of whom, except for the attorney general, must be members of the legislature. He also appoints, on the advice of the government, a deputy governor general for the island of Nevis. Legislative matters are entrusted to a unicameral National Assembly, 11 of whose current members (styled “representatives”) are directly elected from single-member

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constituencies (8 on St. Kitts and 3 on Nevis). After consulting with the prime minister and the leader of the opposition, the governor general may appoint additional members (styled “senators”) who can number no more than two-thirds of the elected membership. Constitutional amendments require approval by two-thirds of the representatives, while certain entrenched provisions must also be endorsed by two-thirds of the valid votes in a national referendum. The highest court—apart from the right of appeal, in certain circumstances, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London—is the West Indies Supreme Court (based on St. Lucia), which includes a Court of Appeal and a High Court, one of whose judges resides on St. Kitts and presides over a Court of Summary Jurisdiction. District courts deal with petty offenses and minor civil actions. Nevis is provided with an island Assembly, currently consisting of five elected and three nominated members (the latter not to exceed two-thirds of the former); in addition, the governor general appoints a premier and two other members of the Nevis Assembly to serve as a Nevis Island Administration. Most importantly, the Nevis Islanders have been accorded the right of secession from St. Kitts, if a bill to such effect is approved by twothirds of their elected legislators and endorsed by two-thirds of those voting on the matter in an island referendum. In late July 1995, following his installation as prime minister, Denzil Douglas announced that he intended to introduce a constitutional reform that would provide separate governments for St. Kitts and Nevis. Having discussed the matter with Nevis Premier Vance AMORY, he pledged to draw on both local and international expertise to draw up a document that would be acceptable to residents of both islands. The overture notwithstanding, Amory in June 1996 initiated secession proceedings, Douglas characterizing the action as indicating that the Nevis leader had “no other issue of note to bring to the people.” Nonetheless, the inhabitants of the smaller island had long chafed at alleged policy discrimination by Basseterre. Involved were a variety of complaints ranging from slow responses to

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the proposed upgrading of public services to fears of exclusion from offshore banking opportunities. Efforts by regional representatives to mediate the dispute having failed, the Nevis Assembly voted unanimously on October 13, 1997, for secession, opposition members indicating their support “on principle.” The change was, however, narrowly defeated in a referendum on August 10, 1998 (see Current issues, below).

Foreign Relations At independence, St. Kitts-Nevis became an independent member of the Commonwealth and shortly thereafter was admitted to the United Nations. It joined the Organization of American States (OAS) in March 1984. Regionally, it is a member of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom), and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). Most of its bilateral aid has come from the United Kingdom, which, at independence, provided a special grant-loan package of £10 million for capital projects and technical cooperation. The Simmonds government endorsed the intervention in Grenada in October 1983, subsequently receiving modest military assistance from the United States in support of its small voluntary defense force. St. Kitts is one of a number of small regional countries receiving fuel under Venezuela’s PetroCaribe supply initiative, and in December 2006 Prime Minister Douglas said he looked forward to deepening relations with a government whose leader displayed “unstinting efforts to alleviate poverty.”

Current Issues On August 10, 1998, 61.8 percent of Nevis voters backed secession. However, the measure was defeated because it failed to gain a constitutionally required two-thirds majority. Following the vote, Prime Minister Douglas pledged to negotiate a new constitutional framework that would provide the smaller island with a greater measure of autonomy. A similar view emerged from a September

2003 legislative debate on a motion opposing the smaller island’s separation. In June 2004 the opposition PAM threatened to boycott the 2005 balloting if electoral reforms, including an updated voter list, were not undertaken. Although the PAM ultimately agreed to participate in the balloting, it lodged complaints in three constituencies concerning the voter registration process. In June 2006 the Douglas government responded with the introduction of an electoral reform bill that called for oversight by both parliamentary and consultative committees, in addition to new procedures for voter registration and changes in electoral constituencies.

Political Parties Government Party St. Kitts-Nevis Labour Party—SKNLP. What was then styled the St. Kitts Labour Party (SKLP) was organized as a socialist party in 1932. Long the dominant grouping on St. Kitts, it won seven of nine Assembly seats in 1971 and retained a plurality of four in 1980 but was forced from office by the PAM/NRP coalition. The party initially opposed federal status for Nevis, claiming that it made Nevis “more equal” than St. Kitts; however, this position was reversed following the SKLP’s crushing defeat in 1984, at which it lost all but two of its legislative seats, including that of opposition leader Lee L. MOORE. Subsequent changes included the ascendancy of youth leader Henry BROWNE as Moore’s successor and a distancing of the party from the 40-year-old sugar workers’ union. It led the 1993 popular vote, while increasing its Assembly representation from two to four; however, it was unable to persuade the CCM (below) to join it in a government coalition. The party swept to victory on July 3, 1995, winning seven of eight seats on St. Kitts. It added the eighth seat in the election of March 6, 2000, but returned to seven in 2004. Leaders: Dr. Denzil Llewellyn DOUGLAS (Prime Minister and Leader of the Party), Timothy Sylvester HARRIS (Chair).

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Cabinet As of July 1, 2007 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister Premier of Nevis

Denzil Llewellyn Douglas Sam Terrence Condor Joseph Parry

Ministers Education, Youth, Social and Community Development, and Gender Affairs Finance, Sustainable Development, and Technology Foreign Affairs, International Trade, Industry, and Commerce Health Housing, Agriculture, Fisheries, and Consumer Affairs Legal Affairs and Attorney General National Security, Justice, Immigration, and Labor Public Works, Utilities, Transport, and Posts Tourism, Culture, and Sports

Sam Terrence Condor Denzil Llewellyn Douglas Timothy Sylvester Harris Rupert Emanuel Herbert Cedric Roy Liburd Dennis Merchant Gerald Anthony Dwyer Astaphan Earl Asim Martin Denzil Llewellyn Douglas

Ministers of State Prime Minister’s Office with Responsibility for Finance, Technology, and Sustainable Development Prime Minister’s Office with Responsibility for Tourism, Sports, and Culture

Other Parties People’s Action Movement —PAM. The PAM is a moderately left-of-center party formed in 1965. It won only 3 of 9 elective seats in the 1980 preindependence balloting, but with the support of 2 members from Nevis was able to force resignation of the existing Labour government. It captured 6 of the 8 seats from St. Kitts in June 1984, thus securing an absolute majority in a new house that had been expanded to 11 elected members; it retained all 6 seats in 1989 but slipped to 4 in 1993. Although finishing second in the popular vote, the PAM, despite SKNLP objections, retained office in coalition with the NRP. It won only 1 legislative seat at the July 1995 election, which was lost in the March 2000 poll but regained in 2004. Leaders: Lindsay GRANT (Party Leader), Shawn RICHARDS (Deputy Leader).

Nigel Alexis Carty Richard Skerritt

Concerned Citizens’ Movement —CCM. The CCM is a Nevisbased party that in 1987 captured one local Assembly seat and in 1989 one National Assembly seat from the NRP (below). It won control of Nevis on June 1, 1992, by securing three of five Assembly seats, retaining them on February 24, 1997. It increased its National Assembly representation from one to two in 1993, retaining both in 1995, 2000, and 2004. At the balloting for the Nevis Assembly in September 2001, the CCM secured four of the five elected seats, two of which were lost in July 2006. Leaders: Vance W. AMORY (Former Premier of Nevis), Malcolm GUISHARD (Former Deputy Premier of Nevis). Nevis Reformation Party —NRP. Organized in 1970, the NRP had, before 1980, campaigned for Nevis’s secession from St. Kitts. It won two National Assembly seats in 1980 and participated in

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the independence discussions that led to the formation of the federal state. It captured all three seats from Nevis in 1984, after having won all five seats to the Nevis Island Assembly in August 1983; it lost one of the latter in December 1987 and one of the former in March 1989, both to the CCM. At the Nevis election of June 1, 1992, it retained only two Assembly seats, forcing its leader to step down as island premier; its local representation was unchanged in February 1997. It lost one of two National Assembly seats in November 1993, with no change in 1995, 2000, or 2004. Following the 1997 Nevis poll, former premier Simeon Daniel stated that he would not contest future elections, since speculation that his party favored the central government’s position may have weakened its position with voters. The NRP lost one of its two seats at balloting for the Nevis Assembly in September 2001 but secured three seats (a majority) in July 2006. Leaders: Simeon DANIEL (Former Premier of Nevis), Joseph PARRY (Premier of Nevis), Levi MORTON (Secretary). United National Empowerment Party — UNEP. The UNEP was launched in May 2004 on a platform of constitutional reform and opposition to independence for Nevis. Leader: Henry L. O. “Stogumber” BROWNE.

Legislature The unicameral National Assembly presently consists of 11 elected members, plus no more than 7 nominated members (two-thirds by the government, one-third by the opposition). The legislative mandate is five years, subject to dissolution. At the most recent balloting of October 25, 2004, the St. Kitts-Nevis Labour Party elected 7 members; the Concerned Citizens’ Movement, 2; the Nevis Ref-

ormation Party, 1; and the People’s Action Movement, 1. President: Marcella A. LIBURD.

Communications Press The following are published in Basseterre: The Weekend Voice (8,000); The Labour Spokesman (6,000), twice-weekly organ of the St. Kitts-Nevis Trade and Labour Union; The Democrat (3,000), weekly PAM organ.

News Agency There is no domestic facility. International news is provided by the Caribbean News Agency (CANA).

Broadcasting and Computing Religious programming is provided by Radio Paradise and the Voice of Nevis, while the government-owned ZIZ Radio and Television broadcasts to about 12,500 TV receivers. As of 2005, there were approximately 261 personal computers and 237 mobile cellular subscribers for every 1,000 residents.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Dr. Izben Cordinal WILLIAMS U.S. Ambassador to St. Kitts-Nevis: Mary Martin OURISMAN (resident in Barbados) Permanent Representative to the UN: Delano Frank BART IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, Interpol, OAS, OECS, OPANAL, WTO

S T. L U C I A SAINT LUCIA

The Country The second largest of the former West Indies Associated States, St. Lucia lies between Martinique and St. Vincent in the Windward Islands chain of the eastern Caribbean. As in the case of adjacent territories, most of the inhabitants are descendants of West African slaves who were brought as plantation laborers in the 17th and 18th centuries. Settlement by the French followed the conclusion of a treaty with the indigenous Carib Indians in 1660, and significant traces of French culture remain despite undisputed British control after 1803. At least 80 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. The principal economic sectors are agriculture, with bananas and coconuts as the leading export items; tourism, which has been growing rapidly in recent years; and manufacturing, which currently embraces more than 40 relatively diversified enterprises. Despite satisfactory infrastructural development and significant geothermal energy potential, the economy has been hampered by rapid population growth, which has yielded widespread unemployment (estimated at 22 percent in 1984, but with a substantial reduction to 13 percent in 1990, before rising again to 19 percent in 2001). Inflation, which rose to 7.0 percent in 1987, receded to near zero in 1997 with a marginal increase thereafter, while improvements in both tourism and banana production yielded real GNP growth of nearly 6 percent annually from 1989 to 1993, before falling to 2.5 percent in 1994 through 1998. Part of the decline was attributed to Hurricane Lu`ıs in September 1995, which destroyed about 17 percent of the banana crop. Real GDP growth of only 0.2 percent was achieved in 2000, while the economy contracted by 5.4 percent in 2001, primarily as a result of a

drastic decline in tourism following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11; it rose steadily thereafter to 5.1 percent in 2005.

Government and Politics Political Background Administered after 1833 as part of the British Leeward Islands, St. Lucia was incorporated in 1940 into the Windward Islands group, which also included Dominica, Grenada, and St. Vincent. It participated in the Federation of the West Indies from 1958 to 1962 and became one of the six

Saint Lucia Channel ST. LUCIA

VENEZUELA

AT L A N T IC

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OCEAN

Anse la Raye Caribbean Sea

Dennery

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4 Mi 4 Km

Saint Vincent Passage

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internally self-governing West Indies Associated States in March 1967. As in the cases of Grenada and Dominica, St. Lucia, under Premier John G. M. COMPTON of the long-dominant United Workers’ Party (UWP), applied for independence under a provision of the West Indies Act of 1966 that required only that an Order in Council be laid before the British Parliament. The opposition St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP), led by Allan LOUISY, called initially for a referendum on the issue but subsequently participated in a constitutional conference held in London in July 1978. Following approval of the proposed constitution by the St. Lucia House of Assembly on October 24 and of a draft termination order by both houses of Parliament in December, independence within the Commonwealth was proclaimed on February 22, 1979, with Premier Compton assuming the office of prime minister. Compton was succeeded by Louisy following a landslide victory by the leftist-oriented SLP on July 2, 1979. In the wake of mounting conflict between the prime minister and a radical SLP faction led by Foreign Minister George ODLUM, Louisy resigned on April 30, 1981, in favor of the essentially centrist Winston CENAC. Cenac, in turn, was forced to step down on January 16, 1982. The governor general subsequently named Michael PILGRIM to head an all-party administration pending a general election on May 3 at which Compton’s UWP secured a decisive victory, sweeping all but three parliamentary seats. Retaining control by only one seat in the balloting of April 6, 1987, Compton called for a second election only three weeks later, which yielded the same outcome. Buoyed by a resilient economy and campaigning on the slogan “Keep St. Lucia in good hands,” Compton led the UWP to an 11–6 victory over the SLP in parliamentary balloting on April 27, 1992. He retired on March 31, 1996, and was succeeded by his recently designated party successor, Dr. Vaughan A. LEWIS, on April 2 but returned to succeed Lewis in mid-1998. In the election of May 23, 1997, the SLP crushed the UWP, 16–1, winning 61.3 percent of the valid votes under its new leader, Kenny D. ANTHONY.

Anthony called early Assembly elections for December 3, 2001, the SLP securing 14 seats compared to 3 for the UWP. In another reversal, on December 11, 2006, the UWP won 11 seats and the SLP 6, with the 82-year-old Compton being invested for the fifth time as prime minister.

Constitution and Government Under the 1979 constitution, the St. Lucia Parliament consists of “Her Majesty, a Senate and a House of Assembly.” The queen, as titular head of state, is represented locally by a governor general whose emergency powers are subject to legislative review. Senators are appointed, serve only for the duration of a given Parliament, may not introduce money bills, and can only delay other legislation. The size of the Assembly is not fixed, although the present house has not been expanded beyond the preindependence membership of 17. The prime minister must be a member of the Assembly and command a majority therein; other ministers are appointed on the prime minister’s advice from either of the two houses. Appointments to various public commissions, as well as the designation of a parliamentary ombudsman, require consultation with the leader of the opposition. The judicial system includes membership in the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, with appeals from its Court of Appeal transferred from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London to the Caribbean Court of Justice upon the latter’s launching in April 2005. In 1985 the Compton government announced a plan to divide the island into eight regions, each with its own council and administrative services; implementation of the decentralization plan began in December 1985 and was completed the following year.

Foreign Relations During St. Lucia’s independence day ceremonies, Prime Minister Compton committed his government to a “full thrust towards Caribbean integration and West Indian unity,” adding, however, that the island’s historic links to the West precluded

S T. L U C I A

Political Status: Former British dependency; joined West Indies Associated States in 1967; independent member of the Commonwealth since February 22, 1979. Area: 238 sq. mi. (616 sq. km.). Population: 158,147 (2001C); 165,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): CASTRIES (14,600). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: East Caribbean Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2.70 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Dame Perlette LOUISY; sworn in September 17, 1997, succeeding Sir W. George MALLET. Prime Minister: Sir John George Melvin COMPTON (United Workers’ Party); served as prime minister 1964–1996; returned to office on December 15, 2006, following legislative election of December 11, succeeding Dr. Kenny Davis ANTHONY (St. Lucia Labour Party).

diplomatic relations with Cuba. These policies were reversed under Prime Minister Louisy. In August 1979 relations were formally established with the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro, and St. Lucia was accorded observer status at the September nonaligned conference in Havana after announcing its intention to apply for full membership in the Third World grouping. After returning to power in May 1982, Prime Minister Compton reaffirmed his earlier wariness of Havana while indicating that his administration would cooperate with all regional governments participating in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), established in June 1981. In May 1987 Compton joined with James Mitchell of St. Vincent in urging that the seven OECS members work toward the formation of a single unitary state. However, the proposal was strongly criticized as a form of neocolonialism by Prime Minister Vere C. Bird Sr. of Antigua, while drawing only modest support from other regional leaders.

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Given the apparent failure of the OECS unification scheme, St. Lucia joined with its Windward Island neighbors (Dominica, Grenada, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) in an effort to launch a less inclusive grouping. During the third meeting of a Regional Constituent Assembly in Roseau, Dominica, in September 1991, agreement was reached on a federal system with a common legislature and executive; however, opposition was also voiced to the more recent proposal, with Prime Minister Compton subsequently reported to be seeking a structure of association that would not require modification of the participants’ constitutions. On September 1, 1997, diplomatic relations were established with the People’s Republic of China, three days after a severance of ties with Taiwan. Earlier, Prime Minister Anthony had offered to maintain economic and trade relations with Taiwan, its ambassador responding that his government appeared to be intent on introducing a “sort of socialist left-oriented” foreign policy. Anthony made a weeklong state visit to China in February 1999, Beijing pledging support for several projects in St. Lucia, including $4 million for a new sports complex. Following the December 2006 election, Prime Minister Compton denied reports that his administration intended to reestablish relations with Taiwan. In early 2007, however, the government invited Taiwan to send a delegation to examine how “the interests of both parties could be advanced.” Four months later, the Taiwanese flag was again raised in Castries, which, momentarily at least, made St. Lucia the only country in the world having diplomatic ties with both Chinas.

Current Issues As in other Caribbean countries, there has recently been an escalation of crime in St. Lucia, the number of murders reaching record levels in 2004– 2006, accompanied by a growth in drug-related crime. The failure of the Anthony administration to reverse the trend, which included a number of high-profile attacks on foreign nationals, was seen as influencing the outcome of the 2006 election.

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Upon his return to office, Prime Minister Compton stated that reducing crime and unemployment would be his top priorities. He also dismissed complaints about his age, insisting that he had secured “the best medical advice” before seeking a new mandate. In August 2007 Hurricane Dean brushed passed the island, causing a preliminary estimated loss of $18 million, although the storm largely left the important tourist areas intact.

Political Parties Government Party United Workers’ Party—UWP. The UWP was organized in 1964 by members of the former National Labour Movement and the People’s Progressive Party. The party’s basically moderate leader, Sir John G. M. Compton, served as chief minister from 1964 to 1967 and as premier from 1967 to 1979, becoming prime minister upon independence. Decisively defeated in July 1979, the UWP returned to power on May 3, 1982. It obtained a bare majority of one Assembly seat in the election of April 6, 1987, and failed to improve its standing in a second election on April 30. By contrast, the party won a healthy margin of five seats in April 1992. In January 1996 Compton retired as party leader in favor of Dr. Vaughan Lewis, who succeeded as prime minister on April 2 before the UWP debacle in the election of May 23, 1997, at which the party secured only one seat. Morella Joseph, a retired school principal, was elected unopposed as the UWP party leader at the October 2000 annual convention. Although Joseph was subsequently named vice president of the National Alliance (NA, below), the UWP withdrew from the formation in October 2001 and ran separately in the December elections. Despite an increase in UWP representation to three with a vote share of 36.6 percent, Joseph subsequently resigned and was replaced on an interim basis by Marius Wilson. In mid-2004 the parliamentary leader of the opposition, Marcus NICHOLS, was sacked after calling for UWP leader Vaughan Lewis to resign. In March 2005 former Prime Minister

Compton came out of political retirement to defeat Lewis for the UWP leadership. Leaders: Sir John G. M. COMPTON (Party Leader and Prime Minister), Stephenson KING (Chair).

Opposition Party St. Lucia Labour Party—SLP. The SLP is a left-of-center party formed in 1946. After boycotting the independence ceremonies because they were not immediately preceded by balloting for a new Assembly, it won a landslide victory in the election of July 2, 1979. Party leader Allan Louisy resigned as prime minister in April 1981 because of intraparty conflict with “new Left” advocate George Odlum, who subsequently withdrew to form the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) in opposition to the government of Louisy’s successor, Winston Cenac. At its 1984 annual convention, the SLP voted to assign the roles of party leader and leader of the opposition to different individuals, and, in a move interpreted as a swing to the right, named Castries businessman Julian HUNTE to the former post. Resistance from some factions to Hunte and his steadfast rejection of unity proposals from the PLP seemed to have declined by 1986, but the party was unable to secure a majority at either of the 1987 elections and secured only 6 of 17 seats in 1992. At a delegates’ conference in July 1992 Hunte turned back a challenge by his former deputy, Peter JOSIE, to succeed him as party leader, and in February 1993 the party’s Central Executive Committee voted to expel Josie because of his “constant criticism” of the leadership. Hunte resigned his leadership post in February 1996 because of the party’s poor showing in a Castries byelection and was succeeded in March by Dr. Kenny Anthony. Dr. Anthony led the SLP to a near sweep (16 of 17 assembly seats) in the election of May 23, 1997. George Odlum joined the subsequent cabinet as minister of foreign affairs and international trade. However, he left the government in March 2001 after announcing he would not stand as an SLP candidate in the 2002 balloting. (See National

S T. L U C I A

Alliance, below, for information on Odlum’s subsequent activities.) Leaders: Dr. Kenny Davis ANTHONY (Former Prime Minister and Party Leader), Allan F. L. LOUISY (Former Prime Minister), Tom WALCOTT (Chair), Oliver SCOTT (Secretary General).

Other Parties National Alliance —NA. The NA was launched in March 2001 as a “multiparty” grouping to challenge the SLP in the elections then scheduled for 2002. Former Prime Minister Sir John G. M. Compton was named president of the Alliance, which also listed recent SLP defector George Odlum as a leader and, apparently, the grouping’s candidate for prime minister. UWP leader Morella Joseph was also listed as the vice president of the group. However, after an NA meeting in October elected Compton to head the formation, Odlum reportedly “cancelled” the meeting, thereby precipitating the breakup of the group as originally constituted. Joseph subsequently announced that the UWP was withdrawing from the NA to run independently in the upcoming elections. Odlum and his supporters retained the NA rubric, the grouping securing only 3.5 percent of the vote and no Assembly seats. Odlum died in September 2003. Two other minor parties participated without success in the 2001 Assembly balloting: the St. Lucia Staff Party, a “satirical” grouping (“staff” has a drunken connotation in the local vernacular) led by television host Christopher HUNTE, and the St. Lucia Freedom Party, led by Martinus FRANC ¸ OIS. Two new formations were launched in 2004: the National Development Movement (NDM), led by Ausbert d’AUVERONE, and the Committee for Meaningful Change and Reconstruction (CMCR). In 2005 the Organization for National Empowerment (ONE) elected Sarah FLOODBEAUBRUN as its leader. She had left the SLP in January 2004 following a dispute over abortion policy.

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Legislature The Parliament of St. Lucia consists of an appointed Senate and an elected House of Assembly, each with a normal term of five years, subject to dissolution. Senate. The upper house encompasses 11 members, of whom 6 are appointed on the advice of the prime minister, 3 on the advice of the leader of the opposition, and 2 after consultation with religious, economic, and social groups. President: Rosemary HUSBANDS-MATHURIN. House of Assembly. The lower house presently consists of 17 directly elected members plus an appointed speaker. In the election of December 11, 2006, the United Workers’ Party won 11 seats and the St. Lucia Labour Party, 6. Speaker: Sarah FLOOD-BEAUBRUN.

Communications In July 1994 Prime Minister Compton, in a speech at the UWP’s annual conference, castigated St. Lucia’s broadcast and print media as “the most vicious in the entire English-speaking Caribbean.” Subsequently a number of incidents, including the expulsion of a newspaper sports editor from a press conference by the sports minister, provoked opposition charges of “wholesale political censorship.”

Press The following are published in Castries: The Star (8,000), SLP weekly; The Voice of St. Lucia (8,000), independent biweekly, Sunday edition published as the Weekend Voice (8,000); The Crusader (4,000), left-wing weekly; The Castries Catholic Chronicle (2,500), monthly; The Vanguard (2,000), UWP fortnightly; The Mirror, weekly, launched in August 1994.

News Agency There is no domestic facility. International news is provided by the Caribbean News Agency (CANA).

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Cabinet As of July 1, 2007 Prime Minister

Sir John G. M. Compton

Ministers Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Communications, Works, Transport, and Public Utilities Education and Culture Economic Affairs, Economic Planning, National Development, and Public Service External Affairs, International Financial Services, Information, and Broadcasting Finance Health and Labour Relations Home Affairs and National Security Housing, Urban Renewal, and Local Government Information Justice and Attorney General Social Transformation, Human Services, Family Affairs, Youth, and Sports Tourism and Civil Aviation Trade, Industry, and Commerce Minister in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister in the Ministry of Education and Culture Minister in the Ministry of Social Transformation, Human Services, Family Affairs, Youth, and Sports, responsible for Human Services and Family Affairs Minister in the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Commerce

Ezechiel Joseph Guy Eardley Joseph Arsene Vigil James Ausbert d’Auvergne Rufus Bousquet Sir John G. M. Compton Stephenson King Keith Mondesir Richard Frederick Dr. Kenny Davis Anthony Nicholas Frederick Lenard Spider Montoute Allen Chastanet George Guy Mayers Marcus Neil Nicholas Gaspard Peter David Charlemagne Charlotte Elizabeth Theresa Mangal [f]

Edmund Estephane

[f] = female

Broadcasting and Computing The government-operated Radio St. Lucia, which resumed broadcasting on July 1, 1995, after a nine-month closure because of strike action and financial difficulties, provides service in English, while Radio Caribbean International (a subsidiary of CIRTES France) broadcasts in French, English, and Creole. Television is provided by the commercial Helen Television Service (HTS). In 2005 there were approximately 163 personal computers and 345 Internet users for every 1,000 residents. In that same year there were an esti-

mated 583 mobile cellular subscribers per 1,000 residents.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: (Vacant) U.S. Ambassador to St. Lucia: Mary Martin OURISMAN (resident in Barbados) Permanent Representative to the UN: (Vacant) IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OECS, OIF, OPANAL, WCO, WTO

S T. V I N C E N T A N D T H E G R E NA D I N E S

ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Chateaubelair

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Kingstown

ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES s

Bequia Baliceaux Island

e n

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Mustique

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a

St. Vincent is located in the Windward group of the eastern Caribbean, south of St. Lucia and west of Barbados. Its jurisdiction encompasses the northern Grenadine islets of Beguia, Canouan, Mayreau, Mustique, Prune Island, Petit St. Vincent, and Union Island, the southern portion of the chain being part of Grenada. The population is mainly of African and mixed origin, with small numbers of Asians, Caribs, and Europeans. The economy is based almost entirely on tourism and agriculture, with bananas, arrowroot, and coconuts being the principal export commodities. An extended series of volcanic eruptions in April 1979 caused massive devastation and necessitated temporary evacuation of the northern two-thirds of the main island, although substantial recovery had been registered by early 1984. Real GDP growth for 1985–1995 averaged 3.9 percent, then dipped to 1.5 percent in 1996 and 1.0 percent in 1997 before rising to 5.7 percent in 1998 and 4.5 percent in 1999. GDP growth fell to 2 percent in 2000 and was close to zero in the ensuing two years because of declining banana exports and the negative impact on tourism of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States; it then rose to 3.6 percent in 2003, 4.0 percent in 2004, and 4.9 percent in 2005.

became part of the general government of Barbados and the Windward Islands and, after the separation of the two in 1885, were administered from Grenada. A founding member of the Federation of the West Indies in 1958, they joined the West Indies Associated States in 1967 as an internally selfgoverning territory with a right of unilateral termination, which they exercised on October 27, 1979. After the state’s admission to the Commonwealth as a special member, Sir Sydney GUN-MUNRO, the former governor, assumed the titular role of governor general, while Premier Robert Milton CATO became prime minister and continued in office after balloting on December 5, at which his St. Vincent

d

The Country

Political Background Claimed by both Great Britain and France during the 17th and 18th centuries, St. Vincent was definitively assigned to the former by the Treaty of Versailles in 1783. The islands, 50 years later,

e

Government and Politics G

r

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Carriacou (GRENADA)

Canouan Tobago Cays Palm Island Petit St. Vincent Is. 0 0

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Labour Party (SVLP) captured 11 of 13 elective parliamentary seats. In the election of July 25, 1984, the SVLP was defeated by the New Democratic Party (NDP), whose 9-member majority forced the resignation of Cato in favor of former premier James F. (“Son”) MITCHELL; the NDP swept the balloting of May 20, 1989, the country being bereft of an elected opposition. It continued in office by winning 12 of 15 elective seats on February 21, 1994, those being reduced to a base majority of 8 seats on June 18, 1998. Arnhim EUSTACE, theretofore finance minister, succeeded Mitchell as prime minister upon the latter’s retirement on October 27, 2000. In accordance with an agreement reached the previous year (see Current issues, below), early elections were held on March 28, 2001. The centerleft Unity Labour Party (ULP) captured 12 elective seats to the NDP’s 3. ULP leader Ralph GONSALVES was appointed prime minister on March 29 and announced a ULP cabinet on April 2, thus ending 16 years of uninterrupted NDP control. Gonsalves remained in office after the election of December 7, 2005, at which there was no change in the legislative distribution.

Constitution and Government An amended version of the 1969 document defining St. Vincent’s status as an Associated State, the present constitution, adopted at independence in 1979, provides for a governor general who acts on behalf of the British Crown and who appoints as prime minister the individual best able to command a majority within the legislature. Other cabinet members are appointed on the advice of the prime minister. The unicameral House of Assembly is currently composed of 15 representatives elected by universal adult suffrage in single-member constituencies, plus six senators (four nominated by the government and two by the leader of the opposition). The highest court—apart from a right of appeal in certain circumstances to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London—is the West Indies Supreme Court (based on St. Lucia), which includes a Court of Appeal and a High Court, one

of whose judges is resident on St. Vincent and presides over a Court of Summary Jurisdiction. District Courts deal with petty offenses and minor civil actions. The main island of St. Vincent is divided into five local parishes (Charlotte, St. George, St. Andrew, St. David, and St. Patrick).

Foreign Relations One of the more moderate Caribbean leaders, Prime Minister Cato declared during independence ceremonies that his government would “not succumb to pressure from any power bloc” and would not seek admission to the Nonaligned Movement because such participation “is to be aligned.” Although Cato assisted in establishing the U.S.-backed Regional Security System (RSS), his successor, James Mitchell, strongly opposed “militarization” of the region and in 1986 helped block the U.S. effort to upgrade the RSS to a stronger alignment that would have established a centralized military force to fight “subversion” in the Eastern Caribbean. Mitchell also canceled St. Vincent’s participation in U.S.-Eastern Caribbean joint military maneuvers late in the year. In July 1996, on the other hand, he agreed to the conclusion of an extradition treaty with Washington that was aimed primarily at drug traffickers. While opposing military enhancement, Mitchell was long viewed as the “father” of regional political integration. Following failure by the seven-member Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to move toward a single unitary state, he advocated unification of St. Vincent with the neighboring Windward Island states of Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia. However, the third session of a Regional Constituent Assembly that convened in Roseau, Dominica, in September 1991 could reach agreement only on a federal system, preliminary approval for which was to be sought by referendums (not yet held) in the four nations. In December 1991 a four-member government delegation headed by St. Vincent’s ambassador to the United States, Kingsley LAYNE, was the first such group to visit Cuba. Five months later formal diplomatic relations were established with Havana.

S T. V I N C E N T A N D T H E G R E N A D I N E S

Political Status: Former British dependency; joined West Indies Associated States in 1967; independent member of the Commonwealth since October 27, 1979. Area: 150 sq. mi. (389 sq. km.), including the Grenadine dependencies, which encompass 17 sq. mi. (44 sq. km.). Population: 109,202 (2001C); 120,000 (2006E). The 2001 figure remains provisional and does not accord with either prior or subsequent estimates. Major Urban Center (2005E): KINGSTOWN (30,400, including suburbs). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: East Caribbean Dollar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2.70 EC dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Sir Frederick BALLANTYNE; sworn in on September 2, 2002, after being appointed by the Queen following the death of Sir Charles James ANTROBUS on June 3. (Deputy Governor General Monica DACON had served in an acting capacity during the interim period.) Prime Minister: Ralph E. GONSALVES (Unity Labour Party); sworn in March 29, 2001, following the election of March 28 in succession to Arnhim EUSTACE (New Democratic Party); remained in office following election of December 7, 2005.

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of marijuana plants with an estimated value of $1 billion. The island’s principal sources of external aid are Great Britain, Canada, and the United States, which contribute both bilaterally and through donations to the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Caribbean Development Bank. Admitted to the United Nations in September 1980, St. Vincent obtained full membership in the Commonwealth in June 1985.

Current Issues The main event following Gonsalves’s retention of office in 2005 was the murder of his press secretary, Glen JACKSON, on March 6, 2006, which served to illustrate an escalating crime rate in St. Vincent and throughout the region. In foreign affairs, St. Vincent has been criticized for accepting aid in exchange for support in international forums. Thus, it is one of some two dozen (mainly small) countries maintaining relations with Taiwan, whose foreign minister, in a discussion of financing for an airport in St. Vincent, declared in September 2006 that even a small country could speak in support of his government’s bid to join international organizations.

Political Parties Government Party

Relations with the United States are conducted through the U.S. ambassador to Barbados. They were jarred in early 1997 by the arrest of two vacationing U.S. citizens, James and Penelia Fletcher, on a charge of having murdered a local water-taxi operator. The two were released on August 8 on a directed verdict of not guilty a month after Prime Minister Mitchell had lashed out at U.S. media for their reporting of the case. Tension with Washington was further heightened in December 1998 by a two-week campaign, conducted by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and Caribbean troops of the Regional Security System, to destroy 12,000 acres

Unity Labour Party—ULP. Formed by merger of two opposition groups, the St. Vincent and Grenadines Labour Party (SVGLP) and the Movement for National Unity (MNU), the ULP held its inaugural convention on October 16, 1994. In September 1993 the SVGLP had rejected an MNU proposal to conclude an anti-NDP alliance for the next general election; however, such an alliance, formed in January 1994, won three seats in the February 21 poll. The SVGLP was launched in 1955 as the St. Vincent Labour Party (SVLP), a moderate socialist formation that obtained 10 of 13 elective legislative seats at the preindependence balloting of 1974 and 11 seats in December 1979. It was forced into

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opposition after winning only 4 seats in 1984. Soon afterward, former prime minister Robert Cato, whose relatively advanced age of 69 and recent ill health were viewed as contributing factors in the election reversal, announced his retirement from politics. Hudson TANNIS was elected party leader at a special congress in January 1985. His rival for the party leadership, Vincent Ian BEACHE, was later elected parliamentary opposition leader, indicating continued competition for control of the SVLP before Tannis’s death in a plane crash on August 3, 1986. Beache retired in September 1992, Stanley JOHN being elected his successor. After the February 1994 election Beache returned to lead the coalition as leader of the opposition. He again resigned as leader in December 1998, being succeeded by Dr. Ralph Gonsalves. The MNU was organized as a moderate leftist grouping by Dr. Gonsalves following his withdrawal from the UPM (below) in 1982; it nominated two unsuccessful candidates in 1989. The ULP has recently been wracked by internal dissent, its parliamentary leader, Vincent BEACHE, stepping down in mid-1999 and its deputy leader, Ken BOYEA, being criticized for joining government representatives in a meeting with EC officials on the banana issue. On May 24, 2000, Boyea resigned from the party, joining fellow dissident Stanley John, who had resigned nine days earlier. The two had accused Gonsalves of activities that were “dividing the country as well as the [ULP]” and stated their intention to form a new party. However, the ULP won an overwhelming victory in the March 2001 legislative balloting and retained its 12-seat majority in December 2005. Leaders: Ralph E. GONSALVES (Prime Minister), Robert FITZPATRICK (Chair), Julian FRANCIS (Secretary General).

Other Parties New Democratic Party —NDP. The NDP is a basically centrist grouping formed in 1975. It became the formal opposition party after the 1979 election, although capturing only 2 legislative seats. Its leader, James Mitchell, lost his bid

for reelection after abandoning his traditional seat from Beguia for a main island constituency. Subsequently, his successor from the Grenadines resigned, permitting Mitchell to regain the seat at a by-election in June 1980. Following a thorough reorganization, the NDP, campaigning in July 1984 under the slogan “Time for a Change,” won 9 of the (then) 13 elective Assembly seats; it captured all 15 such seats in May 1989, with a vote share of 66.2 percent. In February 1994 it fell back to 12 seats on a vote share of 54.5 percent. Mitchell resigned as prime minister in October 2000 and was succeeded by Finance Minister Arnhim Eustace, who led the party to defeat in March 2001 and December 2005. Leaders: Arnhim EUSTACE (Former Prime Minister, President of the Party and Leader of the Opposition), Sir James F. MITCHELL (Former Prime Minister and Former President of the Party), Dr. Linton LEWIS (Chair), Stuart NANTON (Secretary General). People’s Progressive Movement —PPM. The PPM was launched on August 13, 2000, by former members of the ULP. It presented 11 candidates in the March 2001 balloting but won no seats, securing only 2.6 percent of the vote; it was equally unsuccessful in December 2005. Leaders: Ormiston (“Ken”) BOYEA, Stanley (“Stalley”) JOHN. United People’s Movement (UPM). The UPM was organized, under the leadership of Ralph Gonsalves, as a coalition of left-wing groups before the 1979 election, at which it obtained no parliamentary representation. Gonsalves, once described as “the leading Marxist theoretician in the Caribbean,” left the party in 1982 to form the MNU, his role as radical leftist advocate being assumed by Oscar Allen. The party has never secured legislative representation. Leader: Oscar ALLEN. St. Vincent and the Grenadines Green Party (SVGGP). Launched in January 2005, the Green Party won no seats in the December balloting. Leader: Ivan O’NEAL.

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Cabinet As of July 1, 2007 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Ralph E. Gonsalves Sir Louis Straker

Ministers Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Education Finance and Economic Planning Foreign Affairs and International Trade Grenadine Affairs Health and Environment Housing, Informal Human Settlements, Physical Planning, Lands, and Surveys Legal Affairs National Mobilization, Social Development, NGO Relations, Family and Gender Affairs, and Persons with Disabilities National Security Rural Transformation, Public Service, Ecclesiastical Affairs Telecommunications, Science, Technology, and Industry Tourism, Youth, and Sports Transport and Works Urban Development, Labor, Culture, and Electoral Matters Attorney General

Montgomery Daniel Girlyn Miguel [f] Ralph E. Gonsalves Sir Louis Straker Ralph E. Gonsalves Dr. Douglas Slater Julian Francis Ralph E. Gonsalves Michael Browne Ralph E. Gonsalves Selmon Walters Dr. Jerrol Thompson Glen Beache Clayton Burgin Ren´e Baptiste [f] Judith S. Jones-Morgan [f]

Minister of State Prime Minister’s Office

Conrad Sayers

[f] = female

Canovan People’s Movement (CPM). The CPM represents inhabitants of the Grenadine islet of Canovan. Leader: Terry BYNOE.

Unity Labour Party won 12 of the elective seats and the New Democratic Party, 3. Speaker: Hendrick ALEXANDER.

Communications Legislature The unicameral House of Assembly currently consists of 6 appointed senators and 15 representatives elected from single-member constituencies for five-year terms, subject to dissolution. At the most recent balloting of December 7, 2005, the

Press The following are published in Kingstown: The Vincentian (6,000), independent weekly; Justice, UPM weekly; The New Times, NDP weekly; The News, weekly; The Star, ULP fortnightly; Unity, ULP fortnightly.

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News Agency There is no domestic facility. Foreign news is provided by the Caribbean News Agency (CANA).

Broadcasting and Computing St. Vincent’s National Broadcasting Corporation provides local programming as well as BBC news from Kingstown. In May 1987 the government-owned station, Radio 705, was directed not to edit official press releases and to refrain from broadcasting “opposition propaganda” without specific authorization of its manager. The order—bitterly attacked by the NDP’s political adversaries as “high-handed interference” with freedom of speech—was defended as a necessary precaution against those “who would seek to cunningly exploit” the administration’s commitment to democracy. Subsequently, in April 1988, a radio phone-in program was ordered off the air on the

grounds that it had become a vehicle for “blatant mischief-making.” SVG Television transmits both U.S. and local programs via broadcast and cable facilities. There were approximately 139 personal computers and 84 Internet users for every 1,000 people in 2005. In that same year there were an estimated 593 mobile cellular subscribers per 1,000 residents.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Ellsworth I. A. JOHN U.S. Ambassador to St. Vincent: Mary Martin OURISMAN (resident in Barbados) Permanent Representative to the UN: Camillo GONSALVES IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OECS, OPANAL, WTO

S U R I NA M E REPUBLIC

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SURINAME

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ATLANTIC OCEAN Nieuw Nickerie

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Nieuw Amsterdam Moengo Albina

Brokopondo W.J. van Blommestein Lake

French Guiana

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GUYANA

Paramaribo Wageningen Paranam

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Formerly known as Dutch Guiana, Suriname lies on the north-central coast of South America and is bordered by Guyana on the west, French Guiana on the east, and Brazil on the south. Because of the early importation of slave labor from Africa and contract labor from Asia, its society is one of the most ethnically varied in the world. The largest groups are Hindustanis (39 percent) and Creoles (31 percent), followed by Javanese (15 percent), Black Africans, Amerindians, Chinese, and various European minorities. Freedom of worship has traditionally prevailed among equally diverse religious groups, which adhere to Protestant (primarily Dutch Reformed, Lutheran, and Moravian), Roman Catholic, Hindu, Muslim, and Confucian faiths. The greater part of the land area is covered with virgin forest, although the coastal region is both flat and fertile. The tropical climate yields a wide range of agricultural products that include rice, various fruits, sugar, and coffee. Suriname ranks among the world’s leading producers of alumina and bauxite that, together with aluminum, account for nearly 80 percent of the country’s exports but provide employment for only 6 percent of the workforce. Although long enjoying a higher standard of living than many of its neighbors, the country has experienced economic difficulty since 1980, due largely to slackened world demand for bauxite and the suspension of Dutch and U.S. aid in reaction to a wave of official killings in December 1982. By 1986 Suriname faced what its administration termed an “economic emergency” featuring large budget deficits, mounting inflation, 25 percent un-

employment, a flourishing parallel market, and disruption by rebel activity in the eastern and southern parts of the country. In early 1988, following installation of the first elected government in eight years, the country’s major donors indicated that they were prepared to resume aid, agreement with the Netherlands being reached in August for the disbursement of more than $700 million over a seven-to-eightyear period. However, the aid program was suspended in mid-1993 after the disbursement of only $53 million because of the lack of an economic adjustment strategy acceptable to the International

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Monetary Fund and the unwillingness of the European Community to act as an external monitor for other donors. According to the World Bank, GNP per capita was $870 in 1994, a decline of nearly 20 percent from the previous year, although by 1998 it had recovered and grown to $1,660. Economic deterioration was the focus of the May 2000 legislative balloting, which led to the installation of a reformist government. GDP declined by 0.1 percent in 2000 but rose thereafter to an average of 4.5 percent for 2000–2005. During the same period inflation dropped precipitously from 80.4 percent to 9.1 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background First acquired by the Netherlands from Great Britain in 1667 in exchange for Manhattan Island, the territory now known as Suriname passed among Britain, France, and the Netherlands several times before Dutch authority was formally confirmed by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. It remained a dependency of the Netherlands until enactment of a Statute of the Realm in December 1954 that provided the country with a parliamentary form of government and the right of local constitutional revision, thereby according it full equality with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles. A substantial portion of Suriname’s Hindustani population, which accounted for the bulk of the country’s skilled labor force, opposed independence, fearing economic and political repression by the Creole-dominated government of Henck ARRON, who had become prime minister in 1973. More than 40,000 Surinamese, most of them Hindustanis, subsequently emigrated, the majority settling in the Netherlands. Their relocation created a number of social and economic problems for the Netherlands while leaving Suriname with a formidable gap in such areas as commerce, medicine, and teaching. Because of the e´ migr´e problem, provisions guaranteeing certain Hindustani rights were incorporated into the independence constitution of 1975, although the government for

the most part failed in its efforts to convince the expatriates to return. Prime Minister Arron was reconfirmed following a parliamentary election in October 1977 but was ousted in an armed rebellion of 300 noncommissioned officers on February 25, 1980, following government refusal to sanction trade union activity within the armed forces. On March 15 the leaders of the revolt, organized as a National Military Council (NMC), designated the politically moderate Dr. Henk CHIN A Sen as prime minister while permitting the essentially titular president, Dr. Johan H. E. FERRIER, to retain his office. On August 15 the constitution was suspended, with Ferrier being dismissed and Chin being named as his acting successor while continuing as prime minister. On December 3 Chin was confirmed as president, the office of prime minister being abolished. During 1981 differences arose between President Chin, who had called for a return to democratic rule, and Lt. Col. (formerly Sgt. Maj.) D´esi BOUTERSE, who had emerged as the strongman of the NMC. As a result, Chin resigned on February 4, 1982, being replaced four days later, on an acting basis, by Lachmipersad F. RAMDAT-MISIER. In the wake of an unsuccessful uprising by rightwing military elements on March 10–11, martial law was declared, while in apparent response to foreign pressure, a new government headed by Henry N. NEYHORST in the reactivated post of prime minister was announced on March 31. Following the reported discovery of a new antigovernment conspiracy on December 8, Neyhorst also resigned, and the NMC ordered the execution of 15 leaders of a political group called the Association for Democratic Action, claiming that they had scheduled a coup for Christmas day. On February 26, 1983, Dr. Errol ALIBUX of the leftist Progressive Workers’ and Farm Laborers’ Union (PALU) was chosen to head a new cabinet dominated by PALU members. Austerity measures, necessitated by the withdrawal of Dutch and U.S. aid, provoked a strike in December by bauxite workers, who were joined by electricity workers in early January 1984. The action forced the revocation of retroactive increases in income taxes, and on January 8 Colonel

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Political Status: Former Netherlands dependency; granted internal autonomy on December 29, 1954, and complete independence on November 25, 1975; constitution of November 21, 1975, suspended on August 15, 1980, following military coup of February 25; present constitution approved by referendum of September 30, 1987. Area: 63,036 sq. mi. (163,265 sq. km.). Population: 487,824 (2004C), 526,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2005E): PARAMARIBO (urban area, 252,000). Official Language: Dutch. English, Hindi, Javanese, Chinese, and Sranan Tongo (Taki-Taki), a Creole lingua franca, also are widely spoken, while Spanish has been adopted as a working language to facilitate communication with Latin American neighbors. Monetary Unit: Suriname Dollar (market rate November 2, 2007: 2.75 dollars = $1US). (The Suriname Dollar replaced the Suriname Guilder in January 2004.) President: Ronald (Runaldo) VENETIAAN (Suriname National Party); served as president 1991–1996; elected to a second five-year term by the National Assembly on August 4, 2000, succeeding Jules Albert WIJDENBOSCH (formerly National Democratic Party); reelected by United People’s Assembly on August 3, 2005, and inaugurated for a third five-year term on August 12. Vice President and Prime Minister: Ram SARDJOE (Progressive Reform Party); elected by the United People’s Assembly on August 3, 2005, and inaugurated on August 12 for a term concurrent with that of the President, succeeding Jules R. AJODHIA (Progressive Reform Party).

Bouterse announced the dismissal of the Alibux government. On February 3 an interim administration led by former Arron aide Willem (Wim) UDENHOUT was sworn in, pending “the formation of new democratic institutions.” In December the government announced a 27-month program

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for a “return to democracy” that included the establishment, on January 1, 1985, of an appointive 31-member National Assembly charged with the drafting of a new constitution. On August 2, 1985, the Assembly formally designated Colonel Bouterse as “head of government,” while reconfirming Ramdat-Misier as acting president. In early September it was announced that the Assembly had appointed a commission, structured on an essentially corporative basis (including representatives of the major unions and the Association of Surinamese Manufacturers), to draft a new basic law. Subsequently, a number of party leaders accepted an invitation from Colonel Bouterse to join the NMC in forming a Supreme Council (Topberaad) that would serve as the country’s highest political organ. The new body approved the installation of a government headed by Pretaapnarain RADHAKISHUN on July 17, 1986, following the resignation of Prime Minister Udenhout on June 23. Radhakishun was in turn succeeded by Jules Albert WIJDENBOSCH on February 13, 1987. Despite an earlier announcement that a general election would not be held until March 1988, Colonel Bouterse stated on March 31, 1987, that the balloting would be advanced to independence day, November 25, 1987, preceded by a September 30 referendum on the new constitution. The election yielded a landslide victory for the Front for Democracy and Development (FDO), a coalition of the three leading opposition parties, with Bouterse’s recently organized National Democratic Party (NDP) winning only 3 of 51 legislative seats. On January 12, 1988, the new Assembly unanimously elected former agriculture minister Ramsewak SHANKAR to a five-year term as president, with former prime minister Arron designated as vice president and prime minister. Bouterse, however, remained commander-in-chief of the army and, because of a lack of constitutional specificity in regard to both the membership and functions of a revamped Military Council and a nonelective Council of State, appeared to have lost little capacity for the exercise of decisive political influence.

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Of more immediate concern was the continued activity of a rebel Surinamese Liberation Army (SLA), led by former Bouterse aide Ronnie BRUNSWIJK, which, with apparent support from bushnegro (bosneger) villagers, had severely disrupted bauxite mining in the eastern region before a government counteroffensive that had driven it back to the border with French Guiana. In June 1988 the government reversed its long-standing position and announced that it would begin talks with the rebels, which did not, however, commence until late October. Following a number of clashes between elements of the “Jungle Commando” and government militia units, the National Assembly approved an amnesty for the rebels on June 1, 1989, and ratified a formal agreement for terminating the conflict on August 8. Subsequently, however, the accord was strongly condemned by Amerindian representatives as conceding too much to the bosneger population, while the army branded one of its key provisions as unconstitutional. The four-year rebellion took a somewhat surprising turn on June 18, 1990, when Brunswijk appeared in Cayenne, French Guiana, stating that he had tired of the struggle and wished to seek asylum in the Netherlands. He then departed for Paris, leadership of the rebel group seemingly having been assumed by his deputy, Johan “Castro” WALLY. However, it soon appeared that the action had been a ruse to facilitate what proved to be unproductive talks with Dutch officials, followed by Brunswijk’s return to Suriname in July. A series of discussions between army and rebel representatives in October and November culminated in a request by Colonel Bouterse that the government withdraw a number of arrest warrants dating from the period of military rule. Shortly thereafter Bouterse was angered by the president’s failure to offer assistance during a period of detention by Dutch authorities while on a European trip, and on December 22 the colonel resigned as military commander. His successor, Cdr. Iwan GRAANOOGST, promptly mounted a Christmas Eve coup, which yielded Bouterse’s reinstatement following the December 30 replacement, on an acting basis, of President Shankar by Johannes Samuel

KRAAG and of Vice President and Prime Minister Arron by former Prime Minister Wijdenbosch. (Arron died in December 2000 in the Netherlands, to which he had withdrawn in self-imposed exile.) At legislative balloting on May 25, 1991, what was now termed the New Front for Democracy and Development (NFDD) won 30 of 51 seats (10 less than in 1987 and 4 short of the two-thirds needed to elect a president), while the army-backed NDP increased its representation from 3 seats to 10. After a lengthy impasse, during which no candidate was able to secure a presidential majority, a special United People’s Assembly was convened (see Constitution and government, below) that on September 7 elected NFDD nominee Ronald (Runaldo) R. VENETIAAN as the new head of state; ten days later a cabinet headed by the vice president and prime minister, Jules R. AJODHIA, was announced. On March 25, 1992, the National Assembly approved a number of constitutional amendments including, most importantly, abolition of the political role of the army, which would thenceforth be limited to national defense and combating “organized subversion.” On May 5 Brunswijk’s SLA and another leading guerrilla group, the Amerindian Tucayana Amazonicas, agreed to suspend hostilities, and on August 8 signed a revised peace treaty with the government that included revival of the 1989 amnesty. Under the accord, members of the rebel groups would be permitted to join the police force for the interior, while the government was to give the region priority in economic development and social welfare programs. On November 20, 1992, Colonel Bouterse, buffeted by reports that he had become the country’s richest man by corrupt means, again resigned as army commander. However, on October 4, 1993, he returned to the limelight as leader of a mass demonstration at Paramaribo against austerity measures recently mandated by the government and by mid1995 appeared poised to reenter politics as NDP leader. At an inconclusive general election on May 23, 1996, a four-party New Front (NF) coalition led

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by President Venetiaan’s Suriname National Party (NPS) won 24 seats, as contrasted with the NDP’s second-place showing of 16. Thereafter, a series of failed efforts by Venetiaan to forge a majority with smaller parties prompted defections from the NF (see Political Parties, below) that yielded a bloc of 28 legislators supporting the NDP. However, the NDP’s augmented strength fell short of the twothirds needed to elect a president. A new United People’s Assembly was therefore convened, which on September 5 named NDP Vice Chair Wijdenbosch to the presidency on a 437–407 vote. While Bouterse’s party was thus restored to power, the former dictator was himself barred from office at the insistence of the NDP’s allies. Named as vice president and prime minister was Pretaapnarian (Pretaap) RADHAKISHUN, who had first served as cabinet head a decade earlier. By late 1997, a number of party realignments had taken place, although the Wijdenbosch administration retained a parliamentary majority. Also jeopardized by several defections in early 1998, the government succeeded in securing the support of 26 of the 51 legislators by late March. The situation worsened sharply in 1999. On May 28 President Wijdenbosch dismissed his entire cabinet in the wake of an economic collapse that had triggered widespread popular demonstrations. On June 1 the National Assembly voted to remove the president from office, but he refused to comply on the grounds that such action required a two-thirds majority. Six weeks later, on July 16, a Dutch court sentenced Bouterse in absentia to 11 years’ imprisonment and a $2.18 million fine for participating in smuggling drugs into the Netherlands between 1989 and 1997. Additional charges, alleging the torture and killing of dissidents in 1982, were filed by the Dutch attorney general in January 2000 (see NDP below). Before the election of May 25, 2000, Wijdenbosch left the NDP to form a group called the Democratic National Platform 2000. However, the new formation ran a poor third behind Venetiaan’s New Front, which captured 47 percent of the vote, and an NDP-led Millennium Combination, which secured 15 percent. After lengthy interparty dis-

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cussions, Venetiaan succeeded in securing a new mandate on August 4 and assumed office on August 12, with Ajodhia returning as vice president and prime minister. At inconclusive balloting on May 25, 2005, the New Front lost a third of its National Assembly representation and failed to secure a necessary twothirds majority for Venetiaan’s reelection in two legislative ballots in July. Subsequently, the party concluded an alliance with the A-Combination, a recently formed Maroon-based coalition that yielded a third term for Venetiaan in a United People’s Assembly poll on August 3.

Constitution and Government In the immediate wake of the 1990 coup, Commander Graanoogst promised an early return to civilian rule, a pledge that yielded the election of May 25, 1991. The 1987 constitution, under which the polling took place, sets forth a complex system of government within which the intended distribution of power is by no means clearly defined. A 51-member National Assembly, elected for a fiveyear term, selects a president and vice president for terms of the same duration; however, the action must be by a two-thirds majority, lacking which the choice is made by a simple majority of a United People’s Assembly (Vereinigde Volksvergadering), comprising the National Assembly members plus 289 local and regional councilors. The selection must be deferred until 30 days after the election to accommodate any disputed legislative contests. The president serves as chair of a nonelective State Council whose composition is “regulated by law” and whose purpose is to advise the government on public policy, ensuring that its actions are in conformity with the basic law; the president also chairs a Security Council, which is empowered to assume governmental authority in the event of “war, state of siege, or exceptional circumstances to be determined by law.” The Assembly may amend the constitution by a two-thirds majority or, lacking such a majority, by convening the equivalent of a presidential assembly. For electoral purposes the country is divided into ten districts.

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In early 1992 the Assembly began debate on a variety of constitutional amendments, only one of which, a ban on political activity by the army, was subsequently approved. Other proposed changes would have limited the State Council to a purely advisory role, with no capacity to veto government decisions, and given the president the power of legislative dissolution, while permitting a two-thirds majority of the Assembly to dismiss the president.

Foreign Relations Before the 1980 coup Suriname’s foreign relations turned on two main issues: long-standing border disputes with neighboring Guyana and French Guiana (see map. p. 1263), and the status of development assistance from the Netherlands. The border disputes resulted from Guyana’s claim to a 6,000-square-mile tract reputedly rich in bauxite deposits and from France’s claim to a 780-squaremile tract believed to contain deposits of gold; neither controversy has yet been resolved, although Suriname and Guyana agreed in mid-1995 to open negotiations on their dispute within the framework of a joint commission. The Dutch aid, exceeding $1.5 billion, was to have been disbursed over a period of 10–15 years to ensure the opposition’s support for independence, raise the standard of living for the Surinamese people, and compensate for termination of the preindependence right of emigration from Suriname to the Netherlands. Considerable uncertainty followed in the wake of the first Arron overthrow, the coup itself being largely unplanned, with no clear foreign policy overtones. However, a distinctly leftward thrust had become apparent by the time of President Chin’s resignation, the increasingly dominant Bouterse faction within the NMC having adopted a proCuban posture in regional affairs, leading to a sizable increase in the flight of Surinamese to the Netherlands (despite the expiration of automatic entitlement to entry visas) and the recall of the Dutch ambassador in March 1982. The subsequent withdrawal of Dutch aid (which had been the principal source of Suriname’s relatively high standard of living) was a severe blow to the country’s

economy. In early 1983 it appeared that the fiscal shortfall might be alleviated by commitments from Cuba and Libya. However, on June 1, coincident with reports that the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan had considered a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) plan to infiltrate and destabilize the self-proclaimed “socialist” regime, a substantial military and trade agreement was concluded with Brazil. Two weeks later, amid Dutch reports that Brazil had threatened to invade Suriname if efforts were not taken to curb Cuban influence, Colonel Bouterse announced that Sgt. Maj. Badressein SITAL, one of the most pro-Cuban members of the NMC, had been dismissed from both his Council and ministerial positions. In mid-October Bouterse visited the United States and later in the month, following the Grenada action, asked Cuba to withdraw its ambassador and sharply reduce its remaining diplomatic staff in Paramaribo. In early 1984 the regime lodged official protests with the French and Netherlands governments over their alleged complicity in an invasion plot, and in March 1985 Suriname threatened to take the Netherlands to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for discontinuance of its aid program under the 1975 independence accord. The latter pronouncement came in the wake of an adverse UN Human Rights Commission report on the 1982 killings that dissuaded The Hague from reconsideration of its aid posture. On the other hand, an announcement by the government that it would proceed with ICJ action appeared to be rendered moot by The Hague’s positive response in 1988 to the balloting of the previous November. Subsequently, at the conclusion of a three-day visit to the Hague by President Venetiaan in June 1992, the Netherlands and Suriname signed a cooperation treaty that formally ended their lengthy estrangement, although Dutch financial assistance was again suspended in mid-1993 (see The Country, above). The aid issue was further exacerbated in September 1997 by a Dutch request that Interpol issue an international warrant for the arrest and extradition of D´esi Bouterse on drug-trafficking and money-laundering charges. In a similar vein, the Netherlands appealed unsuccessfully for the

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arrest of Bouterse while the former dictator was on a private visit to Trinidad and Tobago in mid1998. Bouterse went on trial in absentia in a Dutch court in March 1999 and four months later was convicted of the charge against him. Development aid from the Netherlands was again suspended in June 1999 before being resumed in early 2001, partly in response to the positive reaction of the Netherlands to the 2000 elections. Relations improved even further in September 2001 when the Netherlands formally apologized for the practice of slavery in Dutch Guiana. A new dispute with Guyana erupted in 2000 involving an offshore oil concession by Guyana to a Canadian oil exploration company. In June a Surinamese gunboat forced the company to move a rig from territory claimed by Paramaribo. The bitter dispute was at the center of discussions at the July summit of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom), to which Suriname had been admitted in 1995. With no resolution forthcoming, Guyana referred the matter to arbitration under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in February 2004. Suriname promptly filed a counterclaim, and in June a UN tribunal was formed in Germany to hear the case. In early 2007 Suriname concluded an agreement allowing Venezuelan nationals to fish in its waters, if all of the catches were delivered to Paramaribo. However, the Surinamese government cited payment concerns in taking no immediate action to join PetroCaribe, under which Venezuela supplies oil and its byproducts to Caribbean countries on preferential terms. A member of the UN and other international and regional organizations, Suriname was admitted to the Caricom in February 1995.

Current Issues President Venetiaan’s capture of a third term, despite his party’s decline, resulted largely from economic improvement since 2000. However, the poorer classes had experienced little gain. In particular, Amerindians were reportedly pressing longstanding land claims with renewed vigor, while

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they and other interior residents (mostly descendants of escaped slaves) were increasingly demanding that the government provide greatly enhanced health, education, and transportation services for their communities. In addition, international task forces were calling for strict national measures to combat drug smuggling and money laundering, which were believed to play an important role in the country’s burgeoning casino industry. Of major concern in late 2006 was the threat of renewed guerrilla activity by former members of the Jungle Commando, who accused the government of failing to provide economic and social benefits promised under the 1992 peace accord.

Political Parties A long-standing rivalry between Creole and Hindustani groups continued to characterize the party structure of Suriname in the years following independence. The Creole-dominated National Party Alliance (Nationale Partij Komibnatie— NPK), organized in advance of the 1977 election with the Suriname National Party (NPS) as its core, controlled a bare majority in the Staten before the coup of February 25, 1980. Most of the leading opposition parties were grouped into the United Democratic Parties (Verenigde Democratische Partijen—VDP), a predominantly Hindu coalition dominated by the leftist Progressive Reform Party (VHP). While traditional party activity was suspended following the 1980 coup, two leftist groups, the now-defunct Revolutionary People’s Party (Revolutionaire Volkspartij—RVP) and the Progressive Workers’ and Farm Laborers’ Union (PALU, below), were represented in postcoup governments, initially as elements of a regime-supportive Revolutionary Front established in November 1981. The Front became moribund after the establishment of the February 25 Movement, which was itself supplanted by the army-backed National Democratic Party before the 1987 election. Earlier, following relaxation of the party ban in the fall of 1985, the VHP, NPS, and Party of National Unity and Solidarity were invited to participate in the

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government, their leaders joining the Supreme Council in November. On August 2, 1987, leaders of the three leading opposition groups formed an electoral alliance, the Front for Democracy and Development, which swept the November balloting by winning 40 of 51 legislative seats. Before the 1991 election the Suriname Labor Party joined the Front, whose representation nonetheless dropped to a simple majority. Numerous changes in alliances occurred before and after the 1996, 2000, and 2005 elections, as indicated below.

Government Groups New Front for Democracy and Development (Nieuw Front voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling— NF). Initially a three-member coalition of traditional ethnic parties (NPS, VHP, SPA, below) styled the Front for Democracy and Development (Front noor Democratie en Ontwikkeling—FDO), the NF, augmented by the KTPI, (see under VVV, below), gained 30 of 51 National Assembly seats in 1991, as contrasted with 40 won by the FDO in 1987. Its representation dropped to 24 after the election of May 23, 1996, and was reduced thereafter as a result of KTPI withdrawal and defections by VHP members in support of the Wijdenbosch presidency. The New Front recovered its majority in the May 2000 elections, the Pertjajah Luhur having joined the coalition to once again bring its membership to four parties. Leader: Ronald (Runaldo) VENETIAAN (President of the Republic). Suriname National Party (Nationale Partij Suriname—NPS). A Creole grouping founded in 1946, the NPS was the leading advocate of independence from the Netherlands and the core party of the National Party Alliance before the 1980 coup. Its leader served as president from 1991 to 1996 and was returned to the office in 2000, when the NPS won 14 of the NF’s 33 National Assembly seats, and again in 2005, despite reduction of the NF to a plurality of 23 seats.

Leaders: Ronald (Runaldo) VENETIAAN (President of the Republic), Rufus NOOITMEER (Former NF Parliamentary Leader), Willem (Wim) Alfred UDENHOUT, Otmar Roel RODGERS (Secretary). Progressive Reform Party (Vooruitstrvende Hervormde Partij—VHP). Initially called the United Reform Party (Verenigde Hervormings Partij—VHP), and long the leading Hindu party, the left-of-center VHP originally opposed independence because of anticipated repression by the Creole-dominated Alliance. The VHP’s legislative representation of 16 seats in 1987 dropped to 9 in 1991, all of which were retained in 1996 before the defection of a group styled the Movement for Freedom and Democracy (see BVD, under VVV, below). Jaggernath LACHMON, VHP leader and president of the National Assembly, died in October 2001. Leader: Ram SARDJOE (Vice President and Prime Minister of the Republic). Suriname Labor Party (Surinaamse Partij van de Arbeid—SPA). The SPA is a social democratic formation affiliated with the Centrale 47 trade union. It withdrew as a member of the New Front in July 2005 but subsequently returned, with its leader, Sigfried Gilds, being named minister of trade and industry. Gilds resigned his ministerial post in January 2006 after being accused of complicity in a money-laundering operation for which a nephew had been convicted. Leader: Sigfried GILDS. Full Confidence Party (Pertjajah Luhur— PL). A splinter from Pendawa Lima (below), the Pertjajah Luhur joined the New Front before the 2000 legislative balloting. Its leader, Paul Somohardjo, is currently president of the National Assembly. Leader: Paul Slamet SOMOHARDJO. A-Combination (A-Combinatie—AC or ACom). The AC was formed before the 2005 election as an alliance that included the General Liberation and Development Party (Algemene

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Bevrijdings en Ontwikkelings Partij—ABOP), led by former SLA leader Ronnie Brunswijk, and the Brotherhood and Unity in Politics (Broederschap en Eenheid in Politiek—BEP), led by Caprino Allendy. An alliance with the NF in mid-2005 yielded the majority supporting Venetiaan’s retention of the presidency. Leaders: Ronnie BRUNSWIJK (ABOP), Caprino ALLENDY (BEP).

Other Parliamentary Groups National Democratic Party (Nationale Democratische Partij—NDP). The NDP was formed before the 1987 election as a political vehicle for the supporters of Colonel Bouterse. As such, it succeeded the February 25 Movement, styled Stanvaste (“Steadfast”) in Dutch, which had been characterized as a “movement, not a party” at its launching in 1984. Contrary to expectations, the NDP secured only three Assembly seats in 1987, two of which were subject to challenge and represented constituencies that had not been contested by Front nominees; the party’s representation rose to 12 in 1991 and to 16 in May 1996. Tension was reported in early 1999 between the rank-and-file of the NDP, described as supportive of Bouterse, and supporters (said to include most NDP legislators) of President Wijdenbosch. The president dismissed Bouterse as a presidential adviser in early April, Wijdenbosch subsequently forming the DNP 2000 (see under VVV, below). An international arrest warrant was issued by a court in the Netherlands for Bouterse in 1997 on charges involving his alleged involvement in the smuggling of cocaine from Suriname to Europe. In June 2000 the Netherlands’ court sentenced Bouterse in absentia to 11 years in prison in the case; however, Bouterse remained free in Suriname under protection of the Surinamese constitution, which prohibits extradition of nationals. (President Venetiaan has proposed revision of the basic law to permit, among other things, extradition in cases such as Bouterse’s.) Meanwhile, pros-

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ecutors in the Netherlands in 2000 also attempted to pursue a case against Bouterse in connection with the execution of 15 political opponents in Suriname in 1982. The Netherlands High Court dismissed the charges in September 2001 on the ground that Netherlands had no jurisdiction in the case. However, similar charges have been levied in Suriname. For the 2000 campaign, the NDP served as the core component of an alliance styled the Millenium Combination (Millenium Combatie—MC) that included the KTPI (under VVV, below) and the DA (under A1, below). Leaders: Lt. Col. D´esir´e (D´esi) BOUTERSE (Former Army Commander and NDP Chair), Col. Harvey NAARENDORP (Former Stanvaste Secretary General). People’s Alliance for Progress (Volksalliante Voor Vooruitgang—VVV). The VVV was formed before the 2005 campaign by former president Jules Wijdenbosch as a grouping of his DNP 2000, plus the other two parties listed below. It won five National Assembly seats in 2005. Leader: Jules WIJDENBOSCH (Former President of the Republic). Democratic National Platform 2000 (Democratisch Nationaal Platform 2000— DNP 2000). The DNP 2000 was launched by Jules Wijdenbosch following his break with Colonel Bouterse in 1999. Closely affiliated with the group for the 2000 elections were D21 (under A1, below) and the Democratic Party (Democratische Partij—DP), led by Frank PLAYFAIR. For the 1996 election the DP had joined the HPP (below) in forming the Alliance. In the 2000 balloting the DNP 2000 list won three National Assembly seats, one of which was taken up by Playfair. Leaders: Jules Albert WIJDENBOSCH, Liakat Ali Errol ALIBUX. Basic Party for Renewal and Democracy (Basispartij voor Vernieuwing en Democratie— BVD). Initially called the Movement for

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Freedom and Democracy (Beweging voor Vriheid en Democratie—BVD), the BVD is a Hindu party formed by a group of VHP dissidents in 1996. The movement participated in formation of the Wijdenbosch government in September and was subsequently registered as a party under its current name. Its former chair, Motilal MUNGRA, was dismissed as finance minister in August 1997 after accusing the president of extravagant expenditure, although the party retained its other cabinet posts. The BVD’s Pretaapnarain RADHAKISHUN served as vice president and prime minister from 1996 until 2000. He died shortly after leaving office. In the 2000 election the BVD won 3.2 percent of the National Assembly vote but no seats. Leader: Dr. Tjanrikapersad (Tjan) GOBARDHAN (Chair). Party of National Unity and Solidarity (Kerukunan Tulodo Pranatan Inggil—KTPI). Formerly known as the Indonesian Peasants’ Party (Kaum-Tani Persuatan Indonesia), the KTPI is a small, predominantly Javanese rural party founded in 1947. It joined the National Party Alliance before the 1977 election but withdrew in December 1978. As a participant in the New Front, it won seven seats in 1991 and five in 1996 before withdrawing to enter the Wijdenbosch government. It contested the 2000 balloting as part of the Millennium coalition. Leader: Willy SOEMITA. A1. A1 was formed before the 2005 balloting as a coalition that included the three groups below. Democratic Alternative ‘91 (Democratisch Alternatief ‘91—DA‘91). The DA‘91 was launched before the 1991 election by Gerard BRUNINGS, an airline executive who urged a constitutional amendment precluding political activity by both labor and the military. At its inception the formation was a coalition of Brunings’s Alternative Forum (Alternatief

Forum—AF), which is now led by Rick van RAVENSWAAY; the Bushnegro Unity Party (Bosneger Eenheids Partij—BEP, see under AC, above), and two groups that withdrew before the 1996 election: the Pendawa Lima and the HPP (both below). The coalition won nine legislative seats in 1991, four in 1996, and two in 2000. Leader: Djagendre RAMICHELAWAN. Democrats of the 21st Century (Democraten van de 21ste Eeuw—D21). Organized in 1986, D21 was affiliated with DNP 2000 for the 2000 poll. Leader: Soewarto MUSTADJA. Political Wing of the Federation of Farmers and Farm Workers (Politieke Vleugel van de Federatie van Agrari¨ers en Landarbeiders— PVF, or Political Wing of the FAL). The PVF was organized in the late 1990s to advance the agenda of the FAL trade union, which opposed the Wijdenbosch government. At the 2000 National Assembly election it won two seats. Leaders: Jiwan SITAL (Chair), Soedichand JAIRAM.

Other Parties Progressive Workers’ and Farmers’ Union (Progressieve Arbeiders en Landbouwers Unie— PALU). The only trade union to have retained a public role after many labor leaders were killed in December 1982, the left-wing PALU dominated the Alibux cabinet but was not represented in subsequent administrations. It won four Assembly seats from “war zone” constituencies in 1987, none in 1991 or 1996, and one in 2000. Leader: Jim K. HOK (Chair). Reformed Progressive Party (Hernieuwde Progressieve Partij—HPP). Formerly a member of the DA‘91, the HPP is a predominantly Hindu social democratic formation that split from the VHP in 1975 and later participated in the pre-1980 National Party Alliance. For the 1996 election it joined the Democratic Party in forming The Alliance (De

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Alliantie), which secured three National Assembly seats. Also subsequently associated with The Alliance was the Christian democratic Progressive People’s Party of Suriname (Progressieve Surinaamse Volkspartij—PSV) of W. WONG Loi Sing. In 2000 the HPP and the PSV registered separately. Leader: Harry KISOENSINGH (Chair). Pendawa Lima. A predominantly Javanese party dating from 1975, the Pendawa Lima (“Five Sons of King Pandu”) joined DA‘91 in 1991, thereafter winning four parliamentary seats in its own right in 1996. Before the 2000 legislative poll, the Pendawa Lima split into two factions, with theretofore Pendawa Lima Chair Paul Somohardjo leading his faction into the New Front and subsequent government as the Pertjajah Luhur. (Both the rump Pendawa Lima and Pertjajah Luhur use the abbreviation “PL,” causing confusion in some news reports.) Leader: Salam SOMOHARDJO. Other parties are the National Party for Leadership and Development (Nationale Partij voor Leiderschap en Ontwikkeling—NPLO), led by Oesman WANGSABESARIE; the National Reform Party (Nationale Hervormings Partij— NHP), led by Kenneth MOENNE; New Choice (Naya Kadam—NK), led by Waldo RAMDHAL; the Party for Democracy through Unity and Development (Partij voor Demokratie en Ontwikkeling in Eenheid—DOE); and the Suriname Amazon Party (Amazone Partij Suriname—APS), led by Kenneth VAN GENDEREN.

Exile Group In January 1983 a Movement for the Liberation of Suriname was formed by exiles in the Netherlands under the leadership of former president Chin and former deputy prime minister Andr´e HAAKMAT. However, the Dutch government refused to recognize the group as a government in exile, and both subsequently declared their support for the Surinamese Liberation Army (SLA, below).

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Guerrilla Groups Surinamese Liberation Army (SLA). The largely bosneger SLA was formed in early 1986 by former army private Ronnie Brunswijk with the avowed aim of overthrowing Colonel Bouterse and “[restoring] the constitutional state” through free elections. The government charged Surinamese e´ migr´es in the Netherlands with supporting the SLA, whose approximately 2,000 members launched a guerrilla campaign in the country’s eastern and southern regions that appeared to have been largely contained by mid-1987. In the wake of the November election, the SLA’s “Jungle Commando” was reported to have declared an unconditional truce, effective January 1, 1988. Sporadic conflict, interspersed by talks with government and army representatives, nonetheless continued, before the conclusion of a preliminary peace accord in a ceremony attended by Bouterse and Brunswijk on March 26, 1991, which was followed by a suspension of hostilities on May 5 and the conclusion of a formal peace treaty on August 1, 1992. The General Liberation and Development Party, led by Brunswijk, competed unsuccessfully in the 1996 and 2000 elections. Brunswijk was sentenced in absentia to eight years in prison by a court in the Netherlands in April 1999 following his conviction on charges of cocaine trafficking. He now heads the ABOP (under AC, above), the present status of the SLA being unclear. Other guerrilla formations have included the Union for Liberation and Democracy, a radical derivative of the SLA led by Kofi AJONGPONG; the Saramaccaner bosneger Angula movement, led by Carlos MAASSI; the Mandela Bushnegro Liberation Movement, led by Leendert ADAMS (“Biko”); the Amerindian Tucayana Amazonica, led by Alex JUBITANA and Thomas SABAJO, which participated in the 1992 peace accords; and the previously unknown Suriname Liberation Front, led by Cornelius MAISI, which was routed by the army after a hostage seizure at a hydroelectric facility south of Paramaribo in March 1994.

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Cabinet As of July 1, 2007 Prime Minister

Ram Sardjoe

Ministers Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries Defense Education and Community Development Finance Foreign Affairs Internal Affairs Justice and Police Labor and Technological Services; Trade and Industry (acting) Natural Resources and Energy Planning and Development Cooperation Public Health Public Works Regional Development Social Affairs and Housing Transport, Communication, and Tourism Urban Planning and Centralization

Keremchand (Stanley) Ragoebarsingh Ivan Fernald Edwin Wolf Humphrey Hildenberg Lygia Kraeg-Keteldijk [f] Maurits Hassankhan Chandrikapersad Santokhi Clifford Marica Gregory Rusland Ricardo van Raavenswaay Celcius Waterberg Ganeshkoemar Kandhai Michel Felisie Hendrik Setrowidjojo Richel Apensa Michael Yong Tjˆıen Fa

[f] = female

Legislature The former unicameral Parliament (Staten) was abolished on August 15, 1980. A constituent National Assembly (Volksvergadering) of 31 nominated members was established on January 1, 1985, as part of the government’s “return to democracy” program. Balloting for the successor National Assembly (Nationale Assemblee) occurred on November 25, 1987, and, in the wake of the 1990 coup, on May 25, 1991. The most recent election for 51 members on May 25, 2005, yielded a distribution as follows: New Front for Democracy and Development, 23; National Democratic Party, 15; People’s Alliance for Progress, 5; A-Combination, 5; Alternative-1, 3. President: Paul Slamet SOMOHARDJO.

Communications All nongovernmental organs of public information were closed down in December 1982, although

some were subsequently permitted to resume activity.

Press The principal newspaper is the independent daily De Ware Tidj published in Dutch and Sranan Tongo; others include De West (15,000), in Dutch, and several Chinese-language publications.

News Agency The official facility is the Suriname News Agency (Surinaams Nieuws Agentschap—SNA), which issues daily bulletins in Dutch and English.

Broadcasting and Computing There are a number of small commercial radio stations in addition to the government-owned Stichting Radio-omroep Suriname (SRS) and Surinaamse Televisie Stichting (STVS), each of which

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broadcasts in all local languages. As of 2005, there were approximately 71 Internet users and 518 mobile cellular subscribers per 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Jacques Ruben Constantjin KROSS

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U.S. Ambassador to Suriname: Lisa Bobbie Scheiber HUGHES Permanent Representative to the UN: Henry L. MacDONALD IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, IADB, IDB, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OIC, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WTO

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Note: Unofficial results from legislative elections held November 5, 2007 showed that the People’s National Movement party would remain in power and extend its majority to 26 of 41 seats in the House of Representatives. Prime Minister Patrick Manning was reinstated in office on December 17, and the opposition United National Congress won the remaining 15 seats. On February 11, 2008, president George Maxwell Richards was reelected during a session of the electoral college, having faced no significant opposition.

The Country Comprised of a pair of scenic tropical islands off the northern coast of South America, the Englishspeaking state of Trinidad and Tobago forms the southern extremity of the island chain known as the Lesser Antilles. Trinidad is the larger and more highly developed of the two islands, accounting for nearly 95 percent of the country’s area and population and by far the greater part of its national wealth. As in nearby Guyana, approximately 43 percent of the population are descendants of African slaves, while another 40 percent are descendants of East Indian indentured laborers brought during the 19th century. Most of the former are presently concentrated in urban areas, while most of the latter are active as independent farmers. People of mixed ancestry, together with a few Europeans and Chinese, make up the rest of Trinidad’s inhabitants, while Tobago’s population is largely of African extraction. Roman Catholicism predominates, but Hinduism, Protestant Christianity, and Islam are also represented. The economy has traditionally been heavily dependent on refined petroleum and related products derived from both domestically extracted and imported crude oil. Although domestic reserves were thought to be approaching exhaustion in the late 1960s, natural gas and oil deposits subsequently discovered off Trinidad’s southeast coast gave new

impetus to the refining and petrochemical industries, which now account for more than 90 percent of export earnings. Tourism is of growing importance, while agriculture plays a relatively minor role in the islands’ economy. In early 2007 the government announced plans to emulate neighboring St. Kitts by closing down its long-standing, but

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Political Status: Independent member of the Commonwealth since August 31, 1962; republican constitution adopted August 1, 1976. Area: 1,980 sq. mi. (5,128 sq. km.), of which Trinidad encompasses 1,864 sq. mi. (4,828 sq. km.) and Tobago 116 sq. mi. (300 sq. km.). Population: 1,262,366 (2000C); 1,315,000 (2006E). Major Urban Center (2000C): PORT-OF-SPAIN (49,031). Official Language: English. On September 1, 2005, the government announced that Spanish would be adopted as an official language by 2020 to permit Trinidadians to compete more effectively in regional markets. Monetary Unit: Trinidad and Tobago Dollar (market rate November 2, 2007: 6.29 dollars = $1US). President: (See headnote.) George Maxwell (Max) RICHARDS; elected by Parliament to a five-year term on February 14, 2003, and inaugurated on March 17, succeeding Arthur Napoleon Raymond ROBINSON. Prime Minister: (See headnote.) Patrick Augustus Mervyn MANNING (People’s National Movement), appointed by the president on December 24, 2001, following general election of December 10, to succeed Basdeo PANDAY (United National Congress); reappointed on October 9, 2002, following election of October 7.

increasingly unprofitable, sugar industry in favor of a more balanced agricultural sector geared to domestic consumption. Starting in 1973, soaring oil prices produced rapid growth, pushing per capita income by the early 1980s to about $7,000, the third highest in the Western Hemisphere. Between 1982 and mid1990, on the other hand, the GNP declined by 30 percent, largely because of falling prices and markets for oil. Further economic adversity resulted from a coup attempt in August 1990, which triggered widespread violence and looting in the capital. While marginal recovery was registered in

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1991, economic performance declined by an average of 1.1 percent annually during 1985–1993, before turning positive, cresting at 5.6 percent in 1998, then declining steadily to 2.7 percent in 2002. Spurred by sales of recently discovered natural gas, growth rose again to 13.2 percent in 2003, declined to 6.5 percent in 2004, then increased marginally to 6.7 percent in 2005. Unemployment fell from 14.6 percent in 1999 to 8.3 percent in 2004, while inflation registered 9.1 percent in 2006. As in other Caribbean countries, Trinidad and Tobago suffered major losses from the series of hurricanes in September 2004; the government estimated local damage at $30 billion.

Government and Politics Political Background Discovered by Columbus and ruled by Spain for varying periods, Trinidad and Tobago became British possessions during the Napoleonic wars and were merged in 1888 to form a single Crown Colony. Political and social consciousness developed rapidly during the 1930s, when the trade union movement and socialism began to emerge as major influences. The People’s National Movement (PNM), the country’s first solidly based political party, was founded in 1956 by Dr. Eric WILLIAMS and controlled the government without interruption for the next 30 years. Following participation in the short-lived, British-sponsored Federation of the West Indies from 1958 to 1962, Trinidad and Tobago was granted full independence within the Commonwealth on August 31, 1962. After an initial period of tranquility, “black power” demonstrations broke out, which led to the declaration of a state of emergency in April 1970 and later to an attempted coup by elements of the military. Subsequent political instability included a fresh wave of labor unrest that resulted in the reimposition of a state of emergency in October 1971. In October 1973 Prime Minister Williams announced his intention to retire from politics, but he reversed himself two months later, ostensibly at

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the request of his party, until steps had been taken to implement a republican constitution. In the legislative election of September 13, 1976, the PNM won 24 of the 36 House seats. Williams died unexpectedly on March 29, 1981, and was succeeded as prime minister and party leader by George M. CHAMBERS, who led the PNM to a 26–10 victory in parliamentary balloting on November 9. Severe economic decline and the formation for the first time of a solid coalition of opposition groups—the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR)—led to reversal in 1986 of the PNM’s theretofore uninterrupted control of the government with the NAR winning 33 of 36 House seats in balloting on December 15, and Arthur N. R. ROBINSON succeeding Chambers as prime minister. However, the Robinson government proved no more successful in coping with fiscal adversity than its predecessor. In April 1989 a group of dissidents under the leadership of Basdeo PANDAY, who had been expelled from the NAR seven months earlier, organized the United National Congress (UNC), which secured a stunning by-election victory over both the NAR and PNM on May 1. A far greater embarrassment to the administration was an attempted coup by members of a militant black Muslim sect, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, on July 27, 1990. The rebels succeeded in occupying Trinidad’s state-run TV station and its legislative building, taking a number of hostages (including the prime minister) before agreeing to surrender on August 1. In a forceful repudiation of Robinson’s austerity program, the PNM, under the relatively youthful Patrick MANNING, won 21 house seats on December 16, 1991; only the ousted prime minister and Tobago’s other representative survived the PNM landslide. At local elections in September 1992, the PNM was victorious in 10 of 14 council races, with the UNC winning 4 and the NAR none. During 1995 both of the leading parties were overtaken by scandals that included indecent assault charges against the leader of the opposition, a storm over demotion of the PNM foreign minister, brief confinement of the speaker of the House of Representatives to house arrest, and suggestions that the police were operating a “death squad.” In an

effort to regain the political initiative, Prime Minister Manning called an early election for November 6, 1995, at which the PNM and the opposition UNC both won 17 seats. The UNC’s Panday subsequently concluded a “partnership agreement” with the minority NAR and on November 9 was sworn in as the country’s first prime minister of Indian descent. Subsequently, on February 14, 1997, Robinson was elected president of the republic in a 46–18 vote in Parliament. The UNC secured a slim majority of 19 lower house seats in the election of December 11, 2000. However, the defection of three ministers in October 2001 forced a premature dissolution and the scheduling of a new election on December 10. The results of the polling were inconclusive (the UNC and the PNM won 18 seats each, on vote shares of 49.9 and 46.5 percent, respectively), and both Panday and Manning claimed the right to form the new cabinet. On December 17 they reportedly agreed to let the president choose who should be the next prime minister. However, when Robinson named Manning on December 24, Panday protested and declared the agreement void, claiming the president was “biased.” Although Manning announced his cabinet over the next few days, Panday rejected the post of “Leader of the Opposition.” In addition, his party refused to participate in the election of a speaker of the House of Representatives, which could not therefore formally convene, forcing an extended political stalemate. On March 14, 2002, President Robinson requested that his term (expiring on March 18) be extended temporarily “in national interest,” because the Parliament remained unable to elect a successor. While Panday protested the request, Manning approved the extension. On April 7, 2002, Robinson, on the advice of Manning, suspended the Parliament following yet another failed attempt to convene the House on April 5. Manning attempted to convene the house one more time in late August, but that effort also failed. At a new election on October 7, 2002, the PNM secured a majority of 20 house seats and Prime Minister Manning was reappointed two days later.

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Constitution and Government Under the 1976 constitution, Trinidad and Tobago became a republic, with a president (elected by a majority of both houses of Parliament) replacing the former governor general. The functions of the head of state remain limited, executive authority being exercised by a prime minister and cabinet appointed from among the members of the legislature. Parliament consists of an appointed Senate, a majority of whose members are proposed by the prime minister, and a House of Representatives elected by universal adult suffrage. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court, which consists of a High Court and a Court of Appeal, while district courts function at the local level. There is also an Industrial Court and a Tax Appeal Board, both serving as superior courts of record. Judges are appointed by the president on the advice of the prime minister. In a waning anomaly among former British dependencies, Trinidad retains the right of ultimate appeal to the Judicial Committee of the UK Privy Council. The provision is designed to afford litigants access to a completely disinterested final court. Rural administration is carried out on the basis of 9 counties on Trinidad, which are subdivided into 29 electoral wards, plus 1 ward for all of Tobago. Four municipalities (Port-of-Spain, San Fernando, Arima, and Point Fortin) have elected mayors and city councils. After three years of debate, the House of Representatives in September 1980 approved a bill establishing a 15-member House of Assembly for Tobago with primarily consultative responsibilities. In January 1987 Tobago was granted full internal self-government, its House being given control of revenue collection, economic planning, and provision of services. In July 1993 Prime Minister Manning announced that agreement had been reached with the Tobago House of Assembly on enhanced constitutional status for the smaller island, including the creation of an Executive Council to oversee its day-to-day affairs and the appointment of a senator to represent Tobago exclusively. However, a

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number of changes were made in the proposed constitutional amendment before its adoption in late November 1996, with plans for additional Senate representation for Tobago being dropped altogether. In August 2006 Manning submitted the draft of a new constitution to Parliament that would abolish the office of prime minister, whose duties would be assumed by an indirectly elected president serving a two-year term. In addition, the Senate would be increased to 49 members, of whom 28 would be appointed by local government bodies, 18 by a system of proportional representation, and 3 by the lower house.

Foreign Relations In 1967 Trinidad and Tobago, which had joined the United Nations at independence, became the first Commonwealth country to be admitted to the Organization of American States (OAS). Its anticolonial but democratic and pro-Western foreign policy is oriented chiefly toward the Western Hemisphere and includes active participation in such regional organizations as Caricom. However, since 1983 a number of disputes with fellow Caricom members over trade restrictions have tended to hinder regional cooperation. Port-of-Spain’s objections to the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada in October 1983 also cooled relations with a number of Eastern Caribbean states, most notably Barbados, and strained traditionally cordial relations with the United States, with Prime Minister Chambers criticizing what he perceived as the Reagan administration’s attempt to “militarize” the region. However, efforts have since been initiated to lower the government’s profile both on trade and foreign policy issues. Relations with the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union were established in 1974, while a broad trade agreement signed in August 1984 with China was hailed as a “major leap forward in China’s relations with the Commonwealth Caribbean.” No major foreign policy changes were advanced under the NAR administration, the essentially moderate Prime Minister Robinson having set as an

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initial priority the elimination of trade barriers within Caricom. In February 1997 Trinidad’s attorney general announced that a special intelligence unit would be established with U.S. and British assistance to monitor suspicious financial activities, including those associated with drug trafficking. In August a longsimmering dispute erupted with Venezuela over oil drilling in the straits separating the two countries, with altercations between Trinidadian riggers and Venezuelan patrol boats becoming increasingly common. Subsequently, the government signaled its intention to supply gas to nearby islands, such as Martinique and Guadalupe, via undersea pipelines, and in 2003 a feasibility study was commissioned for an 1,800-mile line to Florida. Meanwhile, friction arose with Barbados over a 1990 treaty between Trinidad and Venezuela, which was alleged “unilaterally to appropriate to Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago an enormous part of Barbados’ and Guyana’s maritime territory, as well as one-third of Guyana’s land territory” (see Guyana entry). The dispute led to a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in April 2006 that established a median line halfway between the exclusive economic zones of Barbados and Trinidad. However, the ruling allowed Barbados to exploit hydrocarbon resources up to 150 nautical miles beyond the line. On a highly contentious collateral issue, the Court stated that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the right of Barbadian fishermen to operate in Trinidadian waters.

SHARMA stepped down in the face of charges that he had attempted to intervene in the outcome of the case. Earlier, in November 2005, Yasin Abu BAKR, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen leader, had been arrested and charged with inciting violence under a recently enacted Anti-Terrorism Act. He was released on bail in July 2006, reportedly because of ill health. Rearrested on charges of conspiracy to murder two former members of his group, he was again freed in December 2006 because of the unreliability of the government’s evidence against him.

Political Parties Before 1976, Trinidad and Tobago’s party system was based primarily on a long-standing rivalry between the ruling People’s National Movement (PNM) and the opposition Democratic Labour Party (DLP), with the PNM serving to some extent as a vehicle for African voters and the DLP mainly representing East Indians. Efforts toward a unified electoral opposition began in 1981, when the United Labour Front (ULF), which had emerged after the 1976 election as the principal opposition grouping, aligned itself with two smaller parties as the Trinidad and Tobago National Alliance; two years later, the Alliance and the Organization for National Reconstruction formed a temporary coalition (known as the “Accommodation”) that gained 66 of the county council seats to the PNM’s 54. The linkage was formalized in September 1985, with the organization of the National Alliance for Reconstruction (below).

Current Issues In May 2005, opposition leader Basdeo Panday, who had been indicted in September 2002 for corruption while serving as prime minister, was imprisoned after refusing to pay bail set by a magistrates’ court. He was released a week later, amid mounting social tension between his largely Asian UNC supporters and those of the largely African PNM. In April 2006 Panday was fined and sentenced to two years in the matter; the conviction, however, was reversed by an appellate court in March 2007. Meanwhile, Chief Justice Satnarine

Legislative Parties People’s National Movement (PNM). Organized in 1956 by historian-politician Eric Williams, the PNM was the first genuinely modern party in the country’s history and owed much of its success to its early formation, its founder’s gift for leadership, and its comparatively high degree of organization. Although its support is predominantly African, its progressive and internationalist programs have been distinguished by their emphasis on national unity irrespective of

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ethnic origin. Leadership problems within the PNM have involved A. N. R. Robinson and Karl Hudson-Phillips (see under NAR, below). Following Williams’s death on March 29, 1981, George M. Chambers was elected party leader. After three decades of uninterrupted rule, the PNM was forced into opposition in December 1986, when it won only 3 of 36 house seats. The overwhelming reversal was attributed to the inability of the Chambers administration to halt steady economic decline since 1982. Following the defeat, Chambers resigned as party leader and retired from politics (he died on November 5, 1997). Subsequently, the party’s youth movement won its first battle with the “old guard” by the naming of 40year-old Patrick Manning, one of the three successful House candidates, as the PNM’s political leader. Manning led the party to a resounding comeback in December 1991, when it captured 21 legislative seats. In 1995 the PNM secured a vote share of 48.8 percent (an increase of 3.7 percent from 1991) but tied in seats with the UNC, which was able to form a ruling coalition with the NAR. Manning was reelected leader at a party convention on October 13, 1996. The PNM won 16 seats in legislative polling in December 2000, and 8 seats in the Tobago House of Assembly polling in January 2001. The party increased its representation to 18 in the December 2001 legislative polling, but the result was a stalemate, since the UNC also won 18 seats. In new balloting on October 7, 2002, the PNM secured a majority of 20 seats. Leaders: Patrick A. M. MANNING (Prime Minister), Kenneth VALLEY (Deputy Leader), Joan YUILLE-WILLIAMS (Deputy Leader), Franklin KHAN (Chair), Orville LONDON (Party Leader in Tobago), Martin JOSEPH (General Secretary). United National Congress (UNC). The UNC was formally launched on April 30, 1989, by the members of Club ’88 (see under NAR, below) who had been formally expelled from the NAR in October 1988 after having campaigned against Prime Minister Robinson’s style of leadership. The new group drew much of its support from former ULF

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members opposed to Robinson’s IMF-mandated austerity policies. The UNC defeated both the NAR and the PNM at a local council by-election on May 1, 1989, but, while holding six parliamentary seats to the PNM’s three, did not seek appointment as the official opposition until September 1990. A result of dissention within the party was the establishment in September 1994 of the Monday Club, an intraparty pressure group led by Hulsie Bhaggan, an MP who had been stripped of her political responsibilities two months earlier. Concurrently, three women who had been employed at UNC headquarters charged party leader Panday with rape and indecent assault. In late November, after having been arrested and released on bail, Panday lodged a suit against Attorney General Keith SOBION for alleged conspiracy to damage his reputation. Two of the indecent assault charges were dropped in mid-December, revived in January 1995, and again dismissed on March 10, after which Panday sued the government for malicious prosecution. Although the UNC was unable to secure a plurality of seats at the 1995 balloting (it and the PNM winning 17 each), Panday was able to form a government on the basis of a “partnership agreement” with the NAR. The UNC won 19 seats in the December 2000 polling. Relations between Prime Minister Panday and Ramesh MAHARAJ, the attorney general and UNC deputy leader, had long been strained by seeming slights, including Panday’s unwillingness to name Maharaj acting prime minister while he was absent from the country. In addition, Maharaj and two other ministers had criticized Panday over corruption in state facilities and allowing business leaders excessive influence in public policy. In early October 2001, Panday dismissed his rebellious colleagues, who promptly entered into an “alliance” with the opposition PNM. Subsequently, Maharaj claimed that his faction controlled the UNC and would place candidates in all 36 constituencies in the forthcoming election. Although Panday briefly registered a new formation—the United National Party (UNP)—in case the courts allowed the Maharaj faction to use the UNC rubric,

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both the Elections and Boundaries Commission and the High Court ruled in November in favor of Panday, prompting the Maharaj faction to leave the party to form the TNU (see below). The early legislative polling of December 10, 2001, yielded a stalemate with the PNM; at the subsequent balloting of October 7, 2002, UNC representation dropped to 16. Charges of corruption against Panday while heading the UNC administration led to his brief imprisonment in mid-2005, and in October he moved from the post of party leader to that of chair, albeit with no apparent loss of party control. His successor as party leader, Winston Dookeran, resigned in September 2006 to form a new party, the Congress of the People (below). Leaders: Kamla PERSAD-BISSESSAR (Leader of the Opposition), Basdeo PANDAY (Former Prime Minister and Party Chair). Congress of the People (COP). The COP was launched on September 10, 2006, by former UNC party leader Winston Dookeran, who had been threatened with expulsion from the UNC on the basis of claims that he was maintaining a parallel political organization. Leader: Winston DOOKERAN.

Other Parties National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR). The NAR was launched in 1984 as a coalition of the United Labour Front (ULF), the Democratic Action Congress (DAC), and the Tapia House Movement (THM); all had participated in the 1981 campaign as members of the Trinidad and Tobago National Alliance (TTNA). In September 1985 the Organization for National Reconstruction (ONR) joined the new formation, which reorganized as a unified party in February 1986. The ULF had grown out of labor unrest in the sugar, oil, and transport industries in early 1975, and its leaders campaigned in 1976 for the nationalization of these and other major industries. Its leadership consisted primarily of a somewhat uneasy coalition of longtime opponents of the late Prime Minister Williams, including Basdeo Panday, East Indian head of the sugar workers’ union;

George Weekes, head of the black-dominated oil workers; and James Millette of the United National Independence Party (UNIP). The small Liberal Action Party (LAP), led by Ivan Perot, also joined the ULF before the 1976 balloting. Panday resigned as both party and union head in the wake of a poor showing by the former in the 1980 local elections, but he was subsequently returned to the posts by overwhelming majorities. The ULF obtained eight lower house seats in November 1981. Headed by Arthur N. R. Robinson, a former PNM associate (and one-time heir apparent) of Prime Minister Williams, the DAC was a relatively conservative grouping that won the two seats from the island of Tobago in the 1976 parliamentary election, retaining both in 1981. In mid-1978 Winston Murray, one of the winners in 1976, repudiated Robinson’s leadership and in 1980 withdrew from the party (see Fargo House Movement, below). Robinson himself resigned his seat to stand for reelection to the Tobago House of Assembly in 1980, subsequently being named chair of the new body. The Tapia (“mud wall”) group emerged as an offshoot of the black power movement at the University of the West Indies. It called for the nationalization of all foreign-controlled enterprises and a reconstituted, elected Senate with greater representation of ordinary citizens. In late 1974 four of its members were appointed opposition delegates to the Senate on the recommendation of Roy RICHARDSON of the now defunct United Democratic Labour Party (UDLP), who was then the sole recognized opposition member of the House of Representatives. The THM won no parliamentary seats in 1981 and many of its members, including Tapia leader Lloyd BEST, withdrew from the alliance in June 1987 after accusing the Robinson administration of “drifting as aimlessly” as its predecessor. In late 1989 the Tapia House leadership announced that it intended to withdraw from the NAR and reorganize as a separate party, although no such move was subsequently reported to have been implemented. The moderately left-of-center ONR was founded by Karl Hudson-Phillips following his

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withdrawal from the PNM in April 1980. Although failing to win any legislative seats in 1981, the group ran second in the popular vote (22.3 percent) and, given the ULF’s largely ethnic base among sugar workers, was called “the only real claimant, other than the PNM, to national party status.” Despite his group’s steadily improving position in the polls, Hudson-Phillips declared in June 1985 that he would not stand for prime minister, thereby providing indirect support for Robinson’s candidacy. The NAR’s success in coalescing behind Robinson and its leader’s ability to attract support from diverse ethnic and labor groups were considered major factors in the group’s stunning victory in the December 1986 balloting. However, by early 1988 the alliance had encountered severe internal stress, culminating in the expulsion of a number of ULF dissidents led by Basdeo Panday, who had formed an anti-Robinson intraparty formation known as Club ’88 (“Club” being an acronym for Caucus for Love, Unity, and Brotherhood). In April 1989 the Club ’88 group reorganized as a separate party, the United National Congress (UNC, above). The NAR was decimated by the December 1991 poll, retaining only its two lower house seats from Tobago. In the wake of the defeat Robinson resigned as party leader, the former minister of works, Carson Charles was named his successor at the NAR annual convention on March 29, 1992. The party retained overwhelming control of the Tobago House of Assembly on December 7, 1992, winning 11 seats to 1 for the PNM. NAR leader Charles was replaced by Selby WILSON in early 1993, and Charles subsequently left the party to form the National Development Party (NDP). Wilson, in turn, resigned the leadership in August 1994 after having denounced a byelection alliance between the NDP and the NAR. In the 1995 election the NAR again failed to secure representation in Trinidad. However, by keeping its 2 Tobago seats it was able to enter into a ruling alliance with the UNC. The NAR retained 10 of its 11 seats in the Tobago House of Assembly on December 9, 1996, the lost seat going to an incumbent who had resigned from the NAR in November and campaigned as an independent.

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In October 1999 the NAR National Council named former party chair Anthony SMART as interim leader after “vacating of the post” by Nizam MOHAMMED, who insisted he had been dismissed and was subsequently reinstated. The NAR won one seat in the 2000 legislative election and four seats in the January 2001 Tobago House of Assembly poll. The party won no House of Representatives seats in 2001 and 2002. Carson Charles was reelected party leader on October 23, 2006. During 2006 the NAR joined with a number of smaller parties in a series of shifting alliances. On April 20 a merger with the MND (below) and DPTT (below) was announced, which, without reference to the MND but with the addition of the DNA (below), was subsequently styled the Democratic National Alliance. However, the DNA withdrew on June 9, while in July the NDP (below) joined the grouping, which was restyled the National Democratic Alliance. Leaders: Carson CHARLES (Leader of the Party), Christo GIFT (Chair). Movement for National Development (MND). The MND was launched in October 2005 with a platform of government decentralization, improving social services, and reducing the crime rate. Leader: Garvin NICHOLAS. Team National Unity (TNU). The TNU is a breakaway group from the UNC, formed in November 2001 by former attorney general and UNC deputy leader Ramesh Maharaj and others. Their faction’s effort to keep the UNC name was rejected by the courts, and they registered the TNU to contest the general elections in December, at which the TNU won 2.5 percent of the vote and no legislative seats. Leader: Ramesh MAHARAJ. Citizens Alliance (CA). The CA was launched in December 2001 by former cabinet minister Wendell Mottley to “bring a fresh voice to politics beyond the UNC-PNM polarization.” Leader: Wendell MOTTLEY. Movement for Unity and Progress (MUP). The MUP was launched in December 1994 by

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Hulsie Bhaggan, who continued, however, as a member of the UNC until her formal expulsion on August 13. Leader: Hulsie BHAGGAN. National Joint Action Committee (NJAC). The NJAC was organized by Geddes Granger, who played a leading role in the black power disturbances of 1970 and was under detention from October 1971 to June 1972 before changing his name to Makandal Daaga. The group contested elections in 1981, when it secured 3.3 percent of the popular vote, and in 1986, when it won 1.5 percent. Leader: Makandal DAAGA. Republican Party (RP). The RP was launched in January 1994 by Nello Mitchell, the PNM’s former general secretary, who was expelled from the party in July 1993 for “gross disrespect.” Leader: Nello MITCHELL. National Vision Party (NVP). The NVP was formed in early 1994 by Yasin Abu Bakr, leader of the unsuccessful 1990 coup by the Jamaat-alMusilmeen. Leader: Yasin Abu BAKR. People’s Empowerment Party (PEP). The Tobago-based PEP was organized in 1999 by a group of NAR dissidents, including one of its two House of Representatives members. Leaders: Deborah MOORE-MIGGINS, Richard ALFRED (General Secretary). Democratic National Assembly (DNA). The DNA, an outgrowth of a number of groups, including Dr. Kirk Meighoo’s Committee for Transformation and Progress, was launched in March 2006 and participated briefly in the Democratic National Alliance led by the NAR. Leader: Dr. Kirk MEIGHOO. Trinidad’s minor parties also include the Movement for Social Transformation (MST), led by David ABDULLAH; the National Democratic Organization (NDO), led by Enoch JOHN; the United Freedom Party (UFP), led by Ramdeo SAMPAT-MEHTA; the West Indian National Party (WINP), led by Ashford SINANAN; and the Democratic Liberation Party (DLP), a break-

away faction of the WINP, led by Bhadase S. MARAJ. Among new parties formed in 2002 were the Democratic Party of Trinidad and Tobago (DPTT), led by Steve ALVAREZ; and the National Democratic Party (NDP), led by Robert AMAR and Michael SIMS. In early 2003 former NAR faction leader Hochoy CHARLES launched a new Democratic Action Congress (DAC). The move was considered significant, since the original DAC had been a founding component of the NAR; however, the party captured only one seat at the 2005 Tobago election.

Legislature The national Parliament is a bicameral body consisting of an appointed Senate and an elected House of Representatives; Tobago has a unicameral House of Assembly. Senate. The upper chamber consists of 31 members appointed by the president for a maximum term of five years: 16 are named on the advice of the prime minister; 6 on the advice of the leader of the opposition; and 9 at the president’s discretion from religious, economic, and social groups. President: Linda BABOOLAL. House of Representatives. The lower chamber has 36 members directly elected for five-year terms, subject to dissolution. In the election of October 7, 2002, the People’s National Movement won 20 seats and the United National Congress, 16. Speaker: Barendra SINANAN. Tobago House of Assembly. Tobago’s legislature consists of 15 members, 12 directly elected and 3 named by the majority party; its term is four years. In a landslide victory at the most recent balloting of January 17, 2005, the People’s National Movement won 11 of the elective seats and the Democratic Action Congress, 1. Chief Secretary: Orville LONDON.

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Cabinet As of July 1, 2007 see headnote Prime Minister

Patrick Manning

Ministers Agriculture, Land, and Marine Resources Community Development, Culture, and Gender Affairs Education Energy and Energy Industries Finance Foreign Affairs Health Housing Labor and Small- and Micro-Enterprise Development Legal Affairs and Consumer Affairs Local Government National Security Planning and Development Public Administration and Information Public Utilities and the Environment Science, Technology, and Tertiary Education Social Development Sports and Youth Affairs Tobago Affairs Tourism Trade and Industry Works and Transport Attorney General

Jarrette Narine Joan Yullie Williams [f] Hazel Anne Marie Manning [f] Lenny Saith Patrick Manning Arnold Piggott John Rahael Keith Rowley Danny Montano Christine Robinson-Regis [f] Rennie Dumas Martin Joseph Camille Robinson-Regis [f] Lenny Saith Penelope Beckles [f] Mustapha Abdul Hamid Anthony Roberts Roger Boynes Patrick Manning Howard Chin Lee Kenneth Valley Colm Imbert John Jeremie

[f] = female

Communications Press The following are privately owned and are published daily in Port-of-Spain: Trinidad Guardian (51,000 daily, 48,000 Sunday); Trinidad and Tobago Express (43,000 daily, 51,000 Sunday); Newsday (25,000), launched in September 1993. In 1997 a proposed government code of ethics that would require journalists “to highlight and promote activities of the state which aim at national unity and solidarity” was criticized as potentially limiting freedom of expression.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility. The Caribbean News Agency (CANA) is used for most international and some domestic news. A number of foreign agencies maintain offices in Port-ofSpain.

Broadcasting and Computing Radio programming is provided by the government-owned International Communications Network and by the commercial Trinidad

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Broadcasting Company—TBC (Radio Trinidad), which in early 1990 was purchased by a group owning the Trinidad Guardian. Commercial television is provided by the government-owned Trinidad and Tobago Television Company—TTT and by a Caribbean Communications Network—CCN outlet. As of 2005, there were approximately 79 personal computers and 122 Internet users per 1,000 residents. In that same year there were an estimated 613 mobile cellular subscribers for every 1,000 residents.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Marina Annette VALERE U.S. Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago: Roy L. AUSTIN Permanent Representative to the UN: Philip SEALY IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, Caricom, CDB, CWTH, IADB, Interpol, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, SELA, WCO, WTO

UNITED KINGDOM UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Related Territories All major, and many minor, territories of the former British Empire achieved full independence in the course of the last century, and most are now members of the Commonwealth, a voluntary association of states held together primarily by a common political and constitutional heritage and, in most cases, use of the English language (see “The Commonwealth” in Intergovernmental Organizations section). In conventional usage, the term Commonwealth also includes the territories and dependencies of the UK and other Commonwealth member countries. As of 2006 the UK retained a measure of responsibility, direct or indirect, for 3 Crown dependencies, 11 inhabited territories, 2 essentially uninhabited territories, and the so-called Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus. In September 1998, following up on a commitment made at the Dependent Territories Association conference in London the preceding February, the Blair government announced that it intended to introduce legislation that would supersede the 1981 British Nationality Act, which had excluded most colonial residents from British citizenship, and restore their “right of abode” in the UK, which had been revoked in 1962. The dependencies would be restyled British overseas territories. A white paper issued in March 1999 reaffirmed the government’s intentions, although the government added that the Caribbean colonies would be required to introduce various criminal justice reforms—for example, abolishing the death penalty and decriminalizing consensual homosexual relations—before attaining the new status. Implementing legislation was passed in 2002, with British citizenship being

conferred on citizens of all British overseas territories (except the Sovereign Base Areas) from May 21. Since 2005 many of the territories, with London’s cooperation and encouragement, have been studying possible constitutional reforms.

Inhabited Overseas Territories The territories described below remain directly subordinate to the UK, although a number of them enjoy almost complete autonomy in internal affairs. The term “colony” or “crown colony,” a historical relic without contemporary legal import, is often still used in reference to these jurisdictions. Anguilla. One of the most northern of the Caribbean’s Leeward Islands (see Antigua/Barbuda map, p. 48), Anguilla has a land area of 35 square miles (91 sq. km.), exclusive of Sombrero’s 2 square miles (5 sq. km.), and a resident population (2006E) of 13,100. There is no capital city as such, apart from a centrally located sector known as The Valley. The main industries are tourism, offshore banking and finance, and construction. Overseas remittances from Anguillans living abroad are a substantial source of island revenue. Anguilla was first settled by the British in 1632 and became part of the Territory of the Leeward Islands in 1956. Following establishment of the Associated State of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla in early 1967, the Anguillans repudiated government from Basseterre, St. Kitts, and a British commissioner was installed following a landing by British security forces in March 1969. The island was subsequently placed under the direct administration

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Anguilla (U.K.)

ATLAN TI C O CEAN

VENEZUELA

Dog Island

Anguilla Seal Island

Prickley Pear Cays

(U.K.)

Island Harbour

Scrub Island

The Valley

Anguilla Blowing Point Ca r i b b e a n Sea St. Martin (FRANCE)

0 0

8 Mi

St. Maarten (NETH.)

8 Km

of Britain, while a separate constitution that was enacted in February 1976 gave the resident commissioner (subsequently governor) authority over foreign affairs, defense, civil service, and internal security. Other executive functions are undertaken on the advice of an Executive Council that, in accordance with a 1982 constitution (amended in 1990), consists of a chief minister; three additional ministers; and the deputy governor and attorney general, ex officio. Legislative authority, save in respect of the governor’s reserve powers, is the responsibility of a House of Assembly encompassing a speaker; seven elected members; two nominated members; and the deputy governor and attorney general, ex officio. An act of December 1980 formally confirmed the dependent status of the territory, which also includes the neighboring island of Sombrero. Ronald WEBSTER, then leader of the People’s Progressive Party, headed Anguilla’s government after the separation from St. Kitts-Nevis in 1967 until 1977, when he was replaced by Emile GUMBS, then leader of what became the Anguilla

National Alliance (ANA). Webster returned to power in 1980 as leader of the Anguilla United Party (AUP) but in 1984 was again replaced by Gumbs, who remained chief minister following the 1989 election until his retirement in February 1994 (by which time he was Sir Emile). Meanwhile, Webster had founded what became the Anguilla Democratic Party (ADP) but had reverted to the AUP for the 1989 election; subsequently, he formed the Anguillans for Good Government (AGG) party. The March 1994 election failed to produce a clear winner, with the ANA (led by Eric REID), the ADP (led by Victor BANKS), and the AUP (led by Hubert HUGHES) each winning two seats; an independent, one; and Webster’s new party, none. The outcome was an AUP-ADP coalition under the chief ministership of the AUP leader. At the election of March 4, 1999, the ANA, led by Osbourne Fleming, captured three house seats, but with the ADP and the AUP again winning two seats each, a renewal of the AUPADP coalition permitted Hughes to claim a second term as chief minister. Earlier, Hughes had stated that he hoped to move Anguilla closer to full internal self-government, citing Bermuda as a model and commenting that the present constitution placed ministers in “positions without power.” Within months of the election, a constitutional deadlock developed, Victor Banks having resigned as finance minister over Hughes’s managerial style and his failure to consult the ADP. Banks then realigned his ADP with the ANA, and together they began a boycott of the house, leaving it without a quorum. Having failed to convince the High Court that the speaker of the house, a member of the ADP, should be forced to convene the legislature, in January 2000 Hughes asked the governor to call a new election. Held on March 3, the balloting returned all the incumbents to office, but with the Anguilla United Front (AUF) alliance of the ANA and the ADP controlling four seats; the AUP, two; and a former ADP member, now an independent, the seventh. On March 6 Osbourne Fleming assumed office as chief minister, with Banks again in charge

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of finance and economic development as well as investment and commerce. At the election of February 21, 2005, the AUF retained its four seats; the Anguilla National Strategic Alliance, led by opposition leader Edison BAIRD, secured two; and Hubert Hughes’s Anguilla United Movement won one. Also competing in the election was the Anguillan Progressive Party (APP), led by Brent DAVIS. Anguilla’s process for constitutional review and reform, consistent with the 1999 white paper on overseas territories, was jump-started in 2006 with the appointment of a Constitutional and Electoral Reform Commission. The commission presented its report in August of that same year. Negotiations with UK officials over proposed constitutional changes, scheduled for July 2007, were delayed by Chief Minister Fleming in order to extend the period for public consultation. The government issued a press release on July 17, 2007, stating that Anguilla planned to seek “full internal self government” status from the UK. Governor: Andrew GEORGE. Chief Minister: Osbourne FLEMING. Bermuda. Named after Juan de Bermudez, a Spanish sailor who reached the islands in the early 1500s, Bermuda remained uninhabited for a century. Settled by the British and then established as a Crown colony in 1684, it consists of 150 islands and islets in the western Atlantic. It has a total land area of 21 square miles (53 sq. km.) and a population (2006E) of 64,900, concentrated on some 20 islands. Blacks make up approximately 60 percent of the total population. The capital is Hamilton, with a population of approximately 3,000. The main economic activities are offshore business services (principally insurance and reinsurance), tourism, and light manufacturing. Over 10,500 international companies are registered, but only about 300 maintain a physical presence. Customs duties constitute the principal source of government revenue. Under a constitution approved in mid-1967 (amended, in certain particulars, in 1979), Bermuda was granted a system of internal self-

government whereby the Crown-appointed governor, advised by a Governor’s Council, exercises responsibility for external affairs, defense, internal security, and police. The governor appoints as premier the majority leader in the lower chamber of the Parliament, the House of Assembly, which is popularly elected for a five-year term. (Formerly consisting of 40 members from 2-member constituencies, the representation was reduced to 36 singlemember constituencies prior to the 2003 election.) The 11 members of the upper house, the Senate, are appointed by the governor, including 5 on recommendation of the premier and 3 on recommendation of the leader of the opposition. The first general election under the new constitution, held in May 1968 against a background of black rioting, resulted in a decisive victory for the moderately right-wing, multiracial United Bermuda Party (UBP), whose leader, Sir Henry TUCKER, became the colony’s first premier. The left-wing Progressive Labour Party (PLP), mainly black in membership, had campaigned for independence and an end to British rule, and its un-

UNITED STATES

Bermuda (U.K.)

ATLA NTIC OCE A N

St. George’s Island

St. David’s Island

Bermuda

Castle Harbour

(U.K.)

Ireland Island N.

Saint George

Ireland Island S.

Daniel’s Island

Somerset Great Sound

Hamilton

Bermuda Island

ATLA NTIC OCE A N 0 0

4 Mi 4 Km

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expectedly poor showing was generally interpreted as a popular endorsement of the existing constitutional arrangements. At the election of October 5, 1993, the UBP (led since 1981 by Sir John SWAN) returned 22 members to the House of Assembly against 18 for the PLP (led by Frederick WADE), while the National Liberal Party (NLP; led by Gilbert DARRELL) lost the seat it had won in 1989. In February 1994, following an announcement that U.S. and UK forces would vacate Bermuda in 1995, the new legislature voted 20–18 in favor of holding a referendum on independence. The consultation eventually took place on August 16, 1995, with traditional party lines being partially reversed in that Sir John and some other UBP leaders (although not the party as such) urged a “yes” vote and the pro-independence PLP advocated abstention. Of a 58.8 percent turnout, 73.6 percent of the voters opposed independence, whereupon Sir John resigned from the premiership and UBP leadership and was replaced by Finance Minister David SAUL. The new premier moved to heal divisions within the UBP remaining from the bruising independence referendum and a subsequent conflict in the summer of 1996 over approval of a franchise license for a fast food chain. Three members who had rebelled against party leadership on both issues were returned to cabinet portfolios in January 1997, although the moves were insufficient to save the premier. On March 27 Saul was replaced by Pamela GORDON, the new leader of the UBP. Earlier, in December 1996, Jennifer SMITH had been elected leader of the PLP following the death in August of Frederick Wade. Premier Gordon’s decision to reshuffle her cabinet in May 1998 failed to prevent a dramatic victory by the PLP at the election of November 9. The PLP won for the first time, capturing 26 house seats versus 14 for the UBP, which had been in power for three decades. The victory was even more remarkable in that the winning party had run only 34 candidates for the 40 seats. Jennifer Smith was sworn in as premier on November 10 and shortly thereafter named a cabinet of 12 additional ministers, all but 1 black.

At the election of July 24, 2003, the PLP won 22 House seats and the UBP 14. Although reinstalled as premier, Smith had drawn criticism for an alleged “arrogant and secretive” leadership style and was forced to step down on July 28 in favor of Alex SCOTT. In December 2004 the issue of independence was reopened by Prime Minister Scott, who announced the establishment of a Bermuda Independence Commission (BIC) that was instructed to hold public hearings on the subject in early 2005. While the current government favors independence, a July 2007 opinion poll indicated that 63 percent of Bermudans opposed it, with 25 percent in favor and 12 percent undecided. At an October 2006 PLP delegate conference Dr. Ewart Brown was elected party chair by a 107– 76 vote over Alex Scott. Brown was subsequently sworn in as premier on October 30. UBP leader Wayne FURBERT stepped down on March 31, 2007, and was replaced by Michael DUNKLEY on April 2 by a unanimous vote. The Brown government’s health minister resigned from the cabinet in February 2007 amid the opening of a criminal investigation into his business activities. In June the police arrested the former minister under theft and corruption charges. A new heath minister was sworn in on June 12. At the election of December 18, 2007, in a replay of the previous balloting, the PLP won 22 House seats and the UBP 14. New UBP leader Michael Dunkley failed to win reelection from his constituency, leaving the party in disarray. Sir John VEREKER stepped down as governor in October 2007 and was replaced by Sir Richard Gozney in November. Governor: Sir Richard GOZNEY. Premier: Ewart BROWN. British Virgin Islands. A Caribbean group of 46 northern Leeward Islands located some 60 miles east of Puerto Rico, the British Virgin Islands have a total area of 59 square miles (153 sq. km.) and a population (2006E) of 22,465. Tourism and international business are the main industries, with the latter reportedly accounting for 90 percent of

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government revenue. The largest island, Tortola, is the site of the chief town and port of entry, Road Town (population 11,000 in 2002). The administration is headed by a governor. Representative institutions include a 15-member Legislative Council (13 elected members serving four-year terms; the attorney general, ex officio; and a speaker) and a 6member Executive Council appointed and chaired by the governor. A chief minister is chosen from the legislature by the governor. At the election of September 1986 the Virgin Islands Party (VIP), led by H. Lavity STOUTT, won five of nine Council seats, ousting the administration headed by independent member Cyril B. ROMNEY, who had been involved with a company undergoing investigation for money laundering. In March 1988 the deputy chief minister, Omar HODGE, was dismissed for attempting to delay the issuance of a report charging him with bribery; the following year he formed the Independent People’s Movement (IPM). Stoutt remained in office following the balloting of November 2, 1990, at which the VIP won six seats; the IPM, one; and

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independents, two. The United Party (UP), led by Conrad MADURO, lost the two seats it had held since 1986. In early 1994 a proposal by a UK constitutional review commission to expand the Legislative Council to 13 elective seats by adding four “at-large” members drew criticism from several islands parties. Chief Minister Stoutt led the attack on the plan, but to no avail. Balloting on February 20, 1995, for the 13 legislators yielded 6 seats for the VIP, 2 for the UP, 2 for Hodge’s new Concerned Citizen’s Movement (CCM), and 3 for independents. One of the independents sided with the VIP in return for a ministerial post, enabling Stoutt to begin a fifth successive term as chief minister. However, Stoutt died unexpectedly on May 16 and was succeeded by Deputy Chief Minister Ralph O’Neal. The opposition—numbering five members—received an unexpected boost when two supporters of the government temporarily switched sides in April 1997, coming close to bringing the government down. By June, however, the failure to unseat the government and dissatisfaction with the leadership of the UP’s Maduro led three of the five opposition members to rebel, and in December 1997 Maduro was replaced as leader of the opposition by the leader of the CCM, Walwyn BREWLEY. The VIP claimed a narrow election victory at balloting on May 17, 1999, winning seven seats in the Legislative Council to five for the recently formed National Democratic Party (NDP) and one for the CCM. Both the CCM and the UP took less than 10 percent of the total constituency and at-large votes, many of their previous supporters having switched allegiance to the NDP, led by Orlando SMITH. At the election of June 16, 2003, the NDP won eight seats and the VIP five, permitting Smith to head the new government. The Smith government won unanimous approval from the Legislative Council for its proposed draft of a new constitution in May 2007. The UK Privy Council ratified the bill and the new constitution came into force on June 15, 2007. Among the new powers of the British Virgin Islands gov-

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ernment was the creation of a national security council. The VIP regained control of the government at balloting on August 20, 2007, winning in a landslide with ten seats to two for the NDP, while the remaining elective seat went to an independent. Voter turnout was 66 percent. Ralph O’Neal headed the new government as First Premier under the new constitution (formerly the position was titled Chief Minister). Governor: David PEARY. First Premier: Ralph Telford O’NEAL. Cayman Islands. Located in the Caribbean, northwest of Jamaica, the Cayman Islands (Grand Cayman, Little Cayman, and Cayman Brac) cover 100 square miles (259 sq. km.) and have a population (2006E) of 47,400. George Town, on Grand Cayman, is the capital. The traditional occupations of seafaring and turtle and shark fishing have largely been superseded by tourism and other services. The islands have become one of the world’s half-dozen largest offshore banking centers as well as a corporate tax haven. As of January

2000, 570 banks and trust companies, more than 2,200 mutual funds, some 500 insurance companies, and 47,000 other companies were registered. In mid-1999 the territory became the first government to request certification under the newly introduced UN Offshore Initiative. Accordingly, the UN Global Programme against Money Laundering had agreed to review the islands’ banking and financial systems. Discovered by Columbus in the early 1500s, the essentially uninhabited Caymans passed from Spain to England in 1670. Governed from Jamaica from the 1860s until 1959 and then briefly a part of the Federation of the West Indies, the islands were placed in 1962 under a British administrator (later governor), who chairs an Executive Council of 8 other members, including 3 ex officio and 5 chosen by and from among the Legislative Assembly. The latter body initially consisted of a speaker, 3 ex officio members, and 12 elected members. At balloting for an enlarged assembly on November 18, 1992, a National Team of government critics won 12 of the elective 15 seats, the remaining 3 going to independents. The outcome rendered uncertain a plan to introduce ministerial government, as the National Team had campaigned against it. However, after deliberations involving the governor and London, a ministerial system was introduced under a constitutional revision implemented in February 1994. Thus, the 5 elected members of the Executive Council now have ministerial responsibilities. At a general election on November 22, 1996, the National Team secured nine seats, while two recently formed groupings, the Democratic Alliance and Team Cayman, took two and one, respectively, with independents winning three. In 1997 W. McKeeva BUSH, now of the United Democratic Party (UDP), was ousted from the Executive Council following allegations that a bank of which he was a director had approved more than $1 billion in fraudulent loans. In June 2000 George Town expressed astonishment at the decision of the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to place the Caymans on its list of 15 jurisdictions considered noncooperative with efforts to combat money launder-

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ing. In addition to having repeatedly asked the FATF to visit the Caymans, the government had recently been praised by the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office for its regulatory and enforcement efforts. In June 2001 Cayman Islands was delisted. At the most recent election, held May 11, 2005, after a six-month postponement because of damage from Hurricane Ivan in September 2004, the People’s Progressive Movement (PPM), led by Kurt Tibbetts, won 9 of the 15 elective seats, while the UDP won 5 and an independent, 1. The Caymans’ constitutional review process, dubbed the Constitutional Modernization Initiative, is multistaged. In October 2007 the government hosted a roundtable discussion on including a bill of rights and launched a voter registration drive for a constitutional referendum. Public release of a discussion paper on proposed changes is scheduled for January 2008, with a period for public comment to follow. The assembly is due to consider bills amending the Elections Law and providing procedures for a referendum on a new constitution to held in May 2008. Governor: Stuart JACK. Leader of Government Business: Kurt TIBBETTS.

Under a constitution introduced in 1985 (replacing one dating from 1977), the governor is assisted by a Legislative Council that includes eight members elected on a nonpartisan basis (most recently on November 17, 2005) and by an Executive Council, three of whose members are selected by and from the elected legislators. In addition, both bodies have two ex officio members and a chief executive and a financial secretary, who are responsible to the governor. The attorney general and the commander of British forces may also attend Executive Council sessions. The territory is the object of a long-standing dispute between Britain and Argentina, which calls it the Malvinas Islands (Islas Malvinas). Argentina’s claim to sovereignty is based primarily on purchase of the islands by Spain from France in 1766; Britain claims sovereignty on the basis of a 1771 treaty, although uninterrupted possession commenced only in 1833. The Argentine claim has won some support in the UN General Assembly, and the two governments engaged in a lengthy series of inconclusive talks on the future disposition of the

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Falkland Islands. Situated some 480 miles northeast of Cape Horn in the South Atlantic (see Argentina map, p. 51), the Falkland Islands currently encompasses the East and West Falklands in addition to some 200 smaller islands; the South Georgia and the South Sandwich islands ceased to be governed as dependencies of the Falklands in 1985. The total area is 4,700 square miles (12,173 sq. km.), and the resident population, almost entirely of British extraction, is 2,172 (2006C), excluding civilian employees of a British military base, who numbered 534 in 2001; most inhabitants live in the capital, Stanley, on East Falkland Island. The economy, traditionally dependent on wool production, has diversified in recent years, with fishing licenses now being the main source of revenue. Tourism has also increased in importance.

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territory prior to the Argentine invasion of April 2, 1982, and the eventual reassertion of British control ten weeks later (see Argentina article). The issue is complicated by evidence that significant oil and gas deposits may lie beneath the islands’ territorial waters. In addition, Britain has taken the position that any solution must respect the wishes of the inhabitants. Thus, the current constitution refers explicitly to the islanders’ right of self-determination. In the wake of the 1982 war, Britain imposed a 150-mile protective zone, to which it added a 200mile economic zone, effective February 1, 1987, although only a 150-mile radius was subsequently policed, principally to protect Falklands fisheries. As part of the 1990 Madrid agreement that led to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Argentina, Britain maintained its claim to a 200-mile economic zone but conceded that Argentine ships and planes could approach within 50 and 75 miles, respectively, of the islands without prior permission. In a further concession to Buenos Aires, London agreed in November 1990 to convert its 200mile zone (exclusive of overlap with Argentina’s own 200-mile limit) into an Anglo-Argentine cooperation area from which fishing fleets from other countries would be excluded. In 1992 President Carlos Menem of Argentina pursued a dual policy of behind-the-scenes diplomacy and public assertions of the inevitability of Argentinean sovereignty over the Falklands. In November the first direct meeting between islanders’ representatives and an Argentinean minister since 1982 took place in London. A major issue was Argentina’s policy of reducing the cost of its fishing licenses in an attempt to lure foreign fleets into Argentinean waters and thus to deprive the Falklands government of its main source of revenue. In legislative elections on October 14, 1993, the eight elective seats were contested by 25 candidates, all independents, with those elected all rejecting unnecessary contact with Argentina until its sovereignty claim was dropped. After the new Argentinean constitution promulgated in August 1994 repeated the claim to the

islands, the UK government announced that the full 200-mile Falklands’ economic zone would be policed even where it overlapped with the Argentinean zone. Talks in London in October at the foreign minister level made little progress on possible joint oil exploration in Falklands waters and other issues, while the collateral confirmation by President Menem that Argentina was prepared to pay substantial individual compensation to islanders in exchange for sovereignty did nothing to improve relations. In October 1996 the Falklands administration issued oil exploration licenses to 13 companies, refusing only one application, from a consortium with Argentinean involvement. In a significant departure from previous policy, President Menem on December 30 suggested that sovereignty over the islands might be shared. His suggestion was immediately rejected by the UK government and by the Falkland Islands administration. On October 9, 1997, in a nonparty legislative election, the voters returned 5 of the 8 incumbents from among the 14 candidates for the elective seats. Two of the newly elected members to the Legislative Council were also subsequently elected to the Executive Council. In April 1998 the UK announced that oil exploration of the Falklands coast had started, while in Argentina legislators introduced a bill to impose sanctions on commercial companies that failed to obtain Argentinean permission before operating in Falkland waters. The following October President Menem paid the first official visit to the UK by an Argentinean leader in nearly 40 years. Topics covered in a meeting with Prime Minister Blair included Falklands relations, while a subsequent letter from Menem to the islanders called for reconciliation “to heal old wounds.” With secret talks reportedly under way on the territory’s status, in January 1999 Buenos Aires offered to put in abeyance its sovereignty claim if the UK, in a largely symbolic gesture, would permit Argentinean flags to fly at selected locations, including the graveyard for its service-members killed during the Falklands war. Two months later Prince Charles

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visited both the Falklands and Argentina, where he laid a wreath at a monument to casualties of the conflict, as President Menem had done in England during his 1998 visit. In May 1999 an Argentinean ministerial delegation met in London with members of the Falklands Legislative Council. Discussion topics included fishing and air connections. In the latter regard, in March Chile had announced a halt to Falklands flights—the only such contact between the islands and South America—to protest the continuing detention in London of former president Augusto Pinochet, pending resolution of a Spanish extradition warrant for human rights abuses during his reign. In July Buenos Aires and London agreed to permit air travel between Argentina and the islands, and Chile resumed flights with stopovers in Argentina. In early 2004 Argentina granted its flagship airline two routes between Buenos Aires and Stanley. However, the islanders rejected the prospect of regularly scheduled flights from Argentina, and the recently installed N´estor Kirchner regime responded by denying permission for Chilean planes to fly through Argentine air space. Meanwhile, the Falkland economy, which had expanded 13-fold in the two decades after the war, was increasingly imperiled by a decline in sales of fishing licenses that was attributed to collapse in stocks of the previously abundant Ilex squid. Relations between the UK and Argentina soured further in 2006 as President Kirchner, backed by the UN Special Committee on Decolonization and the Organization of American States, repeated his call for London to reopen negotiations on the territory’s future status. Kirchner also indicated that he was considering taking a more hard-line approach on the issues of fishing rights and oil exploration. Upon his wife’s investment in the presidency in 2007 (see Argentina entry), Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner maintained Argentina’s right to the islands. For its part, the British government reiterated that it had no intention to negotiate sovereignty in the absence of evidence that the islanders themselves sought a change.

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A by-election was held in the Falklands for January 3, 2008, electing former legislative member John Birmingham to the Legislative Council. Governor: Alan HUCKLE. Chief Executive: Chris SIMPKINS. Montserrat. A West Indian dependency in the Leeward Island group (see Antigua/Barbuda map, p. 342) with an area of 39.4 square miles (102 sq. km.), Montserrat had a population (1996E) of 10,500 prior to large-scale evacuation (see below), which reduced the total to 4,482 in the 2001 census before recovering to an estimated 4,800 in 2006. Its principal sources of income are tourism, offshore business services, and export of machinery and transport equipment. Ministerial government was introduced in 1960, the territory currently being administered by an Executive Council comprising the chief minister, three additional elected ministers, and two ex officio members (attorney general and financial secretary) under the presidency of the London-appointed governor. The Legislative Council is composed of nine elected and

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the same two ex officio members. Elections are normally held every five years. In August 1987 John OSBORNE of the People’s Liberation Movement (PLM) was installed for a third five-year term as chief minister. In August 1989 a dispute arose between Osborne and Gov. Christopher TURNER over the latter’s alleged failure to inform elected officials of police raids on banks suspected of illicit financial transactions. In late November, with most banking licenses having been canceled, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States issued a statement condemning as “absolutely repugnant” an announcement by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) that a proposed new constitution would transfer responsibility for offshore banking regulation to the governor. In return for Osborne’s acceptance of the controversial change, the new basic law as implemented in February 1990 recognized Montserrat’s right to self-determination and withdrew certain legislative powers formerly held by the governor. Osborne’s PLM retained only one seat in the balloting of October 8, 1991, after which a new administration was formed by the National Progressive Party (NPP), led by Reuben MEADE, who had accused the Osborne administration of corruption and mismanagement. Efforts by the new Legislative Council to reestablish Montserrat as an offshore banking center failed. On February 2, 1993, after an investigation by Scotland Yard, Osborne and Noel TUITT, an associate, were cleared of the corruption charges, and in March 1994 Tuitt joined the NPP government following Meade’s dismissal of David BRANDT as deputy chief minister. A partial eruption of long-dormant Chance’s Peak volcano on July 19, 1995, precipitated the evacuation of some 5,000 people from their homes by late August. Further disruption was caused by a hurricane and tropical storm in September. The eruptions continued intermittently in 1996, by the end of which the entire population of the southern part of the island, including the capital, Plymouth, had been evacuated; 800 were admitted to Britain under a special exemption from normally strict immigration rules, and the rest were housed in temporary accommodation in the north,

where the second town, St. Peter’s, became the de facto capital. With the island administration and the UK overseas aid program disputing how emergency aid grants should be used, the NPP retained only one seat in an election that was held on November 11 even though four southern election districts were either empty or depopulated by evacuation. Two seats were won by the Movement for National Reconstruction (MNR), two by John Osborne’s new People’s Progressive Alliance (PPA), and two by independents. The outcome was an MNR-PPA coalition, MNR leader Bertrand OSBORNE being sworn in as chief minister on November 13. In June 1997 the Soufri`ere Hills volcano erupted, claiming at least 19 lives and obliterating the capital. By the end of the year, only 3,400 of the original population were still on the island (with 500 living in temporary shelters), the remainder having either migrated to the UK or relocated to adjacent islands. The destruction slowed economic activity to a near standstill. As aid packages were caught up in London’s governmental transition in May–June 1997 and the island administration was coping with abandoning the capital, simmering discontent grew among the islanders. On August 21, 1997, after four days of continuous demonstrations and protest, Chief Minister Osborne resigned and was replaced by independent David Brandt, who received the support of the MNR and NPP. Almost immediately, the new chief minister created conflict with London, alleging that aid packages for reconstruction and personal assistance, especially for off-island relocation, were insufficient to meet the emergency and that British policy was directed at depopulating the island. The criticism led London’s secretary of state for international development to assert that the island was asking for “mad money” and “golden elephants next.” A November 27, 1997, report by a Commons select committee placed blame for delays and maladministration on all parties, leading to a rationalization of the aid process and a gradual cooling of tensions. On February 14, 1998, Robin Cook became the first FCO secretary to visit Montserrat. In May the UK government announced that all Montserratians

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who had not resettled elsewhere would be allowed to reside in Britain, while in June a draft development plan for the northern part of the island was announced. Despite continuing periodic volcanic activity and additional damage caused by Hurricane Georges in September, residents and businesses gradually began returning to the island’s central zone. In 1999 the Blair administration announced that it would pay relocation travel costs for most Montserratians who wished to return to the island from Britain or Caribbean relocation sites. At the same time, the island administration moved forward with a proposal to build a new capital at Little Bay, on the northwestern coast, a project expected to take at least ten years to complete. With the devastation in the south having made the parliamentary constituency system unworkable, in 2000 the government introduced legislation to facilitate adoption of a nine-member, atlarge system for the 2001 election. By mid-2000 the resident population numbered about 5,000. The collapse of Chief Minister Brandt’s coalition in February 2001 precipitated an early election. At balloting on April 2 John Osborne’s New People’s Liberation Movement (NPLM) won seven of the nine seats in the Legislative Council, permitting him to reclaim the title of chief minister a decade after his last term in office. The NPP won the other two council seats. In June 2004 U.S. immigration officials ordered the deportation of some 300 Monserratians who had been granted temporary protected status on the grounds that volcanic eruptions on the island were not “temporary” phenomena. Three parties and four independents contested the most recent legislative election, held May 31, 2006. Although Rosalind CASSELL-SEALY’s recently formed Movement for Change and Prosperity (MCAP) won four of the nine seats, Osborne’s NPLM, which won three, formed a coalition administration with independent David Brandt and Lowell Lewis, the head of the Montserrat Democratic Party (MDP) and the leading votegetter. Lewis stated after the election that the government’s priorities would be the economy, housing, use of natural resources, and discussions with

London about development projects, including a safe harbor and marina at Little Bay that would attract more visitors. Montserrat’s constitutional review commissioners made their initial report in 2002. The Legislative Council reviewed this in 2005 and made recommendations to the UK government in April of that year. Four rounds of talks with Monserratian and British officials followed, with the latest held in May 2007. Residents of Old Towne were slow to reoccupy their homes in August 2007 following a reduction in volcanic activity. The next election is scheduled for 2011. Governor: Peter WATERWORTH. Chief Minister: Lowell LEWIS. Turks and Caicos Islands. The Turks and Caicos Islands, a southeastward extension of the Bahamas, consists of 30 small cays (8 inhabited) with a total area of 166 square miles (430 sq. km.) and a population (2005E) of 24,800. The capital is Cockburn Town on Grand Turk. The principal industries are tourism, offshore banking and finance,

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and fishing. As of 1997, some 14,600 offshore businesses were registered in the islands. Linked to Britain since 1766, the Turks and Caicos became a Crown colony in 1962 following Jamaica’s independence. A constitution adopted in 1976 provided for a governor and an Executive Council comprising a chief minister, 5 additional ministers chosen by the governor from among elected legislators, and 3 ex officio members (governor, attorney general, chief secretary). A 20-member Legislative Council comprises 13 elected members, the 3 ex officio members of the Executive Council, 3 members appointed by the governor, and a speaker. The former chief minister, Norman B. SAUNDERS, was obliged to resign after his arrest on drug-trafficking charges in Miami, Florida, in March 1985, Deputy Chief Minister Nathaniel J. S. FRANCIS being elected as his successor on March 28. Francis was also forced to resign following the issuance of a commission of inquiry report on arson, corruption, and related matters. The British government decided on July 25, 1986, to suspend the constitution and impose direct rule under the governor, with assistance from a four-member advisory council. Subsequently, a three-member constitutional commission was appointed to draft revisions in the basic law to inhibit corruption and patronage and promote “fair and effective administration.” At an election marking the islands’ return to constitutional rule on March 3, 1988, the People’s Democratic Movement (PDM), previously in opposition, won 11 of the 13 elective Legislative Council seats; by contrast, at the poll of April 3, 1991, the PDM (led by Derek TAYLOR) lost 6 seats to the Progressive National Party (PNP), whose total of 8 permitted Charles Washington MISICK to form a new government. In an election on January 31, 1995, Taylor and the PDM regained power, winning 8 seats against 4 for the PNP and 1 for Saunders standing as an independent, while the recently formed United Democratic Party (UDP), led by Wendal SWANN, failed to secure representation.

Resentment remaining from the 1986 constitutional suspension, objections to the reserve powers of the governor, and alleged British indifference to the islands found a focus in hostility to Gov. Martin BOURKE in April 1996. Among other things, he was charged with favoring one island (Providenciales, the center of the booming tourist industry) over the others in development. In addition, he caused concern by alleging both police corruption and a steady flow of drugs through the island chain. A petition for his removal from the island administration to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was rejected in April 1996 after consultations with the islands, but in September, when his term expired, he was not reappointed. At the election of April 24, 2003, the PDM secured seven of the elective seats on the Legislative Council, while the PNP took six. Chief Minister Taylor thereby appeared to have retained office for an unprecedented third consecutive term. However, the PNP challenged the results in two closely fought constituencies and won both at by-elections on August 7. As a result, Taylor was obliged to resign in favor of Michael Misick. A constitutional review process begun in 1999 concluded in 2006 with the adoption of a new constitution providing increased internal autonomy. The new document entered into force on August 9, at which time Misick was sworn in as the first premier of Turks and Caicos. The new constitution provides for a governor appointed by HM Queen Elizabeth II, a House of Assembly with 15 elective seats, and 6 seats appointed by the governor, including a speaker and attorney general. The cabinet consists of the governor, the premier, 6 other ministers, and the attorney general. At the election of February 9, 2007, the PNP won a decisive majority by securing 13 of the elective seats on the Legislative Council, while the PDM, now led by Floyd SEYMOUR, took only two. The remaining six seats were to be appointed by the governor. Governor: Richard TAUWHARE. Premier: Michael Eugene MISICK.

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The Country First among the nations of the world in economic production and productivity, the United States ranks third in area (behind Russia and Canada) and also third in population (after China and India). Canada and Mexico are the country’s only contiguous neighbors. Most of U.S. territory ranges across the North American continent in a broad band that encompasses the Atlantic seaboard; the Appalachian Mountains; the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri river valleys; the Great Plains; the Rocky Mountains, and the deserts of the Southwest; and the narrow, fertile coastland adjoining the Pacific. Further contrasts are found in the two noncontiguous states: Alaska, in northwestern North America, where the climate ranges from severe winters and short growing seasons in the north to equable temperatures in the south; and Hawaii, in the mid-Pacific, where trade winds produce a narrow temperature range but extreme variations in rainfall. Regional diversity is also found in economic conditions. Industrial production is located mainly in the coastal areas and in those interior urban centers with good transportation connections, as in the Great Lakes region. Agricultural products come primarily from the far western, plains, midwestern, and southeastern states. Per capita income varies considerably from state to state, ranging in 2005 from a high of $47,819 in Connecticut to a low of $25,318 in Mississippi, with a national average of $34,586. The nation’s ethnic diversity is a product of large-scale voluntary and involuntary immigration, much of which took place before 1920. According to Census Bureau estimates, the population in 2005

was (2000 census estimates in parentheses) 80.2 (81.1) percent white, 12.8 (12.7) percent black, 4.4 (3.9) percent Asian and Pacific Islander, and 1 (0.9) percent American Indian or native Alaskan. In addition, Hispanic Americans (a nonexclusive category) constituted 14.4 percent in 2005 (up from 12.5 percent in 2000 and 9 percent in 1990), thereby becoming the country’s largest minority group. Religious diversity parallels, and is in part caused by, ethnic diversity. In 2001 80.4 percent of adults identified themselves as religious, of whom Protestants constituted 51.9 percent; Roman Catholics, 24.5 percent; Jews, 1.36 percent; and Orthodox Christians, 0.31 percent. Although

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English is the principal language, Spanish is the preferred tongue of sizable minorities in New York City (largely migrants from Puerto Rico), in Florida (primarily Caribbean expatriates), and in the Southwest and California (mainly from Mexico). Other languages are spoken among foreign-born and first-generation Americans. In 2005 women constituted 46.4 percent of the full-time labor force and were concentrated in clerical, retail, and human service occupations. Women earned approximately 81.0 percent of the median male wage. As of July 2007, females held 71 seats (16.3 percent) in the U.S. House of Representatives (up from 62 [14.3 percent] in 2002) and 16 seats (16 percent) in the Senate (up from 13 in 2002). In addition, female governors led eight states (the same as following the 2004 poll, which yielded two more than in 2002). Owing to a historic transfer of population from farm to city (now seemingly at an end, with migration to rural areas fluctuating close to a reversal in 1990–2000), only a small proportion of the population is engaged in agriculture, which nevertheless yields a substantial proportion of U.S. exports. In 2005 agriculture employed 2.2 million workers out of a total civilian labor force of 141.7 million (1.6 percent, excluding 7.6 million unemployed). By contrast, 19.8 percent of the labor force was engaged in mining, manufacturing, and construction; 15.1 percent in wholesale and retail trade; and 63.5 percent in government and other service activities (excluding domestic employment). Of increasing importance to the administration of the nation’s Social Security system is the aging of the population; the percentage of those of age 65 and older rose from approximately 4 percent in 1900 to 12.5 percent in 1998 but declined marginally to 12.4 percent in 2005. The United States has experienced long-term economic growth throughout most of its history, with marked short-term fluctuation in recent years. During 1960–2005 the real per capita change in GDP averaged 3.7 percent, with negative growth in 7 of the 45 years and the highest gain (a surge of 6 percent) in 1984. During the same period the domestic purchasing power of the U.S. dollar, as

measured by the consumer price index, declined steadily from 1.00 to 0.21, the annual rate of inflation reaching a high of 12.5 percent in 1980, plunging to 1.1 percent in 1986, rising to 6.1 percent in 1990, and standing at 3.4 percent in 2005. Of considerable significance in the 1980s and early 1990s was erosion in the exchange value of the dollar, which was valued at 1.41 European Currency Units (ECUs) in December 1984 but then depreciated to 0.74 by December 1990 before reviving to 1.01 euros (successor to ECUs) in December 2002. As of November 15, 2007, the dollar had plunged again to 0.68 euros. The U.S. budget deficit rose to $290 billion in fiscal 1992 (compared with $128 billion in 1982) before contracting steadily to $146 billion in fiscal 1996 and being overcome in 1998 by a surplus of $76 billion. Surpluses continued to accrue into 2001 but went into deficit thereafter, including a projected $427 billion shortfall for fiscal 2005. December 2000 marked the 127th consecutive month of economic expansion, the longest period of peacetime growth in U.S. history. However, by early 2001 there were indications that growth was receding, and in the third quarter of the year the economy contracted by 1.3 percent. A quick recovery saw GDP expansion of 1.4 percent in the fourth quarter, contributing to growth of 1.2 percent for the year as a whole. Thereafter, average annual growth of 3 percent was reported for 2002– 2005. The IMF reported a cooling of the U.S. economy in 2006. Annual GDP was expected to decline to about 2 percent in 2007 from 3.3 percent in 2006. The IMF analyzed the impact of the subprime housing situation, since subprime mortgages accounted for 20 percent of all new home loans since 2005. It concluded that despite sharply reduced lending standards, which led to a doubling of defaults in the year ending May 2007, the outlook was positive overall due to the resiliency of the economy. Despite widespread accounts of a possible recession and the dollar’s weakening against foreign currency in 2007 (falling to its lowest value ever against the euro), the IMF said that the economy was buoyed by increasing foreign investment and exports, and

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Political Status: Independence declared on July 4, 1776; federal republic established under constitution adopted on March 4, 1789. Area: 3,732,396 sq. mi. (9,666,532 sq. km.); includes gross area (land and water) of the 50 states, excluding Puerto Rico and other territories. These totals are somewhat higher than earlier ones because of a 1990 change in the method of calculating interior waters. Population: 281,421,906 (2000C); 304,629,000 (2007E). In July 1991 the U.S. government conceded that the 1990 count of 248,709,873 missed about 2 percent of the population but declined to provide an official adjustment for underenumeration. The 2000 figure was advanced by the Census Bureau as being “much more robust” than anticipated. Major Urban Centers (2007E): City Proper

Population Metro Area

543,000 8,198,000 3,907,000 2,822,000 2,043,000 1,523,000 1,442,000 1,305,000 1,269,000 1,224,000 863,000 803,000 785,000 739,000

5,331,000 18,731,000 12,974,000 9,544,000 5,492,000 4,188,000 5,871,000 1,966,000 2,929,000 6,073,000 4,484,000 1,297,000 1,690,000 1,746,000

WASHINGTON, D.C. New York, N.Y. Los Angeles, Calif. Chicago, Ill. Houston, Texas Phoenix, Ariz. Philadelphia, Pa. San Antonio, Texas San Diego, Calif. Dallas, Texas Detroit, Mich. Jacksonville, Fla. Indianapolis, Ind. Columbus, Ohio

that growth would pick up as business investment was revived.

Government and Politics Political Background Beginning as a group of 13 British colonies along the Atlantic seaboard, the “United States of America” declared themselves independent on July

San Francisco, Calif. Memphis, Tenn. Baltimore, Md. Seattle, Wash. Milwaukee, Wisc. Denver, Colo. Boston, Mass. Kansas City, Mo. New Orleans, La. Cleveland, Ohio St. Louis, Mo. Pittsburgh, Pa.

724,000 681,000 630,000 578,000 572,000 559,000 547,000 446,000 444,000 442,000 342,000 310,000

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4,165,000 1,287,000 2,678,000 3,274,000 1,513,000 2,429,000 4,398,000 1,991,000 1,321,000 2,110,000 2,799,000 2,362,000

Principal Language: English. At the 2000 census approximately 82.1 percent spoke only English; 10.7 percent, Spanish; 7.2 percent, other. Monetary Unit: Dollar (selected market rates July 1, 2006: $1US = 0.48 UK pounds sterling, 114.76 Japanese yen, 1.15 Swiss francs, and 0.69 euros). President: George W. BUSH (Republican Party); elected November 7, 2000 (technically, by electoral college on December 18), and inaugurated on January 20, 2001, for a four-year term, succeeding Bill CLINTON (Democratic Party); reelected on November 2, 2004 (technically, by electoral college on December 13), and inaugurated on January 20, 2005, for a second four-year term. Vice President: Richard B. (Dick) CHENEY (Republican Party) elected on November 7, 2000, and inaugurated on January 20, 2001, for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding Al GORE (Democratic Party); reelected on November 2, 2004, and inaugurated on January 20, 2005, for a term concurrent with that of the president.

4, 1776, gained recognition as a sovereign nation at the close of the Revolutionary War in 1783, and in 1787 adopted a federal constitution that became effective March 4, 1789. George WASHINGTON took office as first president of the United States on April 30. Westward expansion, colonization, judicious purchase, and annexation during the ensuing 100 years found the nation by 1890 in full possession of the continental territories that now make up the 48 contiguous states. Alaska, purchased

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from Russia in 1867, and Hawaii, annexed in 1898, became the 49th and 50th states, respectively, in 1959. The constitutional foundation of the Union has been severely threatened only by the Civil War of 1861–1865, in which the separate confederacy established by 11 southern states was defeated and reintegrated into the Federal Union by military force. The U.S. political climate has been characterized by the alternating rule of the Republican and Democratic parties since the Civil War, which initiated a period of industrial expansion that continued without major interruptions through World War I before being temporarily checked by the Great Depression of the early 1930s. The modern era of administrative centralization and massive federal efforts to solve economic and social problems began in 1933 with the inauguration of Democratic president Franklin D. ROOSEVELT, and the onset of direct U.S. involvement in World War II on December 7, 1941, brought further governmental expansion. Following the defeat of the Axis powers, efforts supporting European reconstruction and attempting to meet the challenge posed by the rise of the Soviet Union as a world power dominated the administration of Harry S. TRUMAN, the Democratic vice president who succeeded Roosevelt upon his death on April 12, 1945, and was elected in 1948 to a full fouryear term. Newly armed with atomic weapons, the United States abandoned its traditional isolation to become a founding member of the United Nations (UN) and the leader of a worldwide coalition directed against the efforts of the Soviet Union and, after 1949, the People’s Republic of China, to expand their influence along the periphery of the communist world. A series of East-West confrontations over Iran, Greece, and Berlin culminated in the Korean War of 1950–1953, in which U.S. forces were committed to large-scale military action under the flag of the UN. Dwight D. EISENHOWER, elected president on the Republican tickets of 1952 and 1956, achieved a negotiated settlement in Korea and some relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union, but efforts to solve such basic East-West problems

as the division of Germany proved unavailing. Whereas Eisenhower’s attempts to restrict the role of the federal government met only limited success, his eight-year incumbency witnessed a resumption of progress toward legal equality of the races— after a lapse of 80 years—pursuant to the 1954 Supreme Court decision declaring segregation in public schools unconstitutional. An economic recession developed toward the end of Eisenhower’s second term, which also saw the beginning of a substantial depletion of U.S. gold reserves. In spite of a resurgent economy, balance-of-payments problems persisted throughout the succeeding Democratic administrations of presidents John F. KENNEDY (1961–1963) and Lyndon B. JOHNSON (1963– 1969). The assassinations of President Kennedy in 1963 and of civil rights advocate Martin Luther KING Jr. and Sen. Robert F. KENNEDY in 1968 provided the most dramatic evidence of a deteriorating domestic climate. To counter sharpening racial and social antagonisms and growing violence on the part of disaffected groups and individuals, Congress, at President Johnson’s urging, passed laws promoting equal rights in housing, education, and voter registration and establishing programs to further equal job opportunities, urban renewal, and improved education for the disadvantaged. These efforts were in part offset by the negative domestic consequences of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, which had begun with limited economic and military aid to the French in the 1950s but by the mid-1960s had become direct and massive. Disagreement over Vietnam was also largely responsible for halting a trend toward improved U.S.-Soviet relations that had followed the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and had led in 1963 to the signing of a limited nuclear test-ban treaty. Moved by increasing public criticism of the government’s Vietnam policy, President Johnson on March 31, 1968, announced the cessation of bombing in most of North Vietnam as a step toward direct negotiations to end the war, and preliminary peace talks with the North Vietnamese began in Paris on May 13. Richard M. NIXON, vice president during the Eisenhower administration and unsuccessful

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presidential candidate in 1960, was nominated as the 1968 Republican candidate for president, whereas Vice President Hubert H. HUMPHREY became the Democratic nominee and former Alabama governor George C. WALLACE, a dissident Democrat, ran as the candidate of the American Independent Party, which sought to capitalize primarily on sectional and segregationist sentiments. Nixon won the election on November 5 with 43.4 percent of the national popular vote, the poorest showing by any victorious candidate since 1912. Humphrey captured 42.7 percent and Wallace won 13.5 percent—the largest total for a third-party candidate since 1924. Following Nixon’s inauguration on January 20, 1969, the president embarked on a vigorous foreign policy campaign while selectively limiting the nation’s external commitments in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Domestically the Nixon administration became increasingly alarmed at the growing antiwar movement and reports of radical extremist activity, and in April 1970 it initiated a program of surveillance of militant left-wing groups and individuals. In May the president’s decision to order Vietnamese-based U.S. troops into action in Cambodia provoked an anti-war demonstration at Kent State University, in the course of which the Ohio National Guard killed four students. Final agreement on a peace treaty in Vietnam was not obtained until January 27, 1973 (see Foreign relations, below), by which time the “youth rebellion” that had characterized the late 1960s was in pronounced decline. Nixon was reelected in a landslide victory over an antiwar Democrat, Senator George S. McGOVERN of South Dakota, on November 7, 1972. Winning a record-breaking 60.7 percent of the popular vote, Nixon swept all major electoral units except Massachusetts and the District of Columbia, although the Democrats easily retained control of both houses of Congress. Within a year, however, the fortunes of Republican executive leaders were quickly reversed. On October 10, 1973, Spiro T. AGNEW resigned as vice president after pleading no contest to having falsified a federal income-tax return. He was succeeded on

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December 6 by longtime Michigan representative Gerald R. FORD, the first vice president to be chosen, under the 25th Amendment of the Constitution, by presidential nomination and congressional confirmation. On March 1, 1974, seven former White House and presidential campaign aides were charged with conspiracy in an attempted cover-up of the Watergate scandal (involving a break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters at their Washington, D.C., building on June 17, 1972), while President Nixon, because of the same scandal, became on August 9 the first U.S. chief executive to tender his resignation. Vice President Ford, who succeeded Nixon on the same day, thus became the first U.S. president never to have participated in a national election. In the election of November 2, 1976, the Democratic candidate, former Georgia governor Jimmy CARTER, defeated President Ford by a bare majority (50.6 percent) of the popular vote. Ford thus became the first incumbent since 1932 to fail in a bid for a second term. Carter also became a oneterm president on November 4, 1980, his Republican opponent, Ronald REAGAN, sweeping all but six states and the District of Columbia with a popular vote margin of 10 percent and a near ten-to-one margin in the electoral college. In congressional balloting the Republicans ended the Democrats’ 28-year control of the Senate and registered substantial gains in the House of Representatives, the two bodies for the first time since 1916 being controlled by different parties. The 1980 outcome was hailed as a “mandate for change” unparalleled since the Roosevelt landslide of 1932. Accordingly, President Reagan moved quickly to address the nation’s economic problems by a combination of across-the-board fiscal retrenchment and massive tax cuts, with only the military establishment receiving significant additional funding to redress the perception of a widening gap between U.S. and Soviet tactical and strategic capabilities. An important component of what was billed as the “New Federalism” was sharply curtailed aid to the states, which were invited to accept responsibility for many social programs that had long been funded directly from

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Washington, D.C. While most liberals decried the new administration’s commitment to economic “realism,” the country made significant progress in lowering interest rates and slowing inflation. Despite the onset of severe economic recession that the administration sought to counter with a series of “hard-line” fiscal and monetary policies, the midterm elections of November 2, 1982, yielded no significant alteration in the domestic balance of power. The Democrats realized a net gain of 7 governorships (the resultant distribution being 34 Democratic incumbents to 16 Republican) and increased their majority in the House of Representatives by 26 seats to 269–166. However, Republican control of the Senate remained unchanged at 54–46. On November 6, 1984, President Reagan won reelection by the second-largest electoral college margin (97.6 percent) in U.S. history, nearly equaling the record of 98.5 percent set by President Roosevelt in 1936. His Democratic opponent, Walter F. MONDALE, won only in his home state of Minnesota and in the District of Columbia. The Republicans also retained control of the Senate (53–47), while the Democrats retained control of the House with a reduced majority of 253–182. The gubernatorial balloting yielded a net gain of 1 for the Republicans, who, as in 1982, could thereafter claim incumbents in 16 states, as contrasted with 34 for the Democrats. During the 1984 campaign Reagan promised no increase in personal income taxes, and in his inaugural address on January 21, 1985, he called for a simplified tax system and drastic limitations on federal spending, from which the military would, however, be partially exempt. Over the ensuing 18 months, sweeping changes were made in what ultimately emerged as the Tax Reform Act of 1986, particularly in a reduction in the number of tax brackets and a lowering of the top rate, with families at or below the poverty line freed of any obligation. The package was to be paid for, in part, by the elimination of many deductions and loopholes, with little measurable gain for individuals in the middle-income range. During the same period, while inflation and unemployment remained at ac-

ceptable levels, the nation recorded massive trade deficits, despite steady erosion in the value of the U.S. dollar, which declined by more than 20 percent in trade-weighted terms from December 1984 to March 1986. As a result the Reagan administration, steadfastly maintaining its commitment to free trade, called for measures to counter what it perceived as a “protectionist upsurge” on the part of many of its trading partners. At the nonpresidential balloting of November 4, 1986, the Democrats increased their margin in the House to 258–177 while regaining control of the Senate, 55–45. At the state level they suffered a net loss of 8 governorships, retaining a bare majority of 26. On November 8, 1988, Republican George H. W. BUSH became the first sitting vice president since Martin Van Buren in 1836 to win the presidency, defeating his Democratic opponent Michael S. DUKAKIS by securing 54 percent of the popular vote and 79 percent of the electoral college vote. The Democrats, however, marginally increased their control of the House (260–175), with no change in the composition of the Senate and a net gain of 1 gubernatorial office over the 27 held immediately before the election. Following the midterm balloting of November 6, 1990, the Democrats held 267 House seats (a net gain of 8 over the preelection distribution) and 56 Senate seats (a net gain of 1), while retaining a total of 28 governorships (a net loss of 1). One House seat in 1990 was won by Bernard SANDERS, an independent Vermont socialist, and the remaining 167 by the Republicans, who retained 44 Senate seats and 20 governorships, with 2 of the state houses being filled by independents. At the presidential poll of November 3, 1992, Arkansas governor Bill CLINTON denied Bush reelection by winning 43 percent of the popular and 69 percent of the electoral college votes, as contrasted with percentages of 38 percent and 31 percent for the incumbent. Business owner H. Ross PEROT, running as an independent, secured no electoral college support despite capturing 19 percent of the popular vote (the best showing by a third candidate since 1912). In congressional

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balloting the Democrats retained control of the Senate by an unchanged majority of 57 (including a vacancy filled on December 4); they also retained control of the House of Representatives by a reduced majority of 259 seats, 175 being won by Republicans, and Sanders retaining his seat from Vermont. At the state level the Republicans gained a single governorship from the Democrats, the resultant distribution being 27–21–2. A record number of voters (more than 104 million) cast ballots in 1992, although the 55.9 percent turnout of those eligible fell short of the 60.8 percent reported in 1968. Five days after Clinton’s inauguration on January 20, 1993, the president named his wife, Hillary Rodham CLINTON, to head a task force on health care reform, for which he campaigned vigorously in the months that followed. Although most observers felt that some form of national health insurance would eventually emerge, the president’s proposals were challenged as administratively burdensome and far too costly, while one of his party’s most influential senators, Daniel Patrick MOYNIHAN of New York, insisted that priority should be accorded to welfare reform. Other legislative matters included a struggle (ultimately successful on November 30, 1993) to secure passage of the so-called Brady bill, requiring a waiting period for the purchase of a handgun, and a bitterly contested budget and deficit reduction plan that secured final approval by a two-vote margin in the House of Representatives on August 5 and by a vice-presidential tie-breaking vote in the Senate the following day. By early 1994 the president’s agenda was becoming increasingly hostage to the “Whitewater” scandal, involving a failed property venture (Whitewater) in which the Clintons had a substantial interest. At the president’s request, a special prosecutor was appointed on January 20, 1994, to investigate the affair, which also became the subject of congressional hearings. To add to the president’s troubles, Paula JONES, a former Arkansas state employee, filed a sexual harassment suit against Clinton on May 6. Despite such distractions, the president in late August finally secured

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congressional approval for his centerpiece crime bill, approving (but not authorizing) expenditure of $30 billion over six years on anticrime measures and banning certain categories of assault weapons. The midterm election of November 8, 1994, yielded disastrous setbacks for the Democrats, who lost control of the Senate for the first time since 1986 by a margin of 52–48 and, far more unexpectedly, of the House for the first time since 1954 by a margin of 230–204, with Sanders again returning as an independent. Astonishingly, no Republican incumbent at either the gubernatorial or congressional levels was defeated. The day after the November poll, Alabama senator Richard C. SHELBY switched his allegiance from Democrat to Republican. Far more embarrassing to the Democrats was the defection of Colorado senator Ben Nighthorse CAMPBELL, a Native American, on March 3, 1995, leaving the Republicans with an upper house majority of 54. A chastened President Clinton accepted responsibility for the congressional defeat and called for a “partnership” between the executive and legislative branches of government. The appeal drew a guardedly favorable response from Republican Senate leader Robert J. (Bob) DOLE, while the more flamboyant incoming House speaker, Newt GINGRICH, indicated that cooperation with the president would take second place to implementation of a ten-point “Contract with America” that had been viewed as the equivalent of his party’s electoral platform. President Clinton’s State of the Union address on January 24, 1995, struck a moderate note that included appeals for phased health care reform, overhaul of the welfare system, curbs on lobbying activity, and efforts to halt illegal immigration. The president’s somewhat awkwardly styled “New Covenant” was overshadowed, however, by the Republicans’ far more drastic contract, which called for a balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution, a presidential line-item veto of budget legislation, denial of welfare benefits to minor mothers, and the introduction of congressional term limits. During the first 100 days of the new

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Congress, the balanced-budget and term-limits amendments were defeated in the House and Senate, respectively, while nine other proposals were approved in the House and pending in the Senate. (On May 27 the Supreme Court ruled that action by the states to impose term limits on federal legislators was unconstitutional.) In a record of restraint unmatched by any chief executive since the Civil War, President Clinton did not cast his first veto until the 28th month of his incumbency, rejecting on June 7, 1995, a spending reduction bill for the year ending September 30. Thereafter, with the 1996 election looming, the president and opposition legislators became locked in a bitter struggle over long-term budget cuts, with Clinton calling for trimming of $1.1 billion over ten years and the Republicans seeking savings of approximately the same magnitude over seven years. Central to the controversy were sharp differences regarding limits on funding for Medicare/Medicaid as opposed to tax cuts. (Democrats argued that their opponents wished to “steal from the poor and elderly to give to the rich.”) Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the country’s worst domestic bombing attack, the destruction of a federal office complex in Oklahoma City on April 19, Congress approved several administration proposals designed to inhibit and punish terrorist attacks on U.S. property or personnel at home and abroad. Buffeted by continuing legal problems, but buoyed by public opinion polls that showed Clinton leading Republican challenger Dole by as much as 20 points, the president accepted renomination by the Democrats and went on to defeat Dole on November 5, 1996, by a popular vote margin of 49– 41 percent, with third-party candidate Perot winning 8 percent. In the electoral college the race was substantially more unbalanced; Clinton secured 379 of the 538 votes, whereas Dole won 159. Despite the president’s victory, the Republicans retained control of both houses of Congress by substantial margins (55 of 100 Senate and 227 of 435 House seats). The biennial congressional balloting of November 3, 1998, yielded an unchanged Senate division, but the Democrats scored an upset by gaining five seats in the House de-

spite the president’s mounting personal difficulties and conventional wisdom regarding midterm elections. On December 19, 1998, President Clinton became the second U.S. president (after Andrew Johnson in 1868) to be impeached by the House of Representatives. The principal charges against him were perjury in testimony before a grand jury regarding a sexual relationship with a former White House intern, Monica LEWINSKY, and obstruction of justice in seeking false testimony from Lewinsky in the sexual harassment case brought by Paula Jones. On February 12, 1999, Clinton was acquitted, the Senate having failed to register the two-thirds majority needed for conviction on largely party-line votes of 45–55 and 50–50, with 10 Republicans defecting on the first count and 5 on the second. The presidential election of November 7, 2000, was one of the most remarkable events in U.S. political history. On election night an extremely close electoral college count indicated that the outcome in Florida would be decisive. Exit polls that initially gave the state to the Democratic nominee, Vice President Al GORE, changed to favor Texas governor George W. BUSH (son of the 41st president), and then suggested a race “too close to call.” Subsequently, a recount of 45,000 disputed ballots was halted by Florida’s secretary of state, resumed by order of the state supreme court, suspended by the U.S. Supreme Court, and then effectively terminated by the Court on December 12. As a result Bush was declared the victor by an electoral college count of 271–266, although he trailed Gore in the popular count and won the Florida contest by only 537 votes of 6 million cast. Meanwhile the Senate was evenly split (50–50) for the first time in 120 years, while the Republican House majority fell to its narrowest since 1954: 221 against 212 for the Democrats, with 2 independents. On June 6, 2001, however, the Democrats assumed control of the Senate as a result of a decision by Sen. James JEFFORDS of Vermont, theretofore a Republican, to sit as an independent and vote with Democrats on most matters. This marked the first time in U.S. history that the balance of power in a house of

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Congress shifted because of a midterm change in party allegiance. On the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States suffered the most devastating terrorist attack in its history when two hijacked commercial airliners were deliberately flown into the upper floors of the World Trade Center’s twin 110story towers in New York City. The towers collapsed shortly after impact, and about 2,800 people died in the catastrophe, which also led to the collapse or ruin of other buildings in the vicinity. On the same morning, hijackers steered a third airliner into one side of the Pentagon, the headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense, near Washington, D.C., costing an additional 184 lives. A fourth hijacked flight crashed in rural Pennsylvania, killing the 44 passengers and crew, some of whom, having been alerted by mobile phone to the fate of the other three aircraft, had attempted to overpower the hijackers. In response to the terrorist assaults, the White House ordered all civilian flights in U.S. airspace grounded and temporarily closed the country’s borders. As a further precaution, President Bush, who was in Florida at the time of the attacks, was routed by the Secret Service to secure military bases in Louisiana and then Nebraska before returning to Washington, D.C., that evening. Attention immediately focused on the al-Qaida terrorist network of Osama bin Laden, and within days the government confirmed that all 19 hijackers had connections to al-Qaida. The Bush administration subsequently demanded that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had afforded safe harbor to bin Laden, hand him over and eliminate his terrorist training camps. The Taliban refused. On October 7 aerial forces from the United States and the United Kingdom, supported on the ground by the opposition Northern Alliance, launched a military assault to unseat the Taliban, capture or kill bin Laden, and destroy the al-Qaida bases. The Taliban succumbed in December, and late in the month an interim government was established in Kabul. Military action against pockets of al-Qaida and Taliban resistance continued as the U.S. government contemplated additional steps

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in what it characterized as a worldwide “war on terrorism.” In late October 2001 the U.S. Congress passed the Patriot Act, a cornerstone of the Bush administration’s domestic response to the terrorism threat. The act expanded the government’s authority to wiretap, conduct Internet surveillance, combat money laundering, and detain foreign nationals. Additional legislation strengthened airport security, while an executive order of November 13 authorized secret military tribunals for foreign nationals. By the end of the year 1,200 individuals were being detained in connection with the September 11 events, and the government had begun “voluntary” questioning of 5,000 noncitizens. The U.S. economy, already in a slump, also suffered significant damage from the September 11 attacks, which the hijackers, most of them Saudi nationals, had directly aimed at the heart of the U.S. financial and business district. The New York Stock Exchange experienced a massive, but temporary, sell-off upon reopening on September 17, consumer confidence flagged, unemployment rose, and the U.S. airline industry registered losses that threatened bankruptcy as business and tourist travel declined precipitously. The government acted quickly to shore up the airlines, supplement defense appropriations, provide tens of billions of dollars for homeland security and for relief and recovery efforts in New York City, and stimulate the economy. One consequence was a swift end to the brief era of budget surpluses recorded during the final years of the Clinton administration. At the midterm elections of November 5, 2002, the Republican Party recaptured control of the U.S. Senate by a 51–48 margin (Senator Jeffords remained an independent) and added 6 seats in the House, its majority rising to 229. On November 25 President Bush signed legislation creating a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security and then named Tom RIDGE, the current director of the White House Office of Homeland Security, as its head. Two days later he approved the establishment of an independent ten-member commission to investigate intelligence failures leading up to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

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In his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, President Bush grouped Iraq, Iran, and North Korea in an “axis of evil” intent on developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and, in the case of Tehran and Baghdad, supporting international terrorism. In October Congress authorized President Bush to take preemptive military action against Iraq if all other means failed to deter the Saddam Hussein regime from an alleged buildup of WMD. Given the Bush administration’s view that Hussein had not adequately complied with UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002, to begin disarming, U.S. forces launched an attack (code-named Operation Iraqi Freedom) on March 20, 2003. On May 1 Bush announced that combat operations had ended, despite resistance that took on an increasingly complex character in the following three years (see Current issues, below). In the 2004 presidential election, President Bush won a second term with 286 electoral college votes on a popular vote share of 50.7 percent, versus 252 electoral college votes for his Democratic opponent, Sen. John KERRY of Massachusetts. In the congressional poll Republicans secured a majority in both chambers (55–44 in the Senate and 232– 202 in the House of Representatives). Following the election, the Republicans held 29 governorships as opposed to the Democrats’ 21. In January 2006 Bush nominated a federal court judge, Michael CHERTOFF, to succeed Ridge as secretary of Homeland Security; subsequently, Bush secured congressional approval for the creation of an overarching director of the nation’s 15 spy agencies and nominated former UN ambassador John D. NEGROPONTE for the post on February 16. The 2006 midterm elections yielded a clear victory for the Democrats, who won control of the House of Representatives by a margin of 31 seats (233–202) and, somewhat unexpectedly, of the Senate, where a 49–49 tie was broken by two pro-Democratic independents. Following the November 7 poll, the Democrats also held 28 of 50 governorships (equaling the number previously controlled by Republicans). At the start of the

110th Congress in January 2007, Democrat-elected Nancy PELOSI, a severe critic of the Bush administration, took office as Speaker of the House—the first woman to be so honored.

Constitution and Government The Constitution of the United States, drafted by a Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 and declared in effect March 4, 1789, established a republic in which extensive powers are reserved to the states, currently 50 in number, that compose the Federal Union. The system has three distinctive characteristics. First, powers are divided among three federal branches—legislative, executive, and judicial—and between the federal and state governments, themselves each divided into three branches. Second, the power of each of the four elements of the federal government (the presidency, the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the federal judiciary) is limited by being shared with one or more of the other elements. Third, the different procedures by which the president, senators, and members of the House of Representatives are elected make each responsible to a different constituency. Federal executive power is vested in a president who serves for a four-year term and, by the 22nd Amendment (ratified in 1951), is limited to two terms of office. The president and vice president are formally designated by an electoral college composed of electors from each state and the District of Columbia. Selected by popular vote in numbers equal to the total congressional representation to which the various states are entitled, the electors are pledged to vote for their political parties’ candidates and customarily do so. Presidents are advised by, and discharge most of their functions through, executive departments headed by officers whom they appoint but who must have Senate approval. Presidents may, if they desire, use these officers collectively as a cabinet having advisory functions. In addition, presidents serve as commanders in chief, issuing orders to the military through the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of

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the Army, Navy, and Air Force, who also serve the chief executive collectively as an advisory body. Legislative power is vested in the bicameral Congress: The Senate has two members from each state chosen by popular vote for six-year terms, with renewal by thirds every two years; the House of Representatives, elected by popular vote every two years, has a membership based on population, although each state is entitled to at least one representative. The two houses are further differentiated by their responsibilities: For example, money bills must originate in the House, whereas the advice and consent of the Senate is required for ratification of treaties and appointment of top government officials such as cabinet members. In practice no major legislative or financial bill is considered by either chamber until it has been reported by, or discharged from, one of many standing committees. By custom the parties share seats on the committees on a basis roughly proportional to their legislative strength. Within the parties preference in committee assignments has traditionally been accorded on the basis of seniority (continuous service in the house concerned), although departures from this rule are becoming more common. The Senate (but not the House) permits “unlimited debate,” a procedure under which a determined minority may, by filibustering, bring all legislative action to a halt unless three-fifths of the full chamber elects to close debate. Failing this, a bill objectionable to the minority will eventually be withdrawn by the leadership. A presidential veto may be overridden by separate two-thirds votes of the two houses. Congress has created the General Accountability Office (formerly the General Accounting Office) to provide legislative control over public funds and has established 60 agencies, boards, and commissions—collectively known as “independent agencies”—to perform specified administrative functions. The federal judiciary is headed by a ninemember Supreme Court and includes courts of appeal, district courts, and various special courts, all created by Congress. Federal judges are appointed by the president, contingent upon approval by the

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Senate, and serve during good behavior. Federal jurisdiction is limited, applying most importantly to cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, to U.S. laws and treaties, and to controversies arising between two or more states or between citizens of different states. Jury trial is prescribed for all federal crimes except those involving impeachment, which is voted by the House and adjudicated by the Senate. In early July 2005 Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’CONNOR, the Court’s first female justice, announced her retirement, providing President Bush with his first opportunity to influence the Court’s direction. To replace O’Connor, who in recent years had been a prominent “swing” vote on a range of conservative-versus-liberal issues, including abortion rights, Bush selected conservative John ROBERTS, a judge on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. As Senate and media investigations into Roberts’s background were getting under way, the court’s chief justice, William REHNQUIST, died on September 3, with Bush then nominating Roberts to succeed Rehnquist. Roberts was quickly confirmed by the Senate and sworn in on September 29. Bush’s new pick to succeed O’Connor was more controversial. Samuel ALITO’s opposition to abortion and his support for expanding presidential powers while serving as a judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals sparked considerable opposition, but not enough to block Senate confirmation. Alito was sworn in on January 31, 2006. The federal Constitution and the institutions of the federal government serve generally as models for those of the states. Each state government is made up of a popularly elected governor and legislature (all but one bicameral) and an independent judiciary. The District of Columbia, as the seat of the national government, was traditionally administered under the direct authority of Congress; however, in May 1974 District voters approved a charter giving them the right to elect a mayor and city council, both of which took office on January 1, 1975. Earlier, under the 23rd Amendment to the Constitution (ratified in 1961), District residents had won

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the right to participate in presidential elections, and in 1970 they were authorized by Congress to send a nonvoting delegate to the House of Representatives. An amendment to give the District full congressional voting rights was approved by both houses of Congress in 1978 but not ratified by the requisite 38 of the 50 state legislatures. In practice, the broad powers of the federal government, its more effective use of the taxing power, and the existence of many problems transcending the capacity of individual states have tended to make for a strongly centralized system of government. Local self-government, usually through municipalities, townships, and counties, is a wellestablished tradition, based generally on English models. Education is a locally administered, federally subsidized function. State and Capital Alabama (Montgomery) Alaska (Juneau) Arizona (Phoenix) Arkansas (Little Rock) California (Sacramento) Colorado (Denver) Connecticut (Hartford) Delaware (Dover) Florida (Tallahassee) Georgia (Atlanta) Hawaii (Honolulu) Idaho (Boise) Illinois (Springfield) Indiana (Indianapolis) Iowa (Des Moines) Kansas (Topeka) Kentucky (Frankfort) Louisiana (Baton Rouge) Maine (Augusta) Maryland (Annapolis) Massachusetts (Boston) Michigan (Lansing) Minnesota (St. Paul) Mississippi (Jackson) Missouri (Jefferson City) Montana (Helena) Nebraska (Lincoln) Nevada (Carson City)

Area (sq. mi.) 51,705 591,004 114,000 53,187 158,706 104,091 5,018 2,045 58,664 58,910 6,471 83,564 56,345 36,185 56,275 82,277 40,410 47,752 33,265 10,460 8,284 58,527 84,402 47,689 69,697 147,046 77,355 110,561

Population (2007E) 4,625,000 676,000 6,358,000 2,838,000 36,719,000 4,794,000 3,532,000 873,000 18,629,000 9,391,000 1,301,000 1,500,000 12,866,000 6,363,000 2,992,000 2,767,000 4,236,000 4,558,000 1,336,000 5,679,000 6,383,000 10,155,000 5,206,000 2,961,000 5,881,000 954,000 1,781,000 2,588,000

New Hampshire (Concord) New Jersey (Trenton) New Mexico (Santa Fe) New York (Albany) North Carolina (Raleigh) North Dakota (Bismarck) Ohio (Columbus) Oklahoma (Oklahoma City) Oregon (Salem) Pennsylvania (Harrisburg) Rhode Island (Providence) South Carolina (Columbia) South Dakota (Pierre) Tennessee (Nashville) Texas (Austin) Utah (Salt Lake City) Vermont (Montpelier) Virginia (Richmond) Washington (Olympia) West Virginia (Charleston) Wisconsin (Madison) Wyoming (Cheyenne)

9,279 7,787 121,593 49,108 52,669 70,702 41,330 69,956 97,073 45,308 1,212 31,113 77,116 42,144 266,807 84,899 9,614 40,767 68,139 24,232 56,153 97,809

1,332,000 8,784,000 1,979,000 19,203,000 8,976,000 639,000 11,492,000 3,596,000 3,743,000 12,502,000 1,068,000 4,371,000 786,000 6,106,000 23,656,000 2,571,000 627,000 7,742,000 6,453,000 1,825,000 5,601,000 509,000

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545,000

Federal District District of Columbia

Foreign Relations U.S. relations with the world at large have undergone a continuing adjustment to the changing conditions created by the growth of the nation and the multiplication of its foreign contacts. An initial policy of noninvolvement in foreign affairs, which received its classical expression in President Washington’s warning against “entangling alliances,” gradually gave way to one of active participation in all phases of international life. At the same time, the nation has evolved from a supporter of revolutionary movements directed against the old monarchical system into a predominantly conservative influence, with a broad commitment to the support of traditional democratic values. U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere, the area of most long-standing concern, continues to reflect the preoccupations that inspired the Monroe Doctrine (of President James Monroe) of 1823, in

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which the United States declared its opposition to European political involvement and further colonization in the Americas and in effect established a political guardianship over the states of Latin America. Since World War II this responsibility has become largely multilateral through such bodies as the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS), and direct U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs has typically been limited to instances in which a Central American or Caribbean country appeared in immediate danger of falling into chaos or under leftist control. Overseas expansion during the late 19th and early 20th centuries resulted in the acquisition of American Samoa, Hawaii, and, following the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam; in addition, the United States secured a favored position in Cuba in 1902– 1903, obtained exclusive rights in the Panama Canal Zone in 1903, and acquired the U.S. Virgin Islands by purchase in 1917. The country did not, however, become a colonial power in the European sense and was among the first to adopt a policy of promoting the political evolution of its dependent territories along lines desired by their inhabitants. In accordance with this policy, the Philippines became independent in 1946; Puerto Rico became a commonwealth freely associated with the United States in 1952; Hawaii became a state of the Union in 1959; measures of self-government have been introduced in the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa; and the Canal Zone was transferred to Panama on October 1, 1979, although the United States retained effective control of 40 percent of the area through 1999. Certain Japanese territories occupied during World War II were provisionally retained for strategic reasons, with those historically of Japanese sovereignty, the Bonin and Ryukyu islands, being returned in 1968 and 1972, respectively. The greater part of Micronesia (held by Japan as a League of Nations mandate after World War I) became, by agreement with the UN, the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific. In 1986, following the conclusion of a series of compacts of association with the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of

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Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau (Belau), the UN Trusteeship Council indicated that it would be appropriate to terminate the trusteeship. This was eventually approved by the UN Security Council in December 1990 in respect of the FSM and the Marshall Islands (which became UN members in 1991) and of the Northern Marianas (which had opted for political union with the United States), whereas a lengthy internal wrangle over Palau’s constitutional status was not conclusively resolved until October 1, 1994. Globally, U.S. participation in the defeat of the Central Powers in World War I was followed by a period of renewed isolation and attempted neutrality, which, however, was ultimately made untenable by the challenge of the Axis powers in World War II. Having played a leading role in the defeat of the Axis, the United States joined with its allies in assuming responsibility for the creation of a postwar order within the framework of the UN. However, the subsequent divergence of Soviet and Western political aims, and the resultant limitations on the effectiveness of the UN as an instrument for maintaining peace and security, impelled the United States during the late 1940s and 1950s to take the lead in creating a network of special mutual security arrangements that were ultimately to involve commitments to more than four dozen foreign governments. Some of these commitments, as in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty Pact, and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact), are multilateral in character; others involve defense obligations toward particular governments, such as those of Thailand, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea. The United States also exercised leadership in international economic and financial relations through its cosponsorship of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, its promotion of trade liberalization efforts, and its contributions to postwar relief and rehabilitation, European economic recovery, and the economic progress of less-developed countries. Much of this activity, like

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parallel efforts put forward in social, legal, and cultural fields, has been carried on through the UN and its related agencies. The United States has pursued international agreements on measures for the control and limitation of strategic armaments. The country initiated first-round strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT) talks with the Soviet Union in late 1969 that ran until May 1972, resulting in a five-year agreement to limit the number of certain offensive weapons. Although second-round talks, held from November 1972 until early 1974, produced few substantive results, President Nixon and Soviet Chairperson Leonid Brezhnev agreed in July 1974 to negotiate a new five-year accord, and the intention was reaffirmed during a meeting between Brezhnev and President Ford in Vladivostok in November 1974. Progress again slowed until late 1978, when President Carter and Brezhnev finally signed the SALT II treaty in Vienna on June 18, 1979. However, the treaty remained unratified following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27. A collateral series of meetings between NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe had been initiated in 1973 but yielded little in the way of substantive agreement during the ensuing 16 years. In November 1981 U.S.-Soviet negotiations on limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) began in Geneva and were followed in June 1982 by the initiation of strategic arms reduction talks (START). Soviet insistence during a summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986 that limits on development of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) be included in any major arms agreement created an impasse in the START talks. But in the INF negotiations a precedent-setting accord, providing for the elimination of an entire category of nuclear missiles (those with a range of 300–3,400 miles, including cruise missiles), was initialed during a summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Washington, D.C., on December 8, 1987, with formal signature following on June 1, 1988, during a reciprocal summit in Moscow.

U.S. military forces, operating under a UN mandate, actively opposed aggression from Communist sources in the Korean War of 1950–1953. Other U.S. forces, together with those of a number of allied powers, assisted the government of South Vietnam in combating the insurgent movement that was actively supported by North Vietnamese forces for nearly two decades. By 1965 this assistance had become a major U.S. military effort, which continued after the initiation of peace talks in 1968. The lengthy discussions, involving U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. KISSINGER and North Vietnamese diplomat Le Duc Tho as the most active participants, resulted in the conclusion of a fourway peace agreement on January 27, 1973, that called for the withdrawal of all remaining U.S. military forces from Vietnam, the repatriation of American prisoners of war, and the institution of political talks between South Vietnam and its domestic (Viet Cong) adversaries. The U.S. withdrawal was followed, however, by a breakdown in talks, renewed military operations in late 1974, and the collapse of the South Vietnamese government on April 30, 1975. In a move of major international significance, the United States and the People’s Republic of China announced on December 15, 1978, that they would establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979. The normalization was essentially on Chinese terms, with the United States meeting all three of China’s long-sought conditions: severance of U.S. diplomatic relations with Taipei, withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan, and abrogation of the Republic of China defense treaty. On the other hand, the United States indicated that it would maintain economic, cultural, and other unofficial relations with Taiwan. In the Middle East, Secretary Kissinger embarked on an eight-month-long exercise in “shuttle diplomacy” following the Arab-Israeli “October War” of 1973. U.S. economic interests were, for the first time, directly involved as a result of an Arab embargo, instituted in October 1973, on all oil shipments to the United States and the Netherlands, and on some shipments to other Western European states. The embargo was terminated by all but two

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of the producing nations, Libya and Syria, in March 1974, following the resumption of full-scale diplomatic relations (severed since 1967) between the United States and Egypt. A first Kissinger-brokered Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement in January 1974 was followed by a second in September 1975. Meanwhile Kissinger brought about a limited Golan Heights disengagement between Israel and Syria in May 1974, followed a month later by a renewal of diplomatic relations between the United States and Syria (also suspended since 1967). In September 1978 President Carter, hosting a Camp David summit, was instrumental in negotiating accords that led to the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in Washington, D.C., on March 26, 1979. Despite a recognized danger to U.S. diplomatic personnel, the Carter administration permitted the deposed shah of Iran to enter the United States in October 1979 for medical treatment, and on November 4 militants occupied the U.S. embassy compound in Tehran, taking 66 hostages. Within days 13 blacks and women were released, with the militants, supported by Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini, demanding the return of the shah in exchange for the remainder. Although condemnations of the seizure were forthcoming from the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, and the World Court, neither their nor personal pleas by international diplomats were at first heeded by the Islamic Republic’s leadership, which vilified the United States as “the great Satan.” President Carter aborted a rescue mission by a U.S. commando force in April 1980 after early mishaps. Eventually, however, negotiations that commenced on the eve of the 1980 U.S. election culminated in the freeing of the hostages on Reagan’s presidential inauguration day (January 20, 1981). The Reagan administration was active in a wide range of foreign contexts. It viewed the conclusion of the 1988 INF treaty as the result of consistent (and largely successful) pressure on U.S. European allies to maintain a high level of military preparedness as compared with the Soviet Union. In the Middle East the Reagan administration attempted to negotiate a mutual withdrawal of Israeli

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and Syrian forces from Lebanon in the wake of the Israeli invasion of June 1982 and the subsequent evacuation of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) forces from Beirut, for which the U.S. government provided truce supervision assistance. During 1987, despite the risk of a major confrontation with Iran, the Reagan administration mounted a significant naval presence in the Persian Gulf to protect oil tankers from seaborne mines and other threats stemming from the Iran-Iraq conflict. In Asia, the United States provided substantial military assistance to Pakistan and Thailand in response to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and communist operations in Cambodia, respectively, while strongly supporting the post-Marcos regime in the Philippines. In the Caribbean, the United States provided the bulk of the forces that participated in the 1983 postcoup intervention in Grenada, and it welcomed the 1986 ouster of Haitian dictator Fran¸cois Duvalier. In Central America, the Reagan administration attempted to contain Soviet-Cuban involvement in Nicaragua and to help the Salvadoran government defeat leftist guerrilla forces. Overall, in keeping with a 1980 campaign pledge, President Reagan sought to restructure both the military and civilian components of the nation’s foreign aid program so as to reward “America’s friends,” whatever their domestic policies, in an implicit repudiation of his predecessor’s somewhat selective use of aid in support of global humanrights objectives. Relations with Panama deteriorated sharply following the nullification of presidential balloting in May 1989. Seven months later Gen. Manuel Noriega assumed sweeping powers to deal with what was termed “a state of war” with the United States, and on December 20 the George H. W. Bush administration intervened militarily to oust the Panamanian dictator, who was flown to Miami two weeks later to face trial (and ultimate conviction) on drugtrafficking and other charges. During 1990 the Bush administration became preoccupied with the international crisis generated by Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait on August 2 and the remarkable prodemocracy upheaval in Eastern Europe that had been triggered by Gorbachev’s

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reforms in the Soviet Union. Five days after the fall of Kuwait, the United States announced the deployment of ground units and aircraft to defend Saudi Arabia, and on November 29 the UN Security Council approved the use of “all necessary means” if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. On January 12 the U.S. Congress authorized military action against Iraq, and on January 16 “Operation Desert Storm” began, yielding the liberation of Kuwait on February 26–27 by a U.S.led multinational force. Four decades of superpower confrontation formally ended on November 21, 1990, with the adoption of a treaty reducing conventional forces in Europe at a Paris summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Agreement eight months later on final details of the long-sought START treaty paved the way for signing by Bush and Gorbachev at a Moscow summit on July 30–31, 1991. Under the accord, 50 percent of the Soviet and 35 percent of the U.S. ballistic missile warheads were slated for destruction. At the conclusion of the Gulf War President Bush announced that he regarded settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute as the top priority of his administration. In pursuit of this objective, Secretary of State James BAKER embarked on an extensive series of meetings with regional leaders to arrange a peace conference that would be sponsored by the UN and provide for Palestinian representation. After a lengthy deadlock over such participation, a conference involving Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was convened in Madrid, Spain, in October 1991 under the joint auspices of the United States and Soviet Union. Further talks, both bilateral and multilateral, were held in an extended series of meetings, largely in Washington, D.C., over the ensuing months, with no substantive results. Following the failed Moscow coup of August 1991, the United States welcomed the achievement of independence by the Baltic states, and in December, after the legal collapse of the Soviet Union, Congress moved to recognize Ukraine. President Bush and Russia’s Boris Yeltsin signed

an unprecedented extension of the 1991 START accord during their first formal summit on June 16–17. Under START II, each nation would be limited to 3,000–3,500 long-range weapons (down from 11,000–12,000 on the eve of START I), while all land-based multiple warhead missiles would be banned. Other summit highlights included agreement on reciprocal most-favored-nation trade status and an enthusiastically received address by President Yeltsin to a joint session of the U.S. Congress. Meanwhile, the Bush administration had recognized all of the remaining former Soviet republics, as well as the former Yugoslavian republics of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the ongoing ethnic conflict in the latter. On November 24, 1992, the United States completed its military withdrawal from the Philippines, ending a presence that had existed since 1898, save for three years during World War II. Ten days later, in an operation termed “Restore Hope,” President Bush ordered the dispatch of 28,000 U.S. soldiers to Somalia to ensure the safe delivery of international relief supplies to the country’s starving population. Trade issues occupied center stage during the waning months of the Bush administration. On November 20, 1992, U.S. and European Community negotiators reached an accord terminating a lengthy controversy over farm subsidies, thus clearing the way for conclusion in December 1993 of the seven-year “Uruguay Round” of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which had been concluded on August 12, 1992, by the United States, Canada, and Mexico after 14 months of negotiation, was formally signed on December 17. It secured U.S. legislative approval in November 1993 and came into force on January 1, 1994. Initially preoccupied with domestic issues, President Bill Clinton met with Russian President Yeltsin in Vancouver, Canada, on April 4–5, 1993, in talks that focused largely on financial aid for the economically beleaguered Russian regime.

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In August 1993 Sudan was placed on the list of states deemed by the U.S. government to be “sponsoring terrorism.” The foreign policy highlight of Clinton’s first year however, was the formal signing at the White House on September 13, 1993, of a historic agreement between Israel and the PLO on Palestinian self-rule in Jericho and the Gaza Strip. Other 1993–1994 concerns included the massive U.S. trade deficit with Japan, renewal of China’s mostfavored-nation trade status, an arms sales dispute with Pakistan, and a deteriorating situation in Somalia, where 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in October 1993, due in large part to the refusal by Defense Secretary Les ASPIN to provide more tanks and armored vehicles. Aspin subsequently admitted his mistake, and on December 15, President Clinton announced Aspin’s resignation. On February 3, 1994, William J. PERRY was sworn in as the new defense secretary, and by March 31, 1994, all but a small number of U.S. troops were withdrawn from Somalia. In the face of a somewhat wavering posture regarding events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Clinton administration in early 1994 issued a new set of guidelines for peacekeeping and related activities that would preclude U.S. military involvement short of a clear threat to international security, a major natural disaster, or a gross violation of human rights. From February 1994 the launching of UN-approved NATO air strikes against Serbian positions in Bosnia eased U.S.European differences on how to respond to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, where deployment of U.S. ground troops continued to be confined to the UN/CSCE observer contingent in Macedonia. Thereafter, the genocidal Rwandan crisis that erupted in April elicited a substantial U.S. humanitarian effort in neighboring countries and the dispatch of 200 U.S. troops to help run Kigali airport, although participation in UN peacekeeping was ruled out. On June 2, 1994, the Clinton administration called for international economic sanctions against

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North Korea to force disclosure of that country’s nuclear weapons capacity; following the death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung on July 8, a U.S.-North Korean agreement signed on August 12 met some of the concerns of the international community. On June 30, 1994, the United States announced its readiness to sign the 1982 UN Law of the Sea treaty, having negotiated changes in sections deemed hostile to free enterprise. The following month U.S. Middle East diplomacy registered a major success when President Clinton on July 25 supervised the White House signing of a peace declaration between King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel. During 1994 the Clinton administration also directed attention toward Haiti and efforts to implement a 1993 agreement providing for departure of the military junta and the return of exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Having initially preferred increasingly draconian UN sanctions to direct action, the U.S. government concluded by August 1994 that some form of armed intervention was required. Accordingly, on September 19 an advance contingent of 20,000 troops landed, unopposed, on Haitian soil under a UN mandate to oust the incumbent regime. On October 13 junta leader Gen. Raoul C´edras left aboard a U.S. flight to Panama, and on October 15 Aristide returned to Haiti (see Haiti article). Meanwhile, large numbers of Haitian “boat people” had been picked up and transported to the U.S. Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, with Cuban refugees (in a change of policy) being accorded like treatment as of August 19. In another policy shift on May 2, 1995, the United States agreed to admit Cuban, but not Haitian, detainees remaining at Guant´anamo, with all subsequent refugees being returned to their homeland. In what was hailed as a significant foreign policy move, the U.S. Senate on December 1, 1994, ratified the 1993 GATT accord establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). The action came after the new majority leader, Sen. Robert Dole, had given his support in return for creation of a

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review panel empowered to trigger a congressional vote on withdrawal should membership be seen as detrimental to U.S. interests. Subsequently, with archconservative senator Jesse HELMS installed as chairperson of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Republicans moved to slash foreign aid (particularly for Africa). Concurrently, the House voted to cut U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts while giving Congress a heightened role in the commitment of U.S. troops abroad. In 1996, the Clinton administration, which for some time had indicated its displeasure with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, vetoed his reelection by the Security Council. At issue was Boutros-Ghali’s alleged failure to reform the world body, in response to which Congress continued to withhold dues of more than $1 billion. On December 13 a lengthy confrontation with France over Boutros-Ghali’s successor ended with the selection of Kofi Annan, a Ghanaian and longtime UN civil servant who had earned high marks for directing peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. On October 26, 1997, Jiang Zemin began a nineday state visit to the United States, the first by a Chinese head of state since 1985, with President Clinton reciprocating in June 1998. Although the two leaders failed to resolve fundamental differences on human rights that had persisted since the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protest, Clinton and Zemin did reference many areas of “significant common interest,” including efforts to end the proliferation of WMD. Shortly thereafter, Clinton failed to win “fast track” trade authority, a practice precluding Congress from partial amendment of trade legislation, even though it had been extended to every other president since 1974 (and would be granted to Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, in August 2002). In 1998 President Clinton ordered cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the August 7 terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He also ordered air strikes against Iraq in mid-December after Baghdad had failed to honor a November 14 pledge to resume full cooperation with UN weapons inspectors.

On March 24, 1999, following a year of escalating ethnic fighting between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a group of ethnic Albanians, and Serb and Yugoslav security forces, NATO air strikes began in which the United States participated. At the same time, Clinton pledged that no U.S. ground troops would be sent to Kosovo. By June, however, Clinton said he would send as many as 7,000 ground troops to assist NATO in peacekeeping operations. In April 1999 relations with China were sorely tested by NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, which the United States attributed to a mapping error. In August the Senate, by a 51–48 vote, refused to ratify the Comprehensive (nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), an action for which the former Joint Chiefs of Staff chairperson, Gen. John M. SHALIKASHVILI, strongly urged reconsideration in early 2001. Talks began in Geneva in April 2000 on a START III accord, following Russian ratification of START II, while the House on May 24 approved the China trade bill, thus paving the way for Chinese admission to the WTO. On August 22 President Clinton signed a controversial measure providing upward of $1.3 billion to aid Colombia’s war on drug traffickers. On October 12, 17 U.S. sailors were killed and 37 wounded in a terrorist attack on the USS Cole, a destroyer in the process of mooring at Aden, Yemen. Before leaving office on January 20, 2001, President Clinton, voicing reservations, signed a treaty to establish an International Criminal Court (ICC) to succeed the ad hoc international war-crimes tribunals at The Hague (an action for which the succeeding Bush administration promptly withdrew support). Concurrently, Senator Helms, the Senate’s leading critic of UN financing, agreed to the release of $582 million in back dues to the world body under a deal providing for reduction of the U.S. share in the annual $1.1 billion administrative budget to 22 percent (down from 25 percent) and of its contribution to the peacekeeping budget to 26 percent (down from 31 percent) by 2004.

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The second war in the Persian Gulf, launched by President George W. Bush on March 20, 2003, proved far more divisive and much more costly than the first. While the United States expressed regret that the UN Security Council would not issue a resolution specifically authorizing military action against Iraq, it insisted that Resolution 1441 provided sufficient authority. However, the chief UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix, had, on March 7, given a decidedly mixed assessment of Iraq’s compliance with the 2002 resolution, and at midyear an administration spokesperson conceded that the President Bush had relied on “incomplete and possibly inaccurate” intelligence in having declared in his January State of the Union address that Saddam Hussein had attempted to secure uranium from Africa. Equally damaging to the administration’s credibility was subsequent evidence that Iraq apparently possessed no WMD at the outset of hostilities. For these and other reasons, most major governments, save that of the United Kingdom, were highly critical of the U.S.-led incursion. By early 2005 more than a dozen countries had decided to pull out or reduce their forces in Iraq, with more following in 2006 and 2007. In November 2007, Arab leaders, including Syria’s foreign minister, accepted an invitation by the United States to attend a broadly inclusive Middle East peace summit, organized by Secretary of State Condoleezza RICE, in Annapolis, Maryland. At the summit’s end, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud OLMERT and Palestinian President Mahmoud ABBAS issued a statement of “joint understanding” committing to negotiating a peace agreement by the end of 2008.

Current Issues In late 2005 a controversy erupted over revelations, first reported by the New York Times, that President Bush had authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantless eavesdropping on telecommunications between U.S. citizens and foreign nationals. The administration argued that the monitoring was key to prosecut-

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ing the “war on terror,” was within the president’s authority as commander in chief, and had been authorized by a congressional resolution to use “all necessary and appropriate force” in response to the September 2001 al-Qaida attacks. Critics of the policy, including the Republican chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Arlen SPECTER of Pennsylvania, countered that it violated the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and had not been authorized by Congress. USA Today revealed in mid-May 2006 that the NSA was gathering the phone records of tens of millions of citizens in an effort to trace terrorists through calling patterns involving communications by any party believed by the NSA to be outside the United States, though the other end of the communication may be within the United States. The Bush administration assailed both newspapers for undermining its antiterrorism efforts, threatened to prosecute those who had leaked the information, and shut down a probe into the legality of the wiretapping by refusing national security clearances for investigators from its Justice Department. (In August 2007, Congress passed a law that legalized warrantless eavesdropping.) Throughout 2006, the war in Iraq continued to dominate politics in the United States. The rapid toppling of Saddam Hussein and Bush’s subsequent declaration of victory in Iraq in early 2003 were followed by unremitting sectarian violence, mostly between Shiite and Sunni factions, as well as attacks from diverse sources— remnants of the prior regime, militias loyal to Islamic clerics and tribal leaders, Iraqi nationalists, al-Qaida recruits—against U.S. military forces and their newly trained Iraqi counterparts. Roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, and other unconventional tactics took a steady toll on military personnel and civilians alike. By mid-2006 the number of U.S. military deaths had exceeded 2,500, while conservative estimates of the death toll among Iraqi civilians stood at around 15,000. The president continued to reject calls, most notably from Democratic representative John P. MURTHA of Pennsylvania, a Marine veteran, to set a timetable for the withdrawal of

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U.S. troops from Iraq. (Murtha subsequently voted in 2007 in favor of a funding bill to “support the troops” in Iraq.) Bush conceded that the war and the U.S. military presence in Iraq would likely outlast his administration, due to end in January 2009. Growing popular opposition to the Iraq conflict contributed to massive opposition gains at the November 2006 midterm election; the Democrats won both houses of Congress, although they captured the Senate by a slim one-vote margin. Following the election, House Democrats argued that the electorate had conferred upon them a mandate for drastic reform legislation. However, with the Democrats having insufficient strength to override the president’s veto power, it soon became apparent that little would be accomplished prior to the 2008 presidential poll. The country’s problems mounted in 2007, with economic reverses that included mounting energy costs; a record trade deficit; a severe decline in housing starts and sales, accompanied by a wave of major financial institutions losing unprecedented amounts of money as fallout from a subprime mortgage-lending crisis; and a drop in the value of the dollar to its lowest level in a quarter century in the latter part of the year. On a more positive note, Gen. David Petraeus, the Iraq war commander, reported to Congress that the U.S. troop “surge” in Iraq, which was initiated in February, was working, and that troops could start to be drawn down by early 2008. Insurgent attacks in Iraq had declined significantly, though the Iraqi government had not met many of the “benchmarks” established earlier to measure progress. Democrats in Congress had repeatedly failed in their attempts throughout the year to force President Bush to withdraw most of the troops by early 2008. Politically, President Bush was buffeted on a variety of fronts in 2007. In March, I. “Scooter” Lewis LIBBY, Vice President Dick Cheney’s former chief of staff, was convicted of lying to a grand jury that was investigating who leaked to the media the name of an undercover CIA officer, Valerie PLAME. She is the wife of Joseph WILSON, who had published an article challenging the administration’s claim

that Saddam Hussein had attempted to purchase uranium in Africa. (The Plame issue also reportedly contributed to the resignation on August 13 of key presidential adviser Karl ROVE, described as the political mastermind behind Bush’s electoral victories.) In June, the Bush administration announced that it would not extend the term of Gen. Peter PACE as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a move reportedly made reluctantly to avoid the anticipated tough confirmation battle in the Senate linked to issues concerning the war in Iraq. Navy Adm. Michael MULLEN was confirmed by the Senate on August 3 to replace Pace. On August 27, Attorney General Alberto GONZALEZ, another longtime ally of President Bush who had been the target of increasing criticism, announced his resignation, following accusations that he had political motives for dismissing eight federal prosecutors in 2006. A former federal judge, Michael MUKASEY, was sworn in as attorney general on November 9, a day after his Senate confirmation. Though his confirmation had initially been seen as a certainty, he became a controversial figure following his refusal to characterize the U.S. interrogation technique known as “waterboarding” as a form of torture. The use of waterboarding in interrogating terrorist suspects had been the source of lengthy recent debate in the United States. On a more positive note, moves to bolster the economy included the U.S. Federal Reserve’s lowering of interest rates three times since September 2007 to ease credit availability, and mortgage lenders agreeing in December to a Bush administration plan to freeze interest rates for up to five years for some two million homeowners who held subprime loans. According to the International Herald Tribune, many of the states hardest hit by mortgage defaults and falling home prices were important swing states in the 2008 presidential election. The presidential campaign, having gotten off to an unprecedented early launch in 2007, included numerous contenders from both parties. Front-runners among the Democrats were New York Senator Hillary CLINTON and Illinois Senator Barack OBAMA. Leading Republican contenders included Arizona Senator John

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McCAIN; Mitt ROMNEY, former governor of Massachusetts; and Rudolph GIULIANI, former New York City mayor.

Political Parties Although the U.S. Constitution makes no provision for political parties, the existence of two (or occasionally three) major parties at the national level has been a feature of the U.S. political system almost since its inception. The presentday Democratic Party traces its origins back to the “Democratic-Republican” Party led by Thomas Jefferson during George Washington’s administration, whereas the contemporary Republican Party, though not formally constituted until the 1850s, regards itself as the lineal descendant of the Federalist Party led by Alexander Hamilton during the same period. The two-party system has been perpetuated by tradition, by the practical effect of single-member constituencies as well as a single executive, and by the status accorded to the second main party as the recognized opposition in legislative bodies. The major parties do not, however, constitute disciplined doctrinal groups. Each is a coalition of autonomous state parties—themselves coalitions of county and city parties—that come together chiefly in presidential election years to formulate a general policy statement, or platform, and to nominate candidates for president and vice president. Control of funds and patronage is largely in the hands of state and local party units, a factor that weakens party discipline in Congress. Policy leadership is similarly diffuse, both parties searching for support from as many interest groups as possible and tending to operate by consensus. For at least a quarter of a century, popular identification with the two major parties was remarkably stable. From 1960 to 1984, according to surveys by the University of Michigan, between 40 and 46 percent of the voters considered themselves Democrats, whereas 22–29 percent identified with the Republicans. During the same period, 23–35 percent viewed themselves as independents (the

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higher figure occurring in the mid-1970s, when younger voters tended to dissociate themselves from partisan politics). In a subsequent poll conducted in early 1995, 37 percent of respondents called themselves independents, 30 percent Republicans, and 29 percent Democrats, with nearly 60 percent of voting-age individuals voicing their preference for a tripartite system. Since 1932 the rate of voter participation has averaged 55.7 percent in presidential elections, ranging from a high of 62.8 percent for John F. Kennedy in 1960 to an estimated low of 49.0 percent for Bill Clinton in 1996 (the 2004 figure was 60.0 percent). The turnout in nonpresidential years has been substantially lower, averaging 39.9 percent, with a range from 32.5 percent in 1942 to 45.4 percent in 1962 and 1966. The reported 2006 figure was 36.8 percent.

Presidential Party Republican Party. Known informally as the “Grand Old Party” (GOP), the present-day Republican Party was founded as an antislavery party in the 1850s and includes Abraham LINCOLN, Theodore ROOSEVELT, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan among its past presidents. Generally more conservative in outlook than the Democratic Party, the Republican Party has traditionally drawn its strength from the smaller cities and from suburban and rural areas, especially in the Midwest and parts of New England. In recent years Republicans have tended to advocate welfare and tax reforms, including a simplified tax system and revenue-sharing to relieve the burden of local property taxes; the achievement of a “workable balance between a growing economy and environmental protection”; and military preparedness sufficient to preclude the nation’s becoming a “secondclass power.” On January 21, 1997, Newt GINGRICH, the Republican’s high-profile speaker of the House, was reprimanded and fined by Congress for illegal use of donations to fund a college course that he had taught. Later, he felt obliged to resign because of the Republicans’ poor showing in 1998.

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Following a hard-fought campaign, with results not clear until December 12, the party’s presidential candidate in 2000, George W. Bush, secured a bare majority of electoral votes. The Senate was split 50–50, while the Republicans retained control of the House with a reduced majority of 221 seats. In June 2001 the Republicans lost control of the Senate when Sen. James Jeffords of Vermont became an independent, but they regained it at the November 2002 election and held it for the ensuing four years. Charged with violating Texas campaign laws, House Majority Leader Tom DeLAY stepped down in January 2006 and was replaced by John Boehner on February 2. Other changes followed the party’s legislative reversal in November 2006. Leaders: George W. BUSH (President of the United States), Dick CHENEY (Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate), Mitch McCONNELL (Senate Minority Leader), John BOEHNER (House Minority Leader), Roy BLUNT (House Minority Whip), John McCAIN (Senator from Arizona), Mitt ROMNEY (Former Governor of Massachusetts), Michael D. (Mike) HUCKABEE (Former Governor of Arkansas), Rudolph GIULIANI (Former Mayor of New York City), Robert M. (Mike) DUNCAN (National Chair).

Leading Congressional Party Democratic Party. Originally known as the Democratic-Republican Party, the Democratic Party counts Thomas JEFFERSON, Andrew JACKSON, Woodrow WILSON, Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Bill Clinton among its past presidents. Its basis has traditionally been an unstable coalition of conservative politicians in the southeastern states, more liberal political leaders in the urban centers of the Northeast and the West Coast, and populists in some towns and rural areas of the Midwest. The party was weakened in 1968 by such developments as the conservative secessionist movement of southern Democrats led by George C. Wallace and the challenge to established leader-

ship and policies put forward by senators Eugene J. McCarthy and Robert F. Kennedy, both of whom had sought the presidential nomination ultimately captured by Hubert H. Humphrey. The party was further divided by the nomination of Sen. George S. McGovern, a strong critic of the Vietnam policies of both presidents Johnson and Nixon, as Democratic presidential candidate in 1972. The party benefited from the circumstances surrounding the resignations of Vice President Spiro Agnew in 1973 and of President Nixon in 1974, scored impressive victories in both the House and Senate in 1974, recaptured the presidency under Jimmy Carter in 1976, and maintained its substantial congressional majorities in 1978. In 1980 it retained control of the House by a reduced majority while losing the Senate and suffering a decisive rejection of President Carter’s bid for reelection. The party’s strength in Congress was largely unchanged in 1984, despite the Reagan presidential landslide, and in 1986 it regained control of the Senate; it retained control of both houses, despite the defeat of its presidential candidate, Michael Dukakis, in 1988. Led by Clinton of Arkansas, the Democrats regained the White House in 1992 while preserving their congressional majorities, but, in a startling reversal, the party lost control of both houses in 1994. Although unable to regain control in 1996 or 1998, the Democrats countered expectations by registering marginal recovery in 1998. Denied the presidency in 2000, despite a popular majority for Vice President Al Gore, the party drew even with the Republicans in the Senate, whereas a ten-seat gain in the House was insufficient to win control. In June 2001, however, the Democrats assumed control of the Senate with the support of Jeffords of Vermont, who had left the Republican Party to sit as an independent. The disappointing results of the November 2002 balloting, at which the party was unable to win either house of Congress, were attributed by many observers to the Democrats’ inability to present clear policy alternatives to the Republican agenda. Following the election, Richard A. GEPHARDT of Missouri, the House minority leader, resigned his post and was succeeded by Nancy Pelosi of

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California, the first woman to head either party in Congress. In 2004 the party was even less successful than in 2000, failing to gain the White House for its standard-bearer, Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, and losing further ground in both the Senate and House. On February 12, 2005, the party elected former Vermont governor Howard Dean as its national chair. A contender for the 2004 presidential nomination, Dean was a committed liberal whose widely publicized antiwar stand was considered secondary to his status as a vigorous and effective political leader. Leaders: Nancy PELOSI (Speaker of the House), Harry REID (Senate Majority Leader), Robert BYRD (Senate President Pro Tempore), Richard (Dick) DURBIN (Senate Majority Whip), Steny HOYER (House Majority Leader), James CLYBURN (House Majority Whip), Hillary Rodham CLINTON (Senator from New York), Barack OBAMA (Senator from Illinois), John EDWARDS (Former Senator from North Carolina and 2004 vice-presidential candidate), Howard DEAN (National Chair and Former Governor of Vermont).

Other Parties Although third parties have occasionally influenced the outcome of presidential balloting, the Republican Party in 1860 was the only such party in U.S. history to win a national election and subsequently establish itself as a major political organization. The third parties having the greatest impact have typically been those formed as largely personal vehicles by prominent Republicans or Democrats who have been denied nomination by their regular parties, such as Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive (“Bull Moose”) Party of 1912 and the American Independent Party organized to support the 1968 candidacy of George C. Wallace. The only nonparty candidates in recent history to attract significant public attention were former Democratic senator Eugene J. McCARTHY, who secured 751,728 votes (0.9 percent of the total) in 1976; former Republican representative John

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B. ANDERSON, who polled 5,719,722 (6.6 percent) in 1980; and Texas entrepreneur H. Ross PEROT, who won 19,237,247 (19 percent) in 1992 and whose substantial support gave rise to subsequent attempts to establish a credible third party before his Reform Party’s far less impressive showing of 8 percent in 1996. Thereafter, despite a 1998 Minnesota victory for the party’s gubernatorial candidate, former professional wrestler Jesse VENTURA, the party declined further, winning only 0.4 percent of the vote in 2000 under longtime Republican conservative Patrick J. BUCHANAN. In a marginally more impressive showing, Green Party nominee Ralph NADER obtained 2.7 percent of the vote, whereas the Natural Law Party candidate, Harry BROWNE, secured 0.4 percent. (Nader ran as an independent in 2004, winning only 0.3 percent of the vote.) Other minor parties, none of national significance in recent elections, have included the Alaskan Independence Party (AIP); the American Beer Drinker’s Party, led by Buddy PILSNER; the American Independent Party (AIP); the American Nazi Party (ANP); the Anti-Hypocrisy Party (AHP), led by Temperance LANCE-COUNCIL; the Church and Family Values Party (CFVP); the Communist Labor Party (CLP); the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA), led by Gus HALL until his death on October 16, 2000; the Concerned Citizens (CC); the New York State– based Conservative Party (CP); the Constitution Party (CP); the Constitutional American Party (CAP); the Rhode Island–based Cool Moose Party, led by Robert J. HEALEY Sr.; the Corrective Action Party (CAP), led by Bernard PALICKI; the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), which is a member of the Socialist International; the Expansionist Party of the United States (XP), which seeks expansion of the United States into an eventual world union; the Grass Roots Party (GRP); the Independent Party (IP); the Independent American Party (IAP); the International Green Party (IGP); the Justice Party (JP); the Latino La Raza Unida (People United) Party (LRUP); the Liberal Party

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Cabinet As of December 31, 2007 President Vice President

George W. Bush Richard B. (Dick) Cheney

Secretaries Agriculture Commerce Defense Education Energy Health and Human Services Homeland Security Housing and Urban Development Interior Labor State Transportation Treasury Veteran’s Affairs Attorney General

Edward T. Schafer (nominated) Carlos Gutierrez Robert M. Gates Margaret Spellings [f] Samuel W. (Sam) Bodman Michael O. Leavitt Michael Chertoff Alphonso Jackson Dirk Kempthorne Elaine Chao [f] Condoleezza Rice [f] Mary E. Peters [f] Henry M. (Hank) Paulson Jr. James Peake Michael Mukasey

Note: All of the above are members of the Republican Party.

Cabinet-Level Aides Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency Director of the National Drug Control Policy Director of the Office of Management and Budget President’s Chief of Staff United States Trade Representative

Stephen L. Johnson John P. Walters Jim Nussle Joshua B. Bolten Susan Schwab [f]

[f] = female

(L); the Libertarian Party (LP); the Liberty Union (LU); the Light Party, led by Da VID; the Mountain Party (MP); the National Christian Party (NCP), led by Martin J. McNALLY; the National Democratic Policy Committee (NDPC), which has supported dissident Democrat, Lyndon LAROUCHE, as a presidential candidate; the antiSemitic National Determination Party (NDP); the National Hamiltonian Party (NHP), supported by a self-proclaimed “aristocracy of the mind,” which has advanced Eric SEBASTIAN as its candidate in every presidential election since

1972; the white supremacist National Patriot Party (NPP), which was formally launched in April 1994, mainly by former supporters of Perot, under the national chairmanship of Nicholas SABATINE III; National States Rights Party (NSRP); the National Unity Party (NUP), which in 1984 endorsed John Anderson for a second presidential bid; the New Federalist Party (NFP), organized in 1975 “to promote the principles of George Washington and the Federalist founders of this nation”; the New Party (NP), which favors adoption of a national health program and abolition of the death

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penalty; the Other Party (OP); the Pacific Party (PP); the Pansexual Peace Party (PPP); the Socialist Peace and Freedom Party (PFP); Politicians Are Crooks (PAC); the Populist Party of America (PPA), an outgrowth of the middle-class “America First” movement of the 1930s; the Priorities Party (PP); the Progressive Party (PR); the Marxist Progressive Labor Party (PLP); the Prohibition Party (PP), a continuation of the historic party; the Right to Life Party (RLP); the Social Democrats USA (SDUSA), a member of the Socialist International; the Socialist Labor Party (SLP); the Socialist Workers Party (SWP); the Timesizing.com Party (TCP); the United States Pacifist Party (USPP); the United States Taxpayers Party (USTP); the Vermont Grassroots Party (VGP); the Veterans Industrial Party (VIP), led by Ernest Lee EASTON; the Working Families Party (WFP); and the World Socialist Party of the United States (WSPUS).

Legislature Legislative power is vested by the Constitution in the bicameral Congress of the United States. Both houses are chosen by direct popular election; one-third of the Senate and the entire House of Representatives are elected every two years. Congresses are numbered consecutively, with a new Congress meeting every second year. The last election (for the 110th Congress) was held November 7, 2006. Senate. The upper chamber consists of 100 members—2 from each state—elected on a statewide basis for six-year terms. Following the 2006 election, the Democratic and Republican parties each held 49 seats, with the Democrats controlling because of support by two independents elected in 2006—Joseph LIEBERMAN of Connecticut, who had lost a Democratic primary bid in August, and Bernard (Bernie) SANDERS of Vermont. President: Richard B. (Dick) CHENEY (Vice President of the United States). President Pro Tempore: Robert C. BYRD.

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House of Representatives. The lower house consists of 435 voting representatives, with each state entitled to at least 1 representative and the actual number from each state being apportioned periodically on the basis of population. The size and shape of congressional districts are determined by the states themselves; however, the Supreme Court has ruled that such districts must be “substantially equal” in population and must be redefined when they fail to meet this requirement. Resident commissioners from the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands were traditionally nonvoting delegates; however, in January 1993, over unanimous Republican opposition, they were given the right to vote in the body’s Committee of the Whole, though not in the (usually pro forma) final passage of legislation. The right was revoked by the new Republican majority in January 1995; Democrats restored the privilege when they retook House control following the 2006 elections. At the beginning of 2007 the Democratic Party held 233 of the nonterritorial seats, the Republican Party, 202. Speaker: Nancy PELOSI.

Communications The press and broadcasting media are privately owned and enjoy editorial freedom within the bounds of state libel laws. There is no legal ban on the ownership of broadcasting facilities by the press, and in 1950 43 percent of the commercial television stations were so owned. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has, however, been under some pressure to deny relicensing under potentially monopolistic circumstances.

Press There were 10,855 newspapers, excluding inhouse and special-purpose publications, issued in the United States as of 2002. Weeklies and semiweeklies outnumbered dailies by more than five to one. Until recently only a few papers have sought national distribution, the most important of the dailies being the New York–based Wall Street Journal, published in four regional editions;

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the Boston-based Christian Science Monitor, published in three domestic editions plus an international edition; the New York Times, whose national edition is transmitted by satellite for printing in eight locations throughout the country; and USA Today, which, after a phased market-by-market expansion beginning in 1982, reached a nationwide circulation of 2.3 million in January 2005 (a figure relatively unchanged in 2006). After a lengthy period of decline, due in part to the impact of television on the printed media, the number of daily newspapers appeared to have stabilized in 1979–1980 at 1,750; however, their number again declined thereafter to 1,452 in 2005, with circulation falling from 62.2 million to 53.3 million over the same period, followed by an unprecedented plunge to 43.7 million in September 2006. Significantly, some of the country’s leading papers, including the Buffalo Courier Express, the Cleveland Press, the Des Moines Tribune, the Minneapolis Star Tribune, the Philadelphia Bulletin, the Pittsburgh Press, the Richmond News Leader, and the Washington Star, were among the casualties. Concurrently, an ever-growing number of formerly independent papers were brought under the control of publishing groups. In June 1993 the New York Times acquired the Boston Globe for $1.1 billion, the most ever paid to that point for an American newspaper. In mid-2000 the Tribune Company (publisher of the Chicago Tribune and several smaller papers) purchased the Times Mirror Company (publisher of seven papers, including the Los Angeles Times, Newsday, and the Baltimore Sun) for $8 billion. Also in 2000 Gannett acquired Central Newspapers, Inc. (owner of six papers, including the Arizona Republic and the Indianapolis Star), for $2.6 billion. In addition Gannett announced plans to purchase a number of papers from the Thomson Corporation, a Canadian publisher that had decided to divest itself of its once formidable newspaper holdings in the United States. Overall, newspaper purchases totaling more than $15 billion were reported for 2000. Major turnovers in newspaper ownership occurred in 2006 and 2007. On March 13, 2006,

the McClatchy Company announced it had bought Knight Ridder for $6.5 billion. On April 26, 2006, McClatchy announced that the San Jose Mercury News, Contra Costa Times, Monterey Herald, and St. Paul Pioneer Press would be sold to MediaNews Group for $1 billion. In 2007 the Chicago Tribune and its corporate parent the Tribune Company were taken private in a transaction underwritten by real estate mogul Sam Zell. Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation acquired the Wall Street Journal from Dow Jones in a deal finalized on December 13, 2007. The principal guides to the following selection are size of circulation and extent of foreign affairs news coverage. A few newspapers with relatively low circulation are included because of their location, special readership character, and the like. The list is alphabetical according to city of publication, with city designations as components of formal names being omitted. Also omitted are Saturday editions. Circulation figures are averages for the six months ending March 31, 2007, as provided by the Audit Bureau of Circulations. Akron, Ohio: Beacon Journal (122,388 morning, 164,902 Sunday. Anchorage, Alaska: Daily News (64,109 morning, 72,488 Sunday). Atlanta, Georgia: Journal-Constitution (357,399 morning, 523,687 Sunday). Baltimore, Maryland: Sun (232,138 morning, 377,561 Sunday). Birmingham, Alabama: News (145,655 morning, 176,087 Sunday). Boston, Massachusetts: Globe (382,503 morning, 562,273 Sunday), retains “full editorial autonomy,” despite acquisition by the New York Times Company; Herald (201,513 morning, 110,834 Sunday); Christian Science Monitor (58,313 daily). Buffalo, New York: News (181,540 all day, 266,123 Sunday). Charlotte, North Carolina: Observer (215,379 morning, 270,347 Sunday).

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Chicago, Illinois: Tribune (566,827 morning, 940,620 Sunday). Cincinnati, Ohio: Enquirer (208,320 morning, 290,500 Sunday). Cleveland, Ohio: Plain Dealer (344,704 morning, 442,482 Sunday). Columbus, Ohio: Dispatch (218,940 daily, 343,616 Sunday). Dallas, Texas: Morning News (411,919 morning, 563,079 Sunday). Dayton, Ohio: Daily News (121,797 morning, 166,235 Sunday). Denver, Colorado: Rocky Mountain News (253,834 morning); Post (254,058 morning, 704,168 Sunday). Although the News and the Post remain editorially independent, they are both published by the Denver Newspaper Agency, which is owned 50 percent by E. W. Scripps Company and 50 percent by Media News Group. Des Moines, Iowa: Register (146,050 morning, 233,229 Sunday). Detroit, Michigan: Free Press (329,987 morning), News (202,029 evening). Combined editions are published on Saturday and Sunday (640,356), as well as on holidays. Fort Worth, Texas: Star-Telegram (210,990 morning, 304,200 Sunday). Grand Rapids, Michigan: Press (133,107 evening, 182,252 Sunday). Hartford, Connecticut: Courant (175,759 morning, 255,419 Sunday). Honolulu, Hawaii: Advertiser (141,934 morning, 155,932 Sunday). Houston, Texas: Chronicle (503,114 morning, 677,425 Sunday). Indianapolis, Indiana: Star (261,405 morning, 352,312 Sunday). Jacksonville, Florida: Florida Times-Union (155,590 morning, 214,572 Sunday). Kansas City, Missouri: Star (260,724 morning, 359,477 Sunday). Little Rock, Arkansas: Arkansas DemocratGazette (182,789 morning, 276,436 Sunday). Los Angeles, California: Times (815,723 morning, 1,173,096 Sunday).

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Louisville, Kentucky: Courier-Journal (218,796 morning, 266,594 Sunday). Memphis, Tennessee: Commercial Appeal (146,252 morning, 184,418 Sunday). Miami, Florida: Herald (272,299 morning, 342,432 Sunday). Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Journal Sentinel (230,220) morning, 400,317 Sunday). Minneapolis, Minnesota: Star and Tribune (345,252 all day, 574,406 Sunday). Nashville, Tennessee: Tennessean (174,073 morning, 232,334 Sunday). New York, New York: Daily News (718,174 morning, 775,543 Sunday), Newsday (398,231 morning, 464,169 Sunday), Post (724,728 morning, 439,202 Sunday), Times (1,120,420 morning, 1,627,062 Sunday); Wall Street Journal (2,062,312 morning, 1,966,413 weekend). Newark, New Jersey: Star-Ledger (372,629 morning, 570,523 Sunday). Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: Oklahoman (216,441 morning, 282,119 Sunday). Omaha, Nebraska: World-Herald (184,150 all day, 222,469 Sunday). Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Inquirer/Daily News (Inquirer: 352,593 morning, 688,670 Sunday; Daily News 113,951 morning). Phoenix, Arizona: Arizona Republic (433,731 morning, 541,757 Sunday). Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Post-Gazette (213,352 morning, 341,474 Sunday). Portland, Oregon: Oregonian (319,625 all day, 375,913 Sunday). Providence, Rhode Island: Journal (148,700 morning, 205,102 Sunday). Raleigh, North Carolina: News and Observer (177,361 morning, 213,124 Sunday). Richmond, Virginia: Times-Dispatch (186,441 morning, 214,971 Sunday). Rochester, New York: Democrat and Chronicle (154,599 morning, 209,427 Sunday). Sacramento, California: Bee (279,032 morning, 324,613 Sunday). St. Louis, Missouri: Post-Dispatch (278,999 morning, 407,754 Sunday).

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St. Petersburg, Florida: Times (322,771 morning, 430,893 Sunday). Salt Lake City, Utah: Tribune and Desert Morning News (203,212 combined morning, 152,859 Sunday). San Diego, California: Union-Tribune (296,331 morning, 378,696 Sunday). San Francisco, California: Chronicle (386,564 all day, 438,006 Sunday. In an initiative approved in 2000 following a protracted court case, Hearst Communications, Inc. sold its longtime paper, the Examiner, to purchase the Chronicle. Seattle, Washington: Times (219,722 morning); Post-Intelligencer (128,012 morning). Although the Times and the Post-Intelligencer remain editorially independent, they have a joint operating agreement under which the Seattle Times Company provides most noneditorial services. A joint edition with a circulation of 423,635 is published on Sunday. Toledo, Ohio: Blade (125,956 morning, 154,556 Sunday). Washington, D.C.: Post (699,130 morning, 929,921 Sunday), USA Today ([national paper] 2,278,022 morning). Wichita, Kansas: Eagle (83,903 morning, 135,998 Sunday).

News Agencies The two major news agencies are the Associated Press (AP), an independent news cooperative serving more than 1,700 newspapers and 5,000 radio and television stations in the United States, and the financially plagued United Press International (UPI), which was rescued from bankruptcy by Mexican publisher Mario V´azquez Ra˜na in 1986 and whose operating rights were sold to an investment group associated with Financial News Network in early 1988 before being sold to the London-based, Saudi-controlled Middle East Broadcasting Centre Ltd. in June 1992. In addition, many important newspapers that maintain large staffs of foreign correspondents sell syndicated news services to other papers. Among the larger of these are the New York Times, the Chicago Tri-

bune, the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington Post.

Broadcasting and Computing Domestic radio and television broadcasting in the United States is a private function carried on under the auspices of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which licenses stations on the basis of experience, financial soundness, and projected program policy. Under a “fairness doctrine” embodied in FCC rules and upheld by the Supreme Court, radio and television broadcasters are required to present both sides of important issues. However, the so-called equal time legislation, which required a broadcaster who gave free time to a political candidate to do the same for his or her opponent, was amended on September 25, 1975, by the FCC, which stated that candidates’ news conferences and political debates are news events and thus are not subject to the equal-time ruling (thus in 1996 Reform Party candidate Ross Perot was barred from the presidential debates, despite having participated four years earlier). The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) is a private body that sets operating rules for radio and television stations and networks. Of 10,944 commercial radio stations in operation in 2006, 4,707 were AM and 6,237 were FM outlets. Approximately one-third of the total were owned by or affiliated with one of the four major commercial radio networks: American Broadcasting Company (ABC), Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), Mutual Broadcasting System (MBS), and National Broadcasting Company (NBC). Supported primarily by paid advertising, most stations carry frequent news summaries; a few in the larger cities now devote all of their airtime to such programming. Noncommercial programming was offered by more than 1,300 additional FM outlets. There were 1,401 commercial television stations in operation during 2006, most of them owned by or affiliated with one of three commercial television networks headquartered in New York City: American Broadcasting Company (ABC), Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), and National

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Broadcasting Company (NBC), in addition to the Los Angeles–based Fox Network. Supported primarily by paid advertising, most stations present news highlights, evening news summaries, and programs of comments and analysis. There is also the nonprofit Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), which services approximately 380 affiliated noncommercial television stations. In addition, more than 8,500 commercial cable TV systems are in operation, a decline from 11,200 in 1995 because of consolidations. An early beneficiary of the advent of cable TV was the Turner Broadcasting System, which by its tenth year of operation in 1990 was widely regarded as a “fourth major network”; by 1995 more new systems had been added, some (such as Paramount and Warner) with roots in historic film companies. Foreign radio broadcasting is conducted under governmental auspices by the Voice of America (VOA), a former division of the United States Information Agency (USIA) that is now part of the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB). It broadcasts in English and 44 other languages throughout the world. The IBB also supports Radio Free Europe, broadcasting in Bulgarian and Romanian (transmissions in seven other Eastern European languages were dropped in mid-1993), and Radio Liberty, broadcasting to the peoples of the former Soviet Union, both of whose facilities were relocated from Munich to Prague in mid-1995. The Florida-based Radio Mart´ı, a VOA affiliate, commenced Spanish-language transmissions to Cuba in May 1985, while a controversial counterpart, Television Mart´ı, was subjected to electronic jamming upon its launching in March 1990. In September 1996, after lengthy congressional debate, an equally controversial Radio Free Asia was launched to “confront tyranny” in East Asia; although its Chinese-language impact from transmitters as far away as Armenia and Tajikistan appeared minimal, its sponsors nonetheless pressed ahead with a Tibetan-language program in December and scheduled future broadcasts aimed at North Korea and Vietnam. The world leader in development of computer technology, the United States in 2005 had an es-

495

timated 762 personal computers and 663 Internet users for every 1,000 American residents. In that same year there were approximately 714 mobile cellular subscribers for every 1,000 people.

Intergovernmental Representation The various U.S. ambassadors to foreign governments, as well as the various foreign ambassadors accredited to the United States, are given at the end of the relevant country articles. Permanent Representative to the UN: Zalmay KHALILZAD IGO Memberships (Non-UN): AC, ADB, AfDB, APEC, BIS, EBRD, G-10, G-7/G-8, IADB, IEA, Interpol, IOM, NATO, OAS, OECD, OSCE, PC, PCA, WCO, WTO

Related Territories The United States never acquired a colonial empire of significant proportions. Among its principal former overseas dependencies, the Philippines became independent in 1946, Puerto Rico acquired the status of a commonwealth in free association with the United States in 1952, and Hawaii became the 50th state of the Union in 1959. In addition to Puerto Rico, the United States now exercises sovereignty in the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and an assortment of smaller Caribbean and Pacific islands. Until October 1, 1979, the United States held administrative responsibility for the Panama Canal Zone (see Panama: Recovered Territory), while U.S. administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was effectively terminated with the independence of Palau on October 1, 1994. (For a discussion of the Trust Territory see the 1993 edition of the Handbook, pp. 946–948.)

Major Caribbean Jurisdictions Puerto Rico. Situated in the Caribbean between the island of Hispaniola in the west and the

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Puerto Rico (U.S.)

ATLAN TI C O CEA N VENEZUELA

Isabela Isla Desecheo

Mayagüez

San Juan

Isla de Culebra

Puerto Rico (U.S.)

Isla Mona

Ponce

Isla de Vieques

Car ibbean Sea 0 0

400 Mi 400 Km

Virgin Islands in the east, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is composed of the large island of Puerto Rico together with Vieques, Culebra, and many smaller islands. Its area is 3,515 square miles (9,103 sq. km.). Its estimated population in 2007 was 3,943,000. Since 1972 “reverse emigration” has largely offset relocation to the mainland. Despite a falling birth rate, population density remains among the highest in the world, amounting in 2007 to 1,122 persons per square mile (433 per sq. km.). San Juan, with a population of 421,958 (2000C), is the capital and principal city. Spanish blood and culture are dominant, with an admixture of Native American, African, and other immigrant stock, largely from Western Europe and the United States. Most Puerto Ricans are Spanish-speaking and Roman Catholic, although religious freedom prevails. Both English and Spanish served as official languages from 1902 to 1991, when a bill was approved requiring that all government proceedings take place in Spanish, with official bilingualism being reestablished in January 1993. The economy, traditionally based on sugar, tobacco,

and rum, advanced dramatically after 1948 under a self-help program known as “Operation Bootstrap” that stressed diversification and the use of incentives to promote industrialization through private investment, both local and foreign. Subsequently, industry surpassed agriculture as a source of income, with per capita income between 1965 and 1975 more than doubling, from $1,069 to $2,222 and reaching $11,259 in 2003. Despite marked economic and social gains, however, the commonwealth is burdened by inflation, high public debt, and unemployment that has ranged as high as 23 percent of the workforce since 1975, the lowest being 10.5 percent in 2001. Ceded by Spain to the United States under the 1898 Treaty of Paris, Puerto Rico was subsequently governed as an unincorporated U.S. territory. The inhabitants were granted U.S. citizenship in 1917, obtaining in 1947 the right to elect a chief executive. The present commonwealth status, based on a U.S. congressional enactment of 1950 approved by plebiscite in 1951, entered into effect on July 25, 1952; under its terms, Puerto Rico now exercises approximately the same control over its internal affairs as do the 50 states. Residents, though U.S. citizens, do not vote in national elections and are represented in the U.S. Congress only by a resident commissioner, whose right to vote in Committee of the Whole, conferred in January 1993, was revoked in January 1995. (In November 1997 the Puerto Rican Supreme Court recognized the existence of Puerto Rican, in addition to U.S., citizenship.) Federal taxes do not apply in Puerto Rico except by mutual consent (for example, Social Security taxes). The commonwealth constitution, modeled on that of the United States but incorporating many progressive social and political innovations, provides for a governor and a bicameral Legislative Assembly (consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives) elected by universal suffrage for four-year terms. An appointed Supreme Court heads the independent judiciary. Puerto Rican politics was dominated from 1940 through 1968 by the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democr´atico—PPD) of Gover˜ nor Luis MUNOZ Mar´ın, the principal architect of

U N I T E D S TAT E S

“Operation Bootstrap” and of the commonwealth relationship with the United States. While demands for Puerto Rican independence declined sharply after 1952, a substantial movement favoring statehood continued under the leadership of Luis A. FERRE and others. In a 1967 plebiscite 60.4 percent opted for continued commonwealth status, 39 percent for statehood, and 0.6 percent for independence. Following shifts in party alignments in advance of the 1968 election, Ferr´e was elected governor as head of the prostatehood New Progressive Party (Partido Nuevo Progresista—PNP), which also gained a small majority in the House of Representatives. Four years later the PPD, under Rafael HERNANDEZ Col´on, regained the governorship and full control of the legislature, while the PNP, under San Juan Mayor Carlos ROMERO Barcel´o, returned to power in 1976. The traditionally antistatehood PPD officially boycotted the October 1978 primary for selection of delegates to the U.S. Democratic Party national convention and a prostatehood faction, styling itself the New Democratic Party, easily won. With PPD head Hern´andez Col´on having been succeeded in July by Miguel HERNANDEZ Agosto, and despite octogenarian Mu˜noz Mar´ın’s return to politics as an advocate for continued commonwealth status, “statehooders” thus held control for the first time of both the PPD and the PNP. In 1979 former governor Hern´andez Col´on, leader of the procommonwealth autonomista wing of the PPD, was designated as his party’s 1980 gubernatorial candidate. With the campaign largely focused on the issue of the island’s status, the “new thesis” of the PPD called for commonwealth administration of most transferred federal funds, authority to negotiate international trade agreements, and creation of a 200-mile economic zone to ensure local control of marine resources and potential offshore petroleum deposits. Governor Romero Barcel´o, meanwhile, was expected to call for a 1981 plebiscite on statehood, if he won reelection. At the November 4 balloting, the PNP won the governorship by an extremely narrow margin of 0.3 percent of the votes cast, while losing the Senate to the

497

PPD (15–12) and tying the opposition in the House (25–25). In view of the outcome, Romero Barcel´o announced that the plebiscite on statehood would be deferred. At the 1984 election Romero Barcel´o was defeated in his bid for another term by Hern´andez Col´on, thereby ensuring that the statehood issue would, for the moment, recede in importance. The PPD victory was attributed, in part, to an active campaign waged by the Puerto Rican Renewal Party (Partido Renovaci´on Puertorique˜no—PRP), a group organized by dissident PNP leader Dr. Hern´an PADILLA in August 1983. By an extremely close margin (50,000 of nearly 2 million votes cast), Hern´andez Col´on won reelection in November 1988, defeating Baltasar CORRADA del R´ıo, the PNP mayor of San Juan. In January 1992 Hern´andez Col´on announced that he would not seek reelection and in February resigned as leader of the PPD. His successor in the ˜ party post, Victoria MUNOZ Mendoza, was defeated at the November gubernatorial balloting by ´ who, upon taking ofthe PNP’s Pedro ROSSELLO, fice in January 1993, scheduled a new referendum on Puerto Rico’s constitutional future for November, at which commonwealth sentiment plummeted to 48 percent, while supporters of statehood and independence registered 44 percent and 4 percent, respectively. On November 5, 1996, Rossell´o won reelection to a second four-year term as governor, while the PNP won 38 House seats, as contrasted with 12 for the PPD and 1 for the PIP; additional opposition seats were, however, added under a constitutional provision that mandated a majority of no more than two-thirds. The antistatehood PPD secured an upset victory at the election of November 7, 2000, sweeping the governorship, both legislative houses, and most city halls. Its standard-bearer, Sila Mar´ıa CALDERON, who on January 7, 2001, became the commonwealth’s first female governor, obtained 49 percent of the vote and the prostatehood PNP candidate, Carlos PESQUERA, 46 percent, with Rub´en BERRIOS Mart´ınez of the Puerto

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Rican Independence Party (Partido Independentista Puertorique˜no—PIP) a distant third. A disputed gubernatorial poll in 2004 was closer than the U.S. presidential balloting of 2000. After a recount that lasted two months, followed by a bitter court battle between the procommonwealth and prostatehood parties, the PPD’s An´ıbal AcevedoVila was declared the winner over former president Pedro Rossell´o by 3,500 votes out of 2 million cast. In the Senate and House races, however, the prostatehood forces secured majorities. A comparatively small but frequently violent independence movement has been active since the 1920s, when the radical Nationalist Party was formed by Pedro ALBIZU Campos. On November 1, 1950, a group of nacionalistas attempted to assassinate President Harry S. Truman, while on March 1, 1954, another group wounded five U.S. members of Congress on the floor of the House of Representatives; on September 6, 1979, President Jimmy Carter commuted the sentences of the four Puerto Ricans still serving sentences for the two attacks, despite Romero Barcel´o’s strong objection. Currently, the separatist movement is directed by the PIP and the Marxist Puerto Rican Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Puertorique˜no—PSP), which collectively have won no more than a combined 6 percent of the vote in recent elections. The most prominent far-left organization advocating independence is the Armed Forces for National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci´on Nacional—FALN), which has engaged in terrorist activities in New York City as well as in San Juan. On December 3, 1979, three other terrorist groups—the Volunteers of the Puerto Rican Revolution, the Boricua Popular Army (Ej´ercito Popular Boricua, also known as the Macheteros), and the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance— claimed joint responsibility for an attack on a busload of U.S. military personnel that killed two and left ten injured. On August 11, 2000, President Bill Clinton offered clemency to 16 FALN members who had been convicted of terrorist acts more than two decades earlier. A month later, 11 of the prisoners were released, despite a 311–41 House vote that condemned the president’s action.

Internationally, the independence movement received support in September 1978 when the UN Decolonization Committee endorsed a Cuban resolution that labeled Puerto Rico a “colony” of the United States and called for a transfer of power before any referendum on statehood. The most recent attempt to authorize a binding referendum in the matter failed to be reported out by a Senate committee in February 1991. (Apparently Republicans feared that as a state Puerto Rico would send an overwhelmingly Democratic delegation to Congress, with others concerned that Puerto Rican statehood would fuel a campaign to grant similar status to the District of Columbia.) Following Rossell´o’s reelection as president of the ruling PNP on August 22, 1994, the governor promised to hold another vote on the island’s status, at which time he hoped for an “absolute majority” in favor of statehood. However, in September 1996 a bill to authorize a new plebiscite was withdrawn from the U.S. House of Representatives at the request of Romero Barcel´o (then resident commissioner), who, while still favoring statehood, objected to a provision that would require English as the official language under such status. On March 4, 1998, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 209 to 208 in favor of a bill authorizing the Puerto Rican government to organize a plebiscite on its future status; however, the U.S. Senate appeared unwilling to address the measure in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, on December 13, in yet another nonbinding referendum, 50.8 percent of Puerto Ricans voted for no change in status, while 46.5 percent favored statehood, and 2.5 percent, independence. In a November 1997 ruling, the Puerto Rican Supreme Court recognized distinct Puerto Rican citizenship, while affirming that holders thereof, even if renouncing U.S. citizenship, could vote in U.S. elections, if resident in Puerto Rico. In August 2000 a U.S. federal court agreed that Puerto Ricans had a right to vote for president and vice president. However, an appeals court overturned the decision in October. In the wake of the 2004 election, Governorelect Acevedo-Vil´a declared, “I am not going to impose my vision on the people of Puerto Rico.”

U N I T E D S TAT E S

He added that he would seek an appropriate means (presumably a plebiscite or constitutional convention) for settling the issue of the commonwealth’s future status. In December 2005 President George W. Bush’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status proposed that the U.S. Congress set a date for a plebiscite in which the island’s voters would indicate if they wanted to change the island’s status. If so, the task force further recommended that Congress should then authorize a second vote in which the choice would be between statehood and independence. While the PNP and the PIP supported the recommendation, Governor Acevedo-Vil´a, a proponent of “enhanced commonwealth” status, rejected it. In an October 2007 letter to the task force, he described the 2005 report as containing “one of the most absurd sets of conclusions I have ever read,” primarily the determination that the term “commonwealth” was merely descriptive and that the U.S. Constitution, having endowed Congress with plenary authority over all nonstate territories, limited the legal options to just two: statehood or independence. Furthermore, the governor disparaged the task force for concluding that Congress was not legally required to take the will of the Puerto Rican citizens into consideration when acting on the island’s status. Despite the governor’s dismissive assessment, the task force reiterated its stand in a second report, delivered in December 2007. Another recent controversy involved the status of the island of Vieques, two-thirds of which had long been used as a bombing range by the U.S. Navy. The issue came to a head after the killing of a civilian security guard during a bombing run in April 1999, with numerous protests erupting in the ensuing months. In December President Clinton ordered a halt to live-fire training on the island and an end to all exercises there by 2003 unless local residents agreed to an extension. In February 2000 the Puerto Rican government agreed to a resumption of limited training as part of a deal involving up to $90 million in aid. In May federal authorities cleared protesters from the range, and in June the navy resumed shelling with inert bombs.

499

On June 14, 2001, President Bush announced that all exercises on Vieques would end by May 2003, but that did not satisfy Vieques residents, who on July 29 voted by a two-to-one margin for immediately closing the naval facility. The U.S. Congress then weighed in by insisting that the range was needed for tests in connection with the war on terrorism. The PIP responded that it would mount a general strike and call for civil disobedience if the navy did not leave on schedule. As a result, the navy withdrew on May 1, 2003, turning about 14,500 acres over to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Since then, with oversight from the Environmental Protection Agency, contract workers have been clearing the site of unexploded munitions. Preliminary plans have called for creation of a wildlife refuge while also permitting a degree of ecotourism to fuel economic development. Newspapers in Puerto Rico are free of censorship; the largest circulations are those of San Juan’s El Vocero de Puerto Rico (259,000) and El Nuevo Dia (203,000 daily, 246,000 Sunday). There were 120 commercial radio stations and 15 commercial television stations in 2002. In addition, the Commonwealth Department of Education sponsors a radio and a television network, while the U.S. Armed Forces operates one radio and three television stations. There were approximately 1.2 million television receivers in 2003. ´ Governor: An´ıbal ACEVEDO-VILA. Virgin Islands. Situated 40 miles east of Puerto Rico and just west and south of the British Virgin Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands (formerly known as the Danish West Indies) include the large islands of St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John, and about 50 smaller islands. The total area, including water surfaces, is 132 square miles (342 sq. km.); the population numbered 108,612 at the 2000 census and remained relatively constant thereafter. The capital and only substantial town is Charlotte Amalie on St. Thomas. Two-thirds of the people are of African origin, and approximately one-quarter are of Puerto Rican descent. Literacy is estimated at 90 percent, and English is the principal language, although Spanish is widely spoken. The people are

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U N I T E D S TAT E S

ATLAN TI C O CEAN

Saint Thomas Charlotte Amalie

British Virgin Islands

Cruz Bay

(U.K.)

Saint John

U.S. Virgin Islands (U.S.) Car ibbean Sea

Saint Croix Christiansted

U.S. Virgin Islands (U.S.)

0 VENEZUELA

0

20 Mi 20 Km

highly religious, with most being either Baptist or Roman Catholic. Purchased by the United States from Denmark in 1917, the Virgin Islands are governed as an unincorporated territory and administered under the Department of the Interior. The inhabitants were made U.S. citizens in 1927 and were granted a considerable measure of self-government in the Revised Organic Act of 1954, which authorized the creation of an elected 15-member Senate. Under a New Organic Act of 1968, executive authority was vested in a governor and a lieutenant governor, both of whom since 1970 have been popularly elected. Since 1973 the territory has sent one delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives. There is only marginal sentiment for independence, a formal constitution for the islands having been rejected in 1964, in 1971, and in March 1979, when 56 percent of the electorate voted against a proposal that would have authorized elective local governments for each of the three main islands. Nonetheless, President Ronald Reagan in July 1981

signed into law a resolution approving a basic law for the territory, which was also rejected in a referendum the following November. Juan F. LUIS of the Independent Citizens’ Movement (ICM, a breakaway faction of the dominant Democratic Party) was sworn in as governor on January 2, 1978, upon the death of Gov. Cyril E. KING. He was elected to a full four-year term the next November and reelected to an additional term in 1982. Alexander Farrelly, a Democrat, defeated the ICM’s Adelbert BRYAN at gubernatorial runoff balloting in November 1986 and defeated two independents in winning a second term in 1990. In a referendum held October 11, 1993, 90 percent of those voting favored continued or enhanced U.S. territorial status, while the options of full integration with the United States and independence each attracted about 5 percent. Only 27.4 percent of the electorate voted, but a turnout of at least 50 percent plus one was required to validate the outcome. On November 22, 1994, Dr. Roy SCHNEIDER, a Republican standing as an independent, was elected governor, defeating the former lieutenant governor, Derek HODGE, a Democrat. Schneider had promised a campaign against crime, the prevalence of which had been the feature of a ten-part series in the Virgin Islands Daily News, a small local newspaper that in April 1995 was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for its efforts. On November 4, 1998, retired university professor Charles TURNBULL, a Democrat, denied reelection to Schneider, who had been under attack for overspending. Turnbull was reelected on November 5, 2002. The Democratic candidate, John deJongh Jr., was elected as his successor in a runoff poll on November 21, 2006. On November 7 Democrats won 8 senatorial seats, to 4 for the ICM; 3 independents were also elected. On June 12, 2007, voters chose 30 delegates for a constitutional convention. Despite four previous efforts since 1964 to draft a constitution, the islands remain an unincorporated territory. The convention is to conclude its work by July 2008. Governor: John deJONGH Jr.

U R U G UAY ORIENTAL REPUBLIC

OF

U R U G U AY

Rep u´ blica Oriental del Uruguay

0

100 Mi

0

100 Km

ARGENTINA Artigas BRAZIL

R.

Rivera Salto

uay

U R U G U AY Paysandú

R.

Second smallest of South American countries, Uruguay has historically been among the foremost in terms of education, per capita income, and social welfare. Its official designation as the Oriental (Eastern) Republic of Uruguay derives from its position on the eastern bank of the Uruguay River, which forms its frontier with Argentina and opens into the great estuary of the Rio de la Plata, on which both Montevideo and the Argentine capital of Buenos Aires are situated. From its 120-mile Atlantic coastline, Uruguay’s rolling grasslands gently climb to the Brazilian boundary in the northeast. More than half of the population, which is almost entirely of Spanish and Italian origins, is concentrated in Montevideo, the only large city. Although cattle- and sheep-raising were the traditional basis of the economy, crop farming has increased in recent years, and a sizable industrial complex (primarily food processing) has developed around the capital. Textiles, meat, wool, and leather goods are currently the leading exports, while industrial promotion and foreign investment laws instituted in the early 1980s have encouraged production of electrical equipment and minerals. The GDP rose at an average rate of 4.8 percent during 1974–1980 but was accompanied by massive inflation that ranged between 45 and 80 percent annually. After 1980, inflation fell dramatically (to a low of 19 percent in 1982) but was coupled with a severe recession induced, in part, by devaluation of the Argentine peso in 1981, followed by disruptions attributed to the Falklands war the following year. During 1987 inflation returned to more

than 60 percent, although unemployment fell from upward of 30 percent in 1983 to a more acceptable 8.3 percent. By early 1988 the nation’s economy, brightened by a rise in exports, showed further signs of improvement, although the external debt had grown to more than $5 billion. During 1990, on the other hand, inflation accelerated to nearly 130 percent because of adverse economic conditions in neighboring Argentina and Brazil. GDP growth averaged 3.7 percent in 1990–1996 and then reached 5.1 percent in 1997 and 4.5 percent in 1998. In the latter year consumer price

Urug

The Country

Negr

Fray Bentos

Embalse del Río Negro

Mercedes Nueva Palmira Rí

o

ARGENTINA

la

Pla

Melo Lagoa Mirin

Treinta y Tres

San José

Colonia de

o

Minas Las Piedras

ta

Montevideo

Punta del Este

AT L A N T I C OCEAN

502

U R U G U AY

inflation finally dropped below double digits, while unemployment fell to about 10 percent. Thereafter, however, the economy entered a protracted recession, contracting by 2.8 percent in 1999, 1.4 percent in 2000, and 3.1 percent in 2001. A principal cause of the downturn was declining world commodity prices for Uruguayan exports, but in late 2001 the economy was thrown into a tailspin by the financial crisis in Argentina. The result was a GDP contraction of 11 percent in 2002, before an improvement in beef exports contributed to a 2.5 percent gain in 2003 and a surge to 12.6 percent in 2004. Meanwhile, inflation rose to 26.0 percent in 2002 before declining to 10.2 percent in 2003, 7.6 percent in 2004, and 4.7 percent in 2005. Uruguay’s inflation stood at 6.4 percent in 2006, and the economy grew 7 percent in the same year.

Government and Politics Political Background Before the 20th century Uruguay’s history was largely determined by the buffer-like position that made it an object of contention between Spain and Portugal and, later, between Argentina and Brazil. Uruguay proclaimed its independence in 1825 and was recognized by its two neighboring countries in 1828, but both continued to play a role in the internal struggles of Uruguay’s Colorado and Blanco parties following proclamation of a republic in 1830. The foundations of modern Uruguay were laid during the presidency of Jos´e BATLLE y Ord´on˜ ez, who took office under the Colorado banner in 1903 and initiated the extensive welfare program and governmental participation in the economy for which the nation was subsequently noted. Batlle y Ord´on˜ ez and the Colorado Party were also identified with the method of government by presidential board, or council, a system employed from 1917 to 1933 and again from 1951 to 1967. The Colorados, who had controlled the government continuously from 1865, were finally ousted in the election of 1958 but were returned to power in 1966, when voters also approved a con-

stitutional amendment returning the country to a one-person presidency. The first of the presidents under the new arrangement, Oscar Diego GESTIDO (Colorado), took office in March 1967 but died nine months later and was succeeded by Vice President Jorge PACHECO Areco (Colorado). Faced with a growing economic crisis, rising unrest among workers and students, and increasing activity by Tupamaro guerrillas, both presidents sought to enforce economic austerity and resorted to emergency security measures. The election of Juan Mar´ıa BORDABERRY Arocena (Colorado) in November 1971 did little to alleviate the country’s problems. Continuing economic and political instability, combined with opposition charges of corruption, culminated in military intervention on February 8, 1973. Under the direction of Gens. C´esar Augusto MART´INEZ, Jos´e ´ PEREZ Caldas, and Esteban CRISTI, the military presented a 19-point program that placed emphasis on economic reform, reducing corruption by officials, and greater military participation in political life. The program was accepted by President Bordaberry on February 13, with governmental reorganization commencing almost immediately. A National Security Council was created to oversee the administration, Congress was dissolved and replaced by a Council of State, and municipal and local councils were supplanted by appointed bodies. Opposition to the increasing influence of the military was met by coercion: A general strike by the National Confederation of Workers (Confederaci´on Nacional de Trabajadores—CNT) resulted in the group’s proscription, while several opposition political leaders were placed in temporary detention during July and August. The National University of Montevideo was closed in October, and the Communist-led Frente Amplio, in addition to numerous minor leftist groups, was banned in December. Subsequently, as many as 400,000 Uruguayans were reported to have fled the country. In early 1976 a crisis shook the uneasy alliance between President Bordaberry and the armed forces. The president, whose constitutional term was due to expire, wished to remain indefinitely in

U R U G U AY

Political Status: Independent state proclaimed in 1825; republic established in 1830; presidential-congressional system reinstated on March 1, 1985, supplanting military-controlled civilian government in power since February 1973. Area: 68,037 sq. mi. (176,215 sq. km.). Population: 3,241,003 (2004C); 3,437,000 (2006E). The 2004 figure excludes and the 2006 figure includes an adjustment for underenumeration. Major Urban Center (2005E): MONTEVIDEO (1,265,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Uruguayan Peso (market rate November 2, 2007: 21.92 pesos = $1US). The Uruguayan peso (peso uruguayo) was introduced on March 1, 1993, to replace the new peso (peso nuevo) at a rate of 1,000 to 1 (the peso nuevo had replaced the peso in 1975, also at 1,000 to 1). ´ President: Dr. Tabar´e Ram´on VAZQUEZ Rosas (Progressive Encounter–Broad Front); elected on October 31, 2004, and inaugurated on March 1, 2005, for a five-year term, succeeding Jorge BATLLE Ib´an˜ ez (Colorado Party). Vice President: Rodolfo NIN Novoa (Progressive Encounter–Broad Front); elected on October 31, 2004, and inaugurated on March 1, for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding Luis HIERRO L´opez (Colorado Party).

office as head of a corporativist state within which normal political activity would be prohibited. The military, on the other hand, preferred a Brazilianstyle “limited democracy,” with the traditional parties gradually reentering the political process over the ensuing decade. On June 12 the military view prevailed: Bordaberry was deposed, and Vice President Alberto DEMICHELLI was named as his interim successor. On July 14 a newly constituted Council of the Nation (incorporating the Council of State, the three heads of the armed services, and other high-ranking officers) designated Dr. Apari-

503

´ cio MENDEZ Manfredini as president for a fiveyear term commencing September 1. In August 1977 the government announced that President M´endez had accepted a recommendation by the military leadership that a general election be held in 1981, although only the Colorado and National (Blanco) parties would be permitted to participate. Subsequently, it was reported that a new constitution would be promulgated in 1980, while all parties would be permitted to resume their normal functions by 1986. The proposed basic law, which would have given the military effective veto power within a context of “restricted democracy,” was rejected by more than 57 percent of those participating in a referendum held November 30, 1980. The government promptly accepted the decision while announcing that efforts toward “democratic institutionalization” would continue “on the basis of the current regime.” Following designation by the Council of the Nation, the recently retired army commander, Lt. Gen. Gregorio Conrado ALVAREZ Armellino, assumed office on September 1, 1981, as “transition” president for a term scheduled to end upon reversion to civilian rule in March 1985. Fourteen months later, on November 28, 1982, a nationwide election was held to select delegates to conventions of three legally recognized groups, the Colorado and Blanco parties and the Civic Union, whose leaders were to participate in the drafting of a constitution to be presented to the voters in November 1984. The balloting, in which anti-military candidates outpolled their promilitary counterparts within each party by almost five to one, was followed by a series of talks between the regime and the parties, which broke down in July 1983 over the extent of military power under the new basic law. The impasse yielded a period of instability through mid-1984, with escalating public protests (including Chilean-style “banging of the pots”), increased press censorship, and arrests of dissidents (most prominently the respected Blanco leader, Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate, upon his return from exile on June 16). Government statements that adherence to the declared electoral timetable (which

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called for balloting on November 25) would be “conditional” upon the cooperation of the civilian parties yielded further protests, while deteriorating economic conditions prompted a series of work stoppages. After talks resumed in July 1984 between the army and a multiparty grouping (Multipartidaria) consisting of the legal parties (excluding the Blancos, who had quit the group in protest at the imprisonment of their leader) and a number of formations that were still nominally illegal, an agreement was reached on August 3 confirming the November 25 election date and establishing a transitional advisory role for the military until late 1985. The signing of the pact was followed by a relaxation of press censorship and the legalization of a number of additional parties that, in concert with the Communist Party (Partido Comunista—PC), which remained outlawed at the time, reactivated the 1971 Broad Front (Frente Amplio—FA) coalition (see Political Parties, below). Despite the Blanco Party’s condemnation of the August 1984 agreement as an “acceptance of dictatorship,” the party rejoined the Multipartidaria after the group had initiated talks with business and union leaders on a peaceful transition to civilian rule. However, because of the continued proscription of both the Blanco leader and Frente Amplio’s Gen. Liber SEREGNI, the Colorado candidate, Julio Mar´ıa SANGUINETTI Cairolo, enjoyed a considerable advantage in the presidential race, gaining a 38.6 percent vote share at the November balloting while his party won a slim plurality in both houses. The new Congress convened on February 15, 1985, followed by Sanguinetti’s inauguration on March 1. To avoid public embarrassment at the swearing-in ceremony (the presidentelect having indicated an aversion to accepting the presidential sash from a military ruler), President Alvarez had resigned on February 12, Supreme Court President Rafael ADDIEGO Bruno being named his interim replacement. In further attempts to remove the legacy of the military regime, the Sanguinetti government, with broad support from the public and opposition parties, released all political prisoners, including former Tupamaro guerril-

las, and permitted the return of an estimated 20,000 exiles. Subsequently, a 1986 decision to declare an amnesty for military members charged with human rights abuses generated strong dissent, although Uruguayan voters failed to reverse the action in a referendum conducted in April 1989. While the Blanco right-wing candidate, Luis Alberto LACALLE Herrera, won the presidency in November 1989, the party’s inability to win more than a plurality of legislative seats necessitated the formation of a National Agreement (Coincidencia Nacional) with the Colorados under which the latter were assigned four portfolios (later three) in the government that took office on March 1, 1990. The de facto coalition was terminated by Lacalle in the course of a cabinet reshuffle in January 1993, albeit with two right-wing Colorados being retained until mid-May 1994. The election of November 27, 1994, returned Sanguinetti Cairolo to the presidency, but in the legislature the vote share was split nearly three ways by the Colorado, Blanco, and recently launched Progressive Encounter (Encuentro Progresista— EP) groupings. Earlier, in a plebiscite conducted on August 28, a number of reforms that had been expected to pass easily (including a measure that would have sanctioned “ticket-splitting”) were overwhelmingly rejected. Given the Colorados’s narrow legislative plurality, President Sanguinetti emulated his predecessor in organizing a coalition government with 6 of 13 cabinet posts awarded to members of three other parties: 4 from the Blancos and 1 each from two nonlegislative groups, the Civic Union (Uni´on C´ıvica—UC) and the People’s Government Party (Partido por el Gobierno del Pueblo—PGP) (see Political Parties, below). In the election of October 31, 1999, the leftwing Progressive Encounter–Broad Front (EP-FA) captured pluralities in both legislative chambers. In a presidential runoff on November 28, however, the ´ EP-FA candidate, Tabar´e VAZQUEZ Rosas, saw his first-round lead of 38.5 percent overcome by the Colorado candidate, Jorge BATLLE Ib´an˜ ez, who had also received Blanco’s backing following the third-place finish of Lacalle Herrera in the initial balloting. Installed as Sanguinetti’s successor on

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March 1, 2000, President Batlle named a coalition cabinet of Colorados and Blancos. In late October 2002, with Uruguay in the throes of a serious economic crisis, the five Blanco ministers announced their intention to resign, and on November 3 a party convention supported the decision, although the Blancos, despite some dissent, indicated that they would continue to work with the government in the legislature. On October 31, 2004, V´azquez, who had been denied election five years earlier, secured a firstround presidential victory of 50.7 percent, becoming at his inauguration on March 1, 2005, the first left-wing chief executive in Uruguayan history. He was supported by narrow majorities in both houses of Congress, the most conspicuous losers in the lower body being Colorados, whose representation plummeted from 35 to 10.

Constitution and Government The present governmental structure is modeled after that of the 1967 constitution. Executive power is vested in the president who appoints the cabinet, while legislative authority is lodged in a bicameral General Assembly. Both the president and the legislature were elected, before 1996, through a complex system of electoral lists that allowed political parties to present multiple candidates, with the leading candidates within each of the leading lists being declared the victors. However, on December 8, 1996, voters narrowly approved a constitutional amendment that provided for internal party elections for presidential candidates. Under the change, a runoff between the two leading candidates is required if one does not win 40 percent of the vote with a 10 percent lead over the runner-up. The judicial system includes justices of the peace, courts of first instance, courts of appeal, and a Supreme Court. Subnationally, Uruguay is divided into 19 departments, which were returned to administration by elected officials at the balloting of November 1984. In accordance with “Institutional Act No. 19” (the August 1984 agreement between the Alvarez regime and the Multipartidaria), the army, navy, and air force commanders participate in an advi-

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sory National Security Council (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad), which also includes the president, the vice president, and the defense, foreign, and interior ministers. The council’s actions are subject to the approval of the General Assembly. Other provisions of the act require the president to appoint military commanders from a list presented by the armed forces, limit the scope of military justice to crimes committed by members of the armed forces, and preclude the declaration of a state of siege without congressional approval.

Foreign Relations A member of the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Latin American Free Trade Association, and other Western Hemisphere organizations, Uruguay has been a consistent supporter of international and inter-American cooperation and of nonintervention in the affairs of other countries. Not surprisingly, the former military government maintained particularly cordial relations with neighboring rightist regimes, while vehemently denying accusations of human rights violations by a number of international bodies. As a result, military and economic aid were substantially reduced under U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Although marginal increases were permitted during the Ronald Reagan’s first administration, a campaign led by the exiled Ferreira Aldunate tended to isolate the M´endez and Alvarez regimes internationally, while the January 1984 accession of Ra´ul Alfons´ın in Argentina substantially inhibited relations with Buenos Aires. Before his initial assumption of office, President Sanguinetti met with Alfons´ın and other regional leaders. His inauguration, attended by 500 representatives of more than 70 countries, featured a carefully staged but largely unproductive meeting between U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. Diplomatic relations with Cuba, broken in 1974 at the request of the OAS, were restored in late 1985, while in an effort to stimulate economic revitalization, trade accords were negotiated with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay, and the Soviet

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Union. During a February 1988 regional summit near Colonia, Uruguay, with Presidents Alfons´ın of Argentina and Sarney of Brazil, President Sanguinetti pledged his government’s accession to protocols of economic integration adopted by the neighboring states in December 1986; the pledge was reaffirmed during a tripartite summit in Buenos Aires in November 1989, and on May 22, 1991, the Uruguayan Senate unanimously approved entry into what had become known as the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Com´un del Cono Sur—Mercosur). By early 2000, however, Uruguay had joined Paraguay in complaining of “creeping bilateralization” of Mercosur decision making, with the smaller partners being pressured to accept agreements reached between Argentina and Brazil. As a result, a number of concessions were made for the minor participants, including special rates for their imports of cars and spare parts. Relations with Argentina were strained in early 2006 and again in 2007 with the projected construction of two pulp mills by separate Spanish and Finnish firms in Uruguay across the Uruguay River from Gualeguaych´u, Argentina. Environmental activists in Argentina succeeded in blockading bridges across the waterway, preventing thousands of tourists from traveling to seaside resorts in Uruguay. In July 2006 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague rejected Argentina’s request that the construction work be suspended. In the meantime President V´azquez filed a new complaint against Argentina at the ICJ over the roadblocks. The Spanish company abandoned its plan to build on the Uruguay River and instead decided to construct a mill in Punta Pereira on the R´ıo de la Plata (River Plate). Construction continued on the Finnish Botnia mill, which was completed at the end of 2007. During the year King Juan Carlos of Spain was asked to act as a mediator in the dispute, and representatives from Argentina and Uruguay met with the king’s representative in April 2007. Both parties were seen to be moving toward possible concessions, with Uruguay possibly agreeing that it failed to comply with all the statutes of a 1975 bilateral treaty regulating the joint management of the Uruguay River and Argentina accepting that it

was too late to relocate the Botnia pulp mill. In April 2007 the Spanish ambassador to Argentina revealed that one proposed solution was the creation of an “ecological conservation zone” around the pulp mill on the banks of the Uruguay River. More importantly, the dispute led a number of Uruguayan politicians to revive the long-standing dispute over the value of participation in Mercosur, given alleged “hegemonistic” behavior by its two largest members. Significantly, the presidents of Argentina and Brazil, at their first formal meeting on January 18, pledged to address trade asymmetries that have worked to the disadvantage of both Uruguay and Paraguay.

Current Issues Any doubts as to President Vasquez’s social policies were resolved at his inauguration on March 1, 2005, with the announcement that he would launch a “Social Emergency Plan” (Plan de Atenci´on Nacional de Emergencia Social). Inspired, perhaps, by the Peruvian president’s ProPer´u scheme, PANES (an acronym translatable as “loaves”) would attempt to offer “a life with dignity” to 200,000 of the country’s poor by providing them with food, medicine, housing, and employment at an estimated cost of $200 million over a two-year period. Subsequently, the new president made good on a campaign pledge by securing the reluctant approval of his economy minister to draft a budget that included an allocation equivalent to 4.5 percent of GDP for education. Considerable tension has remained within the ruling party stemming from a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States. Economy Minister Danilo ASTORI and Energy and Mines Minister Jorge LEPRA have strongly supported the measure, while Foreign Minister Reinaldo GARGANO has promised to resign if Uruguay signs the agreement. The Communist Party (PC), which received the most votes in internal coalition elections held in November 2006, has adamantly opposed the agreement and has been supported by the MPP and other coalition members.

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President V´azquez announced in June 2007 that he would not seek reelection in 2009. While analysts have speculated that the president may seek to extend his tenure, this would require amending the constitution as presidents are currently limited to serving a single five-year term.

Political Parties Uruguay’s two traditional parties, the historically liberal Colorado Party and the more conservative Blanco (National) Party, take their names from flags used by their respective factions in the 1836 civil war. Before the “temporary” proscription of all party activity in June 1976, both principal parties had included innumerable factions, which were not subject to overall party discipline and were permitted to run candidates at election time. In the party delegate balloting of November 28, 1982, Colorado factions presented 45 lists of candidates and Blanco factions presented 21, although most of the votes were won by a quite limited number of groups or coalitions representing both pro- and antigovernment sentiment. A third legal participant, the ultraconservative Civic Union, obtained only 1.2 percent of the vote. The Multipartidaria, a grouping formed in late 1983 to mobilize and solidify opposition to the military regime, was composed of all three groups plus the proscribed Communist, Socialist, and Christian Democratic parties. The legalization of the last two in August 1984 yielded the rebirth of a 1971 coalition, the Broad Front (Frente Amplio), which presented a tripartisan candidate in the November 1984 election. All parties were legalized following President Sanguinetti’s inauguration in March 1985. While most opposition parties formally refused to join the Colorados in the “National Unity Government” proposed by Sanguinetti in late 1984 (the Blancos and Broad Front together holding more legislative seats than the Colorados), some Blanco and Civic Union members were allowed by their parties to join the cabinet as individuals. Although the Blancos outpolled the Colorados at the 1989 balloting, their inability to secure a ma-

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jority of congressional seats necessitated the formation of a coalition administration following the inauguration of President Lacalle in March 1990. The 1994 poll yielded an essentially tripartite division of vote shares among the Colorados, Blancos, and recently organized Progressive Encounter (below). In 1999 the Progressive Encounter secured a plurality in both the presidential and legislative races, but was unable to capitalize on the former because of a second-round coalition by the traditional parties. In 2004 the leftists, for the first time, won majorities in both the presidential and congressional balloting.

Presidential Grouping Progressive Encounter–Broad Front (Encuentro Progresista–Frente Amplio—EP-FA). Encompassing a number of left-wing groups, plus a group of Blanco dissidents, the EP was launched before the 1994 election. While running third in the November poll, the alliance was only marginally eclipsed by the second-place Blancos, thus effectively terminating Uruguay’s traditional two-party system. Tabar´e V´azquez, the popular former mayor of Montevideo who had been the EAP standardbearer in 1994, easily won the EP’s 1999 presidential nomination, securing 82 percent of the votes in the April primary. Although winning a plurality of 38.5 percent in October 1999, he was defeated in second-round balloting by Colorado-Blanco nominee Jorge Batlle Ib´an˜ ez. However, in 2004 V´azquez received slightly more than 50 percent of the firstround vote to win election as president. Originally a Communist-led formation of 11 members that included the PSU, PDC, and MRO (below), the FA contested the 1971 election but was subsequently proscribed by the military regime, while its presidential candidate, retired general L´ıber Seregni, was imprisoned and stripped of his military rank. Seregni was released in March 1984 but was banned from political activity, thus unable to serve as the November nominee of the Front, which had attracted a number of dissidents from the Colorado and Blanco parties. In the 1984 balloting, Front candidate Juan CROTTOGINI won

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20.4 percent of the vote, while the coalition won 21 Chamber seats (almost as many as the Blancos) and 6 Senate seats. In early 1985 a split developed between the group’s Marxist and social democratic legislators over the degree of support to be given to the Sanguinetti administration, although in May the president, in a gesture to the Front, decreed that Seregni’s military rank be restored. Subsequently a noncommunist “Lista 99” faction joined with elements of the PDC and PSU in a “Triple Alliance” that contested elections in student and labor organizations, winning the leadership of the leading student federation in July. Throughout 1986 the Front was solidly opposed to the military amnesty program, joining the call for a plebiscite to decide the issue, although it initially rejected a membership bid by the likeminded MLN (see under MPP, below). Meanwhile the “Lista 99” group became increasingly identified as the People’s Government Party (PGP), which, before the 1989 balloting, joined the PDC and Civic Union in a coalition styled the New Space (Nuevo Espacio) (below), with the MLN subsequently becoming a Front member. By 1992 the Socialists had displaced the longdominant Communists as the leading component of the Front, but the Socialists failed to control the group’s plenum, with the highly popular mayor of Montevideo, V´azquez, threatening in late 1993 to withdraw from the 1994 presidential race if internal party elections were not held; however, in March 1994 V´azquez was proclaimed the group’s standard-bearer for the presidential campaign. On February 5, 1996, Seregni resigned as FA president because of irreconcilable differences over electoral reform (primarily in regard to Seregni’s willingness to endorse second-round presidential balloting in return for abolition of the ley de lemas). In late 1996, following the interim leadership of a 12-member executive, Tabar´e V´azquez was elected Seregni’s successor; however, he resigned in September 1997 because of opposition to his support of the privatization of a Montevideo hotel complex. Seregni died on July 31, 2004.

At the time of the 2004 election, the EPFA (sometimes referenced as EP-FA-NM (Nueva Mayor´ıa) encompassed the groups listed below. The New Space Party (Nuevo Espacio) joined the EP-FA following the election (see below). ´ Leaders: Dr. Tabar´e Ram´on VAZQUEZ Rosas (President of the Republic), Jos´e (“Pepe”) MUJICA (MPP). New Space (Nuevo Espacio—NE). The NE was founded following a struggle within the Frente Amplio nominees for the 1989 presidential balloting. The Marxist wing wished to renominate General Seregni as the coalition’s sole candidate, while social democrats within the party supported PGP leader Hugo BATALLA, or, alternatively, both contenders under an electoral law provision permitting multiple nominees. As an agreement between the factions proved impossible, the PGP and PDC withdrew from the Frente Amplio in March 1989, subsequently joining the Civic Union (see below) in launching Nuevo Espacio as a tripartite formation with Batalla as its standardbearer. Prior to the 1994 balloting, the PGP’s Batalla agreed to campaign as a vice-presidential contender on a ticket with Sanguinetti, the Colorados’ presidential candidate. The PDC joined the Progressive Encounter, and the Civic Union withdrew to campaign separately, with a rump group of PGP members remaining within a reorganized Nuevo Espacio. The latter ran fourth in the presidential race. After the 2004 election the party decided to join the EP-FA and was accepted in November 2005. Leaders: Rafael MICHELINI (President of ´ the Party), H´ector PEREZ Piera (Former President of the Party). People’s Government Party (Partido por el Gobierno del Pueblo—PGP). Formed in mid1986 by an apparent majority of Broad Front participants, the PSD withdrew to support its leader, Hugo Batalla, for the presidency in 1989. In 1994 Batalla returned to the Colorados and won election as vice president on a ticket

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headed by Julio Sanguinetti. He died in October 1998. Leader: Rafael MICHELINI. Uruguayan Socialist Party (Partido Socialista del Uruguay—PSU). Founded in 1910, the PSU has participated in the Broad Front since its inception in 1971. At present, its most conspicuous member is Tabar´e V´azquez, who in 1989 became the first left-wing mayor of the capital and subsequently, as a “renewalist” leader within the FA, became the EP-FA standardbearer in 1999 and the country’s first Socialist president in 2005. The V´azquez cabinet includes the first woman to serve as Interior Minister, Daisy Tourn´e. ´ Leaders: Dr. Tabar´e Ram´on VAZQUEZ Rosas (President of the Republic), Reinaldo GARGANO (President of the Party), Eduardo (Lalo) FERNANDEZ (Secretary General), Daisy TOURNE` (Interior Minister). Movement of Popular Participation (Movimiento de Participaci´on Popular—MPP). Commonly referred to as the Tupamaros (after T´upac Amaru, an 18th-century Inca chief who was burned at the stake by the Spaniards), the MPP is an outgrowth of the National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberaci´on Nacional—MLN), a longtime clandestine guerrilla group that used violence and charges of political corruption in an attempt to radically alter Uruguayan society. Its last recorded clash with the police was in Montevideo in April 1974; six years later, in 1980 MLN founder Ra´ul SENDIC Antonaccio was sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment after having been held without trial since 1972. A number of others were sentenced for “subversion” in late 1983 at the height of the antidissident campaign. Many Tupamaros were among the hundreds who returned to Uruguay at the end of 1984, while the core of the group, including Sendic, was released when all political prisoners were freed in March 1985. At the MLN’s first legal convention in December 1985, an estimated 1,500 delegates established a 33-member central com-

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mittee and endorsed the abandonment of armed struggle in favor of nonviolent electoral politics. Its bid to join the Broad Front was rebuffed in 1986, reportedly due to PDC objection, but approved before the 1989 poll. The MLN was one of the leading opponents of the government’s controversial military amnesty program, attracting an estimated 17,000 for its first political rally in December 1986. Sendic died in Paris in April 1989, reportedly from a neurological condition occasioned by his years of imprisonment, with the Movement campaigning as a Front member during the ensuing electoral campaign. During 1991 relations with other Front members were reported to have cooled, with the ´ MLN’s Eleuterio FERNANDEZ calling for General Seregni’s resignation and an internal election to determine “who are the real leaders of the Uruguayan Left.” MPP candidates attracted nearly one-third of the EP-FA votes in the 2004 balloting, and its leader, Jos´e Mujica, was displeased about some of the president-elect’s initial cabinet choices (particularly that of Danilo ASTARI of the basically centrist Uruguay Assembly [Asamblea Uruguay—AU] as economy minister). However, he was seemingly mollified by his subsequent appointment to head the powerful agricultural ministry. Leaders: Jos´e (“Pepe”) MUJICA, Nora CASTRO (Former President of the Chamber of Representatives). Workers’ Party (Partido de los Trabajadores—PT). The PT is an extreme left-wing formation founded in 1980. It is affiliated with the Progressive Encounter-Broad Front (Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio—EP-FA) Leaders: Juan Vital ANDRADE (1984 presidential candidate), Rafael FERNANDEZ (2004 presidential candidate). Three additional EP-FA components secured cabinet posts in the V´asquez administration: the Artiguist Source (Vertiente Artiguista— VA), led by Mariano ARANA, the Progressive

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Alliance (Alianza Progresista—AP), led by Vice President Rodolfo NIN Novoa and Uruguayan Assembly (Asamblea Uruguay— AU), led by Danilo Astori. Also participating in the EP-FA, but without ministerial representation, were the Blanco Popular and Progressive Movement (Movimiento Blanco Popular y Progresista—MBPP); the Communist Party (Partido Comunista—PC), known when the formation was banned as the Democratic Advance Guard Party (Partido de Democracia Avanzada—PDA); the Left Front of Liberation (Frente Izquierda de Liberaci´on—Fidel); the Leftist Current (Corriente de Izquierda—CI); the Nationalist Action Movement (Movimiento de Acci´on Nacionalista—MAN); the Party for the Victory of the People (Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo—PVP); the Pregon Group (Grupo Preg´on—GP); and the 26th of March Movement (Movimiento 26 de Marzo— M26M).

Other Parties Colorado Party (Partido Colorado—PC). Founded in 1836 and in power continuously from 1865 to 1958, the largely urban-based PC has emphasized liberal and progressive principles, social welfare, government participation in the economy, and inter-American cooperation. For some years the party’s leading faction, as heir to the policies of former president Jos´e Batlle y Ord´on˜ ez, was the Unidad y Reforma, led by a longtime opponent of the military establishment, Jorge Batlle Ib´an˜ ez. However, the group was formally headed by Dr. Julio Mar´ıa Sanguinetti because of the personal proscription of Batlle Ib´an˜ ez under the military regime. Unidad y Reforma obtained 45 percent of the vote in the November 1982 election and successfully advanced Sanguinetti as its presidential candidate in 1984. Other factions included the promilitary Uni´on Colorado Batllista (pachequista) group led by former president Jorge Pacheco Areco, who ran as a minority presidential candidate in 1984; the Libertad y Cambio, led

by former vice president Enrique Tarigo; and the antimilitary Batllismo Radical and Corriente Batllista Independiente. In 1986 the party strongly endorsed the military amnesty urged by President Sanguinetti, while continuing to promote coalition efforts with elements of the Blanco Party. Runner-up in the 1989 balloting, the PC was awarded four portfolios in the Lacalle administration of March 1990, an alliance that effectively ended in January 1993, although two Colorado ministers retained their portfolios until May 1994. By 1992 Unidad y Reforma had split into two components, the Batllismo Unido, (subsequently Batllismo Radical), headed by Batlle Ib´an˜ ez, and the Foro Batllista, led by Sanguinetti. Also active were the Uni´on Colorado Batllista and Cruzada 94, led by Pablo MILLOR. Batlle Ib´an˜ ez captured 54 percent of the votes within the PC’s presidential primary in April 1999, earning the nomination over Luis HIERRO L´opez (45 percent), who had the support of President Sanguinetti. With the additional backing of the Blancos, Batlle won the November runoff against the Frente Amplio’s Tabar´e V´asquez and took office as president in March 2000. The party placed third in the 2004 presidential poll with only 10.3 percent of the vote, while losing two-thirds of its congressional representation. Leaders: Dr. Julio Mar´ıa SANGUINETTI Cairolo (Former President of the Republic and President of the Party), Jorge BATLLE Ib´an˜ ez (Former President of the Republic), Guillermo STIRLING (2004 presidential candidate), Jos´e Luis BATLLE (Former Secretary General). Blanco (Nacional) Party (Partido Nacional— PN). Traditionally representing conservative, rural, and clerical elements but now largely progressive in outlook, the Partido Nacional won the elections of 1958 and 1962, subsequently failing to win either the presidency or a legislative plurality until November 1989. Its longtime principal grouping, the centrist Por la Patria, was led, before his death in March 1988, by Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, who

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was in exile at the time of the 1982 balloting. His absence did not prevent the ferreiristas from obtaining 70 percent of the party vote in 1982; other antimilitary factions in 1982 included the Consejo Nacional Herrerista, heir to a grouping formed in 1954 by Luis Alberto de Herrera, and the conservative Divisa Blanca, led by Eduardo Pons Etcheverry. Ferreira returned to Uruguay in June 1984 and was promptly arrested, along with his son, Juan Ra´ul, who had led an exile opposition group known as the Uruguayan Democratic Convergence. After officially rejecting the August “Institutional Act No. 19” and refusing to participate in the election campaign, the main faction, at Ferreira’s urging, offered Alberto Zumar´an as its presidential candidate. Zumar´an won 32.9 percent of the vote, while the Blancos obtained 35 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 11 Senate seats. Released from prison five days after the November poll, Ferreira was elected party president in February 1985. Although he initially criticized the reported “deal” between the military and the Colorados to thwart the initiation of human rights trials, he vowed to “let the president govern” and supported the military amnesty program in 1986. The issue split the party, however, as the left-leaning Movimiento Nacional de Rocha faction, led by Carlos Julio Pereyra, called for a referendum to defeat the measure. The smaller, right-leaning Divisa Blanca not only supported the amnesty but also reportedly urged coalition with the Colorados. Both Pereyra and Zumar´an presented themselves as Blanco candidates in the 1989 presidential poll, which was won by Luis Alberto de Herrera’s grandson, Luis Alberto Lacalle, with Gonzalo Aguirre Ram´ırez of the Renovaci´on y Victoria faction as his running mate. The coalition forged by Lacalle with the Colorados was effectively terminated as the result of a midterm cabinet reshuffle in January 1993, with the last two Colorado ministers resigning in May. At the 1994 poll, four Blancos presented themselves as presidential candidates: Aguirre Ram´ırez, party chair Carlos Julio Pereyra, former interior minister Juan Andr´es Ram´ırez (fa-

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vored by President Lacalle), and state power utility head Alberto Volont´e. Lacalle, the candidate of the party’s right-wing, secured the Blanco nomination for the 1999 presidential election by winning 49 percent of the votes in the April primary, but he ran third in the firstround poll of October 31. To prevent a possible victory by the Left, the Blancos threw their support in the runoff of November 28 to the Colorado’s Batlle Ib´an˜ ez, who then formed a coalition government in which the Colorados participated until withdrawing in November 2002. In 2003 Cristina MAESO, leader of a Basta y Vamos (“Enough–Let’s Go”) faction, became the first woman to contend (albeit unsuccessfully) for a major party’s presidential nomination. The party ran second in the 2004 presidential race with a 34.1 percent vote share, while increasing its lower house representation from 22 to 34. Leaders: Pablo ITURRALDE (Party Leader), Luis Alberto LACALLE Herrera (Former President of the Republic, Former Party Chair, President of Consejo Nacional Herrerista, and 1999 PN presidential candidate), Dr. Gonzalo AGUIRRE Ram´ırez (Former Vice President of the Republic and leader of Renovaci´ony Victoria), Jorge ˜ LARRANAGA (2004 presidential candidate and President of the Party), Alberto VOLONTE (1994 presidential candidate, Consejo Nacional Herrerista), Carlos Julio PEREYRA (leader of Movimiento Nacional de Rocha and 1994 presidential candidate), Juan Andr´es RAM´IREZ (Former Interior Minister and 1994 presidential candidate), Carlos Alfredo CAT Vidal, Francisco UBILLES (Consejo Nacional Herrerista), Eduardo Pons ETCHEVERRY (Divisa Blanca), Al´ (Secretary General berto S´aenz de ZUMARAN and leader of Por la Patria). Oriental Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Oriental—MRO). The MRO is a pro-Cuban former guerrilla group that participated in the FA’s launching in 1971. It made headlines (and embarrassed other Front groups) in late 1991 by characterizing a follower who had been

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arrested for robbery as a “social fighter.” It was expelled from the FA in 1993 after some of its leaders had urged a return to “armed revolutionary struggle for Latin America.” The party continued to function in 2007. Leaders: Walter ARTOLA, Mario ROSSI. Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem´ocrata Cristiano—PDC). Currently left-democratic in orientation, the PDC was founded in 1962 by dissidents from the predecessor of the current Civic Union (below). Banned at the time of the primary balloting in November 1982, the PDC operated negatively as a “fourth party” by calling on its followers for blank ballots, 84,000 of which were cast. The ban was lifted in August 1984. Before joining the Nuevo Espacio in 1989 the PDC operated as the “moderate” tendency within the Frente Amplio. It participated in forming the Progressive Encounter before the 1994 poll. The party is a member of the Christian Democratic International. A party convention was held in October 2006, during which the PDC confirmed its complete support for the government of President V´azquez Leaders: H´ector LESCANO (President of the Party), Juan A. ROBALLO (Secretary General). Civic Union (Uni´on C´ıvica—UC). The original Uni´on C´ıvica was a conservative Catholic action party from which the left-of-center Christian Democrats withdrew in 1962. The present party is composed of right-wing Christian Democrats who withdrew from the PDC in 1971. A distinctly minor grouping, the party obtained only 14,244 votes out of nearly 1.1 million cast in 1982 and won only two lower house seats in 1984, with 5.8 percent of the presidential vote going to its candidate, Dr. Juan Vicente CHIARINO. Leaders: W. Gerardo AZAMBUYA, Aldo Lamorte (2004 presidential candidate).

Legislature The bicameral Congress (Congreso), dissolved in June 1973 and replaced under the military regime with an appointive Council of State, reconvened for the first time in 12 years on February 15,

1985, following the election of November 25, 1984. The two houses, now styled collectively as the General Assembly (Asamblea General), are elected simultaneously on a proportional basis, both for fiveyear terms. Chamber of Senators (C´amara de Senadores o Senado). The upper house consists of 30 members (but also includes the vice president, ex officio), distributed after the October 31, 2004, balloting as follows: Progressive Encounter–Broad Front, 17 seats; National (Blanco) Party, 10; Colorado Party, 3 seats. President: Rodolfo NIN Novoa. Chamber of Representatives (C´amara de Representantes). The 99-member lower house is elected from national lists. In the most recent election of October 31, 2004, the Progressive Encounter–Broad Front won 53 seats; the National (Blanco) Party, 34; the Colorado Party, 10; independents, 2. President: Enrique PINTADO.

Communications The press is privately owned and edited; broadcasting is conducted under both private and governmental auspices.

Press Uruguay’s long tradition of press freedom was severely curtailed during the military interregnum of 1973–1984. The following dailies, all published in Montevideo, survived intermittent suspension during this period: El Diario (170,000), Colorado independent; El Pa´ıs (110,000 daily, 120,000 Sunday), Blanco conservative; La Ma˜nana (50,000), Colorado; El Diario Espa˜nol (20,000); Diario Oficial, official bulletin. In late 1984 El Nuevo Tiempo, representing the Blanco corriente popular tendency, and the pro´ Communist Ultima Hora commenced daily publication, as did a number of weeklies, including the following: Jaque, independent Coloradobatllista; Opinar, Colorado-Libertad y Cambio; El Correo de los Viernes and La Semana Uruguaya,

U R U G U AY

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Cabinet As of November 1, 2007 President Vice President

Tabar´e V´azquez Rosas (EP-FA) Rodolfo Nin Novoa (EP-FA)

Ministers Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries Social Development Economy and Finance Education and Culture Foreign Affairs Housing, Territorial Planning, and Environment Industry, Energy, and Mining Interior Labor and Social Welfare National Defense Public Health Tourism Transport and Public Works Director, Office of Planning and Budget

Jos´e (“Pepe”) Mujica (MPP) Marina Arismendi (EP-FA) [f] Danilo Astori (AU) Jorge Brovetto (ind.) Reinaldo Gargano (PSU) Mariano Arana (VA) Jorge Lepra (ind.) Daisy Tourn´e (PSU) [f] Eduardo Bonomi (MPP) Azucena Berrutti (PSU) [f] Mar´ıa Julia Mu˜noz (VA) [f] H´ector Lescano (AP) V´ıctor Rossi (AP) Enrique Rubio

[f] = female

Colorado-batllista; La Democracia, Blanco-Por la Patria; Sin Censura, Blanco-ferreirista; Aqu´ı, Christian Democratic. In 1990, on the other hand, competition from nonprint media plus increased newsprint costs forced La Democracia and several other weeklies to join the influential daily, El D´ıa, ´ in suspending publication, while Ultima Hora was forced to cut back to weekly issuance in early 1991.

ernmental and commercial sponsorship. In 2005, there were 133 personal computers and 206 Internet users per 1,000 Uruguayan residents. In that same year there were an estimated 355 mobile cellular subscribers for every 1,000 people.

News Agencies

Ambassador to the U.S.: Carlos Alberto GIANELLI

There is no domestic facility; numerous foreign bureaus, including AP and Reuters, maintain offices in Montevideo.

Broadcasting and Computing The Administraci´on Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Antel) and the Divisi´on Control Servicios Radio-El´ectricos supervise radio and television transmissions, which originate under both gov-

Intergovernmental Representation

U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay: Frank E. BAXTER Permanent Representative to the UN: Elbio O. ROSSELLI IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ALADI, CAN, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, OAS, OPANAL, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

VENEZUELA BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC

OF

VE N E Z U E L A

Rep u´ blica Bolivariana de Venezuela

Note: Following an attack by Colombian security on a FARC camp in Ecuador on March 2, 2008, Venezuela condemned its pro-U.S. rival for violating Ecuadorian sovereignty. Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez sent troops to Colombia’s border, suspending diplomatic and commercial links during the crisis, which was resolved in a conference on March 7. Venezuela denied Colombian allegations that it was funding FARC activities.

Aruba (NETH.)

Punto Fijo Maracaibo Barquisimeto San Cristóbal

Ca r ib b ea n Sea Neth. Antlles (NETH.)

GRENADA

Caracas Valencia

Cuman·

Ciudad Guayana

San Fernando

COLOMBIA

GUYANA

Puerto Ayacucho

BRAZIL 0 0

200 Mi 200 Km

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

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noco Ri ver

Situated on the northern coast of South America between Colombia, Brazil, and Guyana, the Republic of Venezuela is made up of alternating mountainous and lowland territory drained, for the most part, by the Orinoco River and its tributaries. Two-thirds or more of the rapidly growing population, most of it concentrated in coastal and northern areas, is of mixed descent, the remainder being Caucasian, Negro, and Amerindian. Roman Catholicism is the dominant faith, but other religions are tolerated. Women constitute about onethird of the paid labor force, concentrated in the clerical and service sectors. Traditionally holding a small portion of elective offices, women were named to a number of high-level positions in the P´erez administration and constituted nearly onethird of appointees to the Ch´avez regime’s Legislative Commission. One of the world’s leading oil producers, Venezuela has the highest per capita income in Latin America, although national wealth is unevenly distributed. The industrial sector, which includes iron and natural gas, employs about onefourth of the labor force and contributes 50 percent of GDP. By contrast, agriculture now accounts for only 5 percent of GDP; rice, corn, and beans are the principal subsistence crops, while coffee and cocoa

are exported, along with some sugar, bananas, and cotton. Under government sponsorship Venezuela has been attempting to regain its historic position as a major stock-raising country, while diversification has become the keynote of economic planning, in part to reduce a dependence on oil sales that in

O ri

The Country

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recent decades have accounted for more than 90 percent of export revenue. During the boom years of the 1960s and 1970s Venezuelans earned a worldwide reputation for “conspicuous consumption”; subsequently, a period of negative growth (–5.3 percent from 1987 to 1989) threatened fiscal stability and necessitated stringent austerity measures that prompted widespread unrest and two attempted coups in 1992. By 1993 economic performance was again in decline, with GDP plunging by more than 4 percent and inflation nearing 100 percent by late 1994; as of mid-1995 unemployment stood at 17 percent, with 73 percent of households reported to be poverty-stricken. The economy again declined (–3.5 percent) in 1996, though signs of improvement were visible by March 1997 with a two-thirds increase in strong currency reserves and a drop in inflation from 103 percent to 38 percent. Inflation declined further to 20 percent in 1999 and to 13.4 percent in 2000. However, change in GDP fluctuated, plunging to –6.0 percent in 1999, then recovering to 3.2 percent in 2000. During the same period, the poverty rate reportedly rose to 80 percent, with “extreme poverty” in excess of 20 percent. GDP rose by 2.8 percent in 2001 but, amid widespread social unrest that included a petroleum workers’ strike, declined by 8.9 percent in 2002 and by 9.2 percent in 2003. Then, in a remarkable reversal caused by surging oil prices and increased production in the nonoil sector, the index rose by 17.9 percent in 2004, before retreating to what remained a regional high of 9.0 percent in 2005. In 2006 the economy grew by another 10.3 percent, the fastest rate in the region. Oil has driven Venezuela’s phenomenal growth rates in recent years. It accounted for about 90 percent of the country’s export earnings, more than 50 percent of the central government budget revenues, and about 30 percent of GDP in 2006. Venezuela’s proven oil reserves were 80 billion barrels in 2007, among the highest in the world. Production, however, has decreased from about 3.5 million barrels per day in 1999 to about 2.5 million barrels per day in 2007, according to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

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Venezuelan oil revenues have fueled a dramatic increase in government spending, which increased 48 percent in 2006. This has resulted in a more equitable distribution of wealth, with government estimates showing the percent of population in poverty decreasing from more than 50 percent in 2003 to 33 percent in 2006. However, government spending has also aggravated inflation. The official estimate of consumer price increases in mid-2007 was 19 percent per year, the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean. Economists, taking into account black-market prices for price-controlled goods, estimated that the real inflation rate was closer to 25 percent. This view was bolstered by the wide disparity between official and unofficial exchange rates: as of September 2007, the exchange rate was fixed at about 2,150 bol´ıvares to the dollar. On the black market, however, a dollar was widely reported to fetch twice as many bol´ıvares (4,300)— a consequence of high inflation. The Venezuelan government announced in early 2007 a plan to remove three zeroes from the currency and issue a “strong bol´ıvar” (bol´ıvar fuerte) in January 2008. Unemployment and underemployment, meanwhile, remain stubbornly high; the government reported in March 2007 that 45 percent of the labor force continues to work in the informal sector.

Government and Politics Political Background Homeland of Sim´on BOLIVAR, “the Liberator,” Venezuela achieved independence from Spain in 1821 and became a separate republic in 1830. A history of political instability and lengthy periods of authoritarian rule culminated in the dictatorships ´ of Gen. Juan Vicente GOMEZ from 1908 to 1935 ´ and Gen. Marcos PEREZ Jim´enez from 1952 to 1958, the interim being punctuated by unsuccessful attempts to establish democratic government. The ouster of P´erez Jim´enez by a military-backed popular movement in January 1958 prepared the way for subsequent elected regimes. The return to democratic rule was marked by the December 1958 election of R´omulo

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Political Status: Independence originally proclaimed in 1811 as part of Gran Colombia; independent republic established in 1830; federal constitutional system restored in 1958. Current constitution approved by referendum on December 15, 1999. Area: 358,850 sq. mi. (916,445 sq. km.). Population: 23,054,210 (2001C); 27,035,000 (2006E). The 2001 figure excludes an adjustment for underenumeration as well as 180,000 Amerindian jungle dwellers. Major Urban Centers (2005E): CARACAS (2,073,768), Maracaibo (1,764,000), Valencia (1,325,000), Barquisimeto (893,000). Official Language: Spanish. Monetary Unit: Bol´ıvar (official rate November 2, 2007: 2,147 bol´ıvares = $1US). President: (See headnote.) Lt. Col. (Ret.) Hugo ´ Rafael CHAVEZ Fr´ıas (Fifth Republic Movement); elected on December 6, 1998, and inaugurated on February 2, 1999, for a five-year term, succeeding Dr. Rafael CALDERA Rodr´ıguez (National Convergence); reinaugurated by Constitutional Assembly on August 11, 1999; reelected to a new six-year term under the 1999 constitution on July 30, 2000; reelected on December 3, 2006, and reinaugurated for another six-year term on January 8, 2007; new government sworn in on January 8, 2007. Vice President: Jorge RODR´IGUEZ (Fifth Republic Movement); appointed by the president on January 8, 2007, to succeed Jos´e Vicente RANGEL (Fifth Republic Movement).

BETANCOURT, leader of the Democratic Action (AD) party and of the non-Communist Left in Latin America. Venezuela made considerable economic and political progress under the successive AD administrations of Betancourt (1959–1964) and Ra´ul LEONI (1964–1969), with Cuban-supported subversive efforts being successfully resisted. The election and inauguration of Dr. Rafael CALDERA Rodr´ıguez of the Social Christian Party (COPEI) in 1969 further institutionalized the peaceful transfer of power. As the first Christian Democratic president in Venezuela and the second in Latin Amer-

ica (following Eduardo Frei Montalva of Chile), Caldera adhered to an independent pro-Western policy while seeking to “normalize” Venezuelan political life through such measures as legal recognition of the Communist Party, appeals to leftist guerrilla forces to lay down their arms, and the broadening of diplomatic contacts with both Communist and non-Communist regimes. Caldera was succeeded by AD candidate Car´ los Andr´es PEREZ following the election of December 1973, which was highlighted by challenges from the rightist Nationalist Civic Crusade of former dictator P´erez Jim´enez and the New Force, an alliance of left-wing parties. Following his inauguration in March 1974, President P´erez focused on plans to equalize distribution of Venezuela’s substantially increased petroleum revenue. In a minor upset at the election of December 1978, COPEI presidential candidate Luis HERRERA Camp´ıns defeated AD candidate Luis ˜ PINERUA Ordaz. The two parties won an identical number of elective seats in both houses of Congress, but the AD secured a one-member plurality in the Senate because of a seat constitutionally reserved for outgoing President P´erez. Capitalizing on disillusionment with COPEI’s inability to halt declining oil revenue, the AD won 50 percent of the vote in the election of December 4, 1983, COPEI polling less than 30 percent; AD presidential candidate Jaime LUSINCHI defeated former president Caldera and six other candidates and was inaugurated on February 2, 1984. Although economic conditions steadily worsened during the ensuing five years, Carlos P´erez became, on December 4, 1988, the first Venezuelan president to be elected for a second term; the AD, on the other hand, lost its congressional majorities, winning only 23 of 49 elective seats in the Senate and 97 of 201 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Following his inauguration in February 1989 P´erez launched an economic “shock program” that included the elimination of price and wage controls, in addition to the deregulation of interest and exchange rates. The result was skyrocketing unemployment and inflation. On February 27, 1989, days of looting and intense street violence, known

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as the “Caracazo,” erupted following a jump in transport costs; the official death toll from the mayhem was 276 but was believed to be several times higher. The violence was followed by voter apathy: in December 1989 only 30 percent of eligible voters took part in first-ever gubernatorial and mayoral elections. On February 4, 1992, the president escaped assassination during an abortive coup by junior officers, including a prominent paratrooper named Hugo Ch´avez, which included an attack on his official residence. In mid-May legislative members of both leading parties announced a draft bill to cut short P´erez’s term by one year, but in early June COPEI withdrew from the effort, citing a fear that it would trigger a coup. On June 11 COPEI’s two representatives resigned from the “National Unity” government they had joined only three months before, and on June 29, in accepting the resignations of 11 cabinet members, P´erez implemented a previously announced plan to slash cabinet-rank personnel by two-thirds. Despite a second major coup attempt on November 27, state and local elections were held on December 6, at which the AD lost further ground. In March 1993 the attorney general applied to the Supreme Court for a ruling as to whether President P´erez should be charged with the embezzlement of $17 million in state funds that the chief executive said had been expended for secret security and defense purposes, but that opponents insisted had been diverted to campaign and other nonofficial uses. After the court responded in the affirmative, the Senate on May 21 suspended the president, who was constitutionally succeeded, on an interim basis, by the Senate president, Octavio LEPAGE, on May 22. On June 5 the Congress named a highly respected, pro-AD independent, Sen. Ram´on Jos´e VELASQUEZ, to complete the final eight months of the P´erez presidency. On December 5, 1993, former president Caldera, who had been expelled from COPEI in June for refusing to support its presidential candidate, Oswaldo ALVAREZ Paz, was elected to a second term as the nominee of a recently organized, 17-party National Convergence (CN) coalition. Al-

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though credited with only 30.5 percent of the vote, he was but one contender in a record field of 18. On June 24, 1994, in the face of continued economic and political problems that had sparked rumors of a possible coup, President Caldera adopted wide-ranging powers that included a suspension of six constitutional guarantees. On July 21 Congress voted to restore five of the guarantees, leaving in place a limitation on freedom of economic activity. Among the financial difficulties was a liquidity crisis that resulted in a total of 13 banks being brought under state control by mid-August. Although no respite from the recession was evident, President Caldera suspended his remaining emergency powers on July 6, 1995, promulgating instead a financial emergency law that authorized him to intervene in the economy without having to abrogate constitutional rights. Nonetheless, at year’s end what economists termed “an honorable and reasonable agreement” for assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) remained elusive. Considerable social unrest preceded the accord finally concluded with the International Monetary Fund in April 1996, which called for accelerated privatization and flotation of the bol´ıvar. Thereafter, on May 30, the Supreme Court handed down a guilty verdict against former president P´erez, who was, however, released from 28 months of detention on September 19 and then returned to the political arena by campaigning successfully for his old Senate seat in November 1998. On December 8, 1998, the February 1992 coup ´ leader, Hugo CHAVEZ Fr´ıas, gained an impressive victory in presidential balloting over Henrique SALAS R¨omer, the nominee of both traditional rival parties, with former beauty queen ´ Irene SAEZ a distant third. Following his election, Ch´avez pledged to pursue constitutional revision to lay “the foundations of a new republic,” and at a Constituent Assembly poll on July 25, 1999, candidates from his Patriotic Pole coalition won 121 of 128 contested seats. The Assembly created a “judicial emergency commission” charged with radical restructuring of the nation’s court system on August 19, 1999, and

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on August 30 stripped the opposition-controlled Congress of its remaining powers after its leader had rejected the new body’s declaration of a “legislative emergency.” The Assembly then proceeded with the drafting of a new basic law (see below), which was approved by 71.2 percent of the participants in a December 15 referendum. At its concluding session on January 30, 2000, the Constituent Assembly named its president, Ch´avez’s political mentor Luis MIQUILENA, to head a transitional National Legislative Commission, pending the election of a National Assembly on May 28. However, the balloting was subsequently postponed for technical reasons until July 30, when President Ch´avez was elected to a new six-year term and his Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta Rep´ublica—MVR) and its allies won a majority of the 165 seats in the new National Assembly. In November 2000 Ch´avez secured legislative approval of an enabling law granting him decree powers for a year. Further enhancing his power was voter approval of rigid labor controls in a December 3 referendum (although balloting for union leaders in October 2001 failed to yield a chavista takeover). Having already alienated organized labor, Ch´avez exacerbated a growing rift with the military leadership in February 2001 by naming a longtime associate, Jos´e Vicente RANGEL, as Venezuela’s first civilian minister of defense. In June, in an effort to consolidate his support among leftists and the poor, he authorized formation at the neighborhood level of Bolivarian Circles (C´ırculos Bolivarianos) committed to advancement of the “Bolivarian revolution.” On November 13, 2001, using his decree powers, President Ch´avez promulgated 49 laws involving economic, financial, infrastructural, and social policies. The most controversial measures permitted expropriation of underutilized farmland, in the name of an “agrarian revolution,” and required that joint hydrocarbon ventures include majority government participation. Oil royalties were also increased. In response, the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Federaci´on Venezolana de C´amaras y Asociaciones de Comer-

cio y Producci´on—Fedec´amaras), supported by the country’s largest labor union group, the Venezuelan Workers’ Confederation (Confederaci´on de Trabajadores de Venezuela—CTV), announced that it would mount a nationwide one-day strike in December. On January 24, 2002, Ch´avez named as vice president Diosdado CABELLO, a participant in the failed 1992 coup and more recently the secretary of the presidency. A number of additional cabinet changes were made in succeeding weeks, but Ch´avez’s changes failed to stem rising discontent from business and labor as well as demands from a number of senior military officers that the president resign. The volatile political climate also affected the economy, and a decision to float the bol´ıvar quickly led to a drop of nearly 20 percent in its value against the U.S. dollar. In March managerial staff of the state petroleum company, Petr´oleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), with support from the industry’s union, the Federaci´on de Trabajadores Petroleros (Fedepetrol), began a job action, which was followed on April 9 by a general strike organized by the CTV and Fedec´amaras. Two days later, with 150,000 anti-Ch´avez protesters massed outside the presidential palace, more than a dozen demonstrators were killed by gunfire from, apparently, members of the Bolivarian Circles. On April 12, 2002, senior military officers, led by Gen. Luis RINCON, the armed forces commander, announced that Ch´avez had resigned, although it quickly became apparent that a coup had been mounted against him. With Ch´avez in custody, the military named Pedro CARMONA, president of Fedec´amaras, as provisional president. Acting by decree, Carmona attempted to dissolve the National Assembly and the Supreme Court and to suspend the constitution, but wide popular support for the government takeover failed to materialize as advocates of democracy joined Ch´avez loyalists in the streets. Carmona subsequently resigned, and on April 13 the National Assembly elevated Vice President Cabello to the presidency. Cabello, in turn, returned the presidency to Ch´avez on April 14.

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In late 2002 and early 2003 major business and labor sectors staged a general strike over several months that crippled the economy, severely reducing oil production. In the end, the strike’s proponents found themselves forced to call off the action in the face of rising public anger. The episode, which allowed Ch´avez to assume the role of the constitutionally elected president victimized by undemocratic economic power blocs, dealt the opposition a crippling blow before Venezuelan public opinion. In 2003 the opposition was nonetheless confident that it could remove Ch´avez by means of a popular referendum, campaigning for which was launched on November 21. Although surviving a court challenge to petition signatures, the recall ballot on August 26, 2004, was endorsed by only 40.7 percent of participating voters. The president and his allies were further strengthened on October 31 by winning 20 of 23 state governorships (15 of which had been held by antichavistas), as well as the mayoralty of Caracas. With opposition parties boycotting the election of December 4, 2005, Ch´avez loyalists won unanimous control of the National Assembly. Despite the opposition’s collective endorsement of Zulia state governor Manuel ROSALES under the New Time (Un Nuevo Tiempo—UNT) banner, Ch´avez nonetheless beat Rosales by a 62 to 37 percent margin in voting that was internationally judged to be free and fair. No other candidate received more than 0.04 percent of the vote. On January 8, 2007, just before being reinaugurated, Ch´avez replaced nearly every minister in his cabinet. During 2007, President Ch´avez began to move more determinedly toward what he termed “21st Century Socialism” (see Current issues, below).

Constitution and Government Under its constitution of January 23, 1961, Venezuela was designated a federal republic that now encompasses 23 states (the newest, Vargas, created with effect from January 1, 1999), a Federal District, and 72 Federal Dependencies (islands in the Antilles). Executive power was vested in a

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president who was elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term and until mid-1992 (when a oneterm ban was imposed on all future incumbents) could be reelected after a ten-year interval. The legislative body (Congress of the Republic) consisted of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, both elected by universal suffrage for five-year terms concurrent with that of the president. The states were administered by popularly elected governors; had their own elected, unicameral legislative assemblies; and were divided into county-type districts with popularly elected mayors and municipal councils. Among the numerous changes introduced by the 1999 basic law, the presidential term was extended to six years with the possibility of one immediate renewal; executive authority vis-`a-vis the economy was substantially enhanced; the bicameral legislature was abandoned in favor of a unicameral National Assembly; public administration was drastically reorganized; oil production was to remain vested in the state; the rights of indigenous peoples were affirmed; and the country was renamed Rep´ublica Bolivariana de Venezuela in honor of the independence hero. In May 2004 President Ch´avez secured passage of a bill enlarging the Supreme Court from 20 to 32 members, a step seen by the opposition as “stacking” the court with pro-Ch´avez justices. With the legislature under the unanimous control of pro-Ch´avez parties following December 2005 elections, the Supreme Court is, as of 2007, the only branch of central government with any opposition presence, even in a minority. In 2007 President Ch´avez introduced a new package of constitutional reforms, which critics portrayed as an attempt to concentrate power in the presidency. These reforms included permitting indefinite presidential reelection, empowering the president to declare extended states of emergency, reducing the central bank’s autonomy, redefining property rights, and establishing a sixhour workday, among several others. The reforms won quick approval in Venezuela’s Congress, all of whose representatives come from pro-Ch´avez parties. In a December 2, 2007, referendum, however,

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Venezuelans narrowly rejected these reforms by a margin of roughly 51 to 49 percent. The result was hailed by opposition leaders, but President Ch´avez indicated that he would attempt to pass the measures at a later time. State and Capital

Area (sq. mi.)

Amazonas (Puerto Ayacucho) Anzo´ategui (Barcelona) Apure (San Fernando) Aragua (Maracay) Barinas (Barinas) Bol´ıvar (Ciudad Bol´ıvar) Carabobo (Valencia) Cojedes (San Carlos) Delta Amacuro (Tucupita) Falc´on (Coro) Gu´arico (San Juan) Lara (Barquisimeto) M´erida (M´erida) Miranda (Los Teques) Monagas (Matur´ın) Nueva Esparta (La Asunci´on) Portuguesa (Guanare) Sucre (Cuman´a) T´achira (San Crist´obal) Trujillo (Trujillo) Vargas (La Guaira) Yaracuy (San Felipe) Zulia (Maracaibo) Federal District (Caracas)

69,550 16,720 29,540 2,710 13,590 91,890 1,800 5,710 15,520 9,580 25,090 7,640 4,360 3,070 11,160 440 5,870 4,560 4,290 2,860 580 2,740 24,360 170

Population (2006E) 138,000 1,452,000 464,000 1,640,000 740,000 1,503,000 2,190,000 294,000 149,000 885,000 731,000 1,765,000 827,000 2,808,000 836,000 429,000 856,000 903,000 1,155,000 698,000 331,000 586,000 3,551,000 2,192,000

Foreign Relations A member of the United Nations and its related agencies, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Latin American Integration Association, and other hemispheric organizations, Venezuela was traditionally aligned with the West in both inter-American and world affairs. During the presidencies of Betancourt and Leoni, it was subjected by the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro to repeated propaganda attacks and armed incursions. Although it consequently took a particularly harsh line toward Cuba, it was equally critical of

right-wing dictatorships in the Americas and for some years refused to maintain diplomatic relations with governments formed as a result of military coups. This policy was modified during the 1960s by the establishment of diplomatic relations with Argentina, Panama, and Peru as well as with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and other Communist countries, while in December 1974, despite earlier differences, a normalization of relations with Cuba was announced. A long-standing territorial claim to the section of Guyana west of the Essequibo River has caused intermittent friction with that country, Venezuela declining in June 1982 to renew a 12-year moratorium on unilateral action in the dispute and subsequently refusing to sanction submission of the controversy to the International Court of Justice. In September 1999 the issue was revived by the Venezuelan foreign minister, who rejected the century-old award to the former UK dependency, while the Constituent Assembly subsequently adopted a provision that modification of the country’s original territory could only result from treaties “not vitiated by nullity.” The controversy intensified in mid-2000, after Guyana gave permission to Texas-based Beal Aerospace to construct a $100 million satellite launch facility within a few miles of the Venezuelan border. (Tension dissipated later in the year, however, when the Beal project collapsed. See article on Guyana for details.) A Venezuelan claim to tiny Bird Island (Isla de Aves) to the west of Dominica has periodically strained relations with Caribbean neighbors. While the island, on which Venezuela is reportedly constructing a scientific station, is of little intrinsic importance, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) has expressed concern that it might serve as the basis of a claim by Caracas to a 200mile-wide exclusive economic zone. For more than three decades Caracas has been engaged in a dispute with Colombia regarding sovereignty over the Gulf of Venezuela (Gulf of Guajira), with tension escalating to the level of high military alert following the unauthorized intrusion of a Colombian ship into Venezuelan ter-

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ritorial waters in August 1988. (In 2007 President Ch´avez surprised Colombia’s government with an offer to reopen negotiations on the maritime border dispute.) Other disagreements have arisen over the smuggling of food-stuffs, drug trafficking, and alleged attacks by Colombia’s guerrilla and paramilitary groups on the Venezuelan national guard and Venezuelan citizens. Over the years the two countries have concluded a number of agreements aimed at combating drug traffickers, but an “open border” has made interdiction of drug shipments difficult. In 1997 Venezuelan army leaders demanded the right to engage in “hot pursuit” after Colombian guerrillas had killed a cattle rancher in a crossborder raid, and in July 1999 President Ch´avez closed its border to Colombian commercial vehicles after complaining that Venezuelan trucks were unable to travel safely in Colombia because of guerrilla activity. Friction continued, as evidenced by a number of border incidents in late 2003 and early 2004, in addition to the capture of a group of alleged Colombian paramilitaries in Caracas in May 2004. A major rupture in Colombian-Venezuelan relations followed Colombian security forces’ abduction from Caracas of Rodrigo Granda, a Colombian citizen considered to be the “foreign minister” of Colombia’s largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in early 2005. Fallout from the episode was eventually neutralized by a meeting between President ´ Ch´avez and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. High-level tensions continued to simmer, however, as top Colombian officials, including Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, accused Venezuela of harboring and assisting Colombian guerrillas on Venezuelan territory. For his part, Ch´avez continued to be an ardent critic of “Plan Colombia” and other U.S. programs for engagement in the Andes. Venezuela also objected to Colombia’s decision to grant asylum to Pedro Carmona, who was briefly named to Venezuela’s presidency during the abortive April 2002 coup. In August and September 2007, however, relations between the two countries appeared to improve dramatically as Uribe invited Ch´avez to play a more active role in facilitating pos-

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sible peace and prisoner-exchange dialogues with the FARC. Relations with Peru were disrupted briefly in mid-2001, amid conflicting versions of the circumstances surrounding the arrest and extradition of former Peruvian spy chief Vladimiro Montesinos. Venezuela, after complaining that Montesinos had been the object of three “snatch” attempts to spirit him out of the country, insisted that the affair had not generated a rift between the two countries. Peruvian-Venezuelan relations soured further in 2006, when Ch´avez openly endorsed Peruvian presidential candidate Ollanta Humala. Humala did not win, in part because opponents, including the eventual victor, Al´an Garc´ıa, portrayed him as a Ch´avez puppet. Relations between Ch´avez and Garc´ıa have remained rocky, though the two countries exchanged ambassadors in early 2007. A similar election-year dynamic damaged relations between Venezuela and Mexico, with Ch´avez and Mexican President Vicente Fox engaging in a series of bitter verbal exchanges. Relations with Fox’s successor, Felipe Calder´on, have improved somewhat, and Venezuela sent an ambassador to Mexico City in September 2007. Somewhat more serious were factors weakening ties with the United States, including a visit by President Ch´avez to Iraq in August 2000 (the first by a head of state since the first Gulf war), a visit to Caracas by Fidel Castro in late October, the conclusion of a military cooperation treaty with Russia in May 2001, and subsequent criticism of the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan as “fighting terror with terror.” Ch´avez also cultivated closer ties with Iran, hosting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Caracas in January and November 2007. In addition to oil and gas cooperation agreements, the two countries created a joint social investment fund. In April 2002 Washington’s voice was noticeably absent from those regional countries that condemned the abortive coup against President Ch´avez. The U.S. administration of President George W. Bush soon admitted that it knew beforehand that members of Venezuela’s military had discussed deposing the elected government but

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insisted that neither assistance nor verbal support had been offered. Since then, a long list of offenses and insults has marred relations between Venezuela and the United States. U.S. policymakers have been angered by Ch´avez’s ejection of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) from Venezuela and the embassy military group from the armed forces headquarters; by Venezuela’s refusal to allow U.S. counterdrug detection planes to enter Venezuelan airspace; and by Ch´avez’s repeated visits to countries that Washington considers adversaries, notably Cuba. Venezuela, for its part, has been angered by the U.S. refusal to extradite Luis Posada CARRILES, a Cuban exile wanted for his role in the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner departing Venezuela. The Venezuelan president’s taunts reached new proportions on September 20, 2006, at the UN General Assembly in New York when, in a speech that received worldwide attention, Ch´avez called President Bush “the devil” and said that “U.S. imperialism” threatened “the survival of the human species.” The U.S. government’s responses have been low key. Diplomats routinely refer to Ch´avez as a “negative influence” in the region; President Bush said on June 5, 2007, that “elected leaders (in Venezuela) have resorted to a shallow populism to dismantle democratic institutions and tighten their grip on power.” The U.S. government has placed several sets of sanctions on Venezuela for failing to cooperate on initiatives against drugs and terrorism, and for violating religious freedom, making it impossible for Caracas to receive U.S. aid or to purchase weapons with U.S.-made components. The U.S. State Department’s March 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report claimed that illegal drug trafficking in Venezuela had “substantially increased” in 2006, and that a “permissive and corrupt environment” was to blame for fewer drug seizures. The possibility of an imminent U.S. invasion or assassination attempt has been a regular feature of Ch´avez’s speeches since the 2002 coup attempt. With the stated goal of preparing loyalists to mount a guerrilla resistance to the U.S. invaders, Ch´avez has devoted much oil revenue to a series of

large arms purchases, mostly from Russia. In 2007 the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency claimed that Venezuela had purchased more weapons in the previous two years than China, Pakistan, or Iran. Despite these irritants, commercial ties between the United States and Venezuela have never been closer, thanks to the U.S. demand for oil. Trade between the United States and Venezuela increased from $40 billion in 2005 to $50 billion in 2006. In 2006 Venezuela exported 60 percent of its oil to the United States, which accounted for 11 percent of U.S. oil imports. Venezuela has been an intense competitor with the United States for influence in the region; Ch´avez makes no secret of his ambition to unite Latin America and the Caribbean under a “Bolivarian” banner. In August 2007 the Associated Press estimated that, in the first eight months of the year, Ch´avez had pledged grants and loans to the rest of the hemisphere totaling $8.8 billion. The United States, by comparison, granted and loaned about $3 billion per year to the hemisphere during the mid-2000s. Some analysts see Ch´avez using oil largesse to form a “bloc” of countries governed by elected leftist leaders. Those most frequently cited are Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, and, occasionally, N´estor Kirchner in Argentina. In December 2004 Ch´avez embarked on a tour of countries viewed as potential buyers of Venezuelan oil, including the People’s Republic of China, which he invited to develop 15 “mature” oil fields capable of yielding an entire year of Venezuela’s current production. He also invited China to share in offshore oil exploration of what might prove to be the Americas’ largest natural gas reserves. Earlier, Venezuela concluded an agreement with Cuba to supply Havana with cut-rate oil in return for a medical assistance program valued at upward of $750 million. The Ch´avez administration’s use of oil as the pillar of its foreign policy was clear at the first summit of the South American Community of Nations (CSN), held in Bras´ılia, Brazil, in late September 2005. At the meeting, Ch´avez ridiculed both the Andean Community (CAN) and the South-

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ern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), for which merger talks were under way, and offered an “alternative structure” of economic integration with Venezuela’s energy resources as its guarantor. Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur on December 9, 2005, made it the only South American country to be a member of both trade groups; this distinction proved short-lived, however, as Ch´avez pulled Venezuela out of the CAN in protest of Colombia’s and Peru’s decisions to sign bilateral free-trade agreements with the United States. The Ch´avez government’s most notable foreign policy embarrassment came in fall 2006, when it failed to win a nonpermanent seat for Venezuela on the UN Security Council. After 47 rounds of voting, neither Venezuela nor U.S.-backed Guatemala was able to win the two thirds of General Assembly votes necessary to fill the seat normally reserved for a Latin American country. The honor eventually went to a compromise country, Panama, in November.

Current Issues Given estimates that less than half of the country’s agricultural land was being put to productive use (much of it in 500 idle estates), President Ch´avez issued a decree in January 2005 to speed up a land reform process that had lagged since its inception in late 2001. Subsequently, he urged state governors to confiscate idle land and then in late September agreed to negotiate with owners who planned to expand cultivation. As of early 2007, 1.9 million hectares (4.7 million acres) of land had been redistributed. Having failed to oust Ch´avez in the 2004 referendum, the leading opposition parties boycotted the December 2005 legislative balloting. The result was a 75 percent abstention rate, which, it was argued, rendered the new Assembly illegitimate. Undeterred, the administration advanced proposals for a constitutional change that permitted Ch´avez to run, successfully, for a third term in December 2006. The fractious opposition united behind a single candidate in the December 3, 2006, presiden-

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tial elections, endorsing Manuel Rosales as the UNT candidate (see UNT, Political Parties, below). Instead of assailing the president’s popular economic reform programs, Rosales attacked Ch´avez for weakening checks on presidential power, doing little to combat corruption, presiding over rising crime and insecurity, and failing to maintain basic infrastructure such as a highway bridge between Caracas and its international airport in La Guaira, which collapsed in April 2006. Despite coming together behind the Rosales campaign, the opposition remains politically weak and frequently divided. Prior to his reinstatement in the presidency, Ch´avez reconstituted his entire cabinet and named a new vice president, former National Electoral Council (CNE) President Jorge RODR´IGUEZ, to succeed Jos´e Vicente Rangel. (Rangel went on to be a generally progovernment—though occasionally critical—television talk-show host.) Among the new cabinet appointments was Ch´avez’s more ideologically radical brother Ad´an as education minister. Following his January 2007 inauguration, Ch´avez began to take Venezuela in a markedly more radical direction toward “21st Century Socialism,” obtaining from the National Assembly a second “enabling law” allowing him to rule by decree for 18 months, which the opposition derided as a “blank check.” By May 2007, the government had increased its ownership share in the country’s main telecommunications company (CANTV, which was more than one-quarter owned by U.S. telecom giant Verizon), the Caracas electricity company, and oil fields in the Orinoco basin of eastern Venezuela. In the name of increasing “participatory democracy,” Ch´avez also moved to increase the funding of “community councils,” citizen groups accountable to the presidency that are increasingly taking functions away from local governments, in August 2007. Civil-military relations were roiled by a new requirement that soldiers salute with the slogan “fatherland, socialism or death.” Ch´avez meanwhile moved to eliminate “any vestige of autonomy” from Venezuela’s central bank, placing monetary policy under presidential control.

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In August 2007 Chavez announced a series of proposed constitutional reforms that he hoped to enact in 2008, after three votes in the progovernment legislature and a public referendum. The reforms, which passed their first vote unanimously on August 21, would have increased the presidential term to seven years and allow incumbents to run for indefinite reelection. Under current law, Ch´avez must step down when his term ends in 2012; if the constitutional reforms were approved, the president might be able to fulfill his expressed desire to remain in office until “2020 or 2027.” Other proposed reforms included a so-called “new geometry of power” that would have weakened governors and mayors in favor of the presidency and community councils, while enabling the president to declare “special military regions” anywhere in national territory for “strategic defense purposes.” The proposal would also have reduced the legal working day from eight hours to six. The package of constitutional reforms won easy approval in Venezuela’s completely progovernment legislature. Although polls indicated that Venezuelans were likely to support the changes, on December 2, 2007, 51 percent of the voters rejected a referendum on the constitutional reforms. While the president’s popularity remained high as of mid-2007, the oil-fueled economy showed signs of overheating: high inflation continued unabated and pressures to weaken the currency continued to build. Government price controls on meat, eggs, and other foodstuffs brought widespread shortages in 2007; staple items disappeared from store shelves to be sold instead in neighboring countries or on the black market. Public security, meanwhile, has steadily worsened as the government has failed to reduce common crime. In 2007 Venezuela’s murder rate exceeded Colombia’s, and kidnappings were on the rise, especially in states that border Colombia. Ch´avez has also incurred criticism for restraining independent media. On May 27, 2007, the government refused to renew the broadcast license of Venezuela’s most-watched television network, Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), which had frequently criticized the president’s policies. The ad-

ministration justified the closure of RCTV, which inspired a week of large-scale street protests, on the grounds that the network supported the April 2002 coup attempt. The television frequency previously occupied by RCTV was given to a state-sponsored channel, Tves. Only one major opposition television station remains on the air: Globovisi´on, a 24-hour news network. The previously critical Venevisi´on network toned down its coverage significantly after the 2002 coup attempt.

Political Parties Presidential Parties Before the 2000 election, a Patriotic Pole (Polo Patri´otica—PP) of 14 pro-Ch´avez parties was launched that included the MVR and MAS (below). A year later, the MAS withdrew, leaving the MVR as the coalition’s only major component. For the 2005 poll, the pro-Ch´avez group reorganized as the Block for Change (Bloque para el Cambio). In December 2006 Ch´avez decided that by November 2007, the MVR would dissolve in order to form the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Instead of a ruling coalition of 21 groups as before, the president declared that all of his supporters must join the new party or be considered political adversaries. Three coalition members— For Social Democracy (Podemos), Fatherland for Everybody (Patria para Todos—PPT), and the Communist Party of Venezuela (Partido Comunista de Venezuela—PCV)—signaled their desire not to join the new party. Ch´avez responded in March that he considered them “almost in the opposition.” As of mid-2007, key members of all three parties appeared to be moving into the new proCh´avez grouping. Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta Rep´ublica—MVR). The MVR was launched in July 1997 by presidential aspirant Hugo Ch´avez Fr´ıas, who had previously been associated with the outlawed Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement–200 (Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario–200—MBR-200), an intensely nationalist formation composed largely of former

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military figures opposed to the alleged corruption and social disparity occasioned by government economic policies. Ch´avez, having been arrested following the February 1992 revolt and then released from prison in March 1994 as part of a conciliatory gesture by President Caldera toward the military, had indicated that the MBR-200 would be converted into a political formation. In 2002 the MVR saw Ch´avez opponents leave to form the Solidarity Party (below) and the Revolutionary Transparency Party (TR). For the 2005 legislative poll, all MVR candidates were designated by the party’s “National Tactical Command,” with nearly a quarter of sitting members of the National Assembly deemed insufficiently loyal to be given an opportunity for reelection. ´ Leaders: Lt. Col. (Ret.) Hugo CHAVEZ Fr´ıas (President of the Republic), Francisco AMELIACH (Director General). People’s Electoral Movement (Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo—MEP). The MEP was founded in 1967 by a left-wing faction of the AD that disagreed with the party’s choice of a presidential candidate for the 1968 election. It won three lower house seats in 1978, none thereafter. In 1987 the party selected Edmundo CHIRINOS, rector of the Central University of Venezuela, as its 1988 presidential nominee, who, in addition to being supported by the Communist Party (below), received the endorsement of the Independent Moral Movement (Movimiento Moral Independiente— MMI), a small left-wing group formed in 1986. Based on nationwide polling results, the MEP was granted one seat in the Chamber of Deputies after the November 1998 election. Leader: Dr. Jes´us Angel PAZ Gal´arraga (General Secretary). Fatherland for Everybody (Patria para Todos—PPT). The PPT was organized in late 1997 by a dissident faction of La Causa Radical (below). Leader: Jos´e ALBORNOZ (Secretary General). For Social Democracy (Por la Democracia Social—Podemos). The leftist Podemos was

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formed in November 2002, primarily by former members of MAS who remained loyal to President Ch´avez. Leader: Ismael GARC´IA. Communist Party of Venezuela (Partido Comunista de Venezuela—PCV). Founded in 1931, the PCV was proscribed in 1962 but relegalized in 1969 following its renunciation of the use of force. The party lost its three seats in the Chamber of Deputies after endorsing the 1988 presidential candidacy of the MEP’s Edmundo Chirinos. In 1997 it ´ expelled its only MP, Ricardo GUTIERREZ, who subsequently became a leader of Podemos. Leaders: Jer´onimo CARRERA (President), Oscar FIGUERA (Secretary General). Independent Solidarity Movement (Movimiento Solidaridad Independente—MSI or SI). The MSI was organized in early 1997 to support the interests of the middle class. Based on national returns, it was awarded one lower house seat following the November 1998 election. Leaders: Paciano PADRON (Chair), Luis EDUARDO Ortega (Secretary General). Union Party (Partido Uni´on—PN). The PN was launched in May 2001 as a social democratic alternative to the AD and COPEI. It backed Ch´avez in the 2006 presidential election. Leaders: Lt. Col. (Ret.) Francisco ARIAS C´ardenas (2000 presidential contender), Luis Manuel ESCULPI (Secretary General). Other groups formerly affiliated with the Patriotic Pole included the Agriculturalist Action (Acci´on Agropecuaria—AA), led by Hiram GAVIRIA and Gustavo BASTIDAS; the Emergent People (Gente Emergente—GE), founded in 1991 in opposition to the “irresponsible power elite” and led by Fernando ALVAREZ Paz and ´ the Independents for the NaLazaro CALAZAN; tional Community (Independientes por la Comunidad Nacional—IPCN), which was organized by ´ Antonio GONZALEZ to foster community development; the Moral Force (Fuerza Moral—FM), ¨ formed in 1998 by Hern´an GRUBER Odreman, a former rear admiral who participated in the

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abortive coup of November 1992 and was appointed governor of the Federal District by Ch´avez in January 1999; and the New Democratic Regime (Nuevo R´egimen Democr´atico—NRD), which was launched in 1997 by Guillermo GARC´IA Ponce, Manuel ISIDRO Molina, and Pedro MIRANDA. In addition, by 1998 an Independence Movement (Movimiento Independencia—MI), headed by J. A. COVA Sosa, had evolved from The Notables (Grupo Notables), a group of well-known public figures who had supported the 1992 coup attempts. One of The Notables was Jos´e Vicente Rangel, the 1983 presidential candidate of the New Alternative (Nuevo Alternative—NA), a coalition that had included, among other groups, the pro-Moscow faction of the MIR (see MAS, below). In January 2002 Garc´ıa Ponce was named by President Ch´avez to head the Political Command of the Revolution (Comando Pol´ıtico de la Revoluci´on—CPR), while in April, Rangel, one of President Ch´avez’s closest advisers, was named vice president of the Republic.

Other Parties A New Time (Un Nuevo Tiempo—UNT). In 2006 a coalition of forty-four opposition groups, including all of Venezuela’s dominant pre-1998 political parties, formed behind the UNT standard to support one presidential candidate to challenge Ch´avez. Manuel Rosales, the governor of Zulia state in western Venezuela, was unsuccessful in his bid for the presidency. Founded in 1999, the Zulia-based UNT movement was founded by regional dissidents from the Democratic Action Party. Rosales, an outspoken Ch´avez opponent from a social democratic background, was a longtime member of Democratic Action. Nearly all viable opposition parties below were part of the UNT coalition. Following the 2006 elections, UNT ceased to play a formal leadership role in the opposition, as the coalition’s member parties—many of which continue to coordinate closely—remained autonomous. Leader: Manuel ROSALES.

Democratic Action (Acci´on Democr´atica— AD). Founded in 1937, the AD was forced underground by the P´erez Jim´enez dictatorship but regained legality in 1958 and held power for ten years thereafter. An advocate of rapid economic development, welfare policies, and Western values, it won an overwhelming victory in 1973, capturing the presidency and both houses of Congress. Although losing the presidency in 1978, it remained the largest party in the Senate and tied the Social Christians for representation in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1983 it regained the presidency and won majorities in both houses of Congress; it further consolidated its position with a decisive victory at municipal balloting in May 1984. By 1987, with its popularity waning because of continued economic crisis, the AD was deeply divided in the selection of a candidate for the 1988 presidential poll, former interior minister Octavio LEPAGE Barretto, handpicked by President Lusinchi as his successor, ultimately being defeated in party electoral college balloting by former president Carlos Andr´es P´erez, who, following his election on December 4, returned to office on February 2, 1989. The fissure between the Lusinchi and P´erez factions was, in part, responsible for the party’s winning only 12 gubernatorial contests in December 1989. The party suffered a major setback at state and municipal balloting in December 1992, and its candidate finished second with 23.6 percent of the vote in the presidential poll of December 1993, although it won pluralities in both houses of Congress on the latter occasion. In November 1998 presidential hopeful Luis ALFARO Ucero was expelled by the party but nevertheless pursued his quest as an independent supported by an assortment of small parties, including the URD (below). The AD, which had retained both its congressional pluralities earlier in the month, backed the PRVZL’s Salas R¨omer in the December presidential race. (Alfaro Ucero attracted 0.4 percent of the vote, for a fourth-place finish.) On September 26, 2000, Timoteo ZAMBRANO, then the party’s secretary general, convened a renewalist convention to depose Henry

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Ramos Allup as party president. However, the National Electoral Council subsequently ruled against the dissenters, although ordering a new internal party election in early 2001. Ramos Allup was subsequently named secretary general, following the ouster of Rafael MARIN from the post in February 2003. ´ Leaders: Jes´us MENDEZ Quijada, Luis ´ Henry RAMOS Allup (Secretary GenRONDON, eral). Justice First (Primero Justicia—PJ). The PJ traces its origins to a civil association formed in 1992 by a Supreme Court justice, Alirio ABREU Burelli, to promote legal reform. It was constituted as a political party in 2000 and went on to win five seats from the state of Miranda in the National Assembly election. It was the second-largest vote-getter of all 44 parties in the coalition that supported Manuel Rosales’ failed 2006 opposition presidential bid. Leaders: Julio BORGES, Armando BRIQUET Marmol (Secretary General). Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS). Originating as a radical left-wing group that split from the PCV in 1971, the MAS subsequently adopted a “Eurocommunist” posture and became the dominant legislative party of the left by capturing 2 Senate and 11 Chamber seats in 1978. It supported Jos´e Vicente Rangel for the presidency in 1978 but, with the exception of a small group of dissidents, was deeply opposed to his 1983 bid as leader of the left-wing New Alternative coalition. Having responded positively to a mid1981 appeal from AD leader Carlos Andr´es P´erez for a “synchronization of the opposition,” it appeared to be adopting a democratic socialist rather than a rigidly Marxist orientation. In late 1987 the majority, anti-Moscow faction of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR), led by Mois´es MOLEIRO, was reported to have merged with the MAS. (The MIR, which was founded by radical students in 1960, engaged in urban terrorism from 1961 to 1964 and thereafter conducted guerrilla operations from a rural base. Legalized in 1973, it won four

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Chamber seats in 1978 before splitting into two factions, the smaller being a pro-Moscow group led by party founder and 1978 presidential candidate Am´erico MARTIN.) At the 1988 balloting, the MAS secured 3 Senate and 18 Chamber seats, while its nominee, Teodoro PETKOFF, repeated his 1983 performance by placing third in the presidential race. The party captured one governorship in December 1989. It joined COPEI (below) in a 1992 coalition that won ten state governorships, and then joined the National Convergence (CN, below) in supporting Rafael Caldera’s presidential bid in 1993. In March 1996 it formed an alliance with the anti-Caldera legislative bloc, while insisting, somewhat incongruously, that by so doing it was asserting its independence rather than going into opposition. Teodoro Petkoff resigned from the MAS in July 1998 over its decision to support Ch´avez. The party began distancing itself from the government coalition in May 2001 in the wake of reports that the president was considering a declaration of emergency that would permit him to rule by decree. Five months later Ch´avez stated that the MAS was “no longer an ally of the Bolivarian revolution” and called on it to leave the coalition. In late November a dissident group formed Podemos (above). Leaders: Felipe MUJICA (President), Leopoldo PUCHI (Secretary General). Social Christian Party (Partido Social-Cristiano/Comit´e de Organizaci´on Politica Electoral Independiente—COPEI). Founded in 1946, COPEI offers a moderately conservative reflection of the social doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. It nonetheless spans a wide range of opinion, from a clerical right wing to an ultraprogressive, youthful left wing. The party won the presidency by a narrow margin in 1968 and recaptured the office in 1978 without, however, winning control of the Congress. Although it secured 14 Senate and 61 Chamber seats in 1983, it ran a poor second to the AD at the 1984 municipal elections. Subsequently the party was torn by a bitter presidential nomination race between COPEI

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founder Rafael Caldera Rodr´ıguez and his onetime prot´eg´e Eduardo Fern´andez, whose nearly 3–1 victory in late 1987 was termed a “patricidal” embarrassment for the veteran party leader. Fern´andez won 40.4 percent of the popular vote as runner-up to P´erez at the election of December 1988. The party won eight gubernatorial seats in the December 1989 balloting, despite continued friction between Fern´andez and former presidents Caldera and Herrera; in December 1992 it won a total of ten in alliance with the MEP (above). In June 1993 former president Caldera Rodr´ıguez was expelled from the party for refusing to step down as an independent presidential candidate in the wake of COPEI’s nomination of Oswaldo ALVAREZ Paz, who placed third in the December poll. The party finished third in both houses of the Congress at the November 1998 election and supported the PRVZL’s Salas R¨omer in the presidential election. In early 2000 a faction led by Alvarez Paz left COPEI, proclaiming the “death of the party.” Leaders: Enrique MENDOZA (President of the ´ Party), C´esar PEREZ Vivas (Secretary General). Project Venezuela (Proyecto Venezuela— PRVZL or Proven). Originating in the regional Proyecto Carabobo, the PRVZL was launched nationally before the 1998 elections by previously independent presidential candidate Henrique Salas R¨omer, who ran second to Ch´avez in the December 6 balloting with 40 percent of the vote. A month earlier the party had finished fourth in the lower house election. The PRVZL did not participate in the 2006 presidential elections. Leaders: Henrique SALAS R¨omer (1998 presidential candidate), Jorge SUCRE. The Radical Cause (La Causa Radical or Causa R). Causa R is a far-left group whose founder, Alfredo MANEIRO, died in 1983. It retained three Chamber seats in 1988 and in December 1989 captured one governorship. In December 1992 it won the Caracas mayoralty, although the victor, Arist´obulo ISTURIZ, refused to take office until authorities agreed to investigate the alleged fraudulent election of an AD councilor, whose seat was

needed for a Causa R majority. The party placed fourth in the December 1993 balloting with a 22.0 percent vote share and captured one governorship in December 1995. In 1997 it split into factions headed by Andr´es Velasquez and Pablo Medina, with the Medina group then forming the PPT. The Causa R presidential candidate, Alfredo Ramos, finished sixth in 1998 with 0.1 percent of the vote. Leaders: Francisco ARIAS C´ardenas (Former Governor of Zulia), Alfredo RAMOS (1998 pres´ idential candidate), Andr´es VELASQUEZ (Secretary General and 1993 presidential candidate). National Convergence (Convergencia Nacional—CN). The CN was launched in 1993 to support the successful presidential candidacy of Rafael Caldera Rodr´ıguez; however, the CN and its electoral ally, the MAS, collectively placed third in the lower house poll, winning only 50 of 199 seats. At regional balloting on December 3, 1995, the CN won only one governorship, and a decision by the MAS to align itself with the congressional opposition as of March 2, 1996, left the government without an effective legislative majority. In subsequent legislative balloting the CN failed to have a major impact. Leaders: Dr. Rafael CALDERA Rodr´ıguez (Former President of the Republic), Jos´e Miguel UZCATEGUI (Former Leader in the Chamber of Deputies), Juan Jos´e CALDERA Pietri (General Coordinator). Solidarity (Solidaridad). Solidarity was formed in mid-2002, primarily by former members of the MVR who had turned away from what they considered the corruption and confrontation that had come to characterize the Ch´avez administration. The party’s leaders were followers of former justice minister and MVR secretary general Luis Miquilena, who had left the Ch´avez government early in the year and was engaged in an effort to unite the opposition. Leaders: Luis MIQUILENA, Jos´e FARIAS Correa (Former Leader in the National Assembly), Alejandro ARMAS.

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Democratic Republican Union (Uni´on Republicana Democr´atica—URD). Founded in 1946 and once Venezuela’s second-largest party, the URD champions principles similar to those of the AD and has, in the past, supported AD governments. It won three Chamber seats in 1983, all of which were lost in 1988. For the 1988 presidential balloting the party, for the first time, put forward a woman, Ismenia Villalba, as its nominee; however, she joined a number of other candidates in obtaining less than 1 percent of the vote. Following the November 1998 legislative election, the URD was given one lower house seat. It backed the former AD secretary general, Alfaro Ucero, in the December 1998 presidential election. Leaders: Ismenia VILLALBA, Dr. J´ovito VILLALBA. Democratic Left (Izquierda Democr´atica— ID). The ID was launched by a group of former Communists in early 2005 as the vehicle “for a left different than the one that is now ruling us.” It claims to differ from the chavistas in that the latter are alleged to be basically “undemocratic.” Leaders: Pompeo MARQUEZ, Luis Manuel ESCULPI (Secretary General). Other groups with previous legislative representation include the social democratic Alliance of Brave People (Alianza Bravo Pueblo—ABP), led by Antonio LEDEZMA, which won one Assembly seat in 2000 and was subsequently joined by a number of AD dissidents; the Power in Movement Organization (Organizaci´on Fuerza en Movimiento—OFM), which had won two seats from Lara State in 1998 but captured only one in 2000; the Independent Movement We All Win (Movimiento Independiente Ganamos Todos—Migato), based in Monagas and led by its ˜ Lapy, based sole deputy, Jos´e Gregorio BRICENO; in Yaracuy and closely associated with the National Convergence, with which its three deputies sat in the Assembly; and the United Multiethnic People of Amazonas (Pueblo Unido Multi´etnico de Amazonas—Puama), which won one seat in 2000. Recent minor formations have also included the Authentic Renovating Organization

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(Organizaci´on Renovadora Aut´entico—ORA), which was affiliated earlier in the 1990s with the Venezuelan Emergent Right (Derecha Emergente de Venezuela—DEV) coalition, and which was awarded one Chamber seat by the National Election Commission after the 1998 congressional balloting; the Democratic Bloc (Bloque Democr´atico— BD), a former CD faction led by Roberto ALONSO; the leftist Popular Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democr´atico Popular—MDP), which for the 1998 congressional election formed a coalition; the MDP-BR, with the Marxist-Leninist Red Flag Party (Partido Bandera Roja—BR) of Gabriel PUERTA Aponte, who was named to a lower house seat after the balloting; United for Human Rights (Unidos por los Deroches Humanos— UDH), which was likewise granted one diputado adicional in 1998; the United Vanguard (Vanguardia Unida—VU), which, under the leadership of Garc´ıa Ponce (now of the NRD) and the late leftist Eduardo MACHADO, broke from the PCV in 1974 and subsequently joined Vicente Rangel’s New Alternative; and the Venezuelan Devolutionary Party (Partido Devolucionario Venezolano—PDV). In 1998 the following parties served as presidential platforms for their respective leaders, none of whom obtained more than a few thousand votes: the New Bearings (Nuevo Rumbo—NR), led by former minister of defense ˜ Radam´es MUNOZ Le´on, who finished seventh in the December contest; the rightist Sovereign Front (Frente Soberano—FS), led by Oswaldo SUJU Roffo (eighth); the Venezuelan Labor Party (Partido Laboral Venezolano—PLV), led by Alejan˜ Esclusa (ninth); and the Participation dro PENA Movement (Movimiento Participaci´on—MP), led by Dom´enico TANZI (tenth).

Clandestine Groups Very few of the formerly numerous guerrilla groups are currently active. Among those refusing to take advantage of the government’s pacification program were the Maoist-oriented Am´erica Silva Guerrilla Front of the Red Flag (Frente Guerrillero Am´erica Silva de Bandera Roja), which had

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Cabinet As of September 1, 2007 see headnote President Vice President

Col. (Ret.) Hugo Rafael Ch´avez Fr´ıas Jorge Rodr´ıguez

Ministers Agriculture and Lands Basic Industries and Mining Defense Education Energy and Oil Environment and Renewable Resources Finance Food Foreign Affairs Health and Social Welfare Higher Education Indigenous Peoples Information and Communications Infrastructure Integration and Foreign Commerce Interior and Justice Labor Light Industry and Commerce People’s Economy Planning and Development Popular Participation Science and Technology Sports Telecommunications Tourism

El´ıas Jaua Milano Jos´e Khan Gen. Gustavo Rangel Brice˜no Ad´an Ch´avez Rafael Dar´ıo Ram´ırez Carre˜no Yuviri Ortega [f] Rodrigo Cabezas Erika Far´ıas [f] Nicol´as Maduro Vacant Luis Acu˜na Nicia Maldonado [f] William Lara Jos´e Cabello Gustavo M´arquez Pedro Carre˜no Jos´e Ram´on Rivero Mar´ıa Cristina Iglesias [f] Pedro Morej´on Jorge Giordani David Vel´asquez H´ector Navarro ´ Eduardo Alvarez Jesse Chac´on Escamillo Olga Titina Anzuaje [f]

Ministers of State Culture Housing Attorney General Secretary of the Presidency

Francisco Sesto Col. (Ret.) Ram´on Carriz´alez Isa´ıas Mal Rodr´ıguez Hugo Cabezas

[f] = female

been active in the eastern state of Anzo´ategui. In December 1983 the government reported that the Front was virtually destroyed with the capture of 24 of its members, including its alleged leader,

Juan Pablo MIRANDA Herrera, although Red Flag adherents claimed responsibility for two bomb attacks in September 1984. Another guerrilla group, the Argimiro Gabald´on Revolutionary Command

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(Comando Revolucionario Argimiro Gabald´on), was charged with the kidnapping of U.S. businessman William Niehous in 1976, but a number of the Command’s leaders were captured in March 1977 and Niehous was rescued, unharmed, in June 1979. A new left-wing guerrilla group, We Shall Overcome (Venceremos), was reportedly responsible for planting a bomb outside of the Ministry of the Interior in April 1988. More recently announced extremist groups include the Ayacucho Movement (Movimiento Ayacucho) and the Brave People (Bravo Pueblo).

Legislature Under the former constitution, the Venezuelan legislature was a bicameral Congress of the Republic (Congreso de la Rep´ublica) consisting of a 46-member Senate (Senado) and a 189-member Chamber of Deputies (C´amara de Diputados), both with additional nominated members to compensate for party underrepresentation. The Congress was effectively superseded by the Constitutional Assembly elected on July 25, 1999, and was formally dissolved on January 4, 2000. On January 30, the Assembly delegated its legislative powers to a 21-member National Legislative Commission that served until the National Assembly election of July 30. National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional). The current legislature is a unicameral body of 167 members, including three representing indigenous peoples. At the election of December 4, 2005, which was boycotted by opposition groups, the president’s Movement for the Fifth Republic won 114 seats while a number of regime-supportive minor formations were credited with 53. President: Cilia FLORES.

Communications The media are free in principle but subject to censorship in times of emergency. Private media remain occasionally critical of the government, though threats to revoke broadcast licenses have

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resulted in widespread self-censorship. In a February 2007 report, the Committee to Protect Journalists accused Ch´avez of seeking to silence his critics in the media. The report was strongly critical of the Radio and Television Social Responsibility Act discussed below. In December 2006 the government announced that it would not renew the broadcast license of Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), the country’s oldest and most-watched television network, whose news programmers were notoriously critical of the regime. RCTV went off the air on May 27, 2007.

Press The following are Spanish dailies published in Caracas, unless otherwise noted: Ultimas Noticias (200,000), independent; El Universal (120,000 daily, 250,000 Sunday); Panorama (Maracaibo, 120,000 daily, 123,000 Sunday); El Nacional (100,000), independent; $2001$ (100,000), independent; El Carabobe˜no (Valencia, 97,000); El Mundo (80,000); El Siglo (Maracay, 75,000); El Globo (68,000); El Tiempo (Puerto la Cruz, 65,000); The Daily Journal (15,300 daily, 17,200 Sunday), in English.

News Agencies The domestic agency, Venpres, is operated by the government’s Central Information Office; most of the major foreign agencies maintain bureaus in Caracas.

Broadcasting and Computing Broadcasting is regulated by the C´amara Venezolana de la Industria de Radiodifusi´on and the C´amara Venezolana de la Televisi´on. Most of the country’s radio stations are privately owned and commercial. The state-owned Venezolana de la Televisi´on services two national and four regional networks; half a dozen private stations, with numerous relay facilities, also broadcast. In December 2004 President Ch´avez signed a Radio and Television Social Responsibility Act to prohibit programming that would expose children to depictions of undue violence or sexual

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activity. The legislation also prohibits any programming viewed as an incitement to antistate violence. The law is implemented by a Directorate of Social Responsibility, 7 of whose 11 members would be regime-appointed. It would also require broadcasters to air government information material for up to 70 hours a week. In July 2005 Telesur, a Latin American venture in which Venezuela has a controlling interest, began broadcasting “alternative news” to offset programs originating in the United States. The action prompted the U.S. House of Representatives to approve legislation authorizing transmissions to counter the facility’s “anti-U.S. propaganda.” In 2005 there were approximately 82 personal computers and 124 internet users per 1,000

Venezuelan inhabitants. There were an estimated 467 mobile cellular subscribers for every 1,000 residents in that same year.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S.: Bernardo ALVAREZ Herrera U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela: Patrick Dennis DUFFY Permanent Representative to the UN: Francisco ´ Javier ARIAS CARDENAS IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ACS, ALADI, CDB, IADB, Interpol, IOM, Mercosur, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, OPEC, PCA, SELA, WCO, WTO

PART THREE

I N T E R G OV E R N M E N TA L O R G A N I Z AT I O N S

AG E N C Y F O R T H E PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN L AT I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N ( O PA N A L ) Organismo para la Proscripci o´ n de las Armas Nucleares en la Am´e rica Latina y el Caribe

Established: By Treaty of Tlatelolco (Mexico), signed February 14, 1967. The inaugural meeting of OPANAL’s General Conference was held September 2, 1969. Purpose: To administer the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, without prejudice to peaceful uses of atomic energy. Designed to make Latin America and the Caribbean a nuclear-free zone, the treaty prohibits all testing, manufacture, acquisition, installation, and development of nuclear weapons. Headquarters: Mexico City, Mexico. Principal Organs: General Conference of Contracting Parties; Council (five members); Good Offices Committee (five members); Committee on Contributions, Administrative, and Budgetary Matters (at least five members); The Ad Hoc Working Group; Secretariat. Web site: www.opanal.org Secretary General: Edmundo Vargas Carre˜no (Chile).

Membership (33): Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela. Working Language: Spanish. Origin and development. The idea of making Latin America a nuclear-free zone was broached in the early 1960s, with the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 raising concern that the region could become the scene of a confrontation involving nuclear weapons. In April 1963 the presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico announced they were prepared to sign a multilateral agreement to that end, and the following November their declaration gained the support of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. During a conference November 23–27, 1965, in Mexico City, a Preparatory Commission on the Denuclearization of Latin America was created, with instructions to prepare a draft treaty. Differences regarding transit,

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guarantees, boundaries, and safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities were eventually resolved, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Mexico) was signed February 14, 1967. The treaty went into force April 25, 1969, after 11 states deposited ratifications, with OPANAL formally launching to supervise compliance with the treaty’s obligations and conduct periodic consultations among the signatories. For many years the adherence of several important states to the treaty was delayed by national ambitions and regional rivalries. Brazil signed and ratified the treaty in the late 1960s while Chile signed in 1967 and ratified in 1974. However, both countries declined to bring the treaty into force, in accord with a provision (Article 28) specifying it would not enter into effect until all regional states adhered to it. (Other signatories waived this provision, permitting the treaty to enter into force for them.) Argentina, which signed the treaty in 1967, delayed both ratification and the waiving of Article 28, citing several technical reservations while insisting Brazil implement the treaty first. Argentina and Brazil also sought assurances regarding peaceful nuclear projects planned or already under way in both countries. Following the Falklands (Malvinas) dispute in 1982, Argentina charged that Britain violated Protocol II by operating warships equipped with nuclear weapons within the Latin American nuclear-free zone. This contention, along with the claim that the agreement hampered less developed countries’ utilization of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, led Argentina to announce in June 1984 that it did not intend to proceed toward ratification. Subsequently, however, negotiations were conducted with Buenos Aires over the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and OPANAL in 1987 urged that an additional protocol be considered to govern such explosions “following the rules of radiological protection accepted by the international community.” In a related vein, OPANAL urged members who had not yet done so to complete treaty-mandated negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of IAEA safeguards, including periodic inspections, to their nuclear activities.

An important development for OPANAL was the bilateral accord (endorsed in November 1990 and formally signed in July 1991) in which Argentina and Brazil renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons and promised to use nuclear activity “exclusively for peaceful ends.” Although neither country was known to have produced a nuclear weapon, their capacity to do so had been a long-standing international concern. In December 1991 the two countries also pledged to place all their nuclear sites under full IAEA safeguards. Furthermore, at an extraordinary session in August 1992 the General Conference passed several amendments to the Tlatelolco treaty designed to facilitate the full incorporation of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The changes permit special IAEA inspections (if authorized by the OPANAL Council) to investigate “any extraordinary event or circumstance” concerning treaty compliance. Consequently, Argentina and Chile (their former border tension having dissipated under recent bilateral agreements) joined OPANAL on January 18, 1994, Argentina by ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco and waiving Article 28, and Chile by waiving Article 28. Brazil also became a full OPANAL member May 30 when it waived Article 28. In February 1995, Argentina deposited its ratification of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, although Brazil did not do so until September 1998. Continuing the momentum toward complete regional implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Belize became the 29th OPANAL member by ratifying the treaty and waiving Article 28 in November 1994. In addition, Guyana signed and ratified the treaty in January 1995 while St. Kitts and Nevis and then St. Lucia completed their ratifications in April and June 1995, respectively. Cuba, although it had stated it would withhold adherence until the United States relinquished its military base at Guant´anamo, signed the treaty in March 1995. However, Cuba’s intentions regarding ratification and the waiving of Article 28 remained unclear, Havana having in the past “stated clearly and repeatedly that once all the countries of Latin America enter the treaty, it will do likewise,”

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according to OPANAL officials. In 2000, while continuing its “full support” for the precepts of the treaty, Cuba noted that its relationship with the United States “limits the possibilities” for ratification in the short term. Nevertheless, Havana ultimately ratified the treaty and waived Article 28 in October 2002, the final regional state to do so. Structure. The General Conference, the principal political organ of OPANAL, comprises representatives of all member states who attend regular sessions every two years. The conference, which may also hold special sessions, elects the members of the Council. The latter is comprised of five members (currently Argentina, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru) elected for four-year terms, equitable geographic distribution a consideration. The Council functions continuously, its responsibilities including maintenance of a control system for verifying the absence of tests and manufacture of nuclear weapons in Latin America. The Good Offices Committee has sought the adherence of nonparticipating states, including those toward which the Treaty of Tlatelolco’s Additional Protocols are directed (see Activities, below). The Committee on Contributions, Administrative, and Budgetary Matters consists of five members (currently Brazil, Belize, Chile, Guatemala, and Mexico) serving four-year terms, plus other interested members as approved by the General Conference for one-year terms. The secretary general, the chief administrative officer of the agency, is elected by the conference for a maximum of two four-year terms. He may not be a national of the country in which the agency is headquartered. Activities. OPANAL’s primary functions are to ensure the absence of nuclear weapons in Latin America and to encourage peaceful uses of atomic energy. For example, it attempts to prevent the diversion of economic resources into nuclear armament technology and to guard against possible nuclear attacks. In the latter regard, OPANAL has been active in seeking ratifications of Additional Protocols I and II of the treaty. The former requires external powers controlling territories in Latin America (France, Netherlands, United Kingdom,

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and United States) to respect the region’s “denuclearized status” in the event of war in any of those territories. The latter, open to all current or potential nuclear powers in the world, enjoins signatories from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in the region. Protocol I went into force in August 1992 following France’s long-delayed signature, while Protocol II has been ratified by France, China, Russia (as successor to the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States. At the 14th Regular Session of the General Conference, held March 28–30, 1995, in Vi˜na del Mar, Chile, OPANAL Secretary General Enrique Rom´an-Morey asked members to increase their contributions so the agency could undergo a “political revitalization.” Among other things, Rom´anMorey, who was appointed January 1, 1994, called for increased consultation with the signatories of Protocols I and II regarding worldwide nuclear policies and with other organizations, such as the IAEA, regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. OPANAL has also expressed its goal of assuming a leadership role in planning and coordinating regional nuclear energy policy, stressing the need to negotiate an agreement to prevent radioactive pollution, particularly in the marine environment. At the 16th Regular Session of the General Conference, which convened November 30–December 1, 1999, in Lima, Peru, the attendees echoed recommendations from an Ad Hoc Working Group for the Strengthening of OPANAL, which called for cementing ties to other intergovernmental bodies and identifying further common steps that could be taken toward the prohibition of nuclear weapons. At the same time conferees called for formation of a professional group within OPANAL that would increase the group’s analytical capabilities. In May 1998 the council quickly responded to weapons tests by India and then Pakistan by condemning not only those nuclear explosions, but the testing of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. Following the appointment of Secretary General Rom´an-Morey as deputy secretary general for the UN’s Disarmament Conference and director of

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the UN Disarmament Office in Geneva, Switzerland, the 15th Special Session of the General Conference on March 15, 2001, unanimously elected Edmundo Vargas Carre˜no of Chile as his successor, through December 2005. A preceding special session in November 2000 focused primarily on budgetary and administrative matters. Beginning in 1997 the organization undertook unprecedented belt-tightening, which by 2000 reduced the annual budget by a cumulative total of more than 50 percent. At the November meeting the secretary general appealed for those member states in arrears to fulfill their overdue commitments, which at that time amounted to more than $1 million, or more than three times the annual budget. The trend continued at the 2005 meeting, at which a $324,000 budget was approved. The 17th Regular Session of the General Conference, held November 29–30, 2001, in Panama City, saw Secretary General Vargas call for improved safeguards to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials. Labeling the September 11 attacks against the United States a wake-up call, Vargas expressed particular concern over inadequate regulations for the transportation of radioactive materials, especially through the Panama Canal and around Cape Horn.

A year later, OPANAL finally achieved its original goal of full regional adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2002, Cuba’s President Castro announced that his government would at long last ratify the treaty despite the United States’ continued hostility toward Havana. Accordingly, Cuba deposited its instrument of ratification on October 23, making Latin America the world’s first completely nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). The 18th Regular Session of the General Conference, held November 5–6, 2003, in Havana saw the OPANAL members sign the Declaration of Havana, which declared the region free of nuclear weapons. The 19th Regular Session of the General Conference was held November 7–8, 2005, and resulted in the Santiago de Chile Declaration, in which the member states reiterated the organization’s commitment to maintaining a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. At this conference, Chile’s Edmundo Vargas Carre˜no was elected by acclamation to a second term, ending in June 2009. Financial problems dominated an extraordinary meeting held on November 23, 2006. Member nations were urged to catch up and pay their dues. But in February 2007 the organization was able to celebrate 40 years of existence.

ANDEAN COMMUNITY OF N AT I O N S ( C A N ) Comunidad Andina de Naciones

Established: By Agreement of Cartagena (Colombia), dated May 26, 1969 (effective October 16, 1969), as modified by the Protocol of Lima, dated October 30, 1976; Decision 117, dated February 14–17, 1977; the Arequipa (Peru) Protocol, dated April 21, 1978; the Amending Protocol of the Cartagena Agreement (Trujillo Act), dated March 10, 1996; and the Sucre (Bolivia) Protocol, dated June 25, 1997. Purpose: To promote trade integration, regional development, competitiveness, a common foreign policy, and political and social cooperation among members. Headquarters: Lima, Peru. Principal Organs: Presidential Council, Council of Foreign Ministers, Commission, Andean Parliament, Court of Justice, General Secretariat, Andean Development Council, Latin American Reserve Fund. Web site: www.comunidadandina.org/endex.htm Secretary General: (Ecuador).

Freddy

Ehlers

Zurita

Membership (4): Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru. Associate Members (4): Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay. Official Language: Spanish.

Origin and development. Officially known until 1997 as the Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena after its founding instrument, the Andean Group (Grupo Andino) was also identified as the Andean Pact, Andean Subregional Group, or the Andean Common Market (Ancom). Under an amendment to the original agreement adopted in 1996 with effect from August 1997, the organization is now formally called the Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones—CAN). The Andean Group was formed in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru to speed economic integration among those countries whose economies were more compatible with each other than with the rest of the Latin American states. Venezuela became a full member in 1973, while Mexico has considered itself a “working partner” since 1972. The controversial Andean Foreign Investment Code (Decision 24), under which foreign-owned enterprises were required to become “mixed companies” of less than 50 percent foreign capital to benefit from the group’s tariff concessions, was adopted in 1971. In 1974, Chile introduced a very liberal foreign investment law in contravention of Decision 24; after intense negotiation, it withdrew from membership in 1976 because of its partners’ refusal to rescind the code. Panama became an observer in 1979. In practical terms, the Andean Group failed to achieve most of its major long-term goals as of the early 1980s. As a result, negotiations began in 1982 to modify the original accord to reflect the group’s true role more accurately and to ease the terms of

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Decision 24 to permit greater flow of capital to the region. After numerous disputes and delays over proposed changes, the Quito Protocol, which was signed May 12, 1987, in Quito, Ecuador, and which came into effect May 25, 1988, rescinded nearly all of Decision 24. Members became free to establish their own regulations on foreign investment, with the proviso that major ownership of enterprises be sold to local investors within 30 or 37 years, depending on the country involved. However, despite the group’s new philosophy that “foreign investment is better than foreign debt,” political and economic turmoil in the individual countries continued to restrain investment except in the petroleum and tourism sectors. Participants in a 20th anniversary summit, held in May 1989 in Cartagena, acknowledged that serious obstacles to integration remained and that the Quito Protocol had produced little apparent economic benefit for the region. Consequently, a Cartagena Manifesto was issued that called, among other things, for the immediate lifting of intraregional trade barriers and compliance with tariff reduction agreements. The manifesto also endorsed linkage with non-Andean countries and intergovernmental organizations to promote development via “Latin American unity.” During a November 1990 summit in La Paz, Bolivia, the presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela took much greater strides toward Andean economic integration, agreeing on a preliminary timetable for the elimination of virtually all tariffs on trade among their countries, the institution of a Common External Tariff (CET) system, and the eventual establishment of a fullfledged Latin American common market. A greater sense of urgency was reported at the summit in light of the world trend toward the creation of regional economic blocs, and most of the decisions were quickly formalized in the Caracas Declaration, which was signed by the presidents of the five Andean Pact nations on May 18, 1991, in Caracas, Venezuela. A number of contentious issues surfaced in December 1991 regarding what had been agreed on the CET. Consequently, the Andean free trade zone

was formally launched January 1, 1992, without reference to the external tariff. Moreover, only Colombia and Venezuela immediately eliminated their mutual tariffs as required by the pact, although Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru indicated a willingness to follow suit later in the year. The Peruvian presidential coup of April 1992 threw Andean affairs into turmoil. After Venezuela’s severance of relations with the Fujimori government, the group postponed a presidential summit scheduled for June. Bolivia then announced it was applying for membership in the new Southern Cone Common Market (see separate Mercosur article) and, with Ecuador indicating it was not yet prepared to enter the free trade zone, the entire Andean integration scheme seemed in jeopardy. Surprising many observers, however, the Andean Group subsequently rebounded strongly, with tension between Peru and the other members becoming less of an issue as the result of Lima’s suspension of its active participation in the organization in August 1992. A subsequent Andean ministerial session appeared to resolve most of the outstanding problems with the proposed CET, with agreement also being reached to eliminate national subsidies and export incentives so as to provide more equitable conditions for producers throughout the region. With integrationist momentum reestablished, Bolivia formally joined the free trade zone in October, and Ecuador began to phase in the graduated intraregional tariff reductions approved by the other group members. Consequently, attention in 1993 turned to the harmonization of customs procedures and finalization of the CET. Although negotiations again took longer than anticipated, a four-tiered external tariff was finally negotiated in May 1994 and signed on November 26, effective February 1, 1995. About 90 percent of the region’s imports were covered by the CET. Exemptions were initially granted to Bolivia and Ecuador in some areas, while Peru, in view of its inactive status, was permitted to postpone implementation of the pact. The group endorsed the June 1994 Group of Three accord in which Colombia and Venezuela

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agreed to phase out tariffs with Mexico over the ensuing decade. Support for such negotiations between Andean and non-Andean countries reflected the growing opinion among Andean nations (and most other Latin American countries as well) that regional organizations should be considered building blocks for an eventual free trade zone stretching from Mexico to Argentina. In that regard, formal Andean/Mercosur negotiations were launched in early 1995. Some Andean representatives cautioned in the mid-1990s that free-market influence alone would not suffice in combating poverty in the region. Using the European Union (EU) as a model, the Andean Parliament urged that additional attention be given on a regional level to social issues, including the lack of adequate housing and the need for better educational and health services. Moreover, some observers called for establishment of supranational political institutions as well, citing the border conflicts between Ecuador and Peru and between Colombia and Venezuela in early 1995 as indicative of disputes that could easily sabotage fledgling Andean economic progress. Poverty and social development issues were reflected in the 2005 agreement to create a Social Humanitarian Fund. At a summit held March 10, 1996, in Trujillo, Peru, the presidents of the Andean nations signed an Amending Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement, also known as the Trujillo Act, which provided for substantial restructuring of Andean institutions and significant expansion of the purview of the renamed Andean Community of Nations (CAN). Supporters of the proposal expressed the hope that CAN would operate in some respects similarly to the EU, while possibly facilitating creation of a broader Latin American free trade area. On June 25, 1997, the five countries signed in Quito the Sucre Protocol, amending the Agreement of Cartagena. A new chapter on foreign relations called for establishment of a Common Foreign Policy “on matters of subregional interest,” greater integration with other regional economic blocs, and creation of an associate membership category for external countries that concluded free trade treaties

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with the Andean countries. The Sucre Protocol entered into effect April 14, 2003, with all five CAN members having submitted their instruments of ratification. Structure. The Trujillo Act formalized the status of a Presidential Council, comprising the presidents of all member states, as the highest CAN authority. (The Andean presidents had met regularly since 1989 to coordinate regional integration efforts.) A new Council of Foreign Ministers was also established, while the Commission, formerly the highest decision-making body, became a subordinate component, although it retained substantial responsibility for CAN coordination. The Commission, comprising a plenipotentiary member from each member state, holds regular sessions three times a year and special meetings as necessary. Also in 1997, a new General Secretariat was inaugurated to succeed the former Board (Junta). The secretariat is headed by a secretary general with expanded responsibilities for oversight of day-to-day CAN activities, as well as policy coordination with other organizations. The Andean Parliament, its members selected by national legislatures, was established in 1979 to make recommendations on regional policies. (The Trujillo Act called for direct election of members by 2002, but only Venezuela achieved that goal.) To address disputes among member states regarding compliance with the Cartagena Agreement, the Andean Court of Justice was established in July 1983 in Quito, although the tribunal’s role was later expanded to include adjudication of disputes between members. Over the years the Andean grouping has sponsored several associated institutions, collectively called the Andean Integration System (Sistema Andino de Integraci´on—SAI). The Andean Development Corporation (Corporaci´on Andina de Fomento—CAF) was launched in 1970, and in 1978 the group established the Andean Reserve Fund (FAR), which was subsequently restructured as the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR). Other SAI organizations include the Sim´on Bol´ıvar Andean University, founded in 1985 in Sucre, Bolivia; the Andean Labor Advisory Council, which met for

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the first time in 1998 in Caracas; and the Andean Business Advisory Council, based in Lima since its formation in 1998. Activities. The reconciliation with Peru permitted formal launching of the new CAN institutions, with well-known Venezuelan diplomat Sebasti´an Alegrett taking office August 1, 1997, as the first CAN secretary general. Alegrett immediately announced that priority would be given to discussions with Mercosur in the hope that a free trade pact with that grouping could be reached by the end of the year. A CAN-Mercosur accord would cover a population of nearly 300 million and some 13 percent of total GDP in the Americas. Promising CAN discussions were also reported with the EU, while in March 1998 CAN participated as a bloc during a preparatory meeting on how to structure negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). CAN and Mercosur continued their negotiations in 1998, signing the Framework Agreement for the Creation of the Free Trade Area on April 16. The accord established a schedule for further discussion leading up to a proposed free trade agreement between the two organizations by January 1, 2000. However, those talks repeatedly bogged down. In late 1998 Venezuelan president-elect Hugo Ch´avez warned that if the talks did not progress, Venezuela would join Mercosur but continue to be a member of the Andean Community, while in early 1999 Brazil began negotiating a trade preference pact with Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela on its own. In other activities, the members of the Andean Presidential Council, while attending the inauguration of Colombian President Andres Pastrana, asked the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers to prepare a protocol to the Cartagena Agreement spelling out what steps the other members should take in the event one of them experienced a disruption of democracy. A two-year Partial Economic Complementation Accord with Brazil was initiated in August, and in the same month the CAN secretary general conferred with members of the Caribbean Community (Caricom) on closer ties. In August 2000 a Complementation Accord with Argentina entered into effect.

The 12th CAN summit on June 9–10, 2000, in Lima took several significant steps toward greater integration. In addition to reaffirming the 2005 start date for the common market, an effort that has since been subsumed into a closer association with Mercosur, the member presidents encouraged ongoing efforts to develop a Common Foreign Policy and approved guidelines for macroeconomic policy coordination. During the summit the members’ foreign ministers signed a protocol, the Andean Community Commitment to Democracy, which would enter into force following deposit of national ratifications. The document committed the CAN members to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, while also reaffirming principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention in internal affairs. On September 1, 2000, at a meeting of South American presidents in Bras´ılia, Brazil, the participants agreed to relaunch the CAN/Mercosur talks and called for introduction of a free trade area in the “briefest term possible.” The 2001 annual CAN summit, held June 24–26 in Valencia, Venezuela, reaffirmed the members’ resolve to move forward on the Mercosur negotiations and also approved an Andean Cooperation Plan for the Control of Illegal Drugs and Related Offenses. CAN subsequently scheduled an extraordinary presidential summit for January 30, 2002, in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, to move ahead with the free trade area; the introduction of a customs union, preliminary to initiation of the CAN common market; a Common Agricultural Policy; macroeconomic harmonization; and the Common Foreign Policy. In addition, the summit endorsed the introduction of a new CET by late 2003. In September 2002, Guillermo Fern´andez de Soto, former foreign minister of Colombia, assumed the post of secretary general, succeeding Sebasti´an Alegrett, who died in early August. The 14th Andean Presidential Council, held June 27–28, 2003, in Quirama, Colombia, recognized the need to prepare for a “new stage” in the integration process. In addition to giving significant attention to formulation of an Integrated Social Development Plan, the council encouraged adoption

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of the Common Agricultural Policy; rapid movement toward establishment of the Andean Common Market; and implementation of a Border Integration and Development Policy, which would include Border Integration Zones in anticipation of the free circulation of people, capital, goods, and services within CAN. The Council of Foreign Ministers was instructed to submit at the next summit draft guidelines for a Common Security Policy, with particular attention to be paid to terrorism and corruption. (A year earlier, CAN foreign and defense ministers approved an Andean Charter for Peace and Security.) Development of Common Foreign Policy guidelines were also given priority, as were continued negotiations on a new Political Dialog and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, leading to an eventual Association Agreement. The Presidential Council additionally called for strengthening ties to several other countries, including China, Russia, Japan, Canada, the United States, and Cuba. Furthermore, the Commission was encouraged to work toward completing the “finishing touches” on the CAN-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement by the end of 2003. An Economic Complementation Agreement with Mercosur was signed December 6, 2002. On December 16, 2003, CAN and Mercosur signed the much-anticipated free trade accord in Montevideo, Uruguay, during a Mercosur summit that also saw Peru join Bolivia and Chile as associate members of the Southern Cone group. Although many details remained subject to further negotiations, the agreement called for ending all tariff barriers within 15 years. In 2004, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela were admitted to Mercosur as associate members, and CAN admitted all the members of Mercosur as associate members with Decision 613 on July 7, 2005. Venezuela started the process of becoming a full member of Mercosur in late 2005. At a May 2003 summit in Guadalajara, Mexico, CAN entered into an agreement with the EU to launch an integration process that would aid in

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the creation of a free trade agreement between the two organizations. This agreement was codified by CAN in Decision 595 on July 11, 2004. The talks reflect a process started with the Joint Declaration on the Political Dialog signed June 30, 1996, in Rome. Meetings have continued, including a May 2005 ministerial-level meeting in Luxembourg and a May 2006 meeting in Vienna. The biggest challenge currently facing CAN is the political fissure created by the negotiation of free trade agreements with the United States by Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, while Bolivia and Venezuela oppose such agreements. On April 3, 2006, Bolivian President Evo Morales called an emergency meeting of CAN “in an attempt to save the bloc,” but no movement to hold such a meeting resulted from the call. On April 19, 2006, Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez announced that his country would leave CAN, declaring the organization “fatally wounded” as a result of the free trade agreements signed by Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru with the United States. On April 29, 2006, Ch´avez signed a three-way trade pact with Bolivia and Cuba designed to combat U.S. influence in the hemisphere. The bloc’s reaction to this discord has been to try to preserve relations with Venezuela as much as possible. In November 2006 Chile was invited to re-enter the Andean bloc, and its newly elected president, Michelle Bachelet, enthusiastically accepted. 2006 and 2007 also saw intensive negotiations for closer relations with the EU, and in April 2007 the EU announced a large aid package for the region, to be allocated between 2007 and 2013. In May 2007 Spain separately endorsed CAN’s closer ties with Europe, and announced its own plans for environmental assistance. Evo Morales assumed presidency of the bloc in June 2006. His subsequent pronouncements were critical of regional organizations such as CAN and Mercosur, saying that while they favored business interests, they did too little to help the social advancement of their populations.

A S S O C I AT I O N O F C A R I B B E A N S TAT E S ( A C S ) Associaci o´ n de Estados del Caribe Association des Etats de la Caraibe

Established: By convention signed July 24, 1994, in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia. Purpose: To promote “economic integration, and the creation of an enhanced space of free trade and cooperation among the countries of the Caribbean . . . to meet the challenges and exploit the opportunities arising from the globalization of the international economy and progressive liberalization of hemispheric trade relations.” Headquarters: Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.

Observers (18): Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, India, Italy, South Korea, Morocco, Netherlands, Peru, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. Founding observer organizations are the Caribbean Community, Caribbean Tourism Organization, Central American Integration System, Latin American Economic System, Permanent Secretariat of the General Agreement on Central American Economic Integration, and United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Official Languages: English, French, Spanish.

Principal Organs: Heads of State/Government Meetings, Ministerial Council, Secretariat. Web site: www.acs-aec.org Secretary General: Dr. Rub´en Arturo Sili´e Valdez (Dominican Republic). Membership (25): Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela. Associate Members (4): Aruba; France (on behalf of Guadeloupe, French Guiana, and Martinique); Netherlands Antilles; Turks and Caicos Islands.

Origin and development. By the early 1990s, it had become evident to the various island nations and territories of the Caribbean Basin that the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) was insufficient for promoting the region’s integration into the rapidly transforming global economy. Multiple problems such as bureaucratic red tape and protective trade barriers continued to impede economic interaction within the region even after the advent of CARICOM. The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by Mexico, Canada, and the United States was also of concern, alerting the Caribbean region to the vulnerability that could result from the failure to form their own broader trading bloc. Thus the CARICOM members, the Group of Three (Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela); the Central American countries; Cuba; Haiti; and the Dominican Republic envisaged an organization that might

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foster gradual economic, social, and even political cooperation among its members. The hope was that ultimately the new union might lead to the creation of a full-fledged free trade bloc. The original proposal for the ACS came from the West Indian Commission during the 1992 CARICOM summit, and a year later CARICOM endorsed the creation of the new grouping. The Convention Establishing the Association of Caribbean States was signed July 24, 1994, during a meeting of the heads of state/government of its members in Bridgetown, Barbados. Although the ACS was initially scheduled to begin operations January 1, 1995, from its headquarters in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, formal approval of the convention proceeded more slowly than anticipated as national legislators grappled with the proposed budget structure. Consequently, the inaugural ACS summit was delayed until August 17–18, 1995, following receipt of the required ratification by 17 (two-thirds) of the convention’s signatories. Plans also called for inviting the region’s dependent territories to join the ACS as associate members. Structure. The Ministerial Council is the primary decision-making body, and it creates special committees as needed. Current committees are Budget and Administration, Trade Development and External Economic Relations, Natural Disasters, Transport, and Sustainable Tourism. There is also a committee-level Council of National Representatives of the Special Fund. The fund, which has its own budget, was established to aid cooperative development and regional integration through projects in such sectors as tourism; trade; transportation; the environment and natural resources; small and medium enterprises; communications and information; and social, cultural, scientific, and technological development. Administrative tasks are carried out by the Secretariat, headed by a secretary general elected for a four-year term. The size of the Secretariat has been deliberately limited to avoid creating an unwieldy bureaucracy. Overall ACS policy guidance is provided by summit meetings of the members’ heads of state/government.

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Activities. The hope among ACS supporters that the new grouping would be able to pursue “parity” with NAFTA was immediately compromised by its emphatic inclusion of Cuba as a member despite strong objection from the United States. Among other consequences, Puerto Rico’s participation in the ACS was precluded. Nonetheless, the initial ACS summit in August 1995 in Port-of-Spain offered a broadly worded plan of action designed to promote economic integration, encourage extraregional and intraregional private investment, and produce a regional tourism strategy. A modest annual budget of $1.5 million was established, and Simon Molina Duarte, a Venezuelan economist and diplomat, was elected as the association’s first secretary general. The summit attendees also discussed regional strategies to combat drug trafficking and denounced the recent U.S. decision to increase economic pressure on Cuba. Additionally, tentative approval was given to the establishment of a regional integration fund to solve problems associated with economic transition. While there was general consensus within the ACS that the environment should be protected, in 1997 a controversy emerged regarding the shipping of nuclear material through the region. Most members wanted to ban the movement of such material in the Caribbean, but the French representative argued that specialists should decide the issue. At the November 27–28 ministerial session, held in Cartagena, Colombia, the ACS agreed to form a Sustainable Tourism Zone to promote tourism in the region; urged the international community to increase its efforts to end such practices as the U.S. Helms-Burton Law, which ordered sanctions against companies doing business with Cuba; and encouraged members to work toward reducing trade barriers in the region. Also in November the ACS signed a coordination agreement with CARICOM. The Helms-Burton Law and the U.S. embargo of Cuba came under renewed criticism at the second ACS summit, held April 16–17, 1999, in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. Discussions on the creation of a Caribbean tourism zone also

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continued at the summit, with the participants agreeing to cooperate in developing air and sea transportation. In addition, the formation of a regional free trade zone was discussed, but little progress was made. One of the problems faced by the association in forming such a zone is the fact that some ACS members, such as Mexico and Venezuela, belong to other free trade blocs. Additionally, in some instances ACS members compete against each other for the same markets. Competition for Europe’s banana market led to a dispute over how to respond to a recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling overturning a European Union (EU) banana importation scheme that granted several Caribbean states preferential access to EU markets. The Caribbean states argued that the WTO decision would devastate their economies, but several Central and South American members stood to benefit from the ruling. No unified response to the matter could be reached at the summit. The Ministerial Council session December 3– 7, 1999, in Panama City, Panama, elected Norman Girvan of Jamaica as the organization’s new secretary general and authorized creation of an Intergovernmental Reflection Group (IRG) to examine ways of improving regional cooperation. Meeting for the first time in July 2000, the IRG called for greater coordination among the various regional secretariats, including those of CARICOM and the Latin American Economic System (see article on SELA). Central to the IRG discussion was a report by a group of high-level consultants who had been assigned the task of assessing progress on ACS aims and objectives during 1996–1999. The October 2000 inaugural session of another affiliated body, the ACS Business Forum, was highlighted by announcement of an energy agreement between ten oil-importing ACS members and fellow member Venezuela, which agreed to help participating countries offset the cost of oil purchases. All other ACS members were also eligible for long-term, low-interest loans under the new Caracas Energy Agreement. On December 6–8, 2000, the sixth Ministerial Council convened in San Pedro Sula, Honduras.

Participants reached agreement on an Environment Strategy and on Principles for a Common Commercial Air Transport Policy. The ministers also approved a Rationalization and Prioritization of the ACS Work Program, in accordance with which the activities of several special committees were suspended and some of their activities reassigned. On May 17–18, 2001, the ACS Secretariat hosted ten other regional groups in the Second Cooperative Meeting between the Secretariats of the Greater Caribbean. The participants approved creation of an Integrated Information System of the Greater Caribbean and, looking toward upcoming international negotiations sponsored by the WTO, discussed coordinating their trade positions. The third ACS summit was held December 11–12, 2001, in Margarita Island, Venezuela, immediately following the seventh session of the Ministerial Council. The assembled leaders agreed to establish a Greater Caribbean Zone of Cooperation; initial foci were identified as national disasters, trade, and sustainable tourism. With regard to the last, the leaders also signed and urged member jurisdictions to ratify a new Convention for the Establishment of the Sustainable Tourism Zone of the Caribbean. As at past summits, the concluding declaration asked the United States to end the Helms-Burton proscriptions directed against Cuba. The ACS also voiced support for negotiations under the WTO, and, in anticipation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas, the Caribbean leaders noted that fair trade should be “based on rules that favor special and differential treatment for developing countries.” At the eighth Ministerial Council session, held November 29, 2002, in Belize City, Belize, the ACS passed a resolution voicing support for an anticorruption campaign under way in Nicaragua. The ninth session, held November 27, 2003, in Panama City, Panama, discussed security issues, trade, tourism, and regional integration. It also approved an Air Transport Agreement among the Member States and Associate Members of the Association of Caribbean States and the Draft Protocol to the Convention establishing the Sustainable Tourism

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Zone of the Caribbean (STZC). Also at this session, Finland and the Ukraine were admitted as observers to the ACS, and Dr. Rub´en Arturo Sili´e Valdez (Dominican Republic) was elected secretary general. The tenth ministerial meeting, held December 15, 2004, in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, received the application of the Turks and Caicos Islands for associate member status. Formal ratification of the Turks and Caicos Islands’ new status occurred at the 11th Ministerial Council meeting, also held at Port of Spain, on March 26–28, 2006. The fourth ACS summit was held in Panama City, Panama, on July 29, 2005. The proceedings of the summit were dominated by discussions on

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how to reduce hunger in the region and improve regional response to natural disasters. The 12th Ordinary Meeting of the Ministerial Council, held at Port of Spain, Trinidad, on March 15, 2007, made a formal call for all members and associate members to sign or ratify any legal instruments on which they have not yet acted by the end of the year. The Agreement for Regional Cooperation in Natural Disasters, the Agreement for the Establishment of the Sustainable Tourism Zone of the Caribbean, the multilateral Air Transport Agreement, and the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities were all a few votes short of ratification, and the instruments were available for signature at the Colombian mission to the United Nations.

CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET (CARICOM)

Established: August 1, 1973, pursuant to the July 4, 1973, Treaty of Chaguaramas (Trinidad), as successor to the Caribbean Free Trade Association. Purpose: To deepen the integration process prevailing within the former Caribbean Free Trade Association, to enable all member states to share equitably in the benefits of integration, to operate certain subregional common services, and to coordinate the foreign policies of the member states. Headquarters: Georgetown, Guyana. Principal Organs: Heads of Government Conference, Heads of Government Bureau, Community Council of Ministers, Ministerial Councils, Secretariat. Web site: www.caricom.org Secretary General: Edwin Carrington (Trinidad and Tobago). Membership (15): Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas (member of the community but not the common market), Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. Associate Members (5): Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands. Observers (7): Aruba, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Venezuela.

Official Language: English. Origin and development. The formation of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carifta) in 1968 followed several earlier attempts to foster economic cooperation among the Commonwealth countries and territories of the West Indies and Caribbean. Antigua, Barbados, and Guyana signed the initial agreement December 15, 1965, in Antigua, while an amended accord was approved February 23, 1968, in Georgetown, Guyana, by those governments, Trinidad and Tobago, and the West Indies Associated States. Jamaica joined in June 1968 and was followed later in the month by the remaining British-associated islands, which had previously agreed to establish their own Eastern Caribbean Common Market. Belize was accepted for membership in June 1970. At an eight-member conference of heads of state of the Caribbean Commonwealth Countries in April 1973 in Georgetown, the decision was made to replace Carifta with a new Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) that would provide additional opportunities for economic integration, with an emphasis on obtaining greater benefits for the less-developed members. The new grouping was formally established July 4, 1973, in Chaguaramas, Trinidad, by the prime ministers of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad. Although the treaty came into effect August 1, 1973, Carifta was not formally superseded until May 1, 1974, by which time all former Carifta members except Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla had acceded to the new group. Antigua joined July 5, 1974, and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla acceded on

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July 26, with St. Kitts-Nevis continuing its membership after the United Kingdom resumed responsibility for the administration of Anguilla in late 1980. After a lengthy period of close cooperation with the grouping, the Bahamas formally acceded to membership in the community (but not the common market) in July 1983. Suriname was admitted in 1995, thereby becoming the first Caricom member whose official language was not English. Haiti, a long-standing observer, was invited to join at the July 1997 Caricom summit, with final terms for full accession set two years later. Deposit of an accession instrument followed ratification by the Haitian Parliament in May 2002. The 1973 treaty called for a common external tariff (CET) and a common protective policy vis-`a-vis community trade with nonmembers, a scheme to harmonize fiscal incentives to industry and development planning, and a special regime for the less-developed members of the community. However, in the wake of unfavorable economic developments during the mid-1970s, progress toward economic coordination and integration stagnated. Cooperation in finance and joint development projects was virtually halted, and members resorted to developing separate, often conflicting, policies. This problem was most acute in the area of trade, in which Guyana and Jamaica adopted protectionist policies in an effort to offset severe foreign exchange shortages. A 1984 Nassau Agreement called for the dismantling of trade barriers among Caricom members, but quick implementation proved difficult. The Eighth Conference of Heads of Government in July 1987 successfully pledged to remove all intracommunity protectionist measures by the final quarter of 1988, although the smaller Eastern Caribbean countries, who had protested that certain sectors were not sufficiently “healthy” to withstand free market pressures, were allowed to protect several industries and products at least until 1991. As early as 1984 Caricom leaders had agreed to impose a CET on certain imports, but over the next decade deadlines for introducing a comprehensive CET were repeatedly missed. The first CET, with a 30–35 percent maximum, was finally

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instituted in 1993 and then lowered, in two additional phases, to 0–25 percent, although members were permitted considerable flexibility with regard to application. At the same time, Caricom moved forward on a 1989 pledge to create a unified regional market in “the shortest possible time.” Goals for the single regional market included elimination of any remaining trade barriers between members, free movement of skilled labor, abolition of passport requirements, development of regional air and sea transport systems using the resources of existing carriers, and rationalization of investment incentives throughout the community. Adoption of a single currency was also discussed. In furtherance of economic and political integration, in 1989 the heads of government established a West Indian Commission that, in 1992, proposed formation of the broader Association of Caribbean States (see separate ACS entry). Recognizing the need for collateral organizational reform, in October 1992 the heads of government authorized formation of a task force whose work ultimately led to adoption in February 1997 of Protocol I amending the Treaty of Chaguaramas. The first of nine related protocols, Protocol I significantly restructured Caricom’s organs, principally by creating the Community Council of Ministers as the second highest Caricom organ and authorizing formation of supportive Ministerial Councils. Five months later at the annual summit held in Montego Bay, Jamaica, the Caricom leaders called for establishing the Caricom Single Market and Economy (CSME) by 1999, although the goal ultimately proved unattainable. Structure. Policy decisions under the Treaty of Chaguaramas are assigned to a Heads of Government Conference, which meets annually and is the final authority for all Caricom forums. Each participating state has one vote and most decisions are taken unanimously. The chairmanship of the conference rotates annually among the members. Until 1998 a Common Market Council dealt with operational aspects of common market activity, but, as part of the Protocol I restructuring, it was replaced by the Community Council of Ministers. The new council, the organization’s second-highest organ,

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consists of community affairs ministers and any others designated by each member state. Their collective responsibilities include strategic planning and coordination of economic integration, functional cooperation, and external relations. In 1992 a four-member Bureau of the Conference, comprised of the current conference chair, his predecessor and scheduled successor, and the secretary general, was established to initiate development proposals as well as to help bridge the gap between summit decisions and member state implementation. Partly in response to criticism that the bureau would be unable to provide the necessary day-to-day oversight, a Technical Action Services Unit was established within the Secretariat in 1994. It currently helps member states implement regional decisions and also assists in preparations for initiating the CSME. Also assisting the Conference and the Council of Ministers are four Ministerial Councils: Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP), Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR), Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD), and Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED). In addition, there are Legal Affairs, Budget, and Central Bank Governors committees. The Secretariat, Caricom’s principal administrative organ, is headed by a secretary general and includes several administrative directorates in support of the Ministerial Councils. A deputy and various assistant secretaries general oversee numerous subsidiary offices. The Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP), whose creation was endorsed at the 1989 Caricom summit, was established in mid-1994 after a sufficient number of member states ratified the related agreement. A consultative body, the new assembly was designed to promote public and governmental interest in Caricom. Caricom has established or sponsors several other community institutions, including the Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute in St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago; the Caribbean Center for Development Administration in St. Michael, Barbados; the Caribbean Community Climate Change Center

in Belmopan, Belize; the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency in St. Michael; the Caribbean Environmental Health Institute in Castries, St. Lucia; the Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute in St. Augustine; the Caribbean Food Corporation in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago; the Caribbean Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology in Husbands, Barbados; the Caribbean Meteorological Organization, in Port-of-Spain; the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism; the Caribbean Regional Organization for Standards and Quality; and the Caribbean Telecommunications Union in Nassau, Bahamas. Associate institutions include the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) in St. Michael (see separate entry under Regional and Subregional Development Banks); the University of Guyana in Turkeyen, Guyana; the University of the West Indies in Bridgetown, Barbados; the Caribbean Law Institute in Bridgetown; and the Secretariat of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (see separate entry) in Castries. Activities. Regional integration and development lie at the center of Caricom’s activities, but the organization has also negotiated agreements with neighboring countries and sought a common voice in various international forums, particularly those involving trade and globalization. Among the nearby countries with which Caricom has concluded trade or other agreements are the Group of Three (Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela) and the Dominican Republic. Caricom regularly meets with the latter in the Caribbean Forum, and the two concluded a free trade agreement in May 2000 after four years of negotiations. With regard to the broader issue of positioning itself to compete in the global economy, in 1997 Caricom created a Regional Negotiating Mechanism (RNM) to outline a strategy for international trade and economic negotiations, although the RNM soon ran into “serious financial problems” because of funding shortfalls. Relations with the United States have frequently proved frustrating, in part because of Washington’s objections to Caricom’s behind-the-scenes efforts to facilitate Cuba’s reintegration into the Organization of American States (OAS) and other international groupings. Despite this, U.S. President Bill

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Clinton met the Caricom leaders May 10, 1997, in Bridgetown to discuss drug smuggling and other issues. Security agreements between the United States and Caricom members that allow U.S. law enforcement officials access to the national waters of Caribbean countries were completed, and President Clinton pledged to ask the U.S. Congress to grant Caricom’s textiles and leather goods parity with NAFTA goods. Clinton also promised limited aid to overcome the effects of a recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling on a complaint brought by the United States protesting the European Union (EU) granting Caribbean bananas preferential access to EU markets. In late 1998, as the United States was arguing that the revisions to the EU banana import regime did not go far enough, Caricom Chair Kenny Anthony warned that the U.S. position was “undermining the long-standing relationship between the Caribbean and the United States.” The community also objected to the U.S. practice of deporting convicted criminals back to their countries of origin, arguing that not enough notice was being given of the deportations. Caricom has also found itself at odds with the EU. In the late 1990s, in the course of negotiations related to replacing the soon-to-expire Lom´e Convention, Caricom objected to the European Commission’s proposed division of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group by region and level of economic development, and the inclusion of human rights and good governance language in the successor to the Lom´e agreement. Caricom launched a campaign to counter these proposals in March 1998I, and it also urged the EU to minimize the extent of revisions to its banana import regime in response to the WTO ruling, fearing that drastic changes would wreak havoc on some of the economies in the region. At the July 1998 Caricom summit, held in St. Lucia, community leaders approved plans to form a new Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) to function as a court of final appeal (replacing the United Kingdom’s Privy Council in the case of the 12 Caricom states with historical ties to the United Kingdom) and settle disputes arising from the Treaty of Chaguaramas. The community’s ongoing

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mediation efforts in Guyana were also discussed (see Guyana article). The 20th summit, held July 4–7, 1999, at Portof-Spain saw further progress toward establishing the CCJ, despite objections from some who saw the proposed displacement of the UK Privy Council as an effort to reintroduce capital punishment. The Heads of Government Conference also addressed another controversy—namely, the threat of sanctions by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which included 11 Caricom members (the exceptions being Bahamas, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago) on its list of jurisdictions having “harmful” tax policies. In addition, the heads of government signed three of the last five protocols—on trade, transport, and disadvantaged sectors and countries—needed for implementation of the CSME. (Previously signed protocols, including Protocol I, covered the right to establish businesses, provision of services, and movement of capital and labor; industrial policy; trade policy; and agricultural policy.) The last two protocols, covering rules of competition and consumer protection and disputes resolution, were signed at the 11th intersessional heads of government meeting, which met March 13–14, 2000, in St. Kitts. At the session, also in furtherance of CSME preparation, the leaders assigned special sectoral portfolios: to Antigua and Barbuda, services, including information technology and telecommunications; Bahamas, tourism; Barbados, the CSME, including monetary union; Belize, sustainable development, including disaster management; Dominica, labor; Grenada, science and technology; Guyana, agriculture; Haiti (despite its then-provisional status), transportation; Jamaica, external relations; St. Kitts-Nevis, health; St. Lucia, justice and governance; St. Vincent, bananas; Suriname, community development and culture; and Trinidad and Tobago, security, including drug-related issues. On July 15–16, 2000, shortly after the 2000 annual conference, Caricom convened in Castries to discuss the OECD tax policy issue and the recent report of the Group of Seven’s Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which labeled Bahamas,

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Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis, and St. Vincent as “uncooperative” in efforts to combat money laundering. In response, the Bureau of the Conference set up the Caribbean Association of Regulators of International Business (CARIB), which was assigned the initial task of evaluating the FATF criteria. In June 2001 the FATF removed Bahamas from its noncompliance list, although Grenada was added in September. St. Kitts was removed in June 2002, as were Dominica in October 2002, Grenada in February 2003, and St. Vincent in June 2003. In November 2000 Caricom leaders objected to EU plans to grant, with effect from 2001, the world’s 48 least-developed countries duty- and quota-free access to EU markets, which Caricom saw as having “disastrous social and economic consequences” for particular member states. It was feared, for example, that the Caribbean rice export market, which is critical to the economies of Guyana and Suriname, would be overwhelmed by East Asian suppliers. In February 2001 the EU somewhat assuaged Caricom’s concern by delaying full implementation of the policy until 2006 for the banana market and until 2009 for the rice and sugar markets. In furtherance of introducing the CSME, the July 3–6, 2001, Heads of Government Conference agreed in principle to phase out remaining restrictions on the free movement of capital, goods, and services, while in August, Caricom joined with the International Monetary Fund and the UN Development Programme in announcing establishment in Bridgetown of a Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Center (Cartac) to provide technical assistance and training in economic and financial management, including budgeting; tax policy and administration, statistics, and financial oversight. With additional funding from Canada, the CDB, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the World Bank, Cartac opened in November. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, an emergency summit convened October 11–12, 2001, in Nassau, Bahamas, to examine the regional economic impact. Partic-

ular concern was expressed about major losses in the tourism industry. In addition, the participants agreed to implement a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security, with its sphere of concern including money laundering and terrorism. The July 3–5, 2002, Heads of Government Conference in Georgetown continued preparations for the CCJ, called for accelerated progress toward the CSME, and discussed ACP policies under the new Cotonou Agreement. The conference attendees also expressed concern about the decelerating regional growth rate, which was attributed to such factors as globalization and the loss of trade preferences, stiffer international requirements for offshore financial activities, and losses in the tourism industry. Illicit drug trafficking and a rise in related violent crime also drew attention at the session. More positively, the participating countries signed a collective agreement with pharmaceutical companies to reduce the cost of HIV/AIDS drugs. Later in the year, on December 8, many of the Caricom heads of government convened in Havana, Cuba, to mark the 30th anniversary of having established diplomatic relations with the Castro government. The session’s concluding declaration once again called for an end to the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba and efforts to restrict Havana’s participation in multilateral forums. Meeting July 2–5, 2003, in Montego Bay, the heads of government signed several documents required for inaugurating the CCJ, to be sited in Trinidad and Tobago, in November. They included a Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the Caribbean Court of Justice and the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission, and an Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund. The latter measure permitted the CDB to begin raising some $100 million to capitalize the trust fund. In the area of external trade, the attendees discussed anticipated negotiations with the EU related to Economic Partnership Agreements under the ACP, continuing plans for the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and ongoing WTO negotiations, all of which will have significant impact on the CSME.

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Governance issues within the organization and the prospects for restructuring regional air transportation were among the other topics addressed at the midyear summit. The July 4–7, 2004, summit in St. George’s, Grenada, continued a review of options for administrative reform of the organization, including the possibility of establishing a commission (like the EU’s) or a similar “executive mechanism.” The matter was referred to the ACCP, whose consultative role was also under review. In April the heads of government welcomed the start of discussions with the EU on a regional Economic Partnership Agreement, although significant differences, especially over bananas and sugar, persist. The summit agreed that a tenth special session in November would focus on the CSME. The CCJ was inaugurated on April 16, 2005, even though only Barbados and Guyana approved its jurisdiction over civil and criminal appeals. In general, the Caricom members favored letting the court review issues related to the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and the anticipated CSME, but most had not resolved reservations about the court’s appellate status. The CCJ began hearing its first case, an appeal of a libel verdict from Barbados, in August 2005. The 26th Heads of Government Conference convened July 3–6, 2005, in St. Lucia where the participants agreed that the CSME would be launched at the end of the year. The Bahamas, however, had opted out, fearing that its comparatively prosperous economy would attract an overwhelming number of immigrants from other Caricom states and that, with most of its trade involving nonCaricom countries, it would not significantly benefit by participating. To assuage the concern of the Eastern Caribbean member states that they would be dwarfed by Trinidad and Tobago’s economy, the summit agreed to investigate establishing a regional development bank. In other matters, the summit endorsed a Management Framework for Crime and Security that would raise national security and law enforcement to the ministerial level and continued to express concern about political

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turmoil in Haiti. Haiti was suspended from active participation in CARICOM after the ouster of its president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in February 2004. The 10th conference of heads of state was held October 3–5, 2005, in Belize. Discussions focused on environmental matters, including the protection of biodiversity and the promotion of sustainable development. The 17th intersessional meeting of the Heads of Government Conference on February 9–10, 2006, in Port-of-Spain, was mostly concerned with a review of progress toward implementation of the CSME. Significant among the ongoing developments were the Caricom passport, currently adopted by some but not all states, and progress toward an agreement on free movement of all workers within the group. Free movement is currently confined to certain categories of skilled workers and students, and full liberalization is proving slow. Barbados Prime Minister Owen Arthur was quoted after the meeting as saying the way was now clear for full implementation of the CSME, which he saw happening by 2008. After the February 26, 2006, victory of Rene Preval in the Haiti presidential elections, Caricom was quick to invite Haiti to return to full participation in the organization. President Preval was welcomed at the 11th Heads of State Conference held on July 3–6, 2006, in St. Kitts-Nevis. A September 2006 meeting in New York between Caricom foreign ministers and United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was described as “very cordial.” However, the organization did not waver in its support (though ultimately unsuccessful) for Venezuela receiving a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council, and it continued its support for Cuba’s reintegration into world counsels. Early 2007 saw an unusual incentive for regional integration in the ninth Cricket World Cup, with matches played between March 12 and April 28 in all Caricom countries. In preparation for this logistically difficult event the organization issued a special Caricom visa, implemented as a serious attempt to stop undesirables entering and moving about the region.

CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET ( C AC M / M C C A ) Mercado Com u´ n Centroamericano

Established: By General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, signed December 13, 1960, in Managua, Nicaragua, effective June 3, 1961. Purpose: “The Contracting States agree to set up among themselves a common market which should be fully established in not more than five years from the date of the entry into force of [the] Treaty. They also undertake to set up a customs union among their territories.” Headquarters: Guatemala City, Guatemala. Principal Organs: Council of Ministers for Economic Integration, Permanent Secretariat. Web site: None. Secretary General: Haroldo Rodas Melgar (Guatemala). Membership (5): Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua. Official Language: Spanish. Origin and development. A Central American Economic Integration Program was formally launched in August 1952, when the region’s economic ministers organized a Committee for Economic Cooperation of the Central American Isthmus. The CACM was subsequently organized under the General Treaty of Central American

Economic Integration, which was signed by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in December 1960 and became effective in June 1961, after deposit of the required instruments of ratification. Costa Rica acceded to the treaty on June 23, 1962. The general treaty incorporated the Agreement on the Regime for Central American Integration Industries, signed in June 1958, and kept in force a number of other agreements, including the Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Economic Integration, also concluded in June 1958, and the Central American Agreement on the Equalization of Import Duties and Charges, together with its accompanying Protocol on the Central American Preferential Tariff, adopted in September 1959. The CACM’s fundamental strategy was to reduce or eliminate trade restrictions among its members and erect high external tariffs against imports from outside countries, thereby creating a Central American market that could then be supplied by nascent industries. Encouraging manufacturing was also seen as lessening the regional dependence on the export of agricultural commodities, principally coffee, sugar, and bananas, all of which were prone to price volatility. Although the strategy met with considerable success for the better part of a decade and contributed to significant advances in regional GDPs, the benefits accrued disproportionately, particularly to Costa Rica and Guatemala, creating considerable resentment within the CACM. Moreover, the CACM never advanced beyond a customs union; protocols and

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legislation on, for example, free movement of labor and capital—an essential element of a true common market—never reached fruition. In addition, protected regional industries beset by inefficiencies and poor quality of product proved unable to compete in the wider international market, and many failed. The CACM suffered the de facto withdrawal of Honduras in 1969 as a result of its war with El Salvador. Although Honduras continued to view itself as a de jure member, it suspended participation in the CACM in December 1970 by imposing tariffs on all imports from the region. Import duties were subsequently reimposed by other members, particularly after the 1973 oil crisis, as mounting debt and protectionist pressures slowed progress toward realization of the organization’s goals. During the 1970s the CACM was to have been replaced by the Economic and Social Community of Central America (Communidad Econ´omica y Social Centroamericana—CESC), with some expectation that the largely inactive Organization of Central American States (Organizaci´on de Estados Centroamericanos—ODECA), whose charter came into effect in 1952, would also be thereby superseded. However, the new organization’s draft treaty, published in March 1976, was not ratified by any of the potential members. During 1978 several alternative treaties were prepared, but none proved acceptable prior to the resolution of the differences between El Salvador and Honduras in October 1980, at which time the two countries concluded a peace treaty and agreed to restore bilateral trade. This development, along with the restoration of relations with Nicaragua in April 1981, led to Honduras’s pledge to participate in restructuring the CACM. Although negotiations held in 1980– 1981 achieved some progress, a new accord could not be completed prior to the June 3, 1981, expiration of the general treaty, which, however, was to remain in effect unless a member withdrew, necessitating dissolution within five years. In mid-1984 an effort was made to “reactivate” the organization. In September aid talks were held with representatives of the European Community (EC, subsequently the European Union—EU),

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which yielded an economic cooperation agreement in November 1985. Prospects for revitalizing the CACM were enhanced further by negotiations on a Central American peace plan, which, although directed primarily at ending the fighting in the region, also addressed other political, social, and economic issues. In May 1986 the presidents of the five CACM countries endorsed the creation of a Central American Parliament (Parlamento Centroamericano—PARLACEN), and a formal agreement to that effect was concluded in October 1987. However, representatives from only El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras participated in PARLACEN’s October 1991 inauguration. Meanwhile, ODECA was succeeded by the new Central American Integration System (Sistema de Integraci´on Centroamericano—SICA; see separate entry), which was endorsed at a December 1991 Central American summit and formally launched in February 1993. (PARLACEN became one of SICA’s principal organs.) Costa Rica became the fifth and final CACM member to ratify the SICA protocol in June 1995. A protocol to the 1960 CACM treaty was signed October 29, 1993, in Guatemala City, Guatemala. Among other things, it envisaged establishment of a monetary union (over Costa Rica’s objections) and the free movement of labor and capital among members. As of mid-1995 the national legislatures of Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala had ratified the protocol, which was sufficient to activate it for those countries. However, no firm schedule was adopted for implementation of the protocol’s various provisions, which stated that the process would be “gradual, complementary, and flexible according to the will and policy” of the individual members. Panama also signed the 1993 Guatemala Protocol as an observer, pending final negotiations on its full assimilation into regional affairs. Structure. The initial CACM policymaking organ was the Central American Economic Council, which consisted of the economic ministers of the member states and had general responsibility for the integration and coordination of the members’ economies. An Executive Council, comprising deputies to the ministers and their alternates,

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exercised continuing supervision over the course of economic integration and prescribed steps required to fulfill the provisions of the general treaty. Essentially inactive from the 1970 Honduran withdrawal until the effort to revive the CACM in the mid1980s, both organs were ultimately superseded in the 1990s by a Council of Ministers Responsible for Economic Integration and Regional Development (Consejo de Ministros Responsables de la Integraci´on Econ´omica y Desarrollo Regional— COMRIEDRE), which itself gave way later in the decade to the current Council of Ministers for Economic Integration (Consejo de Ministros de la Integraci´on Econ´omica—COMIECO). The Permanent Secretariat (Secretar´ıa de Integraci´on Econ´omica Centroamericana—SIECA) is headed by a secretary general. Its tasks include supervising economic integration efforts, conducting studies, gathering statistics, and promoting cooperation. The SIECA is regarded as a Specialized Technical Secretariat of SICA and constitutes the administrative core of the SICA economic subsystem (Subsistema de Integraci´on Econ´omica). Activities. At their June and December 1990 summits, the presidents of the five CACM nations focused again on regional economic integration, calling for the lowering of tariffs and other trade barriers and joint efforts to improve roads and other elements of the transportation sector. At the December 1991 Central American summit, the leaders agreed to limit tariffs on extraregional imports to 20 percent as a step toward possible trade agreements with other regional groupings, such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). The perception continued to grow that the Central American nations were finally moving beyond the rhetorical stage in their integration efforts, particularly in view of the October 1993 signing of the Guatemala protocol. However, enthusiasm for regional cooperation appeared to have cooled somewhat by mid-1995 because of domestic economic and political concerns. A subsequent survey reportedly revealed little popular understanding or support for integrationist measures.

Although free trade ostensibly applies within the CACM, many exceptions have been permitted. Tariffs or quotas apply, for example, to sugar, coffee, automobiles, petroleum products, and pharmaceuticals. A common external tariff (CET) has been in place since 1992, although Costa Rica initially remained aloof about it. At El Salvador’s insistence, the three-tier CET dropped in 2000 to 0–15 percent, with primary and capital goods entering duty free and finished goods taxed at the uppermost rate. Here again, however, exceptions have been granted, typically on a country-by-country basis. Safeguard measures include permitting a member country to impose duties or quotas if the flow of imports threatens domestic industry. In September 2000 the COMIECO, after four years of negotiations, achieved agreement on a conflict resolution mechanism for trade issues, which was seen as a means of reducing statute violations and the use of retaliatory tariffs within the CACM. Nevertheless, what Central America Report described as a “spider’s web” of bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements continued to exist. In what was generally viewed as a prelude to an effort by the Dominican Republic to enter the CACM and SICA, Santo Domingo and the five CACM states concluded a free trade agreement that was signed in November 1998, with Nicaragua becoming the final party to ratify the accord in September 2002. In April 2001, Canada and Costa Rica concluded another bilateral trade pact, with the other four CACM countries then opening trade talks with Ottawa in November 2001. In the following two years, pressure on the CACM members to settle their disputes and finally establish a full customs union increased, driven in large part by external forces—chiefly, the insistence of the EU and others seeking broad trade agreements that they would negotiate only with a unified bloc, not the individual CACM countries. The second EU-Latin America/Caribbean summit, held May 17–19, 2002, in Madrid, Spain, reinforced the conclusion that Central American participation in a free trade arrangement with the EU first required a Central American customs union.

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Within the Americas, the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay expressed an interest in establishing closer ties to the CACM, largely to achieve a stronger negotiating posture with regard to the much-anticipated comprehensive Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Businesses in the Mercosur countries were also interested in access to future Central American infrastructural projects should Mexican President Vincente Fox’s proposed Puebla-Panama Plan be realized. Meanwhile, in September 2002 Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago opened negotiations on a free trade pact that some observers speculated could become a model for a broader CACM-CARICOM link. At the same time, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua continued their free trade discussions with Canada. In January 2003 the United States and the CACM states opened negotiations on a U.S.Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) that encountered immediate opposition from many Central American trade unionists and farmers, the latter because of concerns over competing with subsidized U.S. exports. The World Bank also issued a caution, predicting that an initial effect of any such agreement would be a loss in fiscal earnings for the Central American participants. On December 17, 2003, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua reached agreement with the United States on CAFTA. Costa Rica withdrew from negotiations because it objected to opening its service sector, particularly the areas of telecommunications and insurance, to U.S. competition, but later signed on in January 2004. Over the next several months, bilateral negotiations between the Dominican Republic and the United States proceeded, paving the way for the Dominican government to join the CAFTA pact on August 5 (leading to the agreement also known as CAFTA-DR, DRCAFTA, or US-CAFTA-DR). Opponents in the United States included trade unions and other advocates for workers’ rights, environmentalists, the textile industry, and sugar and

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other agribusiness interests. Supporters contended that the agreement would increase U.S. access to the Central American market and make permanent features of the 15-year-old Caribbean Basin Initiative, under which many Central American goods already had duty-free access to the United States. Central American textile manufacturers, in particular, supported the pact as a means of protecting their U.S. market against China’s massive textile industry. The George W. Bush administration, recognizing that congressional passage was far from assured, decided to delay legislative consideration until after it won reelection in November 2004. On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Senate gave its assent, 54– 45, and on July 28 the House of Representatives concurred, but by the narrowest of margins, 217– 215. President Bush signed the legislation into law on August 2. The agreement has been ratified by all signers except Costa Rica. The election of proCAFTA Oscar Arias as president of Costa Rica increased the odds that the agreement will be ratified there as well, despite ongoing political opposition. As of April 1, 2006, the agreement was fully implemented only with El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Under the basic terms of the accord, 80 percent of consumer and industrial products will be traded on a duty-free basis, with the percentage rising to 100 percent in a decade. Free trade in some agricultural commodities was, however, expected to take up to two decades, in part to protect the relatively small, but politically powerful, U.S. sugar industry. Maize production in Central America was also among the protected sectors. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, CAFTA will result in more than 70 percent of the CACM’s international trade being liberalized (45 percent of which is currently with the United States and just over 26 percent is within the CACM itself). In 2007 activity of the CACM as an organization appeared minimal, although in June there was some indication that Panama might seek to join in an effort to facilitate trade negotiations with the EU.

CENTRAL AMERICAN I N T E G R AT I O N S Y S T E M (SICA) Sistema de la Integraci o´ n Centroamericana

Established: By the Protocol of Tegucigalpa to the 1962 Charter of the Organization of Central American States, signed December 13, 1991, in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, effective February 1, 1993. Purpose: In furtherance of “the new vision of Central American development,” to serve as a vehicle for coordinating political, social, economic, cultural, and environmental integration. Headquarters: San Salvador, El Salvador. Principal Organs: Meeting of Central American Presidents, Council of Ministers, Executive Committee, Consultative Committee, Central American Parliament, Central American Court of Justice, General Secretariat. Web site: www.sica.int Secretary General: An´ıbal Enrique Qui˜no´ nez Abarca (Honduras). Membership (7): Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama. Associated State (1): Dominican Republic. Observers (3): Republic of China (Taiwan), Mexico, Spain. Official Language: Spanish. Origin and development. The Central American Integration System (SICA) traces its origins to the Organization of Central American States

(Organizaci´on de Estados Centroamericana— ODECA), which was established by charter in 1951 and revamped under a second charter in 1962. However, ODECA eventually fell into inactivity, largely as a result of domestic and regional turmoil. In the late 1980s, spurred by the formation of other regional and subregional groups, Central American leaders expressed a renewed interest in closer political, social, and economic integration on a scale beyond that offered by the Central American Common Market (see separate CACM entry), which Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua formed in 1960 to promote intraregional trade and industrial development. After a decade of moderate success, the CACM’s economic model proved inadequate, and it, too, lost impetus. Thus, the Central American governments returned to the 1962 ODECA charter and drafted an extensive protocol to that document through which they could provide a new framework for further integration. Meeting in the Honduran capital in December 1991, in their 11th summit since 1986, the heads of state of the five CACM members plus Panama signed the Protocol of Tegucigalpa to the ODECA Charter, and in 1993 the General Secretariat of SICA began operations. A number of additional legal documents were required in the effort to make SICA all-encompassing, including the Statute of the Central American Court of Justice (1992), the Central American Alliance for Sustainable Development (1994), the Treaty of Central American

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Social Integration (1995), and the Central American Democratic Security Treaty (1995). In November 1997 the armed forces of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua formed the Central American Armed Forces Conference (Conferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas Centroamericanas—CFAC) for the purpose of creating a joint military force to engage in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions and possibly pave the way for eventual integration of the region’s military. Costa Rica and Panama objected to the agreement, preferring demilitarization to military cooperation. Belize, theretofore an observer, deposited its instrument of adhesion in December 2000. Another observer, the Dominican Republic, later became an associated state. Current observers are the Republic of China, Mexico, and Spain. The acceptance of the first as an observer in February 2000 generated considerable controversy, with some critics asserting that Taipei, eager to build its international ties, bought its way into the organization by offering financial assistance. Structure. The supreme SICA organ is the twice-yearly Meeting of Central American Presidents (including the prime minister of Belize since that country’s accession), which has authority over regional decision making related to democracy, development, peace, and security. Decisions are made by consensus. A Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is identified as the principal organ of coordination and carries through on summit decisions; it is assisted by an Executive Committee of national representatives. Other ministeriallevel councils for integration, regional development, and sectoral policies also meet regularly. A Consultative Committee, comprising business, labor, academic, and other civil society representatives, offers additional input, while a General Secretariat (Secretar´ıa General de le Integraci´on Centroamericana—SG-SICA), headed by a secretary general, serves a coordinating and administrative role. A Central American Court of Justice (Corte Centroamericana de Justicia—CCJ) adjudicates disputes related to the 200 or so regional integration treaties, declarations, protocols,

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and covenants, which cover everything from social integration to combating trafficking of illegal drugs and stolen vehicles. After its formation SICA incorporated key existing institutions within its framework, including the Central American Parliament (Parlamento Centroamericano—PARLACEN), which was established under the CACM and convened for the first time in October 1991, and the CACM’s Permanent Secretariat (Secretar´ıa Permanente del Tratado General de Integraci´on Econ´omica Centroamericana—SIECA), based in Guatemala City, Guatemala, and responsible for administering SICA’s “economic subsystem.” SICA also includes various other Specialized Technical Secretariats: the Central American Social Integration Secretariat (Secretar´ıa de Integraci´on Social Centroamericana—SISCA), located in San Salvador; the General Secretariat for Central American Educational and Cultural Coordination (Secretar´ıa General de la Coordinaci´on Educativa y Cultural Centroamericana—SG-CECC), in San Jos´e, Costa Rica; the Executive Secretariat of the Central American Commission for the Environment and Development (Secretar´ıa Ejecutiva de la Comisi´on Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo—SE-CCAD), at San Salvador; the Executive Secretariat of the Central American Monetary Council (Secretar´ıa Ejecutiva del Consejo Monetario Centroamericano—SE-CMCA), at San Jos´e; the Secretariat for Central American Tourist Integration (Secretar´ıa de Integraci´on Tur´ıstica Centroamericana—SITCA), at San Salvador; the Executive Secretariat of the Central American Commission for Maritime Transport (Secretar´ıa Ejecutiva de la Comisi´on Centroamericana de Transporte Mar´otimo—SECOCATRAM), based in Managua, Nicaragua; and the Secretariat of the Central American Agricultural Council (Secretar´ıa del Consejo Agr´ıcola Centroamericano—SCAC), in San Jos´e. Some two dozen other Central American institutions, including the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (Banco Centroamericano de Integraci´on Econ´omica—BCIE), also fall within SICA’s purview.

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Activities. SICA encompasses four “integration subsystems”—economic, social, environmental, and political—each of which provides functional and institutional coordination among the relevant SICA organs and affiliated Central American bodies. Although the founding Protocol of Tegucigalpa explicitly assigned responsibility for economic administration to the SIECA, the 1993 Protocol of Guatemala more clearly delineated the responsibilities of various organs of the economic subsystem (e.g., the Council of Ministers for Economic Integration, SCAC, CMCA, and SITCA). Similarly, a framework for the Central American Alliance for Sustainable Development (Alianza Centroamericana papa el Desarrollo Sostenible—ALIDES) was adopted at the Gu´acimo, Costa Rica, summit of August 1994 and initiated at the October 1994 Managua Environment Summit. The Treaty of Central American Social Integration, signed March 30, 1995, at the presidential meeting established the legal and institutional framework for the various organs of the social subsystem. On September 2, 1997, in Managua, the national executives committed themselves to the progressive implementation of a Central American Union. In practice, however, the plethora of SICArelated bodies, often with overlapping responsibilities, has created a bureaucratic morass and led to infighting between competing agencies. The structural problems have also been complicated by waxing and waning enthusiasm for integration within various member states’ governments, with the result that SICA accomplished relatively little in the 1990s. Another impediment to closer integration has been long-standing border disputes. Honduras and Nicaragua, for example, have competing claims in the Gulf of Fonseca, Guatemala has claimed roughly half of Belize, and Nicaragua and Costa Rica have sparred over navigation on the San Juan River. In 1997 a report issued by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) castigated the wastefulness of the overlapping secretariats and also criticized payments arrears by some members, a widespread lack

of technical expertise, and the financial burden created by some of the institutions. PARLACEN was singled out for particular criticism because it absorbs a large percentage of the members’ contributions but has no real decision-making authority. The report also asserted that the integration process had “scant public support and social participation.” Among the recommendations included in the report were strengthening the coordinating role of the SICA, eliminating duplication to help reduce costs, relocating the various affiliated headquarters to San Salvador, and reducing the size of both PARLACEN and the CCJ. At their July 1997 presidential summit in Panama, the Central American leaders voiced support for many of the proposals outlined in the ECLAC-IADB report and endorsed Guidelines for the Strengthening and Rationalization of the Regional Institutions of the Central American Integration System. Nevertheless, a number of entrenched bureaucracies, facing elimination or budget cuts, showed little enthusiasm for reform, and no significant concrete actions were immediately taken. Then in October 1998, the reform impetus was brought to a virtual halt when Hurricane Mitch caused widespread damage, devastating agricultural production in Honduras and Nicaragua. In the aftermath, individual countries found themselves competing for international attention and aid. At the same time, the international financial crisis of 1988–1999 and a collateral drop in world prices for key Central American commodities exacerbated the underfunding caused by payments arrears. In response, some SICA institutions sought funding from external sources. Recent summits have focused not only on such economic matters as integration and progress toward a customs union, but also on security and terrorism, measures to combat organized crime, and reform of PARLACEN. A special summit held April 1, 2005, concentrated on energy costs and supply as well as on crime. The 26th regular summit meeting, held June 29–30, 2005, included in its discussions drug trafficking, organized crime, and prospects for adoption of a Central American passport and a common visa.

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Like all of the regional integration organizations in Latin America, the issue that has dominated SICA members’ activities in the past year is trade negotiations with the United States. Specifically, the proposed Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) has been the most significant topic for SICA (for recent developments related to CAFTA see the CACM article). Negotiations that resulted in CAFTA were approved at the 22nd Central American Summit on December 13, 2002, in San Jos´e. SICA heads of state met with President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea on September 13, 2005, to announce that South Korea would join the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. Also, at the 27th regular summit meeting held December 2–5, 2005, it was agreed that SICA should pursue a free trade agreement with the European Union (EU). On April 27–28, 2006, a meeting of foreign ministry officials from SICA countries and the United States was held in Panama City to discuss issues

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such as youth gangs, drug trafficking, arms control, border security, and human trafficking. It was the first such meeting involving the United States. Future meetings appear likely. SICA activity in 2006 and 2007 concentrated on reaching out to other international organizations. Results included a February 2007 agreement for closer cooperation with the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), with a summit proposed between the two organizations in 2009. SICA also received a proposal from Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in May 2007 for the creation of a free trade area with the South American trade bloc Mercosur and negotiated a new association agreement with the EU in July 2007. China’s growing economic power was felt by SICA, as by many other countries and regional groupings. On June 1, 2007, Costa Rica decided to break ties with Taiwan and establish relations with the Beijing government instead. This caused the remaining SICA countries to reaffirm their ties with Taiwan.

T H E C O M M O N W E A LT H

Established: By evolutionary process and formalized December 31, 1931, in the Statute of Westminster. Purpose: To give expression to a continuing sense of affinity and to foster cooperation among states presently or formerly owing allegiance to the British Crown. Commonwealth Center: The Secretariat is located in Marlborough House, London, which also serves as the site of Commonwealth meetings in the United Kingdom. Principal Organs: Meeting of Heads of Government, Secretariat. Web site: www.thecommonwealth.org Head of the Commonwealth: Queen Elizabeth II. Secretary General: Donald McKinnon (New Zealand). Membership (53, with years of entry): Antigua and Barbuda (1981), Australia (1931), Bahamas (1973), Bangladesh (1972), Barbados (1966), Belize (1981), Botswana (1966), Brunei (1984), Cameroon (1995), Canada (1931), Cyprus (1961), Dominica (1978), Fiji (reentered 1997), Gambia (1965), Ghana (1957), Grenada (1974), Guyana (1966), India (1947), Jamaica (1962), Kenya (1963), Kiribati (1979), Lesotho (1966), Malawi (1964), Malaysia (1957), Maldives (1982), Malta (1964), Mauritius (1968), Mozambique (1995), Namibia (1990), Nauru (1999), New Zealand (1931), Nigeria (1960), Pakistan (1947, reentered 1989, but suspended following military coup of October 1999; readmitted on May 22, 2004), Papua New Guinea (1975), St. Kitts-Nevis (1983), St.

Lucia (1979), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1979), Samoa (1970), Seychelles (1976), Sierra Leone (1961), Singapore (1965), Solomon Islands (1978), South Africa (1931, reentered 1994), Sri Lanka (1948), Swaziland (1968), Tanzania (1961), Tonga (1970), Trinidad and Tobago (1962), Tuvalu (2000), Uganda (1962), United Kingdom (1931), Vanuatu (1980), Zambia (1964). (Zimbabwe, a member since 1980, withdrew in 2003.) Working Language: English. Origin and development. A voluntary association that gradually superseded the British Empire, the Commonwealth traces its origins to the mid1800s, when internal self-government was first introduced in the colonies of Australia, British North America (Canada), New Zealand, and part of what was to become the Union of South Africa. The increasing maturity and independence of these overseas communities, particularly after World War I, eventually created a need to redefine the mutual relationships between the United Kingdom and the self-governing “dominions” that were collectively coming to be known as the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Statute of Westminster, enacted by the British Parliament in 1931, established the principle that all members of the association were equal in status, in no way subordinate to each other, and united by allegiance to the Crown. The original members of the Commonwealth, in addition to the United Kingdom, were Australia, Canada, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. In 1949 Newfoundland became a province of Canada, and the Irish Republic became an independent state outside the Commonwealth. South Africa ceased to be a member upon becoming a republic in 1961 because of the opposition of the other Commonwealth

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countries to Pretoria’s apartheid policies; however, it was readmitted June 1, 1994, following the installation of a multiracial government. Pakistan withdrew in 1972 but rejoined in 1989, although its membership was suspended in response to the coup of October 1999. The ethnic, geographic, and economic composition of the Commonwealth has been modified fundamentally by the accession of former colonial territories in Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. This infusion of racially nonwhite and economically less developed states had significant political implications, including modification of the Commonwealth’s unwritten constitution to accommodate the desire of many new members to renounce allegiance to the British Crown and adopt a republican form of government. In 1949 the pattern was set when Commonwealth prime ministers accepted India’s formal declaration that, on becoming a republic, it would accept the Crown as a symbol of the Commonwealth association and recognize the British sovereign as head of the Commonwealth. The movement toward a multicultural identity was solidified by the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles adopted by the heads of government at their 1971 Singapore summit. In addition to acknowledging the organization’s diversity, the Singapore declaration enumerated a set of common principles, including the primacy of international peace and order; individual liberty regardless of racial, ethnic, or religious background; people’s “inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic processes in framing the society in which they live”; opposition to “colonial domination and racial oppression”; and the “progressive removal” of wide disparities in wealth and living standards. The new thrust was further evidenced by a North-South summit in October 1981, which reflected that most Commonwealth members were developing countries. Subsequently, a 1982 report, The North-South Dialogue: Making It Work, proposed many institutional and procedural reforms to facilitate global negotiations on development and related issues, and a 1983 document, Towards a New Bretton Woods, proposed short-, medium-,

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and long-range changes to enhance the efficiency and equity of the international trading and financial system. A declaration in October 1987 that Fiji’s Commonwealth status had lapsed followed two successive coups, abrogation of the country’s constitution, and proclamation of a republic. Readmission required the unanimous consent of the Commonwealth members, and Fiji’s application remained blocked until mid-1997 by India on the grounds that appropriate constitutional recognition had yet to be given to the island’s Indian population. Fiji was finally readmitted effective October 1, 1997, following the adoption of a new constitution in July, but its membership was suspended in May 2000 following displacement of the elected government. Full participation was restored in late 2001, following democratic elections in August through September. The October 1991 summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, was noteworthy for the adoption of a declaration redefining the Commonwealth’s agenda. The Harare Declaration, drafted under the guidance of a ten-member High Level Appraisal Group, committed all Commonwealth countries, regardless of their political or economic conditions, to promote democracy, human rights, judicial independence, equality for women, educational opportunities, and the principles of “sound economic management.” In a departure from precedent, membership was granted on November 13, 1995, to Mozambique, even though it had never been a British colony and was not at least partly English speaking. A “unique and special” case regarding Mozambique had been presented by its Anglophone neighbors because of regional trade concerns. In 1999 Nauru became the 53rd full member of the Commonwealth after 31 years as a special member, and Tuvalu, a special member from 1978, became the 54th full member in 2000. In 2005 Nauru resumed its status as a special member, a category of membership available to very small countries. In March 2002 Zimbabwe’s participation in Commonwealth meetings was suspended as a consequence of a widely condemned presidential election earlier in the month. In response to its

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continued suspension, Zimbabwe withdrew effective December 7, 2003. Structure. One of the least institutionalized intergovernmental organizations, the Commonwealth was virtually without permanent machinery until the establishment of its Secretariat in 1965. The symbolic head of the organization is the reigning British monarch, who serves concurrently as constitutional sovereign in those member states that still maintain their traditional allegiance. Since World War II, the heads of government have held biennial meetings, and specialized consultations occur periodically among national ministers responsible for such fields as foreign affairs, defense, finance, education, agriculture, health, trade, legal affairs, science and the environment, and women’s and youth affairs. National finance ministers normally convene in the nearest convenient Commonwealth site on the eve of the annual fall meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to discuss monetary and economic issues. The Secretariat organizes meetings and conferences, collects and disseminates information on behalf of the membership, and is responsible for implementing collective decisions. The secretary general, who currently serves a four-year term, is assisted by three deputies with responsibilities for political affairs, economic and social development, and development cooperation. Since its reorganization in 2002, the Secretariat has encompassed nine divisions: Communications and Public Affairs, Corporate Services, Economic Affairs, Gender and Human Resources Development, Governance and Institutional Development, Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Political Affairs, Science and Technology, and Special Advisory Services. The organization’s technical assistance program is financed primarily through the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC). The fund is supported by all Commonwealth countries on a voluntary basis, and its governing body includes representatives of all contributors. In addition, a Commonwealth Equity Fund, designed to encourage private sector investment in the emerging stock markets of developing countries, was launched in 1990 and was followed in 1995 by

formation of a Commonwealth Private Investment Initiative (CPII). The latter was established to help geographic regions attract capital for small- and medium-size ventures and for former state enterprises that were being privatized. The first CPII investment fund, for Sub-Saharan Africa, was established in 1996, and others followed. On the political front, a Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) was created in November 1995 to provide guidance toward “good governance” in countries undergoing transition to democracy. The autonomous Commonwealth Foundation, the formation of which was authorized by the Commonwealth heads of government in 1965, supports nongovernmental organizations, professional associations, and other such bodies. Known informally as the “unofficial Commonwealth,” the foundation directs its attention to “inter-country networking, training, capacity-building, and information exchange.” The Commonwealth of Learning, likewise authorized by the heads of government and located in Vancouver, Canada, was established in 1987 to promote distance learning and thereby improve access to education and training. Some three dozen additional Commonwealth associations, institutes, councils, and other groups were also established over the years, largely to promote development or disseminate information in such fields as forestry, health, telecommunications, education, journalism, law, and sports. Most are based in London. Activities. The Secretariat’s divisions oversee Commonwealth activities. Among the most prominent, the Political Affairs Division participates in organizing Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGMs), conducts research, aids various committees in their tasks, and monitors political issues and developments of importance to Commonwealth members. Since 1990 its observer missions have also monitored election campaigns, preparations for balloting, and elections in some two dozen Commonwealth countries around the globe, and in 1999 it drafted a “Framework for Principles for Promoting Good Governance and Combating Corruption.” The Economic Affairs Division conducts research and analysis and supports

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expert groups in such areas as North-South economic relations, protectionist tariffs, reform of the international financial system, debt management, and youth unemployment. Its purview also includes environmental concerns and sustainable development. In the area of technical assistance and development, CFTC provides training, expertise, and advice in the promotion of economic growth, public sector reform, poverty alleviation, infrastructural and institutional development, and capacity building. A Commonwealth Youth Program likewise funded through voluntary contributions, is an effort to encourage youth participation in economic and social development. Among more recent innovations, in 1995 the heads of government endorsed a Commonwealth Plan of Action on Gender and Development. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Commonwealth was most prominently identified with its efforts to end apartheid in South Africa, although debate frequently raged within the organization over tactics, especially the imposition of sanctions. Accordingly, the formal readmission of South Africa at midyear was the highlight of 1994, newly elected South African President Nelson Mandela hailing the “sterling contribution” of the grouping to the installation of a nonracial government in Pretoria. The CHOGM held November 8–13, 1995, in Auckland, New Zealand, was dominated by discussion of the excesses of Sani Abacha, the military ruler of Nigeria, who executed the internationally known author and nonviolent activist Ken SaroWiwa while the conference was in progress. This resulted in the suspension of Nigeria’s membership and the launching of efforts (ultimately largely unsuccessful) by the Commonwealth to influence the actions of the military regime in Abuja. The governments of Gambia and Sierra Leone were also criticized for their perceived failure to support genuine democratization; the summit established CMAG in part to “guide” developing Commonwealth countries toward abiding by the principles enunciated in the 1991 Harare Declaration. Nigeria, Gambia, and Sierra Leone were also major topics at the 1997 CHOGM held in Edinburgh, Scotland. While praising the role Nigeria

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played in the Liberia conflict, the summit decided to continue the former’s suspension because of ongoing human rights abuses and the suppression of democracy by the government. The summit also indicated it might impose sanctions if they would help move Nigeria toward democracy. Sierra Leone was also suspended (until the restoration of President Tejan Kabbah’s government in March 1998), and the summit called on Commonwealth members to support the United Nations (UN) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sanctions imposed on that country. In contrast, the government in Gambia was praised for having made progress toward genuine democratization. Another focus of attention at the summit was the promotion of economic prosperity. The heads of government adopted the Edinburgh Commonwealth Economic Declaration, which called for continued global economic integration with greater attention to the smaller, less developed countries that believed they were being left behind. To assist the smaller countries, the Commonwealth leaders agreed to support efforts to develop a successor to the Lom´e Convention, to offer duty-free access to certain markets, and to establish a Trade and Investment Access Facility (TIAF) with initial funding from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The Commonwealth leaders also endorsed establishing a Commonwealth Business Council, which would meet every two years to ensure that the voice of the business community was heard. In October 1998 CMAG concluded that the Nigerian government had taken enough steps toward democracy to warrant a lifting of sanctions and a resumption of Nigerian participation in some Commonwealth activities. Full participation was restored May 29, 1999, following presidential elections the previous February. In other activities during the year, a Commonwealth ministerial mission lobbied leading providers of aid and loans to developing countries on behalf of small island states, arguing they deserved special consideration because of their extreme exposure to outside political, economic, and environmental forces.

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At the November 12–15, 1999, Commonwealth summit in Durban, South Africa, the organization established a ten-member High-Level Review Group (HLRG) comprising the heads of government of Australia, India, Malta, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, South Africa, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. The HLRG was assigned the task of recommending how the Commonwealth could best meet the challenges of the 21st century. Issues facing the organization included what measures to take in response to corrupt governments and how to reconcile promotion of good governance with the principle of national sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. In this context, a number of Commonwealth countries called for expanding CMAG’s mandate to allow firmer action where democratic practices were perceived as under threat—for example, in cases of arbitrarily postponed elections, restrictions on freedom of speech and the press, and evidence of persistent human rights violations. To date, such proposals have been met with less than unanimity, however, given that many Commonwealth countries have questionable records with regard to political pluralism and press independence. Also at the Durban session, Donald McKinnon, former deputy prime minister and foreign minister of New Zealand, was elected to succeed Chief Eleazar Chukwuemea (Emeka) Anyaoku of Nigeria as secretary general, effective April 2000. McKinnon, who received wise praise for his role in resolving the Bougainville crisis in Papua New Guinea, subsequently indicated that his priorities would include obtaining debt relief for developing countries, promoting democracy, and facilitating technology transfers. The heads of government also confirmed Pakistan’s suspension from Commonwealth activities in the wake of the previous month’s coup in Islamabad. Pakistan (like Fiji, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Solomon Islands) continued to be one of the countries on the CMAG agenda for 2001. Recent threatening events in Zimbabwe were also discussed at CMAG’s March 19–20 session. Collaterally, HLRG established three working groups to

consider the Commonwealth’s political role, including conflict prevention and the mandate of CMAG; its developmental role, including how to reduce the “digital divide”; and Commonwealth governance and structures. The CHOGM scheduled for October 2001 was postponed in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and then rescheduled for March 2–5, 2002, in Coolum, Australia. The meeting’s concluding declaration called for a rationalized and streamlined organizational structure, as HLRG’s report recommended. Emphasis was also given to “people-centered economic development,” good governance and human rights, efforts to bridge the widening gap between rich and poor, and the elimination of terrorism. (Some African participants, however, although condemning the September 11 al-Qaida attacks, expressed concern that the definition of terrorism was too closely tied to U.S. and Western concerns and ignored, for example, that a number of present-day African leaders had themselves been branded as terrorists during the colonial and apartheid eras.) In addition, the assembled heads of government voiced support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was launched in 2001 under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and endorsed a new assistance effort for small states. Countries continuing under CMAG scrutiny included Fiji, Pakistan, the Solomon Islands, and Zimbabwe. In keeping with a summit recommendation that they pursue more active consultations, the Commonwealth foreign ministers convened for the first time in September 2002, during the opening days of the annual UN General Assembly session in New York. At that time the ministers agreed to hold annual meetings. The next CHOGM, which was held December 5–8, 2003, in Abuja, Nigeria, was dominated by the Zimbabwe issue. Although many African states argued that the Mugabe government could best be engaged by lifting the suspension, opponents prevailed. The Commonwealth proceeded to form a balanced committee of leaders from Australia, Canada, India, Jamaica, Mozambique, and

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South Africa to pursue “national reconciliation” in Zimbabwe and a rapid return of that country to full participation, but Zimbabwe’s governing party quickly voted to terminate membership in the Commonwealth. In acknowledging the withdrawal, Secretary General McKinnon, who was elected to a second term at the CHOGM, expressed his hope that Zimbabwe would rejoin “in due course, as have other members in the past.” Also at the CHOGM, membership applications from the Palestinian Authority, Rwanda, and Yemen were rejected. Four and a half years after the military coup that brought Gen. Pervez Musharraf to power, Commonwealth ministers decided to restore full membership to Pakistan at a May 2004 meeting in London. Ministers insisted that General Musharraf uphold his pledge to step down as chief of the army by the end of the year and expected the country to move forward with democratic reforms. Some African nations, including Nigeria and Tanzania, objected to the readmission of Pakistan because they feared that military rulers, believing that any international sanctions levied against them would eventually be reversed despite their actions, might take power in other countries. The marriage of Prince Charles, Queen Elizabeth’s son and heir to the throne, to Camilla Parker Bowles in April 2005 had implications for the Commonwealth. The British Department of Constitutional Affairs stated on March 21 that Parker Bowles would automatically become queen when Charles became king, despite Charles’s declarations to the contrary, unless parliaments of the UK and the Commonwealth countries of which

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the UK monarch was head of state all agreed to a change in the law. On March 23 the Commonwealth Secretariat announced that Charles would not automatically succeed Queen Elizabeth as head of the Commonwealth when he became king. Instead, the various Commonwealth heads of government would elect the next head of the Commonwealth. Appointing anyone other than the British monarch to this symbolic position would mark a substantial shift away from the organization’s British and imperial roots. The next CHOGM, which was held November 25–27, 2005, in Valletta, Malta, declared that Pakistan could remain a member in full standing as long as General Musharraf resigned from the military within two years. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was much criticized for the arrest on treason charges of Uganda’s main opposition leader, Col. Kiza Besigye. The European Union received criticism for maintaining agricultural subsidies and for a 36 percent cut in the guaranteed price of sugar—a matter of great concern to Commonwealth Caribbean countries. The summit issued a Statement on Multilateral Trade, calling for agreement on trade subsidies at forthcoming World Trade Organization talks. In December 2006 Fiji was suspended from full membership following a military coup. Also in that month Rwanda formally applied to join the Commonwealth. The 2007 CHOGM meeting was scheduled to take place in Kampala, Uganda, from November 23– 25. Rwanda’s president had said that he expected to attend, and Rwanda’s application was again on the agenda.

L AT I N A M E R I C A N A N D CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM (LAES/SELA) Systeme Economique Latinam´e ricain Sistema Econ o´ mico Latino-Americano e do Caribe Sistema Econ o´ mico Latinoamericana y del Caribe

Established: By convention signed October 17, 1975, in Panama City, Panama.

Official Languages: English, French, Portuguese, Spanish.

Purpose: To promote intraregional cooperation to accelerate the economic and social development of its members; to provide a permanent system of consultation and coordination for the adoption of common positions and strategies on economic and social issues in international bodies and forums, as well as before third countries and groups of countries.

Origin and development. SELA received its strongest impetus from discussions between Venezuelan President Carlos Andr´es P´erez and Mexican President Luis Echeverr´ıa during the former’s visit to Mexico in March 1975. It has been suggested that the two became convinced of the need for a purely Latin American economic organization after passage of the 1974 United States Trade Reform Act. The new agency, which was established under the October 17, 1975, Panama Convention, succeeded the Latin American Economic Coordination Commission (Comisi´on Especial de Coordinaci´on Latinoamericana—CECLA), which had attempted to provide linkage between Latin American economic policies and those of more developed states. At the 30th ordinary meeting of SELA in 2004, the group’s name was amended to include “the Caribbean,” although at the 31st meeting in 2005 it was decided not to change the acronym. The newest members are Belize and Bahamas, which joined in 1992 and 1998, respectively. Structure. SELA is one of numerous intergovernmental organizations in Latin America focused on trade integration. Its members include states that make up the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the Southern Common Market (Mercosur),

Headquarters: Caracas, Venezuela. Principal Organs: Latin American Council, Action Committees, Permanent Secretariat. Web site: www.sela.org (Almost entirely in Spanish.) Permanent Secretary: Floria Caricote Lovera (Uruguay). Membership (26): Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

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most of the members (all save El Salvador) of the Central American Common Market (CACM), and over half the states of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Like the rest of these groups, SELA is faced with the difficult political task of coordinating the needs of the member states in such a way as to foster trade and other cooperative enterprises. Unlike many of them (such as Mercosur), SELA is neither a customs union nor a free trade zone. It is simply a mechanism for consultation and coordination. The ongoing quest to achieve favorable trade within the community as well as with the United States and the European Union (EU) is a high priority. The governing Latin American Council, comprised of ministers from each member state, convenes at least once a year. To facilitate its work the council may designate Action Committees; areas thus far covered include earthquake recovery, the production of high-protein foodstuffs, housing, and other social welfare endeavors. Each Action Committee is dissolved once it has achieved its objectives, unless a decision has been made to make it a permanent body, of which there are presently two: the Latin American Technological Information Network (Red de Informaci´on Tecnol´ogica Latinoamericana—RITLA), based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and the Latin American Fisheries Development Organization (Organizaci´on Latinoamericana de Desarrollo Pesquero—OLDEPESCA), based in Lima, Peru. The Permanent Secretariat is headed by a secretary whose term of office is four years. SELA’s operating budget for 2006 was US$2.2 million, with each member state paying a quota as defined by the organization. Activities. While many observers believed that SELA had the potential at its inauguration to further regional integration in Latin America, progress was much slower than expected. Nevertheless, a number of cooperative agreements were signed in 1980, including accords to work with the United Nations (UN) Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the UN Development Program (UNDP) on projects concerning energy and capital goods and to join with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

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(ECLAC) to increase joint projects in finance and the exchange of technical information. In January 1982 SELA and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) concluded an agreement in Caracas, Venezuela, to promote trade between member countries of the two organizations. SELA also attempted to increase its role as a Latin American representative in extraregional forums, as evidenced by overtures to the European Community (EC, subsequently the EU). Concerned with the decline of Latin America as an EC trade partner, SELA proposed a number of measures to enhance trade between the regions, including the establishment of a permanent dialogue mechanism and extension of most favored nation status to all Latin American countries. One ongoing SELA concern has been debt relief. Although some SELA members, including Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela, pursued individual debt reduction packages in the 1980s, SELA continued to push for a regional approach. Debt relief discussions, at least as far as official bilateral debt owed to the United States was concerned, were included in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative proposed by U.S. President George H. W. Bush. As a result, the SELA Permanent Secretariat’s attention shifted to analysis of the initiative, which called for eventual creation of a free trade zone encompassing all of North and South America, and establishment of a new fund (financed by the United States, Western European countries, and Japan) to promote investment and free-market activity in Latin America. During the September 1992 Latin American Council meeting, SELA officials emphasized that external debt remained a “monumental” problem for the region, despite recent economic gains in many Latin American countries. SELA also continued to urge members to pursue favorable trade agreements as a bloc, a position that was seen by some as reflecting concern over Mexico’s participation in the recently negotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). At the July 1995 annual meeting, SELA consultants argued that the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and early 1990s had produced

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“mixed results”: economic growth had been stimulated and inflation brought under better control, but the region’s external debt had grown and poverty had worsened. A recent financial crisis in Mexico also had generated widespread insecurity in the region regarding dependency on foreign capital that could be quickly withdrawn in times of economic distress. SELA urged members to refine their investment incentive polices to attract long-term capital, “not speculation.” Latin American countries also would be wise to attend to “social investment,” SELA argued, to guard against political instability and conflicts that would undermine economic advancement. In 1997 SELA reported that Latin American integration was continuing to move forward as trade within and between regional groups increased. Many obstacles, such as protectionist practices and political and economic instability, had been removed. The main topics at the Latin American Council meeting held on October 6–9, 1997, in Port of Spain, Trinidad, were growth and employment. The council also called on the United States to end its economic blockade of Cuba and criticized the American Helms-Burton law, which threatened to impose sanctions on companies doing business with Cuba. A Latin American Council meeting held October 16–18, 2000, in Caracas marked the 25th anniversary of the Panama Convention that established SELA. A joint statement issued at the session identified peace and democracy as prerequisites for more rapid economic development and poverty reduction. At an April 7–9, 2003, session the Latin American Council, responding to a report prepared by its Reflections Group on the Role of SELA in the Future of the Region, concluded that it was necessary to refocus SELA’s priorities, in part to ensure nonduplication of efforts being made by other organizations. The Permanent Secretariat was directed to propose an Annual Work Program emphasizing integration, development, and technical cooperation. The next council session, held November 24–26, was highlighted by the election of a

new permanent secretary, Roberto Guarnieri, a Venezuelan economist, as successor to Chile’s Otto Boye Soto. The group commemorated its 30th anniversary at its 31st ordinary meeting held November 21–23, 2005. In Decision No. 471, it reaffirmed its commitment to the integration of the region. An example of SELA’s work that is linked to economic development rather than integration is the Ibero-American Institutional Development Program for the Development of Small and Medium Business (El Programa Iberoamericano de Cooperaci´on Institucional para el Desarrollo de la Peque˜na y Mediana Empresa—IBERPYME). The program was established at the VIIIth IberoAmerican Summit held in October of 1998 in Oporto, Portugal. It seeks to promote the development of public and private institutions that will aid the growth of small- and medium-size businesses in the region. While multilateral negotiations for the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which would encompass most members of SELA, remain on hold, the growth of free trade agreements within the group, particularly with the United Sates, continues. The largest such agreement is the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR; see separate entry on the Central American Common Market for more details). SELA members Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru have signed free trade agreements with the United States, and Uruguay and the United States have started negotiations. Reconfiguration of regional trade organizations, including the Andean Community of Nations (see separate entry) and Mercosur (see separate entry), also has garnered the interest of SELA members. The prospect of a true regional trading bloc remains elusive. SELA held a two-day meeting at its headquarters in May 2006 on the development of the Venezuelan tourist industry. The organization’s 32nd meeting, held in Caracas March 28–30, 2007, concluded on a note of caution, with the permanent secretary saying that while the organization’s work program was to remain the same as in past years, lack of funds necessitated a severe austerity program and a hiring freeze.

L AT I N A M E R I C A N I N T E G R AT I O N A S S O C I AT I O N (LAIA/ALADI) Asociaci o´ n Latinoamericana de Integraci o´ n Associa¸c ao Latino-Americana de Integra¸c a˜ o

Established: By treaty signed August 12, 1980, in Montevideo, Uruguay, effective March 18, 1981, as successor to the Latin American Free Trade Association. Purpose: To promote the expansion of regional integration, both economic and social, and ultimately to establish a Latin American common market.

Official Languages: Spanish, Portuguese; Spanish is the working language.

Headquarters: Montevideo, Uruguay. Principal Organs: Council of Ministers, Committee of Representatives, Evaluation and Convergence Conference, Secretariat. Web site: www.aladi.org (The site has an instructive section in English.) Secretary General: (Uruguay).

Didier

Opertti

of Korea, Latin American Economic System, Nicaragua, Organization of American States, Panama, Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, United Nations Development Program, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Ukraine.

Bad´an

Membership (12): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. Observers (25): Andean Development Corporation, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Commission of the European Communities, Guatemala, Honduras, Inter-American Development Bank, Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Cooperation, Italy, Japan, Republic

Origin and development. The decision to establish ALADI resulted from an 11-day meeting in June 1980 in Acapulco, Mexico, of the Latin American Free Trade Association—LAFTA (Asociaci´on Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio—ALALC), an organization whose members all joined ALADI. At the Acapulco meeting it was argued that a new organization with more modest goals than those of LAFTA was needed, one without a specific timetable for the achievement of a free trade zone and one that would explicitly take into account the considerable national differences in economic development that made undesirable the reciprocal trade concessions on which LAFTA had focused. The opposition to ALADI was led by the Brazilian and Mexican foreign ministers, who claimed that all that was necessary was a new protocol to the LAFTA charter. The majority, however, followed

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the lead of the Andean Group (now the Andean Community; see separate entry) and agreed to establish the new grouping. The founding treaty was signed in Montevideo, Uruguay, in August and entered into effect on March 18, 1981. A principal aim of ALADI is to decrease trade barriers among its member states, but flexibility is allowed for members to enter into bilateral tariff, trade, and technology agreements. Moreover, members are classified according to their levels of economic development, and all tariff concessions are to take into account these relative assessments: the less-developed members are Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay; the medium-developed are Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela; the more-developed are Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Structure. The Council of Ministers, comprised of the foreign ministers of the member states, is ALADI’s principal political organ. Its annual meetings provide a means for reviewing the work of the organization and determining policy. The Committee of Representatives, the association’s permanent political body, meets regularly to ensure that the provisions of the treaty are being implemented. Assisting the Committee of Representatives are a number of auxiliary organs, including commissions and councils concerned with budget issues; customs valuation, nomenclature, and other customs matters; entrepreneurship; export financing; financial and monetary affairs; labor; technical support and cooperation; tourism; and transport. The Committee of Representatives also may create sectoral councils. The Evaluation and Convergence Conference, comprised of plenipotentiaries of the member states, has the broad task of reviewing integration efforts and promoting new endeavors. The General Secretariat, ALADI’s “technical organ,” is headed by a secretary general who serves a once-renewable three-year term. Activities. During the first meeting of the Council of Ministers, held in November 1983 in Washington, D.C., work was completed on the Regional Tariff Preference (RTP) scheme. The RTP, subsequently approved during the April 1984 council meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, established

a system of tariff cuts from July 1, 1984, for all ALADI members on the basis of their level of development. The council also approved resolutions aimed at strengthening financial and monetary cooperation mechanisms; providing special aid measures for less-developed members; ending nontariff barriers to trade; and extending ALADI cooperative measures, including the RTP, to other Latin American and Caribbean states. The Council of Ministers reaffirmed its “integrationist will” and dedication to the “reinvigoration” of ALADI in 1987. In support of that goal, the council approved expansion of the RTP, again endorsed the proposed elimination of nontariff barriers, established a plan of action to assist the region’s less-developed countries, and announced an agreement designed to yield a 40 percent increase in intraregional trade by 1991. In 1988 ALADI Secretary General Norberto Bertaina called for concentration on six areas: construction, engineering, transportation, tourism, insurance, and information services. Reflecting an emphasis that had grown steadily in recent years, ALADI called on the private sector to play the leading role in regional cooperative ventures in these and other areas. In addition, it continued to stress the need to liberalize intraregional trade, observers noting that many members now appeared to exhibit the political will necessary to implement what had earlier been little more than a rhetorical commitment. Despite the growing importance of subregional free trade zones such as the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), in the mid-1990s ALADI was still perceived by some as playing a useful role in providing a negotiating framework and assisting in settling disputes within or between the fledgling groups. In addition, ALADI and the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) were directed by a June 1994 meeting of the leaders of 19 Latin American nations to coordinate activity toward a proposed free trade zone for all of Latin America. At the conclusion of the 1997 session of the Committee of Representatives, its president, Mario

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Lea Plaza, stated that the movement toward Latin American integration had taken on a “dynamic without precedence.” ALADI’s optimism regarding integration continued in 1998. By then, nearly 100 agreements had been concluded. A study carried out by the association’s secretary general suggested that substantial progress toward integration could be achieved by 2006 due to the negotiation of “third-generation” agreements between ALADI members. These agreements differ from pre-ALADI treaties in that they cover a greater range of products and include automatic, linear tariff reductions. In addition to hearing trade disputes between member countries and reviewing members’ trade agreements, ALADI continues to promote broader integration, assisting, for example, in efforts to coordinate transport systems and telecommunication. The General Secretariat also has set up an Information System on Foreign Trade that interconnects online databases on members’ commerce, tariffs, trade laws and regulations, and preferences.

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ALADI also continues to weigh in on questions affecting broader linkages. For example, on September 23, 2005, the organization’s secretary general signed an agreement to create a technical cooperation plan with the Inter-American Development Bank to promote the development of a free trade zone in the region. Further, a technical meeting focusing on regional integration held May 4–5, 2006, in Montevideo reaffirmed Resolution 59 of the Council of Ministers (passed on October 18, 2004), which calls for a Free Trade Space (Espacio de Libre Comercio—ELC) among the ALADI members. The resolution specifically calls for free trade accords to be signed between Mercosur and non-Mercosur countries within ALADI. Economic activity with the association has been growing rapidly in recent years. While the 2006– 2007 period was one of tension between members within other regional trading blocs, ALADI avoided such troubles. In August 2007, however, the organization decided to give preferential tariff treatment to Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay, its least developed members.

O R G A N I Z AT I O N O F A M E R I C A N S TAT E S ( OA S / O E A ) Organisation des Etats Am´e ricains Organiza¸c a˜ o dos Estados Americanos Organizaci o´ n de los Estados Americanos

Established: By charter signed April 30, 1948, in Bogot´a, Colombia, effective December 13, 1951. Purpose: To achieve “an order of peace and justice, promoting solidarity among the American states; [to strengthen] their collaboration and [defend] their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence . . . as well as to establish . . . new objectives and standards for the promotion of the economic, social, and cultural development of the peoples of the Hemisphere, and to speed the process of economic integration.” Headquarters: Washington, D.C., United States. Principal Organs: General Assembly, Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Permanent Council, Inter-American Council for Integral Development, Inter-American Juridical Committee (11 jurists from member states), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (seven members), Inter-American Court of Human Rights (seven jurists from member states), Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, Inter-American Telecommunications Commission, Inter-American Committee on Ports, General Secretariat.

Membership (35): Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (excluded from formal participation in OAS activities since 1962), Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela. Permanent Observers (60): Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, European Union, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia as the successor state following the split of Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Vatican City State, Yemen.

Web site: www.oas.org Secretary General: Jos´e Miguel Insulza (Chile).

Official Languages: English, French, Portuguese, Spanish.

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Origin and development. The foundations of the OAS were laid in 1890 at an International Conference of American States in Washington, D.C., where it was decided to form an International Union of American Republics to serve as a permanent secretariat. The name of the organization was changed in 1910 to Union of American Republics, and the secretariat was renamed the Pan American Union. The experience of World War II encouraged further development of the still loosely organized “inter-American system.” An Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, meeting in February–March 1945 in Mexico City, concluded that the American republics should consider adoption of a treaty for their mutual defense. Through the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which was opened for signature on September 2, 1947, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, they agreed an armed attack originating either within or outside the American system would be considered an attack against all members, and each would assist in meeting such an attack. (In September 2002 Mexico renounced the Rio Treaty, which it described as obsolete in the post–Cold War era.) Organizational streamlining was undertaken by the Ninth International Conference of American States, which met in March–May 1948 in Bogot´a, Colombia, and established the 21-member OAS. The adoption by Cuba of a Marxist-Leninist ideology generally was viewed by other American governments as incompatible with their fundamental principles, and the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held January 23–31, 1962, in Punta del Este, Uruguay, determined that Cuba, in effect, had excluded itself from participation in the inter-American system because of its Rio Treaty provisions violation. Over time, however, several members began to question the value of continued ostracism of the Castro regime. The trade and diplomatic quarantine against Cuba was ultimately lifted at a special consultative meeting on July 29, 1975, in San Jos´e, Costa Rica, although the “freedom of action” resolution did not constitute termination of Cuba’s exclusion from formal participation in OAS activities.

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Evidence of the organization’s increasing economic and social concerns was manifested by the adoption of the Act of Bogot´a, a program of social development, by a special OAS conference in September 1960. On August 17, 1961, an Inter-American Economic and Social Conference adopted the Charter of Punta de Este, a ten-year program designed to implement the provisions of the U.S.-sponsored Alliance for Progress, while a code of conduct for transnational corporations was approved in July 1978. On July 18, 1978, the nine-year-old Convention on Human Rights entered into force. The agreement provided for an Inter-American Court of Human Rights, composed of seven judges elected by the OAS assembly, to serve in a private capacity. Most members ratified the convention with reservations, so the court’s impact has been limited. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has been more active, devoting, for example, two weeks in September 1979 to an onsite investigation of alleged human rights violations in Argentina. The results of that investigation became the focus of the November 1980 General Assembly meeting, which concluded a compromise accord whereby the assembly deplored every form of human rights infringement without passing judgment on the specific cases enumerated in the commission report. Chile, following criticism of its human rights policy by the commission’s president, suspended its participation in commission activities and accused the body of exceeding its powers. The Falkland Islands crisis of 1982, which began with an Argentinean invasion on April 2, yielded an extended special session of the OAS during April and May. The participants passed a resolution that supported Argentina’s claim to the Falklands (Las Malvinas), condemned the British effort to regain the island colony, and considered a possible U.S. breach of the 1947 Rio pact because of Washington’s assistance to Britain. Following the termination of hostilities on June 14, efforts to resolve the sovereignty issue continued through United Nations (UN) channels. The Falklands conflict pointed to a growing rift between, on the one hand, the United States and the

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English-speaking Caribbean members of the OAS and, on the other, most Latin American members. The United States and Nicaragua sparred over Central American issues within the OAS and at the UN. Following the U.S. intervention in Grenada in October 1983, most OAS members attending a special session on October 26 condemned the U.S. action. Washington and its Caribbean allies countered that the United States had not violated the Rio Treaty, but instead had tried to bring order to Grenada. A special foreign ministers’ meeting convened on December 2, 1985, in Cartagena, Colombia, to consider proposed amendments to the OAS charter. The resulting Protocol of Cartagena, which entered into force in November 1988, modified admission rules to permit the entry of Belize and Guyana, previously ineligible because of territorial disputes with OAS members Guatemala and Venezuela, respectively. Under the new criteria, all regional states that were members of the UN as of December 10, 1985, plus specified nonautonomous territories (Bermuda, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Montserrat, but not the Falkland Islands) would be permitted to apply. The protocol also increased the authority of the secretary general, permitting him, on his own initiative, to bring to the attention of the assembly any matter that “could affect the peace and security of the continent and development of its member countries.” At the same time, the Permanent Council was authorized to provide peacekeeping services to help ameliorate regional crises. Despite initial opposition from the United States, the OAS played an active role in the Central American peace negotiations initiated in early 1987 by former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias, with efforts directed toward conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as Nicaragua. In 1989 attention turned to Panama. The OAS foreign ministers met in emergency session on May 17 and established a four-member team to conduct negotiations with Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel Noriega in hopes of achieving a transition to democratic government. However, the OAS was unable to persuade Noriega to relinquish power and could only call for free elections “within the shortest possible time.” Despite

the diplomatic failure, 20 OAS members approved a resolution in December that “deeply deplored” the U.S. invasion of Panama and called for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops. Canada, which had long avoided active participation in the OAS because of perceived U.S. dominance, finally joined as a full member in 1990. The complement of member states grew to 35 with the accession of Belize and Guyana in 1991. Meanwhile, Washington continued to insist that Cuban eligibility for reintegration into regional activity had to be preceded by democratic elections. During its June 1991 General Assembly the organization adopted Resolution 1080, which authorized an emergency meeting of the Permanent Council following a coup or other threats to democracy in any member country. The resolution reflected that for the first time in OAS history all active members had democratically elected governments. The first test of the resolution was the military overthrow of the Haitian government of Fr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide on September 30, 1991. Haiti remained a focus of attention throughout 1992 and into 1993 as OAS observers attempted to monitor the human rights situation in that nation during UN negotiations. The OAS also met in special sessions to address the seizures of dictatorial power by democratically elected leaders in Peru in 1992 and in Guatemala in May 1993, condemning both events but rejecting any specific action. On December 14, 1992, 30 OAS members signed the Protocol of Washington, a proposed amendment to the OAS charter, which would upon ratification give the body the power to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government had been overthrown by force. Still trying to counter criticism of OAS “inefficiency and passivity,” the General Assembly adopted the Managua Declaration for the Promotion of Democracy and Development during its June 1993 session. The General Assembly also approved a charter amendment, the Protocol of Managua, to establish (subject to ratification by member states) an inter-American council to coordinate regional antipoverty and development programs. The resultant Inter-American Council

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for Integral Development (Consejo Interamericano para el Desarrollo Integral—CIDI) came into existence in 1996. Particular CIDI concerns are trade, social development, and sustainable development. A major OAS concern in the first half of 1994 was Washington’s preparation for a possible invasion of Haiti as diplomatic measures and economic sanctions failed to sway the Haitian military leaders. The OAS General Assembly in June endorsed a tightening of sanctions but took no position on the use of military force, several leading members having argued against such intervention. Consequently, Washington looked to the UN for international approval of its Haitian policy, and in late July the UN Security Council authorized “all necessary action,” including use of a U.S.-led multinational force, to return civilian government to Port-au-Prince. Attesting to the surprisingly rapid restoration of the Aristide government in that nation, the next OAS summit was held June 5–9, 1995, in Montrouis, Haiti. Highlighting the session was the adoption of A New Vision for the OAS, a blueprint for the “rejuvenation” and strengthening of the organization. One priority was the new OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, mandated to observe national elections, provide special training for the staffs of national legislatures, create mechanisms to expand the dissemination of information on governmental activities, and establish courses for the armed forces and police regarding human rights protection. Other areas specified for OAS emphasis were environmental preservation, cultural cooperation, and programs to combat corruption and drug trafficking. In response to calls for reassessment and reform of the organization, including its structure and budget, a major reorganization occurred in 1996, with the CIDI replacing the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture. In 1997 the General Assembly eliminated the InterAmerican Nuclear Energy Commission, which had not been funded since 1989, and in 1999 it authorized creation of the Inter-American Agency for Cooperation and Development (IACD) as a CIDI

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subsidiary. The IACD is the organization’s principal development agency. In September 1997 the 1992 Protocol of Washington came into effect following the deposit of Venezuela’s instrument of ratification; thus, the OAS Charter was officially amended for the fourth time since 1948. In addition to shoring up the OAS’s support for democratic government, the protocol established the eradication of extreme poverty as a basic goal. Structure. As the principal political organ of the OAS, the General Assembly meets annually to set policy, discuss the budget, and supervise the work of the organization’s specialized agencies. The Permanent Council meets throughout the year to oversee the organization’s agenda and has the authority to form committees and working groups. In addition to a General Committee, current committees include Administrative and Budgetary Affairs, Hemispheric Security, Juridical and Political Affairs, Inter-American Summits Management, and Civil Society Participation in OAS Activities. Under the Rio Treaty, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs discharges the organization’s security functions and is convened to consider urgent problems. The General Secretariat, headed by a secretary general who serves a five-year term, encompasses more than two dozen offices, departments, units, and agencies. It also oversees two cultural institutions, the Art Museum of the Americas and the Columbus Memorial Library, both based in Washington. Reporting to the General Assembly, the InterAmerican Council for Integral Development (CIDI) comprises a ministerial-level representative from each member state; it meets annually on a regular basis but also may convene in special session or at a sectoral level at other times. In addition to a Permanent Executive Committee, it has an Executive Secretariat for Integral Development that operates within the overall OAS General Secretariat. Affiliated in various ways with the OAS are many specialized agencies, bodies, and other organizations, many predating the establishment of the OAS itself. These include the

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Administrative Tribunal (established in 1971 in Washington), the Inter-American Children’s Institute (1927, Montevideo, Uruguay), the InterAmerican Commission of Women (1928, Washington), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1959, Washington), the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (Comit´e Interamericano Contra el Terrorismo—CICTE, 1999, Washington), the Inter-American Committee for Natural Disaster Reduction (1999, Washington), the Inter-American Committee on Ports (1998, Washington), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1978, San Jos´e), the Inter-American Defense Board (1942, Washington), the InterAmerican Drug Abuse Control Commission (1986, Washington), the Inter-American Indigenous Institute (1940, Mexico City), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (1942 as the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, San Jos´e), the Inter-American Juridical Committee (mandated by Article 68 of the OAS charter, Rio de Janeiro), the Inter-American Telecommunications Commission (1993, Washington), the Justice Studies Center of the Americas (1999, Santiago, Chile), the Pan American Development Foundation (1962, Washington), the Pan American Health Organization (1902, Washington), and the Pan American Institute of Geography and History (1928, Mexico City). Activities. The 1996 creation of the CIDI came about largely in response to a perception that the earlier donor-recipient model of technical assistance needed to be replaced by a structure entailing cooperation of equal partners on well-defined programs devoted to economic and social development. The addition of the IACD in 1999 continued the process of rationalizing the OAS’s economic and development structures; in addition to serving as the principal agency responsible for promoting and organizing cooperative ventures, the IACD offers training programs and facilitates technical exchanges. The overall CIDI Strategic Plan focuses resources on eight areas: cultural development; economic diversification, integration, and trade liberalization; productive employment generation; science, technological exchange, and

telecommunications; social development and education; strengthening democratic institutions; sustainable development and the environment; and tourism development. Although increasingly supplemented by economic and social considerations, political and security functions remain preeminent in OAS activities. For example, since its 1990 establishment, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy has dispatched observer missions to monitor approximately 80 elections in 19 member countries. In 1998, through the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, the OAS instituted a Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) for evaluating antidrug programs and coordinating members’ responses to the illicit trade in drugs. In recent years the OAS also has increasingly taken on the role of broker in bilateral disputes, including border issues involving El Salvador and Honduras, Honduras and Nicaragua, and Guatemala and Belize. To finance negotiations and such related activities as compliance monitoring, in 2000 the General Assembly authorized establishment of a Fund for Peace. Additional security-related efforts have included the adoption of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, which entered into force in 1998; adoption and ratification of the Inter-American Convention on Conventional Arms Acquisitions in 1999; and ongoing support for a decade-old program devoted to the removal of land mines in Central America. Other recent OAS initiatives have included the following: formation under the General Secretariat of a Trade Unit, which has been an active participant in preparations for establishing the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA); adoption in 1996 of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption—the world’s first anticorruption treaty—and approval in 1997 of the InterAmerican Program for Cooperation in the Fight against Corruption; organization in 1996 of a Unit for Social Development and Education, also within the General Secretariat; approval in 1997 of an Inter-American Program to Combat Poverty; approval in 1998 of an Inter-American Program of

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Culture; and adoption in 2002 of a Strategic Plan for Partnership for Development 2002–2005. In 2003 the General Assembly instructed the Permanent Council to prepare in 2004 a Program for Democratic Governance in the Americas for consideration. The FTAA negotiations were officially launched at the April 1998 Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile (see the discussion in the Latin American Economic System article), and were expected to be completed by 2005. The OAS was given the responsibility of recording and supporting the Summit Implementation Revision Groups’ work in their efforts to coordinate the integration process. At the 1998 Summit of the Americas, many participants again called for Cuba’s reinstatement in the OAS and its inclusion in the next summit in 2002. Having earlier voiced opposition to the U.S. Helms-Burton Law, which tightened economic sanctions and penalized those conducting trade with Cuba, at the annual General Assembly in June the OAS again addressed the proposed reinstatement of Cuba, if the country adopted political reforms. Efforts were short-circuited later that month when the Castro government refused to accept any preconditions. The June 6–8, 1999, General Assembly session in Guatemala City, Guatemala, saw considerable criticism of a U.S. proposal to establish a nonmilitary, consultative mechanism for intervention in cases of perceived threats to democracy. Given the U.S. history of unilateral intervention in Latin American affairs, Venezuela, Peru, Mexico, and a number of other OAS members immediately opposed the proposal, which Washington soon withdrew. Greater support greeted the signing by ten members of an Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities. The 30th General Assembly met June 4–6, 2000, in Windsor, Canada, where the principal topic of discussion was the recent controversial reelection of Peru’s President Fujimori. A week before the May 31 runoff, OAS monitors had left the country, declaring the electoral process fundamentally flawed. The Inter-American Commission on

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Human Rights subsequently described the balloting as a “clear, irregular interruption of the democratic process.” Although many member states supported condemnatory action or demanded a new election, a Canadian-brokered compromise called for dispatch of a mission to Peru to investigate the election and the need for democratic reforms. Venezuela and Brazil opposed the resolution as a departure from the organization’s historical policy of nonintervention in internal matters. In other business, Secretary General C´esar Gaviria Trujillo specifically criticized the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic for payments arrears. At the time, Washington owed some $68 million, equivalent to more than three-fourths of the organization’s budget for 2001. The 2000 General Assembly also devoted considerable attention to the agenda of the Third Summit of the Americas, which was held April 20– 22, 2001, in Quebec City, Canada. The summit assigned an increased workload to the OAS, which was recognized as playing a “central role” in implementing the Quebec Plan of Action. OAS areas of responsibility included not only trade but also hemispheric security, drugs, indigenous rights, infrastructure, gender equity, natural disaster preparedness, sustainable development, and preparation of an Inter-American Democratic Charter. In addition, the OAS was assigned the role of technical secretariat for future summits. At the General Assembly held June 3–6, 2001, in San Jos´e, anticipated approval of a draft InterAmerican Democratic Charter was deferred because of objections from Venezuela, Chile, various Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) states, and others. They argued that the fundamental definition of “representative democracy” leaned too heavily toward Washington’s criteria. Meeting three months later on September 11–12 in special session in Lima, Peru, the OAS adopted the charter, which authorizes sanctions against a member state that experiences “an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order.”

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The special session coincided with the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, which led a September 19 emergency session of the Permanent Council to invoke the Rio Treaty and thereby authorize assistance to Washington in its “war on terrorism.” Two days later, the 23rd Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted the Resolution Strengthening Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism. The events of September 11 also led to two special sessions of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), which had been established in 1999 in furtherance of a commitment drafted in November 1998 at the Second Specialized Conference on Terrorism in Mar del Plata, Argentina. The CICTE met October 15 and again November 29 with a goal of drafting an action plan for 2002–2003 and, more immediately, identifying counterterrorism measures to be implemented by OAS member states. An Intra-American Convention against Terrorism was opened for signature at the 2002 General Assembly session, which met June 2–4 in Bridgetown, Barbados. The meeting’s closing declaration called for a “multidimensional” approach to hemispheric security, which “encompasses political, economic, social, health, and environmental factors.” At the subsequent session, held June 9–10, 2003, in Santiago, the General Assembly issued the Declaration of Santiago on Democracy and Public Trust. In addition to characterizing the Inter-American Democratic Charter as the “principal hemispheric benchmark” for promoting and defending democratic principles and values, the summit identified “greater efficiency, probity, and transparency” as central to good governance. A month later, the Convention against Terrorism entered into force, 30 days after having obtained a sixth ratification. On October 27–28, 2003, the OAS held a Special Conference on Hemispheric Security in Mexico City that concluded with issuance of a Declaration on Security in the Americas. The wide-ranging document stresses that because many of the newer threats to security—among them terrorism, international organized crime, drug trafficking, money

laundering, trafficking in human beings, arms trafficking, and cybercrime—are transnational, they require hemispheric cooperation. The document also notes that, although individual member countries have the right to define their own national security priorities and policies, the values outlined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter unite them. In March 2004 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) expressed concern about continuing “structural deficiencies” in American democracies and, in a separate statement, about adherence to the rule of law in Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela. All five countries had been the subject of numerous discussions, resolutions, or OAS missions in recent years, with international attention since the June 2003 General Assembly being particularly focused on the regimes of controversial presidents Hugo Ch´avez of Venezuela and Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti. In response to the chaotic circumstances and violence surrounding the February 29, 2004, ouster and exile of Aristide, the commission called for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of human rights violators. In June 2003 the United States, for the first time in the IACHR’s history, failed to retain one of the seven seats on the commission, whose membership through 2005 comprised Antigua and Barbuda, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. The vote that rejected the U.S. candidate was attributed by some observers to displeasure at a particularly stern assessment of the Cuban government by then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. A Special Summit of the Americas met January 12–13, 2004, in Monterrey, Mexico, to focus attention on economic growth, social and human development, and democratic governance. The OAS also hosted a series of meetings on drafting an American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. As of mid-2006 the declaration had been drafted, but not yet signed by all member countries. At the OAS General Assembly on June 7, 2004, in Quito, Ecuador, former Costa Rican president Miguel Angel Rodr´ıguez was elected as the new

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secretary general. Rodr´ıguez, who was favored by the United States, announced his resignation October 8, 2004, after allegations surfaced of financial corruption during his time in office in Costa Rica. Rodr´ıguez was just two weeks into his fiveyear term in the OAS post, having been sworn in September 23. Negotiations and debate over Rodr´ıguez’s successor occupied OAS leaders for the next six months, with the group deadlocking 17–17 through five rounds of voting on April 11, 2005. Chile’s interior minister, Jos´e Miguel Insulza, and Mexico’s foreign minister, Luis Derbez, were tied in the special election. Finally, on May 2, 2005, Insulza, a socialist, was elected in what was viewed as a setback for the United States. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice subsequently brokered a deal in which Insulza promised to hold governments accountable if they did not adhere to democratic principles, a pointed reference to Venezuelan President Ch´avez, whose arms buildup was of great concern to the United States. Insulza’s election marked the first time in OAS history that a candidate opposed by the United States won the secretary generalship. At a three-day OAS meeting June 7–9, 2005, in Florida—the first to be held in the United States in 31 years—Venezuela accused the United States of seeking to impose a “global dictatorship” when Secretary of State Rice called for new ways to support “fragile” emerging democracies. The 2006 meeting of the General Assembly, held on June 4–6 in Santo Domingo, was less contentious than the previous one. The U.S. delegate noted with satisfaction the June 5 election of Alan Garc´ıa as president of Peru. (Venezuelan President

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Ch´avez had denounced Garc´ıa as a tool of United States and had campaigned vigorously for his opponent.) The secretary general said that although no member states were in arrears in their dues, inflation and the need to meet UN guidelines on staff compensation meant that many of the organization’s programs would have to be funded privately. In July 2006 Brazil took over the chair of the Inter-American Defense Board—the responsibility leaving the U.S. for the first time in the organization’s history. The OAS was active during 2006 in monitoring elections in Guyana, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Insulza was able to report that 2006 had been a year in which many member countries had elections, all conducted well and with their results respected. 2007 was marked by the actions of Venezuela’s President Hugo Ch´avez and the organization’s response. Amid widespread protests in Venezuela and beyond, the Ch´avez government refused to renew the license of a television station well known for criticizing the government. The U.S. condemned Venezuela and asked the OAS to intervene, but the only result was a general OAS call to respect media freedom. The OAS also complied when Venezuela demanded that it remove from its web site a report from the Berlin-based organization Transparency International criticizing the amount of graft in Venezuela. In February 2007 Insulza said that he was open to some form of renewed dialog with Cuba. The OAS monitored elections in Jamaica and Guatemala, and in August 2007 Insulza stated that Latin America was experiencing a positive period in politics and economics.

O R G A N I Z AT I O N O F EASTERN CARIBBEAN S TAT E S ( O E C S )

Established: By treaty signed June 18, 1981, in Basseterre, St. Kitts, effective July 4, 1981. Purpose: To increase cooperation among members in foreign relations; to harmonize economic, trade, and financial policies; and to coordinate defense and security arrangements, ultimately leading to a deepening of subregional integration. Headquarters: Castries, St. Lucia. Principal Organs: Authority of Heads of Government of the Member States, Secretariat. Web site: www.oecs.org Director General: Len Ishmael (St. Lucia). Membership (7): Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Associate Members (2): Anguilla, British Virgin Islands. Official Language: English. Origin and development. The seven full participants in the OECS were formerly members of the West Indies Associated States, a preindependence grouping established in 1966 to serve various common economic, judicial, and diplomatic needs of British Caribbean territories. The attainment of independence by four of the members—Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent—during 1974– 1979 and the impending independence of Antigua

on November 1, 1981, gave impetus to the formation of a subregional body. Meeting in 1979 in Castries, St. Lucia, the prospective members called for establishment of the OECS as a means of strengthening relations between the seven least-developed members of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM, see separate entry). Following nearly a year and a half of negotiations, an OECS treaty (the Treaty of Basseterre) was concluded and came into force July 4, 1981. A dispute over location of the new organization’s headquarters was settled by agreement that its central secretariat would be located in Castries (administrative center of the former Associated States), while its economic affairs secretariat would be located in St. John’s, Antigua, where the Secretariat of the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) was sited. In a cost-cutting move, in 1997 the economic affairs secretariat was reorganized as a division of an overall Secretariat. To further cooperation and integration in the Caribbean, the OECS established the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) on October 1, 1983, in accordance with its decision in July 1982 to upgrade the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority. The major functions of the ECCB are administering the EC dollar and exchange control, making currency rate adjustments, regulating credit policies, fixing interest rates, and establishing reserve requirements for members’ commercial banks. In response to political unrest in Grenada in October 1983, the OECS formally requested the

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intervention of troops from the United States, member countries, and other Caribbean states, which succeeded in restoring order on the island. Following the intervention, a Regional Security System (RSS) was established in cooperation with the United States to ensure the political stability of the OECS members. In the mid-1980s, at the urging of Prime Minister John Compton of St. Lucia, the OECS considered forming a political union to counter nationalism and promote integration. When serious differences between the member states prevented significant progress, the four Windward countries (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) indicated they might proceed toward their own political union, which would be open to accession by the Leeward states if they so wished. In 1990 the Windward group set up a widely representative Regional Constituent Assembly (RCA), which in January 1992 approved a draft constitution. By then, however, domestic political concerns had dampened enthusiasm for the project, and the RCA’s final recommendations were never presented to the national legislatures and electorates. More recently, the OECS was involved in establishing an independent Eastern Caribbean Telecommunication Authority (ECTEL) in Castries, with members Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. ECTEL was described at its opening in October 2000 as the world’s first regional telecommunications regulatory body. A year later the OECS launched in St. Kitts the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange, the first regional securities market in the hemisphere. Structure. Normally meeting in biennial summits, the Authority of Heads of Government of the Member States is the highest OECS policymaking organ. It is supported by a Secretariat, which is headed by a director general and encompasses four divisions: functional cooperation, external relations, corporate services, and economic affairs. The functional cooperation division oversees several specialized units, including the Environment and Sustainable Development Unit (ESDU), the OECS Education Reform Unit (OERU), the

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Pharmaceutical Procurement Service, the Export Development Unit (EDU), the Social Development Unit (SDU), the Directorate of Civil Aviation (DCA), and a Sports Desk. The External Relations Division maintains missions in Ottawa, Canada, and Brussels, Belgium. In general, the Secretariat prepares reports, extends administrative and legal expertise, and provides supervision for the organization. Activities. The ongoing failure of the OECS to carry out many of its decisions was addressed, not for the first time, at the heads of government meeting held in January 1998 in Castries. New Prime Minister Kenny Anthony of St. Lucia warned his colleagues that the OECS’s lack of resolution was the biggest threat to integration efforts. As an example, he pointed to the environmental levy on tourist arrivals that was approved by the OECS in December but delayed in most member states because of objections from cruise companies. A draft treaty for OECS integration with Barbados was presented in March 1998, although its chances of being approved soon appeared slight, the very future of the OECS itself having fallen deeper into question. Some leaders at the heads of government meeting in May in the British Virgin Islands said it was time to review the “purposes of the organization,” considering the serious financial problems facing the OECS Secretariat as the result of the failure of members to pay their assessments. Attention at the OECS meeting in January 1999 focused on the trade dispute between the United States and the European Union (EU) over the latter’s preferential treatment of banana growers in the Caribbean. The OECS leaders strongly protested the stance of Washington (which called for the World Trade Organization to impose sanctions on the EU in the matter), arguing that Caribbean farmers could not compete with the low wages paid by U.S.-owned firms in Central and South America without severely undermining the standard of living in their countries. A report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in June 2000 labeled all of the OECS members except Montserrat as “tax havens” and threatened to

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impose sanctions if steps were not taken to tighten regulation of their offshore financial industries. At the same time the independent Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) included Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent on its list of “noncooperative” jurisdictions, to which Grenada was subsequently added. The accusations drew heated denials from several OECS governments, some asserting that they had a sovereign right to establish their own banking and financial policies without external interference. Nevertheless, by 2003 all had taken sufficient action to be removed from both lists. A special meeting of the heads of government in Grenada in April 2001 again reviewed the organization’s mission, structure, and financing. Despite previous restructuring and streamlining, budgetary problems continued to plague the group, with participants therefore naming a Technical Committee on the Functioning and Financing of the OECS Secretariat to develop a strategy for resolving financial arrears and also to consider additional reconfiguration. The 34th OECS summit, held July 25–26, 2001, in Dominica, received the report of the technical committee, which recommended maintaining the existing secretariat structure, writing off some arrears, and adopting a two-year strategy for member states to remit the balance of their outstanding commitments. Looking toward the future, the authority directed the Secretariat and the ECCB to formulate a “stabilisation and revitalisation programme” for the regional economies, all of which faced an economic slowdown and severe fiscal constraints. At the same time, summit participants moved forward on two major initiatives. First, the authority set a January 2002 date for instituting the free movement of nationals, including elimination of restrictions on work and residency permits, throughout the member states. A task force was established to work out the details of the plan, which had been discussed for more than a decade, and also to address adoption of a common passport and ID. Member governments signed free movement legislation by the middle of 2002. Second, the heads of government authorized another task force

to work toward establishing an OECS Economic Union modeled on the European Union (EU). In what proved to be a controversial move that drew criticism from several other regional governments, including those of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, the July 2001 session authorized a mission to Libya that was led in late August by the prime ministers of Dominica, Grenada, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Shortly thereafter, Libya pledged assistance in establishing a new development bank for developing countries and offered the OECS states additional financial aid, mostly as grants and soft loans. A special heads of government meeting convened September 28, 2001, to review the economic impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. The region’s tourism industry, for one, was already adversely affected. Meeting on January 31–February 1, 2002, in The Valley, Anguilla, the heads of government endorsed the Economic Union concept. (At least initially, associate members Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands were not expected to participate.) The authority cited the need for a “single economic space” to compete in the era of globalization and trade liberalization. The union was seen as a way to promote economic diversification and growth; increase export competitiveness; expand employment opportunities; further human resource development; and speed up free movement of people, goods, services, and capital. The six independent states and Montserrat also indicated that from March 2002 they would permit passport-free intracommunity travel and six-month stays. On October 10, 2002, a special heads of government session on the economy convened in St. Kitts-Nevis to address such pressing concerns as declining tourism, a drop in investment inflows and aid, reduced export earnings, and higher oil prices, all of which combined to slow GDP growth and increase both fiscal deficits and debt burdens. Tax reform, public sector reform, and improved debt management were identified as necessary steps to improve conditions. The session also agreed to set December 2007 as the deadline for introducing

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free movement of labor across the OECS, although earlier implementation was encouraged for those jurisdictions that could do so. Free movement of goods and services was to be introduced by January 2004. The 38th heads of government meeting, held January 22–23, 2004, in Castries reactivated a Technical Committee on Economic Union to work out principles of governance, the shape of union institutions, and possible arrangements for Montserrat and the OECS associate members. The heads of government also concluded that, rather than revising the Treaty of Basseterre, the Economic Union might best be accomplished through drafting a new treaty. In addition, the summit endorsed restructuring the Secretariat and sending to the national parliaments a proposed Civil Aviation Act that would replace the current Directorate of Civil Aviation with an autonomous authority. In other decisions, the heads of government called for development of a plan to revitalize agriculture and directed the Secretariat to seek aid for reversing environmental damage caused by banana cultivation in the Windward Islands. Other matters still on the OECS agenda include a common passport, a proposal for common citizenship, a unified tourism policy, and a possible customs union. With regard to a proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a report prepared by the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean had concluded that the FTAA would be of little advantage to the OECS members. Half their exports to the United States already enter on a duty-free basis, and many other products have benefited from the U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). According to the report, an

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FTAA could, however, have a negative impact on trade within the 15-member CARICOM, in which all the OECS members participate. The anticipated inauguration of CARICOM’s Single Market and Economy (CSME) provided a focus for the 41st heads of government meeting, which was held June 16–17, 2005, in Roseau, Dominica. Many OECS businesses opposed the CSME, fearing the subregion’s relative disadvantages versus the larger CARICOM economies. At the same time, the authority continued to advance subregional integration, including the final drafting of an OECS Economic Union Treaty. On June 23, 2006, the seven OECS heads of government signed a Declaration of Intent to place the Economic Union Treaty before their countries’ legislatures. At the same event, an OECS flag was unveiled. Work on the Economic Union was still in progress in 2007. One issue to be overcome was the fact that Montserrat, Anguilla, and the British Virgin Islands were not fully independent of the UK. That aside, interest in the OECS by nonindependent states continued. The Dutch territories of St. Maarten, Saba, and St. Eustatius, as well as the Netherlands Antilles expressed interest in joining. In May 2007 Cuba announced that it would build medical diagnostic centers in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, and Antigua and Barbuda, as well as an eye care facility in St. Lucia. This announcement came during the May 2007 summit of OECS leaders in Georgetown, Grenada. In September 2007 trade experts met in Dominica to attempt to harmonize tariffs prior to the December 31, 2007, deadline for completing an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU.

R E G I O NA L A N D S U B R E G I O NA L DEVELOPMENT BANKS

Regional development banks are intended to accelerate economic and social development of member states by promoting public and private investment. The banks are not meant, however, to be mere financial institutions in the narrow sense of the term. Required by their charters to take an active interest in improving their members’ capacities to make profitable use of local and external capital, they engage in such technical assistance activities as feasibility studies, evaluation and design of projects, and preparation of development programs. The banks also seek to coordinate their activities with the work of other national and international agencies engaged in financing international economic development. Subregional banks have historically concentrated more on integration projects than have regional development banks.

Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) Web site: www.caribank.org The origins of the CDB can be traced to a July 1966 conference between Canada and the Anglophone Caribbean states in Ottawa, where it was decided to study the possibility of creating a development-oriented financial institution for the Commonwealth Caribbean territories. An agreement formally establishing the CDB was signed October 18, 1969, in Kingston, Jamaica. From the time it commenced operations in January 1970, the bank’s activities have included offering aid in coordinating development among members, promoting trade, mobilizing public and private financing for developmental purposes, and providing technical

assistance. The Commonwealth Caribbean members are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Turks and Caicos Islands; Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela also participate, as do five nonregional members—Canada, China, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. France withdrew October 27, 2000. The principal policymaking body is the Board of Governors, to which each CDB member names a member, except for Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands, which are collectively represented. A 17-member Board of Directors (including 5 nonregional directors) is elected by the Board of Governors, as is the bank president. Voting on both bodies is weighted on the basis of capital subscriptions, of which regional members must hold at least 60 percent. The president is assisted by two vice presidents, one for operations and the other for finance, planning, legal affairs, and administration. The bank is headquartered in St. Michael, Barbados. In 1996 the CDB considered a membership request from China, which was a delicate matter because some members of the bank suggested that Taiwan be approached regarding possible CDB membership. The People’s Republic of China was admitted as the sixth nonregional member during the May 1997 meeting of the CDB Board of Governors held in Toronto, Canada, having already paid

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an initial installment of capital. Despite China’s admission, Eastern Caribbean members renewed their support for Taiwan’s joining the bank. In October 2000, however, the bank suffered a significant setback when France withdrew its membership. In announcing its intention, six months earlier, France attributed its decision to the CDB’s inability to fulfill expectations and, more specifically, to its failure to extend lending to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. The decision was described by Denzil Douglas, prime minister of St. Kitts and Nevis, as “passing strange,” given that of the three, only Haiti had even requested membership. At the same time, the prime minister of Grenada and others again called for the CDB to admit Taiwan, although the CDB charter limits membership to countries in the United Nations. Grenadian Prime Minister Keith Mitchell noted that even associate membership status for Taiwan could make significant additional capital resources available for Caribbean development. The CDB’s strategic plan for the years 2005– 2009 noted the problems of poverty, near-poverty, spreading crime and drug use, and the frequent incidence of natural disasters in the region. The plan concentrates on promoting broad-based economic growth, fostering inclusive social development, promoting good governance, and encouraging regional cooperation and integration—all with due consideration for environmental sustainability and the improvement of disaster risk management. As of December 2006, the leading CDB subscribers were Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, each with 17.9 percent of capital stock, and Canada and the United Kingdom, each with 9.6 percent. The CDB’s ordinary capital resources (OCR) stood at $1.8 billion, supplemented by $608 million in the Special Development Fund (SDF) and another $228 million in Other Special Funds, sources for which include the United States, Canada, Nigeria, the European Union (EU), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the International Development Association (IDA). Various managerial and organizational changes contributed to a 35 percent drop in approvals in 2001 to only $83.1 million for 28 projects. The

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bank subsequently intensified its efforts to reduce lag time between approvals and disbursement, a problem that has drawn frequent criticism. Gross approvals for loans, grants, and equity investments increased to $128 million in 2002 and $197 million in 2003, before declining to $124 million in 2004, and rebounding to $136 million in 2005 and $146 million in 2006. One important focus of the CDB’s recent activity was raising $100 million for the new Caribbean Court of Justice (inaugurated in April 2005). Attention has also been given to improving disaster response and promoting regional air transportation and agriculture.

Central American Bank for Economic Integration Banco Centroamericano de Integraci´on Econ´omico (BCIE/CABEI) Web site: www.bcie.org/english/index.php The BCIE was established December 13, 1960, as the result of an initiative originating in the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee of the (then) UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). In 1959 the committee called for the preparation, in conjunction with national and other international agencies, of a draft charter for a Central American institution dedicated to financing and promoting integrated economic development. The charter was drafted concurrently with the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, which established the Central American Common Market (CACM) of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The latter four states signed the bank’s constitutive agreement December 12, 1960, while Costa Rica became a signatory July 27, 1963. The BCIE document provides that only adherents to the general treaty are eligible for loans and guarantees. The Board of Governors constitutes the highest authority of the bank and consists of the finance minister and central bank president of each member country. The Board of Directors, responsible for

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BCIE’s management, comprises one director from each member state. Headquartered in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, the bank began operations May 31, 1961, and continued to function, with minimal structural changes, in the aftermath of the 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras. The bank’s mission is “promoting the progress and integration of the Isthmus, and furthering equitable economic growth and respect for the environment by supporting public and private programs that generate productive jobs and contribute to improving the region’s productivity and competitiveness, as well as improving its human development indexes.” It initially focused its lending on infrastructural projects (roads, water supplies, electrification, industrial development, housing, and technical education programs), but later expanded its scope to cover such additional sectors as nontraditional exports, tourism development, industrial development, agribusiness, telecommunications, and social development. In 1985 the bank authorized the creation of a Fund for the Economic and Social Development of Central America (FESDCA) as a temporary mechanism to permit participation by extraregional countries independent of the bank’s general resources. Mexico and the European Community (EC, subsequently the European Union—EU) registered as contributors to the fund in 1986, with Argentina, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic expressing interest in its operations. The FESDCA was absorbed into the bank’s regular activity following the approval of BCIE charter changes in 1989 that extended full BCIE membership to extraregional countries. Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Taiwan have since become extraregional members, while Venezuela has contributed to the bank’s subscribed capital without joining. In 1996 the EU and the BCIE created a Support Program for Small and Medium Enterprises in Central America (Fondo Especial de Apoyo a la Micro y Peqeu˜na Industria en Am´erica Central—FAPIC), with donations that totaled $34.7 million as of mid2001. Over the years, the BCIE has also utilized several other special funds, currently including the

Special Fund for Honduran and Nicaraguan Export Promotion (Fondo Especial de Promoci´on de Exportaciones de Honduras y Nicaragua—FEPEX), the Fund for the Strengthening of Central American Exports (Fondo para el Fortalecimiento de las Exportaciones Centroamericanas—FOEXCA), and the Special Fund for the Social Transformation of Central America (Fondo Especial para la Transformaci´on Social de Centroam´erica— FETS). In addition, donations have been given by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Denmark, Germany, and Sweden. The bank also continues to be active in the World Bank–led initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). Following the members’ 1976 decision to undertake “special capital contributions,” the bank’s resources multiplied, with annual authorization peaking at $185 million in the 1980–1981 fiscal year and cumulative lending reaching $1.5 billion for 873 loans. Subsequently, bank activity plummeted because of economic, social, political, and military turmoil in the region, loan authorizations totaling only $11 million in 1983–1984, $34 million in 1984–1985, and $26 million in 1985–1986. Lending approval jumped to $117 million in 1986– 1987 before falling again to $91 million in 1987– 1988. Although hope for BCIE revitalization was expressed for several years in conjunction with the regional peace plan negotiated by Central American leaders, the bank was reported to be in serious difficulty in early 1991 because of the accumulation of $1.25 billion in repayment arrears. Rolando Ram´ırez, who directed the elimination of approximately 100 BCIE jobs and instituted other austerity measures after being named BCIE president in 1988, resigned in March 1991 because regional members “reneged” on a recently negotiated repayment plan. His successor, Frederico Alvarez, while careful to say the BCIE was “not bankrupt,” called for an “urgent solution” to the problem of the bank’s “low level of liquid reserves.” The bank reported some improvement in the arrears problem by mid-1992 while announcing loan authorizations for 1991–1992 of about

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$105 million. Thanks to the infusion of capital from its new extraregional members, the bank was generally perceived to be in a strengthened position, with BCIE officials indicating a desire to increase lending particularly in the energy and health sectors. In addition, the bank pledged to maintain its recent emphasis on the private sector, noting that more than 50 percent of the 1991–1992 loans went to private projects, compared to a previous average of only about 15 percent. Disbursements rose to $178.5 million in 1992– 1993, and bank officials announced in late 1993 that arrears were reduced from $260 million two years previously to about $53 million. The BCIE’s return to sound fiscal footing was further underscored when disbursements in 1993–1994 grew to $275 million and then soared to $554 million for 118 loans in fiscal 1996–1997. At the end of 2006, BCIE assets stood at $4.5 billion, including $1.5 billion in capital. Disbursements for 2006 amounted to $1.6 billion as compared to $1.3 billion for 2005 and $1.1 billion for 2004, while new loan approvals totaled $2.2 billion, compared to $1.8 billion in 2005 and $763 million in 2004. The bank’s 2004–2009 strategic plan called for emphasis on poverty reduction, regional integration, and globalization. During 2006 Panama, Belize, and the Dominican Republic joined the institution. Loans for new projects tended to lean markedly toward environmentally safe development.

Inter-American Development Bank Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (IADB/BID) Web site: www.iadb.org Following a reversal of long-standing opposition by the United States, the IADB was launched in 1959 after acceptance of a charter drafted by a special commission to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States (OAS). Operations began

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October 1, 1960, with permanent headquarters in Washington, D.C. The current members of the IADB are Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The purpose of the IADB is to accelerate economic and social development in Latin America, in part by acting as a catalyst for public and private external capital. In addition to helping regional states to coordinate development efforts, the bank provides technical assistance; borrows on international capital markets; and participates in cofinancing with other multilateral agencies, national institutions, and commercial banks. Loans typically cover a maximum of 50–80 percent of project costs, depending on the level of development of the country in which the projects are located; poverty-reduction projects in the leastdeveloped countries may be eligible for 90 percent financing. In the wake of criticism that the bank had not supported regional integration and had neglected the area’s poorest nations, major contributors agreed in December 1978, after eight months of intense negotiations, to adopt a U.S.-sponsored policy that would allocate less assistance to wealthier developing nations—such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—and, within such countries, would focus primarily on projects aimed at benefiting the neediest economic sectors. Each IADB member is represented on the Board of Governors, the bank’s policymaking body, by a governor and an alternate, who convene at least once a year. Administrative responsibilities are exercised by 14 executive directors. The Board of Executive Directors is responsible for day-today oversight of operations. The bank president,

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elected by the governors, presides over sessions of the Board of Executive Directors and, in conjunction with an executive vice president and a vice president for planning and administration, is responsible for the management of various offices as well as 13 departments. These departments cover such issues as regional operations, development effectiveness and strategic planning, the private sector, sustainable development, research, information technology and general services, human resources, budget and corporate procurement, integration and regional programs, finance, and legal. An Office of Evaluation and Oversight reports directly to the Board of Executive Directors. In addition, the IADB has established the Institute for Latin American and Caribbean Integration (Instituto para la Integraci´on de Am´erica Latina y el Caribe—INTAL), founded in 1964 and headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina; and the InterAmerican Institute for Social Development (Instituto Interamericano para el Desarrollo Social— INDES), which opened in 1995 in Washington, D.C. IADB voting is on a weighted basis according to a country’s capital subscription; leading subscribers as of December 31, 2004, were the United States (30.3 percent), Argentina and Brazil (10.8 percent), Mexico (6.9 percent), Venezuela (5.8 percent), Japan (5.0 percent), and Canada (4.0 percent). Non-American members held about 16 percent of the voting shares. Total subscribed capital at that time was $101 billion. In November 1984 the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) was established as an autonomous affiliate of the IADB to “encourage the establishment, expansion, and modernization of small- and medium-sized private enterprises” (SMEs) by extending long-term loans and otherwise assuming equity positions in such projects, helping to raise additional resources, and offering advisory services. The first joint meeting of the Boards of Governors of the IADB and the IIC was held in March 1987, with the IIC making its initial disbursements in late 1989. In 1993 the IIC approved loans and equity investments totaling $124 million for 31 projects,

but approvals fell to $42.7 million for 14 projects in 1994. The decline was attributed to a “period of consolidation” precipitated by calls for a review of the corporation’s performance to date, including assessment of administrative costs. Based on the recommendation of an external committee of international experts, the IIC staff was halved to approximately 60 employees in 1994 and additional efficiency measures were instituted. Consequently, the IIC shareholders renewed their backing for the corporation at the April 1995 joint annual meeting with the IADB. Governors agreed to increase the IIC debt to equity ratio to 3:1, thereby permitting lending to increase to $600 million based on the corporation’s subscribed capital of $200 million. The governors also agreed to open IIC membership to nonmembers of the IADB, a measure designed to permit the accession of Taiwan, which has strong economic ties with many Latin American countries. As of 2001, however, all nonregional members were IADB members. In 2000 the IADB Board of Governors approved a capital increase to $700 million for the IIC. Another IADB affiliate, the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), was formally launched in January 1993. Together, the IADB, IIC, and MIF are identified as the IADB Group. Unlike the IIC, which supports individual projects directly, MIF attempts to improve the investment climate in the region in general by financing management training and developing local financial institutions designed to assist small-scale entrepreneurs. The fund also provides grants to help countries formulate policies designed to alleviate the “human and social costs” of structural adjustment. Like the IIC, MIF is an autonomous operation, although it uses IADB technical and administrative resources. About $1.3 billion was pledged (including $500 million each from Japan and the United States) for MIF’s first five years. In 1994, MIF’s first full year of operation, 29 projects totaling $64 million were approved. The IADB also serves as administrator of more than 50 trust funds—for example, the U.S.-backed Social Progress Trust Fund, the Japan Special Fund, and the Venezuelan Trust Fund.

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Relations within the IADB between the United States and some Latin members have been tense on occasion. The bank called for a $25 billion replenishment in 1986, but a dispute ensued when the United States asked for greater influence, including virtual veto power over loans. Although willing to accept the U.S. proposal to link some loans to economic reforms, Latin American and Caribbean members objected strongly to the veto request. The conflict was seen as central to the February 1988 resignation of Antonio Ortiz Mena of Mexico after 17 years as IADB president. Uruguay’s foreign minister, Enrique Iglesias, was named president effective April 1, and, shortly thereafter, a high-level review committee was established that in December called for wide-ranging reform of the bank’s procedures and organization. Concurrently, the Board of Executive Directors adopted an austerity administrative budget for 1989 and endorsed plans to reduce the bank’s staff by more than 10 percent. In early 1989 the IADB reported that 32 loans were approved in 1988 totaling $1.7 billion, down significantly from $2.4 billion in 1987 and $3.0 billion in 1986, and the lowest total since 1976. The decline was attributed to the replenishment impasse as well as the difficulty many bank members faced in undertaking new projects because of continued regional economic crisis. However, the bank’s prospects improved significantly when an 11th-hour compromise was reached on the proposed replenishment at the March 1989 Board of Governors meeting. The agreement, considered a personal triumph for Iglesias, authorized a $26.5 billion capital increase (bringing total authorized capital to $61 billion), designed to permit aggregate lending of $22.5 billion in 1990–1993. Also, $200 million was approved for the Fund for Special Operations (FSO), the bank’s concessional lending window. Although the United States was not given the blanket veto power it sought, a system of “staggered delays” was established under which challenges to specific loans would be reviewed before release of funds. In conjunction with the replenishment, the Board of Governors for the first time directed that

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some bank resources be used to support national economic policy changes via so-called sector adjustment loans. The bank also agreed, as part of its “revival,” to a thorough internal reorganization designed to enhance effectiveness and boost the IADB’s capacity to transfer resources. As a result, several new divisions were created to reflect the bank’s new priorities of regional economic integration, environmental protection, the financing of microenterprises, development of human resources, and additional channeling of nonregional funds (from Japan, in particular) to the region. Stemming in part from resolution of the replenishment issue, lending approvals in 1989 grew to $2.6 billion for 36 loans involving 29 projects in 15 countries. Approvals in 1990 jumped to $3.9 billion for 45 loans; included were the first 6 sector adjustment loans (totaling $1.3 billion), the first 3 microenterprise loans, and 10 loans that were either directly designed to improve environmental conditions or that contained significant environmental components. Continuing its rapid expansion, the bank approved $5.3 billion in loans in 1991 and $6.0 billion in 1992 and 1993. After 16 months of negotiations, agreement was reached in April 1994 on the bank’s next and biggest replenishment, under which subscribed capital grew to $100 billion. Bank officials announced an expanded mandate for lending through the end of the century, consideration to be given for the first time to the “modernization of the state” through reform, for example, of legislative and judicial institutions. In addition, a projected 40 percent of the replenishment was to be earmarked for health services, education, poverty alleviation, and other “social commitments.” More support in those areas was urged by a task force established in 1993, which otherwise described the bank’s portfolio as “generally sound.” The IADB also made it clear it would continue to assist governments establish policies designed to encourage free-market activity, while at least 5 percent of the replenishment would be used for direct loans to the private sector. That emphasis was apparently underscored at the request of donor countries, particularly the United States,

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which were to have voting power virtually equal to that of borrowing countries. The bank was also given a lead role, in conjunction with the OAS, in following up on the recommendations of the Summit of the Americas, held in December 1994 in Miami, Florida. Among other things, the 34 nations represented at the summit agreed to work toward creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005. To that end, the OAS and the IADB signed an agreement in mid-1995 to coordinate their policies and activities to promote regional economic integration. At the second Summit of the Americas, held in April 1998 in Santiago, Chile, IADB President Iglesias pledged that the bank would develop a training facility to improve its members’ bargaining skills in matters of international trade and provide $40 billion in loans in the next five years, including $5 billion for education and $500 million for microenterprises. IADB lending approvals dropped to $5.3 billion in 1994 before rebounding to a record level in 1995 of $7.3 billion for 82 projects in 22 countries. Mexico was the leading recipient of new loans, partly because of the economic crisis it suffered beginning in late 1994. The IADB credited the absence of a deeper economic crisis in Latin America to liberal economic reforms and regional integration. However, rising unemployment and social inequities within the region had begun to concern bank officials by 1996. Approvals totaled $6.8 billion in 1996 and $6.0 billion in 1997 before jumping to $10 billion in 1998. Lending in 1999 totaled $9.5 billion. In May that year the IADB and the World Bank committed a combined $5.3 billion toward a $9 billion reconstruction package for Central American countries devastated by Hurricane Mitch in October 1998. The funding concentrated on debt relief and concessional financing for infrastructure, with the IADB contribution of $3.5 billion combining soft loans and grants over a five-year period. The annual IADB meeting in late March 2000 in Washington, D.C. served to refocus attention on the effectiveness of bank lending strategies. Addressing the meeting, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers proposed the IADB

reassess its programs, increase interest charged to the more affluent borrowing countries, and accelerate the move from large-scale projects—for example, power generation infrastructure—toward smaller ones designed to help alleviate poverty. His remarks, which were supported by Iglesias, came in the context of mounting evidence that despite rapid regional economic growth in the 1990s as a whole, the percent of the population in abject poverty had not changed over the decade. According to the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 15 percent of the population in borrowing countries remained in extreme poverty, with about 40 percent living on $2 a day or less. President Iglesias noted that various economic adjustment policies, although largely successful, had not adequately confronted social problems, and he warned that resultant discontent could ultimately erode democracy in the region. In 2004 the IADB announced its support for the proposed Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and began to allocate resources to projects designed to prepare for it. The bank also committed itself to providing greater assistance to small- and medium-sized businesses and to simplifying procedures for lending to businesses in general. The subject receiving the most attention in the first half of 2005 was China’s request for membership. The United States continued to oppose China’s application, officially because of Washington’s belief that a country should not join a development bank as a donor if it owes money to another development bank (China has outstanding World Bank loans). Complicating the issue was the fact that ten IADB shareholders maintained diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Also in 2005, Luis Alberto Moreno of Colombia was elected to succeed Iglesias as IADB president. On the sidelines of the bank’s March 2007 annual meeting in Guatemala City, China signed a memorandum of understanding with the bank, laying down a framework for formal negotiations for membership. At this meeting the bank also announced that Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,

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and Nicaragua, five of the poorest countries in Latin America, were to have their debts to the bank, a sum of more than $4 billion, forgiven. Concurrently, it was announced that remittances from Latin American emigrants now exceeded all foreign investment and aid to the region.

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Loan approvals and guarantees totaled $6.4 billion in 2006, compared to $6.7 billion in 2005, $5.5 billion in 2004, $6.2 billion in 2003, and $4.1 billion in 2002. Cumulative loans and guarantees reached $145 billion; cumulative disbursements reached $125.6 billion.

SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR/ MERCOSUL) Mercado Com u´ n do Cono Sur/Mercado Comum de Cone Sul

Established: By treaty signed March 26, 1991, in Asunci´on, Paraguay, by the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Purpose: To establish a regional “common market of the southern cone” through the harmonization of policies in agriculture, industry, finance, transportation, and other sectors; to promote economic development through expanded extraregional trade and the pursuit of foreign investment. Headquarters: Montevideo, Uruguay. Principal Organs: Council of the Common Market, Common Market Group, Joint Parliamentary Commission, Secretariat. Web site: www.mercosur.int Director of the Secretariat: Eduardo Duhalde (Argentina). Membership (5): Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela. Associate Members (5): Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru. Official Languages: Portuguese, Spanish. Origin and development. The idea of a regional common market was first advanced in the late 1980s by Argentina and Brazil, which had recently signed a series of bilateral agreements that they hoped could be extended to other countries.

Supporters of the concept also argued that a regional bloc would be helpful in taking advantage of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative recently announced by U.S. President George H. W. Bush. Paraguay and Uruguay responded positively to the integration overtures from their larger neighbors, but Chile, expressing concern about the volatility of Brazil’s economy, declined to join the grouping at that point. In December 1990 the scheduled signing of a proposed common market treaty was postponed as negotiations continued on how to compensate for the two-year lead in integration by Argentina and Brazil and how to lessen the potential for their economies to overwhelm the smaller members. After agreement was reached to permit Paraguay and Uruguay to proceed at a slower pace in implementing some tariff provisions, the Treaty of Asunci´on was signed March 26, 1991, with ratification by the members’ legislatures completed by September. Membership discussions continued thereafter with Bolivia and Chile, one proposal being that they be given associate status pending expiration of a five-year moratorium on new memberships. Meanwhile, Chilean officials continued to pursue duty-free trade with Mercosur countries that would not affect Chilean tariffs on products from other nations, and on October 1, 1996, Chile became an associate member of Mercosur, subject to intraregional free trade provisions but excluded from Mercosur’s external tariff arrangements. Bolivia’s eligibility was complicated by its

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participation in the Andean Group (subsequently the Andean Community of Nations—CAN), because the Asunci´on Treaty forbids dual regional affiliations. Despite this, Bolivia was accorded observer status in 1994 and became an associate member in January 1997. Peru concluded an associate agreement in August 2003 and officially became the third associate member in December 2003. In 2004, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela were added as associate members, meaning that all CAN members were officially associated with Mercosur. In July 2005 all Mercosur members were similarly made associate members of CAN. In 2005 Venezuela officially petitioned to become a full Mercosur member. Structure. The Council of the Common Market (CMC), comprised of members’ foreign and economic ministers, is responsible for policy decisions. Negotiations with third parties are carried out under the auspices of the Common Market Group (Grupo Mercado Com´un), comprised of four regular members and an equal number of deputy members from each country. Working under the direction of the ministers of foreign affairs, the group is assisted by the Mercosur Trade Commission, which also sees to the enforcement of “common trade policy instruments for the operation of the customs union.” The Mercosur parliaments are represented in a Joint Parliamentary Commission, and there also is an Economic-Social Consultative Forum. The administrative Secretariat, assisted by several technical committees, was established in 1992 in Montevideo, Uruguay. Activities. Although negotiations during Mercosur’s first year of existence on a proposed common external tariff were unproductive, significant progress was achieved in reducing intraregional tariffs. By the end of 1992 annual intraregional trade had jumped by an estimated 50 percent, although a substantial portion of the increase resulted from a vast influx of Brazilian goods into Argentina. With the benefits of integration already accruing, the December Mercosur summit accepted further cuts in intraregional tariffs and endorsed study of the possible creation of a regional

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currency unit. Potential regional military cooperation was also discussed at a June 1993 summit, although that issue subsequently appeared to recede among Mercosur priorities. At their fifth summit, held January 17, 1994, in Montevideo, Uruguay, the Mercosur heads of state again expressed their confidence in the common market’s future. No immediate progress was reported on what became the major sticking point in Mercosur negotiations—the common external tariff. With Brazil apparently standing firm in its demand for substantial tariffs on such products as computers, telecommunications equipment, and petrochemicals, some negotiators predicted that external tariff arrangements could not be completed by the January 1, 1995, target date. However, intensive negotiations later in the year yielded sufficient agreement for the Mercosur presidents to sign the Protocol of Ouro Prˆeto on December 17 in Ouro Prˆeto, Brazil, providing for the launching of the intraregional free trade zone and common external tariff on January 1. Free trade within Mercosur was established for approximately 85 percent of the products under consideration. Intraregional tariffs on most of the others were scheduled to decline to zero within four to five years, although each Mercosur country was permitted to protect selected industries for a longer period. In regard to the common external tariff, duties of from 0 to 20 percent were applied to most imports from outside the region. Plans were also endorsed for further discussions toward monetary integration and the coordination of industrial and agricultural policies. Although still far from a full common market, Mercosur, as one of the world’s largest economic blocs (covering approximately 200 million people), subsequently attracted substantial interest from other regional groupings. Thus, the European Union (EU) signed a cooperation agreement in December 1995 with Mercosur, pledging to pursue a reduction in EU-Mercosur tariffs as well as broader economic, scientific, and social consultation. In the period leading up to the 1997 Mercosur summit, held June 19 in Asunci´on, Brazilian import controls once again stirred controversy between

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Brazil and the other members. In response, on the day before the summit, Brazil extended the exemptions it made for Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Chile until October 1997. While that action temporarily mollified the other members, the controversy promised to resurface at a later date. Meanwhile, the current leaders agreed that the Mercosur members and associate members should enter as a group into trade negotiations with others, such as the EU, CAN, and Mexico. They adopted the same approach toward the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Throughout 1997 Mercosur engaged in a series of meetings with Andean countries to create a free trade zone between the two groupings. In April 1998 Mercosur signed a framework agreement with CAN that envisaged the dismantling of trade barriers in 2000. Subsequently, a Mercosur summit in late July in Argentina reaffirmed its commitment to the proposed South American free trade zone. However, Mercosur was unable to resolve two issues for its own members: how to regulate the regional automobile market and how to settle Brazil’s complaint over Argentina’s tariffs on Brazilian sugar. On the political front, the presidents pledged to keep the region free of weapons of mass destruction and signed the Ushuaia Protocol on July 14, which committed the members to appropriate standards of democratic governance and threatened expulsion for noncompliance. The year 1999 was initially dominated by a political crisis in Paraguay and by a major loss in the value of Brazil’s currency, although regional recession later became a primary concern. Argentina, in particular, complained that the effective devaluation of the real gave Brazil’s exports an unfair trade advantage, leading Buenos Aires to raise barriers against, principally, Brazilian cotton textiles and steel. In June 1999 the first EU-Latin AmericanCaribbean summit was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Decisions included an agreement to open negotiations on establishing the world’s largest free trade area, although the initial talks, scheduled for November, were restricted to nontariff concerns. Trade discussions were expected to proceed in

parallel with the next round of global talks sponsored by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The June 30, 2000, summit in Buenos Aires was broadly viewed as an effort to revitalize Mercosur. Chile, despite reservations about what it regarded as the group’s high external tariff, announced that it intended to seek full membership. Among other things, the presidents reiterated the importance of coordinating investment incentives and of presenting a unified front during trade negotiations. On September 1, at a meeting of South American presidents in Bras´ılia, Brazil, participants agreed to relaunch the CAN-Mercosur talks on trade preferences and called for introduction of a South American free trade area in the “briefest term possible.” The year concluded with a December 8 Mercosur summit in Florian´opolis, Brazil, where the major news was a decision to suspend membership talks with Chile, given that country’s decision to pursue a bilateral trade accord with the United States. The tenth anniversary Mercosur summit convened June 20–21, 2001, in Asunci´on. Highlights included an agreement to cut the common external tariff by one point, to 12.5 percent, by January 1, 2002, and to establish a disputes tribunal. It was anticipated that such a tribunal would have the authority to settle conflicts that repeatedly threatened further integration, such as disputes between Brazil and Argentina over motor vehicles, poultry, pigs, sugar, dairy products, footwear, and steel. Also at the summit, Venezuela’s President Hugo Ch´avez formally submitted his country’s application for associate membership, and the Mercosur leaders voiced continuing support for lower trade barriers with the EU and the United States, despite slow progress in negotiations. At the July 4–5, 2002, summit in Buenos Aires, Mercosur voiced firm support for Argentina’s efforts to overcome its economic crisis, criticized the United States for a lack of attention to the needs of Latin America, and welcomed to the session Mexican President Vicente Fox, who argued for a Mexican-Mercosur tariff-free zone. Progress was reported in resolving several issues, including differences over trade in motor vehicles, but

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the national leaders admitted that adverse regional economic and financial circumstances made it difficult to speed progress toward further integration. In contrast, trade negotiations with the Andean Community continued to gain momentum. At the 23rd summit, held December 5–6 in Bras´ılia, a framework agreement with CAN was signed, although some quarters expressed frustration that a detailed pact had yet to be concluded. At the end of 2002 the Southern Cone was still laboring under the burden of adverse economic conditions, with national leaders being forced to abandon their collective commitment to holding inflation under 5 percent annually as one consequence. Mercosur was also unable to resolve internal differences relating to the organization’s common external tariff and other matters that complicated trade negotiations involving the EU and the proposed FTAA. Nevertheless, Brazil’s presidentelect Luiz In´acio da Silva called for strengthening Mercosur through such measures as raising Bolivia and Chile to full membership and creating a directly elected Mercosur Parliament. At the June 18–19, 2003, summit in Asunci´on, Mercosur set 2006 as the target date for establishing the parliament. The 25th summit, held December 16–17, 2003, in Montevideo was highlighted by completion of a ten-year free trade agreement with CAN members Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru. The session also marked Peru’s entry as an associate member of Mercosur, an agreement to that effect having concluded August 25. A principal impetus for the Mercosur-CAN pact was to present a stronger front during FTAA negotiations, although prospects for a comprehensive hemispheric trade agreement had recently receded (see separate article on the Latin American Integration Association for details). In early 2004, stalled trade discussions with the EU resumed, the EU having signaled increased flexibility on the sticking points of EU tariffs and agricultural subsidies. At the same time, Mercosur negotiators reportedly shifted their focus away from subsidies toward the issue of market access for exports from Mercosur members to the EU. Mercosur was also contemplating trade agreements in Africa and the Middle East as well as with China, India, and Japan.

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However, “fundamental differences” among the members were still reportedly hamstringing Mercosur progress as of the mid-2005 summit. Among other things, Brazil and Argentina were embroiled in a sharp dispute over Argentina’s plans to impose trade restrictions on goods entering Argentina. On a more positive note, the summit endorsed the creation of a new Mercosur development fund to assist Paraguay and Uruguay in closing the “wealth gap” between them and Argentina and Brazil. Internal conflict between Argentina and Uruguay over the construction on the Uruguayan side of the Uruguay River of two cellulose plants has been a central issue for Mercosur since 2005. The plants represent the largest foreign investment in Uruguay’s history (approximately $1.7 billion) and are funded by European investors. The Argentines object to the plants on environmental grounds. Uruguay believes the matter should be settled via the conflict resolution mechanisms of Mercosur, while Argentina claims it is a bilateral matter that should be settled in The Hague. Argentina formally filed papers at The Hague in early May 2006. Part of the conflict has manifested in a multimonth blockade of bridges between the two countries by Argentine environmental groups. This blockade was suspended at the behest of the Argentina government when they filed with The Hague. The situation is compounded by Mercosur’s current General Secretary Eduardo Duhalde being from Argentina, so therefore Uruguay has been blocked in its attempt to have mediation take place within the group. This conflict has caused significant conflict between Argentina and Uruguay and could threaten the cohesion of Mercosur, which has been plagued by charges from Uruguay and Paraguay that the group disproportionately favors larger partners Argentina and Brazil. The rhetoric has been heated, including the statement by former Uruguayan president Jorge Battle that “leaving Mercosur is the best alternative” for his country. Another former president, Julio Maria Sanguinetti, claimed that Mercosur was a “wounded project” and that the paper mill conflict constitutes a “regional crisis.”

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In a clear political message to the other countries in the group, especially Argentina, Uruguay’s President Tabare Vazquez used a visit to Washington to note his dissatisfaction with Mercosur “as it currently operates.” Furthermore, his trip was focused on free trade negotiations with the United States, a point of contention among many Latin American states, including Mercosur members. In fact, Venezuela publicly stated it left CAN because its members signed free trade accords with the United States. The accession of Venezuela caused an immediate leftward turn in Mercosur politics. Cuban leader Fidel Castro made an appearance as a special guest at the July 20–21, 2006, summit in Cordoba, Argentina, although Cuba is not a member of Mercosur. By the time of the January 19, 2007,

meeting in Rio de Janeiro, the bloc’s new direction became much more apparent, with Ch´avez proposing a shift in policy toward helping the region’s poor and developing a “Socialism for the 21st century.” Bolivia and Ecuador, both countries with suspicions about free trade, were said to be interested in joining. In April 2007 the first South American energy summit was held in Venezuela. At this meeting it was agreed that work should start on merging Mercosur and the Andean Community (see separate article) into a bloc to be known as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), with headquarters in Quito, Ecuador. Uruguay continued to criticize Mercosur’s new political direction, even as a new Mercosur Parliament opened in Montevideo in May 2007.

U N I T E D N AT I O N S ( U N )

Established: By charter signed June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, United States, effective October 24, 1945. Purpose: To maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among states based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; to achieve international cooperation in solving problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character; and to harmonize the actions of states in the attainment of these common ends. Headquarters: New York, United States. Principal Organs: General Assembly (all members), Security Council (15 members), Economic and Social Council (54 members), Trusteeship Council (5 members), International Court of Justice (15 judges), Secretariat. Web site: http://www.un.org Secretary General: Ban Ki Moon (South Korea). Membership: 192. Official Languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish. All are also working languages. Origin and development. The idea of creating a new intergovernmental organization to replace the League of Nations was born early in World War II and first found public expression in an Inter-Allied Declaration signed on June 12, 1941, in London, England, by representatives of five Commonwealth states and eight European governments-in-exile. Formal use of the term United Nations first occurred in the Declaration

by United Nations, signed on January 1, 1942, in Washington, D.C., on behalf of 26 states that subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter (August 14, 1941) and pledged their full cooperation for the defeat of the Axis powers. At the Moscow Conference on October 30, 1943, representatives of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United Kingdom, and the United States proclaimed that they “recognized the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.” In meetings in Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C., between August 21 and October 7, 1944, the four powers reached agreement on preliminary proposals and determined to prepare more complete suggestions for discussion at a subsequent conference of all involved nations. Meeting from April 25 to June 25, 1945, in San Francisco, California, representatives of 50 states participated in drafting the United Nations Charter, which was formally signed June 26. Poland was not represented at the San Francisco Conference but later signed the charter and is counted among the 51 “original” UN members. Following ratification by the five permanent members of the Security Council and most other signatories, the charter entered into force October 24, 1945. The General Assembly, which convened in its first regular session January 10, 1946, accepted an invitation to establish the permanent home of the organization in the United States; privileges and immunities of the UN headquarters were defined in a Headquarters Agreement with the U.S. government signed June 26, 1947.

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The membership of the UN, which increased from 51 to 60 during the period 1945–1950, remained frozen at that level for the next five years as a result of U.S.-Soviet disagreements over admission. The deadlock was broken in 1955 when the superpowers agreed on a “package” of 16 new members: four Soviet-bloc states, 4 Western states, and 8 “uncommitted” states. Since then, states have normally been admitted with little delay. The exceptions are worth noting. The admission of the two Germanys in 1973 led to proposals for admission of the two Koreas and of the two Vietnams. Neither occurred prior to the formal unification of Vietnam in 1976, and action in regard to the two Koreas was delayed for another 15 years. On November 16, 1976, the United States used its 18th veto in the Security Council to prevent the admission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, having earlier in the same session, on June 23, 1976, employed its 15th veto to prevent Angola from joining. Later in the session, however, the United States relented, and Angola gained admission. In July 1977 Washington dropped its objection to Vietnam’s membership as well. With the admission of Brunei, the total membership during the 39th session of the General Assembly in 1984 stood at 159. The figure rose to 160 with the admission of Namibia in April 1990, fell back to 159 after the merger of North and South Yemen in May, advanced again to 160 via the September admission of Liechtenstein, and returned to 159 when East and West Germany merged in October. Seven new members (Estonia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia) were admitted September 17, 1991, at the opening of the 46th General Assembly. Eight of the new states resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) were admitted March 2, 1992, along with San Marino. Russia announced the previous December that it was assuming the former USSR seat. Three of the breakaway Yugoslavian republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia) were admitted May 22. Capping an unprecedented period of

expansion, Georgia became the 179th member on July 31. The total dropped back to 178 with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993, then moved up to 180 when the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined separately on January 19. On April 8 the General Assembly approved the admission of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” the name being carefully fashioned because of the terminological dispute between the new nation and Greece. Monaco and newly independent Eritrea were admitted May 28, followed by Andorra on July 28. Palau, which achieved independence following protracted difficulty in concluding its U.S. trusteeship status, became the 185th member December 15, 1994. Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga were admitted September 14, 1999, and Tuvalu joined September 5, 2000. A change of government in October 2000 led to the November 1, 2000, admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). On September 22, 1992, the General Assembly, acting on the recommendation of the Security Council, decided the FRY could not automatically assume the UN membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The assembly informed the FRY that it would have to apply on its own for UN membership, and such an application was submitted the following day. However, no action on the request was taken by the assembly because of concern over the Federal Republic’s role in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, later, its actions regarding the ethnic Albanian population in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo. As a consequence, the FRY was excluded from participation in the work of the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies. Throughout this period, however, the UN membership of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia technically remained in effect. A certain ambiguity, apparently deliberate, surrounded the issue, permitting the FRY and others to claim that it was still a member, albeit excluded from active participation, while some nations argued that the membership referred only to the antecedent Yugoslavian state. In any event, the flag of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which

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was also the flag of the FRY, continued to fly outside UN headquarters with the flags of all other UN members, and the old nameplate remained positioned in front of an empty chair during assembly proceedings. In October 2000 the Security Council, in a resolution recommending admission of the FRY, acknowledged “that the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist.” A representative of the FRY took up the empty seat, and a new FRY flag replaced that of the former Yugoslavia. On September 10, 2002, the UN admitted Switzerland, which had long maintained a permanent observer mission at UN headquarters and had actively participated as a full member of the various UN specialized and related agencies. The Swiss government, having concluded that UN membership in the post–Cold War era would not jeopardize its long-standing international neutrality, sought admission after winning majority support from Swiss voters at a March 2002 referendum. TimorLeste became the 191st member on September 27. In 2003 the FRY became the “state union” of Serbia and Montenegro, which dissolved in June 2006, following a successful independence referendum in Montenegro. Accordingly, on June 28 the world’s newest independent state, Montenegro, was admitted as the UN’s 192nd member. Serbia, as the successor state to the state union, retained the UN seat held to that point by the FRY. The Holy See (Vatican City State) has formal observer status in the General Assembly and maintains a permanent observer mission at UN headquarters. In July 2004 the UN granted the Holy See the full range of membership privileges, with the exception of voting. In July 2007 Taiwan formally applied for membership in the UN. The application marked the first effort by the island nation to gain membership as Taiwan and not the Republic of China. The bid was rejected by the UN legal affairs office on the grounds that General Assembly Resolution 2758 granted sole representation for China to the People’s Republic of China. The General Assembly subsequently approved by consensus the recommendation of the legal affairs office in September.

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Structure. The UN system can be viewed as comprising (1) the principal organs, (2) subsidiary organs established to deal with particular aspects of the organization’s responsibilities, (3) a number of specialized and related agencies, and (4) a series of ad hoc global conferences to examine particularly pressing issues. The institutional structure of the principal organs resulted from complex negotiations that attempted to balance both the conflicting claims of national sovereignty and international responsibility, and the rights of large and small states. The principle of sovereign equality of all member states is exemplified in the General Assembly; that of the special responsibility of the major powers, in the composition and procedure of the Security Council. The other principal organs included in the charter are the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council (whose activity was suspended in 1994), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the Secretariat. UN-related intergovernmental bodies constitute a network of Specialized Agencies established by intergovernmental agreement as legal and autonomous international entities with their own memberships and organs and which, for the purpose of “coordination,” are brought “into relationship” with the UN. While sharing many of their characteristics, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains legally distinct from the Specialized Agencies; the World Trade Organization, which emerged from the UN-sponsored General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), has no formal association with the UN. The proliferation of subsidiary organs can be attributed to many complex factors, including new demands and needs as more states attained independence; the effects of the Cold War; a subsequent diminution of East-West bipolarity; a greater concern with promoting economic and social development through technical assistance programs (almost entirely financed by voluntary contributions); and a resistance to any radical change in international trade patterns. For many years, the largest and most politically significant of the subordinate organs were the United Nations Conference

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on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which were initial venues for debates, for conducting studies and presenting reports, for convening conferences and specialized meetings, and for mobilizing the opinions of nongovernmental organizations. They also provided a way for less developed states to formulate positions in relation to the industrialized states. During the 1970s both became intimately involved in activities related to program implementation, and on January 1, 1986, UNIDO became the UN’s 16th Specialized Agency. One of the most important developments in the UN system has been the use of ad hoc conferences to deal with major international problems.

Security Council: Peacekeeping Forces and Missions In addition to the forces and missions listed below, the United Nations Command in Korea (established on June 25, 1950) remains technically in existence. The only UN member now contributing to the command is the United States, which proposed in June 1975 that it be dissolved. As of 2007 no formal action had been taken on the proposal (see Security Council: Origin and development).

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Ha¨ıti (MINUSTAH) Established: By Security Council resolution of April 30, 2004. (MINUSTAH assumed the authority previously exercised by the Multinational Interim Force [MIF] that had been authorized by the Security Council in February 2004.)

Purpose: To support the constitutional and political process underway in Haiti; to help maintain security and stability; to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety, and public order; to assist the transitional government in Haiti in reforming the Haitian national police; to assist in the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups; and to provide support for the holding of free and fair elections. Headquarters: Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Force Commander: Maj. Gen. Carlos Dos Santos Cruz (Brazil). Composition: As of October 31, 2007, 7,060 troops and 1,829 civilian police from Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Togo, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, and Yemen.

Economic and Social Council: Regional Commissions The primary aim of the five Regional Commissions, which report annually to ECOSOC, is to assist in raising the level of economic activity in their respective regions and to maintain and strengthen the economic relations of the states in each region, both among themselves and with others. The commissions adopt their own procedural rules, including how they select officers. Each commission is headed by an executive secretary, who holds the rank of under secretary of the UN, while their Secretariats are integral parts of the overall United Nations Secretariat.

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The commissions are empowered to make recommendations directly to member governments and to Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, but no action can be taken in respect to any state without the agreement of that state.

Planning, Sustainable Development and Human Settlements, International Trade and Integration, Natural Resources and Infrastructure, Population and Development, Productive Development and Management, Social Development, and Statistics and Economic Projections.

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

Web site: http://www.eclac.org/

Comisi´on Econ´omica para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) Established: February 25, 1948, as the Economic Commission for Latin America; current name adopted in 1984. Purpose: To “initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted actions for . . . raising the level of economic activity in Latin America and the Caribbean and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, both among themselves and with other countries of the world.” Headquarters: Santiago, Chile. Subregional headquarters are located in Mexico City, Mexico, and Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. Principal Subsidiary Organs: Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee, Central American Economic Cooperation Committee, Committee of High-Level Government Experts from Developing Member Countries for Analysis of the Achievement of the International Development Strategy in the Latin American Region, Conference on the Integration of Women into the Economic and Social Development of Latin America and the Caribbean, Latin American and Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (Instituto Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Planificati´on Econ´omica y Social—ILPES), Latin American Demographic Center (Centro Latinoamericano y Caribe˜no de Demograf´ıa—CELADE), Statistical Conference of the Americas of ECLAC, Secretariat. The Secretariat includes nine divisions: Economic Development, Economic and Social

Executive Secretary: Jos´e Luis Machinea (Argentina). Membership (44): Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Spain, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Associate Members (8): Anguilla, Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Turks and Caicos, and United States Virgin Islands. Recent activities. Following a decade of political instability and economic crisis, in early 1992 ECLAC Executive Secretary Gert Rosenthal said that the region had reached an economic turning point as reduced inflation, growth in per capita output, and a return of foreign and domestic investment justified a sense of optimism concerning the future. However, he added that high debt remained a severe drain, while the “black mark” of widespread poverty underscored the fact that national economic advances did not always translate into a better standard of living for the poor. In early 1995 ECLAC reported that the region had just completed its fourth consecutive year of strong economic growth, GDP having risen an estimated 3.7 percent in 1994. However, the commission noted that a greater percentage of the region’s population lived in poverty than had in 1980. That trend continued into 1996, commission officials

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describing the prospects for the elimination of poverty as poor during the April ECLAC session held in San Jos´e, Costa Rica. Among other things, ECLAC called upon its members to emphasize privatization of former state-run enterprises in order to attract greater foreign investment. The commission also pledged to conduct regular consultations with national governments to ensure the relevance of ECLAC operations and agreed to undertake a thorough review of its organization and programs in the context of the ongoing reform process being conducted throughout the UN. At the 27th ECLAC session in Oranjestad, Aruba, in May 1999, the commission approved a work program for 2000–2001 with a dozen subprograms focusing on, for example, competitiveness, production specialization, and the global economy; integration, regionalism, and cooperation; productive, technological, and entrepreneurial development; social development and social equity; environmental and land resource sustainability; and population and development. The 2002 ECLAC review of economic performance in the region described the past five years as “a lost half-decade” marked by recession, rising inflation, increased poverty, and higher unemployment. Although recovery started in 2003 and the regional economy grew by 5.5 percent

in 2004, ECLAC leaders argued that poverty and unemployment “had not budged” and that the wealthy segment of the population was the primary beneficiary of the recent expansion. In 2005 ECLAC and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) announced a new program of cooperation on economic and social development in the region. Specifically, ECLAC began providing training to officials on issues such as trade negotiations, disaster assessment, and tourism management. In July 2006 ECLAC predicted that economic growth in the region would exceed 5 percent for the year but urged member states to implement economic safeguards against rising energy prices. ECLAC conferred membership on Japan and associate membership on the Turks and Caicos in 2006 and on the Republic of Korea in 2007. For 2007 ECLAC and Germany launched the program Toward a More Just and Equitable Globalization to cooperate on tax reform, government technology, and renewable energy. The accord covered a threeyear period and was designed to support projects in individual countries. The program was undertaken in tandem with ECLAC’s 2007–2008 cooperation program with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) titled Enhancing Economic and Social Conditions and Opportunities of Vulnerable Groups in Latin America.

PART FOUR

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN THE AMERICAS, 2007

ANGUILLA

BAHAMAS

July 20. Talks on Constitutional Changes Postponed. Government officials postpone initial talks with the United Kingdom over proposed changes to Anguilla’s Constitution that would pave the way to its autonomy. Britain assured that it would not force any changes on Anguilla.

May 2. Former Prime Minister Returned to Office. Hubert Alexander Ingraham (Free National Movement), who served as prime minister 1992– 1997, is returned to office. The opposition Free National Movement (FNM) returns to power after the election, at which, for the first time, a governing party was ousted after only one five-year term. In the legislative election on the same day, the FNM wins 23 seats and the opposition Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) wins 18 seats.

ARGENTINA October 4. Executive Control Increased. President N´estor Kirchner issues a decree effectively granting financial control of the legislative and judicial branches of government to the executive. October 28. New President Elected. Cristina Fern´andez de Kirchner (Victory Front [Frente para la Victoria—FPV], a faction of the Justicialist Party [Partido Justicialista—PJ]), is elected president. The wife of the previous president, N´estor Kirchner, she becomes Argentina’s first elected female head of state after her husband decided not to run for a second term. (She is sworn in for a four-year term and reshuffles the cabinet on December 10.) October 28. Legislative Seats. In legislative elections, 24 seats in the 72-member Senate and 130 seats in the 257-member Chamber of Deputies are contested. Allied parties of the PJ increase their majority in both chambers.

BERMUDA June 7. Minister Arrested. Nelson Bascombe, who had resigned as health minister in February, is arrested on theft and corruption charges. Michael Scott is sworn in as his replacement on June 12. December 12. New Governor Sworn In. Sir Richard Gozney is sworn in as the new governor, replacing Sir John Vereker, who had stepped down from the post in October. December 18. Legislative Election. In a replay of the 2003 balloting, the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) wins 22 House of Representatives seats, and the United Bermuda Party (UBP) wins 14. New UBP leader Michael Dunkley fails to win reelection from his constituency, leaving the party in disarray.

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BOLIVIA January 24. New Cabinet Named. President Evo Morales appoints a new cabinet with a “distinct leftist tilt” in the midst of a severe east/west schism regarding constitutional revision and other issues. August 2. Land Reform Initiative. President Morales announces a land reform initiative that would redistribute some land that is not economically viable or sitting idle to the country’s poor. December 9. Draft Constitution Approved. Despite a boycott by the opposition, the assembly approves a draft constitution. Subsequently, the country’s four eastern provinces adopt their own statutes seeking greater autonomy. Tensions in the region prompt President Morales to put the armed forces on alert.

BRAZIL January 1. President Inaugurated. President Luiz In´acio (“Lula”) da Silva (Workers’ Party) is inaugurated for another four-year term, following reelection on October 29, 2006. Vice President Jos´e Alencar (Brazilian Republican Party), following reelection, is inaugurated for another term concurrent with the president. October 4. “Landmark” Supreme Court Ruling. In what analysts called a landmark ruling that could enhance political stability, the Supreme Court ruled that electoral mandates belong to political parties, not to individual legislators. The ruling would allow lawmakers to change party affiliation only under specific circumstances.

ernment, winning in a landslide with ten seats. The incumbent NDP wins two seats. VIP leader Ralph O’Neal heads the new government as First Premier under the new constitution.

CANADA October. Minority Government Survives Votes of Confidence. The Conservative Party of Canada’s (CPC) minority government, led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, survives three votes of confidence in the House of Commons (the lower chamber of the bicameral federal legislature).

CHILE August 29. Scores Arrested During Protests. Nearly 700 people are arrested and 50 are injured in a series of protests in major cities against the government’s economic policies that demonstrators claim have failed to bridge the gap between rich and poor. September 11–12. Violence Erupts on Anniversary of Coup. A police officer is killed and 40 others are injured during violent clashes with demonstrators on the 34th anniversary of the military coup that ousted President Salvador Allende in 1973. November 13. Bipartisan Education Reform Initiative. A bipartisan pact on educational reforms is seen as a significant political victory for President Michelle Bachelet.

BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS

COLOMBIA

June 15. New Constitution Adopted. A new constitution is promulgated, after having been proposed in May by the government of Orlando Smith (National Democratic Party—NDP) and unanimously approved by the Legislative Council. Among the new powers of the British Virgin Islands government is the creation of a national security council. August 20. New Government Elected. The Virgin Islands Party (VIP) regains control of the gov-

May 25. President Offers to Release FARC Prisoners. In a move that puzzles international observers and domestic critics and supporters alike, ´ President Alvaro Uribe V´elez unilaterally offers to release hundreds of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) prisoners. His expressed goal was to facilitate the release of hostages held by FARC, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and a dozen departmental legislators from Valle del Cauca. The unilateral release

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN THE AMERICAS, 2007

of several dozen FARC insurgents did not inspire reciprocity, however. June 18. Hostages Killed. Eleven of the 12 Valle deputies held hostage by FARC are reported killed after an armed attack on a FARC position by an unidentified group or force. The FARC claims the 11 were victims of crossfire during the attack; the government claims the FARC shot the captives to prevent their escape. Public reaction to the killings is massive: nearly 1 million Colombians demonstrate across the country against the killings on July 5. August 31. Uribe Accepts Mediation Offer from Venezuelan President. In another surprising development, President Uribe accepts Venezuelan President Hugo Ch´avez’s offer to mediate talks between the government and the FARC. November 21. Breakdown in Relations with Ch´avez. President Uribe halts attempts by the Venezuelan president to negotiate the release of hostages held by the FARC, claiming that Ch´avez broke with agreed-upon protocol by meeting with a FARC commander before consulting Uribe.

COSTA RICA June 7. Diplomatic Ties with Taiwan Severed. Costa Rica ends 63 years of diplomatic relations with Taiwan by switching its recognition to the mainland People’s Republic of China. President Oscar Arias S´anchez says he wants to attract more economic investment from China. October 7. Referendum Approves CAFTA Membership. A national referendum on Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) membership results in a 51.6 percent “yes” vote, sufficient for ratification. (Entry into CAFTA is expected to be formalized in March 2008.)

CUBA Early 2007. The dominant issue in Cuban affairs is the condition of President Fidel Castro. Before entering the hospital in 2006, the Cuban leader said that relinquishing authority to his brother, Ra´ul,

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was “provisional.” (Castro’s health remains an issue throughout the year.)

ECUADOR January 15. New President, Vice President. President Rafael Correa Delgado and Vice President Lenin Moreno Garc´es, both of the Country Alliance Movement (Movimiento Alianza Pa´ıs— MPA´IS), are inaugurated for four-year terms, following election of November 26, 2006. April 15. Referendum on Creation of a Constituent Assembly. Voters approve the ballot measure to form a constituent assembly with the power to draft a new constitution. President Correa had called for a constituent assembly and new constitution to weaken the unpopular Congress. Some 57 legislators who opposed plans for a new constitution were dismissed for obstruction by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal prior to the congressional vote approving the referendum. September 30. Constituent Assembly Election. President Correa’s MPA´IS party wins a decisive victory in the election for delegates to the constituent assembly with 69.5 percent of the vote. The MPA´IS and its allies have approximately two-thirds of the seats in the 130-seat assembly. October 31. Congress Suspended. In its first meeting, the constituent assembly votes overwhelmingly to “assume the legislative powers and duties” of the opposition-controlled Congress. It suspends Congress without pay until a new constitution is approved by national referendum sometime next year.

EL SALVADOR February 20. Three Officials Killed. Three members of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista—Arena), the party of President El´ıas Antonio (“Tony”) Saca Gonz´alez, are kidnapped and killed while in Guatemala for a parliamentary meeting. The motive for the murders was unclear. Among the dead was the son of the late Roberto d’Aubuisson Arrieta, Arena party’s founder.

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FRENCH GUIANA June 10 and 17. National Assembly Elections. Christiane Taubira, founder of the leftist Walwari movement, is reelected to the National Assembly. Chantel Berthelot of the Guianese Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Guyanais—PSG), an affiliate of the French Socialist Party, is also elected, replacing incumbent L´eon Bertrand of the Gaullist Union for a Popular Movement (UPM).

GUADELOUPE June 10 and 17. National Assembly Elections. Divers Gauche (Diverse Left) candidates Eric Jalton and Jeany Marc win two seats; Gabrielle LouisCarabin of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) wins one seat; and Victorin Lurel of the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste—PS) wins one seat. Lurel was elected from the fourth district, which still includes Saint Barthelemy and Saint Martin. Accordingly, he continues to represent both new overseas collectivities until the next National Assembly election. The department’s senators are Lucette Michaux-Chevry (UMP), Jacques Gillot of the United Guadeloupe, Socialism and Reality (Guadeloupe Unie, Socialisme et R´ealit´e— GUSR), a PS offshoot, and Daniel Marsin of the Socialist Renewal (Renouveau Socialiste/Divers Gauche).

GUATEMALA September 9. Legislative Elections. The Grand National Alliance (Gana), party of then-President Oscar Jos´e Berger Perdomo, fell to second place in the legislative poll behind the National Union for Hope (UNE), reflecting a continuing trend (since 1986) of not returning a ruling party to power. October 8. Preelection Violence. An associate of presidential candidate Gen. (Ret.) Otto Perez Molina and a security guard are shot and killed in Guatemala City. The killings are the most recent in a wave of violence ahead of the country’s presidential election campaign. At least 38 political leaders and activists have been killed.

November 4. Presidential Election. In balloting ´ at which turnout was less than 50 percent, Alvaro Colom Caballeros (UNE) is elected president with 52.8 percent of the vote over Otto P´erez Molina of the Patriotic Party (Partido Patriota—PP).

GUYANA September 20. UN Resolves Sea Sovereignty Dispute. The United Nations International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea unanimously rules in favor of Guyana in its maritime border dispute with Surinam, dating to 2004.

HAITI October 10. Senate Elections Postponed. Legislative elections for a third of the seats in the Senate, which had been scheduled for November 25, are postponed due to allegations of corruption linked to the electoral council. (A new national electoral council is named on December 11.)

JAMAICA September 3. New Government Elected. The Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) wins a slim majority in the general election, ending the reign of the People’s National Party (PNP), which had been in power since 1989. The election was said to be the closest in Jamaica’s history. (The JLP wins 50.1 percent of the vote; the PNP receives 49.8 percent.) Orrett Bruce Golding, leader of the JLP, is sworn in as prime minister on September 11 and names a new cabinet on September 14.

MARTINIQUE June 10 and 17. National Assembly Elections. Three incumbents are returned, but Philippe Edmond-Mariette loses in the second round to Serge Letchimy of the Martinique Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Martiniquais—PPM). The department is represented in the Senate by

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN THE AMERICAS, 2007

Claude Lise (PPM) and Serge Larcher (Divers Gauche).

MEXICO September 10. Explosions Disrupt Gas Production. A radical group identified as the Popular Revolutionary Army (Ej´ercito Popular Revolucionario—EPR) claims responsibility for a series of explosions that cut natural gas supplies, causing stoppages in 60 percent of Mexico’s steel production and the shutdown of two major auto plants the next day. The state oil company says the attacks will cost hundreds of millions of dollars in production losses.

NICARAGUA January 10. President Inaugurated. President Daniel Ortega Saavedra (Sandinist National Liberation Front) is inaugurated for a five-year term, following reelection on November 5, 2006, and appoints a new cabinet. Vice President Jaime Morales Carazo (Sandinist National Liberation Front), also elected in November, is inaugurated for a term concurrent with that of the president. December 13. Island Dispute Partially Settled. The International Court of Justice rules that three islands in a disputed archipelago belong to Colombia, not Nicaragua. The court says it will rule later on a disagreement between Colombia and Nicaragua over other islands in the chain and the two countries’ maritime border.

PANAMA August 27. Cabinet Resigns. The entire cabinet resigns in the wake of a medicine scandal, putting pressure on President Mart´ın Torrijos Espino to replace five ministers linked to the scandal. Five ministers are replaced in a reshuffle on September 1. September 7. Status of Noriega. A U.S. federal judge refuses to block the extradition of former dictator Gen. Manuel Noriega to France, where he had earlier been convicted of a number of criminal

611

offenses. But it was announced that Noriega would remain in U.S. custody until all appeal routes had been exhausted. Panama had wanted him returned as a prisoner of war, while Washington, feeling that he would be accorded light treatment in his homeland, preferred extradition to France.

PARAGUAY May 8. President Won’t Seek Reelection. President Nicanor Duarte Frutos announces that he has given up on his effort to challenge the one-term limitation, therefore abandoning his plans to run in 2008. Duarte backs the former education minister, Blanca Ovelar, prompting further divisions within the ruling Colorado Party. September 28. Opposition Backs Ex-Bishop’s Presidency Bid. Fernando Lugo, a former bishop who renounced his clerical position in 2006 in order to be eligible for the next presidential ballot, is backed by a newly formed opposition coalition, the Patriotic Alliance for Change, after a larger opposition coalition dissolved. October 3. Vice President Resigns. Vice President Luis Castiglioni, a rival of Ovelar and critic of the president, resigns his post in order to run as the Colorado Party’s presidential candidate in April 2008. October 31. High Court Clears General’s Presidential Bid. The Supreme Court annuls the mutiny conviction of Gen. (Ret.) Lino C´esar Oviedo— accused in 1996 of plotting a coup—clearing the way for him to contest the 2008 presidential election.

PERU April 26. Crack Down on Strikes by Farmers. With much of the chamber abstaining, the Congress gives the president the authority to rule by decree for 60 days on issues relating to drug trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime. The measure is part of President Alan Garc´ıa’s hard-line response to disputes with coca farmers in the highlands, who had organized strikes and blockades to protest the forcible eradication of their crops.

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December 14. Trade Agreement with U.S. The United States signs a free trade agreement with Peru.

without the help of other parties. Manning reshuffles the cabinet on November 7.

TURKS and CAICOS ISLANDS ST. LUCIA May 1. Diplomatic Relations with Taiwan and China. The Taiwanese flag is raised in Castries, which, momentarily at least, makes St. Lucia the only country in the world having diplomatic ties with both Chinas. September 7. Prime Minister Dies. Prime Minister Sir John George Melvin Compton (United Workers’ Party) dies at age 82 after having suffered a series of strokes. He had negotiated the island’s independence from Britain in 1979. Party chair and cabinet minister Stephenson King, who had been acting prime minister since May when Compton fell ill, is inaugurated as Compton’s successor on September 9. He installs a new government on September 12. November 26. Compton’s Daughter Elected to Fill His Seat. In a special election to fill the legislative seat vacated at Compton’s death, his daughter, Jeannine Compton, is elected to parliament.

SURINAME October 1. Maritime Dispute Resolved. A United Nations tribunal ends a six-year maritime boundary dispute between Suriname and Guyana by giving each country access to an offshore oil basin believed to have shores of oil and gas. Both countries agreed to abide by the ruling.

TRINIDAD and TOBAGO November 5. Legislative Election. Prime Minister Patrick Manning retains his office following elections for the House of Representatives in which his party, the People’s National Movement (PNM), increases its majority to 26 of the newly enlarged chamber’s 41 seats. The PNM’s margin was short of the two-thirds majority (28 seats) needed to push through the party’s proposed constitutional reforms

February 9. Legislative Elections. The Progressive National Party (PNP) of Premier Michael Misick secures 13 of the 15 contested seats on the Legislative Council. The People’s Democratic Movement (PDM) wins 2 seats.

UNITED STATES February 20. Federal Appeals Court Rejects Terror Suspects’ Legal Request. A federal appeals court rules that terror suspects being held at the prison camp at Guant´anamo Bay, Cuba, are barred from using the U.S. courts to challenge their openended detention in the war on terror. The court dismissed cases filed by 63 detainees that raised legal challenges to President George W. Bush’s administration’s approach to the war. The ruling was the latest chapter in a national debate over the treatment of Guant´anamo detainees, focusing on President Bush’s move to designate terror suspects as “enemy combatants” and to detain them in Cuba for years without charge pending appearances before military tribunals. (The Supreme Court agrees in December to take up the issue.) March 6. Vice President’s Chief of Staff Convicted. I. “Scooter” Lewis Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney’s former chief of staff, is convicted of lying to a grand jury that was investigating who leaked to the media the name of an undercover CIA agent, Valerie Plame. She is the wife of former ambassador Joseph Wilson, who had published an article challenging the administration’s claim that Saddam Hussein had attempted to purchase uranium in Africa. The Plame issue also reportedly contributed to the resignation on August 13 of key presidential adviser Karl Rove, described as the political mastermind behind Bush’s electoral victories. Mid-2007. Early Start to 2008 Presidential Campaign. The 2008 presidential campaign has an unprecedented early launching. Responding to the

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN THE AMERICAS, 2007

adoption of early caucus and primary dates (led by Iowa and New Hampshire at the start of January 2008), numerous contenders present themselves. Front-runners among the Democrats are New York Senator Hillary Clinton and Illinois Senator Barack Obama. Leading Republican contenders include former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani; Mitt Romney, former governor of Massachusetts; and John McCain, a longtime senator from Arizona. June 8. Joint Chiefs Chairman Forced Out. The term of Gen. Peter Pace as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not extended, a move reportedly made reluctantly by the Bush administration, which did not want to face the anticipated tough confirmation battle in the Senate linked to issues concerning the war in Iraq. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announces that he has asked President Bush to appoint Navy Adm. Michael Mullen to the post. (Mullen is confirmed by the Senate on August 3.) August 27. Attorney General Resigns. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, another longtime ally of President Bush who had been the target of increasing criticism, announces that he will resign. He had been accused of having political motives in dismissing eight federal prosecutors in 2006. September 10. Troop Surge Seen as Successful. Gen. David Petraeus, Iraq war commander, reports to Congress that the U.S. troop surge in Iraq, which was initiated in February, is working, and that troops could start to be drawn down by early 2008. Insurgent attacks in Iraq had declined significantly, though the Iraqi government had not met many of the benchmarks established earlier to measure progress. Democrats in Congress had repeatedly failed in their attempts to force President Bush to withdraw most of the troops by early 2008. November 9. New Attorney General Sworn In. Michael Mukasey is sworn in as attorney general, one day after being confirmed by the Senate. Mukasey, a former federal judge whose confirmation initially seemed a certainty, became a controversial figure following his refusal to characterize the interrogation technique known as “waterboarding” as a form of torture. The use of waterboarding

613

in interrogating terrorist suspects had been the source of lengthy debate in the United States. November 27. U.S. Hosts Peace Talks. Arab leaders, including Syria’s foreign minister, attend Middle East peace talks, organized by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Annapolis, Maryland. At the summit, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas issue a statement of “joint understanding” committing to negotiating a peace agreement by the end of 2008. December 5. Steps Taken to Ease Subprime Crisis. Mortgage lenders agree to a plan proposed by the Bush administration to freeze interest rates for up to five years for some 2 million homeowners who hold subprime loans. In the past year, fallout from subprime lending was linked to massive write-downs for many large U.S. financial institutions, a decline in housing prices and home sales, a rising number of foreclosures, and increasing talk of the possibility of a recession. Additionally, the U.S. dollar weakened, dropping to its lowest rate against the British pound in 26 years and its lowest rate ever against the euro. Adding to the political fallout from the subprime turmoil, according to the International Herald Tribune, is the fact that many of the states hardest hit by mortgage defaults and falling home prices are important swing states in the 2008 presidential election.

URUGUAY June 4. President Will Not Seek Reelection. President Tabar´e Ram´on V´azquez Rosas reportedly surprises constituents when he announces that he will not seek reelection in 2009.

U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS June 12. Constitutional Convention Delegates Chosen. Voters choose 30 delegates for a constitutional convention. Despite four previous efforts since 1964 to draft a constitution, the islands remain an unincorporated territory. The convention is to conclude its work by July 2008.

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VENEZUELA January 8. Vice President Appointed. President Hugo Rafael Ch´avez Fr´ıas (Fifth Republic Movement) is reinaugurated and appoints Jorge Rodr´ıguez (Fifth Republic Movement) as vice president, to succeed Jos´e Vicente Rangel (Fifth Republic Movement). Chavez also announces a new government. August 31. Colombian President Accepts Mediation Offer from Ch´avez. Colombian President

´ Alvaro Uribe accepts President Ch´avez’s offer to mediate talks between the government and a rebel group, FARC, that has been holding hostages for years. December 2. Constitutional Reforms Rejected. Voters reject constitutional reforms by 51 percent to 49 percent. The reforms, which would have greatly enhanced the power of the president, had been proposed by President Ch´avez in August and approved by parliament in November.

APPENDIX B: SERIALS LIST

The Annual Register The Boston Globe The Caribbean Council Central American Report The Christian Science Monitor The Economist Editor and Publisher International The Europa World Yearbook Facts on File Financial Times IMF Article IV Reports IMF Balance of Payments Statistics IMF Direction of Trade Statistics IMF Government Finance Statistics IMF International Financial Statistics IMF Survey IMF World Economic Outlook Keesing’s Record of World Events

Latin American Regional Reports Latin American Weekly Report Le Monde (Paris) The New York Times People in Power Permanent Missions to the United Nations UN Chronicle UN Handbook UN Population and Vital Statistics Report UN Statistical Yearbook US CIA Heads of State and Cabinet Members US Department of State, Diplomatic List The Washington Post Willings Press Guide World Bank Atlas World Bank Country Reports World Development Report

INDEX

The index is alphabetized letter-by-letter (e.g., “Reynoso” precedes “Rey Prendes”). Abbas, Mahmoud, 485 Abd´on, Saguier Carmona Miguel, 391 Abdullah, David, 452 Abente Brun, Diego, 384, 389 Abraham, Herard, 287 Abraham, Jopie, 347 Abreu Burelli, Alirio, 527 Acevedo Candia, Euclides, 389, 390 Acevedo-Vil´a, An´ıbal, 499 Acosta, Claudio Isidoro, 201 Acosta Moro, Arturo, 173 Acosta Polonio, Ilse, 174 Acu˜na Peralta, C´esar, 408 Adams, Grantley, 72 Adams, J. M. G. M. (Tom), 72 Adams, Leendert, 441 Addiego Bruno, Rafael, 504 Adrien, Antoine, 288 Agnew, Spiro, 471 Aguilar, Gonzalo, 217 Aguilar Bulgarelli, Oscar, 173 Aguilar Mirambell, Teresita, 172 Aguinaga, Carlos, 218 Aguirre Arriz, Gonz´alo, 406, 407 Aguirre Ram´ırez, Gonzalo, 511 Aikman, Derek, 84 Ajodhia, Jules, 433, 434 Ajongpong, Ko, 441 Alarcon de Quesada, Ricardo, 183, 184, 186 Alarc´on Rivera, Fabi´an, 208, 221 Albanez de Escobar, Ana Vilma, 227 Albizu Campos, Pedro, 498 Albornoz, Jos´e, 525 Albuja, Manuel, 207 Alburquerque, Rafael, 196, 199 Alckmin, Geraldo, 106, 113 Alcocer, Jorge, 335 Alderete, Jos´e Alberto, 386, 387 Alem´an, Amelia, 357 Aleman, Jos´e Miguel, 371 Alem´an Lacayo, Arnaldo, 354, 360 Alem´an Zubieta, Alberto, 380 Alencar, Jos´e, 105, 112 Alessandri Palma, Arturo, 138 Alexander, Hendrick, 429

Alexander, Vincent, 279 Alexandre, Boniface, 285, 291 Alexis, Francis, 253 Alexis, Jacques-Edouard, 285, 290 Alfaro Garcia, Ronaldo, 172 Alfaro Ocambo, Germ´an, 362 Alfaro Ucero, Luis, 526 Alfons´ın Foulkes, Ra´ul, 43, 53 Alfred, Richard, 452 Alibux, Liakat Ali Errol, 432, 439 Alito, Samuel, 477 Allamand, Andr´e, 145 Allen, Oscar, 428 Allende Gossens, Salvador, 138 Allendy, Caprino, 439 Alleyne, Brian, 188, 191 Ally, Asgar, 281 Almanzar, Ramon Mar´ıa, 201 Almeida Bosque, Juan, 179, 184 ´ Almendares Bonilla, Juan Angel, 309 Almeyda Medina, Clodomiro, 144 Almont, Alfred, 243 Altamirano, Jos´e V., 390 Altimari, Ovasco Roma, 115 Alva Castro, Luis, 396 Alvarado, Adolfo, 396–397 Alvarado, Jos´e Antonio, 361 Alvarado, Juan Le´on, 270 Alvarez, Carlos Alberto, 44 Alvarez, Luis H´ector, 331 Alvarez, Steve, 452 Alvarez Armellino, Gregorio Conrado, 503 ´ Alvarez Desanti, Antonio, 175 Alvarez Herrera, Bernardo, 532 ´ Alvarez Lleras, Antonio, 157 Alvarez Martinez, Gustavo, 303 Alvarez Paz, Fernando, 525 Alvarez Paz, Oswaldo, 517, 528 Alvarez Plata, Federico, 99 Alvear, Soledad, 143 Alves Filho, Garibaldi, 112, 115 Amar, Robert, 452 Amaral, Roberto, 112 Ameglio, Marco, 370, 375 Ameliach, Francisco, 525 Amory, Vance, 415, 417

Anaya, Jorge Isaac, 43 Anaya Guti´errez, Alberto, 336 Anderson, John, 489 Andino, Mario Antonio, 226 Andrada, Luis Manuel, 390 Andrade, Juan Vital, 509 Andrade Carmona, Alberto, 406, 407 Angarita Baracaldo, Alfonso, 160 Angeloz, Eduardo C´esar, 43 Angula Cabrera, Gildo, 96 Antelo, Sergio, 102 Anthony, Kenny Davis, 420, 421, 423 Antoine, Denis, 255 Antrobus, Charles James, 427 Arana, Mariano, 509 Arana Espa˜na, Jorge Roberto, 270 Arana Osorio, Carlos, 257 Arango, Ra´ul, 376 Ara´ujo, de ´Iris, 111 Ara´ujo, Fidel, 219 Ara´ujo, Maria Consuelo, 155 ´ Ara´ujo Castro, Alvaro, 155 ´ Ara´ujo Noguera, Alvaro, 155 Araya Monge, Jos´e Francisco, 174 Araya Monge, Rolando, 168, 171 Arbenz Guzm´an, Jacobo, 257, 269 Arboleda Palacio, Oscar Alberto, 165 Arbul´u Galliani, Guillermo, 395 Arce, Bayardo, 359 Arce Salas, Jos´e Humberto, 175 Ardito Barletta, Nicol´as, 369 Arellando, Delia, 361 Arenas, Jacobo, 161 Arenas Prada, Miguel Jes´us, 158 Arends, Monica Kock, 63 Arga˜na, F´elix, 384 Arga˜na, Luis Maria, 382, 386 Arg¨uello, Jorge, 57 Arguello Morales, M´ıriam, 352, 363 Aria Calder´on, Isabel Cristina, 176 Arias, Ricardo Alberto, 378 Arias Calder´on, Ricardo, 370 Arias C´ardenas, Francisco Javier, 525, 528, 532 Arias Gutti´errez, Rodrigo Jos´e, 176 Arias Madrid, Arnulfo, 368

618

INDEX

Arias Ram´ırez, Jaime, 158 Arias S´anchez, Oscar, 168, 169, 171 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 287, 295 Armas, Alejandro, 528 Armour, Jenner, 188 Arosemena Monroy, Carlos Julio, 206, 222 Arosemena Vald´es, Rub´en, 375 Arraes, Miguel, 112 Arredondo, Francisco, 267 Arriaga Martinez, Rafael, 270 Arrindell, Clement Athelston, 415 Arrivillaga, Sydney Shaw, 267 Arron, Henck, 432 Arrunategui, Marco Antonio, 408 Arteaga Serrano, Rosal´ıa, 208, 221 Arthur, Owen Seymour, 72, 73, 74 Artola, Francisco, 370 Artola, Walter, 512 Arvizu Rivas, Marina, 336 Arz´u Irigoyen, Alvaro Enrique, 261 Ashe, John William, 39 Aspin, Les, 483 Astari, Danilo, 507, 509 Asturias Amado, Rodrigo, 268 Atacho, Pedro, 345 Auilez, Ren´e, 235 Austin, Hudson, 248 Austin, Roy L., 454 d’Auverone, Ausbert, 423 Avenda˜no Calvo, Carlos Luis, 173 Avenda˜no Figuera, Amado, 326 Avirama, Marco, 160 Avril, Prosper, 287, 298 Ayala Cruz, Gustavo, 217 Aylwin Az´ocar, Patricio, 138, 143 Azambuya, W. Gerardo, 512 Azcona del Hoyo, Jos´e Sim´on, 304 Azeredo, Eduardo, 113 Baboolal, Linda, 452 Baca Carbo, Ra´ul, 218 Bacchus, Joseph, 281 Bachelet, Michelle, 139, 143, 144 Bader, Juan Carlos, 391 Baird, Edison, 457 Baird, John, 127 Baker, Charles Henri, 297 Baker, James, 482 Bakr, Yasin Abu, 448, 452 Balaguer Cabrera, Jos´e Ram´on, 184 Balaguer Ricardo, Joaqu´ın, 195, 200 Balconi Turcios, Julio, 261 Ballantyne, Frederick, 427 Banks, Victor, 456 B´anzen Su´arez, Hugo, 86 Baptiste, Leonard (Pappy), 192 Baquedano, Manuel, 146 Barco Isakson, Carolina, 166 Barco Vargas, Virgilio, 150 Barr, Epsy Campbell, 172 Barrantes Ayara, Trino, 174

Barrantes Cartin, Orlando, 176 Barrantes Ling´an, Alfonso, 395 Barrientos Ortun˜no, Ren´e, 86 Barrionuevo, Ney, 218 Barrios, Frank, 95 Barrow, Dean, 82, 83 Barrow, Errol Walton, 72 Barrow, Ruth Nita, 73 Bart, Delano Frank, 418 Barthe, Obdulio, 390 Bastida, Carlos Francisco Sagnay de la, 221 Bastidas, Gustavo, 525 Batalla, Hugo, 508 Bateman Cay´on, Jaime, 160 Batista, Fulgencio, 178 Batlle, Jos´e Luis, 510 Batlle Ib´an˜ ez, Jorge, 503, 504, 510 Batlle y Ord´on˜ ez, Jos´e, 502 Bauer Paiz, Alfonso, 269 Bautista, Juan Gabriel, 98 Baxter, Frank, 513 Bazan, Kaiser Baldonero, 367 Bazin, Marc Louis, 288, 297 Beache, Vincent Ian, 428 Beatrix Wilhelmina Armgard, Queen, 63, 343 Beauplan, Evalli`ere, 296 Bedoya Reyes, Luis, 395 Begn´e Guerra, Alfredo, 336 B´elanger, Philippe-Edwin, 133 Bela´unde Terry, Fernando, 394, 406 B´eliz, Gustavo, 54 B´elizaire, D´ejean, 299 Belle, George, 75 Bello Andino, Rafael, 200 Beltran, Pablo, 162 Benda˜na Valverde, Marlyn, 173 Bengoa, Vicente, 201 Benjamin, Steadroy (Cutie), 38 Benoit, Fran¸cois, 288 Bentoera, Raymond, 347 Berenson, Lori, 401 Berger Perdomo, Oscar Jos´e, 257, 262, 266 Berges, Pedro, 200 Bermudez, Gerardo, 162 Bermudez, Roberto Flores, 313 Bermudez Varela, Enrique, 363 Bernal, Fernando Manfredo, 379 Bernal Pereira, Waldo, 87 Bernard, Jacques, 293 Bernardin, Renaud, 297 Berrios Martinez, Rub´en, 497 Bertero, Mauro, 97 Berthelot, Chantel, 241 Bertrand, L´eon, 241 Berzoini, Ricardo, 110, 111 Best, Lloyd, 450 Betancourt, R´omulo, 516 Betancur Cuartas, Belisario, 150 Bethel, Paulette, 70

Bhaggan, Hulsie, 452 Bignone, Reynaldo Benito Antonio, 43 Binner, Hermes Juan, 54 Bird, Lester Bryant, 34, 35, 38 Bird, Vere C., Jr., 34, 38 Bird, Vere C., Sr., 34 Bishop, Maurice, 248 Bitar, Sergio, 144 Bivar, Luciano Caldas, 115 Blades, Rub´en, 376 Blaikie, Bill, 132 Blaize, Herbert, 248 Blattmann Bauer, Ren´e, 89 Blot, G´erard, 298 Blum de Barberi, Claudia, 166 Blunt, Roy, 488 Blythe, Karl, 318 Boehner, John, 488 Bogran, Edmond, 310 Boh´orquez, Ximena, 222 Boisclair, Andre, 133 Bolanos Alpizar, Gerardo, 172 Bola˜nos Geyer, Enrique, 351, 354 Bolivar, Sim´on, 394, 515 Bolo˜na Behr, Carlos, 408 Booi, Ramonsito, 346 Bordaberry Arocena, Juan Mar´ıa, 502 Bordon, Jos´e Octavio, 44 Borea, Alberto, 408 Borge, Tom´as, 360 Borgella, Joel, 299 Borges, Julio, 527 Borja Cevallos, Rodrigo, 206, 218 Bornhausen, Jorge, 114 Borrego Estrada, Genaro, 325, 333 Bosch Gavi˜no, Juan, 195, 198 Botero Zea, Fernando, 151 Bouchard, Lucien, 121, 131 Bourke, Martin, 466 Bourne, Edgar, 75 Bouterse, D´esir´esi, 432, 439 Bowen, Gregory, 252 Boyd-Knight, Alix, 193 Boyea, Ormiston (Ken), 428 Brandt, David, 464 Brathwaite, Nicholas, 248 Bravo Mena, Luis, 332 Bravo P´erez, Sadie, 172 Brenes Castillo, Juan Guillermo, 175 Brewley, Walwyn, 459 Brice˜no, John, 82 Brice˜no, Jos´e Gregorio, 529 Bri˜nez Poloche, Yesid, 160 Briquet Marmol, Armando, 527 Brisson, Jean-Serge, 132 Brizan, George, 248, 249, 252 Brizola, Leonelda Moira, 113 Broadbent, John Edward, 131 Brot, Jean-Jacques, 243 Brown, Ewart, 458 Browne, Harry, 489

INDEX

Browne, Henry L. O., 416, 418 Brownfield, William R., 166 Brunings, Gerard, 440 Brunswijk, Ronnie, 434, 439 Bryan, Adelbert, 500 Buarque, Cristovam, 113 Bucaram Elmhalim, Assad, 206, 221 Bucaram Ortiz, Abdal´a, 207 Bucaram Saxida, Averroes, 207, 220 Buchanan, Donald, 318 Buchanan, Patrick, 489 B¨uchi Buc, Hern´an, 143 Bueno, Rubens, 114 Bueso Arias, Jorge, 310 Bu Gir´on, Efra´ın, 304 Buitr´on Carrera, Xavier Eduardo, 220 Bullrich, Patricia, 52 Burnham, Linden Forbes, 274 Burnham, Viola, 279 Burt, Martin, 388 Bush, George H. W., 472 Bush, George W., 469, 474, 488 Bush, W. McKenna, 460 Bussi, Antonio Domingo, 55 Bustamante, Alexander, 315 Bustamante, Jos´e Luis, 394 Bustamante Bela´unde, Alberto, 398 Buteau, Jean-Enol, 296 Byer, Richard, 75 Bynoe, Terry, 429 Byrd, Robert, 489, 491 Caballero Vel´asquez, Carlos, 410 Cabanillas, Mercedes, 404, 411 Cabello, Diosdado, 518 Cabrera Olmos, Marilen, 146 Caceres, Andr´es, 404 C´aceres, Herminio, 387 Cafiero, Antonio, 43 Calaz´an, Lazaro, 525 Caldera Pietri, Juan Jos´e, 528 Caldera Rodr´ıguez, Rafael, 516, 528 Calderon, Sila Mar´ıa, 497 Calder´on Cardoso, Jos´e Antonio, 337 Calder´on Fournier, Rafael Angel, 170, 172 Calder´on Hinojosa, Felipe, 323, 328, 332 Calder´on Mu˜noz, Abd´on, 221 Calder´on Sol, Armando, 229, 233 Calheiros, Renan, 110 Callejas Romero, Rafael Leonardo, 304, 309 Camacho, Daniel, 174 Camacho Sol´ıs, Manuel, 333 Cama˜no, Eduardo, 45 Camelia-R¨omer, Suzanne, 344, 346 Campa Cifri´an, Roberto, 335 Campbell, Ben Nighthorse, 473 Campbell, Colin, 317 Campbell, Kim, 121, 129 Campbell, Leo, 319 Campo de Pinedo, Mercedes, 160

C´ampora, H´ector J., 42 Campos, Eduardo, 112 Campos, Jayme, 114 Canel Berm´udez, Miguel Diaz, 184 Canese, Ricardo, 391 Cano, Alfonso, 164 Canseco, Ra´ul Diez, 395 Caputo, Dante, 288 Carazo Odio, Rodrigo, 172 C´ardenas Conde, Victor Hugo, 100 C´ardenas Sandoval, Miguel, 376 C´ardenas Sol´orzano, Cuauht´emoc, 324 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 104, 105, 106, 113 Carhuaricra Meza, Eduardo, 407 Carias Andino, Tiburcio, 303 Carlisle, James B., 35 Carmona, Pedro, 518 Carpio Nicolle, Jorge, 258 Carre, Max, 297 Carrera, Jer´onimo, 525 Carriles, Luis Posada, 522 Carri´o, Elisa Mar´ıa Avelina, 45, 52, 54 Carroll, Jamie, 131 Carter, Jimmy, 471 Carvajal Salazar, Xinia, 172 Casagrande, Renato, 112 Casamitjana, Arturo Saukhan, 341 Casas Regueiro, Julio, 184 Casas Zamora, Kevin, 169 Cason, James Caldwell, 392 Cassell-Sealy, Rosalind, 465 Castaneda, Jorge, 334 Casta˜neda, Oscar Rodolfo, 268 Casta˜nedo Lossio, Luis, 399, 405 Casta˜no, Carlos, 164 Castellanos, C´esar, 309 Castellanos, Rodolfo, 266 Castellanos Pulido, Gustavo, 160 Castello, Juan Jos´e, 217 Castello Branco, Humberto de Alencar, 104 Castiglioni Soria, Luis Alberto, 383 Castillo, Adan, 264 Castillo, Carlos Manuel, 171 Castillo, Fabio, 234 Castillo, Herberto, 334 Castillo, Marino Vinicio (Vincho), 198 Castillo Villacorta, Jos´e Guillermo, 272 Castro, Luciano, 114 Castro, Nora, 509 Castro Gomez, Julio Sergio, 408 Castro Pati˜no, Iv´an, 221 Castro Ruz, Fidel, 178, 179, 184 Castro Ruz, Ra´ul, 179, 180, 184 Cato, Robert Milton, 425 Cat Vidal, Carlos Alfredo, 511 Cavalconti, Severino, 109 Cavallo, Domingo, 54 Cayoja Riart, Humberto, 88 C´edras, Raul, 287

619

Cenac, Winston, 420 Cepeda Sarabia, Efrain Jos´e, 157 Cepeda Vargas, Manuel, 161 Cerezo Ar´evalo, Marco Vinicio, 258, 269 Cerezo Bland´on, Vinicio, 269 Cesar Aguirre, Alfredo, 352 C´espedes Comacho, Jairo, 158 Cevallos Macias, Jorge Jos´e, 224 Cevalos, Orlando, 95 Chacon Vargas, Len´ın, 174 Chadwick, Andr´es, 145 Chambers, George, 446 Chamblain, Louis-Jodel, 291 Chamorro, Coleta Barrios de, 350 Chamorro, Cristiana, 354 Chamorro Cardenal, Pedro Joaqu´ın, 364 Chance, Leo, 346 Charest, Jean J., 129 Charles, Carson, 451 Charles, Hochoy, 452 Charles, Mary Eugenia, 188 Charles, Pearnel, 318 Charles, Pierre, 188, 189 Charles, Vanoulst Jno, 192 Chauvin, Benoˆıt, 245 Chavez, Federico, 382 Ch´avez Cossio, Martha, 405–406 Ch´avez Frias, Hugo Rafael, 516, 517, 525 Ch´avez Mena, Fidel, 229, 235 Cheney, Richard B. (Dick), 469, 488, 491 Cherestal, Jean-Marie, 291 Chertoff, Michael, 476 Chiarino, Juan Vicente, 512 Chica, Eugenio, 233 Chin A Sen, Henk, 432 Chinchilla, Laura, 169 Chirinos, Edmundo, 525 Chisholm, James, 319 Chr´etien, Jean, 121 Christie, Douglas H., 132 Christie, Perry G., 66, 67, 69 Chuayffet, Emilio, 334 Cienfuegos, Ferm´an, 236 Cienfuegos Gorriar´an, Osmany, 179 C´ınez, Gens, 502 Cintra Frias, Leopoldo, 184 Clairius, Alexis, 299 Clark, Charles Joseph, 120 Clarke, Oscar, 279 Clarke, Robert (Bobby), 75 Clarkson, Adrienne, 119 Claude, Silvio, 298 Clavo Peralta, Margie Evelyn, 410 Clinton, Bill, 469, 472 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 473, 486, 489 Clouthier, Manuel, 324 Clyburn, James, 489 Coard, Bernard, 248 Cobos, Julio C´esar Cleto, 41, 50, 56 Cocks, Wendel, 246 Collor de Mello, Fernando, 103, 105, 113

620

INDEX

´ Colom Caballeros, Alvaro, 262, 266 Colome Ibarra, Abelardo, 179, 184 Colosio Murrieta, Luis Donaldo, 325, 333 Compton, John George Melvin, 420, 421, 422 Concepcion, Ramon Emilio, 201 Conde Orellana, Manuel, 269 Condori Uruchi, Juan, 100 Constant-Fleming, Louis, 246 Contreras Sep´ulveda, Manuel, 140 Cooke, Howard Felix Hanlan, 315 Cools-Lartique, Louis, 188 Corbin, Robert H. O., 279 Cordova Rivas, Rafael, 350 Cordovez, Diego, 224 Corrada del Rio, Balt´asar, 497 Corrales Alvarez, Arturo, 310 Corrales Bola˜nos, Jos´e Miguel, 168, 175 Corrales Padilla, Hern´an, 310 Correa, Pablo, 405 Corr´ea, Pedro, 112 Correa Delgado, Rafael, 205, 209, 216 Cortez, Roger, 100 Cortizo, Laurentino, 376 Costa e Silva, Artur da, 104 Costa Neto, Valdemar de, 109 Cota Monta˜no, Leonel, 335 Cova, Errol, 347 Cova Sosa, J. A., 526 Cox Beauzeville, Edmundo Daniel, 410 Creydt, Oscar, 390 Cristi, Esteban, 502 Cristiani Burkhard, Alfredo, 229 Cristiani Burkhard, F´elix, 233 Croes, Gilberto (Betico), 62 Croes, Glenbert Fran¸cois, 63 Croes, Hyacintho R. (Rudy), 63 Croff Centeno, Roberto, 100 Crottogini, Juan, 507 Cruikshank Garc´ıa, Jorge, 337 Cruz, Ram´on Ernesto, 303 Cruz Mart´ınez, Marcos, 336 Cruz Porras, Arturo Jos´e, 350 Cuadra Lacayo, Joaqu´ın, 353, 363 Cubas Grau, Ra´ul, 383, 388 Cubillo Aguilar, Alvaro, 172 Cuellar, Juan Carlos, 162 Curihuentro, Claudio, 145 Daaga, Makandal, 452 Dacon, Monica, 427 Da Cruz, Jos´e Levy Fidelix, 115 Dada Hirezi, H´ector, 226, 235 Dahik, Alberto, 207 Dahik Garzoni, Alberto, 222 Dahua, Belisario, 217 Dalvius, Gerard, 298, 299 Damervil Martinez, Jaime, 220 Daniel, Simeon, 418 Daniel, Wilmoth, 37 Da˜nino, Roberto, 398

Dar´ıo Cu´ellar, Rub´en, 95 Dario Espinal, Flavio, 203 Darrell, Gilbert, 458 Das, Harry, 281 Da Silva, Luiz In´acio (Lula), 105, 111 Dassonville, Yves, 244 D’Aubuisson Arrieta, Roberto, 227 David, Peter, 252 Davies, Libby, 132 Davis, Brent, 457 Day, Stockwell, 129 De Abreu, Jos´e Masci, 115 De Almeida, Jos´e Maria, 115 Dean, Howard, 489 Debray, R´egis, 86 Degazon, Fred E., 188 D´ejoie, Louis, II, 298 De Jongh-Elhage, Emily, 343, 344, 345 De La Cruz, Santiago, 222 De La Cruz de Lemos, Manuel Vladimir, 174 De La Puente Raygada, Oscar, 397 De La R´ua, Fernando, 44 Del Castillo G´alvarez, Jorge Alphonso, 395 Del Cioppo Aragundi, Pascual, 219 De Le´on Carpio, Ramiro, 260 De Le´on Schlotter, Ren´e, 269 Delgadillo Terceros, Walter, 100 Delgado, Javier, 163 Delgado Cascante, Manuel Enrique, 174 Delgado Hern´andez, Fabio Enrique, 174 Delgado Rannauro, Dante, 336 Del Ganado Cos´ıo, Juan, 99 D’el´ıa, Luis, 49 Delpe, Turneb, 299 Delvalle Henr´ıquez, Eric Arturo, 369 Demichelli, Alberto, 503 Denis, Carl, 299 Denis, Herv´e, 290 Denis, Oscar, 389 Denis, Paul, 295 Dent Weissenberg, Ulysses Charles, 270 De Pe˜na Vald´es, Julio, 201 Derham, James M., 272 De R´ıos, Teresa Sosa, 261 D´esert, Pierre, 241 Desouches, Maxime, 245 Desrosiers, Toussaint, 298 Destin, Marc Antoine, 299 Desulme, Thomas, 298 Dev, Ravi, 280 Devia, Luis Eduardo, 164 Dias, Alvaro, 112 Dias, Manoel, 113 D´ıaz, Porfirio, 324 D´ıaz Herrera, Roberto, 369 Didiez, Ramon Nelson, 201 Diefenbaker, John, 120 Dieter, Robert Johann, 84 Diez Canseco, Javier, 408 Dion, St´ephane, 131

Dirceu, Jos´e, 109 Di Tella, Guido, 59 Dole, Bob, 473 Domic, Marcos, 99 Domich, Marcos, 100 Domingo Torres, Jos´e, 375 Dominguez, Jorge, 44 Dominguez Dibb, Osvaldo, 387 Dominguez Stroessner, Alfredo, 387 Donison, Michael D., 130 Dookeran, Winston, 450 Doria Medina, Samuel, 95 Douglas, Denzel Llewellyn, 414, 415, 416 Douglas, Michael A., 190 Douglas, Roosevelt (Rosie), 188 Duarte, Efra´ın, 311 Duarte Dur´an, In´es Guadalupe, 228 Duarte Frutos, Nicanor, 383, 384, 387 Duarte Fuentes, Jos´e Napole´on, 226 Duceppe, Gilles, 131 Due˜nas, Tomas, 176 Duffy, Patrick Dennis, 532 Duguid, William, 75 Duhalde, Eduardo Alberto, 43, 52 Dukakis, Michael, 472 Dumont, Ivy, 67 Dumont, Mario, 133 Duncan, Mike, 488 Dunkley, Michael, 458 Duplan, Rigaud, 297 Dupuy, Ben, 299 Duque Ja´en, Carlos, 370 Duran, Juan Carlos, 89 Duran-Ballen C´ordovez, Sixto, 206, 207, 222 Duran Luss´an, Hernando, 159 Durbin, Dick, 489 Dut´an, Fausto, 217 Dutra, Enrico, 104 Duvalier, Fran¸cois, 285 Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 284, 285 Easton, Ernest Lee, 491 Eaton, William Alan, 378 Echandi Meza, Jos´e Manuel, 173 Echavarr´ıa Olarte, Federico, 157 Echeverr´ıa Alvarez, Luis, 324 Echeverr´ıa Ruiz, Rodolfo, 333 Edmond-Mariette, Philippe, 244 Eduardo Ortega, Luis, 525 Edwards, John, 489 Ehlers Zurita, Freddy, 217 Eisenhower, Dwight, 470 Elizabeth II, Queen, 35, 67, 73, 79, 119, 249, 315, 415, 421, 427 Elorriaga, Javier, 338 Eman, Jan Hendrik Albert (Henny), 62, 63 Eman, Michiel Godfried, 63 Enamorado Dager, Misael, 184 Endara Galimany, Guillermo, 370 Escalona, Arnulfo, 370

INDEX

Escalona, Camilo, 144 Escalona Reguera, Juan, 180 Escobar, Jorge, 237 Escobar, Pablo, 150 Escobar Cerda, Luis, 144 Esculpi, Luis Manuel, 525, 529 Espada, Rafael, 266 Espina Salguero, Gustavo, 260 ´ ındola Ni˜no, Edgar, 158 Esp´ Espino Barrientos, Manuel, 332 Espinosa Martin, Ramon, 184 Espinoza Bravo, Pedro, 140 Espriella, Ricardo de la, 368 Esquivel, Manuel A., 79 Esquivel, Roderick, 369 Estim´e, Dumarsais, 285 Estrada Choque, Aldo Vladimiro, 404 Estrada Orellana, Mario Amilcar, 267 Estrella, Eduardo, 200 Etchecolatz, Miguel, 49 Etcheverry, Eduardo Pons, 511 Eug`ene, Gr´egoire, 285, 297 Eug`ene, Gr´egoire, Jr., 298 Eustace, Arnhim, 426, 427, 428 Eymael, Jos´e Maria, 115 Fabrega, Jorge Ricardo, 376 Facetti, Carlos Alberto, 383, 388 Fadul Niella, Pedro, 384, 389 Falquez Batallas, Pedro Carlos, 219 Fanola Aliaga, Antonio, 98 Farias, Paulo C´esar Cavalcante, 105 Farias Correa, Jos´e, 528 Febres Cordero Rivadeneira, Le´on, 206, 220 Fedor Rey, Jos´e, 163 Feldman, F´abio, 112 Fellner, Eduardo, 57 Fentie, Denis, 134 Fern´anda Flores, Maria, 360 Fernandez, Eduardo Lalo, 509 Fern´andez, Eleuterio, 509 Fernandez, Jaime M., 201 Fernandez, Rafael, 509 Fern´andez Amunategui, Mariano, 147 Fern´andez de Kirchner, Cristina, 40, 41, 52 Fern´andez Maldonado, Jorge, 394 Fern´andez Reyna, Leonel Antonio, 196, 199 Fern´andez Rojas, Max, 96 Fern´andez Saucedo, Johnny, 97 Ferre, Luis, 497 Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, 503 Ferrero Costa, Carlos, 399 Ferrier, Johann H. E., 432 Fevry, Osner, 298 Figueiredo, Jo˜ao Baptista, 104 Figuera, Oscar, 525 Figueres Ferrer, Jos´e, 168

Figueres Olsen, Jos´e Mar´ıa, 168, 171 Figueroa, Armando Caro, 54 Figueroa, Miguel, 132 Figueroa Alcocer, Rub´en, 326 Filho, Oscar Noronha, 115 Filiciangeli, Mar´ıa Herminia, 391 Filizzola Palar´es, Carlos Alberto, 390 Firmenich, Mario, 43 Fishman, Luis, 169 Fitzpatrick, Robert, 428 Flake, Jeff, 183 Fleming, Osbourne, 457 Fleurinord, Luc, 297 Fleury Filho, Luis Antˆonio, 113 Fley, Luis, 362 Flood-Beaubrun, Sarah, 423 Flores, Cilia, 531 Flores, Fernando, 145 Flores, Francisco, 230 Flores Aguilar, Florencio, 368 Flores Ar´aoz, Antero, 405 Flores Estrella, Rafael, 201 Flores Facuss´e, Carlos Roberto, 304 Flores Nano, Lourdes, 399, 405 Flores P´erez, Francisco Guillermo, 227, 233 Flores Rubio, Dario, 220 Flores Santos, Genaro, 100 ´ Fl´orez Rivera, Miguel Angel, 160 Fogal, Constance, 132 Fonseca, Carlos, 352 Fontonelle, Maria Luisa, 110 Ford, Charles A., 313 Ford, Gerald, 471 Ford Boyd, Guillermo, 370 Forde, Henry, 74 Foxe, Ascento, 319 Foxley Rioseco, Alejandro, 141 Fox Quesada, Vicente, 323, 327, 332 Fran, Julian, 428 Francique, Edouard, 297 Francis, Hazelyn Mason, 39 Francis, Nathaniel, 466 Francis, Wayne, 253 Franco, Itamar Agusto Cautiero, 105, 111 Franco G´omez, Julio C´esar (Yoyito), 384, 389 Fran¸cois, Jacques, 286 Fran¸cois, Martinus, 423 Fran¸cois, Michel, 289 Frank, Thomas Hilbourne, 38 Freeland, Eleazer, 38 Frei Montalva, Eduardo, 138 Freire, Roberto, 114 Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Eduardo, 138, 143, 147 Friday, Angus, 255 Fujimori, Alberto Keinya, 396, 406 Fujimori, Keiko, 402, 406 Funes Valladares, Mat´ıas, 309 Furbert, Wayne, 458

621

Gabeira, Fernando, 112 Gairy, Eric, 248 Gairy, Marcelle, 253 Gal´an Sarmiento, Luis Carlos, 158 Galindo, Anibal, 376 Gallardo, Gloria, 219 Gallardo Hern´andez, Carmen Mar´ıa, 238 Gallardo Nu˜nez, Roberto Javier, 175 Gallegos Ch`ıriboga, Luis Benigno, 224 Galn Sarm`ıento, Luis Carlos, 150 Galtieri, Leopoldo Fortunato, 43 G´alvez, Alfredo, 408 Galvez, Juan Manuel, 303 G´alvez Herrera, Ciro Alfredo, 408 Gangadeen, Robert, 281 Garc´ıa, Alvaro Linera, 94 Garc´ıa, Amalia, 322 Garcia, Antonio, 162 Garc´ıa, Gerardo, 94 Garc´ıa, Ismael, 525 Garcia, Marco Aur´elio, 111 Garc´ıa, Nicol´a, 237 Garc´ıa Bela´unde, Victor Andr´es, 407 Garc´ıa Espa˜na, Gustavo, 311 Garc´ıa-Gallout, Fritz, 267 Garcia Godoy, H´ector, 201 Garc´ıa Linera, Alvaro, 87, 102 Garcia Meza Tejada, Luis, 87 Garc´ıa Orjuela, Carlos, 157 Garc´ıa P´erez, Alan, 395, 403, 404 Garc´ıa Ponce, Guillermo, 526 Garc´ıa Rojas, Nestor, 99 Garc´ıa Samayoa, Jos´e Domingo, 260 Gargano, Reinaldo, 507, 509 Garotinho, Anthony, 112 Garret, Julio, 96 Garza, Antonio O., Jr., 341 Garza Herrera, Bernardo de la, 336 Garzon, Luis Eduardo (Lucho), 159 Gaviria, Hiram, 525 Gaviria Diaz, Carlos, 159 Gaviria Trujillo, C´esar, 150, 159 Geisel, Ernesto, 104 Gemio, Luis, 97 Genoino, Jos´e, 110 George, Ambrose, 191 George, Andrew, 457 Georges, Reynold, 298 Gephardt, Richard, 488 G´erard-Giles, Luis, 295 German, Roger, 363 Gestido, Oscar Diego, 502 Giammattei, Alejandro, 265, 266 Giampetri, Luis, 395 Gianelli, Alberto, 513 Gibbs, Nora Sneek, 347 Gibson, Shane, 67 Gift, Christo, 451 Gil Castillo, Luis Alberto, 158 Gilds, Sigfried, 438 Giles, Serge, 295

622

INDEX

Gillot, Jacques, 243 Gingrich, Newt, 473, 487 Giraud, Hugo H., 374 Giroldi Vega, Mois´es, 370 Giucich, Jorge, 390 Giuliani, Rudolph, 487, 488 Giustiniani, Rub´en H´ector, 54 Glazer, Charles L., 238 Gobardhan, Tjan, 440 Godett, Anthony, 344, 346 Godett, Mirna Luisa, 344, 346 Godin, Yvon, 132 Godoy, Leonel, 334 Godoy Reyes, Virgilio, 362 Goitia, Carlos Alberto, 95 Goldberg, Philip S., 102 Golding, Orrett Bruce, 319 Goldson, Philip S. W., 83, 84 Gollop, Fred W., 76 Gomes, Ciro, 112, 114 G´omez, Jos´e Antonio, 144 Gomez, Juan Vicente, 515 G´omez Hurtado, Ivaro, 150 Gomez Santos, Gustavo, 310 G´omez Urcuyo, Alfredo, 351 Gonsalves, Camillo, 430 Gonsalves, Ralph, 426, 427, 428 Gonzalez, Alberto, 486 Gonz´alez, Antonio, 525 Gonzalez, Eli´an, 182 Gonzalez, Juan Miguel, 182 Gonz´alez, Medardo, 234 Gonz´alez, Pedro Miguel, 377 Gonzalez, Ricardo, 153 Gonz´alez, Roberto, 270 Gonz´alez, Rodolfo, 333 Gonzalez Casabianca, Miguel Angel, 387 Gonz´alez del Valle, Jorge Luis, 270 Gonzalez Espinosa, Jos´e, 200 Gonz´alez Fern´andez, Jos´e Antonio, 333 Gonz´alez Macchi, Luis, 383, 384 Gonz´alez Quintana, Enrique, 389 Gonz´alez Rebollo, Jes´us, 330 Gonz´alez Rojas, Enid, 173 Gonz´alez Salazar, Alfredo, 408 Gonz´alez Torres, Jorge Emilio, 336 Gonzalez Vernaza, Gerardo, 368 Goodale, Ralph, 131 Gopaul, Nanda, 281 Gordillo, Elba Esther, 335 Gordillo Martinez, Francisco Luis, 258 Gordon, Minita Elvira, 79 Gordon, Pamela, 458 Gore, Al, 469, 474 Gorozabel, Tito, 217 Goulart, Jo˜ao, 104 Gourgue, G´erard, 286, 294, 298 Gozney, Richard, 458 Graanoogst, Iwan, 434 Granados Clavo, Victor Emilio, 173 Granda, Rodrigo, 153

Granda, Victor, 217 Grant, Lindsay, 417 Green, Hamilton, 281 Green, Ron, 192 Gregoire, Crispin S., 193 Grillo Rivera, Rafael Alberto, 172 Gr¨uber Odreman, Hern´an, 525 Guambo, Pedro, 222 Guardado, Facundo, 234 Guardia F´abrega, Gilberto, 379 Guay, Monique, 131 Gueiler Tejada, Lidia, 87 Guerre, Rockefeller, 299 Guerrero, Francisco, 234 Guerrero Guti´errez, Lorenzo, 350 Guevara, Angel An´ıbal, 258 Guevara, Ernesto (Ch´e), 86, 180 Guevara Arce, Walter, 87 Guevara Barahona, Claudio, 172 Guevara Guth, Otto, 172 Guido, C´elimo, 174 Guillermo Giraldo, Luis, 157 Guimar˜aes, Ulysses, 111 Guimond, Michel, 131 Guishard, Malcolm, 417 Gumabo, Ricardo, 222 Gumbs, Emile, 456 Gumbs, Louis, 346 Gunera de Melgar, Nora, 309 Gun-Munro, Sydney, 425 Guthrie, Alvin, 363 Guti´errez, Jaime Abdul, 226 Guti´errez, Nancy Patricia, 164 Gutierrez, Perfecto, 362 Guti´errez, Raquel, 101 Guti´errez, Ricardo, 525 Guti´errez Borb´ua, Gilmar, 219 Guti´errez Borb´ua, Lucio Edwin, 209, 219 Guti´errez S´aenz, Rodrigo, 174 Guttierez, Germ´an, 99 Guzm´an, Luis Humberto, 353–354 Guzman Err´azuriz, Jaime, 145 Guzman Fern´andez, Silvestre Antonio, 195 Guzm´an Reinoso, Manuel Abimael, 397, 410 Guzman Saldana, Gustavo, 102 Haakmat, Andr´e, 441 Hackett, Christopher Fitzherbert, 77 Hall, Gus, 489 Hall, Kenneth Octavius, 315 Ham, C´esar, 309 Hamlet, Jean-Luc, 245 Hanna, Arthur Dion, 67 Hanna Musse, Jos´e, 221 Hardy, Paul, 280 Harel, Louise, 133 Harguindeguy, Albano, 49 Harper, Stephen, 119, 122, 130 Harris, Bonita, 281 Harris, Mike, 129

Harris, Reuben, 34 Harris, Sylvester, 416 Hassan Morales, Mois´es, 350 Hassel, Ray, 347 Hassell, Steve, 347 Haughton-Cardenas, Antoinette, 319 Haya de la Torre, Victor Ra´ul, 394 Hayes, Wilfred, 253 Haynes, Richard (Richie), 75 Healey, Robert, 489 Hebreux, Joseph, 287 Helena, Helo´ısa, 114 Heller, Claude, 341 Hellmers, James Spalding, 392 Helms, Jesse, 484 ´ H´erbert-Daly, Eric, 132 Hern´andez, Jes´us Antonio Carlos, 337 Hern´andez, Julio, 237 Hernandez, Rafael, 497 Hernandez Agusto, Miguel, 497 Hernandez Castillo, Jos´e Francisco, 201 Hern´andez L´opez, Julio, 333 Hern´andez Vargas, Wilberth, 173 Herrera, Ren´e, 360 Herrera Camp´ıns, Luis, 516 Hervieux-Payette, C´eline, 131 Hierro L´opez, Luis, 503, 510 Higuita Rivera, Benjamin, 157 Hilaire, Jean-Baptiste, 286 Hill, David, 274 Hinds, Samuel, 275, 279 Hodge, Derek, 500 Hodge, Omar, 459 Hok, Jim K., 440 Holguin Sardi, Carlos, 157 Holowesko, Lynn, 69 Honorat, Jean-Jacques, 287 Ho-Ten-You, Joseph, 240 Hoyer, Steny, 489 Hoyte, Hugh Desmond, 275 Hoz, Jos´e Martinez de, 49 Huckabee, Mike, 488 Huckle, Alan, 463 Hueck, George, 346 Huerta Montalvo, Francisco, 222 Hughes, Hubert, 456 Hughes, Lisa Bobbie Scheiber, 443 Humala, Ollanta, 399, 404 Humala Tasso, Antauro, 405 Humbert Arias, Federico Antonio, 378 Humphrey, Hubert, 471 Hunte, Christopher, 423 Hunte, Julian, 422 Hunter, Michelle, 134 Hurtado Larrea, Osvaldo, 206, 220 Hurtado Miller, Juan Carlos, 396 Husbands, Clifford, 73 Husbands-Mathurin, Rosemary, 423 Ibarra de la Piedra, Rosario, 324, 337 Ignatieff, Michael, 131

INDEX

Illueca, Jorge, 369 Ingraham, Hubert Alexander, 66, 67, 68, 69 Insanally, Samuel Rudolph, 283 Irigoyen, Hip´olito, 42 Isaac-Arrindell, Giselle, 39 Isaacs, Kendal G. L., 68 Isaula, Filiberto, 309 Isaza, Ram´on, 164 Isidro Molina, Manuel, 526 Isturiz, Arist´obulo, 528 Iturralde, Gustavo, 216 Iturralde, Pablo, 511 Jack, Stuart, 461 Jackson, Andrew, 488 Jackson, Glen, 427 Jacobs, Wilfred Ebenezer, 35 Jagan, Cheddi, 274 Jagan, Cheddi, Jr., 281 Jagan, Janet, 275, 276, 279 Jagdeo, Bharrat, 275, 276, 279 Jairam, Soedichand, 440 Jalton, Eric, 243 James, Edison, 188 James, Vance, Jr., 346 Jaramillo Hoyos, Eduardo, 160 Jaramillo Ossa, Bernardo, 161 Jarquin Anaya, August´ın, 362 Jarqu´ın Calder´on, Edmundo, 361 Jarquin Ortez, Adolfo, 362 Jay Julio, Dorky, 160 Jean, Micha¨elle, 119, 122 Jean-Baptiste, Chavannes, 296, 299 Jean-Jacques, Pierre Eric, 301 Jean-Juste, G´erard, 295 Jefferson, Roberto, 109 Jefferson, Thomas, 488 Jeffords, James, 474 Jereissati, Tasso, 113 Jeune, Jean Chevannes, 296 Jewell, Linda, 224 Jim´enez, Marco, 233 Jim´enez Remus, Enrique Gabriel, 331–332 John, Ellsworth, 430 John, Enoch, 452 John, Llewellen, 281 John, Patrick Roland, 188 John, Stanley, 428 Johnson, Brenda Lagrange, 321 Johnson, Lyndon, 470 Johnson, Pierre-Marc, 132 Johnston, Will, 347 Jojoy, Mono, 164 Jonassaint, Emile, 289 Jones, Ben, 248, 253 Jones, Fabian, 38 Jongh, John de, Jr., 500 Jord´an Morales, Alfredo, 184 Jorge Blanco, Salvador, 195, 199 Joseph, Antoine, 289

Joseph, Egbert, 38 Joseph, Lawrence, 252, 254 Joseph, Martin, 449 Joseph, Raymond Alcide, 301 Joseph, Volvick R´emy, 298, 299 Josie, Peter, 422 Joy Way Rojas, Victor, 398 Juarez, Benito, 324 Jubitana, Alex, 441 Juez Abuchakra, Ivonne Leyla, 221 Julien, Ren´e, 298 J´unior, Arlindo Chignalia, 117 Justiniano, Jeres, 100 Justo, August´ın P., 42 Kahwagi, Jorge, 335 Karam, Antoine, 241 Karim, Farouk, 133 Karran, Bayney Ram, 283 Kennedy, Gerard, 131 Kennedy, John, 470 Kennedy, Robert, 470 Kenney, Luis Torales, 389 Kerry, John, 476 Khalilzad, Zalmay, 495 Khan, Franklin, 449 Khan, Roger, 278 King, Cyril, 500 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 470 King, Michael Ian, 77 King, Stephenson, 422 King, W. L. MacKenzie, 120 Kinsella, No¨el, 134 Kirchner, N´estor Carlos, 41, 45, 52 Kisic Wagner, Drago Guillermo, 406, 407 Kisoensingh, Harry, 441 Kissinger, Henry, 480 Kissoon, Ramesh, 281 Koechlin Von Stein, Pedro, 408 Komproe, Ben, 344, 346 Kraag, Johannes Samuel, 434 Kross, Jacques Ruben Constantjin, 443 Kubitschek, Juscelino, 104 Kuczynski, Pedro Pablo, 395, 399 Kuljis, Ivo, 96 Kwayana, Eusi, 281 Labastida Ochoa, Francisco, 327, 333 Lacalle Herrera, Luis Alberto, 504, 511 Lacayo Oyanguren, Antonio, 354 Lachmon, Jaggernath, 438 Lacroix, Dominique, 245, 246 Laflagui`ere, Jean-Pierre, 241 Lage D´avila, Carlos, 179, 184 Lagos Escobar, Ricardo, 139, 143, 144 La´ıno, Domingo, 383 Lakas Bahas, Demetrio Rasilio, 368 Lalsingh, Kenny, 252, 254 Lambert, Joseph, 300 Lamidozo, Basilio Arturo, 43 Lance-Council, Temperance, 489

623

Lander, Paul, 253 Landry, Bernard, 126 Langdale, Mark, 176 Langdon, Antonio, 253 Larcher, Serge, 244 Larouche, Lyndon, 490 Larrain, Carlos, 145 Larrain, Hern´an, 145 Larrain, Sara, 146 Larra˜naga, Jorge, 511 Larrea Cabrera, Marcelo, 221 Larreategui, Carlos, 220 Lasso de la Torre, Alejandro, 221 Latortue, Fran¸cois, 298 Latortue, G´erard, 285, 291 Latortue, Youri, 296 Laugerud Garc´ıa, Kjell Eugenio, 258 Lavagna, Roberto, 45 Lav´ın Infante, Joaqu´ın, 139, 144, 145 Layne, Kingsley, 426 Lay Sun, Humberto, 407 Layton, Jack, 132 Lazarte, Silvia, 94 Lazo Hern´andez, Juan Esteban, 179, 184 Leal, Antonio, 143 Lebreton, Marjorie, 130 Lecante, Andr´e, 240 Lechin Oquendo, Juan, 86 Ledezma, Antonio, 529 Leger, Gilbert, 296 Lemus, Jos´e Mar´ıa, 226 Leon, Ren´e Antonio Rodr´ıguez, 238 Leoni, Ra´ul, 516 Lepage Barretto, Octavio, 517, 526 Lepra, Jorge, 507 Leroy, Antoine, 297 Lescano, H´ector, 512 Letchimy, Serge, 244 Letelier del Solar, Orlando, 140 Levenstone, Dave, 347 L´evesque, Ren´e, 122, 132 Lewis, Linton, 428 Lewis, Lowell, 465 Lewis, Vaughan, 420 Lewis Galindo, Samuel, 376 Lewites, Herty, 361 Libby, I. Lewis (Scooter), 486 Liberia-Peters, Maria, 343, 346 Liburd, Marcella, 418 Lieberman, Joseph, 491 Lima, Maria Eugenia, 217 Lincolao, Isabel, 146 Lincoln, Abraham, 487 Lise, Claude, 244 Liverpool, Nicholas, 189 Llano, Blas, 389 Lloreda Ca`ıcedo, Rodrigo, 150 Loaiza Ceballos, Gilberto, 151 Loaiza Ceballos, Henry, 151 Loayza, Roman, 94 Lobo Sosa, Porfirio (Pepe), 309

624

INDEX

Lockward, Alfonso, 201 Loizaga, Eladio, 392 Lombardo Otero, Marcela, 337 Lombardo Toledano, Vicente, 337 London, Orville, 449, 452 Longley, Blair T., 132 Lonsdale, Jorge, 101 Lopes, Mauro, 112 Lopez, Fernando, 311 L´opez, Ra´ul, 311 L´opez Arellano, Oswaldo, 303 L´opez Arias, Oscar Andr´es, 173 L´opez Espinoza, Luis Angel, 362 L´opez Mart´ınez, Alejandro, 174 L´opez Michelsen, Alfonso, 150, 159 L´opez Obrador, Andr´es Manuel, 327, 335 L´opez Portillo, Jos´e, 324 L´opez Rodas, Leonel Eliseo, 268 Lora, Francisco Augusto, 201 ´ Loredo, Alvaro El´ıas, 339 Losada, Mario An´ıbal, 44, 53 Louis-Carabin, Gabrielle, 243 Louisy, Allan F. L., 420, 423 Louisy, Perlette, 421 Lovell, Deborah Mae, 39 Lovera, Waldino Ram´on, 386 Loza, Remedios, 99 Lubeth, Marcellin, 242 Lucas Garc´ıa, Fernando Romeo, 258 Lucero Bola˜nos, Wilfredo, 220 Lucia, Dudley, 348 Lucio, Carlos Alonso, 161 Lugo, Fernando, 388 Luis, Juan, 500 Lupi, Carlos, 113 Lurel, Victorin, 243 Lusinchi, Jaime, 516 Maassi, Carlos, 441 Macas, Luis, 222 MacDonald, Dan, 134 MacDonald, Henry L., 443 Macedo, Edir, 112 Machado, Antˆonio Carlos De Campos, 113 Machado, Eduardo, 529 Machado Ceballos, Alberto, 160 Machado Ventura, Jos´e Ram´on, 179, 184 Machuca Zelayn, Jos´e Rafael, 234 Maciel, Marco, 114 MacLean, Ronald, 97 Macri, Mauricio, 54 Madrazo Pintado, Roberto, 334, 336 Madrid Hurtado, Miguel de la, 324 Maduro, Conrad, 459 Maduro, Edwin, 347 Maduro Joest, Ricardo, 303, 304, 309 Maeso, Cristina, 511 Magalh˜aes Neto, Antonio Carlos, 114 Maga˜na Borja, Alvaro, 228 Magloire, Paul, 285 Magno Castillero, Alberto, 376

Magras, Bruno, 245 Maharaj, Ramesh, 449, 451 Mahuad Witt, Jamil, 208, 220 Maia, Rodrigo, 114 Maidana, Anan´ıas, 391 Maisi, Cornelius, 441 Majano Ramos, Arnoldo, 226 Majluta Azar, Jacobo, 195, 200 Maldonado Guevera, Alba Estela, 268 Maldonado Schaad, Horacio Egberto, 258 Maldonado Venegas, Luis, 336 Mallet, W. George, 421 Malmierca D´ıaz, Rodrigo, 186 Maluf, Paulo Salim, 105, 112 Malval, Robert, 288 Mancuso G´omez, Salvatore, 155, 164 Maneiro, Alfredo, 528 Manigat, Leslie Fran¸cois, 287, 296 Manley, Michael Norman, 315, 318 Manley, Norman W., 315 Manning, Patrick Augustus Mervyn, 445, 446, 449 Manscour, Louis-Joseph, 243 Mantilla, Julio, 96 Mantilla Campos, Agustin, 404 Manuel Melgar, Jos´e, 234 Manus, Leon, 291 Maraj, Bhadase, 452 Marc, Jeany, 243 Marcis, Pauline, 133 Marie, Aurelius, 188 Marie-Jeanne, Alfred, 244 Marim´an, Pedro, 145 Marin, Florencio, 82 Marin, Pedro Antonio (Torofijo), 163, 164 Marin Millie, Gladys, 145 Marlin, William, 346 Marmolejos, Nelsida, 201 M´arquez, Iv´an, 164 Marquez, Pompeo, 529 Marryshow, Terrance, 253 Marshall-Burnett, Syringa, 320 Marsin, Daniel, 243 Martin, Am´erico, 527 Martin, Atherton, 191 Martin, Paul, 119, 122 Martina, Dominic F. (Don), 343, 345 Martinelli Berrocal, Ricardo, 376 Martinez, Abraham, 376 Martinez, Alfonso Moreno, 201 Mart´ınez, Ana Guadalupe, 236, 237 Mart´ınez, Boris N., 368 Mart´ınez, C´esar Augusto, 502 Mart´ınez, Juan Ram´on, 310 Martinez, V´ıctor, 43 Martinez Cuenca, Alejandro, 360 Mart´ınez Nu˜nez, Anibal, 362 Mart´ınez Soriano, Felipe, 338 Marulanda V´elez, Manuel, 163, 164 Mascoll, Clyde, 75 Massaccesi, Horatio, 44

Matos, Paulo Roberto, 115 Matthei, Evelyn, 144 Maximilian, Archduke, 324 May, Elizabeth, 132 Maya, Marco Proa˜no, 221 Mayora Dawe, H´ector, 270 McCain, John, 486–487, 488 McCarthy, Eugene, 489 McConnell, Mitch, 488 McGovern, George, 471 McGuire, George, 253 McKinley, Peter Michael, 412 McLaughlin, Audrey, 131 McNally, Martin, 490 McNee, John, 136 Meade, Reuben, 464 Medici, Em´ılio Garrastaz´u, 104 Medina, Eduardo, 217 Medina, Santiago, 151 Medina Plascencia, Carlos, 332 Meighoo, Kirk, 452 Mej´ıa Arellano, Oscar, 304 Mej´ıa Domingues, Rafael Hip´olito, 196, 199 Mej´ıa V´ıctores, Oscar, 258 Melgar Castro, Juan Alberto, 303, 309 Mello, Pedro de, 105 Mena, Julia, 362 Mena, V´ıctor, 201 Mench´u, Rigoberta, 268 M´endez, Julio C´esar, 257 M´endez Herbruger, Jorge, 271 M´endez Manfredini, Aparicio, 503 M´endez Quijada, Jes´us, 527 Mendieta Castillo, Sergio, 363 Mendoza, Carlos, 208 Mendoza, Enrique, 528 Mendoza, Rodolfo, 267 Mendoza del Solar, Lourdes, 395 Menem, Carlos Sa´ul, 43, 52 Mercado, Patricia, 336 Merino, Jos´e Luis, 234 Merino del Rio, Jos´e, 173 Merino Lucero, Beatrix, 399 Merlano Fern´andez, Jairo Enrique, 160 M´eror`es, L´eo, 301 Mesa, Carlos Diego, 87 M´esadieu, Luc, 287 Mesa Gisbert, Carlos, 89 Messmer, Fernando, 95 Metayer, Buteur, 296 Micco, Sergio, 143 Michaux-Chevry, Lucette, 242 Michel, Smark, 289 Micheletti Ba´ın, Roberto, 313 Michelini, Rafael, 508, 509 Michell, Gehy, 297 Miller, Al, 319 Milliken, Peter Andrew Stewart, 134 Millor, Pablo, 510 Ming, Stanley, 279

INDEX

Miot, Karine, 245 Miquilena, Luis, 518, 528 Miranda, Pedro, 526 Miranda, Rogelio, 86 Miranda Herrera, Juan Pablo, 530 Miret Prieto, Pedro, 179 Misick, Charles Washington, 466 Misick, Michael Eugene, 466 Mitchell, James F., 426, 428 Mitchell, Keith, 248, 249, 252 Mitchell, Nello, 452 Modestin, Jacques Rony, 296 Moenne, Kenneth, 441 Mohamed, Wazir, 281 Mohammed, Nizam, 451 Moleiro, Mois´es, 527 Moliere, Jean, 295 Molina Almanza, Mario, 408 Molina Barraza, Arturo Armando, 226 Molina Mej´ıa, Ra´ul, 268 Molina Pallochia, Oscar, 395 Molina Ure˜na, Jos´e Rafael, 200 Monckeberg Brunett, Cr`ıst`ıan, 145 Mondale, Walter, 472 Monde, Frantz Robert, 289 Monge, Luis Alberto, 171 Monsanto, Pablo, 269 Monta˜na Cuellar, Diego, 161 Monteiro, Elver Bentes, 104 Montelegre Rivas, Eduardo, 360 Montenegro Cottom, Nineth Varenca, 268 Montero Mejia, Alvaro Eduardo, 174 Montes, C´esar, 268 Montesinos, Vladimiro, 398 Montiel Galv´an, Oscar, 390 Moore, Lee, 416 Moore-Miggins, Deborah, 452 Morales, Evo, 87, 89, 94, 99 Morales, Rub´en Dar´ıo, 268 Morales Berm´udez Cerruti, Francisco, 394 Morales Carazo, Jaime, 351 Morales D´avila, Manuel, 98 Moran Caste˜neda, Rafael, 234 Moran Flores, Jos´e Angel, 363 Mora Valverde, Eduardo, 174 Mora Valverde, Manuel, 174 Moreau, Leopoldo Ra´ul Guido, 53 Moreno, Alberto, 408 Moreno de L´opez, Gloria, 376 Moreno Garc´es, Lenin, 205, 216 Moreno P`ıraqu`ıve, Alexandra, 160 Moreno Rojas, Samuel, 159 Morillo, Marco, 222 Mor´ınigo, Higinio, 382 Mor´ınigo Alcaraz, Jos´e Nicol´as, 390 Morote Barrionuevo, Osman, 409 Morton, Levi, 418 Moscoso de Gruber, Mireya Elisa, 367, 370 Mottley, Mia, 74 Mottley, Wendell, 451

Moultrie, D. Halston, 69 Mourra, Samir Georges, 296 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 473 M´ucio Monteiro, Jos´e, 113 Mujica, Felipe, 527 Mujica, Jos´e, 508, 509 Mukasey, Michael, 486 Mulet Martinez, Jaime, 143 Mullen, Michael, 486 Mulroney, Brian, 120, 129 Mungra, Motilal, 440 Mu˜noz, Heraldo, 147 Mu˜noz, Luis, 496 Mu˜noz C´espedes, Walter, 173 Mu˜noz Le´on, Radam´es, 529 Mu˜noz Mendoza, Victoria, 497 Munroe, Trevor, 319 Murphy, Ricardo L´opez, 54 Murtha, John, 485 Musa, Said, 79, 82, 263 Mustadja, Soewarto, 440 Naarendorp, Harvey, 439 Nader, Ralph, 489 Nadir, Manzoor, 280 Nagatani Morishita, Michiaki, 96 Namphy, Henri, 286 Nanton, Stuart, 428 Natusch Busch, Alberto, 87 Navarrete Ruiz, Carlos, 335 Navarro, Nelson, 346 Navarro, Samuel Lewis, 367 Navarro Moreira, Wilfredo, 362 Navarro Wolff, Antonio, 150, 159 Nebot Saadi, Jaime, 207, 220 Negroponte, John, 476 Neira Menendez, Antonio Xavier, 220 Neptune, Yvon, 291 Nerette, Joseph, 287 Neves, A´ecio, 113 Neves, Tancredo, 105 Neyhorst, Henry, 432 Nicholas, Garvin, 451 Nichols, Marcus, 422 Nicolaides, Cristino, 43 Nicolas, Evans, 299 Nin Novoa, Rodolfo, 503, 510, 512 Nisbett, Benedict Jocelyn Montgomery (Benny), 63 Nixon, Richard, 470 Noboa Benjarano, Gustavo, 209 Noboa Pont´on, Alvaro Fernando, 208, 219 Noguera, Jorge, 155 Nooitmeer, Rufus, 438 Noriega Morena, Manuel Antonio, 369 Noriega Salaverry, Ricardo Manuel, 408 Nossies, V´ıtor Jorge Abdala, 114 Nottage, Bernard, 69 Novillo Aguilar, Edmundo, 102 Novoa Vasquez, Jovino, 145 Nu˜nez Calva, Oscar, 171

625

Nu˜nez Gonz´alez, Marco, 174 N´un˜ ez T´ellez, Ren´e, 364 Obama, Barack, 486, 489 Obando y Bravo, Miguel, 354 O’Connor, Sandra Day, 477 Odlum, George, 420 Odria, Manuel A., 394 Oduber, Nelson Orlando, 62, 63 Oduber Quir´os, Daniel, 171 Oliveira Maciel, Marco Antˆonio de, 105 Olivera Vega, Luis Fernando, 408 Olmert, Ehud, 485 O’Neal, Ivan, 428 O’Neal, Ralph Telford, 460 Orellana, Rub´en, 238 Orellana Quintanilla, Carlos, 406 Orellana Rojas, Gabriel, 263 Orozco Alvarez, Gerardo Justo, 173 Ortega Saavedra, Daniel, 350, 351, 360 Ortega Saavedra, Humberto, 352 Ortega Torres, Jorge Luis, 269 Ortiz, Agustin, 218 Ortiz Arana, Fernando, 333 Ortiz Bosch, Milagros, 196 Ortiz de Zevallos Madueno, Felipe, 412 Osborne, Bertrand, 464 Osborne, John, 464 Osirio, Oscar, 226 Osorio, Efren, 146 Ostashek, John, 134 Othily, Georges, 241 Ourisman, Mary Martin, 39, 77, 193, 255, 418, 424, 430 Ovando Cand´ıo, Alfredo, 86 Ovelar, Blanca, 387 Oviedo Silva, Lino C´esar, 382, 389 Pace, Peter, 486 Pacheco Areco, Jorge, 502 Pacheco de la Espriella, Abel, 168, 169, 172 Pacheco Fern´andez, Francisco Antonio, 171, 176 Padilla, Dolores, 218 Padilla, Hern´an, 497 Padilla Aran Cibia, David, 87 Padron, Paciano, 525 P´aes, Andr´es, 218 P˜aes, Eduardo, 113 Paiz Andrade, Rodolfo Ernesto, 269 Palacio, Secundino, 201 Palacio Gonz´ales, Alfredo, 205, 209 Palacios, Jos´e Mar´ıa, 100 Palacios Alcocer, Mariano, 333 Paladino Cabrera, Eduardo, 363 Palenque Avil´es, Carlos, 99 Palicki, Bernard, 489 Pallais Arana, Jos´e, 362 Palmer, Oswald, 249 Palocci, Antonio, 110

626

INDEX

Pammo Rodr´ıguez, Oscar, 88 Panday, Basdeo, 445, 446, 450 Pandolfi Arbul´u, Alberto, 398 Paniagua Corazo, Valentin, 398 Pardo Leal, Jaime, 161 Paredes, Ricardo, 216 Paredes, Rub´en Dar´ıo, 368 Paredes Aguir, Myriam Alicia, 157 Paredes Delgado, Diego, 207 Paredes Rangel, Beatriz, 334 Pared P´erez, Reinaldo, 199, 202 Parent, Jean-Jacques Clark, 299 Parizeau, Jacques, 121, 133 Parker Soto, Rodolfo Antonio, 235 Parodi Valverde, Luis, 218 Parra Herrera, Germ´an, 404 Parry, Joseph, 415, 418 Parsons, Tracy, 132 Pascal-Trouilliot, Ertha, 287 Pastora G´omez, Ed´en, 354, 361 Pastrana, Ern´an, 161 Pastrana Arango, Andr´es, 149, 151 Pastrana Borrero, Misael, 150 Pati˜no, Ricardo, 210 Patriota, Antonio de Aguiar, 117 Patterson, Percival James, 315, 316 Paul, Evans, 295 Paula, Alejandro Felippe, 344 Paya, Dario, 145 Paya, Oswaldo, 183 Payne-Banfield, Gloria, 253 Paz Estenssoro, V´ıctor, 86 Paz Gal´arraga, Jes´us Angel, 525 Paz Garcia, Policarpo, 303 Pazos, Heriberto, 337 Paz Zamora, Jaime, 88, 98 Pearson, Lester B., 120 Peart, Michael, 320 Peary, David, 460 Pelosi, Nancy, 476, 489, 491 Pe˜na G´omez, Jos´e Francisco, 195 Pe˜naherrera Padilla, Blasco Manuel, 221 Pe˜nalosa Londo˜no, Enrique, 160 Pe˜nate, Vinicio, 235, 236 Pe˜na Trivi˜no, Eduardo, 208 Peralta Azurdia, Enrique, 257 Peralta Quintero, Carlos, 325 Pereda Asb´un, Juan, 87 Pereyra, Carlos Julio, 511 P´erez, Carlos Andr´es, 516 P`erez, Lily, 145 Perez, Octavio, 311 P´erez Balladares, Ernesto, 370 Perez Caldas, Jos´e, 502 Perez Cruz, Sergio Alejandro, 270 P´erez de Cu´ellar, Javier, 397 P´erez Hidalgo, Norlento, 100 P´erez Jim´enez, Marcos, 515 Perez Martinez, Gregorio Manuel, 162 P´erez Molina, Otto, 265, 266

P´erez Piera, H´ector, 508 P´erez Vivas, C´esar, 528 Per´on, Juan Domingo, 42 Per´on, Maria Eva Duarte de (Evita), 42 Per´on, Martinez de, 42 Perot, H. Ross, 472, 489 Perry, William, 483 Persad-Bissessar, Kamla, 450 Persaud, Reepu Daman, 276 Pesquera, Carlos, 497 Peters, Marcel, 252 Petkoff, Teodoro, 527 Peynado Garrigoza, Jacinto, 196 Philippe, Guy, 291, 296 Phillips, Peter, 318 Piad, Carlos Ra´ul, 375 Piana, Luis, 222 Picado, Teodoro, 168 Picard, Pauline, 131 Pierre, Eric, 290 Pierre, Joachim, 298 Pierre-Charles, G´erard, 290 Pierre-Louis, Fran¸cois, 297, 299 Pilgrim, Michael, 420 Pilsner, Buddy, 489 Pimenta, Rui Costa, 115 Pindling, Lynden O., 66, 69 Pi˜neda Ponce, Rafael, 304, 308 Pineda Salazar, H´ector El´ıas, 160 Pinedo, Miguel, 159 Pi˜neiros Rivera, Luis, 207 Pi˜nera Echenique, Sebasti´an, 139, 145 Pi˜nerua Ordaz, Luis, 516 Pinheiro, Jorge, 112 Pinilla, Jos´e Mar´ıa, 368 Pinilla Palacio, Javier, 158 Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto, 138 Pintado, Enrique, 512 Pitrola, N´estor, 45 Pizarro Le´on-G´omez, Carlos, 150, 160 Plame, Valerie, 486 Plamondon, Louis, 131 Playfair, Frank, 439 Plaza Lasso, Galo, 206 Pol, Ricardo, 95 Polay Campos, Victor, 410 Pollarollo, Fanny, 143 Ponce Arteta, Julio, 221 Ponce Enriquez, Camilo, 219 Porras Arz´u, Gustavo, 261, 267 Portillo Cabrera, Alfonso Antonio, 257, 261 Posadas Ocambo, Jes´us, 325 Pourier, Miguel, 344, 345 Poveda Burbano, Alfredo, 206 Prado y Ugarteche, Manuel, 394 Pr´eval, Ren´e, 287, 294 Price, George Cadle, 79, 263 Prieto Jim´enez, Abel Enrique, 184 Prieto Yegros, Leandro, 387 Prime, George, 252

Proulx, Marcel, 131 Puchi, Leopoldo, 527 Puerta, Ram´on, 44 Puerta Aponte, Gabriel, 529 Puig, Max, 201 Purcell, Joan, 252 Putten, Kenneth van, 347 Quadros, Jˆanio, 104 Quem´e Chay, Rigoberto, 267, 269 Quercia, Orestes, 111 Quevado Acalinovic, Mirtha, 96 Quilaqueo, Pedro Gustavo, 145 Quintanilla Schmidt, Carlos, 227 Quinteros Ayll´on, Pedro Domingo, 409 Quiroga Ram´ırez, Jorge Fern´ando, 89, 95 Quispe Huanca, Felipe (Malcu), 96 Rabb´e, Luis, 266, 267 Rabello, Dreyfus Bueno, 115 Radhakishun, Pretaapnarain, 433, 435, 440 Ramdat-Misier, Lachmipersad, 432 Ramdhal, Waldo, 441 Rameaux, Ren´e des, 294 Ramichelawan, Djagendre, 440 Ram´ırez, Juan Andr´es, 511 Ram´ırez Benevente, Erick, 362 Ram´ırez de Le´on, Ricardo Arnoldo (Rolando Mor´an), 268 Ramirez Durand, Oscar, 410 Ram´ırez Mercado, Sergio, 350, 360 Ram´ırez Pinz´on, Ciro, 157 Ram´ırez S´anchez, Noel, 360 Ramjattan, Khemraj, 280 Ramkarran, Hari Narayen (Ralph), 282 Ramon Bencosme, Carlos, 201 Ramos, Alfredo, 528 Ramos Allup, Henry, 527 Ramos Botero, Luis Alfredo, 158 Ramos Soto, Oswaldo, 304, 309 Ramotar, Donald, 279 Ramsammy, Leslie, 281 Rangel, Ana Maria, 115 Rangel, Jos´e Vicente, 516, 518 Rappaccioli McGregor, Mario, 361 Ras, Mervin Glorinda, 64 Ravenswaay, Rick van, 440 Reagan, Ronald, 471 Rebello, Fran¸cois, 133 Rebelo, Renato, 112 Rebu, Himmler, 299 Recinos Alvarez, Marcos Emilio, 270 Redman, Karen, 131 Refunjol, Fredis P. (Freddy), 63 Regala, Williams, 286 Reggiardo Say´an, Andr´es, 406 Rehnquist, William, 477 Reid, Eric, 456 Reid, Harry, 489 Reid, Ptolemy, 275

INDEX

Reina, Jorge Arturo, 310 Reina Idi´aquez, Carlos Roberto, 304 Reitze, Cr`ıst`ıa´ n, 146 Reni Rold´an, Mario, 236 Resck, Luis Alfonso, 390 Resende, Luis Henrique de Oliveira, 115 Reverchon, Enrique, 387 Reyes, Ra´ul, 164 Reyes L´opez, Juan Francisco, 257, 267 Reyes Rivera, Sim´on, 100 Reyes Vallejos, Pedro, 362 Reyes Villa, Manfred, 96 Reynolds, John, 129 Reynoso, Antonio, 201 Reynoso, Stormi, 200 Rey Prendes, Julio, 228 Riboud, Dominique, 245 Rice, Condoleezza, 485 Richard, Monique, 133 Richards, George Maxwell, 445 Richards, Shawn, 417 Richardson, Alain, 245 Richardson, Bienvenido, 347 Richardson, Roy, 450 Ridge, Tom, 475 Riera, Enrique, Jr., 387 Rigby, Raynard S., 69 Rimane, Juliana, 241 Rincon, Luis, 518 Rinc´on Chanona, Sonia, 335 Rincon Rinc´on, Miguel, 410 Riojas Santana, Gustavo, 336 Rios, Juan Carlos, 409 R´ıos Montt, Jos´e Efra´ın, 258, 266 Rios Mu˜noz, Jose Noe, 159 Riquelme, Blas, 388 Ritter, Otto, 97 Rivas Leiva, Luis, 362 Rivas Zamora, Carlos, 235, 237 Rivera, Julio Adalberto, 226 Rivera Bryan, Brooklyn, 363 Riviere, William Pava, 191, 193 Rizo Castell´on, Jos´e, 360 Roballo, Juan, 512 Robelo Cllejas, Alfonso, 350 Roberts, John, 477 Robertson, Paul, 318 Robillard, Lucienne, 131 Robinson, Arthur Napoleon Raymond, 445, 446 Robinson, David, 283 Robinson Agramonte, Juan Carlos, 184 Robleda, Agapito, 310 Robles, Marco A., 368 Rodas, Patricia, 308 Rodgers, Otmar Roel, 438 Rodr´eguez Sa´a, Adolfo, 52 Rodr´ıguez, Abraham, 235 Rodr´ıguez, Adolfo, 44 Rodr´ıguez, Eli´ecer, 175 Rodriguez, Francisco, 370

Rodr´ıguez, Gilberto, 151 Rodriguez, Hermo, 391 Rodr´ıguez, Jorge, 516, 523 Rodriguez, Jos´e Nicol´as, 162 Rodr´ıguez, Miguel, 151 Rodr´ıguez, Miguel Angel, 168, 172 Rodriguez, Roberto, 361 Rodriguez, Sergio, 337 Rodr´ıguez Arias, Emilia Maria, 173 Rodriguez Calvo, Juan Rafael, 172 Rodr´ıguez Daza, Guillermo, 160 Rodriguez de Francia, Gaspar, 382 Rodriguez Lara, Guillermo, 206 Rodr´ıguez Orejuela, Eli´eur, 151 Rodr´ıguez Pari, Eliceo, 98 Rodriguez Pedotti, Andr´es, 382 Rodriguez Robl´es, Manuel, 201 Rodriguez Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael, 179 Rodr´ıguez Vargas, Gustavo, 160 Rodr´ıguez Velst´e, Eduardo, 87, 89 Roett, Ishmael A., 76 Rogel, Ilena, 237 Rojas Guti´errez, Carlos, 333 Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo, 149 Rold´os Aguilera, Jaime, 206 Rold´os Aguilera, Le´on, 206, 218 Rol´on, Geraldo, 390 Romain, Franck Fran¸cois, 299 Romero Barcel´o, Carlos, 497 Romero-Mart´ınez, Iv´an, 313 Romero Mena, Carlos Humberto, 226 Romero y Galdames, Oscar Arnulfo, 227 Romney, Cyril, 459 Romney, Mitt, 487, 488 Ronceray, Hubert de, 297 Rond´on, Luis, 527 Roopnaraine, Rupert, 281 Roosevelt, Franklin, 470 Roosevelt, Theodore, 487 Roque Cabello, Martha Beatriz, 184 Rosales, H´ector, 269 Rosales, Manuel, 519, 526 Rosales del Toro, Ulises, 184 Rosales Garc´ıa Salas, Rodolfo, 270 Rosas Abrego, Jes´us Lis´ımaco, 376 Rosenthal Oliva, Jaime, 308 Rosselli, Elbio, 513 Rossell´o, Pedro, 497 Rossi, Mario, 512 Ross Leal, Pedro, 184 Rove, Karl, 486 Royo, Ar´ıstides, 368 Rozas, Angel, 53 Rozendal, Silvio, 343 Rubiales de Chamorro, Mar´ıa, 365 Ruffo Appel, Ernesto, 331 Ruiloba, Rafael, 376 Ruiz, Samuel, 327 Ruiz Hern´andez, Henry, 359

627

Ruiz Massieu, Jos´e Francisco, 325, 333 Ruiz Massieu, Mario, 325 Saati, Georges, 299 Saavedra, Ricardo Solari, 144 Sabajo, Thomas, 441 Sabatine, Nicholas, III, 490 Sab´orio Chaverri, Lineth, 169 Saborio Morales, Alberto, 361 Saca Gonz´alez, Elias Antonio (Tony), 227, 230, 233 Saenz Vargas, Guillermo Le´on, 164 S´aez, Irene, 517 Saez Montejo, Pedro, 184 Sagel, Mariela, 376 Saguier, Miguel Abd´on, 389 Sahag´un, Marta, 322 St. Jean, Peter, 191 St. John, H. Bernard, 72 St. Laurent, Louis, 120 Saint-Louis, Yves, 299 St. Luce, John E., 34, 38 Salas Ramos, Jos´e Francisco, 175 Salas R¨omer, Henrique, 517, 528 Salazar, Juan Jos´e, 401 Salazar, Marcel, 376 Salazar Cutzal, Aura Marina, 266 Saleh, Jaime M, 343 Salinas, Israel, 310 Salinas, Ovidio, 161 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, 324 Salinas de Gortari, Ra´ul, 325 Salom´on, Oscar Rub´en, 391 Samot, Pierre-Jean, 244 Sampat-Mehta, Ramdeo, 452 Samper Pizano, Ernesto, 150, 159 Samuda, Karl, 318, 319 Samudio, David, 368 Samuel, Charlesworth, 37 S´anchez, Guillermo, 384 S´anchez, H´ector, 362 S´anchez, Sylka, 219 S´anchez, Wilson, 219 S´anchez Baret, Vincent, 199 S´anchez C´eren, Salvador, 234 Sanchez de Lozada, Gonzalo (Goni), 88 S´anchez Hern´andez, Fidel, 226 Sanchez Ramirez, Edgar, 337 S´anchez Salgado, Domingo, 363 S´anchez S´anchez, Luis Alberto, 403 S´anchez Sancho, Luis, 363 Sanchez Villagra, Victor, 390 Sancho, Eduardo, 236 Sanders, Bernard, 472, 491 Sanderson, Ann, 301 Sandiford, Lloyd Erskine, 72, 73 Sandoval, Miguel Angel, 268 Sandoval Alarc´on, Mario Augusto, 269 Sangster, Donald, 315 Sanguinetti Cairolo, Julio Mar´ıa, 504, 510 San Martin, Jos´e de, 394

628

INDEX

San Rom´an Caceras, M´aximo, 397 Sansaricq, Bernard, 299 Santa Anna, Antonio L´opez de, 324 Santana, Trajano, 200 Santos, Elvin Ernesto, 303 Santos, Fritz M. de los, 343 Santos Calder´on, Francisco, 149 Sardjoe, Ram, 433, 438 Sarney, Jos´e, 105 Sarney, Roseana, 114 Saul, David, 458 Saunders, Norman, 466 Sauri Riancho, Dulce Mar´ıa, 333 Savarin, Charles, 192 Sawh, Satyadeow, 278 Schaulsohn, Jorge, 144 Schick Guti´errez, Ren´e, 350 Schilling Rodriguez, Marcelo, 144 Schneider, Roy, 500 Schussmuller, Marcio, 390 Schwalb L´opez Aldana, Fernando, 407 Scioli, Daniel Osvaldo, 41, 45 Scoon, Paul, 248 Scott, Alex, 458 Scott, Oliver, 423 Seaga, Edward, 316 Sealy, Eric, 75 Sealy, Philip, 454 Sebastian, Cuthbert Montroville, 415 Sebastian, Eric, 490 Seifart, Angel Roberto, 383, 388 Seineldin, Mohamed Al´ı, 43 Sendic Antonaccio, Raul, 509 Seone Corrales, Edgardo, 406 Sequeira, Arturo Jose Cruz, 365 Sequeira, Consuelo, 361 Sequeira G´omez, Roberto, 362 Seraphine, Oliver James, 188 Seregni, Liber, 504 Serpa Uribe, Horacio, 151, 159 Serra, Jos´e, 106, 113 Serrano Aguilar, Alejandro, 205 Serrano El´ıas, Jorge, 259 Serrano Hidalgo, Bolivar, 173 Serrate Reich, Carlos, 100 Serv´ın, Nicol´as, 391 Seymour, Floyd, 466 Shabazz-Nibbs, Arthur, 39 Shalikashvili, John, 484 Shankar, Ramsewak, 433 Sharma, Chandranarine, 281 Sharma, Satnarine, 448 Shaw, Vernon, 189 Shearer, Hugh, 315 Shelby, Richard, 473 Sierra Cruz, Jorge Luis, 184 Siles Alvarado, Hugo, 102 Siles Salinas, Luis Adolfo, 86 Siles Zuazo, Hern´an, 86, 99 Silva Arguello, H´ector, 234 Silva Nogales, Jacobo, 339

Silva Ruete, Javier, 407 Simental Garc´ıa, Bertha A., 336 Sim´eus, Dumarsais, 296 Simmonds, Kennedy Alphonse, 414, 415 Sim´on, Julio, 49 Simons, Paul, 147 Simpkins, Chris, 463 Simpson Miller, Portia, 315, 316, 318 Sims, Michael, 452 Sinanan, Ashford, 452 Sinanan, Barendra, 452 Singh, Douglas, 83 Singh, Jainarayan, 281 Sirkis, Alfredo, 112 Sisniega, Lionel, 270 Sital, Badressein, 436 Sital, Jiwan, 440 Skerrit, Roosevelt, 189, 191 Skinner-Kl´ee, Jorge, 272 Smart, Anthony, 451 Smarth, Rosny, 290 Smith, Alvin, 69 Smith, Gregory, 280 Smith, Jennifer, 458 Smith, Orlando, 459 Smith, Sandra, 132 Sobel, Clifford M., 117 Soberanis, Ana Catalina Reyes, 269 Sober´on Vald´es, Francisco, 184 Sobion, Keith, 449 Soemita, Willy, 440 Solano Bravo, Alicia, 175 Solari de la Fuente, Luis, 399, 407 Soler, Miguel, 390 Sol´ıs, Luis Guillermo, 171 Sol´ıs Fallas, Ott´on, 168, 172 Solis Palma, Manuel, 369 Solorzano, Carlos, 208 Solorzano Castillo, Pedro, 361 Sol´orzano Martinez, Mario, 270 Somohardjo, Paul Slamet, 438, 442 Somohardjo, Salam, 441 Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, 350 Somoza Debayle, Luis, 350 Somoza Garc´ıa, Anastasio, 350 Sonson, Pierre, 297 Soria Galvarro, Carlos, 100 Sosa Coello, Carlos, 310 Sosa Navarro, Mario, 310 Soto, Bernardo, 168 Soto Gonz´alez, Cecilia, 336 Soto Solano, Jimmy, 173 Spadafora, Hugo, 369 Specter, Arlen, 485 Spencer, Winston Baldwin, 34, 35, 37 Stein Barillas, Eduardo, 257, 263, 266 Stewart, Pepe Auth, 144 Stirling, Guillermo, 510 Stoutt, H. Lavity, 459 Strachman, Winifred, 253 Stroessner, Alfredo, 382, 387

Stuart, Freundel, 75 Su´arez, Roberto, 99 Suarez Vargas, Jorge, 98 Suazo C´ordova, Roberto, 303 Subervi Bonilla, Rafael, 199 Sucre, Jorge, 528 Sucre Pereira, Arturo, 368 Suger, Eduardo, 267 Sule Candida, Anselmo, 144 Swan, John, 458 Swann, Wendal, 466 Sylvain, Jean Jacques, 299 Sylvestre, Louis, 82 Symister, Leon, 37 Symonette, Brent T., 69 Tablada Zelaya, Gustavo, 352, 363 Taiano, Vicente, 219 Taillon, Gilles, 133 Talahua, Guilberto, 217 Talavera Alaniz, Salvador, 362 Tamburelli, Giacomo, 376 Tamer, Sergio, 115 Tanaka, Jaime Yoshiyama, 405 Tannis, Hudson, 428 Tanzi, Dom´enico, 529 Tardencilla, Orlando, 361 Tattenbach Yglesias, Cristi´an, 172 Taubira, Christiane, 241 Tauwhare, Richard, 466 Taylor, Denzil, 319 Taylor, Derek, 466 Teillier, Guillermo, 145 T´ellez, Dora Mar´ıa, 353, 361 Temer, Michel, 111 Tennassee, Paul Nehru, 281 Ter´an, Carlos, 219 Terrazas Rodr´ıguez, Ramiro, 87 Theodore, Ren´e, 287, 296 Thomas, Alistair, 38 Thomas, Clive, 281 Thomas, Tillman, 252 Thompson, David, 75 Thompson, Hugh, 319 Tibbetts, Kurt, 461 Timerman, H´ector, 57 Tinoco, Victor Hugo, 360, 361 Tiscoski, Leodegar, 112 Toh´a Morales, Carolina, 144 Toledo Carranza, Jaime, 172 Toledo Manrique, Alejandro, 395, 398, 407 Torrelio Villa, Celso, 88 Torres, Juan Jos´e, 86 Torres, Lenin, 221 Torres Ant´unez, Mirta, 390 Torres Redondo, Felicia, 176 Torres Vargas, Rafael, 337 Torrijos Espino, Mart´ın, 367, 371, 374 Torrijos Herrera, Omar, 368 Tourn´e, Daisy, 509 Toussaint, Jean-Yvon, 295

INDEX

Toussant, Dany, 297 Townsend Ezcurra, Andr´es, 403 Trivelli, Paul A., 365 Trotman, Raphael, 280 Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, 120, 130 Trujillo, Horacio, 235 Trujillo, Julio C´esar, 220 Trujillo Molina, Rafael Leonidas, 195 Truman, Harry, 470 Tucker, Henry, 457 Tuitt, Noel, 464 Tunnerman Bernheim, Carlos, 361 Turbay Ayala, C´esar, 150 Turcios, Camilo, 363 Turnbull, Charles, 500 Turner, Christopher, 464 Turner, John Napier, 120, 130 Ubico, Jorge, 257 Ubilles, Francisco, 511 Udenhout, Willem Alfred (Wim), 433, 438 Ulloa Elias, Manuel, 407 Uma˜na, Ronald, 235 Ungo, Guillermo, 229 Urbina, Jorge, 176 Urcuyo Malia˜nos, Francisco, 350 Uribe Escobar, Mario, 160 ´ Uribe V´elez, Alvaro, 149, 151 Urquiza, Ricardo, 54 Urroz Castillo, Roberto, 362 Urrutia Parilla, Bol´ıvar, 368 Uzcategui, Jos´e Miguel, 528 Valadez Montoya, Baltasar Ignacio, 337 Valdes, Ruben Arosemena, 367 Valdez, Joel, 362 Valdiva, Encarnaci´on, 363 Valdiva Almanza, Nicolas Felipe, 99 Valent´ın, Julio C´esar, 202 Valentine, Hermina, 193 Valere, Marina Annette, 454 Valladares Ordo˜ne´ z, Olban, 310 Vallarino, Carlos, 380 Vallarino Bartuano, Arturo Ulises, 367, 376 Valle, Victor Manuel, 236 Valle Riestra, Javier, 398 Valley, Kenneth, 449 Van Der Horst, Andr´es, 200 Van Genderen, Kenneth, 441 Van Loan, Peter, 130 Varela Granados, Rafael Angel, 175 Vargas, Antonio, 208, 222 Vargas, Get´ulio, 104 Vargas, Guillermo Caballero, 389 Vargas, Miguel, 199 Vargas Carbonell, Humberto Elias, 174 Vargas Fella, Juan Jos´e, 173 Vargas Lleras, Germ´an, 157

Vargas Llosa, Mario, 396 Vargas Pazzos, Frank, 207, 221 Vargas Prieto, Oscar, 394 Vasquez, Absal´on, 406 Vasquez Badilla, Lorena, 172 Vasquez Casta˜no, Fabio, 162 Vayas, Galo, 220 Vazquez, Walter, 100 V´azquez Rosas, Tabar´e Ram´on, 503, 504, 508, 509 Vega Alvarado, Esli Antonio, 175 Vega Garcia, Ricardo, 362 Vega Miranda, Luis, 362 Velasco, Ramiro, 100 Velasco Alvarado, Juan, 394 Velasco Ibarra, Jos´e Mar´ıa, 206 Velasco Olivia, Cuauht´emoc, 336 Velasco Rodriguez, Ernesto, 144 Vel´asquez, Andr´es, 528 Velasquez, Ram´on Jos´e, 517 Velez, Alejo, 99 Velis, Francisco, 233 Venetiaan, Ronald (Runaldo), 433, 434, 438 Ventura, Jesse, 489 Vera, Fernando, 390 Verduga V´elez, C´esar, 221 Vereker, John, 458 Vidaurre Arg¨uello, Noel, 361 Videla, Jorge Rafael, 42, 49 Vildoso Calder´on, Guido, 88 Villacis, Luis, 217 Villagran Kramer, Francisco, 269 Villalba, Ismenia, 529 Villalba, J´ovito, 529 Villalobos, Joach´ın, 236 Villalobos Uma˜na, Jose Miguel, 173 Villar´an de la Puente, Susana Mar´ıa del Carmen, 408 Villarreal Sanchez, Josefina, 160 Villavicencio, Jos´e, 95 Villeda Morales, Ram´on, 303 Vinicio Castillo, Marino, 201 Vinueza, Rossana, 217 Viola, Roberto Eduardo, 43 Viotti, Maria Luiza Ribiero, 117 Viteri, Cynthia, 219 Volei, Eddy, 299 Volonte, Alberto, 511 Voto-Bernales, Jorge, 412 Wade, Frederick, 458 Waisman, David, 395, 407 Walcott, Tom, 423 Walfrido dos Mares, Guia, 113 Walker Pietro, Patricio, 147 Wall, Brad, 134 Wallace, George, 471 Wally, Johan, 434 Wangsabesarie, Oesman, 441

629

Wardlaw, Barbara, 132 Washington, George, 469 Wasmosy, Juan Carlos, 382, 388 Wasylycia-Leis, Judy, 132 Waterworth, Peter, 465 Wathey, Claude, 343, 346 Wayne, Earl Anthony, 57 Webster, Ronald, 456 Weever, Millicent de, 347 Werleigh, Claudette, 284 Wessin Ch´avez, El´ıas, 200 Wessin y Wessin, El´ıas, 195 Westcott-Williams, Sarah, 347 Westmaas, Nigel, 281 White, Liz, 132 White Hodgson, Carla, 363 Whyte, Abuwa Stedwick, 319 Whyte, Winston, 251 Wijdenbosch, Jules Albert, 433, 439 Wilfred, Rufino Lucas, 363 Wilkins, David Horton, 136 Williams, Abraham, 376 Williams, Daniel, 249 Williams, Earl, 192 Williams, Eric, 445 Williams, Izben Cordinal, 418 Williams, Michael, 319 Williams, Prescott, 253 Williams Agasse, Vincente, 303 Wilson, Joseph, 486 Wilson, Michael, 136 Wilson, Selby, 451 Wilson, Woodrow, 488 Winklaar, C. V., 346 Wolfe, Raymond O., 321 Y´anez, Eduardo, 96 Yat Zarpeta, Luis, 270 Young, Colville, 79 Ys, Etienne, 343, 344, 345 Yuille-Williams, Joan, 449 Zabaneh, Elizabeth, 84 Zaldivar, Adolfo, 143 Zaldivar Larrain, Andr´es, 143 Zambrano, Timoteo, 526 Zamora, Oscar Medina Celli, 98 Zamora Rivas, Rub´en Ignacio, 229, 236 Zamora Rojas, Hern´an Ricardo, 173 Zedillo Ponce de L´eon, Ernesto, 325, 333 Zelaya Rosales, Jos´e Manuel (Mel), 303, 305, 308 Zepeda, Ciro Cruz, 234 Ziegler, Erwin Rivero, 98 Zonzinski, Luis Fishman, 172 Zumar´an, Alberto S´aenz de, 511 Zuniga, Philip, 84 Z´un˜ iga Augustinus, Ricardo, 309 Zu˜niga Ramirez, C´esar Alexander, 173