Putting the Image Back in Imagination Amy Kind Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 62, No. 1. (Jan., 2001), pp. 85-109. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28200101%2962%3A1%3C85%3APTIBII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is currently published by International Phenomenological Society.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXII, No. 1, January 2001
Putting the Image Back in Imagination AMY KIND
Claremont McKenna College
Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of imagining without reference to such ontologically dubious entities as mental images. Second, even those philosophers who accept mental images in their ontology have worried about what seem to be fairly obvious examples of imaginings that occur without imagery. In this paper, I aim to relieve both these points of philosophical pressure and, in the process, develop a new imagery-based account of the imagination: the iinngery model.
Strangely, the image seems to have disappeared from recent philosophical discussions of the imagination. Departing from a tradition that dates back at least to Aristotle, many philosophers in the second half of this century have minimized the importance of the image-or left it out entirely-in their accounts of the imagination. My goal in what follows is to put the image back in imagination.
I. Why Go Imageless? To start, it will be useful to consider a standard case of imagining. Suppose that upon reading the latest news about the ongoing presidential scandal, I imagine Bill Clinton in a prison cell. When I imagine this, it seems that I do so by producing an image. Of course, the image isn't what I imagine; Bill Clinton is. But, so it seems, it is in virtue of the image that I do so. Given that an imagery-based account of the imagination seems wholly intuitive, we might naturally wonder why it has fallen into disrepute. The trouble began with the advent of behaviorism in the first half of this century. The behaviorists, who were concerned to overturn the Cartesian conception of mind, viewed the acceptance of mental imagery as a perpetuation of Descartes' "myth." In one attempt to debunk this alleged myth, Gilbert Ryle advanced a behavioristic theory of mind which eliminated mental images
PUTTING THE IMAGE BACK IN IMAGINATION
85
entircly. Toward this end, he developcd an analysis of thc imagination which procecds cntirely without refercncc to mental images.' Behaviorism has long sincc fallen out of fashion, but there nonethcless remains a general antipathy toward mental images in contemporary philosophy of mind. Perhaps thc main source of this antipathy is the difficulty in accommodating mental imagery within a scientific conception of the mind. As a result, philosophers havc increasingly attempted to explain away mental imagcs, refusing to countcnancc them in thcir mcntal ontology. This widespread rejection of mental images at least partly explains thc imageless trend in recent accounts of the imagination-if mental imagcs do not cxist, thcn imagining cannot bc analyzcd in tcrms of t h ~ m But . ~ this is not the only reason for the disappearance of thc image from accounts of thc imagination. Also problcmatic for an imagcry-bascd account of the imagination are the numcrous cxamples of mcntal cxcrciscs that we call "imaginings" but yct which sccm to involvc no imagery whatsocvcr. What sort of image could bc involvcd in my imagining Bill Clinton having a sccrct dcsirc to be a rock and roll star, or in my imagining him calculating huge sums in his head'! In thc face of thcsc sorts of problem cases, cvcn those philosophcrs who accept the existencc of mental images, and who think that many instances of thc imagination do involve mental images, have tended to rctrcat to thc claim that imagining can occur without i ~ n a g c r y . ~ As I will argue, wc should make no such rctrcat. To do so, I start from scratch with a dcscriptivc investigation into the imagination. Importantly, such an investigation suggests that we are unlikely to bc able to give an adequatc account of the phenomenon of imagining without invoking mcntal images and, as such, scrvcs to undcrcut the imagclcss ontological dcsiderata. Then, in the second half of this paper, I show that an imagery-based account of the imagination need not fall victim to the sorts of counterexamplcs mcntioncd above. Toward this end, I separate the claim that imagery plays an essential rolc in imagining from sevcral othcr claims about mental images with which it has increasingly becn coupled. Sincc it is only insofar as thesc lattcr claims sccm an indispcnsablc part of an imagery-bascd account that thc thrcat of thc abovc countcrcxamplcs ariscs, thc account of imagining that I
'
86
Gilbcrt Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949) For cxamplcs of ontologically-motivated theories of irnagelcss imagination, sec David Armstrong, A Mntericllist Tl~eoryof the Mind (London: Routlcdgc & Kcgan Paul, 1968), pp. 291-303; J.M. Shortcr, "Imagination." Mind 61 (1952), pp. 528-42; and Ilanicl Ilcnnctt, Contetlt crnd Corzsciortsr~ess(London: Routledge & Kcgan Paul, 1986), pp. 13246.
For exarnplcs of this sort of retreat, sec Roger Scruton, Art crnd Inzccgincrtion (London:
Mcthucn & Co., 1974), 11. 97, p. 104; Kcndall Walton, Mimesis cis Make Believe
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Prcss, 1990), p. 13; and Alan White, T h e
Langnage of In~ccgination(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 86-100.
AMYKTND
dcvelop-what I call thc imagery model-is havc lcd philosophcrs away from thc imagc.
relieved of thc problcms that
11. Framing the Investigation
As wc bcgin our investigation of the imagination, it is important that we arc clear on what is to bc invcstigatcd. In particular, I want to point out that while thcrc arc lots of ordinary language uscs of thc word "imaginc" and its cognates, not all of these corrcspond to thc phenomenon in which we arc intercstcd. Many of these, I expect, are rather easy to spot. To givc a trivial example, someone might respond "Imagine that!" to some surprising piecc of news, and yet wc would by no means understand this to imply an cxcrcise of the spcakcr's imagination, nor would it bc propcrly undcrstood as a command for thc listener to do so. In this instance, thc word "imagine" functions simply as part of an idiomatic exclamation. Anothcr common usc of thc word is to signal supposition or, perhaps more commonly, mistakcn supposition. Wc might say of a high school tcachcr, "The teacher imagined that her students had done their homework," and mcan simply that shc made an incorrect assumption.Wf course, this same statcmcnt in a diffcrcnt context might be used to refer to a teacher who attemptcd to escape thc reality of hcr students' indolence by excrcising her imagination. Context, then, helps to makc clcar whcthcr thc word "imaginc" refers to an actual cxercisc of thc imagination, and it should not prcscnt much trouble to separatc out those which refer mercly to an cxcrcisc of suppositi~n.~ Consider also thc following passagc from Gilbert Rylc: Thcre are hosts of widely divergent sorts of bclraviour in thc conduct of which we should ordinarily and correctly bc dcscribcd as imaginative. Thc mendacious witness in tlrc witness-box, the inventor thinking of a ncw machine, thc constructor of a romance, thc child playing bears, and Hcnry Irving are all exercising their imaginations; but so, too, arc thc judgc listening to thc lics of tlrc witness, tlrc colleague giving his opinion on the new invention, thc novel reader, the
"
For further discussion of this sort of example, scc Clrristoplrcr Pcacockc, "Imagination, Experience and Possibility: a Hcrkclcian Vicw Defended," in Essays on Berkeley, cds., John Fostcr and Howard Robinson (Oxford: Clarcndon Prcss, 1985), p. 20. Also, see Zeno Vendler, The Mailer. of Minds (Oxford: Clarendon Prcss, 1984). Vcndlcr therc claims that the word "imagine" is sometimcs uscd in such a way that it is "semantically quitc similar to suppose, tlzink of, guess, ctc. What tlrcsc contexts call for is an exercise of reasoning: to think of certain possibilities, thcir conscqucnccs, i~nplicationsand the like." (P. 61) That the word "imagine" can be used to rcfcr to an act of supposition is denicd by White 1990, pp. 135-48. This dcnial acco~npanicswhat seclns to me an ovcrly strict requircment for the adequacy of a theory of tlrc imagination, namely, that it account for (ill common uses of the word "imagine."
PUTTING THE IMAGE BACK IN IMAGINATION
87
nurse who refrains from admonishing the 'bears' for thcir subhuman nolscs, thc dramatic critic, and tlrc thcatrc-gocr."
I take Ryle to bc making two distinct claims hcrc: first, that wc would judgc all of thesc people to be inzaginative based on thcse widely divcrgcnt activities, and second, that wc would describe the pcoplc engagcd in thcsc various activities as exercising their imaginations. Rylc's first claim is uncontrovcrsial. I would, howcvcr, takc issue with his second claim. Just as thcre is a usc of thc word "imagine" which corrcsponds lncrcly to an cxercise of supposition, and not an exercise of thc imagination, thcrc is a use of the word "imaginative" (and perhaps this is cvcn thc most common usc of thc word) which corrcsponds merely to an exercise of creativity, and not an cxercise of the imagination, Our usc of the word "imaginative," I am claiming, far outruns our actual use of the imagination. With this undcrstood, lct us return to thc cxample with which we began: my imagining Bill Clinton sitting in a prison I have picked up a fair amount of information about Clinton ovcr thc years, from tclcvision, ncwspapers, and the likc. It thus sccms clear that he is somconc whom I can imagine. But what makes it thc case that I do so? Thcre are two very different aspects to this question. First, there is what we might call the internal aspcct, which concerns the mental cxercisc itsclf, in abstraction from the particular contcnt to bc imagined: what makes my imagining Bill Clinton an instance of imaginingas opposed to, say, an instancc of perceiving, believing, or hallucinating? In contrast, the exterrlal aspcct concerns the particular content itsclf: what makes my imagining Bill Clinton an imagining about Hill Clinton-as opposed to anothcr pcrson, or to nothing at all?
"yle
1949,p. 256. A couple of qualifications are in order about my choice of example. First, there is great variation in how we imagine. Though "imagining" is somctimcs takcn to havc a visual connotation, I takc it that our imaginative exercises can proceed by any of tlre five scnscs. Likewise, I usc the word "imagc" in an cxpandcd scnsc, so that an image can go by way of any sensory modc. In what follows, I focus almost exclusively on visual imagi n i n g ~(my imagining of Bill Clinton proceeds visually), but everything I say should carry over to the other sensory modalitics of imagining. Sccond, thcrc is grcat variation in what we imagine. Some imaginings arc dirccted at events, as wlrcn I imagine my ncxt dentist appointment; othcrs arc dirccted at experiences, as when I imagine thc pain of having a tooth pulled. Still othcrs arc directed at objects, as whcn I imagine thc offending tooth, pulled at last. The cxample I focus on is of this last type (witlr thc objcct in question a person) but again, everything I say should carry ovcr to thc otlrcr sorts of imaginings as well.
By separating thcsc two aspects of thc question beforc us, we arc rcminded that thc success of an imagining cannot be dctcrmined solely by-to put it mctaphorically-looking inside the imagincr's hcad. The cxternal aspect forces our focus outward, by asking what it is for my imagining to be about one pcrson or thing in the world rathcr than another. But, for our purposes, perhaps thc most important reason to separate thesc two aspccts of our qucstion is so that wc can consciously sct the external aspcct asidc. Whcthcr mental ilnagcs bclong in an account of thc imagination is an issue that must be settlcd on thc intcrnal front.
111. Thc Three Features of Imagining Thc question beforc us, then, is what makcs a given lncntal cxercisc an excrcise of the imagination? Providing an answcr to this qucstion is a notoriously difficult task. Onc of thc rcasons for this difficulty is thc impossibility of forcing thc imagination into any of thc catcgorics of a standard taxonomy of lncntal phenomena. Although imagining sharcs characteristics with mental acts, mcntal attitudes, and non-attitudinal mental statcs, it does not fit squarcly into any of thcse categories. As a rcsult, authors dealing with issues rclatcd to the imagination oftcn simply throw up their hands, and rely on our intuitivc understanding of what it is to i n ~ a g i n e . ~ This intuitivc undcrstanding of the imagination by no means scrves as an analysis; our intuitions arc simply not that sharp. But, in our effort to provide such an analysis, we can usefully look to intuition to hclp us gathcr a scnsc of what imagining is likc. Intuitively, there are threc charactcristic fcatures of imagining which must be accommodated within any satisfactory account of this phcnomenon: (i)
Directedness: In imagining X , I dircct my imagining at somcthing
(ii)
Activity: To imaginc X is to do somcthing.
This is the strategy taken, for example, by Stephen Yablo in "Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?7Plzosu~~lzy a nd Phenornetzologicnl Reset~rch53 (1993), pp. 1-42. It is also the strategy taken in Walton 1990. Surveying possible strategies for explaining what it is to imagine, Walton notes that: It is not easy to see what beliavioral criteria might throw light on imagining, or what the relevant functions of a functional account might be. Imagining seems less tractable than more frequently discussed attitudcs such as believing, intending, and desiring, as well as emotional statcs such as being happy or sad or feeling guilty or jealous. (p. 21) Believing, intending and the likc, which Walton here calls "attitudcs", are sometimes referred to as mental statcs. However, following Walton I reserve the tcrrn "mental state" to capture only non-attitndinal states. These include sensations, such as being in pain, and the other elnotional statcs Walton mentions (what are colloquially called "feelings"). PUlTTNG THE IMAGE RACK IN IMAGINATION
89
(iii)
Phenomenology: Imagining X has a qualitative character.
In this section, I will discuss each of thesc charactcristic featurcs in turn. As wc will scc, the conjunction of thcsc threc fcaturcs lcads us vcry naturally to an imagery-based account of imagining. ( i ) Directedness Considcr first my belief that Bill Clinton bcat Bob Dole in the 1996 Prcsidential election. This belicf is directed at something, namely Clinton. Bcliefs in general have this quality, which I call directedness. Furthermore, directcdness obtains evcn if the world fails to contain an object at which my belief is dircctcd. So, for cxamplc, if I bclicvc that Homcr Simpson will bc thc next president of the United Statcs, my bclicf has dircctcdness evcn though there is no such pcrson as Ho~ncrSimpson. Many instances of what we might call direct object mental acts and attitudcs, share this quality, for example thinking about Bill Clinton, sceking him, and admiring him. In contrast, non-attitudinal mcntal statcs typically lack dircctcdness; having a headachc, for cxample, is not directcd at any object. In this respect, imagining is like the direct object mental acts and attitudes: Imagining too has directedness. Whcn I imagine, my imagining is directcd at somcthing; in the case of my imagining Bill Clinton, my imagining is dirccted at a pcrson, namcly, Clinton. And, just as with bclicf, an instance of imagining has the quality of directedness cven if the world docs not contain an objcct at which thc imagining is directcd. Onc thing I want to strcss is that all I mcan to bc claiming hcrc is that a mcntal cxcrcise cannot be an imagining unless it is directed in some way. I am not making any claim about the particular direction an imagining takes. The fact that imagining has thc fcaturc of directedness conccrns thc analysis of imagining itself. But the issue of what a particular imagining is directed at-is it Bill Clinton, or somconc clsc?-docs not; rathcr, it bclongs on thc cxternal front. ( i i ) Activity Once again, let us consider my belief that Bill Clinton beat Bob Dole in the last Prcsidcntial clection. Evcn whcn this belicf is occurrent, having the bclicf is not somcthing that I do; it is not an act. In this rcspect, having a belicf contrasts with thinking. Of course, in ordinary languagc wc oftcn usc the word "thinks" as synonymous with "bclicvcs." Wcrc I to say "Bill thinks that thc bcttcr man won," this might simply report a belief of his. But whcn I claim that having a bclicf contrasts with thinking, I intcnd for "thinking" to rcfcr to a mcntal opcration. So supposc I am at prcscnt thinking about Clinton's presidency, and it now occurs to me that it is a shame that hc did not
90 AMYKIND
live up to the initial hopes of thc liberals. Thinking this thought is clearly an active process; it is somcthing that I do. The same point holds for reasoning, or making a decision. In contrast, as we just saw, mental attitudes, such as believing, and non-attitudinal mental states, such as bcing happy and bcing in pain, do not involve any sort of mental activity. I have the belief that Clinton beat Dole, and I am happy that hc did so, but ncithcr of thcsc rcports about my mental life describes any mental activity on my part; neither describes anything that I do. In this respect, it seems that imagining is more like thinking than it is like believing or being happy. To claim that imagining has an active nature does not mcan, howcvcr, that imagining need be something that I do intentionally. As Christopher Peacockc has noted, "it is a common experience for visual or auditory imagi n i n g ~to come to a thinker wholly unbidden-they may even interrupt his thinking."Wften after seeing a particularly gruesome murder scene in a horror movic, I kccp imagining thc murder again and again. In such a case, I usually want thc imagining to stop, I might cvcn will mysclf to stop it, but I typically find mysclf quitc powcrlcss to stop thc imagining. Analogously, aftcr awakening to a catchy tune on the radio, the tune often runs through my head for quitc awhile; I might cvcn be unable to keep Trom imagining it, in this way, all day long. Yct even in cascs like thcsc, whcrc I neither intend nor want the imagining, thc imagining is noncthclcss somcthing that I do. The fact that imagining can occur, and then continue, uninvited is closely related to another fact about imagining: an imaginer can discover to hcr own surprisc that shc is imagining. Again, however, this should not bc taken to suggest that imagining is not an activity. There arc many instances whcrc I might find to my surprise that I am humming a tune aloud, or tapping my foot. Both of thcsc arc clcarly things that I do; my surprisc at finding ~nysclf humming or tapping simply suggests that my doing it was unintended. This point seems completely uncontroversial in thc non-mental sphere, and loscs none of its plausibility when wc turn to thc mcntal sphcrc. Just as I might rcalizc to my surprisc that I am tapping Iny foot, I might realize to my surprise that 1 am once again imagining thc grucsomc murder from last night's horror movic. Importantly, this second feature of imagining hclps us to dirfcrcntiatc it from two mcntal phcnomcna to which it is closely-related. First, the active nature of imagination distinguishes it from perceiving, which is passivc in nature. This claim about thc passivity of perception is not wholly uncontrovcrsial, as thcrc is at lcast some temptation to push perception in a more active direction. I expect that thc temptation springs primarily from thc Pact that in ordcr for us to pcrccivc, thcrc are certain very gcncral things wc must Peacocke 1985, p. 26. See also Walton 1990, pp. 13-14.
PUTTING THE IMAGE BACK IN IMAGINATION
91
do, e.g. we must open our eyes. Other perceptions might require more complicated activity: moving closer to somcthing, turning on another light, and so on. However, it should be clear that these examples suggest only that perceiving is often associated with activity, and not that the activity is itself the perceiving. Another, related, source for the temptation to push perception in a more active direction is the fact that we quite naturally categorize certain sorts of "tracking" activities as perceptual activities. When I visually track the fly that is buzzing around my office, I seem to be doing something. Tracking, I would agree, is an activity. But this docs not mean that pcrceiving is an activity. My point here is just to remind us of the familiar distinction between hearing and listening, or seeing and looking. Sounds and sights bombard me all the time, but I do not attend to all of them. Attending to a particular sound (listcning) or to a particular sight (looking), is an active process; it is somcthing that I do. But while attending to what I perceive is somcthing that I do, the percciving itself is not. Second, the active nature of imagination distinguishes it from hallucinating, which (like perceiving) is passive in nature. The fact that we ordinarily say that someone is experiencing, undergoing, or suffering from, a hallucination suggests that it is something that happens to someone, rather than something that a person does. Furthermore, if we accept that perception is a passive phenomenon, additional support derives from the fact that we frequently dcscribe someone in the midst oP hallucination with words of perception: "The heroin addict is agitated because she is seeing bugs on her arms," or "He is hearing voices again," and so on. Though the claim about the passivity 01 hallucination is, on its own, fairly non-problematic, a problem may seem to arise from the fact that we sometimes use the word "imagine" in everyday speech to refer to hallucination. The heroin addict, upon recovering froin her drug-induced delirium, might report, "While I was high, I imagined that my arms were crawling with bugs." It is a mistake, however, to assimilate hallucination to imagination. In the grip of her delirium, Jones would surely describe herself as seeing the bugs, and dcscribe the wall itself as covered with bugs. If she switches to the word "imagine" upon recovering, this would most likely indicatc that she now r e a l i a s she had been mistaken; here, "imagine" is being used to mean "falsely perceive." In such cases, then, the statement by the hcroin addict (and others of this sort) should not be understood to indicate acts of the imagination."'
"'
Of coursc, I do not mean to imply that no one under the infucnce of hcroin or other hallucinogenic drugs can engage in acts of the imagination. Rather, I simply want to stress that thc fact that we sornctirncs refcr to hallucinations in tcrms of the imagination (as is oftcn the case with drug-induccd hallucinations) docs not cntitlc us to treat hallucination as a spccies of imagination.
( i i i ) Phenomenology It is typically non-attitudinal mcntal states that have a phenomenology. So, for example, there is a "what it is like" to thc statc of being in pain and to the state of being happy, but not to thinking about Bill Clinton, or believing that he beat Dole, or admiring him Sor doing so." Imagining is active in nature, as we have seen, and is thus not itself a statc, but thcrc is nonetheless clearly a phcnomcnology to imagining. Generally, when we attribute a phenomenological charactcr to a mcntal attitude, the explanation for this stems from the fact that the occurrence of the mental attitude involves a statc with phenomcnological charactcr, that is, a sensation. So, for example, consider my belief that a friend of mine often wears a dress that is an ugly shade of orange. When this belief is occurrcnt, there may well be a sensation of orange, and thereby a qualitative fecl, associated with the belief. However, because the belief could be occurrent without the presence of thc sensation (and thus without a qualitative fecl), the bclief does not have its phenomenological charactcr c~scntially.'~ At this point, the question naturally ariscs whether thcrc arc any belicls which do essentially have phcnomcnological charactcr. Some o l our dcmonstrative beliefs about colors might be thought to providc plausible cxamplcs: suppose that, while looking at my friend's dress, I wcrc to havc the belief "That is an ugly shadc of orangc." It is hard to scc how this belief could be occulrcnt without involving a statc with a qualitative feel, that is, a sensation of orangc. What is important to notice, however, is that even if there are some bcliefs which essentially have phenomcnology, having a phcnomcnological character is not an essential characteristic of bclicving. When a bclicf has a phenomenological character, this does not stcm from thc fact that it is a belicf, but rathcr, from somc lact about the content of the particular belief. Our primary interest here is not with belicl, but the lorcgoing discussion provides a nice contrast with imagining. Suppose that I wcrc to imagine my fricnd's orangc drcss. My imagining clearly has a phcnomcnology. Morcovcr, the qualitative fecl involvcd in my imagining is essential to it.17 Most importantly, however, there is nothing special about this particular imagining that I'
l2
l3
The quoted phrasc comcs from Thomas Nagcl, "What is it Like to be a Hat'!" l'hilosop/zicrrl Review 83 (1974), pp. 435-50. Wc rnight attributc a phcnornenological character to an attitude not only bccause of its content (that is, thc involvcmcnt of a statc with a phenomenological character) but also bccausc of the way the attitudc is hcld. Thcrc may, for cxample, bc a phenon~enological difference between beliefs that we hold hesitantly and thosc that wc hold so strongly we are rcady to dic for thcm. Hcrc again, however, the attitudc would not havc its phcnomcnological charactcr csscntially. I usc tlie term "involve" here in a tlcliheratc effort to rcmain neutral on the issuc of whcthcr thc qualitative statc is itsclf a part ob or instead a necessary accompaniment to, an act of imagining. Settling this issuc is not important for our putposcs hcrc; whichcvcr way the notion of involvement is spclled ont, imagining will still have a phcnomcnology.
PU'ITING THE IMAGE RACK IN IMAGINATION
93
providcd it with its phcnomcnology. No matter what I imaginc, my imagining will involve an experiential aspect. Without such an cxpcricntial aspect, a mental exercise is not an act of imagining. Thc experiential aspect of imagining is vcry much likc that involved in scvcral othcr mcntal activities, including hallucinating, dreaming, and pcrcciving. In Pact, pcrceiving and imagining arc so cxpcricntially similar that the formcr is somctimcs mistakcn for thc laucr. One frequently-citcd example comcs from a psychological experimcnt conducted by C.W. Perky.14 Perky placcd a number of pcoplc in a room, facing a scrccn, and askcd them to imaginc various ordinary objccts on thc scrccn. The subjccts werc not aware of thc fact that, aftcr thcy had rcportd that thcy wcrc cngagcd in the rcquested imagining (of a banana, for cxample), an imagc of a banana was lightly projccted onto the scrccn. Thc projccted imagc was slowly incrcased in intensity until, eventually, it was visiblc to any ncwcomcr entering the room, but the subjects in the study never realized that they wcre secing an imagc of a banana. The only differences that the subjects noted in their subjective cxpcricnccs were changes in thc sizc and the oricntation of the banana thcy had been imagining. In this highly controlled setting at least, secing was mistakcn for visual imagining; presumably, thcrc arc also everyday situations whcre this could occur. As thc experiment suggests, imagining feels like perception from the insidc. I want to strcss, howevcr, that this is not meant to bc a strong claim. Grantcd, Perky's experiment shows that, in some cases at least, pcrcciving fccls exactly likc imagining. But thc similarity I mcan to be claiming between the two phenomena is a much weakcr one. Earlier, in our discussion of thc activc naturc of imagining, wc notcd onc important differcncc bctwccn imagining and perceiving. This diffcrence might, in somc cases, translate into a diffcrcncc in our experience. However, as Perky's data suggcst, it nced not. Moreover, I certainly do not think that in typical cascs thc cxpcricncc of imagining something and pcrceiving that thing are cxactly alike. Typically, onc's imaginings arc considerably lcss vivid than onc's perccptions. But thc fact that, most of the timc, our imaginings scem to us simply to be pale imitations of our pcrccptions (or, as Hobbes put it, that imagining is "decaying sense"), does not threaten my claim that imagining fcels like perccption.15 Actually, the fact that we might rcgard imagining as an imitation (albeit palc) of perceiving can bc seen to support my claim. An imitation
l4
Is
94
C.W. Perky, "An Experimental Study of Imagination," Arnericc~nJourncrl of P s y c h o l o ~ y 21 (1910), pp. 422-52. Thomas Hobbes, Lrviutlzcln, ed. C.D. Macpherson (Hammondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 88. Of course, there may be instances where our imaginings are more vivid than our perceptions; 1 arn thinking in particular of what we usually call "fantasizing."
AMY KIND
rcscmblcs thc original in somc way. In the case of imagining and pcrcciving, the resemblance stcms from thc phenomenology of the experienccs. At this point, I hope to havc shown that imagining must bc characterized in terms of three leaturcs: its dircctedncss, its active naturc, and its phenomcnological charactcr. In thc ncxt scction, I will show how an imagerybased account of the imagination can accommodate these three distinctivc features of the imagination. Perhaps more importantly, however, I will offcr reasons to think that any thcory of imageless imagination will offend on at least onc of thcsc three lronts, and thus that the conjunction o l thcsc thrcc featurcs cstablishcs a strong presumption in lavor of an imagc-based account.
IV. The Imagery Model Consider the essentialist claim: mcntal imagcs play an esscndal rolc in thc imagination. This claim will form thc basis of thc imagery modcl, my imagcry-bascd account of imagining. Latcr, whcn we turn to thc countcrexamples which seem to thrcaten an imagery-bascd account, I will fill out the imagery modcl in morc detail. But thc csscntialist claim alonc is cnough to account Sor each of the three characteristic features of imagining. In short: ( 1 ) Thc rcprcscntational aspcct o l mental images cxplains the directedness of imagining; (2) The active nature of the imagination derives from the opcration of imagc formation; and ( 3 ) The expericnce of having an image, which has qualitative character, accounts for the phenomcnology of imagining. Let me address each of these claims in turn. Thc claim that mcntal images are representational is, I expcct, wholly uncontroversial. Although thcrc is considcrablc controvcrsy in discussions of mcntal images about how they rcpresent, no such controvcrsy attachcs to thc claim that they do rcprcscnt. And givcn that my mental imagc of Clinton reprcscnts him, wc havc a straightforward explanation for the directcdness of my imagining Clinton if imagining procceds by way of mental imagery. Taken individually, claims (2) and ( 3 ) are both quite plausible. Calling up, or crcating, an image seems clearly to bc an act, cvcn if it is donc unwittingly. As such, image formation could account for thc activc naturc o l imagination. Granted, someone might bc concerned about (3) as a rcsult of the hcatcd dcbatc in contcmporary discussions of thc philosophy of mind about the qualitative character of our expcricncc. Accounting for this qualitativc character has provcd difficult for materialist thcorics oS the mind, and this has lcd to numerous attempts to explain away thc existcncc of qualia.'Wut oncc someone has accepted the claim that imagining has a phcnomcnology, there
"or'
one such example, see Daniel Dennctt, "Quining Qualia," in Consciousness in Contemporary Science, cd., A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 42-77.
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is no rcason to balk at thc claim that thc cxpcrience of having an imagc can account for it. Unfortunatly, howcvcr, dcspite the individual plausibility of both (2) and ( 3 ) , a tcnsion might sccm to arisc from their conjunction. Wc saw above that the phenomenology of imagining rescniblcs that of pcrception. It thus sccms reasonable to expect that thc expericnce of having an image also accounts for the phenomenology of perception. But if the phenomenology of both imagining and perceiving is supposed to be explained in tcrms of imagery, and thc opcration of image formation providcs imagination with an activc nature, then someone might naturally question why image formation does not likcwise provide perccption with an active nature. To resolvc this tension, it is uscful to consider the motion that a patient's lcg makcs whcn the doctor taps his knce to check his rcflexcs. In this circumstance, thc raising of the lcg is not somcthing that thc paticnt docs but rather something that happens to him. In othcr circumstances, however, the same leg motion might well be somcthing that hc does. He might, for examplc, try to imitate the rcflex action of his leg. At onc timc a shudder might be an involuntary reflcx in responsc to cold wcathcr; at anothcr, it might bc a dclibcratc action on someone's part to signal someone else to turn up the hcat. In short, there are many motions of our bodies that are somctimcs things we do, and somctimcs things that mcrely happen to us. I want to say somcthing analogous about the case of image formation. Grantcd, it would bc artificial to talk of thc opcration of image formation as a modon of one's body. But thc point is that, just likc kncc jcrks and shudders, sometimes the operation of imagc formation is something an agcnt docs, and somctimcs it is somcthing that mcrcly happens to an agcnt. Whcn wc pcrccivc, the formation of images is automatic; it is something that happens to thc pcrccivcr. But this alone does not givc us any reason to bclieve that the lormation of images is also automatic in thc case o l imagination. IS the formation of images is something that we do in thc casc of imagining, as I have suggestcd that it is, thcn wc havc an cxplanation for thc activc naturc o l imagining. At this point I hopc to havc shown that an account o l imagining based on the essentialist claim nicely accommodatcs the three features o l imagining revcalcd by our investigation. But now a further question arises: could an imagcless account also scrvc to accommodatc thcse lcatures? Rcflcction on thc resourccs available to thc opponent of thc essentialist claim suggests that thc answer to this question is 'no.' An account of imagining that does not invoke imagery will have considerable difficulty dealing with the conjunction of thc thrce fcaturcs. Onc natural way for thc opponcnt of thc csscntialist claim to proceed would bc to attempt to rcducc imagining to somc other (imagclcss) mcntal statc. This was Ryle's strategy in The Concept qf Mind, whcre hc offercd an 96
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analysis o l imagining as a species of prctending.I7 There is surely something to be said for the association o l imagining with prctcnding. First of all, the two activitics oltcn occur simultaneously. Children at play pretending to be bears-to take one of Rylc's favorite examples-might well imagine that the sofa pillows are a cave, that the shag rug is grass beneath their hands and knees, and so on. And there arc many other examples of this sort. Second of all, there is what we might call "an air of unreality" around both the activity of pretending and the activity of imagining.lx If someone has only prctcndctl to commit adultery, then he has not committed adultery. And similarly, i l someone has oilly imagined committing atlultcry, then he has not committed adultery. However, though it is true that prctcnding and imagining have several characteristics in common, such similarities do not provide sufficient justification for the claim that imagining is a species of prctcnding. The problem stems from the fact that an analysis of imag~ningin terms of pretending fails to capture all three of the characteristic features of imagining. Though pretending is active in nature, and though at least somc instances of pretending can plausibly be said to havc dircctedness, pretending does not havc a phcnorncnological character. 'The reduction of imagining to prctcnding thus fails. A similar failure confronts the opponent o l the essentialist claim if she attempts to reduce imagining to thinking. This sort of reduction would be able to account for both imagining's directedness and its active nature, but it is no more able than the reduction o l imagining to prctcnding to account lor the phenomenology of imagining. Though somc thoughts (like somc beliefs) may havc qualitative aspects, any such aspects derive solely from the content of the thought and not from the activity of thinking. In general, the activity of thinking does not have an experiential underside. The opponent of the essentialist claim who attempts to reduce imagining to thinking thus owes us an explanation of why an imageless imagining about Bill Clinton necessarily has a qualitative character. The prospects for any such explanation seem dim.'" Faced with the difficulty of accounting adequately for imagining when reducing it to a non-phenomenological state, the opponent of the essentialist claim might attempt to reduce imagining to sensation. But now a diflercnt problem arises. An analysis 01imagining in terms of sensation seems unable to account lor both the dircctedness and the active nature of imagining. Sensations, recall, are neither directed nor active. Ryle 1949, pp. 245-72. In making this observation, I do not mean to imply that we cannot irnaginc something that is real, or evcn somcthing that wc know to bc real. Cf. White 1990, p. 153. '"alton, in correspondence, has suggested that pcrhaps the notion of vivacity could be invokcd. But, as hc admits, this "doesn't help much."
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It appears, then, that no reductive account of imagining will be adequatc. In large part, this follows from something that had alrcady bccn suggested in the discussion of the preccding scction: thc charactcristic fcaturcs of imagining makc it very difficult to locate imagining in any of the standard categories of mental phcnomcna. Any thcory which attcmpts to reduce imagining to somc other mcntal statc is thus unlikcly to be ablc to account for all three of our characteristic featurcs of imagining in conjunction. Of coursc, the possibility still rcmains that some non-reductive account of imagining could be found that docs not invoke images. In thc abstract, howcvcr, it is difficult to scc what any such account would look likc, and I must confess that I havc no dcfinitivc argumcnt to rule out the possibility that onc could bc found. Noncthclcss, our rcflcction on thc difficulties which plagucd rcductive imageless accounts strongly suggcsts that rclated difficulties will plaguc non-reductive imageless accounts as wcll. Invoking non-imagistic rcprescntations will allow a theory to account for imagining's dircctcdncss, and possibility for its activc naturc, though unablc to account for its phenomenology. But since it sccms that a theory of imagining will havc to invoke some sort of mental representation in order to account for imagining's directcdncss, it is difficult to see how a thcory of imagining could succeed without invoking mental imagery. Givcn that an imagery-bascd account adcquatcly capturcs thc three charactcristic featurcs of imagining, our reflections on thc inadequacy of imagclcss accounts thus establishes a significant presumption in favor of invoking imagery. In doing so, the discussion should also serve to defuse the ontological motivation for imageless imagination that I laid out at the beginning of this papcr. Ontological qualms about mental imagery must bc weighcd against the adcquacy or imageless theories of the imagination. In thc absencc of an imagclcss account that is adequate to account for the three characteristic fcatures of imagination, we should be inclined to accept that the desirc for an imageless ontology cannot be satisfied. Notc that I am not hcrc making any claims about thc merits of ontological concerns about imagcs. My argument does not presuppose that such ontological worries are ill-f~undcd.~" My intent, rather, has been to show that 2"
1 should note, however, that I do suspect that some of the ontological worries are misguided, deriving from confusion about a recent debate in cognitive science between the pictorialists and the descriptionalists. While pictorialists argue that mental images represent the way that pictures do, descriptionalists argue that mental images represent nonpictorially. The dispute between the descriptionalists and the pictorialists thus concerns the representative nature of mental images. Unfortunately, however, the imagery debate is commonly mischaracterized as a debate over the existence of mental images. Descriptionalists are often taken to be denying the existence of mental images, whereas pictorialists are often taken to be defending their existence. Evidence for descriptionalism would thus appear to be evidence against mental imagery. But this is clearly a mistake. See, for example, Ned Block's overview of the pictorialism/descriptionalism debate in "Introduction: What is the Issue?" in Imagery (Cambridge, Mass.:
no mattcr how difficult it is to accomrnodatc mcntal imagcry within a scientific conccption of thc mind, it is also difficult to scc how wc can give an adequate account of imagination without invoking mcntal imagery. Sincc wc can give an adequate account of imagination once we do invokc mental imagcry, thc burden of proof falls squarely on thc proponent of imageless imagining.
V. The Individuative Claim Having addresscd thc ontological motivation for imageless imagination through thc dcscriptive entcrprisc of the previous two scctions, I want now to return to the second motivation I sketched at thc start. Here, rccall, the rcsistance to imagcs stems from a purported description of our mental lifc that comcs into tension with an imagery-based account of imagining. When we think about the rangc o l imaginings in which wc engage, are thcrc not some that simply cannot consist of imagery'? Suppose I imagine Bill Clinton doing budgct calculations in his head. It seems that this imagining might be accompanied by a picture of Clinton's face, thc way a mug shot might accompany a ncwspaper article. But it ccrtainly does not seem that there would have to bc such an accompanimcnt. And cvcn if there wcrc, thc image would be just that: a mcrc accompaniment to thc imagining. Thesc cxamples call into question thc csscntialist claim. Howcvcr, as I will arguc, the rcal problcm is not with this claim itself but with what I will call thc individuutive clainz: that imagcs scrve to individuate imaginings. The csscntialist claim has bccn incrcasingly associated with the individuativc claim, so much so that it now seems an indispcnsablc part of an account of the imagination in terms of imagcry. My first aim is to disengagc thcse two claims, in an cffort to show how thc imagery model can accommodate the various examples that have been thought to motivatc imagcless imagination. Doing so will lcad to a discussion of the rolc of thc image, and in thc course of this discussion a lullcr picturc of the imagery modcl will emerge. It will bc uscful to bcgin with the following passagc from Descartes' discussion of thc imagination in thc Meditutions: .. . if 1 want to think of a chiliagon, although I understand that it is a figure consisting of a thousand sides just as well as I understand the triangle to he a three-sided ligure, I do not in the same way imagine the thousand sides or see them as if they were present before me .... Rut
The MIT Press, 1981), pp. 1-18; and Zenon Pylyshyn, "Imagery and Artilicial Intelligence," in Perception rrnd Cogrlitiorr: Issues in the Fourla'trrion.~ Psvchology, C . Wade Savage, ed. (Minn.: University of Minnesota Prcss, I978), pp. 19-56. As Pylyshyn, who is a descriptionalist, describes his view: "The point is not that there is no such object as an image, only that an adequate theory of the mental representation involved in imaging will depict it as having a distinctly nonpictorial character." (p. 19) ins of,^ as the ontological worries about imagery are based on a rnisundcrstanding of the evidence from cognitive science for descriptionalism, such worries are less serious than might otherwise appear.
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suppose I am dealing with a pentagon: I can of course understand the ligure of a pentagon, just as I can the figure of a chiliagon, without the help of the imagination; but I can also imagine a pentagon, by applying the mind's eye to its five sides and the area contained within them. And in doing this I notice quite clearly that imagination requires a peculiar effort of mind which is not required for understanding.*'
Presumably, what he means by this "pcculiar cffort of mind" is the effort involvcd in producing an imagc. In this way, Descartes sharply distinguishcs the act of imagining from thc rclatcd intellcctual act of conceiving (in his terms, the act of understanding). In dcveloping an account of thc imagination bascd on the csscntialist claim, onc might rcjcct Descartes' account of concciving, but onc must acccpt thc imagistic requirement hc placcs on imagining: Descartes' thesis: If a mental cxercisc is an exercisc of thc imagination, then imagery is prcsent. It is also worth noting cxplicitly that the essentialist claim alonc in no way commits one to the converse of Descartes' thcsis. The claim that imagery plays an csscntial role in imagining is indepcndcnt of thc further claim that whcnevcr imagcry is prcscnt in a mental cxcrcisc, such an excrcise counts as an imagining. This furthcr claim is not a part of the imagery model, and thus, my account of imagination should bc cntircly compatible with thc claim that mental cxcrciscs othcr than thc imagination involvc imagery, perhaps even essentially. This is important, since it would ccrtainly be implausible to dcny that we havc all sorts of imagistic beliefs and memories, for example, without exercising our imagination. Thc imagcry modcl vicws thc prcsence of imagery as necessary, but not sufficient, to make a mental cxercisc an cxcrcisc of thc imagination. As yct, howcvcr, thc imagcry modcl is incompletc. Having claimed that thc image plays an essential rolc in imagining, we nccd now to cxplain what that rolc is. Pcrhaps the most likely candidate for this essential role is an individuative one, namely, that thc imagc involvcd in an imagining is what makcs it thc type of imagining that it is.22Dcscartcs sccms to have held such a view. The rcason hc thinks that we cannot imaginc a chiliagon is that the imagc that wc produce when we attempt to do so would be no diffcrent from thc imagc wc would produce whcn trying to imagine a myriagon, or any other many-sided polygon.*' Thus, his discussion prcsupposcs that we cannot havc two imaginings of differcnt typcs (i.e., imagining a chiliagon and imagining a myriagon) that involvc the samc imagc. *' 22
*' 100
The Philosophical Writirtgs of Descccrtes, vol. 2, ed., John Cottingha~net al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 50-51 Another likely candidate is the clairn that the irnage is the object of the imagining. I will discuss this claim in Section VII below Descartes, p . 50.
AMY KIND
In this way, the csscntialist claim secms to commit onc to the individuative claim: images serve to individuatc imaginings. The appearance of this commitment is unfortunate, howcvcr, for it has left imagery-based accounts of imagining susceptible to attack. For cxamplc, in The Language of I ~ n a ~ i nation, Alan White takes up thc qucstion "does any imagcry prcsent play an csscntial rolc in the i m a g i n a t i ~ n ? "The ~ ~ following three passagcs play a critical rolc in his dercnse or a negative answer to this question: One is imagining exactly the same thing when one imagines that, for exarnple, a sailor is scrambling ashore on a desert island, however varied one's imagery may be. The imagery of a sailor scrambling ashore could be exactly the sarne as that of his twin brother crawling backwards into the sea, yet to imagine one of these is quite different from imagining the other. [Tlhough one can easily inlagine that one is being chased by ninety-nine tigcrs and one's friend kills thirty-three of them, it is diflicult to believe that any itnngery one has would distinguish this case from that in which one imagined that one was chased by ninety-seven tigers of whom thirty-one were shot by one's friend."
According to the individuative claim, an imagining is the type o r imagining it is iT and only iT therc is a ccrtain image involved. Thc tirst passage from Whitc offers a counterexample to the necessary condition of the individuative claim; he suggests that no particular image is needcd to make an imagining thc type of imagining it is. Thc sccond and third passages offer countcrexamples to the surficient condition o r thc individuativc claim; Whitc suggcsts that no particular image is cnough to makc an imagining thc typc of imagining it is. Having argucd in this way against the individuativc claim, White takes himself to havc argucd against thc cssentialist claim as well. Examplcs of thc sort Whitc proposcs constitute rathcr dccisivc cvidcncc that images do not individuate imaginings, and they thus justify White's rcjection of thc individuative claim. Howcver, thcy do not thcrcby justify his rejcction of thc cssentialist claim, sincc thcrc is no rcason to think that the esscntialist claim commits us to thc individuative claim. For cvery tokenimagining, imagery is assigned an essential role, but this docs not cntail that the image must play the role of making that particular imagining thc typc of imagining it is. In this regard, the following rough analogy might bc uscrul. Considcr onc typc of voyage: thc voyage from Los Angeles to Honolulu. This voyagc rcquircs somc form of transportation. A train, of coursc, will not gct you therc, but it does not matter whethcr you take a boat or a plane. Similarly, consider one type of imagining: the imagining of Bill Clinton in the act or 24 25
white 1990, p. 91. White 1990. All three passages are from p. 92, though they do not occur in the order I have listed them.
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giving a campaign speech. According to thc essentialist claim, this imagining rcquircs that I producc somc kind of irnagc. Not just any image will do, of coursc, Sor it has to bc an imagc of him, and moreovcr an image of him in thc act of giving a campaign speech, but it does not mattcr whethcr thc image I produce has him drcsscd in a hard-hat or a tuxedo. Thc way I go about the imagining might at one time be via an image of him dressed in a hard-hat, whilc anothcr timc I might go about it via an irnagc of him drcsscd in a tuxcdo; thc imagcs differ, and yet both of thcse are imaginings of Bill Clinton in thc act of giving a campaign spccch. But an image, whatever image it is, is thc means of making the imagining happen, just as thc boat or the plane is the mcans of making thc voyagc happcn. Thc point hcrc is that in assigning imagcry an cssential rolc in imagining, wc can lcavc it opcn what imagc will play that role in a particular typc of imaginative exercise. For any given type of voyage, a variety of means of transportation might be suitable. Similarly, for any givcn typc of imagining, a variety of images might fit the bill. My analogy to voyagcs has so far distanccd thc csscntialist claim from the necessary condition of the individuativc claim. But we can clcarly distance the csscntialist claim from the sufficient condition laid down by the individuative claim as well. Just as morc than onc vchiclc can servc as thc mcans for a single voyagc, more than one voyagc may rcquire usc of thc same vchicle. The vehicle used is not sufficicnt for making thc voyagc thc typc it is. This relationship bctwecn vchiclc and voyagc can oncc again scrvc as an analogy for the relationship bctwccn imagc and imagining: more than one imagining may requirc the use of thc same image. Thc irnagc is not sufficicnt for making the imagining thc typc it is.*"n this way, my account of imagining will not be susccptible to attack by an attack on thc individuativc claim; wc can assign imagery an esscntial role in imagining without having thc particular image involvcd bc cssential for detcrmining the imagining's typc. Thc imagery modcl, which is committcd to the essentialist claim, is not thcreby committed to thc individuativc claim (and is thus not susccptible to attack by an attack on the individuative claim). This said, I want to notc explicitly that my abovc analogy to voyages and vchiclcs scrves only to establish this ncgativc claim: assigning images an cssential rolc in imagining docs not commit the imagcry modcl to thc claim that thc rolc is an individuativc onc. I do not intcnd this analogy to givc rise to a positivc claim about what that esscntial rolc is. Rather, I will rcturn to this issue in the final section of this papcr.
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Bernard Williams' discussion of the relation between what is imagined and what is visualized is suggestive of this sort of treatment of the relation between what is imagined and what is imaged; see "Imagination and the Self," in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 26-45.
AMY KLND
VI. The Alleged Counterexamples There are two morals to draw from thc previous section: first, that two different images might be essentially involved in imaginings of the samc typc, and second, that two imaginings of diffcrent typcs might csscntially involvc the samc image. It is this sccond moral that scrves to protcct thc imagcry modcl from the allcged countercxamples that oftcn motivatc thcorics of imageless imagination. The most plausible counterexamples are cases of predicative objcct-dircctcd imaginings in which what I predicatc of thc imagincd objcct secms to be something that cannot bc imagcd. Rccall the cxamples wc saw abovc: my imagining Bill Clinton having a sccrct desire to bc a rock and roll star, or my imagining Bill Clinton calculating ncxt year's budgct in his h ~ a dImpressed .~~ by such cases, which seem to force us to jettison the essentialist claim, philosophcrs havc often adopted alternative analyses of the imagination which minimizc thc rolc and importancc of the image. Thesc analyses, which I will call mixed models of the imagination, vary in dcgree. Kcndall Walton, for cxamplc, accepts that some exercises of the imagination "consist partly in having mcntal images," but claims also that "imagining can occur without i m a g ~ r y . " ~ W i dIshiguru 6 dc-emphasizes thc imagc cven furthcr. On Ishiguru's vicw, imagery never plays an essential role in imagining: mental images are, at most, necessary tools for a lir~ritednnmher of peoplc in cerl~lirzkinds of exercise of the imagination and are, for Inany people, merely psychological acco~npani~nents which occur when they are engaged in imaginative work and not the essence of it.2'
On any mixcd modcl of imagining, however, the class of imaginings divides in two: some imaginings involvc imagcry (and pcrhaps somc cvcn involvc imagery essentially), whilc others involvc no imagcry at all. So, Tor cxamplc, considcr thc rollowing two imaginings:
(1) I imagine Bill Clinton doing budgct calculations on papcr (2) I imagine Bill Clinton doing budget calculations in his head. Though a proponent of thc mixed modcl will acccpt that mental imagcry is involvcd in the first imagining, shc will deny that thc sccond involvcs any imagery. Rather than adopt a mixed modcl of imagining, onc might try to defend thc imagcry model against alleged counterexamples like (2) by relying on a 27
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Walton has suggested examples such as these in correspondence. For other examples of this sort, see White 1990, p. 88. Walton 1990, p. 13. Hid6 Ishiguru, "Imagination," in Rritish Artctlyticctl Philosophy, ed., Bernard Williarns and Alan Montefiore (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 171.
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involvcd in an imagining is thc object of thc irnagining. An association with the object claim would leave the imagery modcl susceptiblc to attack, but fortunately, we can scparate the essentialist claim from the object clairn (just as wc could scparatc the csscntialist claim frorn the individuativc clairn). Our reflection on how to achicve this separation will have two desired effccts. First, it will rcvcal a more prornising solution to the problcm that both the individuativc claim and thc objcct claim tricd unsuccessfully to solvc, namely, the problcm of assigning a role of thc image. And second, it will thcrcby rcvcal a morc cornplctc picturc of thc imagcry rnodcl itsclf. As G.E. Moorc has notcd, oncc one cndorscs the clairn that imagcs are involved in imagining, it is very natural to claim that "these i~nagcswhich we havc bcforc our minds, whcn wc imaginc things, arc what wc imagine."3o Zcno Vcndlcr, in his discussion of thc imagination, not only attributes the object claim to thc proponent of an imagcry-bascd account of imagining, but also suggests that the need to find a object for thc imagining is thc prime motivation such an account. The argument Vendler sets up goes as follows. In order for mc to sce an elcphant, thc actual clcphant has to bc bcforc me. But in order for me to imaginc an elephant, thcrc nced bc no clcphant in the near vicinity. It is thus tcmpting to trcat thc imagination on the modcl of my sccing a picture of an clcphant, sincc in this case thcrc also nced be no elcphant in the near vicinity. When I see a picture of an elephant, I am ablc to pcrccive thc elephant representcd in thc picture, but only bccausc I am perceiving thc piccc of papcr on which it is reprcscntcd. On analogy with this, the reason that I arn ablc to scc thc clcphant in imagination is that I arn sccing a mental image in which it is represen1ed.l' It is in this sort of way that the object claim becomes cntrenched in an imagery-based account of the imagination. Unfortunately, howcvcr, thc objcct claim embodies a fundamental mistake. If, when one engages in an imaginative exercise, the object of the imagining is an irnagc, thcn our ordinary i~naginativcexercises turn out to be quitc differcnt from what they secm. Whcn it secrns to mc that I am irnagining Bill Clinton, for cxamplc, thc object of my irnagining is rcally an irnagc of Clinton. I arn unablc to imaginc Clinton, for hc is a man, not an irnagc. Noticc that thc problcm is not just that Clinton is somehow too "rcal" a thing to bc thc objcct of my imagining. If thc objcct of my imagining is an image, thcn I am unablc to imaginc Shcrlock Holrncs as wcll. Though the
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G.E. Moore, Some Muin Problenzs of Philosophy (New York: Mac~nillanPress, 1953), p. 235. Moore's way of casting the object claim introduces an ambiguity, since ''WhatVquestions typically may have a variety of possible answers. If I ask someone what she is drawing, her reply might be "a caricature," or it might also be "Rill Clinton." The image is supposed to be what is imagined in the sense that Rill Clinton is whur she is drawing, that is, it is the object of her imagining. Moore goes on to argue forcefully against assigning this role to the image; see especially pp. 236-37. Vendler 1984, p. 58.
AMY KIND
problcm of thc ontological status of fictional objects is a notoriously difficult onc, I take it that howevcr this problcrn is to bc rcsolvcd, Sherlock Holrncs had bcttcr not turn out to be an image (an image, for examplc, cannot solvc mysteries or have a fondness for opium). And so, if an irnagc is the object of my imagining, then Shcrlock Holmes is no more capable of bcing a objcct of my imagining than is Bill Clinton. In this way, thc objcct claim is clearly problematic. But thc proponent of an imagery-based account of imagining clcarly can cndorsc thc claim that imagining csscntially involvcs imagery without thereby acquiring a commitment to the claim that thc irnagc is thc objcct of thc imagining. Just bccausc thc imagc involved in an imagining is not thc objcct of that imagining does not mcan that there is no essential role for that imagc to play in thc imaginative cxcrcise. Reflection on a variety of examples helps to makc this point. First, consider the activity of writing. Words play an essential role in this activity; you cannot write without words. But, when someone writes a biography of Clinton, cvcn though words play an csscntial role in thc activity, they arc not thc object of hcr activity; thcy arc not what the writing is ubout. I take it that these claims about writing arc cntircly uncontrovcrsial. Next, consider the activity of painting. Paint plays an essential role in this activity. But, when someone is engaged in the activity of painting Clinton, cvcn though paint plays an csscntial rolc in the activity, it is not thc object of thc activity. The paintcr is not painting paint, she is painting Clinton. Morcovcr, just as with thc activity of writing, thcsc clairns about painting arc wholly uncontrovcrsial. Thus, claiming that irnagcry plays an csscntial role in imagining does not commit us to the claim that the imagery is the object of the imagining. Bccausc thc csscntialist clairn is logically indcpcndcnt of thc objcct claim, attacks on thc former which proceed by attacking thc lattcr are misguided.12 But givcn this obvious logical independcnce, one might wondcr why the proponents of imagery-bascd accounts havc bcen saddled with the latter claim. The reason, I expcct, is that no other plausible explanation for thc role of thc irnagc has bccn forthcoming. Thc csscntialist claim tclls us only that images arc involved csscntially in imagining. But thc question remains: What docs thc imagc do in imagining'! For any imagcry-based account to bc a satislactory account of imagining, its proponent must answcr this qucstion. The object claim, dcspite all its problems, provided an answcr to this qucstion. Thus, while thc csscntialist clairn by no mcans entails the objcct claim, the nccd to assign a rolc to thc imagc puts a practical pressure on the proponent of the forrncr claim to adopt the latter. Thc rcflcctions of this scction, how-
''
For two examples of such attacks, see Ryle 1954, p. 247 and Vendler 1984, p. 58. Vendler there argues that "An imagined elephant is not a picture-elephant seen with real vision; it is a real elephant perceived in imagination."
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cvcr, havc laid thc groundwork for showing how we can remove thc pressure. In particular, I want to lift from our discussion of thc activity of painting an cnticing metaphor: imagery can be thought of as thc paint of the imaginat i ~ n . ~ ~ This metaphor is, of course, by no means perfcct. Evcn spcaking metaphorically, wc would not want to characterixc the magin nation as a canvas to w h ~ c hsome mind's hand appl~esbrushstrokcs. But this metaphor, imperfect though it may be, hclps us to sec what the Image is d o ~ n gin an irnagining. Suppose I wcre trying to paint a portrait of Bill Clinton. As we have seen, in such a casc, the paint I usc would not itsclf bc thc object of my activity. Rather, the rolc thc paint plays would bc to capturc thc object of my painting, in this case, Bill Clinton. Similarly, if I were trying to imagine Bill Clinton, thc image I use would not itself be the objcct of my activity. But thc rolc that thc imagc plays is to capturc thc objcct of my imagining, in this case, Bill Clinton. Wc should also notc that categorizing thc role of the image in thc activity of imagining on analogy of the rolc of paint in thc activity of painting fits nicely with the observations madc in Section V, in our discussion of thc individuativc claim. Many diffcrcnt sorts of paintings could bc paintcd from the salnc palctte, and the sarnc sort of painting might have been painted with paint from a differcnt palette. Thus, just as a particular image is neithcr ncccssary nor sufficicnt to rnakc an imagining thc imagining it is, particular paint is ncither necessary nor sufficicnt to make a painting thc painting it is. As a result of this discussion we now have bcfore us a fuller picture of thc imagery model. Like any imagcry-based account of imagining, the imagery model centers on the essentialist claim that the image plays an essential rolc in irnagining. But thc irnagcry modcl dcparts from prcvious incarnations of imagery-based accounts of imagining in its explanation of the rolc of the image. The fact that the image is assigned ncither the role of individuator of the imagining nor the rolc of object of the imagining, but rather, the role of capturing the object of the imagination, allows the imagery modcl to cscape criticism that is oftcn airned at imagcry-bascd accounts of imagining. Since similar criticisms are oftcn airncd at imagery-bascd accounts of pcrception (i.e., scnsc-data thcories), thc abovc discussion also has important implications for thcorics of perccption. As I noted in Scction 111, the phcnomcnological charactcr of imagination is vcry much like the phcnomcnological charactcr of pcrccption. Thus, oncc wc accept the imagery model as our theory of imaginat~on,it seems natural to explore an analogous thcory for perception. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop -
ht"i'
108
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this analogy, I do ,lor mean to invoke the notion of "mental paint" sometimes used in discussions of qualia, e.g. Ned Block, "Mental Paint and Mental Latex," in Philoso111hic.cll I.rsues: Perreption (Atascedero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1995).
AMY KIND
such a theory herc, the points I havc made about thc role of irnagery in imagination could surcly bc cxtcndcd to claims about the role of imagcry in pcrccption. An imagc can be involvcd in perception, cvcn csscntially so, without having to scrvc as the objcct of the perception. Rathcr, thc perceptual image, just like the i~nagcinvolved in imagining, could scrve to capturc thc object of the perception. This insight has thc potcntial to allow an irnagcrybased thcory of perception to cscapc rnany of thc standard objections to senscdata theories.
VIII. Conclusion Let us return, oncc morc, to thc cxarnplc with which I bcgan: my imagining Bill Clinton in a prison cell. The irnagcry model aims to explain what makcs this mental excrcise an act of thc imagination. Of course, hard questions still rcmain. Notably, for examplc, our picturc of thc imagery rnodcl docs not cxplain why this mental cxercise is an imagining as opposcd to somc othcr possiblc mental excrcise that involves imagery essentially. Howevcr, insofar as thc i~nagcrymodel is able to explain how mental imagery could be esscntially involved in this mcntal cxcrcisc, the goal of this papcr has been achicved: we havc put thc image back in i ~ n a g i n a t i o n . ~ ~
'4
Thanks are due to Joseph Almog, Tyler Burge, Andrew Hsu, David Kaplan, Frank Menetrez, Alex Racjzi, and Seana Shiffrin for helpful discussion about the issues raised in this paper.
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[Footnotes] 2
Imagination J. M. Shorter Mind, New Series, Vol. 61, No. 244. (Oct., 1952), pp. 528-542. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28195210%292%3A61%3A244%3C528%3AI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E 8
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? Stephen Yablo Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 53, No. 1. (Mar., 1993), pp. 1-42. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28199303%2953%3A1%3C1%3AICAGTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y 11
What Is It Like to Be a Bat? Thomas Nagel The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 4. (Oct., 1974), pp. 435-450. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108%28197410%2983%3A4%3C435%3AWIILTB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y
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