"Charientic" Judgments

Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 125 (Apr., 1958) 138-146.

"CHARIENTIC" JUDGMENTS PETER GLASSEN

IT is one of the objects of what is sometimes called "general theory of value" to study all sorts of value judgments or (what would be a better name for them) evaluational judgments. But what the sorts of evaluational judgment are is a question that has so far by no means been settled. There are only two kinds of evaluational judgment that are universally recognized and that have well-established names, the ethical or moral, and the aesthetic. Another pair that have sometimes been mentioned are the prudential and the economic. The

object of this paper is to direct attention to still another, quite distinct, sort of evaluational judgment which we commonly make, to give judgments of this sort a name, and to characterize them in a provisional way. Let us begin by considering judgments using the term "vulgar":

for example, "It is vulgar to chew gum," "Engaging in altercations in public is vulgar," and so on. Judgments of this kind clearly are not, I should think, descriptive or empirical; they clearly are evaluational. I say "clearly," although the criteria by which we can distinguish evaluational judgments from descriptive statements have by no means been sharply defined as yet to everyone's satisfaction. But there is about these judgments a certain aura, or as Professor Ryle might say, a certain smell, which, to anyone who knows the language, marks them off from such statements as "Chewing gum whitens the teeth" and "Altercations in public usually attract attention," statements which are descriptive. Furthermore, there seems to be no way in which the truth of such assertions can be tested empirically, or if there is, it is no more obvious what form such tests might take than it is in the case of the other kinds of evaluational judgment. Questions of what is vulgar, like questions of what is wrong or what is ugly, are questions that tend to give rise to interminable disputes, and answers to them are practically never considered to state matters of fact but to be, as we often say, matters of opinion. A confident expression of such an opinion is apt to call forth retorts of a kind peculiar to evaluational judgments, as: "Who are you to judge?" "You are simply expressing the attitude of your culture; you are mistaken if you think that your judgment would have validity in every society. There is no universal standard of what is vulgar and what is not"; and so on. Judgments in terms of "vulgar" certainly do express an attitude on the part of the speaker (an unfavourable one, as it happens), as do judgments in terms of "wrong" and "ugly," and, like the latter, are usually also intended to evoke a similar attitude in i38

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"CHARIENTIC'' JUDGMENTS the person addressed. This expressive-evocative function has come to be widely regarded as one of the salient features of evaluational judgments (although it need not be held that it is the only feature). I think, then, that we can quite safely assume that judgments using the word "vulgar" are evaluational judgments, and the question we have to decide is whether they are moral judgments or aesthetic judgments or some third kind, as yet unnamed-for they could not with any plausibility be said to be prudential or economic judgments. It seems to me pretty clear that they are not moral judgments. The things that are thought to be vulgar-like chewing gum, making scenes, picking one's nose, etc.-are not commonly thought to be morally wrong or immoral. Moreover, a man may be regarded as being of the highest moral character, and yet be held to be vulgar in greater or lesser degree. That someone is vulgar is not thought of as incompatible with his being truthful, loyal, courageous, honest, and, in general, the sort of person who tries to do his duty as he sees

it. It is worthy of remark, however, that while vulgar behaviour is not commonly thought of as wrong, certain types of behaviour considered wrong are also considered, by at least some persons of delicate sensibilities, as vulgar-such as petty theft, malicious gossip, lying to escape a deserved penalty, and so on. But this fact, of course, does not show that "vulgar" is a moral term, but rather that moral conduct can be judged from whatever standpoint the term "vulgar" represents, just as it can be judged as, for example, foolish, from the non-moral standpoint of prudence.

It seems to me pretty clear, also, that judgments in terms

of "vulgar" are not aesthetic judgments. Judgments in terms of "vulgar" are characteristically made about persons and their acts; aesthetic judgments are characteristically made about things and

experiences. To be sure, we do judge certain works of art to be vulgar, but this is only an indirect way of judging the artist to be vulgar and those to whom his work appeals. To say that a novel is vulgar is to say that it is the expression of a vulgar mind, and to imply that anyone who enjoys it is vulgar. "Vulgar" as applied to works of art is a transferred epithet; "beautiful" and "ugly," how-

ever, are not. This difference is, I think, sufficient justification for putting "vulgar" and "beautiful" or "ugly" into two different classes of terms, but I shall elaborate on this point somewhat in a later paragraph. The term "vulgar," then, although certainly an evaluational

term, is neither a moral term nor an aesthetic term. It would be convenient if it, and other terms like it (whether pejorative or honorific), were given a distinguishing name, and the name I propose I39

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PHILOSOPHY to give it is that of "charientic"I; judgments made by means of charientic terms I propose to call "charientic" judgments. Charientic judgments, accordingly, will be a class of evaluational judgments the study of which will constitute a division of the general theory of value distinct from the study of moral judgments and aesthetic judgments. This division we might call "charientics" or "charientology." Now, what other charientic terms and judgments are there? It would be difficult, if not impossible, to give a complete list, but the following may be mentioned by way of illustration.

A term that is sometimes used in a sense opposite to that of "vulgar" is the term "refined." More usually, however, this term is used nowadays in an ironical way, and the sort of woman who advertises in the personal columns of the newspaper: "Refined lady, lover of music, art, books, desires meet gentleman, forties, similar tastes" has become a figure of ridicule. (No doubt it is because of its abuse by the vulgar-but-would-be-refined that the word "refined" has fallen into disrepute.) A pair of terms akin to, but not synonymous with, "refined" are the terms "cultivated" and "cultured," but "cultured," like "refined," tends to be used in an ironical way, while "cultivated" does not. Terms roughly opposite in meaning

to "'cultivated' and "cultured" are "boorish, "uncouth,' (crass,"

"philistine." The term "civilized" is often used with a meaning which seems to be practically descriptive and empirical, as when we

say that the head-hunters of New Guinea are becoming gradually civilized, but there is a sense of the word "civilized" which makes it distinctly an evaluational term of the kind that we are consideringa sense exemplified in the sentence "A truly civilized person would not dream of smoking just before dinner," and further exemplified in such a comparison as that, say, between the French and the Americans which finds the French more "civilized" than the Americans. The term "educated," similarly, seems to have both a purely descriptive and also an evaluational, charientic sense. In a descriptive sense, "educated" implies merely that the person said to be so has studied at some institution of higher learning; in an evaluational sense, however, even a person who has studied at an institution of

higher learning may be denied to be "truly educated." What an "educated" man is, in this sense, tends to be a subject of interminable dispute, like other "matters of opinion." A term rather different from any of those mentioned but nevertheless having undoubted affinities with them is the term "gentleman" (with its feminine counterpart, "lady"). The term "gentleman" is I From xaplSVTo', genitive of Xapleg. ". . . in At[tic Greek] xapitg' was

very often used of persons, in relation to qualities of mind, graceful, elegant,

accomplished, . . . ol xaptevTe; men of taste, men of education ... op[posed to] Ol IToAAoi ...." (Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 6th ed., i869.) I40

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"CHARIENTIC" JUDGMENTS sometimes used in a purely charientic sense, as when a man is said

to be a gentleman because of his accent, his way of dressing, and his general deportment in society. On the other hand, there are those

who would like to make the term "gentleman" into a purely moral term, such people as those who go about insisting that "gentle is as gentle does." More usually, however, a man is called a "gentleman" because of both the moral qualities and the charientic qualities that he is thought to possess. In this sense, a man would not be considered to be a gentleman, no matter how refined his manners, how cultivated his accent, or how elegant his deportment, if he were also a liar, a swindler, or a thief; nor, on the other hand, would he be considered to be a gentleman, no matter how honest, truthful, or loyal he might be, if he spoke with a cockney accent, used toothpicks in

public, or buttoned the bottom button of his waistcoat. We might say, then, that in its most common sense "gentleman" is a moralcharientic term. Perhaps, in the sense in which we talk about noble deeds, "noble" is also a moral-charientic term, rather than a purely charientic or a purely moral term. There are, no doubt, many other charientic terms besides the ones I have mentioned, but these should do by way of example. I shall now proceed to point out some of the characteristics which charientic judgments seem to possess, and perhaps the best way to do this would be to compare and contrast them with moral judgments. Both moral and charientic judgments may be made, as I have already mentioned, about persons or their characters as well as about their actions, conduct, or practices. Thus we may say a man is morally good or bad, or that he is cultivated or vulgar; and we may say the same things about his conduct. Both moral judgments and charientic judgments express (in addition to whatever else they may do) attitudes of approval or disapproval. But what makes them significantly different is that they express different kinds of approval and disapproval. Moral approval characteristically takes the form of respect; charientic approval characteristically takes a form for which there appears to be no name, but which seems more akin to admiration than respect. We do not respect a man for being refined or

cultivated; we do respect him for being honest, truthful, and loyal. A well-bred or cultivated man charms us or delights us, and wins the sort of admiration that we reserve for persons who can do these things; a good man may not charm us at all, but nevertheless evokes in us a feeling perhaps more solid and durable, a feeling of esteem. To be sure, if a man's moral excellences are very great, we may also admire him for them, but this admiration is more like awe, while the

admiration we have for a man's charientic excellences is probably never like this. These differences in attitude are reflected in our behaviour. Good men are men whom we are willing to admit to I4I

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PHILOSOPHY

membership in human society generally, altho or uncouth, we shall likely not enjoy their company and consequently shall probably exclude them from the circle of our intimate friends. Well-bred, cultivated persons, on the other hand, are apt to be agreeable companions, but even so, should they also be scoundrels,

swindlers of widows and orphans, we shall probably want to exclude or segregate them from human society. We usually do not want to put a good man in gaol on account of his uncouthness; we usually do want to put a wicked man in gaol in spite of his refinement. This point brings us to the differences between moral disapproval and charientic disapproval. Moral disapproval is a kind of resentful reaction: if it is occasioned by a particular action, it takes the form of indignation (an emotion similar to anger except that it is directed towards an object regarded from the moral point of view); if its object is a person and his character, it takes the form of a settled hostility or animosity. Charientic disapproval, on the other hand, is not a resentful reaction, but a kind of contempt, a looking-downone's-nose reaction. While moral indignation tends to find an outlet in the infliction of physical pain on the agent who evokes it, charientic disapproval tends to express itself as derision or ridicule. We want to laugh at the vulgar; we want to punish the wicked. To be sure, there do appear from time to time denunciations, not so much of the immorality or wickedness of the age, as of its vulgarity, crassness,

or philistinism. Such denunciations may have the fervour, even virulence, of the most outraged moralist, but they do not, all the same, express a moral point of view. They proceed from irritation at having to put up with the unpleasantnesses or frustrations of living in an uncongenial milieu. A good man, unfortunately, can be vulgar

or a philistine, and when he is, his moral virtues do not prevent him from being a bore. Though his vulgarities tend to inspire only

laughter when viewed from a safe distance, close association with him is apt to be a source of tedium. Reflection on his goodness makes him nevertheless endurable; but should a philistine lack this redeeming quality, he can become intolerable. When such persons are very numerous in a society and also wield much influence, there are

manifold ways in which they can interfere with the interests and pleasures of others, and hence be a source of irritation to them. A characteristic way of exposing the charientic deficiencies of a society is comedy, as a characteristic way of denouncing its moral vices is fulminations from the pulpit. Our moral and charientic feelings and attitudes towards others have their counterparts in our moral and charientic feelings and attitudes towards ourselves. When one is conscious of doing some-

thing morally wrong or violating one's duty, one tends to have a feeling of guilt, and should one be caught, one will characteristically I42

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'"CHARIENTIC" JUDGMENTS feel shame. There is usually no temptation to engage in conduct that

is charientically deficient; if someone engages in such conduct at all, it is usually from ignorance. Hence there is nothing corresponding to a feeling of guilt on the part of a person whose behaviour is, for example, vulgar; ordinarily, he simply is not aware that it is so. Yet it may be that an agent will have attained to some conception of what is charientically excellent and what is not, although he may be unaware that some particular practice of his is, or would be regarded by others as, charientically deficient; should he then suddenly realize that this practice of his is a charientic fault or is so regarded by others, he will tend to have a feeling something like shame, a feeling which we usually call embarrassment. Embarrassment characteristically occurs when one thinks oneself detected in the commission of a charientic faux pas, as shame characteristically occurs when one thinks oneself detected in a moral transgression. To conceal his moral deficiencies, an agent is apt to make an emphatic display of moral high-mindedness, a display which we call hypocrisy; similarly, an agent is apt to pretend to charientic virtues that he does not

possess, and this we call affectation. Excessive consciousness of one's moral superiority is self-righteousness; excessive consciousness of one's charientic superiority is one form of snobbishness. I have suggested that the sort of acts and qualities which are ordinarily regarded as charientically deficient are not regarded as morally wrong or bad. But it is interesting to note that the reverse

is not the case. The sort of acts that are considered primarily morally wrong are also, in addition to this or in place of it, sometimes disapproved from the charientic point of view. This is particularly characteristic of sophisticated persons. Such persons often regard practices like lying, promise-breaking, theft, malicious gossip, etc., not only as morally wrong, but in addition to this, or sometimes instead of this, as vulgar, cheap, or common. There are, indeed, persons who seem to be restrained from engaging in such conduct not by moral considerations, but rather by charientic considerations; conduct of this sort they regard as (charientically) "beneath" them. Their reaction to others who do these things is apt to be not the typical moral reaction of indignation or hostility, but rather the typical charientic reaction of contempt. It is characteristic of Lord Chesterfield-that pre-eminent prophet of the charientic, with his credo in the charientic trinity of "the Graces, the Graces, the Graces"-that though he pointed out to his son from time to time the desirability of morally right conduct, the basis of his concern seems to have been charientic rather than moral. To be sure, those who are very much concerned about charientic excellence, particularly those who wish to impress others with their charientic superiority-their superior culture or refinement-do not always, or even as a rule, despise that I43

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PHILOSOPHY from the charientic point of view which others disapprove from the

moral point of view. Indeed, excessive concern with charientic excellence is apt to be accompanied by a corresponding disregard for moral values. Societies where excessive emphasis is placed on the charientic (the French nobility of the eighteenth century, for example) are apt to be condemned, and not without reason, as morally corrupt and decadent.

This brings me to the final point I want to make about the moral and the charientic. Moral excellence, both in character and practice, is generally thought to be much more important than charientic excellence. Most people seem to think that it is a matter of very

serious concern whether a man is, say, honest or not, but of relatively little concern whether he is cultivated or not; and they think it of the gravest importance that a man should refrain from wrongdoing, but of not much consequence that he should refrain from vulgarity. The moral virtues are the solid virtues, the basic

virtues on which we depend in times of stress or crisis, or whenev a vital interest is at stake; by contrast the charientic virtues seem to be merely ornamental and decorative. The relationship between the moral and the charientic virtues is not unlike that between the utilitarian and the aesthetic properties of things. We tend to place the serviceability of things above their "merely" (as we sometimes

say) beautiful or attractive qualities, just as we tend to place the moral virtues above the charientic virtues. This difference in degree of importance attributed to moral virtue as compared with charientic virtue is particularly marked where the conditions of life are difficult and severe, or where people live close to the minimum subsistence level. Under these conditions there is practically complete indifference to the possession or non-possession of charientic excellence, and a maximum of emphasis on the possession of whatever qualities happen to be regarded as morally excellent. Where, however, the conditions of life are easier, where there is peace, security, and prosperity, there people become interested in refinement, culture, breeding, and the charientic virtues generally. It is for this reason that there is an aura of class distinction about the charientic virtues. Until recent times, and even yet in most parts of the world, it was only the upper and the middle classes that could afford, so to speak, to pay much attention to the development of the charientic virtues-a fact marked by the use of names indicating class distinctions as names for charientic excellence or (more usually) the lack of it, such as "gentleman," "vulgar," "common," "boorish," and so on.

I now want to add something to what I said above concerning the difference between aesthetic judgments and charientic judgments. Perhaps the best way to do this would be to consider a pair of I44

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''CHARIENTIC'' JUDGMENTS specific examples, one an aesthetic judgment and the other a charientic judgment: say, "Mrs. Smith is a plain-looking woman" and

"Mrs. Smith is a vulgar woman." It might seem at first thought that these judgments are about the same subject, namely, Mrs. Smith. But in fact the aesthetic judgment is about the face and figure of Mrs. Smith while the charientic judgment is about the character or personality of Mrs. Smith; or, putting this in another way, the aesthetic judgment is about Mrs. Smith considered as a body while the charientic judgment is about Mrs. Smith considered as a person.

Now our attitudes to physical things are characteristically different from our attitudes to persons, and at least one of the things that

make aesthetic judgments and charientic judgments essentially different from each other (in addition to the fact that they take

different sorts of subjects) is the fact that they are expressive of these differences of attitude. (This, of course, as the preceding discussion has been intended to show, is also one of the things that make charientic judgments different from moral judgments.) Let us

consider our two specific examples. When I say that Mrs. Smith is a plain-looking woman I express some sort of attitude of disfavour,

but this has nothing in it of the contempt distinguishing the attitude which I express when I say that Mrs. Smith is vulgar. In saying that Mrs. Smith is plain-looking I am indicating the fact that I derive no pleasure from the sight of Mrs. Smith (as a physical thing), but I do

not imply that I think any the less well of Mrs. Smith for all that. I should certainly not regard Mrs. Smith's being plain-looking as providing me with justification for snubbing her, for excluding her from the circle of my friends, or for making malicious remarks about her to others. Yet Mrs. Smith's being vulgar probably would seem to me to provide some justification for excluding her from the circle of at least my intimate friends, for trying to avoid her when I saw her approaching, and (if I were a certain kind of person) for making some ill-natured remarks about her. There would be corresponding differences in the attitudes expressed by favourable aesthetic judgments and favourable charientic judgments, but I do not think we need elaborate on these here, since my purpose is only to show that

aesthetic judgments and charientic judgments are different. The special quality of charientic judgments is best brought out by contrasting them with moral judgments, and that I have already done.

I hope I have said enough now to make tolerably clear what sort of judgment I mean by the term "charientic judgment." A more thorough study of such judgments, and of their relationship to other evaluational judgments, will be the task of theoretical charientics. There is a certain danger that theoretical charientics will be regarded as a frivolous subject-just as the charientic virtues themselves may D

I45

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PHILOSOPHY be regarded as of trifling importance; but the problems of the general theory of value will require for their solution an understanding of charientic judgments just as much as of ethical and aesthetic judgments. University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada.

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