Review of Unger's Living High and Letting Die

Review: Take and Give Author(s): Thomas W. Pogge Reviewed work(s): Living High and Letting Die by Peter Unger Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 59, No. 1, (Mar., 1999), pp. 189-193 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653468 Accessed: 28/04/2008 16:40 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LIX, No. 1, March 1999

Take and Give* THOMAS W. POGGE

Columbia University

Consequentialist moralities ask only that one should act for the best. Accordingly, (1)

choosing

an optimal

(2)

choosing

a suboptimal

option

is never

option

wrong;

is always

and

wrong.

These two claims are mutually independent, but each entails the weaker claim that (3)

there is always at least not wrong to choose.1

one

optimal

option

that

it is

Ordinary moral thinking rejects all three claims. These rejections are generally traced to three distinct rationales, which can be explicated in terms of highly stylized situations2 in which the sole optimal option of an agent, A, is an action that renders some, B, better off and some others, C, worse off than they would have been had A not acted. This does not mean that B/C become better/worse off than they were before A acted-A's conduct may merely prevent a deterioration/improvement. But the three rationales emerge more vividly in cases where A's optimal action would change at least C's situation (for the worse). The first rationale, which leads to the rejection of all three claims, invokes the thought that C has rights that limit what A may or must do to

2

A review of Peter Unger: Living HighandLettingDie (Oxford University Press 1996). Parentheticalreferences are to pages of this book. (1) entails (3) on the trivial assumptionthat there is always at least one optimal option. (2) entails (3) on the assumption that it cannot be that every available option is wrong to choose. Since (3) is entailed by (1) as well as by (2), the rejection of (3) entails the rejection of both (1) and (2). Often characterizedwith the remarkthat other things are boring, or equal. Without pretending to know what this means exactly, I assume throughoutthis review that some such rideris in play. BOOK SYMPOSIUM 189

rationale, which leads to the rejection only of (2), involves a special tie between A and C and invokes the thought that A may sometimes give more weight to the interestsof herself and her near and dear than she must give to those of B.4 By seeking to deflate both rationales, Unger gives supportto consequentialists.But this does not imply that he is a consequentialisthimself. If he were, he should want to defend consequentialismagainst the third rationale, which may lead either to a weak rejection only of (2) or to a strongrejection of all threeclaims. The firstrationaleinvolves no special ties between A and either B or C, and the second rationaleinvolves a special tie between A and C. So what about special ties between A and B; what if A is B? Consider a travel agent whose sole optimal option involves using a few unneeded frequentflyer miles from a rich man's account to help a poor and overworked woman to a much needed vacation. Many who would approve this theft if committedto benefit a strangerwould be reluctantto endorse it if the agent herself is the vacation-starvedbeneficiary.Some, contraryto (1)(3), consider it wrong for her to take the miles for herself and many, contrary to (2), at least consider it not wrong for her not to do so. The thirdrationale thus involves a special tie between A and B and invokes the thoughtthat, in some cases, A must or at least may give less weight to the interests of herself (and her near and dear) than she must give to those of C. That Unger shows no interest in tackling this third rationale speaks against casting him as a consequentialist. As the title of his book makes clear, Unger's chief target is the second rationale.His principalassertionis that it is seriously wrong not to use one's nonessentialfunds to preventprematuredeaths.Keepingwhat we need to sustain our life and earningpower, we ought to give the rest to life-saving charities, especially ones thatcan save lives cheaply.5 The first rationaleconstitutes however an importantsubsidiarytarget for Unger. He attacksthis rationaleby seeking to show, with the aid of various argumentsbased on cases, that imposing even very serious losses (death) on

C.3 The second

3

4

5

190

Such rights may have thresholds (giving way when the benefits are large enough) and may also be alienable. And both possibilities are combinable, as when the threshold benefits requiredfor permissible infringementof C's right can be reduced or eliminated through waiver or forfeiture. Samuel Scheffler's discussion in The Rejection of Consequentialism(Oxford University Press 1982) proceeds much along these lines. Preferring normative over evaluative terms, he distinguishes between agent-centeredrestrictions, motivated by C's rights, and agent-centeredprerogatives, allowing A to look out for herself and her own. He ends up arguing that the prerogatives(involving rejection of (2)) are on much firmerground than the restrictions(involving rejection of (1)-(3)). Unger stresses how surprisinglycheap it is to save children's lives in the poor countries. But this fact seems to play no role in his argument:Even if the cost per life were very much higher, so that with present funding Oxfam and UNICEF could save only a few lives each year, it would still be seriously wrong not to give. THOMASW. POGGE

some others for the sake of significantly lessening serious losses overall is generally "good behavior"and hence at least not wrong (Chs. 3-4). To show that this deflationof the firstrationalesupportshis deflationof the second, he then postulates The Reasonable Principle of Ethical Integrity. Otherthings being even nearly equal, if it is all right for you to impose losses on others with the result that there's a significantlessening of the serious losses suffered by others overall, then, if you're to avoid doing what's seriously wrong, you can't fail to impose smaller or equal losses on yourself, nor can you fail to accept such losses, when the result's an equal or greater significantlessening of such serious losses overall (p. 139f.).'

This principle can easily be misread as follows: "If you impose losses on others with the result that there is a significantlessening of the serious losses suffered by others overall (and you consider it all right to do so), then you must impose and accept smaller or equal losses on yourself for an equivalent or better result." This principle is indeed quite reasonable, but it is not the one before us. Nor would it be of any help to Unger, who can assume of his readers, at best, that we have accepted the permissibility of imposing such losses on others, not that we have actually imposed such losses. The correct reading of the principleis then: "If you accept the permissibilityof imposing losses on others with the result that there is a significant lessening of the serious losses suffered by others overall, then you must impose and accept smalleror equal losses on yourself for an equivalentor betterresult." But this principle is problematic.The antecedentstipulatesmerely that it is all right to go ahead, not that it is wrong not to do so. It is unclear why the mere fact that A's action is permissible if A?C should entail that it is mandatoryin the parallelcase with A=C.7To see this, consider the following reader'sresponse:"I deem it permissibleto impose such losses on others and agree that anyone imposing such losses on others ought to impose and accept like losses on herself. However, I also deem it permissible to decline to impose such losses on others and hold that anyone who does so decline may then also decline to impose and accept like losses on herself. Since I myself have permissibly declined to impose such losses on others, I am permittedto decline to impose and accept such losses on myself." In light of this gap in Unger's reasoning, and in the spirit of the name he has chosen for his principle, let me suggest this weaker rephrasing: A's declining to act optimally when this involves imposing losses on C for the

6

7

As I indicated above, a word such as "loss" might suggest merely that someone is worse off now, after A's act, than she would be now if A had behaved differently or it might also suggest in addition that she became worse off through A's act than she had been before A acted. I think Unger here has the second, strongersense in mind. Unger's WeakPrinciple of Ethical Integrity (p. 140) involves the same leap and thus also seems too strong in this respect. BOOK SYMPOSIUM 191

sake of significantly lessening serious losses overall should not receive a bettermoral assessmentwhen A=C than when A?C.8 Now one may well argue that my reformulationis still too strong. One could, for example, offer this counter-example:If medicine A controls can save either a life and a foot in group B or C's life only, then A's using it to save C's life is wrong when A is unrelatedto C, but not wrong when A is, or is closely related to, C.9But let us grantthe reformulatedethical integrity principlefor the sake of the argument. This leads to another problem. Unger's principal assertion is that it is seriously wrong not to impose various losses on oneself when doing so would result in a significant lessening of serious losses overall. In order to support this assertion via the reformulatedprinciple of ethical integrity, we need a premise to the effect that it is seriously wrong not to impose such losses on others in like circumstances. However, in all his attacks on the firstrationale,Unger never uses such stronglanguage.The most he concludes from his cases is that imposing losses on some so as significantly to lessen serious losses overall is "good"conduct or behavior.Such argumentsmay be (and, I think, are) quite effective in underminingthe firstrationale'soffensive against (1) and (3). But, since they do not undermineits offensive against (2), they also cannot, via the reformulatedprinciple of ethical integrity, help underminethe second rationale's offensive against (2). All we get by applying this principle to those conclusions are blandjudgments of the form that imposing losses on oneself so as significantlyto lessen serious losses overall is good behavior.And who would deny that? If Unger's discussion of the firstrationaleis to supporthis principalassertion, he thus needs to argue for a linking claim such as: It is always seriously wrong not to impose losses on others so as significantly to lessen serious losses overall.'0Or, weaker:Whenever it is good behavior to impose losses

8

9

1

192

Endorsingagent-neutralreflection,this readingof the principlefits with consequentialism. But Unger might also envisage a more agent-relative principle, which invokes the deontological idea that persons have rights with thresholds:If a goal is so importantthat, to serve it, A may impose right-infringinglosses on C, then it is also so importantthat, to serve it, A ought to impose like losses on herself. Though not promising as a reading of Unger, this principle does suggest a rationale for the leap from "permissible" to "mandatory." Unger himself may have reason to accept some counter-example of this form. He explicitly recognizes special obligations toward one's closest family members (pp. 35f., 149f.-more evidence against casting him as a consequentialist).Such special obligations suggest that one may give more weight to the survival of one's spouse than to that of a stranger-and, likewise, that one may give more weight to saving one's spouse from being widowed than to saving a stranger'sspouse from this fate. Unger has made this claim in conversation.But it would seem to jar with his acceptance of special ties (C might be the agent's mother). And it has the ratherdubious implication that, if m is the smallest number such that saving the lives of m innocents counts as a "significantlessening of serious losses overall,"then, for any n, it is always wrong not to THOMASW. POGGE

on others so as significantly to lessen serious losses overall, it is also seriously wrong not to do so. Through such a link, his discussion of the first rationalecould supportthe view that, when one can significantlylessen serious losses overall by criminally redirectingothers' nonessential funds (e.g. through theft, mugging, blackmail, embezzlement, extortion, kidnapping, murder?),it is seriously wrong not to do so. And this view could then, via the reformulated principle of ethical integrity, support Unger's principal assertion: that it is seriously wrong not to direct one's own nonessential funds towardsignificantlylessening serious losses overall. This argumentativepath may offer the best chance to connect Unger's innovative and suggestive discussion of the first rationale to the principal assertion of his book. I wonder whether it, or some alternativepath, can be filled in convincingly. If so, we would still face two furtherproblems. First, Unger argues that our conduct is wrong in two respects: We fail to direct toward life-saving projects our own nonessential funds and those we could expropriate from others. Now imagine a man who fails only in the first way. He keeps all his own wealth to himself but never misses an opportunity-most of them illegal-to redirect that of others toward life-saving projects. Is his conduct, while still seriously wrong, less wrong than that of the rest of us? And if not, why not?1' Second, it is highly doubtful that an argumentativestrategy of this sort has any justificatorypoint, that Unger can convince anyone that she ought to direct her own nonessential funds to life-saving projects by convincing her first that she ought so to redirect others' nonessential funds that she can expropriate. Unger's book provides highly original discussions of the first and second rationales. These discussions deserve detailed study. In view of space constraints, I have here focused on a more limited question: Is Unger right to claim that his attack on the first rationale supports his (to him much more important)attack on the second? My verdict is that furtherclarificationand justificationare needed to make a convincing case for this claim.

kill n innocents when doing so is the only way of saving n+m innocents from being killed by others. This question suggests what above I had called a quite reasonable principle of ethical integrity. It entails that whoever takes others' property for the purpose of reducing serious losses overall must be willing to impose equally severe propertylosses on herself (and her near and dear) for the same purpose. That our imaginary man runs afoul of this principle could explain why his conduct is, after all, no better than ours and perhaps worse. BOOKSYMPOSIUM193