State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea, 1953-60 (St Antony's)

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State Security and Regime Security President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea 1953–60

Yong-Pyo Hong

STATE SECURITY AND REGIME SECURITY

ST ANTONY’S SERIES General Editor: Eugene Rogan (1997– ), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Recent titles include: Carl Aaron THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPANESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UK AND THE US Uri Bialer OIL AND THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1948–63 Tim Dunne INVENTING INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY Ken Endo THE PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION UNDER JACQUES DELORS Anthony Forster BRITAIN AND THE MAASTRICHT NEGOTIATIONS Fernando Guirao SPAIN AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1945–57 Huck-ju Kwon THE WELFARE STATE IN KOREA Patricia Sloane ISLAM, MODERNITY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP AMONG THE MALAYS Miguel Székely THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY AND WEALTH ACCUMULATION IN MEXICO Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien (editors) DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN Yongjin Zhang CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY SINCE 1949 Jan Zielonka EXPLAINING EURO-PARALYSIS St Antony’s Series Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71109–2 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

State Security and Regime Security President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea 1953–60 Yong-Pyo Hong Research Fellow The Korea Institute for National Unification Seoul

in association with ST ANTONY’S COLLEGE, OXFORD

First published in Great Britain 2000 by

MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0–333–71712–0 First published in the United States of America 2000 by ST. MARTIN’S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 0–312–21766–8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hong, Yong-pyo, 1964– State security and regime security : President Syngman Rhee and the insecurity dilemma in South Korea, 1953–60 / Yong-pyo Hong. p. cm. — (St. Antony’s series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–312–21766–8 (cloth) 1. Korea (South)—Politics and government—1948–1960. 2. Rhee, Syngman, 1875–1965. I. Title. II. Series. DS917.8.H69 1999 951.9504'3—DC21 99–22103 CIP © Yong-Pyo Hong 2000 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. 10 09

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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Contents viii

List of Tables List of Abbreviations

ix

A Note on Romanization

x

1 Introduction

1

The Purpose of the Study A Conceptual Overview of Security in Developing States Methodology: The ‘Archival Data Base’

3 10

2 Historical Setting: The Division of Korea, the Korean War, and the Evolution of Syngman Rhee’s Anti-Communist Policy

15

The Post-Liberation Process of Creating Separate Polities in the Korean Peninsula The Establishment of South Korea and Rhee’s ‘March North’ Policy The Outbreak of the Korean War and Rhee’s Opposition to an Armistice The Implications of the War for Rhee’s Internal and External Security Policies 3 The Ending of the Korean War and Syngman Rhee’s Search for a US–ROK Mutual Defence Treaty, April–August 1953 Rhee’s Threat of Unilateral Action and the Search for a US Security Commitment The Heightening of Rhee’s Bargaining Position: The Release of the Anti-Communist POWs The Signing of the Mutual Defence Treaty Conclusion

v

1

16 24 31 37

40 41 48 52 56

vi

Contents

4 The Post-Armistice Security Policy of Syngman Rhee: The Strengthening of ROK Forces, September 1953– November 1954 Rhee’s Attempt to Consolidate His Domestic Position Strengthening ROK Forces and Participating in the Political Conference Rhee’s Visit to America and the Finalizing of the US Security Commitments in Korea Conclusion 5 Internal and External Challenges to the Rhee Regime and Rhee’s Growing Concern for Regime Security, November 1954–May 1956

59 60 63 71 79

82

Internal Difﬁculties: The Legitimacy Crisis and the Strengthened Opposition External Pressure: The Possibility of Peaceful Coexistence Rhee’s Reactions to Internal and External Challenges Conclusion

87 89 100

6 The Primacy of Regime Security and the Vulnerability of State Security, May 1956–November 1958

102

Internal Instability and the Intensiﬁcation of Repressive Rule The Decrease in Support for Rhee’s Militant Policies The Communist Peace Offensive Conclusion 7 The Domestic Use of State Security and the Collapse of the Rhee Regime, December 1958–April 1960

83

103 108 115 121

123

The Weakening of Rhee’s Control over Political Affairs The Externalization of Internal Threats and the Justiﬁcation of Repressive Rule The Downfall of the Rhee Regime Conclusion

126 138 141

8 Conclusion: The Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea

144

124

Contents Notes and References Bibliography Index

vii 155 199 211

List of Tables 5.1 6.1 6.2

Comparison of Rhee’s references to military uniﬁcation in public speeches between 1954 and 1955 Composition of government expenditure, South Korea Comparison of average growth rate between North and South Korea, 1953–60

viii

90 110 117

List of Abbreviations CASC CIA CPKI DNP DP DPRK JCS KDP KMAG KPG KPR KWP LP NNITs NNSC NSC OPI ROK UNTCOK USAMGIK

Comrades’ Association to Safeguard the Constitution Central Intelligence Agency (US) Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence Democratic Nationalist Party Democratic Party Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (US) Korean Democratic Party Korean Military Advisory Group Korean Provisional Government Korean People’s Republic Korean Workers’ Party Liberal Party Neutral Nations Inspection Teams Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission National Security Council Ofﬁce of Public Information Republic of Korea UN Temporary Commission on Korea United States Army Military Government

ix

A Note on Romanization In romanizing Korean names, this volume has generally followed the McCune–Reischauer system, retaining idiosyncratic spellings of names of well-known persons and places (for example, Seoul instead of So ˘ul, Pyongyang instead of P’yo ˘ngyang, and Syngman Rhee instead of Yi Su ˘ng-man). Korean surnames usually precede given names, which are ordinarily composed of two syllables and hyphenated (except for President Syngman Rhee).

x

1 Introduction THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY At the end of the Second World War in 1945, Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule. The joy of Liberation, however, soon disappeared as a result of the division of the country. Since the establishment of two separate polities on the Korean peninsula in 1948 – i.e. the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the South, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North, the uniﬁcation of the divided country has been the overriding goal of the Koreans. Before the Korean War, both Premier Kim Il Sung in the North, and President Syngman Rhee in the South, argued that uniﬁcation had to be achieved by whatever means necessary including military force. On 25 June 1950, North Korea attempted to reach this objective by military means. After realizing the impossibility of uniﬁcation by this method over the course of the Korean conﬂict, Kim Il Sung, in 1953, accepted the armistice and switched his policy to one that emphasized uniﬁcation by peaceful means, at least publicly. Syngman Rhee, on the other hand, vigorously opposed the armistice itself, and even after its signature, reiterated his intention to resume hostilities in order to unify Korea. The United States, on which South Korea was heavily dependent militarily and economically, strongly opposed this proposed course of action. Although Rhee was well aware of the impossibility of unifying Korea by force without the support of the US, he nevertheless maintained the slogan of ‘March north and unify Korea!’ until his regime collapsed in April 1960. This study begins with the question of why President Rhee repeatedly and publicly stated his intention to take military action to unify Korea after the end of the Korean War. To answer this question, it will be hypothesized that the slogan of ‘march north’ was not just a uniﬁcation policy of the Rhee regime; it was also a manifestation of President Rhee’s concern for security – the security not only of South Korea but also of his regime. The bitter experience of the Korean conﬂict made President Rhee desperate to enhance the security of South Korea through a military build-up, perceiving that another Communist attack was possible in the near future. On the other hand, Rhee also had to deal with the problem of maintaining his rule. 1

2

State Security and Regime Security

Largely due to the impact of the war, the Rhee regime was relatively stable immediately after the conﬂict. With the regime’s political misconduct, and with the growth of popular political consciousness, however, the stability of the regime gradually decreased up to the point of its collapse. More speciﬁcally, it is argued that there were three main factors which led Syngman Rhee repeatedly to express his willingness to initiate military action. First, Rhee sincerely believed that real peace in Korea could only be secured if the Communist regime was removed. Second, the South Korean President tried to utilize his frequent demands to renew hostilities as a bargaining chip in his negotiations to obtain a stronger security commitment from the US, which also sought to contain Communist expansion in the Korean peninsula, but only by peaceful means. Thirdly, President Rhee used the ‘march north’ theme as a domestic political tool to maintain anti-Communist sentiment among the South Koreans, which had deepened after the northern Communist attack. By reiterating the slogan of ‘march north’ which simpliﬁed various arguments against the Communists, President Rhee probably sought to remind the public of the Communist threat. This was intended to enhance his political legitimacy and popular support at home.1 In addition, by presenting to the people his will to unify the country, he sought to bolster his status as a strong leader of the country.2 The ﬁrst two factors related to Rhee’s concern for the security of the South Korean state; the last one related to regime security. In this respect, while examining why Rhee repeated his call to ‘march north’, the focus will be put on the larger question of the relationship between state security and regime security under President Syngman Rhee during the period from 1953, when the armistice to end the Korean War was signed, to 1960, when the Rhee regime collapsed.3 With this focus, this work is expected to ﬁll two important gaps in the study of the security policies of South Korea – gaps both in dimension and in time. First, analyses of South Korean security have thus far paid little attention to the domestic dimension. They have tended to concentrate on the external military aspects such as the nature of the North Korean military threat to South Korea, the military build-up in North and South Korea, and the role of major powers, especially that of the US, in South Korean security.4 Secondly, few works have comprehensively studied security issues during the post-Korean War years under the Syngman Rhee regime. Largely resting on the assumption that the ROK was almost completely dependent militarily on the US at that time, the period 1953–60 has tended to be examined brieﬂy

Introduction

3

and viewed as a background for the study of more recent periods. Such a tendency is also attributable to the inaccessibility of source materials for this period. This factor has also partly limited the more general studies of South Korean foreign relations which have concentrated on the period up to the Korean War.5 This book will try to overcome these gaps by delving into recently available archival sources for the period under study (which will be explained in detail in section 3 below), within a framework derived from the theoretical discussion of the security dilemma for developing countries.

A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW OF SECURITY IN DEVELOPING STATES The term ‘security’ has been regarded as an ‘ambiguous symbol’, as Arnold Wolfers has put it, which ‘may not mean the same thing to different people’, or which ‘may not have any precise meaning at all’.6 Nevertheless, a number of studies on the subject try to understand the security of a state in terms of ‘threat’. For example, Wolfers himself has suggested that ‘security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked’. Similarly, Richard Smoke, who also believes in the ‘abstract’ nature of security, maintains that ‘national security affairs’ is the study of the ‘range of threats in the contemporary world, and how these hazards may be coped with to increase security’. More simply, Barry Buzan deﬁnes security as ‘the pursuit of freedom from threat’.7 What forms of threat crucially affect the security of a state? Although it has been acknowledged that non-military phenomena can threaten a state, most of the literature on security issues has tended to consider that threats to a state’s security are primarily military in nature, and arise from outside its borders.8 This tendency is largely attributable to the fact that the concept of security was developed during the Cold War period in which the major countries of the developed world (especially the US and the Soviet Union) maintained their security by means of a mutual balance of terror.9 More recently, a burgeoning literature on security in developing countries has questioned the validity and applicability to developing countries of such an externally and militarily oriented concept of security, which draws largely from the experience of the developed countries.10

4

State Security and Regime Security

According to these studies, internal threats are more crucial than, or at least as crucial as, external threats in the security of the overwhelming number of developing countries. Such countries tend to share certain characteristics to which security issues are related – political weakness, economic underdevelopment, and social cleavages. Among the variables that distinguish the security of the developing world from that of the developed Western world, the most important and most commonly emphasized one relates to the crisis of political legitimacy in most developing states, a phenomenon which is mainly attributable to the fact that many, if not all, of them are ‘weak states’ in contrast to ‘strong states’ in the developed Western world. As a result of a centuries-old process of development, modern states in the industrialized Western world have reached a position which can be referred to as one of ‘unconditional legitimacy’. Moreover, the prevailing state structures in the Western world are ‘strong and cohesive’. In contrast, in large parts of the Third World, state structures lack legitimacy and cohesiveness, and are ‘weak as states’. Most states in the Third World have recently entered the modern state system (which is European in origin) as a result of decolonization. Moreover, their borders were usually drawn by the colonial powers for the sake of administrative convenience or in some form of trade-off with colonial competitors, without paying much consideration to existing cultural or ethnic boundaries. As a result, the postcolonial boundaries of nation and state rarely coincided.11 The mismatch between nation and state, in turn, brought about a low level of consensus on fundamental social and political issues in many such states because they had not yet developed the capacity to ensure the habitual identiﬁcation of their populations with the respective states and regimes that presided over these post-colonial state structures.12 In other words, many of these states have been ruled by regimes which have narrow support bases: they represent the interests either of a particular component of the population, or of a ruling elite that has taken control. Rival groups or communities thus may operate to threaten the authority of the incumbent regimes. Such a condition, as Yezid Sayigh properly points out, has encouraged the emergence of authoritarian regimes ‘either because a monopoly on power was the only way in which central order could be imposed, or because the new states had not yet developed effective systems of political representation’. Consequently, these regimes usually do not enjoy internal political legitimacy.13

Introduction

5

Given this situation, the leadership in weak states tends to be personalized, and to resort to ‘charismatic authority’ which rests on ‘devotion to the speciﬁc and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person’, in order to strengthen its legitimacy. But leadership based on personal charisma may eventually result in a political instability unless its authority is transformed into institutionalized form.14 More importantly, in relation to security problems, personalized leadership tends to be ‘preoccupied primarily with internal threats’ to its authority.15 Indeed, in the Third World, ‘internal politics will be fraught with security problems’ until the transfer of power is institutionalized.16 These distinctive characteristics of the Third World raise a substantive security issue: security for whom – for the state or for the regime? Since the regime in power does not represent the whole society of the state, the ruling elite’s security concerns do not necessarily coincide with the security of the state. In other words, a regime with weak legitimacy is more concerned about the security of the regime than that of the state as a whole, largely because of its preoccupation with regime survival from domestic challenges to its own authority. Furthermore, the ruling elite in weak states tend to devise policies which, ultimately designed to protect it from internal threats, are presented under the guise of achieving state security, thus blurring the distinctions between regime security and state security.17 The lack of legitimacy of incumbent regimes and their consequent emphasis on regime security have a number of implications for the security of the state as a whole, implications which are usually negative. First, the ruling elite’s preoccupation with its own security weakens the security of the state per se not only because such a preoccupation tends to lead the regime towards rigid and ineffectual policymaking, but also because it further decreases the chances for building public consensus about the means and ends of security policies.18 Secondly, a regime facing internal threats often employs repressive measures to destroy the ‘enemy within’. In addition, such a regime often tries to ‘externalize threats directed at it, in order both to portray such threats as “illegitimate” (in the sense that they emanate from abroad and violate the norm of state sovereignty and its corollary of non-intervention by other states) and to portray its repressive actions as “legitimate”’. While this strategy might work well in an initial stage of a confrontation with political opponents, as Ayoob argues, it usually leads to much bigger conﬂagrations in later stages, which leads to a decrease in regime stability.19

6

State Security and Regime Security

Thirdly, in relation to the above point, many regimes in weak states tend to increase their military forces at the expense of social and economic expenditure in order to maintain internal stability. Such a ‘squandering of material resources’ aimed at a short-term objective of regime survival risks eroding the security of the state as a long-term objective. In addition, the process of militarization to enhance coercive capability often leads to a concentration of political power in the military sector. Such a phenomenon encourages military intervention in politics, which eventually results in the establishment of a military regime by means of a coup d’état. Thus, a vicious circle between authoritarian military regimes and the legitimacy crisis is a chronic problem in many developing states.20 Finally, fragile regimes whose legitimacy is in doubt tend to invite external alliances not only to deter external threats but also to ensure regime survival. But the penetration by external inﬂuences is usually perceived by the domestic population as limiting the sovereignty of the state, thus further weakening the legitimacy of the regime. Moreover, the links with external powers can ‘plunge the weak [states] into the vortex of superpower rivalry, making the global insecurity their own insecurity’.21 In short, as Robert O’Neill suggests, security problems in developing states are ‘much more complex’ than those in long-established and developed states: they are inclined to be ‘subnational’ in nature; but ‘transnational’ and ‘international’ security issues are also present in developing countries.22 Thus, it can be argued that the security dilemma in the Third World lies in the interaction between internal and external security. According to certain authors, internal threats to the security of Third World states are not limited to the above-noted political–military dimensions. In Caroline Thomas’s words, security in the context of the Third World states refers to ‘the whole range of dimensions of a state’s existence which are already taken care of in the moredeveloped states, especially those of the West’. Thus, it is suggested that economic problems, such as underdevelopment, chronic poverty, and deteriorating living conditions which prevail in the Third World, are also part of internal sources of insecurity (although their causes may often be external). Economic threats are said to be crucial for the security of Third World states to the extent that they can be ‘life or death matters’, while in Western developed states they may well be ‘matters of more or less’. In addition, social problems such as demographic imbalances, ethnic/tribal divisions, moral or religious sectarianism, and

Introduction

7

the organic survival of a national population are also regarded as important factors which comprise threats to the security of Third World countries.23 Although these social and economic problems are important characteristics of the Third World or developing countries, I will focus on the political–military dimension in referring to internal threats in the Third World states for the following reasons. First of all, such a broad deﬁnition of security, as pointed out in relation to the security problems in the developed world (see footnote 8), can obscure distinctions between the realm of a state’s security policy and that of more general policies aimed at socio-economic development. Secondly, while social and economic issues vary in scale in Third World countries, the political legitimacy issue is relatively common among them, if different in degree. Thirdly, in a practical sense, it is unlikely that social and economic problems of the kind that Thomas has outlined can be considered as internal threats to South Korean security, as will be examined below.24 The concept of security in developing countries can be applied to the case of South Korea during the period from 1953 to 1960 to the extent that South Korea has manifested the characteristics of ‘weak states’ such as a lack of socio-political cohesion, and a consequent crisis of legitimacy.25 During the thirty-ﬁve years of Japanese colonial rule (1910–45), the Korean state became detached from the civil society: its power relied heavily on coercive means to maintain control, especially on the police, without the social base. The alienated relations between state and society in Korea was aggravated by the decolonization process, as has often been seen in many other Third World countries. Immediately after the Liberation, the nation was arbitrarily divided along the 38th parallel by the superpowers – i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union. By 1948, in the South, the conservative right-wing forces led by Syngman Rhee managed to create a separate government with US support while the leftist and moderate nationalists ﬁercely opposed such a move. In the North, a Communist government was established with Soviet support. Furthermore, after being elected as the President of South Korea, Syngman Rhee established autocratic power while publicly championing a democratic political order. Thus, as Choi Jang Jip put it, a pattern of ‘political cleavage’ in South Korea was set up: ‘confrontation over the legitimacy of the ruling regime on the basis of democratic norms versus authoritarian practice’. After the Korean War, this confrontation continued largely within the conservative forces because

8

State Security and Regime Security

the inﬂuence of the leftists and the moderates was considerably weakened in the course of the war.26 The gap between Rhee’s proclaimed support of democratic ideals and his actual authoritarian rule was partly attributable to the fact that, like many other authoritarian leaders in developing states, Rhee personalized power relying on his charismatic authority. As one study of Rhee’s leadership described it, President Rhee perceived himself as a ‘chosen’ leader who would accomplish the uniﬁcation, and thus the complete independence of Korea: ‘he perceived himself as strong, the people as weak; he as superior, the people as inferior’. Accordingly, Rhee never recognized the role and signiﬁcance of other leaders, and was intolerant of opposition to his leadership, while failing to ‘rationalize’ or ‘institutionalize’ his charismatic authority.27 Although South Korea under President Rhee shared some of the characteristics of Third World states, it should be noted that there were a number of distinctive features in security terms for South Korea. First of all, South Korea had been in confrontation with North Korea ever since the establishment of two separate states in the Korean peninsula in 1948: each had regarded itself as properly sovereign over all Korea, and the other as illegitimate; and each had adopted opposite political ideologies – liberal democracy in the South and Communism in the North, being supported respectively by two rival superpowers – the US and the USSR. The hostility between North and South Korea was hugely magniﬁed by the Korean War provoked by the former in 1950. After the signing of the armistice agreement in 1953, the two Koreas continued their ﬁerce competition with each other politically, economically, militarily, and diplomatically. On the one hand, this factor created conditions in which South Korean concern about external threats was high, however serious the internal problems. In addition, the Rhee government had to deal with Communist subversive efforts which risked undermining its authority. On the other hand, the existence of such a Communist threat appeared to facilitate the Rhee regime’s control of domestic politics in the name of state security. Secondly, despite the economic destruction caused by the war, economic difﬁculties in South Korea appeared not to be serious enough to become a ‘life or death’ matter, and thus to threaten its security, thanks to massive economic assistance from the United States which had become fully committed to South Korea during the Korean conﬂict.28 Thirdly, the Korean people have been homogeneous regardless of the division of their nation. Thus, there have been no internal threats such as ethnic/tribal divisions or

Introduction

9

religious sectarianism within South Korea. For these reasons, together with those noted earlier, I will put emphasis on the political–military dimension in studying the security of South Korea. It does not mean that South Korea during the period under study was free from social and economic problems. However, these matters will be dealt with in terms of their inﬂuence on the political legitimacy of the Rhee regime, and of their exploitability by external forces, but not as internal threats per se. Finally, it should be pointed out that the level of the Rhee regime’s legitimacy was unlikely to be constant throughout its period of ofﬁce despite the fact that the legitimacy crisis had been a chronic problem in South Korea. Many studies on the concept of security in developing countries have a tendency to view legitimacy as a static concept, often postulating a worst case of relations between security and the lack of legitimacy. As suggested by political scientists, however, legitimacy is a ‘relative’ concept, and the problem in any developing country is not one of the existence or non-existence of legitimacy, but rather that of the degree of legitimacy when faced with different problems and conditions.29 As for the South Korean case, as noted earlier, the level of legitimacy of the Rhee regime was relatively high immediately after the Korean conﬂict, but it became low as the war’s inﬂuence faded, and as the regime’s authoritarian rule intensiﬁed. In this respect, this work will focus on the relative change in the degree of legitimacy of the Rhee regime, and how its internal and external security concerns changed accordingly. The degree of legitimacy of the Rhee regime will be assessed via three factors suggested by David Beetham: (1) the regime’s conformity to established rules; (2) the justiﬁability of the rules in terms of beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate; and (3) the expressed consent by the subordinate to the regime.30 The ﬁrst factor is related to the problem of whether the Rhee regime acquired and exercised its power in accordance with the Constitution and other related customary rules in South Korea. In particular, the degree of breach or contravention of rules in the exercise of power will be an important criteria in gauging the Rhee regime’s legitimacy.31 Secondly, the Rhee regime could be said to have lacked legitimacy to the extent that the ‘rules of power’ – i.e. the rules governing the acquisition and exercise of power – could not be justiﬁed in terms of beliefs shared by the South Korean people, and especially by those who were inﬂuential. In this regard, this book will pay attention to the Rhee

10

State Security and Regime Security

regime’s attempts to revise the ‘rules of power’, and to whether such attempts were to serve a ‘recognisably general interest, rather than simply the interests of the powerful’.32 In assessing justiﬁability, this study will mainly rely on South Korean newspapers as a source of public opinion. It was generally agreed by both domestic and foreign observers that the press in South Korea was relatively free to criticize the government’s policies, and gave a good representation of the public view until the last years of Rhee’s rule.33 And if there was a curtailment of the freedom of expression, it also can be regarded as an indication of the illegitimacy of the Rhee regime. Appropriate documentary sources, which contain internal and external observations of the Rhee regime’s exercise of power, will also be referred to in assessing Rhee’s legitimacy. The third dimension of legitimacy involves the demonstrable expression of consent on the part of the South Korean public to the Rhee regime. In relation to this, the process and outcome of the presidential and general elections which were regularly held under the Rhee government provided important criteria of the degree of public consent. Although there was election rigging in almost all elections, foreign assessments (especially those of the UN and the US) of the degree of election abuse and subsequent results in each election will enable a relatively objective assessment of the extent of public support for the Rhee regime. In the previous section, it was hypothesized that President Rhee’s slogan of ‘march north’ was a part of his policy to maintain both regime security and state security. Based on the above discussion regarding legitimacy and security, two further hypotheses can be set up: as the degree of the legitimacy of the Rhee regime decreased, its policy priority shifted from state security to regime security; and the emphasis on regime security undermined state security per se. These hypotheses will be tested by using archival sources.

METHODOLOGY: THE ‘ARCHIVAL DATA BASE’ In order to study the relationship between state security and regime security in South Korea under the Rhee government, this book will primarily examine documentary sources. While chronologically analyzing the period from 1953 to 1960, historical evidence found in the ‘archival data base’ will be discussed in the light of insights derived from the conceptual literature on the security problematique of developing countries.34 This book will use archival sources from the

Introduction

11

United States, Great Britain, South Korea and Russia, along with the secondary materials that are available on the period. United States archival materials are not only the most readily available, but also important in understanding South Korean security because the ROK has had a close security relationship with America. US government documents, memoranda, intelligence reports, personal papers, and oral history interviews of the Eisenhower administration were collected from the National Archives and Records Administration, National Record Center, and the Eisenhower Library. This study also refers to US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) on Korea, which now covers the period up to 1960.35 Documents of the British Foreign Ofﬁce in the Public Record Ofﬁce are also helpful primary sources. Although British materials are less abundant in quantity, they have their own value: sometimes they assess information from the US, and thus provide an alternative perspective on US–ROK relations. Archival sources from both the US State Department and British Foreign Ofﬁce contain quite a lot of information on the internal situation in South Korea, which was usually reported either by their Embassies in Seoul, or by intelligence agencies. This information on South Korean domestic politics is relatively objective, if not always correct, and unavailable elsewhere. In particular, the records of conversations between foreign ofﬁcials and South Korean political leaders, in many of which the Koreans spoke relatively freely of their views on domestic political events, are valuable sources given the fact that interviews with important Korean ﬁgures were impossible.36 In January 1994, the South Korean government for the ﬁrst time declassiﬁed some documents on foreign relations for the period from 1949 to 1959. The government also declassiﬁed some archives for the 1960–4 period a year later. Although they include a relatively small number of politically important documents, they do provide some insight into South Korean positions especially since archives from the Korean side have not been available before. In July 1994, signiﬁcant excerpts from the Russian archives on the Korean War, which had been given to the ROK by the Russian government, were made public with a summarized version in Korean. Although the period covered by this source (from January 1949 to August 1953) is outside the period under direct study, it provides useful information on the situation in the Korean peninsula on the eve of the war, which helps an understanding of the origins of Rhee’s ‘march north’ theme.

12

State Security and Regime Security

The Oliver File, which contains correspondence between President Rhee and Robert Oliver, Rhee’s personal friend and advisor in the United States, gives invaluable information on Rhee’s personal thoughts. A number of Rhee’s ‘conﬁdential’ letters to Oliver, in which Rhee wrote very frankly about his concerns regarding important events, enable a more valid interpretation of the President’s positions in various matters.37 An interview with Robert Oliver was also undertaken at Chestertown, Maryland on 7 June, 1994.38 Finally, this book refers to South Korean newspapers to note their assessment of certain events that took place in South Korea during the period under study, and thus to evaluate public opinion on the events. In the 1950s, the ﬁve largest circulation newspapers in South Korea were the Dong-A Ilbo, and the Kyunghyang Shinmun (proopposition); the Chosun Ilbo and the Hankook Ilbo (independent); and the Seoul Shinmun (pro-government). Among them, this study has mainly relied on the Dong-A Ilbo, and the Chosun Ilbo, which were the oldest and the largest circulation newspapers in South Korea. Both papers had been leaders in the opposition to Japanese rule, and consequently enjoyed a ﬁne reputation among Koreans. The former was regarded as the most vehement and consistent opposition paper. The latter was renowned for its objective editorials while they were somewhat conservative and mildly critical of the government. Another independent newspaper, the Hankook Ilbo, and an outspoken antigovernment paper, the Kyunghyang Shinmun, are also referred to in order to get a range of views on a variety of issues.39 This book will examine President Rhee’s policies to maintain both state and regime security by dividing the period from 1953 to 1960 into ﬁve sub-periods: (1) April–August 1953; (2) September 1953–November 1954; (3) November 1954–May 1956; (4) May 1956–November 1958; and (5) December 1958–April 1960. During the ﬁrst two sub-periods, the Rhee regime’s domestic position was relatively stable partly because of the inﬂuence of the Korean War, and President Rhee devoted himself to obtaining US security commitments – a mutual defence treaty with the US until August 1953, and American military support to strengthen ROK forces until November 1954. This month also marked a turning point in the level of the Rhee regime’s stability. With the Constitution revision to strengthen and prolong Rhee’s power in an unprincipled manner in November 1954, the legitimacy of the Rhee regime began to decrease, and this tendency was conﬁrmed in the May 1956 presidential election. This sub-period also saw an international development unfavourable to

Introduction

13

Rhee – i.e. a movement towards peaceful coexistence with the Communists. From May 1956 on, the ruling elite of the Rhee regime increasingly resorted to heavy-handed tactics to repress growing domestic opposition, while, externally, a peace offensive from North Korea was intensifying. Beginning with the strengthening of the National Security Law in December 1958, the Rhee regime devised a series of measures to suppress its political opponents in the name of national security, which aggravated the regime’s legitimacy crisis to the point where the student revolution of April 1960 could bring about its downfall. In a word, this division of the period under study has been determined mainly by the degree of the stability of the Rhee regime, but external factors have also been taken into consideration. This study will ﬁrst discuss the historical background from the Liberation of Korea to the Korean War in Chapter 2, focusing on the formation and development of Rhee’s ‘march north’ theme which is a crucial variable in analysing the internal and external security problems of the Rhee regime in the post-Korean War era.40 Chapter 3 (April–August 1953) and Chapter 4 (September 1953–November 1954) will examine the negotiations between the ROK and the US, in which President Rhee made efforts to gain further American security commitments to South Korea in return for his cooperation with US policy objectives in Korea: ﬁrst, the conclusion of the armistice agreement, and then South Korean participation in the Geneva conference to solve the Korean question peacefully. In Chapter 5 (November 1954–May 1956) and Chapter 6 (May 1956–November 1958), the focus will be placed on President Rhee’s reaction to mounting internal and external challenges to the legitimacy of his regime. Internally, with the irregular constitutional amendment and the subsequent establishment of a stronger opposition party in 1955, the stability of the Rhee regime began to be undermined. Accordingly the regime became more reliant on coercive means in order to secure its rule. Externally, the improvement in the international atmosphere, which was followed by a North Korean peace offensive and psychological warfare, emerged as a dilemma for Rhee’s security policy. Chapter 6 will also deal with two important issues which deepened this dilemma: Rhee’s emphasis on a military build-up which could affect economic progress; and the internal trend in which support for peaceful uniﬁcation was increasing, while the wisdom of uniﬁcation by force was being questioned. Finally, the seventh chapter (December 1958–April 1960) will examine the ruling elite’s measures to externalize internal threats in

14

State Security and Regime Security

order to oppress political opponents on the pretext of bolstering national security. It will discuss the effect of those measures on both regime security and state security. In each chapter, this book will study the nature of the internal and external sources of threat to the security of South Korea, and the way in which Rhee’s slogan ‘march north’ was used to cope with those threats. It will also examine how Rhee’s concerns for regime security and state security interacted with each other, and which was more signiﬁcant in Rhee’s decision to adopt such a militant posture. Finally it will provide an explanation for Rhee’s changing priorities between state security and regime security under particular domestic and international conditions.

2 Historical Setting: The Division of Korea, the Korean War, and the Evolution of Syngman Rhee’s Anti-Communist Policy ‘I feel strongly that now is the … moment when we should take an aggressive measure … to clean up them [the Communists] in Pyongyang … Our people in the North want us to do it now … I am sure we can all settle this question within a reasonably short time if we are only allowed to do it.’ (Syngman Rhee, 30 September 1949) ‘Now that the uniﬁcation of China has been achieved, it is time to liberate the South. The South Korean people trust me and want uniﬁcation. I cannot sleep at night, thinking of their aspiration for uniﬁcation.’ (Kim Il Sung, 17 January 1950) With the unconditional surrender of Japan on 15 August 1945, Korea was ﬁnally liberated from Japanese rule. But the internal and external circumstances that developed after the Liberation were far from what many Koreans had expected. At the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union decided to divide Korea along the 38th parallel, and to occupy the southern and northern parts respectively in order to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese army. The division was supposed to be temporary. However, the subsequent rivalry between the two superpowers in the Cold War era, combined with the competition between the Communist forces and the rightwing conservative forces of internal Korean politics, brought about the establishment of separate governments in Korea. The division of the

15

16

State Security and Regime Security

Korean peninsula into North and South Korea eventually resulted in the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.1 It was in this period from 1945 to 1953 that South Korea’s basic security environment had been set up. The source of the threat to South Korean security, the northern Communist regime, had been established, and it had indeed attacked the South. The United States, the most important security partner of South Korea, had become fully involved in Korea. Internally, public anti-Communist sentiment had been strengthened in the process of the division, and particularly during the war provoked by the Communists. In examining the historical unfolding of the turbulent period from the Liberation to the Korean War, this chapter will focus on the evolution of Syngman Rhee’s position towards the Communists, and especially his ‘march north’ policy, which is a key variable in studying the internal and external security problems of the Rhee government in the post-Korean War era. The ﬁrst section will study how, throughout the post-Liberation political struggles, Rhee persisted with his antiCommunist posture and his call for a separate southern government. Secondly, this chapter will examine the internal and external situation of South Korea after its establishment in 1948, which led Rhee to introduce his ‘march north’ slogan. The third section will analyse Rhee’s position towards the Korean War, and his anti-armistice campaign which considerably strengthened his domestic position. Finally, based on these examinations, this chapter will discuss the war’s impact on the internal and external security environments, which in turn had important implications for the post-war security situation of South Korea.

THE POST-LIBERATION PROCESS OF CREATING SEPARATE POLITIES IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA In Korea, immediately after Liberation, a number of political organizations were spontaneously established. Among them, the strongest political force was the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) organized by Yo˘ Un-hyo ˘ng, a left-wing nationalist leader. People’s Committees – organizational networks for selfgovernment – spread all over the peninsula under the leadership of the CPKI. On September 6, Yo ˘’s group announced the establishment of the Korean People’s Republic (KPR), and claimed jurisdiction over the whole nation. Although the KPR was composed of diverse political elements from left and right, its leading members were leftists. In

Historical Setting

17

the face of the consolidation of leftist forces, in early September, the conservative groups, who had been opposed to cooperating with Yo ˘, gathered to form a right-wing party, the Korean Democratic Party (KDP).2 The internal political division between left and right was accelerated by foreign occupation of the Korean peninsula. With the surrender of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a temporary military occupation of Korea in zones divided at the 38th parallel: neither side wanted the entire peninsula to be under the other’s control. The Soviet army landed on the northern territory of Korea on 12 August 1945, and established an administrative body based on the People’s Committees. Almost a month later, the American government hastily sent the US XXIV Corps, which had been located in Okinawa, to Seoul as occupation forces. On September 12, the Commander, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, set up the United States Army Military Government (USAMGIK) as the only lawful government in southern Korea. General Hodge refused to conduct relations with the KPR or accept its assistance in managing the internal situation, partly because of orders from Washington not to recognize an indigenous Korean government, and partly because of his suspicion that the KPR was dominated by the Communists. Instead, the General favoured the conservative forces who accepted American authority without question, and who had some English language or administrative skills. Accordingly, the KPR’s stand began to be weakened while the inﬂuence of the conservatives began to grow.3 In the meantime, on October 16, Syngman Rhee returned to Seoul after over 30 years of exile in America. Rhee had long been a ‘legend’ to the Korean people: he was a famous independence activist; he was the ﬁrst President of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in exile; he had an outstanding educational background (he obtained an M.A. at Harvard, and a Ph.D. in International Law at Princeton); he was senior in age to other prominent independence leaders, which was not a factor to be ignored in terms of the Confucian tradition. The prestige of Rhee was so great that the leaders of nearly every political party in South Korea including the KPR and the Communist parties called on him and offered him the chairmanship of their parties. Many Koreans hoped that Rhee could facilitate unity between the leftists and the rightists.4 Reﬂecting such public expectations, Syngman Rhee organized the Central Council for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence,

18

State Security and Regime Security

asking all Koreans to join it. He originated the slogan, ‘Let’s unite ﬁrst without any qualiﬁcations.’ But Rhee’s unity did, in fact, have a qualiﬁcation – he would not form a coalition with the Communists. On October 21, in a ‘conﬁdential’ letter to Robert Oliver, his friend in America, Rhee stated that he was ‘planning to bring Kim Koo [Kim Ku, President of the KPG] and several others from Chungking [where the KPG had located], with the exception of the Kongsan [Communist] group’.5 Rhee also began to show his antagonism towards the KPR and the leftists in general when he denounced them in November, ﬂatly refusing the ofﬁcial request of the People’s Republic to be its chairman. In addition, Rhee began to ally with the conservative Korean Democratic Party. Rhee, who did not have his own connections within Korea, needed the party’s fairly good roots and its friendship network: the KDP lacked a leader of Rhee’s stature and qualiﬁcation. As a result, the leftists came to realize that they could not compromise with Rhee, who now became the acknowledged leader of the right. In December, Syngman Rhee denounced the Communists for destroying national unity, and asserted that they be removed from the movement to achieve national uniﬁcation.6 The Moscow agreement at the end of December 1945 on the fourpower trusteeship for Korea seriously deepened the internal political cleavage.7 At ﬁrst, all the Korean political parties, left and right, opposed the idea of a trusteeship. Syngman Rhee took the initiative in organizing demonstrations against the idea, criticizing any interim international control in which the Soviet Union was to participate. Rhee refused the Moscow decision for three reasons: (1) it was ‘contrary to the principle of independence’; (2) the great powers did ‘not consult the Koreans’ in making the decision; and (3) it would create a ‘coalition government’ which would ‘make it impossible for the Koreans to check the communization of the south’.8 Political leaders in the North had initially denounced the trusteeship plan. In January 1946, however, the North Korean Communist Party, upon receipt of instructions from Moscow, suddenly changed its position to support the Moscow agreement, declaring that Korea could not develop rapidly without Soviet support. Subsequently, the Communists in the South also began to advocate the trusteeship. In February, the right-wing nationalists founded the National Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence in order to consolidate their strength in opposing the Moscow decision. This movement, in turn, prompted the leftists and Communists to organize a united front, called the South Korean Democratic People’s United Front.

Historical Setting

19

The US–USSR Joint Commission, which was to prepare for the establishment of a provisional Korean government, and for the trusteeship, held its ﬁrst meeting in March 1946. But it adjourned two months later without any agreement, reﬂecting the unwillingness of either side to accept the possibility of creating a uniﬁed Korean government friendly to the other. In fact, around this time, the Cold War tensions had heightened.9 Within the Korean peninsula, too, since February, the US and the Soviet Union had already sought to rearrange the political structure in each zone to create a regime loyal to themselves. On February 8, the Soviets and the northern Communists organized, as a central governing body, the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee with Kim Il Sung as its chairman, and eliminated Cho Man-sik, a highly respected nationalist leader. The North Korean Workers Party was established in August, and the ﬁrst local elections to choose the representatives for People’s Committees was held in November. In February 1947, the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly was inaugurated as the highest legislative body.10 While, in the North, the Soviet Union was building a Communist system headed by Kim Il Sung with relatively few problems, the US faced difﬁculties in arranging a friendly political structure in its zone. The American Commander preferred the rightists to the leftists, but the former’s strong opposition to the trusteeship placed him in a difﬁcult position: if he supported them, the Russians would certainly accuse the US of bad faith in carrying out international agreements. In particular, Syngman Rhee, who had demonstrated vigorous antiRussian and anti-Communist sentiments, was a ‘worse pain in the neck every day’ for the Americans.11 The relationship between Rhee and the US was further aggravated when Rhee’s antagonism towards the Communists developed into a call for the establishment of a separate government in the South. In early June 1946, after the Joint Commission had adjourned without any results, Rhee publicly argued that, because there was no hope for uniﬁcation through the Joint Commission, a separate southern government had to be created in order to appeal to world opinion for the withdrawal of the Soviet Union north of the 38th parallel. This forthright statement was widely criticized in Korea (the extreme rightists excepted) as undermining national unity, and embarrassed the US administration which had not entirely abandoned the possibility of cooperation with the USSR.12 By July, the Truman administration came to believe that Rhee had ‘outlived his period of usefulness and

20

State Security and Regime Security

should be gently eased out of the Korean political picture.’ Under instructions from Washington, the American military government sponsored the coalition between the moderate right, represented by Kim Kyu-sik, and the moderate left, represented by Yo ˘ Un-hyo ˘ng, for the purpose of undermining the position of the Rhee rightists, as well as the Communists.13 Rhee, however, was undeterred by such a move. In November, Rhee sent messages to several western delegates at the United Nations in order to request the UN to recognize a ‘separate government’ in South Korea. Otherwise, Rhee argued, the South could not be protected from ‘thousands of Red terrorists constantly inﬁltrating from the North’. The following month, the right-wing leader went to Washington where he suggested to the State Department the following programme entitled ‘A Solution of the Korean problem’: (1) an interim government to be elected for southern Korea to serve until the two halves of Korea could be reunited; (2) the forcible removal of the Soviet Union from northern Korea, so the country could be reunited; (3) the interim government to be admitted to the United Nations, so that it could plead its own case; and (4) the retention of US forces in the South as a bar to further Russian aggression against Korea. This proposal, predictably, met with a negative response from the Americans.14 Why did Rhee support the idea of a separate southern government, which was certain to be criticized both internally and externally? One answer could be found in Rhee’s ‘desire for power’. William Langdon, Hodge’s political advisor in Seoul, observed that Rhee’s appeal for a separate government was possibly an attempt to ‘steal the show at home’, in the light of the fact that American support for the moderates was ‘ruining his chances of being ﬁrst president’.15 These explanations are probably correct, especially when considering Rhee’s personal attributes as described by his close associates: ‘ambitious’; ‘egocentric’; and ‘unable to bear defeat’.16 It should not be denied that however great Rhee’s desire for power, his call for a separate government reﬂected his personal belief that the independence of Korea was unattainable without checking Russian ambition – a belief which had formed through his independence activities. It is necessary to examine Rhee’s earlier activities to understand his perception of Russian ambition. Rhee started his political career by joining the Independence Club which was established in Korea in the late 1890s to advocate Korean independence from foreign control, and to reform Korea’s politics and customs. Around

Historical Setting

21

this time Russia’s desire to dominate Korea was increasing. Accordingly, the Club launched an anti-Russian movement, and Syngman Rhee himself made several speeches warning of the danger of Russian encroachment.17 After the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, Rhee’s anti-Russian feelings had been replaced by antiJapanese sentiments. When Rhee became President of the Korean Provisional Government in 1919, he established the Korean Commission in Washington in order to gain US support for the cause of Korean independence from Japan. As Japan’s defeat in the Second World War became imminent, however, Rhee’s concern about Russia’s ambition revived. From 1942, Rhee devoted himself to obtaining ofﬁcial American recognition of the KPG as the legitimate government of Korea. According to Rhee, recognition was ‘urgently needed’ because after the defeat of Japan, Russia, which had been seeking to obtain all-year warm water sea ports in Korea as outlets to the Paciﬁc, would ‘surely move in and seize Korea unless such a move were forestalled by prior American recognition of Korean independence’.18 The independence leader expected that the US, which was at war with Japan, would quickly grant recognition of the KPG, but his pleas were repeatedly rejected. When Rhee became aware that the US had no intention of recognizing the Provisional Government without consulting the Soviet Union, which was one of America’s wartime allies, and which had a great interest in Northeast Asia, he began to suspect that the Soviet Union was conspiring to seize Korea.19 Rhee’s reaction to the Cairo conference in 1943 demonstrated such a suspicion. In December 1943, when the heads of the US, Britain, and China declared at Cairo that, ‘in due course’, Korea would become ‘free and independent’, Rhee questioned the phrase, ‘in due course’. Assuming that it could mean an indeﬁnite delay of Korean independence, he issued a series of statements condemning this restrictive phrase.20 Later in 1945, Rhee wrote his own interpretation of the Cairo conference as follows: I knew that the shadow of Joseph Stalin loomed large at the Cairo meeting, even though he was not physically present – that Russian ambitions in the Paciﬁc were receiving full consideration … It was evident that the Cairo pledge was rendered deliberately ambiguous in order to keep the Korean question open for later decision. And it was also clear that the chief reason for ambiguity was the undeﬁned position Russia was preparing to assume in Asia … I came to the

22

State Security and Regime Security

conclusion that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had decided that Korea should have a government which would be independent only in form, but that actually it would be under the control of the Soviet Union.21 Since the Soviet Union was Communist, its control of Korea meant Communist control of Korea. In this regard, in December 1942, in a letter to the US Secretary of State, warning of Russian ambition, Rhee asserted that the failure to recognize the KPG would ‘inevitably result in the creation of a Communist state’ on the Korean peninsula.22 By 1945, Rhee’s fear of the Soviet Communists’ advance into Korea moved a step further. In June, Rhee wrote to the State Department that ‘delay in recognizing the Korean Provisional Government would place not only Korea but the US at a disadvantage … The only possibility of avoiding the ultimate conﬂict between the US and the Soviet Republics is to build up all democratic, not communistic, elements wherever possible now.’ In a similar context, another message in July warned of the possibility of ‘blood shed between the Korean Nationalist majority and the Communist minority in Korea’.23 From the above examination of Rhee’s previous position, it can be found that Rhee’s anti-Communism originated from his antagonism towards Russia. In this respect, he had rejected any cooperation with the Communists, arguing that ‘to admit Russia in any guise into Korea would merely be to surrender the independence of the nation’.24 Considering Rhee’s attitude, it was not surprising that he had attacked the Communists upon his arrival in Korea; and that he had strongly opposed the trusteeship which would allow Soviet inﬂuence over Korea. As it became obvious that the Soviet Union would not agree to a uniﬁed government for Korea unless it could control the whole country, it was logical for Rhee to believe that a separate government had to be established in the South to prevent Communist domination of Korea, even if that meant a division of the country. Rhee thought that the problem of division could be solved by driving the Russians out of Korea after the creation of an independent and antiCommunist South Korea. Of course, he might also have considered that his chance to grasp power would be higher if a separate government were to be created. Whether Rhee’s call for a separate government was his ‘desire for power’ or a ‘patriotic move’ for the complete independence of Korea, the international environment was developing favourably for Rhee in early 1947. In March, President Truman announced that ‘it must be

Historical Setting

23

the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures’. Needless to say, Rhee welcomed the Truman Doctrine: ‘now that the US has abandoned the policy of the coalition with the Communists, the dark prospects of the Korean people has become bright.’ The Truman Doctrine was followed by the Marshall Plan in June, and by George Kennan’s ‘containment’ policy in July.25 Given this situation, the US–USSR Joint Commission, which reconvened in May, was doomed to failure. It adjourned in August with the two sides unable to agree even on the reporting of their differences. On August 5, when the Joint Commission had reached its ﬁnal impasse, Syngman Rhee sent a memorandum to Washington which proposed the immediate holding of an election to establish a South Korean government, and US recognition of it as the de jure government of all Korea. Rhee reasoned that this was ‘the best if not the only means of minimizing the evil effects of continued division of the country’. Interestingly, just a day before, the Truman administration had made a decision to move ahead with the creation of an independent South Korea. The US concluded that the time had come to devise some way of ‘withdrawing from Korea without abandoning the entire nation to the Communists’. Accordingly, in September, the US government submitted the Korean question to the United Nations, seeking to share the burden of Korea with the UN, and to withdraw from Korea without damaging its prestige and military position in the Far East.26 In November, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of a uniﬁed Korean government by elections that were to be supervised by the newly created UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). The commission began its work in Korea from January 1948. But the refusal of the Soviets to cooperate with the UNTCOK and to permit it access to the northern zone again caused divisions among political leaders in the South. Most of them, right and left, opposed separate elections on the grounds that it would result in a permanent division of Korea. However, Rhee and Kim So ˘ng-su, the leader of the KDP, advocated holding elections in the South alone. In fact, as early as November 1947, Rhee had already anticipated that the USSR would refuse elections in the North, and supported ‘immediate’ elections in the South to ‘protect the southern people from Communist forces’.27 Facing this situation, the commission resolved to refer the question of elections back to the UN Interim Assembly in February 1948. However, the US, which was now determined to contain the expan-

24

State Security and Regime Security

sion of the Soviet Union, proposed to hold separate elections in the part of Korea that was accessible to the UNTCOK. Although member states of the UNTCOK did not support the US draft resolution, it was approved by the Interim Committee.28 This resolution was what Rhee had eagerly wanted. Thus, he could comfortably proceed to create a separate southern government with support from the US. To obstruct separate elections, the South Korean Communists prompted an opposition campaign which escalated from mass rallies to a general strike and a major popular rebellion in Cheju-do. On the other side, Kim Kyu-sik and Kim Ku united in their opposition to the UN resolution, and advocated a meeting of prominent leaders from North and South Korea to solve the Korean problem. Thus, in midApril, the two Kims attended a North Korea-sponsored uniﬁcation conference held in Pyongyang. But not only did they fail to produce a political breakthrough which could prevent already scheduled elections, they were also criticized by the American military government and the southern rightists of having lent themselves to a Communists device intended to secure hegemony over all of Korea, a criticism which was not groundless.29 On 10 May 1948, general elections for the National Assembly were ﬁnally held in South Korea. About 80 per cent of eligible voters registered and 95 per cent of these went to the polls to cast their vote. As the leftist and moderate parties boycotted the elections, the newly created National Assembly was predominantly conservative in character, substantially composed of the followers of Syngman Rhee and Kim So ˘ng-su.30 The Assembly elected Rhee as the ﬁrst President of the new government. On August 15, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formally established. In the North, where the Communists had consolidated their power with Soviet support, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was ofﬁcially proclaimed on 9 September 1948, electing Kim Il Sung as its Premier. Thus, the ‘temporary and military’ division of Korea ﬁnally resulted in the creation of two separate governments in the Korean peninsula.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOUTH KOREA AND RHEE’S ‘MARCH NORTH’ POLICY Syngman Rhee, the newly elected President of South Korea, stated in his inauguration speech on 24 July 1948 that:

Historical Setting

25

We sincerely ask the Communists in the North to reform themselves and to cooperate with us in unifying North and South Korea peacefully. If they refuse to do so, and continue to behave as Russian puppets, the people will not tolerate it.31 It was highly unlikely, however, that Rhee truly expected the peaceful uniﬁcation of the country. A political solution of the Korean division had already proved impossible in the post-Liberation period. Above all, it was Rhee himself who had opposed any cooperation with the Communists, and called for a separate southern government so as to drive the Soviets out of Korea. Nor had Kim Il Sung ever advocated peaceful uniﬁcation. In 1947, Kim had argued that Korea could be uniﬁed ‘only by ultimate victory over the reactionary traitors in the South’.32 Indeed, with the creation of two separate states in Korea, each claiming jurisdiction over the entire country as the only legitimate government, ‘a major precondition for war was ﬁrmly in place’, and ‘the path of violence beckoned whichever side could muster the strength to overwhelm its bitter rival’.33 From early 1949, both Rhee and Kim devoted themselves to preparing for uniﬁcation by force. On February 8, when the US Secretary of the Army visited Seoul, President Rhee straightforwardly expressed his intention to use force to unify the country. Rhee said that he would like to ‘increase the Army, provide equipment and arms for it, then in a short time move north into North Korea’. He added that the UN’s recognition of South Korea made it ‘legal to cover all Korea’, and that he believed that ‘nothing could be gained by waiting’. Of course, Rhee received a negative response from the US which was unwilling to be militarily embroiled in Korea.34 A week later, Rhee sent a memorandum to Robert Oliver, in which he expressed his strong commitment to uniﬁcation by force: We cannot depend on American aid only, and stand idle without preparing ourselves in arms and by training. Our people in the [N]orth are begging us to help them … to punish the traitors, but we cannot help them because our American friends are fearful that might bring about an international war … [W]e are almost determined to follow the dictates of our conscience and go ahead with our own plan.35 Although such an aggressive view on uniﬁcation had been predictable in the light of Rhee’s previous attitude towards the Communists, there

26

State Security and Regime Security

were a number of internal and external factors which made him determined to unify Korea militarily at this time. First, as implied in Rhee’s conversation with the Secretary of the Army, international recognition of the ROK undoubtedly encouraged Rhee’s desire to ‘march north’. In December 1948, the UN adopted a resolution which declared that ‘there has been established a lawful government [the ROK] … and that is the only such government in Korea’. By February 1949, such great powers as the US, Britain, and France had formally recognized the ROK. Thus, President Rhee believed that, with recognition from the Western powers, South Korea had the right to ‘regain the lost land in the North’.36 Domestically, President Rhee’s political position was unstable, and this probably led him to adopt an aggressive external policy in order to bolster his political position. Rhee had been elected as President with the help of the right-wing Korean Democratic Party, which was the only cohesive and inﬂuential political group in the Assembly. But the KDP started to oppose him shortly after the launching of the new government partly because of Rhee’s failure to put enough KDP leaders in his cabinet despite their support for his election, and partly because of his autocratic rule. In early 1949, the KDP allied with the political group led by National Assembly Speaker Shin Ik-hu ˘i, a former ofﬁcial of the Korean Provisional Government, to form the Democratic Nationalist Party. The main motive of this merger was to develop a united front of opposition to the Rhee administration. In addition, President Rhee’s legitimacy had been continuously questioned by the leftists and moderates, who had rejected the creation of a separate government, and who constituted a not insigniﬁcant proportion of South Koreans. In particular, Kim Ku, the leader of the moderate rightists, publicly demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops in Korea so as to expedite the establishment of a uniﬁed government. This was echoed within the Assembly by a progressive ‘young’ group of over 50 members, who also advocated the withdrawal of American troops for the peaceful uniﬁcation of Korea.37 It was a direct challenge to Rhee who was eager to retain US forces in the South, as will be seen later. As Ambassador Muccio observed at the end of 1949, the Rhee government was indeed ‘incompetent’ and ‘without strong public support’.38 Given these internal difﬁculties, Rhee’s best way to maintain his position was probably to advocate uniﬁcation by force more strongly: on the one hand, the militant policy would attract support from the conservative opposition; on the other, it could serve as a countermeasure against the progressive

Historical Setting

27

opposition. It was unlikely, however, that such a measure contributed to strengthening Rhee’s power, as demonstrated by the result of the 1950 general elections in which the Rhee regime suffered ‘a resounding defeat’.39 Most importantly, the fear of the Communist threat inside and outside the South seemed to force Rhee to contemplate a kind of preemptive war. The Communists challenged the integrity of the ROK only two months after its establishment. In October 1948, an ROK Constabulary regiment, instigated by Communist-indoctrinated junior ofﬁcers, revolted and occupied the south-western cities of Yo ˘su and Sunch’o ˘n. Another regiment, dispatched to control the insurrection, also joined the uprising. Loyal forces put down the revolt in a week, but several hundred rebel troops escaped to mountain areas to become guerrilla ﬁghters. On November 2, a second revolt by constabulary troops broke out at the south-eastern city of Taegu. It too was soon suppressed, but disorder in the region continued as many civilian Communists joined the guerrilla forces. These incidents demonstrated a considerable degree of Communist inﬁltration in the South, and caused fear and insecurity within the military and among the public. President Rhee perceived the revolts as the result of a ‘conspiracy’ of the Communists to ‘overthrow’ the ROK government by provoking a ‘civil war’.40 President Rhee’s apprehension about the Communist threat increased with the rapid communization of China. By January 1949, Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime was on the verge of total defeat in the civil war with the Chinese Communists. Rhee believed that a Communist success in China was ‘bound to have unfavourable effects upon Korea’, and that, before Korea became ‘another China’, the Communists in Korea had to be removed.41 While eagerly seeking to unify Korea by military means if possible, the ROK President had to deal with the problem of the impending withdrawal of American forces from Korea. The US National Security Council had decided, as early as April 1948, to withdraw US troops by December ‘with the minimum of bad effects’. The withdrawal was delayed thanks to the Yo ˘su rebellion and subsequent South Korean insecurity. But in March 1949 the Truman administration decided to complete the withdrawal by the end of June, which was actually done. Although the Americans acknowledged South Korea as a ‘symbol in the Cold War’, the cutback in their defence budget, and their strategic priority in Europe led them to press on with the withdrawal. In place of its troops, the US government decided to establish the Korean

28

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Military Advisory Group (KMAG), and to continue military and economic assistance.42 The South Korean government regarded the withdrawal of US troops as a great danger to its security. Thus, President Rhee, as he wrote to President Truman in November 1948, wanted the retention of US forces until the defence forces of South Korea were capable of dealing with the Communist threat. And, if American forces should leave South Korea, Rhee suggested, the US had to provide ROK forces with proper equipment in order to deter possible aggression from North Korea.43 In addition, in May 1949, Rhee requested one of the following commitments in return for the withdrawal: (1) the formation of a Paciﬁc Pact similar to the NATO; (2) an agreement between the US and Korea for mutual defence against any aggressive nation, or (3) a public declaration by the US of a pledge to defend the ROK.44 The South Korean effort to block US disengagement from Korea was not limited to such gentle proposals. As the ﬁnal withdrawal of US troops became imminent, leaders of the ROK tried to increase the sense of crisis along the 38th parallel. They ‘not only encouraged, but also probably initiated’ border ﬁghting to ‘insure the continued presence of US forces on which their survival was depended’.45 Ambassador Muccio described the atmosphere in the South regarding the withdrawal issue as follows: [T]he Koreans contemplated the withdrawal of the US task force with genuine fear – even jitteriness in certain circles. They moved heaven and earth to have withdrawal deferred. There were even elements that were preparing to instigate an incident with the North with the hopes of embroiling the US task force to thwart withdrawal.46 The border incidents, however, should not be understood only in terms of a South Korean attempt to delay the withdrawal of US forces. Throughout the spring and summer of 1949, both North and South Korea launched attacks and counter-attacks along the 38th parallel, and neither regarded the line as an international boundary. According to John Merrill’s analysis, the size of the military units involved in the border engagements indicated that many of them were major battles, resulting in heavy casualties.47 Considering the seriousness of border clashes and guerrilla warfare within the South, in which about one hundred thousand persons were

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29

killed, it seemed hardly surprising that Rhee sought to launch a ‘defensive war’ against the Communists before they struck ﬁrst, believing that the best means of defence was offence. In addition, based on his perception that the source of Communist threat was the Soviet Union, the South Korean President believed that, when the Communists were removed from the North, as he put it, the ‘line of defense [against the Communists] must be strengthened along the Tumen and Yalu Rivers’. For that purpose, Rhee needed more American military aid. Thus, in September 1949, President Rhee instructed his representatives in the US to lobby American statesmen and the public with the motto, ‘Give us the tools and we will do the job.’ In October, Rhee himself gave an address to American soldiers, saying that he would ﬁght to the end against Soviet aggression alone, if necessary, but ‘preferably with US and UN aid’, describing Korea then as a ‘body cut in half’.48 Needless to say, the proposal of war was not acceptable to the US which had been reluctant to be involved in military action in Korea. Far from providing additional arms, the Americans in Seoul were so fearful of the South undertaking a military offensive against the North that they distributed American ammunition only in quantities that could be used for a few days at a time. When ROK ofﬁcials warned of an impending attack from the North, their US counterparts often suspected that they were exaggerating the Communist threat in order to request more aid from Washington, aid that would be used for a northern expedition. The US administration also repeated that, in the case of a South Korean attack against the North, all of American military and economic aid would be terminated. Furthermore, in January 1950, the Korean aid bill of $150 million was rejected by the US House of Representatives, and Secretary of State Acheson announced that South Korea was outside the defence perimeter of the US.49 Frustrated by American unwillingness to assist South Korean military action, Rhee wrote the following letter to Oliver at the end of 1949: You may remember my letter of February, 1942, to the State Department, in which I put on record the statement that if the Korean [Provisional] Government is not recognized, the Russians will move in and occupy Korea, which would put the United States in an embarrassing position. A similar letter was written two years later, with a stronger warning. You know, the people shrugged their shoulders and said, ‘What is he talking about?’ Now we have the

30

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Russians here – and who is going to get them out? … [T]he Koreans do want to ﬁght the Communists and get the Russians out of the north. But unless they have the moral support of the United States, not to mention material support, nothing can be done … [Communist] planes and everything else are all ready to come down to [S]outh Korea as soon as the harvest is under way. With what are we going to stop them? … What we need is equipment to do the ﬁghting ourselves.50 As indicated in the above letter, Rhee’s commitment to ‘march north’ was basically attributable to his long-held apprehension about Russian domination of Korea. In addition, he seemed to believe that a Communist military offensive was imminent, and that therefore it was necessary to attack the Communists in advance. All that held Rhee back, as the head of the KMAG observed, was the knowledge that this would result in a break with the US, and that the ROK lacked sufﬁcient offensive weapons.51 It was unlikely that President Rhee knew exactly how Kim Il Sung in the North perceived the current situation in the Korean peninsula, and how he prepared for the uniﬁcation of Korea. As a matter of fact, however, Rhee’s perception that a North Korean attack was imminent was quite right. In particular, according to newly disclosed Russian archives on the Korean War, Kim had been considering and preparing for a southern expedition to unify the country from early 1949, fearing a surprise attack from the South.52 The Russian documents show that, like President Rhee, Kim Il Sung believed that peaceful uniﬁcation was ‘impossible under current situation’, and concentrated on unifying the country by military means. By January 1950, Terenti Shtykov, the Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang, observed that Kim was ‘always’ planning to attack the South. In addition, the North Korean leader worried about a possible invasion, as did his southern counterpart. From early 1949, several intelligence reports suggested a southern military offensive was likely.53 In particular, around June, as the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea became imminent, Pyongyang was afraid of Seoul’s ‘freedom’ in military operation. Thus, by September 1949, Premier Kim believed that unless military action was taken at once, the uniﬁcation of the country would be delayed, during which time the southern regime would build up strong armed forces, and overthrow the North. Accordingly, Kim tried to obtain approval of and military aid for military uniﬁcation from the Soviet Union as eagerly as Rhee did vis-à-vis the US.

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31

In a sense, Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee appeared to be involved in a zero-sum game where each feared a surprise attack by the other which would result in a defeat, and thus became more eager to make a pre-emptive strike. But the important difference between the two leaders in Korea lay in their patrons’ responses. While the US, far from supporting South Korea in launching an invasion, continued to prevent one, the Soviet Union ﬁnally approved the North Korean plan to attack the South when Kim met Stalin in April 1950, noting that the international environment had changed in their favour. North Korea then set up a three-stage invasion plan: (1) to prepare and strengthen North Korean military capabilities; (2) to propose peaceful uniﬁcation to the South; and (3) after the South’s refusal, to launch a military offensive. At last, after Seoul’s refusal of Pyongyang’s peaceful proposal of June 19, the North initiated all-out war on 25 June 1950.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR AND RHEE’S OPPOSITION TO AN ARMISTICE When military action to unify the Korean peninsula was ﬁnally undertaken by the northern Communists on 25 June 1950, South Korea was so unprepared to cope with the superior Communist military forces that it was forced to withdraw from Seoul just three days after the outbreak of the war. Although the United States and the United Nations immediately decided to assist the South Koreans, the military situation was very disadvantageous at that stage: by August, UN forces had been forced into a narrow perimeter around Pusan, the very southern part of Korea. Largely encouraged by the participation of the US and 15 other nations under the UN ﬂag, however, President Rhee saw an opportunity to attain a military victory over the northern Communist regime and to unify Korea under his authority, which had been his desire since the division of Korea. On 13 July 1950, President Rhee claimed that the North Korean attack had ‘obliterated the 38th parallel … and no peace and order could be maintained in Korea as long as the division at the 38th parallel remained’.54 Rhee’s argument was further elaborated in a letter to President Truman on July 19: It would be utter folly to attempt to restore the status quo ante bellum and then to await the enemy’s pleasure for further attack

32

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when he had time to regroup, retrain and re-equip. The time has come to cut out once and for all the cancer of imperialist aggression, the malignant growth artiﬁcially grown within the bosom of our country by world Communism.55 The South Korean hope for military uniﬁcation expanded with the success of the Inchon landing on September 15, which shifted the balance of forces in favour of the UN Command. The subsequent UN counter-offensive forced the North Korean army to retreat north of the 38th parallel by the end of September. On September 27, the US government decided that it would shortly move its forces across the 38th parallel to destroy North Korean armed forces.56 On October 1, ROK forces advanced into North Korean territory. A week later, American troops also crossed the 38th parallel with the UN resolution endorsing ‘all appropriate steps to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea’. When South Korean units reached the Sino-Korean border of the Yalu River on October 29, as far as Rhee was concerned, the uniﬁcation of Korea on ROK terms seemed close at hand. The South Korean desire to destroy the Communist regime was frustrated, however, when Chinese forces intervened in late October.57 UN forces were driven below the 38th parallel once again, and the military position ﬁnally stabilized close to that line. In the face of a growing awareness that UN/US policies were rendering military uniﬁcation if not impossible, at least highly improbable as a consequence of Chinese intervention, and that the UN Command might soon come to seek to end hostilities by peaceful means, the ROK reacted by vigorously demanding the removal of all Communist forces from Korea. President Syngman Rhee played a leading role in opposing all moves towards a cease-ﬁre through both his public and private pronouncements. He refused to consider any peaceful settlement short of the complete uniﬁcation of Korea. Rhee repeatedly argued that the 38th parallel was meaningless, and that the mission of the UN should remain the military uniﬁcation of the Korean peninsula. In an address in March 1951, Rhee contended that the 38th parallel was an ‘artiﬁcial’ boundary line separating the northern industrial area from the southern agricultural one, a division that threatened the political and economic survival of the Korean people. Therefore, UN forces should ‘march north’, he argued, until they could establish the ‘natural’ border between Korea and Manchuria along the Tumen and Yalu rivers.58

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33

As a military stalemate emerged near the 38th parallel in the late spring of 1951, the UN and the Communists became more determined to start negotiations to end the ﬁghting in Korea. The statement of June 23 by Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador to the UN, that discussions should be started for an armistice, facilitated the launching of the truce talks. These developments, however, were unacceptable to the Rhee government. Not surprisingly, four days after Malik’s announcement, President Rhee stated that the ‘so-called peace plan’, which involved the division of Korea and left the aggressors in possession of parts of Korea, was an ‘insult’ to the country. He could not accept such a proposal as a ‘peace plan’, he added, because the Communists were seeking to achieve what they had been unable to accomplish by force through diplomatic duplicity.59 Perhaps sensing the strong possibility that armistice negotiations were about to begin, on June 30, the Rhee government tried to ‘clarify its position on the proposed cease-ﬁre’ by suggesting its own ‘peace plan’. The ROK plan consisted of ﬁve points: (1) Chinese forces must withdraw completely from Korea; (2) the North Korean Communists must disarm; (3) the UN must agree to prevent any third power giving any assistance to the northern Communists, militarily, ﬁnancially, or otherwise; (4) the ofﬁcial representative of the ROK had to participate fully in any international conference or meeting discussing or considering any phase of the Korean problem; and (5) no plan or course of action would be considered as having any legal effect which conﬂicted with the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Korea. Although Pyun Yung Tai, the ROK Foreign Minister, emphasized in announcing this proposal that South Korea did not oppose a ceaseﬁre, his plan was tantamount to demanding a surrender from the Communists.60 President Rhee’s opposition to an armistice was fully supported by many South Koreans. Despite disagreements among the political parties over Rhee’s domestic policies, virtually all politicians supported Rhee’s views on uniﬁcation and his opposition to any settlement short of this objective.61 In June, the National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution condemning a cease-ﬁre agreement as ‘appeasement’. Not only pro-government but also anti-government newspapers carried editorials that were highly critical of a truce. The pro-opposition Dong-A Ilbo, for example, wrote in May that any cease-ﬁre that allowed Communist forces to remain on Korean territory would become a ‘trap with which the Soviets would fool the US and other democratic nations’. The US Embassy in Seoul conﬁrmed

34

State Security and Regime Security

these sentiments, observing that the ‘position of articulate [South] Koreans’ must be regarded as ‘one of solid opposition’ to an armistice without uniﬁcation.62 In addition, the Rhee government stimulated popular anti-armistice demonstrations, taking advantage of the widely held popular aspirations for uniﬁcation.63 The Korean armistice talks between the representatives of the UN Command, and the Chinese and North Korean Communists ﬁnally began on 10 July 1951. Through the ﬁrst ten months of these difﬁcult negotiations, the two sides agreed on almost all issues designed to bring the war to an end. By May 1952, there was only one unresolved issue – non-forcible versus automatic repatriation of prisoners of war – an issue which led to the cease-ﬁre talks going into recess from October 1952 to April 1953.64 Regardless of developments in the armistice talks, however, the South Korean government maintained its intransigent attitude towards a peaceful settlement. Furthermore, President Rhee began to argue that, if necessary, South Korea would ﬁght alone against the Communists to unify Korea. At the beginning of March 1952, terming a cease-ﬁre ‘a death sentence to the Korean people’, Rhee argued that ROK forces would ﬁght against the Communists single-handedly. But he added that equipment and training of the ROK troops was needed.65 Needless to say, Rhee’s posture was unacceptable to the Truman administration which was seeking to bring the hostilities in Korea to a conclusion. Thus, on March 4, President Truman wrote a letter to President Rhee, in which he requested assurances of continued ROK cooperation with the UN Command. In his reply of March 21 Rhee for the ﬁrst time gave the US such assurances. But he did not forget to attach conditions: the signing of a mutual security pact between the US and the ROK; and the speeding up of the expansion programme for the ROK army.66 These conditions showed Rhee’s concern for the future security of South Korea, which stemmed from his fear that South Korea would be abandoned after an armistice. The Truman administration felt it necessary to reassure the South Koreans that the US and the UN would not leave them exposed to any renewed Communist aggression. Thus, the US was prepared to assist the ROK to increase its military defence capabilities. With regard to Rhee’s proposal for a security treaty, however, Washington believed that it would not be in the American national interest to negotiate such a treaty at that time. Moreover, it argued that, so long as the US retained adequate military forces in Korea, there seemed to be no necessity for a formal defence agreement. The Americans also

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35

believed that the ‘Greater Sanctions Statement’, which was approved by the 16 UN members participating in Korea, and was to be issued with the signing of the armistice, would be enough to guarantee South Korean security.67 President Rhee’s aggressive anti-armistice policy in this period, however, seemed to have another purpose – i.e. to manipulate domestic politics. At the end of 1951, President Rhee launched a campaign to revise the Constitution to make the presidency subject to popular referendum, realizing that he stood little chance of being re-elected by Assemblymen who were critical and hostile towards him.68 Rhee seemed to be conﬁdent that his personal support was relatively high among the general public, and his belief was not unfounded.69 When the amendment bill for the popular election of the president was rejected by the Assembly by an overwhelming majority of 143 votes to 19, President Rhee inspired popular anti-National Assembly demonstrations, and applied heavy-handed tactics designed to intimidate opposition Assemblymen. In May 1952, Rhee declared martial law in the area of Pusan, the temporary capital, on the grounds of the existence of the Communist guerrillas. A number of Assembly members were arrested allegedly for participating in a Communist plot. Although it was true that the Communists were operating in the area, there was no ﬁrm evidence that those Assemblymen were colluding with the Communists. In addition, during this political crisis, the Rhee administration intentionally sponsored anti-Communist and antiarmistice demonstrations, emphasizing the Communist threat. Finally, at the beginning of July, Assemblymen, including those who were in jail or in hiding to escape arrest, were forcefully brought to the Assembly hall, where they passed the constitutional amendment for direct presidential election by 163 votes to none with one abstention. In the presidential election held in August, Syngman Rhee was elected as President, receiving 74.6 per cent of the popular vote.70 Despite the humiliation in this political crisis, however, anti-Rhee forces in the political arena continued their confrontation with the President over domestic matters, and remained as a potential danger to the Rhee regime. In short, President Rhee’s strong opposition to an armistice and adherence to ‘marching north’ were attributable to three factors. First of all, Rhee’s opposition to a cease-ﬁre without removing the Communists from Korea appeared to be a logical conclusion of his consistently argued position about the Communists. Rhee had warned of the danger of Russian ambition in Korea; thus, he had advocated

36

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the creation of a separate government in the South when the North had been occupied by the Soviet Communists. After the establishment of two separate governments in the Korean peninsula, he had called for uniﬁcation by force, arguing that, otherwise, the northern Communists would invade South Korea. Now, after the Communist invasion, he asserted that they must be removed from the peninsula in order to prevent the recurrence of war, and thus to maintain the security of South Korea. Secondly, as partly indicated in correspondence between Rhee and Truman in March 1952, the South Korean President was likely to exaggerate his terms in order to obtain a guarantee of the future security of South Korea from the US who sought to end the hostilities in Korea. Finally, as seen in the 1952 political turbulence, President Rhee tried to increase popular support for himself and to decrease the inﬂuence of his political opponents by emphasizing the existence of the Communist threat, his opponents’ collusion with those forces, and the need to ‘march north’ to remove that Communist threat. By the end of March 1953, the armistice talks reached their ﬁnal stage with the Chinese concession on the POW issue which had been the only remaining agenda item between the UN and Communist sides. The conclusion of the talks became simply a matter of time, and all the countries concerned began to prepare for the post-Korean War period. Furthermore, uniﬁcation by military means had proved to be impossible, especially once the foreign powers had become involved in the war. Neither the US and UN command nor the Chinese and Soviet Communists, on which South and North Korea were respectively heavily dependent, wanted to continue the war in Korea. In addition, in both the southern and northern parts of the Korean peninsula, the economic difﬁculties caused by the war were too serious to allow the continuation of the war.71 Given these circumstances, it would be a relatively reasonable choice to accept the armistice. And Kim Il Sung did indeed take this option. 72 Unlike Premier Kim, however, President Rhee continued to advance the slogan ‘march north and unify Korea’ even after the conclusion of the armistice. On the one hand, this looked like an inappropriate policy. On the other hand, it was likely that President Rhee had reasons to maintain his militant posture as long as the Communists remained in the northern part of Korea, and as long as anti-Rhee forces existed in the domestic political arena.73 In other words, the slogan of ‘march north’ might have been a reﬂection of Rhee’s post-Korean War security concerns not only for

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37

South Korea but also for his regime, which is the main hypothesis of this book. Although the motivations for Rhee’s call for uniﬁcation by force in the pre- and post-Korean War periods were similar, the internal and external circumstances in which Rhee’s security policies for the state and the regime were carried out differed in the two periods. This change in domestic and external situations was mainly caused by the war, as will be examined in the next section.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR FOR RHEE’S INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY POLICIES The Korean War is said to be the ‘most decisive turning point’ in modern Korean history, and its social, political, economic, and military impact on the Korean people is still difﬁcult to ignore. But, in this study, the focus is placed on the immediate inﬂuence of the conﬂict on South Korean political and military spheres, an inﬂuence closely related to the post-armistice security problems of the South.74 First, with its involvement in the Korean War, US policy in Korea changed from a ‘minimum commitment’ to a ‘maximum commitment’ to the security of South Korea.75 In early April 1953, the US government excluded the option of ‘complete withdrawal from Korea’ from its possible courses of action. In November, NSC 170/1, which became the basis of US policy towards South Korea until 1960, set up the long-range US objective regarding the Korean problem as to ‘bring about the uniﬁcation of Korea … under a free, independent and representative government, friendly toward the United States’. As for the current objective, the NSC decided to maintain a position of strength in Korea by supporting the ‘commitment to oppose aggression’, and by preventing the Korean peninsula ‘from coming under Communist domination either by subversion or by being overrun’. The NSC also stated that the US would seek these objectives through ‘peaceful means.’ In addition, the war in Korea appeared to increase the strategic value of South Korea as a ‘symbol of the Cold War’. President Eisenhower stated in his memorandum of July 31 that never before had the US had a ‘better opportunity to contribute more effectively’ than it now had in Korea ‘toward helping win the Cold War’. With assistance to South Korea, Eisenhower added, Americans could ‘show the entire world’ that they were ‘engaged in helping humans’, and assure that South Korea would remain a ‘real bulwark of freedom, rather than a helpless slave of Communistic dictatorship’.76

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Such a US ‘maximum commitment’ in South Korea offered President Rhee both opportunities and limitations. As indicated above, American interests in South Korea lay in ‘peacefully’ ensuring the status quo and in maintaining US prestige as a leader of the Western world in the Cold War. And in order to pursue these interests, the US government needed the cooperation of South Korea, which provided Rhee with an opportunity to demand a price for his cooperation. On the other hand, as American commitments in South Korea increased, so did the possibility of the former’s intervention in the latter’s domestic affairs, an intervention which could undermine not only the sovereignty of South Korea but also the security of the Rhee regime. Such a danger had already been indicated during the 1952 political crisis when the Truman administration had planned ‘Operation Everready’ for the arrest of Rhee and the installation of an alternative government by the UN Command, fearing that political disorder behind the ﬁghting lines could jeopardize the war effort.77 Internally, after the Communist invasion of the South, antiCommunism became the main basis of the ideological legitimization of the ROK government. North Korea’s provocation of the hostilities and the atrocities committed during the war deepened antiCommunist sentiment among the South Koreans. The following description may aid comprehension of the depth of anti-Communist feeling in South Korea caused by the war: ‘The Korean War brought calamities to virtually everybody. Since Korea has an extended family system, almost everyone in Korea lost blood relatives. Others lost their property and still others were separated from their families. Many South Koreans held North Korea directly responsible for these calamities.’78 Moreover, the war led to the liquidation of a large number of leftists who had threatened the stability of the Rhee regime. Thus, the Rhee government, which had been fragile before the war, could consolidate its position at the end of the conﬂict.79 But it should be noted that, despite the fact that the leftist elements largely had disappeared from the South Korean political scene, conservative anti-Rhee forces, which had challenged the authority of the Rhee regime, were still active. Although their inﬂuence had been weakened after the 1952 political incidents, they remained a potential danger which might threaten the stability of the Rhee regime if his autocratic rule continued. In relation to the above point, the Korean War dramatically strengthened Syngman Rhee’s own political position. President Rhee could claim that his pre-war anti-Communist policy had been proved

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39

right by the North Korean invasion and its support by the Russians and the Chinese. As a result, he had been able to launch the antiarmistice campaign vis-à-vis the US, and this in turn helped Rhee impose his image on the people as a strong nationalist leader, and widened popular support for him. The Korean War thus provided Rhee with a political base from which he could effectively stimulate anti-Communist sentiment for political purposes, if necessary by reminding the public of the Communist threat with the simplistic slogan ‘march north’. Finally, it should be remembered that while a war in Korea had been more or less expected in many quarters before the outbreak of the war, none of the countries involved except South Korea referred to the Korean problem in terms of war after the end of the Korean conﬂict. In addition, with the death of Stalin in March 1953, and the subsequent peaceful gesture of Stalin’s successors, including their willingness to conclude the Korean conﬂict, there were increasing indications of reduced world tension. For Rhee, then, the changing superpower relations had two consequences: on the one hand, they might undermine his goal of uniﬁcation by force; on the other hand, the improvement in East–West tensions might affect the credibility of his ‘march north’ slogan, making public support for war in South Korea substantially less likely. In the following chapters, this book will examine how Rhee’s concern for the internal and external threats interacted with each other and how Rhee applied his ‘march north’ theme to maintain both state and regime security.

3 The Ending of the Korean War and Syngman Rhee’s Search for a US–ROK Mutual Defence Treaty, April–August 1953 ‘I earnestly wish I could … accept any armistice you [the US] may deem necessary. But … to accept any armistice arrangement which would allow the Chinese Communists to remain in Korea would mean … an acceptance of a death sentence without protest … We propose … that a mutual defense pact between our two governments precede it.’ (Syngman Rhee, 30 May 1953) ‘What we were doing was to try to get an armistice … But to get an armistice took great sacriﬁces on our part … We did not promise … to give a security pact because we wanted to. The South Koreans have always wanted one and we have refused until now, because it involves us in Asian mainland commitments we do not like to make.’ (John Foster Dulles, 31 July 1953) The period from April to August 1953 was critical to South Korea in terms of its security: during this period, the Mutual Defence Treaty between the US and South Korea was arranged, a treaty which has been the most important factor in South Korean security to this day. Although South Korea had demanded such a pact since before the outbreak of the Korean War, it was during this period under study that the ROK government, led by President Syngman Rhee, concentrated its efforts on obtaining a bilateral security pact from the United States. Fortunately for Rhee, this period saw few internal problems to which the President needed to pay attention. As examined in the previous chapter, since the 1952 political crisis when President Rhee had 40

Search for a US–ROK Mutual Defence Treaty

41

successfully defeated challenges from his political opponents, their power had been weakened. In the following presidential election, he could be re-elected as President with a massive majority (74.6 per cent of the popular vote) partly because the country was in a war situation, and partly because his anti-armistice campaign boosted his popularity. Whatever the reasons for such public support, the number of votes Rhee received was large enough to enable him to continue his aggressive external policy in the name of the ‘people’s will’. When the truce talks reached their ﬁnal stages around April 1953, difﬁcult negotiations took place between the ROK and US governments: the former was eager to obtain a bilateral security pact before the conclusion of the armistice talks, but the latter was reluctant to give such an explicit security commitment. And if needed, the Americans preferred to settle the issue at least after the end of the war. The tug-of-war between Seoul and Washington lasted almost ﬁve months, and the former eventually claimed victory. This chapter will study the period from April to August 1953, focusing on Rhee’s efforts to gain a mutual defence pact from the US. The ﬁrst section will examine Rhee’s demand for an American guarantee of South Korean security after the conclusion of the war in return for his compliance to the armistice, and the response of the Eisenhower administration to this demand. Secondly, this chapter will analyze the reasons for and repercussions of Rhee’s unilateral action of releasing the anti-Communist Korean prisoners-of-war, an action which considerably increased his bargaining position vis-à-vis the US. In the ﬁnal section, this chapter will study President Rhee’s efforts to ﬁnalize a bilateral security treaty through intensive negotiations with Washington’s high-level ofﬁcials.

RHEE’S THREAT OF UNILATERAL ACTION AND THE SEARCH FOR A US SECURITY COMMITMENT South Korea had vigorously opposed any cease-ﬁre without destroying the Communists, as seen in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, the truce talks between the UN and the Communists, both of which were willing to conclude the war in Korea, were coming to a close. On 30 March 1953, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, made a statement which represented a Communist concession on the issue of POWs: he proposed to exchange those prisoners who wished to be exchanged, and to hand over the remainder to a neutral state, where their wishes

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concerning repatriation could be ascertained. The Chinese thus retreated from their stance on automatic repatriation of all prisoners. The UN side welcomed the proposal, and the armistice talks ﬁnally resumed at Panmunjom on April 26.1 The repatriation of POWs had been virtually the only barrier to the signing of the talks, and now with this Communist concession the last problem was almost resolved. Aware that an armistice agreement was imminent regardless of his opposition, Syngman Rhee began to consider how South Korean security could be guaranteed after a cease-ﬁre. For this purpose, on the one hand, he tried to obtain a mutual security pact through negotiations with the US; on the other hand, he threatened that ROK forces would withdraw from the UN Command and ﬁght alone against the Communists. President Rhee also inspired renewed anti-truce rallies in order to demonstrate the strong and vocal support for his view on the armistice issue. Immediately after the new Communist overture for a truce agreement, the ROK launched a public campaign against an armistice. On March 31, the Rhee government again proposed its conditions for a cease-ﬁre that amounted to a demand for the Communists’ surrender.2 On April 2, the National Assembly passed a resolution opposing an armistice without uniﬁcation. Three days later, President Rhee publicly stated that, regardless of what happened at Panmunjom, South Korea’s objective remained the same – to unify Korea. This coincided with public demonstrations shouting slogans such as ‘Uniﬁcation or Death’, and ‘March to Yalu’. The rallies became larger and more frequent during April. Most South Korean press also supported the government’s position. On April 19, a convention of journalists in Seoul adopted resolutions opposing an armistice.3 While publicly rejecting the truce talks, the Rhee regime sought to negotiate for a defence pact with the US, which wanted to end the war with South Korean cooperation. On April 3, Pyun Yung Tai, the ROK Foreign Minister, informed Washington that a mutual security pact would be ‘the price of ROK cooperation with the armistice efforts’. A few days later, Yang You Chan, the Korean Ambassador in the US, in a conversation with John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, said that if there should be an armistice, a security pact between the US and the ROK would ‘greatly relieve the fears and anxieties’ of the South Koreans, who were ‘constantly afraid that the US and the UN would desert them’. But Dulles responded that it would be better to consider such a pact ‘after the political conference had worked out a peaceful settlement for Korea’.4

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President Rhee thereupon sent a letter to President Eisenhower on April 9, a letter which was described by Eisenhower as ‘drastic in tone and extreme in its terms’. In his letter, Rhee wrote that if a peace agreement allowing the Chinese to remain in Korea were to be arranged, he would have to ask all the nations, who did ‘not desire to drive the Communist forces up to the Yalu River’, to withdraw from Korea. He added that, if the US wanted to take its forces out of Korea, it could do so. On April 24, Ambassador Yang delivered to the State Department an aide-mémoire which indicated that Rhee would withdraw his forces from the UN Command if a cease-ﬁre agreement failed to expel the Chinese Communists from Korea.5 When Rhee said that he would ﬁght alone, he may genuinely have meant it. In a personal letter to Robert Oliver, President Rhee emphasized that: ‘We say it [unilateral military action] not only as a make-believe statement, for we do mean it.’6 As Ellis Briggs, the US Ambassador in Korea, informed Washington, however, Rhee was undoubtedly aware that such a move would isolate him from the only real support South Korea had – i.e. the United States. Despite Rhee’s declaration that the ROK was prepared to ﬁght alone, he might well have realized that his forces could not successfully attack Communist forces without the help of US troops.7 Accordingly, his hard line was interpreted by most American administrators as an attempt to ‘maximize his bargaining position’ in order to obtain the fullest possible support from the US. Although Rhee repeatedly stated that he hoped the US would not consider his actions ‘a form of blackmail’, US ofﬁcials nevertheless perceived that the South Korean President was ‘blufﬁng’.8 The US government could not completely ignore the possibility of President Rhee’s unilateral action, however. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, Rhee had granted the UN Command control over his troops only ‘during the present state of hostilities’. Based on this fact, he was currently arguing, not unreasonably, that an armistice would ‘automatically mean [the] withdrawal of ROK forces from the UN Command’. Since Rhee’s forces were holding two-thirds of the UN line, General Clark, the UN Commander, feared that ‘a sudden decision by Rhee to remove them’ from the UN Command would present ‘all sorts of nightmare possibilities’. Rhee’s perceived behaviour also complicated the US position: American ofﬁcials commented on his ‘unpredictability’ and ‘tendency occasionally to act without adequate prior consideration of consequences’. They suspected Rhee’s blufﬁng, inspired by the passions of the moment, could drive him to

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actions which he might regret in a calmer moment. In addition, because Rhee’s threat was based on his strong belief that the Communists must be removed from Korea, the Americans who met Rhee face to face often observed that he had a ‘burning sincerity and unshakeable conviction’ in expressing his view on uniﬁcation. As a result, his threat began to have greater credibility, thus in turn heightening his unpredictability.9 In fact, when Rhee met US ofﬁcials, his attitude changed so frequently that nobody could anticipate what he would do next. For example, on April 14, ﬁve days after he had sent his adamant letter to Eisenhower, President Rhee showed his relatively ‘frank state of mind’ in a conversation with Ambassador Briggs. He said that he did not want to ‘rock [the] boat’, and asked Briggs to deliver his message to the US President that ‘what the Korean people most need’ was a bilateral security pact with the US. On April 27, when General Clark met President Rhee to discuss the aide-mémoire of April 24 where Rhee mentioned the possibility of South Korean withdrawal from the UN Command, Rhee declared that he was ‘not now even thinking in terms of eventually withdrawing’ his forces from UN control, and that if such an action were taken, it would only be as a ‘last resort’, and then only after ‘thorough and frank’ discussions with the Commander.10 Although Rhee had demanded both the withdrawal of Chinese troops and a mutual defence pact, it is likely that he put more emphasis on the latter when he considered post-armistice security. He probably realized that the removal of Chinese forces was beyond his power. Rhee’s priority for a security pact was indirectly expressed in his new proposal of April 30, when he suggested that a simultaneous withdrawal of both UN and Chinese forces from Korea could be considered as an alternative to the unilateral Chinese withdrawal, if a security pact were to be signed before an armistice. Rhee also proposed an ‘outlandish demand’, as Clark described it, to create a ‘buffer strip on the other side of the Korean boundary’ to be supervised by the UN. It seems likely that Rhee was talking in exaggerated terms in order to enhance his bargaining position over a security pact, because such issues as the withdrawal of foreign troops and the establishment of a buffer zone were not going to be discussed in the truce talks at Panmunjom, as Rhee must have known.11 In the light of Rhee’s unpredictability and his exaggerated statements, US ofﬁcials in South Korea advised that their government had to take measures to prevent Rhee’s possible unilateral actions, actions

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that could be harmful to the US position in the armistice talks. On April 14, they recommended that Washington consider ‘urgently’ measures to satisfy South Korea’s objectives and to obtain its continuing support for UN Command policy. Maximum satisfaction for Rhee, according to the report, would come from the conclusion of some form of security pact, together with assurances of Korean uniﬁcation by peaceful means, and the supply of economic aid. Briggs particularly favoured providing for a defence pact so as to persuade Rhee to change his attitude before he ‘boxes himself in’ by stirring up popular agitation to a point from which he could not retreat. Clark agreed with Briggs, conﬁrming Rhee’s strong desire for such a pact.12 Despite those recommendations, policy-makers in Washington were still not prepared to enter a bilateral security relationship with the ROK. The US government rejected a security pact with South Korea for the following reasons: it would detract from the multilateral UN efforts in Korea; it would give legal effect to Communist control over North Korea; and recent actions of the ROK in opposing the armistice would make it difﬁcult to explain such a treaty to the American people and Congress. More fundamentally, as Secretary Dulles confessed later, the US did not want such a security pact because it would involve America in ‘Asian mainland commitments’. On May 22, the Eisenhower administration, instead of the security treaty option, offered alternative measures for bolstering South Korean security, on condition that Rhee provide sufﬁcient assurances that he would not violate the armistice terms. The measures were: (1) the ‘Greater Sanctions Statement’ against possible future Communist aggression, which had already been approved by 16 members of the UN; (2) discussions with South Korea for an agreement on military assistance; (3) a promise to attempt in the political conference to achieve a uniﬁed Korea and to secure rapid withdrawal of Chinese forces; and (4) military support for a 20-division ROK army.13 Rhee expressed great disappointment, however, at Washington’s suggestions. He regarded the ‘Greater Sanctions Statement’ as far less valuable than a bilateral treaty. As for the US willingness to begin discussing an agreement on military aid, Rhee argued that if such an agreement were to be convincing to the Communists, it had to be concluded ‘now before [the] cessation of hostilities’.14 In the face of Rhee’s recalcitrance, US ofﬁcials on May 29 discussed possible punishments and rewards for South Korea: (1) to support the previously devised ‘Plan Everready’ to establish a military government under the UN Command in South Korea by taking Rhee and his associates into

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custody; or (2) to agree on the withdrawal of the UN Command from Korea if Rhee refused to cooperate in implementing an armistice agreement; or (3) to offer the ROK a mutual defence treaty on the condition that the latter would agree to the armistice agreement.15 Washington ofﬁcials opted for the carrot rather than the stick. The US could neither give up South Korea after having fought three years to protect it, nor subvert the ROK government in the name of the UN – the very institution which had given the government its legality. On May 30, American ofﬁcials agreed to inform President Rhee that the US was prepared to discuss a mutual defence pact with the ROK.16 Without knowing that the Eisenhower administration had decided to provide South Korea with a security pact, President Rhee sent a letter to President Eisenhower on May 30, which was ‘milder in tone’ and more restrained. In this letter, Rhee again proposed, as a condition of accepting an armistice, the simultaneous withdrawal of both UN and Chinese forces from Korea. He emphasized, however, that the signing of a mutual security pact between the US and the ROK had to precede the simultaneous withdrawal. Eisenhower’s reply of June 6 for the ﬁrst time promised Rhee that the US would negotiate with South Korea over a bilateral defence treaty ‘after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice’ [emphasis added].17 Probably, Eisenhower thought that he had made his position clear and ﬁnal. But Rhee seemed not to be impressed by that position: he reacted negatively to the offer of a mutual defence treaty.18 Three reasons probably led Rhee to take such an attitude. First, the progress in the Panmunjom talks narrowed Rhee’s room for manoeuvre. The ﬁnal proposal of the UN Command on the repatriation issue was accepted by the Communists almost entirely at a meeting on June 4. This ‘far exceeded the most optimistic expectation’ of the US and the conclusion of an armistice agreement appeared almost a fait accompli. But Rhee had been too strongly opposed to an armistice to accept it at once. Secondly, in relation to the ﬁrst point, if Rhee did accept a cease-ﬁre without ejecting the Communists from Korea, there had to be assurances for the post-armistice security of South Korea. As Rhee had implied before (e.g., in his conversation with Briggs and Clark on May 25, and his letter to Eisenhower on May 30), his country’s future security had to be assured prior to, not after, the signing of the armistice, a desire that reﬂected his fear that South Korea would be deserted after an armistice. Finally, Syngman Rhee, who was often described as a shrewd politician, must have realized that once the US

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achieved what it desired – i.e. a cease-ﬁre – he would lose his bargaining power vis-à-vis the US.19 Accordingly, Rhee was not satisﬁed with Eisenhower’s remarks that a bilateral security pact would not be discussed until after the conclusion of an armistice. President Rhee expressed his position more explicitly in a meeting on June 9 with General Maxwell Taylor, the Commander of the US 8th Army in Korea. Rhee stressed that he needed ‘deﬁnite assurances’ from the US to allow him to ‘convince the Korean people’. Asked to specify the assurances which would satisfy his requirements, he suggested three points: (1) a reasonable limit on the duration of political discussions at the political conference on Korea, preferably about 60 days; (2) a mutual security pact; and (3) continued expansion of the ROK army to a 20-division ceiling, accompanied by the development of the navy and the air force. When Taylor said that a formal security pact would ‘take some time’ to draft and to be ratiﬁed by the Senate, Rhee stated that all he wanted was a ‘simple statement in writing’ that America would come to the support of South Korea if it was attacked. Taylor observed that Rhee seemed to ‘try to bring himself to an acceptance’ of armistice provisions if the three points were satisﬁed, but ‘could not swallow the loss of face arising from a withdrawal from the uncompromising position’ that he had taken publicly on the truce talks. The Commander concluded that Rhee could not ﬁnd a ‘face-saving means of escape’, and that he needed help ‘to get over this hump’.20 The Eisenhower administration, while assessing that a speedy conclusion of an armistice might limit Rhee’s possible unilateral action, and that progress in that area could also be helpful in convincing him of the inevitability of an armistice, decided to provide Rhee with a ‘face-saving formula’ through a high-level meeting between America and South Korea. Secretary Dulles believed that in this way the US might ‘get Rhee thinking more about post-armistice conditions and what these could mean for him, and that in the meanwhile he might allow the armistice to become an accomplished fact.’ On June 16, Dulles informed Rhee that Walter S. Robertson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, would promptly go as an emissary to South Korea with the ‘full conﬁdence’ of President Eisenhower. Rhee’s response to the suggested visit of Robertson was very positive.21 At Panmunjom, on June 8, a ﬁnal text on the POWs was agreed between the UN and the Communists. General Clark expected that the armistice agreement would be signed possibly on June 18. He also

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hoped that, with the reality of an armistice coming closer, ‘Rhee’s blufﬁng would begin to dissipate’.22 But Clark’s expectation was completely undermined when President Rhee released the antiCommunist North Korean prisoners on June 18 – the very day when the armistice could have been concluded.

THE HEIGHTENING OF RHEE’S BARGAINING POSITION: THE RELEASE OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST POWs Between midnight and dawn on the morning of June 18, approximately 25,000 non-repatriate North Korean prisoners of war broke out of the United Nations Command camps at Pusan, Masan, Nonsan, and Sangmudae. Under the order of President Rhee, General Won Yong-do ˘k the ROK Provost Marshal, had prepared the release of the anti-Communist Korean POWs, with the tacit support of Paik Sun Yup, the Chief of Staff of the Army. The Korean security guards in the camps, who were supposed to prevent the prisoners’ escape, aided and abetted the break-out by cutting the barbed wire and turning off the camps’ lights.23 The release of those non-repatriates was to undermine the basis of the ﬁnal agreement between the two sides at Panmunjom on the POW issue, which had stipulated that a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission would take charge of prisoners who did not wish to exercise their right to be repatriated. In fact, Syngman Rhee’s unilateral release of the anti-Communist North Korean prisoners was not unexpected. As early as May 12, Rhee asked Clark about the possibility of his troops releasing the Korean prisoners without involving the Commander. On May 25, Foreign Minister Pyun hinted to Ambassador Briggs that some unilateral action concerning the North Korean POWs was under consideration. Consequently, both Clark and Briggs had more than once warned Washington that there was a ‘real danger’ of Rhee taking such an action.24 Despite this understanding, General Clark was ‘profoundly shocked’ by Rhee’s abrogation of his commitment that he would not take unilateral action without prior discussion with the General.25 Clark’s reaction is understandable especially in the light of his previous expectation that prospects for an armistice were improving. Furthermore, Rhee had shown a less obdurate attitude towards an armistice until just a few days before his unilateral release of the antiCommunist POWs.

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Why did Syngman Rhee order the release of the Korean nonrepatriates, and what were his aims in taking such unilateral action? Some hints about possible answers to these questions can be found in the statement Rhee issued with his freeing of the POWs. Rhee’s announcement included four major points: (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

‘According to the Geneva Convention and also to the principles of human rights, the anti-Communist Korean war prisoners should have been released long before this.’ ‘I believe that the UN authorities to whom I have explained our desire to release these prisoners are with us in sympathy and principle.’ ‘Now that the UN’s agreement with the communists is making the [international] complications worse than ever, there is a danger of giving satisfaction to our enemy, and causing confusion among our own people.’ ‘In order to avoid these grave consequences, I have ordered on my own responsibility the release of the anti-Communist Korean prisoners on this day, June 18.’26

First, Rhee referred to the release of the North Korean prisoners of war as being in line with his personal beliefs. The President considered those prisoners to be genuinely anti-Communist, based on his own intelligence sources,27 and sincerely believed that they must be released from the POW camps without being turned over to the Repatriation Commission as stipulated in the proposed armistice agreement. General Clark once reported that Rhee might be blufﬁng about other matters, but that he was in ‘dead earnest’ about the release of Korean non-repatriates. In Rhee’s view, if the prisoners were handed over to the Commission which included the ‘proCommunist’ India, these ‘innocent boys’ would be urged not to remain in South Korea by the Communist ‘indoctrinators’.28 Secondly, as Rhee indicated in his statement, a number of US ofﬁcials (especially some of the military) did sympathize with Rhee’s position on the POWs. As early as February 1952, according to the Australian Ambassador to the US, the UN Command contemplated permitting ‘a mass escape from the prison camps’ by those prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated. After Rhee’s release of nonrepatriates, there were signs that Van Fleet, the former Commander of the US 8th Army, and an old friend of Rhee’s, agreed with Rhee’s decision. Ambassador Briggs also understood the South Korean

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President’s desire to set the POWs free. More importantly, General Clark, who was in charge of those prisoners, had ‘complete sympathy’ for Rhee when the latter informed him that he might release the antiCommunist prisoners without involving the former. Even though Clark persuaded Rhee not to do so, the President had known the General’s ‘personal view regarding this matter’, and that Clark ‘could not do anything about it on account of the international complications’. Such US sympathy for Rhee’s stance undoubtedly encouraged Rhee to carry out his action.29 Thirdly, the ROK President’s release of the Korean non-repatriates was stimulated by the agreement on June 8 between the UN Command and the Communists on the POW issue. Rhee was deeply concerned that, with this agreement, the armistice was indeed imminent. For Syngman Rhee, who had so vigorously opposed a cease-ﬁre, it was not easy to accept without protest what was happening at Panmunjom. Perhaps he hoped that his aggressive action would lead the truce talks to be broken off indeﬁnitely. If not, he probably wanted to delay the Panmunjom agreement in order to gain time during which he could negotiate with the US regarding the post-armistice security of South Korea. As noted earlier, President Rhee was keen to obtain a security pact before the signing of an armistice. Therefore, given the information that the US government was planning to send its emissary to South Korea, he was desperate to meet the US negotiator in advance of the conclusion of the truce talks. (In fact, his gamble was successful; the truce talks went into recess immediately after Rhee’s release of non-repatriates, and did not reconvene until Rhee had ﬁnished his negotiations with the US envoy.) Finally, the South Korean President, in his announcement, emphasized that he had unilaterally taken the decision to release the prisoners: he had ordered it on his own responsibility. By emphasizing this point, he may have been hoping for certain internal and external effects. Domestically, he could show to the South Korean people his toughness in the face of any foreign pressure from the Allies as well as the Communists, and thus consolidate his image as a strong nationalist leader. In addition, Rhee sought to ﬁnd a face-saving formula through this unilateral action. That is, given the fact that he had repeatedly insisted that South Korean forces had to march north to unify Korea, now an armistice was inevitable he wanted to show to the populace that he had done his best to block an armistice which would leave Korea divided. Externally, Rhee’s release of the antiCommunist prisoners unequivocally showed the US that he had not

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been blufﬁng, and that he could take unilateral action to obstruct the truce talks. Rhee’s sudden, if not unexpected, action also enhanced his image of unpredictability which had already caused the US government difﬁculties in its dealings with him. As a result, Rhee was able, to some extent, to reinforce his bargaining position vis-à-vis the US. Faced with the ‘embarrassing’ situation caused by the Korean President, the American President, in his letter of June 18, warned his counterpart that, if the South Koreans continued to defy the UN Command it would be necessary to effect ‘another arrangement’ in Korea, meaning the withdrawal of American forces from the ROK. The British government also sent a message to the Rhee government on June 22 in order to ‘strongly condemn this treacherous violation of the authority’ of the UN Command.30 On June 18 and 19, the Eisenhower administration discussed several possible courses of action in Korea. As before, however, the United States had limited room for manoeuvre. The Americans did not wish to ﬁght in Korea any more; but they could not abandon Korea itself, which would mean, in Eisenhower’s words, ‘a surrender to the Chinese, handing them on a silver platter everything for which they had been ﬁghting for three years’. Whatever troubles the South Korean President caused, as the American President acknowledged, the US could not deny the fact that the Communists were ‘still the enemy’, and that Rhee was a champion of anti-Communism. 31 In fact, a number of Americans admired Rhee’s ﬁrm anti-Communism, and could not contemplate deserting him. As Ambassador Briggs argued: Rhee has aroused his country to a determination and will to ﬁght Communism, probably unmatched by any other countries in the world including ourselves. Such spirit and fortitude should be preserved, not destroyed … his army equipped by us is [the] largest and [the] most effective anti-Communist army in Asia and we badly need it on our side.32 Thus, Rhee’s removal was a difﬁcult course to contemplate. At one time, Eisenhower wished the South Koreans would overthrow Rhee and replace him with a ‘more moderate and reasonable’ leader. And US ofﬁcials did discuss the possibility of establishing an ‘amenable’ ROK government by utilizing the South Korean army. But they believed that there was little internal political and military disaffection

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with the South Korean President. Preparing ‘Plan Everready’, General Clark reported that opposition to the UN Command was a ‘solid alignment from Rhee on down through political and military channels backed by the people’.33 The ﬁnal choice was to persuade President Rhee to cooperate with the US. Consequently, on June 22, the US President’s envoy, Walter S. Robertson, was dispatched to Seoul to negotiate with President Rhee. Rhee was fully aware that the US envoy’s visit was the last opportunity before the armistice in which he could obtain a bilateral military pact from the US. This was still deemed vital, not only to ensure the security of Korea, but also to help to save face if he had to accept the armistice. The US needed Rhee’s cooperation in concluding the armistice just as much as Rhee wanted US help. What made South Korean cooperation more imperative to the Americans was the Communists’ demand for an assurance that the ROK would abide by the armistice terms, a demand they made to the UN Command after Rhee’s release of POWs. When the Communists found that their counterpart had experienced difﬁculties in meeting their request, they kept asking for the assurance as a condition for making further progress in the truce talks. American negotiators considered that the Communists were ﬁlibustering while trying to ‘stir up trouble’ between the ROK and the US. Whatever their purpose, their demand for a guarantee of South Korean compliance with the armistice strengthened Seoul’s bargaining power vis-à-vis Washington: it became more difﬁcult for the US to end the war without South Korean cooperation.34

THE SIGNING OF THE MUTUAL DEFENCE TREATY Since his unilateral action in freeing the North Korean prisoners, President Rhee had intensiﬁed his threat to withdraw the ROK troops from the UN Command in order to maximize the effect of that action. When he was informed of Robertson’s departure for Seoul, however, Rhee softened his attitude. On June 23, he handed to General Clark an aide-mémoire proposing four conditions for his adherence to the Panmunjom negotiations. These were: (1) The political conference after the signing of the armistice must be limited to 90 days. If the period expires without agreeing on the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea, the armistice will become null and void. In that case, ROK forces will advance north with US air and naval support.

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(2) Before the signing of the armistice, the US will enter into a mutual defence pact with the ROK. (3) The US will give the South Korean government adequate military and economic assistance. (4) No foreign armed forces shall enter the ROK with a view to guarding prisoners of war, nor shall any Communist indoctrinators be permitted to enter.35 These four points represented Rhee’s maximal position in the negotiations with Robertson. On June 25, President Rhee welcomed Robertson with remarks such as: ‘You are like a hand extended to a drowning man. Please help us ﬁnd a way out.’ Being convinced that Rhee was now looking for a way which would make the reversal of his position seem acceptable to his people, Robertson felt that the US should help him do that.36 In addition, probably inﬂuenced by Rhee’s unilateral release of the antiCommunist POWs, which had reinforced his renowned unpredictability, Robertson believed that Rhee was ‘not blufﬁng’ and ‘capable of the most irrational and damaging action’. Thus, to some degree, President Rhee held the high ground in his negotiation with the US envoy.37 After arduous debate between the two sides, on July 4, Robertson submitted an aide-mémoire to the South Korean government, which was to be the ﬁnal position of the United States. In the aide-mémoire, the Eisenhower administration did make a concession that it was prepared ‘immediately to begin negotiations to draft a mutual defense treaty’ [emphasis added] with South Korea although the ratiﬁcation of such a treaty ‘would be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate’. Washington also suggested that if no agreement on the Chinese withdrawal or a uniﬁed Korea was achieved 90 days after the opening of the political conference, the US would ‘withdraw’ from the conference and ‘consult’ with the ROK to ‘determine what course of action should be taken’. In addition, the US government promised to hold a ‘high level conference’ with President Rhee. In return, the aide-mémoire asked the Rhee government to support the armistice terms and to keep its armed forces under the control of the UN Command.38 President Rhee indicated that he was prepared to accept the aide-mémoire, but asked for ‘some evidence of Congressional support’ for a bilateral treaty so as to present it to his people as a fait accompli. Rhee also wished to see a draft of the mutual security pact, which was given to him next day. On July 8, the ROK President was informed that, at Eisenhower’s personal discretion, Dulles had met with Senate leaders of both parties, and that the

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Senators declared themselves ‘willing to support ratiﬁcation’ of a security treaty.39 At last, on July 9, President Rhee, in a letter to Robertson lukewarmly promised: Although we cannot sign [the] truce, we shall not obstruct it … We shall endeavor to cooperate fully and earnestly in [the] political and peaceful achievement of reuniﬁcation of our nation. (emphasis added) Two days later, Rhee conﬁrmed in his letter to Eisenhower that he had decided not to obstruct, in any manner, the implementation of the armistice terms.40 Dulles thought that whereas Rhee’s letter of July 9 was ‘not entirely satisfactory’, it was probably about all the US would be able to obtain from him at present. The US dissatisfaction stemmed mainly from two considerations. First, Rhee wrote to Robertson that he wanted speciﬁc assurances of ‘moral and material support’, if not supply of armed forces, for an effort with his own forces to repel the Communists, when and if the political conference failed to do so. Secondly, neither of his letters speciﬁed that he would leave ROK troops under the UN Command. Indeed, Rhee’s position continued to trouble the US seriously enough to make Eisenhower believe that he had made a mistake in letting Robertson come home.41 The armistice agreement between the UN Command and the Communists was ﬁnally signed on 27 July 1953, putting an end to the long and difﬁcult dispute between the two sides. Regardless of the conclusion of the truce talks, however, the controversies between the ROK and the US continued. A day after the formal end of the war, Secretary Dulles announced that he would visit South Korea to discuss with President Syngman Rhee the post-armistice problems between the US and South Korea. The Eisenhower administration had made a number of promises during the Rhee–Robertson talks in order to obtain Rhee’s agreement not to disturb the armistice. They included the agreement to conclude a mutual defence treaty with the ROK; to undertake economic and military assistance programmes; and to withdraw from the political conference if it turned out to be futile 90 days after its opening. The main purpose of Dulles’s trip to Seoul was to discuss in detail those inducements for Rhee to observe the armistice. In the Rhee–Dulles meetings, held from 5 to 8 August 1953, the issue of economic and military assistance raised few problems between the

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two sides. The US suggested a substantial economic aid programme including a $200 million grant. Militarily, the South Korean request for US approval and implementation of the 20-division army programme was also acceptable to the Eisenhower administration.42 The two sides, however, found greater difﬁculty in resolving the issues concerning the position to be taken following the political conference, and the arrangement of a security pact. In the Rhee–Robertson meetings of June, the two sides had agreed to withdraw from the political conference if the conference could not ﬁnd a means of unifying Korea. But the South Korean President continued to ask for a deﬁnite commitment on future US action. More speciﬁcally, Rhee desired that if the political conference proved to be fruitless the US would either resume hostilities or else provide the ROK with ‘moral and material support’ until it accomplished the objective of unifying Korea. Rhee asked the US to ‘ﬁnish its objectives instead of leaving them half accomplished and wasting all the sacriﬁces that have been made’. Needless to say, Secretary Dulles could not commit America to go to war again along with South Korea. Dulles wanted his government to retain a ‘free hand’ in determining its position if it were to walk out of the political conference. The Secretary of State ﬁrmly rejected Rhee’s request by saying that the American government could not let President Rhee decide what the US should do.43 In discussing a mutual defence treaty, President Rhee sought to create a treaty that would bind the ROK and the US as tightly as possible in military terms. Accordingly, on reviewing a draft treaty prepared by Washington, he insisted that in the treaty there must be a pledge by the US government that in the case of an attack on South Korea the US would act ‘automatically and immediately’. Rhee also desired to insert a clause stating that the treaty would endure ‘indeﬁnitely’.44 The United States government, on the contrary, was not willing to enlarge its commitment on the Korean peninsular. When Rhee tried to add stronger language to the draft treaty, Dulles emphasized that the treaty had to be drafted in such a way as to guarantee the ratiﬁcation of the US Senate. The Secretary asked President Rhee not to press the US government to add language which would not particularly contribute to the security of South Korea, but which would cause trouble with the Senate. Despite his repeated arguments and appeals, President Rhee failed to change the text of the draft treaty in the way he intended, and ﬁnally approved the draft presented by Dulles with only minor changes.45 On August 8, Foreign Minister Pyun and Secretary Dulles initialled the draft Mutual Defence Treaty between the Republic of Korea and

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the United States. It was formally signed later on October 1 in Washington D.C.46 At the close of his trip, Secretary Dulles assessed his visit to Seoul as successful. He believed that he had effectively resisted Rhee’s efforts to incorporate features which might be objectionable to Washington and enlarge the US responsibility.47 In other words, Rhee gained virtually nothing in his negotiations with Dulles, which basically represented ofﬁcial approval of what had been discussed between Rhee and Robertson before the armistice. Once Rhee agreed to observe the armistice, his bargaining power, which was based on his threat of unilateral action to obstruct the truce, was weakened. On the other side of the coin, it can be said that Rhee was right to attempt to gain US formal support for South Korea’s future security prior to the conclusion of the armistice. Although the terms of the treaty were less binding than he had hoped, the obtaining of the Mutual Defence Treaty from the US was a ‘diplomatic success’ for Rhee, as the Americans put it.48 And he was delighted with the fact that such a treaty was a reality. A day after its initialization, President Rhee made a statement that the beneﬁts of the Mutual Defence Treaty would be ‘enjoyed by generations to come’, and that neighbouring countries would no longer look down on nor attack South Korea. He also tendered his thanks to America. The President added, nevertheless, that his soldiers had to prepare for the opportunity in which they could ‘march north’.49

CONCLUSION Ever since the advent of a possible armistice, President Syngman Rhee had opposed any move towards a cease-ﬁre without removing the Communists from Korea, and repeatedly claimed that he would ‘march north alone’ if necessary. Although Rhee earnestly desired to unify Korea by whatever means available, he also utilized his militaristic posture towards the Communists for his own advantage. Rhee engaged in an all-out campaign against the armistice partly in order to improve his own image as a strong leader of the country, and thus to consolidate his power. Throughout the period under study, however, President Rhee appeared to be more concerned with the security of the country than with the maintenance of his rule. Not only did Rhee enjoy relatively high popular support, but also he faced few domestic political challenges after overcoming the political crisis in 1952.

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The crucial factor was that the South Koreans were still in the midst of a war provoked by the Communists. Accordingly, President Rhee concentrated his efforts on ensuring South Korean security from external threats. The South Korean President believed that a defence pact with the US was the foremost security assurance for the ROK. And he did utilize his commitment to ‘march north’ in acquiring such a treaty: Rhee exaggerated his terms in order to heighten his bargaining power vis-à-vis the US administration, which was eager to end the Korean conﬂict. President Rhee’s tactics were successful. Previously, the US government had been reluctant to accept such a deﬁnite security commitment in relation to the Asian mainland. President Rhee, however, made American policy-makers compromise on their original position: the US initialled the Mutual Defence Treaty with the ROK in return for Rhee’s promise that he would not obstruct the armistice agreement. Although the effectuation of the treaty was subject to legislative ratiﬁcation, he gained an assurance that the US Senate would ratify it. (There was no doubt that the ROK National Assembly would approve it.) The release of the anti-Communist prisoners considerably contributed to Rhee’s success in the negotiations with the US. By freeing the non-repatriates, and thus delaying the progress of the truce talks, Rhee earned time before the armistice agreement during which he could bargain with the Eisenhower administration. Moreover, the sudden unilateral action enhanced Rhee’s bargaining position: on the one hand, it heightened his reputation for unpredictability; on the other hand, it undermined the view that he was blufﬁng. There was a byproduct for Rhee. The Communists’ demand for a guarantee of South Korean compliance with the truce raised the price of Rhee’s cooperation with the US. Domestically, not only could he show his toughness against foreign pressure, but he could also save his face in accepting an armistice. It should be noted, however, that Syngman Rhee’s success was also attributable to the fact that the US had limited room for manoeuvre in Korea. First of all, given that the prime goal of US global policy was to contain the expansion of Communist powers, the US could not allow South Korea to be occupied by the Communists, not only because any small change in the balance of power was perceived as likely to upset the entire international order, but also because American prestige as the leader of the free world would come into question.50 Nevertheless, the US desired the cessation of hostilities in Korea on the basis of the status quo in order to prevent the war from becoming

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global in scope, and from draining any more of the West’s resources. Moreover, President Eisenhower, whose major promise in the 1952 presidential election had been an ‘honorable’ cease-ﬁre in Korea, was eager to end the ‘unpopular’ war as soon as possible. In order to satisfy the two objectives – to protect South Korea from Communist aggression and to end the war promptly – the US government could not but make concessions to South Korea’s demands, revealing its susceptibility to the threat of the withdrawal of ROK forces from the UN Command. It should be pointed out that President Rhee probably understood those constraints, and capitalized on them for his own cause. President Eisenhower’s personal diary written a few days before the armistice perceptively described the US difﬁculties regarding President Rhee and Korea: It is almost hopeless to write about the Korea–Rhee situation. Both the Communists and the South Korean Government have raised so many difﬁculties … It is impossible to attempt here to recite the long list of items in which Rhee has been completely uncooperative, even recalcitrant … There has been so much backing and ﬁlling, indecision, doubt and frustration engendered by both Rhee and the Communists that I am doubtful that an armistice even if achieved will have any great meaning … Of course the fact remains that the probable enemy is the Communists, but Rhee has been such an unsatisfactory ally that it is difﬁcult indeed to avoid excoriating him in the strongest of terms.51 Finally, public support for President Rhee facilitated his successful implementation of the pre-armistice security policy, which was focused on arranging a tighter security relationship with the US. People largely supported Syngman Rhee throughout his campaigns to oppose an armistice and to obtain US security commitment. Furthermore, as far as the security issue was concerned, even his political opponents supported Rhee’s position. Public support for their President added weight to Rhee’s threat to ﬁght alone. It also played a considerably signiﬁcant role in preventing the Eisenhower administration from launching a plan to topple Rhee in favour of a potentially more amenable ally. But US political intervention in South Korea was bound to continue given the interests that governed its commitment to South Korea, and the inequality of the partnership.

4 The Post-Armistice Security Policy of Syngman Rhee: The Strengthening of ROK Forces, September 1953–November 1954 ‘Will [the] US renew war with us [to] accomplish [the] original objective, [the] uniﬁcation of Korea by force, without unnecessary delay [after the failure of Geneva conference]? If [the] US cannot or will not do this, we ask you [to] grant our … request to increase our Land Forces together with Air and Sea Forces commensurate with it.’ (Syngman Rhee, 8 April 1954) [We]must not reply to [the above letter of] President Rhee by throwing a wet ﬁsh in his face … [The US needs to give] a quick reply to Rhee which would have as its theme, “We still love you, you s.o.b.”’ (Dwight D. Eisenhower, 13 April 1954) The signing of the armistice agreement on 27 July 1953 put an end to the long and bitter conﬂict in Korea, leaving the peninsula divided as it had been before the war. According to the armistice agreement, the Korean question was to be discussed at a subsequent political conference. While Kim Il Sung in the North appeared to adopt a peaceful policy and set up a long-term plan for economic reconstruction, President Syngman Rhee appeared not to be prepared to commit himself fully to peace. As Rhee made it clear shortly after the armistice agreement, he did ‘not approve’ of it, but simply intended ‘not to disturb’ it while a political conference was attempting to solve the Korean problem. Rhee hoped that, if the conference failed to ﬁnd a solution, the US would join the South Koreans in undertaking uniﬁcation by force.1 With such a pessimistic view on the likelihood of 59

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a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue, Rhee was reluctant to participate in the conference. When the political conference broke up without any result, as Rhee had expected it would, he voiced the call to ‘march north’ more loudly again. Just as there was little change in Rhee’s view on uniﬁcation, so there was little movement in his posture towards the United States. President Rhee continued to be intransigent, and unpredictable. Above all, he did not stop threatening that he would act unilaterally if necessary. During the period from September 1953 to November 1954, when US military and economic assistance programmes were set up, Rhee utilized this threat tactically, as before, to obtain further security commitments from the US. Although Rhee’s concern for domestic politics increased with the armistice, his priority was still maintaining the security of South Korea, and in particular, gaining a US commitment to strengthening ROK forces, which is the main focus of this chapter. First, this chapter will discuss President Rhee’s attempt to consolidate his power in order to assess the relationship between Rhee’s concern for domestic and external affairs. The second section will examine Rhee’s hard line concerning the political conference, and his effort to extract support for the expansion of South Korean military capabilities from the US, which needed Rhee’s cooperation in the conference for its own reasons. In the third section, this chapter will study the post-Geneva conference period when American security commitments in South Korea were ﬁnalized through Rhee’s summit talks with President Eisenhower, and the subsequent discussions between the two governments.

RHEE’S ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE HIS DOMESTIC POSITION After the end of the conﬂict with the northern Communists, President Rhee’s concern for domestic politics began to grow. Rhee’s ﬁrst objective was to rebuild the Liberal Party (LP) as his loyal organ. For this purpose, in September 1953, President Rhee called for the expulsion of the Yi Po ˘m-so ˘k faction, which had become too powerful to be left unchecked.2 During the next few months, Rhee dismissed a number of Yi’s supporters in the government and in the party. Yi himself was purged in December. Thereafter, Yi Ki-pung, Rhee’s long-time and trusted associate, who had served as the Chief-Secretary of the President and as Defence Minister, took over as LP leader.3

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With the completion of the LP’s reorganization by March 1954 as a centrally directed government party under Yi Ki-pung’s direction, the Rhee regime began to prepare another constitutional amendment to complement the 1952 revision which had provided for the popular election of the president. This time, it was to consolidate the supremacy of the president over the legislature, and more importantly, to provide President Rhee with life-long tenure in ofﬁce. In order to assure the passage of this constitutional amendment, the Liberal Party needed to secure a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly in the forthcoming general elections which were due to be held in May 1954. To this end, the Liberal Party endorsed one ofﬁcial party candidate in each electoral district, and in exchange for its nomination, candidates pledged to support the constitutional amendment. In addition, the party sponsored nation-wide public meetings to promote the constitutional revision.4 In the elections held on May 10, the Liberal Party emerged as the largest party by far, winning 114 out of 203 seats, receiving 36.8 per cent of the total votes. The main opposition party, the Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP), won only 15 seats, which was not enough even to register a formal negotiating group in the Assembly. Sixtyseven legislators were elected among independents. According to the US Embassy’s observation, while the actual balloting was ‘on the whole comparatively free’, police interference in varying degrees was widespread during the election campaign. This interference was ‘clearly an important factor’ in reducing the Assembly seats won by DNP candidates. It cannot be denied, however, that the Democrats’ defeat in the polls was also attributable to their poor political performance and inferior party organization. Whatever the reasons for the Liberals’ victory, President Rhee’s political power was strengthened substantially with the establishment of majority-control over the National Assembly.5 Although the LP had not captured its desired two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly, it subsequently increased its strength to 136 by successfully attracting independents; this was just enough to pass a constitutional revision. On September 6, the Liberal Party formally proposed a constitutional amendment bill. The major contents of the bill were: to authorize a national referendum to pass legislation on important issues affecting national sovereignty or territory; to abolish all elements of a parliamentary system embodied in the original constitution; and to revise economic provisions so as to encourage private enterprise. The most important and controversial revision was

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included in the ‘supplementary provisions’ of the proposed bill, however. That was the clause providing that the two-term restriction on presidential tenure would not be applied to the ﬁrst President of the Republic – i.e. Syngman Rhee.6 In a statement on the constitutional amendment, a government spokesman sought to rationalize the ‘life tenure’ of Rhee: President Rhee, our national father, has been offering his entire life for the independence of our country and is praised by all nations of the world as a world leader. If his post is hindered by the current clause of the constitution, it will be our national loss and a source of unhappiness for the world. The opposition forces reasonably criticized the provision as ‘unprincipled and undemocratic’ for a nation whose constitution was supposedly based on the political equality of all citizens.7 The Assembly debate on the bill had originally been scheduled to begin in October, but the government and the Liberal Party delayed it because of their impending problems, which had to be solved in order to ensure the passage of the amendment bill. First, despite the fact that the LP had secured two-thirds of the Assembly seats, there was still disunity within the party. Accordingly, leaders of the party needed time for ‘further preparation’ to minimize the likelihood of the amendment bill failing. Secondly, as will be discussed later, the Rhee government was involved in a ﬁerce dispute with the US over economic and military assistance programmes for South Korea. In particular, the delay in reaching a settlement with the Americans caused dissatisfaction with the government among inﬂuential Koreans. Therefore, the Rhee government probably wanted to postpone voting on so important and so controversial a measure until an improvement in Korean–American relations had restored public conﬁdence.8 In an effort to enhance the probability of the amendment’s acceptance, President Rhee tried to present the national referendum issue as the most important reason for proposing the bill.9 The so-called ‘New Delhi case’, which involved an opposition leader in an alleged Communist plot to turn Korea into a neutral country, gave the Rhee regime a good opportunity for justifying the necessity of the constitutional amendment. On 27 October, Ham Sang-hun, a leading ﬁgure of the DNP, alleged, on the basis of weak evidence, that in New Delhi in 1953, DNP leader Shin Ik-hu ˘i had met Cho So-ang, the former Assembly Vice-Speaker who had gone north during the war, to discuss

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plans for ‘neutralizing’ Korea. They had reportedly envisaged the creation of a ‘third force’ to carry out south–north negotiations. Although the allegation turned out to be groundless, the LP and the government seized upon the case as proving the existence of an ‘insidious political power’ which was undermining the sovereignty of South Korea. The Rhee regime therefore emphasized the need for the plebiscite on important matters pertaining to a national crisis, arguing that it would help to restrain the ‘enemy campaign’ for a ‘north–south merger and neutralization’. The Rhee regime also attempted to label opposition to the amendment as ‘unpatriotic’ in view of the many ‘international plots’ against Korea.10 On November 18, a day after the agreement between the ROK and the US regarding political, economic and military matters had been achieved, the Rhee government introduced the constitutional amendment bill to the National Assembly. Although the bill was passed at the end of the same month, the abnormal process of its passage eventually weakened the stability of the Rhee regime, creating a strengthened opposition party.11 Although President Rhee paid more attention to internal affairs than before, he did not face serious domestic political difﬁculties. Rhee’s interest in domestic political affairs during this period was focused on further strengthening and prolonging his rule while the opposition forces were still not powerful enough to mount any signiﬁcant challenge, as indicated by their poor showing in the 1954 elections. It was likely that President Rhee’s major concern was still uniﬁcation and South Korean security, and more especially on ensuring US aid to increase South Korean military capabilities. But the increase in Rhee’s interest in internal politics, however limited, had some impact on his external policy, as will be seen later.

STRENGTHENING ROK FORCES AND PARTICIPATING IN THE POLITICAL CONFERENCE With the signing of the armistice agreement to end the Korean War, the issue of unifying Korea was to be settled peacefully at a political conference which was to be held within 90 days after the armistice agreement. President Syngman Rhee was doubtful whether such a conference would ever be held. Pyun Yung Tai, the South Korean Foreign Minister, informed the US government in early October that President Rhee was ‘terribly’ concerned over whether or not there was

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going to be a political conference. Pyun then warned that if the conference was not held ‘on time’ (within three months of the armistice), his government might be forced to take ‘some actions’.12 This position was elaborated by President Rhee himself in a conversation with the new UN Commander, General John Hull. Rhee maintained that even if the political conference was convened, which he doubted, he felt certain that it would not reach a reasonable solution. He also said that if the conference failed to unify Korea he would insist on advancing to the Yalu in order to remove the Communists. Rhee further stated that he would do it alone, with Korean troops, if the US did not support him. During the conversation, General Hull observed that Rhee spoke with the ‘utmost sincerity’. Although Rhee was ‘emphatic’ in his statements, Hull said, he was not emotional.13 The preliminary talks for the political conference began at Panmunjom on October 26, after two months of indirect communication between the US and China. But the two sides were unable to resolve the basic differences between them over the composition, time, and place of the conference. As the Panmunjom talks dragged on, and as the bellicose statements of the ROK government increased in frequency, the Americans again began to worry about a possible resumption of hostilities by the South Koreans. Through a series of interdepartmental discussions from mid-October to early November, the Eisenhower administration prepared courses of action to prevent the ROK from unilaterally initiating military operations. Based on the belief that the principal determinant of President Rhee’s decision on the matter would be whether his action would serve to involve the US in the resumed ﬁghting, the US government, in NSC 167/2, decided to ‘promptly notify Rhee formally’ that all American military and economic support would be terminated immediately in the event of a South Korean attack on the North. At the same time, the US was determined to obtain from Rhee a ‘formal assurance in writing’ that he would not initiate unilateral military action at any time against the Communists. Washington ofﬁcials also planned to ‘replace’ President Rhee if he acted unilaterally.14 President Eisenhower wrote a letter to President Rhee in accordance with the decisions of NSC 167/2, and the letter was delivered by the US Vice-President, Richard Nixon, when he visited Seoul on November 12. In his letter, Eisenhower clearly stated that the US would never become involved in any military action started by the ROK, and that he had to have an ‘explicit’ conﬁrmation from Rhee that he would not renew hostilities.15 Although Rhee told Nixon that

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the South Koreans were ‘the last people in the world’ to disagree with the Americans, he was unwilling to give any explicit assurance to the US President. Instead, on November 16, in his reply to Eisenhower, Rhee wrote that: ‘if everything should go contrary to our expectation and the worse comes to the worst, I would feel compelled to take unilateral action, which I earnestly hope would never happen … however, I would inform you [Eisenhower] before making any such move’. American ofﬁcials considered that Rhee’s oral commitment to Nixon and his letter to Eisenhower, if short of the commitment desired from Rhee, marked a ‘deﬁnite step forward’. In addition, they believed that Rhee ‘certainly now realized’ that Eisenhower’s letter eliminated the prospect of US support for the resumption of ﬁghting.16 It is difﬁcult to judge to what extent Washington’s ﬁrm posture inﬂuenced Rhee’s attitude towards uniﬁcation. After Nixon’s visit, however, there were some indications that President Rhee was not completely ignoring the possibility of a peaceful solution to the Korean problem. First, notwithstanding his doubts about the fruitfulness of the political conference, he asked his advisor Robert Oliver to participate in the conference if it were to take place. Secondly, in the Rhee–Nixon meeting, according to Nixon, the ROK President implied that the publication of his unwillingness to resume hostilities without US approval would actually weaken the position of the US at the conference table. He said to Nixon: ‘The moment the Communists are certain that the United States controls Rhee, you will have lost one of your most effective bargaining points … The fear that I may start some action is a constant check on the Communists.’17 But Rhee’s attitude soon changed again, as the Panmunjom preliminary talks for a political conference broke down on December 12 and the American government announced the withdrawal of two US Army divisions from Korea at the end of the same month.18 On 2 January 1954, President Eisenhower wrote to President Rhee that he would take Rhee’s letter of 16 November 1953 as an assurance of Rhee’s refraining from unilateral action except by mutual agreement. President Rhee’s reaction to Eisenhower’s message, however, was far short of US expectations. In his reply of February 4, Rhee strongly criticized US policy on the ground that it held out ‘no hope’ for the uniﬁcation of Korea. He further stated that ‘we would rather ﬁght until we are united with our own people. If we succeed, we will become free men, or slaves if we fail ﬁghting alone, but we will be united … The time is here when we must decide either one way or the other.’19

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It is possible that, with the failure of the preliminary talks at Panmunjom, President Rhee sincerely hoped to march north with US support. But, more likely, the South Korean President was deliberately exaggerating his terms in order to enhance his bargaining position. Before the signing of the armistice, Rhee had successfully used such tactics in obtaining a US promise to conclude a mutual security treaty. His present objective was to expand the ROK armed forces. In the Rhee–Robertson meetings of June 1953, the South Korean government had agreed a US military assistance programme designed to build up the ROK Army to 20 divisions, and to expand the Navy and Air Force in proportion to the land force strength. The programme was conﬁrmed two months later when Secretary of State Dulles visited Seoul (see Chapter 3). As soon as the US President announced the redeployment of US forces, however, the ROK President began to seek a further strengthening of South Korean military forces. The Eisenhower administration believed that the redeployment of two American divisions from Korea would have ‘excellent psychological effects’: it would indicate that the US had no intention of making war on Communist China; and it would make the ROK realize that the prospect of unifying Korea by force was slight, and that the Rhee government could not count on US military support. In the view of policy-makers in Washington, twenty ROK Army divisions would be reasonably combatready by March 1954, and these forces, together with US air power, would be adequate to deter a possible Communist attack.20 The ROK government, however, feared that the withdrawal of American forces would ‘inevitably weaken military capabilities’ in the Korean front line, and was tantamount to ‘inviting another attack’ from the Communists.21 Thus, Rhee wished to build up his forces more strongly in order not only to make up for the withdrawal of US troops, but also to reduce his dependence on the Americans for South Korean security. In addition, as a long-term goal, Rhee seemed to seek to have military capabilities strong enough to enable him to unify Korea by force even without US military support. For these purposes, Rhee considered asking the Eisenhower administration to train and equip ‘15 or 20 more’ divisions, establishing a total of 35 to 40 ROK divisions.22 Fortunately for President Rhee, the issue of participation in the political conference provided him with an opportunity to further strengthen his bargaining position vis-à-vis the US government. When the Panmunjom talks broke down, Rhee argued that the negotiations with the Communists had ‘unnecessarily wasted time’, and should not be prolonged.23 Nonetheless, in February 1954, the

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Berlin meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four – the US, the USSR, Britain, and France – issued a communiqué calling for a conference of Korean belligerents to discuss the Korean question. The conference was scheduled to begin in Geneva on 26 April 1954. On February 26, the US government extended invitations to the Korean political conference to the ROK and to the UN members which had participated in the Korean War.24 Unsurprisingly, the reaction of the Rhee government to the Berlin agreement was one of ‘disappointment and anger’. Rhee considered the conference ‘the unbaptized offspring resulting from the original sin, that is, the 1953 armistice agreement’. On February 20, Foreign Minister Pyun, accusing the Big Four of acting in secret without consulting the ROK, announced that the government had not yet decided whether to attend it.25 The Eisenhower administration believed that the political conference could not be a success if South Korea did not participate. Although the Americans also recognized that the chances for achieving the peaceful uniﬁcation of Korea at the conference were not great, it believed that the conference might still be successful as ‘good propaganda’. The main objective of the US at the proposed conference was to obtain a ‘strong moral and political position’ by presenting proposals commending themselves as ‘fair, reasonable, and workable’ to the world. If the proposals were not accepted by the Communists, then the US could blame them for the failure to achieve a peaceful settlement.26 In this vein, the US government needed South Korean support for, or at least acquiescence in, the political conference. But Washington would have to pay a price for Seoul’s cooperation. Although Rhee did not intend to boycott the Geneva conference, he did not want the Americans to know his real intention. As he made clear in a letter to Oliver in March 1954, Rhee thought that if the US had the slightest notion of his intention to attend the conference, it would ‘take away from us the bargaining points’. In addition, according to the letter, Rhee had ‘purposely’ ignored the issue of the Geneva conference when he was expected to refer to it, in order to ‘make the State Department rather suspicious’: ‘Not to mention a word of it was more exasperating than saying something against it.’27 Needless to say, President Rhee tried to raise the price of his cooperation by using his usual tactics of blufﬁng and capriciousness, based on his assumption that the Eisenhower administration was eager to ensure the ROK’s presence at the conference.

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On March 3, President Rhee authorized Foreign Minister Pyun to send a letter which requested answers to certain questions regarding the US position at the Geneva conference. The questions were designed to be difﬁcult for the Eisenhower administration to answer ‘without getting into deep water’. Most difﬁcult of all, Pyun asked if the US was prepared to commit itself to resume ﬁghting when the conference failed to unify Korea. He suggested that, if so, his government would participate in the conference.28 A few days later, Yang You Chan, the Korean Ambassador in Washington, visited the State Department to argue that twenty divisions were not sufﬁcient for the self-defence of South Korea. Yang added that it would ‘make good sense’ for the US to train additional ROK divisions before the withdrawal of American forces from Korea. Then, on March 11, President Rhee wrote a letter to Eisenhower combining the above two proposals as a kind of package deal. Rhee demanded that the US either resume hostilities alongside the ROK, or, further strengthen his forces in exchange for South Korea’s agreement to participate in the conference. Apparently, Rhee’s emphasis was put on the latter. In his letter, the ROK President suggested a military programme to be undertaken by the US. Its provisions were: (1) to provide adequate air, naval and logistical support for 20 divisions of the ROK Army; (2) to train and equip ‘immediately’ 15 to 20 additional Korean divisions; and (3) to assign General Van Fleet, the former Commander of the US 8th Army in Korea, to the task of training and supervising the additional ROK forces.29 Washington was reluctant to accept Rhee’s alternative military programme, especially his demand to establish a total of 35 to 40 army divisions, let alone his demand to renew the war. US policy-makers estimated that a 20-division force was the maximum that ROK manpower and economic potential with American assistance could sustain. Moreover, they believed that the security of South Korea depended on the deterrent effect of US atomic capabilities rather than on the size of ROK forces. Most of all, the Eisenhower administration feared that if such a programme was achieved it would encourage Rhee to believe that he had the means successfully to undertake offensive action against North Korea.30 In his reply of March 20, President Eisenhower therefore rejected Rhee’s idea of training additional divisions. But he left room for compromise by saying that the US government was studying the matter of strengthening South Korean armed forces, and that the ﬁnal conclusion had yet to be made; the assignment of General Van Fleet was under consideration; and it might be

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feasible to develop a ‘trained and mobilizable reserve’ in the ROK. In order to put pressure on Seoul, however, Washington delayed the exchange of the ratiﬁcation of the Mutual Defence Treaty, which had been scheduled for March 18.31 On April 8, President Rhee, again but in a more conciliatory tone, asked Eisenhower to choose one of the alternatives he had previously suggested. Probably looking forward to reaching a compromise, he added that the contents of Eisenhower’s last letter concerning the development of Korean troops made him ‘feel very hopeful as it carried promise of fair and favourable consideration of matter’.32 In the meantime, at the end of March, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) made a recommendation regarding the development of ROK military strength. The JCS considered the expansion of ROK armed forces undesirable, but suggested that within ‘currently authorized’ South Korean military strength, an improvement in the quality of its forces was possible through: (1) continued development ‘on an austere basis’ of the ROK Army to a ﬁeld army by providing equipment from US divisions which were to be redeployed; (2) continued modernization of the ROK Navy as currently authorized; (3) reorganization of the ROK Marine Corps from a brigade to a combat-capable division; and (4) modernization of the ROK Air Force by re-equipping the existing ﬁghter wing with jet aircraft.33 The National Security Council (NSC), in a meeting on April 13, not only approved the JCS’s recommendation, but also decided to dispatch General Van Fleet to South Korea for the purpose of recommending the future size of the active armed forces of the ROK and the practicality of a programme for Korean reserve forces. In addition, the NSC agreed to send President Eisenhower’s message to President Rhee, which would reﬂect the two actions of the NSC. In the meeting, Eisenhower remarked that although Rhee was asking too much in enhancing ROK military strength, the US must not reply to him ‘by throwing a wet ﬁsh in his face’. But he plainly revealed his uneasy feelings about the South Korean President when he said that a reply to Rhee would have the theme, ‘We still love you, you s.o.b.’34 When Eisenhower informed Rhee, in his letter of April 16, of the proposed assignment of General Van Fleet, and of the military improvement programme, President Rhee expressed ‘warm satisfaction’. He especially welcomed the expected visit of Van Fleet, a personal friend of his, even if the General’s mission was not to train South Korean troops as Rhee had requested. As a result, Rhee told Briggs, who delivered the letter, that he would, after all, send the South Korean

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delegation to Geneva. In his announcement about the decision to attend the Geneva conference, Rhee nevertheless stated that he hoped ‘sincerely’ that, should the conference fail, America would come to realize ‘ﬁnally and conclusively’ that negotiations with the Communists would be both ‘futile and perilous’. He also expected that the US would join South Koreans in employing ‘other means’ to drive the enemy from Korea if political negotiations proved to be fruitless.35 The Geneva conference opened on 26 April 1954, but the possibility of its success was remote from the beginning.36 In the Korean phase of the conference, South Korea’s initial position was, as presented by Foreign Minister Pyun on April 27, that free elections under UN supervision should be held in North Korea only because such elections had already taken place in the South in 1948. This position meant the extension of the authority of the ROK to the DPRK, which had been advocated by South Korea since its establishment in 1948. On the same day, North Korea proposed to hold all-Korean elections to establish a uniﬁed Korea. For this purpose, the North suggested the creation of an all-Korean Commission, while refusing UN observation of elections in Korea.37 Embarrassingly for the ROK, there was no support for the South Korean position from its UN allies, except the US. Rather, Britain and the Commonwealth countries preferred all-Korean elections. The US tried to bridge the gap between the two different positions by suggesting a compromise formula – to hold all-Korean elections within the framework of the South Korean constitution and under UN supervision. The American government attempted to persuade both the Rhee government and the Western allies to accept the mid-way position. Although the Europeans reacted favourably to the formula, the South Koreans at ﬁrst strongly resisted it. Moreover, President Rhee continued to argue that the only solution to the Korean problem was to ‘march north’ and remove the Communists.38 But later on May 22, after a series of negotiations with the US, the ROK delegation in Geneva proposed a new uniﬁcation programme which contained the US suggestion of elections throughout Korea in accordance with the South Korean constitution, and under UN observation.39 This time it was the Communists who were unwilling to accept the proposal and they were especially ﬁerce in denying the neutral role of the UN. As a result, on 15 June 1954, the UN Command side declared that further discussions of the Korean issue would not be worthwhile. Thus, the Korean phase of the Geneva conference ended without agreement being reached.

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The break-up of the conference was apparently encouraging news for Rhee who had asserted the futility of the negotiations with the Communists. As Brands argued, the failure of the political settlement of the Korean problem placed Rhee in a ‘comfortable “I-told-you-so” position’. Once more, Rhee reiterated that only force would unite Korea.40

RHEE’S VISIT TO AMERICA AND THE FINALIZING OF THE US SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN KOREA As soon as the Geneva conference proved to be fruitless, Secretary Dulles invited President Rhee to Washington in order to ‘consult further’ regarding the Korean problem as agreed in the Rhee–Dulles meetings of August 1953.41 In his trip to America, which took place at the end of July 1954, Syngman Rhee had two main objectives – to appeal for the uniﬁcation of Korea by military means, and to establish US economic and military assistance programmes. First, President Rhee stated not only publicly but also privately that the primary aim in his Washington visit was to bring about the uniﬁcation of Korea. As he admitted in his letter to Dulles in early July, Rhee knew that the US had an ‘opinion that ﬁghting must not be resumed, no matter what the circumstances were’. Nevertheless, the South Korean President seemed to view his journey to America as an opportunity to persuade directly Washington ofﬁcials, the Congress, and the American public, to support his proposal for uniﬁcation by force. When the President asked Robert Oliver to prepare drafts for his speeches during the visit, he wished to stress the point that ‘uppermost’ in Koreans’ minds was ‘not the desire for aid, etc., but for uniﬁcation’.42 In the ﬁrst summit meeting between the US and the ROK on July 27, President Eisenhower tried to prevent Rhee from speaking of war. Eisenhower emphasized at the beginning of the meeting that, with the single exception of war, there was no plan to unify Korea which his government was unwilling to consider – even using subversive tactics. Nonetheless, President Rhee concentrated on the question of destroying the Communists in order to promote world peace, as well as peace in Korea. Rhee added that he had a plan that would not risk a world war but would provide for the uniﬁcation of Korea.43 Syngman Rhee’s appeal to the Americans jointly to initiate a war to remove the Communists reached a climax when he made a speech at a

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joint session of the US Congress on July 28. According to Oliver, in contrast with all the other addresses delivered during his stay in America, Rhee himself wrote the draft for the speech to the Congress. When Oliver asked Rhee to let him make comments on the draft, Rhee replied: ‘No, no, I won’t do it. I came to America to speak my own mind about the truce, and I’m going to do it – in my own way.’44 In this address, he declared: On the Korean front, the guns are silent for the moment, stilled temporarily by the unwise armistice which the enemy is using to build up his strength. Now that the Geneva Conference has come to an end with no result, as predicted, it is quite in place to declare the end of the armistice … Within a few years the Soviet Union will possess the means to vanquish the United States. We must act now. Where can we act? We can act in the Far East … the Korean front comprises only one small portion of the war we want to win – the war for Asia, the war for the world, the war for freedom on earth … I am aware that this is hard doctrine. But the Communists have made this a hard world, a horrible world, in which to be soft is to become a slave … Let us remember … that peace cannot be restored in the world half Communist and half democratic. Your momentous decision is needed now to make Asia safe for freedom, for that will automatically settle the world Communist problem in Europe, Africa and America. As a method of winning the war, President Rhee suggested a ‘counterattack on Red China’, preceded by a ‘blockade of the China coast by the American Navy’, which would produce chaos in its ‘extremely vulnerable economy’. As for the Soviet Union, he argued that if the free world won China back, it would ‘swing the balance of power so strongly against the Soviet Union that it would not dare to risk war’ with the US. Even if the Kremlin decided to participate in the war, Rhee added, it ‘would be excellent for the free world, since it would justify the destruction of the Soviet centers of production by the American Air Force before the Soviet hydrogen bombs had been produced in quantity’.45 US reaction to Rhee’s bellicose arguments was generally negative. Although there were some Americans who personally sympathized with Rhee’s enthusiasm for uniﬁcation, his speciﬁc proposal to attack China stunned even his supporters. A US intelligence source estimated that American response to a call for militant action, which

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Rhee had observed at ﬁrst hand, was so ‘cool’ as to reduce ‘materially’ the danger of ROK action to reopen hostilities in the light of Rhee’s sensitivity to American public opinion.46 Indeed, it was not the kind of address to be delivered by a head of a state to the legislature of another nation, even though the argument might have been right in a fundamental sense. President Rhee himself acknowledged later that his address to the Congress was ‘the worst mistake’ he had ever made in his life.47 Another of Rhee’s important objectives in his visit to Washington was to extract military and economic beneﬁts from the US: in particular, he anticipated a substantial increase in ROK forces, as suggested by the fact that Rhee’s accompanying staff on the trip were predominantly military personnel. One encouraging factor for Rhee regarding the expansion of Korean troops was the recommendations of General Van Fleet, who had ﬁnished his mission in South Korea just before Rhee’s visit to Washington. The General recommended that the mobilization goal of the ROK Army should be a ‘balanced force of thirty divisions’, even if the ten additional divisions were under strength or reserve divisions. He also suggested measures to modernize the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps of South Korea. Naturally enough, Rhee desired Van Fleet’s views to be fully reﬂected in the US military assistance programme,48 and in fact at the Washington meetings, the Eisenhower administration did propose a military assistance scheme which was generally in line with Van Fleet’s recommendations. The South Korean participants received some discouraging news, however, during the talks – the redeployment of four more divisions of US forces from South Korea. As a result, President Rhee sought to obtain even more military aid from the US.49 The US military commitment to the ROK was to be stated in an agreed minute of the Washington summit talks. Accordingly, US policy-makers prepared a draft which declared the American intention of continuing its programmes of strengthening the ROK economically and militarily, with the rider that Seoul cooperate with Washington. The Americans gave the draft to the South Koreans on July 29, and it was scheduled to be discussed next day. US ofﬁcials hoped the agreed minute would be concluded while Rhee was in Washington. But Rhee was insistent that he would not agree on the draft until he knew the speciﬁc details of the US economic and military programme for the ROK.50 A few hours before the scheduled meeting of July 30, General Won Yong-do ˘k, the ROK Provost Marshal who was responsible solely

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to the President, made a sudden public statement in Seoul which warned the Czech and Polish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) to leave South Korea immediately. He also threatened that they would face ‘appropriate measures’ if they remained in South Korea. Won’s announcement was followed by ‘popular’ demonstrations and some violent actions against the NNSC, which were instigated by the General, as the US Embassy alleged.51 General Won’s threat was designed to heighten the bargaining leverage of the South Koreans in Washington. The US government was also seeking to abolish the NNSC at this time, but only by diplomatic means. From as early as May 1954, the Commander in Chief of the UN forces had strongly favoured the dissolution of the NNSC as soon as possible because he observed that the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC were utilizing the inspection functions with substantial success for propaganda and intelligence purposes while successfully evading the effective inspection of Communist forces in North Korea. Consequently, in June, the Eisenhower administration decided to terminate the activities of the NNSC by inducing the governments of Sweden and Switzerland to withdraw their representations from the Commission. The South Korean government was informed of this plan.52 Given this situation, Rhee was obviously trying to raise his negotiating power with the US by threatening that he would unilaterally eject the NNSC. Such action, which would have been in violation of the armistice agreement, would obviously put the American government in an embarrassing position just as Rhee’s unilateral release of anti-Communist Korean non-repatriates had a year before. As Rhee anticipated, at the beginning of the July 30 meeting, Secretary Dulles asked him not to take forceful action at a time when the US was endeavouring to bring an end to the activities of the NNSC through consultation with the Swiss and the Swedes. Rhee agreed that he would give ‘appropriate instructions’ to this effect. Sensing that he could extract more beneﬁts from the US with his enhanced bargaining position, however, Rhee did not agree to the draft minute prepared by American and South Korean ofﬁcials at the conclusion of the talks. He told the US government that he needed ‘further time to study’ the proposed minute, and that he would leave his military and economic advisors to discuss in more detail the questions to be covered by the draft minute. Next day, probably as an attempt to increase his bargaining position, Rhee declared that he believed that General Won had done the ‘right thing’ in his action against the NNSC.53

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Upon returning to Seoul, President Rhee embarked on a public campaign against American policies, which was, in Ambassador Briggs’s words, ‘calculated to mislead the Korean people and misinterpret pending questions’: Rhee represented the redeployment of US troops as abandonment of the ROK; he belittled the US military aid programme as insufﬁcient while Seoul ofﬁcials were still negotiating the details in Washington; and he charged that US economic aid policy was being incompetently handled. The National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution which expressed ﬁrm opposition to further withdrawal of US military forces. In addition, the government inspired nation-wide mass demonstrations opposing the withdrawal of American troops, and it also continued to threaten that it would unilaterally remove the NNSC from South Korean territory.54 On September 14, after a series of negotiations that had lasted more than a month, the text of the draft minute was agreed between the representatives of the US and the ROK. According to the agreed minute, which was approved by the NSC and the US President, on the condition that the ROK would cooperate with the US and retain its forces under the control of the UN Command, America promised to help South Korea with economic aid and direct military assistance worth some $700 million. In terms of the military expansion programme, the Eisenhower government agreed: (1) to undertake the formation of 10 reserve divisions, and supply them with the necessary equipment; (2) to build up the Korean Navy towards the goal of 79 vessels; and (3) to make available more than 100 jet ﬁghters for the ROK Air Force. As for the uniﬁcation issue, the minute stated that the US would support the uniﬁcation of Korea ‘by all peaceful means’. This aid programme was a lot more than the US had wanted to give.55 For the US assistance schemes to be implemented, the agreed minute had to be signed by President Rhee. However, Rhee was not prepared to approve what was then said to be the largest single US aid programme in the world. When Ambassador Briggs and General Hull presented the draft agreed minute to Rhee, instead of endorsing it, he attacked US redeployment as being undertaken ‘without proper consideration of the Communist threat or adequate preparation’, and concluded that South Korea must now ‘determine its own course’, whether the US would support it or not. Despite US ofﬁcials’ persuasion that the draft minute was the ‘requirement’ for American undertaking of the economic and military aid programmes, Rhee only agreed to consider the draft further. In the meeting, Briggs made a strong representation that if current ROK campaigns of ‘abuse and

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misrepresentations’ of US policies and actions continued it would have a ‘seriously adverse effect’ on American–Korean relations. Nevertheless, such campaigns continued through October.56 Rhee’s anti-American campaigns were partly attributable to his domestic political needs. In the context of the presentation of the constitutional amendment bill in early September, and the strong criticism it was facing from the opposition (see the ﬁrst section), President Rhee and his supporters probably intended to divert public attention from internal controversies by arousing anti-American sentiments, as Ambassador Briggs suspected. However, Rhee undoubtedly gave priority to securing additional US commitments, utilizing his favourite obstructionist tactics. The ROK President, in a personal letter to Oliver written on October 18, admitted that, so far, he had been ‘trying to make the situation so aggravating’ as to make American ofﬁcials publicly condemn him.57 His goal was to alter the contents of the agreed minute in the direction of decreasing the commitments of the ROK, and increasing those of the US. On October 22, suggesting some revisions to the draft, the Rhee government demanded that the US establish 15 additional ‘regular’ divisions of the ROK Army as a replacement for the redeployed US ground forces, and agree to seek Korean uniﬁcation ‘by whatever means necessary’ rather than ‘by all peaceful means’ as stated in the present draft.58 Facing Syngman Rhee’s reluctance to sign the agreed minute, and his request to change the text in his favour, the Eisenhower government took a ﬁrm stance, judging that in the past ‘cooperation and conciliation’ had only produced ‘opposition or even outright antagonism’. On October 29, Ambassador Briggs delivered his government’s message to Rhee, which unequivocally stated that the administration’s position on substantive points contained in the ﬁnal draft of September 14 would not be changed, and that the US would not commit itself to economic and military aid if Rhee did not sign the minute.59 In addition, US ofﬁcials considered destabilizing Rhee’s position by supporting political leaders who were in opposition to Rhee’s leadership.60 America’s unyielding posture must have convinced Rhee that his room for manoeuvre had narrowed. Probably judging that additional arguments would not yield any further material help from the US government, President Rhee then began to concentrate his efforts on gaining unqualiﬁed American commitment to the uniﬁcation of Korea. On October 29, President Rhee, emphasizing the importance of the uniﬁcation issue, asked Briggs whether the US government

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would agree either to delete all references to uniﬁcation from the minute, or else to eliminate the qualifying phrase ‘by all peaceful means’ in conjunction with US support of Korean uniﬁcation.61 A few days later, Pyun Yung Tai, who had now become the Prime Minister, made a personal appeal to Secretary Dulles for the same changes to the draft minute that Rhee had earlier requested. But Dulles rejected any revision of the draft, expressing his ‘distress’ at the lack of progress in reaching agreement between the two governments. Consequently, on November 14, the Rhee government retreated further, suggesting that it was prepared to accept the agreed minute if the phrase for American support of uniﬁcation was deleted entirely, leaving South Korean commitment to uniﬁcation as expressed in the draft. With American acceptance of this proposal, Rhee ﬁnally approved the draft minute the next day.62 The negotiation process, as outlined above, shows that President Rhee had been very reluctant to sign a document that would formally bind him to peaceful uniﬁcation. Such reluctance on Rhee’s part was probably motivated by three factors. First, the South Korean President could never abandon his dream of unifying Korea, and probably was still expecting an opportunity to march north with US help regardless of ﬁrm American opposition to the renewal of hostilities. As a result, Rhee seemed unwilling to approve the phrase that the US would support the uniﬁcation of Korea only through ‘peaceful’ means. Secondly, even if President Rhee accepted that uniﬁcation by force had become impossible, it might have been difﬁcult for him to admit it publicly and ofﬁcially without losing face in the light of his long-held and enthusiastic commitment to uniﬁcation by military means. Thirdly, Rhee probably considered that once he gave his word for peaceful uniﬁcation, it would weaken his important bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the US, which was based on his threat of unilateral military action. Although Syngman Rhee managed not to commit himself to uniﬁcation by peaceful means, it is possible to argue that his success only served to give him psychological satisfaction. Not only did the American government repeat that it would never be involved in a war provoked by the South Koreans, but also, to make this point clear, the administration sent a formal note to the ROK to conﬁrm that the position of the American government continued to be to ‘support uniﬁcation of Korea by all peaceful means’, in exchange for the deletion of the uniﬁcation item from the agreed minute. The South Korean government in turn conﬁrmed this understanding.

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More importantly, the delaying of the agreed minute, which was largely caused by Rhee’s obstinacy, brought about increased dissatisfaction with the government’s policy towards the US among many South Koreans who had generally supported their President’s foreign policy, and who had praised his toughness towards the Americans. As a US ‘Special Estimate’ of Korea properly pointed out in October 1953, President Rhee’s ‘past success in achieving his objectives despite seemingly overwhelming odds, including US resistance’ had ‘confounded his critics and greatly enhanced his stature as a leader’.63 However, domestic criticism of Rhee was likely to be encouraged by a fear that Rhee’s excessively intemperate position vis-à-vis the US put at risk the implementation of the $700 million US aid programme including the build-up of ROK forces. For example, in the middle of October, while discussing the current tension in relations with America, Cho Pyo ˘ng-ok the opposition leader, stated that South Korean diplomacy could ‘not be left to President Rhee alone’, as this might ‘jeopardize continued US support’. Subsequently, the National Assembly sent a delegation, which included members of the ruling Liberal Party, to Prime Minister Pyun in order to express its concern over the rifts in US–ROK relations. (The Assembly representatives had tried to meet Rhee without success.) In addition, some leading Korean newspapers, in their editorials, accused the Rhee government of failing to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the US, a failure which was exerting a ‘serious inﬂuence on the economic life of the Korean people’. They also asked both the South Korean and American sides to make ‘mutual concessions’ for speedy settlement of the tension between the two. Such comments by the South Korean press marked a change from their previous position: during the early stage of US–ROK negotiations in September, they criticized only Washington and supported Rhee.64 According to W. D. Reeve, the British advisor to the ROK government, his ‘intimate talks’ with senior ofﬁcials at the ROK Foreign Ministry and with other South Koreans had led him to believe that in spite of the South Korean government’s attempts to blame the Americans for the present deadlock, ‘the average intelligent Korean’ was convinced that Rhee was ‘personally responsible’. American sources made similar observations. The foreign sources also observed that the reaction of the military to the ROK–US crisis was one of ‘concern’ and ‘disquiet’. In particular, according to a US Army report, which covered the opinions of South Korean military leaders, they worried that delaying the US military aid programme would undermine

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‘army morale and combat effectiveness’. The report also observed that while senior ofﬁcers were cautious in criticizing the government for the present impasse, junior ofﬁcers directly expressed their dissatisfaction with the inefﬁciency of the ROK government leaders.65 These expressions of dissent, along with the US administration’s ﬁrm stance, encouraged Rhee to accept the agreed minute with the US. Above all, Rhee could not ignore the criticism of his policy by politicians at the very time when he was attempting to push ahead with a constitutional amendment that would provide him with life tenure of the presidency. To enhance the prospect of winning the amendment bill in the National Assembly, where opposition to the bill was not inconsiderable, President Rhee needed to improve the strained relations with the US, and thus to present himself as a capable leader. As it turned out, the government formally introduced the bill immediately after Rhee’s agreement on the minute. On November 17, the governments of the United States and South Korea initialled the Agreed Minute in Seoul, which set forth the broad area of agreement between the two governments on political, economic and military matters. On the same day the Mutual Defence Treaty between the US and the ROK, which had been signed in Washington on 1 October 1953, came into force. The Treaty stipulated that the two sides were to consult and take suitable measures in the case of external armed attack. It also furnished the US with a legal basis to maintain troops in Korea.66 Thus, the basic framework of the American security commitment to South Korea was established.

CONCLUSION After the conclusion of the armistice agreement, the security policy of President Syngman Rhee was focused on strengthening ROK armed forces while still looking for an opportunity to march to the Yalu, with US support if possible. In respect of Rhee’s efforts to ensure a greater US security commitment than the Americans desired, the postarmistice policy was a continuation of the pre-armistice policy, in which Seoul had sought to obtain a mutual security pact from Washington. Indeed, during the period from September 1953 to November 1954, South Korea and the United States had negotiations over security questions, which were as difﬁcult as during the previous period. Throughout the discussions with the US government in the postarmistice era, Syngman Rhee’s policy followed virtually the same line

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as it had followed in the pre-armistice period. On the one hand, Rhee emphasized both the necessity of military action to unify Korea and his intention to proceed unilaterally if possible; on the other hand, he demanded that the US provide South Korea with military assistance to fortify ROK security. Rhee also resorted to blufﬁng, unpredictability, and intransigence in order to enhance his bargaining power. In addition, there was no change in President Rhee’s belief that the fundamental means of ensuring the security of Korea was to remove the root of the threat – the Communists in the North. In terms of the outcome, Rhee’s post-armistice effort to obtain further US assistance was not fruitless, though not as successful as in the pre-armistice era: the Mutual Defence treaty had ﬁnally come into force; and a considerable amount of US military assistance, as well as economic aid, had been acquired. The US security commitment to South Korea, if less than what Rhee had wanted, was undoubtedly more than what the US government had initially been willing to give. However, there were a number of differences between the periods before and after the armistice. First of all, once the armistice was signed, Rhee’s blufﬁng that he would ‘march north alone’ became less threatening. The Eisenhower administration began to be convinced that the likelihood of Rhee’s taking unilateral action was greatly reduced by the end of the war. Secondly, therefore, President Rhee’s negotiating power, which had largely been based on his commitment to uniﬁcation by force, had become less effective since the cessation of hostilities. It should be noted that most of the US concessions had been made before the breakdown of the Geneva conference. In other words, although Rhee continued to threaten that he would resume hostilities unless the US provided the ROK with a further security commitment, the major reason for American concessions was Washington’s need of Seoul’s cooperation in the political conference and the value of South Korea as a symbol in the Cold War in general. After the Geneva conference, Rhee’s commitment to uniﬁcation by force failed to gain anything but psychological satisfaction for himself. Furthermore, the South Korean President’s excessive adherence to ‘march north’ as expressed in his speech to the US Congress only served to increase distrust among the Americans, with whom he had to work to strengthen the security of South Korea.67 The third difference was that criticism of Syngman Rhee’s foreign policy began to be conspicuous among many inﬂuential South Koreans. Such criticism was still limited to expressing their fear that

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Rhee’s aggressive and intemperate posture towards the Americans might cost continued US support. Nevertheless, this was not an insigniﬁcant change, given that President Rhee had enjoyed almost unreserved support from most South Koreans including his political opponents in external affairs. The main cause of this change was the fact that, as foreign ofﬁcials in Seoul observed, the Korean people had been better off since the end of the war, and they fully appreciated the consequences of peace, in contrast to Rhee’s continued militant posture.68 Finally, there were indications that, with Rhee’s growing interest in domestic affairs, the interaction between Rhee’s concerns for external security policy and internal politics had begun to increase. The case of Rhee’s attempt to revise the constitution to prolong his power was a good example: at one stage, Rhee tried to divert public attention from controversies over the amendment by increasing the intensity of antiAmerican campaigns; at another stage, the criticism of President Rhee for rifts in US–ROK relations contributed to the Rhee regime’s decision to delay introducing the amendment bill to the National Assembly. In addition, Rhee’s desire to pass the bill constituted a motive for him to seek an improved relationship with the US by accepting the agreed minute. Although President Rhee’s priority during this period remained the maintenance of South Korean security by gaining additional US commitments, there were indications that he saw a merit in using external policies for personal political ends.

5 Internal and External Challenges to the Rhee Regime and Rhee’s Growing Concern for Regime Security, November 1954–May 1956 ‘We know what Communism is, and we do not think for an instant that it is possible to appease its ambitions. We do not try to co-exist with cholera.’ (Syngman Rhee, 1 March 1955) ‘If the government makes a mistake or is wanting in ability, it should be forgiven or covered for the sake of the battle against the national enemy … Legislators must give priority to saving the country, putting trivial [domestic] matters off until a later date.’ (Syngman Rhee, 21 February 1955) In November 1954, with the signing of the agreed minute on political, economic and military matters, and the coming into effect of the Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and South Korea, the basic framework of the US security commitment to South Korea had been established. With the long and arduous negotiations to obtain substantial support from the US virtually over, Syngman Rhee began to face internal and external difﬁculties which threatened to weaken the stability of his regime. Domestically, President Rhee had to cope with the creation of a strengthened opposition party and a decrease in his legitimacy, both of which were mainly caused by the unprincipled procedure adopted in revising the Constitution. Internationally, the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the Western world and the Communists – as exempliﬁed by the Geneva Summit of 1955 – faced Rhee with a dilemma not only because he wished to achieve the uniﬁcation of 82

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Korea by force, but also because his political stand was based on strong anti-Communism. In an attempt to overcome these problems, Rhee ﬁercely criticized any movement toward peaceful coexistence, and tried to demonstrate the Communist menace. To this end, he highlighted the issue of expelling the Czech and Polish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), whose activities allegedly helped North Korea’s military build-up. This chapter will ﬁrst study the internal and external developments that troubled Rhee. Then it will examine how and why Rhee condemned the relaxation of world tensions. It will also study how President Rhee used the NNSC issue to justify his objections to the idea of peaceful coexistence with the Communists.

INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES: THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS AND THE STRENGTHENED OPPOSITION On 6 September 1954, a constitutional amendment bill was proposed by the ruling Liberal Party (LP), and introduced in the National Assembly on November 18. The bill was intended to pave the way for ‘presidency for life’ for President Rhee and to consolidate the supremacy of the executive over the legislature.1 When the ballot was ﬁnally voted on in the National Assembly on November 27, 135 voted in favor of the amendment, and 60 against it, with seven abstentions. The Liberal Vice-Speaker Ch’oe Sun-chu announced that the bill had been rejected as only 135 members had voted in favour out of a total of 203 Assemblymen, based on the generally accepted assumption that 136 votes were needed for the twothirds majority to pass the bill. In an emergency meeting held on the evening of the same day, however, Rhee and his supporters undertook a reinterpretation, known as sa-sa-o-ip (drop four [tenths], add ﬁve). Their arguments were that 135.33 was the exact numerical two-thirds of 203, that the generally accepted mathematical practice was to disregard a fraction below 0.5, and that, therefore, 135 was the number of votes required to pass the bill. On November 28, the Rhee government announced that it considered that the Assembly had accepted the constitutional revision. Next day, Vice-Speaker Ch’oe declared in the Assembly that he had been mistaken and that the bill had indeed passed. After the opposition walked out of the Assembly in protest, the remaining Liberal members, under the chairmanship of Speaker Yi Ki-pung, unanimously agreed to change the November 27 minutes

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to read that the amendment bill had passed. Rhee signed and promulgated the constitutional revision on November 30.2 The ruling elite’s arithmetical interpretation of the vote might not have been incorrect. But the issue was a legal, not a mathematical, one. The ROK Constitution clearly stipulated that the concurrence of ‘more than’ two-thirds of Assemblymen was required to decide an amendment to the Constitution. Accordingly, as reasoned by Yu Chin-o, who had drafted the ﬁrst ROK Constitution, if the two-thirds majority was short even by 0.001, it could not be construed as the majority required by the Constitution. Such a legal understanding appeared to be shared by most of the Korean public. Almost all newspapers except pro-government ones repudiated the Rhee regime’s reinterpretation. Foreign observers also considered that 136 was the number of votes required to pass the bill. Moreover, before devising the sa-sa-o-ip interpretation, according to the US Embassy’s observation, the Liberal Party and the administration themselves apparently thought that the bill had failed.3 Immediately after President Rhee had forced through the amendment, the opposition legislators claimed that the government’s interpretation of the vote was ‘illegal and invalid’, and formed a coalition negotiating group, called the Comrades’ Association to Safeguard the Constitution (CASC). They also established a special committee to organize a new opposition party. Furthermore, dissatisﬁed with the heavy-handed actions of their own party, 14 Liberal Assemblymen resigned from the LP, and the party expelled seven members for ‘overt anti-party and unpatriotic activities’. (Of these seven, three had already resigned.) In retrospect, although Rhee was successful in revising the constitution into one that could provide him with indeﬁnite tenure and still greater power, the unprincipled manner in which the Constitution was revised contributed to the political instability of the Rhee regime by eroding its legitimacy. According to Beetham, for power to be legitimate, three conditions are required: its conformity to established rules; the justiﬁability of the rules in terms of shared beliefs; and the expressed consent of the subordinate to those rules.4 In amending the constitution in 1954, however, the Rhee regime largely breached the rules. Although the ruling elite argued for the validity of their reinterpretation of the vote, one important fact was that, as noted earlier, their arguments were incompatible with the belief generally shared by many quarters that the passage of the bill required 136 votes. In addition, the revised Constitution contained a provision providing

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Rhee alone with unlimited tenure in ofﬁce, a provision which was difﬁcult to justify in terms of ‘democratic rules’. As the opposition had argued, Rhee’s third term amendment was unprincipled for a nation whose Constitution was supposedly based on the political equality of all citizens. Moreover, the arbitrary exercise of the law contributed to the deterioration of public support for Rhee, as will be discussed later. It is useful to compare the constitutional crisis of 1954 with that of 1952 in order to see the relative decrease in the legitimacy of the Rhee regime.5 Firstly, in the 1952 political crisis too, President Rhee and his supporters had used high-handed actions (e.g., the declaration of martial law, and arrest of opposition Assemblymen on the basis of ﬂimsy charges) to revise the Constitution for their own ends. Nevertheless, they had not seriously or clearly violated the laws. Secondly, compared with the provision for President Rhee’s lifetime tenure introduced in the 1954 revision, the 1952 constitutional change to make the presidency subject to ‘direct popular vote’ was relatively acceptable to the public.6 More important, in the 1952 case, largely because of the war situation, Rhee’s misconduct could be overlooked, and he was elected as President in the following popular election with a comfortable margin (74.6 per cent of the popular vote). Since his reelection in 1952, as noted in previous chapters, President Rhee had enjoyed comparatively high levels of support. In particular, Rhee’s aggressive anti-Communist policy – e.g., opposing the armistice agreement, releasing North Korean non-repatriates, and calling for a northern expedition – had appealed to South Koreans who had suffered greatly in the war provoked by the Communists. The South Korean leader’s general success in dealing with the US had also strengthened his political position. Thus, it can be said that even if the Rhee regime’s legitimacy was damaged in the 1952 political crisis, it was unlikely to be serious enough to weaken the political stability of the regime.7 The domestic political environment of 1955 was, however, far less favourable for Rhee than that of previous years. Above all, as peace was maintained, public conﬁdence in President Rhee, which had largely been based on his bellicose policy and his toughness vis-à-vis the US, began to wane. The ﬁrst sign of this tendency was found when Rhee’s obstinacy towards the Americans caused domestic criticism at the end of 1954 (see Chapter 4). The abnormal passage of the constitutional amendment seemed to catalyze the deepening of popular dissatisfaction with the Rhee government. President Rhee’s forceful tactics to consolidate his power produced another crucial side-effect – the creation of a stronger opposition

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party, the Democratic Party (DP). Since the humiliation in the 1952 political turmoil, and again in the May 1954 general elections, the opposition had been divided into three major groups: the Democratic Nationalist Party, the Independent Comrades’ Association, and the so-called pure independents. The constitutional crisis of November 1954, however, stimulated the formation of a coalition of anti-Rhee forces. Initially, the opposition leaders conceived of a party to include all elements inclined to oppose Rhee’s power. They could not form such a party, however, because of factional and personal conﬂicts among them. In particular, the opposition forces were at odds over the admission of Cho Pong-am, a progressive leader, to the new party. Eventually, the Democratic Party was established in September 1955. It included the traditional conservative Democratic Nationalists, some former Liberal Party members, and other anti-Rhee elements led by ex-Prime Minister Chang Myo ˘n. The progressive forces, led by Cho Pong-am, later formed the Progressive Party which advocated social democratic principles.8 Although the new opposition party failed to combine all of Rhee’s opponents, it became a considerable burden for the Rhee government and the Liberal Party since they could no longer manoeuvre the Assembly for their own use as they had done before. Furthermore, the establishment of the enlarged opposition party meant that public opinion, especially views unfavourable to the present government, could be collected more effectively. Indeed, the weakening of Rhee’s legitimacy, and the formation of a strengthened opposition party considerably contributed to Rhee’s poor performance in the presidential election of May 1956. In this election, although Rhee was re-elected as president, his share of the vote was considerably reduced when compared with the election of 1952. Furthermore, the vice-presidential candidate nominated by Rhee was defeated by the candidate of the opposition party.9 Another important implication of the formation of the new opposition party was that the enlarged party, through its platforms and policies, indirectly expressed its objection to Rhee’s bellicose and uncompromising posture. In the platform that it adopted in September 1955, the Democratic Party stated its aspiration to attain the uniﬁcation of the country by ‘increasing national strength and developing ties with democratic allies’. The party also declared as one of its major policies its desire to ‘normalize’ South Korean diplomacy through ‘cooperation with democratic allies’. Although the conservative opposition party was still careful in criticizing Rhee’s foreign

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policy, its commitment to peace, however indirect, was a remarkable change when compared with the opposition’s past support for Rhee’s ‘march north’ policy. In addition, a preparatory committee to establish the Progressive Party explicitly announced in December 1955 that it would support ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ through the United Nations.10 Donald Macdonald, a US Embassy ofﬁcial of that time, suggested later that the change in the DP’s platform partly reﬂected the party’s desire to ‘attract foreign support’.11 Given this desire, Rhee could not ignore internal challenges to his policy, in part because of their connection with external developments, most notably the sensitive issue of peaceful coexistence.

EXTERNAL PRESSURE: THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE The ﬁrst signs of the relaxation of world tension came with the death of Stalin in March 1953. The new collective leadership of the Soviet Union sought to improve the international atmosphere. It called for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world; it partially dismantled Stalin’s secret police apparatus; emphasized the production of consumer goods; relaxed controls over Eastern Europe; and offered assurances of Soviet goodwill to Turkey, Iran, and Greece. Stalin’s successors also indicated their willingness to bring the Korean conﬂict to an end, and jointly agreed with the Chinese and North Korean Communists to cease the ﬁghting.12 The US government was ‘not insensitive’ to the changes in Soviet policy but responded ‘cautiously’. As early as the summer of 1953, pressures, especially from the British, began to build for a summit meeting with the new Soviet leaders. The Eisenhower administration did not, however, favour this course of action. Not only was it constrained by the intensity of anti-Communist sentiment in domestic politics, but it also considered that, even after Stalin, the USSR remained a dangerous adversary. In particular, the US Secretary of State, Dulles, believed that Stalin’s death had brought ‘no basic change in Soviet policy’.13 By the middle of 1955, however, Washington was ﬁnding it difﬁcult to ignore shifts in Moscow’s posture. The new First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, who had replaced Malenkov in February 1955 as the front-runner in the continuing Kremlin power struggle, mounted a ‘peace offensive’. Together with

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Bulganin, who replaced Malenkov as Prime Minister, Khrushchev made trips to Beijing, New Delhi, Belgrade and London attempting to break out of the Soviet Union’s political isolation. The Soviet leaders initiated the negotiations with Austria that led to the signing of the Austrian peace treaty on 15 May 1955. They also offered, for the ﬁrst time, to consider disarmament plans involving limited on-site inspection within the USSR.14 In April, leaders of 25 Asian and African countries met in Bandung, Indonesia, and proclaimed the principles of ‘peaceful coexistence’, along with ‘neutralism’ in world affairs. At the Bandung conference, China appealed to those non-aligned states for unity between them on the ‘common ground’ of overturning the ‘sufferings and calamities of colonialism’, putting aside ‘differences in ideology’. The Soviet Union supported the Chinese arguments by emphasizing that Stalin’s ‘old twocamp approach’ had been replaced with a ‘conﬁdence that Communists and nationalists could work against Western imperialism’.15 In July 1955, the United States, responding to the peaceful gestures of the Communists and to mounting pressures from its European allies, attended a summit conference in Geneva, where Eisenhower met Khrushchev and Bulganin, together with the leaders of Great Britain, and France. The conference ended with no agreements on the major issues such as the future of Europe and disarmament. But the symbolic importance of the summit could not be ignored: the so-called ‘spirit of Geneva’ was widely publicized with the hope that problems might be solved by diplomacy rather than force.16 A further dramatic policy change on the part of the Soviet Union came in February 1956. In a speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev announced a series of doctrinal innovations. The First Secretary denounced Stalin and most of his works. Above all, he ofﬁcially repudiated the Stalinist thesis of inevitable conﬂict between states with differing social systems, and the concept of peaceful coexistence now became a ﬁxed principle of Soviet foreign policy. These developments marked a turning point in Soviet politics: Stalinist Russia was being dismantled and the Soviets seemed to be changing both their approach to world affairs and the nature of their regime.17 The years 1955–6 appeared the most hopeful of the postwar era insofar as the relaxation of international tensions was concerned. But historians’ later assessments were that little immediate improvement followed in relations between East and West, a fact for which both sides must bear some responsibility. As Gaddis properly pointed out, ‘distrust on both sides was high and would remain so for years to come’.18

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However, President Rhee, who had vigorously championed antiCommunism, was bewildered by these indications that Cold War tensions might be winding down. Furthermore, South Korea had to cope with a more direct peace offensive from the North. Probably encouraged by the Soviet peace initiative, the northern Communist regime made a series of proposals for peaceful uniﬁcation: a joint conference of representatives of North and South Korea to negotiate national uniﬁcation (30 October 1954); a non-aggression pact between the two Koreas with simultaneous reductions in armed forces (7 March 1955); and an international conference for the solution of the Korean question (28 April 1956). In support of North Korea, China also proposed in December 1954 and again in April 1956 to hold a conference of the nations concerned to discuss the withdrawal of foreign troops from and the uniﬁcation of Korea. President Rhee regarded these proposals for peaceful uniﬁcation as a part of the ‘peace camouﬂage’ designed to hide a surprise attack on South Korea.19 Thus, the South Korean President not only rejected the idea of peaceful coexistence, but also strongly criticized it in order to maintain both state and regime security, as will be examined in the next section.

RHEE’S REACTIONS TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGES Rhee had identiﬁed Communism as an ‘evil’ that had to be eradicated for the sake of peace in Korea as well as in the world, and he believed that the opportunity to unify his country by removing the Communists was fading away with the presumed improvement in East–West relations. Furthermore, the external trend towards peaceful coexistence with the Communists had an important internal implication for Rhee: it could damage his power base because anti-Communism had been a crucial component of Rhee’s ideology. To make matters worse for Rhee, this international development coincided with the weakening of his legitimacy in domestic affairs. As a result, it was undoubtedly difﬁcult for President Rhee to accept any relaxation in world tensions. (1)

The Denunciation of Peaceful Coexistence

Since the conclusion of the agreed minute with the United States in November 1954, there had been indications that President Rhee had

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refrained from talking directly in terms of resuming hostilities. On 29 December 1954, Rhee sent a ‘conﬁdential’ letter to President Eisenhower, demanding his help to ‘save’ the South Koreans from the ‘most serious crisis in [the] history of Korea’. In contrast with previous communications of this kind, however, Rhee did not bluntly urge the US to join the South Koreans in ‘marching north’. Instead, he implicitly expressed his ‘devout hope’ that ‘The prevention of it [a renewed Communist aggression] depends upon adoption of policies that will solve problems that are now being postponed or even ignored.’20 President Rhee tried to avoid using provocative terms in his public speeches, too. For example, as shown in Table 5.1, Rhee’s statements to celebrate Independence Day and Liberation Day in 1955, compared with those in 1954, contained milder or less direct expressions regarding uniﬁcation by force, and did not explicitly call for a ‘march north’.21 Table 5.1 Comparison of Rhee’s references to military uniﬁcation in public speeches between 1954 and 1955 1954

Independence Day (March 1)

Liberation Day (August 15)

1955

(1) We shall march up to the borders of our ancient homeland again. (2) We hope that our Allies will march with us…but if they do not join with us, we shall have to go forward alone.

(1) No one but a demagogue can promise peace and security for freedom except by the harsh and painful way of courage and sacriﬁce. (2) We cannot proclaim a programme and expect to rally the free nations around us to achieve it.

(1) It is our hope that the UN will cooperate with us in pushing up to the Yalu River. (2) All our people will join together in a great crusade and campaign that will lead to victory and to peace.

(1) Our friends should make doubly emphatic the policy they have repeatedly pledged themselves to pursue. (2) The liberation of North Korea is the goal that remains before us, and this is the goal we must and shall achieve.

Source: ROK Ofﬁce of Public Information, Korean Flaming High, Vol. II: Excerpts from Statements by President Syngman Rhee in 1954–55 (Seoul: Ofﬁce of Public Information, 1956), pp. 3–11, 38–41, 52–61, and 79–89.

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This change on the part of Rhee, or at least in his rhetoric, was largely attributable to earlier developments. First, after the signing of the agreed minute in 1954, Seoul and Washington had few disputes that were serious enough to make Rhee use the ‘march north’ theme as a bargaining chip. Secondly, even if he needed to bluff, Rhee must have realized that such tactics had become far less effective. In addition, during the negotiations with the Eisenhower administration to settle the issue of the US military and economic assistance programmes, his excessive adherence to uniﬁcation by military means and his uncooperative attitude had not only been unproductive in obtaining US support, but also had brought about considerable tensions in US–Korean relations. Rhee probably intended to ‘remove some of the sourness’ in relations between the two governments, as the British Embassy suggested.22 Instead of the ‘march north’ campaign, Rhee now committed himself to a struggle against peaceful coexistence. Indeed, the South Korean President used every opportunity available to condemn the perceived relaxation in international tensions.23 As the Communist peace offensive intensiﬁed, so did Rhee’s criticism of it. On May 16, a day after the signing of the Austrian peace treaty, when Rhee met William Lacy, the new US Ambassador in Seoul, the President emphasized the necessity of taking a ‘ﬁrm and uniﬁed stand’ against the Communists, equating negotiation with ‘surrender’.24 On 25 June 1955, in his statement to commemorate the outbreak of the Korean war, Rhee attacked the Communists for ‘loudly advocating peaceful coexistence while doing everything in their power to prepare for military conquest’. He added that any attempt to make a peaceful settlement with the Communists would soon prove to be an ‘illusion’.25 In this vein, he also regarded the non-aligned movement among Asian and African countries as a part of ‘Communist propaganda’. Thus, as early as January 1955, he worried that the proposed Asia–Africa meeting would have a ‘detrimental’ effect on Korea.26 President Rhee’s position was further elaborated in his public speech on the 10th anniversary of Liberation on August 15. Probably inﬂuenced by the Geneva summit conference among the four major powers in July, Rhee’s address focused on the issue of the reduction in world tensions. In the speech, he argued that the real global problem of the world was ‘not how to achieve peace, but how to deal with Communist aggression’. When dealing with Communist aggression, the purpose was to ‘bring it to an end and to roll it back to the point from which it started’, while the aim of achieving peace was to ‘establish a

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compromise on the basis of status quo’. President Rhee did not believe that a ‘status quo peace’ would be ‘practical or possible’ for two reasons. First, the relaxation of tensions would simply give the Communists ‘the chance to continue exterminating all their opposition and to ﬁx their grip permanently on areas they had conquered’. Secondly, the Communists themselves would not abide by peaceful coexistence, and would instead push forward to conquer new territories. Accordingly, for President Rhee, peaceful coexistence would be possible only after the ‘roll-back of the Iron Curtain’, and the ‘liberation of North Korea’.27 As implied in the above statements, Rhee’s rejection of peaceful relationships with the Communists was nothing but a euphemism for his long-held aim to ‘march north’ in order to ensure the ultimate peace and security of Korea. In fact, although Rhee softened his language regarding uniﬁcation as noted earlier, this did not necessarily mean that the South Korean President had changed his fundamental position. On his eightieth birthday, on 25 March 1955, Rhee suggested that the best of all birthday presents would be a public statement by the US government that he was ‘free to go ahead’ with his ‘own plans for the uniﬁcation of Korea’, which would be the ‘realization’ of his ‘life-long objective’. As the elderly leader said on other occasions, he was refraining from a northern expedition not because of a ‘lack of determination’, but because of the ‘international trend’ which favoured peace through negotiations with the Communists.28 Furthermore, according to his memorandum of January 1955 to the ROK representatives in America, President Rhee feared that ‘the Big Powers would tacitly agree to leave Korea divided, as a price of buying peace [sic]’. He knew that it would be difﬁcult for the South Korean government to affect what was happening in the world, but he believed that the South Koreans had ‘surely [to] be prepared to counteract some of its effect’. For this purpose, Rhee needed to ‘drive home to the Korean and American peoples as strongly as possible the disastrous effect of peaceful co-existence on Korea’.29 It cannot be denied, however, that Rhee’s publicizing of the impracticability of peaceful coexistence was also intended to secure his domestic power position. Fundamentally, anti-Communism had been the most important political ideology of the ROK President. In the midst of a ﬁerce ideological confrontation between pro- and antiCommunist forces following the Liberation of 1945, Rhee had entered into the power struggle on the basis of a ﬁrm anti-Communist posture, refusing any kind of coalition with the Communists. When he became

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the president of South Korea, he had removed not only leftist elements but also his political opponents under the pretext of preventing Communist subversion and inﬁltration. As the Korean War intensiﬁed anti-Communist sentiment in South Korea, Rhee had effectively utilized his aggressive posture against the Communists in mobilizing the public. His championing of anti-Communist sentiment had also played an important role in obtaining support from the US. Thus, as Se-Jin Kim pointed out, ‘by constantly repeating and reminding the public of the evils and dangers of Communism’, Rhee had tried to ‘achieve the role of a guardian father’.30 Given this fact, it was certain that peaceful relations between the Western world and the Communists would damage the validity of Rhee’s anti-Communist ideology. Accordingly, President Rhee could not help but try to minimize the impact of peaceful coexistence on domestic politics by reproaching the great powers for pursuing such a policy. Moreover, the Rhee regime was faced with an unfriendly domestic political situation that was mainly stimulated by the dubious constitutional amendment process. Therefore, the South Korean President, like many other leaders with internal troubles, attempted to use external affairs as a means to ‘escape intractable internal difﬁculties and as a device to achieve domestic cohesion’.31 President Rhee’s statement in celebration of the opening of the 20th general session of the National Assembly in February 1955 exempliﬁed this attempt. This was the ﬁrst session after the constitutional crisis, and was held in the midst of a movement to form a coalition party of anti-Rhee elements among the opposition Assemblymen. In his statement, the head of the executive ﬁrst emphasized the current ‘time of need’, in which the uniﬁcation of Korea was being delayed due to the ‘chaotic’ international atmosphere caused by the Communist peace offensive. He then asked the legislative members to refrain from personal or inter-party struggles for the sake of ‘national survival’. He also asserted that the government’s mistakes or insufﬁciency had to be forgiven in order to ﬁght against the ‘national enemy’.32 In March, a special committee of the National Assembly discovered that the Provost Marshal, General Won Yong-do ˘k deliberately delivered Communist propaganda pamphlets to several opposition leaders to ‘test the loyalty’ (as the General expressed it) of the opposition Assemblymen. Despite the Assembly’s denunciation of military interference in politics and a request to punish him, the government insisted that military personnel had the ‘right to engage in political activities at this time of crisis’. The President himself also tried to justify General Won’s action as an effort to prevent ‘Communist instigation’.33

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In terms of securing his power, the ROK President also had to cope with a possible challenge from the US. In January 1955, the Eisenhower administration set up a plan ‘to select and encourage covertly the development of new South Korean leadership prepared to cooperate’ with the US. The CIA were to select a South Korean leadership with ‘appropriate guidance from the Department of State’.34 It was unlikely that Rhee knew of this US plan in detail. Nevertheless, President Rhee perceived that ‘in order to bring Korea into the line of coexistence, the [Eisenhower] administration [had] laid plans to liquidate a strongly anti-Communist regime in [South] Korea, and also to discredit this government’. Rhee’s perception stemmed from Washington’s appointment in May of Lacy as the new Ambassador in Seoul; Lacy had reportedly been partly responsible for the upset defeat of President Quirino by Magsaysay in the 1953 Philippines election. Rhee suspected that Lacy had been sent to South Korea to engineer his own defeat in the forthcoming election of 1956.35 Although Rhee successfully managed to force the Ambassador to resign from his position by October 1955, his suspicion did not completely disappear.36 Rhee’s suspicion appeared to increase with the establishment of the Democratic Party that embraced Chang Myo ˘n the former Ambassador to Washington, as one of its leaders. Rhee deeply disliked Chang because he suspected that during the 1952 political turmoil Chang had appealed to the US for support. Rhee also believed that the State Department preferred the soft-spoken opposition leader to Rhee. 37 Moreover, the new opposition party adopted a foreign policy favouring peace, which could not be overlooked by Rhee, given his perception that the US was intending to remove him because of his opposition to the policy of peaceful coexistence. In this context, unless Rhee was prepared to accept peaceful coexistence, abandoning his deeply held belief that the northern Communists must be removed, one alternative way for him to thwart the alleged US plan to topple him through elections was to win public support. As far as President Rhee was concerned, the most effective way to appeal to the South Korean people was to stimulate their aspirations for uniﬁcation, and to argue that the only possible means of unifying Korea was to destroy the Communists, not to appease them.38 Thus, during the 1956 presidential election campaign, the Rhee regime emphasized the need to consolidate its anti-Communist posture in order to cope with the Communist peace offensive. In addition, Rhee made a number of announcements in which he warned the

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electorate not to vote for candidates who were ‘colluding with the Communists’ to unify Korea under the ‘puppet regime’ in the North.39 In sum, it can be argued that Rhee voiced the impossibility and impracticability of sharing peace with the Communists partly because of his continued belief in the need to remove the northern regime, and partly because of his concern to maintain domestic support for his position as President. To make his arguments persuasive, the South Korean leader needed to demonstrate that a Communist threat still existed. He soon found a good showcase: the issue of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. (2)

The NNSC Issue: Highlighting the Communist Threat

The Korean armistice agreement provided for the formation of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission whose main responsibility was to carry out investigations of alleged violations of the armistice. Under the supervision of the NNSC, Neutral Nations Inspection Teams (NNITs) were to ensure that neither side in North and South Korea increased its military capability through the build-up of military forces, equipment, or supplies. For this purpose, the truce agreement stated that the NNITs would be stationed at speciﬁed ports of entry in both North and South Korea to fulﬁl this mission. The NNSC was composed of representatives from Sweden and Switzerland, chosen by the UN side, and those from Czechoslovakia and Poland, chosen by the Communist side.40 Shortly after the armistice, however, the United Nations Command began to regard the Czech and Polish members as ‘not neutral’ in performing their functions. In May 1954, the US Department of Defense released a statement which accused the Czech and Polish members of using ‘obstructionist tactics’ intended to ‘generate propaganda and intelligence’ opportunities for the Communists while serving as a ‘cover to prevent disclosure and investigation of the military build-up’ in North Korea. The Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC also observed the ‘negative attitude’ of the Communists towards the Commission’s activities, and the ‘restrictive tactics’ of the Polish and Czech members. The following month, the Eisenhower administration decided to terminate the activities of the NNSC by inducing the governments of Sweden and Switzerland to withdraw their representatives from the NNSC.41 The Defense Department, particularly ﬁeld commanders such as General Hull and General Taylor, however, preferred immediate

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disbanding of the NNSC to the diplomatic method taken by the State Department. In addition, from early 1955, the UN Command began to insist that, together with the termination of the NNSC, paragraphs 13 (c) and 13 (d) of the armistice agreement, which were to limit weapons of both sides, be suspended in order to modernize the armed forces in South Korea. General Hull argued that Communist violations of the provisions of the armistice agreement, with the help of the Czech and Polish members of the Commission, considerably increased the military capabilities of the northern Communists, resulting in a danger to UN forces.42 But the State Department favoured less drastic action for political and legal reasons. In particular, US civilian ofﬁcials worried that the Western allies were unconvinced that the Communist military build-up was serious enough to jeopardize the security of the UN Command and the ROK.43 Although military ofﬁcials later agreed to handle the problem of paragraphs 13 (c) and 13 (d) after the abolition of the NNSC, they continued to press the State Department for quick action against the Commission. Finally the State Department agreed to authorize the UN Command in May 1956 to take unilateral action to abolish the NNSC. Following consultation among the sixteen allies that had participated in the Korean War in Washington and with their agreement in principle, the UN Command announced on May 31 that it would provisionally suspend the provisions of the armistice agreement governing the operation of the NNSC. On June 5, the NNSC unanimously decided to withdraw its inspection teams.44 During the resolution of the NNSC problem, the Eisenhower administration had also to deal with strong pressure from the Rhee government. Despite Washington’s repeated assurance that it would abolish the NNSC soon, President Rhee complained about the ‘slow progress’ in eliminating the activities of ‘Communist spies’ in South Korea. He frequently threatened the US that he would be compelled to take unilateral action. Rhee worried, with some reason, that ‘Unless we can get rid of them [the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC], the Communists will have a complete blueprint of ROK defensive arrangements and a very clear conception of our strategy.’45 On the one hand, as a man who deeply abhorred the Communists, and who strongly opposed the armistice itself, Rhee wished to see the immediate withdrawal of the ‘Communist’ inspection teams. On the other hand, as a shrewd politician, the South Korean President might also have intended to present the NNSC issue as a conspicuous illustration of the futility of the policy of peaceful coexistence with the

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Communists. Concerning this point, Rhee was probably encouraged by the US military personnel’s eagerness to abrogate the NNSC by emphasizing Communist violations of the armistice terms and the consequent military build-up in the North. To some extent, it enabled President Rhee to carry out an anti-coexistence campaign from an ‘I-told-you-so’ position. For instance, in a memorandum sent to the Eisenhower administration in March 1955, while expressing satisfaction with the American stand over the abolition of the NNSC, the Rhee government claimed that the ‘so-called’ armistice had become a ‘farce’ because of ‘chronic and downright’ Communist violations. In a similar vein, President Rhee conﬁdently argued in a public statement that ‘What is the result [of peaceful negotiations with the Communists]? One good example can be found in the fact that the Communists explicitly violated the Korean armistice agreement to prepare for another war.’46 Rhee’s intention to exaggerate the NNSC problem for tactical purposes was clearly manifested when his government issued ultimatums requesting the Czech and Polish inspection teams to leave South Korea within a certain time. While keeping up his threat to take unilateral action to discontinue the NNSC, the Rhee government had issued three ultimatums since the summer of 1954. In each case, the ostensible purpose of such drastic action was to avert alleged ‘Communist espionage’ without delay. Undoubtedly, President Rhee sincerely wanted to get rid of the NNSC and regarded its members as ‘Communist spies’. However, a close look at the situations in which those ﬁnal notices were announced shows that the ROK government had other considerations in issuing them. The ﬁrst occasion took place in July 1954 when President Rhee was negotiating with the US to obtain military and economic assistance. In this case, Rhee used the ultimatum to heighten his bargaining position by embarrassing the US, which was seeking a diplomatic way to end the NNSC’s activities without abrogating the armistice terms (see Chapter 4). The second ultimatum was issued on 22 November 1954 when the Provost Marshal, General Won Yong-do ˘k, requested the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC to leave Korea ‘within a week’. When General Hull and Ambassador Briggs visited Rhee the next day, although President Rhee again urged immediate dissolution of the NNSC, he readily accepted Briggs’s demand to cooperate with the US until the problem could be resolved diplomatically and by agreement. American ofﬁcials also asked Rhee not to make any public statement

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on the NNSC issue, which would be unhelpful to the settlement of the problem. On November 26, however, Rhee announced that Hull and Briggs had given him assurances that the NNSC issue would be ‘settled very shortly to Korea’s complete satisfaction’. The US complained that this statement was a ‘distortion’ of comments by Briggs to Rhee, and was used as a ‘face-saving device’ for Rhee to remove the one-week time limit for the departure of the NNSC that had been set by General Won.47 Rhee’s behaviour suggests that he might have had another purpose in issuing the ultimatum: he probably hoped to facilitate the passage of the constitutional amendment bill. Two important factors seemed to support this suggestion despite the lack of ﬁrm evidence. First, the bill was due to be put to the vote in the National Assembly on November 27, and the opposition had been vigorously criticizing Rhee’s third term amendment. Faced with the uncertainty of its passage, the President probably needed to highlight the Communist danger so as to gain the unreserved support of his political opponents. Secondly, the Rhee government had tried to present the need for national referenda on important matters pertaining to a ‘national crisis’ as the most important reason for proposing the amendment. Accordingly, the government probably sought to remind the public, as well as the Assemblymen, of the existence of ‘Communist spies’, who posed a threat to national security.48 It is difﬁcult to gauge the effectiveness of Rhee’s tactics. It is noteworthy, however, that most of the opposition themselves had such strong anti-Communist sentiments that they unanimously approved resolutions supporting Rhee’s position regarding the NNSC issue a few months later even though they were busily forming a united anti-Rhee party.49 President Rhee’s third ultimatum was issued in early August 1955. The South Korean President, in a public statement issued on August 1, ordered the northern Communists to withdraw from Kaeso ˘ng, Ongjin, and the northern portion of the Han river. He added that the ROK government was prepared to restore those areas in order to ‘strengthen the defence lines’ of South Korea. At the same time, Rhee demanded the withdrawal of the NNSC from Korea. A week later, the Rhee government made another announcement to demand that members of the NNSC depart from South Korea ‘no later than 24:00 hours of August 13, 1955’. The statement declared that the South Korean government could not assume any responsibility for any incident involving members of the Commission who failed to comply with the request.50 It appeared that Rhee intended, at least

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initially, to use force to recover the areas below the 38th parallel in North Korean hands. According to US sources, General Cho ˘ng Ilkwon, the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, informed Ambassador Lacy that the Chiefs of Staff of three South Korean armed forces had been asked by President Rhee to use ROK forces to regain the territories. But Cho ˘ng and other Generals told the president ‘ﬂatly’ that they considered this use of the military as ‘impractical and undesirable in every way’.51 Faced with his military leaders’ refusal to use force in regaining the ‘lost territory’, Rhee might well have retired to his second position, i.e. violent organized demonstrations against the NNSC. From August 5, anti-NNSC demonstrations started at all ﬁve ports at which units of the inspection teams were located. According to an American military source, President Rhee had issued instructions to the ROK armed forces to draw up plans for the conduct of demonstrations against the NNITs. It was also reported that Yi Ki-pung, the Assembly Chairman, had agreed with military leaders that the National Assembly would take the lead in campaigning for the deportation of the ‘Communist’ members of the NNSC, and in mobilizing South Korean political and social organizations behind this move. The US Embassy’s reports noted that those public rallies were undoubtedly inspired by quasigovernmental organizations, such as veteran and patriotic groups, and that policemen and military soldiers had participated in the rallies in civilian clothes. These reports also suggested that the participants were small in number, and that the ﬁgures used by the Korean press as to the size of crowds were ‘grossly exaggerated’ because of false information provided by the police and veterans’ organizations.52 President Rhee publicly asserted that he had no intention of ‘disturb[ing] the international trend towards peaceful coexistence’, and labelled the demonstrations as a ‘spontaneous expression of the will and fears of the people’. However, Rhee’s drastic statements and subsequent moves against the NNSC, as foreign observers assumed, largely reﬂected his growing bewilderment over the Geneva summit meeting, and particularly the talks held by the US and China to decrease tensions in the Taiwan Strait.53 Indeed, President Rhee had thought that ‘something should be done’ to prevent peaceful coexistence with the Communists, ‘as the trend of talk’ was to ‘get along with Russia and Red China’.54 In other words, Rhee’s ultimatum to the NNSC was intended more to counteract peaceful coexistence by highlighting the Communist menace rather than to get rid of the NNSC per se.

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Rhee’s intention was clearly shown by his subsequent behaviour. On August 12, President Rhee instructed Ambassador Yang to ask the State Department if the US would give a date on which NNSC activities in the ROK would be terminated. In spite of a negative answer from the Eisenhower administration, the next day Rhee issued an announcement that indeﬁnitely extended the deadline of the ultimatum, on the pretext of US assurance of a speedy resolution of the problem, as on previous occasions. Nonetheless, Rhee did encourage, rather than discourage, anti-NNSC demonstrations. In his statement regarding the NNSC issue on August 25, Rhee again depicted the demonstrations as a ‘genuine mass movement’ which sought to ‘call attention to the terrible danger’ threatening the southern half of the Korean peninsula. He added that these popular rallies would continue until the ‘free world’ joined the South Koreans in ‘removing the menace of the Communist spies’.55 Those anti-NNSC demonstrations did not stop until December 10 when President Rhee asked the public to call the demonstrations off ‘temporarily’. In order to retreat from his original position without losing too much face, Rhee again used a US ‘promise’ to abolish the NNSC as soon as possible.56

CONCLUSION With the Communist peace offensive and subsequent signs of a relaxation in world tensions, President Syngman Rhee concentrated his efforts on counteracting the inﬂuence of the movement towards peaceful coexistence, at least in Korea. For this purpose, Rhee loudly voiced his criticism of the international trend in favour of the status quo. In doing so, he skilfully used the NNSC to illustrate the Communist threat. True, President Rhee sincerely wished to discontinue the activities of ‘Communist’ members of the NNSC without delay. But he was aware that US ofﬁcials, especially military personnel, wanted to abolish the NNSC as eagerly as Rhee himself did, and that they were doing their best to do so. Therefore, President Rhee could comfortably utilize the NNSC case for his own cause. The NNSC issue served Rhee as a good example of his objection to ‘appeasing’ the Communists. He emphasized Communist spying activities and violation of the armistice terms. Rhee’s denunciation of peaceful coexistence was attributable to two major factors. First of all, it was incompatible with Rhee’s personal belief that peace and security could be ensured only when the

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Communists had been destroyed. More speciﬁcally, Rhee could not think of peace in Korea without the prior removal of the Communists from the northern territory. Thus, he needed to prevent his allies, especially the US, from accepting that the Communist peace offensive was genuine. In effect, Rhee’s objection to peaceful coexistence was an indirect expression of the ‘march north’ theme. Secondly, Rhee’s vigorous condemnation of peaceful coexistence was closely related to his concern for regime security. The international atmosphere favouring improved relations with the Communists undoubtedly undermined his political stand based on anti-Communism. Furthermore, the unfavourable external developments coincided with Rhee’s internal difﬁculties. The Rhee regime’s attempt to prolong its power with a constitutional amendment undermined, rather than consolidated, its political stability: the manner in which the amendment bill was passed deepened public dissatisfaction with the regime, and revitalized the opposition. In addition, President Rhee suspected that the US had tried to remove him by ‘interfering’ in the elections. Under these circumstances, Rhee attempted to win public support by further arousing anti-Communist sentiment. Ironically, the international movement in favour of peaceful coexistence, which caused trouble for Rhee, provided him with the opportunity he sought. That is, by presenting the policy of peaceful coexistence as a hindrance to the uniﬁcation of his country, President Rhee tried to stimulate public opposition to it, and thus to mobilize support for the regime that had advocated ‘marching north’ and unifying Korea. In sum, during the period from November 1954 to May 1956, as the stability of the Rhee government weakened under the impact of internal and external challenges, Rhee’s concern for the security of his regime increased. This does not mean, however, that President Rhee’s concern for state security decreased. Indeed, he sought the security and uniﬁcation of the country as enthusiastically as before. But because of his rigid anti-Communist policy, whatever its merits, Rhee effectively could not cope with changing external circumstances. In addition, it should be pointed out that the unstable domestic position forced Rhee to reject peaceful coexistence more ﬁrmly for the sake of regime security. The problems with the inﬂexibility of Rhee’s policy became more conspicuous when both internal and external threats increased, as will be seen in the next chapter.

6 The Primacy of Regime Security and the Vulnerability of State Security, May 1956–November 1958 ‘Our economic difﬁculties, however great, do not justify any move that would create an opportunity for renewed Communist aggression.’ (Syngman Rhee, 27 July 1957) ‘[T]he establishment … of an independent economy in the northern half of Korea will further inspire and encourage the people of South Korea in their struggle against the US imperialists and the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique and for the peaceful reuniﬁcation of the country.’ (Kim Il Sung, 28 June 1958) ‘The [South Korean] people have little faith in the government or sense of identiﬁcation with it … There is little awareness of improvement in the lot of the average man … Discontent with the present state of affairs, in the absence of constructive and effective leadership, might result in the abandonment of Free World principles in favor of extremist ideologies.’ (US Ambassador Dowling, 21 November 1957) After the unprincipled constitutional amendment at the end of 1954 to prolong President Rhee’s time in power, the legitimacy of the Rhee regime decreased. The presidential election in May 1956 conﬁrmed this trend disclosing not insigniﬁcant popular dissent with the Rhee administration, and particularly with its failure to develop social and economic policies. In addition, increasing numbers of South Koreans began to criticize Rhee’s ‘march north’ theme, and his heavy emphasis on a military build-up. President Rhee and the Liberal Party, however, were prepared neither to tackle the worsening socio-economic problems, nor to 102

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accommodate the public desire for a more peaceful approach to uniﬁcation and defence matters. During this period, the South Korean government had to cope with a North Korean peace campaign. After completing political consolidation and economic rehabilitation, the Communist regime launched psychological warfare, aiming at promoting internal difﬁculties in the South. But the Rhee regime’s lack of a sound domestic policy and inﬂexible military policy appeared to increase South Korean vulnerability to the North Korean threat. In this respect, this chapter will focus on how the Rhee regime, given its decreasing legitimacy, dealt both with the internal threat to the regime, and with the external threat emerging from North Korea. The ﬁrst section will analyse the outcome of the 1956 presidential election in order to assess the extent of popular discontent with the Rhee government, and then examine the ruling elite’s reaction to antigovernment forces. Secondly, this chapter will study two important issues related both to the internal and external security of South Korea: (1) the problem of reducing the size of the ROK forces, in which Rhee’s emphasis on military strength was challenged by a view stressing the need for economic development; and (2) the Progress Party’s peaceful uniﬁcation policy which questioned the wisdom of uniﬁcation by force. In the third section, after examining political and economic progress in North Korea, the Communist peace offensive and its impact on South Korean security will be discussed.

INTERNAL INSTABILITY AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF REPRESSIVE RULE In 1956, Syngman Rhee ran for the presidential election for a third term, endorsing Yi Ki-pung, the Chairman of the Liberal Party (LP), as his vice-presidential candidate. Rhee reportedly desired re-election by a large majority as a ‘popular mandate’ for his policies at home and abroad.1 Contrary to Rhee’s expectation, however, the result of the presidential election only revealed his decreasing popularity. The opposition Democratic Party (DP) mounted a ‘vigorous and imaginative’ campaign for its candidates, ex-Assembly Chairman Shin Ik-hu ˘i for President and ex-Prime Minister Chang Myo ˘n for VicePresident. The Democrats were constantly on the offensive, pressing their charges of waste, corruption, and maladministration against the Rhee regime. The Democratic slogan, ‘We can’t live, let’s try a

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change’ (mot salgetta, kara poja), which neatly expressed all the DP campaign arguments, had great popular appeal, and caused the LP a good deal of embarrassment. In major cities, rallies for the Democratic candidates were much larger than those for their Liberal counterparts. In particular, Shin’s rally on the banks of the Han River in Seoul was attended by about 300,000 people, or a quarter of the Seoul electorate.2 Unfortunately for the Democrats, however, Shin Ik-hu ˘i died ten days before the election,3 and Rhee was easily re-elected, receiving 55.6 per cent of the popular vote. In the vice-presidential race, however, the Democratic Party’s Chang Myo ˘n surprisingly defeated Rhee’s ‘anointed’ successor, Yi Ki-pung, by 41.7 to 39.6 per cent of the popular vote.4 In fact, the vice-presidential contest had drawn a keen political interest because a successful candidate would have a chance of inheriting power, should 81-year-old Rhee die in ofﬁce. The election of Chang as Vice President, which situated a member of the political opposition as Rhee’s probable successor, was said to be a ‘distinct shock’ to President Rhee and his supporters.5 Although Rhee won his third term in ofﬁce, a close look at the election outcome demonstrates that Rhee suffered a serious drop in his personal popularity. In the 1952 election, Rhee had received 74.6 per cent of the total votes cast, as compared with 55.6 per cent in 1956. Furthermore, he received nearly 200,000 fewer votes in 1956 than in 1952 in spite of the fact that there were over 1,000,000 more registered voters in 1956 than in 1952 (94.4 per cent of registered voters cast ballots in 1956, as compared with 85.0 per cent in 1952). Even President Rhee’s winning margin was conditioned by the death of his principal opponent. Because Shin Ik-hu ˘i died just ten days before the election, his name could not be removed from the ballots, and a large per centage of the 1,900,000 invalid votes were probably cast for him in protest against the Rhee administration. In Seoul, 46.7 per cent of votes cast were invalid, while Rhee’s share of votes was only 33.7 per cent.6 Undoubtedly, the 1956 election disclosed growing popular dissatisfaction with the Rhee regime. Its neglect of established rules and adoption of unjustiﬁable rules, as revealed in the course of the 1954 constitutional amendment (see Chapter 5), had caused public discontent with the Rhee regime, and this election conﬁrmed that President Rhee and his government no longer enjoyed the same degree of legitimacy among the South Korean populace. A number of observers agreed that this trend was mainly attributable to the growth of pluralist elements within the South, and

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continued lack of major improvement in economic and social conditions.7 The growth of democratic ideas among the general populace was closely related to urbanization and expanded educational opportunities. By 1955, 34.5 per cent of the population were living in cities of over 50,000, as compared with only 18.3 per cent in 1949. In terms of education, the number of students in secondary school had more than tripled from 227,400 in 1947 to 733,185 in 1956, and students in higher education rose from 10,300 to 90,104 over the same period. In addition, increases not only in quantity but also in the quality of daily newspapers had considerably contributed to the improvement in the political consciousness of the populace. President Rhee had presented the freedom of the press as a good example of democracy in Korea, but, ironically, it now consequently became a major problem for Rhee.8 Economic difﬁculties had increased since the end of the Korean conﬂict. The GNP growth rate began to decline in 1954: the rate was 5.2 per cent in 1954, 4.0 per cent in 1955, and 0.3 per cent in 1956. Inﬂation continued to plague the economy, with the price index increasing 26.4 per cent in 1954, 51.0 per cent in 1955, and 42.9 per cent in 1956. Maintenance of a very large military establishment was the principal single source of strain on the ROK’s limited ﬁscal resources, and thus a prime contributor to inﬂationary pressures. In addition, during the post-1953 period, unemployment was estimated at 15 per cent of the labour force, with even greater underemployment.9 Probably sensing popular dissatisfaction with the government as manifested in the 1956 election, President Rhee, in his inaugural address on 15 August 1956, proposed a ﬁve-year development plan to improve the ‘welfare of the people’. The long-term programme, according to Rhee, was to stimulate small industries, to stabilize ﬁnancial structures, and to promote farmers’ living conditions. Unlike most previous speeches, Rhee devoted little time to international affairs on this occasion.10 Although Rhee’s proposal was the ﬁrst indication that his government might develop policies to solve its domestic problems, American ofﬁcials doubted that the Rhee regime was really ‘prepared and able’ to offer constructive economic and social programmes in the public’s interest.11 Unfortunately for the South Koreans, this suspicion turned out to be correct. Although President Rhee saw the economic problems, he saw them ‘in grand terms, in broad strokes’, failing to acknowledge the technical and administrative complexity that would be needed to solve them.12 Moreover, the South Korean President, however great his concern for economic development, was still preoccupied with the problems of

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uniﬁcation and military build-up, as will be seen in the next section. Few within the ruling elite had either the ability or the willingness to tackle the socio-economic problems. From 1956, Rhee entrusted considerable domestic political responsibility to Yi Ki-pung in spite of his defeat in the vice-presidential race. But Yi, in turn, because of his poor health, increasingly depended on the counsel of his principal party colleagues for decisions on important domestic affairs. Around this time, the Liberal Party was largely divided into two factions: the ‘soft-liners’ who were willing to accommodate Western-style moderate politics; and the ‘hard-liners’ who wished to retain their power by whatever means available. In the competition between the two factions, the latter gradually prevailed over the former.13 According to Sungjoo Han, these ‘hard-liners’ had had bureaucratic careers in their past, and had especially close ties with the police organizations. Han argued that they were ‘power-dependent’ people whose political power resulted from their ability to obtain Syngman Rhee’s conﬁdence, without having their own leadership or popular base. The only way they knew of generating power was to use oppressive force.14 Thus, the more inﬂuential the ‘hard-liners’ became within the ruling circle, the more repressive the Liberal Party regime became. In September 1956, Vice President Chang Myo ˘n was shot in the hand, following his speech to the convention of the Democratic Party. The police arrested the gunman on the spot. At ﬁrst, the police announced that the assault had been caused by internal struggle within the Democratic Party. But during the trial, the marksman confessed that he was abetted by police ofﬁcers, and that the Home Minister and the National Police Chief were involved in the plot to assassinate Chang. Nevertheless, the prosecutors indicted only three policemen, deliberately ignoring the allegation that top-level police and Liberal Party ofﬁcials had been involved. After the collapse of the Rhee regime, however, the allegation was ofﬁcially conﬁrmed.15 Undoubtedly, the Liberals attempted to remove the potential danger to their power position by assassinating the opposition leader who would become president in the event of Rhee’s demise. This incident clearly shows that the ruling elite in South Korea, as in many other developing countries, was preoccupied with ‘regime survival’. For its survival, the Liberal regime resorted to the repression of the perceived ‘enemy within’, which was an ‘incongruous and ultimately counterproductive’ measure in support of regime security.16 After the shooting incident, although Chang himself lay low for fear of another assassination attempt, public sympathy for the party

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increased dramatically, and the opposition’s anti-government campaigns became more vigorous.17 On 25 January 1957, after President Rhee had rejected the request of the opposition to discharge the Home Minister and the Police Chief, and to undertake a full investigation of the assassination attempt, an opposition leader moved in the National Assembly to debate a ‘resolution of warning against the President’. Although the proposal was promptly voted down by the Liberal majority, the full text of the draft resolution was printed in all but the pro-government newspapers. The resolution pointedly accused President Rhee of violation of the constitution, abuse of police power, and causing South Korea’s poor economic performance. As an American observer pointed out, ‘the opposition could not have made such a bold step against the President if it had not reﬂected a widespread and generally recognized feeling on the part of the people.’18 In May, after an anti-government rally sponsored by the Democratic Party had been disrupted by hoodlums allegedly mobilized by the Liberals,19 Cho Pyo ˘ng-ok, the leader of the Democratic Party, published an ‘open letter to the President’ in Dong-A Ilbo, the largest newspaper in Korea. The ‘open letter’ severely criticized various types of maladministration committed by the Liberal regime, and claimed that President Rhee was leading the country into dictatorship. It also warned Rhee that if he continued to ‘eradicate political democracy’ without listening to the people’s cry for better living conditions, his government would be overthrown by the people.20 Such public charges against the President illustrated the fact that popular discontent with the quality of Rhee’s leadership had deepened. No longer could Rhee escape blame for government failures; in the past, criticism had tended to be directed not at Rhee himself but at those around him. This new trend continued: a British source of January 1958 noted, after private conversations with Korean politicians, teachers, and social leaders of various professions, that a considerable number of South Koreans were becoming ‘progressively disillusioned’ with the Rhee government.21 Probably the most notorious example of the Rhee regime’s repressive rule in this period was the arrest of Cho Pong-am, and the outlawing of his Progressive Party on the ﬂimsy charge of violating the National Security Law in February 1958. As will be examined later, this measure was intended to control the opposition in general, and the policy of ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’, in particular. This policy adopted by the Progressive Party was a direct challenge to Rhee’s ‘march north’ theme.

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The results of the May 1958 general elections disclosed to some extent increasing public dissatisfaction with the repressive rule of the Rhee regime. Although the Liberal Party won a majority, the Democratic Party substantially increased its representation, and for the ﬁrst time won over one-third of the National Assembly seats. This particular ﬁgure had a very important meaning in the context that the DP now could prevent the LP’s expected attempt to revise the constitution in order to remove the vice-president’s right to succeed to the presidency. In urban areas, the Democrats overwhelmed the Liberals, capturing 43 of 62 urban districts. Indeed, in Seoul, the DP won 14 out of 16 seats. Most of all, the LP was embarrassed by the fact that the rate of the total vote cast for its candidates (42.1 per cent) was not much higher than that for the DP’s candidates (34.2 per cent).22 In view of the not inconsiderable election rigging in the 1958 elections, this outcome implied that the opposition might win the next presidential race if the election atmosphere became freer. Thus, the LP and the government sought to employ more undemocratic and repressive measures in order to prolong their stay in power.23

THE DECREASE IN SUPPORT FOR RHEE’S MILITANT POLICIES In the past, Rhee’s policies of calling for the uniﬁcation of the country by military means, and of strengthening South Korean military capabilities, had been enthusiastically supported by virtually the entire population of the ROK. However, partly because of fading memories of the Korean War on the part of the public, and partly because of the weakening of Rhee’s legitimacy, in the latter part of the 1950s, Rhee’s bellicose policies were no longer exempt from criticism. Although this change had already been hinted at in the previous years, it was during the period covered by this chapter that it became more conspicuous, especially over the issues of force reduction, and the attack on the Progressive Party’s ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ formula. (1) Rhee’s Priority for a Military Build-up and the Lack of Consensus on the Force Reduction Issue In the middle of 1957, the US government proposed to the ROK government a reduction of four divisions in ROK forces, together with modernization programmes including the introduction of atomic

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weapons to the US forces in Korea. This proposal was an effort to solve economic problems regarding the military build-up in South Korea: the United States was encountering severe budgetary constraints in its foreign aid programmes, and at the same time the huge Korean armed forces were threatening to hold back civilian economic development in the country.24 While President Rhee was ‘greatly pleased’ with the US decision to introduce atomic weapons into Korea, he was not prepared to accept force reductions. Rhee’s position was that the size of ROK troops could not be decreased because the northern Communists were threatening South Korean security with their ‘superior’ military capabilities. He claimed that he would agree to the planned cutback of ROK forces only when South Korean, as well as American, forces were provided with modernized equipment including nuclear weapons.25 The Eisenhower administration tried to make the Rhee administration accept the proposed reduction of forces by emphasizing the fact that South Korea would receive less aid than requested, and that, in such a case, the only way to adjust the balance would be to decrease the size of the standing armed forces. Washington properly pointed out that American nuclear deterrent power, the US–ROK Mutual Defence Treaty, and the Joint Declaration of the Sixteen Nations which had fought in Korea, were the most signiﬁcant deterrents against the Communists. While the reduction of four divisions would not be an important factor in terms of any Communist decision to attack, it added, savings resulted from such a reduction would be beneﬁcial to the economy of South Korea. The Eisenhower administration also made it clear that the question of curtailing Korean forces was not negotiable as far as US support was concerned, and that South Korean forces would not be provided with nuclear warheads.26 Despite continued pressure from Washington, Seoul resisted force reductions, arguing that it would be a ‘very sad mistake’ to decrease the size of ROK forces for economic purposes in the face of the ‘tremendous’ military build-up in the North. In February 1958, after the Eisenhower administration had made a new proposal, reducing ROK forces by two – instead of four as had originally been planned – divisions, and after atomic weapons for US forces had arrived in South Korea, Rhee ﬁrst hinted at his intention to accept a reduction plan negotiated between US and ROK representatives. Probably expecting nuclear equipment for South Korean troops, however, he soon changed his position. He delayed his ﬁnal approval of the reduction plan until

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November, citing the crises in the Middle East and the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait as reasons for suspending reductions. In December, two Army divisions were ﬁnally deactivated.27 In effect, President Rhee managed to minimize the reduction of ROK forces. His militarily-oriented attitude, however, was unlikely to be shared by the public as eagerly as before. As noted earlier, South Korea was facing economic difﬁculties, which were the main source of public dissent with the Rhee regime, and the military drag on South Korean economic progress was clear. As shown in Table 6.1, during the period from 1953 to 1958 the average ratio of South Korea’s military spending in the total government expenditure was over 50 per cent, and until 1958 the government spent more money on defence than on civilian purposes. As a result, there was ‘considerable popular sympathy’ for reducing the ‘burdensome’ size of ROK forces, as a US source noted. Reﬂecting these economic views on the part of the public, Cho Pyo ˘ng-ok the leader of the Democratic Party, expressed his opinion in the National Assembly that ‘sound reconstruction would be impossible without cutting down the present standing armed forces’. He argued that the military threat from North Korea should be deterred not by the number of soldiers, but by the Mutual Defence Treaty with the US, and by the nuclear weaponry which would be provided to US forces in Korea. Cho added that President Rhee had better study and decide the proper size of the armed forces based on the capability of the Korean economy, and not just reject American proposals. Thereupon, the opposition adopted a position favouring

Table 6.1 Composition of government expenditure, South Korea (%) Civil

Defence

Others

Total

1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958

29.3 32.7 37.6 44.0 40.3 46.7

62.0 59.6 48.7 42.7 46.8 45.8

8.7 7.7 13.7 13.3 12.9 7.5

100 100 100 100 100 100

Average

38.4

50.9

10.6

Source: The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1962, pp. 24–5.

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substantial curtailment of military spending as a means of speeding up economic development and stability.28 This position was not conﬁned to the opposition circles. Even within the military, there were those who advocated a decrease in the size of ROK forces for the sake of a sound economy. The Air Attaché of the Korean Embassy in Washington, in conversation with a US ofﬁcial, said that force reductions were both ‘inevitable and necessary’, not only in view of the economic situation in Korea but also with regard to the changing climate of opinion in the US and in the world generally. According to a British source, a high-level army ofﬁcer stated, with ‘extreme frankness’, that increased emphasis on economic, instead of military, development was ‘badly’ needed in South Korea.29 It is also notable that the ROK Defence Minister had favoured the cutback of force levels throughout his negotiations with the US on the matter. American Ambassador Dowling, in a secret telegram, reported that he was convinced that the Defence Minister was doing his best to obtain President Rhee’s consent to reductions.30 More important, the South Korean press also criticized, albeit cautiously, President Rhee’s intransigent attitude in the negotiations with the US on ROK force reductions, and asked Rhee to come to an agreement on the issue in order to facilitate economic progress.31 Rhee’s resistance to the plan to reduce South Korean forces without introducing modern weapons, in part reﬂected his concern over the Communist threat. Even before the cutback of ROK troops became an issue, President Rhee had argued that ‘As much as we need industrial development, we are not so foolish as to reduce our defenses … We do not intend to restore Korea to economic strength only to be forced to give it all to the Communists.’ During the negotiations with the US, Rhee privately expressed his disappointment with the lack of progress in modernizing South Korean forces.32 However genuine Rhee’s security concern was, the problem lay in the fact that, for many South Koreans, a policy that emphasized a military build-up at the expense of economic development was inappropriate, if not totally wrong, in the light of the economic difﬁculties in the ROK. Furthermore, during this period, quite contrary to Rhee’s perception, the Communists were threatening South Korea not with military aggression, but with a peace offensive based on their growing economic strength. By concentrating on the military threat, Rhee could not easily cope with the Communist peace campaign.

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(2) Challenges to Rhee’s ‘March North’ Theme and the Suppression of the ‘Peaceful Uniﬁcation’ Movement During the period from 1956 to 1958, as in previous years, President Rhee continued to call for a ‘march north’ in order express his personal belief, enhance his bargaining position, or manipulate domestic politics. First, Rhee was still looking for an opportunity to ‘march north’ with the ‘free nations’ to rescue ‘compatriots from the Communist oppression’.33 Secondly, during the negotiations with the US regarding the reduction of ROK forces, the South Korean President, probably as a bargaining chip, vehemently stated that if uniﬁcation could not be achieved in cooperation with the US, he would ‘have to proceed with his own plan sooner rather than later’.34 But Rhee’s old tactics no longer seemed to work. Thirdly, by emphasizing, or sometimes exaggerating the existence of the Communist threat and the necessity of uniﬁcation by force, President Rhee tried to justify his internal policies. For instance, in July 1957, Rhee stated, in an interview with foreign reporters, that democracy in South Korea was working ‘remarkably well’, considering that it was ‘wartime’ and that the ‘very free survival’ of the South Koreans remained in ‘grave jeopardy’ due to the northern Communists.35 While President Rhee’s view on uniﬁcation remained unchanged, there were signs that the public’s view had begun to change. Foreign observers generally agreed that as the peace stabilized, popular support for military uniﬁcation became less enthusiastic, and increasing numbers of South Koreans began to favour a ‘political solution’ to the uniﬁcation issue.36 More conspicuous evidence of this trend can be found by examining public support for Cho Pong-am, the leader of the Progressive Party, who directly challenged Rhee’s ‘March north’ theme with a ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ programme.37 In the 1956 presidential election, Cho, without strong organization, received about 2,000,000 votes (24 per cent of the total), although this would have been lower had the Democratic candidate not died. In addition, according to a US intelligence source of February 1958, Cho’s following was not insigniﬁcant, and the Progressive Party had made ‘slow but steady’ progress – primarily among students, intellectuals, and some rural elements. In January 1957, Yi Ki-pung, the Chairman of the Liberal Party, confessed to the American Ambassador that he was worried about the possibility of ‘large-scale’ support for Cho’s party.38 It seemed that many politicians supported, or at least sympathized with, the ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ policy. In November 1957, Kim Su-Son,

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an independent Assemblyman who had a close relationship with the Progressive Party, sent President Rhee a petition which was highly critical of the government’s uniﬁcation policy. Kim suggested that the government should carry out the policy of peaceful uniﬁcation by taking such steps as: (1) unifying public opinion; (2) reforming the domestic administration; (3) stabilizing the economy; and (4) improving the level of international cooperation. He further argued that if government reforms were instituted there should be less fear of contacts with North Korea. Kim also expressed his belief that South Koreans did not like the Communists, and therefore the country could afford to take the risk of some contacts with the North through trade, communications and inter-zonal travel. It is noteworthy that twentythree other Assembly Independents had originally co-signed the petition but later withdrew their support after political pressure from the government.39 President Rhee was ‘furious’ at the petition and ordered the immediate arrest of all who had signed it – a course from which he was later dissuaded. Rhee mentioned to Ambassador Dowling ‘with considerable heat’ that he had received ‘a pro-Communist petition’ from opposition leaders. But this led Dowling to believe that this approach to uniﬁcation had ‘wider followings among certain segments of the Korean population than previously supposed’. The US Ambassador also estimated that the line taken by Kim would have increasingly greater appeal to the public.40 Probably in fear of the increase in popular sentiment favourable to ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’, the Rhee regime was determined to destroy the Progressive Party. On 13 January 1958, Cho Pong-am was arrested, together with other party ofﬁcials, on charges of espionage and violation of the National Security Act. In the following month, the government outlawed the Progressive party, ironically under the authority of American Military Government Ordinance 55.41 Given the fact that the government had suspected Cho’s ideological orientation,42 and that Communist inﬁltration in the South was increasing at that time (as will be seen later), the arrest of the progressive leader might have been caused partly by the government’s genuine fear of Communist subversion. Cho’s trial, however, clearly indicated that the main purpose of Rhee’s action was to suppress political opposition, and especially to control the idea of ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’. Cho Pong-am was indicted on charges that his advocacy of ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ by elections in North and South Korea denied the sovereignty of the ROK and consequently was subversive in nature, and

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that he had been in secret contact with North Korean agents. The second charge was based on the testimony of Yang Myong-sam, who was allegedly a recently arrested North Korean agent; Yang had confessed that he had travelled to the North, and transmitted money and instructions to the Progressive Party. But there was speculation that the Yang case had been fabricated by the prosecution, and this was eventually conﬁrmed. According to a US Counter-Intelligence Agency report, police and prosecution ofﬁcials admitted that the espionage case against Cho was ‘very weak’, and indicated that they were expending considerable effort on analysing his concept of ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ in order to classify it as a crime against the ROK.43 Although the prosecutor demanded the death sentence for Cho, the Seoul district court, in July, sentenced him to ﬁve years’ imprisonment. While the court acknowledged Cho’s contact with the Communists, it found that the Progressive Party’s platform did not violate the National Security Law.44 Three months later, however, the appellate court, reversing the decision of the district court, sentenced Cho to death. Obviously, the verdict was politically motivated. During the retrial, whereas the prosecution introduced no fresh evidence against the accused, Yang recanted his testimony regarding the connections between the Progressive Party and the Communists, claiming that his original confession had been obtained under duress. Nevertheless, the court not only found Cho Pong-am guilty of espionage, but also ruled that his uniﬁcation formula represented a plan to overthrow the ROK government. The judge was said to have been under political pressure from the government to deliver a harsher sentence. President Rhee was reportedly delighted with the death sentence.45 By identifying Cho Pong-am as a violator of the National Security Act, the Rhee regime apparently tried to ‘externalize threats directed at it in order both to portray such threats as “illegitimate” and to portray its repressive actions as “legitimate”’.46 That is, for the sake of regime security, Rhee sought to claim that the advocacy of peaceful uniﬁcation was ‘traitorous’. But such a hard-handed measure failed to suppress challenges to the regime. In March 1958, a month after Cho’s arrest, Ambassador Dowling expressed his doubt that the government’s adherence to military uniﬁcation now accorded with ‘majority public opinion’.47 From April, the Democratic Party, which had favoured a less aggressive policy but had refrained from directly expressing it mainly because of its conservative character, began to raise its voice on the matter, advocating the uniﬁcation of the country through elections in both North and South Korea.

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Furthermore, the punishment of the peaceful uniﬁcation idea had the danger of bringing about confusion among the South Korean public regarding the uniﬁcation policy of the Rhee government. It should be noted that the South Korean uniﬁcation proposal put forward at the Geneva Conference in May 1954, which advocated elections throughout Korea in accordance with the South Korean constitution, was not different from Cho’s uniﬁcation programme. The 1954 proposal remained the ofﬁcial uniﬁcation policy of the ROK, regardless of Rhee’s continued call to ‘march north’. Consequently, the labelling of the Progressive Party’s uniﬁcation formula as ‘proCommunist’ might erode the legitimacy of the government’s own policy. More fundamentally, considering the fact that, by and large, the South Korean public, in the informed view of the US Embassy, expressed a ‘lack of belief’ in the charges against Cho, the destruction of the Progressive Party probably dashed popular hopes of a truly democratic government, and further reduced the legitimacy of the Rhee regime. Internationally, too, the criminalization of Cho Pong-am’s policy had similar harmful implications for South Korea. It implied that both US and UN policy in Korea, which championed the uniﬁcation of the country by peaceful means, was criminal. Accordingly, Rhee’s action in externalizing internal threats ran the risk of undermining international support for South Korea, support that would provide security against the Communist threat. These internal and external dangers were aggravated when the northern regime launched a peace campaign.

THE COMMUNIST PEACE OFFENSIVE (1)

Political Consolidation and Economic Progress in North Korea

After the end of the Korean conﬂict, Premier Kim Il Sung’s major political slogans were ‘Peaceful uniﬁcation’, and ‘Everything for the postwar rehabilitation’. Kim publicly asserted that ‘it is wrong to think that war might soon break out again and that peaceful construction could not be undertaken because the armistice does not mean a complete peace’. The entire people ought to devote all their energies to postwar rehabilitation and construction, Kim argued, by ‘taking full advantage of the peace during the armistice’.48 A close look at developments in the northern half of Korea shows that the Communist regime had indeed given priority to consolidating

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its political power and restoring the economy, contrary to the Rhee regime’s charge that the Communists were preparing for further aggression in the guise of a ‘peaceful’ policy. Although the rebuilding of military capabilities was also one of its main goals, it seems that the North placed less emphasis on a military build-up than on postwar rehabilitation until 1962, when Kim Il Sung began once again to emphasize military preparation. Instead, North Korea heavily depended for the defence of the country on China and the Soviet Union.49 In terms of the political consolidation of his regime,50 Kim Il Sung had two tasks. First, it was necessary to reconstruct the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) which had been an essential instrument of power. For that purpose, the North Korean leader made efforts not only to strengthen the political and ideological unity of the party, but also to enlarge the party in terms of numbers, organizing the North Korean masses under tight control. Kim’s second task was to strengthen his own power by eliminating other factional leaders and their followers in the KWP who threatened his political position. Beginning with the purge of his most formidable rival, Pak Ho ˘n-yo ˘ng, in 1953, Kim Il Sung managed to remove all of his rival factions by 1958, successfully establishing himself as an undisputed leader.51 According to a Japanese analysis in 1961, after 1958, Kim’s regime became stable to the extent that factional groups no longer existed in the KWP.52 Post-Korean War economic rehabilitation was the most important goal for North Korea, considering the level of devastation of the economy as a result of the war.53 In August 1953, Kim Il Sung set forth a three-stage economic development programme which gave priority to the restoration and expansion of heavy industry: (1) a preparation stage for overall rehabilitation and construction of the national economy; (2) a three-year plan (1954–6) for the development of the economy to regain pre-war levels in all its branches; and (3) a ﬁveyear plan (1957–61) for the foundation of industrialization. In February 1957, North Korea announced the ‘successful overfulﬁlment’ of its three-year plan, claiming that industrial and agricultural production had been restored to pre-war levels. The Communist regime soon launched the ﬁve-year plan to consolidate ‘the economic foundation of socialism’ in the North. This plan was fulﬁlled well ahead of schedule – it took only two and a half years.54 According to foreign assessment of the results of the two economic plans, industrial production progressed considerably while production levels in agriculture and consumer goods were below target.55

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Table 6.2 Comparison of average growth rate between North and South Korea, 1953–60 Items National income National income per capita

North Korea

South Korea

21.0% 17.1%

4.9% 2.7%

Source: Pong S. Lee, ‘An Estimate of North Korea’s National Income’, Asian Survey, vol. 12, no. 6 (June 1972), pp. 518–26 for North Korea; The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1962 (Seoul: The Bank of Korea, 1962), pp. 12–13 for South Korea.

The ofﬁcial average growth rate in industry claimed by the Pyongyang government during the period 1956–9 was an unparalleled 45 per cent. Even with the recalculation of the growth rate through the adjustment of the exaggerated ﬁgures announced by North Korea, the ﬁgure was still extraordinarily high at 36 per cent per annum.56 In comparison with South Korea, the economic growth rate of North Korea was far higher (see Table 6.2). In 1959, according to one estimate, the GDP per capita of North Korea was $140, while that of South Korea was $81.57 However, it should be noted that a considerable gap was developing between gross national product and living standards. This gap was portrayed indirectly by a Western reporter who visited the North in 1959: ‘The actual amount of new building, particularly in Pyongyang, the showpiece of the Government, is impressive. But most of Pyongyang’s population … are housed in temporary wooden shacks.’ In his evaluation, living standards in North Korea were noticeably lower than those in neighbouring China, Japan, or South Asian countries, and real wages were low even by Asian standards.58 According to a defector from North Korea, all food in North Korea was rationed, and only 50 per cent of the daily food ration was rice while the remaining 50 per cent consisted of corn and potatoes. Due to the poor quality and inadequacy of food, many people were suffering from malnutrition.59 In sum, it appeared that the postwar reconstruction of North Korea was concentrated on industrial development at the expense of the living conditions of the people. It cannot be denied, however, that the economic rehabilitation in the North was well advanced, compared with that in the South.

118 (2)

State Security and Regime Security The North Korean Peace Offensive and Economic Appeal

Since the end of the Korean War, Kim Il Sung had advocated ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’. To examine Kim’s objectives in his peaceful gesture, it is necessary to understand what he meant by uniﬁcation. For Kim, national uniﬁcation was the basic ‘revolutionary task’ to overthrow ‘the aggressive forces of US imperialism and their ushers and allies’, and to free the people in South Korea ‘from imperialist and feudal oppression and exploitation’. The revolution was to be achieved in South Korea, according to Kim, by raising the political consciousness of the people in the South through effective ‘political work’. By ‘political work’, Kim Il Sung meant strengthening the inﬂuence of the northern half of Korea over the southern people, and inducing the broad popular masses of South Korea to support North Korea. In short, ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ involved a sustained political campaign that would culminate in a revolution to overthrow ‘the enemies of the people’.60 As part of the political campaign, the North had made an effort to establish contacts and bases of operation in the South. In particular, Communist agents considerably increased their activities in the ROK from 1957, encouraged both by South Koreans’ growing dissatisfaction with the Rhee regime, and by economic success in the North. The northern agents dispatched to the South consisted mostly of former South Korean residents who had gone to the North during the Korean War. These agents tried to stir up anti-Rhee government sentiment by advertising both the ‘accomplishments’ of the Pyongyang regime and its ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ formula. Few of their missions, according to a captured high-level Korean agent, were related to military or terrorist acts.61 Another important tactic in the North Korean peace offensive was to win support from the South Korean populace by making North Korea economically attractive. Thus, Pyongyang’s propaganda constantly stressed that conditions in the North were akin to ‘paradise’ in comparison with the ‘miserable, and hopeless’ situation of the South. Whenever they made proposals of ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’, the Communists included the item of economic and cultural exchange between North and South Korea – e.g., establishing commercial and ﬁnancial relations, free postal communication, and free travel for Koreans. They also offered the export of items in short supply in the South such as electricity, coal, cement, and chemical fertilizers.62 With the allegedly successful performance of its economic plans, and with the completion of political consolidation, the Kim Il Sung

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regime appeared conﬁdent in launching its peace offensive. For example, in February 1958, Kim said: ‘If the South Korean people see with their own eyes the superiority of our socialist system, it is clear that they will raise their hands in favor of us, not for Syngman Rhee.’63 Considering the poor living standards of North Korea, as suggested earlier, this statement was quite a bold one. Nevertheless, Kim presumably resorted to such propaganda for psychological effect, relying on the fact that the South Koreans too were suffering from economic difﬁculties. In the same month, Pyongyang put forward a uniﬁcation proposal involving: (1) simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea; (2) ‘all-Korean free elections’ under the supervision of ‘neutral nations’; (3) negotiations between North and South Korea regarding North–South economic and cultural exchanges, and freedom of movement; and (4) reduction of North and South Korean armed forces to minimum levels. The North Korean proposal was dramatized by the joint announcement between Kim Il Sung and Zhou Enlai that the Chinese Communist troops would be withdrawn from North Korea by the end of 1958.64 It is difﬁcult to estimate the inﬂuence of the peace propaganda and economic appeals to the South Korean people. But it is most unlikely that the Communist regime gained any tangible support from the southern populace. According to a US Embassy assessment, despite increased Communist subversive activities, there was no evidence that the integrity of the government, the military establishment, or other ROK institutions was endangered. The northern Communists themselves were largely responsible for this failure. Their behaviour toward the South Korean population during the Korean War had been harsh, and had instilled a deep and irreparable antagonism towards the Communists in the people of the South. Thus, most South Koreans were not persuaded by North Korean propaganda, even if they were not satisﬁed with the Rhee government.65 It cannot be denied that South Korea was, at least potentially, vulnerable to the North Korean peace offensive. But this fact was mainly attributable to the misconduct of the Rhee regime. First, when Premier Kim was trying to overthrow South Korea by psychologically appealing to the southern people, President Rhee paid little attention to the social and economic demands of his people, partly because of his preoccupation with the military threat, and partly because of his concern about regime security. The consequences were serious enough to lead Ambassador Dowling to draw the following conclusion:

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The people [in the South] have little faith in the government or sense of identiﬁcation with it … There is little awareness of improvement in the lot of the average man; on the contrary, dissatisfaction is sharpened by increased awareness of high living standards elsewhere. Discontent with the present state of affairs, in the absence of constructive and effective leadership, might eventually result in the abandonment of Free World principles in favor of extremist ideologies.66 Secondly, the South Korean government was not prepared to deal effectively with the peace offensive from the North because President Rhee had so strongly adhered to uniﬁcation by military means. Seoul did little about the uniﬁcation issue except react negatively to Pyongyang’s proposals without devising any workable countermeasures. As a result, the North Korean government could easily seize the strategic initiative in its relations with South Korea over the uniﬁcation issue. Thirdly, the Rhee regime’s hard-line measures to repress any movement towards ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ within South Korea, as shown in the case of the Progressive Party, provided the northern counterpart with a good opportunity to propagandize the ‘inferior’ conditions in the South. In an interview with a foreign pressman, Kim Il Sung conﬁdently attacked the southern government on the grounds that ‘Today even elementary democratic rights are being trampled in [S]outh Korea. Even those who refer to “peaceful reuniﬁcation” are punished by the “law”.’67 Finally, the rigid attitude of the ROK government in the face of the various peace proposals of the DPRK government ran the risk of diminishing international support for the former. For example, when Pyongyang made the February 1958 proposals, Seoul’s response was indeed cool, arguing that the North Koreans were ‘merely talking in their sleep’, and that their proposal was ‘not worthy of consideration’. As for the withdrawal of Chinese troops, ROK ofﬁcials regarded it as mere re-stationing of Communist forces at positions from which a new attack could be quickly and easily launched upon South Korea.68 However, the February 1957 Communist peace proposal touched off a series of consultations among the Sixteen nations that participated in the Korean War for a possible uniﬁcation formula, which lasted about a year. Many of the Sixteen showed ﬂexible views on the Korean problem, proposing some uniﬁcation measures which were more favourable to the North than the South. For instance, Canada suggested all Korean

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elections under UN ‘auspices’ instead of ‘supervision’, in response to the North’s refusal of UN ‘supervision’. In the end, no changes of position resulted from all this activity, but it demonstrated a possible sideeffect of Rhee’s rigid uniﬁcation policy.69

CONCLUSION According to the literature on the relationship between legitimacy and regime security, there are three general types of security strategies adopted by regimes which lack political legitimacy: (1) using repressive methods to destroy internal political opponents; (2) diversionary tactics, i.e. provoking external enemies to distract attention from the situation at home; and (3) developing and arming substantial military forces as effective wielders of power. These measures to ensure domestic power, however, tend to result in increasing threats not only against regime security per se but also against state security.70 During the period under examination, the Rhee regime, facing its lack of legitimacy, exhibited all of these strategies in some degree in the effort to maintain its rule. First of all, the Liberal regime suppressed the growing strength of the opposition by oppressive methods. In particular, in its obsession with regime survival, the ruling elite even attempted to kill the Vice-President who belonged to the opposition party, as a pre-emptive measure against his constitutional right to inherit power should the old President die. Political repression, however, only served to turn the public against the government. Secondly, by connecting the Progressive Party’s advocacy of ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ with Communist subversion, the Rhee regime sought to control internal challenges to its ‘march north’ policy by representing them as external threats. This led to a contradiction in the government’s own uniﬁcation policy, and undermined its credibility. In addition, the attack on the ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ scheme held the danger of decreasing support for South Korea within the international community, which favoured a political solution to the Korean problem. Thirdly, President Rhee tried to maintain ROK armed forces at a level that required increased military spending at the expense of economic development. In Rhee’s case, however, the militarization of the country was more the result of Rhee’s preoccupation with the threat from the Communist North than of his intention to use military forces domestically.71 Whatever his motivation for the military build-up,

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Rhee’s policy was harmful to both regime and state security. While focusing on military preparation, the Rhee government failed to meet the public desire for economic development, and this further increased criticism against the government. More importantly, the lack of constructive economic policies to improve the people’s living standards deepened popular dissatisfaction to a point which the North Korean peace offensive and economic propaganda attempted to exploit. Thanks to strong anti-Communist sentiment in the South, the Communist peace offensive was unlikely to subvert South Korea. However, as an American ofﬁcial noted, the Communist danger remained a ‘potential’ danger which ‘increases day by day as President Rhee and his Government fail to offer believable national goals’.72 Finally, it should be pointed out that Rhee’s emphasis on a military build-up consequently provided the military with considerable political power. President Rhee himself was able to control the increasing power of the military mainly by using the tactic of ‘divide and rule’.73 But it is all too likely that the growing inﬂuence of the military sector during the Rhee regime was one source of the military coup that occurred in 1961, a year after Rhee’s downfall.

7 The Domestic Use of State Security and the Collapse of the Rhee Regime, December 1958–April 1960 ‘We must not kill democracy in the name of anti-Communism, and the cause of anti-communism must not be used by any means to prolong and to maintain the incumbent corrupt and obsolete regime.’ (Cho Pyo ˘ng-ok, 20 May 1959) ‘If it is the wish of the people, I will resign from presidential ofﬁce … I have one thing to ask the people: we should bear in mind that even at this moment, Communist forces are seeking every opportunity to invade us, and therefore, we should do our best not to give them such an opportunity.’ (Syngman Rhee, 26 April 1960) The two years following the 1956 presidential election had witnessed widespread popular dissatisfaction with the Rhee government and the ruling Liberal Party (LP) on the one hand, and increasing popularity for the Democratic Party (DP) on the other. As the 1960 presidential election approached, Democratic Party leaders had the ‘genuine fear’ that the Rhee regime was determined to retain power by whatever means necessary.1 This fear was not groundless. Alarmed by the results of the May 1958 general elections, which conﬁrmed the diminution of their popularity to a dangerous level, key elements in the LP and the government, especially the power-oriented ‘hard-liners’, moved to ensure their victory in the forthcoming presidential contest, devising heavyhanded measures to suppress the opposition. Their major tactic for securing power was to emphasize the Communist threat and the need to enhance national security to combat that threat. This tactic, however, eventually caused the collapse of their regime in April 1960. 123

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The main focus of this chapter is to examine how the Rhee regime repressed opposition forces in the name of national security and/or anti-Communism, and what the role of President Syngman Rhee was in that process. The ﬁrst section will analyze Rhee’s level of control over his regime. Secondly, a series of hard-line measures to strangle the opposition – the revised National Security Law, the closure of an anti-government newspaper, and the execution of a Progressive Party leader – will be examined. Finally, the process of Rhee’s downfall following the 1960 presidential election will be discussed.

THE WEAKENING OF RHEE’S CONTROL OVER POLITICAL AFFAIRS While President Rhee’s ultimate authority and control remained virtually as strong as ever, there had been indications, especially since early 1958, that his ﬁrm grip on political affairs was weakening. This seemed to be particularly true of administrative affairs and matters regarding the Liberal Party – since 1956, Rhee had entrusted considerable political responsibility for these matters to Yi Ki-pung. According to a US source, although Rhee still endeavoured to ‘keep his ﬁnger on’ all major policies, he encouraged his principal subordinates to take greater initiative. The report also pointed out that his policy statements were ‘less heated and aggressive’ than in past years.2 Rhee’s declining participation in governmental affairs was largely attributable to his age – he was 83 in 1958. Rhee probably could no longer, either physically or mentally, keep in close personal touch with the whole range of government activities. In fact, Rhee’s age had long been of concern to many of his acquaintances. For example, as early as 1951, a US ofﬁcial in Korea remarked that Rhee was senile. William Lacy, the former American Ambassador in Seoul, also noted in 1955 that Rhee was approaching senility.3 Nevertheless, until 1958 the effect of age had not been so serious – regular health examinations found no critical problems with Rhee’s physical and mental health.4 From the latter part of 1958, however, there were increasing indications that the condition of the aging President had deteriorated to such a degree as to affect his ability to perform his duties as leader. In October 1958, an American General who had had a meeting with Rhee, speculated that the President appeared to be ‘failing mentally’: Rhee’s mind tended to wander, and he had difﬁculty with his memory.

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It was later conﬁrmed by a medical report that despite Rhee’s remarkable physical condition there was ‘clear evidence of reduction in mental acuity’, and that he was ‘noticeably feebler in voice and gait’. Ambassador Dowling also observed a ‘marked deterioration’ in Rhee’s condition. The South Korean President was ‘increasingly forgetful’, according to Dowling’s report of August 1959, and it was necessary to ‘explain and re-explain ideas and suggestions’ before he understood their meaning or signiﬁcance. The report added that Rhee’s deterioration appeared to be ‘painfully obvious one day and far less evident the next’.5 Unable to be as active intellectually as before, Syngman Rhee became increasingly dependent on information supplied to him by his subordinates. In particular, Mrs Francesca Rhee, the Austrian wife of the President, in collaboration with Park Chan-il, the Presidential Assistant, strictly controlled and limited the matters brought to Rhee’s attention, removing those which might excite or disturb him.6 As Rhee’s physical and mental powers diminished, Rhee was gradually isolated from the uncontrolled outside information needed for effective leadership. The political implications of this trend were crucial: an increasing number of important decisions were made by Rhee’s subordinates. Still, President Rhee retained the ultimate authority to the extent that his followers would not make any important decision without his consent. With tendentious presentations, however, it was not difﬁcult for them to obtain the decisions that they advocated. The aging President, in a press conference in February 1959, stated that ‘it is no longer necessary for me to oversee the details of the activities in each of the executive departments. Men in high ofﬁce are largely outstanding administrators and are doing very well.’7 But the reality was far from what Rhee perceived. ‘Deprived of the counsel of honest and candid advisers,’ as an opposition leader pointed out, Rhee was ‘not aware of the manner in which his policies were implemented, of the full nature of the problems which they confronted, or of the changing nature of the domestic political situation.’8 Indeed, by 1958 the Liberal Party and the government were dominated by the ‘hard’ faction partly because of Yi Ki-pung’s ineffectual leadership in the face of the strengthening opposition, and partly because of President Rhee’s inclination to believe that authoritarian control of the opposition was necessary to cope with the Communist threat.9 It was the ‘hard-liners’ who shaped the domestic policies in the ﬁnal years of the Rhee regime. They sought desperately for a means to ensure their future by securing Rhee’s re-election and the

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election of a Liberal vice-president in the forthcoming presidential race. They therefore set out to suppress the opposition forces, whose popularity was growing.

THE EXTERNALIZATION OF INTERNAL THREATS AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF REPRESSIVE RULE (1)

The Strengthening of the National Security Law

When the National Assembly convened in the autumn of 1958, the government and Liberal Party introduced a number of highly controversial bills. First, by revising the Local Autonomy Law, they sought to make the post of city or town mayor an appointed rather than an elective post. The Liberals asserted that this measure was essential to raise the calibre of local ofﬁcials. The Democrats, on the other hand, suggested that it was designed to ensure Liberal control of local governments, which in recent years had increasingly been dominated by the Democrats. Secondly, the Liberals also introduced a bill to strengthen the powers of the police, although it was later withdrawn in the face of strong press criticism. Most important, the Rhee regime presented to the Assembly the new National Security Law with extensive revisions to the existing law of the same title. The amendment was purportedly aimed at Communist subversion but permitted tightened restrictions on political activity and press freedom.10 The original draft amendment to the National Security Law had been proposed by the Rhee government in August 1958. In the face of the opposition arguments that this ‘loosely drafted bill’ could be a threat to Korean civil liberties, the ROK government submitted a revised draft. Although the new draft was an improvement over the previous one in some respects, no improvements were made in the dangerously loose deﬁnition of espionage activity. Rather, the bill became even more objectionable, and susceptible to government abuse by adding a controversial provision. It was to penalize ‘anyone who has beneﬁted the enemy by disturbing the people by reporting or spreading false facts or distorted news’ (Article 17, paragraph 5).11 Needless to say, the administration and the LP maintained that the proposed legislation was solely designed to enable the government to cope more effectively with ‘increasing’ Communist subversion. The State Council of the ROK government, in a statement signed by all cabinet ministers, urged the passage of the new National Security

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Law. It claimed that South Korea was ‘engaged in a life-and-death struggle for freedom against the North Korean Communist puppet regime’. Existing laws, it added, were ‘inadequate to deal completely with North Korean agents’ whose subversive activities were so extensive. President Rhee emphasized that the bill was a prerequisite for ‘maintaining the national interest and security’ of South Korea.12 Critics of the bill quickly pointed out, however, that the same provisions could be used to silence the opposition as well as the press, and argued that this in fact was the primary purpose of the bill. In particular, the Democratic Party vigorously denounced the proposed amendments as primarily designed to hobble the opposition in the forthcoming presidential election on the pretext of increased antiCommunist activity. It also argued that existing laws were sufﬁcient to handle the dangers to national security. Opposition was not conﬁned to the Democrats. The independent press, as well as leading non-political ﬁgures and organizations including the Korean Bar Association, joined in attacking the proposed legislation. Notably, some leading Liberals also spoke ‘privately but strongly’ against the revision.13 There were a number of indications that the National Security Law was politically motivated. Hong Chin-ki, the Minister of Justice, told an American Embassy ofﬁcer on a highly conﬁdential basis that the most controversial provision of the law (Article 17, paragraph 5, quoted above) had originated with Liberal Party members who had the ‘suppression of [the] opposition in mind’. In addition, when Ambassador Dowling suggested in a conversation that, according to US intelligence, the current increase in the number of North Korean espionage agents was not sufﬁcient to justify a strengthened security law, despite continued Communist subversive efforts, the Minister of Justice accepted his argument.14 Other LP members also acknowledged the political motivation of the law. Legislator Cho Sun commented to the US Embassy that the Liberals had introduced the bill ‘to maintain and perpetuate the Liberal Party’s political domination’. Han Hu ˘i-so ˘k, the Vice-Speaker of the Assembly, and a hard-line Liberal member, later confessed in his memoirs that the Liberals added Article 17 to the original draft in order to prevent the Democrats from ‘libelling’ the government with ‘false facts’.15 Declaring that they would wage a ‘powerful struggle’ to eliminate the ‘dangerous aspects’ of the National Security Law, the Democrats used various tactics to block the passage of the bill. Outside the Assembly, they sought to arouse popular opposition by holding public

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meetings to protest against the law. The government responded by banning all public meetings and demonstrations in Seoul on the grounds that the police had uncovered information about a ‘major Communist plot to subvert the country’. Within the Assembly hall, the Democrats sought to modify objectionable features of the bill in the Legislation and Justice Committee. However, on December 19, taking advantage of opposition members’ tardiness at a meeting of the Committee, the Liberals unanimously approved the bill (with no revisions) in a three-minute session.16 Because of the unprincipled tactics of the Liberals in the Committee the Democrats resolved to prevent a similar surprise passage in the Assembly plenary session. The Democratic Assemblymen, joined by ﬁve independents, began a sit-down strike in the Assembly Chamber. On December 24, the ruling party reacted with force. While specially mobilized ‘security guards’, some 300 in strength, expelled opposition legislators from the Chamber and locked them in a basement restaurant, the Liberals passed the National Security Law with only inconsequential amendments. The government promulgated the new law on December 26. The DP demanded ‘nulliﬁcation’ of the legislation, and called for a ‘nation-wide protest campaign’ against it. Claiming that the enactment was ‘illegal’, an independent newspaper bitterly stated that ‘14 years of democratic development was destroyed in one day’.17 Not only the contents of the security bill, but also the manner in which it was enacted, had drawn the serious attention of the United States. Before the passage of the bill, the Eisenhower administration, through both formal and informal channels, had tried in vain to persuade the ROK government to delete the problematic provisions of the law. According to a British source, Washington considered the law a ‘hunting licence’ under which virtually every opposition could be ‘hauled in for treason’.18 American ofﬁcials also feared that the political crisis in South Korea would cost the ROK international support, tarnish its international standing, and play into the hands of the Communists. Thus, they asserted that the South Korean government should approach the threat of Communist subversion and espionage in a ‘more conﬁdent, a more calm and, thus, a more effective manner’. They also advised that the strength and ability of the ROK to deal with Communist subversion lay in democratic government and principles, including freedom of the press and of political activities.19 A day after the passage of the bill, President Eisenhower sent a letter to President Rhee. The US President stated in his letter that the manner

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in which the law had been adopted by the National Assembly ‘greatly troubled’ him. In addition, the Eisenhower administration recalled Ambassador Dowling to Washington for consultation.20 President Rhee, however, asserted that the domestic ‘objection to the security law’ (not the law itself) had been ‘politically inspired’. He considered that US expression of concern about South Korea’s political problems stemmed from ‘misleading reports and [an] inadequate understanding’ of the situation in Korea. In addition, he criticized the US for attempting to interfere in the domestic affairs of his country.21 It was Syngman Rhee himself, however, who had received ‘misleading reports’ and had an ‘inadequate understanding’ of what was going on in his country, surrounded by the so-called ‘human curtain’. Ambassador Dowling’s telegram of December 27 regarding his meeting with Rhee is worth quoting at length in order to understand the situation: After some stalling by [the] Minister of Foreign Affairs and … [the] Vice Minister which was obviously designed … to convey hint that I should not burden President Rhee with recital details of recent National Assembly action, appointment was made … President Rhee … after reading President [Eisenhower]’s message [of December 25] attentively, remarked that there seemed to be impression that Korea had violated democratic principles. ‘Is this correct,’ he asked. I replied that it was certainly correct … President Rhee then asked ‘what do you think I should do’, but without waiting for my reply launched into 45-minute version of 1952 events in Pusan, in which he demonstrated to his satisfaction that 1) there had been connection between his opponents and [the] Communists and that similar connection probably existed today between [the] Communists and [the] DP; and 2) that foreign attempts … to intervene in Korea’s domestic affairs [had been] defeated, as would such attempt today. He implied that Muccio [then US Ambassador] had connived against him by reporting falsely to Washington, and … he had some hope I would not make [the] same error … In [the] course of his summing up, he referred to reports [that the] Embassy had been ‘negotiating’ with [the] DP. I said that American opinion could hardly be expected to understand LP action in acting while DP members were conﬁned to [the] basement of [the Assembly] building. President Rhee interrupted me, and with air of surprise asked [the] Vice Minister if it were true [that] DP members were under conﬁnement – [the] Vice Minister

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hesitated, hedged, and ﬁnally avoided direct answer despite reiterated questions from President Rhee and my urging. Exchange on this subject ended with President Rhee charging him with preparing full report on [the] incident.22 Uninformed of the details of the event, the President appeared to be convinced of the necessity for an amended security law, and believed that the Communists had so deeply penetrated the country that they were connected with the Democratic Party. Although the DP had been noted for its ﬁrm anti-Communist attitude, Rhee appeared to have been convinced by the ‘hard’ faction that the DP had Communist elements in it, as Ambassador Dowling observed.23 It cannot have been difﬁcult to convince Rhee of Communist involvement in the DP because he had been inclined to suspect any opposition to him of being Communist-inspired. By fabricating connections between the Democrats and the Communists, this faction within the LP probably sought to justify political oppression; at the very least, they could appeal to the public to prevent the country being run by a ‘Communist-inﬁltrated’ party. On the one hand, Rhee repeatedly pledged that the security law had no purpose other than to combat Communist subversion. On the other hand, he strongly indicated that in the struggle against Communist subversion, ‘some departure from democratic processes would be necessary’.24 Given the situation, political suppression of the opposition seemed inevitable as long as Rhee identiﬁed the opposition party as a Communist organization. (2)

The Closure of an Anti-Government Newspaper

‘Thus far, the press [of South Korea], including papers most critical of the government,’ according to a US intelligence analysis of January 1959, ‘has apparently been able to publish without interference.’25 With the enactment of the new National Security Law, however, the Rhee regime was prepared to tame the anti-government press. It selected the Kyunghyang Shinmun, one of the most outspoken antigovernment papers, as its foremost target. Among other things, the newspaper publicly and enthusiastically supported Chang Myo ˘n the Vice-President and DP member. From as early as January 1959, there were speculations that the government would close down the Kyunghyang Shinmun.26 Probably well aware that any drastic move against the press would produce a seriously adverse international

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reaction, the Rhee government took cautious steps to muzzle the newspaper. In February 1959, the police began to investigate a case involving a column published in the Kyunghyang Shinmun of February 4. In the column, Chu Yo-han, an editorial writer of the paper as well as a Democratic Assemblyman, introduced an article written by an American professor about the ‘tyranny of the majority’, which criticized proportional representation. He added at the end that ‘A true majority, of course, is not expressed solely by election … If elections are not capable of determining a true majority, there may be another way of doing it … that is what we call a revolution.’ On February 28, the Seoul District Prosecutor indicted Chu and the publisher of the Kyunghyang Shinmun for ‘instigation and propagation of a revolution against the government’.27 While speculation that the Kyunghyang Shinmun would be closed continued, the owner of the paper tried to appease the government with the publisher’s resignation. But the Rhee government showed its determination by arresting two reporters on the Kyunghyang Shinmun, on April 4, for the violation of the National Security Law. It was the ﬁrst direct use of the security law against the press. One news reporter had reported the arrest of a suspected Communist spy by the police – information given to him by the police with a request not to publish it. Another one had reported the issuance of an arrest warrant for another suspected spy. The accusation stated that, by publishing their reports, they had alerted the spies’ confederates, who were thus able to avoid arrest.28 The Kyunghyang Shinmun believed that this was another attempt by the government to secure evidence to justify the paper’s eventual closure, or at least to intimidate it into modifying its policy. This view was based on the fact that though the arrested reporters appeared to have acted irresponsibly by revealing materials which they knew should be kept in conﬁdence, this was standard procedure in Korean press operations. Furthermore, there was no proof either that confederates, if they existed, were alerted by the news stories, or that the reporters had intended to alert them. American observers regarded the case as part of the continuing ‘war of nerves’ against the Kyunghyang Shinmun which maintained a ‘stoutly’ antigovernment position.29 As had been foreseen, on April 30, the Ofﬁce of Public Information (OPI) cancelled the publishing licence of the Kyunghyang Shinmun. In addition to the above-mentioned two cases, the OPI listed three more alleged offences in which the newspaper had published ‘false or dis-

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torted’ reports. Although the paper was responsible for publishing incorrect reports, this was not a serious enough offence to bring about closure. The cancellation of the licence was taken, somewhat unexpectedly, under US Military Ordinance 88. It seemed that the government was trying to avoid the predictable criticism that it had used the controversial security law to repress the pro-opposition paper. Military Ordinance 88 was to protect the ‘security of the nation and safeguard the legitimate right of the free press’; it had had been legislated in order to block Communist propaganda in 1946. As the legality of the action was questioned by critics, the Director of the OPI justiﬁed his action with a blunt statement that the government could take appropriate administrative action in any situation which, in its opinion, might have a harmful inﬂuence on the state, prior to judicial judgement of the legality of the situation.30 Undoubtedly, the closing of the pro-opposition paper was motivated by partisan considerations. As implied earlier, the government and the Liberal Party had sought to curb opposition newspapers, and had demonstrated increasing sensitivity towards and impatience with ‘irresponsible opposition press attacks’ on their policies. Most of all, the fact that the Kyunghyang Shinmun was an ardent supporter of Chang Myo ˘n disturbed the Liberals who desperately wished to remove him from the vice-presidency. According to an American military intelligence source, in January 1959, the Korean National Police had been investigating alleged connections between Vice-President Chang and the Communists, and was planning to use the National Security Law against him. This plot, however, had been dropped because of the likely international repercussions. Instead, the LP and the government decided to weaken Chang’s position by eliminating his major sponsor. They expected that with the cancellation of the publishing licence the integrity and operational power of the Kyunghyang Shinmun would be ‘completely destroyed’, and Chang would thus have his ‘mouth shut’.31 Another purpose of the closure seemed to be to encourage factional struggles within the Democratic Party in the context that the suppressed paper was closely connected with the ‘new’ faction of the DP. It was said to be a ‘calculated move’ by the LP to weaken the ‘new’ faction in favour of the ‘old’ faction of the DP. There were indeed signs that some Democrats disagreed over how the party should deal with the Kyunghyang Shinmun case.32 There was no suggestion that President Rhee had participated in the decision-making process leading to the closure, except for Rhee’s comment in the State Council that the closing of the Kyunghyang

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Shinmun was ‘appropriate’, as it had been taken in accordance with the law. According to Han Bae-ho’s investigation, based on interviews with politicians involved in the decision to cancel the paper’s licence, it was the Justice Minister, the Home Minister and the OPI Director who, with the help of the ‘tough’ Liberals, led the plan to close down the opposition paper. After they had made the ﬁnal decision, they obtained the President’s consent. Probably the ‘hard-liners’ could conﬁdently assume that they would get Rhee’s ex post facto approval because Rhee had a negative view of the press in South Korea.33 Facing a storm of protest against the action to muzzle the press, the OPI Director declared on May 19 that the press was still free, and promised that the freedom of every Korean would be respected and protected with the maximum power of the government. He added, however, that the government’s action should not be evaluated on the basis of statements from ‘malcontents, the politically motivated, and those who might be inspired by Communism’. Despite strong pressure from many quarters, the ROK government reconﬁrmed the closure of the Kyunghyang Shinmun in July. It remained closed until after the removal of the Rhee regime in April 1960. (3)

The Execution of a Progressive Party Leader

In 1958, Cho Pong-am, the leader of the Progressive Party, had been arrested and indicted on a ﬂimsy charge of espionage and subversion, and his party had been outlawed. Cho had been sentenced to death by the appellate court, apparently for political reasons (see Chapter 6). In February 1959, the Supreme Court found Cho Pong-am guilty of espionage and violation of the National Security Law, conﬁrming his death sentence. As for the Progressive Party, the court stated that the platform of the party did not violate the ROK Constitution. Nevertheless, it ruled that the party was illegal since it was founded and headed by a ‘collaborator’ with the Communist regime. The justiﬁcation of the Supreme Court for the continued outlawing of the Progressive Party seemed to reﬂect government pressure to outlaw the party.34 Judicial independence had indeed been shaken. In October 1958, a new law governing the reappointment of judges was enacted, which gave the President power of veto over the appointment recommendations submitted to him by senior jurists. As the opposition feared, the new law became a weapon with which the government could ‘purge’

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judges who were considered unfriendly to it. By April, the Rhee administration had rejected 13 of the 52 reappointment recommendations submitted to it, without giving the judiciary or the public any reasons for its veto. The US Embassy’s analysis of the list of the rejected judges suggested that those who had taken a mild approach in espionage cases while taking a strict approach to election fraud cases suffered most. Several judges also alleged that political motives were involved in the action.35 Cho Pong-am, on May 5, ﬁled a request for re-examination of the Supreme Court’s February 27 verdict sentencing him to death. Prosecutor O Che-to, who handled the case for the government, told an American Embassy ofﬁcer that he was conﬁdent that Cho’s application for re-examination would be turned down by the Supreme Court. He added that the Minister of Justice, who now had the necessary documents to take ﬁnal action at any time, was ‘morally’ if not legally bound to await the outcome of the re-examination appeal. No sooner had the ‘moral’ constraint been removed than the Justice Minister ordered the execution of Cho. The Progressive Party leader was hanged on July 31, just one day after the Supreme Court had rejected the re-examination appeal.36 Surprised by the ‘sudden and highly questionable’ execution of Cho Pong-am, the US government instructed Ambassador Dowling to see President Rhee and point out the international damage that the action would cause. When Dowling met the Foreign Minister instead of the President (who was away on a trip), the latter offered the routine argument that the ROK government must maintain a ‘stringent defence against Communism’, something that he feared was not always understood abroad. Domestically, according to a US Embassy report, majority opinion showed ‘shock, surprise and regret’, accusing the government of having ‘unjustly’ done away with its political opponent. The report also observed that even many of those who had not been sympathetic with Cho or his policies privately expressed criticism of the government’s action.37 In order to block growing criticism of this ruthless action, the Director of the National Police, on August 1, warned the press not to feature any follow-up stories on the circumstances of Cho’s execution. The Director stated that publication of such stories was ‘contrary to law’, and said that they would not only ‘excite popular sentiment’, but also ‘beneﬁt the enemy’. The warning provoked angry protests by the press and the opposition. Forced to explain the legal basis of his warning, the Police Director pointed to the 1921 Japanese

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Government General Order regarding ‘graves, funeral ceremonies, and photographs of dead criminals’. This was challenged as ‘nonsense’.38 The execution of the opposition leader, as with the two earlier cases, was carried out on the decision of the ‘hard-liners’ in the ruling circle. Their message to the opposition seemed to be clear: they were determined to take all necessary steps to maintain power. Although the hard-liners themselves were responsible for the death of Cho, they would not have dared to do it without Rhee’s agreement. Rhee, after all, had ﬁrmly believed that Cho Pong-am was indeed a Communist, and wanted him removed; it cannot have been difﬁcult for the hard faction to obtain Rhee’s approval for Cho’s execution.39 As examined in the above three cases, under the guise of combating the threat of Communist subversion, the Rhee regime suppressed political activities and expressions which were not favourable to it. Exaggerating the Communist threat to national security, the ruling party legislated a politically motivated security law, and attacked its political opponents with that law. When it was difﬁcult to apply the National Security Law, they used whatever regulations might be applicable – the US Military Ordinance of 1946, and even the Japanese Government General Order of 1921. Indeed, leaders of the LP and the government used the cause of national security as a major weapon to secure their regime from internal political attacks. The externalization of the internal threat, however, endangered state security. According to a CIA analysis, the effectiveness of ROK countersubversion agencies, especially that of the National Police, was hampered since these agencies continued to be utilized by the government as a political instrument. In addition, the counter-espionage campaign suffered from the Rhee government’s propensity to label any political opposition as ‘Communist’. US Assistant Secretary of State, Robertson, feared that political utilization of the Communist threat could ‘lead to the eventual overthrow of the ROK by giving ammunition to the real foes’ of South Korea.40 This apprehension was partly realized when the Koreans in Japan were repatriated to the Communist North. (4) The Real External Threat: The Repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea Since its allegedly successful economic reconstruction and political consolidation around 1958, North Korea had intensiﬁed its psychological warfare, aimed at invading South Korea not militarily, but

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politically and economically. The Communist regime in the North continued to use this strategy, exploiting the aggravated internal situation in the South described above. In October 1959, the Pyongyang government sent letters to a number of Western countries appealing for a peaceful solution to the Korean question. In the letters, the North Korean regime requested international support for its peaceful uniﬁcation proposal of February 1958, and emphasized that the South Korean people were facing ‘extreme political confusion, poverty, degradation, and moral depravity’.41 Despite the increasingly repressive nature of the Rhee regime, there was, as in previous years, no sign that any signiﬁcant portion of the general population in the South looked to the North for an alternative to their present situation. In fact, as will be seen later, no Communist involvement was found in Rhee’s downfall. The northern Communists, however, successfully persuaded the Koreans in Japan that the North was a better place to live. From December 1959 to May 1960, nearly 20,000 Korean residents left Japan for North Korea, mainly for economic reasons. After the end of the Second World War, about 700,000 Korean nationals remained in Japan. Most of the Koreans in Japan were poor, discontented, somewhat crime-prone, and discriminated against by the Japanese. They were, in general, considered ‘undesirable’ by the Japanese. Accordingly, the Japanese wanted to deport as many as possible. While the South Korean government was not really interested in their welfare, the North Korean government was eager to cultivate them, and encouraged the development of anti-ROK sentiments among this group.42 In February 1959, the Japanese government decided to permit ‘voluntary’ repatriation of Koreans from Japan to North Korea, and the repatriation began on 14 December when 975 Koreans sailed for the northern part of Korea. Despite vigorous protests from the South, the repatriation continued until the next year.43 The repatriation was said to be the ﬁrst case in which ‘persons living in the Free World chose in large numbers to live under Communism instead’.44 Needless to say, the North exploited the case in propagandizing its ‘victory’ over the South. Kim Il Sung joyfully declared that the ‘mass repatriation’ of the Koreans from Japan to North Korea, the ‘socialist homeland’, signiﬁed a ‘victory’ not only for the North Koreans, but also for all socialist countries. As for South Korea, this was a major setback, both politically and economically, in its competition with North Korea. As an observer

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pointed out, the reasons behind this reverse migration were mainly economic: ‘in North Korea they [many of the unemployed Korean residents] were offered jobs and homes … Moreover the North Korean regime had spent considerable sums of money in organizing educational facilities and propaganda among the Korean minority in Japan. But the real lesson of the repatriation was the economic success of North Korea in contrast with the conditions in South Korea.’45 The North Korean economic appeal became more effective because of the indifference of the South Korean government to the welfare of its people abroad. In March 1959, a leader of the Mindan (Korean Residents Corps), a right-wing organization of Korean residents in Japan, informed the US Embassy that many Koreans in Japan were dissatisﬁed with South Korea because of its failure to take a ‘more active and tangible’ interest in their welfare. In June, some of the leaders of the Mindan, who were supposed to support the ROK, announced that they could ‘no longer trust or support [the] present Liberal Party or the government’ of South Korea. Apparently shocked by the statement, the Rhee government made hasty efforts to appease the discontented brethren in Japan. The Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs reportedly stated that the government would set up a special fund to ‘help improve their livelihood and education’. The Chairman of the LP sent a message asking the Korean residents to ‘excuse past negligence generously’.46 But these efforts were too late to bring the Mindan back into line. Another important factor which encouraged a considerable number of Koreans in Japan to go to the North was the repressive nature of the Rhee regime. As noted earlier, the Rhee regime had been ruthless in dealing with leftist elements, and, during the repatriation issue, was increasingly inclined to suppress its opponents in the name of antiCommunism. For example, the execution of Cho Pong-am, as the US Under-Secretary of the State Department pointed out, ‘could not have come at a better time to assist the Communists regarding the North Korean repatriation plan and to discourage Koreans in Japan who might be inclined to return to the ROK under the principle of freedom of choice’.47 All these factors together meant that not a few Koreans in Japan, especially those who were leftist in sympathy, were likely to favour repatriation to North Korea. Of course, there were political purges in North Korea too, and although the North outperformed the South in terms of economic growth, the living standards in North Korea were not higher than those of South Korea. (See Chapter 6.) The Koreans in Japan knew

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little of North Korea, however, whereas they had heard all too much about life in the South. Many of those who chose to live under the Communist regime might have recognized that their life would be uncertain. But they probably sought to avoid living in a polity in which an unstable life was certain. In short, the Korean residents in Japan were motivated to go to the North by the following factors: their economic difﬁculties; their dissatisfaction with the Rhee regime caused by the latter’s indifference towards their welfare; their fear of the repression in the South; and the lack of non-propaganda information on North Korea. The implication of this case for South Korean security was not negligible. The South Korean population lived under conditions similar in kind, if different in degree, to those faced by the Koreans in Japan. The South Koreans too were vulnerable to the Communist psychological offensive: the country was in poor economic health; and the government paid little attention to their welfare. They were therefore dissatisﬁed with the Rhee regime, and they objected to the repressive rule. But there was one huge difference between the Koreans in Japan and those in South Korea: the former knew little of the Communists, whereas the latter had experienced the brutality of the Communists during the Korean War. In this respect, it can be argued that the painful memory of the war against the Communists and the consequent deep anti-Communist sentiment among the South Korean people was indeed the most signiﬁcant element in ensuring that South Korean security was largely unaffected by the North Korean psychological offensive. In other words, the Rhee government did virtually nothing to protect against this kind of external threat. Instead, the ruling elite tried to utilize anti-Communist sentiment for its own cause, being preoccupied with regime security. And when the ruling elite depended excessively on such sentiments for its own survival, and sought to externalize internal threats as noted earlier, it eventually brought about the collapse of the regime it was trying to protect.

THE DOWNFALL OF THE RHEE REGIME The repressive actions of the Rhee regime unquestionably alienated a substantial portion of the public. A presidential secretary, who surveyed public opinion in the countryside, found that whereas Rhee’s personal standing was still relatively high, the popularity of the

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government and the Liberal Party was ‘extremely’ low. According to him, ‘the people were highly critical of the Liberal Party and felt it was a useless organization with no interest in their welfare’. 48 The more the popularity of the LP decreased, the more its alarm at the approaching election increased. The resolve of Rhee’s supporters to retain their power by any means necessary climaxed during the 1960 presidential election held on March 15. Syngman Rhee, at the age of 85, ran for a fourth term, with his running mate Yi Ki-pung, who by that time was almost incapacitated by a debilitating illness. The Democratic Party nominated Cho Pyo ˘ng-ok and Chang Myo ˘n as its presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Unfortunately, however, Cho became seriously ill, and was sent to America, where he died a month before the election. As in 1956, Rhee’s re-election was assured in the absence of a serious opponent, and the vice-presidential race became the focus of the political contest.49 The hard-line elements of the Rhee regime prepared ‘speciﬁc and systematic’ election fraud. They devised various forms of election rigging such as group voting, ballot stufﬁng, and invalidation or removal of opposition ballots. Campaign abuses, including beatings, were so widespread and blatant that the Democrats declared, even before the polls were closed, that the election was null and void. Noting the pointlessness of the large-scale coercion in the election, the US Embassy hypothesized that: For a few individuals … these elections may have been approached as the ﬁrst crucial test of their ability [to] employ [the] powers of [the] government to override all organized opposition and perpetuate their hold on power even after death of President Rhee.50 The election results showed massive majorities for LP candidates: Rhee won 89 per cent of the vote; Yi Ki-pung, who had lost to Chang Myo ˘n in 1956 and whose popularity had decreased further since, defeated the same opponent by 79 to 18 per cent of the vote.51 The Liberals had apparently achieved what they had desperately wanted; but the methods by which they did so caused indignation among the public. The resentment exploded when the mutilated body of a protesting student was found in Masan Harbour on April 11. Not only students but also the general population spontaneously mounted a series of vigorous anti-government demonstrations in Seoul and other cities.52 Anti-government protests ﬁnally reached a pitch when a

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crowd of up to 100,000 students and sympathizers demonstrated before Kyung Mu Dae, the presidential palace, demanding a meeting with the President. Gregory Henderson described the situation as follows: ‘They had no thought of revolution, but … the police ﬁred point blank into their ranks. Many fell. The blood of the fallen students and the enormity and unanimity of the crowd’s mass turned demonstration in a few minutes to revolution.’ Throughout the city, 125 people lost their lives and over 1,000 were wounded.53 The Rhee regime, as ever, blamed the ‘devilish hands of the Communists’ for disturbances throughout the country. The police ordered a search for all persons having Communist connections. According to a CIA report, Ambassador Yang, who had claimed that the riots were Communist-instigated, confessed later that he had been instructed by his government to say this while being informed that there had been no Communist involvement. While the Rhee regime was trying to externalize these internal threats caused by its own heavy-handed measures to maintain power, the security of South Korea was in danger, as properly pointed out by a US aide-mémoire handed to the South Korean government on April 19: ‘The stability and security of the Republic of Korea likewise appear to have been compromised through involvement of the police and military in politics. This could seriously detract from their efﬁciency, alienate the public from law enforcement agencies, and contribute to an atmosphere exploitable by the Communists.’54 When Ambassador McConaughy (who replaced Dowling in October 1959) met Rhee on the night of April 19, he found that the President was ‘substantially out of touch with realities’ of the situation. Unaware of the causes and scope of the popular demonstrations, he voiced his ‘certainty that people were not alienated’ from him. Rhee blamed Vice-President Chang, and other DP leaders, for all the troubles. The Ambassador endeavoured to make Rhee realize the true nature of the situation, with ‘some limited measure of success’. On the same day, the Eisenhower administration issued a statement expressing its belief that the demonstrations were a ‘reﬂection of public dissatisfaction regarding the conduct of the recent elections and repressive measures unsuited to a free democracy’.55 Meanwhile, the US government, for the fourth time since 1952, set up a plan to isolate Rhee and his supporters so as to replace them with a new administration, as well as determining action in the event of Rhee’s demise or overthrow. The plan’s contingencies included a coup d’état and a military takeover as a caretaker

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government. Washington also intended to utilize the US aid programme in this process.56 Over the next few days, Rhee began more fully to realize the gravity of the situation, as certain ‘courageous men’ including Pyun Yung Tai, ex-prime minister Ho ˘ Cho ˘ng and Army Chief of Staff Song Yo-ch’an explained it to him. Pressure for Rhee’s resignation heightened on 25 April 1960, when some 300 university professors marched through the streets of Seoul in support of their students, demanding the resignation of Rhee and the entire government. The next morning, after a series of talks with his advisors, Rhee at last announced that he would resign if it was ‘the wish of the people’. Later the same day, the National Assembly passed a resolution calling for Rhee’s immediate resignation. The Assembly also resolved that a new election should be held; that the constitution should be amended to provide for a parliamentary system; and that this should be accomplished under an interim cabinet, with a new legislature to be elected thereafter.57 So ended Rhee’s twelve years of rule. In retrospect, when Chu Yohan had argued that ‘there would be a revolution if elections were not capable of determining a true majority’, the Rhee regime should have listened to him rather than silencing him.

CONCLUSION In his last years in ofﬁce, President Rhee’s control over Korean politics considerably decreased, while his hard-line followers gained ascendancy in the ruling circle. The power-hungry elements of the LP launched various initiatives to suppress the opposition with a series of heavy-handed measures. Most of all, they exaggerated the threat of Communist inﬁltration, and instigated anti-Communist sentiments in order to legitimize their repressive control over political opponents on the pretext of national security. This tactic, however, could not ensure the security of the Rhee regime. The ‘hard’ faction’s pursuit of power by every means available ﬁnally reached the point of no return with its blatant election rigging in March 1960. Right up to the moment of its collapse, the Rhee regime vainly sought to avert public indignation by pointing the ﬁnger at the Communists. Moreover, the ruling elite’s domestic use of national security hampered its efforts to tackle real threats against the security of South Korea. South Korean counter-espionage agencies were mobilized to suppress domestic political opposition at the expense of their

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effectiveness against the external threat to the country – i.e. Communist subversion. In addition, the continued undemocratic rule of the Rhee regime, and the consequent internal turbulence, brought serious international repercussions, as the US government properly pointed out: a ‘loss of ROK prestige’ in the Free World in general, and in the minds of the US public and Congress in particular, and an ‘increased opportunity for the Communists to exploit evident dissension’ within South Korea and to portray the ROK to Koreans throughout the peninsula and abroad as a ‘totalitarian state’.58 Although the hard-liners played a leading role in the process of the externalization of internal threats, President Rhee could not be exempted from all responsibility. Basically, he still had ultimate authority as president. He was in a position to reject any decision had he wished to.59 Instead, the President countenanced, defended, and approved a number of controversial decisions taken by his subordinates. More important, the hard-liners’ decisions were made within the framework of Rhee’s long-established policies and prejudices. As discussed earlier, the ‘tough’ elements surrounding the President could obtain his approval by distorting the evidence, and controlling information. It should be noted, however, that Rhee himself was not only incapable of handling such detailed information because of his deteriorating mental health, but was also unwilling to listen to any advice which was incompatible with his personal beliefs. A number of persons, especially US ofﬁcials, had tried to make the aging President recognize the seriousness of what was happening in South Korea. Nevertheless, Rhee usually responded by saying that there were ‘misunderstandings’ about the Korean situation. Rhee probably reacted in this way because of his bias against the US administration. He believed that the ‘misunderstandings’ arose from the policies and activities of the Department of State and the US Embassy in which there were ‘still’ some people who would ‘do anything and everything to place a wedge between the United States and Korea and also to get rid of Rhee’.60 Furthermore, in all the three cases examined – the National Security Law, the closure of the Kyunghyang Shinmun, and the execution of Cho Pong-am – the decisions taken by Rhee’s close subordinates to some extent reﬂected Rhee’s own long-held personal beliefs. The South Korean President had believed that the Communists must be destroyed for the security of Korea, and that Cho Pong-am had to be removed because of his Communist leanings. For Rhee, Communism was a disease which had to be eliminated: ‘It goes everywhere and affects

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every person. The only way to check it is to ﬁght it as you would ﬁght cholera, smallpox, or any other contagious disease.’61 Accordingly, if the hard-liners reported that the opposition should be ‘treated’ because they were ‘infected’ by Communism, he would readily approve their decision. In earlier years, President Rhee had politically and diplomatically utilized his strong commitment to anti-Communism. In particular, his ‘march north’ theme had been an effective bargaining-chip in his efforts to obtain more US military assistance. As his mental powers diminished, however, it appears that he could no longer develop and utilize this approach. As Sydney Hook, an American philosopher, described it after an interview with Rhee, President Rhee was ‘petriﬁed’, afﬂicted with ‘arteriosclerosis of ideas’.62 In the last year of Rhee’s rule, it was Rhee’s subordinates who utilized the ‘petriﬁed’ ideas of the President.

8 Conclusion: The Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea This book began with the question of why President Syngman Rhee persistently committed himself to the ‘march north’ policy after the end of the Korean War. The ﬁndings in this research demonstrate that President Rhee’s bellicose posture on uniﬁcation did indeed reﬂect his desire to bolster not only state security but also regime security, as assumed in the introductory chapter. For President Rhee, to ‘march north and unify Korea’ was the only way to achieve the ultimate security of South Korea. It was Rhee’s long-held belief which had evolved since he had ﬁrst warned of the danger of Russian ambition in Korea as an independence activist. When the Soviet Communists occupied the northern half of Korea after Liberation in 1945, Rhee demanded the establishment of an independent government in the South in order to block Communist domination of the whole of Korea. With the creation of two separate polities in the Korean peninsula in 1948, the antiCommunist leader called for a pre-emptive war against North Korea which he believed was making ready to attack the South. Two years later, President Rhee saw an opportunity to attain his goal of military uniﬁcation after US/UN forces had successfully counterattacked North Korean troops, and had crossed the 38th parallel in October 1950. However, Rhee’s hope was soon frustrated by the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Facing the prospect of an armistice in the Korean peninsula, the ROK President vigorously opposed any cease-ﬁre that did not include the removal of all Communist forces from Korea. Considering Rhee’s pre-armistice position, it was hardly surprising that the South Korean President was determined to resume hostilities after the conclusion of the Korean conﬂict in July 1953. In fact, shortly before the signing of the armistice agreement, he had simply agreed ‘not to disturb’ the armistice only until a political conference attempted to settle the Korean question peacefully. When the Geneva conference of April–June 1954 failed to produce any fruitful results, 144

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as Rhee had expected, he voiced the call to ‘march north’ more loudly, and hoped the US and the UN would support his military action. President Rhee’s enthusiasm for uniﬁcation by force was so strong that in July 1954 he demanded American and UN support in waging a war against the Communists in order to protect world peace, as well as peace in Korea. With the Communist peace offensive and subsequent signs of a relaxation in world tensions in 1955–6, Rhee’s ‘march north’ theme was transformed into a ﬁrm objection to any movement towards peaceful coexistence with the Communists. President Rhee believed that the trend had to be undermined not only because Communism was an ‘epidemic’ which had to be destroyed, but also because an improvement in Cold War tensions would further reduce his chance to resume hostilities with the support of the allied powers. As the South Korean leader argued, all that made him refrain from a northern expedition at that time was the ‘international trend’, which favoured peace with the Communists. But he never abandoned his hope of ‘advancing to the Yalu river with the free nations’, and repelling the Communists. President Syngman Rhee had been well aware, however, that the main source of threat to South Korean security could not be removed as long as the United States, the major sponsor of the ROK, was not prepared to support Rhee’s military action. Thus, regardless of his sincerity in proposing uniﬁcation by force, he sought to diminish his country’s vulnerability to the Communist threat by gaining a US security commitment to South Korea. For this purpose, President Rhee tactically used his commitment to ‘march north’. That is, in order to heighten his bargaining position in negotiations with the US regarding its military aid to South Korea, he threatened the Eisenhower administration that he would take unilateral military action unless it provided him with what he wanted for the security of South Korea. Washington was susceptible to such a bluff to the extent that there were limitations on its room for manoeuvre in Korea: on the one hand, the US could not abandon South Korea because of the possible damage to its prestige as the leader of the free world, and because it had expended so much blood and so much money on Seoul’s behalf; on the other hand, it was unwilling to be involved in further hostilities in Korea. Rhee perceived and capitalized on these limitations, intentionally exaggerating his terms and behaving unpredictably. The South Korean President’s unilateral release of the North Korean prisoners of war dramatically increased the effectiveness of his blufﬁng.

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During the four months before the formal conclusion of the Korean War, thanks to these tactics, South Korea successfully obtained from the US a mutual defence treaty; the Americans were reluctant to make such a deﬁnite security commitment in mainland Asia, but were eager to end the war in Korea ‘gracefully’ with the cooperation of South Korea. Once the armistice agreement had been signed, Rhee’s negotiating power based on his threat to ‘march north alone’ was weakened. But President Rhee continued to resort to blufﬁng, unpredictable behaviour, and obstinacy in order to receive further US military aid to strengthen ROK forces. Fortunately for Rhee, Washington’s need of Seoul’s cooperation in the political conference on Korea at Geneva gave Rhee another chance to raise the bargaining stakes, and he managed to acquire more military assistance than the Americans had originally wanted to give. Thus, by November 1954, the basic framework of the US security commitment to South Korea was established: the Mutual Defence Treaty between the US and the ROK came into force; and the Agreed Minute between the two governments, which set forth the broad area of agreement on political, economic and military matters, was concluded. While there is no doubt that Rhee’s ‘march north’ slogan reﬂected his concern about South Korean security, it was also unquestionable that his militant anti-Communist posture was aimed at boosting the security of his regime. Anti-Communism had been one of the most crucial components of Rhee’s political base. In all his political struggles since Liberation in 1945, Syngman Rhee had refused any kind of coalition with the Communists, and he had eventually called for a separate southern government. When elected as President of South Korea in 1948, he had tried to remove not only Communist elements but also his political opponents under the pretext of preventing Communist subversion, while championing uniﬁcation by military means. As the Korean War strengthened anti-Communist sentiment among the South Korean people, President Rhee could effectively mobilize the public by appealing to them to ‘drive the Communists out’ of Korea. The international atmosphere favouring peaceful relations with the Communists was not only incompatible with his personal beliefs, as noted earlier, but also put into question the validity of his ruling ideology. To make matters worse for Rhee, this international trend coincided with domestic instability. The Rhee regime’s unprincipled constitutional revision to prolong its rule in November 1954 undermined its legitimacy, and contributed to the creation of an enlarged

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opposition party. Moreover, President Rhee suspected, not without justiﬁcation, that the US government was trying to topple him by supporting the opposition. Given these conditions, Rhee tried to win popular support, and thus to maintain regime security, by denouncing peaceful coexistence with the Communists, which was an alternative way of expressing his ‘march north’ argument. In other words, while criticizing any movement towards peaceful relations with the ‘devilish’ Communists as an inappropriate way to achieve uniﬁcation in Korea, Rhee sought both to stimulate public opposition to it, and to increase support for his own regime, which had always advocated uniﬁcation through the destruction of the Communists. In addition, President Rhee attempted to utilize the issue of abolishing the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), members of which were suspected of being Communist spies, to emphasize the existence of the Communist threat in South Korea. After the results of the 1956 presidential election had conﬁrmed growing popular discontent with the Rhee regime, the ruling elite, especially the so-called hard-liners, began to devise heavy-handed tactics to repress political opponents, as found in many other regimes in developing states. In particular, in order to control the increasing popular sentiment in favour of a peaceful approach to uniﬁcation, the Rhee government arrested Progressive Party leader Cho Pong-am, who had advocated peaceful uniﬁcation. He was charged with violating the National Security Law, without ﬁrm evidence. After the end of 1958, determined to win the next presidential election by whatever means necessary, the hard-line faction within the ruling circle began to intensify its repressive rule, externalizing internal threats to justify the repression. In December 1958, the government forcefully enacted the new National Security Law which was said to be a ‘hunting licence’ to punish any opposition to the regime on the pretext of ‘treason’. In February 1959, the Supreme Court, under obvious political pressure from the executive, found Cho Pong-am guilty of espionage and of violating the National Security Law, and sentenced him to death. Five months later, Cho was executed. In April 1959, the Rhee regime closed the main opposition newspaper ostensibly to protect the ‘security of the nation and safeguard the legitimate right of the free press’. Such measures to suppress the opposition, however, only served to further reduce the legitimacy of the regime, resulting in a vicious circle. At last, after the Rhee regime’s massive election abuse to assure its win in the March 1960 presidential race, mass revolts against the regime forced President Rhee to step down from his ofﬁce in April.

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As discussed above, Syngman Rhee pursued an aggressive antiCommunist policy, and persistently appealed to the nation to ‘march north’. This was motivated by his concerns for both state security – his personal belief in the need for uniﬁcation by force and his tactical use of the slogan as a bargaining-chip – and regime security – the stimulation of anti-Communist sentiment in the South Korean public. What was the relationship between state security and regime security, and how did they interact with each other? To answer these questions, the concept of security in developing countries was applied to the South Korean case. According to the literature on the subject, many ruling regimes in developing states suffer from a crisis in political legitimacy, and consequently have to deal with threats arising from within domestic politics. Given these conditions, they tend to control internal threats in the name of the security of the state, thus blurring the distinction between state security and regime security. This preoccupation with regime survival, however, is said to exert a negative impact on state security because it makes policies rigid and ineffectual; leads to excessive militarization; and to a penetration of the state by external inﬂuences. In this conceptual framework, this book hypothesized that the Rhee regime’s policy priority would shift from state security to regime security as the level of the regime’s legitimacy fell. It also suggested that such an emphasis on regime survival eventually hampered the management of state security. The examination of the case of President Rhee’s regime largely supports these hypotheses. Although the three elements which led Rhee to commit himself to the ‘march north’ theme were intermingled to some degree throughout the period under study, Rhee’s concern for regime security did increase as his legitimacy decreased, and the security of South Korea was accordingly undermined. But this does not necessarily mean that his concern for state security was proportionally reduced. In particular, it is noteworthy that Rhee’s belief that to expel the Communists by ‘marching north’ was the only way to ensure South Korean security marked a signiﬁcant factor in his policy considerations throughout his presidency. In other words, historical evidence drawn from the case of South Korea in the post-Korean War era illustrates both similarities with and differences from the ﬁndings in the conceptual discussion of security in developing states. As in other regimes in the Third World, the Syngman Rhee regime, from its inception, had a narrow support base: it only represented the interests of the right-wing forces, and was challenged by the leftists and the moderates. In addition, Rhee’s authoritarian leadership had

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gradually encouraged the formation of anti-Rhee forces even within the conservative circle. However, the outbreak of the Korean War reduced problems associated with the initial narrowness of Rhee’s political base for it dramatically changed the power conﬁguration in South Korea. While the leftists’ room for manoeuvre was considerably narrowed, President Rhee was also able to obtain support from the conservative politicians on the strength of increased antiCommunist sentiment. Moreover, Rhee’s vigorous anti-armistice campaign fortiﬁed his position as a strong leader of the country. As a result, during the period from April to August 1953, the stability of the Rhee government was relatively high, and the public largely supported President Rhee, and especially his militant external policy. This popular support not only enabled Rhee to concentrate his efforts on acquiring a stronger US security commitment by using such tactics as blufﬁng, unpredictability, and intransigence; but it also added weight to Rhee’s threat to ﬁght alone, which was one of the most important factors in successfully making the Eisenhower administration offer concessions. Rhee’s toughness vis-à-vis the Americans, and the consequent diplomatic success in turn heightened popular support for his presidency. Immediately after the end of the Korean War, the Rhee regime was still stable, and President Rhee continued his efforts to ensure South Korean security by extracting more US assistance. For this purpose, Rhee used the same tactics as before, and they were successful to the extent that South Korea received US aid worth some $700 million. But it should be noted that Rhee’s ‘march north’ theme began to be less effective as a bargaining-chip after the armistice agreement had formally been signed, and as the US government had become convinced that the South Korean President would not launch unilateral military action. Nevertheless, Rhee obstinately continued to commit himself to uniﬁcation by force, an attitude that then began to produce some adverse effects. First, Rhee’s excessive adherence to a militant policy hampered a workable relationship with the US, which sought to pursue its objectives in Korea through political means, and on which Rhee heavily depended to maintain South Korean security. Secondly, when Rhee’s aggressive and intemperate attitude towards the Americans delayed the implementation of US military and economic assistance, his attitude began to be criticized internally. The year 1955 marked another turning point in the stability of the Rhee regime. Externally, the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the Communists carried with it the danger of eroding Rhee’s ruling

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ideology: anti-Communism. Internally, the Rhee regime’s legitimacy decreased: in the process of introducing a constitutional amendment to provide President Rhee with an exclusive right to stay in ofﬁce for life, the regime exercised its power neither in accordance with the established ‘rules of power’, nor in the interest of the general public. Such an undemocratic exercise of power revitalized the opposition. The formation of a strengthened opposition party facilitated not only the gathering together of public opinion unfavourable to Rhee, but also linked the international movement for peaceful coexistence with the domestic opponents of Rhee who criticized his militant posture. The existence of a relatively free press in South Korea, which criticized the Rhee regime’s maladministration without being hampered by severe censorship, contributed to Rhee’s internal difﬁculties. President Rhee also had to deal with a US attempt to intervene in South Korean politics to replace him with a more amenable leader. In order both to divert public attention from his internal difﬁculties, and to prevent external developments unfavourable to himself from inﬂuencing domestic politics, President Rhee vigorously denounced the idea of peaceful coexistence. As noted earlier, Rhee’s critique of the relaxation of world tensions was also attributable to his desire to unify Korea by military means for the security of South Korea. But the problem was that concern for regime security, combined with Rhee’s long-held personal belief, forced Rhee to adhere to a bellicose posture more and more rigidly; he adjusted only slightly his policy to the changing internal and external environments. The problems caused by inﬂexibility in Rhee’s policies were demonstrated in two issues: the Progressive Party’s peaceful uniﬁcation policy, and ROK force reductions. Partly as a result of the improvement in East–West relations (temporary though that may have been), and partly because of fading memories of the war, the wisdom of President Rhee’s militant policy was increasingly questioned within the domestic political arena in the latter part of the 1950s. In an attempt to control this tendency rather than accommodate it, the Rhee regime punished the leader of the Progressive Party, who had directly challenged the government’s policy by adopting the peaceful uniﬁcation formula. It did so in the name of national security. But such a heavy-handed approach did not curb the growing desire for a peaceful uniﬁcation policy. Rather, it deepened public dissatisfaction with the regime. Furthermore, the criminalization of the idea of peaceful uniﬁcation, labelling it as ‘traitorous’, by inference meant that both the US and UN policy aiming at a peaceful settlement in

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Korea was criminal. Rhee’s action therefore ran the risk of damaging the international support for South Korea that was indispensable for its security. Another example of Rhee’s rigid policy can be found in his attempt to maintain large ROK forces at the expense of economic development, reasoning that the North was threatening the South with superior military capabilities. But President Rhee’s heavy emphasis on a military build-up was an inappropriate, if not an entirely wrongheaded, policy, given that many South Koreans wanted to see rapid economic progress made possible by reducing military spending. They thought, reasonably enough, that the Communist threat would be checked by US deterrent power. Since one of the main reasons for public dissent with the Rhee government had been the lack of workable economic and social programmes, the South Korean leader’s continued priority for strengthening military power further undermined the legitimacy of his rule. More important, while President Rhee was inﬂexibly concentrating on measures to cope with the North Korean military threat, the northern Communists were threatening the security of South Korea by psychological warfare. Capitalizing on the international trend towards peaceful relations, and subsequent controversies over the uniﬁcation issue within South Korea, the Kim Il Sung regime in 1957–8 gradually began to increase its peace offensive. Moreover, the Communists highlighted the alleged superiority of the northern economy in their appeal to the South Korean people. But the preoccupation with military matters prevented the ROK government from devising measures to deal with this North Korean peace campaign and to counteract the North’s economic allure. The strong anti-Communist sentiment of the South Korean populace meant that Pyongyang’s psychological offensive was not particularly successful in shaking the integrity of South Korea. The Communist political threat remained as a ‘potential danger’, however, as long as the Rhee government was unwilling and unable to recover internal stability by developing constructive national goals. This potential danger partly became a real one later in 1959 when the Korean residents in Japan, who had experienced economic difﬁculties and were dissatisﬁed with the South Korean government, but had not experienced Communist brutality during the Korean War, chose North Korea as an alternative place to live, having been persuaded by Communist propaganda. This area of vulnerability was aggravated by the Rhee regime’s attempt to legitimize the repression of the ‘enemy within’ in the name

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of national security. Rhee and his supporters artiﬁcially connected the political opposition with the Communists in Pyongyang, implying that there had been extensive inﬁltration. The Rhee regime legislated a politically motivated security law, provisions of which went well beyond what was needed to deal with the external threats. Using that law, it prosecuted a political leader who challenged its authority. An opposition newspaper was also closed on the pretext of protecting national security. The externalization of internal threats, however, not only failed to ensure regime security; but it also endangered state security to the extent that the effectiveness of ROK countersubversion activities was hampered because the responsible agencies continued to be utilized by the government as a political instrument, and because the government tended to label as ‘Communists’ any political opponents. Furthermore, the ruthless suppression of the opposition further alienated the public from the government to the point where the regime collapsed after mass revolts initiated by students in April 1960. The resulting chaotic condition within South Korea could have been exploited by the northern Communist regime. It also ran the risk of weakening international support, and especially diminishing US assistance, two crucial factors in ensuring South Korean security. By and large, South Korea under President Rhee exhibited the distinctive security issues of developing states to the extent that the Rhee regime’s increasing emphasis on regime security brought about such problems as penetration by foreign inﬂuences, militarization, ossiﬁcation in policy-making, and identiﬁcation of internal with external threats. The implications of these problems for South Korean security was, however, different from those of other developing states because of South Korea’s particular characteristics. First, although US inﬂuence on domestic affairs increased with its large security commitment to South Korea, there were few indications that either the general public or politicians within South Korea saw that inﬂuence as a problem for state sovereignty at that time. This phenomenon had originated from the fact that Korea, unlike other Third World states, had become a colony of Japan, a nonWestern power. Thus, as Chong-Sik Lee suggested, many Koreans looked on the West as a liberator from colonial rule rather than as an imperialistic power.1 As far as US–ROK relations were concerned, the fact that the Americans had fought against the Communists for the South Koreans and had remained virtually the sole guarantor of South Korean security further strengthened the US image as a benefactor.

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Secondly, despite a certain number of cases where the military was used as a political instrument by the Rhee regime, it was unlikely that the militarization during Rhee’s rule was primarily related to his domestic political purposes, as the literature on security in developing states might lead one to expect. In fact, the ROK armed forces had expanded remarkably during the Korean conﬂict – from 100,000 to 600,000. Immediately after the signing of the armistice agreement, President Rhee had sought to enlarge the South Korean armed forces partly because of his fear of another Communist attack, and partly because of his desire to ‘march north’ if possible. When, in 1957, the South Korean President tried to reject a US proposal for reducing ROK forces for the sake of economic progress, it was mainly because of his anxiety about the military threat from the Communists. However, his policy did produce side-effects such as a lack of development in the social and economic sectors, and a lack of preparation against the North Korean political threat. Moreover, in the long term, Rhee’s emphasis on a military build-up assisted the emergence of the military as a powerful factor in politics.2 This eventually contributed to the military coup in 1961 and to the establishment of consecutive military governments. As a result, the vicious circle of authoritarian military regimes with weak legitimacy and strong concentration on regime security continued until very recently in South Korea. Similarly, the inﬂexible and ineffectual policy-making of the Rhee government cannot be explained only in terms of its preoccupation with regime survival. President Rhee ﬁrmly believed that the Communists had to be removed for the security and peace of South Korea. And this belief was conﬁrmed by the Communist attack on the South. Rhee’s strong anti-Communist posture, represented by the ‘march north’ slogan, had played a crucial role in bolstering the security of South Korea immediately after the war. But Rhee’s growing concern for regime security, and the necessity to use anti-Communism on the domestic front, made Rhee’s already aggressive position still more rigid, thus inhibiting the development of workable security policies. In his last years in ofﬁce, because of his age – 83 in 1958 – and consequent decrease in mental and physical health, President Rhee was unable to control domestic affairs as before, let alone tactically use the ‘march north’ theme for either regime or state security. At this stage, because of his obsession with uniﬁcation by force and his ‘petriﬁed’ anti-Communist posture, President Rhee was easily persuaded by his power-hungry hard-line followers that the opposition forces were linked with the Communists, and thus needed to be

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suppressed. This situation further impaired Rhee’s legitimacy to the point of his downfall, and consequently posed a danger to South Korean security. Last but not least, as implied in the above three points, the experience of the war initiated by the Communists, and the continued existence of threats above the military demarcation line, whether they were military or political in nature, led both the rulers and the ruled in South Korea to place a high priority on security against external threats. On the other side of the coin, however, these conditions provided the ruling elite with a good opportunity to justify its repression of the opposition by externalizing the ‘enemy within’. Thus, it can be said that the interaction between state security and regime security was more conspicuous in South Korea than in other Third World countries. In short, the post-Korean War insecurity dilemma for the Rhee government lay in the coexistence of the need to enhance South Korean security in the face of the Communist threat with the need to secure the survival of the regime as its legitimacy decreased: the measures employed to maintain its power undermined not only regime security but also state security, which further contributed to the instability of the regime. In addition, given this lack of legitimacy, even Rhee’s strong anti-Communist policy and his desire to ‘march north’, which were supposed to bolster the security of South Korea, in the end damaged South Korean security. Indeed, as Barry Buzan suggests, the creation of a ‘stronger’ state, in which the degree of socio-political cohesion is high and thus the incumbent regime enjoys political legitimacy, is a ‘necessary condition’ for improving the security of a state.3 A similar but more expressive argument was made to President Rhee in a newspaper editorial as early as June 1958, to which he should have listened: The [Rhee] government must make an effort to strengthen the home front by promoting political democracy and economic growth, and by developing the middle class as a bulwark against the Communists.4

Notes and References The following abbreviations are used when citing frequently used primary sources. Full citations are given in the Bibliography. DDEL FO FRROK FRUS JFD MSP NA NRC NSC OCB PRO RG

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library Foreign Ofﬁce Declassiﬁed Documents on Foreign Relations of the Republic of Korea Foreign Relations of the United States John Foster Dulles Mutual Security Program National Archives National Records Center National Security Council Operations Coordinating Board Public Record Ofﬁce Record Group

Introduction 1.

2.

3.

The interpretation that Rhee’s ‘march north’ slogan was a ‘simpliﬁcation’ of various anti-Communist arguments was ﬁrst suggested to me by Robert Oliver, Rhee’s long-time friend and adviser in America, in a written interview with him on 2 June 1994. But he argued that the simpliﬁed slogan was to ‘remind’ the US and the UN that the Communists had to be removed for the ‘peace and the welfare of the whole Korean people, north and south alike’. Although I do not totally deny Oliver’s argument, I thought that the role of the ‘march north’ slogan as a ‘reminder’ more aptly explains Rhee’s domestic concerns. Oliver later admitted in an oral interview on 7 June 1994 that Rhee tried to maintain public support by shouting the ‘march north’ slogan, though he continued to argue that the main motivation was to ‘serve peaceful stability and the security of Korea’. Although these were the three factors that had motivated Syngman Rhee to advocate uniﬁcation by force ever since the establishment of two separate governments in Korea, their relation to the internal and external security problems of South Korea were transformed by the outbreak of the Korean War. This point will be fully examined in the next chapter. This study will mainly concentrate on the post Korean War era. But since negotiations for the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and South Korea – which was considered the most important factor in the postwar security concerns of South Korea – began in April 1953, I will also examine the four months prior to the conclusion of the armistice in

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4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

Notes and References July 1953. In fact, from April, when major obstacles in the truce talks between the UN and the Communists were overcome, the conclusion of the armistice agreement was a matter of time, and all the countries concerned therefore began to prepare for the post-war period. For example, see Sang-Woo Rhee, Security and Uniﬁcation of Korea (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 1984); Young Choi, ‘The North Korean Military Buildup and Its Impact on North Korean Military Strategy’, Asian Survey, vol. 25, no. 3 (March 1985); Tong Whan Park, ‘Arms Race and Arms Control in Korea’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer 1986); Peter Polomka, ‘The Two Koreas: Catalyst for Conﬂict in East Asia?’, Adelphi Papers, 208 (Summer 1986); Byung-joon Ahn, Kangdaeguk kwangyewa hanbando anboron [Major Power Relations and Security on the Korean Peninsula] (Seoul: Ponmunsa, 1986); Kyongsoo Lho, ‘South Korean Foreign Policy, 1969–85: Autonomy Adjusted to Security’, D.Phil. Dissertation, Oxford University, 1989; Joo-Hong Nam, America’s Commitment to South Korea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Kwang-il Baek, ‘An Analysis of the Security Relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea,’ Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1981. There are two exceptions to which I owe the idea of studying the security of South Korea both in internal and external dimensions. Byung-joon Ahn, in his ‘The Korean Peninsula and East Asian Security’, in Robert A. Scalapino et al. (eds), Internal and External Security Issues in Asia (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986), suggests that the security in the Korean peninsula is affected by domestic politics in the two Koreas, along with global, regional factors. But he deals with the domestic factor mainly in terms of political competition between North and South Korea. Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, ‘Third World National Security: Toward a New Conceptual Framework’, International Interactions, vol. 11, no. 2 (1984), provide a useful conceptual discussion of the problems of regime security and state security, while their case study of South Korea in the 1970s is less comprehensive. For example, all the works cited above put their focus on the post-1960 period. For studies of the pre-1953 period, see footnote 1 of Chapter 2. Because of the security classiﬁcation which usually lasts for 30 years, the archival sources for the latter part of the 1950s have not been available until recently. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 147. Ibid., p. 150; Richard Smoke, ‘National Security Affairs’, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science, Volume 8: International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: AddisonWesley, 1975), pp. 250–1; Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 18. Particularly since the 1980s, there have been a growing number of works attempting to broaden the notions of security. For example, see Buzan, ibid.; Richard H. Ullman, ‘Redeﬁning Security’, International Security, vol. 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 129–53; Jessica Tuchman

Notes and References

9.

10.

157

Mathews, ‘Redeﬁning Security’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 162–77. Buzan lists ﬁve types of threats which affect the security of a state – military, political, economic, societal, and ecological. Ullman suggests deﬁning security in terms of threats to the ‘quality of life for the inhabitants of a state’. Mathews’s concept of security is broadened to include resource, environmental and demographic issues. However, Stephen M. Walt argues that deﬁning the ﬁeld of security in such a broad way would ‘destroy its intellectual coherence’ and make it more difﬁcult to devise solutions to important problems related to national security. Thus, he deﬁnes security studies as the ‘study of the threat, use, and control of military forces’. See his ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35 (1991), p. 213. For the debate over the boundaries of security studies, see also, Joseph S. Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ‘International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field’, International Security, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5–27; Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, vol. 17, no. 4 (October 1991), pp. 313–26; Edward A. Kolodziej, ‘What Is Security and Security Studies’, Arms Control, vol. 13, no. 1 (April 1992), pp. 1–31; Egber Jahn et al., European Security-Problems of Research on Non-Military Aspects (Copenhagen: Centre of Peace and Conﬂict Research, 1987); Ken Booth (ed.), New Thinking about Strategy and International Security (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991); Michael Clarke (ed.), New Perspectives on Security (London: Brassey’s, 1993); Michael H. Shuman and Hal Harvey, Security without War (Oxford: Westview, 1993). According to Joseph S. Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, the impetus for the development of security studies came from the ‘twin revolution in American foreign policy and military technology caused by the emergence of the cold war and the development of atomic weapons’. See their ‘International Security Studies’, p. 8. A typical concept reﬂecting the conditions of the Cold War is the ‘security dilemma’: many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security threaten the security of others, which in turn causes counteractions by the threatened state. See Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214. For conceptual discussion of security in developing countries, see Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?’, International Affairs, vol. 60, no. 1 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 41–51; Robert L. Rothstein, ‘The “Security Dilemma” and the “Poverty Trap” in the Third World’, The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol. 8, no. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1–38; Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States (Dover: Auburn House, 1987); Yezid Sayigh, ‘Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries’, Adelphi Papers 251 (Summer 1990); Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (Boulder: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987). See also various articles in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988); Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of

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12. 13.

Notes and References Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992). In this book, the term ‘Third World’ also will be used as a term with the same meaning as ‘developing countries’. In fact, as seen in the above titles, the two terms are used without differentiation in most of the literature on the subject, and differences between the two terms are too vague to be distinguished clearly, especially with respect to the security dimension. For example, Sayigh’s deﬁnition of developing countries and Ayoob’s deﬁnition of Third World countries are very similar to each other: both emphasize the colonial past and the lack of an industrial revolution. For a comprehensive examination of the concepts of ‘strong states’ and ‘weak states’ with reference to security issues, see Barry Buzan, ‘People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World’, in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), pp. 17–27. A similar discussion can also be found in his People, States, and Fear, pp. 96–107. See also Ayoob, ‘Security in the Third World’, pp. 41–51. Buzan differentiates states as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ by using the variable of socio-political cohesiveness. According to him, it is important not to confuse the strength or weakness of a country as a ‘state’ with its strength or weakness as a ‘power’ (i.e. the range and size of resources and capabilities it commands). A detailed study of characteristics of states in the Third World is beyond the scope of this study. For this, for example, see Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), part II & III, which deals with the process of non-European states’ entry into an international system that had been dominated by the European states. Ayoob, ‘Security in the Third World’, p. 45. Brian L. Job, ‘The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World’, in Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma, pp. 17–19; Sayigh, ‘Security in the Developing Countries’, p. 18. See also, Caroline Thomas, ‘New Directions in Thinking about Security in the Third World’, in Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, pp. 278–87. Robert Jackson, labelling the excolonial states in the Third World as ‘quasi-states’, argues that they have not been authorized and empowered domestically, and consequently lack the institutional features of sovereign states. Thus, their governments are often deﬁcient in political will, and institutional authority. See his Quasi-States, pp. 21–6. Similarly, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson suggest that the governments or regimes in ‘pseudostates or quasi-states’ do not possess ‘enduring legal and administrative structures, capable of outlasting the individuals who wield power at any one time; still less do they reﬂect respect for constitution or acceptance of the rule of law.’ See their ‘Conclusion’, in The Expansion of International Society, p. 430.

Notes and References 14.

15.

16. 17.

18.

19.

20.

21. 22. 23.

159

Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 328. For the relationship between charismatic authority and political stability, see Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 148–57; L. Sylla, ‘Succession of the Charismatic Leader: The Gordian Knot of African Politics’, Daedalus, vol. 111, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 15–16. Mohammed Ayoob and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, ‘Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia: Exploring General Propositions’, in Ayoob and Samudavanija (eds), Leadership Perceptions and National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p. 256. Robert O’Neill, ‘Western Security Policy Towards the Third World’, in Robert O’Neill and R. J. Vincent (eds), The West and the Third World (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 216. In this book, the state means the set of institutions that organizes, regulates, and enforces interactions of groups and individuals within its territorial conﬁnes, while the regime refers to the small group of persons who hold the highest ofﬁces, and who command the machinery, especially the coercive forces. For deﬁnitions of the state and the regime in the context of security, see Job, ‘The Insecurity Dilemma’, pp. 15–16; Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 57–96. Although the domestic political factor has also been an important variable in the context of security in Western developed states, it has largely been regarded as a constraint to or determinant of security policies, but not as a threat to the security of the state. For example, see Nye and Lynn-Jones, ‘International Security Studies’, p. 24; Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, p. 224. Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, ‘Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The “Software” Side of Third World National Security’, in Azar and Moon, National Security in the Third World, pp. 82–5; Job, ‘The Insecurity Dilemma’, pp. 27–9. Ayoob, ‘Security in the Third World’, pp. 43–4. Thomas, ‘New Directions in Thinking about Security’, p. 272. See also Henry A Kissinger, ‘Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy’, in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 271–53, which deals with such diversionary tactics in respect of more general foreign policy. Rothstein, ‘The Security Dilemma’, p. 9; Sayigh, ‘Security in the Developing Countries’, p. 17; Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, ‘Toward an Alternative Conceptualization’, in Azar and Moon, National Security in the Third World, p. 291. Azar and Moon, ‘Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity’, p. 85. O’Neill, ‘Western Security Policy Towards the Third World’, pp. 215–18. Thomas, In Search of Security, p. 1; Azar and Moon, ‘Toward an Alternative Conceptualization’, pp. 281–2; Sayigh, ‘Security in the Developing Countries’, pp. 30–48; Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 17–53.

160 24.

25.

26.

27.

28. 29.

30. 31.

32.

Notes and References For a discussion which points out the danger of the broadened concept of security in the Third World, see Mohammed Ayoob, ‘The Security Problematic of the Third World’, World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2 (January 1991), pp. 257–61; Job, ‘The Insecurity Dilemma’, p. 16; Rothstein, ‘The Security Dilemma’, pp. 11–13. Basically, South Korea in the 1950s fulﬁlled the conditions shared by ‘developing’ or ‘Third World’ countries to the extent of its colonial past, its unequal encounter with the Western powers, and its economic undevelopment. During the period 1953–60, the GNP per capita of South Korea was only about $60. Jang Jip Choi, ‘Political Cleavages in South Korea’, in Hagen Koo (ed.), State and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 13–20. In the context that the state has had strong control over civil society, South Korea is often characterized as a ‘strong state’. But this is distinct from this book’s deﬁnition of the South Korean state as a ‘weak state’ in terms of its lack of socio-political cohesiveness. For the discussion of the strong state versus civil society in Korea, see also Hagen Koo, ‘Strong State and Contentious Society’, in Koo (ed.), State and Society, pp. 232–49. The post-Liberation developments towards the creation of separate states in Korea will be examined in Chapter 2. Chan Kwon, ‘The Leadership of Syngman Rhee: The Charisma Factor as an Analytical Framework’, Koreana Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 1–2 (Spring-Summer 1971), pp. 31–48; Quee-Young Kim, The Fall of Syngman Rhee (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1983), pp. 15–17. According to a US intelligence source, Syngman Rhee, ‘asserting that he represents the aspirations and political conscience of the whole Korean people’, adopted a posture of ‘superiority to partisan politics’. The source also noted that the institutionalization of South Korean politics had been undermined by precedents set by President Rhee who had tended to ‘substitute for the constitution the notion that he alone knows what is best for the country’. RG 59, ‘Current Prospects for Presidential Succession in the Republic of Korea’, 23 March 1955, Intelligence Report, no. 6581, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department of State, NA. The impact of the Korean War on the security environment of South Korea will be examined in detail in the next chapter. See Lucian W. Pye, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis’, in Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 147–54; John H. Hertz, ‘Legitimacy: Can We Retrieve It?’, Comparative Politics, vol. 10 (April 1978), pp. 317–43. David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 15–25. The Constitution of South Korea, which had been drafted primarily by Yu Chin-o, an eminent Korean jurist, was adopted unanimously by the Constituent National Assembly, and promulgated in July 1948. It declared that the Republic of Korea ‘shall be a democratic and republican state’. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, pp. 16–17.

Notes and References 33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

161

For example, according to American sources, notwithstanding Rhee’s ﬁtful censorship, a ‘considerable degree of press freedom’ prevailed in South Korea until 1959 partly because of American inﬂuence, backed by American control of newsprint supply, and partly because of a genuine regard for press freedom on the part of President Rhee who had been a newspaper publisher himself. See Donald Stone Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), p. 180. John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies’, International Security, vol. 12, no. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 3–21. John Lewis Gaddis, in an effort to reconcile the discipline of history and political science, suggests that the archives are a ‘data base that would be equally relevant to the respective concerns of historians, political scientists, and policy makers, from which hypotheses could be constructed and tested’. In addition, he points out that archival sources could shed light on contemporary peace and security issues. For studies attempting to reconcile historical lessons with theory and/or policy-making, see also Alexander L. George, ‘Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison’, in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 68; Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986). Some of the documents in the archival libraries are duplicated in FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States). This work will considerably rely on FRUS for the period up to 1954, while the archives collected directly from the libraries will be mainly used for the 1955–60 period because FRUS for that period has been published very recently, and it does not contain all that is available at the Eisenhower library and elsewhere. Macdonald’s U.S.–Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record is an interpretative summary of the archives of the US Department of State for the period 1945 to 1965. According to the author, this work had originally compiled classiﬁed documents on Korea for the guidance of Department of State ofﬁcers, and could only be published after the removal of its security classiﬁcation. The value of this volume lies in the fact that it contains information which is still classiﬁed in US archival libraries. Macdonald was a US Embassy ofﬁcial in Seoul from 1948 to 1950, and from 1955 to 1958. His ‘Korea and the Ballot: The International Dimension in Korean Political Development As Seen in Elections’, Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1977, also provides some ﬁrst-hand materials. At the early stage of this book, I had planned to interview four key ﬁgures of the Rhee government. Unfortunately, three of them passed away, and one was unavailable for interview by the time I visited Seoul in July 1994. Rhee and Robert Oliver, professor of Speech at Syracuse and later at Pennsylvania State University, had been close friends since 1942. Oliver served as Rhee’s political advisor and propagandist in America from

162

38. 39.

40.

2

1.

Notes and References 1947. The two wrote letters to each other from 1943 to 1960. Among them, I had access to letters from Rhee to Oliver during the period 1953–60. I am grateful to Dr Pang Sunjoo, Representative in the USA for ROK Military History Research Institute, who kindly provided me with the ﬁle. Many of these letters, especially during the latter part of 1950s, were written and signed by Mrs Rhee even in cases where the actual content was said to come from President Rhee. According to Oliver, this was because Rhee dictated them to his wife. Parts of the Oliver File were cited in Oliver’s two books on Rhee: Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd Mead, 1955); and Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942–1960 (Seoul: Panmun Book, 1978). Before the oral interview, I undertook a written interview with him between 25 May and 2 June. The pro-government Seoul Shinmun is not used in this research partly because its editorials virtually duplicated what was said by President Rhee or other government ofﬁcials, and partly because its actual circulation to the general people was low. RG 84, ‘Political and Professional Structure of the Korean Press’, April 1954, NA; FO 371/141576, ‘The Press of Korea’, 2 January 1959, PRO. Unlike other chapters, Chapter 2 on the historical setting will mainly depend on secondary sources, partly because this chapter is outside the main period under study, and partly because there have already been a large number of works based on primary sources.

Historical Setting: The Division of Korea, the Korean War, and the Evolution of Syngman Rhee’s Anti-Communist Policy It is beyond the scope of this book to study the origins of the Korean War, which were closely related to post-liberation developments in the Korean peninsula. For general accounts of the post-Liberation period, see Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Ko ˘n-ho Song et al., Haebang cho ˘nhusau ˘i insik [An Account of the History of Korea Before and After the Liberation] (Seoul: Han’gilsa, 1980). See also Ho-je Yi, Han’guk oegyo cho ˘ngch’aeku ˘i isanggwa hyo ˘nsil [The Ideals and Reality of Korean Foreign Policy], 5th edn (Seoul: Po ˘munsa, 1988), which studied the period from the perspective of small states’ foreign policy. For works that focus on the origins of the war, see Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. I and II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981 and 1990); John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989). See also Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), which deals comprehensively with Communist sources. For a useful bibliographical survey on the war, see Rosemary Foot, ‘Making Known the

Notes and References

2.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

163

Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conﬂict in the Last Decade’, Diplomatic History, vol. 15, no. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 411–31. For detailed studies of the CPKI, the KPR, and the KDP, see Henderson, The Politics of the Vortex, pp. 113–20; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. I, pp. 68–100; Robert A. Scalapino and ChongSik Lee, Communism in Korea, Part I: The Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 236–41. Cho, Korea in World Politics, pp. 62–73. For biographical accounts about Syngman Rhee, see Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd Mead, 1955); Won-sun Yi, In’gan Yi Su ˘ng-man [Syngman Rhee: Biography] (Seoul: Shint’aeyangsa, 1965); Kwang Il Koh, ‘In Quest of National Unity and Power: Political Ideas and Practices of Syngman Rhee’, Ph.D. Dissertation, Rutgers University, 1962, ch. 1. Quoted in Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942–1960: A Personal Narrative (Seoul: Panmun Book, 1978), p. 19. Quoted in Yi, Han’guk oegyo cho ˘ngch’ aeku ˘i isanggwa hyo ˘nsil, pp. 114–30. For the text of the Moscow agreement on Korea among the Foreign Ministers of the US, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, see US Department of State, The Record on Korean Uniﬁcation, 1943–1960: Narrative Summary with Principal Documents (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1960), pp. 47–8. The idea of trusteeship originated with President Roosevelt. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, he had suggested a trusteeship for Korea composed of American, Soviet, and Chinese representatives. Quoted in Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement, p. 83. For example, in February, Stalin declared the inevitability of war with capitalism. By March, the US government came to regard the Russians ‘not as an estranged ally but as a potential enemy’, although it continued to make diplomatic efforts for cooperation. In the same month, Churchill denounced the ‘Iron Curtain’ which he alleged had been drawn across Europe by the Soviets. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 282–4; Warren I. Cohen, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. IV: America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 27–34. For detailed analyses of the process of establishing the northern regime, see Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, pp. 320–81; Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918–1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 294–329; Dae-sook Suh., Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 59–95. Quoted in William Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947–1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 27. Yi, Han’guk oegyo cho ˘ngch’ aeku ˘i isanggwa hyo ˘nsil, pp. 228–9. FRUS, 1946, vol. VIII: The Far East, pp. 715–16, July 16, 1946.

164 14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

24.

25.

26. 27. 28.

Notes and References Ibid., pp. 775–8, undated; Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement, pp. 53–6. According to Oliver, Rhee developed the proposal from the summer of 1946. FRUS, 1946, vol. VIII: The Far East, pp. 775–8, undated. Many South Korean works critical of Rhee offer similar interpretations. For example, see Do-hyo ˘n Kim, ‘Yi Su ˘ng-man noso ˘nu ˘i chaego ˘mt’o [The Reassessment of Syngman Rhee’s Political Line] in Song, Haebang cho ˘nhusau ˘i insik, pp. 301–26. Chong-Sik Lee, ‘The Personality of Four Korean Political Leaders: Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku, Kim Kyu-sik, and Yo ˘ Yn-hyo ˘ng’, Asea yo ˘n’gu [Asian Studies], vol. 27, no. 1 (January 1984), pp. 181–226. Lee’s work is based on his interviews with close acquaintances of the four leaders. For Rhee’s personality, see also Chan Kwon, ‘The Leadership of Syngman Rhee: The Charisma Factor as an Analytical Framework’, Koreana Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 1–2 (Spring–Summer, 1971), pp. 31–48. Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 58–9; Yi, Han’guk oegyo cho ˘ngch’ aeku ˘i isanggwa hyo ˘nsil, pp. 207–8. Quoted in Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement, p. 8. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth, p. 178. Cho, Korea in World Politics, pp. 19–20. The original American draft of the Cairo Declaration used the phrase ‘at the earliest possible moment’. But Roosevelt amended that phrase to read, ‘at the proper time’. Finally, it has altered to ‘in due course’ as drafted by the British. Quoted in Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth, pp. 196–8. Ibid., p. 188. FRUS, 1945, vol. VI: The British Commonwealth, The Far East, pp. 1022–3, June 5, 1945, and pp. 1032–6, July 25, 1945. It is noteworthy that the content of Rhee’s letter in June was very similar to the one regarding Japan. In his book, Japan Inside Out, published in 1941, after arguing that Japan’s aggression in Asia was a threat to the entire free world, Rhee concluded that ‘the United States should employ all her power … to check Japan in order to prevent an ultimate conﬂict with her.’ Quoted in Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth, p. 174. Oliver, ibid., p. 220. A close examination of Rhee’s statements regarding the Communists shows that he seldom criticized them ideologically while repeatedly attacking their desire for expansion not only in the Korean peninsula, but also in the world. For a detailed analysis of the containment policy, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). Gye-dong Kim, Foreign Intervention in Korea (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), pp. 80–2; FRUS, 1947, vol. VI: The Far East, pp. 738–41, August 4, 1947, and pp. 742–3, August 6, 1947. Quoted in Yi, Han’guk oegyo cho ˘ngch’ aeku ˘i isanggwa hyo ˘nsil, p. 236. Many members of the commission were genuinely impressed by the arguments of Korean moderates, especially Kim Kyu-sik, that separate

Notes and References

29. 30.

31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37.

38. 39.

40.

165

elections in the South would only perpetuate the division of the country and draw the North more tightly into the Soviet orbit. They were also convinced that, even if elections were held, they should be for a consultative body only and should not result in the establishment of a separate South Korean government. See Merrill, The Peninsular Origins of the War, p. 60; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. II, pp. 72–7. Merrill, The Peninsula Origins of the War, pp. 61–75. For the 1948 elections, see Donald Stone Macdonald, ‘Korea and the Ballot: The International Dimension in Korean Political Development As Seen in Elections’, Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1977, pp. 213–17. ROK Ofﬁce of Public Information, Taet’ongryo ˘ng Yi Su ˘ng-man paksa tamhwajip [Collection of Statements by President Syngman Rhee], Vol. I (Seoul: Ofﬁce of Public Information, 1953), p. 3 (hereafter cited as Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements] with volume number). Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 113. William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 27. FRUS, 1949, vol. VII: The Far East and Australasia, Pt. 2, pp. 956–8, February 8, 1949. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement, p. 223. Quoted in Hakjoon Kim, Uniﬁcation Policies of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study, 2nd edn (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1986), p. 66. For the text of the UN resolution, see US Department of State, The Record on Korean Uniﬁcation, pp. 75–9. Henderson, The Politics of the Vortex, pp. 157–8; Chi-Young Pak, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945–1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980), pp. 46–55; John Kie-Chiang Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), pp. 32–3; Kim Ku was assassinated by an army ofﬁcer in June 1949. There has been a strong suspicion that Rhee was behind the incident, but no evidence has been found to the present day. In the same month, 13 members of the ‘young’ group were arrested and punished on the ﬂimsy charge that they were connected with the Communists. Most of them went north during the Korean War, ‘willingly or otherwise’, according to Macdonald. See his ‘Korea and the Ballot’, pp. 237–8; FRUS, 1948, vol. VI: The Far East and Australasia, p. 1326, November 12, 1948. Rhee’s supporters secured only 57 seats. Although the Democratic Nationalist Party gained only 24 seats, the majority of the Independents who occupied 126 of the 210 seats in the new Assembly held anti-Rhee sentiments. Ibid., pp. 280–3. Merrill, The Peninsula Origins of the War, pp. 98–112; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, pp. 259–67; George M. McCune, Korea Today (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950), pp. 241–3; Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. I, p. 7. Although historians later suggested that the rebellion was spontaneous and without direct support from the northern Communists, Rhee’s attitude was understandable, given both his perception that all Communists were ‘puppets’

166

41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

Notes and References of the Russians and the tense atmosphere of that time. After the Yo ˘su riots, rumours of impending invasion from the North were frequent. In Seoul, the chief of police plastered the city walls and bulletin boards with a proclamation asserting that the ‘North Korean People’s Army has already begun its invasion of South Korea’. Despite the existence of the real Communist threat, it cannot be denied that Rhee used the situation as an opportunity to clamp down on his political opponents. In particular, Rhee pushed through the National Assembly a National Security Law, which outlawed Communism, and gave the police almost unlimited powers of arrest and detention. While it was generally agreed that such a law was necessary to cope with the Communists, there were controversies over the law because some of its provisions were so vaguely worded that they could be utilized in eliminating political enemies in the name of security. In 1958, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, the Rhee regime attempted to strengthen the law in order to repress the growing opposition forces, an attempt which contributed to the collapse of the regime in 1960. For the National Security Law, see Koh, ‘In Quest of National Unity and Power’, pp. 41–2. Won-sun Pak, Kukka poanbo ˘p yo ˘n’gu [Study of the National Security Law], Vol. I (Seoul: Yo ˘ksa pip’yo ˘ngsa, 1992). Quoted in Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement, p. 220. Within the US government, there had been different views on the problem of the withdrawal. While the military had supported an immediate disengagement from Korea where the US had ‘little strategic interest’, the State Department had been reluctant to make a hasty withdrawal, arguing that it might result in the loss of Korea which would damage American ‘credibility’ elsewhere. Soviet troops had withdrawn from the North in December 1948. FRUS, 1948, Vol. VI: The Far East and Australasia, pp. 1167–9, April 2 1948; FRUS, 1949, Vol. VII: The Far East and Australasia, Pt. 2, pp. 969–78, March 22 1949; Kim, Foreign Intervention in Korea, pp. 90–106. For a comprehensive examination of the value of Korea in the US global policy as a symbol of the Cold War, see Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War and Korea, 1945–1950 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981). FRUS, 1948, Vol. VI: The Far East and Australasia, pp. 1331–2, November 19, 1948. For Rhee’s public statement which was similar in content, see Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. I, p. 163. FRUS, 1949, Vol. VII: The Far East and Australasia, Pt. 2, pp. 1023–4, May 16, 1949. Quoted in Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, p. 388. Quoted in ibid., p. 383. For details of the border ﬁghting, see also, Merrill, The Peninsula Origins of the War, pp. 130–42. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement, pp. 250–3; FRUS, 1949, Vol. VII: The Far East and Australasia, Pt. 2, pp. 1093, October 31, 1949. Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, p. 164; Kim, Foreign Intervention in Korea, pp. 127–8. The US House ﬁnally approved in February a revised bill which allocated $60 million for South Korea.

Notes and References 50. 51. 52.

53.

54. 55. 56.

57.

58. 59. 60. 61.

167

Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement, pp. 259–60. Quoted in Merrill, The Peninsula Origins of the War, p. 135. On 2 June 1994, the Russian government handed over its documents on the Korean War, covering the period from January 1949 to August 1953, to the South Korean government. The materials were from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation and the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. On July 20, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public all of the documents with a summarized version in Korean. The following examination of the North Korean attitude towards and preparation for a military offensive exclusively depends on the summarized version of the Russian archives, unless otherwise cited. Although the Russian documents contain valuable new information on the origins of the Korean conﬂict, this book will not seek to compare it with various other interpretations of the origins of the war. For a useful analysis of the Russian archives in the light of the origins of the war, see Kathryn Weathersby’s ‘New Findings on the Korean War’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 3 (Fall 1993), p. 1 and pp. 14–18 and ‘The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence’, Journal of American–East Asian Relations, vol. 3, no. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 1–33; Hakjoon Kim, ‘Russian Archives on Origins of Korean War’, Korea Focus, vol. 2, no. 5 (September–October 1994), pp. 22–31. See also Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, ch. 5. For example, in April, a battalion commander of the ROK Army, who was a North Korean spy, reported that the plan for a surprise attack against the North, which would be launched in June, had been made known to the level of battalion commander. FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII: Korea, p. 373, July 13, 1950. Ibid., pp. 428–30, July 19, 1950. For a comprehensive analysis of the US policy to expand the war across the 38th parallel, see Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conﬂict, 1950–1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 67–87. For details, see Jian Chen, ‘China’s Changing aims during the Korean War, 1950–1951 , Journal of American–East Asian Relations, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 8–41; Zhihai Zhai and Yufan Hao, ‘China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited’, China Quarterly, vol. 121 (March 1990); Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, pp. 168–202. Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. I, p. 50. Ibid., pp. 285–6. Yung Tai Pyun, Korea, My Country (Seoul: The International Cultural Association of Korea, 1954), pp. 159–60. With Communist occupation of Seoul, and subsequent retreat in the course of the war, many of the leftist and the moderate politicians went to the North either voluntarily or by force. Accordingly, by 1951, most politicians in the South were conservatives antagonistic to the Communists. See Sung-joo Han, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 78.

168 62. 63.

64.

65. 66. 67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

Notes and References Dong-A Ilbo, May 26 and June 6, 1951; Donald Stone Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), p. 48. The Rhee government encouraged mass rallies by utilizing quasi-ofﬁcial social organizations such as the National Society, the Korean Youth Corps, the Korean Federation of Trade Unions, and the Korean Women’s Association. It is also true, however, that the general attitude of the South Koreans was ‘overwhelmingly’ against any settlement of the war without uniﬁcation. See RG 59, ‘Recent Reactions in the Republic of Korea to a Possible Cease-ﬁre in the Area of the 38th Parallel’, Intelligence Report, no. 5564, June 29, 1951, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department of State, NA. For detailed analyses of the armistice negotiations, see Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Sydney D. Bailey, The Korean Armistice (London: Macmillan, 1992); William H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations (New York: Praeger, 1958); and Barton J. Bernstein, ‘The Struggle over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners of Repatriation?’, in Bruce Cumings (ed.), Child of Conﬂict: The Korean–American Relationship, 1943–1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), pp. 261–307. Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. I, pp. 72–4. FRUS, 1952–1954. Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 74–6, March 4, 1952, and pp. 114–16, March 21, 1952. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 185–6, April 30, 1952, and p. 189, May 2, 1952. The South Korean government had been informed about the ‘Greater Sanctions Statement’ in February 1952. The statement declared that ‘if there is a renewal of the armed attack … we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to conﬁne hostilities within frontiers of Korea.’ For the full text of the statement, see ibid., p. 14, January 10, 1952. After the outbreak of the war, although Rhee’s political opponents unreservedly supported Rhee’s external policies, they continued to be dissatisﬁed with the President over internal political issues. Moreover, ever since the establishment of the ﬁrst National Assembly in 1948, the opposition had favoured a cabinet system while Rhee had supported a strong presidential system, which had been a main source of antagonism between the two sides. An American Embassy ofﬁcial observed that ‘the Assemblymen … know as well as anybody that the people in their constituencies would follow Rhee rather than themselves’. Quoted in Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations, p. 189. For detailed examinations of the political crisis of 1952, see Jong Yil Ra, ‘Political Crisis in Korea, 1952: The Administration, Legislature, Military and Foreign Powers’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 27, no. 2 (April 1992), pp. 301–18; Oh, Democracy on Trial, pp. 39–46. According to a North Korean report, some 600,000 private dwellings, 8,700 factories, 5,000 schools, and 1,000 hospitals had been destroyed

Notes and References

72.

73.

74.

75. 76.

77.

78. 79.

169

during the war, the great bulk of them in 1950 or 1951. Quoted in Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, p. 413. According to statistics released by the ROK government, 17,000 industrial plants and business facilities, 60,000 homes, and 4.000 schools were destroyed. The total value of property damage was said to be equal to South Korea’s GNP in 1949. Quoted in Byung Chul Koh, ‘The War’s Impact on the Korean Peninsula’, Journal of American–East Asian Relations, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993), p. 59. Although the Korean conﬂict brought about such enormous damage both to North and South Korea, the former suffered greater destruction owing to the heavy aerial bombardment conducted by the United States. For a detailed examination of Kim’s switch to a peaceful policy, see Soon Sung Cho, ‘The Politics of North Korea’s Uniﬁcation Policy, 1950–1965,’ World Politics, vol. 19, no. 2 (January, 1967), pp. 220–1. As will be seen in detail in Chapter 6, the slogans were not just for public use. The Communist regime did indeed emphasize the political and economic reconstruction of North Korea rather than a military build-up until 1962. This does not necessarily mean that Kim did not have internal and external security concerns, or that Rhee did not pay attention to economic reconstruction in the post-armistice period. But in relative terms, Rhee placed more emphasis on security affairs while Kim gave priority to economic rehabilitation. For studies of the impact of the war in general, see Koh, ‘The War’s Impact on the Korean Peninsula’, pp. 57–75; Sang-Seek Park, ‘Legacy of the Korean War’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 15, no. 2 (June 1991), pp. 302–16. See also various articles in Ho-cho ˘l Son et al., Han’gukcho ˘njaenggwa nambuk’an sahoeu ˘i kujojo ˘k pyo ˘nhwa [The Korean War and the Structural Changes in North and South Korean Society] (Seoul: Ku ˘kdong munje yo ˘n’guso 1991). Joo-Hong Nam, America’s Commitment to South Korea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 36–8. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 839–40, April 2, 1953, and pp. 1620–4, November 20, 1953; Memorandum for the Secretary of State, July 31, 1953, DDE Diary-December 1952–July 1953 (1), Box 3, DDE Diaries Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953–61 (Ann Whitman File), DDEL. US action, however, had been limited to veiled threats and psychological warfare at that time. For details, see FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 274–7, May 31, pp. 281–5, and June 2, 1952; Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 166–7. For a close examination, based on archival sources, of the US plan to topple President Rhee, see Barton J. Bernstein, ‘Syngman Rhee: The Pawn as Rook: The Struggle to End the Korean War’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 10, no. 1 (January–March 1978), pp. 38–40. Park, ‘Legacy of the Korean War’, p. 305. Jang Jip Choi, ‘Political Cleavages in South Korea’, in Hagen Koo (ed.), State and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 22.

170 3.

1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7.

8. 9.

Notes and References The Ending of the Korean War and Syngman Rhee’s Search for a US–ROK Mutual Defence Treaty, April–August 1953 Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 168. The Rhee government had already suggested similar conditions in June 1951. Chosun Ilbo, April 2, 1953; Dong-A Ilbo, April 6, 20, and 23, 1953; Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. I, p. 178. RG 84, ‘ROK Asks for Defense Pact with US While Opposing CeaseFire in Korea’, Intelligence Brief, no. 1393, April 21, 1953, Box 7, NRC; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 897–900, April 8, 1953. In the armistice talks, it was agreed that a political conference to settle the Korean problem peacefully would be held within three months after the signing of the armistice agreement. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (London: Heinemann, 1963), pp. 181–2; Memorandum to the President, April 23, 1953, Korea 1953 (3), Box 32, International Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953–61 (Ann Whitman File), DDEL; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 993–35, April 24, 1953. Eisenhower’s reply of April 23 was delivered to Rhee on April 26, in which he warned Rhee not to sabotage the armistice, although he expressed his sympathy with the Korean people’s desire to achieve uniﬁcation. After reading the reply, Rhee reacted by saying that: ‘Chinese Communists must withdraw or [the] peace is no peace.’ FRUS, Ibid., p. 938, April 26, 1953. Letter from Rhee to Oliver, May 19, 1953, the Oliver File. According to a US source, ROK commanders had told Rhee that they had supplies for only 3 days of offensive action. The weakness of South Korean forces was partly proved later when the Communists launched a major offensive against the ROK 2nd Corps in the east-central sector, and pushed them back 5 kilometres on a 12-kilometre front. RG 59, 795.00(W)/5-2953, May 29, 1953, NA; Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 1950–1953, vol. I: Strategy and Diplomacy (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), p. 358. FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. XV: Korea, p. 942, April 26, and pp. 947–9, April 28, 1953. Ibid., pp. 906-7, April 14, and pp. 1100-2, May 25, 1953; Barton J. Bernstein, ‘Syngman Rhee: The Pawn as Rook: The Struggle to End the Korean War’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 10, no. 1 (January-March 1978), p. 38 and p. 41; Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 273. In a sense, Rhee’s manner vis-à-vis the US was, in Thomas Schelling’s term, ‘strategic behavior’, in which Rhee made an ‘overt commitment’ to his unilateral action in order to convince the Americans that he was not ‘blufﬁng’. See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conﬂict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 15–46.

Notes and References 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

18. 19.

20. 21.

171

FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. XV: Korea, pp. 910–13, April 15, and pp. 947–50, April 28, 1953. Ibid., pp. 955–6, April 30, 1953; Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 263. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 906–7, April 14, and pp. 1010–12, May 13, 1953; RG 59, 795B.5/4-753 and 4-2353, April 7 and 23, 1953, NA. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1086–90, May 22, 1953; Telephone Conversation, July 31, 1953, Korean Armistice Matters, Box 9, Subject Series, Paper of John Foster Dulles, DDEL. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1097–102, May 25, and pp. 1106–8, May 26, 1953. In April 1953, General Clark had brought updated ‘Plan Everready’, which had been devised in May 1952. Among US policy-makers, General Collins, the Chief of Staff of the US Army, strongly favoured the extreme measure of toppling President Rhee. US ofﬁcials seemed to expect to be helped by the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, General Paik Sun Yup, if the plan were to be carried out. According to General Collins, General Paik ‘tacitly indicated that he would be prepared to back us [the US] if anything should happen which involves a split with Rhee’. Ibid., pp. 940–3, April 26, pp. 1112–14, 1114–19, 1119–20, May 29, and pp. 1126–9, June 1, 1953; John Kotch, ‘The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea’, in Bruce Cumings (ed.), Child of Conﬂict: The Korean–American Relationship, 1943–1953 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), pp. 244–7. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1122–3, and pp. 1123–4, May 30, 1953. Telegram from Pusan to the Secretary of State, June 2, 1953, Korea 1953 (3), Box 32, International Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1132–3, June 2, and pp. 1134–5, June 3, 1953; Memorandum for Mr W. J. Hopkins, the White House, June 25, 1953, Korea 1953 (2), Box 32, International Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV, pp. 1149–51, June 7, 1953. In fact, when US ofﬁcials were discussing the possibility of making a bilateral security pact with the ROK on May 29, a participant argued that: ‘It actually could be and really would have to be only a promise to negotiate a pact rather than the actual conclusion of a pact. We would have some time before a pact could possibly be concluded and could continue to use this as a pressure point with Rhee.’ Ibid., p. 1119, May 29, 1953. Ibid., pp. 1159–60, June 9, 1953. Originally, the idea of a high-level meeting was initiated on June 10 in the form of Eisenhower’s invitation to Rhee. Rhee rejected the invitation, and suggested Dulles’s visit to Korea. But Dulles preferred sending someone of a high but lesser position. Notably, Bailey suggests that the invitation to Rhee was an effort to remove Rhee from the scene at a crucial juncture – i.e., when the conclusion of the armistice was imminent. In a similar vein, Bernstein argues that Rhee did not

172

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31.

32. 33.

Notes and References accept the invitation not only because he realized that in Washington he could not fan the ﬂames of Korean opposition to the truce, but also because he may have had some suspicion that the US was thinking of overthrowing him. RG 59, 795.00/6-1253, June 12, 1953, and 795.00/61453, June 14, 1953, NA; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, p. 1164, June 10, pp. 1168–67, June 14, and p. 1188, June 16, 1953; Sydney D. Bailey, The Korean Armistice (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 133; Bernstein, ‘Syngman Rhee: The Pawn as Rook’, p. 43. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1157–8, June 9, and pp. 1163–4, June 10, 1953. Sun Yup Paik, From Pusan to Panmunjom (New York: Brassey’s, 1992), pp. 228–30. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1008–10, May 12, pp. 1098–9, May 25, pp. 1102-3, May 26, and pp. 1112–14, May 29, 1953; RG 59, 795.00/6-453, June 4, 1953, NA. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 281. Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. I, p. 300. Oral History Interview with Ellis Briggs, DDEL. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1120–1, May 30, and pp. 1197–9, June 18, 1953. O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, p. 269; Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 264–5; Telephone Conversation with the President, June 20, 1953, Box 20, Telephone Calls Series, Papers of John Foster Dulles, DDEL; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1008–10, May 12, and pp. 1197–8, June 18, 1953. According to Bailey, there had been occasional unconﬁrmed reports that the US Central Intelligence Agency, and perhaps others, encouraged Rhee’s unilateral action. Ambassador Briggs recalled later that he had thought that the unilateral release of anti-Communist POWs would not be an issue over which the Communists would wreck the armistice negotiations. If this view was shared by other American ﬁgures, it is possible that they were willing to acquiesce with, or at least were negligent of Rhee’s expected action, considering that such an action would not destroy the prime US goal – i.e., a cease-ﬁre. But there is no evidence of ofﬁcial US collusion with Rhee. See Bailey, The Korean Armistice, p. 134; Oral History Interview with Ellis Briggs, DDEL. RG 59, 795.00/6-1853, June 18, 1953, NA; FRROK, 729.5UK, from Graham to Pyun, June 22, 1953. 150th Meeting of NSC, June 18, 1953, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1213–21, June 19, 1953; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 185–6; Telephone Conversation with the President, June 24, 1953, Box 9, Subject Series, Papers of John Foster Dulles, DDEL. RG 59, 795B.00/7-153, July 1, 1953, NA. Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report; The Inside Story of the Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 101; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1152–4, June 8, and pp. 1114–20, June 19, 1953; RG 59, 795B.00/6-153, June 1, 1953, NA. On June 8, General Clark issued a revised ‘Plan Everready’, which contained an option to

Notes and References

34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41.

173

establish an ‘amenable’ ROK government instead of a military government under the UN Command. In early July, Gladwyn Jebb, the British representative at the UN, recommended to his government that the British ‘must try to induce the Americans … to arrange for the deposition of the South Korean Dictator.’ FO 371/105512, Jebb Minute, July 9, 1953, PRO. Rhee’s release of the POWs was generally supported even by his political opposition. Many of them applauded Rhee’s action both publicly and privately. But there was an incident in which the President’s unilateral action was criticized. On 20 June, Cho Pyo ˘ng-ok the leader of the opposition party, issued a statement that the freeing of the prisoners was an ‘unwise move in view of international reaction’. While he worried that such action would damage South Korea’s relations with the US and the UN, however, he did not oppose Rhee’s antiarmistice policy itself. In fact, Cho himself also thought that the anti-Communist prisoners should be released, and his party continued to support Rhee’s position on the POW and armistice issues. RG 84, from Briggs to Dulles, June 19 and 23, 1953, Box 13, NRC; Pyo ˘ng-ok Cho, Nau ˘i hoegorok [My Memoirs] (Seoul: Minyosa, 1959), p. 350; Chosun Ilbo, June 20, 1953. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1224–5, June 20, pp. 1347–50, July 8, and pp. 1378–80, July 14, 1953. Ibid., pp. 1197–8, June 18, pp. 1221–2, June 19, and pp. 1240–2, June 23, 1953; RG 59, 795.00/6-2653, June 26, 1953, NA. RG 59, 795B.00/6-2753, June 27, 1953, NA. RG 59, 795.00/6-2753, June 27, 1953; 795.00/7-953, July 7, 1953, NA. When Robertson was negotiating with Rhee, maybe the only thing predictable was that Rhee became mild and cooperative in private conversations without his advisors while very adamant in conference type meetings. Actually, Rhee had shown this tendency before (e.g. his meeting with Briggs on April 14, with Clark April 27, and with Taylor June 9), but in this intensive series of conversations, the tendency was clearly revealed. It is thought that this tendency was attributable partly to Rhee’s dogmatic personality, and partly to his concern for the management of his image as a strong leader. Ambassador Briggs observed in the process of the negotiation that ‘Rhee, in addition to being a shrewd and resourceful trader, is also a highly emotional, irrational, illogical fanatic fully capable of attempting to lead his country into national suicide.’ RG 59, 795B.00/7-153, July 1, 1958, NA. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1312–14, July 3, 1953; RG 59, 795.00/7-453, July 4, 1953, NA. RG 59, 795.00/7-653, July 7, 1953; 795.00/7-753, July 7, 1953; 795.00/ 7-853, July 8, 1953, NA. RG 59, 795.00/7-953, July 9, 1953, NA; From Rhee to Eisenhower, July 11, 1953, Syngman Rhee 1953–1957 (1), Box 33, International Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. RG 59, 795.00/7-935, July 9, 1953, NA; Telephone Conversation with the President, July 22, 1953, Box 10, Telephone Calls Series, Papers of John Foster Dulles, DDEL. Nevertheless, Rhee’s bargaining position was probably undermined to some extent due to a Communist offensive

174

42.

43.

44. 45. 46.

47. 48.

49. 50. 51.

Notes and References which was launched on July 14, and ‘practically destroyed’ ROK divisions by July 20. This offensive was said to be intended as a warning to Rhee who had been threatening to sabotage an armistice agreement. Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 197 and p. 222; Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 291. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1475–8, August 6, and pp. 1478–80, August 6, 1953. The economic and military aid programme was based on President Eisenhower’s suggestion. On July 27, Eisenhower, in his memorandum to the Secretary of State, had proposed several ways to help South Korea: (1) to train, equip, and organize four more divisions of the ROK army (the army had 17 divisions at the time of the armistice), and to give some help in organizing other forms of military units; (2) to help directly through funds of the Mutual Security Assistance Bill; (3) to ask the Congress to authorize the use of $200 million in the economic rehabilitation of South Korea; and (4) to use US forces in Korea as technical advisors, overseers, and actual constructors of needed facilities. See ibid., p. 1446, July 27, 1953. Donald Stone Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), p. 51; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1481–8, August 7, 1953. RG 59, 795.5/8-653, August 6, 1953, NA; Robert Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942–1960: A Personal Narrative (Seoul: Panmun Book, 1978), pp. 426–8. FRUS, 1952–1953, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1466–73, August 5, and pp. 1481–8, August 7, 1953; RG 59, 795.5/8-653, August 6, 1953, NA. For a full text of the Mutual Defence Treaty, see Se-Jin Kim (ed.), Documents on Korean–American Relations, 1943–1976 (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Uniﬁcation, 1976), pp. 185–6. According to the draft treaty initialled by both sides, it was stipulated in Article III that in the event of an armed attack on either Parties, each Party would act in accordance with its ‘constitutional processes’. As for the termination clause, which was provided in Article V, either Party could terminate the treaty one year after notice had been given to the other Party. RG 59, 795.5/8-753, August 7, 1953, NA. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, p. 1491, August 10, 1953. RG 319, ‘Reaction of Far Eastern Leaders to Rhee’s Success in Obtaining US Concessions’, August 15, 1953, NA. This report expressed concern that, encouraged by Rhee’s success, the leaders of the Far East would continue to work for the best interests of their individual nations by seeking the maximum in concessions from the US. Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. I, pp. 314–15. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 109. Personal Diary, July 24, 1953, Box 9, DDEL Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.

Notes and References 4.

1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9.

175

The Post-Armistice Security Policy of Syngman Rhee: The Strengthening of ROK Forces, September 1953–November 1954 Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. I, p. 308. The aim of Kim’s peaceful policy and his post-armistice policies in general will be examined in Chapter 6. But Kim’s following statement made in August 1953 is worth citing to compare the policies of Rhee and Kim during this period: ‘It is wrong to think that war might soon break out again and that peaceful construction could not be undertaken because the armistice does not mean a complete peace.’ Kim Il Sung, Selected Works, Vol. I (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971), pp. 416–9. Since the establishment of the LP in 1951, factional rifts within the party had been growing. In order to cope with this, President Rhee had deliberately played off potential rivals against each other. By the middle of 1953, however, Yi Po ˘m-so ˘k and his followers, who had played an important role in organizing the LP, manoeuvred to dominate various organs of the party. Yi had been the ﬁrst Prime Minister (1948–50) and concurrently Defence Minister (1948–9), and subsequently Home Minister (1952). He had also been noted as the leader of the rightist Racial Youth Corps – an organization which Rhee reportedly feared might give Yi the means to power. For detailed analyses of factional struggles within the Liberal Party, and of the subsequent reorganization of the party, see ROK Central Election Management Committee, Taehanmin’guk cho ˘ngdangsa [History of Korean Political Parties], Vol. I: 1945–1972 (Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1973), pp. 216–20; Chulsu Kim, ‘Parties and Factions in Korean Politics, Ph.D’. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1973, pp. 46–69. John Kie-Chiang Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 48; Richard Allen, Korea’s Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle, 1960), pp. 204–5. ROK Central Election Management Committee, Taehanmin’guk so ˘n’ go ˘sa [History of Elections in Korea] (Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1964), pp. 315–20 and p. 407; Donald Stone Macdonald, ‘Korea and the Ballot: The International Dimension in Korean Political Development As Seen in Elections’, Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1977, pp. 378–80; RG 84, ‘Conduct of the ROK National Assembly Elections of May 20, 1954’, July 14, 1954, Box 13, NRC. Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945–1972 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 141. Dong-A Ilbo, September 1 and 21, 1954. Macdonald, ‘Korea and the Ballot’, p. 393; RG 84, ‘Constitutional Amendment Bill’, October 15, 1954, Box 14, NRC; RG 59, 795B.00/ 10-1454, October 14, 1954, NA. For example, see Rhee’s statement to the public regarding the constitutional amendments on October 19, 1954, in Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. II, pp. 49–51.

176 10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17.

Notes and References The motive for Ham’s attack on Shin was never clariﬁed. There had been two unconﬁrmed speculations that the incident had been plotted by Kim Chang-ryong, the head of the military investigative agency; and that it had resulted from personal disagreement between Shin and Ham. In the DNP disciplinary action, Ham was asked to deny his allegation, but refused to do so. Consequently, he was expelled from the party. Dong-A Ilbo, October 30 and 31, and November 13, 1954; RG 84, from Briggs to Dulles, November 1, 1954, Box 13, NRC; Macdonald, ‘Korea and the Ballot’, pp. 390–1. The manner in which the amendment bill was passed, and its impact on the political situation in South Korea, will be examined in detail in the next chapter. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1519–21, October 2, 1953. Foreign Minister Pyun was in Washington D.C. to sign the Mutual Defense Treaty between the ROK and the US on October 1. Memorandum for the President, October 21, 1953, in Folder for General John Hull, Box 20, Administration Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953–61 (Ann Whitman File), DDEL. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1546–57, October 22, pp. 1563–5, October 27, pp. 1567–70, October 28, and pp. 1598–9, November 6, 1953. The 168th Meeting of the NSC, October 29, 1953, and the 169th Meeting of the NSC, November 5, 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. Paragraph 4 of NSC 167/2, which probably referred to measures to replace Rhee, was deleted from the text of the otherwise declassiﬁed document. According to the Memorandum of Discussion at the 168th Meeting of National Security Council, where the basic contents of NSC 167/2 were decided, there was no great difference between the views of the State Department and the Defense Department: the US had to have measures ready to replace Rhee as head of the ROK if he started hostilities. It is notable that, at the meeting Dulles said that the task of ﬁnding a replacement for Rhee was not hopeless, as certain signiﬁcant elements in the ROK government had recently seemed less likely to rally to Rhee who was bent on a course of national suicide. He also pointed out that the US had to have a strong moral case to put before the world, in order that the US should not appear to be treating the ROK in the way that the Soviets treated their satellite governments. Before the 168th NSC meeting, General Hull had already approved the revised ‘Plan Everready’ to topple Rhee. For the contents of the earlier versions of the ‘Plan Everready’, see Chapter 3. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1590–2, November 4, 1953; RG 59, 795.00/11–1953, November 13, 1953, NA. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, p. 1609, November 13, and pp. 1663–6, December 18, 1953; RG 59, 795B.00/11–1953, November 13, 1953; 795.00/11–1953, November 19, 1953, NA. From Mrs Rhee to Oliver, December 10, 1953, the Oliver File; The 175th Meeting of the NSC, December 15, 1953, Box 5, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Touchstone, 1990), p. 128.

Notes and References 18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

23. 24.

25. 26.

27.

28. 29.

177

On December 26, President Eisenhower released a statement that US ground forces in Korea were to be progressively reduced as circumstances warranted, and that, as an initial step, two Army divisions were to be withdrawn and returned to the US. RG 59, 795.00/1-654, January 6, 1954, NA; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1745–7, February 4, and p. 1747, February 9, 1954. Rhee’s letter, which the State Department believed was ‘offensive in tone’, was withdrawn by Rhee in accordance with the State Department’s suggestion. But a copy of this letter was delivered to President Eisenhower as an unofﬁcial record. The 173rd Meeting of the NSC, December 3, 1953, Box 5, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. RG 59, 795.00/12-2753, December 27, 1953; 795.00/12-3053, December 30, 1953, NA. According to a CIA source based on a report by O. H. King, an American advisor to the ROK government, Rhee said that if he could have 15 or 20 more Korean army divisions, then he could let all foreign troops leave Korea about 6 months later and could ‘handle the situation’. See Memorandum for the White House, January 8, 1954 in Folder for Korea–Top Secret, Box 33, International Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. ROK Ofﬁce of Public Information, Korea Flaming High: Excerpts from Statements by President Syngman Rhee in Crucial 1953 (Seoul: Ofﬁce of Public Information, 1954), pp. 148–9. The Soviet Union was to invite China and North Korea to attend the conference. The Berlin agreement also provided for a discussion at Geneva, by a different group of participants, regarding the problem of Indochina. For details of the Berlin conference, see Robert F. Randle, Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 21–38. RG 59, 795.00/2-2054, February 20, 1954, NA; Dong-A Ilbo, February 21, 1954. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XVI: The Geneva Conference, pp. 119–24, April 20, 1954, and pp. 131–9, April 24, 1954; Henry W. Brands, Jr., ‘The Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, Syngman Rhee and the “Other” Geneva Conference of 1954’. Paciﬁc Historical Review, vol. 61 (February 1987), pp. 64–5. From Mrs Rhee to Oliver, March 11, 1954, the Oliver File. At that time, Dr Oliver was a professor at Pennsylvania State University, and Rhee was negotiating with Mr Milton Eisenhower, the President of the University, and a brother of President Eisenhower, regarding Oliver’s leave from the university. But President Rhee did not want Milton Eisenhower to know that Oliver’s leave was for the Geneva conference, because if so, he would certainly report it to his brother. Ibid.; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XVI: The Geneva Conference, pp. 29–30 and pp. 31–2, March 6, 1954. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1763–4, March 9, 1954; Letter from Rhee to Eisenhower, March 11, 1954, in Folder for DDE DiaryMarch 1954 (2), Box 6, DDE Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.

178 30. 31.

32. 33.

34. 35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

Notes and References RG 59, 795.00/3-1854, March 17, 1954, NA; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1779–81, March 31, 1954. Letter from Eisenhower to Rhee, March 20, 1954 in Folder for DDE Diary-March 1954 (2), Box 6, DDE Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; RG 59, 795.5-MSP/3-1654, March 16, 1954, NA; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, p. 1775, March 23, 1954. The US Senate approved the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROK on January 26. Letter from Rhee to Eisenhower, April 8, 1954 in Folder for John F. Dulles-April 1954 (2), Box 2, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. South Korean force levels then authorized by the Secretary of Defense and the President of the US were as follows: (1) Army – 655,000 personnel (20 divisions); (2) Navy – 15,000 personnel (maximum of 83 ships); (3) Marine Corps – 23,500 personnel (now organized as a brigade); and (4) Air Force – 9,000 personnel (one ﬁghter wing). FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1779–85, March 31, 1954. The 193rd Meeting of the NSC, April 13, 1954, Box 5, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. Letter from Eisenhower to Rhee, April 16, 1954 in Folder for John F. Dulles-April 1954 (2), Box 2, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; RG 59, 795.00/4-1854, April 18, 1954, NA; Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. II, p. 20. Briggs noted that Rhee had prepared a draft of his statement before he received Eisenhower’s letter of April 16. RG 59, 795.00/4–854, April 18, 1954, NA. The Korean phase of the Geneva conference is not within the scope of this study. For detailed analyses of the conference, see Brands, ‘The “other” Geneva Conference’, pp. 59–85; Sydney D. Bailey, The Korean Armistice (London: Macmillan, 1992), ch. 5. For studies of the uniﬁcation policy of North and South Korea during the Geneva conference, see Hakjoon Kim, Uniﬁcation Policies of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study, 2nd edn (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1986), pp. 170–5; Soon Sung Cho, ‘The Politics of North Korea’s Uniﬁcation Policies, 1950–1965’, World Politics, vol. 19, no. 2 (January 1967), pp. 218–41. Various statements made in the Korean phase of the conference are documented in US Department of State, The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26–June 15, 1954 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1954). According to Cho’s analysis, the North attempted to secure a ‘veto power’ in the uniﬁcation process by proposing the formation of the allKorean Commission, and thus to achieve uniﬁcation on North Korean terms only. See Cho, ‘North Korea’s Uniﬁcation Policies’, pp. 222–4. The intensifying Communist assault in Indochina at the time of the Geneva conference made South Korea more valuable for the Eisenhower administration as a symbol of continued US resistance to the Communists. Accordingly, President Rhee was able to insist on uniﬁcation by force. For this point, see Brands, ‘The “Other” Geneva Conference’, p. 85. According to Robert Oliver, who participated in the conference as an advisor, President Rhee never approved the nation-wide election

Notes and References

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48.

49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54.

179

formula which was devised by the ROK delegation in Geneva. But, perceiving that South Korea would be ‘left standing absolutely alone’ among the Allies if South Korea adhered to the north-only elections, Oliver urged Foreign Minister Pyun to disobey Rhee’s instruction, and to announce South Korean support for all-Korean elections. Pyun accepted Oliver’s argument. See Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942–1960: A Personal Narrative (Seoul: Panmun Book, 1978), pp. 443–4. Brands, ‘The “Other” Geneva Conference’, p. 81. Letter from Dulles to Rhee, June 18, 1954, in Folder for John Foster Dulles Chronological, June 1954 (2), Box 8, JFD Chronological Series, Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1951–1959, DDEL. Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. II, p. 106; From Mrs Rhee to Oliver, July 22, 1954, the Oliver File; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, p. 1818, July 2, 1954. FRUS, ibid., pp. 1839–47, July 27, 1954. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement, pp. 446–7. ROK Ofﬁce of Public Information, President Syngman Rhee’s Journey to America (Seoul: Ofﬁce of Public Information, 1955), pp. 15–22. RG 59, 795B.11/8-1654, August 16, 1954, NA. According to the State Department’s analysis, the press had praised Rhee’s vigour and persistence in opposing Communism, but most periodicals ﬂinched at Rhee’s advocacy of hostilities against China. However, some newspapers had considered Rhee’s proposal to have a logical basis, even though they condemned it as unacceptable. RG 59, 795B.11/8-2454, August 24, 1954, NA. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement, p. 450. ‘Report of Ambassador James A. Van Fleet on Korea’, n.d., President’s Papers, 1954 (9), Box 2, Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries, Records of White House Ofﬁce, Ofﬁce of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, DDEL; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1819–21, July 3, and p. 1832, July 10, 1954. FRUS, ibid., pp. 1547–8, and pp. 1850–6, July 29, 1954. Ibid., pp. 1849–50, August 2, 1954; RG 59, 795.00/7-2854, July 28, 1954, NA. Dong-A Ilbo, July 31, 1954; RG 59, 795B.00/8-254, August 2, 1954, NA. According to the armistice agreement, the NNSC was to be responsible for supervising the limitations on the introduction or rotation of military personnel and weapons, and for conducting observations and inspections when violations had been alleged. The NNSC was composed of members from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1806–8, June 11, and pp. 1811–12, June 21, 1954; RG 59, 795.00/6-1954, June 19, 1954, NA. RG 59, 795.00/7-3054, July 30, 1954, NA; FRROK, 724.11US, from Washington to Seoul, July 31, 1954. Dong-A Ilbo, August 20, and 24, 1954; FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1868–9, September 1, pp. 1870–1, September 5, and p. 1885, September 20, 1954.

180 55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60.

61.

62.

63. 64.

65.

66.

67.

Notes and References FRUS, ibid., pp. 1875–82, September 15, 1954. Ibid., pp. 1888–9, September 27, 1954; RG 84, From Briggs to Dulles, September 28, 1954, NRC; RG 59, 795B.00/10-154, October 1, 1954, NA. RG 59, 795B.00/10-754, October 7, 1954, NA; From Rhee to Oliver, October 18, 1954, the Oliver File. In the letter, President Rhee also said that his ‘last letter to Secretary Dulles’, which had not been answered and to which no answer was expected, was ‘the last straw that broke the camel’s back’. But details of the letter to Dulles are not to be found. RG 59, 795B.00/10-2254, October 22, 1954, NA. FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1873–4, September 10, and pp. 1906–7, October 28, 1954. Ibid., p. 1886, September 20, and pp. 1911–14, November 8, 1954; RG 59, 795B.00/9-2954, September 29, 1954, NA. In a report to Washington, on September 20, Ambassador Briggs recommended that: ‘behind [the] scenes … we get busy … there are elements in [the] ROK considerably less intemperate. They lack support and capacity to act at present, but they exist and were known to us.’ In early November, General Hull set up a plan in which US ofﬁcials were to contact Korean political and military leaders to encourage them in their opposition to Rhee in the event of Rhee’s continued refusal of the US offer. In the draft minute, there were two items concerning the uniﬁcation issue. The ﬁrst one was that South Korea would ‘cooperate with the United States in its efforts to unify Korea, including possible efforts through the United Nations to secure this objective’. Secondly, as an American undertaking, the draft stated that the US would ‘support the uniﬁcation of Korea by all peaceful means’. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1907–10, October 29, pp. 1917–18, November 14, and p. 1919, November 15, 1954; RG 59, 795B.00/10-3054, October 30, 1954, NA; RG 84, from Dulles to Briggs, November 13, and from Briggs to Dulles, November 14, 1954, NRC. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1537–8. ROK National Assembly, Kukhoe sokkirok [Records of the National Assembly] (Seoul; The National Assembly), the 19th Plenary Session, the 58th Meeting, pp. 5–8, and the 61st Meeting, p. 1; Dong-A Ilbo, September 12, and October 20, 1954; Chosun Ilbo, September 21, October 29, and November 8, 1954. FO 371/110535, October 31, and November 8, 1954, PRO; RG 84, from Briggs to Dulles, October 20 and 27, 1954, Box 6, NRC; RG 59, 795.00/11-554, November 5, 1954, NA. According to those foreign sources, there were speculations of a possible military coup against Rhee. But both US and British ofﬁcials believed that the chances of a coup were remote because of the military leaders’ loyalty to Rhee and Rhee’s own prestige which was still undeniable. For a text of the Agreed Minute, and the Mutual Defense Treaty, see Se-Jin Kim (ed.), Documents on Korean–American Relations, 1943–1976 (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Uniﬁcation, 1976), pp. 203–5 and pp. 185–6. According to Robert Oliver, after the Washington address, he could not ﬁnd ‘any feeling by top American ofﬁcials that it was worth while trying

Notes and References

68.

181

to work with President Rhee’. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement, p. 450. RG 59, 795.00/9-2454, September 24, 1954, NA.

5. Internal and External Challenges to the Rhee Regime and Rhee’s Growing Concern for Regime Security, November 1954–May 1956 1. 2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

8.

For detailed contents of the bill and the circumstances in which the amendment was suggested, see the previous chapter. For detailed examinations of the passage of the amendments, see Unt’ae Kim, Han’guk hyo ˘ndae cho ˘ng’iron [Modern History of Korean Politics], vol. II: Cheil konghwaguk [The First Republic] (Seoul: So ˘ngmum kak, 1986), pp. 103–6. Donald Stone Macdonald, ‘Korea and the Ballot: The International Dimension in Korean Political Development as Seen in Elections’, Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1977, pp. 389–96. Kim, Han’guk hyo ˘ndae cho ˘ngch’iron, p. 105; Chi-Young Pak, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945–1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980), p. 119; RG 59, 795B.00/11-2954, November 29, 1955, NA; FO 371/110535, from Seoul to London, November 19, 1954, PRO. David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 15–25. For the relations between political stability and legitimacy, see Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 153–7. The process of the 1952 constitutional revision is examined in Chapter 2. For the favourable attitudes of the Korean public, as well as foreigners, towards Rhee’s constitutional amendment of 1952, see Jong Yil Ra, ‘Political Crisis in Korea, 1952: The Administration, Legislature, Military and Foreign Powers’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 27, no. 2 (April 1992), p. 134. Yang Sung Chul suggests that the 1952 incident was the ﬁrst legitimacy crisis of the Rhee government. See his, The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 553. From a different point of view, Kim Il-yo ˘ng argues that during the period between the 1952 political crisis and the 1954 one, the Rhee regime was more stable than during any other period. See his, ‘YiSu ˘ng-man t’ongchigi cho ˘ng chi’ich’ ejeu ˘i so ˘nggyo ˘ke kwanhanyo ˘n’gu [The Characteristics of the Political Regime during the Presidential Reign of Syngman Rhee]’, Ph.D. Dissertation, Songkyunkwan University, Seoul, 1991, p. 205. For the process of creating this new opposition party, see Pak, Political Opposition in Korea, pp. 106–12; ROK Central Election Management Committee, Taehanmin’ guk cho ˘ngdangsa [History of Korean Political Parties], Vol. I: 1945–1972 (Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1973), pp. 216–20; RG 59, ‘Current Prospects for Presidential Succession in the Republic of Korea’, Intelligence Report, no. 6581, March 23, 1955, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department

182

9. 10.

11. 12.

13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Notes and References of State, NA; RG 59, 795B.00/3-755, March 7, 1955, 795B.00/3-3155, March 31, 1955, and 695B.00/4-2155, April 21, 1955, NA. The presidential election of 1956 will be examined in detail in the next chapter. Kim, Han’guk hyo ˘ndae cho ˘ngch’iron, pp. 111–12 and p. 121. Platforms of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Nationalist Party, the predecessor of the Democratic Party, had no items which speciﬁcally dealt with uniﬁcation or diplomacy. The Progressive Party’s peaceful uniﬁcation policy, and the Rhee regime’s reaction to it will be studied in Chapter 6. Macdonald, ‘Korea and the Ballot’, p. 402. Immediately after Stalin’s death, Georgii Malenkov, who, in 1953, seemed to be Stalin’s likely successor, stated in a speech before the Supreme Soviet: ‘At the present time there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested countries. This applies to our relations with all states, including the United States of America.’ Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945–1992, 7th edn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 144; John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History, 2nd edn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), pp. 219–22. Warren I. Cohen, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. IV: America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 87; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 141. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973. 2nd edn (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 560–6. Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 199; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, p. 174. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, pp. 90–1; Robert D. Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 247. For a detailed examination of Khrushchev’s speech of 1956, see Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 572–80. Gaddis, Russia, The Soviet Union and the United States, pp. 219–27. See also, LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, pp. 171–94; Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, pp. 81–120. Hakjoon Kim, Uniﬁcation Policies of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study, 2nd edn (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1986), pp. 177–9; RG 59, 795.00/12-2154, December 21, 1954, NA. From Rhee to Eisenhower, December 29, 1954, in Folder for Rhee, Syngman 1953–57 (1), Box 33, International Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953–61 (Ann Whitman File), DDEL. Independence Day and Liberation Day have traditionally been the most important memorial days in South Korea, in which the heads of the state have usually made speeches on important issues or policies. FO 371/115311, From Seoul to London, March 2, 1955, PRO. Rhee’s address on Independence Day, 1955 seemed to be successful in improving

Notes and References

23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31.

32. 33. 34.

183

US–ROK relations; General Hull, the UN Commander, sent a letter praising Rhee’s address. Hull said in the letter that he was ‘so impressed and moved’ by Rhee’s ‘thoughtful and appreciative words’ about the US. From Hull to Rhee, March 3, 1955, enclosed in the letter from Mrs Rhee to Oliver, March 11, 1955, the Oliver File. Most of Rhee’s public statements regarding political and military issues during 1955 condemned the very notion of ‘peaceful coexistence’. See various addresses or interviews of President Rhee in Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. II & III, and Korea Flaming High, Vol. II. Rhee also asked Robert Oliver to contribute anti-Communist articles to various American journals in the name of either Rhee or Oliver, according to correspondence in the Oliver File. RG 59, 795.00/5-1655, May 16, 1955, NA. Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. II, pp. 72–7. Korea Flaming High, Vol. II, p. 55; From Rhee to Oliver, January 18, 1955, the Oliver File. Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. II, pp. 77–82. Korea Flaming High, Vol. II, p. 183; RG 59, 795.00/5-2655, May 26, 1955, NA; Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. III, pp. 1–5. Memorandum from President Rhee, January 18, 1955, the Oliver File. Se-Jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971), p. 22. Kim suggests that Rhee’s political ideology was of a negative nature, centred around one dominant theme – anti-Communism. Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy’, in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 271–3. For a similar point, See Brian L. Job, ‘The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World’, in Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 28–9. Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. II, pp. 64–6. Macdonald, ‘Korea and the Ballot’, pp. 400–1; Dong-A Ilbo, March 16, 1955; Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. II, p. 122 and p. 124. FRUS, 1955–57, Vol. XXIII, Pt. 2: Korea, pp. 5–6, January 12, 1955. This plan was a part of US courses of action to be taken to prevent unilateral action by the ROK in regard to the armistice. Originally, the proposals had made the UN Commander responsible for imposing martial law if necessary to enable a new leadership to assume power ‘if Rhee initiates or is about to initiate unilateral action’. General Hull, however, requested that he be relieved of this responsibility because the withdrawal of two of his divisions from Korea had removed his capacity to take this action. Therefore, the US government devised a new plan which called for the US covertly to encourage the development of new leadership and, in the event of unilateral action by the Rhee government, to assist such a new leadership to assume power without overt US participation. It should be noted that, unlike the previous scheme, the revised one envisaged a new leadership in the ROK regardless of Rhee’s possible unilateral action.

184 35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

Notes and References From Mrs Rhee to Oliver, November 24, 1955, the Oliver File; FO 371/115309, from Seoul to London, October 10, 1955, PRO. As early as September 1953, Secretary Dulles said to President Eisenhower that he was ‘not happy about the relationship of Clark and Briggs [who had sympathized with Rhee] with Rhee’, and that he was thinking of replacing Briggs by Lacy. Eisenhower agreed with Dulles. But there is no evidence to support Rhee’s allegation. ‘Memorandum for Robertson’, September 24, 1953, Box 1, in Folder for Meeting with the President, White House Memoranda Series, Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1951–59, DDEL. Ambassador Lacy was forced to deal with Rhee’s initiative to impose heavy taxes on American businessmen, a dispute exaggerated far beyond its actual importance. By early October, Lacy had decided that he could not discharge his responsibilities effectively in such an atmosphere. He therefore asked to be relieved of his responsibilities for reasons of health. (After Lacy’s resignation, Washington did not appoint a new ambassador until May 1956, expressing its displeasure with the event.) FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXIII, Pt. 2: Korea, p. 169, October 9, 1955. According to the above cited letter to Oliver, Rhee thought that the Embassy had forced American businessmen to attack him verbally to make his government unpopular, and that it was only after Lacy’s departure that the Embassy stopped such moves. For this point, see Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945–1972 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 144–5 and p. 161. According to US archives, the US Embassy actually favoured Chang taking over the Korean leadership during the 1952 crisis. But Ambassador Muccio feared that any overt outside attempt to help him would cause a ‘ﬂare-up of Korean sensitivities’. Quoted in Donald Stone Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), p. 191. Robert Oliver, a devoted admirer of Rhee, admitted that President Rhee was an ‘ambitious politician’ who was eager to have strong public support, and knew that one thing he had to do for that purpose was to ‘reassure the public of his intention to get a united Korea’. Interview with Robert Oliver, June 7, 1994. ROK Central Election Management Committee, Taehanmin’ guk so ˘n’ go ˘sa [History of Elections in Korea] (Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1964), p. 324; Rhee’s statements in Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. III, pp. 10–11, 12–13, and 14–16. See Article II of the armistice agreement in Se-Jin Kim (ed.), Korean Uniﬁcation: Source Materials with an Introduction (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Uniﬁcation, 1976), pp. 154–72. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, p. 1790, April 16, 1954; RG 59, 795.00/5-2954, May 29, 1954, NA. RG 59, 795.00/2-755, February 7, 1955, NA; The 245th Meeting of the NSC, April 21, 1955, Box 6, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXIII, Pt. 2: Korea, pp. 85–7, May 10, 1955. According to a report submitted to the US Senate by the Defense

Notes and References

44.

45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52.

53.

54.

185

Department in January regarding Communist violations of the armistice, one ‘unequivocal’ proof suggested by the UN Command was the increase of jet aircraft in North Korea. The report said that ‘while few absolute violations of the armistice have been proven against the Communists due to the inability of the NNITs to inspect and document, it is obvious that through bad faith and double-dealing, they have circumvented the provisions at will and in a most serious and complete manner’. In February, Ambassador Briggs suggested that alleged Communist armistice violations might be difﬁcult to prove. According to him, the Swedish and Swiss several times made the point that, since about September 1954, when the Communists might have learned of a US movement to abolish the NNSC, the Communists had been cooperating with the Commission. See ‘Communist Non-Compliance with the Armistice Agreement in Korea and the Functioning of the NNSC’, RG 59, 795.00/1-1555, January 15, 1955; 795.00/2-1155, February 11, 1955, NA. RG 59, 795.00/1-456, January 4, 1956; 795.00/2-1656, February 16, 1956; 795.00/2-2856, February 28, 1956; 795.00/3-2756, March 27, 1956; 795.00/5-1856, May 18, 1956; 795.00/6-556, June 5, 1956, NA. ‘Detailed Development of Major Actions Relating to Korea’, June 28, 1956, in ﬁle for OCB 091. Korea, Box 50, OCB Central File Series, Papers of White House Ofﬁce, National Security Council Staff, DDEL. Korea Flaming High, Vol. II, p. 93. FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXIII, Pt. 2: Korea, p. 51, March 8, 1955; Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. III, p. 1. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. XV: Korea, pp. 1925–6, November 23, 1954; RG 59, 795.00/11-2254, November 22, 1954; 795.00/11-2654, November 26, 1954, NA. As noted in the previous chapter, just before the amendment bill was introduced in the Assembly, the Rhee regime had also utilized the ‘third force’ case, which allegedly involved an opposition leader in a Communist-inspired plan to neutralize Korea, to justify the constitutional revision. Chosun Ilbo, March 24, 1955. Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. II, pp. 269–71; Dong-A Ilbo, August 3, and 9, 1955. RG 59, 795.00/8-1055 and 795B.00/8-1055, August 10, 1955, NA. RG 218, Records of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, 1953–57, ‘Resume of Anti-NNIT Demonstrations’, August 18, 1955, Box 12, NRC; FRUS, 1955–957, Vol. XXIII, Pt. 2, Korea, p. 137, August 7, 1955; RG 59, 795.00/8-655, August 6, 1955; 795.00/8-855, August 8, 1955; 795.00/ 8-1055, August 10, 1955, NA. RG 59, 795.00/8-255, August 2, 1955, NA; FO 371/115309, from Seoul to London, August 4, 1955, PRO. For a detailed examination of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–5, see Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese–American Confrontations, 1949–1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), ch. 7. Korea Flaming High, Vol. II, p. 91; From Mrs Rhee to Oliver, August 4, 1955, the Oliver File.

186 55. 56.

6.

1. 2.

3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Notes and References FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXIII, Pt. 2: Korea, p. 148, August 12, 1955; Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], pp. 271–3, Korea Flaming High, vol. II, pp. 92–6. RG 59, 795.00/12-855, December 8, 1955, NA; Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. II, pp. 273–4.

The Primacy of Regime Security and the Vulnerability of State Security, May 1956–November 1958 The 1956 Presidential Election in the ROK: A Preliminary Estimate’, prepared by the American Embassy, March 2, 1956, RG 59, 795B.00/ 3-256, NA. Sungjoo Han, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 23; Donald Stone Macdonald, ‘Korea and the Ballot: The International Dimension in Korean Political Development As Seen in Elections’, Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1977, pp. 432–6. Although suspicion immediately spread that this was a political assassination, and there was a mass demonstration in Seoul, medical evidence established that Shin had died of a cerebral haemorrhage. For a detailed description of Shin’s death and its aftermath, see ibid. The ROK Constitution of that time stipulated that presidential and vice-presidential candidates from the same party had to run on separate tickets. RG 59, 795B.00/11-1456, November 14, 1956, NA. For the detailed outcome of the 1956 election, see ROK Central Election Management Committee, Taehanmin’guk so ˘n’go ˘sa [History of Elections in Korea] (Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1964), pp. 476–9. In the 1952 election, the ratio of invalid votes was only 3.5 per cent, as compared with 20.5 per cent in 1956. There were several observers who considered that if Shin had not died, he would have won the election. For example, see Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development 1945–1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 145–6; Hahn-Been Lee, Korea: Time, Change, and Administration (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), pp. 54–68; RG 59, 795B.00/5-2456, May 24, 1956, NA. In the 1956 poll, according to a US source, ‘the press contributed a strong performance, reporting all views and developments in uninhibited language which was itself unprecedented in Korean political annals’. RG 59, ‘The Korean Presidential Succession Problem’, Intelligence Report, No. 7371, November 9, 1956, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department of State, NA. The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1962 (Seoul: The Bank of Korea, 1962), pp. 12–13; RG 59, ‘Recent Inﬂationary Trends in the Republic of Korea’, Intelligence Report, No. 7258, July 20, 1956, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department of State, NA. Tamhwajip [Collection of Statements], Vol. III, pp. 23–5.

Notes and References 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

23.

187

RG 59, 795B.11/8-2156, August 21, 1956, NA. David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 26. Chae-hak Yi, ‘Memoir’, in Sasiru ˘i cho ˘nburu ˘l kisulhanda [Reports of All the Truth: Collected Memoirs of Nine Political Leaders] (Seoul: Hu ˘imang, 1966), pp. 185–6; RG 59, ‘The Korean Presidential Succession Problem’, Intelligence Report, No. 7371, November 9, 1956, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department of State, NA; Macdonald, ‘Korea and the Ballot’, pp. 453–4; Han, The Failure of Democracy, pp. 23–5. Ibid. For a similar view, see Lee, Korea: Time, Change, and Administration, pp. 90–4. Han’guk kunsa hyo ˘ngmyo ˘ngsa [History of the Korean Military Revolution], Vol. I (Seoul, 1962), pp. 76–8. Robert L. Rothstein, ‘The “Security Dilemma” and the “Poverty Trap” in the Third World’, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol. 8, no. 4 (December 1986), p. 14; Brian L. Job, ‘The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World’, in Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 28. According to a top secret telegram from the US Embassy in Seoul to the State Department, Chang had expressed to Embassy ofﬁcials on several occasions his concern that some provisions should be made to afford him protection in the case of Rhee’s actual death. RG 59, 795B.11/4-1157, April 11, 1957, NA. Dong-A Ilbo, January 19 and 26, 1957; ROK National Assembly, Kukhoe sokkirok [Records of the National Assembly] (Seoul: The National Assembly), the 23rd Plenary Session, the 11th Meeting, pp. 3–5; RG 59, 795B.11/3-2757, March 27, 1957, NA. Although the opposition immediately charged that the disruption had been incited by the police, the government denied the allegation. But after the downfall of Rhee the military junta conﬁrmed the allegation. See Han’gukkunsa hyo ˘ngmyo ˘ngsa [History of the Korean Military Revolution], p. 112. Dong-A Ilbo, May 26 and 31, 1957. FO 371/ 133660, from Seoul to London, January 29, 1958, PRO. According to a US source, Home Ministry ofﬁcials had computed the total vote cast for the candidates of each party, but had not published these data because they were embarrassing to the administration. RG 59, 795B.00/5-2058, NA. Taehanmin’guk so ˘n’go ˘sa [History of Elections in Korea], pp. 415–27; ChiYoung Pak, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945–1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980), pp. 183–7. According to Macdonald, who was a US Embassy ofﬁcial at that time, the campaign and elections were ‘characterized by organized fraud and coercion, although the abuses were not sufﬁciently extensive or skilful to achieve the Liberals’ goal of a two-thirds majority’. Macdonald, ‘Korea and the Ballot’, pp. 464–8; US Embassy report also observed police intervention in the election. RG 59, 795.00/5-2058, May 20, 1958, NA.

188 24.

25. 26. 27.

28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37.

Notes and References NSC 5702 ‘Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea’, January 14, 1957, Box 19, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Records of Ofﬁce of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, White House Ofﬁce, DDEL; Discussion at the 326th Meeting of the National Security Council, June 13, 1957, Box 9, NSC Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953–1961 (Ann Whitman File), DDEL; RG 59, 795.00/5-2057, May 20, 1957 and 795.00/6-1857, June 18, 1957, NA. RG 59, 795.00/6-2157, June 21, 1957, NA; Letter from Rhee to Eisenhower, August 2, 1957, Box 32, ﬁle for Korea: 1955-57 (1), International Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. FRUS, 1955–57, Vol. XXIII, Pt. 2: Korea, pp. 468–9, July 19, 1957; RG 59, 795B.56/7-1857, July 18, 1957; 795.00/7-2557, July 25, 1957, NA. FRROK, 773.1US, from Ambassador Yang to President Rhee, January 30, 1958. The agreed reduction plan was as follows: (1) reduction of two divisions out of the current 20 ROK Army divisions; (2) a new force ceiling of 630,000 in place of the formerly authorized level of 720,000; (3) modernization of the Air Force, and communication facilities. RG 59, 795.00/11-657, November 6, 1957; 795.00/2-1258, February 12, 1958, NA; Discussion at the 375th Meeting of the National Security Council, August 7, 1958, Box 10, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XVIII: Japan; Korea, pp. 468–71, July 2, and pp. 505–7, November 19, 1958. Donald Stone Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), p. 99; RG 59, 795.00/7-2357, July 23, 1957, NA; Kukhoe sokkirok [Records of the National Assembly], the 25th Plenary Session, the 39th Meeting, pp. 16–21. RG 59, 795.00/3-1058, March 10, 1958; 795.00/3-1458, March 14, 1958, NA; FO 371/127630, from London to Seoul, October 28, 1953, PRO. RG 59, 795.00/7-3057, July 30, 1957; 795.00/10-2457, October 24, 1957, NA. Chosun Ilbo, January 14, 1958. For a similar view, see Dong-A Ilbo, March 19, 1958. Korea Flaming High, Vol. II, p. 239; From Mrs Rhee to Oliver, October 1, and November 19, 1957, the Oliver File. Dong-A Ilbo, June 26, 1956; RG 59, 795.00/11-1056, November 10, 1956, NA. RG 59, 795.00/8-1457, August 14, 1957, NA. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bulletin, no. 11 (September 1957), p. 16. RG 59, 795B.00/11-2157, November 21, 1957, NA; RG 59, ‘The Republic of Korea: Present Situation and Outlook’, Intelligence Report, No. 7654, February 6, 1958, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, NA; FO 371/127603, from Seoul to London, September 7, 1957, PRO. According to the Progressive Party’s platform, the party sought to ‘unify the country through peaceful and democratic means in cooperation with friendly democratic nations under the supervision of the United Nations’.

Notes and References 38.

39. 40. 41.

42.

43. 44.

45. 46.

47. 48. 49.

189

Yo ˘ng-so ˘k Yi, ‘Cho Pong-am sahyo ˘ngjip’aeng: Yi-Su ˘ng-man’gwa posup’au ˘i hapchak [The Execution of Cho Pong-am: The Collaboration between Syngman Rhee and the Conservatives]’, Wolgan Chosun (August 1991), pp. 434–44; RG 59, ‘The Republic of Korea: Present Situation and Outlook’, Intelligence Report, No. 7654, February 6, 1958, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department of State, NA; RG 59, 795B.00/1-1057, January 10, 1957, NA. Dong-A Ilbo, November 14, 1957; RG 59, 795B.00/11-1357, November 13, 1957, NA. RG 59, 795B.00/11-1557, November 15, 1957; 795B.00/11-1957, November 19, 1957, NA. Dong-A Ilbo, January 14, 15, and February 26, 1958. According to a US intelligence note, a ‘usually reliable’ source stated that in early January 1958, President Rhee approved a plan to arrest Cho and four or ﬁve associates, and to dissolve the Progressive Party. RG 59, 795B.00/ 1-1358, January 13, 1958, NA. Cho had been active in the Communist movement prior to the Liberation. But he had apparently recanted his Communist ties, and had been a prominent independent politician since 1948. Following his election to the Constituent National Assembly in 1948, he had served as Rhee’s ﬁrst Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, and as Vice-Speaker of the Second National Assembly. Nevertheless, the conservative groups had doubted whether Cho was sincere in his repudiation of Communism. In particular, President Rhee personally believed that the progressive politician was still a Communist. Pak, Political Opposition in Korea, pp. 155–6; Yi, ‘Memoirs’, pp. 158–9. Yi, ‘Cho Pong-am sahyo ˘ngjip’aeng’, pp. 434–45; RG 59, 795B.00(w)/ 1-3158 and 3-1458, January 31 and March 14, 1958, NA. In his trial, Cho admitted that he had received money from Yang, but argued that he did not know that it had been from the Communist regime. He also denied the allegation that he received instructions from the North to wage a campaign for ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’. Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations, pp. 193–4; RG 59, 795B.00/10-2758 and 11-1258, October 27, and November 12, 1958, NA. Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Security in the Third World: The Worm about to Turn?’, International Affairs, vol. 60, no. 1 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 43–4. As will be examined in the next chapter, from the end of 1958, the Rhee regime made intensive use of tactics to externalize internal threats, including the sudden execution of Cho. Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations, p. 58. Kim Il Sung’s Works, Vol. 7 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House), pp. 456–62 (hereafter cited as Works with volume number). Sungjoo Han, ‘North Korea’s Security Policy and Military Strategy’, in Robert A. Scalapino and Jun-yop Kim (eds), North Korea Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1983), p. 146. See also Pukhan cho ˘nso ˘ [Study of North Korea], Vol. II (Seoul: Ku ˘ktong munje Yo ˘n’guso 1970), pp. 50–1. A good example of North Korean priority in the economic sector during this period was that military personnel were demobilized to make up the shortage of

190

50.

51.

52. 53.

54.

55.

Notes and References manpower in the economic sector. RG 59, ‘North Korean Economic Progress under Its Three-Year Plan (1954–56)’, Intelligence Report, No. 7058, July 19, 1957, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department of State, NA. The process of political consolidation in North Korea is well analysed in Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea, Part I: The Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Chong-Sik Lee, The Korean Workers’ Party: A Short History (Stanford: Hoover institution Press, 1978). See also, RG 59, ‘Factionalism in the Leadership of the North Korean Regime’, Intelligence Report, No. 6559, January 3, 1955, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department of State, NA. It is generally suggested that the KWP had been composed of ﬁve factional elements: (1) Kim Il Sung’s personal followers (the Kapsan group); (2) the returnees from the Soviet Union; (3) the returnees from China (the Yenan faction); (4) the non-Communist nationalist group; and (5) the domestic South Korean Communists, who had been active in the South under Pak Ho ˘n-yo ˘ng until they ﬂed to the North in 1948. But Scalapino and Lee argue that to place too much emphasis upon factional afﬁliation is probably a mistake, especially with respect to the so-called Soviet and Yenan factions. They also suggested that ‘the only meaningful faction was coming to be Kim Il Sung, and one’s relationship to Kim, irrespective of one’s background’. See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, pp. 479–80. FO 371/158554, ‘Information for Judgment of North Korean Situation’, a paper prepared by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the North Korean situation, August 2, 1961, PRO. The Korean War caused enormous damage both to North and South Korea, but the former suffered greater destruction owing to the heavy aerial bombardment conducted by the US. Some 635,000 tons of bombs and 32,557 tons of napalm were dropped in the North; this was greater than the amount of bombs (503,000 tons) used against Japanese islands during the Second World War. According to an American source, the bombardment during the hostilities destroyed about two-thirds to three-quarters of the pre-war industrial and urban residential facilities, and the remaining one-third to one-quarter of pre-war industry was not in operation because ‘the destruction of vital portions of installations was sufﬁcient to render almost the whole installation inoperative’. RG 59, ‘The North Korean Economy’, Intelligence Report, No. 6441, April 14, 1954, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department of State, NA. For a detailed analysis of North Korean economic progress, see Yoon T. Kuark, ‘North Korea’s Industrial Development During the Post-War Period’, in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), North Korea Today (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 56–72; and Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, pp. 527–43. FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXIII, pt. 2: Korea, pp. 286–9; RG 59, ‘North Korean Economic Progress under Its Three-Year Plan (1954–56)’, Intelligence Report, No. 7058, July 19, 1957, Ofﬁce of Intelligence

Notes and References

56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61.

62.

63. 64. 65.

191

Research, Department of State, NA; FO 371/158554, ‘Information for Judgment of North Korean Situation’, August 2, 1961, PRO. For this recalculation, see Pong S. Lee, ‘Overstatement of North Korean Industrial Growth, 1946–63’, Journal of Korean Affairs, vol. 1, no. 2 (July 1971), pp. 3–14. Fujio Goto, Estimates of the North Korean Gross Domestic Product, 1956–1959 (Kyoto: Kyoto Sangyo University Press, 1990), p. 45. Owing to the lack of reliable data and to differences in measurement between North and South Korea, it is difﬁcult accurately to compare the economic ﬁgures of the two sides. Nevertheless, most studies on the subject agreed that the North economically outperformed the South in the 1950s. For example, an analysis suggested that from 1953 to 1960 the average GNP growth rate of North and South Korea was 22.1 per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively, and the North’s GNP per capita increased from $56 to $208, compared with $55 to $60 in the South. See ByoungLo P. Kim, Two Koreas in Development: A Comparative Study of Principles and Strategies of Capitalist and Communist Third World Development (London: Transaction Publishers, 1992), pp. 66–7. FO 371/141537, 2 January 1959, PRO. The reporter was said to have been given a visa for North Korea because the North Koreans wanted to show the rebuilding of their country to a Western witness. FO 371/158554, 13 March 1961, PRO, ‘PKA Special Interrogation Report’, SRI-3, January 12, 1961. Kim Il Sung, Selected Works, Vol. 2 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971), p. 504 and p. 595. Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 146; RG 59, 795B.00/2-1358, February 13, 1958, NA; ‘Counter Intelligence Digest’ by The Paciﬁc Air Force, October 10, 1958 in RG 59, 795.00/11-2058, November 20, 1958, NA. A total of 236 Communist-controlled agents were caught in the ROK during 1957, an increase of 25 to 35 per cent over previous years. For the various uniﬁcation proposals of North Korea, see For the Peaceful Uniﬁcation of Korea (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957); US Department of State, The Record on Korean Uniﬁcation, 1943–1960: Narrative Summary with Principal Documents (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1960). See also, Hakjoon Kim, Uniﬁcation Policies of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study, 2nd edn (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1986), pp. 176–85. Works, Vol. 12, p. 59. For a full text of the North Korean proposal, see US Department of State, The Record on Korean Uniﬁcation, pp. 211–14. For this point, see Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, pp. 156–7; Chong-Sik Lee, ‘Stalinism in the East: Communism in North Korea’, in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 128–9; RG 59, 795B.00/2-1358, NA. One successful example of the North Korean economic lure was the repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea. From 1959 to 1960, nearly 20,000 Korean residents in

192

66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71. 72. 73.

7.

1. 2.

3.

4.

5.

Notes and References Japan had gone to the North mainly because of economic reasons. This will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter. RG 59, ‘Situation and Short-Term Prospects of Korea’, prepared by Ambassador Dowling, 795B.00/11-2157, November 21, 1957, NA. Works, Vol. 12, p. 392. Dong-A Ilbo, February 7 and 21, 1958; RG 59, 795.00/2-2058, February 20, 1958, NA. Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations, p. 57; RG 59, 795.00/6-2358, June 23, 1958; 795.00/11-1058, November 10, 1958, NA. See Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, ‘Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The “Software” Side of Third World National Security’, in Azar and Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), pp. 82–5; Job, ‘The Internal Security Dilemma’, pp. 27–31. It should not be denied, however, that the President had used the Joint Military Provost Marshal, headed by Won Yong-do ˘k as a political tool, as seen in previous chapters. FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXIII, pt. 2: Korea, p. 291, July 12, 1956. For a detailed examination of Rhee’s personal domination over the military, see Se-Jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 69–76.

The Domestic Use of State Security and the Collapse of the Rhee Regime, December 1958–April 1960 RG 59, ‘Democrat Look to 1960 [sic]’, prepared by the US Embassy, 795B.00/12-158, December 15, 1958, NA. This report was made based on conversations with DP leaders. Chae-hak Yi, ‘Memoirs’, in Sasiru ˘i cho ˘nburu ˘l kisulhanda [Reports of All the Truth: Collected Memoirs of Nine Political Leaders] (Seoul: Hu ˘imang, 1966), p. 187; RG 59, 795B.00/2-1358, February 13, 1958, NA. Donald Stone Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), p. 157; Oral History Interview with William Lacy, June 14, 1972, DDEL. President Rhee had been examined periodically by a US Army doctor, usually at least weekly, and the results were sometimes quoted in US Embassy reports. RG 59, 795B.11/7-2056, July 20, 1956; 795B.11/ 9-2856, September 28, 1956; and 795B.00/11-2157, November 21, 1957, NA. RG 59, 795B.00/10-1458, October 14, 1958; and 795H.11/8-1559, August 15, 1959, NA. Dowling also said that one of most signiﬁcant indications of Rhee’s weakness was his preference now for exchange of pleasantries with visitors, and his inclination towards reminiscences, whereas formerly he had been apt to utilize every occasion for a substantive discussion, or for expounding his views.

Notes and References 6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

193

RG 59, ‘The Republic of Korea: Present Situation and Outlook’, Intelligence Report, No. 7654, February 6, 1958, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research and Analysis, Department of State, NA; Sang-u Yi, ‘Karismawa dimocrasi: Yi Su ˘ng-man ron [Charisma and Democracy: The Syngman Rhee Case]’, Wolgan Chosun (April 1983), pp. 290–3. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bulletin, no. 17 (March 1959), p. 15. RG 59, ‘Democrat Look to 1960’, 795B.00/12-158, December 1, 1958, NA. RG 59, 795B.00/1-1759, January 17, 1959, NA. Hahn-Been Lee suggests that the ‘hard-liners’ could increase their power within the LP because in an ‘authoritarian-oriented’ power group those who had the most diehard proposals on the survival of the regime enjoyed their leader’s conﬁdence. According to Macdonald’s interpretation, Yi Ki-pung, the leading moderate, was unable to resist the growing power of the hard faction because he was increasingly handicapped by a progressive systemic disease that hindered his speech and movement. See Hahn-Been Lee, Korea: Time, Change, and Administration (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), p. 93; Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations, p. 195. For a detailed description of the hard faction within the LP, see the previous chapter. The National Security Law had ﬁrst been promulgated on 1 December 1948, in order to outlaw Communism in South Korea, after a Communist-instigated revolt in Yo ˘su and Sunch’o ˘n. The 1948 Law, too, had been criticized on the grounds that the provisions of the law were so vaguely worded that they could be utilized in eliminating political enemies in the name of security. For a comprehensive examination of the National Security Law, see Won-sun Pak, Kukka poanbo ˘p yo ˘n’gu [Study of the National Security Law], Vol. I (Seoul: Yo ˘ksa pip’yo ˘ngsa 1992). Other controversial features of the bill were: (1) expansion of the concept of national secrets; (2) suppression of the opposition’s activities; (3) punishment of libel against constitutional organs such as the President, the Speaker of the National Assembly, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and (4) extension of the period of detention by detectives. Ibid., pp. 149–55. Dong-A Ilbo, November 28, 1958; FRROK, 773.1US, from President to Ambassador Yang, December 10, 1958, Pak, Kukka poanbo ˘p yo ˘n’ gu, pp. 133–7; RG 59, ‘Political Crisis in South Korea’, Intelligence Report, No. 7934, February 16, 1959, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department of State, NA. RG 59, 795B.00/12-558, December 5, 1958, NA; FRROK, B 704.1, Memorandum of Conversation between the ROK Ministers and the US Ambassador, December 30, 1959. RG 59, 795B.00/5-1559, May 15, 1959, NA; Hu ˘i-so ˘k Han, ‘Memoirs’, in Myo ˘ngin okchungki [Writings in Prison: Collected Memoirs of Political Figures] (Seoul: Hu ˘imang, 1966), p. 247. Dong-A Ilbo, November 23 and 29, and December 20, 1958; Un-t’ae Kim, Han’guk hyo ˘ndae cho ˘ngch’iron [Modern History of Korean Politics], Vol. II: Cheil konghwaguk [The First Republic] (Seoul: So ˘ngmun’gak

194

17.

18. 19.

20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28.

29. 30.

Notes and References 1986), pp. 161–71. The banning of public meetings was based on the regulation promulgated under the US Military Government, at a time when a major Communist plot threatened to subvert the country. The Democrats claimed that the ban was unconstitutional. Dong A Ilbo, December 25, 26, and 27, 1958; Chosun Ilbo, December 26, 1958. Following the December 24 incident, there were public meetings in Seoul and elsewhere, including some spontaneous meetings not ofﬁcially sponsored by the DP. These meetings were broken up by the police. FO 371/133669, from British Embassy in Washington to London, December 23, 1958, PRO. RG 59, 795B.5621/12-158, December 1, 1958; 795B.5/12-558 and 795B.00/12-558, December 5, 1958, NA. Ambassador Dowling recommended to Washington that an effort be made to stimulate American press coverage of the crisis, as the only way to convince the Koreans of the need to eliminate restrictive press provisions. In the absence of such action, he believed the US would lose inﬂuence with both the ruling regime and the opposition. RG 59, 795B.34/12-2058 and 12-2258, December 20 and 22, 1958, NA. Letter from Eisenhower to Rhee, December 25, 1958, in Folder for Rhee, Syngman 1958-60 (1), Box 33, International Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL. RG 59, 795B.21/12-2758, December 27, 1958, NA; Bulletin, no. 17 (March 1959), p. 1. FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XVIII: Japan; Korea, pp. 523–5, December 27, 1958. According to Rhee’s letter to Eisenhower, on January 7, 1959, Rhee stated that the conﬁnement of opposition Assembly members had occurred because they attempted to disrupt normal proceedings. RG 59, 795B.00/1-1959, January 19, 1959, NA. RG 59, 795B.00/1-1659, January 16, 1959, NA. RG 59, ‘Political Crisis in South Korea’, Intelligence Report, No. 7934, February 16, 1959, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Ofﬁce, Department of State, NA. For example, when O Chae-kyo ˘ng the Director of the Ofﬁce of Public Information, resigned in January, a conﬁdential source stated that the resignation had been demanded by the Liberal Party due to his reluctance to close down pro-opposition dailies by using the revised National Security Law. O’s dismissal was regarded by the opposition as a strong indication that the government was planning to take stern action in dealing with the press, most of which continued to be highly critical of the government. RG 59, 795B.00/1-1459, January 14, 1959, NA. Kyunghyang Shinmun, February 4, 1959; Dong-A Ilbo, February 28, 1959. The provisions of the National Security Law applied to them were Article 21, paragraph 4 dealing with ‘facilitating escape of violators of the National Security Law’, and Article 24 covering ‘duplication or theft of investigation and prosecution records’. Kyunghyang Shinmun, April 5 and 6, 1959; RG 59, 795B.5/4-759, April 7, 1959 and 795B.00(W)/5-159, May 1, 1959, NA. Dong-A Ilbo, May 1 and 2, 1959.

Notes and References 31.

32.

33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40.

41.

195

RG 59, 795B.00/2-359, February 3, 1959, NA; FRROK, B 704.1, from Vice Foreign Minister to the President, May 9, 1959. For a comprehensive examination of the Kyunghyang Shinmun case, see Bae-ho Han, ‘Kyunghyang Shinmun p’yegankyo ˘ljo ˘ng’e taehanyo ˘n’gu [A Study on the Decision-Making to Close the Kyunghyang Shinmun]’, in To ˘k-kyu Chin et al., 1950 nyo ˘ndaeu ˘i insik [Understanding the 1950s], (Seoul: Han’gilsa, 1990), pp. 125–54. Sungjoo Han, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 45; RG 59, 795B.5/5-359, May 3, 1959, and 795B.00(W)/5-859, May 8, 1959, NA. Within the DP, there were two competing factions: the ‘old’ faction led by Cho Pyo ˘ng-ok and the ‘new’ faction led by Chang Myo ˘n. For the factionalism in the DP, see Chi-Young Pak, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945–1960 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980), pp. 153–75. Dong-A Ilbo, May 6, 1959; Han, ‘Kyunghyang Shinmun’, pp. 125–54. For Rhee’s attitude towards the press, see T’ae-yo ˘ng Yi, ‘Yi So ˘ng-man paksawa ˘ollon [Dr. Syngman Rhee and the Press]’, Shin Dong-A (April 1969), pp. 286–97. According to this study, Syngman Rhee had a ‘negative’ view of newspapers in Korea, whereas the opinion of the foreign press concerning Korea was a matter of concern to him. Dong-A Ilbo, February 28, 1959; RG 59, 795B.00(W)/3-659, March 6, 1959, NA. Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations, pp. 173–4; RG 59, 795B.00/4-1759, April 17, 1959, NA. RG 59, 795B.00(W)/5-859, May 8, 1959, NA; Kim, Han’guk hyo ˘ndae cho ˘ngch’iron, pp. 122–33. RG 59, 795B.00/7-3159, July 31, 1959, and 795B.00/8-459, August 4, 1959, NA. Dong-A Ilbo, August 1 and 2, 1959. Yo ˘ ng-so ˘ k Yi, ‘Cho Pong-am sahyo ˘ ngjip’aeng Yi Su ˘ ng-man’gwa posup’au ˘ i hapchak [The Execution of Cho Pong-am: The Collaboration between Syngman Rhee and the Conservatives]’, Wolgan Chosun, (August 1991), pp. 434–44; RG 59, 795B.00/8-459, August 4, 1959, NA. Yi suggested that Rhee implicitly, if not explicitly, pushed the Minister of Justice to execute the opposition leader promptly. One of Rhee’s subordinates said in his memoirs that Rhee was so conﬁdent of Cho’s Communist character as to object even to the formation of the Progressive Party in 1956. See Yi, ‘Memoirs’, pp. 158–9. Robert Oliver, Rhee’s long-time advisor, also said that Rhee had long considered Cho to be Communist. Interview with Robert Oliver, June 7, 1994. A CIA Annex to ‘Progress Report on US Policy toward Korea (NSC 5857)’ by the Operations Coordinating Board, April 29, 1959, Box 25, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Records of Ofﬁce of the Special Assistance for National Security Affairs, White House Ofﬁce, DDEL; RG 59, 795B.21/12-2958, December 29, 1958, NA. RG 59, 795.00/11-2059, November 20, 1959, NA. For a detailed analysis of the North Korean peace offensive and its inﬂuence on the South, see Chapter 6.

196 42.

43.

44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52.

53. 54.

55.

Notes and References Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea–Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 65; Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea, Part I: The Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 549. Ibid., p. 581. In January 1960, the South Korean government asked the US to urge Japan to stop further repatriation. But the US government told Japan that the US would continue to support ‘the principle of voluntary repatriation to any part of Korea’. FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XVIII: Japan; Korea, pp. 275–6, January 19, 1960. W. D. Reeve, The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 59. According to the Japanese Red Cross, as of June 1959, 75 per cent of the registered Korean residents in Japan were unemployed. Quoted in ibid. RG 59, 795B.00/6-1759, June 17, 1959, NA; The Korea Times, June 22, 1959. The Korean society in Japan was divided into two groups: the Mindan, and the Chosen Soren (Central Federation of Korean Residents in Japan) , a leftist organization. RG 59, 795B.00/7-3159, July 31, 1959, NA. RG 59, 795B.00/4-3059, April 30, 1959, NA. For details of the 1960 election, see Jungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945–1972 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 148–65; John Kie-Chiang Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), pp. 58–71; and Pak, Political Opposition in Korea, pp. 194–201; FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XVIII: Japan; Korea, pp. 600–2, March 10, 1960. Quoted in Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations, p. 202. ROK Central Election Management Committee, Taehanmin’guk so ˘n’go ˘sa [History of Elections in Korea] (Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1964), pp. 481–83. According to the US Embassy’s observation, before the body was found, the general populace had stood by when students inspired demonstrations, but now they joined in anti-government rallies, expressing their ‘long-standing and deep-seated resentment’ against the Rhee regime. FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XVIII: Japan; Korea, pp. 614–16, April 12, 1960. Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), p. 175. Dong-A Ilbo, April 14, 1960; CIA Memo (2), April 26, 1960, 002293 (1982), US Declassiﬁed Documents Reference System. FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XVIII: Japan; Korea, pp. 624–5, April 19, 1960. The CIA report conﬁrmed that no credible evidence to substantiate any claims of Communist instigation or direct participation had been found. FRUS, ibid., pp. 620–2, April 19, 1960; US Department of State, A Historical Summary of United States–Korean Relations, 1834–1962 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1962), p. 131. This conversation between McConaughy and Rhee clearly demonstrated how ill-informed about the current situation the ageing President now

Notes and References

56. 57.

58. 59.

60. 61. 62.

8. 1. 2.

197

was. According to the Ambassador, Rhee professed his ignorance of election fraud, saying he could not believe that his trusted Ministers had lied to him or concealed such a bad situation from him. In another meeting with McConaughy, on April 21, Rhee even stated that Vice-President Chang ‘actively utilized’ Catholic churches for his own political interests to gain power ‘in the violation of the ROK Constitution’. (Chang was a Catholic.) He also argued that he would provide the Ambassador with evidence demonstrating what was done by Chang to ‘agitate those schoolboys to cause disturbance’. FRROK, 701/1960, Conversation between Rhee and McConaughy, April 21, 1960. FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XVIII: Japan; Korea, pp. 634–7, April 23, 1960. Ibid., pp. 639–40, April 26, 1960; Macdonald, U.S.–Korean Relations, pp. 205–7; Cho ˘ng Ho ˘, Naeiru ˘l wihan chu ˘ng’o ˘n [Memoirs: A Testimony for Tomorrow] (Seoul: Samt’osa, 1979), pp. 211–26; ‘Memoirs’ of Chang Myo ˘n and Song Yo-ch’an in Sasiru ˘i cho ˘nburu ˘ kisulhanda, pp. 373–6 and p. 470. For comprehensive examinations of the student uprising and subsequent downfall of Rhee, see Quee-Young Kim, The Fall of Syngman Rhee (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1983); Yong-Pil Rhee, The Breakdown of Authority Structure in Korea in 1960: A Systems Approach (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1982); and Eugene C. I. Kim and Ke-soo Kim, ‘The April 1960 Korean Student Movement’, Western Political Quarterly, vol. 17 (March 1964), pp. 83–92. FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XVIII: Japan; Korea, p. 625, April 19, 1960. A good example can be found in the issue of introducing a parliamentary system. Since the 1956 presidential election, where an opposition leader won the vice-presidency, the Liberals had been concerned about the age and health of Rhee, and felt that the political disaster that might follow Rhee’s death could be avoided by adopting a parliamentary system, especially because the LP had a majority in the National Assembly. Late in 1958, the Liberals proposed a constitutional amendment for a parliamentary system. But they abandoned it because Rhee ﬁrmly objected to the idea, saying that ‘in the Korean situation of today, the presidential system is best suited to our governmental requirements’. See Bulletin, no. 17 (March 1959), p. 1 Letter from Mrs Rhee to Oliver, January 29, 1959, No. 115, the Oliver File. Korea Flaming High, Vol. I, p. 130. RG 59, 795B.00/9-2359, September 1959, NA.

Conclusion: The Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 277–8. A US intelligence source noted in February 1956 that there had been increasing indication of a ‘political potential’ in the military, and that

198

3. 4.

Notes and References the inﬂuence of the military leaders, particularly in the army, was much greater than their current political role might indicate. RG 59, ‘Current Political Trends and Prospects in the Republic of Korea’, February 7, 1956, Intelligence Report, No. 7157, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research, Department of State, NA. Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 106. Dong-A Ilbo, June 25, 1958.

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SECONDARY WORKS 1. (1)

Books In English

Adams, Sherman. Firsthand Report: The Inside Story of the Eisenhower Administration. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. Alagappa, Muthiah. The National Security of Developing States. Dover: Auburn House, 1987. Allen, Richard. Korea’s Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait. Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle, 1960. Al-Mashat, Abdul-Monem. National Security in the Third World. Boulder: Westview, 1985. Ayoob, Mohammed and Samudavanija, Chai-Anan. eds. Leadership Perceptions and National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989. Azar, Edward E. and Moon, Chung-in (eds), National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988. Bailey, Sydney D. The Korean Armistice. London: Macmillan, 1992. Baldwin, Frank (ed.), Without Parallel: The American – Korean Relationship Since 1945. New York: Pantheon, 1974. Ball, Nicole. Security and Economy in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. Beetham, David. The Legitimation of Power. London: Macmillan, 1991.

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Berger, Carl. The Korea Knot: A Military-Political History. Revised edn. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964. Booth, Ken (ed.), New Thinking about Strategy and International Security. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990. Brzoska, Michael and Ohlson, Thomas. Arms Production in the Third World. London and Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, for SIPRI, 1986. Bull, Hedley and Watson, Adam (eds), The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984. Buss, Claude A. The United States and The Republic of Korea: Background for Policy. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982. Buzan, Barry. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991. Cho, Soon Sung. Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Chung, Joseph S. The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974. Clark, Mark W. From the Danube to the Yalu. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. Clarke, Colin and Payne, Tony (eds), Politics, Security and Development in Small States. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987. Clarke, Michael (ed.), New Perspectives on Security. London: Brassey’s, 1993. Clough, Ralph N. Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The Role of US Forces. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976. Cohen, Warren I. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. IV: America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945–1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Cohen, Warren I. and Akira Iriye (eds), The Great Powers in East Asia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Cole, David C. and Lyman, Princeton N. Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971. Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. ––––. The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. ––––. (ed.), Child of Conﬂict: The Korean – American Relationship, 1943–1953. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983. Deger, Saadat and West, Robert (eds), Defence, Security and Development. London: Francis Pinter, 1987. Divine, Robert A. Eisenhower and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. Dobbs, Charles M. The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War and Korea, 1945–1950. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981. Eisenhower, Dwight D. The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956. London: Heinemann, 1963. Foot, Rosemary. A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. ––––. The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korea Conﬂict, 1950–1953. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

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(2)

In Korean

Ahn, Byung-joon. Kangdaeguk kwangyewa hanbando anboron [Major Power Relations and the Security on the Korean Peninsula]. Seoul: Pomnunsa, 1986. Chin To ˘k-kyu et al. 1950nyo ˘ndaeu ˘i insik [Understanding the 1950s]. Seoul: Han’gilsa, 1990. Cho, Pyo ˘ng-ok. Nau ˘i hoegorok [My Memoirs]. Seoul: Minyosa, 1959. Han, Su ˘ng-in. Tokchaeja Yi Su ˘ng-man [Syngman Rhee, the Dictator]. Seoul: Ilwo ˘lso ˘gak, 1984. Ho ˘, Cho ˘ng, Naeilu ˘l wihan chu ˘ng’o ˘n [Memoirs: A Testimony for Tomorrow]. Seoul: Samt’o ˘sa, 1979. Kim, Un-t’ae. Han’guk hyo ˘ndae cho ˘ngch’ron [Modern History of Korean Politics], Vol. II: Cheil konghwaguk [The First Republic]. Seoul: So ˘ngmun’gak 1986. Myo ˘ngin okchungki [Writings in Prison: Collected Memoirs of Political Figures]. Seoul: Hu ˘imang,1966. Pak, Won-sun.Kukka poanbo ˘p Yo ˘n’gu [Study of the National Security Law], Vol. I. Seoul: Yo ˘ksa pip’yo ˘ngsa, 1992. Pukhan cho ˘nso ˘ [Study of North Korea]. 3 vols. Seoul: Ku ˘ktong munje yo ˘n’guso 1970–1974. Pyun, Yung Tae. Oegyo yo ˘rok [A Record of Diplomacy]. Seoul: Hankook Ilbosa, 1959. Sasiru ˘i cho ˘nburu ˘l kisulhanda [Reports of All the Truth: Collected Memoirs of Nine Political Leaders]. Seoul: Hu ˘imang, 1966. Son, Ho-cho ˘i et al. Han’ gukcho ˘njaenggwa nambukhan sahoeu ˘i kujojo ˘k pyo ˘nhwa [The Korean War and the Structural Changes in North and South Korean Society]. Seoul: Ku ˘ktong munje yo ˘n’guso, 1991. Song, Ko ˘n-ho et al. Haebang cho ˘nhusau ˘i insik [An Account of the History of Korea Before and After the Liberation]. Seoul: Han’gilsa, 1980. Yi, Ho-je. Han’guk oegyo cho ˘ngch’ aeku ˘i isanggwa hyo ˘nsil [The Ideals and Reality of Korean Foreign Policy]. 5th edn. Seoul: Po ˘munsa, 1988. Yi, Won-sun. In’gan Yi Su ˘ng-man [Syngman Rhee: Biography]. Seoul: Shint’aeyangsa, 1965.

2.

Articles

Ahn, Byung-joon. ‘The Korean Peninsula and East Asian Security’. In Scalapino, Robert A. et al. (eds), Internal and External Security Issues in Asia. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986. Ayoob, Mohammed. ‘Security in the Third World: The Worm about to Turn?’. International Affairs, vol. 60, no. 1 (Winter 1983/84).

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––––. ‘The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War’. Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, vol. 24, no. 4 (December 1980). Kausky, John. ‘Myth, Self-fulfilling Prophecy, and Symbolic Reassurance in the East – West Conﬂict’. Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, vol. 9, no. 1 (March 1965). Kim, Eugene C. I. and Kim, Ke-soo. ‘The April 1960 Korean Student Movement’. Western Political Quarterly, vol. 17 (March 1964). Kim, Hakjoon. ‘Russian Archives on Origins of Korean War’. Korea Focus, vol. 2, no. 5 (September–October 1994). Kissinger, Henry A. ‘Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy’. In Rosenau, James N. (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy. New York: The Free Press, 1969. Koh, Byung Chul. ‘The Korean War as a Learning Experience for North Korea’. Korea and World Affairs, vol. 3, no. 3 (Fall 1979). ––––. ‘The War’s Impact on the Korean Peninsula’. Journal of American – East Asian Relations, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993). Kolodziej, Edward A. ‘What is Security and Security Studies?’. Arms Control, vol. 13, no. 1 (April 1992). Kolodziej, Edward A. and Harkavy, Robert E. ‘Developing States and the International Security System’. Journal of International Affairs, vol. 35, no. 1 (1980). Kuark, Yoon T. ‘Economic Development Contrast Between South and North Korea’. In Chung, Joseph S. (ed.), Pattern of Economic Development: Korea. Detroit: The Korea Research and Publication, 1966. Kwon, Chan. ‘The Leadership of Syngman Rhee: The Charisma Factor as an Analytical Framework’. Korean Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 1–2 (Spring–Summer, 1971). Lee, Chong-Sik. ‘Stalinism in the East: Communism in North Korea’. In Scalapino, Robert A. (ed.), The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements. Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965. ––––. ‘The Personality of Four Korean Political Leaders: Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku, Kim Kyu-sik, and Yo ˘ Un-hyo ˘ng’. Asea yo ˘n’ gu [Asian Studies], vol. 27, no. 1 (January 1984). Lee, Pong S. ‘Overstatement of North Korean Industrial Growth, 1946–63’. Journal of Korean Affairs, vol. 1, no. 2 (July 1971). ––––. ‘An Estimate of North Korea’s National Income’. Asian Survey, vol. 12, no. 6 (June 1972). Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. ‘Redeﬁning Security’. Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989). Nye, Joseph S. Jr. and Lynn-Jones, Sean M. ‘International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field’. International Security, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988). O’Neill, Robert. ‘Western Security Policy Towards the Third World’. In O’Neill, Robert and Vincent, R. J. (eds), The West and the Third World. London: Macmillan, 1990. Paige, Glenn D. ‘Korea’. in Black, Cyril E. and Thornton, Thomas D. (eds), Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.

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Park, Sang-Seek. ‘Legacy of the Korean War’. Korea and World Affairs, vol. 15, no. 2 (June 1991). Park, Tong Whan. ‘Arms Race and Arms Control in Korea’. Korea and World Affairs, vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer 1986). Polomka, Peter. ‘The Two Koreas: Catalyst for Conflict in East Asia?’. Adelphi Papers, 208 (Summer 1986). Pye, Lucian W. ‘The Legitimacy Crisis’. In Binder, Leonard et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. Ra, Jong Yil. ‘Political Crisis in Korea, 1952: The Administration, Legislature, Military and Foreign Powers’. Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 27, no. 2 (April 1992). Rothstein, Robert L. ‘The “Security Dilemma” and the “Poverty Trap” in the Third World’. Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol. 8, no. 4 (December 1986). Sayigh, Yezid. ‘Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries’. Adelphi Papers, 251 (Summer 1990). Smoke, Richard. ‘National Security Affairs’. In Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson W. (eds), Handbook of Political Science, Volume 8: International Politics. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1975. Ullman, Richard H. ‘Redeﬁning Security’. International Security, vol. 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983). Walt, Stephen M. ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35 (1991). Warner, Geoffrey. ‘The Korean War’. International Affairs, vol. 56, no. 1 (January 1980). Weathersby, Kathryn. ‘New Findings on the Korean War’. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 3 (Fall 1993). ––––. ‘The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence’. Journal of American – East Asian Relations, vol. 3, no. 4 (Winter 1994). White, Gordon. ‘North Korean Chuch’e: The Political Economy of Independence’. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 7, no. 2 (April–June 1975). Yang, Sung Chul. ‘Political Ideology in Korean Politics: Its Elements and Roles’. In Kim, Se-Jin and Cho, Chang-Hyun, Government and Politics of Korea. Silver Spring: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972. Yi, Sang-u. ‘Karismawa dimocrasi: Yi Su ˘ng-man ron [Charisma and Democracy: The Syngman Rhee Case]’. Wolgan Chosun (April 1983). Yi, T’ae-Yo ˘ng ‘Yi Su ˘ng-man paksawa o ˘llon [Dr Syngman Rhee and the Press]’. Shin Dong-A (April 1969). Yi, Yo ˘ ng-so ˘ k ‘Cho Pong-am sahyo ˘ ngjip’aeng: Yi Su ˘ ng-man’gwa posup’au ˘ i hapchak [The Execution of Cho Pong-am: The Collaboration between Syngman Rhee and the Conservatives]’. Wolgan Chosun (August 1991). Zhai, Zhihai and Hao, Yufan. ‘China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited’. China Quarterly, vol. 121 (March 1990).

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3. Dissertations Baek, Kwang-il. ‘An Analysis of the Security Relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea’. Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1981. Lho, Kyongsoo. ‘South Korean Foreign Policy, 1969–85: Autonomy Adjusted to Security’. D.Phil. Dissertation, Oxford University, 1989. Macdonald, Donald Stone. ‘Korea and the Ballot: The International Dimension in Korean Political Development As Seen in Elections’. Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1977. Kim, Chulsu. ‘Parties and Factions in Korean Politics’. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1973. Kim, Il-yo ˘ng ‘Yi Su ˘ng-man t’ongch’igi cho ˘ngchi’i ch’ejeu ˘i so ˘nggyo ˘ke kwanhan Yo ˘n’gu [The Characteristics of the Political Regime during the Presidential Reign of Syngman Rhee’]. Ph.D. Dissertation, Songkyunkwan University, Seoul, 1991. Koh, Kwang Il. ‘In Quest of National Unity and Power: Political Ideas and Practices of Syngman Rhee’. Ph.D. Dissertation, Rutgers University, 1962.

Index Acheson, D. 29 Agreed Minute 73–9, 146, 180 aid see economic assistance; military assistance all-Korean Commission 70, 178 anti-American campaigns 75–6 anti-armistice rallies 34, 42, 168 anti-Communism Korean War and 38 Rhee’s 21–2, 51, 92–3, 142–3, 146–7 anti-Communist POWs, release of 48–52, 57, 172, 173 anti-government demonstrations 139–41, 196 anti-government newspaper, closure of 130–3 anti-NNSC demonstrations 99, 100 archival data base 10–14, 161 armistice 149 agreement 54, 59 Communist concession on POWs 36, 41–2 Communist violations 96–7, 184–5 negotiations for US security pact 45–8, 50–2, 56–7 release of anti-Communist POWs 48 Rhee’s conditions for compliance 52–4 Rhee’s opposition to 31–7, 56 Assemblymen, arrest of 35 Austrian peace treaty 1955 88 Ayoob, M. 5 Bailey, S. D. 171–2 Bandung conference 1955 88 Beetham, D. 9, 84 Berlin agreement 67, 177 Bernstein, B. J. 171–2 Big Four 67 border ﬁghting 28

Brands, H. W. 71 Briggs, E. 43, 51, 173, 180 Agreed Minute 75–6 NNSC issue 97–8, 185 Rhee’s release of anti-Communist POWs 48, 49–50, 172 US security pact negotiations 44, 45 Britain 51 archival materials 11 buffer zone 44 Bulganin, N. 88 Bull, H. 158 Buzan, B. 3, 154, 158 Cairo conference 1943 21–2 Canada 120–1 Central Council for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence 17–18 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 94, 135 Chang Myo ˘n 94, 139, 184, 187 assassination plot 106 Kyunghyang Shinmun 130, 132 vice-presidential contest 1956 103–4 charismatic authority 5, 8 China 51 announcement of troops withdrawal 119 armistice talks 34; concession on POW issue 36, 41–2; Rhee’s demand for withdrawal of forces 43, 44, 46 communization 27 intervention in Korean War 32 and peaceful coexistence 88, 89 Rhee’s proposed attack on 72–3 Cho Man-sik 19 Cho Pong-am 86, 107, 189 arrest and trial 112–15, 147 execution 133–5, 137

211

212

Index

Cho Pyo ˘ng-ok 78, 107, 110, 123, 139, 173 Cho So-ang 62–3 Cho Soon Sung 178 Cho Sun 127 Ch’oe Sun-chu 83 Choi Jang Jip 7–8 Cho ˘ng Il-kwon 99 Chosun Ilbo 12 Chu Yo-han 131 Clark, General 43, 44, 45, 47–8 ‘Plan Everready’ 52, 172–3 release of anti-Communist POWs 48, 49, 50 coalition of anti-Rhee forces 86, 93 Collins, General 171 Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) 16 Communists 8 anti-Communism see antiCommunism armistice: agreement 54; demand for assurance of ROK compliance 52; talks and removal of 33–6 Assemblymen accused of collusion 35 denunciation of peaceful coexistence 89–95, 100–1 denunciation by Rhee 1945 18 force reduction issue and Communist threat 111 Geneva conference 70–1 July offensive 1953 173–4 ‘march north’ and Communist threat 29–30, 144 National Security Law and Communist subversion 126–30 NNSC issue and Communist threat 95–100, 184–5 peace offensive 115–21, 122, 151 Rhee’s appeal to US for military removal 71–3 revolts in 1948 27, 165–6 see also China; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Comrades’ Association to Safeguard the Constitution (CASC) 84 consent 9, 10 conservative anti-Rhee forces 38 constitutional amendment 1952 35 1954 61–3, 79, 83–5, 98 containment policy 23 Czechoslovakian inspection teams 74, 95, 97 Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP) 26, 61, 62–3, 86, 165, 182 Democratic Party (DP) 85–7, 94, 110–11, 114, 123, 132, 195 anti-government campaigns 106–7 National Security Law 127–30 1958 general elections 108 presidential elections: 1956 103–4; 1960 139 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) (North Korea) 1, 7, 8, 151 all-Korean Commission 70, 178 anti-Communist POWs released 48–52 border ﬁghting 28 damage in Korean War 168–9, 190 established 24 outbreak of Korean War 30–2 peace offensive and economic appeal 118–21 political consolidation and economic progress 115–17, 191 proposals for peaceful uniﬁcation 89, 119 repatriation of Koreans in Japan to 135–8, 151, 191–2 Rhee’s 1955 ultimatum 98–9 developing states: security in 3–10 development military spending and 110–11 North Korea 115–17, 191 plan 105

213

Index dissent 78–9, 80–1 see also public support division of Korea 1, 15–31 establishment of South Korea 24–31 post-Liberation process 16–24 Dong-A Ilbo 12, 33, 107 Dowling, Ambassador 102, 111, 113, 114, 127, 134 DP and Communists 129–30 public discontent 119–20 Rhee’s deterioration 125, 192 Dulles, J. Foster 47, 66, 77, 87, 171, 176, 184 Rhee’s visit to US 71, 74 security pact negotiations 40, 42, 45, 53–6 economic appeal 118–21, 151 economic assistance 53, 54–5, 73–6, 174 economic development see development economic problems 6–7, 105 education 105 Eisenhower, D. D. 37, 43, 51, 59, 88, 170, 184 difﬁculties with Rhee 58 economic and military aid programme 174 National Security Law 128–9 Rhee’s visit to US 71 security pact and armistice 45–7 strengthening ROK forces and participation in political conference 64–5, 66, 68–70 Eisenhower, M. 177 elections 10 and division of Korea 23–4 general see general elections presidential see presidential elections proposed all-Korean 70, 178–9 ‘Everready Plan’ 38, 45–6, 51–2, 171, 172–3, 176 external alliances 6 external threats 3–4

externalization of internal threats 5, 114–15, 121, 151–2, 154 and justiﬁcation of repression 126–38 force reduction issue

108–11, 188

Gaddis, J. Lewis 88, 161 general elections 1950 27, 165 1954 61 1958 108, 187 Geneva conference 1954 63–71, 115 see also political conference Geneva summit 1955 88 government expenditure 110–11 ‘Greater Sanctions Statement’ 35, 45, 168 Ham Sang-hun 62–3, 176 Han Bae-ho 133 Han Hu ˘i-so ˘k 127 Han, S. 106 Hankook Ilbo 12 hard-liners 106, 125–6, 135, 141–3 Henderson, G. 140 Ho ˘ Cho ˘ng 141 Hodge, General J. R. 17 Hong Chin-ki 127 Hook, S. 143 Hull, General J. 64, 75, 95–6, 97–8, 180, 183 Inchon landing 32 Independence Club 20–1 Independence Day 90, 182 Independent Comrades’ Association 86 internal instability 103–8 internal threats 4–10 Jackson, R. 158 Japan 21 repatriation of Koreans in 135–8, 151, 191–2 Japanese Government General Order 134–5 Jebb, G. 173

214

Index

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 69 Joint Commission 19, 23 judges, reappointment of 133–4

Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) 19, 116, 190 Kyunghyang Shinmun 12, 130–3

Khrushchev, N. 87–8 Kim, Byoung-Lo P. 191 Kim Chang-ryong 176 Kim Il Sung 1, 15, 19, 120, 136, 169 armistice 36 economic development programme 116 elected Premier of DPRK 24 KWP 116 military uniﬁcation 25, 30–1 peaceful reconstruction 59, 102, 115, 175 peaceful uniﬁcation 1, 118 psychological appeal 119 Kim Ku (Kim Koo) 18, 24, 26, 165 Kim Kyu-sik 20, 24 Kim, Se-Jin 183 Kim So ˘ng-su 23 Kim Su-Son 112–13 Korean Bar Association 127 Korean Commission in Washington 21 Korean Democratic Party (KDP) 17, 18, 26 Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) 27–8 Korean People’s Republic (KPR) 16–17 Korean Provisional Government (KPG) 17, 18, 21–2 Korean War 8, 31–58, 144, 149 armistice see armistice damage in North Korea 168–9, 190 implications for internal and external security policies 37–9 outbreak and Rhee’s opposition to armistice 31–7 release of anti-Communist POWs 48–52 Rhee’s threat of unilateral action 41–8

Lacy, W. 91, 94, 124, 184 Langdon, W. 20 Lee, Chong-Sik 152, 190 Lee, Hahn-Been 193 leftist politicians 38, 167 Legislation and Justice Committee 128 legitimacy developing states 4–6 Rhee regime 9–10, 12–13; crisis 83–7; regime security and state security 148–54 strategies to combat lack of 5–6, 121–2 Liberal Party (LP) 123, 135, 141–3, 182 factions 106 general elections 1958 108 hard-liners 106, 125–6, 135, 141–3 Kyunghyang Shinmun 132–3 legitimacy crisis 83–4 National Security Law 126–30 parliamentary system 197 presidential elections: 1956 103–4; 1960 139 rebuilding 60–3, 175 Liberation Day 90, 91–2, 182 living standards 117 Local Autonomy Law 126 ‘lost territory’ 98–9 Lynne-Jones, S. M. 157 Macdonald, D. 87, 187 Magsaysay, R. 94 Malenkov, G. 87, 182 Malik, J. 33 ‘march north’ 1–2, 35–7, 144–6, 155 challenges to 112–15 establishment of South Korea and 24–31 see also military uniﬁcation Marshall Plan 23 McConaughy, Ambassador 140, 196–7

Index Merrill, J. 28 militarization 6, 121–2, 153 Rhee’s priority and force reduction issue 108–11, 151 strengthening military forces and participation in political conference 63–71 military assistance 53 Agreed Minute negotiations 73–6 JCS recommendations 69 1953 offers 45, 174 request for in September 1949 29–30 Rhee-Dulles meetings 54–5 Rhee-Robertson meetings 66 Rhee’s suggested programme 68–9 military leaders 78–9, 180 military uniﬁcation 1, 65, 144–6, 149 Kim Il Sung 25, 30–1 negotiations for US support 71–3, 75, 76–7, 80 Rhee’s expectations of UN 32 Rhee’s references to in public speeches 90–1, 92 see also ‘march north’ Mindan (Korean Residents Corps) 137 Moscow agreement 1945 18 Muccio, Ambassador 26, 28, 184 Mutual Defence Treaty 40, 57, 69, 79, 146, 174, 178 search for a US security commitment 41–8, 171 signing of 52–6 National Assembly 75, 78, 93 and armistice 33, 42 creation of 24 General Won’s Communist propaganda 93 National Security Law 128 1952 crisis 35 1954 constitutional amendment bill 83–4 1954 general elections 61 Rhee’s resignation 141

215

National Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence 18 National Police 134–5 national referendum 61, 62 National Security Council (NSC) 69 NSC 167/2 64–5, 176 NSC 170/1 37 National Security Law 152, 166, 193 Cho Pong-am 113, 114, 147 Kyunghyang Shinmun 131 strengthening 13, 126–30 Neutral Nations Inspection Teams (NNITs) 95 Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission 48, 49 Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) 74, 75, 95–100, 147, 179 ‘New Delhi’ case 62–3, 176 Nixon, R. 64–5 non-aligned movement 91 North Korea see Democratic People’s Republic of Korea North Korean Provisional People’s Committee 19 North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly 19 North Korean Workers Party 19, 116, 119 nuclear weapons 108–9 Nye, J. S. 157 O Chae-kyong 194 O Che-to 134 Ofﬁce of Public Information (OPI) 131–2, 133 Oliver, R. 12, 161–2, 180–1, 183, 184 ‘march north’ 155 political conference 65, 177, 178–9 Rhee’s visit to US 71, 72 Oliver ﬁle 12 O’Neill, R. 6 opposition, political 98 coalition of anti-Rhee forces 86, 93

216

Index

opposition, political (cont.) development of 26–7 strengthened 83–7 see also Democratic Party; Progressive Party ossiﬁcation of policy-making 153–4 Paik Sun Yup 48, 171 Pak Ho ˘n-yo ˘ng 116 Park Chan-il 125 parliamentary system 197 peace offensive, Communist 115–21, 122, 151 ‘peace plans’ 33 peaceful coexistence 87–9, 149–50 denunciation of 89–95, 100–1, 183 peaceful uniﬁcation 86–7 Kim Il Sung and 1, 118 North Korean proposals 89, 119 suppression of peaceful uniﬁcation movement 112–15, 150–1 People’s Committees 16, 19 policy-making, ossiﬁcation of 153–4 Polish inspection teams 74, 95, 97 political conference 52, 54, 55, 59–60, 80, 115, 177 participation in and strengthening ROK forces 63–71 political legitimacy see legitimacy presidential elections 35 1952 35, 41 1956 86, 94–5, 103–5 1960 139 presidential tenure 61–2 press/newspapers 10, 12, 42, 105, 161 closure of an anti-government newspaper 130–3 and execution of Cho 134–5 US–ROK relations 78 prisoners of war (POWs) release of anti-Communist POWs 48–52, 57, 172, 173 repatriation issue 34, 36, 41–2, 46, 47 Progressive Party 86, 150–1 leader executed 133–5

outlawed 107, 112–15 peaceful uniﬁcation 87, 112, 188 public demonstrations anti-armistice rallies 34, 42, 168 anti-government 139–41, 196 anti-NNSC 99, 100 public support 10, 85 dissent 78–9, 80–1 downfall of Rhee regime 138–41 growing dissatisfaction in 1956–58 104–8 and ROK–US relations 78, 85 Pyun Yung Tai 33, 77, 78, 141, 179 political conference 63–4, 67, 68, 70 POWs 48 security pact with US 42, 55 quasi-states 158 Quirino, President

94

recognition of ROK 26 Reeve, W. D. 78 regime security 5 state security, legitimacy and 148–54 repatriation of Koreans in Japan 135–8, 151, 191–2 POWs issue 34, 36, 41–2, 46, 47 repression 147 intensiﬁcation of 103–8, 121 justiﬁcation of 126–38 revolts of autumn 1948 27, 165–6 revolution of 1960 13, 139–41, 152 Rhee, Francesca 125 Rhee, Syngman 7, 12–13 Agreed Minute negotiations 73–9 anti-communism 21–2, 51, 92–3, 142–3, 146–7 attempt to consolidate domestic position 60–3 Berlin agreement 67 Cairo conference 21–2 Central Council for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence 17–18

Index charismatic authority 8, 160 communization of China 27 constitutional amendments 35; 1954 bill 61–3, 83–5 denunciation of peaceful coexistence 89–95, 100–1, 183 development plan 105 downfall of regime 138–41, 147 early political career 20–1 elected as ﬁrst president of ROK 24 foreign policy criticised 80–1 Korean War 31–2; conditions for adherence to armistice 52–4; heightening of bargaining position 48–52; implications for internal and external security policies 37–9; negotiations for defence pact with US 41–56, 57–8, 173; opposition to armistice 31–7, 56; ‘peace plan’ 33; release of anti-Communist POWs 48–52, 57; threat of unilateral action 41–8 Lacy 94 legitimacy of regime 9–10; legitimacy crisis 83–5; state security, regime security and 148–54 ‘march north’ see ‘march north’ military build-up and force reduction issue 108–11, 121–2 military leaders’ refusal to recapture lost territory 98–9 and Moscow agreement 18 National Security Law 126–30, 166 negotiations with US to expand armed forces 65–71, 79–80 NNSC 96–100 opposition to see opposition ‘Plan Everready’ 38, 45–6, 51–2, 171, 172–3, 176 political conference 55, 59–60, 63–71

217

presidential elections: 1952 35, 41; 1956 103–4; 1960 139 references to military uniﬁcation in public speeches 90–1, 92 request for aid from US in 1949 29–30 ‘resolution of warning against the president’ 107 responsibility in hard-liners’ repressive policies 132–3, 135, 141–3 return to Korea 17 separate southern government 19–24 suppression of ‘peaceful uniﬁcation’ movement 112–15, 121 visit to America 71–4 weakening of control over political affairs 124–6 and withdrawal of US forces 1948–49 27–8 Robertson, W. S. 47, 52, 53, 56, 66, 135 rules breach of for constitutional amend- ment 84–5 conformity to 9 justiﬁability of 9–10 Russia see Soviet Union sa-sa-o-ip reinterpretation 83–5 Sayigh, Y. 4 Scalapino, R. A. 190 Schelling, T. C. 170 security: in developing states 3–10 Seoul Shinmun 12, 162 security dilemma 6, 157 South Korea 144–54 Shin Ik-hu ˘i 26, 62–3, 103–4, 176, 186 Shtykov, T. 30 Sixteen nations consultations 120–1 Smoke, R. 3 social problems 6–7 Song Yo-ch’an 141 South Korean Democratic People’s United Front 18

218

Index

Soviet Union 39, 72 division of Korea 17, 21–2 Korean War 30–1 peaceful coexistence 87–9 Rhee’s fear of Communist domination 29–30, 144 Russian archives 11, 167 US–USSR Joint Commission 19, 23 Stalin, J. 31, 39, 87, 88 state security 5 regime security, legitimacy and 148–54 strengthening ROK forces 63–71 student revolution 1960 13, 139–41, 152 Swedish inspection teams 74, 95 Swiss inspection teams 74, 95 Taiwan Strait 99 Taylor, General M. 47, 95 38th parallel 28, 31–2 Thomas, C. 6–7 training 68–9 Truman, H. S. 34 Truman Doctrine 22–3 trusteeship 18, 163 uniﬁcation 1 conference 1948 24 Geneva conference 70 military see military uniﬁcation peaceful see peaceful uniﬁcation unilateral action 80 NSC 167/2 and Rhee’s response 64–5 release of anti-Communist POWs 48–52 threat of and search for US security commitment 41–8, 145 United Nations 20, 145 armistice agreement 54 and elections in Korea 23–4 Geneva conference 70 Korean War 31–3; armistice negotiations 33, 34–5, 36, 46; demand for removal of forces from Korea 44;

Rhee’s release of antiCommunist POWs 49, 50, 51, 52; threatened South Korean withdrawal from UN Command 43–4 NNSC 95–6 recognition of South Korea 26 United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) 23–4, 164–5 United States (US) 1, 8, 79–81, 145–6, 149, 152 archival materials 11, 161 economic assistance 53, 54–5, 73–6, 174 ﬁnalizing of security commitments in Korea 71–9 force reduction issue 1957 108–11 Korean War 29–30, 31, 31–2, 36, 57–8; ‘maximum commitment’ 37–8; request for ROK cooperation with UN and 34–5; Rhee’s threat of unilateral action and search for security commitment 41–8 lack of support for military uniﬁcation in 1949 25 leadership removal plans 94, 140–1, 183; Plan Everready 38, 45–6, 51–2, 171, 172–3, 176 military assistance see military assistance Mutual Defence Treaty see Mutual Defence Treaty and National Security Law 128–30 NNSC issue 95–100 passim NSC see National Security Council and peaceful coexistence 87, 88 and release of anti-Communist POWs 49–52 Rhee’s letter of December 1954 89–91 Rhee’s visit to 71–4

219

Index separate government for South Korea 19–20, 21–2, 23 strengthening ROK forces and participation in political conference 64–71 US–USSR Joint Commission 19, 23 withdrawal of forces 1948–49 27–8, 166 withdrawal of forces 1953–4 65–6, 177 United States Army Military Government (USAMGIK) 17 United States Military Ordinance 88, 132 university professors 141 urbanization 105 Van ﬂeet, General Walt, S. M. Watson, A.

157 158

49, 68–9, 73

weak states 4–5, 7 Wolfers, A. 3 Won Yong-do ˘k, General 93, 97–8

48, 73–4,

Yang Myong-sam 114, 189 Yang You Chan, Ambassador 42, 43, 68, 100, 140 Yi Ki-pung 60–1, 106, 112, 124 constitutional amendment 1954 83 NNSC 99 vice-presidential contests: 1956 103–4; 1960 139 Yi Po ˘m-so ˘k 60, 175 Yi, Yo ˘ng-so ˘k 195 Yo ˘ Un-hyo ˘ng 16, 20 Yo ˘su rebellion 27, 165–6 ‘young’ group 26, 165 Yu Chin-o 84 Zhou Enlai

41, 119