Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey

SYMBIOTIC ANTAGONISMS Competing Nationalisms in Turkey

EDITED BY

AYfe Kadtoglu and E. Fuat Keyman

THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH PRESS

Salt Lake City

Copyright © 2.011 by The University of Utah Press. All rights reserved. The Defiance House Man colophon is a registered trademark of the University of Utah Press. It is based upon a four-foot-tall, Ancient Puebloan pictograph (late PIlI) near Glen Canyon, Utah. IS 14 13 12. II

I 2.

3 4 S

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Symbiotic antagonisms: competing nationalisms in Turkey / edited by Ay~ KadlOglu and E. Fuat Keyman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-60781-031-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) I. Nationalism-Turkey. 2.. Turkey-Politics and government-1980- I. Kadloglu, Ane. 1961- II. Keyman, Emin Fuat. DR434.S96 2.010 32.0.540956I-dc2.2.

Printed and bound by Sheridan Books. Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan.

For our children, in the hope that they will live in a world not shaped by competing nationalisms

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction: Understanding Nationalism through FamUy Resemblances xi AYje Kadzoglu and E. Fuat Keyman PART I. TURKISH NATIONALISM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 1.

Turkish Nationalism: From a System of Classification to a System of Solidarity

3

$erifMardin 2.. Nationalism in Turkey: Modernity, State, and Identity

10

E. Fuat Keyman 3. The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism

33

Ayje Kad~oglu 4. Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

S7

TamlBora s.The Changing Nature of Nationalism in Turkey: Actors, Discourses, and the Struggle for Hegemony 82.

Umut Ozkmmlt PART II. CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTATIONS OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

6. The Genealogy of Turkish Nationalism: From Civic and Ethnic to Conservative Nationalism in Turkey 103

UmutUzer

Contents

viii

7. On the ~estion ofIslam and Nationalism in Turkey:

Sources and Discourses

In

Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagz 8. Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam in the Construction of Political Party Identities

162

Simten COiar PART III. KURDISH NATIONALISM

9. Does Kurdish Nationalism Have a Navel?

199

Hakan Ozoglu 10.

Banditry to Disloyalty: Turkish Nationalisms and the Kurdish ~estion 223

MesutYegen II.

Toward a Nonstandard Story: 'The Kurdish ~estion and the Headscarf, Nationalism, and Iraq 253

Murat Somer 12..

Reframing the Nationalist Perspective: Kurdish Civil Society Activism in Europe 289

vera Eccarius-Kelly Conclusion

319

AYie Kadtoglu and E. Fuat Keyman References

325

List of Contributors Index

363

357

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

THE IDEA OF THIS BOOK EMERGED IN AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

that we organized in Istanbul in November 2.007 on understanding and exploring competing nationalisms in Turkey. Since that time, we have collectively worked with the contributors in order to put together a coherent and detailed analysis of nationalisms in Turkey. In this endeavor we have benefited from the help and collegial support of a number of people. We particularly thank Tuba KanCl for her valuable effort to finalize the book, Hakan Yavuz for his encouragement about preparing a book on nationalism, Peter DeLafosse for his valuable editorial contribution, Kathy Burford Lewis for meticulous editorial assistance, Bora i§yar for his assistance in translating parts of a chapter, and Evren Tok for his help in finalizing one of the chapters. We are also grateful to Sabancl University and Kos: University for their financial and organizational support for the symposium that led to this book.

INTRODUCTION

Understanding Nationalism through Family Resemblances AY~E KADIOGLU AND

E. FUAT KEYMAN

THE EXPRESSION "SYMBIOTIC ANTAGONISMS" PROMISES TO BE A REL-

evant analytical category for understanding the dynamics of the relationship among various nationalisms. It was first used by Barrington Moore (1966, p. 2.37) in his seminal book on the social origins of modern dictatorships and democracies. In analyzing the Japanese case, he refers to the relationship between the Japanese merchants and the warrior aristocracy (samurai) as one of symbiotic antagonism. The Japanese merchants turned the rice of the Japanese landowners (daimyo) into cash. The samurai were providing protection to both the daimyo and merchants. Before the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Japanese merchants could engage in commercial activities only if the samurai ensured their protection. The samurai and daimyo, however, needed the merchants to turn their rice into cash and provide the aristocratic lifestyle that they were leading. In other words, they all needed each other to carryon with their activities and way of life. They were deriving their livelihood and lifestyles from one another. Yet, due to a prolonged period of peace and luxury during the Tokugawa Shogunate, merchants stopped needing the samurai and became the dominant partner in the menage a trois of the daimyo, merchant, and samurai. The symbiotic antagonism between the samurai and merchants resulted in the downfall of the former. This development was vital in understanding the subsequent development of fascism in Japan. Such a dialectical choreography can be useful in comprehending how the existing nationalisms in Turkey that derive their raison d'etre from one another can prepare the conditions for each other's continuous reproduction or xi

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Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman

downfall. Perhaps the difference between the Japanese example and nationalisms in Turkey is that it is very hard for these nationalisms-which derive their livelihood from each other-to lead to one another's downfall. The imminent antagonism among them occasionally ends in outright military and paramilitary clashes. They have, in fact, the capability to destroy the liberaldemocratic political regime while trying to destroy each other.

UNDERSTANDING NATIONALISM

Nationalist ideology constitutes one of the key parameters of modern Turkish politics, especially since 1999, when Turkey became an official candidate for membership in the European Union (EU). After this date, various constitutional amendments and other legislative changes were accepted in the Turkish parliament that aimed at the recognition of languages other than Turkish as well as facilitating religiOUS practices other than Sunni Islam. With these developments some of the key elements employed in the definition of Turkish national identity, such as common language and religion, were demystified. This led to a fear on the part of the nationalist groups in Turkey that was enhanced by feelings of insecurity on the part of the appointed state elite (the military and the bureaucratic establishment) since the national elections iJ? November 2002.. After those elections, the Justice and Development Party. with a Muslim social base. formed the government in Turkey. The military commanders have been referring to "Islamic fundamentalism" as the biggest threat in Turkey since February 1997. The rise in the popularity of the Justice and Development Party coupled with the acceptance of various legal reforms in the parliament that increased the accountability of the military as part of the European Union membership processes led to the emergence of a discourse of fear on the part of the state elite, afraid of Islamic fundamentalism and the European Union processes. When we add the increasing tension in the southeast border of'I:urkey in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, it becomes possible to understand the relevance of a nationalist discourse in Turkey based on a fear of Islam, the European Union, the United States, the Kurds, and all the non-Muslim and non-Turkish identities in Turkey. All these processes placed the tide of nationalism at the center of the political alignments and divisions in Turkey.

Introduction

xiii

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Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman

By the early twentieth century. nationalist ideology was beginning to flirt with Marxism. Although Karl Marx (1818-83) and Friedrich Engels (182.09S) referred to the workers as non-national beings. they still attempted to integrate nationalist struggles into the Communist project. They used an earlier distinction made by G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) between "historic nations" and "non historic nations." Accordingly. they argued that historic nations played a progressive role by unifying people and territory whereas nonhistoric nations failed to do so. Their views on nationalism became clearer as they evaluated the Polish and Irish struggles for independence. In fact. Marx and Engels embraced Polish nationalism because it would weaken tsarist Russia. They also thought that the Irish nationalist movement geared toward independence would weaken Britain. This opened the way for a distinction between the "nationalism of the oppressors" and the "nationalism of the oppressed." Such a distinction was sharply drawn by V. I. Lenin (1870-192.4). who argued for the right to self-determination of oppressed nations. These distinctions among different types of nationalism are important, because they seem to point to a distinction between "good" and "bad" nationalisms. Accordingly, the nationalism of the oppressed is viewed as good because it involves a transfer of power to the people akin to the nationalist ideology at the time of the French Revolution. Yet it is also possible to argue that all nationalisms including those of the oppressed are bad because they all point to a distinction between "us" and "them." A second common characteristic of all nationalisms is that they are not natural but rather modern constructs that were manufactured. in most cases, by the national intelligentsia. When Yusuf Akc;ura (1876-1935) advocated Turkism in 1904 in an article that was published in a journal in Egypt called Turk, he thought of it as the best project (the others being Ottomanism and Islamism) that would lead to the preservation of the Ottoman state. This epoch-making article is considered the first essay that professed Turkish nationalism as a political project. It is highly interesting that at this particular juncture in history the main raison d'etre of nationalism was enunciated as the preservation of the state rather than the transfer of power to the people. Such an introduction of nationalist ideology in the Ottoman society was to have a major impact on its subsequent evolution. The distinction between the nationalism of the oppressors and the nationalism of the oppressed is still used today in pointing to a distinction among the Turkish, Kurdish, and

Introduction

xv

Islamic nationalisms. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that Turkish nationalism has an unjust discourse by virtue of advocating social cohesion at the national level to the point of excluding and assimilating minorities while Kurdish nationalism and Islamic nationalism employ a JUSt discourse and Opt for a transfer of power to the people. On the other hand, it is also possible to argue that all nationalisms have the potential to exclude and assimilate. Such commonalities make it impossible to refer to the compatibility of any form of nationalism with democracy. This book constitutes one of the first systematic comparisons of different types of nationalism in Turkey: Turkish, Kurdish, and Islamic nationalisms. These nationalisms have encountered one anomer throughout modern Turkish history. It is such encounters that led to their perpetual reproduction. While they were rival ideologies, they were making use of encounters with one another not only to reproduce each another but also to constitute a hegemonic discourse in Turkey. Although mutual encounters of these nationalisms produced various tensions, it was, in fact, these very tensions that made their continuous survival possible. Nationalisms thrive on soils that are able to generate "others" over time through exclusion as well as assimilation. In this sense, in the course of the contemporary history of Turkey, these nationalisms have always acted in a relational and intertwined way as competing and essentially contested discourses of Turkish modernity and politics.

FAMILY RESEMBLANCES

Despite all the debates about nationalism touched upon throughout the book, it is important to specify from the outset how we approach nationalism. In doing so, six "family resemblances" are worth mentioning.' First, as one of the founding philosophers of feminism and existentialism, Simone de Beauvoir (1989 [1949], p. 267), suggests: "One is not horn, hut rather hecomes, a woman:' Similarly, we suggest in this book that one is not born, but rather becomes, a nationalist. In this sense, nationalism is SOcially, historically, ideologically, anthropologically, institutionally; and politically constructed. Second, on the basis of the fundamental principle of critical realism that there is a difference between appearance and essence, nationalism operates at the level of lived reality rather than involving efforts to explore the essential

xvi

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or concealed sources of societal processes and problems. For instance. as in the case of the debates ahout the rise of unemployment in Europe or North America. the nationalist assumption that establishes a causal relationship between migrants and unemployment stays at the level of appearances and hence appeals to the lived reality and experience of the society rather than searching for the structural and essential sources of unemployment. Third. the fact that nationalism operates at the level of appearance does not mean that it lacks effectiveness and power. On the contrary. the nationalist discourse is very powerful in constituting the relationship between the subject and the other. the subject and nature, and the subject and herself/ himself It is through its appeal to lived experiences that nationalism constitutes a community based on we/us versus they/them as the other. Moreover, in creating a community identity through the principle of sameness. nationalism codifies difference as the dangerous other to be resisted or silenced. In this sense. nationalism always operates as a boundary-producing practice between the self and the other as well as between identity and difference. Fourth. in creating a sheltered. warm, and protected community for its followers. nationalism always establishes and reproduces a feeling of insecurity. fear. and resentment against the others who are outside of the boundaries of the community. In this sense, as Zygmunt Baumann ( 200 7, p. 37) suggests. nationalism speaks as "I shout and I resent, therefore I am" rather than promoting critical thinking as the basis of existence. Fifth. nationalism is not only an ideology but also a strategy utilized by different actors, groups. and communities in their search to strengthen their own communitarian identities. In this sense, the distinctions made in regard to different nationalisms in the existing literature on nationalism-between "good" and "bad" nationalisms, nationalisms of the "oppressor" and the "oppressed:' "civic" or "ethnic" nationalisms-are not immune from these constitutive features of nationalism. Last but not least, these family resemblances of di~erent manifestations of nationalism portray the crucial point about its endurance and ability to be pervasive in modern times despite all the changes and transformations. This renders nationalism an ever-present ideology with a hegemonic character. Hence it is imperative to recognize its ability to endure in modernity rather than assuming that nationalism "rises" and "falls" in various periods.

Introduction

xvii

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK

The main endeavor of this book is to explore the encounters among competing nationalisms in Turkey. To recognize competing nationalisms does not ignore the historically dominant position of Turkish nationalism. This book starts with ~erif Mardin's exploration of the endurance of nationalism in the Ottoman-Turkish context as it evolves from a system of classification to a system of solidarity. In chapter 2. Fuat Keyman attempts to read different paradigms of Turkish modernity in order to establish a historical and analytical framework for an understanding of how nationalism has endured and also has been subject to changes and modifications. Keyman traces the role of nationalism in Turkey's journey in modernity since 192.3, including the processes of democratization. globalization. and Europeanization. This brief historical account of the intertwined relationship between nationalism and modernity also provides a background for the chapters to follow. In chapter 3 Ay~e KadlOglu substantiates this intertwined relationship between modernity and nationalism by fOCUSing on the twin motives ofTurkish nationalism: the preservation of the state and Westernism. KadlOglu maintains that these two motives as spelled out by two critical thinkers (Yusuf Ak~ura and Ahmed Agaoglu) at the turn of the twentieth century constitute the root-language of all subsequent nationalisms in Turkey. Kadloglu also considers whether the twin motives of Turkish nationalism that were visible at the time of its emergence are still relevant today. In chapter 4- Taml Bora elaborates on the role of nationalism in Turkish modernity by exploring its recent manifestations. Bora's exploration provides the reader with a very illuminating analysis of the competing discourses of Turkish nationalism that covers a wide spectrum, ranging from officialind left-wing versions of Kemalist nationalism to neo-conservative and neo~ liberal nationalism as well as ultra-right, isolationist. and ethnicist national discourses. Bora's discussion of competing discourses of Turkish natioll:l.lisnl.·· also serves as the basis for a critical reading of the myth that TurkeYI'epresents a homogeneous nation. ..... .. : . . . . . .•.

In chapter) Umut Ozkmmh draws together a Gramscianrea~i.tl.g6frta~ tionalism and the topographical approach of Jean Pierre Faye~.tl.d~~t:~t.tl.pts to deconstruct this myth as well as the ideas of the civic versUsecllllic::nat:io.tl.~ alism and the "rise" and "fall" of the nationalist discourse overtirriei1'l,T\l~key.

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In doing so. Ozkmmh provides a topography of nationalist discourses in Turkey to illuminate the dynamics of the ongoing struggle for hegemony over the nation by various social and political forces at the turn of the twenty-first century. This particular reading places the emphasis on the protean nature of nationalism and presents it as a field of positions in which different and often competing narratives circulate. One of the Significant domains in which Turkish nationalism has been reproduced and reconstructed involves the relationship between conservatism and nationalism in general and Islam and nationalism in particular. In chapter 6 Umut Uzer prOVides a historical and analytical exploration of such relationships. In doing so. he discusses the emergence of Turkish nationalism in the late nineteenth century as well as the main proponents of nationalism such as Ziya Gokalp and Yusuf Ak~ura and other important figures. including Hiiseyin Nihal Atstz and ibrahim Kafesoglu. He maintains that conservative nationalism entails a reference to traditional and moral values, thereby giving religion a central role in the definition of national identity. In chapter 7 Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagt furthers Uzer's analysis of conservative nationalism by providing an overview of the interplay ofIslam and nationalism from the late Ottoman era onward. She focuses on the discourses of key Turkish nationalist figures who attempted to incorporate Islam into their nationalistic views and traces how this interaction has been articulated in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis since the 1980s. Koyuncu-Lorasdagt argues that Islam and Turkish nationalism have had a symbiotic and instrumental relationship in Turkey, where their mutual benefits have been endorsed. and that this articulation ofIslam and nationalism can be called instrumental pious nationalism. She further suggests that Islam has always been an indispensable element of the discourse of nationalism in Turkey. The constant presence ofIslam as one of the defining elements of the nationalist discourses in Turkey can also be observed in Turkish politics, especially with reference to ultra-right and center-right political parties. In chapter 8 Simten Co~ar elaborates this point indetaU. Co§ar analyzes the role of conservative nationalism in the strategies. programs. and discourses of three political parties: the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Grand Unity Party (BBP). and Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Analyzing these political parties' discourses of nationalism as well as the encounters among them. Co~ar reveals the political significance of Sunni Islam as an

Introduction

xix

ingredient of Turkish nationalism, which has also given rise to the use of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as an effective political strategy by which these parties attempt to widen their social bases. Finally, this book also analyzes Kurdish nationalism and its historical and political encounters with Turkish nationalism. In doing so, we start with the question of the origins and genealogy of Kurdish nationalism. Separating Kurdish identity from Kurdish nationalism, in chapter 9 Hakan 6zoglu suggests that Kurdish nationalism was not the result of an evolutionary process; it was, in fact, constructed at a certain time in history. This means that Kurdish nationalism's link with the past was not organic; rather it was historically and institutionally constructed at the end of World War I. Ozoglu also argues that Kurdish movements had existed prior to this time but were not nationalist. It was only at the end of World War I that we could begin to identify Kurdish nationalism as an ethnic-based nationalism that has given rise to the creation of a Kurdish identity. In fact, Turkish nationalism and its approach to the Kurdish question on the basis of an "us" versus "them" distinction have played a crucial role in the construction of Kurdish identity. In chapter 10 Mesut Yegen takes up this issue and examines the ways in which "mainstream," "extreme right-wing:' and "left-wing" versions of Turkish nationalism have viewed the Kurdish question. Yegen's chapter shows that the Kurdish question has been perceived by means of a rich vocabulary, including terms such as "resistance of the past; "banditry;' "political reactionary," "regional backwardness; and "foreign incitement." Despite existing differences, Yegen argues, the idea that the Kurds are Turks-to-be and that the Kurdish question may basically be solved by means of assimilation has remained a constant theme in Turkish nationalist discourses. But he also demonstrates the changes that have taken place in recent years regarding the perception of Kurds in the Turkish nationalist discourses: the increasing characterization of Kurds as "disloyal" in the Turkish nationalist discourses. The historical context in which the term "disloyalty" enters the agenda of the Turkish nationalist discourses about the Kurdish question is what has come to be called the post-9iII world in general and the invasion of Iraq in particular. This historical context has also brought a new dimension to Kurdish nationalism: the possibility of an autonomous Kurdishstai:e in northern Iraq. In chapter II Murat Somer deals with both internal and external

xx

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Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman

dimensions of Kurdish nationalism with special reference to the novelties of the poSt-9/1I world, in which a pronounced ethnic dimension of Kurdish identity became more visible. This chapter illustrates the encounters between Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms in a more ethnically defined and contested arena. Somer maintains that it is important to distinguish between the Kurdish question and the Kurdish conflict: while the former might have been a product of nationalism and modernization, the latter results from structures and political decisions. One of the neglected areas in studying Kurdish nationalism has been the question of the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe and its role in recent ethnicization of Kurdish nationalism. In chapter 12 Vera Eccarius-Kelly explores the ways in which Diaspora Kurdish expressions of nationalism in Europe have influenced and shaped the public discourse on the future of the Kurds in Turkey. Kurdish collective activism has succeeded in connecting the language of victimization to public discourses on Turkish membership in the European Union. The Kurdish Diasporas ability to assert power by controlling and managing nationalist articulations stands out. Yet its capacity to influence Kurdish nationalists inside Turkey. to shape and to inspire new manifestations of interconnected local, regional. and global repertoires of collective protest action, requires further examination. The Diasporas challenges represent a modified version of ethnic nationalism, as Kurds increasingly focus on cultural and linguistic expressions ofidentity rather than on a preoccupation with territorial boundaries. All these chapters have been designed to portray the different manifestations of nationalism in Turkey. Operating as symbiotic antagonisms. these manifestations reveal the choreography of Turkish modernity and the defining role that nationalism plays in it. In this sense, we hope to enlarge the domain of social and political studies of Turkey by introducing one of the most neglected dimensions: critical analysis of encounters among competing claims to nationalism in Turkey. We also hope that this discussion of symbiotic antagonisms produced and reproduced by discourses of nationalism will contribute to the debates about and searches for a democratic disclosure in Turkish politicS and modernity.

Introduction

xxi

NOTES 1.

In trying to ourline the «family resemblances" of differerenc nationalisms (it la Ludwig Wittgenstein) we were inspired by a similar endeavor by Umberto Eco (1995) about fascisms in Europe.

PART I

Turkish Nationalism: Continuity and Change

1

TURKISH NATIONALISM

From a System of Classification to a System of Solidarity ~ERIF MARDIN .

THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER PRESENTS THE OUTLINES OF A ROUGH

frame that I believe can be further developed for an understanding of the process of modernization in Turkey. It is a summary of the ideas that I have acquired in the last fifty years by studying the relationship of the Ottoman Empire, Islam, and the thrust of modernity. In no way, however, does this chapter claim to establish a detailed historical account of the relations between Ottoman society and the state during the many centuries that I cover. A few years ago I developed the idea that an understanding of modern Turkish politics would require knowledge of the structure of the Ottoman Empire. I underlined the idea of a bipolar structure, of the center and the periphery. This was not a terribly original idea. A number of historians had developed the concept of an Ottoman Empire working with two structural components: the military and the nonmilitary (inalcrk 1994, pp. 16-17). A latent, unstated, but important element of the bipolarity, however, had escaped notice: that the Ottoman Empire could be studied as a system of social classification. To my knowledge, this theme has never been developed. The Ottoman map of sociopolitical relations was a static one, but it nevertheless allows today's observer to begin investigations with a new venue into the study of Turkish modernity. I propose that the Ottoman Empire may be seen as an enormous system of classification. Not only askeri (military) 3

4

~erif

Mardin

and reaya (civilians) but many other minute classifications of social positions make up the conceptual map of the Ottoman Empire as seen by Ottoman officialdom and even ulema (members of the religious hierarchy, the higher rungs of which were also integrated with the state). Part of this classificatory behemoth may be traced to detailed imperial regulations such as those proclaimed by Sultan Mehmed II, but many more regulatory strategies of the Ottoman Empire that fall in the same classifying category have been uncovered by Halil inalclk (1994, p. 143). To understand the characteristics of this classification system we may think of the Ottoman view of society as an immense checkerboard of social positions that have an essentially static function of preservation. This does not mean that the system is inflexible. But it relies on keeping the social positions under the control of the state. For example, the Ottoman cavalry is originally recruited from timar holders (inalctk 1994, p. 71). The use of gunpowder makes the cavalry unreliable. The cavalry is replaced by more foot soldiers. The increased number of foot soldiers (shown in the gradual increases in janissaries) is found to be unreliable. The state eliminates the janissaries. Nineteenth-century military reform creates a new military machine, which is found to be unreliable in the war of 1877-78, particularly because the officers are unschooled. The state eliminates unreliable officers (alaylz) and replaces them, much more systematically than in the preceding years, with graduates of military schools. In all these cases, the state remains the agent in control of the military. Compare this with feudalism, where the military forces are organized by the state only in later historical developments. now studied under the rubric of the "militarization of Europe" (Geyer I989). The same picture of change within stability may be followed in the case of dirliks (revenue granted as a living in return for performing military services) (Shaw 1976, p. 332.), which are transformed into mukataa (tax farm) (inalclk 1994. p. 139)' The position is flexible. but the state decides how to change it. The growth of the Ottoman central apparatus of rule from the fifteenth century onward allows us to glimpse the dynamics that paralleled and perpetuated the basic imaginary sOciopolitical map. What we have here is the assumption of power by a new group that in the long run developed its potential by what Max Weber would call a "Switching mechanism." In this

Turkish Nationalism

5

case, the sWitching was activated by growth of the empire in Europe. Relevant here is the Weberian difference between what he would describe as an "intelligentsia" in contrast to what he categorizes as "intellectuals." According to Weber, intellectuals are characterized by a constant strain between "idea" and "ideology:' Members of the intelligentsia, by contrast, have a "less reflective status that is geared to practical rather than theoretical reasons" (Sadri 1992, p. 72). Weber's distinction is important because it allows us to depict an Ottoman bureaucracy that has not yet developed the distinguishing elements that we associate with a modern bureaucracy but nevertheless represents a social set with similar features. Weber is well known for describing the role of these groups in premodern cultures. Weber's intelligentsia is what Ernest Gellner (1993, p. 8) sketches out as a clerisy: "a specialized clerical class or estate." Summarized, Gellner's view of the emergence of nationalism may be described as the decline of the clerisy in the modern industrial order. I see a somewhat different role for the clerisy in the history of the Ottoman Empire. By contrast to the Ottoman attempt to keep social positions fixed, the European social system was one where social positions constantly changed and where there was a growing interrelation among the agents in each social structural position. The extraordinary number of interactive links in this situation can be summarized in one sentence: StadtluJt macht fret (City air makes one free, meaning that a serf who spends two years behind the walls of a city is freed of obligations toward the feudal lord, who is deemed to accept this situation). From these sociopolitical interrelations of the late Middle Ages the following elements emerged with modernity: "society:' "civil society:' "the people;' "representation:' and "constitutionalism." These should all be seen as interactive and interlinked social spaces and positions of power. In the long run, their net effect is to develop something that is not found in the Ottoman Empire: a quality that can only be described as "consociation," the reciprocal acceptance of others and their social positions. I think that the so-called Ottoman decline is in fact a discovery by the Ottonians that their original claSSificatory system-as flexible as it was-was not as useful as the interactive Western European system that brought with it capitalism, the development of industry, and constitutionalism. Ottoman statesmeri realized that these European institutions were linked to interactive processes that

~erif

6

Mardin

created a foundation for solidarity in the sense in which Emile Durkheim used that concept much later. This very "intersociality" may be followed in Charles de Montesquieu's earlier idea of the rule oflaw. My investigations of the Young Ottoman political movement led me to understand that, despite various reform movements that the Ottomans initiated in the sixteenth century, in the nineteenth century they gradually began to realize that they had to change their rigid system of social classification and come closer to the interactive European system. During the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century, the social and political conflicts that developed between the Ottoman center and its periphery as well as the lack of will within the center confirmed that what was missing in the empire was concord, another name for social solidarity (KaraI19SS). The Young Ottoman NamIk Kemal took a first step here by giving Islam a foundational and almost remedial role in his constitutional proposal, usul-

i mesveret (Mardin 1962). Simultaneously, however, he also developed in much greater detail the organization of representation and the separation of powers. Islam remained a source of a diffuse principal base. It is also possible to distinguish

an unacknowledged step toward secularization in this mix. For

instance, one element-love of the fatherland-interrelated in his general system was new. NamIk Kemal assumed the role of Weber's "intellectuals," but, as I showed in Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, his proposal was in fact a reappropriation that still carried out the requirements of the basic Ottoman system of classification. Nineteenth-century Ottoman ism and late nineteenth-century "Turkism" are two different attempts to modify the Ottoman traditional classificatory system and to replace it with a system of solidarity. In other words, the introduction of the idea of Turkishness as a new foundation for Ottoman society in the late nineteenth century was, paradoxically, a harried attempt to establish the foundations of a powerful but equilibrated, productive, and peaceful society as it had grown in Europe. The promotion of such prenationalistic ideas as a culmination of the Ottoman search for civility may appear bizarre in view of the forbiddingly narrow restrictions of the European project of nationalism. To understand how nationalism in the Ottoman Empire carried the element of solidarity that I attributed to it we could turn to the Young Turk Yusuf Aks:ura. He was one of the first authors of a systematic modern political program for the empire. In Of Tarz-t Siyaset (1904), Aks:ura

Turkish Nationalism

7

proposes three alternatives for the solution of Ottoman political problems: first. an Ottoman solidarity; second. an Islamic solidarity; third. a "Turkist" solidarity. As we know, only one of these options. "Turkism," triumphed in the long run. This is not a surprise, because that solution kept the hegemony of the state, the key to the original system of classification. The story of this differentiation has lately begun to be studied. It is not clear, however, to what degree these new historians understand what Ak~ura had in mind: to establish a modern social equilibrium and a "civil SOciety" in Turkey. Fran~ois Georgeon's 1980 study is one exception. The importance of the latent, socializing aspect ofTurkification is once more underlined when we remember the foundational role that Durkheim played in the ideology of the Turkish Republic. Founders of the republic saw no contradiction between the search for the deeply buried, still hidden elements of a Turkist nationalist culture and the quest for a common cause. One element still missing from my description of the Ottoman system is the new space that Islam developed for itself while all these changes were taking place. In the original Ottoman classification, Islam appears under two configurations. The state claims universal leadership for Islam. but it is also extremely suspicious of Islam as the fountainhead of collective movements. As noted, Namtk Kemal's ideas are an interesting example of recasting the political role ofIslam without granting it the secret and contested refuge that had been allowed in popular religious movements. From 1895 onward Namtk Kemal's Young Ottoman constitutionalistIslamic syntheSiS was replaced by a starker element that mirrored the starkness of European international politics and political theories of the time, such as those of the new Machiavellians-Robert Michels and Georges Sorel. The Ottoman dissidents in exile in Europe were now suffused by these increasingly pessimistic European intellectual trends. The shift from their earlier ideals is described well by Zeev Sternhell (1994, p. 9) in his assessment of the wider European context: From the end of the nineteenth century, the new nationalism truly expressed the revolt against the spirit of the French Revolution. The gulf that divided Corradini from Mazzini, or Barrc~s, Drumont, and Maurras from Michelet, reveals the distance between Jacobin nationalism

8

~erif

Mardin

and that of la Terre et les Morts, the Land and the Dead. This formula of Barres was in fact only the French counterpart of the German formula Blut and Boden (blood and soil). and it showed that the old theory consecrated by the French Revolution, that society was made up of a collection of individuals, had been replaced by the theory of the organic unity of the nation. The idea of the organic unity of the nation, which reproduced the unitarian thrust of the Ottoman system of classification, was now added to the search for a formula of "consociation;' basically producing an internal tension between what we may describe as the "Great Search" and demands that brought back the centripetal element of the original classification system. A final development that sets new parameters in the study of Ottoman social change remains to be traced: the new role ofIslam in the nineteenth century. This renovated Ottoman Islam still operated within the boundaries of the earlier incorporated Ottoman political game in the sense that Ottoman rule did not have to bother with an institution like the church. as had been the case in Europe. In Europe, secularity and its promise of freedom were associated with a diminution of the power of the church and ideally its total elimination. In the Ottoman Empire, state Islam, as I have described it, did not have to contend with a church. To the contrary, Islamic collective liberation from state control was the equivalent of the liberation of individuals from the Catholic Church. This independence from state control was what many Muslims began to seek in the nineteenth century. Indeed, during this century an Islamic reform movement, the salafiyya, promoted a type of Islam with the idea of a new Islamic collectivity that had its own autonomous dynamic and validity criteria and was set in opposition to the state's control of religion. Once again, the Young Ottoman Namlk Kemal appears to have taken a first step in this direction in the 1860s. Nevertheless, the earlier control of the state over religion is still visible even in his proposals for a more socially active Ottoman Islam. It is this very continuity of the control of Islam by the state that was eventually taken over by the Turkish Republic. Unfortunately. in our time both "Islamists" and "laics" have taken positions that systematically misconstrue Ottoman political and military history. Laics fear Islam because they believe that it was the sole foundational element of the Ottoman Empire. Islamists want to expand the influence of Islam in

Turkish Nationalism

9

today's Turkey because they believe it was the sole foundational element of the Ottoman Empire. In reality the interests of the Ottoman state were paramount. as was the constant control of Islamic elements that would not fit the classificatory system. I hope I am not mistaken in thinking that these are the main themes promoted by Ahmet Ya~ar Ocak in his studies of Ottoman Islam (see ihsanoglu 1999). I realize that the current contest between Islamic values and secular principles in Turkey in the last decade also must- be studied in a much more complex contemporary frame that takes into account the new parameters of modernity. mass communications. and the emergence of the so-called true believers and their grotesque dreams. That is an investigation that I do not claim to have carried out in this chapter. but I insist that we must begin to unravel the present conundrums in Turkey by remembering the basic features of the Ottoman social imaginary and the real position ofIslam in the Ottoman Empire. Where does all of this take us? It leads us to consider that Turkish nationalism is originally an idiosyncratic form of solidarity creation. Possibly the Western experience of nationalism itself should be studied in comparison with that of Turkey to clear the issue. When I look at nationalism in Germany I am reminded of all the prominent writers about fascism, such as George Mosse (1964). Ernst Nolte (1965). and K. D. Bracher (1970). but in particular of the magnificent description of the diSintegration of the imperial Germany around 1918 found in the memoirs of Ernst Von Salomon (2.007 [1930 D. Frightening. accelerated disintegration had also been the problem of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. For reasons that will have to be studied in detaU. Ottomans in their new republican raiments of 192.3 had been switched by their original counterentropic claSSificatory system onto a regime that carried Ottoman residuals of state authoritarianism, rigidity. severity, and formalism but that nevertheless did not bend to the worst characteristics of fascism. The "Great Search" still had some clout. I believe that it is these complex, contradictory, self-assertive, self-denying, and in the end paradoxical elements that we shall have to pursue to clarify the nature of the republican regime of contemporary Turkey.

2

NATIONALISM IN TURKEY Modernity, State, and Identity

E. FUAT KEYMAN

IN WRITING ON THE HISTORY OF IDEAS THAT HAVE DOMINATED MOD-

ern times, Isaiah Berlin (1979, p. 337) has correctly pOinted out: There was one movement which dominated much of the nineteenth century in Europe and was so pervasive, so famUiar, that it is only by a conscious effort of the imagination that one can conceive a world in which it played no part.... But, oddly enough, no significant thinkers known to me predicted for it a future in which it would play an even more dominant role. Yet it would, perhaps, be no overstatement to say that it is one of the most powerful, in some regions the most powerful, single movement at work in the world today.... This movement is nationalism. Almost half a century after Berlin's observation that nationalism constitutes one of the most powerful and dominant ideas in modern times, David Miller (1995. p. 33) has made a similar suggestion in his diagnOSiS of world affairs in the post-Cold War era:

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Nationalism in Turkey

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The claims of nationality have come to dominate politics in the last decade of the twentieth cenmry. As the ideological contest between capitalism and communism has abated with the breakup of the Soviet Union and its satellite regions, so questions of national identity and national self-determination have come to the fore. It matters less, it seems, whether the state embraces the free market, or the planned economy, or something in between. It matters more where the boundaries of the state are drawn, who gets included and who gets excluded, what languages is used, what religion endorsed, what culture promoted. Likewise, Aviel Roshwald (2006, p. 3) argues in his recent work on nationalism and its historical roots that-despite the contradictions and paradoxes it involves-nationalism "pervades in the modern world" and therefore that the focus of the study of nationalism should be placed on "its endurance" rather than its demise. Isaiah Berlin, David Miller, and Avid Roshwald are correct in their diagnosis that the relationship between nationalism and modernity is much more complex and integral than indicated by those studies assuming that the power of nationalism will eventually die as liberalism and liberal mar· ket values disseminate throughout the world. Contrary to Michael Mandelbaum's powerful argument that "the ideas that conquered the modern world" have been and will be those of "peace, democracy and freedom" (Le., "the liberal Wilsonian triad, widespread although not universal, dominant and unchallenged"), the diagnOSiS regarding the endurance of nationalism has remained even truer in to day's highly globalized and postmodern world.' Rather than suffering a demise, today nationalism and nationalist sentiments are becoming more and more unleashed and paving the way to the emergence and dissemination of ethno-nationalist and religious fundamentalist identity conflicts throughout the world. Moreover, as the claims to national identity and national self-determination have recently involved the simultaneous existence of global terrorism and war (which constituted the defining features of what has come to be known as the "post-9hI world"). it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that nationalism will retain its dominant place in politics in the foreseeable future of national and global affairs.

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In this sense, academic and public discourse has shown an upsurge of interest in the question of the power of nationalism to remain one of the dominant ideologies of modern times as well as its ability to revitalize itself and resurface in various forms in different world-historical contexts and to articulate itself in different political ideologies and social movements. Turkey constitutes an important and interesting case in demonstrating how nationalism has been able to maintain its presence both ideologically and politically in modern times and in understanding its system-defining and systemtransforming power even today. Nationalism has operated as a dominant ideology in the process of the transition to modernity in Turkey. Moreover, the historical experience of Turkish modernity throughout the twentieth century and even now has to a large extent been determined by nationalism's continuing system-defining and system-transforming power. The modern state-building process and the state-centric mode of modernization in Turkey have constituted the very foundation on which nationalism has acquired its dominant ideological status and its transformative power. It should also be pointed out, however. that Significant changes and transformations in the connection between nationalism and modernity have also taken place throughout the modern history of Turkey. Nationalism has been experienced and articulated differently by various political actors, which has given rise to different claims to moder~ity, state, and identity. In this chapter I elaborate on these points by delineating the ways in which the ideology of nationalism has been put into practice historically and discursively in relation to modernity in Turkey. First, I offer a methodological and theoretical basis for an adequate understanding of the continuing presence of nationalism in Turkish modernity. In doing so, I focus on different models of Turkish modernity: modernity as modernization, modernity as identity, and modernity as a project of nation-building. I suggest that concern about the security of the state, the rapid and top-down modernization of society, and the will to civilization have framed the intertwined relationship between nationalism and modernity in the history of modern Turkey. But this intertwined relationship is neither static nor unchanging. In fact, it involves both ruptures and continuities. For this reason, I also analyze briefly and thematically how nationalism has been experienced in different periods of Turkish modernity. More specifically, I focus on the continuities and changes that have occurred in the discourse and practice of nationalism. as the formation

Nationalism in Turkey

13

of Turkish modernity has been transformed through the processes of the transition to state-centric modernity, the transition to democracy, and the exposure to globalization and Europeanization. Finally, I suggest that only through the democratization of the state-society relations could we resist the power of nationalism and its continuing impact on the nature and formation of Turkish modernity.

DIFFERENT PARADIGMS OF TURKISH MODERNITY AND NATIONALISM

The history of modern Turkey raises an interesting question for the students of social change. As a postempire social formation, as a strong state tradition, and as a republican, secular, and state-centric modernity, modern Turkey cannot be analyzed adequately as a product of a class-based revolution or a postcolonial political transformation (Mardin 2.006). This is precisely because Turkey had never experienced colonialism in the real sense of the term; nor had its national independence been achieved by a social class. Just as in other postcolonial states, however, the history of the making of modern Turkey has also entailed Westernization as "the will to (Western) civilization" (Keyman and 6ni~ 2.007). In the process, the image of the Kemalist elite was to "reach the contemporary level of civilization" by establishing its political, economic, and ideological prerequisites, such as the creation of an independent nation-state, the fostering of industrialization, and the construction of a secular and modern national identity. The Kemalist elite thus accepted the universal validity of Western modernity as the way of building modern Turkey. In this sense, the making of Turkey was based upon both a war of independence against Western imperialism and an acceptance of its epistemic and moral dominance. The embeddedness of the Kemalist will to civilization in Western modernity requires a new theoretical framework that goes beyond the existing models of Turkish modernity. With a certain degree of generalization, the available literature on modern Turkey is dominated by two paradigmatic readings ofKemalism: those of modernization and identity. The modernization paradigm situates the Kemalist will to civilization in a teleological and typological understanding of historical development as a transition from Gemeinschaft (community) to Gesellschaft (society)! The issue of how to

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think of this transition, however, produces two different positions in this paradigm. Political modernization sees this transition as a process of nationbuilding, in which the nation-state is taken to be the unfolding essence of modernization. The making of modem Turkey then refers to the process of political modernization aimed at creating a modern nation vis-a.-vis the Ottoman past as a representative of a backward, traditional society. Whereas political modernization sees this transition as a positive break from the past and a move forward, economic modernization in line with dependency theory considers it to be a new form of peripheralization and dependent capitalist development that started with the integration of the Ottoman economy into the world capitalist system in the nineteenth century. In this respect, nationstate building does not alter the condition of economic dependency as the unfolding essence of modernization, even though it means de jure recognition of modern Tuckey as a politically independent state by the international community. However useful the modernization paradigm is in accounting for the making of modern Turkey, as a mode of analyzing the processes of political and economic modernization it operates as a theoretical framework that is limited in itS scope and reductionist in its methodological procedures.! It is limited because it attempts to analyze its subject matter by privileging a certain type of social interaction as the prime mover of social change. Thus either nation-state building or economic development is considered to be a process that produces a system-transforming effect in social interactions, which results in a lack of attention paid to the role of other processes such as culture, identity, and international relations, thereby neglecting their transformative capacity. The modernization paradigm also proves to be reductive insofar as, in a Hegelian fashion, it attributes to the concept of society a quality of being an expressive. constituting totality in which the conditions of existence of various social interactions are regarded as necessarily linked to and determined by the unfolding essence. As a result, the making of modern Turkey is analyzed as a process of modernization, reducing its multidimensionality to what is conceived as the essence: the political level or the economic level. Thus nationalism is seen as an ideology of political or economic modernization: that is. it is an ideological dimension of what constitutes the prime mover of social change.

Nationalism in Turkey

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Contrary to the modernization paradigm, the paradigm of identity attempts to discover the essence of the manner in which Kemalism approaches the question of national identity." This paradigm produces two alternative accounts of the essence, which are derived from two different interpretations of the meaning of "Turk" in cultural practices put into service in the process of the making of modern Turkey. One mode tends to interpret Kemalism as a nationalist discourse whose understanding of national identity was "cultural" in its essence. In this sense, the notion "Turk" is referred to as a meta-identity that is situated above and beyond the difference principle and thus operates as a point of sameness at which the claim to the impartiality and the universality of the state is constructed. The other mode interprets Kemalism on the basis of the difference principle, claiming that the notion "Turk" is framed to a large extent by and within an ethnic-based understanding of national identity. In this sense, Kemalism is regarded as an ethno-nationalist discourse that aims to impose a secular and ethnically essentialist vision of modern Turkey on what Kevin Robbins (1996) terms the other but real Turkey. Despite the fundamental difference between them. however. these two modes of interpretation share in their modus operandi two sets of highly problematical epistemological and methodological gestures. The first concerns the historicist nature of the paradigm of identity, insofar as its search for discovering the true essence of the Kemalist vision of national identity rests upon an attempt to read the past in terms of the present (Dean 1999, p. 9). What is at stake in this paradigm is not to analyze Kemalist nationalism in its own right or in its own context but to find a legitimizing ground for the competing political discourses of the present political landscape over issues such as political Islam. the Kurdish question, laicism, ethno-nationalism, and the crisis of representation in state/society relations. The second problem concerns the essentialist nature of the paradigm. The notion of identity employed in the claim that the Kemalist understanding of national identity is constituted by and operates as a cultural or ethnic identity assumes that each individual or collectivity possesses a fixed, coherent, and totalizing self This means that each identity involves an unfolding essence that makes it a self-contained, self-referential, and self-propelling presence and therefore that the variations that occur historically in terms of the identity formation of individuals or collectivities do not alter the essence

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E. fuat Keyman

of their identities. The paradigm of identity thus acts as an essentializing gesture that ignores the relationality, multiplicity, and historically constructed nature of identity formation and presents the Kemalist understanding of national identity as a universalizing discourse of what is in fact a fixed, unchanging, and original identity. In this sense, what is missing in the paradigm of identity is the idea that nationalism and national identity both are open to changes, modifications, and alternations. If identity is ideological and anthropological-in that it is given but socially, institutionally, historically, and discursively constructed-so is nationalism and/or national identity. So far I have attempted to point out the problematic nature of the paradigms of modernization and identity in order to ground the argument that we must go beyond these paradigms to recognize the crucial fact that the Kemalist will to nation-state building and civilization is intrinsically linked to and operates within the discursive horizon of global modernity. The Kemalist elite's will to civilization was not simply an economic or a political modernization. Nor was it based essentially upon an attempt to create a national identity. It was much more complex and at the same time more ambiguous than these paradigms suggest. To understand this, however, requires regarding the Kemalist will to nation-state building and civilization as a project of modernity premised on the equation of modernity with progress: that is, creating a modern nation through the introduction and dissemination of Western reason and rationality in what seemed to be traditional and backward social relations. In this sense, we must explore the connection between Kemalism and modernity as well as between nationalism and modernity (which has been ignored by these paradigms) in order to provide an adequate account of Turkish nationalism.s In his analysis of the making of modern Turkey, ~erif Mardin (2006, p. 120) argues that the meaning of Kemalism lies in "the conceptualization of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state in its fullest form" and finds its expression in its constant effort to create a modern nation. Mardin's seemingly straightforward and commonsensical argument in fact carries with it a number of crucial insights for a more adequate understanding of Kemalism. First, to think of Kemalism as "an act of conceptualization" is to present it as a "project" of creating a nation on the basis of a set of epistemological and normative procedures. Second, to argue that Kemalism means the conceptualization of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state in its fullest form is

Nationalism in Turkey

17

to recognize that it constitutes a project of modernity: a project of creating a

modern nation that "accepts the claim to universality of the 'modern' framework of knowledge" (Chatterjee 1986, p. II). Third, to think ofKemalism as a project of modernity is to recognize its modus operandi as a social engineering project aimed at creating a modern nation in a social formation that lacks the material and institutional availability of the conception of a modern nation as a nation-state in its fullest form. These three points also indicate that Kemalism is a nationalist discourse that operates as a "will to civilization" by producing at the conceptual level a boundary between what is civilized and what is uncivilized. Thus. by accepting rational thinking and rational morality as the way of becoming modern, Kemalist nationalism attempts to "reach the level of civilization": that is. the making of modern Turkey as nation-state in its fullest form. According to Mardin (2.006), the conceptualization of the Turkish Republic as nation-state manifests itself in (1) the transition in the political system of authority from personal rule to impersonal rules and regulations; (2.) the shift in understanding the order of the universe from divine law to positivist and rational thinking; (3) the shift from a community founded upon the elite-people cleavage to a populist-based community; and (4) the transition from a religious community to a nation-state. Mustafa Kemal (Atatiirk) regarded these transitions as the precondition for the possibility that "Turkey would live as an advanced and civilized nation in the midst of contemporary civilization" (Ahmad 1993, p. S3). It is in this context that the Kemalist elite attempted to remove from political discourse the notion of an Islamic state, the existence of which was regarded as the main cause of the perpetuation of the backwardness of Turkey. Thus the foundation of a modern nation-state was seen as the key element of the will to civilization. For the Kemalist elite, modern Turkey could thus possess secularity and rationality, employ reason to initiate progress, and establish a modern industrial economy, thereby fostering the processes of industrialization and modernization. In a Weberian fashion, the purpose of political power was considered to "carry out a social and economic revolution without which the political revolution would dissipate" (Ahmad 1993, p. 72.). This means that for the Kemalist elite political power was "not reducible but interrelated to the economic." The rationalization of the political and the rationalization of the economic were seen to be relational processes whose reproduction could be made possible through the

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E. Fuat Keyman

construction of a national identity as a modern rational sel£ In this respect, the Kemalist will to civilization was based upon an articulation of modernity (reason) and capitalism (capital) in Turkish society through the construction _ of a modern nation-state. What is striking here, which defines the basis of Kemalist nationalism, is that the identification of popular sovereignty with national sovereignty within the context of the organic conception of society derived not from those "to whom sovereignty belonged" but from those "to whom it did not belong" (Heper 1985, p. 45). In other words, embedded in the making of modern Turkey as an organic society was (to use Michel Foucault's terminology) the governmentality of nationalist discourse to practice inclusion/ exclusion. to create identity in relation to difference. and to freeze the Other (such as the Islamic identity, the Kurdish identity, or the Ottoman past) into history.6 By assuming a self-identity as the primary agent of progress and organic society, the Kemalist elite thus came to locate the principles of secularism and the territorial integrity of the state in binary dichotomies such as progressive versus conservative. modern versus traditional. national identity versus ethnic difference, and the present versus the past. In the process of constructing binary oppositions, which also had functioned as a boundaryproducing practice between the Kemalist regime and its others. nationalist discourse played a crucial role in enabling the state to be successful in its performance: to operate on the basis of the assumed coexistence of the state and the nation, to exclude the Islamic Other and the Kurdish Other from the politicallandscape, to subjugate them to the secular and homogenous national identity. and to prevent them from becoming political actOrs. It can be argued in this respect that the Turkish nation-state did not have a fixed ontological status; on the contrary, its identity was performatively constructed. More importantly. nationalism acted as the main ideological and strategic device by which the state governed society, put the top-down modernization and transformation of society into practice, approached society through a conception of national identity as a secular and homogeneous identity, and also attempted to implement the will to civilization as the main motto of Turkish modernity {Campbell 1992, p. 9),1 I believe that this theoretical extrapolation about the state and the role of nationalism in its performatively constructed identity provides a crucial insight for both the

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endurance of nationalism in Turkish modernity and the changing content and actors of nationalism since the 1980s.

THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY AND NATIONALISM

In the light of this brief and critical reading of the different paradigms of Turkish modernity, in this section I daborate on the intertwined rdationship between nationalism and modernity in Turkey historically. In doing so, I hope to show that the endurance of nationalism is not static but dynamic, insofar as it involves both continuity and change. r have already provided a brief account of the basic characteristics of Turkish modernity in the early republican era (192.3-45). Here I delineate the way in which nationalism frames and acts as an integral element of the process of the making of Turkey in this era. Although it is true that "Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. It was 'made' in the image of the Kemalist elite which won the national struggle against foreign invaders and the old regime" (Ahmad 1993, p. 2.), the history of nationalism goes back to late Ottoman times. A quick glance at the Tanzimat reforms (1839-76) and the Young Turk movement (1908-18) in late Ottoman times demonstrates that nationalism was put into practice as an articulating principle of the need for modernization and the desire to save the Ottoman state (KazanclgU 1981, pp. 37-39). The making of modern Turkey brought about a rupture with the Ottoman past in the emergence of the nation-state, however, and in that context nationalism was situated in direct rdation to the process of state-buUding. To a large extent, the republic indeed presented a radical break with the past, as it was nurtured by "concepts and doctrines such as progress, laicism, nationalism, Comtean positivism and solidarism," owed a lot "to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and nineteenth-century scientism:' and aimed as "its ultimate consequence to create a modern Turkish state" (Kazanclgil 1981, p. 37). The creation of modern Turkey presented a rupture with the past, insofar as it privileged the Turkish state as the sovereign and dominant actor of modernity. Yet, at the same time, it carried in itsdf certain dements of continuity with the past: the goal of saving the state through modernization remained the dominant motto of nationalism in the republican era.

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In fact, this legacy still frames the debate on nationalism in today's Turkey. This means that nationalism has been one of the most important and effective characteristics of the process of making modern Turkey and continues. to play that role. even in different contents and articulations. The main goal of Atatlirk and his followers was to reach the level of "Western civilization" by installing an independent nation-state, fostering industrialization. and constructing a secular and modern national identity. This goal was derived to a large extent from the desire to save the state and secure its existence; it was nationalism that linked security with modernity and became the dominant ideology of the state (Keyman 2008). From the inception of the Turkish nation-state in 1923. modernity and security have constituted intertwined processes that had to be carried out through the ideology of nationalism. As noted, the Kemalist elite's will to civilization was not simply a local project of economic or political modernization. The idea of the state as a commitment to political modernity plays a crucial role in the process of constructing the Kemalist will to civilization. The Kemalist elite saw "the modernization of the polity and society" as "linked to the state" and hence attempted to establish the legitimacy of the new regime through the strength it "bestowed on the state" (Gellner 1984, p. 83)' However, the Kemalist idea of the state was not only institutional. On the contrary. as Bobby Sayyid (1997. p. 269) has correqly pOinted out, the Kemalist elite "took seriously the Weberian answer to the riddle of the 'European miracle'; that is. that the reasons behind Western advancement could be located precisely in Western cultural practices. Kemalism understood modernization not just as a question of acquiring technology, but as something that could not be absorbed without a dense network of cultural practices which made instrumental thought possible:' This means that the commitment to political modernity has to be supplemented with a set of cultural practices in order to ground the articulation of reason and capital via the nation-state. The Kemalist commitment to political modernity in this sense aimed to achieve a top-down and state-based transformation of a traditional society into a modern nation by introducing and disseminating Western reason and rationality. As an integral element of the project of modernity, the state employed nationalism to initiate a rapid political, economic, and cultural modernization, in order to create a modern institu.tional political structure. a quickly industrializing economy, and a homogeneous national identity with

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21

a highly secular and progressing society. The rapid modernization was necessary not only to catch up with the level of Western civilization but also to make the Turkish state more secure and stronger.8 Therefore how to achieve both modernity and security Simultaneously was and has remained the fundamental question for the state to cope with, and it was in this context that nationalism was employed as the effective answer. The idea of the state in the mind of Atatiirk and his followers was by no means abstract: rather it was a reaction to two aspects of the Ottoman state, which they identified as key to the empire's decline. First, because the Ottoman state was identified with the personal rule ot the sultan, eventually it was unable to compete within the European state system, which was organized on the basis of legal-rational authority. Second, the Islamic basis of the Ottoman state was seen as the primary obstacle to progress in Ottoman society, insofar as modernization required the regulation of state-society relations through the nation-state. Thus the republican elite sought to create a state distinct from the person of the sultan and secular enough to reduce Islam to the realm of individual faith. For them, the state had to involve commitment to political modernity, meaning that the state had to establish the link between the modernization of the polity and the modernization of society. It is for this reason that the republican elite initiated reforms, imposed from above to enlighten the people and help them make progress (Heper 1985, p. I). These reforms were designed to equate the national will with the general will and included the principles of republicanism, nationalism, etatism, secularism, populism, and revolutionism (or reformism from above). In each principle, nationalism enabled the state to initiate political and economic modernization, to construct a secular and homogeneous national identity, and thus to make sure that the security of the state could be maintained. Moreover, it is through nationalism that the state maintained its sovereign and dominant role in almost every sphere of societal relations, from politics to economics, from cultural identity and morality to everyday life practices of individuals.

THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM

In this sense, the continuing power of nationalism in Turkey can be said to have gone hand in hand with the success of the strong state in governing

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its society. This was true in the early republican era of the transition to modernity. It remained true as Turkey made its transition to democracy in the second half of the 1940S. In other words, as Turkey created the necessary in-. stitutions for the project of political and economic modernity in terms of politicS, law, economics, and industrialization in order to make its transition to multiparty democracy in 1945 as well as in foreign policy with respect to Turkey's integration in the Western alliance system, this transition did not change the prevailing dominance of the strong state tradition and the endurance of nationalism in it (Ozbudun 2.000, chapter 3). The period of the transition to democracy in Turkey (1950 to 1980), although not altering the essence of nationalism (in terms of its integral character in the strong-state tradition and its security concerns as well as its homogeneous and secular discourse of national identity), has nevertheless given rise to the emergence of the left-right axis in politics and thus has brought the idea of class. As the dominant ideology of the strong-state tradition in this period, nationalism has also been linked with the geopolitical security concerns of the state as well as with the question of national identity, in that it shaped the state's foreign policy vision with respect to the Cold War. At the same time, however, as an ideology of anti-imperialist struggle, nationalism has also been employed by the Left and social democratic actors in their call for a national democratic revolution or nationally independent developmentalism in order to create equality, liberty, and social justice in Turkey (Keyman and Oni§ 2.007, pp. 2.3-2.5). This class dimension involved in nationalism has placed it in the left-right axis of politics and made it possible for various political actors to make different uses of it. Whereas the Left employed nationalism in framing its anti-imperialist discourse of national developmental ism, the Right associated its nationalist discourse with the geopolitical and security concerns of the state. Its goal was to protect the territorial integrity of the state in the context of Cold War international relations, where the Soviet expansipnism was regarded as the real danger confronting the West. Thus the dominance of nationalism in Turkish modernity has remained in this era, yet it has been used by various actors in different ways. In addition to national identity and citizenship, social class has become one of the subjects through which nationalism can be put into practice.

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Neither the emergence of the lett-right axis in politicS nor the reference to the concept of social class was strong enough to challenge the hegemony of Kemalist nationalism. Several reasons explain this continuing hegemony. First, the process of the transition to democracy did not constitute an alternative to the essentialist posture ofKemalist nationalism toward secular national identity. Instead, Kemalists affirmed and reaffirmed such essentialism and its practice of inclusion and exclusion. For this reason, to the extent that they characterized their modus operandi as acting "in the name of the people" and "revolution/reform from above:' they were unable to construct a subjectivityalternative to the secular national identity.9 For example, the critique of Kemalism and its one-party-based operation put forward by the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) was intended only to secure the representation of the private sector in Turkish politics; it was not aimed to challenge the Kemalist notion of the secular and unitary national identity (Ahmad 1993, pp. 103-2.0). Likewise, lettist formulas such as national democratic revolution, which were put forth by the Workers Party of Turkey (Turkiye i~~i Partisi, TiP) and its counterpoint the Yon (Direction) movement during the 1960s, were derived from what Ahmet Samim called "a lett-Kemalist substitutionalism." Its aim was to resist imperialism and to lead Turkey democratically "on behalf of the workers and peasants"- "for the people, in spite of the people" (Samim 1981, p. ISS)' Second, both Democratic Party and New Lett discourses were intrinsically bound with modernity and in this respect were by no means a challenge to the Kemalist will to civilization. Both accepted the validity of the Kemalist notion of the state as the privileged agent of rationality, whose existence was central to the process of modernization. Both prOVided a reading of Turkish society through the lenses of the state by assuming that it is the state that shapes and reshapes social relations. The Democratic Party's critique of Kemalism was therefore only partial: it was directed exclusively at the strict etatist and populist policies by which the state coped with the problems of capitalist industrialization. But the New Lett critique of Westernization as imperialism and its characterization of Kemalist nationalism as an agent of the subordination of Turkey to Western imperialism were derived solely from the rejection of capitalism. In other words, while capitalism was being rejected as a mode of production that generated inequalities and

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uneven development, the modernity aspect of the will to civilization (that is, its epistemic dominance and its reason) was accepted as given. As noted. however. the Kemalist will to civilization was based not on capitalism but on Western modernity. Third. although etatism was subjected to serious criticism, importsubstituting industrialization remained the motor of industrialization after the transition to the multiparty system. Whereas its counterparts in Latin America (such as Brazil. Argentina, and Chile) faced military coups due to the deepening crisis of import-substituting industrialization. the Turkish economy experienced an economic boom during the 1960s (Keyman and Oni~ 2.007, chapter 6). For this reason, liberal discourse, though critical of etatism, was linked with import-substituting industrialization. According to yaglar Keyder, an explanation for this long-lasting dominance of import-substituting industrialization as a form of economic nationalism can be found in the fact that nationalism was a site of global capitalism. a way of reproducing it, and therefore did not present a contradictory tendency. This made it possible for KemaUst nationalism to foster industrialization not against but in concord with global capitalism (Keyder 1987, 1993). For Keyder, only when global capitalism was formed by the liberal market logic did nationalism become a discourse contradictory to the systemic logic. The point here is that the transition to a multiparty system did not involve the replacement of the economic logic. Hence Kemalist nationalism was not questioned with respect to its industrialization policy. As such, the Democratic Party's discourse of industrialization lacked an alternative economic vision and affirmed the functionality of import-substitution industrialization:o

THE EXPOSURE TO GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM

Since the 19805 and especially the 1990S, however, Turkey has begun to witness a set of radical changes and transformations in its economy, politics, and culture. These changes and transformations, being felt in almost every sphere of life, have to do with the increasing globalization of Turkish modernity (Keyman and Oni§ 2007, chapter 7). Two of these changes and transformations that have had an important impact on the discourse and practice of nationalism are the increasingvulnerabUity and fragility of Turkish economy as it has been exposed to the strong global, regional, and local dynamics, on

Nationalism in Turkey

25

the one hand, and the resurgence of identity politicS and its claims to difference and recognition, on the other {Cornell 2.001). These developments have resulted in the emergence of both the global-national axis in politics (especially within the context of the question of state sovereignty) and the new political actors carrying out the process of politicizing cultural identity by voicing a demand for the recognition of difference. Moreover, the impact of globalization on Turkey and its neo-liberal discourse of free market values, minimal state, and individualism as the new universalizing codes of modernization and democratization have not led to the demise of nationalism. On the contrary. globalization has reinforced the prevailing dominance of nationalism in Turkish modernity. Let me briefly focus on each of these developments. Since the 1980s and especially the 1990S the economic strategy for industrialization has shifted dramatically from import-substitution to exportpromotion. and much more emphasis has been placed on market forces. The export-oriented industrialization created a strong shift from a vision of society that was heavily statist toward one that is characterized by neo-liberal free-market individualism. In this sense, the emerging neo-liberal ideology in Turkey during the 1980s called for and initiated radical market-oriented reforms in the name of economic progress (6ni~ 1997, p. 750), which in turn has generated a serious challenge to the state. The neo-liberal restructuring of the economy, which has placed the idea of market rationality at the center of the state-economy interactions, challenged both the dominant regulatory role of the state in the economy and its national developmentalist ideology. At the political and cultural levels, Turkish modernity has been confronted by a number of identity-based conflicts challenging the homogeneous and secular national identity (Keyman 2.008; Keyman and t~duygu 2.00S). A variety of claims to identity and demands for recognition with different political imaginations have made their mark in all spheres of social life. It is the question of identity (practiced and voiced by many actors in a wide spectrum of culture, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, race, and sexuality and thereby operating in a multidimensional and multiplex fashion) that marked the changing formation of Turkish modernity. From the resurgence of Islam, the Kurdish question. the rights of women, and the minority question to civil-societal calls for individual and cultural rights and freedoms, identity politics (with its challenge to national identity) has become one of

26

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the important characteristics of post-1980 Turkish modernity (Keyman and ic;:duygu, 2.00S). Moreover, identity politics, which has been voiced and put into practice by different societal groups, has simultaneously involved both democratic demands for multiculturalism and pluralism and the communitarian political strategies with antidemocratic and ethno-religious nationalist claims to nationality. It is true that it is not possible to think of the present nature and formation of Turkish modernity without reference to identity. Yet it is equally true that identity politics is not necessarily democratic but often conflictual and crisis-ridden. Precisely because of this, identity politics and the frequent use of ethno-religious nationalism have made it very difficult for the state to maintain the secular and homogeneous basis of the national identity that it has attempted to create through the ideology of nationalism as an articulating principle of modernity and security. Since the 19805 security has had increased dominance in state discourse, understood as the security of both the territorial state and the secular national identity of the republic. The most far-reaching impact of identity politics on Turkish modernity. however, has been a shift in the ideology of nationalism from modernity to security (Bora 2003). In other words, if rapid modernization with the intention of reaching the level of Western civilization had been considered an answer to the question of saving and securing the Turkish state in the republican period, post1980 Turkey has witnessed the privileging of security over modernity, leading to an articulation of nationalism and security within the context of identity politics. This has also created a change in the formation of Turkish nationalism, transforming it into what Ghassan Hage (2003, pp. 3-4) has called "paranOid nationalism." As the resurgence of Islam and the Kurdish question both have generated serious impact on the strong state and its claim to secular and unitary national identity (elaborated in detail in other chapters of this book), Turkish nationalism has approached them as security threats to the sovereign and secular state. The more the identity-based conflicts voiced demands for recognition, the more Turkish nationalism began to speak of national identity with a heavy emphasis on ethnicity and also approached social change in a very skeptical tone and with specific reference to the sovereignty and security of the nation-state. In a vicious circle, the more Turkish nationalism perceived the recognition-based claims and demands coming from identity as

Nationalism in Turkey

27

security threats and approached them with skepticism, the more paranoid it became, and the feeling of paranoia began to frame the terrain of nationalism as a whole (Aydm 2.005, chapters 5 and 6). It has to be acknowledged that one of the sources of paranoid nationalism was the changing global context in terms of geopolitics and its impact on Turkish foreign policy (Aras 2004, pp. 15-27). For instance, former Turkish foreign minister ismail Cem (2004, pp. 59-60) emphasized the significance of this broader international context by arguing: "In the formation of Turkey in the twenty-first century, foreign policy is a determining factor.... The goal of current generations should be to create a Turkey ... that will be a global and regional center of attraction with its history, cultural richness, democracy, economy, and progressiveness based on social justice:' With the end of the Cold War, Turkey emerged as a pivotal regional power in a volatile area. Since the 1980s Turkish modernity has also been exposed to globalization, which has triggered the process of widening, deepening, and accelerating the interconnections of states, economies, and cultures in the world. One of the most important impacts of globalization on national societies has been the increasing importance of the global, regional, national, and local interactions that have provided a suitable platform for the emergence of new demands for cultural identity and political recognition. As the research on globalization has indicated, the identity-based conflicts that have been occurring throughout the world since the 1980s and especially during the 19905 have been located in the intersection between the global and local, making claims to nationality and national identity, voicing strong demands for recognition, and strengthening themselves through global networking (Keyman and Koyuncu 2005)' The ideology of nationalism has been influenced by globalization in two ways. First, it has been articulated by the locally organized political movements in their struggle for recognition, and thus we have observed the emergence of micro-nationalism in ethnic, religious, and cultural terms. Second, the national context has lost its capacity and power to be the most important spacial ground for nationalism, and thus nationalism has become a more and more globally and locally constructed ideology. These two impacts of globalization on nationalism have been observed in Turkey too. As noted, POst-1980 Turkey has witnessed the emergence of mainly religious and ethnic identity-based conflicts that have confronted the secular and homogeneous

28

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character of national identity. Moreover, the way in which these groups have voiced their demands for recognition, legitimized their struggle to gain cultural rights and freedoms. and more importantly politicized themselves to influence national and local politics has to a large degree benefited from globalization and global debates about identity/difference. As a result, nationalism not only has become localized in ethnic and religious terms but also has become the main ideology of the state to react against these identity demands and conflicts in a highly security-oriented manner. In the context of globalization. nationalism in Turkey has continued its dominance, but now framed by securiryconcerns (Ozbudun 2000).

GLOBALIZATION, EUROPEANIZATION, AND NATIONALISM

Two specific processes-the end of the Cold War and European integration-should be taken into account in understanding how security concerns have characterized the modus vivendi of nationalism and its relation to modernity in post-1980 Turkey. The end of the Cold War gave rise to the emergence of important changes and ambiguities in the domestic and foreign policy initiatives of Turkey. It is true that the end of the Cold War has also ended the buffer-state foreign policy identity that Turkey had enjoyed and benefited from in the years of the hegemonic struggle between two superpowers and thus brought about a need for Turkey to search for a new identity. Yet it is also true that in the post-Cold War years as well as in today's post-9/n world the geopolitical and historical significance of Turkey in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia has become increasingly apparent. Thus Turkey has been increasingly perceived as a key regional actor in the creation of regional peace and stability (Larrabee and Lesser 2003). But the new identity and role of Turkey in the post-Cold War era, in which international affairs have been undergoing a significant transition and transformation process, is not yet certain. Instead, change and uncertainty about the future are going hand in hand, which has had important consequences for the ideology of nationalism in Turkey. The post-Cold War era has created a new impetus for the ideology of nationalism to continue its dominant role in modernity, a role defined increasingly by the security concerns of the Turkish state (Fuller and Lesser 1993, p. 148). This uncertainty embedded in the foreign policy identity of Turkey since the end of the Cold War

Nationalism in Turkey

29

and the increasing identity-based conflicts in ethnic and religious terms that have marked the changing nature of Turkish domestic politics have both reinforced the security-oriented operation of the ideology of nationalism and its relation to modernity in Turkey. Likewise, changes and uncertainties have also become more and more apparent in the process of European integration since the mid-I990S, as Turkey has attempted to achieve full membership status in the European Union. As a country at the borders of Europe, trying to start the full accession negotiations and initiating the significant political and con~titutional democratic reforms necessary for full membership, Turkey's expectation has been to receive an objective and fair response from Europe. But the high level of uncertainty about whether or not Europe culturally regards Turkey as part of itself has brought about not objectivity and universality but instead a sense of skepticism, double standards, and mistrust in Turkish society. As a result, even though Turkey-EU relations deepened in the period between 1999 and 2.004 and full accession negotiations began in October 2.005, this uncertainty has strengthened nationalism in Turkey. The ideology of nationalism used by the anti-European integration forces, voicing the significance of the state and its sovereignty to maintain the security of Turkish modernity and territorial integrity, has benefited from the high level of uncertainty within Europe about Turkey's place in it. Nevertheless, the EU integration process has served as an important external anchor, giving impetus to the democratization process in Turkey (Ugur and Canefe 2004), and has also played a critical role in shaping the intricate dynamics of the EU-Turkey-U.S. triangle (Larrabee and Lesser 2.003). It would not be mistaken to suggest that the impressive record of Turkey in upgrading its level of democracy in recent years as well as its perception by the United States as a key actor for the future of the Middle East would not have been possible without the positive role of the European integration process. In this sense the way in which the TurkeyEU full accession negotiations develop will to a large extent determine the role and the power of nationalism in reshaping the formation of Turkish modernity in the near future. After this brief outline of the domestic and global developmentsthat have contributed to the continuing dominance of nationalism in Turkey since the 198os, we could reach the following conclusion. Insofar as nationalism functions as the main articulating principle of modernity arid security and

30

E. Fuat Keyman

operates as the dominant ideology in formulating domestic and foreign policies of the state, it continues to operate as a powerful ideology with a systemdefining and system-transforming capacity. Put differently, as long as the experience of modernity involves a strong state without a normative and political commitment to democracy and its consolidation in societal affairs, nationalism acts as a dominant ideology and maintains its presence as such. In this sense, the democratic deficit and nationalism are in fact two sides of the same coin: state-centric modernity.

THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONALISM IN TURKEY

In light of the foregoing analysis of the Turkish experience of nationalism, a number of important insights should betaken into account in delineating the way in which nationalism operates and remains one of the dominant ideologies of modernity. First, Turkey is a postimperial social formation with strong historical, philosophical, and cultural imperial legacies. In analyzing nationalism in Turkey, we cannot ignore the impact of the Ottoman imperial past on the connection between nationalism and modernity, especially within the context of the nation-state building process. Given that Turkey has not experienced prolonged periods of direct foreign rule, it is important to underline that its nation-state building process took place not in the postcolonial but in the postimperial context. Second, Turkey has a strong-state tradition, in which the practice of the ideology of nationalism has been embedded in the active and major role of the state as the sovereign subject of the process of top-down modernization and transformation of traditional society. In order to understand the prevailing dominance of nationalism in the history of Turkish nationalism, it is useful and necessary to explore the linkages between nationalism and the production and reproduction of the strong state tradition. Third, the state-building process and the continuing presence of the strong-state tradition provide an adequate theoretical and political ground for analyzing the historically and discursively constructed relation between modernity and nationalism in Turkey. Moreover, this relationship has been determined to a large extent by the secular state aiming to create a modern society with a strong desire to reach the level of contemporary civilization. Therefore the Turkish experience has revealed that the state can employ the

Nationalism in Turkey

31

ideology of nationalism to secure its territorial existence, to establish the necessary institutions of Western modernity, and to create a modern society through a homogeneous secular national identity. Fourth. the spatial construction of nationalism in Turkey takes place at the intersection of domestic and international politics. In this sense nationalism is an integral element in Turkish modernity and Turkish foreign policy. Nationalism has constituted the ontological foundation for the state-centric formulation of Turkish foreign policy and its ties to the Western world (yelik 1999). Furthermore, nationalism functions as a dominant ideology of the state and its power not only in its governance of society but also in shaping and reshaping its foreign policy regionally and internationally. It is here that the geopolitical context and the need for a constant search for security playa special role that helps nationalism gain its power in shaping the formation of Turkish modernity in relation to the dominance of security concerns over the societal calls for democracy and human development. Finally, as has been pointed out earlier, the discourse and practice of nationalism are not static but rather dynamic, in that it has the capacity both to transform itself in different historical settings and to be integrated into their own political strategies and societal visions by different political actors. In the early republican era. when the rapid modernization of what was regarded as a backward and traditional society was the main motto of the governing elite, nationalism functioned as a dominant state ideology in linking modernity, security, and Westernization through the construction of a homogeneous and secular national identity. The idea of this identity, both as a carrier of the will to reach the level of contemporary Western civUization and as republican citizen-subjects who are supposed to give normative primacy to the realm of duties and responsibilities over rights and freedoms, and the protection of the security of the state and its territorial existence together defined the discourse and practice of nationalism in this era as well as its connection with modernity. Given the significant changes that the formation of Turkish modernity has faced throughout its history (such as the transition to democracy after World War II, the post-I980 economic liberalization. globalization, European integration. and the emergence of religious and ethnic identity-based conflicts since the 1990S). nationalism has nevertheless remained influential and effective. It has been articulated by different and even contrasting political actors and movements in their claims to

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identity and demands for recognition. The endurance of nationalism has to be analyzed critically and thoroughly not only to understand modern Turkey but more importantly to transform it into a just, democratic, and multicultural social formation.

NOTES

Mandelbaum (2.002.), cited in Lal (2004, p. 174)" 2.. For a detailed analysis of the modernization paradigm. see Mardin (2.006) and Keyman (2008). ,. The methodological problems confronting the paradigm of modernization have been explored in Keyman (2.008) and Aydln"{200s). 4. For a detailed analysis of the identity paradigm, see Keyman and i-Sduygu (2.005). 5. The paradigm of modernity was employed by Serif Mardin even in the 1970S, especially in his important work on the history ofideas in Turkey as well as the role of religion and ideology. For his use of modernity. see Mardin (2.006). 6. Foucault (1979. p. 18) defines governmentality as a way of subjugating differences to the domain of subjectivity. As he putS it. "In this sense. 'to be subject' is therefore 'belong to: in other words to behave as both an element of and an actor in a global process whose development defines the current field of possible experiences, inside of which the fact of being subject can only be situated." 7. Campbell (1992) demonstrates such performative construction with reference to security discourse "and foreign policy practice in the United States. 8. For a more detailed analysis of this point about nationalism. see Ay§e KadlOglu's chapter in this book. 9. For a detailed analysis of the New Left and its relation to Kemalism, see Samim (19 81). 10. Similarly. the New Left discourse had no alternative vision of economic development. In fact. the vision of economy that it put into discourse against capitalism was based upon imporr substitution industrialization through the state as the primary agent by which inequalities and uneven development were to be coped with in the name of dominated classes.

I.

3

THE TWIN MOTIVES OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

MODERN REALITY IS FRAGMENTED BY NATION-STATES THAT EVOLVED

along with various nationalisms in Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Various definitions of "us" and "them;' reflected in the concepts of "citizen" and "foreigner;' respectively, emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution. In England, for instance, the 1792 Aliens Bill was a direct response to the flight of French refugees from France (Plender 1972.). In America and Switzerland, too, immigration control began as a reaction to the French Revolution and fears that Jacobin emissaries had infiltrated immigrant groups. The processes that converted "peasants into Frenchmen" (Weber 1976) were quickly being exported to the rest of the world and increasing the levels of participation in ways that shaped the contours of modern politicS. The French Revolution Signaled a connection between the concepts of the nation and the people. The nationalist ideology, insofar as it was based on the idea of self-determination as the supreme political good, went hand in hand with the notion of popular sovereignity. The argLlment by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) that individuals needed self-detemina:tion in order to be truly human was a great source of vitality for nationalism in that it paved the way to an understanding that the nations toO aspiredtoaritonomy and

33

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Ay~e Kadloglu

free will (Reiss 1970). The idea of national self-determination empowered the people who constituted the nations. As the notions of nationalism and popular sovereignity converged, nations became the source of sovereignity and the level of popular political participation increased. Thus at the beginning the nation-state and political participation did not contradict each other. National identity, and hence the nation-state, was rather a precondition for political participation. In setting out to write an essay on a particular nationalism, it is appropriate to clarify the actors that advocate that nationali$,m. References to I "German nationalism:' "French nationalism; and "Turkish nationalism" are misleading because they assume the existence of one national project that is embraced by everyone in that country. The concept of the nation does not contain a homogeneous group, so many nationalisms exist in each national context. In the Turkish context, Tanu Bora (1994) paved the way to the possibility of studying Turkish nationalism as a plural notion. His analysis is mainly about the Turkish nationalisms in the 1990S; yet it harbors the tools for mapping the Turkish nationalist projects in other periods (see Bora and also Ozkmmh in this volume). Bora (1994) delineates five currents of nationalism in Turkey in the 1990S: official nationalism (or what he also calls Ataturk nationalism), Kemalist nationalism based on the leftist discourse of the 1960s, liberal nationalism that glorifies Turkish youth and the popular culture, radical Turkist nationalism based on the cultural connections among the Turkish-populated lands of the former Soviet Union, and Islamic nationalism. He refers to official nationalism as the "root-language" of all the other nationalisms in Turkey. In other words, all the other nationalisms can be mapped in reference to the official nationalism. When I refer to Turkish nationalism in this chapter I am referring to the nationalist discourse as it was formulated especially by some Young Turks at the turn of the twentieth century. Here I specifically refer to the ideas of two thinkers, Yusuf Ak<;ura (1876-1935) and Ahmed Agaoglu (1869-1939), as "advocates" of Turkish nationalism. Living in the same period, these twO thinkers became leading figures in formulating the twin themes of the Turkish nationalist discourse. While Ak<;ura promoted nationalism in order to address the problem of the preservation of the Ottoman state, Agaoglus main reason for embracing nationalism was his ideal of Westernism. In this chapter I argue that the ideas of "preservation of the state" as well as

The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism

35

"Westernism" as spelled out by these two critical thinkers became the twin motives of Turkish nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century. Accordingly, they constituted the root-language of all the subsequent nationalisms in Turkey. While the motive of statism remained a constant in the official nationalist discourses throughout the republic, the relative significance of Westernism fluctuated according to the changes in the domestic and international environment. The flrst motive of Turkish nationalism, which was spelled ou[ as a political project at the turn of the twentieth century, was the preservation of the unity of the Ottoman Empire rather than heightening political participation. This unity was threatened by the nationalisms of the non-Muslim millet within the Ottoman Empire, especially during the reign of Sultan Mahmut II (1808-37). Hence Turkish nationalism from the very beginning opted for the preservation of the unity of the state. The main contention of this chapter is that this feature of Turkish nationalism paved the way to a conception of citizenship in Turkey as a notion that does not necessarily opt for the empowerment of the people. In other words, Turkish nationalism was serving the state rather than the citizens. As shown below, such a feature of Turkish nationalism was also evident in the ideas of Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk. the founder of the Turkish Republic.' Second, Turkish nationalism embraced Westernism. which culminated in the republican project oflaicism and subsequently had an impact on the formation of Turkish national identity (KacilOglu 2010). In the first part of this chapter, I portray the essential importance of these two motives of official Turkish nationalism-preservation of the state and Westernism-at the turn of the twentieth century in the works of Akc;:ura and Agaoglu.. In the second part, I focus on how the sequence of the emergence of the entities of the nation and the state shaped nationalisms in Europe and how this analysis can be used in studying the nature of Turkish nationalism at the time of its emergence. Finally, I briefly consider whether the twin motives of Turkish nationalism at the time ofits emergence are still relevant today in understanding new nationalist discourses.

PRESERVATION OF THE STATE AND WESTERNISM

The root-language of Turkish nationalism was largely f~rmulated by intellectuals who were mainly interested in preserving the· unity of the

Ay~e

Kadloglu

disintegrating Ottoman Empire as well as Westernism at the turn of the twentieth century. The years 1904 to 1913 were crucial in giving shape to the Turkish national identity. This was the period when certain ideological divisions among the Young Turks were played out. The Young Turks first became visible in Europe after the foundation of the Committee of Union and Progre§s (CUP) in 1889. 3 Until the Second Constitutional Monarchy (1908), pofitical dynamics were determined to a great extent by the struggle between the monarchists and the CUP as well as the cleavages among the Young Turks. Ahmed Rlza led the positivist, Unionist wing within the CUP. It was during the First Young Turk Conference (convened in Paris in 1902.) that the division between the Unionists and the Liberals within the CUP became quite visible. 4 The Liberal wing was led by Prince Sabahattin, who espoused individual initiative as a way of reviving a market economy, with the goal of creating a capitalist structure and decentralization (KadlOglu 2.007b). The Liberals within the CUP were upper-class, well-educated, Westernized Ottoman intellectuals. They expected Britain to back the regime that they defended, a constitutional monarchy led by high-level bureaucrats. s The Liberals within the CUP were backed by a number of religious groups. The Unionists within the CUP, led by Ahmed Rlza, also defended a constitutional monarchy. Yet they opposed any intervention by foreign powers; hence they had a nationalist potential. The Unionists wanted to vest all authority in an assembly that they wanted to control. Contrary to the Liberals, they were from the lower middle classes and thus included, for example, schoolteachers, state officials, and junior military officers. The Unionists instigated a "revolution from above" to be carried out by the state authorities. Mer 1908 the Unionists strengthened their position within the CUP. The following years witnessed an increase in the number of Turkists within the CUP cadres (Hanioglu 1985, p. 1397). In sum, the victory of the Unionists over the Liberals within the CUP by 1908 signaled. the beginning of a nationalism that was largely constructed from above in an effort to preserve the state. From this point onward, Turkish national identity placed itself in the service of the Turkish state. Turkish nationalism and national identity acquired a "statist" character. The first motive of Turkish nationalism, the need to preserve the Ottoman state, was nowhere better expressed than in the works ofYusuf Ak~ura.

The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism

37

Aks:ura was descended from a Tatar family of Kazan in Russia. He became acquainted with the Young Turks in Paris, where he studied political science. Initially he was closer to the Ahmed Rtza wing of the CUP. Yet Aks:ura parted with him too in 1897. In 1904 he published an article entitled "Os: Tarz-l Siyaset" (Three Ways of Policy) in a newspaper called Turk in Cairo. It was this article that turned him into a pioneer in going beyond signifying the common cultural traits of Turks and pointing to the necessity of the emergence of Turkism as a secular political project opting for a modern nation-state (Ak~ura 1987 [1904); Thomas 1978). Aks:ura evaluated all the possible policies that could be followed by the Ottoman state (Ottomanism, Isiamism, and Turkism) from a utilitarian perspective. His main interest was to ensure the "power and progress" of the Ottoman state (Georgeon 1999, p. 38). He pointed to the inadequacies of Ottomanism and Islamism in quelling the prevailing ethnic disturbances and in ensuring the unity of the empire.6 AkCfura thought the most rational policy to follow was Turkism. In his opinion, the only difficulty in following this policy was the lack of a national consciousness among the Turks within the empire (Georgeon 1999, p. 39). The year 1904 signaled the Russo-Japanese War, which brought glory to Japan and shattered the racist myth about the second-class character of the "yellow race."7 Akc;ura's article was published a few weeks after the Japanese forces attacked the Russian fleet. It praised the merits of the Japanese over the Russians in that war (Georgeon 1999, p. 45). In his scrupulous analysis ofYusuf Akc;ura's life and works, Franc;ois Georgeon (1999, p. 42.) maintains that "[t]he entire article was devoted to delineating those measures that would prevent the downfall and fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire:' Hence it is possible to argue that what was probably the first manifesto of Turkish nationalism opted for the preservation of the Ottoman state rather than the empowerment of the people. Georgeon maintains that Aks:ura was not a romantic nationalist. His nationalism was rather a utilitarian dictum that placed Islam in the service of a nationalist current: Turkism. The second motive of Turkish nationalism examined in this chapter was Westernism. The reforms geared toward Westernization within the Ottoman Empire began by reforms within the military institution at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Westernizing reforms of the Ottoman rulers acquired some momentum at the turn of the nineteenth century and began to

Ay~e

Kadloglu

involve areas ocher than the military. The Tanzimat reforms, which were introduced by the Tanzimat Charter in 1839, involved a major reorganization at the levels of provincial administration, education, and the judiciary. Turkism was latent in the thought of the Unionists who embraced Westernism. Ahmed Agaoglu's Turkism, for instance, is quite revealing in this sense. He was born in 1869 in Karabag, Azerbaijan, and went to Paris in 1888 to study law, history, and political science. He returned to the Caucasus in 1894, worked for the unification of Russian Muslims, and participated in activities against the tsar (Shissler 2003). Agaoglu immigrated to Istanbul with his family in 1909 in the aftermath of the Second Constitutional Monarchy, because he was facing political pressures in Russia. He became one of the founders of a Turkist organization called Turk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland) in 19II. In those years, he wrote for the organization's journal. In his articles he tried to portray the compatibility of Islam and Turkism. Since Agaoglu did not think ofIslam as the cause for the backwardness of the Ottoman society, he looked elsewhere to account for underdevelopment. In comparing the Indian and the English societies, for instance, he argued that the cause of the enslavement and the imprisonment of the Indian society was the inability of the Indians to constitute a national conscience (Agaoglu 1992b [1924 D. He argued that the Eastern societies were distinguished from the Western ones because they lack~d national sovereignty (hakimiyet-i milliye) (Agaoglu 1992a [1923], p. 85). Hence he professed the need for the establishment of national sovereignty in the East as a prelude for development and progress. Agaoglu's nationalism was a step that he envisioned for achieving the larger goal of Westernism. His nationalism was a type that precluded a nativist culture and embraced Western civilization. Agaoglu thought that the principle of national sovereignty was compatible with early Islamic principles. His nationalism was laden with motifs of Westernism, civilizationism, and Islamism. Agaoglu did not accept a distinction between the. concepts of culture and civilization, which was quite prevalent at the time. In fact, ever since the beginning of the modernization reforms in the Ottoman Empire there had always been a concern about the need to adopt the good (material) aspects of the West while avoiding its bad (spiritual) aspects and retaining native cultural traits. According to Agaoglu, this was not possible. Western culture had to be adopted along with its civilization.s

The Twin Motives of Turkish Nationalism

39

Although Agaoglu insisted on wholesale Westernization by adopting both the culture and civilization of the West. at the same time he distinguished between culture and religion. In his earlier writings he pOinted to compatibility between Islam and Westernization. In the Turkist journal Turk Yurdu. for instance, Agaoglu (1989 [1327/2.8]) saw compatibility between Islam and national feelings. Although Islam constituted a common bond among the Turks, Arabs. Persians. Indians, Circassians, Kurds. and Albanians, it was never capable of rising above such national differences. According to Agaoglu. one of the reasons why Islam became such a powerful religion was its flexibility in adapting to the internal structure of each nationality that embraced it. Such flexibility contributed to the progress of Islam as a religion. Agaoglu, in fact. pointed to the need for the nationalization (Turkification) of Islam. In sum, one of the fundamental pillars of Agaoglu's thought was his Westernism. This Western ism constituted an outer lens through which all his other thought passed. His Turkism and Islamism as well as the traits of individualism in his thought reflected a particular form of Westernism that remained a constant in his writings. He regarded the principle of national sovereignty as a prerequisite to being Western. Hence his Turkism was laden with Westernist motifs (Agaoglu 1992a [192.3]). Ironically, efforts to uplift a national identity in an effort to become Western have led to the exclusion of non-Muslims. Turkish nationalists grew increasingly critical of the lifestyles of the non-Muslims within the empire. This was expressed by one of the most prominent nationalist thinkers in Turkey. Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924): "There is in our country a class, the so-called Levantines or Cosmopolitans. who try to adopt the aesthetic, moral, phil~ osophical tastes and entire customs, ceremonies. and behavior of the West rather than its scientific methods and industrial techniques. That is, they try erroneously to imitate the cultures of other nations under the name civili~ zation" (cited in Aktar 1996a, p. 2.72.). As the Ottomans lost territory to the Russians, Austrians, and the Greeks, migrations of Muslims from these lands into the center of the empire started. These in-migrations of Muslims were soon accompanied by the forced deportation and massive massacre of the Anatolian Armenians. The hardening of the nationalist stance of the Unionists within the CUP coupled with the presence of these newly arrived Muslims in Istanbul led to tensions in relations with the Greeks living in the

40

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western coastal towns of the empire. In fact, the thought of exchanging pop~ ulations was entertained for the first time in 1914. at the end of the Balk.a~ Wars (Aktar 2.005). The onset of the Turkish War of Independence prompted further exchange of populations involVing the Greek Orthodox Christians in Anatolia and Muslims from Rumeli. These were made mandatory via the Lausanne accords Signed between the Turkish and Greek delegates between January and July of 1923. In the years 1922.-24 about 1,200,000 Greek Orthodox Christians from Anatolia and 400,000 Muslims from Rumeli were displaced from their homes (Aktar 2.005, p. 125). The thought behind the forced exchange of populations was to create a nation-state with a homogenized population structure. In 1913 one in every five persons in the lands that constitute contemporary Turkey was a non-Muslim. At the end of 1923 this ratio was down to one in forty (Keyder 1989, p. 67). In the aftermath of the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the unifying power ofIslam among various ethnic groups ended. This led to the marginalization of the non-Turkish-speaking Muslims such as the Kurds (Yegen 1996). After 1924 the idea of Westernization via laicism gained momentum. This eventually uplifted a laicist, Westernist Turkish identity at the expense of Islam (KadlOglu 2.010). After this point the formation of Turkish national identity continued via the adoption of both exclUSionary and assimilatory practices toward the non-Muslims and non-Turkish-speaking Muslims within the Turkish Republic. The assimilatory practices took the form of national campaigns imposing the use of the Turkish language, such as the campaigns of "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" (Vatandas, Turkfe Konuj!). which were unleashed in January 1928 by the student association of the Faculty of Law in Istanbul. Accordingly, languages other than Turkish were forbidden in public places such as movie theaters, restaurants, and hotels. Posters declaring "Citizen. Speak Turkish!" were posted in public transportation vehicles. These practices were acc01Ilpanied by legal measures aimed at Turkifying names. There were also Turkification measures in the realm of education and economics via newly adopted legal codes making Turkish classes mandatory in minority schools and making the use of the Turkish language mandatory in economic institutions (Ylldlz 2001, pp. 2.81 and 286).

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The Turkish national identity was primarily statist. While it was predominantly forged via the exclusion of non-Muslims, it was mostly assimilationist coward the non-Turkish-speaking Muslims. Turks were transformed from subjects of an empire to citizens of a nation-state via both exclusion and assimilation of various distinct cultures. In the course of such transformation, citizenship status was granted not as a result of demands coming from below but by policies from above.' Since the concept of the "people" is associated with such demands, it is possible to say that Turks became citizens without enjoying the possibility of becoming and acting like the "people:'JO In such a route to nationhood, the preservation and glorification of the state were quite distinct. This paved the way to a view of citizens as dutiful servants of the state rather than people who demand rights. All the rights pertaining to citizenship in Turkey were given from above by the republican elite after the proclamation of the republic in 192.3." Establishment of national unity was the main raison d'etre of citizenship in Turkey. The republican elite tried to forge a national union by making use of duties associated with citizenship. These duties were mainly opting for defining and uplifting Turkishness. Turkish nationalism was constructed from above by the state elite. Hence the ensuing Turkish citizenship evolved in a statist manner. The founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, defined a nation as a community that is based on common political existence, language, territory, descent, historical affiliation, and morality (Tezcan 1996, p. 20). Religion was not included in the common bond that constitutes a nation. Instead he put great emphasis on common morality as well as the will to become a nation. Mustafa Kemal stated that "nations that are unaware of their national selves are the prey of other nations" (Tezcan 1996, p. 26). He also pointed to congruence between the notions of the nation and the state when he said: "the Turkish nation-ruled by a republic. which is the rule of the people-is a state." The emphasis laid on the state can be seen in the following statements by Mustafa Kemal: The instrument and rules of a society are the state ... the ambition of a state has a different quality than that of an individual. A state thinks about the common interests and progress of the public. How individuals can be removed from the ambition of private interests is really worth thinking about. (Tezcan 1996, p. 52.)

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It is obvious that some economic and social endeavors are pardy related to the interests of individuals. Therefore liberals see the state's interference with these as interference with the liberties of individuals. Nevertheless, these endeavors also include moments that touch the interests of the entire nation indirectly. As a result, it is appropriate to accept the valid arguments made by the etatists." (Tezcan 1996, p. 51) In February 1932 the People's Houses (Halkevleri) were founded in fourteen cities in order to promote the core principles of the republic. They aimed at creating the ideal republican citizen who had embraced these core principles represented in the insignia of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP): nationalism, laicism, populism, republicanism, etatism, and revolutionism. It was through the activities of the People's Houses that the republican elite attempted to define citizenship in Turkey (Soyank 2000). The main aim of the journal of the People's Houses called Ulkii. was providing the six arrows with a theoretical framework as well as teaching them to the people. The function of the People's Houses was further supported by the formation of two other institutions: the Turkish History SOciety (Turk Tarih Kurumu) and Turkish Linguistic Society (Turk Dil Kurumu) in 1931 and 1932, respectively. The Tur~sh History SOciety researched the history of Turks in the pre-Islamic period and attempted to spread the view that all the civilizations in the world stemmed from the Turkish civilization that was rooted in Central Asia. The Turkish Linguistic Society, in turn, tried to bring out the beauty and richness of the Turkish language as the mother of aU languages. The Peoples Houses as well as the Turkish History SOciety and Turkish Linguistic Society aimed at creating a Turkish citizen prior to the emergence of an individualist ethos in Turkey. Hence they were instrumental in forming a notion of citizenship that emphasized obligations instead of rights. Turkish nationalism therefore served the function of generat~ng obligations for Turkish citizens rather than empowering them. Turkish nationalism did not lead to a language of rights, as in the French case, but rather to a language of obligations that was geared toward the preservation of the state.'l Article 3 of the Constitution (1982) maintains that "the Turkish State, with its country and nation, is an indivisible whole. Its language is Turkish:"" This chapter shows the significance placed on the "indivisibility of the state»

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43

in Turkey. A preoccupation with the preservation of the state is a fundamental feature of Turkish national identity. The debates pertaining to the civil, political, and social rights of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish-speaking groups as well as Muslim women wearing the headscarf have constituted the most salient issues of citizenship in Turkey over the past decade. Issues of citizenship in Turkey involve the minority rights of those people who are legal citizens and hence can participate in local, regional, and national elections.'s Citizenship certificates mask the absence of minority rights. Thus state officials and ordinary people take a false pride in saying that they are all Turkish citizens, without realizing that such homogenization masks difference and therefore is discriminatory. The Turkish national anthem begins with the words "do not fear."·6 Yet it seems that the "different" Kurdish and Armenian identities and the visibility of Muslim women with headscarves generate apprehension on the part of military officers and bureaucrats in terms of the indivisibility of the state. Turkish citizens are burdened with duties toward the state. The fundamental fear that shapes the contours of citizenship politics in Turkey is fear of the disintegration of the state.

A STATE IN SEARCH OF ITS NATION The years between 1789 and 18IS signaled the emergence of both French and German nationalisms (Kohn 1967).'7 German nationalism emerged alongside a literary tradition called Romanticism. One of the most distinguishing features of this tradition was its critical attitude toward French cosmopolitanism. German Romantics thought that the rationalism of the eighteenth century was artificial. They relied on intuitions and emotions rather than on rationality and intellect. The German Romantic tradition reveals the dark and antirational aspects of German nationalism. The notion of a German nation that evolved in the course of the nineteenth century stemmed from a Volkisch ideology that later formed the basis of the National Socialist worldview. The German Romantic literature became the medium for the expression of German nationalism in the course of the nineteenth century. prior to the formation of a German nation-state. German nationalism preceded the nation-state. so it was expressed in ethnic and cultural terms. Accordingly, Rogers Brubaker (1989. 1990, 1992) refers to an

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ethnocultural conception of nationhood in Germany. In comparing the German and French conceptions of nationhood and citizenship. Brubaker (1992. p. 8) says: It is one thing to want to make all citizens of Utopia speak Utopian. and quite another to want to make all Utophiphones citizens of Utopia. Crudely put. the former represents the French. the latter the German model of nationhood. Whether juridical (as in naturalization) or cultural. assimilation presupposes a political conception of membership and the belief. which France took over from the Roman tradition. that the state can turn strangers into citizens. peasants-or immigrant workers-into Frenchmen. Hence the French conception of citizenship evolved in an assimilationist and state-centered manner. while the German conception acquired an organic. differentialist, dissimilationist. and JIOlk-centered character. The French nationhood evolved in a predominantly political way. while the German one became predominantly ethnocultural. As Brubaker (1992., p. 10) puts it:

In fact, traditio~).s of nationhood have political and cultural components in both countries. These components have been closely integrated in France, where political unity has been understood as constitutive, cultural unity as expressive of nationhood. In the German tradition. in contrast, political and ethnocultural aspects of nationhood have stood in tension with one another. serving as the basis for competing conceptions of nationhood. One such conception is sharply opposed to the French conception: according to this view, ethnocultural unity is constitutive. political unity expressive, of nationhood. The temporal distance between the state formation and nation-building processes as well as their sequence gave shape to the conceptions of nationhood and citizenship in France and Germany. This observation can guide analyses on Turkish nationalism (Kadloglu 1991. 1992, 1993a, 1993b. 1996a). Because French nationalism appeared at about the same time as the French nation-state. political and social unity was the work of statesmen. German

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nationalism preceded the formation of the German nation-state by half a century. The German Romantic tradition was laden with motifs of yearning for a national state. Such a temporal distance between nationalism and nationstate made ethnic and cultural unity constitutive of German nationalism. This paved the way to the significance placed on blood ties and/or descent as the basis of modern German citizenship. It is obvious that this ethnocultural view of nation and citizenship was a compensation for political backwardness via the utilization of a claim to spiritual superiority that revived interest in the German medieval past. German nationalist ideology is best explained by the distinction between "Culture" and "Civilization," "which was constantlyon the lips of its adherents" (Mosse 1964, p. 6). "A Culture, to recall Oswald Spengler's words, has a soul, whereas Civilization is 'the most external and artificial state of which humanity is capable'" (cited in Mosse 1964, p.6). The acceptance of culture and the rejection of civilization had a followinglong before the emergence of National Socialists in Germany. Those who advocated a return to culture did not come from the lower classes but rather from the middle classes (middle-class bourgeoisie, artisans, and landowners), who were disadvantaged by the Industrial Revolution. German nationalists opted for a spiritual revolution that would revitalize the nation without revolutionizing its structure, that is, a revolution of the soul (Mosse 1964). The distinctions between the French and German nationalisms and conceptualizations of citizenship are Significant in understanding Turkish nationalism on two grounds.'8 First, Turkish nationalism displays the characteristics of both French and German nationalisms. It embraces both civilization and culture; hence it has a paradoxical nature (KadlOglu 1996b). The paradox of Turkish nationalism resulted in both a hostility toward and an imitation of the Western civilization. Turkish nationalism was not the awakening of Turks to a national consciousness. Rather, it was a project undertaken by intellectuals whose discourse was laden with the dilemma of a choice between imitation and identity. The superior material qualities of the West, its science and technology, could only be synthesized with the spirituality of the East through a project from without. Hence the coexistence of civilization and culture within the Turkish nationalist discourse was the work of intellectuals who took upon themselves the task of transforming a popular consciousness "steeped in centuries of superstition and irrational folk religion"

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(Chatterjee 1993. p. 51). Turkish nationalist discourses. then. endeavored to preserve the unity of the Turkish state by a constructed synthesis. A preoccupation with this balance between modernity and tradition, Western materialism and Eastern spirituality, and civilization (based on the premises of the Enlightenment) and culture (based on the premises of Romanticism) is a recurring theme accompanying Turkish modernization. The desire to achieve such a balance is nowhere better expressed than in the works ofa prominent nationalist thinker, Ziya Gokalp. The type of nationalism that Gokalp mentioned in his writings was critical of the adoption of a Western culture while at the same time advocating an imitation of the Western technological advances (Western civilization). He espoused the retainment of a local, pristine identity. The concepts of civilization and culture were not antithetical, mutually exclusive entities in Gokalp's thought. Rather he tried to synthesize them. In his analysis of Gokalp's thought. Niyazi Berkes (1959, p. 23) maintains: Ifhis analyses are taken as a whole, however, these two concepts [culture and civilization] do not represent antithetical and mutually exclusive entities, but rather two closely related and complementary traits of social reality.... Civilizational elements assume meaning and function in the life of ~en only when they enter into the service of culture. Without a cultural basis, civilization becomes merely a matter of mechanical imitation; it never penetrates into the inner life of a people and never gives fruit of any kind. Gokalp's ideas were wavering among the three trends of Islamism, Turkism, and Westernism and hence reflecting the political climate of the context in which he was located. As Berkes (1959, p. 20) puts it: "He was fighting within himself the battle that intellectuals and politicians were raging on other levels." Gokalp embraced the idea that "<:mly the material civilization of Europe should be taken and not its non-material aspects" (Berkes 1959. p. 21). Berkes (1959, p. 22) sums up Gokalp's convictions: "As the ultimate reality of contemporary society is the nation, and as national ideals are ultimate forces orienting the behavior of the individuals, so the most urgent task for the Turks consisted of awakening as a na,tion in order to adapt themselves to the conditions of contemporary civilization." Gokalp placed a lot of

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emphasis on the concept of the "nation» in coming to terms with the adjustment of culture and civilization. While Ahmed Agaoglu embraced an idea of wholesale Westernization with its culture and civilization, Gokalp was convinced that culture and civilization could be balanced via nationalism.'9 If nationalism is a modern Janus, the Turkish version had two faces as well. While in most instances Turkish nationalism looked similar to the civic French nationalism, the organic, ethnic face that is akin to German nationalism became more pronounced during certain periods in the founding years of the republic. In a study that attempts a periodization of Turkish nationalism in the early years of the republic, Ahmet YtldlZ (2001) brings out into the open the pronounced ethnocultural dimension of Turkish citizenship especially in the period from 1929 to 1938. His book is aptly titled "Ne mutlu Turkum Diyebilene" (How Happy to Be Able to Call Oneself a Turk), pointing to a subtle distinction between "to call oneself a Turk» and "be able to call oneself a Turk:' The latter expression, citing the ability to call oneself a Turk, makes references to ethnic, ascriptive qualifications and was an expression used by one of the ideologues of the Turkish revolution, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, in 1934 (Ytldlz 2001, p. 212). In unraveling the mostly neglected "evil" face of Turkish nationalism, Yddlz refers to legal and political arrangements, the records of parliamentary proceedings, and the proceedings of the Republican People's Party as well as memoirs and texts of the leading ideologues of the early republican period. According to his periodization of the early republican years, the fundamental references of Turkish nationalism evolved from religiOUS (1919-23) to laicist (1924-29) themes and then became suffused with ethnocultural (1929-38) motifs. The citizenship practices evolved in accordance with these core elements in respective periods,>o Second, it is important to point to the sequence of the emergence of the state and nation in Turkey. Whereas in the German case it is possible to refer to a nation preceding a state (a nation in search ofits state), the historiCal order of things is reversed in the Turkish case. In the instance of mOdern republican Turkey, we can refer to a state preceding a nation (a state in search of its nation) {KadlOglu 199s).The Turkish nation was constructed by means of certain measures that were undertaken by the republican ~lite.jn the words of~erifMardin (1981, p. 196): "Mustafa Kemal took upolla hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life in it." In this: construction, political unity appears as the constitutive unit of the Turkiskhati()n~state. In

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short, the indivisibility of the Turkish state and its nation and the irreversibility of its borders-contrary to the case in Germany-constitute the cornerstone of Turkish national identity.

TURKISH NATIONALISM IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989 signaled the end of the Cold War. This has gradually led to the irrelevance of the ideological divisions between the Right and the Left in world politics. The 1990S bore witness to the increasing visibility of Islamic and Kurdish identities in Turkey (KadlOglu 1998b). This was accompanied by the increasing visibility of the Turkish military on the domestic political scene. Moreover, in the course of the 19905 the "Western" attributes of the Turkish society were increasingly being questioned by European Union (EU) officials. In fact Turkey's endeavor to join the EU was facing a serious crisis by 1997. The end of the Cold War dynamics generated doubts as to the Western character of the Turkish SOciety. Omer Ta~pmar (2.005, p. 89) describes the changing status of Turkey in the 1990S: Turks were utterly disappOinted with the fact that their countries [sic] Western identity went unchallenged as long as the Soviet threat existed. It became bitterlY,clear that affiliation with the anti-communist alliance in the framework of NATO membership was at the heart of Turkey's perception as part of the West. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Turkey's identity as a "Western'" nation came to be subject to the much more complex and decisive test of "liberal democracy:' Turkey'S relations with the United States were continuing in favorable terms mainly due to the dynamics generated by the Gulf War. In fact Bill Clinton's administration lobbied in favor of Turkey's candidacy for membership in the EU from 1997 to 1999. By 1999 the direction of the course of events had changed: with the help of the German Social Democrats, Turkey became an official candidate for the EU at the Helsinki summit. From this point onward Turkish governments and specifically the government formed in 2.002. by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkmma Partisi, AKP) became increasingly interested in the reforms that were preconditions for EU membership. There were significant constitutional amendments in

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and 2.004 as well as various "packages" containing amendments of other legal codes that were geared toward realizing such reforms. Some of the constitutional and other legal amendments made it possible to teach and broadcast in "forbidden" languages such as Kurdish (Oran 2.004; Ozbudun and Yazlcl 2.004). Other legal amendments pertained to the civilian control of military institutions. All of these amendments pointed to the acceleration of democratization processes in Turkey. In the meantime the United States had experienced the September II, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City and at the Pentagon. The US. government was getting ready to engage in a war in Iraq. At that historical juncture the Turkish parliament refused to give permission for the utilization of its border with Iraq as the base to launch the attack against Iraq by a historical decision on March 3, 2.003. Thousands marched in a square not far from the parliament, shouting slogans such as "Yankee go home."" This was the beginning of a serious deterioration ofUS.-Turkish relations and increasing public expression of anti-American sentiment by the Turkish people. These sentiments reached a climax at the time of the humiliation of the Turkish Special Forces at the Iraqi border. US. soldiers detained them and covered their faces with hoods on July 4, 2.003. This episode culminated in the 2.006 blockbuster Turkish movie called Kurtlar Vadisi-Irak (Valley of the Wolves-Iraq). Polat, the hero in this movie (the Turkish version of a paramilitary Rambo character), goes to Iraq to humiliate the American soldiers in order to satisfy raging feelings of revenge stemming from the hood episode. By April 2.004 the pictures of torture ofIraqi prisoners by American soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison were in the world press and media. They generated disgust among the people and escalated the existing levels of antiAmericanism in Turkey. Hence it is not surprising that the fantastic novel Metal Ertma (Metal Storm), which depicted a series of events in northern Iraq leading to a U.S.-Turkish war, became a bestseller in Turkey in 2.004 2.001

(Turna and U~ar 2.004). ...... Westernism had always been a distinguishing feature of the root-language of Turkish nationalism. Anti-imperialist sentiments had traditionally been displayed not by the nationalists, who embraced ideologieS thatvVere on the right side of the political spectrum, but by the socialists in Turkey." The most widely remembered socialist anti-American demonstration wa:s held in 1968,

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against the American soldiers who arrived in Turkey on the Sixth Fleet. The slogan "Yankee go home" was popularly used at that time. In 200" after the outbreak of a war in Iraq, the same slogan had apparently returned to Turkey. Yet this time it was on the lips of the nationalists from both the right and left of the political spectrum. This shift signaled a move away from the anti-imperialist stance of the socialists to a brand of nationalism that was harboring not just anti-imperialist but more specifically anti-American and anti-EU sentiments. The years 200, and 2004 signaled the divorce of Turkish nationalism from one of its original and long-lasting motives: advocacy of Westernism. The anti-Americanism of the popular movie character Pol at was beyond the shadow of any doubt. Yet it was also implied in the movie that those who became the archenemies of the United States were created by the U.S. governments themselves in the course of the Cold War dynamics in order to fight the Communists. Polat personified those who waged a dirty and illegal war against the Communists in Turkey. With no Communists left to fight, Polat was ready to take on the United States by making use of the anti-imperialist discourse of the Communists. In sum, anti-Americanism and anti-EU sentiments have become the distinguishing feature of the new nationalist discourse in Turkey after 2003. Preservation of the state still continues to be one of the motives of Turkish nationalism. Yet the state is increaSingly defined in reference to the military and bureaucratic establishment at the expense of the political actors. In fact it is possible to argue that Turkish nationalism has become more militaristic in the course of the past few years. This militarism mainly stems from a criticism directed at the political realm in general and the main political actor, the AKP, in particular. John BreuUly (1992, p. 16) points out the incompatibility between national identity and the parliament in times of crisis: "[I]n times of crisis the national idea-an idea which was almost universally accepted in some form or another-could be turned against government and parliament. The national idea meant national unity whereas parliament meant division." AKP presents itself as the political party that wUl defy the "clash of civilizations" thesis that foresees an inevitable clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations (Huntington 1993). After September 11, 2001, the U.S. government discovered a new reason to ally with Turkey and began to refer

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to Turkey as a "model" for the Middle East due to its adherence to a "moderate Islam" rather than "radical Islam." Tawmar (WOS, p. 91) expresses this shift in the focus of the interest toward Turkey as follows:

u.s.

In effect, Turkey became important for the foreign policy in the aftermath of September II for the first time, not because of "where it was located;' but because of "what it was." In other words, Turkey's importance was increasing not only in geo-strategic context, but also due to its political and civilized identity. In an environment where the Arab geography appeared as a fundamental problem, Turkey's democratic, secular and Western presence was accepted as a "model" by the neoconservative group. Yet Kemalist laicist groups in Turkey were increasingly skeptical of a government with a Muslim base that was at times described as "moderate Islamist." Since 192..4 Turkish governments have followed quite radical laicist policies and regarded laicism as one of the pillars of the Kemalist regime. Any statement in the opposite direction has generated an unprecedented fury in certain segments of the society that have a view of the AKP as a political party that is weakening the laidst foundation of the Kemalist state. In 2..006 the AKP ended up surrendering to militaristic policies, in an effort to establish a strong state. In November 2..00S a bookshop in the predominantly Kurdish town of ~emdinli was bombed. Two low-ranking gendarmerie officers of the Turkish armed forces were arrested as assailants by the people in the area. The owner of the bookstore was an informant of the Kurdish organization PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kiirdistan: Kurdish Workers Party). The public prosecutor of the dty of Van prepared an indictment that pointed a finger at Ya~ar Biiyiikafllt, who was commander of the Land Forces (and became the chief of the General Staff in July 2..006), for trying to prevent the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict and aggravating the tensions in the region by getting involved in such bombings. In a few months the public prosecutor was not only dismissed from office but also barred from the legal profession by the High Council ofJudges and Prosecutors (Milliyet June 2..2.., 2..006; Kaya 2..009, pp. 104-5). Theminister of justice

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went along with this decision. The AKP did not have the determination to protect the prosecutor. By the end of March 2.006 riots broke out in DiyarbakIr during the funerals of PKK militants who were killed by the security forces. Riots spread to other cities such as Batman, Siirt, and Istanbul. In the midst of this increasing violence and death toll, the opposition parties began to blame the AKP for its inability to address the situation and for having a soft posture in the fight against terrorism. At the end of June 2.006 an Anti-Terror Law with draconian measures was passed by the parliament. The law made imprisonment possible for anyone shouting slogans and carrying banners in demonstrations in favor of terror groups. It constituted a major setback in freedom of expression. The law made it possible to imprison minors over the age of fifteen and allowed the security forces to shoot suspects who failed to cooperate (Milliyet, June 30, 2.006). In sum, it reduced Tutkey's Kurdish problem to an issue of terror. By the end of 2007 the PKK had increased its attacks on the Turkish soldiers at the Iraqi border. The loss of hundreds of lives generated great public fury in Turkey. The parliament passed a decision on October 17, 2007, allowing the government to pursue military action against the PKK on the other side of the Turkish border, in northern Iraq. In late February 2.008 Turkish military forces crossed the border into northern Iraq in order to engage in combat with the PKK. As a result of such escalation of conflict at its southeastern border, Turkish nationalism began to be expressed in a more militaristic fashion. In one of the demonstrations against the PKK and in honor of the slain soldiers who became martyrs, for example, people who gathered in a football stadium before a game in Bolu all wore the blue berets of the Special Forces (the commando units) of the Turkish army and recited the military oath. In other such demonstrations women expressed their wish to join the ranks of the military. In 2007 and 2008 the Turkish nationalist language was increasingly motivated by an effort to preserve a more militarist state. By 2008 the relations between Turkish nationalists and Kurdish nationalists had entered a stage that made the characterization "symbiotic antagonisms" all the more relevant. It is quite clear that these developments will strengthen the raison d'etat and the military institutions in Turkey at the expense of political processes. They could also severely damage Turkey-EU

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relations. While nationalists on both sides rejuvenate their livelihood through their mutual antagonisms, the resulting military clashes between them have already resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and continue to generate the deaths of many others. AKP's "Kurdish opening" policy that was unleashed in the summer of 2009 had the potencial to reverse this militarist-nationalist trend in Turkey. Yet the closure of the main Kurdish political party, the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP). by the Constitutional Court in December 2009 Signaled the end of the opening. The negative developments worsened when some of the PKK militants who arrived in Turkey in October 2009 from various camps in Iraq with the expectation of a pardon were arrested in the summer of 2010. Whether political processes can prevail over raison detat in light of these recent developments and against all odds remains to be seen.

NOTES I.

1.

,.

'The text that compiles the ideas of Mustafa Kemal on citizenship was Originally edited and published by Afet inan in 1930 with the title Vatandaj Jfin Medeni Bilgiler (Civic Information for Citizens). She also published an extended version in 1969 (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu). I benefited from a recent edition of this text in highlighting Mustafa Kemal's views on citizenship (Tezcan 1996). I have accounted for these features ofTurkish nationalism in an article in which I compared the formation of national identity and related issues of citizenship in Greece and Turkey. 'The account presented here benefited a lot from that comparative analysis (KadlOglu 2oo9). 'The Committee of Union and Progress was called the Committee of Ottoman Union (lttihad-l Osmani Cemiyeti) at the time of its foundation. In 1895 its name was changed to Committee of Ottoman Union and Progress (Osman" Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti). 'The committee was divided into two after the First Young Turk Conference in 1901. which was convened in Paris. While the liberal wing founded a separate organization espousing individual initiative and decentralization as well as being ruled as a mandate under the ~uthority of Britain. the more centralist wing began to advocate Turkism as opposed to Ottomanism. In the period between 1902 and 1906 the Young Turk activities in Europe lapsed to a certain extent. 'The movement was rejuvenat~d in 1906 with the arrival of new members fleeing from the Ottoman lands. Following the Second Young Turk Conference in 1907, again in Paris. thecentr3.J.isr. Turkist wing began to acquire prominence. The road to the Secon4c;onstitutional

54

4. 5.

6.

7.

AY<je Kadloglu Monarchy was opened through the activities of this wing. The organization reclaimed the name "Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress· after the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908. The information regarding the parameters of the conflict between the Liberals and Unionists here is informed to a great extent by Ahmad (1993. pp. 33-51). Although Prince Sabahattin opposed the invitation of Western powers to back the regime at the beginning. he then-most likely-succumbed to British intervention in order to "prevent other haphazard. unwanted interventions" that might be forced upon the Ottoman regime during a crisis moment. Hence he embraced the idea of "intervention by those free and liberal Western powers whose interests match our interests" (Ak§in 1980, p. 40). Ak.'fura's historically significant article raised some criticism at the time of its publication. Criticisms by Ali Kemal and Ahmet Fedt also published in the same newspaper pointed to the dangers of prompting the nationalist feeling among the Turks in the belief that this would have a domino effect on various other nationalisms and would bring the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Yet the disintegration came not from the Turkist political nationalism but as a result of various other nationalisms of both the non-Muslim and Muslim groups within the empire. The emergence of these nationalisms pointed to the inability of the Ottomanist vision to keep the empire intact and hence the inevitability ofits disintegration. See YlldlZ (2.001, p. 72.). Such racial claims had already been rampant in late-nineteenth-century Europe. One of the pioneering works classifying the races was by Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (1816-82.), enticledEs-sai sur l'inegalite des races humaines

(18 53-55)' Agaoglu's thought in this sense was in line with extreme Westernist thought currents led by Abdullah Cevdet and Celal Nllri. On Agaoglu's insistence on the adoption of Western civilization and culture as a whole. see Bakxrgezer (1997: 41). 9. This should not give the impression that no movements in the society were expressing demands from below. For an account of a women's independent organization with such demands, see Toprak (1988). This organization was suppressed by the republican elite. 10. I have argued that Turks became citizens prior to becoming individuals (Kadloglu 1998a, 1999). Il. This should not make us blind to the existence of many Significant societal demands from below that were thwarted by state policies. See, for instance. Toprak (1988) and also Zihnioglu (2.003). regarding women's demands from below geared toward founding a women's political party.

8.

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12. I have used the expression "etatists" instead of "statists" in translating this sentence into English due to the apparent emphaSiS laid on the "economic" interference of the state. 13. In a study surveying the books utilized in citizenship education courses in primary and secondary schools throughout the republican era. Fiisun Uste! (2002. 2.004) underlines the evolution of a militant citizen burdened with duties in Turkey. 14. Interestingly. in 2.004 a report on minority issues in Turkey suggested that the expression "nation" should be deleted from article 3 of the Constitution. which refers to the "Turkish state" as an "indivisible whole with its country and nation" (Oran 2.004). It was also suggested that the phrase "its language is Turkish" be replaced by the expression "its officiallanguage is Turkish" in order to allow for the utilization oflanguages other than Turkish. These suggestions were geared toward making it possible for multicultural identities to coexist in Turkey in an effort to envision a Turkey that does not only belong to Turks. Legal charges were brought against the authors of this study on the basis of "denigrating T urkishness." IS. Such minority rights. insofar as they refer to rights geared toward integration through the maintenance of religious. ethnic. and language differences. are called "multicultural rights." These rights represent "willingness" on the part of governments "not jllst to tolerate but to welcome cultural difference" (Kymlicka and Norman 1995. p. 307). See also KadlOglu (2.007a). 16. I was reminded of the importance of these words in the national anthem by my colleague Ayhan Aletar. who mentioned this in the paper that he presented at the conference on the Ottoman Armenians during the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire held in Istanbul on September 2.4-2.5. 2005. 17. The expressions "French nationalism" and "German nationalism" are used here in reference to the nature of these nationalisms at the time of their emergence. in an effort to emphasize some of their birthmarks. 18. I have elaborated on this point elsewhere. See KadlOglu (200S). 19. For an analysis of how Ziya Gokalp's views on religion differed from the views of the leading republican elite. who were successful in instigating radical policies oflaicism in the 192,OS. see KadlOglu (2.oro). 20. For a review of practices pertaining to Turkification such as those regarding the obligation to speak Turkish in public places (1931). utilization of Turkish family names (1934). the law on settlement of the minorities (1934). and talCes on the property of Muslims. non-Muslims. foreigners. and converts (1942). see Aktar (2.000), Soyartk (2000). and Ylldlz (2.001). 21. I was in the United States before the voting in the Turkish parliament. Most U.S. television news programs assumed that the Turkish parliament would vote

u.s.

2.2..

"yes" and allow the military to use the Turkish border as a base for launching the attack on Iraq. I clearly remember one commentator who was broadcasting live from Tuckey who referred to the Turkish parliament vote as a "mere formality." Hence the "no" vote in the Turkish parliament was a big sur- . prise in the United States. It seems important to underline the differences between anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism and study their interplay in various manifestations of nationalism in Turkey.

4

NATIONALIST DISCOURSES IN TURKEY

TANILBoRA

AT THE END OF THE 19805 TuRKISH NATIONALISM, PARALLEL TO THE

nationalist waves rising throughout the world (especially in the Balkans. Middle East. and Caucasus), gained an accelerated momentum. This era of globalization encouraged and even incited nationalism in various ways. First, especially with the collapse of the bipolar world system of the Cold War, altering frontiers through military conflicts became possible. Second, minorities and human rights issues have evolved as diplomatic matters. Third, transnational processes of economic-and geographical-deregulation have upset the structures of the nation-state. All these factors have affected the ideology of Turkish nationalism in ways that ratified its reactionary patterns. Modem Turkey has a nation-state tradition that bears the marks of a concern for saving and preserving the state. This concern arose in part due to the grave crises threatening the very existence of the Ottoman state of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century_ Subsequently the surrounding countries were perceived as a severe threat. This perception was indeed rectified by the Cold War. Turkish nationalism and Turkish national identity had been substantially influenced by both this concern for saving andl'erpetuating the state and the perception of threat. Furthermore. the challenges th.at globalization brought to the structures of the nation-state are easily perceived in

57

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Tanll Bora

this context as the modern version of a centuries-old threat to Anatolia!Turkey. This threat is traced back to the Crusades and is regarded as reaching its zenith with the Treaty of Sevres, which temporarily buried the hopes to found a new state that would rise from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish issue no doubt has played the leading role in this perception, which equates the challenges posed by globalization with an ongoing threat to Anatolia. The Kurdish issue, which came to the fore in the mid-1980s with the armed propaganda campaign of the Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kiirdistan, PKK) and was transformed in the 1990S to a "low density war," increased the fear that had been implanted in Turkish nationalism concerning violation of the very existence of the state. The escalation of this old fear was also related to the social destabilization and disorientation caused by the rapid economic, social, and cultural changes that Turkey underwent as part of the globalization (or, in other words, capitalist modernization) process. This destabilization and disorientation was further deepened with the disintegration of the social state. In this atmosphere. as the Kurdish issue was reduced to a "problem of terror;' the ideological mobilization against the Kurdish issue focused on emphasizing ethnic Turkish identity. Yet after the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 a new tendency emerged. Anti-Kurdish resentment became widespread, and signs of polarization started to be observed. Such a tendency developed largely because public opinion, affected by Turkish nationalism, was disillusioned with and reacting against two things. First, the PKK continued to exist despite being defeated militarily and reinitiated armed struggle after 2.003. Second, Kurds continued to demand rights on the basis of their identity. This disillusionment and reaction was nourished by the state. which presumed that the Kurdish issue was in fact "solved" and refrained from taking the steps it would! could take by adapting to the European Union (EU) norms. Under these circumstances, a discourse that defined not only the PKK but also the "Kurds" (taken as a homogeneous subjectivity) as the enemy became prevalent. This banal nationalist discourse, which defines the Kurds as barbarians while criminalizing them not only politically but also socially and ethically, signifies the dangerous replacement of assimilationist optimism with a violent nonassimilationism.

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

59

Another factor affiicting the Turkish national conscience was that the rise in the perception of a threat as well as the crisis regarding the very survival of the state occurred immediately after an era of self-confidence. Turkey, in fact, entered the 1990S with a boom of self-confidence. During the 19805 the country had accumulated capital with the economic policies of the New Right and became increasingly merged in the flows of global capital: consumption had become modernized and Widespread. All these developments fostered hopes of moving up to the "world's tOP league" (as popular media commentators call it). By the end of the 1980s, when Turkey applied for full membership to the EU, the prevailing feeling was "elevating the country to the level of modern civilization." This feeling had indeed been cherished since the founding of the republic. Finally, it seemed that this elevation had been realized-or at least this was the belief that was shared by the proWestern elites and the urban middle classes. The new economically oriented pan-Turkist perspective, espoused by the newly independent the Central Asian Turkic republics in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's disintegration, reinforced this feeling (Bora and La~iner 1995). The historical and cultural legacy of the Turkic republics, regarded as a hinterland from the point of view of official nationalism, was considered to be an additional guarantee for Turkey as it sought to bond with the West without losing its own authentic identity. Turgut Ozal, the prime minister of the strong liberal-conservative government of the 1980s formed by the Motherland Party (Anavatan Pardsi, ANAP), was also a symbol of this period's wind of optimism and self-confidence. The party and the government put forth a conception of Turkish-Islamic-Western synthesis that was far more forceful than its previous formulations. Ozal had the opportunity to repeat the Turkish right-wing politicians' buzzwords such as "great Turkey" and "powerful Turkey" in a relatively "realistic" conteXt. At the beginning of the 1990S the assertive popularized claim that the "twenty-first century will be the Turkish century" was added to such catchphrases. The Gulf War can be seen as a turning point in the transition from this atmosphere of self-confidence and optimism to one defined by the perception of threat. On the one hand, in Turkey the Gulf War led to national strategy plans aspiring to "development" in terms of influence, prestige, and geography. On the other hand, the war invigorated the existing fears; it was argued

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that the existing threat surrounding Turkey would tighten and that the Western hegemony, both in the region and in the country, would increase. The formation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War as well as the new momentum of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey proved the pessimists right and gave the fundamentalist/essentialist factions the opportunity to raise their voices. As Turkey's policies on the Kurdish issue have been restricted to the military solution, its entire democratization program remained under the embargo of these policies. The subsequent pressure it faced on the European platform was used by the radical nationalists to corroborate the argument that Turkey was confronted with a conspiracy. Two other factors also played a part in the erosion of Turkey's national self-confidence and the growing national concern with survival and preservation. One was the gradually increasing awareness that the Turkic republics were not primitive and loyal states that considered Turkey to be their unconditionalleader. Turkey was indeed eqUipped with nothing other than Orientalist prejudices in terms of knowledge about the Caucasus and Central Asia. The second factor was the spiral of economic crises that engulfed Turkey. The country had become entirely dependent on the whims of free-flowing international capital, and in 2.001 it was on the verge of a disaster comparable to the one Argentina had experienced. Despite having entered the decade with the slogan "The twenty-first century will be the Turkish century:' in the mid1990S Turkey eventually came face-to-face with a chronic crisis that has been marked as the gravest depression in the history of the republic. At the beginning of the 2000S, following countrywide impoverishment and the erosion of the urban middle classes, economic stabilization was achieved. A peaceful state of affairs was also established as the neo-liberal/ conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkmma Partisi, AKP) came to rule. But this was a temporary lull. Subsequendy nationalism was again on the rise; the main triggering factor was Turkey's candidacy for EU membership. Following the initiation of Turkey's negotiations for full EU membership in 2002, the anti-Western reactions in nationalist-conservative, Islamist, and Kemalist camps took on a more agitated tone. According to these interpretations, which were shaped through the particular discourses of politicalideological camps (with some of the specific arguments being transferred

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

61

among them), the EU was using Turkey's will to "join Europe" to force Turkey into making concessions regarding the Cyprus and Kurdish issues. Furthermore, Europe was attempting to bring to life its eternal plan to divide and destabilize Turkey. Those who ruled Turkey supported this neo-imperialist plan either because they were imprudent or because they were traitors. Such arguments brought to life images such as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, weak "collaborative" governments that hoped for Western aid, and economic and legal capitulations. These comparisons popularized the idea that the country was secretly being invaded. The traumatic effect of the 2.001 economic crisis on the middle classes should indeed be taken into consideration in analyzing the dissemination and appropriation of such a paranoid discourse. The economy's total dependence on global finance flows, and its concurrent fragility, made it possible for the individual career traumas to be reflected to the national level and combined with the collective loss of confidence. Another important element in the appropriation of the above-mentioned anti-Western discourse was the reaction of the bureaucratic elite. The privileged status of this elite would be weakened by the structural reforms that Turkey would undertake for EU membership. In this context the following paradox emerged. The AKP, though instrumentally, supported the politico-legal framework of the ED. The party indeed partly saw this framework as a tool with which the status of the bureaucracy and the army could be weakened. Yet the same AKP whose founders and leaders came from an Islamic tradition that referred to the EU as a "Christian club" was insulted as a EU collaborator by Kemalist-republicans, who have always been situated as pro-Westerners in Turkish political scene. What makes this situation striking is that the traditional anti-imperialist discourse ofKemalist nationalism has been supplemented by ethnocultural cliches and accordingly attained an anti-Western tone. Kurdish female poet and author Bejan Matur (2.007) made an interesting observation regarding the "Republican Rallies" that were organized as a part of this reactionary nationalist atmosphere and took both the AKP and the EU as targets. According to Matur, republican-Kemalist-secular-Westerner groups fell into an abyss as they came close to joining Europe, which they have identified with and yearned after for so long. What nourished this desire and transformed it into a kind oflove relationship was in fact "the inability to be

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united" with Europe (Matur 2007); yet now the circumstances were changing. Moreover, as these groups increasingly felt unable to manifest the necessary authenticity to grant them an identity that would differentiate them iJ;1/ from Europe, they became vulnerable. Meanwhile the AKP followers, coming from an Islamist tradition, were already regarding Europe as an "other" with which they would only come together on pragmatic terms and referred to their relationship as a kind of trade encounter. This view made them free from these complexes of the republican-Kemalist-secular-Westerner groups in their relations to Europe. This interpretation, which has a socio-psychological component, is worth discussing. Before initiating such a discussion, however, it should be noted that within the Kemalist-republican ideological framework (which also determines the national education curriculum) homogenizing judgments and forms regarding the West had existed before. Nationalism in fact is the common ground of nationalist-conservative, Islamist, and Kemalist-republican discourses and manifests itself as the real Turkish fundamentalism. From the 1990S to the beginning of the twenty-first century two dynamics have been at play in the shaping of Turkish nationalism. One is a reactionary nationalist movement that uses the theme of national survival in a dramatized way. This movement not only strengthens the opposing radical nationalist movement but al$O influences the center/right-wing politics and even, increasingly, the center/left wing. Furthermore, it dominates the state elite and above all the army. The second is a pro-Western nationalistic movement (reminiscent of the nationalism of the late 1980s and early 1990S), which believes that the nation's best interest lies in merging with the globalization process. This movement has found its proponents among the rising segments of the new urban middle classes. the globalizing sectors of big capital, and the media elite. In order to analyze the interplay between these two movements. one must consider Turkish nationalism not as a homogeneous discourse but as a series of discourses with a vast lexis. I distinguish four main nationalist languages that use this lexis. The first is the root-language of Turkish nationalism: in other words. the language of the official Kemalist nationalism. Atatiirk nationalism, which focused on the mission to build and perpetuate the nation-state. The second. which can be considered a dialect of this root-language, is the "left-wing" Kemalist nationalism: Kemalist ulUSfuluk.

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

The third is the language of a pro-Western nationalism advocating "civilization" and prosperity. While being a liberal dialect of the Kemalist rootlanguage. this version grows and develops under the spell of the promises held forth by the era of globalization. The fourth. a deviate dialect of the Kemalist root-language. is the language of the racist-ethnicist Turkish nationalism that derives its elementS from neo-pan-Turkism and from the reaction to the Kurdish nationalist movement. In the event that the currently expanding Islamism merges with a nationalistic discourse. another dialect will be entering this family of languages. In the following pages. I discuss these nationalistic dialects as well as their verbal and visual elements.

THE OFFICIAL NATIONALISM: ATATURK NATIONALISM

The official nationalism of Turkey. Atatiirk nationalism. has been characterized since the founding of the republic by both a French-style conception of nationalism. based on the principle of citizenship and territoriality. and a German-style nationalism. which has ethnicist assumptions. As such it bears the marks of the tension between these two different conceptions of nationalism. Ziya Gokalp's synthesis. based on cultural identity. rested on an extremely delicate balance between a territorial conception of nationalism based on citizenship. which was handed down from Ottoman patriotism. and the conceptions of nationalism that emphasize the nation's uniqueness and eternal existence. The official ideology may well be in line with a kind of nationalism that is based on the territorial notion of citizenship. But in foreign disputes. in "national causes:' and even. for instance. in the domains of popular culture such as international sports competitions an ethnicist, essentialist. aggressive language of nationalism can easily make itself felt. It can be argued that the instinctive. if not conscious. inclination of the advocates of the official ideology has been toward keeping this duality latent and yet keeping it as it is, for this duality and tension help extend their margin of political and ideological maneuvering. Official nationalism, with its ideological ambiguity, thoroughly depends on the existence, power, and manifestations of the nation-state-its symbols and rituals, its pomp and omnipresence. The army, as the crystallized evidence of the existence, power, and manifestations of the nation-state, takes on a central role in the reproduction of the official nationalism. Owing to

Tanll Bora

the requirements of the ideology of vigilance and the automatic system of perceiving threat (which are in fact internalized by all armies) and specifically as a consequence of the state-founding military character of the Tur~­ ish Armed Forces, identified with Mustafa Kemal and his mission, the army considers itself to be the true owner and personified symbol of nationalism. The official nationalism, with its core being the army, focuses specifically on the state itself in addition to the populist attributions of heroism. The definition of "nation" (as stated in a publication by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council) as "one of the constituent elements of the state" as well as the expression "the state's indivisible identity with the country and the nation" (a favorite among official refrains) constitute avowals of the statecentered conception of nationalism.' An important feature of the language of official nationalism is that its ritualism is far too rigid, cold, and stereotyped and its enthusiasm remains artificial. Official nationalism is indeed exhibitionist. It invades political rhetoric with its cliched vocabulary. In public life there is a frenzied consumption of symbols of the nation-state, such as the national anthem, the effigy of Atatiirk. the flag, and the star and crescent. Although this situation is not always directly related to the pressures or incitements of the state, it is at any rate encouraged by the rigid control that the state has over civil society. During the 1994 cri$is the symbols of the nation-state and the phraseology and images of official nationalism were diffused to an even greater extent. The Turkish flag was ubiquitous. During the mid-2.ooos, when nationalism shifted gears. planting "disproportionate" flags (90-100 square meters) became a practice of psychological warfare. This campaign was supplemented by installations such as the painting of a 6oo-square-meter flag (using a ton of paint) on a hill near Ankara. People attached stickers of the Turkish flag to their license plates. Star-and-crescent necklaces and badges became especially popular. Some singers and models decked their costumes with the star and crescent. Pretexts to sing the national anthem multiplied. For instance, the spectators started to stand and sing the national anthem before every football match instead of the usual practice of singing it only at games in which the national team appeared. It could even be heard before pop concerts and at the opening of fashion shows in luxury hotels. Facing the economic crises of 1994 and 2.001, both the government and business circles evinced a heroic nationalist discourse. National-progressivist slogans such as "the economic

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

War of Independence, " "all for Turkey," "striving for Turkey," and "for Turkey, willingly" were coined. The rise of the "Islamist" movement also compelled the official nationalism to emphasize the image of Atatiirk; the portrait of Atatiirk became a kind of logo and was displayed at every opportunity. Without a doubt, this discourse was and is affected by the racialization and fanaticization of Kemalist ulusfuluk. In fact, these discourses are symbiotically related, and the folloWing analysis focuses on the latter.

KEMALIST ULUS<;:ULUK

Kemalism, which was questioned to a great extent in leftist circles during the J980s, flourished anew among the social democratic intelligentsia of the 1990S. The neo-Kemalism of the 1990S, besides constituting a reaction against the hegemony of the New Right and the Islamist movement, had been incited by the anti-Kemalism that these movements shared. NeoKemalism maintained that Kemalism was no longer the official ideology; it had been cast out by the right wing as it tOok control of the government after the September 12, I980, coup. Thus in the beginning the neo-Kemalist movement was relatively distant from the state and attained a more civil character compared to the 19605. The secularist reaction opposing the rise of Islam ism stood on the axis of this movement. The perception of threat regarding a possible reinstitution of the Shari a (the rule of Islamic law) caused the neoKemalist movement to embrace nationalism during the last two years with the realization that it could serve to popularize secularism. This functional and pragmatic embrace of nationalism also depended on the need to seek support from the state and the army and on the renewed interest of some circles in the authoritarian, state-controlled solutions based on the army. The Atatiirk motif became incredibly widespread as the official nationalism became excessively demonstrative, which gave rise to the hopes of spreading Kemalism by way of nationalism. Kemalist uluSfUluk discourse that the neo-Kemalist movemerit acquired from the left-wing Kemalist discourse of the 19605 and 19705 is indeed a version of official nationalism (Atatiirk nationalism) that claims to be left-wing. This claim is founded on the neo-Kemalists' appropriation of the humanistuniversalist branch of Turkish nationalism that is based on territoriality and citizenship. But this neo-Kemalist discourse overlooks and even cloaks the

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ambivalent character of Turkish nationalism. Furthermore, to the extent that it insists on the dissimilarity of Kemalist uluSfUluk and the other nationalist movements, it regenerates the nationalist ideologies of essentialism and uniqueness. During the 19605 and 1970S the chief principles of left-wing Kemalist nationalism as well as the fundamental basis of its claim to be left-wing were anti-imperialism and the stand for independence. In the 19905 these were replaced by secularism; and at the beginning of the twenty-first century the motifs of anti-imperialism and independence once again became marked by the influence of the discourse of antiglobalism. 'This left-wing nationalist discourse reduces both Arabs and Iran to symbols of political Islam; while expressing its opposition to them, it exhibits a stance that is racist, disparaging, and Orientalist. Biilent Ecevit, the prime minister of the "social-liberalnationalistic" coalition government formed after the 1999 elections, typically represents the stance of pro-independence left-wing nationalism; the antiWestern motifs, autarkist national pride, and xenophobia in this posture are striking. The Kemalist uluSfUluk discourse construes nationalism as the advocate of the process of secularization/modernization. The fact that the term ulUSfUluk is preferred to milliyetfilik is part of the design that equates the concept with modernization and sec,ularization. The terms ulu$fUluk (derived from the word ulus) and milliyetfilik (derived from the word millet) are synonymous and both translate into English as "nationalism." Although millet is used in modern Turkish synonymously with ulus (and both words signify "nation"), it was used in Ottoman times to refer to the religiOUS communities of the empire. Ulu$, the modernized term for "nation:' disavows the connotations of the Ottoman times (especially the connection with the Muslim community: ummet).1n the newly formed nation-state of Turkey, nationalism cook over and replaced the monopolized sacredness of religion. 'The efforts to "nationalize" religion are an even clearer indication of this desire. Kemalist ulusfuluk follows this line; by recalling the Single-party Kemalist period when the call to prayer was given in Turkish and considering the Alevi religion a kind of Turkish Islam, it tends toward a kind ofIslamic-Lutheranism. As previously discussed, the upheaval in nationalism in the 2.000S has been nourished by reactions against integration into the EU. 'This integration

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

was led by a party with Islamist roots, which also caused unrest. The most explicit manifestation of this upheaval is the entrance of Kemalist ulUSfUluk into a new phase: ulus{al}ctbk. The difference is that the "ism" is attached to the adjective form of the word "nation" (ulus) instead of the noun form. The ideological increase, however, is much greater than a mere verbal difference.

Ulus{al}czbk distances itself from Kemalist ulUSfUluk by its fanaticism; it does not appropriate the left-wing Kemalist nationalism's (at least formal) valuation of universal values and humanism and its understanding of nationbuilding as a "success of civilization." This new discourse of ulus{al}ctltk speaks with a language of war provoked by a perception of threat; it accuses opposing political stances of "betraying the nation." As noted in the summary of the new gear of nationalism in the 2..000S, the analogy with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the mythology of the War of Independence also play a prominent role. The best-selling novel $u

Plgtn Turkler

(The Crazy Turks), which dramatically constructs this war as the Turkish nation's resistance against imperialism under the leadership of Atatiirk and despite the conditions of deprivation, provides popular heroic images in this atmosphere.' The ulus{al}ctltk discourse interprets imperialism and globalization not as a part of the material rationality and dynamic complexity of the capitalist system but as a part of a web of intrigues stemming from a single center. As such, a conspiracy mentality forms the building block of this discourse, which reduces politics to an act of "deciphering:' All possible actors are deciphered in accordance with their position in the war between the national forces and the puppets and/or collaborators of the United States and the West; all discourses are deciphered in accordance with the secret messages they convey on the basis of this war. Not surprisingly, this mentality, which produces fanaticism, is also in line with the anti-Semitic patterns of thought and behavior. In fact, ulus{al}ctltk, unlike the traditional line of Kemalist ulUSfuluk, has established a discourse that does not avoid the ethnic implications of"Turkishness" -on the contrary, it refers to racist motifs. Without a doubt, it can be argued that the "old" Kernalist ulusfuluk accommodated the seedsof this nationalistic fanaticism: ulus{al)ctltk. Nevertheless, ulus{al)czltkhas6pened a new phase.

68

Taml Bora THE LIBERAL "NEO-NATIONALISM"

The official nationalism in Turkey has a strong modernist-Westernizing vein. Besides Kemalist ulUSfuluk, liberal nationalism is also an offspring of this vein. Yet it provides an interpretation of modernization from an economic perspective; as such it emphasizes the progressivist-developmentalist aspects of the process of modernization. The ideology of liberal nationalism matured toward the end of the 1980S, through the progress of the capitalist modernization process in Turkey. The discourse of liberal nationalism defines national identity in terms of the fervor and ability to attain the level of the "developed" or wealthy countries of the world-in other words, to attain the level of the West. It explains national pride not through the nation's unique, authentic characteristics but through its capacity to harmonize with universal standards. Yet the essentialist discourse of nationalism, of course, fancies this harmony to be an inborn trait "intrinsic to us." Such a nationalist conception, which is tied to the Kemalist goal of attaining the level of "modern civilization:' was potentially present in the liberal and social-democratic circles in Turkey. The dazzling aura of the globalization discourse made this conception more manifest and turned it into an ideological discourse. The discourse of liberal nationalism emerged following the self-confidence boom that Turkey experienced in the early 1990S. The most influential advocates of this discourse are the media, which are intertwined with big capital. Economics holds a privileged position in liberal nationalism. Creating a national market can be regarded as the most important function of nationalism, and it is in fact natural that a liberal type of nationalism emphasizes this function. This cold and scheming aspect of nationalism, however, does not really befit its enthusiastic character. As a matter of fact, even the National Economy movement, which emerged in the early years of the republic, transformed the economy into a vehicle and justified its goals through factors external to economics. The economic dimension of nationalism has been able to become a verbalvisual entity through the populist progressivist discourses of the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) and Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP). This dimension has been strengthened only recently as the ideology of economics has became hegemonic and as Turkish capitalism's progress in interfusing with the global economy has been ingrained into the collective consciousness as a national achievement. The liberal discourse can now speak of"the market

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey

69

and cultural unity of frozen foods, telephone ads, and soccer games" with enthusiasm and pride (Uluengin 1993a). Now the rise in exports, consumption, and standard of living and the fact that "the bonds of our government are eagerly bought on the Tokyo stock exchange"-in short, the dynamism of the economy-are treated as factors that flatter Turkish national pride most (Hurriyet, May 13, 1993). The enterprising energy of the "Turkish people;' which has been revealed with the liberalization of the economy. is lauded as an extremely valuable national characteristic. Even the anomie and vandalism generated by the inconsistencies of sacralizing economic entrepreneurship are tolerated and are considered to be the side effects of a healthy development. A radical variation of liberal nationalism. interfused with the ideology of economics, is the neo-liberal chauvinism of prosperity. This attitude. which violates the idea of social solidarity by its reluctance to share with the "underdeveloped" regions or communities the prosperity that it produces, is akin to class racism, which stigmatizes and discriminates against the lower classes by viewing them as backward and "of no breeding" and segregates them as a different "race" (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). Certain elements of this prosperity chauvinism and class racism can be seen in the liberal nationalism in Turkey. For instance, in 1994 Aegean business leaders demanded financial federalism because they were unhappy about having Ankara laying hands on the wealth they were producing. The villagers who owned land in the economically developing regions had been acting as the strongest advocates of privatization because they considered workers and civil servants parasites. The Europeanized urban upper middle classes (the Euro-Turks) have supposedly caught up with the EU norms not only educationally and professionally but also in terms of consumption, manners, cultural interests, and even in terms of biological standards such as light complexion, tall stature, and other physical attainments. They distinguish themselves as the elite group that represents the nation's essence as opposed to the impoverished lower classes, which they see as a hindrance in entering the ED. When the reactions of class egoism are shaped into nationalist patterns, they can form the nuclei of class racism. The stance that sees the Kurdish immigrants, who come to the western regions in search of jobs and/or as refugees from the war, as parasites gnawing at economic prosperity can easily ally the chauvinism of prosperity with ethno-nationalist radicalism.

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One very important source of pride for liberal nationalism is the de~ gree to which the domestic market merges with the global market and be~ comes identical to the world markets. This integration best manifests itself in the patterns of consumption. The consumer culture in this day and age is the main signifier of "modern civilization" and "universal culture." Neo~ nationalism has indeed buried the slogan of old~style nationalism: "Local goods are Turkish goods, every Turk should use them." Instead it takes pride in seeing in Istanbul "the brands that one can see in Paris, in Washington, in Tokyo" and in catching up with the universal "aesthetics of store windows and shopping" (Ozkok 1993C). It glorifies providing in tourism "not just na~ ture and history, as it did in the past, but also entertainment" and in haVing achieved an "international lifestyle" with credit cards, bars, discos, McDon~ aId's, and international pizza chains. For these all mean that Turkey is a "country that has attained a phUosophy equivalent to that of the West, and a similar level of institutionalization" (Civaoglu 1993). This language of na~ tionalism indeed resembles the language of advertising, the sine qua non rite of consumer culture. The civilizationist discourse of liberal nationalism adapts the ideal of attaining the level of "modern civilization" inherited from Atatiirkism as well as market fetishism and defines the cultural identity in terms of the ability to achieve and catch up ~ith the modern lifestyle. Benefits such as being open to the world, enjoying the pleasures of life, and mastering the tOols of the in~ formation society (such as computers and the English language) are lauded as the values of the "new Turkish" identity. In this context, for instance, when extOlling the victory of the Efes Pilsen basketball team over Panathinakos in Athens, arguments such as "basketball without hesitation is the sport of urbanites and of the cities" become commonplace (Uluengin 1993b). In his eulogy, Hadi Uluengin maintains that "my country has cast off its fanks [rawhide sandals] and become a dynamic society in basketball shoes; it has graduated from the stagnant soilta the swishing bask~t. " The national hero figure of the "new Turk" or "Euro-Turk" is the youth, particularly urban upper- and middle-class youths. l The urban youth is indeed the most dynamic consumer of the modern/globallifestyle and of its distributor and simulator, the media. As it is generally pointed out, the urban youths in Turkey are integrated with the modern culture as much as their Western counterparts are. The physical appearance of urban youths

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is also underlined as a source of pride. Ertugrul Ozkok, the editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper Hurriyet and one of the biggest supporters of liberal neo-nationalism, is also the apostle of the good tidings that "the Turkish populace is becoming more comely" (Ozkok 1992). Even in describing a soldier who lost his leg in the southeast. Ozkok draws attention to "his very slender face set offby thin wire-framed glasses" and calls this "the portrait of the changing, modernizing new Turkish youth" (Ozkok 1992). He describes Sabahattin Oztiirk, who won Turkey its first world championship in wrestling in twenty-three years: "Contemporary and good-looking. No mustache. strongly built, young and modern .... Our Sabahattin is more handsome, more modern. more contemporary than his counterparts in the West" (Ozkok 1993b). It should be noted here that the eugenic tendencies of this civilizationist discourse of nationalism may well lead to neo-racism if it gets carried away by the enthusiasm embodied in the assertion that "the populace is becoming more comely:' As consumer culture increasingly becomes the most valid signifier of the level of modern civilization, high culture is replaced by popular culture, and various forms of mass culture come to dominate the national culture. Liberal nationalism gives its due to this change; it transfers the fervor of nationalism to the world of popular culture. The position that Turkish pop music has acquired in the ritual economy of neo-nationalism reflects this tendency. The narcissism that manifests itselfin the "I love you so much" messages that stars and admirers exchange as a credo in pop music rites is transferred to a national narcissism through the discourse of liberal nationalism. Furthermore, this narcissism intermingles with hedonism. Ozkok, while advocating liberal neo-nationalism, preaches a "civil," entertaining national self-confidence that appeals to everyday life and has no business with "gray colors, grave speeches:' or politicS: "Turkey's indestructible strength, its somehow persisting stability. lies in this passion to live [which also manifests itself in pop music]" (Ozkok 1993a). . . . . . During the 2000S we have witnessed various events tha.t;.h~V'ef~is~dna­ tional confidence by nOUrishing this national narcissism~Ir12~.o6t1lel.inion of European Football Associations (UEFA) Cup was won'~y¥t¥kishteam (Galatasaray) for the first time, and in 2002 the Turkislt~~ti().~alfootball team attained third place in the World Cup. In 2oospop~ing#~S~l'ta~Etener won the Eurovision Song Contest. In 2007 Olker; a ~aj§t'f()#4gl'()~ucer in

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Turkey, purchased one of the most prestigious chocolate brands in the world, Godiva. Finally, a "Turk" (Muhtar Kent) was promoted to the position of chief executive officer in Coca Cola. The discourse of liberal nationalism is nourished with these selfconfidence serums. With its narcissistic and hedonistic character, it stands aloof both from the rigidity of official nationalism and from the fanaticism of ethno-essentialist nationalism. In contrast to the anachronisms of these types of nationalisms, liberal nationalism presents itself as the nationalism of the twenty-first century: a sterile nationalism without complexes that is not formalist, that has dissociated itself from populism and the rural world, and that does not transform national altruism into masochism. The leading exponents of this discourse support terminologies such as "constitutional citizenship" and "Turkish nationalism" that have nothing to do with the ethno-essentialist line; but while doing this, they continue to embrace the aura of sacredness that is part and parcel of traditional nationalism. Ozkok, for instance, used the story of the guitarist of a heavy metal group from Istanbul who died while fighting the PKK in the southwest as the proof that neo-nationalism is not lacking in patriotism. The discourse of liberal neo-nationalism is not only compatible with such causes and taboos of the official nationalism but can even transform and appropriate its basic themes. For example, the "renaissance of Turkish music:' which pop music is believed to have achieved, is celebrated as the realization ofZiya GokaIp's East-West synthesis on the "civil" level. In the words of6zkok (1993a): "Turkey has finally found the magnificent synthesis that it had been looking for since the nineteenth century. We are discovering how to experience the East with the rhythm of the West." This East-West synthesis was attained not through the cultural policies of the state but through the dynamics of the market. Again quoting Ozkok (1994): "[The pop star Tarkan] is the first full-blown megastar of the East-West synthesis, uniting Turkish people of all ages .... The new music that gushes forth from Tarkan's unbuttoned shirt gives the first signs of the transition to sedentary life in the aftermath of an exodus, a mental migration. an aesthetic nomadism that had rejected the East without being able to set foot in the West." In fact, the language of liberal neo-nationalism is a loose discourse. For this reason, it can easily succumb to the hegemony of other nationalist discourses. Due to its capacity to address a large audience. however, it has a chance to assert its domination

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in the modernization process. Turkey's goal of entering the EU also introduces the necessary grounds that encourage the growth of this language of nationalism.

PAN-TuRKIST RADICAL NATIONALISM

The pan-Turanist/Turkist nationalism is a perverted branch of the official nationalism. It is a fascistic ideology founded by the pan-Turkist intelligentsia, which has pursued the racist-ethnicist vein of the official nationalism to its extreme. It departs from the patriotic/''Anatolianist'' line of Atatiirk nationalism and instead refers to the entire territories inhabited by people from the Turkic descent as the homeland. Yet with respect to cultural essentialism and the conception of an organic and authoritarian society, one may argue that the difference between this type of nationalism and the official nationalism of the period remains on a quantitative level. It can be defined on a scale of extremeness-moderateness. The historical conception based on imagining an eternal national existence and the conception of a "national religion" are the points where pan-Turkist nationalism and official nationalism coalesce. The tension between the pan-Turanist/Turkist movement and the official nationalism reached its peak during the World War II years. In 1944, as Turkey joined the Western alliance with urgent haste, the pan-Turkist movement was reduced to a marginal intellectual movement. In the 19605 a new course was plotted by the idealist (itlkiteu) movement and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetc;i Hareket Partisi, MHP). Both the movement and the party rested upon an anti-Communist fanaticism and were formed by Alparslan Tlirke~ through merging the legacy of the pan-Turkist movement with the nationalist-conservative reactionary potential of the 1950S. On the ideological level the racist motives lost ground, and a new discourse of nationalism based on cultural-historical essentialism has developed. This development intensified in the 1970S, and during the late 1970S and early 1980s it went so far as to assert Islam as the principal element of national identity. Following the military coup of September 12, 1980, the dominance of Islamic identity increased to a great extent. The instances in which the state undertook the mission of acting as a de facto militia prior to the coup were also questioned. During this period the pan-Turkist themes became blurred (Bora and Can 1999). In the 1990S a new transformation took

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place as pan-Turkism become "rational:' The reactionary nationalist wave that arose against the Kurdish national movement was part and parcel of this transformation. The idealist movement, both by acting as the original defender of pan-Turkism and by supporting the state morally and materially against the Kurdish "secessionism;' rehabilitated its relationship with the official nationalism. Accordingly, it drew closer to the political center. Yet at the same time it strengthened its cultural and popular ties (Bora 2.001). It distanced itself from its extremist outlook and became "normalized." Along with this development. the MHP rapidly grew stronger. The party increased its votes from 2...9 percent in 1987 to almost 10 percent (which is the threshold required to enter the parliament) in the general elections of 1995. Finally. it took part in the coalition government by gathering close to 18 percent of the votes in the 1999 elections. One aspect of the ideological change that the idealist movement underwent in the 1990S was "re-Turkicizing." The pan-Turanist/Turkist literature. which had become marginalized since the mid-1970S. was revived during this period. References to Turkish mythology and ancient Turkish history multiplied. The totem of original Turkism. the bozkurt (gray wolf). regained esteem both as a symbol and as the name of the young idealist movement Bozkurtlar (Gray Wolves). The books written by Nihal AtSlZ. a prominent racist-fascist author of the 1930S and 19405. were reprinted. Various websites promoting AtSlZ and his works emerged. Another development that occurred on the ideological level as a consequence of this re-Turkicizing was the reduction of Islamism to the position of a subordinate. secondary component of national identity. This transformation of course included other factors: (1) the rivalry between the Islamic and the nationalist movements became more severe as the Islamic movement grew and became a hegemonic power; (2..) the Islamic movement (and the Islamic countries) came to compete in the Turkic republics with the influence that Turkey enjoys there; and (3) the new relation of the MHP with official nationalism drew it closer to a secular position. Even though the MHP did not strongly support the February 28. 1997, process, in which the Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Parrisi, RP) was removed from the political power on the initiative of the army, it nevertheless gave implicit approval to this process with the aim of winning the truSt of the regime. This approval reinforced the secular tendency of the MHP, which paralleled the party's appropriation of Atatiirk by depicting

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him not only as an uncompromising Turkish nationalist but as a pan-Turkist. a ba;bug (chief leader) who espoused the pan-T urkist utopia. Since the beginning of the 1990S the idealist-nationalist youth movement. which had a fanatical and harsh character, has reached out beyond the limits of its traditional constituency and has begun displaying its repertory of symbols outside of its inner circle. The movement started finding sympathizers among the young urban upper-middle classes and reaching modern youth who listened to rock and pop music. The popularization of the idealist/panTurkist symbols and the modernizing tendencies of the idealist movement's young constituency enabled links to be formed between this movement and liberal nationalism. While this expansion opened a new area of influence for the MHP, it also brought problems for the party. From an organizational point of view, it was difficult to absorb the conflicts between the traditional constituency, which had stronger religiOUS proclivities, and the new urban-modern constituency. From the ideological point of view. the party felt anxiety that the rigid essentialism of the pan-Turkist movement could be destroyed by the different identity-perceptions of official and liberal nationalisms. The identity conceptions of the latter were indeed more "lax" and carried the risk of shifting toward cosmopolitism and becoming non-national in character. The problems caused by this tension undoubtedly played a part in the MHP's poor performance in the 1995 general elections; the party was not able to pass the 10 percent threshold. After the death ofTtirke~, who emphasized the modernizing image of his party somewhat exaggeratedly, Deviet Bah
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the labeling of local plant and animal species with Turkish names, and the cool reception given to the foreign aid provided during the major earthquake of 1999, out of concern that it was a vehicle of foreign interference or even espionage. Apart from these, two important matters that challenged the MHP's own specific conception of nationalism were the death sentence of Abdullah 0calan and the legal measures necessary for Turkey to become a member of the ED. The MHP leaders supported the execution of 0calan, because they saw him as personifying the "Kurdish problem:' which in any event they codified as the problem of terrorism. Nevertheless, they consented to not having the sentence executed. They justified this consent in terms of not wanting to put Turkey in a difficult position on the international arena. It was part of the MHP's strategy of earning trust in the eyes of the establishment by showing the party's absolute loyalty to supraparty state policies. As for the goal of entering the EU, which the establishment also designated as a supraparty policy, the MHP did not oppose it. But it interpreted the EU membership as a transitional step in Turkey'S march toward the status of great power or world power. On the one hand, the party insisted that the EU must not prevent Turkey from pursuing its eternal historical aspirations. On the other hand, the MHP spokespersons continued to interpret the legal arrangements undertaken toward integration with the EU's supranational framework as undermining the foundations of the nationstate. These measures were even referred to as a natural continuation of Europe's ancient plans aimed at partitioning Turkey. In the summer of 1.002. the MHP voted against the EU harmonization laws in parliament, going against the nationallefi:-winglliberal-conservative majority of the government of which it is a part. Afi:er the 2.002. general elections the MHP developed a strategy based on reacting against the policies implemented for the EU integration. The MHP cadres continued to provide the main ground for the reactionary nationalist potential in Turkey, while attempting to hold it back from the streets and provocative events and to keep it under control. This stand was a result of both the MHP cadres' worries about being used in provocations outside their control and the plan to continue to be regarded by the regime elite and the people as a responSible party with common sense. The groups affected by this movement. however, played prominent roles in various lynching attempts

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that were carried out during the nationalist upheavals that took place between 2.006 and 2.008. It should be mentioned here that movements that considered the MHP inadequate have emerged within the idealist-nationalist circles. The MHP was not seen taking the necessary active stance against the developments that threatened national existence. This opposition emerged particularly after the Kurdish movement's reinitiation of armed struggle and developed as a result of the spreading of the aforementioned anti-Kurdish resentment. The Unity of Patriotic Forces (Vatansever Kuvvecler Giis: Birligi), established by the retired officers who left the MHP, attracted attention in 2.006 after organizing a mass march in Mersin-a city where mass Turkish and Kurdish populations coexist. During the march a Turkish flag some kilometers in length was carried and threatening slogans were heard. In the same year a small racist group in izmir called the Tribalists (Buduncular) initiated a signature campaign that demanded the implementation of measures to prevent Kurds from reproducing and migrating to the western regions. Furthermore, the Grand Unity Party (Biiyiik Birlik Partisi, BBP), established in 1992.. reinforced this racist-fascist stand. Although the party Originally embraced an Islamist"civil SOciety" discourse, it soon transformed into a racist-fascist discourse that attracted the radicals who were unhappy about the MHP's approach to the center.

NATIONALISM IN ISLAMISM

After the 1980S Turkish modern Islamist intellectuals developed a radical criticism of the nation-state and of nationalism. In the traditional Islamist discourse, the Muslim community (ummet) stands above the nation. Yet one cannot overlook the strong nationalist implications in the discourse of the Islamist movement in Turkey, whose core is formed by the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi. MSP), Welfare Party (RP), Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP). Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP), and Justice and Development Party (AKP). This type of nationalism envisages Turkey as the potential leader of the Islamic world. Within this context the nostalgia for the Ottoman past translates into a modern and nationalistic imperial (or irredentist) fantasy (Bora 1999). Anti-Western xenophobia is the common denominator of pan-Turkist nationalism and Islamism. The specific point of Islamism is

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that it assumes religious identity to be the differentiating element and the backbone of the nation and of nationhood. In view of this, Islam is viewed as the authentic core of the Turkish national identity. Another ideological denominator linking the main Islamist movement with the official modernist nationalism is progressivism-developmentalism. The RP leadership, composed of the Muslim technocratic elite and the new Muslim bourgeoisie, lauded heavy industry as opposed to financial speculation and has been a faithful disciple of the "cause for national progressivism." This makes it possible to form a bond between the nationalist elements within the RP-centered Islamist movement and the discourse of liberal nationalism. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister and the leader of the AKP, occasionally approximates the discourse of liberal nationalism through using the phrase "positive nationalism." In Turkey we observe this trend in the liberal-right tradition, which sees economic development and the ability to attain prosperity as the ultimate sources of national pride. The pragmatist and utilitarian AKP, however, does not embrace this stand once and for all. It either flirts with the reactionary nationalism or parries or stalls the nationalist reactions, not rejecting them outright. The SP, on the contrary, maintains the tradition of orthodox Islam and solidifies the anti-EU and anti-Western stance of this tradition. But this party is being increasingly marginalized. More significant is the ethno-religious populism represented by the newspaper Vakit (Time), which sells almost sixty thousand copies daily. Using macho slang and anti-Communist cliches dating from the Cold War, the newspaper creates a fascist mental universe for its Islamist readers. It declares the secularists, "Westernists," the entire "West:' Masonry, Jews, Zionists, apostates, non-Muslims, and above all the "leftist mentality" -which the newspaper sees as the common denominator of all- to be enemies and incites hatred toward them. All enemies are attributed non-Muslim or non-Turkish origins and defined accordingly by their ethno-religious identities.

HYBRID LANGUAGES AND THE PROBLEM OF HEGEMONY

In addition to tensions, each type of nationalism contains articulations, osmoses, and syntheses among its "Eastern" and "Western," ethno-essentialist

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and civil faces. Such cross-breedings prove to be fruitful and complex in Turkey, where the nationalist language and its different dialects are in continuous progress. Positions known as left and right can come together on the common ground of nationalism. Yet the most striking fusions result from the transfer of the verbal-visual universe of nationalism to the field of popular culture. Many national symbols become a kind of "pop" coat of arms; as such they can be worn relatively independent of a specific political meaning. National symbols become trademarks, engendering their consumption. Thus a dual process begins. The nationalist "exhibitionism" comes to dominate the everyday life and public arenas, yet it is tamed through becoming popularized. This broad and disorganized lexicon created by the plurality of nationalist discourses gives rise to a great swarm of words, becoming a nationalistic hubbub. Nationalism's tyrannizing discourse dominates politics and everyday life. Furthermore, its monopolizing logic expands to the utmost, generating fervor and violence, turning all the political opposition into enemies, insisting on national unity as a dogma, and turning the "shared good" into something otherworldly. The struggle for hegemony that arises among the different nationalist discourses above all reinforces the pressure of nationalism's structural logic. As already noted, the new gear of the 2.000S has increased this pressure. The discursive hybridizations have multiplied. Grotesqueness and fanaticism have surfaced as the results of the chemical reactions between various nationalisms. Despite the short life span of the Ktztlelma Coalition, which brought together Kemalist-nationalists, idealists, and pseudo-leftists with nationalsocialist ideologies, the symbiosis between the ulus{al}ct and idealist groups continued to devel0p.4 This symbiosis has popularized the ethnicist-racist mind-set and conspiracy theories. The murder of Hrant Dink, a prominent Armenian-Turkish journalist and intellectual, in 2007 is an unfortunate example of the outcomes of such a symbiosis. The only thing that is clear about this murder, which is otherwise marked by unanswered questions, is the web of relations of the young assassin. The assassin, a young lumpen, has been influenced by the daily ulus{al}ct and nationalist agitation, which is fueled primarily by the webpages that instigate racist violence and has found himself in the midst of an intricate web of relations (involving the BBP's local organizations, gendarmerie and police units, and "unknown" provocateurs). As a

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result, he volunteered to "kill the Armenian" (the first words of the assassin when he was caught after the murder). At this point the ulus{al}a conspiracy attempts should also be noted. After :2.005 the ulus{al}c~ circles, which include retired military officers as active members, made attempts to topple the AKP government. At the ideological base of these attempts lay the ulus{al)c~ theses. It was argued that the AKP government was not adequately attending to the "national sensibilities" and due to its antisecular, Islamist hidden agenda was willing to carry out the United States' "moderate Islam belt" project directed toward the Middle East. We know that these groups. who have used psychological warfare methods in the media and in nationalist campaigns. have attempted to motivate the army to intervene against this threat. We can now return to the discussion of the struggle for hegemony among nationalisms. As liberal nationalism is far from having a complete ideological doctrine, it has a power that may not be visible but is actually very influential. This is why it permeates most of this chapter; this dialect indeed tends to form the hegemonic discourse of Turkish nationalism. All the languages of nationalism are apt to join this discursive system, regardless of the themes and material they use. As mentioned before, the discourse of "pOSitive nationalism" at times referred to by AKP also displays a tendency to be part of this system. But a handi~ap of the language ofliberal nationalism is that it appeals to the "winners" of this process; it is not likely that this language can convince the underclasses in difficult economic situations. This is why the discourse of liberal nationalism will probably become fused with other nationalist languages, making concessions from its own discursive system along the way. Under these circumstances, the official nationalism and pan-Turkist nationalism, as well as the ulus{al}cz hybrids, wUl come to the fore as they provide more complete discursive systems. They will continue to exert influence especially because of the "maturity" of their reflexes in the face of burning national issues.

NOTES I.

2.

Such expressions pointing to the indivisibility of the Turkish state were incorporated into the opening statement of the 1982. Constitution. The novel. published in 2005, has sold almost I ~illion copies since then.

Nationalist Discourses in Turkey 3. 4.

In the words of those who critically oppose this discourse: the "white Turk." Ulus(al}cl is the adjective form of the term ulus(al}a1tk. For the ulus(al}czltk discourse, see the section "Kemalist Ulusfuluk" above.

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5

THE CHANGING NATURE OF NATIONALISM IN TURKEY

Actors, Discourses, and the Struggle for Hegemony

UMUT OZKIRIMLI

ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1982 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

states: "The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity." This is of course. a reiteration of the famous French revolutionary formula "la Republique une et indivisible:' first used by the National Convention on September 25, 1792, and incorporated in every French constitution starting with the Constitution of June 24, 1793. The key word here is "indivisible:' which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as "incapable of being divided (actually, or in thought); incapable of being distributed among a number; incapable of being separated or detached, inseparable." A republic or a state is only one and indivisible, "incapable of being divided (actually, or in thought);' if it contains no fault lines along which it can fracture-in other words, if the nation it harbors is homogeneous and devoid of any cleavages, social, cultural, or political. The aim of this chapter is to deconstruct the myth of the "homogeneous nation" with particular reference to the case of Turkey. It does this by drawing together a Gramscian reading of nationalism and the topographical approach ofJean Pierre Faye and integrating this with the broader debates on nationalism in Turkey that have been taking place over the past two decades

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or so. In this context, I first propose a conceptual and theoretical framework that takes the plural and heterogeneous character of nationalism into account. I then provide a topography of nationalist discourses in Turkey with a view to throwing light on the dynamics of the ongoing struggle for hegemony over the nation by various social and political forces at the turn of the twenty-first century. This particular reading places the emphasis on the protean nature of nationalism, the diversity of its discourses, and their respective operationalization. Nationalism is presented as a field of positions in which different and often competing narratives circulate, a field that defies the straitjacket of neat categorization, where osmosis and exchange are the norm.

THE MYTH OF THE "HOMOGENEOUS NATION"

Homogeneity is nationalism's ultimate dream, the quintessential characteristic of the "immaculate nation:' as the oft-quoted definition of nationalism as "a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" by Ernest Gellner (1983, p. I) reminds us. Yet such correspondence has been an aberration not a constant in human history. Ethnic and cultural pluralism has been the norm, and the content and the boundaries of the nation have been ceaselessly contested by those who were not considered to be and in most cases did not consider themselves to be part of the officially defined nation. National homogeneity, in the sense of a complete congruence between national and political units, is and has always been a pipe dream. Yet nationalism never relinquishes its claim to homogeneity and continues to turn a blind eye to the fractures, divisions, and differences of opinion that exist within the nation. Even when the differences are acknowledged. nationalism claims that the interests and values of the nation override all other interests and values. It divides the world into binary categories; into "us" and "them; "friends" and "foes," positing a homogeneous and fixed identity on either side. Nationalism produces and legitimates hierarchies among actors, authOrizing particular formulations of the nation.· against others. There is only one "authentic" culture. in which all the·mernbersofthe collective "us" are presumed to share. This transforms the lang11~ge()fnational­ ism into a language of morality and renders nationalis.lllthevery h~rizon of

Umut Ozklrlmll

political discourse (for similar views. see Billig 1995; Calhoun 1997; Herzfeld 1997; Finlayson 1998; Suny 2.001; Brubaker 2004). Needless to say. this conception of "us" and "culture" is very problematic.

as there is no single narrative of the nation. As Prasenjit Duara (1996. pp. 16162) notes:

[TJhe way in which the nation is imagined. viewed and voiced by different self-conscious groups can indeed be very different. Indeed we may speak of different "nation-views" as we do "world-views:' which are not overriden by the nation, but actually define or constitute it. In place of the harmonized. monologic voice of the Nation. we find a polyphony of voices, overlapping and criss-crossing; contradictory and ambiguous: opposing, affirming and negotiating their views of the nation. The same goes for national cultures that are constructed through a multiplicity of relations, which reflect existing social hierarchies, hence particular structures of power and control. As the configuration of power in a given society changes, so do cultures. In the words of Bhikhu Parekh (:2.000. p. 52). "culture ... is not a passive inheritance bur an active process of creating meaning, not given but constantly redefined and reconstituted." The process through which nations. and national cultures are constructed is a complex one, with no sense of closure. Echoing E. P. Thompson (1980) in his foray into the process of the making of the English working class, we might argue that the making of nations can be likened to a journey of discovery, of coming together and parting, of osmosis, exchange, struggle, and confrontation. The myth of the "homogenous nation" is not the preserve of nationalists, however, and informs media reporting and popular-even academic-commentaries that ignore the dynamic and contentious nature of nation-formation and continue to talk of nations as "monolithic" entities. According to Rogers Brubaker, who has provided the most elaborate analysis of this problem to date, most discussions of nationalism begin with the question "what is a nation?" This question, Brubaker (1996, pp. 13-14) argues, is not as theoretically innocent as it seems: "the very terms in which it is framed presuppose the existence of the entity that is to be defined." Accordingly, we casually "reify" ethnic and national groups in our everyday talk and writing, speaking of "the Serbs;' "the Croats;' or "the Turks" for that matter, as if they

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were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes (Brubaker 1998, p. 2.93). Brubaker (1998, p. 2.9, 2.004) introduces the term "groupism" to refer to "the social ontology that leads us to talk and write about ethnic groups and nations as real entities, as communities, as substantial, enduring. internally homogeneous and externally bounded collectivities." The problem with the treatment of nations as real entities, according to Brubaker, is that it adopts categories of practice as categories of analysis. It takes a conception inherent in the practice of nationalism and makes it central to the theory of nationalism (Brubaker 1996, p. IS). Yet the problem is not only intellectual. Reification, Brubaker notes, is also a social process. As such, it is central to the practice of ethnic politicS. Reifying groups is precisely what ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, who may live "off" as well as "for" ethnicity, are in the business of doing. By invoking groups, these entrepreneurs seek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being: When they are successful, the political fiction of the unified group can be momentarily yet powerfully realized in practice. As analysts, we should certainly try to account for the ways in which-and conditions under which-this practice of reification, this powerful crystallization of group feeling, can work .... But we should avoid unintentionally doubling or reinforcing the reification of ethnic groups in ethnopolitical practice with a reification of such groups in social analysis. (Brubaker 2.002, pp. 166-67) This last point is crucial, says Brubaker, and needs to be emphasized more than ever at a time when groupist language prevails in everyday life, journalism, politics, and much of social research. We should treat "group ness" as variable, "as emergent properties of particular structural or conjunctural settings" (Brubaker 1998, p. 298): We should not ask "what is a nation" but rather: how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within anda.tnong states? How does nation work as practical category, as· classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame? What makes the use of that categ~ry by or against states more or less resonant and effective? (Brubaker 1996, p. 16)

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This suggests that we should think of nationalism in the plural or as a site where different constructions of the nation contest and negotiate with each other. Nation-building is not a "teleological" process, tending toward a pre~ determined outcome; it is a social process that involves diverse intentions, a struggle for hegemony between different social and political forces, competing over the final definition of the nation. What is more, the struggle for hegemony does not end after the establishment (or consolidation) of an independent state. Evidently, the victorious nationalist project enjoys considerable advantages over its competitors: it can now employ the "ideological apparatuses" of the state for the cultivation of its values among the medley of populations that inhabit its territories (Althusser 1971). The state monopolizes all channels of socialization from the family and schools to the army and the media. It leaves its imprint on a host of cultural practices, including sports, common pastimes, and holidays, thus permeating everyday life in a myriad of small and taken-for-granted ways. This is in a way a process of "selfreproduction:' whereby nationalism perpetuates its hegemony. At this point, we should recall that in the formulation of Antonio Gramsci (1971) hegemony entails a complex combination of "coercion" and "consene' No ideology, including nationalism, can maintain its hegemony through coercion alone. The fact of hegemony "presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies ?f the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equUibrium should be formed" (Gramsci 1971, p. 161). Reproduction is the main channel through which nationalism attains the "compromise equilibrium." Yet the achievement of hegemony is never total. However potent the victorious nationalist project may be, the society, precisely due to its internal diversity, produces alternative projects (identities, values, even cultures) in defiance of the much-desired homogeneity. Sometimes these projects consist of the reawakening of the failed aspirations of the earlier nation-building process; at other times, they are fresh projects bred by changing conditions. These alternative projects stand in a complex relationship to the nationalism imposed and reproduced by the state, oscillating between conflict and compromise. Here we might return to the concept of hegemony and use it, as William Roseberry (1996) suggests, not to understand the unity of coercion and consent in situations of domination, as Gramsci originally intended, but to understand struggle or the ways in which the words, images, symbols,

The Changing Nature of Nationalism in Turkey

organizations, and institutions of the subordinate populations used to talk about or resist their domination are shaped by the process of domination itself: What hegemony constructs, then, is not a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting about social orders characterized by domination .... The common material and meaningful framework is, in part, discursive, a common language or way of talking about social relationships that sets out the central terms around which and in terms of which contestation and struggle can occur. (Roseberry 1996, p. 80) The image of "hegemony" that Roseberry portrays fits in perfectly with the way in which nationalism is conceptualized in this chapter and enables us to understand both the process of reproduction of nationalism and how (and the extent to which) it can be resisted. When a common discursive framework, such as nationalism, achieves hegemony, certain forms of activity are given the official seal of approval, while others are declared offensive and inadmissible. In such a context, even "forms and languages of protest or resistance must adopt the forms and languages of domination in order to be registered or heard" (Roseberry 1996, p. 81). This is also what James Scott (19 85) argues in his classic f.Veapons of the f.Veak, which recounts the story of everyday peasant resistance in the small village of Sedaka (Malaysia) in the 1970S. According to Scott, resistance to a system of domination is indeed possible; subordinate groups can and otten do penetrate and demystify the prevailing ideology. But the ideological struggle takes place within the normative framework of the existing hegemony: The crucial point is rather that the very process of attempting to legitimate a social order by idealizing it always provides its subjects with the means, the symbolic tools, the very ideas for a critique that operates entirely within the hegemony. For most purposes,. then, it is not at all necessary for subordinate classes to set foot outside the confines of the ruling ideals in order to formulate a critique of power. (Scott 1985, p. 338; emphasis in the original)

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The wider picture will be dearer if we distinguish between two levels of hegemony: the hegemony of state nationalism and the broader hegemony of nationalism as a horizon of political discourse. As alluded to earlier, much of the opposition to state nationalism acknowledges its hegemony to a degree: alternative forms of nationalism are continually using the values of state nationalism in order to press their claims or disparage the claims of their opponents. This is the case, for example, with dissident nationalisms in Turkey, which do not openly question the principle of secularism or more generally Kemalism. Yet certain alternative projects will manage to go beyond the first hegemony and question the foundational principles of the state. Cases in point are variants of Kurdish nationalism striving for independent statehood or a federal structure in Turkey. They will do this, how~ ever, by employing the "universal" language of nationalism. In other words, they will propagate an alternative "nationalist" project against the State and its principles; they will substitute a given set of "national" principles and values with alternative "national" principles and values. But the projects that seek to go beyond the second hegemony, the broader hegemony of na~ tionalism (say, cosmopolitan or multiculturalist projects), are very few in the current "national order of things" (Malkki 1996); what is more, they are weak, lacking in mass support, as they are commonly perceived to be "state~ subverting." The merit of this conception of hegemony is that it helps us draw a more complex map of a field over which a particular ideology or discourse, in this case nationalism, reigns. It also points to the need to develop a new language that does not treat nations as homogeneous, unitary wholes. As Katherine Verdery (1993, p. 39) suggests, the nation is better seen as a symbol, "and any given nationalism as haVing multiple meanings, offered as alternatives and competed over by different groups manoeuvring to capture the symbol's definition and its legitimating effects." Groups orienting to the nation all take it to be the paramount symbol, Verdery contends, but they have different in~ tendons for it. Treating the nation as a symbol increases our sensitivity to the social tensions and struggles within which it has become a Significant idiom-"a form of currency, used to trade on issues that may not be about the nation at all" (Verdery 1993, pp. 41-.42).

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TURKISH NATIONALISMS AND HEGEMONY

Atatiirk nationalism, Kemalist nationalism or Kemalism, Turkism, uluStuluk (literally "nationalism;' derived from the modern Turkish word ulus [nation] instead of the more religiously loaded millet, used by the antiimperialist, Third-Worldist Left in the 1960$ and 1970S), ulusalczlzk (again literally "nationalism," derived from the adjective ulusal [national], used by a broad coalition of social and political forces sharing a staunchly secularist, anti-West/EU-skeptical outlook), patriotism~if there is one single Turkish nationalism, which one is it? The answer to this question would probably vary according to the historical period in which it is raised or the person it is addressed to. For the Constitution of 1982., it is Atatiirk nationalism; for the late Biilent Ecevit, the former leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP), it was uluSfuluk; for the socialist or Communist Left, it is patriotism; for a member of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), it is Turkism or simply Turkish nationalism; for a Kemalist, it is, at least today, ulusalctlzk. More importantly, the contours of what each term means are not fixed or static. Hence the patriotism of the 1960s, which was mixed with a strong dose of anti-Americanism, is different from contemporary patriotism, which defines itself more on the basis of EU-skepticism. The members of what has been commonly referred as the "red apple coalition" (inspired by the term "red apple;' denoting the mythical Turkish land in Central Asia) in the media define ulusalctlzk differently, depending on whether they are affiliated with the MHP or the Workers Party (ip). And in due process, certain terms are removed from circulation, as in the case of ulustuluk, which is Widely replaced by ulusalctlzk today (on Turkish nationalisms, see KadlOglu 1996; Poulton 1997; Aydm 1998; ytldlz 2.001; Bora 2.002.; Gagaptay 2.006). To go back to our introductory question, which of the above is Turkish nationalism? In a sense, they all are. In fact, no single Turkish nationalism exists; there are Turkish nationalisms. This attests to the transitional character of any articulation of Turkish nationalism, which is the end product of a continuous struggle for hegemony where existing formulae are tested and transformed and novel elements are added to make up new articulations of what it means to be a ''Turk:'

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Not surprisingly, nationalist historiography inaugurated by the republican regime in the I930S does not accept such a reading, preferring instead to present the emergence of Turkish nationalism as a process of "awaken.ing," belated yet inevitable. The key actor in this narrative is a mystical, atemporal, even transcendental "Turkishness" whose survival is more important than the survival of its individual members at any given time. Yet, as many studies on the genesis and historical development of Turkish nationalism have shown, the Ottoman elites were torn between at least three broadly discernible political projects at the turn of the nineteenth century, not all of them national, let alone nationalist. Even a cursory glance at the widely cited but rarely properly read manifesto Three Types a/Policy by Yusuf Ak~ura (one of the twin founding fathers of Turkish nationalism with Ziya Gokalp) will prove the point: It seems to me that since the rise of the desires for progress and rehabilitation spread from the West, three principal political doctrines have been conceived and followed in the Ottoman dominions. The first is the one which seeks to create an Ottoman Nation through assimilating and unifying the various nations subject to Ottoman rule. The second seeks to unify politically all Muslims living under the governance of the Ottoman S~ate because of the fact that the prerogative of the Caliphate has been a part of the power of the Ottoman State (this is what the Europeans call Pan-Islamism). The third seeks to organize a policy of Turkish nationalism [Turk Milliyet-i sryasryesi] based on ethnicity. (Ak~ura 1998 [1904], p. I; translated by David S. Thomas) "The idea to bring about a policy of Turkish nationalism based on ethnicity," Ak~ura (1998 [1904], p. 2.3) hastens to add, "is very recent ... [it] is still in its infancy and not widespread." Nationalist historiography, in contrast, posits the$e projects as different stages in the development of Turkish nationalism; thus it presents the emergence of nationalism as a teleological process, culminating in the establishment of an independent "Turkish" state. But not all these political projects (namely Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism) set for themselves the goal of independent statehood; rather, they constituted responses to the agonizing question of "how to save the defunct empire" (for a detailed discussion, see

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Ozkmmh and Sofos 2008). Moreover, as recent studies have suggested, the projects in question did not follow one another in a chronological fashion but were selectively and interchangeably used by political actors, depending on the political conjuncture: [T]he new leaders viewed Turkism, like Ottomanism and Panislamism, as a tool to be used to fulfill their supreme political goal: the salvation of the empire. By early 1908 the CPU [Committee of Progress and Union, the Young Turks] had begun to employ Turkism. Ottomanism, and Panislamism interchangeably in its propaganda. sometimes simply replacing the term "Turk" with "Ottoman" in its appeals. (Hanioglu 2001, p. 296; see also Kayah 1997; Hanioglu 2006)

In short. the emergence of Turkish nationalism was not a foregone conclusion but the product of a protracted process during which a number of alternative projects contested each other. The outcome of this competition among the various projects was not predetermined; it depended on a complex combination of historical and political factors and of contingency. In this sense, the establishment of a "Turkish" nation was less a conscious choice than a historical/practical necessity. Naturally, alternative projects have not JUSt vanished into thin air after the establishment of the republic. They have continued to incubate inside society. waiting for the right moment to hatch out. In examining nationalism in contemporary Turkey. it is important to understand the struggle for hegemony, the ways in which the numerous participants in making the nation promote it, defend it, and challenge it. In other words, we need to construct a topography of Turkish nationalisms that brings together and provides the common thread for the diverse contribution of various actors and ideas while depicting this very diversity. This is akin to what the French poet. historian. and philosopher Jean Pierre Faye (1972) does in his grouridbreakirig Langages totalitaires: Critique de fa raison/l'economie narrative; .astlldyof the narratives produced by right-wing groups in the Weimar Republi~.Accordingto Faye. the field of positions where narratives circulate c()nstlt\ltesanunderlying structure or "topography," "in the sense of a map whichtep.resents the relations of opposition between the principal narratorsariddl'c\uriscribes the spaces of their operation" :

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The field of positions is a ~deep structure" which generates-that is, both limits and renders possible-the kinds of narratives which appear in the historical domain. It renders possible and renders acceptable: this mise en acceptation is the outcome of a process which underlies the production and circulation of narratives. (Thompson 1984, pp. 20910; see also Faye 1972, pp. S-6, 9)

Taml Bora's stimulating article "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey" (2003) provides an excellent point of departure for charting the topography of nationalisms in contemporary Turkey (see an extended version of this article in chapter 4). Bora identifies five nationalist discourses in the Turkey of the 1990S: (I) official nationalism or Atatiirk nationalism, (2) Kemalist nationalism or ulusfUluk, (3) liberal neo-nationalism, (4) Turkist radical nationalism, and (S) nationalism in Islamism. According to Bora, official nationalism or Atatiirk nationalism, with its focus on the mission to build and perpetuate the nation-state, is the root-language of Turkish nationalism. Despite its pretensions to be "civic," official nationalism puts on a rather "essentialist" and aggressive garb in foreign disputes and in the domains of popular culture such as international sports competitions. Pervaded by a perception of constant threat that feeds into a state of vigilance, this nationalism leans ultimately on the army, which it takes as its guardian/protector. Bora argues that official nationalism has a language "far too rigid, cold and stereotyped," a weakness that it tries to compensate with "a frenzied consumption of symbols of the nation-state such as the national anthem, the effigy of Atatiirk. the flag, the star and the crescent" in public life (Bora 2003, pp. 437-38). Kemalist nationalism (uluSfuluk) is a derivative of official nationalism with a "leftish" coloring. It replaces the anti-imperialism and Third Worldism of its predecessor with an uncompromising secularism, yet maintains its general anti-Western outlook, combining it with a strong dose of xenophobia. Its obsession with secularism also explains its privileging of the Turkified term ulus for "nation" over the Arabic millet, given the latter's religious connotation (Bora 2003, pp. 439-40). The third nationalist discourse in Bora's analysis, liberal neo-nationalism, springs from the modernist-Westernist fountainhead of official nationalism and defines "national identity in terms of its fervor and ability to attain the level of the 'developed' or wealthy countries of the world." Its emphasis

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on economic success often turns intO "market fetishism:' "welfare chauvinism;' and "class racism." In its fondness for the youth and popular culture, it presents itself as the nationalism of the twenty-first century (Bora 2.003. pp. 440 -45). Turkist radical nationalism. diverging from official nationalism with its broader conception of homeland covering all territories inhabited by people ofTurkic descent. has been given a new lease of life in the 1990S following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Cleansing its ideology of racist elements and turning it into an exotic cocktail of cultural-historical essentialism with Islamic accretions, Turkist radical nationalism has managed to broaden its electoral base and to gather the support of the urban upper-middle-class youth. Yet this variant is still haunted by the image of its belligerent past and has not succeeded in dosing the rift between its traditional rural and its new urban constituencies (Bora 2.003. pp. 445-48). The nationalist discourse of the Islamists gives pride of place to Turkey's potential leadership of the Islamic world. Its conventional stance in "national causes" and its traditional anti-Westernism frequently take the form of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. It shares with official nationalism an emphasis on "progressivism-developmentalism"; its Achilles' heel, however, is its support for ummah, the unity of the Islamic "community of believers" (Bora 2.003, P·449). Bora's attempt at "mapping nationalism" during the

provides us with several dues for navigating through the complex terrain of nationalisms in today's Turkey. It needs to be pointed out at the outset that most of the discourses of nationalism identified by Bora have survived into the twenty-first century. The most Significant difference between the Turkey of the 1990S and Turkey today is the rapprochement between some of these nationalist discourses and official nationalism-a "partnership of fate;' a coming together, even a coalescence between forces that had a checkered relationship in the past. Bora also refers to the cross-breeding and fusion among discourses. noting that the various nationalisms are "hybrid" rather than purebred (Bora 2003, pp. 449-50). We may suggest that such cross-breeding has intensified today to the extent that we can now talk about a synthesis between official nationalism and some ofits rivals that is at once polyphonic andmulticentered. The synthesis in question is the so-called ulusalcdJe, which has been at the forefront of public debate during the last few years. The omnipresence of the 1990S

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symbols of the nation-state and the elevation of the cult of Atatiirk into one of its pillars clearly demonstrate the centrality of official nationalism in the new synthesis. StUl, not all the factions and interest groups who appropriate the term ulusalczltk receive a warm reception from the state. For this reason, official nationalism continues-at least publicly-to use the term CCAtatiirk nationalism" to describe itself. It can thus be argued that Atatiirk nationalism still constitutes the rootlanguage of nationalism in Turkey. The earlier emphasis of this constitutive nationalism on modernization has tilted toward secularism at the expense of the former (c£ Navaro-Yashin 2.002). On the other hand, a perpetual concern for survival continues to be the defining characteristic of official nationalism, as manifested by the credo "Turks have no friends but Turks:' which in turn gives birth to a thriving industry of conspiracy theories and a laborious process of inventing enemies, both within and outside. This perception of imminent threats leaves its imprint on the psyche of official nationalism in the form of what has been commonly called the "Sevres syndrome:' This involves the belief that the West, more precisely the European Union, is bent on dismembering Turkey, as it attempted in the past through the infamous Sevres Treaty signed by the victorious powers of World War I (except the United States and Russia) and the Ottoman Empire on August 10, 192.0, carving up the imperial territory into various zones of influence. In this view, every social, political, and economic development, domestic or international, is treated as part of a master plan whose perpetrators vary-foreigners purchasing land in Turkey, Christian missionaries, foreign nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and foundations and their domestic collaborators, or "liberal intellectuals." The fear of extinction is so strong and real for those who believe in it that it often takes the form of a collective paranoia; at this stage, the truth hardly matters-no one, in any case, bothers to pursue it. Its claim to be "civic" notwithstanding, however, official nationalism continues to define citizenship on the basis of a vague "Turkishness." In fact, as stated in the memorandum of April 27, 2007, posted on the website of the Turkish General Staff, «[a]nyone who rejects the view 'how happy to call oneself a Turk!' is an enemy of the Republic of Turkey and will always remain so" (this attempt by the army to intervene in the process of the election of a new president by the parliament ultimately led to the early general elections on July 2.2.,2.007, in which the Justice and Development Party [AKP] secured

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4 6,S percent of the votes). The Turkish Armed Forces, which made this dec-

laration, remain the "guardian/protector" of official nationalism. Needless to say, official nationalism itself is not fixed; the autocratic stance of the early 19 80s that aimed to bring all sections of the society under the purview of the state has been relatively softened during the 1990S and early 2.ooos. It would not be wrong to suggest that this trend has been reversed and official nationalism's stance once again stiffened in the last couple of years with the impact of the acceleration of membership negotiations with the European Union, among other things. As noted above, the other two discourses of nationalism identified by Bora, "Kemalist nationalism" (ulus{uluk) and "liberal neo-nationalism;' merged with official nationalism to form a new synthesis: ulusaletltk. The protean nature of nationalism, the osmotic tendencies among its constituent elements, is definitely reaffirmed in the case of ulusalctltk. The actors who utilize it are many and tend to use this label inconsistently, often oblivious to the incoherences and tensions that the stitching together of their narratives may entail. Broadly, we can see that much of the anti-imperialist tone ofKemalist nationalism (especially of its 1960s-70s version) has been traded for secularism and a sweeping anti-Westernism in the new amalgam; Kemalism, however, continues to preserve its sanctity as a vague, ambiguous, and openended set of principles. The price that liberal neo-nationalism had to pay in the new amalgam is its modernist-Westernist face and its emphasis on economic success: for ulusalctltk, the West is the colonizer, not the modernizer. The market fetishism of the 1980s has given way to a vocal antiprivatization stance. The proponents of ulusalctltk argue that Turkey's assets are being sold at fire-sale rates and that foreigners are taking over the country through financial means, a goal they could not achieve with military means in the past. The "class racism" of liberal neo-nationalism, however, does not disappear in the new amalgam. This time the "others" -as opposed to "white Turks"are "those men scratching their belly" (Co~kun 2.007), those "black Turks" "with short legs, hairy and long arms, ruminating, burping, and scratching" (Kmkkanat 2.005). Ulusalczltk employs the symbols of official nationalism; moreover, it popularizes them, as the fetishization of Turkish flags and Atatiirk portraits and the record-breaking sales of popular culture items like the nationalist novel fju plgm Turkler (200S) demonstrate. The enemy figures in their arsenal

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provide a common framework of interpretation and self-identification for the proponents of ulusalctlzk and official nationalism; it would not be inaccurate to suggest that the "villains" of the new synthesis, at least in the current conjuncture, are the European Union, Islam, the Kurds, and their internal collaborators, in particular the "liberal intellectuals." Traditional figures like the Greeks, the Greek Cypriots, and the Armenians still retain their highranking positions in the list of enemies. But today the prime suspect is the European Union, which not only supports the claims of Turkey's traditional enemies but turns them into a prerequisite for possible membership in the Union. While the European Union is trying to divide Turkey from the outside, the Islamists, the Kurds, and the intellectuals are giving a helping hand to the EU from the inside, to demolish or transform the republic, in accordance with their respective agendas. The particular discourse of ulusalczlzk enlists the support of a wide range of actors, including political parties like the Republican People's Party (CHP), Workers Party (tp), Democratic Party (DP), and Motherland Party (ANAP), allegedly located at different poles of the political spectrum. It is also endorsed by a significant portion of the media and by the relatively affluent urban upper-middle classes. It is possible to identify three other discourses of nationalism in today's Turkey: Turkist radical nationalism, the Islamist movement, and Kurdish nationalism. What Taml Bora identified as Turkist radical nationalism still exists today, though not without internal fractures and differences of opinion. It may be argued that the gap between the discourse embraced by the MHP under the leadership of Devlet Bahcreli and "official-ulusalcz" nationalism is rather trivial. This last point has been given further credence by the thesis of a new, more moderate MHP propagated by some of the opinion leaders of the ulusalcz current. Even so, it might be contended that the MHP resorts to a more rigid and uncompromising attitude when "national causes" are at stake. In that sense, the rapprochement between the MHP and the political center is less a product of the transformation· of the former than of the radicalization of the center. On the other hand, we also know that a section of the nationalist movement is discontented with the way Devlet Bahcreli runs the party, conSidering him to be "soft" and somewhat "dovish." This internal dissent reached the level of posing an open challenge to Bahcreli's authority in the person of Omit Ozdag. With all this in mind, it might be more useful to keep the official-ulusalcz nationalism and radical Turkish

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nationalism separate for the purposes of this analysis. Yet the difference between the tWO discourses is not one of kind but of degree. As a final note. it needs to be pointed out that radical Turkist nationalism preserves much of its newly acquired electoral constituency. The main political representative of the movement. the MHP, managed to retain its support within the urban upper-middle classes in the July 2007 elections. despite yielding its traditional constituencies in Central Anacolia to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The Islamist movement has experienced a major split within its ranks that was not yet fully apparent at the time of Tam! Bora's writing. The National Outlook (Milli Gorii~) movement, represented by the Felicity Party (SP) in the political arena, retains many of its traditional characteristics summarized in Bora's 2003 article above: anti-Westernism. developmentalism, and an emphasis on Turkey's potential leadership of the Islamic world. Their social base. however, has shrunk considerably, following the establishment of the AKP in 2001 by the "reformists" who parted ways with the traditional line. Although adherents of official nationalism have considered the AKP an adversary and accused it of being "un-national:' the AKP's discourse is not situated beyond or outside the nationalist parameters. This can be seen in the nationalist language employed by the leaders of the movement (especially by prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan), the nationalist symbolism they fall back upon, and their National Outlook background. But a more fundamental indicator of this movement's "symbiotic" relationship with nationalism is that it has to a great extent shed its elements advocating Islamic unity (ummah). Both the wider Islamist current and its political arm, the AKP, may harbor different goals and aspirations; they may indeed be on a collision course with official nationalism. But they aspire to an alternative Turkey, not for an "unnational" or "supranational" order. The movement in this sense is nationalist, even Turkish nationalist; yet its conception of Turkish nationalism is different from that of official nationalism. Thus the relationship between the Islamist movement spearheaded by the reformists and official-ulusalct nationalism is a struggle for hegemony par excellence. At times the two nationalisms reach a modus vivendi and coexist peacefully; at other times they clash. It might be argued that the controversy that surrounded the latest presidential elections was the harbinger of a trend toward conflict. But the increasing support that the movement gets from all sections of society makes the task of

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official-ulusalct nationalism harder. fordng it to become ever more aggressive and uncompromising. The second nationalist project that openly challenges official-ulusalct nationalism is the Kurdish movement. Taml Bora leaves the Kurdish nationalist movement out of his analysis. claiming to focus on "Turkish" nationalisms. But if the objective is to analyze "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey" (which is indeed the title of Bora's article), Kurdish nationalism cannot be excluded from the map. as it is a crucial actor in the struggle for hegemony. Although it is almost impossible for Kurdish nationalism to win this struggle due to a variety of mostly structural and geopolitical reasons. it nevertheless plays an important role as a counterhegemonic project, constantly disturbing and threatening offidal-ulusalcz nationalism. In this COntext. the ultimate objective of Kurdish nationalism does not really matter. The objective might be an independent state. a federative scheme, or simply more autonomy. The Kurdish nationalist movement is neither homogeneous nor monolithic: it includes various groups with different objectives. But whatever the objective. it wUl oppose the project imposed by official-ulusalcz nationalism, with a view to either transforming the structure of the state or threatening its territorial integrity. In this sense, Kurdish nationalist movement is. in all its forms. the real or imagined "anti-Christ" of Turkish nationalism.

CONCLUSION

The alternative. admittedly schematic and incomplete, reading provided above suggests that the terrain of nationalisms in today's Turkey is much more complex than nationalist accounts, official or otherwise. would claim. To simplify. it might be contended that the topography of nationalism drawn here consists of two principal axes: a horizontal axis that represents a polarity along the line of Western ism/anti-Westernism and a vertical axis that juxtaposes secular and antisecular discourses. Various nationalist discourses identified and explored above are scattered around the "topography, depending on the position they occupy on the Westernism/anti-Westernism and secularism/antisecularism axes (see figure S.l). It would be reasonable to say that these tWO axes to a large extent form the main social and political dividing line in today's Turkey, as the results of the July 2.2., 2007, general elections and the mayhem that ensued over a host of sensitive issues like the election of

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Kurdish Nationalism/BDP

Secularism

Official Nationalism (u/IIsa/cflik)/CHP, DSP, DP, ANAP, ip; Civil-Military

Bureaucracy

Anti·Westernlsm

AKP: Justice and Development Party ANAP: Motherland Party BOP: Peace and Democracy Party CHP: Republican People's Party DP: Democratic Party DSP: Democratic Left Party ip: Workers Party MHP: Nationalist Action Party SP: Felicity Party (inheritor of the National Outlook Movement)

new president have demonstrated, It is thus not surprising that the varinationalist projects that are engaged in a struggle for hegemony position themselves in accordance with these polarities, trying to straddle the dividing between competing universes, Needless to say, the struggle for hegemony far from over, as the static conception of the nation that the nationalists to inculcate and impose on their putative co-nationals is otten disrupted

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by the reality on the ground, which continues to defy the nationalist logic of a homogeneous nation. It is my contention here that only through a topographical approach that underlies the production and circulation of various nationalist projects can we make sense of the plurality and heterogeneity of nationalisms in Turkey-or in each particular case-and the complexity of the struggle for hegemony among them.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This chapter is derived from a wider project on nationalism and EU-Turkey relations supported by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), Open Society Foundation-Turkey, and Friedrich Ebert Stinung-Turkei. I am grateful to the TESEV Foreign Policy Program for allowing me to use material from the monograph that contains the findings of this research. I would also like to thank LSEE (Research on South East Europe. London School of Economics); the Department of Global Political Studies. Malmo University; and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. Lund University. for supporting my research over the last year.

PART II

Conservative Manifestations of Turkish Nationalism

6

THE GENEALOGY OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

From Civic and Ethnic to Conservative Nationalism in Turkey

UMUTUZER

POLITICAL THEORIST HARVEY MANSFIELD POINTS OUT THAT IN OUR

quest for the understanding of politics we should bring in feelings and sentiments as analytical tools. In his judgment, anger, hate, and dignity are important motivations for the explanation of political behavior (Mansfield 2007). I would like to add love as far as the phenomenon of nationalism is concerned. Love of the nation is a key factor in all forms of nationalism. Conversely, hatred is directed to other nations as objects of danger and threat against whom the nation should coalesce. Sentiments occupy a pivotal place in the minds of the people, especially when they feel that their identities are being threatened. Hence love, hate, anger, enmity, feelings of injustice, and desire to be great once again are all factors in the articulation and propagation of nationalism. It is possible to describe Turkish nationalism as reactive and defensive. This is so because Turkish nationalism emerged out of necessity. The political events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century forced Turkish intellectuals to embrace the creed of nationalism. The desire to prolong the existence of the Ottoman body politic proved futile; hence contingencies brought about the imagining of a Turkish nation-state. As 103

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numerous Turks involuntarily adopted nationalism due to political expediency, it is my opinion that many Turks never truly internalized it. 'The three main paths of Turkish nationalism that I analyze in this chapter are all considered to be under the banner of Turkish nationalism because they put the idea of nation and nationalism as paramount among political loyalties. In that sense I define nationalism as a political ideology that argues that a particular group of people living on a specific piece of territory constitutes a nation. Furthermore, according to the adherents of nationalism, each nation should possess a state of its own, as the master in its nation-state. 'Three typologies of Turkish nationalism, territorial-civic, ethnic, and conservative, are useful in analyzing the birth, development, and evolution of Turkish nationalism. It will become manifest from the discussion below that ethnic, civic, and cultural elements playa role in official nationalism, whereas ethnic nationalism does not shy away from offering a coherent ideology based on kinship amounting to nationality. Culture and religion seem to be more important than ethnicity in the definition of Turkish nationalism. 'These typologies should be seen as ideal types (Weber 1997, p. 89) that do not correspond directly to political phenomena existing in the real world and should rather be taken as mental tools to categorize different forms of nationalism. According to this categorization, official nationalism has elements from territorial-civic and ethnic typologies, whereas nationalists such as Hiiseyin Nihal AtS1Z can be labeled as purely ethnic nationalists, and the thinkers who devise a Turkish-Islamic synthesis can be classjfied under conservative nationalism. Anthony Smith (1991) describes the Western or civic model of the nation as entailing a historic territory that is inhabited by a people that is a legalpolitical community possessing a civic culture and an ideology. Any individual can choose his or her nationality, which makes it a voluntary process. In this kind of nationalism citizenship determines nationality in a well-defined territory. A common culture and civic ideology are. developed through education and the media. According to the non-Western or ethnic mode4 the nation is defined as a group of people, which attains nationhood from common descent and not from territory. It is based on the native culture and is a "community of birth" (Smith 1991, p. 9). Smith is quick to point out, however, that all nationalisms usually contain both ethnic and civic-territorial elements (Smith 199Io pp. 9-13).

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Ethnic nationalism and cultural nations employ objective factors such as religion, language, and ethnicity. whereas civic nationalism and political nations use subjective elements such as voluntary expression of nationhood by the citizens. French and American nationalisms, which are characterized as civic, also depend on ethnic cores (Lecours 2.000, pp. IS3, ISS), which require cultural assimilation to be part of the nation. And therein lies the continuing significance of nationalism: as a historically embedded phenomenon that is based on ethnidty. Ethnies, described as loose cultural entities, have existed throughout history, although nations in "mass, legal, public and territorial form" are novel phenomena (Smith 1998, pp. vii-viii, 57). In other words, all nations have a dominant ethnic core on which the state builds itself. In fact, without a dominant ethnic group the establishment of a territorial nationstate is extremely difficult (Smith 1991, pp. 39, 116). Nationalism and occasionally religion, much more than other collective identities, bring dignity and immortality (belonging to an entity that supposedly existed from time immemorial and will exist until eternity) to the common people. It can be a positive force promoting democracy and solidarity, but it can also lead to hatred (Smith 1991, P.176) and regional instability. In addition to dvic and ethnic nationalisms. what I characterize as conservative nationalism exists in the Turkish context. I define conservative nationalism as a form of nationalism in which the nation cannot be conceived except in terms of the religion to which the majority of the members of that nation belong. Usually religious and ethnic identities are complementary and strengthen each other (Smith 1991. pp. 7-8). It follows that religious and national identities reinforce each other and are perceived as constituting an indivisible whole. It should be added that national conflicts also have a religious dimension; the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Indian-Pakistani tension, Northern Ireland. and Cyprus are a few examples pointing to that observation. It should also be added that Polish, Irish, and Arab nationalisms have strong religious elements as well (Smith 1991. p. 62.). This form of nationalism became increasingly important in Turkish nationalism after the 19505, with the triple processes of modernization, democratization. and Islamization of the society and their ramifications for the body politic. This can be explained in the definition of the Turkish nation, in which religion plays a significant part. After the Turks converted to Islam, they "sank their national identity in Islam

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as the Arabs and Persians had never done" (Lewis 1995, p. 88). It should also be added that despite the secularism of the new republic only the Muslims of Turkey were considered true Turks (<;agaptay 2.006, p. I); non-Muslims were at best identified as citizens of Turkey. Needless to say, the reality was much more complex. While the 192.4 Constitution defined Turkishness as territorial, most Muslims were considered potential Turks. An ethnoreligious Weltanschauung crept into daily policy decisions, however, as non-Turkish Muslims were also viewed with caution (<;agaptay 2.006, p. 159). In sum, republican Turkey was characterized as a Turkish state defined to a large extent as Muslims residing in the country yet subject to qualification and occasionally bordering on a more literal meaning of the Turk. The historical background of the Turks' conversion to Islam and the loss of their national identity within Islam, coupled with their role as the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, which precluded the possibility of advocating nationalism, prepared the groundwork for the advent of religious nationalism. The religious content of official nationalism and ethnic nationalism was deficient, so these could not have deep roots among the populace. Turkish nationalism was transformed from an ethnically based Turkism, represented to some extent by Kemalist nationalism and by Hiiseyin Nihal AtSlZ, into an ideology putting m~re emphasis on religion. This can be seen in the writings of Necip Faztl Klsakiirek and the infusion of Turkish-Islamic synthesis into the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyet<;i Hareket Partisi, MHP), with growing intensity in the 1970S and the 1980s. In fact, this state of affairs was the main reason leading to the departure of AtSlZ from the ranks of the MHP and the growing role that Klsakiirek began to play in the ranks of the party, such as campaigning for the MHP in the 1977 elections. This transformation of Turkish nationalism toward embracing religious motifs started in the 1950S but became more important in the 1970S and 1980S. After the 1980 military coup. the Turkish-Islamic syntheSis was adopted to some extent by the military regime and the ruling party. the Motherland Party (1983-91). It should be pointed out that the emergence of a new form of nationalism did not replace Kemalism; rather it complemented it by creating an ideology that would be more acceptable to the common people. The ideologues of conservative nationalism were not confronting the Kemalist state identity

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and were trying to argue that what they were articulating was compatible with Kemalism. making it more responsive to conservative values.

THE ADVENT OF TURKISM: AWAKENING OR CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY?

Turks were latecomers to nationalism. Despite manifestations of nationalism throughout Turkish history, they were rather reluctant to adopt and propagate the nationalist ideal. This state of affairs can be explained by the fact that the Turks of the Ottoman Empire were the masters of a multUingual empire and by their self-perception as the sword of Islam-in other words. the defender of what they believed to be the true faith: Islam. Endorsing a nationalist program would have destroyed the raison d'etre of the Ottoman Empire. They would have been dismantling their own empire with their own hands. Just as the subjects of the empire began to demand independence one after the other. starting with the Serbs and Greeks and then the Bulgarians. Macedonians, and finally (and more shockingly for the Ottoman establishment) the Muslim Albanians and Arabs. the Turks themselves had difficulty in adapting to the new nationalist mind-set. Turks became nationalists as a result of expediency, meaning that the circumstances necessitated their embrace of nationalist thought. The breakup of the Ottoman Empire destroyed the prospect of allegiance to the Ottoman polity; as Turks became the only believers in the empire. transformation into a Turkish state was the logical next step. Bernard Lewis (1968, pp. 2..7-9) argues that the "sense of Turkishness" was retained by ordinary people in the folk literature but that the ruling elite did not have the same amount of national identity felt by the Persians and Arabs. He also argues that a Turkish national consciousness began to emerge in the nineteenth century as a consequence of Turcological studies, through the influence of Turkish emigres from the Russian Empire and the emergence of nationalism among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. While the pre-Islamic past was to a large extent forgotten and Turks "submerged their identity in Islam" much more than other Muslim nations, there were at times efforts to resuscitate Turkish national identity. The Ottoman sultans in the fifteenth century adopted the old Turkish title "khan" and established their genealogy all the way back to the legendary hero Oghuz Khan, who was

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believed to have been the forefather of all western Turks, including those in Turkey and Azerbaijan. Furthermore, to be part of the ruling elite an individual had to convert to Islam and learn the Turkish language as it was spoken and written by the educated classes (Lewis 1968, pp. 2., 7-9, 13). The feeling of Turkish ness was never strong, however, and its impact decreased with the conquest of the Muslim lands of the Middle East, which led to the image of the sultan as the protector of the Muslims. Niyazi Berkes concurs with Lewis by arguing that Arabs and Albanians preserved their ethnic identity, in contrast to the Turks. The latter were more inclined to identify themselves as Muslims and consequently renounced their national identity, emphasizing the Islamic ummet (religious community). in the process becoming "a people without a sense of nationality." It was the political developments that made it clear that the Ottoman polity with its millet system and its self-conception as an Islamic state has become anachronistic (Berkes 1998 [1964]. pp. 318-19) and that almost all nationalities except the Turks have become nationalists. In other words. nationalism became the only viable ideology for the Turks to survive in the age of nationalism. But even with the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress. which was instrumental in the outbreak of the 1908 revolution (promulgating the 1876 Constitution and convening a parliament), Turkish nationalism did not replace Ottomanism. The Young Turks were erroneously described as Turkish nationalists, even though they were following a policy of Ottoman nationalism and centralization (Berkes 1998 [1964]. PP' 32.9-30). Only with the Balkan Wars of 191I-13 and more importantly with the outbreak of World War 1. which made it absolutely clear that even the Muslim nations of the empire were opting for the choice of "exit" (Hirschman 1970, p. 4) from the empire. did the Turks see more clearly that they were the only ones calling themselves Ottoman. Cemal Pasha, who was one of the members of the ruling triumvirate between 1913 and 1918. also admitted that he personally as the minister of the navy and as the commander of Ottoman armies in Syria (that is. as the de facto ruler of Syria) and the ruling Committee of Union and Progress followed an Ottomanist domestic and foreign policy. The CUP tried to increase the powers of the center, however, at the expense of the periphery (Cemal Pa~a 2.001. p. 385), which in fact meant a policy ofTurkification for the subject peoples.

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Turkism has passed through scientific, literary, and political phases (Kuran 1968, pp. m-16), starting with scholarly works on the history and language of the Turks and culminating in the desire to create a Turkish polity. Works of Leon Cahun, Arminius Vambery, and the Turan Society in Hungary contributed to a sense of pride among the Turkish intellectuals who followed their European counterparts in the study of Turkish history and culture. Mustafa Ce1aleddin Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, and Suleyman Pasha could be counted among the Turkish scholars who have written on Turkish history and language. In fact Ziya Gokalp described the latter two as the founders of Turkism (Gokalp 1994, pp. 4-6; Oba 1995, pp. 122-30). Another factor contributing to Turkism, besides political expediency and academic works, was the migration of an influential number of Turks from tsarist Russia, such as Zeki Velidi Togan (Bashkir), Sadri Maksudi Arsal (Kazan Tatar), Ahmed Agaoglu (Azerbaijani), and Yusuf Ak~ura (Kazan Tatar). Pan-Turkism developed among the Turks of Russia as a reaction to panSlavism. Their influence on Turkish scholars can be seen by the fact that the Azeri writer Huseyinzade Ali was the first to propagate Turkification, Islamization, and Europeanization, which had a direct influence on G6kalp (Oba 1995, pp. 142, 154-55)' Thus immigration of external Turks to the Ottoman Empire was a significant development in the history of Turkish nationalism. The impact of the Turks of Russia was particularly important, because they had a more secular and less Islamic conception of nationalism emanating from their interactions with the Russian intelligentsia and the ideas that were floating among those circles, even though Islam also constituted part of their identity. Furthermore, in Russia being Muslim to a large extent meant being Turkish, for the overwhelming majority of the Muslims in Russia were Turks. In fact, even on the eve of the Turkish War ofIndependence there was little manifestation of nationalism among the masses (Oran 1997, p. 78). The feeling of nationalism was articulated and inculcated in the masses by the Kemalist state with its centralized education system and the bandwagon effect that the conversion of the majority of the intellectuals to nationalism had on educated people and hence on the Turkish society. Furthermore, the soldiers in the new Turkish army led by Mustafa Kemal increasednational pride among the masses serving in that army. It should also be pointed out, however, that there was opposition to the War of Independence and the reforms

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that followed from many quarters. including religious circles. those loyal to the ancien regime. and ethnic separatists. In the next section I dwell in depth on the rise of Turkish nationalism a~d its early propagandists. It should be kept in mind that for the nineteenthcentury and to a lesser extent twentieth-century thinkers Turkism usually operated hand in hand with Ottomanism and Westernism.

BIRTH OF AN IDEA: TURKlSM AND ITS RIVALS

The nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire experienced a series of national revolts that culminated in Greek independence in 1830. Romanian autonomy in 1861, and Serbian independence in 1878 with the Congress of Berlin. Attempts were made to counter the centralization of the Ottoman state machinery and the endeavor to inculcate a feeling of Ottoman nationality with the reforms known as the Tanzimat (Kuran 1968,p. 109). Being the cosmopolitan empire it was, however, the Ottoman Empire dissolved as a result of nationalism and war. Ottoman state nationalism tried to create national feeling based on territorial nationalism (Ortayh 2.002.. p. 113), but none of the major ethnic groups felt allegiance to a political entity that was considered alien in the age of nationalism. It was particularly Ali Suavi among Young Ottomans who wrote about Turkish national consciousness and expressed concern about the fate of Turks in Turkistan as these became common themes in Young Ottoman publications. In this sense he can be characterized as one of the precursors of Turkish nationalism (<;elik 1994). According to one scholar of Turkish nationalism, a hidden feeling of Turkishness has always existed throughout Turkish history, manifested in the Orhun scriptures, dating back to the sixth or seventh century AD. Other examples of nationalism could be seen in the Divanu Lugat-ut Turk ofMahmut from Kashgar (the dictionary in which Mahmut argued the superiority of the Turkish language) and Karamanoglu Mehmet Bey, who made Turkish the official language of his princedom (Oba 1995. pp. 13-15). Charles Warren Hostler (1957). who believed that Turkish history included an element of nationalism, pointed out that the Turkification of Anatolia from the eleventh century onward proved that the Turks were not assimUated by Greeks,

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Armenians, Arabs. or Persians. ~te the contrary, they encouraged the assimilation of other peoples into their nation (Hostler 1957, pp. 88-89). But the Turks largely identified themselves with their religion-although there might have been a national awareness-and only in the late nineteenth century did Turkish nationalism begin to emerge with vigor. While the Turks were dominant on the political plane as rulers of the empire, the feeling of Turkishness was latent on the level of consciousness (Ortayh 2.002.. p. 64). The Young Turks, who ruled Ottoman Turkey between 1908 and 1918 by the policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). were ambivalent as far as their ideological orientation was concerned. They started to understand that Ottomanism was becoming obsolete, but they were not ready to substitute another ideology. In fact many Young Turks felt double patriotism. For instance, Ibrahim Temo was both an Albanian nationalist and an Ottoman patriot. Abdullah Cevdet was calling all the nationalities to be loyal Ottoman citizens while at the same time writing for the Kurdistan newspaper of the separatist-autonomist Bedirhan family. Even when the CUP turned to Turkism. its official line was still Ottomanism (Hanioglu 1986, pp. 7, 627-28, 649). In fact we should call the manifestation of Turkish nationalism among Young Turks protonationalism. In other words, most Unionists were ambivalent about the role of Turkish nationalism and embraced Islam and Ottomanism (Mardin 1992. p. 264) almost until the very end of the Ottoman Empire. But the absence of an Ottoman language and the consolidation efforts of the empire necessitated depending on the Turkish language and to some extent on the Turkish ethnicity. The bottom line was that the Young Turks had a very primitive notion ofTurkism; in fact they were more interested in saving the state (Mardin 1992., pp. 268, 305) than in articulating a nationalist doctrine. Among the prominent members of the Young Turks, MizanCl Murat, who published the Mizan newspaper, emphasized Turkish identity besides Ottomanism and Islam: he was aware that Islam was no longer the unifying factor for the Muslim peoples of the empire. In contrast. Sultan Abdiilhamid II, Ahmed Rlza, and Abdullah Cevdet perceived Islam as an instrument of solidarity for the people (Mardin 1992., pp. 18, II3, IIS)' Although Abdullah Cevdet was one of the most ardent advocates of Westernization in Ottoman Turkey. he found a functional role for Islam in Turkish society. Ziya Gokalp also instrumentalized Islam and articulated it with nationalism.

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As far as the rival ideologies of the time-Ottomanism. Islamism. Turkism. and Westernism-were concerned. the latter two gained the upper hand. Yet the Islamist movement had its precursor in the person of Said-i Nursi. Even though he had affiliations with Kurdish nationalists like the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (Kiirdistan Teali Cemiyeti). he advocated a state based on Islam and autonomy for the Kurds within the Ottoman body politic. It should be made clear. however. that Said-i Nursi always condemned nationalism in his publications and speeches (Mardin 1994. pp. 100.141,147). Yet he had ethnic consciousness. which was undoubtedly Kurdish. 'Therefore. it can be said that he possessed loyalty to the Kurdish people as well as to the state and religion. 'The failure of the Islamist and Ottomanist ideologies at a practical level as well as the works of the Turcologists in Europe helped facilitate Turkish nationalism. First of all. it became evident that fellow Muslims in the empire were seceding from the empire and that a nationality based on Ottomanism was rejected by both the Muslims and the Christians of the empire. Thus what was left consisted mainly of Turks. the backbone of the empire. During the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the CUP's relations with Armenians and Greeks deteriorated. It became clear that Greeks were becoming proGreece and the Armenians were trying to put their grievances on the world agenda. It was at this point that the leaders of the CUP decided on or implemented the creation of a national economy and a national bourgeoiSie composed of Muslim Turks and to a lesser extent Jewish business leaders by co-opting the latter. They had no outside patron; nor did they follow a separatist policy, unlike Greeks and Armenians (Keyder 1987, pp. 60-61, 65). Hence they were considered trustworthy and loyal. Later on, however, the Jews were also subjected to exorbitant taxes together with other non-Muslims during the Wealth Tax incident of 1942-44, when non-Muslims were targeted for very high taxes whereas the Muslims got away with much smaller sums (Aktar 2004, p. 144). In fact this taxation policy had been a continuation of the CUP policy, which aimed at creating a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie. Furthermore, this incident together with the September 6-7, I9SS, incidents (when shops and businesses belonging to non-Muslims in Istanbul and izmir were attacked) demonstrated that despite declarations of secularism in Turkey the national identity was very much defined around Islam. In other words. it was much easier for a Kurd, Circassian, Laz, Acara (Muslim

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Georgian), or Arab to assimilate to the Turkish society than for a Greek. an Armenian. or a Jew. And the Muslim groups were less suspect than nonMuslims when they entered the bureaucracy or military. The non-Muslim entrants into the bureaucracy were very limited. if any at all. As a culmination of these factors. nationalist organizations such as Turkish Society (Turk Dernegi) and Turkish Hearths (Turk Ocaklan) were established in 1908 and 1912. respectively. They conducted scholarly studies on the history and language of the Turks, which was to have political ramifications (Ak~ura 1990, pp. 171-77). Hamdullah Suphi Tannaver, the president of Turkish Hearths, was an influential figure in the Republican People's Party, being a member of parliament and minister of education in the republican era. While the society tried to preserve its independence from the Committee of Union and Progress, it gradually lost its autonomy vis-a-vis the CHP, as many members of the society were also members of the party. Besides the chairman, Re~it Galip, Ziya Gakalp, Halide Edip, Yusuf Ak~ura, Ahmed Agaoglu, and many other members of parliament were prominent members of the society. As Hamdullah Suphi pointed out, unity of language, religion. and heart would be enough to define the Turkish nation, not "race" or genealogy. There was also much interest in the Turkic world that lay outside the borders of Turkey. and he advocated the unity of the dialects spoken in various areas of the Turkic world (OstelI997, pp. 60-61, 71, 131, 134, 147, 164). So the society was influential in the creation and dissemination of Turkish national consciousness and national identity in the late Ottoman and early republican periods. Turkishness was to a large extent forgotten in the Ottoman Empire, leading to a total rejection of pre-Islamic Turkish history. Intellectuals such as Ebuzziya Tevfik, Siileyman Nazif, and Babanzade Ahmet Nairn argued that the Ottoman people consisted of Arabs, Greeks, and Armenians and that members of the Ottoman dynasty were probably the only Turks in the empire. Instead of nationalism, they supported Ottoman and Islamic solidarity. Ahmed Agaoglu as well as other Turkists defended the Turkish character of the country and argued that nothing in Islam precluded nationalism (Arai 1994, pp. 106-7)· Yusuf Akt;:ura (1876-1935) believed that the emergence of nationalism among the Kazan Tatars was due to the existence of a bourgeoisie that benefited from the trade between Russia proper and Central Asia. The same was

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also true for the Azeris, who flourished as a result of the oil trade (Georgeon 199 6, pp. 8,78). Hence, according to Akc;:ura, economic factors gave rise to the emergence of nationalism in the sense that the rising middle class became the propagators of the nationalist ideology. Akc;:ura, influenced by his uncle ismail Gasplrah. had a secular outlook manifested in his "Oc;: TarZ-l Siyaset" (Three Styles of Politics, published in 1904) in the journal Turk in Cairo. in which he argued that Islam was to be at the service ofTurkism (ibid., pp. 2.7, 47). It is hard to label this article the manifesto of Turkism: even though it was a manifestation of political Turkism and advocated a policy based on the Turkish unity, it did so in an ambivalent way. He defined Ottomanism as the attempt to create an Ottoman nation from all the ethnic groups living in the empire. This idea was formulated in the nineteenth century during the Tanzimat era. Akc;:ura labeled this a futUe endeavor. Young Ottomans advocated the policy of Islamism. which Akc;:ura characterized as an ideology in which religion was equated with nationality. In comparing Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. he favored Turkism. A Turkish political nationality based on "race" had numerous benefits. It would be welcomed by the Turks in the Ottoman Empire and help assimilate non-Turkish Muslims. This policy, however. had the danger of losing those elements, mostly non-Muslims, in the Ottoman Empire who would resist Turkifica1;ion. More importantly, on the positive side, a Turkish world would be created through the policy of Turkish unity. Akc;:ura was critical of Western Turks for not giving enough attention to Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. Even the journal Turk only focused on the Ottoman Empire rather than on Kazan, the Caucasus, or Turkistan. Akc;:ura concluded the article by pointing out that both Islamist and Turkish policies have their positive aspects and ended with a question: "Which one of the Islamist or Turkist policies would be more beneficial and applicable for the Ottoman State?" (Akc;:ura 1998, pp. 2.0-2.3.31,33-36). Akc;:uras Turkism in "Three Styles of Politics" is equivocal; while he seems to have expected a more pan-Turkist coverage in the journal, he found the publication to be concerned only with the Turks of the Ottoman Empire. This is a hint that he would have preferred a pan-Turkist policy from the journal. While he does not openly call for the unification of all Turks, his proclivities are clearly on the Turkist side.

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Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) is usually accepted as one of the most influential ideologues of Turkish nationalism. He based the definition of the nation on cultural unity, not on racial or political considerations. He talked about the cultural unity of all Oghuz (Western Turks) and enumerated the stages ofTurkism as Turkeyism (Turkiyecilik), Oghuzism (Oguzculuk), and lastly Turanism (Turanclhk), the last stage being the unity of all Turks (Gokalp 1994, pp. 18, 21-24). Thus pan-Turkism, but not racism, was an integral part

of his ideology. In the final analysis Ziya Gokalp was promoting a Turkish/Muslim/Western synthesis in which Turkishness would predominate while the beneficial aspects of Islam and the West would also be adopted and internalized. Gokalp advocated national policies in every sphere of life from politics, economics, and ethics to language, music, and architecture. He even supported Turkism in religion and wanted to eradicate all forms of theocracy and clericalism. This would include prayers being recited in Turkish (Gokalp 1994, pp. 154-55). His main objective was to create a modern Turkish-Islamic culture under the guidance of science and technology (Gokalp 1988, p. 34). His ideas were mainly oriented toward Turkism, however, with Islam and the West playing only secondary roles. Islam was to be a force of solidarity among the people, whereas the West was seen as a source of technology and development; in other words, they were instruments used for the exaltation of the Turkish nation. Just like other nationalists, Gokalp was apologetic in his approach to nationalism and tried to prove that Islam was not against nationalism. He did not reject the idea of pan-Islam but said that for the time being different Muslim groups were to go their separate ways to achieve political independence. In fact nationalism would be a force that would facilitate the independence of different Muslims; hence nationalism would strengthen the Islamic community (ummet in Turkish) (Gokalp 1988, pp. 76-80). It should be made dear that Gokalp did not openly reject Islam but gave it a secondary role in his thinking. He emphasized the importance and power of nationalism and hence became the most eminent advocate of Turkish nationalism. Gokalp also advocated equality between men and women and expressed opinions against the veiling of women. Along with his belief in the separation of religion and state and prayers in Turkish (Heyd 195 0 , pp. 88, 95-96,

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102.), Gokalp was very much a precursor of Kemalist nationalism, although

there were a number of differences between Gokalp's and Atatiirk's understandings of nationalism. As discussed below, Atatiirk dropped all demands for unification of Turks, focusing instead on the internal development within the borders ofTurkey. Furthermore, he did not accept the culture-civilization dichotomy of Gokalp. Instead he adopted Western ways in their entirety. Turkish nationalism as articulated in the late Ottoman period was the direct precursor of both Kemalist nationalism and pan-Turkist/racist nationalism. Hence offidal nationalism and pan-Turkism should be seen as derivatives or different types of Turkish nationalism. The main difference was that KemaHst nationalism tried to create a nation-state within the borders of the republic, whereas pan-Turkism tried to unite all the Turks wherever they lived. Irredentism and expansionism characterized pan-Turkism, while Kemalist nationalism, although inward looking, managed to annex Hatay from Syria in 1939 (Uzer 2.007). The Kemalist education system and the historical thesis that was devdoped in fact created an atmosphere conducive to the emergence of the pan-Turkist movement. Constant reference to Central Asia as the motherland of all Turks and the popularization of ancient Turkish symbols such as the gray wolf were to have a direct effect on ethnic nationalists (6zdogan 2.001, pp. 16-17. 23. 86). As far as the main actors of the three currents of Turkish nationalism are concerned, I should point out that the civilian and military branches of the bureaucracy to a large extent succumbed to KemaHst nationalism. The social democratic parties such as the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Left Party and center-of-right parties such as the Democratic Party, the Justice Party. and later the True Path Party all followed official nationalism. A faction in the Motherland Party adopted Kemalist nationalism, but the nationalist-conservative faction (the so-called Holy Alliance composed of former members of the Nationalist Action Party and the National Salvation Party), which advocated conservative nationalism, was stronger than the Kemalist or liberal factions. Ethnic nationalism to a large extent ceased to exist except among a few members of the MHP, such as Abdulhaluk <;ay. It is a distinct possibility that such a nationalism might reemerge as a reaction to the ethnic nationalism followed hy the political wing of the PKK, the Halkm Emek Partisi (People's Labor Party, HEP), Demokratik Emek Partisi (Democratic Lahor Party, DEP), Hallo.n Demokrasi Partisi (People's

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Democracy Parry, HADEP), Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Sodety Party, DTP), and Barx~ ve Demokrasi Partisi {Peace and Democracy Party, BDP}. Overall it is safe to say that Kemalist nationalism until recently was the most influential form of nationalism in Turkey. In fact it occupies a dominant or almost hegemonic position among its rivals. It is the only form of nationalism that is the offidal ideology of the Turkish state, so it has more impact than ethnic or conservative nationalism on Turkish domestic and foreign policy.

OFFICIAL KEMALIST NATIONALISM AND KEMALIST STATE IDENTITY

K.emalism or Atatiirkism (in Turkish Kemalizm and Atatiirkcriiliik, respectively) is the official ideology of Turkey. The "six arrows" represent the six principles of Kemalism: republicanism, nationalism, secularism, etatism, populism, and reformism. The six arrows were accepted in the Third CHP Congress. held on May 10-18,1931. The party secretazy general, Recep Peker. was an azdent advocate of a centralized state, etatism. and state-party amalgamation. In time Kemalism was to have connotations similar to a religion and to substitute for Islam. In fact a member of parliament wrote a book on Kemalism in which he ar~ gued that Kemalism is beyond Marxism. fascism, and all sorts of ideologies and that it is a religion based on life itself (Tuncay 1992.. pp. 308-9. 32.0, 32.537).

Kemalist nationalism as opposed to Turanism was a territorial nationalism. which entailed forgetting the Ottoman past and remembering the glorious pre-Ottoman Turkish past. Getting rid of the Arabic script and Arabic-Persian words was also part of this policy of forgetting and remembering (<;olak 2.000, pp. 146. 2.2.6. 2.71-72.. 2.92.) the pre~Ottoman Turkish past. Baskm Oran argues that Atatiirk nationalism is the successor to European nationalism and precursor of colonial peoples' nationalism. It followed a revisionist policy vis-a-vis the Versailles system; but once a national Turkish state was established. Kemalist nationalism advocated the status quo. Furthermore. it was an anti-imperialist struggle that lacked an irredentist dimension, rejecting racism and advocating cultural nationalism for those living on the same piece of territory. Atatiirkist nationalism was peaceful when contrasted with

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the Young Turk era, which had a "racist and expansionist" nationalism. Attachment to the Turkish culture was presented as a major criterion for belonging to the Turkish nation, and the Republican People's Party program excluded outside Turks within its political concern even though they wished them all the best and expressed fraternal love toward them (Oran 1997, pp. 40, 4 8-5°, 64-65, 177). Atatiirk, however, expressed his interest in "captive Turks" and his hope

that one day Turks under the rule of the Soviet Union would gain their independence. Turkey had to prepare for such an eventuality. He pointed out that historical and linguistic studies were conducted with this objective in mind (Oran 1997, pp. 168-69). The Turkish history thesis and the Sun Language Theory, devised at the 1932 Turkish Historical Congress and 1936 Language Congress, argued that Turks were the creators of almost all known civilizations, including ancient Egyptians, Hittites, and Sumerians. and that the Turkish language was the root of all languages. These studies were used to holster the legitimacy of the regime and create a single identity among aU the citizens (Behar 1996, pp. 13, 92, 104, 179-80). While numerous serious academic works were written within the general atmosphere supportive of scholarly work, it should be noted that many of the arguments of the Turkish historical thesis cannot be substantiated by evidence. By trying ~o prove that Anatolia was Turkish from antiquity on, the Kemalist regime tried to increase the sense of pride and belonging among the people living in Turkey at the time. While Central Asia was presented as the fatherland of the Turks, pan-Turkist tendencies were to be curbed by focusing on Anatolia as the present motherland. Contrarily, these arguments created an environment conducive to pan-Turkist movements. In fact, during the trials of the 1944 Racism-Turanism incident (when the government arrested a number of nationalist officers, bureaucrats. and intellectuals), defendants such as Alparslan Turke~ and Hiiseyin Nihal AtSlZ argued that it was the government and the educational. system that propagated racism (Turke~ 2000, pp. 38-40); hence what they were doing, in their judgment, was very much in line with state policies. hmet inonii, prime minister for most of Atatiirk's rule, argued that the primary precondition for those who wanted to serve the country was that they had to be Turks and Turkists. Non-Turkish groups in the country were

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to be assimilated (Ostel 1997, p. 173). Such statements demonstrate the extreme/ ethnic nationalist character of the regime. Kemalist nationalism gave equal citizenship to the people residing in the territory of Turkey, however. Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution stipulated: "The people of Turkey without any regard for religion or race are called Turks through citizenship" (my translation). In that sense it can be described as territorial-civic nationalism. The efforts to assimilate the non-Turks in the country with campaigns such as "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" and restrictions on state employment indicate that it also had strong ethnic elements (6zdogan 2001, pp. 297-98). In fact, one scholar (ytldlz 2001) divides the evolution of Kemalist nationalism into three phases. The first phase (191923), corresponding to the war of national liberation, is characterized by ethnic pluralism and the nation is defined according to religion. In the second era (1924-29) a militant secular outlook is imposed on the people and all the citizens of the country are considered Turks. In the last phase (1929-38) more emphasis is put on ethnocultural elements. KemaBst nationalism is identified not as racist but rather as ethnicist and discriminatory toward ethnic and religious groups that remain different from the official identity (ytldlz 2001, pp. 16-18, 139): the secular, Westernized Turk. Oran argued that linguistic and historical studies, together with the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign and the requirement of being ethnically Turkish in order to be able to enter military academies, bordered on chauvinism and racism. He still believed, however, based on the CHP program, that all citizens living in Turkey who spoke Turkish and accepted Turkish culture and ideals, no matter which religion or sect they belonged to, were considered Turks. So he argued that territorial and subjective qualifications prevailed over objective criteria such as ethnicity or religion, making Kemalist nationalism similar to French-type nationalism (Oran 1997, 204-S, 221). The key here was that anyone who accepted the principles of Kemalism and did not insist on keeping the ethnic or religious identities that might be considered anathema to the Kemalist regime could be a Turk. Nobody was excluded from politics or social life provided that person was in line with Kemalism. Among the ideologues of Kemalism, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt defined this ideology as an authoritarian democracy, which was based on the people. The Turkish nation was likened to a pyramid, with the leader at the top and

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the people at the base. Defining himself as a Turkish nationalist, Bozkurt expressed his belief that Turkish unity would be realized in the future. He pointed to the absolute necessity that the Turkish Revolution should stay in the hands of "genuine Turks." While describing the Turkish regime as being based on culture and language rather than race, he also quoted Atatiirk as having warned the Turks not to trust anybody who was not of their own blood (Bozkurt 1995, pp. 107, 142, 160, 228-29, 267). The duality continues between the ethnic and territorial-cultural sides ofKemalism; but even if the latter aspects are emphasized, it is stU! based on the dominant ethnic: hence to be a Turk one has to assimilate into Turkish culture and language. Bozkurt (1995) praised republicanism as superior to monarchy. Furthermore, he argued that the six arrows had totally eradicated the past, but he concluded his book by saying that the Turkish nation has a past much superior to those of other nations (Bozkurt 1995. pp. 53, u8, 288). Undoubtedly he was talking about the pre-Ottoman past. Even though the Ottoman Empire was the strongest and best-institutionalized state among Turkish states in history, its culture was equated with fanaticism and discarded due to its defeats in the past tWO centuries and replaced by a new Turkish state with a novel ideological outlook. Munis Tekinalp (Moiz Kohen), another proponent of official nationalism. argued that Turkish language and culture were under invasion from Arabic and Persian and had to be liberated. The new Turk found a new spirit. a new history. and even a new God because of the use of the Turkish ~Tann" instead of "Allah." Turkish nationalism, contrary to other forms of nationalism. was peaceful and humanitarian and emerged from an instinct to protect itself-hence it was defensive and also secular. A racial or religious background had no place in the definition of the Turkish nation. which was instead based on sharing the same language. culture. and ideal. Those who were not "racially" Turks could become Turks by culturally aSSimilating. Having said that. however. Tekinalp added that this did not mean that they had to forget their ethnic background. be it Circassian, Kurdish. Laz, or Jewish (Tekinalp 1998. pp. 166, 176, 180, 277, 281, 289, 301). As a matter of fact, Tekinalp was jewish and never changed his religion, though he changed his name. He was a propagator of first pan-Turkism and then Kemalist nationalism, and his religious background was not an issue throughout his intellectuallife.

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Tekinalp argued that the Kemalist revolution introduced the Western civilization to the Turks. Religious law and Islamic ties were superseded, and national identity was constructed in the new Turkey. The new Turk was created by the leader (onder), who represented the nation in its entirety without distinction of class. In sum, Tekinalp contended that Kemalism was democratic in its essence but that a more centralized and strong state was created due to some problems of implementing democracy. He gave the active parliament and elections as examples of a functioning democracy. He assumed that the people of Turkey were not mature enough to accept the intricacies of democracy at that time but envisaged the gradual emergence of a democratic political system. Tekinalp also argued that Turkey could not accept classical democracy together with its individualism and economic liberalism, because it would mean exploitation of national sources by foreign capital. This was the reason why Turkey adopted etatism in order to try to provide capital and services for its populace. The establishment of state factories and state economic enterprises was achieved by credits from the Soviet Union. He quoted Atatiirk as saying that etatism emerged from Turkey's needs and hence was created according to the special conditions of the country. Etatism was not only aimed at the economic sphere, however, but was also implemented to shape the society and culture (Tekinalp 1998, pp. 33, 35. 90, 205-6, 213, 224. 228-29. 233. 252). The aim was to free the society from the shackles of the past through a project of social engineering and transform it into a modernized Western society. The ideas of Atatiirk clearly present a nationalist worldview. He pointed out that he was a Turkish nationalist and that the more Turkish the country became. the stronger the republic would become. Many of his speeches also dealt with pride in being a Turk and praise for the noble blood that ran in the nation's veins, the beauty of the Turkish "race;' and the strength of the Turks, which were expressed to increase national pride among the people (YlldlZ 2001, pp. 154. 163, 170). But this should not be construed as Atatiirk using nationalism as an instrument to manipulate the masses. To the contrary. throughout his military and political career he expressed patriotism and undertook national policies when he had the power. It should be pOinted out, however. that Atatiirk specifically condemned irredentism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism in the long speech he made in the second Republican People's Party Congress in Ankara between October

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IS and 20, 1927. He argued that those ideologies had never succeeded in his-

tory and that it would not be possible to unite all the Turks in one state. Instead a national policy within the borders of the Turkish Republic was to be followed (Atatiirk 1963, p. 436). The ruling circles, including the secretary general of the CHP, Recep Peker, in fact displayed sympathy toward the outside Turks but no political interest because they did not share the fate of those Turks (Aydemir 1965, p. 448; ytldlZ 2001, p. 202). The Republican People's Party, which was established in 1923, restricted membership to Turks and those that accepted Turkish citizenship and culture. In 1927 the party declared the dissemination of Turkish culture and language to be one of its foremost objectives (BUa 1999. pp. 42• 55). Leftist Kemalist writers, such as Turhan Feyzioglu. Toktaml~ Ate§. and Ahmet Taner Kr~lah, argued in the late twentieth century that Kemalist nationalism is territorial, modern, progressive, and peaceful and that it pays no attention to ethnic-racial factors. In fact, official nationalism has an ethnic face as well, which remained latent for a long time (Y11dlZ 2001, pp. 12.3-24). WhUe it is true that it contains territorial-civic factors, Kemalism also includes ethnic nationalism, which tries to create a Turkish nation-state based on the pre-Islamic and pre-Ottoman Turkish culture. In the parlance of Atatiirk, "Religion was relegated to the mosques and consciences" (YtldlZ'200I, p. 318). Islam was portrayed by Afet inan, a scholar who was one of Atatiirk's adopted daughters, as having stifled Turkish national identity and weakened Turkish national consciousness. Some of the prominent members of the ruling elite also argued that Islam was a hindrance to progress (YlldlZ 2001, p. 3(8). These statements were aimed at superseding the Ottoman and Islamic heritage and were no doubt condoned by the Turkish political leadership. In sum, Kemalist official nationalism, also known as Atatiirk nationalism, had both territorial and ethnic elements; while the roots of the Turks were found in Central Asia, Anatolia itself was portrayed as being Turkish from time immemorial. These efforts were made to sidestep the Ottoman and Muslim legacy of the Turkish people and create a new Turkish nation that was Western. Granting full equality to all citizens, the Kemalist regime required assimUation in the new political identity to be able to participate in the political affairs of the country.

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ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND ATSIZ

Hiiseyin Nihal AtSlZ (1905-75) was one of the few nationalists who explicitly articulated and propagated racism together with pan-Turkism. AtSlZ argued that Turkism consisted of racism and Turanism, the former addressing the internal sphere and the latter related to the Outside Turks. He was critical of the older generation of nationalists, including Gokalp, for not being racists. He was also critical of materialism in a puritan and secular way. What makes him unique is that very few people· expressed a view that was outside the scope of Islam within the rightist circles. He did not reject Islam in his writings but counted Islam among foreign ideologies, such as communism and fascism, which were antinational (Uzer 2002, pp. 125-28). AtSlZ'S views, including racism and his quaSi-shamanistic themes, were repulSive in an Islamic mUieu. He did not gain support either among the masses or among the elite. Even the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), for which he voted, was too Islamic for AtSlZ. So he supported the party but was critical of the party's Islamic leanings. This proves the point that a non-Islamic idea has very little or no appeal to the Turkish political Right. In other words, AtSlZ found that the MHP had moved toward Islamism and in return the party's leadership as well as the grassroots perceived his ideas as repulsive and costly during elections. According to one account, Ats1Z's ideas appeared un-Islamic in Central Anatolia, even among nationalists, and hence were not widely followed (Deliorman 1978, p. 362). It should be emphasized that Hiiseyin Nihal Atslz is one of the few openly racist Turkish nationalists, a state of affairs that clearly differentiates him from his predecessors such as Yusuf Akcrura and Ziya Gokalp and successors such as Erol Gungor and tbrahim Kafesoglu. He does, however, share the idea of pan-Turkism with most of the earlier thinkers. His form of nationalism did not attract many followers in a Muslim milieu, which is one of the reasons for the transformation of nationalism into a more Islam-oriented ideology. And in this sense KlSakiirek played a role in making Turkish nationalism more responSive to its environment by declaring that it should be dependent on and shaped by Islam. AtSlZ'S brother, Nejdet Sancrar, similarly emphasized the significance of race in the definition of Turkish as well as Hungarian and German national

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identities. whereas it was not relevant for the French and Americans. But he defined Islam as the national religion of Turks. Like AtSlZ, he argued that panTurkism and racism were the twO pillars ofTurkism (Sanerar 1995. pp. 13,· 17. 34. 46). Other pan-Turkists such as Reha Oguz Turkkan and RIza Nur also emphasized the :mportance of race in the makeup of the nation at the expense of culture (Ozdogan 2.001. pp. 2.30-39). What characterized AtSlZ and other racist-Turanists or simply Turkists in their jargon was the identification of ethnicity with nation. Any person who was not ethnically Turkish was suspect in their eyes and should not playa role in the political affairs of the country. Their ultimate objective was the unification of all Turks. and naturally their ideas were not confined to Turkey. Their nationalism was purely based on race; citizenship was irrelevant. Furthermore. AtSlZ wanted to Strip certain ethnic groups of citizenship (Uzer 2.002. p. 12.6). His kind of nationalism had a very weak influence on Turkish politics. Unless Turkey is radically transformed due to the Kurdish problem, the popularization of ethnic nationalism is unlikely. Of course. Kurdish nationalism. which is an ethnic form of nationalism, could very well invite a reciprocal form of ethnic nationalism.

THE TURKISH-IsLAMIC SYNTHESIS: THE EMERGENCE OF CONSERVATIVE NATIONALISM

The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was formulated and articulated by the Intellectuals' Hearth (IH: Aydmlar Ocagl), a right-wing organization influential in Turkish politicS. The IH was established in May 1970 by a group of professors. politicians. bureaucrats. and politicians. Among the founders of the organization were the founding chairman ibrahim Kafesoglu, Siileyman Yalerm, Salih Tug, Muharrem Ergin. Nevzat Yalermta~. Kemal lilcak. Ahmed Kabakh. and Said Bilgi<; (Giivener et aI. 1994. pp. ISS-56). The association was instrumental in the creation of Nationalist Front governments (1975-78) (Bora and Can 1994. p. IS3; Sakalhoglu 1993. p. 124) and was influential during the military regime (1980-83) as well as during the Turgut Ozal premiership (1983-89) within the Motherland Party. In fact the rightist parties contained quite a number of members or sympathizers ofIH. Members of the IH were so close to the establishment. however. that the assertion that they were Islamists (Giivener et aI. 1994, pp. 34-35) was quite problematic. An analysis of

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The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis by ibrahim Kafesoglu. who was the first person to articulate the concept in question. dearly proves the point that they supported secularism (Kafesoglu 1996. pp. 18;-86). ibrahim Kafesoglu referred to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis for the first time in a conference in 1972 and later wrote his thoughtS on the subject in a book in 1985 (Bora and Can 1994. pp. 169-70). The book focused on Turkish history from the time of the Huns to the present day. It contained little analysis of the Turkish culture/Islamic civilization nexus. the relative importance of pre-Islamic Turkish culture. or the Islamic religion in the makeup of the contemporary Turkish identity. Kafesoglu tried to prove that the pre-Islamic Turkish religion was very similar to Islam; thus when the Turks converted to Islam. they quickly adapted to their new religion. 'The commonalties between the ancient religion of Turks and Islam included belief in one God. the creator of the universe. who is present everywhere at all times and is omnipotent. the nonexistence of the clerical class. and the desire to impose Turkish law (tore) throughout the world. which is similar to jihad (Kafesoglu 1996. p. 161). Another scholar argued that the belief in martyrdom during the pre-Islamic and Islamic phases was identical (Giingor 1996. p. 136). Deciding whether the parallels are accurate demands expertise in theology but what is important is that Kafesoglu tried to prove that Turkishness and Islam are baSically the same or are very similar. Actually he and the Intellectuals' Hearth tried to solve the religionnation problematic in Turkish nationalist thought by determining the place of Islam in nationalist discourse. 'The Turkish-Islamic synthesis is a conservative form of Turkish nationalism; thus. branding it as Islamist (Guvenc et al. 1994) is false. It should be seen within the main parameters of Turkish nationalism. Hence conservative nationalism would be a better characterization of the phenomenon. 'The main problem in Kafesoglu's thought is the relative importance that he gives to Islamic values on the one hand and the pre-Islamic Turkish culture on the other in the makeup of contemporary Turkish identity. In one place he sees the Hun state as the model for all Turkish states as well as having influenced all the Turkish empires. states. and princedoms (Kafesoglu 1996. p. 10). and later he argues that after the Turks became Muslims the institutions that were created were substantially different from those that had existed during the time of pre-Islamic states. In fact a new Turkish-Islamic synthetic

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culture was created as a result of the Islamization process (Kafesoglu 1996, p. 162). Thus the desire to see Turkish history as an undivided whole (like Zeki Velidi and Atslz) on the one hand combined with willingness to emphasize the unique culture that emerged as a consequence of the conversion to Islam on the other hand is the biggest contradiction that exists in Turkish nationalist thought. As Bernard Lewis mentioned, the Turks were integrated into Islam at the expense of the loss of some aspects of their national characteristics. It became inconceivable for a Turk to think of the existence of a non-Muslim Turk, being totally ignorant of the Gagauz in Moldova and the Chuvash and the Yakut Turks in Russia, who are all Christians. The same conception does not apply to Arabs or Albanians, who are used to seeing Christian Arabs or Albanians who speak the same language and have the same culture as the rest of the society. According to those who advocated the synthesis ideology, Islam was seen as a central or the central component of Turkish culture; but it should be stressed that the Sufis Hoca Ahmed Yesevi, Mevlana Celalettin-i Rumi, Yunus Emre, and Hac! Bekta~ were mentioned as the carriers of Turkish Islam and the creators and facUitators of national unity (Gungor 1996, pp. 177.181). The problematic nature of their thoughts regarding Islam and Turkish culture can be seen from this quotation: "Undoubtedly, the Islamic faith is the central source of our national culture; but our national culture is not composed of only that; we also had cultural values that did not emanate from Islam" (Kosoglu 1996, p. 186). This remains the major source of uncertainty and lack of clarity in nationalist thinking. Turkish nationalist thinkers are often confused about the relative importance of pre-Islamic Turkish culture and Islamic Turkish culture in the articulation of their thoughts because of what I call the religion-nation problematic. For intellectual clarity in Turkish nationalism, religion needs to be relegated to a secondary role at the service of nationalism because in nationalist thought the hierarchy ofloyalty is reversed: from religion or tribe to the nation. In other words, international, transnational, or subnationalloyalties are suppressed, giving way to nationalism. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the Intellectuals' Hearth, whether consciously or unconsciously, tried to address and resolve the affinity between Turkishness and Islam. But they too were confused about the relative

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importance ofIslam and Turkishness in the makeup of contemporary Turkish identity. The Nationalist Action Party was the only party that emphasized nationalism as its raison d'etre and was an ideological parey just like the Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) and the Communist Turkish Workers Party (Trirkiye l~
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Gokalp as racist and his ideas as kavrniyetrilik (ethnic nationalism). In his judgment, nationalism (milliyetplik) was an Islamic concept in which the nation was defined by its religion (Klsakiirek 1993. pp. 89, 2.79. 308). In other words. Necip Fazll saw nationalism as racism and described Islamism as true nationalism. He totally subjugated Turkish identity to Islam so that. according to him. Turkish national identity emerged solely as a function of the conversion to Islam and the only legitimate historical concerns were Muslim history and the Ottoman era. In a brief formulation, a Turk became a Turk only through Islamization and a non-Muslim Turk was an anomaly in Turkish Islamist thought. He defined Turkish identity as having developed only after the conversion to Islam and saw in Islam a civilizing mission for the uncultivated Turks via language and philosophy. Furthermore, Necip Fazll advocated an Islamic worldview and called for the centralization ofIslam in all facets of political and social thought (Klsakiirek 1993. pp. 301-2). Nationalism in Klsakiirek's view should be dependent on Islam; hence Islam should be the source to which al1loyalty and aspirations were directed. He cited the hadith to the effect that people cannot be blamed for loving their nation but called for a restrictive nationalism shaped and delimited by Islam (Ktsakiirek 1993. p. 33.64.238.402-4). In his criticism of Nihal AtS1Z and nationalism in general Necip Fazll put forward the argument that his premise was Islam whereas Ats1Z's was Turkism. No ideology could be confined to a nation alone. Only a worldwide ideology encompassing all of humanity would be a correct approach. Furthermore, Turks became Turks only when they became Muslims; in fact "our institutionalization as nation and state is only after Islam:' Thus nationalism must be based on religion (Klsakiirek 1990a, pp. 393-94, 1997. p. 72.. and 1992.b, p. 33). Furthermore, he attacked Ziya Gokalp for advocating a Turkish ~ran. Necip FaZlI said: "I wish Arabic had been our language:' He also did not believe in the strategic and emotional importance of Cyprus (Ktsakiirek 1991. pp. 45. S2, 92-93, 1990b. p. 90 ).The Cyprus issue was defined by nationalists and by a significant section of the Right and Left as the national cause of Turkey. Hence his position makes Klsakiirek the odd man out in Turkish politics. It would be highly problematic to characterize such ideas as "nationalist;' and it is ironic that Kisakiirek has been considered a nationalist both by nationalists themselves and by independent scholars. His ideas are more fitting

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to what Mark Juergensmeyer (1993) calls religious nationalism, defined as movements trying to link religion with the nation-state. In movements such as the Hamas in Palestine and the BJP (BharatiyaJanata Party) in India, "[r] eligious and ethnic identities are intertwined" (Juergensmeyer 1993, p. 2; also pp. 4, 6,4 0 ,47,199). With the establishment of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Panisi, MNP) and then the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP), Necip Fazd supported this political movement in- the 1973 elections and saw it as a genuine Islamic current. But his criticisms started when the MSP entered a coalition with the CHP and failed to stop inflation, leftist infiltration into the Ministry of Education, and Bulent Ecevit's exploitation of the Cyprus issue. The MSP should not have entered the coalition with the CHP but should have articulated its thesis while it was in opposition. Necip Fazrl was highly critical of the leader of the MSP, Necmettin Erbakan, for being conceited and incapable of leading such a party and called for his resignation. He described heavy industry and National Outlook (Milli Gorii§) as utopias. Thus in the 1977 elections he backed the MHP, the party that he tried to move away from "racism." He tried to influence the MHP toward becoming an Islamist party. In 1977 Necip Fazll urged the voters to vote for either the MHP or the AP so the two parties could form a coalition government and discouraged everybody from voting for any other party, including the MSP. He also rejected any ideological similarity between his ideology, the Grand East (Biiyuk Dogu: BD), and the MSP, which he called a bad imitation of the BD and a hindrance to the Islamic ideal. Yet he concluded by saying that his criticisms of the party came from a fellow Muslim and that he would reject any criticism coming from unbelievers (Klsakurek 1992b; p. 103, 1993, pp. 26-27, 68-69, 29 0 , 1990b, pp. 1[4-19, 1992a, pp. 276- 83: Tercuman, June 4 1977). He also supported the Nationalist Front governments (see Milti Gazete, April 9, 1975). One scholar argued that Necip Fazd was particularly successful in solving the "ambivalence of the Kemalist modernizers by advocating a (national) identity defined by total rejection of the West;' emphasizing "the folk character of national identity" and hence creating an Islamic form of nationalism that addressed the religious emotions of the people. In that sense, he contributed more to nationalism than did Kemalism. which had an artificial side in its nationalism (Ozdalga 1992, pp. 81-83).

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It might be true that Necip FazIl.K.tsakiirek influenced Turkish nationalism and the Turkish~Islamic synthesis that came after, but his impact can best be described as indirect and minor. From an outline of his ideas it should be evident that his views had very weak nationalist connotations and very strong Islamic leanings. In fact Islam was central, the beginning and the end, in his ideological orientation. Regarding his impact on the MHP, it is clear that this influence was more on the religious faction in the party, culminating in the Grand Unity Party (Biiyiik Birlik Partisi, BBP), which is more Islamist than nationalist in my judgment. The Turkish~Islamic synthesis (conservative nationalism) makes the point that Turkishness had a meaning only after the Turks converted to Islam around the tenth century AD. Its adherents are proud that Turks became the sword of Islam, first serving the Abbasid caliphate and then establishing independent states such as the Seljuks and the Ottoman Empire. The Ot~ tomans, in particular. ruled most of the Arab Middle East and very much defined the state identity in Islamic terms. This concept of nationalism un~ doubtedly would not be attractive to those people with secular leanings and the Alevis living in Turkey. The Alevis are a religious sect originating from Shiism but have followed a very different trajectory than that of the Twelver Shiism ofIranians. They are usually critical of the Ottoman past because they suffered during that time and have a very different understanding of Islamic religion. They perceive Sunni Islam as Arab Islam and believe that they fol~ Iowa Turkish form of Islam. Therefore they would have difficulty in accept~ ing the main arguments of conservative nationalism.

CONCLUSION: DIVERGING PATHS OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

The nation~religion nexus in which Turkish nationalism is formulated is a highly problematic area that needs to be understood and analyzed. For clarity in nationalist discourse a rejection of religion is .t:lot necessary. What is essential is putting religion in its proper place: below the nation in the hierarchy ofloyalties. Thus in nationalist thought the nation supersedes all other forms of allegiances such as religion, tribe. family, class, and gender. In other words, religion should be seen as a source of solidarity. which is functional for nationalism. Needless to say, such thinking is anathema to "fundamental~ ists" in all religions.

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Not pursuing such an intellectual endeavor leads to a blurring of the difference on the issue of religion between the nationalists and the Islamists, which remains vague. The Islamists are clear in their rejection of nationalism, but the nationalists are muddled in their approach to religion. On the one hand, they try to emphasize the importance of Turkish culture from the time of the Huns and their impact on contemporary Turkish culture. On the other hand, they try to prove the indivisibility of the Turkish-Islamic culture. In other words, they are trying to keep both cultures as the central component of Turkish culture. This problem arises from their thinking in an Islam-oriented fashion and their lack of ability to formulate their thoughts in a nation-centered way. It should be evident from these arguments that Turkish nationalism has moved away from the secular nationalism ofKemalism and pan-Turkism toward a more religion-oriented conception of the self and the nation. This can be explained by the democratization of the polity, starting in the 19SOS with a government that was more responsive to the demands of the populace and coupled with increased education, leading to the emergence of intellectual cadres with an Anatolian background for whom religion was an essential part of their lives. Nonetheless, eclecticism seems to be common in Turkish political thought, and none of the nationalist strands are withering away. Territorial, ethnic, and religious elements continue to play various roles in the definition of Turkish national identity. It should be pointed out, however, that it is no longer possible to find the pure Turanism of AtSlZ and eclecticism seems to be preferred by nationalists, who take elements from Turkism, Islamism, and Ottomanism (Ogiin 2.000, p. 150)' In other words, nationalism as it came under the influence of conservative nationalism became more responsive to Islam and the Ottoman past. In fact one of the reasons why members of the Nationalist Action Party preferred Islamic symbols to racism and pan-Turkism was that they realized that they would not be successful in elections with non-Islamic slogans (Ogiin 2.000, pp. 142.-43). Particularly after the 1960S, the Nationalist Action Party monopolized nationalism, whereas the Republican People's Party monopolized Kemalism. The nuances of nationalism and the fact that Kemalism itself was a form of nationalism caused confusion. In fact, throughout the 1960S, the CHP

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increasingly became a center-of~le.ft party, as the young and energetic secre~ tary general of the party, Bulent Ecevit, advocated social democracy. The election of the Justice and Development Party in 2.002. and 2.007 without an expressly nationalistic discourse or program heralded the "emer~ gence of a new Turkey" (Yavuz 2.006) with a less significant role for nationalism in Turkish politics. There is also a nationalist backlash nowelectorally, however, confined to a minority and pretty much represented in the Nation~ alist Action Party and the Republican People's Party. In the 2007 elections the two parties' discourses converged in such a manner that they discussed forming a grand coalition. This proved to be a futile project because they were defeated by the AKP, which garnered 47 percent of the national vote. Even though nationalism in Turkey has become more marginal, national~ ists are still a strong minority in the state bureaucracy and civil society. The pro~republic demonstrations, reactions to the rising activities of the PKK, the humiliation experienced in Iraq since 2003 by America and the Kurdish regional government, and the discriminatory policies of EU toward Turkey have culminated in the emergence of reactive nationalist feelings, besieged by "forces of evil." The rise in the display of flags in the three major cities ofTur~ key (Istanbul, Ankara. and izmir) as well as in other cities is a result of this feeling of weakness and fear that a Kurdish state is imminent. To return to the beginning of this chapter, positive or negative sentiments are sources that feed nationalist theory and practice. This is the reason for the continued relevance of nationalism for contemporary politicS.

7

ON THE QUESTION OF ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN TURKEY Sources and Discourses

BERRIN KOYUNCU-LORASDAGI

THE INTRACTABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND NATION-

alism-whether incompatibility or coexistence-has long been the object of academic interest. Views concerning this relationship in the literature can be broken down into twO basic groups. The first includes the proponents of the modernist approach to nationalism, who assume a fundamental incompatibUity between religion and nationalism: because nationalism is a modern phenomenon, the impact of religion on people's lives is expected to fall in line with the processes of modernization and secularization.' According to the second group, however, religion and nationalism can coexist. The writings of Anthony Smith (1991) and John Hutchinson (1987) point [0 the importance of religion for building a national identity! Transcending these dichotomist views placing either no emphasis or [00 much emphasis on the role of religion in the formation of nationalism, Barbara-Ann Rieffer (2003) makes a useful classification of the interplay of religion and nationalism by taking into account the extent to which religion can influence nationalism. She comes up with three types: secular nationalism, instrumental pious nationalism, and religious nationalism. As examples of secular nationalism she cites the French, German, Italian, and Turkish cases 133

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(in fact the secular. official one). which allow no place for religion in the construction of national identity. Based on the institutionalization of religion in the law and governing institutions and the degree of its role in nationalism. Rieffer makes a distinction between religious and instrumental pious nationalism. She regards religiOUS nationalism as a political movement by a group of people heavily influenced by religious beliefs and aspiring to political selfdetermination to establish national unity under their own independent political units. which are governed according to religious beliefs institutionalized in laws and procedures (Rieffer 2003. p. 225). Religion has an essential significance for these nationalist movements. so they are based heavily on religious language and modes of communication. This type includes the nationalisms of the Irish. Polish. Iranians, and Indians (twentieth century). In contrast, she defines instrumental pious nationalism as a movement in which religion occupies an influential position as an element supporting national identity. This category includes Russian and Iraqi nationalism from the 1980s to the present (Rieffer 2003. p. 224.). This chapter provides an overview of the interplay of Islam and nationalism from the late Ottoman era onward from a historical perspective by focusing on the discourses of key Turkish nationalist figures who have incorporated Islam into their nationalistic views and traces how this interaction has been articulated in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis since the 1980s. My goal here is to explore the nature of the relationship between Islam and nationalism in Turkey. Excluding some brief periods since the mid-nineteenth century {such as those of secular Kemalist nationalism and extreme versions of nationalism}. I contend that Islam and Turkish nationalism have had a symbiotic relationship in Turkey that is most appropriately conceived as instrumental pious nationalism. not as Islamic nationalism. At this juncture. two important points should be noted. First. although this chapter does not directly address the issue of modernization in the views of these figures. it should be kept in mind that focusing on the relationship between religion and nationalism necessitates viewing this issue within the context of Turkish modernization. Mid-nineteenth/eady-twentiethcentury modernization efforts concentrated on the question of how to save the unity of the empire and prevent its decay vis-a.-vis developments in Europe while holding onto its Islamic identity. Second, this chapter is concerned with (modernist/reformist) Turkish nationalists who contended

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that nationalism is compatible with Islam. They argued pragmatically that the best path in the age of nations was to establish unity under the name of the "nation" with the help of Islam, which would further the interests of both the Turkists and the Islamists (Tunaya 2.003. pp. 73-74). This chapter consists of four main parts. In the first part I outline the roots of the symbiotic relationship between Islam and nationalism in the late Ottoman Empire. In the second part I examine the discourse of the key Turkish nationalists of the late Ottoman and early republican period and the official discourse concerning the role of religion in Turkish nationalism. The discussion briefly touches upon the interplay of Islam and nationalism in the multiparty period between 1946 and 1980. In the third part I delve into the Turkish-Islamic synthesis by focusing on the views of the Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydmlar Ocagl) and Fethullah Giilen since the 198oS.In the fourth part I discuss the limitations and prospects of the conceptualization of the symbiotic interplay of Islam and nationalism in Turkey as instrumental pious nationalism.

THE INTERPLAY OF ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN THE LATE OTTOMAN ERA: PAN-IsLAMISM AS THE SOURCE OF PROTO-NATIONALISM

The Ottoman Empire was first confronted with nationalist sentiments at the beginning of the nineteenth century, during the Greek revolt, which became a watershed in Ottoman history. This was no simple loss of territory: at that time the empire was alarmed to face independence movements in addition to the secession of its non-Muslim provinces in the Balkans (Ogiin 2.000, p. 99; Zubaida 2004, p. 408). This period also included nascent modernization efforts to seek a way out of the empire's deterioration and strengthen it against the European powers. The main concern was how to modernize and become more civilized while holding Onto its Islamic identity. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha. a leading statesman of the Tanzimat period, was the first figure in Turkish political history whose discourse on nationalism included Islamist themes (Ogun 2.000, p. 103). He advocated a political-legal modernization based on the Islamic values strictly embraced by the Muslims, who made up the majority of the Ottoman population. At the center of his political thought was the assimilation/Islamization of the empire's nonMuslim population (Ogiin 2.000, pp. 103-4). To Cevdet Pasha, the empire's

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success and longevity was attributable to the Turks' contributions through their culture of solidarity. But it should be underlined that what he meant by the expression "Turks" was very much associated with being Muslim. He also adhered to the policy of Ottomanism. While the concern of the Tanzimat state elites, whether they were Islamist or Turkist, was preserving the empire, they could not conceive of any alternative to Ouomanism, meaning the attempt to create an idea of territorial nationhood. They believed this was the best strategy to cope with the empire's diverse population (Arai 1994, pp. 1819; Giilalp 2002, p. 23; Thomas [978, p. 130). This attempt to unite the empire's diverse population regardless of religion and ethnicity did not work, however. It was under these circumstances that Young Ottoman thought emerged. Although the Young Ottomans supported the modernizing efforts of the Tanzimat elite, they also reacted against the privileges given to non-Muslim minorities (in the 18s6 Reform Edict) under the guise of formal equality between Muslims and nonMuslims. They highlighted Islam's importance as one of the primary factors uniting the Muslim population and an important pillar of the Ottoman state and society. Moreover, conceiving of the Islamic community as a modern nation, the Young Ottomans adopted the idea of ittihad-l Islam (unity of Islam) as referring to Islamic nationalism. The writings of Namlk Kemal and Ali $uavi, in particular, put the emphasis on being a Turk, although they did not have political goals and mainly remained Ottomanists (Berkes 1954, p. 381; Ogiin 2000, p. 106; Yavuz 1993, p. 198). Three main influences paved the way for nationalism supported by Islam to thrive in Turkey: the nationalist movements in the Balkans supported by (Christian) European powers; Persian intellectual Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), who championed the idea of ittihad-l Islam as a protonationalism;J and Turk-Tatar modernism (Cedidism), which served to fuse Turkish nationalism and Islamic modernism.4Starring with the way in which nationalist movements in the Balkans affected the evolution of nationalism with Islamic themes, Turkish nationalism is rooted in the proto nationalistic strain of Islamic political consciousness that developed as a result of the centralization and mass expulsion of Muslims from the Balkans (Kara 1997, p. 30; Yavuz 1993, p. 180). In addition, due to the empire's loss of territory in the Balkans and the rising threat posed by Christians to Ottoman unity, Sultan Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909)

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realized the need to rethink the significance of religion. In this regard, Abdiilhamid II decided to change the empire's main policy from Ottomanism to pan-Islamism, which is a progressive Islamic and nationalist movement whose main goals are modernization and transformation (Karpat 2.001, pp. :/.7-2.8). In this vein, he llsed Islam "as a lever which would instill some con" sciousness of a collective goal into his subjects" (Mardin 1981, p. 201) and to cere-strengthen the social foundation of the weakening state" (Giilalp 2002., /\ p. 26). It is important to stress that the adoption of pan-Islam ism by Abdiilh\i , amid II as an instrumental tool to keep the Ottoman Muslims of the empire i· united cannot be regarded as the consequence of his piety; it was a part of his \. political plan. He led "a national awakening" process by glorifying and moi, bilizing Islamic identity under "Muslim nationalism" (Karpat 2001, p. 32.0). "• •'.,• "• ," The second influence thought to have had an impact on the evolution .itionalism would serve Islamic unity by strengthening the individual elements >(Muslim nations) that were the constituents of that unity. Although his in«fiuence on political ideas within the Ottoman Empire has always been sub-

i'

• • •.',".".'.', ject to debate, it is hard to discount Afghani's impact on the views of Muslim i intellectuals of the Russian Empire such as Ahmed Agaoglu. As Nikki Ked> die (1968, p. 40) states, this impact was not due to a well-developed religious Sireformation program on the basis of theological questions. Instead, Afghani's \iattempts to find an appropriate way to absorb technical advances from Europe without letting Western cultural values enter Muslim lands and his idea \.that religion plays a critical role as a cohesive social force for forging group • solidarity inspired those intellectuals as well as Ziya Gokalp (Kara 1997, \pp. 41-42; Shissler 2.003, p. 103). ?> The third influence on the evolution of pan-Islamism as protonationalism .iwas the impact of Tatar-Turk modernist nationalism. This was a kind of relii:gious nationalism that reinforced the reconciliation ofIslam, modernism, and

:ii

\ Turkish nationalism, as represented by ismail Gasprinski (18S1'-1914). With a \ Worldly emphasis on the significance ofIslam, Gasprinski appropriated Islam

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as a useful tool for promoting group solidarity and leading a national and intellectual revival among Russian Muslims (Georgeon 1996; Karpat 2001, p. 550; Ogiin 1995> 2.000). The next part of this chapter deals with the influence of Tatar-Turk nationalism in detail through the thoughts of Yusuf Ak~ura and Ahmed Agaoglu. As A. Holly Shissler (2.003, p. 8) claims, the significant contributions of these two emigrants from the Russian Empire to the articulation of Turkish nationalism and Islam stemmed from the specific circumstances of Muslims under Russian rule. This led them to appropriate a particularly ethno-national interpretation of modern society that was unknown for Muslim Turks in the Ottoman Empire. 6

THE DISCOURSE ON NATIONALISM AND ISLAM BETWEEN THE LATE OTTOMAN AND EARLY REPUBLICAN ERAS

There are three important figures of Turkish nationalism in its formative period whose discourse on nationalism included Islamist themes: Yusuf Ak<;ura (1876-1935). Ahmed Agaoglu (1869-1939), and Ziya Gokalp (1876192.4).

After the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the main question occupying Turkish political thought was how to halt the Ottoman Empire's decline. Here the discussions revolved around three main political currents: Ottoman ism (the drive to establish an Ottoman nation on the basis of common territory), Islamism (the drive to establish an Islamic state), and Turkism (the drive to establish an ethnic political nationalism). In 1904 Yusuf Ak~ura, known as the first leading modern Turkish nationalist, wrote an article entitled "D<; Tarz-l Siyaset" (Three Types of Policies) in the Cairo-based magazine Turk in which he analyzed these political currents in terms of their potential to help save the empire from deterioration. Whereas he regarded the policy of Ottomanism as impracticable, the other two policies, he argued, did have the potential to save the empire, so long as the possible internal and external threats to them were eliminated. At the end of the piece, Ak<;ura posed the choice between Islamism, which could cause problems by sowing antagonism among non-Muslims in the empire, and Turkism but did not make clear his preference. Suavi Aydin (1993), Fran<;ois Georgeon (1996), and David Thomas (1978) contend that Ak~ura's choice was Turkish nationalism, a political

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understanding of a Turkish nation based exclusively on ethnic collectivity free from religious influence. They regard Ak<j:ura as a secular nationalist who did not give religion a sizable role in constructing national identity, thus making him the founding father of Kemalist nationalism. 7 In this vein, Aydm and Georgeon stress that Ak~ura intentionally dissociated religion from nationalism because he saw Islam as taking a merely supporting role in Turkish national culture to strengthen the soul of unity. They assert that Ak~ura is different from Agaoglu and Gokalp in the sense that he did not attempt to reconcile Islam and nationalism by citing the ~ran and hadiths to prove the existence of nationalism in Islam (Aydm 1993, pp. 214IS; Georgeon 1996, p. 47). Ak~ura adopted a historical approach to the role of religion in Turkish nationalism and asserted that Islam had to accept nationalism due to the changing laws of history. In Ak~ura's conception, Islam should be in the service of the Turkish "race" (Aks:ura 1976, pp. 19, 30; Georgeon 1996, pp. 43,47), Some works point to the significance of religion in Ak~ura's nationalist discourse, however, stressing that he made no clear distinction between the two but tried to prove that Islam could play an important role in the development of Turkish nationalism (Aks:ura 1978, p. 173; Yavuz 1993, p. 196; also yetinsaya 1999, p. 356). Like Georgeon, Yavuz (1993) contends that Aks:ura treated Islam as a social, in fact historical, phenomenon that can change in light of different circumstances.8 Due to his historical approach to religion, Ak~ura did not see Islam as hostile to nationalism; in fact it is argued that he endorsed a kind of religious nationalism (Oglin 1995, p. 182; Yavuz and Esposito 1993, p. :W3). In terms of Rieffer's categorization of the relationship between religion and nationalism, two things are clear at this point: on the one hand, it is not possible to ignore the significance ofIslam in Aks:uras nationalist views, as Oglin and Yavuz assert; on the other, it is not proper to caU Ak<j:uras articulation of Islam and nationalism a religiolls one, as Aydm and Georgeon argue. Instead, it is more appropriate to regard it as an instrumental pious nationalism. Under the influence of ismail Gasprinski, whose approach to Islam was determined by the extent to which Islam contributed to the national life, Ak<j:ura's articulation ofIslam and nationalism was based on his belief that Islam could help nationalism flourish and gain strength by providing symbolic tools that enhance unity and solidarity (Aks:ura 1978, p. 99; Bora 1999; Georgeon 1996, p. 47).

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As Shissler (2.003) states, Ahmed Agaoglu, with his Russian background, is an important figure in Turkish nationalism in terms of the role he played in the development of attitudes toward identity, particularly Islam, among Muslim Turks.? He believed that religion and nationalism are mutually supportive elements of national identity. In this delicate and complex relationship each element both serves and feeds off the other. In a series of articles entitled "Turk Alemi" (Turkish World), "one of the manifestos of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis:' Agaoglu explored how Islam and Turkish nationalism could be reconciled (Ogiin 1995, p. 196; Shissler 2003. p. 173).'0 While the shared Islamic consciousness is an indispensable element in the creation of national unity among Muslims as well as in giving that consciousness a particular shape, in Agaoglu's view, Islam's well-being depends upon the wellbeing of the nations in which it exists (Shissler 2003, p. lSI). Agaoglu pointed to the articulation of the nation and religion in Turkey, arguing that the 900-year history of the Turks as the principal defenders of Islam had created a connection between the nation and the religion so deep that no element or institution of Turkish life was not permeated by Islam. Thus Islam may justly be called the national religion of the Turks (Agaoglu 1914). At this point he believed that the spread ofIslam could only be good for the Turks and that they were dedicated to eradicating religious ignorance and inculcating the Tur~sh nation with Islamic truths (Shissler 2003, p. 173). In addition to Agaoglu's emphasis on the significance of Islam for nationalism, he attempted to prove that Islam is not hostile to nationalism. He based his contention on two arguments. One is that nationalism does not pose a challenge to Islamic unity. In 1914-15 he wrote a lengthy two-part article for the premier journal of the Turkists, Turk Yurdu, entitled "tslamda Dava-Yl Millet" (The Nationalist ~estion in Islam). This article was a response to a 1914 piece by Babanzade Ahmet Naim (1872-1934), a leading Islamist, in Sebilu'refad. Naim analyzed the question of nationalism in Islam on the basis of the hadiths and the ~ran and concluded that nationalism, an illness borrowed from the West, was not acceptable in Islam because it harmed the Islamic world by damaging Islamic unity (Nairn 1914; Tunaya 2003, p. 7 1). Rebuffing Naim's claim that nationalism is rejected in Islam, Agaoglu argued that Islam's original purpose was to establish unity among the Arab nations. He asserted that the Prophet Muhammad worked hard to overcome

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asabiyyet (tribal feeling), "a feeling of attachment to a group of agnates directed towards a narrow, concrete circle of individuals," and to establish an Islamic consciousness among the Arabs that would lead to Arab unity (Shissler 2.003, pp. 178-79). Here he underlined the Significance of religion as one of the most important principles of nationality due to its vital role in "the establishment of the national language, the national customs and convictions, and the national mode of thought and way of life" and argued that religion has always played a key role in the formation of nations if a nation is defined as a group of people who feel the same way (Shissler 2.003, pp. 174-75). In that regard, Agaoglu presents nationalism and Islam as having a kind of symbiotic relationship. Religion, an integral part of a nationalist program and vision, is needed to overcome asabiyyet, and national unity is needed to create "a worthy vessel for the transmission ofIslam" (Shissler 2.003, p. 179)' Therefore he stressed that Islam and nationalism are not only compatible but indeed complementary. Agaoglu's second argument to prove that nationalism is not hostile to Islam was based on his historical perspective on religion. He conceived of religion as a dynamic force that constantly remakes itself through the historical process and in light of changing circumstances as part of a complex and dynamic process of interaction between revelation and context (Kara 2.003; Oglin 1995, p. 199; Shissler 2003). He highlighted the flexibility of Islam in terms of adapting itself to "the requirements of the environment, social conditions and spiritual circumstances in which the nation found itself, together with preserving its own fundamental truths and essentials" (Shissler 2.003, p. 17). Therefore Agaoglu tried to refute that Islam and nationalism cannot coexist. It is evident that Agaoglu had an instrumental attitude toward Islam: he thought that it was a form of discourse that could be effectively used to promote the goals of nationalism. While he believed that Islam contributed to the establishment of national unity, he contended that nationalism also advocated the progress of Islam by enhancing Islamic unity. Like Ak~ura and Agaoglu, Ziya Gokalp worked on the best way to establish a national identity in the context of the impending disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the Westernization efforts of the nascent Turkish republic." Like Ak~ura, Gokalp saw Ottomanism as an ineffective policy for creating a nation due to the coexistence of several different nationalities and religions. He believed that for decades Turks had become alienated from

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Koyuncu-Lorasdagl

their own national traditions and instead appropriated the cultures of other peoples. It was the Turks' neglect of nationalism that had led to their demise (Berkes 1981, p. 73). Gokalp wrote: As the non-existence of the ideal of nationalism among the Turks resulted in the lack of any national economy, so the same factor has been an obstacle to the development of a national language and to the appearance of national patterns in fine arts. And, again, because the ideal of nationalism was not present Turkish morality remained only a personal and familial morality. The notions of solidarity, patriotism, and heroism did not transcend the confines of the family, the village, and the town. As the ideal of ummet [religion] was too large and the ideal of family too narrow, the Turkish soul remained a stranger to the sot[ of life and to the intensive moral feelings that should be the bases of sacrifice and altruism. The disintegration seen in our economic, religious, and political institutions is the consequence of this state of affairs. (Berkes 1981, p. 74) Therefore what Gokalp referred to was a nation-based unity through a synthesis of the three ideals on which a Turkish nation should be founded: Islamism, Turkism, and modernism. Gokalp maintained that these three ideals were not irreconcilable but rather complementary, because they appealed to different needs. For example, modernism stood for the pursuit of the scientific, technological, and industrial civilization of the West, not the adoption of a European way of life. While culture represents the moral and aesthetic aspect of civilization, science and technology represent the cognitive and material aspects (Parla 198), p. 27). In fact this synthesis is very well expressed in his saying "The Turkish nation today belongs to the Ural-Altai group of peoples, to the Islamic ummet, and to Western internationality" (Berkes 1981, p. 76). For the purpose of this chapter, it is sufficient to note the relevance of this synthesis to the relationship between religion and nationalism in Gokalp's nationalist discourse. Like Agaoglu, Gokalp rejected the view that Islam and the idea of nationalism are contradictory by pointing to the distinction between "the universally valid truths in Islam and those aspects which were only socially and temporally relevant" and claimed that Islamists' failure to see this distinction

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led them to see nationalism and Islam as irreconcilable (Berkes 1954. p. 387; Heyd 1950. p. 98). Turkism. "a scientific. philosophical and aesthetic movement to elevate the Turkish nation" by awakening "national culture:' which included both non-Islamic evolving national traditions and historically variable Islamic traditions that had over time become part of the Turkish national identity. and Islam ism are complementary (Berkes 1981, p. 2.88). He regarded Turkism as a nationality and cultural norm and Islam ism as an internationality and moral norm (ParIa 1985. p. 2.6). In this respect. as Berkes (1954, p. 383) notes, Gokalp transformed the Turkism of the purist pan-Turks from a political movement into a cultural one. Gokalp contended that religion constituted one element of the national culture and added that, as Turks were Muslims. Islam would naturally be an indispensable element in their culture (Berkes 1981, pp. 2.85-86). He stated that what was irreconcilable with Western civilization was the culture of religious community, because it refused to view religion as a sphere of life that changes and evolves alongside the mores of the people (Berkes 1981, p. 2.86). Hence. like Ak<;ura and Agaoglu, Gokalp conceived ofIslam as a historical phenomenon that is subject to change and dependent on social circumstances and sought to employ it to enhance Turkish nationalism (Heyd 1950, p. 82). In that regard, Gokalp rejected the view that the sources of Islamic law (Sharia) should be found solely in divine revelation (nass), meaning the Quran and the Sunna (the sayings and the doings of the Prophet Muhammad). He claimed that or/(the mores or social circumstances of various Islamic societies) should also be taken into account as sources of Islamic law (Davison 1995, p. 195). Gokalp did not regard Islam as a civilization and demanded the purging of Arab traditions from Islam in Turkey, arguing that they did not accord with the Turkish national soul. In doing so, he attempted to combine Islam with Turkish nationalism. Gokalp's nationalist discourse entails an instrumental adoption of Islam, the most significant constituent of Turkish national culture, to revive national pride and consciousness in establishingTurkish national identity. In tracing the roots of the relationship between Islam and nationalism, it is clear that pan-Islam ism fi.mctioned as a protonationalism in the formative period of Turkish nationalism in the late Ottoman Empire. The nationalist discourse throughout this period and the following early republican period, in which constructing a national identity was the main concern, endorsed a

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symbiotic and instrumental articulation ofIslam and Turkish nationalism on the basis that nationalism could be enhanced through the help ofIslam."

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN THE OFFICIAL DISCOURSE OF THE EARLY REPUBLICAN ERA

During the Turkish War of Independence, religion was employed as the ultimate glue holding the nation together against the invading foreign powers. Here a kind ofIslamic nationalism was used to justify the nationalist struggle (Poulton 1997; Bora 1999). When it was realized that Islamic nationalism's traditional aspects were impeding reforms toward modernization, however, the secular Kemalist ideology did not hesitate to subordinate the role of religion vis-a.-vis language and history for Turkish nationalism (Poulton 1997, pp. 91, 98; Zubaida 2.004, p. 413). Dmit Cizre Sakalltoglu (1996. p. 2.35) explains this subordination: Islam was being a threat to the Kemalist project of Western-style Enlightenment. which primarily aimed to cause a fundamental change in terms of "the attitudes of individuals whose communal self-identity and emotional security had been provided by Islam." Rejecting any close affinity with pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism as acceptable policies for the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal adopted language and history as the main co~tituents of the Turkish nation. To him, a nation was based on political. territorial, linguistic. and cultural unity (unity of lineage and roots. shared history. and shared morality). In that regard. Mustafa Kemal also rejected Perso-Arabian and Ottoman cultural elements and instead endorsed Turks' Asiatic roots. By claiming that "the Turks were a great nation before adopting Islam:' he stressed the need to focus on the pre-Islamic history of the Turks and the puriflcation of the language as prominent goals for strengthening the idea of Turkish national identity (Landau 1995, p. 74; also <;etinsaya 1999, pp. 362.-63; Poulton 1997. pp. 100-102., 12.8)." This strictly secular Kemalist nationalism can be said to have changed the discourse of Turkish nationalism by being strongly against the idea that nationalism should be enhanced or established through the help of Islam (Ogun 1995; Poulton 1997; Zubaida 2.004). Although religion was replaced by language and history as the main elements of Turkish nationalism during this era through the transfer of sacredness and legitimacy from religion to the national state, religious symbols were being used in the official discourse to cope

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with the problem of the illegitimacy of secular nationalism (Bora 1999; Cizre Sakalhoglu 1996).'~ This discourse lasted until the end of World War II.'!

THE INTERPLAY OF RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN THE MULTIPARTY PERIOD (1946 TO 1980)

During World War II a revival of the symbiotic relationship between religion and nationalism, in which Islam and Turkism were seen as indispensable for the Turkish national identity, took place for three main reasons. First, due to the weakness of the republic in understanding the role played by Islam in the building of personal identity and providing ontological security, a resurgence of religion rose to fill this void (Mardin 1981). The second reason was the political liberalization that freed religion, and the third was the threat of communism. As Cizre Sakalhoglu (1996) contends, Islam became a powerful weapon against communism. Parallel to these developments, the state revised its position that Turkish nationalism should be based on history and religion. Another important development was the emergence of a new generation of "nationalist-conservative" intellectuals made up ofTurkists and Islamists such as Necip Fazrl KIsakiirek, Nurettin Top~u, Peyami Safa, and Yahya Kemal, all of whom emphasized the symbiotic relationship between Islam and nationalism by arguing that there is no conflict between the two. Furthermore, they contended, both are the essential components of Turkish national identity (yetinsaya 1999, p. 368). From their point of view, the secular policies of the Kemalist regime led to the corruption of the youth and the only way to save Turkish youth from the Communist threat was the reconstruction of the place ofIslam. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis developed as a political vision in this climate during the Democratic Party rule throughout the 19S0S (yetinsaya 1999, p. 369; Poulton 1997)' A noticeable attempt to reconcile Islam with Turkish nationalism occur-

red in the liberal environment created by the 1960 Constitution (Poulton 1997, p. 174). The Turkists, with the help of academics such as Miimtaz Turhan, Erol Gungor, lbrahim Kafesoglu, and Osman Turan, began to redefine Turkish nationalism by stressing the coexistence of Islam and Turkish nationalism.16 As Gokhan yetinsaya (1999. p. 370) argues, the significance of the 1rnamHatip schools and the nationalist youth (Olkiicii) movement, which played

Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagl

critical roles in sowing the seeds of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, should be noted because Islamists and Turkists flourished in these places. In addition, in the period starting in 1967 and lasting through 1980, the National Turkish Students' Union contributed to the reinforcement of the Turkish-Islamic' synthesis by acting as an important defender of the idea that it was impossible to think of Turkish nationalism without Islam (Okutan 2004, pp. 14243, 14S).'7 Their idea was again based on the belief that Turks served Islam and that Islam included principles vital for Turkish nationalism. A parallel development in the 1970S was the attempt to reconcile Islam and nationalism for political reasons in political party discourse. It advocated a kind ofIslamic nationalism where Islam was seen as a vital factor of the Turkish nation and Turks were seen as the foremost soldiers of Islam (Poulton 1997, p. 178). We encounter this reconciliation in both Alparslan Tlirke§'s Nationalist Action Party and Necmettin Erbakan's National Order Party (Poulton 1997, p. 179)' The emergence of the Intellectuals' Hearth in 1970 was the most striking attempt to reconcile Islam and Turkish nationalism, because the TurkishIslamic synthesis then gained an institutional ground. In the 1980s this position of the nationalists in terms of Islam did not see any necessary change; Islam continued to be one of the utmost elements of national culture upon which nationalism was based.

THE SYMBIOSIS OF ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD: THE TURKISH-ISLAMIC SYNTHESIS The doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was formulated by the Intellectuals' Hearth in the late 1970S and then adopted as the policy of the interim military government during 1980-83.'81he main theme of this doctrine was that the reason behind the collapse of the regime prior to the 1980 military intervention was a cultural crisis experienced by Turkish youth. who were deprived of moral and religious values as a result of the replacement of national culture policies by humanist ones,'9 Muharrem Ergin. an ideologue of the Hearth, blamed the humanist movement undertaken by "cosmopolitan intellectuals" who glorifled Greco-Roman civilization for having developed the roots of Anatolian culture. According to him. this contention provided a breeding ground for the development of communism as a threat

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against the national culture (Ergin 1975, pp. 179-88). The Hearth's main concern was therefore to find a way out of the cultural depression that Turkey faced at this time by reviving Turkish national culture and empowering the elements that constituted national existence with the help of Islam (The Hearth Regulation 1970). They believed that Islam would act as an antidote to four group of enemies: atheists (materialists), Communists and humanists, dividers (meaning Kurdish separatists), and fundamentalists and sectarians (Ergin 1975)' The Hearth's ideologues made strong efforts to highlight the significance and uniqueness of Turkish culture in order to promote a revival of national pride. As Elisabeth 6zdalga (2006, p. 556) states, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis narrative is concentrated on origins, "the great historical event." In this regard, it highlighted two periods and the related striking features of Turkish culture, one related to pre-Islamic history and the other to the Islamic history of the Turkish nation. As the ideologues of the Hearth argued, the first feature was the Turkish nation's uniqueness in terms of establishing several pre-Islamic states. This itself was seen as one of the highest activities of humankind, producing outstanding personalities (mythic figures) such as Alp Arslan (the sultan of the Seljuk dynasty who, by defeating the Byzantines in Eastern Anatolia in 1071, contributed to Anatolia's Turkification and Islamization) and Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk (the founder of the Turkish Republic) (Ergin 1975, p. 29). In addition, Turkish culture was lauded as being unique in initiating an original steppe culture with the distinguishing characteristics of possessing a monotheist view as well as resolve, courage, and military skill from birth. The domestication of certain animals. most notably the horse, and the use of iron increased the potential of Turks to expand militarily and conquer new places to spread Islam (Kafesoglu 1999, pp. 49-S1). According to the Islamic history of the Turkish nation put forward by proponents of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the second unique feature of Turkish culture was its merging with Islam, which. they believed, originated in Central Asia and was transmitted to the Anatolia region and other areas that were later established as Turkic states by the Turks. They emphasized that Islam and Islamic thought did not come to the Turkic states directly from the Arab world. Instead they came via Central Asia, matured, and were then transmitted by the dervishes to the Turkic states (Ergin 1975; KafesogIu 1999). Trying to establish a distance from both other Muslim countries such

Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagl

as Arab ones and the idea of the ummah, the Hearth claimed that the present era was not an age of religious states but one of nation-states based upon national culture (Ergin 1975, pp. 2.09, 2.11,2.19). According to the Intellectuals' Hearth, culture is the most important component of the nation, with its main elements of language, mores and traditions. worldview, religion, art. and history (Ergin 1975, p. 6). They underlined its significance by stating that it is culture that actually makes the nation a nation and distinguishes the people of one nation from others (Ergin 1975, p. 6: ~aylan, Tekeli, and Turan 1994. p. 134). In fact the main reason why they attributed so much significance to culture is that national consciousness, seen as an indispensable constituent of a nation's establishment. requires the existence of a culture (Ergin 1975. pp. 12.-13). The Hearth's ideologues highlighted the significance ofIslam as the most appropriate religion for Turks and placed it at the center of Turkish culture. Their most influential activity in this regard was to prepare reports, mainly on the issues of education and culture.'" One such report entitled "A Query into the Responsibilities and Methods to Be Applied in Determining Cultural Policies and Cultural Aspects (June 2.0, 1986)" stressed the role of religion in determining the norms and values of society and the Significance of Islam for the existence of the Turkish nation (Sarak 1987). Accordingly, being a Turk and being a ~uslim have equal weight in terms of national identity. Charging that Turkey had been experiencing a serious cultural crisis due to "the irresponsibility of the country's intellectuals' interest in a humanistic movement:' the Hearth pOinted to a need for the reformation of the education system. It called for the nationalization of education by injecting basic constituents of national culture such as Turkish morality. religion. and Turkish art and history and its redemption from humanist. materialist, and Communist influences as the best solution to all the problems facing Turkey in the 1970S (Ergin 1975. pp. 393, 396). The ultimate goal of education should therefore be to raise Muslim Turks!' Like the other Turkish nationalists mentioned before, adherents of the Hearth argued that Turkish nationalism and Islam are inseparable (Ergin 1975, pp. 2.0 7-9: Kafesoglu 1999, pp. 93. 144-45). They contended that this unification was to the advantage of both sides. After they adopted Islam, Turks (particularly the Seljuks and Ottomans) served Islam by defending and expanding it, and Turks easily adopted Islam because their belief

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in Tann (God) closely resembled Islam's belief in Allah (Ergin 1975, p. 208; Kafesoglu 1999, pp. 144-45)' Their intention was to prove that ''Turkish nationalism begins and ends with Islam," because Anatolia was first Islamicized and then Turkified (Kafesoglu 1999, p. 23). At this point, as Siileyman Seyfi Cgiin (1995, p. 183) underlines, they tried to emphasize the symbiotic nature of Turkish nationalism and Islam, which is thought to be a more acceptable alternative to Islamic feelings. In the 1990S the influence of the Intellectuals' Hearth began to decline. It is an open question whether this happened because it had completed its mission or whether it underwent a transformation in the political and social context of that time. It is believed that the mission of the Hearth was inherited by Fethullah Giilen, a charismatic retired Islamic preacher and the leader of the education-based Giilen movement, who spelled out a new concept of "Turkish Muslimhood" with clear kinship to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.

THE INTERPLAY OF ISLAM AND NATIONALISM SINCE THE 1990S: FETHULLAH GOLEN'S "TURKISH MUSLlMHOOD"

Fethullah Giilen (b. 1941) was a state preacher who reSigned from his POSt in 1981." He received public attention in Turkey in the mid-1990S!1 The movement he led became a large, well-known religious movement both in Turkey and worldwide!4lt was involved in a wide range of activities, education being the most important!S In the 2000S, particularly after the 9/U incident, he gained international fame and support, being depicted as the "most reasonable" and "moderate" religious leader, in fact as a "religious scholar" (Carroll 2007). His movement is praised as a tolerant and liberal religiOUS network that is far from extremism!6 Giilen's stay in the United States since 1999 also contributed to this international popularity of the movement, which is regarded as an agency of "transnational ism" through educational activities and interfaith dialogue.·7 What makes the Giilen movement distinctive vis-a.-vis other religiOUS movements in Turkey is the accent on educational mobilization, interfaith dialogue and tolerance, and the nationalist tones This is expressed as "Turkish Muslimhood;' which stresses the uniqueness of Islam practiced in the Turkish context"~ In fact Giilen owes his "positive image" to this

15°

Berrin Koyuncu-lorasdagl

conceptualization of Turkish Muslimhood, which is regarded as a safeguard against radicalism both in Turkey and in the world. This part of the chapter concentrates mainly on Giilen's Turkish Muslimhood, a synthesis of Turkish nationalism, a nationalized Islam, and modernism. Giilen's Turkish Muslimhood refers to the tolerant and moderate reinterpretation of Islam in light of the dynamics, traditions, and character specific to the Turkish nation in its current circumstances but maintaining the universal principles and criteria of religion (Milliyet [daUy], April IS, 1997).30 This conceptualization based on the tradition of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis is based on the Turks' unique and superior understandingofIslam, "which is also superior to other cultures" (Ozdalga 2.006, p. 552.). To emphasize this uniqueness and superiority of Turkish culture, contrary to his tolerance and interfaith discourse, Giilen's discourse on nationalism is constructed on the Other, "the fanatic and intolerant" exercise of Islam practiced in Arab countries and Iran (Turgut 1997).3 1 Giilen argued that since Iran exported a fanatical, sect-based understanding ofIslam (Shiite) in the name of religion, it adopted a reactionary attitude toward societies dominated by Sunni groups (Sevindi 1997). From this perspective, he tried to show that Turkey has a different climate, with freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and freedom of enterprise (Turgut 1997). Giilen based the distinction between the "good Turkish model" a~d these "negative examples" on the variation in the culture of other Muslim countries. As the Intellectuals' Hearth pointed out, Giilen also claimed that a nation's culture plays a key role in the interpretation of religion. He here referred to the two historical periods in Turkey: Turkish culture whose roots went back to Central Asia and Turkish culture that witnessed the coexistence of peoples with different ethnic roots during the great Ottoman Empire. Relatedly, his nationalism has two constituents: neo-nationalism and neo-Ottomanism. Giilen advocated neo-nationalism, whose roots go back to pan-Turkism, shaped by the desire to he dose to the Turkic states (Narh 1997). He saw Asia as very important, arguing that Turks spread all over the world from Asia. If they were to cut their ties with this ancestral homeland and ignore its role as the foundation of their existence, they would lose their roots and suffer a sharp drop in status (Turgut 1997). He maintained that Turkey should cooperate with this region, whose people are very close to the Turks, rather than with people "who consider themselves more Muslim than Turks and despise

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them" (Giindem 2.005 [January 2.6]; Sevindi 1997 [July 2.3]), referring to the Arabs. Giilen stated that Middle Eastern countries always close their doors to his movement's education activities, whereas in Central Asia and Africa people allow them to open schools, hang Turkish flags in their doorways, and sing the Turkish national anthem (Gundem 2.00s). He highlighted that his childhood dream was to create a powerful Turkish world together with Turks in Central Asia (Giindem 2.005). He backed up this aspiration by glorifying the Turkish past in that region. Giilen mentioned two characteristics of Central Asian Turkish culture previously stressed by the Intellectuals' Hearth, which made it possible for Turkey to produce a moderate local interpretation of Islam without posing a challenge to its universal character: the influence of Sufi tradition and the unique historical experience of Turks. In Giilen's thought, the most significant feature of Turkish culture is a moderate, tolerant interpretation of Islam blended with Sufism.)' Its origins go back to Central Asia because Islamic jurisprudence, hadiths, and ~ranic commentary developed there. Like Hearth adherents of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, Giilen argued that Islam practiced in Turkey did not take its sources from Arab Islam, as lived in Mecca or Medina. The Turks living in Central Asia totally accepted Islam at the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the Hegira. Giilen claimed that some pans of the Islamic constitution are open to interpretation and were tolerantly interpreted by Turks under the influence of Sufism (Can 1995; Gi.indem WOs). From there it was carried to Anatolia by dervishes. In the fifth and sixth Islamic centuries, it was handed down to the Great Seljuks and then passed to their heirs, the Ottomans (Turgut 1997). To him, the distinguishing feature of such Islam as practiced in Turkey was being open to interpretation and to the spiritual life ofIslam: mysticism. ll This unique version of Islam can have "praiseworthy characteristics" such as being tolerant and moderate, keeping a distance from politics, advocating the coexistence of science and faith, and embracing values like love for humanity, democracy, and secularism. He stated that under these conditions he preferred to use the term "Turkish Islam" or "Turkish Muslimhood" (Turgut 1997). Like the Intellectuals' Hearth, Giilen maintained that Turks accepted Islam because they saw it as the religion most appropriate to their nature. He believed that the decision of Turkish tribes to convert to Islam was natural and that Turks served Islam by defending, preserving, and spreading its

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message through the states they established over the centuries. He underlined that Turks not only contributed to Islam's historical surviving and indeed thriving but also interpreted its message more deeply and suitably to its spirit than any other nation, including the Arabs (Ugur 2004, p. 336). Thus, according to Giilen, the universal character of Islam did not constitute an obstacle for Turks to accept it while retaining their customs and traditions (Giindem 200S). Like the Intellectuals' Hearth, Giilen contended that the Turks' experience in developing close relations with Sufism and founding states made it possible for Turks alone to contribute to the universality ofIslam by the appropriation and spread of it through love and tolerance (Turgut 1997). He highlighted the intertwined relationship of religion, nationalism, and culture that continually fed each other in the Turkish context. In one interview he stated: For me. being Muslim is an essential because it encompasses my happiness both in this world and in the afterlife. But among my general thoughts and perceptions I believe, as expressed by one of our famous poets, that the Turkish nation put its true values on a solid foundation after becoming Muslim. Turks reached their zenith as a nation only after becoming Muslim. I look at myself as a Muslim Turk from this perspective .... I d~dn't think of my Turkishness as separate from my Muslimness. At the same time, I am very, very far from racism. (6zkok 1995)

As Narh (1997) argues, the other component of Giilen's nationalism is neo-Ottomanism. a nationalism based on the legacy of the Ottoman Islamic state with a desire to revive the glOrious past of the Ottoman Empire. Giilen praised the Ottoman heritage. asserting that the mosaic structure of the Ottoman Empire also had a positive impact on the practice of Turkish Islam. He contended that the diverSity of the ethnic and sectarian backgrounds of the people in the empire made Turks open to change. whereas Muslims in other countries lived in closed. isolated worlds, which meant that they easily became fanatics who focused on the secondary details of Islam (Bayramoglu 1996). Giilen's hope for the future. even as a child. was for Turkey to be a powerful global power as it was during the Ottoman era. He highlighted his aspiration by saying that he looked at a map when he was twelve and asked

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himself when Turkey would regain the power to influence world politics. He stressed that he was brought up with this yearning and had no other goals in his life, such as material goods or having children (Turgut 1997)' At the outset Gtilen endorsed a symbiotic relationship between Turkish nationalism and Islam under the name "Turkish Muslimhood;' as a combination of the Hanifa sect and the Turkish understanding of Islam. He wanted to export this "unique" articulation to the Turkic Central Asian countries after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990S to revive their ethnic identities. Berna Turam (2.003, p. 190) states that Gtilen aimed to employ a pragmatic Islam that would help to establish a network at the international level based on its primary loyalties to the nation. In the late 1990S the movement extended to the Western European countries with a large number of Turkish immigrants (such as the Netherlands and Germany) through educational and economic activities to reinforce the Turkish and Muslim identity of people who were regarded as being under threat.34 The expectation was that an instrumental articulation of Islam and Turkish nationalism would serve to build a transnational network among the Turks around the world. It is noteworthy that the establishment and extension of the Giilen schools did not confront any difficulty in the Western European countries with large Turkish immigrant populations, which have been very sensitive to Islam, particularly since 91 n. As stated above, this silent support on the part of the host countries is related to the Turkish Islam model of Gillen. It constitutes an example of the Euro-Islam idea, a kind of "soft Islam" that is presented as a prescription for revealing how to deal with the unrest within those European countries concerning the negative image ofIslam. In the late 1990S, as Bekir Agai (2.003) argues, a change occurred in the nationalist discourse of Giilen: a decreasing emphasis on the nationalist tone and an increasingly global one. This change cannot be read as Giilen's total abandonment of his aspiration for Turkish nationalism, however, which still stands at the center of his thought. His positive stance toward the Western world and globalization is grounded in a pragmatic decision based on the need to survive in a global world. ll In the twenty-first century Gillen envisions a Turkish world that has a tight hold on Muslim identity hut at the same time has established good relations with the West (Sevindi 1997). Thus, under the impact of globalization, his approach to nationalism is inclusive toward relations with the West. In addition to urging Turkey to forge closer ties

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with the Central Asian Turkic states, Giilen has acknowledged that taking an antagonistic stance toward the West would end up excluding Turkey from the modern world. In this regard, he is a supporter of Turkey's EU membership, which he believes will not threaten Turkey so long as the values, traditions, and dynamics of the Turkish nation are kept intact (Giindem 200S).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter explores the symbiotic relationship between Turkish nationalism and Islam in the Turkish nationalist discourse, which points to the coexistence ofIslam, nationalism, and modernism. The nature of this symbiotic and instrumental interaction between religion and nationalism in Turkey should be distinguished, I contend, from religious nationalism with a political orientation. Thus I argue that references to Islamic nationalism in Turkey like the nationalism in Iran are mistaken. Instead this ideological thread should be regarded as an instrumental pious nationalism, in which Islam has not had a dominating role over nationalism. Instead it has endorsed the mutual benefit of both sides, Islam and Turkish nationalism. At this point, however, the prospects and hazards or limitations of conceptualizing the relationship between Islam and Turkish nationalism in Turkey as instrumental pious nationalism should also be discussed. The most significant limitation of such a conceptualization pointing to the difference between religious nationalism and instrumental pious nationalism is the danger that it could unintentionally result in attributing a positive connotation to instrumental pious nationalism. In the current context of hysteria over Islamic fundamentalism, this could seem like praising instrumental pious nationalism for being "less threatening" than religious nationalism. A related handicap is that being embedded in a cultural orientation rather than a political one should not mean that instrumental pious nationalism has an inclusive approach toward the differences, as is evident in the Intellectuals' Hearth and Giilen cases. In terms of its prospects, employing this category of instrumental pious nationalism to grasp the nature of the relationship between Islam and nationalism will help show that Islam has always been an indispensable element of the discourse of nationalism in Turkey, although it has never completely subjugated nationalism, as happened in religious nationalism. A related but

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more important prospect is that conceiving the incorporation of religion into nationalism in Turkey from its inception as instrumental pious nationalism forces us to rethink the role of religion in Turkish society and politics. A point that deserves to be elaborated here is why the interplay of religion and nationalism in Turkey has had a symbiotic nature. Although this is a complex question needing a lengthy treatment of its own, here are a few points for consideration. First, attention should be paid to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in terms of the prominent role that religion played in society and politics. As Binnaz Toprak (1981) points Ollt, Islam had entrenched itself so thoroughly in the social, political, and legal system of the Ottoman Empire that the basic concern of Ottoman reformers throughout the nineteenth century was how to Westernize/modernize in a Muslim society where Islam had penetrated all substructures of the Ottoman political system. Even during the secular Kemalist period religious symbols were used to win public support and provide social integration, as noted above. Second, as Cizre SakalllOglu (1996) contends, Islam was never completely abandoned but in fact has been continuously and strategically used in Turkish political life for pragmatic reasons. From my point of view, this is deeply related to Islam's "symbolic power" (Keyman 2.007). the potential to provide a sense of belonging and cohesion as well as present a code of ethics to work as "a cultural code or cultural frame of reference for a community of people that think of themselves as sharing a way of life" (Giilalp 2.003, p. 383). Thus it is no exaggeration to claim that any successful worldview. ideology, or political trend in Turkey must include a noticeable dosage of Islamic themes. though it need not be solely based on Islam. This role of Islam in Turkish society makes it possible for Turkey to be regarded as a Muslim and laik (not secular) country with problems. This particular function ofIslam in the Turkish society has an important repercussion for the question of secularism in Turkey. Due to the strong position ofIslam in the Turkish context, the issue of secularism, defined as the first and foremost significant principle of (Kemalist) modern Turkey, has always remained on the national agenda as the most polarizing political problem. It is believed to be under a continuous threat from Islam in the competition for "political and ideological primacy" (Giilalp 2.005, p. 352.). In fact, as Haldun Giilalp (2.005, p. 352.) very rightly points out, this is the reason why the Turkish case is peculiar in terms

Berrin Koyuncu-lorasdagl

of "appearing to be perennially caught in a dilemma between secularization and democracy." In light of these considerations we have to rethink the role ofIslam in Turkey at the axis of secularization and democracy.

NOTES 1.

2..

3.

4.

S.

6.

7.

8.

While Ernest Gellner (1983) places considerable importance on the impact of culture on nationalism and pays specific attention to Protestantism in the formation of nationalism, he does not approve of religion's role in nationalism. Eric Hohshawm (1992., pp. 47, 68; Mihelj 2.007, p. 2.67) also believes that religion cannot be identified with modern nationalism, because it may constitute a challenge to "the nation's monopoly claim to its members'loyalty." Anthony Smith (1991, p. 49) argues that, though nationalism is a fundamentally secular ideology, there is "nothing unusual about religiOUS nationalism." He contends that nationalists have found it necessary to appeal to the religious sentiments of the masses. Afghani, who was regarded as an influential Islamic reformer, traveled extensively in the Middle East and Europe to encourage the strengthening of the Muslim world against Europe. Cedidism refers to the "New Method," whose appropriation was endorsed in an educational movement among the Muslim Turks/Tatars of the Russian Empire. !.smail Gasprinski advocated the adoption of modern instructional methods to make the Turks of Russia learn modern subjects such as mathematics and geometry in their native languages as well as traditional subjects such as ~ran recitation, Persian, and Arabic. What was specific to Cedid schools was the prohibition of blind memorization and recitation, to be replaced by a more comprehension-based method of instruction (Shissler 2.003, pp. 107-8). See also Afghani and Abduh (1987). Both ~ura and Agaoglu were part of a tradition of reformist and modernizing Muslim intelligentsia. much like Ismail Gasprinski, Mirza Fethali Ahundzade, Seyid Azim ~irvani, and Hasan Melikov Zerdabi (Shissler 2.003, p. 103). For this reason Thomas (1978. p. 136) and Jacoh Landau (1995. p. 14) see Akc;:uras pOSition on nationalism as the first significant (political) challenge to the other policies of the Ottoman Empire. namely, Islamism and Ottomanism. Masami Arai (1994, p. 19) also points to the statement of Ahmet Ferit, one of Akc;:uras closest friends, that he could not accept the main thesis of any manuscript rejecting the idea of an Ottoman nation. ~ura believed that the logic of history was moving in a certain direction: in order not to be left behind. everyone had to keep up with this evolution. Thus

On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey

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he saw religion as a phenomenon within the flow of history (Shissler 2.003, P·176 ).

9.

10.

II.

12..

I3. 14.

15.

Agaoglu, a Turkic emigrant from Russia, was an influential figure of Turkish nationalism, particularly through his work in 1911 in founding the highly influential Turkist journal Turk Yurdu as well as the Turkist institution Turk Ocaklan (Turkish Hearths) the same year. He also worked as an editor and regular contributor to many daily newspapers and journals. For detailed biographical information, see Shissler (2.003). Shissler (2.003, p. 173) claims that "Turk Alemi" can be regarded as a typical nationalist manifesto in terms of defining the Turkish world very broadly and stating his hope for a future lying in a unified, forward-looking Turkish nation. But more important was the degree of emphasis and importance given to Islam in Agaoglu's articles in this magazine, because they demonstrate how religion remained a very basic, irreducible element of identity for him. In that regard, he was heaVily influenced by Afghani, who argued that the emphasis on science and the principles of consultation and consensus during the classical age ofIslam demonstrate that Islam is not hostile either to science or to representative institutions (Ak<;:ura 1975). See, for instance, Berkes (1954, pp. 375-76). There was an implicit alliance between the Turkists and the Islamists. Turkists such as Ak<;:ura and Agaoglu wrote for lslamist journals, and Islamists such as Mehmet AkifErsoy and ~emseddin Giinaltay never raised a serious challenge to the Turkists and also contributed to Turkist journals. In this vein, while the idea of Islamism was replaced by the idea of nationalism supported by Islam in the discourse of the Islamists, the Turkists strongly emphasized the elements of "Islamic nationalism" in their writings (<;etinsaya 1999, pp. 356, 361; Ogiin 1995, p. lSI). To comprehend this symbiotic relationship between religion and nationalism in the Turkish context, it is helpful to mention "the paradox of adopting religion as proto-nationalism" (Hobsbawm 1991, p. 2.4.). On the one hand Islam helped to establish Turkish national identity by functioning as an adhesive bond, but on the other hand it was thought to pose a serious challenge to the modernist mission of nationalism. Therefore the antidote to this paradox was conceived to be the instrumental nationalization of religion. See also Nutuk 2-Ig27 (Atattirk 2.007, pp. 6-7). Here Cizre Sakalhoglu (1996) points to the distinction between enlightened (secular) Islam. which was promoted by the Kemalist elite. and reactionary Islam, which was completely prohibited. Apart from an opposition to religion within the official discourse. some attempts were made during this era to reconcile Islam and nationalism by construing religion as one of the crucial pillars of a nation. Without going into

Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagl

details, it is adequate to mention a few prominent figures in this regard, such as Hamdullah Suphi Tannover, Yahya Kemal, and ~emseddin Giinaltay. Their views remained isolated in the Kemalist ideology until the 1940S (Bora 1999, p. 12.4). In addition to these figures, there was also the Anatolianism movement, which included Remzi Oguz Ank and his journal Millet (Nation), Nurettin Top~u and his publication Hareket (Movement), Hilmi Ziya Oiken, and Ziyaeddin Fahri Fmdikoglu. Their main argument was that Turkish nationalism based on the thousand-year history of AnatOlia, the phase beginning with the Battle of Malazgirt (1071), should stay within the borders ofIslam, freed from its Turanian content and ethnic elements (Bilir 2.004, p. 2.61). 16. See Turk MilliyetFzliginin Meseleleri (The ~estions ofTurkish Nationalism) (Kafesoglu 1970) and TUrk Cihan Hakimiyeti MeJkuresi Tarihi (The History of Turkish World Domination Ideal) (Turan 1969). 17. The National Turkish Students' Union was established in 1916 and was active until its closure in 1980. Its ideological stand was determined by nationalism, racism, Turanism, and conservatism (Okutan 2004, pp. 6-7). For the views of the Union. see Milli GenFligin Sesi (1970, p. 8); MTBB 48. Donem Genel Ku-

ruluFaaliyet Raporu (1966). 18. The Hearth was established on May 14, 1970, by right-wing Turkish intellectuals as a reaction against the 1960S ideological conflicts between the Left and

Right, which, the Hearth members argued. had resulted in a crisis in the national culture. It was preceded by the Intellectuals' Club, which was established in 1962 to serve as a platform for the conservative and nationalist intellectuals to discuss a wide range of social and political issues. 19. See Yal~m (1988); and Devlet Planlama Te§kilatl (1984, p. 543). 2.0. This articulation of religion and nationalism formulated under the name "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" was believed to exert considerable influence on the culture and education policies of governments of the time. For the influence of the Intellectuals' Hearth on culture and education policies, see Bilir (2004, p. 263); Bora and Can (1990, pp. 32-33); ~aylan, Tekeli, and Turan (1994, p. 34). 2.1. Such an articulation of the relationship between religion and nationalism was championed by the military rule of the time because the Hearth advocated the spread of Islam, which was depicted as being in line with secularism. Within this context, Tantl Bora and Kemal Can (1990, p. 2.8) argued that the practical use of the Hearth was to legitimize the military rule by integrating Islam into the official ideology while retaining Turkic and Western elements. 22. Gulen was born in Erzurum, a culturally conservative city of Eastern Anatolia that is characterized by dadar culture determined by the frontier conditions and oriented by the security concern (Yavuz and EspOSito 2.003). His hometown is said to have had a Significant influence on the nationalist discourse of Gii.len.

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2.3. In that period Gillen was celebrated by those (secular) people who regarded

him as an antidote to the political Islam of the Welfare Party, which was closed in 1998. The Gwen movemellt was also exposed to serious criticisms, however, for twO reasons. One criticism has been raised by fierce secularists, who are suspicious about the "sinister" intentions of the movement with regard to the secular establishment of the Turkish Republic. Gillen was indicted by the chief prosecutor of the Ankara State Security Court in 2000 because his activities under the name of "moderate Islam" allegedly undermined the secular structure of the state with the aim of replacing it with a state based on Sharia law. On March 8, 1008, the Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the acquittal of Gillen, first issued by the Ankara Eleventh High Criminal Court in May 1006. On April 7, 2008, the court declared the acquittal to be null. The second criticism concerns the financial sources of the movement and the wide extension of the educational activities (from the Central Asia to Africa, Australia, and Latin America) undertaken by the sympathizers of the movement. Gillen claims that the schools are supported by business leaders in Turkey and local businesses where the schools operate (Gilndem 1005). For detailed information about the Gillen movement, see Yavuz and Esposito (2003) and Koyuncu-Lorasdagl (2.007). 24. No concrete information about the size of the movement is available. Ali Yurtsever, one of the influential members of the movement, however, stated that the high circulation of Gillen newspapers and large number of Giilen schools give an idea of its size. The circulation of the Gillen newspapers is around 750,000 daily. The Gillen schools and universities include about 300 private schools in Turkey as well as about 500 other educational institutions and approximately 600 schools all over the world in about 100 countries. Interview by Katherina Marshall, Berkeley Center, November 23, 2.007. 2.5. The Gillen movement is based on educational mobilization. In the late 1970S he started his educational mobilization by initiating summer camps, lighthouses (tflkevleri), and dormitories to support successful students who cannot afford to pay for their educational and accommodation needs. In those places they prayed together and received religious and moral education by readingRisale-i Nur (Epistles of Light) and listening to Gillen's sermons on tape. These .. children inculcated with both scientific and moral values are expected to act in the service (hizmet) of the movement by teaching at the Gillen schools volun~ ... tarily and becoming members of the "golden generation" that Gillen aiIIiilto . . . create. It is noteworthy that the teaching in Gillen-inspired schools is secular. Instead of giving a religious education, the goal here is to instill Islamic ethics and a "Turkish way of life" through socialization. The Australian Catholic

160

2.6.

2.7. 2.8.

2.9.

30.

31.

32..

33.

Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdagl

University in Melbourne launched the Fethullah Giilen Chair in the Study ofIslam and Muslim-Catholic Relations to "note his sensivity to education" (http://www.intercultural.org.au/events_2oo7/gulen_chair/index.htm.December 3, 2.007). In January and March 2.008 the leading economy magazines Economist and Forbes allocated pages to Galen, claiming that his movement should be endorsed and comparing it favorably to religious movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), and Tablighi Jamaat chat demand isolation from Western political life. The papers noted that the Galen movement embraces scientific beliefs and modern and democratic values and prefers to keep close ties with the Western world within an Islam-based ethical framework (Forbes,January 2.3, 2.008; Economist, March 8, 2.008). They exaggerated Giilen's significance to the point of depicting him as a "prophet:' Carroll (2007) treats Giilen as a scholar or philosopher, trying to show the similarities between Gwen's views and those of philosophers such as Plato, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Paul Sartre, John Stuart Mill, and Confucius. For the Gwen movement as a transnational phenomenon, see Park (2.007). Yavuz and Esposito (2.003. p. 16) argue that the Gi.llen movement utilized the discourse of nationalism by indicating its contribution to national culture to seek its legitimacy before the state. For detailed information about the difference between the Galen movement and other religiOUS movements with Turkish origins such as the Siileymancl community and the National Outlook movement in the Western European countries, see Demir (2.007). Giilen stated his belief in the universality of Islam with respect to its principles but at the same time underlined the need to reinterpret Islam in terms of the details in today's world, noting that some aspects ofIslam may change due to time and circumstances (Can 1995; Ozkok 1995). For the treatment of Arabs as Others by advocates of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, see Ozdalga (2.006); for the treatment ofIranians as Others in Galen's views. see Kosebalaban (2.003, pp. 179-80). Giilen's way of life and interpretation ofIslam are heavily determined by Sufism. The interviews portray Galen as a modest person who strictly observes his religious obligations and prefers to have a modest lifestyle, without any desire to own material things. For Galen's appropriation of Sufism, see Samoprak (2.003, pp. 15 6- 69). According to Sukuti MemiogIu (1997). an influential writer on Islamic society, Giilen utilizes the functional dimension of religion in constructing national culture by stressing mysticism as one of the significant elements of national culture.

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34. On the educational activities of the Gillen movement in the Western European

countries, see Demir {:W07). 3S. For detailed information about Giilen's views on Turkey's relationship with the West, see Kosebalaban (2.003) and Koyuncu-Lorasdagl (2.007).

8

TURKISH NATIONALISM AND SUNNIISLAM IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL PARTY IDENTITIES

SIMTEN CO~AR

IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE DISCOURSE ON NATIONALISM, CRAIG CAL-

houn (1999) notes that "national identity" is taken for granted in referring to the category of individual and/or citizen. Calhoun offers a critical analysis of the public and social scientific implications of the nation as a "discursive formation," which in the final analysis involves the adoption of nationalist rhetoric to different degrees and/or a delimitation of the social scientific imagination in the public space within the contours of nationalism. Calhoun's argument can be taken as a reference point in understanding current debate on the rise of nationalism in contemporary Turkish politics. Especially after the assassination of Armenian intellectual Hrant Dink, publisher of Armenian fortnightly Agos, in early 2.007, the debate has accelerated both in public and in academic circles. Within the frame of Calhoun's theoretical scheme, however, one can argue that nationalism has never decreased and/or been outside the political agenda in Turkey. More than any other ideology, it has functioned as the discursive reference point for different political parties on the left and the right, as competitors or rivals. In this respect, it has taken multiple forms, ranging from liberal nationalism to integral nationalism.

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In this chapter my aim is to reveal the manifestations of these forms in party politics at the "official level" (Smith 2.003, p. 28), with reference to Adalet ve Kalktnma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP), Biiyiik Birlik Partisi (Grand Unity Party, BBP), and Milliyetcri Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, MHP). These political parties are important for elaborating the different compositions of nationalism in party discourses and uncovering the political significance of Sunni Islam as an unavoidable ingredient of Turkish nationalism.' In this respect, I take the three political parties as different versions of the "Turkish-Islamic synthesiS" of the Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydmlar Ocagl), instituted in the aftermath of the 1980 coup d'etat.' But each party represents the dominance of nationalism as a political discourse, with its different facets shaped in accordance with the party's place in power politics, defined by centrist priorities. To understand nationalist political identity and the discourse of each party, three channels of communication are functional: addressing the state, the "nation:' and the international community. In regard to its fluctuating discourse along these dimensions, the AKP-which has assumed institutional power for two subsequent general elections (2002., 2007 )-shifts between liberal nationalism and fascistic impulses (KadlOglu 2006). The MHP, as a parliamentary opposition party, is dearly representative of integral nationalism in terms of the discourse that it employs in addressing the nation, while still trying to accommodate the components of liberal nationalism in its official reading of global politics. The BBP, in contrast, is the pivotal example of Turkish-Islamist fascism, with its insistent appeal to the "heart of the masses" through an aggressive and violent discourse as well as its parochial conceptualization of the public space. It overtly denies differences in the definition of the nation and rejects any basis for an individual stance versus the community. The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part I provide a brief analysis of the institutionalization and socialization of the Turkish-Islamic synthesiS as a form of nationalism in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup d'etat. In the second part I analyze the different shapings of the TurkishIslamic synthesis in the AKP, the BBP, and the MHP discourses with a historical approach. In doing so I focus on three issue areas: the foreign policy dimension, particularly each party's approach to Turkey/EU and Turkey/ U.S. relations; the religious dimension (the place ofIslam in the definition

Simten Co~ar

of the nation); and the ethnic dimension, especially the interpretation of the Kurdish question. In analyzing the AKP's and the MHP's discourses, I also take into consideration the policies that the parties have pursued when in government. In the third and concluding part I outline relational aspects of the forms of nationalism in the three political parties' discourses.

UNDERSTANDING THE ISLAMIST-NATIONALIST CONNECTION IN TURKEY IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD The declared purpose of the 1980 military coup d'etat was to end the civil strife and political violence that had increased in the second half of the 19705. This provided a justification for the authoritarian measures during the interim government between 1980 and 1983, including those measures within the 1982 Constitution. Thus the narrowing down of the political sphere, the rapid execution of political activists from both the Left and the Right, and the emphasis on stability and consensus against the risk of falling into "extremist" tendencies were presented as a recipe to preempt the recurrence of the political dynamics that had marked the previous decade. The new structuration in politics. which relied mainly on the continuous emphasis on stability-cum-consensus. was accompanied by the articulation of the economic structure with the rising tide of neo-liberalism (6zman and Co§ar 2007, pp. 201-26). The new politico-economic restructllration of the post-1980 period in Turkey was reflected in the hegemonization of center politics and centrist political discourse. Briefly. relying on the discourse of stability-cum-consensus, the ideal political party was defined with reference to curbing the extremist leanings to embrace the largest number of electorates possible. Likewise, the rise of the discourse on the end ofideologies and the culmination of history in liberalism further reinforced the consolidation of the centrist hegemony. The initial carrier of this consolidation in Turkey. af1;er the interim regime, was Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party. ANAP), under the lead of Turgut 6zal. The ANAP is an important case in point for understanding centrist politics. which I think also marks the discourse and identity of the AKP, along with its Milli Gorii§ (National Outlook) past. The synthetic essence of

Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam

centrist polities symbolized in me ANAP of the 1980S. to which Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Party. DYP) of the 1990S and after and now the AKP have been added. is fundamentally based on a fragile articulation of a pro-Islamist political stance with Turkish nationalism. The articulation was fragile because the official state nationalism supposedly was founded on me denial of Islam as a political identity.l The turn in the POSt-1980 statist-nationalist discourse from denial to a reconciliation with Islam as a source of political identity made the Turkish-Islamic synthesis an asset of the state. The political parties, which tend to articulate the synthesis. became potential competitors with the state. Since the syntheSiS was offered as the basis of centrist and thus viable politics. the political parties of the synthesis have had to search for additional features that would distinguish them from each other. This in turn has carried the risk of falling into dispute with the statist version of the synthesis. All the centrist attempts have been founded on the acknowledgment of Islam as an undeniable component-a "sociological reality" -of the bulk of the Turkish people. Thus the center was defined in terms of a new style of Turkish nationalism, in which Islamic political identity was featured as a central but domesticated component. Apart from the articulation and/or domestication of Islamic political identity in Turkish nationalism, another important peculiarity of politics imbued with the syntheSiS is the practice of politics as a technical endeavor: reducing participation, decision making. and executive functions to a matter of problem solving and project pursuit. This style of political practice was best exemplified in the case of the ANAP governments of the 1980s. The same holds true for the AKP governments. The implicatiOns of this style of politics for the relative dispositions of political parties of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis-and hence the different versions of the articulation between Islamic political identity and nationalist political identity-can be seen in regard to what Michael Billig (1997 [1995]) calls "banal nationalism." Briefly, pointing to the everyday practices that institute the habitual display of nationalist sentiments, Billig calls attention to the decisiveness of nationalism within different and opposing political discourses. While the nation-state itself allows for a nationalist setting, the versions of nationalism that find grounds for flourishing depend upon the factors that underlie and color the sentiments. And the banality startS not only in the widespread and daily utilization of these

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sentiments but also in their unnoticed and ready acknowledgment. As far as party politicS is concerned, the banality is most manifest in the naturalization of the identification of the electorate with the nation (see Calhoun 1999)· The increasing effectiveness of banal nationalism in the current decade (which normalizes the liberal synthesis of the AKP and the integral synthesis of the MHP and makes the parochial synthesis of the BBP "understandable") is directly connected with the socialization of Islam as a peculiar and indispensable component of Turkish national identity in the post-1980 period through the restructuring of the national education system. Besides the constitutional article making religious courses (on Sunni Islam) compulsory in primary and secondary education, the whole educational system was devised in line with nationalist priorities, in which Islam occupied an uncontested place. As Hugh Poulton points out, "[T]his synthesis aimed at an authoritarian but not an Islamic state where religion was seen as the essence of culture and social control" (Poulton 1997, p. 184, citing Richard Tapper). Immediately after the 1980 coup d'etat the key institutional posts (including the Ytiksek Ogretim Kurumu [Higher Education Council], Turk Radyo Televizyon Kurumu [Turkish Radio and Television Institution], higher administrative ranks in the universities, and the cadres in the Ministry of National Education) were filled with the forerunners and/or supporters of the synthesis (Poulton 1997, p. 184). The appropriation of the synthesis was most significantly manifested in the 1983 National Culture Plan of the State Planning Organization, whereby the standard assumption that "99 percent of Turks are Muslims" is documented as "a fact;' while Islam is considered to be the most fit religion for the Turks on historical grounds (cited in Giiven~ et al. 1991, p. 49): "The two fundamental pillars of our national cultute are [our] 'essential values' that descend from Central Asia and Islam. The religion best fit for the character and nature of the Turks is Islam. The Turks could not survive with other religions; those who tried lost their identities" (cited in Giivenli et al., 1991, p. so; my translation). With its emphasis on an authoritarian state with strict control over culture the original form of the synthesis provided the appropriate formula for the 1980-82. interim regime to preempt the possibility of political opposition that would run counter to the ongoing restructuration process. It also provided the military regime with relatively easier means to appeal to the

Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam

public. As far as the long-term outcomes of this formula are concerned, it might be argued that it set the grounds for the increase in "Islamization in cultural terms" and for the rise of culturalist nationalism, while easing the transition from ideology-based politicS to synthetic politics on the political plane (Kahraman 2007, pp. 161-71).4 Although the grounds for this sociopolitical restructuration were set by the military regime, the synthesis was consolidated under the ANAP rule in the 19805, which supposedly-but more strategically-ran counter to the military. As Taml Bora (1999, p. 127; my translation) notes, during the ANAP governments under the leadership of Turgut OzaI. "religion was elevated to the status of the 'hardest' element of national culture." The ANAP, as a synthetic party of nationalists, liberals, and religious conservatives that founded its legitimacy and popularity on the denial of any descent from the ideological attachments of the 19705, can be considered the first post-1980 adherent of the synthesis. Despite the denial, the leading members of the party were from the nationalist and/or Islamist flanks of the 19705. Nuray Mert (2001), in her analysis of the synthetic nature of the ANAP in terms of the nationalism/religious conservatism articulation, offers a succinct account of the almost one-to-one correspondence of nationalist sentimentality of the 19705 with the ANAP's nationalism as well as the materialization of Turkish-Islamic synthesis in party discourse and identity. She provides direct quotations from the speeches of the leading ANAP members, starting with Ozal: "Ours was a program that had already been in the making. The paper that I had presented to the Nationalists' Assembly, organized by the Intellectuals' Hearth, in 1979 was the basis of our party's program" (quoted in Mere 2001, p. 69; my translation). The legacy of Turkish-Islamic discourse was further displayed in the ANAP's integration ofIslam as a "national source that feeds the moral, spiritual, and cultural values of the society" (cited in Giivenc;: et al. 1991, p. 125). The same approach can be observed in the ANAP's interpretation oflaicism, based on a careful distinction between "reactionary" and/or "fundamentalist Islam" on the one hand and "Islam as a traditional characteristic of the Turkish nation" on the other (Ozman and Co§ar 2007, p. 209). Apart from this overt acknowledgment, the ANAP's brand of nationalism embodied almost the same approach to politics found in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which is based on a friend-foe approach. The recourse to the never-ending

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vital threats to Turkey's existence and the need to be on constant alert to survive, which has been the unchanging motto of various versions of Turkish nationalism, worked as another source of inspiration that not only the ANAP but also the post-1980 nationalist discourse of synthetic politicS at large maintained. What differentiated the parties in the following decades was the means they offered to live with this state of affairs. The synthesis was meant not only to institutionalize the assimilation of Islam within Turkish nationalism but also to make peace between the Islamist political outlook and Westernization. The synthesis embodied a certain notion of Westernization, which has long been proposed by nationalistconservatives since as early as the 1930S. In this synthetic combination, the West is imbued with a dichotomous identity. On the one hand, it is one of those "foreign powers" that should be dealt with cautiously in order to ensure the survival of the Turkish nation and state. On the other hand, it is considered a source of inspiration for technical progress. It might be argued that the term "progressive conservatism" used by Mesut Yllmaz during his run for the head of the ANAP represents such a legacy. Briefly, progressive conservatism refers to commitment to technological and economic progress (in the 1980s almost exclusively meaning articulation with the neo-liberal world economic system) while adhering to the preservation of national values. In this respect the synthesis. experienced in the making of the ANAP's identity, necessarily entailed neo-liberal economic policies. This was further reflected in the adoption of "market pragmatism and instrumental rationality" in the appropriation of Islamic values into nationalist rhetoric {Bora 1999. p. 128).1 The ANAP was an arbitrary blend of Turkism. Islamism, and neoliberalism forged with a pragmatist tendency. It fit well into the newly structured political space after the 1980 coup d'etat. characterized by depoliticized politics. In this respect it represented the first experience with the marketization of politics in the Turkish context, based on a supply-demand, commodity-consumer model. This state of affairs affected both the appeal of the party to a large portion of the population in the second half of the 1980s and its gradual demise throughout the 1990S. The main leitmotif behind the rise and consolidation of the ANAP's power in the political space was basically its claim to be a new political party, which filled in the blanks created by the exclusion of almost all political actors of the previous decade from the political sphere. In other words, the party appropriated the narrowing down of

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the political space. The gradual demise of the ANAP, in contrast, was just the outcome of the same political restructuring. By lifting the ban on pre-1980 political activists to engage in politics in 1987 and the subsequent formation of political parties (with nationalist and Islamist priorities) with claims to the heritage of the 1970s, the ANAP brand of synthesis started to dissolve. The 1990S in this respect were a test period both for the newly born political parties with old attachments and for the ANAP. In the final analysis, both flanks experienced a remaking of their political identities. The ANAP lost strength by the return of a significant number of its members to their original nests. In this respect the Turkish-Islamic synthesis proved to be functional in the forging of new synthetic alliances. In contemporary Turkey one brand of these new alliances is represented by the AKP, which I prefer to consider a "party in the making" in terms of its policies in the sociocultural sphere. The second brand is exemplified by the MHP's evolution from within the Milliyet
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based totally on one-man leadership and its Islamist discourse ornamented with nationalist priorities, the BBP is a "Turkish-Islamic Idealist" political party that fundamentally runs counter to the establishment. Yet it still feeds on the synthesis.

THE TURKISH-IsLAMIC SYNTHESIS IN THE POLITICS OF THE 2000S: BETWEEN LIBERAL NATIONALISM AND FASCISM The Turkish-Islamic synthesis that forms the grounds for viable politics in the post-1980 period is not static in nature. Different political parties appropriated the synthesis into their discourse, both reproducing and revising it. But three elements of the synthesis seem to be constant: the defensive reflex in both foreign and domestic policy; emphasis on (Sunni) Muslim identity as one of the main elements of Turkish ness; and conservative preferences in the sociocultural sphere. The AKP, the MHP, and the BBP all embody these elements in their discourses in various degrees and in various versions. The frequency of the resort to these elements and the forms in which they are employed largely depend upon each party's historical heritage as well as its position in power politics.

Between Survival and Accommodation to the "New Age": Foreign Policy as a Testing Groundfor "National Sensitivities" The AKP, which has been on the rise both in terms of its electoral support and as the object of increaSing public and academic attention, can be taken as the political party that has most successfully manipulated the synthesis to carve out a political identity for itself in order to break away from the National Oudook heritage. This is in fact the case when one considers the defining features of the National Oudook: appealing to the people as the Muslim community; a nationalist stance in foreign policy preferences; advocating etarist economic policies; and attentiveness to forming good relations with the military (Atacan 2.005, p. 190). The National Oudook tradition has been represented by the chain of pro-Islamist political parties, starting with Milli Nizam Parrisi (National Order Party, 1970-71) and continuing with Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, 1972.-80), Refah Parrisi (Welfare Party, 1983-98), Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party: FP, 1997-2.001), and Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party: sp, 2001-). The majority of

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the AKP's members (especially during its foundation and first term in government) originated from the National Outlook tradition, which led the party to emphasize its difference from the other offspring of that tradition. The AKP has continuously felt the urge to prove itself as a party of the center rather than of extremities. This is one of the reasons why I refer to the party as a party in the making. The other reason concerns the fluctuations in party discourse and in its policy preferences between liberal priorities and authoritarian tendencies. The AKP's liberal preferences are most manifest in its foreign policy, which is the main sphere that differentiates the party from the National Outlook tradition. Both during its short term in opposition and during its first term in government between November 2002 and July 2007, the party proved to be a loyal partner in the world neo-liberal economic system with its staunch follow-up of economic policies sponsored by the International Monetary Fund {IMF}.'ln the same vein, it has been careful not to break ties with the traditional preference for alliance with the West, which has been one of the constant foreign policy themes of the state since the mid-1940S. The AKP's foreign policy has also been proved to be a ground for {re)asserting its "non-Islamist" identity to the stern secularists. Evinced especially in its enthusiastic and zealous attempts at Turkey's accession to the EU, such a liberalizing tendency might also be read as one manifestation of the party's endeavor to survive in a political culture that has been marked with subsequent military interventions {Dagl 2006, pp. 95-104}. Likewise, the first AKP government initiated or at least attempted to initiate a new start by breaking with the traditional hawkish foreign policy in the Cyprus issue. Especially during the controversy over the Annan Plan that extended from December 2002 to April 2004, the party displayed a totally compromising and liberal approach that ran counter to the traditional official stance. Moreover, the foreign policy area until recently also has functioned as a breathing space from the AKP's gordian knot-the headscarf issue-at least until the decision of the European COllrt of Human Rights in November 200S to overrule a plea to wear a headscarfin public institutions (Robins 2007, p. 293).' The policy preferences of the party that are in line with liberal priorities in the international sphere stop at the EU door. As far as the party's relations with the United States are concerned, the AKP has presented a much more uneasy profile. On the one hand. the party continued the strategic alliance

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with the United States that has long been one of the prevalent themes of Turkish foreign policy. On the other hand, allegiance to the U.S. administration's preferences at times carried the risk of alienating the core AKP electorate: conservative Muslims. This state of affairs resulted in a fluctuating profile. The Iraq War is a case in point. Philip Robins (2.007, p. 295) notes the general hesitation on the part of all political institutions concerned about readily taking the necessary measures for active engagement in the war on the side of the United States. At the end of the day, however, the blocking of the initial step (the parliamentary note for engagement opened to a vote on March I, 2003) cannot be attributed to the liberal tendency of the party at the international level. It had more to do with the mass opposition as well as opposition from the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party. CHP) members of the parliament, joined by 75 "no" votes from the AKP.8 It is not mainly the issue of allegiance to the U.S. policy in the Middle East that casts a shadow on the liberal tendencies of the AKP. More importantly, the fragile balance that it has had to maintain between its commitment to alliance with the United States on the one hand and the sensitivities of its conservative Muslim electorate on the other hand has led the party to grapple with the contradictions between its foreign policy preferences and its appeal to the nation. In the words of the party chairperson, compromising abroad while at times being tough at home symbolized that the party does not seem persuasive and/or decisive enough to maintain its initial liberal approach: The world and especially the United States cannot solve the Palestinian problem by unconditionally supporting Sharon, whose real identity is [forged by) resorting to violent policies. and who turns the issue into a jigsaw puzzle .... Suicide attacks work neither for peace nor for justice.... But the world has to offer a reason to the Palestinian youth for living.... Turkey has to be active in Palestine, in the Middle East. for the ... establishment of peace and justice. Just as in the case of commanding the Peace Corps in Mghanistan, it is of ultimate importance that Turkey take a more active role in such issues, which concern both the Muslim world and the Western world. (Erdogan 2.002.C; my translation)

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Despite the well-devised liberal internationalism in this quotation, as noted above, the foreign policy preferences and policy pursuits of the AKP have functioned as strategic tools for the party in its endeavor to survive in domestic politics rather than suggesting a consistent and exclusive liberal nationalism. Having learned the lesson that its survival depends on a centrist appeal, the party has been trying hard to prove that it has cut its ties with the pro-Islamist National Outlook. The National Outlook tradition has long been outwardly hostile toward the West. In this respect, it opposed alliance with the United States and the idea of EU membership. Except for a brief flirtation with a pro-EU and pro-U.S. (pro-Western) stance among the ranks of the FP. the tradition kept its anti-Western posture: [The West] tries to dominate nature and human beings .... The West has not been able to create a world or a political system free of domination. Here is the main difference between Islam and others. According to Islam, sovereignty belongs to God, but this does not mean that somebody can dominate nature or a group of people in the name of God. It simply means the emergence of a new model where nobody can dominate the other. That is why the political philosophy is different. Everybody is equal before the law. Western philosophy is based on domination and hence on power. As a result, it is colonialist and imperialist. That is why the West uses different ways of discrimination against others in the name of civilization, evolution, etc. In this framework Milli Gorii~ [National Outlook] is the name of a movement which tries to establish a new civilization in the world. (Bahri Zengin, quoted in Atacan :?OOS, p. 189) Thus, unlike the foreign policy perspective of National Outlook, the AKP displays an outwardly pro-Western stance. Being pro-Western, however, does not necessarily mean staying loyal to liberal criteria. Rather, it is possible to argue that the AKP has so far presented a fluctuating stance between liberal appeals and rather harsh outbursts when the "nation's pride" and thus the party's electoral support are at stake. In this respect, Erdogan's statement in reply to the EU's insistence on the resolution of the Cyprus issue as a requisite for continuing negotiations with Turkey is illustrative. In that instance,

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Erdogan went so far as to take no notice of the warnings about the risks of failure in resolving the issue: "Let the negotiations halt: we do not care. We act according to the win-win approach .... We descend from a civilization in which there is justice and not oppression" (Erdogan quoted in Ozalp 2.006; my translation). It should be noted that two points of emphasis come to the fore when the party faces problems at the international level. First, the statements of almost all the leading figures in the AKP are based on the prioritization of the rule oflaw, which can be taken as repetitive assertion of the party's liberal stance. Second, insistent appeals are made to "national sensitivities; in terms of the exclusively positive characteristics of the Turks. Unlike the AKP's occasional (however frequent) resorts to the sublime values of the Turks, the MHP's foreign policy is solely based on Turkish pride. This time, however, what is taken to be at stake is not the survival of the party per se but of the country and the state. The MHP retains the approach that characterized the party's stance in the 1970S with an outwardly friend-foe dichotomy. In this reading, Turkey is portrayed as a lone country and the Turkish state as a bystander in the international sphere, open to constant threats coming mainly from the West. In this respect, the party's discourse evokes a constant state of mobilization for national defense, which in the final analysis amounts to a preference for "the sacred national security state" (Bora and Can 2004, p. US). As a result of the reconsideration process that the Idealist movement has gone through after the 1980 coup d'etat, the MHP constantly opposes the military's active role in politics. Still, its discourse on international politicS is exclusively based on security (Bora and Can 1991; Yanardag 2.002, pp. >37-573). "The ruling mentality that dominates Turkey, the dominant bloc in Turkey, and the foreign relations network with which they are articulated are in a search that hinders Turkey['s development] ... [and] threatens its national existence" (Bahcreli 2003; my translation). The AKP's foreign policy is criticized on these grounds; the party is accused of having "surrendered to the will of domestic and foreign groups that work against the interests of the Turkish state and Turkish nation and global interest lobbies, who aim to exploit the labor and hard work of our sacred nation" (Kolaycl 2007: my translation). Although it can be argued that the party has not experienced a radical transformation in terms of its interpretation of international affairs since the 1970s, twO changes have occurred. The first stems from the contemporary

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dynamics of world politics. Unlike the discourse of a national security state of the Cold War era, the discourse of the MHP in the post-1990 period does not have the same enemy (communism). Second, it cannot be grounded on an institutionalized international dichotomy between a free world and its opposite. In other words, the post-1990 discourse of the party is seriously challenged by the rise of a rather complicated new world order. In the Cold War days of the late 1960s and 1970S the MHP could find substantial grounds for its hostile approach to the West and to anticommunism while distinguishing itself from radical Islamist circles, which took the same negative stances. In the post-1980 period, as a result of the changing dynamics of world politics, the party seems to have lost its ground. The end result has turned out to be handing over the task of "dealing with the Communists" to the state. Besides, the reconfiguration of the leadership (which led to the development of a more diplomatic party discourse) and the traditional hostility of the party to anything non-Turk, with the West being the prime target at the international level, seem to have paved the way for the domestication of hostility with "reasonable suspicion." Second, and related to the veiling of hostility with suspicion, the unavoidable rise and penetration of various versions of liberalism in politics have also affected the MHP's discourse on Turkey-West relations. Still, the party might aptly be considered anti-Westernist. The issue of Turkey's membership in the EU is a modal example of the party's foreign policy preferences, which can be taken as more nuanced than reformed when compared to the 19705 and 1980s. As in the previous decades, the MHP of the 2.000S still perceives the West as an essentially foreign and thus threatening bloc, led by mainly the United States and the EU. In this respect, it is clearly a "Euroskeptic" political party {bni~ 2.007, p. 2.49).9 While it does not unconditionally reject Turkey's membership, it is dear that it rejects the notion of integration in all aspects (see bni~ 2.003). In the MHP's approach to the accession process, the culturalist separation of economic relations from political adaptation forms the frame of reference. This separation is symbolized in the MHP's discourse with reference to "honorable membership" (Bahc;:eli 2.002, pp. 10, 108, 131, 143)' Despite standing against the privatization policies when it was in opposition, on the grounds that they function as a means for maintaining Western hegemony, the party has proved its capacity for easy adaptation to neo-liberal economic requisites when in power as a partner in the ANAP-MHP-DSP coalition government (1999-2.002).'°

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In contrast, the rigid reservations about adjustment to liberal political and cultural values that the MHP constantly voices do not change according to the party's location in opposition or in government. In fact, "honorable _ membership" connotes the MHP's uncompromising attitude with respect to issues such as the abolition of the death penalty, education, and communication in native languages. The party perceives these criteria and related EU credentials as threats to the national unity. In this respect, it displays an either-or stance toward Turkey's EU membership. On the one hand, it argues for a membership that does not hamper the "identity of the Turkish nation:' which it bases on Muslim-Turkishness. On the other hand, in line with its traditionalized perception of international affairs, it openly accuses the EU of "detaining [and] excluding Turkey, and playing upon its honor." Relatedly, the EU process is based on a "Christianity project," according to the MHP's chairperson (Bah~eli 2006). Two points of emphasis are explanatory in this respect. First, the MHP has a clear vision of the West in general and the EU in particular as "a synthesis:' in which Christianity plays a major role. For the MHP, the Western synthesis was forged between capitalism and Christianity and has been going through an unresolvable crisis. In party discourse, this crisis has been reflected in the West's attempts to maintain its hegemony over Turkey. In the face of this crisis, T.urkey is viewed as the bedrock of a "new civilization" that has its roots in a "great civilization [that is the] Turkish-Islamic tradition" (Yeni Bir Dunya Yeni Bir Turkiye ifin Buyuk Bulzqma 2.003 p. 77; my translation). Second, and as part of the project of this new civilization, it proposes "opening up to a new politics with a Eurasian perspective" (Yeni Bir Dunya Yeni Bir Turkiye ifin Buyuk Bulu/ma 2003, p. 66: my translation). This option is reminiscent of the pan-Turkist ideal." Moreover, the MHP's opening up does not stop at the borders of the Turkic republicS. In an attempt to have a say in the reshaping of the Middle East, the party insistently draws attention to Mosul-Kirkuk as the territories over which Turks have historical rights, while it also points to "a new foreign relations network that extends from the Balkans to China with a Eurasian perspective" (Yent Bir Dunya Yeni Bir Turkiye ifin Buyuk Bulu/ma 2003, p. 81; my translation). The ongoing reference to the dichotomy between the West and Turkey on ethno-religious grounds (Christianity versus Islam and Turkishness) and

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the proposal of a new civilization is reminiscent of the new civilization of the National Outlook tradition. In particular, the evaluation of Western civilization as rotten because of its materialist priorities and the hopelessness of stemming the tide of rapid moral degeneration find a direct match in the National Outlook's interpretation of the West. Although the major components of this new civilization are the same, their weight and functions differ. In other words, the MHP proposes a Turkish-Muslim identity as the forerunner of the new civilization, in which Islam is presented as a historical element of Turkishness (added but by no means removable), and the Turks are considered to be the forerunners of Islamic identity." The BBP clarifies the civUizational classification in the MHP's discourse through a more pristine resort to Islam, embracing the Turkish identity. Unlike the MHP, which proposes dealing with the globalization process, the BBP totally denies the process and calls upon the Turkish nation and the state to wage a war against it. In this respect, the party is fundamentally against the Turkey-U.S. alliance as well as Turkey-EU relations, let alone EU membership for Turkey. In a direct confrontation with the MHP, the late BBP leader Muhsin YaZlclOglu (quoted in Muhsin Yazzaoglu-Son Roportaj 2009; my translation) states: I am absolutely against Turkey's full membership in the EU. The EU is not a project that would develop Turkey; on the contrary, it is a concept that would enslave and weaken [the country] .... We have to consider our own realities and power. It is not we who are in need of the EU; the EU needs us.... We are the descendants of the Ottomans. We have to focus on the Otoman inheritance. We have to expend effort to revive this civilization. The EU cannot forget the Ottomans and it [suffers from] an inferiority complex; and in the past 40 years it has been taking revenge for the 500 years [of the Ottoman Empire]. The Turkish-Islamic Idealism on which the party bases its stance also shapes this hostUe attitude to the West. As a party formed by the Idealists of the 1970S (who named themselves "Turkish-Islamic Idealists," connoting the Islamization process they went through), the BBP bases its reading of foreign policy exclusively on anti-Westernism.'~ The party rejects the consideration of any connection with the West.

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This rejection can be considered in twO aspects. The first is related to Muslimhood: the East-West divide. The second is related to Turkishness. In this respect, the perception of the international sphere as a battleground between the imperialist West and the Muslim peoples in general, and Turkish people in particular, shapes the party discourse. Especially in the foundation phase of the party (in the early 1990S), the Turkist mission was overwhelmed by the Islarnist cause, symbolized in the phrase "my cause is the cause of Islam" (Bora and Can 2004, p. 56; my translation). This has connoted the ideal of "instituting the dominance of the word of God [Islam] in the world" (Bora and Can 2.004, p. 41; my translation). In this framework, the leading role is attributed to the Turks. The clear-cut dichotomy between the West and the East, with a religious colOring, is a constant reference point in party discourse. This dichotomy is fed by an exclusively Cold War understanding of the international sphere. As is the case with the MHP's approach. the BBP also views the new world order from a friend-foe perspective. Thus globalization is conceived merely as the encroachment of imperialist Western powers over the "nations of the East" and, particularly. over the Turkish nation (YazlclOglu 2.006). Thus one can discern the motif of civilizational clash between the East and the West in the approaches of both the MHP and the BBP. Certainly, Eastern civilization is cqnsidered superior to the West. All aspects of world politics are viewed in terms of the West's inferiority complex. In this reading, the West constantly attempts to dominate the East in order to overcome its inferiority complex. This overwhelmingly skeptical disposition, tinged with a faith in the greatness of Turkish-Islamic civilization and the Cold War view, is best echoed in the claim that Turkey and the Turkish nation are "under occupation" by the EU and the United States (YaZlclOglu 2.007b). In this respect, while calling the Turkey-EU negotiation process a chimera, the party proposes looking to other lands in shaping the international alliances ofTurkey: the "Great Turkish Unity in the Balkans and Caucasia" (YaZlclogiu n.d.; my translation). The desire for this unity was most recently evinced in the public statement by Hakkt Oznur. the BBP's vice-chairperson, on the parliamentary note approving military operations in northern Iraq against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). which holds the "imperialistic aims of the West" ("the United States. Israel. and the EU countries") responsible for the Kurdish issue: "The

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parliamentary note should not be limited to nonhern Iraq. It should have a transatlantic scope .... It is clear that what opposes us is not the terrorist organization but the United States and NATO. The PKK is a hollow organization. The murderer of our [martyrs] is the United States" (6znur 2007; my translation) . All in all, it can be argued that the MHP and the BBP, descended from the Idealist movement of the 1970s, represent two versions of nationalist sentiments in their foreign policy preferences. Oni~ argues that the BBP's approach corresponds to "hard-Euro-skepticism" and the MHP's stance might be considered "soft-Euro-skepticism." "Soft-Euro-skepticism involves a certain dislike of the conditions associated with full membership if not the idea of membership." "Hard-Euro-skepticism:' in contrast, stands for an unwavering rejection of EU membership (6ni§ 2007, pp. 2.49-S0). Oni~ (2007, note 8) also notes the pOSSibility of transformation from the soft to the hard version ofEuro-skepticism. Contrary to 6ni~'s initial classification, however, I would argue that the MHP is a hard-Euro-skeptical political party. The MHP's emphasis on honorable membership might at first Sight situate it as a soft-Euro-skeptical political party. But because of its frequent references to the irreconcilability of Turkey's interests with those of the West, it is apt to conclude with an anti-EU stance for the MHP. The BBP is clearly a hard-Euro-skeptical political party in its outright rejection of both Turkey's EU membership and alliance between Turkey and the West. But what differentiates the twO parties' approaches cannot be discerned merely by looking at their considerations of Turkey-EU relations. Also important is the place they accord to Islam and ethnicity in defining and propagating their nationalism. The AKP, in contrast, stands at the opposite pole of the disposition that these twO political parties represent. As elaborated above, such a stance offers a breathing space for the party to disclaim the attribution of political Islamism. This position also gives a liberal coloring to the party's foreign policy preferences. It is undeniable that the party's economic policies are neo-liberal. The same holds for the party's approach to the Cyprus problem and to the process of Turkey's accession to the ED. But the projections of the AKP's foreign policy preferences to domestic politics and the shifts in its discourse from liberal credentials to romanticized nationalist motifs necessitate a closer look at its conceptualization of the link between Turkishness and Islam.

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Turkishness and Muslimhood: Three ~ys ofArticulation, Three Versions ofNationalism It is not surprising that the MHP and the BBP raise harsh criticisms . against the AKP governments' foreign policy record in terms of national sensitivities. The irony is that while both start from the same grounds-Turkey and the Turkish nation facing a survival problem; the roots of domestic issues lying in the conspiracies of foreign powers, symbolized in an overt/ covert call for a security state-each accuses the other of diluting Turkish na~ tionalism. In this schema the AKP seems to represent the liberal version of nationalism. When one considers the basic precepts of liberal nationalism. however. it is still dubious whether the party can rightly be termed liberal nationalist or not. As far as the historical outline of nationalism in Europe drawn by Carlton J. H. Hayes (1931) is concerned. certain policies that the AKP governments have pursued make it tempting to label the AKP a liberal nationalist political party. Tracing the roOtS of liberal nationalism to Jeremy Bentham. Hayes (1931. pp. 124-33) offers a formula for liberal nationalism that requires not only an emphasis on individual liberties vis-a.-vis the state but also a pacific foreign policy preference. The AKP has been strategically cautious in involving the military in the Iraqi dispute. in its stance in the uneasy atmosphere caused by the controversies over the Annan Plan in Cyprus. and in its persistence in pursuing the process of Turkey's accession to the EU. Moreover, at home it has used the language of individual rights and liberties and offered adjustment to EU requirements as an asset for guaranteeing ba~ sic rights and liberties. But the party's record in government in regard to the infamous article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, the Law on Struggle against Terror. and the Law on Foundations (especially in regard to the foundations of the non-Muslim minority) casts a shadow over the liberal attributes of the AKP's nationalism. A careful analysis of the party's discourse and policies reveals that it is relatively liberal abroad but conservative at home. First. the AKP bases its appeal to the nation on an Qrganic connection between the family and the nation. In this respect, the emphasis on the state serving the nation, which might be read as a liberal credo by eighteenth- and nineteenth~century standards. can be seen in the party's definition of the Turkish nation. After emphasizing "identity differences as a sphere of natural freedom," Conservative Democracy (which can be considered the manifesto of the party) asserts that the "conservatives care for ... 'national; shared values."

Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam

,8,

These values are revealed between the lines, not only in Conservative Democracy but also in various other AKP publications as well as in public statements by the leading members of the party. The Turkish-Ottoman past, "the greatness of the Turks as state-builders," and above all the Muslim identity that characterizes the Turks and the country ("Turkey is a Muslim country") are the common points that define Turkey and Turkishness (Erdogan 2002.b; my translation). 'These common points are frequently utilized either in relation to domestic issues or in the efforts to explicate the necessity of Turkey's membership in the EU. "We have been walking on this path for fifty years. We entered into a serious process. In the coming years, Turkey, with its Muslim identity, will become an EU country.... Turkey, with its Muslim identity in the EU, will pursue relations with Muslim countries on a firmer basis" {Abdullah Gill, quoted in "AB ~imdi Daha Yakm" 2.003; my translation}. Acknowledging Islam as the asset of national identity unavoidably leads to hesitant language concerning non-Muslim citizens. In this respect, as noted above, the Law on Foundations has been one of the major issues, attesting to the party's unease in reconciling its liberal credo in its pro-EU orientation, on the one hand, and its appeal to Muslim Turks, on the other.'''' Similarly, the party's discomfort in dealing with the "Report on Minority Rights and Cultural Rights" (prepared by the Prime Ministerial Advisory Board on Human Rights in 2004), which extends from disclaim to total indifference, also attests to its vulnerability and/or reluctance in going beyond the limits of national sensitivities. A similar case can be observed in the AKP governments' policy preferences related to article 216 (article 312 before 2.004) and article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which are directly related to freedom of thought. The AKP government has been at best silent about and at worst indifferent to the issues related to human rights violations related to these articles, again casting doubt on the liberal attributes of the party in the face ofits nationalist stance (Human Rights Watch Report 2007; BiA Medya Gozlem Raporu 2007).'s Moreover, it is not possible to provide a clear picture of the AKP's stance in relation to the fragile balance between its proclaimed advocacy for human rights in the context of EU accession process, on the one hand, and its outspokenly conservative nationalist key members as well as its appeal to the conservative Muslim electorate, on the other. The statements by Cemil <;ic;ek, the minister of justice in the fifty-ninth AKP government and the

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state minister responsible for human rights in the sixtieth AKP government (especially concerning the infamous article 301), are telling. <;i<;ek argues, for example, that "Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code constitutes a problem not for the common citizen but for the intellectuals" (Savumlu 2.006; my translation). The AKP's fragile balance and fine-tuning indicate twO possibilities regarding the party's location on the nationalist pendulum. First, reminiscent of the ANAP's synthetic composition, it can be argued that the AKP started with a synthetic discourse (if not composition) in order to appeal both to the bulk of the Turkish centrist electorate and to the international community. !nthis respect, the synthetic discourse of the party has only recently taken a synthetic turn by excluding some AKP members who descended from the National Outlook tradition from the candidate list of the party, in 2.007 general election and by including some liberal and social-democratic figures. Second, the party is a well-knit representation of the hegemonic place that Muslim-Turkish features have attained in the political space. This is not only because of the party's strategic concerns in appealing to the centrist electorate but also because nationalism is an organic ingredient of the party's identity per se. The party's resort to nationalist sentiments marks the indispensability of nationalism for its pplitical identity. It speaks of the historical "Turkish nation, taking the three continents under its wings, and embracing numerous tribes and countries with loving care"; the "metaphYSical foundation, universal ideal" of the Turkish nation; and the civilizational (meaning that the "Ottoman civilization that has far surpassed the West in historical development") assets of the Turks, including "love, lore, and inSight [i':fon)" (Erdogan 2.OO2.a, 2.007; my translation). Likewise, the emphasis on "one nation, one flag, one state ... the shared values and ideals as a means for strengthening our unity" and on the "impossibility of thinking small for the Turks ... they have to think big" gives clues about th~ mode of nationalism that the party attempts to appropriate (Erdogan 2.007; my translation). Direct and indirect references to tolerance and the will to live together, despite differences, as organic features of Turkishness attest that merging conservative nationalism with the irresistible tide of liberalism (irresistible for the party's survival) results in banal nationalism, as, conceptualized by Michael Billig (1997 [1995]).'6 In this respect, the nationalistic discourse of the AKP

Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam

goes unnoticed for a wide audience, while appealing to the heart of the centriSt electorate, as defined incisively by Nur Vergin (quoted in Sever 2002; my translation): [The Center-Right] is that platform formed by people who avoid excess ... these are people who search for "sound" [policies]. Sound, that is, center-right, is a locus composed of sound people ... who in some respects express mild demands. They are conservatives, but they do not pay tribute to fanaticism. They are religious, but they do not like fanaticism. They stand at a distance from the state, they want to change [state] structure, but they do not even imagine damaging it. They adhere to their traditions, but they inherently have an enormous will to change. They want freedom, but they do not overlook the destruction of order. They have developed national sentiments, but they oppose ethnicity or racist nationalism. They are against state control over the economy, but they aspire to a regulatory state. They support democracy to the extent that it does not threaten the unity of the state. Of course, the "mild religiosity" of the centrist electorate, in this definition, is mild Muslimhood, which goes widely unnoticed. While Muslimhood shapes the cultural attributes of the centrist electorate, nationalism shapes their political tendencies, which is also not emphasized (insel2.003, p. 298). It is this normality of nationalistic motifs in the AKP's discourse and policy pursuit that renders it "non-nationalist" not only in the eyes of political parties that build their existence on Turkish nationalism but also in the reading of prominent social scientists (KalayclOglu 2007; Vergin 2007). As Billig (I997 [I995], p. 8) underlines, the banality of nationalism renders its everyday hegemonization unseen, as in the case of "the flag, hanging unnoticed on the public building ... not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion." Likewise, the banality of the AKP's nationalism can be disclosed with reference to the specialities of the "national us": "stereotypes of character, identity and history" that are frequently used in its appeal to the nation (Billig I997 [I99S], pp. 70ff.). The national education policies reveal the unnoticed nationalistic preferences of the party. In this respect, the mentality that shaped the Seventeenth National Education Council (convened on November I,-I7, 2.006) and its decisions are illustrative. The minister

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of national education of the fifty-ninth and sixtieth governments. Hiiseyin <;elik. announced the aim of the party's national education policy as "making the twenty-first century the century of Turks;' thus connecting the policy preferences and especially the pro-EU stance of the party to this goal. This reading indicates the concern with conserving national attributes in the face of the rising tide of globalization: "In the contemporary world. where a revolution in communication is underway, the world is becoming ever smaller. and everything is interconnected. in the processes of globalization and of membership in the EU it is necessary that all shareholders of education be sensitive to protecting the national elements of the Turkish national education system" (article 88 of the Council Decisions, On Yedinci Mill; Egitim $urasz Kararlarz 2.006. p. 10j my translation). It can be argued that the AKP's policy preferences and policymaking in the educational sphere are an extension of the state-sponsored TurkishIslamic synthesis of the 1980S with a more liberally nuanced tune. In this respect. while the compulsory religious (Sunni Islam) courses are retained in the national education system. the voices from within the party that seem to oppose the practice have been no less Muslim: "being Alevi is a social ... fact of this nation. of the Islamic world. Alevi does not mean non-Muslim. Alevi means real Muslim. Not being Alevi or being Sunni but the common points of families with Alevi 3:nd Sunni belief should be emphasized in the textbooks" (Tugcu 2007; my translation). The same holds true for the recent discussions on the drafting of the new Constitution. While the draft prepared by a group of academicians (at the request of the AKP) included the annulment of compulsory religious education in elementary schools. the party's draft prepared after the revision of the first draft maintained the related constitutional article.'1 The AKP's SunniMuslim Turkishness is a banalized version of the Turkish-Islamic syntheSiS. appropriated not only to appeal to the core of the party's electorate but also to guarantee the party a safe place in its fragile positioning between its National Outlook past and its present. which is still in the making. Since the late 1960S the MHP's merging of Muslim hood and Turkishness has gone down a long path: starting with a pragmatic, discursive add-and-stir formula and evolving to a staunch advocacy of the Muslimhood of Turkishness. In the 19705 anticommunism provided the POt for the easy add-and-stir combination of Muslimhood and Turkishness. From the 1990S onward the

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Kurdish issue has turned out to be the main point of reference for the party to accentuate the necessity to love the Turkish nation. In other words, in the 1990S the Kurdish issue has provided a convenient basis for the MHP to appeal to the nation and legitimize its necessity. While casting doubt on Muslimhood as a binding component in appealing to the nation, however, the party's approach to the Kurdish issue reveals the contentious mixing of ethnicist and culturalist elements in its nationalism. Islam first appeared in the party's identity preferences in the late 1960s, due to electoral concerns. Throughout the 1970S it became an integral part in the identification of the Turkish nation, summarized in Turke§'s symbolic statement: "As Turkish as the Tengri Mountain, as Muslim as Mount Hira" (quoted in Agaogullan 1987, p. 222). The 19805 proved to be the turning point for the party in terms of the consideration of Muslimhood. In the 1970S the Intellectuals' Hearth provided the scheme of reference for the party's articulation of Muslim hood and Turkishness.'8 Islam was taken as the moral bedrock, while Turkishness was considered to be the basis for "consciousness and pride" (Bora and Can 2004, p. 47). But the state's adoption of the synthesis of the Intellectuals' Hearth in the postcoup period and the exclusion of the MHP from the political sphere (which signified the end of the state preference to have contact with the party's organizational means) necessitated a redefinition of the place and role of Islam. Starting with the questioning of the state's attitude to the Idealists in the postcoup period, the distancing of the grassroots from the state was accompanied by a split within the Idealist movement. The process of division and the consolidation of the factions marked the late 1980s and early 19905. The MHP revitalized its prosynthesis stance, and the BBP emerged as the Islamist version of Turkish nationalism (Bora and Can 2004, pp. 41-S9). Throughout the process and in its aftermath the MHP's consideration of the Kurdish issue remained essentially the same. The MHP has almost constantly denied the existence of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. This does not mean denying the existence of the Kurds. Within the MHP's nationalist discourse. the Kurds exist, but not as a separate identity. Rather, Kurdishness is supposed to be part and parcel of Turkishness, a contention again symbolized in Turke§'s words: "I am as Kurd as they are; they are as Turk as 1 am" (quoted in Bora and Can 2004, p. 90; my translation). In the late 19605 and 1970S the Kurdish issue was associated with the Communist tendencies

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fueled by foreign and hostile powers (primarily the USSR). The label "foreign and hostile powers" was retained in the 1990S, though the subject of this label was converted to the general term "Western imperialism." Like almost aU other domestic issues, the Kurdish issue has been viewed as part of a foreign conspiracy. In this reading, the party has rejected the label "Kurdish; emphasizing that it is exclusively a matter of terrorism. In the party's official discourse, a Turk is identified along the statist line: ''Anyone connected to the State of Turkey through citizenship is a Turk."'9 Though apparently cleared of the ethnicist definition, this formula seems to faU short of explicating the nationalism of the MHP when the party's discourse on the Kurdish issue is considered. On the one hand, the party ranks and grassroots offer a standardized opposition to the calls for the cultural rights of the Kurdish population in Turkey, by labeling them as calls for "ethnic discrimination," for the "creation of a Kurdish minority," and thus for ethnic nationalism. On the other hand, party discourse constantly refers to the themes of the "historic" Turkish-Islamic civilization and Ottoman heritage and prehistoric Turkish attributes. Moreover, the identification of the Turks as the dominant ethnie in the foundation years of Turkey does more than negate the ethnic tenor of Turkishness. Calling the people connected to the "Turkish State" through bonds of citizenship "Turks" ~s at best an example of integral nationalism and at worst a tautology. It is well known that official Turkish nationalism in the founding years of the Turkish Republic oscillated between ethnic and civic versions, passing this legacy to coming generations of nationalists (YddlZ 2.001). The MHP's portion of this inheritance in the current decade has been twofold. On the one hand, it manifests a concern for loyalty to its original cause: guarding the indivisible unity of the state with the nation. On the other hand, it seeks to adjust to the rising tide of globalization. That is why the party seems to have been walking a tightrope by referring to liberal terms in trying to explicate its nationalism. It has advocated tolerance, resolving problems with dialogue, consensus, and persuasion rather than force (Bah'reli I999a, p. 2.9. 1999b, pp. 44-S 0, 1999c, p. 64,2.000, p. 7). In the party's attempt to merge the liberal-tinged terms with Turkish nationalism. nationalism and democracy are presented as two organic phenomena. Democracy is defined as a political system that respects the values of society and that considers social demands to be fundamental and legitimate

Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam

inputs. In this respect, nationalism is an ideology that necessitates the democratization of the political system (Bahs:eli 2000; Yeni Bir Dunya Yeni Bir

TUrkiye ifin Buyuk BulUfma 2003, p. 64)· It is in this framework that the MHP tackles or attempts to tackle the Kurdish issue. The intensity of violence (either in terms of exclusionary discourse or in terms of the call for mobilization) varies according to the dynamics of the period. In times of increased visibility of the demands for cultural rights from the Kurdish groups and/or intensified armed conflict between the Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK, the MHP resorts to hawkish discourse. It accuses those who assert cultural rights of treason and/or demands military action to solve the problem (Bora and Can 2004, pp. 90-157). For the MHP. demands for cultural rights. the PKK's attacks, and dashes with the Turkish Armed Forces are different faces of the same coin: terrorism with "roots abroad" (Bahs:eli 2007a, 2oo7b, 2007C). The MHP's Kurdish issue is also telling for the party's rather thorny articulation of Muslimhood with Turkishness. In his attentive analysis of the Kurdish problem of Turkish nationalism, Mesut Yegen (2007) describes the current period as one of paradigmatic change. He notes the increasing currency of the association of Kurdishness with non-MusHmhood, especially withJews. Though this association has not yet been articulated in the public discourse of the party. it has been in use at the grassroots level (Yegen 2007. pp. 137-39). Another manifestation of this thorny articulation is the MHP's problem of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Apart from the derogatory use of the names of non-Muslim communities, the party at best has displayed a total neglect of the existence of the non-Muslims in its discourse or at worst approachedthe issue of non-Muslim minorities with a contradictory footnote to the official formula of being a Turk noted above.>o In this respect, the MHP's leader's words concerning the assassination of Hrant Dink in January 2.007 are illustrative: It is a very bitter incident that one of our citizens of Armenian descent

was murdered. It is unthinkable to approve any murder, let alone the assassination of Hrant Dink. However, it is a great injustice to hold nationalism, Turkish nationalism, responsible for this obnoxious incident. Turkey has had no benefit from Hrant Dink's murder. It is also

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unacceptable to tend to question nationalism, to pronounce nationalism guilty on the basis of this incident. We have had no problem with our citizens of Armenian descent. They were [our} loyal subjects in Ottoman period, and during the republican period they have been our brothers in minority status. They are in our trust, in the truSt of the Turkish nation.... it is not right to pronounce nationalists guilty. to commit words and deeds against nationalism in order to sow the seeds of separatism on the basis ofHrant Dink's assassination. (quoted in BHa 2.007; my translation, emphasis added) With a naive approach, the contradiction between integral nationalism and the use of liberal motifs in the MHP's discourse can be read as proof that the party is turning its face toward some version of liberal nationalism. The care that the party rank and file has displayed since the 19905 in teaching new manners to the "advocates of Turkish nationalism" along liberal and democratic lines might reinforce such a contention. Considering the currency of rather fascistic discursive practices at the grassroots level of the party (frequently circulated on various websites and in web groups), however, one might argue that the politicking style of image-making introduced in Turkey in the 1980S and consoli,dated afterward has also penetrated the MHP.In any case, while Muslimhood as the essential feature of Turkishness is retained, the party in essence continues to be an integral nationalist one, with a considerable dose of ethnic nationalism. The BBP's version of the synthesis, in contrast, is based on the dominance of the "three Crescents" (representing Islam) over the "Gray Wolf" (representing Turkism). The party has gone from total denial of the synthesis-on the grounds that Muslimhood and Turkishness do not represent contradictory states of being-to coming to terms with the syntheSiS along culturalist lines." In other words, while Islam is the reference point for the worldwide cause that the BBP claims to advocate, it considers Turkish nationalism to be an organic necessity. While the denial of the term "syntheSiS" is maintained in the political sphere, however, it is recognized in the cultural sphere: In explicating the worldview, the perspective oflooking at life, it would be accurate to refer to the term "Turkish-Islamic ideal" or "the Islamic

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ideal of the Turk." But we have to refer to the term "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" in portraying Selimiye Mosque because synthesis does not necessarily mean the outcome of thesis and antithesis .... We cannot observe the idea of spreading the word of God throughout the world and the idea of the order of the world [Sharia] in pre-Islamic Arabic societies.... [But] the reason behind such a resonance between the idea of the order of the world. for spreading the word of God throughout the world. and the essential features in the constitution of the Turk is that Turks had already had such a character.... This means that "TurkishIslamic synthesis" and "Turkish-Islamic ideal" are not identical. "Turkish-Islamic ideal" should be used for the ultimate political goal, and "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" for our cultural products. (S. Ahmed Arvasi, quoted in Bora and Can 1991, pp. 266-67; my translation) The argument on the organic necessity ofTurkish nationalism hints at the conceptualization of Turkishness and Muslimhood as unavoidable and indispensable identities for the Turks. Notwithstanding the tautology apparent in this understanding, this duality is interpreted as states of being that cannot be chosen. But they are presented as given, fixed foundations for cultural and political preferences. Thus the emphasis is on the historical necessity of a direct correspondence between the given Turkish-Islamic synthesis as a cultural fact and the Turk's political preference: Turkish-Islamic Idealism. In the shaping of this ideal, the significance of being Turkish is founded on the ontological characteristics of the Turks. Turks are defined with reference to courage, bellicosity for righteous reasons, decency/good morals, and the spirit of ruling:' In this framework the connection between Muslimhood and Turkishness is read as a historical moment in the becoming of Turkishness. Islam is also perceived as another ontological attribute of being Turk: The Turk, in his voyage to Islam with all his being and ardor. had experienced the elation of reuniting with the religion for which he had been yearning. Islam, which states that "there is no deity but God:' which feeds "the spirit of heroism" with its "command for jihad;' and which states that the ink from the pens of the learned is much holier than the martyr's blood. did not suffice for the revelation of the Turk's spirit, but it made the Turk regain the Turk. (Arvasi n.d., p. 267; my translation)

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Thus it can be argued that the Islamic cause that the BBP adopts and defines as its raison d'crre works through the essentiaHzation of Turkishness over and above other Muslims. In this framework Turks are portrayed as the "chosen people" of the Islamic world and are privileged over the other nonMuslim peoples within a discourse of brotherhood (Smith 2003). The nuance-and not the essential difference-between the BBP's Turkish-Islamic Idealism and the MHP's Turkish-Islamic synthesis is clarified in this instance. Though both political parties claim to be seeking to institute the supremacy of the Turkish-Islamic civilization worldwide, the MHP stands more on statist grounds, whereas the BBP runs counter to the established statist priorities by claiming to pursue an international Islamic cause. The BBP overtly opposes the established understanding and practice oflaicism in symbolic cases such as the headscarf issue and the imam Hatip high schools. On the one hand, it refers to Islam as an essential feature of the Turkish nation; on the other, it brings up freedom of conscience. At a glance, it is possible to observe an emphasis on individual rights and liberties, especially in matters concerning religion, and to read this emphasis in line with the MHP's use of liberal motifs. A deeper look at the party's discourse, however, reveals not a contradiction in terms, as is the case with the MHP, but that the emphasis on freedom of conscience is embodied in the argument against the unrepresentativeness of the state. The terms "democracy" and "civil society" frequently used in the party's discourse are employed in a similar fashion. Starting with its foundation program in 1993, the BBP has continuously pointed to the distance between the state and the nation in Turkey and called for state-nation unification in the name of democracy: "In a country that is exclusively composed of Muslim people, it is a requisite of democracy that the state resemble its people, that it represent the beliefs of its people" (BBP Program 1993, p. 9; my translation),'l The same emphasis on unification can also be observed in the BBP's emphasis on "civilian politics." The call for civilian politics is symbolized in the party's "Program for a Civilian Initiative" (BBP Program 1993, p. 8). Forming the grounds on which the party delineates its distinction from other political parties in general and from the MHP in particular, the emphasis on civilian politics is revealed in its call for the mobilization of the people into politicS without exception. This would render the "state not the sovereign of but in service to its people" (BBP Program 1993. pp. 8, II). In this respect, the BBP's

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nationalism is characterized by populist calls, and politics is considered to be the means for attaining a moral cause. It is viewed "as a necessary means for commanding the good and banning the evil. It can never be an aim in itself" (BBP Program 1993, p. 9; my translation). This call is combined with a zealous program organized to "contain all aspects, all instances of the social Hfe," indicating that the call is for hyperpoliticization of the (Muslim-Turkish) people in order to take hold of the state. The identification of the people with Muslimhood and Turkishness and of politics with a moral cause suffices to show the exclusionary preferences of the party regarding the non-Muslim citizens as well as the Kurdish issue. In this respect, it is more similar to than divergent from the MHP's approach. The similarity is again best manifested in the BBP leader's comments on the assassination of Hrant Dink. While ensuring the dominance of Muslim Turks in Turkey, the leader claims the Armenians as his citizens and criticizes the assassination on the grounds that it "did no good for Turkey and Turkish nationalists. A conscious Turkish youth does not commit a deed that has no utility for his country" (YaZlclOglu 2007b; my translation). Likewise, the assassination is considered to be a conspiracy by foreign powers in an attempt to annihilate the unity of the Turkish nation. When read within the context of the party's understanding of the people. the state, and politics, this mode of interpretation essentially connotes the denial of non-Muslims in a Turkish society and ends up in exclusionary nationalism. The same conspiratorial and exclusionary stance is also displayed in the BBP's reading of the Kurdish issue.'4 Like the MHP, the party denies the existence of a Kurdish issue and considers the problem to be terrorism. In this reading, the party employs Muslimhood as a bond of brotherhood between the Turks and the Kurds. Turkishness is stated to be the essential national identity for the Kurds. In other words, as in the MHP's discourse, Kurdishness is not accepted as a referential identity at the political level. For the BBP, the recognition of the Kurdish issue as a political problem means separatism. Thus the party perceives the calls for the recognition of cultural rights as a basis for the solution of the Kurdish issue as instances of "treason." It can be argued that the MHP and the BBP represent two sides of the integral nationalist coin. On one side, the MHP seeks a balance between appealing to the sentiments of its traditional advocates and coping with the necessities of the current stage of globalization. In doing so, it holds fast to

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the statist credo of the Turkish~Islamic synthesis. On the other side. the BBP stands for a populist reading of power, which finds its essence in Islam and offers a totalizing understanding of politics based on the Turkish-Islamic Ideal. Both discourses find their corresponding activists and advocates at the societal level, who resonate with each other in terms of the hostility and violence in their discourses!S There are nuances rather than divergences between the two political parties, ending up with integral nationalism on the part of the MHP and Turkish~Islamist fascism on the part of the BBP. This indicates the transitivity among different modes of nationalism documented by Hayes (1931).

CONCLUSION: NATIONALISM AS THE HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE/NATIONALISM AS A BELIEF SYSTEM

In his historical outline of the evolution of modern nationalist discourse in Europe, Hayes (1931) traces the historical dynamics that gave rise to "humanitarian nationalism" and ran through "Jacobin nationalism," "traditional nationalism," and "liberal nationalism," culminating in "integral nationalism" of the twentieth century. Certainly he does not arrive at a point where these different versions of nationalism mean one and the same thing. Likewise, he does not propose universality in the unfolding of these versions. What is im~ portant is that he emphasizes the decisiveness of historical and societal dynamics in the transition from one to the other. In this chapter I have outlined the wide~ranging and elastic contours of Turkish nationalism and the articulation of Muslimhood with Turkishness in the framework of the AKP, the BBP, and the MHP discourses. In the same vein as Hayes's account of nationalism in Europe, Turkish nationalism is not static in nature. Neither is the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. as a mode of a national identity, based on MuslimTurkishness. An analysis of the discourses of these political parties reveals the potential for transitivity among different versions of nationalism in the Turkish context. It is possible to argue that what Smith (2.003, pp. 31ff.) calls the "beliefsystem of 'nationalism in general'" can be observed in the discourses of all three political parties. Smith (2.003, pp. 31ff.) points to the transformation of this-worldly nationalism into a sacred discourse on "community, territory, history, and destiny." Within the scope of this chapter, however, Smith's

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analysis should be accompanied by Calhoun's argument on nationalism as providing the world of meaning for the discursive reproduction of the nation and nation-state. In this respect. all three parties' discourses evince the indispensability of Muslim hood for Turkishness and the Turkish nation-state. To sum up. the AKP, the BBP. and the MHP offer modal examples of different. at times converging, versions of this discursive formation at the "official" party level (Smith 2.003, p. 2.8). All three political parties resort not only to sentimental motifs but also to the "sacredness" of Turkish community, Turkish territory. Turkish history. and Turkish destiny, overtly or covertly. Likewise, they also converge in their appeals to Muslimhood as an ingredient of Turkishness. These political parties differ, however, in terms of their points of emphasis within the frame of the "belief-system of 'nationalism in general'" as well as in terms of the way they design the "sacredness" of the Turkish nation. Briefly, the AKP takes for granted that Muslimhood is a historical fact of the Turkish people and refers to the greatness of the Turks as an organic feature. In so doing, the party gives its nationalist discourse a liberal tone, by attributing liberal motifs to the "Turkish character." Thus the party's liberal outlook not only derives from its foreign policy preferences but also proves to be functional in its appeal to the nation. For the time being. the AKP's attempt at a synthesis between the sacralization and liberalization of the nationalist discourse can be seen as a manifestation of banal nationalism (Billig 1997 [I99S]). The MHP. in contrast, with its faith in Turkishness as the prior basis for the identity of the people and in Muslimhood as a historically integral part of this identity, presents an integral nationalist portrait. Finally, by referring to the nation as a "moral community of the faithful" and to the Turks as the "chosen people" of the Islamic cause, the BBP represents the pristine version of integral nationalism, seeming to identify the party with fascism (Smith 2003, p. 32.). The intricate relationship among these different forms of nationalism and hence the potential for transitivity might in this instance be observed in the seemingly confusing configuration of morality and faith in the discourses of the three political parties. While the AKP and the MHP institute the sacred dimension in Turkishness and take Muslimhood as the moral dimension, the BBP merges the morality and sacredness within Turkish-Islamic Idealism.

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NOTES

1.

It should be noted that attempts to carve out a Turkish nationalism that totally excludes Islam as an ingredient of national identity were especially visible in the foundation years of the Turkish Republic (192.3-45). In this respect, various versions of Turkish nationalism were proposed, ranging from formulas totally denying Islam to ethnic-based nationalism and territorial nationalism. The final choice was the version that considered Sunni Islam to be a component of Turkish identity, whereby Islam is taken as a passive component and/or is domesticated into the national identity. For a succinct account of the different facets of Turkish nationalism in the period, see YIldlz (2.001). 2.. In this study, I do not discuss the "inaccuracy" of the term "Turkish-Islamic synthesis;' which has been argued both by secularist academics and intellectuals on epistemological grounds and by the "Turkish-Islamic Idealists," now represented by the BBP. 3. This is not to say that Islam-especially its Sunni version-was left out of the official nationalist formula. Rather, until the 1980s. it had been considered a rather paSSive-though Significant-component of Turkish cultural identity. What marks the post-I980 period is that the incorporation ofIslam into Turkish nationalism has been political in character: not only as one of the ritual objects of nationalism but as a dominant ingredient in the shaping of the political discourse of nationalism. 4. For the role of the National Education System in this process, see Kaplan (2.005). 5. Bora (1999) points to a new version of"Protestantization ofIslam" in this specific configuration. 6. During its opposition days the AKP raised criticism of the governing ANAPMHP-Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party. DSP) coalition government's economic policies on the basis of the "unsuccessful management of economy" and total surrender to IMF policies (among others, see Gedikli 2.002.), 7. Ziya Oni~ (2.007, p. 2.54) points to the same decision as marking the beginning of a "new episode" in the AKP's approach to the EU. 8. Robins (2.007, p. 2.95) states that the number of opposing AKP members was around ninety. Despite this initial "no vote; a second parliamentary note was accepted on March 2.0, 2.003. reforging an aUiance with the United States in the Iraq War (<;andar 2.005). 9. According to bni§ (2.007, p. 2.49, note 6), the MHP is among the "defensive nationalist" political parties. 10. On the reasoning behind the compromising attitude of the MHP when in power. as explained by the chairperson, Bah~eli, see Oni§ (2.003. pp. 35ft).

Turkish Nationalism and Sunni Islam II.

12..

13.

14.

IS.

16.

17.

18.

195

On the parallelisms between the MHP's interest in the Turkic Republics and the Turkish-Islamic synthesis outlook. see Bora and Can (2.004. pp. 2.38-44). This version of Muslim-Turkishness clearly differs from National Outlook's version. which prioritizes Islamic ummah and takes the Turks as the "bosses" (Altan Tan. quoted in Atacan 2.005. p. 190). The term "Turkish-Islamic Idealist" is a direct reference to Aluned Arvasi. the founding father of the "Turkish-Islamic Ideal." In his book Turkish-Islamic Ideal. Arvasi portrays the world order (in the I970S) as being regulated by two "colonialist blocs." One of them is "black capitalist imperialism; and the other is '''red imperialism" with all its factions. The first pursues its conquest under the cloak of "multinational firms" and under the guise of "supporting and bringing freedom and civilization to less developed and developing people." while the second does so under the guise of "bringing freedom. independence. and justice to oppressed. exploited peoples" in the name of "the solidarity of the world proletariat" and starts "civil wars" with the slogan "class war" (Arvasi n.d .• p. 5; my translation). For the "illiberar nature of the new draft of the Law on Foundations. see the draft report prepared by Dilek Kurban (2.007). The AKP government has so far not taken steps to amend or annul article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. Instead it either put the responsibility on civil society organizations or did not consider the article a problem. On the indifferent attitude of the incumbent vice prime minister responsible for human rights, Abdullah Giil. toward the Prime Ministerial Advisory Board for Human Rights. see Kaboglu (2.005, 2.007). At this point one should note the parallelism in the articulation of Romandeism in liberal nationalism in the late nineteenth century (Hayes 1931. pp. mfr.)· At the time of writing, the whole text of the Draft Constitution of the AKP had not been publicized. There have been instances in which the first version prepared by a group of academics at the request of the AKP was discussed and hints about the AKP's draft. But the complete final version of the draft constitution is still unknown. On the relation between the Intellectuals' Hearth and the MHP. see Ankan (1998.PP·I2.3-17).

Here the MHP borrows from the article 66 of 1982. Constitution with a nuance. Whereas in the article the state is defined as Turkish. in the party's version the preferred term is "the State of Turkey" (Bah~eli 2.002.. p. 58. 2.006). 2.0. As an example. "Armenian seed" has been one of the most frequently used derogatory phrases in nationalist circles. including the MHP. The derogatory use of the term "Armenian" was also implicated in the verbal attacks at Hrant Dink after his publication in Agos of some accounts about the Armenian descent of 19.

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Sabiha Gokc;en, adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal Atadirk. The attackers were from the Istanbul Hearths of the Ideal. See Ba§lang1'i (lO07). 2.1. The denial was initially based on the prioritization ofIslam and instrumentalization of being born a Turk for the Islamic cause (ilay-: kelimetullah) (Bora and Can 1991, pp. 2.53-59). 2.2.. The term alperen, used for the identification of the BBP youth organized under uAlperen Hearths" (as the counterparts of the Gray Wolfs of the MHP), symbolizes both the ontological characteristics attributed to the Turks and the identification of Turkishness with Muslimhood: while alp connotes heroism, fortitude, and bravery, eren connotes holiness, saintliness. 2.3. Note that the widespread, and rather traditionalized, reference to the phrase "99.9% of people living in Turkeyax'c Muslims" as a fact is replaced by "the people, who are all Muslims." 24. In the line of argument voiced by the BBP, the Armenian and Kurdish issues are portrayed as historical moments of the imperialistic aims of foreign/Western powers. It is assumed that just as the Armenians were seduced during the late Ottoman era the Kurds are currently faced with the threat of seduction by the foreign powers. See YazlclOglu's speech in the panel on "Kiiresel Giic;:lerin K.!skacmdaki Ermeniler ve Tarihi Gerc;:ekler" organized by the Birlik Akademisi of the BBP: http://www.bbpsivas.net/haberoku216/ermeni-kurt-sorunu. 2.s. In this respect, see, for example, http://www.a1perenocaklari.net, http://www. alperenturk.com, http://www.yusufiye.net, http://www.uikuocagi.net. and http://www.milliyetciforum.com.

PART III

Kurdish Nationalism

9

DOES KURDISH NATIONALISM HAVE A NAVEL?

HAKAN OZOGLU

THEORIG[N OF KURDISH NATIONALISM IS DESTINED TO CREATE

much controversy among many people who judge the question from the arigleof legitimacy. However, questioning the origins and the genealogy of KurdIsh nationalism should not be seen as an attempt to delegitimize it. It is, infact,ac:ritique of the imprecision or vagueness of nationalism in general. lllthiscontext, the present research seeks answers to two main questions. First, when did Kurdish nationalism emerge as a political movement? Secorid, what is the relationship between Kurdish nationalism and the "past"itt other w~rds, what type of connection did Kurdish nationalism have with the."past"when it emerged? Let me immediately respond to these questions. First;thischapter proposes that Kurdish nationalism originated from the unstable political environment created by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War 1. Second, Kurdish nationalism, like most nationalisms,didliot necessarily have an organic link with previous times. These concl~sions clearly contradict political positions suggesting that history has alwaysbeenabattleground for ethnic groups to realize their self-government . and thati"n
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would mean that it does not have credibility or legitimacy. Lest I be misunderstood, this chapter does not question the credibility of Kurdish nationalism. I do suggest, however, that the correct dating of Kurdish nationalism and the question of the link with the past have greater implications. . In order to provide a larger perspective for my arguments, I would first like to refer to a very stimulating debate on the origin of nationalism that took place on October 2.4, 1995, on the campus of Warwick University. The debaters on the panel were Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner. Smith is a well-known critic of the modernist school. He is also the student of late Ernest Gellner, a modernist himself Gellner is known for his stan~e not only against the primordialist school of nationalism but more significantly against the pOSition that categorizes nationalism as a premodern concept. The issue discussed at the Warwick Debates is quite relevant to the argument of this chapter. In the Warwick Debates the two scholars presented their views on the origins of nationalism in a very concise yet eloquent way. In his opening remarks, Anthony Smith pointed out the heart of the issue under consideration: the relationship between nationalisms and the past. Before presenting his view, Smith summarized Gellner's general position on the subject: [T]he nation is not only relatively recent; it is also the product of specifically modern conditions-those of early industrialism or its anticipations, social mobility, the need for mass literacy, public education and the like. It is the modern transition from spontaneous, non-literate "low" cultures to highly cultivated, literate and specialized "high" cultures that engenders nationalism and nations. (Smith 1996, p. 359)' Acknowledging the validity of this statement, Smith responded by claiming that it tells only half the story. The connection with the past was the missing part. In order to demonstrate his point, Smith offered his definition of nationalism: By "nationalism" I shall mean an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance oj autonomy, unity and identity oj a human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential "nation." A "nation" in turn I shall define as a named human

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population sharing an historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members. (Smith 1996, p. 359; emphasis in the original) After this definition, Smith went into describing some modernists as being "materialists" and warned that this line of thinking should not lead us to categorize nationalism as imagined or fabricated. In fact, he suggested. "nations and nationalisms are also the products of preexisting traditions and heritages which have coalesced over the generations" (Smith 1996. p. 361). Hence Smith's main disagreement with the modernists comes from the claim that modernists disregard the role of the past. Modern political nationalisms cannot be understood without reference to these earlier ethnic ties and memories. and, in some cases, to pre-modern ethnic identities and communities. I do not wish to assert that every modern nation must be founded on some antecedent ethnic ties. let alone a definite ethnic community; but many such nations have been and are based on these [preexisting] ties. (Smith 1996, p. 361) Smith bases his claim on the link with the past on ethnie, a term that he introduced to modern scholarship. Smith claims that ethnic does not carry ethnic or racial connotations; it refers only to dimensions such as a common myth of descent, a shared history, a collective name, and a distinctive shared culture. Hence nationalists are in fact "political archaeologists" trying to construct a nation by rediscovering and reinterpreting the past in order to reconstitute the community as a modern nation: [The task of nationalists] is indeed selective-they forget as well as remember the past-but to succeed in their task they must meet certain criteria. Their interpretations must be consonant not only with the ideological demands of nationalism, but also scientific evidence, popular resonance and patterning of particular ethnohistories. (Smith 1995> p. 16) Smith does not see the modern nation existing throughout history, yet he believes that the major ingredients that paved the way to modern nationalisms were present in history. In other words, perhaps the whole essence of the

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nation was not present, but essential traits existed. Thus the task of nationalists is nothing but to assemble these fragmentary essences into modern nations. It is this position that emphasizes the elements existing in history and hence the link with the past that Ernest Gellner rejects. . In his response to his student Smith, Ernest Gellner clarified the disagreement: [T]he dividing line between what I now call primordialists and modernists, where one side says that nations were there all the time or some of them were anyway, and that the past matters a great deal; and where the modernists like myself believe that the world was created round about the end of the eighteenth century, and nothing before that makes the slightest difference to the issues we face. (Gellner 1996, p. 366) At this point, Gellner posed a significant question about whether nations were created at some point or rather evolved into what they are today. To elaborate on his position, he introduced a powerful analogy and asked: did Adam have a navel? The case in point is that Adam did not need a navel. "It's perfectly possible to imagine a navel-less Adam;' he suggested, "because navels, once they were engendered by the original process by which they were engendered, perform no further function. I mean you could live navel-less and there is no problem" (Gellner 1996, p. 367). Other parts of Adam, however, such as his blood circulation or his food consumption or his breathing, had to be created as if they existed before, so that he could survive. Here Gellner hinted with his analogy that the existence of certain developed organic systems does not prove that Adam was not created at a certain time. For Adam to survive, they had to be created in "a misleading way" that may project the idea that they evolved to that stage. Using the Adam analogy on nations to demonstrate the irrelevance of the past, Gellner stated: [O]n the whole the ethnic, the cultural national community, which is such an important part of Anthony's case, is rather like the navel. Some nations have it and some don't and in any case it is inessential. What in a way Anthony is saying is that he is anti-creationist and we have this

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plethora of navels and they are essential, as he said, and this I think is the crux of the issue between him and me. (Gellner 1996, p. 367)

In other words, Gellner trivialized Smith's term ethnie by comparing it to the navel, whose existence is not vital for the creation of a nation. In this chapter I am more concerned with Gellner's contention that some nations have navels and some do not and in any case having a navel (read as the link with the past) is inessential. This intellectual position raises more specific questions. Does Kurdish nationalism have a navel? Is it essential for Kurdish nationalism to have a navel? As I have argued elsewhere, my reading of Kurdish nationalism fits better with the modernist school, for I suggest that Kurdish nationalism was created at the end of World War I (Ozoglu 2004; see particularly chapter 4). At that stage it did not need a navel, for its relation with the past was "unnatural:' as I explain below. A significant distinction must be made here to clarify my position. I claim that Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalism are like two adopted brothers. They are related in the context of their adopted family, but they do not necessarily have a biological bond with each other. In other words, Kurdish identity and nationalism do not share the same genealogy. In this context, we can state with a degree of confidence that Kurdish nationalism did not have a navel but Kurdish identity or Kurdishness did indeed have one (see the discussion below). Kurdish identity has evolved in time into what it is today. So the link with the distant past in determining group identity exists. This link is not predetermined, however; on the contrary, its development to a certain direction is accidental, affected by external forces in the course of history. Kurdish nationalism, in contrast, was created at a certain point in history that coincides with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It was created based on the political realities ofits time and on a blurry snapshot of Kurdish identity at that moment. As noted above, it did not have a navel. At the present, however, the political realities of the world make it almost mandatory that children of Kurdish nationalism imagine such a navel, without which Kurdish nationalism is conceived as illegitimate. Let me repeat lest my point be misunderstood. My attempt to demonstrate the createdness of Kurdish nationalism does not mean labeling Kurdish nationalism as illegitimate. I think of all nationalisms as navel-less.

204

Hakan 6zoglu THE GENEALOGY OF KURDISH IDENTITY

As noted above, a common mistake among those who emphasize the link between nationalism and the past is the confusion prevalent in distinguishing collective identity from nationalism .. Anthony Smith's ethnie, which emphasizes the role of the past, would fit better in the concept of group identity than nationalism. Critics may argue that the link with the past is a valid one because nationalism bases itself upon group identity. But I submit that nationalists most often ignore such an evolution or mutation, fearing that accepting this would potentially harm its legitimacy. Instead they attempt to "imagine" a group with a unique essence that persists throughout the ages. Nationalists often take an intentionally blurry snapshot of a group at a certain moment and claim the existence of this unique group and their struggle for self-determination persisting throughout history. What evolves in fact is not nationalism but group identity. At this point let me try to demonstrate the evolution of Kurdish identity. My assumption in this chapter is that Kurdish identity is not rigid and has gone through several overlapping stages of evolution.' These stages are dialectical, dialogical, and monological in nature. I further suggest that in all these stages the overarching assumption is that Kurdish identity evolves in relation to an exterior force. Elsewhere I have examined the interrelation between Kurdish identity and surrounding strong states and Islam (6zoglu 2.004 and 2.006). In what follows, I summarize my points regarding the Kurdish identity formation. The dialectical interaction is a process in which local identities clash with outside forces and the synthesis is a step forward in the evolution of Kurdish identity. The interaction between Kurdish identity and the Ottoman Empire is a case in point. This Hegelian view can readily be demonstrated in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Kurdish/Ottoman (later Turkish) interactions. Substantial evidence suggests that as the clashes took place between the Kurds and the state, Kurdish identity reached a new level to accommodate larger groups, such as non-Muslim Kurdish speakers and groups such as the Zazas in Central Anatolia and the Lurs of Iran. This form of evolution, however, cannot be extrapolated to earlier periods. For example, we can speak of a voluntary interaction between the Kurdish identity and external forces. This state is called the dialogical interaction and can be defined more as a communication than as a clash. In some cases

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the difference between the dialogical and dialectical interaction is a matter of perception. Ottoman/Kurdish relations until the mid-nineteenth century, when the empire introduced more centralization policies, can be regarded as an example. During this time Kurdish principalities were mainly autonomous, and Kurdish identity was influenced by the empire's general perception of its Muslim subjects. As the members of the Muslim ruling elite, Kurdish leaders emphasized their religious identity that united them with the state based upon their linguistic background. It must be evident to the reader that I have avoided employing the term "ethnic" and preferred "linguistic." The main reason for this is that ethnicity was not a common denominator for the groups at the time. Even though today we retrospectively label human groups based on ethnicity, another highly elusive term, sufficient evidence demonstrates that prior to the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries ethnicity was not a group identity around which the members gathered in the Ottoman Empire.

In the formation and evolution of the group identity, another level exists that has been mostly ignored for a variety of reasons. I call this the monological process. When compared to the dialectical and dialogical, this process is very distinct. In this stage, external forces-the Ottoman Empire or Islam in the Kurdish case-impose a certain identity on the group, with minimal interaction. The term "Kurd" as a distinct group was introduced and defined, however imperfectly, by outsiders in earlier texts, which indicates the validity of this claim. Many scholars have argued that attempts to connect the present-day Kurds to ancient people of Mesopotamia (such as Medes or Kardu) lack substance and credibility. I have suggested that an examination of Kurdish identity should begin with historical records that speak of a group of people as the Kurds. We are not certain as to who introduced the term "Kurd" as a group identity. We know, however, that the earliest available record by a Kurd that talks about Kurds as a cohesive group comes from the sixteenth century. This book, titled $erefnamc) was written by the Kurdish tribal leader ~erefhan (1990) and clearly shows a perception of Kurds as a distinct group. Although ~erefhan's understanding of "Kurd" does not entirely match what the term means today, it still is an invaluable source for the students of Kurdish identity and nationalism. It tells us what the term "Kurd" as a group identity meant to him. We can trace the evolution of a perception from this point onward.

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The reader must be wamed that the term "Kurd" was in circulation centuries before ~erefhan. The earliest reliable source referring to a group of people as the Kurds comes with the Arab invasion of the area in the seventh century. Arab travelers and geographers made use of the term as a group identity without any dear definition. In other words. the term "Kurd" was in circulation as a group identity 900 years prior to ~erefhan. But we have no evidence prior to the sixteenth century that Kurds saw themselves as a distinct group above the tribal level. This lack of evidence allows me to suggest that a group identity was first imagined and then imposed on them by outsiders. Kurds were imagined by outsiders as a distinct and cohesive social (not necessarily political) unit. I therefore suggest that at this earlier stage Kurdish identity stemmed from the monological process in which outsiders imposed their perception on the local groups. In time. this perception was adopted by those who were labeled as such. In the long journey of Kurdish identity formation, dialectical. dialogical, and monological stages most often overlapped. The perception of who the Kurds were was constantly altered, modified. and mutated. Still, no matter how different the Kurdish identity today may be compared to that of the seventh. sixteenth, or eighteenth centuries, they are interconnected and the link with the past does exist. Can we say the same thing for Kurdish nationalism?

THE GENEALOGY OF KURDISH NATIONALISM

One of the greatest challenges to tracing the genealogy of Kurdish nationalism is the lack of a universal definition for the concept of nationalism. The term no doubt provokes different meanings in different people's minds. Nationalism, like most social terms, is very problematic. To date, no consensus exists among scholars as to what constitutes a nation and what defines nationalism. Hence serious scholars-although amazed at the effects of nationalism on the human imagination-are challenged by the ambiguous nature

ofit. It should be noted that variable definitions of the term are also among the greatest assets of nationalism. This inadvertent flexibility provides nationalism with ideological compatibility. The term's variant meanings make nationalism seem compatible even with contradictory ideologies such as socialism, religion, secessionism, imperialism, anticolonialism, and fascism. Such a high

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degree of adaptability. unfortunately. does not allow a universal definition that both provides a scholarly ground for comparison and at the same time complies with indigenous variations. The definition of Kurdish nationalism is not immune to the confusion stemming from the vague nature of the term "nationalism." Like other nationalisms, Kurdish nationalism is extremely difficult to define because it registers different meanings in people's minds. As hard as it is to offer a satisfactory definition of Kurdish nationalism. however, I am obliged at least to offer the following working definition. "Kurdish nationalism" refers to an intellectual and political movement that is based mainly (though not entirely) upon two premises-the belief in a consistent Kurdish identity, which is rooted in ancient history; and the conviction of an unalienable right of self-determination in a historic Kurdish homeland or territory. It is important to repeat that this study recognizes Kurdish nationalism as a political movement, not as a claim by an individual for self-determination in a territory. This definition excludes historical evidence indicating the existence of Kurdish consciousness as a proof for nationalism. Let us look at some historical documents by the Kurds that can readUy be confused with nationalism.

THE NATIONALIST DIMENSION OF AHMED-I HANI IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The first example of such literature is the well-known epic Mem-u Zin, written by Ahmed-i Hani (Ehmede Xani, b. 1651), a Kurdish man of religion and poet. In his work, Ahmed-i Hani demonstrates a clear group consciousness when he distinguishes the Kurds from Arabs, Turks, and Iranians. In a section titled "Derde Me" (Our Ills) in Mem-u Zin, which was completed in

1695, he writes: If only there were harmony among us, If we were to obey a single one of us, He would reduce to vassalage Turks, Arabs and Persians. all of them. We would perfect our religion, our state, and would educate ourselves in learning and wisdom. (van Bruinessen 1992., p. 2.67)

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Inspired by the epic Meme Alan, transmitted orally in the region, Ahmed-i Hani's epic is in the form of a love story between Mem and Zin, with the exception of the section mentioned above. By virtue of this section and being written in the Kurmanci dialect of Kurdish, Ahmed-i Hani's Mem-u Zin is regarded as the "national epic of the Kurds" by present-day Kurdish nationalists. This section does treat the Kurds as a tribal confederation and, more importantly, seeks self-rule for them. The section "Our Wills" contains many references to the Kurds. Ahmed-i Hani seems to use "Kurd" and "al-Akrad" (its Arabic plural) interchangeably with "KUI:manci:' a sublinguistic group in Kurdish society. This clearly testifies that he regarded the Kurmanci speakers as Kurds; yet it is not very clear whether he regarded other groups such as the Zazas, Lurs, or Kelhurs as Kurds. Unlike the $erefoame, Mem-u Zin does not mention any of the other subgroups or categorize them as Kurds. Nor does Ahmed-i Hani explicitly define "Kurdistan:' His account rather implicitly describes it as a region lying in the middle of Persian (Ajam), Ottoman (Rum), Arab, and Georgian (Giircii) lands (Ahrned-i Hani 1975, p. S6). Did the word "Kurd" mean only the Kurmanci speakers for Ahmed-i Hani, living among the above-mentioned groups? This was indisputably not the understanding of the Kurds in the twentieth century, which was inclusive. But no available information indicates that Ahmed-i Hani's definitjon incorporated other linguistic groups within the umbrella of the Kurds. Hence his perception of the

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Kurdish society may not have coincided with that of the twentieth-century writers. The quantity of surviving copies makes it clear that Mem-u Zin was read widely in Kurdistan in later times and that manuscripts were copied by local religious leaders (imams and mullahs ofKurmanci origin) and by Sufi tariqas (van Bruinessen 1992, p. 267). We simply have no information, however, on how many people read Ahmed-i Hani's version of the epic and what messages they received from it. Mem-u Zin was written in verse, which made it easier to memorize, and was undoubtedly a very popular story. But it is unclear whether Mem-u Zin's continuing popularity stems from its love story or from its protest against Persian and Ottoman misrule. What is indisputable is that in the twentieth century the epic took pride of place in Kurdish literature as the first manifestation of Kurdish nationalism. Nonetheless, it is misleading to label Mem-u Zin as nationalist literature. For one thing, it is highly unlikely that Ahmed-i Hani sought a nation-state for the Kurds as we recognize them today. His complaints about the Safavid or Ottoman rule and his desire for a Kurdish (Kurmanci) king do not necessarily prove that Kurdish nationalism as a political movement existed in the seventeenth century. Our knowledge is too incomplete to make such a claim by merely interpreting Ahmed-i Hani's resentment of the Ottoman and Persian rule. In fact, only after the penetration of the Western concept of nationalism into the Kurdish community early in the twentieth century did Mem-u Zin become a monument of nationalist literature for the Kurds and mobilize them politically. In the seventeenth century Ahmed-i Hani possibly concerned himself only with the Kurmanci speakers; hence his perception of the Kurds consisted mainly of the tribal Kurmancis. Consequently, it is not the epic but the political and the intellectual environment of the twentieth century that retrospectively qualified this piece ofliterature as nationalist. Therefore it is safe to state that the genealogy of Kurdish nationalism does not go as far back as the seventeenth century.

BEDIRHAN PASHA AND HIS REVOLT OF 1847

Another Significant character in the discussions on the origin of Kurdish nationalism is Bedirhan Pasha (1802/3-1869170), who became the ruler of Botan in 1835 and controlled this strong emirate in the first half of the

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nineteenth century. His revolt of 1847 is considered nationalist by many Kurds. A loyal subject until 1842., Bedirhan seemed very agitated by the new Ottoman administrative policies in the following five years and revolted against the Ottoman state in the summer of 1847.4 Provoked by the centralization policies of the empire in the Tanzimat period, this revolt caused so much chaos in the region that when it was suppressed on July 2.9, 1847, a new medal (the Medal of Kurdistan) was issued to those who had fought against Bedirhan. As noted above, the significance of Bedirhan and his revolt comes from later Kurdish claims that it was a nationalist uprising. But Nazmi Sevgen, in a study on the Bedirhan family, has uncovered several Ottoman documents to demonstrate that this revolt was not nationalistic. The Ottoman archives indicate that Bedirhan's revolt did not stem from nationalism in any real sense of the term but from a new administrative system enforced by the Ottoman central government aimed at dividing Bedirhan's land and weakening his authority. According to the new system, Botan (the emirate's core territory) remained in the Diyarbaktr province, while Cizre (a subdistrict) was attached to Mosul. whose governor, Mehmet Pasha, was at odds with Bedirhan. A letter dated December 10, 1842., from the governor of Diyarbaktr, Vecihi Pasha. to Bedirhan demonstrates this arrangement: We have heard that there exists disharmony and quarrelsomeness between you and the governor of Mosul, Mehmet Pasha, stemming from the attachment of Cizre district to Mosul, and that you are full of anxiety [vesvese] ..•• As long as you serve and stay loyal to the Ottoman state, Mehmet Pasha cannot do you harm. The matter was referred to Istanbul and to the governor of Mosul, Mehmet Pasha. Hence you should be free from such anxiety. (Sevgen 1982, pp. 72-73)5 As this document indicates. Bedirhan was agitated at the attempt to divide his emirate administratively. Similar letters in the Ottoman archives conclusively demonstrate that Bedirhan revolted to keep his emirate administratively intact. His revolt does not have any expressed nationalistic aim. Therefore it should not be referred to as the origin of Kurdish nationalism.

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Prior to 1847 Bedirhan was loyal to the Ottomans and helped local governors to govern the Kurdish land. This made him a well-known and respected figure in the Ottoman provincial administrative structure. Thus it should not be very surprising that even after his revolt was suppressed Bedirhan was not condemned to death but placed on the Ottoman payroll. Immediately after the revolt, Bedirhan was sent to Istanbul, where he arrived on September 12, 1847, and died in Damascus, Syria, in 1869-70.

THE SAYYID UBEYDULLAH REVOLT OF 1880-81

The Sayyid Ubcydullah revolt is another event that has been regarded as the first Kurdish nationalist movement. Therefore we need to examine the nationalistic dimensions of this revolt. Ubeydullah was a member of the ~emdinan family, which proved to be one of the most influential and politically active Kurdish families in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although it only became visible to the European powers in the second half of the 1880s, this family had enjoyed high prestige (particularly in the Hakkari region) due to its religious genealogy prior to the nineteenth century. Its silsita (spiritual genealogy) is that of the Khalidiyya branch of the Naqshbandi tariqa, and the family traces its origin back to Abd aI-Qadir Gilani, a twelfth-century Baghdadi mystic and the founder of the Qadiri order. The ancestry of the ~emdinans extends to the Prophet himself through his daughter Fatima. With such a pedigree, the ~emdinans were spiritual leaders oflocal communities and advisors of Kurdish emirs, which apparently generated the necessary income to be a great land-owning family. The ~emdinans emerged as political and military leaders of the Kurds in the second half of the nineteenth century and controlled a vast region in southeast Anatolia and northwest Iran. The rise of the ~emdinan family headed by Sayyid Ubeydullah in the 1870S and 1880s marks an important era in which political power changed hands from tribal leaders to the Naqshbandi ~emdinan family. Until this time, the Sufi sheikhs generally had functioned under tribal leaders as spiritual advisors. Although Naqshbandi sheikhs had personal charisma and enjoyed intertribal influence, the political history of the region confirms that in addition to their religious duties they became political or military leaders with the rise of the ~emdinan family. Ubeydullah seems to be one of the first examples of such leadership.

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Several reasons seem to explain the rise of Ubeydullah. The most important is the power vacuum created by the destruction of Kurdish tribal leadership in the nineteenth century. Desperate for income to compete with the European powers. Sultan Mahmut II (1808-39) initiated a centralizing policy to collect taxes directly from the areas controlled by local rulers. The Kurdish leadership in Kurdistan consisted mainly of tribal chiefs who ruled over vast areas while paying only lip service to Istanbul. The most notable of these tribal confederacies in the Ottoman Empire were the Botan. Baban, and Hakkari. who competed with one another. After a series of military expeditions. the Ottoman state dismantled the authority of these powerful tribes in the first half of the nineteenth century. As mentioned above, the Bedirhan family was removed from power in the last semi-independent emirate, Botan. in 1847. From this time until the outbreak of the Turco-Russian war of 1877-78, there is no record of a powerful Kurdish leader in the region. In the aftermath of this brutal war, which paralyzed the area, Sayyid Ubeydullah of ~emdinan filled the political and military power vacuum and assumed Kurdish leadership not only in most of Ottoman Kurdistan but also in Iran. Primary sources indicate the power of Sayyid Ubeydullah in 1880, when he led an uprising against Qajar Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Seemingly concerned with the well-being of the Christian (mainly Armenian and Nestorian) population,in the region, Britain monitored the uprising closely (Parliamentary Papers 1881, 5:1-82). British correspondence confirms that Ubeydullah was the paramount chief of the Kurds in 1880, and his political control extended over a vast region that was formerly controlled by the Botan. Bahdinan, Hakkari, and Ardalan confederacies. It seems that the main reason for the revolt was the promise made to Armenians after the signing of the Treaty of Berlin on July 13, 1878, by the OttOman Empire. The treaty stipulated that the Sublime Porte would undertake all necessary steps to protect Armenians against the Circassians and the Kurds (article 61). To show his dissatisfaction with ,the treaty. in July r880 Ubeydullah warned Tosun Pasha. the mutasarrif(governor of a subdivision) of Ba~kale: "What is this I hear, that the Armenians are going to have an independent state in Van. and that the Nestorians are going to hoist the British flag and declare themselves British subjects? I will never permit it, even if I have to arm the women" (Parliamentary Papers 1881. 5:7).6

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Thus Wadie Jwaideh (1960, p. 2.31), the author of a comprehensive study on the Kurds, is correct when he states that "fear of the Armenian ascendancy in Kurdistan appears to have been one of the most powerful reasons behind [Ubeydullah's] attempt to unite the Kurds" and lead them to revolt. It should be added, however, that Ubeydullah also publicly presented his movement as an attempt to restore law and order in the region and sought the support of the Christians against the Persian and Ottoman states. Ubeydullah complained that these two states had done nothing tei stop the aggression of rival Kurdish tribes: the Shekak of Persia and the Herki of the Ottoman Empire. To achieve this aim, for a short time local Christians (Nestorians) provided him with military support (Parliamentary Papers 1881, 5:74),7 Hoping to enforce law and order in the area where he had ambitions to rule and where the Armenians were receiving support for self-rule from the British and French, Ubeydullah invaded the northwestern territories of the Qajar state in September 1880, expanding his sphere of control in the Persian territories. But Ubeydullah's militia, consisting mainly of Kurdish tribesmen, was easily defeated by the Qajars. Upon his return to the Ottoman territories, Ubeydullah surrendered to the Ottoman authorities in early 1881. They exiled him to Istanbul and then to Hijaz, where he died in 1883. The Ubeydullah revolt is important not only because it demonstrates the emergence of new political leadership in Kurdistan but, more importantly, because some students of Kurdish nationalism identify this revolt as the origin of the Kurdish nationalist struggle. They say this because the sheikh had demanded a Kurdish state (independent or autonomous) governed by himself British documents seem to attest that Ubeydullah from time to time entertained the idea of separation from the Ottoman and Persian empires. Ronald Thomson, a British officer in Tehran, wrote in a letter in October 1881: The Sheikh ... states that he and all the Kurdish Chiefs are now agreed as to necessity of establishing a united Kurdistan [emphasis added] in order that they may be in a position to manage their own affairs without the interference of either Turkish or Persian authorities .... There seems to be no doubt from ... the proclamations and correspondence which [Ubeydullah] has lately sent to various Kurdish Chiefs along the lines of the Persian border that his design is to detach the entire

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Kurdish population from their allegiance to Turkey and Persia and to establish under his own authority a separate autonomous Principality.

(Parliamentary Papers 1881, 5:45)8 The most convincing evidence of Ubeydullah's "nationalist" aim comes from a letter that he himself supposedly wrote. In a letter to Dr. Cochran, an American missionary in the Hakkari region, Sayyid Ubeydullah stated: The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their religion is different [from that of others], and their laws and customs distinct .... We are also a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our hands, so that in the punishment of our own offenders we may be strong and independent, and have privileges like other nations.... This is our object [for the revolt] .... Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands, as they are unable to put up with these continual evil deeds, and the oppression, which they suffer at the hands of the [Persian and Ottoman] governments.

(Parliamentary Papers 1881, 5:47-48)9 The question of the intended meaning of the phrase "Kurdish nation" immediately arises. Unfortunately, we do not know what word the sheikh used that was rendered as "nation" by the translators or possibly by Cochran himself It is not only possible but also probable that Ubeydullah, a Naqshbandi sheikh, did not know the explosive meaning of the word "nation" or at least that the word did not mean the same thing to him that it did to Cochran. Therefore caution should be exercised in draWing any conclusions about the nationalist intention ofUbeydullah based on this text. Relying on the aforementioned letter to demonstrate the secessionist fervor of Ubeydullah, some scholars state that Ubeydullah's statement "certainly leaves no doubt as to his strong nationalist sen~iment)J (Jwaideh 1960, p. 'J.'J.7). But other primary sources contain confusing, if not contradictory, evidence about the nature ofUbeydullah's secessionist aim. A good example of this can be found in a letter written by Major Henry Trotter, the British consul-general in Erzurum, in October 1880: "I believe the Sheikh to be more or less personally loyal to the Sultan; and he would be ready to submit to his authority and pay him tribute as long as he could get rid of the

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Ottoman officials, and be looked at de lege as well as de jacto as the ruling Chief of Kurdistan" (Parliamentary Papers 1881, 5:17).'0 As demonstrated in this excerpt, primary sources do not consistently testify that Sayyid Ubeydullah's movement was secessionist. Was it even nationalist? Ubeydullah entertained the idea of an independent principality, yet he was ready to settle for the recognition of his authority in Kurdistan within the Ottoman state. He wanted to be the ruler of a principality similar to those of the earlier Kurdish emirates but greater in its territory to match his influence in the region. Ubeydullah's aim to rule a Kurdish principality similar to that of Bedirhan is evident in an earlier British report (July II, 1880) to Henry Trotter from Emilius Clayton, the vice-consul of Van: "The Sheikh [Ubeydullah] was going to send his son to Constantinople with the following proposal. He will point out the large sum paid to the Sultan by Beder Khan Bey, when semiindependent, and will offer to pay a still larger sum ifhis authority over Kurdistan is recognized, and his rule is not interfered with" {Parliamentary Papers 1881,5:17, p. 7 ).ll

Although Sayyid Ubeydullah wanted to be the ruler of Greater Kurdistan and the present scholarship retrospectively labels him a nationalist, it seems very unlikely that the participants (who at one point included some Nestorian Christians) in his revolt were motivated by nationalist designs. This revolt can simply be seen as Sayyid Ubeydullah's demand for greater control in the region; however, it undoubtedly provided the Kurdish nationalist movements in the twentieth century with the symbol for a struggle against a dominant state. The Ubeydullah revolt of 1880-81 seems more like an intertribal revolt than a national one. With his religiOUS appeal as a Naqshbandi sheikh, Sayyid Ubeydullah's authority transcended the tribal boundaries. Either directly or through his khalifas (deputies), he spread his influence over a vast area where the Kurds were divided by their tribal loyalties but united by their respect to Sayyid Ubeydullah. When Sayyid Ubeydullah called for an uprising in 1880, he thus enjoyed remarkable support from the members of the local tribes and was able to exercise political authority over a large territory that included formally powerful Kurdish emirates. These Kurdish revolts resulted in the exile of Kurdish leaders to Istanbul, where Kurdish notable families interacted with one another with much greater frequency than before. The cultural, political, and intellectual

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atmosphere of the Ottoman Empire that arose with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 also provided Kurdish notables ofIstanbul with a rare occasion to establish cultural and later political organizations that gave birth to Kurdc ish nationalism. From the declaration of the Second Constitutional Period of 1908 to the end of World War I in 1918, the Kurds formed several societies, a majority of which stopped short of making political demands. They could not go beyond functioning essentially as cultural clubs for the Kurdish nobility. Therefore, although these pre-1918 Kurdish societies were the prime example of the Kurdish cultural effiorescence, they should not be seen as nationalist organizations. Political organizations that pursued an openly nationalist agenda emerged only at the end of World War I.

FROM KTTC TO KTC: THE EMERGENCE OF KURDISH NATIONALISM

These post-World War I organizations followed a distinct nationalist program and called for Kurdish self-determination. To highlight this ideological shift, this section discusses two significant Kurdish societies representing the cultural and political Kurdish organizations. The Kurdish organization Kiirdistan Teaviin ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Society for Mutual Aid and Progress of Kurd is tan, KTTC) emerged in 1908. This organization was governed by the children of Ubeydullah and Bedirhan and was based in Istanbul. Although it was Kurdish, the KTTC was not nationalist, as clearly indicated in its constitution: A beneficial society [cem.ryet-i hayr.rye] by the name of Kiirdistan Teaviin ve Terakki Cemiyeti has been established to consolidate Kurdish ties [revabtt] with [the Ottoman state] while protecting the Constitution [Me~rutiyet] as the only way for progress and explaining to those Kurds who are not aware of the virtues of the Constitution [Kanun-u Esasi] that it is responsible for the happiness of the people and also compatible with the great rules of Islam. [It shall] protect the high esteem [mubeccele] of being an Ottoman and strengthen the relations with the Armenian, Nasturi, and other citizens of the OttOman Empire. [It shall also seek] solutions to the problems among the tribes and confederacies [kabail ve tlfair] by uniting them [and it shall]

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encourage commerce, agriculture, and education. (Kurdistan Terakki ve Teavun Cemiyeti Nizamnamesi n.d.)" Obviously, this was very carefully worded to reiterate the position of the Kurds as an inseparable part of the Ottoman Empire; the Kurds, it implied, did not pursue secessionist or even autonomist policies. This passage may also indicate, however, that by desiring unification of the Kurdish tribes the KTTC wanted to represent Kurds at large in Istanbul; hence it wished to obtain more political leverage from the government. As the Ottoman Empire entered World War I and its demise became imminent, this Kurdish society was replaced by another: the Kiirdistan Teali Cemiyeti (Society for the Advancement of Kurdis tan, KTC). The most significant aspect of the KTC was that it followed a distinct nationalist line and was involved in political activities for Kurdish self-determination. Another telling aspect of the formation of the KTC is that its leadership consisted almost entirely of members of the KTTC. Let us examine this first Kurdish nationalist organization in more detail. The Mudros Armistice, Signed on October 30, 1918, between the Ottoman Empire and the victorious Allied powers, was a death sentence for the empire. The elite group in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) escaped from the empire, but secondary members of the party were arrested and exiled to Malta. The empire was in complete disarray. Meanwhile, Woodrow Wilson declared his Fourteen Points, which recommended political selfdetermination for all ethnic minorities. It is against this background that the KTC was established on December 17, 1918, approximately one and a half months after the Mudros Armistice. The founders of the KTC were the same Kurdish notables prominent in the earlier Kurdish organizations. The constitution of the KTC states that the purpose of the society is to ensure the general well-being of the Kurds (article 1).1> Article 4 states that the responsibUity of the administration (heyet-i istifare) is to work toward the advancement of Kurdistan and the Kurdish people (Kurt kavmi). Contrary to the KTTC's constitution, the political position of the KTC in the Ottoman Empire is left unclear. We do not know if this ambiguity was meant to disguise its nationalist aim or if the society originally did not develop a clear nationalist program. The KTC leaders chose to establish the society legally

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and to function within the Ottoman context, which might suggest the latter, but it is impossible to know because of the lack of information. Soon, however, the KTC was actively involved in creating a form of Kurdish identity not as part of Ottoman identity but separate from it. If its constitution does not state that the KTC is a Kurdish nationalist organization, its subsequent activities and publications definitely attest to this. The best evidence comes from the newspaper jin, which published many articles that were unmistakably nationalist propaganda. For example, in one article Siverekli Hilmi addresses Kurdish youth: "The time of following others is past .... Work only for your own people. Do not forget that we have a language of our own, however neglected, and a rich history. Here you have a formula for independence: action and initiative" (Bozarslan 1988, vol. 2,

p.4 01 ). In addition, the political activities of the KTC members confirm that the KTC sought international assistance for its nationalist deSigns. For example, on August 4, 1919, the executive committee of the KTC visited the American, French, and British representatives in Istanbul to explain Kurdish nationalist aspirations in the empire. Zinar SHopi (Kadri Cemilpa~a) states: The KTC leaders visited American, British, and French representatives in Istanbul and argued for the national rights of the Kurdish people. In a meeting with the American representative, Sayyid Abdulkadir, Emin Ali Bedirhan, Said Nursi, and Dr. Mehmet Bey pointed out the boundaries of Kurdistan on the map and asked for alliance on the sea. Upon the reply of the American representative indicating the U.S. intention to create an independent Armenia at the expense ofland called Kurdistan, Said Nursi responded, "IfKul'distan had a seacoast, you would destroy it with your naval power; but you cannot enforce such a decision in the mountains of Kurdistan." (Silopi 1991,p. 57) The threat of an independent Armenian state in Kurdistan seemed to validate the KTC activities in the eyes of the Ottoman government, because the Kurds had always been seen as a balancing power in the region against any Armenian threat to the empire's territorial integrity. Moreover, until 1919 the Ottoman governments were not terribly bothered by Kurdish political activities. The Damat Ferit Pasha government only became concerned about the

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nationalist propaganda of the KTC when the Kurdish representatives sought international support for a Kurdish state in 1919. On July 10, 1919, the representatives of the Ottoman government-Avni Pasha, the minister of the Marine Department; Haydar Efendi, a former ~eyh-iil-tslam (chiefjurisconsuIt); and Ahmet Abuk Pasha. a former minister of war-met with the KTC members: Sayyid Abdulkadir, Emin Ali Bedirhan, Mevlanzade Rlfat, Captain Emin, and Colonel Avni Bey. British intelligence was able to obtain information regarding the content of the meeting. A British report dated July 2.1, 1919, states that, when asked to explain the KTC's meeting with the British without the permission of the government. Mevlanzade Rlfat replied: [A]ccording to the Wilsonian principles every nationality had the right to work for their own welfare and ... the Kurds were convinced that the only power which could assure them freedom and security was Great Britain. They had therefore considered it desirable to approach the British Authorities. I asked how it could be possible for the Turkish Government to grant any form of autonomy to the Kurds, seeing that the Turks themselves were not sure of their own future. (British Foreign Office 1985, p. 696)'4 Notably, this document hints that the Istanbul government entertained the idea of granting autonomy to the Kurds. Whether the Ottoman government was serious about this or only trying to ensure the loyalty of the Kurds is unknown. But we do know that the KTC was overtly seeking independence or at least autonomy in 1919. encouraged by the Wilsonian principles. Scores of articles and editorials published injin ask for independence or autonomy (Golda~ 1991, pp. 237-89). Therefore, unlike the previous Kurdish organizations. we can justifiably categorize the KTC as the first nationalist organization. In search of the origin of Kurdish nationalist movements. so far we have examined Kurdish uprisings and literature produced by the Kurds. The con· clusion is obvious: Kurdish revolts prior to World War I did not have any express nationalistic deSign. Among the literature produced by the Kurds, Ahmed-i Hani's position for self-rule comes closest to the modern ideology of nationalism. Ahmed-i Hani cannot be considered the father of Kurdish nationalism. however. for his understanding of the Kurds does not overlap with

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that of the present. His call for a Kurmanji king to protect the Kurmanjis against Ottoman and Persian misrule lacks the necessary ingredients of a nationalist movement. It should be noted that Mem-u Zin fell far short_ of creating a political movement. Ottoman and British archival documents indicate that nineteenth-century Kurdish uprisings were motivated by the desire of local Kurdish notables to recover or expand their control of the land. After 1908 the Kurds, along with other communities in the Ottoman Empire, enjoyed a liberal political environment, but this liberal period did not last long. After the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 the CUP leadership that ran the empire Single-handedly with little or no regard for political opposition reversed the multiethnic liberalization process and put an emphasis on the Turkish elements of the Ottoman Empire. Even in this period we do not see any express desire for Kurdish self-determination. Kurdish organizations chose to operate within the Ottoman system and preserved their decentralist/Ottomanist identity while celebrating their own communal one until the emergence of the KTC. Therefore 1 suggest that Kurdish nationalism originates at the end of World War I with the formation of the KTC. When the KTC initiated a nationalist agenda, it propagated its ideology based upon a Kurdish identity that was specific to the realities of the postWorld War I environment. Corresponding with the strategic map of Kurdistan, this understanding of Kurdish identity was much more inclusive. The Lurs ofIran. the Zazas, and even the non-Muslim Kurdish-speaking population were included in the new Kurdish identity. It was this snapshot of Kurdish identity that became the basis for Kurdish nationalism. In the service of promoting it, Kurdish leaders also tried to give historical depth to the Kurdish struggle by selectively llsing the prior Kurdish literature and uprisings. In reality, however, the nationalist link with the past was engineered.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined several issues concerning the origin and the genealogy of Kurdish nationalism. The first argument concerns timing: when did Kurdish nationalism emerge? This research has suggested that we should exercise caution in labeling Kurdish movements prior to World War I as nationalist. I demonstrated here that Kurdish nationalism as a political movement originates from the end of World War I.

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I further suggest that Kurdish militant and intellectual movements prior to World War I should not even be seen as "Kurdish protonationalism." This might be rather misleading, if it assumes that these militant and intellec~ tual movements were destined to evolve into fuII~fledged nationalisms. The available evidence is just too inconclusive to support this claim. There is no evidence to prove that Kurdish nationalism would have materialized if the Ottoman Empire had survived World War 1. This also applies to most other nationalisms that emerged at the end of the Ottoman Empire. Surely, Turkish and to some extent Arab nationalisms were responses to the crumbling empire. Their success in creating nation-states, I suggest, was not the inevitable and natural order of political evolution; nor is nationalism the "end of history," if! may borrow the expression of Francis Fukuyama (1993). The other argument dealt with the createdness of Kurdish nationalism. This chapter has contended that Kurdish nationalism was not the result of an evolutionary process; it was created at a certain time in history, at the end of World War I. On a theoretical level, I have argued against Anthony Smith's point that nationalisms are based upon preexisting elements and against his emphaSiS on nationalism's link with the past. Although Smith's argument for the ethnie certainly has merit for the formation of identity, we must be careful in extrapolating it to nationalism. True, most nationalisms base themselves upon perceived ethnic identities; however, the perception of identity is fixed at the time it is created. In other words, nationalists utilize a selective group identity, which is most responsive to the realities of their time. In many cases nationalists do not entirely acknowledge the evolving (or constructed but real) nature of the group identity. For Kurdish nationalists, Kurdish identity possesses a unique essence. Although they do not (in fact cannot) deny the shifting nature of Kurdish identity, they ignore this very point on purpose. Elsewhere I have argued that Kurdish nationalism was created by a cadre of Kurdish notables consisting of the children of the previous generation of Kurdish religious and tribal elite (bzoglu 2004). They were based in Istanbul and were heavily influenced by the projects of Arab and Turkish nationalists. When the collapse of the Ottoman Empire became imminent, they felt obligated to subscribe to the idea of nationalism as the Arabs and the Turks did earlier. No doubt they utilized the past in the service of creating a nationalist discourse, a common practice for all nationalists; and like all other nationalists, they were highly selective. "Collective forgetting" more than the

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shared memory was the main mode utilized. As mentioned above, the link with the past was engineered, not discovered. For this reason, when Kurdish nationalism was created, a navel was painted in to make it look natural. On the practical level, we must understand the nationalists' need to establish a link with the distant past. In order to recruit followers for the nationalist ideology and to claim legitimacy, nationalists feel obligated to present their case as a natural flow of history. Therefore I take issue with Gellner: although such a link with the past is imaginary, it is significant and necessary to imagine it in order to claim credibility and attract a following to create a nation-state.

NOTES I. 2.

3. 4.

). 6. 7.

This is Smith's paraphrasing of Gellner (1983) in the debate. I do not go into much detail in this section because I have already given details of this argument in Ozoglu (2004, chapter 2.). For the justification of this claim, see Ozoglu (2004). There is no exact date for the revolt, but from 1842 to 1847 Bedirhan was paying only lip service to Istanbul. The Ottoman local administration in the region was very suspicious about Bedirhan's loyalty and was planning a military operation against him in 1846. We do know the exact date of the first military clash between the gove~nment forces and Bedirhan:June 4. 1847 (17 Cemaziyelahir 1263). B3.§kabanlik Al"§ivi, Mesail-i Miihimme, l2.2;; this document was reprinted in Sevgen 1982., appendix doc. no. XXXI. A letter from Vice-Counsel Clayton to Major Trotter, B3.§kale,July Il. 1880. A letter from Clayton to Trotter, dated November 27. 1880; also Clayton to Trotter. November 2, 1880. "The Sheikh tried very hard to get the Christian to join him.... Some 400 or ;00 Nestorians accordingly jOined his force" (ibid., ;: 54).

8. 9. 10. II.

12. 13. 14.

A letter to Earl Granville from Ronald Thomson. Tehran, October 31, 1881. A letter from Ubeydullah to Dr. Cochran, dated October s, 1880. The letter was sent to Mr. Goshan and dated October 20, 1880. The letter was dated July II, 1880. Article I, "Maksad-l Tesis:' in Kurdistan Terakki ve leavun Cemiyeti Nizamnamesi (n.d.). Great Britain, Foreign Office. 371/4191, 91082, dated June 17. 1919. "Letter from Mr. Hohler (Constantinople) to Sir F. Tilley," July 2.1, 1919.

10

BANDITRY TO DISLOYALTY

Turkish Nationalisms and the Kurdish Question

MESUTYEGEN

TURKISH NATIONALISM'S PERCEPTION OF THE KURDISH Q,£ESTION

has not been uniform. From its emergence in the late nineteenth century until today, Turkish nationalism has perceived the Kurdish question by means of a rich vocabulary, including "resistance of the past:' "banditry; "political reactionary:' "regional backwardness:' "foreign incitement," and "disloyalty." This variation in discourse has several causes. First, as Turkish nationalism has evolved and changed from its rise in the late nineteenth century to the present, its perception of the Kurdish question has Significantly changed too. Second. there have been distinct versions of Turkish nationalisms, which also resulted in variation in the way in which the Kurdish question is perceived. The "extreme" nationalism of the Nationalist Action Party, a left-wing Turkish nationalism, "nationalism in Islamism," and the popular nationalism of the last decade are only some of the versions of Turkish nationalism.' To these, of course, must be added mainstream Turkish nationalism.> Although it is inaccurate to suggest that each of these nationalisms has had its own specific view of the Kurdish question, it is clear that their existence would contribute to varying understandings of the issue.

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Turkish nationalism's openness to numerous other discourses is a third factor contributing to the varying perceptions of the Kurdish question. Just like any other nationalism, Turkish nationalism has not been an introverted discourse. Instead it has been enriched by discourses such as reformist Westernism, corporatist populism, and developmentalism, which culminated in a proliferation of the ways in which Turkish nationalism has perceived the Kurdish question. The fourth aspect. in the same vein, has to do with the articulation of the Kurdish question with other social issues. Here the case is obvious: the Kurdish question has never been a pure ethnic/national question. While it emerged as an opposition to the reforms implemented by the Ottoman modernizers, who aimed to dissolve the autonomous sociopolitical space inhabited by the Kurds, it progressed into an opposition to the transformation of a non-national political community to a national one in the first quarter of the twentieth century. By the mid-twentieth century, however, the nodal point of the Kurdish unrest became the discontent generated by the consolidation of market relations in the regions occupied by the Kurds. The Kurdish unrest of the last few decades, in contrast, has mostly been shaped by international developments such as the rising significance of human rights discourse in contemporary politics, the rising publicity of the Kurdish question after the Gulf War, and the emerge,nce of a Kurdish diaspora in Europe. The history of the Kurdish question is composed of several paradigmatic periods, all of which have contributed in some way to a change in the understanding of the issue. In this chapter I argue that the relational and historical nature of both Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question influenced Turkish nationalism toward perceiving the Kurdish issue in many different ways. I examine the ways in which Turkish nationalisms have perceived the Kurdish question, elaborating first on mainstream Turkish nationalism's perception of the issue. This is followed by a discussion on the perception of the Kurdish question by extreme right-wing and left-wing Turkish nationali~ms.

MAINSTREAM TURKISH NATIONALISM AND THE KURDISH Q,£ESTION

Turkish nationalism emerged as a linguistic and cultural movement in the late nineteenth century (Mardin 1962.). It immediately became an alternative

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to Ottomanism, the prevailing strategy of political integration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Following its ascendancy over Ottomanism, Turkish nationalism evolved to become the constitutive ideology of building a secular and modern "nation-state society" in the second quarter of the twentieth century. As the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic, Turkish nationalism has been a source of inspiration not only for all three Constitutions of the republic but also for the programs of the main political parties in Turkey. The follOWing discussion provides a roughly chronological examination of the ways in which mainstream Turkish nationalism has perceived the Kurdish question.

IsLahat (Reforms) and the Kurdish Question Ottoman politics during the late nineteenth century was characterized by a state-imposed Islahat (reforms) program intended to preclude the disintegration of the Ottoman state by replacing the classical Ottoman administrative bodies with a modern state apparatus.' This being the case, Turkish nationalism flourished in accordance with the dynamics of Is/ahat. Accordingly, Turkish nationalism of the time viewed the inSignificant Kurdish unrest from the perspective of the logic of tslahat. To be more concrete, Turkish nationalism at the turn of the century perceived Kurds' unrest in relation to the reforms that aimed to strengthen the state power and especially in relation to those disseminating the modern state power into the "periphery."4 The unrest of the Kurds, in other words, was believed to be nothing more than a reaction of the forces of the periphery annoyed by the program of

tslahat. Turkish nationalism of the time emerged and evolved as a response to the idea of Ottoman ism. Its most central maxim was that the unity of the Ottoman state/territory would be saved by rendering all its subjects with different religious and ethnic origins "Ottoman citizens:' tied to the Ottoman dynasty. In opposition, Turkish nationalism conceived "Turkishness" as the only possible ground for political unity on Ottoman territory. The idea of decentralization in administration, the other major component of the politics of Ottomanism, was also uniformly opposed by Turkish nationalism. Under such conditions, the intensification of tsLahat in the administration after 1908 was not a surprise. Having seized power in 1908, the nationalist Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) made it clear that it would

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continue the policy of centralization. Accordingly, the CUP approved the principle of centralization in administration as the first article of its program in the 1913 Congress of the organization {Tunaya 1989, p. 2.36).1 This alone manifestS how vital centralization in administration was for Turkish nationalists. The same congress also decided to settle the nomadic tribes, most of which were Kurdish. This indicated that Turkish nationalism of the time addressed Kurdish unrest through the program of tslahat that was engaged in pursuing centralization. This was evident as early as 1908, as the following speech by an Ottoman army officer on the first day of the Young Turk Revolution in Diyarbakxr (a major Kurdish town in Anatolia) shows. The constitution abolished landlordship and chieftainship. From now on, a landlord and a porter are equal. There is no more landlordship. There are no more tribes.... Don't be afraid of the soldiers as you were in the past. Military service is a religious obligation.... Tribal fights are for the devil. Whereas military service is for God.... Do not consider taxes a misfortune as you did in the past. The Kurds have a unique problem; it is ignorance. (cited in Kutlay 1992., pp. 176-79)6 The Kurds' political loyalty was to the tribe; they would not perform military service; they ~ere not enthusiastic in paying taxes to the central power; they were ignorant: thus Turkish nationalism perceived the Kurds and the territory inhabited by them. Turkish nationalism saw the unrest of Kurds as a set of obstacles delaying the dissemination of a modern political and administrative power into the Kurdish regions. The followers of Turkish nationalism were of course determined to remove such impediments by means of the zslahat program. The narrative above discloses that the way Turkish nationalism perceived and tackled the Kurdish question in these years was shaped primarily by the prerequisites of the program of zslahat. But it was also shaped by at least two further concerns: expanding political representation and making Turkish people the ruling nation in the multiethnic Ottoman Empire. These two concerns, however, were intrinsically incompatible. As the resumption of a constitutional regime and the reopening of the parliament testify, widening political representation was the second important concern for the nationalists of the time.? One most immediate outcome

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of this expansion in political representation was the election of some ten Kurdish deputies to the parliament (Tunaya 1988, p. 407).8 Another was the flourishing of organizations that sllstained the rights of various ethnic groups in the empire. Kiirdistan Teaviin ve Terakki Cemiyeti was one such organization. Furthermore, CUP's inclination toward enlarging political representation and freedoms prompted many intellectuals from various ethnic groups to assume leading roles in the CUP. As this brief remark indicates, Turkish nationalism's preoccupation with the unrest of Kurds at the time was also mediated by a politics of freedom. But the societies built by the ethnic groups were soon banned by a constitutional decree (Tunaya 1988, pp. 36869). Why did this take place? This question brings us to the third preoccupation of Turkish nationalists. While Turkish nationalism adopted a liberal discourse aimed at widening political representation, at the same time it also made a political investment to render the Turkish people the dominant nation in the multiethnic Ottoman Empire. The idea that Turkish people were the unsur-i aslt (main ethnic group) in the Ottoman Empire was already in circulation before the CUP seized power. Once in power, however, the CUP began to pursue policies deSigned to promote the Turkish people from the status of unsur-i asit to that of millet-i hakime (ruling/dominant nation).9 Accordingly, while societies built by ethnic groups were banned, institutions such as the National Library, the National Archive, the National Cinema, and the National Music Organization; sports/youth organizations such as the Turkish Force; and cultural organizations such as the Turkish Hearths were all founded under the patronage of the CUP (Tunaya 1988, pp. 34-35). Hence Turkish nationalism implemented a general program designed to render the Turkish people the dominant nation. As this abridged outline indicates, the prerequisites of expanding political representation and making Turkish people the ruling nation were completely inconsistent. Promoting a more liberal politicS and building a millet-i hakime in a multiethnic society were mutually exclusive. It is no surprise that this inconsistency was echoed in the relationship between Kurds and Turkish nationalists. The support for the CUP by the intellectuals of notable Kurdish families in Istanbul, thanks to its once "liberal" inclinations, was immediately withdrawn as the nationalist face of the CUP prevailed over its liberal face. To this must be added the growing discontent of

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"traditional" Kurds, whose habitat became the subject of the CUP's fortified policy of centralization. All this suggests that Turkish nationalism's perception of the Kurdish question in the three decades preceding the foundation of the republic was molded primarily by the double mission of the nationalists: Turkification of public space and fortification of administrative centralization. The opposition of Kurds to both missions led the Turkish nationalists to consider the Kurdish question simultaneously from two different angles. As well as impeding the establishment of the Turkish people as the millet-i hakime, the Kurdish question also represented resistance to the establishment of a modern state and society. But one thing was evident in the language of Turkish nationalism: when the Kurdish question was at stake, the themes and tones of the discourse of ~slahat prevailed over those of nationalism.'o This can basically be attributed to the birth of Turkish nationalism out of tslahat, on the one hand, and to overwhelming Kurdish opposition to the ~slahat program aimed at ending the autonomy of the Kurdish territory, on the other. inktlap and the Kurdish Question World War I forced a detour in Turkish nationalism. One minor outcome of the war was that the nationalists had to vacate political power. A more important consequence was the collapse of the empire. By the end of the war, Ottoman imperial territory had shrunk to the Anatolian peninsula, some regions of which were occupied by the Allied forces. The most Significant result of the war in terms ofits repercussions on the future trajectory of Turkish nationalism, however, was the abrupt Muslimization of Anatolia. Of the tWO non-Muslim peoples of Anatolia, the Armenians were deported or killed and the Greeks were exchanged with the Muslims of Greece. 11 In the meantime, though many of its elite figures were expelled, no other political program in Anatolia had as zealous a political cadre as the reformist-nationalist movement. This was most evident with the launching of the War of Independence, which not only overruled the occupation of Anatolia but also restored a mighty political power shortly after the collapse of the empire. By W1.2 the reformist-nationalist ideal had returned to power. The "relative homogenization" of the religious composition of Anatolia defined the mind-set of those who restored not the empire but the state apparatus. A Turkishness married with Muslimhood became the new

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"spiritual" ground for the establishment of a political community on Anatolian territory." The continuity between prewar and postwar reformist-nationalisms in terms of both recruitment and ideology was manifest. Nonetheless, what characterized the relation between these two nationalisms was discontinuity rather than continuity. This of course had to do with the dramatic series of events and changes that took place in the years before the nationalists reclaimed power. To reiterate, though defeated in World War I, the reformistnationalist cadre and ideal remained the most powerful. and Anatolia became a more homogeneous social space. It was these changes that paved the way for a discontinuity in the reformist-nationalist ideal. The discontinuity in the sphere of ulahat occurred thanks to the stunning success of the reformist-nationalist cadre in ending the occupation of Anatolia and restoring political power. This success endowed the reformistnationalists with both might and legitimacy, facilitating the reformist ideal's evolution into a more radical program. This radical form of reformism is known in Turkish politics as the idea or program of inkdap (revolution). A firm politics of inktlap prevailed during the first fifteen years of the new regime. The replacement of the sultanate and caliphate with a secular republic was followed by reforms in law, education, administration, and other areas. As to the discontinuity in Turkish nationalism, "relative homogenization" of Anatolia prompted the powerful nationalists of the time to revise their prewar task. As noted, nationalism of the earlier period endeavored to make Turkish people the millet-i hakime in the multiethnic Ottoman society. HaVing established the Republic of Turkey, nationalists were now more ambitious. Their task was to render the nation the ultimate bond for political adherence and to create a nation-state out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, the founders of the republic firmly "refuted the polyethnic and multi religious Ottoman heritage" (Canefe 2.002., p. 149). The boldest Signifier of this change in Turkish nationalism was the new Constitution itself. As stated in the justification of the 192.4 Constitution, the new Turkish Republic "is a nation-state. It is not a multinational state. The state does not recognize any nation other than the Turks. There are other peoples who come from different races and who should have equal rights within the country. Yet it is not possible to give rights to these people in accordance with their racial [ethnic] status" (cited in Goziibiiyiik and Sezgin 1957, p. 7).

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What the new Constitution declared was that the new republic was established as a nation-state. Though this new state acknowledged the existence of ethnic groups other than Turks, it denied recognizing their legal rights. This was something entirely novel, of course, especially from the standpoint of the Kurds, because the leading reformist-nationalists of the new regime had clearly announced immediately before the foundation of the republic that they were going to recognize such rightS.'l The situation was obvious. In 192.4, whUe stUl conceding the existence of ethnic communities other than Turks in Anatolia, Turkish nationalism began to deny recognizing the assumed "cultural" rights of such communities. All those who were now citizens of the Turkish Republic, including Kurds, were invited to become Turks. Accordingly, a comprehensive policy of compulsory assimilation began to be implemented.'+ These changes in the reformist-nationalist ideal prompted some major changes in the relationship between Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question. As well as aggravating the Kurdish unrest, such changes also altered the way in which Turkish nationalism perceived the Kurdish question. The years following the foundation of the republic testified to a growing Kurdish discontent, which sometimes took the form of revolts and rebellions against the state power. The discontent of Kurds was twofold: they resisted both the logic of ink~lap and the logic of the nation-state. This prompted the reformist-nationalists of the time to perceive the Kurdish question in terms of the prerequisites of transforming a heterogeneous social space ruled by the logic of empire to a homogenous social space governed by a modern nationstate. Aiming to build a nation-state as well as to accelerate the creation of a secular and modern society, Turkish nationalism of the time approached the resistance by Kurds by means of a hybrid language enunciating all these components together. An exemplary text is the speech of the chairman of the Court ofIndependence that sentenced the leaders of the Kurdish rebellion in 192.5 to death: Some of you used people for your personal interests, and some of you followed foreign incitement and political ambitions, but all of you marched to a certain point: the establishment of an independent Kurdistan.... Your political reaction and rebellion were destroyed immediately by the decisive acts of the government ofthe Republic and by the

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fatal strokes of the Republican army.... Everybody must know that as the young Republican government will definitely not condone any cursed action like incitement and political reaction; it will prevent this sort of banditry by means of its precise precautions. The poor people of this region who have been exploited and oppressed under the domination of sheikhs and feudal landlords will be freed from your incitements and evil and they will follow the efficient paths of our Republic, which promises progress and prosperity. (cited in Aybars 1988, pp. 32526; emphasis added) A double reading would show that the text actually speaks about a fatal rivalry. Political reaction. banditry. sheikhs. and feudal landlords were on the one side. and the republican government and republican army promising progress and prosperity were on the other. Clash was evident. Against those resisting the modern, secular, and national "state-society" were the guardians of such a state-society: the republican government and the republican army. The language of the text gives the impression that every single social and political element that the reformist-nationalists aimed to liquidate was assembled in the Kurdish rebellion of 1925. Political reactionaries. bandits. landlords. and the sheikhs were a "gang of evil:' resisting the foundation of the nation-state and the dissemination of central administration into the periphery. It is very much evident that the collision between this gang of evil and the reformist-nationalists of the time may be translated into a duality representing this fatal rivalry. The Kurdish question, in particular the rebellion in 1925, was nothing but resistance of the past to the present. represented by the political program of reformist-nationalism, which promised progress and prosperity. For a considerable period the Turkish nationalism of the time perceived the Kurdish question on the basis of such a fatal rivalry between the past and present.'s Claiming to represent the present. Turkish nationalism viewed the Kurdish unrest of the time as the resistance of premodern social structures and adherences. Tribes and banditry were the leading components of such structures. According to the nationalists. those who resisted the new regime were not the Kurds with an ethno-political cause but the tribes and bandits threatened by the dissemination of modern state power into the region. In this respect. the Settlement Law of 1934, a privileged text of Turkish nationalism

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of the 19305, was exemplary. Resisted by two large-scale Kurdish rebellions in 192.5 and 1930, the new regime embarked on solving the Kurdish question by means of an extensive settlement law. Although the text clearly states that the ultimate aim of the law was the Turkification (assimilation) of nonTurks, it produces the impression that those who would be assimilated were some tribal people with no ethnic identity. One of the central articles of the Settlement Law announced that "[t]he Law does not recognize the political and administrative authority of the tribe ... all previously recognized rights have been abolished even if they were officially documented. Tribal chief doms, ... sheikhdoms, and all their organizations and elements have been abolished" (Official Paper 1934: emphasis added). According to this logic, the Kurdish question was an issue of the endurance of tribal organizations, which of course would not be tolerated by a modern nation-state. Another remainder of the premodern past was banditry. While commanded by a modern and secular organization, Hoybun, the Kurdish rebellion in Agn in 1930 was perceived by the Turkish nationalists of the time as an instance of banditry. Throughout the summer of that year the newspapers were full of reports about "how the brigands were being destroyed." On July 9, 1930, the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet reported: "Our aircraft have heavily bombed the brigands." Another report in the same paper construed the Kurdish rebellion i!1 terms of a more eloquent dichotomy. The report on July 13, 1930, stated that "the Republic was defended by our citizens against the bandits:'

The Outside World and the Kurdish Question As the narrative above indicates, the establishment of a modern, secular, and national "state-society" out of the Ottoman Empire concurred with a long period of war. from the Balkan Wars to the War of Independence via World War 1. This made those who were in charge of this establishment anxious about the outside world. Those who built a nation-state out of the remnants of the empire were traumatized, especially by the events in the years between 1912. and 1919. A vast Ottoman territory, including the very heart of the empire. was lost in this remarkably short period. This traumatic series of events made the nationalists uneasy about the future intentions of the major powers of the time. Consequently, Turkish nationalism did not hesitate for

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long to establish a connection between the unrest of the Kurds and the outside world. The claim that the Kurdish unrest could be attributed to outside incitement was put forward as early as 192.5. The Court of Independence in 192.5 had concluded in its verdict that the rebellion was incited by foreigners (see the quotation above). This perception was shared by all versions of Turkish nationalism at all time. One point needs to be highlighted, however. As Turkish nationalism's notion of the particular state that was believed to be the major threat for the Turkish state changed from one period to another, the state believed to be inciting Kurds changed as well. Outsiders inciting Kurds sometimes included Western imperialists and northern Communists and at other times southern neighbors. After the War of Independence the inciting outsiders were the Western powers, particularly Britain. During the Cold War the outsider that threatened the Turkish state, now a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, became the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Kurdish unrest of the 1960s and 1970S was viewed as an outcome of Communist incitement. When the Cold War ended, the major threat was believed to be coming from the south. Today it is again the West's turn to be the outsider. European states have steadfastly accused Turkey of human rights violations in Kurdish regions and in the last decade have become the home for a militant Kurdish diaspora. This environment has given Turkish nationalism reason to bdieve that the Kurds are once again being incited by the European powers. The United States, another Western power, is also not free from accusations. The gradual establishment of a Kurdish authority in northern Iraq since the Gulf War under the mandate of the United States is taken by many to be an indicator that the Kurdish unrest is stirred by the United States!6 A case in 1963 against a group of Kurdish intellectuals is unique in simultaneously displaying both the nationalist contention that Kurdish unrest was due to incitement from the outside and the changing nature of the outside opponents of Turkish nationalism. '7 The charge stated: During the Republican period ... some foreign states intended to cause trouble in Eastern AnatoHa. As a matter of fact, the Sheikh Said, Agn, and Dersim rebellions were due to the counter-revolutionary actions of some tribes that were incited by foreign powers .... [But] [t]he

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content of foreign incitement at present is not the same as that of the past. While previous foreign incitements ... were caused by the imperialist states that had interests in the Middle East, at present these in~ citements are caused by Communist activity. While the incited were sheikhs and the chiefs of tribes [in the past], they are now a few intellectuals .... Today ... the Kurdish ideal is entirely the product of incitement by international communism. (cited in ~adillili 1980, pp. 184-85)

Development and the Kurdish Question The prerequisites of building a modern and secular nation-state society continued to inspire the ways in which Turkish nationalism perceived the Kurdish question until the 1950S. As the cessation of Kurdish revolts testified, by that time reformist nationalism had almost completed the task of achieving political integration. Nevertheless, this success had not yet been echoed in the sphere of the economy. Market· relations in the regions inhabited by the Kurds were still far from extensive. In other words, economic integration had not been achieved yet. This prompted Turkish nationalism to focus on the issue of development. As Turkish nationalism became preoccupied with the task of the dissemination of market relations into the regions inhabited by Kurds, it began to perceive the Kurdish question in terms of the requirements of economic integration. Both the Democratic Party (which had overthrown the founding party of the republic, the Republican People's Party, in 1950) and its successor, the Justice Party (]P), perceived Kurdish unrest through the discourse of economic integration and development. According to the mainstream nationalism of the 19505 and 1960s, what Kurds needed to do was simple. Now that their resistance against political integration had been crushed, they were expected to integrate into the new nation-state society through the market. Citing the massive underdevelopment in eastern and southeastern Anatolia (regions inhabited mostly by Kurds), the JP government in 196; promised the alleviation of economic disparity among geographical regions (TBMM 1988, p. 104). It was plain, however, that development was not the only concern behind the government's intense interest in these regions. A more preeminent concern was the lack of integration between the region and the national market. This genetic relationship between the development of the

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region and its integration with the national market was boldly included in the program of the 1969 JP government: Another important issue we stress is that of the development of the Eastern region. The development of aU the regions of our country, the territorial and national integrity of which is indivisible, is a constitutional necessity.... Our aim is to bring all regions of Turkey to contemporary levels of civilization. It is for this reason ... that we see the necessity of introducing special measures in the regions where backwardness is massive and acute. The aim of these special measures is not to create privUeged regions, but toforge integration. (TBMM 1988, p. ISS emphasis added) As this text shows, the issue of development was not a question in itself in the view of mainstream nationalists at the time. Rather it was seen as part of economic integration, which in turn was taken to be a part of the question of civilization. In other words, development was construed as a means to remove the lack of integration between the region and the national economy.'s The discussion thus far indicates that the mainstream Turkish nationalists' perception of the Kurdish question has significantly varied in the past century. Turkish nationalists in power between the early 19005 and late 19005 perceived the Kurdish question as one of political reaction, banditry, tribalism, foreign incitement, and regional backwardness.

EXTREME RIGHT-WING TuRKISH NATIONALISM AND THE KURDISH QEESTION

A racist version of Turkish nationalism appeared around the time of World War II.'9 This remained an intellectual movement until the 1960s. It was only in the sixties and seventies that this version of Turkish nationalism flirting with racism became a political movement. In the meantime Kurdish discontent had become substantial again. As opposed to the military resistance of the twenties and thirties, however, Kurdish unrest of the sixties and seventies assumed the form of popular support for left-wing parties or political groups, some of which seriously confronted the establishment in Turkey. Under such conditions the Kurdish question began to be perceived by some with a racist vocabulary.

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Nihal AtS1Z, a spectacular representative of racism in Turkey, suggested in these years that Kurds are of an inferior descent. In his view, "Kurds are not of Turkish or Turanian descent. They are Iranians. The language they speak is a corrupt, primitive Persian. So are their [facial] physical features" (AtSlZ 1992 (1967], p. 525). Because they are not of Turkish descent, AtS1Z believes that Kurds have no alternative but to go away. "Where to? Wherever they admire! Let them go to Pakistan, to India, or to Barzani. Let them apply to United Nations and ask for a country in Africa. Let them learn from the Armenians that the Turkish race is extremely patient, yet may not be stopped when it is provoked" (AtS1Z 1992 (1967], p. 530). However appalling, this did not become the core view of extreme rightwing nationalism, which in general followed the notion that all Muslims in Anatolia were of Turkish origin. Like mainstream nationalism, it also championed the policy of assimilation, rather than ethnic cleansing or destruction, as the main instrument to reach a "soltttion:'>o It may be argued that mainstream nationalism of the thirties was not fundamentally different from extreme right-wing nationalism of the sixties and seventies in terms of the way the Kurdish question was perceived. For a long time, extreme right-wing nationalism used the language provided by mainstream nationalism in regard to the Kurdish question. Extreme right-wing nationalists also endorsed the belief that incitement by foreigners was at the root of the Kurdish unrest. Nevertheless, this shared language must not blur the chasms between these two nationalisms. One thing is clear: however much mainstream nationalism held that foreign incitement played some role in the untest of Kurds, it predominantly perceived the Kurdish unrest as a question of resistance of the past or lack of economic integration. Hence it was a socioeconomic question to be resolved by means of inktlap. For extreme right-wing nationalism, however, the predominant reason for the Kurdish unrest was foreign incitement. Thus it was merely a question of public order, requiring military precautions. As the Kurdish discontent of the sixties and seventies flourished as a component oflefi:-wing opposition in Turkey, this "proved" that the outsiders could be none other than the Communists in the north: the USSR.

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LEFT-WING TURKISH NATIONALISM AND THE KURDISH Q,£ESTION

Although a left-wing version of Turkish nationalism has existed throughout the whole republican period, from the beginning to the present, it has never been a major discourse in modern Turkish politics. Deliberations of left-wing nationalism on the Kurdish question appeared first in the monthly journal Kadro (Cadre), which was established in 1932. by a few former Communists who had become the champions of a blend of etatism and nationalism." It is most evident that Kadro provided a more refined version of the standard argument of mainstream Turkish nationalism that the Kurdish unrest was nothing more than the resistance of the past to the present, represented by the new regime. Two distinguished contributions to this effect were presented by the two stars of Kadro: ~evket Siireyya Aydemir and Ismail Hiisrev Tokin. According to Aydemir (1932., p. 42.), Kurdishness was an economic regime, albeit a backward one. Kurdishness. he believed, was identical with feudalism. This being the case, it was most natural that Turkishness was identical with another economic regime. The old Turkish law [social order] was based on each individual Turk's house [hearth], herd, and land. It is for that reason that we always brought to the places we lived, at least for those who were from our race, private property and small farming.... However, Kurdishness is an economic regime at the base of which lies, before everything, intense land slavery. i.e., the landlessness of the producer. [Therefore] all stages of Ottoman history in Van and Diyarbela.r provinces passed with a struggle between economically and legally free Turkish peasants and urban dwellers and Kurdish feudalism, which is based on an individual's economic and legal slavery. (Aydemir 1932., p. 42.) According to Aydemir, the contrast between Kurdishness and Turkishness (that these two peoples belong to different times: past and present) was apparent in the domain of religion too. While religion was an emotional bond among old Turks, what was essential to Kurdish dervish lodges was a profound irreligiosity (Aydemir 1932., p. 43)' This backwardness of Kurds would naturally disable them from becoming a nation. In this respect, the second star of Kadro, ismaU Hiisrev Tokin. was

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quite confident that the Kurdish resistance was not a national movement but a class struggle: A national movement may arise only and foremost out of sharing ~n economic and national interest. However. in the eastern provinces neither a unity of economic interest nor a national one exists .... In our eastern provinces is not a proper Kurdish nation but Kurdish-speaking tribes and Turkish elements that have been forced to speak Kurdish. We may not find the attributes of a nation among these tribes. Nation is an eminent social category. (Tokin 1932.. p. 2..1) As the deliberations in Kadro indicate, there was no fundamental difference in the way in which the Kurdish question was perceived by the mainstream nationalism and left-wing nationalism of the thirties. Both viewed the Kurdish question basically as an issue of the endurance of premodern sodal and economic structures. The only remarkable difference was that leftwing nationalism of the time sustained this view with a language inspired by Marxism of a kind. Left-wing Turkish nationalism reappeared in the early sixties in the weekly magazine Yon (Direction). the most popular journal among the leftist circles of the time. !---s a matter of fact, not only left-wing nationalists but all leftist opponents of the time, including the leftist Kurds, voiced their views in Yon. The Kurdish question was touched on, though vaguely. in Yon first through a discussion on the question of the endurance of feudal relations in the eastern region as well as its underdevelopment. Arguing that the governments of the 1950S followed policies that deepened the regional inequalities. Yon ("Dogunun Kalkmdmlmast 1962..) maintained that the development of the east was one of the most urgent problems of the country. As such, Yon seems to have echoed mainstream Turkish nationalism and identified the Kurdish question with the endurance of premodern social relations and regional backwardness. Yon also conceded, however, that these two problems had an ethno-cultural aspect. In this respect, an article on the "exUe" of fifty-five Kurdish landlords in 1960 is exemplary ('i\.galan Tanlyor musunuz?" 1962..)." This article basically opposed the decision of the government to allow the exUed landlords to return home. Yet it also stressed that

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all the exiled landlords were Kurdish citizens. In other words, while left-wing nationalism of the time basically perceived the Kurdish question as an issue of the endurance of backward social relations, it also conceded, albeit reluctantly, that the issue had an ethno-cultural aspect. Among the numerous authors who wrote in Yon, it was undoubtedly Dogan Avcloglu, the prime writer and one of the architects of the journal, who best represented both Yon and the left-wing nationalism of the time. In an article entitled "The Kurdish ~estion:' Avcloglu (l966) criticized the attempts to solve the Kurdish question through a policy of enforced integration. Although he acknowledged the importance of the questions concerning the underdevelopment of the Kurdish region and the endurance oflandlordship, he stated boldly that the question also had an ethnic dimension. Hence AvclOglu claimed that the Kurdish question would not be solved merely by means of economic precautions. He confessed that socialists of the time, including himself, could not produce a powerful idea to resolve the issue. He exposed his nationalist inclinations and warned Kurds very boldly: "At this point there is no space for hesitation. We are one nation and we would not forfeit one inch of our land. If there are oblivious persons having separatist aims. may they be mindful! They must know that socialists would fight first for an inch ofland" (AvclOglu 19 66, p. 3). Thus left-wing Turkish nationalism perceived the Kurdish question basically as mainstream Turkish nationalism did. For both, the Kurdish question was an issue of the endurance of feudal relations and regional backwardness. It is still important to note, however. that the left-Wing nationalism of the sixties was different from that of the thirties in that it recognized the ethnic aspect of the question.

TURKISH NATIONALISM AND THE KURDISH Q£ESTION TODAY

It is now manifest that Turkish nationalisms have perceived the Kurdish question in many different ways. The Kurdish question has been identified with such diverse issues as political reactionary. banditry, tribalism, feudalism, regional backwardness, and foreign incitement. Despite this impurity in perception and language, one thing has remained nearly unchanged for all versions of Turkish nationalism: Kurds could become Turkish. In other words, Turkish nationalisms have principally perceived Kurds as Turks-to-be.

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This perception of Kurds as Turks-to-be has had crucial reverberations in citizenship practices in Turkey. Unlike non-Muslim citizens, Kurds and other non-Turkish Muslim inhabitants of the country did not face massive discrimination in citizenship practices!l While it is untrue to say that Kurds were entirely exempt from such practices, in most cases they were allowed to exercise basic citizenship rights in full so long as they were assimilated into Turkishness!>! The disparity between Kurds and non-Muslim citizens of the republic in exercising citizenship rights was due to one primary factor. Non-Muslims of the country were treated as people who might/would not be assimilated into Turkishness, whUe Kurds were seen within the confines of the project of assimilation. Today the whole picture is changing. The confidence of Turkish nationalisms as to the Kurds' potential of becoming Turkish is not as firm as it used to be. In addition to the standard insulting labels, other signs indicate that the followers of mainstream Turkish nationalism are building a connection of some sort between Kurds and non-Muslims!S In this respect, the usage of the term "Jewish Kurds" has been symptomatic. The compound term "Jewish Kurds" entered the vocabulary of Turkish nationalism immediately after the occupation of Iraq. The banal fact that some Kurdish-speaking Jews live in Israel (Sabar 1982; Brauer 199,) suddenly became popular in the Turkish media with a "minor" change. The fabricated story that some leading Kurdish figures are either converted or crypto-Jews was followed by the allegation that quite a number of Israeli citizens have recently bought land in Kurdish-populated southeastern Anatolia and that a secret Jewish community exists in Urfa (a Kurdish-populated city). Eventually ordinary citizens often came to believe that many Kurds are in fact converted Jews and that Kurds have become the instrument of the alleged ultimate Jewish ideal of controlling the land between the Nile and the Euphrates. My conviction is that the circulation of the term "Jewish Kurds" is a symptom of the doubts of Turkish nationalism regarding the Turkishness of Kurds. The term indicates that the status of Kurds in Turkey vis-a-vis Turkishness is now much closer to that of non-Muslim citizens of the republic. This suggests that mainstream Turkish nationalism's longtime belief in the idea that Kurds are Turks-to-be is now weaker, It is as if the compound term "Jewish Kurds" came into existence just because Turkish nationalism has

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lost its belief in another compound term: "Turkish Kurds" (its belief in the Kurds' potential to become Turkish).'6 The belief that many Kurds are "Jewish Kurds" is important not solely because it Signals that the Turkish nationalist motto that "Kurds are Turksto-be" is now weaker but also, and more importantly, because it indicates that Turkish nationalists are no longer certain about the loyalty of Kurds. As Turkish nationalism emerged and developed in and as a response to the "painful" decades of territorial losses, it has characteristically perceived the Ottoman Empire's Christian peoples who pushed for separation as "disloyal." This is why the few thousand Greeks and Armenians who remained in Turkey after the foundation of the republic have been under constant surveillance and have been subject to discrimination. The rising view of Kurds as similar to non-Muslims is alarming, for it indicates that Turkish nationalism's image of Kurds is now closer to its image of the non-Muslim peoples of the empire. Some recent signs suggest that not only ordinary Turkish citizens but even the Turkish state, the chief follower and disseminator of mainstream Turkish nationalism, is on the verge of revising its image of Kurds. One notorious sign has been the usage of the term "pseudo-citizens" in a statement issued by the Turkish General Staff immediately after the Newroz demonstrations across Turkey in 2005. Demonstrations that year were unprecedented in terms of both the intense symbolism used and the size of the crowds. Posters of Abdullah Ocalan (the captured leader of the PKK) and the Kurdish flag of confederalism designed by Ocalan for Kurds in the Middle East were both used extenSively during demonstrations in Istanbul, Ankara, tzmir, Diyarbalo.r, Urfa, Van, Mersin, and Adana. Pictures of the demonstrations, which were attended by hundreds of thousands of Kurdish citizens, were quite telling. The intense symbolism in the form of flags and posters indicated that a large number of Kurds felt themselves to be alienated from the Turkish political community. Two Kurdish boys desecrated a Turkish flag during one particular demonstration in Mersin. Immediately after this event, the General Staff issued a response addressed to the "Great Turkish Nation" on March 22,2005: [T]he innocent activities organized in the name of celebrating the coming of spring have been furthered by a group .. . to the extent that

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the Turkish flag, the symbol of the sublime Turkish nation ... , was desecrated. In its long history, the Turkish nation has lived good and bad days, betrayals as well as victories. Yet it has never faced such a treachery committed by its own pseudo-citizens in its own homeland. This is treachery. {emphasis added)'7 This statement was significant because public authorities in Turkey for the first time accused individuals who violated the law of being "pseudo-citizens" versus citizens. It is important to note that the statement addressed not just the two young perpetrators who desecrated the flag or the very act of the desecration itsel£ Rather, the statement was directed at the unprecedented symbolism of the Newroz demonstrations of 2005. This was immediately realized and acknowledged by a number of people. Giindiiz Aktan, a former diplomat and a pro-state columnist in Radikal and now a member of parliament (Nationalist Action Party), asserted that it would not be correct to reduce the statement in question to a "flag incident...•8 In his view, "just as the flag is a symbol, the statement also had its own symbolism." The General Staff was not the only public institution to use the term "pseudo-citizens." Several days after the General Staff issued its statement, the senate of Ankara University issued a declaration in response to the recent events, stating that it "condemns ... the desecration of Turkish flag ... by a group of our pseudo-citizens."·9 Following the declaration, an Internet discussion took place between the academic staff at the university and Nusret Aras, the president of the university. The president began his comments with the words "'the flag crisis that started in Diyarbaklr and continued in Mersin."~o This was a misleading phrase because the flag incident did not occur during the demonstrations in Diyarbaktr, the town hosting the largest crowds during the Newroz demonstrations of 2005. Perhaps this phrase should be taken as a slip of the tongue, suggesting that what prompted the usage of the term "pseudo-citizens" was not Simply a "flag incident" but the Newroz demonstrations in their entirety. Another recent event confirms this argument. On November 17, 2.005, warplanes made low-altitude passes over thousands of marching Kurdish citizens in Y'uksekova who were meeting for a funeral of three people shot by security forces during a previous demonstration against the bombing of a

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bookstore in ~emdinli." The key distinguishing characteristic of this funeral was again the degree of symbolism used. Pictures of the funeral showed once more that many Kurdish citizens have lost their sense of belonging to the Turkish political community. Many demonstrators carried posters ofOcalan and the flag of the PKK. The public authorities did not welcome the deep symbolism of the funeral. This was displayed by another symbolic act: the two warplanes that made four low-altitude passes over the cortege. l ' These incidents suggest that not only some ordinary followers of Turkish nationalism but even some sections of the Turkish bureaucracy are no longer adherents of the longtime motto that Kurds are Turks-to-be. The idea that Kurds would become Turkish through assimilation, just like the other Muslim peoples of Anatolia, does not seem to be as credible as it once was. These signs suggest that some nonofficial and official followers of mainstream Turkish nationalism have lost their confidence in the loyalty of Kurds in Turkey. This shows that a fundamental rupture is gradually taking place in the way in which mainstream Turkish nationalists have perceived the Kurdish question. The bandits of the past are gradually becoming the disloyal "pseudo-citizens" of the present. Not surprisingly, this fundamental gradual shift in mainstream nationalism's perception of the Kurdish question has echoed in the perceptions of both extreme right-wing and left-wing nationalisms. As noted above, for extreme right-wing nationalism, the Kurdish question has basically been an artificial issue incited by foreigners. In this view, the Kurdish question was nothing more than the incitement of some "Kurdish Turks" who somehow had forgotten that they were actually of Turkish descent. Therefore the solution called for equipping those who deem themselves Kurdish with the consciousness of belonging to Turkishness again (Bora and Can 2.000, p. 59). Today, however, extreme right-wing nationalism does not seem to be a firm follower of the idea of "re-Turkification." In the eyes of extreme right-wing nationalism, Kurds are no longer an ignorant people incited by the foreigners. While it did not cease to exist, the gap between the inciters and the incited became less obvious. Extreme right-wing nationalism seems ready to replace its formula "Kurds are the Turks who have forgotten their Turkishness" with "Kurds are an untrustworthy people on Turkish territory." However cautiously the extremists avoided appealing to the public with this new conception, the idea that "Kurds are of an inferior and incurable descent"

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and that they are disloyal has now become popular among the lay followers of extreme right-wing nationalism.ll Kurds increaSingly have come to be perceived as unassimilable. Likewise, some followers of extreme nationalism now make an analogy between the possible fate of the Kurds and what happened to the Armenians at the beginning of the twentieth century. The idea that Kurds are of inferior descent and that they are disloyal is now also sustained by some nationalists who view themselves as the followers of leftist movements of the sixties. Some groups in Turkish politics now use the name "Turkish Left" and at the same time champion a politics of enmity with respect to Kurds. The weekly magazine Turkish Left (TurkSolu), for instance, suggests rather outrageously that Turkey is now under invasion by Kurds and is full of racist terms insulting Kurds. H It is necessary to note, however, that not all versions ofleft-wing Turkish nationalism are attracted to such extreme views. A current of left-wing nationalism upholds the view that the Kurdish question is actually a problem of foreign incitement and may basically be solved by means of massive assimilation. For instance, for the Workers Party (i~cri Parrisi, iP) of Dogu Perincrek, who was one of the leading figures of left-wing nationalism of the 1970S, today's Kurdish question is not a genuine SOciopolitical problem. Rather, it is a fake issue manipulated by U.S. and EU imperialism. According to Perincrek (:z.oOS, p. 3), the "Kurdish question has been resolved in terms of democratic rights and freedoms" and "our citizens of Kurdish origin have gained their democratic rights in every sphere." This view also has been approved by the central organs of the ip as well ("i~s:i Partisi Merkez Komitesi Karan" 200S). Believing that the Kurdish question has been resolved, the ip now champions the policy of assimilation. For this party, the task today is to finalize the coalescence of Turks and Kurds as one nation.

CONCLUSION

The narrative in this chapter leads to the following conclusions. A fundamental rupture is about to take place in the way in which Turkish nationalisms have seen the Kurdish question. While Turkish nationalists have perceived the Kurdish question in diverse ways, the idea that the Kurds are Turks-to-be and that the Kurdish question may basically be solved by means of assimilation has remained a constant in Turkish nationalist discourses.

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Today, however, this idea does not seem to be as strong as it once was. Instead all three versions of Turkish nationalism are now flirting with a fundamentally different idea: that the Kurdish question is one of disloyalty. Why did this shift in the image of Kurds from "Turks-to-be" to "those who defy Turkishness" take place? To begin With, the new millennium illuminated a very plain fact: despite the Turkish Republic's success in defeating the armed Kurdish resistance of the 1990S. many Kurdish citizens were stUl not assimilated into Turkish society and. moreover. did not want to be. In fact. many Kurds seemed to have developed a very strong consciousness of being different. Within the last decade growing political support for proKurdish parties in local and national elections and increasing demonstrations by Kurdish citizens show that many Kurds have been resisting assimilation. That has been a major disappointment for all three versions of Turkish nationalisms. which for so long sustained the idea of creating a homogenized. monolinguistic nation from the diverse range of Muslim inhabitants in Anatolia. But this disappointment was not only because Kurds have resisted Turkification. A conviction that Kurds who resist assimilation constitute a significant portion of the total population in Turkey and that they are settled in a particular region of the country furthered the disappointment of Turkish nationalists. It is as if a second territorial-linguistic community. a parallel nation. now exists side by side with its Turkish counterpart. The distress prompted by this unbearable perception is the main reason for the erosion in the long-standing image of Kurds as Turks-to-be. Moreover. in the early 2000S Turkey's candidacy for EU membership and the recent establishment of a federal Kurdish state in northern Iraq have furthered Kurds' consciousness of being different. As Turkey continues en route to EU membership. it is increasingly less viable to pursue a massive policy of Kurdish assimilation, especially one based on forcible means like displacement. In fact, the opposite is more likely. As long as Turkey remains a candidate for EU membership, outside demands to remove restrictions on Kurdish cultural expression will continue to increase. Several reforms in this respect have already been enforced. The government now allows limited state-sponsored and private TV broadcasting in Kurdish and permits the Kurdish language to be taught in select private institutions. Hence Turkey's progress in the process of EU membership seems to be fortifying the present state of Kurds in Turkey as a second territorial-linguistic community

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and has thus also worked to undermine the meta-image of Kurds as Turksto-be. The recent establishment of a federal Kurdish state in northern Iraq has also served to increase the present alienation of Kurds in the Turkish political community. The existence of a (federal) Kurdish state adjacent to the Kurdish provinces of Turkey and the growing cultural and economic ties with the Kurds there seem to have reinforced the self-confidence of Kurdish citizens of Turkey in resisting assimilation. In other words, what has happened in Iraq in the last few years has also increased Kurds' alienation from the Turkish political community, which in turn has weakened the Turkish nationalists' dictum that Kurds are Turks-co-be. To conclude, the domestic and regional events of the last two decades have transformed the Kurdish people in Turkey co a parallel second nation within the borders of the Turkish Republic. This, not surprisingly, has traumatized all versions of Turkish nationalisms that have championed a homogeneous and monolingual political community. Only against this background can we explain why Turkish nationalisms' enduring belief in the dictum that Kurds are Turks-to-be is not as strong as it was and why the bandits of the past have become the disloyal "pseudo-citizens" of today.

NOTES

An earlier version of this essay appeared in Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no.

I

(2007): 119-51. 1.

2.

For a recent study involving the assessments of all these versions of Turkish nationalism, see Bora (2002). The term "mainstream Turkish nationalism" is used in this chapter to refer to that particular version of Turkish nationalism that has guided the program of building a modern scace and a secular nation-society in Turkey since che beginning of the twentieth century. It was formulated by the bureaucratic and intellectual elite of the early 1900S and since then haS been sustained by the judiciary, diplomats, the military, and even the political parties in power: by the main components of the establishment in Turkey. It has also been a major source of inspiration for the Turkish Constitutions of 192.4, 1961, and 1982. The deliberations of this version of Turkish nationalism on categories such as the nation. Turkishness. and citizenship are elaborated below. There are of course numerous works on this mainstream Turkish nationalism, which is marked by

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

247

an inability to decide between a civic and ethnicist understanding of nation. Kushner (1977) and Heyd (1950) are the twO well-known studies available in English. The Ottoman Palace and palace bureaucracy embarked upon reforms in the army. administration. and finance starting in the late eighteenth century. The reforms in the nineteenth century. however. were far from being incessant and all-inclusive. Reforms were resisted on many occasions. Only afi:er the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was a comprehensive and resolute reform program followed. For a scholarly examination of nineteenth-century Ottoman politics, see Lewis (1961). Ortayh (198,). and Zurcher (1993). While the reign of Abdiilhamid II (1876-1908) was successful in maintaining the loyalty of Kurds by means of building the Hamidiye Regiments (Kurdish tribal militia) in 18~)I. Kurds revolted a few times afi:er the 1908 Revolution. Soon after the Young Turk government came to power several Kurdish sheikhs submitted a petition asking for the adoption of a Kurdish administration and adopting Kurdish as the language of instruction in Kurdish districts (Olson 1989, p. 17). This was followed by the two revolts that took place in the very first few years of the revolution and were led by Sheikh Said Berzenci and Ibrahim Pasha. the leader of a tribal confederation (Jwaideh 1960. pp. 309-12). Although the nationalist CUP seized power in 1908. Turkish nationalism could defeat Ottomanism only after the Balkan Wars. which ended in 1913 with the loss ofRwnelia. "the heart of the Empire" (Ahmad 1969, pp. 152-53). The Balkan Wars were considered the ultimate confirmation of the failure of the strategy of Ottoman ism to preserve the integrity of the state (ibid.). All translations are mine unless otherwise stated. The Ottoman Empire had experienced a short constitutional period between 1876 and 1878, so the (re)introduction of the Constitution in 1908 represented the beginning of the Second Constitutional Period. The expansion of political representation was not limited to the election of some Kurdish deputies to the parliament. In 1908 the parliament had sixty Arab, twenty-seven Albanian, twenty-six Greek, fourteen Armenian. four Jewish. and ten Slavic deputies (Ahmad 1969. p. ISS). For this shift from the notion of unsur-i asl, to millet-i hakime, see Hanioglu

(1989. pp. 626-44). 10. This was also pointed out by Tank Zafer Tunaya (1988. p. 407). who saw an es-

sential difference between the way the CUP approached the Kurdish question and the way it approached the Armenian and Arab questions. The Kurdish question was taken to be an issue of the amelioration of the socioeconomic conditions of the eastern region. If we translate this remark into the language of this chapter. the Kurdish question was basicaHy a question of ISlahat for the CUP nationalists.

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Muslimization of the Ottoman territory had started earlier. The Ottoman Empire had already lost some of its territories inhabited by the non-Muslim and the non-Turkic peoples before World War I. Likewise, the escape of Muslim masses from the Balkans and Caucasia to Anatolia during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also contributed to the same process. For the Muslimization process of Anatolia toward the end of the Ottoman State. see Karpat (1985. pp. 60-77). To give some figures, the percentage of non-Muslim population decreased from 55.96 percent at the end of the nineteenth century to 35.2. percent in 192.7 in Istanbul, from 61.S to 13.8 percent in izmir, from 43.6 to 18.4 percent in Edirne. and from 42..8 to 1.2. percent in Trabzon (Behar 1996. p. 64). Overall, while non-Muslims constituted approximately 2.7 percent of the total Ottoman population in 1885 (Behar 1996, p. 46), only 3 percent of the population in Turkey in 192.7 was non-Muslim (Diindar 1999, p. 159). It is also estimated that almost a million people migrated from the Balkans to Turkey in the years between 192.3 and 1939 (Kiri~4j:i 2.000. p. 8). For an overall assessment of this process, see Karpat (1985). Akgiindiiz (1998), and Kiri~4j:i (2.000). 12.. This new spirit, which is composed of a marriage between Turkishness and Muslimhood, was most evident in the population exchanges between the Turkish Republic and Greece after the War of Independence. During this exchange the Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians were asked to leave Turkey while non-Turkish-speaking Muslims living in the Balkans were admitted into Turkey. According to the Lausanne Treaty signed in 192.3 (Meray 1993. pp. 82.87), Orthodox Greeks who were Turkish citizens were to be exchanged with the Muslims who were Greek citizens. As this striking example suggests, some non-Turkish people living outside of Turkey were admitted into the country, whereas some non-Muslim people living in Turkey were asked to leave. This testifies that Turkishness was open to non-Turks but not to all of them. While Turkish authorities apparently considered Muslimhood to be the key to achievingTurkishness, they saw non-Muslimhood as a "natural" obstacle. Having identified Turkishness with the Muslimhood of Anatolia, the new regime embarked upon the Turkification of the Muslims of Anatolia. For the role of Muslimhood in the constitution of Turkishness. see Ni~anyan (1995), Somel (1997). and Yxldlz (2.001). 13. A clear example of such an announcement is found in the first article of Anadolu ve Rumeli Miidafa-i Hukuk Cemiyetieri (SOCieties for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia: ARMHC). the political organization that led the War ofIndependence between 1919 and 192.2.: 'j\ll the Muslim elements [ethnic groups] living on Ottoman territory are genuine brothers who are full of feelings of respect for and devotion to each other and are respectful to each other's social and ethnic norms and local conditions" (igdemir 1986, p. II3). As

11.

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the article boldly putS it, the founding organization of the Turkish nation-state was quite firm that it would recognize the ethnic heterogeneity of Turkish society in legal terms. Likewise, the founder of the republic did not hesitate to echo the same recognition. In his view, "various Muslim elements living in the country ... are genuine brothers who respect each other's ethnic, local, and moral norms [laws] .... Kurds, Turks, Lazs, Circassians, all these Muslim elements !ivingwithin national borders have shared interests" (TBMM 1985, p. 73). When the scate of the Kurds was at stake. nationalists were even bolder. Amasya Protokolleri (Amasya Protocols) (Unat 1961). a document signed between the Ottoman government in occupied Istanbul and the representatives of ARMHC in 1919. recognized Turks and Kurds as the two major Muslim communities living on Ottoman land. The recognition of this "objective fact" was supported by the acknowledgment of the Ottoman territory as the home of Turks and Kurds. Defining Kurds as an inseparable element of the Ottoman nation, the document reiterated that the ethnic and social (cultural) rights of Kurds were to be recognized. 14. A notorious example of the program of assimilation was the Settlement Law of 1934. which had the following aim: "The Republic of Turkey could not condone those who would enjoy Turkish citizenship and all the rights that law provided without having a devotion to the Turkish flag. It is for this reason that this law has specified the ways of assimilating such people in the Turkish culture. In the Republic of Turkey. the Turkishness of anyone who says she/he is Turkish must be evident and clear for the Turkish state" (TBMM 1934. 4th Period. 2.3-2.4: 8). For an examination of the Settlement Law of 1934, see Be§ik'ii (1978). 15. A prominent figure of the Turkish nationalism of the period. Yusuf Ak'iura, perceived the Kurdish question in terms of the same conflict (see the discussion below). In his assessment of the Kurdish rebellion of 192.5, Akc;ura (1984 [192.5]. p. 18) scates that "while the Turkish Republic is endeaVOring to become a contemporary scate, legal, social, economic, traditional. and diplomatic obstacles have been encountered. These obstacles are either because the Ottoman state belonged to the civilization of the Orient or because of the degeneration of the Ottoman scate organization. Now those individuals, institutions. and groups representing these obstacles have constituted a sort of front in opposition to the efforts of the Republic .... As observed in the last Kurdish reaction. the Turkish Republic is bound to eliminate this reactionary front in a very short time." 16. This conviction is most obvious in the results of a recent poll showing that the discontent with the recent policies of the United States is the highest among Turkish citizens (compared to the citizens of twenty-one other countries). See http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2.ooS/01/19/.

250

17.

IS.

19. 2.0. 2.1. 2.2.. 2.3.

Mesut Yegen InJune 1963 forty-two Kurds were arrested on the charge of attempting to establish an independent Kurdistan. Among them were leading Kurdish intellectuals such as Musa Anter, Ya~ar Kaya, and Medet Serhat. Note that the perception of the Kurdish question as an issue of regional underdevelopment did not disappear from the discourse of Turkish nationalism of the following years. Instead it became a constant of Turkish nationalism. As Orner Faruk Gencrkaya (1996) shows, the Kurdish question continued to be perceived as an issue of economic integration in the 1980s and 1990S. Many deputies in the parliament viewed the issue as a "socio-economic problem of underdevelopment enhanced by the feudal structure" (Gencrkaya 1996, p. 101). For an examination of extreme right-wing nationalism in this period, see Ozdogan (2.001). For an analysis of extreme right-wing nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, see Bora and Can (1991). For an assessment of Kadro, see Turke~ (1998). The military coup in 1960 exiled fifty-five Kurdish landlords to non-Kurdish provinces of the country. Although non-Muslims of the country are defined as citizens of the republic. they have not been allowed to exercise all the rights aSSigned to Turkish citizens. Many non-Muslims were fired from their jobs in the bureaucracy (Bali 1999, pp. 2.06-2.7) in accordance with the law enacted in 192.6, which specified Turkishness instead of Turkish citizenship as a requirement to become a state employee. The fourth item of article 788 stated that being ethnically Turkish is a precondition to become a state employee (Aktar 1996. p. II). This law was in force until 1965. Likewise, the gates of some institutions such as the army were closed for non-Muslims. For instance, an announcement published in the newspaper Cumhuriyet (Republic) on July 2., 1935, specified being of «Turkish race" as a necessary condition to be admitted to the Military Veterinary School (Ylldlz 2.001, p. 2.S3). Non-Muslim citizens' estate rights also have been violated occasionally. The Wealth Tax (Aktar 2.000) and the prevention of foundations built by non-Muslim citizens for holding estates are two examples of the violation of this right. For a very helpful study examining the discriminatory citizenship practices that non-Muslim citizens have experienced, see Oran (2.004, pp. 81-104). Non-Muslim citizens of the republic are still subject to such practices, adeast occasionally. Note. however, that not all non-Muslim citizens of the republic have experienced the same trajectories in regard to citizenship rights. Some non-Muslim communities such as Assyrians, Keldanis, and Nasturis have not even been recognized. As such, these communities were not given the lingUistic and religiOUS rights granted to the recognized religious communities (Greeks, Armenians, and Jews). Even these three communities have not experienced their recognized rights in the same manner. The relations between

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24.

25.

16.

27. 28. 2.9. 30. 31.

251

citizens ofJewish origin and the state have not been as harsh as those between the state and the citizens of Greek and Armenian origin. For these disparities in citizenship practices, see Oran (2004, pp. 66-70). For a discussion on the bonds between citizenship and ethnicity in Turkey, see Yegen (2004). The Kurds' exemption from discriminatory citizenship practices has not been a categorical one. Many Kurds did encounter such practices when they revolted against the central power. In some cases the estates of those who jOined the revolt were confiscated, and many Kurds faced compulsory settlement. For the legal background of such practices, see the Law about Individuals to Be Deported from East to West of 1927 and the Settlement Law of 1934. In both cases, many Kurds were deported from their native places and the estates of some were confiscated. For an examination of these laws and their consequences, see Tezel (1982. pp. 346-47). Yet it is essential to note that these discriminatory practices mostly took place in what might be called extraordinary cases. In principle, Kurds were allowed to experience citizenship rights without discrimination provided that they assimilated into Turkishness. The representation of the Kurdish leaders Mesud Barzani and Jalal Talabani as tribal chieftains who lack the ability to rule a modern administrative apparatus is now ordinary. Not only are Kurds despised, but they are sometimes plainly insulted. When the governorship election at Kirkuk in May 2.003 was won by the Kurdish candidate, Abdurrahman Mustafa, this was reported by the T urkish newspaper Star on May 2.9, 2.003, with the title "Kerkiirt;' which in Kurdish means "donkey-Kurd." Signs to this effect are not confined to use of the term jewish Kurds." Doubts about the dictum that Kurds are future Turks may often be encountered, especially in the readers' responses to the news regarding Kurds on the Internet. For a few examples of these reader responses, see http://www.hurriyetim.com.trl haber / o"sid~ I@W~ 2.@tarih ~2.005-0 1-27-m@nvid ~S292.42,OO.asp (January 2.7,2.005); http://www.hurriyetim.com.trlhaber/ 0"sid~l@w~3@tarih~200s01-31-m@nvid~530884,o0.asp (January 31,2.005); and http://www.milliyet. com.trhoos/ 01127 / (January 2.7,2.005). http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.trhoos/03/U/617IILasp (March 2.1, 2.005). http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=147472.&tarih=24/0 3/2.005 (March 24, 2.0 0 5). http://www.ankara.edu.tr/yazLphp?yad=2802 (March 24, 2.005). http://www.ankara.edu.tr/yazi.php?yad=2838 (March 30, 2.005). According to the Human Rights Association report, "in ~emdinli on November 9, 2005, three people threw a hand grenade to a bookstore and killed one of the three persons in the store and wounded another." It also stated that "the assailants were apprehended as a result of the pursuit of the other person in the bookstore and the local people while they were getting in a car. Following

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the finding of three AK-47 assault rifles in the trunk of the car of the apprehended men the public prosecutor of the town launched an investigation, but as he started exploration in the SpOt of the incident another civilian was shot to death and four others were wounded after being fired upon." See http://www. ihclorg.tr/repspec/semdinli/semdinlireport.html (March IS, 2.ooS). 32.. http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=170375 (November IS, 2.oos). 33. For a few examples, see http://www.atsizcilar.comlforum/kirolarin-hainliklerive-ibret-alinmasi-gerekenyasanmis-olaylar-60l7.htm1?s=I8oa96bSl0ge7bcd418 l3ls6eIedsdee& (January 14, 2.006). 34. For such articles, see FIrat (loosa, lO0Sb, lO05C).

11

TOWARD A NONSTANDARD STORY The Kurdish Question and the Headscarj, Nationalism, and Iraq

MURAT SOMER

IN THIS CRITICAL ESSAY

I

PUT FORWARD TWO ARGUMENTS. FIRST,

the Kurdish conflict entered a new period after the summer 2007 elections that resembles the conflict's formative period of 1923-2.6 in the following sense.' Both the possibilities and constraints of peaceful resolution resemble those that appear to have sown the seeds of this conflict in the formative period. Now as then, peaceful and sustainable resolution is closely interwoven with the status of Kurds in the region, especially in Iraq, and with the path of secular modernization. Specifically, it requires that Turkish and Kurdish nationalists and secular and religious-conservative modernizers resolve two "security" (prisoner's) dilemmas explained below.. These dilemmas are not the only mechanisms hindering resolution. But they receive insufficient attention in extant research. The first dilemma arises because Kurds form a trans-state and transnational minority. This creates the possibility of pan-Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish secession. This dilemma must be credibly resolved via democratic processes involving domestic Kurdish political actors and cooperation with regional Kurds and states. The second dilemma arises because political elites who need to build a consensus over a modernization path that is

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more amenable to ethnic-national diversity and Kurdish difference must resolve their separate conflict over secularism. Otherwise, elite divisions over secularism may undermine democratic processes in the Kurdish conflict. Attempts to recognize Kurdish difference within a framework of Islamic solidarity, by emphasizing the public role of religion, may reinforce the conflict over secularism. It is also questionable whether religious solidarity alone can be an effective recipe for an identity-based political conflict. Because of these two dilemmas, two factors had and continue to have a major effect on the evolution of the Kurdish conflict: relations with Iraq (and its superpower patron), Iran, and Syria; and elite competition (and in the present period also middle-class competition) over the secular nature of Turkish modernization. My second main argument regards how we should study the Kurdish conflict. In order to develop rigorous analyses with a potential to produce realistic policy implications, scholars should avoid "standard stories" that describe "self-propelled actors interacting with each other.") Instead the challenge is to build "deep" (nonstandard), causal stories that explain how agents respond to their social, political, and institutional environments, making good choices as much as they can. Standard stories produce descriptive narratives where actors are "self-propelled": they are assumed to act as they do because they are self-motivated to do so. In other words, standard stories transpire as if this was the only way they could transpire. In contrast, nonstandard stories produce causal narratives that account for what happened as well as what could have happened. In Max Weber's terms, they also account for "counterfactuals:' which are "contrary to fact but not to logical or 'objective' pOSSibility" (Levi 1997, pp. 31-32; Weber 194-9 [1905]). Building a nonstandard story requires distinguishing between the Kurdish question and the Kurdish conflict. 'This is important, because the latter was not the only logically or objectively possible outcome of the former. The Kurdish question emerged as soon as some people i~ areas where Kurds lived developed nationalist ideas (such as Kurdish, Turkish, Armenian, and Arab nationalisms), primarily during the nineteenth century. Thus the Kurdish question concerns the issue of what the status of Kurds would have been first within the Ottoman and Persian empires and then in relation to the majorityTurkish, Arab, and Persian states that replaced these multiethnic empires. How could Kurdish nationalists' aspirations to self-government be addressed

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in the face of the competing nationalist projects? How feasible were Kurdish independence and autonomy? How could Kurdish ethnic-cultural difference be accommodated? The Kurdish conflict emerged because the Kurdish question was not resolved peacefully and successfully. At least in the Turkish context, the dominant response of the state to the Kurdish question was oppression and denial rather than dialogue and accommodation. Kurdish ethno-political movements made their nationality daims predominantly through violent rebellion, which reinforced the distrust between them and the state. Why did the state and Kurdish movements show these reactions? The causal mechanisms underlying them should be properly explained. The critical claim here is that the Kurdish conflict was not an inevitable result of the Kurdish question because the former was a direct product of nationalism while the latter was not. In the Turkish context, the Kurdish conflict resulted from the domestic and external political-institutional and geopolitical developments in the formative period 192.3-2.6, as elaborated below in building a nonstandard story. In other words, the Kurdish question being the same, it can be argued that a counterfactual and less conflict-prone relation was possible between Kurds and the Turkish nation-state. The challenge is to develop a causal explanation of why such a counterfactual path was not embarked upon. The first step to develop such an explanation is to conceptualize the Kurdish conflict in general terms in a comparative perspective to compare and contrast it with other conflicts in the world. My goal here is not to develop a full-fledged definition, so it is sufficient to mention four conditions that will help me to build a nonstandard story. First, it is a violent conflict mainly between the state and the ethno-political movements that claim to represent the will of a "minority."4 Social-political conflicts among ordinary people from the majority and minority have so far been minimal in the Kurdish case, in comparison to cases like the Irish conflict or Kosovo. S Second, the minority forms a trans-state ethnic-national group in the region. This distinguishes Kurds from cases like the Scots, who do not have ethnic kin in neighboring countries. and makes them resemble the Muslims or Tamils in India. Third, the minority is semimixed with the majority society territorially. socially, and culturally, with a vague legacy of territorial and institutional

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boundaries. 6 Ethnic Kurds are much more mixed with the rest of the society than, for example, the Slovaks and the Czechs were in the former Czechoslovakia. They are not as mixed, however, as, say, the Irish in the United States; they also constitute the dominant ethnic-linguistic group in major portions of the eastern partS of the country. Yet historically clear boundaries of the minority institutions and territory, which are visible in cases like Scotland and Catalonia, are weak in the Kurdish case.? Many Kurdish chieftains had semiautonomy under the Ottomans until the nineteenth century. But vague and variable borders and limited territory excluded major portions of areas where Kurds lived and what Kurds today consider their historical homeland, such as Diyarbahr, which were ruled "directly" from the center. S The term "Kurdistan;' first used by Sultan Sanjar of the (Turkic-ruled) Great Seljuk state in the twelfth century, henceforth referred to administrative units or geographical areas with shifting borders and no necessary ethnic connotation.9 Fourth, accommodating the nationality claims of the minority's ethnopolitical movements requires elite consensus on the nature of the majority society's nation-building and secular modernization. Other cases may also exhibit this characteristic. For example, the Tamils form an ethnic-linguistic group sharing the majority Hindu religion in India. Their status is closely related to the question of how secular and "Hindu" India is and how open secular Indian nationalists are to ethnic-linguistic pluralism. This relationship seems to be particularly strong in the Kurdish case, however, because ofTurkey's peculiar history of modernization. In combination, the four conditions embedded in this definition create major "security" (prisoner's) dilemmas. These dilemmas can account for most of the differences between the Kurdish conflict and other conflicts, such as the seemingly "most different case" of the Scottish question (Somer 2.008).10 These dilemmas have been produced historically during the modernization/ disintegration of the Ottoman and Persian empires. Many features of the Turkish, Kurdish, and other regional nationalisms that at first may seem to result from culture may in fact be institutional by-products of the security dilemmas unleashed during this period. Turkish. Kurdish, and Western external actors have more than sufficient reason to seek to resolve these dilemmas. Up to 40,000 people have lost their lives and hundreds of thousands of villagers have lost their homes since the 1980s because of the direct and indirect consequences of the Kurdish

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conflict. The eastern provinces with significant ethnic Kurdish populations remain among the country's least developed areas (Mutlu 2.002; Kurban et al. 2.006). Following a two-decade-Iong violent rebellion, Turkish Kurds gained some important yet limited cultural rights, which mostly came through Turkey's EU accession process since 1999. Democratic deficits and human rights problems associated with the conflict are among the major barriers before Turkey'S democratic consolidation and accession to the ED. Finally, peaceful resolution would help Iraq's stability and regional economic development and reinforce the safe transportation of Iraq's oil and natural gas to world markets through Turkey." Alternatively, the deterioration of the Kurdish conflict could potentially destabilize major portions of the Middle East.

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD: 1923 TO 1926

At the end of this period the new republican regime viewed Kurds and Kurdish culture as fundamental threats and had embarked on a long-term policy of oppression and assimilation. "The regime ruled out a different path that would have attempted to accommodate the Kurdish component of the nationalist struggle through some form of autonomy. administrative decentralization. cultural rights. or other kind of recognition. Some Kurds have fought the Turkish state for such rights or for independence ever since that time. Could the Kurdish question have taken a more pluralist and less violent path in its formative period? Currently. two types of research try to answer these questions. producing standard stories.

Standard Story 1: Self-Propelled Actors One type of research examines historical records and documents with a view to discovering the major actors' goals and intentions in the formative period. How did Atatiirk and nationalists plan to resolve the Kurdish question (Olson 1989; Oran 1990; van Bruinessen 2003)? Kurdish nationalists have long claimed that those Kurds who joined Turkish nationalists in the War ofIndependence (1919-22) had been promised some form of autonomy (Bayrak 2004; Bucak 1991; £kinci 2000. pp. 137-67). The records of the first. wartime parliament are illuminating. Members talked freely about Kurds and "Kurdish rights" as a component of one

Murat Somer

(Muslim-Ottoman) nation (TBMM 1985 [192.0-34]; Somer 2oo7a). British documents suggest that a draft resolution regarding limited Kurdish autonomy was discussed (Olson 1996, pp. 213-23). In a message to the a,rmy, Atatiirk argued that the government would gradually establish local government in "areas where Kurds reside ... in the interest of domestic politicS as well as foreign policy." This would be a part of a general plan to establish local governments wherever there was popular demand and "sensitivity" (TBMM 1985 [192.0-34]. pp. 550-51). He talked of such autonomy to journalists briefly before the proclamation of the republic in 1923, again as part of general decentralization (together with rights for other ethnic-regional groups). Atatiirk wrote about his contacts with Kurdish notables, which led the majority of them to provide active support for the nationalist war." Many Kurds vehemently opposed separation from Turkey and inclusion in what became Syria and later Iraq (Bayrak 2.004. pp. 2.31-32). Writers sympathetic to Kurdish nationalism cite such evidence to maintain that Turkish nationalists promised Kurdish autonomy to co-opt them during the war. only to discard these plans once they consolidated their nation-state. The "causal" narrative implicit in these accounts implies the existence of a preexisting and accepted plan to build a homogeneous Turkish nation and deny Kurdish rights; this plan was implemented by self-propelled Turkish nationalists as soon as they no longer depended on Kurds' support (Ekinci 2.000, pp. 137-62; Bayrak 2.004).'''" Turkish writers tend to downplay the validity and importance of any promises of autonomy, even when they are critical of Turkish nationalist state policies.'s Such historical research is very important to uncover the facts of the period; it also helps to discern what the goals of the major actors were. On its own, however, even the best of such research could only produce limited results toward building a causal narrative. A major portion of the events and actors' thoughts went unrecorded in this tumultuous period. More importantly, actors' goals and intentions do not by ,themselves determine the evolution of political conflicts. These are constrained by structures and mediated by institutions and social and political mechanisms. Actors have limited control over these environments. And their priorities may change as the environment changes. Thus research should incorporate structural conditions (such as geopolitics and demographic changes), theory, and analytical construction.

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Besides historical documentation, one important way to explain the fundamental dilemmas in this period is through what Thomas Schelling called "vicarious problem-solving": how would the major actOrs have behaved, given their fundamental goals, different configurations of political and institutional environments, and perceptions of each other (Lichbach 2003, p. 12)? For example, whatever their views were on the Kurdish question. how much importance did it carry for different Turkish nationalists, compared to questions such as secular reforms, the status of non-Muslim minorities. and integrating/assimilating the great influx of new Muslims of Turkish and non-Turkish ethnic origin? Factors that were only indirectly linked to Kurds and to nationalist ideology itself, such as demography. might sometimes have caused actors to change their positions on the Kurdish question. The influx began with the 1774 Ottoman-Russian war and gained major momentum in the second half of the nineteenth century. It came mainly from the Balkans, Crimea. and the Caucasus. Besides economic changes. it was a product of the great "unmixing" of the Muslim and Christian populations that resulted from the overall Ottoman retreat and from the Russian expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Consequently, as of 1922 Muslim refugees and immigrants or their second- or third-generation descendants could represent aiquarter or more ofTurkey's population. Many of these were non-Turkishspeaking (Tekeli 1990; Brubaker 1995; McCarthy 2.001).'6 Accordingly, the question of their assimilationlintegration must have been a major considerationfor Turkish nationalists, in addition to the Kurdish question itself

Standard Story 2: Self-Propelled Nationalisms Vicarious problem-solving can also complement current research on Turkishand Kurdish nationalisms. In recent decades this research has produced a considerable amount of new knowledge regarding the historical trajectories anqmodern constructions of these two ideologies (Oran 1990; Bora 2.002; van.Bruinessen 2003; bzoglu 2004; Vali 2.00S; Zurcher 2.005; Yegen 2.006; .Afulled and Gunter 2007). Especially but not exclusively in popular writing, however, this research hasi~~l1erated two tendencies that weaken its ability to produce causal explatlations and feasible policy implications. The first is the tendency to perso~ifynationalism, as if it was not an ideology or principle but an agent th;!.tmak:es decisions, wants things. learns things. and "collides" with other

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nationalisms. A quick review of the language used in current research easily reveals this tendency: intentionally or unintentionally, "nationalism" (as opposed to "nationalists") is often used as the subject of actions and desires." Implicitly or explicitly, this "nationalism as agent" is often treated as the selfpropelled cause of a variety of phenomena ranging from the Kurdish conflict to democratic deficit. It even shapes its own evolution. The second tendency is to examine nationalism mainly as a discourse. An example can be cited from a valuable and informative account of various versions of Turkish nationalism (Bora 2.003). What motivates the study is "accelerated Turkish nationalism in the 19905." This denotes a change that must be explained causally, and its occurrence and extent must be checked against evidence and measured. In order to do so, however, it would be necessary to decide "as what" nationalism should be examined. Should it be studied and measured primarily as a discourse, sentiment. ideology, principle, movement, or something else? What changed during the 1990S, why, and how? Bora argues that "one must consider Turkish nationalism ... as a series of discourses and a vast lexis" where four main nationalist languages "speak using this lexis" (Bora 2.003, pp. 436-37). Accordingly, at some point, he uses the terms "discourse," "language:' and "dialect" seventeen times within two paragraphs describing different versions of Turkish nationalism. Fruitfully, the article also refers to nondiscursive factors such as economic globalization, the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, and the Kurdish conflict. Nevertheless. the reader is advised to examine nationalism as a "discursive system" and focus on "discursive dynamicS" in explaining it (Bora 2.003, p. 4S0). The point here is not to underestimate the importance of language in understanding nationalism or its role in the expression and internalization of nationalist values. The first point is that nationalist discourse is not the only or the most important manifestation of nationalism and that "language" is probably more an effect than a cause of changing nationalism. Thus it may be a poor measure and explanati<:>n of changing nationalism. Second, in shaping actions, "nationalism as discourse" competes against non-nationalist discourses (such as liberalism or religion) and against material interests. Third, "nationalism as discourse" cannot simultaneously explain political changes and its own shifts. While language plays an important role in facilitating and framing change, it is also true that "unless the facts themselves change, no amount of changing names changes them" (Hobsbawm 2.008, pp. 60-61).

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A better approach would be to treat nationalism as a vague ideology or set of principles that affects people's identities, loyalties, acts, and beliefs alongside other ideologies and material and nonmaterial interests. We can then examine its manifestations as discourse as well as social movements, actor choices, institutions, and government policies.

The Policy Implications ofthe Standard Stories The tendencies to personify nationalism and to examine it as a discourse turn the Kurdish question and conflict into nonquestions direcdy produced by either self-propelled nationalists or self-propelled nationalisms. Consequently, solutions are sought in targeting nationalism and nationalist speech per se rather than the political and social causes and causal mechanisms that drive nationalist actions, policies, and expressions. In other words, conflict resolution is hinged upon the "transcendence of nationalism," with all its implications, through transition to a postnational, postnationalist society. As one author argued: It is time to say a last good-bye to the Turkish nationalism which is rooted in the inter-war period-although this does not hold good for a couple of its declared. but unattained, goals: equality, democracy, and a modern secular state under the rule of law. The last goodbye concerns the underlying national identity. Turkluk "Turkishness," based (among the Young Turks) on Muslim Turkish identity and (for Atatiirk and many Kemalists) on an anthropological, ethno-racial identity. If the ethnically and religiously neutral Turkiyelilik ("being from Turkey") is not given pride of place as a cornerstone of Republican identity ... modern Turkey's problematic ambivalence can hardly be overcome. (Kieser 2.006, p. x) I can only agree that Turkey's democracy in general and the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict in particular would greatly benefit from critical reevaluations of nationalist identities and histories from a more pluralist perspective and in light of historical evidence and democratic deliberation. The emergence of identities such as Tiirkiyelilik (and more inclusive and pluralistic versions of other identities such as Turkishness and Turkish citizenship) would both reflect and benefit the development of a more pluralistic

Murat Somer

democracy. These would help to include people who feel excluded by the officially endorsed Turkish identity. The problem is the importance attributed to nationalism and national identity as causes, not outcomes. First, solutions are sought in new identity projects that define who people are. Can the discourse of new identities resolve complex political problems? What would prevent these new identities from evolving into exclusive projects themselves? For example, what would prevent the majority's perception of "being from Turkey" (Tiirkiyelilik) from beginning to exclude Kurds? What would prevent some people from beginning to exclude the Laz because they are only "from Turkey," not Turkish? An alternative causal approach is to focus on improving institutions, structures, and politics, which may produce more inclusive and pluralistic definitions of both new and existing identities. Certainly these new identities and identity definitions would not arise by themselves but would have to be generated by writers, intellectuals, and political leaders. But such efforts cannot resolve political conflicts or, for that matter, make people internalize these identities without improvements in political and social conditions. It should also be acknowledged that the minority and majority societies will always have asymmetric perceptions of identities such as Turkishness. Turks and Kurds do not and need not hold the same perception of what it means to be Turkish or 'rrom Turkey" (Somer 2008). Second, identities are assumed to be constructed and deconstructed at wilL The possibility and desirability of this is often justified by the observation that Turkish nationalism and identity (and, for that matter, other nationalisms and national identities) were top-down elite projects imposed on society.'s While the elite-driven nature of these projects is dear, their success cannot be explained by the will of the elites alone. Most elite-driven identity projects (whether nationalist, religious, or socialist) fail to become popu1ar. Those that last are those that align with the material and SOcial-cognitive changes already occurring within society. Accordingly, political Turkification in the twentieth century appears to have built on, and transformed, a prior process of cultural (in particular linguistic) "Turkification" of the Ottoman society in the nineteenth century. This seems to have been largely a spontaneous process resulting from socialdemographic and ideological transformations, state modernization, the development of Turkism in Russia, and the instrumentalization of Islam as a

Toward a Nonstandard Story

state ideology (Karpat 2.001, especially chapter 16, 2008). As a result of these "real" processes, a new and more comprehensive form of Turkish ethnonationality gained prominence within the Ottoman dynasty, intellectuals. and larger societal segments. Moreover. even if we asswne that nationalist projects initially were purely elite driven. this does not necessarily imply that they can later be changed at will by new elites. Once they become embedded in the worldviews and self-images of ordinary people, identities only change through long-term social-cultural, demographic, and political processes. Processes such as EU integration and economic globalization may, for example. increase the relative weight of subnational, transnational, and supranational identities and worldviews over time. Identities are all multilayered and contested, however, and their contents and levels of contestation change through processes that are yet insufficiently understood (Abdelal et al. 2.006). In popular as well as academic writing, the view of nations as modern constructions tends to take on an additional meaning: "artificial" or "fake." It is indicative that Benedict Anderson's concept of a nation as an "imagined community" is misleadingly translated into Turkish as hayali cemaat, which means "imaginary community:' A more appropriate translation would be tahayyul edilmi/ cemaat or hayal edilmif cemaat, meaning "imagined community."" Lost in translation are real factors such as civil service and print capitalism, which in Anderson's analysis changed people's notions of time and space and enabled the imagination of nations (Anderson 1983). From marriage to gender and religion, social identities are all socially constructed: they were imagined by people at some point in history. This, however, does not necessarily make them "less real" in the sense of being imaginary or transitory. Nationalism may lose relative significance, but it is unrealistic to expect that a transition to a postnational world will occur in the foreseeable future. Nationalisms legitimize not only particular nation-states but also the global ; system of nation-states. Thus transcendence of nationalism hinges on global trends. Emerging powers such as Russia, China, India, and, for that matter, 'J:'llrkey seem to be turning more nationalist rather than more postnationalist. :Sil1.ce :tOOl nationalist expressions have increased in the United States. Even >t4e EU, currently the most powerful postnationalist project. modifies the ex>pres.sion of national identities and interests. rather than eradicating them. )'rh{"banal" implications of nationalism are intact (see Billig 1995. chapter

Murat Somer

s; Plattner 2.003-4). In addition to following global trends, "banal" reproductions of nationalism and national identities are fueled in Turkey by defensive reactions to the Kurdish conflict, EU accession, and integration with the global economy (Somer 2oo7a, 2oo7b). Hence the potential usefulness of hinging the resolution of complex political conflicts upon transition to a postnational society would be quite limited. Toward a Nonstandard Story Why did the formative period produce "defensive" dominant versions of Turkish and Kurdish nationalism that perceived each other as absolute threats ?"O Explaining why can also shed light on how Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms can become more compromising in the future. The folloWing is an attempt to begin to construct a nonstandard story. Most analysts who reject primordialist accounts of nationalism trace the development of Turkish and Kurdish nationalist ideologies to the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman state tried to modernize and centralize. Turkish nationalists formed an ethnically diverse lot and were mainly concerned with the question of how to rescue the Ottoman state by turning it into a nation-state. They developed ethnic (pan-Turkic) versions as well as cultural-territorial variants. But, to differing degrees. they all drew on the Ottoman legacy and were aimed at turning Ottoman Muslims into a modern nation. Thus Turkish nationalists like Yusuf Ak'Sura put forward nation-building strategies focusing on ethnic and cultural commonalities with Turkic people in the world. Others like Ziya Gokalp put more emphasis on the ideational. religious, and cultural traits uniting Ottoman Muslims in Turkey (Georgeon 2006). In these latter strategies, Turkishness was not employed as a historically fixed, exclusive ethnic category. It was used in a reinvented and more inclusive form, to denote a titular nationality and core ethnic culture. The remaining Ottoman territories on which Turkish nationalists aimed to build a nation had an ethnically diverse population. The aforementioned great influx of ethnically diverse Muslims reinforced this characteristic throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus cultural-territorial models became relatively more influential in the way Turkish nationalists imagined the nation. While ethnic models also continued to influence the perception of Turkish identity, even these tried to

Toward a Nonstandard Story

include Kurds in the perverted sense that they often tried to "demonstrate" that Turks and Kurds had common ethnic-racial roots or that many Kurds are or descended from acculturated rural Turks." By comparison and relatively speaking, Kurdish nationalism was aimed at mobilizing a people in a more limited geography with more cultural homogeneity and thus was predominantly ethnic. One of its salient features was Kurdish nationalists' emphasis on Kurdish ethnic difference from neighboring groups. A symbolic example is a letter that was reportedly written by Celadet Bedirhan, a Kurd, to Mustafa Kemal (later Atatiirk). In this letter Bedirhan chastises Turkish nationalists for trying to mix Turkish ethnicity with other ethnicities {Bozarslan 2005, p. 53).» A salient theme in much Kurdish nationalist writing is the resistance to "mixing;' which in republican periods came to imply assimilation for many Kurds. Mixing is often opposed by using biological metaphors such as the "wrongness" of cross-breeding different animal species or "pure-bred" horses with others (Anter 1996). Like Turkish nationalists, many of whom also drew on putative ethnic-racial categories, Kurdish nationalists formed a diverse group and developed ideas emphasizing ethnicity, religion, and political loyalty to differing degrees (VaH 2005; Ahmed and Gunter 2007). But it seems clear that Kurdish nationalists were primarily concerned with the question of Kurdish ethnic-cultural distinction. and political and cultural well-being. in the face of the Ottoman demise and the emergence of Turkish and Armenian nationalisms surrounding them. Politically, they developed autonomist as well as prO-independence versions. The emergence of these nationalist ideas, however, did not automatically create the Kurdish conflict. It did not make them inherently incompatible and conflict-prone. Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms initially had a lot in common. They shared a modernist zeal (Bozarslan 2005). They both had secular and Islamic-conservative variants. They could, for example, merge into one nationalist ideology that draws on a geographical (Turkey) or religiOUS (Muslim) identity or coexist within one nation-state. with Kurds having (symmetrical or asymmetrical) autonomy from Turks or individual cultural rights. This happened in other cases. Pakistan was established as an Islamic republic. as the nation-state of the Muslims of Pakistan, and as a federal republic where regions associated with major ethnic groups and federally administrated tribal areas have significant autonomy from the center. Scots

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obtained first administrative then legislative autonomy within the British unitary state, which is evolving into a union state through asymmetric devolution to the Scottish and Welsh regions (Somer 2.008; see also Seymour 2.0 0 4).

The point here is not how stable and successful these other cases became. They show the logical and political possibility of different paths that nationalist movements can take. If the standard stories discussed above were correct, however, we were to believe that Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms and the underlying national identities are peculiar in the sense that they could never follow such paths. Thus it is possible to put forward the following thesis. The Kurdish conflict resulted from six developments in the formative period from 1923 to 1926. This is not the place to "prove" the correctness of this thesis but to show its possibility and relevance for the current political debates. First, Ottoman Kurds were divided among Turkey, Iran, the British mandate of Iraq, and the French mandate of Syria as a result of three developments: the Ankara Treaty (1921); the British defeat of Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji, who declared himself the king of Kurdistan in Iraq and might have favored unity with Turkey (1922-24); and the Lausanne Treaty (1923), which recognized Turkey as a nation-state and the heir of the Ottoman Empire.~3 These developments changed the geopolitical structures in a way that made a Turkish-Kurdish nation-state less pOSSible. They rendered Kurdish nationalism and irredentism an existential territorial threat to Turkey's political and territorial integrity. Second, the Republic of Turkey was established soon thereafter without any recognition and rights for the Kurds (and other Muslim ethnicities), most of whom fought in the War of Independence. It was also established as a republic rather than, say, a constitutional monarchy where the Ottoman sultan was maintained as a symbol uniting Muslims of different ethnicities and representing tradition. Third, Kurdish nationalists began to organize a rebellion, seeking support from the British, among others!4 Fourth, the republic was founded by a new (second) parliament, which was less representative of ethnic Kurds (and of Islamists and Islamictraditionalists) than the first parliament of the nationalist struggle. The first parliament would have been unlikely to support the radical reforms of

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secular modernization that Ataturk subsequently embarked on. One such crucial reform was the 1924 abolition of the caliphate, which was an important religious symbol uniting Kurds with the rest of Turkey. Another reform consolidated secular education and abolished religious schools and brotherhoods that fulfilled significant functions among Kurds, such as education in Kurdish . •••••.. . . Fifth, Kurdish religious figures who resented the regime's secular reforms :uid secular Kurdish nationalists who resented the disregard of Kurdish ethIlidty reacted with the violent Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, which the state :brutally crushed. This turned the founding elites' suspicions of Kurdish sepdratism into actual fear, while sowing the seeds of a disgruntled group of k~rdish nationalists deeply suspicious of the state and Turkish state nationalism. An important indirect result of the rebellion was the marginalization 6fthose Turkish nationalists who would have harbored more moderate poll~i~s· toward both religion and ethnic diversity and more gradualist reforms ·6rtllodernization and nation-building. While a series of violent Kurdish rebellions followed until the late 1930S, the state launched a series of policies

~itlled at assimilating Kurds. >.iSbcth, "Iraqi Kurds" formally became part of the British mandate of Iraq

iri.I~t6...

xiii

Security Dilemmas over Territory and Values

ii·• .• These six developments jointly created two security dilemmas. A security atl~lllma over territory was created through the transformation of Ottoman

kdMs, who had hitherto been a major component of the Turkish nationalist ~.r6jd:::t; into a trans-state ethno-national group. Within a separate neighbor-

.:4Mstate, Iraqi Kurds could always pursue irredentism. Accordingly, during ):hehegotiations on the Lausanne Treaty, one of the concessions to British ~~irriithat Turkish nationalists resisted most, but conceded, was the separa~i9¥6fMosul province, where ethnic Kurds and Turks constituted a majoritY~fr6.tnTurkey. Turkish and British representatives disagreed over the ratio :9f~t:hnic Kurdish and Turkish populations hut agreed that together they ::?BI1~tit:l.lted a significant majority over the other groups.·s ::iillissecurity dilemma could only be resolved through cooperation with !4-a.q.('Kurds and their British patrons. Kurds who were left within Turkey

~2~ld,/~ave overcome this dilemma by credibly renouncing pan-Kurdish

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nationalism. This would have been very difficult to do, however, even if Kurdish actors wanted to do so. Kurdish nationalism was already a mobilized force among some Kurdish elites, although it is unclear how much support it had among the ordinary Kurdish masses. In fact, Kurdish nationalists had good reasons to believe that violent rebellion, which they had resorted to in 192.5, was their chance to obtain concessions from the government. This is what Kurdish elites traditionally did to obtain concessions from the Ottoman government. They might also have hoped that the threat of secession could force the government to concede autonomy. Furthermore, the composition of nationalist elites produced a tradeoff between secular and (ethnically) pluralistic modernization. Turkish nationalists who led the War of Independence agreed on goals such as the establishment of a nation-state that would replace the Ottoman state and be on a par with its Western counterparts. But they had different visions as to how Ottoman, Turkish, secular, and Muslim this nation-state would be. They disagreed over the type of modernization. Religious nationalists opposed radical secular reforms. The nationalist struggle had started in the form of a Muslim nationalism (of Ottoman Muslims, including most Kurds) with many religious figures and conservative nationalists (Oran 1990; Olson 1996; Zurcher 2.005, chapter 14). Many deputies in the first parliament held "a genuine belief that the Kurds should be dealt with by other than forceful means" (Olson 1989, p. 40). But the deputies who would have favored such means were also the ones who favored a modernizing yet Islamic state. They would have embraced more ethnic pluralism within a state emphasizing religious values and a nation bound together by faith and traditional culture. This division created a security dilemma over clashing values ofsecularism between two types of nationalist elites. For both elites, ethnicity and the Kurdish question seemed to be secondary to the question of secularism (secular vs. religious modernization). For secularists, alliance with religious-conservative elites for the sake of ethnic pluralism would have meant less power to implement the secular reforms. For religious-conservative elites, promoting the recognition of the Kurdish component would have made them vulnerable to charges of separatism, thus also weakening their position on the issue of secular reforms. Indeed, the political ramifications of the Sheikh Said rebellion gave the secularist nationalists the perfect exqlse to remove the more "liberal" government ofFethi Okyar and to sideline religious-conservative nationalists.

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I am not suggesting that a less secular and more Islamic political model would have resolved the Kurdish question in the long run, especially given the existence of the territOrial security dilemma. Islamic states do not necessarily perform better in resolving ethno-political questions. The foundation of Pakistan as an "Islamic state" did not prevent the secession of the Bengali Muslims later. The point is that the accommodation of the Kurdish claims with less than forceful means, say with some type of administrative decentralization, would have necessitated cooperation between secularist and religious-conservative elites. Such cooperation would have required a consensus regarding the nature of secularism, however, in addition to a consensus over the issue of ethnic pluralism. Nor am I suggesting that the elites in the formative period were ideologically well equipped to address the Kurdish question democratically. For example, the religious-conservative elites were not democrats in today's sense, beyond an instinctive and antirevolutionary tendency to respect the tradition and the will and culture of the "people." I am arguing that-absent the security dilemmas over territory and secularism-some elites would have had the opportunity and predisposition to develop policies more respectful of the Kurdish difference. This could have given rise to more recognition of diversity in one institutional form or another, especially with the development of democracy. It should also be highlighted that opportunities do not automatically translate into actual policies. In the end. a more propitious formative period would have required agency (elites that developed feasible projects to accommodate the Kurdish difference). The same goes for the Kurdish elites. The importance of this point is clearer when we discuss the present period.

THE POST-2.007 PERIOD

Turkey's Kurdish conflict went through several periods between its formative period and the present, which are examined in a growing body of writing. My focus is on the similarities between the current and formative periods. As in the formative period. the question of secular modernization is a salient and decisive challenge for the Republic of Turkey, albeit in importantly modified forms. Today's Islamist and religious-conservative modernizers are as much a product of secular modernization that has occurred since

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the formative period as the secular modernizers are. Also, compared to the religious-conservatives of the formative period, their worldviews are significantly shaped by their economic interests, which favor integration with the global economy (Yavuz 2003; 6ni~ 2007). They are also influenced by "the current visions of modernity and postmodernity in the Western world and by the changing visions of Islamism in the world. Meanwhile, secular modernizers who largely led the transition to secular, multiparty democracy face the challenge of reconciling with the current standards of secularism and democracy in the Western world, which are more amenable to religious expressions. They also face the challenge of reconciling with the restrictions and requirements of economic globalization. These standards now allow less autonomy for nation-states and promote more society-centered models of development. Following major public rows with the secularist military-bureaucracy and social groups over secularism in the spring of 2007. the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a landslide victory in the national elections of July 2007. receiving 47 percent of the national vote. This gave the party and Prime Minister Erdogan a second term in government. Soon thereafter, one of the party's founders, former prime minister and minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gill, was elected president. The AKP is a reformist and pro-West political party. It combines a moderate or "new" Islamist ideology, which is effective in areas such as public administration, education, and social regulation, with a globalist economic outlook and a Muslim-conservative version of Turkish nationalism. The AKP boasts that about a fifth of its members of parliament are ethnically Kurdish, primarily but not exclusively from eastern provinces. In eastern provinces with substantial Kurdish populations, the AKP increased its share of votes by about ISO percent between 2002 and 2007 (Somer 2008).'6 With about half of all votes in those provinces, it now is the first party. With about 30 percent of the votes in the region. the second party, the Democratic Society Party (DTP). also entered parliament. The DTP is largely controlled by the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). although it is not a monolithic party and harbors various views and tendencies.'7 The PKK has fought the state for Kurdish self-rule since the l9805. Since then its expressed goals have changed from independence to a vague notion of constitutional recognition of Kurds.

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Like secularism, pan-Kurdish nationalism and relations with Iraq are salient questions, as in the formative period. Before the elections, the AKP government resisted increasing pressures from the military and opposition parties for a military campaign against the PKK bases in northern Iraq. Clashes between the PKK and security forces had increased since 2.004, when the PKK ended its unilateral "cease-fire:' and intensified in 2007. The PKK has a significant base within Turkey as well as within Europe and other countries. But its ability to sustain itself and organize attacks increased significantly following the American invasion ofIraq and the development of the de facto autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. The clashes with the PKK, which had practically stopped since the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan with US.-Turkish cooperation in 1999, restarted after the occupation. Turkey's refusal at the beginning of the war to allow US. land forces to use Turkish territory impaired Turkish-US. cooperation and boosted the US. alliance with Iraqi Kurds.· 8 This significantly reduced Turkey's clout to influence American policies. Any operations without US. consent could gravely damage the decades-long close alliance between Turkey and the United States. A military operation causing civilian casualties also carried major risks for relations with the EU, which Turkey is trying to join. Especially before the elections, a military operation would have cost the AKP support in eastern provinces, where most people are weary of military conflict and want peaceful resolution. Amid increasing tensions over secularism and political pressures to take action against the PKK attacks, the government neither opposed nor authorized military action. Compared to the opposition parties, which were eager to support military operations, however, the AKP's position looked "pro-peace" and "pro-people," valuing the interests of the ordinary people in the region as much as state security interests. Other factors also helped the AKP garner support among Kurdish and non-Kurdish voters in the east and gave it opportunities to address the Kurdish conflict in the new period. Erdogan had a major advantage of credibility in the region. He presided over the relatively peaceful period since 2002 and did not play any role in government in the violent years of 1991-94. He was elected from the southeastern province of Siirt, where his wife is from. The AKP continued the EU reforms initiated by the previous government and legislated limited yet important cultural rights for Kurdish and other ethnic minorities.

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The AKP stimulated development and helped the poor through projects of rural infrastructure and government health and aid programs and through the increased charity activities ofTurkish-Kurdish Islamic faith-based groups. Regional economic well-being was also helped by cross-border trade with northern Iraq. where Turkey is a major investor and supplier. which was supported by the AKP's reluctance to use military measures against the PKK. All in all, the AKP signaled to people that it was willing to adopt a more society-centered approach to the Kurdish conflict that would be respectful of people's ethnic identities and cultures and would give priority to peace and human welfare over state security. The AKP also benefited from the rising Islamic conservatism in the southeast and the neighboring Middle East.'9 Last but not least. the AKP benefited from its rivals' weaknesses. The opposition parties portrayed a security-oriented profile disregarding ordinary people's needs. The DTP focused on the political aspects of the Kurdish question. disregarding socioeconomic problems. The AKP did not introduce any major legal-political initiative for a political solution of the Kurdish conflict, however. disappointing many of its Kurdish constituencies. Nor did it launch any major policy programs to induce systematic socioeconomic development in the east, beyond the aforementioned activities.

Secular and Religious Kurdish Nationalism In general Turkish Kurds are thought to form a predominantly religiousconservative and traditional constituency, especially in the east (van Bruinessen 2..000). Tribal. sectarian. and religious-communal bonds continue to play important roles. Tribal and religious leaders have significant authOrity. Yet ethnic Kurds do not form a monolithic or static population. They are being transformed by social-economic development and global ideological trends. As argued above, one reason why Kurdish nationalist elites failed to mobilize Kurdish masses for a Kurdish-nationalist project during the fall of the Ottoman Empire was their relatively pro-secular and m~dernist outlook. Within the republic. secular Kurdish nationalists pursued alliance with traditional Kurdish elites by downpJaying secular Kurdish nationalism. The transition to multiparty democracy in 1946 provided traditional Kurdish elites with new opportunities for political patronage. Many joined conservative parties on the center-right. In the 19605 a new generation of

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Kurdish activists emerged. They were a product of relative socioeconomic development and upward mobility through education and the political opportunities provided by the liberal-democratic Constitution instated after the military coup of 1960. This new generation had a pro-secular outlook, was less dependent on traditional sOcial-religious bonds, and was ideologically shaped by Marxism. Thus a tripartite division emerged among Kurdish nationalists: secularrevolutionary nationalists, traditional (elite) nationalists, and religiousconservative or "Islamist" nationalists. Juxtaposed on these were secular and religious-conservative "loyalists." For the sake of a better word, this refers to people who shunned Kurdish nationalism for one reason or another, whether or not they would like to see more recognition of their ethnic identity. These were seen as "pro-state" or "pro-Turkish" by the nationalists. This profile is still visible today, with vague and porous borders and changing contents. Loyalists joined Turkey-wide social movements and Turkish mainstream parties in the center-right and center-left. Traditional nationalists were organized under illegal parties such as the Turkish KDP (Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan). Secular revolutionaries became organized under legal and underground movements such as Tip (Workers Party of Turkey) and DDKO (Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths). Their secular and leftist orientation provided them with both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it enabled them to build alliances with Turkish leftist movements and political parties and to portray the image of a political force that favors social transformation, development, and justice. On the other hand, their secular and revolutionary outlook limited their ability to bond with and mobilize religious-conservative Kurdish constituencies (Watts 2.007). Thus secular Kurdish nationalists have to walk a tightrope: while promoting social transformation, they also have to display their respect for religion and tradition. The PKK can be seen as the violent manifestation of the secular, leftistrevolutionary version of Kurdish nationalism. Like other secular Kurdishnationalist actors, the PKK and the DTP have to downplay their secular revolutionary goals in order to maintain their support base. Similarly, the use of terror is a double-edged sword. While impressing some by demonstrating coercive power to challenge the state and to silence dissident Kurds, it also turns away people who want peace and stability.lo

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The AKP's Rise and Opportunities for Peaceful Resolution Against this background, the AKP's popularity among Kurds represents the retreat of secular Kurdish nationalism vis-a-vis twO forces: religiousconservative Kurdish nationalism and a type of Muslim-Turkish or "MuslimTurkey" nationalism that the AKP promotes. While the AKP proclaims its respect for Kurdish rights, for example, it also proclaims the principle of "one nation, one state, and one flag." As such, it represents a more globalist (less defensive and less inward-oriented) and less diversity-phobic Turkish nationalismY But the AKP has to resolve many potential contradictions of interest and ideas that exist between a "Turkey nationalism" and the ability to recognize Kurdish rightS before its constituencies can embrace this new version of nationalism. Yet the nature of the nationalism that the AKP promotes is still in the making. Its content is uncertain and contested, and the party's leaders frequently resort to "defensive" Turkish nationalist symbols and rhetoric.l~ It is still unclear whether or not the party can successfully combine a notion of Turkey-wide patriotism with a "less defensive" Kurdish nationalism and demands for Kurdish rights. Nevertheless, the AKP's strong support among both the majority and minority societies provides a Significant potential for peaceful resolution. What are the chances that the AKP can utilize this potential? Is the AKP's ascendance (and that of its version of Turkish and Kurdish nationalism) a temporary or long-lasting one? The potential for peaceful resolution is constrained by the two security dilemmas discussed above. Insofar as nationalism, rather than the security dilemmas, is the root cause of this conflict, we would expect the AKP to address the Kurdish conflict with different means than those used by other Turkish parties. Insofar as the security dilemmas playa more major causal role, we should expect the AKP to act in ways similar to other parties in regard to issues that are demonstrably related to the security dilemmas. Recent developments point to the continuing importance of the security dilemmas.

The AKP, Iraq, and the PKK After the elections, Erdogan declared his party to be the true representative of Turkish Kurds, with a strong mandate to address the Kurdish question. The party also got his candidate elected to the presidency. Thus, everything

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else being the same, the postelection AKP had more ability and was more likely to resist military operations in northern Iraq. Yet, in the aftermath of the elections, the AKP and the military seemed to be in agreement rather than at odds over actions against the PKK. In December 2007 the Turkish air forces attacked PKK targets in northern Iraq. In February 2008 the military launched a major military operation against PKK bases in northern Iraq, which lasted eight days and involved about ten thousand troops. Thus, as soon as the AKP obtained a stronger popular mandate. it employed military power against the PKK in Iraq. The security dilemmas posed by the strengthening of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq in general and by the PKK presence in Iraq in particular affected the government as much as it affected previous governments. In addition, the AKP might have felt that it had to target the PKK in order to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the secular-nationalist state elites, many of whom believed the AKP to be secretly antisecular. Finally, the AKP also tried to marginalize the DTP. In November 2.007, when prosecutors asked the Constitutional Court to ban the DTP for separatism and links with the PKK, the AKP silently endorsed the case. More Significantly for the subject at hand, the military operations occurred in the aftermath of Erdogan's visit to the United States in November s. 2007, and with active U.S. compliance and intelligence support. 13 This was a new turn in Turkish-U.S. and Turkish-Iraqi relations. Since 2.004 Turkey had unsuccessfully tried to convince the United States and the Iraqi Kurds either to allow a Turkish intervention or to force the PKK out of Iraq themselves. In addition to punishing Turkey for its aforementioned intransigence before the war. the United States feared that an operation would destabilize what it considered to be the most stable and pro-U.S. region in Iraq. More importantly, the United States was trying to balance a seeming clash of Turkish and Iraqi-Kurdish interests. It was unclear whether the target of a Turkish intervention would be Kurdish separatists per se, Kurdish interests in Iraq as a whole, or both. Since the 1990S, when Iraqi Kurds began to develop their de facro self-government with U.S. support, Turkey had made it dear that it would oppose a Kurdish state, which it feared would become a magnet of pan-Kurdish nationalism. Turkey also opposes developments that it perceives to be stepping stones toward Kurdish statehood, especially the

Murat Somer

Kurdish demands to absorb oil-rich Kirkuk. This would make a Kurdish state economically viable and the territorial integrity ofIraq less sustainable. For their part, Iraqi Kurds were wary of helping Turkey, fearing that they would be the next target. They also feared PKK reprisals and did not Want to be seen as fighting "fellow Kurds." Furthermore, they might have felt that without the PKK threat Turkey would have no reason to compromise with them. In other words, the presence of the PKK in Iraq was a valuable, yet very risky, bargaining chip for Iraqi Kurds who wanted to negotiate with Turkey and with other regional states for the recognition of their autonomy. Two ambiguities in the positions of the two sides make them irreconcilable. In the case of Turkey's stance it is unclear whether Turkey opposes Kurdish autonomy or statehood per se or the possibility that such a state would become anti-Turkish and expansionist (i.e.• supportive of pan-Kurdish nationalism). The first position makes Turkish and Iraqi-Kurdish interests mutually exclusive, putting Turkey and Iraqi Kurds on a collision course. The second position allows mutual compromise and makes a positive-sum outcome possible (Somer 2.00S). In fact, an Iraqi Kurdish administration or state that opposes Kurdish separatism in the region (in the same way that Turkey opposes ethnic Turkish separatism in neighboring countries) may prove to be a stabilizing rather than destabilizing force. It may pacify rather than fuel Kurdish nationalist ambitions in the region by eliminating a major grievance driving these ambitions: the claim that Kurds are the only major ethnic group in the region without a state. Due to their geostrategic dependence on Turkey and historical ties. Iraqi Kurds are eager to pursue peace and economic integration with their major northern neighbor as long as their own autonomy is safeguarded.~4

The critical question is how Iraqi Kurds can credibly renounce panKurdism in the future. In this regard, the ambiguity in the Iraqi-Kurdish position has been their relation to Kurdish separatism in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Regional leader Massoud Barzani frequently made statements giving the impression that his ambitions were not limited to Kurdish interests in Iraq. There was a lack of trust between Turkey and Iraqi-Kurdish leaders. u.s. assurances help to bridge this distrust. Most importantly, however, credibility can be established by concrete actions, including policies vis-a.-vis the

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PKK and Kirkuk. Joint economic projects such as pipelines to carry Iraqi natural gas to Turkey and Europe would also nurture mutual tfuSt. All in all, peaceful reconciliation of Turkish and Iraqi-Kurdish interests requires that the parties reach an understanding. Iraqi Kurds should actively and credibly renounce Kurdish separatism in Turkey; Turkey should credibly declare that it accepts Iraqi Kurdish autonomy (Kurdish Regional Government) and supports Iraqi Kurds' economic development; and the United States should commit to opposing Kurdish separatism and irredentism. Erdogan's visit to the United States in November 2007 appears to have involved some kind of an agreement to this effect. The Turkish government made clear that the military operations after the visit that had US. intelligence support exclusively targeted the PKK. Iraqi Kurdish leaders subdued their public criticisms of the Turkish operation. Following the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, the Iraqi president and Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani paid a landmark visit to Ankara. Barzani renounced violence in pursuing Kurdish interests and emphasized the importance of good relations with neighboring countries, apparently with US. prodding.1s Finally, the Turkish military, which had been critical of the government's "soft" stand toward the PKK in particular and Kurdish separatism in general, ceased to express such criticisms. The actual elimination of the territorial security dilemma, however, depends on the future and stability ofIraq. Will Iraq become a stabilized country, with Iraqi Kurds being an autonomous yet integral part of it? Will the Kirkuk question be resolved without destabilizing the region (International Crisis Group 2007)? What will be the policies of President Barack Obama's administration toward Iraq, Kurds, and Turkey? What will the US. demands on Turkey be in regard to containing Iran? Will Turkey be able to meet these demands, and how will this affect Turkish-US. relations?

The AKP, Secularism, and the Kurdish Question Beginning in 2007, Turkish politics and public life became increasingly polarized over the question of secularism. In March 2.008 prosecutors charged the AKP with being a "center of antisecular activities" and asked the Constitutional Court to shut it down. The charges were not unprecedented: between 1946 and 2001 eight other allegedly antisecular parties were banned.

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But this was the first time that a party ruling in a single~party government faced such charges. Moreover, the case was unprecedented because domestic "secular" public opinion and the external world were divided over the identity of the AKP and overall much more supportive of it than of previous "Islamist" governments. In fact, the AKP had been hailed by many Turkish and foreign observers as a welcome example of the "moderation" or democratization of political Islam. l6 The party enjoyed significant external support from the United States and the EU and domestic support from secular~liberal intellectuals and business interests. Such support contributed a great deal to the par~ ty's ascendance. In light of this background, what is causing the opposition to the AKP and the polarization over secularism? And how is this affecting the prospects for the democratic resolution of the Kurdish question? Three factors feed the divisions over secularism. First, the powerful military and judiciary are trained to view themselves as the guardians of the strictly secular-republican principles that underlie the legal and political system and view the AKP's intentions as suspect. These principles were laid down during the 1920S and 1930S by secular-modernizing elites. First Atatiirk and then his followers decreed them with a view to consolidating the secu~ lar republic by sidelining religious-conservative opposition. The problem is that the military and judiciary never conceded to democratic amendment of the formal content of secularism, in the sense of relaxing some of its stricter boundaries in accordance with the changing times, even after the consolidation of the republican regime. Rather. the content changed informally, through the practices of conservative governments and the military regime Of I 9 80 -

83· The republican regime had potential for democratizing because its primary goal was to create a modern nation~state on a par with contemporary Western powers. Most of these powers adopted democratic regimes after World War II. Accordingly. the founding Republican People's Party that had previously decreed authoritarian secularism also decreed a transition to multiparty democracy under the leadership of President inonii. It voluntarily allowed opposition in 1946 and a change of government in 1950. Mul~ tiparty democracy, which has been interrupted by the military for relatively brief periods four times since then, has allowed the representation of Islamic~ conservative interests within center~right and Islamist parties. Islamist

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parties were frequently sanctioned by the secular establishment. But this happened after they contested elections and participated in local and national governments. The interventions of the military and judiciary in the political system produced two consequences. First, it can be argued that such interventions stifled the strengthening of civil society and politics, which could give rise to powerful civilian secular-democratic actors. For example, the 1980-83 military rule brutally cracked down on all political opposition, but especially on secular-leftist political opposition. Paradoxically, the ensuing gap in the political space was later filled by both Islamists and militant Kurdish nationalists. Second, the interventions generated a power struggle between the militaryjudiciary and Islamists/ religious conservatives, which they both began to perceive as a zero-sum struggle. Paradoxically, this occurred even though Islamic conservatives increaSingly penetrated state institutions and ideology and affected government polices. The military-judiciary deeply distrusted the Islamists, however, even when sanctioning conservative policies such as compulsory religion classes in high schools in the 19805. The Islamists tried to bypass secularist restrictions by attacking the military-judiciary's ideological authority and by trying to penetrate the bureaucracy's personnel and practices. Given this backdrop, no matter how moderate they are, the AKP government's actions are perceived as undermining the military-judiciary and, by association, secularism. In turn, the military-judiciary perceives its privileged status as ensuring secular modernization. This environment hampers the renegotiation of secularist restrictions by civilian-democratic actors even if these actors uphold the essence of the principle of secularism. The second factor feeding the divisions over secularism is the electoral, ideological, and organizational fragmentation and weakness of secularist political parties (Somer 2.oo7b). Given the AKP's quest for acceptance, its electoral victory worked to its disadvantage. First, the election outcome strengthened the moralists vis-a-vis the pragmatists within the AKP, encouraging them to embark on more conservative policies. This helps to explain why Erdogan changed the Constitution, in an attempt to allow women with headscarves on college campuses, without seeking sufficient consensus with opposition parties. The subsequent political crisis culminated in the legal proceedings against the party. Second, the AKP's control of both parliament

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and the presidency and its ability to make changes in the Constitution increased the threat perceived by the secularist actors. The weakness of the democratic seculariSt actors should be understood in a broad ideological. organizational, and discursive sense. In particular; the main opposition party (CHP) has failed to communicate effectively with voters and to minimize corruption within its ranks. Furthermore. it has not produced viable social and political projects mat can simultaneously promote secularism. democracy. and continuing economic development and modernization. It also has failed to develop discursive strategies to defend secularism from me point of view of democracy and human rights. For example, the CHP could not offer alternative policies mat would protect the freedoms of both secular women and religious women with headscarves when the AKP defended me rights of the latter in me name of democracy and religious freedom. Thus the CHP gave me impression mat it held the principle of secularism above me principles of democracy and of human rights, such as the right to education. This weakness of secular-democratic checks and balances against the AKP's conservative agenda creates a false dichotomy between democracy and secularism. The supporters of me AKP claim to defend democracy despite secularism, and its critics claim to defend secularism despite democracy. Finally. me ambiguous nature of the AKP's impact on secularism feeds the mutual suspicions. Aside from short-lived attempts such as a move to criminalize adultery. the party did not attempt to change any secular laws. Thus secular concerns result from the government's administrative policies in areas such as education, public recruitment. and local services and indirectly from the way me government's identity affects social perceptions of the mainstream social and political values. Sensing a shift of power from secular to religious political and economic actors, many people may be emphasizing religious symbols for opportunistic reasons. With more recognition of their values and lifestyles by the new political center. Islamic conservative groups, especially religious communities such as Islamic brotherhoods. increase meir public visibility and activism. Simultaneously, secular segments of the society and me secular media pay more attention to the increasing visibility of religion. which is most noticeably symbolized by the Islamic headscar£ This increases meir fears of religious pressures. They are drawn to a defensive and authoritarian version of secularism. which displays itself in pro-secular and

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antigovernment mass demonstrations. Defensive secularist reactions in turn radicalize the AKP supporters, who view them as antagonistic toward their conservative values. These divisions reveal the tensions between the freedom of religion, a major component of the principle of secularism, and freedom from religious pressures. These tensions affect especially but not exclusively women, because social-religious pressures often pertain to gender segregation. Insofar as it is hard to pinpoint the direct and indirect effects of the government on secularism in the social realm objectively, it becomes hard to avoid the growth of mutual threat perceptions. How do the divisions over secularism affect the Kurdish conflict? They divide the social and political actors who could otherwise he expected to cooperate for the resolution of the conflict within liberal democracy. Without the secularism division (and the territorial security dilemma), secular and religious conservative parties could form a grand coalition to democratize the laws on ethnic-national diversity and to implement more inclusive strategies toward the DTP and less coercive policies toward the PKK. This could marginalize the PKK and begin to resolve the Kurdish conflict within liberal democracy. In fact, the coalition government before the AKP was a limited example of such cooperation. It consisted of center-left nationalist, liberal-conservative, and far-right nationalist parties. Among other things, it took actions such as abolishing the death penalty and amending the Constitution. These actions saved the captured PKK leader Ocalan from execution and later made it possible for the AKP to legislate limited Kurdish rights. But by 2.007 such cooperation between the AKP and the CHP had become almost unthinkable because of their rift over secularism. During the 1980s and 1990S Turkish social democrats were the foremost defenders of the "democratic resolution" of the Kurdish conflict. After the AKP came to power, however, the CHP chose to shed its already weakened links to social democracy and focused on a platform of secular nationalism. Simultaneously, the CHP's uncompromising stand in regard to secularism drove the AKP toward the second opposition party in parliament: the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The two parties jOined forces to legalize headscarves on college campuses. This undermined the AKP's ability to employ more liberal policies vis-a.-vis the Kurdish issue because of the MHP's hard-line Turkish nationalist stand. A similar dilemma afflicted the AKP's

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relations with the military. Given its existing quarrel with the military over secularism, the AKP could not afford to open a new front with the military over the Kurdish question. The secularism division also weakened the, government's relations with secular business associations such as the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TOSIAD), which could otherwise actively support government policies to resolve the Kurdish conflict through democracy and EU integration. Finally, some actors who could cooperate in the democratic promotion of secularism are divided over the Kurdish conflict. Without this conflict and thus the PKK's control of the DTP, pro-secular actors such as the CHP and the DTP could cooperate in order to balance the AKP's conservative policies with secular-democratic alternatives. Can the AKP resolve the Kurdish conflict on its own rather than through cooperation with other actors? What would happen, for example, if the AKP successfully survived the legal charges against itself and won a decisive victory over its rivals in the upcoming local elections throughout Turkey, including the east ?11 Unless checked and balanced by strong secular-democratic actors (that is, without competition and cooperation with actors such as social-democratic and liberal parties), the AKP would be likely to overemphasize Islamic values and solidarity in its policies vis-a.-vis the Kurdish issue. Such policies would undermine the AKP's relations with both secularist institutions and the EU, where significant portions of the public are highly skeptical of Muslims and Islam. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Kurdish conflict can be resolved successfully without the active involvement of explicitly Kurdish actors who represent major disgruntled segments of ethnic Kurds (Somer 2008). While the AKP has many Kurdish members, they subsume their Kurdish identity under the AKP's Islamic-conservative political identity. Finally, the AKP's support among ethnic Kurds, which subsided because of the military operation in Iraq, may further erode ifit fails to formulate and implement feasible policies to address the cultural and political aspects of the conflict.'s

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I have argued against the overuse of nationalism as a selfpropelled, causal analytical category. Instead the two security (prisoner's)

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dilemmas discussed deserve more attention. They feed incompatible nationalist actions and undermine peaceful resolution. Thus a well-intentioned public-political campaign opposing a vaguely defined notion of "nationalism" would not by itself be a solution. From Muslim Iran and Turkey to Christian Greece, the nation-states in the region have developed "banal" nationalisms that uphold cultural-linguistic and religious homogeneity and often blend religion and language to mold a national identity. This suggests that the type of dominant nationalisms that emerged in these countries cannot be explained by self-propelled nationalisms. Nor can it be explained by cultural factors such as the legacy of the Islamic notion of the ummah (millet), which historically lumped together different ethnicities under the same category. In one specific sense of nationalism, however, Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms per se impede the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question in a causal sense. Ernest Gellner (1983, p. I) famously defined nationalism primarily as a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent, and nationalist sentiment as the anger aroused by the violation of this principle. If the nationalist principle is held to be absolute, if the political unit that nat~onalists seek is a territorial, centralized nation-state, and if people who uphold nationalism adhere to it as an absolute value that may not be compromised against other values and constraints, then Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms become absolutely incompatible. Turks and Kurds share among other things a common territory that they consider to be their homeland. Thus one has to lose in order for the other to achieve its goal of a territorial nation-state. Because there already is a nation-state in Turkey today, Kurdish nationalism becomes a destabilizing force. If this was the only definition of nationalism, then the only way to resolve the Kurdish conflict would be through the (unlikely) transition to a postnational stage. Turkish and Kurdish nationalists could coexist in a less conflicting relationship. however, if they uphold nationalism's political principle not as an absolute but as an ideal that can be weighed against other principles such as democracy, economic well-being, peace, and human rights; if they believe that the political principle of nationalism can be satisfied by institutions btherthan a centralized nation-state, such as autonomy (for minority nationalism) and a decentralized state (for the majority nationalism); and if they

Murat Somer

can prioritize nationalist and competing political, cultural, and religious values, seeking a compromise between the two. Realizing the difficulties of social and territorial separation, for example. Kurdish nationalists could seek first a more democratic regime and then goals such as cultural and administrative autonomy. by using peaceful means. The majority society in general and Turkish nationalists in particular could agree to the accommodation of such goals, for instance, by becoming more amenable to the recognition of cultural diversity, autonomy. and rights. Early discussion of inflammatory issues such as amnesty for PKK leaders might derail the social and political processes of reconciliation. Hence it might be wise for both sides to postpone such difficult questions until other issues that are more amenable to resolution (such as lowering the electoral threshold, amnesty for ordinary PKK members, and bilingual education in Kurdish areas) are addressed and thus create a more peaceful and less polarized political situation. Countries such as Britain and Bulgaria have successfully accommodated their ethnic-national minorities through such policies within democracy, but it would be hard to argue that they transcended nationalism, especially its banal manifestations (Billig 1995; Qzkmmh 2008). The consolidation of European standards of pluralistic democracy and secularism provides opportunities for such accommodation. Mutual fears. distrust, and conceptual gaps that exist between Turkish and Kurdish actors beset this conflict. Majority-Turkish actors fear social and political disintegration; Kurdish-minority actors fear oppression and assimilation. Even the "moderates" of the two types of actors have different understandings ofseemingly mutual goals such as democratization and "equality" (Somer 2.008). The freedoms and checks and balances embedded in consolidated, pluralistic democracy provide the best means to overcome these fears and gaps over time, through peaceful representation, negotiation, and deliberation. Certain current events clearly threaten democracy. When this essay was being written in 2.008, the two parties with the most support in the eastern provinces were both facing legal charges that could cause them to be banned by the Constitutional Court. Such a possibility would create a major deficit of representation and legitimacy.39 This would strengthen radical Kurdish nationalism and Islamism in the region. It could also give rise to a new period of violence and undermine democracy and social peace. I hope that the legal

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28S

and political actors involved in such cases use their agency and capability in pursuit of peace and democracy. Without the resolution of the security dilemmas discussed in this chapter, however, choices that make sense to well-intending actors may also produce unintended consequences. For example, simple provision of Kurdish cultural-linguistic rights or the promotion ofIslamic solidarity between ethnic Turks and Kurds, as opposed to secular state nationalism, would not suffice to resolve the Kurdish question. The Islamic Republic of Iran also has a significant ethnic Kurdish minority along its Turkish, Iraqi, and Azerbaijani borders. It has been more tolerant of Kurdish expressions and long permitted the use of Kurdish in the media and education, compared to the secular Republic of Turkey, which has only recently granted such rights in limited forms (Entessar 2.007)' Yet Iran's relatively more lenient policies toward Kurdish culture did not eliminate the distrust between Kurdish nationalists and the Iranian state. Both Turkey and Iran face entrenched conflicts with Kurdish nationalists and allegedly secessionist Kurdish movements. Unless the underlying security dilemmas are resolved, simple promotion of cultural rights and religious solidarity diminishes neither Kurdish nationalism nor majority state intransigence. More than eight decades ago the inability to achieve simultaneous resolution of the security dilemmas over territory and secularism significantly shaped the evolution of Turkish modernization. Secular Turkish modernization since then has built a secular, multiparty democracy in a predominantly Muslim society that is a candidate for EU membership. But it also transformed the Kurdish question into the Kurdish conflict. Furthermore, secular democracy is not yet consolidated because of the conflict between the prosecular and Islamic-conservative elites and the middle classes over what secularism should entail. In the present period the resolution of the two security dilemmas will once again shape the evolution of Turkish modernization and the Kurdish conflict. Can Turkey and Iraqi Kurds become cooperating partners rather than conflicting enemies? Can pro-secular and Islamic-conservative elites agree on values that would consolidate both secularism and democracy? Can they overcome their divisions over secularism so that they can cooperate on addressing the Kurdish conflict democratically?

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Ominously, the resolution of the territorial conflict hinges on a number of external factors, such as the U.S. policies toward Iran and the developments in Iraq. Historically, conflicts over secularism in the Western world required long-term and often violent battles. There is still no precedent for consolidated secular democracy among predominantly Muslim societies. Auspiciously, compared to its formative period, Turkey is now a mature democracy with a semideveloped economy and enjoys significant external support. Thus even seemingly zero-sum debates over territory and secularism have to be framed in terms of positive-sum goals such as democracy and human rights, continuing economic development, and possibly EU membership.

NOTES

I.

2.. 3. 4.

5.

I completed this essay in May 2.008. Many important developments have taken place since then with respect to the Kurdish conflict. I have chosen not to discuss these developments except in a few places because my main goal is to develop a framework of analysis that highlights the long-term structural dynamicS shaping the evolution of this conflict, in particular the two security (prisoner's) dilemmas discussed. The analysis and the critical comments in regard to extant research continue to apply to the present. They also help to predict the future evolution of this. conflict and produce policy implications. Another advantage of not including the recent developments is to show that the analysis was able to predict them, such as the escalation of the conflict with the PKK and increasing signs ofTurkish-Kurdish social polarization. For the concept of security dilemma employed here, see, among others, Dasgupta (1988) and Basu (2.000). Lichbach (2.003, pp. 12.-14). For "deep vs. standard stories," see also Tilly (1999). The term "minority" is used here in a numerical sense, not in a legal-political sense. Drawing on the Lausanne Treaty in 192.3, whereby the Republic ofTurkey was recognized internationally as a nation-state, Turkish law considers only deSignated non-Muslim groups as minorities. Many Kurds view the minority status as pejorative, and many Kurdish nationalists want recognition as a founding nation ofTurkey as equal to Turks. As a by-product of the conRict, however, there have been worrying signs of social polarization and possible violence among civilians. See, for instance, "Tepkide Ollfii KaC;:lyor" (Reactions Go Overboard), Radikal (daily), October 2.8, 2.007. These signs have been increasing since I completed this essay.

Toward a Nonstandard Story

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

II.

12.

13. 14. IS.

16.

See Somer (2.008) for elaboration and evidence. For comparable cases, see, for instance, Seymour (2.004). Tezcan (2.000), Ozoglu (2004), and map in Hanioglu (2.008). Ibid. The other tWO factors that distinguish the Turkish and Scottish cases are that Turkish and Kurdish moderates lack sufficient autonomy from hardliners and the difficulty of identifying who the moderates are among Kurdish nationalists (Somer 2008). More cooperative relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds may reduce Iran's influence in Iraq, while the resolution of the regional Kurdish question requires Iranian cooperation. See Oztiirk (2.007). See also Heper (2.007), who argues that the state policies should rather be seen as attempts to prevent "dissimilation." Though it is true that the policies did not necessarily target the assimilation of private identities, however, they attempted to eradicate public signs of Kurdish ness, such as placenames. Olson (1989, p. 37) notes that during the war Atatiirk built better relations with Kurdish chiefs and landowners than elite Kurdish nationalists could. For an account of Kurdish history writing in different periods, see Bozarslan (2.00S). See also Ahmed and Gunter (2007). For critical accounts from liberal and liberal-conservative perspectives, see Cemal (2003) and Akyol (2.006). See also Oran (1990, pp. 12.2-32) and Heper (2007). After 1922 Muslims from Greece were added to this influx as a result of an "exchange of populations" between the Turkish and Greek governments (An

1995). 17. To my surprise, I noticed that my own writing was at times inadvertently affected by this form. 18. See, for instance, Ne§e Diizel's interview with Ahmet Gigdem (Diizel2008). 19. See, among others, VaH (2.005, pp. 2.2-23). Ozkmmh (2.008) also uses the term hayali, even though he highlights that Anderson does not imply that nations are any more "fake" than other social identities. 2.0. Neither nationalism is monolithic, however, and they contain less defensive beliefs underneath the dominant versions (Somer 2oo7a). 21. For a recent example, see Giirbiiz (2007). See also Yegen (2006). 22. The letter uses the phrase "blood and race;' which in that period was commonly used to denote ethnicity. 2.3. The border with Syria was recognized in 1912 by the Armistice of Mudanya. 2.4. More research is needed to establish how much Ankara was aware of the Kurdish Azadi movement and how seriously it was perceived as a threat, in comparison to other "threats."

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2.5. The British cited 455,000 ethnic Kurds and 66,000 ethnic Turks in a total population of 786,000; and Turks cited 2.6,,830 ethnic Kurds and 146.960 ethnic Turks in a total population of 503.000 (Lozan Bart! Konferanst: TutanaklarBelgeler 1993 [192.3], pp. 343-72.). . 2.6. See especially table 5 in Somer (2.008). Turkish censuses do not include questions on ethnicity, so provinces where the pro-Kurdish party got more than 10 percent of the votes are considered to have substantial ethnic Kurdish populations, as an estimate. Those provinces were Adlyaman, Agrr, Ardahan, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbaklr, Hakkari, Igdlr, Kars, Mardin, Mu~, ~anhurfa, Siire, ~lCnak, Tuncdi, and Van. 2.7. Receiving about 4 percent of the national vote, the DTP candidates bypassed the 10 percent electoral threshold by running as independents. 2.8. In March 2.00, the Turkish parliament prevented the government from allowing U.S. land forces to use Turkish territory for the invasion. 2.9. See, for instance, <;iyek (2.008). ,0. See, for instance. Tavernise and Arsu (2.008). 31. For defensive Turkish nationalism and ethnic diversity. see Somer (2.007a); for a discussion of the AKP's globalism, see Oni~ (2.007). 32.. See Somer and Liaras (2.010) for the relationship between AKP policies and the religious-conservative elite values regarding Kurds. 33. See, for instance, "Bush Offers Turks Added Aid to Contain Kurdish Rebels," International Herald Tribune (daily), November 5, 2.007. 34. See, for instance, Devrim Sevimay's interview with Ha§im Ha~imi (Sevimay 2.008). . 35. Among others, see Kohen (2.008). 36. For an overview, see Yavuz (2.006). 37. After the completion of this essay, the AKP survived the legal charges but also lost some votes in the local elections in Kurdish areas. 38. See, for instance, the aforementioned interview with Ha~im Ha§imi (Sevimay 2.008). 39. See. for instance, Bejan Matur's "Kiirtler Kime Oy Versin?" (For Whom Should the Kurds Vote?) (Matur 2.008).

12

REFRAMING THE NATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE Kurdish Civil Society Activism in Europe

VERA ECCARIUS-KELLY

To CONSTRUCT A NATIONAL STATE, ITS MEMBERS HAVE TO SCULPT A unifying identity. Nationalists engage in the meticulous selection of complementary cultural features to advance their national project. Therefore nationalists frequently utilize symbolism, historical memory, and myth to enhance a web of social, political, and ethnic threads that make up a nation's fabric. Anthony D. Smith (1995, p. 19) posits that nationalists represent political archaeologists involved in a process of "rediscovering and reinterpreting the communal past in order to regenerate the community." Interestingly, nationalists need not live in or near the boundaries of their national state to act as capable archaeologists. Distance frequently intensifies the compulsion to reimagine, reinterpret, and construct. Dispersed, banished, and exiled communities are often fiercely nationalistic and engage in archaeological excavations to unearth and decode their own histories. In particular, forcefully scattered Diaspora communities reproduce nationalistic and homeland-oriented aspirations by reacting to or inspiring events. Among the familiar examples of politically active communities in exile are the Jewish, Armenian, Greek, African, and Irish Diasporas (Sheffer 2005). In contrast, scholars have paid far less attention to Turkish-origin

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Kurdish Diaspora communities in Europe, which are particularly numerous in Germany but also strongly represented in the Netherlands, Belgium. France, and the United Kingdom. When ethnic Kurds arrived in Europe they carried Turkish passports; host countries classified them initially as labor migrants and only later recognized them as political refugees. Turkishorigin Kurds represented a small subgroup of migrants and lacked effective agency as members of labor unions. religious organizations, and neighborhood associations. In 1956 a group of Kurdish university students, including several from Turkey, established a pan-Kurdish nationalist organization in Europe: the Kurdish Students Society in Europe (KSSE) (Hassanpour and Mojab 2.005, p. 2.19). Initially members of the Kurdish society engaged in networking activities through meetings at annual congresses, published nationalist information, and participated in homeland-oriented protests until 1975. This organization marked the beginning of Kurdish nationalist aspirations and articulations in the European Diaspora. Some fifty years after the emergence of Kurdish nationalism in Europe, ethnohistorical expressions and ideologically framed demands for a Kurdish homeland have resurfaced in the European public consciousness as the war in Iraq creates regional fallout. The prospect of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdish region has alerted policymakers in Europe once again that Kurdish ethnic identity, Kurdish nationalism, and the larger Kurdish question escape neat definitions and unambiguous categorizations. Until the late 1990S references to the Kurdish question among Europeans conjured up images oflongstanding secessionist wars between Kurdish separatists and nation-states opposed to the creation of an independent Kurdish homeland. Today the Kurdish question expands far beyond the geographic boundaries of countries that are presumed to be predominantly linked to the Kurdish conflict (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria). Seven years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it is reasonable to argue that the ~urdish question represents not JUSt a Turkish or Iraqi conundrum but also a European one (Yavuz 2.001). The Kurdish question merged into a European question as a consequence of intensive awareness-raising, agitation, and po!iticization campaigns by Diaspora associations over a period of at least three decades. Kurdish Diaspora activists, and in particular those determined to force change inside Turkey, now successfully voice their concerns and interests through networks and

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lobbying efforts within the supranational structures of the European Union (Blatte 2.006; Eccarius-Kelly 2.002..; van Bruinessen 2..000). Kurds and their European-born children participate in a range of political processes today. At times they articulate demands for controversial culturally based privileges such as state-sponsored minority-language instruction or religious education. While such particularistic requests stand out, it must be recognized that many Kurds pursue citizenship rights and voting privileges throughout Europe in order to become stakeholders in the societies they live in. Newly acquired rights create authentic political spaces and alternative options for activism, encourage innovative articulations of nationalist principles. and energize collective mobilization. Ethnic Kurds with European passports legitimately challenge controversial policies implemented by the Turkish state. As European voters they can raise expectations with regard to Turkish membership in the European Union, and as Diaspora Kurdish nationalists they can pursue the option of encouraging critical examinations of Turkey's treatment of the Kurdish minority. Diaspora Kurdish expressions of nationalism in Europe influence and shape the public discourse on· the future of the Kurds in Turkey. But the Diaspora's challenges represent a modified version of ethnic nationalism. Increasingly, Diaspora Kurds focus on cultural and linguistic expressions of identity rather than on an obsession with territorial boundaries. This is a reflection of the influence of second- and third-generation Kurds in Europe who spearhead the political effort as they obtain technical expertise. acquire political and legal skills, access advanced educational degrees, and demonstrate the re. quired familiarity with multiple layers of cultural competencies. In his ground-breaking London School of Economics and Political Scieilce (LSE) Centennial Lecture "The Resurgence of Nationalism? Myth and • Memory in the Renewal of Nations:' Anthony D. Smith (1996) proposed to ~am.ine the resurgence of nationalism by highlighting three resources that provide impetus. According to Smith, preexisting ethno-symbolic resources in.~pire nationalism. They include the collective memory of a "golden age; the notion that one's community represents a "chosen people:' and the claim t
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in the Diaspora by making claims to Newroz (New Year) celebrations and by reviving the Kurdish language (Kurmanji) in both written and spoken forms. They postulate national boundaries of a pure ancestral homeland-even if elements of this narrative appear more historically imagined than real.' Kurdish collective activism in Europe has succeeded in connecting the language of victimization to public discourses on Turkish membership in the European Union (EU). The Kurdish Diaspora's ability to assert power through controlling and managing nationalist articulations stands out. But its capacity to influence Kurdish nationalists inside Turkey, to shape and inspire new manifestations of interconnected local, regional, national, and global repertoires of collective protest action, requires further examination and analysis.

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The proliferation and pronounced activism of Turkish-origin Kurdish civil society organizations in Europe present convincing evidence that a historically marginalized minority group can effectively pursue political opportunities at the supranational level (Bliitte 2.006; Eccarius-Kelly 2.002.). Over the course of the past decade Turkish-origin Kurdish organizations established a collaborative network of allies who advanced the assertion that Europe's recognition of a separate Kurdish ethnic identity presented a fundamental human rights issue. The political path that Kurdish activists pursued in Europe should be recognized as politically innovative for a number of reasons, but especially for its organizational ingenuity, dogged determination, and ideological flexibility. Initially, activists focused on motivating collective protest action among Kurdish migrants who did not hold European passports. While political refugees were more easily mobilized in the 1980s in the aftermath of the Turkish military coup, labor migrants joined in to s,upport the Kurdish cause, even though they tended to be less often involved in civil society organizations (Joppke and Morawska 2003). Some scholars asserted that strategic awareness-raising efforts essentially awakened a Kurdish consciousness in Europe, as Kurdish activists identified and disseminated effective messages to mobilize the constituency (Leggewie 1996). In addition, Kurdish activists recognized that collective protest action required a shift away from the

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customary targeting of national centers of decision-making. To go beyond the limited influence that Kurdish activists had on encouraging reforms in Turkish society, they pursued a campaign that internationalized pressure on the country. Kurdish civil society groups in Europe effectively pursued political opportunities by taking their messages to Brussels (the location of the European Commission and the Council of Europe) and Strasbourg (the location of the European Parliament) and thereby implemented a transnational coordination of protest activities by forming a social movement. Social movements utilize group-based contentious politics to question and undermine the status quo and to assert collective claims that challenge, contradict. or interfere with other groups' interests in an established power structure (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2.001). This broad definition of sodal movement activism serves as a parameter for examining Turkish-origin Kurdish organizations that operate in Europe. Expanding this concept to organizationallinkages across state boundaries, as is the case with Kurdish civil society associations, requires a closer look at the transnational dimensions of social movement organizations. Kurdish groups conceived of and then created a European-based social movement structure to advance the Kurdish nationalist agenda and utilized familiar social movement strategies to do so. A roadmap for the examination of the Turkish-origin Kurdish movement and its sustained effort to organize collectively in opposition of Turkish authorities can be found in the extensive social movement literature. Ample comparative studies invite questions about how groups such as the Turkishorigin Kurds articulated specific claims to challenge the nation-state concept; how groups utilized protest repertoires to advance an agenda; and whether groups succeeded in their appeals to supporters over time.> The aim of this chapter is to trace the emergence of a distinct Turkish-origin Kurdish social movement within Europe, to examine the movement's evolution and its transformation, and to explore its future potential. Typically, social movement research identifies several interconnected areas of analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of a group's sustained expressions of collective opposition. The underlying purpose of collective protest action is to advance a group's sociopolitical position or particularistic interests within society. First, social movement researchers analyze patterns of collective protest action as they take place in defiance of institutionally authorized channels of expression. Orchestrated demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, and vigils

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held in opposition to policy choices by German antinuclear protesters in the 1980s, for example, represent a typical pattern for such sustained action out~ side of authorized channels. Second, social movement literature assesses group~specific claims that are expected to advance dearly articulated collective interests. Such claims can range from human rights-based assertions to labor issues, as was the case with South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) during the apartheid regime, or demands linked to a group's religious, national, or ethnolinguistic identity, such as the Serb minority in Kosovo or Mayan indigenous commu~ nities in Guatemala. Third, social movement literature pays attention to the formation of or~ ganized structures of resistance, their networks and traditions, and their symbolic and/or direct influences on collective dynamics. A recent example emerged when Burmese Buddhist monks led popular protests against the re~ pressive military regime of Myanmar. Buddhist temples served as symbolic centers of resistance, which encouraged state authorities to target them im~ mediately in a campaign to suppress dissent. Finally, social movement researchers explore the longevity of structures of resistance or centers of collective organization to determine if a group's claims effectively capture the imagination of itS membership and supporters over time. Clearly, i,n three of the examples mentioned earlier (the German antinuclear movement, the South African ANC, and the Burmese monks), collective action took place over extended periods, even over multiple de~ cades. While the level of intensity of collective action may wax and wane, the structures and networks of resistance continue to exist despite hostile and repressive dynamics that force groups to reshape, reorganize, or go un~ derground. And, most importantly, the fundamental claims that these movements assert must resonate with supporters over extended periods. The Turkish~origin Kurdish social movement in Europe (hereafter simply called the Kurdish movement) manifests all of th~ key characteristics of a tra~ ditional social movement. Utilizing Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow's extensive work on identifying essential dementS of social movements, four factors must be considered in the analysis. Social movements engage in (1) sustained claims making; (2) public performances of activism; (3) displays of worthiness, unity, manifestations of size, and con;unitment to the cause; and (4) the establishment of sustained networks (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, p. 8). The

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Kurdish movement in Europe persistently engages in all four of these layers of social activism. Over the years ethnic-conflict scholars have observed patterns of collective protest action that express specific Kurdish grievances and demands in Europe (Lyon and Ucarer 2.001; Wahlbeck 1998). Kurdish activists are known for appropriating communal spaces by organizing protest events in train stations and public parks; they focus on increasing awareness by disseminating leaflets, pamphlets. petitions. and films; and they mobilize support by sharing information with supporters through the Internet and via text-messaging (Eccarius-Kelly 2.000; Lyon and Ucarer :2.001; 0stergaardNielsen 2002). The Kurdish movement claims an essentially nationalist agenda that straddles a number of political demands. At times Kurdish groups assert a right to sovereignty or to regional autonomy or appear to embrace an acknowledgment of cultural and linguistic rights. In principle the Kurdish movement couches its demands in the extensive language of victimization by emphasizing a history of ethnic, social, and economic discrimination (Ta§pinar 200S, p. 1I2.; Houston 2001, pp. 95-98). Regular references to the establishment of a system of internal colonialism in Turkey appear in Kurdish pamphlets or on the web. This facilitates blaming powerful regional players, including Arabs, Islamists, and Turks, for the repression ofKUI."dish communities. While the Kurdish movement effectively articulates its demands to supporters, its position vis-a.-vis state authorities has undergone periods of vulnerability in Europe, as PKK cadres appropriated the movement's networks untU the late 1990S.

Undoubtedly the main weakness of the Kurdish movement relates to its centers of resistance and civil society networks, which became controlled by the Marxist-Leninist PKK between the early 19805 until the late 19905. Op.erating far beyond the parameters of collective resistance typical for social .movements, PKK cadres eliminated and replaced moderate voices within Kurdish organizations (the Socialist Workers Federation of Kurds: KOM:KAR) to control the agenda. Only when Diaspora Kurds shifted the cen•·•• ters of resistance away from PKK structures in the late 1990S after critical discourse related PKK military failures in Turkey to weaknesses in Kurdish political organizations in Europe did moderate voices gain influence again.
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it is possible to assert that a Kurdish social movement was gaining strength in Europe by the beginning of the new millennium (Eccarius-Kelly 2.002). It may be controversial to categorize Kurdish transnational activism within the boundaries of social movement theory because of remaining PKK affiliations and past aberrations. It is essential, however, to acknowledge that the radical element within the resistance networks in Europe has lost its dominant influence. Since 2000 the Kurdish movement's commitment to disruptive yet nonviolent public marches, large-scale demonstrations. petition drives, Internet-based messages, and transnational coordinated lobbying efforts has strengthened the argument that a process of political maturity has been attained. German security reports indicate that the PKK shuns open violence to advance its political agenda in Europe (Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz 2006, pp. 278-81). Undeniably, Kurdish activists mostly operate outside of approved and officially authorized channels of opposition in Europe. Their agenda is not integrated by interest groups such as trade unions, state-supported immigrant associations, or political parties. which tend to be influenced by more numerous immigrant groups, including ethnic Turkish activists. Yet in pursuit of their national project Kurds in Europe have started to distance themselves from cooperating with PKK cadres and focus instead on strengthening European-wide civil society networks. Social movements and their affiliated civil society organizations operate differently from standard interest groups. The main distinction between interest groups and social movements relates to their polar oppOSite status and level of legitimacy within a state's bureaucratic structures. Social movements function in opposition to state authority and therefore lack legitimacy, while interest groups collaborate with, are authorized by, or appear to be embedded within the state's bureaucracy. A direct affiliation with the state provides interest groups with a guarantee of legality. In contrast, social movements operate without approval by official sources, are not authorized or co-opted by the state, and therefore experience various levels of opposition to their collective activities from official centers of power (Snow. Soule, and Kriesi 2004, pp. 7-8). They function in ways that often question or challenge the established sociopolitical order. This is particularly the case because social movements represent issues that are not of primary concern or even of marginal interest to the established power-holders. Frequently social movements are perceived as a direct threat

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to the established social structures. Due to such unauthorized expansion of

the democratic space, it is essential to distinguish between social movement activities and ideas supported by interest groups. Collective protest action by social movements is organized and implemented to articulate dissent outside of the approved channels or modes of communication. Social movements express disagreement in the form of disruptive demonstrations or sit-ins, marches that slow down traffic, blockades to disrupt commercial areas, awareness-raising campaigns that disturb expectations for public order, and so forth. Kurdish activist organizations clearly fall into this category, because they engage in conduct that is disruptive or disorderly (0stergaard-Nielsen 2.002., pp. 191-2.00). Kurds in Europe often organize mass events in appropriated public spaces with or without officially granted permits for demonstrations or candlelight vigils. Social movement activity on a national scale has been studied extensively. Collective action that advanced the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s is seen as commendable today, while it certainly was classified as disruptive or even criminal conduct at the time. In a similar way, transnational collective action is often classified-as volatile, dangerous, and illegal. Power-holders in nation-states fundamentally reject opposition to economic globalization as misguided or ill advised today.' To mention another example, networked activist circles who receive support from international solidarity coalitions, as in the case of the landless peasant movement {Landless Workers Movement, MST) in Brazil, tend to be classified as problematic and unpredictable, even as prone to violence (Wright and Wolford 2.003). The hostile rhetoric against MST intensifies as a consequence of successful collective protest action. Sometimes state authorities attempt to provoke activists into a violent response to be able to intervene and dismantle a protest apparatus. Occasionally state authorities lack the expertise or necessary training that could deescalate a potential confrontation (della Porta and Reiter 1998). Hence it is not surprising that power-holders often view homelandoriented organizations as motivated by criminal intent, zealous extremism, or even terrorism (Somali, Pakistani, and Algerian immigrant organizations fall into this category, for example). Similarly, the Sanctuary Movement in the United States (an organized effort to hide Central American refugees from U.S. immigration officials to prevent deportations during the 198 os) became categOrized as dangerous criminal activity in an effort to undermine the

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movement's unity. Ideological supporters sensed that the aim was to intensify fear of arrest among the members of the movement." In light of such examples it becomes obvious that traditional social movement research needs to incorporate additional transnational case studies. Only then will scholars be able to look further for patterns in collective resistance strategies, identify modifications in repertoires of contention under specific circumstances, and assess the range of responses implemented by power-holders. Outstanding research is available on the origins, roles, and impact of transnational collective action, but the emphasis is often on advocacy networks linking European and US. activists to less powerful groups in developing countries (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1998). Scholars predominantly appear to be interested in the implementation and monitoring of existent or yet to be created international norms for human rights or social justice frameworks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002.). Comprehensive transnational case studies that focus on specific ethnic groups emerge mosdy from the fields of nationalism or ethnic conflict studies. This is not surprising, of course, because ethnic groups tend to be examined through the lens ofDiaspora politics or homeland-oriented activities or migration studies rather than through a systematic application of social movement theory. It appears that as, long as transborder activism addresses neatly defined human rights issues, such as a critique of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Serbian nationalist regime, it is considered acceptable by nation-states and their power-holders. The inherent role of human rights-based activism, after all, is to develop and enforce norms in order to tame violence within a state and to manage the conduct of states. Not surprisingly, ideologically motivated collective activism that challenges the authority of the state is categorized as undesirable, treacherous, and hostile, perhaps even considered inherently dangerous. Palestinians and Kurds, for example, who question a state's raison d'etre or its exclusive control over definitions of national identity, membership, and nationhood are confronted by power-holders who aim to render them impotent (McDowall 2.003; Romano 2006). The Kurdish movement in Europe is a case in point, even though Kurds operate in a geographically distant space. Kurdish activists present a direct ideological challenge to the Turkish state by questioning its claim to sovereignty in the southeastern provinces. Kurdish articulations of grievances,

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the use of collective protest action, and the establishment of centers of networked resistance undermine the authority of the state. Only a small group of researchers such as Arnir Hassanpour, Eva 0stergaard-Nielsen, Martin van Bruinessen, and Osten Wahlbeck offer comprehensive and innovative projects that address a range of issues directly related to European-based Kurdish collective activism. Yet it is nearly impossible to examine modern Turkish domestic and foreign policy choices and its related political discourses without noticing the significance of transnational Kurdish activism. The involvement of Kurdish migrant communities in the articulation of multiple versions of a nationalist agenda must be considered a central element of analysis (Ercan Argun 2,003; Wahlbeck 1998). Kurdish civil society organizations in Europe regularly question the dominance of Turkey's Kemalist ideology. This is particularly the case when European-based civil society groups and political organizations in Turkey collaborate to undermine constraints that are imposed by Turkish state authorities. The most obvious area of contestation relates to the use of media for the purpose of disseminating ideologically framed interpretations of nationhood (Bundesamtfiir Verfassungsschutz 2,006, p. 2.82.). For example, the Turkish government requested that Denmark's government withdraw its media license from Roj-TV, a Kurdish-language station that broadcasts into Turkey and irritates the Turkish government. In the past Ankara had successfully pursued the closures of Medya-TV in France in 2,004 and Med-TV in the UK in 1999 (Brandon 2,007). But the Danish government rejected Turkey's limits on Kurdish opposition groups, perhaps due to fear of another problem following the Prophet Muhammad cartoon incidents (Schleifer 2,006). Fiftythree mayors representing the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) faced persecution in Turkey for having sent a signed letter to the Danish government that expressed their desire to keep Roj-TV on the air. Danish officials considered it unacceptable that Turkish state authorities accused the leadership of the DTP of "knowingly and willingly supporting the PKK" by asking that a TV station retain its license. s The interactions between European governments and Turkey over limits to Kurdish media organizations are conspicuous in contrast to broader human rights issues. Nonprofit organizations that collaborate with Kurdish groups and emphasize human rights concerns, immigrant integration, economic assistance, or religious needs otten benefit from an official

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endorsement by European governments. 6 Not surprisingly, Kurdish Diaspora networks and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) without a clear emphasis on traditionally defined human rights are rarely embraced and cannot take advantage of state funding sources. Organizations such as Roj-TV, Medya-TV, and Med-TV are inherently controversial and operate as long as they retain a license in Europe. This is also the case for Kurdish web portals on the Internet that circumvent government controls or are listed on security reports, such as Firat News Agency in the Netherlands and Kurdistan Rundbrief in Germany. The majority of references to Kurdish transnational groups are found in studies related to national security, terrorism, and criminal networks (Barkey and Fuller 1998; Gunter 2000; Olson 1996). In part this is due to the overpowering influence the PKK once had on the Kurdish movement. But it is also a reflection of a strong nationalist and even segregationist emphasis by Kurdish groups. Anti-Turkish discourses among Kurds in Europe represent a form of a tripwire to security officials, fueling suspicions of terrorist activities, human trafficking, heroin smuggling, and other criminal conduct. Rather than encouraging a differentiation between the criminal element and civil society participants, numerous Kurdish nationalist organizations disassociated themselves from European human rights networks during the 1990S/ This segregationist conduct contributed to profound suspicions about Kurdish associations and linkages to terrorist activities. For the purpose of opening a window into the Kurdish movement in Europe, it makes sense to avoid classifying Kurdish civil society organizations and their activists as radicals, fanatics, and militants even if evidence points to contacts with PKK-affiliated groups. Van Bruinessen noted a dear shift within the PKK's thinking following Ocalan's capture. Noticing an essential change toward embracing Kurdish political activism in Europe, van Bruinessen (in the foreword to Jwaideh 2006, p. xii) commented that "since the arrest of its leader ... the PKK has scaled down its demands even further and has been concentrating on cultural rightS and political liberalization. It has become one of the strongest advocates of Turkey's accession to the European Union. perceiving that the incorporation of the Turkish nation-state in a strong supranational body is the best guarantee for Kurdish cultural rights and for its prospects of devolution and a degree of self-rule."

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Filmmaker and journalist Kevin McKiernan's 2.001 documentary Good Kurds, Bad Kurds explored a related point of contention by juxtaposing the idea that Iraqi Kurds were "good" and deserving of protection against Sad~ dam Hussein, while Turkish Kurds were "bad" because they waged an armed insurrection against a U.S. ally. The Kurdish movement in Europe and its networked civil society organizations maintain connections with PKK-affiliated groups as a consequence of their past. That reality does not delegitimize the Kurdish movement in its entirety in Europe; nor should it exclude the pos~ sibility that Kurdish civil society organizations have limited influence over strategies employed by the PKK in southeastern Turkey. Every time tensions flare up in Turkey's southeastern provinces, immigrant neighborhoods in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands mirror the deteriorating developments (Islam 2007).

A PIVOTAL POINT Kurdish nationalist articulations present a fundamental dilemma not only in Turkey but also in Europe. The process of European integration is based on human rights norms that are expected to eradicate the notion of nationalism. Categorized as chauvinist, myopic, and counterintuitive to the construction and shaping of a united Europe, nationalism appears to be out of place. Supporters of a broader supranational Europeanization project perceive nationalist trends as an unpleasant by~product of a larger globalization process, perhaps even as a defensive act against the dismantling of established systems of privileges. As the supranational legal and political structure gains influence through the strengthening of the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament, and the Council of Europe, regional interpretations of nationalism or subnationalisms gain support.s Acutely aware of countries losing their sovereign control over external borders, opponents of European integration utilize nationalist expressions to create an alternative voice that is critical of the EU process. Nationalists insist that they have the right to define their state's ethnic identity and that they ought to determine who deserves membership. Nationalist sentiments tend to intensify as a consequence of changes to immigration policies, followed by increased cultural diversity, and integration efforts linked to citizenship rights (Koopmans et al. 200S, pp. 1-10).

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It is easy to grasp the reasons for Europe's caution with regard to Kurdish nationalism. Perceived as an import-a notion that was transferred from Turkey to Europe as part of a labor migration-Kurdish nationalism is anathema to supporters of the Europeanization process. The phenomenon of Kurdish nationalism often becomes interpreted through patriarchal constructs such as tribalism and gendered violence, including honor killings in Europe. 9 It is obvious that the repression of women is perceived as a fundamental obstacle to the idea of Europeanization, human rights, and gender equality. A secondary issue is that nationalism essentially endorses isolationist and segregationist tendencies rather than an embrace of values linked to social integration, multiethnicity, and multiculturalism (Koopmans et al. 2005, p. 12.).'0 Ideologically the EU is dominated by an embrace of cultural and political plurality, principles of human rights, and a commitment to integration rather than the segregation of groups based on ethnicity or heritage. The EU's motto "united in diversity; an approximation of "in varietate concordia," advocates for this ideological commitment. It will be difficult for Kurdish activists in Europe to insist on nationalist concepts if they hope to gain support from allies or members of Europe's supranational political and judicial structures. Kurdish civil society organizations can successfully appeal for improvements in human rights norms or advances in minority protections but will find that openly segregationist tendencies couched in nationalist language consistently faU to advance a broader Kurdish agenda in Europe. A clear characterization of what constitutes a Kurdish transnational social movement helps to circumvent superficial categorizations of Kurdish collective action in Europe. Tarrow (2001, p. II) defined transnational social movements "as socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor." The Kurdish movement in Europe deserves further inquiry, as it pursues a multipronged strategy of conventional repertoires of protest in European cities and simultaneously appeals to the EU through transnational activism at the new centers of power in Brussels and Strasbourg. Utilizing standard protest mechanisms as well as innovative ways to pursue change, the Kurdish movement itself has been transformed by its approaches to activism.

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Kurdish activists in Europe are nearing a pivotal point in their struggle for recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights. Hoping to benefit from growing international pressure on Turkey to reform its institutions, European Kurds perceive political conditions to be ripe for transformation. The successful demarcation of a Kurdish region in northern Iraq and Europe's expectation for improved minority rights in Turkey created advantageous conditions for Kurdish activists. These dynamics require a fresh assessment of Kurdish civil society organizations, their networked lobbying efforts, and transnational activist challenges to the Kemalist interpretations of statehood. The fundamental predicament for European-based Kurdish activists and pro-Kurdish organizations is whether they will manage to take advantage of favorable conditions. In the past, periods of violence followed internal ideological disputes among Kurdish Diaspora organizations. Such divisions led to the alienation of a significant portion of Turkish-origin Kurdish residents in Europe, making Kurdish unity a daunting prospect. But as promising as the circumstances appear for an accommodation between the Turkish government and pro-Kurdish civil society organizations, miscalculations by PKK units and internal rifts among Kurds in exile could turn the quest for Kurdish cultural equality into another mirage along the arduous path to international recognition. Another pivotal moment emerged nearly a decade ago and then slipped away. This occurred when Kurdish activists in Europe offered a confused, inarticulate, and misguided response following PKK leader Abdullah Dcalan's arrest in 1999. Hundreds of Kurdish protesters stormed the Israeli consulate general in Berlin, among other administrative buildings throughout Europe. Security agents shot and killed several intruders who had scaled the compound walls and turned the consulate's courtyard into a battleground. Instead of taking this opportunity to shift attention away from the PKK, Kurdish organizations in Europe wasted precious energy on defending Dcalan, his leadership style, and the use of violence. The short window of opportunity for legitimacy evaporated in its entirety after Kurdish civil society associations failed to communicate an innovative and new direction. In the emerging security environment of Europe following terrorist attacks in Spain and Britain, Kurdish activists appeared to create justifications for past strategies. Instead of condemning the targeting ofTurkish commercial interests abroad to announce a shift in approach, activists

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proposed that such conduct represented a defensive response to repressive mechanisms utilized by Turkish state authorities. Missing an opportunity to provide leadership. Kurdish civil society organizations lacked a vision that could have improved their relationship with European human rights organizations and intergovernmental agencies at that time. It is important to examine the state of Kurdish activism today and in particular its willingness to espouse reframed nationalist ideals. In the language utilized to express Kurdish identity and the avenues pursued to influence Europe's official stance toward the Kurdish question. Kurdish communities are sending the unmistakable signal that they have fully arrived as members in Europe. Through the formation of a transnational sphere of influence. Kurds are remarkably empowered in contrast to the actual size of the community.

THE ORIGIN OF EUROPE'S KURDISH MOVEMENT

An examination of the underlying causes that explain the formation and maturing process of the Kurdish movement in Europe must consider the transfer of Kurdish nationalism from Turkey to European countries. In particular. Germany's relationship with Turkey requires closer scrutiny: the vast majority of Kurds in Europe live in Germany (estimates suggest some 500,000 to 600,000), but the Netherlands and Belgium also attracted significant numbers of Kurds from Turkey. German labor recruitment schemes during the 1960s initially encouraged Kurdish immigrants to establish enclaves abroad and thereby facilitated the transplantation of nationalist agendas to Europe. Then radical subgroups among Kurdish immigrants gained critical support after Kurdish asylum applicants escaped to Europe following the Turkish military's crackdown on leftist dissent in 1980. Finally, politicized Kurds in exile effectively utilized the liberal democratic environment during the 19805 and J990S to define the transnational political space. Nearly fifty years ago postwar Germany recruited foreign workers to satisfy labor needs during the country's reconstruction period. Between 196J, the initial year of the so-called German-Turkish worker agreement, and J975, just a few years after the recruitment period ended, about 650,000 Turkish citizens settled into semipermanent arrangements in Germany (Gurr and Harff 1994. pp. 67-68). Despite a relatively large influx of Italian, Greek,

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Spanish, and Portuguese workers during the 19605, the German government failed to satisfy the economy's extensive demand for additional labor. This shortage persuaded government officials to pursue temporary worker arrangements outside of the traditional European labor migration countries. In this period of dynamic economic growth the German government neglected to consider the human and societal effects of migratory patterns. A common expression among politicians-arrive today and leave again tomorrow-underscored the utilitarian attitude that German business and public policy circles promoted within the country (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994, p. 135). Only decades later would German society acknowledge that the question of social and political integration of immigrant communities deserved attention from the highest levels of policymakers (International Cri-

sis Group 2007). In retrospect it is obvious that multiple intertwined sociopolitical factors contributed to an accelerated formation of a distinct Kurdish Diaspora identity in Germany. While the public primarily characterized Turkish and Kurdish immigrant workers by their country of origin (Turks) and their blue-collar employm.ent or legal status (guest workers), minimal social interactions took place between Germans and immigrants outside of prescribed contacts in their places of employment. Differences and nuances within Turkish and Kurdish immigrant communities related to cultural, class, religious, and educational backgrounds became entirely obscured by stereotypical assumptions about immigrants who had arrived from Turkey. The general public lacked incentives to discern between Turks and Kurds as a consequence of pronouncements by German government officials that foreign workers would close the gap between labor supply and demand as long as it was necessary. Officials had no intention of permanently integrating and thereby acknowledging and addressing the diversity among workers from Turkey. As a result, a public attitude emerged that can best be characterized as a mixture of disregard for domestic Turkish conflicts and a high degree of ignorance and disinterest about the political baggage that immigrants brought with them (Faist 20°4: Eccarius-Kelly 2000). Politically astute and engaged Kurdish immigrants in Germany perceived their host country to be hostile, because it denied them the right to claim a separate Kurdish identity just as had been the case in Turkey (bgelman et al. 2002, p. 156)."

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Without a doubt. many Kurdish men initially arrived in Germany hoping to improve their economic status back home by working several years abroad (Fuller and Lesser 199,. p. 2.,)." But others entered into foreign labor agreements mainly to escape a repressive cultural climate in Turkey or to utilize what they perceived to be extensive political freedoms abroad-especially in contrast to the permanent marginalization that ethno-nationally oriented Kurds experienced in Turkey (Fuller 1993, p. Ill). 'The speed with which the separate Kurdish Diaspora identity formed accelerated as a consequence of the sudden end to labor recruitment in 1973. 'The German hiring freeze, directly related to the international oU crisis, affected all foreign workers, yet Kurds felt the consequences more immediately than other groups. Kurdish workers who lived in Germany lost their direct connection to predominantly Kurdish regions and urban neighborhoods when the flow of new Kurdish arrivals was reduced to a mere trickle in the host country. Young and predominantly male Kurds were cut off from regular patterns of communication and especially new information, which made them susceptible to ethno-national propaganda disseminated by radicals in Germany (Eccarius-Kelly 2.000). Turkey's military coup in 1980 created the necessary preconditions for a rapid emergence of Kurdish political activism and waves of radicalization within Europe (Lucassen 2.005, p. ISO ).'3 In the decade following the coup tens of thousands of Turkish citizens, many of them ethnically Kurdish, entered Germany. the Netherlands. and Belgiwn to escape political. religious, and ethnic persecution in Turkey (Lucassen 2.005. p. 150).14 The granting of asylum in European countries facilitated the creation of clandestine political resistance networks by both ethno-national Kurds and leftist Turks. This development transformed the makeup and organizational structures of both the Turkish and the Kurdish Diasporas from predominantly apolitical migrant groups to highly organized and homeland-oriented challenger communities. Germany in particular registered a significant increase in asylum applications from Turkish citizens in the 1980s· (Statistisches Bundesamt 1980-9°).'5 Germany did not collect ethnically based data on immigrants as a consequence of the Nazis' destructive use of such information. so it has been difficult to estimate the exact percentage of asylum applicants who claimed Kurdish ethnicity during that period. Migration experts. however.

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suggested that one-quarter to one-third of all Turkish asylum seekers were ethnic Kurds (Castles and MUler 1993, pp. 2.76-77). Radical PKK cadres entered Germany among the asylum applicants, established clandestine support networks, and provided Kurds in Germany with detailed images and information (or propaganda materials) about human rights offenses experienced by their kin in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The exposure to carefully selected information and the PKK's effective recruitment tactics essentially strengthened the cohesion of Diaspora Kurds, who experienced rising levels of economic exclusion as well as antiforeigner sentiments in Germany (Leggewie 1996). But the most crucial element that led to the rapid formation of a separate Kurdish identity in Germany related to the host country's democratic structures. Kurds gathered in neighborhood organizations, cultural clubs, and mosques to take advantage of the discursive and associational space afforded to them. This stood in dramatic contrast to the Kurdish experience in Turkey. Denise Natali (2.005, p. 85) argued that already during Turkey's transition to republican statehood "the denial of Kurdish identity, harsh secularization policies, prohibition of opposition groups, and militarization of the Kurdish regions prevented the continued evolution and open manifestation of nationalist sentiment." In Germany, despite the PKK's attempt to control the Kurdish national sentiment, dissent and alternative interpretations of Kurdishness emerged and survived.'6 In the late 1990S Kurdish Diaspora activists established connections with human rights organizations and lobbying groups to initiate transnational networking efforts. The Diaspora moved away from violent and confrontational tactics utilized by the PKK and encouraged the formation of special interest groups and lobbying efforts instead. Collaboration between the special interest lobby and the Kurdish Diaspora showed promise through its influence on Turkish accession negotiations within the European Parliament.'? Kurdish exile groups and their sympathizers in various EU member states catapulted the Kurdish question to prominence in EUTurkish relations as a consequence of political pressure campaigns (Kramer 2.000, p. 2.46).

In essence, several political opportunities contributed to the formation of . . a Kurdish transnational movement in the past decade. Diaspora Kurds ex•. pressed a preference for political negotiations after the capture ofPKK leader

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Ocalan. More importantly, Turkey's interest in joining the EU elevated the Kurdish human rights agenda to a new level and thereby enhanced the influence of Kurdish civil society organizations in Europe. Kurdish civil society organizations encouraged sympathetic parliamentary delegates at the national and EU levels to become more outspoken about human rights and minority concerns in Turkey. Among the most controversial figures involved in this effort is Turkishorigin Kurdish-German EU parliamentarian Feleknas Uca. She severely criticizes the treatment of Kurds in Turkey and demands a more judicious EU reporting system for specific human rights.'B In 2.006 Turkish-origin German EU delegate Cern Ozdemir also participated in a discussion on the situation of Kurds in Turkey. He demanded that the Kurdish ethnic identity be recognized and that Turkey discontinue its assimilation policies toward minorities.'9 While these two MEPs (Members of European Parliament) emphasize diverse aspects related to the treatment of Kurdish communities, both demonstrate a strong commitment to improving minority rights in Turkey and support Turkey's accession to the EO. It is obvious that a number ofMEPs are particularly sensitive to the Kurdish minority issue in Turkey (Blatte 2.006). Throughout the entire process of Kurdish identity formation in Europe and the movement's transition to an organized challenger community abroad, European governments played an enabling role through policies of benign neglect (Eccarius-Kelly 2.000). German public officials in particular expected to prevent the transfer of the Kurdish question from Turkey to Germany by disregarding the presence of Turkish-origin Kurds and later by labeling Kurds as a threat to the democratic foundations of the state. Both policy approaches failed by ignoring the root causes of increasing Kurdish nationalism and only contributed to a radicalization process within Kurdish communities. Examining the path of how Kurds in Germany (and essentially in most other European countries) became aware of their separate identity provides important inSights. Reacting to friction created in Turkey and in Germany, the Kurdish Diaspora established transnational linkages, engaged in political activism, and formed a social movement as a consequence of a lack of political recognition.

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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PKK The levels of violence between Turkish military units and cadres of the separatist PKK have intensified once again along the Turkish-Iraqi border. Not surprisingly, Kurdish activists in Europe face growing scrutiny of their political networks and their transborder linkages when violence is on the rise in southeastern Turkey. Transplanted hostilities fueled conflict between ultranationalist Turkish Gray Wolves and PKK cadres throughout the 1980s and resulted in a ban on the PKK and its splinter organizations in Europe in 1993. While current public opinion in Europe has shifted away from perceiving Kurdish residents as prone to engaging in politically motivated violence. the notion that migratory patterns encourage the transfer of a homelandbased conflict to Europe continues to be a serious concern to the public (Hoppe 2.004, pp. 123-31). Iraq's persecution of Kurds in the early 1990S "mobilized strong public opinion sympathetic to the Kurds" in the Western press and shifted attention to the larger Kurdish question in the region (Ta~pinar 2005, p. 174). Now Kurds in Turkey may gain some leverage from Kurds in Iraq, who essentially established de facto control over northern Iraq. A self-confident Iraqi Kurdistan that is poised to strengthen its economy through the Kirkuk oil reserves also counts on a lasting relationship with the US. military (Samson 2007). In turn, the US. military benefits from Kurdish logistical and military collaboration in northern Iraq; and, to the distress of the Turkish military, the United States and its Iraqi Kurdish allies appear to have ignored PKK units that are deeply ensconced along the Iraqi-Turkish border.'o The leadership of the Turkish military hopes to destroy the PKK, but it must be careful not to undermine the precarious negotiations between the civilian Turkish government and the European Union over the country's application for full membership. To complicate the scenario further, Turkey relies on continued US. support for full EU membership privileges, while the United States wants to access incirlik air base to supply its troops in Iraq. Turkey continues to face EU pressure to speed up democratization efforts as well as U.S. demands not to cause difficulties in its relationship with the Iraqi national government. At the same time, Turkey's military confronts a direct challenge by PKK units. The country's civilian leadership is expected to respond to rising levels of domestic nationalism. which reflects growing pressure to assert sovereign control over the country's borders.

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The PKK's use of guerrilla action in Turkey complicates the transnational Kurdish movement's campaign. The PKK had hoped to draw the Turkish military into a large-scale response during the late spring and early summer months of 2.008 so that it could point to repressive patterns and simult~ne­ ously increase international pressure on Turkey. In a surprise winter offensive during the final week of February, however, the Turkish military ordered more than 8,000 troops into Iraqi-Kurdish territory. This represented the Turkish military's most significant strike against the PKK in a decade and compromised the PKK's ability to prepare for a spring campaign from its stronghold in Iraq. Nonetheless, a purely military approach to the region's problems fails to address the myriad political, social. cultural, and economic factors underlying the conflict. Pro-Kurdish activists carefully observe developments along the border region, and civil society organizations warn Turkey not to pursue a full-fledged military option. Ankara now faces increasing international pressure to follow up its military offensive with a serious approach to accommodation in the Kurdish regions (German Foreign Ministry 2..008). Asserting an influential position in the region. the PKK utilizes violence but aims to force a negotiated setdement or arrangement with Turkey. William Gamson (1990, pp. 72.-88) posits that groups engage in violent campaigns if they perceive a direct benefit from their militant behavior. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) during the 1980s represents a convincing example that could proVide a parallel to the thinking within the most militant wing of the PKK. As an organization, the IRA sensed that Northern Irish sympathies would be gained in a violent resistance campaign against the British authorities. Nationalist militant groups like the PKK tend to avoid militancy and open violence when the general population is largely opposed to their presence, as that would grant authorities the necessary legitimacy to take oppressive action. Terrorism and militancy therefore will be embraced by the PKK and the DTP if the leadership among the Kurdish population in Turkey signals a level of acceptance of the violence. Any terrorism would be presented as justified by a need for ethno-national self-defense. With U.S. and European efforts to develop a plan for negotiation in hopes of avoiding large-scale Turkish military campaigns into Iraqi-Kurdish terri to ries, the Kurdish movement in Europe is poised to benefit. Kurdish civil society organizations and their networks in Europe pay dose attention to human

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rights violations committed by the Turkish authorities. The open question is whether Turkey's government will expose itself to a renewed campaign of international criticism related to the Kurdish question. The EU doubts Turkey's ability to reform, shows a level of impatience with the powerful role of the military, and suspects a rise in Islamic nationalism in Turkey.

A HYDRA-HEADED MOVEMENT The heightened sense of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and its politicized offspring in Europe have failed to establish Kurdish ideological unity on a broader scale. Despite the transnational Kurdish movement's effective European-focused campaign in the 1990S, Kurds in Europe have not articulated a common political agenda for the new millennium. Kurdish civil society actors in Europe appear unable or unwilling to agree on a publicly identifiable position or a representative voice. Interestingly, this development parallels the PKK's inability to replace Ocalan after his arrest in 1999. The absence of clear and unifying leadership seems to have weakened the case made by the transnational Kurdish movement-at least in the eyes of public officials in Europe's capitals and national representatives at the Eu:f()pean Union. But several pragmatic reasons explain why a sense of unity "'ithin the Kurdish Diaspora may not be a realistic expectation at this time. The Kurdish movement essentially operates as an unauthorized challenger community that gains little from seeking authorization by governments in i Europe. Kurdish nationalist mobilization is most effective in opposition to state control rather than in collaboration with authorities-even in a deterri
i~m.>ri:1:~advance its political agenda for over a decade now. By employing

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differing interpretations of ethnocultural demands and utilizing the language of human rights, Kurdish groups appeal to many audiences, including NGOs, community activists, and left-wing or radical parties. This strategy has allowed Kurdish activists to strengthen their relationship with s~nc­ tioned civil society organizations, including leading human rights groups. As media images shifted in favor of the Kurds after Saddam Hussein's gas attacks on Kurdish villages, interest in human rights in Turkey increased. It became clear that Europe would have a role to play in resolving the Kurdish question. At the same time, the EU accession process provided the necessary impetus to improve channels of communication and broaden the dialogue and information-sharing processes with NGOs such as Amnesty International and the Rafto Foundation, intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSeE) and the UN, and Kurdish civil society actors such as the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) in London. The Kurdish movement currently utilizes three interconnected and overlapping levels of activism to gain access to political circles. It Simultaneously operates on the national, transnational, and global levels but increasingly emphasizes the transnational and global political spaces. While Originally a grassroots movement, today Kurdish organizations are more sophisticated in their lobbying activities and in the uses of the legal and human rights fields. Kurdish organizations always seek to involve the loyal rank-and-file protesters, however. even though it is quite obvious that effective campaigns in the future will take place in a globalized environment rather than merely on multiple parallel nation-state levels. On the national level, the activities of Kurdish associations and institutes occur in most major urban areas in Europe, where Kurdish groups continue to engage in protest repertoires typical for social movements (0stergaardNielsen 2002; van Bruinessen 2000; Wahlbeck 1998). The majority oflocalized Kurdish groups are directly linked to an umbrella organization called the Confederation of Kurdish Organizations (KON-KURD). This network incorporates. for example, the Federation of Kurdish Associations (YEKKOM). just as it includes its French. Dutch, Danish, and other subgroupings. KON-KURD itself operates on an elevated cross-national stage: it mirrors national protest events but tailors them to an international audience.

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On the transnational level, KON-KURD increases Kurdish political influence by organizing mass demonstrations or Kurdish cultural events and by coordinating the countless Kurdish communities from various European countries (Bundesamt fiir Verfassungsschutz 2006, p. 2.81). For example, KON-KURD organizes the annual Newroz celebrations across Europe as well as other annual cultural festivals, and it spearheads signature campaigns to encourage Kurds to self-identify as Kurdish nationalists (Bundesamt fUr Verfassungsschutz 2006, p. 2.84). According to van Bruinessen (2.000, p. 10), Newroz events in the 1990S "drew up to several tens of thousands of participants of all ages"; and despite the "political character, they were family events, attended by people of all ages." This general trend continues, as German sociologist Andreas Bla.tte (2006, p. 182.) recently argued, pOinting to empirical evidence that the "Europeanization of the Kurdish movement has begun to occur in a fuller sense, including European-level Kurdish protest activity." Transnational Kurdish organizations have opened up offices in Brussels and Strasbourg to position themselves strategically for future political campaigns. Awareness-raising efforts that target EU officials help to publicize and reinforce the Kurdish ~ationalist agenda. Lobbying is a favorite technique of the Kurdish movement. A spring 2.007 signature campaign illustrates how this technique is employed. A petition encouraged German-speaking Kurds to forward a KON-KURD letter by either regular mail or e-mall to Turkish-origin Kurdish German EU delegate Uca. This petition demanded that the European Council's Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) send an independent medical team to Imrali prison in Turkey, where PKK leader Ocalan was being held in solitary confinement." Uca and other leftlibertarian EU delegates directly solicit support from Kurdish organizations and tend to couch their political statements in the language of a larger human rights framework. This communication and lobbying relationship between Kurdish groups and Uca's office at the European Parliament frustrates Turkish public officials. A comment by a Kurdish scholar explains why this relationship creates such unease in Turkey: "Uca is politically slippery, and she has links to the PKK, but in the end she is an elected European Union parliamentarian from Germany. In that sense she is legitimized by her office, even if Ankara doesn't lilee it."» At the same time, the Kurdish movement is also represented by a highly effective human rights organization that operates in entirely different circles

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from KON-KURD. The London-based Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) is led by Turkish-origin Kurd Kerim YlldlZ and effectively pursues legal cases before the European Court of Human Rights. It uses successful cases to highlight the violence perpetrated against Kurds in Turkey and condemns the Turkish state for its counterinsurgency strategies. The KHRP increased its ability to put pressure on Turkey by cooperating with three recognized international human rights groups: the Ratto Foundation of Norway, the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales, and Medico International ofGermany. The Ratto Foundation convened the fourth annual conference of the European Union-Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC). which provides an avenue to articulate diverse perspectives on the Kurdish question. The Ratto Foundation's website confirms a high degree of ideological disunity among Kurdish activists, scholars, and politicians at the conference!l Collaborative relationships with NGOs and the success of KHRP at the European Court of Human Rights dearly advance the Kurdish human rights organization's position. KHRP's legal experts, fact-finding participants, and researchers have been invited to present findings at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and the UN.·4 KHRP is the closest link that exists between a wider Kurdish movement in Europe and international human rights advocacy circles. On the globalleve1, one particular example stands out that highlights the potential for effective collaborative advocacy spearheaded by Kurdish groups. The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), initiated in 1983, offers a first glimpse at future antimodernization/globalization campaigns that aim to curtail Turkey's sovereignty and reduce the influence of its multinational corporate partners. Turkey has faced persistent international scrutiny related to the massive dam system. which is expected to flood some 2,500 square miles ofland (Ta§pinar 2.005, p. 170). This modernization effort by the state to create vast tracts of irrigated farmland will disrupt an estimated 6 million lives. Among Kurds, persistent economic inequality in the predominantly Kurdish southeastern regions has been interpreted as evidence of Turkish discriminatory policies (Yavuz 2007, p. 74). While the Turkish state always linked the upsurge of Kurdish nationalism to uneven development, many Kurdish communities tend to perceive the dam project as a direct assault on their way

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of life, including their claim to a historical homeland and its archaeological sites. Between 1999 and 2001 numerous international protests were directed against the massive hydroelectric project. In essence, European Kurdish organizations and diverse environmental, human rights, archaeological, and antiglobalization forces mounted an effectively articulated and united campaign against multinational corporations and the Turkish state. Once the project became publicly linked to the dislocation of population groups, the flooding of an archaeological site, and the suggestion that Turkey engaged in a version of ethniedeansing by targeting Kurds, multinational corporations withdrew from the project.os While not entirely successful in undermining GAP, the vigorous campaigns against the dam system provide valuable inSights into how diversified the appeals can become when Kurdish activists avoid segregationist language and nationalist rhetoric. By establishing a pragmatic coalition of antiglobalization groups, environmental activists, and human rights NGOs; th.e Kurdish movement learned to broaden its appeal, effectively apply the lahguage of i~ternational human rights, and link it to environmental just:ic:~coll~erns and the protection of Kurdish historical sites and a people's

··.collective~emory.

"::. . .::. :. -:. . . «......

CONCLUSION: NATIONALISM REFRAMED

kurdish civil society actors in Europe identified innovative political spac~s,pllrsued alternative options for collective mobilization, and articulate~less6penly segregationist and nationalist principles. An emphasis on •>~tllil1J:alJ:~~()gnition including language rights may lead to increasing levels of ic:olIab(")ratlonamong Kurdish activists in Europe. At the same time, demands J()r~~etrit:ory-bound Kurdish homeland are fading away in Europe. Ethnic gtlid.ishici#zens in Europe, and in particular their European-born children, {ha~~littl~i.incentive to relocate physically to an impoverished "Kurdistan" .th#)#¢~<:thployment opportunities, basic amenities, and the technologi:~aJ.i~f(#t~~cture that they take for granted. Instead some Kurds imagine visi~ihgi4e~~()rneland" in the sense of an emotional journey similar to that of '.:~Pt~~pi~tsP()ra heritage tourists. Europe's Kurds predominantly pursue eth:#it:trtd.cillt:tlral recognition for Kurdish communities inside Turkey and for

316

Vera Eccarius-Kelly

themselves in Europe and utilize their increasingly advanced legal training and technological skills to focus on achieving this goal. The Kurdish movement's critical examinations of Turkey's conduct. toward the Kurdish minority will serve as a constant reminder that the implementation of legal and political reforms has yet to be realized. Anything but a full accommodation of the Kurdish minority in Turkey, including political representation, cultural autonomy in terms oflanguage use. cultural life. educational opportunities, media access, and compensation for victims of counterinsurgency policies. will end in a zero-sum game for the Turkish state and Kurdish nationalists. If Turkey's vision for full membership in Europe is to flourish at any point in the future, it will require a commitment to a multiethnic and multicultural social construct.

NOTES I.

2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

Kurds lived in multiethnic empires until the OttOman Empire was split up after World War I. It is a myth that Kurdistan belonged exclusively to the Kurdish people, as Armenian and Kurdish lands overlapped. for example. For further discussion on the imagined sense of belonging to a community, see Anderson (1999)· For a broader discussion of the concept of "protest repertOires" and its application by social movc:ments, see Traugott (1994). To place standard manifestations of transnational opposition to power-holders into a larger context, see Smith and Johnson (2002). This comment is based on my interviews with participants in the Sanctuary Movement in Vermont. For further information on this case, see Amnesty International Annual Report (2007) at http://archive.amnesty.orglreport2.007 / engiRegions/Europe-andCentral-Asia/Turkey/default.htm (accessed in July 2010). Immigrant organizations that receive official funding include Exilio and Refugio in Germany, for example, and the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) in the United Kingdom. In Germany KOMKAR (the Socialist Workers Federation of Kurds) is a noticeable exception to this rule. See http://www.komkar.orglkurdistan.html (accessed in July 2010). Recent nationalist articulations in Belgium provide an interesting example. See Rainsford (2005). The article presents summarized survey data from Kurdish regions about public support for honor killings.

Reframing the Nationalist Perspective 10.

II.

12.

13.

14.

IS.

16.

17.

317

It is important to reflect on the comment by Ruud Koopmans (Koopmans et al. 1005) that the PKK has little to gain from a process of assimilation or integration among Turkish-origin Kurdish citizens (in particular since Kurds are applying for citizenship in Europe). -The PKK is identified as an organization that embraces and benefits from segregationist tendencies. "According to a 1996 opinion poll that assessed German sentiments toward four minority communities-Jews, Italians, AU5siedler (ethnic German immigrants), and Turks-Germans consider Turks to have the most alien life styles: they are least comfortable haVing Turks marry into their families or move next door: and they are least willing to see Turks enjoy equal rights: as quoted in Ogelman, Money, and Martin (2002, p. 156). Fuller and Lesser (1993) review the reasons for Kurdish migration within Turkey and abroad, including finding employment and gaining access to better educational opportunities for their children. "Like other Turkish citizens, Kurds migrate abroad, too, in search of work and to accumulate capital to improve their status when they come home, perhaps to the southeast, perhaps to the cities. Kurds from the southeast constitute a Significant share of Turkish laborers in Germany" (ibid., p. 2.3). Lucassen (2.005, p. ISO) states: "Until the military coup d'etat in 1980, virtually all Turks entedng Germany had arrived under the auspices of the guestworker program, although it was clear that a number of them had political or religiOUS reasons for leaving Turkey as weU. This was the case with the communist activists, members of minority Muslim sects (such as the Alevites), and the Kurds. When the military abolished democracy in Turkey in 1980 and started a straightforward repressive policy, the number of asylum seekers increased rapidly." Lucassen (lOOS, p. ISO) argues that "one of the results of theincreased refugee migration from Turkey in the 19805 was that the number of Kurds increased by one-quarter of the total Turkish population in Germany, laying the foundations for large scale intragroup violence in the 1990S." Available figures indicate that at least 120,000 refugees from Turkey were accepted in this decade (Statistisches Bundesamt 1980-90). One organization that competed with the PKK is KOMKAR. Information about this association is available at http://www.komkar.org/selbstdar.htm (accessed in June 2.007). Radio Free Europe (2005) posted the article "Turkey: EU Conference Highlights Continued RepreSSion of Kurds" online, stating that Hatip Dicle, a former Kurdish member of the Turkish parliament, supported Turkish membership in the EU to aid Kurdish interests. This article also demonstrates that exchanges ofideas take place between MEPs and Kurdish interest groups:

318

18.

19.

2.0.

2.1.

22..

2.3.

2.4.

25.

Vera Eccarius-Kelly

http://www.rferLorg/ featuresarticle/ 2.00S/ 0919761872-7-009f-4ac3-8449d062.fSd982eJ.html (accessed in July 2.007)' Also of interest are efforts by the London-based KHRP (2.005) to pressure Turkey into improving Kurdish ethnic recognition: http://www.khrp.org/ newsline/newsline31/ newslinC31.pdf (accessed in July 2007). For example, see Uca's 2.003 speech at the parliament in its entirety at http://www.europarLeuropa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef::;:-1 IEPII TEXT +CRE+20030604+ITEM-004+ DOC+ XML+Vol lEN &language:::: EN&query==INTERV&detail=3-IS6 (accessed in July 2.007). For Ozdemir's full comments, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/getDoc.do ?pubRef==-1 /EP I ITEXT +CRE+2.0060406+ ITEMOll+ DOC+XML+Vol IEN&language=EN&query=INTERV&detail=4-131 (accessed in July 2007). Graham Fuller is quoted in Today's Zaman as stating that the United States supports the PKK-affiliated terror group PJAK (Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan) and its incursions into Iran. See the article at http://www.todayszaman. com/tz-webldetaylar.do ?load=detay&link;::; 12-5112, (acccssed in October 2007). The full text of thc petition (in German) is availablc at http://www.kon-kurd. org! deutsch/index.php ?f=news&act=show&id= 14 (accessed November 2-007). This conversation tOok place in November 2.007 in Istanbul. The scholar asked to remain anonymous. http://www.ratto.no/DesktopModules/ViewAnnouncement. aspx?ItemID=333&Mid=42. (accessed in July 2007). See also the Ratto Foundation's condemmition of the arrest ofNurettin Demirtas following his participation in the EUTCC conference in Norway, at http://www.eutcc.org/ articles/7Ipress.ehtml (accessed in July 2.010). The KHRP'S Submission to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, June 2.1, 2.010. Available at http://www.khrp.org/khrp-news/human-rightsdocumencs/2010-publications.htmI (accessed in August 2.010). Protests against the hydroelectric dam project continue today. See the article "Demonstrators Occupy Brandenburg Gate to Protest Turkish Dam" at http;/ / findarticIes.com/p/articleslmi_kmenslis_2.00703/ai_nI872.812.41 (accessed in September 2-007).

CONCLUSION

AY~E KAmOGLU AND

E. FUATKEYMAN

THE YEARS ;2.009 AND 2010 WILL NO DOUBT BE RECORDED IN HISTORY

as the era of the trials and tribulations of the "Kurdish opening." On January I. 2009. Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) began broadcasting in Kurdish on one of its channels called TRT 6. This development symbolized . official recognition and acceptance of the Kurdish language on the part of iii: the state authorities; In the summer of ;2.009 the AKP government disclosed ii: its intention to initiate a Kurdish opening. This intention was expressed i::/ quite keenly by the prime minister. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the minis:·ter of the interior. Be~ir Atalay. who made an effort to meet with several lead:iers of civil societal organizations. intellectuals, and popular Turkish artists in 'order to specify the nature of the Kurdish opening. :ii:·· On October 19. 2009, thirty-four members of the PKK arrived in Turkey />from various camps in Iraq within the framework of the Kurdish opening of (the government. They entered Turkey on the border at Habur and surreniclered themselves to the Turkish authorities. They expected to be pardoned /i\ollthe basis of article 221 of the Turkish Penal Code. which outlines the paiihmeters of "active regret." According to this article. people who have joined /i:anorganization that engages in Ulegal activity are pardoned. provided that :;:they voluntarily express regret. Their arrival was described as the "descent of Fi'the Kurdish terrorists from the mountains" by almost all the newspapers in :T~rkey. These people were greeted as heroes by thousands of Kurds in Turkey i:i~()rtg the road from Silopi to DiyarbakIr. in Cizre. Nusaybin. and Klztltepe. ;'IheTurkish media portrayed the crowds who were cheering for them in a .Yst#eOfjoyous celebration. These sights offended some Turks. who were filled 319

320

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Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman

with memories of the loss of beloved Turkish soldiers who died during armed clashes with the PKK militants or were killed by the explosion of mines planted by them. The arrival of the thirty-four militants was the most important event since the beginning of the rhetoric of a Kurdish opening by the AKP government. This major move was going to be extended to some other members of the PKK in European countries, who also would use the framework of "active regret." Yet the festive greeting ceremonies held for the thirty-four members of the PKK backfired on the AKP. The members of the opposition political parties expressed their reaction by blaming the AKP for collaborating with the terrorists and for surrendering to the wishes of the u.s. government. Their rhetoric was laden with an anti-American and statist nationalism that glorified the fehits (martyrs) of the Turkish military. On October 24, 2009, the prime minister had to announce the postponement of the new arrivals of PKK militants from Europe who would voluntarily express their regret for joining the PKK. Hence "the descent of the Kurdish terrorists from the mountains" was put on hold. In June 2010 some of these PKK militants who sought pardon were arrested. Their arrest jeopardized the entire rhetoric of the Kurdish opening. In July 2010 seventeen of them returned to their camps. On November 10, 2009, the parliament held a historically significant meeting to discuss the democratic opening in relation to the Kurdish question. The leaders of the governing and opposition parties delivered the positions of their own parties on the government initiative as well as their proposals for the solution of the question. Indeed, it was a significant day in the history of modern Turkey. After twenty-five years of terror and violence as well as human tragedy and misery the Kurdish question was debated where the issue was supposed to be debated and resolved: in the parliament. The parliamentary debate was Significant because it demonstrated the possibility of dealing with the Kurdish question through de!l10cratic deliberation. It also revealed the enduring dominance of nationalism as an ideology and as a strategy. which was evident in the frequent use of nationalist terms and discourses in the speeches of the party leaders. Although the initial rhetoric of the Kurdish opening in 2009 pointed to a major shift in the AKP's policy away from the militarization that characterized earlier years, by the summer of 2010 the Kurdish issue once again began

Conclusion

321

to be dealt with as a security matter. The closure of the main Kurdish political party, the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi. DTP). by the Constitutional Court in December 2.009 signaled the beginning of the end of the Kurdish opening. Although the pardon of the thirty-four militants could be the most important step taken in the history of the Turkish Republic toward a reconciliation rather than conflict. the arrest of some of these militants in June 2.010 signaled the return of conflict. The outcome still remains to be seen as we write these final lines. Recent policy shifts seem to have led to an escalation of conflict by igniting the fire of radical nationalist appeals whose very raison d'etre was undermined by the earlier attempts at reconciliation. This book represents a serious attempt to show that competing nationalisms nurture one another. Nationalist feelings are kept alive by the constant reproduction of mutually exclusive discourses that deny the identities of others. The flow of competing nationalisms is realized by a dialectical choreography based on the negation of the other. All national identities are reproduced by the repudiation of difference. Competing nationalisms have the capacity to harm liberal dem"ocratic regimes in their struggle to negate one another. The contributors to this volume share a view of nationalism as a constructed ideology that also operates at the level of our lived reality in the world. Nationalism can feed feelings of insecurity. fear, and resentment in people by its ability to construct borders and identify the boundaries of the national self vis-a.-vis others. It also nurtures these feelings by keeping alive a discourse of imminent threat to the integrity of the national self. Nationalism is an ideology that uplifts homogeneity at the expense of difference. Given such traits. it can be argued that nationalism is inherently incompatible with the ethos of democracy. The literature on nationalism contains endless classifications of this ideology. Modern nationalist practices become part of our lived reality through border control regulations between nation-states and policies of admission to national citizenship as well as denial of citizenship. In some nation-states the doors that lead to the granting of citizenship rights are rdatively open: admission to national citizenship is a possibility, provided that the individual embraces certain national practices. In others the doors are tightly closed: citizenship is defined on the basis of ascriptive criteria such as descent, ethnicity, or religion. While the practices in nation-states with tightly closed doors

322

Ay~e Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman

are usually viewed as bad, half-open doors with impending images of membership in a national community are considered good. We often hear people refer to their nationalism as "good:' indicating that they do not give credit to the idea of excluding others by tightly closed doors. They are more concerned with the definition of the self rather than the exclusion of the others. Yet it is clear that aU nationalisms either assimilate (half-open doors) or exclude (tightly closed doors) and hence are incompatible with the ethos of democracy by discriminating against differences. Readers will discern a shared caution in the book about employing a single category of "Turkish nationalism." An underlying claim runs through all the chapters: nationalism is a multidimensional and multiactor-based phenomenon, functioning simultaneously as an ideology, a discourse, and a political strategy. Its sphere of influence includes not only global-regionalnational-local interactions but also the sociological and symbolic construction of everyday life. Precisely because of this it acquires the capacity to endure in our globalized world. As societies become more global, the effectiveness of nationalism as an ideology, discourse, and strategy does not diminish but remains strong. The contributors to this book are well aware of the various manifestations of nationalism in Turkey, such as official nationalism of the state, lett-wing Kemalist nationalism, ethnic and religious nationalisms, and the more recent convergences among some of these distinct currents. While they try to delineate the root-language of Turkish nationalism in historical analyses, they also shatter the myth of the existence of a single national project called Turkish nationalism. Moreover, the contributors are attuned to the dynamics among Turkish and Kurdish as well as conservative/religious nationalisms. Official nationalist practices clearly have resorted to both assimilation ism and exclusion in the history of the Turkish Republic. While it was mostly the nonMuslims who were subjected to exclusion, Muslim Kurds received their share of official discrimination by being forced to deny their language and cultural practices. Nationalist projects survive by resorting to discrimination through both assimilation and exclusion. It is obvious that one type is not necessarily better than the other; hence the distinction between "good" and "bad" nationalisms is misleading. The official view regarding the Kurds in Turkey underwent significant changes throughout the Turkish Republic. Once viewed as "potential Turks"

Conclusion

323

and subjects of assimilation, they were also referred to by a top military officer as "alleged citizens" who were disloyal to the Turkish state. A preoccupation with the preservation of the state has always been a key theme in all versions of Turkish nationalism, despite the differences among them. The state has been the dearest partner of the nation in Turkey, almost its raison d'etre. Some versions of Turkish nationalism adopted clearly anti-imperialist and at times more discriminatory anti-Westernist stances, while others remained loyal to the original Westernist endeavor of the early republican elite. Nationalism has proved to be an ideology with an exceptional ability to endure the crises of modernity. This was mostly due to its ability to flirt with a number of irreconcilable ideologies: liberalism, conservatism, and Marxism. Hence many of the contributions to this volume strengthen the argument that nationalism as an ideology does not "rise" or "fall" but is ever present. Several chapters also show that nationalism has the ability to flirt with several religious affiliations. Modern political agents often use religion as an instrument of nationalism. The marriage of Sunni Islam with nationalist practices that resulted in a pious nationalism in Turkey is dearly manifested in the second part of this book. Through this marriage Islam became an indispensable element of some of the nationalist discourses in Turkey. Globalization processes have undoubtedly led to a crisis of the nation. state discourses. The notion of citizenship is no longer defined exclusively on :. the basis of membership in a nation-state. Various studies attempt to envision ·.·citizenship on the basis of a discourse of rights rather than membership. The literature on nationalism and citizenship is thriving with notions of postnational citizenship, denationalization of citizenship, and constitutional, muliticultural citizenship. Yet none of these ideas and developments has made !:henationalist discourses obsolete. This is mainly because every builder of .•.• bridges among cultures is matched by a trench digger employing mUitary pt~ttices. Domestic Turkish politics has been going through major changes since t~~I990S. Several constitutional and legislative amendments have pointed in J~.~4.irection of further recognition of differences. Speaking Kurdish in pri,*~tewas illegal in Turkey until 1991. In 2..002.. it became possible to broad5~~tii~Kurdish on radio and television. These legal amendments finally '\\I'#~#i.reflected in the daily lives of the Kurds in Turkey with the beginning ?fbl'~~dcasting in Kurdish by a state television channel in 2009. All such

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Ay?e Kadloglu and E. Fuat Keyman

developments were matched by the escalation of military clashes between the Turkish military and the PKK militants. Countless lives were lost. Many demonstrations took place that reflected the anger and fear of the Turks who mourned these losses. Hence, while the path toward the denationalization of citizenship in Turkey is long and thorny, the journey has already begun. Modern Turkey represents a matchless case of congruence between the entities of the state and the nation. Many reforms in recognition of differences are pushing some political actors toward envisioning a divorce between these tWO entities and a reconceptualization of citizenship along these lines. But others have become engaged in rather violent and militant forms of nationalism when faced with such slippery conceptual ground. Whether these developments in Turkey will pave the way to more multicultural and less nationally celebrated forms of citizenship or, conversely, ignite the fire of new forms of nationalism still remains to be seen. The key question of our times is whether nationalisms will continue their triumphant journey through late modernity.

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CHAPTER I

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CHAPTER 2-

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CHAPTER 3

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Bozarslan, Hamit. 100S. "Turkiye'de (1919-1980) Yazdi Kiirt Soylemi Uzerine Bazi Hususlar" (Some Issues on the Written Kurdish Discourse in Turkey, 19191980). In Abbas Vali (ed.), Kurt Milliyetfiliginin Kokenleri (The Roots of Kurdish Nationalism). Istanbul: Avesta. Brubaker, Roger 1995. "Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples: Historical and Comparative Perspectives." Ethnic and Racial Studies 18h (April): 189-118. Bucak, Mustafa Remzi. 1991. Bir Kurt Aydmmdan ismet iniinu'ye Mektup {Letters from a Kurdish Intellectual to hmet Inonii}. Istanbul: Doz Yaymlan. Cemal, Hasan. 1003. Kurtler (The Kurds). Istanbul: Dogan Kitap. <;it;ek, Nevzat. 2.008. "Dindar Kiircler Partile~me Yolunda" (Religious Kurds on the Way to Form a Party). Tarqf(daily), March II. Dasgupta, Partha. 1988. "Trust as a Commodity." In Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. New York: Basic Books. Diizel, Ne~e. 1008. "Turk Kimlij:V Diye Bir ~ey Yok" (There Is Nothing Called "Turkish Identity"). Interview with Ahmet <;igdem, Tarqf( daily), April 21. Ekinci, Tank Ziya. 2.000. Vatanda,lzk Aflsmdan Kurt Sorunu ve Bir 90zUm Onerisi (The Kurdish Question from the Perspective of Citizenship and a Proposal for a Solution). Istanbul: Kilyerel Yaymlan. Entessar, Nader. 2.007. "The Kurdish National Movement in Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979." In Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and Michael M. Gunter (eds.), 1he Evolution ofKurdish Nationalism. Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers. Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. New York: Cornell University Press. Georgeon, Frant;ois. 2006. Osman/t-TurkModernlefmesi (I900-I930) (OttomanTurkish Modernization, 1900-1930). Istanbul: Yap! Kredi Yaymlan. Giirbiiz, Macit. 2007. Kurtle,en Turkler (Kurdified Turks). Istanbul: Selenge Yaymlan. Hanioglu, ~iikrii M. 2008. A BriefHistory ofthe Ottoman Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Heper, Metin. 2.007. 1he State and Kurds in Turkey: 1he Question ofAssimilation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hobsbawm, Eric. 2.008. On Empire. New York: Pantheon Books. International Crisis Group. 2.007. "Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis." Crisis Group Middle East Report 64 (April 19): 1-16. Karpat, Kemal H. 1001. 1he Politicization ofIslam: Recons.tructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State. New York: Oxford UniverSity Press. --.2.008. "Tiirkt;e ve 'Turkle§me'" (Turkish and "Turkincation"). Taraf(daily}, March 9. Kieser, Hans-Lukas. 1006. "Introduction." In Hans-Lukas Kieser (ed.), Turkey beyondNationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities. London: 1. B. Tauris.

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CHAPTER 12

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CONTRIBUTORS

TANIL BORA has been the editor of nonfiction books at ileti~im Publishing House since 1988 and editor-in-chief of the trimonthly social science journal Toplum ve Bilim (Society and Science) since 1993. He is the editor of nine-volume encyclopedic book Modern Turkiyeae Siyast DUfunce (Political Thought in Modern Turkey), with more than 300 contributors. He has written articles in the monthly socialist culture journal Birikim since 1989. Some of his books are Devlet Ocak Dergah: IpSo'lerde OtkUcu Hareket (Devlet Ocak Dergah: Ultra Nationalist Movement in the 19805, with Kemal Can, 1991); Futbol ve Ku/turu (Football and Its Culture, edited volume. with R. Horak and W. Reiter, 1993); Devlet ve Kuzgun-Ippo'lardan 2ooo'lere MHP (The Nationalist Action Party from the 19905 to 20005, with Kemal Can, 200+): and Medeniyet Kaybt-Milliyetfilik ve Fafizm Uzerine Yaztlar (Loss of Civilization: Texts on Nationalism and Fascism, 2006). SIMTEN CO~AR is an associate professor of political science, Ba§kent University, Ankara (Ph.D. in Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara, 1997: M.A. in Political Science. Bilkent University. Ankara. 1991; B.A. in Political Science and International Relations, Bogazici University, Istanbul, 1990). Her areas of interest are political thought, political thought in Turkey, political parties in Turkey, and women in political thought. She is the author of various articles inJournal o/Political Ideologies, Contemporary Politics, Femi-

nist Review, Journal o/Third World Studies, South European Society and Politics, and Monthly Review. VERA ECCARIUS-KELLY is an associate professor of political science, Siena College, Albany, New York (Ph.D. in International Studies, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Boston, 2002; M.A. in Law and 357

358

List of Contributors

Diplomacy at Tufts University. 1996; B.A. in International Studies. Macalester College. St. Paul, Minnesota. 1989). Her areas ofinterest are comparative politics. Muslim minority communities. revolutionary movements in Latin America. and globalization. She is the author of various articles in Journal oj'

Muslim Minority Affairs, Peace Review, Migration Letters, InternationalJournal oj'Business Research, and Fletcher Forum oj'WOrld Affairs and book chapters in edited collections. She is the author of The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategyfor Freedom (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2010). AY~E KADIOGLU is a professor of political science at Sabancl University in

Istanbul (Ph.D. in Political Science, Boston University. 1990; M.A. in International Relations, University of Chicago. 1984; B.S. in Political Science, Middle East Technical University, Ankara. 1982). She was the Sabancl Fellow at the University of Oxford during the academic year 2009-10. Her areas of interest are comparative politicS, citizenship studies, political ideologies in Turkey. and women and Islam. She is the author of Cumhuriyet jradesi, Demokrasi Muhakemesi (Republican Will. Democratic Reason. Istanbul: Metis, 1999) and VatandlZjlzgm Donujumu: Uyelikten Haklara (Transformation of Citizenship: From Membership to Rights, Istanbul: Metis. 2008) as well as various articles in Middle East Journal Middle Eastern Politics, Interna-

tional Migration, Muslim WOrld, Citizenship Studies, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Law and Governance, and Philosophy and Social Criticism. E. FUAT KEYMAN is a professor of political science and international relations at Sabancl University in Istanbul. He is also the director of the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabancl UniverSity. He works on democratization, globalization, international relations, civil society, and Turkey-EU relations. He has produced many books and articles in these areas in both English and Turkish. Among his books are Remaking Turkey (Oxford: Lexington, 2008);

Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dyna~ics, Domestic Transformations (Istanbul: Bilgi University Publications, 2.007, with Ziya Oni§); Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences (London: Routledge, 2005, with Ahmet icrduygu); Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference: Towards a Critical Social Theory oj'International Relations (Atlantic Highlands, N.}.: Humanities Press, 1997); The Good Governance oj'Turkey

List of Contributors

359

(Istanbul; Bilgi University Publications, 2.008, in Turkish); Changing World, Traniforming Turkey (Istanbul: Bilgi University Publications, 2.005, in Turkish); and Turkey and Radical Democracy (Istanbul: Alfa, 2.001, in Turkish). BERRIN KOYUNCU-LoRASDAGI is an associate professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Hacettepe University in Ankara (Ph.D. in Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2.004; M.A. in Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara, 1997; B.A. in Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara, 1996). Her areas of interest are Turkish political thought and the political economy of state-business relations. She is the author of various articles concerning cultural and economic Islam in Turkey, the Giilen Movement, the headscarfissue in Europe, and Turkish business associations. ~ERIF MARDIN is a professor emeritus at Sabancl University, Istanbul (Ph.D.

in Political Science, Stanford University, 1958; M.A. in International Relations, Johns Hopkins UniverSity, 1950; B.A. in Political Sciences, Stanford University, 1948). His areas of interest are sociology of religion, historical sociology of the Ottoman Empire, in~ellectual history of the Ottoman Empire, and Turkish modernization. He is the author of numerous books and articles, including Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case o/Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (Albany: State University of New York, 1989) and Cultural Transitions in the Middle East (Leiden: E.]. Brill, 1994). His complete works were published by tIeti~im publishers in Turkish. Syracuse University Press has been republishing his key works, such as Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey (2.006) and The Genesis ofthe Young Ottoman Thought:.A. Study in the Modernization ofTurkish Political Ideas (2.000). UMUT OZKIRIMLI is a professor of politics and director of the Center for Turkish-Greek Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey (Ph.D. in International Relations, Istanbul University, 1999; M.S. in International Relations, London School of Economics, 1995; B.A. in Political Science and International Relations, Bogazici University, Istanbul, 1994). He also holds visiting fellowships at LSEE (Research on South East Europe, London School of Economics); the Department of Global Political Studies, Malmo University; and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University. His areas

List of Contributors

of interest are theories of nationalism, nationalism in Greece and Turkey, Islam and nationalism, and multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. He is the author of Iheories ofNationalism: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacmUlan, 2.000; 2.nd ed. 2.010); Nationalism and Its Futures (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2.003, edited collection): Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2.005): Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey (London: Hurst and Company and New York: Columbia University Press, 2.008, with Spyros A. Sofos); and Nationalism and Turkey-EU Relations (Istanbul: TESEY, 2.008). His last book is Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2.010, edited collection with Ayhan Aktar and Niyazi KIztlyiirek). HAKAN OZOGLU is an associate professor in the Department of History at the University of Central Florida, Orlando (Ph.D. in History at the Ohio State University, 1997; B.A. in Social Anthropology at Istanbul University, 1987). From 1997 to 2.007 he was on the faculty of Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago as the Endowed Aya~h Senior Lecturer in Modern Turkish Studies, teaching modern Turkish language, culture, and history. He also taught classes in different capacities for New York Uni~ersity. the University of Michigan, Loyola University at Chicago, and the Ohio Wesleyan University. His book Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004 and 2.007) deals with the role of Kurdish notables in the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. The Turkish translation of this book was published by Kitap Yaymevi under the title Osmanl:. Devleti ve Kurt Millryetfiligi in 2005. His second book. From Ca-

liphate to Secular State: Silencing the Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood/Praeger Publishing, 2.OIl), examines the power struggle in the early Turkish Republic. The Turkish translation of the book, Halifelikten Cumhunyete Gefitte Muhalefttin Basttnlmast, will be released by Kitap Yaymevi in 2.0II. His current book pr~ject deals with the tenure of U.S. high commissioner Mark L. Bristol in Turkey, 1919-2.7. MURAT SOMER is an associate professor of international relations at Ko~ University in Istanbul {Ph.D. in Political Economy and Public Policy, M.A. in Economics, UniverSity of Southern California, Los Angeles: B.A. in

List of Contributors

Economics, Bogazi
emy ofPolitical and Social Science, Comparative Political Studies, Middle East Journal, Middle East PoliCY, and 1hird World ~arterly. UMUT UZER is a research professor in Turkish studies at the University of Utah (Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs, University ofVirginia, Charlottesville, 2006; M.S. in International Relations. Middle East Technical University. Ankara, 1997; B.S. in International Relations. Bilkent University. Ankara, 1994). He has taught at Smith College. University of Maryland University College, and the State University of New York. He was a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 2007-10. His areas ofinterest are international relations theory, Turkish nationalism, Turkish foreign policy. the Cyprus dispute, and the Middle East peace process. He is the author of articles inJournal ofSouth Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,fournal

ofMuslim Minority Affairs, Journal of Global Initiatives. Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, and Perceptions. His book Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy was published by I. B:Tauris in 2.010. MESUT YEGEN is a professor of sociology at Istanbul ~ehir University (Ph.D. in Sociology, Essex University, UK, 1994; M.A. in Sociology, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 1989; B.S. in Sociology, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 1986). His areas of interest are nationalism, citizenship, discourse analysis. and the Kurdish question in Turkey. He is the author of various articles in Middle Eastern Studies, Journal of Contemporary History,

Ethnic and Racial Studies, Patterns ofPrejudice, and European Political Science and Middle East Journal.

INDEX

Abdiilhamid II, Sultan, lU, 136-37, 247n4 al-Afghani,Jamal ad-Din, 136, I37, 156n" 157 n1O Agai, Bekir, 153 Agaoglu, Ahmed, 34-35, 38-39, 47, 54n8, 109, 140-41, 156n6, 157n9, 157m2 Ahmad, Feroz, 19, 54n4 Ahmed-i Hani (Ehmede Xani), 207-9, 219-20 Ak~ura, Yusuf, xiv, 6-7, 34-35, 36-37, 54n6, 90, 109, 1I3-14, 138-39, 1,6n6, 156-57n8 ,157m2, 249m, , AKP. See Justice and Development Party Aktan, Giindiiz, 242 Aktar, Ayhan, 5Sm6, 5,n20 Alevis (religious sect), 130, 184 Ali, Hiiseyinzade, lO9 Alperen Hearths, 196n22 Amasya Protocols (1961), 249m3 Amnesty International, 312, 316nS Anatolia: and Muslimization process at end of OttOman era, 39, u8, 248nl1-12, 287nI6; Turkish nationalism and history of, 158m5; underdevelopment in eastern and southeastern, 234-35 Anderson, Benedict, 26, Ankara Treaty (1921),266

II"

Ante~Musa,265

anti-Kemalism,65 Anti-Terror Law (2006), 52 Arabs, treatment of as Others in Turkish-Islamic synthesis, 160n31. Arai, Masami, 156n7 Aras, Nusret, 242 Armenians: BBP on issue of, 196n24: and Committee of Union and Progress, Il2; and in-migrations of Muslims to Ottoman Empire, 39,228; and threat of independent Armenian state in KUl'clistan, 218; and Treaty of Berlin, 212; use of term, 195-96n20. Arsal, Sadri Maksudi, 109 Arslan, Alp, 147 Arvasi, S. Ahmed, 189, I95nI3 assimilation: and ethnic nationalism in Turkey, 105; and formation of Turkish national identity, 40-41; Kurdish question and policy of, 232, 236,24 0 ,243, 245, 249 nI 4 Atatiirk (Mustafa Kemal), 17, 41-42, 121-22,144,147,258 Atatiirk nationalism, 63-65, 94 Ate~, Toktaml§, 122 AtSIZ, Hiiseyin Nihal, 74,104,106, n8, 123-24,236 authoritarianism, and state control over culture, 166-67 Avcloglu, Dogan, 239 Aydemir, ~evket Siireyya, 237

Index

Aydm, Suavi, 32.n3, 138-39 Bahs:e1i, Devlee, 75, 96, 174, 1941110 Balibar, Etienne, 69 Balkan Wars of 1911-13,108, JI2., 2.20, 2.47n, banal nationalism, 16,-66, 182., 183, 193, 2.63-64,2.83 banditry, and images of Kurds, 2.31, 2.32 Bar Human Rights Committee, 314 Barzani. Mahmoud, 266 Barzani. Massoud, 2.5m2.5. 276, 277 Baumann, Zygmunt, xvi BBP. See Grand Unity Party Beauvoir, Simone de. xv Bedirhan, Celadet, 209-II, 2.2.2.n4, 2.65 Bekta§. HacI, 12.6 belief system, hegemonic discourse and nationalism as, 192.-93. See also values Bentham, Jeremy. 180 Berkes, Niyazi, 46, 108, 142. Berlin, Isaiah, 10, 11 Berlin, Treatyof(1878), 2.12 Bey, Karamanoglu Mehmet, lIO Billig, Michael, 165, 182.. i83 Blatte, Andreas, 313 Bora, TanIl. xvii. 34, 92-93, 96, 98, 1,8n2.l, 167, 168, 174, 178, 185, 194n5, 2.46111,2.60 Bozarslan, Mehmet Emin, 218 Bozkurt, Mahmut Esat, 47, 119-20 Bracher, K. D., 9 Brazil, and Landless Workers Movement, 2.97 Breuilly, John, 50 Britain, and Kurdish question, 2.I2., 2.33 Brubaker. Rogers, 43-44, 84-85 Biiyiikanit. Ya§ar, 51 Cahun. Leon, 109 Calhoun, Craig. 162, 193 Campbell, David, 32.n7 Can, Kemal, 158n:2.l, 174, 178, 18;

Cane.&:, Nergis, 22.9 capitalism: Kemalist nationalism and rejection of, 2.3-2.4: in New Left discourse, 32.1110 Carroll, B.Ji11, 149, 160n26 <;:ay, Abdulhaluk, 116 Cedidism, and education, 156n4 <;:elik, Hiiseyin, 184 Cem, ismail, 2.7 <;:etinsaya, Gokhan, 145-46 Cevdet, Abdullah. 54n8, III Cevdet. Ahmet Pasha. 135-36 Chatterjee. Partha, 17 CHP. See Republican People's Party Christianity. and dichotomy between West and Turkey on ethno-religious grounds. 176-77. See also Greek Orthodox Church: religion <;:is:ek. Cemil, 181-82. citizenship: and establishment of national unity, 41; Kemalist nationalism and ethnic equality in. Il9: and Kurdish question, 240, 2.41-42, 250-5m23-2.4: Turkish nationalism and concept of, 35 Civaoglu, Glineri, 70 civic model. of nation. 104. See also territorial-civic nationalism civilization: culture and paradox of Turkish nationalism, 45-46: and discourse ofliberal nationalism, 70 civil society organizations, and Kurdish activism in Europe, 289-316 Cizre Sakalhoglu. Omit, 144. 155, 157 nI 4 class. transition to democracy and emergence of idea of, 2.2.-2.3 classification, Ottoman Empire as system of, 3-9 Clayton. Emilius, 2.1; coercion, and hegemony in nationalism. 86 Cold War: Europeanization and nationalism after end of. 2.8-30:

Index and foreign policy, 175; Kurdish question and end o£ 233; and transition to democracy in Turkey, 22; Turkish nationalism in period following, 48 colonialism, Kurds and system of internal in Turkey, 295. See also postcolonialism Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), 313. Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), 36, 53n3, 108, III, Ill., 225-26 Confederation of Kurdish Organizations (KON-KURD), 312- 1 3 consent, and hegemony in nationalism, 86 conservatism. and nationalist ideology in late nineteenth century, xiii. See also conservative nationalism; progressive conservatism; right wing Conservative Democracy (journal), 18081 conservative nationalism, 104, 124-30 Constitution: of 192.4,106, Il9, 22.9-30; of 1982,82,89, 164, 1951lI9 Co~ar, Simten, xviii-xix, 167 Co~kun, Bekir, 95 Council of Europe, 314 Court ofIndependence (1925), 2.33 critical realism, and debates about nationalism, xv-xvi culture: authoritarianism and state control over, 166-67; civilization and paradox of Turkish nationalism, 45-46; construction of national. 84; and ethnicity in definition of Turkish nationalism, 104; liberal nationalism and popular, 71; preIslamic Turkish and Islamic Turkish, 126. See also society Cyprus: European Union membership and resolution of conflict over,

173-74; and foreign policy in 20005, 171,180; as national cause in Turkish politics, 12.8 Demirras, Nurettin, 318n23 democracy: current events as threats to, 284-85; definition of in Turkish context, 186-87; Turkish nationalism and transition to, 21-24; and use of term "civil society:' 190 Democratic Party (DP), 23 Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (KDP),2.73 Democratic Society Party (DTP), 53, 270,275, 2.88n27, 2.99, 32.1 Denmark, and Kurdish organizations, 2.99 development, and Kurdish question, 234-35,2.5 0 llI8 Diaspora communities, of Kurds in Europe, 2.89-316 Dicle,Hatip,317nI7 Dink, Hrant, 79-80, 162.,187-88,191, 195n2.0 Disraeli, Benjamin, xiii Divanu Lugat-ut Turk (Mahmut from Kashgar), lIO domination, hegemony and process of,87 Duara, Prasenjit, 84 Durkheim, Emile, 6, 7 Eccarius-Kelly, Vera, xx Ecevit, Bulent, 66, 89 Eco, Umberco, xxinI economics and economy: crisis of 2001,61; as dimension of liberal nationalism, 68-69, 70; and Kurdish question, 2.34-35; New Lett and vision of, 32llIO; and New Right policies in 1980s, 59. See also capitalism; development; industrialization Edip, Halide, XI3

Index education: and Cedidism, 156n4; and Giilen schools and universities, 159-60n23-25 Emre, Yunus, 126 Engels, Friedrich, xiv Erbakan, Necmettin, 129 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 78, 97, 174, 182, 271.274,277,1.,79,319 Erener. Sertab. 71 Ergin, Muharrem, 146-47 Ersoy, Mehmet AId£. 157nn Esposito,John,160n28 ethnicity. See minority populations ethnic nationalism, 104. 123-24. 186 Europe. Kurdish civil society organizations and activism in. 1.,89316. See also Denmark; European Union; Euro-skepticism; France; Germany; Westernization and Westernism European Court of Human Rights, 314 European Union (EU): candidacy of Turkey for membership in, xii, 48, 59, 60-61. 76, In, 175-76, 180. 181, 245; and· Kurdish question. 308; and multiculturalism. 302; reactions against integration into, 66-67; Turkish modernity and process of integration With. 29 European Union-Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC). 314 fascism, liberal nationalism and TurkishIslamic synthesis in politics of 2000S. 170 -9 2 Faye,Jean Pierre. 82, 91-92 Federation of Kurdish Associations (YEK-KOM),312 Felicity Party (SP), J7, 78, 97 Fedt. Ahmet. )4n6, 156n7 feudalism. and state control of military, 4 Feyzioglu. Turhan.122 Firat News Agency (Netherlands). 300

flag (Turkish), and political symbolism, 64 foreign policy: and nationalism as dominant ideology of state, 31; as testing ground for "national sensitivities" in 2000S. 170-79 Foucault, Michel. 18, 32n6 France: concepts of nation and citizenship compared to German. 44-45; influence of French Revolution on concepts and emergence of nationalism. xiii, 35, 82. See also Europe Fukuyama, Francis, 221 Fulier, Graham. 317m2, 318n20 Galip. Re~it. 113 Gamson. William. :po Gasprinski. ismail, 137-,8. 139. 156n4 Gellner. Ernest. 5. 20. 83. 156m. 200-203, 222. 283 Genc;:kaya. Omer Faruk. 250m8 Georgeon. Franc;:ois, 7, 37. 138-39 Germany: and history of nationalism. 43-45; Kurdish movement in and relationship with Turkey. 304-8, 317nl2-14. See also Europe Geyer. Michael, 4 globalization: and crisis of Ilc'\tion-state discourses. 323; and discourse ofliberal nationalism. 68; Europeanization and nationalism after end of Cold War. 1.,8-30; influence of on ideology of Turkish nationalism. 57; in Kemalist discourse, 67; radical changes and transformations in economy. politics, and culture as result of exposure to. 2.4-28. See also modernity; Westernization and Westernism Gobineau. Joseph Arthur de. 54n7 Gokalp. Ziya. 39. 46-47, S5Dl9. 63, 7 2 • 90.109. Ill, 113. lIS-x6. 141-43 Good Kurds, Bad Kurds (documentary 2001),301

Index

Gramsci, Antonio, 86 Grand East Party (BD). 12.9 Grand Unity Party (BBP): and identification of Turkishness with Muslimhood.196n2.2.; and Kurdish issue, 191, 196m.4; political significance ofSunni Islam as ingredient of nationalism, 16~, 169-70. 177-79, 180-92.; and racist-fascist discourse, 77; TurkishIslamic synthesis and conservative nationalism of, 12.7,130 Greece and Greeks: and Committee of Union and Progress, 112.; Muslimization of Anatolia and exchange of populations with Turkey. 2.2.8. 2.48nn-I2., 2.87m6; revolt in late Ottoman era, 135. See also Cyprus Greek Orthodox Church, 40 groupism. and concept of homogeneous nation, 85 Giil, Abdullah, 181, 195nIS, 2.70 Giilalp, Haldun, m, ISS-56 Giilen, Fethullah, 149-54, Is8-6m2.2.-3S Gulf War, 48, 55-56n2.1, 59-60 Giinaltay, ~emseddin, 157nI2. Giindem, Mehmet, lSI Giiven~, Bozkurt, 166,167 Hage, Ghassan, 2.6 Hanioglu, ~iikrii, 91 Hayes, CarltonJ. H., 180, 192Hegd, G. W. F., xiv hegemony: changing nature of nationalism and struggle for, 82.-100; hybrid languages and problem of. 78-80; and nationalism as bdief system, 192.-93 Heper, Metin, 18, 2.87nI2. Heyd, Urid, 2.47n2. Hilmi, Siverekli, 2.18

histOriography. and devdopment of Turkish nationalism, 90-91 Hobsbawm, Eric, 156m, 157m2., 2.60 homogeneous nation. deconstruction of myth of, 82.-100 Hostler, Charles Warren, 1I0-1I human rights: and Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code, 181-82.; and Kurdisl). activism in Europe, 2.98, 199-300,313-14; violations of in Kurdish regions, 133 Hiirriyet (newspaper), 71 Hutchinson,John, 13~ identity: formation of Turkish after War of Independence, 40-41; and genealogy of Kurdish nationalism, 103, 2.04-6; Islam and Turkish national. 78, 194m, 194n3; Kemalist nationalist and identity ofstate, 1I7-2.2.; and Kurdish nationalism, 2.18, 2.10, 2.11, 308; preoccupation with preservation ofstate as fundamental feature of Turkish national, 43; role ofIsIam in construction of for political parties. 162.-93; Turkism and construction of national, 107-10; and understanding of nationalism in context of modernity in Turkey. 10-32. ideology: influence of globalization on nationalist, 2.7-18; nationalism as, xiii; nationalism and crises of modernity, 313 tgdemir. Ulug, 148nI~ "imagined community; concept of nation as, 163 immigration: and French Revolution. 33; and Kurdish Diaspora identity in Germany, 304-6, 317nI2.-14 inalclk. Halil, 4Inan, Afee, 5~m industrialization: globalization and shift from import-substitution to export-promotion. 15;

368

Index

import-substituting as form of economic nationalism, 2.4 inlalap, and Kurdish question, 2.2.8-32. inonii,lsmet, 118-19 intellectuals, Weber's distinction between intelligentsia and, 5 Intellectual's Hearth (Aydmlar Ocagl), 12.4.12.6-2.7, 146-49, ISO. 152.. 158018, Is8n2.1. 163, 185 intelligentsia. Weber's distinction between intellectuals and, 5 interest groups, and social movements, 2.96-97 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 17 1 Internet. and Kurdish activism. 300 Iran, and ethnic Kurdish minority, 2.85, 2.87n II Iraq: establishment of Kurdish state in northern, 2.45, 2.46: and PKK, 2.71, 2.75-77, 309; US. war in, 49, So. 172. Ireland, and religious elements in nationalism, lOS Irish Republican Army (IRA), 310 Islahat reforms. and Kurdish question in Ottoman Empire. 2.2.5-2.8 Islam: Agaoglu on nationalization and, 39: Alevi sect and Shiism, 130: and emergence of conservative nationalism, 12.4-30; Giilen on universality of, 160n30; and Ottoman classification system. 7. 8, 9: and pre-Islamic Turkish religion. 12.5: question ofin discourse on nationalism. 133-56; role of in construction of political party identities. 162.-93; and Turkish national identity. 78, 194m, 194n3. See also Islamism and Islamists; panIslamism: Sharia; Sufism; Sunni Islam Islamic Welfare Party (RP), 74. n 78 Islamism and lslamists: and discourses of nationalism in contemporary

Turkey, 96. 97-98, 164-70: and military-judiciary intervention in political system, 2.79: and radical criticism of nation-state and nationalism. 77-78: and official nationalism, 93; and representations of Ottoman political and military history, 8-9; and Turkists. 157nI2.. See also Islam lttihad-l Islam (unity ofIslam), 136, 137 Japan, and symbiotic antagonism between samurai and merchants, xi Jews: and economic policies of Committee of Union and Progress, II2.; and ''Jewish Kurds:' 2.40-41 lin (newspaper). 2.18, 2.19 Juergensmeyer. Mark, 12.9 Justice and Development Party (AKP); and discourses on nationalism in contemporary Turkey, 132.; and economic policies in 2.0005, 60, 194n6; and EU membership, 48, 61; and Kurdish question, 2.70-72.. 2.74-82.,32.0-2.1; and nationalism in Islamism. 77. 78: political significance of Sunni Islam as ingredient of nationalism. 163, 169, 170-74, 180-92.; and positive nationalism, 80; rise in popularity of, xii Jwaideh, Wadie. 2.13, 2.14 KadlOglu, Ay~e, xvii, 32., 53n2.. 54nlO, S5 nI 9 Kadro (journal), 2.37-38 Kafesoglu, ibrahim, 12.5-2.6 Kahraman. Hasarl Biilent, 167 Kant, Immanuel, xiii. 33 Karpat. Kemal H., 137 Kazanclgil, Ali, 19 Keddie, Nikki, 137 Kemal, Ali, 54n6 Kemal, Mustafa. See Atatiirk

Index

Kemal, Namlk, 6, 7, 8, 136 Kemalism: and conceptualization of Turkish Republic as nationstate, 16-18,2.0: and conservative nationalism, 106-7. 131-32.: and definition ofKemalist nationalism, 92., 95: identity and meaning of "Turk," 15-16, 18; and Kurdish civil society organizations in Europe, 2.99; and language of official nationalism, 62.-63: and modernization paradigm in Turkey, 13-14: and nationalist discourses in 1980s and 1990S, 65-67; official nationalism and state identity, Il7-2.2. Kent, Muhtar, 72 Keyder, Gaglar, 2.4 Keyman, E. Fuat, xvii, 13, 32.n2-4, 155 Khan, Oghuz, 107-8 Kieser, Hans-Lukas. 261 Kmkkanat, Mine, 95 Klsakiirek, Necip Fazll. 106. 127-29. 130 Kl~lah. Ahmet Taner. 122 Ktzdelma Coalition. 79 Kolaycl, Mustafa. 174Koopmans, Ruud, 317nIO Koyuncu-Lorasdagl. Berrin. xviii KTTC. See Society for Mutual Aid and Progress of Kurd is tan Kurban, DUek, 195nI4 Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP), 312, 314, 318nI7, 318n24 Kurdish Students Society in Europe (KSSE),290 Kurdish Workers Party. See PKK Kurdistan: history of term, 2,6: and Ottoman Empire, 316m. See also Kurds and Kurdish issue Kurdistan Rundbrief(Germany), 300 Kurds and Kurdish issue: as alternative nationalist project in contemporary Turkey. 88, 96. 98. 223-46: BBP's reading of, 191, 196n24; civil society organizations and activism in

Europe, 289-316: and dilemmas in Turkish nationalism, 253-86, 319-24; history of term, 205-6: marginalization of after abolition of caliphate, 40: and nationalism in 21St century. 51-53: and Nationalist Action Party, 185-86, 187: origins of controversy on, 199-222; and panTurkism. 74. 77; and preservation of state as motivation for Turkish nationalism. 58. See also Kurdistan: PKK Kurtlar Vadisi - [rak (movie), 49 Kushner, David. 24702. Kymlicka, Will, 5SnI, Laics and laicism: and foundations of Kemalist state. 51; and Ottoman political and military history. 8-9 Landau,Jacob,156n6 language: Diaspora communities and preservation of Kurdish. 2.92: hybrid forms of and problem of hegemony. 78-80: ofKemalist nationalism, 62.-63: and Turkification measures in new Turkish Republic, 40; and 2.004 report on minority issues in Turkey. 55nI4: and understanding of nationalism, 2.60 Lausanne Treaty (1923), 40, 2.48m2., 2.66. 267, 286n4 Law on Foundations, 180, 181, 195nI4 Law on Struggle against Terror. 180 left wing, and Kurdish question, 2.37-39. See also New Left; radical nationalism Lenin. V. 1.. xiv Lesser, Ian, 317n12. Lewis, Bernard, 107-8. 126 liberalism, and nationalism as ideology, xiii. See also liberal nationalism; neoliberalism liberal nationalism: definition of, 92-93. 95; and discourse of

370

Index

Nationalist Action Party, 188; neoIlationalism and discourse of, 68-73; and Turkish-Islamic synthesis. 170-92,180 lobbying, and Kurdish movement in Europe, 313 Lucassen. Leo, 317nI3-I4 Lurs (Iran), 204 Mahmut II, Sultan, 212 Malazgirit, Battle of (1071), IS8nI5 Malkki. Liisa, 88 Mandelbaum. Michael, II Mansfield, Harvey, I03 mapping, of nationalisms during 1990S, 93 Mardin, ~erif, xvii, 16-17. 32.n2, 32.n5. 47,137 Martin, Philip, 317nI1 Marx, Karl, xiv Marxism. and nationalist ideology in early twentieth century. xiv Matur, Bejan, 61-62 McKiernan. Kevin, 301 Medico International (Germany), 314 Med-TV (Britain), 2.99, 300 Medya-TV (France). 2.99, 300 Mehmed II, Sultan, 4 Memioglu, Sukuti, 160n33 Mem-u Zin (epic, 1695),2.07-9,2.2.0 Mert, NU1·ay. 167 Metal Bruna (Turna and U~ar 2.004), 49 MHP. See also Nationalist Action Party Michels. Robert. 7 Middle East. U.S. foreign policy in, 2.9,172 militarism. and Turkish nationalism in 2.lst century. 50 military: consequences of intervention in political system, 2.79; and coup d'etat in 1980, 164; and official nationalism, 95: and PKK, 310:

Turkish state and control of, 4. See also militarism Miller, David, 10-II millet-i hakime (ruling/dominant nation), 2.2.7, 22.8. 2.2.9 minority populations: citizenship and rights of, 2.50-51023: and group identity of members of Ottoman Empire. 105: Nationalist Action Party and problem of non-Muslim, 187-88: Turkish nationalism and rights of, 5SnI4-ls: use of term "minority:' 2.86n4. See also Armenians: Greece and Greeks; Jews; Kurds and Kurdish issue modernity: framework for understanding process of in Turkey, 3-9: nationalism as ideology and crises of, 323: preoccupation with balance between tradition and. 46: relationship between religion and nationalism in context of Turkish, 134; understanding of Turkish nationalism in context of, 10-32.. See also globalization: Westernization and Westernism Money,Jeannette,317nll Montesquieu, Charles de, 6 Moore, Barrington. xi Mosse, George, 9 Motherland Party (ANAP), 59. 164-65, 167,168-69 Murat. Mizanci. III Murdos Armistice (1918).217 Mustafa, Abdurrahman, 2.5ID2.5 myth. of homogeneous nation. 83-88 Nairn. BabanzadeAhmet. 113. 140 Narl!, Niliifer, 152. narratives. and standard versus nonstandard stories, 2.54. See also language Natali, Denise, 307

Index

national anthem (Turkish), and political symbolism, 64 National Culture Plan of the State Planning Organization (1983), 166 nationalism, in Turkey: current status of, 319-24; and discourses between reactionary and proWestern movements, 57-80; family resemblances among different manifestations of, xv-xvi, xxim; hegemony and changing nature of, 82-100; ideas of "preservation of the state" and "Westernism" as twin motives of, 33-53; Kurdish question and dilemmas in, 223-46, 253-86; and modernity, state, and identity as issues in understanding of. 10-32; relationship between Islam and, 133-s6; and role ofIslam in construction of political party identities, 162.-93; and Structure of current volume, xvii-xx; transition from civic/ethnic to conservative, 103-32'; transition from system of classification to system of solidarity, 3-9; understanding of in Turkish context, xii-xv; and use of term "mainstream," 2.46-47n2. See also banal nationalism; conservative nationalism; ethnic nationalism; Kemalism; Kurds and Kurdish issue; liberal nationalism; neo-nationalism; paranoid nationalism; positive nationalism; radical nationalism; territorial-civic nationalism Nationalist Action Party (MHP): and discourses of nationalism in contemporary Turkey, 96; and headscarf question, 281; as ideological party emphasizing nationalism. 12.7. 131; and panTurkist movement, 73,74,75-77; political Significance ofSunni Islam

371

as ingredient of nationalism, 163, 169, 174-76.178,179.180-92.; and Turkism.89 Nationalist Work Party (MGP), 169 National Order Party (MNP), 12.9 National Outlook movement, 97. 170-71. 173. 177, 195m2 National Salvation Party (MSP). n. 127, 129. National Turkish Students' Union. 146, 158017 Nazif, Siileyman. 113 Necip FazIl. See Klsakiirek, Necip Fazll neo-Kemalism. 65-67 neo-liberalism. emergence of as ideology during 1980s. 2.5. See also Justice and Development Party neo-nationalism: and discourse of liberal nationalism. 68-73; and "Turkish Muslimhood;' ISO-51 New Left: and critique of Westernization, 2.3; and vision of economy, 32nIO New Right. economic policies of in 1980s.59 Newroz celebrations, 313 Nolte, Ernst, 9 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and human rights concerns of Kurdish groups, 2.99-300.312., 314 Norman, Wayne, SSnI5 Nur, Rna. 12.4 Nuri. Celal, 54n8 Nursi. Said-i, Ill. Ocak, Ahmet Y3§ar. 9 Ocalan, Abdullah, 58, 76, 241, 271, 2.81,303 Ogelman, Nedim. 317n1l Ogiin. Sii.leyman Seyfi, 149 Olson, Robert, 268, 287m3 Oni~. Ziya. 13, 179. 194n7, 194n9 Oran, Baskm, 5Sm4. 117-18, II9

372

Index

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 311,3 14 Ottoman Empire: breakup of and emergence of Turkish state, 107, 114, 130; and Greek revolt as watershed event, 135; impact of imperial past on connection between contemporary nationalism and modernity, 30; and introduction of nationalist ideology, xiv-xv; Islahat reforms and Kurdish question, 2.2.5-2.8: Kurdish nationalism and collapse of, 2.03, 2.04, 2.17; and Kurdistan, 316m; religion and legacy of, 155; and study of Turkish modernity, 3 OzaI. Turgut, 59,164,167 Ozdag, Omit, 96 Ozdalga, Elisabeth, 119, 147, 150 Ozdemir, Cern, 308 Ozkmmh, Umut, xvii, 91, 2.S7nI9 Ozman, Aylin, 167 Oznue, HakkJ, I7S-79 Ozoglu, Hakan, xix Ozkok, Ertugrul, 70,71,72., 152. pan-Islamism, as source of protonationalism in late Ottoman era, 135-38 pan-Turkism: development of among Turks of Russia, 109; and ethnic nationalism, 12.3: and ideology ofGokalp, IIS, 143; and radical nationalism,73-77. See also Turkism paranoid nationalism, 2.6-2.7 Parekh, Bhikhu, 84 patriotism, and definitions of nationalism, 89 Peker, Recep, 117, 12.2. Penal Code (article 301), ISO, 181, 182., I95nI ;,3 19 People's Houses (Halkevleri), 42. Perins;ek, Dogu, 2.44

PKK (Kurdish Workers Party), 51, 52., 53,58,187,2.70-72.,2.73,2.75,2.95,2.9 6, 300,309-11, 317nIO, 319. See also Kurds and Kurdish issue Poland, and religiOUS elements in nationalism, 105 politics: and Cyprus issue, 12.8; and emergence of Kurdish nationalism as movement, 199, 2.07; impact of identity politics on Turkish modernity, 2.6; military intervention in, 279; role ofIslam in construction of party identities, 162-93; transition to democracy and emergence of left-right axis in, 2.2.-2.3. See also conservatism: democracy; Grand Unity Party (BBP); Justice and Development Party (AKP); left wing: liberalism: Nationalist Action Party (MHP): New Left: New Right: Republican People's Party (CHP): right wing; state positive nationalism, 78, 80 postcolonialism, and Westernization in Turkey, 13. See also colonialism Poulton, Hugh, 166 progressive conservatism, 168 racism, and Kurdish question, 2.35-36 radical nationalism: definition of, 93, 96-97; and pan-Turkism, 73-77 Radio Free Europe, 317nI7 Rafto Foundation (Norway), 311, 314, 3I8n2.3 Rainsford, Sarah, 316n9 religion: and content of official and ethnic forms of nationalism. 106: and definition of Turkish nationalism, 104; Islam and pre-Islamic Turkish, 12.5; and legacy of Ottoman Empire, ISS; and nationalism in multiparty period (1946 to I9S0), 145-46; secularism and freedom of and from. 2.81. See also Christianity; Greek

Index

Orthodox Church: Islam; Jews: secularism and secularization "Report on Minority Rights and Cultural Rights" (2.004), 181 reproduction, and nationalism as "compromise equilibrium," 86 Republican People's Party (CHP): and headscarf question, 2.80; and Kemalism, 131-32.; restriction of membership to Turks. 12.2.: Turkish identity and insignia of, 42. resistance, social movement literature and structures of, 2.94 Revolt of 1847 (Kurdish). 2.09-Il, 2.2.2.n4 Revolt of 1880-81 (Kurdish), 2.II-16 Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (DDKO).2.73 Rieffer. Barbara-Ann, 133-34, 139 Rxfat, Mevlanzade, 2.19 right wing, and Kurdish question, 2.3S-36,2.43-44. See also conservatism; New Right Rxza, Ahmed, 36,111 Robbins, Kevin,,IS Robins, Philip, 172., 194n8 Roj-TV (Kurdish-language station), 2.99,300 Romanticism. and German nationalism, 43-4S,19SnI6 Roseberry, William, 86-87 Roshwald, Avid. II Rumi, Mevlana Celalettin-i, 12.6 Russia, development of pan-Turkism in Turkish minority population of, 109. See also Soviet Union Russo-Japanese War (1904), 37 Sabahattin, Prince. 36, 54n5

salafiyya (Islamic reform movement). 8 Samim, Ahmet, 2.3, 32.n9 Sanljar. Nejdet. 12.3-2.4 Saudi Arabia. and religious elements in nationalism, lOS

373

Sayyid, Bobby, 20 Schelling, Thomas, 259 Scott, James. 87 secularism and secularization: and freedom of and from religion, 281: and Kemalist ulUSfuluk, 66; and Kurdish question. 2.68-69, 277-82.. See also religion security, privileging of over modernity, 2.6. See also terrorism ~emdinan family. 2II Serdengec;:ti, Osman Ytiksel, 127 ~erefhan (Kurdish tribal leader). 2.05 Settlement Law of 1934. 231-32. 2.49nI4, 2SIn2.4 Sevgen. Nazmi, 210 Sevres, Treatyof(192.0), S8, 94 Sharia (Islamic law), 65. 143, 159n2.3 Sheikh Said rebellion (192S), 2.67 Shiism, and Alevis. 130 Shissler, A. Holly, 1;8. 140, 141. IS7nIO Silopi. Zinar, 2.18 Smith, Anthony D., 104-5, 133, 156n2., 163, 192-93. 2.00-2.0;, 2.04, 2.2.1, 2.89, 29 I Socialist Workers Federation of Kurds (KOM-KAR). 295, 316n7, 317nI6 social movements, and Kurdish activism in Europe, 293-301 Societies for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (ARMHC),248-49nI; society: classification systems and Ottoman view of, 4; modernization paradigm in Turkey and concept of, 14. See also civil society organizations; class; culture Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (KTC), 217-2.0 Society for Mutual Aid and Progress of Kurdistan (KTTC), 2.16-17, 227 Sofos, Spyros A., 91 Somer, Murat, xix-xx, 2.84, 288m.6 Sorel. Georges, 7

374

Index

Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), 314-15,3ISn25 sovereignty, and Kemalist nationalism, 18 Soviet Union, and Kurdish question, 2H. See also Russia Soyarlk, Nalan, 5Sn20 Spengler, Oswald, 45 state: authoritarianism and control over culture, 166-67: and conception of citizenship in Turkish nationalism, 35: congruence between entities of state and nation in Turkey, 32.4: establishment of Kurdish in northern Iraq, 245, 2.46; and hegemony of nationalism, 88: history of concept in Europe and emergence of nationalism in Turkey, 43-48: history of Turkish nationalism and strong tradition of, 30-31: Kemalist nationalism and identity of, 117-2.2.; Turkish nationalism and preservation of, 35-43, So, S758: understanding of nationalism in context of modernity in Turkey, 1032.. See also foreign policy: politics Sternhell, Zeev, 7-8 . Suavi, Ali, 110, 136 $u plgzn TUrkler (The Crazy Turks, novel), 67, 95-96 Sufism, 151, 152., 160n32 Sun Language Theory, II8 Sunni Islam, 130, 184, 194nI, 194n3 symbiotic antagonisms, origins of concept and use of as analytical category, xi Talabani, Jalal, 2.5In2.S, 2.77 Tannover, Hamdullah Suphi, II3 Tanzimat reforms (1839-76),19-2.1,38 Tarrow, Sidney, 2.94, 302. Ta§pmar, bmer, 48, 51, 309 taXation policy, and creation of MuslimTurkish bourgeoisie, 112.

Tekinalp, Munis, llO-2.1 Temo, Ibrahim, III territorial-civic nationalism, 104-37. territory, and security dilemmas posed by Kurdish question, 267-69 terrorism, and references to Kurdish transnational groups, 300 Tevfrk, Ebuzziya, 113 Tezcan, Nuran, 41-42 Thomas, David, 138-39, IS6n7 Thompson, E. P., 84 Thomson, Ronald, 2.13-14 Tilly, Charles, 294 Togan, Zeki Velidi, 109 Tokin, Ismail Husrev, 237-38 topography, of nationalisms in contemporary Turkey, 91, 92 Toprak, Binnaz, 54n9, ISS tribes, and Kurdish question, 2.31, 232. Trotter, Henry, 2.14-15 True Path Party (DYP), 165 Tugcu, Huseyin, 184 Ttikkan. Reba Oguz, 12.4 Tunaya, Tank Zafer, 2.47fllO Turam, Berna, 153 Turan Society (Hungary), 109 Turgut, Hulusi, ISO, 151 TUrk (journal), 1I4 Ttirke~, Alparslan, 73, 1I8, 12.7 Turkey: as case of congruence between entities of state and nation, 32.4: Cold War and transition to democracy in, 2.2: framework for understanding process of modernization in, 3-9: Kurdish movement in Europe and relationship with Turkey, 304-8: relationship of with U.S., 48, 49, 50, 55-S6n2.l, 172. See also AnatoHa: culture: identity: Kemalism: nationalism: Ottoman Empire: politics: society; state: Turkism Turkish History Society, 42.

Index

Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD).282 Turkish-Islamic synthesis. See Islam; Islamism and Islamists "Turkish Muslimhood," and Fethullah Giilen.149 Turkish Radio and Television (TRT). 319

Turkism: Agaoglu's version of, 38; Akc;ura's support for policy of, 37; and construction of national identity. 107-10; end of Ottoman Empire and emergence of. 110-17; and Islam. 138: and Islamists. 157m2; and Ottomanism, 6-7. 136. 137. 138. 141.225. See also pan-Turkism Turki5h Left (magazine). 2.44Turkish Linguistic Society. 42 Turko-Russian War of 1877-78, 2.ll Turk Yurdu (movement & journal). 38. 39.157 n 9 Ubeydullah. Sayyid. 2.11-16 Uca. Feleknas. 308. 313. 318m8 Olkii, (journal): 42 Uluengin. Hadi. 69. 70 Ulus and ulus{al)ctlsk (nation and nationalism). 66. 80. 8In4. 93-94. 95 Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). 71 United Nations (UN). 31l, 314 United States: deterioration of relations with Turkey in 2.000S. 49; and foreign policy of Turkey in 2.000S, 172; Gulf War and relations with Turkey. 48. 5S-S6m.1; and Kurdish question, l33. 2.75: and Sanctuary Movement. 2.97-98; and view of Turkey as key actor for future of Middle East. 29; and war in Iraq. 49.5 0 Unity of Patriotic Forces. 77

375

UStel. Fiisun. 55m3 Uzer. Umut. xviii

Vakit (newspaper). 78 values, and security dilemmas in Kurdish questions, 2.67-69. See also belief system Vambery. Arminius. 109 van Bruinessen. Martin, 300, 313 Verdery. Katherine, 88 Vergin, Nur, 183 Virtue Party (FP). 77 Von Salomon, Ernst. 9 Wallerstein. Immanuel. 69 War of Independence (1919-22), 40. 109-10.144.228,2.57-59 Wealth Tax incident of 1942-44. 1I2.. 2.50n2.3 Weber. Max. 4-5, 33. 2.54 Welfare Party. See Islamic Welfare Party Westernization and Westernism: dichotomy between West and Turkey on ethno-religious grounds. 176-77; and Europeanization after end of Cold War. 2.8-30; New Left critique of, 23; and POstcolonialism in Turkey. 13; preservation of state as motive for Turkish nationalism. 35-43. See also globalization Wilson. Woodrow, 2.17 women, repression of and perception of Kurdish nationalism in Europe, 302. Workers Party of Turkey (TiP), 23, 12.7, 2.44. 273 World War I: end of Ottoman Empire and emergence of Turkish state. 108. 2.28; and Kurdish nationalism. 22.0-21 World War II: and pan-Turkist movement. 73; and revival of symbiotic relationship between religion and nationalism. 145

376 Yavuz, Hakan M., 132., 139, 16002.8 YaZlclOglu, Muhsin, 177, 178, 191, 196n2.4 Yegen. Mesut. xix, 187 Yesevi, Hoca Ahmed, 12.6 Ylldlz, Ahmet, 47, 55n2.0, 119,12.1 Ydmaz, Mesut, 168

Index

Yon (magazine), 138-39 Young Turk movement (1908-18),1911,34-35,36,108, III Yurcsever, Ali, 159n14 Zazas (Central Anatolia), 104