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THE ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS Assignment is a crucial topic in commercial law, and this new work by Gregory Tolhurst is the most comprehensive work on the assignment of contractual rights ever published. It seeks to explain the existence, meaning and application of the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights and it does this by reference to the idea that assignments involve transfers. The book is logically structured to follow the issues that arise in planning, drafting and enforcing an assignment, including: —what is meant by “assignment”; —what is the distinction between legal and equitable assignments; —how an assignable contractual right is identified; —what formalities apply to assignment; and —what rights and remedies are available to the parties to an assignment The topic of assignment is of such universal importance to commercial lawyers that all practicing lawyers will find this work invaluable. However, the work will also be required reading for academics teaching contract, equity and personal property.
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The Assignment of Contractual Rights
GREG TOLHURST
OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2006
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Published in North America (US and Canada) by Hart Publishing c/o International Specialized Book Services 920 NE 58th Avenue, Suite 300 Portland, OR 97213-3786 USA Tel: +1 503 287 3093 or toll-free: (1) 800 944 6190 Fax: +1 503 280 8832 E-mail:
[email protected] Website: www.isbs.com © Greg Tolhurst 2006 Greg Tolhurst has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any mean, without the prior permission of Hart Publishing, or as expressly permitted by law or under the terms agreed with the appropriate reprographic rights organisation. Enquiries concerning reproduction which may not be covered by the above should be addressed to Hart Publishing at the address below. Hart Publishing, Salters Boatyard, Folly Bridge, Abingdon Rd, Oxford, OX1 4LB Telephone: +44 (0)1865 245533 Fax: +44 (0)1865 794882 Email:
[email protected] Website: http//:www.hartpub.co.uk British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data Available ISBN-13: 978-1-84113-586-1 (hardback) ISBN-10: 1-84113-586-0 (hardback) Typeset by Hope Services (Abingdon) Ltd. Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
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For Elisabeth, Joshua, Samuel, Benjamin and Michael
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PREFACE
This book is based on my PhD dissertation and remains a thesis-based work. However, I hope practitioners will find it useful. The thesis is conservative; it attempts to explain the well known rules governing the assignment of contractual rights by reference to the legal notion of “transfer”. Much material has been included in the text that falls outside the thesis. The book is structured to deal with those questions that tend to get asked when assigning contractual rights, namely, “what is meant by ‘assignment’”? (Chapter 3); “what is the nature of equitable and legal assignments”? (Chapters 4 and 5); “have I got an assignable right”? (Chapter 6); “what have I got to do to assign an assignable right”? (Chapter 7) and “what are the various rights and remedies of the parties to an assignment”? (Chapter 8). I would like to thank my supervisers, Professors Christopher Rossiter and Denis Harley of the University of New South Wales for all their support during the writing of the dissertation. I also owe thanks to my examiners, Professors JW Carter, Charles Rickett and Norman Palmer, all of whom have been helpful in turning the dissertation into a book. I would like to single out Professor Carter who has given me an enormous amount of support and time and coffee in writing the book. I also owe an enourmous debt to Justice McPherson AO of the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of Queensland, for reading and commenting on a draft of the book. I would also like to thank Richard Wilson of the Victorian Bar for reading and commenting on some of the early chapters and for providing me with a copy of his dissertation, “Alienation of Income by Assignment”. I should add to this list Dr Simon Evans, who read a draft of the initial PhD dissertation. There have been many other people who encouraged me to write the dissertation and book or have given of their time to discuss aspects of this subject or who have kept me in mind when some interesting case or article has crossed their desks or have been helpful in tracking down books, articles or papers that were not easy to get hold of. Within this broad group I would particularly like to thank Sir Jack Beatson, Justice Keith Mason, President of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, The Honourable RP Meagher QC, Professor DW McLauchlan, Professor Michael Furmston, Professor Lee Aitken, Professor Andrew Burrows, Professor Malcolm Clarke, Richard Nolan, Elise Bant, Richard Potok, Gerald Ng and Peter Turner. I would also like to thank my colleagues at Freehills, particularly Matthew Stutsel and John Angus, for the wonderful variety of assignment-related facts they have thrown at me. I could never have thought of them all on my own and many have never and probably will never appear in a judgment.
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I would also like to thank Kelly Ngo and Helen Saunders for their helpful research assistence in the latter, “what have I missed” part of the process. I would also like to thank the University of Sydney, Research Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, for providing a small writing fellowship that afforded me with some teaching relief to finalise the book. Some of the contents of Chapters 4, 6 and 8 were originally published in the Law Quarterly Review and the Sydney Law Review. I would like to thank the editors for permission to reproduce that work. I would also like to thank the band for occasionally dragging me away from this. And also thanks to Gerd and Dylan for their artistic recommendations. I must also mention and thank Richard Hart and his team at Hart Publishing Ltd for agreeing to publish this book and for making the publication process a smooth one. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank Elisabeth for all her love and support. GJ Tolhurst 10 October 2005
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CONTENTS
Preface Table of Cases Table of Statutes Table of Statutory Instruments International Conventions and Model Laws
vii xiii lv lxii lxiii
PART 1: INTRODUCTION 1. Introduction (a) General (b) Structure of Book (c) Some Limitations 2. A Brief History of Assignment (a) (b) (c) (d)
Introduction Choses in Action Assignment of Choses in Action Conclusion
3 3 8 9 11 11 11 19 27
PART 2: THE NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT 3. Assignment and the Concept of Transfer (a) Introduction (b) Meaning of Assignment (i) Introduction (ii) Assignment Distinguished from Other Transactions (c) Assignment as Transfer (d) The Element of Intention (i) Introduction (ii) Outright Assignment and Security Assignments (iii) Equitable Charges (iv) Declarations of Trust (e) The Requirement of a Proprietary Right (f) Assignment and Privity of Contract
31 31 32 32 33 35 44 44 44 49 52 53 62
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x
Contents
4. Equitable Assignments (a) Introduction (b) Equitable Assignment of Equitable Interests (c) Equitable Assignment of Legal Interests Assignable at Law (i) Introduction (ii) The Character of an Equitable Assignment of a Legal Right (iii) Notice and joinder (d) Equitable Assignment of Legal Interests Not Assignable at Law (e) Assignment of Future Interests 5. Statutory or Legal Assignments (a) Introduction (b) The Procedural View (c) The Substantive View (d) Conclusion
65 65 66 66 66 68 73 90 97 103 103 105 107 117
PART 3: ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS 6. Assignable Contractual Rights (a) Introduction (b) The Requirement of a Chose in Action (i) Contractual Rights as Choses in Action (ii) Contractual Rights as Property Rights (iii) Ownership of Contractual Rights (c) The Requirement of Present Property (i) Introduction (ii) The Distinction between Present and Future Property (iii) Dealings in Conditional, Contingent and Unconditional Contractual Rights (d) Division and Separation of Contractual Rights (e) Restrictions on the Assignment of Contractual Rights (i) Introduction (ii) Public Policy Restrictions (iii) Personal Contractual Rights and Obligations A. Personal contractual rights B. Personal obligations (iv) Contractual Provisions Dealing with Assignment (v) The principle of Transfer as it Relates to the Personal Rights Rule and Contractual Provisions Dealing with Assignment (vi) Assignment and the Variation of the Obligations of the Obligor (f) Assignment of Contractual Burdens
121 121 122 122 133 136 138 138 139 148 171 187 187 187 212 216 235 246 278 279 287
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7. Formalities 313 (a) Introduction 313 (b) Intention 314 (c) Subject Matter 330 (d) Formalities 334 (i) Equitable Assignments of Choses in Action; the Assignment of Legal Interests 334 (ii) Equitable Assignments of Choses in Action; the Assignment of Equitable Interests 349 (iii) Legal Assignments of Choses in Action 360 (iv) Assignment of Future Contractual Rights 376 PART 4: THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES 8. The Position of the Parties (a) Introduction (b) Assignor/Obligor (c) Assignor/Assignee (d) Assignee/Obligor (i) The Rights of the Assignee (ii) The Rights of the Obligor (iii) The Rights of the Obligor: Transfer and the Obligor’s Ability to Vary the Contract after Notice of Assignment (iv) The Rights of the Obligor: Transfer and the Obligor’s Defences against the Assignor to which the Assignee is Subject (v) The Rights of the Obligor: Unconscionable Conduct and the Obligor’s Defences against the Assignor to which the Assignee is Subject (vi) Counterclaims (e) Successive Assignments (f) Insolvency (g) Controlling the Discretion of the Obligor
381 381 382 383 386 386 407
Index
473
416 426
450 458 466 469 470
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TABLE OF CASES References are to paragraph number Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1991] 1 AC 56 ..................................6.47 Abbott v Philbin [1961] AC 352 ..........................................................................6.88 Abjornson v Urban Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1989] WAR 191 .................7.26, 7.30 Aboussafy v Abacus Cities Ltd [1981] 4 WWR 660 ............................................8.64 Abraham v Thompson [1997] 4 All ER 362 ........................................................6.63 Abram Steamship Co Ltd v Westville Shipping Co Ltd [1923] AC 773 ...6.10, 8.04 Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Microcomputer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 389.......................................................................................3.11, 4.18, 4.27 Actien-Gesellschaft für Cartonnagen Industrie AG v Tenler (1899) 16 RPC 447.........................................................................................................4.13 Adams and the Kensington Vestry, Re (1883) 24 Ch 199 ..................................8.30 Adamson v Hayes (1973) 130 CLR 276 ...............................................................7.26 Adcock v Jolly (1893) 19 VLR 609 ............................................4.14, 4.15, 4.25, 7.21 Aectra Refining & Manufacturing Inc v Exmar NV [1994] 1 WLR 1634...............................................................................................8.64, 8.76 Aetna Insurance Co v Smith, McKinnon & Son (1918) 78 So 289 ....................6.87 AF Grant Pty Ltd v MacDonald [1960] Qd R 465 ..............................................3.07 AG v Swan & Fuller (1877) SALR 85 ...................................................................7.07 AGIP (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547........................................................3.11 Agnew & Bearsley v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710...................................................................................................3.17, 6.44 Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710...................3.16, 6.56 Agra Bank, ex parte (1868) LR 3 Ch App 555 .....................................................7.18 Agra and Masterman’s Bank, Re (1867) LR 2 Ch App 391 ................................8.26 Aiolos, The [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25 ...........................................................3.10, 4.18 Akron Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson (1951) 82 CLR 477................................7.16, 7.44 Aktion, The [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 283 .................................................................3.06 Alabaster v Harness [1895] 17 Ch D 49...............................................................6.59 Alderson v White (1858) 2 De G & J 97 ..............................................................3.16 Alexander & Alexander v Koelz (1987) 722 SW 2d 311 .....................................6.08 Alexander v Steinhardt, Walker & Co [1903] 2 KB 208 ...................6.15, 7.06, 7.07 Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518 ..............8.03
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Allgemeine Versicherungs-Gesellschaft Helvetia v Administrator of German Property [1931] 1 KB 672 .................................................................................7.40 Allhusen v Caristo Construction Corp (1952) 103 NE 2d 891..................6.87, 6.88 Allied Carpets Group plc v MacFarlane [2002] EW HC 1155 QBD (TCC)......7.06 Altarama Ltd v Camp (1980) 5 ACLR 513 ..........................................................8.91 Amalgamated General Finance Co Ltd v CE Golding & Co Ltd [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 163....................................................................6.73, 7.35, 7.38, 7.40 Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2005) 214 ALR 56...........................................................................................6.101 American Colortype Co v Continental Colortype Co (1903) 188 US 104 ........6.73 American Smelting & Refining Co v Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co (1918) 248 F 172 .................................................................6.71 Amicable Assurance Co v Bolland (1830) 4 Bligh NS 194; 5 ER 70...................8.63 AMP Specialist Funding Consultants Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 326 ..............8.70 ANC Ltd v Clark, The Times , 31 May 2000 ...............................................6.87, 6.88 Anderson v Commercial Union Assurance Company (1885) 55 LJQB 146 .....8.25 Anderson v Peldan (2005) 220 ALR 565..............................................................3.11 Anderson v Radcliffe (1858) EL BL & EL 806; 120 ER 710 ................................6.59 Androma Pty Ltd, Re [1987] 2 Qd R 134 ...............2.14, 4.31, 6.15, 7.13, 7.16, 7.44 Anning v Anning (1907) 4 CLR 1049 ...............................................4.14, 4.19, 6.87, 6.89, 7.20, 7.21, 7.38, 8.04 Aplin v Cates (1860) 30 LJ Ch 6..................................................................8.06, 8.48 Application by Marly Laboratory Ltd, Re [1952] 1 All ER 1057 ........................7.43 Arbuthnot v Norton (1846) 5 Moore 219; 13 ER 474 ........................................6.58 Archibold Howie Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1948) 77 CLR 143.........................................................................................................6.20 Arden v Arden (1885) 29 Ch D 702 ............................................................4.20, 7.18 Argo Fund Ltd v Essar Steel Ltd [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 203........................6.71, 6.87 Aries Tanker Corp v Total Transport Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 185..........8.64, 8.78, 8.90 Arjon Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2003) 8 VR 502 ...................7.18 Arkansas Valley Smelting Co v Belden Mining Co (1888) 127 US 379 ..............................................................................6.68, 6.70, 6.73, 6.79 Aron v Miall [1929] 98 LJKB 204 6.59m .............................................................6.73 Ashby Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 ............................................................................3.15, 3.17, 4.27, 6.49, 7.39 Ashmore v Corporation of Lloyd’s (No 2) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 620................6.78 Ashwin v Burton (1862) 7 LT 589........................................................................8.67 Asphaltic Wood Pavement Co, Re (1885) 30 Ch D 216 .....................................8.96 Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 588.....................................................................................................3.16, 6.84 Atkins v Dawbury (1714) Gilb Eq Rep 88; 22 ER 835 ........................................8.18 Atlantic & NCR Co v Atlantic & NC Co (1908) 61 SE 185 ..............................6.121
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Atlantic Lines & Navigation Co Inc v The Ship “Didymi” and Didymi Corp (The Didymi) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 97...................................................8.78 Attika Hope, The [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 439 ........................................................7.01 Attwood and Reid Ltd v Stephens Excavators Ltd [1932] NZLR 1332 ..............................................................................6.87, 6.88, 6.89, 7.12 Auckland City Council v Union House Ltd 11/8/2004 New Zealand Court of Appeal 162/03.....................................................................................6.87 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (No 2) (1992) 177 CLR 106.......................................................................................................2.06 Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust, Re (1991) 30 FCR 491 ...........................7.07 Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 ...................................................6.14, 6.20, 6.37, 6.39, 6.42, 6.43, 6.45 Australian Olympic Committee Inc v Big Fights Inc [1999] FCA 1042 ...6.84, 6.88 Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700 .........................................................................................................7.38 Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (2000) 172 ALR 702, affd (2001) 110 FCR 157 ..........................................6.86, 6.87, 6.88 Australian Workers Union v Bowen (1946) 72 CLR 575 ...................................4.27 Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104 ..............................................................................................6.69, 6.79 Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435 ......................6.28 Automobile Association (Canterbury) Inc v Australasian Secured Deposits Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 417......................................................................3.16 Automobile Carriage Builders Ltd v Sayers (1909) 101 LT 419 .........................6.08 Awwad v Geraghty & Co [2001] QB 570.............................................................6.59 Ayala Holdings Ltd (No 2) [1996] 1 BCLC 467 ..................................................6.67 Babson v Village of Ulysses (1952) 52 NW 2d 320 .............................................8.41 Bacon v Yatchaw Irrigation and Wagter Supply Trust (1898) 23 VLR 485.....................................................................................................5.06, 5.18 Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399.....................................................................................................3.17, 4.27 Baines v Geary (1887) 35 Ch D 154 .....................................................................6.08 Baird v Baird [1990] 2 AC 548 .............................................................................7.33 Baker v Adam [1908-10] All ER 632....................................................................8.88 Baker v Merckel [1960] 1 QB 657 ........................................................................8.03 Bakewell v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (South Australia) (1937) 58 CLR 743....................................................................................6.37, 6.45 Balder London, The [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 489..................................7.16, 7.40, 8.95 Ball v Warwick (1881) 50 LJQB 382 ....................................................................6.59 Baloglow v Konstantinidis (2001) 11 BPR 20 ............................................7.28, 7.29 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (The Mikhail Lermontov) (1993) 176 CLR 344.....................................................................................6.26, 6.28, 8.33
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Banco Central SA and Trevelan Navigation Inc v Lingoss & Falce Ltd v BFI Line ltd (The Raven) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 266 ...............................8.83, 8.94 Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 776.....................6.14 Bandwill Pty Ltd v Spencer-Laitt (2000) 23 WAR 390 .....................6.59, 6.61, 6.63 Bank of Australasia v Annie Hertz (1937) 54 WN(NSW) 179 ..................................................................................4.14, 4.15, 7.07, 7.12, 7.37 Bank of Boston Connecticut v European Grain and Shipping Ltd [1989] 1 AC 1056.............................................................................8.64, 8.85, 8.90 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8), Re [1998] AC 214.......................................................................................................3.17, 6.14 Bank of Liverpool & Martins Ltd v Holland (1926) 43 TLR 29 .......4.26, 7.39, 7.40 Bank of Melbourne Ltd v HPM Pty Ltd (1997) 26 ACSR 110 ...........................6.67 Bank of New South Wales v Brown (1983) 151 CLR 514...................................6.49 Bank of New South Wales v Northern British and Mercantile Insurance Co (1882) 3 NSWLR (L) 60 ..............................................................................6.73 Bank of New South Wales v The King [1918] NZLR 945.................3.17, 7.09, 7.40 Bank of New Zealand v Harry M Miller & Co Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 48.........8.64 Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd (The Good Luck) [1990] 1 QB 818 .............................6.12, 6.101 Bank of NY Butterfield and Son Ltd v Golinsky [1926] AC 733........................4.15 Bank of Victoria Ltd v Langlands Foundry Co Ltd (1898) 23 VLR 230 ............3.09 Barclays Bank v Willowbrook International Ltd [1986] BCLC 45.....................8.04 Barker v Stickney [1919] 1 KB 121.................................................6.88, 6.106, 6.110 Barroora Pty Ltd v Provincial Insurance Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 170................6.76 Barrow v Isaacs & Son [1891] 1 QB 417 ..............................................................6.87 Batchelor v Murphy [1926] AC 63.......................................................................8.30 Bateman Television Ltd v Coleridge Finance Co Ltd [1969] NZLR 794 ...........7.37 Bateman v Hunt [1904] 2 KB 530...............................................................7.38, 8.60 Bawejem Ltd v MC Fabrications Ltd [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 377..................6.88 Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd v Natural Gas Corporation Energy Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 173.................................................................................6.120, 8.83 Baytur SA v Finagro Holding SA [1992] 1 QB 610 ................4.26, 6.73, 6.132, 8.29 Bayview Quarries Pty Ltd v Castley Development Pty Ltd [1963] VR 445 .......8.85 Beatty v Brashs Pty Ltd [1998] 2 VR 201 ...........................................2.05, 6.61, 6.62 Beaumont, Re [1902] 1 Ch 889 ............................................................................7.04 Beckett v Tower Assets Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 1.....................................................3.16 Beecham v Pater (1890) 16 VLR 13 .....................................................................7.07 Belize Motor Supply Company v Cox [1914] 1 KB 244 .....................................6.87 Bell Bros Pty Ltd v Sarich [1971] WAR 157 ........................................................3.07 Bell v London & North Western Railway Co (1852) 15 Beav 548; 51 ER 651 ................................................................................4.15, 7.04, 7.05, 7.07 Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gated Export Corp (1984) 52 ALR 176 ......................6.63
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Bence v Shearman [1898] 2 Ch 582 ............................................................7.18, 8.06 Bennett v White [1910] 2 KB 643 ......................................................3.27, 5.06, 8.83 Bergmann v MacMillan (1881) 17 Ch D 423 ......................................................4.27 Berliner Foods Corp v Pilsbury Co (1986) 633 F Supp 557 ...............................6.80 Bevan Ashford v Geoff Yeandle (Contractors) Ltd [1999] Ch 239....................6.59 BICC plc v Burndy Corporation [1985] 1 Ch 232 ..............................................8.04 Bickerton v Walker (1885) 31 Ch D 151 .............................................................8.60 Biggerstaff v Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd [1896] 2 Ch 93 .............................4.27, 8.51, 8.83 Bingham v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 209 ..........................................6.88 Birchal v Birch, Crisp & Co [1913] 2 Ch 375 ......................................................8.70 Birmingham Breweries Ltd v Jameson (1898) 67 LJ Ch 403 .....................6.70, 6.76 Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 183....................6.09 Blacktown Municipal Council v Doneo [1971] 1 NSWLR 157 .........................6.88 Blackwood’s Ltd v Chartres (1931) 31 SR(NSW) 619 ..............................6337, 6.20 Blakely Ordnance Co, Re (1867) LR 3 Ch App 154 ............................................8.26 Blankenstein, The [1985] 1 WLR 435.........................................................3.06, 3.07 Board of Education of the Borough of Flemington v State Board of Education (1911) 81 A 163 ...............................................................................6.73 BOC Group plc v Centeon LLC [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 53............................8.26 Bond, Re (1940) 35 Tas LR 96.....................................................................6.87, 7.12 Bond Worth Ltd, Re [1980] Ch 228 ....................................................................3.17 Bone v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1972] 2 NSWLR 651..........................7.37 Booth v Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159 .........................................................................3.09, 3.22, 4.31, 6.10, 6.20, 6.38 Booth v Williams (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 421 ..........................................................2.12 Boston Ice Co v Potter (1877) 25 Am Rep 9 .....................................6.69, 6.76, 6.77 Bourne v Colodense Ltd [1985] ICR 291 ............................................................6.61 Bovis International Inc v Circle Ltd Partnership (1995) 49 Con LR 12...............................................................................6.73, 6.79, 7.41, 8.10, 8.13 Bradford Banking Co Ltd v Henry Briggs, Son & Co (1886) LR 12 App Cas 29 .........................................................................................................8.13 Bradford Old Bank Ltd v Sutcliffe [1918] 2 KB 833 .........................................6.100 Bradlaugh v Newdegate (1883) 11 QBD 1...........................................................6.59 Bray v Commissioner of Taxation (1968) 117 CLR 349.....................................7.37 Brede, The [1974] 1 QB 233 ........................................................................8.64, 8.78 Brennan v Pitt Son & Badgery Ltd (1889) 20 NSWR 179 ..................................8.83 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376...................................................................6.09 Brew v Whitlock [1967] VR 449 ..........................................................................6.59 Briargate Developments Ltd v Newprop Co Ltd [1990] 1 EGLR 283 ...........................................................................................................6.08 Brice v Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569...............................2.02, 4.20, 4.27, 6.07, 6.88, 7.07, 7.12, 8.06, 8.38, 8.45, 8.46, 8.48
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Bridge v Wholesale Acceptance Corp (Aust) v Burnard (1992) 27 NSWLR 415 ..................................................................................................6.58 Britain & Overseas Trading (Bristles) Ltd v Brooks Wharf & Bull Wharf [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 51 .......................................................................6.117 Britain v Rossiter (1879) 11 QBD 123 .................................................................5.04 British Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Marine Management (UK) Ltd [1980] QB 137 ...................................................................................8.47 British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store Service Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006 ...............................................................................................6.59 British Fuels Ltd v Baxendale [1999] 2 AC 52...................................................6.101 British Gas Trading Ltd v Eastern Electricity Plc, unreported, English Court of Appeal, 18 Dec 1996...........................................................................6.87 British Homes Assurance Corp Ltd v Paterson [1902] 2 Ch 404.......................3.06 British Union & National Insurance Co v Rawson [1916] 2 Ch 476 ........6.08, 8.13 British Waggon Co and Parkgate Waggon Co v Lea (1880) 5 QBD 149..............................................................3.08, 6.74, 6.77, 6.79, 6.80, 6.101 Broad v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 2 NSWLR 40 ..........................6.14 Broadcast Australia Pty Ltd v Minister Assisting the Minister for Natural Resources (Lands) (2004) 204 ALR 46 ....................................................6.84, 6.88 Brookfield v Davey Products Pty Ltd (1996) 14 ACLC 303 ...............................6.67 Brown & Gregory Ltd, Re [1904] 1 Ch 627 .........................................................8.26 Brown, Re [1954] 1 Ch 39 ....................................................................................6.76 Brown, Shipley & Co v Kough (1885) 29 Ch D 848 ..................................7.07, 7.09 Brown v Bank of Australasia [1915] VLR 453.....................................................7.38 Brown v Heffer (1967) 116 CLR 344 ...................................................................7.16 Brown v Metropolitan Counties Life Assurance Society (1859) 28 LJQB 236 ............................................................................................................6.15 Browne & Company v John P Sharkey Company (1911) 115 P 156 .................6.78 Brown’s Estate, Re [1893] 2 Ch 300...................................................................6.100 Brownton Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499 ..............................................................................................6.61, 6.62, 6.64 Bruce v Tyley (1916) 21 CLR 277.................................6.73, 6.84, 6.88, 6.113, 6.122 Brunker v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1937) 57 CLR 555 ...................................7.20 Brush Aggregates Ltd, Re [1983] BCLC 320...............................................4.27, 6.44 Bruynius, Re [1995] 1 Qd R 492 ..........................................................................7.07 Bryant v Primary Industries Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 142..................8.25 Buck v Robson (1878) 3 QBD 686 ..............................................................7.07, 7.08 Buckland v Papillon (1866) LR 1 Eq 477.............................................................8.07 Buiscex Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 357 .......................................6.67 Bunny Industries Ltd v FSW Enterprises Pty Ltd [1982] Qd R 712...................7.17 Burck v Taylor (1894) 152 US 634 ............................................6.68, 6.87, 6.88, 6.89 Burdett, ex parte Byrne, Re (1888) 20 QBD 310 .................................................6.50
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Buring and Chapman, Re (1941) 13 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 72 ............................................................................................6.15, 6.88, 7.07 Burlinson v Hall (1884) 12 QBD 347.................................................3.17, 5.05, 7.40 Burn v Carvalho (1839) 4 Myl & Cr 690; 41 ER 265.........................6.15, 7.07, 7.09 Burr v Wimbledon Local Board (1887) 35 WR 404 ...........................................8.07 Burrows v Gradin (1843) 12 LJQB 333................................................................8.67 Burston Finance Ltd v Spierway Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1648 ..................................3.10 Burton v Camden London Borough Council [2000] 2 AC 399 .......3.11, 6.86, 7.32 Burton v Great Northern Railway Co (1854) 9 Exch 507; 156 ER 216..............6.73 Burwood Land, Building, and Investment Co Ltd v Berridge (1893) 19 VLR 630................................................................................................4.20, 6.83 Burwood Project Management Pty Ltd v Polar Technologies International Pty Ltd (1999) 9 Butterworths Property Reports 97801 ......................6.08, 6.84, 6.88 Business Computers Ltd v Anglo-African Leasing ltd [1977] 1 WLR 578....................................................................................................8.83, 8.85 Butler v Capel (1823) 2 B & C 251; 107 ER 377 ..................................................3.04 Button’s Lease, Re [1964] Ch 263 ........................................................................6.08 Byrne v Reid [1902] 2 Ch 735 ..............................................................................3.07 Bysouth v Shire of Blackburn & Mitcham (No 2) [1928] VR 562 .....................6.86 CA Stewart & Co v PHS Van Ommeren (London) Ltd [1918] 2 KB 560 .........8.33 Caboche v Ramsay (1993) 119 ALR 215.....................................................6.84, 6.85 Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (in liq) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 253 ...................................................................6.63 Caddy v Beattie (1908) VLR 17............................................................................8.18 Caerns Motor Services Ltd v Texaco Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 247 ...........................6.76 Calaby Pty Ltd v Ampol Pty Ltd (1990) 71 NTR 1....3.27, 6.71, 6.101, 6.123, 6.133 Caldy Manor Estates ltd v Farrell [1974] 1 WLR 1303 .......................................6.84 Cambrian Mining Co, Re (1882) 48 LT 114 .......................................................6.59 Camden & Burton v London Borough Council [2000] 2 AC 399 .....................3.09 Camdex International Ltd v Bank of Zambia [1996] 1 WLR 864.............6.59, 6.64 Camfield Pastoral Co v Dixon [1972] Qd R 289.................................................4.18 Camp v King (1887) 14 VLR 22 ..................................................................7.12, 7.38 Campbell, Re [1997] Ch 14 ..................................................................................6.06 Canadian Admiral Corp Ltd v LF Dommerich & Co Inc (1964) 43 DLR (2d) 1 ....................................................................................................8.83 Canny Gabriel Jackson Advertising Pty Ltd v Volume Sales (Finance) Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 321..............................................................................6.48 Cantrell v Lemons (1948) 200 P 2d 911 ..............................................................6.08 Care Shipping Corp v Latin American Shipping Corp [1983] 1 QB 1005 ...........................................................................................................4.02, 7.41 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256 .............................................3.07 Carpenter v Boyce (1896) 22 VLR 248 ................................................................6.59
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Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] Ch 207.......3.15 Carter v Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115........................................................................6.08 Castellain v Preston (1882) 8 QBD 617 ......................................................6.59, 8.25 Cathay Developments Pty Ltd v Laser Entertainment Pty Ltd [1998] NSWSC 82 .........................................................................................................6.88 Cathedral Place Pty Ltd v Hyatt Australia Ltd [2003] VSC 385 .........................6.87 Cator v Burke (1785) 1 Brown’s Ch 434; 28 ER 1222.........................................4.05 Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 .........................................................................6.09 Cavendish v Geaves (1857) 24 Beav 163; 53 ER 319 .........................7.18, 8.94, 8.99 CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 ............................................6.70, 6.71, 6.72, 6.73, 6.76, 6.78, 6.79, 7.19 Cellulose Products Pty Ltd v Truda (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 561 ........................8.75 Central Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corp (The Aiolos) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25...................................................................3.10, 4.04, 4.18 Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co v Snider [1916] 1 AC 266...............................3.23 Centre Insurance International Co v Freakley [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 65.....6.73 Century 21 (South Pacific) Pty Ltd v Century 21 Real Estate Corp (1996) 136 ALR 687.........................................................................................6.101 Chadwick v Clarke (1845) 1 CB 700; 135 ER 717 ...............................................7.37 Chang v Regsitrar of Titles (1976) 137 CLR 177.................................................7.17 Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 5) (2002) ATPR (Digest) 46 .........................6.05 Charge Card Services Ltd, Re [1987] Ch 150 .............................................3.17, 6.14 Charlotte Thirty Ltd and Bison Ltd v Croker Ltd (1990) 24 Con LR 46 .........................................................................................................6.73, 6.79 Chase Manhattan Asia Ltd v Official Receiver and Liquidator of First Bangkok City Finance Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1181 ...............................................3.16 Chatsworth Investments Ltd v Cussins (Contractors) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1 .....3.06 Cheltenham & Gloucester plc v Appleyard [2004] EWCA Civ 291...................3.10 Cherry v Boultbee (1839) 4 My & Cr 442; 41 ER 171.........................................8.83 Chick v Blackmore (1854) 2 Sm & Giff 274; 65 ER 398 .....................................8.83 Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties v ISPT Pty Ltd (1998) 45 NSWLR 639 ..............................................................................................7.17, 7.18 Child v Dynes [1985] 2 NZLR 554..............................................................6.09, 6.10 China Steamship Co, Re (1869) LR 7 Eq 240......................................................8.83 Chow Yoon Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] AC 209 ...........3.16 Christie v Taunton, Delmard, Lane & Co [1893] 2 Ch 175 ...............................8.83 Chung Kwok Hotel Co Ltd v Field [1960] 1 WLR 1112.....................................7.14 Cinema Plus Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 49 NSWLR 513 ......................................................................................6.14 Circuit Systems Ltd v Zuken-Redac (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 721, affd [1999] 2 AC 1.....................................................................................................6.87 Cirillo v Citicorp Australia Ltd [2004] SASC 293 ...............................................6.10
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Citibank Pty Ltd v Simon Fredericks Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 168..........................8.67 City Life Assurance Ltd Co, Re [1926] Ch 191.........................4.14, 4.15, 7.18, 8.96 City of London Corp v Fell [1994] 1 AC 458 ......................................................8.70 City of Omaha v Standard Oil Co (1898) 75 NW 895 ...............................6.87, 6.88 Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139..............................6.59, 6.61, 6.63, 6.64 Clairs Keeley (No 2) v Treacy (2004) 29 WAR 479.........6.59, 6.61, 6.63, 6.64, 6.66 Clairs Keeley v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86 .......................6.59, 6.61, 6.63, 6.64, 6.66 Clark v Dedvukaj [1993] 2 Qd R 10...................................................................6.100 Clark v Lonergan [1961] NSWR 313 ...................................................................3.07 Clarke, Re (1887) 36 Ch D 348..................................................6.50, 7.11, 7.13, 7.41 Clark’s Refrigerated Transport Pty Ltd , Re [1982] VR 989 ...............................6.71 Clayman v Goodman Properties Inc (1973) 518 F 2d 1026 ...............................6.08 Clearance Nominees Pty Ltd v Discount Acceptance Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 25 ACSR 531 ..........................................................................................7.38 Clegg v Hands (1889) 44 Ch D 503......................................................................6.76 Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1..............................................................................1.06, 6.45, 8.55, 8.83, 8.86 Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186 .......................6.59 Coba Industries Ltd v Millie’s Holdings (Canada) Ltd [1985] 6 WWR 14 .......8.64 Coca-Cola Financial Corp v Finstat International Ltd [1998] QB 43................8.26 Cockell v Taylor (1851) 15 Beav 103; 51 ER 475...............................6.59, 8.04, 8.59 Coker and Bellamy v Richey (1922) 204 P 945 ...................................................6.08 Cole v Booker (1913) 29 TLR 295........................................................................6.59 Cole v Wellington Dairy Farmers Co-op Association Ltd [1917] NZLR 372..................................................................................................6.73, 6.95 Coles Myer Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [1998] 4 VR 728 ................3.11 Collyer v Isaacs (1881) 19 Ch D 342 ....................................................................4.32 Colonia Verscherung AG v Amoco Oil Co (1997) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 261 ......6.16, 8.25 Colonial Bank v European Grain & Shipping Ltd (The Dominique) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 239...............................................6.37, 8.86, 8.88, 8.90, 8.92 Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261........................2.02, 2.04, 2.05, 2.06 Colonial Mutual General Insurance co Ltd v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1140...........................................................3.17 Comfort v Betts [1891] 1 QB 737 ...............................................................6.59, 7.40 Commercial Bank of Tasmania v Jones [1893] AC 313 .....................................3.06 Commercial Factors Ltd v Maxwell Printing Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 724 ................................................................................4.18, 7.15, 7.40, 8.71 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1926) 38 CLR 272....................................................................................3.11, 7.18 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Yeend (1929) 43 CLR 235............................................................................................2.06, 3.11, 6.84 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Fulliffe (1920) 28 CLR 178 ................7.29
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Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Livingston [1965] AC 694..............................................................................................3.11, 3.23, 3.24 Commissioner of State Revenue (Victoria) v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 651....................................................................7.18 Commissioner of Taxation v Betro Harrison Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 37 FLR 150 ................................................6.33, 6.34, 7.09, 7.15, 7.16, 7.17 Commissioner of Taxation v Linter Textiles Australia Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 1...........................................................................................................6.15 Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd (1986) 163 CLR 199.....................................................................................................6.20, 6.49 Commissioner of Taxation v Orica Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 500 ..........................6.101 Commissioner of Taxes (Queensland) v Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127 ............3.11 Commonwealth Quarries (Footscray) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1938) 59 CLR 111 ........................................................................6.49 Commonwealth v Ling (1993) 118 ALR 309..............................................6.61, 6.62 Compania Columbiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101 ..................................2.02, 4.11, 5.12, 5.18, 5.20, 6.59, 7.38, 8.13 Compania Sud-Americana de Vapares v Shipmair BV (The Teno) [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 289...................................................................................8.64 Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 .........................................................................3.16, 3.17, 4.27, 5.05, 5.23, 7.07 Comptroller of Stamps (Vic) v Howard-Smith (1936) 54 CLR 614 ................................................................4.14, 7.04, 7.05, 7.06, 7.23, 7.27, 7.29 Condliffe v Hislop [1996] 1 WLR 753 ........................................................6.59, 6.63 Congreve v Evetts (1854) 10 Exch 298; 156 ER 457............................................7.11 Conlan v Carlow County Council [1912] 2 Ir 535..............................................7.39 Conley v Barclays Bank Ltd, Re (1938) 2 All ER 127 ..........................................6.50 Connolly, Re [1931] GLR 551 ............................................................4.16, 6.15, 7.07 Conquest’s case (1875) 1 Ch D 334 .....................................................................3.06 Consolidated Trust Co Ltd v Naylor (1936) 55 CLR 423 ......6.100, 7.34, 7.37, 7.38 Contemporary Cottages (NZ) Ltd v Margin Traders Ltd [1981] 2 NZLR 114........................................................................................................3.16 Coombe v Carter (1888) 36 Ch D 348.................................................................7.11 Cooney v Burns (1922) 30 CLR 216 ....................................................................3.23 Cooper v Micklefield Coal and Lime Co Ltd (1912) 107 LT 457....................................................................................6.73, 6.79, 6.95, 6.134 Cooper v Reilly (1829) 2 Sim 560; 57 ER 897......................................................6.58 Coorey v Bolous (1933) 50 WN(NSW) 187 ........................................................8.82 Cope v Keene (1968) 118 CLR 1 ..........................................................................7.20 Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 .......................4.05, 4.14, 4.27, 6.71, 7.15, 7.20 Corson v Lewis (1906) 109 NW 735 ....................................................................6.79 Cory v Gertcken (1816) 2 Madd 40; 56 ER 250 ..................................................8.82
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Cossill v Strangman [1963] NSWR 1695....................................................5.17, 7.37 Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd, Re [1998] Ch 495 ....................................................7.07 Cottage Club Estates Ltd v Woodside Estates Co (Amersham) Ltd [1928] 2 KB 463 ......................................................................................6.73, 6.118 Cotterill v Bank of Singapore (Australia) Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 238 ..............................................................................................6.05, 6.67 Cotton v Heyl [1930] 1 Ch 510 ........................................6.19, 6.46, 7.07, 7.44, 8.04 Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460...................................................................................3.27, 6.07, 7.04, 7.07 Coulter v Chief Constable of Dorset Police [2004] 1 WLR 1425; affd [2005] 1 WLR 130 ......................................................................................7.05 Countess of Bective v FCT (1932) 47 CLR 417 .................................................6.135 County Hotel and Wine Co Ltd v London and North Western Railway Co [1918] 2 KB 251; affd [1919] 2 KB 29.......................................2.02, 6.08, 6.59 Court Line Ltd v Aktiebolaget SpA v G¢taverken (The Halycon the Great) [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 283 ..............................................................6.73, 7.40 Cousins, Re (1885) 30 Ch D 203.................................................................6.08, 6.69 Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 605 ..................................6.88 Cozens, Re [1913] 2 Ch 478 ........................................................................7.04, 7.06 CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 1 NSWLR 510 ..............................................................................................3.18, 7.18 Crane Ice Cream Co v Terminal Freezing & Heating Co (1925) 128 A 280..........................................................................................................6.68, 6.70 Crichton v Crichton (1930) 43 CLR 536 .............................................................7.26 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1.......................................................................................................6.73, 6.101 Cronk v M’Manus (1892) 8 TLR 449 .........................................................3.12, 5.08 Crothers, Re [1930] VLR 49 ..................3.04, 3.26, 4.05, 4.07, 4.10, 4.14, 4.19, 8.99 Crouch v Credit Foncier of England Ltd (1873) LR 8 QB 374...........................4.05 Crouch v Martin (1707) 2 Vern 595; 23 ER 987 .................................................6.58 Crouch v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1907] VLR 80 ...........................6.58 Crowe v Price (1889) 22 QBD 429.......................................................................6.58 Crowfoot v Gurney (1832) 9 Bing 372; 131 ER 655..........................4.23, 6.15, 7.07 CSR Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-193 ....................................................................................................6.134 Cummings v Johnson (1913) 4 WWR 543..........................................................8.70 Cunningham, Re [1965] WAR 115......................................................................4.27 Curran v Newpark Cinemas Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 295.......................7.04, 7.07, 7.18 Currey v The Federal building Society (1929) 42 CLR 421 ................................3.26 Curtain Dream plc v Churchill Merchanting Ltd [1990] BCC 341 ...................3.16 Curtis Moffat Ltd v Wheeler [1929] 2 Ch 224 ....................................................8.07 D Galambos & Son Pty Ltd v McIntyre (1974) 5 ACTR 10.....8.64, 8.86, 8.88, 8.91
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Daley, ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 8 ACSR 395 ...........................................................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64 Dallas, Re [1904] 2 Ch 385 ..........................................................................7.38, 8.83 Damon Compania Naviera SA v Hapag-Lloyd International SA (The Blankenstein) [1985] 1 WLR 435 ...................................................3.06, 3.07 Daniel Erat Consulting Services Pty Ltd , Re (1999) 162 ALR 429 ....................6.67 Danish Bacon Co Ltd, Staff Pension Fund Trusts, Re [1971] 1 WLR 248....................................................................................................7.04, 7.33 Dansk Rekylriffel Syndikat Aktieselskab v Snell [1908] 2 Ch 127....................6.106 Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshire Northern Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 68.............................................................................................8.03, 8.13, 8.15 Davenport Central Service Station Ltd v O’Connell [1975] 1 NZLR 755 .........8.30 David Jones Ltd v Lunn (1969) 91 WN(NSW) 468 ...................................6.08, 6.69 David v Malouf (1908) 5 CLR 749 .......................................................................6.45 Davies v Collins [1945] 1 All ER 247 .............................3.08, 6.69, 6.77, 6.86, 6.101 Davies v Davies (1887) 36 Ch D 359...........................................................6.08, 6.58 Davies v Rees (1886) 17 QBD 408........................................................................6.50 Davis & Co, Re (1888) 22 QBD 193............................................................6.15, 8.45 Davis v Duke of Marlborough (1818) 1 Swan 74; 36 ER 303.............................6.58 Davis v Freethy (1890) 24 QBD 519 ....................................................................4.15 Davis v Hedges (1871) LR 6 QB 687....................................................................8.75 Dawson v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260 ............................................................................2.02, 6.06, 6.15, 6.59, 8.13 DCT v Lanstel Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 314........................................................7.34 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v British South Africa Co [1912] AC 52......7.16 De Hoghton v Money (1866) 2 LR Ch App 164 ........................................6.09, 6.59 De Lisle v Union Bank of Scotland [1914] 1 Ch 22 ............................................8.81 De Marney, Re [1943] Ch 126..............................................................................6.15 De Nicholls v Saunders (1870) LR 5 CP 589 .......................................................8.46 De Pothonier v De Mattos (1858) El Bl & El 461; 120 ER 581 ..................4.24, 8.83 Dear v Reeves [2002] Ch 1 .................................................................2.05, 2.06, 6.08 Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1; 38 ER 475 ..........................................4.20, 5.05, 5.23 Deaton v Lawson (1905) 82 P 879 .......................................................................6.79 Defries v Milne [1913] 1 Ch 98 ............................................................................6.59 Delaware County Commissioners v Diebold Safe and Lock Company (1890) 133 US 473 ...........................................................................6.49, 6.68, 7.12 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Cridlands Pty Ltd (2003) 134 FCR 474......6.61, 6.62 DeMattos v Gibson (1858) 4 De G & J 276; 45 ER 108..........................6.106, 6.127 Dempsey & The National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Traders’ Finance Corp Ltd [1933] NZLR 1258.............................................................................7.15 Denham Bros Ltd v W Freestone Leasing Pty Ltd [2004] 1 Qd R 500 ...........................................................................................6.50, 6.69, 6.71, 8.30
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Denham v Midland Employers Mutual Assurance Ltd [1955] 2 QB 437..........6.73 Denney, Gasquet & Metcalfe v Conklin [1913] 3 KB 177 ..................................7.38 Dent, Re [1923] 1 Ch 113 .....................................................................................4.32 Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367 ..........................................................4.05, 4.08, 4.11, 4.27, 6.98, 8.06, 8.18 Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 ...................................................................4.05, 4.08, 4.11, 4.27, 8.06, 8.18 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 117 ALR 61 .................................................4.32, 6.06 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lanstel Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 314 ...........................................................................................................1.06 Devefi Pty Ltd v Mateffy Pearl Nagy Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 225 .................................................................6.72, 6.83, 6.84, 6.86, 6.87, 6.88 DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 3 All ER 462 .............................................................................7.28 Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337.....................................................6.09, 6.59 Didymi, The [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 97..................................................................8.78 Dillon, Re (1890) 44 Ch D 76...............................................................................7.09 Diplock v Hammond (1854) 2 Sm & Giff 141; 65 ER 339 .................................7.07 Diptford Parish Lands, Re [1934] Ch 151 ...........................................................7.37 Dixon v Winch [1900] 1 Ch 736 ........................................................7.38, 8.81, 8.83 DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 1 NSWLR 510 ...............................................................................3.18, 7.18 DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 431..............................................................................3.11 Doe v Reid (1830) 10 B & C 849; 109 ER 664 .....................................................6.76 Dominique, The [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 239......................6.37, 8.86, 8.88, 8.90, 8.92 Domson Pty Ltd v Zhu [2005] NSWSC 1070 ...................................6.66, 6.67, 7.07 Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291.........................................1.01, 3.18, 6.50, 6.70, 6.79, 6.84, 6.87, 6.90, 7.22 Donaldson v Donaldson (1854) Kay 711; 69 ER 303.................................4.14, 4.19 Dorman v Rodgers (1982) 148 CLR 365 .............................................................3.19 Douglas v Culverwell (1862) 4 De GF & J 20; 45 ER 1089 .................................3.16 Downes v Bank of New Zealand (1895) 13 NZLR 723 .......................................8.83 Downie v Lockwood [1965] VR 257....................................................................7.14 Dr Jaeger’s Sanitary Woollen System Co Ltd v Walker and Sons (1897) 77 LT 180...................................................6.70, 6.74, 6.77, 6.79, 6.81, 6.88 Drew & Co v Josolyne (1887) 18 QBD 590 .........................................................6.15 Drummond’s Trusts, Re (1907) 4 Tas LR 9 ........................................................6.58 Duck Jarm, Re (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 521.............................................5.05, 6.15, 7.0 Dunnicliff & Bagley v Mallett (1859) 7 CB(NS) 209; 141 ER 795 .........................................................................................................7.39
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Durham Bros v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 ...........................3.17, 4.04, 4.25, 4.27, 5.06, 5.18, 7.07, 7.38, 7.39, 7.40, 7.41, 8.06 E Brown Pty Ltd v Florence [1966] SASR 214.....................................................6.77 E Pellas & Co v Neptune Marine Insurance Co (1879) 5 CPD 34 .....................8.94 E Pfeiffer WeineinKauf GmbH & Co v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 150........................................................................................5.05, 6.17, 8.58 Earl of Egremont v Smith (1877) 6 Ch D 469 .....................................................3.07 Earl of Lucan, Re (1890) 45 Ch D 470 ........................................................3.17, 7.27 Earle’s Shipbuilding and Engineering Company v Atlantic Transport Company (1899) 43 Sol Jo 691 .........................................................................2.02 Eastern Telegraph Co Ltd v Dent [1899] 1 QB 835 ............................................6.87 Edinburgh United Breweries Ltd v Molleson [1894] AC 97 ..............................6.10 Edmunds v Edmunds [1904] P 363 ...................................................6.36, 7.18, 8.04 Edward Nelson & Co Ltd v Faber & Co [1903] 2 KB 367 ..................................8.81 Edward Ward & Co v McDougall [1972] VR 433...............................................8.85 Edwards v Newland & Co [1950] 2 KB 534..............................6.77, 6.78, 6.79, 6.81 Elders Pastoral Ltd v Bank of New Zealand [1991] 1 NZLR 385 ..............3.17, 7.07 Electronic Rentals Pty Ltd v Anderson (1971) 124 CLR 27................................7.37 Elgar Heights Pty Ltd Ltd [1985] VR 657 ............................................................6.45 Ellenborough, Re [1903] 1 Ch 697..............................................................6.17, 7.44 Ellerman Lines Ltd v Lancaster Maritime Co Ltd (The Lancaster) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 497..........................................................................5.05, 5.23 Ellis and Company’s Trustee v Dixon-Johnson [1924] 2 Ch 451 ....................6.128 Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399 ...........................................2.02, 6.09, 6.59, 6.61 Elton v Cavill (No 2) (1993) 34 NSWLR 289 ......................................................6.84 Elves v Croffs (1850) 10 CB 241; 138 ER 98 ........................................................6.08 EM Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1904] 2 Ch 86 .............................................................................................4.13, 4.25, 7.15 Equus Financial Services Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd (unreported Queensland CA , 19 May 1994)..........................................4.18, 7.16 ER Ives Investment Ltd v High [1967] 2 QB 379 ...................................6.108, 6.135 Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Jackson (1993) 11 ACLC 138 .................................6.14 Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA 228 ...............................................................................................6.87 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Hall & Russell & Co Ltd [1989] AC 643....................3.10 Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Cherrywood Park Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 279 ...................................................................................................6.08, 6.50 Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979..........................................3.17 Evelpidi Era, The [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 54 .................................................8.38, 8.71 Fanti, The [1991] 1 AC 1 ....................................................................................6.118 Farm Products Co-operative (Tararua) Co Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioner (NZ) (1969) 1 ATR 85 .............................................................3.11
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Farmer v Mosley Holdings Ltd [2001] 2 BCLC 572 ...........................................6.63 Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Hogg (1995) 64 SASR 450 ...........6.100, 6.108 Fashion v Atwood (1688) 2 Chan Cas 37; 32 ER 835 ................................4.08, 8.18 Fasken v Minister of National Revenue [1949] 1 DLR 810 ................................3.11 FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440 ........................3.11, 4.03, 4.19, 4.27, 4.32, 5.07, 6.20, 6.48, 7.39, 7.44, 8.16, 8.29 Federal Commerce & Navigation Co Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc [1978] 1 QB 927..... 8.64, 8.66 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Galland (1986) 162 CLR 408 ..................6.48 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Murry (1998) 193 CLR 605 ....................6.48 Feistel v King’s College Cambridge (1847) 10 Beav 491, 50 ER 671 ...........................................................................................................6.58 Felix v Hadley & Co v Hadley [1898] 2 Ch 680..........................................8.06, 8.82 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32......................................................................................................6.27 Field v Battye [1939] SASR 235............................................................................6.58 Field v Megaw [1869] LR 4 CP 660......................................................................7.07 Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle Protection and Indemnity Association (The Fanti) [1991] 1 AC 1......................................................................6.118, 8.13 First City Corporation v Downsview Nominees Ltd [1989] 3 NZLR 710.........................................................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62 First National Bank of Chicago v West of England Shipowners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg) (The Evelpidi Era) [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 54....................................................................8.38, 8.71 Fisher v Harrison [2003] EWCA Civ 1047 ..........................................................6.58 Fitzgerald v Stewart (1831) 2 Russ & M 457; 39 ER 467.....................................7.04 Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364.....................2.05, 2.07, 2.14, 3.10, 4.07, 4.08, 4.24, 5.06, 6.59, 6.64, 6.69, 6.71, 6.77, 6.86, 6.98, 7.40 Fleming v Loe [1901] 2 Ch 594; rvsd [1902] 2 Ch 359 .......................................8.34 Flint v Walker (1847) 5 Moore 180; 13 ER (PC) 459..........................................7.07 Flood v Shand Construction Ltd (1996) 54 Con LR 125 ..................................................................................6.45, 6.51, 6.54, 6.87, 8.29 Foamcrete (UK) Ltd v Thrust Engineering Ltd [2002] BCC 221..............6.87, 6.88 Foloquet v Woodburn Public School (1934) 29 P 2d 554 .........................6.68, 6.79 Forbes v NSW Trotting Club Ltd (1979) 25 ALR 1 ............................................6.88 Forster v Baker [1910] 2 KB 636 .................................................................4.27, 7.39 Fortescue v Barnett (1834) 3 MY & K 36; 40 ER 14............................................7.21 Forth v Stanton (1681) 1 Wms Saund 210; 85 ER 217 .......................................4.23 Fortunato v Patten (1895) 41 NE 572................................................6.87, 6.88, 6.89 Foster v Cockerell (1835) 3 Cl & Fin 456; 6 ER 1508..........................................4.20 Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 166...................................................................................6.59, 6.60, 6.63, 6.66
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Francis v NPD Property Developments Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 240........................................................................................3.15, 3.18, 7.17, 7.18 Fraser v Buckle [1996] 2 ILRM 34 .......................................................................6.65 Fratelli Sorrentino v Buerger [1915] 1 KB 307................3.08, 6.78, 6.79, 6.81, 8.03 Freehill Hollingdale & Page v Bandwill Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 150 .......6.59, 6.63 Freeman v Joiner (2005) 219 ALR 136 ................................................................6.67 Freeway Mutual Pty Ltd v Taylor (1978) 22 ALR 281 ........................................7.07 French v Queensland Premier Mines Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 294..........................6.50 Freshfields’ Trust, Re (1879) 11 Ch D 198 ..........................................................4.20 Friary Holroyd and Healey’s Breweries Ltd v Singleton [1899] 1 Ch 86, rvsd [1899] 2 Ch 261; (1899) 81 LT 101......................................6.87, 8.30 Fricker v Uddo & Taormina Co (1957) 312 P 2d 1085.......................................8.48 Front Comor, The [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 257 ....................................................6.118 Fry, Re ]1946] 1 Ch 312........................................................................................7.40 Fuller v Happy Shopper Markets Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 2853.................................8.66 G & N Angelakis Shipping SA v Compagnie National Algerienne de Navigation (The Attika Hope) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 439 ...............................7.01 G H Myers & Co v Brent Cross Service Co [1934] 1 KB 46 ...............................6.79 G and T Earle Ltd v Hemsworth Rural District Council (1928) 44 TLR 758 .................................................................6.07, 6.16, 6.21, 6.34, 7.39, 7.40 Gallagher v Rainbow (1994) 179 CLR 624 .............................................6.108, 6.132 Gardiner v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2004) 59 NSWLR 549.......7.20 Garnac Grain Co Inc v HMF Faure & Fairclough Ltd [1966] 1 QB 650 ...........3.16 Garnham, Harris & Elton Ltd v Alfred W Ellis (Transport) Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 940..........................................................................................................6.79 Garrison Pty Ltd v The Solicitors’ Trust [2004] TASSC 139.....................3.27, 6.71 Gathercole v Smith (1880) 27 Ch D 1.........................................................3.09, 6.82 Gatoil Anstalt v Omennial Ltd (The Balder London) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 489.............................................................................................7.16, 7.40, 8.95 GE Crane Sales Pty ltd v FCT (1971) 126 CLR 177.........3.23, 4.07, 7.19, 7.22, 8.04 General Estates Co, Re (1868) LR 3 Ch App 758 ................................................8.26 General Horticultural Company, Re (1886) 32 Ch D 512..................................4.14 Geo Thompson (Australia) Pty Ltd v Vittadello [1978] VR 199 .......................7.34 George Inglefield Ltd, Re [1933] Ch 1 .................................................................3.16 George Wimpey & Co Ltd v IRC [1975] 2 All ER 45..........................................3.11 Geroff v CAPD Enterprises Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 187 .....6.34, 6.36, 6.44, 6.50, 8.45 Gibson v Overbury (1841) 7 M & W 555; 151 ER 887 .......................................7.07 Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd [1974] AC 689....................................................................................................8.76 Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142........................6.59, 6.60, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64, 6.65 Gill v Gill (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 400...................................................................6.135 Gill v Lewis [1956] 2 QB 1....................................................................................6.08
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Gillott’s Settlement, Re [1934] 1 Ch 97 .............................................4.32, 7.05, 7.07 Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474 ....................................6.20, 6.55, 6.59, 7.15, 7.19 Glencore International AG v Metro Trading International Inc [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 899..........................................................................6.118 Global Minerals v Valerica (2000) Butterworths Property Reports 18, 463 ......................................................................................................................6.09 Goldsborough Mort & Co Ltd v Commonwealth Agricultural Service Engineers Ltd [1930] SASR 201 ........................................................................7.07 Goldsborough Mort & Co Ltd v Tolson (1909) 10 CLR 470 ....................2.05, 7.14 Goldschmidt & Loewenick v Diamond Fibre Co (1919) 174 NYS 800; affd (1921) 130 NE 918 ............................................................................6.68, 6.73 Good Luck, The [1990] 1 QB 818 .............................................................6.12, 6.101 Goodman v Napier Harbour Board (1939) NZLR 97 ........................................7.16 Gore v Justice Corporation Pty Ltd (2002) 189 ALR 712 ..........................6.61, 6.63 Gorringe v Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works (1886) 34 Ch D 128 ...............................................................4.14, 4.15, 7.05, 7.07, 7.08, 7.18 Goss v Chilcott [1996] AC 788.............................................................................6.49 Gough v Timbalok New Zealand Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 303 .................................8.75 Gould v Skinner [1983] QdR 377 ...............................................................6.55, 7.43 Government Insurance Office (NSW) v KA Reed Services Pty Ltd [1988] VR 829 ................................................6.61, 6.103, 6.127, 6.132, 6.133, 6.135, 8.30 Government of Newfoundland v Newfoundland Railway Co (1888) 13 App Cas 199 .....................................................8.59, 8.64, 8.85, 8.87, 8.90, 8.91 Goy & Co Ltd, Re [1900] 2 Ch 149 ......................................................................8.26 Gray v UDC Finance Ltd [2003] 3 NZLR 192............................................8.06, 8.32 Great Northern Railway Co v Witham (1873) 29 LT 471 ..................................6.73 Green v Ingham [1867] LR 2 CP 525...................................................................7.07 Greig v National Amalgamated Union of Shop Assistants (1906) 22 TLR 274..............................................................................................................6.59 Grein v Imperial Airways Ltd [1937] 1 KB 50............................................6.51, 8.09 Grenfell v The Dean and Canons of Windsor (1840) 2 Beav 544; 48 ER 1292 .........................................................................................................6.58 Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 669........................................................7.07, 7.18, 7.31, 7.38, 7.40, 7.41 Grey v IRC [1958] Ch 690 .........................................................3.11, 7.26, 7.29, 7.30 Griffin, Re [1899] 1 Ch 408 .........................................................................6.87, 6.89 Griffin v Weatherby (1868) LR 3 QB 753............................................................2.13 Griffith v Pelton [1958] Ch 205 .........................................................6.08, 6.50, 8.30 Griffith v Tower Publishing Company Ltd and Moncrieff [1897] 1 Ch 21 .............................................................................................6.73, 6.74, 6.79 Griffiths v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 123 ALR 111 ..................6.14 Griffiths v Secretary of State for Social Services [1974] QB 468.........................6.74
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Gross v Lewis Hillman Ltd [1970] 1 Ch 445 .......................................................6.09 Grovewood Holdings Plc v James Capel & Co Ltd [1995] Ch 80 .............6.64, 6.67 Gunsborough, Re (1919) 88 LJKB 479 ................................................................7.12 Gurfunkel v Bentley Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 98 ................................................3.16 GUS Property Management Ltd v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd [1982] SLT 533 ..................................................................................................8.13 Guy v Churchill (1888) 40 Ch D 481..........................................................6.59, 6.67 Gwelo (Matabeleland) Exploration and Development Co Ltd, Re [1901] 1 IR 38 ....................................................................................................8.53 H Dengate and Son, Re (1921) 21 SR(NSW) 619 ...............................................7.07 Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517 .............6.20, 6.48 Hagan v Waterhouse (1991) 34 NSWLR 308.............................................6.90, 7.29 Hain Steamship Co Ltd v Tate & Lyle Ltd (1936) 41 Com cas 350....................6.11 Hall, ex parte (1878) 10 Ch D 615 .......................................................................7.04 Hall v Busst (1960) 104 CLR 206 .......................................................6.84, 6.85, 6.88 Halley v The Law Society [2003] EWCA Civ 97.........................................6.09, 8.62 Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch 169...............................6.106, 6.108, 6.119, 6.125, 6.130 Halycon the Great, The [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 283 .....................................6.73, 7.40 Hambleton v Brown [1917] 2 KB 93 ..........................................................6.20, 6.39 Hamilton, Re (1921) 124 LT 737 ................................................................7.06, 7.27 Hamilton v Letherbridge (1912) 14 CLR 236.............................................6.73, 7.07 Hammond v Messenger (1838) 9 Sim 327; 59 ER 383 .....................4.05, 4.08, 8.18 Hanak v Green [1958] 2 QB 9.....................................................................8.72, 8.85 Handley Page Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise and Rockwell Machine Tool Co Ltd [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 459..............................................8.83 Hannan’s Hill Amalgamated No Liability v Barbican Corporation Ltd (1939) 13 ALJ 255 ..............................................................................................3.07 Haq v Singh [2001] 1 WLR 1594 .........................................................................6.06 Haque v Haque (1965) 114 CLR 98 ............................................................3.26, 7.16 Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 81; rvsd [1993] QB 701....................................6.118 Harbour Estates Ltd v HSBC Bank plc [2005] 2 WLR 67...................................6.11 Harding Carpets Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1980] 4 WWR 149.........................................................................................5.05, 5.22, 7.38 Harding v Harding (1886) 17 QBD 442 .................4.26, 5.09, 7.04, 7.07, 7.27, 7.36 Harrison v Harrison (1888) 13 PD 180 ...............................................................6.58 Harry Simpson & Co Ltd and Companies Act [1964-5] NSWR 603.................8.53 Hart v Porthgain Harbour Co Ltd (1903) 1 Ch 690 ...........................................7.16 Hartley v Russell (1825) 2 Sim & St 244; 57 ER 339 ...........................................6.59 Harvard Securities Ltd, Re [1997] 2 BCLC 369..........................................4.27, 7.29 Haseldine v Hosken [1933] 1 KB 822 ..................................................................6.59 Hauber v Halifax Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1940] SASR 341 ................................6.59
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Haycock’s Policy, Re [1876] 1 Ch D 611 .............................................................8.06 Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd v Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd (1968) 121 CLR 584 ......8.75, 8.79 Helby v Matthews [1895] AC 471........................................................................3.16 Helou v PD Mulligan Pty Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 74 ..........................................6.45 Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County Council [1978] 3 All ER 262..................................................................................................6.87, 6.88 Hendry v Chartsearch Ltd, The Times, 16 September 1998..............6.83, 6.87, 6.88 Henriksens Rederi A/S v THZ Rolimpex (The Brede) [1974] 1 QB 233.......................................................................................................8.64, 8.78 Herkules Piling Ltd v Tilbury Construction Ltd (1992) 61 BLR 107 ...........................4.12, 4.14, 5.06, 6.54, 6.87, 6.118, 7.38, 7.40, 8.06, 8.29 Herman v Mount Lyell Mining and Railway Co Ltd (1903) 29 VLR 550 .........7.07 HG Harper & Co v J Bland & Co Ltd (1914) 84 LJKB 738.................................7.04 Higgs v Northern Assam Tea Co Ltd (1870) LR 10 Eq 458................................8.26 Hiley v Peoples Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1938) 60 CLR 468............4.15, 8.96 Hilger Analytical Ltd v Rank Precision Industries Ltd [1984] BCLC 301 .........8.26 Hill v Caillovel (1748) 1 Ves Sen 122; 27 ER 931 ................................................8.60 Hill v Ziymack (1908) 7 CLR 352 ........................................................................8.64 Hilliard, Re [1907] VLR 375.................................................................................6.58 Hirachand Punamchand v Temple [1911] 2 KB 330..........................................3.08 HJ Wigmore & Co Ltd v Rundle (1930) 44 CLR 222 .......................6.20, 6.42, 6.45 Hoare v Dresser (1859) 7 HL Cas 290 .................................................................4.27 Hockley and Papworth v Goldstein (1920) 90 LJKB 111 ...................................7.38 Hodder & Tolley Ltd v Cornes [1923] NZLR 876....................6.86, 6.87, 6.88, 6.89 Hodges v State of New South Wales (1988) 77 ALR 1........................................6.63 Holden v Thompson [1907] 2 KB 489.................................................................6.59 Hole v Bradbury (1879) 12 Ch D 886 .........................................................6.73, 6.74 Holli Managed Investments Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1998) 160 ALR 409.........................................................................................6.132 Holmes, In re [2005] 1 WLR 1857 .......................................................................3.10 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191; 11 ER 999 .......6.17, 7.13, 7.15, 7.19, 7.44 Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1...........................4.05, 4.08, 4.14, 4.15, 4.24, 5.10, 7.19, 7.36, 7.38, 8.04 Holt’s Settlements, Re [1969] 1 Ch 100...............................................................7.28 Hong Kong and Shangai Banking Corp v Kloeckner & Co AG [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 323...............................................................................................8.26 Hooper v Smart (1875) LR 1 Ch D 90 .................................................................8.59 Hopkins v Hannah Tatchell (1893) 15 ALT 148.................................................7.07 Horwood v Millar’s Timber and Trading Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 305 .......................................................................................................6.37, 6.58 Hospital for Sick Children (Board of Governors) v Walt Disney Productions Inc [1966] 1 WLR 1055.......................................................6.87, 6.88
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Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 157.....................................................................................................6.118 Housing Guarantaee Fund Ltd v Yusef [1991] 2 VR 11 ............................6.73, 8.24 Howard v Fanshawe [1895] 2 Ch 581..................................................................6.08 Howard v Miller [1915] AC 318 ..........................................................................7.16 Huggins, Re (1882) 21 ChD 85 ...................................................................2.02, 6.58 Hughes v Fresh-Pack Fruit & Vegetable Market Pty Ltd [1965] WAR 199.....6.100 Hughes v Kingston Upon Hull City Council [1999] QB 1193...........................6.59 Hughes v Pump House Hotel Co Ltd [1902] 2 KB 190 .........................................................................4.27, 6.07, 6.43, 6.45, 7.41 Humble v Hunter (1848) 25 Am Rep 9 ......................................................6.77, 6.79 Hume v Monro (No 2) (1943) 67 CLR 461................................................4.22, 4.25 Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452 ..............................................................4.27, 7.29 Hutchens v Deauville Investments Pty Ltd (1986) 68 ALR 367 ..............6.49, 6.100 Hutley v Hutley (1873) LR 8 QB 112...................................................................6.59 Hyde v Johnson [1836] 2 Bing NC 776; 132 ER 299...........................................7.37 Hyne & Sons v Podosky [1905] QSR 147 ............................................................7.07 Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Papdopoulos [1980] 1 WLR 1129......................................................................................6.21, 6.31, 8.61 IMI Cornelius (UK) Ltd v Bloor (1991) 57 BLR 108..........................................8.03 Independent Automatic Sales Ltd v Knowles and Foster [1962] 1 WLR 974.................................................................................................6.20, 6.37 Inglis, Re (1932) 5 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 255 ................................6.15, 7.07 Inland Revenue Commissioners v John Lewis Properties plc [2003] Ch 513 .......................................................................................................3.11, 6.20 Insurance Australia Ltd, Re (2004) 139 FCR 450..............................................6.101 Inter-Southern Life Insurance co v Humphrey (1919) 84 So 625 .....................6.87 International Leasing Corp (Vic) Ltd v Aicken [1967] 1 NSWLR 669 ..............7.07 International Leasing Corp (Vic) Ltd v Aiken [1967] 2 NSWR 427........................................................3.27, 6.15, 6.100, 7.18, 7.31, 7.38 International Polymers Pty Ltd v Custom Credit Corp Ltd (1995) 8 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-234.......................................................6.84, 6.86, 6.89 Interstate Investment Co Ltd v Mobbs (1928) 28 SR(NSW) 572 .............7.39, 7.40 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896...........................................................2.04, 2.05, 3.10, 6.10, 6.112, 8.04 Investors in Industry Commercial Properties Ltd v South Bedfordshire District Council [1986] 1 All ER 787.......................................................3.08, 6.79 Ipswich Permanent Money Club Ltd v Arthy [1920] 2 Ch 257 .........................7.18 IRC v Oswald [1945] AC 360 ...............................................................................6.49 Irving, Re (1877) 7 Ch D 419 ...............................................................................7.07 Israel v Douglas (1789) 1 H Bl 239; 126 ER 139..................................................4.23 J Miller Ltd v Laurence and Bardsley [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90.......6.69, 6.73, 6.127
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Jackson v Richards [2005] NSWSC 630 ..............................................................7.07 Jacobs v Larkin (1892) 13 NSWR (Eq) 62 .......................................6.08, 6.69, 6.113 Jambrecina v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2003] FCA 1352.........................6.67 James Nelson & Sons Ltd v Nelson Line (Liverpool) Ltd [1906] 2 KB 217 ...........................................................................................3.10, 4.08, 7.39 James Talcott Ltd v John Lewis & Co Ltd [1940] 3 All ER 592 ........7.18, 7.38, 8.06 James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 37 FCR 445 ...........................................................................................8.64, 8.85, 8.86, 8.91 Jartay Developments Ltd (1983) 22 Build LR 134 ..............................................6.16 JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 314 ................................................................................................6.61, 6.64 JC Williamson Ltd v Lukey & Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 .........................4.22 Jeffree v NCSC (1989) 15 ACLR 217 ..........................................................6.61, 6.64 Jeffrey v Agra & Masterman’s Bank (1866) LR 2 Eq 674 ....................................8.83 Jeffs v Day (1866) LR 1 QB 372..........................................................4.05, 4.09, 8.06 Jenkins v Visualeyes Pty Ltd [2005] VSC 218......................................................7.38 Jennings v Credit Corp Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 48 NSWLR 709 .....................4.17 Jerome v Kelly [2004] 1 WLR 1409....................................................3.11, 7.16, 7.17 John Nitschke Nominees Pty Ltd v Hahndorf Golf Club Inc (2004) 88 SASR 334 .......................................................................6.84, 6.85, 6.108 John Rigby (Haulage) Ltd v Reliance Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1956] 2 QB 468.................................................................................................3.08 John Young & Co Kelvinhaugh Ltd v Rugby Group Plc, QBD, HT 00/337, 19 Dec 2000....................................................................................6.88 Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 .........................................................................6.21 Johnson v Raylton, Dixon & Co (1881) 7 QBD 438 ................6.74, 6.77, 6.78, 6.79 Johnson v Vickers (1909) 120 NW 837 ...............................................................6.68 Johnstone v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1966] NZLR 833 ....................7.44 Jones v Farrell (1857) 1 De G & J 208; 44 ER 703 ...............................................8.06 Jones v Gibbons (1804) 9 Ves Jun 407; 32 ER 659.....................................4.14, 6.50 Jones v Humphreys [1902] 1 KB 10...................................................4.27, 7.39, 7.40 Jones v Jones (1838) 8 Sim 633; 59 ER 251 .........................................................4.20 Jones v Thompson (1858) EB & E 63; 120 ER 430..............................................6.45 Jordan Nicolav, The [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 11.........................6.08, 6.73, 6.118, 7.38 Joseph v Lyons (1884) 15 QBD 280 .....................................................................7.11 Josselson v Borst [1938] 1 KB 723......................................................7.05, 7.07, 7.38 JWH Group Pty Ltd v Kimpura Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 39.................................6.86 Kaukomarkkinat O/Y v “Elbe” Transport-Union GmbH (The Kelo) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 85...................................................................6.61, 6.62, 7.37 Kauter v Kauter [2003] NSWSC 741 .................................................................6.106 Keith v Butler & Foster (1866) 1 QSCR 141........................................................8.04 Kekewich v Manning (1851) 1 De GM & G 176; 42 ER 519 ..............................7.27
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Kelly, Re (1932) 4 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 258 .........................707, 3.09, 7.07 Kelly v Inland Revenue Commissioner (NZ) (1969) 1 ATR 380 .......................6.48 Kelo, The [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 85 .....................................................6.61, 6.62, 7.37 Kemp v Baerselman [1906] 2 KB 604 ..........................6.70, 6.73, 6.88, 6.121, 6.134 Kenneth Wright Distributors Pty Ltd, Re [1973] VR 161 .......3.27, 6.59, 7.38, 8.36 Kennewell v Dye [1949] Ch 517...........................................................................6.08 Kent and Sussex Sawmills Ltd, Re [1947] Ch 177 ...........3.16, 3.17, 4.27, 7.07, 7.08 Kern Corp Ltd v Walter Reid Trading Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 164 .................7.17 Kijowski v New Capital Properties Ltd (1990) 15 Con LR 1 .....................7.04, 7.06 King v Brown (1912) 14 CLR 17 ..........................................................................7.34 King v David Allen & Sons, Billposting Ltd [1916] 2 AC 55 ..............................8.03 King v Michael Faraday and Partners Ltd [1939] 2 KB 753 ...............................6.58 King v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd (1895) 6 QLJ 202; [1896] AC 250..............................................................................................5.12, 5.13, 6.59 King v West Coast Grocery Co (1913) 129 P 1081 ....................................6.68, 6.70 Kitson v Hardwick (1872) LR 7 CP 473 ..............................................................6.67 KL Tractors, Re [1954] VLR 505..........................................................................8.85 KLDE Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1984) 155 CLR 288 .............7.17 Knight v Burgess (1864) 33 LJ Ch 727.................................................................6.68 Kollerich & Cie SA v State Trading Corp of India [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 32......6.79 Konstas v Southern Cross Pumps and Irrigation Pty Ltd (1996) 217 ALR 409............................................................................................................6.132 Kova Establishment v Sasco Investments Ltd [1998] 2 BCLC 83 ......................6.71 Krasner v Dennison [2001] Ch 76 ..............................................................6.58, 6.82 La Rue v Groezinger (1890) 24 P 42 ...........................................................6.70, 6.76 Lakatoi Express, The (1990) 103 FLR 32 .............................................................3.06 Lam Soon Australia Pty Ltd v Molit (No 55) Pty Ltd (1996) 70 FCR 34..............................................................................................6.17, 6.36, 6.38 Lambe v Orton (1860) 1 Dr & Sm 125; 62 ER 325 .............................................7.05 Lampet’s case (1612) 10 Co Rep 48b; 77 ER 994 ................................................2.09 Lancaster, The [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 497....................................................5.05, 5.23 Landau v Barclays Bank plc [2004] 2 All ER (Comm) 16...................................7.15 Lang v James Morrison & Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 1............................................3.07 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 265................6.09 Latham, Re (1857) 1 De G & J 152; 44 ER 681....................................................7.12 Laurent v Sale & Co [1963] 1 WLR 829.............................................6.59, 6.61, 6.64 Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil Corp Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 138................................................................3.27, 6.51, 6.108, 6.129, 6.132 Law Institute of Victoria v Cowan [1973] VR 293..............................................5.07 Law v Coburn [1972] 1 WLR 1238 .............................................................6.42, 6.75 Lawrence v Hayes [1927] 2 KB 111....................................................8.62, 8.64, 8.83 Lawsons Construction Pty Ltd , Re [1942] SASR 201................................4.27, 7.40
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Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57 .................6.08, 6.88, 6.101 Leage, The [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 259 ...............................................6.08, 6.73, 6.118 Leask v Scott Brothers (1877) 2 QBD 376 ...........................................................8.49 Lechmere v Hawkins (1798) 2 Esp 626; 170 ER 477...........................................8.26 Lee v Simmons (1999) ANZ Conveyancing Reports 372 .................................6.100 Lee-Parker v Izzet [1971] 1 WLR 1688 ................................................................8.46 Legh v Legh (1799) 1 Bos & Pul 447; 126 ER 1002 ....................................4.24, 8.06 Leonard George Munday v ACT [1998] SCACT 62 ...........................................6.88 Lett v Morris (1831) 4 Sim 607; 58 ER 227 ................................................7.07, 8.06 Letts v IRC [1957] 1 WLR 201 ..................................................4.02, 4.03, 6.52, 7.07 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728 .........................3.10 Lidden v Composite Buyers Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 560 ..........................................4.22 Lind, Re [1915] 2 Ch 345...........................................................4.31, 4.32, 4.33, 7.44 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 ..............................................................6.50, 6.52, 6.73, 6.79, 6.84, 6.85, 6.86, 6.87, 6.88, 6.101, 8.03, 8.05 Ling v Commonwealth Australia (1994) 123 ALR 65.........................................2.12 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548.......................................2.05, 6.05 Liquidation Estates Purchase Co Ltd v Willoughby [1898] AC 321 .........8.04, 8.06 Liverpool & London and Globe Insurance Co Ltd v Hartley & Ford [1927] VR 523...........................................................................................6.42, 7.07 Liversidge v Broadbent (1859) 4 H & N 603; 157 ER 978 .........................2.13, 7.15 Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyrill Lord Carpets Sales Ltd [1992] BCLC 609 ...........................................................................................................3.16 Lloyds Bank plc v Rosser [1989] Ch 350 .............................................................6.47 Lloyd’s TSB Bank plc v Clarke [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 992 ............................7.07 Lloyds v Banks (1868) LR 3 Ch App 488 .............................................................7.18 Loan Investment Corp of Australasia v Bonner [1970] NZLR 724 ...................7.16 Lockhart, Re (1894) 15 NSWR (B & P) 80 ..........................................................7.04 London & Yorkshire Bank Ltd v White (1895) 11 TLR 570......................4.14, 7.15 London County and Westminster Bank Ltd v Tomkins [1918] 1 KB 515 ........3.17 Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd (1991) 5 BPR 11.......4.05, 4.17, 4.18, 4.27 Lonsdale Sand and Metal Pty Ltd v FCT (1998) 162 ALR 220...........................7.38 Lord Cateret v Paschal (1733) 3 P WMS 197; 24 ER 1028 .................................8.18 Lord Southhampton’s Estate, Re (1880) 16 Ch D 178........................................8.83 Lord Strathcona SS Co v Dominion Coal Co [1926] AC 108 ..........................6.106 Lovell v Western Australian Police Union of Workers [1991] Aust Torts R 68 ..................................................................................................6.61 Loxton v Moir (1914) 18 CLR 360.....................................................2.05, 3.10, 6.07 Lucas v Lucas [1943] P 68 ....................................................................................6.58 Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216; 118 ER 759 ...................................................6.69 Lunn v Thornton (1845) 1 CB 379; 135 ER 587 .................................................7.11
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Lyon v Creati (1892) 18 VLR 629 ...............................................................6.73, 6.78 Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499.................................................................7.17 Mac-Jordan Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd [1992] BCLC 350 ................................................................................................6.16, 6.106 McArdle, Re [1951] Ch 669.....................................7.05, 7.07, 7.09, 7.19, 7.27, 7.28 McCallum, Re [1933] VLR 35..............................................................................8.06 McClure, In the Estate of (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 93 ....................................6.14, 6.30 McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 ..............................................................4.24 McDonald, Re [1918] NZLR 626.........................................................................7.12 McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457 ...............6.21, 6.25, 6.26, 6.27, 6.28, 6.29, 6.31, 8.33, 8.34, 8.37, 8.61 McDonald v Isaac Construction Co Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 612 ...................6.33, 8.07 MacDonald v Robins (1954) 90 CLR 515..........................................3.07, 6.88, 8.30 McDonnell & East Ltd v McGregor (1936) 56 CLR 50............8.64, 8.84, 8.86, 8.91 McElroy v Flynn [1991] ILRM 294......................................................................6.65 McFadden v Public Trustee for Victoria [1981] 1 NSWLR 15...........................7.33 McFarlane v E E Caledonia Ltd (No 2) [1995] 1 WLR 366.......................6.61, 6.63 MacFarlane v Lister (1887) 37 Ch 88...................................................................7.07 McIntosh v Shashoua (1931) 46 CLR 494 ..................................................7.38, 8.06 McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 ALR 289 ........................................4.27, 7.17, 7.21, 7.39 Mackender v Feldia AG [1967] 2 QB 590............................................................8.62 Mackenzie v City Bank (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 1 ................................................7.07 McKerrell, Re[1912] 2 Ch 648 .............................................................................4.27 Mackusick v Fleming [1904] WN 44; (1904) 90 LT 101 ....................................8.34 McLean (deceased), Re (1904) 23 NZLR 504......................................................2.02 McLeay, Re (1875) LR 20 Eq 186 .........................................................................6.76 McLeay v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1963] NZLR 711 ..............................................................3.18, 6.20, 6.39, 6.49, 7.40, 7.41 McMahon v Docker (1945) 62 WN(NSW) 155..................................................6.87 McMahon v Gilberd & Co Ltd [1955] NZLR 1206....................................4.18, 7.09 McMahon v Swan [1924] VLR 397......................................................................8.30 McPherson, Thom & Co , Re [1929] VLR 295...........................................7.07, 8.06 McRae v Coulton (1986) 7 NSWLR 644 .............................................................7.37 McWilliam v McWilliams Wine Pty Ltd (1964) 114 CLR 656...........................7.16 Madison Pictures Inc v Chesapeake Industries Inc (1955) 147 NYS 2d 50...........................................................................................6.50, 6.69 Magee v UDC Finance Ltd [1983] NZLR 438............................................7.18, 7.38 Magic Menu Systems Pty Ltd v AFA Facilitation Pty Ltd (1997) 142 ALR 198.......................................................................................................6.63 Mail-Well Envelope Co v Saley (1972) 497 P 2d 364..........................................6.08 Majestic Homes Pty Ltd v Wise [1978] Qd R 225...............................................6.09 Malcolm v Scott (1843) 3 Hare 39; 67 ER 288 ...........................................7.04, 7.07
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Mallyons Ltd v South Australian Harbours Board [1933] SASR 166 ..........................................................................................6.73, 6.76, 6.79 Malory Enterprises Ltd v Chesire Homes (UK) [2002] Ch 216 .........................6.09 Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608 ................................................................4.18, 4.22, 5.12, 6.73, 6.76, 8.07 Manchester, Re [1925] VLR 670 ..........................................................................7.07 Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co v North Central Wagon Co (1888) 13 App Cas 554......................................................3.16 Mangles v Dixon (1852) 2 CR & M 231; 149 ER 745........................7.18, 8.60, 8.71 Maple Flock Co Ltd v Universal Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd [1934] 1 KB 148 ..........................................................................................6.50 Marathon Electrical Manufacturing Corp v Mashreqbank PSC [1997] 2 BCLC 460 ...................................................................................6.34, 6.43 Marchant v Morton, Down & Co [1901] 2 KB 829 ..........................5.05, 7.15, 7.37 Mark Sensing (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 68 ALR 367 .............................................6.100 Marr v The Admiralty (1926) SC 842 ..................................................................6.58 Martell v Consent Iron Co Ltd [1955] 1 Ch 363 ......................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64 Master v Miller (1791) 4 TR 320.................................................................2.16, 4.23 Matahina Rimu Co Ltd, Re [1941] NZLR 490 ..................................7.15, 7.19, 7.34 Mathews v Wallwyn (1798) 4 Ves 118; 31 ER 62 ................................................8.81 Matson v White (1950) 220 P (2d) 864 ......................................................6.70, 6.73 Matthews v Usher [1900] 2 QB 535.....................................................................8.67 May v Lane (1894) 64 LJQB 236 ......................................6.06, 6.43, 6.59, 6.75, 8.45 Meek v Port of London Authority [1918] 2 Ch 96 .............................................3.06 Mellowes Archital Ltd v Bell Products Ltd (1997) 87 BLR 26............................8.74 Mercantile Bank of London Ltd v Evans (1899) 2 QB 613........................3.16, 7.41 Mercantile Finance Corp Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd [1932] NZLR 1107.............................................................................................6.87 Merrill v Merrill (1825) 3 Me 463........................................................................7.07 Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd v ZCCM Investment Holdings plc [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 37.....................................................................................8.64 Meux v Bell (1841) 1 Hare 73; 66ER 955.............................................................4.20 M’Gillivray v Simson (1826) 2 C & P 320; 172 ER 145.......................................8.26 MH Smith (Plant Hire) Ltd v DL Mainwaring (T/A Inshore) [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 244...................................................................................3.10 Middleton v Pollock (1876) 2 Ch D 104..............................................................7.29 Mikhail Lermontov, The (1993) 176 CLR 344 ..................................6.26, 6.28, 8.33 Milan Tramways Co, Re (1884) 25 Ch D 587 .....................................................8.95 Miller Construction Co v First Industrial Technology Corp (1991) 576 So 2d 748 .........................................................................................6.79 Miller’s Case (1876) 3 Ch D 391 ..........................................................................3.06 Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De GF & J 264; 45 ER 1185..........................7.20, 7.21, 7.27
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Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd (2005) 214 ALR 24............................................................6.101 Minister for Land and Water Conservation v NTL Australia Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 149 ...........................................................................6.88, 6.92 Ministry of Sound (Ireland) Ltd v World Online Ltd [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 823.................................................................................................6.21 Minnetoka Oil Co v Cleveland Vitrified Brick Co (1910) 111 P 326.................6.73 Minucoe v London and Liverpool and Globe Insurance Co Ltd (1925) 36 CLR 513....................................................................................6.73, 6.87 Mirams, Re [1891] 1 QB 594................................................................................6.58 Misner v Australian Capital Territory (2000) 146 ACTR 1................................6.09 Mitchell v Purnell Motors Pty Ltd [1961] NSWR 165......................8.49, 8.64, 8.72 MK and JA Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 744 ...........6.87 Modern Weighbridge and Scale Services Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission (Supreme Court, Sth Australia, 6 Sept 1995) ....6.84, 6.86 Mondel v Steel (1841) 8 M & W 858; 151 ER 1288....................................8.75, 8.79 Monk v ANZ Banking Corp Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 148.........6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64 Montedipe SpA v JTP-RO Jugotanker (The Jordan Nicolav) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 11...............................................6.08, 6.73, 6.118, 7.38, 8.29 Montgomery v De Picot (1908) P 305 ........................................................6.71, 6.79 Moore v Collins [1937] SASR 195 ..............................................................6.70, 6.73 Moresk Cleaners Ltd v Hicks [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 338 .....................................6.79 Morgan v Larivière [1875] LR 7 HL 423..............................................................7.04 Morley v Morley (1858) 25 Beav 253; 53 ER 633 ..............................................6.100 Morrell v Wootten (1852) 16 Beav 197; 51 ER 753...............................................................2.13, 4.12, 7.04, 7.06, 7.07, 7.18 Morrison v Young (1872) 3 VR (L) 35 ................................................................6.59 Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973] AC 331...................................................6.100 Moseley v Cressey’s Co (1865) LR 1 Eq 405........................................................7.07 Moss Bay Hematite Iron and Steel Co Ltd (1892) 8 TLR 63; affd 8 TLR 475 ...................................................................................................8.71 Moss, Ex parte (1884) 14 QBD 310 .....................................................................6.15 Moss v Barnett (1862) 1 SCR(NSW) 313 ............................................................7.14 Motel Marine Pty Ltd v IAC (Finance) Pty Ltd (1964) 110 CLR 9 ....................7.37 Moulsdale v Birchall (1772) 2 Black W 820; 96 ER 483......................................4.23 Mountain Road (No 9) Ltd v Michael Edgley Corp Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 335 ....................................................................4.10, 4.11, 4.13, 4.14, 7.16 Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims, Re (1996) 19 ACSR 440 .....................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.63, 6.64, 6.65, 6.67 Mowry v Todd (1815) 12 Mass 281 .....................................................................7.07 Moxon v Berkeley Mutual Benefit Building Society (1890) 62 LT 250............................................................................................................8.99
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MS Fashions Ltd v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 2) [1993] Ch 425 ................................................................................6.100 MSP Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamps (1999) 198 CLR 494 ........3.11 Mulkerrins v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2003] 1 WLR 1937.....................6.98, 8.04 Muntz v Smail (1909) 8 CLR 262.........................................................................7.07 Muscat v Smith [2003] 1 WLR 2853...........................................................8.66, 8.69 Mutual Export Corp v Asia Australian Express Ltd (The Lakatoi Express) (1990) 103 FLR 32 ..............................................................................3.06 Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 179 CLR 155..............................................................................................6.61, 6.62 N Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corp [1921] 3 KB 110............................................6.37 Napier v Williams [1911] 1 Ch 361 .....................................................................6.09 Natal Investment Co, Re (1868) LR 3 Ch App 355.............................................8.26 National Carbonising Co Ltd v British Coal Distillation Ltd (1936) 54 RPC 41.......................................................................6.69, 6.70, 6.79, 6.99, 8.09 National Express Group Australia (Swanston Trams) Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 694.......................................................................................................6.36 National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 6 ACTR 1........................................3.17, 4.1, 4.18, 4.27, 7.40 National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 514..........................6.05, 6.58, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64, 6.65 National Provincial & Union Bank of England v Lindsell [1922] 1 KB 21........6.50 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 ............2.06, 6.09, 8.79 National Provincial and Union Bank v Charnley [1924] 1 KB 431 ...................3.17 Neave v Neave [1926] GLR 254 ..................................................................4.05, 4.12 Nettleton v Molineaux (1889) 15 VLR 13 ...........................................................7.14 Neville v London “Express” Newspaper Ltd [1919] AC 368..............................6.59 Neville v Wilson [1997] Ch 144 .........................................................7.16, 7.28, 7.29 New Bullas Trading Ltd, Re [1994] 1 BCLC 485 ................................................6.56 New England Cabinet Works v Morris (1917) 115 NE 315 ......................6.77, 6.79 New Redhead Estate & Coal Co Ltd v Scottish Australian Mining Co Ltd (1919) 20 SR(NSW) 12 .......................................................................6.121 New York Bank Note Company v Hamilton Bank Note Engraving and Printing Company (1905) 73 NE 48 .........................................................6.08 New York Underwriters Insurance Company v Central Union Bank of South Carolina (1933) 65 F 2d 738 ..............................................................6.73 New Zealand Factors Ltd v Farmers Trading Co Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 703 ........7.38 New Zealand Payroll Software Systems Ltd v Advanced Management Systems Ltd [2003] 3 NZLR 1 ..................................................................6.87, 6.88 Newbolt v Bingham (1895) 72 LT 852.................................................................6.08 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 190 CLR 513.......................................................................................................3.11
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Newman v Cook [1963] VR 659 .................................................................8.75, 8.79 Ngyen: Ex Parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1992) 120 ALR 424...............6.67 Nichols, ex parte (1883) 22 Ch D 782..................................................................6.15 Nioa v Bell (1901) 27 VLR 82...............................................................................8.06 Nirens v Fowler Asphalt Pty Ltd (1966) 9 FLR 255 ............................................4.27 Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 ....................................3.08, 3.09, 6.73, 6.74, 6.79, 6.88, 6.92, 6.95, 6.101 Nolan v King and Cook [1931] QSR 342 ...................................................4.18, 7.07 Noonan v Martin (1987) 10 NSWLR 402...................................................7.04, 7.40 Noranda Australia Ltd v Lachlan Resources NL (1988) 14 NSWLR 1 ..............6.84 Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd [1999] 2 AC 1 .............................................................................6.59, 6.63, 6.64, 6.67, 6.82 Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9 .........................................2.05, 2.18, 3.04, 3.14, 3.23, 3.25, 4.04, 4.05, 4.07, 4.09, 4.16, 4.27, 6.17, 6.19, 6.20, 6.49, 6.90, 7.15, 7.20, 7.21, 7.22, 7.27, 7.28, 7.39, 7.44 Norrish v Marshall (1821) 5 Madd 475; 56 ER 977 ............................................8.81 Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (1990) 170 CLR 146.....7.37 NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Trevor (2000) 23 WAR 482 ............................7.16 Nullagine Investments Pty Ltd Western Australian Club Inc (1993) 177 CLR 635.......................................................................................................6.85 NW Robbie & Co Ltd v Witney Warehouse Co Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 1324 .........8.83 Oakdale (Richmond) Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc [1997] 1 BCLC 63 ..........................................................................................................6.86 Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd, Re [1998] Ch 170 ......................6.06, 6.64, 6.67 OBG Ltd v Allan [2005] 2 WLR 1174 ..................................................................8.11 O’Brien v Benson’s Hosiery (Holdings) Ltd [1980] AC 562 ............2.05, 3.11, 6.73 Official Manager of the Athenoeum Life Assurance Society v Pooley (1858) 3 De G & J 294; 44 ER 1281...................................................................8.58 Ogdens Ltd v Weinberg (1906) 95 LT 567 ...............................6.06, 6.15, 6.52, 6.54 Old Grovebury Manor Farm Ltd v W Seymour Plant Sales & Hire Ltd (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 1397.........................................................................6.87 Old Papa’s Franchise Systems Pty Ltd v Camisa Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 11 .........................................................................................................6.87 Oldham v Oldham (1867) LR 3 Eq 404 ...............................................................7.05 Olds Discount Co Ltd v Cohen [1938] 3 All ER 281n ........................................3.16 Olds Discount Co Ltd v John Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275 .........................3.16 Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365 ......................2.14, 3.06, 7.05, 7.15, 7.20, 7.21 Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95..............................................3.09 Ord v White (1840) 3 Beav 357; 49 ER 140 .........................................................8.83 Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 .................................................................................................3.16, 3.17
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Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 78 ..............................................................................................3.16 Orlando Orange Groves Co v Hale (1935) 161 So 284.......................................6.92 Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 ....................................4.05 Ostabridge Pty Ltd v Stafford [2001] NSWCA 335 ............................................8.82 O’Sullivan v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1984] 1 Qd R 212......................3.18 OT Computers Ltd, Re [2004] Ch 317 ................................................................6.73 Oughtred v IRC [1960] AC 206 .........................................................7.26, 7.28, 7.29 Overall v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [1929] GLR 69 ..........................................6.73 Owen, Re [1894] 3 Ch 220 ...................................................................................3.17 Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 288..................................................................................................6.11 Padre Island, The [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 408.............................................6.08, 6.118 Padre Island, The (No 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 259..........................................6.118 Paige v Faure (1920) 127 NE 898 .......................................................6.68, 6.71, 6.73 Pain, Re [1919] 1 Ch 38 ....................................................4.03, 5.09, 5.13, 5.18, 5.27 Paine v Meller (1801) 6 Ves jun 349; 31 ER 1088 ...............................................7.17 Pakenham Upper Fruit Ltd v Crosby (1924) 35 CLR 386 ..................................3.26 Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 ...............3.10, 4.07, 4.31, 4.32, 6.05, 6.33, 6.34, 7.07, 7.09, 7.15, 7.16, 7.44 Palmer v Bate (1821) 2 Brad & B 673; 129 ER 1125............................................6.58 Palmer v Carey [1926] AC 703.........................................3.17, 4.27, 7.07, 7.09, 7.12 Palmer v Culverwell Brooks & Co (1902) 85 LT 758..........................................7.07 Palmer v Locke (1881) 18 Ch D 381 ....................................................................5.05 Palmer’s Decoration & Furniture Co, Re [1904] 2 Ch 743 ................................8.62 Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp (The Trident Beauty) [1994] 1 WLR 161............................................................3.12, 5.05, 6.22, 6.29, 6.38, 6.41, 6.104, 8.01, 8.31, 8.33, 8.34, 8.37 Paper Products Mach Co v Safepack Mills (1921) 131 NE 288.................6.68, 6.69 Paquine v Snary [1909] 1 KB 688 ........................................................................6.58 Paradise Motors Co Ltd, Re [1968] 1 WLR 1125.......................................7.15, 7.31 Paragon Finance plc v Pender [2005] 1 WLR 3412 ............................................4.05 Paris Skating Rink Co, Re (1877) 5 Ch D 959.....................................................6.59 Park Gate Waggon Works Co, Re (1881) 17 Ch D 234 ......................................6.67 Park v Allied Mortgage Corp Ltd (1993) ATPR (Digest) 46 ..............................6.05 Parker v Jackson [1936] 2 All ER 281 ..................................................................8.81 Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd v Concrete Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 373...........................................................................................6.69 Parsons v Sovereign Bank of Canada [1913] AC 160 .........................................8.64 Partnership Pacific Securities Ltd , Re [1994] 1 Qd R 410...............................................................................7.40, 8.26, 8.67, 8.69, 8.86 Paterson v Murphy (1853) 11 Hare 88; 68 ER 1198 ..................................7.27, 7.29
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Patience, ex parte (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 96..........................................................6.58 Paton v IRC [1938] AC 341..................................................................................6.49 Patrick, Re [1891] 1 Ch 82..................................................................4.15, 7.21, 8.04 Patrick Smythe, Re Trust of [1970] ALR 919 ....................................7.07, 7.16, 7.19 Patten v Thomas (1965) 66 SR (NSW) 458; [1965] NSWR 1457 ......................6.46 Paul & Frank Ltd v Discount Bank [1967] Ch 349 .............................................6.44 Paul v Constance [1977] 1 All ER 195 .................................................................7.29 Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221......................................2.10 Pawlett v AG (1667) Hard 465; 145 ER 550 ........................................................4.24 Pearcy, In re (1871) LR 13 Eq 309 .......................................................................6.45 Pearson v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA 1427 ....................................4.22 Peden Iron & Steel Co v McKnight (1910) 128 SW 156.....................................8.48 Pendal Nominees Pty Ltd v Lednez Industries (Australia) Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 282 ..................................................................................................8.13 Pennington v Waine [2002] 1 WLR 2075............................................................7.15 Pennsylvania R Co v Huston (1936) 81 F 2d 704.......................................6.68, 6.78 Percival v Dunn (1885) 29 Ch D 128..........................................................7.12, 7.40 Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1.............................................................................4.13, 4.16, 4.25, 5.23 Perkins, Re [1898] 2 Ch 182.................................................................................8.13 Perpetual Executors Trustees and Agency Co (WA) Ltd v Maslen [1952] AC 215....................................................................................................7.14 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Smith (1938) 39 SR (NSW) 19 ...............................7.07 Perryer v Halifax (1677) Rep Temp Finch 299; 23 ER 164.................................8.18 Peter v Shipway (1908) 7 CLR 232.......................................................................7.19 Peters v General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp Ltd [1937] 4 All ER 628; [1938] 2 All ER 267 (CA).............................................6.72, 6.73, 6.88 Peters v Soame (1701) 2 Vern 428; 23 ER 164 ....................................................8.18 Pettit & Johnson v Foster Wheeler Ltd [1950] 2 DLR 42 .................5.05, 7.07, 8.06 Phillips v Alhambra Palace Co [1901] 1 QB 59..........................................6.74, 6.79 Phillips v Clagett (1843) 11 M & W 84; 152 ER 725 ...........................................4.24 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF & J 208; 45 ER 1164......................................6.09 Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd v Earl’s Court Ltd (1913) 30 TLR 50 ......................8.26 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 ...6.31, 6.51, 8.61 Pickering v Sogex Services (UK) Ltd (1982) 20 BLR 66 .....................................6.61 Pinches (No 2), Re (1932) 4 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 200 .........................7.07 Pincott v Moorstons Ltd [1937] 1 All ER 513 .....................................................6.90 Pino v Spanish Broadcasting System of Florida Inc (1990) 564 So 2d 186 .......6.08 Pinto Leite and Nephews, Re [1929] 1 Ch 221....................................................8.83 Plater v Meng (1887) 30 Fed Rep 308..................................................................7.07 Plating Co v Farquharson (1881) 17 Ch D 49.....................................................6.59 Pooley v Goodwin (1835) 4 Ad & E 94; 111 ER 722 ...........................................7.40
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Portuguese-American Bank of San Francisco v Welles (1916) 242 US 7 ..................................................................................................3.10, 6.87, 6.89 Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society [1967] 2 QB 363 .............................................................................................................6.22, 6.73 Poulton v Commonwealth (1953) 89 CLR 540..........................................6.59, 6.61 PP Consultants Pty Ltd v Finance Sector Union (2000) 201 CLR 648 ............6.101 Precious Metals Australia Ltd v Xstrata (Schweiz) AG [2005] NSWSC 141 .....................................................................................................6.100 Premetis v 260 Oxford Street Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 904.................................6.48 President of the Shire of Benalla v Turner (1881) 7 VLR 200 ...................6.50, 7.14 Price v Murray [1970] VR 782 .............................................................................8.30 Price v Seaman (1825) 4 B & C 525; 107 ER 1155 ..............................................4.09 Primelife (Glendale Hostel) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2004) 9 VR 665.................................................................................................6.48 Pritchard v Racecage Pty Ltd (1997) 142 ALR 527 .............................................6.05 Proctor v Union Coal Co (1923) 137 NE 659 .................................6.70, 6.88, 6.121 Project 28 Pty Ltd v Barr [2005] NSWCA 24 ..................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.63, 6.66 Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481; 160 ER 263 ...........................6.10, 6.59 Provident Finance Corp Pty Ltd v Hammond [1978] VR 312.........8.70, 8.85, 8.86 Pryors Tours Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport [2003] WASCA 129 .......................................................................................................6.87 PT Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 241....................6.100, 7.26 Public Trustee v Mortleman [1928] NZLR 337 ................................................6.128 QPSX Ltd v Ericsson Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 1 ........................6.59, 6.66 Quach v Huntof Pty Ltd (2000) Motor Vehicle Reports 263 ...........6.59, 6.63, 6.65 Queensland Insurance Co Ltd v Australian Mutual Fire Insurance Society Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 195 ...............................................................8.07 R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (No 8) [2003] QB 381............................................................6.59 R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1980) 144 CLR 13 .................................7.17 R v Chester & North Wales Legal Aid Area Office (No 12) [1998] 1 WLR 1496..................................................................................................6.87, 6.88 R v Justices of Kent [1873] LR 8 QB 305 .............................................................7.37 R v Licensing Justices for the Licensing District of Charleville [1902] St R Qd 111 ........................................................................................................7.37 R v Preddy [1996] AC 815....................................................................................3.10 R v Sofroniou [2004] QB 1218.............................................................................3.10 R v Toohey, ex parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327 .......2.06, 3.19 RA Brierley Investments Ltd v Landmark Corporation Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 224..............................................................................................6.08, 6.93 Radstock Co-operative and Industrial Society v Norton-Radstock UDC [1967] Ch 1094; [1968] Ch 605.............................................................6.104
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Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] QB 825................................................................3.19, 4.12, 4.16, 6.76, 8.25 Rajski v Computer Manufacture & Design Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 443 .......6.63 Ralston v South Greta Colliery Co (1912) SR(NSW) 6 ......................................8.06 Ramsey v Hartley [1977] 1 WLR 686........................................6.63, 6.67, 7.38, 7.40 Ranken v Alfaro (1877) 5 Ch D 786.....................................................................7.07 Rasbora Ltd v JCL Marine Ltd [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 645 ...................................3.06 Ratcliffe v Oceanic Life Ltd [1998] NSWSC 31.................................................6.100 Raven, The [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 266 .........................................................8.83, 8.94 Rawson v Samuel (1841) Cr & Ph 161; 41 ER 451..............................................8.64 Raynor v Preston (1881) 18 Ch D 1..........................................6.76, 7.15, 7.17, 8.25 Read v Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128.....................................................3.27, 5.06, 5.18 Reade v Bentley (1857) 3 K & J 271; 69 ER 1110........................................6.74, 6.79 Redman v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1916) 22 CLR 84.....................................................................................4.02, 7.15, 8.16, 8.57 Reed Publishing Holdings Ltd v Kings Reach Investments Ltd, unreported, 25 May 1983, English Court of Appeal........................................6.88 Rees v De Bernady [1896] 2 Ch 437............................................................6.59, 6.65 Reeve v Whitmore (1863) 33 LJ Ch 63 ................................................................7.44 Reeves v Barlow (1884) 12 QBD 436 ...................................................................7.16 Reeves v Pope [1914] 2 KB 284 ..........................................................8.67, 8.68, 8.69 Reid v McIntyre (1905) 11 ALR 159 ....................................................................7.07 Rekstin v Severo Sibirsko Gosudarstvennoe Akcionernoe Obschestvo Komseverputj and the Bank for Russian Trade Ltd [1933] 1 KB 47 .....7.04, 7.06 Rendall v Morphew (1914) 84 LJ Ch 517 ............................................................6.08 Residues Treatment & Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 1................................................................................................3.11 Reuthlinger v MacDonald, unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, 20 Oct 1976 .............................................................................6.84, 6.85 Rhodesia Goldfields Ltd, Re [1910] 1 Ch 239 .....................................................8.26 Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310...............3.27, 6.107, 6.108, 6.119, 6.124, 6.130 Riccard v Prichard (1855) 1 K & J 277; 69 ER 462..............................................7.07 Richards v Delbridge (1874) LR 18 Eq 11 ..................................................7.21, 7.29 Rickard Constructions v Rickard Hails Moretti [2004] NSWSC 1041.....6.61, 6.62 Riseda Nominees Pty Ltd v St Vincent’s Hospital (Melbourne) Ltd [1998] 2 VR 70 ..........................................................................7.09, 7.15, 7.40 Roadshow Entertainment Pty Ltd v ACN 053 006 269 Pty Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 462 ....................................................................6.88, 8.66, 8.85 Robbins v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1973) 1 ALR 13 .......................7.37 Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257.............................4.14, 4.20, 4.27, 6.15, 7.07 Robinson, Re (1884) 27 Ch D 160 .......................................................................6.58 Robinson v Podosky [1905] QSR 118.........................................................6.15, 7.07
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Robinson v The State of South Australia [1928] SASR 42..................................5.03 Robson v Drummond (1831) 2 B & Ad 303; 109 ER 1156........................6.74, 6.79 Rodger v Comptoir d’Escompte De Paris (1869) LR 2 PC 393..........................7.19 Rodick v Gandell (1852) 1 De GM & G 763; 42 ER 749........................................................................3.17, 4.27, 7.07, 7.09, 7.12 Rogers v Challis (1859) 27 Beav 175; 54 ER 68 ..........................................6.75, 7.16 Rolls-Royce Ltd v Jeffrey [1962] 1 All ER 801.....................................................2.04 Rolston v South Greta Colliery Co (1912) 13 SR (NSW) 6 ................................6.14 Rolt v White (1862) 3 De GJ & S 360; 46 ER 674................................................8.60 Rose, Re [1952] Ch 499............................................4.07, 7.15, 7.17, 7.20, 7.21, 8.04 Rose v Clark (1842) 1 Y & C 534; 62 ER 1005.....................................................8.06 Rosenthal & Sons Ltd v Esmail [1965] 1 WLR 1117...........................................6.50 Rosher, Re (1884) 26 Ch D 801............................................................................6.76 Ross T Smythe & Co Ltd v TD Bailey Son & Co [1940] 3 All ER 60 .................6.50 Ross v Blackham (1875) 1 VLR (E) 220...............................................................4.08 Rothwells Ltd v Nommack (No 100) Pty Ltd (1988) 13 ACLR 421 .........2.13, 7.16 Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577 ..................................................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.63 Row Dal Constructions Pty Ltd , Re [1966] VR 249.......4.31, 6.15, 6.45, 7.07, 7.44 Row v Dawson (1749) 1 Ves 331; 27 ER 1064............................................7.07, 8.18 Rowell, ex parte (1878) 39 LT 259, affd (1879) 10 Ch D 615 .............................6.15 Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall (2001) 208 CLR 516...............................6.49 Roxburghe v Cox (1881) 17 Ch D 520......................................8.38, 8.52, 8.81, 8.83 Royal Exchange Assurance v Hope [1928] Ch 179 .............................................8.38 Royal Insurance Co Ltd v Mylius (1926) 38 CLR 477 ........................................6.73 Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Ltd v Barrett [1928] Ch 411 ................................................................................................................8.63 Royal Victorian Institute for the Blind Ltd v RBS.RVIB.VAF Ltd (2004) 206 ALR 581...........................................................................................6.73 Ruddenklau v Charlesworth [1925] NZLR 161 ..................................................6.28 Rufa Pty Ltd v Cross [1981] Qd R 365...............................................................6.132 Rumput (Panama) SA v Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (The Leage) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 259..........................................6.08, 6.73, 6.118 Rural & Agricultural Management Ltd v West Merchant Bank Ltd (1995) 128 FLR 440........................................................................6.132, 6.135 Russell and Co Ltd v Fryers (1909) 25 TLR 414.........................................6.68, 7.41 Russell, Re [1968] VR 285 ...........................................................................6.20, 7.04 Sacher Investments Pty Ltd v Forma Stereo Consultants Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 5 ..........................................................................................6.100 Sacks v Neptune Meter Co (1932) 258 NYS 254......................6.58, 6.83, 6.85, 6.88 Saffron Walden Second Benefit Building Society v Rayner (1880) 14 Ch D 406 .......................................................................................................7.38
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St Hilliers (Developments) Pty Ltd v Radmanovich [2002] NSWSC 524; (2002) Butterworths Property Reports 20 .................................6.87 St Mary’s Bank v Cianchette (1951) 99 F Supp 994............................................8.48 Salemi v Mackellar (1977) 137 CLR 396..............................................................7.37 Saliterman v Finney (1985) 361 NW 2d 175 .......................................................6.08 Sally Beauty Co Inc v Nexxus Products Co Inc (1986) 801 F 2d 1001 .............................................................................................6.74, 6.79, 6.80 Salmon Lake Seed Co v Frontier Trust Co (1931) 153 A 671 ............................6.68 Salter v Gilbertson (2003) 6 VR 466 ....................................................................3.07 Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 ..........................................................3.15, 4.27, 6.42, 7.07, 7.19, 7.39, 7.40 Sargent Glass Company v Matthews Land Company (1904) 72 NE 474 ..........6.70 Saunderson & Co v Clark (1913) 29 TLR 579.....................................................3.16 Scarf v Jardine (1882) 7 App Cas 345 ..................................................................3.06 Schalit v Joseph Nadler Ltd [1933] 2 KB 79 ........................................................8.67 Schlessinger v Forest Products Co (1910) 76 A 1024..........................................6.68 Schmaling v Thomlinson (1815) 6 Taunt 147; 128 ER 989................................3.08 Schneidman v Barnett [1951] NZLR 301 ..........................................4.18, 6.15, 6.34 Schroeder v Central Bank of London Ltd (1876) 34 LT 735 .....................6.37, 7.04 Schultz v Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp Ltd (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 153 .........................................................................................................6.59 Schupack v McDonald’s System Inc (1978) 264 NW 2d 827 .............................6.79 Schweiger v Hoch (1969) 223 So 2d 557 .............................................................6.92 Scientific Investments Pension Plan Trusts [1999] Ch 53..................................6.85 Scribes West Ltd v Relsa Anstalt (No 3) [2005] 1 WLR 1847....................8.18, 8.67 Scruples Imports Pty Ltd v Crabtree & Evelyn Pty Ltd (1983) 1 Intellectual Property Reports 315.........................................................................................3.06 Secretary, Department of Social Security v James (1990) 95 ALR 615 ..............7.29 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Frid [2004] 2 AC 506.....................6.36 Seear v Lawson (1880) 15 Ch D 426 ....................................................................6.67 Shackwell v Howe, Thornton & Palmer (1909) 8 CLR 170................................7.07 Shalson v Russo [2005] 2 WLR 1213 ...................................................................8.62 Shamia v Joory [1958] 1 QB 448..........................................................................2.13 Sharp v The Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd (1944) 69 CLR 539.................6.08 Shaw v Foster (1872) LR 5 HL 321............................................7.16, 7.17, 7.18, 8.83 Shaw v Harris (No 2) (1992) 3 Tas R 167...................................................3.07, 8.04 Shayler v Woolf [1946] 1 Ch 320 ............................................6.69, 6.73, 6.77, 6.118 Shea v Moore [1894] 1 IR 158..............................................................................4.27 Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 407 ..3.17, 4.27, 7.07 Shearer v Wilding (1915) 15 SR(NSW) 283 ........................................................6.08 Sheehan, In the Marriage of (1990) 97 FLR 190 .................................................6.61 Sheers v Thimbleby & Son (1897) 76 LT 709....................................................6.100
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Shellard, ex parte (1873) 17 Eq 109 .....................................................................7.07 Shepherd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 113 CLR 385 ...............................................4.27, 6.17, 6.19, 6.20, 6.38, 7.05, 7.12, 7.39 Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548..................................................3.27, 4.05, 4.12, 4.17, 4.27, 6.88, 7.38 Shropshire Union Railways & Canal Co v The Queen (1875) LR 7 E & I App 496............................................................................................7.15 Sickles v Lauman (1918) 169 NW 670.................................................................6.08 Sidney Raper Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1975] 2 NSWLR 227 ........................................................................................8.78 Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142 .........................................................................3.15, 3.16, 6.56, 6.82, 6.88, 7.40 Sim v Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council [1986] 3 All ER 387 ................................................................................................................8.79 Simmons v Harvey [1965] Tas SR 84.................................................2.04, 6.07, 6.85 Sinclair v British Telecommunications plc [2001] 1 WLR 38 ...................6.63, 6.98 Singh v Observer Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 751...........................................................6.63 Sinochem International Oil (London) Co Ltd v Mobil Sales and Supply Corp [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 474............................................................................8.26 Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 AC 199 ..............................6.73 Skipper & Tucker v Holloway & Howard [1910] 2 KB 630 ...............................7.39 Skipskredittforeningen v Emperor Navigation SA [1997] 2 BCLC 398 ...........................................................................................................8.26 Smit Tak International Zeesleepen Bergingsbedriff BV v Selco Salvage Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 398 ............................................................................8.99 Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health (1990) 95 ALR 87 .......................................3.23 Smith v ANL Ltd (2000) 204 CLR 493........................................................2.05, 3.11 Smith v Board of Education of City of Liberal (1924) 222 P 101..............6.74, 6.79 Smith v Bridgend County Borough Council [2002] 1 AC 336.........3.16, 7.07, 7.16 Smith v Corry & Co (1909) 28 NZLR 672...........................................................7.38 Smith v Jones [1954] 1 WLR 1089 .....................................................7.14, 8.67, 8.79 Smith v Parkes (1852) 16 Beav 115; 51 ER 720 ........................7.18, 8.87, 8.88, 8.89 Smith v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1910) 11 CLR 148.................................................................6.87, 7.04, 7.05, 7.06, 7.07, 7.08 Smith v Smith (1833) 2 Cr & M 231; 149 ER 745 ...............................................7.18 Smits v Roach (2004) 60 NSWLR 711 .................................................................6.59 Snape v Kiernan (1988) 13 NSWLR 88 ...............................................................6.08 Snyder’s Ltd v Furniture Finance Corp Ltd [1931] 1 DLR 398.................5.05, 6.47 Société des Ateliers et Chantiers de France [1919] AC 1 ....................................6.87 Society of Lloyds v Leighs (1997) 6 Re LR 289....................................................8.26 Society of Lloyds v Wilkinson (No 2) (1997) 6 Re LR 214.................................8.26
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Socony Mobil Oil Co Inc v West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association (London) Ltd (The Padre Island) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 408....................................................................................6.08, 6.118 Socony Mobil Oil Co Inc v West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association (London) Ltd (The Padre Island No 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 191.................................................................................6.118 South Australian Management Corp v Sheahan (1995) 16 ACSR 45 .......6.61, 6.62 South East Thames Regional Health Authority v Y J Lovell (London) Ltd (1985) BLR 127 ..................................................................................6.61, 6.64 South, ex parte (1818) 3 Swanst 392; 36 ER 907 ........................................7.06, 7.07 Southern British National Trust Ltd v Pither (1937) 57 CLR 89 ......................8.04, 8.26, 8.53, 8.55, 8.58, 8.59, 8.62, 8.70, 8.83, 8.94, 8.95 Southern Cross Interiors Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 53 NSWLR 213.......................................................................6.45 Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 Building Law Reports (BLR) 33 ..................................................................................3.08, 6.68, 6.74, 6.79 Southwell v Scotter (1880) 49 LJQB 356 .............................................................8.36 Specialised Transport Pty Ltd v Dominiak (1989) 16 NSWLR 657 ..........6.84, 6.88 Spectrum Plus Ltd, Re [2005] 3 WLR 58.........................3.15, 3.16, 4.32, 6.56, 6.88 Spellman v Spellman [1961] 1 WLR 921 ....................................................6.87, 6.90 Squires v SA Steel & Sheet Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 147 ...................4.12, 7.18, 8.06 SSL Realisations (2002) Ltd, Re [2005] 1 BCLC 1 ..............................................6.56 Standard Chautaugua System v Gift (1926) 242 P 145.......................................6.79 Standing v Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282....................................................7.29, 7.31 Stanley v English Fibres Industries Ltd (1899) 68 LJQB 839..............................7.38 Stansbery v Medo-Land Dairy (1940) 105 P 2d 86 .............................................8.48 Steel Wing Co Ltd, Re [1921] 1 Ch 349 ...........................4.05, 4.07, 4.18, 4.27, 7.39 Stein v Blake [1996] AC 243...............................................................6.06, 6.15, 6.67 Stephens v Venables (No 1) (1862) 30 Beav 625; 54 ER 1084...................8.06, 8.83 Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489..............................................3.26, 7.16, 7.17 Stevens v Benning (1855) 6 De G M & G 223; 43 ER 1218 .......................6.73, 6.74 Stevens v Keogh (1946) 72 CLR 1 ........................................................................6.59 Stevenson & Sons v Maule & Co (1920) SC 335 .................................................6.79 Stewart v Reavell’s Garage [1952] 2 QB 545...............................................3.08, 6.79 Stocks v Dobson (1853) 4 De GM & G 11; 43 ER 411 ......................4.12, 4.20, 8.83 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574.......................................................6.21, 6.25, 6.28, 6.31, 8.33, 8.37, 8.61 Stoddart v Union Trust Ltd [1912] 1 KB 181....................................8.59, 8.64, 8.70 Stokes v Liverpool & London and Globe Insurance Co (1925) 126 SE 649 ......6.87 Stone v Lidderdale (1795) 2 Anst 533; 145 ER 958 .............................................6.58 Stump v Gaby (1852) 2 De GM & G 623; 42 ER 1015 ........................................6.09 Sturt & Co, ex parte (1871) LR 13 Eq 309 ...........................................................6.45
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Sun Candies Pty Ltd v Polites (1991) 24 NSWLR 326 ...............................8.70, 8.85 Sunbird Plaza Pty Ltd v Maloney (1988) 166 CLR 245 ....................................6.100 Sunrise Restaurants, Re (1991) 135 BR 149; [1991] Bankr Lexis 1841..............6.79 Sutton’s Trusts, Re [1879] 12 Ch D 175 ..............................................................8.06 Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd, Re (1950) 81 CLR 418...........................................6.87 Swan and Cleland’s Growing Dock and Slipway Co v Maritime Insurance Co [1907] 1 KB 116........................................................4.19, 6.34, 6.73 Swanston Mortgage Pty Ltd v Trepan Investments Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 672.............................................................................................................6.10 Swarts v Narragansett Lighting Co (1904) 59 A 77..................6.69, 6.71, 6.78, 6.79 Sweet v Cater (1841) 16 RPC 447 ........................................................................4.13 Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177 ......................................2.05, 6.90 Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584 .....3.11, 3.17, 6.106, 7.07, 7.16 Syrett v Egerton [1957] 3 All ER 331 ........................................6.50, 6.58, 6.86, 7.13 T Choithram International SA v Pagarani [2001] 1 WLR 1...............................7.15 Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523...................2.14, 3.26, 4.31, 6.15, 6.17, 6.45, 7.11, 7.13, 7.15, 7.16, 7.17, 7.19, 7.44 Taita Hotel Ltd v Spelman [1963] NZLR 206 .....................................................6.08 Tancred v Delagoa Bay and East Africa Railway Co (1889) 23 QBD 239...............................................................................................3.17, 7.41 Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315 .....3.26, 4.22, 6.86, 7.17 Taylor v Blakelock (1886) 32 Ch D 560......................................................8.55, 8.68 Taylor v DCT (1969) 123 CLR 206 ......................................................................7.20 Taylor v Okey (1806) 13 Ves Jun 180; 33 ER 263 ...............................................8.26 Taylor v Sanders [1937] VLR 62 .................................................................8.13, 8.14 Telewest Communications plc v Telewest Communications (Publications) Ltd [2003] EWHC 3176 (Ch).................................................6.123 Telford v Holt (1987) 41 DLR (4th) 385 ....................................................8.64, 8.83 Temsign Pty Ltd v Bisen Pty Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 83..........................................6.67 Teno, The [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 289 ....................................................................8.64 Thai Trading Co v Taylor [1998] QB 781 ...........................................................6.59 Thamesmead Town Ltd v Allotey (1998) 79 P & CR 557...........6.108, 6.119, 6.126 Tharros Shipping Co Ltd v Bias Shipping Ltd (1995) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 541......................................................................................................6.61, 6.63 Thayer v Lister (1861) 30 LJ Ch 427 ....................................................................7.12 Theodore v Mistford Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 296 ....................................4.22, 7.07 Thomas & Co v Thureau (1905) 1 Tas LR 58 .....................................................7.40 Thomas Jacquess v Thomas, Re [1894] 1 QB 747...............................................6.59 Thomas v Harris [1947] 1 All ER 444 ................................................3.17, 4.27, 7.40 Thomas v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] Qd R 448.................4.14, 4.16, 4.18 Thomas v National Farmer’s Union Mutual Insurance Society Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 386.......................................................................................6.76
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Thomas v Silvia (1994) 14 ACSR 446 ..................................................................6.71 Thompson v McInnes (1911) 12 CLR 562 ..........................................................7.37 Thornley v Lang [2004] 1 WLR 378 ....................................................................6.59 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 .......................................................3.11, 4.04, 4.07, 4.12, 4.16, 4.25, 8.03, 8.06 Tibbits v George (1836) 5 AD & E 107; 11 ER 1107 ...........................................7.07 Tichener, Re (1865) 35 Beav 317; 55 ER 918.......................................................7.18 Timothy’s Pty Ltd and Companies Act, Re [1981] 2 NSWLR 706 ....................................................................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62 Timpson’s Executor’s v Yerbury [1936] 1 KB 645 ............................7.06, 7.18, 7.27 Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] 1 Ch 106...........................6.103, 6.106, 6.108, 6.119, 6.120, 6.126, 6.132, 6.133, 6.135 Todd Petroleum Mining Co Ltd v Shell (Petroleum Mining) Co Ltd [2005] NZCA, CA 155/05, 23 Sept 2005 .................................................6.87, 8.79 Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 .............................................3.08, 4.18, 4.22, 4.25, 5.05, 6.07, 6.69, 6.70, 6.73, 6.75, 6.76, 6.79, 6.86, 6.87, 6.96, 6.99, 6.121, 6.123, 6.124, 6.134, 8.06, 8.07 Tom Shaw and Co v Moss Empires Ltd (1908) 25 TLR 190 ............6.88, 7.04, 7.07 Tomlinson v Cut Price Deli Pty Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 490 ....................................8.70 Toms v Cuming (1845) 7 M & G 88; 135 ER 38 .................................................7.37 Tony Lee Motors Ltd v M S MacDonald & Son (1974) Ltd [1981] 2 NZLR 281............................................................................................8.83 Tooth v Brisbane City Council (1928) 41 CLR 212 ...............................................3.17, 4.20, 6.21, 6.22, 7.07, 7.09, 8.06, 8.59 Tooth v Hallett (1869) LR 4 Ch App 242 ........................6.07, 6.15, 6.22, 8.07, 8.46 Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427.............................2.02, 2.04, 2.05, 4.11, 5.05, 5.11, 5.13, 6.07, 6.59, 8.20 Toronto-Dominion Bank v Block Bros Contractors Ltd (1980) 118 DLR (3d) 311 ..............................................................................................8.71 Torrington Creamery v Davenport (1940) 12 A 2d 780.....................................6.08 Tosich Construction Pty Ltd, Re (1997) 23 ACSR 126.......................................6.67 Total Liban SAL v Vitol Energy SA [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 700...................6.61, 6.62 Townsend v Jarman [1900] 2 Ch 698 ..................................................................6.08 Transphere Pty Ltd, Re (1986) 5 NSWLR 309 ....................................................3.11 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 ............................................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64, 6.65 Trent v Hunt (1853) 9 Ex 14; 156 ER 7 ...............................................................8.67 Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2), Re [1963] 1 Ch 199...........................................6.59, 6.61 Trident Beauty, The [1994] 1 WLR 161..........................3.12, 5.05, 6.22, 6.29, 6.38, 6.41, 6.104, 8.01, 8.31, 8.33, 8.34, 8.37 Trubenizing Process Corp v John Forsyth Ltd [1943] 4 DLR 577 ............5.05, 7.09
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Trytel, Re [1952] 2 TLR 32 ..................................................21, 6.15, 6.17, 6.22, 6.42 Turcan, Re (1888) 40 Ch D 5 ....................................................6.86, 6.88, 6.90, 7.22 Turner Corp Ltd (in liq), Re (1995) 17 ACSR 761.....................................6.84, 6.86 Turner v Smith [1901] 1 Ch 213..........................................................................8.81 Turquand & The Capital and Counties Bank v Fearon (1879) 4 QBD 280 ......4.05 Turton v Benson (1718) 1 P WMS 496; 24 ER 488.............................................8.62 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762 .........................................2.12 United Builders Pty Ltd v Mutual Acceptance Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 673...........6.48 United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Parkway Motors [1955] 1 WLR 719, overruled [1967] 1 WLR 295............................................6.88 United States Shoe Corp v Hackett (1986) 793 F 2d 161...........................6.73, 6.74 Universal Management Ltd, Re [1983] NZLR 462 ...........................3.16, 3.17, 7.41 Upson, Re (1941) 12 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 147 .....................................3.17 UTC Ltd v NZI Securities Australia Ltd (1991) 4 WAR 349 ..........................................................................................4.27, 7.16, 7.27 UTSA Pty Ltd v Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd [1997] 1 VR 667; affd (1996) 21 ACSR 440...................................................................................6.67 Van Lynn Developments Ltd v Pelias Construction Co Ltd [1969] 1 QB 607.............................................................................................................7.38 Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291..............................................................7.26, 7.30 Vangale Pty Ltd v Kumugai Gumi Co Ltd [2002] QSC 137...............................6.84 VGM Holdings Ltd, Re [1942] Ch 235................................................................3.11 Victoria Insurance Co v King (1895) 6 QLJ 202, affd [1896] AC 250 ...............5.05 Victorian Producers’ Co-operative Co Ltd v Leng [1918] ALR 35 ....................7.37 Voyle v Hughes (1854) 2 Sm & G 18; 65 ER 283 ................................................7.28 Waghorn v Linden Manufacturing Pty Ltd [1970] 3 NSWLR 559 ....................3.08 Waitomo Wools (NZ) Ltd v Nelsons (NZ) Ltd [1974] 1 NZLR 484 .................3.17 Wakefield and Barnsley Banking Corp v Nomanton Local Board (1881) 44 LT 697; affd (1881) 44 LT 697...............................8.58, 8.60, 8.64, 8.71 Walker Electric Company v New York Shipbuilding Company (1917) 241 F 569 .......................................................................................6.78, 7.69 Walker v Bradford Old Bank Ltd (1884) 12 QBD 511....2.02, 4.19, 5.05, 6.34, 7.38 Walker v Department of Social Security (1995) 129 ALR 198 ...........................8.86 Walker v Phoenix Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1980) 1 ANZ Ins Cas 60-045 .......................................................................................8.13 Walker v Rostron (1842) Ex 173; 152 ER 174 .....................................................7.07 Walter & Sullivan Ltd v J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584.........................................................................4.04, 4.27, 7.07, 7.39, 8.06 Walton v Lavater (1860) 8 CB(NS) 162; 141 ER 1127........................................7.39 Ward, Re (1984) 3 FCR 112 .................................................................................6.14 Ward, Re (1984) 55 ALR 395 ...............................................................................7.22 Ward v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 ................4.15, 4.20, 5.23, 7.15, 7.18, 7.38, 8.16
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Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1976] 1 QB 430.....................................................................................3.27, 4.07, 4.12, 8.30 WASA International (UK) Insurance Co Ltd v WASA International Co Ltd [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 696 .............................................................6.101 Waterson’s Trustees v St Giles Boys Club (1943) SC 369...................................7.37 Watkins v Watkins [1896] P 222..........................................................................6.58 Watson v Duke of Wellington (1830) 1 Russ & M 602; 39 ER 231....................7.12 Watson v Mid-Wales Railway Co (1867) LR 2 CP 593.....................8.71, 8.83, 8.88 Watson v Shepherd (1904) QWN 57...................................................................7.38 Way’s Trusts, Re (1864) 2 De GJ & S 365; 46 ER 416 .........................................4.14 Webb v National Australia Bank (1990) 2 Butterworths Property Reports 11 ..........................................................................................................6.71 Webb v Smith (1885) 30 Ch D 192......................................................................8.99 Webb v Stenton (1883) 11 QBD 518 ..........................................................6.42, 6.45 Weddell v JA Pearce & Major [1988] Ch 26.............................4.11, 4.13, 7.18, 7.38 Wells v Foster (1841) 8 M & W 149; 151 ER 987................................................6.58 Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270...........3.16 Welstead v Hadley (1904) 21 TLR 165 ................................................................6.08 Werderman v Société Générale d’ Eletricité (1881) 19 Ch 246 ...............4.13, 6.106 West Tankers Inc v RAS Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurta (The Front Comor) [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 257 ..................................................................6.118 West v Newing (1900) 82 LT 260.........................................................................7.07 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669.............................................................................3.11, 4.22 Western Wagon & Property Company v West [1892] 1 Ch 271 .....6.42, 6.75, 7.16 Westerton, Re [1919] 2 Ch 104 ......................4.05, 4.14, 5.17, 6.89, 7.07, 7.09, 8.04 Westgold Resources NL v St George Bank Ltd (1998) 29 ACSR 396 ................................................................................6.08, 6.84, 6.86, 6.88 Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee [1956] 1 Ch 7.........................................................6.09 Westminster Estates Pty Ltd v Calleja (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 222.....................3.07 Westralian Farmers Co-operative Ltd v Southern Meat Packers Ltd [1981] WAR 241 ................................................................................6.05, 6.54 Westralian Farmers Ltd v Commonwealth Agricultural Service Engineers Ltd (1936) 54 CLR 361............................................................6.36, 6.37 Wetherall Bros Co v United States Steel Co (1952) 200 F 2d 761......................6.74 WF Harrison & Co Ltd v Burke [1956] 1 WLR 419............................................7.38 Whale v Viasystems Technograph Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 480 ..........................6.47 Wharf St Pty Ltd v Amstar Learning Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 256 ........................6.100 White v Southern Hotel Co [1897] 1 Ch 767......................................................6.76 Whiteley Ltd v Hilt [1918] 2 KB 808 ........................................................6.08, 6.127 Whiteley v Hill [1918] 2 KB 808 ..........................................................................6.73 Whithorn Brothers v Davison [1911] 1 KB 463..................................................8.62
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Whittingstall v King (1882) 46 LT 520 ................................................................7.18 Whitton v ACN 003 266 886 Pty Ltd (1996) 42 NSWLR 123 ............................6.56 Wickham Holdings Ltd v Brooke House Motors Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 295....................................................................................................6.85, 6.87 Wigan v English & Scottish Life Assurance Association [1909] 1 Ch 291.........8.63 Wild v Simpson [1919] 2 KB 544.........................................................................6.59 Wilding v Richards (1845) 1 Coll 655; 63 ER 584...............................................7.04 Wilkinson v Wilkinson (1819) 3 Swan 515; 36 ER 958 ......................................7.07 Willcock v Terrell (1878) 3 Ex D 323...................................................................6.58 Willes v Greenhill (1861) 4 De G F & J 147; 45 ER 1139 ....................................7.18 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 ..................................................................4.09, 4.11, 4.13, 4.18, 5.10, 7.05, 7.06, 7.07, 7.08, 7.18, 7.19, 7.21, 8.06, 8.18 William C Attwater & Co Inc v Terminal Coal Corporation (1940) 115 F 2d 887.........................................................................................6.121 William Felton Co Pty Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 228.................................................6.67 William v Pickersgill & Sons Ltd v London and Provincial Marine & General Insurance Co Ltd [1912] 3 KB 614 .................................................8.07 Williams, Re [1917] 1 Ch 1 .........................................................................7.04, 7.34 Williams, Re [1930] 2 Ch 378 ..............................................................................6.20 Williams v Atlantic Assurance Co Ltd [1933] 1 KB 81 ..................................................................4.27, 6.76, 7.34, 7.38, 7.39, 7.40 Williams v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1965] NZLR 395 ......................6.20 Williams v Frayne (1937) 58 CLR 710.................................................................6.87 Williams v Lloyd (1934) 50 CLR 341...................................................................7.21 Williams v Nicoski [2003] WASC 131........................................................6.68, 6.69 Williams v Owens (1840) 5 My & Cr 303; 41 ER 386.........................................3.16 Williams v Protheroe (1829) 5 Bing 309; 130 ER 1080.......................................6.59 Williams v Sorrell (1799) 4 Ves Jun 389; 31 ER 198 ...........................................8.83 Wilmot v Alton [1897] 1 QB 17...........................................................................6.15 Wilson v Commissioner of Probate Duties (Vic) (1978) 8 ATR 799........6.08, 6.72 Wilson v Gabriel (1863) 4 B & S 243; 122 ER 450 ............................8.52, 8.60, 8.83 Wilson v Ragosine & Co Ltd (1915) 84 LJKB 2185.............................................4.18 Wilson v St Helens Borough Council [1999] 2 AC 52........................................6.73 Wilson v Wallani (1880) 5 Ex D 155 ...................................................................7.37 Wilsons (NZ) Portland Cement Ltd v Gatx-Fuller Australasia Pty Ltd (No 2) [1985] 2 NZLR 33 ...........................................................................8.70 Wily v St George Partnership Banking Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 1 ...........................3.23 Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619; 99 ER 1284..........................2.17, 4.05, 4.23, 4.24 WJ Adams & Co Ltd v Blencowe (1929) 46 WN(NSW) 150 ....................7.07, 7.12 Wong Mee Wan v Kwan Kin Travel Services Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 38 .................6.78 Wood v Downes (1811) 18 Ves 120; 34 ER 263 ..................................................6.59
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Wood v Freehold United Quartz Mining Co Registered (1870) 1 VR (Eq) 168 ....................................................................................................6.59 Wood v Griffith (1818) 1 SW 43..........................................................................6.59 Woodhams v Anglo-Australian & Universal Family Assurance Co (1861) 3 Giff 238; 66 ER 397 .......................................................................8.55 Worthington, Re [1914] 2 KB 299 .......................................................................8.04 Wreckair Pty Ltd v Emerson [1992] 1 Qd R 700......................4.27, 6.14, 6.37, 7.40 Wright v Morgan [1926] AC 788 .........................................................................6.08 Wright v Wright (1749-50) 1 Ves Sen 410; 27 ER 1111......................................4.05 Yeandle v Wynn Realisations Ltd (1995) 47 Construction LR 1.................................................................................1.01, 6.45, 6.54, 6.87, 8.29 Yellow Cab of Cleveland Inc v Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (1991) 595 NE 2d 508 ......................................................................6.79 Young v Kitchin (1878) 3 Ex D 127 ........................8.49, 8.64, 8.72, 8.87, 8.88, 8.89 Young v Matthew Hall Mechanical & Electrical Engineers Pty Ltd (1988) 12 ACLR 399 ..........................................................................................3.17 Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560.......................................2.10 Zeil Nominees Pty Ltd v VACC Insurance Co Ltd (1975) 180 CLR 173...........8.25 Zhu v Treasurer of New South Wales (2004) 211 ALR 159 ...............................6.07 Zigurds, The (1931) 47 TLR 525..........................................................................7.07 Zigurds, The [1932] P 113; [1933] P 87; [1934] AC 209 ...........................7.07, 7.18 Zuks v Jackson McDonald (1996) 132 FLR 317..................................................1.06
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TABLE OF STATUTES
References are to paragraph number ENGLAND Army Act 1955 s 203(1) ..............................................................................................................6.58 Bankruptcy Act 1869 ............................................................................................7.37 Bills of Exchange Act 1882 s 11 .....................................................................................................................7.40 s 38(2) ................................................................................................................8.49 Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882 s 8 .......................................................................................................................7.01 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 s 2 .......................................................................................................................7.34 s 3(1) ................................................................................................................6.119 s 3(3) ................................................................................................................6.101 Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 ..............................................................6.62 Common Law Procedure Act 1854 s 85 ............................................................................................................4.09, 4.24 Companies Act 1985 s 36A(4) .............................................................................................................7.37 s 182 ...................................................................................................................7.34 s 395(1) ..............................................................................................................7.35 s 427(3)(a) .......................................................................................................6.101 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 .....................................................6.73 Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988 s 90 .....................................................................................................................7.34 Criminal Law Act 1967 s 13(1) ................................................................................................................6.59 s 13(2) ................................................................................................................6.59 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 s 111 .................................................................................................................6.101 Insolvency Act 1986 s 130(2) ..............................................................................................................8.98
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Table of Statutes
s 153(3) ..............................................................................................................4.32 s 167 ...................................................................................................................6.67 s 248 ...................................................................................................................4.32 s 281(1) ..............................................................................................................4.32 s 281(2) ..............................................................................................................4.32 s 285(3) ..............................................................................................................8.98 s 314 ...................................................................................................................6.67 s 344 ...................................................................................................................7.35 s 345(4) ..............................................................................................................7.38 s 436 ...................................................................................................................6.67 Sch 4...................................................................................................................6.67 Sch 5...................................................................................................................6.67 Judicature Act 1873.............................................................................2.11, 5.17, 5.20 s 25 ............................................................................................................5.11, 5.19 s 25(6) ...................................................................2.17, 4.09, 5.04, 5.11, 5.27, 7.34 s 25(7) ................................................................................................................5.19 s 25(11) ..............................................................................................................5.11 Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 ......................................................8.30 Law of Property Act 1925 s 53(1) ................................................................................................................7.26 s 53(1)(a) ...........................................................................................................7.29 s 53(1)(b)...........................................................................................................7.29 s 53(1)(c) ..................................................................................................5.10, 7.29 s 53(2) .......................................................................................................7.26, 7.28 s 56 ...................................................................................................................6.108 s 136 ...............................................................................................5.03, 5.10, 6.118 s 136(1) ..............................................................................................................5.03 s 205 ...................................................................................................................7.26 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s 2 .......................................................................................................................7.26 Marine Insurance Act 1906 s 50 .....................................................................................................................7.34 Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 s 5 .......................................................................................................................6.58 Patents Act 1977 s 30 .....................................................................................................................7.34 Pensions Act 1995 s 91 .....................................................................................................................6.58 Policies of Assurance Act 1867 ............................................................................6.90 s 1 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 20A ..................................................................................................................7.11
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s 53(1)(a) ...........................................................................................................8.73 Social Security Administration Act 1992 s 187 ...................................................................................................................6.58 Superannuation Act 1972 s 5(1) ..................................................................................................................6.58 Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 ..............................................6.73
AUSTRALIA Commonwealth Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 5 ..............................................................................................................4.32, 6.67 s 58(3) ................................................................................................................8.98 s 62 .....................................................................................................................7.38 s 134 ...................................................................................................................6.67 s 153(1) ..............................................................................................................4.32 s 153(3) ..............................................................................................................4.32 Bills of Exchange Act 1909 s 16 .....................................................................................................................7.40 s 43(1)(b)...........................................................................................................8.49 Cheques Act 1986 s 12(1) ................................................................................................................7.40 Commonwealth Employees Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 s 112(1) ..............................................................................................................6.58 Copyright Act 1968 s 196 ...................................................................................................................7.34 s 196(4) ............................................................................................................6.101 s 197 ...................................................................................................................7.34 Corporations Act 2001 Pt 7.11 ................................................................................................................7.34 s 9 .......................................................................................................................6.67 s 127 ...................................................................................................................7.37 s 266 ...................................................................................................................7.35 s 413 ........................................................................................................6.73, 6.101 s 471B.................................................................................................................8.98 s 477(2) ..............................................................................................................6.67 Design Act 2003 s 11 .....................................................................................................................7.34 Financial Sector (Transfers of Business) Act 1999 s 22 ...................................................................................................................6.101 Insurance Act 1973 ............................................................................................6.101
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Insurance Contracts Act 1984 s 48 .....................................................................................................................6.73 s 50 .....................................................................................................................6.73 Life Insurance Act 1995 s 200 ...................................................................................................................7.34 s 200(3) ............................................................................................................6.101 s 201 ...................................................................................................................7.34 s 202 ...................................................................................................................7.34 s 203 ...................................................................................................................7.34 Marine Insurance Act 1909 s 56 .....................................................................................................................7.34 Patents Act 1990 s 13 .....................................................................................................................7.34 s 103(1) ..............................................................................................................7.34 Reserve Bank Act 1959 s 25(c) ................................................................................................................6.58 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 s 60 .....................................................................................................................6.58 Trade Marks Act 1995 s 106(1) ..............................................................................................................7.34 Trade Practices Act 1974 s 52 .....................................................................................................................6.67 s 82 .....................................................................................................................6.05 s 87 .....................................................................................................................6.05 Veterans Entitlements Act 1986 s 125 ..........................................................................................................6.58, 6.86 Australian Capital Territory Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 151A ................................................................................................................6.59 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 ............................................7.26 s 51(1) ................................................................................................................7.26 s 51(1)(a) ...........................................................................................................7.29 s 51(1)(b)...........................................................................................................7.29 s 54(1) ................................................................................................................7.26 s 68 .....................................................................................................................6.59 Sale of Goods Act 1954 s 56 .....................................................................................................................8.73 New South Wales Bills of Sale Act 1898 s 5c(1) ................................................................................................................7.01
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Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 21(1) ................................................................................................................8.83 Conveyancing Act 1919 s 2 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 7 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 12 ...................................................................................................5.03, 5.06, 5.25 s 12(4) ................................................................................................................5.25 s 23C(1) .............................................................................................................7.26 s 23C(1)(c) ........................................................................................................7.26 s 23C(2) .............................................................................................................7.26 s 36C ................................................................................................................6.108 s 54A ..................................................................................................................7.37 s 54A(1) .............................................................................................................7.26 Insurance Act 1902 ss 14-16 ..............................................................................................................6.73 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 s 3 .......................................................................................................................6.58 Limitation Act 1969 ..............................................................................................4.17 Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 1993 s 3 .......................................................................................................................6.59 s 4 .......................................................................................................................6.59 Sale of Goods Act 1923 s 54 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 s 8 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Northern Territory Bills of Lading Act 1859 SA s 1 .......................................................................................................................7.34 s 3 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Law of Property Act 2000 s 4 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 10 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 12 ...................................................................................................................6.108 s 56(3)(b).........................................................................................................6.108 s 62 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 182 ...................................................................................................................5.03 Sale of Goods Act 1972 s 54 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Queensland Property Law Act 1974
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s 3 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 11 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 13 ...................................................................................................................6.108 s 55(3)(b).........................................................................................................6.108 s 59 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 199(1) ..............................................................................................................5.03 s 199(2) ..............................................................................................................5.03 Sale of Goods Act 1896 s 54 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1996 s 6 .......................................................................................................................7.34 South Australia Law of Property Act 1936 s 7 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 15 .....................................................................................................................5.03 s 29 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 34(1) ..............................................................................................................6.108 Law of Property Act 1938 s 26(1) ................................................................................................................7.26 Sale of Goods Act 1895 s 52 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Tasmania Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 s 2 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 36(1) ................................................................................................................7.26 s 60(2) ................................................................................................................7.26 s 61(c) ..............................................................................................................6.108 s 86(1) ................................................................................................................5.03 s 86(2) ................................................................................................................5.03 Sale of Goods Act 1896 s 57 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 s 7 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Victoria Crimes Act 1958 s 322A ................................................................................................................6.59 Goods Act 1958 s 59 .....................................................................................................................8.73
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Instruments Act 1958 s 126 ...................................................................................................................7.26 Property Law Act 1958 s 18 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 53 .....................................................................................................................7.26 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1998 s 8 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Wrongs Act 1958 s 32 .....................................................................................................................6.59 Western Australia Property Law Act 1969 s 7 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 11(1) ..............................................................................................................6.108 s 11(3)(c) .........................................................................................................6.108 s 20 .....................................................................................................................5.03 s 20(3) ............................................................................4.27, 4.29, 5.20, 7.22, 7.39 s 34 .....................................................................................................................7.26 Sale of Goods Act 1895 s 52 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 s 8 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Statute of Frauds 1677 (Imp) s 4 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 9 .......................................................................................................................7.26
NEW ZEALAND Contractual Remedies Act 1979 s 11(1) ................................................................................................................8.32 s 11(2) ................................................................................................................8.32 Property Law Act 1952 ........................................................................................5.07
UNITED STATES Restatement of Contracts 2d s 317(2) ..............................................................................................................6.69 s 322 .................................................................................................6.85, 6.87, 6.89 s 322(2)(a) ................................................................................................6.69, 6.86 s 322(2)(b).........................................................................................................6.88
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s 333 ...................................................................................................................8.04 s 336(2) ..............................................................................................................8.92 s 338(2) ..............................................................................................................8.39 s 338(3) ..............................................................................................................8.38 Uniform Commercial Code s 2-210..............................................................................................6.85, 6.96, 6.98 s 2-210(4) ........................................................................................................6.134 s 2-306................................................................................................................6.96 s 2.210(2) ...........................................................................................................6.69 s 9-318(4) ..........................................................................................................6.87 s 9-405................................................................................................................8.39 s 9-406................................................................................................................6.85
TABLE OF STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS
References are to paragraph number Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/1794) reg 4A.................................................................................................................6.73 reg 5(1) ..............................................................................................................6.73 reg 5(2) ............................................................................................................6.101
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INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND LAWS
References are to paragraph number Principles of European Contract Law Art 11:103 ..........................................................................................................6.50 Art 11:204 ..........................................................................................................8.04 Art 11:301 ..........................................................................................................6.85 Art 11:303(2) ............................................................................................7.38, 8.06 Art 11:304 .................................................................................................7.38, 8.06 Art 12:201 ........................................................................................................6.134 UN Convention on Assignment of Receivables in International Finance Art 11 .................................................................................................................6.85 Art 20(1) ............................................................................................................8.34 Art 20(2) ............................................................................................................8.34 Art 20(3) ............................................................................................................8.34 Art 22(1) ............................................................................................................8.39 Art 22(2)(a) ......................................................................................................8.39 Art 22(2)(b).......................................................................................................8.39 Art 22(3) ............................................................................................................8.39 Unidroit Convention on International Factoring Art 6 ..................................................................................................................6.85 Art 8(1)(a) .........................................................................................................8.06 Art 9 ...................................................................................................................8.92 Art 10(1) ............................................................................................................8.34 Art 10(2)(a) .......................................................................................................8.04 Art 11 .................................................................................................................8.94 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts Art 9.1.3 ....................................................................................................6.93, 6.98 Art 9.1.4 .............................................................................................................6.50 Art 9.1.8 .............................................................................................................6.93 Art 9.1.9(1) ........................................................................................................6.85 Art 9.1.9(2) ........................................................................................................6.86 Art 9.1.12 ..................................................................................................7.38, 8.06 Art 9.1.15 ...........................................................................................................8.04 Art 9.3.1-9.3.7..................................................................................................6.134
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Part 1 Introduction
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1 Introduction (a) General [1.01] Subject matter of the book. The subject matter of this book is the rules governing the voluntary inter vivos assignment of contractual rights.1 Such transactions involve the transfer of a contractual right from the owner (assignor) to the transferee (assignee). The person bound to perform the correlative obligation is either (in the case of a debt) the debtor or (in the case of some other contractual performance obligation) the obligor. Assignments of contractual rights form an important area of commercial practice. Despite this, in terms of legal publications, the assignment of contractual rights is an area that has received little attention.2 Recently it was described as “undeveloped”.3 1 Often this is referred to as assigning the benefit of a contract. Statements can be found that seek to distinguish the assignment of the “benefit” of a contract from the assignment of rights under a contract, eg Yeandle v Wynn Realisations Ltd (1995) 47 Construction LR 1. However, under the property model of assignment (see [3.19]) this distinction cannot be maintained. Only contractual rights may be assigned, and for the most part these flow from contractual terms. The class of contractual rights and duties that do not flow from the terms of a contract is small: see E Peden, Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts (Sydney, Butterworths, 2003) para 1.5. References to the assignment of the “benefit” of a contract should be taken to refer to an assignment of all the rights under a contract rather than any specific rights under a contract. 2 This is despite statements such as, “modern capitalism begins with the assignment and negotiability of contracts”: see JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York, Macmillan, 1924) at 253. It has also been said: “If we were asked—Who made the discovery which has most deeply affected the fortunes of the human race? We think, after full consideration, we might safely answer—The man who first discovered that a Debt is a Saleable Commodity”: see H Dunning Macleod, The Theory and Practice of Banking (5th edn, London, Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer, 1892) i, at 200. There have been a number of publications dealing with the more general topic of the assignment of choses in action: see WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899); FCT Tudsbery, The Nature, Requisites and Operation of Equitable Assignments (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1912); OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950); JG Starke, Assignment of Choses in Action in Australia (Sydney, Butterworths, 1972). See also J Barr Ames, Lectures on Legal History (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1913) at 210; SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1931) 47 LQR 516, (1932) 48 LQR 248, 547; WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, at 515). Textbooks have also considered in some detail the position of a trustee where a beneficiary assigns its interest: see generally B Marks, Alienation of Income (2nd edn, Sydney, CCH Australia, 1982) para 224. In addition,
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In the result, the assignment of contractual rights is made up of a number of rules which overlap, make little sense as statements in their own right and appear to lack any general underlying and unifying principle. These rules are as follows: 1. An assignor can assign no greater right than it has nor can an assignee obtain a right greater than that held by the assignor. 2. Only non-personal contractual rights may be assigned. 3. It is not possible by assignment to increase or vary the obligations or burdens of an obligor. 4. It is possible to assign only rights and not obligations. 5. After receiving notice of an assignment, the obligor may not do anything to diminish the rights of the assignee. 6. An assignee can be in no better position than the assignor was prior to the assignment. 7. An obligor should be no worse off by virtue of an assignment. 8. An assignee takes subject to the equities. [1.02] Objects and themes of the book. This book seeks to explain the existence, meaning and operation of these rules in Anglo-Australian law by proving two points.4 First, that most of these rules can be explained by reference to what is termed (in this book) “the principle of transfer”. Case law dictates that an assignment involves a transfer of rights. This prompts an investigation into the legal concept of transfer. It is shown that the principal effect of a legal transfer flows from the fact that it is governed by the nemo dat rule. This rule forms the basis of “the principle of transfer”. The principle of transfer holds the key to understanding the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights as it is the fundamental principle governing such assignments. Most of the “rules” are merely different ways of expressing this principle. The reason for having different expressions of the one principle is that each rule attempts to express the operation of the principle of transfer at different stages of an assignment. Therefore, the principle of transfer explains the existence, meaning and operation of these rules. In short, an assignment does not merely involve a transfer; assignment is transfer. Secondly, in investigating the case law to show its compliance with the principle of transfer, it will be seen that there are some deviations. It is suggested that those deviations are explicable by recognising that a formal legal relationship exists there are a number of specialist works that have dealt with receivables financing and the alienation of income: see F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991); F Salinger, Factoring: The Law and Practice of Invoice Financing (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1999); PM Biscoe, Credit Factoring (London, Butterworths, 1975); B Marks, Alienation of Income (2nd edn, Sydney, CCH Australia, 1982). See also LW Melville, Precedents on Industrial Property and Commercial Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1965). 3 Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291 at 318 per Lightman J (affirmed [2000] Ch 291). 4 Despite this emphasis use is made of instructive cases from a number of jurisdictions.
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between the assignee and obligor which is policed by equity to prevent unconscionable conduct. The content of rules 5 and 8, to the extent that they focus on the obligor/assignee relationship rather than the assignor/assignee relationship, are explicable on this basis rather than the principle of transfer.5 [1.03] Application of theme to the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights. The conclusions that are reached in the book as regards the application of the principle of transfer to the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights are as follows. Rule 1: An assignor can assign no greater right than it has nor can an assignee obtain a right greater than that held by the assignor. This rule is a clear adoption of the nemo dat rule which is the hallmark of all legal transfers. As an assignment involves a transfer, the principle of transfer dictates the existence of this rule and provides the meaning of this rule. Rule 2: Only non-personal contractual rights may be assigned. The personal rights rule on its face would appear to be the most difficult rule to explain by reference to the principle of transfer. However, it is suggested that because contractual rights owe their existence to the intention of the parties then it must follow that that intention moulds the character of contractual rights not only as personal rights but also as choses in action. This point makes it clear why the principle of transfer would dictate the existence of a rule that gave such prominence to party intention and autonomy. That is, if the parties rob a chose in action of its inherent assignability by evidencing an intention that the obligor should only perform for the other party to the contract, then to allow the assignment of that right would be to allow the assignment of a right greater than and different from the one vested in the assignor, which would breach the principle of transfer. The same reasoning explains both the efficacy of contractual provisions prohibiting assignment and provisions that make rights assignable that would otherwise be construed as personal.
5 The explanatory nature of this book by no means exhausts the issues that face the law of assignment. For example, the current law, reflecting the history of this area, views assignment as involving the transfer of a proprietary right. Whether this fixation with property rights should continue is questionable. In addition, to a large extent, the present law determines the assignability of contractual rights by reference to the intention of the parties, and there is a legitimate view that assignability should be further promoted and that this could be achieved by allowing for assignment regardless of party intention where there is no good objective reason for limiting assignment: see LA DiMatteo, “Depersonalization of Personal Service Contracts: The Search for a Modern Approach to Assignability” (1994) 27 Akron LR 407. Finally, it may be questioned whether Anglo-Australian law should continue to maintain both an equitable and legal system of assignment.
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Rule 3: It is not possible by assignment to increase or vary the obligations or burdens of an obligor. Like rule 1 above, this rule is a clear adoption of the nemo dat rule. If the assignor cannot assign a right different from or greater than the one vested in him or her, then the effect of that assignment must be that the correlative obligation of the obligor is also not capable of variation by reason of the assignment. It may be noted that “variation” here concerns variations of legal obligations rather than factual changes to performance. So long as the obligor is being asked to perform for the assignee the exact same legal obligation as that promised to the assignor, then the obligor cannot complain that there has been a variation to its obligation. It is accepted that there may be some increased inconvenience in fact by reason of an assignment. This rule is also used to state the conclusion (or sub-rule) that the assignee can recover by way of damages for breach of contract no more than the assignor could have recovered. It is suggested that the principle of transfer dictates that the assignee should recover for its own personal loss. Nevertheless, the potential loss of the assignor should operate as a cap on liability, because the right to performance does not change its character when assigned but remains a right to an obligation promised to the assignor. This impacts on the value of the right vested in the assignee, and this result is dictated by the principle of transfer. Rule 4: It is possible to assign only rights and not obligations. When dealing in choses in action, it is only possible to transfer something one owns. At the time when a contract is formed a party does not own an obligation that it owes to the other party. To recognise the assignment of a chose in action which the assignor does not own would be at odds with the nemo dat rule. The principle of transfer cannot recognise the transfer of such obligations and therefore there is necessarily a rule governing the assignment of contractual rights that such obligations cannot be assigned. There is still a debate whether a party to a contract can take from the other party an assignment of the right to the performance of the obligation that the first party owes that second party, and whether such an assignment would result in an extinction of the obligation or allow for the first party to deal further with the “right” to the obligation it owes the second party. In any case, because the character of a contractual right as a chose in action is shaped by the intention of the parties to the contract, it is theoretically possible to make an obligation an intrinsic part of a right. In such a case, the principle of transfer would dictate that any transferee taking the right must also accept the obligation. If this were not the case, a right greater than and different from, that vested in the assignor would have been transferred, which is at odds with the principle of transfer. Rule 5: After receiving notice of an assignment, the obligor may not do anything to diminish the rights of the assignee. It is suggested in Chapter 8 that this rule is not a rule dictated by the principle of transfer. This rule is concerned with the
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obligor/assignee relationship which is not the relationship under which the transfer takes place. The “transfer relationship” is that of the assignor/assignee. In practice, this rule has been used in Anglo-Australian law to prohibit the assignor and obligor from varying the contract after notice of the assignment. It is suggested that the principle of transfer would not prohibit such variations. Thus, in taking the assignment of a contractual right, the assignee must accept that that right in its nature as a chose in action may be varied by the obligor and assignor, because this power is vested in the parties to a contract. Such an act may put the assignor in breach of contract with the assignee, but that alone does not call into question the inherent power of the assignor to agree to such variations in its capacity as party to the contract with the obligor. It follows that the rule can be explained only by recognising a formal legal relationship between the obligor and assignee which allows the assignee to resist such variations to the contract when the obligor’s agreement to the variation amounts to unconscionable conduct. Rule 6: An assignee can be in no better position than the assignor was prior to the assignment. The notion that an assignee can be in no better position than the assignor is a clear adoption of the nemo dat rule as recognised in rule 1 above. However, rule 6 is more often referred to when the question being asked concerns the extent of performance the assignee can demand from the obligor. Rule 7: An obligor should be no worse off by virtue of an assignment. This rule is often used to express the reason why the damages awarded to an assignee for breach of contract by the obligor cannot exceed those which would have been awarded to the assignor. This is clearly a result dictated by the principle of transfer, as the discussion of rule 3 above shows. Rule 8: An assignee takes subject to the equities. It is suggested in Chapter 8 that although the origins of this rule probably lie in the early procedure adopted for enforcing assignments, the rule is also dictated by the principle of transfer. That is, the nemo dat rule demands that an assignee take subject to all the inherent weaknesses or infelicities of the subject right. Thus, in the case of a contractual right, the assignee must take subject to such things as the obligor’s right to terminate the contract for breach or repudiation by the assignor or to rescind the contract by virtue of some misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or unconscionable conduct on the part of the assignor. In addition, the principle of transfer dictates that the assignee takes subject to substantive defences the obligor has against the assignor such as a right to substantive equitable set-off. It is also suggested in Chapter 8 that part of the operation of the subject to equities rule can be explained by recognising a formal legal relationship between the obligor and assignee which is policed to prevent unconscionable conduct. This would then explain why the assignee would be subject to such things as statutory
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set-offs, payments to the assignor and releases given by the assignor where these arise or occur prior to the obligor receiving notice of the assignment.
(b) Structure of the Book [1.04] Order of the book. The book is divided into four parts. This first part introduces the subject matter of the book, its objects and theme, and provides a brief history of the subject. Part 2 investigates the meaning of “assignment” and the nature of equitable and legal assignments. This part explains the legal concept of transfer. The major propositions flowing from this part are that it is sensible to speak of a transfer in the context of assignment only if the assignee becomes the owner of the subject right and such a transfer is governed by the nemo dat rule. Part 3 is concerned with the process of assigning contractual rights and investigates the rules most relevant to this aspect of an assignment. It will show that the existence, meaning and operation of these rules is explicable by the principle of transfer. This part also addresses the formalities of an assignment. Part 4 is concerned with the relationships between the assignor, assignee and obligor and investigates the rules most relevant to these relationships. It will be shown that the existence, meaning and operation of these rules yields to the principle of transfer. However, in this part it is also necessary to introduce the notion of a formal relationship existing between the assignee and obligor to explain some of the content of the rules. Although the object of this book is to investigate the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights, the rules are not dealt with in separate chapters. Such a structure would result in repetition as the rules overlap. As noted above, each of the rules reflects a different stage of an assignment. An assignment may be broken down into the following steps, (1) assignability, (2) formalities, and (3) position of the assignor, assignee and obligor as regards enforcement and remedies. The approach of the book is to deal with the rules within the context of such a transaction. Generally, rules 1, 2 and 4 (and to some extent rule 3) are concerned with assignability. Rules 5, 6, 7 and 8 (and again to some extent rule 3) concern the position of the parties. Of course, the formalities for an assignment cannot be explained by reference to the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights, but are nevertheless important to any such transaction and are discussed in Chapter 7.
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(c) Some Limitations [1.05] Main limits of the book. The abovementioned object of this book sets some important limitations. First, this book attempts to explain the law of assignment of contractual rights and therefore seeks to work within the case law. That is, the aim is to explain as many of the important authorities as possible while keeping suggestions that leading cases should be overruled to a minimum. Secondly, because the methodology is analytical, the current property model of assignment is adopted without question.6 The concern is how contractual rights are integrated within that system. [1.06] Other limitations. The focus of this book is on the assignment of contractual rights to receive performance.7 Although such performance often involves the payment of money, the book is not a complete statement of the law governing the assignment of debts. A debt does not require a contract for its existence, and many debts arise outside contract. Moreover, debts, whether accruing under a contract or not, have always been considered to be a distinct chose in action. In addition, because this is a book dealing with general principles of law and because of its focus on assignment of contractual rights, there is no discussion of other legal or commercial matters that may have to be addressed in the planning of such transactions. For example, there is no discussion of the various legal and commercial issues that arise in determining the form of a financing of receivables or the best structure to be adopted in a securitisation. Such matters are dealt with in specialised works on such topics. In addition, whether or not an assignment should be set aside upon the bankruptcy or insolvency of the assignor is left to specialised works.8 6 It is unlikely that this model will be jettisoned at any time soon, and it is adopted in the United Nations Convention on Assignment of Receivables in International Trade: see Uncitral, Analytical Commentary on the Draft Convention on Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, A/CN. 9/489, 13 Mar 2001, paras 85, 127. 7 The book does not deal with the involuntary assignments that occur by operation of law upon death, bankruptcy and the replacement of trustees: these are dealt with in standard works on these topics. In addition to these, it may be noted that many contractual rights, particularly debts, may be assigned by force of statute: see generally Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lanstel Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 314; Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1 at 26–7 per Brennan J; Zuks v Jackson McDonald (1996) 132 FLR 317. 8 The book also does not consider the unique issues that arise in determining the nature and transfer of indirectly held investment securities. This is an area of law that is now the subject of specialised works: see AO Austen-Peters, Custody of Investments (Oxford, OUP, 2002); J Benjamin and M Yates, The Law of Global Custody (2nd edn, London, Butterworths, 2002) J Benjamin, Interests in Securities (Oxford, OUP, 2002); R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) ch 6; R Goode, “The Nature and Transfer of Rights in Dematerialised and Immobilsied Securities” in F Oditah (ed), The Future for the Global Securities Markets (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996). See also Financial Markets Law Committee, Issue 3—Property Interests in Investment Securities
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In relation to assignments by way of security, because the book is limited to the issue of assignment, it is not concerned with that stage of a security transaction that deals with the perfection of security interests (that is, the efficacy of the security as between third parties such as liquidators or other creditors9) and the priority of security interests (that is, the rules for resolving competing interests in the property). In addition, because this book is principally concerned with assignments of rights to performance, the language of the book tends to be language that describes an outright assignment rather than an assignment by way of security. Basically this results in references being made to “assignors”, “assignees” and “transfer” rather than “mortgagors”, “mortgagees” and “attachment”.10
(2004) at www.fmlc.org. See further Unidroit, Preliminary Draft Unidroit Convention on Harmonised Substantive Rules Regarding Securities Held with an Intermediary (2004). 9 In the case of an outright assignment the transfer (that is, attachment) will protect the assignee from most third parties claiming through the assignor. In the case of an assignment of a debt, notice to the debtor may be viewed as a perfection requirement. For reasons set out fully in paras [4.10]–[4.20], unless a statutory provision dictates to the contrary, notice to the debtor is not a requirement for an equitable assignment of a legal right. The transfer or attachment can take place prior to notice. Notice is required to bind the conscience of the debtor, and the assignee can expect a personal accounting by the debtor only if notice is given. However, this does not mean that prior to notice the assignment is operative only as between the assignor and assignee: see [4.20]. See further R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 2.17. 10 However, the general principles governing attachment and transfer are the same. For a discussion of attachment: see R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) chapters 2–5.
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2 A Brief History of Assignment (a) Introduction [2.01] Purpose of the chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the history of this area of law. This historical section is brief as the ultimate concern of the book is with the assignment of contractual rights, and not the broader topic of the assignment of choses in action. The chapter begins with a look at the meaning of “choses in action”.
(b) Choses in Action [2.02] Meaning of “choses in action”.1 A chose in action is regarded today as a personal right of property.2 When the term “chose in action” is used it may be referring to a right enforceable by action or to the right of action itself. Choses in action are distinct from choses in possession as they are a form of intangible property. The law distinguishes between two types of choses in action, namely legal choses in action and equitable choses in action. A legal chose in action is a right created by the common law which is enforceable at common law, such as a legal debt. An equitable chose in action is a right created by equity and enforced in equity, for example, an interest in a partnership or an interest under a trust. Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, perhaps originally the term “chose in action” was recognised at common law as an expression used to describe a right to sue for the purposes of recovery and was generally used to describe a
1 For examples of judicial descriptions of choses in action see Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th edn, London, Butterworths, 1991) vi, para 1; OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 5–8; WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 1–8. In addition, a statute may provide its own meaning. 2 See [2.05] below.
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personal right to sue for a debt or damages.3 Thus, the phrase was originally used to describe a right that could be asserted only by action and not by taking possession.4 Although medieval lawyers had no problem with the concept of incorporeal property, these rights were considered personal.5 In time, the phrase was extended to include rights of action that did not involve the recovery of money.6 Early descriptions can be found which capture rights of action in respect of tangible objects where the claimant did not have possession of the object.7 For example, Blackstone wrote:8 Having thus considered the several divisions of property in possession, which subsists there only, where a man hath both the right and also the occupation of the thing, we will proceed next to take a short view of the nature of property in action, or such where a man hath not the occupation, but merely a bare right to occupy the thing in question; the possession whereof may however be recovered by a suit or action at law: from whence the thing so recoverable is called a thing or chose in action.9
The inclusion of such rights of action within the class of choses in action may have partly flowed from the merger that occurred between choses in action real10 and choses in action personal.11 Although originally a distinction was drawn between these, with the former readily lending itself to the inclusion of rights to recover assets, at some point these groups were merged and simply entitled 3 See Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 282 per Lindley LJ, cf at 286 per Fry LJ and Colonial Bank v Whinney (1886) 11 App Cas 426 at 439 per Lord Blackburn. See also C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 304; WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1899) at 1; OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 36–45. Such a description meant that the only obligations to pay that fell within the category were debts that were payable, or at least payable at a certain date. It was only much later that it could be conclusively said that existing but conditional or contingent obligations to pay were included in the class of “choses in action” and the class of “assignable choses in action”: see Brice v Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569; Walker v The Bradford Old Bank Ltd (1884) 12 QBD 511. See also Re Huggins (1882) 21 Ch D 85 at 91 per Jessel MR. 4 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 998 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 517). 5 Ibid, at 1000, 1012 (article), 518, 528 (book); JV Orth, “Contract and the Common Law” in HN Scheiber (ed), The State and Freedom of Contract (Cal., Stanford, Stanford UP, 1998) at 45–6. 6 C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 304. 7 See HW Elphinstone, “What is a Chose in Action?” (1893) 9 LQR 311; C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 304; S Brodhurst, “Is Copyright a Chose in Action?” (1895) 11 LQR 64 at 69; C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1895) 11 LQR 238. See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 8–27. 8 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1766) ii, at 396. 9 See further S Brodhurst, “Is Copyright a Chose in Action?” (1895) 11 LQR 64 at 66. 10 This class emerged around the sixteenth century. 11 The action in debt, which was readily accepted as a chose in action, was always viewed as an action to recover detained property, that is, the recovery of a thing transferred under the transaction. Given this, it perhaps would not have seemed illogical to extend the class to include rights of action in respect of tangible assets. See further AWB Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987) at 75–80.
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“choses in action”.12 The expression “chose in action real” fell into disuse.13 Once rights to recover possession fell within the class it might have been a logical development for the class to take on the character of proprietary rights and then assignable rights. Certainly courts recognised the proprietary interest such actions protected. The reasons why this did not occur are discussed later.14 Another reason why such rights fell within the class of choses in action was the view that anything not assignable was considered to be a chose in action.15 [2.03] Some inclusions in the class of choses in action appear to have simply followed from others. For example, in the sixteenth century the class was extended to include documents that evidenced a right to bring an action, such as a bond.16 In later centuries, and partly because of this inclusion, the class was readily extended to include such things as negotiable instruments, shares, insurance policies and bills of lading.17 [2.04] Another important development in the class of choses in action concerned classification. Between the seventeenth century and the late nineteenth century much weight was placed on the distinction between choses in possession and choses in action. This classification was not new,18 but there was a growing view, which was firmly in place by the late nineteenth century, that all personal things must be either choses in possession or choses in action as there was no middle ground.19 This view, 12 C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 305; WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1002 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 520). See also Re McLean (deceased) (1904) 23 NZLR 504. See further [2.09]. 13 C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 308. 14 [2.09]. 15 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 16–17. In May v Lane (1894) 64 LJQB 236 at 238, Rigby LJ in suggesting that a “legal chose in action is something which is not in possession, but which must be sued for in order to recover possession of it”, appeared to be of the view that the inclusion of rights of possession into the class actually narrowed the field of choses in action. Cf the explanation of this case in Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 433–4. See also Earle’s Shipbuilding and Engineering Company v Atlantic Transport Company (1899) 43 Sol Jo 691; Dawson v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260 at 270; County Hotel & Wine Company Ltd v London & North Western Railway Co [1918] 2 KB 251 at 259–60; Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399 at 413; Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101 at 116. 16 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 997–8 and 1011 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 516, 527). 17 Ibid. at 997–8, 1011 (article), 516, 527 (book). 18 T Cyprian Williams, “Is a Right of Action in Tort a Chose in Action?” (1894) 10 LQR 143 at 143–4; WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1899) at 9. 19 See Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 285 per Fry LJ. Fry LJ’s dissenting opinion was upheld on appeal: see (1886) 11 App Cas 426 esp at 439 per Lord Blackburn. However, it would appear that in earlier times not only was there acceptance of a middle ground but also a mixed ground: see OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 2.
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together with the notion that choses in action were not transferable, made it much easier to increase the class of choses in action, or at least more readily to accept some inclusions that had crept into the class which was now clearly not limited to rights to sue for debts or damages.20 It was beyond doubt that the class included rights that were clearly linked to tangible property, as well as rights that did not depend on enforcement for their enjoyment and rights that were not capable of enforcement.21 It was also readily accepted that the class included existing conditional and contingent obligations to pay.22 Descriptions of “choses in action” from this time reflect this broad categorisation. For example, Williams, writing in 1895, said:23 A thing in action, then is properly the benefit of an obligation arising from the breach of an antecedent duty. It would also appear to be the benefit of some real, mixed or personal action, that is, of an action brought for the realisation of some right, which is valuable as tending to result in the ownership of land, goods or money. . . . [These are] not included in property in the strict sense of the word, because that is confined to the ownership with possession of tangible things, but comprehended in property in its widest sense, because valuable as being possibilities of property in the narrow sense. The term chose in action has, however, been extended to other things arising from some cause of action. Thus it has been applied to the benefit of an obligation arising from contract . . . [even though] no action can be maintainable before breach of the obligation. . . . [In this] extended sense of the word, [it] would seem to be a thing which, if wrongfully withheld, you must bring an action to realise; a thing which you cannot take but must go to law to secure.
The classification of personal things into choses in possession and choses in action perhaps had both positive and negative effects. On the positive side it meant that it was acceptable to include in the class rights that did not depend on enforcement for their enjoyment. This remains the case today.24 This was important 20 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons, 1950) at 3; S Brodhurst, “Is Copyright a Chose in Action?” (1895) 11 LQR 64 at 68. See further T Cyprian Williams, “Property, Things in Action and Copyright” (1895) 11 LQR 223. 21 WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 8–18 and WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 997–8, 1011, 1013 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 516, 527, 529). See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 21–2, 28–32. Cf Re Huggins (1882) 21 Ch D 85 at 90–1 per Jessel MR. 22 Elphinstone suggested that it was easier to bring contract rights and debts within the term “choses in action” because, although they were capable of enjoyment without action and gave rise to actionable rights only upon infringement, they consisted of rights against other persons rather than being rights in respect of a thing, and were ultimately capable of enforcement: see HW Elphinstone, “What is a Chose in Action?” (1893) 9 LQR 311 at 313. 23 T Cyprian Williams, “Property, Things in Action and Copyright” (1895) 11 LQR 223 at 230–1, 232. 24 See further Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 431 per Channell J (reversed on another point [1903] 1 KB 644) (but compare the definition of “chose in action” he used which is set out below: see [2.05]). See also Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 915 per Lord Hoffmann. Cf Simmons v Harvey [1965] Tasmanian State Reports (Tas SR) 84 at 94 per Neasey J.
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because if the assignment of contractual rights were to be eventually governed by the rules relating to the assignment of choses in action, it was necessary that contractual rights to performance were securely positioned in the class of choses in action. Clearly they were considered choses in action prior to this strict classification, but the classification put the issue beyond doubt.25 On the negative side, this classification required the law to fit within one of the categories subject matter that did not fit easily into either, most notably the developing intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights and trade marks. Today, the law readily accepts the existence of sui generis interests.26 [2.05] Choses in action as property. It is difficult to determine when lawyers began to think of choses in action as being property. Although by the twentieth century equity had long recognised the assignment of legal rights, it had originally done this by recognising an agreement to assign between the assignor and assignee and took steps to hold the assignor to its promise.27 This methodology does not depend on there being a transfer of property. The most authoritative statement that equity had moved on and recognised such rights as property for the purposes of transfer occurred in 1905.28 However, that development must have occurred well before then.29 Perhaps the factor that put this issue beyond doubt was the enactment of certain statutory provisions, most notably bankruptcy legislation. From early times “goods and chattels” in bankruptcy legislation included choses in action,30 thus being recognised as capable of being owned. It was this (together with some examples of other legislation) that led Lindley LJ in Colonial Bank v Whinney 31 to conclude that “whatever its original meaning may have been, [the term ‘chose in action’ had] come to be used as denoting a certain class of property”. Lindley LJ, writing in 1885, took the view that the law had come to recognise the existence of incorporeal personal property and having no term to describe such property
25
Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 286–7 per Fry LJ. Eg Rolls-Royce Ltd v Jeffrey [1962] 1 All ER 801. 27 [4.05]. 28 See Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372–3 per Cozens Hardy LJ. 29 See Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 34 per Windeyer J (“Before 1873 a chose in equity and a chose in action were both transferable in equity”). 30 Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 280, 283 per Lindley LJ. 31 (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 283 (in this case the majority of the Court of Appeal, Lindley LJ being in that majority, held that shares did not fall within the expression “choses in action” as used in the reputed ownership provisions, and therefore passed to the trustee in bankruptcy; under these provisions a chose in action not owned by the bankrupt could not be in the reputed ownership of the bankrupt so as to pass to the trustee; this point was later overruled by the House of Lords: see Colonial Bank v Whinney (1886) 11 App Cas 426). See further WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 297–302. 26
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simply extended the meaning of “choses in action” to denote it.32 Today, the term “chose in action” appears to be solely used to describe certain property rights, that is, “personal property of an incorporeal nature”.33 There appears to be no separate class of personal choses in action.34 Authoritative judicial descriptions from the early twentieth century onwards all appear to agree on this point. For example, in Torkington v Magee,35 “choses in action” were described by Channell J as:36 [A]ll personal rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by action, and not by taking physical possession.
In Loxton v Moir,37 Rich J said:38 The phrase “chose in action” is used in different senses, but its primary sense is that of a right enforceable by an action. It may also be used to describe the rights of action itself, when considered as part of the property of the person entitled to sue. A right to sue for a sum of money is a chose in action, and it is a proprietary right.
Finally, and more recently, in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society,39 Lord Hoffmann said:40 [A] chose in action is property, something capable of being turned into money . . . [W]hat is assignable is the debt or other personal right of property. It is recoverable by 32 (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 283–4. Later in the House of Lords, Lord Blackburn ( (1886) 11 App Cas 426 at 439), did not think this point was made out. He did not think that the term “chose in action” once had a technical meaning that had been extended, but rather that for a long time the class was determined by what could not fit into the notion of a chose in possession. Thus, when new forms of property were created, like shares, they naturally fell into the chose in action class. The point Lindley LJ was making was that as choses in action were excluded from being in the reputed ownership of the bankrupt, it was necessary to determine whether that phrase, as used in the legislation, was being used in a narrow technical and historical sense or in a wide sense that would include shares. 33 HW Elphinstone, “What is a Chose in Action?” (1893) 9 LQR 311 at 312. See also Colonial Bank v Whinney (1886) 11 App Cas 426 at 440 per Lord Blackburn. It has also been said that the principles of choses in action provide a set of legal norms that allow certain rights to be considered property. Once a right satisfies those norms it may be traded, and it is these norms, for example, that dictate that a patent is property while an invention is not: see J Braithwaite and P Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 40. 34 One exception may be a bare right of action which is still referred to as a chose in action that is incapable of assignment because it is personal: see RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 6.480. However, today rights of action are assignable if the assignee has a sufficient interest in the suit. The better view may be that such rights are true proprietary choses in action that may not be assigned in some cases due to overriding public policy considerations: see Beatty v Brashs Pty Ltd [1998] 2 VR 201 at 207. Occasional references can be found to the effect that a chose in action is a personal right which is assignable, eg Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v Tolson (1909) 10 CLR 470 at 474 per Griffith CJ. 35 [1902] 2 KB 427 (reversed on another point [1903] 1 KB 644). See also Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 574 per Lord Goff, and see Smith v ANL Ltd (2000) 204 CLR 493. 36 [1902] 2 KB 427 at 430 per Channell J (reversed on another point [1903] 1 KB 644). 37 (1914) 18 CLR 360. 38 (1914) 18 CLR 360 at 379. 39 [1998] 1 WLR 896. 40 [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 915. See also Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177.
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action, but what is assigned is the chose, the thing, the debt or damages to which the assignor is entitled. The existence of a remedy or remedies is an essential condition for the existence of the chose in action but that does not mean that the remedies are property in themselves, capable of assignment separately from the chose.41
It should be noted that the personal nature of a right may still impact upon the determination of whether it is, or is not, a chose in action, or at least an assignable chose in action.42 For example, certain rights, such as a promise to marry, may be held too personal to be considered choses in action on public policy grounds.43 [2.06] What remains unclear is the extent to which the commercial need to recognise the assignment of choses in action figured in the movement of choses in action from personal to proprietary. Although today it is clearly not necessary for something to be seen as property before its transfer can be recognised,44 this was once a requirement of the common law.45 It is often stated that assignability is properly viewed as a possible effect of something being considered property rather than a test for property itself.46 This reasoning is not entirely convincing. Although it is necessary to avoid circular reasoning, such as that a chose in action is property because it is assignable and it is assignable because it is property, it is perfectly legitimate for the law to take the view that a right can be assignable by reason of the commercial need to accept that transferability, and it is by reason of that transferability that it is property because the institution of property is the vehicle generally used to affect transfers. The fact that choses in action are generally considered property only for the purposes of transfer dictates that transferability 41 The history of the common law’s movement from limiting the idea of “property” to tangibles to accepting a commercial meaning based on the “price of things” is traced in JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York, Macmillan, 1924) ch 7. Cf Dear v Reeves [2002] Ch 1 (right of pre-emption considered a property right and assignable without having a present value). For some purposes a contractual right may be considered an asset which may be disposed of without its necessarily having a market value, thus making it unassignable: see O’Brien v Benson’s Hosiery (Holdings) Ltd [1980] AC 562. It follows that not all dispositions involve assignments. As to whether an assignment requires a disposition: see [3.11]. 42 It is possible for a right to be considered property without its being considered a chose in action, but quaere whether it is now possible to limit the term “chose in action” to property rights that have the characteristic of being transferable, cf Re Huggins (1882) 21 Ch D 85 at 91 per Jessel MR. See further OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 25–6. 43 Ibid, at 25. 44 Arguably it is necessary for something to be considered only a commodity to be alienable and this is something less than (but includes) property: see MJ Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard UP, 1993) ch 2. 45 Cf [2.07] below. 46 See Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Yeend (1929) 43 CLR 235 at 245 per Isaacs J; Reg v Toohey; Ex parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327 at 342–3 per Mason J; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (No 2) (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 166 per Brennan J. See also JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 130. Cf National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 at 1247–8 per Lord Wilberforce; Dear v Reeves [2002] Ch 1 at 10 per Mummery LJ.
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is an informing factor rather than a mere incident of the right being property. Similarly, as noted in Lord Hoffmann’s description of choses in action in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society,47 a chose in action may be considered property if property is given the wide meaning of something of value; that is, something capable of being measured in money terms.48 Although this alone cannot explain the inclusion of some rights in the class of choses in action, if one first recognises the transferability of a mere right, then by virtue of this assignability it attracts a value, and in this way can then be considered property.49 Despite the above, it may be that assignability had little effect on the recognition of choses in action as property since legal assignment generally was not possible until provided for by legislation. Moreover, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, equity originally upheld the assignment of a legal chose in action by way of contract between the assignor and assignee rather than by viewing the transaction as involving a true transfer.50 It was only later that equity viewed choses in action as property for the purposes of transfer.51 It follows that although it is sometimes said that equity, conscious of commercial needs, recognised choses in action as property for the purposes of transfer,52 it needs to be added that initially, acting by reference to reasonableness53 and commercial needs, equity upheld assignments of legal choses in action. What is clear is that prior to the recognition that choses in action were assignable, the lack of transferability played an important part in allowing the class of choses in action to be expanded.54 Holdsworth suggested that this in part allowed lawyers in the eighteenth century to class patents and copyrights as choses in action.55 It may have been due to this expansion (based on non-assignability) that it appeared logical to split all interests into choses in action and choses in 47
[2.05]. See further JW Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) at 50–1. 49 See T Cyprian Williams, “Property, Things in Action and Copyright” (1895) 11 LQR 223 at 227–8. An alternative is simply to adopt the position that all legally protected interests may be considered property for certain purposes: see LD Smith, The Law of Tracing (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 49. 50 [4.05]. 51 [4.07]. 52 GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 621. 53 FCT Tudsbery, The Nature, Requisites and Operation of Equitable Assignments (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1912) at 6. 54 Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 287 per Fry LJ. See also WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1013 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 529). 55 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1013 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 529). See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 21–2, 28–32. 48
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possession.56 It has been said that the term “chose in action” moved from being described as a mere right of action to a “right incapable of being assigned”.57 It may be that, once assignability was recognised, it in fact had some impact on limiting the further expansion of the class of choses in action.58
(c) Assignment of Choses in Action [2.07] Choses in action and assignment, the position at common law. It is generally accepted that the common law did not develop a set of rules for the assignment of choses in action.59 It may be that a more precise statement is that to the extent that the common law did recognise the assignment of choses in action, that position did not prevail.60 Moreover, and despite the ability of the common law to recognise incorporeal property,61 the original reason for the common law’s reluctance to recognise the assignment of choses in action was probably due to the more general view that “property” meant something tangible and, in any case, that a transfer required delivery of possession.62 The need for a delivery of possession nevertheless allowed for the transfer of an intangible that was encapsulated in a document and could be the subject of a delivery. However, as noted, the common law has long recognised the idea of intangible property, so that this reasoning
56 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1014 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 530). 57 C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 307. 58 See the debate between Elphinstone and Williams on including tort within the class of choses in action; HW Elphinstone, “What is a Chose in Action?” (1893) 9 LQR 311 at 315, T Cyprian Williams, “Is a Right of Action in Tort a Chose in Action?” (1894) 10 LQR 143. See also C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 315; Editors’ note (1904) 20 LQR 113; Editors’ note (1905) 21 LQR 101. 59 Cf WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) 29 Harv LR 816; G Glenn, “The Assignment of Choses in Action: Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser” (1934) 20 Virginia LR 621. One exception was that from early times members of the Jewish community in England could assign debts: see SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1931) 47 LQR 516, (1932) 48 LQR 248, 547. 60 EH Warren, The Rights of Margin Customers (Norwood, Mass, Plimpton Press, 1941) ch 4. See also Bernard Rudden, “Things as Thing and Things as Wealth” in JW Harris (ed), Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds (London, Kluwer, 1997) ch 12 at 152. 61 [2.02]. 62 F Pollock and FW Maitland, The History of English Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1899) ii, at 226; WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 32; JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York, Macmillan 1924) at 247; EH Warren, The Rights of Margin Customers (Norwood, Mass, Plimpton Press, 1941) at 38–47; PM Biscoe, Credit Factoring (London, Butterworths, 1975) at 96. See also FW Maitland, “The Seisin of Chattels” (1885) 1 LQR 324; FW Maitland, “The Mystery of Seisin” (1886) 2 LQR 481. See further G Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, at 200.
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alone could not be sustained.63 Nevertheless, the view was also adopted that choses in action could not be assigned because they were personal in nature.64 [2.08] The origins of the “too personal” labelling of choses in action appears to have a number of sources.65 On one view, a chose in action was personal because it presupposed a personal relationship between two people, one having a right, the other a corresponding duty.66 That is, a chose in action, being a mere right of action, presupposes a definite plaintiff and defendant.67 It was irrelevant whether the action was to recover damages or some tangible property. It has also been suggested that the notion that a debt was personal and not transferable owed much to the dire consequences in early times that could follow the non-payment of a debt. Most obvious of these was the threat of debtor’s prison. Therefore, a debtor had a great interest, not only in the identity of his or her creditor, but in the likelihood of enforcement action being taken.68 In addition, choses in action were considered at one time to be too uncertain to be the subject of a grant until liquidated by a judgment or recognizance.69 Finally, because it was the duty of the debtor to seek out its creditor, it was thought this would be rendered too onerous if assignments were upheld.70 [2.09] One development that showed some promise of recognising the assignability of some choses in action was the recognition that personal actions to recover
63 [2.02]. See WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1000, 1012 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 518, 528). 64 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 36–45; G Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, at 200–1. See also Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372 per Cozens-Hardy LJ. Cf G Glenn, “The Assignment of Choses in Action: Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser” (1934) 20 Virginia LR 621 at 638–9 (suggesting that it was the fear of maintenance that was solely responsible for the position at common law. However, as noted below, the fear of maintenance arose in respect of choses in action real and almost by accident was applied to choses in action personal: see [2.09]). 65 EH Warren, The Rights of Margin Customers (Norwood, Massachusetts, Plimpton Press, 1941) at 68. It has been said that the too personal rule could arise only in an economy at a time when credit played a minor role: see EA Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1990) iii, para 11.2. This statement is not entirely convincing. To the extent that agriculture, industry and commerce were seasonal, credit would have been a fact of life: see WR Cornish and G deN Clark, Law and Society in England 1750–1950 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) at 226. 66 JB Ames, Lectures on Legal History (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard UP, 1913) 210 at 211–12. 67 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1000 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 518). 68 SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 248 at 257, (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 549–50. 69 Ibid, at 554; PM Biscoe, Credit Factoring (London, Butterworths, 1975) at 97. 70 WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 31–2.
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personal property were personal actions to protect proprietary interests.71 For example, by the sixteenth century it was accepted that a bailor’s interest in the reversion was proprietary.72 In commentating on these developments, Holdsworth stated:73 We might therefore have expected that the rights of the owner out of possession would come to be recognised as something more than a mere personal chose in action; and that they would develop into assignable rights of property.
Why this did not take place he put down to two causes.74 The first was events that took place in personal actions to recover property. The action in detinue, which was regarded as proprietary in character,75 was superseded by trover which, although protecting a proprietary interest, was not characterised as a proprietary action and was considered a mere chose in action.76 The second cause ultimately resulted in the merger of choses in action real and choses in action personal. This merger had occurred at least by the sixteenth century.77 Choses in action real never developed past being considered mere personal choses in action because of the law’s growing concern with maintenance and champerty.78 Holdsworth suggested that this concern, which was legitimate in relation to choses in action real, was adopted and applied naturally, but without much thought or reason, to choses in action personal. He suggested that when this occurred it was inevitable that all these rights would be grouped together as “choses in action”.79 71 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1002 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 521). See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 10–16. 72 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1004 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 522). Cf EH Warren, The Rights of Margin Customers (Norwood, Massachusetts, Plimpton Press, 1941) at 42 who suggests that it was not until the middle of the 19th century that it became clear that a bailor’s right in a chattel was more than a chose in action. 73 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1005 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 522). 74 Ibid, at 1005 (article) at 522 (book). 75 WT Barbour, “The History of Contract in Early English Equity” in P Vinogradoff (ed), Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History (Oxford, OUP, 1914) iv, at 28–33. 76 See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 10. 77 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1001 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 519). 78 C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 306, 308, 311. 79 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1007–10 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 524–5).
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It follows from what was said above that the concern over maintenance and champerty in respect of real actions rolled over into personal actions, preventing choses in action being recognised as property and holding up the acceptance of their assignability. At the same it had the effect of widening the class of choses in action. It is important to note, though, that Holdsworth was of the view that a right to recover ownership of personal property should have been assignable and that the dread of maintenance and champerty should have been confined to choses in action real; that is, rights of entry upon and actions for land. He thought that choses in action in the form of mere rights of action should not be assignable because they were too personal.80 [2.10] It may be, as Holdsworth appears to suggest, that even if personal rights of action to recover personal property were considered assignable, this would have had no effect on mere rights of action. Take, for example, an action in debt which was long considered proprietary in nature as it was an action to recover certain coins or chattels.81 Such an action was not seen as the enforcement of an agreement, but was thought to be in the nature of a real action to recover a thing that had been detained.82 That is, an action either based on a proprietary right or at least protecting a proprietary right. This is akin to an action to recover personal property, but this never resulted in the general field of choses in action being rendered proprietary. In addition to the reasoning suggested by Holdsworth a further reason why this was so may be added. There was a time when the law did not distinguish a promise from its tangible representation.83 Unlike the position under a credit contract, the relationship of debtor and creditor, in a cash society, was not seen in terms of assets and liabilities.84 In such a society it would be logical to view an action in debt as an action to recover coins or chattels unlawfully withheld. It could not be an action to enforce a promise, because the law did not 80 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997, at 1009–10 (article), 526–7 (book). Thus the relevance of maintenance and champerty to the history of the assignment of choses in action should not be over-emphasised. Perhaps the most cited judgment evidencing the relevance of maintenance is that of Sir Edward Coke in Lampet’s case (1612) 10 Co Rep 48b, 77 ER 994 at 997, viz, it was “the great wisdom and policy of the sages and founders of our law, who have provided that no . . . thing in action shall be granted or assigned to strangers, for that would be the occasion of multiplying of contentions and suits”. However, it has been persuasively argued that Coke referred to “choses in action” in both a broad and a narrow sense, and in this famous statement he used it in a narrow sense to mean “cause of action” thus saying nothing about a contractual right prior to breach: see EH Warren, The Rights of Margin Customers (Norwood, Mass, Plimpton Press, 1941) at 47–59. See further PH Winfield, “Assignment of Choses in Action in Relation to Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 143. 81 [2.02] note 11. 82 Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560 at 567; Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 265 per Dawson J. See also Thomas Atkins Street, The History and Theory of English Contract Law (Washington DC, Beard Books, 1999 reprint) at 1–2. 83 JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York, Macmillan, 1924) at 247. 84 Quaere though the extent to which England was a cash society: see [2.08].
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distinguish the promise.85 Moreover, given that an action in debt was thought to be an action to recover certain coins or chattels from a certain person, it would follow that once the move was made to distinguish the promise or obligation from the coins or chattels it remained a personal obligation correlative to a personal right. This would halt assignability in that it prevented the recognition of the concept of “ownership” of a personal right to an obligation. It would also prevent the common law’s acceptance of notions of intangible property from being transplanted to choses in action.86 [2.11] Conclusion. It follows from what has been said above that, to the extent that choses in action were recognised as property (things) prior to the passing of the Judicature Act 1873 (UK), the common law did not develop any sustained rules for the assignment of these “things”, because it still entertained the objection that they were personal “things”. [2.12] Common law exceptions and circumventions. It is possible to find a number of exceptions to the general position taken by the common law. For example, subject to a number of factors, it was possible for the Crown to take (or give) an assignment.87 Moreover, the common law readily accepted the transfer, and in some cases negotiation, of certain instruments; examples include bills of exchange, promissory notes and bills of lading.88 Various statutory provisions were also
85
JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York, Macmillan, 1924) at 250. It can also be added that in the period where the class of choses in action was being expanded, the law of contract was being developed. The history of the law of contract can be seen as a movement from “property” to “obligation”: see JV Orth, “Contract and the Common Law” in HN Scheiber (ed), The State and Freedom of Contract (Stanford, Cal., Stanford UP, 1998) 44 at 45–9; PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, OUP, 1979) at 398. It may have been difficult in that environment also to entertain the thought of a movement in the opposite direction, which was thought to be required for the assignment of choses in action. 87 WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 34–7; SJ Bailey, “Assignment of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1931) 47 LQR 516 at 520, 529; PH Winfield, “Assignment of Choses in Action in Relation to Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 143 at 144–7; RT Fenton, Garrow and Fenton’s Law of Personal Property in New Zealand (6th edn, Wellington, Butterworths, 1998) para 12.043; Ling v Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 123 ALR 65 at 69–70 per Gummow, Lee and Hill JJ; Booth v Williams (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 421. If an assignee from the Crown further assigned the chose, that second assignee could not enforce the assignment as it was void: see King v Twine (1607) Cro Jac 179 at 180, 79 ER 156. 88 WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 37–41; RT Fenton, Garrow and Fenton’s Law of Personal Property in New Zealand (6th edn, Wellington, Butterworths, 1998) para 12.044. See also JS Rogers, The Early History of the Law of Bills and Notes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995) ch 8. Where a seller took a bill of exchange from a buyer and transferred it to a third party, there was no assignment of the debt owed by the buyer to the seller under the contract of sale. Inherent in the bill itself was a separate payment obligation, and if the buyer accepted the bill it was primarily liable on the bill, and right to payment was transferred upon a negotiation of the bill. 86
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enacted to allow for the assignment of certain choses in action.89 There are also examples of the common law accepting assignments when the debtor had bound him or herself in advance by “obligatory writing to the creditor and his assigns”.90 By the end of the seventeenth century the common law courts, although still adhering to the notion that choses in action could not be assigned, allowed an assignee to sue the assignor for breach of covenant.91 There are also examples (prior to the end of the eighteenth century) of the common law courts allowing assignees to bring an action in the name of the assignor where the debtor continued to pay the assignor when he or she had notice of the assignment.92 [2.13] In addition, there existed the idea of “acknowledgment”. If a debtor held funds belonging to his or her creditor and agreed, upon a request being made by the creditor, to pay a third party out of the fund, then, on notification to the third party, there is authority for the view that the third party could bring an action against the debtor for the amount, even though there was no consideration moving from the third party for the debtor’s promise.93 It has been suggested that this doctrine is similar to that of attornment in respect of tangible chattels.94 However, it has also been held that the doctrine can be applied where the debtor does not hold a fund belonging to the creditor so long as there is consideration moving from the third party.95 More recently this doctrine was applied to a case where the debtor did not hold a fund of the creditor’s, and agreed to a request from the creditor to pay a third party and notified that third party.96 If this doctrine is akin to attornment, it may be that in the case of a debt the transfer should take place by either assignment or novation, which would require the formalities of either 89 See FCT Tudsbery, The Nature, Requisites and Operation of Equitable Assignments (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1912) at 8. 90 SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 548–9. Perhaps these cases simply reflect the fact that prior to the establishment of the doctrine of privity of contract in Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393, 121 ER 762, the common law allowed third parties to enforce contracts made for their benefit: see Law Commission for England and Wales, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties Law (London, HMSO, 1996) Law Com No 242, paras 2.2–2.5; R Flannigan, “Privity—The End of an Era (Error)” in P Kincaid (ed), Privity: Private Justice or Public Regulation (Sydney, Ashgate, 2001) at 29; MA Eisenberg, “Third-Party Beneficiaries” (1992) 92 Columbia LR 1358. See further GW Keeton and LA Sheridan, Equity (3rd edn, London, B Rose, 1987) at 227. 91 SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 574. 92 Ibid, at 575–9. 93 Morrell v Wootten (1852) 16 Beav 197, 51 ER 753; Griffin v Weatherby (1868) LR 3 QB 753. 94 R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution, (6th edn, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2002) ch 28. See further NE Palmer, Bailment (2nd edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1991) ch 21; F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 5.4. 95 Liversidge v Broadbent (1859) 4 H & N 603, 157 ER 978. 96 Shamia v Joory [1958] 1 QB 448. Cf Rothwells Ltd v Nommack (No 100) Pty Ltd (1988) 13 Australian Company Law Reports (ACLR) 421 where McPherson J refused to apply the doctrine to the case of a debt.
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assignment or novation be complied with. Without a fund of the creditor’s in the hands of the debtor it is not possible for him or her to attorn to the third party.97 Note, however, that, unlike assignment, the consent of the debtor was always required in an acknowledgement. Today, given the recognition of legal assignments, the concept of “acknowledgment” has fallen into disuse.98 [2.14] The strict position of the common law was also circumvented by use of a power of attorney.99 This became popular from around the fourteenth century and was achieved simply by the assignor appointing the assignee as his or her attorney to sue (in the assignor’s name or on behalf of the assignor) for a debt with a stipulation that the assignee was to keep any monies recovered.100 The power of attorney had a number of problems. Such arrangements could still be attacked as savouring of maintenance if the assignee did not have a sufficient interest in the suit.101 The main type of interest accepted by the courts was where the assignor, at the time of the appointment of the assignee as his or her attorney, owed money to the assignee. In addition, unless prevented by injunction, the assignor could still exercise its common law rights, such as giving a release to the debtor.102 The power of attorney could also be revoked. In time, limitations on the right to revoke were developed where the power of attorney was given for valuable consideration.103 There is also evidence that the common law went a step further and recognised the actual assignment of debts by a debtor to its creditor104 and allowed anyone with a pecuniary interest in a debt to sue in the name of the creditor.105 Novation was also recognised by the common law.106 97 Liversidge v Broadbent (1859) 4 H & N 603, 157 ER 978. See further R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution (6th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) ch 28; JD Davies, “Shamia v Joory: A Forgotten Chapter in Quasi-Contract” (1959) 75 LQR 220; D Yates, “Trusts, Contracts and Attornments” (1977) 41 Conv (NS) 49; JC Hall, “Gift of Part of a Debt” [1959] CLJ 99 at 118–19; F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 5.4 at 88. 98 However, it is not beyond revival: see R Goode, Legal Problems in Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.54. 99 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 67–71. As to its origins: see SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1931) 47 LQR 516 at 527. Many assignments are coupled with powers of attorney, eg Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523; Re Androma Pty Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 134. 100 FC Tudsbery, The Nature, Requisites and Operation of Equitable Assignments (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1912) at 9. 101 JB Ames, Lectures on Legal History (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard UP, 1913) 210 at 213. See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 67. 102 WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) 29 Harv L R 816 at 823–4. 103 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 68; G Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, at 202. 104 WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 42. 105 Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372 per Cozens-Hardy LJ. 106 Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365 at 388 per Windeyer J. See also JB Ames, Lectures on Legal History (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard UP, 1913) 210 at 212. See further JG Starke, Assignments of Choses in Action in Australia (Sydney, Butterworths, 1972) at 52–4.
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[2.15] From around the eighteenth century the law started to accept that rights to recover personal property could be assigned.107 For example, a bailor could make a gift of the right to the bailed goods and, although initially any action for detinue did not go with the goods, this eventually changed with the acceptance that a chose in action may be transferred as an incident to the transfer of some tangible property. Nevertheless, the common law generally did not change its position as regards contractual rights, which remained unassignable except by operation of law, for example, upon death. [2.16] The approach of equity. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, it was settled that equity would recognise the assignment of a legal chose in action and viewed the common law’s position as “absurd”.108 The mechanics of how equity gave effect to such “assignments” and how it protected the position of the obligor are dealt with in Chapter 4. Equity also remained unconvinced of any necessary link between assignment and maintenance.109 However, equity did not recognise the assignment of choses in action it thought were too personal or uncertain. For example, a claim for unliquidated damages in tort for a personal wrong or for breach of contract.110 More generally, the assignment of a bare right of action, that is, a right without occupation or enjoyment,111 was not upheld on public policy grounds. [2.17] The reaction of the common law. The common law eventually dropped its presumption of maintenance and began to recognise the “assignment” of debts, but still only by use of the power of attorney.112 This was not a true assignment, but it was no longer open to the suggestion of maintenance or champerty. Moreover, there is evidence that the existence of a power of attorney became a mere formality and could be implied.113 Generally, however, most choses in action remained unassignable at common law.114 107 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1017 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 533). 108 Master v Miller (1791) 4 TR 320 at 340, 100 ER 1042 at 1053 per Buller J. 109 Ibid, at 340 (TR), 1053 (ER) per Buller J. 110 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1022–3 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 538–9). 111 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1766) ii, at 396. 112 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1021 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 536). 113 GP Costigan, “Gifts Inter Vivos of Choses in Action” (1911) 27 LQR 326 at 328. 114 Nevertheless, whilst reiterating that a chose in action was not assignable, the common law courts would take notice of the assignee’s right in equity and allow an action to be brought in the name of the assignor without the need to go to equity. Thus, where the assignor had become bankrupt, the court
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Legal assignment became possible upon the passing of section 25(6) of the Judicature Act 1873 (UK). This provision affected a procedural change to the law, allowing any legal chose in action that was assignable in equity prior to its passing to be assigned at law. It did not make assignable at law something that prior to its enactment was not assignable in equity. This is the extent of the procedural effect of this provision which has been the cause of some confusion and is dealt with in detail later.115 Today, equivalent statutory provisions exist in England and in all Australian States and Territories and allow an assignee to bring an action in its own name if the formal requirements of the statute are made out. There remain some interests that cannot be assigned under the statutory provisions but which may still be assigned in equity, the most important being an assignment of part of a debt or chose in action.
(d) Conclusion [2.18] Conclusion. There are two principal conclusions to be drawn from the above history. The first is that the law has adopted a property model of assignment. The second is that Anglo-Australian law has been left with two methods of assignment, legal and equitable, each with its own set of rules. A full study and critique of the property model falls outside the scope of this book, however, an explanation for it is suggested in Chapter 3. Before moving on to discuss the rules for the assignment of contractual rights, it is necessary to look in some detail at the two broad categories of legal and equitable assignment. This is done in Chapters 4 and 5. However, prior to this it is necessary to outline what is meant and achieved by an assignment. This is done in Chapter 3. Finally, throughout this chapter reference has been made to choses in action, (and more particularly contractual rights) being property. This is consistent with the language used in legal discourse as regards the assignment of choses in action and it is convenient to continue to use it throughout this book. However, it is suggested that this should be viewed as a shorthand way of expressing a more sophisticated idea. The law did not designate contractual rights to performance as property; what the law did was recognise that a party to a contract had title to a right to contractual performance.116 It was this title (ownership) that was considered recognised the equitable assignment so that the property did not pass to the trustee: see Winch v Keely (1787) 1 TR 619, 99 ER 1284. This approach led Gilmore to make the now famous remark: “Thus by the typically muddle-headed process of thinking known as the genius of the common law, assignments of intangibles were made effective in fact whilst basic theory still proclaimed them to be legal impossibilities”: see G Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, at 202. 115 [5.04]–[5.26]. 116 See Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 26 per Windeyer J (suggesting that anything that can be the subject of ownership may be assigned). Cf T Cyprian Williams, “Property, Things in Action and Copyright” (1895) 11 LQR 223 at 230–1 cited above [2.04].
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property. That is, a party to a contract had a (proprietary) right to a (personal) right of performance.117 This title was recognised for the purposes of transfer. As between the parties to the contract, their rights and obligations remain personal.118
117
See further LD Smith, The Law of Tracing (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 61. Although the law has long recognised the legitimacy of recognising rights as property for only some purposes, quaere the extent to which this distinction can still be maintained: see [6.14]. 118
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Part 2 The Nature of Assignment
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3 Assignment and the Concept of Transfer (a) Introduction [3.01] Purpose of the part. This part looks at some fundamental aspects of assignment. It is divided into three chapters. This chapter deals with the meaning of assignment. In Chapters 4 and 5 the principal ways in which legal rights may be assigned are analysed. The purpose of this part insofar as the theme of the book is concerned is to elucidate the legal concept of transfer and to see how that concept is reflected in equitable and legal assignments. More generally this part looks at what occurs when rights are assigned and investigates the nature of equitable and legal assignments. [3.02] Purpose of the chapter. This chapter considers the meaning of assignment and investigates the legal concept of transfer. Its primary purpose is to extract the principal features and ingredients of an assignment. This exercise is also important in helping distinguish assignments from other transactions. It will be suggested that the principal feature of an assignment is contained in the idea that an assignment involves a transfer. The principal ingredients are the requirement of an intention to assign and the existence of a proprietary right which is the subject matter of the transfer. [3.03] Structure of the chapter. This chapter begins by looking at the meaning of assignment and what is meant by and involved in the idea that an assignment involves a transfer. It also deals with the relevance of intention in assignment and its importance in distinguishing assignments from other transactions. This is followed by a section which attempts to explain the current property model of assignment. Finally, the distinction between assignment and privity of contract is discussed.
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(b) Meaning of Assignment (i) Introduction [3.04] The legal concept of assignment. The word “assignment” has not been used uniformly throughout legal history.1 At one time it may have been used to describe a transaction that today would be described as a direction to pay.2 In Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,3 Windeyer J described the modern assignment of a chose in action as involving “the immediate transfer of an existing proprietary right, vested or contingent, from the assignor to the assignee”.4 This description captures the most important feature and ingredients of assignment as a legal concept today. First, assignment is concerned with transferring rights. More precisely, it is suggested that a transaction is properly termed an assignment only if its effect is to transfer to the assignee the ownership of a right vested in the assignor. Transfer is the essence of assignment. It is the principal feature of an assignment. The transferred interest may amount to the ownership of the entire interest held by the assignor in the subject right, or ownership of a part of that interest.5 Moreover, a true assignment results in an immediate transfer. Secondly, although not expressly stated by Windeyer J, except where the assignment is by operation of law, it is inherent in his description that there be an intention to transfer the right. This is the first main ingredient of any assignment. It may be expressed as a substantive formality. The intention required is an intention immediately to assign; however, there are instances where equity can uphold an agreement to assign an interest as an immediate equitable assignment.6 Thirdly, the law of assignment is concerned with the transfer of property rights.7 The existence of a present property right is the second main ingredient in any assignment or the second substantive formality. Moreover, when there is dealing in property rights, there is always a requirement that the property be inherently identifiable and adequately identified.8 1 See SJ Bailey, “Assignment of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 580. See also [2.02]. In general discourse “assignment” or “assign” can also be used in the sense of to “allot”, “appoint” or “determine”: see The Oxford English Dictionary. See further Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 65 per MacFarlan J. 2 SJ Bailey, “Assignment of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 580. 3 (1963) 109 CLR 9. 4 Ibid, at 26. See further W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1766) ii, at 326. 5 Cf Butler v Capel (1823) 2 B & C 251 at 253, 107 ER 377. 6 [7.15]–[7.16]. 7 [3.19]. 8 [7.11]–[7.14].
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[3.05] The institution of “assignment”. The description of assignment adopted by Windeyer J could be used to describe the “transfer” of intangibles (or rights) component of many transactions, for example, the transfer of title under a sale of goods.9 However, in practice the use to which the word “assignment” is put tends to be limited to describing a transfer which does not involve a transfer of a tangible asset,10 that is, transactions involving mere choses in action.11 It is here that “assignment” appears as an institution or subject in its own right, with its own peculiar rules which, to a limited extent, appear to divorce it from the rules governing sale of goods and sale of land. This book is concerned with this institutional concept of assignment as it applies to the assignment of contractual rights.
(ii) Assignment Distinguished from Other Transactions12 [3.06] Assignment and novation.13 A novation usually involves three parties; the two parties to a contract and a third party. The effect of a novation is that for valuable consideration the parties to the contract agree to extinguish14 the contract and one party enters into a replacement contract with the third party.15 The new contract replaces the extinguished contract.16 A novation may also occur between 9 In fact, following his description of assignment, he said ((1963) 109 CLR 9 at 26): “Anything that in the eye of the law can be regarded as an existing subject of ownership, whether it be a chose in possession or a chose in action, can to-day be assigned”. 10 Strangely, the word “assignment” is not generally used to describe a transaction which involves the transfer of title to tangibles (by way of sale) but where no transfer of possession occurs. 11 Occasionally it is also used to describe a transfer by way of security, whether the security involves tangible or intangible property. The word “assignment” is also sometimes used in practice to describe any transaction which is concerned with the alienation or vesting of rights and which does not involve the transfer of a tangible asset, for example, a declaration of trust and a charge. 12 Some transactions are distinguished elsewhere: see [2.13] (assignment and acknowledgement), [2.14] (assignment and powers of attorney), [3.13] (assignment and negotiation), [7.04] (assignment and revocable mandate). 13 See generally J Bailey, “Novation” (1999) 14 JCL 189. 14 The word “extinguish” is often used to describe what happens to the original contract. The novation does not result in a rescission, at least in the sense of the parties handing back benefits received under the contract. Nor does it result merely in a discharge of the contract with unconditionally accrued obligations surviving that discharge. The effect on the original contract may be that of discharge, but unless there is express provision to the contrary, each novation operates as between the original parties to the contract as a release: see Commercial Bank of Tasmania v Jones [1893] AC 313. In commercial practice the effect of a novation on accrued rights and obligations is dealt with expressly. 15 Scruples Imports Pty Ltd v Crabtree & Evelyn Pty Ltd (1983) 1 Intellectual Property Reports 315 at 320 per Powell J (“a novation is merely a contract between three parties, the obligee, the original obligor and the substituted obligor, the effect of which contract is that in consideration of the obligee releasing the original obligor from his obligation, the substituted obligor promises the obligee that he will assume responsibility for the performance of the obligation”). See also Mutual Export Corp v Asia Australian Express Ltd (The Lakatoi Express) (1990) 103 FLR 32 at 40. 16 As to the requirement of consideration see Scarf v Jardine (1882) 7 App Cas 345 at 351 per Lord Selborne and Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365 at 390 per Windeyer J. See further GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 155, 701–2.
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the parties to a contract whereby they agree to discharge one contract and to enter into another replacement contract. A novation does not involve a transfer of rights.17 The replacement contract creates new rights which are not derived from the original contract.18 A valid novation requires the consent of all the parties.19 [3.07] Assignment and contractual nominations.20 An offer or option may be made or given to a grantee and/or his or her nominee. Moreover, a contract, typically a contract of sale, may be expressed to be made with the buyer and/or its nominee. The effect of such a clause depends on construction. It may be intended as a personal offer to the grantee but which may be accepted by the nominee for the grantee.21 It may be a personal offer to the grantee, but in the sense of an offer to sell to the grantee or such persons as the grantee nominates. Here, if a nomination is made the contract will be between the grantor and that nominee.22 This is not an assignment, nor is it a novation. It is simply a form of offer made to the grantee and any person falling within the description of “nominee”, albeit that the named grantee dictates the content of that class.23 Where the offer is contained in a contract and it is exercisable and exercised by a nominee, this results in a new contract, that is, a novation, as it is not possible to add a party to a contract without discharging the contract.24 In this regard, it does not matter whether the benefit of the nomination provision is made to the party “or” its nominee, or whether it is made to the party “and” its nominee. Often a nominee provision merely expresses what would be implied in any case, namely that the grantee can direct that the subject matter of the contract be transferred to a nominee without 17 A statute may dictate that a “transfer” of certain subject matter takes effect by way of novation: see R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 1.07, 1.13, 1.50, 3.03. See also Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1989] Ch 497 at 513. See further J Benjamin, Interests in Securities (Oxford, OUP, 2000) paras 305–7. See also [6.87]. 18 See Rasbora Ltd v JCL Marine Ltd [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 645. 19 See Damon Compania Naviera SA v Hapag-Lloyd International SA (The Blankenstein) [1985] 1 WLR 435; The Aktion [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 283 at 310 –11. See also Conquest’s Case (1875) 1 Ch D 334; Miller’s Case (1876) 3 Ch D 391; Chatsworth Investments Ltd v Cussins (Contractors) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1; Scarf v Jardine (1882) 7 App Cas 345; British Homes Assurance Corp Ltd v Paterson [1902] 2 Ch 404; Meek v Port of London Authority [1918] 2 Ch 96. 20 See CJ Rossiter, Principles of Land Contracts and Options in Australia (Sydney, Butterworths, 2003) para 3.20. 21 See AF Grant Pty Ltd v MacDonald [1960] Qd R 465. See also Lang v James Morrison & Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 1 at 6 per Griffith CJ. 22 See Westminster Estates Pty Ltd v Calleja (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 222; Bell Bros Pty Ltd v Sarich [1971] WAR 157 at 159. See also Clark v Lonergan [1961] NSWR 313; Byrne v Reid [1902] 2 Ch 735. In the case of an option, doctrinally this result follows only if the option is drafted as an irrevocable offer rather than as a conditional contract. 23 See Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256. See also Westminster Estates Pty Ltd v Calleja (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 222 at 229. 24 Salter v Gilbertson (2003) 6 VR 466. Cf Damon Compania Naviera SA v Hapag-Lloyd International SA (The Blankenstein) [1985] 1 WLR 438 at 446–7 per Fox LJ; Hannan’s Hill Amalgamated No Liability v Barbican Corporation Ltd (1939) 13 ALJ 255 at 256 per Rich J.
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that nominee being a party to any contract with the grantor.25 Thus, the contract of sale is made with the original party but there is a sale (conveyance) to the nominee. [3.08] Assignment and vicarious performance. Generally, the burden of a contract is not assignable.26 However, it is possible to have a contractual obligation vicariously performed if the obligation does not call for personal performance.27 In such a case, if the performance is given on behalf of the contractor and with the intention of discharging the contractor, then performance by the third party will discharge the contractor.28 However, the delegation of a delegable duty does not discharge the contractor from its obligation to perform and the contractor remains liable for any non-performance.29 This is the case despite the customer’s consent to the vicarious performance.30 Finally, although there is no privity between the employer and sub-contractor,31 in some cases the sub-contractor may be liable to the employer in tort or bailment.
(c) Assignment as Transfer [3.09] “Transfer” generally. An “assignment”, in legal discourse, is said to involve a transfer. It is therefore important to determine what “transfer” means in this context. 25 See Earl of Egmont v Smith (1877) 6 Ch D 469 at 474 per Jessel MR; MacDonald v Robins (1954) 90 CLR 515 at 524 per Dixon CJ; Salter v Gilbertson (2003) 6 VR 466. Such a direction may be combined with an assignment of the benefit of the contract of sale to the nominee: see Shaw v Harris (No 2) (1992) 3 Tas R 167. 26 [6.101]. 27 [6.77]–[6.81]. 28 Eg John Rigby (Haulage) Ltd v Reliance Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1956] 2 QB 468 at 482 per Singleton LJ. 29 Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414; Fratelli Sorrentino v Buerger [1915] 1 KB 307 at 313 per Atkin J (affirmed [1915] 3 KB 367); Stewart v Reavell’s Garage [1952] 2 QB 545; Davies v Collins [1945] 1 All ER 247 at 249 per Lord Greene MR; Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 at 1019 per Viscount Simon LC; British Waggon Co and Parkgate Waggon Co v Lea (1880) 5 QBD 149; Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 Building Law Reports (BLR) 33 at 43 per Parker LJ. 30 Stewart v Reavell’s Garage [1952] 2 QB 545. For an exception see Investors in Industry Commercial Properties Ltd v South Bedfordshire District Council [1986] 1 All ER 787 discussed at [6.79] note 548. Nevertheless, if an employer agrees to accept performance by a third party it will be bound by that performance even if it is not in accordance with the contract, so long as it is in accordance with the agreement for vicarious performance: Hirachand Punamchand v Temple [1911] 2 KB 330 (creditor agreeing to accept payment of smaller amount from third party). See also Waghorn v Linden Manufacturing Pty Ltd [1970] 3 NSWLR 559. 31 John Rigby (Haulage) Ltd v Reliance Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1956] 2 QB 468 at 484 –5 per Jenkins LJ; Schmaling v Thomlinson (1815) 6 Taunt 147, 128 ER 989.
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The word “transfer” is capable of wide meaning.32 In its day-to-day use (and in part as a legal concept) it is employed to describe the situation where a person parts with something in circumstances where the transferee obtains the exact same thing as that once held by the transferor.33 For example, in the context of sale of goods where the contract calls for delivery of possession, the goods themselves are the subject of such a transfer. However, in its popular sense, “transfer” may occur without there being a consequent movement of legal rights.34 [3.10] The legal meaning of “transfer”. In law, “transfer” is also used to describe a conveyance of property.35 In the context of a conveyance, the law’s focus is not merely on the transfer of tangible things but on the transfer of property rights. However, a transferee never obtains the exact same property rights as those held by the transferor. All property rights at a certain level of sophistication are personal and incapable of this type of transfer.36 Rather, it is generally accepted that a 32 Gathercole v Smith (1881) 17 Ch D 1 at 7 per James LJ, at 9 per Lush LJ. See also Bank of Victoria Ltd v Langlands Foundry Co Ltd (1898) 23 VLR 230 at 251 per Holroyd J; Re Kelly (1932) 4 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 258 at 267; Camden & Burton v London Borough Council [2000] 2 AC 399. See further Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 at 1021 per Viscount Simon LC. 33 Lyle & Scott Ltd v Scott’s Trustees [1959] AC 763 at 778 per Lord Reid. 34 See Booth v Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159 at 164 per Mason CJ. 35 An assignment (in the institutional sense) involves (and is) a transfer, but not all transfers necessarily involve (or are) assignments. For example, in Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95 at 104 Lord Diplock described subrogation as involving a transfer of rights without an assignment; cf. Cheltenham & Gloucester plc v Appleyard [2004] EWCA Civ 291 para 25; Burston Finance Ltd v Spierway Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1648 at 1652, and see RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) paras 9.060–9.065. However, at least in the case of simple subrogation, such as where an insurer is subrogated to the position of the insured, the action is not merely nominally in the name of the plaintiff/insured, it is the plaintiff’s action; subrogation here merely gives a person the right to stand in the shoes of another without vesting the chose in action in the party with the right to be subrogated: see James Nelson & Sons Ltd v Nelson Line (Liverpool) Ltd [1906] 2 KB 217 at 223 per Collins MR; Central Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corp (The Aiolos) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25 at 30; MH Smith (Plant Hire) Ltd v DL Mainwaring (T/A Inshore) [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 244 at 246; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Hall & Russell & Co Ltd [1989] AC 643. For a discussion of simple subrogation as opposed to reviving subrogation: see C Mitchell, The Law of Subrogation (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) at 5–7. In the law of documentary credits a distinction is drawn between the transfer of a credit and the assignment of a credit: see R Jack, A Malek and D Quest, Documentary Credits (3rd edn, London, Butterworths, 2001) ch 10; A Ward and G McCormack “Assignment of Documentary Credits” (2001) 16(5) Journal of International Banking Law (JIBL) 138. See further Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 22 per Dixon J. A transfer of rights is also sometimes distinguished from an assignment of rights where the transfer takes place without reference to the institutional rules governing the assignment of choses in action, for example, where commercial practice recognises a transfer of rights by delivery of certain documents: see generally C Debattista, The Sale of Goods Carried by Sea (2nd edn, London, Butterworths, 1998) ch 3 and AM Tettenborn, “Transferable and Negotiable Documents of Title—A Redefinition?” [1991] LMCLQ 538. 36 On one view this fact should end the law’s fascination with the idea of a transfer of rights: see JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 147; JB Ames, “The Disseisin of Chattels” (1890) 3 Harv L Rev 313 at 315; JB Ames, “The Disseisin of Chattels” (1890) 3 Harv L Rev 337 at 339; JH Beale, Conflict of Law (1916) para 152 as cited by WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston” (1916–17) 30 Harv LR 449 at 449. Cf TD Kenneson,
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transfer of rights occurs when the transferor disposes of a right (which is extinguished) and where an equivalent and derivative right is created and vested in the transferee.37 Nevertheless, in the context of choses in action, it has been said that what is transferred is the chose in action; that is, the exact same chose in action and not an equivalent.38 It is suggested that the point being made by such statements is that in the case of an assignment of a contractual right there is an actual transfer of a right to contractual performance. That is, in addition to the extinction/creation transfer of title, there is a transfer that is akin to the transfer of goods in a contract for the sale of goods. This actual transfer occurs when the transferee is put in the same relationship to the right to performance as that previously held by the transferor. The legal concept of transfer which requires an extinction of rights on the one hand, and the creation and vesting of new but equivalent and derivative rights on the other hand, does not refer to the right to performance under a contract. That concept of transfer is concerned with the transfer of title to a contractual right. It is title that is the subject of extinction and creation. In the case of a sale of goods the effect of the sale is that the title of the seller is extinguished and there are created and vested in the buyer rights that are equivalent to those which were held by the seller. Similarly, in the assignment of a contractual right to performance, the assignor’s title to that right is extinguished and a new and equivalent title is vested in the assignee. Under a sale of goods the transfer of title relates to certain subject matter, namely the goods. Similarly, in the case of assignments of contractual rights the transfer of title relates to certain subject matter, namely the right to performance.39 It is also relevant to note that, although it is convenient to refer to a “right of performance” under a contract, that expression is apt to mislead. Inasmuch as a sale of a particular type of goods cannot vest in the buyer a different type of goods, a transfer of title to a contractual right to performance cannot vest in the assignee something that becomes “the assignee’s contractual right of performance”. There is no such “thing” as a “contractual right to performance”. There is only “the “Purchase for Value Without Notice” (1914) 23 Yale LJ 193; WA Searey, “Purchase for Value Without Notice” (1914) 23 Yale LJ 447. See also W Mincke, “Property: Assets or Power? Objects or Relations as Substrata of Property Rights” in JW Harris (ed), Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds (London, Kluwer, 1997) ch 7. 37 See R v Preddy [1996] AC 815 at 834 per Lord Goff, at 841 per Lord Jauncey. 38 Eg Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 915 per Lord Hoffmann: see [2.05]. In the case of a debt, often the “debt” itself is referred to as a piece of property which can be dealt with like any other asset—the necessity of enforceability to the characterisation of it being a chose in action being considered a mere incident: see Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372, 373 per Cozens-Hardy LJ. See further [6.34], [6.54]. 39 For a reference to contractual rights and debts as “things” see Portuguese-American Bank of San Francisco v Welles (1916) 242 US 7 per Holmes J.
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promisee’s right to performance”.40 This results from the personal nature of contract and this is all that the assignor has to sell. The assignee’s title is derived from the assignor, and although the assignor’s title to the right to performance is extinguished and replaced, the obligation of the obligor is not replaced or extinguished.41 The obligation owed by the obligor to the assignee is therefore the same obligation the obligor owed the assignor.42 As a result of the transfer of title, the assignee owns and is owed the performance under the contract, but what the assignee owns and is owed remains a contractual obligation promised by the obligor to the assignor.43 That is, the assignee buys the promise made to the assignor, “the assignor’s right to performance”. If the assignor’s right to performance was extinguished and replaced by “the assignee’s right to performance” or if there existed a chose in action entitled “a right to contractual performance” then the effect of an assignment would be to create privity of contract between the obligor and assignee which is not the law.
40 Strictly there are two rights; first, the promisee’s right to the promise of performance (in most cases this is more accurately expressed as the right to the promise to procure some performance) and secondly, the promisee’s right to performance, the latter being correlative to the obligation to perform. For the most part it is not necessary to distinguish between these two rights, and it is convenient and less cumbersome to continue to refer to the promisee’s “right to performance”. Moreover, there are doctrinal reasons for holding that at the moment of contract formation a contract party has, in addition to a right to a promise of performance, a right to performance: see [6.44]. That is, the right to performance exists from the moment of contract formation and does not come into existence when the correlative obligation to perform accrues. 41 This point distinguishes “transfer” as the term is used in assignment from the notion of “transfer” when used in banking law to describe a “transfer of funds”. Take, for example, a simple transfer of funds where the payer and payee have accounts at the same bank. The “transfer” would take place without any transfer of money; all that is required is book entries. In the result, the bank’s liability to the payer will be decreased and the bank’s liability, under a separate contract, to the payee will be increased. Thus, although this transaction involves both an extinction of rights on the one hand and a creation of rights on the other, this does not occur by way of assignment. Such directions are also not intended to be assignments but revocable mandates; however, even when the directions become irrevocable, the fact that at least two separate contracts are involved prevents there being a transfer by way of assignment. It has been suggested that what is transferred is a transfer of liability: see AL Tyree and A Beatty, The Law of Payment Systems (Sydney, Butterworths, 2000) para 3.2.2. In economic terms there is a transfer of purchasing power: see R Crane, I Fraser and T Martin, Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 2001) at 27. It has also been suggested that it is misleading to use the word “transfer” to describe this type of transaction: see Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728 at 750 per Staughton J. See also R v Preddy [1996] AC 815. See further M Brindle and R Cox (eds), Law of Bank Payments (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) para 3.062. 42 Loxton v Moir (1914) 18 CLR 360 at 377 per Isaacs J. 43 Since the efficacy of the assignment will depend on the continued existence of the contract, quaere whether it is correct to say that the obligor still owes its duty in contract to the assignor even though that duty is clearly trumped by the duty to the assignee. The recognition of such a continuing contract duty has its uses: see [8.36] cf [5.05]. In the case of an equitable assignment of a contractual right there is no doubt legitimacy in the notion that the obligor continues to owe its duty in law to the assignor: see [4.19], [4.20].
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The recognition of this actual transfer of the right to performance helps to explain, at a doctrinal level, certain aspects of assignments of contractual rights. For example, it impacts on the valuation of the assignee’s interest. This is discussed in detail later.44 It also results in the assignee obtaining property that was once owned by the assignor. This would not be the case if the assignment merely transferred title as that transfer occurs by way of extinction and creation of rights.45 In addition, if there were no more to an assignment than a transfer of title (resulting in the assignee owning the subject right and being owed the subject obligation) then the obligor could in all cases discharge its obligation to the assignee by continuing to perform to the assignor. That is, because the assignee merely owns the title to a promise made by the obligor to the assignor, then by continuing to perform to the assignor the assignee receives its expected performance. Thus, performance is to the assignor but (legally) for the benefit of the assignee. It may be that for commercial reasons an assignee requires the obligor to perform to the assignor but this would be dictated by the assignee, not the law governing the assignment. Moreover, there may be rules regulating the relationship between the obligor and assignee (such as a requirement of notice) which would prevent the obligor having to account to the assignee if it discharged its obligation to the assignor.46 However, generally, it is accepted that the effect of an assignment is not merely that the obligation be performed for the benefit of the assignee but rather to the assignee; that is, the assignee can expect personal performance. This is the whole point of the institution of assignment, and is achieved by recognising that the contractual right to performance is actually transferred upon the transfer of title with the result that the obligor performs the exact same obligation, but to the assignee. All true assignments of contractual rights require an actual transfer of the right to performance. Unlike a sale of goods where it is possible to transfer title without possession, a transfer of title to a contractual right must always carry with it the actual right to performance.47 This, of course, does not mean that a person cannot get the benefit of an intangible thing such as a debt or contractual right without getting title. That benefit may result from a gift, a mistake or fraud. [3.11] The extended meaning of “transfer” in assignment. The view could be taken that any transaction which does not have as one of its components this dual disposition and creation of title does not involve a transfer, and in turn cannot be 44
[8.11]–[8.12]. Cf the position where funds are transferred between bank accounts; here the transferee’s interest is not in any way derivative; it obtains original title rights as well as an original chose in action: see above n 41. At the level of legal doctrine such a transferee does not obtain property that once belonged to another: see R v Preddy [1996] AC 815 (the result in R v Preddy was reversed by legislation: see Law Commission for England and Wales, Offences of Dishonesty: Money Transfers (London, HMSO, 1996) Law Com 243; see further R v Sofroniou [2004] QB 1218; In re Holmes [2005] 1 WLR 1857). 46 See further [8.06]. 47 See further [4.19]. Cf [6.75], [6.83]. 45
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described as an assignment.48 At the very least one might logically argue that although not all dispositions of rights involve transfers, a transfer requires a disposition.49 Such a restricted notion of title “transfer” would not capture an equitable assignment of a legal right which at an analytical level merely creates and vests in the assignee an equitable interest.50 The assignor does not dispose of an equitable interest because when, one person holds the “whole right of property”, no distinction is drawn between legal and equitable interests.51 Equitable interests are “engrafted” or “impressed” upon legal interests rather than “carved out of” them. Nevertheless, these transactions are today treated in law as assignments, and therefore must involve a transfer even if not involving a disposition.52 Any description of the legal concept of transfer as it applies to assignments would be seriously lacking if it did not capture such a large parcel of the subject matter.53 It is suggested that, in addition to the primary meaning of title transfer set out above, a transfer by way of institutional assignment also occurs where a derivative
48 Eg Re VGM Holdings Ltd [1942] Ch 235 at 241 per Lord Greene MR; Commissioner of Taxes (Queensland) v Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127 at 133–4 per Latham CJ; George Wimpey & Co Ltd v IRC [1975] 2 All ER 45 at 50 per Sir John Pennycuick; Burton v Camden London Borough Council [2000] 2 AC 399 at 408–9 per Lord Millett. In these cases, it was suggested, that a transaction which involves the vesting in one party of an interest not previously held by the other party cannot be described as a sale, transfer or assignment: cf AGIP (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547 at 561; Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584 at 615 per Lord Wilberforce; Fasken v Minister of National Revenue [1949] 1 DLR 810. However, what was really in issue in these cases was whether a particular transaction came within a statute, and therefore they cannot be accepted as strong authority for this more general proposition. This is not to suggest that there may be cases at common law where the mere creation and vesting of some interest should not be classified as a transfer. It is also conceivable that a transaction may amount to a transfer for one purpose and not for another: see FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440 at 453–4. See also MSP Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamps (1999) 198 CLR 494. See further Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Microcomputer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 389 at 393. 49 There will be transactions which involve a creation of rights (some of which may be informed by an intention to transfer) but which do not equate to transfers, conveyances or dispositions for the purposes of certain legislation: see generally Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1926) 38 CLR 272; Commissioner of Taxes (Queensland) v Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127. 50 See [7.18]. 51 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Livingston [1965] AC 694 at 712 per Viscount Radcliffe; DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 431 at 442 per Gibbs CJ, at 463–4 per Aickin J. See also Grey v IRC [1958] Ch 690 at 708 per Lord Evershed MR (affirmed [1960] AC 1); Re Transphere Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 309 at 311 per McLelland J; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 706 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See further [7.18]. 52 [7.18]. See also Jerome v Kelly [2004] 1 WLR 1409. Cf Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Microcomputer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 389 at 393. See further O’Brien v Benson’s Hosiery (Holdings) Ltd [1980] AC 562. However, if it were not logical to speak of the disposal of an interest that did not exist prior to the time of the intended disposition then there would be no need to have drafted the statutory writing requirements in the manner in which they are drafted: see [7.26]. 53 Unless there is a statutory provision to the contrary it is more problematic to describe a transaction that involves a disposition without a vesting as a transfer: see Coles Myer Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [1998] 4 VR 728. For a discussion of a statutory provision that treats the mere creation of a right as a transfer see Anderson v Peldan (2005) 220 ALR 565.
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title to a right is merely created and vested in the transferee if that title may be said to give the transferee the equitable ownership of the right which is the subject matter of the assignment, and if there is an intention to transfer that ownership. The latter requirement is dealt with in detail later.54 However, it is important to emphasise that whether or not a transfer has taken place cannot be determined by the movement of rights alone. Like space and time, ultimately that movement cannot be separated from, or analysed without reference to, the intention that informs that movement. It may at first appear fictional to describe a transaction as involving a transfer when all that is involved is the creation and vesting of rights in the transferee. However, that is perhaps no more than a reflection of the limits of any analytical analysis of the movement of rights upon assignment. Moreover, although coming under some attack in recent years,55 if resort is made to the “bundle of rights” theory of ownership it is easy to view the assignor as disposing of an interest. Take, for example, the equitable assignment of a legal right by way of sale. In such a transaction, the assignor maintains the legal title to the subject right. Nevertheless, the interest56 the assignor continues to hold is now worth less to the assignor as it is held for the benefit of the assignee.57 But this is not merely an issue of decreased value;58 there is a clear diminishing of the assignor’s interest and an enlargement of the interest of the assignee which, on the bundle of rights theory, evidences a disposal and consequent vesting in the assignee.59 In the result, the word “transfer” is a word of wide import, and the sophistication of legal notions of property and transfer make it impossible to limit the
54
[7.03]–[7.10]. K Gray, “Property in Thin Air” [1991] Cambridge Law Journal (CLJ) 252; K Gray, “Equitable Property” (1994) 47 Current Legal Problems (CLP) 157 at 183; JE Penner, “The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property” (1996) 43 UCLA L Rev 711; K Campbell, “On the General Nature of Property Rights” (1992) 3 KCLJ 79. 56 For the distinction between title and interest see R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, London, Penguin, 2004) at 31. 57 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 at 304 per Waite LJ. 58 In the case of an assignment by way of security, the mortgagor’s right to redeem helps maintain the value of the property to the mortgagor. A movement in value may in some cases amount to a “transfer”: see Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547 at 561. For some purposes, such as tax, the value of a legal right may stand unaffected by an equitable interest: see Farm Products Co-operative (Tararua) Co Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioner (NZ) (1969) 1 ATR 85 at 89–90 per Turner J. 59 See generally Residues Treatment & Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1988) 6 Australian Company Law Cases (ACLC) 1,160 (issuing of shares so as to reduce voting rights of certain shareholders held to amount to an expropriation of shareholder’s rights); Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 190 CLR 513 (incorporation of land subject to mining leases within a national park, thus reducing the utility of the lessees’ rights under the lease amounted to an acquisition of property by the government, even though what was taken did not correspond to the interest held by the mining company). See also Smith v ANL Ltd (2000) 204 CLR 493; MSP Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamps (1999) 198 CLR 494 at 509. See further Inland Revenue Commissioners v John Lewis Properties plc [2003] Ch 513 at 551 per Schiemann LJ. 55
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concept of “transfer” to a narrow analytical formula.60 The context must dictate how wide or narrow the concept is in the particular case. In the context of an assignment of contractual rights, so far as the title to those rights is concerned, the concept of transfer must encapsulate both extinction and creation type transactions as well as transactions where title in merely created and vested. [3.12] Transfer and nemo dat quod non habet. The nemo dat rule is the fundamental rule governing transfers. Since an assignment of a contractual right involves a transfer, it is governed by this rule. The rule states that “no one gives what he does not have”. This rule has two principal aspects. First, a person cannot acquire title without the consent of the owner.61 Secondly, a person cannot transfer to another a better right than he or she has. This second aspect of the rule has three important consequences. The first and most obvious is that a transferee takes subject to existing real rights such as an existing security interest. Secondly, and related to the first, a transferee must take subject to any inherent weakness or infelicity in the subject right. Thirdly, from a practical perspective, it is very important properly to characterise the features of the right which is the subject matter of the assignment because if this is not done correctly then, although the rule cannot be breached, the effect may be equivalent to a breach, as the transferee may end up taking advantage of features that the right did not have. The rule does allow for the transfer of what may loosely be termed “lesser” rights. For example, a creditor may assign a debt in equity rather than at law. Nevertheless, the assignee in such a case obtains an interest in the debt and not something different. There are, of course, various exceptions to the nemo dat rule. Perhaps the most well known examples concern sales of goods by buyers and sellers in possession under sale of goods legislation. Even as regards choses in action exceptions are said to occur. For example, where an assignor assigns a debt twice, then priority will go to the assignee first giving notice to the debtor. Without there being an exception to the nemo dat rule such a priority dispute could not arise; if the first assignment was effective at law then the assignor would have had nothing to assign to the second assignee.62 Arguably, in certain contexts there is no need to recognise such an exception. In the case of an equitable assignment of a legal right, the assignor 60 It has even been suggested that the acquisition of a promise upon the formation of a contract takes place by way of transfer: see E Weinrib, “The Juridical Classification of Obligations” in P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 52–3; P Benson, “The Unity of Contract Law” in P Benson (ed), The Theory of Contract Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001) ch 4. Despite this being a legitimate theory, if it were adopted as contract law doctrine it could have undesirable results: eg The Commissioner of Stamp Duties (New South Wales) v Yeend (1929) 43 CLR 235 at 241. 61 T Weir, “Taking for Granted—The Ramifications of Nemo Dat” (1996) 49 CLP 325 at 328. 62 See R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, London, Penguin, 2004) at 55.
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would not be assigning the same interest more than once but merely creating equivalent interests each time. This results from the principle that equitable interests are not drawn out of legal interests but engrafted upon them. A similar analysis would apply to a series of legal assignments of a legal chose in action if the procedural view of the statutory regime for legal assignments were adopted. In this book, a substantive view of the statutory regime is adopted and therefore an exception to the nemo dat rule would be required to assign a chose in action more than once under that regime.63 Similarly, an exception would be required if the law allowed for the multiple assignment of an existing equitable chose in action. Another exception may have recently appeared. In Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp (The Trident Beauty),64 it was held that where an assignor assigns a right to an advance payment which is conditional upon some later performance by the assignor, the assignee obtains an unconditional right of payment. At first sight, the result here appears to go beyond an exception to the nemo dat rule. Generally, exceptions to the rule address defects in title to an existing asset. The effect of these exceptions is not only to allow for the transfer of the defective title held by the transferor but also for the title held by some third party. However, the issue in the example is not a simple defect in title; the assignor has a perfectly good title to a conditional right of payment. At the time of the assignment an unconditional right to payment did not exist. The exception to the rule here seems to create the asset which is the subject of the assignment. Nevertheless, this appears to be the way some exceptions to the nemo dat rule operate when dealing in pure intangibles. The example was given above of how a priority dispute can arise because a debt can be assigned more than once, even though at the time of the second assignment the assignor has nothing to assign. Arguably, the example here goes even further, because in the case of a double assignment at least the subject matter of the assignment, for example title to the debt, does exist although it is vested in a third party, namely, the first assignee. In the example, title to the unconditional right to payment was not held by anyone. Exceptions in the case of tangibles are usually based on the transferor at least having possessory title to the subject asset. It may be that the above analysis overstates this aspect of the decision in The Trident Beauty, and the finding that the assignee’s receipt of payment was unconditional was merely intended to express a view that the assignee was immune from any restitutionary claim by the debtor: it was not intended to characterise the nature of the chose in action held by the assignee.65
63 See [5.06]–[5.26]. See also Cronk v M’Manus (1892) 8 TLR 449, which suggests that an assignment of a debt by way of security under the statutory regime will be treated like a legal mortgage of tangible personal property. It would follow that any second mortgage could only be a dealing with the equity of redemption and therefore equitable. 64 [1994] 1 WLR 161. 65 See [8.33].
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[3.13] Transfer and negotiation. The concept of transfer is often contrasted with negotiability. The idea of a contrast here should not be overstated, since negotiation does involve a transfer but it is a transfer that is free of the nemo dat rule. The essential point is that an instrument that is negotiable (by delivery or endorsement and delivery) allows a bona fide transferee for value without notice to take the instrument free of any defects in title of prior parties and free from any equities that could be raised by prior parties.66
(d) The Element of Intention (i) Introduction [3.14] The requirement of an intention to assign. It will be recalled that Windeyer J in Norman’s case described an assignment as involving an immediate transfer.67 It was suggested that this must in turn require an intention to assign.68 That intention is a crucial ingredient of an assignment and distinguishes assignments from other transactions. The particular focus here is on the distinction between assignment on the one hand and equitable charges and declarations of trust on the other hand, as these are closely related to assignment. It is therefore convenient and imperative to distinguish these transactions in this chapter. The methodology applied by the courts for determining whether an intention to assign exists is dealt with in Chapter 7.
(ii) Outright Assignments and Security Assignments [3.15] Introduction. An assignment may be given for a variety of reasons. Assignments of contractual rights for the supply of goods or services usually follow the sale or transfer of some asset such as land or a business. A debt may also be assigned for a number of reasons. It may be a gift. It may be used in a number of ways to borrow money or raise finance. It may be assigned to discharge a debt in whole or in part. Often a right to an income stream is assigned for a period as a method of paying a debt. In relation to debts, an important distinction exists
66 Sometimes a reference to a negotiable instrument is used merely to refer to an instrument that can be transferred by delivery and endorsement even though that transfer is subject to the nemo dat rule: see R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, London, Penguin, 2004) at 49. 67 [3.04]. 68 [3.04].
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between an outright assignment69 and an assignment by way of security, that is, a mortgage.70 [3.16] Distinguishing outright assignments from security assignments. Whether or not an assignment is outright or by way of security depends on intention. The concern is to find the real intention of the parties.71 The first principle is to give effect to the express words of the memorandum.72 However, effect will not be given to the express words or an express object if the form of the transaction is a sham; that is, if it seeks to mask the true transaction,73 for example, where a
69 The expression “outright assignment” includes an assignment by way of sale but is broader. Not all outright assignments are by way of sale. For example, a debt can be assigned for the purposes of discharging a loan in whole or in part. Such an assignment is not an assignment by way of security nor is it an assignment by way of sale: see Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyds Rep 142 at 161–2 per Slade J (overruled on another point: Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 3 WLR 58). It is not a sale as the consideration for the assignment is the loan or a forbearance to sue rather than the payment of a purchase price or the promise of the payment of a purchase price. See also Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137; Ashby Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 and see Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] Ch 207 (application of the Quistclose principles to a transfer of funds (not by way of loan) for the payment of the transferee’s debts). See further R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.34. Finally, where there is an assignment by way of sale which incorporates an obligation to re-transfer the property, then, if no fresh consideration is required for the re-transfer, the retransfer will not be by way of sale: see Francis v NPD Property Development Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 240. 70 In addition, debts and contractual rights to payment are often used as security by way of charge. Here, the chose in action is merely appropriated as security; any assignment of the chose would occur as a means of enforcing the charge after a default. As to the nature of an “assignment by way of charge” see [4.27], [7.40]. 71 Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co v North Central Wagon Co (1888) 13 App Cas 554 at 568 per Lord Macnaghten. This intention is to be distinguished from the motive for the particular form of assignment. The motive may be to circumvent a statutory requirement which would apply if the transaction took a different form. Generally, motive is not a relevant consideration in characterising the form of the assignment: see Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1 at 22–3 per Lord Hanworth MR, at 23 per Lawrence LJ, at 26–7 per Romer LJ. 72 Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd [1992] Butterworths Company Law Cases (BCLC) 609 at 615–16 per Lord Wilberforce, at 619 per Lord Scarman (stating that the approach is to give effect to the express intention of the parties rather than characterise the transaction on the basis of function; it is not to the point that a sale in certain circumstances will perform the same function as a loan on security; the approach is one of method and nature and not object). See also Olds Discount Co Ltd v Cohen [1938] 3 All ER 281n; Olds Discount Co Ltd v Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275 at 277; Re Kent and Sussex Sawmills Ltd [1947] Ch 177 at 179 (note the criticism of this case in F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1991) at 80); Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] AC 209 at 216 per Lord Devlin; Gurfinkel v Bentley Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 98 at 114 per Windeyer J; Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] British Company Cases (BCC) 270 at 300. See also Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 588 at 607–8. 73 Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1 at 17 per Lord Hanworth MR; Curtain Dream plc v Churchill Merchanting Ltd [1990] BCC 341 at 349. See also Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 (and see Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 382).
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formal document of sale is used to disguise a loan on security.74 In addition, evidence that the express words of a memorandum do not reflect the real intention of the parties or no longer reflects the intention of the parties can come from the manner in which the transaction is conducted.75 However, that will generally be sufficient only if it shows that the parties made some other contract.76 Where there is no question of a sham or replacement agreement, the discovery of the true intention of the parties is one of construction and usually involves an interpretation of a memorandum of assignment. It is a question of law.77 Like the construction of any contract this process involves an investigation of the meaning of the words used by the parties and the legal effect of those words. The investigation into the meaning of words here is particularly concerned with discovering the various rights and obligations received and undertaken by the parties. It is then necessary to determine the legal effect of those rights and obligations divorced from any labels the parties themselves have attached to them. That is, the true transaction is determined by a legal analysis of the rights and obligations given and undertaken in the agreement.78 If in form a memorandum of assignment uses words of sale but in substance grants rights between the parties that are not consistent with a sale but are consistent with a security, then the real intention of the parties is to assign by way of security.79 Similarly, if a memorandum uses the word “security” but it is clear that the intention of the parties is that of an outright assignment, the word “security” will be ignored.80 However, a court will not strive to characterise a transaction in a way that is inconsistent with the label attached to it by the parties. The investigation by the court is without prejudice.81 Where a memorandum of assignment is documented as a sale but grants rights that are 74 Eg Saunderson & Co v Clark (1913) 29 TLR 579. See also R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, London, Penguin, 2004) at 605–9. See further Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 278–9 per Dillon LJ, at 301 per Staughton LJ. 75 See Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 (and see Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 382). However, the fact that the parties do not follow the exact course dictated by the memorandum of assignment may be explained away on other grounds: see F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 2.12 at 37–8. See further Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd (1992) BCLC 609. 76 Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 301 per Staughton J citing Garnac Grain Co Inc v HMF Faure & Fairclough Ltd [1966] 1 QB 650 at 683 per Diplock LJ. 77 Smith v Bridgend County Borough Council [2002] 1 AC 336 at 352 per Lord Hoffmann, at 355 per Lord Scott. 78 Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1 at 17 per Lord Hanworth MR; Helby v Matthews [1895] AC 471 at 475 per Lord Herschell; Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 279 per Dillon LJ, at 301 per Staughton LJ. 79 Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 at 725–6 per Lord Millett. The type of security interest created is also a question of law. For example, in the case of a charge, if the relevant memorandum uses words suggesting an intention to create a fixed charge but rights are given that are inconsistent with the charge being fixed then a court may hold that it is a floating charge. See further Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 3 WLR 58. 80 See Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142. 81 Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1 at 20 per Lord Hanworth MR.
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consistent with both a sale and a security a court will continue to recognise the transaction as one of sale unless there is evidence that this is not the true or real intention of the parties.82 This approach is dictated by the fact that no one criterion of sale or security is conclusive.83 This necessarily follows from the fact that a sale may be used to raise finance in much the same way as an assignment can be used to secure a loan.84 In either case the documentation is likely to mix language and in part use expressions and words that are more apt to describe the other form of transaction. This process of construction is not merely one of construing the operative words of the assignment clause, but rather construing that clause in light of the contract as a whole.85 The concern is with the substance of the transaction, and therefore it is necessary to look at the transaction, the relationship of the parties and the circumstances that gave rise to the transaction.86 In some cases there may be other admissible extrinsic evidence which suggests that the express words of the memorandum do not reflect the true intention of the parties.87 The particular concern is whether there is evidence of the assignor having an express or implied right to redeem the subject property. A sale contract would not contain such a right. However, care must be taken not to imply a right of redemption too quickly. For example, it is doctrinally possible to assign outright an income stream, not so as automatically to discharge a debt or loan but as a method of repayment of the debt or loan, which automatically comes to an end upon the repayment of that debt or loan without a revesting.88 Thus, in order for the assignor to be paid any excess in the hands of the assignee and to ensure that the transaction is not labelled a “security” it is not always necessary to make this a personal obligation of the assignee to pay an equivalent amount. Nevertheless, the possibility of there being a right of redemption is raised in situations where the 82 See Douglas v Culverwell (1862) 4 De GF & J 20, 45 ER 1089; Williams v Owen (1840) 5 My & Cr 303, 41 ER 386; Curtain Dream plc v Churchill Merchanting Ltd (1990) BCC 341; Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 (and see Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 382). 83 Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 at 84–5 (and see Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 382); Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd (1992) BCLC 609 at 617. 84 Ibid, at 615 per Lord Wilberforce. 85 Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 280 per Dillon LJ, at 302 per Staughton LJ; Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 (and see Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 382). 86 Beckett v Tower Assets Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 1 at 25–6 per Cave J; Re Kent and Sussex Sawmills Ltd [1947] Ch 177 at 180–1; Automobile Association (Canterbury) Inc v Australasian Secured Deposits Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 417; Contemporary Cottages (NZ) Ltd v Margin Traders Ltd [1981] 2 NZLR 114. 87 Olds Discount Co Ltd v Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275 at 280 per Branson J; Re Row Dal Constructions Pty Ltd [1966] VR 249 at 259; Automobile Association (Canterbury) Inc v Australasian Secured Deposits Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 417. See also Beckett v Tower Assets Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 1; Re Universal Management Ltd [1983] NZLR 462 at 470 per Cooke J at 476 per McMullin J; Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 at 608 per Mummery J. 88 The mechanics for achieving this are discussed at [7.40].
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assigned debts are greater (or potentially greater in the case of an assignment of an income stream) than the debt the assignor owes the assignee, where the assignor has a right to any amount received by the assignee in excess of the debt owed to the assignee, and where the assignor has a right or obligation to repurchase the chose. Moreover, in the case of a loan, where the income stream is assigned at the time of the loan and where the lender is to look solely to the assigned income for repayment, the transaction is more likely to be characterised as a security transaction.89 The mere fact that the assignment is expressed to be for the “repayment” of the loan rather than as “security” for the loan is not conclusive. Where a debt is assigned by way of mortgage, the assignee owns the chose and therefore has a right to the income stream which must be used by the mortgagee to discharge the debt.90 Goode, in the context of discussing transfers to cover future indebtedness, suggests that the critical distinction in assignments of this type is between an assignment of a debt where payment “must be held and applied exclusively for the purpose of satisfying any indebtedness of the [assignor], any surplus being returned and meanwhile being held on trust for the [assignor] . . . and . . . an outright payment which becomes part of the [assignee’s] free assets, so that his only obligation if the sum [received] exceeds the [indebtedness of the assignor] is a personal repayment obligation”.91 It is necessary to add to this the possibility of an assignment that is automatically extinguished upon the repayment of the loan. The issue can also be looked at from the position of the assignee. As has been pointed out, if “a purchaser sells the property he has purchased, he may keep any profit he had made on the transaction; if a mortgagee does so, he must account for the profit to the mortgagor. . . . If a purchaser sells the property he has purchased and makes a loss on the transaction, he cannot recover his loss from the vendor; if a mortgagee realises the mortgaged property for less than he is owed, he may recover the balance from the mortgagor.”92 However, none of these points is necessarily conclusive.93 The result ultimately depends on the true meaning, purpose and legal effect of the assignment. Thus, a right or obligation to repurchase a chose 89
See R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, London, Penguin, 2004) at 609–10. Whether or not the mortgagee allows the mortgagor to keep receiving that income stream prior to any default is, subject to the mortgagee giving notice of the assignment, a matter to be agreed between the parties. An assignment without notice where the assignor continues to collect the debt but is required to pay sums received or equivalent amounts over to the assignee is capable of being construed as a security assignment. Ultimately this will depend on the true intention of the parties. The assignment may be by way of sale with the assignor collecting for the assignee: see Olds Discount Co Ltd v John Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275; Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd [1992] BCLC 609; Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 273, 283–4. See further Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] AC 209 at 217 per Lord Devlin. 91 R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.36. 92 Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 at 84 per Millett LJ. 93 See Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 279–80. It has even been suggested that an express right of redemption is not conclusive: see Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd [1992] BCLC 609 at 618 per Lord Wilberforce. 90
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may evidence a right of redemption or it might be no more than a contractual option or obligation to purchase.94 An obligation to pay the assignor amounts received in excess of the amount the assignor owes the assignee may result from a right of redemption or it may be no more than a personal obligation to pay.95 As already noted, the fact that the assignee’s interest is to be extinguished once a debt is repaid by the assignor does not necessarily evidence an assignment by way of mortgage. A mortgage requires an obligation to re-transfer, that is, a reassignment by separate assurance rather than by virtue of the initial instrument of assignment itself.96
(iii) Equitable Charges [3.17] Assignment, equitable charges and transfer. A charge is a security which makes certain property liable to discharge an obligation.97 It is usually created by contract98 and gives the chargee a proprietary interest by way of security. The intention required to create a charge is an intention to appropriate a fund to the debt and not merely an intention to pay a debt out of the proceeds of a certain 94 See Williams v Owen (1840) 5 My & Cr 303, 41 ER 386; Alderson v White (1858) 2 De G & J 97 at 105, 44 ER 924 at 928; Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1 at 27 per Romer LJ; Gurfinkel v Bentley Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 98 at 113 per Windeyer J; Automobile Association (Canterbury) Inc v Australasian Secured Deposits Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 417; Contemporary Cottages (NZ) Ltd v Margin Traders Ltd [1981] 2 NZLR 114; Curtain Dream plc v Churchill Merchanting Ltd [1990] BCC 342; Chase Manhattan Asia Ltd v Official Receiver and Liquidator of First Bangkok City Finance Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1181. There is a view that it is possible to avoid a sale and repurchase being interpreted as a mortgage by having the sale back characterised as a sale of equivalent property and not the same property. However, where the property is something like shares, it makes no sense to say that one is only selling back equivalent property if one adopts the view that the ownership of a share merely represents an indivisible interest in the capital of the company, because if that is correct one can only ever sell back the same thing: see [4.27]. See further R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.37; F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 2.12 at 38–9. 95 Olds Discount Co Ltd v John Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275; Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] AC 209; Lloyds and Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpet Sales Ltd [1992] BCLC 609. See also R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.34. See further PR Wood, Title Finance, Derivatives, Securitisations, Set-Off and Netting (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) at 19–21, 53–5. 96 There remains the possibility that such a transaction may be a security transaction by way of charge. See Mercantile Bank of London Ltd v Evans (1899) 2 QB 613. See further [7.40]. 97 Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584 at 595 per Buckley LJ; Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] Ch 150 at 176 per Millett J. 98 Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228 at 250 per Slade J. When created by contract, a charge requires consideration: Re Earl of Lucan (1890) 45 Ch D 470; this is necessarily the case where the charge is intended to encumber future property. See also Agnew & Bearsley v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 at 726. Not all charges require a contract: see PG Turner, “Floating Charges—A ‘No Theory’ Theory” [2004] LMCLQ 319 at 320. See further EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 773; R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 1.07, 1.53 (creation of charge by way of trust).
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fund.99 Like an equitable assignment of a legal right, a charge merely involves the creation and vesting of an interest in the chargee. However, it is said that a charge merely encumbers the relevant property; it does not operate by way of assignment.100 In terms of enforcement, the position at law is that the chargee may, by judicial process, call for an assignment of the charged property upon default by the chargor.101 It is only then that an assignment of the charged property takes place.102 Nevertheless, there are numerous judicial decisions stating that a charge operates as an equitable assignment and an equitable assignment operates by way of charge.103 In securities law the expressions “equitable charge” and “equitable mortgage” are often used interchangeably.104 In some cases an equitable charge 99
See further ibid, para 1.17. Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] Ch 150 at 176 per Millett J; Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228 at 250 per Slade J; Tancred v Delagoa Bay and East Africa Railway Co (1889) 23 QBD 239 at 242 per Denman J. See also EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 17–20, 193–7, 616–7, 771–3. 101 See Re Owen [1894] 3 Ch 220. Statute may increase the powers of a chargee, eg Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s109. 102 A charge may be used in conjunction with an assignment. The assignment may allow an assigned income stream to be used by the assignee without a prior default by the assignor, and the charge over the source of the income prevents that source being alienated and thus destroying the assignment: see Bank of New South Wales v The King [1918] NZLR 945 at 947 per Hosking J. Where this is the case, it does not necessarily result in the assignment being by way of security. Many documents use the words “assign” and “charge” in the one clause: eg Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78. Whether the intention here is to create a charge or assign an interest or use both in conjunction is a question of construction. Often the express reference to a charge will be evidence that the transaction is intended to be by way of security. However, there may be cases where a document only uses the word assign but where a charge (in the conjunction sense explained above) is implied which, as explained above, supports an outright assignment. 103 Eg Rodick v Gandell (1852) 1 De GM & G 763 at 777–8, 42 ER 749 at 754 per Lord Truro (cited with approval in Palmer v Carey [1926] AC 703 at 706 and Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584 at 613 per Lord Wilberforce); Re Kent & Sussex Sawmills Ltd [1947] 1 Ch 177 at 183; Thomas v Harris [1947] 1 All ER 444 at 445 per Scott LJ; National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 6 Austrailan Capital Territory Reports (ACTR) 1 at 3–5 per Blackburn J; Re Universal Management Ltd [1983] NZLR 462 at 476 per McMullin J; Elders Pastoral Ltd v Bank of New Zealand [1991] 1 NZLR 385 at 387 per Lord Templeman; Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 at 619 per Mummery J; Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399 at 446 per McHugh and Gummow JJ; Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 407 at 422 per Brennan CJ; Agnew & Bearsley v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 at 721. See also National Provincial and Union Bank of England v Charnley [1924] 1 KB 431 at 449–50 per Atkin LJ. Cf Ashby Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 at 708 per Greene LJ. There is also academic authority suggesting that a charge operates by way of assignment: see W Gough, Company Charges (2nd edn, London, Butterworths, 1996) at 19, 38–9 (Gough appears to rely on the bundle of rights theory to argue that there is an assignment: see also in this regard Waitomo Wools (NZ) Ltd v Nelsons (NZ) Ltd [1974] 1 NZLR 484 at 490 per Richmond J and Young v Matthew Hall Mechanical & Electrical Engineers Pty Ltd (1988) 12 ACLR 399 at 403 per Brinsden J). The various statutory regimes for legal assignments also recognise this possibility by expressly stating that they apply only to absolute assignments “not purporting to be by way of charge”: see [7.39] and see PG Turner, “Assignment by Way of Charge” (2004) 24 Australian Bar Review 1 at 13. 104 London County and Westminster Bank Ltd v Tomkins [1918] 1 KB 515 at 528–9 per Scrutton LJ; Re Upson (1941) 12 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 147. 100
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has been said to involve a partial assignment.105 Both the House of Lords and the High Court of Australia in mentioning an equitable charge have talked of a right to redeem, even though a charge not operating by way of assignment would automatically be discharged upon performance of the secured obligation.106 The possible reasons for making this link between charges and assignments are discussed later.107 It is not possible to view a chargee’s rights as being merely potential. Prior to default by the chargor the chargee does have rights that may be enforced directly against the security property.108 In addition, the chargee’s interest subsists despite the chargor transferring ownership of the charged property to a third party (except a bonafide purchaser for value and without notice of the legal estate) and despite the chargor becoming insolvent. Therefore, the chargee is vested with some form of immediate proprietary interest in respect of the subject property.109 Arguably, given that the word “transfer” is a word of wide import, there may seem little point in suggesting that a charge does not involve a form of transfer. Nevertheless, it is suggested that there is no “transfer” in the sense that that word is used in relation to assignments. A “transfer” for the purposes of an assignment requires both the movement of rights and an intention to transfer ownership. One without the other does not equate to a transfer. In the case of a charge, there is no intention to transfer ownership even though that may result if there is a default.110 There is also an important difference in effect. Even if it is accepted that a charge involves a transfer, there is a difference in degree between an assignment and a charge because the assignee becomes the owner of the assigned right. Even where 105 Durham Bros v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 at 769 per Chitty LJ; Colonial Mutual General Insurance Co Ltd v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1140 at 1144 per Lord Hoffmann. See also Tooth v Brisbane City Council (1928) 41 CLR 212 at 221 per Isaacs J. 106 Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214 at 226 per Lord Hoffmann; Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 588 at 595–6. See also Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 at 612 per Mummery J; Durham Bros v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 at 770 per Chitty LJ. 107 [4.27], [7.40]. 108 F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 5.6; W Gough, Company Charges (2nd edn, London, Butterworths, 1996) at 19. Cf EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 17–20. 109 Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214 at 226 per Lord Hoffmann. See also W Gough, Company Charges (2nd edn, London, Butterworths, 1996) at 19; EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 18. 110 In practice, the express powers usually given to a chargee under a charge make the legal distinctions between an assignment by way of mortgage and a charge of little practical importance: see F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 5.6. Moreover, it appears to be generally accepted that upon the crystallisation of a floating charge, there is a complete equitable assignment: see National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 6 ACTR 1 at 5–6 per Blackburn J. However, that result probably derives from the construction of the relevant documents rather than a rule of law (see Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 407 at 422 per Brennan CJ). Arguably, documents containing such provisions are on the way to being more like floating mortgages than floating charges: see Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979 at 999 per Buckley LJ.
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a chargee obtains an assignment by enforcing the charge this is different from having ownership upon the creation of the security. In addition, where the chargee obtains an order for sale, this does not equate to a right to sell property held by an owner.111 Thus, any transfer that does take place upon the creation of a charge is not an absolute transfer. Moreover, to the extent that a chargee obtains rights that are not merely potential, those rights do not equate with ownership. In addition, if the chargor grants the chargee a charge over some fund owed to the chargor by a debtor, the chargee obtains no right of action against the debtor. The chargee’s right is limited to a right of action against the chargor.112 Generally, and subject to the particular characteristics of an assigned right, an assignee may have recourse to the obligor directly.113 Finally, in the case of a charge, there is no actual transfer of an underlying personal right which is necessary for a transfer by way of assignment.
(iv) Declarations of Trust [3.18] Assignment, declarations of trust and transfer. Trusts may be created by assignment, declaration or direction.114 The concern here is solely with declarations of trust. A declaration of trust over a legal interest, like a charge, does not analytically involve a disposal of rights by the settlor/trustee but rather a creation and vesting of rights in the beneficiary.115 Nevertheless, trusts are used to alienate assets and a contractual right may be the subject of a declaration of trust.116 Therefore, despite the notion of an “alienation” being broader than the concept of a transfer, there is probably nothing heretical in readily accepting that the creation of a trust may involve a transfer.117 111
EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 17. Burlinson v Hall (1884) 12 QBD 347 at 350. 113 [4.04], [4.08]. 114 A transaction may require a combination of these: eg Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540; McLeay v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1963] NZLR 711 at 717. 115 Cf the position as regards a declaration of trust over an existing equitable interest: see RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) paras 7.200–7.215; JD Heydon and PL Loughlan, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (6th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 7.15; RP Meagher and WMC Gummow, Jacobs Law of Trusts (6th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 1997) ch 7. 116 For the implications of a trust on a promise see ibid, paras 222–5; Law Commission for England and Wales, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties (London, HMSO, 1996) Law Com No 242, paras 2.8–2.9; R Merkin (ed), Privity of Contract (London, LLP, 2000) paras 2.18–2.25; IB Stewart, “Why Place Trust in a Promise?: Privity of Contract and Enforcement of Contracts by Third Party Beneficiaries” (1999) 73 ALJ 354. In some cases it may be more advantageous to declare a trust over the benefit of a contract than to assign the benefit of the contract: see Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291 at 319 (affirmed [2000] Ch 291). 117 Cf [4.07]. Usually, the question whether a declaration of trust involves a transfer arises in the context of a statutory provision, and the resolution of the issue will depend on whether terms such as, “transfer”, “dispose” and “alienate” as used in the legislation are intended to capture declarations of trust. 112
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It is common to describe the beneficiary of a trust as the beneficial owner of the trust property.118 Clearly the concept of ownership here depends on the type of trust and the terms of the trust.119 Often, although the interest of the beneficiary attaches to the property that is the subject matter of the trust, so that the beneficiary’s interest is properly characterised as being proprietary, that interest does not equate with ownership.120 However, there can be little wrong with calling the beneficiary under a bare trust who is sui juris and entitled to an equitable interest corresponding to the full legal interest the equitable owner of the trust property. Such a beneficiary may require the trustee to transfer to it the legal interest or direct the trustee to hold the property for a third party. If it is correct to call such a beneficiary the equitable owner of the trust property then it becomes necessary to distinguish an assignment from a declaration of trust by reference to the intention required for each. In the case of a declaration of trust, the settlor/trustee’s intention is for it to maintain ownership and hold the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiary. In the case of an assignment the intention is to simply transfer ownership.121 It is therefore irrelevant that a court may impose trustee obligations on the assignor in some instances to protect the interest of the assignee. When equity upholds transactions as a declaration of trust or assignment, it is to give effect to these varying intentions.
(e) The Requirement of a Proprietary Right [3.19] Introduction. An assignment of a contractual right is said to involve the transfer of existing proprietary rights.122 It may be questioned whether this property analysis still has value. Clearly the fact that something is thought of as 118 Cf JW Brunyate (ed), Maitland’s Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd revised edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1936) at 17. See also O’Sullivan v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1984] 1 Qd R 212 at 230 citing DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 1 NSWLR 510 at 519 per Hope JA. See further Francis v NPD Property Development Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 202; CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2005) 79 ALJR 1724. 119 Nevertheless, because trust property is not available to the trustee’s creditors, the beneficiaries must have some immediate interest in or over trust property even if that interest is not in any specific asset. 120 DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 1 NSWLR 510 at 519 per Hope. 121 Despite this it is difficult to draw a clear line in some cases. For example, if an assignor, instead of holding a general intention to assign, holds an intention to assign in equity only, then clearly he or she intends to withhold legal ownership. 122 [3.04]. For some purposes it may be necessary to view assignment as primarily involving an issue of contract rather than property, eg, for private international law purposes: see Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] QB 825.
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property may mean that it is transferable, but this is not true of all property.123 In addition, it is not necessary today for something to be considered property for it to be enforceable against a third party, and the fact that something is considered property does not necessarily mean it is enforceable against third parties or has some impact on third parties.124 It is beyond the scope of this book to delve into the detail of any alternative models for assignment. It is also beyond the scope of this book to provide any detailed defence of the current property model of assignment. Nevertheless, since this chapter is concerned with the fundamental feature and ingredients of an assignment and the transfer of a property right is one of those fundamental ingredients, it is appropriate to offer some rationale for the current model. That is, some explanation of why a contractual right may be considered a transferable property right. In this section, the concern is not with explaining how contractual rights came to be viewed as property rights as a matter of legal history. The history of choses in action was dealt with earlier, and it was seen that this process was not systematic and probably occurred by virtue of a number of legal and economic factors. The aim of this section is to suggest an analysis of “contract as transferable property” that reflects modern legal doctrine. [3.20] Contractual rights as transferable property rights. It is generally accepted that, from a legal perspective, property rights arise as a legal response to some causative event.125 One such causative event is consent.126 This is the relevant category of causative event for contractual rights. Of course, consent may also give rise to personal rights. It is therefore necessary to look at what principles determine when such a causative event may give rise to a property right, that is, what principles inform the law to recognise that a person should be designated as having title (ownership) of a right. As evidenced in Chapter 2, the assignability of choses in action, outside statute, has been the creature of equity. Although the common law reached the point of recognising choses in action as being property, it never appeared entirely to accept that they had the characteristic of being transferable. It could be said that the legislative regime for legal assignment ended the need for that characteristic to develop at law. However, because that regime made assignable at law that which 123 Dorman v Rodgers (1982) 148 CLR 365 at 374 per Murphy J; R v Toohey Ex parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327 at 342–3 per Mason J. 124 K Gray and S Gray, “The Idea of Property in Land” in S Bright and J Dewar (eds), Land Law; Themes and Perspectives (Oxford, OUP, 1998) at 35–6. 125 P Birks, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths” [1997] NZLR 623; R Grantham and C Rickett, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths or Unnecessary Complexity?” [1997] NZLR 668. 126 K Gray, “Property in Thin Air” [1991] CLJ 252 at 302–3.
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was previously assignable in equity, it is perhaps more accurate to conclude that the common law (by force of legislation) adopted the approach of equity. Therefore, it is necessary to look to those principles that give rise to equitable proprietary rights not only for the purpose of characterising contractual rights as property but also as having the characteristic of transferability. Professor Gray has suggested that equity defines property by reference to inclusion rather than exclusion. The exclusionary aspect of property has its origins in the common law but in equity property is access.127 He states:128 It is perhaps worth noticing that the historic function of equitable intervention in property matters has always been to ensure, promote and safeguard rights of access. Equity’s concerns have long focused on the perceived need to preserve, for doctrinal reasons,129 various forms of access to the beneficial value of desired goods and resources. Thus, for example, the critical duty of the trustee is to deflect enjoyment to the beneficiary. The function of the restrictive covenant is likewise to permit the covenantee access to part of the utility in the land subject to covenant. The principal must be protected in his or her access to the commercial opportunities which the fiduciary might otherwise hijack. In each of these instances equitable property and the notion of stewardship seldom stand apart. Whereas legal rights, with their stolid and uncompromising character, more clearly connote the exclusionary aspect of property, equitable rights more subtly articulate a range of protected access to the benefits derived from profitable guardianship.
This analysis may be applied to debts and contractual rights. It can be readily accepted that in market economies contractual rights, particularly debts, are valuable assets. By reason of that value alone they may be considered property.130 More importantly that characterisation as an “asset” and the value of that asset depend on the extent to which the law provides access. A creditor requires access to a debt in order to use it like any other asset, for example, as security for the raising of finance and to pay off a debt. Such access would be cumbersome if the creditor was required to obtain the consent of the debtor to transfer the asset. Therefore, the recognition that such rights are assignable is a way of providing such access as it is a way of allowing the asset to be transferred without consent.131 Property is the institution and vehicle that allows that transfer to occur. To talk of access (or property) here without transferability would be nonsense. For the assignee, access requires an ability legitimately to call for performance of an assigned right and to enforce the rights it has purchased from the assignor. Access for the assignee requires enforceability. 127 See further ibid, at 294. See also FS Cohen, “Dialogue on Private Property” (1954–5) 9 Rutgers L Rev 357 at 373. 128 K Gray, “Equitable Property” (1994) 47 CLP 157 at 171. 129 He suggests the doctrinal force that drives equity here is the conscience of the community; see ibid, at 207. 130 [2.05]. 131 See TW Merrill and HE Smith, “The Property/Contract Interface” (2001) 101 Columbia LR 773.
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It follows that assignment is a method by which access is both controlled and given to these resources without the consent of the person bound to provide the performance.132 Moreover, because this access is provided by the law it is legitimate and usual to view such transactions as dealings in property. [3.21] Property and enforcement by the assignee. As noted in the previous paragraph, if access is to be provided to the assignor, it is essential that the subject right be transferable. Little more needs to be said on this point. However, the position of the assignee requires further explanation. In the last paragraph, it was suggested that access vis-à-vis the assignee requires enforceability. This still begs the further question, how does the characterisation of the assignee’s interest as property aid in this enforceability? [3.22] As a starting point, it is instructive to review how the characterisation of something as property affects rights and duties in respect of that property. Grantham and Rickett133 suggest, correctly it is submitted, that once a property right is created as a response to some causative event, it then becomes a causative event in itself,134 which may be the subject of a legal response as it gives rise to primary rights and correlative duties, which, when infringed, give rise to secondary rights and obligations.135 Those rights may be personal rights or proprietary rights. Although the party subject to a duty owes that duty to the right holder, these are rights in respect of a thing in the case of personal rights, and as regards proprietary rights, these are rights which relate to a thing, not a person.136 Thus, statements to the effect that the common law distinguishes between what one is owed and what one owns do not tell the full story. It is necessary to add that one
132 Another related reason for granting access would be the promotion of efficient use of resources: see MD Bayles, Principles of Law: A Normative Nalysis (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1987) at 78–9, 83. 133 R Grantham and C Rickett, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths or Unnecessary Complexity?” [1997] NZLR 668 at 671. See also R Grantham and C Rickett, “Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event” [2003] CLJ 717. 134 Admittedly, some rights such as the right of an owner of property to the income generated by that property are abstract rights. Such a right cannot be transferred separately from the property, as it follows the ownership of the property and it becomes active only if the owner uses the property to generate income: see Booth v Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159 at 165 per Mason CJ. See also Commissioner of State Revenue (Victoria) v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 651 at 666. Nevertheless, it cannot be correct to hold that, until infringed, all property rights are inanimate and not causative events in themselves. To be able to infringe a right the right must not only exist but cause the relevant duty to arise, that is, it is causative; cf P Birks, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths” [1997] NZLR 623. 135 Cf ibid; P Birks, “Definition and Division: A Mediation on Institutes 3.13” in P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) ch 1. See also P Watts, “Property and ‘Unjust Enrichment’: Cognate Conservators” [1998] NZLR 151. 136 See further as regards the rights in respect of things and rights in things, [4.33].
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may be owed an obligation because of what one owns. Importantly property de-personalises the “right–duty correlation”.137 As Penner explains:138 The reference to things is vital. If a thing stands between the right-holder and the dutyower, then we can see how the normative guidance of the rights and duties can be impersonal. We do not have to frame the duty to respect property as a duty to particular individuals, but as a duty in respect of things. This will, of course, benefit the individual right-holders, but they need not be individually enumerated in order to understand the content of the duty.
Given that a “thing” may include a chose in action,139 this analysis could explain why a person in the position of an assignee, who has no contractual relationship with the obligor, can enforce performance by the obligor. That is, because the personal right is a right in respect of a thing.140 [3.23] Despite the above analysis, it is not clear to what extent these general rules of property, which for convenience are here referred to as a “rights model”, explain the assignment of legal choses in action. There are two reasons for this doubt. First, a legal assignment is enforceable by virtue of statute. The common law never had to address these enforcement issues. Secondly, in equity certain subject matter may be considered property due to the degree of protection equity provides.141 That is, courts do not in all cases protect property, but rather “the judiciary calls property that which they protect”.142 In fact, in Norman v Federal Commissioner of 137 R Grantham and C Rickett, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths or Unnecessary Complexity?” [1997] NZLR 668 at 677. 138 JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 24: see also at 75–7. See also JW Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) ch 8; J Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988) at 38; AM Honoré, “Rights of Exclusion and Immunities Against Divesting” (1960) 34 Tulane LR 453 at 463; J Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (2nd edn, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980) at 179–81. 139 [3.10]. 140 Cf JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 129–32. 141 Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health (1990) 95 ALR 87 at 135–6 per Gummow J (affirmed (1990) 99 ALR 679). 142 JE Cribbert, “Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property” (1986) U Ill L Rev 1 at 41. See also D Wright, “The Remedial Aspects of Equitable Property” in P Jackson and DC Wilde (eds), Contemporary Property Law (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999) ch 2. See further Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Livingston [1965] AC 694 at 712 (equity “calls into existence and protects equitable rights and interests in property only where their recognition has been found to be required in order to give effect to its doctrines.”); Cooney v Burns (1922) 30 CLR 216 at 232–3 per Isaacs J (“The word ‘contract’ itself primarily means a transaction which creates personal obligations; but it may, though less exactly, refer to transactions which create real rights. . . . If the personal obligations are such that according to the rules of equity operating on the conscience of the defendant it is a right specifically to enforce the performance of the contract, then, and then only, does equity regard the purchaser as owner of the property.”) Cf P Birks, “Proprietary Rights as Remedies” in P Birks (ed), Frontiers of Liability (Oxford, OUP, 1994) ii, at 216; P Birks, “Annual Miegunyah Lecture: Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment” (1999) 23 Melbourne ULR 1; P Birks, “Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies” (2000) 20 OJLS 1; P Birks, “Personal Property: Proprietary Rights and Remedies” (2000)
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Taxation,143 Windeyer J not only described an assignment as involving a transfer but suggested that equitable assignments were effective because of the remedies equity provided. That is, it is possible to define the assignee’s interest only by reference to the relief the court would provide.144 It is important to stress that equity’s approach here is not moving from effect to cause. In each case the cause for equity’s intervention is the existence of some equity that calls for protection. Thus, the obligation, not the remedy protecting that obligation, comes first.145 Nevertheless, it is the degree of protection provided that dictates that what is being protected is property. It follows that in equity there exists a coalescence between property and obligation.146 An agreement to assign, creating an obligation on the part of the assignor, can (if equity would provide sufficient protection) be upheld as an immediate equitable assignment, giving the assignee beneficial ownership of the assignor’s right against the obligor. [3.24] In terms of enforcement, this remedial model does not require a highly technical explanation. If the conscience of equity is drawn to an assignment, an equity will be raised and equity will consider that an obligation is owed to the assignee by the assignor.147 Equity will make remedies available to the assignee to protect its interest in having those obligations carried out. The degree of protection (access) made available results in the interest of the assignee in the subject right being viewed as a proprietary interest. If sufficiently proprietary, then the assignee can be said to own the subject right and will be owed the obligation by the obligor and may, depending on certain factors, have direct recourse against the obligor.148 Alternatively, and more directly, the explanation may run that it is necessary to call into existence a proprietary interest here to give effect to equitable doctrine. That is, equity’s conscience (via equitable doctrine) is drawn to the transaction; to give effect to that doctrine it is necessary to characterise the KCLJ 1; P Birks, “Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism” (2000) 29 WALR 1 and see S Evans, “Defending Discretionary Remedialism” [2001] Syd LR 463. 143 (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 33–4 per Windeyer J. See also GE Crane Sales Pty Ltd v FCT (1971) 126 CLR 177 at 180 per Barwick CJ. 144 See further Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co v Snider [1916] 1 AC 266 at 272 per Lord Parker. 145 Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health (1990) 95 ALR 87 at 135–6 per Gummow J (affirmed (1990) 99 ALR 679); Wily v St George Partnership Banking Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 1 at 3 per Sackville J. See also P Parkinson, “Reconceptualising the Express Trust” [2002] CLJ 657 at 663. Cf Joshua Getzler, “Patterns of Fusion” in P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987) ch 7 at 175. 146 K Gray, “Equitable Property” (1994) 47 CLP 157 at 165, 183. See also R Goode, “Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions” (1987) 103 LQR 433 at 437. Quaere whether the common law can continue to maintain this distinction: see G Samuel, “Property Notions in the Law of Obligations” (1994) 53 CLJ 524 and P Benson, “The Unity of Contract Law” in P Benson (ed), The Theory of Contract Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001) ch 4. 147 This will depend on whether the elements of an equitable assignment are made out: see [7.18]–[7.23]. 148 [4.08].
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assignee’s interest as proprietary, because the assignment may not only be voluntary but it may be necessary to allow the assignee to have recourse directly against the obligor. It is therefore necessary here to admit an equitable interest in the subject matter of the assignment.149 [3.25] This remedial view of assignment is not at odds with the idea that an assignment involves a transfer. As noted earlier, it was in Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation that Windeyer J recognised the remedial model but nevertheless described assignments as involving a transfer. It does not matter to the “principle of transfer” what method equity uses to hold the assignor to its promise to assign the legal right (or an equitable right) so long as it is acting to give effect to the intention of the assignor (and perhaps in some cases the expectation of the assignee),150 and so long as the interest vested in the assignee is the equitable ownership of the subject legal right. [3.26] It should be added that, although it has never been expressly displaced, it is not entirely clear to what extent this remedial model still represents the totality of equity’s approach to assignment.151 There may be some scope also to recognise the operation of the rights model. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the notion that equity calls property that which it protects means little if this is not dependent upon the degree of protection provided. It is readily accepted that where a court would decree specific performance, the interest protected is proprietary.152 Moreover, in such a case, where the intention is to assign then the interest of the assignee equates to the ownership of the chose.153 Nevertheless, there are numerous authorities that have suggested that, so long as equity will provide any type of protection, then the interest of the assignee may be considered proprietary.154 Such decisions appear to rob the idea of “the degree of protection” of any 149
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Livingston [1965] AC 694 at 712 per Viscount Radcliffe. [7.16]. 151 However, the continued relevance of the principle that an equitable interest is commensurate with the protection that equity will provide was recently reaffirmed by the High Court of Australia in Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315 at 333. Arguably a weakness of the remedial model is that although one might readily conclude that a right protected by specific performance is a property right, nevertheless, for as long as one requires such a remedy to protect his or her position, there is no transfer of ownership: see Currey v The Federal Building Society (1929) 42 CLR 421 at 448 per Isaacs J. This argument seems to be based on the view that if one owns something, although remedies may be required to prevent intrusions upon the enjoyment of that ownership, no remedy is required to uphold the interest as it is complete. Perhaps there is a weakness in this argument, in that it appears to be based on a common law view of ownership which defines ownership by exclusion rather than an equitable concept of ownership based on access. 152 The relevant time for determining the availability of a remedy is the time of the assignment rather than the time an order to enforce it is sought: see JF Keeler, “Some Reflections on Holroyd v Marshall” (1967–70) 3 Adelaide Law Review 360 at 371. Cf [7.16]. 153 Cf Currey v The Federal Building Society (1929) 42 CLR 421 at 448 per Isaacs J. 154 For a collection, discussion and criticism of these decisions see RP Meagher, “Sir Frederick Jordan’s Footnote” (1999) 15 Journal of Contract Law (JCL) 1. 150
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meaning. If a party may claim some equitable relief in respect of some thing then, although that right may legitimately be characterised as protecting some property interest, it does not necessarily equate to the recognition of equitable ownership of the thing. Moreover, if the governing principle is that equity considers property that which it protects, then the remedy itself will dictate whether or not the subject matter (debt or contractual right) constitutes a “thing” in the first place. That is, the action may not properly be characterised as being in respect of a thing.155 Transactions properly termed “assignments” should be limited to cases where the assignee is vested with an interest equating to ownership (legal or equitable) and not something less than this. Arguably where the protection being provided is not specific performance, then, unless the transaction can be upheld as an assignment on some other approach, such as the rights model, it should perhaps be viewed as a transaction that is on its way to being an assignment, but not in fact an assignment.156 Secondly, the remedial model was adopted at a time when an equitable assignment was viewed as giving the assignee rights only against the assignor.157 In such circumstances it makes sense to speak of the assignment as capable of being the subject of an order for specific performance. The assignee was interested only in forcing the assignor to lend its name to the suit or later taking the necessary steps to complete a legal assignment. Today, the joinder of the assignor is generally thought to be a mere matter of procedure and, in any case, no separate action is required to join the assignor. Moreover, it is now accepted that an equitable assignee may have direct claims against the obligor and, although it may make sense to say that as against the assignor the assignee owns the subject right by reason of the degree of protection equity will afford, ultimately, to enforce that right against the obligor the assignee is relying on its ownership of the assigned right, and not the availability of a remedy against the assignor. The relevance of the rights model is seen in the fact that the efficacy of an assignment is not dependant upon the continued existence of a remedy against the assignor. Thus, the better view may be that the two models work in combination to give full effect to the assignment. Therefore, in some instances equity is not calling property that which it protects, but is simply protecting an interest in property that is already in existence. That is, as is sometimes said, equity simply recognises that a chose in action is property for the purposes of transfer.158 Thirdly, it is readily accepted that where parties agree for valuable consideration immediately to assign a legal right then, if for any reason the transaction is not upheld as a legal assignment, it will be upheld as an equitable assignment as soon 155
See further ibid, at 9. Haque v Haque (1965) 114 CLR 98 at 124–5 per Kitto J; Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489 at 523 per Deane and Dawson JJ. 157 [4.05], [4.19]. 158 [4.07]. 156
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as the assignee’s consideration is executed.159 That equitable assignment is not dependent upon the availability of specific performance.160 Therefore, although equity will provide a remedy to protect the interest of an assignee, that remedy flows from a right which in turn arises from having an interest in the legal right which is the subject of the assignment. In such cases it does not matter what remedy equity would provide to protect the interest of the assignee. In fact, in Tailby v Official Receiver,161 Lord Macnaghten, in discussing the relevance of specific performance to assignments of future property, said:162 [T]he Court is merely asked to protect rights completely defined as between the parties to the contract, or to give effect to such rights either by granting an injunction or by appointing a receiver, or by adjudicating on questions between rival claimants. The truth is that cases of equitable assignment . . . where the consideration has passed, depend on the real meaning of the agreement between the parties. The difficulty, generally speaking, is to ascertain the true scope and effect of the agreement. When that is ascertained you have only to apply the principle that equity considers that done which ought to be done if that principle is applicable under the circumstances of the case. The doctrines relating to specific performance do not, I think, afford a test or measure of the rights created.
This is significant because equitable assignments of legal rights are important to commerce, and must therefore be seen as based on a set of reliable factors rather than being discretionary.163 Although it may be said that where a failed legal assignment is upheld as an equitable assignment, or where an agreement legally to assign is upheld as an immediate equitable assignment, it is, in a sense, upheld in equity by operation of law,164 today, such equitable assignments may be all that is intended by the parties.165 That is, the parties intend to take advantage of those equitable principles that have been applied to uphold such transactions. However, on a pure remedial approach the type of remedy available should be very important, and
159
[7.19]. [7.19]. 161 (1888) 13 App Cas 523. 162 (1888) 13 App Cas 523 at 547–8. See also Pakenham Upper Fruit Co Ltd v Crosby (1924) 35 CLR 386 at 398 per Isaacs and Rich JJ; Re Crothers (1930) VLR 49 at 56. 163 Alternatively, it may be that equity gives effect to the assignment upon execution of consideration because at that point damages become inadequate. This is not to introduce a requirement of specific enforceability, but it may suggest that equity’s approach here is still remedial rather than rights based. It would follow that if damages were still an adequate remedy the assignment would not be upheld. This may explain why no equitable interest arises upon entry into an agreement for the sale of goods: see further JF Keeler, “Some Reflections on Holroyd v Marshall” (1967–70) 3 Adelaide LRev 360 at 374. However, if that were the sole reason for equity’s recognition of assignments of legal rights, then, given that it is now possible to assign at law, one would have expected equity to retire from this field. 164 [7.16]. 165 Eg in receivables financing often there is intended to be only an equitable assignment, or at least an assignment without notice. Such transactions are not upheld as failed legal assignments. 160
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strictly only the availability of specific performance would be enough to give rise to an interest amounting to the beneficial ownership of the legal right.
(f) Assignment and Privity of Contract [3.27] Assignment distinguished from privity. The assignment of a contractual right does not create privity of contract between the assignee and obligor.166 This is obvious enough in the case of an equitable assignment,167 but it is also true of a legal assignment.168 As noted earlier, the effect of an assignment is that the relevant obligation is owed to the assignee, but what the assignee acquires in terms of characterisation is title to a contractual obligation promised by the obligor to the assignor. The assignment does not substitute the assignee for the assignor as a matter of contract.169 If it were otherwise there would have been no need to state in the legislative provisions that the assignee takes subject to the equities, nor expressly state that the assignment transfers the legal right as well as the legal remedies and other remedies for its recovery.170 Moreover, if an assignment did bring the parties into privity, it would not be possible to maintain the distinction that is drawn between the assignment of contractual rights and contractual duties. If an assignee is brought into privity with the obligor, it would be bound by contractual duties and liable for the non-performance of those duties. This is not the law.171 In addition, if the assignee and obligor are brought into privity, the assignee should, in all cases, be able to recover for its own personal loss resulting from a breach of contract by the obligor.172 The enforcement of the assignee’s right is not at odds with privity because what the assignee protects or enforces is its title to the 166 Similarly, a contract for the benefit of a third party does not, without more, create an assignment: Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460. 167 Bagot Pneumatic Tyre Co v Clipper Pneumatic Tyre Co [1902] 1 Ch 146 at 156 per Vaughan Williams LJ; Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1976] QB 430 at 445 per Sir John Pennycuick. Cf Calaby Pty Ltd v Ampol Pty Ltd (1990) 71 NTR 1 at 17–20 per Angel J (overruled (1991) 110 ALR 343). In this last case, Angel J was inclined to think that an assignment can create privity and in any case believed privity would exist if the original contract was expressly made with the promisee and its assigns. However, the better view is that such a provision merely goes to evidencing the assignability of the subject right: see further [6.71] and see [3.07]. 168 Cf Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1976] QB 430 at 445 per Sir John Pennycuick; Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 561 per Giles J. 169 International Leasing Corp (Vic) Ltd v Aiken [1967] 2 NSWR 427 at 438 per Jacobs JA. 170 Read v Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128 at 132 per Lord Esher MR. See also Bennett v White [1910] 2 KB 643 at 646 per Cozens-Hardy MR. 171 Bagot Pneumatic Tyre Co v Clipper Pneumatic Tyre Co [1902] 1 Ch 146 at 156 per Vaughan Williams LJ; Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil Corp Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 138 at 147 per Hoffmann J (overruled on another point [1995] Ch 152); Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310 at 317 per Lord Templeman. 172 [8.09]–[8.15].
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subject right. Thus, assignment is not a true exception to privity. Moreover, it is not improper to refer to the assignee as the “promisee” in the case of an assignment of a contractual right, or the “licensee” in the case of an assignment of a contractual licence, or “the bank” in the case of an assignment of the benefit of a security where the bank is defined to include its “assigns”. However, in doing this it is necessary to recognise that the assignee is being characterised by reference to the property right that it owns and not by reference to the personal contactual rights that exist between the parties to the contract.173 Finally, because an assignment does not create privity of contract, except for the enforcement of unconditionally accrued rights, the assignee is dependent upon the continued existence of the contract and the continued legal existence of the parties to the contract.174
173 174
See further Garrisons Pty Ltd v The Solicitors’ Trust [2004] TASSC 139. See Re Kenneth Wright Distributors Pty Ltd [1973] VR 161.
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4 Equitable Assignments (a) Introduction [4.01] Purpose of the chapter. This chapter is concerned with the characterisation of an equitable assignment of a legal right. In Chapter 3 it was suggested that such an assignment can be legitimately understood as involving a transfer and therefore properly termed an “assignment”. So far as the theme of this book is concerned, the purpose of this chapter is to determine whether this “assignment as transfer” idea is in fact reflected in case law even if not necessarily articulated in the manner suggested in Chapter 3. This is an issue that is not only important in attaching a label to such transactions. Whether or not the transaction is properly seen as an assignment will affect the nature and characteristics of the right vested in the assignee as well as how, and the extent to which, the assignee, may enforce its assigned right. More generally, this chapter is concerned with investigating the essence of an equitable assignment. This is important for the chapters that follow. [4.02] Structure of the chapter. The main focus of this chapter is on the equitable assignment of legal rights assignable at law. The characterisation of such transactions as true assignments is problematic. This flows from the view that the assignee is, to a certain extent, dependant on the assignor for its protection, or may only have rights against the assignor. The chapter also briefly looks at the equitable assignment of legal interests not assignable at law to determine whether such transactions are properly termed “assignments”. Finally, the chapter addresses the so-called “assignment” of future interests. For completeness, the chapter begins with a brief statement of the position as regards equitable assignments of equitable interests. Although the principal concern of the book is the assignment of legal contractual rights, an equitable assignee of such a right who further assigns the right will obviously be attempting to assign an equitable rather than a legal interest.1 It is, therefore, necessary to deal with equitable assignments of equitable interests as the presence of such intermediate 1 Eg Care Shipping Corp v Latin American Shipping Corp [1983] 1 QB 1005. See also Letts v IRC [1957] 1 WLR 201 (here it was held that a contractual right to have shares issued was an equitable chose in action as it could be protected only by specific performance).
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assignees will be important when later addressing the position of the parties in Chapter 8.2
(b) Equitable Assignment of Equitable Interests [4.03] Equitable assignment of equitable interests. The assignee of an assignment of an equitable interest that subsists at the time of the assignment can sue in his or her own name and give a good discharge, as the assignee alone is regarded as having an interest in the subject matter assigned.3 However, where the equitable assignment is of only part of an equitable interest, then as a procedural safeguard the assignor must be joined in any action.4 In either case, there can be no doubt that there is a true transfer of the equitable interest. The assignee becomes the owner (in equity) of the relevant interest and is owed the relevant duty. There is both a transfer of title and an actual transfer of the subject right.
(c) Equitable Assignment of Legal Interests Assignable at Law (i) Introduction [4.04] The equitable assignment conundrum. Despite its longevity, there continues to be a difference of opinion whether an equitable assignment of a legal right should be characterised as a true assignment. In practice, these unresolved issues tend to cause problems in two areas. The first concerns whether notice to the 2 Where a contract creates an equitable interest, the contract rights themselves constitute a legal chose in action. If it were possible to deal with the contract right distinct from the equitable interest, the dealing would be a dealing in legal rights: see Lane v Conlan (2003) 28 WAR 337. 3 Redman v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1916) 22 CLR 84 at 95 per Isaacs J. However, it has been held that a partner cannot separately assign his or her right to a share in the profits of the partnership as it is not distinct from the interest in the partnership. Moreover, an assignment of a partner’s interest in the partnership, though valid, does not make the assignee a partner. Therefore, to give effect to the assignment of this equitable interest it is necessary to impose a trust, so that the assignor who remains a partner holds the relevant interest on trust for the assignee: see FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440; Commissioner of Taxation v Galland (1986) 162 CLR 408. Cf Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1989] 2 NZLR 447, [1991] 3 NZLR 517, [1993] AC 524, FCT v Everett (1978) 21 ALR 625 at 643–4 per Deane J. 4 Eg Letts v IRC [1957] 1 WLR 201. Moreover, in the case of a mortgage where an action is on foot between the assignee and obligor, if the assignor wishes to enforce its equity of redemption, he or she needs to be joined: see Re Pain [1919] 1 Ch 38.
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obligor is required for the validity of the assignment,5 and the second is the more problematic conundrum caused by the requirement of joinder. Although the issue of notice is prima facie a matter of formality, it is important to address it here as it impacts on the nature of the relationship between the assignee and obligor, which is important in characterising the essence of the transaction. The requirements for a valid notice are discussed in the context of formalities in Chapter 7. As to joinder, the great weight of modern authority holds that in any action by an assignee to enforce its assigned right it must join the assignor as a matter of procedure.6 The reasons for such procedural joinder have been said to be to ensure that the debtor does not have to pay twice;7 to ensure that the assignor is bound;8 to ensure the debtor is protected from a further claim;9 and to give the assignor the opportunity to challenge the assignment.10 It is probably this last statement that best captures the idea here. If the assignment is valid the assignor cannot deny the assignee’s ownership. The debtor is at risk only if he or she accounts to the assignee and the assignment is invalid. However, even if the assignment is valid the debtor will not want the inconvenience of a further action being brought by the assignor. Being merely a matter of procedure, joinder may be dispensed with in certain cases. This gives rise to a conundrum, in that the procedural view of joinder apparently allows an equitable assignee to claim a legal remedy for the purposes of enforcing a legal right. Legal doctrine would suggest that such a claim would require the joinder of the assignor as a matter of substantive law. In addition, at the same time as the authorities appear to accept the procedural view of joinder, there is another line of authority that suggests that an equitable assignment merely gives the assignee rights against the assignor. If this is correct, then any action against the obligor must by definition be brought by the assignor which would, in turn, dictate that joinder is substantive. This directly calls into question both the character of these transactions as true assignments and the interest vested in the assignee. The conclusions drawn in this chapter may be broken down into the following points: 1. For the reasons discussed in Chapter 3, a transaction is properly characterised as an equitable assignment of a legal right only if the assignor intends to transfer ownership of an identifiable and identified legal right to the assignee and if the assignee is vested with the equitable ownership of that legal right and is treated (in equity) as being owed the relevant obligation. 5
This issue was left open by Windeyer J in Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 38. As regards partial assignments: see [4.27]. 7 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 at 298 per Staughton J. 8 Walter & Sullivan Ltd v J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584 at 588; Central Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corp (The Aiolos) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25 at 32. 9 Ibid, at 33–4. 10 Durham Brothers v Robinson [1898] 1 QB 765. 6
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Point five and the extent and type of remedies that may be available to the equitable assignee are mentioned in this chapter but dealt with in detail in Chapter 8.11
(ii) The Character of an Equitable Assignment of a Legal Right [4.05] The contract analysis. Historically, for an equitable assignee of a legal right to enforce the legal right the action had to be brought by the assignee in the name of the assignor.12 If the assignor refused to allow its name to be used the assignee could, if the assignment was for valuable consideration,13 file a bill in equity and, upon giving an indemnity as to costs, obtain an injunction allowing the assignor’s
11
[8.27]–[8.30]. Cf as to the assignment of part of a debt Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 29–30 per Windeyer J. See [4.27]. 13 Re Westerton [1919] 2 Ch 104 at 111 per Sargant J; Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 3 per Atkinson J. See also Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 31 per Windeyer J. 12
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name to be used in a suit at law to recover the assigned debt.14 The action had the appearance of one brought by the assignor. Even today, because the assignor remains the legal owner of the debt,15 he or she maintains a cause of action.16 Where the equity courts were capable of enforcing the assignee’s claim directly, they generally did not do so because the potential then existed for the assignor to bring an action at law on the same claim, thus requiring the obligor to obtain an injunction to stop the second suit. More generally, injunctions could be obtained in equity to prevent an assignor suing at law for his or her own benefit.17 The fact that the action proceeded at law, and in the name of the assignor, was logical because the proceedings were intended to enforce the legal right. If the assignee could enforce the legal right directly it would suggest that the legal right had been transferred. That result would have been beyond the jurisdiction of equity to deliver. Equity could not put in place rules for the transfer of legal rights. What it could and did do was take the position that, if a person intends to assign a legal right, that person should, in certain circumstances (such as where there is executed consideration for the promise), be bound by that act. Thus, equity acting in personam attaches to the conscience of the assignor and forces the assignor to lend his or her name to the suit at law.18 On the above analysis the equitable assignment of a legal right merely provided the assignee with a remedy against the assignor, that is, the assignment operated only between the assignor and assignee. What is obtained or “assigned” from the assignor appears to be no more than a right to sue in the name of the assignor.19 There are numerous authorities, even of recent origin, that take this view of the
14 Crouch v Credit Foncier of England Ltd (1873) LR 8 QB 374 at 380 per Blackburn J. See also Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619, 99 ER 1284; Re Westerton [1919] 2 Ch 104; Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292; Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 26 per Windeyer J. See also Turquand & The Capital and Counties Bank v Fearon (1879) 4 QBD 280. The assignor could also be restrained from receiving the debt: see Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 27 per Windeyer J. Alternatively, the defendant could be forced to admit, in the action at law, that the assignee held the legal interest: see Sweet v Cator (1841) 11 Sim Rep 572, 59 ER 994. Where the assignee held a power of attorney from the assignor it could bring an action at law and could obtain relief in equity only if the assignor obstructed or threatened to obstruct the assignee’s claim: see Cator v Burke (1785) 1 Brown’s Ch 434, 28 ER 1222. If the assignee failed to offer the indemnity before joining the assignor as a defendant, the assignee, although successful in the action, may have been required to pay that defendant’s costs: see Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 89 per Gaudron and Gummow JJ. See also Turquand & the Capital & Counties Bank v Fearon (1879) 4 QBD 280. 15 Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 357; Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 at 381 (overruled on another point sub nom Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367). 16 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292. See also Paragon Finance plc v Pender [2005] 1 WLR 3412. 17 Jeffs v Day (1866) LR 1 QB 372. 18 See Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 66 per MacFarlan J. 19 Hammond v Messenger (1838) 9 Sim 327, 59 ER 383.
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assignee’s position.20 The rationale for this analysis is that such an assignment operates by way of agreement or contract between the assignor and assignee.21 The effect of this contract analysis is that equity forces the assignor to perform its promise rather than leave the assignee with a remedy in damages. It is important to note what that promise is. Initially, the assignor had agreed immediately to assign a legal right to the assignee. Such an agreement was incapable of being performed at law and therefore it cannot be the case that equity would uphold such contracts of assignment only if they were capable of being the subject of an order for specific performance. It appears that equity implied a promise that the assignor would lend its name to any suit against the obligor and held the assignor to this promise.22 In short, and perhaps with less precision, equity gave effect to the intended assignment by recognising an agreement to assign. The remedial model of an equitable assignment of a legal right discussed earlier originated with the contract analysis.23 [4.06] As noted earlier, the remedial model of assignment is not at odds with the notion that an assignment involves a transfer.24 However, if the remedial model remained grounded in this contract analysis a problem does arise because, if the assignee’s rights merely flow from a contract and its ability to obtain remedies to enforce a promise flowing from that contract, then that result could be achieved without resorting to the language of assignment and vested rights.25 This is even more the case if the “remedy” is merely in respect of a promise by the assignor to lend its name to any suit against the obligor. The mere fact that a person may have an equitable remedy in relation to a legal right does not mean that they have an interest in the legal right. Clearly, in the past, the word “assignment” has been used in a broad sense.26 If the extent of the assignee’s rights was limited to actions against the assignor then equity did little more than the common law, except to construct a power of attorney when no express power was given.27 For there to be a true assignment, that is, a transfer, it is not sufficient for the assignor to vest in the assignee a right against the assignor, but rather the assignee must be vested 20 Eg Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd (1991) 5 Butterworths Property Reports (BPR) 11,512 at 11,518; Showi Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 561; Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 at 576 per Deane J. See also Neave v Neave [1926] GLR 254 at 256. 21 Wright v Wright (1749–50) 1 Ves Sen 410 at 412, 27 ER 1111 at 1112. 22 From this it is not difficult to see the legitimacy of equity giving immediate effect to what in law is a mere agreement to assign and, alternatively, where an immediate assignment fails at law, giving effect to the transaction as an agreement (legally) to assign and thus an immediate equitable assignment. 23 [3.23]. 24 [3.25]. 25 It would also prevent the recognition of voluntary assignments. 26 [3.04]. 27 SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 567.
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with the ownership of rights which exist between the assignor and the obligor by virtue of the contract between the assignor and obligor. The contract analysis does not provide this result. [4.07] The assignment analysis. An alternative analysis, and one which gives effect to a transfer, is that equity restated or progressed the remedial model so that the transfer was given effect to by reason of the remedies equity provided.28 Here equity did not merely take the view that in certain circumstances an assignor should be bound by his or her promise to assign, rather, by virtue of the degree of protection it was prepared to provide the assignee, it recognised the assignee’s beneficial ownership of the subject matter of the assignment. Here, equity does not simply bind the conscience of the assignor and act in personam; rather, because the conscience of the assignor is bound equity fastens upon the subject property itself.29 In addition, for reasons discussed earlier, equity also at some point appears to have taken the step of simply recognising the proprietary character (ownership) of a legal right for the purpose of transfer.30 This is a clear recognition of a transfer taking place. It follows that such transactions take effect as assignments because an equitable interest is created and vested in the assignee, and that interest is the beneficial ownership of the legal right which is the subject of the assignment and the assignee is treated (in equity) as being owed the obligation. That is, in less precise terms (and in respect of contractual rights), the assignee obtains an interest in the contract that exists between the assignor and obligor. This is referred to here as the assignment analysis.31 It is only by reference to this analysis that such assignments are, as they are said to be, examples and applications of the maxim that equity treats as done that which ought to be done.32 28
[3.23]. Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 27 per Dixon J. 30 [3.26]. See also Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372–3 per Cozens Hardy LJ; Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 355 per PO Lawrence J. See further Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 at 315 per Peter Gibson LJ. 31 This analysis can be confused with a trust analysis, that is, an equitable assignment operated by way of trust: see further ICF Spry, Equitable Remedies (6th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 2001) at 80. Here, the interest of the assignee is equated to the interest of a beneficiary under a trust. However, it is inaccurate to align an assignment with a trust merely because a court may impose a trust to protect the interest of an assignee: see Re Rose [1952] Ch 499 at 510–11 per Evershed MR; Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1976] 1 QB 430 at 443–4 per Roskill LJ. See further GE Crane Sales Pty Ltd v FCT (1971) 126 CLR 177 at 183 per Menzies J (suggesting that where a creditor constitutes itself as a trustee of its debts for another, this amounts to an assignment in equity of the debts). Nevertheless, the trust analysis is perhaps an important indicator that equity would recognise the assignment of legal interests by way of gift: see Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 33 per Windeyer J. The trust analysis was perhaps a logical consequence of the contract analysis. That is, if the effect of upholding the assignment was only to give it effect as between the assignor and assignee, a trust may be required to protect the assignee’s interest when the subject matter of the assignment was in the hands of the assignor: see Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 66 per MacFarlan J. 32 [7.15]. 29
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[4.08] Conclusions on the characterisation of equitable assignments of legal rights. There is a dichotomy between the assignment analysis and the contract analysis. It is suggested that the assignment analysis represents the modern and better view. This is evidenced by the procedural view taken of joinder which, although designed to protect the obligor and to ensure all interested parties are before the court, appears implicitly to recognise that the obligor owes its obligation in part to the assignee as the assignee, can bring an action in its own name against the obligor under this rule.33 Thus, the view that such a transaction involves a true transfer is reinforced by the fact that the need for an action at law to enforce the obligation of the obligor began to be viewed as a mere procedural incident. The assignor plaintiff was merely a nominal plaintiff.34 The contract analysis itself showed early signs of breakdown when equity took the view that if the assignor would not lend its name to the suit at law or did or intended to do some act which would prevent the assignee from recovering at law in the assignor’s name, the assignee could commence an action in equity in its own name against the obligor, especially if there had been collusion between the assignor and obligor.35 [4.09] In addition, in time, and perhaps as a consequence of section 85 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854,36 if an assignor would not lend its name to a suit at law for the benefit of the assignee, then the assignee could commence an action in law in its own name and join the assignor as co-defendant. From this the view naturally formed, at law, that it was necessary only that the assignor be a party to the action to ensure that the assignor was bound by the decision for the protection of the obligor. However, that procedure reflects an equitable, rather than a common law, approach to joinder.37 Certainly, the point was reached where the common law courts, knowing that the assistance of equity was available, adopted the position that an assignee could sue in the assignor’s name without having to go 33 See [4.04]. See also Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 4 per Atkinson J; Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 at 385 (overruled on another point sub nom Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367). 34 Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372 per Cozens-Hardy LJ; James Nelson & Sons Ltd v Nelson Line (Liverpool) Ltd [1906] 2 KB 217. 35 Hammond v Messenger (1838) 9 Sim 327 at 332, 59 ER 383 at 385–6. There is also early authority that appears to recognise the assignee as the owner in equity: see Fashion v Atwood (1688) 2 Chan Cas 37, 22 ER 835. See also Ross v Blackham (1875) 1 VLR (E) 220 at 232. 36 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 77. This Act allowed the common law courts to entertain equitable defences. Thus, if a debt was assigned in equity and the assignor attempted to enforce the debt for his or her own benefit in a common law court, the court could entertain the defence that in equity an injunction could be obtained to prevent this: see Jeffs v Day (1866) LR 1 QB 372. 37 The fact that the assignor may be joined as a defendant does not mean that the action by the assignee is against the assignor. This is simply a procedure used by equity to ensure all interested parties are before the court and bound by the judgment.
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to equity.38 When this position was reached at law, equity adopted the position that, because the assignee had a remedy at law, it should be left to that remedy rather than an equitable remedy. However, the common law courts never reached the point, prior to the Judicature Act 1873 section 25(6), of allowing an assignee of a chose in action to sue in its own name at law without joining the assignor.39 Today, no separate action in equity is required to force the assignor to lend its name to the suit. The assignor is simply joined as co-plaintiff, and if it refuses to be so joined then it can be joined as co-defendant. Moreover, if the obligor does not take the point that the assignor has not been joined, the court may ignore it.40 Finally, the assignment analysis gives effect to the transaction as a transfer, and therefore is in line with the modern view that an assignment involves a transfer. It also follows that on the assignment analysis, the interest equity protects is the assignee’s equitable ownership of the assigned right. The assignee’s rights do not derive from a mere personal equity giving the assignee a personal right to seek an equitable remedy against the obligor.
(iii) Notice and Joinder [4.10] The case law. The view that notice to the obligor is necessary for the efficacy of an equitable assignment of a legal right was stressed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Mountain Road (No 9) Ltd v Michael Edgley Corp Pty Ltd.41 This case involved a purported assignment for value of certain contractual rights, expressed to take effect only upon the execution of a memorandum of assignment. That memorandum was never signed by one of the parties, and the invalidity of the assignment was upheld on that ground. However, the court went on to suggest that even if that were not the case the assignment could not be enforced as an equitable assignment of a legal right because notice had not been given to the obligor. Prior to such notice the assignment was complete only as between the assignor and assignee. [4.11] Two principal authorities were relied upon in Mountain Road. The first was the decision of Lord Macnaghten in William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd.42 In this case the debtor had paid the assignor after receiving notice 38
[2.12]. Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 27 per Windeyer J. See also Price v Seaman (1825) 4 B & C 525, 107 ER 1155. 40 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 at 462 per Lord Macnaghten. 41 [1999] 1 NZLR 335. Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 65 per MacFarlan J. 42 [1905] AC 454. Reliance was also placed on Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co. [1965] 1 QB 101 at 129 where Roskill J said that “notice to the debtor before action is brought is clearly required”. These remarks were criticised by Scott J in Weddell v JA Pearce & Major [1988] Ch 26 at 45. However, it may be that Roskill J was simply referring to the requirements for a legal assignment. Cf Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 431 (overruled on another point [1903] 1 39
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of the assignment. The issue raised for judgment was whether the debtor had received sufficient notice. If sufficient notice had been given, the debtor’s payment to the assignor would not result in the discharge of the debt and the debtor would remain liable to the assignee. The court in Mountain Road thought that the tenor of Lord Macnaghten’s speech supported the view that “the title of an equitable assignee is not effective against third parties unless and until they have been given notice”.43 However, Lord Macnaghten made only two remarks as regards notice. First, he said that as between assignor and assignee the assignment was complete without notice.44 Secondly, the only statement he made that may imply that notice is relevant to the efficacy of the assignment was, “All that is necessary is that the debtor should be given to understand that the debt has been made over by the creditor to some third person”.45 However, that statement was simply addressing the issue of the form that equitable assignments may take. That is, it need not be in the form of a communication to the assignee, but rather a communication to the debtor/obligor. It was not meant as a comprehensive statement of the requirements of an equitable assignment. In fact, the statement was meant to convey the informal nature of equitable assignments. [4.12] The second case relied on was Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd.46 This case concerned the equitable assignment of an option. The preliminary issue put before the court was: “[w]hether or not an equitable assignee of a contractual option who has not given notice of the assignment to the grantor of the option may exercise the same in his own name so as to bind the grantor of the option”.47 Lord Denning MR said that “it is a settled principle of equity that in order to perfect the title of an assignee of a debt notice to the debtor is necessary”.48 He considered that this principle was not limited to debts, but also extended to options. He said that a “grantor cannot be expected to act on a letter purporting to exercise the option which comes out of the blue from someone or other of which he knows nothing. . . . Notice is therefore necessary to perfect the right of the assignee to KB 644) where Channell J, in dealing with an assignment of a legal right, suggested that prior to the passing of the Judicature Act the assignee would have had rights after giving notice to the obligor. See also Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 at 387 per Sir Michael Fox (overruled on another point sub nom Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367). 43 [1999] 1 NZLR 335 at 341. 44 [1905] AC 454 at 462. 45 Ibid. 46 [1976] 1 QB 430. 47 Ibid, at 440. 48 Ibid, at 442, citing Stocks v Dobson (1853) 4 De GM & G 11, 43 ER 411. The issue in the latter case concerned whether a sub-assignee, having given no notice, could force the debtor to pay again after it had settled with the assignor/intermediate-assignee. Turner LJ saw the facts as giving rise to a priority dispute, hence the reference to notice being necessary to perfect title. See also Neave v Neave [1926] GLR 254 at 256 per Adams J; Squires v SA Steel & Sheet Pty Ltd (1987) 45 South Australian State Reports (SASR) 147 at 144 per Bollen J; Herkules Piling Ltd v Tilbury Construction Ltd (1992) 61 BLR 107 at 119–20 per Hirst J; Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] QB 825.
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exercise the option.”49 Arguably the latter statement does not follow from the former. Although the element of surprise may be a reason for staying an action brought by the assignee, that cannot be determinative of the title of the assignee.50 In the same case Roskill LJ said that “an equitable assignee of a contractual option who has not given notice of the assignment to the grantor of the option cannot exercise that option in his own name”.51 He continued, “the only rights that an equitable assignment can create in the equitable assignee are rights against his assignor who thenceforth becomes the trustee of the benefit of the option for the assignee, and the assignor could, of course, be compelled in equity to exercise those rights for the benefit of the assignee. . . . The present equitable assignee never became the legal assignee, and so, in my judgment, never became in a position to enforce the contractual right.”52 These remarks suggest that, unlike Lord Denning MR, Roskill LJ saw notice as being relevant only to determining whether or not the statutory regime had been satisfied. He did not suggest that the assignment was not a perfectly good equitable assignment prior to notice being given. His remarks concerning enforcement by an equitable assignee follow the traditional contract analysis of an equitable assignment, although he added that the assignee becomes a trustee, thus recognising a beneficial interest in the assignee.53 Similarly, Sir John Pennycuick took the view that the equitable assignee could not exercise the option because the assignment did not put the assignee into a contractual relationship with the obligor. Although this case involved an attempted exercise of a legal right, it would follow on his reasoning that an equitable assignee could not bring proceedings against the obligor to enforce a legal right. He suggested that the equitable assignee’s interest consists only of a right in equity to require the assignor to protect the interest which he or she had assigned, by, in that case, exercising the option.54 Where the assignor refuses to do so, the assignee can take action in equity to compel the assignor to act for the benefit of the assignee. His analysis is an even more straightforward adoption of the contract analysis than that of Roskill LJ. He saw enforcement as based on personal contractual rights and obligations. There being no contract between the assignee and obligor, the assignee had no rights against the obligor. It appears that both Roskill LJ and Sir John Pennycuick were of the view that if a person wishes to exercise a legal right, that person must have the legal right. An equitable interest in that right is not sufficient. This is a sound view and the result 49 [1976] 1 QB 430 at 442. This statement on its face appears merely to address the sufficiency of notice, that is, it appears to suggest that for a notice to be legitimate it must originate from the assignor. Cf Morrell v Wootten (1852) 16 Beav 197, 51 ER 753. See further [7.18]. 50 Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 561. 51 [1976] 1 QB 430 at 443. 52 Ibid, at 443–4. 53 Cf Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 at 302 per Staughton LJ, at 315 per Peter Gibson LJ. 54 [1976] 1 QB 430 at 445.
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in the case is therefore the correct one.55 Moreover, both Roskill LJ and Sir John Pennycuick appeared to be of the view that even if notice had been given, the assignee would still not have been able to exercise the option in its capacity as an equitable assignee.56 Notice would have made a difference only if it was the final element of a legal assignment. Therefore, it was only Lord Denning MR who emphasised a need for notice to perfect the title of an equitable assignee.57 What can no longer be accepted from the judgments of Roskill LJ and Sir John Pennycuick is the idea that an equitable assignment only ever gives the assignee rights against the assignor. There was no need to hark back to this contract analysis to provide the desired commercial result in the case when both could have simply relied on the sounder basis just mentioned which also gives effect to the transaction as a true assignment. [4.13] The court in Mountain Road disagreed with the well known decision of Scott J in Weddell v JA Pearce & Major.58 This case involved the commencement of a claim in negligence by an equitable assignee prior to any notice of the assignment being given to the obligor. Scott J did not appear to be of the belief that notice was necessary for the efficacy of the assignment. Rather, he appeared to consider notice as being primarily relevant to priorities as between competing assignees. His decision was reached simply by focusing on the notion, expressed in a number of cases, that, although the assignee should join the assignor, an action commenced by the assignee was not a nullity.59 This assumed that the assignee is otherwise entitled to sue in its own name. Such an action, he thought, was liable to be stayed pending the joinder of the assignor.60 Without such joinder the assignee could obtain interim relief 61 but would generally be unable to obtain damages or a perpetual injunction. It followed that he considered joinder to be a 55 It should be noted that the case involved an attempt to exercise a legal right, and in that context there was no need for Roskill LJ and Sir John Pennycuick to draw the distinction between the enforcement of a legal right by way of a legal remedy on the one hand and the enforcement of a legal right by way of an equitable remedy on the other. 56 See also Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 561 (however, quaere whether Giles J is of the view that the reason a legal assignment would have made a difference is that it creates privity of contract between the assignee and obligor, whilst (relying on the contract analysis) an equitable assignment, being merely operative between the assignor and assignee, does not touch the contract with the assignor and obligor and therefore the assignor could exercise the right). Cf [3.27]. 57 See further Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 at 315 per Peter Gibson LJ. 58 [1988] 1 Ch 26. 59 He cited William Brandt’s & Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 at 462 per Lord Macnaghten; Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1 at 14 per Viscount Cave LC, at 19 per Viscount Finlay, at 30 per Lord Sumner. 60 EM Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1904] 2 Ch 86. 61 Eg Sweet v Cater (1841) 11 Sim Rep 572, 59 ER 994; Actien-Gesellschaft für Cartonnagen Industrie AG v Tenler (1899) 16 RPC 447; EM Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1904] 2 Ch 86 at 91 per Warrington J.
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matter of procedure. He said the reason for joinder was “a pragmatic one”.62 That is, the “debtor must not be at risk of suit by the legal owner of the chose”.63 Where there is no such risk, and where the debtor can obtain a complete discharge by paying the assignee, then joinder may be dispensed with. The court in Mountain Road said that Scott J had failed to recognise the “difference between a proceeding lacking a party (the assignor not joined)64 and a proceeding where there is no title in the plaintiff to sue at all because a prerequisite to the right to sue (notice of the assignment to the defendant) is absent”.65 [4.14] The decision in Mountain Road has been strongly criticised in two Australian cases. The first is the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Thomas v National Australia Bank Ltd.66 In this case, the parties agreed to have tried, as a preliminary issue, whether the appellant assignee was entitled to bring and maintain an action even though at the time the action was commenced no notice of the assignment had been given to the obligor. The assignment concerned the transfer of certain rights of action by a trustee in bankruptcy to the appellant. Pincus JA wrote the leading judgment. His starting point was the undoubted position that an equitable assignment of a legal interest is complete between assignor and assignee without notice.67 The next consideration was whether that meant property passed without notice. He suggested it would be a strange result practically if the giving of notice just prior to proceedings made the proceedings good, but just after proceedings made them bad.68 He thought that references to an equitable assignment being effective as between the assignor and assignee without notice do not mean that it is void against all persons other than the assignor and 62
[1988] 1 Ch 26 at 40. Ibid, at 40. 64 No action is dismissed for want of parties: see Werderman v Société Générale d’Eletricité (1881) 19 Ch 246; William Brandt’s & Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 at 462 per Lord Macnaghten. 65 [1999] 1 NZLR 335 at 345. 66 [2000] Qd R 448. 67 Ibid, at 453. Other examples where similar statements have been made include, Re General Horticultural Company (1886) 32 Ch D 512 at 515 per Chitty J; Gorringe v Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works (1886) 34 Ch D 128 at 132 per Cotton LJ; Adcock v Jolly (1893) 19 VLR 609 at 615 per Holroyd J; The London & Yorkshire Bank Ltd v White (1895) 11 TLR 570; Anning v Anning (1907) 4 CLR 1049 at 1064 per Isaacs J; Re Westerton [1919] 2 Ch 104 at 111 per Sargant J; Re City Life Assurance Co Ltd [1926] Ch 191 at 215 per Pollock MR, at 220 per Warrington LJ; Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257 at 266 per Gavan Duffy CJ and Starke J; Comptroller of Stamps (Vic) v Howard-Smith (1936) 54 CLR 614 at 622 per Dixon J; Bank of Australasia v Annie Hertz (1937) 54 WN (NSW) 179 at 180; Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 4 per Atkinson J; Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 at 577 per Deane J; Herkules Piling Ltd v Tilbury Construction Ltd (1992) 61 BLR 107 at 117, 119 per Hirst J. See also Jones v Gibbons (1804) 9 Ves Jun 407, 32 ER 659; Donaldson v Donaldson (1854) Kay 711, 69 ER 303; Re Way’s Trusts (1864) 2 De GJ & S 365, 46 ER 416. Cf Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 55 per Cussen J (here it is suggested that the assignment is operative between the assignor and assignee without notice, but “completed” by giving notice). 68 [2000] Qd R 448 at 453. See also Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 5 per Atkinson J. 63
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assignee.69 In this regard he concluded that the decision in Mountain Road had overlooked a number of authorities and that the decision in Warner (heavily relied on in Mountain Road) was irreconcilable with the general trend of the authorities.70 [4.15] One important decision overlooked was Re City Life Assurance Co Ltd.71 This case involved two actions. In the relevant action, an insurance policy holder mortgaged the policy to the issuing company to secure certain advances. The issuing company then assigned its interest to certain trustees without notice. The issuing company then went into compulsory liquidation. It was held that, by virtue of the fact that the mortgage debt had been assigned, there was no right of set-off between the policy holder and the liquidator in respect of the amount due under the policy and the amount of the mortgage debt. That is, at the date of the winding up there was no debt due from the policy holder to the company, but there was a debt due from the company to the policy holder. The equitable assignment was “absolute and complete” despite the lack of notice.72 [4.16] On the issue of joinder, Pincus JA recognised that the balance of authority dictated that the joinder of the assignor was a matter of procedure (rather than substantive law) which might be departed from.73 The most important decision in that regard is Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd.74 Here it was held that the equitable assignee of a copyright could not obtain a perpetual injunction to prevent infringement without joining the assignors. Viscount Cave LC said that although such an assignee may obtain interim relief, the person having the legal right must, subject to few exceptions, in due course be made a party.75 He thought this was always the practice of the Court of Chancery and was also the rule of the Supreme Court. He noted that although an action could not be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder, this did not mean it was possible to obtain judgment in the absence of a necessary party. Viscount Finlay also referred to 69
[2000] Qd R 448 at 455. Ibid, at 456. 71 [1926] 1 Ch 191. See also Hiley v The Peoples Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1938) 60 CLR 468. 72 [1926] 1 Ch 191 at 220 per Warrington LJ; see also at 215 per Pollock MR. See further Bell v The London & North Western Railway Co (1852) 15 Beav 548, 51 ER 651; Davis v Freethy (1890) 24 QBD 519; Bank of NT Butterfield and Son Ltd v Golinsky [1926] AC 733; Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 5 per Atkinson J; Ward v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 at 392 per Lord Macnaghten; Gorringe v Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works (1886) 34 Ch 128; Re Patrick [1891] 1 Ch 82 at 87 per Lindley LJ; Re Connolly [1931] Gazette Law Reports (GLR) 551; Adcock v Jolly (1893) 19 VLR 609 at 615 per Holroyd J; Bank of Australasia v Annie Hertz (1937) 54 WN (NSW) 179 at 180. 73 [2000] 2 Qd R 448 at 456–9. 74 [1924] AC 1. See also Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 29–30 per Windeyer J; National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 6 ACTR 1 at 7–8 per Blackburn J; Weddell v JA Pearce & Major [1988] Ch 26 at 40–1; Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] QB 825 at 850 per Mance LJ. See further Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292. 75 [1924] AC 1 at 14, 18. 70
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joinder being a rule of practice which should be observed except under very special circumstances.76 Lord Sumner drew a distinction between the recognition of “an equitable title or a valid title in equity and the grant of relief to a person so entitled”. The latter, he said, requires the joinder of the legal owner as a matter of procedure.77 In Thomas’ case, Pincus JA thought the joinder of the trustee in bankruptcy involved no practical advantage; it would have increased delay and complexity and, moreover, the trustee would take no part in the proceedings in any case. There was, therefore, no chance of the assignor later suing the debtor, and so the rule could be relaxed. [4.17] The second Australian case is the decision of Santow J in Jennings v Credit Corp Australia Pty Ltd.78 The issue here concerned the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), viz, does the Act bar an enforcement action against a debtor when the action was brought solely by an equitable assignee of a debt who got in the legal estate only after the limitation period expired. The initial action by the assignee was commenced within time. The debtor claimed that the action was a nullity as the assignor was never joined, and therefore it did not prevent time running for the purposes of the Act. The basis of this argument was that an equitable assignee had rights only against the assignor and had no standing to enforce the legal contractual right. No argument was raised concerning the effectiveness of an assignment without notice. The issue was one of joinder. Santow J thought the long line of authority upholding the assignee’s right to claim interlocutory relief and the statements that joinder was a matter of procedure clearly suggested that such actions were not a nullity. He referred to the proposition, expressed by Sheller JA in Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd,79 that the procedural rule requiring the joinder of the assignor said nothing about the actual validity of a demand made by an assignee against a debtor. In Long Leys, Sheller JA also said that joinder had both a procedural and substantive aspect. He thought that the procedural aspect was to protect against duplicated claims, whereas the substantive aspect dictated that the equitable assignee’s right was one against the assignor rather than the obligor.80 Santow J thought these propositions could not co-exist if the latter was stated in such absolute terms. He thought it clear that the procedural rule allows an equitable assignee rights against the obligor in certain circumstances, such as where a claim is made for interim relief or where the debtor waives his or her right for the legal assignor to be present. He thought this gave rise to a false dichotomy between the procedural and substantive rules— 76
Ibid, at 19. Ibid, at 29. 78 (2000) 48 NSWLR 709. 79 (1991) 5 BPR 11,512 at 11,518. 80 Ibid, at 11,518. See also Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 561 per Giles J. 77
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the substantive rule had exceptions and in each of those exceptions the assignee was exercising a contractual (that is, presumably legal) right against the debtor. He thought that Mountain Road had adopted the substantive rule in its absolute form. [4.18] It is suggested that Santow J was correct in his view that Sheller JA’s two propositions could not co-exist. He was also correct in his observation that in the authoritative examples in which the joinder rule has been relaxed, namely William Brandt’s & Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd 81 and Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd, 82 it does appear as if the court readily allowed the assignee to enforce the legal right. However, it is suggested that the law should not accept that the substantive position has a number of exceptions. The dichotomy that Santow J referred to falls away if the assignee is not attempting to enforce the legal right, but rather is seeking to enforce its equitable right or otherwise seeking an equitable remedy to enforce a legal or equitable right.83 In addition, it is suggested that the continued adherence to the idea that the assignee has rights only against the assignor, as evidenced in the judgment of Sheller JA, should be abandoned. As an all-encompassing rule this fails to reflect that the assignee is intended by the assignor to be either the legal or beneficial owner of the right, and in any case is in law the beneficial owner because the transaction is upheld as involving a transfer by way of assignment. [4.19] Conclusions on notice. All the principal authorities agree that an equitable assignment is complete as between the assignor and assignee without notice to the obligor. That is, notice is not necessary to perfect the assignment.84 It follows that whether or not the assignee has a direct remedy against the obligor, when an 81
[1905] AC 454. [1903] AC 414. See further Thomas v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] 2 Qd R 448; Equus Financial Services Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd (unreported Queensland CA, 19 May 1994) per McPherson JA; Commercial Factors Ltd v Maxwell Printing Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 724; Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd (1991) 5 BPR 11,512 at 11,518 per Sheller JA; Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Microcomputer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 389; Central Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corp (The Aiolos) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25 at 34 per Ackner LJ; National Mutual Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 6 ACTR 1 at 708 per Blackburn J; Camfield Pastoral Co v Dixon [1972] Qd R 289; Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 256 per PO Lawrence J; Wilson v Ragosine & Co Ltd (1915) 84 LJKB 2185; Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608 at 616–17 per Farwell J; Schneidman v Barnett [1951] NZLR 301 at 307 per FB Adams J; McMahon v Gilberd & Co Ltd [1955] NZLR 1206 at 1219 per Turner J. See also Nolan v King and Cook [1931] QSR 342 (no joinder required where assignor authorises assignee to give discharge). 83 Brandt’s case was an equitable assignment of a debt, the equitable assignee/equitable creditor relied on its equitable interest to claim an equitable remedy to enforce an equitable debt; equity has long recognised a jurisdiction to enforce debts: see [4.27], [8.18]. Tolhurst’s case was a claim for specific performance, the assignee (assuming the assignment was equitable and not legal) relied on its equitable interest to claim an equitable remedy to enforce a legal right. 84 In addition to the cases discussed above: see Ward v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 at 392 per Lord Macnaghten; Walker v The Bradford Old Bank Ltd (1884) 12 QBD 511; Anning v Anning (1907) 4 CLR 1049 at 1069–70 per Isaacs J. See also Donaldson v Donaldson (1854) Kay 711, 69 ER 303. 82
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assignment is complete as between the assignor and assignee then the obligor is bound by the assignment.85 Generally (and putting aside priority disputes and exceptions to the nemo dat rule), in any dealing in property rights, once a transfer is complete between the parties this will automatically, without more, impact on relationships between the transferee and third parties in respect of the asset or thing which is the subject of an actual transfer.86 If an equitable assignment of a legal right is properly entitled an “assignment” then it must involve a transfer, as this is the essence of assignment, and therefore the same result must follow. The reason so many cases make statements to the effect that “as between the assignor and assignee the assignment is complete without notice” without any mention of the efficacy of the assignment vis-à-vis the obligor may, in part, lie with the now outmoded contract analysis, and in part with the view that such assignments were made effective because of the remedies equity provided.87 As already noted, the latter does not stop such transactions being properly recognised as assignments, but courts were rarely asked to consider any remedies the assignee may have against the obligor. The assignee was content either to force the assignor to take steps to bring about a legal assignment (once legal assignments of choses in action became possible) or to force the assignor to lend its name to any suit by the assignee against the obligor. There was little need, therefore, to consider direct actions against the obligor despite the fact that joinder was ultimately perceived as being a requirement of procedure. In addition, the notion that the assignment is complete as between the assignor and assignee without notice does reflect the practical reality of the transaction. From the perspective of the assignor, whether notice of the assignment is given or not it holds the assigned right and its fruits for the benefit of the assignee. From the perspective of the obligor, the reality is that it continues to owe its obligation at law to the assignor. This does not deny the efficacy of the transfer but reflects the doctrinal allocation of rights. It is only upon receipt of notice that the obligor must consider the position of the assignee and look to the assignee for a discharge even though prior to notice it owed its obligation in equity to the assignee.88 None of this is meant to deny the possibility of the assignor and assignee transacting in a way that does not impact on the obligor. For example, the assignor and assignee may come to their own arrangements as regards the fruits of a contract. Such dealings often occur where the benefit of a contract cannot be assigned either because the benefit of the contract is personal to the assignor or 85
FCT v Everett (1979) 143 CLR 440 at 452. This may mean that third parties coming into contact with the transferee must respect the transferee’s interest or it may mean that the transferee must recognise the interest of a third party. 87 Where judges adhered to the contract analysis but also accepted that an assignee might enforce an assigned right against an obligor, perhaps it was logical to require something more in order to effect the transfer, and this was found in a requirement of notice: see Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 55 per Cussen J, at 66 per MacFarlan J. 88 See further [8.06]. 86
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there is a prohibition on assignment. In such a case, the assignor may seek to transfer to the assignee some interest in the fruits of the contract which would be effective once those fruits were received by the assignor. Arguably, where there is such a limitation on assignment and there is an attempt to assign the benefit of the contract, the assignment may be construed or read down to assign that which is assignable, namely the fruits.89 Moreover, when such an agreement is entered into equity may characterise the relationship between the assignor and assignee as proprietary even before the fruits of the contract vest in the assignor. Thus, again the transaction may be expressed to be complete as between the assignor and assignee, although the transfer could not be said to be complete prior to the property coming into existence. Finally, if one accepts the above analysis that distinguishes between the title to a chose and the chose itself, and goes a step further and recognises the ability of an assignor to assign title to a chose and retain the chose itself, then such a transaction would be a complete transfer as between the assignor and assignee, but would not affect the obligor because it would continue to perform to the party “holding” the chose, that is, the assignor.90 [4.20] Notice, it is suggested, serves four purposes. First, it maintains the assignee’s priority.91 Secondly, it prevents certain equities arising as between assignor and obligor to which the assignee would be subject.92 Thirdly, it will generally prevent the obligor from obtaining a discharge from the assignor.93 Fourthly, it binds the conscience of the obligor.94 The first purpose is readily accepted and a discussion of priorities falls outside this text. The second and third purposes are also readily accepted and are discussed 89
See Swan and Cleland’s Graving Dock and Slipway Co v Maritime Insurance Co [1907] 1 KB 116. See further [6.75], [6.83]. 91 It may be noted that it was in the narrow context of a priority dispute that Sir Thomas Plumer MR in Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1 at 22, 24, 38 ER 475 at 483, 484, said that notice was necessary to perfect title (see also Foster v Cockerell (1835) 3 Cl & Fin 456 at 476, 6 ER 1508 at 1516; Jones v Jones (1838) 8 Sim 633 at 643, 59 ER 251 at 255; Meux v Bell (1841) 1 Hare 73, 66 ER 955; Stocks v Dobson (1853) 4 De GM & G 11, 43 ER 411; Re Freshfields’ Trust (1879) 11 Ch D 198 at 202; Arden v Arden (1885) 29 Ch D 702 at 708). To the extent that Sir Thomas Plumer MR meant his statement to have a wider impact, this can be explained away on the basis of his concern with the reputed ownership provisions of the bankruptcy legislation which required notice to take “goods”, which included certain debts, out of the possession of the bankrupt: see Ward v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 at 378 Lord Herschell LC, at 392–3 per Lord Macnaghten (“In defence of the rule in Dearle v Hall, it has been said that notice is necessary in order to ‘perfect’ the title of the assignee—in order to ‘complete’ his title. Those expressions have frequently been used; but they are, I venture to think, little more than mere phrases. Notice does not render title perfect. Notice was not even a step in the title until it was made so by the decision in Foster v Cockerell. Apart from the rule in Dearle v Hall, an assignee of an equitable interest from a person capable of disposing of it has a perfect equitable title, though the title is no doubt subject to the infirmity which attaches to all equitable titles. And that infirmity is not and cannot be wholly cured or removed by notice to the trustees”.) 92 [8.49]. 93 Brice v Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569. See further [8.06]. 94 Tooth v Brisbane City Council (1928) 41 CLR 212 at 222 per Isaacs J; Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257 at 266 per Gavan Duffy CJ and Starke J. 90
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in other chapters. The significance of the fourth purpose does require further explanation here as it is important to the underlying theme of this book and is used later to advance the argument that a formal legal relationship exists between the assignee and obligor. If a transaction is upheld as an equitable assignment of a contractual right then the obligor must immediately owe its personal obligation to the assignee. Therefore, notice is not required for the assignee to commence an action against an obligor as the assignee’s title is complete.95 The fact that the obligor may at that point have no knowledge of the assignee is not to the point.96 In terms of knowledge, it is only important that the obligor knows it has a contractual obligation. If the obligor fails to carry out that obligation by breaching the contract, it should be accountable to whoever was owed the obligation at the relevant time. Ultimately this will be the person beneficially entitled to the obligation. Thus, in the case of an assigned contractual right where the obligor is required to perform some obligation, the requirement of notice, in terms of binding the conscience of the obligor, is to bring home to the mind of the obligor its responsibility to the assignee before the time for performance accrues. Whether or not this should impact upon the assessment of damages available to the assignee is discussed later.97 Where the assigned right is such that an assignee may call for a personal accounting or performance, for example, in the case of an assignment of a debt, notice to the obligor is necessary to bind the conscience of the obligor to render that personal accounting. However, this does not mean that the obligation was not owed to the assignee prior to such notice. If that were the case then the efficacy of the assignment prior to notice is called into question. It simply means that a payment to the assignor will discharge the debtor as its conscience is not bound prior to notice; this is possible without denying the efficacy of the transfer as there is still a contract between the obligor and assignor and strictly the obligation at law is owed to the assignor. However, if the debtor fails to pay it is liable to the assignee as the assignment is valid prior to notice. It follows that it is not necessary to adopt a view that, upon notice, the obligor has imposed on it a fresh obligation in equity. That obligation exists prior to notice. [4.21] Conclusions on joinder. Logically, if an assignee’s intention is to exercise a legal right such as an option, or to enforce a legal right by way of a legal remedy, such as a claim for damages for breach of contract, then the involvement of the assignor is dictated as a matter of substantive law. However, if the law were to stop there the result would be inconvenient. The ability of assignees in certain cases to bring an action in their own name against 95 96 97
See The Burwood Land, Building, and Investment Co Ltd v Berridge (1893) 19 VLR 630. Ward v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 at 392 per Lord Macnaghten. [8.09].
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the obligor without joining the assignor and receive final judgment is clearly efficacious and must be maintained. What must be attempted is an explanation (which makes doctrinal and analytical sense) of how the assignee’s right of enforcement operates. [4.22] Arguably there are three possible paths the law could take. The first is based on equity’s ability to enforce legal rights using equitable remedies.98 The principal example of this jurisdiction is the remedy of specific performance. This is an equitable order forcing a person to carry out a legal obligation. However, generally, the benefit of an order for specific performance goes to a person who has a legal right to performance and has provided valuable consideration. That is, equity here aids legal rights, not equitable rights, and the rights it protects are personal primary rights to contractual performance. The only legal right the equitable assignee has arises out of its contract with the assignor. There is therefore an inherent limitation to this path. However, this limitation is not necessarily insurmountable.99 Statements can be found which recognise a jurisdiction to grant specific performance to such assignees.100 It is thought that an assignee can obtain an order for specific performance if such an order could have been obtained by the assignor.101 In addition, it is in the context of orders for specific performance that the requirement of joinder is often relaxed.102 Such a result makes sense if the assignment is a failed legal assignment and is upheld in equity by virtue of equity treating as done that which ought to be done; in such a case the assignment is treated in equity as if the legal assignment had occurred, and so it is logical to make available to that assignee those equitable remedies which may be used to enforce legal rights. However, this would not help an assignee claiming common law damages for breach of contract. Moreover, there is also the view, perhaps not yet fully addressed in the context of assignments, that for equity to grant a person with an
98 This is distinguished from the ability of a person who has rights which in equity are enforceable against the legal owner as the “legal owner” here would be the assignor: see Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 707 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 99 The jurisdiction to grant specific performance is not narrow. Specific performance can be granted to a party to a contract despite the discharge of the contract if there is evidence of fraud, accident, mistake or surprise: see Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315. 100 See Hume v Monro (No 2) (1943) 67 CLR 461 at 482 per Williams J. See also JC Williamson Ltd v Lukey & Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 at 297 per Dixon J and Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608 at 616–17 per Farwell J. If Tolhurst’s case is seen as an equitable assignment it too is an important example: see [8.06]. See further ICF Spry, Equitable Remedies (6th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 2001) at 80. Quaere whether a privity rule that allowed for a third party beneficiary to enforce a contract without characterising the third party’s interest as either legal or equitable would warrant equity adopting a course that would allow a third person/assignee with an equitable interest in the relevant contract a right to seek specific performance of the contract. 101 [8.07]. 102 Ibid.
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equitable interest some relief that is not merely equitable requires exceptional circumstances.103 Such circumstances could not exist in every assignment. [4.23] A second path lies not in arguing that an assignee with an equitable interest can rely on that interest to bring an action in equity to enforce a legal right, but rather that that equitable interest is sufficiently recognised by the law to justify an action at law. If correct this would appear to be a case of either the law treating as done that which ought to be done or the law following equity. There is no doubt that after the Judicature Acts, and even before then, the common law recognised equitable rights and interests.104 Moreover, there is clear evidence that the common law recognised the effectiveness of equitable assignments105 and the breach of a contract of assignment was actionable for damages at common law. However, there is a clear difference between the common law recognising an equitable right and the common law allowing a person with an equitable right to enforce a legal right. Although exceptions can be found, the highest point reached by the common law was to recognise the interest of an equitable assignee and allow the assignee to bring an action in the name of the assignor.106 The common law always required the assignor to be joined. Although the common law has moved a long way since its early stance of refusing to “recognise that equitable rights, titles and interests entitled their holders to any relief at law”,107 it has still not reached a general position where it will give its aid to enforce equitable interests. The trend of modern law has been one of increased availability of equitable relief to protect common law rights rather than of common law remedies being made available to protect equitable rights.108 103 See Lidden v Composite Buyers Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 560 at 563 per Finn J; Pearson v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA (Federal Court of Australia) 1427 para 13. The High Court of Australia recently expressed equity’s jurisidiction to grant remedies in the case of an assignment in the following terms: see Theodore v Mistford Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 296 at 302 (“In respect of a legal interest, under the general law an agreement to give a legal mortgage is described as an equitable mortgage. Subject to compliance with any statutory formalities, it may be treated in equity as if a legal mortgage had been granted and therefore as carrying with it the remedies, including foreclosure, incident to a legal mortgage. Hence the statement that while in theory the equitable mortgagee may call for a legal mortgage, in the great majority of cases the mortgagee rests upon its equitable rights. Lord Eldon LC said of the Court of Chancery that ‘an equitable title to a mortgage is here as good as a legal title’. In this way, by looking at the intent rather than the form, equity is able to treat as done that which in good conscience ought to be done.” (citations omitted)). 104 Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619 at 623, 99 ER 1284 at 1286 per Ashhurst J. 105 Forth v Stanton (1681) 1 Wms Saund 210, 85 ER 217; Moulsdale v Birchall (1772) 2 Black W 820, 96 ER 483; Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619 at 623, 99 ER 1284 at 1286 per Ashhurst J; Master v Miller (1791) 4 TR 320 at 341, 100 ER 1042 at 1053 per Buller J. See also Israel v Douglas (1789) 1 H Bl 239, 126 ER 139; Carpenter v Marnell (1802) 3 B & P 40, 127 ER 23; Crowfoot v Gurney (1832) 9 Bing 372, 131 ER 655: see further [2.15], [4.08], [4.09]. 106 [2.12], [2.17], [4.09]. 107 RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 1.200. 108 See generally A Mason, “The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law World” (1994) 110 LQR 238.
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[4.24] One way round this is the suggestion that in the case of assignment the common law did not merely recognise the equitable assignment of legal rights but, in addition, accepted those assignments as assignments at law.109 Thus, where equity would recognise the assignment of a contractual right, it was concurrently recognised as an assignment at law. This argument was put forward by Professor Cook in 1916 in the Harvard Law Review.110 Cook took the view that the common law reached the position where, upon notice to the obligor, legal ownership of the chose in action vested in the assignee and the assignor ceased to be the legal owner, except for the purposes of lending its name to the title of the suit. It was in this sense that he thought the Judicature Act provisions allowing the assignee to sue in its own name were procedural.111 In his view the assignee’s ownership of the chose was concurrently legal and equitable. Cook’s argument was principally based upon American authorities, but he also relied on a handful of English common law cases that appeared to recognise the assignment of legal rights.112 It must be said that the idea that the common law fully recognised the assignment of choses in action is at odds with the general flow of all historical treatises on the history of assignment of choses in action.113 Although it is possible to point to cases that show the common law recognising assignments, it certainly did not develop any general doctrine of common law assignment that survived up to the passing of the Judicature Act 1872 section 25(6). Nor did it adopt the position that an assignment in equity was an assignment at law.114 The English case on which Cook principally relied was Legh v Legh,115 a case in which a debtor paid an assignor and received a release from the assignor at a time when the debtor had notice of the assignment. The Court of Common Pleas ordered the release to be cancelled. Cook suggested that this was evidence that one of the ingredients that make up ownership, namely the right to 109 There are examples of the common adopting equitable doctrines either as its own or taking equities into account in working out common law rights: see RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 1.205. An example of the first is the adoption by the common law of equity’s approach to variations of a principal contract without the approval of the guarantor. An example of the second is the recognition of a mortgagor’s equity of redemption: see Pawlett v AG (1667) Hard 465 at 469, 145 ER 550 at 552 per Hale CB. 110 WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) 29 Harv LR 816. See further G Glenn, “The Assignment of Choses in Action: Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser” (1934) 20 Virginia L R 621; Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, para 7.4. 111 WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) 29 Harv LR 816 at 821. See also Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1. See further F Oditah, “Priorities: Equitable Versus Legal Assignment of Book Debts” (1989) 9 OJLS 513 at 522. See [5.04], [5.27]. 112 Cf Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372 per Cozens-Hardy LJ. 113 See Chapter 2. 114 See VV Palmer, The Paths to Privity (San Francisco, Cal, Austin & Winfield, 1992) at 146–7; WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) ch 1; SJ Bailey, “Assignment of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 579. 115 (1799) 1 Bos & Pul 447, 126 ER 1002.
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give a release, was now missing from the bundle of rights held by the assignor.116 Thus, both at common law and in equity there was a transfer to the assignee. This analysis flows from Cook’s application of Hohfeldian rights analysis which, although legitimate, was certainly not in the mind of the court at the time of Legh v Legh. Moreover, Cook would have needed to explain away the fact that the action was brought by the assignee in the name of the assignor, which in fact evidences that there was no legal assignment operating. All this case really evidences is a recognition (rather than the adoption) by a common law court of the assignment in equity.117 At its highest, it may evidence a court of common law exercising equitable jurisdiction. In this regard, in Phillips v Clagett,118 Parke B suggested that this “equitable jurisdiction” of the courts of common law was limited to “preventing the defendant from pleading pleas of release, where the release is valid in point of law, but invalid in equity, as being a fraud for which the defendant is answerable”. If that is correct, it should not therefore have been extended to actually setting aside the release.119 Cook’s views were convincingly criticised by Professor Williston.120 Williston had no trouble calling the assignee’s right legal if by that all that was meant was that it was enforced in a court of law in the name of the assignor. However, he thought Cook had meant to go further than that. Williston suggested that if Cook was right there was no doctrinal reason why the assignee should take subject to the equities that the obligor has against the assignor.121 Secondly, he thought that if Cook’s view was accepted, then the normal priority rules which treat the assignee as having an equitable right must be changed and the assignee as the holder of a legal right must generally prevail over other equitable rights. Thirdly, he pointed out that if Cook was correct then a partial assignment of a debt, being a mere equitable assignment, could always be defeated by a later legal assignment of the whole debt.122 116
WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) 29 Harv LR 816 at 824, 828. See also Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619, 99 ER 1284. Cf WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston” (1917) 30 Harv LR 449 at 463. 118 (1843) 11 M & W 84 at 93, 152 ER 725 at 729. 119 See OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 74–80. The requirement of fraud which allowed the common law courts to look beyond the parties to the action was later alleviated by the Common Law Procedure Act 1854, s85 which allowed the assignee to set up an equitable reply to the defendant’s plea of release. That is, the common law courts could take account of the assignee’s reply that the obligor had notice of the assignment at the time it obtained a release from the assignor without the need for there to have been any fraud: see De Pothonier v De Mattos (1858) El Bl & El 461, 120 ER 581. See further McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 at 186–9 per Dixon J. See [4.09]. 120 Samuel Williston, “Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?” (1916) 30 Harv LR 97. For Cook’s reply see WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston” (1917) 30 Harv LR 449. For Williston’s final comments see S Williston, “The Word ‘Equitable’ and its Application to the Assignment of Choses in Action” (1918) 31 Harv LR 822. 121 See further F Oditah, Legal Aspect of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 6.15. 122 See S Williston, “Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?” (1916) 30 Harv LR 97 at 104. 117
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Some further observations may also be made. First, although Cook denied that the assignor remains the owner of the assigned right (except for the purpose of lending its name to the suit), the weight of authority suggests that in the case of an equitable assignment of a legal right, the assignor retains the legal interest and remains the legal owner.123 Combining that authority with Cook’s argument would result in both the assignor and assignee having a legal interest when generally the common law has never recognised two rights of ownership. Perhaps this might be overcome by concluding that the assignor and assignee are co-owners. However, if that were the case, and if both interests were legal, then presumably either party could release the debtor.124 But the accepted position is that generally upon notice of an assignment the assignor cannot discharge the obligor.125 Finally, Cook’s idea that the assignee’s interest is both legal and equitable appears to suggest the two interests may continue to exist separately when vested in the one person.126 That too is at odds with the great weight of authority.127 [4.25] It is necessary then to turn to the third path. To do this it is necessary to put aside both the notion that the assignee is always attempting (at law or in equity) to enforce the legal right and the idea that the assignee’s rights consist only of rights against the assignor. Dealing first with the latter, it is suggested that the assignee’s rights may be limited to action against the assignor in three cases. First, where the transaction is not really an assignment. Secondly, where the assignee either wants to exercise a legal right or wants a legal remedy—although strictly this no longer requires an action, the assignor is simply joined. Thirdly, where the transaction is properly called an assignment but the strength of the assignee’s right is such that it allows for enforcement only by taking action against the assignor. The idea of the strength of a right is dealt with in Chapter 8.128 In essence it will be suggested that, subject to certain statutory constraints, the terms of an assignment may expressly or impliedly limit the remedial avenues open to the assignee. Turning to the former issue, it is suggested that the stone that has been left unturned is the assignee’s ability to seek equitable relief to protect its equitable interest. It has already been noted that joinder is procedural where the assignee seeks an equitable remedy to enforce a legal right. The same is true where the assignee seeks to enforce or protect its equitable interest. Clearly, the assignee is the proper plaintiff to claim such equitable relief against the obligor. If equitable remedies are sufficiently versatile to protect the assignee’s interest, there will be no 123
[4.25]. See S Williston, “Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?” (1916) 30 Harv LR 97 at 108. 125 [8.06]. 126 See WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston” (1917) 30 Harv LR 449. 127 [3.11]. 128 [8.27]. 124
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need to take the strict procedural approach to joinder for the purposes of doing justice and allowing an assignee to bring an action in its own name in certain cases. That is, it could be accepted, as doctrinally it should be, that where the assignee wishes to exercise a legal right or to seek a legal remedy then the involvement of the assignor is required as a matter of substantive law. If that position is accepted then there appear to be only two situations that on their face may cause injustice. The first occurs where the obligor waives its right to have the assignor present and the second where the assignor ceases to exist. The first of these, it is suggested, may be dealt with on the basis of estoppel. As to the second situation, it must be rare for an assignor to cease to exist and its legal interest not to vest in some other party by operation of law.129 However, if that is the case, then there may be much to be said for the view that that outstanding legal interest should vest in the assignee.130 The alternative, of course, is that if the legal interest dies, so too does the equitable interest; however, this result would cause numerous problems in sale of business transactions and is commercially unacceptable. There is some support for the view that, generally, the action of the assignee should be seen as a cause of action in equity. In Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England,131 Staughton LJ said that the equitable assignee has a cause of action, but it is a cause of action in equity.132 In the same case, Peter Gibson LJ said that the equitable assignee becomes in equity the owner and controller of the assigned right and entitled to sue for the recovery of the chose.133 Moreover, in Durham Brothers v Robertson134 Chitty LJ, in one of the most famous statements of the joinder rule, characterised the assignee’s action as being an action in equity rather than an action in law to enforce the legal right. He said:135 As is well known, an ordinary debt or chose in action before the Judicature Act was not assignable so as to pass the right of action at law, but it was assignable so as to pass the right to sue in equity. In his suit in equity the assignee of a debt, even where the assignment was absolute on the face of it, had to make his assignor, the original creditor, party in order primarily to bind him and prevent his suing at law, and also to allow him to dispute the assignment if he thought fit. This was a fortiori the case where the assignment was by way of security, or by way of charge only, because the assignor had a right to redeem.136 129
Eg EM Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1904] 2 Ch 86. Alternatively, because there is no one left to claim a legal remedy, such a case may be one that may more readily be the subject of an order for specific performance in favour of the assignee: see Hume v Monro (No 2) (1943) 67 CLR 461 at 482 where Williams J makes this suggestion and cites Tolhurst’s case as authority. 131 [1996] QB 292. 132 Ibid, at 303. 133 Ibid, at 308. 134 [1898] 1 QB 765. See also Adcock v Jolly (1893) 19 VLR 609 at 615 per Holroyd J. 135 [1898] 1 QB 765 at 769–70 (emphasis added). 136 In referring to the suit being in equity, Chitty LJ did not suggest that after joinder the suit continued as one at law. 130
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It is suggested that the insistence called for here that joinder be seen as a matter of substantive law when the assignee seeks a legal remedy is not inconsistent with those cases which have held that the commencement of an action by the assignee to enforce the legal right is not a nullity. Clearly the assignee can claim interim relief. However, and more fundamentally, the equitable assignee may rely on its equitable interest to commence an action to enforce the legal right. What the assignee cannot obtain is a legal remedy, and so the assignor must be joined prior to judgment and the making of such an order. The mere commencement of the action is not the enforcement. Moreover, the assignee cannot exercise a legal right. It follows that an election by the equitable assignee to exercise an option is a nullity.137 It is also suggested that there is nothing inconsistent between this approach and the decision in Performing Right.138 That case concerned a claim for injunctive relief. Clearly there joinder is procedural. Viscount Cave LJ, as noted above, focused on the need to join a “necessary” party. The joinder of the legal right holder prior to judgment is merely joining a necessary party but in a substantive sense. Moreover, it is suggested that the speeches of Viscount Finlay and Lord Sumner may be read as limited to claims for equitable relief. Finally, it is suggested that the analysis put forward here would be as efficacious as the procedural joinder rule, and more doctrinally sound, if equitable remedies were sufficiently versatile to protect the assignee’s interest. The assignee’s remedies are dealt with in Chapter 8 where it is suggested that the assignee has a right to claim equitable compensation for breach of contract by the obligor and, where the assignment is of an obligation to pay, the assignee can (as a creditor in equity) enforce that primary obligation in equity.139
(d) Equitable Assignment of Legal Interests Not Assignable at Law [4.26] Introduction. Certain legal choses in action may not be assignable at law but are said to be assignable in equity. The prime example is the assignment of part of a debt or chose in action. Whether or not an assignment is entire or partial 137 A contractual right to arbitration is also a legal right and, therefore, in addition to other procedural requirements, generally requires a legal assignment for the assignee to be able to exercise it in its own name: see Baytur SA v Finagro Holding SA [1992] 1 QB 610 at 618 per Lloyd LJ. The enforcement of a guarantee, being the enforcement of a legal right, would also generally require a legal assignment if the assignee wished to exercise it in its own name. Therefore, notice would be necessary. However, notice to the guarantor of the assignment of the main contract would not be necessary. 138 Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1. 139 [8.24].
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depends upon the construction of the terms of the assignment and need not be considered further here.140 What are of concern are the nature and characteristics of these transactions and whether or not they are be properly termed “assignments”. [4.27] The assignment of part of a debt. In the case of an assignment of part of a debt, the proper plaintiff is the assignee. Where an entire debt was assigned in equity the assignee could bring an action at law in the name of the assignor to enforce the debt. However, that procedure was not available in the case of a partial assignment. A debt could not be recovered piecemeal at law.141 Despite a partial assignment, there remains one debt.142 This is still the position under most statutory regimes for legal assignments.143 It follows that such assignments (and such interests) were and still are (subject to a few statutory exceptions) recognised only in equity and, therefore, the assignee can bring an action in equity in its own name to enforce its assigned right.144 The assignor necessarily had to be joined so that the rights of all persons interested in the debt could be determined.145 Procedurally joinder is required to protect the assignor, as he or she may have a defence to raise against the efficacy of the assignment. Substantively, joinder is necessary as there is only one indivisible debt that must be enforced in its entirety. Two important points appear to flow from this. First, this explanation appears to recognise the assignee as the beneficial owner of the assigned right and therefore 140 Eg Harding v Harding (1886) 17 QBD 442; Bank of Liverpool & Martins Ltd v Holland (1926) 43 TLR 29. The ability partially, fractionally or divisionally to assign contractual rights to performance is considered later, [6.48]–[6.56]. 141 Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 29 per Windeyer J. 142 Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 at 385 per Simon Brown LJ (overruled on another point sub nom Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367). 143 Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 29 per Windeyer J. Cf Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s20(3) allowing for the legal assignment of part of a debt or chose in action. 144 Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 29 per Windeyer J. See also McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 ALR 289 at 295. Cf Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd (1991) 5 Butterworths Property Reports (BPR) 11,512 where the ability of an equitable assignee to enforce a debt was thought to be a triable issue. See further Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 559. 145 Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 29 per Windeyer J. See also Bergmann v MacMillan (1881) 17 Ch D 423; Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 357; Williams v Atlantic Assurance Co Ltd [1933] 1 KB 81 at 100 per Greer LJ; Walter & Sullivan Ltd v J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584 at 588–9 per Parker LJ; Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 at 387 per Sir Michael Fox (overruled on another point sub nom Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367). However, in the case of a partial assignment of a judgment debt, the view has been expressed that leave should not be given to the assignee to sue without joining the assignor, as there should be only one execution order. Since the assignor has only one judgment and can therefore issue only one execution, to allow multiple executions would be to recognise the assignment of a right the assignor did not have which is at odds with the nemo dat rule governing transfers. See McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 ALR 289 at 293; Forster v Baker [1910] 2 KB 636. See also Australian Workers Union v Bowen (1946) 72 CLR 575. It follows that the debt is not partially assignable: see Nirens v Fowler Asphalt Pty Ltd (1966) 9 FLR 255. Where there is a partial assignment of a debt together with a partial assignment of the security interest under a mortgage (which secures payment of the debt), it is not possible partially to enforce rights under the mortgage.
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the transaction is upheld as an assignment. Secondly, it appears that from early times equity had jurisdiction to enforce a debt on the basis that the assignee was the equitable creditor.146 It is sometimes suggested that the assignment of part of a debt operates by way of charge.147 The distinction between assignment and charge has already been dealt with,148 and so too the need in some cases to combine an assignment with a charge.149 The notion of an “assignment by way of charge” is dealt with later.150 The question here is whether, in the case of a partial assignment of a debt, it makes sense to speak of the actual assignment of a part, or whether it is necessary, to give any legal effect to the transaction, that it be upheld as a charge. Any transfer requires certainty of subject matter. It is impossible to transfer an interest in goods when they are unascertained; transfer requires an unconditional appropriation of the goods to the contract. Similarly, it may be thought to be impossible to have an interest in an undivided part of a debt, so that any interest must be a partial interest in the entirety of the debt, and this can be achieved only by way of charge.151 It may be true that when an “assignment” of part of a debt is given by way of security what is often meant is a charge.152 In many such cases it will probably not matter whether the transaction is upheld as a charge or assignment.153 In addition, it is accepted that an assignment by way of security, that is, a mortgage, incorporates a charge.154 However, this should not been seen as denying the possibility of there being an actual assignment of part of a debt.155 Arguably, anything capable of being charged is capable of assignment because the enforcement of a charge involves the chargee approaching a court for an assignment.156 In addition, when 146
Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 355. See further [4.18], [8.18]. Eg Rodick v Gandell (1852) 1 De GM & G 763 at 777–8, 42 ER 749 at 754 per Lord Truro; Palmer v Carey [1926] AC 703 at 706 per Lord Wrenbury; Re Lawsons Constructions Pty Ltd [1942] South Australian State Reports (SASR) 201 at 201 per Mayo J; Thomas v Harris [1947] 1 All ER 444 at 445 per Scott LJ; Walter & Sullivan Ltd v J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584 at 588 per Parker LJ; National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Developments Commission (1975) 6 Australian Capital Territory Reports (ACTR) 1 at 5 per Blackburn J; Wreckair Pty Ltd v Emerson [1992] 1 Qd R 700; Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399 at 446 per McHugh and Gummow JJ. 148 [3.17]. 149 [3.17]. 150 [7.39]–[7.40]. 151 See further R Goode, “Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions” (1987) 103 LQR 433 at 448. 152 Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 at 141; Hughes v Pump House Hotel Co Ltd [1902] 2 KB 190 at 195 per Mathew LJ. 153 See Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257 at 271 per Dixon J (who appears not to place too much weight on the distinction in this case). 154 Shea v Moore [1894] 1 IR 158 at 168 per Walker C. See further R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.52. 155 Ashby, Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 at 704–5 per Greer LJ. 156 Quaere whether “assignment” in this context only means “appropriation”, that is, an order for payment of the assigned sum. 147
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an assignor is indebted to an assignee, the assignment of a debt to the assignee, whether partial or otherwise, may be given as a method of payment.157 Such an assignment may be outright or by way of mortgage. In either case, its purpose of providing a method of payment prior to default would be defeated if it were upheld as a mere charge. Moreover, in Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,158 Windeyer J, in perhaps the leading modern statement on partial assignments, did not at any stage suggest that the transaction could operate only as a charge. In fact, the whole tenor of his judgment was that there could be partial assignments and they could be by way of gift. It appears odd for a transaction to be upheld as a charge when the intention of the parties was that of an assignment. It has been said many times that if an assignor intends to make an assignment and fails to comply with the necessary requirements, then a court will not rescue the transaction by upholding it as a trust.159 The same must go for rescuing an assignment by upholding it as a charge. However, it has also been said that it is not inconsistent with this rule that a court may impose a trust to protect the interest of the assignee.160 Perhaps upholding the equitable assignment of part of a debt as a charge merely serves this purpose.161 That is, it does not deny the efficacy of the assignment and the vesting of ownership in the assignee, but seeks to protect the interest of the assignee. Perhaps equity, like the common law, cannot identify any specific part of the debt or fund for the purposes of assignment. However, equity is capable of taking substantive institutions like trusts and charges and using them for a remedial or protective purpose. Thus, by using the notion of an equitable charge equity can protect the interest of the assignee as a true assignee and not a chargee. It would follow from this that equity’s requirement that the subject matter be identified is satisfied merely by the identification of the debt or fund and not the part of the debt or fund. 157
This would not automatically discharge the debt: see Re Cunningham [1965] WAR 115. (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 29. See also McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 ALR 289 at 296; Shepherd v FCT (1965) 113 CLR 385; Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 at 141; Ashby, Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697; Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 355 per PO Lawrence J; Brice v Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569; Durham Bros v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 at 773 per Chitty LJ (but cf Chitty LJ at 774 where he appears to suggest that insofar as the legislative scheme for legal assignments is concerned, any partial assignment is by way of charge (see also Jones v Humphreys [1902] 1 KB 10 at 13–14 per Lord Alverstone CJ, although on the facts before him, his statement may not be as objectionable as Chitty LJ’s)—however, as noted above, the reason for partial assignments falling outside the legislative regime is properly based on the impediments to enforcement in common law courts—this reasoning of Chitty LJ was doubted in Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 at 141). See further [7.39]–[7.40]. 159 Re Rose [1952] Ch 499 at 510. 160 [4.07]. 161 Perhaps this is the best explanation for the decision in Re Lawson Constructions Pty Ltd [1942] SASR 201. Cf Re Brush Aggregates Ltd [1983] Butterworths Company Law Cases (BCLC) 320 and the powerful criticism of this case in F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) at 74. 158
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Alternatively, in Ashby, Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons,162 Greene LJ suggested that in those cases where it was said that an equitable assignee had a charge over the fund, the expression was used to make the point that the assignee had a right against the fund, and not merely a personal right against an individual. It may also be the case that the word “charge” has been used loosely when the judge in fact meant assignment or mortgage.163 It may be that in some cases, although the transaction was intended to be an assignment, it was still characterised as a charge for the purposes of some legislative provision, so that maintaining the distinction in that context was immaterial.164 However, from a doctrinal perspective assignment and charge must be kept distinct.165 As already noted, when dealing with a security the notion that the mortgage takes effect by way of charge (as opposed to a charge taking effect by way of partial assignment) is less offensive because every mortgage incorporates a charge. When used to express an outright assignment though the notion that the assignment takes effect by way of charge remains problematic. Goode suggests that the reason for this confusion of terminology “lies in the fact that in contrast to charges on tangibles, under which the creditor looks to the proceeds of the charged asset, a charge on a debt or fund is enforced by collecting payment out of the fund from the fund holder in the same way as under a partial assignment, and in construing the statutory provisions governing the assignment of choses in action the courts focused on the question whether the assignment was to be considered absolute or ‘by way of charge only,’ a phrase taken to include partial assignment”.166 Returning to the protection point made above, it may be that in the case of an outright assignment the law recognises a charge on the fund for the purposes of ensuring that the assignment cannot be defeated.167 This may be no more than an application or extension of the principle that every mortgage incorporates a charge; the expression “assignment by way of charge” is then simply a shorthand expression for such a transaction. However, if correct, this analysis would not apply only to partial assignments. Another possibility may be that perhaps some courts see an analogy between an assignment of part of a debt and the recognition of equitable interests in contracts 162
[1936] 2 All ER 697 at 708. See UTC Ltd v NZI Securities Australia Ltd (1991) 4 WAR 349 at 354 per Ipp J. 164 Eg Re Kent & Sussex Sawmills Ltd [1947] 1 Ch 177; Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602. See also Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399 at 446 per McHugh and Gummow JJ. 165 See Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 407 at 422–3 per Brennan CJ. 166 R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.52. See also PG Turner, “Assignment by Way of Charge” (2004) 24 Australian Bar Review 1 at 5–13, tracing much of the idea that a charge takes effect as an assignment to a misunderstanding of the decision in Biggerstaff v Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd [1896] 2 Ch 93. 167 See [3.17]. 163
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for the sale of unascertained or future goods.168 In the latter, equity has generally always followed the law, requiring the goods to be ascertained, present and unconditionally appropriated to the contract before any transfer would be recognised. Thus, generally, no equitable interest is recognised as it would arise only at the same time that the legal interest was transferred. It is not necessary here to debate whether this is the approach equity should take to contracts for the sale of goods except to note that this analogy may have been impliedly drawn, thus requiring the recognition of a charge to give effect to the partial assignment of a debt.169 It is suggested, however, that there is no impediment to the recognition of an outright assignment of part of a debt.170 Moreover, the proper characterisation of such an assignment is not the assignment of an unascertained part of an ascertained whole but rather the assignment of something akin to the sale of specific goods. In the case of sale of goods, it has generally been thought that a sale of an undivided share (expressed as a fraction) in goods, such as the sale of a share in a racehorse, is a sale of specific goods so that legal title can pass without an act of appropriation.171 This is akin to what occurs in the case of the assignment of part of a debt. The debt is specific (indivisible) property. It is not akin to an identified bulk. In fact, most of the debate about this issue as regards sale of goods has been whether or not such a transaction concerns goods for the purposes of the legislation or merely a dealing in choses in action.172 The notion that the transfer involves specific property is generally accepted. It may be argued that one weakness with this analysis is where the assignment is not expressed as a fraction. Here it could be argued that the “assignment” is more akin to the transfer of an unascertained part of an ascertained whole. It is suggested that this is incorrect, and that an assignment of part of a debt is always an assignment of a fraction no matter how it is expressed, and must always be analysed in terms of a fraction of the whole debt no matter what expression is used in the transaction.173 The result of such a partial assignment is that the assignor and assignee become co-owners.174 Presumably 168 See Hoare v Dresser (1859) 7 HL Cas 290 at 317–18, 11 ER 116 at 127 per Lord Cranworth, (cited in Palmer v Carey [1926] AC 703 at 706 per Lord Wrenbury); Ashby Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 at 704 per Greer LJ; Re Lawsons Construction Pty Ltd [1942] SASR 201 at 204 per Mayo J. 169 Cf R v Grieg [1931] VLR 413 at 435 per Cussen ACJ (suggesting that different considerations apply as regards assignment of part of a debt and the sale of part of a bulk of goods). 170 Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 at 141. 171 See Law Commission for England and Wales, Sale of Goods Forming Part of a Bulk (London, HMSO, 1993) Law Com No 215, paras 2.5–2.7. It is not clear whether the sale of a fractional share in an identified bulk is considered a sale of specific goods: see KCT Sutton, Sale and Consumer Law (4th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1995) at 94 and cf Law Commission for England and Wales, Sale of Goods Forming Part of a Bulk (London, HMSO, 1993) Law Com No 215, para 4.2. 172 See ibid, paras 2.5–2.7. 173 R Goode, Commercial Law in the Next Millennium (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at 73. Where the memorandum simply refers to a sum of money, it can be translated into a fraction, unless on construction the intention is merely to assign the fruits of the debt and not the “right” to payment. 174 Ashby, Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 at 704 per Greer LJ (“[the] assignment gave [the assignee] an equitable claim on the fund if the fund came into existence”).
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this co-ownership is a tenancy in common,175 as this would allow each to enforce its own interest in its own name subject to the joinder of the other party.176 However, the interest of the assignee is assignable in whole or in part and therefore is usually referred to as a chose in action in its own right.177 The above assignment of a debt is to be distinguished from the assignment of a right to performance where that performance will ultimately result in a debt, but where the assignment is effective prior to the accrual of an obligation to pay, that is, prior to the coming into existence of a debt. For example, assume A owes a debt to B of £100 and that A wishes to assign to B part of a present right to an income stream for the purposes of paying the debt. A may alienate the entire income stream and express the assignment to terminate upon payment of a definite sum. However, it is more likely that A will assign “such part of [the income stream] as is necessary to pay B £100”.178 This is a partial assignment and, although ultimately when the income stream comes to an end it may be possible to determine the fractional interest assigned to B, it is difficult to calculate this at the time of the assignment. Arguably here the assignment is of an unascertained part of an ascertained whole, but the result is the same, the assignee becomes a co-owner of the whole to the extent of its interest.179 [4.28] The assignment of part of a chose in action. The same analysis must operate as regards partial assignments of choses in action other than debts. In commercial practice such an assignment may have limited use other than in the 175 Although there is a view that at law a chose in action can only be co-owned jointly, in equity it can be co-owned by tenants in common, and presumably a tenancy in common would be implied, particularly if the interests are not equal: see Re McKerrell [1912] 2 Ch 648 and see AP Bell, Modern Law of Personal Property in England and Ireland (London, Butterworths, 1989) at 74–5, 166–7. Where parties hold rights as joint tenants, they will hold undivided interests in the whole of the subject property. Therefore, one joint tenant cannot separate and assign its interest so as to constitute the assignee a joint tenant. Such a result can be achieved only by the establishment of a new joint tenancy. However, a joint tenant can sever the joint tenancy so as to create a distinct interest in the subject matter and, if the subject matter is otherwise transferable, assign that interest so that the assignee takes as tenant in common: see Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 at 575 per Deane J. 176 See Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Microcomputer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 389. 177 See FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440 at 450. 178 Drawing the distinction here between the assignment of a right to performance and a debt would be more difficult where the obligation to pay accrued from moment to moment; such instances are rare. Another possibility is for A to assign “the next £100 to be derived from [the income stream]”. This is likely to be an assignment of future property if no debt exists at the time of the intended assignment. When the property does come into existence, then if the debt accruing from the income stream is £100 the assignment is properly characterised as absolute, not partial. If the debt is greater than £100 then the assignment is partial and is a fractional assignment of a debt. 179 Although the cases have not adopted this reasoning, the same analysis could explain the efficacy of a partial assignment of an interest in a shareholding. The result is not based on the subject matter being fungible because the interest is indivisible and incapable of being fungible: see R Goode, “Are Intangible Assets Fungible?” in P Birks and A Pretto (eds), Themes in Comparative Law (Oxford, Hart, 2002) ch 7. See generally Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452; Re Harvard Securities Ltd [1997] 2 BCLC 369.
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case of a contractual right to performance, where that performance will require the payment of money but where the debt has yet to accrue. However, unlike the position as regards debts, equity’s ability to enforce such rights is limited and its ability to grant legal remedies non-existent. It follows that the joinder of the assignor (who may or may not want to take enforcement action) should be a matter of substantive law. There is nothing unique in this result; the position is the same as that involving joint promisees. [4.29] Conclusion. It follows from the analysis above that partial assignments are true assignments. It should be added that although such assignments are not “absolute” for the purposes of most legislative regimes for legal assignments, the construction of these regimes is driven by their focus on protecting the debtor and the procedural impediments to enforcing a debt piecemeal in a court of law. They should not to be viewed as evidence of any fundamental impossibility of assigning part of a debt. Moreover, it may be noted that the statutory regime for legal assignment in Western Australia expressly recognises the partial assignment of debts.180 Given that that regime is concerned with absolute assignments not by way of charge, this jurisdiction must then envisage a true assignment of part of a debt.
(e) Assignment of Future Interests [4.30] Introduction. Since this chapter is concerned with the proper characterisation of equitable assignments, it is necessary to say something about the characterisation of so-called “assignments” of future interests. [4.31] Assignments of future property. Strictly, it is not possible to assign future property as it does not exist. However, when made for value, equity will give effect to such transactions by upholding them as agreements to assign future property. Upon the property coming into existence the assignee takes an immediate interest, as the transaction takes effect as an assignment at that point rather than being merely a bipartite transaction between the assignor and assignee. In Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn,181 Dixon J expressed the position in the following manner:182 As the subject to be made over does not exist, the matter primarily rests in contract. Because value has been given on the one side, the conscience of the other party is bound 180
Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s20(3). (1937) 58 CLR 1. See also Re Lind [1915] 2 Ch 345 at 357, 358, 360 per Swinfen Eady LJ; Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523 at 543 per Lord Macnaghten; Booth v FCT (1987) 164 CLR 159 at 165 per Mason CJ. 182 (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 27. 181
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It also follows that the assignor never takes the full beneficial interest as the assignment actually binds the property itself when it comes into existence.183 [4.32] Nature of the interest held by the assignee. An issue then arises as to the nature of the interest held by the assignee prior to the property coming into existence. Prima facie the assignee’s rights appear to rest simply in contract. However, it has been said, and it appears settled, that the assignee’s interest is not merely contractual but has some of the incidents of a proprietary interest.184 The fact that the assignment occurs upon the property coming into existence without any act of the parties evidences that the right of the assignee prior to this time is more than merely contractual. This is an issue that is important when the assignor becomes bankrupt. For example, assume there is an assignment by way of sale where for a certain consideration the assignor agrees to assign some expectancy. Assume that prior to that expectancy coming into existence the assignor becomes bankrupt and is later discharged from bankruptcy, and that it is only after this that the property comes into existence and is vested in the assignor. The discharge from bankruptcy would release the assignor from its obligation under the “sale”. If the assignee’s interest under the agreement to assign, which in this example is the same transaction as the sale, merely rests in contract then that too is released. If, however, the assignee’s interest is a “higher interest” then arguably it should continue to attach to the property when it comes into existence. Another, more likely, example is where an assignor assigns an expectancy as security for some debt owed to the creditor/assignee. The assignor then becomes bankrupt and is discharged from bankruptcy without the assignee proving in the bankruptcy and only later does the property come into existence. Here, again, the debtor would be released from its liability to the creditor following the discharge of bankruptcy and this would include the covenant to pay under the security. Despite legislative provisions then allowing for the enforcement of securities in the 183 Re Lind [1915] 2 Ch 345 at 360 per Swinfen Eady LJ; Re Row Dal Constructions Pty Ltd [1966] VR 249 at 254 per Herring CJ; Re Androma Pty Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 134 at 152 per McPherson J. 184 FCT v Everett (1978) 21 ALR 625 at 643–4 per Deane J (Deane J was in the minority in this case and the decision of the majority was later affirmed by the High Court ((1980) 143 CLR 440); however, this point was not mentioned by the High Court and later decisions of the High Court have approved Deane J’s statement as to the effect of such an assignment). See also Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 27 per Dixon J; McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 ALR 289 at 296–7; Booth v FCT (1987) 164 CLR 159 at 177 per Toohey and Gaudron JJ. In the case of a security assignment, its immediate effect will be that of a floating security: see Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 3 WLR 58 at 93 per Lord Scott.
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face of such a release,185 if the assignee’s security interest under the assignment merely rested in contract, that too would be discharged, leaving the assignee with no claim to the subject property. However, in Re Lind,186 which is now the leading case in this area,187 in a factual situation akin to the one just mentioned, it was held that the assignee continues to have an interest in the subject property when it comes into existence. Much of the reasoning of the court was based on the idea that the assignee’s interest prior to the subject matter coming into existence is a “higher” interest than a mere contractual interest.188 A question arises whether the reasoning in Re Lind can be applied to the first example. The question in Re Lind was whether or not the transaction created a security. As long as the creditor was characterised as a “secured creditor” the security could be enforced despite the discharge. It is possible to classify the relationship between the debtor and creditor as a secured relationship without any transfer of the secured property. Arguably, for the assignee’s interest in the first example to survive the assignor’s bankruptcy and discharge from bankruptcy there needs to have been a transfer prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy. However, it is probably sufficient that the assignee’s interest is classified as proprietary to survive discharge and the higher right analysis achieves that. Certainly, despite the narrow question in Re Lind, the weight of the reasoning simply relied on the recognition of a “higher right”, and there is no logical reason to limit this to security transactions.189 Moreover, it would be inconsistent to limit the reasoning in Re Lind to intended security assignments and not outright transfers when the relevant legislation continues, insofar as assignments are concerned, to define a secured creditor as a creditor holding a mortgage: a mortgage assumes a transfer.190 185
Eg Insolvency Act 1986 (Eng) s281(1) and (2); Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 153(1) and (3). [1915] 2 Ch 345. See also Re Gillott’s Settlement [1934] 1 Ch 97. Cf Collyer v Isaacs (1881) 19 Ch D 342. See also Re Dent [1923] 1 Ch 113; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 117 ALR 61. See further RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) paras 6.275–6.330. 187 See Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 27 per Dixon J (referring to Re Lind and saying; “[A]lthough the matter rests primarily in contract, the prospective right in property which the assignee obtains ‘is a higher right than the right to have specific performance of a contract,’ and it may survive the assignor’s bankruptcy because it attaches without more eo instanti when the property arises and gives the assignee an equitable interest therein.”). 188 [1915] 2 Ch 345 at 357, 358 per Swinfen Eady LJ, at 365 per Phillimore LJ, at 373–4 per Bankes LJ. 189 However, at one point in his judgment, Swinfen Eady LJ did say ([1915] 2 Ch 345 at 360–1, and see at 370–1 per Bankes LJ), in answer to an argument that because the debts created by the mortgage were discharged, so too was the ancillary contract relating to future property, that; “The answer is that the mortgagees . . . elected to rely upon their security, and not to prove, and therefore as mortgagees they stand outside the bankruptcy; and, moreover, that any contract contained in those deeds for vesting the future property in the mortgagees was ancillary not to the debt, but to the mortgage by which the debt was secured.” See also Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 117 ALR 61 at 73 per Hill J and cf at 63 per Jenkinson J. 190 Insolvency Act 1986 (Eng) s248; Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s5. 186
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[4.33] Problems with the analysis.191 Despite the interest of the assignee prior to the property coming existence being well settled by case law, the actual characterisation of this right remains problematic.192 To say that the assignee’s interest is higher than a mere contractual right merely begs the question, “a higher interest in respect of what”? There is only the agreement to assign. Nevertheless, arguably this analysis provides a desired commercial result. Moreover, given that the efficacy of “assignments” of future property is the basis for the development of the floating charge it would appear that the “higher right” analysis is now so well entrenched that is makes little sense spending time critiquing it. The result in Re Lind is usually explained on the basis of relation back. That is, where the consideration for an agreement to assign is executed equity immediately gives effect to the assignment, but it relates back to the date of contract. However, this merely begs another question: why does it relate back? In the result, it is suggested that any problems in recognising the proprietary character of the right vested in the assignee flow from either limiting property and property law to being concerned with the recognition of rights in things or putting too much emphasis on the need for a presently existing thing. A large part of property and property law is concerned with characterising relationships between people in respect of things.193 The things may be either present or future. Property rights come into existence by some causative event. The most usual such event is consent. Thus, the execution of a contract, such as a memorandum of mortgage, immediately brings into existence property rights in terms of characterising the relationship between the parties. It is logical at that point to refer to the creditor as a secured creditor. The actual existence of the thing is necessary only for the purposes of attachment or transfer or for recognising some sui generis interest in the property.194 So long as that proprietary relationship continues to exist then property coming into existence which can be identified as the subject matter of that relationship will be
191 See generally R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 2.13. 192 See RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 6.320. See further CJ Davis, “Floating Rights” [2002] CLJ 423. 193 Some may take the view that this is all property and property law are concerned with. It could even be argued that the need for a “thing” no longer reflects the entirety of the category “property”. However, at the level of doctrinal law there remains a strong view that property law is not merely concerned with relationships between people in respect of things, but that it is still sensible and useful to continue to characterise some rights as rights “in” things. This expression has its use where any enforcement mechanism is against the thing itself: see EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 6–10; P Ali, The Law of Secured Finance (Oxford, OUP, 2002) paras 2.33–2.40. 194 In the case of a floating security where property which is the subject of the charge exists, it is not necessary to characterise the interest of the chargee (prior to crystallisation) as merely a proprietary relationship with the chargor. When such property exists the chargee has an interest over that property, although that interest is not fixed on any particular property.
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attached. Hence the relation back.195 Importantly, that relationship can continue despite the non-consensual discharge, release or extinction of the underlying contract, as the proprietary relationship arises as a matter of law as a consequence of the initial consensual agreement between the parties. If it is necessary to place a description on the interest of the assignee arising from this relationship, it can be expressed as an equity.
195 It also follows that the nature and characterisation of this relationship are dependent upon the type of transaction entered into between the parties. For example, this relation back does not occur upon crystallisation of a floating charge: see R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 4.07, 5.38. However, prior to crystallisation the relationship between chargor and chargee is proprietary as there is a present security. It follows that if a situation were to arise where despite crystallisation the chargee had to rely on its pre-crystallisation interest then that interest was different from the interest that takes effect from crystallisation: see ibid, paras 5.40. See further [7.15].
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5 Statutory or Legal Assignments (a) Introduction [5.01] Purpose of the chapter. Since the passing of the Judicature Act 1873, it has been said that legal choses in action may be assigned at law. At the same time, it has also been said that the statutory regime is a procedural provision. These statements are inconsistent. The purpose of this chapter is to explore this inconsistency to determine whether or not there can be a true legal assignment of contractual rights at law. Unlike the position with equitable assignments of legal rights, there is no issue here as to whether statutory or legal assignments are true assignments. That is, in the case of contractual rights, if one takes a substantive view of the legal regime then clearly there is a true legal transfer, as title is transferred by way of extinction and creation and the right to performance is actually transferred so that the assignee is owed the obligation. If the procedural view is adopted there will also be a true transfer and the analysis of such a transaction will be the same as set out in Chapter 4 in the section dealing with equitable assignments of legal rights. There is nothing akin to the “contract analysis” as discussed in Chapter 4 appearing in the cases concerning statutory assignments to complicate the picture. However, clearly there is an issue as to the characterisation of such an assignment. The answer to this lies with resolving the abovementioned inconsistency. In the result, it is concluded that the statutory regime has a substantive effect rather than being merely procedural in effect. Thus, transactions complying with the regime are true legal assignments. [5.02] Structure of the chapter. Apart from this introduction, the chapter has three sections. The first sets out the arguments for the procedural view, the second the arguments for a substantive view and the last reaches a conclusion. [5.03] Contents of the statutory provisions. The contents of the various provisions for statutory or legal assignment existing in England and all Australian states are essentially the same. For the purposes of the discussion in this chapter, the English and New South Wales provisions are set out here. The relevant English
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provision is contained in section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1915 and provides:1 (1) Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only) of any debt or other legal thing in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to claim such debt or thing in action, is effectual in law (subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee) to pass and transfer from the date of such notice— (a) the legal right to such debt or thing in action; (b) all legal and other remedies for the same; and (c) the power to give a good discharge for the same without the concurrence of the assignor: Provided that, if the debtor, trustee or other person liable in respect of such debt or thing in action has notice— (a) that the assignment is disputed by the assignor or any person claiming under him; or (b) of any other opposing or conflicting claims to such debt or thing in action; he may, if he thinks fit, either call upon the persons making claim thereto to interplead concerning the same, or pay the debt or other thing in action into court under the provisions of the Trustee Act 1925.
The relevant New South Wales provision is contained in section 12 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) and provides: Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only) of any debt or other legal chose in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or chose in action, shall be, and be deemed to have been effectual in law (subject to all equities which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee if this Act had not passed) to pass and transfer the legal right to such debt or chose in action from the date of such notice, and all legal and other remedies for the same, and the power to give a good discharge for the same without the concurrence of the assignor: Provided always that if the debtor, trustee, or other person liable in respect of such debt or chose in action has notice that such assignment is disputed by the assignor or anyone claiming under the assignor, or any other opposing or conflicting claims to such debt or chose in action, the debtor, trustee or other person liable shall be entitled if he or she thinks fit, to call upon the 1 Conveyancing Act 1919 (ACT) s12; Law of Property Act 2000 (NT) s182; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s199(1) and (2); Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s15; Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas) s86(1) and (2); Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) s134; Property Law Act (1969) (WA) s20. Prior to the enactment of these provisions, South Australia enacted a general provision for the assignment of choses in action which for a time co-existed with the Judicature Act provisions. It is discussed in Robinson v The State of South Australia [1928] SASR 42.
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several persons making claim thereto to interplead concerning the same, or he or she may, if he or she thinks fit, pay the same into court under and in conformity with the provisions of the Acts for the relief of trustees.
(b) The Procedural View [5.04] Introduction. The provisions for statutory or legal assignment have their origins in section 25(6) of the Judicature Act 1873. Generally, the Judicature Act brought about certain procedural reforms to the administration of law and equity in England.2 The history and effect of these reforms have been well documented.3 As to legal assignments being part of this reform, it is said that the effect of the statutory regime is merely procedural. By this it is meant that the statutory regime for legal assignment does no more than allow an assignee, who previously could have maintained a claim in the assignor’s name (by reason of an equitable assignment of a legal right), to sue the debtor in its own name without joining the assignor and give a good discharge. However, if the statutory regime is a procedural provision then it must follow that, although the assignee can sue in its own name, the right assigned is still an equitable right. That is, the assigned right is notionally legal for the purpose of allowing the assignee to bring an action in its own name. [5.05] Support for the procedural view. There is much case support for the view that the statutory regime is merely procedural.4 That support essentially relies on the procedural nature of the Judicature Act reforms. Moreover, there is some support for taking the procedural analysis to the ultimate conclusion mentioned in the last paragraph, namely that the assignee’s interest is only notionally legal. In 2
See generally Judicature Commission, First Report of the Commissioners London, HMSO, (1869). Eg RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) ch 2; P Loughlan, in P Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (2nd edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 2003) para 111. See also Britain v Rossiter (1879) 11 QBD 123 at 129 per Brett LJ. 4 Burlinson v Hall (1884) 12 QBD 347 at 349 per Day J; Victoria Insurance Co v King (1895) 6 QLJ 202 at 203 (affirmed [1896] AC 250); Marchant v Morton, Down & Co [1901] 2 KB 829 at 832 per Channell J; Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 435 per Channell J (reversed on another point [1903] 1 KB 644); Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660 at 676 per Cozens Hardy LJ ([1903] AC 414 at 424 per Lord Lindley); Walker v The Bradford Old Bank Ltd (1883) 12 QBD 511 at 515 per Smith J. See also Snyder’s Ltd v Furniture Finance Corp Ltd [1931] 1 DLR 398 at 313; Trubenizing Process Corp v John Forsyth Ltd [1943] 4 DLR 577 at 580; Slattery v Slattery [1946] 1 DLR 304 at 313; Pettit & Johnston v Foster Wheeler Ltd [1950] 2 DLR 42 at 48–9 (affirmed [1950] 3 DLR 320); Harding Carpets Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1980] 4 WWR 149 at 157–60. See further S Williston, “Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?” (1916) 30 Harv LR 97 at 105; S Williston, “The Word ‘Equitable’ and its Application to the Assignment of Choses in Action” (1917–18) Harv LR 822 at 833 and cf WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) Harv LR 816 at 821. 3
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Harding Carpets Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada,5 it was held that in a priority dispute a statutory assignee may be postponed to another assignee who gives first notice to the debtor.6 The reasoning of Morse J in that case was based in part on the procedural nature of the statutory regime. It was thought that the efficacy of a statutory assignment was based on equity, that is, it did not transfer to the assignee any rights recognised by the common law.7 This suggests that Morse J was of the view that the assignee’s rights were equitable.8 In addition, although not stated, it would appear to follow from his judgment that he applied the rule in Dearle v Hall 9 to resolve the priority dispute. The application of this rule to resolve a priority dispute between an equitable and a legal assignee carries the weight of judicial support.10 Moreover, it further suggests that the statutory assignee’s interest is equitable as the rule applies to priority disputes between competing equitable interests.11 Morse J also based his decision on that part of the statutory regime which states that the assignee takes subject to the equities. In England that provision states that the assignee takes “subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee”. In New South Wales the provision states that assignee takes “sub5
[1980] 4 Western Weekly Reports (WWR) 149. Under Anglo-Australian law this dispute will arise only where there is a prior equitable assignment and a later statutory assignment. If the statutory assignment is first and the equitable assignment second (such as where there is a legal assignment by way of mortgage and the assignor further assigns its equity of redemption), the notice required for the efficacy of the statutory assignment will automatically be notice for the purposes of priority. In Harding Carpets Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1980] 4 WWR 149, Morse J was of the view that, under the relevant Canadian legislation, notice was not a necessary requirement for a statutory assignment. Thus, it was legitimate to speak of a contest between a statutory and equitable assignee prior to any of them giving notice. Under Anglo-Australian law the case would be understood as a competition between a prior equitable assignee and a later statutory assignee. 7 [1980] 4 WWR 149 at 158. 8 See also S Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (3rd edn, New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co, 1960) iii, para 447. 9 (1828) 3 Russ 1, 38 ER 475. 10 The authorities usually relied upon for this point are E Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf GmbH & Co v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 150 at 162–3 per Phillips J; Harding Carpets Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1980] 4 WWR 149 and Marchant v Morton, Down & Co [1901] 2 KB 829 per Channell J (but see the powerful arguments put forward by Oditah that these cases are not strong authorities for this point and, in any case, should be rejected in terms of principle: see F Oditah, “Priorities: Equitable Vesus Legal Assignments of Book Debts” (1989) 9 OJLS 513 at 517 and F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 6.15). See also Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 at 620–1 per Mummery J. See further OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 104–5; S Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (3rd edn, New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co, 1960) iii, para 438; JS Ziegel, “The Legal Problems of Wholesale Financing of Durable Goods in Canada” (1963) 41 Can BR 54 at 109; P Biscoe, Credit Factoring (London, Butterworths, 1975) at 132–7; DM McLauchlan, “Priorities and Equitable Tracing Rights and Assignments of Book Debts” (1980) 96 LQR 90; R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 5.09; EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 870–2. 11 Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602. Cf Palmer v Locke (1881) 18 Ch D 381 at 386–7 per Jessel MR (affirmed (1881) 18 Ch D 381); Re Duck Jarm (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 521 at 526. 6
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ject to all equities which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee”. It was thought that these words did not govern the relationship between merely the assignee and debtor but also the assignee and competing third parties. More recently, Lord Goff in Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp (The Trident Beauty)12 also appears to have adopted a procedural view of the statutory regime. That case concerned an action by a debtor against a defendant assignee to recover a payment made on the ground of total failure of consideration. The assignment appears to have fulfilled all the requirements of the statutory regime. In discussing the role restitution should play in cases involving third parties, Lord Goff characterised the case as one in which the plaintiff had conferred a benefit on the defendant (assignee) in the course of performing an obligation to a third party (assignor).13 However, if the effect of a statutory assignment were substantive, the assignee would own the assigned right outright and the obligor’s duty would be owed only to the assignee and not in part to the assignor.14 The assignor would stay in the picture as a matter of contract and may still have duties to perform. It is only if the statutory regime is procedural that it could be said that the obligor would continue to owe any substantive duty in part to the assignor.15
(c) The Substantive View [5.06] Primary argument for the substantive view. The primary argument for the statutory regime having a substantive effect flows from the words of the provision. The relevant provision in each jurisdiction has words to the effect that the assignment shall be “effectual in law . . . to pass and transfer the legal right to such debt or thing in action”.16 On its face this clearly suggests that the assignee takes the assignment at law not in equity and that it obtains a legal right and not an equitable right. In Read v Brown,17 it was argued that “legal right” as it appears in the 12 [1994] 1 WLR 161. Cf his remarks at first instance in Ellerman Lines Ltd v Lancaster Maritime Co Ltd (The Lancaster) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 497 at 503 (where he refused to apply the rule in Dearle v Hall to a competition between a legal assignee and an equitable assignee, holding that the legal assignee “ranks before any equitable interest, even a prior equitable interest, unless the [legal] assignee had actual or constructive notice of the equitable interest at the time of the assignment.”). 13 [1994] 1 WLR 161 at 166. 14 Other than a bare personal obligation, perhaps (see [8.36]) Lord Goff was only intending to express the point that in the case of an assignment of a contractual right, what the assignee purchases is a right to a contractual obligation owed to the assignor: see [3.10]. 15 [8.06]. 16 Eg Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s12. 17 (1888) 22 QBD 128. See also Durham Brothers v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 at 773 per Chitty LJ; Bacon v Yatchaw Irrigation and Water Supply Trust (1898) 23 VLR 485 at 487–8 per Williams J; Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 373 per Cozens-Hardy LJ; Bennett v White [1910] 2 KB 643 at 646 per Cozens-Hardy MR, at 648 per Farewell LJ, at 648 per Kennedy LJ; Herkules Piling Ltd v Tilbury Construction Ltd (1992) 61 BLR 107 at 116, 118 per Hirst J.
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provision meant the same thing as “legal and other remedies” as it appears later in the section. Lord Esher MR (with whom Fry and Lopes LJJ agreed) said:18 It is said that [the statutory regime] only affects procedure . . . [T]he words mean what they say; they transfer the legal right to the debt as well as the legal remedies for its recovery. The debt is transferred to the assignee and becomes as though it had been his from the beginning; it is no longer the debt of the assignor at all, who cannot sue for it, the right to sue being taken from him; the assignee becomes the assignee of a legal debt and is not merely an assignee in equity, and the debt being his, he can sue for it, and sue in his own name.
[5.07] The argument against the literal view: applicability of the regime to equitable choses in action. There is an argument that suggests that the literal view of the provision cannot be sustained. This argument is not itself directly concerned with the substantive/procedural issue being discussed here, but rather with whether the provision applies to the equitable assignment of equitable interests. One point that fuels this argument is the reference to a “trustee” in the provision. If the provision applies to the assignment of equitable interests, it becomes nonsensical to construe it literally. Under this argument, the better construction of the provision is that it was intended to capture those rights which before the Act were capable of lawful assignment.19 The High Court of Australia (in obiter) has adopted this view of the provision.20 In the section that follows, it is suggested that the provision does not generally apply to the assignment of an equitable chose in action. However, there may be one exception. The exception arises where there is a chain of assignments and where the first assignment involves an equitable assignment of a legal interest. For example, assume A attempts to assign a legal debt to B which fails to satisfy the statutory requirements because no notice is given to the debtor, but which nevertheless takes effect as an equitable assignment. B then assigns its entire interest to C which in turn assigns its entire interest to D. Clearly, the assignments to C and D are assignments of equitable choses in action. However, if the assignments to C and D are assignments of the assignor’s entire interest then the end result is that D owns the right that was once vested in B which, in terms of characterisation, is the equitable ownership of the promise made by the debtor to A. The result is that B and C effectively drop out of the picture so that there is only a tripartite relation-
18
(1888) 22 QBD 128 at 131–2. The equivalent New Zealand provision now expressly provides that it applies to equitable choses in action: see Property Law Act 1952 (NZ) s130(1). 20 FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440 at 447 per Barwick CJ, Stephen, Mason and Wilson JJ. Cf Law Institute of Victoria v Cowan [1973] VR 293 at 302. See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons, 1950) at 166–8; FCT Tudsberry, The Nature, Requisites and Operation of Equitable Assignments (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1912) at 10–12; R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.12. 19
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ship left. If B could have given notice to the debtor for the purposes of rendering the assignment legal, then there seems no reason why D (who took an equitable assignment of an equitable interest) cannot now give notice, render the assignment legal and vest in D the legal right to the chose. The requirements of that notice may be more onerous than those that would have applied if B were giving the notice.21 [5.08] In defence of the literal view. Subject to the exception just noted, there are a number of arguments that suggest the provision was not intended to apply to the equitable assignment of equitable interests.22 [5.09] First, the provision applies to the assignment of any “debt or other legal thing in action”. There is no mention of equitable choses in action. Moreover, if the provision does apply to equitable assignments of equitable interests then on its face it transfers a “legal right”.23 That cannot be correct unless it is limited to the exception suggested above as well as to legal rights that are consequent on an equitable right. That is, rather than the assignor continuing to hold any consequent legal rights on trust for the benefit of the assignee, if the assignment satisfies the statute such consequent legal rights are also assigned.24 [5.10] Secondly, the language of the provision is mandatory. There can be no legal assignment of a legal interest unless its requirements are made out. That mandatory language would need to be ignored in the case of an equitable assignment of an equitable interest.25 If not, it would lead to the result that it is easier to assign a legal chose in action in equity than an equitable chose in action.26 It would make notice to the obligor an essential ingredient27 and the assignment would not take effect until the time of notice.28 In addition, writing requirements would become more stringent as the assignment would need to be under the hand of the 21
See [7.38]. See RP Austin, “The Conveyancing Act, 1919 (As Amended): Section 12 and Equitable Choses in Action” (1974) 7 Syd Uni L Rev 394 at 396–7, 397–8. See also Robinson v The State of South Australia (1928) SASR 42 at 49–50. See further Cronk v M’Manus (1892) 8 TLR 449. 23 There is authority to this effect: see Re Pain [1919] 1 Ch 38 at 44–5 per Younger J; Harding v Harding (1886) 17 QBD 442 at 445 per Wills J. 24 JD Heydon and PL Loughlan, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (6th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 7.27. 25 Ibid, para 7.27. 26 See PR Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) paras 6.030–6.040. 27 See further Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 5, where Atkinson J suggests that it would be strange if the effect of the legislation was that an absolute assignment given for consideration without notice was effective in equity, but an absolute assignment given without consideration and without notice was not, but in the latter, this was instantly cured by the giving of notice. 28 [7.38]. 22
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assignor.29 In this regard, the law appears to be clear: the statutory regime does not in any way impair the efficacy of equitable assignments.30 [5.11] Thirdly, it is doubtful whether the decision most often cited as authority for the provision applying to equitable assignments of equitable interests is authority for that point. The case is Torkington v Magee 31 where Channell J said:32 I think the words “debt or other legal chose in action” mean debt or right which the common law looks on as not assignable by reason of its being a chose in action, but which a Court of Equity deals with as being assignable.
An equitable chose in action would obviously fall into this category. Such a conclusion, however, appears to miss the point that Channell J was making. He observed that the statutory regime originated in a subsection of section 25 of the Judicature Act. He noted that although the first ten subsections (of which the relevant provision was contained in section 25(6)) contained specific provisions, it was important to look at section 25(11), which provided that where there was a conflict between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law the rules of equity were to prevail. He said, “This seems to me to shew that sub-s 6 is one of the matters particularly mentioned in which the rules of equity and common law had conflicted or varied in reference to the same matter, and this gives the clue to the meaning of any doubtful expression.”33 That is, the resolution of such conflicts was the basis for section 25’s existence. It must then follow that since the common law did not deal with equitable interests there could be no conflict, and therefore the section does not apply to equitable interests. The only conflict that existed was that equity recognised the assignment of legal choses in action and the common law did not. Moreover, Torkington’s case concerned the assignment of a contractual right, and not the assignment of an equitable right and it was the common law’s approach to the assignment of legal rights that Channell J was directing his comments to. He thought the assignment fell within the regime because, in line with his understanding of the provision set out above, it concerned a right the
29 Alternatively, it has been suggested that if the writing requirements under this section and the writing requirements under the various equivalents of the Law of Property Act 1925 (Eng) s53(1)(c) (see [7.26]) are to be kept separate, it may be necessary to draw a distinction (if possible) between “equitable choses in action” for the purposes of s136 and an “equitable interest or trust subsisting at the time of disposition” for the purposes of s 53(1)(c). It may also be necessary to distinguish an absolute assignment as per s136 from a “disposition” as per s53(1)(c): see JD Heydon and PL Loughlan, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (6th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 7.27. 30 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 at 461 per Lord Macnaghten. Cf as to assignments by way of gift, [7.21]. 31 [1902] 2 KB 427 (reversed on another point [1903] 1 KB 644). 32 Ibid, at 430–1. 33 Ibid, at 430.
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assignment of which would have been recognised by a court of equity prior to the passing of the Judicature Act.34 In addition, the quotation set out above and relied on for the argument that the provision includes equitable choses in action appears in a part of his judgment where he attempted (famously) to define the meaning of “chose in action”.35 He came to the conclusion that the phrase had a wide meaning and would capture rights clearly not meant to be covered by the provision. He gave the example of a transfer of shares. He then made the abovementioned statement in an attempt to limit the reach of the provision rather than widen it. [5.12] Fourthly, another judgment often cited for the view that the provision is intended to capture those rights which before the Act were capable of “lawful” assignment, whether in law or equity, also does not appear to be strong authority for this point. The judgment is that of Griffith CJ in the Queensland Supreme Court in King v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd.36 In that case he said:37 [T]he test to be applied for determining the validity of an assignment of a ‘chose in action’, which is in accordance with . . . [the Act], is whether the subject matter of the assignment and the circumstances under which it is made are such that before the Act a court of law or equity would have considered the assignment a lawful one, and would have given in respect of it such relief as, according to the practice of the court, was appropriate.
This statement was not made for the purposes of clarifying the section, but rather to negative an argument that the section had done away with the rule preventing the assignment of bare rights to litigate. The answer to that argument was that the statutory regime requires the assignment to be “lawful” and not against public policy.38 Later, the Privy Council said that it did not wish expressly to dissent from the views of the Court below as to the construction of the Judicature Act but preferred to express no opinion on what, if any, limitation should be placed on the meaning of phrase “legal chose in action”.39
34 Ibid, at 432. See RP Austin, “The Conveyancing Act, 1919 (As Amended): Section 12 and Equitable Choses in Action” (1974) 7 Syd L Rev 394 at 397. 35 [2.05]. 36 (1895) 6 QLJ 202 ([1896] AC 250). See also Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608 at 619 per Farwell J; Re Pain [1919] 1 Ch 38 at 44 per Younger J. See also the discussion of King v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd in Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101 at 116–21 per Roskill J. 37 (1895) 6 QLJ 202 at 204. 38 See RP Austin, “The Conveyancing Act, 1919 (As Amended): Section 12 and Equitable Choses in Action” (1974) 7 Syd L Rev 394 at 395. See also Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101 at 121. 39 [1896] AC 250 at 256. The Privy Council held that the assignment did not savour of maintenance and therefore did not have to resolve this issue.
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[5.13] Fifthly, the case with the strongest statement that the statutory regime applies to the assignment of equitable choses in action is Re Pain,40 but it too is not strong authority for this view. In that case Younger J said:41 [T]he assignments in the present case do fall within the section; for, although prior to that Act the interest of the plaintiff in this case, being properly recoverable only in a Court of Equity, was strictly a “chose in equity”, not cognisable in a Court of Law, the expression in the section “legal choses in action” includes chose in equity within its scope. These, since King v Victoria Insurance Co—although the Privy Council decision there merely indicated negative approval of a view of the Colonial Court on an analogous Colonial statute—have been treated as including “all rights the assignment of which a Court of law or Equity would before the Act have considered lawful”; or, in the words of Channell J in Torkington v Magee, as including a “debt or right which the common law looks on as not assignable by reason of its being a chose in action, but which a court of Equity deals with as being assignable”.
It can be seen, however, that the authority relied upon by Younger J was that of Torkington v Magee and King v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd, both of which, as noted, cannot stand as authority for this point. [5.14] Sixthly, if the provision was meant to be merely procedural, with its purpose being to allow the assignee to sue without joining the assignor, then an equitable assignee of an equitable interest could already do that by an absolute assignment before the provision was enacted. It therefore adds nothing to the efficacy of equitable assignments of equitable rights. [5.15] Seventhly, it makes perfect sense to confine the word “trustee” to the trustee in bankruptcy, and this may be what the drafter had in mind as he was mainly concerned with the assignment of debts.42 [5.16] Further arguments for the substantive view. Five further reasons may be raised against the statutory regime being merely procedural.43 [5.17] First, the provision clearly allows for the assignment of interests in circumstances where, prior to its enactment, the assignment would not be upheld by equity for lack of consideration.44 In Re Westerton,45 Sargant J suggested that the legislation had improved the position of the assignee procedurally by allowing the 40
[1919] 1 Ch 38. Ibid, at 44–5. 42 See RP Austin, “The Conveyancing Act, 1919 (As Amended): Section 12 and Equitable Choses in Action” (1974) 7 Syd L Rev 394 at 398–9. 43 See further Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 431 per Channell J. 44 Cossill v Strangman [1963] NSWR 1695 at 1698–9. 45 [1919] 2 Ch 104 at 111. 41
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assignee to sue at law in its own name. At the same time he appeared to recognise a substantive improvement to the assignee in the relaxation of the need for consideration. He said:46 It does seem to me that the aim of the sub-section was to reform procedure and to make it unnecessary for an assignee who had an out and out assignment to go through the double process that was formerly necessary in the case of an unwilling assignor. . . . To that extent, . . . the position of the assignee as a question of procedure was improved; he could come at once to law, and come not in the name of the assignor but in his own name as assignee. But if that is so and by means of that simplification of procedure the assignee has been relieved from taking preliminary proceedings in equity, there seems to me to be nothing very startling in the further conclusion, that the assignee has also been relieved from the terms which equity imposed as a condition of assisting him in obtaining the legal right, if at law the question of consideration was regarded as wholly immaterial; and I think that it must have been so regarded for this reason, that at law the action was brought in the name of the assignor, so that there was no question at all of any transaction between the assignor and the assignee under which the question of consideration could arise. If that be so and if since the Judicature Act 1873, the assignee can come directly in his own name and sue as effectually as he could have done in the name of the assignor, it appears to me that there is no reason for continuing against the assignee those terms which were imposed by equity as a condition of granting relief. The position of the assignee has in this respect been improved once and for all by the sub-section of the Judicature Act in question, which has conferred on him a legal right to sue, and in my judgment I ought not to consider that legal right as being in any way dependent upon the question whether the assignment was made for valuable consideration or not, provided it complies with the express conditions of the sub-section.
[5.18] Secondly, under a statutory assignment although the contract between the assignor and obligor continues to exist, the assignor retains no interest in the right assigned, and therefore has no cause of action if the obligor fails to perform the relevant obligation.47 As noted earlier, in the case of an equitable assignment of a legal right the assignor maintains a cause of action because the obligation is still owed to the assignor at law.48 [5.19] Thirdly, despite the Judicature Act reforms being said to be procedural in nature, it must be recognised that section 25 was concerned with resolving conflicts between law and equity. Generally, it resolved those conflicts in favour of the equitable rule. It is suggested that this was intended to have substantive 46
Ibid, at 113–14. Read v Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128 at 132 per Lord Esher MR; Durham Bros v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 at 773 per Chitty LJ; Bacon v Yatchaw Irrigation and Water Supply Trust (1898) 23 VLR 485; Re Pain [1919] 1 Ch 38 at 49 per Younger J; Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101. 48 [4.05]. 47
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consequences.49 In addition, the only conflict it could have been resolving with respect to assignments was the fact that the common law generally did not recognise the assignment of legal choses in action and equity did. Moreover, the argument that the provision is procedural dictates that the only change was to allow an assignee to bring an action in its own name without joining the assignor. However, the requirement that the assignor be joined was a rule of equity, so it can hardly be argued that by dropping that requirement the section was allowing a rule of equity to prevail. [5.20] Fourthly, the idea that the provision is procedural in the sense that it changed procedure to allow an assignee to bring an action in its own name may have only superficial appeal. The argument that this evidences the procedural nature of the provision is that prior to the provision if an assignee wished to enforce the assigned right it was required to get the consent of the assignor to lend its name to the suit at law or, if that was not forthcoming, obtain an order from equity forcing the assignor to lend its name to the suit at law. The provision is said to have merely done away with either having to get consent or having to get such an order.50 However, as noted earlier, prior to the Judicature Act, the common law courts had already stopped requiring the assignee to obtain such an order and allowed the assignee to bring an action in the name of the assignor.51 Thus, the real change brought about by the provision was the ability of the assignee to bring an action in its own name. This can be explained only on the basis that the provision is substantive in nature, in that it passes the legal title to the assignee. In fact, the provision says nothing about joinder, nor does it expressly state that the assignee can bring an action in its own name. The relevant words are, “Any absolute assignment shall be . . . effectual in law to pass and transfer the legal right . . . and all legal and other remedies . . . and the power to give a good discharge . . . without the concurrence of the assignor”. The reference to the “concurrence of the assignor” qualifies only the issue of discharge, and the accepted ability of the assignee to bring an action in its own name must come from the previous words which are clearly directed to vesting legal title in the assignee. There is no need to mention the issue of joinder because the assignee owns the legal right and so, of course, it 49 RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) paras 2.065, 2.115. Similarly it is difficult to see how s 25(7) of the Judicature Act which “construed” time provisions in contracts in accordance with the equitable rule, namely, that they were not of the essence, as opposed to the common rule which did treat them as conditions, could be said to be merely enacting a procedural change. 50 As noted earlier, [4.24], it has been argued by some commentators that the provision is procedural in the sense that prior to its enactment the common law had come to recognise the assignment of choses in action, and this provision did away with the need to join the assignor. This is, with respect, a strange position to adopt. The requirement that all interested parties had to be before the court was a procedural requirement of equity. It is not clear how this provision resolved a conflict between law and equity in favour of equity if it did away with that requirement. 51 [2.12].
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need not join the assignor.52 Moreover, the fact that the assignee can provide a discharge without the concurrence of the assignor is also substantive as it means that, unlike the position prior to this enactment, the obligation must no longer be, in part, owed to the assignor. It is therefore suggested that the true essence and limit of the provision’s procedural nature are that it did not make anything assignable at law that was not, prior to the enactment, assignable in equity.53 [5.21] Fifthly, and most pragmatically, even if the procedural view is correct, if the view is then taken that the common law has not developed at all since 1873, so that it has never managed to recognise the transfer of legal rights, that result will reflect a rather unsophisticated system of commercial law. [5.22] The priorities issue. Finally, something must be said about the procedural view of the provision and the issue of priorities. According the judgment of Morse J in Harding Carpets Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada,54 there appear to two aspects to this issue. [5.23] The first simply dictates that because the provision is merely procedural the interest of the assignee is equitable, and therefore in any priority dispute the rules governing competing equitable assignments operate.55 That is, priority goes to the party first giving notice rather than applying the first in time rule and/or the bona fide purchaser rule.56 This argument is simply met with the points put forward above that suggest that the provision is not procedural but substantive. Thus, the starting point for this argument is undermined.
52 Quaere whether it logically follows that the enforcement of a partial assignment under the Western Australia Act (Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s20(3)) which recognises the legal assignment of partial interests in debts and choses in action would not require an assignee to join the assignor even as a matter of procedure to enforce its claim. If, as the provision appears to accept, a debt may now be recovered piecemeal in a court of law, and if the assignee of part of a debt owns the legal right to that part of the debt, then the enforcement of that part by the assignee could not place the debtor in the position in which he or she may later be sued by the assignor for that same part. 53 See Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co (1965) 1 QB 101 at 114–21 per Roskill J. 54 [1980] 4 WWR 149. See [5.5]. 55 See also Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 at 620 per Mummery J (in this case Mummery J also rejected the argument that the rule in Dearle v Hall applies only to transactions involving equitable interests and not transactions that involve equitable dealings with legal interests). 56 There is some authority for applying the bona fide purchaser rule, eg Ellerman Lines Ltd v Lancaster Maritime Co Ltd (The Lancaster) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 497 at 503 per Goff J; Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1 at 19 per Viscount Finlay; Ward v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 at 392 per Lord Macnaghten. See also F Oditah, “Priorities: Equitable Vesus Legal Assignments of Book Debts” (1989) 9 OJLS 513 at 529–31. Cf Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 at 621 per Mummery J.
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[5.24] The second aspect is more sophisticated. It dictates that because the provision expressly adopts, as a priority rule (for a competition between an equitable assignee and a statutory assignee), the rule that applies between competing equitable assignees, then the interest of the statutory assignee must be equitable, and therefore the provision must in turn be procedural in nature. The argument for the provision adopting this priority rule is said to lie in the words that the assignee takes “subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee”. The problem with this argument is that it is not entirely clear that these words are meant to operate as a priority provision. Apart from this reference to the word “priority” the provision deals only with the tripartite relationship between the assignor, assignee and obligor/debtor. It may have been thought by the legislator that because the right vested in the assignee is legal then to ensure that the rule that an assignee takes subject to the equities the obligor has against the assignor prior to receiving notice of the assignment continues to apply to such assignments, it was necessary to state this expressly. However, unfortunately, the word chosen was “priority” which is generally used to describe disputes between competing assignees.57 [5.25] It is also important to note that the original provision which is still reflected in section 12 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) (but not any other Australian jurisdiction and not in England) said that the assignee takes “subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee if this Act had not passed”.58 It is suggested that these final words are important. If we assume that this provision is meant to govern priorities (as well as defences the obligor may have against the assignor), then these words tend to suggest that the effect of the provision is in fact substantive. That is, they suggest that for the purposes of priority it is necessary to consider what the position of the assignee would have been if the Act was not passed. If the Act had not been passed, the assignee’s interest would have been equitable, and so you apply the rules governing competition between competing equitable interests. There would have been no need to expressly state this if, in fact, the provision was procedural, because in that case the assignee’s interest would only ever have been equitable. Therefore, even if it is accepted that the provision is intended to govern priorities and that it expressly adopts the rules governing competing equitable assignees, this does not prove the argument that the provision is procedural. In fact, as noted, it can equally be seen as strengthening the case against the procedural view. 57 One might argue that the reference in the section to the subject to equities rule evidences that it is a procedural provision because a true transfer at law would not adopt that rule. However, if the common law accepted the assignment of choses in action it is not clear whether it would or would not have adopted such a rule: see [8.67]. 58 The Australian Capital Territory provision uses a different expression but still captures this idea. S 12(4) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (ACT) states; “However, the transfer is subject to all equities that would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee apart from this section”.
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[5.26] In the result, it is difficult to come to any firm conclusion whether or not the provision was meant to govern priorities. It is suggested that in any case the correct priority rule to apply between a statutory assignee and an equitable assignee should be determined by the policies underlying priority rules, and not a strained or questionable construction of this provision. There is certainly a strong case that this aspect of the regime should be made clear.
(d) Conclusion [5.27] Conclusion. For the reasons set out above, it is suggested that the statutory provisions for legal assignment, which have as their genesis section 25(6) of the Judicature Act 1873, are substantive in effect. They provide for the transfer of legal interests so that the assignee becomes the owner at law of the subject chose in action. The assignor retains no interest and no cause of action against the obligor.59 The provisions are procedural only to the extent that they do not make assignable anything that prior to the enactment could not have been assigned in equity.
59 Of course where the assignment is by way of mortgage the assignor will obtain an equity of redemption. Moreover, when claiming redemption, the assignor, despite there being a legal assignment, may be a necessary party to any suit that is on foot between the assignee and obligor: Re Pain [1919] 1 Ch 38 at 49–50.
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Part 3 Assignment of Contractual Rights
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6 Assignable Contractual Rights (a) Introduction [6.01] Purpose of the part. This part investigates the process of assigning contractual rights. It consists of two chapters. The first deals with the identification of assignable contractual rights and the second deals with the formalities for an assignment. [6.02] Purpose of the chapter. The first issue that must be addressed when deciding to assign a contractual right is to determine whether or not the right is assignable. This chapter is concerned with that issue. As regards the underlying theme of the book, this chapter seeks to explain those rules which are relevant to the issue of assignability by reference to the principle of transfer. Those rules are: 1. An assignor can assign no greater right than it has, nor can an assignee obtain a right greater than that held by the assignor. 2. Only non-personal contractual rights may be assigned. 3. It is not possible by assignment to increase or vary the obligations or burdens of an obligor. 4. It is possible to assign only rights and not obligations. Rule 1 is clearly a statement of the nemo dat rule which is the hallmark of the legal concept of transfer and needs no further discussion insofar as the theme of the book is concerned. The chapter will focus on rules 2, 3, and 4. [6.03] Structure of the chapter. The first requirement for an assignable contractual right, at least under the current property model of assignment, is that it be a chose in action. This issue is dealt with in the next section. Closely associated with the need for a chose in action is the requirement that the subject matter be present property. It is therefore necessary in this chapter to discuss the distinction between present and future property. Following this there is a section on the division and separation of contractual rights. After this there is a long section on restrictions.1 1 It is possible to view the requirement of a present chose in action as a restriction on assignability, however, the restrictions dealt with in the “restrictions” section of this chapter are more concerned with the placing of positive restrictions on assignment as opposed to positive requirements of assignability.
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The first part of this section deals with public policy restrictions on assignment. The second part deals with the notion of personal contractual rights. The third part looks at contractual provisions dealing with assignment. The fourth part ties parts 2 and 3 to the principle of transfer. The fifth part looks at the rule which prohibits an assignment from varying or increasing the obligations or burdens of the obligor insofar as that rule relates to assignability. Finally, the sixth part looks at the assignment of contractual burdens.
(b) The Requirement of a Chose in Action (i) Contractual Rights as Choses in Action [6.04] Introduction. For a contractual right to be assignable it must first be characterised as a chose in action. The meaning of “chose in action” was dealt with in Chapter 2.2 This section identifies those contractual rights that are choses in action. [6.05] Debts.3 A debt is a right to receive a payment.4 Apart from being expressly made assignable under the statutory regime,5 a contractual debt whether it is payable immediately or not, is a chose in action6 and may be assigned. Whether or not a memorandum of assignment captures a debt is a question of construction.7 For example, where a memorandum refers only to the fruits of a contract it may not capture the right to the obligation to pay.8 An assignment of a debt requires the creditor to assign its rights against the debtor.9 Moreover, an assignment of the benefit of a contract may not capture an obligation to pay, that is, a debt, that had accrued prior to the assignment.10
2
[2.02]–[2.06]. As to the assignability of causes of action under s 82 and 87 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth): see Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 5) (2002) Australian Trade Parctices Reports (ATPR) (Digest) 46,214; National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 514; Park v Allied Mortgage Corp Ltd (1993) ATPR (Digest) 46,105. See also Pritchard v Racecage Pty Ltd (1997) 142 ALR 527. Cf the position of a trustee in bankruptcy: Cotterill v Bank of Singapore (Australia) Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 238. 4 Westralian Farmers Co-operative Ltd v Southern Meat Packers Ltd [1981] WAR 241 at 244. 5 [5.03]. 6 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 574 per Lord Goff. 7 [6.34]. 8 [6.33]. 9 See Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 13 per Latham CJ and cf at 28–30 per Dixon J. This does not extend to the right to determine whether a sum is payable under a contract: see [6.54]. 10 [6.34]. 3
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[6.06] Right to Damages. An accrued right to sue for damages for breach of contract is a chose in action.11 Some older cases suggest that a mere right to sue for breach of contract is not a chose in action because, if it were, it would be assignable and that would be at odds with the law of maintenance and champerty.12 However, the better view is that the law does not deny the character of a chose in action to a right to bring an action for damages for breach of contract, but recognises that the assignability of that chose in action is subject to overriding public policy considerations.13 It cannot be correct that the degree of interest the assignee has in the subject matter of the assignment can affect the nature of that subject matter as a piece of property. Therefore, a conclusion that a right is a bare right of action and therefore not assignable does not necessarily deny that the right may still be a chose in action; it is merely a conclusion that the right is either not a chose in action or, more likely, is a chose in action but is not assignable for public policy reasons.14 In addition, if the secondary right to damages for breach of contract were not a chose in action, the recognised ability of liquidators and trustees in bankruptcy to assign such rights would be anomalous.15 [6.07] The right to performance. The benefit (or right to performance) of a contract is a chose in action.16 The recognised assignability of a right to receive the benefit of contractual performance demonstrates that it is not necessary for a right to be capable of enjoyment only by action for it to be a chose in action.17 A right to receive contractual performance satisfies the modern enforceability requirement of a chose in action as it is capable of enforcement by action.18 It is enforceable by action because it is possible to sue for damages if there is a breach of contract. Unlike an order for specific performance a claim for damages for breach of contract does not enforce the contract in a primary sense. Nevertheless, 11 Quaere whether some of those heads of damages that do not reflect a financial loss, such as damages for loss of enjoyment or injured feelings, are too personal to be assigned, or whether the assignability of such rights is dependent upon whether the benefit of the primary right to performance is itself personal and not assignable: see Re Campbell [1997] Ch 14 at 19 per Knox J; Haq v Singh [2001] 1 WLR 1594. 12 Eg May v Lane (1894) 64 LJQB 236 at 238 per Rigby LJ (see [2.02]); Dawson v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260 at 270–1 per Stirling LJ. 13 See further [6.59]. 14 See Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 117 ALR 61 at 70 per Hill J. 15 Eg Ogdens Ltd v Weinberg (1906) 95 LT 567. See also Stein v Blake [1996] AC 243 at 258 per Lord Hoffmann. Cf Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1998] Ch 170. See [6.67]. 16 Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 431 per Channell J; Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 at 420 per Lord Macnaghten. See also Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460 at 504 per Windeyer J; Zhu v Treasurer of New South Wales (2004) 211 ALR 159 at 192–3. 17 Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 431 per Channell J. Cf Simmons v Harvey [1965] Tas SR 84 at 94 per Neasey J. 18 [2.04]. See also Loxton v Moir (1914) 18 CLR 360 at 379 per Rich J.
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damages are assessed on the basis of putting the plaintiff in the position it would have been in if the contract had been properly performed. Therefore damages enforce the obligation to perform and the correlative right to perform in a secondary sense as they secure performance. It follows that in a legal sense the damages represent the fruits of the contract. Insofar as its characterisation as a chose in action is concerned, it does not matter whether a present right to performance is conditional or unconditional.19 However, in the case of a conditional or dependent obligation, the extent to which the contract is executed or executory will impact on the ability of the assignee to enforce performance.20 [6.08] Miscellaneous contractual rights.21 The assignment of contractual rights is not limited to rights to some positive performance.22 For example, a contractual promise in restraint of trade which is otherwise enforceable is a chose in action and is assignable unless, on construction, it is personal to the assignor.23 A contractual right of pre-emption has also been held to be an assignable chose in action.24 In addition, the benefit of a contractual arbitration provision is a chose in action and is assignable.25 Moreover, a contractual right of indemnity has been classified as a chose in action, although, often, such rights (as opposed to the fruits or perhaps the right to the fruits of such contracts) are construed as personal and not assign-
19 Eg Hughes v Pump House Hotel Co Ltd [1902] 2 KB 190. See also Tooth v Hallett (1869) LR 4 Ch App 242; Brice v Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569; G and T Earle Ltd v Hemsworth Rural District Council (1928) 44 TLR 758 at 760 per Scrutton LJ. Cf the position when the existence of the right is conditional or contingent, [6.20]. 20 [8.07]. 21 On the assignment of funds standing to the credit of the drawer of a bill of exchange: see AG Guest, Chalmers and Guest on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes (16th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) para 7.005. 22 It has been held that a right to relief against forfeiture of a lease is a chose in action which will vest in a trustee in bankruptcy and is assignable by the trustee: see Howard v Fanshawe [1895] 2 Ch 581. Quaere whether the extent to which such an order is discretionary may dictate that all the assignor really has is a right to approach a court for an order granting relief against forfeiture; cf Newbolt v Bingham (1895) 72 LT 852; Gill v Lewis [1956] 2 QB 1. 23 Elves v Croffs (1850) 10 CB 241, 138 ER 98; Baines v Geary (1887) 35 Ch D 154; Townsend v Jarman [1900] 2 Ch 698; Welstead v Hadley (1904) 21 TLR 165; Automobile Carriage Builders Ltd v Sayers (1909) 101 LT 419. See also New York Bank Note Company v The Hamilton Bank Note Engraving and Printing Company (1905) 73 NE 48; Sickles v Lauman (1918) 169 NW 670; Coker and Bellamy v Richey (1922) 204 P 945; Torrington Creamery v Davenport (1940) 12 A 2d 780; Cantrell v Lemons (1948) 200 P 2d 911; Mail-Well Envelope Co v Saley (1972) 497 P 2d 364; Saliterman v Finney (1985) 361 NW 2d 175; Alexander & Alexander v Koelz (1987) 722 SW 2d 311; Pino v Spanish Broadcasting System of Florida Inc (1990) 564 So 2d 186. Cf Davies v Davies (1887) 36 Ch D 359 at 394 per Bowen LJ. 24 Dear v Reeves [2002] Ch 1. 25 Rumput (Panama) SA v Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (The Leage) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 259; Socony Mobil Oil Co Inc v The West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association (London) Ltd (The Padre Island) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 408; Montedipe SpA v JTP-RO Jugotanker (The Jordan Nicolov) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 11. See further [6.73].
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able.26 Finally, an option is a chose in action27 and is capable of assignment unless, on construction, it is personal to the grantee.28 Interestingly, the assignability of an option is not limited to options in the form of (existing) conditional contracts. An option in the form of an irrevocable offer is also assignable even though an offer to contract is not, as it is personal to the extent of not being a chose in action.29 Where an option in the form of an irrevocable offer is assigned it cannot be the case that the assignee only receives the benefit of the contract not to revoke that accompanies such an offer because, if that were all the assignee received, it would never be in the position of being able to exercise the option.30 [6.09] Rights to rectify or rescind. Rights to rectify or rescind contracts are more problematic. There are cases that have held that a right to rescind or rectify is a chose in action and is assignable.31 However, these cases have involved dealings in land where the right to rescind or rectify has been held to amount to an equitable interest. Where the right of rectification or the right to rescind is an incident of the property conveyed then the grantor will continue to have an interest in the property and the right to rectify or rescind will be assigned when there is a conveyance
26 Eg British Union & National Insurance Co v Rawson [1916] 2 Ch 476; Rendall v Morphew (1914) 84 LJ Ch 517. See further [8.13]. 27 Griffith v Pelton [1958] Ch 205 at 225; Re Button’s Lease [1964] Ch 263; Snape v Kiernan (1988) 13 NSWLR 88 at 95 per Mahoney JA; Westgold Resources NL v St George Bank Ltd (1998) 29 Australian Company and Securities Reports (ACSR) 396 at 433 per Anderson J (affirmed [2000] Western Auistralian Supreme Court, Court of Appeal (WASCA) 85). 28 County Hotel and Wine Co Ltd v London and North Western Railway Co [1918] 2 KB 251 (affirmed [1919] 2 KB 29); Wright v Morgan [1926] AC 788; Griffith v Pelton [1958] Ch 205. See also Re Cousins (1885) 30 Ch D 203; Jacobs v Larkin (1892) 13 NSWR (Eq) 62; Shearer v Wilding (1915) 15 SR(NSW) 283; Whiteley Ltd v Hilt [1918] 2 KB 808; Taita Hotel Ltd v Spelman [1963] NZLR 206; Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Cherrywood Park Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 279; Briargate Developments Ltd v Newprop Co Ltd [1990] 1 EGLR 283 and see CJ Rossiter, Principles of Land Contracts and Options in Australia (Sydney, Butterworths, 2003) paras 3.15–3.18. See further Sharp v The Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd (1944) 69 CLR 539; Wilson v Commissioner of Probate Duties (Vic) (1978) 8 Australian Taxation Reports 799; Burwood Project Management Pty Ltd v Polar Technologies International Pty Ltd (1999) 9 Butterworths Property Reports 97801; Clayman v Goodman Properties Inc (1973) 518 F 2d 1026. The fact that an option is given to a grantee and its nominee does not of itself render the option personal: see David Jones Ltd v Lunn (1969) 91 WN(NSW) 468. Generally, if an option is not personal and is assignable then it may be exercised by the personal representatives of the offeree: see Carter v Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115; Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57. See also Kennewell v Dye [1949] Ch 517 (exercise of option against personal representatives). 29 See RA Brierley Investments Ltd v Landmark Corporation Ltd (1966) 120 CLR 224 at 232 per Barwick CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ. 30 In the case of an option to acquire an interest in land, the option may vest an interest in land in the optionee. Where that is the case any formal writing requirements need to be satisfied: see CJ Rossiter, Principles of Land Contracts and Options in Australia (Sydney, Butterworths, 2003) para 3.19. 31 Eg Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337; Majestic Homes Pty Ltd v Wise [1978] Qd R 225 at 232; Child v Dynes [1985] 2 NZLR 554 at 560; Misner v Australian Capital Territory (2000) 146 ACTR 1.
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of the property by the grantor.32 The conveyance of property carries with it the transferor’s right to rectify or rescind. Thus, if A sells to B where A has a right to recover the property from B and that right is an incident of the property, then A will continue to have an interest in the property and can assign that equitable interest to C, allowing C to sue B to recover the legal estate.33 However, this result depends on the equity to rescind or rectify being an incident of the property rather than an incident of the contract between the first two parties.34 Whether it is an 32 Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337 at 342. See also Stump v Gaby (1852) 2 De GM & G 623, 42 ER 1015; Majestic Homes Pty Ltd v Wise [1978] Qd R 225 at 232. Despite this there is a view that such an interest is best described as a mere equity, with any full equitable interest being dependent on the exercise of the right to rescind or rectify which in the meantime may be defeated by a bona fide purchaser: see Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF & J 208, 45 ER 1164 and compare the judgments of Kitto and Taylor JJ in Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 265. Cf Prosser v Edmunds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 160 ER 196. See further Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399; De Hoghton v Money [1866] LR 2 Ch App 164. There has been a long debate concerning the reconciliation of the decisions in Dickinson and Prosser : see PH Winfield, “Assignment of Choses in Action in Relation to Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 143 at 158–9; YL Tan, “Champertous Contracts and Assignments” (1990) 106 LQR 656 at 659. Both cases involved transactions between A and B and then A and C, with the dispute being between B and C. They did not involve transactions between A and B and then B and C, with the dispute being between A and C. The difference in the cases may lie in the fact that Dickinson involved a conveyance of land while Prosser involved an assignment of a chose in action. In the case of a chose in action it has always been the case that if the assignor assigns the chose twice any dispute between the assignees is resolved by the normal priority rules, and this would extinguish the relevance of the rule in Dickinson’s case. 33 Gross v Lewis Hillman Ltd [1970] 1 Ch 445 at 460 per Cross LJ explaining the decision in Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337 at 342. See also Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 265 at 284 per Taylor J. It has been suggested that such a right to rescind may be asserted by the grantor against subsequent third party purchasers. Thus, where A sells to B who sells to C, C may take subject to rights A could assert against B where those rights are an incident of the property: see Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 183; cf Napier v Williams [1911] 1 Ch 361. Unless there is a statutory provision to the contrary this result seems questionable if C is a purchaser of the legal estate. The Dickinson v Burrell line of cases does not automatically give priority to the party in the position of A; in the case of a priority dispute the Dickinson v Burrell line of cases merely aids in recognising and characterising the interest of A. If there is a priority dispute between A’s interest and C’s interest, the applicable priority rules should dictate the result: see generally Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 265; Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376; Phillips v Phillips (1862) 4 De GF & J 208 at 215, 45 ER 1164 at 1166; Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 at 646 per Fry J; Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee [1956] 1 Ch 7 at 18–19 per Upjohn J. See also RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) paras 4.150–4.205 and P Parkinson and D Wright, in P Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (2nd edn, Sydney, LBC, 2003) para 316. 34 Quaere whether this analysis would be applied in relation to a sale of goods. If A sells goods to B giving B possession of the goods and A then agrees to sell the goods to C, if the circumstances are that B is guilty of some fraud the sale to C will usually amount to an election by A to rescind against B, so there is no need for C to rescind against B. If A sells to B who sells to C and A is guilty of some fraud, then by on-selling to C, B will have lost its right to rescind against A. Where A sells to B and is left in possession of the goods and then sells to C, title between B and C is determined by application of statutory exceptions to the nemo dat rule. In the case of contractual rights if A has a contract with B which is vitiated by the conduct of B and B assigns its right to C, then C takes subject to A’s right to rescind by virtue of the subject to equities rule: see [8.62]. The issue that remains unclear and which is discussed below ([6.10]) is where B assigns the benefit of its contract with A to C and where A is the party guilty of some vitiating conduct.
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incident of the contract (a mere equity) or an incident of the subject matter of the contract (equitable interest) will depend on the right and the nature of the subject matter.35 It has been held that the result will be different where the fraud is that of the original seller rather than the intermediate buyer. In Gross v Lewis Hillman,36 it was said that in a sale of property from A to B to C, where the contract between A and B is vitiated by reason of a misrepresentation by A, then, although C may have separate rights against B, C cannot rescind against A by handing back the property to A and receiving from A the price B paid to A. However, in that case A agreed to sell land to B making certain misrepresentations to B. B, as equitable owner of the land, offered to sell the land to C if C paid the purchase price to A and paid B a commission. Upon payment, C took a transfer of the legal estate from A, and it was held that C could not rescind against A. The fact that the transfer was a direct transfer from A to C prevented B’s right to rescind running with the land. However, the court suggested that the result would have been the same if there was a sub-sale by B to C. One reason given for this result is that the misrepresentation was not made to the party claiming relief, that is, C. The misrepresentation was spent upon A and B entering into a contract. However, that alone does not distinguish this case from the case dealt with in the last paragraph. It may be that in this scenario the party in the position of B has a mere equity because the only relief B would be claiming is the restitution of the purchase price, and this (subject to what is said below) may not be a sufficient interest to be transferred upon the transfer of the property. Cross LJ, in drawing a distinction between this case and Dickinson v Burrell 37 which concerned the scenario discussed above, said:38 There, property had been assigned by A to B, in circumstances which, so it was claimed gave A an equitable right to recover it and so an equitable interest in it. A assigned that equitable interest to C, and it was held that C could sue B to recover the legal estate. That case does not appear to me to support the proposition advanced by counsel in the present case. Here, the assignee is not claiming to recover an equitable interest in the property previously conveyed away by his assignor, but is claiming to throw back the property assigned to him not on his immediate assignor but on the party who sold it to his assignor. 35 See Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 183 at 195; National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 at 1238 per Lord Upjohn; Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 265 at 277 per Kitto J, at 284 per Taylor J; Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376. See also Malory Enterprises Ltd v Cheshire Homes (UK) [2002] Ch 216 at 232–3; Global Minerals v Valerica (2000) 10 Butterworths Property Reports 18,463. Outside dealings in interests in land, generally the transferee under a voidable contract will obtain full beneficial title to the property which is the subject matter of the transaction: see Shalson v Russo [2005] 2 WLR 1213 at 1248–50. Any retention of an interest by the transferor would need to be based on the contract being entirely ineffective: see Halley v The Law Society [2003] EWCA Civ 97. See further [8.62]. 36 [1970] 1 Ch 445. 37 (1866) LR 1 Eq 337. See above n 33. 38 [1970] 1 Ch 445 at 460–1.
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Perhaps here it is necessary for C first to rescind against B so as to revive B’s right to rescind against A.39 [6.10] Ultimately, the nature of the right would be irrelevant if the law recognised that an equity to rescind or rectify was nevertheless assignable.40 The scenario to be considered is where A enters into a contract with B which may be rescinded by B. Can B assign the benefit of that right to rescind to C? Clearly, if the rescission will involve B handing back property to A, C would require B’s co-operation.41 On one view a mere equity is a personal right rather than a right of property, and therefore cannot be assigned.42 Certainly if the right is classified as a personal equity it cannot be assigned. This may occur where the contract is entirely executory and does not create any interests in personal property.43 However, a mere equity is capable of binding third parties taking with notice, so it is not necessarily personal. Nevertheless, in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society,44 Lord Hoffmann said that a right to rescind is not a chose in action and not a part of a chose in action. There was no suggestion that he was limiting his remarks to personal equities. He was dealing with a right to rescind a mortgage over land and said the right was not transferable separately from the mortgage property. Given this context perhaps, his remarks were intended to reflect the line of cases discussed above where the equity to rescind follows a conveyance of the property and is incidental to the property. However, his remark was general in character. Professor Treitel has suggested that the reason for Lord Hoffmann’s remark is that rescission is a remedy and therefore not a chose in action.45 It is true that in understanding choses in action it is necessary to distin39 See Abram Steamship Co Ltd v Westville Shipping Co Ltd [1923] AC 773. If a contract of sale which is the subject of an assignment contains a contractual right to rescind, then it is important for an assignee of the benefit of that contract to determine whether that right allows for the avoidance of the disposition or the contract. If the latter then that right may be intended to come to an end upon the conveyance and the assignee cannot then rely upon it: see Edinburgh United Breweries Ltd v Molleson [1894] AC 97. 40 This necessarily assumes that the circumstances are such that the assignment to C does not amount to an election to affirm the contract. 41 As noted above (n 34), where A sells goods to B and B can rescind the contract but sells the goods to C, then B will not be able to rescind against A because B cannot return the goods to A. Moreover, if rights to rescind can be assigned, then if the sale to C amounted to an election to affirm the contract, then the right to rescind would be lost and not assigned. 42 Child v Dynes [1985] 2 NZLR 554 at 560 (affirmed on other grounds [1985] 2 NZLR 554); Swanston Mortgage Pty Ltd v Trepan Investments Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 672 at 675 per Brooking J. 43 RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 4–145. 44 [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 916. 45 GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 674. It may be that Treitel understood Lord Hoffmann to be taking this view of rescission, because when Lord Hoffmann defined a “chose in action” he was careful to distinguish remedies and stated that they are not property in themselves: see [2.05]. Cf Prosser v Edmunds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 160 ER 196 (here the assignment of a right to set aside was rejected on the basis that it was nothing more than a bare right of action).
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guish the right from the remedy, however, the fact that rescission is a remedy does not necessarily mean there is not some right preceding that remedy. It is suggested that although the legal basis for rescission (legal or equitable) or the type of rescission (ab initio, partial or on terms) may dictate whether one has a right to rescission or merely a right to approach a court for an order of rescission, it is still correct to recognise the existence of a right to rescind46 as long as it is recognised that in some instances this will merely refer to a right of action.47 The real question is whether or not this right is a chose in action. Arguably where the claim for rescission is to the equitable jurisdiction of the court, the discretionary nature of the order dictates that the “rescission” or “right to rescind” cannot be a chose in action. There is some force in this view. However, if the distinction between the right and remedy operates with respect to rescission, then arguably it is only the remedy (or order) that is discretionary and not the selfhelp right to elect to rescind and this is perhaps even more so if the better view today is that the rescinding party merely has a right to approach a court for an order of rescission.48 Ultimately, the right to rescind is either a right that may be enforced by action or a right of action itself and is therefore, at least in theory, capable of being considered a chose in action. In Booth v Commissioner of Taxation,49 Mason CJ pointed to the example of an owner of land having a right to the income from that land. He suggested that such a right is merely an abstract right; it is not a chose in action, although its fruits may be dealt with by contract and it may give rise to a chose in action if infringed. Such a right is enjoyed by anyone buying the subject land as it is inherent in the concept of ownership. Perhaps Lord Hoffmann in the Investors Compensation Scheme case was making a similar claim to a right to rescind in suggesting the right was not transferable separately from the mortgaged property.50 However, it is not clear
46 Some may prefer the expression “right to avoid”, which then leaves the word “rescission” as an expression of the remedy that may follow. However, there is nothing illegitimate in the expression “right to rescind”. 47 In fact Lord Hoffmann referred to a “right to rescind” and stated that “a claim to rescission is a right of action”: see Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 916. 48 Compare the “enforcement” of an undertaking as to damages upon the termination of an injunction. The undertaking does not found a cause of action. It has been said that in such a case the party claiming damages merely has a right to “apply to the court to request an exercise of discretion to order an enquiry as to damages. There is no ‘right’ to an enquiry until the court’s discretion is positively exercised in favour of ordering an enquiry. Even where it is determined that an injunction should not have been granted, the court retains a discretion not to enforce an undertaking”: Cirillo v Citicorp Australia Ltd [2004] SASC 293 para 73. In such a case, the applicant merely has a hope of being awarded damages; there is no existing chose in action. The right to apply to court to seek enforcement of the undertaking was here described as a “mere right of procedure or a mere equity”: para 93. In the same paragraph it was also concluded that a “right to apply to the Court to seek the exercise of a discretion is not a chose in action”. 49 (1987) 164 CLR 159 at 165, 166.
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whether Lord Hoffmann was suggesting that a right to rescind is transferred only with the subject matter of the contract when it is an incident of that subject matter (as discussed above) or whether he was suggesting that a right to rescind would be transferred with an assignment of the benefit of the contract despite being a mere equity. Finally, although Lord Hoffmann did not express a view on the point, arguably it is possible to declare a trust over a present right to rescind. If that is correct then the right must be property,51 and this would suggest that its non-assignability actually results from a presumption that the parties would not generally intend such a right to be vested in one person while the right to the benefit of the contract was in another. On this view, the right to rescind is a chose in action and is assignable but the manner of its assignment is controlled by the intention of the parties, so that it may be assigned only to a person taking the general benefit of the contract. Alternatively, and more doctrinally, the better view may be that it is not possible to separarte the right to rescind from the general benefit of the contract and then assign or retain that right to rescind because the person then having the right to rescind will not be able to affect restitution because they do not own the benefit of the contract. On its own, the right to rescind is valueless. Moreover, arguably the existence of a right to rescind depends on the contiunued existence of the contract and, in a sense the contract would cease to exist if it were assigned to a third party; this too suggests that it is not possible to separate the right to rescind from the general benefit of the contract. [6.11] Right to terminate. A right to terminate a contract for breach or repudiation does not come into existence until there is a breach or repudiation. Prior to that time it too may be expressed as an abstract right being inherent in the right to performance. Nevertheless, where, prior to any breach of contract, there is an assignment of the benefit of a contract then any right to terminate for breach that does later arise will be vested in the assignee as it is the party with title to the right to performance at the relevant time.52 When the right to terminate comes into existence prior to the assignment of the benefit of the contract, one view may be that it is not a chose in action but a mere personal right of election. This follows from its being a self-help remedy rather than a right that is capable of enjoyment by action. However, it is suggested that the better view is that the right to terminate follows the right to
50 See Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 916 per Lord Hoffmann. 51 Cf P Parkinson, “Reconceptualising the Express Trust” [2002] CLJ 657. 52 See Hain Steamship Co Ltd v Tate & Lyle Ltd (1936) 41 Com Cas 350; Harbour Estates Ltd v HSBC Bank plc [2005] 2 WLR 67. Cf Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 288 (an appeal from this decision is still pending at the time of writing).
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performance; although arising by operation of law upon a breach of contract, it is a contractual right. If the benefit of a contract is assignable then, upon the assignment of the benefit of the contract, any existing rights of termination will follow. It is doubtful that it could be assigned separately from the right to receive performance, either because that separation would be at odds with the intention of the parties to the contract or because the nature of the right itself prohibits such separation.53 That is, the right to terminate cannot continue to exist if separated from the thing that supports it, namely, the general benefit of the contract. It follows that an assignor could not terminate a contract for the breach of an obligation when the assignor know longer owns the general benefit of the contract. It is a basic principle of the law of assignment that, although the obligator’s conscience is bound only upon receiving notice of the assignment, the proper person to grant a discharge to the obligor is the assignee, since the right to terminate a contract is a right to elect to discharge the parties from their obligations under the contract, the right to terminate must vest in the assignee. In addition it would rarely be the case that the decision to assign the benefit of a contract at a time when a right to terminate existed would amount to an election by the assignor to affirm the contract. Nevertheless, general principle dictates that if the assignor elects to affirm prior to the assignment then the right to terminate is extinguished and will not vest in the assignee.54 Moreover, if at the time of the assignment the assignee has notice of the existence of a right to terminate the contract, the taking of the assignment itself would generally not amount to an election by the assignee to affirm the contract.55 [6.12] The duty of utmost good faith in insurance contracts. The duty of utmost good faith is an incident of insurance contracts rather than an obligation arising by reference to a term of the contract. It is doubtful whether the right to this duty can be assigned. It is a duty that is owed by both an insured and an insurer. It is a legal duty rather than a contractual duty. Therefore, breach of this duty does not give rise to a right to damages. Often, as security for an advance a financier will take a mortgage over certain property and, in addition to requiring that property to be insured, will require an assignment of the fruits of that insurance policy or a
53 Another view may be that the right to terminate is merely part of the right to performance, so that an assignment of the right to terminate would in fact involve a division of the right to performance: see [6.48]. 54 Cf as regards the special form of transfer that occurs in the case of bills of lading Hain Steamship Co Ltd v Tate & Lyle Ltd (1936) 41 Com Cas 350 at 356–7 per Lord Atkin, at 364 per Lord Wright MR, where it was held that the indorsee of a bill of lading obtained the right to discharge a contract by reason of deviation even though the deviation was waived by the charterer prior to the indorsement. 55 See further GH Treitel and FMB Reynolds, Carver on Bills of Lading (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) para 5.029.
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charge over the proceeds.56 Clearly the financier taking a mere assignment of the fruits of the contract cannot expect to be benefited or burdened by the duty of utmost good faith. Moreover, even with an assignment of the entire benefit of a contract, the assignee should not expect to have the benefit of this duty as it arises as an incident of the contract, and an assignment does not create privity of contract between the assignee and obligor. It is different with the right to damages that arises as an incident of a contract upon breach because that right does secure performance. An assignee of the right to performance of a contract can expect to have the benefit of any right to damages when there is a breach of contract. However, there are cases where rights under insurance contracts are “assigned” so as to allow the assignee to take over the entire contract. Usually this means the assignee will also take over the burden of the contract. Where such an assignment is valid, the view has been expressed that the assignee should get the benefit of the insurer’s obligation of utmost good faith.57 It is doubtful that this result flows from the “right” to the duty suddenly becoming a chose in action that is assignable. A better analysis, putting aside any relevant statutory provision, is that the “assignment” is really a novation, and in such a case there would be no problem with the duty arising as an incident of the new contract.58 Thus, the result flows from the contract that now exists between the insurer and the “assignee”. Perhaps the point made here would be clearer if this legal incident was thought to involve mutual duties rather than a right to a duty. [6.13] Contracts for the benefit of third parties. In the case of a contract for the benefit of a third party where the circumstances are such that that third party can
56 Eg Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd (The Good Luck) [1990] 1 QB 818. Usually there is no intention to assign the right to the proceeds; rather, the financier is given a charge over the proceeds. In this way, any funds recovered by the financier from the insurer which are in excess of the liability of the debtor will be handed to the debtor and this better reflects the intention of the parties: Colonial Mutual General Insurance Co Ltd v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1140. However, in any given case an insurable interest of the security provider may be intended to be covered by the policy, and often the secured creditor requires that it be named in the contract of insurance and that it be shown a copy of the insurance certificate prior to advancing funds: see P Samuel & Co Ltd v Dumas [1924] AC 431. Where the intention is to assign the right to the proceeds by way of outright assignment then the assignee will be able to keep all the proceeds as it owns the right to them. If the “assignment” were by way of mortgage then the mortgagor would have the right to the excess by reason of its being his or her property; this results from the equity of redemption. Finally in the case of an assignment of an insurance policy by way of security, it is necessary to ask whether the mortgagee takes an assignment of the policy as security for certain security or security for a debt: see Swan and Cleland’s Graving Dock and Slipway Co v Maritime Insurance Co and Croshaw [1907] 1 KB 116 at 122 per Channell J. See further T Scott, “The Characterisation and Protection of Lenders” Interests in Insurance” (2005) 15 J of Banking and Finance L and Practice 253. 57 Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Burmuda) Ltd (The Good Luck) [1990] 1 QB 818 at 890 citing the decision of Hobhouse J at first instance: see [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 514 at 547. 58 [3.06].
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enforce the subject right,59 it may be that that right can be considered a chose in action, and in some cases an assignable chose in action. However, it is less likely that such a right can be considered a contractual right. In any case, the issues governing the assignment of such a right will generally be the same as those governing the assignment of contractual rights. Moreover, generally the actual parties to the contract could not by assignment lessen or avoid the right vested in that third party.60
(ii) Contractual Rights as Property Rights [6.14] Limitations set by the notion that a chose in action is merely property for the purposes of transfer. A contractual right is generally considered property for the purposes of transfer.61 There is a presumption in this that contractual rights are property only for the purposes of transfer to a third party. As between the contracting parties their rights and obligations remain personal. If this is correct it follows that a person in the position of a creditor does not own the right to the debt as against the debtor and cannot assign the debt to the debtor. An attempt to do this operates only at the level of contract and is interpreted as a release or set-off.62 Similarly, it has always been held that the termination of a contract does not of itself result in a forfeiture of property for the purposes of claiming relief against forfeiture. Although there can be no doubting the legitimacy of the law characterising rights as property for some purposes and personal for other purposes and that generally contractual rights are property only for the purposes of transfer to third parties, it is not clear that this statement is correct in respect of debts. The action in debt has long been considered an action to recover property of the plaintiff’s which was being detained by the defendant.63 This suggests that as between the parties a debt (thing) is property and the action in debt protects that interest.64 59 See GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 651–71; JW Carter, Carter on Contract (Sydney, Butterworths, looseleaf) paras 17.110–17.230. 60 See further MA Lumsden, “Contract, Rights of Third Parties’ Act 1999 (the ‘Act’): Its Impact on Financiers’ Assignments of Contracts” [2000] JIBL 160; Law Commission for England and Wales, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties (London, HMSO, 1996) Law Com No 242, paras 2.17, 14.6. 61 [3.26], [4.07]. On contractual rights as “quasi property” see Zhu v Treasurer of New South Wales (2004) 211 ALR 159 at 190–4. 62 However, it has been held that if the liability of obligors is joint and several, then the obligee, could, in order to keep the obligation to perform alive, assign the right to performance to one of the joint and several obligors: see Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 776 at 779 per Waller LJ. Quaere whether the end result here overcomes any problem with a contracting party contracting with itself on the basis that it is a contract between A on the one side and A and B on the other side: see GL Williams, Joint Obligations (London, Butterworths, 1949) at 47–8. 63 [2.10]. 64 See also Re Ward (1984) 3 FCR 112 at 116 (forgiveness of a debt expressed as a “disposition of property”). Cf In the Estate of McClure (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 93 at 96 per Jordan CJ.
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Moreover, a debt is a chose in action that has a distinct existence outside the contract.65 Today there must be a question mark over the continued doctrinal correctness of the notion that contractual rights, or at least debts, are property only for the purposes of transfer to third parties. In Wreckair Pty Ltd v Emerson,66 McPherson ACJ appeared to recognise an assignment of a debt between the parties to a contract. The relevant facts were that A bailed goods to B for the purposes of B hiring the goods to C. Payments made by C to B were to be shared by A and B on a 60:40 basis. However, because A owed money to B, A agreed that its 60 per cent should be used to reduce that debt. McPherson ACJ said that in the circumstances A had assigned its right to hire to B. There is nothing in the report to suggest that B contracted with C as principal and agent for A, so A could not have been assigning to B any interest it had in a contract with C. Moreover, McPherson ACJ stressed that what was assigned was the contractual right and not the proceeds of the fund created when C paid B. The latter would have been explicable on the basis that A had owned a portion of the fund and that ownership arose from a distinct chose in action not arising under its contract with B; therefore it could be assigned to B. In addition, in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8),67 it was held that a bank can take a charge over the proceeds of a customer’s deposit account. That is, a bank can take a charge over a debt which it owes its customer. More generally, a debtor can take a charge (or perhaps some other form of proprietary interest) over a debt (or perhaps another obligation) which its owes another. Prior to this case, the possibility of such a security was questioned, not merely because of the obvious conceptual problems but also because its acceptance appeared to require the law to accept that a person could sue himself.68 Nevertheless, the Court gave effect to this security because of the recognised commercial practice of taking such security. It was thought that where there was such a practice and where there was no threat to the consistency of law or any public policy objection, then courts should be slow to declare a transaction conceptually impossible.69 Moreover, in the circumstances of a charge over a deposit, enforcement would take the form not of an action but rather a set-off. Given that 65
[6.34]. [1992] 1 Qd R 700 (also discussed at [6.37]). 67 [1998] AC 214. See also Cinema Plus Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 49 NSWLR 513. Cf Broad v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 2 NSWLR 40 at 47–8 per Lee J; Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] Ch 150 at 175 per Millett J (affirmed [1989] 1 Ch 497); Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Jackson (1993) 11 Australian Company Law Cases (ACLC) 138 at 140 per King CJ; Griffiths v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 123 ALR 111 at 120 per Lee J. 68 See R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 1.40 and 3.12; R Goode, Commercial Law in the Next Millennium (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 69–71. Cf R Derham, Set-Off (3rd edn, Oxford, OUP, 2003) paras 16.59–16.67. See further RE Parsons, “Re-Drafting Bank Security Documents Following Charge Card Services” [1987] 3 JIBL 165 at 165. 69 [1998] AC 214 at 228. 66
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reasoning, it is unlikely to be applied in the case of outright sales of intangibles as opposed to security transactions. It may not be applicable outside debts, and even within debts it may be limited to security over bank deposits. Nevertheless, that same reasoning may suggest that if commercial reasons exist to recognise such a charge then similar reasons may exist to recognise a mortgage (that is, a security assignment), over such an interest.70 However, the Court limited its remarks to charges, and, although ultimately basing its decision on commercial convenience, appeared to take some refuge in the fact that a charge does not transfer title.71 It may be that this pragmatic legal reasoning should be viewed as creating no more than a narrow rule to resolve the particular commercial problem faced by the court. Nevertheless, it does confirm that for some purposes debts, and perhaps even contractual rights, may be considered property as between the parties to the contract. Finally, it may be that this commercial result can be achieved by other means. For example, if the substantive view of the statutory regime for legal assignments is adopted72 and there is a series of legal assignments, then although the ultimate assignee’s title is derivative, the ultimate asignee derives that legal title from the previous assignee and not the original assignor. The relation between that ultimate assignee and obligor is a relationship based on property, not contract. It then makes doctrinal sense to speak of an assignment by that ultimate assignee to the original debtor or obligor. However, because the thing being assigned in each case remains the “right to performance promised by the obligor to the assignor”, the result in a sale transaction is to discharge the obligation, but by way of assignment, not release.73 If that is right, then to disagree with the view taken by the House of Lords in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) is to put form over substance. 70 It may be argued that it is easier for a court to recognise the appropriation (charge) to the debtor of a debt owed by that debtor than it is to recognise that that debtor owns the debt it owes the creditor, which would be the result of a mortgage. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the problems in recognising such a mortgage have been overstated (see R Derham, Set-Off (3rd edn, Oxford, OUP, 2003) para 16.61) and, although in the case of a charge the creditor would retain title, a mortgage, although transferring title, transfers title for a purpose, and the mortgagor/creditor retains an interest by way of its equity of redemption. See also DE Allan, “Security: Some Mysteries, Myths, & Monstrosities” (1989) 15 Monash Uni L Rev 337 at 356. 71 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214 at 226, 227 (however, the Court also referred to the chargor’s equity of redemption; given that a chargor does not obtain or need an equity of redemption as a charge is automatically terminated upon payment, such references could be construed as references to a mortgage with the equity of redemption vested in the mortgagor being considered sufficient to recognise the taking of a mortgage over an obligation the mortgagee owes the mortgagor). See [3.17]. 72 [5.06]. 73 See Rolston v South Greta Colliery Co (1912) 13 SR (NSW) 6 (here the obligor was required to pay the assignor certain royalties; the assignor assigned this right to the assignee who assigned it to the obligor; in an action by the assignor against the obligor for rent and royalties it was held that the obligor could raise its assigned right by way of set-off). The discharge referred to above does not necessarily follow if the assignment to the obligor is by way of security.
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(iii) Ownership of Contractual Rights [6.15] The assignor must own the chose in action. The above paragraph gives rise to another obvious point, namely, that it is not sufficient that the right in question be identified as a chose in action; the assignor must also own that chose in action. This is not an issue that usually gives rise to much difficulty. Nevertheless, it is easy to make the mistake of thinking you have one type of contractual right but in fact have another.74 Therefore, along with determining whether or not the subject matter of the assignment is a chose in action it is necessary to characterise the contractual right vested in the assignor under the contract. To a certain extent this process of characterisation occurs concurrently with the identification of an assignable right, as it is necessary to identify the right before determining its assignability.75 It should also be added that it is necessary to construe the terms of the assignment to determine to what extent the assignor has assigned that right.76 The assignor’s ownership of the chose is particularly important when the assignor is adjudged bankrupt, as the property of the bankrupt vests in the trustee from the commencement of the bankruptcy.77 If there is a present assignment of an existing accrued right to payment which satisfies any transfer, attachment or perfection requirements for validity against the trustee in bankruptcy and which is entered into prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy, it does not matter that the date for payment arises after commencement so long as the payment is 74 Eg Schneideman v Barnett [1951] NZLR 301 (here an argument to the effect that the intended subject matter of the assignment was “the contract of insurance” (so as to make the assignee the insured) was rejected when the assignor, at the time of the assignment had only the right to receive the proceeds; the assignment of the proceeds was upheld despite adjustment not having taken place at the time of the assignment). Similarly, where a lessor of goods assigns the benefit of the lease without transferring title to the goods to the assignee, all that is usually assigned is the benefit of the promise to pay the hire: see International Leasing Corp (Vic) Ltd v Aiken [1967] 2 NSWR 427 at 438 per Jacobs JA. Moreover, some rights under such contracts, such as contractual licences to seize, may be personal and will not be carried with an assignment of the benefit of the contract: see Re Davis & Co (1888) 22 QBD 193; Brown v The Metropolitan Counties Life Assurance Society (1859) 28 LJQB 236: see [6.50]. However, presumably such a right would pass with title to the goods and so, perhaps, the better analysis is that the right is assignable but to a limited class: see further The Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 at 161 per Dixon J: see [6.76]. 75 Eg Dawson v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260. 76 Eg Ogdens Ltd v Weinberg (1906) 95 LT 567 (assignment of all “contracts” was sufficient to assign a right to sue for breach of contract that had accrued at the time of the assignment). 77 See generally IF Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (3rd edn, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2002) para 8.005, and see paras 8.029–8.033. In Australia, the commencement of bankruptcy is still determined by reference to the notion of relation back: see generally M Murray, Keay’s Insolvency; Personal and Corporate Law and Practice (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 2005) paras 2.80–2.95. An assignment caught by relation back in bankruptcy (and not subject to some statutory protection against relation back) will not be effective to vest title in the assignee, cf Re Duck Jarm (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 521. Where a debtor becomes insolvent and there are mutual dealings between the creditor and debtor so as to attract insolvency set-off, the creditor cannot then seek to assign the entire debt but may agree to assign any net balance which may result in its favour: see Stein v Blake [1996] 1 AC 243 at 258 per Lord Hoffmann.
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earned by the assignor and not the trustee in bankruptcy.78 Generally, unless the trustee can set aside the transaction it can obtain no better title than that of the assignor.79 Where the assigned debt accrues prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy but is not payable until the completion of performance under the contract, then, if the trustee carries out the work to complete the contract, the trustee will have earned any payment in respect of that work carried out by the trustee, but the assignee can then claim the sum due under the assignment.80 However, this depends on the trustee executing that work under the contract which is the subject of the assignment and not under a different contract.81 The various cases explaining the above outcomes do not do so uniformly.82 However, at the level of legal doctrine, it is suggested that they may be explained as follows. When an assignor assigns a right to payment which has not yet been earned, the assignee obtains a conditional right to payment. In the normal course of events when the assignor carries out the performance required to earn that payment the assignee’s conditional right will be replaced with an unconditional right to payment.83 That unconditional right is a distinct chose in action, and in the circumstances being dealt with here it comes into existence after the commencement of bankruptcy. It follows that when bankruptcy intercedes and the payment is earned by reason of the trustee performing the act that earns that payment, then by force of the legislation that unconditional right to payment must vest in the trustee. Thus, the trustee obtains the payment because it owns the right to payment. The bankrupt assignor cannot vest that right in the assignee as it is not the assignor’s property.84 It would also follow that where an obligation to pay is independent of any performance the only issue is whether or not it has accrued prior to or after the commencement of bankruptcy.85 78 Ex parte Nichols (1883) 22 Ch D 782; Ex parte Moss (1884) 14 QBD 310; Wilmot v Alton [1897] 1 QB 17; Robinson v Podosky [1905] State Reports (Queensland) (QSR) 118; Re Inglis (1932) 5 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 255; Re De Marney [1943] Ch 126; Re Trytel [1952] 2 TLR 32; Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523 at 538 per Lord Fitzgerald; Re Buring and Chapman (1941) 13 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 72. See also Burn v Carvalho (1839) 4 My & Cr 690, 41 ER 265; Crowfoot v Gurney (1832) 9 Bing 372, 131 ER 655; Re Davis (1888) 22 QBD 193; Alexander v Steinhardt, Walker & Co [1903] 2 KB 208; Re Connolly [1931] Gazette Law Reports (GLR) 551; Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257; Ex parte Rowell (1878) 39 LT 259 (affirmed (1879) 10 Ch D 615). 79 [8.04]. 80 Drew & Co v Josolyne (1887) 18 QBD 590. 81 Tooth v Hallett (1869) LR 4 Ch App 242. 82 An excellent review of the important decisions can be found in Re Buring and Chapman (1941) 13 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 72. 83 The mechanics of this process are discussed at [6.44]. 84 Ex parte Nichols (1883) 22 Ch D 782 at 786 per Jessel MR. 85 In the case of corporate insolvency this explanation does not work, as the property of the insolvent company does not vest in the liquidator. In corporate insolvency the company retains legal title to its property. As to whether beneficial title it taken out of the company: see Commissioner of Taxation v Linter Textiles Australia Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 1. See further IF Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) para 22.057; A Keay, McPherson, The Law of Company Liquidation (4th edn, Sydney, LBC, 1999) at 219. Nevertheless, the result is the same. As Goode states,
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As regards agreements to assign future property entered into prior to the commencement of bankruptcy, when the property which is the subject of the assignment comes into existence, then, assuming the consideration for the assignment is executed, beneficial title vests in the assignee without ever vesting in the assignor. Therefore, it is not property of the assignor and cannot vest in the trustee.86 However, this assumes that without the assignment the property would have vested in the assignor.
(c) The Requirement of Present Property (i) Introduction [6.16] Introduction. It is possible to assign only present property. Therefore, a pre-requisite of assignability is that the subject matter of the assignment exists. For example, a contractual right cannot be assigned if its correlative obligation has been fully performed so as to discharge the right; similarly, if the obligation to perform has been the subject of a release.87 In addition, an agreement to assign an interest in a fund, such as the fund created by the deposit of retention monies under a building contract, cannot take effect until monies are paid into the fund so that it exists.88 This last example reflects the more important practical issue, namely, attempting to assign what is in fact future property. This section is concerned with the identification of present property as distinguished from so-called future property.
“The underlying idea is very reasonable. The liquidator has used the money and other resources of the company to carry out the contract; therefore the fruits of the performance should belong to the general body of creditors free from the prior interest”; R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) para 6.26, and note the criticism of this rule as regards its application where, at the time of the bankruptcy or insolvency, the assignor had completed part of the subject performance to earn the debtor’s performance. 86 Re Androma Pty Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 134; Re Row Dal Constructions Pty Ltd [1966] VR 249. 87 Thus, if an insured has a claim against both its insurer and a tortfeaser and settles with the tortfeaser, giving the tortfeaser a release, but also assigns its claim against the insurer to the tortfeaser, the release may also benefit the insurer: see Colonia Verscherung AG v Amoco Oil Co (1997) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 261. 88 Re Jartay Developments Ltd (1983) 22 Build LR 134; Mac-Jordan Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd [1992] BCLC 350. However, a debt owed to the contractor may arise at the time monies are required to be deposited in the retention fund and even if that deposit is not made an assignment of that debt (as opposed to an assignment of an interest in the fund yet to be created) would be an assignment of present property: see G and T Earle Ltd v Hemsworth RDC (1928) 44 TLR 605 (affirmed [1928] All ER 602, (1928) 44 TLR 758).
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(ii) The Distinction between Present Rights and Future Property [6.17] Future rights and present rights to future performance. Whether or not a contractual right exists is usually not a difficult issue.89 The most problematic issue concerning present and future property in the context of contractual rights is the distinction between the assignment of future contractual rights and the assignment of some present contractual right to receive some performance in the future. The latter is not an assignment of future property and is immediately assignable. [6.18] The distinction between future property and a present right to some future performance is evidenced in two, now famous, contrasting decisions of the High Court of Australia, namely, Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation90 and Shepherd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.91 In Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, the assignor attempted to assign, without consideration, his “right title and interest” to interest payable under a loan which was repayable by the borrower at will and without notice, and his “right title and interest” to dividends that might be declared on certain shares. The assignment of interest was for a threeyear period. The period of the second assignment was expressed to be from 1 January 1957 to 30 June 1958. At the time of this “assignment” his interest in the shares was as a residuary beneficiary of two estates; he had a 1/5th interest in the residuary estates. During the period of this second assignment (in particular, between May and October 1957) and before the beginning of the relevant tax year (1 July 1957–30 June 1958) shares from the relevant estates were transferred to the assignor and, in the relevant tax year, dividends were declared and paid (by cheque) to the assignor; the assignor endorsed the cheques to the assignee. The Commissioner of Taxation took the view that the assignments concerned future property which required consideration to be upheld as a valid agreement to assign and therefore both interest accrued and paid and dividends declared and paid during the relevant tax year were income in the hands of the assignor. He assessed tax accordingly. In a unanimous decision the High Court held that the right to dividends was a mere expectancy. A majority of the High Court took the view that the right to interest was also future property. 89 Examples of future property or mere expectancies include the interest of a beneficiary under the will of a person still living: see Re Ellenborough [1903] 1 Ch 697; the rights under a contract not yet formed: see E Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf GmbH & Co v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 150 at 161 per Phillips J; the right to sue for a breach of contract prior to any breach occuring: see Lam Soon Australia Pty Ltd v Molit (No 55) Pty Ltd (1996) 70 FCR 34 at 44; future book debts and stock in trade: see Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523; Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191, 11 ER 999; income, such as royalties, which have not been earned: see Re Trytel [1952] 2 TLR 32. 90 (1963) 109 CLR 9. 91 (1965) 113 CLR 385.
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In the majority, Dixon CJ emphasised that at the start of the tax year no interest had accrued and no dividends had been declared. He thought the intention to assign in both cases was an intention to assign “a sum of money which did not exist but which was expected to arise with more or less confidence”.92 In the case of the dividends this depended on a dividend being declared. In the case of the loan, this depended on it not being repaid so as to prevent the accrual of interest. He does not appear to place any particular emphasis on the fact that the assignment referred to the “right” to interest and dividends and not just the “interest” and “dividends”. He thought that to recognise the assignment of the dividends was also contrary to the provisions of the relevant tax legislation. As to interest he concluded:93 “It appears to me that the future interest was the merest expectancy or possibility, having no existence in contemplation of law. After all, it must be remembered that to escape the obligation of including the interest in his assessable income the taxpayer must show that by 1 July 1957 he had denuded himself of all right to the interest. That, I think, could not be correct. After all, there was no more than an expected right with respect to the sums and I do not think the necessary divestment of the future accrual could be made by way of gift”.
Much of Dixon CJ’s reasoning as to interest appears to have been based on the fact that the accrual of interest was dependent on a contingency, that is, that the loan was not repaid. If that is right, such comments do not have general application to a term loan. As is noted below, in the discussion of Shepherd’s case, this also appears to be Kitto J’s understanding of the decision.94 However, Dixon CJ’s reference to “an expected right” may have more general application. Menzies J (with whom Owen J agreed) also held that the rights to dividends and interest were future property. He did note that the question before him concerned “rights” to interest and dividends and not merely “interest” or “dividends”.95 Nevertheless, he said, “I regard interest which may accrue in the future upon an existing loan repayable without notice as having the character of a right to come into existence rather than of a right already in existence”.96 On its face, this comment would limit his decision to questions involving interest on loans that are repayable at will and not term loans. However, he went on to say, “Under the contract of loan now under consideration, there was no liability for or right to interest until it began to accrue”.97 This comment may be of more general application. He thought his comments on interest also answered the dividends issue but added that, at the time of execution of the deed of assignment, the shares 92 93 94 95 96 97
(1963) 109 CLR 9 at 15. Ibid, at 16 (emphasis added). [6.19]. (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 20. Ibid, at 21. Ibid, at 22.
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themselves were future property and, like Dixon CJ, he thought that to recognise the assignment of dividends would be at odds with the relevant legislation. The minority agreed that the dividends were future property. However, McTiernan J held that the right to interest was present property. He thought that the loan created an immediate obligation to pay interest although it could not be claimed until it accrued. That present obligation created a present chose in action or right to interest which could be the subject of an immediate assignment. It made no difference that the loan could be repaid at any time. Until such an event occurred the right remained in existence.98 Windeyer J agreed, saying, “[A] contract to pay a sum of money on a future day, call it interest . . . calculable in amount according to conditions presently agreed, is in my view a presently existing chose in action. . . . [What the creditor assigns] is not, its seems to me, a right to arise in the future but a present contractual right to be paid at a future date a sum of money, to be calculated in the agreed manner”.99 He thought it made no difference that the loan was repayable at will. [6.19] In Shepherd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,100 the assignor granted a manufacturer an indefinite licence to use a patent in return for a royalty which was based on a percentage of the sale price of the items manufactured. Later the assignor assigned, without consideration, all his “right title and interest in and to an amount equal to ninety per centum of the income which may accrue during a period of three years from the date of this assignment from [the] royalties”. The Commissioner of Taxation took the view that royalties received were income in the assignor’s hands, the assignment being invalid as an assignment of future property made without consideration. However, a majority of the High Court (Barwick CJ and Kitto J) took the view that the assignor had not assigned a mere expectancy; instead he had assigned part of his existing contractual rights which included an entitlement to receive royalties.101 Barwick CJ thought the issue was purely a matter of construction. That is, it had to be determined by construction whether the assignor had intended to assign “part of the royalties” or “part of the right to the royalties”. The latter was an assignment of present property. He thought the words “all my right title and interest in and to” clearly evidenced an intention to assign the right to the royalties. Although the following words, “an amount equal to ninety per centum of the income which may arise during a period of three years from the date of this assignment”, was at odds with the intention expressed in the first part of the clause, he was prepared to excuse this on the basis that this part of the clause was not aimed 98
Ibid, at 18–19. Ibid, at 37–8. 100 Cf Cotton v Heyl [1930] 1 Ch 510. 101 A further issue concerned whether or not the deed evidenced an intention to assign as it required payment of an amount “equal” to 90%. 99
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at characterising the intention to assign, but was an inelegant attempt to express the fact that the assignment was an assignment of part of a chose in action. It was also argued, on the basis of Norman’s case, that the property was not a present right capable of immediate assignment because any royalties were entirely contingent upon the manufacturer making and selling items using the patent. Barwick CJ thought this submission was misconceived, saying: That a promise may not be fruitful does not make it incapable of assignment. [Insofar as Norman’s case] dealt with the attempted assignment of the promise to pay interest, it must, in my respectful opinion, depend upon the view that the promise to pay interest in that case inhered in the existence of a principal sum upon which the interest was to be calculated and payable. Consequently, there was there no promise to pay interest, if no principal remained due.
Kitto J also held the assignment to be a dealing in present property, saying:102 [T]here existed . . . [at the date of the assignment] . . . a contractual relationship between the [assignor] and the [manufacturer] which by its terms must continue throughout the ensuing three years, whether [the manufacturer] should wish it to continue or not. [The assignor], therefore, had a vested right in respect of those three years . . .[T]he existence of the [assignor’s] contractual right would be unaffected, though the quantum of its product might be. The tree, though not the fruit, existed at the date of the assignment as a proprietary right of the [assignor] of which he was competent to dispose; and he assigned ninety per centum of the tree.
There can be little doubt that the efficacy of many an assignment will depend upon whether or not the assignor has assigned a present contractual right or a future contractual right or the future fruits of a present contractual right. A dealing in the fruits of a contract is a dealing in the subject matter of the contract as opposed to a dealing in contractual rights. Finally, in distinguishing this case from Norman’s case Kitto J said:103 [I]t is necessary to remember that in respect of the future year the loan agreement [in Norman’s case] recorded the terms which should apply to the relationship of borrower and lender so long as such a relationship should exist, but it left the borrower free to decide whether such a relationship should exist, in the relevant year. It gave the lender no right in any possible event to insist upon there being a loan in existence in that year.
[6.20] It has been suggested that the different results in these two cases show the importance of careful drafting, for although the “fruits” (or even the “right” to the fruits) may not yet exist, such existence being contingent or conditional on some event, there may be some present right flowing from the relationship of the parties which can be the subject of an assignment without having to comply with the rules 102 103
(1965) 113 CLR 385 at 396. (1965) 113 CLR 385 at 396.
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for assigning future property.104 Thus, an assignment of a present contractual right which, upon the occurrence of some condition or contingency, will result in an unconditional right to the fruits can be the subject of a present assignment.105 Nevertheless, in Booth v FCT,106 Mason CJ appeared to disagree with this distinction between the cases. He suggested that the result in Norman’s case did not turn on the drafting of the memorandum of assignment, but was dictated by legal doctrine. He viewed it as an example of the occasional impossibility of identifying “a present right to future income divorced from the proprietary right which generates that future income”.107 He added, “In such cases an attempted assignment deals with future property or an expectancy and operates to vest the future income in the assignee as and when that future income accrues due, but not before it accrues due. Accordingly, the assignment would not be effective to prevent the income being derived or being deemed to be derived by the assignor.”108 There is some force in this statement. In Norman’s case the assignee, in both assignments, attempted to assign his “right to” interest and dividends. He did not merely attempt to assign “interest” and dividends’, that is, the fruits, but rather the right to the fruits. If the result turned on drafting, could the assignor have done any more? In the case of shares, one view might be that the right to dividends is an abstract right; it does not have a separate existence from the ownership of the shares and is not capable of being separately assigned. This may be taking the idea of an abstract right too far. The notion of abstract rights is probably limited to ownership rights which do not carry any expectancy of income unless there are further dealings with the rights, for example, land, patents and copyright. Other ownership rights such as the ownership of a share generally do carry an expectancy of income, but no actual right to income until a contingency occurs.109 On either analysis no amount of drafting can circumvent the result in Norman’s case. However, once a dividend is declared a debt arises which has a distinct existence.110 Alternatively, and particularly if one adopts a bundle of rights theory of ownership, one should be able to assign that part of the ownership in the shares that will carry the right to
104 RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 6.235. 105 [6.38]. See also In the Estate of McClure (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 93 at 96 per Jordan CJ. 106 (1987) 164 CLR 159. 107 Ibid, at 167. 108 Ibid, at 167–8. The latter statement, according to Cooke P in Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517 at 520, cf at 528 per Richardson J (aff’d [1993] AC 524), suggested that Mason CJ was not denying the difference between assigning the fruit and assigning the tree but that for certain purposes, especially tax, it may not be possible to rely on such fine doctrinal distinctions to prevent the income being derived by the assignor: see also FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440 at 453. 109 See Archibald Howie Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1948) 77 CLR 143 at 157 per Williams J; Re Russell [1968] VR 285 at 300 per McInerney J. 110 Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 40 per Windeyer J.
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dividends when they are declared.111 The problem with this latter argument is that it may require recognition of distinct ownership interests, each deriving from the one ownership interest. The assignment is not an assignment of part of the ownership so as to make the assignor and assignee co-owners of the whole, that is, the “share”, but rather the assignee is intended to own absolutely that ownership right which gives rise to the “right” to dividends. The common law does not allow ownership to be split in this way. There may be more scope for equity to recognise such an interest, but there may be difficulties even here because the interest that needs to be recognised is not akin to an estate in the ownership of the whole, but ownership of an entire part of what would otherwise be considered to be an indivisible ownership interest. In respect of the right to interest, in Shepherd’s case, Kitto J appears to draw a distinction between when the exercise or enjoyment of a right is subject to a contingency and when the continued existence of the right is subject to a contingency. Shepherd’s case fell within the former and was a dealing in present property. Norman’s case fell within the latter category and was a dealing in future property. Barwick CJ, too, was perhaps relying on this distinction when he said that the promise to pay interest (and presumably the correlative right to that interest) existed only as long as principal remained due. There can be no doubt about the legitimacy of that distinction, and on that reasoning an assignment of the right to interest under a term loan (which has been drawn down) would be a dealing in present property. Moreover, and subject to the legitimacy of the drafting approach noted above which relies on a bundle of rights theory, there is no doubt that the efficacy of these transactions will turn on whether one attempts to assign an existing right to performance the enjoyment of which is dependent upon a condition or a contingency, or whether one assigns a right to performance the very existence of which is dependent upon a condition or contingency: there is also the possibility of a mere assignment of “the fruits” prior to their receipt. However, even recognising this distinction, arguably it still does not explain the result in Norman’s case. If the continued existence of a contractual right is dependent upon a contingency in the sense of an event not occurring, such as the repayment of the principal and outstanding interest under a loan, then unless that contingency eventuates the right continues to exist. The more logical proposition is that where the formation of a contract depends on a contingency then any attempted present assignment of such expected rights would be a dealing in future property.112 This may be the basis of Dixon CJ’s reasoning in Norman’s case except that he logically extends this 111 Thus, it has been suggested that the result might have been different if the assignor had assigned, “such of his rights as holder of the shares as would entitle him, if dividends were declared on shares of that class, to be paid the portion thereof attributable to his shares”: see RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 6.235. 112 Re Williams [1930] 2 Ch 378.
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principle to an already existing contract; that is, it was not only interest that was future property but the “right” to interest itself depended on the accrual of interest for its existence, and this was despite the fact that the contract from which that right would emanate was already in existence at the time of the assignment.113 He distinguished the “right to income” from the thing or property (that is, the loan) from which income and the right to that income may arise. To continue the metaphor, here the “right to income” was itself the fruit. Moreover, the income itself was not the fruit of that right but rather of the principal. The “right” to income dictated only who should be paid. It may be that it was this point (the idea that the right to interest under a loan does not constitute the tree from which the fruit (interest) derives) that Barwick CJ too was relying upon in the abovementioned quotation to distinguish Shepherd’s case from Norman’s case. The idea here it that a present right to accrued interest is not the “thing” that produces the fruits, and so it does not equate to the tree. Under a loan contract, the right to interest is referable to principal and depends on there being an outstanding balance of principal that must be repaid: the right to interest is not in itself an income-producing asset.114 Interest flows from the outstanding principal. From this, one may argue that even if at law it is possible to distinguish the right to interest from the actual fruits (interest), that right does not come into existence until interest accrues, so any attempted dealing in that right beforehand must necessarily be a dealing in future property. If that is correct then the same result must apply to a dealing with the right to interest under a term loan. The above reasoning distinguishes Norman’s case from Shepherd’s case. In Shepherd’s case because the contract there was nothing more than a contract for income (with no outstanding condition or contingency under the contract having to be met) any dealing in the “right to income” was a dealing in a present right. In such a case it may be correct to view this right as the asset providing the ultimate fruits. However, views could differ on this. In any case, clearly the “right to income” was the tree. The patent itself was not the tree because the notion of a “right to income” from a patent is in fact a mere abstract right. Similarly, it has been held that if a contract of hire-purchase is determinable by the hirer at will then it cannot be said that that contract contains a promise to pay for the goods prior to the accrual of hire. Thus, prior to the accrual of such an obligation there
113 See also Williams v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1965] NZLR 395 (here the assignor attempted to assign “the first five hundred pounds . . . of the net income” under a trust which he had a life interest in, together with “the right” to receive that sum; this was held to be an assignment of an expectancy, as both the sum and the right to it did not exist at the time of the assignment; the only thing that existed at that time was the assignor’s life interest in the trust which, on construction, he had not assigned). 114 Commissioner of Taxation v The Myer Emporium Ltd (1986) 163 CLR 199 at 217.
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can be no present right to payment.115 On the same reasoning, if one attempts to deal in the fruits of litigation that is still on foot, then it should not matter whether the assignor attempts to assign the sums that may become due or the right to sums that may become due; in either case the transaction will be a dealing in future property.116 Despite the above, arguably there must be some existing contractual right that allows for this right to interest, when it arises, to vest in the other party to the contract and which should be capable of present assignment if it can be identified.117 But again, as with dividends, the assignment of that right causes problems because it is not capable of being identified, as distinct from the other interests that make up the benefit of the contract, because it is not possible to split a single ownership interest in the manner required to achieve such an assignment. In addition, despite recognition that the right to interest is not an income producing right and does not constitute the tree from which the fruit, interest, derives, the High Court of Australia in Commissioner of Taxation v The Myer Emporium Ltd 118 nevertheless recognised the possibility of the existence of a “right” to interest prior to the accrual of interest. In a joint judgment, the Court said:119 That is not to say that a right to interest is not an existing chose in action. It is an existing chose in action unless, perhaps, the borrower can avoid any liability for interest by repaying the loan: see Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation; Shepherd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation. But the interest which becomes due is not the produce of the mere contractual right to interest severed from the debt for the money lent. Interest is regarded as flowing from the principal sum. . . . A covenant to pay interest on a principal sum may, according to the terms of the lending agreement, be independent of or accessory to a covenant to repay the principal sum or the covenants may be integral parts of a single obligation. The source of interest is never the mere covenant to pay. Interest is not like an annuity. Annuity payments are not derived from the money paid for the annuity; they are derived solely from the annuity contract.
The result appears to be that if a loan is repayable at any time then a dealing with the “right” to interest, prior to the accrual of any interest, is necessarily a dealing in future property. The same reasoning applies to shares. One expects to earn 115 See Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 at 159 per Dixon J. See also HJ Wigmore & Co Ltd v Rundle (1930) 44 CLR 222; Blackwood’s Ltd v Chartres (1931) 31 SR(NSW) 619. Cf Independent Automatic Sales Ltd v Knowles and Foster [1962] 1 WLR 974 at 984 per Buckley J. 116 See Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474 at 489 per Fletcher Moulton LJ and Parker J, but cf at 484 per Williams LJ. However, once judgment is given there exists an assignable chose in action: see Hambleton v Brown [1917] 2 KB 93. 117 Thus it has been suggested that the result in Norman’s case would have been different if the assignor had assigned, “such of his rights under the contract of loan as would, if the loan were not repaid, entitle him to be paid interest”: see RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 6.235. 118 (1987) 163 CLR 199. 119 Ibid, at 217–18.
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some income from being a shareholder or lender and to speak of a “right to income” here is not to speak of a mere abstract right. However, if the loan is repayable at will or if a dividend has not been declared, then that right is a mere expectancy. Similarly if any contract is determinable by one of the parties at any time then arguably that contract does not contain any present promise to perform, and no present right to such performance prior to the accrual of a performance obligation. In the case of a term loan, it may be possible to speak of a present right to interest prior to the accrual of interest, but this will ultimately depend on the construction of the contract.120 Again the right to interest may only determine who is paid interest, it is not necessarily the asset that produces the interest. Moreover, the contract will dictate whether the entitlement to recieve both the repayment of principal and payment of interest constitute one indivisible right (debt) or whether they are two distinct rights albeit that the interest flows from the outstanding principal.121 Where the assignment transfers only the fruits (there being no mention of the “right” to the fruits) then, if those fruits are subject to a contingency, the dealing will be a dealing in future property.122 Finally, the reasoning of the High Court in the Myer Emporium case shows the dangers of placing too much emphasis on the tree and fruit metaphor in order to distinguish between present and future property.123 Although it has its uses it also has its limitations. To take another basic example, under a presently existing lease it is well recognised that one can presently assign the right to rent. However, that “right” is not the asset which produces the fruits, that is, the “rent”. The asset producing the rent is the underlying lease/demise. The right to rent is in a sense the fruit of that underlying lease as much as the rent is.124 However, unlike unpaid rent, the right to rent is present property, and if one wants to collect the rent then one must be vested with the right to that rent. If the above analysis is correct it is necessary to distinguish the chose, (the lease) from the contractual right to performance under the lease. It is the lease that is the asset that produces the rent. This distinction does not make sense if one reasons only through contract as one would then argue that the lease is no more than the mass of contractual rights that make up the lease and the most relevant right in terms of the rent is the right to that rent under the lease. On that reasoning the right to rent must be the thing or tree that produces the fruit rent. Nevertheless, 120 Eg McLeay v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1963] NZLR 711 (a mortgagee assigned its right to interest for 5 years; the loan could be repaid at will but only after July 1965; the assignment was to come to an end in May 1964; this was held to be an assignment of a present right to the interest which would accrue during the period of the assignment: see further [7.40]). 121 See [6.49]. 122 Eg Williams v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1965] NZLR 395. 123 See further CS Lyon and JS Eustice, “Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the PG Lake Case” (1961–2) 17 Tax L Rev 293. 124 See generally Inland Revenue Commissioners v John Lewis Properties plc [2003] Ch 513 at 526, 534–5, 539 per Arden LJ, at 546–7 per Dyson LJ.
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the issue here, and the issue in all cases discussing the tree/fruit metaphor, has been an issue of property law, not contract, and for the reasons discussed earlier it is necessary to accept the existence of the contract as a thing.125
(iii) Dealings in Conditional, Contingent and Unconditional Contractual Rights [6.21] Meaning of “conditional”, “contingent” and “unconditional” contractual rights. The words “conditional”, “contingent” and “unconditional” have various meanings in contract law depending upon the context in which they are used.126 Together with the terms “dependent” and “independent”, they may be used to describe the order of performance. Thus, a right is dependent if its enjoyment requires the prior or simultaneous performance of an obligation or the prior or (more rare) simultaneous occurrence of a contingency.127 The terms “conditional” and “unconditional” are also used to describe the effects of discharge of a contract. Here a reference to an unconditional right refers to a contractual right the benefit of which has been earned, so that it survives the discharge of the contract.128 A contractual right does not survive discharge merely because the time for its performance has accrued by the time of discharge.129 In addition, where a right to some performance is conditional upon the prior occurrence of some condition or contingency, and where that condition of contingency occurs the right is then sometimes referred to as being unconditional. Here “unconditional” is not used in the sense that the right will survive discharge (which may or may not be the case), but to express the result that the obligation that is correlative to a right has accrued even if the time for performance has not yet arrived. It follows that during the life of a contract a promisee’s rights vis-à-vis the other party’s obligations may be classified as conditional or contingent in terms of the order of performance, accrued in terms of performance and conditional or unconditional in terms of discharge. [6.22] Importance of the distinction for assignment. Whether or not the assignor is assigning a conditional right, an accrued right or an unconditional right is 125
[3.10]. See further SJ Stoljar, “The Contractual Concept of Condition” (1953) 69 LQR 485; JW Carter, Breach of Contract (2nd edn, Sydney, LBC, 1991) paras 408–10. 127 See the discussion in Ministry of Sound (Ireland) Ltd v World Online Ltd [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 823 at 839–41. 128 McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457 at 476–7 per Dixon J; Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 at 396. 129 Cf Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Papdopoulos [1980] 1 WLR 1129 at 1141 per Lord Edmund-Davies; Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574 at 597 per Lord Lloyd. Where a right is independent and the time for the performance of its correlative obligation has accrued by the time of discharge, it is by definition unconditional. 126
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important because the nemo dat rule dictates that the assignor cannot assign a right greater than the one it has. In addition, in terms of the order of performance the distinction between conditional and accrued rights is important. If an obligation to pay accrues only upon the occurrence of some condition then the assignee of the right to payment must wait until that condition occurs before it can call for performance.130 Moreover, the condition may not simply order performance but characterise what is acceptable performance. If a present right to a future payment is assigned where the obligation to pay will accrue upon the performance of some obligation by the assignor,131 then the assignee cannot enforce that right to payment prior to the performance of that obligation by the assignor.132 The assignee’s right is contingent upon that obligation not only being performed but being performed by the assignor or vicariously performed by the assignor. This is the result of the obligation (being a contractual obligation of the assignor) defining the nature of the contractual right vested in the assignee. It is not possible to characterise that right independently of the contract. For example, in Tooth v Hallett,133 a builder assigned a right to receive payment under a building contract. The assignment occurred after the time for performance of the contract had expired. At the expiration of that time, the obligor had a right to employ others to complete the work. Soon after the assignment, the builder entered into a creditor’s deed and the trustee of that deed, with the consent of the obligor and using its own funds, completed the work. No amount was due under the contract prior to the trustee taking over the work. It was held that the assignee’s right must be characterised by reference to the contract and was therefore subject to the conditions of the contract, which allowed the obligor to get someone else in to complete the work. If that had occurred here, then clearly anything payable to that third party could be deducted from anything that was due to the assignee. It could make no difference that it was the trustee who completed the work; the assignee could not be placed in a better position simply because the work was carried out by the trustee of the assignor. 130 Eg Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1967] 2 QB 363 (here an assignee took a statutory assignment of a right against an insurer but was subject to the same condition as the assignor, namely, that the indemnity was in respect of sums the assignor became legally liable to pay so that such liability had to be first established). Where a right is classified as conditional and the condition is a condition subsequent, then the condition subsequent will be some act that must occur to render the right “unconditional” as that word is used to describe the effect of discharge. Here the condition does not prevent the accrual of the right. Thus, a right to an advance payment may be said to be conditional in the sense that the payee must at some point provide some goods or services to earn that payment: see Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd (The Trident Beauty) [1994] 1 WLR 161, and see [6.29]. 131 This is to be distinguished from the case where the obligation to pay has accrued at the time of the assignment but it is not yet payable: see G and T Earle Ltd v Hemsworth RDC (1928) 44 TLR 605 (affirmed [1928] All ER 602, (1928) 44 TLR 758). 132 [8.07]. 133 (1869) LR 4 Ch App 242. See also Tooth v Brisbane City Council (1928) 41 CLR 212 at 226 per Higgins J. Cf as to amounts accrued prior to the third party taking over contract Re Trytel [1952] 2 TLR 32. As to bankruptcy and insolvency and the trustee or liquidator completing the contract see [6.15].
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Finally, the distinction between conditional and unconditional rights is important to an assignee as this determines whether an assigned right survives the discharge of a contract. This is an obvious point. However, distinguishing between conditional and unconditional rights can be problematic, and this issue is addressed immediately below. [6.23] Identification of conditional and unconditional contractual rights. The distinction between conditional and unconditional contractual rights ultimately turns on construction and in most cases is straightforward. However, difficulties have arisen in respect of instalment sale contracts. The particular fact scenario has concerned the restitution of payments made under such a contract. Here the limited contractual relevance of the distinction between conditional and unconditional rights, as used to characterise performance obligations and to denote the order of performance, has been expanded to provide a basis for restitution. It is necessary to take a short diversion into these cases as they highlight some of the difficulties of the distinction. [6.24] The restitution context. Both the House of Lords and the High Court of Australia have suggested that the conditional nature of a payment (rather than unjust enrichment) could provide the ground for its recovery after the contract under which the payment was made is discharged for breach or repudiation. There is no intention here to enter into the debate whether such claims are best approached by reference to contract or unjust enrichment, but simply to highlight the difficulties these cases give rise to as regards the characterisation of contractual rights as either conditional and unconditional. [6.25] The decision of the House of Lords is Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co.134 Here a shipbuilder terminated contracts for breach by the buyers and sued for amounts that had fallen due under the contracts. The buyers argued that they did not have to pay as there was a total failure of consideration as regards each payment obligation. Lord Goff, obiter, distinguished these construction contracts from contracts of sale and, relying principally on the judgment of Dixon J in McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd,135 said that in sale contracts, “it has been held that the buyer’s remedy is contractual, the seller’s title to retain the money being conditional upon his completing the contract”. [6.26] The decision of the High Court of Australia is that of Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (The Mikhail Lermontov).136 Here, upon the sinking of a cruise ship in the 134 135 136
[1998] 1 WLR 574. (1933) 48 CLR 457 at 475–9. Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (The Mikhail Lermontov) (1993) 176 CLR 344.
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middle of a voyage, a passenger sued for damages and restitution of the fare. The restitution claim failed. Mason CJ (with whom Brennan and Toohey JJ agreed) said that in the context of a discharged contract a payment may be recovered by reference either to the intention of the parties or failure of consideration. He suggested that this intention would be made out where the “defendant’s right to retain the payment is conditional upon the performance of his or her obligations under the contract”.137 Gaudron J suggested that failure of consideration has no role where the relevant obligation is not an entire obligation, because here recovery is based on non-fulfillment of a condition. In the case of an entire obligation, she suggested that there is necessarily a failure of consideration unless there is complete performance.138 McHugh J appeared also to reason that recovery is based on intention, suggesting that where a contractual payment is made “conditionally upon the performance of a promise by the payee, the right to retain the moneys after discharge of the contract is dependent on whether the promise has been performed”.139 However, he did add that where “the promise has not been performed, there has been a total failure of consideration by reason of the non-fulfillment of the condition”.140 For these statements, the majority principally relied upon the judgment of Dixon J in Dennys Lascelles. The other members of the Court, Deane and Dawson JJ, suggested that in such cases recovery (restitution) is granted to prevent an unjust enrichment and is based on failure of consideration.141 [6.27] Given the reliance on the decision of Dixon J in Dennys Lascelles, it is necessary to look in some detail at his judgment. In that case Dixon J said:142 When a contract stipulates for payment of part of the purchase money in advance, the purchaser relying only on the vendor’s promise to give him a conveyance, the vendor is entitled to enforce payment before the time has arrived for conveying the land; yet his title to retain the money has been considered not to be absolute but conditional upon the subsequent completion of the contract.
Dennys Lascelles concerned a contract for the sale of land where the price was payable in instalments. Title (or at least delivery of a certificate of title in registrable form) was to be transferred upon the final instalment being tendered. The contract was discharged for breach by the purchaser prior to this time. It was held that the purchaser was not obliged to make payments that had accrued prior to the time of discharge. Moreover, payments that had been made were recoverable, and 137
Ibid, at 351. Ibid, at 386. 139 Ibid, at 389. 140 Ibid, at 389. 141 Ibid, at 375. 142 Ibid, at 477. For a similar statement see Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 at 65 per Lord Wright. 138
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it is here that Dixon J’s statement to the effect that payments made were not absolute but conditional has been seized upon to ground recovery in contract rather than restitution. [6.28] It is suggested that the interpretation placed on Dixon J’s statement in both Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co and The Mikhail Lermontov is incorrect.143 Although most payments made under a contract may be said to be conditional in the loose sense of being related to some performance obligation, the true nature of an obligation must be determined by construction. The contract in Dennys Lascelles concerned an instalment contract for the sale of land, and here the agreed return for each instalment is the other party’s promise to perform rather than the actual performance of that promise. It is this distinction that allows a vendor (prior to discharge) to bring an action to recover an instalment that has not been paid. This is reflected in Dixon J’s reference to “the purchaser relying on the vendor’s promise to give him a conveyance”. It must follow that since the buyer bargained for only the vendor’s promise to perform and that promise was given at formation, that is, prior to the time the instalment became payable, then each instalment (other than the last instalment), in terms of intention, involved an unconditional obligation to pay.144 Therefore, reliance on this case for the proposition that a conditional payment is recoverable by reason of its character as a conditional payment cannot be maintained. In addition, once a determination of the presumed intention of the parties is made it cannot change. Therefore, since Dixon J concluded that, on construction, the instalments were unconditional payments, his later reference to the vendor’s title to retain them being conditional could not have been a reference to the intention of the parties. It is suggested that Dixon J characterised the title to retain the payment as conditional because of the obligation to make restitution that was imposed where there was a total failure of consideration; that imposition may result from a term implied in law or by virtue of an unjust enrichment. He did not mean to use the word “conditional” to describe the order of performance or to characterise performance obligations such as where each payment is matched by concurrent obligations of performance.145 [6.29] It may be that the distinction Dixon J was drawing was accepted by Lord Goff in Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp (The Trident Beauty).146 This case concerned the assignment of rights to hire payments (payable in advance) under a 143 See further JW Carter and GJ Tolhurst, “Conditional Payments and Failure of Consideration: Contract or Restitution” (2001) 9 Asia Pacific Law Review 1. 144 See also Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435 at 464 per Dixon J. See further Dixon J’s citation of Ruddenklau v Charlesworth [1925] NZLR 161 at 164–5, at (1933) 48 CLR 457 at 475–6. 145 See generally SJ Stoljar, “Dependent and Independent Promises” (1957) 2 Sydney LR 217. 146 Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd (The Trident Beauty) [1994] 1 WLR 161.
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time charterparty. In one particular period an advance payment was made to the assignee and the ship was off-hire for repairs for the entire period covered by the payment. An action for recovery of the payment was brought against the assignee. In the result, the action failed as the debtor had contracted on the basis that it would look only to the assignor for restitution. However, in answer to a submission that the right to payment was conditional in the hands of the assignor and therefore also conditional in the hands of the assignee, Lord Goff remarked that this was to misunderstand the meaning of “conditional”. He took the view that “conditional” simply meant the payment was not final because there was in his view a contractual obligation to repay it if the instalment was not subsequently earned.147 Except perhaps for classifying the obligation to repay as contractual148 (which Lord Goff would have held to be the case whether or not there was an express contractual right to repayment),149 Lord Goff’s response here is consistent with Dixon J’s approach in Dennys Lascelles. That is, the description of the payment as conditional was only for the purpose of noting that it was repayable if not earned. However, as this was a case where the goods had to be immediately available upon the tender of the first instalment, it would appear that in terms of intention this case involved a true conditional payment, so that the submission of counsel was correct, and the assignment should have been characterised as an assignment of a conditional right.150 That is, the obligation to pay was conditional in an order of performance sense, there being concurrent obligations, and conditional in a discharge sense as it had to be later earned by some performance on the part of the assignor. [6.30] Lord Woolf said that the right to receive hire was independent of the obligation to give credit for hire paid but not earned.151 He did not think the right was conditional at all. He said there was “nothing qualified about the right”, there was only an independent right to be repaid.152 It may be that Lord Woolf’s view is also in line with that of Dixon J, but he did not explain how the independent right to be repaid arises. This was not crucial in the case as there was an express contractual regime dealing with that issue. [6.31] A potential problem, the effect of discharge. Where a vendor terminates an instalment contract for the sale of land for breach by the purchaser, the vendor cannot sue for instalments that fall due prior to discharge and are not paid. Arguably 147
Ibid, at 165. Dixon J did not decide whether restitution was contractual or implied in law: see (1933) 48 CLR 457 at 480–1. 149 [1994] 1 WLR 161 at 164. 150 It is a distinct issue whether or not the obligor should be successful in claiming restitution against the assignee: see [8.33]. 151 [1994] 1 WLR 161 at 169. 152 Ibid, at 171. 148
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this result flows from the payment obligation accruing only conditionally at the time of discharge.153 That is, the right to receive payment is never totally divorced from the obligation to perform, and so the right to receive payment is not unconditional at the time of discharge.154 However, as noted above, in terms of intention such instalments (when time for payment falls due) are not only independent of performance in an order of performance sense but independent in the sense of being unconditionally accrued obligations. It is suggested that the better explanation of the effect of discharge here is simply that it would be inconsistent with the discharge of the contract for the vendor to bring an action for part of the price. Therefore, although unconditionally accrued rights survive discharge, it does not follow that it is possible to call for the performance of those obligations after discharge, as opposed to suing for damages for the non-performance of those obligations. In order for a party to call for performance, the performance must not be inconsistent with the discharge of the contract. For example, in the case of a sale of goods by instalments where the price for a particular instalment is paid in advance, the buyer can continue to call for the goods to be delivered after discharge. Moreover, a debt that has been earned by performance can be enforced after discharge. [6.32] Conditional rights and conditional benefits. In the section of this chapter that deals with the assignment of contractual burdens, there is a discussion of the notion of a “conditional benefit”.155 This refers to a class of rights in which the burden forms an intrinsic part of the right held by the assignor. The right carries with it the burden and it is not possible for the assignee to take the right without the burden. This may result in the assignee being required to perform the relevant contractual obligation. However, where there is no assignment of a true “conditional benefit”, but where the right assigned is conditional in the sense of having to be earned by some later performance by the assignor, then, although that obligation defines the character of the assigned right, that right still has an independent existence as a conditional right. It does not carry with it the obligation to perform; it is subject only to the performance of that obligation.
153 See generally on the effect of discharge Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 at 849 per Lord Diplock; McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457 at 476–7 per Dixon J. Cf Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Papadopoulos [1980] 1 WLR 1129; Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574. 154 This explanation makes some sense because, if the right to receive payment was intended to be independent of performance, how could there ever be recovery based on failure of consideration? The answer lies in rejecting any notion that failure of consideration is based on qualified intent: see GJ Tolhurst in S Hedley and M Halliwell (eds), The Law of Restitution, Butterworths Common Law Series (London, Butterworths, 2002) para 19.31. See further [8.33]. 155 [6.104].
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[6.33] Assigning the fruits of a contract.156 A transaction may seek to deal only with the fruits of a contract.157 Whether or not this is the case is an issue of construction. Such transactions may be intended to be no more than promises by one person to another to account to the latter for any payments received under a contract. This is a true dealing in the fruits. Such a transaction operates only as a bipartite relationship. The assignor merely contracts to deal with the subject property in a particular way once it comes into his or her hands. It is an assignment of the subject matter of the contract. Nevertheless, because this agreement may be seen as an agreement to assign the fund (rather than the debt)158 once it comes into existence, equity may give effect to the transaction as an agreement to assign future property. In that case, assuming the formalities for such an assignment are made out, the assignee will obtain a beneficial interest in the proceeds when they are acquired by the assignor if at that point there is still no legal transfer.159 The result may be different if it is clear that the intention is that the fund must first vest beneficially in the assignor or if the assignment is subject to some other contingency. Different considerations apply where the subject matter of a contract involves goods, that is, where A agrees to sell goods to B and, before delivery, B agrees to sell the goods to C. This is dealt with in standard texts on sale of goods. [6.34] Assigning the right to the fruits of a contract. More often, assignments seek to deal with the right to the fruits of the contract. For example, a memorandum of assignment might refer to a “right to rent” or a “right to hire” or a “debt” or “receivable”. For reasons already noted, it may be still legitimate to view such transactions as involving dealings in the fruits of a contract.160 That is, a reference 156 For a discussion of what may constitute the fruits or proceeds of an asset in a broader context see R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 1.59–1.69. 157 Eg Commissioner of Taxation v Betro Harrison Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 37 FLR 150. 158 Pallette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 13 per Latham CJ. 159 Quaere whether, despite an express intention to deal only in the fruits of the contract, equity may, if the consideration for the promise is executed or specific performance is otherwise available, treat the transaction as also involving an agreement to assign the benefit of the contract. There is a view that where there is an absolute assignment of the fruits, or an absolute assignment of part of the fruits which correlates with a distinct and severable right to performance, then the purchaser may have direct rights against the obligor; this assumes that the benefit of the contract is assignable. This result would suggest that the benefit of the contract, that is, the right to performance, has also been assigned: see ICF Spry, Equitable Remedies (6th edn, Sydney, LBC, 2001) at 86–7 and see McDonald v Isaac Construction Co Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 612. The generally accepted position is that an assignment can work forward from an asset to its proceeds but not backwards: see R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 1.26, 1.59, 1.68, 3.02, 3.37. Therefore arguably this result should follow only if, despite the express reference to the fruits, on construction the assignment is intended also to assign the benefit of the contract. Cf [6.54]. 160 [6.20]. See G & T Earle Ltd v Hemsworth RDC (1928) 44 TLR 605 at 608- 609 (affirmed (1928) 44 TLR 758) (assignment of “all moneys now or hereafter to become due to us . . . for retention moneys”; although retention monies had accrued, none were payable at the relevant time and no sum had been placed in an account as “retention moneys”; nevertheless it was said by Wright J that the “moneys” constituted a specific fund and were capable of being the subject of a legal assignment; the
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to the “fruits” is not necessarily limited to the actual money paid to discharge a payment obligation; a right to some performance may be the fruits of some other underlying asset. Moreover, because the extent of an assignment is dependent upon construction, a memorandum that on its face assigns the fruits or subject matter of a contract may be construed to extend to the “right” to that subject matter.161 Being a matter of construction, it is also a matter upon which opinions may differ. For example, in Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn,162 the defendant manufacturer made shoes and agreed to sell its stock to the plaintiff. The defendant kept possession of the shoes and sold them to customers as the “agent” of the plaintiff. Every week a discounting took place. The defendant was required to inform the plaintiff of the value of shoes sold to customers, and upon receiving this the plaintiff paid the defendant that value less 5.5 per cent. The defendant was required to pay all monies received by it from customers to the plaintiff’s bank account within 48 hours of receipt of such monies. Upon the liquidation of the defendant the plaintiff claimed for those sums which had been received by the defendant from customers for sales made by the defendant to customers both before and after the liquidation but which had not been deposited into the plaintiff’s account. To achieve this the plaintiff had to claim that the obligation on the defendant to bank these sums into the plaintiff’s account arose by reason of either the plaintiff’s ownership of the monies or an assignment of the right to the monies (that is, the debt) which was not void for being either an unregistered bill of sale or an unregistered assignment of book debts. The registration issues are not relevant here. The relevant clause provided: The [defendant] shall within forty-eight hours after the receipt thereof pay all moneys received by it on account of such boots and shoes supplied by it as aforesaid to the credit of such account and at such bank as the [plaintiff] may from time to time appoint and shall at least once in each month render to the [plaintiff] a statement in writing showing all moneys received by it as aforesaid during the preceding period.
Latham CJ was of the view that the defendants sold the shoes as agent of the plaintiff so that moneys owed by the customers were in fact owed to the plaintiff. The customers never owed moneys to the defendant so there could be no assignment of debts. The defendant merely collected moneys owned by the plaintiff and prior to banking them held them on trust for the plaintiff.163 If that agency assignment was therefore a dealing in the fruits of the contract and, arguably, given the drafting of the memorandum of assignment, the assignment was dealing with the “right” to such moneys, that is the debt created. 161 See Commissioner of Taxation v Betro Harrison Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 37 FLR 150 at 157 per Bowen CJ. 162 (1937) 58 CLR 1. See also Marathon Electrical Manufacturing Corp v Mashreqbank PSC [1997] 2 BCLC 460 at 464–5. 163 (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 12.
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reasoning was wrong he still thought there was no assignment of debts, that is, the rights to payment under the contracts entered into by the defendant with customers. This was the necessary result of a clause that dealt only with the fruits of any contracts with customers, that is a clause that dealt with “all moneys received”. He said that to assign a debt there must be an intention to assign the right of the creditor (the defendant) against the debtor (customer).164 In this case he construed the clause as creating an obligation on the defendant to account to the plaintiff only after the defendant had been paid by customers. There was no agreement to assign debts; there was only an agreement affecting the fruits of the contract which is a distinct chose in action.165 Rich J also thought no assignment took place by virtue of the abovementioned clause. Any assignment in law or equity was dependent upon the discounting taking place. When a discounting took place he thought that the “proceeds of the debt discounted became in equity the property of the [plaintiffs] that is, in anticipation of payment by the customers”. He was not prepared to say there was no assignment of the subject debt which took effect in equity rather than by virtue of the instrument.166 He made no comment about the fact that the instrument, on its face, dealt only with monies received. Dixon J did not think the agency relied upon by Latham CJ was made out on the facts.167 Moreover, even if made out, this did not mean the monies received by the defendant were owned by the plaintiff. The relationship between principal and agent as regards the obligation to account is one of debtor and creditor involving personal liability only.168 That is, just because A (with authority) sells goods belonging to B does not of itself give B a proprietary interest in the proceeds at law. As to the assignment issue, rather than construing the subject clause itself, he took a view, consistent with the modern approach to the construction of contracts, of the overall transaction between the plaintiff and defendant. That transaction he classified as one involving the discounting of book debts.169 The whole point of the transaction was for the plaintiff to pay a discounted sum derived from valuing shoes which the defendant had under contract agreed to sell to customers. Those sales were on credit terms. It followed that, when construing the “assignment” clause in light of the contract as whole, it was clear that it was not merely a transaction to purchase the fruits of a contract but rather the right to those fruits. Dixon J thought there was an assignment of book debts which was intended to occur when the discounting took place, and, moreover, in equity the assignment could occur only at that point because that was when the consideration for the 164 165 166 167 168 169
Ibid, at 13. [6.56]. A debt is also a distinct chose in action, [6.50]. (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 17–18. Ibid, at 28–30. Ibid, at 30. Ibid, at 27.
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assignment was executed. Until then the debt or its proceeds was the property of the defendant.170 It is suggested that the approach of Dixon J reflects the modern and better view. Finally, McTiernan J thought the effect of the assignment clause was to bind the defendant to pay the plaintiff sums received. It did not operate to assign book debts in law or equity. The defendant was obliged to pay over sums to the plaintiff because it held them on trust for the plaintiff; the monies were the property of the plaintiff. Walker v The Bradford Old Bank Ltd171 is perhaps another example. In that case the assignment was of “all moneys now or hereafter to be standing” to the assignor’s credit in a certain bank account. At the time of the assignment there was £48 in the account. At the time the assignee brought an action against the bank there was in excess of £217 in the account. The assignment on its face appears to be an assignment of the fruits, but the court appeared to reason that the assignment was an assignment of the right to the fruits being a present assignment of a contractual right to an accruing debt, which, being present property, was immediately assignable under the statutory regime for legal assignments.172 A final example is provided by Geroff v CAPD Enterprises Pty Ltd.173 Here the assignor assigned the benefit of a contract at a time when debts had accrued under the contract and were owing to the assignor. A debt is no more than a “right to payment” and is distinct from the actual monies paid.174 However, although the expectation of the payment of such a debt is an expectation that the contract will be performed, and despite that payment being an act in the performance of the contract, a debt has always been considered a distinct chose in action. Thus, an assignment of the benefit of the contract did not on construction carry with it the right to such payments. McPherson JA concluded that what was assigned was the tree, that is, the right to performance of the contract, and although that would carry with it the fruits of performance that came into existence after the assignment it did not carry with it the fruits already accrued. Importantly the “fruits” here were not limited to the proceeds of the debt but the debt itself, that is, the right to payment.175 170 171 172
(1937) 58 CLR 1 at 30–2. (1884) 12 QBD 511. See further F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) at
30. 173
[2003] Queensland Court of Appeal (QCA) 187. See further [6.05]. 175 There must be some limitations to this case. It would not apply if what were assigned were “debts” or “receivables” arising under a contract. Moreover, in the case of a loan that had been drawn down prior to the assignment and where the debt had accrued at the time of draw down with only repayment being deferred, an assignment of the “benefit” of the loan contract would be unlikely to be intended to refer to anything other than the right to recover repayments as they fell due. See further Swan v Cleland’s Graving Dock and Slipway Co v Maritime Insurance Co [1907] 1 KB 116; Schneideman v Barnett [1951] NZLR 301. 174
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[6.35] It should also be noted that an assignment that on its face may deal with the “right to the fruits” may be a dealing with the fruits only when construed in light of the contract as a whole. This result is based on construction and is additional to the case where the “right to the fruits” may be no more than the fruits of some other underlying right. Practical examples of this point of construction are not easy to find. However, if one assigns a “debt” which would normally carry with it the right to enforce payment, but expressly reserves such enforcement rights, then the assignment may be no more than a bilateral agreement between the assignor and assignee to deal with the fruits of the contract. Alternatively, and more likely, when dealing in a debt an assignment of the “right to the fruits” may carry with it the right to claim a sum due, but not to take proceedings to determine whether a sum has fallen due.176 [6.36] Where an assignment seeks to assign the “right” to the fruits of a contract, then, on its face, this appears to be intended to be only a dealing in accrued rights and would operate when the correlative obligation to perform accrues. That is, in the case of a debt, when the debt comes into existence. Of course this may be before the time set for payment.177 Moreover, clearly the assignee’s right will eventually carry forward to those fruits that represent the interest of the assignee.178 However, often at the time such an assignment is entered into the expected receipt of the fruits of the contract is conditional or contingent upon the occurrence of some prior performance or event. An assignment of the “right” to the fruits of a contract does not appear to seek to deal with those conditional or contingent rights, and the question arises whether the dealing is a dealing in future property. Clearly there is an existing contract and the assignor must have some existing right. That right may be expressed as a right to the performance of the contract or at least a right to the promise of performance. The assignment does not seek to deal with that right; it seeks to deal more specifically with the right to the obligation to pay. It therefore becomes necessary to pinpoint the nature of the right vested in the assignor at the relevant time vis-à-vis the debtor’s obligation to pay. Here the movement of contractual rights (in their nature as choses in action) from conditional rights to accrued rights to unconditional rights is important. Prior to looking at that point it is important to note that if the assignor does not assign the “right” to the fruits of the contract, but simply assigns the benefit of the contract at a time when the expected performance is conditional, then that assignment will be an assignment of a present right and 176
[6.54]. See Westralian Farmers Ltd v Commonwealth Agricultural Service Engineers Ltd (1936) 54 CLR 361 at 379–80 per Dixon and Evatt JJ. See also Edmunds v Edmunds [1904] P 363. 178 See R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.61, especially the discussion of proceeds in relation to insurance. 177
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will pick up that conditional right and carry through to the accrued and unconditional stages.179 Moreover, there can be no doubt that in some cases the existence of a condition or contingency will dictate that a particular right is a mere expectancy. For example, prior to the occurrence of a breach of contract, the right to damages is a mere expectancy, its existence being contingent upon a breach of contract.180 [6.37] In the case of an assignment of a “right” to a payment, on one view such an assignment should be characterised as an assignment of future property if the “assignment” is entered into prior to the accrual of the obligation to pay.181 That is, where the obligation to pay (which may or may not coincide with the time for payment) is conditional or contingent upon some prior event.182 For example, in Wreckair Pty Ltd v Emerson,183 a company agreed to supply the plaintiff with certain pumps. The plaintiff was to hire out the pumps and the proceeds of hire were to be split between the company and plaintiff on a 60:40 basis. However, the company’s 60 per cent was to be used by the plaintiff to reduce the debt owed by the company to the plaintiff. At the time of the winding up of the company A $9,000 had been produced from hire and an issue arose whether 60 per cent of that could be set off by the defendant guarantors against a claim by the plaintiff. The result of that set-off application is not relevant here, however, it was held that the company had assigned a future chose in action, being 60 per cent of the fruits of the hire proceeds. Importantly, McPherson ACJ did not think the subject matter of the assignment was the fund or proceeds of hire, but rather the right to receive or recover the hire, and that right came into existence when the debt accrued, that is, when it
179 The position is more complicated if one assigns the benefit of the contract at a time when there exist either accrued or unconditionally accrued rights: see [6.34] discussing Geroff v CAPD Enterprises Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 187. 180 See Lam Soon Australia Pty Ltd v Molit (No 55) Pty Ltd (1996) 70 FCR 34 at 44. Cf Re National Express Group Australia (Swanston Trams) Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 694. Whether such “contingent” rights are caught by legislation, such as insolvency legislation, is an issue of statutory construction: see IF Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) paras 9.025–9.037; R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) at paras 3.09, 4.26–4.29, 7.32–7.33. See also Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Frid [2004] 2 AC 506. 181 There is a view that the chose in action represented by a bank account is not a debt until a demand is paid, and so any assignment of the “debt” prior to such a demand is an assignment of future property, that is, the demand is a contingency affecting the existence of the debt: see Schroeder v Central Bank of London Ltd (1876) 34 LT 735 at 736 per Brett J. The better view is probably that the demand impacts only on the time for payment and not the accrual of the obligation to pay, so that there is an existing debt. See further N Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corp [1921] 3 KB 110. 182 Although an obligation to pay may have accrued and time for payment fallen due, that obligation may still be characterised as a conditional obligation in the discharge sense (as opposed to the order of performance and performance sense), if it must later be earned by the performance of some obligation. 183 [1992] 1 Qd R 700 (also discussed at [6.14]).
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became due and owing to the plaintiff under the hire contracts.184 Admittedly, whether any proceeds would ever exist was contingent upon the plaintiff entering into contracts of hire with third parties, but such a contingency did not result in the assignment in Shepherd’s case being held a dealing in future property.185 A similar result would probably follow where there is an assignment of the right to payment under an existing contract for the supply of goods or services but where that supply is to occur “if and when” the buyer requests. [6.38] On the other hand, there are many examples of assignments which refer to an assignment of the right to the fruits, whether expressed as a “right to payment”, a “right to hire”, or a “right to receivables” etc, which have been upheld as assignments of present property even though the obligation to pay has not accrued at the time of the assignment, and even though the assignments on their face do not seek to assign a “conditional” right to payment. For example, an assignment of the right to rent under an existing lease which is entered into prior to any rent accruing has
184 Ibid, at 705. Where an assignment is of future property it may still be sensible to speak of the assignment a future debt in a non-technical sense (see Independent Automatic Sales Ltd v Knowles and Foster [1962] 1 WLR 974 at 985 per Buckley J). However, and subject to any statutory provision to the contrary if the assigned right is a present right to some future payment where the obligation to pay is conditional or contingent upon some event, then that present right cannot sensibly be termed a debt because there is no present obligation to pay: see Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140; Re WF LeCornu Ltd [1931] SASR 425; Independent Automatic Sales Ltd v Knowles & Foster [1962] 1 WLR 974; Bakewell v The Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (South Australia) (1937) 58 CLR 743 at 754 per Latham CJ; Blackwood’s Ltd v Chartres (1931) 31 SR(NSW) 619; Re Gasbourne Pty Ltd (1984) 8 ACLR 618. This does not mean that a debt can exist only if the obligation to pay has “unconditionally” accrued in the sense that that word is used to describe the effects of discharge. Thus, if the time for payment has arrived under a sale transaction there is a debt even if the seller still needs to do some later act to earn that payment. Quaere where the condition or contingency upon which the obligation to pay is dependent is bound to occur or is within the control of the creditor, so that in essence only payment is deferred and not the accrual of the obligation to pay. See further Westralian Farmers Ltd v Commonwealth Agricultural Service Engineers Ltd (1936) 54 CLR 361 at 379–80 per Dixon and Evatt JJ (if an obligation to pay has arisen by the time of discharge, then although the date for payment may not have arisen by that time there will still exist an assignable chose in action (a debt) even if payment is still dependent on the occurrence of a contingency so long as that contingency, does not involve further performance of the contract), and see further Colonial Bank v European Grain & Shipping Ltd (The Dominique) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 239. On the characterisation of advance payments as debts see The Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 at 152–3 per Isaacs J. See also National Cash Register Co Ltd v Stanley (1921) 3 KB 292. 185 See Horwood v Millar’s Timber and Trading Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 305 (assignment of wages to be earned in the future under a present contract of employment viewed as a dealing in future property). See also Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 22. See further The Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 at 160 per Dixon J, suggesting that even an assignment which attempts to assign all the assignor’s “right, title and interest in and to payment under the contract” may evidence an intention to assign the “debt” only when it accrues, that is, future property. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, prior to amendments made in 1972, a distinction was drawn between “accounts” and “contract rights”, the latter referring to payments not yet earned. These distinctions are now subsumed into the definition of “account”: see §9.102.
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been considered an assignment of a present right.186 An assignment of the right to receivables under a hire contract where at the time of the assignment the contract of hire exists but no hire has yet accrued has been considered an assignment of a present right.187 In each of these cases the accrual of the obligation to pay is conditional on the rented property being available during the rental period. It will be recalled that in Shepherd’s case an assignment of the right to “income that may accrue” under a presently existing contract was held to be a dealing in present property.188 In that case Barwick CJ suggested that where there exists a present contract and there is an assignment of the “right” to the fruits of that contract, it will always be an assignment of present property.189 He did not appear to consider the existence of some other contractual right prior to the accrual of the obligation to pay or perform. Admittedly in that case the right to income was not dependent on any condition or contingency under the contract, but was dependent on one party electing to use the subject matter of the contract to produce income. [6.39] It is necessary either to choose between these two sets of cases or to distinguish between them. If the preferred course is to choose between them this must be done by reference to doctrine. One view might be that prior to the obligation to pay accruing, although it might be said in a loose sense that there exists either a conditional right to payment or a contingent right to payment, there is in fact no “obligation to pay”, and therefore “no right to payment”, there is merely a present contractual right to some future performance where that performance will involve the making of a payment.190 Thus, any attempt to deal with the “right to payment or performance” prior to the obligation to pay accruing will be a dealing in future property. This would be the case even if the memorandum of assignment sought to assign the “conditional right to payment”. Any immediate assignment would be dependent upon the assignor identifying the presently existing right: this can be achieved by assigning the “benefit” of the contract if the intention is to assign one’s entire interest in the contract and not, for example, merely an income stream.191 Nevertheless, even if one takes the view that there is no such chose in action as a conditional or contingent contractual right, if the assignor uses such an expression in a memorandum of assignment there can be little doubt about its meaning; the assignor is attempting to assign whatever is then the existing contractual right or part thereof. It is important to note that the case being dealt with here is distinct from that where an obligation to pay exists but where it is only payment that is 186 Booth v The Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159. See also Lam Soon Australia Pty Ltd v Molit (No 55) Pty Ltd (1996) 70 FCR 34 at 42. Contrast the situation where the assignment is of “the rent” or “the rent received” or “the net rent”, as these are mere assignments of the fruits. 187 Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp (The Trident Beauty) [1994] 1 WLR 161. 188 [6.19]. 189 [6.19]. 190 The Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 at 153 per Isaacs J. 191 See Hambleton v Brown [1917] 2 KB 93 at 95 (assignment of the “benefit” of a judgment).
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suspended. Here the condition, that is, the running of time, characterises only the time for performance and not the existence of the “right to payment”.192 [6.40] Alternatively, one could argue that when we speak of conditional, accrued and unconditional contractual rights, we are not talking about different contractual rights. Upon the condition occurring the conditional right is not replaced with an accrued right or unconditional right; rather, the condition is merely lifted from the already existing contractual right. Thus, an assignment of the “right to the fruits”, whether it be drafted in the form of a “right to rent” or a “right to hire” etc, is a dealing in the one and only existing contractual right, so that it must pick up that right whether at the time of the assignment the right is conditional, accrued or unconditional. Of course, for the reasons discussed earlier, this will not help where the dealing is in such unique rights as abstract rights and those rights such as the right to interest under a loan repayable at will.193 [6.41] A question arises under this second analysis whether the idea that there is only one contractual right means that any condition or contingency does not define the subject right while that condition or contingency persists. One view is that the condition or contingency continues to define the chose in action until lifted, so that the assignor whose right is conditional or contingent cannot immediately assign any different right, and this explains why an assignee of such a right cannot immediately call for the performance of the obligation or otherwise seek to enforce it after discharge. Alternatively, it may be argued that the condition or contingency merely defines the obligation of the obligor, and it is because of the nature of that obligation that the assignee cannot immediately call for performance upon taking an assignment of the “right to the fruits” or otherwise enforce that obligation after discharge. It is suggested that the better analysis is that it is not possible to define an obligation without also defining its correlative right: the condition of contingency defines the chose in action while it persists.194 [6.42] Although the second analysis is doctrinally sound, it is doubtful whether it reflects the current law. It appears to be the law that if an assignor clearly intends to deal only in accrued rights then such a dealing, prior to the accrual of that right, is a dealing in future property. For example, if an assignor/seller attempts to transfer the debt under a sale contract prior to property in the goods passing, then he or she will usually be dealing in future property. Although there is clearly some 192
McLeay v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1963] NZLR 711. [6.20]. 194 Cf Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp (The Trident Beauty) [1994] 1 WLR 161 at 165 per Lord Goff. This issue arises in a number of contexts; for example, is the personal rights rule merely a rule as to the nature of the obligor’s obligation (see [6.75]), and do prohibitions on assignment merely characterise the obligor’s obligation (see [6.83])? 193
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existing property at that time, namely, the right to the promise to pay, which would be transferred with an assignment of the benefit of the contract, until property in the goods passes there is no present obligation to pay and therefore no debt.195 As noted above, an assignment of the right to the fruits is concerned with assigning rights to obligations and not merely rights to promises of obligations.196 Similarly, if a party seeks to deal in the proceeds or even the “right” to the proceeds under a building contract, but at the time of the dealing no proceeds have accrued and the dealing is intended to deal only with accrued rights then it will be held to be a dealing in future property.197 Moreover, generally, if an assignor seeks to assign sums due prior to the time an obligation to pay has accrued, it will be a dealing in future property.198 However, on this second analysis, given that there exists only one contractual right to the relevant correlative obligation, the result of such an assignment should be that it is not intended to take effect until the obligation to pay accrues. Whether or not it is a dealing is future property should not arise. [6.43] It should also be noted that the result in cases of sale may be different if, under the contract, the obligation to pay accrued prior to the conveyance of the property. Once such an obligation to pay arises there is a debt.199 The law recognises an accrued obligation to pay under a sale agreement as a debt even though that obligation may still be conditional in the sense of having to be earned by some later performance by the payee.200 However, not all obligations to hand over sums of money result in debts. Thus, where an executory loan agreement is in place, no debt is created, but merely a contingent contractual right to an advance which will result in a breach of contract if it is not forthcoming when a call is made on it.201 195 Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 at 153–4 per Isaacs J; HJ Wigmore & Co Ltd v Rundle (1930) 44 CLR 222 at 228, 229. See also Re Trytel [1952] 2 TLR 32; Western Wagon & Property Company v West [1892] 1 Ch 271; Webb v Stenton (1883) 11 QBD 518; Law v Coburn [1972] 1 WLR 1238. 196 [6.36]. 197 Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137. Cf Hughes v Pump House Hotel Co Ltd [1902] 2 KB 190. 198 Eg Liverpool & London and Globe Insurance Co Ltd v Hartley & Ford [1927] VR 523. 199 Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 at 160 per Dixon J. This must be the case even in immediate over-the-counter sales; that is, there is a moment when an agreement for sale is concluded and a right to payment (that is, a debt) accrues, even though payment and transfer of property follow almost instantaneously. Moreover, where a contract states that payment is to be made on a certain day, then a debt will arise on that day even if there is no conveyance by that time because there is nevertheless an obligation to pay: see The Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 at 154 per Isaacs J. 200 See Marathon Electrical Manufacturing Corp v Mashreqbank PSC [1997] 2 BCLC 460 at 465–6 per Mance J approving a statement made by F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) at 28–9. 201 May v Lane (1894) 64 LJQB 236. The right to the advance, that is, the right to performance, may not be assignable as it may be personal, being based on the confidence placed by the lender in the borrower’s ability to repay, [6.75]. However, in May v Lane, it was suggested by Rigby LJ (at 238) that it was not assignable because it was not a chose in action, and it was not a chose in action because to recognise it as such would be at odds with the law of maintenance and champerty: cf [2.02].
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In such a case it is impossible for the borrower presently to assign a debt as it does not exist. [6.44] The above discussion gives rise to a third view, namely that where a party’s enjoyment of the benefit of a contract is dependent upon some prior act or event occurring, then that person, at that time, has, in addition to his or her right to the promise of performance, a distinct right which is a conditional or contingent contractual right.202 That right is then replaced with an accrued right or an unconditional right, as the case may be, once that condition or contingency occurs.203 On this view, and subject to those cases where it is impossible to identify a present right to the subject fruits as the fruits are in fact generated by a right to the performance of some other obligation under the contract,204 whether or not an assignment of the “right to the fruits” of the contract picks up the present existing conditional or contingent right will be dependent upon construction.205 If on construction it appears that the assignment is intended to deal only with accrued rights, then, if it is entered into prior to those rights accruing it will be a dealing in future property. This view does not choose between the two sets of cases previously discussed, but merely distinguishes them. At present, this view probably represents the law. That is, where there is an existing contract which cannot be terminated by the obligor at will, then the party in the position of the assignor will be the beneficiary of both a present contractual promise (given by the obligor) to pay or perform and a conditional, accrued or unconditional right to an obligation to perform. Whether that assignment picks up that present right to perform is an issue of construction. It must also be kept in mind that an assignment that merely assigns the right to the fruits may also be capable of being construed as an assignment of the general benefit of the contract.206 Clearly that is an assignment of present property, and such a construction is possible if at the time of the assignment the only performance that can be expected under the contract is the receipt of those fruits identified in the assignment. Moreover, there is much to support the idea that one right can be replaced with another. For example, it has always been accepted that when a debt arises under a contract it forms a distinct chose in action even though the right to the payment of that debt is also a right to the performance of a contractual obligation. Thus, if a debt has accrued under a contract and the assignment assigns only the “right to performance” then that assignment will not 202 There is some logic in this in the sense that the promise of performance was the consideration that supported the contract, and to classify that promise as conditional or contingent would call into question the existence of the contract. 203 This appears to be the view adopted in Re Brush Aggregates Ltd [1983] BCLC 320. 204 [6.20]. 205 Re Brush Aggregates Ltd [1983] BCLC 320 at 323. See also Paul & Frank Ltd v Discount Bank [1967] Ch 349 at 363 per Pennycuick J. 206 See [6.33] and cf [6.54].
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pick up the existing debt.207 Similarly, when one is paid money under a contract, the right to that fund replaces the right to payment under the contract.208 [6.45] It follows from an acceptance of the third view that where some present contractual right to an obligation exists, the issue of whether an assignor intends to assign that present right or some future right depends on the facts of each case. Nevertheless, precedent does have a role to play and there is a line of authority dealing with clauses assigning sums due under a contract. For example, an assignment of “debts due or to become due”, or “debts owing or accruing” or “debts due or to accrue due”, “or moneys due or to become due” relates only to present property. On one view such provisions capture both presently accrued obligations to pay and existing contingent obligations to pay.209 On another view such provisions capture only accrued obligations to pay whether payable presently or in the future.210 However, it has been suggested that a reference to sums “due and owing” would not necessarily mean “due and payable”211 but would require the obligation to pay to have accrued.212 The word “due” could refer to either the time of payment or the existence of the indebtedness.213 However, it would appear that once a reference is made to debts which “might become due and owing” then the provision captures future property.214 [6.46] The view that a conditional or contingent contractual right is replaced by accrued and unconditional rights is not without its difficulties. For example, if there is an attempted assignment of an unconditional right to payment prior to the 207
Geroff v CAPD Enterprises Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 187. Nevertheless, precedent does have a role to play and there is a line of authority dealing with clauses assigning sums due under a contract; see Agnew & Bearsley v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710. See further [6.54]. 209 Hughes v Pump House Hotel Co Ltd [1902] 2 KB 190. 210 HJ Wigmore & Co Ltd v Rundle (1930) 44 CLR 222 at 228. See also Jones v Thompson (1858) EB & E 63, 120 ER 430; Webb v Stenton (1883) 11 QBD 518. 211 Where there is a reference to money “due and payable” the reference to “payable” refers to the time for payment and that time must have accrued: see Helou v PD Mulligan Pty Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 74 at 76–7 and the cases there cited. It is a question of construction whether the reference to “due and” as opposed to “due or” is intended to limit the clause to unconditionally accrued rights or whether it is also intended to capture conditionally accrued rights that are due and payable such as an advance payment. 212 Bakewell v The Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (South Australia) (1937) 58 CLR 743 at 768 per Dixon and Evatt JJ. 213 See Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1 at 9–10 per Gibbs CJ. See also HJ Wigmore & Co Ltd v Rundle (1930) 44 CLR 222 at 228 citing David v Malouf (1908) 5 CLR 749 at 752–4 per Griffith CJ. See further Ex parte Sturt & Co, In re Pearcy (1871) LR 13 Eq 309 at 310–11. See further Re Elgar Heights Pty Ltd [1985] VR 657; Southern Cross Interiors Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 53 NSWLR 213 and see GJ Hamilton, “An Insolvency Riddle: When is a Debt which is Due not a Debt which is Due and Payable?” (1997) 5 Insolvency Law Jnl 78. 214 See The Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 at 156–7 per Starke J; Tailby v The Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523; Re Row Dal Constructions Pty Ltd [1966] VR 249; Yeandle v Wynn Realisations Ltd (1995) 47 Con LR 1; Flood v Shand Construction Ltd (1996) 54 Con LR 125. 208
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obligation to pay becoming unconditional (which if given for value would be upheld as an agreement to assign), then presumably the existing conditional or contingent contractual right to performance must still be vested in the assignor.215 Clearly, when the obligation to pay becomes unconditional, the assignee will take the immediate beneficial interest in that right and, if at that point there is still no valid legal assignment, the assignor will hold its legal interest on trust for the assignee. However, what if, prior to the obligation to pay becoming unconditional, the assignor further assigns the present conditional or contingent right to performance to a second assignee? That is, what happens when the obligation to pay becomes unconditional?216 One view may be that because on this analysis the present right to some conditional performance is a distinct chose in action from the unconditional right to payment and, as the latter has then been assigned away, the second assignee will have no claim to the payment. From a contract perspective, in terms of discharge, a contractual right to performance which is conditional or contingent upon some performance or event is automatically classified as an unconditional right when that performance or event occurs. Moreover, it is quite clear (putting aside the complication of the first assignment in the above scenario) that if there is an assignment of a conditional or contingent contractual right where the condition or contingency is a condition precedent to the performance of the obligation that is correlative to the assigned right, then, although the assignee cannot immediately enforce that right, once the condition is fulfilled or the contingency occurs the assignee can immediately enforce the assigned right without the need for a separate assignment of the accrued or unconditional right.217 The difficulty, is to explain this result from a personal property perspective. 215 Admittedly these are distinctions that are usually not drawn in memoranda assigning rights to payment. In fact an assignee would need to think very carefully before taking such an assignment because, if the word “unconditional” is being used in the sense to describe a right that survives discharge, that is, where the counterperformance has been earned, then under many contracts the obligation to pay and the time for payment will arrive well before that time. That is, the obligation to pay will accrue while the right to payment remains conditional in a discharge sense. Moreover, from the assignee’s perspective the distinction would matter only if it provided some protection from claims for restitution in respect of payments made. However, putting aside the complication of the assignment, generally the receipt of payment pursuant to an unconditional right to payment is no guarantee of protection from such a claim: see [6.28]. Nevertheless, the law seems to be that even if the assignee takes an assignment of a right to advance payments, and even where that right is classified as conditional in the sense that the assignor must perform some condition subsequent in order to earn the payment, the assignee is protected from any claim for restitution following the discharge of the contract: see [8.34]. 216 The assignor will most likely be in breach of duty to the first assignee: see Cotton v Heyl [1930] 1 Ch 510. 217 Of course an assignee can enforce performance as long as the time for performance has arrived, whether or not the right to that performance is at that time still characterised as conditional or unconditional.
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If it is accepted that conditional, contingent and unconditional rights are distinct rights, then, putting aside the third analysis for the moment, one explanation for the above result may flow from the idea of feeding title. That is, at the time of the assignment the assignor had title to only a conditional or contingent right and could assign only such a right. However, clearly, if there were no assignment, then once the obligation to pay had been earned the party in the position of the assignor would be said to hold an unconditional contractual right to payment. Arguably, where there is an assignment, this is then fed through to the assignee. This analysis does have a weakness. The idea of feeding title generally refers to the transmission of a better title to a thing, such as goods. Importantly, the “thing” never changes; only the strength of the title in respect of that thing. In the case of contractual rights, however, the “thing” is the contractual right, that is, in the scenario being discussed the assigned conditional or contingent right to performance. Thus, the application of the feeding of title idea here would seem to change the “thing” which is not possible; it is feeding title to a different thing. The conditional/contingent and unconditional rights are distinct things. It would be different if the second analysis above were adopted because what is assigned is simply the “right to performance under the contract”, so that what is then fed through is simply a better title to that right to performance. Nevertheless, it may be that this aspect of feeding title applies only to transactions involving tangibles and different rules apply to intangibles. It has already been noted in Chapter 3 that the law with respect to intangibles does, in certain respects, operate by its own set of rules.218 Thus, arguably, an exception to the nemo dat rule allows an assignor to assign a debt twice, with any dispute between the assignees being resolved as a priority dispute.219 If it is the case that feeding title explains how an unconditional right is transferred to an assignee without a separate assignment, then, in the case where an assignor first agrees to assign a future unconditional right and later separately assigns to another assignee the remaining present conditional right, then, when the obligation to pay unconditionally accrues the effect of feeding title would arguably be that both assignees were then vested with an unconditional right to performance. That is, the effect is the same as if the assignor assigned the right twice. Thus, any dispute would be resolved as a priority dispute.220 Another way of explaining the transformation of a conditional right to an unconditional is to rely on the third analysis, that is, when the obligation to pay has been earned the conditional or contingent chose in action is replaced by an unconditional one, and this automatically vests in the person who at that time is 218
[3.12]. Ibid. 220 The position would appear to be different with tangibles where it has been held that title is fed to the first transferee: see Patten v Thomas (1965) 66 SR (NSW) 458, [1965] NSWR 1457 and see MG Bridge, The Sale of Goods (Oxford, OUP, 1997) at 397–8. 219
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vested with the right to performance. That is, there is a true replacement and the conditional or contingent right ceases to exist. Thus, upon the obligation to pay being earned the conditional right is extinguished and replaced by the unconditional right. If this analysis is correct, then no issue of priority will ever arise. If the assignor maintains the conditional right or assigns that right to a second assignee, that right will in due course be extinguished and the first assignee, taking the assignment of the unconditional right, will be the only party left with an interest. [6.47] Despite the doctrinal force of the argument above, two problems arise. First, it is generally accepted that a person can assign a chose in action more than once with any dispute between competing assignees being determined by the principles governing priorities. Of course such a dispute will usually only arise where assignments are given by way of security and where the subject matter of the assignment is a debt. Nevertheless, given this ability one can adopt the view that since an assignment of the ‘tree’ will follow through to the ‘fruits’, the assignee of the conditional right must be vested with an unconditional right when such a right accrues with the result that both assignees are vested with unconditional rights. Second, there are arguments based on the nemo dat rule that would allow an assignee who takes a later assignment of the general benefit of a contract to prevail over an assignee who takes a prior assignment of a future debt arising under the contract. Assume that A sells goods to X and takes an assignment of X’s present and future book debts; assume that X enters into an agreement to sell the goods to Y on credit terms but that X maintains title in the goods until the price is paid, next, assume that the contract of sale between X and Y was set out in a document that evidenced an immediate assignment of the benefit of the contract to B which may be the case where B is financing X. On one view the benefit of the contract of sale between X and Y never vested in X, or, if it did, it was always a title conditional upon an assignment to B. Since A’s title is subject to the principle of transfer, it could not have obtained any right to payments under the contract between X and Y. The above explanation is open to the criticism that it requires the agreement for sale to Y and assignment to B to be concurrent events, when logic and the nemo dat rule suggest that X cannot assign a right to B unless that right first vests in X. Thus, on another view the owner of the goods is X, and so X is a necessary party to the contract of sale between X and Y. It follows that the benefit of the contract must have vested at least in part in X. The assignment is a distinct part of the transaction even though one may view the entire dealing as a single transaction. This does not necessarily resolve the matter in favour of A. Much will depend on how one construes B’s involvement. If one takes the view that B had no part in the contract of sale then one is left with a true priority dispute between A and B. A number of questions may then arise, such as, are both interests attached or is one
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floating; when should an agreement to assign take effect for the purposes of priorities; which of A or B’s interest vests first or do both interests vest at the same time—B’s interest is merely dependent on the existence of the contract with Y whereas, unlike the above example where Y’s debt accrues at the time of contract, usually A’s interest would be conditional upon a conveyance of the goods as it is then that a debt would accrue— in any case the priority dispute would be over the debt and B’s initial right would have been replaced by a right to that debt which would have vested in B the same time it vested in A. A different result would follow if B had an interest in the contract of sale. It is still possible for X and B jointly to enter into a contract with Y to sell X’s goods. If that is the case then B is a co-owner of the contractual benefit of Y’s promise to pay and A will take subject to B’s interest.221 Moreover, if, at the time of the agreement to sell to Y and assignment to B, X transferred title in the goods to B the result is likely to be a novation with the contract of sale being between Y and B, here A would have no claim to debts arising under that contract.222 This second view also neglects the possibility of X and B, prior to contracting with Y, entering into an prior agreement to assign which if effective will result in beneficial title vesting in B without first passing through A. If that is possible it may be drawing too fine a point to hold that the formation of the contract between X and Y and the assignment to B cannot be concurrent events. However, putting aside any complications that may arise with floating securities, arguably the interest of A and B would attach at the same time, although the dates of their agreements to assign would differ. Despite all this it is not clear why A’s subjection to the interest of B should be dependent upon whether or not the assignment to B takes place prior to or after the assignment to A or whether normal priority rules between choses in action should apply to resolve the situation. In the context of contracts for the sale of land, and in a more typical purchase money security transaction, the House of Lords in Abbey National Building Society v Cann223 appears to have adopted a version of the first view noted above. Thus, if 221 Similarly, if A provides finance to X and takes a security of X’s present and future property, and if later X and Y undertake to purchase some property as co-owners, then A’s interest in that property will be subject to Y’s interest. That is, because X’s title is always subject to Y’s: the nemo dat rule applies. 222 See Snyder’s Ltd v Furniture Finance Corp Ltd [1931] 1 DLR 398 (here, at 406, it was suggested that the same result should follow even if the assignment to B was not immediate, so long as the contract of sale between X and Y had an express provision to the effect that it might be assigned). A distinct situation is where there is a sale of goods subject to a title retention provision with a subsequent on-sale of the goods on credit terms, together with an assignment of book debts by the buyer/on-seller. Here there is a priority dispute between the assignee and title retention seller: see DM McLauchlan, “Priorities—Equitable Tracing Rights and Assignments of Book Debts” (1980) 96 LQR 90. Contrast the example discussed by Goode in R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.66. 223 [1991] 1 AC 56 (see further Whale v Viasystems Technograph Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 480 para 72 per Jonathan Parker LJ, where it was stated that the principle flowing from the decision in Abbey National was not limited to “cases involving the purchase of property coupled with the grant of a mortgage [but applies] in every case where an issue arises as to priority as between equitable interests”).
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A provides finance to X and takes a security of X’s present and future property, and if later X purchases property from a third party with finance provided by B, then, if prior to the sale there existed an agreement between X and B to grant a mortgage over the property in favour of B which is to take effect at the same time as the sale of the property to X, B’s interest will take priority over that of A on the basis that the sale to X and mortgage to B constitute one “indivisible transaction”. The party in the position of X obtains only the equity of redemption. The decision in Abbey National rejected the view that for X to grant a mortgage to B the property must first vest in X. The reasoning here is perhaps open to the criticism that the transaction between X and B was a mortgage and not a purchase by them as co-owners, and in terms of the efficacy of the assignment there is no doctrinal reason why A should be subject to B’s interest on the basis of the nemo dat rule rather than a distinct priority rule; the assignment to A would occur at the same time as the assignment to B, although the dates of both agreements to assign would be different. Moreover, for the agreement to assign to B to be effective and attract the maxim that equity treats as done that which ought to be done then it must be a contractual agreement and the consideration for the agreement should be executed or the agreement should otherwise be specifically enforceable. It is not sufficient to have an agreement for security in place or to have an understanding that such an agreement will be entered into.224 In practice, because the execution of the consideration is likely to occur concurrently with the transfer of title to the land and, unless the assignment relates back to the date of the agreement to assign, there would be no need to draw a distinction, between where there is a prior agreement and where the agreement comes into existence only at the time of transfer or contract.225
(d) Division and Separation of Contractual Rights [6.48] Introduction. An important issue of assignability concerns the extent to which it is possible on the one hand to divide up a chose in action (here a contractual right) and assign the parts, and on the other hand assign distinct choses in action arising under a contract separately from other choses in action arising 224 See WJ Gough, Company Charges (2nd edn, London, Butterworths, 1996) at 490–1. See further Gerald Ng, ‘Built on Quicksand: The Purchase Money Security Interest Under the General Law’ (2006) 80 ALJ 53 (discussing the relevance of B being subrogated to the unpaid vendor’s lien). 225 It is of course possible to ensure that the party in the position of X never obtains title that is not encumbered by an interest to B. The transaction could be structured so that the seller, in return for the price, mortgages the property to B and then assigns the equity of redemption to X: see Lloyds Bank plc v Rosser [1989] Ch 350 at 391 per Mustill LJ. However, these structures may or may not, depending on the facts, give priority to B over A.
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under the same contract. Such assignments would result in the separate ownership of the divided or separated choses in action. In addition, there is the issue of fractional assignments, that is, the assignment of partial interests in a single right resulting in the co-ownership of the chose in action.226 Whether a transaction involves a question of division or separation as described above falls to be determined by whether or not the “right” in question is a right within a right or a distinct right itself. This can often be a difficult question. For example, in Australia it has been held that a partner’s entitlement to partnership profits is not a separate right from his or her interest in the partnership, and is incapable of being separated and immediately assigned.227 From this one might logically conclude that if an assignment of such a “right” were possible it would be a case of an assignment by way of division as it is a right within a right. Given that such an assignment is not possible (as it is never possible to divide from one right another right when the latter is an abstract right), and given that it is still possible fractionally to assign an interest in a partnership (even though that will not constitute the assignee a partner),228 one might conclude that such a fractional assignment would take effect in the same way that a partial assignment of a debt takes effect: that is, the assignor and assignee become co-owners of the chose in action to the extent of their respective interests.229 However, it is not clear whether the High Court of Australia in FCT v Everett 230interpreted such a fractional assignment in this way. There, the majority said, “the partner’s fractional interest is an entire chose in action; it is capable of division by assignment into further fractions”.231 It may be that the difference lies in the meaning the court intended to give to the words “fractional” and “division”. The reference to a partner’s share in a partnership being an “entire chose in action” for the purposes of assignment does not deny that that “share is not a thing separate from the share of another partner” but rather 226
As opposed to the whole of a distinct part of a single right, as in a division as described. FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440. A partner can enter into a contract to deal with his or her future profits and bind those profits (fruits) when they are derived. However, a partner cannot separately assign the right to the fruits, as that does not exist as a distinct present right: see FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440 at 490–50. Cf Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517 (affirmed [1993] AC 524). See also Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Galland (1986) 162 CLR 408. See further B Marks, Alienation of Income (2nd edn, Sydney, CCH, 1982) paras 218–20, 603–22. Contrast the common law position as regards goodwill which (where it constitutes property) is a distinct right, that is, it is distinct from its source, but is inseverable from the conduct of the business; it is also indivisible: see Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Murry (1998) 193 CLR 605; Primelife (Glendale Hostel) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2004) 9 VR 665; Premetis v 260 Oxford Street Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 904 para 48, and see JD Lipton, Security Over Intangible Property (Sydney, LBC, 2000) paras 6.2, 6.3.3, 7.5, 7.7. As regards abstract rights (see [3.22], [6.10]), such rights are merely an aspect or incident of a person’s ownership of certain property and have no separate existence until utilised. Therefore, abstract rights are incapable of division. 228 [4.07]. 229 [4.27], [4.28]. 230 (1980) 143 CLR 440. 231 Ibid, at 449. 227
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a “fractional interest in a surplus of assets over liabilities on a winding up and a fractional interest in the future profits of the partnership business”.232 This “interest in the partnership” is in addition to the “sui generis interest which a partner has in partnership assets, being his beneficial interest in every asset of the partnership, although not including title to any specific property of the partnership”.233 Thus, if two partners assigned each other their share in the partnership they would have achieved nothing. This is not because their interests are in any way fungible, but rather because they are indivisible as between themselves. In addition, because a partner’s interest in the partnership is an entire chose in action and because that interest is not fungible (and although that interest is indivisible as between partners), it is capable of being the subject of a fixed charge.234 [6.49] Divisional and fractional assignments. It is possible to deal briefly with divisional and fractional assignments. As regards division, and subject to what is said in the next paragraph, it is difficult to come up with any example of where the law allows a single right to be divided up into smaller rights. For example, a debt, be it a contractual debt or otherwise, is usually expressed as being indivisible.235 If it were possible to divide a single right the result would be to create two or more contractual obligations which would not only increase the burden of the obligor but ultimately be at odds with the principle of transfer which governs assignments.236 Nevertheless, it is possible fractionally to assign a debt or chose in action in equity, and this is usually expressed as a “partial” assignment. As noted earlier, the result here is that the assignee becomes a co-owner of the debt.237 One possible example of a division of a right concerns the interest component under a loan or bond. It was noted above that although the “right to interest” does not necessarily equate to the tree, that is, the thing producing the interest, there may nevertheless be a present right to interest,238 and it may be assigned.239 The 232 Kelly v Inland Revenue Commissioner (NZ) (1969) 1 ATR 380 at 383 per Woodhouse J. See further Canny Gabriel Jackson Advertising Pty Ltd v Volume Sales (Finance) Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 321 at 327–8; United Builders Pty Ltd v Mutual Acceptance Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 673; FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440 at 446. 233 United Builders Pty Ltd v Mutual Acceptance Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 673 at 679 per Stephen J, at 687 per Mason J. See also Sandhu v Gill [2005] 1 All ER 990. 234 United Builders Pty Ltd v Mutual Acceptance Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 673. 235 Quaere whether the view adopted by the Privy Council in Goss v Chillcott [1996] AC 788 that, in respect of restitutionary claims for money paid the law could now apportion payments made and allow for recovery based on partial failure of consideration, may ultimately lead to a breaking down of the assumption that a debt is indivisible. 236 In Hutchens v Deauville Investments Pty Ltd (1986) 68 ALR 367, the High Court of Australia expressed the view that the obligation of a guarantor is an obligation to pay the same debt as that of the debtor. It followed that it was not possible then separately to assign the guarantee without also assigning the underlying credit contract because the result would be to create two debts. See [6.100]. 237 [4.27]. 238 [6.20]. 239 Eg McLeay v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1963] NZLR 711.
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view has been expressed that it is possible equitably to assign the interest component even though the principal and accrued interest constitute one debt.240 This view may be based on the rule that interest, even if capitalised, never loses its character as interest.241 Arguably this is not a case of division but rather a partial assignment of the debt. If principal and interest constitute one debt then the assignment of all or part of the interest component is an assignment of a fraction no matter how it is expressed.242 Alternatively it may be that the better view is that it is possible separately to assign a present right to interest because that right and the right to the repayment of principal are two distinct debts arising under the one contract. Thus, the separate assignment of principal and interest is an example of separation and not division or partial assignment.243 If that is right, then, being a separate chose in action, the right to interest should also be capable of legal assignment.244 Finally, it may be that the result will depend on construction, that is, the facility agreement will dictate whether principal and interest constitute one or two debts.245 Similarly, in the case of a contract for the sale and delivery of goods by instalments, whether or not the price for each instalment constitutes a distinct debt or part of one indivisible debt under the contract is an issue of construction.
240 See P Watts, “The Rending of Charges” (2002) 118 LQR 1 at 2. See also Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall (2001) 208 CLR 516 at 585 per Callinan J (citing Commonwealth Quarries (Footscray) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1938) 59 CLR 111 at 121 per Dixon and McTiernan JJ). 241 Eg Paton v IRC [1938] AC 341 at 350–1 per Lord Atkin; IRC v Oswald [1945] AC 360 at 379 per Lord Porter; Bank of New South Wales v Brown (1983) 151 CLR 514 at 534 per Brennan J. 242 [4.27]. However, if it is clear that the parties intended to divide up an indivisible debt, a court may not necessarily re-interpret this as an assignment of a fraction for the purposes of upholding the assignment. For example, if under a lump sum building contract the contractor sub-contracts some of the work and attempts to assign a particular amount under the main contract to the sub-contractor as payment, this may be intended to be a division, and if that is the case it may not then be upheld on the basis that, despite the intention to divide, the stated sum forms a fraction of the purchase price. Alternatively, it may be that it is the contract which evidences an intention that there are to be no fractional assignments. This may be the case where the obligation to perform was personal and incapable of vicarious performance: see Delaware County Commissioners v Diebold Safe and Lock Company (1890) 133 US 473. Usually, however, if one subcontracts work and assigns the right to a particular amount to the sub-contractor, this will be construed as a fractional assignment: see Ashby, Warner & Co v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697. 243 See Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 38 per Windeyer J; Goss v Chilcott [1996] AC 788 at 798; Bank of New South Wales v Brown (1983) 151 CLR 514 at 549; 45 ALR 225 per Dawson J. See also the submissions of counsel in Bank of New South Wales v Brown (1983) 151 CLR 514 at 516–17. This may be at odds with the view of bankers that the various current accounts of a customer in fact form one account, which results in the bank having a right of combination. But this right may not necessarily depend on there being only one debt, but rather a number of debts arising under one contract, allowing the bank at some point to draw a balance between the various debits and credits. 244 Cf [7.39]. 245 See The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v The Myer Emporium Ltd (1986) 163 CLR 199 at 218 (“A covenant to pay interest on a principal sum may, according to the terms of the lending agreement, be independent of or accessory to a covenant to repay the principal sum or the covenants may be integral parts of a single obligation”.)
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[6.50] Separation of contractual rights. A separation as described above requires distinct rights.246 A question involving the separation of contractual rights to performance will usually arise in contracts for the supply of goods. For example, a buyer may have ordered 1,000 uniform items only to find out later that he or she required only 500. That party may wish to assign the right to receive 500 of those items. If the contract contains severable rights to each item then it will be possible to assign them and to do so absolutely. However, if the rights are not severable any assignment will be a partial assignment and take effect only in equity.247 Ultimately it is a question of construction whether a contract involves one right or a number of severable rights.248 Rarely, if ever, would an agreement to deliver goods by instalments be considered to be made up of a number of distinct contracts. Where there are distinct rights arising under a contract, whether or not it is possible to assign them separately will depend on the nature of those rights, their relationship to other rights (and duties) and the intention of the parties.249 Generally a court will not recognise the assignment of a distinct right if the vesting of that right in one assignee, while other rights continue to be vested in the assignor or other assignees, could not have been in the reasonable contemplation of the obligor.250 An interesting example of this concerns leases and options to purchase. A question that has arisen from time to time is whether an assignment of a lease carries with it the benefit of an option to purchase. The leading case on this point is Griffith v Pelton.251 That case and the line of cases that have followed it have been criticised, because the court in Griffith v Pelton reasoned that the assignment of the lease carried the benefit of the option because the original parties to the lease had agreed that this would follow. The basis of the criticism is that, although the original parties to a lease (or contract) may agree on the assignability of any right, it is a distinct question whether that right has been assigned. The actual assignment of an assignable right is dependent upon a construction of the memorandum of assignment.252 There is much force in this criticism. However, 246
See Syrett v Egerton [1957] 3 All ER 331. See further Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2004), Art. 9.1.4; Principles of European Contract Law (2003), Art. 11:103. 248 See generally Maple Flock Co Ltd v Universal Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd [1934] 1 KB 148 at 154; Ross T Smythe & Co Ltd v TD Bailey Son & Co [1940] 3 All ER 60; Rosenthal & Sons Ltd v Esmail [1965] 1 WLR 1117. 249 Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291 at 318–19 per Lightman J (affirmed [2000] Ch 291). See also Re Clarke (1887) 36 Ch D 348. 250 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 at 105–6 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 251 [1958] Ch 205. See also [8.30]. 252 See generally Denham Bros Ltd v W Freestone Leasing Pty Ltd [2004] 1 QdR 500 at 520–4 per Holmes J; Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Cherrywood Park Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 279 at 283 per Burt CJ, at 300–1 per Brinsden J (here examples of clauses that would and would not capture such an option are discussed). 247
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there is a further issue that needs to be addressed. Contractual rights owe their existence to the consent of the parties. It follows that the parties may shape those rights in their nature as choses in action. One such issue of characterisation, which goes to both assignability and assignment, is whether or not the parties contemplated that various distinct rights under a contract could be separated from one another and individually assigned or withheld. Depending on the facts of each case, it may be that a person in the position of a lessor would not have intended that the lease might be vested in one person and the option to purchase in another. Alternatively a lessee may not have intended that the reversion be vested in one person and the put option in another, with the result that the lessee may be told by one person to buy the land from a third party who may not want to sell it to the lessee! Nevertheless, a definition of “lessor” and “lessee” as including “assigns”, although evidencing an intention to make the lease assignable, would rarely be sufficient to evidence an intention that any assignment of the term carries with it the option. One would generally need some further express provision, especially given that an option to purchase in a lease is a distinct right and does not touch and concern the land so as to run with the reversion or the lease and pass automatically with the reversion or an assignment of the lease. However, where such an intention is made clear and where there is an attempt to assign one without the other, this construction may take effect as a prohibition on assignment either preventing the assignment or making the assignor liable in damages. Nevertheless in any given case the rights in question may be intended to be separated, and when that is the case then whether or not the put option is assigned will depend on the construction of the memorandum of assignment. Presumably the situation that arises with the land being vested in one person and the put option in another is simply that the person with the put option cannot exercise it if he or she is not in a position to deliver the subject matter of the option. Where rights can be separated it is a question of construction whether the assignment does separate them. A simple assignment of the benefit of the contract will usually carry all rights to performance.253 However, in the case of rights that 253 In the case of a memorandum of mortgage which contains a covenant to pay, the assignment of the mortgage will carry with it the benefit of the covenant to pay. Nevertheless, it may be possible to separate the covenant to pay and the security interest and to assign them separately. This would allow for the security interest to be vested in a security trustee in the case of loan syndications and participations, while the benefit of the covenant to pay contained in the mortgage deed remains with the participants. If the debt is not assigned to the assignee of the security interest, then the assignee could not enforce the debt. There is, however, a view that the assignment of the mortgage must carry with it the benefit of the covenant to pay on the basis that they cannot be separated: see Jones v Gibbons (1804) 9 Ves 407 at 411, 32 ER 659 at 661. That is, an assignment of a mortgage necessarily involves an assignment of the debt. However, not all mortgages incorporate a covenant to pay and the security interest remains assignable: see Re Conley v Barclays Bank Ltd (1938) 2 All ER 127. The better view may be that where a mortgage contains a covenant to pay and that covenant is not reserved then it will be transferred with an assignment of the security interest. Moreover, there is clear authority recognising that the benefit of the covenant to pay contained in the mortgage can be assigned without the security interest. Here, the assignor will remain the secured party, but as trustee of the rights and remedies under the
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are not only severable but are considered to have a distinct existence care must be taken expressly to include them in the assignment. For example, in The President of the Shire of Benalla v Turner,254 a contractor assigned the benefit of a contract to the assignee and it was held that this did not extend to the right to recover a deposit upon completion of the work which was paid by the contractor to the employer at the time of contract. In Geroff v CAPD Enterprises Pty Ltd,255 it was held that an assignment of the right to the performance or benefit or “right title and interest” in a contract did not carry with it the right to accrued debts under the contract as they are distinct choses in action.256 There is also a view that where there is an accrued right to sue for damages for breach of contract in existence at the time of the assignment, then a general assignment of the benefit of the contract will not carry with it that cause of action.257 Despite this, for reasons discussed more fully below, it is suggested that because the right to damages is intended to secure performance, such rights will be carried along with any assignment of the general benefit of the contract or any assignment of a specific severable right to performance where the correlative obligation in respect of that right is the subject of the breach of contract. Occasionally a memorandum of assignment may attempt to assign rights some of which are assignable (and have been correctly assigned as regards formalities) and some of which are not assignable (or are assignable but have not properly followed the relevant formalities). If a court can construe these as distinct assignments then they may be upheld; this assumes the subject rights are capable of severance.258 [6.51] The more difficult issue is identifying distinct rights arising under one contract which are by their nature incapable of being separated. Two possible examples were mentioned at the start of this chapter, namely, the rights to rescind and terminate a contract. Perhaps the most problematic example concerns whether or not it is possible separately to assign the right to performance under a contract and the right to damages for breach of contract. Clearly, this may be a matter upon which public policy and party intention may dictate that no such separation be allowed. However, the principal issue here is whether or not such a separation is doctrinally possible. mortgage instrument for the benefit of the assignee: see Morley v Morley (1858) 25 Beav 253, 53 ER 633. Finally the better view may be that it is not necessary that a mortgage contain a covenant to pay for the debt to be assigned along with the mortgage, and that the assignment of the mortgage is sufficient to transfer any debts secured by the mortgage: see generally French v Queensland Premier Mines Pty Ltd [2004] Victoria Supreme Court (VSC) 294. All this is subject to any relevant statutory provision, eg Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s91. 254 (1881) 7 VLR 200. 255 [2003] QCA 187. 256 See further [6.34]. 257 See Madison Pictures Inc v Chesapeake Industries Inc (1955) 147 NYS 2d 50. 258 See Re Burdett ex parte Byrne (1888) 20 QBD 310; Davies v Rees (1886) 17 QBD 408; National Provincial & Union Bank of England v Lindsell [1922] 1 KB 21 (dealing with Bills of Sale legislation).
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There can be little doubt that when a right to damages has accrued it is a distinct right from the right to performance. If it were otherwise, the right to damages would not survive the discharge of the right to performance. The right to bring an action for damages is a secondary right which arises when another party breaches a contract by failing to perform a primary obligation, and comes under a secondary obligation to pay damages.259 A contract is not an agreement to pay damages on breach.260 Moreover, the right to damages, although arising from a contract, is not a performance right; it merely secures performance. However, once a breach occurs, if the contract remains on foot, clearly there will be a distinct right to performance and a distinct right to damages. [6.52] An interesting question is whether it is possible, prior to any breach, to agree to assign the right to claim damages as distinct from the right to receive performance.261 Such an assignment would be a dealing in future property because until a breach occurs there is no “right” to damages. To reach an answer on this issue it is convenient to start with the reverse scenario, that is, is it possible to assign the right to contractual performance divorced from the right to damages? It is suggested that it is not possible to hold back such secondary rights.262 Although secondary rights are, once they accrue, distinct rights, they are intended to secure the right of performance, and therefore must vest, as a matter of law, in the person with the right to performance. Upon payment, damages replace some lost performance. This result cannot be drafted round; the assignee at most can agree to assign back the right to damages.263 Thus, a general assignment of the benefit of a contract will carry with it the right to damages.264 The same result may be reached from another direction; if the assignor assigns the right to performance but keeps back the right to enforce that right to performance then what the assignor is attempting to assign cannot be a chose in action 259 On the secondary obligation to pay damages see Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 at 848 per Lord Diplock. On the secondary right to damages see Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil Corp Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 138 at 152 per Hoffmann J, [1995] Ch 152 at 163, 165 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR, at 169 per Beldam LJ, at 171–2 per Saville LJ (CA). See also Flood v Shand Construction Ltd (1996) 54 Con LR 125 at 131. 260 Grein v Imperial Airways Ltd [1937] 1 KB 50 at 69 per Green LJ; Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 at 849 per Lord Diplock. 261 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd (1992) 57 BLR 66 at 99 per Sir Michael Kerr. 262 Whether or not it is possible to achieve this result by getting the assignee to agree that the assignment is to come to an end if the obligor breaches the contract is dealt with later, [7.39]. 263 Similarly, unless notice is not given to the obligor, if the assignor assigns the right to performance the assignee can expect to receive that performance, that is, the fruits of that right to performance. Even if notice is not given, if the assignor receives the performance and that performance leaves some residuum it will be held on trust by the assignor for the assignee. A distinct issue is whether the assignor and assignee can agree that the assignment is to come to an end at a certain point so that the assignee no longer owns the right to performance: see [7.39]. 264 Ogdens Ltd v Weinberg (1906) 95 LT 567.
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because a chose in action must be capable of being enforced.265 Perhaps it is sufficient to constitute a chose in action that the right be merely capable of enforcement, and it does not matter that the ability to enforce remains with the assignor. Nevertheless, it seems anomalous to suggest that the assignee owns the right to performance but not the right to enforce or secure that performance. The latter must follow the former if there is a real intention to transfer ownership even though the right to damages when it exists is a distinct chose in action. [6.53] It does not necessarily flow from the above analysis that it is impossible to agree to assign the right to damages and hold back the right to performance. Clearly, if there is a breach of contract and a right to damages comes into existence, then that right may be assigned subject to overriding policy concerns. It should be no different if the assignor agrees, for value, to assign the right to damages prior to any breach of contract. The assignee should be vested with an immediate interest when a breach occurs. If the above paragraph is correct, it needs to be asked, what happens to the right to performance that remains vested either in the assignor or a later assignee? It may be tempting to conclude that, upon breach, the now existing right to damages replaces that right to performance, although not in the sense that it vests in the assignor; rather, the right to performance is extinguished to the extent that the right to damages replaces some lost performance. The fault in this reasoning is that the notion that the right to damages replaces the right to performance, although often referred to, is not precise. It is only when damages are paid that the right to performance, which is compensated for by those damages, is extinguished. When a breach of contract occurs, the obligation to pay damages that arises upon that breach co-exists with the obligation to perform, and that obligation to perform is discharged only if the contract is terminated (assuming the performance obligation has not unconditionally accrued at the time of discharge) or if damages in respect of that breach are paid.266 This is why it is possible for the innocent party both to apply for an order of specific performance and to claim damages. Thus, damages replace performance but the right to damages or the liability to pay damages does not replace the right to performance or the obligation to perform. It must follow that, despite the assignee having the right to claim damages, the assignor or second assignee could still demand performance and seek specific performance. That problem is not necessarily a good reason for refusing to recognise such an assignment as it can arise between joint promisees. Where the assignor 265 This route is perhaps not as satisfactory as the first because it may be that the availability of an order for specific performance would be sufficient to render the right a chose in action; quaere though whether this should dictate that the right is equitable: see Letts v IRC [1957] 1 WLR 201. In the case of debts, in order to conclude that a chose in action is vested in the assignee, all that may be necessary is for the assignee to be able to sue for the debt: see [6.54]. 266 Cf D Pearce, “Property and Contract: Where Are We?”, in A Hudson (ed), New Perspectives on Property Law, Obligations and Restitution (London, Cavendish, 2004) ch 4 at 104–5.
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further assigns the right to performance, the view may be taken that a right to damages should vest in the second assignee creating a form of priority dispute between the first and second assignee. That view may carry some weight where the assignor assigns two different rights to performance such as an unconditional right to performance and a conditional right to performance because here the latter is replaced with an unconditional right. Thus, in effect the assignor is assigning the same right twice. However, that is not the case where the assignor assigns the right to damages to one assignee and the right to performance to another assignee as damages merely secure performance. It is suggested that the better view is that the nemo dat rule should be applied here so that the second assignee does not obtain a right to damages. [6.54] Separating debts from the benefit of the contract. It was noted above that there is a long accepted view that, although the payment of a debt that accrues under a contract is an act in the performance of the contract and the promisee will have a right to that performance, a debt when it arises under a contract is a distinct chose in action. Therefore, a general assignment of the benefit of a contract will not carry with it the right to an accrued obligation to pay.267 Accepting that position, should it then follow that, prior to the accrual of a debt under a contract, an assignor can express an intention to separate the debt from the contract and assign the debt and keep back the general benefit of the contract? Assume A enters into a contract with B under which A is to perform some service for B and be paid for that service. Further, assume that it is only upon the performance of that service that B’s obligation to pay accrues. Clearly at the time the contract is formed A has a present chose in action and may assign the benefit of the contract. More precisely the chose in action that A has is the benefit of B’s promise to perform. If A wanted to assign the benefit of the contract it is unlikely that A will express that assignment in terms of an assignment of the “promise by B to perform”. A will more likely assign “the benefit of [its] contract with B” or “its right to payment”. In any given case the latter may be construed as an assignment of future property because at the time of formation B is under no obligation to pay.268 But even if that is so, the expression “right to payment” may be construed as intending to assign the benefit of the contract as it exists from time to time throughout the life of the contract; once B comes under an obligation to pay clearly A has a “right to payment”, and this expresses the entire nature of A’s rights and expectations under the contract at that time.269 It would follow then that if there were any dispute over whether a payment was due, the assignee of A could commence proceedings to determine that question. The result should not be any 267 268 269
[6.37], [6.38]. [6.34]. See Westralian Farmers Co-operative Ltd v Southern Meat Packers Ltd [1981] WAR 241 at 244.
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different if A does not enter into any agreement to assign until B actually performs its obligations under the contract and comes under an obligation to pay; that is, when a debt arises under the contract and vests in A. If on the other hand the assignment by A is construed as dealing only in the debt arising under the contract, then, although the assignee may claim for any sums that fall due under the contract, the assignee cannot commence proceedings to determine whether a debt is due. The ability to commence such proceedings is a right that flows from being vested with the benefit of the contract, and when an assignee is vested with a debt, then although the obligation to pay that debt arises under a contract and constitutes the performance of that contract, the assignee is vested with a distinct chose in action and not a contractual right. The leading decision adopting this view and the possibility of such assignment is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Yeandle v Wynn Realisations Ltd.270 This case concerned a contract between a contractor and a sub-contractor under which the sub-contractor was prohibited from assigning the benefit of the contract without consent but could assign “any sum which is or may become due and payable” under the sub-contract without consent. It followed that the sub-contractor could deal only in debts arising under the sub-contract, that is, rights to payment. The memorandum of assignment expressly assigned “debts” arising under the subcontract and did not refer to the general benefit of the contract. Pursuant to the sub-contract an engineer made a determination whether a sum was payable under the contract. The assignee wished to re-open that decision by taking arbitration proceedings. It was held that the assignee could not take such action as it was not vested with the benefit of the contract, or more precisely the right to performance of the contract. The assignee could claim and enforce only amounts that fell due under the contract. This result follows from the debt being a distinct chose in action, and the assignee is not vested with the right to performance of the contract even though what the assignee expects from the debtor is the performance of an act that constitutes the debtor’s performance of the contract. Therefore, it is possible to separate the debt arising under a contract, from the general benefit of the contract and this separation is usually forced on the assignor by way of a prohibition on assignment which is intended to ensure that the obligor always knows the identity of the person it is likely to be in dispute with. However, as the court noted the issue ultimately turns on construction. Thus, putting aside the existence of such a prohibition, whether an assignor intends to deal with a contractual right to performance or only the distinct chose in action represented by a debt turns on construction. References in assignments to “debts” or “sums due” clearly deal with debts, but references to “rights to payment” are more ambiguous. In addition, the court held that although the statutory regime for legal assignments transfers the 270 (1995) 47 Con LR 1. See further Ogdens Ltd v Weinberg (1906) 95 LT 567. Cf Herkules Piling Ltd v Tilbury Construction Ltd (1992) 61 BLR 107 at 118. See further [6.118].
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debt or chose in action together with “all other remedies for the same”, the right to commence proceedings to determine whether a sum is due under a contract is not a remedy for a debt. There is no doubt that the analysis in this case has doctrinal appeal. A debt is a an accrued obligation to pay and the right to question whether an obligation to pay has accrued does not logically vest in the person with title to a debt. Nevertheless, this doctrinal point could lead to impracticle results if debtors could stall actions brought by assignees simply by arguing that the claimed debts have not accrued. Perhaps, outside the unique circumstances of Yeandle v Wynn Realisations Ltd, an assignment of a “right to payment” under a contract will be construed to carry some portion of the benefit of the contract to allow the assignee to commence an action to determine whether a payment has accrued. The decision in Yeandle was applied in Flood v Shand Construction Ltd.271 This case also concerned the operation of a prohibition on assignment that was in the same terms as that in Yeandle. Here the memorandum of assignment was expressed to assign all the assignor’s assets “including causes of action”. The assignee sought to pursue a cause of action in damages. It was held that although the assignee could enforce payment of a sum payable, under the contract it could not commence a cause of action under the contract to determine whether such a sum was payable as such causes of action were vested in the person who had the benefit of the contract; the prohibition prevented the assignee obtaining the benefit of the contract despite the drafting of the memorandum of assignment. In the result, the assignee could not take the preliminary steps necessary to determine whether a sum was due and payable under the contract. In arriving at its decision the court gave some consideration to whether damages when liquidated by an order became a sum due under a contract. There is a certain logic to this point to the extent that damages replace and secure performance, and therefore can be viewed as representing the fruits of the contract. However, it is necessary when faced with such an assignment to determine what those damages are replacing. If the proper construction of the assignment is that it is an assignment of debts arising under the contract it would not be right to allow that assignee to claim the damages that are ordered to be paid for the nonperformance of some obligation other than the late or non-payment of a sum due under the contract.272 Evans LJ thought that the prohibition allowed for the 271
(1996) 54 Con LR 125. Where damages are ordered to compensate for the non- or late payment of money under a contract, whether or not an assignee of debts arising under that contract can obtain the entire amount of damages awarded is not without difficulty. Where a debt accrues and is not paid and the promisee sues in damages for breach of contract, the “damages” will comprise two components, the debt and a sum for late payment. Strictly, it is only the latter that is damages. From this the view could be taken that where damages are given for the non- or late payment of money they do not operate as security for the debt (a distinct chose in action) but rather maintain their purpose of securing performance of the contract. If the assignee is not assigned the benefit of the contract, but only the debt arising under the contract, then the right to damages does not vest in the assignee. 272
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assignment of money claims under the contract and this was not limited to debts arising under the contract in a primary sense, but allowed for the assignment of liquidated damages, whether or not technically at that point the claim continued as one for damages or for a debt. What could not be assigned was the cause of action for damages. [6.55] In the case of a judgment debt, it has been held that the right to conduct proceedings is inherent in the right of action and is not incidental to the judgment debt.273 A legal assignment of a judgment debt would carry with it the right to demand the debt, to enforce the judgment and give a good discharge, but not the right to conduct proceedings. Hence, an assignment of the fruits of an action does not give the assignee power to interfere in the proceedings and is therefore not an assignment savouring of maintenance of champerty.274 [6.56] Separating a debt from its proceeds. Another important distinction is between a debt and its proceeds. If an assignor assigns a debt, that is, a right to payment, then the assignee will receive title to the proceeds of the debt when they are paid. However, it is also clear that the debt and its proceeds represent two distinct proprietary interests. Given that distinction, is it then possible to assign a debt but hold back title to the proceeds? In Agnew v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Lord Millett said:275 While a debt and its proceeds are two separate assets, however, the latter are merely the traceable proceeds of the former and represent its entire value. A debt is a receivable; it is merely a right to receive payment from the debtor. Such a right cannot be enjoyed in specie; its value can be exploited only by exercising the right or by assigning it for value to a third party. An assignment or charge of a receivable which does not carry with it the right to the receipt has no value. It is worthless as a security. Any attempt in the present context to separate the ownership of the debt from the ownership of their proceeds (even if conceptually possible) makes no commercial sense.276
This statement was made in the context of characterising a security interest.277 The Privy Council rejected earlier authority which had recognised the possibility of having a fixed charge over a debt and a floating charge over the proceeds of that debt.278 It also rejected the possibility of having a fixed charge over a debt and an 273
Gould v Skinner [1983] Qd R 377. Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474 at 484 per Vaughan Williams LJ. See further [6.59]. 275 [2001] 2 AC 710 at 729. 276 Of course it is possible to take a fixed charge over the proceeds and not the debt: see Re SSL Realisations (2002) Ltd [2005] 1 BCLC 1. It should also be noted that despite this statement the proceeds of a debt do not always represent the fruits of the debt, that is, the right to payment: see [6.20]. 277 The efficacy of such a security in Australia is not clear: see Whitton v ACN 003 266 886 Pty Ltd (1996) 42 NSWLR 123. 278 This restriction does not extend to tangibles: see R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.67. 274
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initial fixed charge over the proceeds of that debt, where the latter was replaced by a floating charge over the proceeds by the act of the chargor collecting the proceeds for its own use and benefit. It was held to be inconsistent with a fixed security for the chargor to have either the discretion to take property out of the reach of the security or the power to extinguish the security.279 The Privy Council also overruled the decision in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd,280 and in doing this rejected the possibility of it being consistent with a fixed charge if property were released from the charge by force of contract, that is, when the release automatically occurred by the occurrence of an event dictated by the contract. Given the overruling of New Bullas (a release case) and the fact that Agnew involved a document that sought to extinguish the charge upon an act of the chargor, the court would no doubt have rejected the notion of extinguishing the charge by force of contract rather than merely releasing property from the charge by force of contract: for example where there is a fixed charge over a debt and its proceeds which upon the chargor’s receipt of such proceeds is agreed to be extinguished and upon that extinction there is granted a floating charge over the proceeds. The decision of the Privy Council in Agnew was approved by the House of Lords in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd 281 This case concerned the efficacy of a security given to secure an overdraft which was expressed to be a “specific” (that is, fixed) charge over book debts. The chargor was free to collect the proceeds of the book debts, but there was a restriction preventing the chargor alienating the debts and the chargor was required to pay sums received into its account with the chargee bank. However, the chargor was free to withdraw funds from that account and use them as part of its cash flow in running its business. The Court of Appeal upheld the characterisation of the charge as being a fixed charge over the debt and its proceeds, reasoning that the deposit into the account was a loan to the bank with title in the funds vesting in the bank. It was thought to be irrelevant that the chargor might be able to withdraw equivalent funds from the account without requiring further consent from the chargee. This reasoning was rejected by the House of Lords and it did not matter whether the account at the time was in credit or debit;
279 Although it is not inconsistent with a fixed charge or a mortgage for the chargor/mortgagor to have the benefit or use of the charged or mortgaged property during the period of the security, it is inconsistent if the chargor/mortgagor can alienate title to the subject property free of the charge or mortgage or freely take the property out of the reach of the charge. The ability to alienate the property or take it out of the reach of the charge without the consent of the chargee is the hallmark of a floating security. In the case of mortgages over tangible property, although the mortgagee has the right to possession, by agreement possession is usually left with the mortgagor. In the case of debts, the ability of the chargor either to assign the debts or to deal with the proceeds in the ordinary course of business is inconsistent with the charge being a fixed charge. 280 [1994] 1 BCLC 485. 281 [2005] 3 WLR 58 (overruling Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142 and Re Bullas Trading Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 485).
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in this case the account was always in debit.282 The court did not distinguish this regime for a charge from the Agnew line of cases where the “fixed” charge over the debt and its proceeds is expressed to be replaced with a floating charge over the proceeds that are collected by the chargor.283 Ultimately a fixed charge requires control over both the debt and its proceeds.284 It follows that despite any label the parties may put on the transaction if the chargee does not have this control, because the chargor can either keep and use any proceeds it collects or draw freely on an account the proceeds are required to be deposited in or, if only a floating charge operates over the collected proceeds, then this impacts on the character of the entire transaction and renders the charge a floating charge.295 There can be little doubt, as the courts suggested in Agnew and Re Spectrum, that it makes no commercial or legal sense for a lender to take a charge over a debt or an assignment of a debt by way of mortgage but to reserve to the borrower the right to the proceeds.286 The whole point of the security is to ensure that the chargee/mortgagee gets paid if there is a default, and this will not occur with such a transaction. At the very best such an arrangement has limited commercial
282 See [2005] 3 WLR 58 at 96 per Lord Scott. There can be no doubt that a provision requiring such a deposit controls the power of the chargor to use the actual proceeds for its benefit. However, the payment by the chargor into its account with the bank is merely replacing one right of property for another. If the account is not blocked and the chargor is free to withdraw equivalent funds at any time, then it will be to put form over substance to suggest that the chargee is maintaining control over the proceeds. Moreover, despite the title to funds deposited into a bank account becoming the property of the bank (a rule that has often been circumvented in areas such as liability for knowing receipt), it has never been the law that a direction by a creditor to its debtor to pay sums into the creditor’s account with its bank is an assignment to the bank: see [7.07]. 283 See [2005] 3 WLR 58 at 86 per Lord Scott (“If a charge over book debts can be a fixed charge even though the money received by the chargor in payment of those debts is to be subject to only a floating charge, it becomes difficult to quarrel with the proposition that the charge over uncollected book debts . . . can be a fixed charge even though the chargor can freely use for its business purposes the money it receives from its debtors in payment of the debts subject to the charge”.) 284 In Re Spectrum Lord Hope ([2005] 3 WLR 58 at 76), citing S Worthington, “‘An Unsatisfactory Area of the Law’—Fixed and Floating Charges Yet Again” (2004) 1 International Corporate Rescue 175 at 182, affirmed that there are a limited number of ways of ensuring that a charge over books debts is fixed. “One is to prevent all dealings with the book debts so that they are preserved for the benefit of the chargee’s security. . . . Another is to prevent all dealings with the book debts other than their collection, and to require the proceeds when collected to be paid to the chargee in reduction of the chargor’s outstanding debt. . . . A third is to prevent all dealings with the debts other than their collection, and to require the collected proceeds to be paid into an account with the chargee bank. That account must then be blocked so as to preserve the proceeds for the benefit of the chargee’s security. A fourth is to prevent all dealings with the debts other than their collection and to require the collected proceeds to be paid into a separate account with a third party bank.” 285 Interestingly Lord Scott ([2005] 3 WLR 58 at 95–6) emphasised that the bank could not have sold the debts prior to taking steps to extinguish the chargor’s rights to collect and use the proceeds. That step would be characterised as one of crystallising the security, thus the security was a floating security. This point has force if the security is in essence a mortgage. However, if it is a charge in the strict sense then, even if it is fixed, the chargee will not be able to assign the debts as it has no title to the debts since the security does not take effect by way of assignment: see [3.17]. 286 [2001] 2 AC 710 at 729.
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applications.287 However, arguably when the security over the debt is backed up by a floating security over the proceeds, the transaction makes perfectly good commercial sense. Nevertheless, as was emphasised in Re Spectrum, it is necessary to look at the overall rights of the chargor in relation to the assets that are subject to the charge.288 If the debt and its proceeds are expressed to be subject to a fixed charge then any right in the chargor to deal freely with the proceeds and alienate them from the charge is inconsistent with the charge being fixed. However, if one were to take a fixed charge over the right to payment and made it clear that the fixed charge did not extend to the proceeds, then in characterising that charge one could not take into account the rights of the chargor over the proceeds if one were limited to investigating the chargor’s rights in respect of the property that is subject to the charge. The chargor here would not be freely withdrawing property that was caught by the security. Despite that distinction, the decision in Agnew appears to stand in the way of this approach. The broad finding in that case that one cannot have a fixed charge over a debt and a floating charge over its proceeds seems to suggest that, in characterising the fixed charge component, one is not limited to investigating only the property that is expressed to be the subject matter of the charge; one must look at the transaction as a whole.289 That approach is perfectly in line with the approach courts are developing in relation to the construction of chain and network contracts. The decisions in Agnew and Re Spectrum do not deny the legal distinction between a debt and its proceeds. Moreover those decisions are concerned with both the nature of a security interest and the characterisation of particular security interests. As regards nature, the point was made that the notion of taking security over a debt and yet having no chance of being paid by enforcing that security as it does not extend to the proceeds of the debt is nonsensical. As regards characterisation the decisions were concerned with determining whether or not the security, be it technically a charge or a mortgage, was fixed or floating. The decisions were not so much concerned with underlying principles of assignment. It has always been possible to enter into an assignment that ceases at a certain point in time.290 The classic example is the assignment of an income stream until a debt is repaid. Here the assignee obviously obtains an interest in the debt and it proceeds. Nevertheless, if such an assignment is possible it must make perfect doctrinal sense 287
Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2004] 3 WLR 503 at 520–1 (overruled [2005] 3 WLR 58). See [2005] 3 WLR 58 at 93, 94, 97 per Lord Scott, at 102 per Lord Walker 289 See also Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 3 WLR 58 at 95 per Lord Scott (“If the accompanying provision were, instead to say that any money received from the debtor would be subject to a floating charge, that provision would, in my opinion, necessarily describe and limit the nature of the charge over the receivable debt. And if the charge were to be expressed to be a fixed charge as respects the receivable debt but a floating charge as respects the money received from the debtor there would be an internal contradiction in the formulation of the charge”.) 290 [7.40]. In the case of a charge (as opposed to a mortgage) the charge will automatically cease once the debt which it secures is discharged. 288
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to have an assignment of a debt where the interest of the assignee is expressed to cease upon the debtor (who presumably has no notice of the assignment) paying the debt to the assignor. However, it is difficult to imagine any commercial use for such an outright assignment. In Re Spectrum Lord Scott appeared to provide some support for such an assignment. He said, “Suppose, for example, a case where an express assignment of a specific debt by way of security were accompanied by a provision that reserved to the assignor the right, terminable by written notice from the assignee, to collect the debt and to use the proceeds for its (the assignor’s) business purposes, ie, a right, terminable on notice, for the assignor to withdraw the proceeds of the debt from the security. This security would, in my opinion, be a floating security notwithstanding the express assignment. The assigned debt would be specific and ascertained but its status as a security would not”.291 Here Lord Scott does not seem to question the efficacy of the assignment but does question its efficacy as a security and places it in the category of a floating security.
(e) Restrictions on the Assignment of Contractual Rights (i) Introduction [6.57] Rules governing restrictions on assignment. The following section investigates public policy restrictions on assignment and the rules that dictate that personal contractual rights may not be assigned and that it is not possible by assignment to vary the obligations of the obligor. It also looks at the related issue of the extent to which parties may expressly prohibit assignment.
(ii) Public Policy Restrictions [6.58] Public policy generally. Clearly public policy may impact upon assignability. Public policy may dictate that a certain right be assignable.292 More often public policy restricts assignability. For example, if the effect of an assignment would be to increase the risk that the obligor will not receive its performance, the assignment may be ineffective for varying the risk accepted by the obligor under the contract293 291
[2005] 3 WLR 58 at 92. Eg: see Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 (Eng) s 5; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) s 3, giving a surety who has discharged the secured debt a right to an assignment of any security for the debt. 293 [6.39]. An assignment may also improperly increase the risk that the obligor will have to perform. 292
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or it may be ineffective by reason of public policy. Thus, it is against the public interest to allow a public officer to assign his or her unearned salary if that assignment increases the risk that the officer will not then render the required performance in respect of that salary.294 Such salaries are given to ensure due discharge of obligations and to maintain the dignity of the office. Moreover, although it is possible to agree to assign present and future income,295 it may not be possible to assign salaries where the effect would be to deprive employees of their means of supporting themselves and their families.296 In addition, many statutory provisions exist which limit
294 For this rule to apply the office must be a public one connected to public service in which the public has an interest in both the performance of the duties and the readiness of the officer to perform them. That is, the pay must be given at least in part to induce the officer to keep himself ready to perform. If this requirement is necessary then the principal is quite limited, but where it does apply arguably it will also capture accrued income. It may be that this requirement is limited to salaries and pensions which are given as retainers for future services: see Re Mirams [1891] 1 QB 594 at 595, and see the discussion in Field v Battye [1939] SASR 235 at 248–9. See also Stone v Lidderdale (1795) 2 Anst 533, 145 ER 958; Wells v Foster (1841) 8 M & W 149, 151 ER 987; Re Huggins (1882) 21 Ch D 85 at 91 per Jessel MR; Lucas v Lucas [1943] P 68; Arbuthnot v Norton (1846) 5 Moore 219, 13 ER 474; Palmer v Bate (1821) 2 Brad & B 673, 129 ER 1125; Cooper v Reilly (1829) 2 Sim 560, 57 ER 897; Re Hilliard [1907] VLR 375; Crouch v The Victorian Railways Commissioners [1907] VLR 80. See further Marr v The Admiralty (1926) SC 842. Cf the position for non-public officers including persons who serve a public function, such as a member of the clergy, but who are not paid by the state: see Feistel v King’s College Cambridge (1847) 10 Beav 491, 50 ER 671; Re Drummond’s Trusts (1907) 4 Tas LR 9 (cf Berkeley v King’s College Cambridge (1830) 10 Beav 602, 50 ER 714); Re Mirams [1891] 1 QB 594 (cf Grenfell v The Dean and Canons of Windsor (1840) 2 Beav 544, 48 ER 1292, chaplin paid by state). See also Re Robinson (1884) 27 Ch D 160; Watkins v Watkins [1896] P 222; Paquine v Snary [1909] 1 KB 688 (unsecured maintenance payments) and cf Harrison v Harrison (1888) 13 PD 180 (secured maintenance payments). It has been held that public officer pensions given in respect of past services may be assigned unless specific statutory provisions prohibit assignment: see Willcock v Terrell (1878) 3 Ex D 323; Crowe v Price (1889) 22 QBD 429. Moreover, the assignment of the right to income of a public officer may be upheld if it is not to take effect until the death of the assignor: see Arbuthnot v Norton (1846) 5 Moore 219, 12 ER 474. Where a pension is given to a public officer in recognition of services to the nation, then, subject to any express terms of the grant, the assignment of such an interest would depend on whether a transfer would rob the pension of its purpose: see Davis v The Duke of Marlborough (1818) 1 Swan 74, 36 ER 303. See further Krasner v Dennison [2001] Ch 76 at 99 per Chadwick LJ. In the private sector express prohibitions may appear in contracts for the purpose of securing the employee’s performance: see Sacks v Neptune Meter Co (1932) 258 NYS 254 at 260 per Untermyer J. See further FCT Tudsbery, The Nature and Requisites and Operation of Equitable Assignments (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1912) at 38–45; DW Logan, “A Civil Servant & His Pay” (1945) 61 LQR 240. As regards the assignability of moneys recoverable from the Crown: see Ex parte Patience (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 96 at 103 per Jordan CJ. For a complete list of the cases that have dealt with the assignment of wages and pensions see The Digest, Choses in Action (London, LexisNexis, 1990) viii, paras 963–1017. 295 Davies v Davies (1887) 36 Ch D 359. See also Crouch v Martin (1707) 2 Vern 595, 23 ER 987. 296 King v Michael Faraday and Partners Ltd [1939] 2 KB 753. Cf Syrett v Egerton [1957 3 All ER 331 at 334; Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corp (Aust) v Burnard (1992) 27 NSWLR 415 at 423 per Clarke JA, at 425 per Meagher JA. See also RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 6.195. It has been held to be against public policy for a person to assign income and property to an assignee as security for a debt where the effect would be to create a relationship of serfdom between assignor and assignee: see Horwood v Millar’s Timber & Trading Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 305.
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or prohibit assignment on grounds of public policy.297 Such prohibitions may be drafted in terms that render the right inalienable or a prohibtion may be expressed to render the assignment void as against the obligor.298 Insofar as the assignment of choses in action is concerned, the most well known public policy limitation has been the law’s concern to prevent maintenance and champerty.299 [6.59] Maintenance and champerty.300 Maintenance involves the support of litigation. However, the mere financing of litigation itself is not wrongful; there is nothing wrong with a lender advancing sums it knows are to be used in litigation. For example, where a bank lends money at interest for the purpose of financing a customer’s litigation, this may be considered a part of its ordinary business. The loan itself is not necessarily stirring up or intermeddling in litigation, and if it were it is nevertheless done with legal justification. The agreement to indemnify derives from and is given in the course of what the community considers to be a legitimate business transaction.301 To render an agreement for maintenance wrongful there must be some intermeddling or stirring up of litigation without legal justification. 297 Eg Army Act 1955 (UK) s 203(1); Superannuation Act 1972 (UK) s 5(1); Social Security Administration Act 1992 (UK) s 187; Pensions Act 1995 (UK) s 91; Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 25(c); Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) s 118; Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 60. See also National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 514; Fisher v Harrison [2003] EWCA Civ 1047. 298 Compare Commonwealth Employees Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 112(1) and Veterans Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) s 125. 299 The impact of the offences of maintenance and champerty to the development and recognition of the assignment of choses in action has already been mentioned and has been well documented: see [2.09]. See further PH Winfield, “Assignment of Choses in Action in Relation to Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 143; PH Winfield, “The History of Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 50; OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 46–9; A Walters, “A Modern Doctrine of Champerty” (1996) 112 LQR 560 at 561. For a statement setting out the reasons for the demise of the law’s concern with the offences of maintenance and champerty insofar as they were used to maintain discipline, protect litigants and uphold the impartiality of the legal system see Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 at 153 per Lord Mustill. 300 Although the criminal offences in relation to maintenance and champerty as well as the torts have been abolished in most jurisdictions, this has not affected any rule which treats a contract as contrary to public policy: see Criminal Law Act 1967 (Eng) s 13(1) and (2). Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 (ACT) s 68; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 151A; Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 1993 (NSW) ss 3 and 4; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 32; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 322A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) sch 11. In Western Australia the common law of maintenance and champerty still applies. See also Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 at 695 per Lord Wilberforce and 702 per Lord Roskill; Monk v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 148 at 151 per Cohen J; Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577 at 605 per Byrne J; Re Motivor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440 at 445 per Drummond J. 301 Martell v Consent Iron Co Ltd [1955] 1 Ch 363 at 416–7 per Jenkins LJ. See also Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd [1999] 2 AC 1 (interest of shareholder in outcome of proceedings of company). See also Re Daley; Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 8 Australian Corporations and Securities Reports (ACSR) 395 and cf Monk v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 148.
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Hence, at least where the common law of maintenance and champerty applies, references are sometimes made to lawful and unlawful maintenance.302 Champerty is a form of wrongful maintenance where the supporter not only wrongfully helps maintain the suit but does so for a share in the proceeds.303 It follows that champerty requires maintenance.304 However, to attract a public policy prohibition an agreement has only to savour of wrongful maintenance or champerty.305 Moreover, because this area is driven by public policy, what amounts to “wrongful” maintenance or champerty has changed over time.306 An agreement savouring of wrongful maintenance or champerty is against public policy and therefore unenforceable. An assignment savouring of wrongful maintenance or champerty is ineffective. The practical issue is to determine when an assignment savours of maintenance or champerty. There may have been moments in the past when it was thought that the multiplication of suits alone was something to be feared. In that environment any agreement savouring of maintenance or champerty would be unenforceable because it could have that result. This would not be the case today when an overriding policy concern is access to justice. 302 See Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139 at 151 per Templeman J (see also Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2004) 29 WAR 479 and Clairs Keeley v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86). 303 It does not require an undertaking to carry on the suit: see Ball v Warwick (1881) 50 LJQB 382 and compare Rees v De Bernardy [1896] 2 Ch 437. See further the definitions collected throughout the decision in British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store Service Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006 and see especially at 1012 per Cozens-Hardy MR and at 1013 per Fletcher Moulton LJ. See also Awwad v Geraghty & Co [2001] QB 570 and Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] 1 Ch 363 at 399 per Jenkins LJ. See further Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 at 161; First City Corporation v Downsview Nominees Ltd [1989] 3 NZLR 710 at 754 per Gault J ([1990] 3 NZLR 265, CA; [1993] AC 295, PC); Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440 at 445 per Drummond J; Clyne v The New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186. 304 See Thai Trading Co v Taylor [1998] QB 781 at 788 per Millett LJ. See also Hartley v Russell (1825) 2 Sim & St 244, 57 ER 339; Haseldine v Hosken [1933] 1 KB 822 at 831 per Scrutton LJ; Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139 at 151 per Templeman J (see also Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2004) 29 WAR 479 and Clairs Keeley v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86). Quaere whether the extension of champerty to cover the purchase of a mere right of action allows for the recognition of champerty where maintenance is not contemplated: see County Hotel and Wine Co v London & NW Railway [1918] 2 KB 251 at 258; Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 at 153 per Lord Mustill. See also, as to whether champerty is a species of maintenance or an aggravated form of maintenance, PH Winfield, “The History of Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 50 at 57. The notion that it may be an aggravated form of maintenance has led to comments to the effect that a lawful justification for maintenance will not necessarily excuse champerty. This is no longer the law. Anything justifying maintenance will also justify champerty: see below n 324 and see YL Tan, “Champertous Contracts and Assignments” (1990) 106 LQR 656 at 657. 305 Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 371 per Cozens-Hardy LJ. 306 Some of the most important changes concern the conduct of litigation: see Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142; Thai Trading Co v Taylor [1998] QB 781; Bevan Ashford v Geoff Yeandle (Contractors) Ltd [1999] Ch 239; Smits v Roach (2004) 60 NSWLR 711. Cf Hughes v Kingston Upon Hull City Council [1999] QB 1193; Awwad v Geraghty & Co [2000] QB 570. See also R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (No 8) [2003] QB 381; Thornley v Lang [2004] 1 WLR 378; Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 166; Project 28 Pty Ltd v Barr [2005] NSWCA 240; QPSX Ltd v Ericsson Australia Pty (No. 3) (2005) 219 ALR 1. See further GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 431.
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In any case, generally, the fact that a party to a suit was being maintained was not a defence to the action unless there was an abuse of process or a risk to the administration of justice, in which case a stay might have been granted.307 However, if the right the plaintiff sought to enforce was founded on an agreement for champerty it would be unenforceable. Thus, if the plaintiff was an assignee, the assignment was a champertous agreement and the assignee had no other legitimate interest in the suit then the assignment would be ineffective; there would then be consequent repercussions for the efficacy of the suit.308 When the tort of maintenance existed it might allow the successful party to the action to sue the maintainer for costs if the other party to the action could not pay the costs. However, it was necessary to evidence loss or damage by reason of the maintenance. Maintenance and champerty can also impact on third parties. For instance, although a solicitor can conduct litigation despite having knowledge that his or her client has entered into a champertous agreement, the solicitor may not be able to recover costs if the solicitor actively participated in the agreement, even though they are not a party to the agreement.309 The most well known example of an assignment savouring of champerty was the assignment of a bare right of action.310 Such an assignment was considered champertous even though the maintenance component of champerty was not automatically made out. However, an assignment of a cause of action may savour of maintenance or champerty because it may be given in recognition for the support of litigation or for the purposes of commencing or continuing a suit that the assignor may not have commenced; in short it may be the result of intermeddling in the disputes of others or may be for the purposes of stiring up litigation. Generally, a person will have a bare right to litigate where the right is not related to or dependent on any property, or where that person does not have the underlying 307 See Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] 1 Ch 363; Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577 at 608; Freehill Hollingdale & Page v Bandwill Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 150 para 25; Bandwill Pty Ltd v Spencer-Laitt (2000) 23 WAR 390; Quach v Huntof Pty Ltd (2000) Motor Vehicle Reports 263; Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139 (see also Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2004) 29 WAR 479 and Clairs Keeley v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86). See further Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 166. 308 But this was not relevant if the plaintiff had a legal right against a defendant which was independent of any collateral illegal arrangement with a third party: see Carpenter v Boyce (1896) 22 VLR 248 at 253; Laurent v Sale & Co [1963] 1 WLR 829. 309 Re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [1963] 1 Ch 199. See also Re Thomas Jaquess v Thomas [1894] 1 QB 747; Wild v Simpson [1919] 2 KB 544. See also Wood v Downes (1811) 18 Ves 120, 34 ER 263. 310 See generally on bare rights Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481, 160 ER 196; May v Lane (1894) 64 LJQB 236; Torkington v Magee [1903] 1 KB 644; Dawson v Great Northern & City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260; Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474; Defries v Milne [1913] 1 Ch 98; City Hotel & Wine Company v L & NWR Railway Company [1918] KB 251; Laurent v Sale & Co [1963] 1 WLR 829; Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101 at 119–21 per Roskill J; Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1980] QB 629 at 656 per Lord Denning MR ([1982] AC 679, HL); Poulton v Commonwealth (1953) 89 CLR 540 at 602 per Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ; Re Timothy’s Pty Ltd and Companies Act [1981] 2 NSWLR 706 at 710 per Needham J.
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property which the cause of action seeks to protect. For example, a cause of action in tort for personal injury is a bare right to litigate. An action for breach of contract, at least where the claim is for an unliquidated sum, is another example.311 Where the right of action protected some underlying property and where the assignment transferred that property then the assignment did not involve a bare right of action. Moreover, in such a case the assignee’s interest in the underlying property was usually sufficient to protect the assignment from being rendered ineffective by reason of maintenance or champerty.312 For example, a tenant with a right to sue a landlord for the breach of a lease covenant has as interest in the lease which is more than a bare right. Similarly, a person who has a right to bring an action for conversion of a cheque will have an interest in the instrument. However, if the tenant or holder were merely to assign the right to sue and keep back the proprietary interest in the lease or cheque, he or she would be assigning a bare right of action. If the assignee took an interest in the lease or cheque he or she was more likely to be immune from any claim of maintenance or champerty. Similarly, the purchaser of real or personal property could take an assignment of an action for breach of contract in relation to that property.313 However, this assignment of underlying property together with the right of action worked only if the property was not transferred solely for the purpose of bringing the cause of action or solely for the purpose of obtaining the cause of action.314 Thus, motive would appear to have been relevant315 and an assignment of property prior to any suit being commenced was more likely to be upheld than an assignment of property once the suit was on foot. Moreover, although it was possible to assign a right to damages for breach of covenant if there was, in addition, a conveyance of property to which the suit was incidental, that conveyance would not help if the action was for tortious waste.316 Other interests were also recognised as being sufficient to avoid claims of maintenance or champerty. However, it was not clear where the line was drawn.317 A 311 See the discussion in County Hotel and Wine Co v London & NW Railway [1918] 2 KB 251 at 258–61 per McCardie J. See also May v Lane (1894) 64 LJQB 236; Torkington v Magee [1903] 1 KB 644, and see [2.02]. 312 See Monk v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (1994) 34 NSWLR 148 at 151 per Cohen J. See also Re Kenneth Wright Distributors Pty Ltd [1973] VR 161; Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337. 313 Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399. 314 Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C 481, 160 ER 196; Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399 at 412–13 per Scrutton LJ. See also Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 at 703 per Lord Roskill; Williams v Protheroe (1829) 5 Bing 309, 130 ER 1080; Re Cambrian Mining Co (1882) 48 LT 114; First City Corporation v Downsview Nominees Ltd [1989] 3 NZLR 710 at 754 per Gault J ([1990] 3 NZLR 265 CA; [1993] 3 All ER 626 PC). Cf De Hoghton v Money (1866) 2 LR Ch App 164. See further Castellain v Preston (1882) 8 QBD 617 and see Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474 at 490 per Parker J. 315 See PH Winfield, “Assignment of Choses in Action in relation to Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 143 at 149–51. Cf OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 53. See further [6.64]. 316 See Defries v Milne [1913] 1 Ch 98. 317 See the remarks of Parker J in Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474 at 490.
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creditor of the assignor might have a sufficient interest. Instead of relying on its right of subrogation, an insurer could take an assignment of a cause of action in tort after compensating the insured.318 That is, it was proper for an insurer to take an assignment to support and enlarge that which it had already acquired by way of subrogation.319 Moreover, where the insurer was potentially liable to the insured, it was not maintenance for the insurer to fund the insured’s litigation against a third party due to the insurer’s substantial pecuniary interest in the result.320 It was also held that a mortgage of a suit for the purposes of putting the mortgagor in funds to pursue his or her suit was not champertous.321 Exceptions were also made for common interests,322 charity323 and family ties.324 If the right of action arose out of some other right that was assigned prior to the right of action coming into existence, then the assignee could exercise that right without any question of the assignment savouring of maintenance or champerty. For example, if a person took the assignment of a contractual right prior to any breach of contract that assignee could later sue if there was a breach of contract by the obligor. Certain rights were considered property rights in themselves and not bare rights, and these could be assigned.325 The principal example was a debt.326 Thus, it is said that the prohibition on the assignment of bare causes of action does not 318 King v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [1896] AC 250; Compania Columbiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101. 319 See Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 at 703 per Lord Roskill. See also Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101. 320 Schultz v The Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp Ltd (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 153. 321 See Cockell v Taylor (1851) 15 Beav 103, 51 ER 475. Cf OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 54–5. See also Morrison v Young (1872) 3 VR (L) 35 (distinguishing the improper mortgage of a right to litigate from a mortgage of an interest in an existing suit). See further Anderson v Radcliffe (1858) EL BL & EL 806, 120 ER 710. 322 See the judgment of Danckwerts J in Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] 1 Ch 363 (affirmed [1955] Ch 363: see especially at 416–19 per Jenkins LJ suggesting that the common interest exception was subsumed into a business exception). See also Wood v The Freehold United Quartz Mining Co Registered (1870) 1 VR (Eq) 168; Plating Co v Farquharson (1881) 17 Ch D 49; Bradlaugh v Newdegate (1883) 11 QBD 1 at 11 per Lord Coleridge CJ; Alabaster v Harness [1895] 1 QB 339; Greig v National Amalgamated Union of Shop Assistants (1906) 22 TLR 274; Neville v London “Express” Newspaper Ltd [1919] AC 368 at 389 per Viscount Haldane; Holden v Thompson [1907] 2 KB 489; Schulz v The Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp Ltd (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 153; Baker v Jones [1954] 1 WLR 1005. 323 See Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] 1 Ch 363 at 387 per Danckwerts J (cf [1955] 1 Ch 363 at 421 per Jenkins LJ and 427 per Hodson LJ). See also Stevens v Keogh (1946) 72 CLR 1 at 12 per Latham CJ; Brew v Whitlock [1967] VR 449; Condliffe v Hislop [1996] 1 WLR 753. 324 See Hutley v Hutley (1873) LR 8 QB 112 (however it has been suggested that the comment made in this case to the effect that an interest which may justify maintenance does not necessarily justify champerty is no longer good law: see Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440). See also Guy v Churchill (1888) 40 Ch D 481; Cole v Booker (1913) 29 TLR 295. 325 Cockell v Taylor (1852) 15 Beav 103 at 117, 51 ER 475 at 481. See further RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 6.480. 326 Comfort v Betts [1891] 1 QB 737; Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364. See also County Hotel and Wine Co v London & N W Railway [1918] 2 KB 251 at 258–60 per McCardie J.
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apply to debts.327 This is so even if litigation is necessary to enforce the debt and even if the assignor retains some interest in the proceeds of the litigation. However, at the same time it has been said that if the object of a transaction was that of unlawful maintenance or champerty, then the transaction would not be saved by dressing it up as the assignment of a debt.328 In addition to these exceptions, equity early on rejected any necessary link between assignment and maintenance and champerty.329 The efficacy of equitable assignments was dependent on adopting this view. As noted earlier, in the case of an equitable assignment of a legal right the action was brought in the name of the assignor in the common law courts. The assignee could, after giving an indemnity as to costs, obtain an order forcing the assignor to lend its name to that action if the assignor did not volunteer this. In short the assignee maintained the action, but its underlying interest was sufficient to negate any claim of unlawful maintenance; moreover the indemnity was required to prevent the action being held to be an abuse of process, the abuse arising by reason of the nominal plaintiff being unable to pay the costs of the successful party. In addition, equity accepted the legitimacy of assigning the fruits of the action, whether by way of security or outright sale.330 Such an assignment is contingent upon a successful outcome to proceedings. The property the subject of the assignment does not exist until a judgment is given. The assignee will usually have no right to interfere in the litigation in any way nor insist on the action being carried on.331 However, if, in addition to the assignment of the fruits of the action, the assignee has a right to interfere with or participate in the litigation, the assignment may be invalid if it constitutes what would be considered today as a wrongful intermeddling in litigation imperilling the interests of the defendant or an unacceptable risk to the administration of justice.332 It is here that defining maintenance and champerty by 327 Camdex International Ltd v Bank of Zambia [1996] 1 WLR 864; Re Daley; Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 8 ACSR 395. See also Gould v Skinner [1983] 1 Qd R 377; Hauber v The Halifax Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1940] SASR 341 (judgment debts). 328 In determining the efficacy of an assignment of a debt it is necessary to consider any other rights assigned along with the debt: see eg Re Paris Skating Rink Co (1877) 5 Ch D 959. 329 The mere fact that an assignee may choose to enforce a right when the assignor would not does not necessarily lead to an improper maintenance of an action. The mere possibility of litigation being increased by recognising assignment is not of itself sufficient. See also Wood v Griffith (1818) 1 SW 43 at 55–6, 36 ER 291 at 295–6. 330 Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 at 702 per Lord Roskill and Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474. See also Davis v Freethy (1890) 24 QBD 519. The assignment of the proceeds of insurance policies is another example of a transaction that has been generally immune from a claim of maintenance: see Aron v Miall [1929] 98 LJKB 204. 331 See Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474. 332 It was also held that if the purchaser of the fruits of an action gives the seller an indemnity against costs the agreement may be impeached as savouring of maintenance: see the discussions of the conflicting cases on this point by PH Winfield, “Assignment of Choses in Action in relation to Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 143 at 155–6 and OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 55–6.
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reference to intermeddling tends to blur the line between maintenance and champerty and abuse of process. Maintenance and champerty may result in a stay being granted for an abuse of process, but arguably are only factors to be taken into account and are not of themselves conclusive.333 The ability to interfere in litigation and/or keep out of the reach of court procedure is perhaps more important to determining whether a stay ought to be granted than determining the legitimacy of any maintenance. Much will depend on the circumstances, and it may be necessary to keep distinct the situation where a third party simply maintains a suit and where the third party takes an assignment of the suit. An assignee taking an assignment of a bare cause of action without justification may be said to be intermeddling in the affairs of others. That lack of interest would be sufficient to impugn the assignment; that is because the plaintiff assignee will be seeking to enforce a right it obtained from a champertous assignment. The intermeddling may be sufficient to warrant a stay, although the assignee would clearly be subject to court procedures. But quaere the extent to which the defendant ought to be able to raise the efficacy of the assignment in requesting a stay. Should that be a matter that concerns only the assignor and assignee? Clearly the court would not want to enforce an agreement that is at odds with public policy. For the most part these issues can be put to one side.334 The concern here is only with the efficacy of the assignment, and that generally will depend on whether the assignee has what is considered today as a sufficient interest. This is discussed in detail below. However, it may be noted that even with a sufficient interest, if the assignee takes an assignment of a cause of action for an improper motive, such as to traffic in litigation for a profit, the assignment will be ineffective. [6.60] When does an issue of maintenance or champerty arise? As already noted, although the criminal offences and torts of maintenance and champerty have been abolished, this has not affected any rule that treats a contract as contrary to public policy. Thus, an assignment may still be set aside for savouring of maintenance or champerty. In the assignment context, the issue of maintenance or champerty arises where there is an assignment of a bare cause of action, where the assignee seeks to make a profit from the suit,335 where the assignee has some interest in sums recovered in the suit and where the assignee can take over the litigation.336 However, the fact that a transaction such as an assignment may increase litigation is itself not sufficient to raise an issue of maintenance or champerty unless combined with other factors.337 As noted earlier, today an overriding policy 333
[6.66]. See further ibid. 335 See further [6.64]. 336 However, this is less likely to raise an issue of maintenance or champerty if the interests of the assignor and assignee do not diverge: see Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142. 337 See ibid. 334
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concern is that of access to justice, the third party funding of litigation and the resulting promotion of suits that may otherwise not have come to court is an important element in providing that access.338 Although an assignee commencing a claim in its own name may not necessarily be seen as providing the assignor with access to justice, the mere fact that the assignee might pursue the claim when the assignor would not is not in itself a strong reason for staying the action. [6.61] The requirement of a sufficient interest by way of a “genuine commercial interest” or a “genuine and substantial interest”. An assignment of a right of action will not savour of wrongful maintenance or champerty if the assignee has a sufficient interest in the suit.339 The ownership of the chose in action that results from the assignment is not a sufficient interest; the assignment may be no more than a method by which a third party funder of the litigation takes over the litigation and subordinates the interest of the assignor. The required interest will, of course, be made out if the assignee takes an assignment of the property which the cause of action is incidental to. Thus, no issue of illegitimate maintenance or champerty will arise in the case of an assignment of the benefit of a contract prior to there being any breach of contract. However, in the case of assignments of bare rights of action, although a sufficient interest may still be made out by charity, common interest or family ties (at least to the extent that these grounds still have an independent existence), the modern formulation of a sufficient interest is that of a “genuine and substantial interest” or a “genuine commercial interest”. These expressions derive from the decision of the House of Lords in Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse 340 and have been the subject of much litigation.341 338
See Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 166 at 185–7 per Mason P. Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399 at 406 per Bankes LJ. 340 [1982] AC 679 at 694 per Lord Wilberforce (genuine and substantial interest required), at 703 per Lord Roskill (genuine commercial interest required). Although the decision in Trendtex is the leading authority, the notion of a commercial or business interest was first authoritatively stated in Martell v Consent Iron Co Ltd [1955] 1 Ch 363. The High Court of Australia has yet to determine whether the principles adopted in Trendtex form part of Australian law, cf Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 179 CLR 155 at 173 per Mason CJ. Nevertheless, as the cases in n 342 below suggest, there is a considerable number of decisions of lower courts that have applied these principles and it is relatively safe to suggest that these principles or some analogous principle will be applied to determine the legitimacy of assignments of contractual claims. As regards choses in action arising from torts the relevance of the Trendtex principles in Australia is more problematic: see [6.62]. 341 Eg Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142; Kaukomarkkinat O/Y v “Elbe” Transport-Union GmbH (The Kelo) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 85; Brownton Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499; Bourne v Colodense Ltd [1985] ICR 291; Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440; First City Corporation Ltd v Downsview Nominees [1989] 3 NZLR 710 ([1990] 3 NZLR 265, CA; [1993] 3 All ER 626, PC); Tharros Shipping Co Ltd v Bias Shipping Ltd (1995) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 541; McFarlane v E E Calendonia Ltd (No 2) [1995] 1 WLR 366; Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577; Monk v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group (1994) 34 NSWLR 148; National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 514; Commonwealth v Ling (1993) 118 ALR 309; Beatty v Brashs Pty Ltd (1995) 13 Australian Company Law Cases (ACLC) 925; Re Daley; Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 8 Australian Corporations and Securities Reports (ACSR) 395; Jeffree v NCSC (1989) 15 Australian Company Law Reports (ACLR) 217; Re Timothy’s Pty Ltd and the Companies 339
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In that case, Trendtex was contracted to supply cement to an English company. Payment was to be by a letter of credit issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria. Trendtex was financed by Credit Suisse with repayments being made from payments received under the letter of credit. The Central Bank of Nigeria repudiated its obligations under the letter of credit, leaving Trendtex with no way of paying Credit Suisse. Trendtex commenced an action against the bank in November 1975. However, Trendtex had no real way of funding that litigation. If Credit Suisse wanted to be paid it had only one option, namely, to guarantee all the costs incurred by Trendtex in its action against the Bank.342 This it did in November 1975. Later, on 6 September 1976, Trendtex assigned to Credit Suisse (by way of security) all its claims against the English cement company, “until the claims of the assignee are covered”. In addition, on 26 November 1976, to the extent of Trendtex’s indebtedness to Credit Suisse, it “surrendered” (by way of security) its claim against the Bank. Trendtex was successful in its action in the Court of Appeal. However, an appeal to the House of Lords was lodged. In an attempt to settle the matter, on 4 January 1978, Trendtex entered into an agreement with Credit Suisse which recited inter alia, that Trendtex was indebted to Credit Suisse for US$1,500,000, that Credit Suisse would attempt to recover that sum by negotiating a settlement with the bank, that Credit Suisse had received an offer from a third party to buy Trendtex’s claim for US$800,000, that Trendtex would release to Credit Suisse all its residual rights against the Bank and that Trendtex was not opposed to that sale. Credit Suisse then assigned the cause of action to the third party for US$1,100,000. Soon after this the matter settled for US$8,000,000. The third party made a profit of US$6,900,000. Trendtex (the assignor) claimed that the agreement of 4 January 1978 should be set aside as savouring of maintenance or champerty. The House of Lords, although granting a stay to Credit Suisse on the basis that the agreement of 4 January 1978 was governed by Swiss law and its efficacy was to be determined by a Swiss court, held that under English law, despite the sufficiency of Credit Suisse’s interest in the litigation, the agreement of 4 January 1978 was void. Act [1981] 2 NSWLR 706; Pickering v Sogex Services (UK) Ltd (1982) 20 BLR 66; J C Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 314; South East Thames Regional Health Authority v Y J Lovell (London) Ltd (1985) 32 Building Law Reports (BLR) 127; In the Marriage of Sheehan (1990) 97 Federal Law Reports (FLR) 190; Lovell v Western Australian Police Union of Workers [1991] Aust Torts R 68,575; Government Insurance Office (NSW) v K A Reed Services Pty Ltd [1998] VR 829; South Australian Management Corp v Sheahan (1995) 16 ACSR 45; Gore v Justice Corporation Pty Ltd (2002) 189 ALR 712; Rickard Constructions v Rickard Hails Moretti [2004] NSWSC 1041; Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 166; Project 28 Pty Ltd v Barr [2005] NSWCA 240. See also Laurent v Sale & Co [1963] 1 WLR 829 (approved by Lord Wilberforce in Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 at 695); In re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [1963] 1 Ch 199, (approved by Lord Wilberforce in Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 at 695); Martell v Consent Iron Co Ltd [1955] 1 Ch 363; Poulton v Commonwealth (1953) 89 CLR 540. See further C Campbell, “An Examination of the Champertous Assignment of Bare Causes of Action” (1999) 27 Australian Business Law Review (ABLR) 142. 342 See also Total Liban SAL v Vitol Energy SA [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 700.
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Lord Wilberforce, with whom Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Roskill agreed, expressed the necessary interest as a “genuine and substantial” interest. He said that if the only parties involved had been Trendtex and Credit Suisse there could be no question of the agreement being invalid for maintenance or champerty because of Credit Suisse’s genuine and substantial interest in the success of the litigation; it had guaranteed the costs of the litigation, taken a security interest in the litigation or its proceeds, and accepted a surrender of Trendtex’s residual interest. The vice, however, was the appearance on the face of the document of the possibility of the cause of action being sold to a third party. This, he said, “manifestly involved the possibility, and indeed the likelihood, of a profit being made, either by the third party or possibly also by Credit Suisse, out of the cause of action”. He continued, “in my opinion this manifestly “savours of champerty”, since it involves trafficking in litigation—a type of transaction which, under English law, is contrary to public policy”.343 One might question his emphasis on the “possibility” of a further assignment. Most choses in action assigned to assignees are capable of further assignment and that mere possibility of assigning to someone who may not have a sufficient interest should not generally impact on the efficacy of the initial assignment. Here, however, the whole purpose of the settlement agreement was in fact to give effect to that possibility, which was expressed on the face of the document. Lord Roskill, with whom Lord Edmund-Davies and Lord Keith of Kinkel agreed, expressed the necessary interest as a “genuine commercial” interest. In stating that the rule that one cannot assign a bare right to litigate was not dead,344 he said:345 [A]n assignee who can show that he has a genuine commercial interest in the enforcement of the claim of another and to that extent takes an assignment of that claim to himself is entitled to enforce that assignment unless by the terms of that assignment he falls foul of our law of champerty, . . . If the assignment is of a property right or interest and the cause of action is ancillary to that right or interest, or if the assignee had a genuine commercial interest in taking the assignment and in enforcing it for his own benefit, I can see no reason why the assignment should be struck down as an assignment of a bare cause of action or as savouring of maintenance.
He held the settlement agreement to be champertous. It was not an agreement to recoup Credit Suisse’s losses; its object was to allow for the cause of action to be sold to a third party for the purposes of the third party making a profit from it. He concluded that such “an agreement . . . offends for it was a step towards the sale of a bare cause of action to a third party who had no genuine commercial interest in the claim in return for a division of the spoils”.346 It follows from this that an 343 344 345 346
[1982] AC 679 at 694. Ibid, at 703. Ibid. Ibid, at 704.
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assignment to an assignee with a genuine commercial interest can still savour of maintenance or champerty if the assignment is construed as not being given for the purpose of protecting that commercial interest but rather to profit from and traffic in litigation. More generally, despite a legitimate interest, if there still exists an unacceptable risk to the administration of justice the assignment will be ineffective.347 [6.62] The meaning of “genuine and substantial interest” and “genuine commercial interest”. As already noted, the meaning of “genuine and substantial interest” and “genuine commercial interest” has been the subject of much litigation, not all of it involving assignments. The expressions are probably not meant to be interpreted as legislative terms.348 If it were otherwise there would be a conflict between them with Lord Roskill’s “genuine commercial interest” being a narrower formulation. The better view may be that he used the word “commercial” because of the commercial nature of the Trendtex case. The “commercial interest” formulation is not dependent upon a commercial transaction. For example, in Bourne v Colodense Ltd,349 the plaintiff’s union agreed to finance an action against the defendant. The action failed and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs. This order was made on the understanding that the union was financing the action. The union refused to pay and the defendant petitioned for a receiver to be appointed to the plaintiff to take proceedings to enforce the plaintiff’s rights against the union. It was held that the defendant had a commercial interest in the enforcement of the plaintiff’s rights otherwise he or she would be left with a worthless order for costs. That commercial interest was sufficient to protect him or her from any claim of champerty because there was no attempt to get out of the union any more than what the defendant was entitled to under the order for costs.350 It follows that what amounts to a sufficient interest will be context-specific. For example, with respect to governments, it has been said that the interest required is that of a genuine and substantial governmental interest.351 Often, as in Trendtex, the interest will arise because the assignee’s only chance of being paid a debt or damages owed to it by the assignor is to help maintain the assignor’s action against a third party. However, it is not necessary for the assignee 347 See Bandwill Pty Ltd v Spencer-Laitt (2000) 23 WAR 390; Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139 (see also Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2004) 29 WAR 479 and Clairs Keeley v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86). See also Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Cridlands Pty Ltd (2003) 134 Federal Court Reports (FCR) 474 (assignment requiring assignor to give particular evidence in court). See further [6.65]. 348 See Brownton Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499 at 505 per Sir John Megaw, discussed below. 349 [1985] ICR 291. 350 It has been suggested that this case leads to the conclusion that a commercial interest is not based upon the relationship of the parties nor on the type of transaction between them, but rather the motivation for taking the assignment: see YL Tan, “Champertous Contracts and Assignments” (1990) 106 LQR 656 at 664. 351 Commonwealth v Ling (1993) 118 ALR 309.
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to be in the position of suffering some loss for a sufficient interest to arise. For example, in The Kelo,352 a shipper’s agent took possession of goods for the consignee. The goods were damaged and the consignee assigned its right of action against the shipowners to the agent. It was held that the agent had a genuine commercial interest in the discharge and delivery of the goods because he or she habitually acted as agent for the consignee and it made commercial sense for him or her to deal with these types of claim as a legitimate part of their business activity. The assignee must have an interest “in the assignor or its business affairs or activities which the assignment may in some way protect”.353 Thus, the extent of the assignment must correspond with the interest that that assignment protects. The interest cannot derive from the assignment itself.354 That is, the concept of a “genuine and substantial interest” or a “genuine commercial interest” “does not embrace an interest arising from an arrangement voluntarily entered into by the assignee of which the impugned assignment is an essential part. . . . Rather the expression refers to a commercial interest which exists already or by reason of other matters, and which receives ancillary support from the assignment”.355 These expressions are helpful where the interest flows from some transaction such as in the Trendtex case. In that case there was a clear interest as Credit Suisse was a substantial creditor of the assignor with a right to enforce the debt at the time of the assignment.356 Without the assignment, it had no chance of being paid. Even more directly, Credit Suisse provided the finance that allowed Trendtex to perform its obligations under the supply contracts. However, in some cases the interest may be in the litigation357 In Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims,358 Drummond J said of an interest in litigation:359 [I]f an interest in litigation is to be sufficient to justify its maintenance by an outsider, including its maintenance in circumstances that involve champerty, that it be an interest in the litigation separate from the benefit the outsider seeks to derive from his support 352
Kaukomarkkinat O/Y v “Elbe” Transport-Union GmbH (The Kelo) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 85. Monk v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group (1994) 34 NSWLR 148. 354 National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 514 at 540. See further Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363 at 415–16 per Jenkins LJ; Rickard Constructions v Rickard Hails Moretti [2004] NSWSC 1041. See also Project 28 Pty Ltd v Barr [2005] NSWCA 240 at para 41 per Ipp JA (“[The interest] must be distinct from the benefit that the person supporting the action seeks to derive from the litigation. It must be something beyond a mere personal interest in profiting from the outcome of proceedings”). 355 National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 514 at 540–1. 356 See also Re Timothy’s Pty Ltd [1981] 2 NSWLR 706; Monk v Australian and New Zealand Bank Group Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 148 at 153. 357 Eg Kaukomarkkinat O/Y v “Elbe” Transport-Union GMBH (The Kelo) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 85. 358 Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440, discussed further at [6.64]. See also Giles v Thompson [1994] AC 142 at 163 and Beatty v Brashs Pty Ltd [1998] 2 VR 201. 359 (1996) 19 ACSR 440 at 446. 353
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for the litigation. If the agreement to assist another’s litigation could itself provide an interest by the outsider in the litigation sufficient to take the agreement out of the area of maintenance and champerty, the rule against maintenance and champerty could always be easily circumvented.
In determining the existence of a sufficient interest, the transaction must be looked at as a whole.360 In addition, the assignment must be characterised at the time of the assignment.361 It is not necessary for the interest of the assignee to derive out of the same contract as that of the assignor and obligor. It is sufficient if the interest derives from the same transaction. Thus, if A sells goods to B in circumstances where A is in breach of contract and B is obliged under a separate contract to sell the goods to C, then as part of that overall transaction C will have a sufficient interest in B’s rights against A especially if B is not in a position to pay damages to C.362 In Brownton Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd,363 A contracted with B for B to advise A as to the suitability of a computer system to be supplied by C. The system turned out to be unsuitable and A sued B (in contract and tort) and C (in contract). A and B settled out of court on terms that A would accept an amount paid by B into court as full settlement against both B and C provided that satisfactory arrangements could be made with C in respect of costs. C refused to forgo its costs and A and B agreed that A would accept the amount paid into court, B would indemnify A in respect of any claim by C for costs and A would assign to B its cause of action against C. B believed that its liability overlapped with C’s and damages recovered against C would reduce B’s liability.364 C claimed the assignment was champertous, arguing that although B had a genuine commercial interest in the litigation there was one head of damage in which no such interest existed. The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument, noting that the transaction must be looked at in its totality, and although the contracts between A and B and A and C were separate they were part of the same commercial transaction in which both B and C were sued in respect of the same damage. If C had properly performed its obligations it followed that B’s damages to A would be less. It did not matter that the pre-existing interest was a contingent liability, as opposed to a pre-existing debt which was the case in Trendtex. Whether that would have made a difference if the pre-existing interest arose out of a distinct transaction was left open. Sir John Megaw did not think that Lord Roskill’s statement in Trendtex to the effect “an assignee who can show that he has a genuine commercial interest in the 360 Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 at 164 per Lord Mustill; Brownton Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499; Kaukomarkkinat O/Y v “Elbe” Transport-Union GMBH (The Kelo) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 85; Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440. 361 Brownton Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499 at 509 per Lloyd LJ. See further [6.64]. 362 See Total Liban SA v Vitol Energy SA [2000] 1 All ER 267. 363 [1985] 3 All ER 499. 364 See now the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (Eng) which allows for contribution where liability is in respect of the “same damage” without regard to whether it arises in contract or tort.
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enforcement of the claim of another and to that extent takes an assignment of that claim”365 was to be taken literally. It is not necessary that the assignee’s commercial interest relate to every facet of the cause of action.366 B had a genuine commercial interest in reducing the amount it would have to pay in damages, and any sum recovered by A against C would reduce B’s liability to A, and this interest existed prior to the assignment. Nor did he take literally Lord Roskill’s statement that the assignee must have a “genuine commercial interest . . . in enforcing [the claim] for his own benefit”.367 The words “for his own benefit” he thought were clearly chosen because of the particular facts of the Trendtex case. Credit Suisse did not purchase the cause of action to “enforce” it at all but to re-sell it for someone else to “enforce” it for their own benefit. Here on the other hand B was clearly going to enforce the claim for B’s own benefit. Similarly in The Kelo,368 Staughton J concluded that these words were not to be taken literally and an assignee with a genuine commercial interest would not fall outside the Trendtex test merely because it enforced the assigned right for the benefit of the assignor. The interest must be more than a mere personal interest. For example, in Monk v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group,369 a company payee assigned to its directors (one of whom was Mr Monk) the right to bring an action for conversion against the bank in respect of certain cheques without any transfer of property rights in the cheques. The assignment was expressed to be limited to the choses in action the assignor might have against the defendant. The ANZ Bank at the time had a judgment against Mr Monk and a bankruptcy notice had been issued against him. Cohen J did not think that the obtaining of a judgment by Monk so as to enable him to satisfy the debt upon which his bankruptcy notice was based was a sufficient commercial interest. It was in reality a personal interest to obtain a debt he could use as a set-off against the judgment debt, and in that respect he was “in no stronger position than he would be if he had obtained an assignment of a cause of action for negligence by a customer of the Bank who claimed to have suffered injuries arising from unsafe premises”.370 He continued, “in the authorities where the Trendtex test has been applied, the commercial interest has gone beyond a mere personal interest in profiting from the outcome of the proceedings and has required an interest by the assignee in the assignor or its business affairs or activities which the assignment may in some way protect”.371
365
[1982] AC 679 at 703. [1985] 3 All ER 499 at 505. 367 [1982] AC 679 at 703. 368 Kaukomarkkinat O/Y v “Elbe” Transport-Union (The Kelo) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 85 at 89–90. 369 (1994) 34 NSWLR 148. In this case Re Daley; Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 8 ACSR 395 was distinguished on the basis that it involved an assignee who was the sole shareholder and who was also a guarantor of the assignor. 370 (1994) 34 NSWLR 148 at 153. 371 Ibid. 366
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Finally, the ability to claim a genuine and substantial interest or a genuine commercial interest as a defence to an allegation of maintenance or champerty may not be limited to actions concerning rights deriving from contracts and may extend to tort actions.372 [6.63] Liability for costs. Although a court can make a costs order against a third party maintainer,373 the fact that a maintainer is not liable for costs is not determinative of wrongful maintenance.374 Generally, a genuine commercial interest 372 See First City Corporation Ltd v Downsview Nominees [1989] 3 NZLR 710 ([1990] 3 NZLR 265, CA; [1993] 1 NZLR 513 PC). See also Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577 at 607 per Byrne J (here it was held that an employer has a legitimate commercial interest in maintaining a libel action brought by its employee on the basis that the employer, in that case, “rightly or wrongly, might see in the material complained of a threat to its own public image and effectiveness, in as much as its procedures were under criticism”; such an employer “might also see that it has a moral, if not a legal, obligation to protect its employees where they have been subjected to perceived hurt for the performance of their duties at its employees”.). Cf Monk v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group (1994) 34 NSWLR 148 at 152 (action in conversion) See further Brownton Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499; Beatty v Brashs Pty Ltd [1998] 2 VR 201; South Australian Management Corp v Sheahan (1995) 16 ACSR 45 at 57–8; National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 514 at 538–9; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Cridlands Pty Ltd (2003) 134 FCR 474. Despite some Australian authority suggesting that the principles of Trendtex may be applied to allow for the assignment of some types of tort action, the prior decision of the High Court in Poulton v Commonwealth (1953) 89 CLR 540 at 602 (obiter) held that such actions could not be assigned, and for the present this must remain the position. See further Rickard Constructions v Rickard Hails Moretti [2004] NSWSC 1041 paras 43–54, and see Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 179 CLR 155 at 173 per Mason CJ. 373 Eg Gore v Justice Corporation Pty Ltd (2002) 189 ALR 712. See also Project 28 Pty Ltd v Barr [2005] NSWCA 240 para 101. 374 See Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440 at 453. See also Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corp (1984) 52 ALR 176; Rajski v Computer Manufacture & Design Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 443; Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (in liq) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 253. In addition, an assignment is not invalid merely because it would deprive the defendant of the right to apply for security for costs which it would have been able to do if the assignor had continued the action: see Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd [1999] 2 AC 1. An application for a stay pending security for costs will usually be refused unless there is an abuse of process or a risk to the administration of justice. The usual course is to let the matter proceed and later make a costs order against the third party: see Abraham v Thompson [1997] 4 All ER 362; Hodges v State of New South Wales (1988) 77 ALR 1; Singh v Observer Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 751. If an abuse of process arises by reason of a third party maintainer not being liable for the costs of the successful defendant, this would not be cured by an order for security for costs from the nominal plaintiff: see Project 28 Pty Ltd v Barr [2005] NSWCA 240. See further as to orders for security for costs against a person who is maintained Farmer v Mosley Holdings Ltd [2001] 2 BCLC 572; Ramsey v Hartley [1977] 1 WLR 686; Condliffe v Hislop [1996] 1 All ER 431. Cf Magic Menu Systems Pty Ltd v AFA Facilitation Pty Ltd (1997) 142 ALR 198. See also Freehill Hollingdale & Page v Bandwill Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 150 para 25; Bandwill Pty Ltd v Spencer-Laitt (2000) 23 WAR 390; Quach v Huntof Pty Ltd [2000] Motor Vehicle Reports 263; Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139 at 151 per Templeman J (see also Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2004) 29 WAR 479 and Clairs Keeley v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86); Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 166. However, an assignee can be in no better position than the assignor, and if an assignor brings an action which for some reason fails, then an assignee’s action may be stayed pending payment of outstanding costs and struck out if costs are not paid: see Sinclair v British Telecommunications plc [2001] 1 WLR 38.
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will save an assignment from a claim of maintenance or champerty, there is no further requirement that there be liability for costs.375 However, if there is an inability to subject a maintainer to court procedure, this may be a relevant factor in determining whether proceedings ought to be stayed on the basis of an abuse of process. [6.64] Motivation for assignment. If an assignee does not have a sufficient interest in the suit, the fact that the assignee is acting out of good motives will not help him or her. For example, in National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd,376 an insurer paid out certain claims and took an assignment of causes of action because this offered it an advantage not available under contribution legislation. Without the assignment most actions would not have been litigated due to the small amounts involved. Despite this commendable behaviour, in paying out all claims the insurer had encouraged litigation the proceeds of which would all go to itself. Therefore the transaction was tainted with maintenance and champerty. The more important issue is whether or not a questionable motive is saved by a sufficient interest. The fact that an assignment is made to an assignee for the purposes of commencing or continuing an action is not of itself sufficient to impeach the assignment on the basis of public policy.377 Such assignments often occur where the assignor does not have sufficient funds to commence or continue litigation but where the assignee does.378 Such assignments, particularly assignments for the purpose of commencing litigation, appear to be intended to stir up litigation and are not necessarily aimed at providing access to justice when the assignee is taking over and benefiting from the litigation. Presumably the assignment itself is efficacious if a sufficient interest in the assignee can be found. It has been said that it would not be proper to take an assignment of a sum, said to be owing, on terms that the assignee would pay the assignor a proportion of any amount recovered, when the parties knew that the debt was contested and that proceedings would have to be initiated to enforce the debt and the assignee intended to conduct that litigation at his own risk and expense for no other purpose than obtaining a share in the spoils.379 Such a scenario clearly raises an issue of maintenance and champerty but arguably would be negated by evidence of a sufficient interest. 375 See Tharros Shipping Co Ltd v Bias Shipping Ltd [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 541 at 557. Cf McFarlane v E E Calendonia Ltd (No 2) [1995] 1 WLR 366. See also Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577; Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440 at 453. 376 (1995) 132 ALR 514. See also Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363; Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440. Cf Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142, discussed at [6.65]. 377 Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 (assignment of debt not invalid despite being for the ulterior purpose of allowing the assignee to make the debtor bankrupt). Cf JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413 . 378 Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd [1999] 2 AC 1. 379 See Laurent v Sale & Co [1963] 1 WLR 829.
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There can be little doubt that if an assignee has a legitimate interest in a suit and the extent of the assignment corresponds with the extent of that interest then the actual motivation for the assignment will not carry much weight in determining the legitimacy of the maintenance or champerty. For example, in Re Daley; Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd,380 the National Australia Bank had a judgment debt against the debtor and sought to take out a sequestration order for failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice. The debtor claimed he had a counterclaim, setoff or cross-demand exceeding the amount of the judgment debt. That counterclaim arose in the following manner; after judgment was obtained the debtor acquired all the issued share capital in a company which owned all the shares in another company; the debtor had introduced the latter company as a customer to the bank and had personally guaranteed its indebtedness to the bank. The debtor became a director of both companies which by the time of these proceedings had ceased trading. The companies had claims against the bank for wrongfully honouring cheques. The companies assigned to the debtor all their right, title and interest in the debts said to be owing from the Bank and the right to sue for the recovery of those debts. The consideration for the assignment was that the assignee was to fund the litigation and pay A$1.00. The assignee was to receive the benefit of any judgment given in favour of the assignor. The debtor gave an undertaking that he would cause the companies to release the Bank from payment of so much of any judgment entered against it in the proceedings as was equal to the debt he owed the Bank. He gave the court a further undertaking that the fruits of the action would be paid to the two companies, enabling the companies to pay their creditors. The Bank argued that the assignments were void as amounting to the assignment of bare causes of action. The clear purpose of the assignment was to allow the debtor to counterclaim against the Bank for a sum greater than he owed the Bank. Heerey J held that the assignments did not infringe the law of champerty and the assignee had a genuine commercial interest in the subject suit. He reasoned that the assignee was the sole beneficial shareholder of the companies and had guaranteed their liability. Commercial morality did not require the debtor to stand by and become bankrupt, with the result that the claims of the companies would not be pursued. There was no prejudice to other creditors of the companies, the companies could not pay their debts and the challenged assignments were the only way other creditors were likely to be paid.381 More fundamentally, the assignment concerned debts and the prohibition on assigning bare rights of action does not apply to debts. Nevertheless, despite the existence of what would otherwise be a legitimate interest in the suit, if the motivation for stirring up litigation is not to protect that 380
(1992) 8 ACSR 395. Cf Monk v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group (1994) 34 NSWLR
148. 381
Cf Jeffree v NCSC (1989) 15 ACLR 217.
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interest then that motivation may be taken into account and may render the assignment ineffective. For example, if a person has an interest in seeing that a contract is performed but nevertheless stirs up litigation and maintains a suit brought by the promisor under the contract not to protect that interest but rather to embarrass the other party to the suit and hopefully have that party wound up this would amount to wrongful maintenance; this would be particularly so if the funds provided to maintain the suit were repayable only if the suit was successful.382 Separately an issue of abuse of process may arise here. If the intention was to protect the maintainer’s commercial interest the method suggested may not be appropriate and it may be more acceptable to pay the promisor what he or she is owed under the contract and take an assignment of the cause of action against the promisee. Here, unless there is some threat to the administration of justice, the assignee is not necessarily stirring up litigation and is, in any case, as an assignee, amenable to court procedure.383 The issue of motivation is most likely to be raised when it appears that the assignee may make a profit from the suit. As a general statement, it may be said that if an assignee enters into an assignment for the sole purpose of making a profit from the litigation then the assignment will be set aside.384 For example, in Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims,385 the liquidator of a firm of chartered accountants entered into a “debt retrieval agreement” with an insurer which did not oblige the insurer to provide moneys to pursue claims, but rather permitted the liquidator to submit proposals to the insurer from time to time. The insurer had complete discretion to accept or reject a claim and, if accepted, to accept on any terms it thought fit. If the insurer decided to accept a proposal it was said to agree to provide “insurance”. The insurer did accept a proposal to provide insurance in respect of an action against the former directors of the firm. The relevant terms were that the insurer was to provide the necessary funds for the liquidator to be able to bring the action together with an indemnity against part of the costs if the action failed. In return, if the action was successful the insurer was to be both reimbursed and paid 12 per cent of the net proceeds. The insurer was also entitled to be involved in the conduct of the litigation. It was held that the insurance involved both maintenance and champerty. The insurer had no commercial interest in the litigation prior to the provision of insurance. Its sole interest was the opportunity to make a profit from supporting litigation and that interest derived from the insurance arrange382 See JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413 at 429–30 per McPherson J and cf Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364. 383 JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 413 at 429 per McPherson J. 384 See Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 and Quach v Huntof Pty Ltd [2000] Motor Vehicle Reports 263 (in both these cases hire companies did not seek merely to profit from litigation but rather made their profits from hiring out motor vehicles with the proceeds of litigation being used as one method of paying hire charges). 385 (1996) 19 ACSR 440.
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ment itself. Accepting that issues of maintenance and champerty are to be decided by taking the whole transaction into account, Drummond J said it was not legitimate to separate, for the purpose of suggesting there was an anterior interest, the “debt retrieval agreement” from the provision of “insurance” under the particular proposal. Moreover, the good motive of the insurer in providing funding to liquidators for the purpose of recovering monies that would not otherwise be recoverable was irrelevant. In addition to the above, it should be added that despite a genuine or commercial interest in the suit, if the assignee takes the assignment solely for the purpose of making or attempting to make a profit that motivation may impeach the assignment.386 However, the mere fact that an assignee may make a profit is not alone sufficient to impeach the assignment if it is backed up by a legitimate interest. That is, if an assignee with a legitimate interest takes an assignment the extent of which is commensurate with that interest and it turns out that the assignee is better off by reason of the assignment, this alone does not taint the assignment with champerty or maintenance. Thus, Sir John Megaw in Brownton Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd 387 said:388 An agreement to assign is not champertous merely because the assignee, or the assignor, or both has as a part of his genuine commercial interest the contemplation that he will be better off as a result. If, however, “contemplation of making a profit” is confined to such situations as existed in Trendtex where the assignee’s intention was, not himself to pursue the action, but to sell the cause of action for a higher price . . . there is obvious good reason why such a transaction may be regarded as champertous. . . . [I]f there were a prospect of some excessive profit, that might properly be a factor in deciding whether the commercial interest was genuine.
In this passage there is a suggestion that it is alright for the assignee to pursue the action and make a profit so long as the purpose is not to make a profit from a further “resale” of the assigned rights. However, this profit motive must form a legitimate part of the assignee’s genuine commercial interest.389 In the same case, 386 See Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 at 703–4 per Lord Roskill. Lord Wilberforce left open the question whether Credit Suisse (with its accepted genuine and substantial interest) would have been required to hand over surplus funds it received upon settlement if it had not assigned the cause of action to the third party. 387 [1985] 3 All ER 499. See also South East Thames Regional Health Authority v Y J Lovell (London) Ltd (1985) 32 BLR 127. 388 [1985] 3 All ER 499 at 506. 389 Presumably the possibility of profit would form part of the commercial interest of a receivables financier: see Camdex International Ltd v Bank of Zambia [1996] 1 WLR 864. Similarly litigation funders who contract with liquidators do so for profit: see Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139 at 155 per Templeman J (see also Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2004) 29 WAR 479 and Clairs Keeley v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86). However, that legitimate interest will not help if there is nevertheless an abuse of process, such as where a litigation financier is given control of proceedings over that of the liquidator: see Grovewood Holdings Plc v James Capel & Co Ltd [1995] Ch 80; Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1998] Ch 170.
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Lloyd LJ suggested that the ultimate basis for the decision in Trendtex was that the court could not determine whether the third party had a genuine commercial interest, and not the fact that Credit Suisse or the third party could derive a profit from the assignment. If that were not the case he thought it was difficult to reason why the House of Lords would have upheld the assignment if it went no further than Credit Suisse, subject to leaving open the question whether it could maintain any profit. He emphasised that the validity of any assignment must be judged at the time of the assignment. This is why the possibility of further assignment to an unknown third party is problematic. In making this point he did note that, “it would be difficult to tell at [the time of the assignment] whether the assignment would be likely to result in a profit, and if so how great” and “even in those cases where the size of the profit could be fortold with certainty, there would arise the question, necessarily uncertain, whether the profit was out of all proportion to the interest”.390 Perhaps Lloyd LJ would regard the extent of the profit as relevant to the genuiness of the interest claimed. [6.65] Protection from claims of maintenance and champerty outside sufficient interest. As noted above, it has always been possible to defeat an allegation of maintenance or champerty by having a sufficient interest, and that is how assignments are protected. The modern doctrine of a sufficient interest was set out in the Trendtex decision. However, in Giles v Thompson,391 Lord Mustill said that the tests laid down in that case were “addressed to transactions of the kind then before the House; they are not to be understood as if they had statutory force”.392 That statement must be read in the context of an earlier statement he made to the effect that the grounds for denying recognition of an assignment of a bare right of action had “achieved an independent life”.393 He reiterated that the public policy concern remains the protection of the purity of justice and the interests of vulnerable litigants.394 The reason for controlling maintenance and champerty in giving effect to that policy is the prevention of what today amounts to intermeddling in the disputes of others without legal justification and the stirring up of litigation without legal justification.395 All aspects of the transaction must therefore be investigated to determine whether there is such intermeddling or stirring up of litigation without a sufficient interest or legal justification. In Giles v Thompson, the plaintiffs were injured in motor accidents caused by the defendants. For the purposes of having access to a car while their cars were being 390
[1985] 3 All ER 499 at 509. [1994] 1 AC 142. 392 Ibid, at 164. 393 Ibid, at 153. 394 Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 at 164 per Lord Mustill. 395 Ibid, at 164 per Lord Mustill; see also Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440 at 445 per Drummond J. 391
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repaired, the plaintiffs hired cars from a hire company. The hire agreements provided that the hire company was to have the right to pursue the actions against the defendants in the plaintiffs’ names using solicitors of its choice. The hire charge was not payable until the outcome of the proceedings was known. If the proceedings were successful the hire charge was to be paid out of the damages. It was known in the insurance industry that if hire companies did not provide this type of transaction the number of claims for damages in respect of substitute vehicles would be quite low. In this case the hire companies funded the plaintiffs’ claims and pursued the actions, including a claim for damages in respect of the hire charges. The defendants claimed that the agreements were champertous or otherwise contrary to public policy. The court held that the agreements were not champertous. There was no “wanton and officious intermeddling” in the dispute between the motorists and the defendants. The company simply allowed the motorists to get on with the claim and awaited a favourable result. The motorists were merely required to press on with the claims, and the agreements made sure that appropriate funds reached the companies so as to discharge the hire charges; however the motorists were still under a personal obligation to pay the hire charges, and the companies were not in the position of having to look solely to the fruits of the action.396 In the result the hire companies still made their money out of hiring and not from profiting in litigation.397 There was no risk of exploiting motorists as the balance of the transaction was in favour of the motorist, as he or she was receiving professional and financial assistance to recover a valid claim that would otherwise go unsatisfied. [6.66] Maintenance and champerty and its relationship to stays for abuse of process. It was noted above that despite wide use of the principles set out in the Trendtex decision by Ausralian courts, the High Court of Australia has yet to rule on the application in Australia of those principles. Recently the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd,398 took the view that the ultimate question when determining whether or not a stay ought to 396 Cf Rees v De Bernardy [1896] 2 Ch 437. Quaere whether the result may have been different if the assignee were to look solely to the fruits of the litigation for payment and if motorists were required to press on with the claims: see National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 514. See also Fraser v Buckle [1996] 2 ILRM 34 at 38–9, approving a statement of Balyney J in McElroy v Flynn [1991] ILRM 294 (“I agree that a contract by a person to communicate information on terms of getting a share of any property that may thereby be recovered by the person to whom the information is to be given . . . is not champerty. . . . But if the arrangement come to is not merely that information shall be given, but also that the person who gives it and who is to share in what may be recovered shall himself recover the property or actively assist in the recovery of it . . . then I think the arrangement is contrary to the policy of the law and void”). See further D Capper, “A Modern Doctrine of a Champerty?-A Postscript” (1997) 113 LQR 49. 397 See also Quach v Huntof Pty Ltd [2000] Motor Vehicle Reports 263. 398 (2005) 218 ALR 166. At the time of writing special leave to appeal from this decision to the High Court of Australia has been granted but the appeal is yet to be heard. See also QPSX Ltd v Ericsson Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2005) 219 ALR 1.
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be granted depends on abuse of process. That is, a stay of proceedings is granted when there is an abuse of process or a tendancy to abuse process. The existence of a third party funding litigation by way of maintenance or champerty does not of itself constitute an abuse of process. In an application for a stay it is not the champertous nature of an agreement that must be considered, but whether the champertous agreement has a tendency to lead to an abuse of process.399 In an important passage Mason P said:400 In my opinion, a conclusion about abuse of process must stem from a finding directed at the actual or likely conduct of the party in whose name the litigation is brought (or its agents). The court is not concerned with balancing the interests of the funder and its clients. Indeed, it is not concerned with the arrangements, fiduciary or otherwise, between the plaintiff and the funder except so far as they have corrupted or have a tendency to corrupt the processes of the court in the particular litigation. It is only when they have that quality that the defendant has standing to complain about them. Even at common law, the aspects of public policy hostile to champerty were concerned with the interests if the opposing parties, not the party who had entered in the champertous arrangement. . . . The additional vice of champerty compared with mere maintenance lay in the attempted profiting from the assistance provided. But a profit motive is no longer the touchstone of illegality, even at common law. Many people seek profit from assisting the processes of litigation, including lawyers, expert witnesses, printers, couriers, forensic accountants. A desire to earn a “success fee” may have a tendency to corrupt processes and that tendency may be greater if the fee is higher and the activity is unregulated. But such a finding should focus clearly on the dangerous tendency, not the profit as such. . . . In general, it is simply no business of a defendant to be taking up the cudgels on behalf of the funded litigants who are either parties or represented persons, invoking interlocutory processes ostensibly on behalf of the funded litigants but in reality in its own interest. . . . Defendants may in proper cases seek security for costs and they may obtain special costs orders against funders if the proceedings fail. But they have no entitlement “to be protected from litigation where the Appellants have been indemnified by an intermeddler, against the negative effect of adverse costs orders”.
The decision in Fostif does not appear to deny that the legitimacy of an assignment of a cause of action will depend on the existence of what constitutes today a genuine commercial interest in the proceedings. What the case does deny is that a dismissal or stay of proceedings will be granted simply on the basis of the existence of maintenance or champerty. Perhaps it then follows that the efficacy of any third 399
(2005) 218 ALR 166, at 187 per Mason P. See also Domson Pty Ltd v Zhu [2005] NSWSC 1070. Ibid, at 190–90 (disagreeing with a statement made earlier in Clairs Keeley (No 2) v Treacy (2004) 29 WAR 479 at 493 viz: “It is not acceptable for the litigation to be pursued in such a way that the interests of the plaintiffs are subservient to those of the funder. That would be an abuse of process”.). See also Clairs Keeley v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86. 400
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party funded litigation is a wholly distinct issue from the efficacy of an assignment of a cause of action. In the latter, the funder and plaintiff is the assignee, who is clearly subject to court procedure; however, the legitimacy of the assignee’s interest will be dependent upon the efficacy of the assignment which itself depends on the extent of the assignee’s interest. The decision is Fostif was applied by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Project 28 Pty Ltd v Barr.401 This case concerned a third party funding litigation which, if successful, would have allowed the plaintiff to exercise an option to purchase land from the defendant (a land developer) and then sell the land to the third party, which itself was a land developer in competition with the defendant. The third party funder had no interest in the transaction other than being a land developer and wanting the land. This was held to not to amount to a genuine commercial interest as it was not rights-based. It was based on a mere hope.402 However, that alone did not determine whether or not a stay ought to be granted, as that ultimately depended on whether or not the funding arrangement had the tendency to lead to an abuse of process. Moreover, it was held that the mere existence of an arguable genuine commercial interest did not determine whether or not a stay ought to be granted.403 The factors that are relevant in determining the existence of an abuse of process were also discussed. [6.67] Trustees in bankruptcy. The law has always given a great degree of latitude to trustees in bankruptcy and liquidators.404 Generally, they can assign a bare right of action, including an assignment, in return for a share in any net proceeds.405 It has been held that such assignments may be valid even though they are assignments to the bankrupt who will in turn be legally aided.406 The power to traffick 401
[2005] NSWCA 240. Ibid, at para 42. 403 Ibid, at para 57. 404 Norglen Ltd v Reed Rains Prudential Ltd [1997] 2 AC 1. 405 Ramsey v Hartley [1977] 1 WLR 686. See also Kitson v Hardwick (1872) LR 7 CP 473; Seear v Lawson (1880) 15 Ch D 426; Re Park Gate Waggon Works Co (1881) 17 Ch D 234; Guy v Churchill (1888) 40 Ch D 481; Ngyen: Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1992) 120 ALR 424; Grovewood Holdings Plc v James Capel & Co Ltd [1995] Ch 80; Stein v Blake [1996] AC 243; Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440; UTSA Pty Ltd v Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd [1997] 1 VR 667 (affirmed (1996) 21 ACSR 457); Buiscex Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 357; Re Daniel Erat Consulting Services Pty Ltd (1999) 162 ALR 429 at 437 per Branson J; Domson Pty Ltd v Zhu [2005] NSWSC 1070. See also Cotterill v Bank of Singapore (Australia) Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 238 (assignment of the right to sue for contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth): see [6.05]). Because the insolvency legislation in both Australia and England does not vest the company property in the liquidator, the company must be named as assignor, Brookfield v Davey Products Pty Ltd (1996) 14 ACLC 303; Bank of Melbourne Ltd v HPM Pty Ltd (1997) 26 ACSR 110. 406 Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd [1999] 2 AC 1 (here an assignor liquidator who was incapable of financing the action itself assigned the cause of action to a director in return for a share in the proceeds; the director could be legally aided; without the assignment the defendant would have escaped liability; the assignment was held not to be invalid merely because the assignee was legally aided or because the defendant could not apply for security for costs against the individual assignee; even if 402
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in litigation which would otherwise be against public policy is thought to be firmly based on the existence of the statutory power of sale.407 It is thought that the exercise of that power could not involve the doing of an unlawful act or an act contrary to public policy. The policy behind this leniency is that claims of maintenance and champerty against the trustee or liquidator should be excluded so as to allow the trustee or liquidator to get on with realising the estate. A finding of maintenance or champerty would frustrate the trustee or liquidator in efficiently carrying out his or her statutory duty in the interests of creditors. The exemption allows a liquidator or trustee with no monies to spend on litigation to recoup some damages for creditors and, by distributing the risk, avoid the loss that would accrue to creditors if the liquidator or trustee alone brought proceedings and lost.408 The exception is limited to the “property” of the company or bankrupt as relevantly defined by the legislation.409 It has been held in England that this leniency or exemption does not extend to or apply to an agreement to assign the fruits of an action (as opposed to the right of action), so that the validity of such an assignment must be determined on normal grounds.410 Ultimately this should depend upon whether or not such “fruits” fall within the statutory meaning of property, and Australian cases have taken the opposite view.411
(iii) Personal Contractual Rights and Obligations [6.68] The personal rights rule. It is a rule of assignment that personal contractual rights may not be assigned without the consent of the obligor.412 This is the the liquidator improperly exercised statutory power to assign this did not affect the assignment; the fact the assignee was eligible for legal aid and the assignor was not was a relevant matter for the legal aid board). See also Stein v Blake [1996] AC 243. Cf as to whether upholding an assignment of a cause of action to a bankrupt (during the term of the bankruptcy) properly reflects the policy of the legislation: see Temsign Pty Ltd v Biscen Pty Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 83; Jambrecina v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2003] FCA 1352 paras 30–1. As to the limits of this power: see IF Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) para 22.062; A Keay, McPherson The Law of Company Liquidation (4th edn, Sydney, LBC, 1999) at 340. See also Freeman v Joiner (2005) 219 ALR 136. 407 Re Daniel Erat Consulting Services Pty Ltd (1999) 162 ALR 429 at 438 per Branson J. Cf Re William Felton Co Pty Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 228; Grovewood Holdings Plc v James Capel & Co Ltd [1995] Ch 80; Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440; Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1998] Ch 170. See Insolvency Act 1986 (Eng) s 167 and Sch 4 and s 314 and sch 5; Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 134; Corporations Act (2001) s 477(2). 408 Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd [1999] 2 AC 1. 409 Insolvency Act 1986 (Eng), s 436; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9; Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 5. See Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1998] Ch 170; Re Ayala Holdings Ltd (No 2) [1996] 1 BCLC 467. See also Re William Felton Co Pty Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 228. 410 Grovewood Holdings Plc v James Capel & Co Ltd [1995] Ch 80. See also Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1998] Ch 170. 411 Re Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims (1996) 19 ACSR 440 at 450 per Drummond J; Re Tosich Construction Pty Ltd (1997) 23 ACSR 126. 412 This rule is obviously subject to statutory provisions to the contrary. Various statutory provisions exist that create exceptions to this rule. Many of these are enacted to aid in the transfer of businesses which would otherwise become extremely complicated or impossible to achieve: see [6.101].
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“personal rights” rule. In addition, a contractual obligation may not be vicariously performed if it calls for the personal performance of the obligor. Although the delegation or vicarious performance of a duty is distinct from the assignment of a right (or even the assignment of a duty), it is necessary to discuss the delegation of duties in this section for two, and perhaps three, reasons. First, the approach to determining whether a right or obligation is personal is the same, and many of the leading cases concern the delegation of duties rather than the assignment of rights. Secondly, often an assignment of a right goes hand in hand with a delegation of a duty. That is, the assignor makes it a condition of the assignment that the assignee agree to perform the assignor’s outstanding duties under the contract. The third reason is that if a party’s obligations are personal then in some cases this will impact on the nature of their rights.413 For example, where a builder’s duties are personal this impacts on its rights under the contract as it would not be possible for such a builder to convey all its property and assign its business to an assignee, and for that assignee to then enter into contracts with any sub-contractor to complete works left unfinished by the builder at the time of the assignment.414 There is a view that the personal nature of an obligation can even render a right to payment for that obligation personal if the assignor’s obligation to perform accrues after receipt of the payment.415 Usually, though, the fact that an obligation is personal will not prevent that obligor assigning the right to payment for that obligation.416 It should also be noted at the outset that, although there may be an inhibition on the assignability of a right, such as where the right is personal or where there is a prohibition on assignment, the contract to assign may still be valid. It follows that the assignor will be in breach of contract and liable in damages to the assignee for failing to assign. Moreover, the contract to assign may be given effect to as a bilateral transfer in the sense that it attaches to the fruits of the contract, requiring 413 It may also follow in some cases that if an obligation can be vicariously performed this will impact on the assignability of the obligor’s rights: see King v West Coast Grocery Co (1913) 129 P 1081. See also Williams v Nicoski [2003] WASC 131 para 53. Cf note 428. 414 Knight v Burgess (1864) 33 LJ Ch 727. See also Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 BLR 33 at 45 per Parker LJ. 415 Pennsylvania R Co v Huston (1936) 81 F 2d 704. The basis of this view may flow from comments made by Pollock: see the discussion in Goldschmidt & Loewenick v Diamond Fibre Co (1919) 174 NYS 800 (affirmed (1921) 130 NE 918). In any case, it is a view that has been applied in numerous decisions of the courts of the United States, particularly in the context of a sale of business where the seller/assignor will cease to exist and where the buyer/assignee is to take over all contracts and perform the obligations of the assignor; often the right is assignable but not until work is complete: see Arkansas Valley Smelting Co v Belden Mining Co (1888) 127 US 379; Delaware County Commissioners v Diebold Safe & Lock Co (1890) 133 US 473; Burck v Taylor (1894) 152 US 634; Johnson v Vickers (1909) 120 NW 837; Schlessinger v Forest Products Co (1910) 76 A 1024; Paige v Faure (1920) 127 NE 898; Paper Products Mach Co v Safepack Mills (1921) 131 NE 288; Crane Ice Cream Co v Terminal Freezing & Heating Co (1925) 128 A 280; Salmon Lake Seed Co v Frontier Trust Co (1931) 153 A 671; Folquet v Woodburn Public Schools (1934) 29 P 2d 554. See further [8.48]. 416 Crouch v Martin (1707) 2 Vern 595, 23 ER 987; Russell and Co Ltd v Fryers (1909) 25 TLR 414.
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the assignor to account to the assignee for those fruits once they are in the hands of the assignor. Generally, this will be relevant only where the obligor’s performance leaves some residuum in the hands of the assignor. [6.69] The relevance of intention. It appears to be generally accepted that, subject to a statutory provision to the contrary, the parties may inhibit the assignability of a contractual right or the delegation of a contractual duty as a matter of contractual intent.417 One way this can be done is to make the right or duty personal.418 That is, in general terms and in the case of a right, the obligor must evince an intention that he or she wishes to perform only for the other party to the contract.419 In the case of an obligation, the obligee must evince an intention that he or she requires the subject contractual obligation to be performed only by the obligor. It follows that whether a contractual right or obligation is personal or not as a matter of contractual intent is an issue of construction.420 The presumed intention as to the nature of any particular right or obligation must be derived by construing the entire contract in light of its surrounding circumstances421 and its own subject matter.422 As a general statement it may be said that a right will not be personal if, on construction, “it can make no difference to the person on whom the [corresponding] obligation lies to which of two persons he is to discharge it”.423 This is the essence of the investigation. The focus is not on whether the parties contemplate
417 Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 368 per Collins MR; Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660 at 673 per Collins MR ([1903] AC 414 HL); Davies v Collins [1945] 1 All ER 247 at 250 per Lord Greene MR. Cf GW Keeton and LA Sheridan Equity (3rd edn, Chichester, Barry Rose Books, 1987) at 229. 418 Express prohibitions on assignment are dealt with at [6.82]–[6.90]. 419 Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216, 118 ER 759; Boston Ice Co v Potter (1877) 25 Am Rep 9. 420 Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 ([1902] 2 KB 660, CA); National Carbonising Co Ltd v British Coal Distillation Ltd (1936) 54 RPC 41; Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104 at 118–9. 421 The importance of the surrounding circumstances should not be underestimated. For example, in Re Cousins (1885) 30 Ch D 203 a testator granted an option to his son to purchase a hotel; his son was already a hotel owner; in the particular town where the hotel stood it was important that a hotelkeeper have an interest in as many hotels as possible; thus the option gave the son a personal advantage which only a hotel owner could get and this evidenced the personal nature of the option, cf Jacobs v Larkin (1892) 13 NSWR (Eq) 62. 422 Shayler v Woolf [1946] 1 Ch 320 at 322 per Lord Greene MR; Davies v Collins [1945] 1 All ER 247 at 249 per Lord Greene MR; Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364; J Miller Ltd v Laurence and Bardsley [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90. 423 Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660 at 668–9 per Collins MR. Cf Denham Bros Ltd v W Freestone Leasing Pty Ltd [2004] 1 Qd R 500 at 517–18 per Holmes J, who after quoting this test from Tolhurst’s case asked, “what was the intention of the parties as to assignability. . . . The issue . . . is not whether the substitution of an assignee will operate adversely to the person obliged, because of the particular skills of, or the relationship of confidence he has with, the original contracting party, but whether he will, without his consent, be made worse off by the assignment”.
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assignment, but rather on whether it can reasonably be presumed that they contemplated that rights are personal.424 In this way the rule promotes assignability.425 It follows that the effect of making a right personal is to prevent the party who has the benefit of that right from transacting with the right in a way that would make the obligor account to a third party. Clearly this prevents the assignment of the right, and it does this by characterising the contractual right in its nature as a chose in action and robbing it of its characteristic of being transferable.426 It is important to note that although a contract is construed at the time of formation, it may be the intention of the parties (at the time of formation) that a right will be personal only up to a certain point in time. For example, a conditional right to performance may become unconditional and this may change its intended assignability. In addition, if the presumed intention of the parties was that the assignor’s right was made personal solely for the purpose of securing the assignor’s performance, then it may be that the right becomes assignable once the assignor performs the relevant obligation. It may also be noted that the fact that a right to performance is considered personal will not in all cases necessarily dictate that the right to sue for damages for the obligor’s failure to perform the correlative obligation will also be personal.427 Turning to obligations, an obligation will not require personal performance if, on construction, it can make no difference to the person having the corresponding right which of two persons performs it. Here the focus of the investigation is on
424 See David Jones Ltd v Lunn (1969) 91 WN(NSW) 468 at 478. If the right is not held to be personal and is assignable, intention may still be important in determining the manner of assignment. For example, on construction it may be found that it was not in the contemplation of the parties that the assignor could assign certain rights of performance and keep back others, creating a situation whereby the obligor is bound to account to both the assignor and assignee. Cf Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd v Concrete Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 373 (one issue before the court in this case was whether a purchaser of land could use architects’ plans which were prepared (free of charge) for the previous owner; this depended upon whether the vendor’s licence to use the drawings was assignable; the court took the view that this depended upon whether or not there was an express of implied term allowing assignment). 425 Cf LA DiMatteo, “Depersonalization of Personal Service Contracts: The Search for a Modern Approach to Assignability” (1994) 27 Akron L Rev 407. DiMatteo argues that the personal rights rule restricts assignability at a time when greater assignability is required. He argues that assignability should depend upon whether or not the assignment “materially changes” the duty to be performed. If the obligor is not adversely affected by the assignment then the assignment should be upheld, cf Frissell et ux v Nichols (1927) 114 So 431 at 434; Swarts v Narragansett Electric Lighting Co (1904) 59 A 77. In his view assignability should depend on whether the assignment should in fact be of concern to the obligor. He suggests that this is the test ultimately adopted in the Uniform Commercial Code §2.210(2). See also Restatement of Contracts 2d §317(2). 426 See [6.75], [6.91], [6.92]. 427 See Madison Pictures Inc v Chesapeake Industries Inc (1955) 147 NYS 2d 50 and compare Paper Products Mach Co v Safepack Mills (1921) 131 NE 288. See also Uniform Commercial Code §2.210(2). See further Restatement of Contracts 2d §322(2)(a).
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whether the parties contemplated personal performance, and not whether they contemplated vicarious performance.428
A. Personal Contractual Rights [6.70] Personal contractual rights and construction: Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd. Perhaps the most famous case in the law of assignment of contractual rights, and certainly the leading authority for the view that intention determines the personal or impersonal nature of a contractual right, is Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd.429 The relevant facts were that Tolhurst owned land that contained chalk quarries. He sold part of the land to the Imperial Portland Cement Company for the purpose of that company establishing a cement works on the land. The parties also entered into a contract on terms providing that Tolhurst would, for a term of 50 years or for such shorter period (not being less than 35 years) as he was possessed of chalk available and suitable and capable of being quarried, supply to the company, and the company would take and buy at least 750 tons per week, and so much more, if any, as required by the company for the whole of its manufacture of cement upon the land. Later the Imperial Portland Cement Company assigned this right to the Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd, together with a sale of the land works and business. The Imperial Cement Company went into voluntary liquidation and ceased to carry on business. Tolhurst claimed that he was no longer bound by the contract owing to the assignor’s attempted assignment and liquidation. The House of Lords held by a majority that Tolhurst was bound by the contract because the right in question was not intended to be personal to the assignor. The Earl of Halsbury LC thought that the duration of the contract, the persons involved and the nature of the contract itself led to this conclusion.430 Lord Macnaghten, with whom Lord Shand agreed, thought that it could not “make the slightest difference to anybody who the proprietors of the cement works or the actual manufacturers may be, provided they are in a position to carry out the terms of the original contract”.431 This result depended 432 “simply and solely on the true meaning and effect of the contract”, and in this regard he thought it was not right 428 If a party negotiates a term allowing it to delegate all its obligations under the contract then this indicates an intention that that party is not concerned personally to perform for the other party to the contract. see Williams v Nicoski [2003] WASC 131 para 53. However, this does not necessarily mean that the right to that performance is not personal. Although the impersonal nature of an obligation may be relevant to characterising the correlative right to that obligation, the obligor remains liable for the non-performance of the obligation and therefore the identity of the party receiving the benefit of that performance may remain important. 429 [1903] AC 414. 430 Ibid, at 416. 431 Ibid, at 417. 432 Ibid.
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to construe the contract literally, limiting it to the named parties. The factors giving rise to this interpretation were that the contract was intended to run for up to 50 years and at least for 35 years and the cement company had set up business right next to the quarry. He thought that it was the plain intention of the parties that the reference in the contract to Tolhurst and the reference in the contract to the company should be read as including the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, owners and occupiers of the quarries and the successors and assigns, owners and occupiers of the cement works.433 Lord Lindley agreed that the rights and obligations on their face did not call for any personal confidence or personal skill, but based his ultimate decision on a construction of the entire contract. He said:434 [T]he nature of the agreement and the time it was to last negative the idea that it was confined to the parties to it. The word “assigns” does not occur in the agreement. But this does not shew that the benefit of the contract is not assignable. An agreement for a lease, and even an option to require a lease or a renewal of a lease, is assignable in equity even although there is no mention of executors, administrators, or assigns.
The result in the case was that the obligor had not contracted to supply the personal needs of the assignor; rather, on construction, he had contracted to supply the needs of any person taking over the cement works who took an assignment of the right. Thus, as a matter of intention, it made no difference to the obligor whom he supplied. The obligation to supply was limited by the extent of his quarry and the extent of any cement works that could be constructed on the relevant land.435 This meant the obligor was required to act on the orders of the assignee. This decision is often contrasted with Kemp v Baerselman.436 In that case, in return for an exclusive dealing arrangement, a farmer agreed to supply a baker with all the eggs the baker required for one year. In due course the baker sold his business to a large company and attempted to assign his rights in the contract to the company. The farmer refused to supply eggs to the company and the court upheld his action. One of the reasons for the decision was based on construction. It was thought that the existence of the exclusive dealing arrangement made the right personal. Since the baker’s duty to deal exclusively with the farmer could not be assigned, the company would take the right without being burdened by an 433 See also National Carbonising Co Ltd v British Coal Distillation Ltd (1936) 54 RPC 41. Cf Dr Jaeger’s Sanitary Woollen System Co Ltd v Walker and Sons (1897) 77 LT 180 at 183, 184 per Kekewich J. See further Birmingham Breweries Ltd v Jameson (1898) 67 LJ Ch 403. 434 [1903] AC 414 at 423. Lord Robertson at 421–2, dissented on the ground that the assignment varied the obligation of the obligor: see [6.96]. 435 See CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 at 584. See also Matson v White (1950) 220 P (2d) 864. 436 [1906] 2 KB 604. See also Moore v Collins [1937] SASR 195; Proctor v Union Coal Co (1923) 137 NE 659; Crane Ice Cream Company v Terminal Freezing & Heating Company (1925) 128 A 280; Sargent Glass Company v Matthews Land Company (1904) 72 NE 474; Arkansas Valley Smelting Company v Belden Mining Company (1888) 127 US 379. Cf King v West Coast Grocery Company (1913) 129 P 1081; La Rue v Groezinger (1890) 24 P 42.
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important term of the bargain. This suggested that the right was itself personal. This decision shows why it is important to look not only at the contract as a whole, but at how a party’s obligations may impact upon the nature of other rights.437 Moreover, the right to supply was considered personal because, on construction, the obligation was to supply the personal needs of the assignor. [6.71] Assignability by use of definitions provisions. The assignability of the rights under the contract in Tolhurst’s case did not depend on an express or implied term that the benefit of the contract was assignable. Rather, the court interpreted the meaning of any reference to the parties in the contract and said that references to the parties included references to assigns. Many contracts deal with assignment in this way; that is, rather than having a clause stating that the benefit of the contract is assignable, the definitions provision of the contract states that a reference to the parties includes a reference to their assigns.438 Importantly, the Court did not hold that such provisions resulted in the obligor agreeing to enter into a contract with an assignee or that the obligor was agreeing to a future novation of the contract. The effect of such a provision, be it express or implied, is that contractual rights are not personal and are therefore assignable.439 However, it should be noted that, despite the presence of such a provision, if other terms of the contract are inconsistent with assignability then the subject right will be construed as not being assignable.440 Nevertheless, dealing with the issue of assignability by way of a definitions clause can have its advantages. For example, in the case of a typical all monies security which defines the “bank” to include its assigns, the bank may assign the benefit of the security to an assignee who may be intending soon after to enter into a syndicate with the bank to provide further finance to the borrower, and that finance provided by that assignee will then be secured by the security as the assignee is deemed to be the “bank” under the security.441 Ultimately, of course, the use to which such definitions can 437
See also Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291 at 319 (affirmed [2000] Ch 291). See Denham Bros Ltd v W Freestone Leasing Pty Ltd [2004] 1 Qd R 500; American Smelting & Refining Co v Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co (1918) 248 F 172. The assignability of statutory rights will often turn on whether the person benefitted by the statutory provision can be construed to include that person’s assigns: see Garrisons Pty Ltd v The Solicitors’ Trust [2004] TASSC 139. 439 Cf Calaby Pty Ltd v Ampol Pty Ltd (1990) 71 NTR 1 at 17–18 per Angel J (overruled (1991) 110 ALR 343). 440 See CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 at 581–2; Swarts v Narragansett Electric Lighting Co (1904) 59 A 77; Paige v Faure (1920) 127 NE 898; Montgomery v De Picot (1908) P 305. 441 Where the assignee is a security trustee, arguably the beneficiaries of that trust, despite not being parties to any agreement to assign, would also be the bank’s “assigns” because the trust is fully constituted at the time of the assignment and they take their interest in the security by virtue of the assignment to the trustee, and not merely by reference to the terms of the trust; that is, the trustee never obtains a title unencumbered by the interests of the beneficiaries: see Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 at 579 per Deane J; Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 373. Arguably, such beneficiaries, being assigns, are not limited to bringing action against the trustee but have direct rights against the borrower. 438
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be put will depend upon a construction of the entire security memorandum, and particularly the “secured moneys” provisions: for example, if the “all obligations” provision secures “repayment” obligations it cannot be used to secure a payment obligation. It addition, without an express provision to the contrary it is unlikely that such an assignment will secure moneys already owing to the assignee at the time of the assignment. Moreover, it will be rare for the secured creditor to be able to take assignments of unsecured debts from other creditors of the debtor and have them characterised as secured debts under the security.442 There may be other limitations to this technique. Courts have suggested that a narrow (contra proferentem) approach should be taken to the construction of “all obligations” provisions in security documents despite any lack of ambiguity. It has also been suggested that some control must be exercised over assignability when it is based solely on such definition provisions. There has also been a suggestion that in some cases such an assignment may constitute a clog on the equity of redemption.443 It may be that this technique is best suited to refinancing structures where the original mortgagee is a primary lender in the refinancing. [6.72] Inherently personal and impersonal rights. Statements can be found in cases to the effect that a right may be inherently personal or inherently impersonal.444 This arises more in the context of vicarious performance of obligations and is dealt with in more detail in the section dealing with vicarious performance.445 Generally, however, it is suggested that where a right is one that is obviously personal or impersonal, this conclusion is simply one that would represent the common intention of the parties, and therefore it is personal or impersonal by virtue of construction. Lord Lindley, in Tolhurst’s case made this point clear when he expressly based his decision on a construction of the entire contract rather than basing it solely on his determination that the particular right involved did not on its face call for personal confidence or personal skill. It follows from this that there is no rule that prevents the assignment of rights that are considered inherently personal, and a right that would otherwise be considered inherently personal may be made assignable by the parties.446 If it were held in any particular case that, despite 442 See Kova Establishment v Sasco Investments Ltd [1998] 2 BCLC 83; Re Clark’s Refrigerated Transport Pty Ltd [1982] VR 989 at 995–6. Cf Webb v National Australia Bank (1990) 5 Butterworths Property Reports 11,395. See further J O’Donovan and J Phillips, The Modern Contract of Guarantee, English Edition (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 5.82–5.85. 443 See Thomas v Silvia (1994) 14 ACSR 446 (and see R Burgess, “Assignment of Debt— Modification of Mortgagor’s Rights” [1996] JBL 247), where the relevant authorities are discussed. The fact that the assignor is a bank may also limit the class of potential assignees: see Argo Fund Ltd v Essar Steel Ltd [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 203. 444 Eg Peters v General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation Ltd [1938] 2 All ER 267 at 269, 270 per Sir Wilfred Greene MR. 445 [6.78]. 446 See Devefi Pty Ltd v Mateffy Pearl Nagy Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 225 at 235; CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 at 581–2. See also Wilson v Commissioner of Probate Duties (Vic) (1978) 78 ATC 4278 (affirmed on other grounds [1979] VR 592).
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the intention of the parties to make a right assignable, it remained inherently personal and not assignable, the better reason for that result would be that the right is so personal that it is not capable of being a chose in action.447 [6.73] Personal rights: some relevant factors. Since the personal nature of a right is an issue of construction each case is dependant upon its own facts. Therefore there is little use comparing results in cases and that exercise can be misleading. What is more important is the proper application of principles of construction, and this is best dealt with in standard texts on contract law. However, a survey of the cases does suggest that certain factors are taken into account in determining whether a contractual right has a personal quality. It must be emphasised that these factors do overlap and are not conclusive. In all cases the primary focus must be on the operative provisions of the contract. It is suggested that the most important factors to be found in the decisions are as follows: Personal confidence attached to right (or obligation). If one party to a contract makes a contractual promise to the other party because of some personal confidence it places in that other party, then not only are the second party’s obligations likely to be personal but so too may be some of his or her rights. For example, if one party places confidence in the other party’s discretion and impartiality in determining whether the contract is being properly performed or places confidence in the other party’s co-operation in agreeing to variations of the contract, or if the contract requires a high degree of post-contract co-operation, then the second party’s rights are likely to be personal.448 A further example is the provision of credit. When a creditor promises to make a loan to a borrower it does so on the basis of its assessment of the borrower, the use to which the loan is to be put and the borrower’s ability to repay. This is a personal confidence it places in the borrower which generally makes that right to draw down on the loan a personal right.449 In the case of a contracts for the sale of goods or provision of services the identity of the purchaser is usually irrelevant to the seller. The seller’s only concern is that it be paid.450 However, if a contract for the sale of goods or for the provision of services is not a cash transaction but provides for a period of credit, this is an important factor to consider in determining the assignability of the right to
447 This issue was left open in CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 at 582. 448 Mallyons Ltd v The South Australian Harbours Board [1933] SASR 166; Goldschmidt & Loewenick v Diamond State Fibre Company (1919) 174 NYS 800 (affirmed (1921) 130 NE 918); Arkansas Valley Smelting Company v Belden Mining Company (1888) 127 US 379. 449 [6.75]. 450 Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414. See also Whiteley v Hill [1918] 2 KB 808 (benefit of a hire purchase agreement); J Miller Ltd v Laurence and Bardsley [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90 (benefit of contractual mooring rights).
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delivery or supply.451 For example, in Cooper v Micklefield Coal and Lime Co,452 the obligor supplied coal to the assignor (a coal merchant) on credit terms. It was held that this right to supply on credit terms was personal, as it was given to the assignor by the obligor because of the confidence the obligor placed in the debtor’s ability to repay. This confidence was based on an assessment of the debtor’s experience and ability to run the business. However, the fact that a contract allows for the provision of credit should not be thought to render the rights under a particular contract personal in all cases. If it did then rights under many supply contracts would not be assignable. Although the issue ultimately rests on the presumed intention of the parties, the provision of credit will usually assume more importance where the subject contract is in essence a credit contract, for example, a bank loan. In the case of a contract for the supply of goods on credit, the essence of that contract is that of sale and not credit so that the provision of credit, is merely a factor to be taken into account in determining the nature of any rights under that contract. It is also important to note that there is an overlap here with the rule that prohibits an assignment where the assignment would vary the obligation of the obligor. For reasons that are discussed later, this rule is concerned with legal and not merely factual variations, that is, where the assignment would have the effect of varying the obligation agreed to under the contract or the legal burden of the contract. An assignment by the borrower of its rights under a loan contract may contravene this rule because it is of the essence of that contract that the lender accept a certain level of risk that the borrower will not repay. An assignment may vary that allocation of risk. Although most contracts are concerned to some extent with allocations of risk, in the case of a credit sale contract, an assignment of the right to supply would rarely vary the allocation of risk under the contract in a legal (as opposed to a factual) sense. That risk is not the essence of the contract.453 It is also important to keep in mind that in all these cases the assignor is still liable to make the payment or repayment, as the case may be. There is no replacement of credit. It is only if the assignment would materially change the risk of the obligor receiving its performance that the right to supply will not be assignable. 451 See Arkansas Valley Smelting Co v Belden Mining Co (1888) 127 US 379; Paige v Faure (1920) 127 NE 898; Goldschmidt & Loewenick v Diamond State Fibre Company (1919) 174 NYS 800 (affirmed (1921) 130 NE 918). 452 (1912) 107 LT 457. See also Cole v Wellington Dairy Farmers Co-op Association Ltd [1917] NZLR 372; Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 at 1019 per Viscount Simon LC. 453 It may be argued that despite being a credit sale, if the assignment in fact increases the chances of the assignor being paid, for example, if the assignment is conditional upon the assignee paying, then the obligor should have no complaint, as it will still have its action against the assignor. See FC Woodward, “Assignability of Contract” (1905) 18 Harv LR 23 at 27–31. The problem with this view is that it appears to be based on whether or not the obligor ought to have a problem with the assignment, which is not the test. The test is based on the presumed intention of the parties and is not a purely objective test but rather objective from the position of the parties.
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This is most likely to be the case where the assignor intends to cease to exist after the assignment, which often occurs in the case of the sale of a business.454 It may also be the case in a credit sale where the period of credit is long.455 Here the nonassignability of the right flows not so much from its being personal but because an assignment would vary the legal risk accepted under the contract by the obligor. A further example of personal confidence in the context of sale of goods is where the right to supply a buyer, which is the subject matter of an assignment, is based on the capacity of the assignor to supply a commodity.456 However, it may be difficult for a buyer to prove such a construction where the contract has built in protective provisions allowing for inspection and cancellation in the case of a defective supply. It should be noted that although it may appear odd to speak of a right to supply rather than an obligation to supply, that terminology is correct where a supplier is required by law to sell all its goods to a buyer such as a government body or producers’ association which is responsible for safety standards and on-sale.457 Moreover, where a buyer is obliged to purchase certain goods from a supplier the supplier can be said to have a “right” to supply which may be assignable if it is not personal to that supplier.458 Another example of personal confidence concerns insurance contracts.459 Subject to any relevant statutory provisions,460 the benefit of a contract of general insurance is thought to be personal and not assignable by the insured.461 454 However this does not affect assignability where the right assigned is a conditional benefit and where the obligor has agreed to look only to the assignee for payment: see Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414, and see [6.121]. 455 See Minnetonka Oil Co v Cleveland Vitrified Brick Co (1910) 111 P 326. 456 See CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 at 582. 457 See also Mallyons Ltd v The South Australian Harbours Board [1933] SASR 166 at 172 (here the appellant paid for the right to shunt trucks). 458 See Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608. 459 See further [6.95]. The assignment of policies of marine and life insurance is specifically governed by statute: see the discussion in MA Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (4th edn, London, LLP, 2002) ch 6; KCT Sutton, Insurance Law In Australia (3rd edn, Sydney, LBC, 1999) paras 2.129, 2.130. 460 Eg Insurance Act 1902 (NSW) ss 14–16. Statutory provisions exist that allow third parties to take the benefit of an insurance policy in certain situations although the mechanism by which this is achieved varies, eg Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 50 and see the discussion in GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 666–9. See also Insurance Contracts Act (Cth) s48; Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 (Eng); and see Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1967] 2 QB 363; Re OT Computers Ltd [2004] Ch 317; Centre Reinsurance International Co v Freakley [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 65. See further Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (Eng). See generally MA Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (4th edn, London, LLP, 2002) ch 5; N Legh-Jones, J Birds and D Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law (10th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 20.1–20.16. 461 Peters v General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp Ltd [1937] 4 All ER 628; [1938] 2 All ER 267, CA. See also Minucoe v The London and Liverpool and Globe Insurance Co Ltd (1925) 36 CLR 513 at 524; Royal Insurance Co Ltd v Mylius (1926) 38 CLR 477; Bank of New South Wales v Northern British and Mercantile Insurance Co (1882) 3 NSWR (L) 60; Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 AC 199.
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That is, it is not possible to assign the right to the indemnity. This in part is because the insurer’s decision to offer insurance is based on its assessment of the level of risk posed by the insured. This is an aspect of personal confidence.462 However, if the personal nature of such a policy is solely based on risk it may be possible to assign the contractual right to the indemnity if to do so will not change that level of risk.463 Where that is possible the assignee becomes the insured. This may occur where the assessed risk relates more to the nature of the property than any assessment of the insured. Therefore, it is more likely that a policy of home insurance would be assignable than a policy of car insurance.464 The distinction being drawn here is between “the level of risk” on the one hand and “the same risk” on the other. However, although the decision to insure may be made by reference to the level of risk posed, ultimately what is promised by the insurer is an indemnity for the loss of the insured, and this also renders the insurance contract personal. It follows that any “transfer” of the right to the indemnity is usually achieved by novation.465 Any true assignment is usually limited to an assignment of the right to recover for the loss suffered or which may be suffered by the assignor. That is, an assignment of the right to any proceeds under the policy.466 This may be done to reinforce the position of a secured creditor.467 Since the contract is one of indemnity, such an assignment is an assignment of a cause of action, namely a right of damages for a breach of contract; those damages secure performance and therefore, in a secondary sense, may be viewed as the fruits of the contract. Moreover, although not constituting a right of performance, damages do secure performance and the assignment of the right to damages is, in a sense, an assignment of the benefit of the contract and this shows that the contract is not personal for all purposes; it is personal to the extent that an assignee cannot become the insured. If the assignment of the right to the proceeds was no more than an assignment of a debt, then the assignee could not commence proceedings to determine whether a sum was payable 462 New York Underwriters Insurance Company v Central Union Bank of South Carolina (1933) 65 F 2d 738. Like credit contracts such contracts may also not be assigned, because to allow for such an assignment would breach the rule that prohibits variations of the obligor’s obligation: see [6.95]. 463 See generally MA Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (4th edn, London, LLP, 2002) para 6–3D. See also Minucoe v The London and Liverpool and Globe Insurance Co Ltd (1925) 36 CLR 513 at 524 per Starke J. 464 It is possible for a vendor to take out general insurance on behalf of a purchaser if the information given to the insurer relates to the purchaser: see Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 AC 199 at 210. 465 See Overall v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [1929] Gazette Law Reports (GLR) 69 at 73. 466 Eg Aron & Co v Miall (1929) 98 LJKB 204. See also Swan & Cleland’s Growing Dock & Slipway Co v Maritime Insurance Co [1907] 1 KB 116; Peters v General Accident & Life Assurance Corp Ltd [1937] 4 All ER 628 at 633 (affirmed [1938] 2 All ER 267); Amalgamated General Finance Co Ltd v CE Golding & Co Ltd [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 163 at 167 per Diplock LJ. 467 [6.12].
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under the contract. Finally, the benefit of such contracts may also be personal to the insurer. This may be the case where the continued solvency of the insurer is of concern to the insured.468 It should also be noted that if the benefit of a contractual promise can be said to be given more in respect of the subject matter of the contract than to the other party, then it is less likely that any personal confidence will attach to that right. For example, a manufacturer’s warranty is more concerned with the subject matter of the contract than the identity of the buyer. Generally, however, whether a contract involves such a level of personal confidence as to render rights under it non-assignable depends on the facts of each case. For example, a right to collect refuse from certain property may involve no personal confidence, but when that right involves the removal of refuse from a military camp in time of war the identity of personnel going on to such property becomes a matter of personal confidence.469 Reliance on the skill, taste, judgment or expertise of the other party.470 These factors may be grouped by reference to a personal right of (or personal obligation to) service. For example, a contractual right to the services of an employee is generally personal and incapable of assignment.471 An employee has a right to choose whom he or she will work for and cannot be forced to work for an employer against his or her will. That decision involves an issue of personal taste or judgement.472 If a business is sold, or if there is a corporate amalgamation, then, subject to a legislative provision to the contrary,473 employment contracts are terminated and the new owner or new company must enter into fresh contracts with the
468
See MA Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (4th edn, London, LLP, 2002) para 6–3D. Bruce v Tyley (1916) 21 CLR 277. 470 This factor could also be viewed as part of personal confidence: see Cooper v Mickefield Coal and Lime Co Ltd (1912) 107 LT 457. 471 Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014. See also American Colortype Co v Continental Colortype Co (1903) 188 US 104; Board of Education of the Borough of Flemington v State Board of Education (1911) 81 A 163. See further M Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford, OUP, 2003) at 493–501. Cf Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1 (here an Authority assigned workers to work with a particular employer, the workers had no say in their placement); and see Hamilton v Letherbridge (1912) 14 CLR 236. 472 In many cases the real concern of the employee is the type of work, and not necessarily the identity of the employer. However, an employee also places personal confidence in the ability of his or her chosen employer to pay wages. 473 Legislative provisions do exist to vary this position as it can be inefficient when a business is sold without any detriment to employees. For example, in England see Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/1794), (as amended), regs 4A and 5(1). See further Wilson v St Helens Borough Council [1999] 2 AC 52, and see GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 694, 704. See also C Bourn (ed), The Transfer of Undertakings in the Public Sector (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999); M Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford, OUP, 2003) at 506–14. A similar result can be obtained by orders made under other pieces of legislation, eg Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 413, and see Royal Victorian Institute for the Blind Ltd v RBS.RVIB.VAF Ltd (2004) 206 ALR 581. 469
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employees.474 There is an overlap here with the rule preventing an assignment from varying the obligations of the obligor. If the benefit of an employment contract were assigned this would result in the obligor having to account to the new employer, and this by its very nature may result in a change to the substance of the obligations agreed upon under the contract, if the employee must now satisfy some personal requirements of the new employer and if the obligation to supply the personal needs of a third party was not incorporated into the contract of employment.475 In the case of a contract for the supply of goods, if the buyer’s obligation is not merely to pay but to inspect the goods or carry out some other obligation upon delivery, that reliance on the buyer’s skill, taste or judgement may impact on the construction of the buyer’s rights.476 Other examples of where there has been some reliance on the personal skill, taste, judgement of expertise of the other party include the rights of a publisher to the benefit of its agreement with an author, the rights of an author to the benefit of its publishing agreement477 and the benefit of a share-farming agreement where only one of the parties has farming experience and the other relies on that first party.478 Again, however, each case is dependent on its own facts. Length of time over which the contract is to run. This was one of the factors taken into account in Tolhurst’s case and there it was suggested that the contract was not personal, as it had to be expected that in a contract operating for over 50 years the parties might sell their respective businesses. However, where the length of time is not so long that it would be greater than the working life of a person, this factor would assume less importance. The linking of obligations to the personal requirements of the assignor. Contracts for the supply of goods or services may be intended to satisfy the personal needs of the other party. Such contracts are often contracts to supply “if and when” 474 Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 (this decision might have been different if the transfer had occurred by sale of shares: see at 1021 per Viscount Simon LC, at 1026, 1030 per Lord Atkin). See also Denham v Midland Employers Mutual Assurance Ltd [1955] 2 QB 437; Housing Guarantee Fund Ltd v Yusef [1991] 2 VR 11. Cf O’Brian (Inspector of Taxes) v Benson’s Hosiery (Holdings) Ltd [1980] AC 562. See further United States Shoe Corp v Hackett (1986) 793 F 2d 161 at 163–4 (“a merged firm ‘ceases to exist’ only in the sense that it has no separate existence. It is sometimes misleading to talk of a firm as an “it”. The corporation is just the legal identity of a complex set of contracts, and these contracts . . . are what matter. When the firm ceases to have a separate identity, the contracts live on.”). 475 See Denham v Midland Employers Mutual Assurance Ltd [1955] 2 QB 437 (although it is not possible to transfer the contractual right to the services of an employee, it may be possible under the contract of employment to require the employee to act under the instructions of a third party and therefore in a sense “transfer” the use and benefit of the employee’s services). 476 See Arkansas Valley Smelting Co v Belden Mining Co (1888) 127 US 379 and see FC Woodward, “Assignability of Contract” (1905) 18 Harv LR 23 at 28–30. 477 Stevens v Benning (1855) 6 De G M & G 223, 43 ER 1218; Hole v Bradbury (1879) 12 Ch D 886; Griffith v Tower Publishing Co Ltd [1897] 1 Ch 21. Cf Lyon v Creati (1892) 18 VLR 629. 478 Moore v Collins [1937] SASR 195.
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required.479 In such cases the buyer’s benefit of the contract will be personal.480 There is an overlap here with the personal confidence factors discussed above. For example, where a supply contract is for the personal needs of the buyer but is a long term contract, it is personal not only because it is a personal needs contract but because the seller bases its decision to enter into such a contract on the character, stability, commercial competence, creditworthiness and resources of the buyer. It will not necessarily aid the assignability of such a contract that there is a minimum or maximum weekly, monthly or annual quota, as the seller will have budgeted and planned for the expected orders of the buyer.481 The result would be different in a contract of supply where the number of goods to be delivered is fixed with no discretion in the assignor to vary this. In the case of building contracts, usually it is of no consequence whom the employer pays or whom the builder does the work for. Therefore, and subject to what is said below, rights under such contracts are generally not considered personal.482 However, if the work is dependent upon orders given by the employer (assignor) rather than by reference to any express terms of the contract, then assignment may not be possible because the builder (obligor) may have contracted on the understanding that it will comply with the orders of that particular employer.483 This will be the case only if the transaction taken as a whole evidences that the assignee and not the assignor will be issuing such instructions.484 For example, where the assignment of contractual rights occurs at the same time as a sale of the underlying property to the assignee. Again, like the other factors this factor is not conclusive. Dispute resolution. It has been suggested that it is in the nature of some contracts, particularly building contracts, that disputes will arise and therefore the builder will have intended to deal only with the particular employer it contracted with.485 It is quite true that parties may be concerned about the identity of the person they may arbitrate or litigate with, and if a contract is of such a kind that disputes are likely to occur this may suggest that rights arising under that contract are personal. However, the mere incorporation of an arbitration or dispute 479 This of course assumes that such an arrangement results in a contract and not just a standing offer: see Burton v The Great Northern Railway Co (1854) 9 Exch 507, 156 ER 216; Great Northern Railway Co v Witham (1873) 29 LT 471. 480 Cooper v Mickefield Coal and Lime Co Ltd (1912) 107 LT 457. 481 See Crane Ice Cream Company v Terminal Freezing & Heating Company (1925) 128 A 280. 482 Charlotte Thirty Ltd and Bison Ltd v Croker Ltd (1990) 24 Con LR 46 at 56. 483 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd (1992) 57 BLR 57 at 77 per Staughton LJ ([1994] 1 AC 85 HL), citing Kemp v Baerselman [1906] 2 KB 604. See also Bovis International Inc v The Circle Ltd Partnership (1995) 49 Con LR 12 at 22 per Staughton LJ. Cf Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 (intention to supply the personal needs of any person taking the subject land and an assignment of the benefit of the contract); Matson v White (1950) 220 P (2d) 864 (intention to supply the owners of certain land with their personal water needs). 484 The power to issue such instructions may be seen as being as much a duty as a right. 485 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 at 105.
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resolution clause will not automatically suggest that there are likely to be disputes. Nor will it automatically render other contractual rights personal. In fact, depending on whether or not the right to arbitrate is construed as personal, it too is capable of assignment.486 Moreover, it is important that this factor not be taken too far. As mentioned earlier, one of the original reasons given for the view that contractual rights were personal and not assignable was the threat of debtors’ prison.487 That threat made it important for debtors to choose their creditors carefully. Any recognition by the law of the possibility of creditors assigning debts upset that decision of the debtor as the assignee might be more litigious than the assignor. The possibility of assigning a right to a person more litigious than the assignor still exists, and, although the end result may no longer be a debtors’ prison, there remains the burden of the cost of litigation. This, it could be argued, makes it imperative not only for debtors to choose and know their creditors but for all contract parties to know and choose whom they are dealing with. The weakness in this last point is that it requires people to have a choice whom they contract with for every need and want as well as access to information to achieve this. This is as false today as it was in the time of debtors’ prisons, and if this factor were taken too far it could render most contractual rights personal. [6.74] The problem with companies. Generally, a party contracts on the understanding that employees, managers or partners may resign,488 or companies may be restructured.489 However, the fact that one party to a contract is a company is no reason to assume that the personality of that party is not material.490 A person may contract with a particular company for the skill that that company is held out to have. Therefore certain obligations of that company may not be vicariously 486 Like any other contractual right, whether or not the right to arbitration is assignable depends upon the construction of the clause in light of the surrounding circumstances: see Shayler v Woolf [1946] 1 Ch 320; Rumput (Panama) SA & Belzetta Shipping Co SA v Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (The Leage) [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 259). Cf Cottage Club Estates Ltd v Woodside Estates Co (Amersham) Ltd [1928] 2 KB 463 at 466 per Wright J. See further Court Line Ltd v Aktiebolaget Gøtaverken (The Halcyon the Great) [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 283 at 289 per Staughton J; Montedipe SpA v JTP-RO Jugotanker (The Jordan Nicolov) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 11; Baytur SA v Finagro Holding SA [1992] 1 QB 610. 487 [2.08]. 488 See Johnson v Raylton, Dixon & Co (1881) 7 QBD 438 at 454 per Brett LJ. See also Phillips v Alhambra Palace Co [1901] 1 QB 59. 489 See Sally Beauty Co Inc v Nexxus Products Co Inc (1986) 801 F 2d 1001 at 1009 per Posner J citing United States Corp v Hackett (1986) 793 F 2d 161 at 163–4. 490 Hence the inclusion of change of control provisions in contracts that mirror restrictive assignment provisions. Previously, the personal nature of a contract with a company may have been evidenced by reference to the powers contained in its memorandum and articles. In addition, the existence of such powers may have limited the field of potential assignees. This perhaps is not as relevant today, given the demise of the ultra vires doctrine: see further Wetherell Bros Co v United States Steel Co (1952) 200 F 2d 761.
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performed, nor certain rights assigned. For example, in Griffith v Tower Publishing Company Ltd, and Moncrieff,491 the receiver of a corporate publisher attempted to assign its rights under a certain publishing agreement to another publisher. The plaintiff argued that he entered into the publishing contract with that company because he liked the style and form in which that company published its books and he was impressed with the efficiency of the company’s manager. It was held that the rights were not assignable; they were personal to the company because of the confidence placed by the plaintiff in the corporate publisher. In short, an author may place the same type of confidence in a corporate publisher as he or she would an individual publisher, and such a company would wish to maintain its good reputation despite changes in members and officers and despite the fact that it could dismiss a manager. Such a party could act on the assumption that the company would appoint someone who would maintain the company’s reputation if the author entered into the agreement because he or she was impressed with a particular manager.492 It should be noted, though, that because a company may operate only through its officers there will usually be an implied right allowing the company to delegate duties to competent persons. However, as Griffith’s case shows, there may be cases where a person has contracted with a company because of the particular expertise of a certain officer. Where there is such a reliance, the duty cannot be performed by anyone other than that officer.493 Despite what was said above, the ability of a company to vary its management and even its ownership does present problems for persons contracting with it. For example, a company can change its ownership by a sale of shares without a sale of assets. Moreover, the management of the company may completely change for the sole purpose of changing the personality of the company and the way it operates. The management of the company may also be placed in the hands of a receiver or liquidator.494 In each of these cases, even though there has been no assignment or sub-contracting, one party to the contract has completely changed character. Here it may be legitimately argued that certain contractual rights have been dealt in a manner equivalent to an assignment and certain duties delegated. 491 [1897] 1 Ch 21. See also Stevens v Benning (1855) 6 De GM & G 223, 43 ER 1218; Hole v Bradbury (1879) 12 Ch D 886. See further Reade v Bentley (1857) 3 K & J 271, 69 ER 1110; Johnson v Raylton, Dixon & Co (1881) 7 QBD 438. 492 See further M Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford, OUP, 2003) at 493–501. 493 Eg Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 BLR 33. See also Smith v Board of Education of City of Liberal (1924) 222 P 101 (this case concerned a contract with a partnership of architects; one of the two partners left the firm and was replaced; it was held that the obligations of an architect are generally personal as they require special knowledge, skill and taste and involve an element of personal confidence; here a change in the firm meant that the services of one of the architects was not available and that rendered the contract unenforceable; the Board had contracted for the skill of both the partners.). As to partnerships see also Dr Jaeger’s Sanitary Woollen System Co Ltd v Walker and Sons (1897) 77 LT 180; Robson v Drummond (1831) 2 B & Ad 303, 109 ER 1156, The British Waggon Company and the Parkgate Waggon Company v Lea and Co (1880) 5 QBD 149. 494 Griffiths v Secretary of State for Social Services [1974] QB 468. See also Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 at 1021 per Viscount Simon LC, at 1026, 1030 per Lord Atkin.
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[6.75] Is the “personal rights” rule misconceived? As will be seen in the next section, the notion that a personal obligation cannot be delegated makes sense, because the effect of a delegation is that a third person will carry out the relevant duty. However, arguably, an assignment of a contractual right could have one of three effects. First, the effect may be that the obligor is by virtue of the assignment required not only to perform to and for the benefit of the assignee but to follow the orders or satisfy the needs of the assignee. This type of assignment is rare; usually it is not possible by assignment to require the obligor to follow the instructions or satisfy the personal needs of the assignee. However, Tolhurst’s case is a clear example that an assignment may have this effect, and the reasons for this are discussed later.495 Secondly, the effect of an assignment of a contractual right may be that the obligor must perform to and for the benefit of the assignee, but is required to perform only the obligation it promised the assignor and only to the standard promised to the assignor. However, there is a third possibility. If under an assignment of a contractual right the assignee purchases title to a right which the assignor has against the obligor, and if an assignment does not create privity of contract between the obligor and assignee, then arguably the effect of an assignment should be that the obligor continues to perform to the assignor but for the assignee; the performance is for the assignee as it is the assignee who owns the benefit of the right to performance and it is the assignee who can sue for breach of contract if the obligor fails to perform to the assignor.496 This is not to say that only the contingent right to damages has been assigned; the primary right to performance is now owned by the assignee, but that performance obligation remains an obligation to be performed to the assignor. Arguably any other result would change the promise made by the obligor to the assignor in breach of the principle of transfer. That is, the promise must remain a promise to the assignor. If this is right, then the personal nature of a right becomes irrelevant because in all cases the obligor continues to perform to the assignor. For example, a right to have one’s portrait painted may be viewed as a personal right; it cannot by assignment be turned into an obligation to paint a portrait of the assignee. However, on this reasoning the right may be assigned but the obligor continues to paint a portrait of the assignor. A further point may be that even if this is not the necessary legal effect of all assignments of contractual rights, is it one that the assignor and assignee can agree to where the assignment would otherwise be ineffective as an assignment of a personal contractual right. The above possibility on its face takes no account of notice and dictates that this must be the effect of an assignment whether or not notice has been given. Clearly 495
[6.121]. This view is supported by Corbin: see AL Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (St Paul, Minn, West Publishing, 1951) iv, para 865. 496
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that is not the law. There is no doubt that upon receipt of notice the obligor can generally obtain a discharge only by accounting to the assignee and that prior to notice the obligor can obtain a discharge only by performing to the assignor.497 To give this third possibility any weight it is necessary to confine it and suggest that it is concerned only with characterising the effect of the transfer to the assignee which is an aspect of the assignor/assignee relationship, and it is not concerned with the effects of the overriding relationship between the assignee and obligor which, although arising at the time of the assignment, binds the conscience of the obligor only upon receipt of notice of the assignment. At a practical level then, this third possibility is concerned only with equitable assignments and suggests that in the case of an assigned contractual right no part of the obligor’s duty to account to the assignee can be based on the transfer of the right. If that sets the proper parameters of this third possibility and if this third possibility is correct, it would put not only the “personal rights” rule in jeopardy but arguably the entire institution of assignment of choses in action. The result would be that the accepted duty of an obligor to account to the assignee must derive from some other doctrine which is grounded on receipt of notice of the transaction between the assignor and assignee. Very often in commercial assignments, the assignment is given because the assignor is going to cease to exist or cease to be interested in the contract. For example, in the case of building contracts, an assignment of the rights under such a contract by the owner of the relevant property is usually made where, at the same time as the assignment, the owner/assignor sells the land to the assignee. In that case, it would be nonsense to suggest that the obligor must still perform to the assignor and that the assignee, in owning that right to performance, would then be getting the benefit of that performance. Moreover, at a doctrinal level, it is suggested that this result need not and cannot follow. The fact that an assignee, when taking an assignment of a contractual right, buys title to a right to a duty owed by the obligor to the assignor does not lead to the result that the assignee can expect the obligor to perform only to the assignor.498 In fact, rather than this result being dictated by the principle of transfer, it is totally at odds with it. That is, to say that the obligor must continue to perform to the assignor gives no effect whatsoever to the actual transfer of the right to performance.499 Therefore, not only must the obligor perform to and for the assignee directly, this result cannot be drafted around by the assignee and assignor in an attempt to circumvent the personal rights rule.500 Unlike contracts for the sale of goods where it is possible to transfer 497
[8.06]. That characterisation may be relevant in determining the value of the right vested in the assignee and the standard of performance the assignee can expect: [8.08]–[8.12]. 499 [3.10]. 500 To achieve this effect the assignor would have to assign only the contingent right to damages. As to that possibility see [6.50]–[6.53]. 498
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title and leave the seller in possession, it is not possible to do this in the case of a contractual right because it is not possible to have a “transfer of title to the right” without an actual transfer of the right itself. However, as noted, an equivalent result can be achieved if the obligor is not given notice of the assignment or is required by the assignee to perform to the assignor. Here, the obligor will obtain a good discharge by continuing to perform to the assignor. However, this results from the need to bind the conscience of the obligor before the assignee can expect a personal accounting. This does not deny that prior to that notice the obligation is still owed to the assignee by virtue of the transfer and that that transfer can take place only if it does not involve a personal right. Despite the above, if one adopted the view that the personal rights rule was not so much a rule about rights but rather obligations, then this third possible effect of an assignment may be correct, at least where the transaction involves a right correlative to a personal obligation. That is, if one takes the view that party intention only characterises the obligation as personal are not the right to the perforamace of that obligation then that correlative right to performance remains assignable. This view has been put forward to explain the effect of clauses prohibiting assignments and is dealt with in that context later.501 If correct, then a right that is correlative to a personal obligation remains assignable, with the result that the obligor continues to perform to the assignor, and the rules on receipt of notice of an assignment do not change this position because those rules cannot change the nature of the assigned right. It is sufficient to note here that the personal rights rule has always been understood as a rule concerning the characterisation of contractual rights. The fact that the process of determining the nature of rights is one that focuses on the intention of the obligor when agreeing to the obligation does not change this. It is not possible to characterise the right to an obligation without looking at the obligation. There would seem to be an underlying view behind this “personal obligations” analysis that parties may characterise obligations as a matter of intention, but if the right to that obligation is property, that is, a chose in action, the parties may not, as a matter of intention, deal with the peculiar property aspects of that right, in particular its assignability. However, it is suggested that although the attachment of the title “property” to a right will depend on legal principles and policy, when a right owes its existence to the intention of the parties, the parties can fashion its characteristics in any way they think fit. The effect of making a right personal is to make it incapable of being dealt with in a manner that would result in the obligor having to account to a third party. This clearly prevents assignment, and this is achieved by the parties evidencing an intention to rob the right of its characteristic of being transferable. Where that is the case, although the assignor can agree
501
[6.83].
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to account to an assignee for the fruits of such a contract this does not assign the benefit of the contract so as to affect the obligor.502 It is suggested that the weight of Anglo-Australian authority is that a personal right may not be assigned. However, one case that may provide some indirect support for the above argument is the decision of Chitty J in Western Wagon and Property Co v West.503 This case concerned the assignment of rights by a borrower under a loan contract. Despite notice of the assignment being given to the lender, when the assignee made a call under the loan agreement the lender made the advance to the borrower. The assignee brought an action against the lender/ obligor for the amount of the advance or alternatively damages for breach of contract. The assignee’s action failed, and this can be correct only if the assignment was not effective; otherwise, it would appear that the obligor could continue to perform to the assignor. It is accepted law that an agreement for a loan does not create a debt, and therefore any attempt immediately to assign a debt will fail.504 However, there is a contract in existence and if the right to performance is considered assignable (which was not really questioned by the court), then the only right that could possibly be assigned is the right to make a call for an advance. If that is the case, it appears incorrect to suggest that the lender can continue to conform to the demands of the assignor. Chitty J’s reasoning for rejecting the efficacy of the assignment is not convincing. First, he focused on the point that equity would not compel a lender/obligor to make an advance and would leave the parties to their contract law remedy, that being damages for breach of contract.505 Thus, at no point could the assignee compel the lender to pay the assignee. He recognised that it was important not to base assignment on the availability of specific performance, and on one view he does not do this because under the remedial model for equitable assignments, when an assignment is upheld by reason of the protection equity will afford, that generally relates to remedies the assignee has against the assignor. However, on another view, Chitty J does appear to base the efficacy of the assignment on the availability of specific performance. Many contractual rights to performance are unlikely to be the subject matter of an order for specific performance due to the adequacy of damages, but this does not mean they are not assignable (at law or in equity) or that the obligor need perform only to the assignor. This then was not a good reason for rejecting the assignment; the assignee should have had an action for damages for breach of contract. 502 The assignor could also agree to assign the benefit of the contract to the assignee in the sense of creating merely a bilateral relationship between them. However, because that agreement cannot bind the obligor, it achieves no more than an agreement to assign the fruits. 503 [1892] 1 Ch 271. 504 May v Lane (1894) 64 LJQB 236; Western Wagon and Property Co v West [1892] 1 Ch 271; Law v Coburn [1972] 1 WLR 1238. 505 [1892] 1 Ch 271 at 275. Similarly, a lender cannot obtain specific performance of a contract to borrow: Rogers v Challis (1859) 27 Beav 175, 54 ER 68.
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Chitty J’s second line of reasoning was that the contract was not to lend out of a particular fund, and so no money in the hands of the lender was ever owned by the assignee or assignor prior to the lender parting with it.506 This reasoning appears to be based on the requirement that the subject matter of an assignment must be identifiable and the assignment failed sufficiently to identify the property. However, as Chitty J notes, this was not an assignment of a right to a fund but an assignment of a right to some contractual performance. If the assignment failed on this ground then it is difficult to see how any assignment of a contractual right to performance could be upheld. This reasoning cannot therefore be sustained. It is not clear why Chitty J did not reach his desired result by the much easier route of holding that all the rights of the borrower under the loan agreement were personal and not assignable, as they were granted by the lender because of the confidence it placed in the borrower’s ability to repay and in the probability of the obligor repaying. That probability is reduced if the right to performance is vested in an assignee while the unassignable duty to repay stays with the assignor. This, of course, is distinguishable from where a borrower gives a lender a direction to pay. This may occur where the loan is for the purpose of purchasing goods or land. In fact, where the lender intends to take security over the subject property it will usually insist on paying the money directly to the owner/vendor of the property. It may be that Chitty J’s reference to specific performance was aimed at this point; that is, he may have reasoned that the contract was too personal to be the subject of an order for specific performance and therefore the rights under the contract were too personal for assignment. [6.76] Limited class of assignees. It is possible that a right may be assigned to only a limited class of assignees.507 For example, in Tolhurst’s case the right to the supply of chalk, although being a distinct chose in action and not a mere abstract right,508 could not be assigned separate from those to the land and cement works.509 Usually it is also not possible to assign the benefit of what would otherwise be an assignable contract to a competitor of the obligor.510 506
[1892] 1 Ch 271 at 276. Outside dealings with choses in action and contractual rights, in assessing the efficacy of such a limitation one would have to consider the applicability of the restraints on alienation doctrine: see Re MacLeay (1875) LR 20 Eq 186; Re Rosher (1884) 26 Ch D 801; Re Brown [1954] 1 Ch 39. 508 [6.70]. See also [6.10], [6.20] (abstract rights). This point is distinguishable from that of abstract rights, such as the right to the income from ownership of land which is not at all transferable but which nevertheless follows a sale of the land. 509 Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 at 423 per Lord Lindley. See also CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 at 584. See further Doe v Reid (1830) 10 B & C 849, 109 ER 664; Clegg v Hands (1889) 44 Ch D 503 at 520 (see also Caerns Motor Services Ltd v Texaco Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 247); White v Southern Hotel Co [1897] 1 Ch 767; Birmingham Breweries Ltd v Jameson (1898) 67 LJ Ch 403; Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608. 510 See Mallyons Ltd v The South Australian Harbours Board [1933] SASR 166 at 174 per Angas Parsons J. See also [6.80]. 507
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A further example of a limited class of assignees concerns the assignment of guarantees. For an assignee to obtain the benefit of a guarantee it is necessary to assign both the principal contract and guarantee.511 Contracts of general insurance are another example. Where there is a legal requirement that the insured have an insurable interest, if the benefit of the contract is assignable then, at least in the case of a legal assignment,512 it will be necessary for the assignee to have an interest in the property insured.513 If the interest the assignee relies upon for its insurable interest is the interest vested in the assignor, then the transfer of that interest must occur at the same time as the assignment. If the interest in the property vests in the assignee prior to the assignment, and the assignor is left without an insurable interest, then the policy will lapse.514 Where the assignment is merely as assignment of the right to the proceeds of the insurance policy, no such interest is required. Finally, although the limited class in the above examples flows from the nature of the subject matter of assignment, if it is possible to have an express prohibition on assignment then it must be possible expressly to limit the class of potential assignees. However, once that class is identified, it is doubtful whether the obligor 511
[6.100]. MA Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (4th edn, London, LLP, 2002) para 6–4E. 513 In Australia the insured under a contract of general insurance is not required to have an insurable interest. The right of recovery is dependent upon the insured suffering a loss: see Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) ss16 and 17: see also s18. In those rare cases where it is possible to assign the right to the benefit of the indemnity, arguably the assignee is not under this regime required to hold an insurable interest but recovery is still dependent upon the assignee suffering a loss being a loss which is indemnified under the policy: see further Barroora Pty Ltd v Provincial Insurance Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 170 at 180–1. Although the provisions which relax the need for an insurable interest or an interest in law or in equity in the subject property are stated to apply to the parties to the contract, nevertheless, because the extinction of the need for such an interest was an important factor in the reform of this area, and given that some of the reforms were designed to allow third parties to take the benefit of insurance contracts and to recognise some assignments that did not require an insurable interest in the assignee, it is doubtful whether the requirement for an insurable interest in an assignee could be introduced by resorting to a narrow construction of the provisions: see The Australian Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts (Rpt No 20) (Canberra, Aust Government Printers, 1982) paras 130, 144. See further [8.13], [8.25]. 514 The policy would not lapse if the insured retained an interest such as an equity of redemption: see Rayner v Preston (1881) 18 Ch D 1. See also Thomas v National Farmer’s Union Mutual Insurance Society Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 386. As regards the effect of involuntary assignments or assignments by operation of law, such as to a trustee in bankruptcy: see N Legh-Jones, J Birds and David Owen, MacGillivray on Insurance Law (10th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 20.12–20.14. Legislative provisions governing marine insurance require the assignor to assign the entire beneficial interest in the policy, and it has been held that if the assignment takes place before the loss has been incurred then the whole beneficial interest in the policy will not have been assigned if the assignor retains any insurable interest is the subject matter insured: see Williams v Atlantic Assurance Co Ltd [1933] 1 KB 81 at 105 per Slesser LJ; Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] QB 825 at 851–2 per Mance LJ. It would appear that if the general legislative regime for the assignment of legal choses in action is used instead of these specialist provisions (and its use is not abrogated by these specialist provisions) then its requirement for an “absolute” assignment will also require the insured to transfer its entire interest in the insured property: see Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] QB 825 at 855–6 per Mance LJ. 512
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can complain that a particular member of that class is distasteful to him or her so as to prevent an assignment to that person. Such distinctions may arise where A terminates a contract with B for a repudiation by B and enters into a contract with C only to find that C, has assigned the benefit of the contract to B.515
B. Personal Obligations [6.77] Personal obligations and construction. Generally, a party to a contract has a right to have the obligations and benefits it bargained for performed or rendered by the other party.516 However, in many cases the promise given by the promisor is to ensure that a certain performance is tendered. Here the obligation to perform is not personal and it may be vicarious performed. As with contractual rights, whether or not an obligation is personal must be deduced from construing the entire contract in light of its surrounding circumstances. It is not sufficient for a party to have a mere expectation of personal performance. It is necessary that the obligation personally to perform flows from the terms of the contract.517 The relevance of construction was made clear by Lord Greene MR in Davies v Collins 518 where he said:519 Whether or not in any given contract performance can properly be carried out by the employment of a sub-contractor must depend on the proper inference to be drawn from the contract itself, the subject-matter of it, and other material surrounding circumstances.
That case concerned a contract for the cleaning and repair of a garment. It was held that the presumed intention of the parties was that no part of the cleaning and repair service could be vicariously performed, although tasks such as delivery could be.520 This result did not flow simply from a construction of the obligation but from a construction of the entire contract. In particular, much weight was placed on the construction of a limitation clause in the contract. The existence of that clause increased the risk to the customer and evidenced the personal nature of the obligation.521 515 See FC Woodward, “Assignability of Contract” (1905) 18 Harv LR 23 at 26–7. See also La Rue v Groezinger (1890) 24 P 42; Boston Ice Company v Potter (1877) 25 Am Rep 9. 516 Humble v Hunter (1848) 12 QB 310 at 317, 115 ER 885 at 887 per Lord Denman CJ; Boston Ice Co v Potter (1877) 25 Am Rep 9. 517 See E Brown Pty Ltd v Florence [1966] SASR 214. 518 [1945] 1 All ER 247. 519 Ibid, at 250. See also Dr Jaeger’s Sanitary Woollen System Company Ltd v Walker & Sons (1897) 77 LT 180 at 186 per Lindley LJ; Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364; Shayler v Woolf [1946] 1 Ch 320 at 322 per Lord Greene MR; Edwards v Newland & Co [1950] 2 KB 534 at 538 per Somervell LJ; J Miller Ltd v Laurence and Bardsley [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90; Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 BLR 33 at 48 per Parker LJ, at 52 per Nourse LJ, at 53 per Bingham LJ. 520 In Edwards v Newland & Co [1950] 2 KB 534 at 540, Tucker LJ suggested that where there is express or implied authority for a bailee to part with possession, the contract ceases to be one of pure bailment. 521 [1945] 1 All ER 247 at 250 per Lord Greene MR.
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Once an obligation is found to be personal it cannot be vicariously performed by a sub-contractor even if that sub-contractor is more talented than the contractor.522 This is perhaps an obvious point when it comes to artistic obligations, but it is applied elsewhere too. For example, in Johnson v Raylton, Dixon & Co,523 it was held that if a manufacturer is retained to produce certain goods, it is generally not sufficient to supply goods of equal or better quality from another manufacturer.524 Such a conclusion may be rebutted by evidence that in the particular trade and in respect of the particular goods there is a practice that manufacturers are at liberty to supply goods of the kind ordered made by other manufacturers.525 Strong evidence of custom or trade would be required to allow a manufacturer to supply goods from another manufacturer when the first manufacturer was a manufacturer only and not a dealer in those goods. In such circumstances it is generally assumed that the purchaser contracted with the particular manufacturer “in reliance on the general excellence of the work of the [manufacturer], and is entitled in the absence of any express stipulation to the contrary, to have, in performance of the contract, goods of the manufacturer’s own make”.526 However, even in such cases it is usually not necessary for every part of a manufactured item to be made by the manufacturer. It is in the nature of manufacture that materials for producing the manufactured item come from elsewhere. Those materials are not the subject matter of the contract; it is the finished product that is the subject matter of the contract.527 [6.78] Inherently personal obligations. Despite the nature of an obligation being generally dependant upon construction, courts have taken the view that some obligations, such as the obligation to write a book, are inherently personal. Here the focus of the court is on the subject matter of the contract.528 For example, in 522 The British Waggon Co and the Parkgate Waggon Co v Lea & Co (1880) 5 QBD 149 at 153 per Cockburn CJ. 523 (1881) 7 QBD 438 at 444 per Cotton LJ at 452–3 per Brett LJ. 524 Cf (at 447) the powerful remarks of Bramwell LJ, who thought the proposition that goods had to be made by the contracted manufacturer was applicable if the goods were of a peculiar make or if the brand or name is known in the market. However, he did not think it applied to articles not so situated in the market, “articles of which one maker’s make is as good as another’s, and which have no special repute or name or other distinction”. In such circumstances he thought it a matter of indifference to the buyer what goods it was ultimately given. He thought this was a pure question of law and considered arguments such as the possibility of lower prices if the manufacturer of such goods could perform any given contract by using substitute goods especially in times of low production. 525 Johnson v Raylton, Dixon & Co (1881) 7 QBD 438 at 444 per Cotton LJ. 526 Ibid, at 445–6 per Cotton LJ, at 454 per Brett LJ (who described the result on the basis of an implied term). See also New England Cabinet Works v Morris (1917) 115 NE 315. 527 Johnson v Raylton, Dixon & Co (1881) 7 QBD 438 at 454–5 per Brett LJ. 528 This is not unique in contract law. Terms implied in law are implied by reference to the nature of the contract and not the intention of the parties. The onus then falls on the party claiming that the term should not be implied. Even the distinction between offers and invitations to treat can sometimes be based on the nature of the transaction rather than on intention. For example, it is generally presumed that an advertisement to hold an auction amounts to an invitation to treat with the subsequent bids being the offers.
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Edwards v Newland & Co,529 it was held that it was in the nature of a bailment by way of “hire of custody” (that is, a bailment for storage) that it be personally performed. Somervell LJ stated,530 “it may also be said that the class of case with which we are dealing, namely, the storage of furniture, does come within the principle . . . namely, that there is a type of contract in which the personal care of the other contracting party is the essence of the contract”. Denning LJ said531 that the result depends on the circumstances as many bailments allow for sub-bailment.532 However he thought that in the case of a contract to store furniture, “the personal skill and care of the contractor is of the essence of the contract”. As can be seen from the above quotations, in such cases it is usually said that personal performance is the “essence” of the contract.533 It has also been said that the type of obligation which falls into this category is where there is a clear reliance on some personal quality of the other party, such as personal skill, taste or judgement.534 It is not clear that this search for such personal qualities is necessarily in line with the presumptive “essence” approach as these factors are also important in determining the intention of the parties. In any case, where the presumption applies, the onus must fall on the person claiming otherwise to show that the presumed intention of the parties was that the obligation was not personal.535 Arguably, there is no need to adopt a presumptive approach. Moreover, if the presumptive approach is dropped, this does not mean that previous cases will not be relevant. There is a difference between applying a presumption based on the nature of the contract and applying precedent to identify a factor taken into account in characterising an obligation as a matter of construction. The latter approach is often used in contract; for example, many contractual terms are now held to be conditions or warranties or intermediate terms by reference to precedent. However, ultimately each contract should be looked at on its own facts. In the case of a contract to write a book, although generally it may be expected that the publisher requires the author to write it, it may be that the publisher is more concerned about having the book written than with who writes it. In some cases, the publisher may want only some final say in the employment of a ghost writer 529
[1950] 2 KB 534. See also Pennsylvania R Co v Huston (1936) 81 F 2d 704. [1950] 2 KB 534 at 539. 531 Ibid, at 542. 532 In many bailments for repair it will be necessary for the repairer to send certain parts off to specialists repairers or restorers. In such cases the bailment is not personal. In Edwards (at 542) Denning LJ gave the example of a bailment for carriage which may allow for sub-bailment for part of the journey. 533 Eg Fratelli Sorrentino v Buerger [1915] 1 KB 307 at 314 per Atkin J (affirmed [1915] 3 KB 367); Edwards v Newland & Co [1950] 2 KB 534 at 539 per Somervell LJ; The British Waggon Co & The Parkgate Waggon Co v Lea & Co (1880) 5 QBD 149 at 153 per Cockburn CJ. See also Walker Electric Company v New York Shipbuilding Company (1917) 241 F 569. 534 Fratelli Sorrentino v Buerger [1915] 1 KB 307 at 313 per Atkin J (affirmed [1915] 3 KB 367). 535 Edwards v Newland & Co [1950] 2 KB 534 at 539 per Somervell LJ; see also Tucker LJ at 540 and Denning LJ at 542. 530
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for an autobiography or novel by a sports star, model or pop star. In other cases the subject matter or nature of the book may dictate that it need not be written or put together by the hired author.536 To take the view that a contract is of a particular type is perhaps to take a too simplistic view of the range and complexity of contracts. There would be very few obligations to which courts would be comfortable in applying such a presumption. Courts are more likely to prefer to base a decision on intention.537 In addition, characterising the type or subject matter of a contract is itself an exercise in construction.538 The better view may be that the “inherently personal” presumptive approach should be subsumed into construction, so that it means no more than that certain obligations may be so obviously personal that the common or presumed intention of the parties must be that the obligations cannot be vicariously performed.539 Thus, where a person is hired to carry a cargo which is of a type that “every gang of lorry thieves, and every lorry thief, will strive with every nerve to steal”, the conclusion that the nature of the load renders the obligation personal is no more than a conclusion as to the presumed intention of the parties.540 [6.79] Personal obligations: some relevant factors. Where an obligation is not inherently personal, the onus of proving that it is personal lies with the party so claiming.541 The determination of this question is a matter of construction. As in the case of personal rights, it is possible to identify a number of factors taken into account by the courts when carrying out this construction exercise. Nevertheless these factors are not conclusive or exhaustive, and merely represent the most often recurring factors in the cases. In addition, the following list of factors is not limited to cases concerned with “not inherently” personal obligations and is also drawn from cases which were concerned with inherently personal obligations because, despite those cases supposedly characterising the subject matter of the contract, many of them provided the clearest statement of the relevant factors. In 536 See Lyon v Creati (1892) 18 VLR 629. See also Browne & Company v John P Sharkey Company (1911) 115 P 156. 537 Swarts v Narragansett Electric Lighting Co (1904) 59 A 77 at 77–8 (this case involved a contract to install electrical apparatus under the supervision of the contractor; the court held the contract was personal and could not be assigned; after giving the classic example of a contract to paint a picture the court said: “In the present matter the court is unable to say, as a matter of law, to what extent the personal service may have been important. The construction and installation of electric pumps is not a matter of such common knowledge that the court can say how far it should or should not be held to call for personal service, but apparently the contract implies it.”). See also Ashmore v Corporation of Lloyd’s (No 2) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 620 at 631 per Gatehouse J. 538 Wong Mee Wan v Kwan Kin Travel Services Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 38 at 42 per Lord Slynn of Hadley. 539 See CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers [1963] NZLR 576 at 581–2. 540 Garnham, Harris & Elton, Ltd v Alfred W Ellis (Transport) Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 940 at 946–47 Paull J. 541 Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 at 417 per Lord Macnaghten; National Carbonising Co Ltd v British Coal Distillation Ltd (1936) 54 RPC 41 at 46 per Clauson J.
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addition, it should be noted that there is a degree of overlap between the factors. The factors are: The extent to which personal confidence is attached to an obligation.542 The notion of a personal confidence is an all-encompassing factor, and many of the other factors listed here could be seen as sub-groups of this factor. However, there will be many contracts which involve a distinct type of obligation that are best characterised in terms of trust and confidence: for example, a private contract to drive school children from school.543 In addition, a seller or supplier will usually have contracted on the basis of the confidence it places in the buyer’s personal ability to pay. However, a buyer can have a third party carry out the duty to pay as it is irrelevant to the seller who actually pays.544 In the case of a credit sale, if the credit is being provided by allowing the buyer to provide a promisory note to the seller or to accept a bill of exchange, this generally cannot be delegated to an assignee of the benefit of the contract, as this would be to replace the assignor’s credit with that of the assignee. The seller agrees to give credit on the basis of the assignor’s ability to pay.545 The extent to which personal skill, taste, judgement or expertise is attached to an obligation. These factors are more likely to be evidenced in service contracts than in contracts for the supply of goods.546 For example, such personal performance is likely to attach to a person hired to paint a picture or to write a play or book or to perform at a venue.547 Similarly an obligation of personal skill would attach to the services of a lawyer or physician. However, examples are not limited to the arts or such professions: For instance, it has been held that an architect cannot sub-contract his or her responsibilities of design.548 In Mallyons Ltd v The South 542 It is possible to add to this the solvency of the performing party, as this is relevant to its ability to carry out the obligation: see Swarts v Narragunsett Electric Lighting Co (1904) 59 A 77. 543 See Foloquet v Woodburn Public School (1934) 29 P 2d 554. 544 Cooper v Micklefield Coal and Lime Co Ltd (1912) 107 LT 457 at 458 per Hamilton J. 545 There may be cases where, despite there being a credit sale, the financial responsibility of the assignor was not material in inducing the obligor to contract with the assignor. This may be the case where there is made available some real security such as a mortgage. Here, arguably the obligation to supply a negotiable instrument may be delegated: see Montgomery v De Picot (1908) 96 P 305. 546 CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 at 582. See also Stevenson & Sons v Maule & Co (1920) SC 335 (vicarious performance in contracts for services should be rare unless the work can only be carried out by a sub-contractor as it increases costs, delays, complexity and misunderstandings without being advantageous to the client). 547 Griffith v Tower Publishing Co [1897] 1 Ch 21; Stevens v Benning (1855) 6 De G M & G 223, 43 ER 1218; Reade v Bentley (1857) 3 K & J 271, 69 ER 1110. See also Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660 at 668 per Collins MR; Fratelli Sorrentino v Buerger [1915] 1 KB 307 at 313 per Atkin J (affirmed [1915] 3 KB 367); Johnson v Raylton, Dixon & Co (1881) 7 QBD 438 at 444 per Cotton LJ; Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 BLR 33 at 52 per Bingham LJ; Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291 at 319 (affirmed [2000] Ch 291). 548 Moresk Cleaners Ltd v Hicks [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 338. See also Miller Construction Co v First Industrial Technology Corp (1991) 576 So 2d 748 at 751; Smith v Board of Education (1924) 222 P 101. Where part of the design involves specialist knowledge, such as that of an engineer, and the contractor independently employees such persons, the architect will not be liable for the work of that specialist even if he recommended him, unless he did not recommend a reputable consultant. In such a case, the architect
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Australian Harbours Board,549 a person was hired because of his personal skill and the confidence the other party placed in his ability to shunt trucks. However, if goods are bailed for some general repairs together with some specialist repairs and the repairer does not hold itself out as doing that specialist work, then he or she will be able to sub-contract that specialist work to a specialist.550 Moreover, in the case of a very mundane task, such as beating a carpet, it will usually be presumed that the customer is not concerned with the identity of the person carrying out the task.551 Outside these more obvious cases, decisions may differ on very similar facts. For example in Robson v Drummond,552 the defendant hired a carriage from its maker, Sharpe, for five years, rent payable yearly and in advance, on condition that the carriage be kept in repair and painted once a year by the maker. The maker retired from the business, the business was dissolved and all his interest was assigned to Robson who at all times was the other silent partner in the business. Robson offered to perform the duties previously carried out by Sharpe. The defendant refused to go on with the contract and Robson and Sharp brought an action against him. The claim was dismissed on the ground that the defendant might have been induced to enter into the contract by reason of the personal confidence he placed in Sharpe.553 The Court did not have to decide what the position would have been if the partnership had continued and the action was brought in the joint names of the partners. Littledale J said there would have been no objection to either partner suing on a contract entered into by one of them for the benefit of the firm. However, if the partnership did continue the firm would not have been able to enforce the contract if performance by the partnership was dependent
can be liable only if a problem arises with the consultant’s work that an architect of ordinary competence ought reasonably to be aware of and fails to warn its employer: see Investors in Industry Commercial Properties Ltd v South Bedfordshire District Council [1986] 1 All ER 787. 549 [1933] SASR 166. See also G H Myers & Co v Brent Cross Service Co [1934] 1 KB 46 at 55 per Parcq J. See further Standard Chautaugua System v Gift (1926) 242 P 145 at 146 (contract to select lecturers, musicians and entertainers); Corson v Lewis (1906) 109 NW 735 (contract for legal services); Deaton v Lawson (1905) 82 P 879 (contract for the services of a physician); Swarts v Narragensett Electrical Lighting Co (1904) 59 A 77 (provision of electrical services); Walker Electric Company v New York Shipbuilding Company (1917) 241 F 569 (contract for the supply of electrical parts for a battleship). 550 Edwards v Newland & Co [1950] 2 KB 534 at 542 per Denning LJ. Similar principles apply to all contracts for work and materials where the work involves further specialist work and the contractor does not have the skills to perform that work. In such cases it will be implied that the work may be vicariously performed. The customer’s consent to the sub-contracting will not necessarily extinguish the duty of the contractor to the customer for the performance of that obligation, especially if the contractor holds itself out as performing that type of work either itself or through sub-contractors: see Stewart v Reavell’s Garage [1952] 2 QB 545. In some cases the contractor’s obligation may be limited to exercising due care in choosing the sub-contractor: see above note 548. 551 See Thomas Stevenson & Sons v Robert Maule & Son [1920] SC 335. 552 (1831) 2 B & Ad 303, 109 ER 1156. See also Humble v Hunter (1848) 12 QB 310, 116 ER 885. 553 (1831) 2 B & Ad 303 at 307, 109 ER 1156 at 1158 per Lord Tenterden CJ, at 307–8, 1158 per Littledale J, at 308, 1158 per Parke J.
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upon the personal performance of the retired partner.554 Here, however, the contract was entered into in the name of one partner and the existence of the partnership was unknown to the defendant. Robson v Drummond was distinguished in The British Waggon Company and the Parkgate Waggon Company v Lea and Co.555 In that case, Parkgate Co hired out wagons to the defendant, Lea, and was under an obligation to keep the wagons in repair. The company (together with its liquidators), upon being voluntarily wound up, assigned its rights under this contract to another company, British Waggon Co, which in turn undertook to carry out the obligation to keep the wagons in repair and took possession of the repairing stations. The court held that the first company could sub-contract the duty to repair and would still be liable for any non-performance of that duty. Coburn CJ said:556 [W]e cannot suppose that in stipulating for the repair of these wagons by the company— a rough description of work which ordinary workmen conversant with the business would be perfectly able to execute—the defendants attached any importance to whether the repairs were done by the company, or by any one with whom the company might enter into a subsidiary contract to do the work. All that the hirers, the defendants, cared for in this stipulation was that the wagons should be kept in repair; it was indifferent to them by whom the repairs should be done.
The divergence in the results of these cases may suggest that the approach to characterising obligations is flawed. The only thing in Robson’s case that objectively appears capable of being a personal obligation is the duty to paint which the defendant could not complain of if Sharpe had stayed in business and had an employee carry out.557 However, as long as it is understood that the result depends 554 That is, although it may be possible for the partnership to continue to perform a contract made with the partnership as opposed to an individual partner even when a particular partner has left, there may be contracts that are entered into with the partnership solely because of the skills of a particular partner: see [6.74] and see Dr Jaeger’s Sanitary Woollen System Co Ltd v Walker & Sons (1897) 77 LT 180. See also Phillips v Alhambra Palace Co [1901] 1 QB 59. 555 (1880) 5 QBD 149. The decision in this case was approved by Lord Lindley in Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 at 425 and Parker LJ in Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 BLR 33 at 43. See also Edwards v Newland & Co [1950] 2 KB 534 at 538 per Somervell LJ. 556 (1880) 5 QBD 149 at 153. See also Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 at 1019 per Viscount Simon LC where he said that the point of the British Waggon case “was that the contract which the Parkgate Co had made with Lea for the repair of certain wagons did not call for the repairs being necessarily effected by the Parkgate Co itself, but could be adequately performed by the Parkgate Co arranging with British Waggon Co that the latter should execute the repairs. . . . [T]he contract of repair was duly discharged by Parkgate Co by getting the repair satisfactorily effected by a third party. In other words, the contract bound the Parkgate Co to produce a result not necessarily by its own efforts, but if it preferred by vicarious performance.” 557 See OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 45. Cf the comment of Cockburn CJ in The British Waggon Co and the Parkgate Waggon Co v Lea & Co (1880) 5 QBD 149 at 153 and that of Kekewich J at first instance in Dr Jaeger’s Sanitary Woollen & Co v Walker (1897) 77 LT 180 at 183. See also Phillips v Alhambra Palace Co [1901] 1 QB 59.
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upon construction and not simply a characterisation of the nature of the obligation, the variance in results should not be seen as troublesome.558 Moreover, there are some important differences between the cases.559 The British Waggon case involved a contract with a company, whereas Robson v Drummond involved a partnership. It is more likely that personal confidence would be found in the latter especially if it is expressed to be made with the existing partnership only.560 In addition, in Robson v Drummond the defendant did not know of the partnership or the existence of the silent partner. Finally, the decision in the British Waggon case is problematic. In that case the assignor ceased to exist, however, presumably it was still the party liable to the obligor for the non-performance of its contractual duties. What then would have happened if the contract rights had been assigned and the assignee consented vicariously to perform the assignor’s duties but failed to do so? The obligor would be left in the situation whereby rights are enforceable against him or her but the party liable to perform obligations for the obligor had ceased to exist. Except for unconditionally accrued obligations the assignee’s rights are dependent upon the continued existence of the contract and the contract may not survive the extinction of the assignor unless it vests in some legal representative of the assignor.561 If that is not the case, one answer, not available at the time of the decision, is that the assignee contractually consented to perform the duties and the obligor, being the third party beneficiary of that agreement, may enforce it. Alternatively, it would be necessary to show that this was an instance where a duty was assigned along with the right making the assignee directly liable to the obligor for the non-performance of the duties.562 In addition to service contracts, there will be sale contracts where the buyer relies on the personal skill of the vendor.563 However, often it will not matter to the buyer who supplies or delivers the goods.564 Moreover, where a contract exists and orders under that contract depend upon the personal idiosyncrasies of the buyer, that duty may not be vicariously performed as the seller has agreed to accommodate that buyer. However, the actual placing of orders according to the buyer’s wishes could be carried out by a third party.565 558 See also Schupack v McDonald’s System Inc (1978) 264 NW 2d 827 and compare Re Sunrise Restaurants (1991) 135 BR 149, [1991] Bankr Lexis 1841. 559 Interestingly in Phillips v Alhambra Palace Co [1901] 1 QB 59, the decision in Robson v Drummond was discussed without criticism whilst the decision in the British Waggon case was not mentioned. 560 Phillips v Alhambra Palace Co [1901] 1 QB 59 at 65 per Kennedy J. Cf [6.74]. 561 [8.36]. 562 [6.101]. 563 Cooper v Micklefield Coal and Lime Co Ltd (1912) 107 LT 457 at 458 per Hamilton J. See also Sally Beauty Co Inc v Nexxus Products Co Inc (1986) 801 F 2d 100. 564 Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1903] AC 414 at 417 per Lord Macnaghten; Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291 at 319 (affirmed [2000] Ch 291). 565 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd (1992) 57 BLR 57 at 77 per Staughton LJ (on appeal [1994] 1 AC 85); Bovis International Inc v The Circle Ltd Partnership (1995) 49 Con LR 12 at 22 per Staughton LJ.
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The requirement of personal attendance or supervision. Personal attendance or supervision is also an important indicator and overlaps to some extent with the second mentioned factor. For example in Kollerich & Cie SA v The State Trading Corp of India,566 a seller was given an option to appoint one of two inspectors to inspect the loading and stacking of certain bags. If carried out the seller would have been absolved from liability for shortage or bursting bags. The seller appointed one of the inspectors and, although that inspector issued the relevant certificate, the actual work was performed by a third party. It was held that the seller was not absolved from liability to the buyer. On construction it was held that the inspection had to be carried out by one of the two nominated inspectors. Any other construction was nonsense. There was no point in nominating an inspector if he or she could sub-contract the work to a third party. Similarly although it may be normal practice in certain businesses to have an employee, apprentice or student carry out some or all of the work,567 this may not excuse the employer’s obligation of supervision. Reputation. Where a contractor is chosen because of some previous experience with the contractor or because of a recommendations provided by friends of the employer or because of the contractor’s public reputation, then some, if not all, of the contractor’s obligations are likely to be personal.568 Term of contract. In many large or long-term contracts, a contracting party may be concerned about changes in the way the other party performs its contracts, as that may affect it receiving the performance contracted for.569 In such a case, the obligations of the other party are likely to be personal. However, equally, in a longterm contract it may be expected that the identity of the parties may change over time, and this assignability may suggest that obligations can also be vicariously performed.570 Nature of the service or product. Where the excellence or value of the service or product depends on the input of the other party it is more likely that the obligation is intended to be personal.571 In many cases a manufacturing contract will not be with an individual, but rather a firm or company; however, when a contract is made with a firm or company having a reputation and where there is reliance on that reputation, then the purchaser can refuse goods not manufactured by that firm or company.572 This is most likely to be the case in respect of goods of 566
[1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 32. Johnson v Raylton, Dixon & Co (1881) 7 QBD 438 at 444 per Cotton LJ, at 454 per Brett LJ. 568 Ibid, at 444 per Cotton LJ; Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 BLR 33 at 49 per Parker LJ. 569 Cooper v Micklefield Coal and Lime Co Ltd (1912) 107 LT 457 at 459 per Hamilton J. 570 Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 (where the excessive term of the contract suggested that rights and duties were not personal). 571 Johnson v Raylton, Dixon & Co (1881) 7 QBD 438 at 444 per Cotton LJ; New England Cabinet Works v Morris (1917) 115 NE 315. 572 The reputation of the manufacturer need not be a public reputation; the buyer may rely on his or her own experience or that of friends. 567
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excellence573 and custom-made goods,574 however, because ultimately the issue is one of construction, it is not solely determined by the nature of the goods and therefore may apply to more mundane items when the nature of the service or transaction is looked at as a whole.575 For example, in Dr Jaeger’s Sanitary Woollen System Co Ltd v Walker & Sons,576 a manufacturing firm was retained by a company to produce certain garments that would carry the company’s logo. The Court of Appeal held that the contract concerned special goods requiring the personal responsibility of all three partners of the firm. In coming to this conclusion the Court did not limit its investigation to the goods; it also investigated the financial terms of the contract which evidenced the personal nature of the obligation as the firm had a right to inspect the books of the company, and that so long as the company owed money to the firm on any debenture, the company had to accept drafts drawn by the firm on the company up to certain amounts. (7) Need for co-operation. Where the contract requires a substantial degree of post-contract co-operation and amplification of terms it is likely that duties under that contract are intended to be personal.577 This is often the case in building contracts where it is impossible to set out and define every aspect of the work at the time of contract. Therefore, overlapping with some of the above factors in helping to make those post-contract decisions an employer may place great trust and confidence in a contractor’s or developer’s reputation and experience.578 In such cases, the more discretion vested in a person the more likely it is their duty is personal.579 [6.80] Limited class of delegatees. An obligation may be delegated only to a person with the requisite skill to perform the obligation. Other factors may also be relevant in limiting the class of potential delegatees. For example, in Sally Beauty 573
Johnson v Raylton, Dixon & Co (1881) 7 QBD 438 at 444 per Cotton LJ, at 447 per Bramwell LJ. Eg Dr Jaeger’s Sanitary Woollen System Co Ltd v Walker & Sons (1897) 77 LT 180. 575 See further on performance and manufacturers [6.77]. 576 (1897) 77 LT 180. 577 Arkansas Valley Smelting Co v Belden Mining Co (1888) 127 US 379. 578 Eg Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 BLR 33 (here the extent of trust and confidence placed in the developer was evidenced by the amount of details still to be determined; for example, there was at the time no determination as to the number, size and placement of windows, doors, walls or toilets; in addition the location of the stairway, lifts and entrance foyer was still to be decided; moreover the development was one part of a larger development of the surrounding area of which the developer had intimate knowledge; such knowledge was crucial to the making of decisions; thus even if delegation was possible it had to be a person who had an interest in the entire development rather than a person who was interested in carrying out the work only in a way least burdensome to him- or herself; taken together this evidenced the personal nature of these obligations even though the actual party to the contract was a company and the developer in question was a member of that company; however, to all intents and purposes he was the company). See also Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd (1992) 57 BLR 57 at 77 per Staughton LJ ([1994] 1 AC 85 HL); Charlotte Thirty Ltd & Bison Ltd v Croker Ltd (1990) 24 Con LR 46; Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104 at 118–20; Johnson v Vickers (1909) 120 NW 837. 579 Yellow Cab of Cleveland Inc v Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (1991) 595 NE 2d 508 at 511. 574
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Co Inc v Nexxus Products Co Inc,580 a manufacturer of hair care products entered into an agreement with a distributor which was later taken over by a successor. That successor was a wholly-owned subsidiary of another manufacturer of hair care products. The majority of the court did not conclude that the distributor’s obligations were personal.581 Nevertheless they concluded that there could be no delegation to such a competitor without the consent of the manufacturer. The manufacturer had contracted for the distributor’s “best efforts”, and this was its consideration for refraining from contracting with other distributors. It was thought that such a successor was unlikely to use its “best efforts”. The decision of the majority was subject to a powerful dissent from Posner J. He did not think the delegatee’s owner was a true competitor as it made hair care products for a different end of the market and sold them in different types of outlets. In addition, the delegatee distributed products for a number of other manufacturers, and it would not be in its interests to refrain from using its “best efforts” as it would soon obtain a reputation for not doing so and put its other distribution agreements in jeopardy. He cautioned against approaching such cases with a professional mind set which views the situation as one involving a conflict of interest. Such conflicts, although an impediment to professional practice, may be an accepted and legitimate part of business for commercial people. [6.81] Vicarious performance, repudiation and termination. If a contract requires personal performance then the hiring of another person to carry out that performance may amount to a breach or repudiation of the contract, and, if not, then the performance of that obligation by that third party may in some cases put it out of the power of the obligor to perform, thus giving rise to a breach or repudiation.582 In most cases, whether or not there has been a repudiation will be a matter of degree.583 In addition, it has been held that where a personal obligation rests on the partners of a firm,584 it is not possible for those partners unilaterally to terminate their obligation to perform by having one of the partners leave the firm and dissolve the partnership. In such a case, the other party is given an election to terminate the contract or to affirm it.585
580
(1986) 801 F 2d 1001. Cf Berliner Foods Corp v Pillsbury Co (1986) 633 F Supp 557. 582 The British Waggon Co and the Parkgate Waggon Co v Lea & Co (1880) 5 QBD 149 at 153 per Cockburn CJ; Edwards v Newland & Co [1950] 2 KB 534 at 537–8 per Somervell LJ. 583 Eg Fratelli Sorrentino v Buerger [1915] 1 KB 307 ([1915] 3 KB 367 CA). 584 That is, where the contract is made with the individual partners and not the firm and no provision exists in the contract for it to continue despite a change in the firm. 585 Dr Jaeger’s Sanitary Woollen System Co Ltd v Walker & Son (1897) 77 LT 180. Upon the dissolution of a partnership there remains an obligation on the partners to perform and complete contracts that are on foot at the time of the dissolution. 581
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(iv) Contractual Provisions Dealing with Assignment [6.82] Introduction.586 As already noted, an express contractual provision may allow for the assignment of a right which otherwise may have been construed as being personal and not assignable.587 Usually, however, contractual provisions attempt to limit or prohibit assignability.588 These may be directed towards contractual rights to performance or even an equity of redemption.589 This section is concerned with the effect of such prohibitions.590 [6.83] The doctrinal operation of a prohibition on assignment. Before turning to the legitimacy and legal effect of prohibitions on assignment it is necessary to consider how such provisions may operate. That is, if one assumes that a prohibition may render any attempted assignment ineffective, how is that achieved at a doctrinal level? At present, this is a point that has not been considered in detail by the courts. In Devefi Pty Ltd v Mateffy Pearl Nagy Pty Ltd,591 the Federal Court approved a statement of Untermyer J in Sacks v Neptune Meter Co,592 where he suggested that prohibitions on the assignment of contractual rights do not impeach the rule against restraints on alienation because such provisions merely condition the obligation to perform rather than the right itself.593 That is, because the contractual restraint conditions the obligation to perform it does not affect the assignability of the right. The result of this analysis would appear to be that the right may 586 For a discussion of relevant American authorities see G Grismore, “The Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in a Contract” (1933) 31 Michigan L Rev 299; G Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, paras 7.7–7.9. 587 [6.72]. 588 There are various commercial reasons why a party may wish to inhibit assignability and why another party would demand assignability: see A McKnight, “Contractual Restrictions on a Creditor’s Right to Alienate Debts: Part 1” [2003] JIBL 1 at 3; WF Manning, “Assignment Clauses in Mining and Petroleum Joint Ventures” [1986] Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association Yearbook 119; RA Epstein, “Why Restrain Alienation” (1985) 85 Columbia L Rev 970 at 982. See also G Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, para 7.9. There are also legal reasons for including a prohibition on assignment, for example, to preserv