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THE ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS Assignment is a crucial topic in commercial law, and this new work by Gregory Tolhurst is the most comprehensive work on the assignment of contractual rights ever published. It seeks to explain the existence, meaning and application of the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights and it does this by reference to the idea that assignments involve transfers. The book is logically structured to follow the issues that arise in planning, drafting and enforcing an assignment, including: —what is meant by “assignment”; —what is the distinction between legal and equitable assignments; —how an assignable contractual right is identified; —what formalities apply to assignment; and —what rights and remedies are available to the parties to an assignment The topic of assignment is of such universal importance to commercial lawyers that all practicing lawyers will find this work invaluable. However, the work will also be required reading for academics teaching contract, equity and personal property.
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The Assignment of Contractual Rights
GREG TOLHURST
OXFORD AND PORTLAND, OREGON 2006
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Published in North America (US and Canada) by Hart Publishing c/o International Specialized Book Services 920 NE 58th Avenue, Suite 300 Portland, OR 97213-3786 USA Tel: +1 503 287 3093 or toll-free: (1) 800 944 6190 Fax: +1 503 280 8832 E-mail:
[email protected] Website: www.isbs.com © Greg Tolhurst 2006 Greg Tolhurst has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any mean, without the prior permission of Hart Publishing, or as expressly permitted by law or under the terms agreed with the appropriate reprographic rights organisation. Enquiries concerning reproduction which may not be covered by the above should be addressed to Hart Publishing at the address below. Hart Publishing, Salters Boatyard, Folly Bridge, Abingdon Rd, Oxford, OX1 4LB Telephone: +44 (0)1865 245533 Fax: +44 (0)1865 794882 Email:
[email protected] Website: http//:www.hartpub.co.uk British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data Available ISBN-13: 978-1-84113-586-1 (hardback) ISBN-10: 1-84113-586-0 (hardback) Typeset by Hope Services (Abingdon) Ltd. Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
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For Elisabeth, Joshua, Samuel, Benjamin and Michael
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PREFACE
This book is based on my PhD dissertation and remains a thesis-based work. However, I hope practitioners will find it useful. The thesis is conservative; it attempts to explain the well known rules governing the assignment of contractual rights by reference to the legal notion of “transfer”. Much material has been included in the text that falls outside the thesis. The book is structured to deal with those questions that tend to get asked when assigning contractual rights, namely, “what is meant by ‘assignment’”? (Chapter 3); “what is the nature of equitable and legal assignments”? (Chapters 4 and 5); “have I got an assignable right”? (Chapter 6); “what have I got to do to assign an assignable right”? (Chapter 7) and “what are the various rights and remedies of the parties to an assignment”? (Chapter 8). I would like to thank my supervisers, Professors Christopher Rossiter and Denis Harley of the University of New South Wales for all their support during the writing of the dissertation. I also owe thanks to my examiners, Professors JW Carter, Charles Rickett and Norman Palmer, all of whom have been helpful in turning the dissertation into a book. I would like to single out Professor Carter who has given me an enormous amount of support and time and coffee in writing the book. I also owe an enourmous debt to Justice McPherson AO of the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of Queensland, for reading and commenting on a draft of the book. I would also like to thank Richard Wilson of the Victorian Bar for reading and commenting on some of the early chapters and for providing me with a copy of his dissertation, “Alienation of Income by Assignment”. I should add to this list Dr Simon Evans, who read a draft of the initial PhD dissertation. There have been many other people who encouraged me to write the dissertation and book or have given of their time to discuss aspects of this subject or who have kept me in mind when some interesting case or article has crossed their desks or have been helpful in tracking down books, articles or papers that were not easy to get hold of. Within this broad group I would particularly like to thank Sir Jack Beatson, Justice Keith Mason, President of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, The Honourable RP Meagher QC, Professor DW McLauchlan, Professor Michael Furmston, Professor Lee Aitken, Professor Andrew Burrows, Professor Malcolm Clarke, Richard Nolan, Elise Bant, Richard Potok, Gerald Ng and Peter Turner. I would also like to thank my colleagues at Freehills, particularly Matthew Stutsel and John Angus, for the wonderful variety of assignment-related facts they have thrown at me. I could never have thought of them all on my own and many have never and probably will never appear in a judgment.
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I would also like to thank Kelly Ngo and Helen Saunders for their helpful research assistence in the latter, “what have I missed” part of the process. I would also like to thank the University of Sydney, Research Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, for providing a small writing fellowship that afforded me with some teaching relief to finalise the book. Some of the contents of Chapters 4, 6 and 8 were originally published in the Law Quarterly Review and the Sydney Law Review. I would like to thank the editors for permission to reproduce that work. I would also like to thank the band for occasionally dragging me away from this. And also thanks to Gerd and Dylan for their artistic recommendations. I must also mention and thank Richard Hart and his team at Hart Publishing Ltd for agreeing to publish this book and for making the publication process a smooth one. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank Elisabeth for all her love and support. GJ Tolhurst 10 October 2005
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CONTENTS
Preface Table of Cases Table of Statutes Table of Statutory Instruments International Conventions and Model Laws
vii xiii lv lxii lxiii
PART 1: INTRODUCTION 1. Introduction (a) General (b) Structure of Book (c) Some Limitations 2. A Brief History of Assignment (a) (b) (c) (d)
Introduction Choses in Action Assignment of Choses in Action Conclusion
3 3 8 9 11 11 11 19 27
PART 2: THE NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT 3. Assignment and the Concept of Transfer (a) Introduction (b) Meaning of Assignment (i) Introduction (ii) Assignment Distinguished from Other Transactions (c) Assignment as Transfer (d) The Element of Intention (i) Introduction (ii) Outright Assignment and Security Assignments (iii) Equitable Charges (iv) Declarations of Trust (e) The Requirement of a Proprietary Right (f) Assignment and Privity of Contract
31 31 32 32 33 35 44 44 44 49 52 53 62
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x
Contents
4. Equitable Assignments (a) Introduction (b) Equitable Assignment of Equitable Interests (c) Equitable Assignment of Legal Interests Assignable at Law (i) Introduction (ii) The Character of an Equitable Assignment of a Legal Right (iii) Notice and joinder (d) Equitable Assignment of Legal Interests Not Assignable at Law (e) Assignment of Future Interests 5. Statutory or Legal Assignments (a) Introduction (b) The Procedural View (c) The Substantive View (d) Conclusion
65 65 66 66 66 68 73 90 97 103 103 105 107 117
PART 3: ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS 6. Assignable Contractual Rights (a) Introduction (b) The Requirement of a Chose in Action (i) Contractual Rights as Choses in Action (ii) Contractual Rights as Property Rights (iii) Ownership of Contractual Rights (c) The Requirement of Present Property (i) Introduction (ii) The Distinction between Present and Future Property (iii) Dealings in Conditional, Contingent and Unconditional Contractual Rights (d) Division and Separation of Contractual Rights (e) Restrictions on the Assignment of Contractual Rights (i) Introduction (ii) Public Policy Restrictions (iii) Personal Contractual Rights and Obligations A. Personal contractual rights B. Personal obligations (iv) Contractual Provisions Dealing with Assignment (v) The principle of Transfer as it Relates to the Personal Rights Rule and Contractual Provisions Dealing with Assignment (vi) Assignment and the Variation of the Obligations of the Obligor (f) Assignment of Contractual Burdens
121 121 122 122 133 136 138 138 139 148 171 187 187 187 212 216 235 246 278 279 287
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7. Formalities 313 (a) Introduction 313 (b) Intention 314 (c) Subject Matter 330 (d) Formalities 334 (i) Equitable Assignments of Choses in Action; the Assignment of Legal Interests 334 (ii) Equitable Assignments of Choses in Action; the Assignment of Equitable Interests 349 (iii) Legal Assignments of Choses in Action 360 (iv) Assignment of Future Contractual Rights 376 PART 4: THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES 8. The Position of the Parties (a) Introduction (b) Assignor/Obligor (c) Assignor/Assignee (d) Assignee/Obligor (i) The Rights of the Assignee (ii) The Rights of the Obligor (iii) The Rights of the Obligor: Transfer and the Obligor’s Ability to Vary the Contract after Notice of Assignment (iv) The Rights of the Obligor: Transfer and the Obligor’s Defences against the Assignor to which the Assignee is Subject (v) The Rights of the Obligor: Unconscionable Conduct and the Obligor’s Defences against the Assignor to which the Assignee is Subject (vi) Counterclaims (e) Successive Assignments (f) Insolvency (g) Controlling the Discretion of the Obligor
381 381 382 383 386 386 407
Index
473
416 426
450 458 466 469 470
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TABLE OF CASES References are to paragraph number Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1991] 1 AC 56 ..................................6.47 Abbott v Philbin [1961] AC 352 ..........................................................................6.88 Abjornson v Urban Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1989] WAR 191 .................7.26, 7.30 Aboussafy v Abacus Cities Ltd [1981] 4 WWR 660 ............................................8.64 Abraham v Thompson [1997] 4 All ER 362 ........................................................6.63 Abram Steamship Co Ltd v Westville Shipping Co Ltd [1923] AC 773 ...6.10, 8.04 Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Microcomputer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 389.......................................................................................3.11, 4.18, 4.27 Actien-Gesellschaft für Cartonnagen Industrie AG v Tenler (1899) 16 RPC 447.........................................................................................................4.13 Adams and the Kensington Vestry, Re (1883) 24 Ch 199 ..................................8.30 Adamson v Hayes (1973) 130 CLR 276 ...............................................................7.26 Adcock v Jolly (1893) 19 VLR 609 ............................................4.14, 4.15, 4.25, 7.21 Aectra Refining & Manufacturing Inc v Exmar NV [1994] 1 WLR 1634...............................................................................................8.64, 8.76 Aetna Insurance Co v Smith, McKinnon & Son (1918) 78 So 289 ....................6.87 AF Grant Pty Ltd v MacDonald [1960] Qd R 465 ..............................................3.07 AG v Swan & Fuller (1877) SALR 85 ...................................................................7.07 AGIP (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547........................................................3.11 Agnew & Bearsley v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710...................................................................................................3.17, 6.44 Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710...................3.16, 6.56 Agra Bank, ex parte (1868) LR 3 Ch App 555 .....................................................7.18 Agra and Masterman’s Bank, Re (1867) LR 2 Ch App 391 ................................8.26 Aiolos, The [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25 ...........................................................3.10, 4.18 Akron Tyre Co Pty Ltd v Kittson (1951) 82 CLR 477................................7.16, 7.44 Aktion, The [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 283 .................................................................3.06 Alabaster v Harness [1895] 17 Ch D 49...............................................................6.59 Alderson v White (1858) 2 De G & J 97 ..............................................................3.16 Alexander & Alexander v Koelz (1987) 722 SW 2d 311 .....................................6.08 Alexander v Steinhardt, Walker & Co [1903] 2 KB 208 ...................6.15, 7.06, 7.07 Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518 ..............8.03
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Allgemeine Versicherungs-Gesellschaft Helvetia v Administrator of German Property [1931] 1 KB 672 .................................................................................7.40 Allhusen v Caristo Construction Corp (1952) 103 NE 2d 891..................6.87, 6.88 Allied Carpets Group plc v MacFarlane [2002] EW HC 1155 QBD (TCC)......7.06 Altarama Ltd v Camp (1980) 5 ACLR 513 ..........................................................8.91 Amalgamated General Finance Co Ltd v CE Golding & Co Ltd [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 163....................................................................6.73, 7.35, 7.38, 7.40 Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2005) 214 ALR 56...........................................................................................6.101 American Colortype Co v Continental Colortype Co (1903) 188 US 104 ........6.73 American Smelting & Refining Co v Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co (1918) 248 F 172 .................................................................6.71 Amicable Assurance Co v Bolland (1830) 4 Bligh NS 194; 5 ER 70...................8.63 AMP Specialist Funding Consultants Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 326 ..............8.70 ANC Ltd v Clark, The Times , 31 May 2000 ...............................................6.87, 6.88 Anderson v Commercial Union Assurance Company (1885) 55 LJQB 146 .....8.25 Anderson v Peldan (2005) 220 ALR 565..............................................................3.11 Anderson v Radcliffe (1858) EL BL & EL 806; 120 ER 710 ................................6.59 Androma Pty Ltd, Re [1987] 2 Qd R 134 ...............2.14, 4.31, 6.15, 7.13, 7.16, 7.44 Anning v Anning (1907) 4 CLR 1049 ...............................................4.14, 4.19, 6.87, 6.89, 7.20, 7.21, 7.38, 8.04 Aplin v Cates (1860) 30 LJ Ch 6..................................................................8.06, 8.48 Application by Marly Laboratory Ltd, Re [1952] 1 All ER 1057 ........................7.43 Arbuthnot v Norton (1846) 5 Moore 219; 13 ER 474 ........................................6.58 Archibold Howie Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1948) 77 CLR 143.........................................................................................................6.20 Arden v Arden (1885) 29 Ch D 702 ............................................................4.20, 7.18 Argo Fund Ltd v Essar Steel Ltd [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 203........................6.71, 6.87 Aries Tanker Corp v Total Transport Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 185..........8.64, 8.78, 8.90 Arjon Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2003) 8 VR 502 ...................7.18 Arkansas Valley Smelting Co v Belden Mining Co (1888) 127 US 379 ..............................................................................6.68, 6.70, 6.73, 6.79 Aron v Miall [1929] 98 LJKB 204 6.59m .............................................................6.73 Ashby Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 ............................................................................3.15, 3.17, 4.27, 6.49, 7.39 Ashmore v Corporation of Lloyd’s (No 2) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 620................6.78 Ashwin v Burton (1862) 7 LT 589........................................................................8.67 Asphaltic Wood Pavement Co, Re (1885) 30 Ch D 216 .....................................8.96 Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 588.....................................................................................................3.16, 6.84 Atkins v Dawbury (1714) Gilb Eq Rep 88; 22 ER 835 ........................................8.18 Atlantic & NCR Co v Atlantic & NC Co (1908) 61 SE 185 ..............................6.121
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Atlantic Lines & Navigation Co Inc v The Ship “Didymi” and Didymi Corp (The Didymi) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 97...................................................8.78 Attika Hope, The [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 439 ........................................................7.01 Attwood and Reid Ltd v Stephens Excavators Ltd [1932] NZLR 1332 ..............................................................................6.87, 6.88, 6.89, 7.12 Auckland City Council v Union House Ltd 11/8/2004 New Zealand Court of Appeal 162/03.....................................................................................6.87 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (No 2) (1992) 177 CLR 106.......................................................................................................2.06 Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust, Re (1991) 30 FCR 491 ...........................7.07 Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v Balding (1930) 43 CLR 140 ...................................................6.14, 6.20, 6.37, 6.39, 6.42, 6.43, 6.45 Australian Olympic Committee Inc v Big Fights Inc [1999] FCA 1042 ...6.84, 6.88 Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700 .........................................................................................................7.38 Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd (2000) 172 ALR 702, affd (2001) 110 FCR 157 ..........................................6.86, 6.87, 6.88 Australian Workers Union v Bowen (1946) 72 CLR 575 ...................................4.27 Australis Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104 ..............................................................................................6.69, 6.79 Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435 ......................6.28 Automobile Association (Canterbury) Inc v Australasian Secured Deposits Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 417......................................................................3.16 Automobile Carriage Builders Ltd v Sayers (1909) 101 LT 419 .........................6.08 Awwad v Geraghty & Co [2001] QB 570.............................................................6.59 Ayala Holdings Ltd (No 2) [1996] 1 BCLC 467 ..................................................6.67 Babson v Village of Ulysses (1952) 52 NW 2d 320 .............................................8.41 Bacon v Yatchaw Irrigation and Wagter Supply Trust (1898) 23 VLR 485.....................................................................................................5.06, 5.18 Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399.....................................................................................................3.17, 4.27 Baines v Geary (1887) 35 Ch D 154 .....................................................................6.08 Baird v Baird [1990] 2 AC 548 .............................................................................7.33 Baker v Adam [1908-10] All ER 632....................................................................8.88 Baker v Merckel [1960] 1 QB 657 ........................................................................8.03 Bakewell v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (South Australia) (1937) 58 CLR 743....................................................................................6.37, 6.45 Balder London, The [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 489..................................7.16, 7.40, 8.95 Ball v Warwick (1881) 50 LJQB 382 ....................................................................6.59 Baloglow v Konstantinidis (2001) 11 BPR 20 ............................................7.28, 7.29 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (The Mikhail Lermontov) (1993) 176 CLR 344.....................................................................................6.26, 6.28, 8.33
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Banco Central SA and Trevelan Navigation Inc v Lingoss & Falce Ltd v BFI Line ltd (The Raven) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 266 ...............................8.83, 8.94 Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 776.....................6.14 Bandwill Pty Ltd v Spencer-Laitt (2000) 23 WAR 390 .....................6.59, 6.61, 6.63 Bank of Australasia v Annie Hertz (1937) 54 WN(NSW) 179 ..................................................................................4.14, 4.15, 7.07, 7.12, 7.37 Bank of Boston Connecticut v European Grain and Shipping Ltd [1989] 1 AC 1056.............................................................................8.64, 8.85, 8.90 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8), Re [1998] AC 214.......................................................................................................3.17, 6.14 Bank of Liverpool & Martins Ltd v Holland (1926) 43 TLR 29 .......4.26, 7.39, 7.40 Bank of Melbourne Ltd v HPM Pty Ltd (1997) 26 ACSR 110 ...........................6.67 Bank of New South Wales v Brown (1983) 151 CLR 514...................................6.49 Bank of New South Wales v Northern British and Mercantile Insurance Co (1882) 3 NSWLR (L) 60 ..............................................................................6.73 Bank of New South Wales v The King [1918] NZLR 945.................3.17, 7.09, 7.40 Bank of New Zealand v Harry M Miller & Co Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 48.........8.64 Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd (The Good Luck) [1990] 1 QB 818 .............................6.12, 6.101 Bank of NY Butterfield and Son Ltd v Golinsky [1926] AC 733........................4.15 Bank of Victoria Ltd v Langlands Foundry Co Ltd (1898) 23 VLR 230 ............3.09 Barclays Bank v Willowbrook International Ltd [1986] BCLC 45.....................8.04 Barker v Stickney [1919] 1 KB 121.................................................6.88, 6.106, 6.110 Barroora Pty Ltd v Provincial Insurance Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 170................6.76 Barrow v Isaacs & Son [1891] 1 QB 417 ..............................................................6.87 Batchelor v Murphy [1926] AC 63.......................................................................8.30 Bateman Television Ltd v Coleridge Finance Co Ltd [1969] NZLR 794 ...........7.37 Bateman v Hunt [1904] 2 KB 530...............................................................7.38, 8.60 Bawejem Ltd v MC Fabrications Ltd [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 377..................6.88 Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd v Natural Gas Corporation Energy Ltd [2002] 1 NZLR 173.................................................................................6.120, 8.83 Baytur SA v Finagro Holding SA [1992] 1 QB 610 ................4.26, 6.73, 6.132, 8.29 Bayview Quarries Pty Ltd v Castley Development Pty Ltd [1963] VR 445 .......8.85 Beatty v Brashs Pty Ltd [1998] 2 VR 201 ...........................................2.05, 6.61, 6.62 Beaumont, Re [1902] 1 Ch 889 ............................................................................7.04 Beckett v Tower Assets Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 1.....................................................3.16 Beecham v Pater (1890) 16 VLR 13 .....................................................................7.07 Belize Motor Supply Company v Cox [1914] 1 KB 244 .....................................6.87 Bell Bros Pty Ltd v Sarich [1971] WAR 157 ........................................................3.07 Bell v London & North Western Railway Co (1852) 15 Beav 548; 51 ER 651 ................................................................................4.15, 7.04, 7.05, 7.07 Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gated Export Corp (1984) 52 ALR 176 ......................6.63
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Bence v Shearman [1898] 2 Ch 582 ............................................................7.18, 8.06 Bennett v White [1910] 2 KB 643 ......................................................3.27, 5.06, 8.83 Bergmann v MacMillan (1881) 17 Ch D 423 ......................................................4.27 Berliner Foods Corp v Pilsbury Co (1986) 633 F Supp 557 ...............................6.80 Bevan Ashford v Geoff Yeandle (Contractors) Ltd [1999] Ch 239....................6.59 BICC plc v Burndy Corporation [1985] 1 Ch 232 ..............................................8.04 Bickerton v Walker (1885) 31 Ch D 151 .............................................................8.60 Biggerstaff v Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd [1896] 2 Ch 93 .............................4.27, 8.51, 8.83 Bingham v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 209 ..........................................6.88 Birchal v Birch, Crisp & Co [1913] 2 Ch 375 ......................................................8.70 Birmingham Breweries Ltd v Jameson (1898) 67 LJ Ch 403 .....................6.70, 6.76 Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 183....................6.09 Blacktown Municipal Council v Doneo [1971] 1 NSWLR 157 .........................6.88 Blackwood’s Ltd v Chartres (1931) 31 SR(NSW) 619 ..............................6337, 6.20 Blakely Ordnance Co, Re (1867) LR 3 Ch App 154 ............................................8.26 Blankenstein, The [1985] 1 WLR 435.........................................................3.06, 3.07 Board of Education of the Borough of Flemington v State Board of Education (1911) 81 A 163 ...............................................................................6.73 BOC Group plc v Centeon LLC [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 53............................8.26 Bond, Re (1940) 35 Tas LR 96.....................................................................6.87, 7.12 Bond Worth Ltd, Re [1980] Ch 228 ....................................................................3.17 Bone v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1972] 2 NSWLR 651..........................7.37 Booth v Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159 .........................................................................3.09, 3.22, 4.31, 6.10, 6.20, 6.38 Booth v Williams (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 421 ..........................................................2.12 Boston Ice Co v Potter (1877) 25 Am Rep 9 .....................................6.69, 6.76, 6.77 Bourne v Colodense Ltd [1985] ICR 291 ............................................................6.61 Bovis International Inc v Circle Ltd Partnership (1995) 49 Con LR 12...............................................................................6.73, 6.79, 7.41, 8.10, 8.13 Bradford Banking Co Ltd v Henry Briggs, Son & Co (1886) LR 12 App Cas 29 .........................................................................................................8.13 Bradford Old Bank Ltd v Sutcliffe [1918] 2 KB 833 .........................................6.100 Bradlaugh v Newdegate (1883) 11 QBD 1...........................................................6.59 Bray v Commissioner of Taxation (1968) 117 CLR 349.....................................7.37 Brede, The [1974] 1 QB 233 ........................................................................8.64, 8.78 Brennan v Pitt Son & Badgery Ltd (1889) 20 NSWR 179 ..................................8.83 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376...................................................................6.09 Brew v Whitlock [1967] VR 449 ..........................................................................6.59 Briargate Developments Ltd v Newprop Co Ltd [1990] 1 EGLR 283 ...........................................................................................................6.08 Brice v Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569...............................2.02, 4.20, 4.27, 6.07, 6.88, 7.07, 7.12, 8.06, 8.38, 8.45, 8.46, 8.48
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Bridge v Wholesale Acceptance Corp (Aust) v Burnard (1992) 27 NSWLR 415 ..................................................................................................6.58 Britain & Overseas Trading (Bristles) Ltd v Brooks Wharf & Bull Wharf [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 51 .......................................................................6.117 Britain v Rossiter (1879) 11 QBD 123 .................................................................5.04 British Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Marine Management (UK) Ltd [1980] QB 137 ...................................................................................8.47 British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store Service Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006 ...............................................................................................6.59 British Fuels Ltd v Baxendale [1999] 2 AC 52...................................................6.101 British Gas Trading Ltd v Eastern Electricity Plc, unreported, English Court of Appeal, 18 Dec 1996...........................................................................6.87 British Homes Assurance Corp Ltd v Paterson [1902] 2 Ch 404.......................3.06 British Union & National Insurance Co v Rawson [1916] 2 Ch 476 ........6.08, 8.13 British Waggon Co and Parkgate Waggon Co v Lea (1880) 5 QBD 149..............................................................3.08, 6.74, 6.77, 6.79, 6.80, 6.101 Broad v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 2 NSWLR 40 ..........................6.14 Broadcast Australia Pty Ltd v Minister Assisting the Minister for Natural Resources (Lands) (2004) 204 ALR 46 ....................................................6.84, 6.88 Brookfield v Davey Products Pty Ltd (1996) 14 ACLC 303 ...............................6.67 Brown & Gregory Ltd, Re [1904] 1 Ch 627 .........................................................8.26 Brown, Re [1954] 1 Ch 39 ....................................................................................6.76 Brown, Shipley & Co v Kough (1885) 29 Ch D 848 ..................................7.07, 7.09 Brown v Bank of Australasia [1915] VLR 453.....................................................7.38 Brown v Heffer (1967) 116 CLR 344 ...................................................................7.16 Brown v Metropolitan Counties Life Assurance Society (1859) 28 LJQB 236 ............................................................................................................6.15 Browne & Company v John P Sharkey Company (1911) 115 P 156 .................6.78 Brown’s Estate, Re [1893] 2 Ch 300...................................................................6.100 Brownton Ltd v Edward Moore Inbucon Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 499 ..............................................................................................6.61, 6.62, 6.64 Bruce v Tyley (1916) 21 CLR 277.................................6.73, 6.84, 6.88, 6.113, 6.122 Brunker v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1937) 57 CLR 555 ...................................7.20 Brush Aggregates Ltd, Re [1983] BCLC 320...............................................4.27, 6.44 Bruynius, Re [1995] 1 Qd R 492 ..........................................................................7.07 Bryant v Primary Industries Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 142..................8.25 Buck v Robson (1878) 3 QBD 686 ..............................................................7.07, 7.08 Buckland v Papillon (1866) LR 1 Eq 477.............................................................8.07 Buiscex Ltd v Panfida Foods Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 357 .......................................6.67 Bunny Industries Ltd v FSW Enterprises Pty Ltd [1982] Qd R 712...................7.17 Burck v Taylor (1894) 152 US 634 ............................................6.68, 6.87, 6.88, 6.89 Burdett, ex parte Byrne, Re (1888) 20 QBD 310 .................................................6.50
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Buring and Chapman, Re (1941) 13 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 72 ............................................................................................6.15, 6.88, 7.07 Burlinson v Hall (1884) 12 QBD 347.................................................3.17, 5.05, 7.40 Burn v Carvalho (1839) 4 Myl & Cr 690; 41 ER 265.........................6.15, 7.07, 7.09 Burr v Wimbledon Local Board (1887) 35 WR 404 ...........................................8.07 Burrows v Gradin (1843) 12 LJQB 333................................................................8.67 Burston Finance Ltd v Spierway Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1648 ..................................3.10 Burton v Camden London Borough Council [2000] 2 AC 399 .......3.11, 6.86, 7.32 Burton v Great Northern Railway Co (1854) 9 Exch 507; 156 ER 216..............6.73 Burwood Land, Building, and Investment Co Ltd v Berridge (1893) 19 VLR 630................................................................................................4.20, 6.83 Burwood Project Management Pty Ltd v Polar Technologies International Pty Ltd (1999) 9 Butterworths Property Reports 97801 ......................6.08, 6.84, 6.88 Business Computers Ltd v Anglo-African Leasing ltd [1977] 1 WLR 578....................................................................................................8.83, 8.85 Butler v Capel (1823) 2 B & C 251; 107 ER 377 ..................................................3.04 Button’s Lease, Re [1964] Ch 263 ........................................................................6.08 Byrne v Reid [1902] 2 Ch 735 ..............................................................................3.07 Bysouth v Shire of Blackburn & Mitcham (No 2) [1928] VR 562 .....................6.86 CA Stewart & Co v PHS Van Ommeren (London) Ltd [1918] 2 KB 560 .........8.33 Caboche v Ramsay (1993) 119 ALR 215.....................................................6.84, 6.85 Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (in liq) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 253 ...................................................................6.63 Caddy v Beattie (1908) VLR 17............................................................................8.18 Caerns Motor Services Ltd v Texaco Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 247 ...........................6.76 Calaby Pty Ltd v Ampol Pty Ltd (1990) 71 NTR 1....3.27, 6.71, 6.101, 6.123, 6.133 Caldy Manor Estates ltd v Farrell [1974] 1 WLR 1303 .......................................6.84 Cambrian Mining Co, Re (1882) 48 LT 114 .......................................................6.59 Camden & Burton v London Borough Council [2000] 2 AC 399 .....................3.09 Camdex International Ltd v Bank of Zambia [1996] 1 WLR 864.............6.59, 6.64 Camfield Pastoral Co v Dixon [1972] Qd R 289.................................................4.18 Camp v King (1887) 14 VLR 22 ..................................................................7.12, 7.38 Campbell, Re [1997] Ch 14 ..................................................................................6.06 Canadian Admiral Corp Ltd v LF Dommerich & Co Inc (1964) 43 DLR (2d) 1 ....................................................................................................8.83 Canny Gabriel Jackson Advertising Pty Ltd v Volume Sales (Finance) Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 321..............................................................................6.48 Cantrell v Lemons (1948) 200 P 2d 911 ..............................................................6.08 Care Shipping Corp v Latin American Shipping Corp [1983] 1 QB 1005 ...........................................................................................................4.02, 7.41 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256 .............................................3.07 Carpenter v Boyce (1896) 22 VLR 248 ................................................................6.59
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Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] Ch 207.......3.15 Carter v Hyde (1923) 33 CLR 115........................................................................6.08 Castellain v Preston (1882) 8 QBD 617 ......................................................6.59, 8.25 Cathay Developments Pty Ltd v Laser Entertainment Pty Ltd [1998] NSWSC 82 .........................................................................................................6.88 Cathedral Place Pty Ltd v Hyatt Australia Ltd [2003] VSC 385 .........................6.87 Cator v Burke (1785) 1 Brown’s Ch 434; 28 ER 1222.........................................4.05 Cave v Cave (1880) 15 Ch D 639 .........................................................................6.09 Cavendish v Geaves (1857) 24 Beav 163; 53 ER 319 .........................7.18, 8.94, 8.99 CB Peacocke Land Co Ltd v Hamilton Milk Producers Co Ltd [1963] NZLR 576 ............................................6.70, 6.71, 6.72, 6.73, 6.76, 6.78, 6.79, 7.19 Cellulose Products Pty Ltd v Truda (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 561 ........................8.75 Central Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corp (The Aiolos) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25...................................................................3.10, 4.04, 4.18 Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co v Snider [1916] 1 AC 266...............................3.23 Centre Insurance International Co v Freakley [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 65.....6.73 Century 21 (South Pacific) Pty Ltd v Century 21 Real Estate Corp (1996) 136 ALR 687.........................................................................................6.101 Chadwick v Clarke (1845) 1 CB 700; 135 ER 717 ...............................................7.37 Chang v Regsitrar of Titles (1976) 137 CLR 177.................................................7.17 Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 5) (2002) ATPR (Digest) 46 .........................6.05 Charge Card Services Ltd, Re [1987] Ch 150 .............................................3.17, 6.14 Charlotte Thirty Ltd and Bison Ltd v Croker Ltd (1990) 24 Con LR 46 .........................................................................................................6.73, 6.79 Chase Manhattan Asia Ltd v Official Receiver and Liquidator of First Bangkok City Finance Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1181 ...............................................3.16 Chatsworth Investments Ltd v Cussins (Contractors) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1 .....3.06 Cheltenham & Gloucester plc v Appleyard [2004] EWCA Civ 291...................3.10 Cherry v Boultbee (1839) 4 My & Cr 442; 41 ER 171.........................................8.83 Chick v Blackmore (1854) 2 Sm & Giff 274; 65 ER 398 .....................................8.83 Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties v ISPT Pty Ltd (1998) 45 NSWLR 639 ..............................................................................................7.17, 7.18 Child v Dynes [1985] 2 NZLR 554..............................................................6.09, 6.10 China Steamship Co, Re (1869) LR 7 Eq 240......................................................8.83 Chow Yoon Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] AC 209 ...........3.16 Christie v Taunton, Delmard, Lane & Co [1893] 2 Ch 175 ...............................8.83 Chung Kwok Hotel Co Ltd v Field [1960] 1 WLR 1112.....................................7.14 Cinema Plus Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 49 NSWLR 513 ......................................................................................6.14 Circuit Systems Ltd v Zuken-Redac (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 721, affd [1999] 2 AC 1.....................................................................................................6.87 Cirillo v Citicorp Australia Ltd [2004] SASC 293 ...............................................6.10
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Citibank Pty Ltd v Simon Fredericks Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 168..........................8.67 City Life Assurance Ltd Co, Re [1926] Ch 191.........................4.14, 4.15, 7.18, 8.96 City of London Corp v Fell [1994] 1 AC 458 ......................................................8.70 City of Omaha v Standard Oil Co (1898) 75 NW 895 ...............................6.87, 6.88 Clairs Keeley v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139..............................6.59, 6.61, 6.63, 6.64 Clairs Keeley (No 2) v Treacy (2004) 29 WAR 479.........6.59, 6.61, 6.63, 6.64, 6.66 Clairs Keeley v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86 .......................6.59, 6.61, 6.63, 6.64, 6.66 Clark v Dedvukaj [1993] 2 Qd R 10...................................................................6.100 Clark v Lonergan [1961] NSWR 313 ...................................................................3.07 Clarke, Re (1887) 36 Ch D 348..................................................6.50, 7.11, 7.13, 7.41 Clark’s Refrigerated Transport Pty Ltd , Re [1982] VR 989 ...............................6.71 Clayman v Goodman Properties Inc (1973) 518 F 2d 1026 ...............................6.08 Clearance Nominees Pty Ltd v Discount Acceptance Corp Pty Ltd (1997) 25 ACSR 531 ..........................................................................................7.38 Clegg v Hands (1889) 44 Ch D 503......................................................................6.76 Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1..............................................................................1.06, 6.45, 8.55, 8.83, 8.86 Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186 .......................6.59 Coba Industries Ltd v Millie’s Holdings (Canada) Ltd [1985] 6 WWR 14 .......8.64 Coca-Cola Financial Corp v Finstat International Ltd [1998] QB 43................8.26 Cockell v Taylor (1851) 15 Beav 103; 51 ER 475...............................6.59, 8.04, 8.59 Coker and Bellamy v Richey (1922) 204 P 945 ...................................................6.08 Cole v Booker (1913) 29 TLR 295........................................................................6.59 Cole v Wellington Dairy Farmers Co-op Association Ltd [1917] NZLR 372..................................................................................................6.73, 6.95 Coles Myer Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [1998] 4 VR 728 ................3.11 Collyer v Isaacs (1881) 19 Ch D 342 ....................................................................4.32 Colonia Verscherung AG v Amoco Oil Co (1997) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 261 ......6.16, 8.25 Colonial Bank v European Grain & Shipping Ltd (The Dominique) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 239...............................................6.37, 8.86, 8.88, 8.90, 8.92 Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261........................2.02, 2.04, 2.05, 2.06 Colonial Mutual General Insurance co Ltd v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1140...........................................................3.17 Comfort v Betts [1891] 1 QB 737 ...............................................................6.59, 7.40 Commercial Bank of Tasmania v Jones [1893] AC 313 .....................................3.06 Commercial Factors Ltd v Maxwell Printing Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 724 ................................................................................4.18, 7.15, 7.40, 8.71 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1926) 38 CLR 272....................................................................................3.11, 7.18 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Yeend (1929) 43 CLR 235............................................................................................2.06, 3.11, 6.84 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Fulliffe (1920) 28 CLR 178 ................7.29
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Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Livingston [1965] AC 694..............................................................................................3.11, 3.23, 3.24 Commissioner of State Revenue (Victoria) v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 651....................................................................7.18 Commissioner of Taxation v Betro Harrison Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 37 FLR 150 ................................................6.33, 6.34, 7.09, 7.15, 7.16, 7.17 Commissioner of Taxation v Linter Textiles Australia Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 1...........................................................................................................6.15 Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd (1986) 163 CLR 199.....................................................................................................6.20, 6.49 Commissioner of Taxation v Orica Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 500 ..........................6.101 Commissioner of Taxes (Queensland) v Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127 ............3.11 Commonwealth Quarries (Footscray) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1938) 59 CLR 111 ........................................................................6.49 Commonwealth v Ling (1993) 118 ALR 309..............................................6.61, 6.62 Compania Columbiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101 ..................................2.02, 4.11, 5.12, 5.18, 5.20, 6.59, 7.38, 8.13 Compania Sud-Americana de Vapares v Shipmair BV (The Teno) [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 289...................................................................................8.64 Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 .........................................................................3.16, 3.17, 4.27, 5.05, 5.23, 7.07 Comptroller of Stamps (Vic) v Howard-Smith (1936) 54 CLR 614 ................................................................4.14, 7.04, 7.05, 7.06, 7.23, 7.27, 7.29 Condliffe v Hislop [1996] 1 WLR 753 ........................................................6.59, 6.63 Congreve v Evetts (1854) 10 Exch 298; 156 ER 457............................................7.11 Conlan v Carlow County Council [1912] 2 Ir 535..............................................7.39 Conley v Barclays Bank Ltd, Re (1938) 2 All ER 127 ..........................................6.50 Connolly, Re [1931] GLR 551 ............................................................4.16, 6.15, 7.07 Conquest’s case (1875) 1 Ch D 334 .....................................................................3.06 Consolidated Trust Co Ltd v Naylor (1936) 55 CLR 423 ......6.100, 7.34, 7.37, 7.38 Contemporary Cottages (NZ) Ltd v Margin Traders Ltd [1981] 2 NZLR 114........................................................................................................3.16 Coombe v Carter (1888) 36 Ch D 348.................................................................7.11 Cooney v Burns (1922) 30 CLR 216 ....................................................................3.23 Cooper v Micklefield Coal and Lime Co Ltd (1912) 107 LT 457....................................................................................6.73, 6.79, 6.95, 6.134 Cooper v Reilly (1829) 2 Sim 560; 57 ER 897......................................................6.58 Coorey v Bolous (1933) 50 WN(NSW) 187 ........................................................8.82 Cope v Keene (1968) 118 CLR 1 ..........................................................................7.20 Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 .......................4.05, 4.14, 4.27, 6.71, 7.15, 7.20 Corson v Lewis (1906) 109 NW 735 ....................................................................6.79 Cory v Gertcken (1816) 2 Madd 40; 56 ER 250 ..................................................8.82
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Cossill v Strangman [1963] NSWR 1695....................................................5.17, 7.37 Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd, Re [1998] Ch 495 ....................................................7.07 Cottage Club Estates Ltd v Woodside Estates Co (Amersham) Ltd [1928] 2 KB 463 ......................................................................................6.73, 6.118 Cotterill v Bank of Singapore (Australia) Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 238 ..............................................................................................6.05, 6.67 Cotton v Heyl [1930] 1 Ch 510 ........................................6.19, 6.46, 7.07, 7.44, 8.04 Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460...................................................................................3.27, 6.07, 7.04, 7.07 Coulter v Chief Constable of Dorset Police [2004] 1 WLR 1425; affd [2005] 1 WLR 130 ......................................................................................7.05 Countess of Bective v FCT (1932) 47 CLR 417 .................................................6.135 County Hotel and Wine Co Ltd v London and North Western Railway Co [1918] 2 KB 251; affd [1919] 2 KB 29.......................................2.02, 6.08, 6.59 Court Line Ltd v Aktiebolaget SpA v G¢taverken (The Halycon the Great) [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 283 ..............................................................6.73, 7.40 Cousins, Re (1885) 30 Ch D 203.................................................................6.08, 6.69 Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 605 ..................................6.88 Cozens, Re [1913] 2 Ch 478 ........................................................................7.04, 7.06 CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 1 NSWLR 510 ..............................................................................................3.18, 7.18 Crane Ice Cream Co v Terminal Freezing & Heating Co (1925) 128 A 280..........................................................................................................6.68, 6.70 Crichton v Crichton (1930) 43 CLR 536 .............................................................7.26 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1.......................................................................................................6.73, 6.101 Cronk v M’Manus (1892) 8 TLR 449 .........................................................3.12, 5.08 Crothers, Re [1930] VLR 49 ..................3.04, 3.26, 4.05, 4.07, 4.10, 4.14, 4.19, 8.99 Crouch v Credit Foncier of England Ltd (1873) LR 8 QB 374...........................4.05 Crouch v Martin (1707) 2 Vern 595; 23 ER 987 .................................................6.58 Crouch v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1907] VLR 80 ...........................6.58 Crowe v Price (1889) 22 QBD 429.......................................................................6.58 Crowfoot v Gurney (1832) 9 Bing 372; 131 ER 655..........................4.23, 6.15, 7.07 CSR Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-193 ....................................................................................................6.134 Cummings v Johnson (1913) 4 WWR 543..........................................................8.70 Cunningham, Re [1965] WAR 115......................................................................4.27 Curran v Newpark Cinemas Ltd [1951] 1 All ER 295.......................7.04, 7.07, 7.18 Currey v The Federal building Society (1929) 42 CLR 421 ................................3.26 Curtain Dream plc v Churchill Merchanting Ltd [1990] BCC 341 ...................3.16 Curtis Moffat Ltd v Wheeler [1929] 2 Ch 224 ....................................................8.07 D Galambos & Son Pty Ltd v McIntyre (1974) 5 ACTR 10.....8.64, 8.86, 8.88, 8.91
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Daley, ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 8 ACSR 395 ...........................................................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64 Dallas, Re [1904] 2 Ch 385 ..........................................................................7.38, 8.83 Damon Compania Naviera SA v Hapag-Lloyd International SA (The Blankenstein) [1985] 1 WLR 435 ...................................................3.06, 3.07 Daniel Erat Consulting Services Pty Ltd , Re (1999) 162 ALR 429 ....................6.67 Danish Bacon Co Ltd, Staff Pension Fund Trusts, Re [1971] 1 WLR 248....................................................................................................7.04, 7.33 Dansk Rekylriffel Syndikat Aktieselskab v Snell [1908] 2 Ch 127....................6.106 Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshire Northern Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 68.............................................................................................8.03, 8.13, 8.15 Davenport Central Service Station Ltd v O’Connell [1975] 1 NZLR 755 .........8.30 David Jones Ltd v Lunn (1969) 91 WN(NSW) 468 ...................................6.08, 6.69 David v Malouf (1908) 5 CLR 749 .......................................................................6.45 Davies v Collins [1945] 1 All ER 247 .............................3.08, 6.69, 6.77, 6.86, 6.101 Davies v Davies (1887) 36 Ch D 359...........................................................6.08, 6.58 Davies v Rees (1886) 17 QBD 408........................................................................6.50 Davis & Co, Re (1888) 22 QBD 193............................................................6.15, 8.45 Davis v Duke of Marlborough (1818) 1 Swan 74; 36 ER 303.............................6.58 Davis v Freethy (1890) 24 QBD 519 ....................................................................4.15 Davis v Hedges (1871) LR 6 QB 687....................................................................8.75 Dawson v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260 ............................................................................2.02, 6.06, 6.15, 6.59, 8.13 DCT v Lanstel Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 314........................................................7.34 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v British South Africa Co [1912] AC 52......7.16 De Hoghton v Money (1866) 2 LR Ch App 164 ........................................6.09, 6.59 De Lisle v Union Bank of Scotland [1914] 1 Ch 22 ............................................8.81 De Marney, Re [1943] Ch 126..............................................................................6.15 De Nicholls v Saunders (1870) LR 5 CP 589 .......................................................8.46 De Pothonier v De Mattos (1858) El Bl & El 461; 120 ER 581 ..................4.24, 8.83 Dear v Reeves [2002] Ch 1 .................................................................2.05, 2.06, 6.08 Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1; 38 ER 475 ..........................................4.20, 5.05, 5.23 Deaton v Lawson (1905) 82 P 879 .......................................................................6.79 Defries v Milne [1913] 1 Ch 98 ............................................................................6.59 Delaware County Commissioners v Diebold Safe and Lock Company (1890) 133 US 473 ...........................................................................6.49, 6.68, 7.12 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Cridlands Pty Ltd (2003) 134 FCR 474......6.61, 6.62 DeMattos v Gibson (1858) 4 De G & J 276; 45 ER 108..........................6.106, 6.127 Dempsey & The National Bank of New Zealand Ltd v Traders’ Finance Corp Ltd [1933] NZLR 1258.............................................................................7.15 Denham Bros Ltd v W Freestone Leasing Pty Ltd [2004] 1 Qd R 500 ...........................................................................................6.50, 6.69, 6.71, 8.30
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Denham v Midland Employers Mutual Assurance Ltd [1955] 2 QB 437..........6.73 Denney, Gasquet & Metcalfe v Conklin [1913] 3 KB 177 ..................................7.38 Dent, Re [1923] 1 Ch 113 .....................................................................................4.32 Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367 ..........................................................4.05, 4.08, 4.11, 4.27, 6.98, 8.06, 8.18 Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 ...................................................................4.05, 4.08, 4.11, 4.27, 8.06, 8.18 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 117 ALR 61 .................................................4.32, 6.06 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lanstel Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 314 ...........................................................................................................1.06 Devefi Pty Ltd v Mateffy Pearl Nagy Pty Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 225 .................................................................6.72, 6.83, 6.84, 6.86, 6.87, 6.88 DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 3 All ER 462 .............................................................................7.28 Dickinson v Burrell (1866) LR 1 Eq 337.....................................................6.09, 6.59 Didymi, The [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 97..................................................................8.78 Dillon, Re (1890) 44 Ch D 76...............................................................................7.09 Diplock v Hammond (1854) 2 Sm & Giff 141; 65 ER 339 .................................7.07 Diptford Parish Lands, Re [1934] Ch 151 ...........................................................7.37 Dixon v Winch [1900] 1 Ch 736 ........................................................7.38, 8.81, 8.83 DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 1 NSWLR 510 ...............................................................................3.18, 7.18 DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 431..............................................................................3.11 Doe v Reid (1830) 10 B & C 849; 109 ER 664 .....................................................6.76 Dominique, The [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 239......................6.37, 8.86, 8.88, 8.90, 8.92 Domson Pty Ltd v Zhu [2005] NSWSC 1070 ...................................6.66, 6.67, 7.07 Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291.........................................1.01, 3.18, 6.50, 6.70, 6.79, 6.84, 6.87, 6.90, 7.22 Donaldson v Donaldson (1854) Kay 711; 69 ER 303.................................4.14, 4.19 Dorman v Rodgers (1982) 148 CLR 365 .............................................................3.19 Douglas v Culverwell (1862) 4 De GF & J 20; 45 ER 1089 .................................3.16 Downes v Bank of New Zealand (1895) 13 NZLR 723 .......................................8.83 Downie v Lockwood [1965] VR 257....................................................................7.14 Dr Jaeger’s Sanitary Woollen System Co Ltd v Walker and Sons (1897) 77 LT 180...................................................6.70, 6.74, 6.77, 6.79, 6.81, 6.88 Drew & Co v Josolyne (1887) 18 QBD 590 .........................................................6.15 Drummond’s Trusts, Re (1907) 4 Tas LR 9 ........................................................6.58 Duck Jarm, Re (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 521.............................................5.05, 6.15, 7.0 Dunnicliff & Bagley v Mallett (1859) 7 CB(NS) 209; 141 ER 795 .........................................................................................................7.39
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Durham Bros v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 ...........................3.17, 4.04, 4.25, 4.27, 5.06, 5.18, 7.07, 7.38, 7.39, 7.40, 7.41, 8.06 E Brown Pty Ltd v Florence [1966] SASR 214.....................................................6.77 E Pellas & Co v Neptune Marine Insurance Co (1879) 5 CPD 34 .....................8.94 E Pfeiffer WeineinKauf GmbH & Co v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 150........................................................................................5.05, 6.17, 8.58 Earl of Egremont v Smith (1877) 6 Ch D 469 .....................................................3.07 Earl of Lucan, Re (1890) 45 Ch D 470 ........................................................3.17, 7.27 Earle’s Shipbuilding and Engineering Company v Atlantic Transport Company (1899) 43 Sol Jo 691 .........................................................................2.02 Eastern Telegraph Co Ltd v Dent [1899] 1 QB 835 ............................................6.87 Edinburgh United Breweries Ltd v Molleson [1894] AC 97 ..............................6.10 Edmunds v Edmunds [1904] P 363 ...................................................6.36, 7.18, 8.04 Edward Nelson & Co Ltd v Faber & Co [1903] 2 KB 367 ..................................8.81 Edward Ward & Co v McDougall [1972] VR 433...............................................8.85 Edwards v Newland & Co [1950] 2 KB 534..............................6.77, 6.78, 6.79, 6.81 Elders Pastoral Ltd v Bank of New Zealand [1991] 1 NZLR 385 ..............3.17, 7.07 Electronic Rentals Pty Ltd v Anderson (1971) 124 CLR 27................................7.37 Elgar Heights Pty Ltd Ltd [1985] VR 657 ............................................................6.45 Ellenborough, Re [1903] 1 Ch 697..............................................................6.17, 7.44 Ellerman Lines Ltd v Lancaster Maritime Co Ltd (The Lancaster) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 497..........................................................................5.05, 5.23 Ellis and Company’s Trustee v Dixon-Johnson [1924] 2 Ch 451 ....................6.128 Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399 ...........................................2.02, 6.09, 6.59, 6.61 Elton v Cavill (No 2) (1993) 34 NSWLR 289 ......................................................6.84 Elves v Croffs (1850) 10 CB 241; 138 ER 98 ........................................................6.08 EM Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1904] 2 Ch 86 .............................................................................................4.13, 4.25, 7.15 Equus Financial Services Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd (unreported Queensland CA , 19 May 1994)..........................................4.18, 7.16 ER Ives Investment Ltd v High [1967] 2 QB 379 ...................................6.108, 6.135 Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Jackson (1993) 11 ACLC 138 .................................6.14 Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA 228 ...............................................................................................6.87 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Hall & Russell & Co Ltd [1989] AC 643....................3.10 Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Cherrywood Park Pty Ltd [1986] WAR 279 ...................................................................................................6.08, 6.50 Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979..........................................3.17 Evelpidi Era, The [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 54 .................................................8.38, 8.71 Fanti, The [1991] 1 AC 1 ....................................................................................6.118 Farm Products Co-operative (Tararua) Co Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioner (NZ) (1969) 1 ATR 85 .............................................................3.11
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Farmer v Mosley Holdings Ltd [2001] 2 BCLC 572 ...........................................6.63 Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Hogg (1995) 64 SASR 450 ...........6.100, 6.108 Fashion v Atwood (1688) 2 Chan Cas 37; 32 ER 835 ................................4.08, 8.18 Fasken v Minister of National Revenue [1949] 1 DLR 810 ................................3.11 FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440 ........................3.11, 4.03, 4.19, 4.27, 4.32, 5.07, 6.20, 6.48, 7.39, 7.44, 8.16, 8.29 Federal Commerce & Navigation Co Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc [1978] 1 QB 927..... 8.64, 8.66 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Galland (1986) 162 CLR 408 ..................6.48 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Murry (1998) 193 CLR 605 ....................6.48 Feistel v King’s College Cambridge (1847) 10 Beav 491, 50 ER 671 ...........................................................................................................6.58 Felix v Hadley & Co v Hadley [1898] 2 Ch 680..........................................8.06, 8.82 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32......................................................................................................6.27 Field v Battye [1939] SASR 235............................................................................6.58 Field v Megaw [1869] LR 4 CP 660......................................................................7.07 Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle Protection and Indemnity Association (The Fanti) [1991] 1 AC 1......................................................................6.118, 8.13 First City Corporation v Downsview Nominees Ltd [1989] 3 NZLR 710.........................................................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62 First National Bank of Chicago v West of England Shipowners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg) (The Evelpidi Era) [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 54....................................................................8.38, 8.71 Fisher v Harrison [2003] EWCA Civ 1047 ..........................................................6.58 Fitzgerald v Stewart (1831) 2 Russ & M 457; 39 ER 467.....................................7.04 Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364.....................2.05, 2.07, 2.14, 3.10, 4.07, 4.08, 4.24, 5.06, 6.59, 6.64, 6.69, 6.71, 6.77, 6.86, 6.98, 7.40 Fleming v Loe [1901] 2 Ch 594; rvsd [1902] 2 Ch 359 .......................................8.34 Flint v Walker (1847) 5 Moore 180; 13 ER (PC) 459..........................................7.07 Flood v Shand Construction Ltd (1996) 54 Con LR 125 ..................................................................................6.45, 6.51, 6.54, 6.87, 8.29 Foamcrete (UK) Ltd v Thrust Engineering Ltd [2002] BCC 221..............6.87, 6.88 Foloquet v Woodburn Public School (1934) 29 P 2d 554 .........................6.68, 6.79 Forbes v NSW Trotting Club Ltd (1979) 25 ALR 1 ............................................6.88 Forster v Baker [1910] 2 KB 636 .................................................................4.27, 7.39 Fortescue v Barnett (1834) 3 MY & K 36; 40 ER 14............................................7.21 Forth v Stanton (1681) 1 Wms Saund 210; 85 ER 217 .......................................4.23 Fortunato v Patten (1895) 41 NE 572................................................6.87, 6.88, 6.89 Foster v Cockerell (1835) 3 Cl & Fin 456; 6 ER 1508..........................................4.20 Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 166...................................................................................6.59, 6.60, 6.63, 6.66
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Francis v NPD Property Developments Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 240........................................................................................3.15, 3.18, 7.17, 7.18 Fraser v Buckle [1996] 2 ILRM 34 .......................................................................6.65 Fratelli Sorrentino v Buerger [1915] 1 KB 307................3.08, 6.78, 6.79, 6.81, 8.03 Freehill Hollingdale & Page v Bandwill Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 150 .......6.59, 6.63 Freeman v Joiner (2005) 219 ALR 136 ................................................................6.67 Freeway Mutual Pty Ltd v Taylor (1978) 22 ALR 281 ........................................7.07 French v Queensland Premier Mines Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 294..........................6.50 Freshfields’ Trust, Re (1879) 11 Ch D 198 ..........................................................4.20 Friary Holroyd and Healey’s Breweries Ltd v Singleton [1899] 1 Ch 86, rvsd [1899] 2 Ch 261; (1899) 81 LT 101......................................6.87, 8.30 Fricker v Uddo & Taormina Co (1957) 312 P 2d 1085.......................................8.48 Front Comor, The [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 257 ....................................................6.118 Fry, Re ]1946] 1 Ch 312........................................................................................7.40 Fuller v Happy Shopper Markets Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 2853.................................8.66 G & N Angelakis Shipping SA v Compagnie National Algerienne de Navigation (The Attika Hope) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 439 ...............................7.01 G H Myers & Co v Brent Cross Service Co [1934] 1 KB 46 ...............................6.79 G and T Earle Ltd v Hemsworth Rural District Council (1928) 44 TLR 758 .................................................................6.07, 6.16, 6.21, 6.34, 7.39, 7.40 Gallagher v Rainbow (1994) 179 CLR 624 .............................................6.108, 6.132 Gardiner v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2004) 59 NSWLR 549.......7.20 Garnac Grain Co Inc v HMF Faure & Fairclough Ltd [1966] 1 QB 650 ...........3.16 Garnham, Harris & Elton Ltd v Alfred W Ellis (Transport) Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 940..........................................................................................................6.79 Garrison Pty Ltd v The Solicitors’ Trust [2004] TASSC 139.....................3.27, 6.71 Gathercole v Smith (1880) 27 Ch D 1.........................................................3.09, 6.82 Gatoil Anstalt v Omennial Ltd (The Balder London) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 489.............................................................................................7.16, 7.40, 8.95 GE Crane Sales Pty ltd v FCT (1971) 126 CLR 177.........3.23, 4.07, 7.19, 7.22, 8.04 General Estates Co, Re (1868) LR 3 Ch App 758 ................................................8.26 General Horticultural Company, Re (1886) 32 Ch D 512..................................4.14 Geo Thompson (Australia) Pty Ltd v Vittadello [1978] VR 199 .......................7.34 George Inglefield Ltd, Re [1933] Ch 1 .................................................................3.16 George Wimpey & Co Ltd v IRC [1975] 2 All ER 45..........................................3.11 Geroff v CAPD Enterprises Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 187 .....6.34, 6.36, 6.44, 6.50, 8.45 Gibson v Overbury (1841) 7 M & W 555; 151 ER 887 .......................................7.07 Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd [1974] AC 689....................................................................................................8.76 Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142........................6.59, 6.60, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64, 6.65 Gill v Gill (1921) 21 SR (NSW) 400...................................................................6.135 Gill v Lewis [1956] 2 QB 1....................................................................................6.08
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Gillott’s Settlement, Re [1934] 1 Ch 97 .............................................4.32, 7.05, 7.07 Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 KB 474 ....................................6.20, 6.55, 6.59, 7.15, 7.19 Glencore International AG v Metro Trading International Inc [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 899..........................................................................6.118 Global Minerals v Valerica (2000) Butterworths Property Reports 18, 463 ......................................................................................................................6.09 Goldsborough Mort & Co Ltd v Commonwealth Agricultural Service Engineers Ltd [1930] SASR 201 ........................................................................7.07 Goldsborough Mort & Co Ltd v Tolson (1909) 10 CLR 470 ....................2.05, 7.14 Goldschmidt & Loewenick v Diamond Fibre Co (1919) 174 NYS 800; affd (1921) 130 NE 918 ............................................................................6.68, 6.73 Good Luck, The [1990] 1 QB 818 .............................................................6.12, 6.101 Goodman v Napier Harbour Board (1939) NZLR 97 ........................................7.16 Gore v Justice Corporation Pty Ltd (2002) 189 ALR 712 ..........................6.61, 6.63 Gorringe v Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works (1886) 34 Ch D 128 ...............................................................4.14, 4.15, 7.05, 7.07, 7.08, 7.18 Goss v Chilcott [1996] AC 788.............................................................................6.49 Gough v Timbalok New Zealand Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 303 .................................8.75 Gould v Skinner [1983] QdR 377 ...............................................................6.55, 7.43 Government Insurance Office (NSW) v KA Reed Services Pty Ltd [1988] VR 829 ................................................6.61, 6.103, 6.127, 6.132, 6.133, 6.135, 8.30 Government of Newfoundland v Newfoundland Railway Co (1888) 13 App Cas 199 .....................................................8.59, 8.64, 8.85, 8.87, 8.90, 8.91 Goy & Co Ltd, Re [1900] 2 Ch 149 ......................................................................8.26 Gray v UDC Finance Ltd [2003] 3 NZLR 192............................................8.06, 8.32 Great Northern Railway Co v Witham (1873) 29 LT 471 ..................................6.73 Green v Ingham [1867] LR 2 CP 525...................................................................7.07 Greig v National Amalgamated Union of Shop Assistants (1906) 22 TLR 274..............................................................................................................6.59 Grein v Imperial Airways Ltd [1937] 1 KB 50............................................6.51, 8.09 Grenfell v The Dean and Canons of Windsor (1840) 2 Beav 544; 48 ER 1292 .........................................................................................................6.58 Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 669........................................................7.07, 7.18, 7.31, 7.38, 7.40, 7.41 Grey v IRC [1958] Ch 690 .........................................................3.11, 7.26, 7.29, 7.30 Griffin, Re [1899] 1 Ch 408 .........................................................................6.87, 6.89 Griffin v Weatherby (1868) LR 3 QB 753............................................................2.13 Griffith v Pelton [1958] Ch 205 .........................................................6.08, 6.50, 8.30 Griffith v Tower Publishing Company Ltd and Moncrieff [1897] 1 Ch 21 .............................................................................................6.73, 6.74, 6.79 Griffiths v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 123 ALR 111 ..................6.14 Griffiths v Secretary of State for Social Services [1974] QB 468.........................6.74
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Gross v Lewis Hillman Ltd [1970] 1 Ch 445 .......................................................6.09 Grovewood Holdings Plc v James Capel & Co Ltd [1995] Ch 80 .............6.64, 6.67 Gunsborough, Re (1919) 88 LJKB 479 ................................................................7.12 Gurfunkel v Bentley Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 98 ................................................3.16 GUS Property Management Ltd v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd [1982] SLT 533 ..................................................................................................8.13 Guy v Churchill (1888) 40 Ch D 481..........................................................6.59, 6.67 Gwelo (Matabeleland) Exploration and Development Co Ltd, Re [1901] 1 IR 38 ....................................................................................................8.53 H Dengate and Son, Re (1921) 21 SR(NSW) 619 ...............................................7.07 Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517 .............6.20, 6.48 Hagan v Waterhouse (1991) 34 NSWLR 308.............................................6.90, 7.29 Hain Steamship Co Ltd v Tate & Lyle Ltd (1936) 41 Com cas 350....................6.11 Hall, ex parte (1878) 10 Ch D 615 .......................................................................7.04 Hall v Busst (1960) 104 CLR 206 .......................................................6.84, 6.85, 6.88 Halley v The Law Society [2003] EWCA Civ 97.........................................6.09, 8.62 Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch 169...............................6.106, 6.108, 6.119, 6.125, 6.130 Halycon the Great, The [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 283 .....................................6.73, 7.40 Hambleton v Brown [1917] 2 KB 93 ..........................................................6.20, 6.39 Hamilton, Re (1921) 124 LT 737 ................................................................7.06, 7.27 Hamilton v Letherbridge (1912) 14 CLR 236.............................................6.73, 7.07 Hammond v Messenger (1838) 9 Sim 327; 59 ER 383 .....................4.05, 4.08, 8.18 Hanak v Green [1958] 2 QB 9.....................................................................8.72, 8.85 Handley Page Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise and Rockwell Machine Tool Co Ltd [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 459..............................................8.83 Hannan’s Hill Amalgamated No Liability v Barbican Corporation Ltd (1939) 13 ALJ 255 ..............................................................................................3.07 Haq v Singh [2001] 1 WLR 1594 .........................................................................6.06 Haque v Haque (1965) 114 CLR 98 ............................................................3.26, 7.16 Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 81; rvsd [1993] QB 701....................................6.118 Harbour Estates Ltd v HSBC Bank plc [2005] 2 WLR 67...................................6.11 Harding Carpets Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1980] 4 WWR 149.........................................................................................5.05, 5.22, 7.38 Harding v Harding (1886) 17 QBD 442 .................4.26, 5.09, 7.04, 7.07, 7.27, 7.36 Harrison v Harrison (1888) 13 PD 180 ...............................................................6.58 Harry Simpson & Co Ltd and Companies Act [1964-5] NSWR 603.................8.53 Hart v Porthgain Harbour Co Ltd (1903) 1 Ch 690 ...........................................7.16 Hartley v Russell (1825) 2 Sim & St 244; 57 ER 339 ...........................................6.59 Harvard Securities Ltd, Re [1997] 2 BCLC 369..........................................4.27, 7.29 Haseldine v Hosken [1933] 1 KB 822 ..................................................................6.59 Hauber v Halifax Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1940] SASR 341 ................................6.59
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Haycock’s Policy, Re [1876] 1 Ch D 611 .............................................................8.06 Healing (Sales) Pty Ltd v Inglis Electrix Pty Ltd (1968) 121 CLR 584 ......8.75, 8.79 Helby v Matthews [1895] AC 471........................................................................3.16 Helou v PD Mulligan Pty Ltd (2003) 57 NSWLR 74 ..........................................6.45 Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County Council [1978] 3 All ER 262..................................................................................................6.87, 6.88 Hendry v Chartsearch Ltd, The Times, 16 September 1998..............6.83, 6.87, 6.88 Henriksens Rederi A/S v THZ Rolimpex (The Brede) [1974] 1 QB 233.......................................................................................................8.64, 8.78 Herkules Piling Ltd v Tilbury Construction Ltd (1992) 61 BLR 107 ...........................4.12, 4.14, 5.06, 6.54, 6.87, 6.118, 7.38, 7.40, 8.06, 8.29 Herman v Mount Lyell Mining and Railway Co Ltd (1903) 29 VLR 550 .........7.07 HG Harper & Co v J Bland & Co Ltd (1914) 84 LJKB 738.................................7.04 Higgs v Northern Assam Tea Co Ltd (1870) LR 10 Eq 458................................8.26 Hiley v Peoples Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1938) 60 CLR 468............4.15, 8.96 Hilger Analytical Ltd v Rank Precision Industries Ltd [1984] BCLC 301 .........8.26 Hill v Caillovel (1748) 1 Ves Sen 122; 27 ER 931 ................................................8.60 Hill v Ziymack (1908) 7 CLR 352 ........................................................................8.64 Hilliard, Re [1907] VLR 375.................................................................................6.58 Hirachand Punamchand v Temple [1911] 2 KB 330..........................................3.08 HJ Wigmore & Co Ltd v Rundle (1930) 44 CLR 222 .......................6.20, 6.42, 6.45 Hoare v Dresser (1859) 7 HL Cas 290 .................................................................4.27 Hockley and Papworth v Goldstein (1920) 90 LJKB 111 ...................................7.38 Hodder & Tolley Ltd v Cornes [1923] NZLR 876....................6.86, 6.87, 6.88, 6.89 Hodges v State of New South Wales (1988) 77 ALR 1........................................6.63 Holden v Thompson [1907] 2 KB 489.................................................................6.59 Hole v Bradbury (1879) 12 Ch D 886 .........................................................6.73, 6.74 Holli Managed Investments Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1998) 160 ALR 409.........................................................................................6.132 Holmes, In re [2005] 1 WLR 1857 .......................................................................3.10 Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HLC 191; 11 ER 999 .......6.17, 7.13, 7.15, 7.19, 7.44 Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1...........................4.05, 4.08, 4.14, 4.15, 4.24, 5.10, 7.19, 7.36, 7.38, 8.04 Holt’s Settlements, Re [1969] 1 Ch 100...............................................................7.28 Hong Kong and Shangai Banking Corp v Kloeckner & Co AG [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 323...............................................................................................8.26 Hooper v Smart (1875) LR 1 Ch D 90 .................................................................8.59 Hopkins v Hannah Tatchell (1893) 15 ALT 148.................................................7.07 Horwood v Millar’s Timber and Trading Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 305 .......................................................................................................6.37, 6.58 Hospital for Sick Children (Board of Governors) v Walt Disney Productions Inc [1966] 1 WLR 1055.......................................................6.87, 6.88
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Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 157.....................................................................................................6.118 Housing Guarantaee Fund Ltd v Yusef [1991] 2 VR 11 ............................6.73, 8.24 Howard v Fanshawe [1895] 2 Ch 581..................................................................6.08 Howard v Miller [1915] AC 318 ..........................................................................7.16 Huggins, Re (1882) 21 ChD 85 ...................................................................2.02, 6.58 Hughes v Fresh-Pack Fruit & Vegetable Market Pty Ltd [1965] WAR 199.....6.100 Hughes v Kingston Upon Hull City Council [1999] QB 1193...........................6.59 Hughes v Pump House Hotel Co Ltd [1902] 2 KB 190 .........................................................................4.27, 6.07, 6.43, 6.45, 7.41 Humble v Hunter (1848) 25 Am Rep 9 ......................................................6.77, 6.79 Hume v Monro (No 2) (1943) 67 CLR 461................................................4.22, 4.25 Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452 ..............................................................4.27, 7.29 Hutchens v Deauville Investments Pty Ltd (1986) 68 ALR 367 ..............6.49, 6.100 Hutley v Hutley (1873) LR 8 QB 112...................................................................6.59 Hyde v Johnson [1836] 2 Bing NC 776; 132 ER 299...........................................7.37 Hyne & Sons v Podosky [1905] QSR 147 ............................................................7.07 Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Papdopoulos [1980] 1 WLR 1129......................................................................................6.21, 6.31, 8.61 IMI Cornelius (UK) Ltd v Bloor (1991) 57 BLR 108..........................................8.03 Independent Automatic Sales Ltd v Knowles and Foster [1962] 1 WLR 974.................................................................................................6.20, 6.37 Inglis, Re (1932) 5 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 255 ................................6.15, 7.07 Inland Revenue Commissioners v John Lewis Properties plc [2003] Ch 513 .......................................................................................................3.11, 6.20 Insurance Australia Ltd, Re (2004) 139 FCR 450..............................................6.101 Inter-Southern Life Insurance co v Humphrey (1919) 84 So 625 .....................6.87 International Leasing Corp (Vic) Ltd v Aicken [1967] 1 NSWLR 669 ..............7.07 International Leasing Corp (Vic) Ltd v Aiken [1967] 2 NSWR 427........................................................3.27, 6.15, 6.100, 7.18, 7.31, 7.38 International Polymers Pty Ltd v Custom Credit Corp Ltd (1995) 8 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-234.......................................................6.84, 6.86, 6.89 Interstate Investment Co Ltd v Mobbs (1928) 28 SR(NSW) 572 .............7.39, 7.40 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896...........................................................2.04, 2.05, 3.10, 6.10, 6.112, 8.04 Investors in Industry Commercial Properties Ltd v South Bedfordshire District Council [1986] 1 All ER 787.......................................................3.08, 6.79 Ipswich Permanent Money Club Ltd v Arthy [1920] 2 Ch 257 .........................7.18 IRC v Oswald [1945] AC 360 ...............................................................................6.49 Irving, Re (1877) 7 Ch D 419 ...............................................................................7.07 Israel v Douglas (1789) 1 H Bl 239; 126 ER 139..................................................4.23 J Miller Ltd v Laurence and Bardsley [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 90.......6.69, 6.73, 6.127
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Jackson v Richards [2005] NSWSC 630 ..............................................................7.07 Jacobs v Larkin (1892) 13 NSWR (Eq) 62 .......................................6.08, 6.69, 6.113 Jambrecina v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2003] FCA 1352.........................6.67 James Nelson & Sons Ltd v Nelson Line (Liverpool) Ltd [1906] 2 KB 217 ...........................................................................................3.10, 4.08, 7.39 James Talcott Ltd v John Lewis & Co Ltd [1940] 3 All ER 592 ........7.18, 7.38, 8.06 James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 37 FCR 445 ...........................................................................................8.64, 8.85, 8.86, 8.91 Jartay Developments Ltd (1983) 22 Build LR 134 ..............................................6.16 JC Scott Constructions v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 314 ................................................................................................6.61, 6.64 JC Williamson Ltd v Lukey & Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 .........................4.22 Jeffree v NCSC (1989) 15 ACLR 217 ..........................................................6.61, 6.64 Jeffrey v Agra & Masterman’s Bank (1866) LR 2 Eq 674 ....................................8.83 Jeffs v Day (1866) LR 1 QB 372..........................................................4.05, 4.09, 8.06 Jenkins v Visualeyes Pty Ltd [2005] VSC 218......................................................7.38 Jennings v Credit Corp Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 48 NSWLR 709 .....................4.17 Jerome v Kelly [2004] 1 WLR 1409....................................................3.11, 7.16, 7.17 John Nitschke Nominees Pty Ltd v Hahndorf Golf Club Inc (2004) 88 SASR 334 .......................................................................6.84, 6.85, 6.108 John Rigby (Haulage) Ltd v Reliance Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1956] 2 QB 468.................................................................................................3.08 John Young & Co Kelvinhaugh Ltd v Rugby Group Plc, QBD, HT 00/337, 19 Dec 2000....................................................................................6.88 Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 .........................................................................6.21 Johnson v Raylton, Dixon & Co (1881) 7 QBD 438 ................6.74, 6.77, 6.78, 6.79 Johnson v Vickers (1909) 120 NW 837 ...............................................................6.68 Johnstone v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1966] NZLR 833 ....................7.44 Jones v Farrell (1857) 1 De G & J 208; 44 ER 703 ...............................................8.06 Jones v Gibbons (1804) 9 Ves Jun 407; 32 ER 659.....................................4.14, 6.50 Jones v Humphreys [1902] 1 KB 10...................................................4.27, 7.39, 7.40 Jones v Jones (1838) 8 Sim 633; 59 ER 251 .........................................................4.20 Jones v Thompson (1858) EB & E 63; 120 ER 430..............................................6.45 Jordan Nicolav, The [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 11.........................6.08, 6.73, 6.118, 7.38 Joseph v Lyons (1884) 15 QBD 280 .....................................................................7.11 Josselson v Borst [1938] 1 KB 723......................................................7.05, 7.07, 7.38 JWH Group Pty Ltd v Kimpura Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 39.................................6.86 Kaukomarkkinat O/Y v “Elbe” Transport-Union GmbH (The Kelo) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 85...................................................................6.61, 6.62, 7.37 Kauter v Kauter [2003] NSWSC 741 .................................................................6.106 Keith v Butler & Foster (1866) 1 QSCR 141........................................................8.04 Kekewich v Manning (1851) 1 De GM & G 176; 42 ER 519 ..............................7.27
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Kelly, Re (1932) 4 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 258 .........................707, 3.09, 7.07 Kelly v Inland Revenue Commissioner (NZ) (1969) 1 ATR 380 .......................6.48 Kelo, The [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 85 .....................................................6.61, 6.62, 7.37 Kemp v Baerselman [1906] 2 KB 604 ..........................6.70, 6.73, 6.88, 6.121, 6.134 Kenneth Wright Distributors Pty Ltd, Re [1973] VR 161 .......3.27, 6.59, 7.38, 8.36 Kennewell v Dye [1949] Ch 517...........................................................................6.08 Kent and Sussex Sawmills Ltd, Re [1947] Ch 177 ...........3.16, 3.17, 4.27, 7.07, 7.08 Kern Corp Ltd v Walter Reid Trading Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 164 .................7.17 Kijowski v New Capital Properties Ltd (1990) 15 Con LR 1 .....................7.04, 7.06 King v Brown (1912) 14 CLR 17 ..........................................................................7.34 King v David Allen & Sons, Billposting Ltd [1916] 2 AC 55 ..............................8.03 King v Michael Faraday and Partners Ltd [1939] 2 KB 753 ...............................6.58 King v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd (1895) 6 QLJ 202; [1896] AC 250..............................................................................................5.12, 5.13, 6.59 King v West Coast Grocery Co (1913) 129 P 1081 ....................................6.68, 6.70 Kitson v Hardwick (1872) LR 7 CP 473 ..............................................................6.67 KL Tractors, Re [1954] VLR 505..........................................................................8.85 KLDE Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1984) 155 CLR 288 .............7.17 Knight v Burgess (1864) 33 LJ Ch 727.................................................................6.68 Kollerich & Cie SA v State Trading Corp of India [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 32......6.79 Konstas v Southern Cross Pumps and Irrigation Pty Ltd (1996) 217 ALR 409............................................................................................................6.132 Kova Establishment v Sasco Investments Ltd [1998] 2 BCLC 83 ......................6.71 Krasner v Dennison [2001] Ch 76 ..............................................................6.58, 6.82 La Rue v Groezinger (1890) 24 P 42 ...........................................................6.70, 6.76 Lakatoi Express, The (1990) 103 FLR 32 .............................................................3.06 Lam Soon Australia Pty Ltd v Molit (No 55) Pty Ltd (1996) 70 FCR 34..............................................................................................6.17, 6.36, 6.38 Lambe v Orton (1860) 1 Dr & Sm 125; 62 ER 325 .............................................7.05 Lampet’s case (1612) 10 Co Rep 48b; 77 ER 994 ................................................2.09 Lancaster, The [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 497....................................................5.05, 5.23 Landau v Barclays Bank plc [2004] 2 All ER (Comm) 16...................................7.15 Lang v James Morrison & Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 1............................................3.07 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 265................6.09 Latham, Re (1857) 1 De G & J 152; 44 ER 681....................................................7.12 Laurent v Sale & Co [1963] 1 WLR 829.............................................6.59, 6.61, 6.64 Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil Corp Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 138................................................................3.27, 6.51, 6.108, 6.129, 6.132 Law Institute of Victoria v Cowan [1973] VR 293..............................................5.07 Law v Coburn [1972] 1 WLR 1238 .............................................................6.42, 6.75 Lawrence v Hayes [1927] 2 KB 111....................................................8.62, 8.64, 8.83 Lawsons Construction Pty Ltd , Re [1942] SASR 201................................4.27, 7.40
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Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57 .................6.08, 6.88, 6.101 Leage, The [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 259 ...............................................6.08, 6.73, 6.118 Leask v Scott Brothers (1877) 2 QBD 376 ...........................................................8.49 Lechmere v Hawkins (1798) 2 Esp 626; 170 ER 477...........................................8.26 Lee v Simmons (1999) ANZ Conveyancing Reports 372 .................................6.100 Lee-Parker v Izzet [1971] 1 WLR 1688 ................................................................8.46 Legh v Legh (1799) 1 Bos & Pul 447; 126 ER 1002 ....................................4.24, 8.06 Leonard George Munday v ACT [1998] SCACT 62 ...........................................6.88 Lett v Morris (1831) 4 Sim 607; 58 ER 227 ................................................7.07, 8.06 Letts v IRC [1957] 1 WLR 201 ..................................................4.02, 4.03, 6.52, 7.07 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728 .........................3.10 Lidden v Composite Buyers Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 560 ..........................................4.22 Lind, Re [1915] 2 Ch 345...........................................................4.31, 4.32, 4.33, 7.44 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 ..............................................................6.50, 6.52, 6.73, 6.79, 6.84, 6.85, 6.86, 6.87, 6.88, 6.101, 8.03, 8.05 Ling v Commonwealth Australia (1994) 123 ALR 65.........................................2.12 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548.......................................2.05, 6.05 Liquidation Estates Purchase Co Ltd v Willoughby [1898] AC 321 .........8.04, 8.06 Liverpool & London and Globe Insurance Co Ltd v Hartley & Ford [1927] VR 523...........................................................................................6.42, 7.07 Liversidge v Broadbent (1859) 4 H & N 603; 157 ER 978 .........................2.13, 7.15 Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyrill Lord Carpets Sales Ltd [1992] BCLC 609 ...........................................................................................................3.16 Lloyds Bank plc v Rosser [1989] Ch 350 .............................................................6.47 Lloyd’s TSB Bank plc v Clarke [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 992 ............................7.07 Lloyds v Banks (1868) LR 3 Ch App 488 .............................................................7.18 Loan Investment Corp of Australasia v Bonner [1970] NZLR 724 ...................7.16 Lockhart, Re (1894) 15 NSWR (B & P) 80 ..........................................................7.04 London & Yorkshire Bank Ltd v White (1895) 11 TLR 570......................4.14, 7.15 London County and Westminster Bank Ltd v Tomkins [1918] 1 KB 515 ........3.17 Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd (1991) 5 BPR 11.......4.05, 4.17, 4.18, 4.27 Lonsdale Sand and Metal Pty Ltd v FCT (1998) 162 ALR 220...........................7.38 Lord Cateret v Paschal (1733) 3 P WMS 197; 24 ER 1028 .................................8.18 Lord Southhampton’s Estate, Re (1880) 16 Ch D 178........................................8.83 Lord Strathcona SS Co v Dominion Coal Co [1926] AC 108 ..........................6.106 Lovell v Western Australian Police Union of Workers [1991] Aust Torts R 68 ..................................................................................................6.61 Loxton v Moir (1914) 18 CLR 360.....................................................2.05, 3.10, 6.07 Lucas v Lucas [1943] P 68 ....................................................................................6.58 Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216; 118 ER 759 ...................................................6.69 Lunn v Thornton (1845) 1 CB 379; 135 ER 587 .................................................7.11
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Lyon v Creati (1892) 18 VLR 629 ...............................................................6.73, 6.78 Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499.................................................................7.17 Mac-Jordan Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd [1992] BCLC 350 ................................................................................................6.16, 6.106 McArdle, Re [1951] Ch 669.....................................7.05, 7.07, 7.09, 7.19, 7.27, 7.28 McCallum, Re [1933] VLR 35..............................................................................8.06 McClure, In the Estate of (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 93 ....................................6.14, 6.30 McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 ..............................................................4.24 McDonald, Re [1918] NZLR 626.........................................................................7.12 McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457 ...............6.21, 6.25, 6.26, 6.27, 6.28, 6.29, 6.31, 8.33, 8.34, 8.37, 8.61 McDonald v Isaac Construction Co Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 612 ...................6.33, 8.07 MacDonald v Robins (1954) 90 CLR 515..........................................3.07, 6.88, 8.30 McDonnell & East Ltd v McGregor (1936) 56 CLR 50............8.64, 8.84, 8.86, 8.91 McElroy v Flynn [1991] ILRM 294......................................................................6.65 McFadden v Public Trustee for Victoria [1981] 1 NSWLR 15...........................7.33 McFarlane v E E Caledonia Ltd (No 2) [1995] 1 WLR 366.......................6.61, 6.63 MacFarlane v Lister (1887) 37 Ch 88...................................................................7.07 McIntosh v Shashoua (1931) 46 CLR 494 ..................................................7.38, 8.06 McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 ALR 289 ........................................4.27, 7.17, 7.21, 7.39 Mackender v Feldia AG [1967] 2 QB 590............................................................8.62 Mackenzie v City Bank (1876) 14 SCR (NSW) 1 ................................................7.07 McKerrell, Re[1912] 2 Ch 648 .............................................................................4.27 Mackusick v Fleming [1904] WN 44; (1904) 90 LT 101 ....................................8.34 McLean (deceased), Re (1904) 23 NZLR 504......................................................2.02 McLeay, Re (1875) LR 20 Eq 186 .........................................................................6.76 McLeay v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1963] NZLR 711 ..............................................................3.18, 6.20, 6.39, 6.49, 7.40, 7.41 McMahon v Docker (1945) 62 WN(NSW) 155..................................................6.87 McMahon v Gilberd & Co Ltd [1955] NZLR 1206....................................4.18, 7.09 McMahon v Swan [1924] VLR 397......................................................................8.30 McPherson, Thom & Co , Re [1929] VLR 295...........................................7.07, 8.06 McRae v Coulton (1986) 7 NSWLR 644 .............................................................7.37 McWilliam v McWilliams Wine Pty Ltd (1964) 114 CLR 656...........................7.16 Madison Pictures Inc v Chesapeake Industries Inc (1955) 147 NYS 2d 50...........................................................................................6.50, 6.69 Magee v UDC Finance Ltd [1983] NZLR 438............................................7.18, 7.38 Magic Menu Systems Pty Ltd v AFA Facilitation Pty Ltd (1997) 142 ALR 198.......................................................................................................6.63 Mail-Well Envelope Co v Saley (1972) 497 P 2d 364..........................................6.08 Majestic Homes Pty Ltd v Wise [1978] Qd R 225...............................................6.09 Malcolm v Scott (1843) 3 Hare 39; 67 ER 288 ...........................................7.04, 7.07
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Mallyons Ltd v South Australian Harbours Board [1933] SASR 166 ..........................................................................................6.73, 6.76, 6.79 Malory Enterprises Ltd v Chesire Homes (UK) [2002] Ch 216 .........................6.09 Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608 ................................................................4.18, 4.22, 5.12, 6.73, 6.76, 8.07 Manchester, Re [1925] VLR 670 ..........................................................................7.07 Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co v North Central Wagon Co (1888) 13 App Cas 554......................................................3.16 Mangles v Dixon (1852) 2 CR & M 231; 149 ER 745........................7.18, 8.60, 8.71 Maple Flock Co Ltd v Universal Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd [1934] 1 KB 148 ..........................................................................................6.50 Marathon Electrical Manufacturing Corp v Mashreqbank PSC [1997] 2 BCLC 460 ...................................................................................6.34, 6.43 Marchant v Morton, Down & Co [1901] 2 KB 829 ..........................5.05, 7.15, 7.37 Mark Sensing (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 68 ALR 367 .............................................6.100 Marr v The Admiralty (1926) SC 842 ..................................................................6.58 Martell v Consent Iron Co Ltd [1955] 1 Ch 363 ......................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64 Master v Miller (1791) 4 TR 320.................................................................2.16, 4.23 Matahina Rimu Co Ltd, Re [1941] NZLR 490 ..................................7.15, 7.19, 7.34 Mathews v Wallwyn (1798) 4 Ves 118; 31 ER 62 ................................................8.81 Matson v White (1950) 220 P (2d) 864 ......................................................6.70, 6.73 Matthews v Usher [1900] 2 QB 535.....................................................................8.67 May v Lane (1894) 64 LJQB 236 ......................................6.06, 6.43, 6.59, 6.75, 8.45 Meek v Port of London Authority [1918] 2 Ch 96 .............................................3.06 Mellowes Archital Ltd v Bell Products Ltd (1997) 87 BLR 26............................8.74 Mercantile Bank of London Ltd v Evans (1899) 2 QB 613........................3.16, 7.41 Mercantile Finance Corp Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd [1932] NZLR 1107.............................................................................................6.87 Merrill v Merrill (1825) 3 Me 463........................................................................7.07 Metal Distributors (UK) Ltd v ZCCM Investment Holdings plc [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 37.....................................................................................8.64 Meux v Bell (1841) 1 Hare 73; 66ER 955.............................................................4.20 M’Gillivray v Simson (1826) 2 C & P 320; 172 ER 145.......................................8.26 MH Smith (Plant Hire) Ltd v DL Mainwaring (T/A Inshore) [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 244...................................................................................3.10 Middleton v Pollock (1876) 2 Ch D 104..............................................................7.29 Mikhail Lermontov, The (1993) 176 CLR 344 ..................................6.26, 6.28, 8.33 Milan Tramways Co, Re (1884) 25 Ch D 587 .....................................................8.95 Miller Construction Co v First Industrial Technology Corp (1991) 576 So 2d 748 .........................................................................................6.79 Miller’s Case (1876) 3 Ch D 391 ..........................................................................3.06 Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De GF & J 264; 45 ER 1185..........................7.20, 7.21, 7.27
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Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd (2005) 214 ALR 24............................................................6.101 Minister for Land and Water Conservation v NTL Australia Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 149 ...........................................................................6.88, 6.92 Ministry of Sound (Ireland) Ltd v World Online Ltd [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 823.................................................................................................6.21 Minnetoka Oil Co v Cleveland Vitrified Brick Co (1910) 111 P 326.................6.73 Minucoe v London and Liverpool and Globe Insurance Co Ltd (1925) 36 CLR 513....................................................................................6.73, 6.87 Mirams, Re [1891] 1 QB 594................................................................................6.58 Misner v Australian Capital Territory (2000) 146 ACTR 1................................6.09 Mitchell v Purnell Motors Pty Ltd [1961] NSWR 165......................8.49, 8.64, 8.72 MK and JA Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 744 ...........6.87 Modern Weighbridge and Scale Services Pty Ltd v Australian National Railways Commission (Supreme Court, Sth Australia, 6 Sept 1995) ....6.84, 6.86 Mondel v Steel (1841) 8 M & W 858; 151 ER 1288....................................8.75, 8.79 Monk v ANZ Banking Corp Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 148.........6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64 Montedipe SpA v JTP-RO Jugotanker (The Jordan Nicolav) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 11...............................................6.08, 6.73, 6.118, 7.38, 8.29 Montgomery v De Picot (1908) P 305 ........................................................6.71, 6.79 Moore v Collins [1937] SASR 195 ..............................................................6.70, 6.73 Moresk Cleaners Ltd v Hicks [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 338 .....................................6.79 Morgan v Larivière [1875] LR 7 HL 423..............................................................7.04 Morley v Morley (1858) 25 Beav 253; 53 ER 633 ..............................................6.100 Morrell v Wootten (1852) 16 Beav 197; 51 ER 753...............................................................2.13, 4.12, 7.04, 7.06, 7.07, 7.18 Morrison v Young (1872) 3 VR (L) 35 ................................................................6.59 Moschi v Lep Air Services Ltd [1973] AC 331...................................................6.100 Moseley v Cressey’s Co (1865) LR 1 Eq 405........................................................7.07 Moss Bay Hematite Iron and Steel Co Ltd (1892) 8 TLR 63; affd 8 TLR 475 ...................................................................................................8.71 Moss, Ex parte (1884) 14 QBD 310 .....................................................................6.15 Moss v Barnett (1862) 1 SCR(NSW) 313 ............................................................7.14 Motel Marine Pty Ltd v IAC (Finance) Pty Ltd (1964) 110 CLR 9 ....................7.37 Moulsdale v Birchall (1772) 2 Black W 820; 96 ER 483......................................4.23 Mountain Road (No 9) Ltd v Michael Edgley Corp Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 335 ....................................................................4.10, 4.11, 4.13, 4.14, 7.16 Movitor Pty Ltd v Sims, Re (1996) 19 ACSR 440 .....................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.63, 6.64, 6.65, 6.67 Mowry v Todd (1815) 12 Mass 281 .....................................................................7.07 Moxon v Berkeley Mutual Benefit Building Society (1890) 62 LT 250............................................................................................................8.99
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MS Fashions Ltd v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 2) [1993] Ch 425 ................................................................................6.100 MSP Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamps (1999) 198 CLR 494 ........3.11 Mulkerrins v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2003] 1 WLR 1937.....................6.98, 8.04 Muntz v Smail (1909) 8 CLR 262.........................................................................7.07 Muscat v Smith [2003] 1 WLR 2853...........................................................8.66, 8.69 Mutual Export Corp v Asia Australian Express Ltd (The Lakatoi Express) (1990) 103 FLR 32 ..............................................................................3.06 Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 179 CLR 155..............................................................................................6.61, 6.62 N Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corp [1921] 3 KB 110............................................6.37 Napier v Williams [1911] 1 Ch 361 .....................................................................6.09 Natal Investment Co, Re (1868) LR 3 Ch App 355.............................................8.26 National Carbonising Co Ltd v British Coal Distillation Ltd (1936) 54 RPC 41.......................................................................6.69, 6.70, 6.79, 6.99, 8.09 National Express Group Australia (Swanston Trams) Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 694.......................................................................................................6.36 National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 6 ACTR 1........................................3.17, 4.1, 4.18, 4.27, 7.40 National Mutual Property Services (Australia) Pty Ltd v Citibank Savings Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 514..........................6.05, 6.58, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64, 6.65 National Provincial & Union Bank of England v Lindsell [1922] 1 KB 21........6.50 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 ............2.06, 6.09, 8.79 National Provincial and Union Bank v Charnley [1924] 1 KB 431 ...................3.17 Neave v Neave [1926] GLR 254 ..................................................................4.05, 4.12 Nettleton v Molineaux (1889) 15 VLR 13 ...........................................................7.14 Neville v London “Express” Newspaper Ltd [1919] AC 368..............................6.59 Neville v Wilson [1997] Ch 144 .........................................................7.16, 7.28, 7.29 New Bullas Trading Ltd, Re [1994] 1 BCLC 485 ................................................6.56 New England Cabinet Works v Morris (1917) 115 NE 315 ......................6.77, 6.79 New Redhead Estate & Coal Co Ltd v Scottish Australian Mining Co Ltd (1919) 20 SR(NSW) 12 .......................................................................6.121 New York Bank Note Company v Hamilton Bank Note Engraving and Printing Company (1905) 73 NE 48 .........................................................6.08 New York Underwriters Insurance Company v Central Union Bank of South Carolina (1933) 65 F 2d 738 ..............................................................6.73 New Zealand Factors Ltd v Farmers Trading Co Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 703 ........7.38 New Zealand Payroll Software Systems Ltd v Advanced Management Systems Ltd [2003] 3 NZLR 1 ..................................................................6.87, 6.88 Newbolt v Bingham (1895) 72 LT 852.................................................................6.08 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 190 CLR 513.......................................................................................................3.11
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Newman v Cook [1963] VR 659 .................................................................8.75, 8.79 Ngyen: Ex Parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1992) 120 ALR 424...............6.67 Nichols, ex parte (1883) 22 Ch D 782..................................................................6.15 Nioa v Bell (1901) 27 VLR 82...............................................................................8.06 Nirens v Fowler Asphalt Pty Ltd (1966) 9 FLR 255 ............................................4.27 Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 ....................................3.08, 3.09, 6.73, 6.74, 6.79, 6.88, 6.92, 6.95, 6.101 Nolan v King and Cook [1931] QSR 342 ...................................................4.18, 7.07 Noonan v Martin (1987) 10 NSWLR 402...................................................7.04, 7.40 Noranda Australia Ltd v Lachlan Resources NL (1988) 14 NSWLR 1 ..............6.84 Norglen Ltd v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd [1999] 2 AC 1 .............................................................................6.59, 6.63, 6.64, 6.67, 6.82 Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9 .........................................2.05, 2.18, 3.04, 3.14, 3.23, 3.25, 4.04, 4.05, 4.07, 4.09, 4.16, 4.27, 6.17, 6.19, 6.20, 6.49, 6.90, 7.15, 7.20, 7.21, 7.22, 7.27, 7.28, 7.39, 7.44 Norrish v Marshall (1821) 5 Madd 475; 56 ER 977 ............................................8.81 Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (1990) 170 CLR 146.....7.37 NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Trevor (2000) 23 WAR 482 ............................7.16 Nullagine Investments Pty Ltd Western Australian Club Inc (1993) 177 CLR 635.......................................................................................................6.85 NW Robbie & Co Ltd v Witney Warehouse Co Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 1324 .........8.83 Oakdale (Richmond) Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc [1997] 1 BCLC 63 ..........................................................................................................6.86 Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd, Re [1998] Ch 170 ......................6.06, 6.64, 6.67 OBG Ltd v Allan [2005] 2 WLR 1174 ..................................................................8.11 O’Brien v Benson’s Hosiery (Holdings) Ltd [1980] AC 562 ............2.05, 3.11, 6.73 Official Manager of the Athenoeum Life Assurance Society v Pooley (1858) 3 De G & J 294; 44 ER 1281...................................................................8.58 Ogdens Ltd v Weinberg (1906) 95 LT 567 ...............................6.06, 6.15, 6.52, 6.54 Old Grovebury Manor Farm Ltd v W Seymour Plant Sales & Hire Ltd (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 1397.........................................................................6.87 Old Papa’s Franchise Systems Pty Ltd v Camisa Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 11 .........................................................................................................6.87 Oldham v Oldham (1867) LR 3 Eq 404 ...............................................................7.05 Olds Discount Co Ltd v Cohen [1938] 3 All ER 281n ........................................3.16 Olds Discount Co Ltd v John Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275 .........................3.16 Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365 ......................2.14, 3.06, 7.05, 7.15, 7.20, 7.21 Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95..............................................3.09 Ord v White (1840) 3 Beav 357; 49 ER 140 .........................................................8.83 Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 .................................................................................................3.16, 3.17
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Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 78 ..............................................................................................3.16 Orlando Orange Groves Co v Hale (1935) 161 So 284.......................................6.92 Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 ....................................4.05 Ostabridge Pty Ltd v Stafford [2001] NSWCA 335 ............................................8.82 O’Sullivan v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1984] 1 Qd R 212......................3.18 OT Computers Ltd, Re [2004] Ch 317 ................................................................6.73 Oughtred v IRC [1960] AC 206 .........................................................7.26, 7.28, 7.29 Overall v Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [1929] GLR 69 ..........................................6.73 Owen, Re [1894] 3 Ch 220 ...................................................................................3.17 Pacific Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd v Underworks Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 288..................................................................................................6.11 Padre Island, The [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 408.............................................6.08, 6.118 Padre Island, The (No 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 259..........................................6.118 Paige v Faure (1920) 127 NE 898 .......................................................6.68, 6.71, 6.73 Pain, Re [1919] 1 Ch 38 ....................................................4.03, 5.09, 5.13, 5.18, 5.27 Paine v Meller (1801) 6 Ves jun 349; 31 ER 1088 ...............................................7.17 Pakenham Upper Fruit Ltd v Crosby (1924) 35 CLR 386 ..................................3.26 Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 ...............3.10, 4.07, 4.31, 4.32, 6.05, 6.33, 6.34, 7.07, 7.09, 7.15, 7.16, 7.44 Palmer v Bate (1821) 2 Brad & B 673; 129 ER 1125............................................6.58 Palmer v Carey [1926] AC 703.........................................3.17, 4.27, 7.07, 7.09, 7.12 Palmer v Culverwell Brooks & Co (1902) 85 LT 758..........................................7.07 Palmer v Locke (1881) 18 Ch D 381 ....................................................................5.05 Palmer’s Decoration & Furniture Co, Re [1904] 2 Ch 743 ................................8.62 Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp (The Trident Beauty) [1994] 1 WLR 161............................................................3.12, 5.05, 6.22, 6.29, 6.38, 6.41, 6.104, 8.01, 8.31, 8.33, 8.34, 8.37 Paper Products Mach Co v Safepack Mills (1921) 131 NE 288.................6.68, 6.69 Paquine v Snary [1909] 1 KB 688 ........................................................................6.58 Paradise Motors Co Ltd, Re [1968] 1 WLR 1125.......................................7.15, 7.31 Paragon Finance plc v Pender [2005] 1 WLR 3412 ............................................4.05 Paris Skating Rink Co, Re (1877) 5 Ch D 959.....................................................6.59 Park Gate Waggon Works Co, Re (1881) 17 Ch D 234 ......................................6.67 Park v Allied Mortgage Corp Ltd (1993) ATPR (Digest) 46 ..............................6.05 Parker v Jackson [1936] 2 All ER 281 ..................................................................8.81 Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd v Concrete Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 373...........................................................................................6.69 Parsons v Sovereign Bank of Canada [1913] AC 160 .........................................8.64 Partnership Pacific Securities Ltd , Re [1994] 1 Qd R 410...............................................................................7.40, 8.26, 8.67, 8.69, 8.86 Paterson v Murphy (1853) 11 Hare 88; 68 ER 1198 ..................................7.27, 7.29
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Patience, ex parte (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 96..........................................................6.58 Paton v IRC [1938] AC 341..................................................................................6.49 Patrick, Re [1891] 1 Ch 82..................................................................4.15, 7.21, 8.04 Patrick Smythe, Re Trust of [1970] ALR 919 ....................................7.07, 7.16, 7.19 Patten v Thomas (1965) 66 SR (NSW) 458; [1965] NSWR 1457 ......................6.46 Paul & Frank Ltd v Discount Bank [1967] Ch 349 .............................................6.44 Paul v Constance [1977] 1 All ER 195 .................................................................7.29 Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221......................................2.10 Pawlett v AG (1667) Hard 465; 145 ER 550 ........................................................4.24 Pearcy, In re (1871) LR 13 Eq 309 .......................................................................6.45 Pearson v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA 1427 ....................................4.22 Peden Iron & Steel Co v McKnight (1910) 128 SW 156.....................................8.48 Pendal Nominees Pty Ltd v Lednez Industries (Australia) Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 282 ..................................................................................................8.13 Pennington v Waine [2002] 1 WLR 2075............................................................7.15 Pennsylvania R Co v Huston (1936) 81 F 2d 704.......................................6.68, 6.78 Percival v Dunn (1885) 29 Ch D 128..........................................................7.12, 7.40 Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1.............................................................................4.13, 4.16, 4.25, 5.23 Perkins, Re [1898] 2 Ch 182.................................................................................8.13 Perpetual Executors Trustees and Agency Co (WA) Ltd v Maslen [1952] AC 215....................................................................................................7.14 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v Smith (1938) 39 SR (NSW) 19 ...............................7.07 Perryer v Halifax (1677) Rep Temp Finch 299; 23 ER 164.................................8.18 Peter v Shipway (1908) 7 CLR 232.......................................................................7.19 Peters v General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp Ltd [1937] 4 All ER 628; [1938] 2 All ER 267 (CA).............................................6.72, 6.73, 6.88 Peters v Soame (1701) 2 Vern 428; 23 ER 164 ....................................................8.18 Pettit & Johnson v Foster Wheeler Ltd [1950] 2 DLR 42 .................5.05, 7.07, 8.06 Phillips v Alhambra Palace Co [1901] 1 QB 59..........................................6.74, 6.79 Phillips v Clagett (1843) 11 M & W 84; 152 ER 725 ...........................................4.24 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De GF & J 208; 45 ER 1164......................................6.09 Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd v Earl’s Court Ltd (1913) 30 TLR 50 ......................8.26 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 ...6.31, 6.51, 8.61 Pickering v Sogex Services (UK) Ltd (1982) 20 BLR 66 .....................................6.61 Pinches (No 2), Re (1932) 4 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 200 .........................7.07 Pincott v Moorstons Ltd [1937] 1 All ER 513 .....................................................6.90 Pino v Spanish Broadcasting System of Florida Inc (1990) 564 So 2d 186 .......6.08 Pinto Leite and Nephews, Re [1929] 1 Ch 221....................................................8.83 Plater v Meng (1887) 30 Fed Rep 308..................................................................7.07 Plating Co v Farquharson (1881) 17 Ch D 49.....................................................6.59 Pooley v Goodwin (1835) 4 Ad & E 94; 111 ER 722 ...........................................7.40
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Portuguese-American Bank of San Francisco v Welles (1916) 242 US 7 ..................................................................................................3.10, 6.87, 6.89 Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society [1967] 2 QB 363 .............................................................................................................6.22, 6.73 Poulton v Commonwealth (1953) 89 CLR 540..........................................6.59, 6.61 PP Consultants Pty Ltd v Finance Sector Union (2000) 201 CLR 648 ............6.101 Precious Metals Australia Ltd v Xstrata (Schweiz) AG [2005] NSWSC 141 .....................................................................................................6.100 Premetis v 260 Oxford Street Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 904.................................6.48 President of the Shire of Benalla v Turner (1881) 7 VLR 200 ...................6.50, 7.14 Price v Murray [1970] VR 782 .............................................................................8.30 Price v Seaman (1825) 4 B & C 525; 107 ER 1155 ..............................................4.09 Primelife (Glendale Hostel) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2004) 9 VR 665.................................................................................................6.48 Pritchard v Racecage Pty Ltd (1997) 142 ALR 527 .............................................6.05 Proctor v Union Coal Co (1923) 137 NE 659 .................................6.70, 6.88, 6.121 Project 28 Pty Ltd v Barr [2005] NSWCA 24 ..................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.63, 6.66 Prosser v Edmonds (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 481; 160 ER 263 ...........................6.10, 6.59 Provident Finance Corp Pty Ltd v Hammond [1978] VR 312.........8.70, 8.85, 8.86 Pryors Tours Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport [2003] WASCA 129 .......................................................................................................6.87 PT Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 241....................6.100, 7.26 Public Trustee v Mortleman [1928] NZLR 337 ................................................6.128 QPSX Ltd v Ericsson Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 1 ........................6.59, 6.66 Quach v Huntof Pty Ltd (2000) Motor Vehicle Reports 263 ...........6.59, 6.63, 6.65 Queensland Insurance Co Ltd v Australian Mutual Fire Insurance Society Ltd (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 195 ...............................................................8.07 R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (No 8) [2003] QB 381............................................................6.59 R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1980) 144 CLR 13 .................................7.17 R v Chester & North Wales Legal Aid Area Office (No 12) [1998] 1 WLR 1496..................................................................................................6.87, 6.88 R v Justices of Kent [1873] LR 8 QB 305 .............................................................7.37 R v Licensing Justices for the Licensing District of Charleville [1902] St R Qd 111 ........................................................................................................7.37 R v Preddy [1996] AC 815....................................................................................3.10 R v Sofroniou [2004] QB 1218.............................................................................3.10 R v Toohey, ex parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327 .......2.06, 3.19 RA Brierley Investments Ltd v Landmark Corporation Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 224..............................................................................................6.08, 6.93 Radstock Co-operative and Industrial Society v Norton-Radstock UDC [1967] Ch 1094; [1968] Ch 605.............................................................6.104
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Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] QB 825................................................................3.19, 4.12, 4.16, 6.76, 8.25 Rajski v Computer Manufacture & Design Pty Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 443 .......6.63 Ralston v South Greta Colliery Co (1912) SR(NSW) 6 ......................................8.06 Ramsey v Hartley [1977] 1 WLR 686........................................6.63, 6.67, 7.38, 7.40 Ranken v Alfaro (1877) 5 Ch D 786.....................................................................7.07 Rasbora Ltd v JCL Marine Ltd [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 645 ...................................3.06 Ratcliffe v Oceanic Life Ltd [1998] NSWSC 31.................................................6.100 Raven, The [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 266 .........................................................8.83, 8.94 Rawson v Samuel (1841) Cr & Ph 161; 41 ER 451..............................................8.64 Raynor v Preston (1881) 18 Ch D 1..........................................6.76, 7.15, 7.17, 8.25 Read v Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128.....................................................3.27, 5.06, 5.18 Reade v Bentley (1857) 3 K & J 271; 69 ER 1110........................................6.74, 6.79 Redman v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1916) 22 CLR 84.....................................................................................4.02, 7.15, 8.16, 8.57 Reed Publishing Holdings Ltd v Kings Reach Investments Ltd, unreported, 25 May 1983, English Court of Appeal........................................6.88 Rees v De Bernady [1896] 2 Ch 437............................................................6.59, 6.65 Reeve v Whitmore (1863) 33 LJ Ch 63 ................................................................7.44 Reeves v Barlow (1884) 12 QBD 436 ...................................................................7.16 Reeves v Pope [1914] 2 KB 284 ..........................................................8.67, 8.68, 8.69 Reid v McIntyre (1905) 11 ALR 159 ....................................................................7.07 Rekstin v Severo Sibirsko Gosudarstvennoe Akcionernoe Obschestvo Komseverputj and the Bank for Russian Trade Ltd [1933] 1 KB 47 .....7.04, 7.06 Rendall v Morphew (1914) 84 LJ Ch 517 ............................................................6.08 Residues Treatment & Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 1................................................................................................3.11 Reuthlinger v MacDonald, unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, 20 Oct 1976 .............................................................................6.84, 6.85 Rhodesia Goldfields Ltd, Re [1910] 1 Ch 239 .....................................................8.26 Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310...............3.27, 6.107, 6.108, 6.119, 6.124, 6.130 Riccard v Prichard (1855) 1 K & J 277; 69 ER 462..............................................7.07 Richards v Delbridge (1874) LR 18 Eq 11 ..................................................7.21, 7.29 Rickard Constructions v Rickard Hails Moretti [2004] NSWSC 1041.....6.61, 6.62 Riseda Nominees Pty Ltd v St Vincent’s Hospital (Melbourne) Ltd [1998] 2 VR 70 ..........................................................................7.09, 7.15, 7.40 Roadshow Entertainment Pty Ltd v ACN 053 006 269 Pty Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 462 ....................................................................6.88, 8.66, 8.85 Robbins v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1973) 1 ALR 13 .......................7.37 Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257.............................4.14, 4.20, 4.27, 6.15, 7.07 Robinson, Re (1884) 27 Ch D 160 .......................................................................6.58 Robinson v Podosky [1905] QSR 118.........................................................6.15, 7.07
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Robinson v The State of South Australia [1928] SASR 42..................................5.03 Robson v Drummond (1831) 2 B & Ad 303; 109 ER 1156........................6.74, 6.79 Rodger v Comptoir d’Escompte De Paris (1869) LR 2 PC 393..........................7.19 Rodick v Gandell (1852) 1 De GM & G 763; 42 ER 749........................................................................3.17, 4.27, 7.07, 7.09, 7.12 Rogers v Challis (1859) 27 Beav 175; 54 ER 68 ..........................................6.75, 7.16 Rolls-Royce Ltd v Jeffrey [1962] 1 All ER 801.....................................................2.04 Rolston v South Greta Colliery Co (1912) 13 SR (NSW) 6 ................................6.14 Rolt v White (1862) 3 De GJ & S 360; 46 ER 674................................................8.60 Rose, Re [1952] Ch 499............................................4.07, 7.15, 7.17, 7.20, 7.21, 8.04 Rose v Clark (1842) 1 Y & C 534; 62 ER 1005.....................................................8.06 Rosenthal & Sons Ltd v Esmail [1965] 1 WLR 1117...........................................6.50 Rosher, Re (1884) 26 Ch D 801............................................................................6.76 Ross T Smythe & Co Ltd v TD Bailey Son & Co [1940] 3 All ER 60 .................6.50 Ross v Blackham (1875) 1 VLR (E) 220...............................................................4.08 Rothwells Ltd v Nommack (No 100) Pty Ltd (1988) 13 ACLR 421 .........2.13, 7.16 Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1992] 2 VR 577 ..................................................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.63 Row Dal Constructions Pty Ltd , Re [1966] VR 249.......4.31, 6.15, 6.45, 7.07, 7.44 Row v Dawson (1749) 1 Ves 331; 27 ER 1064............................................7.07, 8.18 Rowell, ex parte (1878) 39 LT 259, affd (1879) 10 Ch D 615 .............................6.15 Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall (2001) 208 CLR 516...............................6.49 Roxburghe v Cox (1881) 17 Ch D 520......................................8.38, 8.52, 8.81, 8.83 Royal Exchange Assurance v Hope [1928] Ch 179 .............................................8.38 Royal Insurance Co Ltd v Mylius (1926) 38 CLR 477 ........................................6.73 Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Ltd v Barrett [1928] Ch 411 ................................................................................................................8.63 Royal Victorian Institute for the Blind Ltd v RBS.RVIB.VAF Ltd (2004) 206 ALR 581...........................................................................................6.73 Ruddenklau v Charlesworth [1925] NZLR 161 ..................................................6.28 Rufa Pty Ltd v Cross [1981] Qd R 365...............................................................6.132 Rumput (Panama) SA v Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (The Leage) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 259..........................................6.08, 6.73, 6.118 Rural & Agricultural Management Ltd v West Merchant Bank Ltd (1995) 128 FLR 440........................................................................6.132, 6.135 Russell and Co Ltd v Fryers (1909) 25 TLR 414.........................................6.68, 7.41 Russell, Re [1968] VR 285 ...........................................................................6.20, 7.04 Sacher Investments Pty Ltd v Forma Stereo Consultants Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 5 ..........................................................................................6.100 Sacks v Neptune Meter Co (1932) 258 NYS 254......................6.58, 6.83, 6.85, 6.88 Saffron Walden Second Benefit Building Society v Rayner (1880) 14 Ch D 406 .......................................................................................................7.38
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St Hilliers (Developments) Pty Ltd v Radmanovich [2002] NSWSC 524; (2002) Butterworths Property Reports 20 .................................6.87 St Mary’s Bank v Cianchette (1951) 99 F Supp 994............................................8.48 Salemi v Mackellar (1977) 137 CLR 396..............................................................7.37 Saliterman v Finney (1985) 361 NW 2d 175 .......................................................6.08 Sally Beauty Co Inc v Nexxus Products Co Inc (1986) 801 F 2d 1001 .............................................................................................6.74, 6.79, 6.80 Salmon Lake Seed Co v Frontier Trust Co (1931) 153 A 671 ............................6.68 Salter v Gilbertson (2003) 6 VR 466 ....................................................................3.07 Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 ..........................................................3.15, 4.27, 6.42, 7.07, 7.19, 7.39, 7.40 Sargent Glass Company v Matthews Land Company (1904) 72 NE 474 ..........6.70 Saunderson & Co v Clark (1913) 29 TLR 579.....................................................3.16 Scarf v Jardine (1882) 7 App Cas 345 ..................................................................3.06 Schalit v Joseph Nadler Ltd [1933] 2 KB 79 ........................................................8.67 Schlessinger v Forest Products Co (1910) 76 A 1024..........................................6.68 Schmaling v Thomlinson (1815) 6 Taunt 147; 128 ER 989................................3.08 Schneidman v Barnett [1951] NZLR 301 ..........................................4.18, 6.15, 6.34 Schroeder v Central Bank of London Ltd (1876) 34 LT 735 .....................6.37, 7.04 Schultz v Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp Ltd (1923) 23 SR (NSW) 153 .........................................................................................................6.59 Schupack v McDonald’s System Inc (1978) 264 NW 2d 827 .............................6.79 Schweiger v Hoch (1969) 223 So 2d 557 .............................................................6.92 Scientific Investments Pension Plan Trusts [1999] Ch 53..................................6.85 Scribes West Ltd v Relsa Anstalt (No 3) [2005] 1 WLR 1847....................8.18, 8.67 Scruples Imports Pty Ltd v Crabtree & Evelyn Pty Ltd (1983) 1 Intellectual Property Reports 315.........................................................................................3.06 Secretary, Department of Social Security v James (1990) 95 ALR 615 ..............7.29 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Frid [2004] 2 AC 506.....................6.36 Seear v Lawson (1880) 15 Ch D 426 ....................................................................6.67 Shackwell v Howe, Thornton & Palmer (1909) 8 CLR 170................................7.07 Shalson v Russo [2005] 2 WLR 1213 ...................................................................8.62 Shamia v Joory [1958] 1 QB 448..........................................................................2.13 Sharp v The Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd (1944) 69 CLR 539.................6.08 Shaw v Foster (1872) LR 5 HL 321............................................7.16, 7.17, 7.18, 8.83 Shaw v Harris (No 2) (1992) 3 Tas R 167...................................................3.07, 8.04 Shayler v Woolf [1946] 1 Ch 320 ............................................6.69, 6.73, 6.77, 6.118 Shea v Moore [1894] 1 IR 158..............................................................................4.27 Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 407 ..3.17, 4.27, 7.07 Shearer v Wilding (1915) 15 SR(NSW) 283 ........................................................6.08 Sheehan, In the Marriage of (1990) 97 FLR 190 .................................................6.61 Sheers v Thimbleby & Son (1897) 76 LT 709....................................................6.100
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Shellard, ex parte (1873) 17 Eq 109 .....................................................................7.07 Shepherd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 113 CLR 385 ...............................................4.27, 6.17, 6.19, 6.20, 6.38, 7.05, 7.12, 7.39 Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548..................................................3.27, 4.05, 4.12, 4.17, 4.27, 6.88, 7.38 Shropshire Union Railways & Canal Co v The Queen (1875) LR 7 E & I App 496............................................................................................7.15 Sickles v Lauman (1918) 169 NW 670.................................................................6.08 Sidney Raper Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1975] 2 NSWLR 227 ........................................................................................8.78 Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142 .........................................................................3.15, 3.16, 6.56, 6.82, 6.88, 7.40 Sim v Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council [1986] 3 All ER 387 ................................................................................................................8.79 Simmons v Harvey [1965] Tas SR 84.................................................2.04, 6.07, 6.85 Sinclair v British Telecommunications plc [2001] 1 WLR 38 ...................6.63, 6.98 Singh v Observer Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 751...........................................................6.63 Sinochem International Oil (London) Co Ltd v Mobil Sales and Supply Corp [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 474............................................................................8.26 Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 AC 199 ..............................6.73 Skipper & Tucker v Holloway & Howard [1910] 2 KB 630 ...............................7.39 Skipskredittforeningen v Emperor Navigation SA [1997] 2 BCLC 398 ...........................................................................................................8.26 Smit Tak International Zeesleepen Bergingsbedriff BV v Selco Salvage Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 398 ............................................................................8.99 Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health (1990) 95 ALR 87 .......................................3.23 Smith v ANL Ltd (2000) 204 CLR 493........................................................2.05, 3.11 Smith v Board of Education of City of Liberal (1924) 222 P 101..............6.74, 6.79 Smith v Bridgend County Borough Council [2002] 1 AC 336.........3.16, 7.07, 7.16 Smith v Corry & Co (1909) 28 NZLR 672...........................................................7.38 Smith v Jones [1954] 1 WLR 1089 .....................................................7.14, 8.67, 8.79 Smith v Parkes (1852) 16 Beav 115; 51 ER 720 ........................7.18, 8.87, 8.88, 8.89 Smith v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1910) 11 CLR 148.................................................................6.87, 7.04, 7.05, 7.06, 7.07, 7.08 Smith v Smith (1833) 2 Cr & M 231; 149 ER 745 ...............................................7.18 Smits v Roach (2004) 60 NSWLR 711 .................................................................6.59 Snape v Kiernan (1988) 13 NSWLR 88 ...............................................................6.08 Snyder’s Ltd v Furniture Finance Corp Ltd [1931] 1 DLR 398.................5.05, 6.47 Société des Ateliers et Chantiers de France [1919] AC 1 ....................................6.87 Society of Lloyds v Leighs (1997) 6 Re LR 289....................................................8.26 Society of Lloyds v Wilkinson (No 2) (1997) 6 Re LR 214.................................8.26
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Socony Mobil Oil Co Inc v West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association (London) Ltd (The Padre Island) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 408....................................................................................6.08, 6.118 Socony Mobil Oil Co Inc v West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association (London) Ltd (The Padre Island No 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 191.................................................................................6.118 South Australian Management Corp v Sheahan (1995) 16 ACSR 45 .......6.61, 6.62 South East Thames Regional Health Authority v Y J Lovell (London) Ltd (1985) BLR 127 ..................................................................................6.61, 6.64 South, ex parte (1818) 3 Swanst 392; 36 ER 907 ........................................7.06, 7.07 Southern British National Trust Ltd v Pither (1937) 57 CLR 89 ......................8.04, 8.26, 8.53, 8.55, 8.58, 8.59, 8.62, 8.70, 8.83, 8.94, 8.95 Southern Cross Interiors Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 53 NSWLR 213.......................................................................6.45 Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 Building Law Reports (BLR) 33 ..................................................................................3.08, 6.68, 6.74, 6.79 Southwell v Scotter (1880) 49 LJQB 356 .............................................................8.36 Specialised Transport Pty Ltd v Dominiak (1989) 16 NSWLR 657 ..........6.84, 6.88 Spectrum Plus Ltd, Re [2005] 3 WLR 58.........................3.15, 3.16, 4.32, 6.56, 6.88 Spellman v Spellman [1961] 1 WLR 921 ....................................................6.87, 6.90 Squires v SA Steel & Sheet Pty Ltd (1987) 45 SASR 147 ...................4.12, 7.18, 8.06 SSL Realisations (2002) Ltd, Re [2005] 1 BCLC 1 ..............................................6.56 Standard Chautaugua System v Gift (1926) 242 P 145.......................................6.79 Standing v Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282....................................................7.29, 7.31 Stanley v English Fibres Industries Ltd (1899) 68 LJQB 839..............................7.38 Stansbery v Medo-Land Dairy (1940) 105 P 2d 86 .............................................8.48 Steel Wing Co Ltd, Re [1921] 1 Ch 349 ...........................4.05, 4.07, 4.18, 4.27, 7.39 Stein v Blake [1996] AC 243...............................................................6.06, 6.15, 6.67 Stephens v Venables (No 1) (1862) 30 Beav 625; 54 ER 1084...................8.06, 8.83 Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489..............................................3.26, 7.16, 7.17 Stevens v Benning (1855) 6 De G M & G 223; 43 ER 1218 .......................6.73, 6.74 Stevens v Keogh (1946) 72 CLR 1 ........................................................................6.59 Stevenson & Sons v Maule & Co (1920) SC 335 .................................................6.79 Stewart v Reavell’s Garage [1952] 2 QB 545...............................................3.08, 6.79 Stocks v Dobson (1853) 4 De GM & G 11; 43 ER 411 ......................4.12, 4.20, 8.83 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574.......................................................6.21, 6.25, 6.28, 6.31, 8.33, 8.37, 8.61 Stoddart v Union Trust Ltd [1912] 1 KB 181....................................8.59, 8.64, 8.70 Stokes v Liverpool & London and Globe Insurance Co (1925) 126 SE 649 ......6.87 Stone v Lidderdale (1795) 2 Anst 533; 145 ER 958 .............................................6.58 Stump v Gaby (1852) 2 De GM & G 623; 42 ER 1015 ........................................6.09 Sturt & Co, ex parte (1871) LR 13 Eq 309 ...........................................................6.45
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Sun Candies Pty Ltd v Polites (1991) 24 NSWLR 326 ...............................8.70, 8.85 Sunbird Plaza Pty Ltd v Maloney (1988) 166 CLR 245 ....................................6.100 Sunrise Restaurants, Re (1991) 135 BR 149; [1991] Bankr Lexis 1841..............6.79 Sutton’s Trusts, Re [1879] 12 Ch D 175 ..............................................................8.06 Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd, Re (1950) 81 CLR 418...........................................6.87 Swan and Cleland’s Growing Dock and Slipway Co v Maritime Insurance Co [1907] 1 KB 116........................................................4.19, 6.34, 6.73 Swanston Mortgage Pty Ltd v Trepan Investments Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 672.............................................................................................................6.10 Swarts v Narragansett Lighting Co (1904) 59 A 77..................6.69, 6.71, 6.78, 6.79 Sweet v Cater (1841) 16 RPC 447 ........................................................................4.13 Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177 ......................................2.05, 6.90 Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584 .....3.11, 3.17, 6.106, 7.07, 7.16 Syrett v Egerton [1957] 3 All ER 331 ........................................6.50, 6.58, 6.86, 7.13 T Choithram International SA v Pagarani [2001] 1 WLR 1...............................7.15 Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523...................2.14, 3.26, 4.31, 6.15, 6.17, 6.45, 7.11, 7.13, 7.15, 7.16, 7.17, 7.19, 7.44 Taita Hotel Ltd v Spelman [1963] NZLR 206 .....................................................6.08 Tancred v Delagoa Bay and East Africa Railway Co (1889) 23 QBD 239...............................................................................................3.17, 7.41 Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315 .....3.26, 4.22, 6.86, 7.17 Taylor v Blakelock (1886) 32 Ch D 560......................................................8.55, 8.68 Taylor v DCT (1969) 123 CLR 206 ......................................................................7.20 Taylor v Okey (1806) 13 Ves Jun 180; 33 ER 263 ...............................................8.26 Taylor v Sanders [1937] VLR 62 .................................................................8.13, 8.14 Telewest Communications plc v Telewest Communications (Publications) Ltd [2003] EWHC 3176 (Ch).................................................6.123 Telford v Holt (1987) 41 DLR (4th) 385 ....................................................8.64, 8.83 Temsign Pty Ltd v Bisen Pty Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 83..........................................6.67 Teno, The [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 289 ....................................................................8.64 Thai Trading Co v Taylor [1998] QB 781 ...........................................................6.59 Thamesmead Town Ltd v Allotey (1998) 79 P & CR 557...........6.108, 6.119, 6.126 Tharros Shipping Co Ltd v Bias Shipping Ltd (1995) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 541......................................................................................................6.61, 6.63 Thayer v Lister (1861) 30 LJ Ch 427 ....................................................................7.12 Theodore v Mistford Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 296 ....................................4.22, 7.07 Thomas & Co v Thureau (1905) 1 Tas LR 58 .....................................................7.40 Thomas Jacquess v Thomas, Re [1894] 1 QB 747...............................................6.59 Thomas v Harris [1947] 1 All ER 444 ................................................3.17, 4.27, 7.40 Thomas v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] Qd R 448.................4.14, 4.16, 4.18 Thomas v National Farmer’s Union Mutual Insurance Society Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 386.......................................................................................6.76
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Thomas v Silvia (1994) 14 ACSR 446 ..................................................................6.71 Thompson v McInnes (1911) 12 CLR 562 ..........................................................7.37 Thornley v Lang [2004] 1 WLR 378 ....................................................................6.59 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 .......................................................3.11, 4.04, 4.07, 4.12, 4.16, 4.25, 8.03, 8.06 Tibbits v George (1836) 5 AD & E 107; 11 ER 1107 ...........................................7.07 Tichener, Re (1865) 35 Beav 317; 55 ER 918.......................................................7.18 Timothy’s Pty Ltd and Companies Act, Re [1981] 2 NSWLR 706 ....................................................................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62 Timpson’s Executor’s v Yerbury [1936] 1 KB 645 ............................7.06, 7.18, 7.27 Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] 1 Ch 106...........................6.103, 6.106, 6.108, 6.119, 6.120, 6.126, 6.132, 6.133, 6.135 Todd Petroleum Mining Co Ltd v Shell (Petroleum Mining) Co Ltd [2005] NZCA, CA 155/05, 23 Sept 2005 .................................................6.87, 8.79 Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414 .............................................3.08, 4.18, 4.22, 4.25, 5.05, 6.07, 6.69, 6.70, 6.73, 6.75, 6.76, 6.79, 6.86, 6.87, 6.96, 6.99, 6.121, 6.123, 6.124, 6.134, 8.06, 8.07 Tom Shaw and Co v Moss Empires Ltd (1908) 25 TLR 190 ............6.88, 7.04, 7.07 Tomlinson v Cut Price Deli Pty Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 490 ....................................8.70 Toms v Cuming (1845) 7 M & G 88; 135 ER 38 .................................................7.37 Tony Lee Motors Ltd v M S MacDonald & Son (1974) Ltd [1981] 2 NZLR 281............................................................................................8.83 Tooth v Brisbane City Council (1928) 41 CLR 212 ...............................................3.17, 4.20, 6.21, 6.22, 7.07, 7.09, 8.06, 8.59 Tooth v Hallett (1869) LR 4 Ch App 242 ........................6.07, 6.15, 6.22, 8.07, 8.46 Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427.............................2.02, 2.04, 2.05, 4.11, 5.05, 5.11, 5.13, 6.07, 6.59, 8.20 Toronto-Dominion Bank v Block Bros Contractors Ltd (1980) 118 DLR (3d) 311 ..............................................................................................8.71 Torrington Creamery v Davenport (1940) 12 A 2d 780.....................................6.08 Tosich Construction Pty Ltd, Re (1997) 23 ACSR 126.......................................6.67 Total Liban SAL v Vitol Energy SA [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 700...................6.61, 6.62 Townsend v Jarman [1900] 2 Ch 698 ..................................................................6.08 Transphere Pty Ltd, Re (1986) 5 NSWLR 309 ....................................................3.11 Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679 ............................................................................6.59, 6.61, 6.62, 6.64, 6.65 Trent v Hunt (1853) 9 Ex 14; 156 ER 7 ...............................................................8.67 Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2), Re [1963] 1 Ch 199...........................................6.59, 6.61 Trident Beauty, The [1994] 1 WLR 161..........................3.12, 5.05, 6.22, 6.29, 6.38, 6.41, 6.104, 8.01, 8.31, 8.33, 8.34, 8.37 Trubenizing Process Corp v John Forsyth Ltd [1943] 4 DLR 577 ............5.05, 7.09
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Trytel, Re [1952] 2 TLR 32 ..................................................21, 6.15, 6.17, 6.22, 6.42 Turcan, Re (1888) 40 Ch D 5 ....................................................6.86, 6.88, 6.90, 7.22 Turner Corp Ltd (in liq), Re (1995) 17 ACSR 761.....................................6.84, 6.86 Turner v Smith [1901] 1 Ch 213..........................................................................8.81 Turquand & The Capital and Counties Bank v Fearon (1879) 4 QBD 280 ......4.05 Turton v Benson (1718) 1 P WMS 496; 24 ER 488.............................................8.62 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393; 121 ER 762 .........................................2.12 United Builders Pty Ltd v Mutual Acceptance Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 673...........6.48 United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Parkway Motors [1955] 1 WLR 719, overruled [1967] 1 WLR 295............................................6.88 United States Shoe Corp v Hackett (1986) 793 F 2d 161...........................6.73, 6.74 Universal Management Ltd, Re [1983] NZLR 462 ...........................3.16, 3.17, 7.41 Upson, Re (1941) 12 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 147 .....................................3.17 UTC Ltd v NZI Securities Australia Ltd (1991) 4 WAR 349 ..........................................................................................4.27, 7.16, 7.27 UTSA Pty Ltd v Ultra Tune Australia Pty Ltd [1997] 1 VR 667; affd (1996) 21 ACSR 440...................................................................................6.67 Van Lynn Developments Ltd v Pelias Construction Co Ltd [1969] 1 QB 607.............................................................................................................7.38 Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291..............................................................7.26, 7.30 Vangale Pty Ltd v Kumugai Gumi Co Ltd [2002] QSC 137...............................6.84 VGM Holdings Ltd, Re [1942] Ch 235................................................................3.11 Victoria Insurance Co v King (1895) 6 QLJ 202, affd [1896] AC 250 ...............5.05 Victorian Producers’ Co-operative Co Ltd v Leng [1918] ALR 35 ....................7.37 Voyle v Hughes (1854) 2 Sm & G 18; 65 ER 283 ................................................7.28 Waghorn v Linden Manufacturing Pty Ltd [1970] 3 NSWLR 559 ....................3.08 Waitomo Wools (NZ) Ltd v Nelsons (NZ) Ltd [1974] 1 NZLR 484 .................3.17 Wakefield and Barnsley Banking Corp v Nomanton Local Board (1881) 44 LT 697; affd (1881) 44 LT 697...............................8.58, 8.60, 8.64, 8.71 Walker Electric Company v New York Shipbuilding Company (1917) 241 F 569 .......................................................................................6.78, 7.69 Walker v Bradford Old Bank Ltd (1884) 12 QBD 511....2.02, 4.19, 5.05, 6.34, 7.38 Walker v Department of Social Security (1995) 129 ALR 198 ...........................8.86 Walker v Phoenix Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1980) 1 ANZ Ins Cas 60-045 .......................................................................................8.13 Walker v Rostron (1842) Ex 173; 152 ER 174 .....................................................7.07 Walter & Sullivan Ltd v J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584.........................................................................4.04, 4.27, 7.07, 7.39, 8.06 Walton v Lavater (1860) 8 CB(NS) 162; 141 ER 1127........................................7.39 Ward, Re (1984) 3 FCR 112 .................................................................................6.14 Ward, Re (1984) 55 ALR 395 ...............................................................................7.22 Ward v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 ................4.15, 4.20, 5.23, 7.15, 7.18, 7.38, 8.16
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Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1976] 1 QB 430.....................................................................................3.27, 4.07, 4.12, 8.30 WASA International (UK) Insurance Co Ltd v WASA International Co Ltd [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 696 .............................................................6.101 Waterson’s Trustees v St Giles Boys Club (1943) SC 369...................................7.37 Watkins v Watkins [1896] P 222..........................................................................6.58 Watson v Duke of Wellington (1830) 1 Russ & M 602; 39 ER 231....................7.12 Watson v Mid-Wales Railway Co (1867) LR 2 CP 593.....................8.71, 8.83, 8.88 Watson v Shepherd (1904) QWN 57...................................................................7.38 Way’s Trusts, Re (1864) 2 De GJ & S 365; 46 ER 416 .........................................4.14 Webb v National Australia Bank (1990) 2 Butterworths Property Reports 11 ..........................................................................................................6.71 Webb v Smith (1885) 30 Ch D 192......................................................................8.99 Webb v Stenton (1883) 11 QBD 518 ..........................................................6.42, 6.45 Weddell v JA Pearce & Major [1988] Ch 26.............................4.11, 4.13, 7.18, 7.38 Wells v Foster (1841) 8 M & W 149; 151 ER 987................................................6.58 Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270...........3.16 Welstead v Hadley (1904) 21 TLR 165 ................................................................6.08 Werderman v Société Générale d’ Eletricité (1881) 19 Ch 246 ...............4.13, 6.106 West Tankers Inc v RAS Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurta (The Front Comor) [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 257 ..................................................................6.118 West v Newing (1900) 82 LT 260.........................................................................7.07 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669.............................................................................3.11, 4.22 Western Wagon & Property Company v West [1892] 1 Ch 271 .....6.42, 6.75, 7.16 Westerton, Re [1919] 2 Ch 104 ......................4.05, 4.14, 5.17, 6.89, 7.07, 7.09, 8.04 Westgold Resources NL v St George Bank Ltd (1998) 29 ACSR 396 ................................................................................6.08, 6.84, 6.86, 6.88 Westminster Bank Ltd v Lee [1956] 1 Ch 7.........................................................6.09 Westminster Estates Pty Ltd v Calleja (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 222.....................3.07 Westralian Farmers Co-operative Ltd v Southern Meat Packers Ltd [1981] WAR 241 ................................................................................6.05, 6.54 Westralian Farmers Ltd v Commonwealth Agricultural Service Engineers Ltd (1936) 54 CLR 361............................................................6.36, 6.37 Wetherall Bros Co v United States Steel Co (1952) 200 F 2d 761......................6.74 WF Harrison & Co Ltd v Burke [1956] 1 WLR 419............................................7.38 Whale v Viasystems Technograph Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 480 ..........................6.47 Wharf St Pty Ltd v Amstar Learning Pty Ltd [2004] QCA 256 ........................6.100 White v Southern Hotel Co [1897] 1 Ch 767......................................................6.76 Whiteley Ltd v Hilt [1918] 2 KB 808 ........................................................6.08, 6.127 Whiteley v Hill [1918] 2 KB 808 ..........................................................................6.73 Whithorn Brothers v Davison [1911] 1 KB 463..................................................8.62
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Whittingstall v King (1882) 46 LT 520 ................................................................7.18 Whitton v ACN 003 266 886 Pty Ltd (1996) 42 NSWLR 123 ............................6.56 Wickham Holdings Ltd v Brooke House Motors Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 295....................................................................................................6.85, 6.87 Wigan v English & Scottish Life Assurance Association [1909] 1 Ch 291.........8.63 Wild v Simpson [1919] 2 KB 544.........................................................................6.59 Wilding v Richards (1845) 1 Coll 655; 63 ER 584...............................................7.04 Wilkinson v Wilkinson (1819) 3 Swan 515; 36 ER 958 ......................................7.07 Willcock v Terrell (1878) 3 Ex D 323...................................................................6.58 Willes v Greenhill (1861) 4 De G F & J 147; 45 ER 1139 ....................................7.18 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 ..................................................................4.09, 4.11, 4.13, 4.18, 5.10, 7.05, 7.06, 7.07, 7.08, 7.18, 7.19, 7.21, 8.06, 8.18 William C Attwater & Co Inc v Terminal Coal Corporation (1940) 115 F 2d 887.........................................................................................6.121 William Felton Co Pty Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 228.................................................6.67 William v Pickersgill & Sons Ltd v London and Provincial Marine & General Insurance Co Ltd [1912] 3 KB 614 .................................................8.07 Williams, Re [1917] 1 Ch 1 .........................................................................7.04, 7.34 Williams, Re [1930] 2 Ch 378 ..............................................................................6.20 Williams v Atlantic Assurance Co Ltd [1933] 1 KB 81 ..................................................................4.27, 6.76, 7.34, 7.38, 7.39, 7.40 Williams v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1965] NZLR 395 ......................6.20 Williams v Frayne (1937) 58 CLR 710.................................................................6.87 Williams v Lloyd (1934) 50 CLR 341...................................................................7.21 Williams v Nicoski [2003] WASC 131........................................................6.68, 6.69 Williams v Owens (1840) 5 My & Cr 303; 41 ER 386.........................................3.16 Williams v Protheroe (1829) 5 Bing 309; 130 ER 1080.......................................6.59 Williams v Sorrell (1799) 4 Ves Jun 389; 31 ER 198 ...........................................8.83 Wilmot v Alton [1897] 1 QB 17...........................................................................6.15 Wilson v Commissioner of Probate Duties (Vic) (1978) 8 ATR 799........6.08, 6.72 Wilson v Gabriel (1863) 4 B & S 243; 122 ER 450 ............................8.52, 8.60, 8.83 Wilson v Ragosine & Co Ltd (1915) 84 LJKB 2185.............................................4.18 Wilson v St Helens Borough Council [1999] 2 AC 52........................................6.73 Wilson v Wallani (1880) 5 Ex D 155 ...................................................................7.37 Wilsons (NZ) Portland Cement Ltd v Gatx-Fuller Australasia Pty Ltd (No 2) [1985] 2 NZLR 33 ...........................................................................8.70 Wily v St George Partnership Banking Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 1 ...........................3.23 Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619; 99 ER 1284..........................2.17, 4.05, 4.23, 4.24 WJ Adams & Co Ltd v Blencowe (1929) 46 WN(NSW) 150 ....................7.07, 7.12 Wong Mee Wan v Kwan Kin Travel Services Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 38 .................6.78 Wood v Downes (1811) 18 Ves 120; 34 ER 263 ..................................................6.59
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Wood v Freehold United Quartz Mining Co Registered (1870) 1 VR (Eq) 168 ....................................................................................................6.59 Wood v Griffith (1818) 1 SW 43..........................................................................6.59 Woodhams v Anglo-Australian & Universal Family Assurance Co (1861) 3 Giff 238; 66 ER 397 .......................................................................8.55 Worthington, Re [1914] 2 KB 299 .......................................................................8.04 Wreckair Pty Ltd v Emerson [1992] 1 Qd R 700......................4.27, 6.14, 6.37, 7.40 Wright v Morgan [1926] AC 788 .........................................................................6.08 Wright v Wright (1749-50) 1 Ves Sen 410; 27 ER 1111......................................4.05 Yeandle v Wynn Realisations Ltd (1995) 47 Construction LR 1.................................................................................1.01, 6.45, 6.54, 6.87, 8.29 Yellow Cab of Cleveland Inc v Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (1991) 595 NE 2d 508 ......................................................................6.79 Young v Kitchin (1878) 3 Ex D 127 ........................8.49, 8.64, 8.72, 8.87, 8.88, 8.89 Young v Matthew Hall Mechanical & Electrical Engineers Pty Ltd (1988) 12 ACLR 399 ..........................................................................................3.17 Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560.......................................2.10 Zeil Nominees Pty Ltd v VACC Insurance Co Ltd (1975) 180 CLR 173...........8.25 Zhu v Treasurer of New South Wales (2004) 211 ALR 159 ...............................6.07 Zigurds, The (1931) 47 TLR 525..........................................................................7.07 Zigurds, The [1932] P 113; [1933] P 87; [1934] AC 209 ...........................7.07, 7.18 Zuks v Jackson McDonald (1996) 132 FLR 317..................................................1.06
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TABLE OF STATUTES
References are to paragraph number ENGLAND Army Act 1955 s 203(1) ..............................................................................................................6.58 Bankruptcy Act 1869 ............................................................................................7.37 Bills of Exchange Act 1882 s 11 .....................................................................................................................7.40 s 38(2) ................................................................................................................8.49 Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882 s 8 .......................................................................................................................7.01 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 s 2 .......................................................................................................................7.34 s 3(1) ................................................................................................................6.119 s 3(3) ................................................................................................................6.101 Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 ..............................................................6.62 Common Law Procedure Act 1854 s 85 ............................................................................................................4.09, 4.24 Companies Act 1985 s 36A(4) .............................................................................................................7.37 s 182 ...................................................................................................................7.34 s 395(1) ..............................................................................................................7.35 s 427(3)(a) .......................................................................................................6.101 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 .....................................................6.73 Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988 s 90 .....................................................................................................................7.34 Criminal Law Act 1967 s 13(1) ................................................................................................................6.59 s 13(2) ................................................................................................................6.59 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 s 111 .................................................................................................................6.101 Insolvency Act 1986 s 130(2) ..............................................................................................................8.98
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Table of Statutes
s 153(3) ..............................................................................................................4.32 s 167 ...................................................................................................................6.67 s 248 ...................................................................................................................4.32 s 281(1) ..............................................................................................................4.32 s 281(2) ..............................................................................................................4.32 s 285(3) ..............................................................................................................8.98 s 314 ...................................................................................................................6.67 s 344 ...................................................................................................................7.35 s 345(4) ..............................................................................................................7.38 s 436 ...................................................................................................................6.67 Sch 4...................................................................................................................6.67 Sch 5...................................................................................................................6.67 Judicature Act 1873.............................................................................2.11, 5.17, 5.20 s 25 ............................................................................................................5.11, 5.19 s 25(6) ...................................................................2.17, 4.09, 5.04, 5.11, 5.27, 7.34 s 25(7) ................................................................................................................5.19 s 25(11) ..............................................................................................................5.11 Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 ......................................................8.30 Law of Property Act 1925 s 53(1) ................................................................................................................7.26 s 53(1)(a) ...........................................................................................................7.29 s 53(1)(b)...........................................................................................................7.29 s 53(1)(c) ..................................................................................................5.10, 7.29 s 53(2) .......................................................................................................7.26, 7.28 s 56 ...................................................................................................................6.108 s 136 ...............................................................................................5.03, 5.10, 6.118 s 136(1) ..............................................................................................................5.03 s 205 ...................................................................................................................7.26 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s 2 .......................................................................................................................7.26 Marine Insurance Act 1906 s 50 .....................................................................................................................7.34 Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 s 5 .......................................................................................................................6.58 Patents Act 1977 s 30 .....................................................................................................................7.34 Pensions Act 1995 s 91 .....................................................................................................................6.58 Policies of Assurance Act 1867 ............................................................................6.90 s 1 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 20A ..................................................................................................................7.11
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s 53(1)(a) ...........................................................................................................8.73 Social Security Administration Act 1992 s 187 ...................................................................................................................6.58 Superannuation Act 1972 s 5(1) ..................................................................................................................6.58 Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 ..............................................6.73
AUSTRALIA Commonwealth Bankruptcy Act 1966 s 5 ..............................................................................................................4.32, 6.67 s 58(3) ................................................................................................................8.98 s 62 .....................................................................................................................7.38 s 134 ...................................................................................................................6.67 s 153(1) ..............................................................................................................4.32 s 153(3) ..............................................................................................................4.32 Bills of Exchange Act 1909 s 16 .....................................................................................................................7.40 s 43(1)(b)...........................................................................................................8.49 Cheques Act 1986 s 12(1) ................................................................................................................7.40 Commonwealth Employees Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 s 112(1) ..............................................................................................................6.58 Copyright Act 1968 s 196 ...................................................................................................................7.34 s 196(4) ............................................................................................................6.101 s 197 ...................................................................................................................7.34 Corporations Act 2001 Pt 7.11 ................................................................................................................7.34 s 9 .......................................................................................................................6.67 s 127 ...................................................................................................................7.37 s 266 ...................................................................................................................7.35 s 413 ........................................................................................................6.73, 6.101 s 471B.................................................................................................................8.98 s 477(2) ..............................................................................................................6.67 Design Act 2003 s 11 .....................................................................................................................7.34 Financial Sector (Transfers of Business) Act 1999 s 22 ...................................................................................................................6.101 Insurance Act 1973 ............................................................................................6.101
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Insurance Contracts Act 1984 s 48 .....................................................................................................................6.73 s 50 .....................................................................................................................6.73 Life Insurance Act 1995 s 200 ...................................................................................................................7.34 s 200(3) ............................................................................................................6.101 s 201 ...................................................................................................................7.34 s 202 ...................................................................................................................7.34 s 203 ...................................................................................................................7.34 Marine Insurance Act 1909 s 56 .....................................................................................................................7.34 Patents Act 1990 s 13 .....................................................................................................................7.34 s 103(1) ..............................................................................................................7.34 Reserve Bank Act 1959 s 25(c) ................................................................................................................6.58 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 s 60 .....................................................................................................................6.58 Trade Marks Act 1995 s 106(1) ..............................................................................................................7.34 Trade Practices Act 1974 s 52 .....................................................................................................................6.67 s 82 .....................................................................................................................6.05 s 87 .....................................................................................................................6.05 Veterans Entitlements Act 1986 s 125 ..........................................................................................................6.58, 6.86 Australian Capital Territory Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 151A ................................................................................................................6.59 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 ............................................7.26 s 51(1) ................................................................................................................7.26 s 51(1)(a) ...........................................................................................................7.29 s 51(1)(b)...........................................................................................................7.29 s 54(1) ................................................................................................................7.26 s 68 .....................................................................................................................6.59 Sale of Goods Act 1954 s 56 .....................................................................................................................8.73 New South Wales Bills of Sale Act 1898 s 5c(1) ................................................................................................................7.01
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Civil Procedure Act 2005 s 21(1) ................................................................................................................8.83 Conveyancing Act 1919 s 2 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 7 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 12 ...................................................................................................5.03, 5.06, 5.25 s 12(4) ................................................................................................................5.25 s 23C(1) .............................................................................................................7.26 s 23C(1)(c) ........................................................................................................7.26 s 23C(2) .............................................................................................................7.26 s 36C ................................................................................................................6.108 s 54A ..................................................................................................................7.37 s 54A(1) .............................................................................................................7.26 Insurance Act 1902 ss 14-16 ..............................................................................................................6.73 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 s 3 .......................................................................................................................6.58 Limitation Act 1969 ..............................................................................................4.17 Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 1993 s 3 .......................................................................................................................6.59 s 4 .......................................................................................................................6.59 Sale of Goods Act 1923 s 54 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 s 8 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Northern Territory Bills of Lading Act 1859 SA s 1 .......................................................................................................................7.34 s 3 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Law of Property Act 2000 s 4 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 10 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 12 ...................................................................................................................6.108 s 56(3)(b).........................................................................................................6.108 s 62 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 182 ...................................................................................................................5.03 Sale of Goods Act 1972 s 54 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Queensland Property Law Act 1974
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s 3 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 11 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 13 ...................................................................................................................6.108 s 55(3)(b).........................................................................................................6.108 s 59 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 199(1) ..............................................................................................................5.03 s 199(2) ..............................................................................................................5.03 Sale of Goods Act 1896 s 54 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1996 s 6 .......................................................................................................................7.34 South Australia Law of Property Act 1936 s 7 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 15 .....................................................................................................................5.03 s 29 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 34(1) ..............................................................................................................6.108 Law of Property Act 1938 s 26(1) ................................................................................................................7.26 Sale of Goods Act 1895 s 52 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Tasmania Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 s 2 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 36(1) ................................................................................................................7.26 s 60(2) ................................................................................................................7.26 s 61(c) ..............................................................................................................6.108 s 86(1) ................................................................................................................5.03 s 86(2) ................................................................................................................5.03 Sale of Goods Act 1896 s 57 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 s 7 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Victoria Crimes Act 1958 s 322A ................................................................................................................6.59 Goods Act 1958 s 59 .....................................................................................................................8.73
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Instruments Act 1958 s 126 ...................................................................................................................7.26 Property Law Act 1958 s 18 .....................................................................................................................7.26 s 53 .....................................................................................................................7.26 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1998 s 8 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Wrongs Act 1958 s 32 .....................................................................................................................6.59 Western Australia Property Law Act 1969 s 7 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 11(1) ..............................................................................................................6.108 s 11(3)(c) .........................................................................................................6.108 s 20 .....................................................................................................................5.03 s 20(3) ............................................................................4.27, 4.29, 5.20, 7.22, 7.39 s 34 .....................................................................................................................7.26 Sale of Goods Act 1895 s 52 .....................................................................................................................8.73 Sea-Carriage Documents Act 1997 s 8 .......................................................................................................................7.34 Statute of Frauds 1677 (Imp) s 4 .......................................................................................................................7.26 s 9 .......................................................................................................................7.26
NEW ZEALAND Contractual Remedies Act 1979 s 11(1) ................................................................................................................8.32 s 11(2) ................................................................................................................8.32 Property Law Act 1952 ........................................................................................5.07
UNITED STATES Restatement of Contracts 2d s 317(2) ..............................................................................................................6.69 s 322 .................................................................................................6.85, 6.87, 6.89 s 322(2)(a) ................................................................................................6.69, 6.86 s 322(2)(b).........................................................................................................6.88
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s 333 ...................................................................................................................8.04 s 336(2) ..............................................................................................................8.92 s 338(2) ..............................................................................................................8.39 s 338(3) ..............................................................................................................8.38 Uniform Commercial Code s 2-210..............................................................................................6.85, 6.96, 6.98 s 2-210(4) ........................................................................................................6.134 s 2-306................................................................................................................6.96 s 2.210(2) ...........................................................................................................6.69 s 9-318(4) ..........................................................................................................6.87 s 9-405................................................................................................................8.39 s 9-406................................................................................................................6.85
TABLE OF STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS
References are to paragraph number Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/1794) reg 4A.................................................................................................................6.73 reg 5(1) ..............................................................................................................6.73 reg 5(2) ............................................................................................................6.101
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INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND LAWS
References are to paragraph number Principles of European Contract Law Art 11:103 ..........................................................................................................6.50 Art 11:204 ..........................................................................................................8.04 Art 11:301 ..........................................................................................................6.85 Art 11:303(2) ............................................................................................7.38, 8.06 Art 11:304 .................................................................................................7.38, 8.06 Art 12:201 ........................................................................................................6.134 UN Convention on Assignment of Receivables in International Finance Art 11 .................................................................................................................6.85 Art 20(1) ............................................................................................................8.34 Art 20(2) ............................................................................................................8.34 Art 20(3) ............................................................................................................8.34 Art 22(1) ............................................................................................................8.39 Art 22(2)(a) ......................................................................................................8.39 Art 22(2)(b).......................................................................................................8.39 Art 22(3) ............................................................................................................8.39 Unidroit Convention on International Factoring Art 6 ..................................................................................................................6.85 Art 8(1)(a) .........................................................................................................8.06 Art 9 ...................................................................................................................8.92 Art 10(1) ............................................................................................................8.34 Art 10(2)(a) .......................................................................................................8.04 Art 11 .................................................................................................................8.94 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts Art 9.1.3 ....................................................................................................6.93, 6.98 Art 9.1.4 .............................................................................................................6.50 Art 9.1.8 .............................................................................................................6.93 Art 9.1.9(1) ........................................................................................................6.85 Art 9.1.9(2) ........................................................................................................6.86 Art 9.1.12 ..................................................................................................7.38, 8.06 Art 9.1.15 ...........................................................................................................8.04 Art 9.3.1-9.3.7..................................................................................................6.134
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Part 1 Introduction
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1 Introduction (a) General [1.01] Subject matter of the book. The subject matter of this book is the rules governing the voluntary inter vivos assignment of contractual rights.1 Such transactions involve the transfer of a contractual right from the owner (assignor) to the transferee (assignee). The person bound to perform the correlative obligation is either (in the case of a debt) the debtor or (in the case of some other contractual performance obligation) the obligor. Assignments of contractual rights form an important area of commercial practice. Despite this, in terms of legal publications, the assignment of contractual rights is an area that has received little attention.2 Recently it was described as “undeveloped”.3 1 Often this is referred to as assigning the benefit of a contract. Statements can be found that seek to distinguish the assignment of the “benefit” of a contract from the assignment of rights under a contract, eg Yeandle v Wynn Realisations Ltd (1995) 47 Construction LR 1. However, under the property model of assignment (see [3.19]) this distinction cannot be maintained. Only contractual rights may be assigned, and for the most part these flow from contractual terms. The class of contractual rights and duties that do not flow from the terms of a contract is small: see E Peden, Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts (Sydney, Butterworths, 2003) para 1.5. References to the assignment of the “benefit” of a contract should be taken to refer to an assignment of all the rights under a contract rather than any specific rights under a contract. 2 This is despite statements such as, “modern capitalism begins with the assignment and negotiability of contracts”: see JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York, Macmillan, 1924) at 253. It has also been said: “If we were asked—Who made the discovery which has most deeply affected the fortunes of the human race? We think, after full consideration, we might safely answer—The man who first discovered that a Debt is a Saleable Commodity”: see H Dunning Macleod, The Theory and Practice of Banking (5th edn, London, Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer, 1892) i, at 200. There have been a number of publications dealing with the more general topic of the assignment of choses in action: see WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899); FCT Tudsbery, The Nature, Requisites and Operation of Equitable Assignments (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1912); OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950); JG Starke, Assignment of Choses in Action in Australia (Sydney, Butterworths, 1972). See also J Barr Ames, Lectures on Legal History (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1913) at 210; SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1931) 47 LQR 516, (1932) 48 LQR 248, 547; WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, at 515). Textbooks have also considered in some detail the position of a trustee where a beneficiary assigns its interest: see generally B Marks, Alienation of Income (2nd edn, Sydney, CCH Australia, 1982) para 224. In addition,
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In the result, the assignment of contractual rights is made up of a number of rules which overlap, make little sense as statements in their own right and appear to lack any general underlying and unifying principle. These rules are as follows: 1. An assignor can assign no greater right than it has nor can an assignee obtain a right greater than that held by the assignor. 2. Only non-personal contractual rights may be assigned. 3. It is not possible by assignment to increase or vary the obligations or burdens of an obligor. 4. It is possible to assign only rights and not obligations. 5. After receiving notice of an assignment, the obligor may not do anything to diminish the rights of the assignee. 6. An assignee can be in no better position than the assignor was prior to the assignment. 7. An obligor should be no worse off by virtue of an assignment. 8. An assignee takes subject to the equities. [1.02] Objects and themes of the book. This book seeks to explain the existence, meaning and operation of these rules in Anglo-Australian law by proving two points.4 First, that most of these rules can be explained by reference to what is termed (in this book) “the principle of transfer”. Case law dictates that an assignment involves a transfer of rights. This prompts an investigation into the legal concept of transfer. It is shown that the principal effect of a legal transfer flows from the fact that it is governed by the nemo dat rule. This rule forms the basis of “the principle of transfer”. The principle of transfer holds the key to understanding the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights as it is the fundamental principle governing such assignments. Most of the “rules” are merely different ways of expressing this principle. The reason for having different expressions of the one principle is that each rule attempts to express the operation of the principle of transfer at different stages of an assignment. Therefore, the principle of transfer explains the existence, meaning and operation of these rules. In short, an assignment does not merely involve a transfer; assignment is transfer. Secondly, in investigating the case law to show its compliance with the principle of transfer, it will be seen that there are some deviations. It is suggested that those deviations are explicable by recognising that a formal legal relationship exists there are a number of specialist works that have dealt with receivables financing and the alienation of income: see F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991); F Salinger, Factoring: The Law and Practice of Invoice Financing (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1999); PM Biscoe, Credit Factoring (London, Butterworths, 1975); B Marks, Alienation of Income (2nd edn, Sydney, CCH Australia, 1982). See also LW Melville, Precedents on Industrial Property and Commercial Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1965). 3 Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291 at 318 per Lightman J (affirmed [2000] Ch 291). 4 Despite this emphasis use is made of instructive cases from a number of jurisdictions.
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between the assignee and obligor which is policed by equity to prevent unconscionable conduct. The content of rules 5 and 8, to the extent that they focus on the obligor/assignee relationship rather than the assignor/assignee relationship, are explicable on this basis rather than the principle of transfer.5 [1.03] Application of theme to the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights. The conclusions that are reached in the book as regards the application of the principle of transfer to the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights are as follows. Rule 1: An assignor can assign no greater right than it has nor can an assignee obtain a right greater than that held by the assignor. This rule is a clear adoption of the nemo dat rule which is the hallmark of all legal transfers. As an assignment involves a transfer, the principle of transfer dictates the existence of this rule and provides the meaning of this rule. Rule 2: Only non-personal contractual rights may be assigned. The personal rights rule on its face would appear to be the most difficult rule to explain by reference to the principle of transfer. However, it is suggested that because contractual rights owe their existence to the intention of the parties then it must follow that that intention moulds the character of contractual rights not only as personal rights but also as choses in action. This point makes it clear why the principle of transfer would dictate the existence of a rule that gave such prominence to party intention and autonomy. That is, if the parties rob a chose in action of its inherent assignability by evidencing an intention that the obligor should only perform for the other party to the contract, then to allow the assignment of that right would be to allow the assignment of a right greater than and different from the one vested in the assignor, which would breach the principle of transfer. The same reasoning explains both the efficacy of contractual provisions prohibiting assignment and provisions that make rights assignable that would otherwise be construed as personal.
5 The explanatory nature of this book by no means exhausts the issues that face the law of assignment. For example, the current law, reflecting the history of this area, views assignment as involving the transfer of a proprietary right. Whether this fixation with property rights should continue is questionable. In addition, to a large extent, the present law determines the assignability of contractual rights by reference to the intention of the parties, and there is a legitimate view that assignability should be further promoted and that this could be achieved by allowing for assignment regardless of party intention where there is no good objective reason for limiting assignment: see LA DiMatteo, “Depersonalization of Personal Service Contracts: The Search for a Modern Approach to Assignability” (1994) 27 Akron LR 407. Finally, it may be questioned whether Anglo-Australian law should continue to maintain both an equitable and legal system of assignment.
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Rule 3: It is not possible by assignment to increase or vary the obligations or burdens of an obligor. Like rule 1 above, this rule is a clear adoption of the nemo dat rule. If the assignor cannot assign a right different from or greater than the one vested in him or her, then the effect of that assignment must be that the correlative obligation of the obligor is also not capable of variation by reason of the assignment. It may be noted that “variation” here concerns variations of legal obligations rather than factual changes to performance. So long as the obligor is being asked to perform for the assignee the exact same legal obligation as that promised to the assignor, then the obligor cannot complain that there has been a variation to its obligation. It is accepted that there may be some increased inconvenience in fact by reason of an assignment. This rule is also used to state the conclusion (or sub-rule) that the assignee can recover by way of damages for breach of contract no more than the assignor could have recovered. It is suggested that the principle of transfer dictates that the assignee should recover for its own personal loss. Nevertheless, the potential loss of the assignor should operate as a cap on liability, because the right to performance does not change its character when assigned but remains a right to an obligation promised to the assignor. This impacts on the value of the right vested in the assignee, and this result is dictated by the principle of transfer. Rule 4: It is possible to assign only rights and not obligations. When dealing in choses in action, it is only possible to transfer something one owns. At the time when a contract is formed a party does not own an obligation that it owes to the other party. To recognise the assignment of a chose in action which the assignor does not own would be at odds with the nemo dat rule. The principle of transfer cannot recognise the transfer of such obligations and therefore there is necessarily a rule governing the assignment of contractual rights that such obligations cannot be assigned. There is still a debate whether a party to a contract can take from the other party an assignment of the right to the performance of the obligation that the first party owes that second party, and whether such an assignment would result in an extinction of the obligation or allow for the first party to deal further with the “right” to the obligation it owes the second party. In any case, because the character of a contractual right as a chose in action is shaped by the intention of the parties to the contract, it is theoretically possible to make an obligation an intrinsic part of a right. In such a case, the principle of transfer would dictate that any transferee taking the right must also accept the obligation. If this were not the case, a right greater than and different from, that vested in the assignor would have been transferred, which is at odds with the principle of transfer. Rule 5: After receiving notice of an assignment, the obligor may not do anything to diminish the rights of the assignee. It is suggested in Chapter 8 that this rule is not a rule dictated by the principle of transfer. This rule is concerned with the
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obligor/assignee relationship which is not the relationship under which the transfer takes place. The “transfer relationship” is that of the assignor/assignee. In practice, this rule has been used in Anglo-Australian law to prohibit the assignor and obligor from varying the contract after notice of the assignment. It is suggested that the principle of transfer would not prohibit such variations. Thus, in taking the assignment of a contractual right, the assignee must accept that that right in its nature as a chose in action may be varied by the obligor and assignor, because this power is vested in the parties to a contract. Such an act may put the assignor in breach of contract with the assignee, but that alone does not call into question the inherent power of the assignor to agree to such variations in its capacity as party to the contract with the obligor. It follows that the rule can be explained only by recognising a formal legal relationship between the obligor and assignee which allows the assignee to resist such variations to the contract when the obligor’s agreement to the variation amounts to unconscionable conduct. Rule 6: An assignee can be in no better position than the assignor was prior to the assignment. The notion that an assignee can be in no better position than the assignor is a clear adoption of the nemo dat rule as recognised in rule 1 above. However, rule 6 is more often referred to when the question being asked concerns the extent of performance the assignee can demand from the obligor. Rule 7: An obligor should be no worse off by virtue of an assignment. This rule is often used to express the reason why the damages awarded to an assignee for breach of contract by the obligor cannot exceed those which would have been awarded to the assignor. This is clearly a result dictated by the principle of transfer, as the discussion of rule 3 above shows. Rule 8: An assignee takes subject to the equities. It is suggested in Chapter 8 that although the origins of this rule probably lie in the early procedure adopted for enforcing assignments, the rule is also dictated by the principle of transfer. That is, the nemo dat rule demands that an assignee take subject to all the inherent weaknesses or infelicities of the subject right. Thus, in the case of a contractual right, the assignee must take subject to such things as the obligor’s right to terminate the contract for breach or repudiation by the assignor or to rescind the contract by virtue of some misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or unconscionable conduct on the part of the assignor. In addition, the principle of transfer dictates that the assignee takes subject to substantive defences the obligor has against the assignor such as a right to substantive equitable set-off. It is also suggested in Chapter 8 that part of the operation of the subject to equities rule can be explained by recognising a formal legal relationship between the obligor and assignee which is policed to prevent unconscionable conduct. This would then explain why the assignee would be subject to such things as statutory
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set-offs, payments to the assignor and releases given by the assignor where these arise or occur prior to the obligor receiving notice of the assignment.
(b) Structure of the Book [1.04] Order of the book. The book is divided into four parts. This first part introduces the subject matter of the book, its objects and theme, and provides a brief history of the subject. Part 2 investigates the meaning of “assignment” and the nature of equitable and legal assignments. This part explains the legal concept of transfer. The major propositions flowing from this part are that it is sensible to speak of a transfer in the context of assignment only if the assignee becomes the owner of the subject right and such a transfer is governed by the nemo dat rule. Part 3 is concerned with the process of assigning contractual rights and investigates the rules most relevant to this aspect of an assignment. It will show that the existence, meaning and operation of these rules is explicable by the principle of transfer. This part also addresses the formalities of an assignment. Part 4 is concerned with the relationships between the assignor, assignee and obligor and investigates the rules most relevant to these relationships. It will be shown that the existence, meaning and operation of these rules yields to the principle of transfer. However, in this part it is also necessary to introduce the notion of a formal relationship existing between the assignee and obligor to explain some of the content of the rules. Although the object of this book is to investigate the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights, the rules are not dealt with in separate chapters. Such a structure would result in repetition as the rules overlap. As noted above, each of the rules reflects a different stage of an assignment. An assignment may be broken down into the following steps, (1) assignability, (2) formalities, and (3) position of the assignor, assignee and obligor as regards enforcement and remedies. The approach of the book is to deal with the rules within the context of such a transaction. Generally, rules 1, 2 and 4 (and to some extent rule 3) are concerned with assignability. Rules 5, 6, 7 and 8 (and again to some extent rule 3) concern the position of the parties. Of course, the formalities for an assignment cannot be explained by reference to the rules governing the assignment of contractual rights, but are nevertheless important to any such transaction and are discussed in Chapter 7.
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(c) Some Limitations [1.05] Main limits of the book. The abovementioned object of this book sets some important limitations. First, this book attempts to explain the law of assignment of contractual rights and therefore seeks to work within the case law. That is, the aim is to explain as many of the important authorities as possible while keeping suggestions that leading cases should be overruled to a minimum. Secondly, because the methodology is analytical, the current property model of assignment is adopted without question.6 The concern is how contractual rights are integrated within that system. [1.06] Other limitations. The focus of this book is on the assignment of contractual rights to receive performance.7 Although such performance often involves the payment of money, the book is not a complete statement of the law governing the assignment of debts. A debt does not require a contract for its existence, and many debts arise outside contract. Moreover, debts, whether accruing under a contract or not, have always been considered to be a distinct chose in action. In addition, because this is a book dealing with general principles of law and because of its focus on assignment of contractual rights, there is no discussion of other legal or commercial matters that may have to be addressed in the planning of such transactions. For example, there is no discussion of the various legal and commercial issues that arise in determining the form of a financing of receivables or the best structure to be adopted in a securitisation. Such matters are dealt with in specialised works on such topics. In addition, whether or not an assignment should be set aside upon the bankruptcy or insolvency of the assignor is left to specialised works.8 6 It is unlikely that this model will be jettisoned at any time soon, and it is adopted in the United Nations Convention on Assignment of Receivables in International Trade: see Uncitral, Analytical Commentary on the Draft Convention on Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, A/CN. 9/489, 13 Mar 2001, paras 85, 127. 7 The book does not deal with the involuntary assignments that occur by operation of law upon death, bankruptcy and the replacement of trustees: these are dealt with in standard works on these topics. In addition to these, it may be noted that many contractual rights, particularly debts, may be assigned by force of statute: see generally Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lanstel Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 314; Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1 at 26–7 per Brennan J; Zuks v Jackson McDonald (1996) 132 FLR 317. 8 The book also does not consider the unique issues that arise in determining the nature and transfer of indirectly held investment securities. This is an area of law that is now the subject of specialised works: see AO Austen-Peters, Custody of Investments (Oxford, OUP, 2002); J Benjamin and M Yates, The Law of Global Custody (2nd edn, London, Butterworths, 2002) J Benjamin, Interests in Securities (Oxford, OUP, 2002); R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) ch 6; R Goode, “The Nature and Transfer of Rights in Dematerialised and Immobilsied Securities” in F Oditah (ed), The Future for the Global Securities Markets (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996). See also Financial Markets Law Committee, Issue 3—Property Interests in Investment Securities
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In relation to assignments by way of security, because the book is limited to the issue of assignment, it is not concerned with that stage of a security transaction that deals with the perfection of security interests (that is, the efficacy of the security as between third parties such as liquidators or other creditors9) and the priority of security interests (that is, the rules for resolving competing interests in the property). In addition, because this book is principally concerned with assignments of rights to performance, the language of the book tends to be language that describes an outright assignment rather than an assignment by way of security. Basically this results in references being made to “assignors”, “assignees” and “transfer” rather than “mortgagors”, “mortgagees” and “attachment”.10
(2004) at www.fmlc.org. See further Unidroit, Preliminary Draft Unidroit Convention on Harmonised Substantive Rules Regarding Securities Held with an Intermediary (2004). 9 In the case of an outright assignment the transfer (that is, attachment) will protect the assignee from most third parties claiming through the assignor. In the case of an assignment of a debt, notice to the debtor may be viewed as a perfection requirement. For reasons set out fully in paras [4.10]–[4.20], unless a statutory provision dictates to the contrary, notice to the debtor is not a requirement for an equitable assignment of a legal right. The transfer or attachment can take place prior to notice. Notice is required to bind the conscience of the debtor, and the assignee can expect a personal accounting by the debtor only if notice is given. However, this does not mean that prior to notice the assignment is operative only as between the assignor and assignee: see [4.20]. See further R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 2.17. 10 However, the general principles governing attachment and transfer are the same. For a discussion of attachment: see R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) chapters 2–5.
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2 A Brief History of Assignment (a) Introduction [2.01] Purpose of the chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the history of this area of law. This historical section is brief as the ultimate concern of the book is with the assignment of contractual rights, and not the broader topic of the assignment of choses in action. The chapter begins with a look at the meaning of “choses in action”.
(b) Choses in Action [2.02] Meaning of “choses in action”.1 A chose in action is regarded today as a personal right of property.2 When the term “chose in action” is used it may be referring to a right enforceable by action or to the right of action itself. Choses in action are distinct from choses in possession as they are a form of intangible property. The law distinguishes between two types of choses in action, namely legal choses in action and equitable choses in action. A legal chose in action is a right created by the common law which is enforceable at common law, such as a legal debt. An equitable chose in action is a right created by equity and enforced in equity, for example, an interest in a partnership or an interest under a trust. Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, perhaps originally the term “chose in action” was recognised at common law as an expression used to describe a right to sue for the purposes of recovery and was generally used to describe a
1 For examples of judicial descriptions of choses in action see Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th edn, London, Butterworths, 1991) vi, para 1; OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 5–8; WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 1–8. In addition, a statute may provide its own meaning. 2 See [2.05] below.
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personal right to sue for a debt or damages.3 Thus, the phrase was originally used to describe a right that could be asserted only by action and not by taking possession.4 Although medieval lawyers had no problem with the concept of incorporeal property, these rights were considered personal.5 In time, the phrase was extended to include rights of action that did not involve the recovery of money.6 Early descriptions can be found which capture rights of action in respect of tangible objects where the claimant did not have possession of the object.7 For example, Blackstone wrote:8 Having thus considered the several divisions of property in possession, which subsists there only, where a man hath both the right and also the occupation of the thing, we will proceed next to take a short view of the nature of property in action, or such where a man hath not the occupation, but merely a bare right to occupy the thing in question; the possession whereof may however be recovered by a suit or action at law: from whence the thing so recoverable is called a thing or chose in action.9
The inclusion of such rights of action within the class of choses in action may have partly flowed from the merger that occurred between choses in action real10 and choses in action personal.11 Although originally a distinction was drawn between these, with the former readily lending itself to the inclusion of rights to recover assets, at some point these groups were merged and simply entitled 3 See Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 282 per Lindley LJ, cf at 286 per Fry LJ and Colonial Bank v Whinney (1886) 11 App Cas 426 at 439 per Lord Blackburn. See also C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 304; WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1899) at 1; OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 36–45. Such a description meant that the only obligations to pay that fell within the category were debts that were payable, or at least payable at a certain date. It was only much later that it could be conclusively said that existing but conditional or contingent obligations to pay were included in the class of “choses in action” and the class of “assignable choses in action”: see Brice v Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569; Walker v The Bradford Old Bank Ltd (1884) 12 QBD 511. See also Re Huggins (1882) 21 Ch D 85 at 91 per Jessel MR. 4 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 998 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 517). 5 Ibid, at 1000, 1012 (article), 518, 528 (book); JV Orth, “Contract and the Common Law” in HN Scheiber (ed), The State and Freedom of Contract (Cal., Stanford, Stanford UP, 1998) at 45–6. 6 C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 304. 7 See HW Elphinstone, “What is a Chose in Action?” (1893) 9 LQR 311; C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 304; S Brodhurst, “Is Copyright a Chose in Action?” (1895) 11 LQR 64 at 69; C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1895) 11 LQR 238. See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 8–27. 8 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1766) ii, at 396. 9 See further S Brodhurst, “Is Copyright a Chose in Action?” (1895) 11 LQR 64 at 66. 10 This class emerged around the sixteenth century. 11 The action in debt, which was readily accepted as a chose in action, was always viewed as an action to recover detained property, that is, the recovery of a thing transferred under the transaction. Given this, it perhaps would not have seemed illogical to extend the class to include rights of action in respect of tangible assets. See further AWB Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987) at 75–80.
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“choses in action”.12 The expression “chose in action real” fell into disuse.13 Once rights to recover possession fell within the class it might have been a logical development for the class to take on the character of proprietary rights and then assignable rights. Certainly courts recognised the proprietary interest such actions protected. The reasons why this did not occur are discussed later.14 Another reason why such rights fell within the class of choses in action was the view that anything not assignable was considered to be a chose in action.15 [2.03] Some inclusions in the class of choses in action appear to have simply followed from others. For example, in the sixteenth century the class was extended to include documents that evidenced a right to bring an action, such as a bond.16 In later centuries, and partly because of this inclusion, the class was readily extended to include such things as negotiable instruments, shares, insurance policies and bills of lading.17 [2.04] Another important development in the class of choses in action concerned classification. Between the seventeenth century and the late nineteenth century much weight was placed on the distinction between choses in possession and choses in action. This classification was not new,18 but there was a growing view, which was firmly in place by the late nineteenth century, that all personal things must be either choses in possession or choses in action as there was no middle ground.19 This view, 12 C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 305; WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1002 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 520). See also Re McLean (deceased) (1904) 23 NZLR 504. See further [2.09]. 13 C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 308. 14 [2.09]. 15 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 16–17. In May v Lane (1894) 64 LJQB 236 at 238, Rigby LJ in suggesting that a “legal chose in action is something which is not in possession, but which must be sued for in order to recover possession of it”, appeared to be of the view that the inclusion of rights of possession into the class actually narrowed the field of choses in action. Cf the explanation of this case in Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 433–4. See also Earle’s Shipbuilding and Engineering Company v Atlantic Transport Company (1899) 43 Sol Jo 691; Dawson v Great Northern and City Railway Co [1905] 1 KB 260 at 270; County Hotel & Wine Company Ltd v London & North Western Railway Co [1918] 2 KB 251 at 259–60; Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399 at 413; Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co [1965] 1 QB 101 at 116. 16 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 997–8 and 1011 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 516, 527). 17 Ibid. at 997–8, 1011 (article), 516, 527 (book). 18 T Cyprian Williams, “Is a Right of Action in Tort a Chose in Action?” (1894) 10 LQR 143 at 143–4; WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1899) at 9. 19 See Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 285 per Fry LJ. Fry LJ’s dissenting opinion was upheld on appeal: see (1886) 11 App Cas 426 esp at 439 per Lord Blackburn. However, it would appear that in earlier times not only was there acceptance of a middle ground but also a mixed ground: see OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 2.
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together with the notion that choses in action were not transferable, made it much easier to increase the class of choses in action, or at least more readily to accept some inclusions that had crept into the class which was now clearly not limited to rights to sue for debts or damages.20 It was beyond doubt that the class included rights that were clearly linked to tangible property, as well as rights that did not depend on enforcement for their enjoyment and rights that were not capable of enforcement.21 It was also readily accepted that the class included existing conditional and contingent obligations to pay.22 Descriptions of “choses in action” from this time reflect this broad categorisation. For example, Williams, writing in 1895, said:23 A thing in action, then is properly the benefit of an obligation arising from the breach of an antecedent duty. It would also appear to be the benefit of some real, mixed or personal action, that is, of an action brought for the realisation of some right, which is valuable as tending to result in the ownership of land, goods or money. . . . [These are] not included in property in the strict sense of the word, because that is confined to the ownership with possession of tangible things, but comprehended in property in its widest sense, because valuable as being possibilities of property in the narrow sense. The term chose in action has, however, been extended to other things arising from some cause of action. Thus it has been applied to the benefit of an obligation arising from contract . . . [even though] no action can be maintainable before breach of the obligation. . . . [In this] extended sense of the word, [it] would seem to be a thing which, if wrongfully withheld, you must bring an action to realise; a thing which you cannot take but must go to law to secure.
The classification of personal things into choses in possession and choses in action perhaps had both positive and negative effects. On the positive side it meant that it was acceptable to include in the class rights that did not depend on enforcement for their enjoyment. This remains the case today.24 This was important 20 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons, 1950) at 3; S Brodhurst, “Is Copyright a Chose in Action?” (1895) 11 LQR 64 at 68. See further T Cyprian Williams, “Property, Things in Action and Copyright” (1895) 11 LQR 223. 21 WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 8–18 and WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 997–8, 1011, 1013 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 516, 527, 529). See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 21–2, 28–32. Cf Re Huggins (1882) 21 Ch D 85 at 90–1 per Jessel MR. 22 Elphinstone suggested that it was easier to bring contract rights and debts within the term “choses in action” because, although they were capable of enjoyment without action and gave rise to actionable rights only upon infringement, they consisted of rights against other persons rather than being rights in respect of a thing, and were ultimately capable of enforcement: see HW Elphinstone, “What is a Chose in Action?” (1893) 9 LQR 311 at 313. 23 T Cyprian Williams, “Property, Things in Action and Copyright” (1895) 11 LQR 223 at 230–1, 232. 24 See further Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 431 per Channell J (reversed on another point [1903] 1 KB 644) (but compare the definition of “chose in action” he used which is set out below: see [2.05]). See also Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 915 per Lord Hoffmann. Cf Simmons v Harvey [1965] Tasmanian State Reports (Tas SR) 84 at 94 per Neasey J.
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because if the assignment of contractual rights were to be eventually governed by the rules relating to the assignment of choses in action, it was necessary that contractual rights to performance were securely positioned in the class of choses in action. Clearly they were considered choses in action prior to this strict classification, but the classification put the issue beyond doubt.25 On the negative side, this classification required the law to fit within one of the categories subject matter that did not fit easily into either, most notably the developing intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights and trade marks. Today, the law readily accepts the existence of sui generis interests.26 [2.05] Choses in action as property. It is difficult to determine when lawyers began to think of choses in action as being property. Although by the twentieth century equity had long recognised the assignment of legal rights, it had originally done this by recognising an agreement to assign between the assignor and assignee and took steps to hold the assignor to its promise.27 This methodology does not depend on there being a transfer of property. The most authoritative statement that equity had moved on and recognised such rights as property for the purposes of transfer occurred in 1905.28 However, that development must have occurred well before then.29 Perhaps the factor that put this issue beyond doubt was the enactment of certain statutory provisions, most notably bankruptcy legislation. From early times “goods and chattels” in bankruptcy legislation included choses in action,30 thus being recognised as capable of being owned. It was this (together with some examples of other legislation) that led Lindley LJ in Colonial Bank v Whinney 31 to conclude that “whatever its original meaning may have been, [the term ‘chose in action’ had] come to be used as denoting a certain class of property”. Lindley LJ, writing in 1885, took the view that the law had come to recognise the existence of incorporeal personal property and having no term to describe such property
25
Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 286–7 per Fry LJ. Eg Rolls-Royce Ltd v Jeffrey [1962] 1 All ER 801. 27 [4.05]. 28 See Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372–3 per Cozens Hardy LJ. 29 See Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 34 per Windeyer J (“Before 1873 a chose in equity and a chose in action were both transferable in equity”). 30 Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 280, 283 per Lindley LJ. 31 (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 283 (in this case the majority of the Court of Appeal, Lindley LJ being in that majority, held that shares did not fall within the expression “choses in action” as used in the reputed ownership provisions, and therefore passed to the trustee in bankruptcy; under these provisions a chose in action not owned by the bankrupt could not be in the reputed ownership of the bankrupt so as to pass to the trustee; this point was later overruled by the House of Lords: see Colonial Bank v Whinney (1886) 11 App Cas 426). See further WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 297–302. 26
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simply extended the meaning of “choses in action” to denote it.32 Today, the term “chose in action” appears to be solely used to describe certain property rights, that is, “personal property of an incorporeal nature”.33 There appears to be no separate class of personal choses in action.34 Authoritative judicial descriptions from the early twentieth century onwards all appear to agree on this point. For example, in Torkington v Magee,35 “choses in action” were described by Channell J as:36 [A]ll personal rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by action, and not by taking physical possession.
In Loxton v Moir,37 Rich J said:38 The phrase “chose in action” is used in different senses, but its primary sense is that of a right enforceable by an action. It may also be used to describe the rights of action itself, when considered as part of the property of the person entitled to sue. A right to sue for a sum of money is a chose in action, and it is a proprietary right.
Finally, and more recently, in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society,39 Lord Hoffmann said:40 [A] chose in action is property, something capable of being turned into money . . . [W]hat is assignable is the debt or other personal right of property. It is recoverable by 32 (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 283–4. Later in the House of Lords, Lord Blackburn ( (1886) 11 App Cas 426 at 439), did not think this point was made out. He did not think that the term “chose in action” once had a technical meaning that had been extended, but rather that for a long time the class was determined by what could not fit into the notion of a chose in possession. Thus, when new forms of property were created, like shares, they naturally fell into the chose in action class. The point Lindley LJ was making was that as choses in action were excluded from being in the reputed ownership of the bankrupt, it was necessary to determine whether that phrase, as used in the legislation, was being used in a narrow technical and historical sense or in a wide sense that would include shares. 33 HW Elphinstone, “What is a Chose in Action?” (1893) 9 LQR 311 at 312. See also Colonial Bank v Whinney (1886) 11 App Cas 426 at 440 per Lord Blackburn. It has also been said that the principles of choses in action provide a set of legal norms that allow certain rights to be considered property. Once a right satisfies those norms it may be traded, and it is these norms, for example, that dictate that a patent is property while an invention is not: see J Braithwaite and P Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 40. 34 One exception may be a bare right of action which is still referred to as a chose in action that is incapable of assignment because it is personal: see RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 6.480. However, today rights of action are assignable if the assignee has a sufficient interest in the suit. The better view may be that such rights are true proprietary choses in action that may not be assigned in some cases due to overriding public policy considerations: see Beatty v Brashs Pty Ltd [1998] 2 VR 201 at 207. Occasional references can be found to the effect that a chose in action is a personal right which is assignable, eg Goldsbrough Mort & Co Ltd v Tolson (1909) 10 CLR 470 at 474 per Griffith CJ. 35 [1902] 2 KB 427 (reversed on another point [1903] 1 KB 644). See also Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 574 per Lord Goff, and see Smith v ANL Ltd (2000) 204 CLR 493. 36 [1902] 2 KB 427 at 430 per Channell J (reversed on another point [1903] 1 KB 644). 37 (1914) 18 CLR 360. 38 (1914) 18 CLR 360 at 379. 39 [1998] 1 WLR 896. 40 [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 915. See also Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177.
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action, but what is assigned is the chose, the thing, the debt or damages to which the assignor is entitled. The existence of a remedy or remedies is an essential condition for the existence of the chose in action but that does not mean that the remedies are property in themselves, capable of assignment separately from the chose.41
It should be noted that the personal nature of a right may still impact upon the determination of whether it is, or is not, a chose in action, or at least an assignable chose in action.42 For example, certain rights, such as a promise to marry, may be held too personal to be considered choses in action on public policy grounds.43 [2.06] What remains unclear is the extent to which the commercial need to recognise the assignment of choses in action figured in the movement of choses in action from personal to proprietary. Although today it is clearly not necessary for something to be seen as property before its transfer can be recognised,44 this was once a requirement of the common law.45 It is often stated that assignability is properly viewed as a possible effect of something being considered property rather than a test for property itself.46 This reasoning is not entirely convincing. Although it is necessary to avoid circular reasoning, such as that a chose in action is property because it is assignable and it is assignable because it is property, it is perfectly legitimate for the law to take the view that a right can be assignable by reason of the commercial need to accept that transferability, and it is by reason of that transferability that it is property because the institution of property is the vehicle generally used to affect transfers. The fact that choses in action are generally considered property only for the purposes of transfer dictates that transferability 41 The history of the common law’s movement from limiting the idea of “property” to tangibles to accepting a commercial meaning based on the “price of things” is traced in JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York, Macmillan, 1924) ch 7. Cf Dear v Reeves [2002] Ch 1 (right of pre-emption considered a property right and assignable without having a present value). For some purposes a contractual right may be considered an asset which may be disposed of without its necessarily having a market value, thus making it unassignable: see O’Brien v Benson’s Hosiery (Holdings) Ltd [1980] AC 562. It follows that not all dispositions involve assignments. As to whether an assignment requires a disposition: see [3.11]. 42 It is possible for a right to be considered property without its being considered a chose in action, but quaere whether it is now possible to limit the term “chose in action” to property rights that have the characteristic of being transferable, cf Re Huggins (1882) 21 Ch D 85 at 91 per Jessel MR. See further OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 25–6. 43 Ibid, at 25. 44 Arguably it is necessary for something to be considered only a commodity to be alienable and this is something less than (but includes) property: see MJ Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard UP, 1993) ch 2. 45 Cf [2.07] below. 46 See Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Yeend (1929) 43 CLR 235 at 245 per Isaacs J; Reg v Toohey; Ex parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327 at 342–3 per Mason J; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (No 2) (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 166 per Brennan J. See also JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 130. Cf National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 at 1247–8 per Lord Wilberforce; Dear v Reeves [2002] Ch 1 at 10 per Mummery LJ.
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is an informing factor rather than a mere incident of the right being property. Similarly, as noted in Lord Hoffmann’s description of choses in action in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society,47 a chose in action may be considered property if property is given the wide meaning of something of value; that is, something capable of being measured in money terms.48 Although this alone cannot explain the inclusion of some rights in the class of choses in action, if one first recognises the transferability of a mere right, then by virtue of this assignability it attracts a value, and in this way can then be considered property.49 Despite the above, it may be that assignability had little effect on the recognition of choses in action as property since legal assignment generally was not possible until provided for by legislation. Moreover, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, equity originally upheld the assignment of a legal chose in action by way of contract between the assignor and assignee rather than by viewing the transaction as involving a true transfer.50 It was only later that equity viewed choses in action as property for the purposes of transfer.51 It follows that although it is sometimes said that equity, conscious of commercial needs, recognised choses in action as property for the purposes of transfer,52 it needs to be added that initially, acting by reference to reasonableness53 and commercial needs, equity upheld assignments of legal choses in action. What is clear is that prior to the recognition that choses in action were assignable, the lack of transferability played an important part in allowing the class of choses in action to be expanded.54 Holdsworth suggested that this in part allowed lawyers in the eighteenth century to class patents and copyrights as choses in action.55 It may have been due to this expansion (based on non-assignability) that it appeared logical to split all interests into choses in action and choses in 47
[2.05]. See further JW Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) at 50–1. 49 See T Cyprian Williams, “Property, Things in Action and Copyright” (1895) 11 LQR 223 at 227–8. An alternative is simply to adopt the position that all legally protected interests may be considered property for certain purposes: see LD Smith, The Law of Tracing (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 49. 50 [4.05]. 51 [4.07]. 52 GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 621. 53 FCT Tudsbery, The Nature, Requisites and Operation of Equitable Assignments (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1912) at 6. 54 Colonial Bank v Whinney (1885) 30 Ch D 261 at 287 per Fry LJ. See also WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1013 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 529). 55 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1013 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 529). See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 21–2, 28–32. 48
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possession.56 It has been said that the term “chose in action” moved from being described as a mere right of action to a “right incapable of being assigned”.57 It may be that, once assignability was recognised, it in fact had some impact on limiting the further expansion of the class of choses in action.58
(c) Assignment of Choses in Action [2.07] Choses in action and assignment, the position at common law. It is generally accepted that the common law did not develop a set of rules for the assignment of choses in action.59 It may be that a more precise statement is that to the extent that the common law did recognise the assignment of choses in action, that position did not prevail.60 Moreover, and despite the ability of the common law to recognise incorporeal property,61 the original reason for the common law’s reluctance to recognise the assignment of choses in action was probably due to the more general view that “property” meant something tangible and, in any case, that a transfer required delivery of possession.62 The need for a delivery of possession nevertheless allowed for the transfer of an intangible that was encapsulated in a document and could be the subject of a delivery. However, as noted, the common law has long recognised the idea of intangible property, so that this reasoning
56 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1014 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 530). 57 C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 307. 58 See the debate between Elphinstone and Williams on including tort within the class of choses in action; HW Elphinstone, “What is a Chose in Action?” (1893) 9 LQR 311 at 315, T Cyprian Williams, “Is a Right of Action in Tort a Chose in Action?” (1894) 10 LQR 143. See also C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 315; Editors’ note (1904) 20 LQR 113; Editors’ note (1905) 21 LQR 101. 59 Cf WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) 29 Harv LR 816; G Glenn, “The Assignment of Choses in Action: Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser” (1934) 20 Virginia LR 621. One exception was that from early times members of the Jewish community in England could assign debts: see SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1931) 47 LQR 516, (1932) 48 LQR 248, 547. 60 EH Warren, The Rights of Margin Customers (Norwood, Mass, Plimpton Press, 1941) ch 4. See also Bernard Rudden, “Things as Thing and Things as Wealth” in JW Harris (ed), Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds (London, Kluwer, 1997) ch 12 at 152. 61 [2.02]. 62 F Pollock and FW Maitland, The History of English Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1899) ii, at 226; WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 32; JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York, Macmillan 1924) at 247; EH Warren, The Rights of Margin Customers (Norwood, Mass, Plimpton Press, 1941) at 38–47; PM Biscoe, Credit Factoring (London, Butterworths, 1975) at 96. See also FW Maitland, “The Seisin of Chattels” (1885) 1 LQR 324; FW Maitland, “The Mystery of Seisin” (1886) 2 LQR 481. See further G Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, at 200.
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alone could not be sustained.63 Nevertheless, the view was also adopted that choses in action could not be assigned because they were personal in nature.64 [2.08] The origins of the “too personal” labelling of choses in action appears to have a number of sources.65 On one view, a chose in action was personal because it presupposed a personal relationship between two people, one having a right, the other a corresponding duty.66 That is, a chose in action, being a mere right of action, presupposes a definite plaintiff and defendant.67 It was irrelevant whether the action was to recover damages or some tangible property. It has also been suggested that the notion that a debt was personal and not transferable owed much to the dire consequences in early times that could follow the non-payment of a debt. Most obvious of these was the threat of debtor’s prison. Therefore, a debtor had a great interest, not only in the identity of his or her creditor, but in the likelihood of enforcement action being taken.68 In addition, choses in action were considered at one time to be too uncertain to be the subject of a grant until liquidated by a judgment or recognizance.69 Finally, because it was the duty of the debtor to seek out its creditor, it was thought this would be rendered too onerous if assignments were upheld.70 [2.09] One development that showed some promise of recognising the assignability of some choses in action was the recognition that personal actions to recover
63 [2.02]. See WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1000, 1012 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 518, 528). 64 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 36–45; G Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, at 200–1. See also Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372 per Cozens-Hardy LJ. Cf G Glenn, “The Assignment of Choses in Action: Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser” (1934) 20 Virginia LR 621 at 638–9 (suggesting that it was the fear of maintenance that was solely responsible for the position at common law. However, as noted below, the fear of maintenance arose in respect of choses in action real and almost by accident was applied to choses in action personal: see [2.09]). 65 EH Warren, The Rights of Margin Customers (Norwood, Massachusetts, Plimpton Press, 1941) at 68. It has been said that the too personal rule could arise only in an economy at a time when credit played a minor role: see EA Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1990) iii, para 11.2. This statement is not entirely convincing. To the extent that agriculture, industry and commerce were seasonal, credit would have been a fact of life: see WR Cornish and G deN Clark, Law and Society in England 1750–1950 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) at 226. 66 JB Ames, Lectures on Legal History (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard UP, 1913) 210 at 211–12. 67 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1000 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 518). 68 SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 248 at 257, (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 549–50. 69 Ibid, at 554; PM Biscoe, Credit Factoring (London, Butterworths, 1975) at 97. 70 WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 31–2.
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personal property were personal actions to protect proprietary interests.71 For example, by the sixteenth century it was accepted that a bailor’s interest in the reversion was proprietary.72 In commentating on these developments, Holdsworth stated:73 We might therefore have expected that the rights of the owner out of possession would come to be recognised as something more than a mere personal chose in action; and that they would develop into assignable rights of property.
Why this did not take place he put down to two causes.74 The first was events that took place in personal actions to recover property. The action in detinue, which was regarded as proprietary in character,75 was superseded by trover which, although protecting a proprietary interest, was not characterised as a proprietary action and was considered a mere chose in action.76 The second cause ultimately resulted in the merger of choses in action real and choses in action personal. This merger had occurred at least by the sixteenth century.77 Choses in action real never developed past being considered mere personal choses in action because of the law’s growing concern with maintenance and champerty.78 Holdsworth suggested that this concern, which was legitimate in relation to choses in action real, was adopted and applied naturally, but without much thought or reason, to choses in action personal. He suggested that when this occurred it was inevitable that all these rights would be grouped together as “choses in action”.79 71 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1002 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 521). See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 10–16. 72 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1004 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 522). Cf EH Warren, The Rights of Margin Customers (Norwood, Massachusetts, Plimpton Press, 1941) at 42 who suggests that it was not until the middle of the 19th century that it became clear that a bailor’s right in a chattel was more than a chose in action. 73 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1005 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 522). 74 Ibid, at 1005 (article) at 522 (book). 75 WT Barbour, “The History of Contract in Early English Equity” in P Vinogradoff (ed), Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History (Oxford, OUP, 1914) iv, at 28–33. 76 See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 10. 77 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1001 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 519). 78 C Sweet, “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 at 306, 308, 311. 79 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1007–10 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 524–5).
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It follows from what was said above that the concern over maintenance and champerty in respect of real actions rolled over into personal actions, preventing choses in action being recognised as property and holding up the acceptance of their assignability. At the same it had the effect of widening the class of choses in action. It is important to note, though, that Holdsworth was of the view that a right to recover ownership of personal property should have been assignable and that the dread of maintenance and champerty should have been confined to choses in action real; that is, rights of entry upon and actions for land. He thought that choses in action in the form of mere rights of action should not be assignable because they were too personal.80 [2.10] It may be, as Holdsworth appears to suggest, that even if personal rights of action to recover personal property were considered assignable, this would have had no effect on mere rights of action. Take, for example, an action in debt which was long considered proprietary in nature as it was an action to recover certain coins or chattels.81 Such an action was not seen as the enforcement of an agreement, but was thought to be in the nature of a real action to recover a thing that had been detained.82 That is, an action either based on a proprietary right or at least protecting a proprietary right. This is akin to an action to recover personal property, but this never resulted in the general field of choses in action being rendered proprietary. In addition to the reasoning suggested by Holdsworth a further reason why this was so may be added. There was a time when the law did not distinguish a promise from its tangible representation.83 Unlike the position under a credit contract, the relationship of debtor and creditor, in a cash society, was not seen in terms of assets and liabilities.84 In such a society it would be logical to view an action in debt as an action to recover coins or chattels unlawfully withheld. It could not be an action to enforce a promise, because the law did not 80 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997, at 1009–10 (article), 526–7 (book). Thus the relevance of maintenance and champerty to the history of the assignment of choses in action should not be over-emphasised. Perhaps the most cited judgment evidencing the relevance of maintenance is that of Sir Edward Coke in Lampet’s case (1612) 10 Co Rep 48b, 77 ER 994 at 997, viz, it was “the great wisdom and policy of the sages and founders of our law, who have provided that no . . . thing in action shall be granted or assigned to strangers, for that would be the occasion of multiplying of contentions and suits”. However, it has been persuasively argued that Coke referred to “choses in action” in both a broad and a narrow sense, and in this famous statement he used it in a narrow sense to mean “cause of action” thus saying nothing about a contractual right prior to breach: see EH Warren, The Rights of Margin Customers (Norwood, Mass, Plimpton Press, 1941) at 47–59. See further PH Winfield, “Assignment of Choses in Action in Relation to Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 143. 81 [2.02] note 11. 82 Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560 at 567; Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 265 per Dawson J. See also Thomas Atkins Street, The History and Theory of English Contract Law (Washington DC, Beard Books, 1999 reprint) at 1–2. 83 JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York, Macmillan, 1924) at 247. 84 Quaere though the extent to which England was a cash society: see [2.08].
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distinguish the promise.85 Moreover, given that an action in debt was thought to be an action to recover certain coins or chattels from a certain person, it would follow that once the move was made to distinguish the promise or obligation from the coins or chattels it remained a personal obligation correlative to a personal right. This would halt assignability in that it prevented the recognition of the concept of “ownership” of a personal right to an obligation. It would also prevent the common law’s acceptance of notions of intangible property from being transplanted to choses in action.86 [2.11] Conclusion. It follows from what has been said above that, to the extent that choses in action were recognised as property (things) prior to the passing of the Judicature Act 1873 (UK), the common law did not develop any sustained rules for the assignment of these “things”, because it still entertained the objection that they were personal “things”. [2.12] Common law exceptions and circumventions. It is possible to find a number of exceptions to the general position taken by the common law. For example, subject to a number of factors, it was possible for the Crown to take (or give) an assignment.87 Moreover, the common law readily accepted the transfer, and in some cases negotiation, of certain instruments; examples include bills of exchange, promissory notes and bills of lading.88 Various statutory provisions were also
85
JR Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (New York, Macmillan, 1924) at 250. It can also be added that in the period where the class of choses in action was being expanded, the law of contract was being developed. The history of the law of contract can be seen as a movement from “property” to “obligation”: see JV Orth, “Contract and the Common Law” in HN Scheiber (ed), The State and Freedom of Contract (Stanford, Cal., Stanford UP, 1998) 44 at 45–9; PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, OUP, 1979) at 398. It may have been difficult in that environment also to entertain the thought of a movement in the opposite direction, which was thought to be required for the assignment of choses in action. 87 WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 34–7; SJ Bailey, “Assignment of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1931) 47 LQR 516 at 520, 529; PH Winfield, “Assignment of Choses in Action in Relation to Maintenance and Champerty” (1919) 35 LQR 143 at 144–7; RT Fenton, Garrow and Fenton’s Law of Personal Property in New Zealand (6th edn, Wellington, Butterworths, 1998) para 12.043; Ling v Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 123 ALR 65 at 69–70 per Gummow, Lee and Hill JJ; Booth v Williams (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 421. If an assignee from the Crown further assigned the chose, that second assignee could not enforce the assignment as it was void: see King v Twine (1607) Cro Jac 179 at 180, 79 ER 156. 88 WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 37–41; RT Fenton, Garrow and Fenton’s Law of Personal Property in New Zealand (6th edn, Wellington, Butterworths, 1998) para 12.044. See also JS Rogers, The Early History of the Law of Bills and Notes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995) ch 8. Where a seller took a bill of exchange from a buyer and transferred it to a third party, there was no assignment of the debt owed by the buyer to the seller under the contract of sale. Inherent in the bill itself was a separate payment obligation, and if the buyer accepted the bill it was primarily liable on the bill, and right to payment was transferred upon a negotiation of the bill. 86
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enacted to allow for the assignment of certain choses in action.89 There are also examples of the common law accepting assignments when the debtor had bound him or herself in advance by “obligatory writing to the creditor and his assigns”.90 By the end of the seventeenth century the common law courts, although still adhering to the notion that choses in action could not be assigned, allowed an assignee to sue the assignor for breach of covenant.91 There are also examples (prior to the end of the eighteenth century) of the common law courts allowing assignees to bring an action in the name of the assignor where the debtor continued to pay the assignor when he or she had notice of the assignment.92 [2.13] In addition, there existed the idea of “acknowledgment”. If a debtor held funds belonging to his or her creditor and agreed, upon a request being made by the creditor, to pay a third party out of the fund, then, on notification to the third party, there is authority for the view that the third party could bring an action against the debtor for the amount, even though there was no consideration moving from the third party for the debtor’s promise.93 It has been suggested that this doctrine is similar to that of attornment in respect of tangible chattels.94 However, it has also been held that the doctrine can be applied where the debtor does not hold a fund belonging to the creditor so long as there is consideration moving from the third party.95 More recently this doctrine was applied to a case where the debtor did not hold a fund of the creditor’s, and agreed to a request from the creditor to pay a third party and notified that third party.96 If this doctrine is akin to attornment, it may be that in the case of a debt the transfer should take place by either assignment or novation, which would require the formalities of either 89 See FCT Tudsbery, The Nature, Requisites and Operation of Equitable Assignments (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1912) at 8. 90 SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 548–9. Perhaps these cases simply reflect the fact that prior to the establishment of the doctrine of privity of contract in Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393, 121 ER 762, the common law allowed third parties to enforce contracts made for their benefit: see Law Commission for England and Wales, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties Law (London, HMSO, 1996) Law Com No 242, paras 2.2–2.5; R Flannigan, “Privity—The End of an Era (Error)” in P Kincaid (ed), Privity: Private Justice or Public Regulation (Sydney, Ashgate, 2001) at 29; MA Eisenberg, “Third-Party Beneficiaries” (1992) 92 Columbia LR 1358. See further GW Keeton and LA Sheridan, Equity (3rd edn, London, B Rose, 1987) at 227. 91 SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 574. 92 Ibid, at 575–9. 93 Morrell v Wootten (1852) 16 Beav 197, 51 ER 753; Griffin v Weatherby (1868) LR 3 QB 753. 94 R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution, (6th edn, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2002) ch 28. See further NE Palmer, Bailment (2nd edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1991) ch 21; F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 5.4. 95 Liversidge v Broadbent (1859) 4 H & N 603, 157 ER 978. 96 Shamia v Joory [1958] 1 QB 448. Cf Rothwells Ltd v Nommack (No 100) Pty Ltd (1988) 13 Australian Company Law Reports (ACLR) 421 where McPherson J refused to apply the doctrine to the case of a debt.
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assignment or novation be complied with. Without a fund of the creditor’s in the hands of the debtor it is not possible for him or her to attorn to the third party.97 Note, however, that, unlike assignment, the consent of the debtor was always required in an acknowledgement. Today, given the recognition of legal assignments, the concept of “acknowledgment” has fallen into disuse.98 [2.14] The strict position of the common law was also circumvented by use of a power of attorney.99 This became popular from around the fourteenth century and was achieved simply by the assignor appointing the assignee as his or her attorney to sue (in the assignor’s name or on behalf of the assignor) for a debt with a stipulation that the assignee was to keep any monies recovered.100 The power of attorney had a number of problems. Such arrangements could still be attacked as savouring of maintenance if the assignee did not have a sufficient interest in the suit.101 The main type of interest accepted by the courts was where the assignor, at the time of the appointment of the assignee as his or her attorney, owed money to the assignee. In addition, unless prevented by injunction, the assignor could still exercise its common law rights, such as giving a release to the debtor.102 The power of attorney could also be revoked. In time, limitations on the right to revoke were developed where the power of attorney was given for valuable consideration.103 There is also evidence that the common law went a step further and recognised the actual assignment of debts by a debtor to its creditor104 and allowed anyone with a pecuniary interest in a debt to sue in the name of the creditor.105 Novation was also recognised by the common law.106 97 Liversidge v Broadbent (1859) 4 H & N 603, 157 ER 978. See further R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution (6th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) ch 28; JD Davies, “Shamia v Joory: A Forgotten Chapter in Quasi-Contract” (1959) 75 LQR 220; D Yates, “Trusts, Contracts and Attornments” (1977) 41 Conv (NS) 49; JC Hall, “Gift of Part of a Debt” [1959] CLJ 99 at 118–19; F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 5.4 at 88. 98 However, it is not beyond revival: see R Goode, Legal Problems in Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.54. 99 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 67–71. As to its origins: see SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1931) 47 LQR 516 at 527. Many assignments are coupled with powers of attorney, eg Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523; Re Androma Pty Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 134. 100 FC Tudsbery, The Nature, Requisites and Operation of Equitable Assignments (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1912) at 9. 101 JB Ames, Lectures on Legal History (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard UP, 1913) 210 at 213. See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 67. 102 WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) 29 Harv L R 816 at 823–4. 103 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 68; G Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, at 202. 104 WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) at 42. 105 Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372 per Cozens-Hardy LJ. 106 Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365 at 388 per Windeyer J. See also JB Ames, Lectures on Legal History (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard UP, 1913) 210 at 212. See further JG Starke, Assignments of Choses in Action in Australia (Sydney, Butterworths, 1972) at 52–4.
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[2.15] From around the eighteenth century the law started to accept that rights to recover personal property could be assigned.107 For example, a bailor could make a gift of the right to the bailed goods and, although initially any action for detinue did not go with the goods, this eventually changed with the acceptance that a chose in action may be transferred as an incident to the transfer of some tangible property. Nevertheless, the common law generally did not change its position as regards contractual rights, which remained unassignable except by operation of law, for example, upon death. [2.16] The approach of equity. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, it was settled that equity would recognise the assignment of a legal chose in action and viewed the common law’s position as “absurd”.108 The mechanics of how equity gave effect to such “assignments” and how it protected the position of the obligor are dealt with in Chapter 4. Equity also remained unconvinced of any necessary link between assignment and maintenance.109 However, equity did not recognise the assignment of choses in action it thought were too personal or uncertain. For example, a claim for unliquidated damages in tort for a personal wrong or for breach of contract.110 More generally, the assignment of a bare right of action, that is, a right without occupation or enjoyment,111 was not upheld on public policy grounds. [2.17] The reaction of the common law. The common law eventually dropped its presumption of maintenance and began to recognise the “assignment” of debts, but still only by use of the power of attorney.112 This was not a true assignment, but it was no longer open to the suggestion of maintenance or champerty. Moreover, there is evidence that the existence of a power of attorney became a mere formality and could be implied.113 Generally, however, most choses in action remained unassignable at common law.114 107 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1017 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 533). 108 Master v Miller (1791) 4 TR 320 at 340, 100 ER 1042 at 1053 per Buller J. 109 Ibid, at 340 (TR), 1053 (ER) per Buller J. 110 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1022–3 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 538–9). 111 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1766) ii, at 396. 112 WS Holdsworth, “The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 997 at 1021 (reprinted with minor amendments in WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd edn, London, Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937) vii, 515 at 536). 113 GP Costigan, “Gifts Inter Vivos of Choses in Action” (1911) 27 LQR 326 at 328. 114 Nevertheless, whilst reiterating that a chose in action was not assignable, the common law courts would take notice of the assignee’s right in equity and allow an action to be brought in the name of the assignor without the need to go to equity. Thus, where the assignor had become bankrupt, the court
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Legal assignment became possible upon the passing of section 25(6) of the Judicature Act 1873 (UK). This provision affected a procedural change to the law, allowing any legal chose in action that was assignable in equity prior to its passing to be assigned at law. It did not make assignable at law something that prior to its enactment was not assignable in equity. This is the extent of the procedural effect of this provision which has been the cause of some confusion and is dealt with in detail later.115 Today, equivalent statutory provisions exist in England and in all Australian States and Territories and allow an assignee to bring an action in its own name if the formal requirements of the statute are made out. There remain some interests that cannot be assigned under the statutory provisions but which may still be assigned in equity, the most important being an assignment of part of a debt or chose in action.
(d) Conclusion [2.18] Conclusion. There are two principal conclusions to be drawn from the above history. The first is that the law has adopted a property model of assignment. The second is that Anglo-Australian law has been left with two methods of assignment, legal and equitable, each with its own set of rules. A full study and critique of the property model falls outside the scope of this book, however, an explanation for it is suggested in Chapter 3. Before moving on to discuss the rules for the assignment of contractual rights, it is necessary to look in some detail at the two broad categories of legal and equitable assignment. This is done in Chapters 4 and 5. However, prior to this it is necessary to outline what is meant and achieved by an assignment. This is done in Chapter 3. Finally, throughout this chapter reference has been made to choses in action, (and more particularly contractual rights) being property. This is consistent with the language used in legal discourse as regards the assignment of choses in action and it is convenient to continue to use it throughout this book. However, it is suggested that this should be viewed as a shorthand way of expressing a more sophisticated idea. The law did not designate contractual rights to performance as property; what the law did was recognise that a party to a contract had title to a right to contractual performance.116 It was this title (ownership) that was considered recognised the equitable assignment so that the property did not pass to the trustee: see Winch v Keely (1787) 1 TR 619, 99 ER 1284. This approach led Gilmore to make the now famous remark: “Thus by the typically muddle-headed process of thinking known as the genius of the common law, assignments of intangibles were made effective in fact whilst basic theory still proclaimed them to be legal impossibilities”: see G Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, at 202. 115 [5.04]–[5.26]. 116 See Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 26 per Windeyer J (suggesting that anything that can be the subject of ownership may be assigned). Cf T Cyprian Williams, “Property, Things in Action and Copyright” (1895) 11 LQR 223 at 230–1 cited above [2.04].
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property. That is, a party to a contract had a (proprietary) right to a (personal) right of performance.117 This title was recognised for the purposes of transfer. As between the parties to the contract, their rights and obligations remain personal.118
117
See further LD Smith, The Law of Tracing (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 61. Although the law has long recognised the legitimacy of recognising rights as property for only some purposes, quaere the extent to which this distinction can still be maintained: see [6.14]. 118
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Part 2 The Nature of Assignment
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3 Assignment and the Concept of Transfer (a) Introduction [3.01] Purpose of the part. This part looks at some fundamental aspects of assignment. It is divided into three chapters. This chapter deals with the meaning of assignment. In Chapters 4 and 5 the principal ways in which legal rights may be assigned are analysed. The purpose of this part insofar as the theme of the book is concerned is to elucidate the legal concept of transfer and to see how that concept is reflected in equitable and legal assignments. More generally this part looks at what occurs when rights are assigned and investigates the nature of equitable and legal assignments. [3.02] Purpose of the chapter. This chapter considers the meaning of assignment and investigates the legal concept of transfer. Its primary purpose is to extract the principal features and ingredients of an assignment. This exercise is also important in helping distinguish assignments from other transactions. It will be suggested that the principal feature of an assignment is contained in the idea that an assignment involves a transfer. The principal ingredients are the requirement of an intention to assign and the existence of a proprietary right which is the subject matter of the transfer. [3.03] Structure of the chapter. This chapter begins by looking at the meaning of assignment and what is meant by and involved in the idea that an assignment involves a transfer. It also deals with the relevance of intention in assignment and its importance in distinguishing assignments from other transactions. This is followed by a section which attempts to explain the current property model of assignment. Finally, the distinction between assignment and privity of contract is discussed.
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(b) Meaning of Assignment (i) Introduction [3.04] The legal concept of assignment. The word “assignment” has not been used uniformly throughout legal history.1 At one time it may have been used to describe a transaction that today would be described as a direction to pay.2 In Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,3 Windeyer J described the modern assignment of a chose in action as involving “the immediate transfer of an existing proprietary right, vested or contingent, from the assignor to the assignee”.4 This description captures the most important feature and ingredients of assignment as a legal concept today. First, assignment is concerned with transferring rights. More precisely, it is suggested that a transaction is properly termed an assignment only if its effect is to transfer to the assignee the ownership of a right vested in the assignor. Transfer is the essence of assignment. It is the principal feature of an assignment. The transferred interest may amount to the ownership of the entire interest held by the assignor in the subject right, or ownership of a part of that interest.5 Moreover, a true assignment results in an immediate transfer. Secondly, although not expressly stated by Windeyer J, except where the assignment is by operation of law, it is inherent in his description that there be an intention to transfer the right. This is the first main ingredient of any assignment. It may be expressed as a substantive formality. The intention required is an intention immediately to assign; however, there are instances where equity can uphold an agreement to assign an interest as an immediate equitable assignment.6 Thirdly, the law of assignment is concerned with the transfer of property rights.7 The existence of a present property right is the second main ingredient in any assignment or the second substantive formality. Moreover, when there is dealing in property rights, there is always a requirement that the property be inherently identifiable and adequately identified.8 1 See SJ Bailey, “Assignment of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 580. See also [2.02]. In general discourse “assignment” or “assign” can also be used in the sense of to “allot”, “appoint” or “determine”: see The Oxford English Dictionary. See further Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 65 per MacFarlan J. 2 SJ Bailey, “Assignment of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 580. 3 (1963) 109 CLR 9. 4 Ibid, at 26. See further W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1766) ii, at 326. 5 Cf Butler v Capel (1823) 2 B & C 251 at 253, 107 ER 377. 6 [7.15]–[7.16]. 7 [3.19]. 8 [7.11]–[7.14].
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[3.05] The institution of “assignment”. The description of assignment adopted by Windeyer J could be used to describe the “transfer” of intangibles (or rights) component of many transactions, for example, the transfer of title under a sale of goods.9 However, in practice the use to which the word “assignment” is put tends to be limited to describing a transfer which does not involve a transfer of a tangible asset,10 that is, transactions involving mere choses in action.11 It is here that “assignment” appears as an institution or subject in its own right, with its own peculiar rules which, to a limited extent, appear to divorce it from the rules governing sale of goods and sale of land. This book is concerned with this institutional concept of assignment as it applies to the assignment of contractual rights.
(ii) Assignment Distinguished from Other Transactions12 [3.06] Assignment and novation.13 A novation usually involves three parties; the two parties to a contract and a third party. The effect of a novation is that for valuable consideration the parties to the contract agree to extinguish14 the contract and one party enters into a replacement contract with the third party.15 The new contract replaces the extinguished contract.16 A novation may also occur between 9 In fact, following his description of assignment, he said ((1963) 109 CLR 9 at 26): “Anything that in the eye of the law can be regarded as an existing subject of ownership, whether it be a chose in possession or a chose in action, can to-day be assigned”. 10 Strangely, the word “assignment” is not generally used to describe a transaction which involves the transfer of title to tangibles (by way of sale) but where no transfer of possession occurs. 11 Occasionally it is also used to describe a transfer by way of security, whether the security involves tangible or intangible property. The word “assignment” is also sometimes used in practice to describe any transaction which is concerned with the alienation or vesting of rights and which does not involve the transfer of a tangible asset, for example, a declaration of trust and a charge. 12 Some transactions are distinguished elsewhere: see [2.13] (assignment and acknowledgement), [2.14] (assignment and powers of attorney), [3.13] (assignment and negotiation), [7.04] (assignment and revocable mandate). 13 See generally J Bailey, “Novation” (1999) 14 JCL 189. 14 The word “extinguish” is often used to describe what happens to the original contract. The novation does not result in a rescission, at least in the sense of the parties handing back benefits received under the contract. Nor does it result merely in a discharge of the contract with unconditionally accrued obligations surviving that discharge. The effect on the original contract may be that of discharge, but unless there is express provision to the contrary, each novation operates as between the original parties to the contract as a release: see Commercial Bank of Tasmania v Jones [1893] AC 313. In commercial practice the effect of a novation on accrued rights and obligations is dealt with expressly. 15 Scruples Imports Pty Ltd v Crabtree & Evelyn Pty Ltd (1983) 1 Intellectual Property Reports 315 at 320 per Powell J (“a novation is merely a contract between three parties, the obligee, the original obligor and the substituted obligor, the effect of which contract is that in consideration of the obligee releasing the original obligor from his obligation, the substituted obligor promises the obligee that he will assume responsibility for the performance of the obligation”). See also Mutual Export Corp v Asia Australian Express Ltd (The Lakatoi Express) (1990) 103 FLR 32 at 40. 16 As to the requirement of consideration see Scarf v Jardine (1882) 7 App Cas 345 at 351 per Lord Selborne and Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365 at 390 per Windeyer J. See further GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (11th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 155, 701–2.
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the parties to a contract whereby they agree to discharge one contract and to enter into another replacement contract. A novation does not involve a transfer of rights.17 The replacement contract creates new rights which are not derived from the original contract.18 A valid novation requires the consent of all the parties.19 [3.07] Assignment and contractual nominations.20 An offer or option may be made or given to a grantee and/or his or her nominee. Moreover, a contract, typically a contract of sale, may be expressed to be made with the buyer and/or its nominee. The effect of such a clause depends on construction. It may be intended as a personal offer to the grantee but which may be accepted by the nominee for the grantee.21 It may be a personal offer to the grantee, but in the sense of an offer to sell to the grantee or such persons as the grantee nominates. Here, if a nomination is made the contract will be between the grantor and that nominee.22 This is not an assignment, nor is it a novation. It is simply a form of offer made to the grantee and any person falling within the description of “nominee”, albeit that the named grantee dictates the content of that class.23 Where the offer is contained in a contract and it is exercisable and exercised by a nominee, this results in a new contract, that is, a novation, as it is not possible to add a party to a contract without discharging the contract.24 In this regard, it does not matter whether the benefit of the nomination provision is made to the party “or” its nominee, or whether it is made to the party “and” its nominee. Often a nominee provision merely expresses what would be implied in any case, namely that the grantee can direct that the subject matter of the contract be transferred to a nominee without 17 A statute may dictate that a “transfer” of certain subject matter takes effect by way of novation: see R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 1.07, 1.13, 1.50, 3.03. See also Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1989] Ch 497 at 513. See further J Benjamin, Interests in Securities (Oxford, OUP, 2000) paras 305–7. See also [6.87]. 18 See Rasbora Ltd v JCL Marine Ltd [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 645. 19 See Damon Compania Naviera SA v Hapag-Lloyd International SA (The Blankenstein) [1985] 1 WLR 435; The Aktion [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 283 at 310 –11. See also Conquest’s Case (1875) 1 Ch D 334; Miller’s Case (1876) 3 Ch D 391; Chatsworth Investments Ltd v Cussins (Contractors) Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1; Scarf v Jardine (1882) 7 App Cas 345; British Homes Assurance Corp Ltd v Paterson [1902] 2 Ch 404; Meek v Port of London Authority [1918] 2 Ch 96. 20 See CJ Rossiter, Principles of Land Contracts and Options in Australia (Sydney, Butterworths, 2003) para 3.20. 21 See AF Grant Pty Ltd v MacDonald [1960] Qd R 465. See also Lang v James Morrison & Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 1 at 6 per Griffith CJ. 22 See Westminster Estates Pty Ltd v Calleja (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 222; Bell Bros Pty Ltd v Sarich [1971] WAR 157 at 159. See also Clark v Lonergan [1961] NSWR 313; Byrne v Reid [1902] 2 Ch 735. In the case of an option, doctrinally this result follows only if the option is drafted as an irrevocable offer rather than as a conditional contract. 23 See Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256. See also Westminster Estates Pty Ltd v Calleja (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 222 at 229. 24 Salter v Gilbertson (2003) 6 VR 466. Cf Damon Compania Naviera SA v Hapag-Lloyd International SA (The Blankenstein) [1985] 1 WLR 438 at 446–7 per Fox LJ; Hannan’s Hill Amalgamated No Liability v Barbican Corporation Ltd (1939) 13 ALJ 255 at 256 per Rich J.
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that nominee being a party to any contract with the grantor.25 Thus, the contract of sale is made with the original party but there is a sale (conveyance) to the nominee. [3.08] Assignment and vicarious performance. Generally, the burden of a contract is not assignable.26 However, it is possible to have a contractual obligation vicariously performed if the obligation does not call for personal performance.27 In such a case, if the performance is given on behalf of the contractor and with the intention of discharging the contractor, then performance by the third party will discharge the contractor.28 However, the delegation of a delegable duty does not discharge the contractor from its obligation to perform and the contractor remains liable for any non-performance.29 This is the case despite the customer’s consent to the vicarious performance.30 Finally, although there is no privity between the employer and sub-contractor,31 in some cases the sub-contractor may be liable to the employer in tort or bailment.
(c) Assignment as Transfer [3.09] “Transfer” generally. An “assignment”, in legal discourse, is said to involve a transfer. It is therefore important to determine what “transfer” means in this context. 25 See Earl of Egmont v Smith (1877) 6 Ch D 469 at 474 per Jessel MR; MacDonald v Robins (1954) 90 CLR 515 at 524 per Dixon CJ; Salter v Gilbertson (2003) 6 VR 466. Such a direction may be combined with an assignment of the benefit of the contract of sale to the nominee: see Shaw v Harris (No 2) (1992) 3 Tas R 167. 26 [6.101]. 27 [6.77]–[6.81]. 28 Eg John Rigby (Haulage) Ltd v Reliance Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1956] 2 QB 468 at 482 per Singleton LJ. 29 Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] AC 414; Fratelli Sorrentino v Buerger [1915] 1 KB 307 at 313 per Atkin J (affirmed [1915] 3 KB 367); Stewart v Reavell’s Garage [1952] 2 QB 545; Davies v Collins [1945] 1 All ER 247 at 249 per Lord Greene MR; Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 at 1019 per Viscount Simon LC; British Waggon Co and Parkgate Waggon Co v Lea (1880) 5 QBD 149; Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 Building Law Reports (BLR) 33 at 43 per Parker LJ. 30 Stewart v Reavell’s Garage [1952] 2 QB 545. For an exception see Investors in Industry Commercial Properties Ltd v South Bedfordshire District Council [1986] 1 All ER 787 discussed at [6.79] note 548. Nevertheless, if an employer agrees to accept performance by a third party it will be bound by that performance even if it is not in accordance with the contract, so long as it is in accordance with the agreement for vicarious performance: Hirachand Punamchand v Temple [1911] 2 KB 330 (creditor agreeing to accept payment of smaller amount from third party). See also Waghorn v Linden Manufacturing Pty Ltd [1970] 3 NSWLR 559. 31 John Rigby (Haulage) Ltd v Reliance Marine Insurance Co Ltd [1956] 2 QB 468 at 484 –5 per Jenkins LJ; Schmaling v Thomlinson (1815) 6 Taunt 147, 128 ER 989.
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The word “transfer” is capable of wide meaning.32 In its day-to-day use (and in part as a legal concept) it is employed to describe the situation where a person parts with something in circumstances where the transferee obtains the exact same thing as that once held by the transferor.33 For example, in the context of sale of goods where the contract calls for delivery of possession, the goods themselves are the subject of such a transfer. However, in its popular sense, “transfer” may occur without there being a consequent movement of legal rights.34 [3.10] The legal meaning of “transfer”. In law, “transfer” is also used to describe a conveyance of property.35 In the context of a conveyance, the law’s focus is not merely on the transfer of tangible things but on the transfer of property rights. However, a transferee never obtains the exact same property rights as those held by the transferor. All property rights at a certain level of sophistication are personal and incapable of this type of transfer.36 Rather, it is generally accepted that a 32 Gathercole v Smith (1881) 17 Ch D 1 at 7 per James LJ, at 9 per Lush LJ. See also Bank of Victoria Ltd v Langlands Foundry Co Ltd (1898) 23 VLR 230 at 251 per Holroyd J; Re Kelly (1932) 4 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 258 at 267; Camden & Burton v London Borough Council [2000] 2 AC 399. See further Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 at 1021 per Viscount Simon LC. 33 Lyle & Scott Ltd v Scott’s Trustees [1959] AC 763 at 778 per Lord Reid. 34 See Booth v Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159 at 164 per Mason CJ. 35 An assignment (in the institutional sense) involves (and is) a transfer, but not all transfers necessarily involve (or are) assignments. For example, in Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978] AC 95 at 104 Lord Diplock described subrogation as involving a transfer of rights without an assignment; cf. Cheltenham & Gloucester plc v Appleyard [2004] EWCA Civ 291 para 25; Burston Finance Ltd v Spierway Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1648 at 1652, and see RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) paras 9.060–9.065. However, at least in the case of simple subrogation, such as where an insurer is subrogated to the position of the insured, the action is not merely nominally in the name of the plaintiff/insured, it is the plaintiff’s action; subrogation here merely gives a person the right to stand in the shoes of another without vesting the chose in action in the party with the right to be subrogated: see James Nelson & Sons Ltd v Nelson Line (Liverpool) Ltd [1906] 2 KB 217 at 223 per Collins MR; Central Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corp (The Aiolos) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25 at 30; MH Smith (Plant Hire) Ltd v DL Mainwaring (T/A Inshore) [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 244 at 246; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Hall & Russell & Co Ltd [1989] AC 643. For a discussion of simple subrogation as opposed to reviving subrogation: see C Mitchell, The Law of Subrogation (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) at 5–7. In the law of documentary credits a distinction is drawn between the transfer of a credit and the assignment of a credit: see R Jack, A Malek and D Quest, Documentary Credits (3rd edn, London, Butterworths, 2001) ch 10; A Ward and G McCormack “Assignment of Documentary Credits” (2001) 16(5) Journal of International Banking Law (JIBL) 138. See further Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 22 per Dixon J. A transfer of rights is also sometimes distinguished from an assignment of rights where the transfer takes place without reference to the institutional rules governing the assignment of choses in action, for example, where commercial practice recognises a transfer of rights by delivery of certain documents: see generally C Debattista, The Sale of Goods Carried by Sea (2nd edn, London, Butterworths, 1998) ch 3 and AM Tettenborn, “Transferable and Negotiable Documents of Title—A Redefinition?” [1991] LMCLQ 538. 36 On one view this fact should end the law’s fascination with the idea of a transfer of rights: see JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 147; JB Ames, “The Disseisin of Chattels” (1890) 3 Harv L Rev 313 at 315; JB Ames, “The Disseisin of Chattels” (1890) 3 Harv L Rev 337 at 339; JH Beale, Conflict of Law (1916) para 152 as cited by WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston” (1916–17) 30 Harv LR 449 at 449. Cf TD Kenneson,
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transfer of rights occurs when the transferor disposes of a right (which is extinguished) and where an equivalent and derivative right is created and vested in the transferee.37 Nevertheless, in the context of choses in action, it has been said that what is transferred is the chose in action; that is, the exact same chose in action and not an equivalent.38 It is suggested that the point being made by such statements is that in the case of an assignment of a contractual right there is an actual transfer of a right to contractual performance. That is, in addition to the extinction/creation transfer of title, there is a transfer that is akin to the transfer of goods in a contract for the sale of goods. This actual transfer occurs when the transferee is put in the same relationship to the right to performance as that previously held by the transferor. The legal concept of transfer which requires an extinction of rights on the one hand, and the creation and vesting of new but equivalent and derivative rights on the other hand, does not refer to the right to performance under a contract. That concept of transfer is concerned with the transfer of title to a contractual right. It is title that is the subject of extinction and creation. In the case of a sale of goods the effect of the sale is that the title of the seller is extinguished and there are created and vested in the buyer rights that are equivalent to those which were held by the seller. Similarly, in the assignment of a contractual right to performance, the assignor’s title to that right is extinguished and a new and equivalent title is vested in the assignee. Under a sale of goods the transfer of title relates to certain subject matter, namely the goods. Similarly, in the case of assignments of contractual rights the transfer of title relates to certain subject matter, namely the right to performance.39 It is also relevant to note that, although it is convenient to refer to a “right of performance” under a contract, that expression is apt to mislead. Inasmuch as a sale of a particular type of goods cannot vest in the buyer a different type of goods, a transfer of title to a contractual right to performance cannot vest in the assignee something that becomes “the assignee’s contractual right of performance”. There is no such “thing” as a “contractual right to performance”. There is only “the “Purchase for Value Without Notice” (1914) 23 Yale LJ 193; WA Searey, “Purchase for Value Without Notice” (1914) 23 Yale LJ 447. See also W Mincke, “Property: Assets or Power? Objects or Relations as Substrata of Property Rights” in JW Harris (ed), Property Problems: From Genes to Pension Funds (London, Kluwer, 1997) ch 7. 37 See R v Preddy [1996] AC 815 at 834 per Lord Goff, at 841 per Lord Jauncey. 38 Eg Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 915 per Lord Hoffmann: see [2.05]. In the case of a debt, often the “debt” itself is referred to as a piece of property which can be dealt with like any other asset—the necessity of enforceability to the characterisation of it being a chose in action being considered a mere incident: see Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372, 373 per Cozens-Hardy LJ. See further [6.34], [6.54]. 39 For a reference to contractual rights and debts as “things” see Portuguese-American Bank of San Francisco v Welles (1916) 242 US 7 per Holmes J.
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promisee’s right to performance”.40 This results from the personal nature of contract and this is all that the assignor has to sell. The assignee’s title is derived from the assignor, and although the assignor’s title to the right to performance is extinguished and replaced, the obligation of the obligor is not replaced or extinguished.41 The obligation owed by the obligor to the assignee is therefore the same obligation the obligor owed the assignor.42 As a result of the transfer of title, the assignee owns and is owed the performance under the contract, but what the assignee owns and is owed remains a contractual obligation promised by the obligor to the assignor.43 That is, the assignee buys the promise made to the assignor, “the assignor’s right to performance”. If the assignor’s right to performance was extinguished and replaced by “the assignee’s right to performance” or if there existed a chose in action entitled “a right to contractual performance” then the effect of an assignment would be to create privity of contract between the obligor and assignee which is not the law.
40 Strictly there are two rights; first, the promisee’s right to the promise of performance (in most cases this is more accurately expressed as the right to the promise to procure some performance) and secondly, the promisee’s right to performance, the latter being correlative to the obligation to perform. For the most part it is not necessary to distinguish between these two rights, and it is convenient and less cumbersome to continue to refer to the promisee’s “right to performance”. Moreover, there are doctrinal reasons for holding that at the moment of contract formation a contract party has, in addition to a right to a promise of performance, a right to performance: see [6.44]. That is, the right to performance exists from the moment of contract formation and does not come into existence when the correlative obligation to perform accrues. 41 This point distinguishes “transfer” as the term is used in assignment from the notion of “transfer” when used in banking law to describe a “transfer of funds”. Take, for example, a simple transfer of funds where the payer and payee have accounts at the same bank. The “transfer” would take place without any transfer of money; all that is required is book entries. In the result, the bank’s liability to the payer will be decreased and the bank’s liability, under a separate contract, to the payee will be increased. Thus, although this transaction involves both an extinction of rights on the one hand and a creation of rights on the other, this does not occur by way of assignment. Such directions are also not intended to be assignments but revocable mandates; however, even when the directions become irrevocable, the fact that at least two separate contracts are involved prevents there being a transfer by way of assignment. It has been suggested that what is transferred is a transfer of liability: see AL Tyree and A Beatty, The Law of Payment Systems (Sydney, Butterworths, 2000) para 3.2.2. In economic terms there is a transfer of purchasing power: see R Crane, I Fraser and T Martin, Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 2001) at 27. It has also been suggested that it is misleading to use the word “transfer” to describe this type of transaction: see Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] QB 728 at 750 per Staughton J. See also R v Preddy [1996] AC 815. See further M Brindle and R Cox (eds), Law of Bank Payments (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) para 3.062. 42 Loxton v Moir (1914) 18 CLR 360 at 377 per Isaacs J. 43 Since the efficacy of the assignment will depend on the continued existence of the contract, quaere whether it is correct to say that the obligor still owes its duty in contract to the assignor even though that duty is clearly trumped by the duty to the assignee. The recognition of such a continuing contract duty has its uses: see [8.36] cf [5.05]. In the case of an equitable assignment of a contractual right there is no doubt legitimacy in the notion that the obligor continues to owe its duty in law to the assignor: see [4.19], [4.20].
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The recognition of this actual transfer of the right to performance helps to explain, at a doctrinal level, certain aspects of assignments of contractual rights. For example, it impacts on the valuation of the assignee’s interest. This is discussed in detail later.44 It also results in the assignee obtaining property that was once owned by the assignor. This would not be the case if the assignment merely transferred title as that transfer occurs by way of extinction and creation of rights.45 In addition, if there were no more to an assignment than a transfer of title (resulting in the assignee owning the subject right and being owed the subject obligation) then the obligor could in all cases discharge its obligation to the assignee by continuing to perform to the assignor. That is, because the assignee merely owns the title to a promise made by the obligor to the assignor, then by continuing to perform to the assignor the assignee receives its expected performance. Thus, performance is to the assignor but (legally) for the benefit of the assignee. It may be that for commercial reasons an assignee requires the obligor to perform to the assignor but this would be dictated by the assignee, not the law governing the assignment. Moreover, there may be rules regulating the relationship between the obligor and assignee (such as a requirement of notice) which would prevent the obligor having to account to the assignee if it discharged its obligation to the assignor.46 However, generally, it is accepted that the effect of an assignment is not merely that the obligation be performed for the benefit of the assignee but rather to the assignee; that is, the assignee can expect personal performance. This is the whole point of the institution of assignment, and is achieved by recognising that the contractual right to performance is actually transferred upon the transfer of title with the result that the obligor performs the exact same obligation, but to the assignee. All true assignments of contractual rights require an actual transfer of the right to performance. Unlike a sale of goods where it is possible to transfer title without possession, a transfer of title to a contractual right must always carry with it the actual right to performance.47 This, of course, does not mean that a person cannot get the benefit of an intangible thing such as a debt or contractual right without getting title. That benefit may result from a gift, a mistake or fraud. [3.11] The extended meaning of “transfer” in assignment. The view could be taken that any transaction which does not have as one of its components this dual disposition and creation of title does not involve a transfer, and in turn cannot be 44
[8.11]–[8.12]. Cf the position where funds are transferred between bank accounts; here the transferee’s interest is not in any way derivative; it obtains original title rights as well as an original chose in action: see above n 41. At the level of legal doctrine such a transferee does not obtain property that once belonged to another: see R v Preddy [1996] AC 815 (the result in R v Preddy was reversed by legislation: see Law Commission for England and Wales, Offences of Dishonesty: Money Transfers (London, HMSO, 1996) Law Com 243; see further R v Sofroniou [2004] QB 1218; In re Holmes [2005] 1 WLR 1857). 46 See further [8.06]. 47 See further [4.19]. Cf [6.75], [6.83]. 45
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described as an assignment.48 At the very least one might logically argue that although not all dispositions of rights involve transfers, a transfer requires a disposition.49 Such a restricted notion of title “transfer” would not capture an equitable assignment of a legal right which at an analytical level merely creates and vests in the assignee an equitable interest.50 The assignor does not dispose of an equitable interest because when, one person holds the “whole right of property”, no distinction is drawn between legal and equitable interests.51 Equitable interests are “engrafted” or “impressed” upon legal interests rather than “carved out of” them. Nevertheless, these transactions are today treated in law as assignments, and therefore must involve a transfer even if not involving a disposition.52 Any description of the legal concept of transfer as it applies to assignments would be seriously lacking if it did not capture such a large parcel of the subject matter.53 It is suggested that, in addition to the primary meaning of title transfer set out above, a transfer by way of institutional assignment also occurs where a derivative
48 Eg Re VGM Holdings Ltd [1942] Ch 235 at 241 per Lord Greene MR; Commissioner of Taxes (Queensland) v Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127 at 133–4 per Latham CJ; George Wimpey & Co Ltd v IRC [1975] 2 All ER 45 at 50 per Sir John Pennycuick; Burton v Camden London Borough Council [2000] 2 AC 399 at 408–9 per Lord Millett. In these cases, it was suggested, that a transaction which involves the vesting in one party of an interest not previously held by the other party cannot be described as a sale, transfer or assignment: cf AGIP (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547 at 561; Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584 at 615 per Lord Wilberforce; Fasken v Minister of National Revenue [1949] 1 DLR 810. However, what was really in issue in these cases was whether a particular transaction came within a statute, and therefore they cannot be accepted as strong authority for this more general proposition. This is not to suggest that there may be cases at common law where the mere creation and vesting of some interest should not be classified as a transfer. It is also conceivable that a transaction may amount to a transfer for one purpose and not for another: see FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440 at 453–4. See also MSP Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamps (1999) 198 CLR 494. See further Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Microcomputer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 389 at 393. 49 There will be transactions which involve a creation of rights (some of which may be informed by an intention to transfer) but which do not equate to transfers, conveyances or dispositions for the purposes of certain legislation: see generally Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1926) 38 CLR 272; Commissioner of Taxes (Queensland) v Camphin (1937) 57 CLR 127. 50 See [7.18]. 51 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Livingston [1965] AC 694 at 712 per Viscount Radcliffe; DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 431 at 442 per Gibbs CJ, at 463–4 per Aickin J. See also Grey v IRC [1958] Ch 690 at 708 per Lord Evershed MR (affirmed [1960] AC 1); Re Transphere Pty Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 309 at 311 per McLelland J; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 706 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See further [7.18]. 52 [7.18]. See also Jerome v Kelly [2004] 1 WLR 1409. Cf Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Microcomputer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 389 at 393. See further O’Brien v Benson’s Hosiery (Holdings) Ltd [1980] AC 562. However, if it were not logical to speak of the disposal of an interest that did not exist prior to the time of the intended disposition then there would be no need to have drafted the statutory writing requirements in the manner in which they are drafted: see [7.26]. 53 Unless there is a statutory provision to the contrary it is more problematic to describe a transaction that involves a disposition without a vesting as a transfer: see Coles Myer Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [1998] 4 VR 728. For a discussion of a statutory provision that treats the mere creation of a right as a transfer see Anderson v Peldan (2005) 220 ALR 565.
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title to a right is merely created and vested in the transferee if that title may be said to give the transferee the equitable ownership of the right which is the subject matter of the assignment, and if there is an intention to transfer that ownership. The latter requirement is dealt with in detail later.54 However, it is important to emphasise that whether or not a transfer has taken place cannot be determined by the movement of rights alone. Like space and time, ultimately that movement cannot be separated from, or analysed without reference to, the intention that informs that movement. It may at first appear fictional to describe a transaction as involving a transfer when all that is involved is the creation and vesting of rights in the transferee. However, that is perhaps no more than a reflection of the limits of any analytical analysis of the movement of rights upon assignment. Moreover, although coming under some attack in recent years,55 if resort is made to the “bundle of rights” theory of ownership it is easy to view the assignor as disposing of an interest. Take, for example, the equitable assignment of a legal right by way of sale. In such a transaction, the assignor maintains the legal title to the subject right. Nevertheless, the interest56 the assignor continues to hold is now worth less to the assignor as it is held for the benefit of the assignee.57 But this is not merely an issue of decreased value;58 there is a clear diminishing of the assignor’s interest and an enlargement of the interest of the assignee which, on the bundle of rights theory, evidences a disposal and consequent vesting in the assignee.59 In the result, the word “transfer” is a word of wide import, and the sophistication of legal notions of property and transfer make it impossible to limit the
54
[7.03]–[7.10]. K Gray, “Property in Thin Air” [1991] Cambridge Law Journal (CLJ) 252; K Gray, “Equitable Property” (1994) 47 Current Legal Problems (CLP) 157 at 183; JE Penner, “The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property” (1996) 43 UCLA L Rev 711; K Campbell, “On the General Nature of Property Rights” (1992) 3 KCLJ 79. 56 For the distinction between title and interest see R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, London, Penguin, 2004) at 31. 57 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 at 304 per Waite LJ. 58 In the case of an assignment by way of security, the mortgagor’s right to redeem helps maintain the value of the property to the mortgagor. A movement in value may in some cases amount to a “transfer”: see Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547 at 561. For some purposes, such as tax, the value of a legal right may stand unaffected by an equitable interest: see Farm Products Co-operative (Tararua) Co Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioner (NZ) (1969) 1 ATR 85 at 89–90 per Turner J. 59 See generally Residues Treatment & Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1988) 6 Australian Company Law Cases (ACLC) 1,160 (issuing of shares so as to reduce voting rights of certain shareholders held to amount to an expropriation of shareholder’s rights); Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 190 CLR 513 (incorporation of land subject to mining leases within a national park, thus reducing the utility of the lessees’ rights under the lease amounted to an acquisition of property by the government, even though what was taken did not correspond to the interest held by the mining company). See also Smith v ANL Ltd (2000) 204 CLR 493; MSP Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamps (1999) 198 CLR 494 at 509. See further Inland Revenue Commissioners v John Lewis Properties plc [2003] Ch 513 at 551 per Schiemann LJ. 55
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concept of “transfer” to a narrow analytical formula.60 The context must dictate how wide or narrow the concept is in the particular case. In the context of an assignment of contractual rights, so far as the title to those rights is concerned, the concept of transfer must encapsulate both extinction and creation type transactions as well as transactions where title in merely created and vested. [3.12] Transfer and nemo dat quod non habet. The nemo dat rule is the fundamental rule governing transfers. Since an assignment of a contractual right involves a transfer, it is governed by this rule. The rule states that “no one gives what he does not have”. This rule has two principal aspects. First, a person cannot acquire title without the consent of the owner.61 Secondly, a person cannot transfer to another a better right than he or she has. This second aspect of the rule has three important consequences. The first and most obvious is that a transferee takes subject to existing real rights such as an existing security interest. Secondly, and related to the first, a transferee must take subject to any inherent weakness or infelicity in the subject right. Thirdly, from a practical perspective, it is very important properly to characterise the features of the right which is the subject matter of the assignment because if this is not done correctly then, although the rule cannot be breached, the effect may be equivalent to a breach, as the transferee may end up taking advantage of features that the right did not have. The rule does allow for the transfer of what may loosely be termed “lesser” rights. For example, a creditor may assign a debt in equity rather than at law. Nevertheless, the assignee in such a case obtains an interest in the debt and not something different. There are, of course, various exceptions to the nemo dat rule. Perhaps the most well known examples concern sales of goods by buyers and sellers in possession under sale of goods legislation. Even as regards choses in action exceptions are said to occur. For example, where an assignor assigns a debt twice, then priority will go to the assignee first giving notice to the debtor. Without there being an exception to the nemo dat rule such a priority dispute could not arise; if the first assignment was effective at law then the assignor would have had nothing to assign to the second assignee.62 Arguably, in certain contexts there is no need to recognise such an exception. In the case of an equitable assignment of a legal right, the assignor 60 It has even been suggested that the acquisition of a promise upon the formation of a contract takes place by way of transfer: see E Weinrib, “The Juridical Classification of Obligations” in P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 52–3; P Benson, “The Unity of Contract Law” in P Benson (ed), The Theory of Contract Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001) ch 4. Despite this being a legitimate theory, if it were adopted as contract law doctrine it could have undesirable results: eg The Commissioner of Stamp Duties (New South Wales) v Yeend (1929) 43 CLR 235 at 241. 61 T Weir, “Taking for Granted—The Ramifications of Nemo Dat” (1996) 49 CLP 325 at 328. 62 See R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, London, Penguin, 2004) at 55.
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would not be assigning the same interest more than once but merely creating equivalent interests each time. This results from the principle that equitable interests are not drawn out of legal interests but engrafted upon them. A similar analysis would apply to a series of legal assignments of a legal chose in action if the procedural view of the statutory regime for legal assignments were adopted. In this book, a substantive view of the statutory regime is adopted and therefore an exception to the nemo dat rule would be required to assign a chose in action more than once under that regime.63 Similarly, an exception would be required if the law allowed for the multiple assignment of an existing equitable chose in action. Another exception may have recently appeared. In Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp (The Trident Beauty),64 it was held that where an assignor assigns a right to an advance payment which is conditional upon some later performance by the assignor, the assignee obtains an unconditional right of payment. At first sight, the result here appears to go beyond an exception to the nemo dat rule. Generally, exceptions to the rule address defects in title to an existing asset. The effect of these exceptions is not only to allow for the transfer of the defective title held by the transferor but also for the title held by some third party. However, the issue in the example is not a simple defect in title; the assignor has a perfectly good title to a conditional right of payment. At the time of the assignment an unconditional right to payment did not exist. The exception to the rule here seems to create the asset which is the subject of the assignment. Nevertheless, this appears to be the way some exceptions to the nemo dat rule operate when dealing in pure intangibles. The example was given above of how a priority dispute can arise because a debt can be assigned more than once, even though at the time of the second assignment the assignor has nothing to assign. Arguably, the example here goes even further, because in the case of a double assignment at least the subject matter of the assignment, for example title to the debt, does exist although it is vested in a third party, namely, the first assignee. In the example, title to the unconditional right to payment was not held by anyone. Exceptions in the case of tangibles are usually based on the transferor at least having possessory title to the subject asset. It may be that the above analysis overstates this aspect of the decision in The Trident Beauty, and the finding that the assignee’s receipt of payment was unconditional was merely intended to express a view that the assignee was immune from any restitutionary claim by the debtor: it was not intended to characterise the nature of the chose in action held by the assignee.65
63 See [5.06]–[5.26]. See also Cronk v M’Manus (1892) 8 TLR 449, which suggests that an assignment of a debt by way of security under the statutory regime will be treated like a legal mortgage of tangible personal property. It would follow that any second mortgage could only be a dealing with the equity of redemption and therefore equitable. 64 [1994] 1 WLR 161. 65 See [8.33].
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[3.13] Transfer and negotiation. The concept of transfer is often contrasted with negotiability. The idea of a contrast here should not be overstated, since negotiation does involve a transfer but it is a transfer that is free of the nemo dat rule. The essential point is that an instrument that is negotiable (by delivery or endorsement and delivery) allows a bona fide transferee for value without notice to take the instrument free of any defects in title of prior parties and free from any equities that could be raised by prior parties.66
(d) The Element of Intention (i) Introduction [3.14] The requirement of an intention to assign. It will be recalled that Windeyer J in Norman’s case described an assignment as involving an immediate transfer.67 It was suggested that this must in turn require an intention to assign.68 That intention is a crucial ingredient of an assignment and distinguishes assignments from other transactions. The particular focus here is on the distinction between assignment on the one hand and equitable charges and declarations of trust on the other hand, as these are closely related to assignment. It is therefore convenient and imperative to distinguish these transactions in this chapter. The methodology applied by the courts for determining whether an intention to assign exists is dealt with in Chapter 7.
(ii) Outright Assignments and Security Assignments [3.15] Introduction. An assignment may be given for a variety of reasons. Assignments of contractual rights for the supply of goods or services usually follow the sale or transfer of some asset such as land or a business. A debt may also be assigned for a number of reasons. It may be a gift. It may be used in a number of ways to borrow money or raise finance. It may be assigned to discharge a debt in whole or in part. Often a right to an income stream is assigned for a period as a method of paying a debt. In relation to debts, an important distinction exists
66 Sometimes a reference to a negotiable instrument is used merely to refer to an instrument that can be transferred by delivery and endorsement even though that transfer is subject to the nemo dat rule: see R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, London, Penguin, 2004) at 49. 67 [3.04]. 68 [3.04].
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between an outright assignment69 and an assignment by way of security, that is, a mortgage.70 [3.16] Distinguishing outright assignments from security assignments. Whether or not an assignment is outright or by way of security depends on intention. The concern is to find the real intention of the parties.71 The first principle is to give effect to the express words of the memorandum.72 However, effect will not be given to the express words or an express object if the form of the transaction is a sham; that is, if it seeks to mask the true transaction,73 for example, where a
69 The expression “outright assignment” includes an assignment by way of sale but is broader. Not all outright assignments are by way of sale. For example, a debt can be assigned for the purposes of discharging a loan in whole or in part. Such an assignment is not an assignment by way of security nor is it an assignment by way of sale: see Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyds Rep 142 at 161–2 per Slade J (overruled on another point: Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 3 WLR 58). It is not a sale as the consideration for the assignment is the loan or a forbearance to sue rather than the payment of a purchase price or the promise of the payment of a purchase price. See also Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137; Ashby Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 and see Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] Ch 207 (application of the Quistclose principles to a transfer of funds (not by way of loan) for the payment of the transferee’s debts). See further R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.34. Finally, where there is an assignment by way of sale which incorporates an obligation to re-transfer the property, then, if no fresh consideration is required for the re-transfer, the retransfer will not be by way of sale: see Francis v NPD Property Development Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 240. 70 In addition, debts and contractual rights to payment are often used as security by way of charge. Here, the chose in action is merely appropriated as security; any assignment of the chose would occur as a means of enforcing the charge after a default. As to the nature of an “assignment by way of charge” see [4.27], [7.40]. 71 Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co v North Central Wagon Co (1888) 13 App Cas 554 at 568 per Lord Macnaghten. This intention is to be distinguished from the motive for the particular form of assignment. The motive may be to circumvent a statutory requirement which would apply if the transaction took a different form. Generally, motive is not a relevant consideration in characterising the form of the assignment: see Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1 at 22–3 per Lord Hanworth MR, at 23 per Lawrence LJ, at 26–7 per Romer LJ. 72 Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd [1992] Butterworths Company Law Cases (BCLC) 609 at 615–16 per Lord Wilberforce, at 619 per Lord Scarman (stating that the approach is to give effect to the express intention of the parties rather than characterise the transaction on the basis of function; it is not to the point that a sale in certain circumstances will perform the same function as a loan on security; the approach is one of method and nature and not object). See also Olds Discount Co Ltd v Cohen [1938] 3 All ER 281n; Olds Discount Co Ltd v Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275 at 277; Re Kent and Sussex Sawmills Ltd [1947] Ch 177 at 179 (note the criticism of this case in F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1991) at 80); Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] AC 209 at 216 per Lord Devlin; Gurfinkel v Bentley Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 98 at 114 per Windeyer J; Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] British Company Cases (BCC) 270 at 300. See also Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 588 at 607–8. 73 Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1 at 17 per Lord Hanworth MR; Curtain Dream plc v Churchill Merchanting Ltd [1990] BCC 341 at 349. See also Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 (and see Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 382).
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formal document of sale is used to disguise a loan on security.74 In addition, evidence that the express words of a memorandum do not reflect the real intention of the parties or no longer reflects the intention of the parties can come from the manner in which the transaction is conducted.75 However, that will generally be sufficient only if it shows that the parties made some other contract.76 Where there is no question of a sham or replacement agreement, the discovery of the true intention of the parties is one of construction and usually involves an interpretation of a memorandum of assignment. It is a question of law.77 Like the construction of any contract this process involves an investigation of the meaning of the words used by the parties and the legal effect of those words. The investigation into the meaning of words here is particularly concerned with discovering the various rights and obligations received and undertaken by the parties. It is then necessary to determine the legal effect of those rights and obligations divorced from any labels the parties themselves have attached to them. That is, the true transaction is determined by a legal analysis of the rights and obligations given and undertaken in the agreement.78 If in form a memorandum of assignment uses words of sale but in substance grants rights between the parties that are not consistent with a sale but are consistent with a security, then the real intention of the parties is to assign by way of security.79 Similarly, if a memorandum uses the word “security” but it is clear that the intention of the parties is that of an outright assignment, the word “security” will be ignored.80 However, a court will not strive to characterise a transaction in a way that is inconsistent with the label attached to it by the parties. The investigation by the court is without prejudice.81 Where a memorandum of assignment is documented as a sale but grants rights that are 74 Eg Saunderson & Co v Clark (1913) 29 TLR 579. See also R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, London, Penguin, 2004) at 605–9. See further Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 278–9 per Dillon LJ, at 301 per Staughton LJ. 75 See Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 (and see Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 382). However, the fact that the parties do not follow the exact course dictated by the memorandum of assignment may be explained away on other grounds: see F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 2.12 at 37–8. See further Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd (1992) BCLC 609. 76 Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 301 per Staughton J citing Garnac Grain Co Inc v HMF Faure & Fairclough Ltd [1966] 1 QB 650 at 683 per Diplock LJ. 77 Smith v Bridgend County Borough Council [2002] 1 AC 336 at 352 per Lord Hoffmann, at 355 per Lord Scott. 78 Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1 at 17 per Lord Hanworth MR; Helby v Matthews [1895] AC 471 at 475 per Lord Herschell; Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 279 per Dillon LJ, at 301 per Staughton LJ. 79 Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 at 725–6 per Lord Millett. The type of security interest created is also a question of law. For example, in the case of a charge, if the relevant memorandum uses words suggesting an intention to create a fixed charge but rights are given that are inconsistent with the charge being fixed then a court may hold that it is a floating charge. See further Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 3 WLR 58. 80 See Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142. 81 Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1 at 20 per Lord Hanworth MR.
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consistent with both a sale and a security a court will continue to recognise the transaction as one of sale unless there is evidence that this is not the true or real intention of the parties.82 This approach is dictated by the fact that no one criterion of sale or security is conclusive.83 This necessarily follows from the fact that a sale may be used to raise finance in much the same way as an assignment can be used to secure a loan.84 In either case the documentation is likely to mix language and in part use expressions and words that are more apt to describe the other form of transaction. This process of construction is not merely one of construing the operative words of the assignment clause, but rather construing that clause in light of the contract as a whole.85 The concern is with the substance of the transaction, and therefore it is necessary to look at the transaction, the relationship of the parties and the circumstances that gave rise to the transaction.86 In some cases there may be other admissible extrinsic evidence which suggests that the express words of the memorandum do not reflect the true intention of the parties.87 The particular concern is whether there is evidence of the assignor having an express or implied right to redeem the subject property. A sale contract would not contain such a right. However, care must be taken not to imply a right of redemption too quickly. For example, it is doctrinally possible to assign outright an income stream, not so as automatically to discharge a debt or loan but as a method of repayment of the debt or loan, which automatically comes to an end upon the repayment of that debt or loan without a revesting.88 Thus, in order for the assignor to be paid any excess in the hands of the assignee and to ensure that the transaction is not labelled a “security” it is not always necessary to make this a personal obligation of the assignee to pay an equivalent amount. Nevertheless, the possibility of there being a right of redemption is raised in situations where the 82 See Douglas v Culverwell (1862) 4 De GF & J 20, 45 ER 1089; Williams v Owen (1840) 5 My & Cr 303, 41 ER 386; Curtain Dream plc v Churchill Merchanting Ltd (1990) BCC 341; Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 (and see Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 382). 83 Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 at 84–5 (and see Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 382); Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd (1992) BCLC 609 at 617. 84 Ibid, at 615 per Lord Wilberforce. 85 Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 280 per Dillon LJ, at 302 per Staughton LJ; Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 (and see Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 BCLC 382). 86 Beckett v Tower Assets Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 1 at 25–6 per Cave J; Re Kent and Sussex Sawmills Ltd [1947] Ch 177 at 180–1; Automobile Association (Canterbury) Inc v Australasian Secured Deposits Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 417; Contemporary Cottages (NZ) Ltd v Margin Traders Ltd [1981] 2 NZLR 114. 87 Olds Discount Co Ltd v Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275 at 280 per Branson J; Re Row Dal Constructions Pty Ltd [1966] VR 249 at 259; Automobile Association (Canterbury) Inc v Australasian Secured Deposits Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 417. See also Beckett v Tower Assets Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 1; Re Universal Management Ltd [1983] NZLR 462 at 470 per Cooke J at 476 per McMullin J; Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 at 608 per Mummery J. 88 The mechanics for achieving this are discussed at [7.40].
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assigned debts are greater (or potentially greater in the case of an assignment of an income stream) than the debt the assignor owes the assignee, where the assignor has a right to any amount received by the assignee in excess of the debt owed to the assignee, and where the assignor has a right or obligation to repurchase the chose. Moreover, in the case of a loan, where the income stream is assigned at the time of the loan and where the lender is to look solely to the assigned income for repayment, the transaction is more likely to be characterised as a security transaction.89 The mere fact that the assignment is expressed to be for the “repayment” of the loan rather than as “security” for the loan is not conclusive. Where a debt is assigned by way of mortgage, the assignee owns the chose and therefore has a right to the income stream which must be used by the mortgagee to discharge the debt.90 Goode, in the context of discussing transfers to cover future indebtedness, suggests that the critical distinction in assignments of this type is between an assignment of a debt where payment “must be held and applied exclusively for the purpose of satisfying any indebtedness of the [assignor], any surplus being returned and meanwhile being held on trust for the [assignor] . . . and . . . an outright payment which becomes part of the [assignee’s] free assets, so that his only obligation if the sum [received] exceeds the [indebtedness of the assignor] is a personal repayment obligation”.91 It is necessary to add to this the possibility of an assignment that is automatically extinguished upon the repayment of the loan. The issue can also be looked at from the position of the assignee. As has been pointed out, if “a purchaser sells the property he has purchased, he may keep any profit he had made on the transaction; if a mortgagee does so, he must account for the profit to the mortgagor. . . . If a purchaser sells the property he has purchased and makes a loss on the transaction, he cannot recover his loss from the vendor; if a mortgagee realises the mortgaged property for less than he is owed, he may recover the balance from the mortgagor.”92 However, none of these points is necessarily conclusive.93 The result ultimately depends on the true meaning, purpose and legal effect of the assignment. Thus, a right or obligation to repurchase a chose 89
See R Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, London, Penguin, 2004) at 609–10. Whether or not the mortgagee allows the mortgagor to keep receiving that income stream prior to any default is, subject to the mortgagee giving notice of the assignment, a matter to be agreed between the parties. An assignment without notice where the assignor continues to collect the debt but is required to pay sums received or equivalent amounts over to the assignee is capable of being construed as a security assignment. Ultimately this will depend on the true intention of the parties. The assignment may be by way of sale with the assignor collecting for the assignee: see Olds Discount Co Ltd v John Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275; Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd [1992] BCLC 609; Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 273, 283–4. See further Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] AC 209 at 217 per Lord Devlin. 91 R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.36. 92 Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78 at 84 per Millett LJ. 93 See Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd [1992] BCC 270 at 279–80. It has even been suggested that an express right of redemption is not conclusive: see Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd [1992] BCLC 609 at 618 per Lord Wilberforce. 90
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may evidence a right of redemption or it might be no more than a contractual option or obligation to purchase.94 An obligation to pay the assignor amounts received in excess of the amount the assignor owes the assignee may result from a right of redemption or it may be no more than a personal obligation to pay.95 As already noted, the fact that the assignee’s interest is to be extinguished once a debt is repaid by the assignor does not necessarily evidence an assignment by way of mortgage. A mortgage requires an obligation to re-transfer, that is, a reassignment by separate assurance rather than by virtue of the initial instrument of assignment itself.96
(iii) Equitable Charges [3.17] Assignment, equitable charges and transfer. A charge is a security which makes certain property liable to discharge an obligation.97 It is usually created by contract98 and gives the chargee a proprietary interest by way of security. The intention required to create a charge is an intention to appropriate a fund to the debt and not merely an intention to pay a debt out of the proceeds of a certain 94 See Williams v Owen (1840) 5 My & Cr 303, 41 ER 386; Alderson v White (1858) 2 De G & J 97 at 105, 44 ER 924 at 928; Re George Inglefield Ltd [1933] Ch 1 at 27 per Romer LJ; Gurfinkel v Bentley Pty Ltd (1966) 116 CLR 98 at 113 per Windeyer J; Automobile Association (Canterbury) Inc v Australasian Secured Deposits Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 417; Contemporary Cottages (NZ) Ltd v Margin Traders Ltd [1981] 2 NZLR 114; Curtain Dream plc v Churchill Merchanting Ltd [1990] BCC 342; Chase Manhattan Asia Ltd v Official Receiver and Liquidator of First Bangkok City Finance Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1181. There is a view that it is possible to avoid a sale and repurchase being interpreted as a mortgage by having the sale back characterised as a sale of equivalent property and not the same property. However, where the property is something like shares, it makes no sense to say that one is only selling back equivalent property if one adopts the view that the ownership of a share merely represents an indivisible interest in the capital of the company, because if that is correct one can only ever sell back the same thing: see [4.27]. See further R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.37; F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 2.12 at 38–9. 95 Olds Discount Co Ltd v John Playfair Ltd [1938] 3 All ER 275; Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] AC 209; Lloyds and Scottish Finance Ltd v Cyril Lord Carpet Sales Ltd [1992] BCLC 609. See also R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.34. See further PR Wood, Title Finance, Derivatives, Securitisations, Set-Off and Netting (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) at 19–21, 53–5. 96 There remains the possibility that such a transaction may be a security transaction by way of charge. See Mercantile Bank of London Ltd v Evans (1899) 2 QB 613. See further [7.40]. 97 Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584 at 595 per Buckley LJ; Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] Ch 150 at 176 per Millett J. 98 Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228 at 250 per Slade J. When created by contract, a charge requires consideration: Re Earl of Lucan (1890) 45 Ch D 470; this is necessarily the case where the charge is intended to encumber future property. See also Agnew & Bearsley v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 at 726. Not all charges require a contract: see PG Turner, “Floating Charges—A ‘No Theory’ Theory” [2004] LMCLQ 319 at 320. See further EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 773; R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 1.07, 1.53 (creation of charge by way of trust).
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fund.99 Like an equitable assignment of a legal right, a charge merely involves the creation and vesting of an interest in the chargee. However, it is said that a charge merely encumbers the relevant property; it does not operate by way of assignment.100 In terms of enforcement, the position at law is that the chargee may, by judicial process, call for an assignment of the charged property upon default by the chargor.101 It is only then that an assignment of the charged property takes place.102 Nevertheless, there are numerous judicial decisions stating that a charge operates as an equitable assignment and an equitable assignment operates by way of charge.103 In securities law the expressions “equitable charge” and “equitable mortgage” are often used interchangeably.104 In some cases an equitable charge 99
See further ibid, para 1.17. Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] Ch 150 at 176 per Millett J; Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228 at 250 per Slade J; Tancred v Delagoa Bay and East Africa Railway Co (1889) 23 QBD 239 at 242 per Denman J. See also EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 17–20, 193–7, 616–7, 771–3. 101 See Re Owen [1894] 3 Ch 220. Statute may increase the powers of a chargee, eg Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s109. 102 A charge may be used in conjunction with an assignment. The assignment may allow an assigned income stream to be used by the assignee without a prior default by the assignor, and the charge over the source of the income prevents that source being alienated and thus destroying the assignment: see Bank of New South Wales v The King [1918] NZLR 945 at 947 per Hosking J. Where this is the case, it does not necessarily result in the assignment being by way of security. Many documents use the words “assign” and “charge” in the one clause: eg Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 78. Whether the intention here is to create a charge or assign an interest or use both in conjunction is a question of construction. Often the express reference to a charge will be evidence that the transaction is intended to be by way of security. However, there may be cases where a document only uses the word assign but where a charge (in the conjunction sense explained above) is implied which, as explained above, supports an outright assignment. 103 Eg Rodick v Gandell (1852) 1 De GM & G 763 at 777–8, 42 ER 749 at 754 per Lord Truro (cited with approval in Palmer v Carey [1926] AC 703 at 706 and Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 584 at 613 per Lord Wilberforce); Re Kent & Sussex Sawmills Ltd [1947] 1 Ch 177 at 183; Thomas v Harris [1947] 1 All ER 444 at 445 per Scott LJ; National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 6 Austrailan Capital Territory Reports (ACTR) 1 at 3–5 per Blackburn J; Re Universal Management Ltd [1983] NZLR 462 at 476 per McMullin J; Elders Pastoral Ltd v Bank of New Zealand [1991] 1 NZLR 385 at 387 per Lord Templeman; Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 at 619 per Mummery J; Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399 at 446 per McHugh and Gummow JJ; Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 407 at 422 per Brennan CJ; Agnew & Bearsley v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 at 721. See also National Provincial and Union Bank of England v Charnley [1924] 1 KB 431 at 449–50 per Atkin LJ. Cf Ashby Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 at 708 per Greene LJ. There is also academic authority suggesting that a charge operates by way of assignment: see W Gough, Company Charges (2nd edn, London, Butterworths, 1996) at 19, 38–9 (Gough appears to rely on the bundle of rights theory to argue that there is an assignment: see also in this regard Waitomo Wools (NZ) Ltd v Nelsons (NZ) Ltd [1974] 1 NZLR 484 at 490 per Richmond J and Young v Matthew Hall Mechanical & Electrical Engineers Pty Ltd (1988) 12 ACLR 399 at 403 per Brinsden J). The various statutory regimes for legal assignments also recognise this possibility by expressly stating that they apply only to absolute assignments “not purporting to be by way of charge”: see [7.39] and see PG Turner, “Assignment by Way of Charge” (2004) 24 Australian Bar Review 1 at 13. 104 London County and Westminster Bank Ltd v Tomkins [1918] 1 KB 515 at 528–9 per Scrutton LJ; Re Upson (1941) 12 Australian Bankruptcy Cases 147. 100
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has been said to involve a partial assignment.105 Both the House of Lords and the High Court of Australia in mentioning an equitable charge have talked of a right to redeem, even though a charge not operating by way of assignment would automatically be discharged upon performance of the secured obligation.106 The possible reasons for making this link between charges and assignments are discussed later.107 It is not possible to view a chargee’s rights as being merely potential. Prior to default by the chargor the chargee does have rights that may be enforced directly against the security property.108 In addition, the chargee’s interest subsists despite the chargor transferring ownership of the charged property to a third party (except a bonafide purchaser for value and without notice of the legal estate) and despite the chargor becoming insolvent. Therefore, the chargee is vested with some form of immediate proprietary interest in respect of the subject property.109 Arguably, given that the word “transfer” is a word of wide import, there may seem little point in suggesting that a charge does not involve a form of transfer. Nevertheless, it is suggested that there is no “transfer” in the sense that that word is used in relation to assignments. A “transfer” for the purposes of an assignment requires both the movement of rights and an intention to transfer ownership. One without the other does not equate to a transfer. In the case of a charge, there is no intention to transfer ownership even though that may result if there is a default.110 There is also an important difference in effect. Even if it is accepted that a charge involves a transfer, there is a difference in degree between an assignment and a charge because the assignee becomes the owner of the assigned right. Even where 105 Durham Bros v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 at 769 per Chitty LJ; Colonial Mutual General Insurance Co Ltd v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1140 at 1144 per Lord Hoffmann. See also Tooth v Brisbane City Council (1928) 41 CLR 212 at 221 per Isaacs J. 106 Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214 at 226 per Lord Hoffmann; Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001 452 106 Pty Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 588 at 595–6. See also Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 at 612 per Mummery J; Durham Bros v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 at 770 per Chitty LJ. 107 [4.27], [7.40]. 108 F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 5.6; W Gough, Company Charges (2nd edn, London, Butterworths, 1996) at 19. Cf EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 17–20. 109 Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214 at 226 per Lord Hoffmann. See also W Gough, Company Charges (2nd edn, London, Butterworths, 1996) at 19; EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 18. 110 In practice, the express powers usually given to a chargee under a charge make the legal distinctions between an assignment by way of mortgage and a charge of little practical importance: see F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 5.6. Moreover, it appears to be generally accepted that upon the crystallisation of a floating charge, there is a complete equitable assignment: see National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 6 ACTR 1 at 5–6 per Blackburn J. However, that result probably derives from the construction of the relevant documents rather than a rule of law (see Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 407 at 422 per Brennan CJ). Arguably, documents containing such provisions are on the way to being more like floating mortgages than floating charges: see Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979 at 999 per Buckley LJ.
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a chargee obtains an assignment by enforcing the charge this is different from having ownership upon the creation of the security. In addition, where the chargee obtains an order for sale, this does not equate to a right to sell property held by an owner.111 Thus, any transfer that does take place upon the creation of a charge is not an absolute transfer. Moreover, to the extent that a chargee obtains rights that are not merely potential, those rights do not equate with ownership. In addition, if the chargor grants the chargee a charge over some fund owed to the chargor by a debtor, the chargee obtains no right of action against the debtor. The chargee’s right is limited to a right of action against the chargor.112 Generally, and subject to the particular characteristics of an assigned right, an assignee may have recourse to the obligor directly.113 Finally, in the case of a charge, there is no actual transfer of an underlying personal right which is necessary for a transfer by way of assignment.
(iv) Declarations of Trust [3.18] Assignment, declarations of trust and transfer. Trusts may be created by assignment, declaration or direction.114 The concern here is solely with declarations of trust. A declaration of trust over a legal interest, like a charge, does not analytically involve a disposal of rights by the settlor/trustee but rather a creation and vesting of rights in the beneficiary.115 Nevertheless, trusts are used to alienate assets and a contractual right may be the subject of a declaration of trust.116 Therefore, despite the notion of an “alienation” being broader than the concept of a transfer, there is probably nothing heretical in readily accepting that the creation of a trust may involve a transfer.117 111
EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 17. Burlinson v Hall (1884) 12 QBD 347 at 350. 113 [4.04], [4.08]. 114 A transaction may require a combination of these: eg Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540; McLeay v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1963] NZLR 711 at 717. 115 Cf the position as regards a declaration of trust over an existing equitable interest: see RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) paras 7.200–7.215; JD Heydon and PL Loughlan, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (6th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 7.15; RP Meagher and WMC Gummow, Jacobs Law of Trusts (6th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 1997) ch 7. 116 For the implications of a trust on a promise see ibid, paras 222–5; Law Commission for England and Wales, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties (London, HMSO, 1996) Law Com No 242, paras 2.8–2.9; R Merkin (ed), Privity of Contract (London, LLP, 2000) paras 2.18–2.25; IB Stewart, “Why Place Trust in a Promise?: Privity of Contract and Enforcement of Contracts by Third Party Beneficiaries” (1999) 73 ALJ 354. In some cases it may be more advantageous to declare a trust over the benefit of a contract than to assign the benefit of the contract: see Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291 at 319 (affirmed [2000] Ch 291). 117 Cf [4.07]. Usually, the question whether a declaration of trust involves a transfer arises in the context of a statutory provision, and the resolution of the issue will depend on whether terms such as, “transfer”, “dispose” and “alienate” as used in the legislation are intended to capture declarations of trust. 112
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It is common to describe the beneficiary of a trust as the beneficial owner of the trust property.118 Clearly the concept of ownership here depends on the type of trust and the terms of the trust.119 Often, although the interest of the beneficiary attaches to the property that is the subject matter of the trust, so that the beneficiary’s interest is properly characterised as being proprietary, that interest does not equate with ownership.120 However, there can be little wrong with calling the beneficiary under a bare trust who is sui juris and entitled to an equitable interest corresponding to the full legal interest the equitable owner of the trust property. Such a beneficiary may require the trustee to transfer to it the legal interest or direct the trustee to hold the property for a third party. If it is correct to call such a beneficiary the equitable owner of the trust property then it becomes necessary to distinguish an assignment from a declaration of trust by reference to the intention required for each. In the case of a declaration of trust, the settlor/trustee’s intention is for it to maintain ownership and hold the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiary. In the case of an assignment the intention is to simply transfer ownership.121 It is therefore irrelevant that a court may impose trustee obligations on the assignor in some instances to protect the interest of the assignee. When equity upholds transactions as a declaration of trust or assignment, it is to give effect to these varying intentions.
(e) The Requirement of a Proprietary Right [3.19] Introduction. An assignment of a contractual right is said to involve the transfer of existing proprietary rights.122 It may be questioned whether this property analysis still has value. Clearly the fact that something is thought of as 118 Cf JW Brunyate (ed), Maitland’s Equity: A Course of Lectures (2nd revised edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1936) at 17. See also O’Sullivan v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1984] 1 Qd R 212 at 230 citing DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 1 NSWLR 510 at 519 per Hope JA. See further Francis v NPD Property Development Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 202; CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2005) 79 ALJR 1724. 119 Nevertheless, because trust property is not available to the trustee’s creditors, the beneficiaries must have some immediate interest in or over trust property even if that interest is not in any specific asset. 120 DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1980] 1 NSWLR 510 at 519 per Hope. 121 Despite this it is difficult to draw a clear line in some cases. For example, if an assignor, instead of holding a general intention to assign, holds an intention to assign in equity only, then clearly he or she intends to withhold legal ownership. 122 [3.04]. For some purposes it may be necessary to view assignment as primarily involving an issue of contract rather than property, eg, for private international law purposes: see Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] QB 825.
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property may mean that it is transferable, but this is not true of all property.123 In addition, it is not necessary today for something to be considered property for it to be enforceable against a third party, and the fact that something is considered property does not necessarily mean it is enforceable against third parties or has some impact on third parties.124 It is beyond the scope of this book to delve into the detail of any alternative models for assignment. It is also beyond the scope of this book to provide any detailed defence of the current property model of assignment. Nevertheless, since this chapter is concerned with the fundamental feature and ingredients of an assignment and the transfer of a property right is one of those fundamental ingredients, it is appropriate to offer some rationale for the current model. That is, some explanation of why a contractual right may be considered a transferable property right. In this section, the concern is not with explaining how contractual rights came to be viewed as property rights as a matter of legal history. The history of choses in action was dealt with earlier, and it was seen that this process was not systematic and probably occurred by virtue of a number of legal and economic factors. The aim of this section is to suggest an analysis of “contract as transferable property” that reflects modern legal doctrine. [3.20] Contractual rights as transferable property rights. It is generally accepted that, from a legal perspective, property rights arise as a legal response to some causative event.125 One such causative event is consent.126 This is the relevant category of causative event for contractual rights. Of course, consent may also give rise to personal rights. It is therefore necessary to look at what principles determine when such a causative event may give rise to a property right, that is, what principles inform the law to recognise that a person should be designated as having title (ownership) of a right. As evidenced in Chapter 2, the assignability of choses in action, outside statute, has been the creature of equity. Although the common law reached the point of recognising choses in action as being property, it never appeared entirely to accept that they had the characteristic of being transferable. It could be said that the legislative regime for legal assignment ended the need for that characteristic to develop at law. However, because that regime made assignable at law that which 123 Dorman v Rodgers (1982) 148 CLR 365 at 374 per Murphy J; R v Toohey Ex parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327 at 342–3 per Mason J. 124 K Gray and S Gray, “The Idea of Property in Land” in S Bright and J Dewar (eds), Land Law; Themes and Perspectives (Oxford, OUP, 1998) at 35–6. 125 P Birks, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths” [1997] NZLR 623; R Grantham and C Rickett, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths or Unnecessary Complexity?” [1997] NZLR 668. 126 K Gray, “Property in Thin Air” [1991] CLJ 252 at 302–3.
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was previously assignable in equity, it is perhaps more accurate to conclude that the common law (by force of legislation) adopted the approach of equity. Therefore, it is necessary to look to those principles that give rise to equitable proprietary rights not only for the purpose of characterising contractual rights as property but also as having the characteristic of transferability. Professor Gray has suggested that equity defines property by reference to inclusion rather than exclusion. The exclusionary aspect of property has its origins in the common law but in equity property is access.127 He states:128 It is perhaps worth noticing that the historic function of equitable intervention in property matters has always been to ensure, promote and safeguard rights of access. Equity’s concerns have long focused on the perceived need to preserve, for doctrinal reasons,129 various forms of access to the beneficial value of desired goods and resources. Thus, for example, the critical duty of the trustee is to deflect enjoyment to the beneficiary. The function of the restrictive covenant is likewise to permit the covenantee access to part of the utility in the land subject to covenant. The principal must be protected in his or her access to the commercial opportunities which the fiduciary might otherwise hijack. In each of these instances equitable property and the notion of stewardship seldom stand apart. Whereas legal rights, with their stolid and uncompromising character, more clearly connote the exclusionary aspect of property, equitable rights more subtly articulate a range of protected access to the benefits derived from profitable guardianship.
This analysis may be applied to debts and contractual rights. It can be readily accepted that in market economies contractual rights, particularly debts, are valuable assets. By reason of that value alone they may be considered property.130 More importantly that characterisation as an “asset” and the value of that asset depend on the extent to which the law provides access. A creditor requires access to a debt in order to use it like any other asset, for example, as security for the raising of finance and to pay off a debt. Such access would be cumbersome if the creditor was required to obtain the consent of the debtor to transfer the asset. Therefore, the recognition that such rights are assignable is a way of providing such access as it is a way of allowing the asset to be transferred without consent.131 Property is the institution and vehicle that allows that transfer to occur. To talk of access (or property) here without transferability would be nonsense. For the assignee, access requires an ability legitimately to call for performance of an assigned right and to enforce the rights it has purchased from the assignor. Access for the assignee requires enforceability. 127 See further ibid, at 294. See also FS Cohen, “Dialogue on Private Property” (1954–5) 9 Rutgers L Rev 357 at 373. 128 K Gray, “Equitable Property” (1994) 47 CLP 157 at 171. 129 He suggests the doctrinal force that drives equity here is the conscience of the community; see ibid, at 207. 130 [2.05]. 131 See TW Merrill and HE Smith, “The Property/Contract Interface” (2001) 101 Columbia LR 773.
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It follows that assignment is a method by which access is both controlled and given to these resources without the consent of the person bound to provide the performance.132 Moreover, because this access is provided by the law it is legitimate and usual to view such transactions as dealings in property. [3.21] Property and enforcement by the assignee. As noted in the previous paragraph, if access is to be provided to the assignor, it is essential that the subject right be transferable. Little more needs to be said on this point. However, the position of the assignee requires further explanation. In the last paragraph, it was suggested that access vis-à-vis the assignee requires enforceability. This still begs the further question, how does the characterisation of the assignee’s interest as property aid in this enforceability? [3.22] As a starting point, it is instructive to review how the characterisation of something as property affects rights and duties in respect of that property. Grantham and Rickett133 suggest, correctly it is submitted, that once a property right is created as a response to some causative event, it then becomes a causative event in itself,134 which may be the subject of a legal response as it gives rise to primary rights and correlative duties, which, when infringed, give rise to secondary rights and obligations.135 Those rights may be personal rights or proprietary rights. Although the party subject to a duty owes that duty to the right holder, these are rights in respect of a thing in the case of personal rights, and as regards proprietary rights, these are rights which relate to a thing, not a person.136 Thus, statements to the effect that the common law distinguishes between what one is owed and what one owns do not tell the full story. It is necessary to add that one
132 Another related reason for granting access would be the promotion of efficient use of resources: see MD Bayles, Principles of Law: A Normative Nalysis (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1987) at 78–9, 83. 133 R Grantham and C Rickett, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths or Unnecessary Complexity?” [1997] NZLR 668 at 671. See also R Grantham and C Rickett, “Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event” [2003] CLJ 717. 134 Admittedly, some rights such as the right of an owner of property to the income generated by that property are abstract rights. Such a right cannot be transferred separately from the property, as it follows the ownership of the property and it becomes active only if the owner uses the property to generate income: see Booth v Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 164 CLR 159 at 165 per Mason CJ. See also Commissioner of State Revenue (Victoria) v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 651 at 666. Nevertheless, it cannot be correct to hold that, until infringed, all property rights are inanimate and not causative events in themselves. To be able to infringe a right the right must not only exist but cause the relevant duty to arise, that is, it is causative; cf P Birks, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths” [1997] NZLR 623. 135 Cf ibid; P Birks, “Definition and Division: A Mediation on Institutes 3.13” in P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) ch 1. See also P Watts, “Property and ‘Unjust Enrichment’: Cognate Conservators” [1998] NZLR 151. 136 See further as regards the rights in respect of things and rights in things, [4.33].
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may be owed an obligation because of what one owns. Importantly property de-personalises the “right–duty correlation”.137 As Penner explains:138 The reference to things is vital. If a thing stands between the right-holder and the dutyower, then we can see how the normative guidance of the rights and duties can be impersonal. We do not have to frame the duty to respect property as a duty to particular individuals, but as a duty in respect of things. This will, of course, benefit the individual right-holders, but they need not be individually enumerated in order to understand the content of the duty.
Given that a “thing” may include a chose in action,139 this analysis could explain why a person in the position of an assignee, who has no contractual relationship with the obligor, can enforce performance by the obligor. That is, because the personal right is a right in respect of a thing.140 [3.23] Despite the above analysis, it is not clear to what extent these general rules of property, which for convenience are here referred to as a “rights model”, explain the assignment of legal choses in action. There are two reasons for this doubt. First, a legal assignment is enforceable by virtue of statute. The common law never had to address these enforcement issues. Secondly, in equity certain subject matter may be considered property due to the degree of protection equity provides.141 That is, courts do not in all cases protect property, but rather “the judiciary calls property that which they protect”.142 In fact, in Norman v Federal Commissioner of 137 R Grantham and C Rickett, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths or Unnecessary Complexity?” [1997] NZLR 668 at 677. 138 JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 24: see also at 75–7. See also JW Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) ch 8; J Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988) at 38; AM Honoré, “Rights of Exclusion and Immunities Against Divesting” (1960) 34 Tulane LR 453 at 463; J Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (2nd edn, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980) at 179–81. 139 [3.10]. 140 Cf JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) at 129–32. 141 Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health (1990) 95 ALR 87 at 135–6 per Gummow J (affirmed (1990) 99 ALR 679). 142 JE Cribbert, “Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property” (1986) U Ill L Rev 1 at 41. See also D Wright, “The Remedial Aspects of Equitable Property” in P Jackson and DC Wilde (eds), Contemporary Property Law (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999) ch 2. See further Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Livingston [1965] AC 694 at 712 (equity “calls into existence and protects equitable rights and interests in property only where their recognition has been found to be required in order to give effect to its doctrines.”); Cooney v Burns (1922) 30 CLR 216 at 232–3 per Isaacs J (“The word ‘contract’ itself primarily means a transaction which creates personal obligations; but it may, though less exactly, refer to transactions which create real rights. . . . If the personal obligations are such that according to the rules of equity operating on the conscience of the defendant it is a right specifically to enforce the performance of the contract, then, and then only, does equity regard the purchaser as owner of the property.”) Cf P Birks, “Proprietary Rights as Remedies” in P Birks (ed), Frontiers of Liability (Oxford, OUP, 1994) ii, at 216; P Birks, “Annual Miegunyah Lecture: Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment” (1999) 23 Melbourne ULR 1; P Birks, “Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies” (2000) 20 OJLS 1; P Birks, “Personal Property: Proprietary Rights and Remedies” (2000)
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Taxation,143 Windeyer J not only described an assignment as involving a transfer but suggested that equitable assignments were effective because of the remedies equity provided. That is, it is possible to define the assignee’s interest only by reference to the relief the court would provide.144 It is important to stress that equity’s approach here is not moving from effect to cause. In each case the cause for equity’s intervention is the existence of some equity that calls for protection. Thus, the obligation, not the remedy protecting that obligation, comes first.145 Nevertheless, it is the degree of protection provided that dictates that what is being protected is property. It follows that in equity there exists a coalescence between property and obligation.146 An agreement to assign, creating an obligation on the part of the assignor, can (if equity would provide sufficient protection) be upheld as an immediate equitable assignment, giving the assignee beneficial ownership of the assignor’s right against the obligor. [3.24] In terms of enforcement, this remedial model does not require a highly technical explanation. If the conscience of equity is drawn to an assignment, an equity will be raised and equity will consider that an obligation is owed to the assignee by the assignor.147 Equity will make remedies available to the assignee to protect its interest in having those obligations carried out. The degree of protection (access) made available results in the interest of the assignee in the subject right being viewed as a proprietary interest. If sufficiently proprietary, then the assignee can be said to own the subject right and will be owed the obligation by the obligor and may, depending on certain factors, have direct recourse against the obligor.148 Alternatively, and more directly, the explanation may run that it is necessary to call into existence a proprietary interest here to give effect to equitable doctrine. That is, equity’s conscience (via equitable doctrine) is drawn to the transaction; to give effect to that doctrine it is necessary to characterise the KCLJ 1; P Birks, “Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism” (2000) 29 WALR 1 and see S Evans, “Defending Discretionary Remedialism” [2001] Syd LR 463. 143 (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 33–4 per Windeyer J. See also GE Crane Sales Pty Ltd v FCT (1971) 126 CLR 177 at 180 per Barwick CJ. 144 See further Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co v Snider [1916] 1 AC 266 at 272 per Lord Parker. 145 Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health (1990) 95 ALR 87 at 135–6 per Gummow J (affirmed (1990) 99 ALR 679); Wily v St George Partnership Banking Ltd (1999) 161 ALR 1 at 3 per Sackville J. See also P Parkinson, “Reconceptualising the Express Trust” [2002] CLJ 657 at 663. Cf Joshua Getzler, “Patterns of Fusion” in P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987) ch 7 at 175. 146 K Gray, “Equitable Property” (1994) 47 CLP 157 at 165, 183. See also R Goode, “Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions” (1987) 103 LQR 433 at 437. Quaere whether the common law can continue to maintain this distinction: see G Samuel, “Property Notions in the Law of Obligations” (1994) 53 CLJ 524 and P Benson, “The Unity of Contract Law” in P Benson (ed), The Theory of Contract Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001) ch 4. 147 This will depend on whether the elements of an equitable assignment are made out: see [7.18]–[7.23]. 148 [4.08].
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assignee’s interest as proprietary, because the assignment may not only be voluntary but it may be necessary to allow the assignee to have recourse directly against the obligor. It is therefore necessary here to admit an equitable interest in the subject matter of the assignment.149 [3.25] This remedial view of assignment is not at odds with the idea that an assignment involves a transfer. As noted earlier, it was in Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation that Windeyer J recognised the remedial model but nevertheless described assignments as involving a transfer. It does not matter to the “principle of transfer” what method equity uses to hold the assignor to its promise to assign the legal right (or an equitable right) so long as it is acting to give effect to the intention of the assignor (and perhaps in some cases the expectation of the assignee),150 and so long as the interest vested in the assignee is the equitable ownership of the subject legal right. [3.26] It should be added that, although it has never been expressly displaced, it is not entirely clear to what extent this remedial model still represents the totality of equity’s approach to assignment.151 There may be some scope also to recognise the operation of the rights model. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the notion that equity calls property that which it protects means little if this is not dependent upon the degree of protection provided. It is readily accepted that where a court would decree specific performance, the interest protected is proprietary.152 Moreover, in such a case, where the intention is to assign then the interest of the assignee equates to the ownership of the chose.153 Nevertheless, there are numerous authorities that have suggested that, so long as equity will provide any type of protection, then the interest of the assignee may be considered proprietary.154 Such decisions appear to rob the idea of “the degree of protection” of any 149
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Livingston [1965] AC 694 at 712 per Viscount Radcliffe. [7.16]. 151 However, the continued relevance of the principle that an equitable interest is commensurate with the protection that equity will provide was recently reaffirmed by the High Court of Australia in Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315 at 333. Arguably a weakness of the remedial model is that although one might readily conclude that a right protected by specific performance is a property right, nevertheless, for as long as one requires such a remedy to protect his or her position, there is no transfer of ownership: see Currey v The Federal Building Society (1929) 42 CLR 421 at 448 per Isaacs J. This argument seems to be based on the view that if one owns something, although remedies may be required to prevent intrusions upon the enjoyment of that ownership, no remedy is required to uphold the interest as it is complete. Perhaps there is a weakness in this argument, in that it appears to be based on a common law view of ownership which defines ownership by exclusion rather than an equitable concept of ownership based on access. 152 The relevant time for determining the availability of a remedy is the time of the assignment rather than the time an order to enforce it is sought: see JF Keeler, “Some Reflections on Holroyd v Marshall” (1967–70) 3 Adelaide Law Review 360 at 371. Cf [7.16]. 153 Cf Currey v The Federal Building Society (1929) 42 CLR 421 at 448 per Isaacs J. 154 For a collection, discussion and criticism of these decisions see RP Meagher, “Sir Frederick Jordan’s Footnote” (1999) 15 Journal of Contract Law (JCL) 1. 150
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meaning. If a party may claim some equitable relief in respect of some thing then, although that right may legitimately be characterised as protecting some property interest, it does not necessarily equate to the recognition of equitable ownership of the thing. Moreover, if the governing principle is that equity considers property that which it protects, then the remedy itself will dictate whether or not the subject matter (debt or contractual right) constitutes a “thing” in the first place. That is, the action may not properly be characterised as being in respect of a thing.155 Transactions properly termed “assignments” should be limited to cases where the assignee is vested with an interest equating to ownership (legal or equitable) and not something less than this. Arguably where the protection being provided is not specific performance, then, unless the transaction can be upheld as an assignment on some other approach, such as the rights model, it should perhaps be viewed as a transaction that is on its way to being an assignment, but not in fact an assignment.156 Secondly, the remedial model was adopted at a time when an equitable assignment was viewed as giving the assignee rights only against the assignor.157 In such circumstances it makes sense to speak of the assignment as capable of being the subject of an order for specific performance. The assignee was interested only in forcing the assignor to lend its name to the suit or later taking the necessary steps to complete a legal assignment. Today, the joinder of the assignor is generally thought to be a mere matter of procedure and, in any case, no separate action is required to join the assignor. Moreover, it is now accepted that an equitable assignee may have direct claims against the obligor and, although it may make sense to say that as against the assignor the assignee owns the subject right by reason of the degree of protection equity will afford, ultimately, to enforce that right against the obligor the assignee is relying on its ownership of the assigned right, and not the availability of a remedy against the assignor. The relevance of the rights model is seen in the fact that the efficacy of an assignment is not dependant upon the continued existence of a remedy against the assignor. Thus, the better view may be that the two models work in combination to give full effect to the assignment. Therefore, in some instances equity is not calling property that which it protects, but is simply protecting an interest in property that is already in existence. That is, as is sometimes said, equity simply recognises that a chose in action is property for the purposes of transfer.158 Thirdly, it is readily accepted that where parties agree for valuable consideration immediately to assign a legal right then, if for any reason the transaction is not upheld as a legal assignment, it will be upheld as an equitable assignment as soon 155
See further ibid, at 9. Haque v Haque (1965) 114 CLR 98 at 124–5 per Kitto J; Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489 at 523 per Deane and Dawson JJ. 157 [4.05], [4.19]. 158 [4.07]. 156
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as the assignee’s consideration is executed.159 That equitable assignment is not dependent upon the availability of specific performance.160 Therefore, although equity will provide a remedy to protect the interest of an assignee, that remedy flows from a right which in turn arises from having an interest in the legal right which is the subject of the assignment. In such cases it does not matter what remedy equity would provide to protect the interest of the assignee. In fact, in Tailby v Official Receiver,161 Lord Macnaghten, in discussing the relevance of specific performance to assignments of future property, said:162 [T]he Court is merely asked to protect rights completely defined as between the parties to the contract, or to give effect to such rights either by granting an injunction or by appointing a receiver, or by adjudicating on questions between rival claimants. The truth is that cases of equitable assignment . . . where the consideration has passed, depend on the real meaning of the agreement between the parties. The difficulty, generally speaking, is to ascertain the true scope and effect of the agreement. When that is ascertained you have only to apply the principle that equity considers that done which ought to be done if that principle is applicable under the circumstances of the case. The doctrines relating to specific performance do not, I think, afford a test or measure of the rights created.
This is significant because equitable assignments of legal rights are important to commerce, and must therefore be seen as based on a set of reliable factors rather than being discretionary.163 Although it may be said that where a failed legal assignment is upheld as an equitable assignment, or where an agreement legally to assign is upheld as an immediate equitable assignment, it is, in a sense, upheld in equity by operation of law,164 today, such equitable assignments may be all that is intended by the parties.165 That is, the parties intend to take advantage of those equitable principles that have been applied to uphold such transactions. However, on a pure remedial approach the type of remedy available should be very important, and
159
[7.19]. [7.19]. 161 (1888) 13 App Cas 523. 162 (1888) 13 App Cas 523 at 547–8. See also Pakenham Upper Fruit Co Ltd v Crosby (1924) 35 CLR 386 at 398 per Isaacs and Rich JJ; Re Crothers (1930) VLR 49 at 56. 163 Alternatively, it may be that equity gives effect to the assignment upon execution of consideration because at that point damages become inadequate. This is not to introduce a requirement of specific enforceability, but it may suggest that equity’s approach here is still remedial rather than rights based. It would follow that if damages were still an adequate remedy the assignment would not be upheld. This may explain why no equitable interest arises upon entry into an agreement for the sale of goods: see further JF Keeler, “Some Reflections on Holroyd v Marshall” (1967–70) 3 Adelaide LRev 360 at 374. However, if that were the sole reason for equity’s recognition of assignments of legal rights, then, given that it is now possible to assign at law, one would have expected equity to retire from this field. 164 [7.16]. 165 Eg in receivables financing often there is intended to be only an equitable assignment, or at least an assignment without notice. Such transactions are not upheld as failed legal assignments. 160
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strictly only the availability of specific performance would be enough to give rise to an interest amounting to the beneficial ownership of the legal right.
(f) Assignment and Privity of Contract [3.27] Assignment distinguished from privity. The assignment of a contractual right does not create privity of contract between the assignee and obligor.166 This is obvious enough in the case of an equitable assignment,167 but it is also true of a legal assignment.168 As noted earlier, the effect of an assignment is that the relevant obligation is owed to the assignee, but what the assignee acquires in terms of characterisation is title to a contractual obligation promised by the obligor to the assignor. The assignment does not substitute the assignee for the assignor as a matter of contract.169 If it were otherwise there would have been no need to state in the legislative provisions that the assignee takes subject to the equities, nor expressly state that the assignment transfers the legal right as well as the legal remedies and other remedies for its recovery.170 Moreover, if an assignment did bring the parties into privity, it would not be possible to maintain the distinction that is drawn between the assignment of contractual rights and contractual duties. If an assignee is brought into privity with the obligor, it would be bound by contractual duties and liable for the non-performance of those duties. This is not the law.171 In addition, if the assignee and obligor are brought into privity, the assignee should, in all cases, be able to recover for its own personal loss resulting from a breach of contract by the obligor.172 The enforcement of the assignee’s right is not at odds with privity because what the assignee protects or enforces is its title to the 166 Similarly, a contract for the benefit of a third party does not, without more, create an assignment: Coulls v Bagot’s Executor & Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460. 167 Bagot Pneumatic Tyre Co v Clipper Pneumatic Tyre Co [1902] 1 Ch 146 at 156 per Vaughan Williams LJ; Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1976] QB 430 at 445 per Sir John Pennycuick. Cf Calaby Pty Ltd v Ampol Pty Ltd (1990) 71 NTR 1 at 17–20 per Angel J (overruled (1991) 110 ALR 343). In this last case, Angel J was inclined to think that an assignment can create privity and in any case believed privity would exist if the original contract was expressly made with the promisee and its assigns. However, the better view is that such a provision merely goes to evidencing the assignability of the subject right: see further [6.71] and see [3.07]. 168 Cf Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1976] QB 430 at 445 per Sir John Pennycuick; Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 561 per Giles J. 169 International Leasing Corp (Vic) Ltd v Aiken [1967] 2 NSWR 427 at 438 per Jacobs JA. 170 Read v Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128 at 132 per Lord Esher MR. See also Bennett v White [1910] 2 KB 643 at 646 per Cozens-Hardy MR. 171 Bagot Pneumatic Tyre Co v Clipper Pneumatic Tyre Co [1902] 1 Ch 146 at 156 per Vaughan Williams LJ; Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil Corp Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 138 at 147 per Hoffmann J (overruled on another point [1995] Ch 152); Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310 at 317 per Lord Templeman. 172 [8.09]–[8.15].
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subject right. Thus, assignment is not a true exception to privity. Moreover, it is not improper to refer to the assignee as the “promisee” in the case of an assignment of a contractual right, or the “licensee” in the case of an assignment of a contractual licence, or “the bank” in the case of an assignment of the benefit of a security where the bank is defined to include its “assigns”. However, in doing this it is necessary to recognise that the assignee is being characterised by reference to the property right that it owns and not by reference to the personal contactual rights that exist between the parties to the contract.173 Finally, because an assignment does not create privity of contract, except for the enforcement of unconditionally accrued rights, the assignee is dependent upon the continued existence of the contract and the continued legal existence of the parties to the contract.174
173 174
See further Garrisons Pty Ltd v The Solicitors’ Trust [2004] TASSC 139. See Re Kenneth Wright Distributors Pty Ltd [1973] VR 161.
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4 Equitable Assignments (a) Introduction [4.01] Purpose of the chapter. This chapter is concerned with the characterisation of an equitable assignment of a legal right. In Chapter 3 it was suggested that such an assignment can be legitimately understood as involving a transfer and therefore properly termed an “assignment”. So far as the theme of this book is concerned, the purpose of this chapter is to determine whether this “assignment as transfer” idea is in fact reflected in case law even if not necessarily articulated in the manner suggested in Chapter 3. This is an issue that is not only important in attaching a label to such transactions. Whether or not the transaction is properly seen as an assignment will affect the nature and characteristics of the right vested in the assignee as well as how, and the extent to which, the assignee, may enforce its assigned right. More generally, this chapter is concerned with investigating the essence of an equitable assignment. This is important for the chapters that follow. [4.02] Structure of the chapter. The main focus of this chapter is on the equitable assignment of legal rights assignable at law. The characterisation of such transactions as true assignments is problematic. This flows from the view that the assignee is, to a certain extent, dependant on the assignor for its protection, or may only have rights against the assignor. The chapter also briefly looks at the equitable assignment of legal interests not assignable at law to determine whether such transactions are properly termed “assignments”. Finally, the chapter addresses the so-called “assignment” of future interests. For completeness, the chapter begins with a brief statement of the position as regards equitable assignments of equitable interests. Although the principal concern of the book is the assignment of legal contractual rights, an equitable assignee of such a right who further assigns the right will obviously be attempting to assign an equitable rather than a legal interest.1 It is, therefore, necessary to deal with equitable assignments of equitable interests as the presence of such intermediate 1 Eg Care Shipping Corp v Latin American Shipping Corp [1983] 1 QB 1005. See also Letts v IRC [1957] 1 WLR 201 (here it was held that a contractual right to have shares issued was an equitable chose in action as it could be protected only by specific performance).
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assignees will be important when later addressing the position of the parties in Chapter 8.2
(b) Equitable Assignment of Equitable Interests [4.03] Equitable assignment of equitable interests. The assignee of an assignment of an equitable interest that subsists at the time of the assignment can sue in his or her own name and give a good discharge, as the assignee alone is regarded as having an interest in the subject matter assigned.3 However, where the equitable assignment is of only part of an equitable interest, then as a procedural safeguard the assignor must be joined in any action.4 In either case, there can be no doubt that there is a true transfer of the equitable interest. The assignee becomes the owner (in equity) of the relevant interest and is owed the relevant duty. There is both a transfer of title and an actual transfer of the subject right.
(c) Equitable Assignment of Legal Interests Assignable at Law (i) Introduction [4.04] The equitable assignment conundrum. Despite its longevity, there continues to be a difference of opinion whether an equitable assignment of a legal right should be characterised as a true assignment. In practice, these unresolved issues tend to cause problems in two areas. The first concerns whether notice to the 2 Where a contract creates an equitable interest, the contract rights themselves constitute a legal chose in action. If it were possible to deal with the contract right distinct from the equitable interest, the dealing would be a dealing in legal rights: see Lane v Conlan (2003) 28 WAR 337. 3 Redman v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1916) 22 CLR 84 at 95 per Isaacs J. However, it has been held that a partner cannot separately assign his or her right to a share in the profits of the partnership as it is not distinct from the interest in the partnership. Moreover, an assignment of a partner’s interest in the partnership, though valid, does not make the assignee a partner. Therefore, to give effect to the assignment of this equitable interest it is necessary to impose a trust, so that the assignor who remains a partner holds the relevant interest on trust for the assignee: see FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440; Commissioner of Taxation v Galland (1986) 162 CLR 408. Cf Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1989] 2 NZLR 447, [1991] 3 NZLR 517, [1993] AC 524, FCT v Everett (1978) 21 ALR 625 at 643–4 per Deane J. 4 Eg Letts v IRC [1957] 1 WLR 201. Moreover, in the case of a mortgage where an action is on foot between the assignee and obligor, if the assignor wishes to enforce its equity of redemption, he or she needs to be joined: see Re Pain [1919] 1 Ch 38.
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obligor is required for the validity of the assignment,5 and the second is the more problematic conundrum caused by the requirement of joinder. Although the issue of notice is prima facie a matter of formality, it is important to address it here as it impacts on the nature of the relationship between the assignee and obligor, which is important in characterising the essence of the transaction. The requirements for a valid notice are discussed in the context of formalities in Chapter 7. As to joinder, the great weight of modern authority holds that in any action by an assignee to enforce its assigned right it must join the assignor as a matter of procedure.6 The reasons for such procedural joinder have been said to be to ensure that the debtor does not have to pay twice;7 to ensure that the assignor is bound;8 to ensure the debtor is protected from a further claim;9 and to give the assignor the opportunity to challenge the assignment.10 It is probably this last statement that best captures the idea here. If the assignment is valid the assignor cannot deny the assignee’s ownership. The debtor is at risk only if he or she accounts to the assignee and the assignment is invalid. However, even if the assignment is valid the debtor will not want the inconvenience of a further action being brought by the assignor. Being merely a matter of procedure, joinder may be dispensed with in certain cases. This gives rise to a conundrum, in that the procedural view of joinder apparently allows an equitable assignee to claim a legal remedy for the purposes of enforcing a legal right. Legal doctrine would suggest that such a claim would require the joinder of the assignor as a matter of substantive law. In addition, at the same time as the authorities appear to accept the procedural view of joinder, there is another line of authority that suggests that an equitable assignment merely gives the assignee rights against the assignor. If this is correct, then any action against the obligor must by definition be brought by the assignor which would, in turn, dictate that joinder is substantive. This directly calls into question both the character of these transactions as true assignments and the interest vested in the assignee. The conclusions drawn in this chapter may be broken down into the following points: 1. For the reasons discussed in Chapter 3, a transaction is properly characterised as an equitable assignment of a legal right only if the assignor intends to transfer ownership of an identifiable and identified legal right to the assignee and if the assignee is vested with the equitable ownership of that legal right and is treated (in equity) as being owed the relevant obligation. 5
This issue was left open by Windeyer J in Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 38. As regards partial assignments: see [4.27]. 7 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 at 298 per Staughton J. 8 Walter & Sullivan Ltd v J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584 at 588; Central Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corp (The Aiolos) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25 at 32. 9 Ibid, at 33–4. 10 Durham Brothers v Robinson [1898] 1 QB 765. 6
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Point five and the extent and type of remedies that may be available to the equitable assignee are mentioned in this chapter but dealt with in detail in Chapter 8.11
(ii) The Character of an Equitable Assignment of a Legal Right [4.05] The contract analysis. Historically, for an equitable assignee of a legal right to enforce the legal right the action had to be brought by the assignee in the name of the assignor.12 If the assignor refused to allow its name to be used the assignee could, if the assignment was for valuable consideration,13 file a bill in equity and, upon giving an indemnity as to costs, obtain an injunction allowing the assignor’s
11
[8.27]–[8.30]. Cf as to the assignment of part of a debt Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 29–30 per Windeyer J. See [4.27]. 13 Re Westerton [1919] 2 Ch 104 at 111 per Sargant J; Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 3 per Atkinson J. See also Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 31 per Windeyer J. 12
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name to be used in a suit at law to recover the assigned debt.14 The action had the appearance of one brought by the assignor. Even today, because the assignor remains the legal owner of the debt,15 he or she maintains a cause of action.16 Where the equity courts were capable of enforcing the assignee’s claim directly, they generally did not do so because the potential then existed for the assignor to bring an action at law on the same claim, thus requiring the obligor to obtain an injunction to stop the second suit. More generally, injunctions could be obtained in equity to prevent an assignor suing at law for his or her own benefit.17 The fact that the action proceeded at law, and in the name of the assignor, was logical because the proceedings were intended to enforce the legal right. If the assignee could enforce the legal right directly it would suggest that the legal right had been transferred. That result would have been beyond the jurisdiction of equity to deliver. Equity could not put in place rules for the transfer of legal rights. What it could and did do was take the position that, if a person intends to assign a legal right, that person should, in certain circumstances (such as where there is executed consideration for the promise), be bound by that act. Thus, equity acting in personam attaches to the conscience of the assignor and forces the assignor to lend his or her name to the suit at law.18 On the above analysis the equitable assignment of a legal right merely provided the assignee with a remedy against the assignor, that is, the assignment operated only between the assignor and assignee. What is obtained or “assigned” from the assignor appears to be no more than a right to sue in the name of the assignor.19 There are numerous authorities, even of recent origin, that take this view of the
14 Crouch v Credit Foncier of England Ltd (1873) LR 8 QB 374 at 380 per Blackburn J. See also Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619, 99 ER 1284; Re Westerton [1919] 2 Ch 104; Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292; Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 26 per Windeyer J. See also Turquand & The Capital and Counties Bank v Fearon (1879) 4 QBD 280. The assignor could also be restrained from receiving the debt: see Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 27 per Windeyer J. Alternatively, the defendant could be forced to admit, in the action at law, that the assignee held the legal interest: see Sweet v Cator (1841) 11 Sim Rep 572, 59 ER 994. Where the assignee held a power of attorney from the assignor it could bring an action at law and could obtain relief in equity only if the assignor obstructed or threatened to obstruct the assignee’s claim: see Cator v Burke (1785) 1 Brown’s Ch 434, 28 ER 1222. If the assignee failed to offer the indemnity before joining the assignor as a defendant, the assignee, although successful in the action, may have been required to pay that defendant’s costs: see Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 89 per Gaudron and Gummow JJ. See also Turquand & the Capital & Counties Bank v Fearon (1879) 4 QBD 280. 15 Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 357; Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 at 381 (overruled on another point sub nom Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367). 16 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292. See also Paragon Finance plc v Pender [2005] 1 WLR 3412. 17 Jeffs v Day (1866) LR 1 QB 372. 18 See Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 66 per MacFarlan J. 19 Hammond v Messenger (1838) 9 Sim 327, 59 ER 383.
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assignee’s position.20 The rationale for this analysis is that such an assignment operates by way of agreement or contract between the assignor and assignee.21 The effect of this contract analysis is that equity forces the assignor to perform its promise rather than leave the assignee with a remedy in damages. It is important to note what that promise is. Initially, the assignor had agreed immediately to assign a legal right to the assignee. Such an agreement was incapable of being performed at law and therefore it cannot be the case that equity would uphold such contracts of assignment only if they were capable of being the subject of an order for specific performance. It appears that equity implied a promise that the assignor would lend its name to any suit against the obligor and held the assignor to this promise.22 In short, and perhaps with less precision, equity gave effect to the intended assignment by recognising an agreement to assign. The remedial model of an equitable assignment of a legal right discussed earlier originated with the contract analysis.23 [4.06] As noted earlier, the remedial model of assignment is not at odds with the notion that an assignment involves a transfer.24 However, if the remedial model remained grounded in this contract analysis a problem does arise because, if the assignee’s rights merely flow from a contract and its ability to obtain remedies to enforce a promise flowing from that contract, then that result could be achieved without resorting to the language of assignment and vested rights.25 This is even more the case if the “remedy” is merely in respect of a promise by the assignor to lend its name to any suit against the obligor. The mere fact that a person may have an equitable remedy in relation to a legal right does not mean that they have an interest in the legal right. Clearly, in the past, the word “assignment” has been used in a broad sense.26 If the extent of the assignee’s rights was limited to actions against the assignor then equity did little more than the common law, except to construct a power of attorney when no express power was given.27 For there to be a true assignment, that is, a transfer, it is not sufficient for the assignor to vest in the assignee a right against the assignor, but rather the assignee must be vested 20 Eg Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd (1991) 5 Butterworths Property Reports (BPR) 11,512 at 11,518; Showi Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 561; Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 at 576 per Deane J. See also Neave v Neave [1926] GLR 254 at 256. 21 Wright v Wright (1749–50) 1 Ves Sen 410 at 412, 27 ER 1111 at 1112. 22 From this it is not difficult to see the legitimacy of equity giving immediate effect to what in law is a mere agreement to assign and, alternatively, where an immediate assignment fails at law, giving effect to the transaction as an agreement (legally) to assign and thus an immediate equitable assignment. 23 [3.23]. 24 [3.25]. 25 It would also prevent the recognition of voluntary assignments. 26 [3.04]. 27 SJ Bailey, “Assignments of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 567.
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with the ownership of rights which exist between the assignor and the obligor by virtue of the contract between the assignor and obligor. The contract analysis does not provide this result. [4.07] The assignment analysis. An alternative analysis, and one which gives effect to a transfer, is that equity restated or progressed the remedial model so that the transfer was given effect to by reason of the remedies equity provided.28 Here equity did not merely take the view that in certain circumstances an assignor should be bound by his or her promise to assign, rather, by virtue of the degree of protection it was prepared to provide the assignee, it recognised the assignee’s beneficial ownership of the subject matter of the assignment. Here, equity does not simply bind the conscience of the assignor and act in personam; rather, because the conscience of the assignor is bound equity fastens upon the subject property itself.29 In addition, for reasons discussed earlier, equity also at some point appears to have taken the step of simply recognising the proprietary character (ownership) of a legal right for the purpose of transfer.30 This is a clear recognition of a transfer taking place. It follows that such transactions take effect as assignments because an equitable interest is created and vested in the assignee, and that interest is the beneficial ownership of the legal right which is the subject of the assignment and the assignee is treated (in equity) as being owed the obligation. That is, in less precise terms (and in respect of contractual rights), the assignee obtains an interest in the contract that exists between the assignor and obligor. This is referred to here as the assignment analysis.31 It is only by reference to this analysis that such assignments are, as they are said to be, examples and applications of the maxim that equity treats as done that which ought to be done.32 28
[3.23]. Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 27 per Dixon J. 30 [3.26]. See also Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372–3 per Cozens Hardy LJ; Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 355 per PO Lawrence J. See further Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 at 315 per Peter Gibson LJ. 31 This analysis can be confused with a trust analysis, that is, an equitable assignment operated by way of trust: see further ICF Spry, Equitable Remedies (6th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 2001) at 80. Here, the interest of the assignee is equated to the interest of a beneficiary under a trust. However, it is inaccurate to align an assignment with a trust merely because a court may impose a trust to protect the interest of an assignee: see Re Rose [1952] Ch 499 at 510–11 per Evershed MR; Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1976] 1 QB 430 at 443–4 per Roskill LJ. See further GE Crane Sales Pty Ltd v FCT (1971) 126 CLR 177 at 183 per Menzies J (suggesting that where a creditor constitutes itself as a trustee of its debts for another, this amounts to an assignment in equity of the debts). Nevertheless, the trust analysis is perhaps an important indicator that equity would recognise the assignment of legal interests by way of gift: see Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 33 per Windeyer J. The trust analysis was perhaps a logical consequence of the contract analysis. That is, if the effect of upholding the assignment was only to give it effect as between the assignor and assignee, a trust may be required to protect the assignee’s interest when the subject matter of the assignment was in the hands of the assignor: see Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 66 per MacFarlan J. 32 [7.15]. 29
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[4.08] Conclusions on the characterisation of equitable assignments of legal rights. There is a dichotomy between the assignment analysis and the contract analysis. It is suggested that the assignment analysis represents the modern and better view. This is evidenced by the procedural view taken of joinder which, although designed to protect the obligor and to ensure all interested parties are before the court, appears implicitly to recognise that the obligor owes its obligation in part to the assignee as the assignee, can bring an action in its own name against the obligor under this rule.33 Thus, the view that such a transaction involves a true transfer is reinforced by the fact that the need for an action at law to enforce the obligation of the obligor began to be viewed as a mere procedural incident. The assignor plaintiff was merely a nominal plaintiff.34 The contract analysis itself showed early signs of breakdown when equity took the view that if the assignor would not lend its name to the suit at law or did or intended to do some act which would prevent the assignee from recovering at law in the assignor’s name, the assignee could commence an action in equity in its own name against the obligor, especially if there had been collusion between the assignor and obligor.35 [4.09] In addition, in time, and perhaps as a consequence of section 85 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854,36 if an assignor would not lend its name to a suit at law for the benefit of the assignee, then the assignee could commence an action in law in its own name and join the assignor as co-defendant. From this the view naturally formed, at law, that it was necessary only that the assignor be a party to the action to ensure that the assignor was bound by the decision for the protection of the obligor. However, that procedure reflects an equitable, rather than a common law, approach to joinder.37 Certainly, the point was reached where the common law courts, knowing that the assistance of equity was available, adopted the position that an assignee could sue in the assignor’s name without having to go 33 See [4.04]. See also Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 4 per Atkinson J; Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 at 385 (overruled on another point sub nom Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367). 34 Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372 per Cozens-Hardy LJ; James Nelson & Sons Ltd v Nelson Line (Liverpool) Ltd [1906] 2 KB 217. 35 Hammond v Messenger (1838) 9 Sim 327 at 332, 59 ER 383 at 385–6. There is also early authority that appears to recognise the assignee as the owner in equity: see Fashion v Atwood (1688) 2 Chan Cas 37, 22 ER 835. See also Ross v Blackham (1875) 1 VLR (E) 220 at 232. 36 OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 77. This Act allowed the common law courts to entertain equitable defences. Thus, if a debt was assigned in equity and the assignor attempted to enforce the debt for his or her own benefit in a common law court, the court could entertain the defence that in equity an injunction could be obtained to prevent this: see Jeffs v Day (1866) LR 1 QB 372. 37 The fact that the assignor may be joined as a defendant does not mean that the action by the assignee is against the assignor. This is simply a procedure used by equity to ensure all interested parties are before the court and bound by the judgment.
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to equity.38 When this position was reached at law, equity adopted the position that, because the assignee had a remedy at law, it should be left to that remedy rather than an equitable remedy. However, the common law courts never reached the point, prior to the Judicature Act 1873 section 25(6), of allowing an assignee of a chose in action to sue in its own name at law without joining the assignor.39 Today, no separate action in equity is required to force the assignor to lend its name to the suit. The assignor is simply joined as co-plaintiff, and if it refuses to be so joined then it can be joined as co-defendant. Moreover, if the obligor does not take the point that the assignor has not been joined, the court may ignore it.40 Finally, the assignment analysis gives effect to the transaction as a transfer, and therefore is in line with the modern view that an assignment involves a transfer. It also follows that on the assignment analysis, the interest equity protects is the assignee’s equitable ownership of the assigned right. The assignee’s rights do not derive from a mere personal equity giving the assignee a personal right to seek an equitable remedy against the obligor.
(iii) Notice and Joinder [4.10] The case law. The view that notice to the obligor is necessary for the efficacy of an equitable assignment of a legal right was stressed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Mountain Road (No 9) Ltd v Michael Edgley Corp Pty Ltd.41 This case involved a purported assignment for value of certain contractual rights, expressed to take effect only upon the execution of a memorandum of assignment. That memorandum was never signed by one of the parties, and the invalidity of the assignment was upheld on that ground. However, the court went on to suggest that even if that were not the case the assignment could not be enforced as an equitable assignment of a legal right because notice had not been given to the obligor. Prior to such notice the assignment was complete only as between the assignor and assignee. [4.11] Two principal authorities were relied upon in Mountain Road. The first was the decision of Lord Macnaghten in William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd.42 In this case the debtor had paid the assignor after receiving notice 38
[2.12]. Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 27 per Windeyer J. See also Price v Seaman (1825) 4 B & C 525, 107 ER 1155. 40 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 at 462 per Lord Macnaghten. 41 [1999] 1 NZLR 335. Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 65 per MacFarlan J. 42 [1905] AC 454. Reliance was also placed on Compania Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co. [1965] 1 QB 101 at 129 where Roskill J said that “notice to the debtor before action is brought is clearly required”. These remarks were criticised by Scott J in Weddell v JA Pearce & Major [1988] Ch 26 at 45. However, it may be that Roskill J was simply referring to the requirements for a legal assignment. Cf Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 431 (overruled on another point [1903] 1 39
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of the assignment. The issue raised for judgment was whether the debtor had received sufficient notice. If sufficient notice had been given, the debtor’s payment to the assignor would not result in the discharge of the debt and the debtor would remain liable to the assignee. The court in Mountain Road thought that the tenor of Lord Macnaghten’s speech supported the view that “the title of an equitable assignee is not effective against third parties unless and until they have been given notice”.43 However, Lord Macnaghten made only two remarks as regards notice. First, he said that as between assignor and assignee the assignment was complete without notice.44 Secondly, the only statement he made that may imply that notice is relevant to the efficacy of the assignment was, “All that is necessary is that the debtor should be given to understand that the debt has been made over by the creditor to some third person”.45 However, that statement was simply addressing the issue of the form that equitable assignments may take. That is, it need not be in the form of a communication to the assignee, but rather a communication to the debtor/obligor. It was not meant as a comprehensive statement of the requirements of an equitable assignment. In fact, the statement was meant to convey the informal nature of equitable assignments. [4.12] The second case relied on was Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd.46 This case concerned the equitable assignment of an option. The preliminary issue put before the court was: “[w]hether or not an equitable assignee of a contractual option who has not given notice of the assignment to the grantor of the option may exercise the same in his own name so as to bind the grantor of the option”.47 Lord Denning MR said that “it is a settled principle of equity that in order to perfect the title of an assignee of a debt notice to the debtor is necessary”.48 He considered that this principle was not limited to debts, but also extended to options. He said that a “grantor cannot be expected to act on a letter purporting to exercise the option which comes out of the blue from someone or other of which he knows nothing. . . . Notice is therefore necessary to perfect the right of the assignee to KB 644) where Channell J, in dealing with an assignment of a legal right, suggested that prior to the passing of the Judicature Act the assignee would have had rights after giving notice to the obligor. See also Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 at 387 per Sir Michael Fox (overruled on another point sub nom Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367). 43 [1999] 1 NZLR 335 at 341. 44 [1905] AC 454 at 462. 45 Ibid. 46 [1976] 1 QB 430. 47 Ibid, at 440. 48 Ibid, at 442, citing Stocks v Dobson (1853) 4 De GM & G 11, 43 ER 411. The issue in the latter case concerned whether a sub-assignee, having given no notice, could force the debtor to pay again after it had settled with the assignor/intermediate-assignee. Turner LJ saw the facts as giving rise to a priority dispute, hence the reference to notice being necessary to perfect title. See also Neave v Neave [1926] GLR 254 at 256 per Adams J; Squires v SA Steel & Sheet Pty Ltd (1987) 45 South Australian State Reports (SASR) 147 at 144 per Bollen J; Herkules Piling Ltd v Tilbury Construction Ltd (1992) 61 BLR 107 at 119–20 per Hirst J; Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] QB 825.
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exercise the option.”49 Arguably the latter statement does not follow from the former. Although the element of surprise may be a reason for staying an action brought by the assignee, that cannot be determinative of the title of the assignee.50 In the same case Roskill LJ said that “an equitable assignee of a contractual option who has not given notice of the assignment to the grantor of the option cannot exercise that option in his own name”.51 He continued, “the only rights that an equitable assignment can create in the equitable assignee are rights against his assignor who thenceforth becomes the trustee of the benefit of the option for the assignee, and the assignor could, of course, be compelled in equity to exercise those rights for the benefit of the assignee. . . . The present equitable assignee never became the legal assignee, and so, in my judgment, never became in a position to enforce the contractual right.”52 These remarks suggest that, unlike Lord Denning MR, Roskill LJ saw notice as being relevant only to determining whether or not the statutory regime had been satisfied. He did not suggest that the assignment was not a perfectly good equitable assignment prior to notice being given. His remarks concerning enforcement by an equitable assignee follow the traditional contract analysis of an equitable assignment, although he added that the assignee becomes a trustee, thus recognising a beneficial interest in the assignee.53 Similarly, Sir John Pennycuick took the view that the equitable assignee could not exercise the option because the assignment did not put the assignee into a contractual relationship with the obligor. Although this case involved an attempted exercise of a legal right, it would follow on his reasoning that an equitable assignee could not bring proceedings against the obligor to enforce a legal right. He suggested that the equitable assignee’s interest consists only of a right in equity to require the assignor to protect the interest which he or she had assigned, by, in that case, exercising the option.54 Where the assignor refuses to do so, the assignee can take action in equity to compel the assignor to act for the benefit of the assignee. His analysis is an even more straightforward adoption of the contract analysis than that of Roskill LJ. He saw enforcement as based on personal contractual rights and obligations. There being no contract between the assignee and obligor, the assignee had no rights against the obligor. It appears that both Roskill LJ and Sir John Pennycuick were of the view that if a person wishes to exercise a legal right, that person must have the legal right. An equitable interest in that right is not sufficient. This is a sound view and the result 49 [1976] 1 QB 430 at 442. This statement on its face appears merely to address the sufficiency of notice, that is, it appears to suggest that for a notice to be legitimate it must originate from the assignor. Cf Morrell v Wootten (1852) 16 Beav 197, 51 ER 753. See further [7.18]. 50 Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 561. 51 [1976] 1 QB 430 at 443. 52 Ibid, at 443–4. 53 Cf Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 at 302 per Staughton LJ, at 315 per Peter Gibson LJ. 54 [1976] 1 QB 430 at 445.
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in the case is therefore the correct one.55 Moreover, both Roskill LJ and Sir John Pennycuick appeared to be of the view that even if notice had been given, the assignee would still not have been able to exercise the option in its capacity as an equitable assignee.56 Notice would have made a difference only if it was the final element of a legal assignment. Therefore, it was only Lord Denning MR who emphasised a need for notice to perfect the title of an equitable assignee.57 What can no longer be accepted from the judgments of Roskill LJ and Sir John Pennycuick is the idea that an equitable assignment only ever gives the assignee rights against the assignor. There was no need to hark back to this contract analysis to provide the desired commercial result in the case when both could have simply relied on the sounder basis just mentioned which also gives effect to the transaction as a true assignment. [4.13] The court in Mountain Road disagreed with the well known decision of Scott J in Weddell v JA Pearce & Major.58 This case involved the commencement of a claim in negligence by an equitable assignee prior to any notice of the assignment being given to the obligor. Scott J did not appear to be of the belief that notice was necessary for the efficacy of the assignment. Rather, he appeared to consider notice as being primarily relevant to priorities as between competing assignees. His decision was reached simply by focusing on the notion, expressed in a number of cases, that, although the assignee should join the assignor, an action commenced by the assignee was not a nullity.59 This assumed that the assignee is otherwise entitled to sue in its own name. Such an action, he thought, was liable to be stayed pending the joinder of the assignor.60 Without such joinder the assignee could obtain interim relief 61 but would generally be unable to obtain damages or a perpetual injunction. It followed that he considered joinder to be a 55 It should be noted that the case involved an attempt to exercise a legal right, and in that context there was no need for Roskill LJ and Sir John Pennycuick to draw the distinction between the enforcement of a legal right by way of a legal remedy on the one hand and the enforcement of a legal right by way of an equitable remedy on the other. 56 See also Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 561 (however, quaere whether Giles J is of the view that the reason a legal assignment would have made a difference is that it creates privity of contract between the assignee and obligor, whilst (relying on the contract analysis) an equitable assignment, being merely operative between the assignor and assignee, does not touch the contract with the assignor and obligor and therefore the assignor could exercise the right). Cf [3.27]. 57 See further Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 at 315 per Peter Gibson LJ. 58 [1988] 1 Ch 26. 59 He cited William Brandt’s & Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 at 462 per Lord Macnaghten; Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1 at 14 per Viscount Cave LC, at 19 per Viscount Finlay, at 30 per Lord Sumner. 60 EM Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1904] 2 Ch 86. 61 Eg Sweet v Cater (1841) 11 Sim Rep 572, 59 ER 994; Actien-Gesellschaft für Cartonnagen Industrie AG v Tenler (1899) 16 RPC 447; EM Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1904] 2 Ch 86 at 91 per Warrington J.
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matter of procedure. He said the reason for joinder was “a pragmatic one”.62 That is, the “debtor must not be at risk of suit by the legal owner of the chose”.63 Where there is no such risk, and where the debtor can obtain a complete discharge by paying the assignee, then joinder may be dispensed with. The court in Mountain Road said that Scott J had failed to recognise the “difference between a proceeding lacking a party (the assignor not joined)64 and a proceeding where there is no title in the plaintiff to sue at all because a prerequisite to the right to sue (notice of the assignment to the defendant) is absent”.65 [4.14] The decision in Mountain Road has been strongly criticised in two Australian cases. The first is the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Thomas v National Australia Bank Ltd.66 In this case, the parties agreed to have tried, as a preliminary issue, whether the appellant assignee was entitled to bring and maintain an action even though at the time the action was commenced no notice of the assignment had been given to the obligor. The assignment concerned the transfer of certain rights of action by a trustee in bankruptcy to the appellant. Pincus JA wrote the leading judgment. His starting point was the undoubted position that an equitable assignment of a legal interest is complete between assignor and assignee without notice.67 The next consideration was whether that meant property passed without notice. He suggested it would be a strange result practically if the giving of notice just prior to proceedings made the proceedings good, but just after proceedings made them bad.68 He thought that references to an equitable assignment being effective as between the assignor and assignee without notice do not mean that it is void against all persons other than the assignor and 62
[1988] 1 Ch 26 at 40. Ibid, at 40. 64 No action is dismissed for want of parties: see Werderman v Société Générale d’Eletricité (1881) 19 Ch 246; William Brandt’s & Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 at 462 per Lord Macnaghten. 65 [1999] 1 NZLR 335 at 345. 66 [2000] Qd R 448. 67 Ibid, at 453. Other examples where similar statements have been made include, Re General Horticultural Company (1886) 32 Ch D 512 at 515 per Chitty J; Gorringe v Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works (1886) 34 Ch D 128 at 132 per Cotton LJ; Adcock v Jolly (1893) 19 VLR 609 at 615 per Holroyd J; The London & Yorkshire Bank Ltd v White (1895) 11 TLR 570; Anning v Anning (1907) 4 CLR 1049 at 1064 per Isaacs J; Re Westerton [1919] 2 Ch 104 at 111 per Sargant J; Re City Life Assurance Co Ltd [1926] Ch 191 at 215 per Pollock MR, at 220 per Warrington LJ; Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257 at 266 per Gavan Duffy CJ and Starke J; Comptroller of Stamps (Vic) v Howard-Smith (1936) 54 CLR 614 at 622 per Dixon J; Bank of Australasia v Annie Hertz (1937) 54 WN (NSW) 179 at 180; Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 4 per Atkinson J; Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 at 577 per Deane J; Herkules Piling Ltd v Tilbury Construction Ltd (1992) 61 BLR 107 at 117, 119 per Hirst J. See also Jones v Gibbons (1804) 9 Ves Jun 407, 32 ER 659; Donaldson v Donaldson (1854) Kay 711, 69 ER 303; Re Way’s Trusts (1864) 2 De GJ & S 365, 46 ER 416. Cf Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 55 per Cussen J (here it is suggested that the assignment is operative between the assignor and assignee without notice, but “completed” by giving notice). 68 [2000] Qd R 448 at 453. See also Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 5 per Atkinson J. 63
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assignee.69 In this regard he concluded that the decision in Mountain Road had overlooked a number of authorities and that the decision in Warner (heavily relied on in Mountain Road) was irreconcilable with the general trend of the authorities.70 [4.15] One important decision overlooked was Re City Life Assurance Co Ltd.71 This case involved two actions. In the relevant action, an insurance policy holder mortgaged the policy to the issuing company to secure certain advances. The issuing company then assigned its interest to certain trustees without notice. The issuing company then went into compulsory liquidation. It was held that, by virtue of the fact that the mortgage debt had been assigned, there was no right of set-off between the policy holder and the liquidator in respect of the amount due under the policy and the amount of the mortgage debt. That is, at the date of the winding up there was no debt due from the policy holder to the company, but there was a debt due from the company to the policy holder. The equitable assignment was “absolute and complete” despite the lack of notice.72 [4.16] On the issue of joinder, Pincus JA recognised that the balance of authority dictated that the joinder of the assignor was a matter of procedure (rather than substantive law) which might be departed from.73 The most important decision in that regard is Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd.74 Here it was held that the equitable assignee of a copyright could not obtain a perpetual injunction to prevent infringement without joining the assignors. Viscount Cave LC said that although such an assignee may obtain interim relief, the person having the legal right must, subject to few exceptions, in due course be made a party.75 He thought this was always the practice of the Court of Chancery and was also the rule of the Supreme Court. He noted that although an action could not be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder, this did not mean it was possible to obtain judgment in the absence of a necessary party. Viscount Finlay also referred to 69
[2000] Qd R 448 at 455. Ibid, at 456. 71 [1926] 1 Ch 191. See also Hiley v The Peoples Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1938) 60 CLR 468. 72 [1926] 1 Ch 191 at 220 per Warrington LJ; see also at 215 per Pollock MR. See further Bell v The London & North Western Railway Co (1852) 15 Beav 548, 51 ER 651; Davis v Freethy (1890) 24 QBD 519; Bank of NT Butterfield and Son Ltd v Golinsky [1926] AC 733; Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 5 per Atkinson J; Ward v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 at 392 per Lord Macnaghten; Gorringe v Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works (1886) 34 Ch 128; Re Patrick [1891] 1 Ch 82 at 87 per Lindley LJ; Re Connolly [1931] Gazette Law Reports (GLR) 551; Adcock v Jolly (1893) 19 VLR 609 at 615 per Holroyd J; Bank of Australasia v Annie Hertz (1937) 54 WN (NSW) 179 at 180. 73 [2000] 2 Qd R 448 at 456–9. 74 [1924] AC 1. See also Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 29–30 per Windeyer J; National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 6 ACTR 1 at 7–8 per Blackburn J; Weddell v JA Pearce & Major [1988] Ch 26 at 40–1; Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star Trading LLC [2001] QB 825 at 850 per Mance LJ. See further Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292. 75 [1924] AC 1 at 14, 18. 70
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joinder being a rule of practice which should be observed except under very special circumstances.76 Lord Sumner drew a distinction between the recognition of “an equitable title or a valid title in equity and the grant of relief to a person so entitled”. The latter, he said, requires the joinder of the legal owner as a matter of procedure.77 In Thomas’ case, Pincus JA thought the joinder of the trustee in bankruptcy involved no practical advantage; it would have increased delay and complexity and, moreover, the trustee would take no part in the proceedings in any case. There was, therefore, no chance of the assignor later suing the debtor, and so the rule could be relaxed. [4.17] The second Australian case is the decision of Santow J in Jennings v Credit Corp Australia Pty Ltd.78 The issue here concerned the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), viz, does the Act bar an enforcement action against a debtor when the action was brought solely by an equitable assignee of a debt who got in the legal estate only after the limitation period expired. The initial action by the assignee was commenced within time. The debtor claimed that the action was a nullity as the assignor was never joined, and therefore it did not prevent time running for the purposes of the Act. The basis of this argument was that an equitable assignee had rights only against the assignor and had no standing to enforce the legal contractual right. No argument was raised concerning the effectiveness of an assignment without notice. The issue was one of joinder. Santow J thought the long line of authority upholding the assignee’s right to claim interlocutory relief and the statements that joinder was a matter of procedure clearly suggested that such actions were not a nullity. He referred to the proposition, expressed by Sheller JA in Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd,79 that the procedural rule requiring the joinder of the assignor said nothing about the actual validity of a demand made by an assignee against a debtor. In Long Leys, Sheller JA also said that joinder had both a procedural and substantive aspect. He thought that the procedural aspect was to protect against duplicated claims, whereas the substantive aspect dictated that the equitable assignee’s right was one against the assignor rather than the obligor.80 Santow J thought these propositions could not co-exist if the latter was stated in such absolute terms. He thought it clear that the procedural rule allows an equitable assignee rights against the obligor in certain circumstances, such as where a claim is made for interim relief or where the debtor waives his or her right for the legal assignor to be present. He thought this gave rise to a false dichotomy between the procedural and substantive rules— 76
Ibid, at 19. Ibid, at 29. 78 (2000) 48 NSWLR 709. 79 (1991) 5 BPR 11,512 at 11,518. 80 Ibid, at 11,518. See also Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 561 per Giles J. 77
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the substantive rule had exceptions and in each of those exceptions the assignee was exercising a contractual (that is, presumably legal) right against the debtor. He thought that Mountain Road had adopted the substantive rule in its absolute form. [4.18] It is suggested that Santow J was correct in his view that Sheller JA’s two propositions could not co-exist. He was also correct in his observation that in the authoritative examples in which the joinder rule has been relaxed, namely William Brandt’s & Sons and Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd 81 and Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd, 82 it does appear as if the court readily allowed the assignee to enforce the legal right. However, it is suggested that the law should not accept that the substantive position has a number of exceptions. The dichotomy that Santow J referred to falls away if the assignee is not attempting to enforce the legal right, but rather is seeking to enforce its equitable right or otherwise seeking an equitable remedy to enforce a legal or equitable right.83 In addition, it is suggested that the continued adherence to the idea that the assignee has rights only against the assignor, as evidenced in the judgment of Sheller JA, should be abandoned. As an all-encompassing rule this fails to reflect that the assignee is intended by the assignor to be either the legal or beneficial owner of the right, and in any case is in law the beneficial owner because the transaction is upheld as involving a transfer by way of assignment. [4.19] Conclusions on notice. All the principal authorities agree that an equitable assignment is complete as between the assignor and assignee without notice to the obligor. That is, notice is not necessary to perfect the assignment.84 It follows that whether or not the assignee has a direct remedy against the obligor, when an 81
[1905] AC 454. [1903] AC 414. See further Thomas v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] 2 Qd R 448; Equus Financial Services Ltd v Glengallen Investments Pty Ltd (unreported Queensland CA, 19 May 1994) per McPherson JA; Commercial Factors Ltd v Maxwell Printing Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 724; Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd (1991) 5 BPR 11,512 at 11,518 per Sheller JA; Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Microcomputer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 389; Central Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corp (The Aiolos) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 25 at 34 per Ackner LJ; National Mutual Nominees Ltd v National Capital Development Commission (1975) 6 ACTR 1 at 708 per Blackburn J; Camfield Pastoral Co v Dixon [1972] Qd R 289; Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 256 per PO Lawrence J; Wilson v Ragosine & Co Ltd (1915) 84 LJKB 2185; Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608 at 616–17 per Farwell J; Schneidman v Barnett [1951] NZLR 301 at 307 per FB Adams J; McMahon v Gilberd & Co Ltd [1955] NZLR 1206 at 1219 per Turner J. See also Nolan v King and Cook [1931] QSR 342 (no joinder required where assignor authorises assignee to give discharge). 83 Brandt’s case was an equitable assignment of a debt, the equitable assignee/equitable creditor relied on its equitable interest to claim an equitable remedy to enforce an equitable debt; equity has long recognised a jurisdiction to enforce debts: see [4.27], [8.18]. Tolhurst’s case was a claim for specific performance, the assignee (assuming the assignment was equitable and not legal) relied on its equitable interest to claim an equitable remedy to enforce a legal right. 84 In addition to the cases discussed above: see Ward v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 at 392 per Lord Macnaghten; Walker v The Bradford Old Bank Ltd (1884) 12 QBD 511; Anning v Anning (1907) 4 CLR 1049 at 1069–70 per Isaacs J. See also Donaldson v Donaldson (1854) Kay 711, 69 ER 303. 82
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assignment is complete as between the assignor and assignee then the obligor is bound by the assignment.85 Generally (and putting aside priority disputes and exceptions to the nemo dat rule), in any dealing in property rights, once a transfer is complete between the parties this will automatically, without more, impact on relationships between the transferee and third parties in respect of the asset or thing which is the subject of an actual transfer.86 If an equitable assignment of a legal right is properly entitled an “assignment” then it must involve a transfer, as this is the essence of assignment, and therefore the same result must follow. The reason so many cases make statements to the effect that “as between the assignor and assignee the assignment is complete without notice” without any mention of the efficacy of the assignment vis-à-vis the obligor may, in part, lie with the now outmoded contract analysis, and in part with the view that such assignments were made effective because of the remedies equity provided.87 As already noted, the latter does not stop such transactions being properly recognised as assignments, but courts were rarely asked to consider any remedies the assignee may have against the obligor. The assignee was content either to force the assignor to take steps to bring about a legal assignment (once legal assignments of choses in action became possible) or to force the assignor to lend its name to any suit by the assignee against the obligor. There was little need, therefore, to consider direct actions against the obligor despite the fact that joinder was ultimately perceived as being a requirement of procedure. In addition, the notion that the assignment is complete as between the assignor and assignee without notice does reflect the practical reality of the transaction. From the perspective of the assignor, whether notice of the assignment is given or not it holds the assigned right and its fruits for the benefit of the assignee. From the perspective of the obligor, the reality is that it continues to owe its obligation at law to the assignor. This does not deny the efficacy of the transfer but reflects the doctrinal allocation of rights. It is only upon receipt of notice that the obligor must consider the position of the assignee and look to the assignee for a discharge even though prior to notice it owed its obligation in equity to the assignee.88 None of this is meant to deny the possibility of the assignor and assignee transacting in a way that does not impact on the obligor. For example, the assignor and assignee may come to their own arrangements as regards the fruits of a contract. Such dealings often occur where the benefit of a contract cannot be assigned either because the benefit of the contract is personal to the assignor or 85
FCT v Everett (1979) 143 CLR 440 at 452. This may mean that third parties coming into contact with the transferee must respect the transferee’s interest or it may mean that the transferee must recognise the interest of a third party. 87 Where judges adhered to the contract analysis but also accepted that an assignee might enforce an assigned right against an obligor, perhaps it was logical to require something more in order to effect the transfer, and this was found in a requirement of notice: see Re Crothers [1930] VLR 49 at 55 per Cussen J, at 66 per MacFarlan J. 88 See further [8.06]. 86
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there is a prohibition on assignment. In such a case, the assignor may seek to transfer to the assignee some interest in the fruits of the contract which would be effective once those fruits were received by the assignor. Arguably, where there is such a limitation on assignment and there is an attempt to assign the benefit of the contract, the assignment may be construed or read down to assign that which is assignable, namely the fruits.89 Moreover, when such an agreement is entered into equity may characterise the relationship between the assignor and assignee as proprietary even before the fruits of the contract vest in the assignor. Thus, again the transaction may be expressed to be complete as between the assignor and assignee, although the transfer could not be said to be complete prior to the property coming into existence. Finally, if one accepts the above analysis that distinguishes between the title to a chose and the chose itself, and goes a step further and recognises the ability of an assignor to assign title to a chose and retain the chose itself, then such a transaction would be a complete transfer as between the assignor and assignee, but would not affect the obligor because it would continue to perform to the party “holding” the chose, that is, the assignor.90 [4.20] Notice, it is suggested, serves four purposes. First, it maintains the assignee’s priority.91 Secondly, it prevents certain equities arising as between assignor and obligor to which the assignee would be subject.92 Thirdly, it will generally prevent the obligor from obtaining a discharge from the assignor.93 Fourthly, it binds the conscience of the obligor.94 The first purpose is readily accepted and a discussion of priorities falls outside this text. The second and third purposes are also readily accepted and are discussed 89
See Swan and Cleland’s Graving Dock and Slipway Co v Maritime Insurance Co [1907] 1 KB 116. See further [6.75], [6.83]. 91 It may be noted that it was in the narrow context of a priority dispute that Sir Thomas Plumer MR in Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1 at 22, 24, 38 ER 475 at 483, 484, said that notice was necessary to perfect title (see also Foster v Cockerell (1835) 3 Cl & Fin 456 at 476, 6 ER 1508 at 1516; Jones v Jones (1838) 8 Sim 633 at 643, 59 ER 251 at 255; Meux v Bell (1841) 1 Hare 73, 66 ER 955; Stocks v Dobson (1853) 4 De GM & G 11, 43 ER 411; Re Freshfields’ Trust (1879) 11 Ch D 198 at 202; Arden v Arden (1885) 29 Ch D 702 at 708). To the extent that Sir Thomas Plumer MR meant his statement to have a wider impact, this can be explained away on the basis of his concern with the reputed ownership provisions of the bankruptcy legislation which required notice to take “goods”, which included certain debts, out of the possession of the bankrupt: see Ward v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 at 378 Lord Herschell LC, at 392–3 per Lord Macnaghten (“In defence of the rule in Dearle v Hall, it has been said that notice is necessary in order to ‘perfect’ the title of the assignee—in order to ‘complete’ his title. Those expressions have frequently been used; but they are, I venture to think, little more than mere phrases. Notice does not render title perfect. Notice was not even a step in the title until it was made so by the decision in Foster v Cockerell. Apart from the rule in Dearle v Hall, an assignee of an equitable interest from a person capable of disposing of it has a perfect equitable title, though the title is no doubt subject to the infirmity which attaches to all equitable titles. And that infirmity is not and cannot be wholly cured or removed by notice to the trustees”.) 92 [8.49]. 93 Brice v Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569. See further [8.06]. 94 Tooth v Brisbane City Council (1928) 41 CLR 212 at 222 per Isaacs J; Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257 at 266 per Gavan Duffy CJ and Starke J. 90
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in other chapters. The significance of the fourth purpose does require further explanation here as it is important to the underlying theme of this book and is used later to advance the argument that a formal legal relationship exists between the assignee and obligor. If a transaction is upheld as an equitable assignment of a contractual right then the obligor must immediately owe its personal obligation to the assignee. Therefore, notice is not required for the assignee to commence an action against an obligor as the assignee’s title is complete.95 The fact that the obligor may at that point have no knowledge of the assignee is not to the point.96 In terms of knowledge, it is only important that the obligor knows it has a contractual obligation. If the obligor fails to carry out that obligation by breaching the contract, it should be accountable to whoever was owed the obligation at the relevant time. Ultimately this will be the person beneficially entitled to the obligation. Thus, in the case of an assigned contractual right where the obligor is required to perform some obligation, the requirement of notice, in terms of binding the conscience of the obligor, is to bring home to the mind of the obligor its responsibility to the assignee before the time for performance accrues. Whether or not this should impact upon the assessment of damages available to the assignee is discussed later.97 Where the assigned right is such that an assignee may call for a personal accounting or performance, for example, in the case of an assignment of a debt, notice to the obligor is necessary to bind the conscience of the obligor to render that personal accounting. However, this does not mean that the obligation was not owed to the assignee prior to such notice. If that were the case then the efficacy of the assignment prior to notice is called into question. It simply means that a payment to the assignor will discharge the debtor as its conscience is not bound prior to notice; this is possible without denying the efficacy of the transfer as there is still a contract between the obligor and assignor and strictly the obligation at law is owed to the assignor. However, if the debtor fails to pay it is liable to the assignee as the assignment is valid prior to notice. It follows that it is not necessary to adopt a view that, upon notice, the obligor has imposed on it a fresh obligation in equity. That obligation exists prior to notice. [4.21] Conclusions on joinder. Logically, if an assignee’s intention is to exercise a legal right such as an option, or to enforce a legal right by way of a legal remedy, such as a claim for damages for breach of contract, then the involvement of the assignor is dictated as a matter of substantive law. However, if the law were to stop there the result would be inconvenient. The ability of assignees in certain cases to bring an action in their own name against 95 96 97
See The Burwood Land, Building, and Investment Co Ltd v Berridge (1893) 19 VLR 630. Ward v Duncombe [1893] AC 369 at 392 per Lord Macnaghten. [8.09].
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the obligor without joining the assignor and receive final judgment is clearly efficacious and must be maintained. What must be attempted is an explanation (which makes doctrinal and analytical sense) of how the assignee’s right of enforcement operates. [4.22] Arguably there are three possible paths the law could take. The first is based on equity’s ability to enforce legal rights using equitable remedies.98 The principal example of this jurisdiction is the remedy of specific performance. This is an equitable order forcing a person to carry out a legal obligation. However, generally, the benefit of an order for specific performance goes to a person who has a legal right to performance and has provided valuable consideration. That is, equity here aids legal rights, not equitable rights, and the rights it protects are personal primary rights to contractual performance. The only legal right the equitable assignee has arises out of its contract with the assignor. There is therefore an inherent limitation to this path. However, this limitation is not necessarily insurmountable.99 Statements can be found which recognise a jurisdiction to grant specific performance to such assignees.100 It is thought that an assignee can obtain an order for specific performance if such an order could have been obtained by the assignor.101 In addition, it is in the context of orders for specific performance that the requirement of joinder is often relaxed.102 Such a result makes sense if the assignment is a failed legal assignment and is upheld in equity by virtue of equity treating as done that which ought to be done; in such a case the assignment is treated in equity as if the legal assignment had occurred, and so it is logical to make available to that assignee those equitable remedies which may be used to enforce legal rights. However, this would not help an assignee claiming common law damages for breach of contract. Moreover, there is also the view, perhaps not yet fully addressed in the context of assignments, that for equity to grant a person with an
98 This is distinguished from the ability of a person who has rights which in equity are enforceable against the legal owner as the “legal owner” here would be the assignor: see Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 707 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 99 The jurisdiction to grant specific performance is not narrow. Specific performance can be granted to a party to a contract despite the discharge of the contract if there is evidence of fraud, accident, mistake or surprise: see Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315. 100 See Hume v Monro (No 2) (1943) 67 CLR 461 at 482 per Williams J. See also JC Williamson Ltd v Lukey & Mulholland (1931) 45 CLR 282 at 297 per Dixon J and Manchester Brewery Co v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608 at 616–17 per Farwell J. If Tolhurst’s case is seen as an equitable assignment it too is an important example: see [8.06]. See further ICF Spry, Equitable Remedies (6th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 2001) at 80. Quaere whether a privity rule that allowed for a third party beneficiary to enforce a contract without characterising the third party’s interest as either legal or equitable would warrant equity adopting a course that would allow a third person/assignee with an equitable interest in the relevant contract a right to seek specific performance of the contract. 101 [8.07]. 102 Ibid.
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equitable interest some relief that is not merely equitable requires exceptional circumstances.103 Such circumstances could not exist in every assignment. [4.23] A second path lies not in arguing that an assignee with an equitable interest can rely on that interest to bring an action in equity to enforce a legal right, but rather that that equitable interest is sufficiently recognised by the law to justify an action at law. If correct this would appear to be a case of either the law treating as done that which ought to be done or the law following equity. There is no doubt that after the Judicature Acts, and even before then, the common law recognised equitable rights and interests.104 Moreover, there is clear evidence that the common law recognised the effectiveness of equitable assignments105 and the breach of a contract of assignment was actionable for damages at common law. However, there is a clear difference between the common law recognising an equitable right and the common law allowing a person with an equitable right to enforce a legal right. Although exceptions can be found, the highest point reached by the common law was to recognise the interest of an equitable assignee and allow the assignee to bring an action in the name of the assignor.106 The common law always required the assignor to be joined. Although the common law has moved a long way since its early stance of refusing to “recognise that equitable rights, titles and interests entitled their holders to any relief at law”,107 it has still not reached a general position where it will give its aid to enforce equitable interests. The trend of modern law has been one of increased availability of equitable relief to protect common law rights rather than of common law remedies being made available to protect equitable rights.108 103 See Lidden v Composite Buyers Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 560 at 563 per Finn J; Pearson v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA (Federal Court of Australia) 1427 para 13. The High Court of Australia recently expressed equity’s jurisidiction to grant remedies in the case of an assignment in the following terms: see Theodore v Mistford Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 296 at 302 (“In respect of a legal interest, under the general law an agreement to give a legal mortgage is described as an equitable mortgage. Subject to compliance with any statutory formalities, it may be treated in equity as if a legal mortgage had been granted and therefore as carrying with it the remedies, including foreclosure, incident to a legal mortgage. Hence the statement that while in theory the equitable mortgagee may call for a legal mortgage, in the great majority of cases the mortgagee rests upon its equitable rights. Lord Eldon LC said of the Court of Chancery that ‘an equitable title to a mortgage is here as good as a legal title’. In this way, by looking at the intent rather than the form, equity is able to treat as done that which in good conscience ought to be done.” (citations omitted)). 104 Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619 at 623, 99 ER 1284 at 1286 per Ashhurst J. 105 Forth v Stanton (1681) 1 Wms Saund 210, 85 ER 217; Moulsdale v Birchall (1772) 2 Black W 820, 96 ER 483; Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619 at 623, 99 ER 1284 at 1286 per Ashhurst J; Master v Miller (1791) 4 TR 320 at 341, 100 ER 1042 at 1053 per Buller J. See also Israel v Douglas (1789) 1 H Bl 239, 126 ER 139; Carpenter v Marnell (1802) 3 B & P 40, 127 ER 23; Crowfoot v Gurney (1832) 9 Bing 372, 131 ER 655: see further [2.15], [4.08], [4.09]. 106 [2.12], [2.17], [4.09]. 107 RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 1.200. 108 See generally A Mason, “The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law World” (1994) 110 LQR 238.
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[4.24] One way round this is the suggestion that in the case of assignment the common law did not merely recognise the equitable assignment of legal rights but, in addition, accepted those assignments as assignments at law.109 Thus, where equity would recognise the assignment of a contractual right, it was concurrently recognised as an assignment at law. This argument was put forward by Professor Cook in 1916 in the Harvard Law Review.110 Cook took the view that the common law reached the position where, upon notice to the obligor, legal ownership of the chose in action vested in the assignee and the assignor ceased to be the legal owner, except for the purposes of lending its name to the title of the suit. It was in this sense that he thought the Judicature Act provisions allowing the assignee to sue in its own name were procedural.111 In his view the assignee’s ownership of the chose was concurrently legal and equitable. Cook’s argument was principally based upon American authorities, but he also relied on a handful of English common law cases that appeared to recognise the assignment of legal rights.112 It must be said that the idea that the common law fully recognised the assignment of choses in action is at odds with the general flow of all historical treatises on the history of assignment of choses in action.113 Although it is possible to point to cases that show the common law recognising assignments, it certainly did not develop any general doctrine of common law assignment that survived up to the passing of the Judicature Act 1872 section 25(6). Nor did it adopt the position that an assignment in equity was an assignment at law.114 The English case on which Cook principally relied was Legh v Legh,115 a case in which a debtor paid an assignor and received a release from the assignor at a time when the debtor had notice of the assignment. The Court of Common Pleas ordered the release to be cancelled. Cook suggested that this was evidence that one of the ingredients that make up ownership, namely the right to 109 There are examples of the common adopting equitable doctrines either as its own or taking equities into account in working out common law rights: see RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 1.205. An example of the first is the adoption by the common law of equity’s approach to variations of a principal contract without the approval of the guarantor. An example of the second is the recognition of a mortgagor’s equity of redemption: see Pawlett v AG (1667) Hard 465 at 469, 145 ER 550 at 552 per Hale CB. 110 WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) 29 Harv LR 816. See further G Glenn, “The Assignment of Choses in Action: Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser” (1934) 20 Virginia L R 621; Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1965) i, para 7.4. 111 WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) 29 Harv LR 816 at 821. See also Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1. See further F Oditah, “Priorities: Equitable Versus Legal Assignment of Book Debts” (1989) 9 OJLS 513 at 522. See [5.04], [5.27]. 112 Cf Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 372 per Cozens-Hardy LJ. 113 See Chapter 2. 114 See VV Palmer, The Paths to Privity (San Francisco, Cal, Austin & Winfield, 1992) at 146–7; WR Warren, The Law Relating to Choses in Action (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1899) ch 1; SJ Bailey, “Assignment of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century” (1932) 48 LQR 547 at 579. 115 (1799) 1 Bos & Pul 447, 126 ER 1002.
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give a release, was now missing from the bundle of rights held by the assignor.116 Thus, both at common law and in equity there was a transfer to the assignee. This analysis flows from Cook’s application of Hohfeldian rights analysis which, although legitimate, was certainly not in the mind of the court at the time of Legh v Legh. Moreover, Cook would have needed to explain away the fact that the action was brought by the assignee in the name of the assignor, which in fact evidences that there was no legal assignment operating. All this case really evidences is a recognition (rather than the adoption) by a common law court of the assignment in equity.117 At its highest, it may evidence a court of common law exercising equitable jurisdiction. In this regard, in Phillips v Clagett,118 Parke B suggested that this “equitable jurisdiction” of the courts of common law was limited to “preventing the defendant from pleading pleas of release, where the release is valid in point of law, but invalid in equity, as being a fraud for which the defendant is answerable”. If that is correct, it should not therefore have been extended to actually setting aside the release.119 Cook’s views were convincingly criticised by Professor Williston.120 Williston had no trouble calling the assignee’s right legal if by that all that was meant was that it was enforced in a court of law in the name of the assignor. However, he thought Cook had meant to go further than that. Williston suggested that if Cook was right there was no doctrinal reason why the assignee should take subject to the equities that the obligor has against the assignor.121 Secondly, he thought that if Cook’s view was accepted, then the normal priority rules which treat the assignee as having an equitable right must be changed and the assignee as the holder of a legal right must generally prevail over other equitable rights. Thirdly, he pointed out that if Cook was correct then a partial assignment of a debt, being a mere equitable assignment, could always be defeated by a later legal assignment of the whole debt.122 116
WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) 29 Harv LR 816 at 824, 828. See also Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619, 99 ER 1284. Cf WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston” (1917) 30 Harv LR 449 at 463. 118 (1843) 11 M & W 84 at 93, 152 ER 725 at 729. 119 See OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 74–80. The requirement of fraud which allowed the common law courts to look beyond the parties to the action was later alleviated by the Common Law Procedure Act 1854, s85 which allowed the assignee to set up an equitable reply to the defendant’s plea of release. That is, the common law courts could take account of the assignee’s reply that the obligor had notice of the assignment at the time it obtained a release from the assignor without the need for there to have been any fraud: see De Pothonier v De Mattos (1858) El Bl & El 461, 120 ER 581. See further McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 at 186–9 per Dixon J. See [4.09]. 120 Samuel Williston, “Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?” (1916) 30 Harv LR 97. For Cook’s reply see WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston” (1917) 30 Harv LR 449. For Williston’s final comments see S Williston, “The Word ‘Equitable’ and its Application to the Assignment of Choses in Action” (1918) 31 Harv LR 822. 121 See further F Oditah, Legal Aspect of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 6.15. 122 See S Williston, “Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?” (1916) 30 Harv LR 97 at 104. 117
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Some further observations may also be made. First, although Cook denied that the assignor remains the owner of the assigned right (except for the purpose of lending its name to the suit), the weight of authority suggests that in the case of an equitable assignment of a legal right, the assignor retains the legal interest and remains the legal owner.123 Combining that authority with Cook’s argument would result in both the assignor and assignee having a legal interest when generally the common law has never recognised two rights of ownership. Perhaps this might be overcome by concluding that the assignor and assignee are co-owners. However, if that were the case, and if both interests were legal, then presumably either party could release the debtor.124 But the accepted position is that generally upon notice of an assignment the assignor cannot discharge the obligor.125 Finally, Cook’s idea that the assignee’s interest is both legal and equitable appears to suggest the two interests may continue to exist separately when vested in the one person.126 That too is at odds with the great weight of authority.127 [4.25] It is necessary then to turn to the third path. To do this it is necessary to put aside both the notion that the assignee is always attempting (at law or in equity) to enforce the legal right and the idea that the assignee’s rights consist only of rights against the assignor. Dealing first with the latter, it is suggested that the assignee’s rights may be limited to action against the assignor in three cases. First, where the transaction is not really an assignment. Secondly, where the assignee either wants to exercise a legal right or wants a legal remedy—although strictly this no longer requires an action, the assignor is simply joined. Thirdly, where the transaction is properly called an assignment but the strength of the assignee’s right is such that it allows for enforcement only by taking action against the assignor. The idea of the strength of a right is dealt with in Chapter 8.128 In essence it will be suggested that, subject to certain statutory constraints, the terms of an assignment may expressly or impliedly limit the remedial avenues open to the assignee. Turning to the former issue, it is suggested that the stone that has been left unturned is the assignee’s ability to seek equitable relief to protect its equitable interest. It has already been noted that joinder is procedural where the assignee seeks an equitable remedy to enforce a legal right. The same is true where the assignee seeks to enforce or protect its equitable interest. Clearly, the assignee is the proper plaintiff to claim such equitable relief against the obligor. If equitable remedies are sufficiently versatile to protect the assignee’s interest, there will be no 123
[4.25]. See S Williston, “Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?” (1916) 30 Harv LR 97 at 108. 125 [8.06]. 126 See WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston” (1917) 30 Harv LR 449. 127 [3.11]. 128 [8.27]. 124
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need to take the strict procedural approach to joinder for the purposes of doing justice and allowing an assignee to bring an action in its own name in certain cases. That is, it could be accepted, as doctrinally it should be, that where the assignee wishes to exercise a legal right or to seek a legal remedy then the involvement of the assignor is required as a matter of substantive law. If that position is accepted then there appear to be only two situations that on their face may cause injustice. The first occurs where the obligor waives its right to have the assignor present and the second where the assignor ceases to exist. The first of these, it is suggested, may be dealt with on the basis of estoppel. As to the second situation, it must be rare for an assignor to cease to exist and its legal interest not to vest in some other party by operation of law.129 However, if that is the case, then there may be much to be said for the view that that outstanding legal interest should vest in the assignee.130 The alternative, of course, is that if the legal interest dies, so too does the equitable interest; however, this result would cause numerous problems in sale of business transactions and is commercially unacceptable. There is some support for the view that, generally, the action of the assignee should be seen as a cause of action in equity. In Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England,131 Staughton LJ said that the equitable assignee has a cause of action, but it is a cause of action in equity.132 In the same case, Peter Gibson LJ said that the equitable assignee becomes in equity the owner and controller of the assigned right and entitled to sue for the recovery of the chose.133 Moreover, in Durham Brothers v Robertson134 Chitty LJ, in one of the most famous statements of the joinder rule, characterised the assignee’s action as being an action in equity rather than an action in law to enforce the legal right. He said:135 As is well known, an ordinary debt or chose in action before the Judicature Act was not assignable so as to pass the right of action at law, but it was assignable so as to pass the right to sue in equity. In his suit in equity the assignee of a debt, even where the assignment was absolute on the face of it, had to make his assignor, the original creditor, party in order primarily to bind him and prevent his suing at law, and also to allow him to dispute the assignment if he thought fit. This was a fortiori the case where the assignment was by way of security, or by way of charge only, because the assignor had a right to redeem.136 129
Eg EM Bowden’s Patents Syndicate Ltd v Herbert Smith & Co [1904] 2 Ch 86. Alternatively, because there is no one left to claim a legal remedy, such a case may be one that may more readily be the subject of an order for specific performance in favour of the assignee: see Hume v Monro (No 2) (1943) 67 CLR 461 at 482 where Williams J makes this suggestion and cites Tolhurst’s case as authority. 131 [1996] QB 292. 132 Ibid, at 303. 133 Ibid, at 308. 134 [1898] 1 QB 765. See also Adcock v Jolly (1893) 19 VLR 609 at 615 per Holroyd J. 135 [1898] 1 QB 765 at 769–70 (emphasis added). 136 In referring to the suit being in equity, Chitty LJ did not suggest that after joinder the suit continued as one at law. 130
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It is suggested that the insistence called for here that joinder be seen as a matter of substantive law when the assignee seeks a legal remedy is not inconsistent with those cases which have held that the commencement of an action by the assignee to enforce the legal right is not a nullity. Clearly the assignee can claim interim relief. However, and more fundamentally, the equitable assignee may rely on its equitable interest to commence an action to enforce the legal right. What the assignee cannot obtain is a legal remedy, and so the assignor must be joined prior to judgment and the making of such an order. The mere commencement of the action is not the enforcement. Moreover, the assignee cannot exercise a legal right. It follows that an election by the equitable assignee to exercise an option is a nullity.137 It is also suggested that there is nothing inconsistent between this approach and the decision in Performing Right.138 That case concerned a claim for injunctive relief. Clearly there joinder is procedural. Viscount Cave LJ, as noted above, focused on the need to join a “necessary” party. The joinder of the legal right holder prior to judgment is merely joining a necessary party but in a substantive sense. Moreover, it is suggested that the speeches of Viscount Finlay and Lord Sumner may be read as limited to claims for equitable relief. Finally, it is suggested that the analysis put forward here would be as efficacious as the procedural joinder rule, and more doctrinally sound, if equitable remedies were sufficiently versatile to protect the assignee’s interest. The assignee’s remedies are dealt with in Chapter 8 where it is suggested that the assignee has a right to claim equitable compensation for breach of contract by the obligor and, where the assignment is of an obligation to pay, the assignee can (as a creditor in equity) enforce that primary obligation in equity.139
(d) Equitable Assignment of Legal Interests Not Assignable at Law [4.26] Introduction. Certain legal choses in action may not be assignable at law but are said to be assignable in equity. The prime example is the assignment of part of a debt or chose in action. Whether or not an assignment is entire or partial 137 A contractual right to arbitration is also a legal right and, therefore, in addition to other procedural requirements, generally requires a legal assignment for the assignee to be able to exercise it in its own name: see Baytur SA v Finagro Holding SA [1992] 1 QB 610 at 618 per Lloyd LJ. The enforcement of a guarantee, being the enforcement of a legal right, would also generally require a legal assignment if the assignee wished to exercise it in its own name. Therefore, notice would be necessary. However, notice to the guarantor of the assignment of the main contract would not be necessary. 138 Performing Right Society Ltd v London Theatre of Varieties Ltd [1924] AC 1. 139 [8.24].
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depends upon the construction of the terms of the assignment and need not be considered further here.140 What are of concern are the nature and characteristics of these transactions and whether or not they are be properly termed “assignments”. [4.27] The assignment of part of a debt. In the case of an assignment of part of a debt, the proper plaintiff is the assignee. Where an entire debt was assigned in equity the assignee could bring an action at law in the name of the assignor to enforce the debt. However, that procedure was not available in the case of a partial assignment. A debt could not be recovered piecemeal at law.141 Despite a partial assignment, there remains one debt.142 This is still the position under most statutory regimes for legal assignments.143 It follows that such assignments (and such interests) were and still are (subject to a few statutory exceptions) recognised only in equity and, therefore, the assignee can bring an action in equity in its own name to enforce its assigned right.144 The assignor necessarily had to be joined so that the rights of all persons interested in the debt could be determined.145 Procedurally joinder is required to protect the assignor, as he or she may have a defence to raise against the efficacy of the assignment. Substantively, joinder is necessary as there is only one indivisible debt that must be enforced in its entirety. Two important points appear to flow from this. First, this explanation appears to recognise the assignee as the beneficial owner of the assigned right and therefore 140 Eg Harding v Harding (1886) 17 QBD 442; Bank of Liverpool & Martins Ltd v Holland (1926) 43 TLR 29. The ability partially, fractionally or divisionally to assign contractual rights to performance is considered later, [6.48]–[6.56]. 141 Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 29 per Windeyer J. 142 Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 at 385 per Simon Brown LJ (overruled on another point sub nom Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367). 143 Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 29 per Windeyer J. Cf Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s20(3) allowing for the legal assignment of part of a debt or chose in action. 144 Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 29 per Windeyer J. See also McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 ALR 289 at 295. Cf Long Leys Co Pty Ltd v Silkdale Pty Ltd (1991) 5 Butterworths Property Reports (BPR) 11,512 where the ability of an equitable assignee to enforce a debt was thought to be a triable issue. See further Showa Shoji Australia Pty Ltd v Oceanic Life Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 548 at 559. 145 Norman v FCT (1962) 109 CLR 9 at 29 per Windeyer J. See also Bergmann v MacMillan (1881) 17 Ch D 423; Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 357; Williams v Atlantic Assurance Co Ltd [1933] 1 KB 81 at 100 per Greer LJ; Walter & Sullivan Ltd v J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584 at 588–9 per Parker LJ; Deposit Protection Board v Dalia [1994] 2 AC 367 at 387 per Sir Michael Fox (overruled on another point sub nom Deposit Protection Board v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 2 AC 367). However, in the case of a partial assignment of a judgment debt, the view has been expressed that leave should not be given to the assignee to sue without joining the assignor, as there should be only one execution order. Since the assignor has only one judgment and can therefore issue only one execution, to allow multiple executions would be to recognise the assignment of a right the assignor did not have which is at odds with the nemo dat rule governing transfers. See McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 ALR 289 at 293; Forster v Baker [1910] 2 KB 636. See also Australian Workers Union v Bowen (1946) 72 CLR 575. It follows that the debt is not partially assignable: see Nirens v Fowler Asphalt Pty Ltd (1966) 9 FLR 255. Where there is a partial assignment of a debt together with a partial assignment of the security interest under a mortgage (which secures payment of the debt), it is not possible partially to enforce rights under the mortgage.
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the transaction is upheld as an assignment. Secondly, it appears that from early times equity had jurisdiction to enforce a debt on the basis that the assignee was the equitable creditor.146 It is sometimes suggested that the assignment of part of a debt operates by way of charge.147 The distinction between assignment and charge has already been dealt with,148 and so too the need in some cases to combine an assignment with a charge.149 The notion of an “assignment by way of charge” is dealt with later.150 The question here is whether, in the case of a partial assignment of a debt, it makes sense to speak of the actual assignment of a part, or whether it is necessary, to give any legal effect to the transaction, that it be upheld as a charge. Any transfer requires certainty of subject matter. It is impossible to transfer an interest in goods when they are unascertained; transfer requires an unconditional appropriation of the goods to the contract. Similarly, it may be thought to be impossible to have an interest in an undivided part of a debt, so that any interest must be a partial interest in the entirety of the debt, and this can be achieved only by way of charge.151 It may be true that when an “assignment” of part of a debt is given by way of security what is often meant is a charge.152 In many such cases it will probably not matter whether the transaction is upheld as a charge or assignment.153 In addition, it is accepted that an assignment by way of security, that is, a mortgage, incorporates a charge.154 However, this should not been seen as denying the possibility of there being an actual assignment of part of a debt.155 Arguably, anything capable of being charged is capable of assignment because the enforcement of a charge involves the chargee approaching a court for an assignment.156 In addition, when 146
Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 355. See further [4.18], [8.18]. Eg Rodick v Gandell (1852) 1 De GM & G 763 at 777–8, 42 ER 749 at 754 per Lord Truro; Palmer v Carey [1926] AC 703 at 706 per Lord Wrenbury; Re Lawsons Constructions Pty Ltd [1942] South Australian State Reports (SASR) 201 at 201 per Mayo J; Thomas v Harris [1947] 1 All ER 444 at 445 per Scott LJ; Walter & Sullivan Ltd v J Murphy & Sons Ltd [1955] 2 QB 584 at 588 per Parker LJ; National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v National Capital Developments Commission (1975) 6 Australian Capital Territory Reports (ACTR) 1 at 5 per Blackburn J; Wreckair Pty Ltd v Emerson [1992] 1 Qd R 700; Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399 at 446 per McHugh and Gummow JJ. 148 [3.17]. 149 [3.17]. 150 [7.39]–[7.40]. 151 See further R Goode, “Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions” (1987) 103 LQR 433 at 448. 152 Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 at 141; Hughes v Pump House Hotel Co Ltd [1902] 2 KB 190 at 195 per Mathew LJ. 153 See Robertson v Grigg (1932) 47 CLR 257 at 271 per Dixon J (who appears not to place too much weight on the distinction in this case). 154 Shea v Moore [1894] 1 IR 158 at 168 per Walker C. See further R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.52. 155 Ashby, Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 at 704–5 per Greer LJ. 156 Quaere whether “assignment” in this context only means “appropriation”, that is, an order for payment of the assigned sum. 147
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an assignor is indebted to an assignee, the assignment of a debt to the assignee, whether partial or otherwise, may be given as a method of payment.157 Such an assignment may be outright or by way of mortgage. In either case, its purpose of providing a method of payment prior to default would be defeated if it were upheld as a mere charge. Moreover, in Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,158 Windeyer J, in perhaps the leading modern statement on partial assignments, did not at any stage suggest that the transaction could operate only as a charge. In fact, the whole tenor of his judgment was that there could be partial assignments and they could be by way of gift. It appears odd for a transaction to be upheld as a charge when the intention of the parties was that of an assignment. It has been said many times that if an assignor intends to make an assignment and fails to comply with the necessary requirements, then a court will not rescue the transaction by upholding it as a trust.159 The same must go for rescuing an assignment by upholding it as a charge. However, it has also been said that it is not inconsistent with this rule that a court may impose a trust to protect the interest of the assignee.160 Perhaps upholding the equitable assignment of part of a debt as a charge merely serves this purpose.161 That is, it does not deny the efficacy of the assignment and the vesting of ownership in the assignee, but seeks to protect the interest of the assignee. Perhaps equity, like the common law, cannot identify any specific part of the debt or fund for the purposes of assignment. However, equity is capable of taking substantive institutions like trusts and charges and using them for a remedial or protective purpose. Thus, by using the notion of an equitable charge equity can protect the interest of the assignee as a true assignee and not a chargee. It would follow from this that equity’s requirement that the subject matter be identified is satisfied merely by the identification of the debt or fund and not the part of the debt or fund. 157
This would not automatically discharge the debt: see Re Cunningham [1965] WAR 115. (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 29. See also McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 ALR 289 at 296; Shepherd v FCT (1965) 113 CLR 385; Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 at 141; Ashby, Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697; Re Steel Wing Co Ltd [1921] 1 Ch 349 at 355 per PO Lawrence J; Brice v Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569; Durham Bros v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 at 773 per Chitty LJ (but cf Chitty LJ at 774 where he appears to suggest that insofar as the legislative scheme for legal assignments is concerned, any partial assignment is by way of charge (see also Jones v Humphreys [1902] 1 KB 10 at 13–14 per Lord Alverstone CJ, although on the facts before him, his statement may not be as objectionable as Chitty LJ’s)—however, as noted above, the reason for partial assignments falling outside the legislative regime is properly based on the impediments to enforcement in common law courts—this reasoning of Chitty LJ was doubted in Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 at 141). See further [7.39]–[7.40]. 159 Re Rose [1952] Ch 499 at 510. 160 [4.07]. 161 Perhaps this is the best explanation for the decision in Re Lawson Constructions Pty Ltd [1942] SASR 201. Cf Re Brush Aggregates Ltd [1983] Butterworths Company Law Cases (BCLC) 320 and the powerful criticism of this case in F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) at 74. 158
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Alternatively, in Ashby, Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons,162 Greene LJ suggested that in those cases where it was said that an equitable assignee had a charge over the fund, the expression was used to make the point that the assignee had a right against the fund, and not merely a personal right against an individual. It may also be the case that the word “charge” has been used loosely when the judge in fact meant assignment or mortgage.163 It may be that in some cases, although the transaction was intended to be an assignment, it was still characterised as a charge for the purposes of some legislative provision, so that maintaining the distinction in that context was immaterial.164 However, from a doctrinal perspective assignment and charge must be kept distinct.165 As already noted, when dealing with a security the notion that the mortgage takes effect by way of charge (as opposed to a charge taking effect by way of partial assignment) is less offensive because every mortgage incorporates a charge. When used to express an outright assignment though the notion that the assignment takes effect by way of charge remains problematic. Goode suggests that the reason for this confusion of terminology “lies in the fact that in contrast to charges on tangibles, under which the creditor looks to the proceeds of the charged asset, a charge on a debt or fund is enforced by collecting payment out of the fund from the fund holder in the same way as under a partial assignment, and in construing the statutory provisions governing the assignment of choses in action the courts focused on the question whether the assignment was to be considered absolute or ‘by way of charge only,’ a phrase taken to include partial assignment”.166 Returning to the protection point made above, it may be that in the case of an outright assignment the law recognises a charge on the fund for the purposes of ensuring that the assignment cannot be defeated.167 This may be no more than an application or extension of the principle that every mortgage incorporates a charge; the expression “assignment by way of charge” is then simply a shorthand expression for such a transaction. However, if correct, this analysis would not apply only to partial assignments. Another possibility may be that perhaps some courts see an analogy between an assignment of part of a debt and the recognition of equitable interests in contracts 162
[1936] 2 All ER 697 at 708. See UTC Ltd v NZI Securities Australia Ltd (1991) 4 WAR 349 at 354 per Ipp J. 164 Eg Re Kent & Sussex Sawmills Ltd [1947] 1 Ch 177; Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602. See also Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 399 at 446 per McHugh and Gummow JJ. 165 See Sheahan v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 407 at 422–3 per Brennan CJ. 166 R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.52. See also PG Turner, “Assignment by Way of Charge” (2004) 24 Australian Bar Review 1 at 5–13, tracing much of the idea that a charge takes effect as an assignment to a misunderstanding of the decision in Biggerstaff v Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd [1896] 2 Ch 93. 167 See [3.17]. 163
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for the sale of unascertained or future goods.168 In the latter, equity has generally always followed the law, requiring the goods to be ascertained, present and unconditionally appropriated to the contract before any transfer would be recognised. Thus, generally, no equitable interest is recognised as it would arise only at the same time that the legal interest was transferred. It is not necessary here to debate whether this is the approach equity should take to contracts for the sale of goods except to note that this analogy may have been impliedly drawn, thus requiring the recognition of a charge to give effect to the partial assignment of a debt.169 It is suggested, however, that there is no impediment to the recognition of an outright assignment of part of a debt.170 Moreover, the proper characterisation of such an assignment is not the assignment of an unascertained part of an ascertained whole but rather the assignment of something akin to the sale of specific goods. In the case of sale of goods, it has generally been thought that a sale of an undivided share (expressed as a fraction) in goods, such as the sale of a share in a racehorse, is a sale of specific goods so that legal title can pass without an act of appropriation.171 This is akin to what occurs in the case of the assignment of part of a debt. The debt is specific (indivisible) property. It is not akin to an identified bulk. In fact, most of the debate about this issue as regards sale of goods has been whether or not such a transaction concerns goods for the purposes of the legislation or merely a dealing in choses in action.172 The notion that the transfer involves specific property is generally accepted. It may be argued that one weakness with this analysis is where the assignment is not expressed as a fraction. Here it could be argued that the “assignment” is more akin to the transfer of an unascertained part of an ascertained whole. It is suggested that this is incorrect, and that an assignment of part of a debt is always an assignment of a fraction no matter how it is expressed, and must always be analysed in terms of a fraction of the whole debt no matter what expression is used in the transaction.173 The result of such a partial assignment is that the assignor and assignee become co-owners.174 Presumably 168 See Hoare v Dresser (1859) 7 HL Cas 290 at 317–18, 11 ER 116 at 127 per Lord Cranworth, (cited in Palmer v Carey [1926] AC 703 at 706 per Lord Wrenbury); Ashby Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 at 704 per Greer LJ; Re Lawsons Construction Pty Ltd [1942] SASR 201 at 204 per Mayo J. 169 Cf R v Grieg [1931] VLR 413 at 435 per Cussen ACJ (suggesting that different considerations apply as regards assignment of part of a debt and the sale of part of a bulk of goods). 170 Sandford v DV Building & Constructions Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 137 at 141. 171 See Law Commission for England and Wales, Sale of Goods Forming Part of a Bulk (London, HMSO, 1993) Law Com No 215, paras 2.5–2.7. It is not clear whether the sale of a fractional share in an identified bulk is considered a sale of specific goods: see KCT Sutton, Sale and Consumer Law (4th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1995) at 94 and cf Law Commission for England and Wales, Sale of Goods Forming Part of a Bulk (London, HMSO, 1993) Law Com No 215, para 4.2. 172 See ibid, paras 2.5–2.7. 173 R Goode, Commercial Law in the Next Millennium (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at 73. Where the memorandum simply refers to a sum of money, it can be translated into a fraction, unless on construction the intention is merely to assign the fruits of the debt and not the “right” to payment. 174 Ashby, Warner & Co Ltd v Simmons [1936] 2 All ER 697 at 704 per Greer LJ (“[the] assignment gave [the assignee] an equitable claim on the fund if the fund came into existence”).
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this co-ownership is a tenancy in common,175 as this would allow each to enforce its own interest in its own name subject to the joinder of the other party.176 However, the interest of the assignee is assignable in whole or in part and therefore is usually referred to as a chose in action in its own right.177 The above assignment of a debt is to be distinguished from the assignment of a right to performance where that performance will ultimately result in a debt, but where the assignment is effective prior to the accrual of an obligation to pay, that is, prior to the coming into existence of a debt. For example, assume A owes a debt to B of £100 and that A wishes to assign to B part of a present right to an income stream for the purposes of paying the debt. A may alienate the entire income stream and express the assignment to terminate upon payment of a definite sum. However, it is more likely that A will assign “such part of [the income stream] as is necessary to pay B £100”.178 This is a partial assignment and, although ultimately when the income stream comes to an end it may be possible to determine the fractional interest assigned to B, it is difficult to calculate this at the time of the assignment. Arguably here the assignment is of an unascertained part of an ascertained whole, but the result is the same, the assignee becomes a co-owner of the whole to the extent of its interest.179 [4.28] The assignment of part of a chose in action. The same analysis must operate as regards partial assignments of choses in action other than debts. In commercial practice such an assignment may have limited use other than in the 175 Although there is a view that at law a chose in action can only be co-owned jointly, in equity it can be co-owned by tenants in common, and presumably a tenancy in common would be implied, particularly if the interests are not equal: see Re McKerrell [1912] 2 Ch 648 and see AP Bell, Modern Law of Personal Property in England and Ireland (London, Butterworths, 1989) at 74–5, 166–7. Where parties hold rights as joint tenants, they will hold undivided interests in the whole of the subject property. Therefore, one joint tenant cannot separate and assign its interest so as to constitute the assignee a joint tenant. Such a result can be achieved only by the establishment of a new joint tenancy. However, a joint tenant can sever the joint tenancy so as to create a distinct interest in the subject matter and, if the subject matter is otherwise transferable, assign that interest so that the assignee takes as tenant in common: see Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 at 575 per Deane J. 176 See Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Microcomputer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 389. 177 See FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440 at 450. 178 Drawing the distinction here between the assignment of a right to performance and a debt would be more difficult where the obligation to pay accrued from moment to moment; such instances are rare. Another possibility is for A to assign “the next £100 to be derived from [the income stream]”. This is likely to be an assignment of future property if no debt exists at the time of the intended assignment. When the property does come into existence, then if the debt accruing from the income stream is £100 the assignment is properly characterised as absolute, not partial. If the debt is greater than £100 then the assignment is partial and is a fractional assignment of a debt. 179 Although the cases have not adopted this reasoning, the same analysis could explain the efficacy of a partial assignment of an interest in a shareholding. The result is not based on the subject matter being fungible because the interest is indivisible and incapable of being fungible: see R Goode, “Are Intangible Assets Fungible?” in P Birks and A Pretto (eds), Themes in Comparative Law (Oxford, Hart, 2002) ch 7. See generally Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452; Re Harvard Securities Ltd [1997] 2 BCLC 369.
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case of a contractual right to performance, where that performance will require the payment of money but where the debt has yet to accrue. However, unlike the position as regards debts, equity’s ability to enforce such rights is limited and its ability to grant legal remedies non-existent. It follows that the joinder of the assignor (who may or may not want to take enforcement action) should be a matter of substantive law. There is nothing unique in this result; the position is the same as that involving joint promisees. [4.29] Conclusion. It follows from the analysis above that partial assignments are true assignments. It should be added that although such assignments are not “absolute” for the purposes of most legislative regimes for legal assignments, the construction of these regimes is driven by their focus on protecting the debtor and the procedural impediments to enforcing a debt piecemeal in a court of law. They should not to be viewed as evidence of any fundamental impossibility of assigning part of a debt. Moreover, it may be noted that the statutory regime for legal assignment in Western Australia expressly recognises the partial assignment of debts.180 Given that that regime is concerned with absolute assignments not by way of charge, this jurisdiction must then envisage a true assignment of part of a debt.
(e) Assignment of Future Interests [4.30] Introduction. Since this chapter is concerned with the proper characterisation of equitable assignments, it is necessary to say something about the characterisation of so-called “assignments” of future interests. [4.31] Assignments of future property. Strictly, it is not possible to assign future property as it does not exist. However, when made for value, equity will give effect to such transactions by upholding them as agreements to assign future property. Upon the property coming into existence the assignee takes an immediate interest, as the transaction takes effect as an assignment at that point rather than being merely a bipartite transaction between the assignor and assignee. In Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn,181 Dixon J expressed the position in the following manner:182 As the subject to be made over does not exist, the matter primarily rests in contract. Because value has been given on the one side, the conscience of the other party is bound 180
Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s20(3). (1937) 58 CLR 1. See also Re Lind [1915] 2 Ch 345 at 357, 358, 360 per Swinfen Eady LJ; Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523 at 543 per Lord Macnaghten; Booth v FCT (1987) 164 CLR 159 at 165 per Mason CJ. 182 (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 27. 181
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It also follows that the assignor never takes the full beneficial interest as the assignment actually binds the property itself when it comes into existence.183 [4.32] Nature of the interest held by the assignee. An issue then arises as to the nature of the interest held by the assignee prior to the property coming into existence. Prima facie the assignee’s rights appear to rest simply in contract. However, it has been said, and it appears settled, that the assignee’s interest is not merely contractual but has some of the incidents of a proprietary interest.184 The fact that the assignment occurs upon the property coming into existence without any act of the parties evidences that the right of the assignee prior to this time is more than merely contractual. This is an issue that is important when the assignor becomes bankrupt. For example, assume there is an assignment by way of sale where for a certain consideration the assignor agrees to assign some expectancy. Assume that prior to that expectancy coming into existence the assignor becomes bankrupt and is later discharged from bankruptcy, and that it is only after this that the property comes into existence and is vested in the assignor. The discharge from bankruptcy would release the assignor from its obligation under the “sale”. If the assignee’s interest under the agreement to assign, which in this example is the same transaction as the sale, merely rests in contract then that too is released. If, however, the assignee’s interest is a “higher interest” then arguably it should continue to attach to the property when it comes into existence. Another, more likely, example is where an assignor assigns an expectancy as security for some debt owed to the creditor/assignee. The assignor then becomes bankrupt and is discharged from bankruptcy without the assignee proving in the bankruptcy and only later does the property come into existence. Here, again, the debtor would be released from its liability to the creditor following the discharge of bankruptcy and this would include the covenant to pay under the security. Despite legislative provisions then allowing for the enforcement of securities in the 183 Re Lind [1915] 2 Ch 345 at 360 per Swinfen Eady LJ; Re Row Dal Constructions Pty Ltd [1966] VR 249 at 254 per Herring CJ; Re Androma Pty Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 134 at 152 per McPherson J. 184 FCT v Everett (1978) 21 ALR 625 at 643–4 per Deane J (Deane J was in the minority in this case and the decision of the majority was later affirmed by the High Court ((1980) 143 CLR 440); however, this point was not mentioned by the High Court and later decisions of the High Court have approved Deane J’s statement as to the effect of such an assignment). See also Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 27 per Dixon J; McIntyre v Gye (1994) 122 ALR 289 at 296–7; Booth v FCT (1987) 164 CLR 159 at 177 per Toohey and Gaudron JJ. In the case of a security assignment, its immediate effect will be that of a floating security: see Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 3 WLR 58 at 93 per Lord Scott.
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face of such a release,185 if the assignee’s security interest under the assignment merely rested in contract, that too would be discharged, leaving the assignee with no claim to the subject property. However, in Re Lind,186 which is now the leading case in this area,187 in a factual situation akin to the one just mentioned, it was held that the assignee continues to have an interest in the subject property when it comes into existence. Much of the reasoning of the court was based on the idea that the assignee’s interest prior to the subject matter coming into existence is a “higher” interest than a mere contractual interest.188 A question arises whether the reasoning in Re Lind can be applied to the first example. The question in Re Lind was whether or not the transaction created a security. As long as the creditor was characterised as a “secured creditor” the security could be enforced despite the discharge. It is possible to classify the relationship between the debtor and creditor as a secured relationship without any transfer of the secured property. Arguably, for the assignee’s interest in the first example to survive the assignor’s bankruptcy and discharge from bankruptcy there needs to have been a transfer prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy. However, it is probably sufficient that the assignee’s interest is classified as proprietary to survive discharge and the higher right analysis achieves that. Certainly, despite the narrow question in Re Lind, the weight of the reasoning simply relied on the recognition of a “higher right”, and there is no logical reason to limit this to security transactions.189 Moreover, it would be inconsistent to limit the reasoning in Re Lind to intended security assignments and not outright transfers when the relevant legislation continues, insofar as assignments are concerned, to define a secured creditor as a creditor holding a mortgage: a mortgage assumes a transfer.190 185
Eg Insolvency Act 1986 (Eng) s281(1) and (2); Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 153(1) and (3). [1915] 2 Ch 345. See also Re Gillott’s Settlement [1934] 1 Ch 97. Cf Collyer v Isaacs (1881) 19 Ch D 342. See also Re Dent [1923] 1 Ch 113; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 117 ALR 61. See further RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) paras 6.275–6.330. 187 See Palette Shoes Pty Ltd v Krohn (1937) 58 CLR 1 at 27 per Dixon J (referring to Re Lind and saying; “[A]lthough the matter rests primarily in contract, the prospective right in property which the assignee obtains ‘is a higher right than the right to have specific performance of a contract,’ and it may survive the assignor’s bankruptcy because it attaches without more eo instanti when the property arises and gives the assignee an equitable interest therein.”). 188 [1915] 2 Ch 345 at 357, 358 per Swinfen Eady LJ, at 365 per Phillimore LJ, at 373–4 per Bankes LJ. 189 However, at one point in his judgment, Swinfen Eady LJ did say ([1915] 2 Ch 345 at 360–1, and see at 370–1 per Bankes LJ), in answer to an argument that because the debts created by the mortgage were discharged, so too was the ancillary contract relating to future property, that; “The answer is that the mortgagees . . . elected to rely upon their security, and not to prove, and therefore as mortgagees they stand outside the bankruptcy; and, moreover, that any contract contained in those deeds for vesting the future property in the mortgagees was ancillary not to the debt, but to the mortgage by which the debt was secured.” See also Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1993) 117 ALR 61 at 73 per Hill J and cf at 63 per Jenkinson J. 190 Insolvency Act 1986 (Eng) s248; Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s5. 186
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[4.33] Problems with the analysis.191 Despite the interest of the assignee prior to the property coming existence being well settled by case law, the actual characterisation of this right remains problematic.192 To say that the assignee’s interest is higher than a mere contractual right merely begs the question, “a higher interest in respect of what”? There is only the agreement to assign. Nevertheless, arguably this analysis provides a desired commercial result. Moreover, given that the efficacy of “assignments” of future property is the basis for the development of the floating charge it would appear that the “higher right” analysis is now so well entrenched that is makes little sense spending time critiquing it. The result in Re Lind is usually explained on the basis of relation back. That is, where the consideration for an agreement to assign is executed equity immediately gives effect to the assignment, but it relates back to the date of contract. However, this merely begs another question: why does it relate back? In the result, it is suggested that any problems in recognising the proprietary character of the right vested in the assignee flow from either limiting property and property law to being concerned with the recognition of rights in things or putting too much emphasis on the need for a presently existing thing. A large part of property and property law is concerned with characterising relationships between people in respect of things.193 The things may be either present or future. Property rights come into existence by some causative event. The most usual such event is consent. Thus, the execution of a contract, such as a memorandum of mortgage, immediately brings into existence property rights in terms of characterising the relationship between the parties. It is logical at that point to refer to the creditor as a secured creditor. The actual existence of the thing is necessary only for the purposes of attachment or transfer or for recognising some sui generis interest in the property.194 So long as that proprietary relationship continues to exist then property coming into existence which can be identified as the subject matter of that relationship will be
191 See generally R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 2.13. 192 See RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) para 6.320. See further CJ Davis, “Floating Rights” [2002] CLJ 423. 193 Some may take the view that this is all property and property law are concerned with. It could even be argued that the need for a “thing” no longer reflects the entirety of the category “property”. However, at the level of doctrinal law there remains a strong view that property law is not merely concerned with relationships between people in respect of things, but that it is still sensible and useful to continue to characterise some rights as rights “in” things. This expression has its use where any enforcement mechanism is against the thing itself: see EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 6–10; P Ali, The Law of Secured Finance (Oxford, OUP, 2002) paras 2.33–2.40. 194 In the case of a floating security where property which is the subject of the charge exists, it is not necessary to characterise the interest of the chargee (prior to crystallisation) as merely a proprietary relationship with the chargor. When such property exists the chargee has an interest over that property, although that interest is not fixed on any particular property.
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attached. Hence the relation back.195 Importantly, that relationship can continue despite the non-consensual discharge, release or extinction of the underlying contract, as the proprietary relationship arises as a matter of law as a consequence of the initial consensual agreement between the parties. If it is necessary to place a description on the interest of the assignee arising from this relationship, it can be expressed as an equity.
195 It also follows that the nature and characterisation of this relationship are dependent upon the type of transaction entered into between the parties. For example, this relation back does not occur upon crystallisation of a floating charge: see R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) paras 4.07, 5.38. However, prior to crystallisation the relationship between chargor and chargee is proprietary as there is a present security. It follows that if a situation were to arise where despite crystallisation the chargee had to rely on its pre-crystallisation interest then that interest was different from the interest that takes effect from crystallisation: see ibid, paras 5.40. See further [7.15].
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5 Statutory or Legal Assignments (a) Introduction [5.01] Purpose of the chapter. Since the passing of the Judicature Act 1873, it has been said that legal choses in action may be assigned at law. At the same time, it has also been said that the statutory regime is a procedural provision. These statements are inconsistent. The purpose of this chapter is to explore this inconsistency to determine whether or not there can be a true legal assignment of contractual rights at law. Unlike the position with equitable assignments of legal rights, there is no issue here as to whether statutory or legal assignments are true assignments. That is, in the case of contractual rights, if one takes a substantive view of the legal regime then clearly there is a true legal transfer, as title is transferred by way of extinction and creation and the right to performance is actually transferred so that the assignee is owed the obligation. If the procedural view is adopted there will also be a true transfer and the analysis of such a transaction will be the same as set out in Chapter 4 in the section dealing with equitable assignments of legal rights. There is nothing akin to the “contract analysis” as discussed in Chapter 4 appearing in the cases concerning statutory assignments to complicate the picture. However, clearly there is an issue as to the characterisation of such an assignment. The answer to this lies with resolving the abovementioned inconsistency. In the result, it is concluded that the statutory regime has a substantive effect rather than being merely procedural in effect. Thus, transactions complying with the regime are true legal assignments. [5.02] Structure of the chapter. Apart from this introduction, the chapter has three sections. The first sets out the arguments for the procedural view, the second the arguments for a substantive view and the last reaches a conclusion. [5.03] Contents of the statutory provisions. The contents of the various provisions for statutory or legal assignment existing in England and all Australian states are essentially the same. For the purposes of the discussion in this chapter, the English and New South Wales provisions are set out here. The relevant English
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provision is contained in section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1915 and provides:1 (1) Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only) of any debt or other legal thing in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to claim such debt or thing in action, is effectual in law (subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee) to pass and transfer from the date of such notice— (a) the legal right to such debt or thing in action; (b) all legal and other remedies for the same; and (c) the power to give a good discharge for the same without the concurrence of the assignor: Provided that, if the debtor, trustee or other person liable in respect of such debt or thing in action has notice— (a) that the assignment is disputed by the assignor or any person claiming under him; or (b) of any other opposing or conflicting claims to such debt or thing in action; he may, if he thinks fit, either call upon the persons making claim thereto to interplead concerning the same, or pay the debt or other thing in action into court under the provisions of the Trustee Act 1925.
The relevant New South Wales provision is contained in section 12 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) and provides: Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (not purporting to be by way of charge only) of any debt or other legal chose in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or chose in action, shall be, and be deemed to have been effectual in law (subject to all equities which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee if this Act had not passed) to pass and transfer the legal right to such debt or chose in action from the date of such notice, and all legal and other remedies for the same, and the power to give a good discharge for the same without the concurrence of the assignor: Provided always that if the debtor, trustee, or other person liable in respect of such debt or chose in action has notice that such assignment is disputed by the assignor or anyone claiming under the assignor, or any other opposing or conflicting claims to such debt or chose in action, the debtor, trustee or other person liable shall be entitled if he or she thinks fit, to call upon the 1 Conveyancing Act 1919 (ACT) s12; Law of Property Act 2000 (NT) s182; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s199(1) and (2); Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s15; Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1884 (Tas) s86(1) and (2); Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) s134; Property Law Act (1969) (WA) s20. Prior to the enactment of these provisions, South Australia enacted a general provision for the assignment of choses in action which for a time co-existed with the Judicature Act provisions. It is discussed in Robinson v The State of South Australia [1928] SASR 42.
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several persons making claim thereto to interplead concerning the same, or he or she may, if he or she thinks fit, pay the same into court under and in conformity with the provisions of the Acts for the relief of trustees.
(b) The Procedural View [5.04] Introduction. The provisions for statutory or legal assignment have their origins in section 25(6) of the Judicature Act 1873. Generally, the Judicature Act brought about certain procedural reforms to the administration of law and equity in England.2 The history and effect of these reforms have been well documented.3 As to legal assignments being part of this reform, it is said that the effect of the statutory regime is merely procedural. By this it is meant that the statutory regime for legal assignment does no more than allow an assignee, who previously could have maintained a claim in the assignor’s name (by reason of an equitable assignment of a legal right), to sue the debtor in its own name without joining the assignor and give a good discharge. However, if the statutory regime is a procedural provision then it must follow that, although the assignee can sue in its own name, the right assigned is still an equitable right. That is, the assigned right is notionally legal for the purpose of allowing the assignee to bring an action in its own name. [5.05] Support for the procedural view. There is much case support for the view that the statutory regime is merely procedural.4 That support essentially relies on the procedural nature of the Judicature Act reforms. Moreover, there is some support for taking the procedural analysis to the ultimate conclusion mentioned in the last paragraph, namely that the assignee’s interest is only notionally legal. In 2
See generally Judicature Commission, First Report of the Commissioners London, HMSO, (1869). Eg RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity, Doctrines and Remedies (4th edn, Sydney, Butterworths, 2002) ch 2; P Loughlan, in P Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (2nd edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 2003) para 111. See also Britain v Rossiter (1879) 11 QBD 123 at 129 per Brett LJ. 4 Burlinson v Hall (1884) 12 QBD 347 at 349 per Day J; Victoria Insurance Co v King (1895) 6 QLJ 202 at 203 (affirmed [1896] AC 250); Marchant v Morton, Down & Co [1901] 2 KB 829 at 832 per Channell J; Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 435 per Channell J (reversed on another point [1903] 1 KB 644); Tolhurst v The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660 at 676 per Cozens Hardy LJ ([1903] AC 414 at 424 per Lord Lindley); Walker v The Bradford Old Bank Ltd (1883) 12 QBD 511 at 515 per Smith J. See also Snyder’s Ltd v Furniture Finance Corp Ltd [1931] 1 DLR 398 at 313; Trubenizing Process Corp v John Forsyth Ltd [1943] 4 DLR 577 at 580; Slattery v Slattery [1946] 1 DLR 304 at 313; Pettit & Johnston v Foster Wheeler Ltd [1950] 2 DLR 42 at 48–9 (affirmed [1950] 3 DLR 320); Harding Carpets Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1980] 4 WWR 149 at 157–60. See further S Williston, “Is the Right of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?” (1916) 30 Harv LR 97 at 105; S Williston, “The Word ‘Equitable’ and its Application to the Assignment of Choses in Action” (1917–18) Harv LR 822 at 833 and cf WW Cook, “The Alienability of Choses in Action” (1916) Harv LR 816 at 821. 3
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Harding Carpets Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada,5 it was held that in a priority dispute a statutory assignee may be postponed to another assignee who gives first notice to the debtor.6 The reasoning of Morse J in that case was based in part on the procedural nature of the statutory regime. It was thought that the efficacy of a statutory assignment was based on equity, that is, it did not transfer to the assignee any rights recognised by the common law.7 This suggests that Morse J was of the view that the assignee’s rights were equitable.8 In addition, although not stated, it would appear to follow from his judgment that he applied the rule in Dearle v Hall 9 to resolve the priority dispute. The application of this rule to resolve a priority dispute between an equitable and a legal assignee carries the weight of judicial support.10 Moreover, it further suggests that the statutory assignee’s interest is equitable as the rule applies to priority disputes between competing equitable interests.11 Morse J also based his decision on that part of the statutory regime which states that the assignee takes subject to the equities. In England that provision states that the assignee takes “subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee”. In New South Wales the provision states that assignee takes “sub5
[1980] 4 Western Weekly Reports (WWR) 149. Under Anglo-Australian law this dispute will arise only where there is a prior equitable assignment and a later statutory assignment. If the statutory assignment is first and the equitable assignment second (such as where there is a legal assignment by way of mortgage and the assignor further assigns its equity of redemption), the notice required for the efficacy of the statutory assignment will automatically be notice for the purposes of priority. In Harding Carpets Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1980] 4 WWR 149, Morse J was of the view that, under the relevant Canadian legislation, notice was not a necessary requirement for a statutory assignment. Thus, it was legitimate to speak of a contest between a statutory and equitable assignee prior to any of them giving notice. Under Anglo-Australian law the case would be understood as a competition between a prior equitable assignee and a later statutory assignee. 7 [1980] 4 WWR 149 at 158. 8 See also S Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (3rd edn, New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co, 1960) iii, para 447. 9 (1828) 3 Russ 1, 38 ER 475. 10 The authorities usually relied upon for this point are E Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf GmbH & Co v Arbuthnot Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 150 at 162–3 per Phillips J; Harding Carpets Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1980] 4 WWR 149 and Marchant v Morton, Down & Co [1901] 2 KB 829 per Channell J (but see the powerful arguments put forward by Oditah that these cases are not strong authorities for this point and, in any case, should be rejected in terms of principle: see F Oditah, “Priorities: Equitable Vesus Legal Assignments of Book Debts” (1989) 9 OJLS 513 at 517 and F Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) para 6.15). See also Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602 at 620–1 per Mummery J. See further OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1950) at 104–5; S Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (3rd edn, New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co, 1960) iii, para 438; JS Ziegel, “The Legal Problems of Wholesale Financing of Durable Goods in Canada” (1963) 41 Can BR 54 at 109; P Biscoe, Credit Factoring (London, Butterworths, 1975) at 132–7; DM McLauchlan, “Priorities and Equitable Tracing Rights and Assignments of Book Debts” (1980) 96 LQR 90; R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 5.09; EI Sykes and S Walker, The Law of Securities (5th edn, Sydney, Law Book Co, 1993) at 870–2. 11 Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 602. Cf Palmer v Locke (1881) 18 Ch D 381 at 386–7 per Jessel MR (affirmed (1881) 18 Ch D 381); Re Duck Jarm (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 521 at 526. 6
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ject to all equities which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee”. It was thought that these words did not govern the relationship between merely the assignee and debtor but also the assignee and competing third parties. More recently, Lord Goff in Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp (The Trident Beauty)12 also appears to have adopted a procedural view of the statutory regime. That case concerned an action by a debtor against a defendant assignee to recover a payment made on the ground of total failure of consideration. The assignment appears to have fulfilled all the requirements of the statutory regime. In discussing the role restitution should play in cases involving third parties, Lord Goff characterised the case as one in which the plaintiff had conferred a benefit on the defendant (assignee) in the course of performing an obligation to a third party (assignor).13 However, if the effect of a statutory assignment were substantive, the assignee would own the assigned right outright and the obligor’s duty would be owed only to the assignee and not in part to the assignor.14 The assignor would stay in the picture as a matter of contract and may still have duties to perform. It is only if the statutory regime is procedural that it could be said that the obligor would continue to owe any substantive duty in part to the assignor.15
(c) The Substantive View [5.06] Primary argument for the substantive view. The primary argument for the statutory regime having a substantive effect flows from the words of the provision. The relevant provision in each jurisdiction has words to the effect that the assignment shall be “effectual in law . . . to pass and transfer the legal right to such debt or thing in action”.16 On its face this clearly suggests that the assignee takes the assignment at law not in equity and that it obtains a legal right and not an equitable right. In Read v Brown,17 it was argued that “legal right” as it appears in the 12 [1994] 1 WLR 161. Cf his remarks at first instance in Ellerman Lines Ltd v Lancaster Maritime Co Ltd (The Lancaster) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 497 at 503 (where he refused to apply the rule in Dearle v Hall to a competition between a legal assignee and an equitable assignee, holding that the legal assignee “ranks before any equitable interest, even a prior equitable interest, unless the [legal] assignee had actual or constructive notice of the equitable interest at the time of the assignment.”). 13 [1994] 1 WLR 161 at 166. 14 Other than a bare personal obligation, perhaps (see [8.36]) Lord Goff was only intending to express the point that in the case of an assignment of a contractual right, what the assignee purchases is a right to a contractual obligation owed to the assignor: see [3.10]. 15 [8.06]. 16 Eg Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s12. 17 (1888) 22 QBD 128. See also Durham Brothers v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 at 773 per Chitty LJ; Bacon v Yatchaw Irrigation and Water Supply Trust (1898) 23 VLR 485 at 487–8 per Williams J; Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 373 per Cozens-Hardy LJ; Bennett v White [1910] 2 KB 643 at 646 per Cozens-Hardy MR, at 648 per Farewell LJ, at 648 per Kennedy LJ; Herkules Piling Ltd v Tilbury Construction Ltd (1992) 61 BLR 107 at 116, 118 per Hirst J.
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provision meant the same thing as “legal and other remedies” as it appears later in the section. Lord Esher MR (with whom Fry and Lopes LJJ agreed) said:18 It is said that [the statutory regime] only affects procedure . . . [T]he words mean what they say; they transfer the legal right to the debt as well as the legal remedies for its recovery. The debt is transferred to the assignee and becomes as though it had been his from the beginning; it is no longer the debt of the assignor at all, who cannot sue for it, the right to sue being taken from him; the assignee becomes the assignee of a legal debt and is not merely an assignee in equity, and the debt being his, he can sue for it, and sue in his own name.
[5.07] The argument against the literal view: applicability of the regime to equitable choses in action. There is an argument that suggests that the literal view of the provision cannot be sustained. This argument is not itself directly concerned with the substantive/procedural issue being discussed here, but rather with whether the provision applies to the equitable assignment of equitable interests. One point that fuels this argument is the reference to a “trustee” in the provision. If the provision applies to the assignment of equitable interests, it becomes nonsensical to construe it literally. Under this argument, the better construction of the provision is that it was intended to capture those rights which before the Act were capable of lawful assignment.19 The High Court of Australia (in obiter) has adopted this view of the provision.20 In the section that follows, it is suggested that the provision does not generally apply to the assignment of an equitable chose in action. However, there may be one exception. The exception arises where there is a chain of assignments and where the first assignment involves an equitable assignment of a legal interest. For example, assume A attempts to assign a legal debt to B which fails to satisfy the statutory requirements because no notice is given to the debtor, but which nevertheless takes effect as an equitable assignment. B then assigns its entire interest to C which in turn assigns its entire interest to D. Clearly, the assignments to C and D are assignments of equitable choses in action. However, if the assignments to C and D are assignments of the assignor’s entire interest then the end result is that D owns the right that was once vested in B which, in terms of characterisation, is the equitable ownership of the promise made by the debtor to A. The result is that B and C effectively drop out of the picture so that there is only a tripartite relation-
18
(1888) 22 QBD 128 at 131–2. The equivalent New Zealand provision now expressly provides that it applies to equitable choses in action: see Property Law Act 1952 (NZ) s130(1). 20 FCT v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440 at 447 per Barwick CJ, Stephen, Mason and Wilson JJ. Cf Law Institute of Victoria v Cowan [1973] VR 293 at 302. See also OR Marshall, The Assignment of Choses in Action (London, Pitman & Sons, 1950) at 166–8; FCT Tudsberry, The Nature, Requisites and Operation of Equitable Assignments (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1912) at 10–12; R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) para 1.12. 19
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ship left. If B could have given notice to the debtor for the purposes of rendering the assignment legal, then there seems no reason why D (who took an equitable assignment of an equitable interest) cannot now give notice, render the assignment legal and vest in D the legal right to the chose. The requirements of that notice may be more onerous than those that would have applied if B were giving the notice.21 [5.08] In defence of the literal view. Subject to the exception just noted, there are a number of arguments that suggest the provision was not intended to apply to the equitable assignment of equitable interests.22 [5.09] First, the provision applies to the assignment of any “debt or other legal thing in action”. There is no mention of equitable choses in action. Moreover, if the provision does apply to equitable assignments of equitable interests then on its face it transfers a “legal right”.23 That cannot be correct unless it is limited to the exception suggested above as well as to leg