The End of Tradition, or the Tradition of Endings? i
The End of Tradition?
‘Since the beginning of history, human bei...
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The End of Tradition, or the Tradition of Endings? i
The End of Tradition?
‘Since the beginning of history, human beings have been fascinated with endings – the end of their lives, the end of seasons and the end of the world . . .’, so says Nezar AlSayyad in his preface to The End of Tradition? But, he and his contributors argue, endings are also coupled with beginnings, and destruction is sometimes a precondition for construction or reconstruction, particularly where the built environment is concerned. Indeed, the end of tradition does not entail the death of tradition itself, only our conception of it – and the emergence of a need to re-evaluate its utility as a repository of authentic (and hence valuable) ideas to be handed down or preserved. Following an introductory chapter in which Nezar AlSayyad presents the current debates about ‘endings’, about ‘tradition’, and about the relationship between tradition and modernity, the book is divided into three parts. Part I, ‘Traditions of the Modern’, explores the ways in which the terms ‘tradition’ and ‘modern’ have become inextricably linked, while Part II, ‘Invented Landscapes’, chronicles how traditions are identified, manufactured, and deployed. The final Part, ‘Programmes of Tradition’, reveals how tradition is deployed, resisted and reworked through hegemonic struggles that seek to create both built environments and citizen subjects. Drawing on case studies from round the world, Nezar AlSayyad and his contributors provide a unique window on how globalization has unsettled the conventional connection between place and culture and so given rise to the question ‘The End of Tradition?’.
ii The End of Tradition?
The End of Tradition, or the Tradition of Endings? iii
The End of Tradition?
edited by
Nezar AlSayyad
iv The End of Tradition?
First published 2004 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Talyor and Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. © 2004 Selection and editorial, Nezar AlSayyad; individual chapters, the authors This book was commissioned and edited by Alexandrine Press, Marcham, Oxfordshire All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data The end of tradition? / edited by Nezar AlSayyad.—1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0–415–29040–6 — ISBN 0–415–29041–4 (pbk.) 1. Tradition (Philosopy) 2. Globalization—Social aspects. 3. Globalization— Political aspects. I. Alsayyad, Nezar. B105.T7 E53 2003 148—dc22 2003018044 ISBN 0-203-42133-7 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-67479-0 (Adobe eReader Format)
The End of Tradition, or the Tradition of Endings? v
Contents Preface
vii
Illustration credits and sources
ix
Contributors
xi
1 The End of Tradition, or the Tradition of Endings? Nezar AlSayyad
1
I. Traditions of the Modern 2 Tradition is (not) Modern: Deterritorializing Globalization Jane M. Jacobs 3 The Tradition of the End: Global Capitalism and the Contemporary Spaces of Apocalypse Katharyne Mitchell 4 Nostalgias of the Modern Ananya Roy
29
45
63
II. Invented Landscapes 5 Nature and Tradition at the Border: Landscaping the End of the Nation State Matthew Sparke 6 The Tensed Embrace of Tourism and Traditional Environments: Exclusionary Practices in Cancún, Cuba, and Southern Florida Robert Mugerauer
87
116
7 Architecture and the Production of Postcard Images: Invocations of Tradition vs. Critical Transnationalism in Curitiba 144 Clara Irazábal
III. Programmes of Tradition 8 Tradition as a Means to the End of Tradition: Farmers’ Houses in Italy’s Fascist-Era New Towns Mia Fuller
171
vi The Tradition? The EndEnd of of Tradition?
9 Cultural Identity and Architectural Image in Bo-Kaap, Cape Town Fabio Todeschini and Derek Japha
187
10 The Latency of Tradition: On the Vicissitudes of Walls in Contemporary China Duanfang Lu
210
11 Seizing Locality in Jerusalem Alona Nitzan-Shiftan
231
Selected Bibliography
256
Index
258
vi
The End of Tradition, or the Tradition of Endings? vii
Preface Since the beginning of history, human beings have been fascinated with endings – the end of their lives, the end of seasons, and the end of the world. In a sense, the idea of endings is as old as human history. This book, however, is not about endings. Instead, its starting point is a healthy scepticism with the utility of the notion of endings. In fact, for those of us who study the built environment, endings are also coupled with beginnings, and destruction (creative or otherwise) is sometimes a precondition or prerequisite to construction or reconstruction. My opportunity to take on the theme of endings came up when I was writing the Call for Papers for the IASTE 2000 conference, which was held in Trani, Italy, in a beautiful medieval fort on the Adriatic Sea. The previous IASTE conference, held in Cairo two years earlier, had dealt with the theme, ‘Consuming Traditions and Manufacturing of Heritage’, and later published as a book bearing the same title. It became clear during that conference, and in the process of putting a book together from it, that attention must be paid to cycles of life and death as they relate to tradition in the built environment. Additionally, my own interest in endings led me to structure the IASTE 2000 conference around three broad themes: ‘Deterritorialization and Traditions’, ‘Globalization and Place’, and ‘Tradition as a Call to Arms’. In general, the conference was concerned with a specific historical moment, one in which an all-consuming capitalism seemed to be levelling differences and particularities, but in which a resurgence of localisms, populisms, and fundamentalisms was simultaneously occurring. It was this paradoxical simultaneity which necessitated our question: ‘The End of Tradition?’ The papers at the conference showed how globalization unsettled the conventional connection between place and culture. While some saw these dislocations as new traditions in and of themselves, others argued that the spatial basis of tradition is still firmly grounded. Similarly, many of the conference papers demonstrated how the fervent revival of some place-based traditions marked the urban landscapes of much of the world at the end of the millennium. From the ravages of the Balkans, Afghanistan and Palestine, and, more recently, Iraq, to the nitty-gritty neighbourhood battles of post-industrial First World cities, the politics of difference were playing havoc with cities, nations, and regions. Subsequently, the events of September 11, 2001 made this point very clear, and necessitated turning these intellectual debates into a book. While no one can provide reasonable justification for the events of 9/11, we must all labour to understand their nature and repercussions. In doing so, we should refuse to read the attack on the World Trade Center as a meaningful protest against long-established traditions of urbanism, against globalization, or against America’s role in it. The individuals who perpetrated this atrocity harbour a fundamental ignorance of America and of the global landscape within which they exist. Their intolerance and fanatical belief in a singular invented truth remains
viii End The of End of Tradition? The Tradition?
the only rationale for their action. The new global realities demand that we be intolerant of intolerance itself. The failure of a few countries and peoples around the world to understand this message has allowed a climate in which a handful of maniacal individuals managed to hold the entire world hostage to their will, even after their death. Although the events of 9/11 occurred almost a year after the conference, some of the contributing authors revised their chapters to deal with their significance or repercussions. The book is mainly based on keynote papers at the conference, but they are complemented by additional chapters from the theme sessions. I have divided the book into three parts, dealing with traditions of the modern, invented landscapes, and programmes of tradition. Although I commented on all the chapters, I have specifically refrained from asking the contributing authors to abide by certain definitions or to come to an agreement regarding the ‘end of tradition’ as an intellectual notion. Indeed, any such agreement, if it emerges, is possibly a product of discussions we all had during and after the conference. This project took three years to complete, but I am very grateful to all the contributors for their commitment to it and to insisting on making it happen. Many individuals deserve serious thanks for helping put this book together. First, my partner Ananya Roy helped me articulate the initial idea for the conference, and later the book. Second, I would like to thank the people who helped me put the original conference together: Attilio Petruccioli, the local conference coordinator; Montira Horayangura, the conference coordinator; and Mark Gillem, the IASTE coordinator. Third, I would like to thank my research assistants who helped with different tasks on the project. Duanfang Lu was assigned the task of identifying library material, and never failed to discover new books and articles that educated me enormously. William Duncanson worked with me on my chapter, and it owes as much of its current form to him as it does to me. I am grateful for his intellectual input. Mrinalini Rajagopalan and Madhuri Desai helped with a variety of tasks during the time I put the book proposal together. Renu Desai was my principal research assistant on the editing task and was a very able liaison with my contributors. She did a superb job handling the book in its last stages and I am very thankful for her efforts. I am also grateful for the editorial advice we received from David Moffat. Fourth, I would like to thank Ann Rudkin at Alexandrine Press and Caroline Mallinder at Routledge. Ann handled the book in its final stages, answered many of the difficult issues faced by some of the contributors, and was very patient in dealing with all of us. I am very grateful for her work. Like many of my previous books, I hope that this book will excite and incite my students and my friends in the field to study further the traditions of place in this everchanging world. Nezar AlSayyad September 2003
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The End of Tradition, or the Tradition of Endings? ix
Illustration credits and sources The editor, contributors and publisher would like to thank all those who have granted permission to reproduce illustrations. We have made every effort to contact and acknowledge copyright holders, but if any errors have been made we would be happy to correct them at a later printing. Chapter 1 1.1, 1.2, 1.3
© Bill Duncanson
Chapter 2 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4
© Kim Dovey
Chapter 3 3.1 Source: Spencer Museum of Art: Museum purchase: Letha Churchill Walker Memorial Art Fund 3.2 © Duncan Long 3.3 © Peter Proksch 3.4 © Benetton. Source http://www.benetton.com/imgfuturefamily.jpg 3.5 Source http://www.irnpdx.edu/~strukn/Watts/images/riot3thumb.jpg 3.6 © Ron Olsen (source: http://www.workingreporter.com/riot2.jpg) 3.6 © Office of Logistics and Technology, Foundation for the Law of Time. Source http://www.tortuga.com/updates) Chapter 4 4.1 © Dafna Kory 4.2 © Casaro Renato 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 © Anaya Roy 4.7 © Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York/ADAGP, Paris/FLC 4.8, 4.9 Source: Battle of Algiers publicity material 4.10 Source: Charulata publicity material 4.11 Source: Anaya Roy Chapter 5 5.1 © Matthew Sparke 5.2, 5.3, 5.7 Source: Cascadia: A Tale of Two Cities, Mortone P. Beebe ©1996, Harry N. Abrams Publishers 5.4 © David D. McCloskey, Cascadia Institute 5.5 © Port of Seattle 5.6 Source: University of Washington, Special Collections Division, Seattle, WA. Negative # UW17081 Chapter 6 6.1–6.13 © Robert Mugerauer Chapter 7 7.1–7.8 © Clara Irazábal Chapter 8 8.1, 8.2 © Mai Fuller 8.3 Source: Dagoberto Ortensi, Edilizia rurale. Urbanistica di centri comunali e di borgate rurali, 2d edition, Rome, Casa Mediterranea, 1941, p. 515 8.4–8.9 © Mai Fuller ix
x The The EndEnd of Tradition? of Tradition?
Chapter 9 9.1 Source: National Library of South Africa, Cape Town 9.2 Source: Copy in the National Library of South Africa, Cape Town. © Atlas Van Stolk, Rotterdam: inventory number top.1052 9.3 Source: Cape Archives: M1/339 9.4 Source: Cape Archives: M/453 9.5, 9.6 Source: City Planner’s Department, Cape Town 9.7 Source: National Library of South Africa, Cape Town 9.8 Source: Cape Archives: E3860 9.9 Source: Cape Archives: E9181 9.10 © Fabio Todeschini and Derek Japha 9.11 Source: Cape Archives: M1/65 9.12 Source: Cape Archives, Elliott collection 9.13, 9.14, 9.15 © Fabio Todeschini and Derek Japha 9.16 Source: Cape Archives: E8145 9.17 Source: Cape Archives: E7807 9.18 Source: Cape Archives: E1933 9.19 Source: Cape Archives: Elliott collection 9.20 Source: Cape Archives: Elliott collection 9.21 Source: City Engineer’s Department, Cape Town: A740/9 9.22 Source: City Engineer’s Department, Cape Town:A740/54 9.23 Source: Die Burger, re-published in Suid-Afrikaanse Oorsig, October 1970; © Die Burger 9.24 © Fabio Todeschini and Derek Japha Chapter 10 10.1 Source: Edward Farmer, Early Ming Government: The Evolution of Dual Capital, Harvard East Asian Monographs, No. 66, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976 10.2 © Song Huancheng 10.3 Source: Liang Sicheng, Liang Sicheng wenji, Vol. 4, Beijing, Construction Industry Press, 1986 10.4, 10.5 © Duanfang Lu Chapter 11 11.1 Source: reprinted from Israel, The Ministry of Housing, Israel Builds, Tel Aviv, The Ministry of Housing, 1964 11.2 Source: David Kroyanker, Jerusalem – Conflicts over the City’s Physical and Visual Form, Jerusalem, Zmora-Bitan, 1988, p. 319 11.3 Source: Dubi Tal and Moni Haramati, Kav Ha-Ofek, (Jerusalem Skyline), Israel, Ministry of Defense, 1993, p. 9 11.4 © Ram Karmi 11.5 Source: Ministry of Labor, Housing Department, Tel Aviv, Israel 11.6 Source: Avraham Vachman and members of the Hachsharah 11.7 © Dan Etan 11.8 Source: Tvai, 1, Spring, 1966, p. 19 11.9 Source: Ram Karmi, ‘On the Architecture of Shadows’, kav, 3, 1965, p. 55 11.10 left: Source: Moshe Safdie, Safdie in Jerusalem, slidcas no. 3, London, Pidgeon Audio Visual, May 1979; top right: Alona Nitzan-Shiftan; bottom right: source: photograph by Amikam Shoov in Irit Zaharoni, Israel, Roots & Routes: A Nation Living in Its Landscape, Tel Aviv, MOD Pub. House, 1990, pp. 20–21 11.11 Source: Moshe Safdie, Jerusalem: The Future of the Past, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989, unpaginated. The photograph ‘Habitat Jerusalem’ is credited to Arnott Rogers Batten Ltd) 11.12 Source: G. Blas and I. Tatenbaum, Social Realism in the 1950, Political Art in the 1990s, Haifa, The New Haifa Museum, 1998, p. 97 x
The End of Tradition, or the Tradition of Endings? xi
Contributors Nezar AlSayyad is Professor of Architecture and Planning and Chair of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of California at Berkeley. He is also the Director of the International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments. Mia Fuller is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Italian Studies at the University of California at Berkeley. Clara Irazabal is an Assistant Professor of Urban Design and Planning in the School of Policy, Planning, and Development at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. Jane M. Jacobs is Director of Graduate School in Geography at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. Derek Japha is Professor of Architecture at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. Duanfang Lu is a Lecturer in Environment-Behaviour Studies in the School of Architecture, Design Science, and Planning in the Faculty of Architecture at the University of Sydney, Australia. Katharyne Mitchell is Associate Professor of Geography at the University of Washington at Seattle. Robert Mugerauer is Dean of the College of Architecture and Urban Planning at the University of Washington at Seattle. Alona Nitzan-Shiftan is currently a Samuel H. Kress Postdoctoral Curatorial Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Visual Arts at the National Gallery of Art in Washington D.C. Ananya Roy is Assistant Professor of Urban Studies in the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of California at Berkeley. Matthew Sparke is Associate Professor of Geography and International Studies at the University of Washington at Seattle. Fabio Todeschini is Professor of Architecture, City Planning, Urban Design, and Landscape Architecture at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. xi
xii The End of Tradition?
To Memories of Trani
The end of tradition, or the tradition of endings?
Chapter 1
The end of tradition, or the tradition of endings? Nezar AlSayyad
The July 2002 issue of Time magazine featured the prescient title ‘The Bible and the Apocalypse’ emblazoned on a cross engulfed in flames. This blasphemous image underscored the degree to which American popular culture has become obsessed with the ‘end of the world’. For some, 9/11 was an indication that the end was near. On that day, the prophecies of the Bible’s book of Revelations suddenly seemed to be manifest in our own backyard. Eerily coincident with the millennium, when the duel between the Lord Almighty and the beast Satan will take place, some believed it signalled the End. And according to Time, 59 per cent of Americans now believe that the events depicted in Revelations will come true.1 This view, of course, is a singularly Christian imaginary of the Apocalypse. Yet it is held by a substantial proportion of people in a country which, despite a Constitution dividing church and state, remains fundamentally Christian. References to ‘God’ on our money, in the classroom, and (make no mistake) in every speech by President George W. Bush are not to a generalized, ambiguous God, but to the same God that ‘our’ forefathers came to the ‘New World’ to worship. Consequently, this talk of Apocalypse, at least in the United States, is not empty. Increasingly, Americans see it as involving the need for a ‘Holy War’ against the ‘Holy War’.2 Indeed, the Time article focused on the popularity of a series of books on the (Christian) Apocalypse called Left Behind which have now sold more than 32 million copies – a surprisingly large number in a world of increased product differentiation.3 This certainly suggests that many Americans, if not actually awaiting the End, are at least curious about it. Clearly, the popular and often evangelical anxiety about endings has gained new import since the events of 9/11. But surprisingly, this is true not only for American Christians, but also for non-Christians and in other parts of the world. The irony, of course, is that what one group or nation may consider hell another may consider the road to heaven. But the consistent thread through all these discourses – on endings, on apocalypse, on heaven and hell – is that they are all ‘modern’ for having been dialectically constructed as a binary. Triumph is predicated upon the reciprocal defeat of an ‘other’. These debates, omnipresent not only in America but in other parts of the world, 1
The End of Tradition?
are instructive of the duplicity of discourses on endings – indeed, discourse in general. One needs merely to turn on the television to be reminded of how ‘endings’ and their perception have become instruments of propaganda in complex negotiations between competing subject positions. Thus, news coverage of the same incident in the Middle East by different networks like CNN, MSNBC, BBC, and Al-Jazeera, and their commentary on the looming apocalypse, underscores the relative positions of different cultural groups with different vested interests, politics, tactics, and beliefs. It may be reasonable to infer then that the study of endings is more about an end to certain noble truths than to any real end in the historical sense. This study of ‘ends’ is, paradoxically, not without precedent. There has, in fact, been a proliferation of proclaimed ends in both the popular media and academia coincidental with the ‘end of the millennium’. These ‘endings’, although secular, exhibit no less anxiety. They are, nonetheless, the stories of the end of things. Consequently, it makes sense to see what can be learned from these ‘other’ end(s) before we consider the end of ‘tradition’. Most importantly, this exercise will shed light on why one writes about an ‘end’ in the first place. Specifically, there are four recent ends that are often explicitly in dialogue with one another. Not surprisingly, each of these proposed ‘ends’ cites similar precedents and outcomes. However, there is little agreement as to whether the results are to be lamented or celebrated.
On endings While humans have been fascinated with cataclysmic tales of endings since time immemorial, more calculated accounts have been rare. The first scholarly discussion about endings in recent history was Daniel Bell’s The End of Ideology.4 Written in the late 1950s in the United States (and published in 1960) this book chronicled how the great catastrophes of the twentieth century (World War I, World War II, Russian totalitarianism, etc.) fomented a general suspicion and subsequent abandonment of nineteenthcentury utopian ideologies. ‘In the last decade, we have witnessed an exhaustion of the nineteenth-century ideologies, particularly Marxism, as intellectual systems that could claim truth for their views on the world.’5 Bell defined ideology as a means of translating ideas into action, and claimed that ‘few serious minds believe any longer that one can set down “blueprints” and through “social engineering” bring about a new utopia of social harmony’.6 By contrast, he argued that the acceptance of the ‘welfare state’ by both the ‘right’ and ‘left’ was demonstrative of intellectual and political convergence. Citing such trends, Bell outlined the potential malaise for contemporary intellectuals. The young intellectual is unhappy because the ‘middle way’ is for the middle-aged, not for him; it is without passion and is deadening. Ideology, which by its very nature is an all-or-none affair, and temperamentally the thing he wants, is intellectually devitalized, and few issues can be formulated any more, intellectually, in ideological terms.7
But Bell was actually excited about the prospect of an end to ideology, since he viewed ideology as a means to limit and ‘preconceive’ reality. As dogma, ideology gets in the way 2
The end of tradition, or the tradition of endings?
of new ideas. And in the end, he suggested, it was not prudent to sacrifice today for the future. Critics have suggested that history proved Bell’s prophecy false when in the 1960s many movements arose, fuelled by recombinant ideologies regarding human society. Ostensibly, the radicalism of the 1960s in the United States made Bell’s critique of the malaise surrounding issues of social justice moot. His theories, however, particularly regarding the difficulties facing intellectuals, were to be rekindled by others later. Bell’s was an end not so much of events or progress, but an anticipated end of what he considered the ‘dogma’ of nineteenth-century social planning. Significantly, he saw this end as a victory of sorts. No longer hampered by the musings of Marx, society would be free to develop new solutions for its problems. Implicit in Bell’s account, however, was the triumph of the Western democratic model over the (evil) dogmas of the nineteenth century. This victory existed in time, and was thus ‘historical’. Indeed, it was Bell’s trajectory of theoretical achievement by democracy (or failure of communism and totalitarianism) that suggested that those ‘other’ ideological models were dead. Not surprisingly, the historical transformations provided as evidence by Bell for the end of ideology also provided the starting point for other writers. The next major proposition about endings was Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, which identified a similar but, at first, less invidious end.8 According to Fukuyama, Hegel had envisioned an ‘end of history’ upon the consolidation of ‘free societies’.9 And pointing to the same twentieth-century events as Bell, he argued that because there was no conceivable alternative to liberal democracy, centuries of ideological evolution had come to an end.10 Thus, according to Fukuyama, the international consensus for liberal democracy was the ‘endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution’.11 However, in what amounted to a truly teleological account of philosophical and political development, Fukuyama allowed no room for alternative visions of the future. Indeed, all systems not currently conforming to the model of liberal democracy were merely waiting to become indoctrinated in the ‘struggle for recognition’, thus resulting in an end to history. But this end was clearly contingent upon a highly circumscribed definition of history, and as such, it became the cause of much of the confusion surrounding the book. For Fukuyama, history was simply the evolution of (Western) political ideology, and its end merely represented the inability to develop it further. To be sure, ‘events’ would continue, but none would significantly alter the political-economic makeup of the modern world. Like Bell, Fukuyama described what appeared, at first, to be a victorious tale of human development and progress. But it, too, held the seeds of a perverse and flawed future. Fukuyama, again citing Hegel and echoing Bell, warned that, upon achieving the peace and prosperity of the end of history, ‘men would face the constant danger of degenerating from citizens to mere bourgeois, and feeling contempt for themselves in the process’.12 Fukuyama’s end, again like Bell’s, was a tale of how an ostensibly celebratory series of events – the twentieth-century collapse of fascist, totalitarian, and other despotic regimes – could have a less-than-positive outcome. Nevertheless, notions of the ‘end of ideology’ and the ‘end of history’ both constituted radical, yet sanguine breaks with what had 3
The End of Tradition?
heretofore been considered the root of history and mankind – progress. In both accounts, progress, considered a single, coherent, evolutionary process, emerged as a simple tale of cause and effect. According to Fukuyama, if there was no further challenge, man would simply fester and die. Looking back, it is interesting today to note the ambivalence both authors exhibited toward such a dispassionate future. In the wake of 9/11, Fukuyama’s reticence appears as myopic as Bell’s some forty years ago. Today, it has become abundantly clear that there remain serious challenges to liberal democracy. But fundamentalist Islam is not the only one, and all threats are not necessarily violent. For example, China, despite becoming increasingly market oriented, has maintained a uniquely Chinese authoritarian government, indicating how democracy may not be the only choice. Here, of course, one is reminded of the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis and the idea that differences between Western liberal democracy, political Islam, and Chinese market socialism will define the next world conflict.13 It is here that we may also see the impact of history and ideology on space. But the spatial implications of a proposed end to history are quite nebulous. Since history here really means the end of challenges to the ideology associated with liberal democracy, the spatial implications may simply follow Bell’s points, particularly because these ends are concerned with intellectual developments and are predicated on paradigm shifts in both government and economics. In this regard, Bell outlined the end of ideologies competing with capitalism, and Fukuyama described the end of associated governments. But neither dealt with the unit of analysis that defined geopolitical discourse in the last century, the nation-state. It was here that Kenichi Ohmae seemingly picked up the discourse on endings.14 Curiously, Ohmae proposed an end to the very institution Fukuyama claimed had reached ubiquity. In The End of the Nation State, Ohmae described the end of the nation-state as playing a substantive role in the global economy. He stated that ‘because most of the money now moving across borders is private, governments do not have to be involved at either end’.15 Unconsciously echoing postcolonial critiques, Ohmae asserted that nationstates no longer adequately represent groups of people based on social interest. Nationstates move too slowly and often exhibit conflicting motives with regard to free and open markets. Moreover, they may actually discourage economic activity in instances of political instability or governmental intervention in local markets.16 Ohmae proposed the region-state as an economically viable alternative. Using such terms as ‘unbounded’, and ‘deterritorialized’, he described this neoliberal economic paradise as follows: [Region-states] may lie entirely within or across the borders of a nation-state. This does not matter. It is the irrelevant result of historical accident. What defines them is not the location of their political borders but the fact that they are the right size and scale to be true, natural business units in today’s global economy. Theirs are the borders – and the connections – that matter in a borderless world.17
While it is difficult to argue against the ‘nostalgic fiction’ of the nation-state in terms of its effectiveness at representing the desires of its subjects, or its cohesion regarding ethnic and cultural representation, both the spatial implications and the veracity of such a model have become problematic in a post-9/11 world. One might look to the current 4
The end of tradition, or the tradition of endings?
U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq for evidence of both a resurgence of nationalist and imperialist agendas in regulating the world economy and local nation-building. Here, both History and Ideology seem to be still alive and well. In terms of architecture and urban form the end of the nation-state (arguably, a somewhat discredited concept) holds the most relevant spatial implications. The nationbuilding apparatus has always been responsible for much of what might be described as official built tradition. Thus, a radical reconceptualization of what constitutes a ‘state’ would have serious implications for the redefinition of established regions, often typified in architectural terms. In this regard, the above eulogies have recently been bolstered by yet another, even more trenchant ‘end’. Exhibiting an acute anxiety akin to that of evangelicals awaiting the Apocalypse, Russell Jacoby’s The End of Utopia has taken the discourse on endings even farther.18 According to Jacoby, Bell was right – just premature.19 Jacoby argues that Bell’s account of the malaise of the intellectual in the face of the various triumphs of the West simply failed to prophesize the radical leanings of the 1960s. But, according to Jacoby, the present moment (1999) is the true ‘end of utopia’, and he pronounces a suitably contemporary account of doom and gloom. In what should now sound painfully familiar, Jacoby states: We are increasingly asked to choose between the status quo and something worse. Other alternatives do not seem to exist. We have entered the era of acquiescence, in which we build our lives, families, and careers with little expectation the future will diverge from the present.20
Armed with a new arsenal of geopolitical interpretations, Jacoby claims that the notion of a future that can transcend the present is dead. He engages in a calculated assault on the ‘left’ and its representative intellectual leanings. In a familiar binary of cause and effect, Jacoby declares that the death of the right caused a loss of vigilance on the part of the left.21 And in this regard, he attacks notions of ‘multiculturalism’ as a strategy of retreat by the left: since it lost the war of equity, it must be satisfied with celebrating diversity.22 He attributes this ‘loss’ to an ‘intellectual refusal to define what makes up culture’.23 In particular, Jacoby finds the fascination of Cultural Studies with the ‘everyday’ and the quotidian of ‘mass culture’ to be particularly ironic and paradoxical, especially when the field was founded by Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart to protect ‘working-class culture’ from ‘mass culture’.24 In reality, Jacoby’s ‘end of utopia’ is an attempt to identify and critique the very ‘malaise’ that Bell predicted. As such, it is no more and no less than a call for rethinking universals. And, despite his rancour, Jacoby does offer some valuable insights. Possibly the most instructive for our inquiry here into the ‘end of tradition’ is his statement: ‘It is the rootless, not the rooted who fetishize their roots’.25 In this respect, a question has much to tell about its questioner, for those engaged in a search, revival, or simply engagement of/with traditions are usually those most preoccupied with defining and redefining their position in a changing world. All four of the above ‘ends’, with their apocalyptic claims, belie a certain anxiety not 5
The End of Tradition?
only over ideology, history, the nation-state, and utopia, but also over the role of the intellectual. Most chronicle the now-fashionable disfavour for universals and nostalgically propose a tentative return to the certainty of the nineteenth century. But it remains to be seen what asking about ‘the end of tradition’ says about us. Are we the traditionless, grasping for traditional roots? Today, the events of 9/11 also necessitate a different reading of the above scholarship on endings. These events have shown that serious challenges exist to liberal democracy, both as an institution and an ideology. In particular, Ohmae’s views look woefully naïve in a post-9/11 world. State intervention, unilateral posturing, ‘nation-building’, and many other components of the supposedly dead model of the nation-state have increasingly come to the fore. And the disjunctures between U.S. imperatives and those of the international community highlight the degree to which consensus is often unachievable, especially when common sense gives way to the personal agendas of powerful national leaders. But of course, such self-interested policies were never really abandoned, despite Ohmae’s (and other’s), best attempts to tell us otherwise. Thus, the end of the nationstate, the only true threat to an ‘end of tradition in the built environment’, is no less a fallacy than that of the end of utopia, ideology, and history. Spawned as a challenge to Western hegemony, the events of 9/11 have clearly shown that the homogenizing forces of globalization are far from being a fait accompli. Indeed, serious challenges, most of which are a product of globalization itself, remain.
On tradition The above debates on endings teach us that, among other things, ‘endings’ are always contingent upon carefully circumscribed definitions. The study of ‘tradition’ has been championed by many scholars, and the lively debates that have occurred in Traditional Dwelling and Settlements Review (TDSR) and at conferences of the International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments (IASTE) point to an open-ended definition of tradition. These studies parallel questions of what constitutes ‘tradition’, ‘culture’, and ‘ethnicity’, in fields from Architecture to Anthropology to Cultural Studies. The multiplicity of definitions of these and other mutually dependent terms makes their study all the more problematic. Surely, there are some who might argue that ‘tradition’ exists, and that it is in danger of being exterminated by contemporary forces in the name of ‘globalization’. But these arguments are generally weak, or else are invoked to preserve particularly national or regional agendas. As evidenced by the chapters of this book, tradition may more profitably be considered a foil for exploring the contested subjectivities involved in producing and/or occupying space. Thus, the tangible products of tradition are those processes by which identities are defined and refined. That said, the writing of an introduction about ‘The End of Tradition’ is no less complicated. In Keywords, Raymond Williams suggested that tradition is a particularly problematic concept because of its multifarious popular uses.26 Furthermore, he identified a correlation between the degree to which tradition is imbued with notions of ‘ceremony, 6
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duty, and respect’, and a relative lack of these qualities with the modern.27 Indeed, the uneasy relationship between the mutually dependent categories of tradition and modern makes the postulation of an end to one a de facto victory for the other – or, more earnestly, challenges the very existence of both as objective categories. The 1989 publication of Dwellings, Settlements, and Tradition marked both a great deal of excitement in the field and a reconceptualization of the approach to this subject.28 I argued at that time: . . . we are not concerned here with presenting an exhaustive view, nor with unifying terminology or agreeing on paradigms. In fact, we are seeking acceptance of the multiplicity of definitions and meanings contained in the idea of traditional dwellings and settlements. In the process of putting this book together we have tried to avoid proposing grand theories. And yet, recognizing that the worst type of research is one that is ill-defined, we did adopt some basic theoretical positions. One of these was that tradition must not be interpreted simply as the static legacy of the past but rather as a model for the dynamic reinterpretation of the present.29
In keeping with this model of dynamic reinterpretation, the book contained three chapters that proposed three different concepts of ‘tradition’. Prefacing his remarks with a comment on the ambiguity of the word tradition, Yi-Fu Tuan identified the primary component of tradition as constraint. Tuan suggested that nonliterate and folk societies are characterized by a limited number of choices, which are imposed by religious custom, available resources, local climate, etc.30 A space of constraint is a space bounded by a neatly defined culture and ecology. These constraints once resulted in a material world that, in relation to ‘our’ seemingly unlimited choices, may now appear attractive in its simplicity. Thus, ‘tradition’, as constraint, existed as the antithesis of modernity – so much so, Tuan wrote, that nostalgia for it could be explained by our postmodern anxieties for a ‘simpler’ time. But this innovative concept, while explaining tradition qualitatively, could not articulate the process by which tradition comes to be. Paul Oliver’s contribution focused on how the concept of ‘handing down’ provided the key to understanding traditional architecture and built environments. While most accounts of traditional places use the phrase ‘handed down’, Oliver suggested that we concentrate on the actual process of transmission from one generation to the next. And he proposed that we look closely at the actual methods of transmission, both oral and other, in our study of these environments. Moreover, he argued that these practices of transmission constitute what tradition is, since the material products themselves were not tradition. ‘In one sense it can be argued that there is no such thing as a traditional building, no larger field of traditional architecture. There are only buildings which embody traditions.’31 Here, tradition, as handing down, became less concrete, in comparison to Tuan’s ideas of tradition as constraint, which could be seen diagnostically as a product of culture and ecology. But these seemingly mutually exclusive conceptions of tradition still both focused on tradition as a noun. Thus Oliver, who denied the materiality of tradition, still outlined an identifiable thing that happens: transmission. Amos Rapoport’s chapter focused on our interpretation of the commonly received concept of tradition. He suggested that tradition is widely used and described but seldom 7
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defined, and is consequently pregnant with implication. Rapoport compiled these implied definitions into a ‘list of attributes’ by which one could test the degree of ‘traditionality’ in a given environment. He acknowledged that many of these attributes are mutually exclusive and/or may not fit within a given environment, but he proposed that such discrepancies are useful in and of themselves for identifying what is traditional and what is not. Individually, the chapters described above helped articulate the difficulty in defining tradition. Together, however, they outlined a new trajectory for the study of traditional environments. The other chapters in Dwellings, Settlements, and Tradition could then be considered examples of using these new approaches in studying traditional environments. One key theme that emerged from the above positions was a burgeoning selfconsciousness about the role of the researcher in the study of traditional environments – now seen by most as a dialogic process between researcher and subject. Consequently, there has been a proliferation of studies that question the role of tradition in the production of space and place. This shift in both the implied methods and subjects has resulted in much new and exciting scholarship.32
On built environments One of the main issues in studying traditional built environments has been how to resolve the issue of change in various societies, and the fact that many scholars in the field have assumed a linear history and accepted the myth of progress. There have thus been two, often antagonistic moral, positions describing such change. In a seminal article in the first year of Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, Henry Glassie outlined the case for what could be considered the paternalistic view of traditional dwellings and settlements. His essay began with the assumption from which all interrogation into traditional dwellings and settlements must begin: that all architecture is the embodiment of cultural norms that pre-exist individual buildings. So defined, traditional dwellings and settlements were ‘material culture’ – the physical evidence of society. From this point, ostensibly equating in importance all built forms, Glassie continued to press a case seemingly against the merits of ‘modern’ architecture and for the vernacular. ‘True vernacular tradition is based upon participation, engagement, and egalitarian political ethic . . . [b]ut much of the connection to these forces has been lost in modern society, and thus has led to ignorance, weakening of culture, and a decline in personal empowerment’.33 Thus, Glassie established a binary – yet one he was quick to qualify. For him, ‘the Western technology called “modern” was much less a violation of the vernacular than it is an exaggeration of one impulse within the vernacular: the wish to free will from environmental conditions, the intention to set the human being righteously in the role of exploiter’.34 So, while there was a clear distinction between the modern and the vernacular, both were examples of how ‘social order cannot be disjoined from economic aspiration and ideas of the sacred, then houses cannot be understood outside their economic, political, and religious contexts, outside of their reality as cultural creations’.35 In the following year, Amos Rapoport bolstered the argument that the built 8
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environment – that is, the ‘cultural landscape’ – is always symbolic.36 As the material result of human interaction with the natural landscape, cultural landscapes provide rich raw data to study human behaviour. Rapoport claimed that ‘cultural landscapes’ ‘add-up’ because of shared traits in a given society – that is, ‘schemata’. Like Glassie, he suggested that the way vernacular or traditional settlements change, however, is different from contemporary or modern ones. In general, the persistence of clear (or strong) orders depends on conservatism, that is, the existence of tradition-oriented people unwilling (or unable) to alter that which has worked and is time-honored. As tradition weakens or disappears, so do the degree of sharing schemata and the strength of rules. The result is a reduction of clearly distinct cultural landscapes, especially at larger scales, with consequent ‘blurring’ and hence, a declining place specificity of traditional vernaculars (as opposed to the time specificity of high-style and popular design).37
Both Glassie’s and Rapoport’s contributions to the concept of tradition, particularly as it applies to built environments, emphasized the degree to which the built environment is the material realization of cultural norms. Both contributions were also predicated on certain assumptions that other contributors to TDSR began to question. In the very same issue of TDSR, Janet Abu-Lughod’s ‘Disappearing Dichotomies’ proposed a radical shift away from the paternalistic conceptualization of an endangered vernacular environment. Critiquing one of the fundamental tenets of traditional dwellings and settlements studies, Abu-Lughod suggested that (today) there is a decreasing congruence between spatial location and social formation. She suggested that the old spatial distinctions of East and West no longer make sense. And, echoing Edward Said, Abu-Lughod warned of the use and abuse of the concept of ‘tradition’ to reinforce or maintain ‘traditional’ forms of domination.38 Adapted from John Turner, she suggested thinking in terms of the present participle ‘traditioning’, so that we ‘pay more attention to the process of making houses and settlements, rather than the form or result or outcome’.39 Here, the assumptions that easily identify tradition as being from a particular place and belonging to a particular ‘ethnographic present’ were seriously questioned. Where Abu-Lughod challenged the assumptions of linking tradition to place (and even time), Dell Upton, a year later, challenged the very concept of tradition. He suggested that ‘the young field of vernacular landscape studies suffers from limitations imposed by its fundamental categories, which in turn grew out of the field’s roots in Western intellectual and aesthetic concepts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’.40 Upton suggested that ‘proceeding in a positivistic manner from a belief that the landscape has some authentic connection to a discrete population is risky and can have only limited success’.41 ‘We should turn our attention away from a search for the authentic, the characteristic, the enduring, and the pure, and immerse ourselves in the active, evanescent, and the impure, seeking settings that are ambiguous, multiple, often contested, and examining points of contact and transformation – in the market, at the edge, in the new and the decaying.’42 These views were bolstered by another contribution from Janet Abu-Lughod. In a second, later paper in the journal, she took issue with the assumptions regarding the isolation of traditional environments, and consequently their absolute representativeness. 9
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I begin with the premise that throughout history architectural forms have migrated – either along with migrations of people (the world has always been nomadic, although the current range is spectacularly wide), or with the reports of travelers who carried goods and ideas from one place to another . . . Such diffusion served a valuable function. Because humans are both imitative and adventurous, the creative impulses of builders have been strengthened and transfused by such gifts. Indeed, great architecture has always traveled, interbred, and synergized. In the process of its transmission, changes have been integrated with existent forms, thus ‘becoming’ the transformed ‘tradition’.43
Abu-Lughod then asked if there is anything different about this process today. In response, she offered the historical anomaly of colonialism as an event which significantly altered the natural course of selection and diffusion of architectural norms and forms. She went on to comment on the ‘sheer cacophony of postmodernity’, rejecting the argument that it might pose a ‘threat to coherence and authenticity’, because that would deny the possibility ‘that truly great and innovative art forms can be generated by incorporating the traditions of others’.44 Later, I would expand on the above notions of deterritorialization of identity and place by addressing the phenomena of globalization.45 I proposed four historic phases, each corresponding to a particular kind of norm regarding the production of space. During the ‘Insular Period’, characterized by the indigenous vernacular, architectural production was largely determined by local forces. This changed during the ‘Colonial Period’, which could be characterized by a ‘hybridity’ of core and peripheral styles.46 Both sites were irreparably altered in an unequally representative synergy, but indigenous forms were particularly changed. The third period was that of ‘Independence and Nation-Building’, characterized by the modern and pseudo/modern.47 Here the influences of modernism coupled with the imperatives of nation-building to produce a proliferation of ‘invented traditions’, often with the expressed intent of exporting the illusion of social cohesion to a global audience. In the last phase, that of ‘Globalization’, I predicted that while settlements are likely to become homogenized, their inhabitants are likely to demonstrate rising levels of awareness of the ethnic, religious, and racial associations of the subcommunities within which they exist. I concluded that identity and tradition, in the era of globalization, are likely to become less rooted in place and more informationally based. Recently, Dell Upton articulated a trenchant indictment of the modern/tradition binary. In ‘Authentic Anxieties’ he stated: ‘the adjectives traditional and modern are themselves artifacts of modernity: tradition did not exist until it was imagined as the defining complement of modernity’.48 Focusing on the dichotomous pair of ‘authentic and inauthentic’, he then claimed that the concept of tradition has served as a mirror for the anxiety that ‘arises from the fear that modern life is by its nature inauthentic – even counterfeit or spurious’.49 [Scholars of tradition] too often leave unchallenged the notions of tradition as a definable, hence commodifiable, entity, and of authenticity as a testable and desirable quality of tradition. Implicitly or explicitly, they assume the defense of tradition and authenticity against modernity and artificiality . . . Thus the attempt to deconstruct the discourse of modernity becomes simply an example of that discourse, betraying a continued allegiance to modernity that flourishes in the so-called postmodern age.50 10
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Clearly, for Upton, any instance when ‘tradition’ is invoked requires as much scrutiny as the supposed tradition itself. In my chapter in the edited volume Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage I next looked at the ‘new dynamics of relocalization’.51 Through the lens of tourism, I problematized many of the assumptions regarding tradition and heritage and showed how built environments are often packaged and sold in a global economy of image consumption. Significantly, I argued that value judgments associated with the ‘authenticity’ of traditional environments should be jettisoned because they are predicated on a false dichotomy of traditional versus modern. The book helped dispel the assumption that tradition is always the ‘authentic’ product of a group of people, and proposed that tradition can also be catalogued, packaged, imagined, and sold. But I also argued that despite their increasing consumption by tourists, traditional places remain places where real people live, and where real conflicts may arise. But in these places ‘tradition’, as a frame of reference, is becoming fundamentally dis-located; indeed, we can no longer consider the physical or the authentic to be a safe point of reference when looking at urbanism. In another chapter in an edited book that year (2001) I then explored what I called ‘Third Place’. Building upon the postcolonial connotation generated by Homi Bhabha, I attempted to ‘spatialize’ this reworking of the received binaries of identity politics. Within such a schema, I considered Third Place to encompass the reinterpretation of the politics of spatial production in a globalized world. Specifically, I pointed out that space and place are not entirely local phenomena and need to be reconsidered in the context of contemporary ‘flows’ of people, goods, and information. ‘Globalization has made the very issues of identity and representation in urbanism cumbersome.’52 Because I argued that culture has become increasingly placeless, I wrote that urbanism will continue to be an arena where one can observe the specificity of local cultures and their attempts to mediate global domination.53 Thus, the local remains the stage for the drama of identity to be played out; however, assumptions regarding the actors themselves have become increasingly problematic. The same, of course, can be said for tradition. Linking tradition and identity to place has become equally problematic, especially as the various ‘scapes’ of Arjun Appadurai multiply.54 The assumption that hybrid environments simply accommodate or encourage pluralistic tendencies or multicultural practices should be turned on its head. Hybrid people do not always create hybrid places, and hybrid places do not always accommodate hybrid people. All that can be hoped for at the beginning of the twenty-first century then are environments that harbour the potential for growth and change, and for peoples who may find the possibility of adapting and adopting otherness as a legitimate form of self-identification.55 Is this, then, the ‘end of tradition’? All this emphasis on the re-evaluation of tradition, its role in the production of environments, its relative efficacy of transmission, its demise in the face of globalization, etc., certainly does suggest its possible ‘end’. Indeed, if tradition is merely the dialectical fabrication of modernity, then its objective reality is seriously in peril. Does not the end of tradition as an object of inquiry suggest the end of tradition as an objective reality? 11
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Fortunately, as stated above, the end of tradition does not entail the death of tradition itself, only an end to our conception of it – and the emergence of a need to re-evaluate its utility as a repository of authentic (and hence valuable) ideas to be handed down or preserved. Indeed, many of the commonly received assumptions regarding tradition have recently been revised or jettisoned completely. For example, the notion that tradition must be associated with place and is specific to a certain group of people has been significantly modified by scholarship on globalization in fields from Anthropology to Geography. The implication of isolation and rootedness fostered by earlier work on tradition has also been significantly challenged. As many authors, including the contributors to this volume, have shown, modernity’s complicity in locating and defining tradition makes its invocation altogether suspect. These suspicions, however, warrant more scholarship to uncover the relationship between tradition and modernity.
Traditions of the modern In Part I of this book, the contributors explore the ways in which the terms ‘tradition’ and ‘modern’ have come to be inextricably linked. All three chapters seek to think in and through this dualism, revealing its geopolitical implications while presenting intellectual alternatives. In this sense, these chapters logically build upon the themes explored in TDSR and seek to problematize the very assumptions associated with the study of tradition. It is worth noting that instead of proclaiming an end to a seriously challenged concept, each author establishes tradition as an entirely new exploratory device – albeit in differing ways. In her chapter ‘Tradition is (not) Modern: Deterritorializing Globalization’, Jane M. Jacobs makes several important points as to the role of tradition in an era of globalization. She starts by arguing that tradition has indeed been brought into being by modernity’s own imaginary. But she notes that rather than doing away with tradition, under globalization, tradition has been reshaped and enlivened in a range of unexpected ways. Globalization has thus delivered new conditions for the re-emergence of tradition, installed new mechanisms for its transference, and brought into being new political imperatives for its performance. Under these conditions, Jacobs believes that it is useful to think about tradition and modernity as a vibrating couplet, where the terms are both co-dependent and mutually exclusive. She presents this as a formula: ‘tradition is (not) modern’. To illustrate this theme, Jacobs presents a case study of the emergence of an ‘Aboriginal architecture’ in Australia. During the 1990s in order to meet tourists’ desire to experience this aspect of Australia, a number of architectural elements were inserted into the design of hotels and interpretation and cultural centres to express what might be described as Aboriginal identity. This new architecture was not simply imposed upon indigenous communities; nor did it simply appropriate, willy-nilly, aspects of their culture. Instead, architects were actively commissioned by local Aboriginal communities to design buildings in consultation with appropriate traditional custodians. The projects were also approved by the broader community, and continued to retain Aboriginal input in their 12
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management and functioning. In other words, despite how one might judge the formal features of such architecture – whether as authentic or appropriative, innovative or kitsch – the structure of authorization conformed to the structure of tradition. For Jacobs, this provides a powerful example of the circulation of tradition through modern structures. In particular, the new architectural collaborations offered novel ways to perform traditional authority. Furthermore, it was under the global deterritorializations of tourism that the traditional structure of authorization could be extended to new ways of dwelling, to new kinds of built form, and to emergent architectural styles. In ‘The Tradition of the End: Global Capitalism and the Contemporary Spaces of Apocalypse’, Katharyne Mitchell offers an account of the shifting conceptions of the apocalypse in the era of capitalist globalization, and particularly how they relate to conceptions of the city. While in the Book of Revelation, the city of hyperproductivity and conspicuous consumption was considered sinful, Mitchell argues that such negative associations have been reversed in contemporary neoliberal thinking, so that ‘profitmaking in the limitless spaces of the new global community becomes something holy, becomes the New Jerusalem’. She highlights the paradox that such a neoliberal utopia may simultaneously still be considered a harbinger of the Apocalypse. Here the neoliberal position would celebrate the end of tradition as an end to barriers and the beginning of the complete freedom of movement of capital. For neoliberal thinkers like Fukuyama, the current apocalypse is also the present utopia. But for those who see the spaces of economic globalization under the condition of late capitalism as affecting human society negatively, this apocalypse is a form of further alienation. Here arises the question: how can we imagine the spaces of utopia in an interdependent world, without either duplicating the logic of late capitalism, or resorting to tyrannical and ill-conceived closures of various kinds, as seems simultaneously to happen in different parts of the world? Mitchell recognizes that the city of ‘Babylon’ is no longer only Rome, but also Cairo and London, Sao Paolo, and Los Angeles. For her, these are the sites of our future utopias. She calls upon us, citing the contemporary work of David Harvey, to reclaim these spaces as a way of contesting the apocalyptic visions and spaceless utopias, which ‘front for the imagined communities of global capitalism’. In the chapter ‘Nostalgias of the Modern’, Ananya Roy then completes the first section of the book by presenting the end of tradition as the end of traditional ways of thinking about tradition. Arguing that tradition cannot be understood as having authentic or intrinsic value, she states that the practices of valuation associated with consumption give value to tradition. In other words, the consumption of tradition is the production of tradition. But consumed in what ways? Roy makes note of two different systems of valuation and meaning. The first, which she calls ‘dwelling’, is concerned with authenticity, and often seeks to recover authentic traditions through narratives of nostalgia. As in neotraditional design movements, this nostalgia is often formalized in the form of heritage. For Roy, a second and quite different system of valuation and meaning is ‘performing’. She sees performing as making explicit the consumption of tradition, of 13
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involving inauthentic practices such as borrowing and mimicking, and therefore unsettling the fixed relationship between tradition and place. Roy presents two sets of examples to discuss her ideas of dwelling and performing. In each, she is as concerned with tradition as she is with the modern, for she argues that the two concepts are tightly linked. Taking on the theme of the world-as-exhibition, Roy then examines various nineteenth-century discourses of the Crystal Palace. Contrasting the anxious and critical interpretation of the ‘crystal edifice’ by Dostoevsky with the upstart arrogance of Walt Whitman, she shows how this moment of modernity was constituted through the dualities of development and underdevelopment, of progress and backwardness. She then moves her focus to twentieth-century world exhibitions, in this case comparing the clumsy cardboard Eiffel Tower of the Calcutta book fair, located at the margins of globalization, with the global grandeur of Las Vegas’s Paris Casino. However, she unsettles these dualities by arguing that, in such forms of mimicry, it is impossible to judge representation against any original reality. The original Eiffel Tower was itself a gateway to a world exhibition, to the city as theme park. The study of such displacements, of the performance of the Eiffel Tower in different world locations, allows Roy to point to the multiplicity of the modern. She argues that this is much more than simply the modern taking on different meanings in different places. Indeed, it is that difference which lies at the very heart of the modern. Tradition, she notes, is often the distillation of this difference. By turning to French colonialism in North Africa, she shows how colonial modernity preserved and managed this difference as tradition. But she also discusses how such dualities – of tradition and modern, of native Casbah and modern city, were undermined by independence struggles. Drawing upon the example of the battle of Algiers (in both historical and cinematic genres) she points out the ways in which the veil, a symbol of tradition, was strategically deployed to negotiate the cordon sanitaire, and wage battle against the French. Algerian women, by shedding the veil, took on the guise of French women; Algerian men, by donning the veil, took on a gendered disguise. And yet Roy warns that such forms of performance cannot always be understood as subversion. They are often ‘compulsory’ performances, and often replicate structures of power through the performance. She makes note of how, while Algerian women had so creatively performed tradition in the context of colonialism, with independence, they were subject to purist interpretations of tradition that severely circumscribed their freedoms. They were expected to dwell in the prescribed spaces of home and nation. In her closing section, Roy points out that by paying attention to performance it becomes possible to think about the inauthenticity of tradition and the multiplicity of the modern. For her, then, the ‘post’ – as in postmodern or post-tradition – is not a new historical phase but rather a surplus or an excess that has always existed within the original terms: modern, tradition, urban, colonial. She closes on the note that this surplus is one that is often experienced through geographical displacements, through movements in and across space, in the web of flows through which colonialism and postcolonialism are constituted. Geography then is inherently political: it can be the stasis and fixity of dwelling, or it can be disruptive, and even subversive. 14
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The contributions of Jacobs, Mitchell, and Roy successfully problematize any preconceived notions of tradition, squarely placing it within the rubric of modernity, and offering insight into its persistent utility in the study of the built environment. While the material reality of tradition as an authentic expression of an isolated and culturally homogeneous group may be in doubt, it is still useful in identifying instances of difference and resistance, manifestations and aspirations of utopia, and the tropes of competing subject positions, respectively. Thus, ‘traditions of the modern’ are situational and relational, and while predicated on the ‘end’ of previous preconceived notions of tradition, they constitute expressions of tradition nonetheless.
Invented landscapes These new traditions, however, contain some attributes that are at odds with the earlier definition of tradition. One of the most glaring is an increasing self-consciousness of invention. Beginning with Hobsbawm and Ranger in 1983, the ‘invention of tradition’ has been well articulated as a critical theme. The contributors to Part II now further chronicle how traditions are identified, manufactured, packaged, and deployed. Here ‘tradition’ becomes the rhetoric for both inclusion and exclusion, and is explicitly dissected as the product of particular vested interests’ aspirations to capital accumulation. In each of the examined ‘invented’ landscapes, tradition is the trope of cohesion. If tradition is a process of invention, then clearly one of the most appropriate places to study it is in the making of landscapes and landscape myths. In his chapter ‘Nature and Tradition at the Border: Landscaping the End of the Nation-State’, Matthew Sparke examines the notion of Cascadia, an idealized transnational space on the Pacific Coast of North America. Sparke invokes the concept of ‘enframing’ as formulated by Timothy Mitchell in an account of how nineteenth- and early-twentieth century colonialism in Egypt, by employing modern planning and building design, managed to embody and diffuse a set of powerful distinctions between the lived world and an ordered, underlying abstract space. Thus, in Egypt, the ‘traditional’ could be remade as ‘modern’ by dismissing all that was considered chaotic and unruly in contemporary life. The Cascadian case is far simpler, Sparke points out, because there are fewer macroscale issues. Indeed, the work of enframing can be accomplished simply with images like those reprinted in a coffee-table book. But at its core this is still nothing more than ‘a semiotic attempt to make such an order seem a natural destiny by enframing at a visual level what is not being enframed by actual political, economic, and sociological developments on the ground’. Nevertheless, the sense of an underlying Cascadian crossborder space is evoked in a putatively postcolonial gesture of emergent, incomplete, and aspirational inventiveness. Sparke then explores the production of Cascadia as a postnational form of locality using the prism of Appadurai’s five disjunctive ‘scapes’. While agreeing with Appadurai that there are fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture, and politics to which we need to attend, Sparke also maintains that certain reterritorializing forces tie the 15
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various cross-border visions together. In terms of ideoscapes, Sparke finds that while there remain certain contradictions between the ecological and economic visions of Cascadia, the two are nonetheless closely related. Thus, where bioregionalists like McCloskey see in the transboundary space a harmonious ecosystem that needs to be liberated from the disciplinary apparatus of two industrial nation-states, the promoters of the economic vision likewise see a harmonious region divided by an unnatural border to the free market. However, in terms of financescapes, Sparke argues that such deregulated global financial flows are far more destabilizing than even Appadurai allows. Promoters of Cascadia claim that ‘gold’ may be found in a future landscape of high-tech investment and growth. But Sparke warns that the same future could be ‘a bubble destined to burst’. Sparke goes on to examine Appadurai’s notions of mediascape and technoscape. Appadurai has written that contemporary electronic communications and media technologies have the power to create new solidarities through deterritorialized webs of communication that subvert exclusive nationalisms and their associated power structures. But Sparke suggests that the campaign to promote Cascadia calls these idealistic claims into question. In Cascadia, such mediascaping and technoscaping merely embody the desire of local promoters of neoliberal reterritorialization to develop revenues ‘out of the fantastic objects of postnationalism’. Finally, Sparke addresses Appadurai’s notion of ethnoscapes. For Appadurai these are comprised of the moving peoples who in turn constitute the liberatory promise of the postnational public sphere. But for Sparke, the emancipatory possibilities of the Cascadia ethnoscape ‘stem less from a postnationalism than from a multinationalism’. As evidence, he points to the postnational-cum-multinational call to First Nations to work together across a border drawn by colonialists. For him, this call is ‘a reterritorialization which moves beyond the nation-states of today, not by creating a transnational ethnoscape of postcolonial movement, but by reclaiming an ethnoscape of precolonialism, an ethnoscape of native space that existed before the first round of modern territorialization even took place’. Sparke’s study of the excessive and inauthentic enframing of Cascadia shows how dependent the present ‘borderless-world’ discourse is on geography, and how dependent postmodern gestures of regional invention are on modernist strategies for bounding space with maps and exhibitionary views of people and place. However, Sparke concludes that there are always opportunities for other traditions to be fashioned in postnational space – ones that can replace the territories of the nation-state with a more just and environmentally responsible geography of the future. While Sparke maintains that the neoliberal ideoscape of Cascadia effectively overdetermines the other promotional landscapings of the region, he also believes that this promotional effort has not completely co-opted and erased other more radically disjunctive regional forces. This view is also held by Robert Mugerauer. In his chapter, ‘The Tensed Embrace of Tourism and Traditional Environments: Exclusionary Practices in Cancún, Cuba, and Southern Florida’, he observes how global mass-tourism is often blamed for bringing about the end of traditions by consuming and destroying natural environments, unsettling 16
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local ways of life, and threatening traditional values. As an alternative, Mugerauer points to the many groups that now advocate ‘ecotourism’. The goals of these groups often include minimizing environmental damage through low-impact practices, sustaining local ways of life by promoting the use of ‘simple accommodations built of traditional materials by local people’, and advancing the economies and cultures of areas they visit through the ‘use of as many local materials, products, and people as possible’. However, in his chapter, Mugerauer provides a more complicated picture of the impacts of mass-tourism and ecotourism through three case studies: of south Florida, of Cancún, and of Cuba. He maintains that south Florida offers little of interest to ecotourism since its existing natural and cultural environments, mainly based on citrus growing, are neither exotic enough to lure ecotourists nor aesthetically/physically attractive enough to entice activity tourists. Instead, the Disney Company has created a huge tourist enclave, with a classically separated service sector that is not only physically distinct from the tourist zone and the surrounding agricultural realm, but also socially segregated from them. In Cancún, Mugerauer then shows how the focus of tourism activity has recently changed. Originally, tourists were principally attracted to the area by its beaches. But a shift to such new tourist activities as water skiing and windsurfing has now led to the construction of new facilities along the inner lagoons. Simultaneously, a fear of spending too much time in the sun has stimulated shopping and restaurant patronage. As a result, formerly bypassed lagoons and service areas have today become important commercial and tourist destinations. The region has also shifted its promotional focus to capitalize on the popularity of outdoor activity and ecotourism. Some new ventures, such as swimming through the underground river-cenote trail south of Cancún, might qualify as ecotourism. But many others, such as swimming with and petting dolphins, fall within the bounds of traditionally packaged nature experiences. With its exceptionally high-quality and well-preserved natural environment, Mugerauer suggests that Cuba has the greatest potential as a setting for ecotourism. At the moment, Cuba is experiencing a mixture of economic and social impacts as a result of increased hard currency flows from international tourism. On the one hand, these flows have benefited the overall regional economy and improved conditions for many local people. On the other, the introduction of a second, U.S.-dollar economy, and the attempts to limit it to those sectors of the population serving the tourist trade, have been problematic in a country that still advocates social equity. While the criticisms of mass-tourism are valid, Mugerauer then argues that ecotourism is not without problems. For example, ecotourism may deprive local people of access to environments when they are ‘set aside for international tourists (including conservation groups) and removed from the traditional patterns of hunting, fishing, farming, religious, and other uses . . .’. Yet he is not totally pessimistic about the future of tourism. He claims that both forms of tourism may potentially protect or support traditional environments and local cultural practices. But tourism needs to be evaluated not only in terms of a broad critique of the dominant mode of capitalist social constitution, ‘but in terms of the open possibilities and the need for active resistance . . .’ to the stratification and 17
The End of Tradition?
displacement that are always going to result from a capitalist value system. Overall, Mugerauer believes it is no longer possible simply to retreat into isolation, since the only hope for the self-development of nations and communities is the reinstrumentalization of tourism for their own benefit. If Mugerauer’s cases of Cuba, Cancún, and south Florida expose the dangers of embracing tourism while also attempting to resist it, Clara Irazábal’s case-study examination of Curitiba, Brazil, reveals the risks and possibilities of tourism development from another perspective. In ‘Architecture and the Production of Postcard Images: Invocations of Tradition Versus Critical Transnationalism in Curitiba’, Irazábal explores the theming of vernacular settings, a contemporary worldwide trend involving the invention and consumption of tradition in the built environment. In the last two decades, she reports, as part of a calculated strategy of self-promotion, the government of Curitiba has dotted the city with foreign-style landmarks, mostly based on selective samples of European architectural traditions. The landmarks have sought to exploit the heritage of the city’s different ethnic communities to construct a cosmopolitan, international image. But for Irazábal, such new constructions as the Polish, Italian, and German parks have merely created the Brazilian version of Epcot Center, the section of Disneyworld where a pedestrian loop connects the pavilions of eight nations. Yet Curitiba’s claims are even more inflated than Epcot’s, she argues. At Epcot, one is explicitly invited to enter a ‘Magic Kingdom’. But, in Curitiba the urban spaces and monuments created are supposedly the genuine expressions of ethnic groups with claims on the city’s past and present. As a result, Curitiba’s public building campaign may actually alter contemporary power struggles in the city. In fact, despite being officially presented (and superficially accepted by some residents and visitors) as a celebration of diversity and rich heritage, Irazábal reveals how these stage-set landmarks actually work as mechanisms of exclusion. The decisions as to who gets represented and who does not are deliberately made by a governing elite, targeting both resident groups with cultural and economic power in the city and potentially desirable visitors, tourists, and eventual investors. Only lately have some other ethnic groups, such as the city’s Chinese population, managed to approach the government to bargain for a space and monument to represent them. Rather than signalling the end of tradition, Irazábal claims that the creation of these ethnic memorials re-enacts a singular process of ‘inventing’ tradition, which defines a future through the editing and reconstruction of the past. As an alternative approach, she proposes ‘critical transnationalism’ as a way for cities like Curitiba to re-create themselves in the present era of globalization. To do so, she reworks the notion of critical regionalism, widely established in the realms of architecture and urbanism, to reflect current theoretical discourse on spatial and cultural globalization. Irazábal employs the term ‘glocalization’, as opposed to globalization, to recollect the hybrid, fluxional, and as-yet-not-fullyunderstood relationship between the local and the global environments. Her choice of the term ‘critical transnationalism’ also emphasizes the importance of a critical attitude for the conscious articulation of the global and local in the creation of architecture and urbanism. If critical-regional architecture, as advocated by Tzonis and Lefaivre, is an architecture that 18
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redefines itself through the defamiliarization of regional elements, Irazábal proposes a critical-transnational architecture which redefines itself through the defamiliarization of glocal elements and a creative proposal of their reconnection. Through an investigation of such other city building projects as its Unilivre and City Memorial, she then argues that critical-transnational design practices have the potential to become instrumental in allowing glocalities to overcome the homogenizing forces of globalization. In all these instances, the spectacle of history is aestheticized and naturalized in the complex and dynamic interplay between the postmodern and the traditional. The authors in Part II not only examine the multiple dimensions and trajectories of the interplay, but also reveal the subtle process in which diverse groups attempt variously to employ the interstice it has created for active resistance and assert the possibilities of alternative traditions and environments. Thus, the invented landscape is inherently incomplete, for it is predicated on the successful deployment of an invented tradition. As the contributors to Part II demonstrate, this process is inevitably a failure, for such deployments are inherently messy and bear the vestiges of the competing traditions they seek to exclude. Thus, the increasing self-consciousness of tradition is also increasingly visible. This fact is further clarified by the chapters of Part III.
Programmes of tradition In many ways, tradition is a regime, programmed and policed. The chapters in Part III show how tradition is deployed, resisted, and reworked through hegemonic struggles that seek to create both built environments and citizen-subjects. Building on themes of a complicit modernity and invention, this section stresses the role of the state in identifying, manufacturing, and mediating tradition. Here the institutionalized ‘end’ of tradition may beget curious remanifestations of tradition. As shall be shown, traditions may persist and grow, albeit in unanticipated and unexpected ways. Furthermore, the contributions in this section simultaneously challenge and enrich debates regarding the correlation between built form and identity. In her chapter ‘Tradition as a Means to the End of Tradition: Fascist-Era “New Towns” in Italy’, Mia Fuller examines farmhouses built by the Italian Fascist regime during its last decade as an unusual instance of the simultaneous naming and dismantling of tradition. On the one hand, the designs for these farmsteads were rhetorically saturated with allusions to ‘traditions’ of rural life; and in this sense, they were unlike Fascist designs for housing in the industrial towns. But on the other hand, the government carefully reconfigured ‘tradition’ so that settlers’ houses appeared regionally ‘neutral’, and yet generically ‘traditional’ enough to make the settlers’ adaptation to local life as unproblematic as possible. If the lack of added regional character and the loss of familiar traits were dissatisfying to settlers, this neutral, generic new housing aligned well with the Fascist government’s desire: that Italians behave more like, or look more like, nationminded citizens than like people whose regional and local identities came first, and whose nationality seemed more like an afterthought. Ultimately, this reinvention of tradition 19
The End of Tradition?
helped cloak the Fascist regime’s intensely modern reach for control of Italians’ political and economic lives. In this juxtaposition of the semblance of architectural traditionality with modern, totalizing agendas, Fuller argues, the appearance of traditionality directly supported the undermining of traditional life and political institutions. Her chapter offers an instance of invoking old traditions in invented new ways to put an end to living traditions that do not meet the political aspirations of a state. It is provides a good example of what happens when a state becomes the guardian of tradition or possesses the authority to define it. In the chapter ‘Cultural Identity and Architectural Image in Bo-Kaap, Cape Town’, Fabio Todeschini and Derek Japha tell a fascinating story of the conservation of Bo-Kaap, a residential enclave on the fringe of the Cape Town city centre. While Bo-Kaap had long been home to the poor of various backgrounds, the notion of a united ‘Malay’ community was constructed there during the first half of the twentieth century. Using this newly invented identity, cultural conservationists such as Du Plessis could blame the supposed social ills of the area not on poverty in general but on the presence of natives and other undesirables. Thus, the conservation of Bo-Kaap involved not just the preservation of ‘Malay’ architecture but also reconstitution of a ‘diluted Malay community’ into an ethnically pure neighbourhood. On the one hand, Todeschini and Japha show how this restoration effort subtly changed the landscape of Bo-Kaap by privileging the flat-roofed house, with its supposedly Eastern character, to capture an idealized image of ‘Malay’ exoticism. On the other, they illustrate how the conservation project also involved the removal of ‘disqualified persons’ from the neighbourhood, and a search for suitable ‘Malays’ to move to the ‘Malay Quarter’. Since the capacity to execute the restoration programme was tied to funding and affordability, the latter meant not just persons who were ‘Malay’, but those who fell within the income guidelines accepted by the National Housing Commission for statesubsidized housing. This involved a stipulation in 1957 under the Group Areas Act (which in 1950 had created the legislative framework for the connection of space and ethnicity) mandating that by 1962 no person other than a designated ‘Malay’ could own property in the neighbourhood. These interventions eventually resulted in a physical and social fabric that matched the rewritten social history, but was far more homogeneous than the actual character of the neighbourhood had ever been. Today, according to Todeschini and Japha, with the Group Areas Act repealed and houses in Bo-Kaap for sale on the open market, good views, proximity to town, and quaint charm have made the area attractive to wealthy buyers, many of whom are not Malay. But such gentrification has brought new pressures and twists to this story of conservation. For example, many Bo-Kaap residents now claim, as did Du Plessis half a century ago, that the influx of newcomers is destroying the social fabric of the area. Where Todeschini and Japha highlight the role of the state and certain ‘enlightened individuals’ in the creation and preservation of a ‘Malay’ architectural idiom in South Africa, Duanfang Lu next identifies the persistence of the wall as a building typology in contemporary China through successive political changes and despite state condemnation. In ‘The Latency of Tradition’, Lu describes the transformation from ‘City Wall’ to ‘Unit 20
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Wall’ as a progression of symbolic importance from one regime of power to the next, which challenges notions of cultural homogenization purported to be associated with the ‘triumph of capitalist democracy’. Lu’s chapter starts with a discussion of the ideas of tradition and history put forth by Freud in his book Moses and Monotheism. She points out that by conceiving of the past as being constantly contained in the present, Freud’s formulation provides a way of circumventing the progressive view of history embodied in modernist thinking. For Lu, tradition is not ‘simply a “not-yet” waiting to be turned into a “now”; instead, it shares with modernity the same “now”, the same responsibilities for making the lived ground, and the same potential to shape the future’. To illustrate her point, Lu provides a case study of the making and unmaking of the wall-building tradition in China. Historically, China was a society of walls, with the physical structure of Beijing typifying this model. According to Lu, upon consolidation of socialist control in 1949, many people eagerly identified themselves with modernity. But since their lives were constrained by a host of barriers, ‘tradition became the offensive odour that one . . . could not wait to escape’. Such thinking was quickly turned toward the city wall. While it used to be the most important symbol of the city, its utility was now called into question. As the new government struggled to create a material reality commensurate with their ethical aims, city walls came to be seen as representing the old society, and were officially condemned. Such old walls also provided a much-needed source of raw materials to transform the city into a new socialist image. Yet, while one era of city wallbuilding in Chinese culture was ending, a new one was beginning. Lu states that by the mid-1960s, work units, the self-contained and largely self-sufficient entities peculiar to Chinese socialism, were building walls to address security concerns and define their territories. Thus the wall was resurrected as a functional and symbolic element in a newly socialist Chinese landscape. Beginning in 1978, China began the gradual change from a planned economy to a market economy. And in her final section, Lu points out how the present campaign to rebuild city walls is a particularly ironic emblem of the present reform era. As Beijing’s resources were redirected toward tourism and the service industries, a regretful city government acknowledged that the demolition of the old city walls was short-sighted, and a mile-long segment of the city wall was re-erected. In contrast, the walled work unit compound is now considered to be a barrier to the new economy and social life. Yet due to increased crime and social instability, the importance of walls has not decreased; instead, the need for walls has been strengthened, and the work unit’s wall-building tradition is now being emulated by new private office complexes and residential enclaves. Lu argues that this history of walls, ‘rather than representing a series of events unfolding progressively through time, is actually a case of dynamic repetition’. She points out that some traditions may be repressed temporarily during periods of political and social change. Yet, like the traumatic experience in Freud’s account, ‘after a latency period, these traditions may resurrect themselves under new conditions, and once again actively participate in shaping, for better or worse, distinctive presents’. Therefore, while 21
The End of Tradition?
scholars like Fukuyama consider that a period of quiet has currently descended on history after the passing of a storm of revolutions, Lu suggests that ‘the debris that has been smashed by the previous storm is more than just a residue: it holds the potential to bring about another storm’. In the final chapter in Part III, ‘Seizing Locality in Jerusalem’, Alona Nitzan-Shiftan examines the construction projects of Israelizing Jerusalem after the 1967 War. If the symbols of the conqueror were the cubical, ordered housing blocks of pre-1967 West Jerusalem, and the symbols of the conquered were the historic stone buildings of the Old City, then the post-1967 architecture seemed to absorb the symbols of the conquered rather than those of the conqueror. To explore this bewildering phenomenon, NitzanShiftan traces its roots in the cultural and professional formation of architects. During the 1960s and 1970s, the architects who were entrusted with the national mandate of Israelizing Jerusalem found themselves inextricably bound up in developing crises about modernism. At the same time that architects worldwide were questioning the premises of the Modern Movement in architecture, Israelis were becoming more vocal in challenging the modernization project of Labor Zionism, which had campaigned for decades for ‘progress and development’. This twofold crisis resulted in critiques of both architectural and Zionist modernisms among Israeli-born architects, who turned for an alternative to the Palestinian vernacular, which had fascinated them for a decade. However, the wellmeaning desire to adopt architectural forms of another nation eventually also helped inscribe the contested city with an Israeli character. In fact, as Nitzan-Shiftan points out, the very localities that Israeli artists and architects came to identify as points of connectedness to place were exactly those places that most embodied the pain and alienation of their former Palestinian inhabitants. Eventually, Nitzan-Shiftan argues, ‘the efforts of Israeli architects to crack the Palestinian code for local habitation on unequal political grounds diverted their focus on the structuralist Man of post-World War II architectural culture away from its humanistic path, depriving other men of the symbolic ownership of their built heritage’. Nitzan-Shiftan’s chapter provides a convincing example of what happened when the political ideology of Zionism attempted to define a future with no past, only to find out that on the ground this was impossible. As the chapters in Part III clearly demonstrate, the ‘end’ of a tradition far from marks its demise. Indeed, through careful scholarship one can identify acute patterns of cultural persistence despite a regime of power’s best efforts to do otherwise. Thus, the efficacy of state manipulation of the built environment is cast in a particularly questionable light. It is only in the case of extremely authoritarian regimes (such as Fascist Italy) that such a project can be considered successful. Clearly, the ‘end of (one) tradition’ often marks the beginning of another.
On the end of tradition So far, two opposite concepts of tradition appear salient in the general debates. The first privileges national culture and continuity; the second stresses the absence of choice. Yet in 22
The end of tradition, or the tradition of endings?
a sense, both positions may be challenged by Benedict Anderson’s idea of ‘imagined communities’, and by Hobsbawm’s and Ranger’s notion regarding all tradition being invented. More recently, the emergence of the idea of a global cultural supermarket has cast further doubt on the legitimacy of tradition as a stable frame of reference. According to Gordon Mathews, the earlier idea of culture as ‘the way of life of a people’ should be combined with a more contemporary concept of culture as ‘the information and identities available from the global cultural supermarket’. This is to say, roughly speaking, that in a global era it is necessary to adopt a view of culture that is equally shaped by both the state and the market.56 Tradition, like culture, has now, at least for some, become a matter of choice, because both information and alternative identities are now available in this global supermarket. Today, tradition should also be viewed as the arena of mediation between the hegemony of national or local culture and the exercise of choice by some members or groups of that society. According to a Hong Kong newspaper article, for instance, when a reporter asked members of a motorcycle gang in China why they were obsessed by Harley Davidsons and the American dream of freedom, he was told, ‘Cultures . . . are like the dishes on a table. You just pick up what you like’.57 People all over the globe increasingly identify with more than one tradition, as they do with more than one identity. Tradition, therefore, has become a global hyphen. If people today identify themselves as AmericanAfricans, Arab-Muslim, or Chinese-Indonesians, then tradition must be accepted as equally hyphenated. With the rising power of civil, local, and military groups, tradition is no longer fundamentally mediated mainly or only by the state. Similarly, the cultural landscape of so-called ‘traditional’ societies in a media-crazed world is becoming as much manipulated by the cultural and material global supermarket as by state or society. But this does not apply to all situations. For example, ethnic or minority groups, oppressed or otherwise, may defy this pattern. Indeed, the traditions that shape their cultural landscapes are often moulded by two additional factors: practical resistance against the dominant majority culture, and their allegiance to a community identity that may be more important than their national or state identity. So it would seem that what has ended, in the end, is not tradition itself, but the idea of tradition as a harbinger of authenticity, and as a container of specific cultural meaning. What has ended is not tradition, but tradition as a place-based, temporally situated concept; as a static authoritative legacy; and as a heritage owned by certain groups of people. We must recognize that what lasts in tradition today is the ‘transient, the fleeting, the contingent’, because that is the new way to find ‘the eternal and the immutable’.58 We should take the position that ‘fashion is not innocent of history . . . [and in fact] it continually scavenges the past for props, masks, and costumes’.59 Ultimately, not only does the distinction between the fake and real become meaningless, but also the simulation may become the real in and of itself. Tradition is not dead either. What is dying is tradition revered as authenticity. Tradition is no longer found only in ‘real’ places; it lives on in the most fake of all places, where it is reborn everyday in the social practice of those who inhabit what used to be the space of fakery. Thus, the recent collapse of the Old Man of the Mountain, a natural rock 23
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formation at Franconia Notch State Park in New Hampshire has led to an intense and lively debate on the importance of this symbol and how and whether to resurrect it. For a century the Old Man was the State’s symbol. It was reproduced on license plates, the State letterhead, and even on a quarter dollar coin issued by the U.S. government. But following the collapse of the Old Man, the State government announced that May 10, 2003, would be Family Remembrance Day, and it invited families to ‘visit Franconia Notch and reflect on what the Old Man of the Mountain has meant to people young and old’.60 Ever since, people have expressed support for the reconstruction of the Old Man. But whatever the final form of its resurrection, this will not be the original or authentic Old Man. Does that really matter? As the Boston Globe reported: ‘the lore of the Old Man has only been enhanced by the history-making geological event that brought him down’.61 Thus, the tradition that the Old Man of the Mountain stood for in New Hampshire will not only continue after its collapse, but will also be modified with practices that its collapse has put into motion. Another interesting story that may be appropriate to mention has to do with New York, the quintessential American city, and its Times Square. In the 1990s Rudolph Giuliani took over the mayorship of New York City, vowing to clean Times Square of prostitution, drugs, and informal street hawkers. This campaign included taking over several establishments, selling property, rezoning, and offering various financial incentives to encourage major corporations to take over this public space.62 By the end of the 1990s Times Square had
1.1 (left) The New York/New York hotel casino in Las Vegas 1.2 (right) Where informal street vendors used to sell their products after September 11th in front of New York/New York now has a plaque bearing New York City’s mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s words regarding September 11th 24
The end of tradition, or the tradition of endings?
1.3. Cards with pictures and phone numbers of prostitutes being distributed on the Las Vegas strip
been totally remade, with the Disney Company occupying a major part of it. Times Square is now safe for tourists and citizens alike, but the price is that it now seems more like Disneyland or Las Vegas than a piece of New York. And, of course, the street hawkers, prostitutes, and pimps have just set up shop in other parts of New York. Meanwhile, on the Las Vegas strip, a place no one even called a city a few years ago, a new hotel casino named New York/New York was built in the mid-1990s (Figure 1.1). The casino, with a skyline that emulates New York’s with a scaled Brooklyn Bridge in front, has become popular among tourists who may never have been to the ‘real’ New York, but find New York/New York a worthwhile experience nonetheless. Yet even as New York/New York continues inside as a private casino, its public space on the strip is being taken over. After September 11, street vendors began to sell all forms of New York souvenirs – from fire-fighter T-shirts to police-officer memorabilia – on the sidewalk out front (Figure 1.2). Hispanic men and women distribute cards with pictures of prostitutes who can arrive at your door in thirty minutes. The cards promise prompt service, credit-card convenience, and faithfulness to the advertised image. The cards go on to identify rates ranging from $50 for half an hour for a ‘brunette’ to $80 for an ‘Asian beauty’ (Figure 1.3). And in front of the hotel, mounted riot police control teenage crowds on weekends – sons and daughters of the casino employees – mainly minorities and predominately Hispanic. None of this behaviour would have been so openly tolerated in the New York of Rudolph Giuliani. Yet, in Las Vegas, the ultimate fake city, these former New York traditions are alive and well. Has Las Vegas become the real [New York] city? The paradox is that Vegas, designed as a utopia, and streamlined for unfettered 25
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consumption, now exhibits all the ‘messiness’ of a real city. This story should remind us that the end of tradition does not come when a highly circumscribed utopia ceases to exist; rather, it comes when we realize that tradition is what we make and sustain everyday and everywhere through the occasionally contemptuous act of living.
Notes 1. N. Gibbs, ‘Apocalypse Now’, Time, July 1, 2002. 2. The irony that each ‘Holy War’ is viewed as divine justice with the aim of eradicating evil is most certainly lost on their respective adherents. 3. As of 6:30 am on October 18, 2002, the U.S. population was 288,378,598. Viewed on http: //www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html. 4. D. Bell, The End of Ideology, New York, The Free Press, 1960. Daniel Bell, Henry Ford Professor Emeritus of the Social Sciences at Harvard, scholar in residence at American Academy of Arts and Sciences, past Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, co-founder of The Public Interest magazine, was one of the last of what we used to call ‘public intellectuals’. The brazen sweep of subject and theory covered by him and his contemporaries will surely pass with his generation when they die. Along with Irving Kostol (with whom he co-founded The Public Interest), Irving Howe, and Nathan Glazer, he was one of the famous critics known as ‘New York Intellectuals’. 5. Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 16. 6. Ibid., p. 373. 7. Ibid., p. 375. 8. F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York, The Free Press, 1992. Currently a Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University and a member of the President’s council on bio-ethics, Francis Fukuyama has been a political scientist working both privately and for the United States Government since the 1970s. 9. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, p. 64. 10. Ibid., p. 51. 11. Ibid., p. xi. 12. Ibid., p. 329. 13. S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996. 14. Kenichi Ohmae, known as ‘Mr. Strategy’, has a Ph.D. from MIT in Nuclear Engineering. He is an American Management consultant. Once a partner in McKinsey and Co., he now has his own firm, Ohmae and Associates. He lives in Tokyo where he received his undergraduate degree. He is a business consultant, social reformer, author and journalist, adviser to governments and business entrepreneur. He has written over one hundred books. 15. K. Ohmae, The End of the Nation-State, New York, The Free Press, 1995, p. 3. 16. Ibid., p. 71. Ohmae cites the example of the uprising in Tianneman Square in 1989 as ‘scaring’ investors away from China. 17. Ibid., p. 12. 18. Russell Jacoby is a Professor at UCLA whose interest is in twentieth-century European and American intellectual history. 19. R. Jacoby, The End of Utopia, New York, Basic Books, 1999, p. 5. 20. Ibid., p. xi. 21. Ibid., p. 8. 22. Ibid., p. 32–33. 23. Ibid., p. 39. 24. Ibid., p. 77. 25. Ibid., p. 48. 26. R. Williams, Keywords, New York, Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 318. 27. Ibid., p. 319. 28. Indeed, a deliberate interest in ‘vernacular’ architecture can be traced back to Bernard Rudofsky, 26
The end of tradition, or the tradition of endings?
Architecture without Architects, New York, Doubleday, 1964; Amos Rapoport, House Form and Culture, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1969; and Paul Oliver, Shelter and Society, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1969. Together, these works began to outline an interest in non-monumental buildings. 29. N. AlSayyad and J. Bourdier (eds.), Dwellings, Settlements, and Tradition, Lanham, University Press of America, 1989, p. 3. 30. Ibid., p. 28. 31. Ibid., p. 74. 32. A somewhat recent article in Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review (TDSR) provided a summation of these issues surrounding the problematic of tradition. In ‘Writing Spaces’, Greig Crysler chronicled the shifts in attitude and definition of the concept of ‘tradition’ in the context of TDSR’s history, reminding us that all ‘journals are institutions in themselves’. Crysler suggested that there have been two primary attitudes to tradition in the space of the journal. The first, ‘narratives of the ethnographic pastoral’, were dominant until 1995. The second, ‘critical reflexivity’, gained prominence since 1995, and can be characterized as scepticism or ambivalence to the former. Thus Crysler highlighted the degree to which all discussion of tradition is inherently ‘modern’. See G. Crysler, ‘Writing Spaces: Cultural Translation and Critical Reflexivity’, Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, vol. 11, no. 2, Spring 2000. 33. H. Glassie, ‘Vernacular Traditions and Society’, Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, vol. 1, no. 2, Spring 1990, p. 9. 34. Ibid., p. 11. 35. Ibid., p. 18. 36. Rapoport chronicled the genealogy of the concept of ‘cultural landscape’ from Carl Sauer and German Cultural Geography at the turn of the twentieth century. A. Rapoport, ‘On Cultural Landscapes’, Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, vol. 3, no. 2, Spring 1992, p. 34. 37. Ibid., p. 36. 38. J. Abu-Lughod, ‘Disappearing Dichotomies’, Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, vol. 3, no. 2, Spring 1992. 39. Ibid., p. 10. For a discussion on the adjectival use of ‘cultural’, see A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 40. D. Upton, ‘The Tradition of Change’, Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, vol. 5, no. 1, Fall 1993, p. 9. 41. Ibid., p. 14. 42. Ibid., p. 14. 43. J. Abu-Lughod, ‘One’s Future From One’s Past,’ Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, vol. 7, no. 1, Fall 1995, p. 8. 44. Ibid., p. 10. 45. N. AlSayyad, ‘From Vernacularism to Globalism: The Temporal Reality of Traditional Settlements’, Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, vol. 7, no. 1, Fall 1995, p. 14. 46. Ibid., p. 15. 47. Ibid., p. 16. 48. D. Upton, ‘Authentic Anxieties’, in N. AlSayyad (ed.), Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage, New York, Routledge, 2001, p. 299. 49. Ibid., p. 299. 50. Ibid., p. 300. 51. N. AlSayyad, ‘Global Norms and Urban Forms in the Age of Tourism’, in N. AlSayyad (ed.), Consuming Tradition, Manufacturing Heritage, New York, Routledge, 2001, p. 16. 52. N. AlSayyad, ‘Hybrid Culture/Hybrid Urbanism: Pandora’s Box of the “Third Place”’, in N. AlSayyad (ed.), Hybrid Urbanism: On the Identity Discourse and the Built Environment, Westport, Praeger Publishers, 2001, p. 13. 53. Ibid., p. 13. 54. For an in-depth discussion of the ‘scapes’ through which culture flows, see A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large. Alternately, see Matthew Sparke’s chapter in this volume for a ‘spatialized’ critique of Appadurai. 27
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55. AlSayyad, ‘Hybrid Culture/Hybrid Urbanism’, p. 16. 56. G. Mathews, Global Culture/Individual Identity: Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket, London and New York, Routledge, 2000, p. 1. 57. Ibid., p. 4. 58. D. Gaonkar, ‘On Alternative Modernities’, Public Culture, vol. 11, no. 1, 1999, pp. 1–18, The quotation is from page 7. 59. Ibid. 60. Website of the State government of New Hampshire. Viewed on May 25, 2003, at http: //www.state.nh.us/oldman. 61. M. Rosenwald, ‘Lasting Image’, The Boston Globe, May 5, 2003. Viewed on May 25, 2003, at http://travel.boston.com/places/newengland/stories/050503_nh_old_man_image.htm. 62. Alexander Reichl, Reconstructing Times Square: Politics and Culture in Urban Development, Lawrence, KA, University Press of Kansas, 1999; and Todd W. Bressi, ‘Reveille for Times Square: It’s a New Day for Manhattan’s Traditional Entertainment District’, Planning, vol. 62, no. 9, September 1996, pp. 4–8.
28
Tradition is (not) modern: deterritorializing globalization
Chapter 2
Tradition is (not) modern: deterritorializing globalization Jane M. Jacobs
For many of us the idea of globalization has become such a naturalized fact of current times that what this process entails and the consequences to which it gives rise are constant accessories to our self-understandings of being in the world. But, of course, it is usually such ‘naturalized’ things that need the most careful and constant scrutiny. We, by and large, take as given that globalization is linked to the current workings of Late Capitalism which is, itself, a marauding extension of earlier processes of capitalism as enacted through exploration, trade, empire building, and modernization. Diagnosing the logic and consequences of this global condition has become an academic preoccupation, albeit one that has tended to be confined to the purview of certain styles of critical thinking. There is general agreement that globalization is marked by a peculiar set of transformations, many of which are explicitly spatial. We might begin with the new intensity of time-space compression. We might point to the new pace in the transnational flow of goods, information, people, and technologies. We might verify such transformations by focusing upon specific localities that have been changed or even produced by globalization. Such is the scale and scope of these transformations that Fredric Jameson famously called for a new cognitive mapping of the present.1 What might constitute this new cartography of the present? Arjun Appadurai argues that it is essential that we ‘name and analyse . . . mobile civil forms’.2 This requires a shift away from what he describes as ‘trait geographies’; those studies which assume that certain enduring properties (such as values, languages, material practices, and traditions) are tied to specific, bounded socio-spatial units (such as the locality, the region, and the nation).3 Appadurai proposes instead that we focus on ‘process geographies’, which chart ‘various kinds of action, interaction, and motion’, be they manifest through trade, travel, migration, pilgrimage, invasion, proselytization, exploration, or colonization.4 Alternatively, Saskia Sassen has argued that our understanding of global processes is urgently in need of ‘thickening’.5 Her advice for this thickening is not simply to attend to the sociology of flows, for globalization, she argues, is not that diffuse. Every flow begins somewhere and is destined for somewhere. Flows are, in their own ways, embedded in specific localities. Sassen herself has conducted in depth research on a certain type of locality, the global 29
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city. But we can imagine that there are many other, albeit perhaps less spectacular, global localities. Methodological prescriptions such as these attempt to bring into view ‘the global everyday’.6 In doing so they disaggregate the process of globalization, not by wishing it away as some current social theorists might, but by attending both to its specificities and its reach, its genealogies and its present states.
Deterritorializing globalization The spatial outcome of globalization is often described as being that of deterritorialization. A nest of interrelated transformations is implied by this term and it may be useful to outline them at this point. Most directly, the term implies the replacement of the bounded by the unbounded, or the superseding of territory by geographies that exceed the bounded unit. Some commentators conceptualize this as the triumph of space over place. Others, like Anthony Giddens, have diagnosed this as a process of disembedding in which social relations are ‘lifted out’ from the local.7 Under such conditions one’s sense of dwelling-in-the-world no longer derives simply from the particulars of one’s locality.8 Furthermore, places under these conditions become ‘phantasmagorical’, for what appears to be local is neither constituted through localized forces nor even likely to be unique to our peculiar place in the world. We see parallel analyses manifest in the debates about whether or not the nation-state continues to matter, or in, say, Marc Augé’s account of the emergence of so-called ‘non-places’ under conditions of supermodernity.9 These are but a few threads in a broader analytical cloth that I would like to suggest carries with it assumptions most relevant to the thematic question of this book, ‘the end of tradition?’ It is almost always assumed that the socio-spatial relations of globalization mark a radical break from those that existed previously. Not least, so the story goes, globalization marks an extension and intensification of a set of processes established in modernity. These have resulted in a distinctive reconfiguration of the associations between place and tradition understood to characterize a premodern world. In that world, it is assumed that there was a ‘natural’ relationship between everyday lived culture and geographical territory or place – a pre-given or natural order of things embedded in, and confirmed by, one’s locality. Within a ‘traditional’ framework of dwelling, one’s fate is understood to be tied to that which is given within a closed system of belief and faith, often conceived of as the god-given rules of sacred authority. This structure of authority is stably confirmed by the locale in which one is embedded. Modernity, it is argued, delivers us away from this embedded mode of dwelling, and injects us into a more disembedded and rationalized, and individuated being in the world. For example, Giddens suggests that modernity is marked by a radical turn from tradition, and a demise in ‘the local’ as a meaningful life-world constituted through face-to-face interactions.10 No longer subjects of fate, we are active agents of rational choice. Authority no longer lies outside of us, but within us. Modernity is not without tradition and, in fact, requires an idea of it in order to know itself. In this regard, tradition is either disdained (something to be left behind in the rage 30
Tradition is (not) modern: deterritorializing globalization
for the new) or lamented (as something now lost). Tradition is something that is brought into being by modernity’s own imaginary.11 So formed, it is important to interrogate the specific logics of the relations that exist between the terms ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’. In the first instance we need to move away from seeing ‘tradition’ as fixity and stasis. The root origin of the word tradition is of course the Latin verb tradere, meaning ‘to transmit’ or ‘to give something over to another’.12 This verb root alerts us to the fact that tradition is not a ‘thing-like vessel’. Rather, it is something that is handled and which is embedded in action in specific contexts. As Timothy Luke suggests, ‘traditions are . . . continuously sent and chaotically received throughout all generations’.13 This interpretation of tradition suggests that the fixing of stable traditions ‘back then’ or ‘out there’ is but part of the modern (re)making of this idea. I am pointing here to the embedded teleology and geography of the modern making of tradition. Behind it lies a story in which modernity first arises in Europe and then spreads, by way of European imperial expansion. Other cultures, and their traditions, it is assumed, give way to the force of this expansion and all that it delivers. If tradition survives, it does so anachronistically – perhaps because modernity has inexplicably passed it by or, alternatively, because modernity has assumed a paternal stance towards it and sought to protect and preserve it.14 Other cultures and traditions encountered in and through such deterritorialization themselves come to be viewed through the lens of modernity. Most notably, other cultures (and their traditions) come to be known worldwide through certain scientific frames – like that of anthropology. Recent histories of anthropology have brought clearly into view how this discipline functioned as the framework of knowledge for conceptualizing tradition in modern times. It has been through modern geographical processes of movement (such as exploration, colonization, and globalization), working hand-in-hand with comparative knowledge fields like anthropology, that our modern idea of ‘tradition’ has come into being. As Dipesh Chakrabarty reminds us: ‘the picture of a changeless or static past is . . . itself a construction of early-modern European historical or sociological thinking. It has seldom been a non-western society’s way of describing itself until recent times’.15 In short, so-called traditional societies only came to see themselves as such once subjected by Europeans and their modes of thought. Talal Asad has argued that through anthropological thinking non-European societies were classified in ways ‘consistent with Europe’s story of triumph as ‘progress’’.16 They came to be seen as remnants of a past time, which appeared in the present only because of the spatial fact that they were distant from, and therefore beyond the influence of, Europe’s modernizing force.17 Through ‘discovery’, these ‘traditional’ societies were incorporated into the now spatially extensive reach of European modernization. And through disciplinary fields like anthropology, such societies were incorporated into a so-called salvage paradigm, whereby as much as possible of their ‘traditions’ were recorded before the final and fatal blow of modern social change.18 In this sense, it is true to say that the tradition/modern binary, in and of itself, is a product of global expansion and the kind of ‘world picture’ it inaugurated. As Tomlinson notes, this ‘tradition-modern dualism becomes the single, universal story of human development’.19 Indeed, Timothy Luke has gone so far as to 31
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suggest that, ‘seeing the past (tradition) in ruins and the present (modernity) as its ruination is now ‘traditional’ for us’.20 One clear expression of this view of world history was in ‘modernization theory’, but there is a sense that its ‘ideological drift’ is residual in much current globalization theory.21 This is the case even though there has been a radical restructuring of the place of tradition in the present under Late Capitalism. I have already mentioned the way flows of information, goods, people, and power are understood to disembed social relations. I have also sketched how some commentators view this as a process through which one’s sense of the structure of authority for being in the world is radically changed and place-based authority lost. So along with deterritorialization, we might assume a concomitant process of detraditionalization.22 A symptom of such a process might well be registered in the view that globalization results in cultural homogenization, a ‘global culture’. Such cultural flattening is understood to be a consequence of local specificity, often conceived of in terms of ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’, being compromised or over-ridden by global processes. Of course, this assumption coincides with our awareness of new intensities of differentiation into which an idea of tradition immediately gets drawn.23 So at the same time that there is a discernable emergence of a ‘global culture’ under Late Capitalism, there is a re-emergence of tradition, albeit in forms that are often assumed to be inauthentic. As Tomlinson notes, a homogenization of culture – the doing away with tradition – is the most obvious, but least plausible, outcome of globalization. Rather than doing away with tradition, globalization has delivered new conditions for its emergence; installed new mechanisms for its transference; and brought into being new political imperatives for its performance. Under globalization, tradition has been reshaped and enlivened in a range of unexpected ways. We see this in the ever-expanding markets for ‘traditional artworks’ (most of which are, of course, produced in the here and now); in the traditional performances and environments choreographed and staged for tourist consumption; and in the nostalgias, religious fundamentalisms, and essentialized identity categories that emerge as defensive stances in relation to the modern, the Western, and the global. If we remain wedded to the idea of tradition as something archaic or residual, then these emergent forms come always to be construed as somehow not authentic enough. They are, as Hobsbawm and Ranger diagnosed, ‘invented traditions’.24 The idea of ‘invented tradition’ provided a framework for understanding the work that modern traditions do under conditions of deterritorialization. ‘Invented traditions’, it would seem, do not come from the authority of the local, but from the demands of deterritorializing forces. As J. B. Thompson has suggested, under global conditions ‘[t]raditions do not disappear but they lose their moorings in the shared locales of everyday life’.25 Most benignly, such traditions may be understood simply as mediated, globally scoped elaborations of existing traditions. More actively, such traditions may be attempts at re-embedding and reterritorializing bounded spatial units (such as the nation or the region) whose pre-given sense of self has been compromised by the deterritorializing effects of globalization. More cynically, they may be seen as disembedded marketing ploys that claim tradition as a way of expressing market-driven 32
Tradition is (not) modern: deterritorializing globalization
differentiation. Of course, the residual problem, that the idea of invented traditions has left us with, is the sense that there was somewhere, sometime, ‘real’ traditions and that these present ‘invented’ traditions are but ideological malformations. As Chakrabarty notes, this structure of thinking about now-modern traditions is but an extension of that earlier relational (modern) system of thought that brought the idea of tradition into being in the first place.26
Tradition is (not) modern Can we think about this relationship between modernity and tradition differently? Is it possible to think past this binary altogether? Or should we simply think more productively in and through the binary? A useful starting point might be to think about tradition and modernity as being a vibrating couplet within which the terms are both co-dependent and mutually exclusive. We might deliver this formula in the following terms: ‘tradition is (not) modern’.27 And we might then attach this formula to some very specific spatial questions about processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization under globalization. There are a number of thinkers who have started this process and their insights are very suggestive of alternative ways of thinking about both modernity and tradition. In the first instance, we might note the ways in which traditions move, not just intergenerationally but now, also through space. They move with people as they make their transnational journeys from old homes to new homes (be it voluntarily or not). They circulate (often globally) as mediated and romanticized reports on people and place, to eager and curious audiences elsewhere. These kinds of movements, J. B. Thompson rightly notes, are the precondition for traditions to be re-embedded in new contexts and ‘within new territorial units that exceed the limits of shared locales’.28 We might think here, by way of example, of the processes of historic built environment conservation and management. Set within the framework of this chapter, we might variously read such activity as making tradition, salvaging tradition, or activating tradition anew (inventing tradition). My own research into built environment conservation in Britain, Australia, and Asia has, in part, focused upon the very powerful role of the idea of townscape in aesthetic evaluations of what is of value, and what matters in historic built environments. Part of that project has entailed constructing a genealogy of the idea of townscape, from its early shaping in the writings of Hubert de Cronin Hastings (under the curious pseudonym of Ivor de Wolfe) in the pages of Architectural Review in the 1940s, to the elaborations offered by Nikolaus Pevsner, through the popularization of the concept by way of the skilful renditions of Gordon Cullen.29 The push toward townscape was undoubtedly a nationalistic expression, coming as it did during World War II and its immediate aftermath. It sought, in de Cronin Hastings’s own words, to identify, protect, and enhance a ‘landscape tradition to which England owes it most personal aesthetic character’.30 We might interpret this as a kind of turn to the local, a reterritorialization under conditions (here of war) that threatened deterritorialization. Yet we know that the townscape principle, and the aesthetic assemblies framed by it, have 33
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not simply served British planning. Townscape has become a planning common sense that has traversed national boundaries with surprising ease. These principles not only define what can and cannot be built around, say, for example, the dome of St Paul’s in London, but also what should be done about war-damaged Dubrovnik, about the refurbishment of Singaporean high-rise, about redevelopment and restoration in decaying Hanoi, and about the (re)making of ‘Chinatowns’ both in the West and the East. While townscape’s aesthetic principles are highly sensitized to the specificities of the local (that is, they are territorialized), its logic as a planning principle has been disseminated across the globe in an utterly deterritorialized manner. Something supposedly of, from, and for the local, has happily expanded its sphere of influence through the deterritorialized structure of modern planning. We can stretch our thinking about townscape even further by delving more deeply into the genealogy of townscape itself. For Hastings, the point of townscape was to improve a scene or environment ‘by the manner suggested by itself’, a notion of development based on the genius loci of place, the intrinsic, indigenous qualities of the local. In particular, his aesthetic preference was for the enhancement of areas that had what he referred to as ‘infinite variety’, ‘irregularity’, and ‘disdain [for] formality’. This visual disorder he dubbed ‘sharawaggi’, and glossed this as being a term derived from an ‘East Asian’ expression for ‘irregular gardening’. Here we glimpse something peculiarly hybrid about this supposedly indigenous ‘English’ principle of place. At its very heart stands an aesthetic concept that was by no means purely English, but had derived out of a global flow which came to bear on what was thought to be ‘genius loci’, or put in the terms of this chapter, the tradition of place. Through this example, we can see the need to think differently about tradition, and to draw into view the ‘geographies of process’ (flow) that produce it. In doing so, we will see how these processes produce traditionalisms that express themselves as oppositional to modernity (not modern), but are also in and of modernity. We should not imagine that the mobility of tradition always occurs smoothly. Such movement produces disturbances, and most usually in terms of tradition’s sources of authority. So, for example, under conditions of migration, questions are raised about who has the authority to judge what is or is not ‘proper’ in terms of relocated traditions. Furthermore, a migrant group that re-embeds elsewhere through the reconfiguration and performance of tradition may be met with hostility by others who feel that their own traditions and their own authority over locality are being threatened. Similar disturbances around authorization and tradition are felt by those who experience what we might think of as deterritorialization-without-movement – the dispossessed subject of colonization.31 For both the migrant and the colonized, the performance of tradition almost always entails (re)constructing lines of authorization. Often enough, such reconstructions rely upon utterly modern structures – be it the records of anthropology, global networks of communication, recent technologies of representation, or modern regimes of governance. For this reason, modern tradition is always surrounded by debates about who is the proper authority as well as suspicions as to authenticity.32 Another kind of relational process is worth considering when seeking to complicate 34
Tradition is (not) modern: deterritorializing globalization
our sense of the tradition/modernity binary. This is the way in which, under the logic of consumption, traditions routinely pass out of the very group they were assumed to belong to. We might think of the seemingly insatiable appetite that the global subculture of the ‘New Age’ seems to have for indigenous ways of being in the world. These New Age romantics scan the web and scour globally-supplied New Age stores for the traditions they imagine they no longer have. What come to be assembled from such global shopping sprees are innovative, thoroughly mediated, utterly commodified, and usually unauthorized, versions of indigenous living. It is, of course, very easy to be cynical about such New Age activities, but, in their own globalized way, they are attempts to dwell meaningfully in the world by assembling an infrastructure of tradition derived from anywhere, anytime, anyplace.
Modern architectures of tradition: ‘Aboriginal architecture’ in Australia In the last part of this chapter, I want to touch upon some formations which elucidate the formula ‘tradition is (not) modern’, by drawing on my research into indigenous cultural property matters in Australia.33 One component of that work was to examine (along with colleagues Kim Dovey and Mathilde Lochert) the emergence of a specific touristic architecture that has come to be referred to as ‘Aboriginal’ or ‘indigenous’ architecture. Tourism is, of course, one of the more evident flows that help give our globalized existence one of its specific characteristics. Australia has vast numbers of international tourists, and the majority of them state a desire to experience something of Aboriginal Australia. In this world of touristic consumption, what comes to stand as ‘Aboriginal Australia’ is far more narrow than the diverse ways of life and cultural performatives that are the reality of contemporary indigenous Australian life. The Aboriginal Australia that is sought out by tourists is framed for the most part by a primitivist Aboriginalism. Only those Aboriginal people and places that register Aboriginality in terms of certain hallmarks of ‘tradition’ are sought out by the modern tourist wishing to touch radical otherness. What these hallmarks come to be is mediated as much by anthropological reconstructions, as it is by more populist and romanticized stereotypes of the noble savage. This preference for an experience of traditional Aboriginal society draws specific parts of Australia into the purview of the tourist. Two premier sites on the tourist map of Australia are Kakadu National Park in northern Australia (where there are World Heritagelisted rock-art complexes), and the central Australian Uluru and Kata-juta National Park (where the mythical and symbolic importance of the monolith Uluru – Ayers Rock – is well recognized). Both these areas are legally owned by their indigenous custodians, having been returned to them in the 1980s under special legal provisions to restore lands to ‘traditional owners’. That these communities were successful in claiming lands under that early Land Rights legislation meant that they were able to prove in the eyes of the law that they had had continuing ‘traditional’ association with the land. This recent history of recognition of indigenous rights over these lands, and their repatriation under land 35
The End of Tradition?
rights provisions, is itself a symptom of the way in which these ‘traditional’ Aboriginal places are constituted out of a strange mix of modern (Anglo-Australian) law and preexisting (indigenous) tradition. A further expression of this hybrid status is the fact that neither Kakadu nor Uluru were exclusively returned to indigenous custodians. Such was the ‘world’ significance of these places (culturally and naturally), they were ‘returned’ to their indigenous custodians with the proviso that they were leased back to the state so that they could be national parks, accessible to all. During the 1990s, a number of architectural elements – in the form of hotels, visitor, interpretation, and cultural centres – were inserted into these already complexly constituted places. At a functional level, this architecture serves the needs of tourists by providing either accommodation or visitor interpretation facilities. Yet, many of these buildings are also expected to express what might be described as Aboriginal identity or Aboriginal notions of dwelling and being in the country. Some of them, like the Warradjun Cultural Centre, built in Kakadu National Park in 1995, and the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Aboriginal Cultural Centre opened in the Central Australian park of the same name, are dedicated specifically to housing interpretation centres representing local Aboriginal views of the land and ways of life (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Other buildings, like the Aboriginal-owned South Alligator
2.1 Warrandjun Cultural Centre, Kakadu National Park, northern Australia. The centre offers interpretations of the Aboriginal interests in and associations with the park
2.2 Uluru-Kata Tjuta Cultural Centre, UluruKata Tjuta National Park, Central Australia: The centre provides an Aboriginal interpretation of the park 36
Tradition is (not) modern: deterritorializing globalization
Hotel houses an indigenous enterprise that seeks to take economic advantage of tourism (Figure 2.3). Still others, like the Bowali Visitor Centre, also in Kakadu, are intended to act both as administrative headquarters for park managers as well as general (not specifically cultural or indigenous) interpretation centres (Figure 2.4). This emergent ‘Aboriginal architecture’ is haunted by one peculiar ‘fact’: that indigenous Australians are popularly seen to not have their own permanent architectural traditions in pre-contact times.34 This so-called ‘fact’ is itself a symptom of essentialist assumptions about pre-contact Aboriginal society. Most groups had some style of impermanent weather shelter, and in some communities, versions of these continue to be used. There are also very precise rules about the spatial organization of customary camps and complex symbolic knowledge fields that structure the landscape more generally. So, the so-called ‘fact’ that indigenous Australians were without architecture emerged hand-in-hand with racist colonial logics as proof that Aborigines were ‘uncivilized’, ‘primitive’, and did not properly (read productively) occupy the land. Colonists were unable to translate the different spatial logics by which indigenous Australians dwelt, into something that could claim equivalence to European spatial logics of occupation (such as architecture or property). This created an erasure that legitimated colonial dispossession,
2.3 The South Alligator Motel, Kakadu. This Aboriginal-owned enterprise takes economic advantage of the thousands of tourists who annually visit this World Heritage area 2.4 Bowali Visitor Centre, Kakadu National Park. The centre is designed to house park administrators and to display a general interpretation of the natural and cultural features of the area. Depicted here is an interior wall in the restaurant where indigenous and nonindigenous people involved in the building of the centre left their marks in a style reminiscent of traditional art practices (although not ones especially common to this area) 37
The End of Tradition?
for it allowed the early colonists to construct the imaginative geography of terra nullius (no one’s land). With this history in tow, the ‘Aboriginal architecture’ emerging in these new touristic contexts is predisposed to being read as inauthentic. Yet at the same time, this architecture is often over-determined by ‘Aboriginal tradition’, for it is drawn immediately into the task of expressing Aboriginality in a tourist context. How then might we think of these buildings in a way that moves us beyond terms like ‘inauthentic’ and ‘appropriative’? It is at this point that we might usefully invoke an alternate notion of hybridity to that which has come to us by way of postcolonial theory.35 This is Bruno Latour’s notion of the hybrid event.36 His work on science and technology in society has usefully drawn attention to the ways in which some of the social templates of the modern (notably rational science) are actively made through acts of ‘purification’ which rid them of signs of the non- (or pre-) modern orders of knowledge. Latour charts another world, one filled with hybrids in which the modern and the premodern, the human and the non-human, proliferate. Latour draws our attention to the networks of artefact, idea, nonhuman, person that make up life. Anthropologist Marilyn Strathern gives us a very relevant application of this notion to the frame of thinking about culture, and, specifically, what we might think of as modern/nonmodern culture mixes. Latour’s notions of hybrids and networks are, she says ‘visible effects of mediation’, they are ‘translations’ between ‘different orders of knowledge’.37 She goes on to observe that a key analytical responsibility lies in not simply revealing that a thing is hybrid (made of, say, two versions of the same thing), but that there has been a ‘hybrid constitution of an artefact’.38 Bringing this into view, she argues, is democratizing, in that it assumes that ‘the configuration of meanings’ that are an artefact, are the product of many actors (some human, some non-human, some animate, some not).39 If we use this model to think about the emergent artefact called ‘Aboriginal architecture’ then it might be possible to see how these buildings are quite different from the dynamics implied by processual terms like ‘appropriation’ and categorical labels like ‘inauthentic’. If these buildings were indeed ‘hybrids’ then what might need to come into view is not so much their architectural form (although this too is important) but the creatures and people and places that are attached to and constitute the making of these buildings. It is this wider network of constitution that could account for a far more meaningful – but not any less political – hybridity in relation to these buildings. We might begin this alternative reading of ‘Aboriginal architecture’ by focusing on aspects of these buildings that self-consciously carry an ‘Aboriginal meaning’. For example, the architects of the Bowali Visitor Centre (the renowned Glenn Murcutt in conjunction with Troppo Architects), assembled layouts, finishes, ornamentations, and formal features that very loosely interpret aspects of the varied spiritual, artefactual, ritualistic, or spatial aspects of the customary owners whose lands are now incorporated into Kakadu National Park (Figure 2.4). Such a building expresses tradition by assembling into a coherent architectural whole a set of features that were either previously outside indigenous architectures or expressed in quite different indigenous spatial terms. Illustrative in this context is the entranceway of the Bowali Visitor Centre (Figure 2.5). It offers a meandering 38
Tradition is (not) modern: deterritorializing globalization
2.5 Bowali Visitor Centre. Architects Glenn Murcutt and Troppo Architects designed an entranceway that interprets local protocols for how visitors should approach country to which they do not belong
and indirect entrance route into the building. The rationale for this architectural feature is that it expressed – in built form – a translation of local indigenous protocols about how strangers should approach lands, sites, and encampments in which they are visitors and about which they have little knowledge and uncertain authority. In short, this entrance is a hybrid form in that it comes from an indigenous spatial logic (albeit not formally architectural) and a non-indigenous (architectural) translation of it. At least some of these buildings, like the Warradjun Cultural Centre and the South Alligator Hotel in Kakadu, and the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Cultural Centre in Central Australia, are zoomorphic. These buildings have their formal features derived from a mimetic interpretation of the form of an animal or dreaming figure of special importance to locals (Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3). In the case of the Warradjun Cultural Centre and the South Alligator Hotel, the totemic figure that is expressed in the zoomorphic architectural forms of these buildings is the turtle and the alligator, respectively. A similar, and certainly more interpretative, zoomorphic building was designed by architect Greg Burgess for the UluruKata Tjuta Cultural Centre. The building is in the form of two snakes (Liru and Kuniya) that are associated with the main dreaming for the area (Figure 2.2). This kind of zoomorphic architecture is over-determined by a specific interpretation of Aboriginal tradition. It is also an architecture that bares little relationship to any preexisting spatial logics of actual building structures used by the indigenous people of the area. In short, traditional shelters never were and are still not in the shape of alligators, turtles, or snakes. Yet the indigenous landscapes within which these buildings are placed are animated in very real terms for the indigenous custodians by alligators, turtles, and snakes. These are but a few of the more important creatures to whom indigenous custodians are related – in their view, literally and symbolically – and with whom they work to co-produce proper occupation of the lands for which they are responsible under customary law. What to an architectural critic may be animal kitsch may be, to a local 39
The End of Tradition?
custodian, an apt expression of proper human-nonhuman relations. How this will be known will depend on more than any formal signs of architectural hybridity. We can start to see the complex ambivalence of the widened concept of architectural hybridity by returning to one of the zoomorphic forms described above. Burgess’s UluruKata Tjuta Cultural Centre in Central Australia is an award-winning building by an architect who has considerable fame (at least in local Australian terms). A celebrity building enters into a specific set of representational and discursive formations that both account for its status and contribute to it. In short, Greg Burgess’s story of the production of this building is one component in the complex semiotic of this hybrid architecture, and the fame it has garnered. Burgess’s own account of how the design came about refers to a complex set of consultations and artistic collaborations with the Anangu (Aboriginal) custodians of the area. The building is based, he suggests, on an architectural interpretation of an Aboriginal elder’s sand drawing of the snake story. Overlaying this is a site plan that replicated a specific inter-locking hand gesture – made during consultation by one of the Anangu custodians – which expressed the mood of reconciliation on cohabitation envisaged for this iconic part of Australia.40 So, this building has a detailed and widely circulated story of joint authorization that is attached to it and elaborates its status and meaning. Similar collaborations may have been associated with the South Alligator Hotel or the Warradjun Cultural Centre in Kakadu, but as buildings lacking celebrity status, such stories remain locked in the opaque networks of the community and the government bureaucracies that produced them. They can do little or no work to augment the, often negative, adjudication that these examples of ‘Aboriginal architecture’ receive. In contrast, the celebrity building, with its story of productive and artistic collaboration, captures a certain hope in a nation self-consciously seeking to move beyond its colonial past. It is a story of production that suggests mutual authorization over the form and, as such, works to embed the building in the imaginative landscape of a postcolonizing Australia.
Amplifying indigenous authority There are many things that can be said about the architectural, aesthetic, and political features of this emergent Aboriginal architecture.41 My purpose in activating the formula ‘tradition is (not) modern’ is to move beyond, on the one hand, romantic notions of architectural hybridity, and, on the other, cynical readings of appropriation. Rather, I am proposing a more radical notion of hybridity in which stylistic cross-fertilizations, if present, are but one aspect of a wider set of intersecting semiotic systems in which things, people, ideas, technologies, and nonhuman natures come together in inventive events. To use the language of inventiveness is not to imply an inauthentic tradition, nor is it to suggest a romantic optimism. One certain thing about the hybrid event is that it cannot be pinned down. As Strathern reminds us, the characteristics of the hybrid ‘do not reside in any one part but in the way parts work together’.42 In short, such inventiveness does not necessarily mean reconciled coexistence. To capture the uneven fortunes of this kind of inventiveness, we need only think of the ambiguous politics of how these 40
Tradition is (not) modern: deterritorializing globalization
buildings were produced, and the often ambivalent registers into which they are received. These aspects of the event of ‘Aboriginal architecture’ detail the uncertain structures of authority and authorization that gave rise to these buildings and flow on from them. In an earlier part of this chapter, I referred to the assumption that tradition operated with a specific level of authority attached to and verified by a monogamous, place-based geography. One of the ways that globalization deterritorializes, so it is argued, is by undoing that local (tradition-bound) structure of authority and imposing other (modern and external) authorities over the fate of one’s place in the world. We might imagine that this emergent Aboriginal architecture is evidence of such a process of deterritorialization, arising in the first instance from colonization, and, subsequently, from the intensified forms of dispossession that occur when thousands of tourists daily traverse one’s country. Yet, it is also true that this architecture is not simply imposed upon these indigenous communities, nor does it simply appropriate, willy-nilly, aspects of their culture. These are buildings that were actively commissioned by the local Aboriginal communities. They are buildings that were designed with varying levels of consultation with the appropriate traditional custodians of the area. They are buildings that were approved by the broader community through elaborate consultation procedures. They are buildings that retain significant (albeit varying) levels of Aboriginal input into their ownership, management, and functioning. Despite how the formal features of such architecture might be adjudicated – whether they are seen as ‘authentic’ or ‘appropriative’, ‘innovative’ or ‘kitsch’ – the processes of authorization that flow through these buildings are a significant part of their hybrid nature. Each building, in differing ways, reflects traditional obligations around place and kinship for indigenous authorization. Each was produced out of complex processes in which traditional meaning was enjoined with modern architecture by a range of technologies of communication and representation (themselves both traditional and modern). It is this hybrid inventiveness that gives these building events the potential to be something entirely productive in political and architectural terms. Whether this is the case, however, is by no means guaranteed by architectural hybridity alone. Any radical potential remains poised in the shifting and uneven networks of power and authorization that come together to produce the hybrid event called ‘Aboriginal architecture’. The architecture produced out of such processes is never merely something traditional in the service of the modern, nor is it only ever an expression of touristic nostalgia, nor even is it simply an indigenous essentialism. This architectural event is an expression of the productively unstable formula ‘tradition is (not) modern’, a formula that is energized in peculiar ways by the deterritorializations of globalization. In these sites and through these architectures, global heritage regimes and global tourist consumption are in inventive relations with traditional structures of authorization and spatiality. Through these hybrid architectural events, new regimes of authorization are produced; new ways of dwelling in country are enacted; new forms of land management are devised; new structures of pedagogy are delivered; and new kinds of knowledge translations are made. Sometimes for the better, sometimes not.
41
The End of Tradition?
Notes I would like to thank Nezar AlSayyad and the conference participants of ‘The End of Tradition?’ (Conference of the International Association for the Study of Traditional Environments, Trani, Italy, October 12–15, 2000) for their input to this chapter. 1. F. Jameson, ‘Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, New Left Review, vol. 146, 1984, pp. 53–92. 2. A. Appadurai, ‘Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination’, Public Culture, vol. 12, no. 1, 2000, p. 6. 3. Ibid., p. 5–6. 4. Ibid., p. 6. 5. S. Sassen, ‘Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global’, Public Culture, vol. 12, no. 1, 2000, p. 217, footnote 2. 6. Appadurai, ‘Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination’, p. 18. 7. A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990. 8. J. Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, London, Polity Press, 1999, p. 107. 9. Augé, Marc, Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity (translated by John Howe), London, Verso, 1995 10. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity. 11. Jean-Paul Bourdier notes that ‘[t]radition identified as the past is a modernist idea’. He goes on to note the problems this produces for the study of traditional dwellings, resulting in nostalgia, romanticism, and antiquarianism. See J. Bourdier, ‘Reading Tradition’, in J. Bourdier and N. AlSayyad (eds.), Dwellings, Settlements, and Tradition: Cross-cultural Perspectives, Lanham, University of America Press, 1989, p. 38. 12. D. Gross, The Past in Ruins: Tradition and the Critique of Modernity, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1992, as cited in T. Luke, ‘Identity, Meaning, and Globalization: Detraditionalization in Postmodern Space-Time Compression’, in P. Heelas, S. Lash, and P. Morris (eds.), Detraditionalization: Critical Reflections on Authority and Identity, Oxford, Centre for the Study of Cultural Values at Lancaster University with Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996. See also E. Shils, Tradition, London, Faber and Faber, 1981; Bourdier, ‘Reading Tradition’; and Y. Tuan, ‘Traditional: What does it Mean?’ in Bourdier and AlSayyad (eds.), Dwellings, Settlements, and Tradition, pp. 27–34. 13. Luke, ‘Identity, Meaning, and Globalization’, p. 116. 14. Malinowski said, ‘Destroy tradition, and you will deprive the collective organism of its protective shell, and give it over to the slow but inevitable process of dying out’. See B. Malinowski, ‘Ethnology and the Study of Society’, Economica, vol. 2, 1922, pp. 214 as quoted in G. Stocking Jr., ‘Maclay, Kubary, Malinowski: Archetypes from the Dreamtime of Anthropology’, in G. Stocking, Jr. (ed.), Colonial Situations: Essays on the Contextualization of Ethnographic Knowledge, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1991, p. 51. 15. D. Chakrabarty, ‘Afterword: Revisiting the Tradition/Modern Binary’, in S. Vlastos (ed.), Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, p. 286. 16. T. Asad, ‘Afterword: From the History of Colonial Anthropology to the Anthropology of Western Hegemony’, in Stocking (ed.), Colonial Situations, p. 314. 17. Malinowski expressed this notion through a very specific time-space model. For him, what ‘time had hidden from us, space keeps preserved for a while.’ See Malinowski, ‘Ethnology and the Study of Society’, Economica, vol. 2, 1922, pp. 216 as quoted in Stocking (ed.), Colonial Situations, p. 51. 18. Asad, ‘Afterword: From the History of Colonial Anthropology to the Anthropology of Western Hegemony’, p. 315. 19. Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, p. 64. 20. T. Luke, ‘Identity, Meaning, and Globalization: Detraditionalization in Postmodern Space-Time Compression’, p. 114. Talal Asad suggests that this notion of tradition is derived from the conservative Edmund Burke. For Burke ‘“the past” is a palpable point of authority to which one is 42
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21. 22. 23.
24. 25. 26.
27. 28. 29.
30. 31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
either linked by mimetic action or from which one is forever severed.’ See Asad, ‘Afterword: From the History of Colonial Anthropology to the Anthropology of Western Hegemony’, p. 316. Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, p. 64. P. Heelas, ‘Introduction: Detraditionalization and its Rivals’, in Heelas, Lash, and Morris (eds.), Detraditionalization: Critical Reflections on Authority and Identity, pp. 1–20. Doreen Massey describes what she calls the new ‘power-geometry’ of deterritorialization. She argues that ‘different social groups have distinct relationships to . . . differentiated mobility: some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movements, others don’t; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it’. See D. Massey, Space, Place and Gender, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1994, p. 149. E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984. J. B. Thompson, ‘Tradition and Self in a Mediated World’, in Heelas, Lash, and Morris (eds.), Detraditionalization: Critical Reflections on Authority and Identity, p. 94. Chakrabarty, ‘Afterword: Revisiting the Tradition/Modern Binary’, p. 286. Kwame Anthony Appiah gives an exemplary account of the entanglements of modernity, rationality, myth, neotraditionalism, and traditionalism in contemporary global art markets. He offers us a template for how to understand the modern through its supposed antithesis – the traditional – by exposing some of the ‘natural errors’ in the West’s thinking about both. See A. Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 107. See K. Gelder and J. M. Jacobs, Uncanny Australia: Sacredness and Identity in a Postcolonial Nation, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1998. Thompson, ‘Tradition and Self in a Mediated World’, p. 99. H. de Cronin Hastings, ‘Exterior Finishing or Sharawaggi: The Art of Making Urban Landscape’, The Architectural Review, January 3–8, 1944; and G. Cullen, Townscape, London, Architectural Press, 1961. de Cronin Hastings, ‘Exterior Finishing or Sharawaggi’, p. 5. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari describe imperialism as the ‘first great movement of deterritorialization’. G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, London, Althone, 1983, p. 261. Similarly, the authority of earlier imperialists to remove artefacts and other items of cultural value in the name of science, and place them in metropolitan collections, is now being challenged. There is now a worldwide repatriation of such objects. And while this is a process of re-embedding, the fate of these now floating objects is accompanied by transnational struggles over to whom the objects rightfully belong, who might best care for them, and who has proper authority over them. See, for example, R. Handler, ‘On having a Culture: Nationalism and the Preservation of Quebec’s Patrimoine’, in G. W. Stocking Jr. (ed.), Objects and Others: Essays on Museums and Material Culture, Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1991. This research was in part undertaken with colleagues Kim Dovey and Mathilde Lochert from the University of Melbourne. The research was supported by a grant from the Australian Research Council. There is considerable scholarship on indigenous architecture in Australia. See M. Heppell, A Black Reality: Aboriginal Camps and Housing in Remote Australia, Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1979; B. Hodge, ‘Aboriginal Iconographies of Home’, Communal/Plural, vol. 5, 1997, pp. 47–68; P. Memmott, Humpy, House, and Tin Shed: Aboriginal Settlement History on the Darling River, Ian Buchan Fell Centre, University of Sydney, 1991; and P. Memmott, ‘The Way it Was: Customary Camps and Houses in the Southern Gulf of Carpentaria’, in P. Read (ed.), Settlement: A History of Australian Indigenous Housing, Canberra, Aboriginal Studies Press, 2000. See, as examples, J. Clifford, The Predicament of Culture, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1988; R. J. C. Young, Colonial Desire, London and New York, Routledge, 1995; and in the spatial sciences, E. W. Soja, Thirdspace, Oxford and Cambridge, MA, Blackwell, 1996. See especially B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993. 43
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37. M. Strathern, Property, Substance, and Effect: Anthropological Essays on Persons and Things, London and New Brunswick, NJ, The Athlone Press, 1999, p. 120. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Gregory Burgess can be seen giving this account at the following web site: www.abc.net.au/arts/ architecture/arch/ar_bur.htm 41. See K. Dovey, J. Jacobs, and M. Lochert, ‘Aboriginality and Architecture’, in Lesley Lokko (ed.), White Papers/Black Marks: Architecture, Race, and Culture, London, The Athlone Press, 2000, pp. 25–37. 42. Strathern, Property, Substance, and Effect, p. 120.
44
The tradition of the end: global capitalism and the contemporary spaces of apocalypse
Chapter 3
The tradition of the end: global capitalism and the contemporary spaces of apocalypse Katharyne Mitchell
. . . there, there overhead, there, there, hung over those thousands of white faces, those dazed eyes, there in the starless dark the poise, the hover, there with vast wings across the cancelled skies, there in the sudden blackness the black pall of nothing, nothing, nothing – nothing at all. Archibald MacLeish1 Eschatology is the study of endings or last things, from the Greek eschatos ‘last’ or ‘furthest’. Individual eschatology is concerned with the fate of the individual after death. Is there an afterlife? What is the future of the soul? Cosmic eschatology is more concerned with the fate of the planet and of human society as a whole. What will happen to humanity in the event of worldly cataclysm? What is the destiny of the universe?2 Although forecasting the end of humanity, space, and time is an old and widespread practice, the discourse of endings has proliferated greatly in Western philosophy and popular culture in recent years. Examples from scholarly books in the last two decades alone include the titles The End of Space, The End of Time, The End of History, The End of the Nation, The End of Tradition, and The End of the World. Postmodernist philosophy, in particular, can be characterized by an increasingly apocalyptic tone, one in which all parties vie for the strongest language of foretelling the end, and of predicting the extreme limit, the ‘imminence of the last’. In an essay from the 1980s, Derrida wrote about this penchant for eschatological thinking, where each claimant for a particular discourse of the end attempts to speak more forcefully and lucidly than the last:
45
The End of Tradition?
. . . this is not only the end of this here but also and first of that there, the end of history, the end of class struggle, the end of philosophy, the death of God, the end of religions, the end of Christianity and morals . . . the end of the subject, the end of man, the end of the West, the end of Oedipus, the end of the earth, Apocalypse Now, I tell you, in the cataclysm, the fire, the blood, the fundamental earthquake, the napalm descending from the sky by helicopters, like prostitutes, and also the end of literature, the end of painting, art as a thing of the past, the end of psychoanalysis, the end of the university, the end of phallocentrism and phallogocentrism, and I don’t know what else.3
Derrida links the desire of the new preachers to circumvent the power of the Kantian logos through perverting philosophy into poetry. The ‘poetry’ of the end resists the overweening power of philosophical ‘reason’, which has occupied the centre stage of Western thought since Enlightenment times. It is a language of persuasion, which ‘naturally wants to attract, to get to come, to arrive at this, to seduce in order to lead . . .’.4 Derrida’s essay is concerned with philosophical texts and the current ontological and epistemological struggles over reason and language which are played out through the metaphor of the apocalypse. But in this chapter I am more interested in the current philosophical and popular imaginings of the end as they are co-opted and instrumentalized by the institutions and actors of capitalism, and as they play out in space. The notion of apocalypse is part of the eschatology of the communal end, and historically it has contained the seeds of a positive future. What are the shifting conceptions of the apocalypse in the era of capitalist globalization, and how do modern understandings and experiences of space contribute to these conceptions? I will begin with a quick perusal of some of the motifs and spaces of apocalyptic thinking in the past.
Apocalyptic visions and spaces Historically the idea of apocalypse, or global destruction, was a meaningful one within many religious traditions across the globe. The narrative of the end of the world can be found in most of the extensive historical civilizations, including the GrecoRoman, Babylonian, Indian, and Mexican empires, and was prevalent also in JudeoChristian narratives and in Sumerian, Buddhist, and Islamic myths of destruction and transformation. Apocalypse was a liberatory vision in most of these societies, as it was interpreted as containing future redemption alongside the destruction of the present. The component of transformation was a key one as it gave meaning to the event itself – with world annihilation came regeneration and expiation; with destruction came creation; with an ending came the chance for a new beginning. The Book of Revelation from the Bible forms the basis for most Western traditions of apocalypse. In Revelations, John offers a vision of the future cataclysmic destruction of the city of Babylon and those who have profited from its blasphemies and excesses (Figure 3.1). The text focuses on the evil events and practices occurring within Babylon, and foretells the day when an angel will come and announce the fall of the wicked city. The city is henceforth destroyed, and the pagans are judged, found guilty, and punished.5 The 46
The tradition of the end: global capitalism and the contemporary spaces of apocalypse
3.1 The Fall of Babylon, by John Martin, 1835
book ends with a depiction of the heavenly, perfect Jerusalem as the glorious city to be inhabited by the Christian believers – those deemed to be faithful and pious at the time of last judgement. The depiction of the actual spaces of the new city, however, remains largely abstract. The city is never clearly delineated, but rather exists in the imagination as part of the perfect and limitless future (Figure 3.2). Two points are useful for my discussion here: the first is the idea of descriptive time and normative time which run through the text; and the second is the deeply spatial nature of the vision, which locates the apocalypse (and the ensuing salvation for the chosen few) squarely within the cities of Babylon (Rome) and the New Jerusalem. The conceptualization of descriptive time versus normative time is based on the idea that there is a distinction between the world that is (the descriptive order) and the world that ought to be (the normative vision). In the former, the existing world is spatial, temporal, and eminently categorizable. In the latter, it is eternal, infinite, and uncategorizable.6 Babylon, as a metaphor for a real city (Rome) is describable, and hence immediately rendered imperfect in and through its being in the world. The New Jerusalem, on the other hand, is not of this world; it is a normative vision of what ought to be, a perfect system existing as an ideal type – and hence, above and beyond the messy imperfections rendered concrete and inescapable by the ravages of space and time. Hendrix writes: Whether Judeo-Christian or secular, apocalyptical thought and literature reside at the nexus of the ontological and the ethical, and are necessarily concerned with the perfectability or imperfectability of humanity in time . . . What I am attempting to define as ‘apocalyptic’, then, is a tradition within literature in which there is a peculiarly pronounced revelatory shift – by which I mean that point of radical differencing in any narrative at which ‘what is’ gives way so that ‘what ought to be’ may reveal itself. If, in analyzing any narrative, we label as descriptive time that time in which ‘what is’ occurs, and as normative time that time in which ‘what ought to be’ occurs, then the apocalyptic moment is the crossroads at which descriptive time yields narrational right of way to normative time.7
In the Book of Revelation, as in most apocalyptic narratives, the movement from descriptive to normative time is a profoundly conflictory and catastrophic moment. The traditional world of Babylon must be destroyed in order that the perfect world may be 47
The End of Tradition?
3.2 Imagining the New Jerusalem, by Duncan Long
born (again). This is also the ultimate ‘return’ narrative as it involves the strong desire for the return or restoration of the perfect world of Genesis, the moment in time prior to the Fall, the time in which ‘God dwelled among men’. This quest for a return to the time of Genesis is a desire for perfection, for the transcendent moment when God and man were one and there were no fissures between them, no knowledge of good and evil, no alienation caused by the comprehension of the ‘real’ world – the world of awareness and of description. It is also a desire to escape the alienations of the world as it actually exists, and to punish the ‘bad guys’ who have created such an alienating world for the apocalyptic visionary. Apocalypse is thus an ecstatic catastrophe for the narrator/promoter, in that it promises both salvation, a perfect oneness with God and a perfect normative world/city in which to spend his days, and damnation for the unbelievers. The vision of the apocalypse is a profoundly spatial one on a number of scales. If the idea of the apocalypse is concerned with the ravages of alienation and distance (from God) and of thus restoring the lost perfections of the oneness with God found in Genesis, ‘then the pursuit of apocalypse is itself a quest for direct apprehension of the transcendent – a quest for the end of metaphor, escape from the net of words, freedom from entrapment in the hermeneutical circle’.8 This ‘escape’ – from the distance 48
The tradition of the end: global capitalism and the contemporary spaces of apocalypse
of metaphor, from the alienations of language, from the fissure between subject and object – is fundamentally an escape from all of the paradoxes of time and space. ‘It is a metaphor for the direct apprehension of a paradoxical reality, for the disappearing of that epistemic gap that makes knowledge, description, definition, language, and metaphor all possible and necessary.’9 Apocalyptic thinking represents the quest for a world without metaphor, and hence a world without time or space as it actually exists. It is thus a vision inherently connected with the end of tradition, and ultimately the end of the world. Babylon, the city drawn from the Old Testament to represent blasphemy and sin, is modelled on the city of Rome, as it existed at the time of St. John the apostle, circa 95 AD. In Revelations, the city of Babylon is postulated as the ultimate place of evil – it is not just the place in which prostitutes linger, it is the prostitute and the seductress: The woman was dressed in purple and scarlet, and glittered with gold and jewels and pearls, and she was holding a gold wine cup filled with the disgusting filth of her fornication; on her forehead was written a name, a cryptic name: ‘Babylon the Great, the mother of all the prostitutes and all the filthy practices on the earth’.10 (Figure 3.3)
For John, part of the great seduction of Babylon exists in its capacity to make money, to be a successful commercial capital for traders and merchants. For him it is the ultimate market capital of the world, the first truly ‘global’ city, and when the ‘people of the world mourn for Babylon’, they are depicted in Revelation as mourning the loss of their riches and of the possibility for great profit-making which the city enabled. ‘Mourn, mourn for this great city whose lavish living has made a fortune for every owner of a seagoing ship; ruined within a single hour . . . never again will craftsmen of every skill be found or the
3.3 Die Grosse Babylon (Babylon as Prostitute); designed by Peter Proksch and woven by Heide Proksch 49
The End of Tradition?
sound of the mill be heard. Your traders were the princes of the earth, and all the nations were under your spell.’11 Here the city is depicted as the locus of evil-doing, primarily because of its seductive qualities as a ‘merchant’ city, a site of tremendous productivity and conspicuous consumption. In this apocalyptic vision, it is the closure of space within the city which hints of biblical evil, the possible ‘sedimentation’ of sin through time. The city form itself represents the loss of perfection, as perfection can only exist in the perfect space of the ideal type, of the limitless (spaceless) place of oneness with God. This early equation of closure with negative qualities, and openness with positive ones is a reversal of the typical understandings of tradition, in which community values are believed to survive through the generations because of their very qualities of rootedness in place. In John’s apocalyptic vision, however, tradition has been spoiled by the unbelievers – the sinners, fornicators, and merchants – and must be swept away so that the New Jerusalem (and a new set of ‘perfect’ traditions) can be established for the chosen few. In this negative depiction of Babylon (Rome), and positive vision of the New Jerusalem, the element of persuasion is very clear. If the listener will follow the apocalyptic visionary wholeheartedly and without reservation, then the chance of perfection will be his. The angel says, ‘Come up here: I will show you what is to come in the future . . . Then I saw the Lamb break one of the seven seals, and I heard one of the four animals shout in a voice like thunder, “Come”. When he broke the second seal, I heard the second animal shout, “Come”’.12 It is this tone of warning and persuasion that signals the apocalyptic narrative, and it is a narrative that behoves its listeners to listen and follow. Derrida writes, ‘Whoever takes on the apocalyptic tone comes to signify to, if not tell, you something. What? The truth, of course . . . The end is beginning, signifies the apocalyptic tone. But to what ends does the tone signify this? The apocalyptic tone naturally wants to attract, to get to come . . .’.13 It is this tone of warning and revelation, tied in with the vision of limitless space, of the end of cities as repositories of tradition, and the beginning of new traditions formed in the ideal-type spaces of the imagined (global) community, that I wish to examine in the contemporary moment. However, unlike the Book of Revelation, the negative association of closed city spaces with sinful money-making activities is reversed, so that profit-making in the limitless spaces of the new global community becomes something holy, becomes the New Jerusalem.
The spaces of apocalypse now According to apocalypse historian Daniel Wojcik, since the nineteenth century a belief in the inevitable end of the world is no longer necessarily tied to the promise of transformation and redemption. Instead, the belief in a fundamentally meaningless apocalypse has been growing exponentially over the course of the last century.14 Any vacuum such as this invites narrative rewriting. What is the possibility for redemption in the current moment? In Western literature and film, global catastrophe is often depicted 50
The tradition of the end: global capitalism and the contemporary spaces of apocalypse
as imminent and unavoidable. From the early Planet of the Apes and Mad Max movies of the 1970s, to the visions of global decay, annihilation, and societal collapse in Waterworld, Terminator, and The Handmaid’s Tale, images of the destruction of the environment and of human society itself are commonplace. Often the post-civilization societies following nuclear or other catastrophes are set in the ruined cities of the past, for example, Blade Runner (Los Angeles) and Escape from New York (New York).15 These urban wastelands, however, do not hold any promise of a utopian future community on the horizon. On the contrary, the terrible consequence of the ‘hyper’ modernity that has brought them to this pass continues with unabated horror – barbarians rule, and the few humane survivors are not ‘chosen’ for redemption because of their faith in God, but rather have survived randomly, or because of their skills as warriors. Thus, after massive destruction and near annihilation, comes only more chaos and pain, and not the salvation and redemption promised in earlier apocalyptic visions. In these contemporary visions of death and destruction, the nonsecular component of associated peace and justice, of redemption and expiation following the pain and suffering of cataclysm, is largely absent. For religious apocalyptic thinkers, the belief that the cosmos was ordered and that events were inevitable – guided by a stronger or larger force – was central to the regenerative quality of the belief. Faith and fatalism were woven together. For contemporary secular thinkers, however, there seem to be few redemptive qualities in the end of the world narrative. And it is thus a vision characterized largely by pessimism and despair. One scholar has called the use of the old visions without the attendant spiritual beliefs in salvation ‘metaphors for modern anxiety’.16 What forms the basis of this modern anxiety? Why the fascination with endings but not beginnings?17 Why and how does apocalyptic thinking and discourse continue to take shape in the modern era? Economic instability and spatial dislocation are two of the primary symptoms of negative change often associated with modernity. With the growth of industrial capitalism in the West and its rapid global spread, the experience of a more secure and stable sense of being in the world declined for many.18 In more recent decades, global capitalism has grown into the unrivalled socioeconomic system of the world, while at the same time, the negative experiences of modernity vis-à-vis its sociospatial referents of instability, anxiety, and dislocation appear to have accelerated. I believe it is these accelerating forces of ‘global’ capitalism and modernity that are leading to the proliferating discourses of apocalypse. But what kind of apocalypse? Apocalypse which leads to redemption and the New Jerusalem? Or the apocalypse of the Road Warrior, leading to endless damnation, chaos, and pain? It seems there is a current effort underway to harness and rework the discourse of apocalypse into a discourse of endings, but with an attendant future salvation; this represents a very strategic manipulation of the earlier, religious visions of the apocalypse. What is this vision? It is one which replaces the sense of God as representing the perfect entity (with whom we have a desire to become one) with a pseudo-religious sense of globalization as the perfect ideal-type system. Further, as with the acceptance of God, 51
The End of Tradition?
it is a system which demands complete faith. Despite the often catastrophic ending of tradition, belief in the perfect system must continue, for it is only with the destruction of old cities and spaces, that way can be made for the New Jerusalem.
Global capitalism as the apocalypse Globalization is a term that has become so ubiquitous and bloated with often contrary and conflicting meanings that it now has come to mean hardly anything at all. Scholars critical of the processes associated with economic globalization refer to the expansion of a laissez-faire brand of capitalism worldwide. It is an expansion networked through command centres often referred to as ‘global cities’, and it is accompanied by the subsequent liberalization of markets and labouring bodies; and the general attrition of governance – especially the sociopolitical power wielded by the erstwhile welfare state. Interestingly, these same processes of economic globalization, when discussed by globalization proponents, also refer to the expansion of a laissez-faire brand of capitalism worldwide – with the subsequent freeing up of markets and bodies, and the general attrition of governance, especially the sociopolitical power wielded by the welfare state. What is most astonishing about these two visions is not the similar depiction of global processes, but the realization that for the former this vision represents apocalypse, while for the latter, utopia. For one group, it is about endings without redemption; and for the other, it is about endings and attendant salvation. Most of us are now familiar with scholarly discussions of globalization written from a critical, spatial perspective.19 In the last three decades, a number of forces have come together to create a highly integrated and interdependent international system. Research in globalization studies focuses primarily on changes in the systems of world governance, including the proliferation of regional and cross-border trade agreements and pacts, the end of the cold war and the beginning of a ‘new world order’, and the ongoing impacts of neocolonialism and neoliberalism. There is an emphasis on shifts in the nature of capitalism as a global socioeconomic system – especially the changing geographies of production, the changing flows of capital and labour, the rise of new kinds of networks and commodity flows, and the increasing polarization of wealth on both macro (geographic) and micro (household) scales. A key feature of contemporary capitalism that is often discussed is the increased global nature and flexibility in regimes of accumulation – these include the deterritorialization of finance, the geographical fragmentation of production, and the growth of various kinds of systems of subcontracting.20 This flexibility is also manifested in the increasing, and often enforced, movements of labourers in extended social fields across borders; and in the consciousness, sociocultural expressions, and identity formation of both these transnational migrants and those who remain locally based. The overall perception of contemporary economic globalization as purveyed by critical scholars is one of individual anomie and despair as jobs are lost through runaway shops; of collective powerlessness in the face of failing unions as corporations and nations play 52
The tradition of the end: global capitalism and the contemporary spaces of apocalypse
off against each other in the entrainment of labour; of the increasing misery of less developed states through the enforcement of neoliberal policies by market pressures; of global environmental catastrophe owing to insufficient attention to questions of ecological sustainability; and of the rise of regimes of anti-democratic transnational governance in the form of regional and global trade agreements such as the WTO. In the most apocalyptic vision of all, it is a new world order structured primarily by spaces of flows. There is capital without capitalists, production without labour, just flows travelling at the speed of bits through networks of information, with nothing short of planetary catastrophe in the making.21 In the intensity and scope of the vision it is apocalyptic in the extreme, but it is an eschatological image that is ultimately unredemptive. Compare this with the vision of economic globalization from the perspective of thinkers on the right side of the political spectrum. These discourses of globalization are described well by Fernando Coronil, who writes: As an expression of this millennial fantasy, corporate discourses of globalization evoke with particular force the advent of a new epoch free from the limitations of the past. Their image of globalization offers the promise of a unified humanity no longer divided by East and West, North and South, Europe and its Others, the rich and the poor. As if they were underwritten by the desire to erase the scars of a conflictual past or to bring it to a harmonious end, these discourses set in motion the belief that the separate histories, geographies, and cultures that have divided humanity are now being brought together by the warm embrace of globalization, understood as a progressive process of planetary integration.22
It is this global-village image of harmonious integration that is harnessed and put to work for corporations from AT&T to Benetton, from Global Crossing to IBM (Figure 3.4).23 Different histories and bodies are fused together into a perfect oneness, and then difference itself is banished from future discussion. This is the ultimate fantasy of disembodied, ahistorical spacelessness, where there are no material or discursive frictions to hinder the space of flows. This is the fantasy of liberalism – a world without historical and spatial closure, without fissures and alienation. This is the transcendent moment for capitalism as well, for in a world without ‘the scars of a conflictual past’ or ‘the separate
3.4 ‘Future Family’: Planetary Integration by Benetton 53
The End of Tradition?
histories, geographies, and cultures that have divided humanity’, there also exist no barriers to the free circulation of capital and labouring bodies across space. For the corporate world, and for neoliberal thinkers like Francis Fukuyama, human society is poised for a great evolutionary leap – the leap into total obeisance to the laws of capitalist motion. For Fukuyama, the ‘end of history’ means the end of the twentieth-century experiments of different doctrines of government; it means the victory of capitalism and liberalism over socialism, communism, fascism, and dictatorship. For him, the current apocalypse is also the current utopia – the moment where the limits of so-called social engineering are made manifest, and a liberal, market-based order grounded in human nature emerges triumphant.24 The end of history means the final moment of evolution in the Hegelian-Marxist sense of a progressive evolution of political and economic institutions. Economic globalization, finally made possible through the perseverance of laissez-faire capitalism’s dynamic and inexorable motion, will mean the ending of the old traditions, and the beginning of a new world era.
Spaces of identity: towards the global self What are the spatial ramifications of this capitalist apocalypse? I will select a few transformations which can be said to categorize the shifting experience of being-in-theworld in late modernity. In terms of the sense of self, one of the changes that economic globalization has wrought is in the connection between identity and place. For many individuals worldwide, the sedentary relationship to a homeland, especially, a ‘national’ homeland since the eighteenth century, has been greatly disrupted by the processes characteristic of globalization. The word ‘homeland’, or ‘heimat’ in the German, connotes roots and territory – land itself. The deep connections that were felt between peoples and their land in many societies can be found in archival evidence dating back to early agrarian times. The contemporary philosopher, Sloterdijk, analyzed the many linguistic concepts around the world that connote this connection between a people and a particular territory. He wrote: The reason for this common capability can be found in analogous experiences of cultural development. It was thus with concepts like ‘folk’ and ‘motherland’ that people who began to cultivate the earth after the Neolithic revolution characterized the positive side of their sedentarism. Through the different expressions which they gave to the space with which they had become familiar, sedentary people articulated their symbiosis with an earth that, while feeding them, was also the depository of their dead. Through these words, which expressed deep allegiance to their own spatial residence, these peoples manifested what could be called agrarian patriotism.25
This patriotism – the patriotism of people to land, of citizen to nation, of self to space – is rendered increasingly unstable by the growing interdependencies between spaces in a global era. The current phase of neoliberal globalization involves the reordering and redefinition of geohistorical units, and it is a reordering that is profoundly spatial. The absolute and unquestioned relationship to a particular territory – in the last two centuries, a national territory – is ripped apart by the relentless dislocations and new articulations 54
The tradition of the end: global capitalism and the contemporary spaces of apocalypse
characteristic of capitalist development. There is an insistent tension between the state and global forces that has lead to the inexorable breaching and tearing of territorial narratives as well as physical boundaries, a constant rhythmic refrain of deterritorialization and reterritorialization played out unevenly across space.26 One of the concepts that has been caught up in the headlights of territorial transformation is that of community. Scholars of modernity from Tönnies through Weber have made the distinction between a sense of community as a more rooted, familiar, and personal set of relations than those characterized by the word ‘society’. Society is identified with the relationships of modernity, where personal connections are lost in the anomie of an abstracted and individualist world of monetary calculability and bureaucratic instrumentality. Michael Watts makes the connection between community and ‘its sister concepts of tradition and custom’ and stands them in sharp contrast to the ‘instrumental, individuated and formal properties of state or society in the modern sense’.27 He reflects at length on the question of why the concept of community ‘figures so centrally in contemporary violence’. Clearly, the highly charged contemporary politics of community centres on the shifting relationships between self and space. The dislocations occasioned by economic globalization have accelerated the modernist angst of loss of community – community here operating as a metonym for the shared personal spaces of social relationships anchored in a particular place. This has been heightened by the loss of the nation as the default repository of these narratives of shared identities, memories, and histories. Whether these narratives were ever actualized or not is insignificant beside the imagined community of national belonging.28 The loss of these imaginings is widely experienced as unacceptable and viciously struggled over, as it leaves in its wake nothing but a secular image of economic globalization, or, in other words, apocalypse without redemption. So here we are at the crossroads of discourses of apocalypse. Apocalyptic thought in contemporary scholarship results from the multiple transformations in society in the current period of flexible capitalism or late modernity; they are changes that go to the core of being and are intimately overlapped in the relationship of self and space. Historically, the concept of apocalypse contained a ‘redemptive’ quality to it in a nonsecular age. There was a pronounced religious fervour to the clearing out of old debris; the prospect of conflagration led to the prospect for a future rising, Phoenix-like from the ashes. Apocalypse was the precursor or preamble to utopia. Those apocalyptic promoters like Fukuyama, who see neoliberal globalization as progressive, depict utopia as the end of barriers – the complete freedom of movement. Movement through space is the ultimate democratic moment. It is bodies in movement, capital in motion. The End of History is the moment of an ultimate realization of and for society – utopia as the spaces of movement. Thus the religion of the market is the vision of apocalypse as the redemptive moment of capital’s perfect movement through space – and the creation that it leaves in its destructive wake. A regional example of a neoliberal utopia is the vision of Cascadia. Cascadia is an imagined, unified territory which stretches, according to the more expansive accounts, 55
The End of Tradition?
from Alaska through British Columbia, into parts of Idaho and down into Washington and Oregon. It is perceived as a postnational space by its promoters. Matthew Sparke describes it in the following terms: Rather than being territorially fixed, static and statelike, Cascadia appears to its promoters first and foremost as a moving ‘state of mind’. However, as a vision, an idea, a discourse, a dream image, a space-myth and a state of mind, to list only a few of the terms applied to Cascadia, this CBR [Cross-Border Regionalism] project is actively sustained by Canadian and US think tanks, visionaries and policy-makers.29
Cascadia manifests the logic of borderless flows, of networks and spaceless connections rather than of cities and embodied relationships. Cascadia is an ideal type, a perfect system that is always imagined and never attained. It is a node in a profoundly spaceless global economy, and its citizens are the managerial elite, disembodied (at least in the imagining) and inherently mobile in their ability to manage and evade the regulatory systems of cities and states. The Cascadian subject citizen is the veritable ‘global self’, a faceless, placeless being whose homeland is utopia itself.30 This ‘utopian’ vision rests on several assumptions, the first of which is that the normative citizen who is able to remain disembodied and contextless, is always a wealthy, white male. As with all neoliberal visions, the only body which can be truly bodyless, is this ‘standard’ body. This understanding is tacit, but never acknowledged, as it would disrupt the corporate narrative of warm and fuzzy planetary integration. The second assumption is that the actual spaces in which Cascadia is inscribed are environmentally more ‘natural’ and thus more sustainable than the arbitrary divisions caused by state borders. This narrative is key to the promotion of Cascadia as a pure space, one that is inherently more natural and perfect than the slow, ugly, and unsustainable regulatory spaces of the two nation-states. The dystopic vision of neoliberals, by contrast, is represented by the spaces of blockage and impurity. These blocked spaces are the postmodern cities of messiness and hybridity, of antagonistic bodies of difference, vying with and against each other, creating havoc and confusion, and united only in opposition to the ravages caused to their communities by the destructive side of capitalism’s uneven development. The classic city of dystopia is Los Angeles, where ghettos are perceived as constant sources of potential friction, with their normally contained inhabitants unexpectedly erupting out and beyond the barriers of poverty to protest and riot at their bloody marginalization (Figure 3.5). These types of postmodern cities represent the antithesis of Cascadia, for the ‘differences’ of bodies, their racialization and marginalization, is palpable, and is a constant source of tension. Los Angeles is the metaphor for a cultural pluralism that can never be harmonized and forgotten. The blockades of tires burning in the streets; the looted shop windows; the inassimilable migrants unable to cross legal or cultural borders freely and easily; the non-labouring, immobile, incarcerated, and welfare-dependent bodies – these are all the emblems of closure and dystopia found in the neoliberal vision of Los Angeles (Figure 3.5 and 3.6). It is in these stubborn, existing sites of sticky and immovable difference and tradition that neoliberals see apocalypse without redemption, 56
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and in which the discourse of ‘environmental apocalypticism’ is trumpeted most loudly. This particular narrative (too many people, too many irresolvable problems, too much sedimented sin) serves to depoliticize and disable those who are most likely to contest the economic and social inequities of the environments in which they are mired. As Cindi Katz notes, ‘nature made apocalyptic gives rise to a politics of hopelessness from which the means of social and environmental transformation are unlikely to emerge’.31 The apocalyptic tone here is again one that warns and persuades, although to different ends. And once again, it is concerned with a profoundly spatial struggle – the future of the city and of nature itself.
Apocalypse and utopia: spaces without limits? In All That is Solid Melts into Air, Marshall Berman emphasizes the profoundly spatial nature of capitalism’s force of creative destruction.32 In his discussion of Goethe’s legend of Faust, Berman writes of a man who makes a pact with the devil. In one of his three incarnations, that of the developer, the man connects his personal drives with the economic, political, and social forces that drive the world. He learns to build and destroy,
3.5 Ghetto Blockages: ‘Turn Left or Get Shot’
3.6 California National Guard Barricades in Los Angeles 57
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taming nature for contemporary needs, making progress, making the world modern. His ultimate project, what we would now see as the capitalist urban mega-project of all time, is to transform a particular coastal site into a ‘productive’ space through massive reclamation projects involving the construction of harbours, canals, dams, irrigation systems, fields, and waterpower. The transformation of the coastal site represents the rebuilding of the world through capitalist motion, and in the name of modernity. The creation of this dynamic space (and almost all the changes are changes that facilitate movement through space) allows business to expand exponentially. International trade can be opened up through the transportation of commodities through the canals and harbours. People can come to labour in the new fields and factories. Unlike the Gothic, slow, stagnant, closed, barren, and traditional spaces which he destroys, spaces are opened up for freedom. All natural and human barriers fall. Faust is thus the ‘new’ man, wrecker and creator, the ultimate figure of the master developer. Of course this spatial transformation has a cost. The people in this new modern space must become ‘modern’ people. But not all are willing to adapt and to create the new ‘community’ that is necessary to survive in modern times. Faust finally decides that the old, traditional people who are standing in the way of the project must be sacrificed for the greater good. He has the elderly couple, Baucis and Philemon destroyed, so that the project can be completed as planned. It is only through the clearing out of the old and the traditional, that the new and modern can take hold. For Faust, capitalism’s creative destruction is both apocalypse and utopia in one. Faust’s religion is modernity. And this modernity is represented by the limitless spaces of capitalist progress. In this epic narrative, we thus see once again the connection of apocalypse and space, and its moment of transition from the age of faith to the modern era. As Gottlieb notes: . . . if the central drama of the age of faith was the conflict between salvation and damnation by deity, in our secular modern age this drama has been transposed to a conflict between humanity’s salvation or damnation by society in the historical arena.33
First capitalism and now global capitalism have taken the place of the deity, and events such as the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001, indicate the
3.7 World Trade Center as Babylon, from the Foundation for the Law of Time 58
The tradition of the end: global capitalism and the contemporary spaces of apocalypse
widespread furore that this displacement has caused. Indeed, this terrorist attack has been projected by some Christian fundamentalists as a blow against the religion of global capitalism and its unfettered movement across the spaces of the globe. In this apocalyptic imagining, the destruction of the World Trade Center represents the modernday equivalent of the Fall of Babylon (Figure 3.7). The attack, however, was, needless to say, an ultimately unredemptive act – one without a vision of a viable alternative. It was a political act but an act without politics, without a conceptualization of the spaces of hope, without a vision of utopia. What are these contemporary visions?
Alternative utopias Those who see the spaces of economic globalization under Late Capitalism as negative (as ultimately apocalyptic) for human society and the planet are caught in a bind vis-à-vis a consideration of the spaces of utopia. Here’s the bind: how to imagine the spaces of utopia (a constructive imagining) in an interdependent world, without either duplicating the capitalist logic of movement, speed, and openness being equated with freedom, or resorting to tyrannical and ill-conceived closures of various kinds (especially closures that lead directly to the neo-traditionalist identity politics that most progressive critics see as suffocating of difference). In the worst-case scenarios, these closures lead to the kinds of terrorist acts or ethnic cleansings discussed above.34 The reality and the prospect of violence from the ‘territorial fallacy’ – the false connection between the land and its proprietor, is perceived as a crucial problem of the contemporary moment by both neoliberal and radical scholars. But, whereas Marxist geographers tend to depict violence without surcease (apocalypse without redemption), neoliberal philosophers like Sloterdijk offer apocalypse with the possibility of an attendant utopia. Utopia, for Sloterdijk, will come with the total submission to the reality of a new, multi-spatial self, or as he puts it, the ‘global self’. This self, as in all of the neoliberal images, exists in free and mobile space and is represented by ‘movement away from a point of departure toward an open global space’.35 If the utopia of free-marketeers is the absolute freedom of movement, then what is the utopia of Marxists, or others critical of laissez-faire capitalism and its various violences? If critical discourses of globalization as apocalypse do not contain any seeds of hope, they will either lead followers (including students) to pessimism and despair, or over to the ‘other’ side – the side that promises salvation, the side which sees neoliberal globalization as a warm and fuzzy moment of planetary integration. The problem for critical scholars on the left is the problem of imagining progressive spaces in a non-identarian mould; of imagining the spaces of community without communal exclusions and normative assumptions; of imagining a global civil society, but without the biases of Western liberalism. David Harvey’s Spaces of Hope is a partial response to these questions of alternative imaginings. The book is both a reaffirmation of Harvey’s earlier work and an apologia for the lack of alternatives it seemed to offer. The need to imagine the spaces of hope rather 59
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than just critique the spaces of alienation is palpable. There is now a growing scholarly interest in the formation of these spaces on a global scale, as a form of cosmopolitan civil society or transnational public sphere – a space that is neither neoliberal globalization nor fundamentalist, neonationalist separation. What might this alternative space look like? Spaces of Hope consists primarily of a reworking of Harvey’s earlier theses on spatializing Marx but set within contemporary globalization debates. He does not directly address the topic of spatializing utopia until near the end of the book, and he begins his discussion with a critique of degenerative utopias – particularly those of urban redevelopment projects and other profit-oriented, capitalist projects hiding behind the rhetoric of progress. For example, Harvey introduces Disneyland as an example of a ‘degenerative utopia’, and uses it as a way of critiquing any kind of spatial form that represents itself as a form of materialized utopianism. In his examination of alternative spaces, spaces of hope and possibility, he quickly rejects the limitations necessitated by any idea of utopia that is fixed in space. Inevitably, he argues, these spaces are closed, often authoritarian, ultimately undialectical as soon as they are rendered concrete. Thus begins a quest for an alternative. He writes: ‘The task is to pull together a spatiotemporal utopianism – a dialectical utopianism – that is rooted in our present possibilities at the same time as it points towards different trajectories for human uneven geographical developments’.36 This is a search for an alternative space of possibility that is materially grounded, yet never actually materialized. Harvey takes back the rhetoric of movement and freedom for his alternative utopian vision from the neoliberal right. For him, the alternative to a sense of despair stemming from the apocalypse of economic globalization is in the proactive imagining of a better society – one springing from a greater awareness of the inherent internal contradictions of Late Capitalism. His sociospatial and dialectical utopia allows, in fact necessitates, closures of various kinds, but they are closures that are negotiated and made vulnerable to constant critique. He writes: How, then, can a stronger utopianism be constructed that integrates social process and spatial form? Is it possible to formulate a more dialectical form of utopianism, construct, even, a utopian dialectics? For this to happen requires a dialectics that can operate in relation to both space and time (something impossible within the Hegelian tradition). It also has to face up to the materialist problems of authority and closure. Closure (the making of something) of any sort contains its own authority because to materialize any one design, no matter how playfully construed, is to foreclose, in some cases temporarily but in other instances relatively permanently, on the possibility of materializing others. We cannot evade such choices.37
The revalorization of closure is an interesting theoretical move. But alongside this suggestion vis-à-vis the imagining of a ‘normative’ spatial form, I would like to rethink the descriptive order of being itself. The cities of ‘Babylon’ are with us now: they are still Rome, but also Cairo and London and Sao Paolo and Los Angeles. These are the sites of our future utopias: the ontological world that is. The first step in reclaiming these spaces is to contest the apocalyptic visions and narratives of Cascadian-style, spaceless utopias, which front for the imagined communities of global capitalism. At the same time, we must contest the image of dystopia, the actually existing, described, and describable 60
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urban places (or city fragments) around the globe which do not correspond to the freeflowing narratives of openness and perfection. These are the cities to fight for, to improve, and to claim as our utopias, ones in which none are excluded and all may enter. They are the messy, hybrid, historical, and geographical cities of the postmodern era, and they are the cities that we must revalorize and work to make our New Jerusalem of the future.
Notes 1. A. MacLeish, ‘The End of the World’, Collected Poems, 1952. 2. D. Wojcik, The End of the World as We Know It, New York, New York University Press, 1997. 3. J. Derrida, ‘Of an Apocalyptic Tone Adopted in Recent Philosophy’, Oxford Literary Review, vol. 6, no. 2, 1984, pp. 20–21. 4. Ibid., p. 24. 5. The New Jerusalem Bible, New York, Doubleday and Company Inc., 1968. 6. H. Hendrix, The Ecstacy of Catastrophe: A Study of Apocalyptic Narrative from Langland to Milton, Peter Lang, New York, 1990, p. 2. 7. Ibid., p. 3 8. Ibid., p. 6. 9. Ibid., p. 7. 10. The New Jerusalem Bible, p. 333. 11. Ibid., p. 335. 12. Ibid., pp. 324–325. 13. Derrida, ‘Of an Apocalyptic Tone Adopted in Recent Philosophy’, p. 24. 14. Wojcik, The End of the World as We Know It. 15. J. Combs, ‘Pox-Eclipse Now – The Dystopian Imagination in Contemporary Popular Movies’, in C. Sharrett (ed.), Crisis Cinema: The Apocalyptic Idea in Postmodern Narrative Film, Washington D.C., Maisonneuve Press, 1993, pp. 17–35. 16. W. Wagar, Terminal Visions: The Literature of Last Things, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982. 17. One could argue that the fascination with the end of the second millennium accelerated modern angst and soul-searching concerning endings of various kinds. Certainly, the furore brought about by this calendric moment was widespread and initiated countless ‘revelations’ concerning an impending apocalypse. Nevertheless, I think the overall volume of prognostications concerning the end speaks to deeper and more long-term changes than could be caused by millennium fantasies alone. 18. There are numerous widely divergent types of literatures on this theme. Some scholars of the shifting spaces of modernity include Allan Pred, Timothy Mitchell, T. J. Clark, Derek Gregory, and Carl Shorske. 19. See, for example, P. Dicken, Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity, New York, Guilford Press, 1992; K. Cox, Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local, New York, Guilford Press, 1997; J. Agnew and M. Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory, and International Political Economy, New York, Routledge, 1995; K. Olds, P. Dicken, P. Kelly, L. Kong, and H. Yeung, Globalization and the Asia Pacific: Contested Territories, London, Routledge, 1999; A. Herod, G. O Tuathail, and S. Roberts, Unruly World? Globalization, Governance, and Geography, London, Routledge, 1998; and A. Amin and N. Thrift, Globalization, Institutions, and Regional Development in Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994. 20. D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford, Blackwell Publications, 1989. 21. See M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, Oxford, Blackwell Publications, 1996. 22. F. Coronil, ‘Towards a Critique of Globalcentrism: Speculations on Capitalism’s Nature’, Public Culture, vol. 12, no. 2, 2000, pp. 351–374. 23. See, for example, my discussion of the strategic use of the liberal discourse of multiculturalism for global corporate ends in ‘Multiculturalism, or the United Colors of Capital?’ Antipode, vol. 25, no. 4, 1993. 61
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24. F. Fukuyama, in ‘Post-Human History?’ New Perspectives Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3, Summer 2000, p. 4. See also F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York, The Free Press, 1992. 25. P. Sloterdijk, ‘From Agrarian Patriotism to the Global Self’, New Perspectives Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1, Winter 2000, p. 15. 26. A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996; M. Sparke, Hyphen-Nation-States, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming; and J. M. Jacobs, ‘Tradition is (not) Modern: Deterritorializing Globalization’, this volume. 27. M. Watts, ‘Geographies of Violence and the Narcissism of Minor Difference’, Struggles Over Geography: Violence, Freedom, and Development at the Millennium, Department of Geography, University of Heidelberg, 2000, pp. 9–10. 28. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London, Verso, 1983. 29. M. Sparke, ‘Not a State, But More than a State of Mind: Cascading Cascadias and the Geoeconomics of Cross-Border Regionalism’, in M. Perkmann and N. Sum (eds.), Globalization, Regionalization, and Cross-Border Regions, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 212. 30. For an illustration of Cascadia, see M. Sparke, ‘Nature and Tradition at the Border: Landscaping the End of the Nation-State’, this volume. 31. C. Katz, ‘Under the Falling Sky: Apocalyptic Environmentalism and the Production of Nature’, in A. Callari, S. Cullenberg, and C. Biewener (eds.), Marxism in the Postmodern Age, New York, Guilford, 1995, p. 277. 32. M. Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1982. 33. E. Gottlieb, Dystopian Fiction East and West, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s, 2001, p. 3. 34. Watts, ‘Geographies of Violence and the Narcissism of Minor Difference.’ 35. Sloterdijk, ‘From Agrarian Patriotism to the Global Self’, p. 16. 36. D. Harvey, Spaces of Hope, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000, p. 196. 37. Ibid.
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Chapter 4
Nostalgias of the modern Ananya Roy
The menu lists ‘steak au poivre’ ($18) and ‘tenement mac and cheese’ ($12).1 The restaurant is called ‘Tenement’ (Figure 4.1).2 It is located in the Lower East Side of New York. The name, Lower East Side, refers to a distinctive neighbourhood history of nineteenth-century tenements that housed immigrants, to the labour struggles and rent struggles that once animated the area, and more generally to a working-class milieu.3 The Lower East Side is the past; its symbolic elements, such as the tenements, are today its tradition. The Lower East Side is now the East Village, a renaming that indicates the intense gentrification that has taken place here at various times but in most sustained fashion in the 1980s and 1990s. As brilliantly argued by Smith, this gentrification has actively capitalized on the theme of urban decay, turning dilapidation and poverty into a corporate fantasy.4 The devalued terrain of the inner city has been reclaimed through techniques of ‘cultural boosterism’5 that transform the experiences of the inner city into iconography. As these icons such as the ‘tenement’ are consumed, so the inner city itself disappears. The opening of a high-priced restaurant called ‘Tenement’ inaugurates the end of the working-class tenements, or more specifically of the working-class residents of the tenements. The tenement itself is now a façade, housing rich consumers interested in an exotic cityscape. It is above all an aesthetic icon, dissociated from both the property systems and inhabitants that once gave meaning to its form. Elsewhere, I have called this separation of form and social practice the ideology of space.6 Gentrification is a stark manifestation of the ideology of space, where what is revitalized is real-estate profit and not the lives or livelihoods of neighbourhood residents.7 But the ideology of space involves much more than simply evictions or demolitions; it is often the recreation of space through the deployment of tradition, through the appropriation of the very icons whose material realities are being negated through such redevelopment. In the case of the Lower East Side, Mele thus argues that the aesthetic landscapes of gentrification gesture toward and even mimic the look and feel of the very social elements they threaten to displace.8 It can be argued then that the consumption of tradition is the end of tradition, that the consumption of the icon of the ‘tenement’ marks the end of tenements as a housing tradition.9 I do not mean this proposition as a lament, a mourning for the commodification of allegedly authentic traditions. Rather, my intention is to point out the inauthenticity 63
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4.1 The Tenement restaurant, Lower East Side, New York, 2003
of tradition and, further, to note that tradition becomes authentic only in the act of consumption. Put simply, the valuation implicit in consumption gives value to tradition. There is no inherent or intrinsic value to tradition outside these processes of valuation. It can also be argued then that the consumption of tradition is tradition. As in the case of the Lower East Side, history becomes tradition only through the practices of consumption. It is thus that memory is distilled into icons of value. Tradition then is one of those commodities where the distinction between production and consumption is meaningless. The consumption of tradition is the production of tradition. This proposition can in turn be articulated in at least two different ways, in two different systems of meaning. The first, which I will call ‘dwelling’,10 is concerned with authenticity. The second, which I will call ‘performing’,11 is blatantly inauthentic. Both involve frameworks of valuation but dwelling, concerned as it is with authenticity, masks the act of valuation in a narrative of nostalgia. In contrast, performing makes explicit the consumption of tradition thereby revealing the geopolitical order of valuation, and at times even unsettling this order. Both, I will argue, are ultimately concerned with the modern. Gentrification embodies modernization, the teleology of progress, of renewal and remaking. As evident in the case of the Lower East Side, gentrification operates through an appropriation of tradition, through a ‘looking backward’. Such are the nostalgias of the modern. I use the term ‘looking backward’ quite deliberately to make reference to the 64
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novel, Looking Backward, published by the American writer, Edward Bellamy, in 1888.12 This utopia envisioned a modern world, the year 2000, complete with welfare capitalism and a benevolent state. But it also preserved the saccharine sweet Victorian family as a model. Other than the ubiquitous credit card to which women have unfettered access, this radically modern utopia is also staunchly traditional, unable to overcome a ‘longing for early America’.13 Similar themes of nostalgia run through present-day utopias such as New Urbanism. Here too the icons of family and community loom large as the ‘new’ seeks to recreate the ‘old’. Frantz and Collins describe New Urbanist towns like Celebration as a ‘back to the future’.14 This, like Bellamy’s utopia, is a future modelled after a mythicized and cleansed past. Most significant, it is this ‘looking backward’ that masks practices of consumption and naturalizes capitalist valuation. Nostalgia then has important political implications. I have argued in previous work that quite a bit of urban redevelopment, such as slum upgrading, operates through an imperialist nostalgia, a term used by Rosaldo to indicate the ‘mourning for what one has destroyed’.15 Such mourning generates innocence. It obscures agency and culpability. When formalized as heritage, nostalgia goes a step further: it produces legitimacy through aestheticization. As Mele argues in the case of gentrification, ‘reinvention legitimizes the entire process of urban restructuring and masks the class conflict that is inherent in the restructuring of working-class neighborhoods’.16 Nostalgia as heritage serves a double function – on the one hand, it generates aesthetic icons of value, icons that add value, icons that revalorize and revitalize; on the other hand, through this aestheticization, it renders invisible the brutal mechanics of capitalist valuation. In this way, nostalgia also magically resolves the problematic of change and transformation. In Bellamy’s Looking Backward, there is no revolution, there is no politics, there is only utopia as the ‘determinate sociohistorical negation of what exists’.17 In New Urbanism, change is mandated through the environmental determinist techniques of the master-architect. Politics, as the conflict over valuation, is irrelevant in such aesthetic democracies because everything of value is aesthetic and has already been preserved as heritage. And yet this lack, this absence, is of course the ultimate political project: a claim to the postmodern future by way of the authentically traditional past. There are other ways of remembering the past, for example, as memory that forces us to mourn, to take account of a difficult and bitter history.18 While I am cautious about the idea of mourning and its implication that innocence can be achieved through catharsis, I am interested in memory as a counterpoint to nostalgia. Nostalgia is a narrative of loss and eventually a celebration as what was once lost is recovered. It is not surprising then that Disney’s New Urbanist town is called Celebration. And it is in this sense that it is postmodern, a ‘look back to the future’. Memory overflows; it cannot be contained in this teleology. Memory wanders; it cannot be fixed in this relationship between place and tradition. Memory betrays; it cannot fully remember and therefore cannot ever be authentic. Later in this chapter I will pay attention to such discontinuities, displacements, and duplicities. For the moment, let me state what I see to be the geography of memory and nostalgia: If memory evokes territorial loss and struggle, then nostalgia establishes 65
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territorial claims, and when formalized as heritage, such claims attain legitimacy. Nostalgia makes possible a dwelling in modernity,19 an occupation and inhabitation of space. In contrast to dwelling, I have posed the notion of performing. The performance of tradition was a key idea in the work of Neil Leach and Ackbar Abbas who, in their keynote talks at a recent conference, focused on the performative dimensions of tradition.20 The conference, a site of academic production, was also a site of consumption – of consuming tradition. On our first evening, as many of us from Berkeley sat down to a jetlagged dinner having just flown in to Hong Kong on a recently bankrupt United Airlines, we noticed that we were surrounded by American paraphernalia. What we had thought was a French bistro, La Brasserie, was in fact L.A. Brasserie, complete with American flags and waitresses in Statue of Liberty ties. In keeping with the L.A. theme, the walls were lined with famous images such as the Last Supper, except that now Hollywood stars had replaced traditional icons (Figure 4.2). It is perhaps significant that Marilyn Monroe, that symbol of gendered performativity, was centre-stage as Jesus, and in another as the hand of God. Here is a performance of tradition, one that is in Abbas’s framework, a ‘slip of the tongue’.21 This is a mimicry, one that produces what Bhabha sees as ‘slippage’, ‘excess’, ‘difference’.22 But this is a performance of inauthenticity that can only be understood in the space between places. It is spatial slippage, a Hong Kong performance of L.A. traditions. It is about displacement and dislocation rather than dwelling. It is about experiencing spatial separation and distance through performance rather than inhabiting space through nostalgia. That this performance can be interpreted as either mimicry or satire, or in Bhabha’s terms, as both, is interesting because it reveals the paradoxes that are inherent in performativity and more generally in the structure of modernity. In this chapter I examine such issues by broaching the question of tradition through the trope of the modern. I investigate the modern as a simultaneous transcendence and valuation of tradition. As tradition is superseded by modernist progress, so a pure and distilled tradition is put on display, such that it can be consumed within the circuits of
4.2 A mural by Casaro Renato entitled Invitation, on the wall of the L.A. Brasserie restaurant, Royal Kowloon Hotel, Hong Kong 66
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modernization, such that the other continents can arrive as contributions. In a second move, I make evident how such frameworks of authenticity come to be disturbed through the performing of tradition. Most important, such performances unsettle the relationship between tradition and place. Instead, there are spatial slippages where the practices of desire, aspiration, fakery, borrowing, and ambivalence signify one place but in the context of the other. These displacements are not accidental; rather they belong to the very real cartography of postcolonialism and its web of flows, fantasies, and figments. In this chapter then the end of tradition is not a temporal ending. Rather, it is the end of an epistemological order where tradition is derived through techniques of nostalgia and formalized in a spatial order as heritage. The end of tradition signals a slipping past the cordons of the modern, a breaching of the boundaries of dwelling, a movement in and through geography. It is also the end of the universal modern, that which seeks to transcend geography. If tradition no longer has a fixed relation to place, then the modern need not supersede the particularities of place. The end of tradition is the geographical multiplicity of the modern.
The other continents arrive as contributions The idea of the modern is also the idea of progress. This notion of progress operates in time and space. If some places are seen as backward, then moving ahead also implies being ahead of such places, of being essentially different from such places. Such geographical articulations of development and underdevelopment constitute a key dimension of the modern. They imply that progress can only exist in relation to what is seen as backwardness; that the modern must put not only itself but also tradition on display: the other continents must arrive as contributions. Let me discuss such ideas in the context of a quintessentially modern icon: the Crystal Palace. Erected first in London, in 1851, to house a world exhibition, the Crystal Palace was hailed as a feat of modern engineering. Assembled from thousands of small prefabricated parts, the structure was a feat of iron lattice work and uniform sheets of glass.23 But while the Crystal Palace was initially located in London, a geopolitical mapping of this emblem of modernization requires a more global sweep. I have chosen two other nineteenth-century locations, St. Petersburg and New York, within which to situate my discussion of the Crystal Palace. Eventually, I expand the argument by taking on another icon of the colonial world exhibitions, the Eiffel Tower, this time in the contemporary locations of Calcutta and Las Vegas. Such displacements, I hope, will unsettle some of the certainties of progress and difference that are embodied in the universal modern. In late-nineteenth-century Russia, the Crystal Palace was an accomplishment worthy of emulation. Russian intellectuals, inspired by the momentous 1861 emancipation of the serfs, began to envision a modern Russia, free of its feudal trappings and rapidly catching up with the West and its democratic traditions. The Crystal Palace signified such dreams.24 It was the affirmation of a universal modern to which Russia could aspire. And this aspiration was a prescient vision, located midway between the words of Marx and 67
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the actions of Stalin. In 1867, Marx had declared that the country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed, the image of its own future.25 Almost a century later, Stalin had insisted that the Soviet Union, while fifty or hundred years behind the advanced countries, must make good this distance in ten years. The teleology and geography of modernization had been thus laid out. But there was a late-nineteenth-century Russian voice that was markedly different. In the writings of Dostoevsky, the modernist utopia of Russia took on dystopic undertones. In Notes from the Underground, he called into question the promises of modernism, instead foregrounding a stomach-turning nausea that prefigures Sartre and the angst of the twentieth century. Looking towards the West, Dostoevsky saw the norms of modernization and progress, enshrined in monuments like the Crystal Palace, but saw little to celebrate. In the garb of the Underground Man, he wrote: You believe in a crystal edifice that can never be destroyed, an edifice at which one would not be able to stick one’s tongue out, or to thumb one’s nose, even on the sly. And I am afraid of this edifice just because it is of crystal and can never be destroyed, and because one could not stick out one’s tongue at it on the sly.26
Who is this ‘you’ of which Dostoevsky writes? Perhaps the timeless subject of the universalist modern? And how is Dostoevsky’s snub of the Crystal Palace to be interpreted? As the perverse envy of a backward Russian? In his path-breaking book, All that is Solid Melts into Air, Marshall Berman designates Dostoevsky’s gesture as a ‘modernism of underdevelopment’. It is a modernism, Berman argues, that is characterized by desirous mimicry, bearing the apparent forms of the modern while lacking its processes and possibilities. And it is a modernism marked by an almost pathological envy, an ‘abject longing for the enemy’s love’.27 Berman’s interpretation is of some importance, because it casts the question of being modern in the universalist idiom of Western reforms, and brands the rejection of this as indelibly regressive. Herein lies a lineage that weaves its way through quite a bit of the social and political theory of the twentieth century. I find it quite interesting to revisit Dostoevsky in the current era of globalization. It is worth remembering that the Crystal Palace was entitled the ‘Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations’. Prince Albert introduced it to the British public as a setting where ‘the products of all quarters of the globe are placed at our disposal’.28 It was one of many world exhibitions where a newly carved-up globe was displayed through the techniques of colonial power. Dostoevsky rightfully recognized it as an attempt to generate ‘worldwide commerce’. A Prussian diplomat had described the Crystal Palace as a ‘midsummer’s night dream in the noonday sun’.29 Dostoevsky, writing in a poignantly titled piece called ‘Winter Notes on Summer Impressions’ rejected the symbolic order of world exhibitions, this ‘Biblical scene’, this ‘ultimate truth’: You sense that it would require a great deal of eternal spiritual fortitude and denial in order not to submit, not to yield to the impression, not to bow down to the fact, not to worship, not to accept the world that exists as one’s own ideal.30
Today, as the battles over globalization play out on city streets, in the protests against the spectacle of institutions such as WTO, Dostoevsky’s Winter Notes sound eerily familiar. 68
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But the dualistic structure of this modernist narrative lies not so much in the feud between Russia and the West, in what Berman sees as Dostoevsky’s attempt to snub what he cannot have. The significant counterpart is the American response to the Crystal Palace, which I present through the words of the poet, Walt Whitman. This is the geopolitical imaginary that marks the other end of the map and seals its boundaries. Whitman has long been hailed as a ‘captain’ of American literature. Leaves of Grass has long held a special place of prominence, although more recently it has had the dubious distinction of appearing on the national agenda as the only recorded gift that Bill Clinton had given to Monica Lewinsky! But, I digress. Whitman, while writing the 1855 edition of Leaves of Grass is said to have attended the 1853 Crystal Palace Exhibition in New York on a daily basis. It is reported that he marvelled in the sights day and night, until even the guards knew him well.31 There are two striking ways in which Whitman’s writings on the Crystal Palace contrast sharply with those of Dostoevsky. First, Whitman revels in the Archimedean bird’seye view provided by the exhibition, in what Cutler calls ‘spectacular modernity’.32 If Dostoevsky’s Underground Man felt his presence negated by the splendor of the edifice, then Whitman embraces the sweeping moment when ‘to him the other continents arrived as contributions’.33 This was the very spirit of the world exhibitions, to exhibit the world, and even bolder, as Mitchell notes, to image the world as exhibition. It was an order that epitomized ‘the strange character of the West, a place where one was continually pressed into service as a spectator by a world ordered so as to represent’.34 This was the order that Dostoevsky rejected, and this was the order that Whitman affirmed. Second, Whitman not only gazed at the view, but also managed to position himself beyond and above it, as its master. Dostoevsky saw himself on the margins of this eternal and universal order, a Biblical scene that demanded of him a bowing down. Whitman, in contrast, stated boldly, as if to the exhibition itself: Encompass worlds but never try to encompass me I crowd your noisiest talk by looking toward you.35
These are stunning words, which mark the arrogant privileges of an upstart American nation. This piece, aptly titled Song of Myself, delineates a commanding gaze, one that prefigures the cartographies of the twentieth century. Here lies the mastery of the twentieth century, which in its second half is indubitably an American century. Whitman’s America exists; Dostoevsky’s Russia mimics. One embodies gentlemanly progress, the other engages in the rudeness of a snub. One desires (and conquers), the other desires but only in warped and perverse ways, even hating with ambivalence. This theme of Third World envy and mimicry can be explored by looking at contemporary articulations of the world-as-exhibition. For this I turn to Calcutta, a Third World metropolis historically named as the black hole of urbanization. Languishing at the margins of global change, Calcutta nevertheless participates in spectacular modernity, for example, through its book fairs.36 The annual book fair is a well-established tradition in Calcutta, an urban ritual played 69
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4.3 Bangladesh pavilion, 1997 Calcutta Book Fair
out under a hazy late winter sun. The dense lines of bamboo and cloth stalls, barely holding up to the swirls of dust stirred up by the shuffling of avid visitors, have always symbolized more than simply the city’s famed cultural passions. In many ways, the fairs are also meant to signal Bengal’s participation in a world arena of literary production with stalls ‘representing’ particular nations and their cultural traditions. Thus, at the 1997 Book Fair, an ill-proportioned copy of Louis Kahn’s National Assembly building served to represent Bangladesh (Figure 4.3), and a stocky arch led to the French pavilion where indigent local artists displayed their paintings for ridiculously low prices (Figure 4.4). The 1997 Calcutta Book Fair had a French theme, with a truncated cutout of the Eiffel Tower that served as the venue’s gate, and complete with the French philosopher Jacques Derrida as guest of honor. Derrida was as symbolic as the cardboard Eiffel Tower, his presence upstaged by a communist regime simply eager to attract European investment to the city. However, there was an unfortunate twist to this Bengali world exhibition. A gas cylinder, which was being used to cook food in one of the stalls, overturned and set off a fire. The sole fire truck on duty had no access to water supplies, and the others did not arrive until the combustible mixture of bamboo, cloth, and books had created a mushroom cloud of
4.4 French pavilion, 1997 Calcutta Book Fair 70
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4.5 Eiffel Tower gate with fire in the background, 1997 Calcutta Book Fair
fire and smoke (Figure 4.5). The book fair burnt to the ground. The European publishers who had arrived in the city ever so tentatively retreated ever so rapidly. The fire can be seen as just another instance of Calcutta’s crumbling infrastructure, a deathblow to a city long designated as ‘dying’; just another example of a Third World metropolis unable to secure for itself the certainties of modernization. The Calcutta book fair can also be seen as a world exhibition of sorts. If the fin-desiècle expositions symbolized the colonial power to represent, then, at the turn of this century, the clumsiness of Calcutta’s book fair stalls is perhaps indicative of its tenuous presence on the margins of a global cartography. How is this to be interpreted? As a modernism of underdevelopment, the pathetic gesture of a liberalizing communist government seeking to image itself within global capitalism? Or, as a deliberate and snide rejection of the Crystal Palace motif, like Dostoevsky wishing to stick his tongue out, on the sly, at the edifices of the West? There is another form of mimicry with which this contrasts: this one from Las Vegas and its invocation of Parisian themes. Walking through Las Vegas’s Paris (Figure 4.6), along with the 33 million annual tourists who make the pilgrimage to this asphalted stretch of Nevada desert, I have thought back to that day in Calcutta: to a lone and paralyzed fire truck on a winter afternoon. How is the Las Vegas Eiffel Tower to be interpreted? As First World postmodernism, a success in a city where fakery is at a premium? The idea of ‘authentic fakery’37 might sound oxymoronic, but this seeming paradox reveals a particular geopolitical privilege. Foucault distinguishes between resemblance and similitude.38 In this vein, Calcutta’s Eiffel Tower can be seen to bear resemblance to a ‘model’, ‘an original element that orders and hierarchizes the increasingly less faithful copies that can be struck from it’. Located at the edge of the world-system, it is a dimunition of authenticity. In contrast, the Las Vegas Eiffel Tower can be seen as a simulacrum, one that repeats, but through ‘an indefinite and reversible relation of the similar to the similar’. Here, both the original and the copy are authentic, both equally part of a geopolitical order that links the Parisian world exhibition of 1889 to the global display of Las Vegas 2000. The contrast between Calcutta and Las Vegas is provocative because it indicates varied 71
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4.6 Eiffel Tower, Paris Hotel & Casino, Las Vegas
genres of performance. That contrast, which I have cast as that between resemblance and similitude, is not a contrast between better or worse representations, between more authentic and less authentic forms of representation. Rather it is the contrast between different forms of representation. The continents arrive as contributions in both sites of modernity but they do so in drastically different ways. This difference indicates geopolitical difference, in this case between a city at the margins of globalization and that at the heart of global circuits of tourism and consumption. This difference also indicates a multiplicity to the idea of spectacular modernity and indeed to modernity itself. As I will argue later in this chapter, the notion of multiple modernities involves far more than diversity, or the multiple articulations of the modern in multiple places. Such notions of diversity are still in keeping with the idea of dwelling, of dwelling in modernity by tweaking the modernist ideal to fit the unique necessities of place. Instead, the concept of multiple modernities can indicate the paradoxes and ambiguities that are inherent in modernity. This is most evident in the concept of performing. The displaced world exhibitions of Calcutta and Las Vegas are performances. But they cannot be judged against any original reality. While commentators like Paul Goldberger contrast the ‘authentic’ Eiffel Tower with the corrupt mimicry of Las Vegas,39 it is important to note that the so-called original was itself a performance, a gateway to the world exhibition as theme park, in Roland Barthes’s terms, a tower meant to be seen and to see from.40 As Mitchell notes, ‘in the world-as-exhibition, “reality” means that which can be represented’.41 It is in this sense that Chaplin and Holding espouse the idea of the posturban. Drawing upon Virilio’s notion of the ‘overexposed city’ they seek to understand the city as comprised of various disguises and façades, as performances if you will.42 This is the multiplicity, even duplicity, of the modern. 72
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Slipping past the cordon sanitaire Colonialism, argues Mitchell, divided the world into two: one part was the exhibition and the other was the museum. As the wonders of the modern were exhibited so was tradition preserved and put on display. ‘The colonial order depended upon at once creating and excluding its own opposite.’43 It is thus that difference, embodied as the native or indigenous or traditional, came to be implicated in the very constitution of the universal modern. And yet difference was maintained as separate – at once transcended and appropriated by the modern. If the layout of the world exhibitions indicated this logic of separation, then at the scale of the colonial city, the cordon sanitaire was the technique of separation. This technique was of course also a technique of power: the power to name, value, preserve, and separate tradition. By discussing the case of colonial Algiers, I show how this cordon sanitaire was imagined but also breached. What did it mean to slip past tradition, into modernity? I pursue such questions by briefly turning to a second context, colonial Bengal. A great deal has been written about French colonialism in Algeria, that oldest of colonies, that most protracted of bloody independence struggles. It is not my intention to rework these debates.44 I revisit them to simply outline some key themes. First, it is obvious that colonialism involved an unprecedented level of modernization and modernism. Not only were cities and regions brutally remade in ways that would have made Haussmann proud, but so also was put into place an entire professional apparatus of modernism. Thus, on the one hand, the future was ‘invented’,45 and on the other hand, this invention was made possible through the rationalization of geopolitical knowledge, an ordering of the world if you will. This was the hierarchical structure best epitomized by the world exhibitions like the Crystal Palace and most clearly expressed in the discursive logic of Orientalism.46 Crucial to this modernism was the supervised preservation of carefully selected native traditions, manifested on the ground through the sociospatial management of difference. A striking example of this comes from Corbusier’s famous Plan Obus for Algiers. For someone who had dedicated one of his earliest designs to a single god, Authority, and who lamented the republicanism of post-Haussmann France, it is not surprising that Corbusier saw colonialism as a welcome opportunity to spread modernism. His graphic representation of colonialism portrayed it as an axis of ideas, taking hold in Algiers, and then extending further south to French black Africa.47 Of course, this is the very axis along which a different colonial exchange – of resource extraction and revenues and labour power – was taking place. This was the primitive accumulation, the bloody modernization, which would make the edifices of modernism possible. Corbusier was particularly interested in Algiers. He had first visited the city in the early 1930s during the festivities marking one hundred years of French occupation, and had thought that the city was perhaps ‘the most beautiful in the world’.48 His Plan Obus envisioned preserving intact the city’s Casbah, with a highway hovering above it, connecting the planned expansions of European residences with European businesses. Quarantined behind this 73
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vertical cordon sanitaire, the Casbah and its traditions would endure, as would the careful balance between European and Muslim cultures that Corbusier had articulated in various sketches. Tafuri describes the Plan Obus as the ‘most elevated theoretical hypothesis of modern urbanism . . . the repository of a new scale of values . . . a means of collective integration’.49 The plan never came to fruition. Even the French military authorities who were in charge of Algiers were convinced that it could only be implemented through a new bombardment of the city. But it is perhaps this incompletion that imparts unsullied perfection to Corbusier’s vision, making it a distilled spatial image of colonialism. The Casbah of Algiers was preserved in other ways by the French, most notably through policies of associationism, or what Rabinow has called techno-cosmopolitanism.50 But what is interesting for our purposes is that it is precisely this spatial order that aided the emergence of particular forms of political protest. Lamprakos, for example, documents the ways in which the geography of the Casbah made possible the guerilla warfare waged by the National Liberation Front.51 The native Casbah, in fact, often proved impenetrable to European troops and tanks, refusing entry to its very creator. There is another way of mapping these impositions of the modern and the challenges posed by tradition. The boundaries between Casbah and White Town were not simply regulated through zoning and building regulations, but equally through the contestation of social norms, and specifically through the regulation of gendered hierarchies and meanings. This too was a cordon sanitaire of sorts, marking as separate the traditions of the other. Corbusier, for example, presented the city as a feminized entity, as being caressed by the godly hand of the architect and more specifically represented the Casbah in the image of a veiled woman (Figure 4.7).52 He was particularly fascinated with the seductive veil, which he saw as concealing the ‘penetrable mystery’ of ‘ravishing coquettes’.53 His representations make evident the mutual constitution of gendered and geopolitical difference: how the ‘Woman’ Question is in fact the ‘Other’ question. In Algeria, the veil became the ‘visible marker’ of cultural difference,54 a misogynist tradition that had to be eradicated through modernization. Indeed, the colonial mission of civilization could only be complete when the Oriental woman had been liberated from what was perceived to be the patriarchal tyrannies of her own culture. This, as Spivak notes, is the itinerary of recognition through the assimilation of the Other: a mis-recognition of the other as unfree and therefore of the self as free.55 In Algeria, the itinerary took the form of elaborate rituals of unveiling: colonial liberalism inscribed on to the female body.56 But if these were the gendered and sexualized terms of the colonial modern, then the Algerian nationalist movement turned them on its head. The veil, marked as tradition by the French, became a sign of moral resistance to colonialism. In his Studies in a Dying Colonialism, Fanon writes of how Algerian women, particularly in the cities, re-adopted the veil, as a direct engagement with French interventions.57 As the nationalist movement gained strength and vigour, the French responded by closing off the Casbah and monitoring all movement in and out of it. Algerian nationalists contested such forms of spatial surveillance through performative strategies of gender that hinged on the creative 74
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4.7 Le Corbusier, Poesie sur Alger, sketch showing the Casbah as a veiled head
deployment of the veil. This is powerfully depicted in the film, Battle of Algiers (1965), Italian director Gillo Pontecorvo’s paean to the FLN 1954–1958 uprising in the Casbah.58 Algerian women would transform themselves into European women, thus carrying bombs and revolvers into the heart of the European districts. Fanon writes of such moments: The unveiled Algerian woman moves like a fish in the Western waters. The soldiers, the French patrols, smile to her as she passes, compliments on her looks are heard here and there, but no one suspects that her suitcases contain the automatic pistol which will presently mow down four or five members of one of the patrols.59
And when this strategy was uncovered by the French, the veil was once again assumed, this time by nationalist men who donned the chador, thus claiming the feminized protections of what was perceived to be a misogynist tradition. Surely French soldiers would never have the courage to look underneath the disguise of the veil (Figure 4.8). And so we have a traditional symbol, ‘manipulated’, and ‘transformed into a technique of camouflage’.60 Also revealed are the ambiguities of both colonialism and its postcolonial articulations. The Battle of Algiers shows how the seeming duality of the colonial city is a binary that is not easily policed and implemented. Instead, it is the inauthenticity of tradition, in this case embodied in the strategic deployment of the veil, which allows a remapping of city and home, nation and world. Here, the veil loses its fixed meaning as a traditional symbol, and instead becomes a claim to a modern nation-state. This is also a distinctively regional articulation of that modernity, a remaking of self and society that Watts has termed ‘Islamic modernities’.61 In other words, as the authenticity of tradition is undermined, so is the universalism of the modern eroded. Perhaps this is clearest in the gendered nuances of this narrative. It is the performance 75
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4.8 Film still from Battle of Algiers
of gender that creates a surplus of meaning, one that defies the simple mapping of modern and traditional. When the Algerian woman takes off her veil is she modern? Is she mimicking the modern? Or is this the purest moment of her traditional incarnation? It is this equivocation that is exciting. A similar displacement attends the film, Battle of Algiers, and its style of pseudo-documentation.62 Pontecorvo deliberately uses documentary techniques, creating an air of objectivity. In fact, it is this claim of objectivity that Louis Malle deployed when showing the film in Paris, after it had been banned in France for a while. And yet, Pontecorvo also states quite clearly at the start of the film that not a single documentary reel was used. The tension between the documentary techniques and the staging of content creates an ambiguity, a ‘mimetic overflowing’, that is highly provocative.63 It becomes difficult to tell apart the historical from the cinematic. In the Battle of Algiers, such tensions are gendered. If nationalist projects are also body projects, regulating the gendered body, then this moment of Pontecorvo directing the performance of the veiled Algerian woman reveals the imitative and repetitive rituals through which gender is inscribed onto the body (Figure 4.9). This body is also the body politic.64 Against Fanon, Bhabha argues that colonial culture is not simply ‘present and mummified’; it is ‘potentially and strategically an insurgent counter-appeal’. This potential unfolds through mimcry, through the cover of camouflage: ‘For the fetish mimes the forms of authority at the point at which it deauthorizes them. Similarly, mimicry rearticulates presence in terms of its “otherness”, that which it disavows’.65 The struggle for the Algerian Casbah mimed the fetish of the veil and yet is it a counter-appeal? I have argued that the performative gender strategies of the battle of Algiers – of both history and cinema – reveal the rituals of colonialism and postcolonialism. But is this revelation necessarily an undoing? Do the rituals revealed come undone? In this case, the mimicry of the fetish seems to maintain the fetish, even imparting to it an authenticity that becomes the essence of nationalism. Performance then is not necessarily subversion, especially when, as in Butler’s terms, it is ‘compulsory’ performance.66 76
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4.9 Film still from Battle of Algiers
For example, despite the intricacies of Fanon’s argument,67 he maintains the female body as the ultimate site of nationalist struggle. Corbusier’s vision of the Casbah is consummated through his imagining of a city as plastic and beautiful as the supplehipped and full-breasted Algerian woman.68 Fanon’s nationalist imaginary is fuelled by a fetishized and feminized Algerian authenticity. For him, the Algerian struggle was made possible through a remaking of the female body which in turn remade urban space. But, in the last instance, the revolutionary act of unveiling was to him the sexualized act of walking into an European city ‘stark naked’.69 Indeed, here, the contradictions of the Algerian veil, and discourses thereof, can be read as a forebearer of contemporary anguishes. It is thus that Assia Djebar has written of an independent Algeria where the bombs that nationalist women had carried under their clothes, that they had taken out as if they were taking out their own breasts, exploded against them, right against them.70 In the nationalist imaginary, women became the ‘embodiments of cultural authenticity’, condemned as Lazreg points out, to an ‘irremediable caricatural existence’, and eventually to the violence of an increasing fundamentalist ‘religiosity’.71 Dubey notes that ‘the metaphorical figure of woman’ had been conjured up ‘to resolve the inescapable contradiction’ of the nationalist project: the contradiction of laying claim to ‘European categories of progress and modernity, while reviving precolonial traditions to safeguard the nation’s cultural difference from the West’.72 But in postcolonial times, this figure congealed and froze, taking on the rigour of nationalism. The performative gender strategies that had sought to unravel colonialism, to lay claim to modernity, were folded into the imaginary of the nation. As the veil once again came to be seen as an authentic symbol of timeless tradition, so the subversive rituals of performance became the pedagogical rituals of nationalism. Let me emphasize this point with another example, this one from colonial Bengal. In the early part of the nineteenth century, Bengal, the heart of the British empire, witnessed what has come to be called the Bengali Renaissance – a social reform movement founded 77
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on the alliance between a liberal colonial administration and a Westernized Bengali elite eager to cast its aspirations in the image of the Enlightenment. Such aspirations can of course be seen as a way of dwelling in colonialism, of a colonized elite making a home in the world by appropriating the modern customs of the colonizers. It is this dwelling that is made evident in the Satyajit Ray film Charulata (1964), which in turn is an adaptation of a novel by Rabindranath Tagore. In what is perhaps the quintessential image of the film, the central character, Charulata, is broodingly contemplative with a pair of binoculars in her hand (Figure 4.10). The subtitle of the film is The Lonely Wife and Charu is indeed lonely and bored. While her husband seeks to have her trained in Western ways, even hiring an English teacher for that purpose, Charu spends much of her time within the traditional confines of home. It is from here that she gazes at the world outside, with curiosity and longing. The binoculars signify the modern practices of consumption that have been displaced onto the colonial subject and that make possible this desire. In this they are a symbol of colonial modernity as it is performed by the colonial subject; they are the instrument of what Bhabha calls ‘the displacing gaze’ of colonial imitation.73 But, as in the Algiers case, performativity is not necessarily subversion. The figure of Charu, binoculars in hand, embodies a tension generated by performance, mimicry, and displacement on the one hand, and by gendered confinement and dwelling on the other. The Bengali Renaissance and its objects of consumption soon came to be superseded by a different form of nationalism. Known as swadeshi, this late-nineteenth-century moment involved the economic boycott of all British goods and an alternative social order. The linchpin of this new order was to be the Bengali woman – not Charulata, but a mother figure, free of colonial corruptions, untouched by material consumption, the spiritual and moral opposite of the Englishwoman.74 In other words, the imagining of a modern and free nation was predicated on the resurrection of gendered icons of tradition. Such forms of nationalism had crucial consequences for the ordering of space and society, most obviously through a mandate for the seclusion of women within the home. If this was a ‘Bengali modern’,75 then this domestication of the modern was made possible through the domestication of the gendered subject. So also emerged the
4.10 Film still from Charulata 78
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4.11 Bharatmata, watercolour by Abanindranath Tagore, 1925
nationalist imaginary of the motherland. The slogan of the Bengali nationalist movement was bande mataram: hail the mother, the motherland. The nation was imagined as mother-goddess, as bharatmata (Figure 4.11). Interestingly enough, this icon invokes long regional traditions of mother cults, of vengeful and powerful goddesses; but within the bourgeois imagination of nation, such cults were purified into the frail image of a mother requiring the protection of her sons.76 The domestic order of home and nation is at times unsettled. In the Ray film, Ghare Baire (1984), roughly translated as The Home and the World, and also based on a Tagore novel, the central character, Bimala, literally and metaphorically steps out of the inner sanctum of domestic and feminine space into public and male spaces, thereby violating the separation of home and world. This transgression comes to threaten her entire marriage and the nationalist project itself, ultimately being repaired through the punishment of widowhood. But such moments of transgression reveal the necessary incompleteness of the project of dwelling and the constant possibility of displacement. There are times when this displacement is subversive as in the various veiled disguises of the battle of Algiers. Here displaced identities – of gender and race – allow a displacement of the spatial order of colonialism. And there are times when this displacement is a borrowing, as in the case of Charu’s binoculars where colonial consumption is performed and thereby replicated. Both are instances of mimicry, an unsettling of notions of authenticity and tradition. But one is radical and the other barely so. Even the radicalness of the battle of Algiers is short-lived, for the postcolonial modern is quickly consolidated through the purification of tradition. The architecture of nationalism as it turns out is very much the space of dwelling, a sealing of borders that make difficult the acts of displacement. 79
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Multiple modernities This is a time of endings, or at least of the talk of endings. From the end of the modern to the end of tradition, there is an eager discourse of closure and finality. This discourse with its definitive proclamation of endings has not, however, led to an assertion of new beginnings. In the place of a much anticipated millennial utopianism has come a more tentative but pervasive chatter about the ‘post’ – postmodern, posttraditional, posturban. There is an ambivalence inherent in the idea of the ‘post’ – the sense of an afterwards but little sense of what is to come. There is the certainty of succession, of teleological progress beyond, but to what? In many cases then, the ‘post’ has come to be a looking backward as in postmodern design movements such as New Urbanism. The brave, new future is cast in the mould of nostalgia; the modern is transcended through tradition. In contrast to such conservative interpretations, there is also the attempt to cast the ‘post’ as the end of concepts, or at least concepts as we know them.77 The posturban then does not mark the end of the city; rather it marks the end of established signification, of the epistemological order through which iconography is linked to meaning. It is not that the city can no longer be experienced or known, but rather that the authenticity of this experience or knowledge, and therefore of the city, is now in doubt. To pose the issue of inauthenticity is not to undermine the legitimacy of such forms of signification; rather it is to assert that posturbanism involves a different social construction of reality, a different calculus of representation. The practices of valuation and performance are thus particularly important; they are mechanisms through which reality – or perhaps more appropriately post-reality – is constructed and negotiated. This radically different framework of signification is perhaps most apparent in the case of postcolonialism, where the ‘post’ is much less about moving beyond colonialism and much more a system of critical analysis that emerges through an engagement with colonial experiences and epistemologies. And yet, the terminology of the ‘post’ has taken on a temporal dimension in today’s debates. Not only is the ‘post’ seen as an element of contemporaneity, even if this is a ‘looking backward’, but there is also a loose consensus that this contemporary phase started sometime around the 1970s. The ‘post’ then is simply the latest phrase in a wellestablished vocabulary of progress. It is this timeline that I seek to question. Against the sense of moving ahead, I want to pose the idea that the ‘post’ is a surplus, an excess, that exists within the originary terms: modern, tradition, urban, colonial. The ‘post’ indicates a constantly contested hegemony, a subversion of the singular ideal. It is, in the narration of T.S. Eliot, the ‘shadow’ that falls between, in between.78 I have argued that this casting of the shadow takes place through acts of displacement, in the slippages of geography. This dissonance and disturbance is created as the Crystal Palace, that icon of modernity, is understood and experienced in diverse locations. This disruption is created as the Eiffel Tower, the world-as-exhibition, is performed in diverse sites. Such forms of displacement are rarely revolutionary and scarcely rebellious. As evident in the cases of Algiers and Bengal, they can be easily co-opted in the making of new forms of hegemony. And yet 80
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there is a transgression, a rupture, a remaking, an unsettling, and one that