The Ethics of Animal Experimentation: A Critical Analysis and Constructive Christian Proposal (American Academy of Religion Academy Series)

The Ethics of Animal Experimentation: A Critical Analysis and Constructive Christian Proposal

DONNA YARRI

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Ethics of Animal Experimentation

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The Ethics of Animal Experimentation A Critical Analysis and Constructive Christian Proposal

donna yarri

1 2005

1 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Copyright 䉷 2005 by The American Academy of Religion Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Yarri, Donna. The ethics of animal experimentation : a critical analysis and constructive Christian proposal / Donna Yarri. p. cm.—(American Academy of Religion academy series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13 978-0-19-518179-1 ISBN 0-19-518179-4 1. Animal experimentation—Religious aspects—Christianity. 2. Animal experimentation—Moral and ethical aspects. 3. Christian ethics. I. Title. II. Series. BT747.Y37 2005 241'694—dc22 2004025114

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

To Charles E. Curran, my dissertation advisor and mentor, who taught me how to speak in my own voice

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On the Fifth Day Creation of Beings began Their fate determined by Man For either good or ill And so it continues still. —Anonymous

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Preface

Both the practice of animal experimentation and ethical concerns about it have a long history going virtually back to the ancient Greek period. While the discussion of ethics has waxed and waned throughout the years, animal experimentation has continued unabated and has in fact significantly increased in use since the middle of the twentieth century. The voices raising concerns about animal experimentation for most of human history have come from animal advocacy groups and interested individuals, but the publication in 1975 of Peter Singer’s book Animal Liberation moved the discussion into the scholarly realm. Scholars interested in the treatment of animals now are able to marshal sound philosophical, scientific, and theological arguments to present and bolster their views. While many more animals are raised for food than are used in experimentation, the latter has garnered most of the discussion because it so dramatically pits the interests of humans and animals against each other in matters of life, death, and health. Many good works have been written on the topic of animal experimentation, and so one could rightly ask why another book is needed. A straightforward answer to this question is that not only is animal experimentation not likely to abate in the near future but also the numbers of animals used are likely to increase as technology pushes us in new directions. Issues such as using animals as organ donors, transplanting genes from one species of animal into another, and using animals to study additional genetic topics in light of the advent and completion of the mapping of the human genetic code ensure that animal experimentation will be with us for a long time to come. Thus, concerns about the treatment of experimental animals seem especially important, current, and, of course, contro-

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versial. I attempt to do two unique things simultaneously. First, I provide an interdisciplinary approach to the topic by utilizing the insights of cognitive ethology, philosophy, science, and theology. I lay out the basic issues related to the ethical treatment of animals in general, such as animal cognition, pain, and rights, and I explore these issues from the perspective of these different disciplines, particularly their relevance for animal experimentation. Second, I provide a concrete and pragmatic way of assessing and comparing the benefits to humans with the burdens to animals. Those who support animal experimentation often assert that the benefit from animal experiments is what justifies continuing this practice, whereas those seeking to eliminate or greatly restrict experimentation tend to focus on the harm to animals. What is generally missing is a pragmatic way to distinguish among the kinds of experiments that would be permissible from those that would not be. This book is a slightly revised version of my dissertation, which provides an interdisciplinary approach to the topic of animal experimentation, along with a comparison of burdens and benefits. This book’s ultimate purpose is to provide specific guidelines for benign animal experimentation, which, if followed, would greatly restrict animal experimentation while still allowing some research to continue.

Acknowledgments

This project could not have been successfully completed without the assistance of a number of people along the way. The first round of thanks goes to those who helped me as I worked on my dissertation, most notably those at Southern Methodist University (SMU). I would like to thank William Babcock, director of the Ph.D. program in Religious Studies at SMU, for his support throughout the program and for all of his wise counsel. His open-door policy with students endeared him to all of us who went through the program, and I am especially grateful for all that he has done to make the Ph.D. program at SMU the top-quality program that it is today. I am also very indebted to all members of my dissertation committee for enabling my ideas for the dissertation to come to fruition. Alastair Norcross, with his own research interests in animal ethics, provided me with the opportunity to study independently with him and to regularly engage in dialogue with him on this issue. My dissertation largely became a reality because of his expertise in the area of animal ethics and his willingness to work with me to develop my own thinking on the subject. William F. May was a wonderful guide not only within but also outside the classroom. I am especially grateful for the courses in ethics I was able to take with him, for the opportunity to work with him as his associate director at the Cary M. Maguire Center for Ethics at SMU, and for his own example and encouragement to produce writing of high quality. I feel especially privileged to have had Charles E. Curran as my dissertation advisor and to have worked with him so closely throughout my Ph.D. studies. He has been a wonderful mentor, and in the dissertation process I especially appreciated his insightful comments, his almost immediate feedback on all work turned in to him, and his encour-

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agement. He was a concrete model of not only an excellent scholar but also a truly ethical human being. Finally, I would like to thank all of my friends and family members who cheered me on throughout this process, most especially David A. Westcott, without whose constant support this project would never have been completed. A second round of thanks goes to those who helped at the book manuscript stage. Kimberly Rae Connor at the American Academy of Religion (AAR), who acted as my liaison between the AAR and Oxford University Press, helped greatly in moving along the process and also provided a very positive outlook from the outset. Marc Bekoff and Paul Waldau, as readers of the manuscript, provided extremely helpful comments and suggestions for editing, along with positive endorsements for publication, for which I am very grateful. Most especially, I would like to thank all of those at Oxford, in particular the Oxford Board and Cynthia Read, my editor, for believing in my manuscript, and Christine Dahlin for her assistance with the production. My gratitude goes to all at Oxford involved in the production of this manuscript at all stages, for all of their creativity and hard work.

Contents

Introduction, 3 1. Nature of the Problem, 11 2. Animal Minds, 21 3. Animal Pain, 57 4. Animal Rights, 85 5. Christian Theology, 107 6. Burden/Benefit Analysis, 135 Conclusion, 155 Notes, 159 Bibliography, 199 Index, 215

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The Ethics of Animal Experimentation

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Introduction

The ethical treatment of animals has become the subject of concern for many academics and many laypeople as well in recent years. The subject of animal experimentation,1 while by no means a new issue, is an especially controversial one, with three generic positions: approval of all experimentation, abolition of all experimentation, and permissibility of some experimentation (with some arguing for the status quo and others for significantly greater restrictions).2 The ultimate reasons for these differences arise from the difficulty of reconciling the values involved: the good of science, human advancement, and concern for all sentient beings. The purpose of this book is to critically examine the issue of animal experimentation. The specific question to be addressed is, Should animal experimentation be permitted, and, if so, under what conditions? I will focus on writings from the last thirty years approximately, since that is when the treatment of animals became of serious academic interest, although there will be references to works prior to that time period if deemed important enough to warrant inclusion.3 This book will be interdisciplinary in approach, taking into account primarily the voices of philosophers, theologians, and scientists. (The term “scientist” will be used to include all those who utilize animals in experiments, although obviously not all who experiment on animals are, strictly speaking, scientists.) Many writers have tried to provide an ethical theory that addresses all uses of animals. While I will examine some of the more important theories related to the treatment of animals (since it is foundational to developing an approach to the particular issue of animal experimentation), the goal is not to propose a monolithic theory addressing all uses of animals. Instead, the purpose is to develop an ethic primarily for the

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issue of animal experimentation. Although there have been an increasing number of Christian theologians writing on the treatment of animals (mostly in the context of environmental ethics), there have been relatively few voices in theology writing specifically on the subject of animal experimentation. Therefore, the constructive part of this book will suggest a specifically Christian theological and ethical way of thinking about this topic, as well as provide a concrete burden/benefit analysis of experimentation. Many academics and laypeople are challenging some of the long-held assumptions about animals, and important questions are being raised, particularly about their moral status and the implications of this for their treatment, such as the following: What is the relationship between humans and animals? Do animals have moral standing? Do animals deserve moral consideration? Do animals have rights? Do we have direct or indirect duties to animals? Do animals have intrinsic or only instrumental value? What are the relevant differences between humans and animals, and do these differences justify different treatment? Are humans superior to animals? If so, in what ways, and what difference should this make, if any? Does human benefit always outweigh animal suffering? How do we resolve conflicts of interest between humans and animals? While this book cannot hope to answer or even adequately address all of these questions, many will be discussed because they do have implications for the use of animals in experimentation. However, questions about the ethical treatment of animals are by no means new, in spite of their recent more academic nature. Not only does animal experimentation have a long history4 but also the relationship of humans and animals has a long history. Humans have interacted with and been in relationships with animals since the beginning of human history.5 Thus, it is inevitable that questions arose about the use and treatment of animals. Humans have conceptualized their relationships to animals in many different ways throughout history, but one common method is to divide the attitude toward animals into three broad views: animals have no moral status (we have no direct duties to them and can do with them as we please); animals have minimal status (we can use animals but must avoid cruelty and practice kindness); and animals have considerable status (based either on their ability to experience pain and pleasure or on their mental capacities).6 Although all of these positions have been held throughout history, in a sense one can also view them as distinct stages, with the latter view, often referred to as animal liberation, having come into existence in its more radical form as a minority view within the last thirty years.7 The Western tradition in general and the Christian tradition in particular have typically subordinated animals to humans, although individuals throughout history challenged this approach.8 It is important to note here that with the advent of Darwin’s theory of evolution, humans came to be understood as animals as well, although certainly still, in most minds, a vastly superior animal. Humans throughout history have utilized animals in a number of different ways. Many of these uses had their origins in early human history, including animals originally hunted for food and clothing, later domesticated as beasts

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of burden, and ultimately venerated as objects of worship and kept as pets for companionship.9 The practice of animal experimentation is generally traced back to ancient Greece to Alcmaeon of Croton in approximately 450 b.c.e.10 He was a physician and the first person to use animals to study physiology, in particular by severing an animal’s optic nerve and observing the resulting blindness.11 The first real experiments on live animals are believed to have been conducted by Erasistratus of Alexandria (304–258 b.c.e.). It is fairly common knowledge that Aristotle made anatomic dissections of animals.12 In addition, Aristotle’s philosophical system, in which he created a hierarchy with animals considerably lower than humans due to their alleged lack of a rational nature, became embedded in the Western tradition and ultimately incorporated into the Christian tradition through the writings of Thomas Aquinas in the medieval period. Galen (129–ca. 210 c.e.), the most renowned physician in the Roman Empire, went further than any other individual in the numerous experiments he undertook in an attempt to understand physiology.13 During the ancient Roman and Greek periods, animal experimentation was carried out periodically by individuals, primarily to better understand physiology, but it was far removed from the institutionalized practice that exists today. Although ancient Greece had more diverse views toward animals (some positive and some negative), ancient Rome attached little importance to animals.14 The Judeo-Christian tradition, whose writings arose during this period, was certainly influenced by Greek and Roman thought and practice. The dominion model has predominated in this tradition, with a definitive hierarchy and with distinct differences drawn between humans and animals. The Genesis creation narrative, in particular the first creation account, was and is often cited as theological justification for the domination of humans over animals and for the belief that animals exist only (or primarily) for human use.15 Even to the present, the Roman Catholic Church (and much of Christendom) follows the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, whose principal reason for forbidding cruelty to animals was that it would lead to cruelty to people. Human superiority was and is often defended religiously on the grounds that humans are made in the image of God and that humans possess rationality, language, free will, moral responsibility, and an immortal soul.16 During the Middle Ages, experimentation was not widely practiced. Medieval Christianity was more concerned with eternal life than with animal life.17 However, as mentioned previously, the writings of Thomas Aquinas put a stronger foundation under the notion of human superiority to animals by the incorporation of Aristotelian philosophy into his approach to Christianity. Although the Christian church was not an advocate for animals, there were individuals—generally saints and mystics—who spoke out on behalf of animals, the most notable being Francis of Assisi. However, one of the peculiarities of the medieval period was the apparently common practice of putting animals on trial and condemning them to torture and/or death.18 In any case, although animal experimentation was not widely practiced, the general view that the purpose of animals was to ultimately benefit humans did not undergo significant change.

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The scientific thought and practice of Rene´ Descartes in the seventeenth century provided a stronger foundation for the general acceptability of the practice of animal experimentation. His mind-body dualism and his theory that animals were mere machines undermined the notion that animals could feel pain, and this therefore justified the already commonly accepted view of the absolute superiority of humans over animals. As a result of Descartes’ theory that animals could not really feel pain, experimentation became more widely accepted and practiced.19 The scientists Franc¸ois Magendie and his student Claude Bernard, two well-known heirs of Descartes’ scientific tradition, performed many dissections on live animals. Descartes, Magendie, and Bernard all had their contemporary critics, many of whom observed firsthand the experiments that were often carried out in public places. The Enlightenment period brought with it two different emphases regarding the treatment of animals in general. Thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and John Locke questioned some of the assumptions traditionally held about animals. Bentham in particular argued that animals feel pain and, subsequently, that this fact has moral implications for their treatment. On the other hand, Enlightenment philosophy provided even stronger reasons for the accepted hierarchy of humans over animals. Its emphasis on the natural rights of humans and the high place given to rationality undergirded the acceptance of a sharp distinction drawn between humans and animals. The nineteenth century saw the rise of humane societies, beginning in England.20 Although there were individual opponents of animal experimentation prior to this time, the rise of these societies signaled serious systematic opposition to many practices involving animals, and they often took up antivivisection as their particular cause.21 In 1824, the first Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals came into existence, and many similar organizations eventually sprang up.22 As a result of this opposition to experimentation, the first antivivisection legislation, the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876, passed in England. For the first time, the treatment of experimental animals became the focus of law. Although the legislation did not abolish painful research, it did regulate it.23 In the United States, Henry Bergh founded the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) and got the first serious animal protection law passed in 1866 by the New York state legislature.24 Although this was not the first law to give some protection to animals (some state laws already existed), it was the first effective one, and it was one that the ASPCA was charged with enforcing.25 Henry Bergh did try to get vivisection banned through legislation in New York in the 1870s but was unsuccessful, especially due to the work of the state medical society.26 Alongside this growing humane movement, though, was a concurrent rise in the practice of experimentation. The number of American laboratories grew significantly in the 1880s and 1890s, and America became a leading center of scientific medicine.27 The work of scientists such as Louis Pasteur, whose studies on animals showed that diseases were produced and could be cured by immunization, empirically demonstrated the tremendous advances in human

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health that could result from animal experimentation. With other scientific advances—some of them taking place in the twentieth century, such as understanding the causes and development of vaccines for diseases such as whooping cough, tuberculosis, measles, mumps, rubella, and polio28—the belief in the necessity of animal experimentation for human (and animal) health was a very strong justification for its continuance. The twentieth century saw a significant rise in both the institutionalized practice of animal experimentation and grassroots and academic opposition to it. The contemporary animal rights movement in the United States has become a considerable force, addressing issues in the treatment of animals in the public sphere and often bringing to light abuses of animals in experiments. Two movements address the humane treatment of animals, especially with regard to animal experimentation: the reformist humane movement, which seeks reform in the treatment of animals in science; and the more radical antivivisection movement, a contemporary movement that is generally opposed to all or most animal experimentation. A distinction is often made between animal welfarists (those principally advocating kindness and absence of cruelty toward animals) and animal liberationists/animal rightists. (There is a tendency in the popular literature, and sometimes even in more academic writings, to lump all animal activists under the phrase “animal rights,” although not all those so called actually believe in animal rights.) The former group is more reformist and the latter group is more radical and tends to be abolitionist regarding certain practices involving animals. Both types of groups are actively fighting to better the condition of animals, although they are often at odds with regard to their practical objectives and even ultimate goals. However, their theoretical differences are often stronger than their practical differences.29 Both of these groups have their roots in the humane societies of the nineteenth century, but what was unique in the twentieth century was the growth of animal rights groups, which tend to be more radical than their reformist counterparts with regard to animal experimentation, as well as on many other animal issues.30 The number of those involved in the animal movement continues to grow, with an estimated ten to fifteen million Americans supporting animal protection groups. By 1990, several thousand animal welfare groups and several hundred animal rights groups were in existence.31 There are several reasons for this growth in interest in animal issues, particularly in the latter part of the twentieth century. The first is the emergence of other liberation movements, particularly for women and minorities, with some arguing that we should also include animals as an oppressed group. The second is the publication in 1975 of Peter Singer’s book Animal Liberation (released in a revised edition in 1990), often dubbed “the bible of the animal rights movement,” which signaled the beginning of significant academic interest in the subject. For many activists, Singer’s book was an impetus to involvement in the movement, and almost every animal rights activist either owns or has read Singer’s book.32 The book has also gained respectability in academic circles, as Peter Singer is a philosopher of great renown who holds

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a chair at Princeton University (although many disagree with his ideas). Many articles and books have been written mostly challenging but sometimes supporting some of Singer’s arguments, and other writers have subsequently addressed the treatment of animals from their own perspectives.33 A third reason is the growth in the field of animal ethology, which studies animals primarily in their natural habitats. Many of these studies have raised questions about animal rationality and other cognitive processes. In spite of this growth in activist and academic interest in the treatment of animals in science, animal experimentation was more prevalent in the twentieth century than ever before. A majority of people do not support the agenda of the more radical animal rights groups, and perhaps not even that of the more reformist humane groups. Most Americans, depending on how the survey is worded, indicate that they do believe that animal experimentation is necessary and should continue if benefits to humans are anticipated to accrue from it. In addition, some surveys have indicated that people tend to be more in favor of experimentation if the animal is a rat as opposed to a dog,34 indicating a kind of distinction not often made by animal rights groups, who tend to want to extend protection at least to all mammals or vertebrates. The field of science in general has grown, and there has been tremendous growth particularly in medicine due to the results believed to be achieved through animal experimentation. Some of the benefits to humans traditionally cited include increased understanding of human physiology, better surgical techniques, new procedures that enhance human life and well-being, and the explosion of new drugs to treat all kinds of mental and physical illnesses. Advances in human health and increases in life expectancy are considered to be directly attributable to animal experiments. The proliferation in the number of drugs available means that many more animals must be used to test these substances, since U.S. legislation requires that substances be tested on animals before they are tested on humans. As academic interest in the area of animal experimentation grew, scientists also joined the discussion to respond to what they considered to be extremists who want to undermine the very health of human society by their desire to either significantly restrict or abolish the practice of animal experimentation. These scientists often provide for the public evidence of the important human health benefits accruing from animal experimentation. Some of the newer techniques now being tested, such as cloning and the creation of transgenic animals, will probably require an increase in the number of animals used or, if not an actual increase, then a justification for their continued use. The issue of xenotransplantation in particular highlights the concern with the continuing need for animals. With so many humans dying due to the shortage of human organs for transplantation, animals as potential organ donors are viewed as a very real solution to a serious human health issue. The question frequently comes down to weighing the anticipated beneficial consequences for humans against the potential suffering and death entailed for animals.35 Opponents of experimentation point out its paradoxical nature:

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on the one hand, animal experimentation is justified on the grounds that animals are so different from humans; on the other hand, animal experimentation is justified on the grounds that animals are close enough to humans to be appropriate objects of comparison. A problem is how to reconcile these seemingly contradictory viewpoints, if they can be reconciled at all. On a more specific level, numerous ethical questions arise with regard to the issue of animal experimentation: If animal experimentation is to conducted, who should be responsible for making the decisions as to which experiments to do and which animals to use? Should only certain species of animals be used? What criteria should exist for whether experiments can be done? Are there some experiments that should not be done (e.g., because of reasons of pain or because of the uncertainty of results)? Who should conduct experiments? Are there realistic alternatives to the use of animals? What kind of legislation should be in place to protect laboratory animals? Which ethical theories provide us with the best approach on the issue of animal experimentation? In this book, I will attempt to answer these questions. A number of different ethical theories, or approaches, have been utilized to address the treatment of animals and the particular questions related to animal experimentation. Here I will address rights theory and Christian theology and provide a burden/benefit analysis,36 specifically as they relate to animal experimentation. The topic of rights is included since much of the contemporary philosophical writing on the treatment of animals addresses the question of animal rights. Christian theology, while not a moral theory, is included because of its potential contribution to the issue. This book will exclude explicit discussion of three other approaches that address the treatment of animals: the cruelty-kindness view, social contract theory, and feminist approaches. The cruelty-kindness view posits that we should practice kindness and refrain from practicing cruelty to animals. Social contract theory understands morality as a social contract among autonomous individuals (which generally excludes animals) who make decisions for the rest of the community.37 Feminist approaches focus either on the relationship between the exploitation of animals and the exploitation of women or on challenging essentialist approaches of other philosophical theories, with a particular concern for the role of emotions and the concept of caring.38 These are important, albeit minor, perspectives in the contemporary philosophical and theological debate, and therefore this book will focus on the arguments utilized primarily in the philosophical literature. The book is organized in the following way. Chapter 1 lays out the general nature of the issue of animal experimentation, especially related to factual considerations and definitions of important terms. Chapters 2 and 3 explore the bases for the more important alleged similarities and differences between humans and animals: mental capacity and the ability to feel pleasure and pain. Chapter 4 addresses the issue of animal rights. Chapter 5 provides a constructive Christian theology for animal experimentation. Chapter 6 offers a casuistry based on a burden/benefit analysis. The conclusion offers an interim ethic and

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provides some closing remarks. While I do not claim in any way that this book is the last word, its goal is simply to think carefully and ethically about a serious moral issue from the perspectives of several disciplines, with the intention of emphasizing the unique contribution that Christian theology can make on the issue of animal experimentation, and to provide a burden/benefit analysis in light of the important issues considered throughout the book.

1 Nature of the Problem

My purpose in this chapter is to lay out some basic facts about animal experimentation. It will include general information such as important definitions, different types of experimentation, the typical users of animals, the numbers and types of animals used, sources of animals, and legislation.1 One of the most important terms to define is “animal.” This definition should be fairly straightforward, but biologists differ among themselves in terms of what to classify as an animal.2 In common usage, any living organism that is not a plant typically is considered an animal.3 Since the treatment of animals has become a serious and widespread ethical concern, many people now tend to use the term “human animal” (rather than “human” or “human being”) when referring to a human being and to use the term “nonhuman animal” (rather than “animal”) when referring to an animal. The effect and perhaps the purpose of this kind of distinction highlight the evolutionary continuity among all nonplant organisms, suggesting that the difference between “human beings” and “animals” is one of degree rather than kind—that both groups are in fact “animals.” There is general agreement that some kind of hierarchical classificatory system of animals exists, with simple organisms at the lowest level (including bacteria and insects) and proceeding upward to cold-blooded vertebrates (including fish, amphibians, and reptiles) and finally up to warm-blooded vertebrates (including birds and mammals, with primates at the very top).4 Thus, animals are often classified as higher or lower, depending on the kinds of distinctions that are usually made among them. These distinctions generally have to do with the degree of similarity of the animal to humans, based particularly on the existence of a nervous system (indicating

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the ability to feel pain) and mental complexity. However, the use of a hierarchy to differentiate among animal species is very problematic for a number of reasons. First, evolutionary theory, though often talked about in terms of a linear progression, is more correctly understood as a line with different branches. In addition, evolutionary theory tends to posit a difference of degree rather than a difference of kind. Second, the problem of how to arrange the taxonomy differs with regard to which characteristics are compared. Thus, humans may be superior to nonhuman primates in some cognitive functions, and nonhuman primates cognitively superior to rodents, but it may be possible for a particular rodent to be more intelligent than a particular (e.g., braindamaged) chimpanzee. In addition, in their capacity to experience pain, there may not be a hierarchy (and hence difference) at all. Finally, there are certain characteristics (e.g., good eyesight, speed) in which some animals are superior to humans. Of course, there are legitimate reasons for positing some kind of hierarchy, and it is difficult to get away from it completely. The next chapter has a more detailed consideration of hierarchy and its implications for animal experimentation. In this book, unless otherwise specified, when the term “animal” is used, it refers to any living organism that is a vertebrate (warm-blooded or coldblooded), excluding human beings, as well as those invertebrates with welldeveloped nerve clusters (e.g., octopus and squid). The reason for drawing the line at this place is because pain perception is generally believed to exist in all vertebrate species5 and in these invertebrate species as well.6 Pain is the most important issue in animal experimentation. Although there may be other differences among these species, most notably in cognitive capacities, the ability to experience pain is the minimum requirement that should provide these animals greater moral consideration in experimentation than those who cannot feel pain.7 Aside from the use of humans in experiments, animals are considered the best “models”8 for understanding human beings, and this is why they are so often the subjects of experiments. The expression “animal model” is commonly used to refer to the study of animals for the purpose of gaining helpful information for humans or other animals,9 and animals are considered especially helpful because they are analogous to human beings in many ways.10 To talk about the issues related to the use of animals in experiments, though, we must also define precisely what is meant by experimentation. The term “vivisection” was the word often used in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to refer to animal experimentation. It specifically meant dissection of live animals, but it is now broader and includes the use of animals for the induction of disease and for educational purposes.11 This term has largely been replaced by the term “animal experimentation,” both because the former word developed a pejorative sense that many do not want to attribute to animal research and because animal research has to do with more than literally dissecting animals.12 Unless otherwise indicated, the term “experimentation” in this book will refer specifically to animal experimentation. Most discussion about and definitions of experimentation divide it into

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three broad categories: research, testing, and education. When the term “research” is used in the scientific literature, it generally refers to biomedical research, although research can also more broadly encompass the categories of testing and education. Biomedical research is generally divided into two types: basic research and applied research. Basic research does not necessarily have a specific goal to achieve or hypothesis to test; rather, it is an attempt to better understand how biological systems function. Applied research has practical ramifications that can be ascertained once the experiment is completed. Its specific goal is to improve the health of humans and animals.13 Research also includes experimentation such as the development and deployment of weapons, space research, agricultural research (usually undertaken to increase production and profit), ethology (the study of animals in their natural habitats), and behavioral and psychological research.14 Testing refers to any experiments in which substances are administered to animals to determine their toxicity or benefit to humans. It is usually referred to as toxicity testing. Products commonly tested are drugs, cosmetics, chemical household products, and pesticides. The rationale for toxicity testing is that, if the substance is safe or harmful for animals, then it will be safe or harmful for humans. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires that all new drugs to be tested in humans must first be tested on animals.15 Two of the more common and traditional tests that have been used in toxicity studies are the LD50 test and the Draize test. Both tests have been subject to severe criticism over the years, and, as a result, both have been significantly modified to involve fewer animals and to entail less suffering. There have been some attempts to completely phase out use of these tests, particularly the Draize test. The LD50 test (median lethal dose) is the administration of a test substance to a group of animals until half of the animals die. The Draize test is an eye irritancy test, primarily using rabbits, in which the substance to be tested is put into one eye of an immobilized rabbit, and the results of the irritancy are compared with the other eye. In this way, substances can be rated as mild, moderate, or severe in their expected irritancy for human beings.16 Of the three types of experimentation, testing seems to have come under the most severe criticism, and many who favor biomedical research and educational uses of animals are opposed to product testing in animals.17 Education refers to the use of animals in educational institutions, such as experiments on animals for school science fairs, dissection in high school biology classes, dissection and study of animals in college biology classes, and demonstration on animal models in medical and veterinary schools.18 Whereas research and testing typically use live animals in their experiments, education uses both living and dead animals, depending on the nature of the experiments. In all categories of experiments, animals are generally put to death at the conclusion of the experiment (the usual term for this is that the animals have been “sacrificed”), and sometimes they are then dissected to determine the effects of the experiments. The three categories of biomedical research, testing, and education are not always that easy to distinguish. For example, testing the efficacy of a particular

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drug on animals in order to determine its potential effects on humans can be considered biomedical research and/or testing. Although there may be some different issues related to the specific type of experimentation under discussion, for the purpose of this book, all three categories of biomedical research, testing, and education are meant when the term “experimentation” is used.19 The reason for this is that many important ethical issues to be addressed on the use of animals in experimentation are relevant for all three categories— for example, the problem of pain and the question of whether animals should be experimented upon at all. However, the strongest resistance to abolition of animal experiments has to do particularly with the perceived benefits of biomedical research for human health. Animals are utilized in many different sectors. The federal government is a large user of animals. They are used in the following U.S. agencies in the following ways: the Department of Agriculture (USDA, in the improvement of animal health and food products, especially in agriculture); the Department of Defense (in the testing and deployment of weapons, chemical and otherwise); the Department of Energy (in health and environmental technologies and programs); the Department of Health and Human Services (for example, the National Institutes of Health [NIH], which utilizes more animals than any other agency; the FDA; the National Institute on Drug Abuse; and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health); the Department of the Interior (in improvement in fish and wildlife management); the Department of Transportation (in transportation safety); the Consumer Product Safety Commission (in toxicity testing of potential consumer products); the Environmental Protection Agency; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (in gaining knowledge about health for astronauts); and the Department of Veterans Affairs.20 Animals are also used in the private sector for biomedical research and in toxicity testing (e.g., cosmetics companies). Some uses of animals are more carefully regulated than others, which will be covered in the discussion on legislation later in this chapter. Animal research is a multibillion-dollar industry. Much money can be made by researchers and their institutions, those that supply animals and equipment for experiments, and companies that sell products tested on animals. The government is the primary source of funding for research, in particular through the NIH, as well as through other federal agencies. In addition, funding comes from the private sector (e.g., pharmaceutical companies), schools, and private foundations and agencies.21 The amount spent on research is not easily determined and in some cases is completely unknown. However, the NIH is the biggest single provider of funds to medical research institutes.22 Somewhere between 30 percent and 70 percent of NIH funding goes to animal research, although the NIH will not reveal the exact amount.23 In 1992, most of the twelve billion dollars in the NIH’s budget went to animal research,24 and it had 57 percent more money in 2001 than it did five years earlier, with Congress seeking to increase it even more.25 The number of animals used in research is also very uncertain, so that

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ranges of numbers differ widely.26 One of the major problems is that the USDA compiles statistics only on the use of nonrodent species; rats and mice (the majority of animals used) are not counted. The Office of Technology Assessment, which provides official statistics on the numbers of animals used, maintains that it is not possible to know even whether the number of animals used is increasing or decreasing. Their quote from 1986 of between seventeen and twenty-two million animals in research (which includes most vertebrates) is still widely used in the literature today.27 There are two primary sources for numbers and species of animals used: the National Research Council’s Institute for Laboratory Animal Resources (ILAR) and the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). The latter’s more recent study of official data suggests that between twenty-five and thirty million are used.28 Others put the figure as high as a hundred million.29 Because the actual number of animals used cannot be determined precisely, it is difficult to know with certainty precisely what percentage of animals is used in different kinds of experiments. One source estimates that half of the animals are used in testing, the other half in research, and only 53,000 in education,30 while another estimates that 40 percent are used in basic research, 26 percent in drug development and testing, 20 percent in testing products other than drugs, 7 percent in education, and 7 percent for other uses.31 There is considerable agreement that rats and mice comprise most experimental animals used, with percentages commonly given as between 75 percent and 90 percent. Many reasons exist for the high number of rodents as research subjects: they are easy to obtain, maintain, and handle (due to their small size); they have a relatively short life span; they are relatively inexpensive to purchase and to keep; they often are or can be genetically defined; and they have been well studied widely in the past. The most commonly used rodents, in addition to rats and mice, are guinea pigs, Syrian hamsters, and gerbils.32 The questions considered in choosing a species for a particular experiment include which is expected to yield the most helpful results, which has been most helpful in the past, which would provide the fewest biological risks for the researchers, which would require the fewest numbers of animals, and which is the most economical.33 In addition, some experiments require a genetically or microbiologically standardized animal.34 Tradition is also a consideration in species choice, as well as public opinion.35 There are basically two sources for animals used in experimentation: purpose-bred animals and random-source animals. Purpose-bred animals, the biggest source of experimental animals, are those specifically reared for the purpose of experiments. They can be bred by individual breeders or commercial laboratories (who then sell the animals to research laboratories) or by the laboratory itself. Random-source animals are those not purposely bred. The term “random-source” usually refers to cats and dogs obtained in several ways: from shelters and pounds,36 from dealers (who bought them from auctions or farms or stole them from the streets), or, in the case of retired greyhounds, from the racetrack.37 Another source for animals, which is not generally re-

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ferred to as random-source, is their capture in the wild. Some frogs used for dissection experiments, as well as some chimpanzees, are sometimes taken from the wild, although both of these species are purpose-bred, too. There are advantages and disadvantages in terms of the sources of animals, but there are criticisms of all sources for animals. Criticisms on obtaining animals from the wild focus on interference in ecosystems, the problem with removing endangered species from their habitat, and the suffering and often death that result from their transport.38 The purpose-breeding of animals also raises significant ethical concerns. One of the concerns has to do with the commodification of animals as “products” to be used by humans, especially with the idea of raising animals simply to experiment on and then kill them. In addition, animals are often purposely bred with genetic predispositions or certainties to develop particular diseases, which ensures that many experimental animals will experience pain and suffering. The most controversial topic on the source of animals in experimentation revolves around the issue of pound animals, in particular because it involves normally favored species (cats and dogs) and also because it undermines the idea of a shelter as a place of refuge for animals.39 Several kinds of legislation address the issue of the treatment of animals in general and the care of research animals in particular. Legislation exists at both the federal and state level. The most comprehensive legislation occurs at the federal level in the form of two laws: the Animal Welfare Act and its amendments (administered by the USDA, through APHIS) and the Public Health Service (PHS) policy (administered by the NIH, through the Office for the Protection from Research Risks [OPRR]).40 There is some overlap in their coverage, and attempts to bring these two laws more into line with one another continue.41 The Animal Welfare Act first passed on August 24, 1966,42 and amendments in 1970, 1976, 1985, 1990, and 2002 have significantly modified it. Each amendment has strengthened the legal protection of animals, particularly the protection afforded research animals, with the exception of the last amendment. An article in Life magazine on the mistreatment of dogs by dealers who were raising them for use in experiments helped to awaken public awareness on this issue and provided the impetus for the initial legislation. The law, which protected cat and dog owners from pet theft, prevented the use of stolen animals for experimentation, established humane standards by animal dealers and research facilities for six kinds of animals (dogs, cats, primates, guinea pigs, hamsters, and rabbits, although record keeping was required only for dogs and cats), and required the USDA to enforce regulations.43 However, this law did not require annual reports to Congress,44 and, although the secretary of agriculture was to establish minimum standards for animal care, the secretary could not prescribe standards for experiments.45 Each of the amendments will be examined next. The first amendment was approved on December 24, 1970.46 This amendment arose in response to allegations of animal abuse by those not regulated

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by passage of the first law and because the public wanted to provide greater protection to animals other than cats and dogs. Some of the changes regulated those who exhibited animals to the public and those who sold animals to auctions. Other important changes expanded definitions: the definition of “animal” was extended to include all warm-blooded animals that, as determined by the secretary, were to be used for experimentation, in exhibitions, or as pets (although farm animals used in medical research, as well as rats, mice, and birds, were excluded);47 the definition of “research facility” was expanded to include facilities using covered animals in addition to cats and dogs (e.g., primates, guinea pigs, hamsters, and rabbits); and the definition of “proper veterinary care” now included the use of pain relievers, if deemed necessary by the veterinarian involved.48 The 1976 amendment expanded the regulations covering those who dealt with animals: carriers and intermediate handlers were now required to register and keep records; and animal exhibitors, dealers, and auction operators had to be licensed.49 In addition, civil penalties were increased; animal fighting was prohibited; the definition of “dog” was expanded to protect dogs used in hunting, for security, or for breeding; animals used in research, in exhibition, or as pets were to receive humane treatment, including during transport;50 and federal research facilities were now required to submit an annual report to Congress51 to demonstrate that they were following acceptable standards of treatment for the animals in their care.52 The 1985 amendment passed as the Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act of 1985. This act dealt specifically with treatment accorded to research animals: research facilities were required to provide exercise for dogs and a physical environment for nonhuman primates that would enhance their psychological well-being;53 pain and distress during procedures was to be minimized by the use of drugs;54 alternatives to the use of animals were to be considered in the event of painful or distressing experiments; each research facility was to appoint an institutional animal committee of at least three members, one of which had to be a veterinarian, and another member not in any way affiliated with the research facility conducting research;55 the USDA must perform annual inspections of each facility; a centralized information center was to be established to prohibit duplication and minimize animal distress; all research facilities had to provide training for personnel in animal care;56 and the use of animals in more than one major surgery was prohibited.57 If a facility did not comply with USDA requirements, its federal support could be suspended or revoked.58 The amendment of 1990 added farm animals to its list of protected animals (but not farm animals used for food, fiber, or other agricultural purposes) but still excluded birds, rats, and mice.59 The act’s specific definition of “animal” continued to exclude these species when bred for use in research. The issue of the continued exclusion of these three types of animals generated much controversy and concern, particularly among those concerned with animal well-being. In 2000, a federal court order compelled the USDA to modify

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its definition of “animal” to include birds, rats, and mice.60 In response to that action, in 2001, under pressure from the medical research industry, Senator Jesse Helms successfully attached an amendment (called the Helms Amendment) to the Senate Farm Bill to permanently exclude birds, rats, and mice from the protections of the Animal Welfare Act. On May 13, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, known as the Farm Bill, with the Helms Amendment intact.61 In summary, with the exception of the final amendment, the progressive amendments to the Animal Welfare Law appear to have tightened legislation considerably, particularly in the following areas: they increased the scope of animals protected, added to the list of those held responsible for inhumane treatment of animals, provided government oversight of additional areas in research, and focused more on the issue of pain. However, the 2002 amendment that permanently excluded the most used species was a severe blow to those concerned with research animal interests. In addition to the amendment to the Animal Welfare Law, another federal law was passed in 1985. It is usually referred to as the Public Health Service (PHS) policy, although it was technically called the Health Research Extension Act. This law applies to all research institutions receiving funding from the PHS and ultimately through the NIH.62 Some of the legislation of the PHS policy is very similar to that mandated by the Animal Welfare Act. The PHS policy covers all vertebrate species without exception (including those excluded by the Animal Welfare Act), although it has no jurisdiction over companies not receiving its federal funding.63 PHS requires adherence to a guide developed in 1963 by the NIH, through the National Research Council’s Institute of Laboratory Animal Resources (ILAR), entitled Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals.64 This guide virtually has the force of law. It is a living document, subject to continuing change, and has been revised several times. Its wording is general so that it can be adapted in different situations.65 A number of other guides have also been developed by the National Research Council, dealing with particular species or particular aspects of animal research.66 Both the Animal Welfare Law and the PHS policy depend heavily on self-regulation, particularly in their use of institutional animal care and use committees.67 Someone once said that the way one knows legislation is good is if nobody is happy. In this regard, federal legislation on the treatment of animals must be excellent—it has come under severe criticism on a number of points, from disparate voices in the discussion.68 Many scientists consider animal experimentation already overregulated, and many animal activists consider the legislation still insufficient. New laws continue to be introduced on the federal level.69 Federal law has been supplemented, though, through state laws, which have been enacted largely to deal with painful experiments on animals in settings below the college level (e.g., in science fairs).70 Many states have anticruelty statutes. On both the state and federal levels, sunshine laws, such as the Freedom of Information Act,71 have been designed to bring government

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activities in research out into the open and subject to public scrutiny. Not all states have these laws, and the laws that do exist vary considerably.72 Such is the factual situation at the present time with regard to animal experimentation. Since the ethical arguments about animal experimentation focus on the qualities and nature of animals, the next chapter will discuss animal mentality.

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2 Animal Minds

Many justify using animals for experiments (and for other purposes as well) on the basis of their supposed lack of mental capacities. Although experimentation is usually defended explicitly on the grounds that studying animals can prove beneficial for humans, it is the assumption that animals are inferior to humans in some significant sense that justifies their subordination to serving the human good. Humans have usually considered themselves to be superior to animals because of some kind of mental capacity or capacities that we believe we possess but animals do not or that we believe they possess to a considerably lesser degree. A pervading concern of Western philosophy has been to search for the criterion or criteria that would distinguish humans from animals.1 The importance of this search for a criterion or criteria has implications for the treatment of animals, because the conclusions we reach determine which beings we consider to have moral standing and hence to deserve moral consideration.2 The question of moral standing in particular may be the most fundamental problem in moral theology.3 To say that a creature has moral standing is to go beyond simply saying that we should not treat him cruelly; it suggests that this creature has interests that must be protected and that he cannot simply be used only as a means to an end. The two most common criteria offered as to why animals may or may not deserve moral consideration are their cognitive capacities and their capacity to feel pleasure and pain. This chapter will focus on the question of animal mentality and its implications for experimentation.4 Addressing the issue of animal minds is no easy task; it is a complex matter for a number of reasons, including the difficulty of defining terms, problems in interpretation of behavior, and differ-

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ences in the implications of this knowledge for the treatment of animals. Since what we think about animal minds affects the way we treat them, there is much at stake in this discussion. In examining the issue of the cognitive capacities of animals, a number of questions have been raised: Do animals have mental experiences? What kinds of mental experiences do animals have? Are their mental experiences similar to those of humans? How can we study the mental experiences of animals? Numerous mental criteria have been cited as evidence of human uniqueness, and while I cannot address them all in this chapter, I will proceed in the following way. In the first section, I will examine the arguments for and against the existence of animal minds in general. In the next three sections, I will examine the arguments for and against the possession by animals of some of the most significant mental criteria usually offered as evidence of distinctions between humans and animals: consciousness, rationality (and related concepts), and language.5 In the fifth section, I will address the question of speciesism, its relation to what have been called marginal humans, and the issue of hierarchy. In the last section, I will offer some concluding remarks.

The Existence of Animal Minds Considerable disagreement exists as to whether animals have minds and, if they do, to what extent their minds are similar to those of human beings. The issue of animal minds is distinct from the question of whether they have brains, upon which all would obviously agree. The question of animal minds, or animal mentality, ultimately is asking whether the minds of humans and animals are similar and in what ways they are similar. To say that animals have minds means that animals have subjective experiences and can think. But this does not yet answer the further question of how sharp the distinction is between human and animal mentality. While there are significant differences between humans and animals (which will be developed more fully in the subsequent sections), my contention is that animals do have minds, that their mental experiences are similar to those of humans, and that the differences between them are primarily differences of degree rather than differences of kind. The three arguments I will use to buttress this view are the argument from evolution, the argument from other minds, and the argument from behavior. The argument from evolution serves as the foundation for the other two arguments. The theory of evolution is accepted by virtually everyone (with the exception of some conservative religious groups and individuals) and therefore is very important in considering the relationship of humans to other species. Evolutionary theory in its most general outline posits a common origin for all species and a gradual development of species differentiation, although this progression is not necessarily linear. The emphasis in evolutionary theory is on gradual rather than sudden differentiation. Evolutionary theory is often marshaled in discussions of animal capabilities because it is fairly obvious that

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animals are similar to us in a number of important ways.6 They are constructed anatomically like humans, with both a nervous system and a similar brain structure. At least some mental experiences (such as subjective feelings and conscious thoughts) are believed to result partly from the functioning of the nervous system.7 The most obvious similarities are with nonhuman great apes (which include bonobos, chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans).8 If certain physiological structures relate to mentality in humans, and if animals have physiological structures similar to those of humans, then it follows that they must have similar kinds of mental experiences. It seems difficult to argue that animals are so similar to us physiologically and then assume a radical discontinuity when it comes to mental capacities, especially when there is such a close connection between the physiological and the mental. In addition, it does not make sense to argue for a gradual development in terms of physical characteristics and then to posit the sudden emergence of mentality in humans. A concrete example would be the possession of consciousness and the existence of a central nervous system, both of which are believed to be related to the experience of pain and suffering. However, to argue that differences between human and animal mentality are a matter of degree rather than kind does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the mental experiences of humans and animals are exactly the same. There will certainly be significant differences between different species (both between humans and other animals and between other animal species) and even among members of the same species. Just as there are some animals that are physiologically closer to humans than others, there certainly are some animals that are closer to humans in certain cognitive capacities than others. In addition, arguing for the existence of animal minds with an emphasis on a difference of degree between human and animal minds does allow that humans are more cognitively advanced than other animals.9 The importance of arguing for the existence of animal minds is that it allows us to interpret animal behavior as we interpret human behavior—namely, as a result of mental experiences—rather than simply from a behaviorist perspective. It also allows us to take more seriously the implications of the existence of these minds for the way we treat them. Thus, if animals can think and have subjective experiences, then what we do to them matters much more than if we think that they are completely “other.” There are basically three ways that the argument from evolution has been challenged with regard to animal minds. The first is by way of religious argument in which the superiority of humans is understood to have been established by God, as revealed in the biblical tradition, primarily through the creation accounts. The creation accounts are often quoted to demonstrate that the directive given by God to humans includes the notion of dominion over the earth.10 The second is by arguing from a behaviorist perspective—that all animal behavior can be explained by reference to observation of behavior rather than through understanding cognitive processes. This argument basically assumes that animals do not have minds. The behaviorist tradition was popular earlier in the twentieth century and the dominant paradigm for understanding

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animal minds in the 1940s and 1950s, and B. F. Skinner is the most famous advocate of this approach.11 However, though behaviorism has been challenged in recent times (since it is considered by many to be too simplistic a way to explain all kinds of behavior, including human behavior) and somewhat replaced by the new field of cognitive ethology, its influence remains strong in some circles. The third argument does not challenge evolutionary theory in general or the existence of animal minds in particular but rather maintains that the differences between humans and animals are a difference of kind rather than of degree. There is general acceptance of differences of degrees but that eventually a difference of degree can become so great as to become a difference of kind. This is most often argued with regard to humans in comparison with all other animal species. Even if we do have physiological similarities with animals, the argument goes, we cannot jump to the conclusion that we have comparable mental similarities; our mental capacities are significantly greater than even those of our closest animal relatives, the chimpanzees. Thus, if animals do possess some mental states, they are much inferior to the capabilities found in humans. The question of whether evolutionary theory posits a difference of degree or a difference of kind is a very important one with regard to the extent of differences between humans and animals. In most of Western history, particularly before Darwin, there was general acceptance often based on religious grounds that humans were a substantially different kind of creature than any other animal species. However, Darwin’s theory and his own explicit statements suggest that this line of demarcation had previously been drawn much too sharply.12 His theory suggests (and he himself believed) that the differences between humans and animals were no longer differences of kind, as previously believed, but rather differences of degree. This includes both physiological and mental differences. Thus, Darwin also believed that animals had emotions for the same reason.13 These similarities have then serious implications for our treatment of animals. Because evolutionary theory maintains a common origin of all beings and presents a differentiation of species, and because these differences emerged gradually, it seems more logical to argue for a difference of degree. Of course, arguing for a difference of degree rather than kind still allows for the fact that humans are superior to animals in a number of significant ways. More important than the theoretical discussion, though, are the implications of whether one holds to a difference of degree or kind. Maintaining a difference of degree generally (although not necessarily) allows animals greater moral standing and hence greater moral consideration than does a focus on a difference of kind. The second argument regarding the existence of animal minds centers on the knowledge of other minds—do other minds exist?14 The first question that arises is whether we can possibly know or understand the subjective experiences of another human, and the subsequent question is whether we can understand the minds of other animals in the same way that we can understand the minds of other humans. In answer to the first question, to function in human society, not only must we assume that other humans have minds but

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also we must believe that they have minds—mental experiences—similar to ours. Otherwise, there would not even be a basis for communication. Even if not done consciously, humans relate to other humans on the basis of their expectation of commonality of subjective experiences. We assume that, when we communicate our thoughts and feelings to others, they will understand us. We expect that in situations when we feel sad, for example, that other humans in similar situations will also feel sad. One way we can know that others experience these mental states similarly is that when we respond sympathetically or empathetically to them, they respond appropriately. The problem of at least other human minds is a problem more for a minority of philosophers than for the average person, and it is not at all a “problem” for those who believe that animals have minds. Again, this does not commit us to the assertion that human and animal minds function in exactly the same way, but it allows that if we can (1) assume that other humans have minds and (2) then have recourse to evolutionary theory, it is not such a far jump to say that other animals have minds as well. Those who argue against the existence of animal minds with reference to the problem of other minds must assume one of two things: either that humans do not have mental experiences (or that they are at least skeptical about this possibility, since it cannot be proven) or that we cannot understand the mental experiences of others because we cannot literally “get into their heads” and hence experience something precisely as they would.15 The latter argument is the one more commonly asserted. Of course, there is truth to the assertion that we cannot necessarily understand precisely the experiences of another, and at times we may even be mistaken, such as when we misjudge motives or misunderstand emotions. However, this does not foreclose the possibility that most of the time we can have a good idea that other humans do have minds, that they do think, and that their thought processes are similar to ours. As mentioned previously, we would not be able to function in society if we did not believe and act on this belief. Thus, the presence of other human minds, coupled with evolutionary theory, provides strong evidence for the existence of animal minds. However, all that this commits us to is the belief that animals do have mental experiences, that their mental states can be studied, and that animal behavior can be explained other than simply by reference to instinct or stimulus-response. The third argument on the existence of animal minds is a commonsense view based on observation of animal behavior, both by laypeople in everyday situations and by many scientists, either in the laboratory or in more natural settings. Common sense dictates that animals do have minds and that it makes sense to ascribe mental states to animals as a way of both understanding and explaining their behavior.16 The average pet owner, for example, believes that her dog has cognitive abilities—that not only can he make his wants known but also he can do so in such a way that his human owner can understand him. Much of the way that we relate to animals would be difficult to explain if not for the presence of animal mentality. The fact that animal minds are specifically studied by many scientists both

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in their natural habitat and in controlled laboratory experiments (particularly psychology experiments) underscores the belief in the existence of animal minds. In particular, the recent emergence of the discipline of cognitive ethology attests that not only do many scientists believe that animals have minds but also they believe that they can be studied.17 Cognitive ethology is the discipline that studies cognitive processes in animals18 within the context of evolutionary theory.19 Whereas most studies in animal cognition have traditionally taken place in laboratories, cognitive ethologists typically study animals in their natural habitats.20 Cognitive ethologists move beyond merely studying animal learning and discrimination to considering the possibility of animal mental states and the study of some of their attendant features, such as deception and communication. Darwin’s approach was very much a cognitive ethology approach, although it was called “anecdotal cognitivism,” making him perhaps one of the first cognitive ethologists. He attributed mental states to animals based on particular observations rather than on controlled experiments.21 There is a bias against anecdotal evidence by many in the scientific community, with a premium placed on being able to empirically verify one’s hypothesis. However, there is some disagreement by scientists on the question of animal minds and on how to best understand and explain animal behavior. Some scientists who study animal behavior in the laboratory may also believe that animals have mental states, although descriptions of animal behavior that connote mental states are often used in scare quotes (e.g., an animal is “afraid”), as if the scientist is reluctant to attribute this emotion to animals. The strict behaviorist, unlike the average layperson and many cognitive ethologists, however, tends to describe all animal activity by reference to external influences and without reference to subjective states. The principal reason that many reject the behaviorist school is because cognitive studies on animals must often assume, and therefore have concluded, that animal behavior can best be understood on the basis of mental states. Even though there are few strict behaviorists around today, a more modified view of how to explain animal behavior is made by reference to Morgan’s Canon, which results in what could be termed a neobehaviorist position. Morgan’s Canon asserts that we should not interpret the behavior of any nonhuman animal as caused by a higher psychical faculty if it can be explained by a lower one. Thus, Morgan’s Canon is a specific example of the phenomenon of Occam’s Razor: that, all things being equal, we should prefer simpler explanations for behavior over more complicated ones.22 Thus, if a particular animal’s behavior could be explained in terms of instinct or stimulus-response rather than as a result of higher cognitive functioning, then this is the best explanation because it assumes the least. The differences in conclusions between strict behaviorists, neobehaviorists, and cognitive ethologists have to do both with the kinds of questions they bring to the study of animals and with their different interpretations of behavior. Ultimately, the question comes down to, What is the best explanation for animal behavior? If we cannot attribute mental states to animals, then we must assume a different reason for their behavior than we would if, for example, we were

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interpreting the behavior of humans. Animal behavior simply does not make sense if we cannot understand it on the basis of mental states. This is an example of what is known in philosophy as “the argument to the best explanation”—if the best argument includes the existence of mental states, then we must use it. On the basis of these arguments, then, we can posit at least the existence of animal minds, meaning that animals have mental states by means of which we can interpret and understand their behavior and by means of which animals themselves behave in certain ways rather than in others. Of course, animal mental states have to do with more than simply behavior, such as the question of whether animals can experience the negative emotional mental states that are sometimes attributed to them in laboratories, such as suffering.23 However, to fully answer the question of whether Morgan’s Canon or the argument to the best explanation provides a better interpretation of animal behavior, it will be necessary to study the specific criteria usually attributed to humans but denied to animals: consciousness, rationality, and language.

Consciousness Consciousness is the foundational concept in the discussion of animal minds. It is related not only to cognitive capacities but also to the experience of pain, and therefore it has serious implications for the question of whether animals can experience pain and suffering. It continues to be important today in the discussion of animal minds because it is considered the defining feature of the mental, notwithstanding the difficulty of even defining “mental state.”24 Consciousness is generally considered a more elementary mental state than rationality or language possession and therefore raises the question at the most basic level of what the best basis is for understanding animal behavior, as well as the issue of the cognitive similarities between humans and animals. The concept of consciousness is generally traced back to Descartes, although he never explicitly defined it.25 Both then and now, the issue of animal consciousness is a mixture of philosophy and science.26 The questions related to consciousness are as follows: Do animals possess consciousness? How similar is it to human consciousness? Do animals have self-consciousness? The questions get answered differently, depending on how “consciousness” is defined. It is not necessarily controversial to argue for animal consciousness, since by the late twentieth century most philosophers and scientists had postulated some kind of consciousness for both humans and animals.27 However, this is not a universally held position, and some still want to distinguish between consciousness and self-consciousness. My position is that animals have at least rudimentary levels of consciousness that operate as consciousness does in humans and that some animals possess selfconsciousness as well, although perhaps not to the same extent as normal adult humans. Before discussing the presence or absence of consciousness in animals, it

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is important to define what is meant by it. As with so many other terms related to animals, though, the very definition is problematic, even with regard to humans. The reason for the difficulty is that there is no observable property to consciousness, in the sense that we can point to a direct behavior as evidence of consciousness.28 However, some behavior can be viewed as indirect evidence of the presence of consciousness, as later examples will attest. Consciousness has been defined in a number of ways.29 Most simply put, consciousness is an awareness or perception that a creature has—a kind of subjective feeling about what is going on. It appears to have an affective component. Consciousness includes the notion of the experience of sensations. One of the best ways to understand it is to see it as being synonymous with awareness. To say that an animal is conscious is to say that she has awareness of her environment, her own actions, and the actions and communications of her companions.30 Some characteristics commonly associated with consciousness are intentionality; sensations such as fear and hunger; communication, both with the environment and with conspecifics;31 and versatility of behavior—behavior that is nonstereotyped, including deceptive behavior.32 Strong arguments support the proposition that animals have consciousness. Some of the arguments are very similar to those considered in the discussion on animal minds, so I will mention them only briefly, although here they will be examined particularly with regard to consciousness. The arguments are functional-evolutionary, analogy with humans, and observation of animal behavior. The first argument is a functional-evolutionary one. It not only assumes an evolutionary continuity but also postulates that, in general, we should assume that, if an animal has a particular type of mental state, then this mental state would confer an evolutionary advantage to its possessor.33 The gist of this argument is that possessing consciousness is to the evolutionary advantage of a species. In addition, if humans have evolved from nonhuman creatures by a gradual process, then it is difficult to postulate the sudden emergence of consciousness.34 From an evolutionary perspective in general, if at least one species possesses consciousness, then it is valid to ask to what extent it may be present in others.35 The second argument is by analogy with humans. Virtually no one would disagree that humans possess consciousness. We believe that others have mental states like our own. The analogy with humans postulates, just as with the existence of minds in general, that if we can assume that humans possess consciousness because we know they experience sensations, and animals tend to act in ways that we would typically regard as signs of experiencing sensations, then we have every reason to think that they possess consciousness as well.36 That is, if animals manifest behavior that we know is conscious for humans, then it is likely that it is conscious for animals as well.37 In addition, in humans, mental states are closely related to brain structure and physiology. Physiology and biochemistry in animals and humans are remarkably similar. The brain and nervous system have typically been considered the organs of human mental life,38 and consciousness has been especially correlated with

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complex nervous systems.39 Thus, if we posit consciousness in humans due to their physiology, then we can do so for animals as well, since they are physiologically similar. This is especially important with regard to the experience of pain, which is believed to be directly linked to consciousness.40 The last argument is based on observation of animal behavior. On the basis of animal behavior, we attribute consciousness to animals as part of the way we view the world and as part of the way in which we speak about animals. There is not sufficient justification to reform or replace this way of speaking about animals.41 We assume that animals do have an awareness of their surroundings, can make adaptations in it, and can communicate with others about it. It seems difficult to explain normal animal behavior without regard to consciousness.42 Strong evidence exists for the belief that animals possess consciousness, most specifically related to observation of their behavior, by citing the kinds of activities in which animals typically engage. Any activities that go beyond simple stereotyped behavior or simple instinctual or stimulus-response behavior can be used as evidence of consciousness. The following abilities in animals provide strong evidence for their possession of consciousness. Communication among animals is generally considered evidence of conscious thinking, since it entails some simple thoughts and feelings about situations. The study of animal communication in particular seems to indicate an ability in animals to convey to others some of their thoughts.43 Communication is also considered an example of consciousness because part of its purpose is to intentionally affect the receiver’s behavior. To convey thoughts to others, one must not only be aware of one’s own situation but also be able to convey that situation to conspecifics. A very common example cited in the literature is the symbolic dances of honeybees, particularly what have been called waggle and round dances.44 The movements in these dances are used to indicate the precise location of food from the hive, including directions to, distance from, and desirability of food. Thus, some believe it to be more than a stereotyped behavior, especially due to its variability at different times. Pain, suffering, intelligence, and social life are typically considered evidence of consciousness in humans, and to the extent that animals exhibit these characteristics, they are also conscious.45 Any activities that require planning a long sequence of behaviors to achieve a future goal would also be examples of conscious behavior.46 Animals searching for food provide evidence of at least simple conscious thinking because searching involves decisions, since animals do not always know what objects might provide food. This is not to say that the search for food is not instinctual on some level, but the sometimes innovative ways in which animals go about it indicate conscious thought and thereby conscious behavior. Predation involves versatility in hunting for individual animals. Construction of artifacts, especially shelters and structures, requires animals to adjust their behavior in light of the materials available. This can be argued even in the case of birds’ nest-building activity, which some behavioral ethologists want to argue is simply the result of genetic programming rather than intention or learning.

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Beavers and their dam building indicate evidence of adapting their behavior to circumstances and modifying their behavior when something is not working. Some animals have exhibited tool use. One example is birds that drop stones or other hard objects on eggs too strong to break with their beaks. Not all primates use tools, but a number of them do, and there is considerable variability among individuals. Finally, deception has also been offered as an example of intentional conscious behavior, although some have argued that deception requires self-consciousness rather than consciousness.47 In spite of the strong evidence (both theoretical and in terms of practical examples) for the existence of consciousness in animals, some persist in arguing against animal consciousness by proceeding in one of three ways. The first way is to simply deny consciousness to animals.48 The only way to argue against any presence of animal consciousness seems to be to hold to a strict behaviorist view, which disallows subjective mental states in explanations of behavior. As has been argued previously, it does not make sense to interpret animal behavior so simplistically and so radically differently from how we interpret human behavior. The second way is by linking consciousness with rational thought or language. The argument proceeds as follows: only humans have rationality and language; rationality and language are necessary for consciousness; therefore, only humans have consciousness. What is missing is why there is a necessary connection between conscious thought and either rationality or language. However, where this argument about other cognitive criteria being required for consciousness often leads is the more common way of proceeding on this issue—namely, to divide consciousness into different types. Therefore, one could still argue that animals have some basic type of consciousness, but it is far removed from the consciousness found in humans. Those who argue in this way tend to believe that animals have consciousness (awareness) but not self-consciousness (self-awareness).49 Whereas consciousness is generally understood as a capacity to experience sensations, selfconsciousness is sometimes distinguished by defining it as an ability to think about the sensations experienced. It has also been defined as a creature’s ability to form mental concepts about the self. Self-consciousness seems to entail being able to reflect on one’s own thoughts, thus making it a second-level activity rather than a first-level activity. Sometimes self-consciousness has been specifically linked with language possession.50 There are two ways to respond to the question of self-consciousness. The first is to examine the question of whether animals possess rationality and language, which is addressed in the following two sections. The second is to look at examples of behavior typically associated with self-consciousness to see if animals actually manifest behaviors that can be explained only with reference to higher cognitive capacities. Both deception and self-recognition are widely cited as evidence of selfconsciousness rather than mere consciousness. Numerous studies have demonstrated that some species are indeed capable of deception. Although only a couple of examples will be offered here, many others exist.51 Deception can include concealment, distraction, lying, and creating an image.52 One common example is found in certain bird species, in which the mother bird sometimes

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feigns a broken wing display and pretends to be hurt herself in order to distract predators from her young. By dragging her pretended broken wing on the ground, the bird is able to move the predator animal away from her vulnerable young. If the preying animal attempts to catch her, she simply flies away and returns to her young at a safer time. Many examples of deception have been found in apes through observation of their behavior. Monkeys have been observed concealing an erect penis to prohibit a more dominant male from seeing them courting a female. Some monkeys have purposely looked away from a food source they alone knew about until they knew that their conspecifics were gone.53 Self-recognition has not been as widely reported in other species as deception has been (at least based on studies undertaken thus far), partly because it is more difficult to test for. Self-recognition is believed to require awareness of oneself at least at a minimum level. It is found in chimpanzees, although not in all monkeys. One of the ways this is studied in monkeys is through the use of videos or mirrors.54 In experiments, anesthetized chimpanzees have been painted with odorless markers in places they could not see without a mirror (e.g., their foreheads). When they woke up and were given a mirror, they immediately begin to touch the marks on their faces. Those animals not given mirrors did not do so. Only humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans have demonstrated this ability, although chimps reared in isolation did not have this ability.55 The significance of this experiment is that chimps were able to associate themselves with a mirror image of themselves, and not with that of a different animal, suggesting some concept of a self.56 In general, selfconsciousness is believed to be more likely to develop in highly social animals raised normally than in solitary animals.57 One way to address the issue of consciousness and self-consciousness is to maintain that it is not necessary to posit two different kinds of consciousness and instead that one should construct a continuum of levels of consciousness, with simple consciousness and awareness at one end and a more complex consciousness and awareness at the other end (perhaps something like selfconsciousness), in the most mentally complex animals, such as nonhuman primates, but not necessarily limited to primates. One advantage of this approach is that it would eliminate dualistic thinking—that consciousness or even self-consciousness is an all-or-nothing category—and the subsequent problems associated with dualistic thinking. Instead, consciousness should be viewed as possessed in different degrees by different animals. Even if it is difficult to know where to draw the line in the phylogenetic scale in terms of complexity of consciousness, this uncertainty should not prevent us from making some judgments about the presence of consciousness in animals.58 To speak of a continuum is, of course, to assume that animals do possess consciousness. The evidence overwhelmingly supports this contention. Evolutionary theory makes it unlikely that consciousness would suddenly emerge in the human species, given the many other similarities between humans and animals. Since the possession of consciousness is closely connected to the possession of a nervous system, it seems, then, that one must postulate some

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kind of consciousness for all animals with nervous systems. It is difficult to understand how we can explain animal behavior if not by the presence of at least some degree of consciousness. After all, all animals must make decisions, communicate with their conspecifics, engage in self-directed activities, and modify their behavior in light of changes in their environment—all evidence of consciousness that we would attribute to humans. In addition, if we do posit a continuum, we undermine the argument that possession of consciousness requires possession of rationality and language as well. Instead, possession of rationality and language may simply indicate the presence of a higher form of consciousness. However, even when we posit a continuum rather than a sharp break, there are animals whose complexity of consciousness puts them quite close to humans in this regard, especially animals typically believed to have higher cognitive functions, such as primates, whales, and dolphins. It is also possible, though, depending on how it is defined and which experiments are done to explore this, that even other animals may have self-consciousness as well. Ultimately, it gets down to a question of definition, and the way one defines “consciousness” will determine not only which animals have it but also to what degree they have it. Although some animals may possess higher levels of consciousness than some humans, no animal may be likely to have selfconsciousness to the extent found in normal adult humans.59 There is much at stake in the question of whether animals have consciousness. Consciousness is often linked with experiences of pain and suffering. If animals possess only the most rudimentary mental state of consciousness, then the results can have an impact on our ethical views on and treatment of animals, particularly in experimentation. But even if we agree that animals possess consciousness, this does not answer the question of whether they have more advanced mental states, which must be considered subsequently.

Rationality Rationality Defined The biggest difficulty in addressing the question of rationality concerns the definition. As with many other terms commonly associated with mental states, how the word is defined will determine whether one can conclude that animals possess it. Rationality differs from consciousness in that the latter is a broader concept and tends to refer to mental processes as a whole, whereas rationality is usually more narrowly defined and tends to refer to higher level cognitive processes. There are basically two ways to define rationality: one is by reducing it to the particular components typically associated with it, and the other is by defining it as a uniquely human capacity. Obviously, to define it as a uniquely human capacity excludes animals at the outset, which is therefore not really helpful in understanding what rationality is. My position is that rationality can best be understood or explained in terms of its component parts, that animals possess it to the degree to which they possess these component parts, and that rationality, as consciousness, is best understood as being on a continuum, with

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some creatures having greater degrees of rationality than others. In terms of its component parts, rationality has often been associated with intelligence, beliefs and desires, autonomy, and personhood. To argue that animals possess rationality, then, it will be necessary to examine these components individually, although it is not always easy to separate out what is meant by these terms, which overlap and are interconnected. At least since Aristotle, who believed that happiness consisted in the life of reason, rationality has been considered by many to be the unique province of humans.60 John Stuart Mill’s dictum that it is better to be a human dissatisfied rather than a pig satisfied captures the importance put on the higher intellectual pleasures, of which rationality is the principal one and of which it was believed that only humans were capable.61 Thus, rationality became the concept often used for the principal cognitive function that separates humans from animals. Some have even defined “rationality” as the feature that separates humans from animals; Jonathan Bennett specifically defined “rationality” as “whatever it is that humans possess which marks them off, in respect of intellectual capacity, sharply and importantly from all other known species.”62 Rationality thus understood encompasses the ability to reason, and many who attribute consciousness to animals are reluctant to attribute rationality to them. To define “rationality” as that which belongs only to humans empties it of any specific content. Another possible way of distinguishing between human and animal rationality is by dividing rationality into different types, as is often done in distinguishing between consciousness and self-consciousness. Thus, the higher level definition of “rationality” includes the ability to engage in higher level reasoning, such as constructing and following complex chains of reasoning (this typically depends upon language possession); a lower sense would include adjustment in behavior to the demands in one’s environment, and it can be found in humans and animals.63 However, the more common way of defining “rationality” is by viewing it as an all-or-nothing category, and humans are then believed to possess rationality because they have the ability to evaluate reasons as better or worse, they can detach themselves from their desires, they can imagine alternative realistic futures, and they can make true practical judgments about a variety of kinds of goods.64 There are a number of problems with defining “rationality” as something possessed by humans but not animals. First, not all humans possess rationality. If some humans do not possess it, then we cannot make it the defining feature of the human. Second, if rationality is understood in terms of its component parts and animals can be demonstrated to possess these characteristics, then not only do some humans lack rationality but also some animals possess greater degrees of rationality than these humans. Third, it is not helpful to define a term as something humans have and animals lack, without specifying more exactly what constitutes it. However, even when this is done, such as when rationality is associated with, for example, being able to follow a complex line of reasoning, studies on some species indicate that they may be capable of these higher level capacities. Again, one does not have to argue that rationality is an all-or-nothing category but simply that it is possessed in degrees.

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Finally, there are problems with correlating rationality with language possession. The argument usually proceeds as follows: language and rationality are interconnected; only humans possess language; therefore, only humans possess rationality. This way of arguing typically excludes animals at the outset, because it assumes that human language and animal communication are different things.65 In addition, it also excludes humans not capable of language.

Intelligence In everyday morality and traditional moral philosophy, rationality and reason have usually been understood to mean normal adult human intelligence, which by definition excludes animals.66 The question then becomes how “intelligence” is defined. Intelligence is often understood as an ability to respond to problematic situations, in which more than one response can be given. It usually encompasses the notion of learning and thinking. However, as with some of the other mental concepts, “intelligence” has also been narrowly defined as being evidenced by the possession of language.67 Instead of this narrow understanding of intelligence, it is best understood as the capacity to learn and to respond in novel ways to new situations. By this definition, if rationality is understood as intelligence or if intelligence is at least one component of rationality, then animals have at least lower levels of rationality because they possess some intelligence. There is considerable evidence for the existence of animal intelligence. Virtually no one would deny that animals display some degree of intelligence, especially if the definition excludes the possession of language. It is interesting to note that both David Hume and Charles Darwin attributed the capacity to reason to animals because their ability to adapt to changing circumstances suggests that their behavior goes beyond mere instinctual response. An example of animal reasoning, or intelligence, at least on a lower level, is an attempt to obtain food by a series of complex novel moves that were never before learned or used.68 This adaptation to often unpredictable circumstances, common among birds and mammals, has often been considered as evidence of intelligence.69 In addition, in many different settings, humans teach animals a number of things with the expectation that animals can learn; for example, we instruct dogs on how to behave, we train horses for riding, and we teach animals to perform tricks for entertainment. Even many fields of scientific study (although not all), such as cognitive ethology and psychology, are committed to the notion that animals have intelligence and can learn. Many experiments in learning are conducted on animals, utilizing positive and negative reinforcement. It is assumed that animals are able to learn, and the experiments are often undertaken to determine how animals do learn and what features in their environments help them learn better, usually with the intention of better understanding how humans learn. Many learning experiments are carried out on animals: mazes for rats and mice test how quickly they can learn where the food is; language is studied with apes and dolphins, and conceptual abstraction in pigeons and seals; octopuses are observed to see if they

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can learn behavior by observing another octopus open a jar (they can). Learning is evidenced partly by the fact that animals can learn and demonstrate what is being taught to them, as well as by their ability to distinguish between reward and punishment and to associate the punishment signal with the unpleasant experience that follows.70 When it comes to intelligence, especially when it is correlated with rationality, two arguments are generally brought against its possession by animals. The first argument is that animals are moved only by instinct.71 The second argument is that animal intelligence is much inferior to human intelligence— so inferior as to be a difference in kind. The first argument can be easily challenged on a number of grounds. If animals are moved only by instinct, then it makes no sense to study their behavior, particularly in psychology and learning experiments, because it will not at all help us understand humans better, unless one believes that all human behavior is instinctual as well. Also, if animals are moved only by instinct, then how can we explain their ability to make innovations when faced with novel features in their environment? Finally, how can we explain the behavior, for example, of the octopus, who we can certainly say is not programmed to know how to open jars, something he would never ordinarily find in his environment, unless he “learned” it from another conspecific? The second argument, that animal intelligence is greatly inferior to human intelligence, is not necessarily a controversial one, and it is an argument that has some validity. Obviously, humans are far superior to animals in their learning ability, adaptability to new circumstances, and ability to engage in abstract thought. Recently, however, there has been criticism even of intelligence tests designed for humans because they are believed to judge only one type of intelligence. The development of EQ tests for humans, designed to measure emotional intelligence, demonstrates that there may be more to human intelligence than simply IQ scores.72 When it comes to animals, assessing intelligence becomes even more problematic, most notably because the criteria are created by people (e.g., experimenters and statisticians) to evidence a particular kind of intelligence—human intelligence.73 It is probably inevitable that we humans can test only for the kind of intelligence with which we are familiar. There is the further problem of how to scale animal intelligence. The belief that some species are smarter than others has been subject to criticism on the grounds that each species is smart in its own way and in what is necessary for it to survive and thrive as a particular species.74 Thus, in some ways it is difficult to say simply that one species is superior to another in an absolute way. Even though animal intelligence is inferior to human intelligence, we again run into the problem of “marginal humans,” some of whom have lesser degrees of human intelligence than do some animals.75 There are certainly some humans who cannot be taught to navigate a maze as well as a rodent. However, although intelligence exists on a continuum, with some animals closer to the level of human intelligence than others, clearly the intellectual capacities of normal humans are superior to those of animals, at least in terms of the typical human understanding of intelligence.

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What, then, can we conclude about animal intelligence? First, intelligence is not an all-or-nothing category. If defined as the ability to learn, think, and adapt to new situations, it at least commits us to the idea that animals have some intelligence, even if most have considerably less intelligence than do humans. Thus, like some of the other mental states, it is best to see it as existing on a continuum. Second, the argument that there are different kinds of intelligence is a compelling one. Thus, to compare and rate species according to some arbitrary measuring point will certainly do injustice to animal species, while allowing humans to have their superiority remain unchallenged. This does not commit one to the position that humans are not mentally superior to animals in many ways, but it allows the reverse argument to be true—that different animal species can be superior to a comparatively small number of humans in different ways. Finally, the use of animals in experiments underscores the notion that we do believe that they can learn and that their learning can be applicable to humans. Thus, how rats learn in a maze is not generally undertaken with the intent of understanding rats better but of better understanding how humans think and learn. Of course, to assert that animals do have intelligence, which at the very least means that they operate on a more complex basis than mere instinct, still does not necessarily commit one to the notion that animals have rationality in the same way as do normal adult humans, but at least it commits one to the belief that animals have at least a lower level rationality and that some animals have greater intelligence, and hence rationality, than some humans. However, with regard to the issue of multiple intelligences, it is not even necessary to state too strongly that humans are absolutely intellectually superior to animals.

Beliefs and Desires In addition to intelligence, beliefs and desires have also been associated with rationality. Beliefs and desires tend to be distinguished, although there is a relationship between them. They are both considered key components of consciousness, as well as of rationality.76 Taken together, beliefs and desires form reasons for actions. They are related to rationality because we often explain an animal’s behavior as the animal wanting (desiring) certain things and then taking steps to get what she wants or desires.77 Whether or not we believe that animals have beliefs and desires largely depends upon how they are defined. My contention is that animals have at least simple desires and beliefs. Desires are generally believed to precede beliefs,78 although sometimes desires can arise by the interaction of beliefs with other desires. Thus, it may be possible for a creature to have desires but not beliefs.79 Desires are generally understood as having an affective component that suggests caring about something. They are linked with concepts such as wants and preferences. A creature is said to have desires if she is disposed to bring something about and to have some pleasant or unpleasant feelings, depending on her success or failure in attaining the objective. Desires can arise from deprivation, from avoiding painful stimuli, and by the interaction of beliefs with other desires. For example,

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if in the course of an experiment an animal is deprived of food and attempts to get food, we can say she desires food; if we subject the animal to a painful stimulus and she pulls away, we can say that she desires to avoid the stimulus. Simple desires that can be attributed to animals in general include the desire for food and water, the desire for mobility, and the desire to be free from pain. In addition, there are simple desires that are species-specific; for example, cats desire to lie in the sun, horses desire to snack on carrots, and pigs desire a dry, clean environment (contrary to popular opinion). To argue that animals have these simple desires is simply to say that animals “want” to engage in this behavior or to be in a particular kind of environment if given a choice (or, in the case of harmful outcomes or environments, to avoid them). One way that the notion that animals have desires has been challenged has been by dividing desires into two types: lower level desires and higher level desires. Thus, the way that one defines “desires” determines if in fact desires are present in animals. Like the distinctions between other such pairs of concepts, lower desires are sometimes believed to exist in animals but not the higher desires. It is not necessary to argue that animals have higher level desires. It seems logical to assume that animals have desires, at least on a simple level. It is difficult to explain animal behavior if we do not allow that they have desires. For example, if our dog is whining at the door with his leash in his mouth, we assume that the animal “wants” or “desires” to go out. If indeed the dog has this desire, then this desire can be thwarted, and thus we may be harming him if we deprive him of what he desires (although of course there are times we must do this for his own good). As with consciousness, rationality in general, and intelligence in particular, it is probably best to think of desires as being along a continuum rather than as an either/or, with all animals having at least simple desires, with some animals possessing higher level desires, and with some animals having these desires to a greater degree than do some humans. To grant that animals have desires still falls short of granting them beliefs, which are considered a higher level cognitive ability. Beliefs are often understood as having propositional content, as interacting with desires to produce action, and as being representations of the way things are perceived to be.80 Beliefs have been analyzed in two different ways. The first way is understanding beliefs as mental representations, which can be triggered by internal and external events. It is likely that animals at least have simple beliefs in light of this definition.81 Empirical evidence from animal learning demonstrates animal belief, because learning often requires acquiring new beliefs.82 An example is a rat winding its way through a maze to find a piece of cheese. If turning to the left at a certain point leads the rat into a blind alley, and the next time the rat turns the other way and continues to do so on subsequent trials, what explanation can we offer for its behavior except to say that the rat believes that the cheese is to the right? However, there is considerable reluctance to attribute even simple beliefs like these to animals lower on the phylogenetic scale.83 Like arguments for other cognitive criteria, the argument from analogy with humans also compels us to at least consider the possibility that beliefs exist in

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animals. Beliefs in humans are thought to arise from perception, inference, and other beliefs, and it is likely that beliefs similarly arise in animals. However, the way beliefs are generally denied to animals is by understanding beliefs as objects, such as sentences or propositions. This means that beliefs are sentence-like—that to believe something is to be able to put it in the form of a proposition. Thus, there must be propositional content to the belief. This understanding of beliefs generally entails the possession of language, and therefore on this understanding animals probably do not have them, unless we believe that animals have language.84 Therefore, if we cannot attribute content to belief, then it cannot be a belief,85 and no matter how much we study animals, we will not be able to attribute content to their belief. In addition, not having language precludes animals from having beliefs. The behaviorist argues that animal behavior can be understood as unthinking, knee-jerk reactions without reference to beliefs.86 In addition, the possession of beliefs has also been tied in with having a soul, and since it is not generally accepted that animals have the latter, they cannot have the former.87 To adhere to the more restrictive view that entails language possession is to define it specifically to exclude animals—and also some humans (e.g., infants). This is an overly narrow view; common sense dictates that animals have beliefs at least on the lower definition. If one denies this, then one is committed to a strictly behaviorist view, which, for reasons cited earlier, is not very convincing. To go back to the example of the dog at the door: to say that a dog has a belief in terms of a mental representation, which is being argued, is to say that the animal has some understanding of in and out and at a particular time has a preference to be out rather than in (for whatever reason). On the other hand, to say that a dog has this belief in terms of a proposition is to say that when the dog whines at the door, he is literally thinking in sentences and could put the desire in the form of a proposition. It is not necessary to argue this way with regard to animal belief, and all that this argument succeeds in doing is suggesting that perhaps the ability to put beliefs in the form of propositions is the way that humans express their beliefs. However, even if that is the case, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that humans have higher level beliefs than do animals, although we can probably safely assume that they do, and it is also problematic with regard to those humans who do not have language. In response to the argument from language, even human language is at best an approximation of human thought; there cannot be an absolute correspondence between thought and language. Another way of arguing against animals’ possession of beliefs is by making a distinction between first-order and second-order beliefs. However, it leaves us with the same problem as the argument from distinguishing between beliefs that do and do not have propositional content. Thus, we can conclude that animals have at least rudimentary desires and beliefs, which, even if they are at a significantly lower level than most humans, commits us to caring about their mental states and compels us to take them into account in experimentation when we subject them to procedures that may adversely affect their mental states.

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Autonomy and Personhood The terms “autonomy” and “personhood,” particularly the latter, often come up with regard to animals.88 These terms are especially problematic because they are even more difficult to define than some of the terms already considered, although it is still important to address them. My argument is that, depending on how the terms are defined, animals can be said to possess at least a weaker sense of autonomy; that although personhood is not an especially helpful category, some animals can be considered persons, depending on how it is defined; that both concepts should best be understood as occurring on a continuum; and that neither is as important as the previously considered criteria of consciousness, beliefs, desires, and intelligence. One way in which autonomy can be considered important for the issue of animal experimentation is that we can raise the question of whether we are violating an animal’s autonomy when we use him in an experiment. As with so many other terms, though, how the term is defined determines whether animals even possess autonomy. One of the problems with defining “autonomy” and with establishing it empirically is that, like the concept of consciousness, autonomy cannot be directly observed or measured in the same way as can intelligence, for example.89 Autonomy carries with it the notions of self-governance and self-direction. We believe an autonomous being is capable of freely making her own decisions and should be allowed to do so without undue interference from others. We are said to respect the autonomy of others if we refuse to be paternalistic and trust that they can make good decisions without our assistance.90 To deny a being autonomy, or to violate his autonomy, is to in some sense make decisions for him, ostensibly believing that we know what is best for him. In human experimentation, for example, we respect the autonomy of the experimental subject by requiring informed consent as an essential part of the process for engaging in an experiment. Heavy criticism has been leveled in the past toward researchers who experimented on humans without their knowledge, partly because it was considered a violation of their rights but also because it was considered an infringement on their autonomy. However, animals cannot consent in the same way, and therefore we can ask that, if animals do have some kind of autonomy, are we justified in using them against their will in experiments? If they do not possess autonomy, then it may be easier to justify their use in experimentation. However, this assumes that the human experimenter knows what is best for the animal subject, which is not always so obvious, especially when the principal justification for animal experimentation is that it is for the benefit of humans and not for the benefit of the particular experimental animal. Of course, to be able to violate an animal’s autonomy by utilizing her in experimentation assumes that she has an autonomy that can be interfered with. In what sense, then, can we say that an animal has autonomy? If autonomy, as defined here, includes the notion of self-governance and self-direction, and if, as has been argued previously, that animal behavior goes beyond the level of instinctual response, then animals certainly have a weak sense of autonomy.

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A weak sense of autonomy would simply suggest the ability to act on the basis of one’s own desires, preferences, or beliefs. Thus, dogs could be said to be autonomous, but you could not say the same for rocks, for example. Of course, this does not mean that animals have autonomy in the same sense as do humans; obviously, humans have a stronger sense of autonomy, which places severe restrictions on what we can do to them. If we believe that we violate the autonomy of humans when we do things to them to which they would not consent, then the same argument can be made with regard to animals, at least in a restricted sense. We believe that autonomous beings have the right to be free from undue interference from others. Of course, it is problematic to define exactly what one means by “undue,” since there are even times when we believe it justified to infringe on the autonomy of human beings, such as requiring citizens to obey the law and confining them when they are found guilty of committing a crime. However, we are still committed to the notion that infringement of autonomy, most often understood as infringement of rights, should be the exception rather than the rule. When it comes to animals, though, it can certainly be argued that we are infringing on their autonomy when we utilize them for experiments, especially without serious consideration for their well-being or for their “choice.” It is not farfetched to assume that animals who were given a choice would prefer life outside a cage to life inside or that social animals would prefer a life with conspecifics to one without them. This is not to say, though, that animals cannot be utilized in experiments because they have autonomy, even if just in a weak sense. Whether and to what extent an animal’s autonomy can be infringed on needs to be addressed in relation to animal rights and a burden/benefit analysis, but, at least preliminarily, we can conclude that animals do possess at least a weaker sense of autonomy and that this should at the very least put some restrictions on what we can do to them in experimentation. Those arguing against animals’ possession of autonomy require a high level of rationality, which often includes reasoning ability, intelligence, and beliefs. As with the other mental concepts, autonomy has also been linked with language possession and is sometimes considered necessary for the possession of rights.91 A strong sense of autonomy includes the notion of selfdetermination, including the ability to choose between clearly understood alternatives and to understand one’s choices in light of these alternatives.92 In this latter sense, then, only humans can be considered autonomous. Of course, one can simply agree that humans have autonomy in a way that animals do not, so that, as is often the case with the concept of rationality, it is defined to exclude animals by definition. However, one of the problems with this approach is the same one that is a problem with regard to other high-level definitions of “cognition”—that some humans lack them and a number of animals possess them. Thus, while there may be levels of autonomy that normal adult humans possess and all animals lack, it is best to view autonomy as being on a continuum. There are certainly some animals with higher cognitive functioning whose autonomy is close to that of humans—and sometimes even surpassing that of some humans. However, because autonomy is not a directly

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observable quality, because it is difficult to come up with a precise definition of what it is, because its stronger definition excludes some humans, and because it ultimately does not change the fact that animals do demonstrate at least lower level intelligence, desires, and beliefs, then the presence or absence of autonomy in animals does not need to be a significant factor in our consideration of whether and in what ways we experiment upon them. But even if it can be demonstrated that all animals lack autonomy in the sense that humans have it, one can still maintain that a weak sense of autonomy is all that is necessary for animals to be given greater consideration in their treatment as experimental subjects—although not in most cases the same kind of consideration we give to humans. The issue of autonomy is closely linked with that of personhood. Sometimes when distinctions among creatures are attempted, instead of pointing to specific criteria, the general notion of personhood is introduced, although this notion often includes the possession of particular criteria in its definition. The question of personhood often comes up in biomedical ethical discussions, particularly with regard to abortion and euthanasia, and the question is sometimes raised as to whether a fetus or a comatose individual is a person. In regard to animal experimentation, the question becomes how we can justify doing experiments on animals that may be persons and yet exempt humans who may not be persons. The ultimate question then becomes, Is a human being the same as a person? The answer may seem to be obviously yes, but that is not necessarily the case; it all depends on how one defines “person.” Like all of the other terms considered, one of the problems is that there is no agreed-on definition for this term.93 Virtually everyone would agree on what a “human being” is. If a person or potential person has been born to human beings and looks like a human being, then he is considered a human being, regardless of whether he has deformities (physical or mental) that might distinguish him from more “normal” humans. Thus, “human being” and “member of the species Homo sapiens” are really synonymous.94 On this definition, animals are obviously excluded; animals are not “human beings.” The key way in which persons are distinguished from human beings is by defining “person” in terms of the possession of specific criteria, rather than by simply equating a person with a human being. The term “person” has often been defined in terms of higher level rational capacities. Thus, Kant defined a “person” as a rational being, endowed with dignity and worthy of respect, who was to be treated only as an end in herself and not as a means to the ends of others.95 The term “person” usually includes the notions of self-consciousness and awareness.96 The attribution of personhood usually carries with it the denotation of a certain status. Thus, to be a person is to be a being whose interests are respected because she is believed capable of suffering harms and who is deemed worthy of moral consideration. The notion of personhood is often integrally related to the notion of rights, in the sense that some argue that only persons have rights.97 But then two questions arise: first, are there some human beings who are

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not persons; second, can animals be persons? It is beyond the scope of this work to address these questions in detail, so just a few brief comments are in order. In both cases, it all depends on how one defines “person.” With regard to the first question, the issue of personhood is often raised in biomedical discussions with reference to marginal humans in an attempt to distinguish treatment among individuals or among certain groups of individuals. At times it may be important to distinguish treatment in certain cases between marginal humans and normal adult humans, so that the treatment afforded to fully autonomous persons probably should, at least in some conflict cases, be different from and perhaps superior to that afforded to individuals in permanent vegetative or comatose states, for example. However, since personhood is related to moral status, and since the lack of denotation of personhood tends to reduce the moral status of the individuals so designated, it makes me uncomfortable to designate any humans as nonpersons. It seems that utilizing such language could result in devaluing the lives of these marginal humans, and it is my contention that marginal humans are vulnerable populations who should be given extra protection. Thus, while designating such humans as nonpersons may be a convenient shorthand language at times, it is best avoided. Instead, it would be better to simply view these individuals as humans with lesser capacities than normal humans. With regard to the second question, some animals can be persons insofar as they fit the definition proffered. There is also the additional point that we do not know enough about the nature of many animals’ mental lives to simply dismiss the notion that they can be persons. However, if “personhood” is defined as by Kant and typically understood in light of Kant’s perception that animals exist as means to human ends, then no animals could be persons. If “personhood” is defined in terms of some higher cognitive capacities, though, and if cognitive capacities are viewed on a continuum, then perhaps animals such as whales, dolphins, and primates (typically considered the most intelligent animals) could be considered persons. One of the advantages of designating certain animals as persons is that it does make sense that animals who have higher rational capacities should be afforded greater protection than those that do not, all other factors being equal. Of course, it is not always easy to know where to draw the line in terms of personhood for animals—perhaps there are other animals that should be included as well. There are certainly legal advantages to attributing the status of personhood to animals; at the very least, it would provide them with rights. However, aside from the obvious advantages to considering some animals persons, the corollary must follow that there are some humans who may not be persons. It seems best to designate all humans as persons and perhaps a few animals as persons, but it still seems preferable to simply acknowledge that there is a continuum in terms of specific cognitive states, which some animals have to a greater degree than do a few humans. There are a number of problems with the term “personhood” that make it not especially helpful, whether with regard to humans or to animals. While it can be a useful term in discussing medical ethical issues at times, the reason

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for introducing it in relation to humans generally has to do with trying to find a way to treat differently those humans not considered persons, such as marginal humans. The reason for introducing it with regard to animals is that, depending on one’s argument, either animals are not persons because they lack the requisite criteria or animals are persons because they have the requisite criteria to a higher degree than do some humans. Both reasons can be problematic. With regard to humans, defining “persons” as those who possess higher cognitive criteria can result in marginalizing those humans not believed to be persons. With regard to animals, even if some animals do possess the criteria needed for personhood, it does not help those animal species not designated as persons. However, in both cases, since “personhood” is a general term by definition including possession of some of the criteria looked at earlier, one is still forced back to consider questions of what it means to have consciousness, rationality, intelligence, and the like. In other words, to assert that a creature is a person depends on having a clear definition of what characteristics one must possess to qualify as a person. Therefore, it is not very helpful to make personhood the distinguishing characteristic for different treatment, and in fact, when it is introduced into the discussion, it seems only to muddy the ethical waters. In addition, it might sound odd to talk about a particular animal as being a person and subsequently some humans as not being persons, although that may simply be due to linguistic custom.98 While the term “personhood” may be a convenient shorthand way of defining a being with the characteristics described here, it seems better to continue the discussion in light of the specific criteria.99

Language Language and rationality have been integrally linked in such a way that some believe language to be the evidence of rationality; some even say that it is a precondition of rationality. Thus, even if animals can be shown to possess rationality, intelligence, beliefs, desires, autonomy, and personhood, the final line of distinction between humans and animals is often drawn on the basis of language possession. Language possession thus is sometimes considered the most important distinguishing criterion between humans and animals.100 Some of the lower level cognitive functions, such as consciousness, are not believed to be integrally connected to language, but many of the higher level cognitive functions (e.g., rationality, beliefs) are.101 The necessary relationship between language and higher cognitive concepts is generally posited by those who want to deny to animals possession of any of these concepts. However, rather than trying to untangle the interrelatedness of language and these other concepts, the focus here will be on language itself, independent of any other criterion. The first problem when it comes to language is in knowing how to define it, and obviously how one defines it will determine whether one believes that animals possess it. There are two principal ways of understanding language:

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language as communication and language as cognition. My contention is that animals possess language in at least a communicative sense; that this communication is analogous to human language, in that it serves the same function, namely, the ability to negotiate in one’s world, by making oneself understood and by strengthening social bonds;102 and, in addition, that some animals communicate in a cognitive way. In general, though, the linguistic abilities of animals are inferior to those of normal humans. To maintain that animals communicate, it is necessary to define “communication.” Communication occurs when there is a transfer of information between two individuals (or between groups of individuals) through the use of signals; the receiver gains and understands the information that the sender deliberately means to communicate.103 It is not controversial to maintain that animals communicate; how the communication is understood is where the controversy comes in. It is possible to understand animal communication as a stimulus response to an immediate circumstance, thereby not involving a higher level, second-order activity. However, since it has already been demonstrated that animals act from more than mere instinct, it is not necessary to belabor this point. In addition, numerous studies have demonstrated that animals use verbal (and nonverbal) communication to influence the behavior of conspecifics and to communicate about important matters, such as the location of food and the presence of predators. Even if communication is understood as operating just at this simple level, it can be argued that animal communication is analogous to human language.104 This does not mean that human language does not have some features lacking in animal communication, such as the ability to engage in abstract reasoning. However, the point is that the principal use of communication, or language, is to make oneself known to and understand conspecifics and to be able to function in one’s world as a result. Animals are certainly able to do this through their communication systems. However, to say that animal communication is analogous to human language is still a far cry from saying that it is actually a language and thereby comparable in sophistication to human communication. Just because an animal may appear to be using a language, though, does not mean that he is actually using a language.105 Thus, those who want to deny language ability to animals typically do it by understanding it as a cognitive function, so that language becomes a uniquely human capacity. Language is thus thought to be cognitive rather than communicative.106 To the extent that animals lack cognition, then, they also lack language. If we define “language” as cognitive (as do most scientists), then we need to ask the further question: what are the characteristics or features of a form of communication that make it specifically cognitive? The common characteristics typically associated with cognitive language possession are a vocabulary (including a stock of words and a stock of expressions, some of which consist of a string of words), a syntax (a set of rules for combining expressions and words to make sentences), specific types of expressions (including names, definite descriptions, predicates, quantifiers, demonstratives, and pronouns), the ability to perform speech acts, and the ability

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to perform certain linguistic tasks through the use of speech acts (for example, to know that one expresses a doubt by asking a question).107 In this understanding, to speak a language implies the ability to put together expressions or words in a grammatically correct and meaningful way, the ability to understand the proper way of communicating what one needs to (and to receive communication from others as well), and the ability to engage in speech acts. Some other characteristics evidencing linguistic communication are tensed expressions (indicating the past, present, and future), words indicating spatially remote states of affairs (e.g., “the cat is down the street”), and expressions asserting principles.108 Whereas communication does involve the successful transmission of information from one animal to another, what makes communication cognitive is generally the use of syntax, particularly that found in human grammar. Even if one acknowledges that perhaps some animals do possess some kind of language, this does not necessarily mean that one must maintain that animal language is of the same kind as human language. In other words, not only is it possible to argue that human language is considerably more complex, versatile, and subtle than animal language109 but also it is likely to be the case. There are basically two ways of determining whether animals have language, both of which involve studying animals. The first is to study animals in traditional ways to attempt to understand if and how they categorize, formulate concepts, and link ideas. This is a roundabout way to study language by examining the attendant cognitive capacities believed to be integrally linked to cognitive language possession. Language as communication has been studied in numerous animal species; some of the more common studies focus on honeybees, parrots, dolphins,110 and apes. A second and especially important way to study animal language is by attempting to teach animals our system of language study.111 The significance of this kind of study is obvious: if animals can communicate in human language with humans, then we must concede that they do possess human language capability—that is, a cognitive type of language. The focus here will be on the latter type of study, because it directly studies language ability. Some of the most significant work has been done with bonobos, chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans. Ape language experiments began in earnest in the 1970s.112 There have been several different approaches utilized and critiques of these approaches as well. The first is the attempt to train apes to vocalize spoken English. Not much effort has been expended here, because apes are able to vocalize only a very few words with very great effort, probably because they lack the vocal apparatus necessary for human speech. One indication for this is that one chimpanzee used her fingers to hold her lips in the proper position as she tried to mouth particular words.113 It may be possible that chimps are capable of advanced communication, but because their anatomy and physiology may severely limit their ability to communicate in a human manner, the use of gestures is a more comfortable way to communicate than vocally.114 The second method is teaching apes Amelsan, or American sign language for the deaf, by means of which some apes have apparently learned

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hundreds of words. The third method is by using plastic symbols to represent “words,” and the fourth method is called the Lana project, which has apes press keys to produce strings of symbols.115 The Lana project was developed at the Yerkes Primate Center, where a computerized keyboard was invented that displayed a number of arbitrary signs known as lexigrams.116 It was named after Lana, the first chimpanzee to use it.117 In all of these studies, human trainers usually present animals with questions in the form in which the language is being studied (for example, sign language is used by the human trainer to get a response in sign language from the apes). It is probably by means of sign language that the greatest strides have been made, such that some apes have achieved the language ability of a small child, considered to be a significant feat by virtually everyone. Before these studies were undertaken, nearly no one believed that animals could learn human language at all.118 The most common and impressive example often offered in the literature is Koko and Michael, the world’s only signing gorillas, who eventually became companions (Michael died in 2001). At the age of twenty-seven, Michael was believed to know five hundred signs. Although no one had taught Koko English, by 1993 she understood several thousand English words. In addition to learning words, she was able to invent new words (for example, using two signs to create a symbol for a word she did not previously know). Her IQ consistently measured between 70 and 95 on human intelligence tests, thus placing her in the “below average” but not “retarded” range.119 There are similar accounts of language acquisition by Washoe as well.120 In spite of the advances made in ape studies, they have been subject to a number of criticisms, primarily by those who want to deny cognitive language possession to animals. One is that simply because an ape can identify an object by reference to a particular word does not mean that she is able to understand syntax; thus, labeling items is not the same as grammatical construction and understanding concepts. In addition, some have dismissed the language-like behavior of apes because it is much simpler than human language and because it lacks the spontaneity and creativity of human language.121 Others maintain that apes are not able to lie; if they are not able to lie, then they are not able to assert anything; if they cannot assert anything, then they do not have language. However, as was demonstrated earlier, apes are certainly capable of deception, which is certainly a form of a lie, even if not a verbal one. Thus, apes are able to “lie” nonverbally. In addition, the level of language of those apes who have learned it is criticized because it has never gotten beyond the level of a young child.122 Of course, this is quite a significant feat in and of itself (especially because for many years it was not believed possible) and raises the question again of marginal humans who do not have language. Another strong criticism is that the human trainers are inadvertently cueing the subjects, either through natural movements or facial expressions, thereby undermining the animal’s ability to engage in linguistic behavior. This has been called the Clever Hans phenomenon.123 The trainers are not generally accused of intentionally trying to manipulate the situation; rather, they may be just so eager for the expected results that they may see them where they do

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not exist. This is a valid criticism that may be impossible to completely eliminate, but it is also possible to apply this criticism to adult humans attempting to teach language to young children. But even if inadvertent cueing does sometimes take place in using sign language with apes, some dolphin trainers have avoided this criticism by using only their hands and by masking their faces so as not to cue inadvertently through eye contact as they train dolphins to respond to complex commands. In addition to understanding simple commands in this way, dolphins have demonstrated their ability to understand syntax by differentiating between two commands that use the exact same words in a different order.124 If indeed some animals are able to understand and manipulate human grammatical syntax properly, this undermines the argument that animal language is not cognitive or is not similar to human language—at least the language of some primates and dolphins can be said to be cognitive, even if they lack the human vocal apparatus. Of course, perhaps a more obvious reason for the apparent lack of success in ape studies is that the animals may not be interested in communicating with humans about the things we want them to communicate.125 Apes may not share the same worldview as do humans and hence cannot communicate in a meaningful way with humans.126 In addition, some of the descriptions of ape studies suggest that the animals found the repetition of naming tests to be boring and frustrating.127 Of course, we could probably learn a lot more about ape language if, instead of devising laboratory situations for the study of language in which apes are taught to communicate with humans in human language, humans instead went into the forest and listened to the animals.128 In spite of the criticisms and problems in ape language studies, though, no one is suggesting that something significant has not been achieved, since some apes are able to at least learn rudimentary communication with humans on the basis of human language. Therefore, ape language studies will probably continue, with some deliberate intent to work on the methodological problems mentioned here. In some ways, the benefits of cognitive language have been greatly exaggerated. Language is not necessary for communication, since communication, even among humans, can happen nonverbally or through nonlinguistic vocalizations. In fact, humans can communicate with other humans without the benefit of a shared language.129 If animals such as dolphins and apes can demonstrate that they understand syntax and can even create new words, then they are engaging in something much more considerable than simply lower level communication—namely, a cognitive type of language. In addition, Wittgenstein’s oft-quoted aphorism that “if the lion could talk, we could not understand him” is implausible, since most cat owners understand the lion’s domestic cousin without any problem.130 In this regard, most of the domestic animals in relationship with humans seem able to make themselves understood to their human companions, as we are often able to make ourselves understood to them. Making oneself understood is not synonymous with talking, but the significant fact is that communication is taking place.131 The question of language also raises the problematic question noted earlier: What about those

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humans who do not possess language? Finally, the arguments against possession of language in animals seem to be integrally linked with the notion of human language. Why is human language the only criterion we will accept that animals have language? In this sense, then, language again is defined as something that humans have and animals lack, which simply becomes a circular argument. However, all of the foregoing does not forestall the importance of human language. It is the principal means by which humans communicate with each other, and the cognitive component of language enables humans to communicate on a number of levels, including discussion of abstract concepts, something animals are generally not considered capable of. Thus, while the benefits of human language may sometimes be exaggerated and force an unnecessary boundary between humans and animals, the significance of human language cannot be easily dismissed. The issue of language possession also raises the question of consent, which was mentioned earlier in the discussion on human experimentation. One obvious advantage of language is that it provides one with the means to indicate verbally that one does not want to participate in the action at hand. If one does not have language, then one may lose that advantage. However, an example of nonverbal nonconsent can be observed in the following case: let us say that an experimenter is using cats in sleep-deprivation experiments, which involve implanting electrodes in their brains, placing them in restraining apparatuses, and hooking them up to devices that deliver painful shocks whenever they fall asleep. If when the experimenter goes to get a cat for the experiment and all of the cats retreat to a corner of their cages and cower, hissing and striking out at the experimenter when he attempts to take one out of his cage, and, furthermore, on the trip to the laboratory, the animal continually tries to escape, what can we say? Can we say that the cat is not consenting to the experiment and would “vote with its feet” to run away if given the chance?132 Thus, the animal can in a sense withhold consent or, to put it another way, express its wishes and desires, without the use of language.133 What are the implications of language possession by animals and particularly for animal experimentation? One way to answer this question is to say that it does not matter whether animals have language. The fact that animals have communication and can therefore express their likes, desires, and other matters is sufficient for us to have some knowledge of their preferences. It is problematic that language gets defined so narrowly as to exclude animals at the outset. One wonders if that is not the very intention of these cognitive definitions, so that whenever an animal is discovered to fulfill the criterion for language we have laid down, such as a stock of vocabulary words, we add that it must also be able to understand syntax and create new words. It is easy enough to keep upping the definition of what a language is so that most or all animals are excluded, but this still does not tell us very much about animals except that they are not exactly like humans in this regard. Granted that human language is related to higher level cognitive abilities, this still does not mean that animals do not have some understanding of what is being done to them,

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that they can at times communicate their consent or nonconsent, and that what is done to them can affect them for better or for worse.

Speciesism, Marginal Humans, and the Question of Hierarchy In the consideration of different cognitive criteria, the issue arose concerning those humans who also do not possess the characteristics that are attributed to “normal” or “average” adult human beings. That is, most adult human beings can reason, have intelligence, are autonomous, and possess language, in ways that most animals do not. However, there are many humans who lack one or more of these criteria or who possess them to such a limited degree that some animals are superior to them in this regard. These people are usually referred to in the literature as marginal humans. To call them marginal humans is not to say that they are not human beings but simply to indicate that they lack some of the cognitive criteria possessed by normal adult humans. Those typically belonging to this category include infants, children, the severely retarded, the senile, and the comatose. The question then becomes, How can we draw the line so sharply between humans and animals on the basis of characteristics that are lacking in some human beings? Some of these groups are easier to explain away than others. For example, we can say that infants and very young children are at least potentially rational and linguistic, and we can say that cognitively damaged, comatose, or senile adults were at least at one time rational and linguistic, so that these groups are still very much “human” in every sense of the term, even though they are disabled at present.134 In addition, there is a possibility that any of us could become similarly cognitively disabled. However, the situation of the severely retarded is more problematic and hence is often used as the paradigm case in these discussions, even though they represent a very small percentage of marginal humans. These are individuals who never have been and never will be as rational and linguistic as normal members of the human species, or even as much as some animal species. If this is the case, then the argument is often made that we cannot be justified in drawing a hard line in the sand between humans and animals. Of course, one could argue that it is not valid to compare marginal humans with normal animals and that the comparison instead should be between marginal animals and marginal humans or between normal animals and normal humans. Even if this were true, we cannot escape the conclusion that our typical attempts at drawing a line on the basis of certain cognitive criteria is undermined by the argument from marginal cases. While the argument from marginal human cases should not be made too strongly, the very existence of marginal humans at least undermines the case for a sharp line of distinction and a subsequent absolute attribution of superiority to humans on the basis of cognition. We seem to have an intuitive sense that these marginal humans should not be treated in the same way as animals. In fact, at least in the Christian

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tradition, they are considered as valuable as other human beings and perhaps should even be given special protection because of their vulnerabilities. (Of course, as the discussion on personhood indicated, not all believe this.) Even though some animals are more intelligent and rational than some of these marginal humans, we generally do not think that it is right to experiment on these marginal humans without their consent or at least not without the consent of a proxy who has the patient’s best interests at heart. That is, we believe these marginal humans have a dignity above what we usually attribute to animals. Thus, for many people, it is membership in the species Homo sapiens that becomes important, rather than possession of particular criteria. However, this notion of granting favor simply on the basis of species membership— which has been termed “speciesism”—has recently been challenged.135 For those concerned with bringing animals into the moral community, speciesism is considered analogous to other “isms” such as racism and sexism.136 Racism and sexism are discrimination simply on the basis of race and sex, both without any regard to the individual characteristics of these persons and without taking into account any morally relevant differences among them. Speciesism maintains that membership in a particular species is what entitles one to moral consideration.137 Speciesism has been identified as the prejudice of always granting automatic favor to one’s own species over other species, regardless of relevant differences. Those arguing for some kind of speciesism maintain that not only is it legitimate to give preference to one’s own species over other species but also that it is morally required.138 In this sense, speciesism is analogous to family loyalty.139 To better understand speciesism, it may be helpful at this juncture to offer a couple of brief examples of what is meant by morally relevant and irrelevant characteristics, first with regard to humans. If we argue that a woman has a right to an abortion, then it is not sexist to say that men cannot have one; having a uterus is the morally relevant characteristic in this case, and it is not discriminatory to deny men who cannot bear children the right to an abortion. However, if we argue that women cannot vote because they are women, this is discrimination based on a morally irrelevant characteristic—gender rather than the ability to make a political decision.140 What would be an example of morally relevant and irrelevant characteristics with regard to animals? If we deny animals access to a college education and were asked why we would not admit them, we would probably first say that it is because they are animals. However, if we were pushed, we would probably then say that we are denying it to them due to their lack of cognition, because having a certain level of intelligence is morally relevant to college attendance. Therefore, to say that we can perform experiments on animals simply because they are animals may be speciesist, because the morally relevant characteristic is the ability to feel pain, and animals can probably feel pain.141 For this reason, speciesism is generally introduced with the topic of pain, but I introduce it here because, although pain is the principal morally relevant characteristic in animal experimentation, cognition is important as well. It is important in the context of animal experimentation because cognitive development has been traditionally believed to

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be related to the quality of one’s life, and therefore generally those beings (usually associated with species membership, such as being human) with a higher quality of life should be granted greater consideration than those with a lesser quality. Thus, those animals with cognitive abilities closer to humans may suffer more than animals less closely related to humans, and, for this reason, discriminating simply on the basis of species does not address the question of different mental complexity among animal species. So, does species membership matter at all? One way to answer this is by distinguishing among different types of speciesism.142 A radical speciesism would maintain that species membership is all that matters and that we should automatically give preference to humans. This does not mean that we can do anything we want to animals; it is most often argued for when animal and human interests are in conflict. Radical speciesism is defended on a number of different grounds. Most commonly, it is argued that humans are qualitatively cognitively superior to animals and therefore should always be given preferential treatment. However, the existence of marginal humans at least undermines these criteria as a basis, and therefore we must look elsewhere. The second response is that there is something simply to being human that offers us protected status, so that even when it comes to marginal humans, other features put them in the same protected class as normal adult humans, such as the concern of others for them, the fact that they are born to human parents, the fact that they look like other humans, or the belief that humans are made in the image of God.143 Some of these criteria have validity. However, a moderate or qualified speciesism would come to this same conclusion as well and, in my view, is ethically superior to radical speciesism. A qualified speciesism maintains that species membership is a morally relevant criterion but not the only morally relevant criterion; instead, species membership is correlated with other significant differences (e.g. cognitive ability, sentience). Beings with greater mental capacities do deserve greater moral consideration than beings with lesser mental capacities, partly because it affects their capacity to suffer; this is why, if given a choice, we can justify swatting a fly rather than killing a monkey. Some animals have greater mental capacities than marginal humans and therefore deserve some moral protection. What is morally significant in qualified speciesism is the richness and complexity of the individual life, as well as the ability to feel pain, although higher cognitive ability may affect the experience of suffering perhaps more than the experience of pain. A hypothetical example may be helpful to clarify the differences between adherents of these two types of speciesism. Animal experimentation is an excellent example because most people believe that it is permissible to experiment on animals but not on marginal humans—at least not without the consent of a proxy. What is the reason? Although the reasons often proffered for extending better treatment to humans are cognitive criteria, when it can be demonstrated that the animal in question possesses these criteria to a greater degree than these humans, then the argument reverts back to the fact that they are human and therefore we cannot experiment on them against their will, do horrendous things to them, experiment on them for the benefit of others, and

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so on—all of which we regularly do to animals. In other words, species membership becomes the most important—and sometimes the only—criterion. Thus it is possible from the perspective of a qualified speciesism that in general we should give greater priority to our own species but that we need to rethink the case for those beings with abilities similar to or higher than those of these marginal humans. In addition, we need to ask the question about what the morally relevant characteristic is with regard to experimentation. Since it is my position that pain is the most important consideration, then we cannot simply subject animals to pain and exempt all humans, if both can feel pain. Therefore, it is possible to argue that marginal humans should be exempt from experimentation but that animals possessing some of these same criteria by which we exempt these humans (e.g., the ability to feel pain and suffer, simple beliefs and desires) should be exempt as well, at least from certain experiments.144 One could say that the preference for our own species may simply be sentiment.145 This may be going too far, but it is possible to hold to a qualified speciesism in which one maintains that species membership is a morally relevant criterion but not the only one. What the arguments from speciesism and marginal cases do is undermine the typical way we make moral distinctions, putting all the emphasis only on species membership. Although speciesism may not be exactly analogous to racism and sexism, it does seem arbitrary to differentiate moral treatment on the basis of species boundary alone.146 Therefore, qualified speciesism has much to commend it. It allows for some of our intuitive notions (e.g., that we generally do give ethical preference to humans over animals, that some animals are higher than others) and also permits us to therefore treat them differently. Since there are serious problems with allowing marginal humans to receive less moral consideration than animals, those animals with higher capacities should be given greater moral consideration and perhaps at least receive treatment similar to what we would accord to marginal humans. Thus, in the specific case of animal experimentation, we probably should not perform experiments on animals whose cognitive capacities are equal to or greater than that of marginal humans if we are not willing to so use marginal humans.147 This would certainly make more sense than the other possible alternative—which would relegate marginal humans to the level of animals or at least to that of nonpersons. What, then, are we to conclude about human superiority and animal inferiority? First, superiority should not be viewed as an all-or-nothing category. It is obvious that other animals are superior to us in a number of ways: elephants are larger, eagles have better eyesight, cougars run faster, and beavers are better engineers, for example.148 Thus, all species are superior to others in particular ways, whether by virtue of one specific criterion or a combination of criteria. However, not all of these criteria by which some animals are superior to us are morally relevant. But even when it comes to the usual human criteria we use to compare ourselves with animals, it may ultimately be more helpful to see differences between humans and animals in light of specific characteristics that should be viewed as a continuum rather than as an overarching,

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unilateral criterion or in terms of criteria possessed by humans to the exclusion of animals. It is possible that there is not one criterion that sets humans apart but a combination of criteria, so that what makes us human is our whole human nature, not just one aspect of it. However, every species has a unique combination of characteristics that separates it out from all other species.149 We do need to be careful, though, about too static a view of human and animal natures, which have their roots in a pre-Darwinian worldview.150 Second, if we define too narrowly the criterion or criteria that make humans unique, then we are in danger of having this uniqueness undermined if and when such features are found in other species.151 Thus, if humans are unique due to their possession of language as cognition, then what do we do if we discover that other species utilize this kind of language (whether other animal species or alien species)? In fact, some have argued that there has not been one criterion identified by behaviorists, linguists, and ethologists that is not possessed to some degree at least by the higher mammals.152 One of the ways in which this argument has been averted is by so defining the criterion that it virtually excludes animals at the outset. Again, describing differences between species on the basis of a combination of criteria may be more helpful than focusing on one criterion or on particular criteria. Third, because we humans are the ones who set the criteria, we must remember that we are likely to be self-interested in the way we do it.153 Therefore, if in fact another species were setting up the criteria, they would be quite different. This is not to suggest that the criteria could be set up by other species, whatever that means; it is simply to point out that if humans are setting the criteria, then humans will tend to include those characteristics only humans possess or which humans possess to a significantly greater degree than do animals.154 Fourth, even though it can be shown that we are different from animals in some of our mental capacities, this does not negate the strong similarities that we do have with them—physiologically, biochemically, and emotionally. The issue then becomes which characteristics should be given prominence in our comparison with animals—those that make us similar or those that make us dissimilar. After all, all species are unique in some significant ways; thus, why should the line be drawn so sharply between humans and other animals? In other words, humans and nonhuman primates are closer to each other than either of them is to a dog, especially if the comparison is made with regard to intellectual abilities and social needs. In some respects, all social mammals are more like each other than any of them is like a snake or bee, for example.155 Fifth, the issue of superiority also raises the problem that while we may indeed grant that there is a hierarchy with humans at the top, it is more difficult to scale the rest of the animal kingdom. For example, are rats superior to cats, and are horses superior to dogs? It is very difficult to even ask such a question when comparing animal species with each other, although apparently not when comparing humans with other animals. This raises the difficulty of arguing, for example, that, when faced with a choice, we should always utilize the rat rather than the dog. Ultimately, the problem of deciding that one animal spe-

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cies is inferior or superior to another species is present with regard to such assertions about human superiority as well. However, notwithstanding all of these factors, we feel the need to acknowledge the existence of some kind of hierarchy with humans on top. Even if animals are superior to us in certain ways, they are generally not superior to us in the ways that are morally relevant to us. With regard to the cognitive criteria discussed, normal adult humans generally have these criteria to a considerably greater degree than do normal animals. Even though we may be unwittingly and possibly necessarily self-interested in the establishment of the morally relevant criteria, we must remember that we are the only animals in a position to set up such criteria on the basis of which comparisons can be made. In particular, what does set humans apart is ultimately not the possession of one or two of these criteria but a combination of criteria that provides us with the ability to make tools; engage in abstract reasoning; possess higher degrees of consciousness, rationality, and autonomy; have complex desires and beliefs; establish culture; and adapt and mold virtually any environment in which we find ourselves.156 This still does not mean that human superiority is of a different kind, but it is of a different degree. In this regard, certainly some animals, such as nonhuman primates, whales, and dolphins, are much closer to humans than are other animals and, because of their higher cognitive abilities, should be given greater consideration, all other factors being equal, on the issue of their use in animal experimentation. However, because there is still so much that we do not know about other animals, we need to proceed cautiously in simple assertions of superiority. But even if humans are superior to animals in these ways, we are still not justified in doing to them whatever we will. In the case of animal experimentation, do we have the right to subject animals to all kinds of experiments simply because we are superior? Is it not possible that our superiority should provide us with the prudence and compassion not to abuse our authority and superiority? After all, we do not think that greater intelligence by some humans gives them license to exploit humans of lesser intelligence.157 Even if humans are superior in significant ways, the real question is whether these differences are morally relevant, particularly with regard to animal experimentation. Thus, the question is not so much whether there is or should be a hierarchy; a better question is what purpose does a hierarchy serve? Rather than seeing all life as created with a strict hierarchy, it seems preferable to see the world as interrelated, and all creatures as interdependent, since each part has an indispensable role to play. However, there are inevitable conflicts among animal species, and sometimes we need to make hard judgments, which humans are in a unique position to do. We need to remember that humans are animals, too, even if we are the most rational, linguistic, and intelligent animals, according to the criteria we have set. Of course, even these characteristics can be challenged on the grounds that we are also unique in the unparalleled devastation we cause not only to other animal species but also to our own and to the environment as a whole. Perhaps instead of focusing on what distinguishes us, we should focus on what

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we have in common, most notably, our ability to feel pain. If we paid sufficient attention to this criterion alone, we would go a long way in eliminating many of our current practices toward animals. The next chapter will address the issue of pain.

Conclusion The issue of animal mentality is a very complex one, and since entire books are devoted to each of the cognitive criteria, it is very difficult to do justice to them in this short space. What has been argued simply is that animals do have minds, meaning that they do think and have mental experiences, including at least simple desires and beliefs, intelligence, a weak sense of autonomy, and, at the minimum, a communication system that functions analogously to human language, and with some animals possessing language in a cognitive way. Thus, animals possess all of the states humans have, only to a lesser degree, in light of which it is maintained that the differences between humans and animals are ones of degree rather than kind. In addition, as the examination of marginal humans has demonstrated, some animals are cognitively superior to some humans. This at least undermines the Enlightenment legacy that has put a premium on reasoning ability and intelligence, and it also undermines a strong notion of hierarchy and human superiority. The fact that animals have these cognitive criteria means, at the very least, that what we do to them in experimentation matters to them and can significantly affect them for better or worse. However, all of the foregoing does not mean that humans are not superior to animals in significant ways, and it especially does not mean that there is not something special to being human. Yes, there is a danger of humans privileging themselves, but on the basis of the continuum approach developed in this chapter, adult human beings are superior to adult animals in all of the aspects considered here. However, as this chapter has pointed out, animals possess to a certain degree the characteristics discussed in this chapter, including consciousness, beliefs and desires, intelligence, rationality, autonomy, and language. The question of animal minds is often discussed in the literature. Proponents of a very unrestricted animal experimentation often appeal to the fact that animals do not have many of the important characteristics that human beings have. This chapter has refuted such positions. However, the primary reason for a more restrictive approach to animal experimentation is based on the question of animal pain and suffering, which will be discussed in the next chapter. It is in this regard that Jeremy Bentham’s oft-quoted observation becomes pertinent: “The question is not, Can they reason? or Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”

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3 Animal Pain

The issue of pain and suffering is a very significant one in philosophy, science, and theology. There seems to be a general consensus that pain is a bad thing, something to be avoided, if at all possible. In the history of philosophy, many philosophers have started from the presumption that happiness, or pleasure, was the ultimate good in life and that its opposite was to be avoided or at least minimized as much as possible. In theology, the troubling existence of pain and suffering in the world has come to be known as the problem of evil, or theodicy. Put simply, the problem is that if there exists a loving and powerful God (which Christianity has traditionally believed), then why does this God allow pain and suffering? There seem to be only two possible answers: either God is not all loving or God is not all powerful. Since no one in the Christian tradition wants to minimize the reality of God’s love, the answers usually come in terms of restrictions on God’s power, generally believed to be self-imposed. That is, God usually chooses not to directly intervene in worldly affairs, even in the face of great tragedies. Evil has traditionally been divided into two categories: natural evil and moral evil. Natural evil refers to the sources of pain and suffering caused by phenomena such as hurricanes and tornadoes. The usual way to account for these sources of evil is to say that they are the result of natural forces beyond our control, which God permits. Moral evil refers to the sources of pain and suffering caused directly or indirectly by the actions of human beings. The usual way to account for this source of evil is with what has been called the free-will defense: that God has given humans free will as part of their nature and that God is loath to interfere even when humans make bad choices. That is, most in the Christian tradition have opted for an understanding of

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God and human beings that would permit free will with bad choices rather than no free will with no bad choices. The issue of animal experimentation would clearly fall under the rubric of moral evil, since it is the actions of humans that account for the pain and suffering of animals. From a scientific perspective, though, one must also deal with the issue of pain, although the questions are certainly different. Science certainly believes in the reality of pain for at least most humans, but the reality of pain and suffering for animals raises more perplexing questions. What exactly is pain? What about other related concepts, such as stress and suffering? How can we know that animals experience pain? Should animals ever be subjected to pain? Are there some animals whose pain or suffering is such that they should never be used in experiments? Are there some experiments that should not be performed? Are there some procedures within experiments that should not be done? What protocols should be in place to determine whether certain experiments should be permitted? What training should be required of those engaging in animal experimentation to ensure humane treatment? How can we minimize animal pain? What about the killing of animals?1 The answers to any of these questions, as well as others, by those with an interest in animal experimentation are by no means uniform. What I hope to accomplish in this chapter is to demonstrate that animals do experience pain and suffering. Almost all agree that animals experience some pain, and thus there exists a broad general agreement today, at the very minimum, on steps to reduce animal pain with regard to animal experimentation. The chapter will proceed as follows. In the first section, I will define “pain” and related concepts (e.g., anxiety, distress, stress, suffering) and the relationship of these concepts to one another. In the second section, I will address the question of whether animals feel pain, considering both the arguments for and against the experience of pain in animals. In the third section, I will examine the kinds of experiments that cause animals pain and in the fourth section will determine how animals suffer in experiments and how we can assess whether they are suffering. In the fifth section, I will examine and critique some of the measures taken by the scientific community in addressing animal pain, including alternatives to animal experimentation, legislation, use of pain scales, use of drugs, use of preference tests, and euthanasia. I will provide some concluding remarks in the last section.

Definitions To offer guidelines on pain management and address in the final chapter how to balance animal pain and human benefit, it is necessary to define “pain” and related concepts. In spite of its importance to science, there is no universally agreed-on definition of “pain,” although the development of a universal definition and the necessity for further study on this issue have been urged.2 “Pain” can be defined as an unpleasant sensation that arises from damage to a par-

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ticular part of the body.3 There are two components typically associated with pain: the physiological experience of physical sensations (typically related to the presence of nociceptors) and the conscious emotional experience of pain, involving nerve pathways in the highest part of the brain, the cerebrum.4 It is precisely this emotional aspect that is part of the problem in defining pain, specifically because some want to disallow any affective or emotional components to animals since they involve mental capacity.5 It is undisputed that there is at least a physical component to pain: it must be processed in the central nervous system, and nerve impulses that indicate pain must pass down through the nerves.6 The physiological experience of pain is typically believed to be related to the presence of a complex nervous system, and for those animals that have such a nervous system, we can probably safely conclude that they can experience pain, at least on a sensory level. For pain to be experienced in the sensory way, there generally must be the presence of what are called nociceptors. Nociceptors are a group of nerve endings, typically found in mammals and in birds, and they respond to stimuli that can potentially cause tissue damage. When the nociceptors are stimulated, they send a message down the nerve fibers that may or may not result in a response, such as a reflex action. However, the mere presence of a reflex action is not sufficient to conclude that pain has been experienced. For example, insects also withdraw from aversive stimuli, although it is probably a simple startle reflex rather than a response to pain, because they lack the nervous system processing mechanisms found in higher animals.7 Thus, a reaction to sensory stimulus is not the equivalent of a capacity to feel pain.8 The lack of a centralized nervous system and the subsequent inability to experience pain are why the line is often drawn between vertebrates and invertebrates. However, the question has arisen about the possibility of nociceptors in invertebrates, or at least whether they can experience pain in some other way. The primary test for postulating pain mechanisms in these animals is by exposing them to stimuli typically associated with nociception and to observe whether they present clearly aversive behavior. There is evidence that some invertebrates (the cephalopods, including the squid, cuttlefish, and octopus) do feel pain. Although they may not possess nociceptors, they do possess large nerve clusters and demonstrate aversive behavior in the presence of negative stimuli.9 In addition to animals’ physiological experience of pain, there is also sufficient evidence to argue for an emotional component of pain. The vast majority of commentators support this position. Since cognitive development is necessary for pain perception in humans, this is probably true for animals as well.10 Thus, if the creature in question is unable to mentally process pain for some reason (typically due to some lack of mental capacity, such as consciousness), then it is questionable whether they are indeed able to feel, or experience, pain. Examples would be humans with prefrontal lobotomies11 or perhaps the comatose.12 If animals lack this capacity for consciousness, then they may be unable to experience pain as well, and those who argue against the capacity of animals to experience pain argue in such a fashion. However, since it was

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argued in the last chapter that animals do have simple consciousness, then they would also have the emotional capability to experience pain, in addition to the sensory capability.13 There may be many different kinds of experiences of pain; it is not sufficient to simply claim that animals can feel pain. One way of distinguishing different kinds of pain is by talking about thresholds. The nociceptor threshold refers to the strength that the stimulus must have to cause the generation of a nerve impulse.14 The pain detection threshold is that point in humans when the smallest stimulus can be felt half the time; for animals it is evidenced by attempts to escape.15 The pain tolerance threshold is the upper limit of pain that an individual will accept voluntarily.16 In animals, it is evidenced by their unwillingness to pursue a reward in the face of painful stimulation.17 The pain tolerance threshold varies considerably among individuals and cultures, and it can be affected by the individual’s prior background, environment, stress, and drugs.18 This third level appears to be the crucial one in the discussion of how much pain we can cause animals, with some suggesting that in order to avoid suffering, we should not go above this pain tolerance threshold in laboratory animals.19 Another way that pain levels have been differentiated has been by distinguishing between acute and chronic pain. Acute pain is usually short-lived and primarily warns about injury; this is generally considered a beneficial effect of pain. Chronic or persistent pain is more difficult to recognize because its onset is slow and not necessarily associated with an obvious pathological condition. It is chronic pain that can often lead to distress and other maladaptive behaviors in laboratory animals.20 Different signs are associated with the presence of these different kinds of pain. For example, restlessness and sweating may be signs of acute pain, whereas reluctance to move or loss of appetite may indicate chronic pain.21 Distinctions between different levels of pain and between the kinds of procedures that can result in different levels of pain have resulted in calls for the use of pain scales for animals, both to assess the degree of pain and to help determine when to use pain-relieving drugs. Clinical assessment of animal pain has yielded the conclusion that different species of animals experience pain differently. The determination of pain is based on clinical assessments of particular physiological features, such as weight, temperature, heart rate, respiration, vocalizing, posture, locomotion, and temperament. Different signs have been observed for particular species. For example, dogs in pain tend to vocalize in whimpers, growls, or howls; their posture is cowered or crouched; and they are reluctant to move or move only with apparent difficulty. Pigs in pain, on the other hand, can squeal excessively or be completely silent; their posture is a stance with all four feet close together under the body; and they are unwilling to move and often unable even to stand.22 The National Research Council recognizes the important differences among species by devoting individual books to some species. Those working with animals must know the species well enough to determine if in fact an individual animal is in pain. In addition to pain, other words related to assessing the well-being of

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animals in experimentation have also been defined, such as anxiety, fear, distress, and suffering. Unlike pain, these other terms are generally considered to be solely mental states, although they can be related to or a result of physical states. Because there is some controversy as to whether animals can experience mental states, the definitions related to these seem to be more general and are in greater flux, subject to new findings;23 they also tend to be more controverted, although many do acknowledge their existence.24 Because these terms have been explored in other discussions on pain, they will be included here as well. My position is that, given the conclusions of the previous chapters—that animals have at least simple mental states—animals do experience at times the negative states to be discussed here. It is often difficult to separate anxiety, fear, and suffering.25 In particular, fear and anxiety are not easily distinguished; however, causes of fear are considered more specific than causes of anxiety.26 Fear is a response to a particular object or previous experience, whereas anxiety is a generalized response to the unknown.27 Both anxiety and fear are believed likely to be present in all vertebrates28 and in some invertebrates as well.29 The experience of anxiety in animals has been suggested by the very presence of nervous system receptors for chemicals that alleviate anxiety,30 the possession of a structure similar to the human cerebral cortex, and particular behaviors. Some behaviors typically associated with anxiety are motor tension (e.g., jumpiness), hyperactivity (e.g., increased pulse rate, frequent urination), inhibited behavior in novel situations, and hyperattentiveness to the environment. Animals are also believed to experience anxiety because antianxiety drugs appear to work similarly in humans and animals.31 Although the experience of anxiety in animals is not as straightforward or as empirically verifiable as that of pain, the presence of anxiety can lead to animal stress, distress, and ultimately suffering. “Stress” is another word lacking a universally accepted definition.32 However, it is important to attempt to define and understand it because prolonged stress is believed to lead to distress in laboratory animals. Stress can be defined as a reaction to stressors in one’s environment that negatively affect biological equilibrium.33 Pain is one source of stress but by no means the only one.34 Stressors include both husbandry factors (e.g., noise, inadequate ventilation, variable temperature, and stale food) and experimental design features (such as deprivation of food, water, or social contact; use of restraint devices; and inadequate caging).35 There is some controversy as to whether stress is a mental state as well as a physical one. However, as stress researchers on humans have noted, not all stressors are bad, and not all stress is bad; a stress-free environment is neither possible nor desirable. Animals even in their wild state experience stressors on a regular basis, and the presence of stressors can result in a more stimulating environment.36 What is more important to consider is the level of stress and how well the animal can adapt to it. Like pain, stress can be acute or chronic. It is the persistence of stressors from which animals cannot escape that can lead to distress, and this should be the concern of laboratories, rather than trying to eliminate all sources of stress.37 What seems likely, though, is that while the

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concept of stress is not as definitive as that of pain, most vertebrates and some invertebrates probably experience stress somewhat similarly to humans.38 Although it is generally acknowledged that some stress is necessary, “distress” is generally defined as the point at which an animal is no longer able to adapt to the stressors in her environment, and therefore it is considered an undesirable state. It is often evidenced by maladaptive behaviors such as hair pulling or self-mutilation.39 Acute stress can be relieved by tranquilizers, but sustained or chronic stress is not responsive to drug therapy; a change in environment or behavior is warranted.40 Thus, experimenters should strive to identify and eliminate extreme forms of stress through some change in the animal’s environment or in experimental procedures. One of the reasons for the concern with stress in laboratory animals is not just that it adversely affects the animals but that it can also adversely affect research results.41 Although considered related, the term “suffering” is often distinguished from pain. Suffering is a mental state resulting from an inability to cope with pain or distress.42 Suffering is an unpleasant subjective state and differs from stress, which is more related to physiological changes.43 One of the key differences between pain and suffering is that suffering does not necessarily involve tissue damage and therefore is considered more of a mental than a physical experience. However, there is a relationship between pain and suffering in that prolonged or considerable pain is thought to lead to suffering, although pain is not the only source of suffering.44 Virtually all definitions of suffering call it an emotional state, and for this reason some who are willing to attribute pain to animals are unwilling to attribute suffering to them. This reluctance is sometimes also seen with regard to anxiety and distress.45 Because animals do have at least simple mental states, my view is that they are capable of suffering.46 In spite of the fact that some have devised means for assessing suffering in animals, the concept of suffering continues to be a controversial one. In the United States, the word “suffering” is never used in official policies on laboratory animals because it is considered too emotional a word; rather, the less controversial word “distress” is used.47 Since suffering is not something that can be definitively indicated, some have called for further research on this concept.48 This is a topic where fruitful research by animal ethologists and behaviorists can prove invaluable. More positive concepts related to animals’ mental states have also been defined in the literature. “Comfort,” “happiness,” and “well-being” are examples of terms that describe the opposite of some of the concepts just considered. In general, though, there seems to be greater stress in the literature on the concept of well-being than on happiness, for example, although it is usually put in negative terms (how to minimize negative features rather than how to maximize positive features).49 Without going into detail on the definitions of these terms, it is important to note their existence because they demonstrate that there is more to good laboratory animal husbandry than simply avoiding pain and negative stressors; it is important to be concerned with trying to create a positive environment as well.50 Thus, in addition to the stressors listed previously, animal well-being is considered to be compromised by either the ex-

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istence of a boring environment or by a frustration of the normal behavior of a species that it would exhibit in a wild state. What is clear, though, is that an animal’s state can vary across a continuum from comfort to distress and that an animal moves from comfort to distress when it is not able to maintain a state of equilibrium.51 It is also clear that there are different degrees for each of these concepts. In addition, these concepts are not static, and they can be affected by numerous variables. Notwithstanding some of the difficulties inherent in defining pain and other related concepts, particularly suffering, more stringent efforts should be made to arrive at universal definitions that can be used by those who conduct or assess research. Since animals may be suffering even if not actually in pain, it seems that suffering should be as strong, if not a stronger, focus of attention by the scientific community than is pain. Attempts should be made to provide criteria for animal suffering. While no one method of assessing animal pain and suffering may be sufficient on its own, better definitions would go a long way in helping to clarify these concepts and to identify when animals are experiencing these states. It would also be helpful to put more stress on how to address laboratory animal pain and distress in a proactive way, by accentuating how we can create a more positive environment for laboratory animals, instead of having a minimalist ethic.

Do Animals Experience Pain? Most people think that both humans and animals experience pain and therefore depart for the most part from Descartes’ legacy. His mind-body dualism enabled him to postulate the animal-machine theory, in which he argued that animals were like machines due to their inability to reason, think, and respond52 and that the groans of seemingly suffering animals were like the movement of the springs of a clock—a response to a stimulus but not a mental event and therefore not a significant (painful) bodily event. For Descartes, it was simpler to explain animal responses in a mechanistic manner, without regard to consciousness.53 With regard to animal actions, he says in Discourse, Part V, that “what it shows is that they are destitute of mind and that it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs, just as a clock, which is composed only of wheels and weights, can number the hours and measure time more exactly than we can with all our knowledge.”54 Those who maintain today that animals do not feel pain argue along similar lines, although for others it seems obvious that animals do feel pain.

Yes, Animals Can Feel Pain Common sense dictates that animals can experience pain. The idea that animals can feel pain is foundational to medical science and the very reason that at least some experiments are carried out on animals. Most people accept that mammals and birds are capable of experiencing pain because they have the

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nerves and the centrally organized brain necessary for this;55 in fact, pain has been studied extensively in mammals.56 However, as was indicated earlier, evidence suggests that all vertebrates, as well as some invertebrates, probably feel pain. The overall basis on which people assume that animals can feel pain is by analogy with human beings. But the prior question of other minds emerges: How can we know the subjective experience of another, even of another human being? How can we know if and how another human being is experiencing pain, since all mental experiences are considered subjective and private? As was argued in the previous chapter, we can know that other humans have mental experiences, and we can conclude that this is true related to the experience of pain and suffering as well. This problem is important in regard to the question of animal pain, because if we cannot even know for sure that other human beings, who are so similar to us, feel pain, how can we possibly understand the mental state of another species? We generally do assume that other human beings experience pain in situations where we do. We assume that when faced with the same stimulus, their reactions will be quite similar to ours. This does not mean that there cannot be great variety in pain thresholds among individuals; however, there is basic agreement among humans on what constitutes painful stimuli and pain responses in humans. By observing behavior, through the verbal utterances of the one in pain, or due to the simple recognition that we are physiologically constructed similarly, we believe that we can know fairly well when another human being is experiencing pain. In fact, not believing that another human experiences pain could have severe negative consequences in our treatment of them,57 and it also flies in the face of common sense. Even assuming that we can know when other humans are experiencing pain, how can we know whether animals experience pain? Admittedly, our ability to assess animal pain has limitations, but medical science, animal ethology, and philosophy have offered theories and devised methods for this assessment. There are several criteria by which we can judge whether animals experience pain, all of which operate by way of analogy with human beings— similar cognitive processes, physiology, and behavior. If we can be fairly certain that other humans experience pain, then it may not be such a stretch to assume that animals can experience pain in a similar way. Evolutionary theory has most often been marshaled to account for the similarities between humans and animals on a number of levels. Evolutionary theory posits a continuity among animal species, both physically and mentally, although biological science seems readier to accept evolutionary theory for physiological processes than for mental processes.58 One of the questions with relation to evolutionary theory developed in the last chapter is whether the differences between humans and animals are differences of kind (emphasizing discontinuity) or differences of degree (emphasizing continuity). But whichever position on this one chooses to hold, it is still fairly obvious that there are considerable similarities in behavior, physiology, and even some mental experiences of humans and animals. While there are obvious differences between

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some animals and humans, there are enough similarities to make assumptions about animal experiences, including their pain experiences.59 The first criterion for determining pain is the cognitive processes of animals. Whereas the previous chapter more fully examined the question of animal minds and consciousness, the focus here highlights the question of consciousness as the mental state most pertinent to the discussion of pain, and those who argue that animals can feel pain on an emotional or affective level often do so on the basis of their possession of consciousness. As was noted, consciousness is a very controversial issue, and it is difficult to find an agreedon definition. However, many do agree that animals have some kind of consciousness, meaning at the very least that they have some kind of awareness of what is going on around them and what is happening to them. It is not necessary to posit self-consciousness for the experience of pain. One of the reasons for the controversy and discomfort with discussing the concept of consciousness is that it is intangible and cannot be measured or observed in an objective way. Strict behaviorists deny consciousness to animals because they do not believe that mental states can be confirmed by other observers, and therefore they have no real significance in the study of behavior.60 The importance of the issue of consciousness for pain is that the presence of consciousness means that one is aware of one’s feelings and sensations and that pain not only is a physical sensation but also has an affective component, as was mentioned previously. Since animals do possess consciousness, then their response to a painful stimulus is more than simply a reflex action. It means that an animal makes a mental connection between the physical stimulus and what he subsequently experiences. It means that an animal experiences pain as a subjective experience and not just as a physical experience. Thus, the possession of consciousness by animals, on the basis of analogy with humans, is one of the criteria for the position that animals do feel pain—and feel pain much as humans do. No one is arguing that animals experience pain exactly in the same way as do humans, for there are even differences among humans. However, the gist of the argument is that there is enough similarity to warrant similar concerns about inflicting unnecessary pain on animals. It is also important to note that some philosophers consider pain to be a mental, or subjective, experience; for this reason, higher cognitive capacities are believed necessary for its experience, rather than simply the ability to experience physical sensations. The second criterion involves the physiological level, which is probably the strongest reason for supposing that animals can feel pain similarly to humans. This conclusion is reached on the basis of obviously similar physiological structures.61 The phylogenetic scale has been widely used to demonstrate the developmental history and relationship of species on a continuum. Vertebrates differ from invertebrates in that the former have a backbone and a central nervous system with a brain and spinal cord. Instead of a backbone and central nervous system, invertebrates have nerve clusters throughout their bodies.62 It is the presence of a highly developed nervous system that is foundational for the experience of pain sensations, in particular the presence of nociceptors,

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which have been found in mammals and other vertebrates.63 The similarity in this regard between humans and animals is what permits us to extrapolate from human pain experience to animal pain experience.64 In fact, it is the very presence of a nervous system in some animals that sometimes justifies the performance of particular experiments on them.65 The issue of the possibility of pain sensation in invertebrates has been addressed in the literature, although Orlans’s general conclusions on particular species seem to be representative of the literature in general: because fish avoid aversive stimuli yet appear to act completely normally when seriously injured, we should be cautious in concluding they can feel pain; mollusks have not generally been subjects of concern, although there is strong evidence that due to the existence of complex nervous systems, the cephalopods, which include squid and octopus, might experience pain; and some entomologists have even raised the question of pain perception in insects, although here one also needs to maintain caution.66 The third criterion for assessing animal pain is at the behavioral level. One of the problems with animals’ expression of pain is that they cannot verbalize it in the same ways as do humans (e.g., in human language); however, nonverbal communication can be as expressive, if not more so, than verbal communication. In addition, although animals cannot speak our language, they do verbalize in other ways,67 particularly in nonlinguistic ways.68 Although we have seen that the relationship between higher mental states and language is an important one in the discussion of animal minds, it is not as significant in the discussion of pain, because pain is a more primitive state than abstract reasoning and therefore does not require the presence of language. The responses to pain in humans are similar to those in animals and include verbalizations (cries, squeals, groans),69 attempts to avoid the source of the stimuli, aggressiveness,70 generally miserable and dejected appearance, abnormal posturing, lack of grooming behavior, change in appetite, and absence of usual social behavior, although no one criterion is sufficient to indicate animal pain.71 Other indicators of chronic pain include weight loss, sleep loss, decreased mating, changes in bowel and urinary activities, and teary eyes.72 Although there are some guidelines for general behavioral pain responses for animals, particular species have their own ways of indicating pain or discomfort. In addition, animals are individuals, and what may be normal for one may not be normal for another of the same species.73 Those working with animals must be familiar with the usual or normal behavior for a particular animal (and not just the species alone) to know when an animal is deviating from her normal behavior, which may be an indication that she is in pain or experiencing discomfort. On the basis of similarities between humans and animals on cognitive, physiological, and behavioral levels, a good rule of thumb in assessing animal pain is that if it causes pain to humans, it probably causes pain to animals as well.74

No, Animals Cannot Feel Pain In spite of this evidence, a small minority persist in arguing that animals do not feel pain, or at least that we cannot know with certainty that animals feel

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pain.75 These assertions differ from arguments that acknowledge that animals feel pain but not that their pain is comparable to human pain, or acknowledge that animals feel pain but assert it does not really matter because the benefits to humans take precedence over the suffering of animals. Those who argue that animals do not feel pain generally do so on the supposed lack of mental states in animals, particularly consciousness, since they consider pain to be primarily a mental experience rather than a physical or sensory experience. This argument accepts evolutionary theory, although the differences between humans and animals are considered to be differences of kind rather than of degree. Animals do bear significant resemblances to humans in physiological ways, but, the argument goes, animals do not have our cultural achievements or other higher cognitive capacities. This makes humans different from and superior to animals in significant ways. Of course, it has already been argued in the previous chapter that humans are superior to animals in a number of ways on the basis of advanced cognitive states. With regard to the discussion of pain, though, the crucial difference specifically comes down to the presence or absence of consciousness in animals. It is for this reason that those arguing against animal pain must likewise argue against animal consciousness. The focus of this discussion will not be that of the scientific community, which was discussed in the previous chapter, but the arguments of philosophers, which proceed somewhat differently. Some philosophers have made a distinction between conscious and nonconscious mental experiences. They argue as follows: Examples of nonconscious experiences in humans would be when one is engaged in activities in which one is not aware of what one is doing, such as might happen when washing dishes or driving a car.76 Human performance of these actions without really being aware that they are performing them is considered analogous to the kind of nonconscious mental experiences that animals have. Animals do not have conscious mental experiences because they lack second-order beliefs (beliefs about beliefs) and a language.77 Animals, then, have only nonconscious mental experiences. Therefore, this lack of consciousness means that they cannot experience pain or at least that it is unlikely that they experience pain. Thus, when animals exhibit aversive behavior in the face of a stimulus, it may simply be a reflex action. These philosophers argue that it is better to speak of animal responses to pain, rather than animal expressions or reactions to pain; that is, their responses are adaptive rather than expressive of an internal state.78 Thus, it is possible for one to experience a painful stimulus and yet not feel pain. Even single-celled organisms may withdraw from painful stimuli, but this does not mean that they are feeling pain.79 Although animals may act as if they are in pain, they do not actually feel pain. This is because they have no continuity of consciousness, no self-concept that would allow them to connect the pain to something.80 Because pain is a mental state, we simply cannot infer that animals feel pain on the basis of behaviors or the physiological structure of the brain.81 Finally, there is controversy as to whether pain should be categorized only as a sensation, although this idea has a long history in the Western tradition.

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Rather, pain is not simply a function of neuroanatomy but of psychological and cultural factors that play a significant role in human lives but only a minimal one in animal lives. For example, cultures vary in the way they deal with pain, so that in our culture childbearing is a very painful experience, but this is not necessarily true in all cultures. In addition, people can experience pain relief from placebos, suggesting that their experience of pain is more than just physical; there is a mental dimension to it.82 Obviously, then, the differences between humans in the experience of pain becomes even sharper when one is comparing humans and animals. Those arguing that animals cannot or probably do not feel pain conclude that we have a moral imperative to suppress moral sympathy toward animals and direct it instead toward humans83 or that when balancing human and animal interests, we should tip the scale in favor of humans, although this does not mean that we should mistreat animals.84 There are a number of problems with the argument that animals (probably) do not feel pain on the basis of a lack of consciousness. The difference between conscious and nonconscious mental experiences is a weak one. First of all, it is unclear what it means for a human to have a nonconscious experience. The fact that a person driving a car, for example, may for short periods not seem to be paying attention does not mean that he is temporarily nonconscious. After all, he is usually able to avoid having an accident, so there must be some level of awareness. Second, it is a big leap to presume that these allegedly nonconscious experiences in humans are the way that animals experience the world. It would make more sense to posit a lower kind of consciousness for animals than to suggest the presence of nonconsciousness.

What Can We Conclude about Whether or Not Animals Feel Pain? We can be fairly sure that animals experience pain in much the same way as do humans. It is interesting to note that it is a minority of philosophers, and scientists only during certain periods of time, that have held that animals do not have consciousness. This raises two problems. First, from a philosophical perspective, it underscores the danger of arguing only from a philosophy of mind rather than from observation; one trip to a laboratory where painful experiments were being performed and where animals were vocalizing their pain and suffering would seem sufficient to undermine their position. Their very unwillingness to consider animal behavior is perhaps the strongest indictment against their thesis. To imply that Bentham’s question “Can they suffer?” is merely a rhetorical device seems absurd in the face of common sense, simple observation, and empirical evidence. With regard to science, a recognition that the ideology of science regarding issues such as animal pain is driven by considerations other than empirical facts should also humble science in its assertions of theories as facts.85 Even if one were to agree that sentience is not the only or the best basis for moral consideration, there is good reason to believe that animals can feel pain. As the history of animal experimentation has amply demonstrated, the limits of what is considered acceptable treatment of animals can be directly correlated with one’s views on

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animal pain; it is no accident that Descartes’ philosophy and those of some of his followers paved the way for atrocities perpetrated on animals in the name of science. However, to acknowledge that animals feel pain is still far from addressing the question of whether they should ever be subjected to pain and how to best manage their pain.

Experiments That Cause Pain While there is considerable disagreement about what percentage of animal experiments cause pain to animals and the degree of pain caused, there is virtual agreement that at least some experiments and some procedures do cause pain.86 The writings of some animal activists and ethicists contain numerous descriptive examples of gruesome experiments performed on animals that leave no doubt, except possibly in the mind of a die-hard Cartesian, that they have caused considerable pain, often for questionable ends.87 In fact, public knowledge and outrage about some of these experiments that have been brought to media attention have come about as a result of expose´s done by animal activists infiltrating science laboratories, whose activities have resulted in actually helping laboratory animals. Karen Snow Guillermo recounts one of the most famous cases, known in the popular literature as the Silver Springs Monkey case, in which an animal rights activist (who later founded one of the most aggressive animal rights organizations, PETA, or People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) worked undercover at the lab of Dr. Edward Taub, who was later charged with abuse of his animals in a court case that dragged on for almost a decade.88 Another high-profile case involved head trauma administered to baboons at the University of Pennsylvania. A videotape showed the researchers laughing and ridiculing the animals they were working on. A shortened version of the videotape was eventually shown on TV, and the case provoked considerable outrage even among many in the scientific community, with the laboratory losing its funding for this experiment as a result. These two cases are recent examples that helped to refuel interest in the plight of laboratory animals. Making the public aware of particularly painful experiments is helpful in creating ultimate changes in legislation for the protection and well-being of laboratory animals, or at least in ending funding for particular experiments. However, it should be emphasized at the outset that not all experiments cause animals pain, and the scientific community has become rightfully upset with attempts by some animal activists to portray all experimentation as causing considerable unnecessary pain. What kinds of experiments and procedures do cause pain? Painful experiments can be divided into three different types based on their relationship to pain: experiments designed to study the nature of pain itself and/or its relief through drugs,89 experiments that are painful by nature but that are not done to study the phenomenon of pain in particular, and experiments in which the procedures done in the course of experiments can cause pain.

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The first type of experiment is designed specifically to study the phenomenon of pain. Much of our scientific understanding of pain has come from comparative studies in animals in which pain was the experimental variable. Since the main purpose of these experiments is extrapolation to the understanding of pain in humans, it is fairly obvious that at least some of those conducting the experiments do believe that animals are capable of experiencing pain.90 These experiments involve administering pain to animals by various means and then trying to find ways to alleviate the pain, usually through medication. In the second type of painful experiment, pain is incidental to the experiment in that the purpose is to study some other phenomenon, but the experiment may involve inflicting significant pain. The head trauma experiment on baboons cited earlier would be an example: baboons were fitted with helmets and then had a considerable weight come crashing down on their heads for the purpose of inducing brain damage. The helmets were then removed and the brains of the animals examined. Although the purpose was not to inflict pain but rather to study brain damage with the ultimate intention of extrapolating results to humans, there is no doubt that the experiment itself caused considerable pain. Other examples where pain is incidental to the experiment include burn experiments (where an animal is burned by immersion in hot water or through the use of hot plates or blowtorches), radiation research (often used by the military in connection with weapons development), drumming (animals are used to study traumatic shock by placing them in a revolving drum in which protuberances break their bones and bruise their flesh), and brain research (often through the use of electrodes to influence behavior). Other experiments that are painful by nature include punishment experiments (often through the use of electric shock), immobilization research (animals restrained for hours on end), sensory deprivation experiments (such as blinding of animals), and aggression research (animals are induced by researchers to fight among themselves).91 Other areas where pain is especially problematic are product testing, pain experienced after operations, and induction of illnesses in animals (e.g., tumors). This is not an exhaustive list, just examples of experiments that most would agree do cause animals pain. Finally, pain can be caused by procedures within experiments themselves. Thus, even for experiments that would not be considered painful in and of themselves, some of the procedures routinely performed can be sources of pain, such as withdrawing blood and giving injections. These procedures can be made more or less painful, depending on the training of the personnel who administer the procedures. It is obvious that there are many potential sources for pain in animal experiments, even if not all or even a majority fall into this category. Because there is potential for great pain either in the actual experiment or in the standard husbandry procedures, every effort should be made to minimize the amount of pain in experiments. If experiments that cause pain cannot be adequately refined, then perhaps they should not be performed at all. However,

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even for those experiments that are not believed to cause pain, the question of animal suffering still is a significant issue.

How Animals Suffer in Experiments An earlier section demonstrated that animals do suffer, despite some contrary arguments. Evidence points to several sources of suffering in laboratory animals. In addition to procedures within experiments and some experiments themselves, animal husbandry is often implicated in animal suffering. “Animal husbandry” refers to all nonexperimental care of animals—in other words, the conditions in which they live, which are separate from (though related to) the features of the experiment itself. Animal husbandry issues, for both laboratory animals in general and for particular species, are dealt with extensively in the guidebooks established by the National Research Council. Animal husbandry includes some of the following concerns: cage size, construction, types of cleaning methods, lighting, temperature, food availability and type, the way animals are housed (together or separately), noise, location of other animals, the presence or absence of items with which to play (to relieve boredom; this is especially an issue with primates since the inclusion of the stipulation into the law that laboratories provide for their psychological well-being), and adequate exercise (this is especially an issue for dogs since the inclusion of the stipulation in the law that they be walked). In particular, the fact that laboratory animals lack freedom and often the space to engage in what has been called typical species-specific behavior (behavior an animal would engage in if he was not confined, such as in the wild) has been considered a source of stress and suffering in laboratory animals. Some examples illustrate how husbandry issues can cause suffering. Caging is a very important husbandry issue, since this is where the laboratory animal spends virtually all of her time. The National Research Council has laid down very specific guidelines for the minimum cage sizes for particular species. However, the specifications tend to be on the small size, and thus the space is often not large enough for the animal to move around; in fact, it is significantly less space than an animal would have if in the wild. Also, cages seem to be constructed for the convenience of the human handler rather than with the concerns of the animal in mind (e.g., for easy observation of and access to the animal, for easy cleaning). Studies of rodents have demonstrated that they typically like to burrow but are unable to do so in many laboratory cages. This also leads to a frustration of their species-specific nesting behavior. In addition, the question of whether to house animals individually or in groups can be problematic. For those animals that are solitary by nature (e.g., cats and hamsters), it is not necessarily harmful to house them alone. However, animals that are more sociable by nature (e.g., rats, chimps) may suffer from the absence of cage mates. This is considered especially problematic for nonhuman

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primates, whose social and psychological needs are believed to be very similar to those of humans. Noise is another example of an animal husbandry issue that can lead to animal suffering. For example, some animals can hear above the frequency of human hearing. In some laboratories, there may be equipment in the room where the animals are kept that creates a continual droning noise that humans cannot hear but that could be very stressful for the animals housed there. Although caging and noise levels have been briefly considered, virtually any aspect of an animal’s environment can cause stress as well. In addition, some of the procedures routinely carried out on animals, such as cleaning cages or handling by humans, have been shown to cause stress in laboratory animals. There is even evidence to suggest that the very attitude of the handlers toward the animals can significantly affect their stress levels. Animal husbandry seems to be an easy place to make changes that might reduce animal stress and suffering, since these factors are relatively easy to adjust and do not entail an abolition of experimentation in general. Two questions are generally raised about husbandry concerns: What are the behavioral needs of animals, and do they suffer if these needs are frustrated?92 Sometimes the term “boredom” is used rather than “suffering” when referring to the absence of a stimulating environment.93 However, in spite of the guidelines published on animal husbandry issues, surprisingly few scientists pay attention to these concerns, partly because the animals appear to be healthy.94 Cost is another factor often cited against making significant husbandry changes, particularly in regard to changes in cage construction.95 Animal husbandry is an especially fruitful place to focus attention, since this is where many problems seem to occur and because it is probably the easiest to correct, financial costs notwithstanding. Although improved conditions in the animal environment might occur voluntarily, experience shows the need for enforced legislation. In addition, training should be mandatory for all personnel who work directly with animals, especially training in the particular species with which people are working. In addition to husbandry issues, though, the nature of some experiments or even particular features in experiments can cause suffering in animals. For example, in the discussion on definitions, aside from its physical component, pain can also cause suffering, so that painful experiments can be assumed to result in suffering as well as pain. Thus, any experiments that maim, cause deformities, or otherwise make animals ill can typically be said to cause suffering.96 In addition, there are some experiments that, while they do not cause pain, can be said to cause suffering. Some examples are psychological experiments such as maternal deprivation studies (e.g., Harry Harlow’s famous experiments in which infant monkeys were separated from their natural mothers and either kept alone or with harmful surrogate mothers) and learned helplessness studies (often done with dogs who are continually subjected to shocks from which they cannot escape so that they finally stop trying to escape, even when the shocks cease; this is considered helpful in understanding depression in humans). In addition, shock treatments, prolonged restraint, and food,

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sleep, or water deprivation can cause suffering as well as pain. We can probably postulate the presence of suffering as well when species are denied opportunities to engage in species-specific behavior, or fulfillment of their telos. Bernard Rollin has emphasized in several of his writings the importance of allowing an animal to live according to its telos. Again, this goes beyond simply applying a minimalist ethic, focused only on eliminating negative features in the animal’s environment, to including positive features that will result in greater animal well-being. Although the difficulty of assessing suffering is a real one, some have devised objective methods for measuring this, with the ultimate intention of reducing animal suffering. One approach tries to determine as best we can the animal’s opinion, or perspective, on what is being done to him rather than trying to see things only from our own perspective.97 In this approach, there are principally five areas in which we can assess whether an animal is suffering: physical health, physiological signs, behavior, comparisons with wild animals, and analogies with ourselves. Although problems in one area may not be sufficient to determine the presence of suffering, problems in multiple areas provide considerably stronger evidence. The first criterion is poor physical health, which can generally be determined by observation alone. Symptoms of poor physical health include loss of appetite, poor appearance, and weight loss. On the basis of a general poor appearance, we can surmise that animals are suffering.98 As indicated previously, the National Research Council books offer guidelines for the assessment of pain that can also be utilized to assess suffering or distress. The second criterion is physiological changes. Sometimes seemingly healthy animals may be experiencing stress that is not evident by mere observation but can be ascertained through measurements, such as heart rate or brain activity. However, the presence of stress does not necessarily mean the presence of suffering, and therefore this may not be the best method for assessing animal suffering. Some physiological changes may simply indicate that an animal is adapting to its environment. Another problem with this criterion is that the very testing of physiological factors may themselves cause suffering.99 The third criterion is animal behavior. Animals often act maladaptively, sometimes harming themselves and acting aggressively toward other animals, when they are suffering. One specific way of studying how an animal may suffer is by putting the animal in a mildly stressful situation and observing her signs.100 In particular, abnormal behavior needs to be distinguished from unusual behavior; the former is more problematic and typically refers to a persistence in manifesting undesirable actions, even in the absence of the initial stressors.101 The fourth criterion is comparing the behavior of laboratory animals with that of their counterparts in the wild. Animals kept in captivity are often prevented from engaging in behavior normal for those in the wild. Comparisons with wild animals can help us learn more about behavior that is typical for animals in their natural habitat and thus ultimately assist us in designing

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laboratories that can allow for at least more of these activities. There are some controversial aspects to this approach, however. First, domestication has significantly modified the behavior of certain species, and there may be actual genetic differences between wild and captive animals.102 Second, it is by no means a given that animals suffer if not allowed to behave “naturally”—that is, to engage in activities natural for their wild counterparts. Third, this comparison suggests that wild animals do not suffer. Obviously, then, comparison with wild animals is not sufficient in itself as a criterion, but it may serve as a warning sign of the presence of suffering.103 The final criterion is analogies with ourselves, one of the same bases on which it was determined that we can assess animal pain. As mentioned earlier, there are considerable physiological similarities between some animals and humans. The basis for analogy with ourselves in relationship to suffering is that animals can also have unpleasant subjective experiences when prevented from doing something they are strongly motivated to do. Some problems with the argument from analogy are that we can misinterpret the behavior of animals (for example, a small rodent remaining still may seem to us to be resting, but may in actuality be frozen in fear), it may be more physiologically difficult to compare ourselves with certain species (e.g., birds), and basic biological facts about other animals are simply very different from ours.104 There is some legitimacy in comparing animals with ourselves and drawing similar conclusions, but this should be the last step in the assessment of animal suffering.105 The benefits of assessing animals’ suffering have been noted,106 although the concept of animal suffering is by no means as clear-cut as that of animal pain. Even if one does not use the term “suffering,” the scientific community itself in guidebooks is willing to talk about distress and stress, which are not necessarily related to pain. Those conducting experiments need to pay attention to the criteria noted previously and recognize that sometimes the very nature of experimentation in general (rather than the specifics of particular experiments) can cause suffering to animals.

Approaches in Science to the Problem of Animal Pain and Suffering Subsequent chapters will argue, on philosophical and theological grounds, for a more restrictive approach to animal experimentation. However, the steps already accepted in the scientific community (to be discussed here) serve as a minimal moral restriction on animal experimentation. Society at large and the scientific community in general do not yet accept the more restrictive position that will be developed later, but from my perspective those restrictions that do currently exist today (primarily in the form of legislation) are acceptable as an interim ethic while working toward a more restrictive approach to animal experimentation. Some initial proposals for legislative changes will be noted in the appropriate sections here.

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Alternatives to Experiments The concept of alternatives to the use of animals is generally called the “3Rs.”107 The 3Rs are replacement, reduction, and refinement, all of which together comprise the approach to alternatives. When animal activists refer to alternatives, they often tend to focus specifically on replacement of animal models with other models. Because of this tendency, some scientists oppose the concept of the 3Rs because of the implication that we can eventually do away with using animals in experiments—something they deny is possible. In fact, the NIH and research advocacy organizations prefer to use instead the terms “adjunct” or “complementary methods” rather than “alternatives.”108 However, there does seem to be a general commitment to the concept of the 3Rs in the scientific community, if it is understood as encompassing replacement, reduction, and refinement. Although for purposes of definition and explanation it is helpful to consider them individually, they do have a chronological progression and cannot always be so easily separated.109 Replacement means replacing sentient animals with nonsentient animals in experiments, if at all possible.110 It can also refer to the use of plants and humans.111 Again, for some, the notion exists that animals can be completely replaced with other models, but this has not been the way that replacement has been traditionally understood. Replacement requires that if a researcher believes that he can get the same result by utilizing a worm rather than a dog, for example, then he should utilize the worm. There are obvious advantages to the concept of replacement in that it has the potential to result in superior research, it can reduce animal suffering, it can be cheaper, it can conserve wild species, and it may be politically advantageous.112 Reduction is the easiest and least controversial aspect of the 3Rs. It simply means that, if in a particular experiment one cannot replace a sentient animal with a nonsentient one, then one should make an attempt to use the least number of animals necessary to yield accurate results. Statistical analysis is generally utilized to assess the least number of necessary animals. Reduction can also refer to the notion of actually reducing the number of experiments performed, which is important in light of the problem of unnecessary duplication in experiments. Refinement comes in after replacement and reduction; once the first two have been attempted, then one is obligated to refine the experimental procedure to inflict the minimum amount of pain and distress on laboratory animals. Refinement also includes the use of pain medication and humane destruction of animals at the conclusion of experiments, as well as refining techniques within the research protocol itself to minimize causation of pain. Although the terms “3Rs” and “alternatives” are generally used interchangeably, the term “alternatives” is also frequently used in the literature to refer to any methods by which whole living animal models can be replaced; thus, “alternatives” sometimes refers only to different kinds of replacement techniques. A number of organizations and journals are devoted to the pursuit of alternatives to live animal models, in at least some experiments.113 For an

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alternative to animals to be seriously considered, the results must be satisfactory, even though they might be somewhat less satisfactory than results from the use of animals.114 The search for alternatives to animals continues, with additional monies being provided to research organizations, and the availability of nonanimal sources is continually growing.115 One alternative is the use of humans. Obviously, humans are already utilized in some experiments, and this issue has its own set of controversies, particularly with regard to the issue of informed consent.116 Notwithstanding this problem, there may be some experiments currently conducted on animals that can be performed on humans without significant harm to them. In addition, the use of humans can also refer to the utilization of human tissue, organs, and cells, such as corneas, blood, and fetal brain tissue,117 or even to the use of human cadavers. A second alternative is in vitro tests, which can be contrasted with in vivo tests. In vivo tests utilize whole intact animals, whereas in vitro tests utilize parts of animals (such as organs or tissues).118 One of the arguments against in vitro tests is that it is generally not considered sufficient to study a tissue or organ in isolation; it is important to see the interconnectedness of the entire organism.119 However, in vitro tests are often performed, in particular with animal embryos. A test growing in popularity, especially in toxicity testing, is the chick embryo test (referred to as the CAM assay test), in which an opening is made in the shell of a partially developed chick and a potentially toxic substance is inserted to test the reaction. The early chick embryo is used because it is not believed to have nerve sensations so early in its development. However, ethical issues accompany even the use of animal embryos and fetuses. The first concern is that they should be used only if they have not yet reached a developmental level where they are able to experience pain. The second concern is that their use necessitates keeping reproductive adult animals. Therefore, instead of using animal fetuses, it may be preferable to use the tissues from animals already dead, such as the corneas of cows from slaughterhouses.120 A third alternative is the use of computer models. The principle here is that the experiment can in a sense be done on the computer, with the researcher varying the data on the computer rather than using actual animals to determine how the data will change. Computer models tend to be more helpful where physiological systems are well understood and are definable in mathematical terms.121 However, this method has been criticized on the same grounds as in vitro tests and the use of alternatives in general: that they cannot replicate a living, breathing organism in all its complexity. In addition, the use of computers still requires that animal experiments be conducted initially, after which the computer can be used to test different variables. However, computers are being more widely used in medical education, especially with their increasingly sophisticated graphic and interactive capabilities. The principal concern in education regarding computers is whether using computers is pedagogically more valuable than traditional hands-on methods.122 Although these are the most common alternatives traditionally urged,

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other alternatives exist as well, including using wax models, using plants instead of animals, using mathematical models (sometimes in conjunction with computer models), and using film and video recordings, particularly in education.123 It is likely that additional alternatives, or refinements on existing ones, will continue, and should continue, to be developed. Although the concept of alternatives is widely accepted in theory, there is still much resistance to the notion that we can ultimately completely do away with animal models, for a number of reasons: there is a lack of training in alternatives, there may be financial constraints prohibiting the development of alternatives, a conservative mind-set in the scientific community prefers to stick to status quo methods (that is, the use of animal models in experiments),124 and a pressure to publish, with animal experiments bringing much quicker results and thus more frequent papers for publication.125 However, there does seem to be a place for alternatives in the discussion on animal experimentation, although their use in education and toxicity testing seems to be more generally accepted than their use in biomedical research. The concept of the 3Rs, and its adoption and incorporation by many, is a positive sign. If animals indeed suffer and experience pain, then anything we can do to reduce their numbers, replace them with alternative methods, and refine procedures is laudatory. However, most of the effort in the scientific community focuses on refinement rather than replacement. In this regard, increasing the financial incentive for finding alternatives to traditional experiments might move us in the direction of nonanimal alternatives, at least in those experiments that we know cause pain and suffering. The emphasis on in vivo use of animals is understandably strong, due to tradition and to the entrenched belief that the best way to understand biological processes is by viewing them in their entirety in a whole organism. However, the reluctance of some to even consider the possibility that animals could be replaced, at least in some experiments, will ultimately decrease creativity in the consideration of alternatives and ensure that painful animal experimentation will be with us for a long time to come.

Legislation Legislation governing animal experimentation does address the issue of animal pain to a certain extent.126 In particular, the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and guidelines provided by the NIH to laboratories receiving funding serve a legislative function in that they limit in some ways what can be done to research animals. Although the NIH guidelines do not have the force of law behind them, violations of these guidelines can result in the cessation of funding or the closing of laboratories. According to some of the guidelines, all laboratories administered by the USDA are supposed to be visited at least once a year (to address problems in husbandry conditions), laboratories are supposed to contact the National Agricultural Library before conducting research in order to avoid the unnecessary duplication of experiments by reference to its data bank,127 the institutional animal care and use committee (IACUC) must in-

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clude at least one noninstitutional member and a veterinarian, and research facilities are supposed to train all personnel in the proper care of animals.128 The presence of the veterinarian is to ensure that sources of distress are identified and eliminated, although this is also the responsibility of the investigator.129 However, there are certain limitations to legislation at the present time. Animals are still primarily considered property under the law.130 Some of the criticism is leveled particularly at IACUCs. All research protocols in funded laboratories must receive their approval, but little guidance is provided to them to determine the potential harmfulness of experiments, and there is no official policy for disallowing an experiment that is deemed harmful.131 Thus, the researcher has tremendous discretion and ultimately the final say in research design.132 Although IACUCs are intended to enhance refinement, they have not been very effective in terms of replacement or reduction.133 Interviews conducted with IACUC members in an independent study found some additional problems: a bias toward approving research protocols, conflicts of interest by committee members, lack of tolerance for opposing voices, lack of accountability to the public, and little participation from those representing public concerns.134 Finally, in experiments involving pain or distress, only one member of the committee is needed to approve it. Ultimately, the veto power of IACUCs is limited because they are not allowed to interfere in the design, outline, or guidelines of the experiment. Thus, in effect, the prohibition of unnecessary suffering in the act is determined by what is considered necessary by the researcher.135 Although somewhat difficult to legislate, strengthening the power of IACUCs would go a long way in reducing animal pain and suffering, in particular by including the presence of a committee member representing the animal’s interest who would be free from intimidation, and by allowing the IACUCs to have a greater impact on research protocols. One specific way they could minimize animal pain would be through the presence of more than one member on the committee who is an advocate for the animals, because sometimes the IACUC is primarily viewed as a rubber-stamping process, and the voices of those advocating for the animals are largely silenced. Another major problem with the current legislation is that the USDA often does not do its job in enforcing the AWA in a number of different areas: facilities are not inspected as often as required, inadequate training is provided for inspectors, and there is inadequate follow-up on facilities with problems.136 Apparently the USDA has been unhappy from the beginning with having to enforce the AWA, and therefore it is not surprising that its compliance has been minimal and unenthusiastic. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are significant problems with data collection. Finally, pharmaceutical companies and toxicity testing labs are not covered by the Act because they do not receive federal funding.137 For the legislation to respond more directly to the issues of animal pain and suffering, these problems need to be resolved. Diverting some research money to the enforcement of the AWA would enable the USDA to perform its job with regard to procedures required by the federal law.

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The scientific community, whether on its own initiative or due to pressure from without, seems to have a growing concern for animal pain and suffering. Legislation continues to increasingly refine existing regulations for the treatment of animals in laboratories and thus ensure that some restrictions are in place on what can be done to at least some animals, with the exception of the last amendment. As an interim ethic, the current legislation should be more strictly adhered to, and severe penalties administered for any violations. In addition, several additional legislative positive changes should eventually be made: combine the AWA and Public Health Service policy into one law so that the guidelines on the treatment of laboratory animals are consistent; extend protection to all experimental animals believed likely to feel pain, namely, all vertebrates and the invertebrate cephalopods (it is a glaring omission that the animals utilized in approximately 75 to 90 percent of animal experiments— namely, rodents—are not covered by the AWA); extend protection to all animals used in experiments (including the junior high, high school, and college levels) where federal funding is not provided; and work toward significantly improving husbandry conditions by taking into account not only the minimal physical needs of animals but also their emotional and species-specific well-being. It is especially problematic that the 2002 AWA amendment has the effect of permanently excluding certain species from protection, first of all because of its resultant continued deleterious effects on these species and, second, because the nature of law is usually understood to be changing and evolving, not static.

Use of Pain Scales Another method for minimizing animal pain is requiring the use of pain scales. Although not mandatory in the United States or most other countries, pain scales have been adopted by some countries as part of their public policy and by some IACUCs in the United States. Pain scales provide a classification system for rating pain inflicted on animals in experiments, and their purpose is to reduce animal pain, convey concern about animal pain, and emphasize the need to justify every experiment. In addition, the use of pain scales can provide a category for procedures that might be unacceptable from the perspective of animal pain and suffering.138 Pain scales are designed to measure not only pain but also suffering and other harms. Therefore, they should probably be called “categories of invasiveness” (as they are in Canada) rather than “pain scales.”139 Generally, pain or invasiveness scales are divided into several categories representing the level of pain experienced. An example of one categorization is as follows: Category A (involves use of nonsentient organisms and thereby involves no suffering), Category B (experiments on vertebrates that produce little or no discomfort), Category C (experiments on vertebrates that involve some short-term pain or discomfort), Category D (experiments on vertebrates that involve significant distress or discomfort), and Category E (experiments on conscious vertebrates involving severe pain with no pain relief ).140 In addition, the categories also include descriptions of the kinds of procedures that

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would fit into a particular category. One of the ways this kind of scale can be used is to incorporate it into a research protocol that would ultimately be assessed by an IACUC. For pain scales to be truly effective, researchers must be willing to use them to rule out certain experiments and procedures, and they would need to be utilized universally by researchers as well as by IACUCs. Of course, some problems would need to be addressed in the utilization of pain scales: assessing animal pain requires subjectivity; it does not address the problem of animals killed; it does not address other procedural issues (such as husbandry concerns);141 the same procedure could cause mild or severe pain, depending on the skill of the researcher;142 and any attempt to compile statistics on percentages of animals utilized in each of the different categories (for those institutions that use them) is insufficient, partly because institutions vary in the way they report their use of animals by pain category.143 In addition, the way they are set up now excludes from consideration and protection invertebrates that feel pain. In spite of some of these shortcomings, the use of pain scales, if made mandatory in reviewing research protocols, would be a tangible way to decrease animal pain and suffering. Although there is an element of subjectivity in this assessment and though there may still be pressure to approve a particular experiment, the presence of specific criteria could establish a level beyond which we could not go in animal experimentation.

Use of Drugs The use of pain-relieving drugs is another important component in the management of animal pain. There are several important terms to be defined, representing different kinds of medication and their relief of pain. Curariform agents produce muscle relaxation or paralysis but have no effect on pain. Although widely used in experimentation at one time, they have generally fallen into disuse unless combined with another drug because, even though the animal is rendered impotent, she can still experience pain but cannot communicate that pain. Thus, the researcher may not realize the extent of pain the animal is experiencing. Analgesics are what we typically mean by pain relievers. They are drugs that do not cause sleep or unconsciousness, such as aspirin. Anesthesia is used to induce unconsciousness and is generally administered before surgery.144 Historically, anesthesia for either humans or animals was not widely used until 1850,145 and in veterinary practice it was little used until the twentieth century.146 While it is now standard practice to administer anesthesia for animals undergoing surgery, the use of analgesics has been more sporadic. In particular, they are often not provided in the postoperative period, especially for rodents. Whereas virtually all researchers use anesthesia, the use of analgesics is left to the discretion of the researcher, and they are thereby infrequently used. This is also partly because the researchers do not perceive that animals are suffering or in pain.147 Several other reasons generally given for not administering analgesics are that the animal might injure herself, the

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drugs may have undesirable side effects, it is difficult to determine dosages, and the drugs might adversely affect the experimental results.148 Thus, while drugs are sometimes used to minimize pain and suffering in laboratory animals, their use appears to be sporadic and inconsistent. Drugs should be used wherever they can possibly minimize or eliminate animal pain. Although some argue that using drugs could skew the results of the experiment, to know or even strongly suspect that an animal is experiencing severe pain that could be mitigated with anesthetics but not use them is unconscionable. Although there may be a very few exceptional circumstances in which animals would not be given pain relievers, withholding pain relievers should be the exception and not the rule.

Use of Preference Tests One empirical method used for assessing potential animal suffering that is specifically a result of husbandry conditions is the use of preference tests. Preference tests provide a group of animals choices about a certain feature in their environment. The idea behind preference tests is that we are in a sense asking the animals for their opinions—their likes and dislikes—of their experimental environment, because they may be in a better position to know this than we are. They are a way of allowing animals to “vote with their feet.”149 Preference tests thus provide an objective basis by which to assess animal suffering. If an animal will work hard to escape from a particular environment or work hard to get into a particular environment, we might have a good sense of what his preferences are. The real advantage of these tests is that they seem to provide the animal’s perspective. A number of different preference tests have been utilized. In one test, battery hens were allowed a choice of which kind of flooring on which they would prefer to stand.150 In another test, in an effort to determine preference for caging conditions, three different groups of hamsters were housed separately, one of which was the control group, one of which included a jar in their cage, and one of which included a pipe in their cage. On the basis of observations of reduced aggression, the researchers concluded that the animals preferred an enriched environment (presence of the pipe and jar), with a preference for the jar over the pipe.151 Another study on barbering in mice (the activity by which mice bite the fur and whiskers of other mice) found that when environmental enrichment is provided, the incidence of barbering significantly decreased.152 On the basis of many such experiments, it has been determined that, when given a choice, animals prefer a more stimulating environment.153 Like everything else related to improving conditions for laboratory animals, though, a number of problems with preference tests have been pointed out: they do not measure the strength of a preference (although tests can be designed to do so); an animal’s short-term preferences may be different from his long-term preferences; preferences can vary depending on the testing method, breed of animal, and the individual animal; and animals do not always choose what is best for their long-term well-being. Thus, preference tests

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should be used in conjunction with other methods.154 However, in spite of these shortcomings, more preference test studies should be done as long as we continue to experiment on animals, since their laboratory environment is where they will spend most, if not all, of their lives, and anything we can do to make it more pleasant will be of ultimate value to the animals. Despite the particular problems with preference tests, they should be more widely used, and their results should be taken more seriously by those working with animals, especially with regard to husbandry concerns. The idea of seeing things from the animal’s perspective, as best as possible, might result in a more empathetic approach that, while at least partly based in subjectivity, could go a long way toward reducing animal pain and suffering.

Euthanasia Finally, animal death has also become an important concern of those working with animals, since animals are generally put to death at the conclusion of an experiment. The term “euthanasia” is generally used in medical situations to refer to a kind of mercy killing in which the animal or human in question has its life ended prematurely, and ideally painlessly, due to the possibility of an extended period of pain and suffering. Thus, euthanasia is often implicitly understood to mean a painless death, generally for the well-being of the one undergoing it. The National Research Council defines it in the following way: “Euthanasia is the act of inducing death without pain. Humane death of an animal may be defined as one in which the animal is rendered unconscious, and thus insensitive to pain, as rapidly as possible with a minimum of fear and anxiety.”155 However, the term “euthanasia” has also been used to refer to the convenience killing of animals, such as when there is an excess number of animals, such as in shelters and zoos. Because of the virtual inevitability of animals being put to death in research laboratories, there is a concern that the method of death be painless. In cases where humane killing is not carried out, the very process of death is simply one more opportunity for animals to experience further pain and suffering. Although by definition euthanasia is humane, this has not always been true in practice. In fact, much of the literature on this subject addresses the most humane methods of euthanasia for particular species.156 One of the general concerns with euthanasia for animals relates to if and how death harms animals. It is obvious that we consider death to be harmful to humans for a number of reasons, including that it prevents a person’s future (usually pleasurable experiences) and because of the effect that the death will have on others close to the deceased. The killing of humans by other humans is usually considered a violation of a person’s rights (the most foundational one being the right to life), as well as of his autonomy. Euthanasia for humans has recently garnered much discussion in medical ethics textbooks, where the argument is generally presented in terms of quality versus quantity of life and also in terms of whether humans are “playing God” by making these decisions

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about their own or others’ deaths. Considerable discussion has ensued with regard to how death might hurt animals. The reasons for which animals are put to death in research laboratories vary: to collect tissue, to humanely end their suffering from illness or disease, to conduct autopsies because they are not suited for other experiments, and due to an overstock from breeding.157 One of the reasons for the controversy related to euthanasia is that no guidelines are available to indicate precisely when an animal needs to be euthanized. The emphasis on euthanasia methods generally relates to the particular species, but the sensibilities of the human participants in the procedure need to be considered as well. However, the wellbeing of the animal should be the principal concern. For this reason, it is generally recommended that animals not be killed in the presence of other animals.158 Another interesting point to note in the discussion of euthanasia in the scientific literature is that the death of animals is usually referred to by the term “sacrifice.”159 Using a euphemism in this way may serve the purpose that all such language does: to obscure the reality of the situation or to objectify it in some sense. The emphasis on euthanasia as a humane putting to death can be helpful in alleviating animal suffering and distress, in that the decision can be made to end animal life before it becomes too distressing or painful and because efforts need to be taken to avoid death’s becoming simply one more painful experience in the lives of experimental animals. However, an issue regarding euthanasia that needs to be challenged is the practice of routinely putting to death animals at the conclusion of an experiment, especially when the animals may still be healthy. It is regrettable that animal death is the standard end to animal experiments. When this is necessary for the conclusion of the experiments—for example, if the animal is to be dissected and a portion of her body analyzed— then it may be more defensible. However, when postmortem dissection is not a part of the experimental protocol and it is determined after the experiment that the animal can probably live a healthy life, greater efforts should be made to adopt out these animals. Obviously, some animals, such as dogs and cats, have greater adoptive appeal, but this does not foreclose the possibility of finding homes for other research animals as well.160 However, when animals must be put to death, the most humane methods possible should be used, by those specifically trained in these methods, without cost being the most important consideration.

Conclusion What, then, can we conclude from this brief overview of animal pain and suffering, in terms of an ethic of pain management in laboratory animals? My position is that animals do undergo pain and suffering in many experiments and that greater attention must be paid to minimizing or reducing the pain

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that animals experience. As an interim ethic for the reduction of animal pain and suffering, the existing legislation needs to be enforced and severe penalties administered for any violations. Obviously, changes need to be made to AWA in terms of the animals protected. As a way of providing greater protection, some other suggestions to be incorporated into legislation include additional funding for research into alternatives and the promotion of the use of alternatives; the mandatory use of pain scales; greater power on the part of IACUCs to veto or refine experiments; additional funding for the USDA to carry out its responsibilities in monitoring animal laboratories; having one comprehensive law that covers all animal experimentation, including protection of those species not currently protected (particularly mice, rats, birds, and cephalopods); mandatory use of pain-relieving medication for at least extremely painful procedures and experiments, especially in postoperative care; continued use of preference tests and the incorporation of these results into husbandry conditions; and humane euthanasia in all cases, with an attempt to find ways to more humanely dispose of research animals, such as by adoption. A helpful rule of thumb would be that when there is good reason to believe that particular animal species can experience pain and suffering, their use should be subject to the most stringent guidelines, and when the evidence is more ambivalent, we should proceed very cautiously and be willing to extend greater protection to any subsequent species that we may eventually find to be capable of experiencing pain and suffering. The answer to the question of whether animals should ever be subject to pain cannot be sufficiently addressed in this chapter, and obviously it is not the only issue to consider in the treatment of laboratory animals. Therefore, the next chapter will consider the further issue of whether experimental animals do and should have rights.

4 Animal Rights

The issue of rights, even for humans, is one of the most controverted ones in philosophy.1 It is not surprising, then, that the specific question of whether animals have rights is even more problematic. In this chapter, I will argue for the thesis that animals do have moral and natural rights2 and that they should have legal rights extended to them as well. The significance of the argument that animals have rights is that it challenges the notion that potentially beneficial consequences to human beings are the only bases for judging appropriate behavior toward animals, both in science and in other settings. Possession of rights accords greater protection to rights holders than what they might have without rights. Although the question of animal rights applies to the use of animals in general, the focus here will be on rights with regard to experimental animals in particular. The chapter will proceed as follows. In the first section, I will argue for the position that animals have rights by defining what is meant by rights, by distinguishing between moral and legal rights, and by presenting grounds for animal rights. In the second section, I will present the arguments against my position and my rebuttal of these arguments. In the third section, I will lay out some of the specific rights that experimental animals should have. In the final section, I will offer some concluding remarks.

Arguments for Why Animals Have Rights What It Means to Say That Animals Have Rights Before arguing for why animals have rights, I will briefly define what is meant by a right. Rights have been defined in many differ-

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ent ways, but in its simplest understanding, a right is something that is due to someone as one’s own. After asserting that rights typically include notions of entitlements to be treated in certain ways, valid claims an individual can make or have made on his behalf, and having one’s interests and welfare taken into account, Tom Regan ultimately defines what rights are as simply “justified limitation or constraint upon how others may act.”3 It is something that is owed to the rights holder by others in the community, based on the intrinsic nature of the rights holder rather than simply being a means for something else. Two generic distinctions of rights are natural rights and positive rights. Natural rights are those based on nature or, for theists, those based on God’s gift to us. Positive rights, on the other hand, come from the free will of the people—those rights acknowledged and bestowed on the rights holders by others in the community. First, the most basic way in which rights can be understood in regard to animals is to say that animals can be wronged.4 Of course, it is possible to assert this without resorting to rights language, as, for example, those might do who believe that our obligations to animals are just treating them with kindness and abstaining from cruelty. However, arguing from the perspective of rights puts a stronger foundation under the notions of kindness and absence of cruelty; it states in a much more emphatic way that there are restrictions on what we can do with and to animals and that these restrictions arise from something within the nature of the animals themselves. Second, arguing for animal rights means that our duties to animals are direct rather than indirect. Rights and duties are typically reciprocal, so that if we say that a creature has rights, then others have the duty to protect those rights. Having indirect duties to animals means that what is wrong with harming animals is not primarily the harm resulting to an animal but the harm potentially resulting to a human being. It means that the reason, or motivation, for refraining from cruelty to animals is the effect that the action will have on the human being engaging in the action or on the human being whose animal is on the receiving end of the cruel treatment. From an indirect duties perspective, in the former case, when a person acts cruelly toward and harms an animal, the real problem is that her behavior may ultimately lead to practicing cruel behavior toward other humans, so that her very nature can become desensitized to suffering in general. In the latter case, having only indirect duties to animals means that when a person harms another’s animal (such as a pet), he is actually doing harm to the owner of the animal, because the animal is her property and therefore she does not want to see her animal harmed. Although in both cases the end result of prohibiting such behavior would be abstaining from cruelty to animals (and therefore the animal would benefit), the motivation for such action is human centered. However, even acknowledging that harming an animal could result in harm to humans does not prohibit us from arguing as well that what is really wrong with being cruel to animals is that it harms the animals themselves. Thus, “rights” implies a direct duty to animals themselves because of the effect the negative treatment will have on them directly.

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Third, to say that animals have rights means that animals have intrinsic rather than instrumental value. Intrinsic value means that animals have value in themselves, apart from any benefit that they may yield for humans. To say that an experimental animal in particular has intrinsic value means that her entire worth is not tied up with what she can yield for humans in terms of scientific knowledge and advances in the fight against disease and that she should not be regarded or treated as such. However, intrinsic value does not necessarily mean the absence of instrumental value. Thus, experimental animals can be used for human purposes at times (instrumental value), but what will likely safeguard their well-being and protect them from excessive harm is the position that they have value, worth, and integrity in and of themselves (intrinsic value), which places constraints on what we can do to them. To assert intrinsic value for animals is to mean something like Kant’s categorical imperative put in language related to animals: We should treat animals as ends in themselves and never only as means to our ends. Fourth, to say that animals have rights is to say that they have interests that should not routinely be sacrificed for human benefit.5 This means that animals have a well-being, or quality of life, which should place some constraints on how we can interfere with this well-being, just as in the case of humans. Although there are several different ways of understanding interests and different bases for interests (such as interests based on sentience, preferences, or desires), in the most elementary sense, it means that animals have a well-being that can be interfered with. If animals have an interest in avoiding pain and suffering (as will be argued later in this chapter), then our assigning them rights is a way of protecting their interests. Fifth, asserting that animals have rights means more than saying that we should use the language of rights with reference to animals. In other words, there is a distinction between actually saying that animals have rights (which is what is being argued) and saying that we should use rights language with reference to animals. An example of the latter would be Peter Singer’s contention that although animals do not have rights, using this kind of language may be a “convenient political shorthand,” since people understand what we mean when we use rights language.6 Although Singer’s position is certainly tenable, it does fall short of what the actual assertion of rights maintains—that we should not simply talk as if animals have rights, but, rather, we need to assert that animals do have rights. Thus, while rights language is important, it is the attribution of rights that is the more important consideration. Another way to explain what is meant by rights is considering what is not meant when saying that animals have rights. Obviously, to say that animals have rights is not to say that they do have or should have identical rights to humans. One way that the notion of animal rights is ridiculed is by pointing to a right of humans (such as voting) and, by way of analogy, demonstrating the absurdity of assigning that right to animals.7 However, we do not believe that even all humans have the same rights. Although there are certain general rights that we would accord to all humans (such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness), there are more specific rights applicable to particular groups of

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individuals. Thus, in our society we have decided that women should have the right to an abortion, but obviously we would not say that men have this same right, because it does not make sense to assign this right to men. In the same way, just as men and women may have some but not all of the same rights, the same case can be argued with regard to animals. To argue for animal rights is also not to say that all animals have the same rights as other animals. As with the previous example regarding men and women, all animals have some of the same general rights, but some species may have greater rights or different kinds of rights than others. There are numerous benefits to asserting that animals have rights. As mentioned previously, the existence of rights generally provides a stronger foundation for protection of the individuals who are granted them. It provides significant restrictions or constraints on how others may treat the class of rights holders. Rights give one greater status in the moral community than one would have without the possession of rights; they confer a dignity that might otherwise be lacking. Rights tend to be justice oriented rather than based on charity and thus can be enforceable, especially legal rights. In fact, the laws of society depend on the enforcement of such rights. However, there are limitations to the use of rights language in general, whether with regard to humans or to animals. Rights cannot cover all possible contingencies. This is simply another way of saying that rights by nature must be generic, or general. With regard to human rights, we often assert them in general terms, such as the right to life, without carefully delineating every exigent circumstance. In the same way, although an attempt will be made to delineate the rights that animals should have, an underlying assumption is that these rights can be stated only in general terms. Even when it comes to human rights, such as the right to life, we certainly allow for circumstances in which this right can or should be trumped, such as in cases of war or selfdefense. This is just another way of saying that rights are not absolute.8 In addition, rights cannot eliminate—or even adequately address—all conflict cases. It is inevitable that the rights of some individuals will conflict with the rights of others. With regard specifically to the issue of animal experimentation, the conflict will generally come down to one between humans and animals. Does the right of a human always trump the right of an animal? Does it matter which rights are being considered? Obviously, the problem of conflict cases is not something unique to animals but arises in relation to humans as well, such as when the rights of one group (e.g., the right of individuals to own private property) conflicts with the rights of another group (e.g., the needs of the state to use the property for the common good). In the chapter on burden/ benefit analysis, I will delineate some guidelines that would govern at least some of the conflict cases, but it is inevitable that when we use rights language, conflicts will arise that cannot always be easily adjudicated. Finally, it is important to point out that there is considerable resistance to the idea of animals having rights. Some reasons are physical (the sheer number of animals we regularly kill), economic (the large amount of money invested in animal use), political (some treatment of animals has often been compared

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to human slavery), religious (particularly the dominion argument), historical (animals have never had rights before), legal (the law usually divides the physical universe into persons and things), and psychological (the belief that animals do not have mentality corresponding to that in humans).9

The Relationship between Moral and Legal Rights Oftentimes in discussions of animal rights, it is unclear whether moral or legal rights are the subject, which tends to confuse the issue.10 For this reason, it is important to distinguish between them—to explain what is meant by each one and to demonstrate the relationship between them. As mentioned earlier, the thesis of this chapter is that animals have moral rights and should have legal rights as well. Another way of talking about moral rights is to call them natural rights. Moral rights are those rights that are somehow inherent in the nature of being itself. Even when it comes to human beings, the traditional ways of arguing for the bases or grounds of rights is to say that they come from God, they are self-evident, or they come from or are there by nature. With regard to animals, the basis of rights for animals is best asserted on grounds of their nature. Arguing for rights as coming from God at this point unnecessarily limits the discussion to theists,11 and it is certainly problematic to say that it is self-evident that animals should have rights. Obviously, to most people in the contemporary period, it seems absurd to suggest that animals have or should have rights. To say that animals have rights by nature means simply that they have moral rights on the basis of the criteria they possess.12 Legal rights, on the other hand, are those rights that are enforceable by law. One way of understanding them is to say that legal rights are “any theoretical advantage conferred by recognized legal rules.”13 While there is a difference of opinion as to whether animals have moral rights, it is indisputable that animals do not have legal rights. In fact, twentieth-century judicial decisions have reconfirmed the “legal thinghood” rather than the “legal personhood” of animals.14 However, this does not mean that they do not have protection under the law. As discussed in chapter 1, numerous laws protect animals, including laws governing laboratories that receive government funding, the federal Animal Welfare Act, and various state laws. Animals do have some protection under the law, but it is insufficient and not generally based on the notion that animals have rights. Thus, legal protection does not equal legal rights.15 Under the law, animals are merely considered property.16 Therefore, they have no legal standing in court. This lack of legal standing extends even to humans who might wish to bring a lawsuit on behalf of animals they believe to have been mistreated or harmed. People can do this only if they have been directly harmed themselves by the action to the animal, and since this would be virtually impossible to demonstrate in the case of experimental animals, people would always be prohibited from suing on behalf of experimental animals in particular.17 One of the legal problems with protection for research animals in particular is that scientific research is exempt from many state

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anticruelty statutes,18 so that we allow treatment toward research animals that we would never allow for pets. Providing legal rights to animals could circumvent this problem.19 Obviously, there are differences between moral and legal rights, although there is a relationship between them. Whereas moral rights are discovered, legal rights are conferred or ascribed. Moral rights do not have the force of law, whereas legal rights are conferred by a legal system.20 Moral rights tend to be universal and inalienable, whereas legal rights depend on the law of the country. Although both moral and legal rights are important in the discussion of animals, moral rights are the more foundational issue, for several reasons. First, animals already have some protection under the law. While it is not as strong as the protection they could have by possessing legal rights, there are still some restrictions on how we can treat them. Second, moral rights are often used as a reason for obtaining legal protection for the interests they protect.21 Thus, moral rights are often viewed as the basis for legal rights. It is difficult to argue that animals should have legal rights if we cannot first demonstrate that they have moral rights. Therefore, we must first discover the moral rights that animals have and then ascribe legal rights to them on this basis. However, even if moral rights do not result in legal rights, they are still important because, as was noted earlier, the existence of rights tends to raise the dignity, status, and protection of these rights holders above what they would have if they did not have moral rights. Tom Regan notes that the notion of rights with regard to animals is abolitionist by nature, but it can also consistently support incremental steps,22 which I am arguing in this book. When the word “rights” is used in this book, it refers to moral rights unless otherwise indicated, since demonstrating the existence of moral rights is the more controversial and basic issue. However, the presumption also exists that the next step after demonstrating moral rights is ascribing legal rights.

Grounds for Rights As argued here, the basis for moral rights for animals should primarily be grounded in their nature. There are three bases for the natural rights of animals: sentience, cognitive criteria, and miscellaneous arguments, each of which will be examined separately. The first and most important is the criterion of sentiency, by which is meant the capacity to experience pain and suffering.23 Although pain can lead to suffering, it is also possible for suffering to be present without the causation of pain, such as with regard to husbandry conditions. Therefore, it is important to include both notions in talking about sentiency. I have previously argued that animals experience pain in a sensory way (physically) and emotionally as well, due to the presence of nociceptors, a central nervous system (or nerve clusters), and aversion in the face of painful stimuli. Animals can also experience suffering (e.g., anxiety, stress, fear, distress), although animals with higher cognitive states may suffer more than other animals. In addition, animals have at least simple desires, such as the

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desire to be free from pain and the desire for food and water, the lack of which can lead to pain and suffering. For all of these reasons, to say that animals are sentient and that sentiency is an important criterion means that animals can be harmed as research animals because of pain caused to them, the suffering they undergo directly or indirectly by virtue of being research subjects, and by being deprived of what they need and desire. Therefore, sentiency is the bottom-line criterion on the basis of which animals should be permitted into the moral arena. Sentiency is basic to the discussion of rights of animals because we tend to believe that pain and suffering—at least unnecessary pain and suffering—are evils in themselves. In addition, the harms visited on experimental animals tend to cause them pain and suffering, and therefore their capacity to experience these negative states must be foundational in assigning them rights. In fact, the word “animal” has been defined for the purpose of this project to include all animals that are believed to already have this capacity. Thus, all animals capable of experiencing pain and suffering (all vertebrates and some invertebrates) should be extended rights. In addition, any animals that we subsequently discover to experience pain and suffering should also be extended rights. In this regard, the criterion of sentiency must be an elastic one. Finally, while cognitive states are also important in the consideration of rights, there is considerable disagreement as to the extent of cognitive states of animals, whereas there is more general agreement that animals can at least experience pain and possibly suffering as well. In addition, one of the reasons for extending rights to marginal humans is their ability to experience pain, although they may have limited cognitive states, often well below that of normal adult humans. What the criterion of sentiency does with regard to the rights of animals, then, is to extend at least basic protection to all sentient animals, with the basis of protection being the possession of sentiency. Just as with humans, though, the absence of pain and suffering is not sufficient; we must also move in the direction of well-being. To put this in terms of rights, rights must have a positive as well as a negative component. However, sentiency is not the only basis for animal rights. Although there is controversy regarding cognitive states of animals, I have already argued that animals do have minds, that animals’ mental experiences are similar to those of humans, that the differences between humans and animals in terms of cognition are differences of degree rather than kind, that there is a continuum of cognitive ability, that animals’ weak sense of autonomy at the very least puts some restrictions on what we can do to them in experiments, and that their ability to communicate enables them to make known their nonconsent. There are several reasons for introducing cognition as an additional basis for the possession of rights. One reason is related to the question of what would happen if animals were unable to feel pain—does this mean that it would not matter how we treat them? Thus, the introduction of the criterion of cognition allows for pain and suffering to be the most basic criterion, but if for some reason an animal lacked sentiency, the possession of certain mental states

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should certainly accord them some rights. Obviously, it is difficult to imagine a case where an animal would be unable to experience pain but still have cognitive states, but the possibility that this could theoretically happen is sufficient to make a case for a second criterion. A second reason for an additional criterion to be added to that of sentiency is that assigning rights on the basis of cognitive states enables us to be able to distinguish between animals and subsequently to distinguish among rights assigned to particular animals. Thus, all animals should have some rights based simply on sentiency, but finer lines of distinction can be made among species based on their cognitive ability. Thus, animals with greater cognition should be afforded greater protection, especially with regard to suffering and death. Finally, the third grounds for rights are based on two miscellaneous arguments, which I will mention only briefly. One argument brings together James Rachels’s notion that animals have a biographical (and not simply a biological) life24 and Tom Regan’s notion that animals (at least mammals one year or older) are subjects-of-a-life, meaning that they have perception, memory, beliefs, self-consciousness, intention, and a sense of the future.25 Some of these characteristics I have already included in the discussion of cognitive criteria, but what I mean by this is that animals have rights because they are beings who have a life that matters to them. They are not simply creatures of instinct but can make some choices about their lives, and they seek to avoid that which is harmful and to pursue that which is helpful. They have the capacity to enjoy life, and therefore we should extend the legal right to them to be able to do this to a certain degree, especially when we have virtually ultimate control over their destiny and well-being, as in the case of experimental animals. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the idea that animals have been created by God could provide at least intrinsic value to animals, on the basis of which we can infer rights.

Arguments of Those Who Disagree with My Position Obviously, not everyone agrees with my contention that animals have rights or with the basis upon which rights should be granted. The disagreements can be grouped into three different areas: those who maintain that rights language is problematic in itself and therefore is not particularly helpful with regard to protection for either animals or humans; those who argue that animals in particular cannot have rights because of the significant differences between humans and animals; and those who argue for a different basis for rights for animals.

Problems with Rights in General Although the language and notion of rights have been widely used with regard to humans, especially since the Enlightenment period, not all have agreed that rights is the best way to talk about protection for other beings. There are two

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basic positions within this approach: the idea that rights language is problematic in and of itself and the utilitarian idea that the existence of basic moral rights would require an obligation other than consequences in determining right moral action. With regard to rights language in particular, rights have been criticized for being individualistic (and, in particular, part of liberal-individualist capitalist societies)26 and adversarial, predominantly negative rather than positive, essentialist, minimalistic, paternalistic (assigned by those with power and also tending to favor the powerful),27 and therefore easily withdrawn, difficult to enforce, and subject to slippery-slope arguments. As noted previously, there are limitations to rights language, and therefore it is difficult to disagree with some of the challenges raised. However, instead of arguing why these contentions are wrong, I will argue why these challenges are not insurmountable obstacles in the discussion of rights in general and animal rights in particular. The issue with regard to the individualistic and adversarial nature of rights is that it can eliminate concern for the common good by focusing only or especially on the individual and the violation of his rights and by setting people against each other or, in the case of animals, in setting people against animals. While this is certainly a danger, particularly in our contemporary overly litigious society, the actual benefits to be gained are greater than the potential harms. When it comes to issues of morality and justice, conflicts are unavoidable. Conflict in and of itself is not necessarily a problem, but rather how the conflict is resolved. Rights language must by its very nature be adversarial because some individuals or groups take advantage or trample the rights of others, and, if the “others” object, an adversarial relationship will be established. However, adversarial relationships will exist even without the use of rights language, and one of the significant benefits of rights language is that it can help to highlight and redress this adversarial relationship. Although rights language is typically predominantly negative rather than positive, this is not even always true with regard to rights for humans, and certainly rights by their very nature do not need to be negative. The most basic rights of humans are usually stated in positive terms: that humans have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Of course, whether stating rights positively or negatively, the opposite is always implied. Thus, having the right to life implies that one has the right to not have one’s life taken away (except in certain extreme circumstances). With regard to the rights of experimental animals that I will delineate here, both negative and positive rights will be argued for. The charge that rights are essentialist is a challenge to the search from virtually the beginning of the history of philosophy for the one criterion that can define the essence of a creature.28 Once this “essence” or essential nature is discovered, then it has typically been used to draw the line of separation between those possessing this criterion and those not possessing it and, in particular, drawing the line between humans and animals. This essentialist approach ignores the complex nature of creatures, especially their relational nature—that they can and should be defined by more than one characteristic,

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such as the totality of their selves, especially in relation to others. This challenge of essentialism is very valid and may be applicable to certain theories of rights, such as those based on the possession of one criterion (such as rationality) as a reason to establish rights. However, it is not necessarily in disagreement with my own position, arguing for multiple criteria for the establishment of rights. One could argue, though, that the emphasis on sentiency can be considered essentialist. There are two ways to respond to this challenge: first, in my own argument, sentiency is not the only criterion to be taken into consideration. Second, sentiency is not being presented as the essence of a creature (since many species of animals are sentient) but merely as a baseline for protection from actions that would potentially adversely affect that sentiency, such as by causing pain and suffering. Rights language has also been criticized as being minimalistic. The concern seems to be that such language can only narrowly proscribe treatment toward other creatures by establishing minimum requirements or standards for moral action. However, it certainly seems better to set minimum standards than no standards at all. Further, even if one argues that current legislation provides some minimum standards of protection, arguing on the basis of rights has the effect of drawing very clear lines for treatment, beyond which we should not go. One could certainly argue that the human rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are minimalistic, since we do not always lay out all of the particulars regarding what we mean by each of these terms. This does not mean, however, that we cannot offer some general guidelines. In addition, the critique of minimalism is not something peculiar to rights language; it is a problem with laws in general. We cannot set out rules or guidelines for behavior that will govern every possible situation, and laws must allow for extenuating circumstances, as must rights. The charge of paternalism is also something not unique to rights language. Laws in general tend to be made by the powerful for their benefit, over and against the disempowered, and like the exercise of any power, it can be abused. However, the possibility of abuse or paternalism does not negate the general benefit that can ensue, and in fact rights can and have been used to protect the weak. The difficulty of enforcing rights most often comes in with regard to conflict cases. I already argued that conflict cases are inevitable when rights language is used but that conflict will exist even where rights language is not used. We do not seem to have much difficulty in our attempts to enforce human rights in spite of their conflictual nature; as a global community, we have agreed that all humans have rights, that we can delineate what these rights are, and that these rights should be protected.29 Of course, we should not minimize the difficulty of enforcing human rights in the global community. Even though there is general agreement in theory, human rights are widely violated in practice. However, having documents specifying the rights we theoretically believe belong to all humans provides us not only with an ideal but also with a concrete goal to shoot for. It is possible to do the same thing with regard to rights for animals. A final concern with rights language has to do with the slippery-slope

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argument: where should we draw the line with regard to the possession of rights, and will we be able to maintain the line? As with all slippery-slope arguments, we can answer by saying that ultimately there may be a point beyond which we may not want to go. However, as with the particular criterion of sentiency, we may need to maintain some elasticity in the position of where the line for the possession of rights should be drawn. Even in relatively recent human history, some humans were accorded rights that other subgroups of humans were denied (e.g., women and minorities). Before that time, there were certainly individuals who ridiculed the idea of certain groups of humans possessing the same rights as other humans. Thus, not until very recently were women granted some of the same rights that men had enjoyed for years, such as the right to vote. What the assertion of rights does is to say that all beings who have the same criteria should have rights—the idea embedded in the notion of justice that similar cases should be treated similarly. If the same basis for rights exists in both animals and humans, such as sentiency and cognitive criteria, then both should be accorded rights, although the particular rights that they have will be somewhat different. This does not necessarily lead to the position, however, that plants should have rights, a position that is not being maintained here, primarily due to their lack of sentiency. If one day, however, we discover that plants are sentient or have some other characteristic whereby we believe that they should have rights extended to them, then we should be willing to do so, with the understanding that they would not necessarily have the same rights as either humans or animals.30 Some utilitarians also have problems with the use of rights language, although for different reasons than those discussed previously. In addition to moral rights being considered unhistorical, abstract, and inexplicable,31 some utilitarians reject rights because they would require an obligation other than consequences in evaluating moral arguments.32 Rule utilitiarians, at least in theory, could very well accept rights, but act or preference utilitarians would probably not. Because most utilitarians fall into the latter category, it is their views that I am considering here. The essence of act utilitarianism is that the morality of an action is solely determined on the basis of consequences, such that an action that would bring about the greatest good for the greatest number would be superior to an action that did not. Thus, acts can be right or wrong without resorting to rights language, and rights language may even be a distraction. Obviously, not all utilitarians have included animals in the calculus, but those who do would be more restrictive regarding the treatment of animals (e.g., Peter Singer), whereas those who do not include animals in the calculus, or who give animals much less weight than people, would be less restrictive regarding the treatment of animals (e.g., R. G. Frey). However, this rejection of rights in general and of animal rights in particular could be true regardless of whether the utilitarian was concerned primarily with arguing for or against better treatment for animals. For Singer, attributing rights is not the only way to change the moral status of animals; we can attribute interests to them, with the capacity to feel pain as the basis of interests. However, while Singer does not believe that animals have rights, he thinks that it is fine to talk that way,

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and if we do argue for animal rights, then the one right animals should have is the right to equal consideration—not to have pain gratuitously inflicted on them.33 Obviously, it is difficult to argue against these views by saying that utilitarianism should include rights as part of its ethical theory. Instead, a brief assessment of utilitarianism as a theory with regard to the treatment of animals is in order. Obviously, utilitarianism can greatly restrict what we do to animals since, from its inception, it has usually permitted animals as part of the calculus in determining the rightness or wrongness of a moral action: that the greatest good for the greatest number includes animals. Thus, Singer’s position in particular would restrict the treatment of animals and come to many of the same positions as a rights theory with regard to specific practices in the treatment of animals. However, one of the problems with utilitarianism is that not all utilitarians give the same weight to the interests of animals or even include animals in the calculus, so the same theory can yield different conclusions. In addition, even for those utilitarians such as Singer, who want to greatly restrict what we do to animals, their conclusions can be problematic in terms of what they would allow in the treatment of animals. On the issue of animal experimentation, while both a rights theory and utilitarianism could severely restrict or eliminate many of the same harmful experiments, utilitarianism could still allow experimental animals to be subject to excruciatingly painful experiments if the beneficial results obtained were expected to outweigh the animal pain and suffering. Therefore, while utilitarianism for some could be a good first step in deciding what would and would not be permitted in terms of research on animals, the use of rights language could further restrict what we can do to animals, and indeed should do so. As I will argue in chapter 6, my position is that some things should never be done to animals, regardless of the expected benefits for humans.

Animals in Particular Cannot Have Rights Many who maintain that humans have rights, however, do not want to extend the possession of rights to animals. The arguments typically made have to do with the ontological status of animals as compared with that of humans. However, two pragmatic issues that are frequently raised should be briefly addressed before moving on to the arguments as to why animals should be denied rights: that animal rights debase human rights because they deflect concern away from humans34 and the difficulty of assigning rights to animals even if they did have them. With regard to the first issue, no necessary connection exists between the attribution of rights to animals and the debasement of human rights. In fact, empirical studies of animal rights activists have demonstrated that these people also tend to be involved in issues of concern to humans, such as poverty and the environment.35 Therefore, the extension of rights to animals may not entail a devaluing of human life or rights as much as the demonstration of the interconnectedness of these kinds of concerns. Arguing that one must either be for human rights or for animal rights is setting up an arbitrary

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dichotomy and this suggests that one must choose either humans or animals. It is both preferable and reasonable, instead, to maintain a both-and position. The issue of the difficulty of which rights to ascribe to animals is also not an insurmountable problem. This difficulty can exist even with regard to humans, and yet there is now substantial agreement on which rights humans do or should have. Even if not all animal rights theorists could agree on which rights animals have, this does not preclude them from trying to specify which rights they should have. Thus, although it may be difficult, it is not impossible, as the later section on which rights animals should have will demonstrate. The strongest arguments against attributing rights to animals, though, are based on what are often considered the obvious differences between humans and animals. The most common arguments against animal rights can be grouped into four categories: that animals are not part of the human species, that animals lack rationality and other attendant cognitive features possessed by humans, that animals specifically do not have language and thus cannot claim rights, and that animals cannot reciprocate in extending rights. The argument that animals are not part of the human species is quite obvious on the face of it, and therefore it is difficult to argue against this contention.36 One of the advantages of the position of allowing rights for only and all humans is that it extends protection to all humans, including marginal humans, since being a member of the species Homo sapiens is all that matters. Of course, it is due to the problem with this position that the notion of personhood is often introduced into moral arguments regarding the treatment of animals, and also of marginal humans. What is implied in the position that only humans have rights, though, is that there is something unique and special about humans that entails the attribution of rights to them as a class and subsequently prohibits the attribution of rights to any nonhumans. One of the ways even in human history by which certain human subgroups were prohibited from rights extended to other humans was by arguing that they were not fully humans, as in the example of slaves, who were considered by some to be three-fifths human. From a Christian theological perspective, the reason that humans are considered superior to animals is ultimately because they are the only creatures believed to be created in the image of God. Although this theological position does not necessarily entail rights, it provides a stronger foundation for theists, at least as to why humans are superior to animals and may thereby have rights extended to them. However, for those arguing from a nontheistic perspective, the inevitable question that arises once one asserts that only humans can have rights is, What is it about humans that makes them unique and so different from animals? Species membership is a morally relevant criterion, but it is certainly not the only one. Ultimately, then, one must resort to a discussion of other criteria. The subsequent answer, then, as to why humans should be extended rights denied to animals has to do with humans’ possession of rationality and other cognitive features that are not believed to be possessed by animals, or that are believed to be possessed by animals to a significantly lesser degree. Thus, it is because humans possess these criteria that they should have rights. However,

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as I already argued in chapter 2, the difference between humans and animals is a difference of degree rather than a difference of kind, so that not only do animals possess some of these criteria believed to be the unique province of humans but also some animals possess them to a higher degree than some humans. If we do grant rights on the basis of cognition, then we must admit animals to the class of rights holders, unless we want to retreat to a position where only species membership matters. In fact, the argument from marginal cases is a strong one with regard to why animals should be extended rights. If we define rights so narrowly for humans that they can be possessed only by those with high degrees of rationality, then children and marginal humans would be excluded, which we prefer not to do. We concede that children and marginal humans do have rights even if they lack the cognitive criteria possessed by normal adult humans, and we often protect their rights through a proxy, such as a parent or guardian. However, even though these rights are exercised on their behalf, we still consider that the right belongs directly to the individual being protected and not to the proxy. In addition, a problem with the argument from cognition is that it is presented as the primary reason for granting humans rights. Of course, one of the problems with violating the rights of people is the violation of their autonomy. However, as I have already argued, the criterion of sentiency is the foundational one for attribution of rights because it suggests that what is wrong with infringing upon a creature’s right is not primarily that it is an offense against his rationality but rather that it causes him harm. In addition, even if autonomy is the primary consideration with regard to rights possession, it has already been argued that animals have at least a weak sense of autonomy that should put some restrictions on what we can do to them in experiments. In particular, the cognitive criterion most often marshaled in defense of denying rights to animals is language. Because animals do not have language and thus cannot speak, they cannot claim rights, and the ability to claim rights is considered foundational to the notion of rights.37 While in most cases rights are exercised and asserted through speech, particularly by the person whose rights are violated, this is not a necessary condition for rights. As I argued in chapter 2, animals do have communication that is functionally analogous to human language, such that they are able to communicate at least some of their desires to us. Animals, like humans, can express their nonconsent nonverbally as well. Therefore, although most rights holders exercise their rights through speech, the fact that we extend rights to humans who do not have this capacity seems to demonstrate that it should not be a necessary condition for rights. In addition, marginal humans who cannot speak are not denied rights but, rather, are provided with proxies who can speak on their behalf. If we do believe that speech is so necessary for claiming rights, then another way to redress this with regard to animals is to provide them with proxies who can assert their rights on their behalf. To a certain extent, this is done for experimental animals in that at least one member of the institutional animal care and use committee is required to represent the interests of the animals. Therefore, even if speech

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is necessary for the exercise of rights, it seems that it is not necessary that the actual rights holder have this capability. The final argument for denying rights to animals is that they cannot reciprocate with regard to rights, and that rights by their very nature entail reciprocal responsibilities.38 In other words, those to whom rights are granted must also be capable of respecting the rights of others. To say that someone has rights means that others have a duty or obligation not to interfere with those rights. Thus, if we say that humans have the right to life, then we mean that all humans should both have this right respected in their own person and also be expected to respect this right in others. Therefore, the argument goes, if humans extend rights to and subsequently are expected to respect the rights of animals, then animals should be capable of respecting the rights of humans. If animals are incapable of doing this, then they cannot be the possessors of rights. Animals, to put it in other words, cannot be moral patients because they cannot be moral agents.39 The most obvious challenge to this argument is to deny that rights by nature must be reciprocal. As I argued earlier, we ascribe rights to marginal humans, although they are certainly incapable of moral agency in the same way as normal adult humans. Even though they cannot respect the rights of others, this does not mean that they do not have rights themselves. In addition, if we do believe that humans are uniquely capable of moral agency, then humans have a greater burden to protect the rights of those who cannot protect themselves. Greater power suggests greater responsibility, and thus it seems childish to argue that we should be exempt from our moral responsibility simply because others cannot respond in kind. Just because animals do not and cannot operate in the same moral arena as humans does not mean that humans should lower their own ethical standards and thereby relinquish their obligation to protect the rights of animals. Therefore, animals can be moral patients even if they are not moral agents.

Different Bases for Animal Rights There are others who also want to argue for animal rights but whose positions differ from mine with regard to two points. First, many tend to argue on the basis of a single criterion. Second, some want to draw the line somewhere differently between those animals that possess rights and those that do not. With regard to the first point, some who want to argue either for rights for animals or for greater protection of animals even if it is not couched in rights language (such as Peter Singer) tend to do so on the basis of a single criterion, such as the ability to experience pain. However, as I argued earlier, pain alone is not a sufficient basis for protecting animals, although it is a good first step. Although pain is the strongest reason for extending rights to animals, causing pain is not the only thing that can harm animals. In addition, the criterion of pain in and of itself does not permit us to distinguish among treatments for different species. It seems preferable to introduce cognition as a second cri-

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terion because it enables us to act in accord with our intuitions that, for example, harming a fish is not exactly the same (is not as morally problematic) as harming a chimpanzee. If pain is the only criterion, then we are unable to do this. In addition, as I have already argued, extending rights on the basis of any other single criterion mentioned, such as species membership or advanced cognitive criteria, is insufficient as well. The place where the line should be drawn for rights for animals is also subject to varying opinions. It is clear that any line drawing is going to be subject to criticism, since it is difficult to be exact and also because the different points will vary according to the basis upon which the distinctions are being made. Obviously, those who want to deny rights to animals but extend them to humans draw the line at the human species boundary, although as was argued previously, this seems rather arbitrary, and other criteria must ultimately enter in. Steven Wise wants to draw the line for now at those animals he believes possess autonomy and consciousness, in particular, chimpanzees and bonobos.40 Paul Waldau, while not specifically arguing for rights for animals, believes that the animals to be protected should include all great apes, whales, dolphins, and elephants.41 Peter Singer maintains that, since pain is the most important criterion, the line should be drawn somewhere (approximately) between a shrimp and an oyster.42 My own position, therefore, is quite similar to Singer’s on this point because although he rejects rights, the line for protection is drawn at sentience. However, Tom Regan’s position needs to be addressed here, both since his position with regard to the rights of animals is closest to my own and because he has been the strongest and most systematic spokesperson for the rights of animals. Regan argues that animals who have rights are those who are subjects-of-alife, a position that I briefly touched on earlier. However, once he has established his criteria for these animals, he maintains that the line should be drawn at mammals aged one year and older.43 Even on the basis of Regan’s own criteria, drawing the line at one year of age seems arbitrary. It seems fairly obvious that even mammals below the age of one can be subjects-of-a-life. In addition, it is difficult to compare different species. Is a one-year-old mouse mentally equivalent to a one-year-old dog or to a one-year-old human, if the life spans of these species differ so greatly? On average, a one-year-old mouse is one-third to one-half of the way through its life, the dog not even one-tenth, and the human just one-seventieth. Thus, drawing the line at the same place for all species seems discriminatory toward those species whose development occurs later and whose life span is shorter. In addition, if the reason for extending rights to animals begins with sentience instead of being subject-of-alife, then there are not only problems with drawing the line beginning with one-year-old mammals but also problems with even drawing the line specifically at mammals. Since some animals other than mammals can experience pain, then these animals need to have rights extended to them as well. One other important distinction that exists between myself and Tom Regan and therefore is important to mention at this point has to do with the practical implications of extending rights to animals, particularly experimental animals.

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Regan believes that the ways in which research is currently conducted make it impossible to sufficiently protect the rights of animals. Therefore, he says specifically that the answer is not reform (better cages) but liberation (empty cages). He does make one exception, though: if we could envision and put into practice a benign form of animal experimentation in which the rights of animals were certain to be protected, then he could support it. However, because he thinks it is impossible to practice such benign animal experimentation, he believes the practice of experimentation should be completely abolished.44 Although he is probably correct in terms of the unlikelihood that benign experimentation could be practiced, my later discussion of which rights experimental animals should have is an attempt to carefully describe what benign experimentation would look like. Although my proposals may be idealistic and hence unrealistic in the minds of many, including Regan, it does seem possible to outline such guidelines and urge people to follow them. Therefore, it is not that there is something inherent in the practice of animal experimentation that violates the rights of animals as much as some of the ways animals are treated in the process of experimentation.

Rights That Experimental Animals Should Have One way to address the question of the importance of assigning rights to animals is to ask what is to be accomplished by extending rights to animals.45 What are the implications for experimentation in particular if animals have rights? Obviously, as I argued earlier, extending rights to animals would have the effect of greatly improving their lives. However, it is important to go beyond theoretical discussion and to lay down specific rights that animals should have. Others have offered their own suggestions for which rights animals should have, but I am arguing here for the five that are essential, particularly for experimental animals. The first three are negative rights (freedom from interference), whereas the next two are positive rights (assistance of some sort). In regard to their rights in general, though, experimental animals should at least have the same kinds of protection that we currently extend to pets. It is obvious from even a cursory reading of the scientific literature that experimental animals in general are not treated in the same ways as those domesticated animals with whom humans have relationships. In fact, the treatment of any particular species can vary considerably, depending on the environment in which it lives and the purpose for which it is kept.46 Thus, a rabbit will receive very different treatment if he is a family pet as opposed to a research subject or even a zoo animal.47 If we are to respect the integrity of animals based on the possession of particular criteria, then it seems that a greater degree of consistency is required, particularly when we assert that animals have rights. However, since it is beyond the scope of this project to address the rights of animals in general, the focus in the discussion here will be on what rights experimental animals in particular should have.48 In addition, the rights listed are moral rights and in my judgment should also be legal rights.49

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Freedom from Unnecessary Pain and Suffering Every effort must be made to minimize painful experiments or those that cause considerable suffering. Thus, we have a prima facie responsibility to experimental animals not to cause them pain and suffering. Although it is difficult to specify precisely what is meant by “unnecessary” pain and suffering, this term is used because it suggests that there may be times when infliction of pain and suffering can be justified. However, because the infliction of pain and suffering on experimental animals is a frequent occurrence, it is important to distinguish between when it is and is not necessary. This can be determined partly by weighing the benefit gained to humans against the harm caused to animals. However, other ways to ensure that this right is protected is to insist on the use of drugs for considerable pain, the use of pain scales to determine points beyond which we should not go, husbandry conditions that do not in and of themselves cause suffering, and humane euthanasia by those specifically trained in such methods when death as the end point is unavoidable. A helpful rule of thumb would also be to prohibit any kind of pain and suffering to experimental animals to which a pet owner would be unwilling to expose her own pet. One important distinction needs to be made with regard to pain and suffering. When it comes to infliction of pain, all animals capable of experiencing pain should be extended similar treatment. Thus, all other factors being equal, we cannot justify doing a painful procedure on a mouse instead of a chimpanzee if we know that both will experience pain similarly. However, due to different cognitive levels, some animals may have a greater capacity to suffer than others, and when we can determine this, then those animals capable of greater suffering should be extended greater protection so that when we have a choice, animals with lesser capacities for suffering should be used in experiments instead.

Not to Have Liberty So Restricted All animals have a simple desire for mobility that is greatly restricted in a laboratory setting. Obviously, in a natural wild state, animals would have considerable mobility, although it would vary greatly depending on the particular species. We usually cannot accord most experimental animals the same degree of mobility as their wild counterparts, but we should extend to them at least what would we extend to them if we kept them as pets. While the practice of keeping pets has its own set of problems, what is simply being argued here is that even if most pets have a more restricted life than their wild counterparts, they generally have a significantly better life than their experimental counterparts. Therefore, when it comes to mobility, a helpful rule of thumb would be that significant efforts should be made to extend to laboratory animals an equivalent kind of mobility that we extend to pets. In practical terms, this would necessitate larger cages for rodents and perhaps large rooms or pens for ani-

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mals not typically kept in cages, with outdoor facilities where this is a possibility. Obviously, the requirements would depend on the specific needs of the species in question.50

Not to Have Their Lives Unnecessarily Shortened It is regrettable that most experimental animals will be put to death at the conclusion of the experiments. Obviously, there are times when this may be warranted, as in cases of postmortem dissection to ascertain the results of the experiment or when the animals will experience considerable pain and suffering in living out the rest of their lives. However, one of the most striking differences between human and animal experimentation is that experimental animals usually spend their entire lives living in a laboratory. Most people would probably be opposed to all human experimentation if the only way for it to occur would be by confining humans for life in a laboratory, regardless of whether they were subjected to pain and suffering, but especially if they were killed at the conclusion of the experiment. Of course, just because humans have a right to life does not mean that animals should have this same right. However, the fact that experimental animals must often lead such diminished lives and then have them unnecessarily shortened seems unavoidable in current practice, but there are practical suggestions for averting this problem. The first way is making concerted attempts to adopt out experimental animals no longer needed as experimental subjects,51 and the second way is allowing people to volunteer their pets for short-term experiments.52 Granted, there are obvious logistical problems with both of these solutions. In addition, there may be times when this would not work for medical reasons, as in cases where animals as a result of their experiments are carrying diseases that can spread to humans or other animals, or when the postoperative care required would be too much of a burden on the human owner. However, just because these solutions would not work in some cases does not mean that they cannot work in other cases, and attempts should be made to implement them if they will provide a longer and better quality of life for experimental animals. The right to not have their lives unnecessarily shortened is obviously quite different from having a right to life, which is not being argued for most animals. When it comes to animals, the right to life is not as strong a right as the right not to be treated cruelly or the right to be free from unnecessary pain and suffering. That animals may not have a right to life does not mean that they do not have a right to a good life while they are alive. However, there should be a stronger presumption against taking the lives of animals with higher cognitive levels, especially nonhuman primates, both because they have at least enough understanding of the concept of death to be capable of grieving over the death of conspecifics and because they have the capacity to engage in a rich cognitive life. Therefore, when animals such as these are not easily adopted out, stringent efforts should be made to enable them to live out the remainder of their lives in sanctuaries with conspecifics.53

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To Engage in Species-specific Behavior This right means that animals should be enabled, as far as is practically possible in experimental settings, to live according to the nature of the species to which they belong, according to their telos.54 In general, this right is compromised or violated by a boring, barren environment and by frustration of their normal behavior. For us to enable animals to live according to their natures in laboratories, we must first learn what their natures are. There are two ways that we can do this: one is by observing the behavior of these species in the wild, to in a sense determine how they behave in more natural settings (or even in some cases by observing these species kept as pets), and to utilize preference tests (notwithstanding some attendant problems with these tests, which were discussed in chapter 3). Some attempts to permit animals to engage in species-specific behavior are already enforced legislatively, such as the requirements that dogs be walked and primates be provided with items to create a more stimulating environment for them. However, even these requirements are limited with regard to these species and certainly exclude other animals from consideration. It is obvious that many species are prohibited from engaging in normal behavior for their species by virtue of being kept in small cages, and the right that animals’ liberty not be unnecessarily restricted is part of what is required to enable them to engage in species-specific behavior. Two examples should suffice to explain what is meant here. Rodents such as rats are social creatures that like to burrow. However, being kept in laboratories in often individual, sanitary cages devoid of bedding prohibits them from these natural actions. In fact, virtually all experimental animals, even social ones, are kept isolated from conspecifics. Cats, while typically solitary, enjoy jumping and climbing, which their small cages prohibit them from doing. Although it may be impossible and even impractical to enable laboratory animals to have the same quality of life that their natures would dictate, attempts should be made to move in this direction.

To Be Treated with Respect as Individuals This is the one right that would be the most difficult or in some cases even impossible to enforce legislatively, since it ultimately goes to the attitude and motivation of the experimenter.55 Even when it comes to humans, we can legally draw acceptable boundaries for treatment, but we cannot with the same legislation force people to respect others or to relinquish their prejudices toward them. However, even when we cannot enforce respect, it is often obvious when it is present and when it is missing. It is even more difficult, though, to express what it means to say that animals have the right to be treated with respect, but there are some general attitudes and practices that could engender respect toward experimental animals. First, experimenters must move beyond seeing animals only as resources to be used and toward seeing them as creatures with an integrity and purpose aside from their use as experimental subjects. This is another way of saying that to respect animals is to see them as

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having intrinsic and not only instrumental value.56 Second, experimenters should try to view the species they work with and the way they treat them as they would if these animals were their pets. Third, experimenters need to make an attempt to empathize with the suffering of the animals they experiment on, so that an initial question before even submitting an experimental procedure for approval would be whether they would be willing to allow such treatment to be accorded to themselves, if it would result in a comparable level of suffering.57 Fourth, a practical way to begin to see animals as individuals worthy of respect would be to name all animals in experiments. While this is done with some species, especially where the number of animals used is smaller and the individual animals have discernible personalities (such as primates), and while it may not be practical in all cases to relinquish the use of numbers, naming individuals is an important way of recognizing them as individuals. The use of numbers instead of names with regard to humans is usually seen as a depersonalization of the individuals, from the perspective of both the victims and the victimizers, such as in prison settings. This idea echoes the well-known adage in farming communities: “If you are going to eat them, then do not name them.” Naming a creature is one way that experimenters can keep in mind that research animals are not just numbers and therefore must not be treated as such.58

Conclusion Obviously, to grant experimental animals rights, whether moral or legal, is not the solution to all problems with regard to their treatment. Of course, to have general agreement that animals have rights, as we do with humans, would be extremely helpful in moving us toward greater protection, but it will not solve all of the problems. A particularly thorny problem that would remain is how to protect the rights of animals when they come into conflict with the rights of humans or with benefits that are believed likely to result for humans as a result of these rights violations. To say that animals have rights ultimately means that, when it comes to conflict cases, we should not automatically choose in favor of humans. However, the use of animals in experiments is a classic case of the rights of humans versus the rights of animals. Instead of arbitrarily always favoring the rights of humans, though, we need to ascertain more precisely the burdens and benefits for each group, and therefore in chapter 6 I will attempt to provide such an analysis. Before that, though, we will examine how Christian theology can provide an even stronger foundation for the recommendations being made in this project to further restrict animal experimentation, before addressing a specific burden/benefit analysis.

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5 Christian Theology

The Christian tradition is often criticized as not having played a very positive role with regard to the treatment of animals and, in fact, has sometimes been charged with contributing to the negative treatment of animals.1 This charge is generally made about its concept of dominion, which seems to suggest that animals have only instrumental value in relationship to human beings. In addition, until recent times, there has been very little serious academic interest addressing the positive role and treatment of animals. However, Christianity has not been completely negative in its approach to animals. Although they have been minority voices, throughout the ages, there have been saints, mystics, and theologians who have been vocal advocates for animals, such as Francis of Assisi and Albert Schweitzer, and some theologians have recently focused on the issue of animals.2 Thus, even if Christianity may have a mixed history on its view toward and treatment of animals, this does not negate the possibility of creating a more positive theology regarding animals.3 In this chapter, I will argue that Christian theology contains the resources from which one can construct a more positive theology for animals, and I will do so by examining some of the principal doctrines within systematic theology, specifically creation, sin, Christology, and eschatology. While I am certainly not claiming to be the first to do so, I will be constructing my own theology regarding animals and will derive implications for the treatment of experimental animals. This theology will not necessarily provide a completely different ethic from other religious or nonreligious sources also trying to establish a more positive ethic for animals. Rather, it will simply conceptualize one Christian way for Christians to think about the treatment of experimental animals, which will provide a stronger

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foundation for the arguments already made on the subject in previous chapters.4

Creation Creation is probably the most important doctrine regarding the role and treatment of animals in relationship to human beings. This doctrine is largely derived from and dependent on the creation narratives in the book of Genesis, and therefore in this section I will examine certain elements within these narratives and within the traditional doctrine of creation itself to address specifically the relationship between God and animals, the relationship between God and humans, and the relationship between humans and animals. There are actually two creation narratives in the book of Genesis, one found in Genesis 1:1–2:4a and the other in Genesis 2:4b–25. The first account is the one more commonly cited about the relationship between humans and animals, so it will be the focus in this chapter, but comments about the other account will be addressed as well.5

The Creation Narratives To explore the doctrine of creation, it is important to first examine the actual creation narratives primarily found in Genesis, acknowledge the limitations of the biblical text in general and of the creation narratives in particular, and then derive certain general principles from it. In the first creation narrative, everything is presented as being created through the spoken word of God. God brought order out of chaos, beginning with inanimate matter and then moving on to vegetation, animals, and humans, in that order. God created the world in six days and rested on the seventh, with animals created on the fourth, fifth, and sixth days of creation and humans on the sixth day. After each day of creation, God noted that it was “good,” and on the sixth day, with the creation of the land animals and human beings, God saw that it was “very good.” The same word, nephesh, is used to indicate the matter with which God endowed all creatures.6 Humans (Adam and Eve) were specifically created in the image of God, as male and female. They were blessed by God and were told to be fruitful and multiply, to replenish and subdue the earth, and to have dominion over all living things. The second creation account begins in the garden with the existence of Adam, who at that point did not have a companion for himself. After Adam’s creation and placement in the garden, God creates the rest of the animals. Adam is permitted to name all of the animals, and he viewed them to see if there was a companion suitable for himself from among the animals. Because there was not one, God created Eve as Adam’s companion. There is no mention of the concept of dominion in this account, which is frequently cited as the justification for many treatments of animals. The third chapter of Genesis follows with what has come to be known as the Fall in Christian theology.

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Before this Fall, all of creation appeared to peacefully coexist and had a vegetarian diet (1:29–30). The evidence for the latter is that eating meat is not mentioned until after the Fall, and the creation narrative itself specifically mentions God giving vegetation for food not only to Adam and Eve but also to all animals (1:29–30). It was not until after the expulsion from the garden that Adam and Eve used the skins of animals for clothing (3:21), and Abel is the first person mentioned to engage in animal sacrifice (4:1–4). The only significant point related to animals found in the second creation narrative is that humans (Adam) were specifically given the task of naming animals. These narratives have had a significant impact on conceptualizing the relationship between humans and animals. However, before examining what they can contribute to a theology for animal experimentation, I will acknowledge limitations in the use of the biblical text in general and with these narratives in particular. With regard to the biblical text, it should not be regarded as an infallible, inerrant guide containing specific timeless truths for faith and morals. Rather, as many religious scholars now acknowledge, the Bible should be viewed as a historically and culturally conditioned text, as all texts are, written at specific points in history and addressing specific concerns. Since the Bible itself is actually a collection of books, written by many different authors over a long span of time, the problems are even greater, because there are sometimes even contradictions and discrepancies among these different authors. Therefore, the Bible cannot simply be taken literally in such a way that biblical commands can always unilaterally and specifically be applied to contemporary situations. Some of the practices the Bible either supported or commanded we would consider abhorrent today, such as slavery, oppression of women, and certain aspects of the Holiness Code (e.g., stoning homosexuals and putting to death children who disobey their parents). In addition, there are other serious contemporary ethical issues the Bible does not specifically address, such as nuclear war, cloning, and even animal experimentation. However, this does not mean that the Bible can be of no help to us with regard to contemporary issues, including the treatment of animals. What, then, can be concluded about the use of the Bible for shedding light on ethical concerns? First, the Bible is only one resource among many, and therefore the Wesleyan quadrilateral in Methodism with tradition, reason, and experience complementing the biblical text is more helpful than reliance on the Bible alone.7 Thus, while it is important to see what the biblical text has to say about the treatment of animals, it must be supplemented by these other sources. Second, the Bible is more helpful with regard to general guidelines rather than specific laws, given the context-driven nature of many of the narratives and prescriptions. Third, the hermeneutic of suspicion utilized by liberation theologians with regard to women and other marginalized minorities is important in reminding us that the biblical text has been written from the perspective of and by the powerful rather than the disenfranchised. The creation narratives should not be understood as presenting a literal account of the origin of the universe. These narratives (and many other narratives in the Bible as well) are now considered to be primarily myths rather

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than literal accounts of the way things happened. A myth is simply a symbolic story whose primary purpose is to convey religious rather than empirical truth. In particular, the creation account is a means by which people tried to arrive at a religious understanding of and meaning for creation, as something that uniquely proceeded from God. Obvious problems exist with an attempt to accept this story as literally true, such as how we can actually know how the world came into existence since no one was there with God at the creation of the universe, and how the creation of the world in six days squares with theories from science on the origins and particularly the age of the universe. Subsequently, then, the biblical account of creation need not be at odds with a theory of evolution, particularly theistic evolution. It is possible to maintain a theistic account of evolution, in which God is viewed as somehow involved in directly fashioning creation at the beginning of the process but since then works from within creation through evolution. Thus, theistic evolution maintains what is most important in the doctrine of creation—that God is the ultimate origin of the whole created order, regardless of the specific manner in which it came into being. Therefore, since the purpose of the creation narrative is religious understanding and meaning, we are able to derive certain principles from its account that can prove useful in the development of a Christian theology for animals. The creation narratives were and are often cited as theological justification for the domination of humans over animals and for the belief that animals existed only (or primarily) for human use. However, we can derive several general observations from these narratives that can inform a more positive theology for animals. First, the inherent goodness of creation: Everything God has created is good because it comes from the hand of God, such that nothing is intrinsically evil. God takes pleasure in all of God’s created order, and all of creation reveals the goodness and glory of God. Second, the relationship between God and all of creation: All of creation is necessarily dependent on God not only for its origin but also for its continuance. Everything not God derives its existence from God. Thus, implicit in the doctrine of creation is not only the idea that God created the world but also the concept that God continues to sustain the world through God’s providential care. Third, the largest gap is not between humans and animals but between God and the rest of creation. All of creation is completely other than God. This suggests a closer relationship between humans and animals, and it emphasizes the continuity of all creation. This continuity is also suggested by the idea that all of creation was endowed with the same nephesh, which is usually understood to mean the animating force that came forth from God and now resides in all creatures.

The Relationship between God and Animals The doctrine of creation can aid us in several ways to provide a better understanding of what the relationship is between God and animals. First of all, if all of creation has inherent goodness and thereby inherent value, then God has endowed animals as well with this inherent goodness and value. Animals are

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considered “good” by God by simple virtue of the fact that God has brought them into existence. One of the questions that is sometimes raised with regard to theodicy is whether this is the best possible world that God could have created. It is impossible for humans to answer this question with satisfaction, but it is apparent that God could have created a world without animals. The fact that they were brought into existence suggests that God’s ideal of a world includes the existence of beings other than humans. In addition, the notion of the goodness of creation suggests that for God, all of animal creation has value—not just nonhuman primates, dolphins, and dogs but rats, mice, and birds as well. It seems logical to argue that God cares about all animals and does not make the same kind of distinctions among animals that humans tend to make. Of course, one could argue that perhaps we should not even make distinctions between sentient and nonsentient creatures, if God loves all creatures. However, even if God does not make these same kinds of distinctions as humans sometimes make, God is concerned with the suffering of God’s creatures, and it makes sense to say that God has a particular concern for those animals that are sentient. This does not commit one to the view that God loves these sentient creatures better, but to the extent that they can experience harm, pain, suffering, and other deprivations, then it seems logical to say that God would be concerned especially but not necessarily exclusively that these sentient animals (as well as nonsentient animals) enjoy a life of well-being as much as is possible. Second, the doctrine of creation includes both God’s original act of creation and God’s continuing providential care of God’s creatures, including animals. If animals have value by virtue of their creation, then it follows that God would be concerned about their continued well-being. It does not make sense for God to have created animals with goodness and value to simply leave them to the whims of nature, life, and, especially, humans. This is simply another way of saying that God cares about the suffering of all of God’s creatures, and thus God continues to care about the well-being of all animals.8 The Christian understanding of God puts a strong emphasis on God as personal, loving, and compassionate, and these characteristics result in God extending this personal loving care toward all individuals. It is not necessary that this personal care be restricted to humans; it can extend to animals as well. Again, this does not mean that God cares only about those animals able to experience pain and suffering, just as God does not love only those humans who experience pain and suffering. Rather, to say that God is compassionate and empathizes with the pain of all creatures is to say that God carries a special burden for those of God’s creatures who suffer more than those who do not, even though God may equally love them all. This providential care of God is also contained in the notion of covenant. The notion of covenant binds God to all of God’s creatures, not just to humans.9 Although the covenant is typically understood as relating only to humans, at least a couple of biblical texts militate against this position. One text is the Noahic covenant: After the flood, God’s covenant included not only Noah, his family, and all of his descendants but also all of the creatures in the ark with

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him and his family.10 Another is the story of Jonah: Jonah is commanded by God to preach to the people of Nineveh, and the book concludes with God’s concern not only for the people of that city but also for the cattle of that city. This suggests at the very least that the destinies of humans and animals are interrelated.11 Finally, the second creation narrative offers a perspective that emphasizes the interrelationship between humans and animals with regard to their shared destiny.12 These examples suggest that an exclusively humancentered approach to covenant can be challenged by at least some biblical narratives. Third, since animals were created before humans (at least in the first creation account), their purpose must be something other than, or at least in addition to, their relationship to humans. This would be true whether or not animals were created in the literal six days of creation or over millions or billions of years through an evolutionary process. It seems ludicrous to argue, especially on the basis of evolutionary theory, that animals exist largely or only for human use if they predate us by such a long period of time. It also raises the question of what purpose these animals had before humans entered on the scene. Certainly, any animals that existed before humans but are now extinct, such as dinosaurs, would have to have had a purpose completely unrelated to human beings, or why would they have existed in the first place? However, other animals as well must have intrinsic and not only instrumental value. Of course, this was already argued in an earlier chapter on the basis of their natures, but the doctrine of creation undergirds this idea. We can then ask the subsequent question of what the original purpose of animals was. It seems that it can easily be answered in the same way as we can for humans: that the dual purpose of all creation is to live in relationship with God and to give glory to God. Specifically in regard to the relationship between God and animals, then, we can say that animals were created by God with the original intention of giving glory to God simply by virtue of their existence. Fourth, animals can be said to have rights because they are creatures of God. In chapter 4, I argued that animals do have moral rights and should have legal rights as well on the basis of their natures, most specifically, due to their cognitive ability and sentience. However, I also suggested that God is another source for the grounding of rights. If indeed all of creation has intrinsic value and goodness simply by virtue of its creation by God, then it seems logical to assert that God has endowed not only humans but also animals with rights. Theologian Andrew Linzey has argued for the notion of what he calls “theosrights.” His view is that God has rights in God’s creation and that these rights bear witness to the sacredness of all life. Although I am in agreement with much of Linzey’s theology, one of the troubling aspects of his view of rights is that he seems to suggest that the rights of animals are indirect rather than direct—that what is wrong with harming animals is that it harms their Creator. He does not specifically state this, but his emphasis on “God’s rights in creation” rather than on the actual rights of animals strongly suggests this.13 If this is true, then not only are our duties to animals indirect rather than direct but also we are arguing on the contemporary human model of animals as property,

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whose only real harm is in terms of its effect on its owner, in this case with the property owner being God. However, as has already been argued, to say that animals have rights on the basis of their nature and that humans subsequently have direct duties to them is simply to say that what is wrong with harming animals is not just that God will be grieved but that the actual animals themselves will suffer harm. Of course, to say that animals have been endowed with rights by God does not mean that rights are the only basis of moral obligation within Christian theology. The notion of rights must be supplemented by the presence of other qualities, such as reverence and responsibility.14 However, at the very least, the Christian doctrine of creation reinforces the notion of animal rights. What are the implications for animal experimentation? The most important issue is how the treatment of experimental animals fares from God’s perspective. If God values, loves, and cares about all animals, then the setting in which they are found should not affect God’s view toward them. With regard to experimental animals, it means that God does not care less about animals kept in cages in laboratories than about those in the wild. To the extent that experimentation harms animals, to that extent does God care about what is done to them and how they are treated? As I noted in an earlier chapter, humans often discriminate between the kinds of treatment accorded to particular animals on the basis of their relationship to humans, so that a pet would ordinarily receive better treatment than a laboratory animal, and some species, regardless of the context, are afforded better treatment. If God loves all of God’s creatures, then God is concerned about the treatment accorded even to less favored species, including those animals not currently protected in research under the Animal Welfare Act (e.g., rats, mice, birds) but who are sentient. Finally, if God does not desire the suffering of God’s creatures, then God must will well-being and lack of pain and suffering even for laboratory animals. If animals have intrinsic value and ultimately exist for the glory of God, then it is difficult to see how the treatment accorded to many laboratory animals would be in keeping with God’s original purposes for them, especially in light of the fact that in experimentation animals are viewed primarily in terms of their instrumental value to humans.

The Relationship between God and Humans To derive implications from the doctrine of creation for the relationship between humans and animals, it is important to examine first the relationship between God and humans. Humans are considered to be the only creatures made in the image of God (imago dei), meaning that there is something unique about humans that differentiates them from all other creatures.15 There has been considerable speculation as to what it means to say that humans are created in the image of God, focusing on two broad areas—whether the differences are ontological or functional. To argue that the differences are ontological is to assert that there is some innate capacity or nature at the foundation of the difference, such as the possession of morality, rationality, soul, personal

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existence, or responsibility.16 To argue that the differences are functional is to assert that it is something that humans do, such as a particular task assigned to them by God, that distinguishes them from the rest of creation. A functional model seems to be a more helpful way of understanding what it means to say that humans are created in the image of God.17 It has already been argued that at least some cognitive capacities traditionally considered to be ontologically unique to humans can be located on a spectrum, thereby representing differences of degree rather than differences of kind with relation to animals. Thus, there is no cognitive capacity present in humans that is absent in animals. If this is true, then we cannot point to any one cognitive ontological difference between humans and animals that would conclusively indicate that this is what it means for humans to be created in the image of God. Of course, this is not to say that there are not significant differences between humans and animals, and it is likely that the higher capacities of humans are the principal basis for their unique function. However, this does not necessarily mean that ontological differences should be the primary basis for an understanding of what it means for humans to have been created in the image of God. It may be more difficult to argue one way or the other on the basis of other typical criteria that have been proposed, such as the possession of a soul and the possession of a moral sense, because they are less available to empirical testing.18 Regarding the issue of animals lacking a moral sense, there are two ways to respond to this. The first way is to argue that at least some animals do have a moral sense.19 This is a very broad topic that has recently garnered much attention. Some examples typically offered of animal behavior that may indicate a moral sense are animals taking care of orphaned babies within their own species, monkeys willing to suffer themselves rather than harm conspecifics, and even interspecies acts of helpfulness, such as dolphins rescuing humans from drowning. The second way is to question the actual moral virtue typically practiced by humans. While acknowledging the fact that humans certainly are capable of and often choose to engage in right moral actions, sometimes even supererogatory actions to help their fellow humans, the existence of moral evil in the world should at the very least make us a bit humble in our assertions about the moral superiority of human beings.20 Finally, another challenge to the argument from cognitive criteria is that the biblical text does not specifically express what this ontological criterion (or criteria) would be, so the discussion is quite speculative. However, it does explicitly address a particular task assigned to humans—that of dominion. Before considering precisely what dominion means in relationship to humans’ treatment of animals, dominion suggests that God’s rulership in the world is largely exercised through the power, decisions, and actions of human beings. What primarily makes humans the crowning point of God’s creation is that they have been given responsibility to be God’s agents in this world, vessels through whom God works God’s purposes for all of creation.

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The Relationship between Humans and Animals The doctrine of creation—and specifically the concept of dominion—can contribute to our understanding of the relationship between humans and animals in several ways. First, as I previously mentioned, if animal existence predates human existence, then we have to be careful about assuming or asserting that animals exist only or primarily for human use. While this does not completely rule out an instrumental understanding of animals, it is an insufficient basis on which to build a theology for animals. In support of this, the biblical narrative also states that on the sixth day of creation, said by God to be “very good,” land animals were created on the same day as human beings. The narrative also states that all of creation was made from or with the same substance. All of this suggests that humans and animals both have their common origin in God, everything created by God has its own value, and thus animals cannot simply be seen as a means to the end of the rest of creation. Second, the original relationship between humans and animals was one of peace. This is evident in the vegetarian diet charged to both humans and animals. Meat eating and subsequent violence are a result of the Fall, and they do not appear to have been part of God’s original plan for creation, as they first appear in the story of Cain and Abel (Gen. 4:1–7). Obviously, the existence of sin has adversely affected not only relationships among humans but also relationships between humans and animals. At the very least, this means that we must engage in whatever efforts we can to restore the original peace to our disordered existence. Third, we need to reconceptualize precisely what is meant by dominion. The understanding of dominion derives from the biblical narrative in which humans were commanded by God to subdue the earth and have dominion over all living things, and it is also implied by the activity of naming animals, which suggests the power of the one doing the naming over the one who is named. In particular, the word “dominion” has been translated or understood on a spectrum, ranging from despotism to benign stewardship. Although despotism was probably never specifically asserted as part of the Christian doctrine of creation, the ways in which animals have been treated in human history certainly suggest that interpretation, at least by some. Of course, the entire history of the mistreatment of animals cannot be laid at the doorstep of Christian theology, although it can be argued that a more negative interpretation of the term “dominion” certainly has not helped and suggests that dominion has not always been understood in a benevolent way. The typical understanding of dominion in Christian theology does not mean that any kind of cruelty was permitted and supported toward animals. However, as evident in the writings of people such as Aquinas and Kant, the principal concerns for acts of cruelty toward animals were the effects they would ultimately have on human beings, whether on the human animal owner being harmed, or by the cruel dispositions of the ones who harmed animals subsequently coming to express their cruelty toward humans. If dominion means that God’s exercise of power and influence toward all creation is mediated through human beings, then this dominion must be a reflection of the character of God. If, as in

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Christian theology, God is conceived of as loving and compassionate, then the view of dominion as benevolent stewardship seems a better understanding of the term than despotism. The concept of stewardship implies caring for that which is actually the property of another.21 If animals (and ultimately all of creation) in a sense “belong” to or are “owned” by God, then dominion, interpreted as benign stewardship, implies a careful treatment of what belongs to God, precisely because it does belong to and is subsequently cared about by God. What, then, are the implications of dominion for understanding the relationship between humans and animals? While one can justify some instrumental use of animals, since humans have been given the responsibility for animals, it certainly does not justify any treatment of animals. This use does need to be moderated by some restrictions on their treatment. The task of naming animals in the biblical narrative supports the contention previously made that animals in laboratory settings should be named. Although in the biblical narrative it was likely a manifestation of the power of humans over animals, it can also be argued that naming was a way of individuating animals, since it was how Adam decided that none of these animals was fit for him as a companion.22 In addition, if the functional task of humans in relation to the rest of creation has been given to them by God, then our theology toward animals needs to be a theocentric one rather than an anthropocentric one, meaning simply that when considering attitudes and actions toward animals, the primary question should not be how they can be of use to humans but how this use of animals measures against God’s original and ultimate purposes for them. At the very least, humans should attempt to demonstrate the care and concern toward God’s creatures that God has toward them, and it seems that special care should be taken in the practice of experimentation in which the possibility for great harm toward animals exists. Although to have dominion can allow for the use of animals in experiments, it certainly does not justify utilizing them in harmful ways simply because of the possible or even certain benefits to humans.23

Sin The actions by which the ideal portrayed in the opening chapters of Genesis has been destroyed have been called “sin” in the Christian tradition. Although sin has been analyzed in many different ways in Christian theology, in this section I will address the doctrine of original sin and liberation theology with regard to the implications for the treatment of animals, as well as possible solutions to the sin problem toward animals.

Original Sin The peaceful and idyllic garden portrayed in the opening chapters of Genesis was very short-lived. What the creation and subsequent narratives on the dis-

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obedience of Adam and Eve toward God suggest is that the world in which we now live is not the world as God intended it to be. We do not live in an ideal world, but one characterized by many problems. The Christian understanding of the departure from God’s original purpose for creation has been called the Fall, and its reality is manifested through the presence of sin in the world. Original sin is typically viewed as the reason or the basis for the manifestation of sinful actions. Although the narrative in the third chapter of Genesis provides a mythical account of how the Fall occurred, the importance of the doctrine of original sin is not so much in its origin as in its reality. Even if we do not believe in any literal way in the biblical account of the Fall, and even if we cannot subsequently explain the origin of sin in any other satisfactory way, this doctrine provides us with an explanation for the continuing and pervasive reality of sin in the world. This reality is expressed toward both animals and humans. Recently some theologians have wanted to discount or downplay the doctrine of original sin. Some reasons why some theologians have rejected the doctrine of original sin are as follows: that it expresses a predominantly negative rather than a positive view of human nature (that humans are basically evil rather than good); that this doctrine is not that clear even in the biblical text; and that it focuses too much on sin, which has been too much of an emphasis in Christian theology in the past. For a number of reasons, I think that it is a very important doctrine to retain. It provides a way of explaining the universality of sin, in its individual, social, historical, and cosmic dimensions. It explains the ever-present reality of sin and the tendency of humans to so often make wrong moral choices. It is obvious that the world in which we live is beset by disorder, violence, and selfishness of all kinds and is thereby in sharp contrast with the way that God or even humans in their utopian dreams would want the world to be. Of course, the reality of original sin does not negate the potential and even actual goodness of human beings to make right moral choices. It simply expresses the immense freedom humans have, both for good and evil, with an inclination to often choose the latter. Although the doctrine of original sin is primarily understood as having implications for relationships among human beings, it also has significant implications for the relationship between humans and animals. Although only humans are believed to be capable of sin, animals suffer the effects of sin as well, such that the ideal peaceful relationship between humans and animals has been marred. Thus, the doctrine of original sin provides the backdrop for the existence of disharmony in human-animal relationships—and possibly even for the disharmony in relationships among animals. It seems obvious that much of human disorder, violence, and selfishness has been manifested toward the animal kingdom. In the biblical account, early evidence of the effects of the Fall and thus original sin upon animals was that the human diet changed from a vegetarian to a meat-based one, and animals became routinely utilized in sacrifices to God.24 Subsequent biblical narratives indicate that animals eventually were also extensively used in agriculture, for transportation, and in warfare. In fact, one of the ways in which the treatment of animals has

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been justified in the Christian tradition, in addition to the creation injunction on dominion, has been by pointing to such examples in the biblical text in an attempt to demonstrate that animals do seem primarily to have been created for their instrumental value to humans. While the doctrine of original sin can be used to explain the disharmony between humans and animals, the question can be raised as to why there is disharmony within the animal kingdom. After all, some might argue, animals do harm and kill other animals, implying some kind of hierarchy. If some animals can engage in such acts against other animals, then does this not justify human superiority over other animals, and is not this superiority justified by evolutionary theory itself as opposed to the reality of original sin? My position is that the disharmony even within the animal kingdom is a result of sin. As I argued before, the diet of all beings was a vegetarian one before the Fall, and the eschatological hope of Isaiah (11:6) presents an ideal in which the lion will lie down with the lamb. This suggests that the harm animals do to one another is not part of God’s original plan, but rather it is a result of the fallen condition of the entire cosmos. However, even if the disharmony within the animal kingdom is not due to sin, there are very significant differences between what animals do to one another and what human beings do to animals in experimentation. First, one can argue that the only reason for some animals to kill others is that they are biologically constituted to do so, on the basis of their instincts. Although we can agree that humans have some instincts, it seems a stretch to suggest that humans have an instinct to kill animals. Second, even when animals do kill one another, it is in a controlled situation—one animal against another animal—and does not result in an institutional slaughter or mistreatment of a large group of animals. Third, when a carnivorous species seeks food, it tends to prey on a limited number of species that specifically will fulfill its food requirements, unlike the case of humans, who tend to cause harm to virtually all animal species. Fourth, when animals do kill others, they usually kill the weakest rather than the healthiest specimens of the particular species they are pursuing; they pick out the most vulnerable, who, for example, are not able to run as fast or who wander from the protection of the herd. This is in sharp contrast to humans, who routinely utilize and kill healthy animals. Fifth, when animals kill each other, it is usually a quick death that is not preceded by a long period of suffering, such as is the case in experimentation. Sixth, while this argument of animal violence might have more validity with regard to eating animals, there is nothing in the animal kingdom analogous to experimentation upon another species. Thus, the argument from the survival of the fittest does not adequately challenge the notion that original sin is the principal reason for disorder in all relationships among species. Again, one does not need to rely on a literal understanding of the Bible to demonstrate the significance of the doctrine of original sin for the treatment of animals. However, this does not mean that the treatment of animals has been unilaterally negative. The Bible itself contains numerous prescriptions regarding their treatment, such as Sabbath rest for animals as well as humans,

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and injunctions on taking care of and expressing kindness toward one’s animals.25 However, it is clear that the predominant message of the biblical text, the history of the Hebrew people, archaeological evidence of other groups during that time, and the subsequent record of the treatment of animals in human history all bear extensive witness to the poor treatment humans afford animals. Animals often were and continue to be treated primarily as resources for human beings. The doctrine of original sin has implications for the treatment of experimental animals in particular. Animal experimentation provides evidence of the disorder in the relationship between humans and animals. The entire practice demonstrates that animals are largely viewed and treated as existing primarily for the purposes of human beings. The very fact that animals in this setting are seen virtually only in terms of their potential contribution to human life and health is problematic enough. In addition, the often poor treatment afforded many experimental animals and the subsequent lack of legal protection extended toward some species also demonstrate the existence of this disharmony. Many of the procedures done on animals in the course of experiments that cause significant suffering and pain seem inexplicable if not for the reality of human sin. Original sin also provides us with an explanation for the attitudes of at least some scientists (but certainly not all), who seem to put their careers and reputations above the interests of animals.26

Liberation Theology and Sin The traditional understanding of dominion, as well as the doctrine of original sin, can be understood as explanations for the ill treatment often afforded to animals, although primarily in terms of individual sin. However, sin can also be understood in social terms, through the oppression of one group by another, and as residing within the structures of institutions themselves. Animal experimentation can be considered an example of the exploitation of the powerless by the powerful, and therefore it is worth briefly mentioning the contribution that liberation theology can make to this issue. Although liberation theology is traditionally understood with regard to humans, I will argue that application can be made to the situation of animals as well. Liberation theology is a relatively recent development in Christian theology, rooted in Marxist ideology. It attempts to highlight the plight of and thereby the special interest of God in the economically and politically disadvantaged groups in human society. Liberation theology begins with the assumption that history has been written and promulgated from the viewpoint of the dominant class, primarily male humans. The exodus story in the Old Testament provides the foundation for this theology, in which God helped to free the Israelites from slavery and bring them into the promised land. This story provides the metaphor for how God continues to be concerned with and work on behalf of the poor, oppressed, marginalized, and powerless in society. This does not mean that God loves the marginalized better but simply that they require a special kind of protection not needed by some other groups, particularly the

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powerful. This work of freedom and empowerment, obviously, needs to be done through the work of other humans, both by those who suffer the oppression but especially by those who are the oppressors. Sin, then, in addition to being understood as individual acts, is primarily viewed as a larger social— sometimes even institutional—problem, in which some groups tend to marginalize and exploit others. Liberation theology, in its various forms, also includes a biblical hermeneutic of suspicion, which brings a critical eye to the biblical text in light of the fact that biblical history has been written from the perspective of the powerful and not the powerless. Because of this bias, feminist theologians, for example, search for the sometimes obscure clues both in the text and in human history to demonstrate that the biblical account of the treatment of and attitude toward women is not the whole picture and thereby represents a distortion of God’s purposes. Since men wrote the history and held the ultimate positions of power, it was inevitable that their views and values would predominate, and thus it was also inevitable that women would be marginalized. All presentations of “truth,” therefore, are somewhat suspect because they cannot be objective but are molded by the perspectives of the ones presenting this truth. It is for this reason that liberation theology maintains that it is important to listen to all voices in the creation of theology, especially those whose voices have largely been silenced in human history because of their disadvantaged position. How can liberation theology help us in the understanding of sinful treatment toward animals and in the formulation of a more positive ethic for animals in general and for experimental animals in particular?27 First and most important, liberation theology can extend to the treatment of animals because they, too, are a marginalized and oppressed group in society. Obviously, many experimental animals are exploited by those more powerful who are in a position to do so, even if the motive is a good one, such as for human benefit. Of course, many who embrace liberation theology for humans would balk at the idea of including animals, in the belief that this step will ultimately result in the debasement of oppressed humans. However, as I have previously argued, it is not necessary to pit humans against animals in such a way. Instead of viewing animal liberation as competing with or deflecting attention away from human liberation, it is preferable to view oppression as a kind of seamless garment, since all forms of oppression include victimization of the powerless by the powerful. If animals are such a marginalized group, and if God is on the side of the marginalized, then God must be on the side of oppressed animals, and ultimately we must be, too. To the extent that experimental animals, then, are oppressed and victimized (and certainly not all of them are), they, too, represent a group in need of liberation. In addition, as previously noted, many who work for the liberation of animals tend to work for the liberation of humans as well, suggesting that many people already see the connection between human and animal liberation. Finally, it can be argued that just as there are some people who devote themselves to fighting against particular forms of human oppression (e.g., environmental problems, abortion, poverty), some people can devote themselves to the issue of animal oppression. The model of

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the Christian church as the body of Christ in which each part has a different gift supports the notion that not all people are called to the same task of mission in the world, and I would argue that, for some people, their task is the liberation of animals. Second, the liberation of animals is supported by the exodus story. Although it is not a focal point, the flocks of the Israelites are included in the departure from Egypt. Certainly, the primary reason was so that the people would have a means of food and livelihood in their new life, but nevertheless they are included in the exodus as part of the human community. Third, we need to view the biblical text with regard to animals with a hermeneutic of suspicion. Biblical history was not written from the perspective of animals but from the perspective of humans, who had express purposes in mind for the use of these animals, primarily understood in terms of service to humans. Obviously, the analogy with the plight of women falls short here somewhat, since it seems absurd to talk about how history would have been written from the perspective of animals. However, what a hermeneutic of suspicion does is highlight questions about the history of and attitudes regarding the treatment of animals, and it suggests that there may be more to the story than the way it has been recorded. Thus, although the references to animals are primarily negative in the biblical text (such as assuming their use in sacrifice and warfare), we need to mine the text more carefully for clues to a more positive ethic for animals.28 In addition, numerous extrabiblical sources throughout human history suggest that the treatment of animals certainly has been more positive by some. For example, both apocryphal stories about the life of Jesus and legends of some of the saints and mystics provide a more positive ethic for the treatment of animals, suggesting at the very least that some in the Christian tradition held animals in higher esteem than many of the biblical texts would suggest.29 Finally, liberation theology suggests that sin is broader than simply the acts of individuals. Although social sin was a concept before the dawn of liberation theology, it especially supports and highlights the notion that sin can be understood as a force larger than the cumulative acts of the individuals involved. With regard to animal experimentation, this suggests that what is wrong with much of it cannot be laid at the doorstep of the sinful motives of individual scientists who do not care at all about animals but rather that the entire institution of animal experimentation supports some practices that many scientists in their personal lives would both abhor and avoid.30 This is simply another way of saying that the problem is much larger than any of the individuals involved, and it thereby needs to be addressed as a social sin, or problem, and not simply as an individual one.

Solutions to Sin We need to actively work against the reality and manifestation of sin in the practice of experimentation and the subsequent treatment of experimental animals. It is insufficient to look at some of the treatment of experimental animals and to justify it theologically by a ready appeal to dominion or simply to say

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that it is the price that we must pay for progress in human health. Obviously, the world is not the way God intended it to be, nor is it as ideal as humans would like it to be, and Christian theology uses sin to explain this gap between what is and what could be.31 Although humans have been and certainly are capable of tremendous good, we are also capable of tremendous evil, and some of this evil has been manifested in the practice of animal experimentation. However, regardless of the extent of the disordered relationship between humans and animals, sin is not the final word in Christian theology, and therefore the current treatment of animals in general and in laboratories in particular is capable of change. The doctrines of Christology and eschatology will help to provide some of the answer to the problem of sin, the former by demonstrating the answer that the person of Jesus provides not only to the sin problem in general but also to the treatment of animals in particular, and the latter by offering the ultimate hope for the return of all creation to God’s original purposes. However, there are some preliminary suggestions with regard to animal experimentation that can be made, based on the preceding discussion. First, there needs to be a recognition at the outset that the motivations of scientists, as with all human beings, are not always altruistic, even when it comes to animal experimentation. This is simply another way of saying that human beings often, if not always, work from mixed motives. Certainly many, if not all, scientists want to improve human health and extend human life, but many are also interested in furthering their careers and reputations, sometimes in ways that cause great harm to animals. To suggest, as the scientific literature often seems to, that the concern of scientists is almost always altruistic not only belies what I have argued about human nature but also does not explain many of the seemingly unnecessary and sometimes even trivial harmful experiments that are often undertaken on animals. Of course, this does not mean that we should paint a caricature of all scientists as self-interested people who care only about their own careers, as much of the animal rights literature seems to suggest. However, the Christian doctrine of sin reminds us that even scientists need to be careful in assessing their motives and actions. Second, lest those who are not scientists simply point the self-righteous accusing finger at those who actually engage in animal experiments, it is important to recognize that sin is not only wrong actions that are done but also good actions that are omitted, hence the common distinction made in Christian theology between sins of commission and sins of omission. Thus, it is not only some scientists who need a change of heart but also all people who are affected by and the beneficiaries of the results of experimentation, which is all of us. Those of us who stand by silently in the face of the mistreatment and subsequent suffering of animals are also guilty. As Edmund Burke once noted, the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men [sic] to do nothing.32 It is very easy for those who are concerned about the plight of animals to become self-righteous toward those engaging in actions they oppose, but a healthy dose of humility by both parties and the recognition that sin can be found in oppressors as well as in the oppressed (or in the case of the animal experimentation, in those who are advocates for the oppressed) could go a long

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way at least in modifying attitudes and judgments about others whose actions we may not like. It is also important to mention that sin also tarnishes our capacity to correctly judge other people, and we need to be careful about claiming to know, let alone judge, the motives of others. Third, we need to remember that human beings, while often choosing wrongly, are certainly capable of right intentions, motives, and actions. If motives are mixed, then certainly motives are good most of the time, and perhaps are present all of the time, even in what may seem to some to be questionable or even evil actions. This is simply another way of saying that humans are not bound by their sinful inclinations but have the capacity to rise above them as well and to be capable of truly heroic and self-sacrificing actions. It is the latter tendency that needs to be cultivated and embraced more fully, both by those who engage in and support experimentation and by those who oppose it. Fourth, as I previously mentioned briefly, we need to regard animal experimentation not simply as a problem due to the actions of individual scientists but as part of a larger institutional problem that cannot simply be solved through change by these individual participants. This is why change is required on a legislative level, change that can be enforced.

Christology The Historical Jesus The doctrine of Christology is commonly divided into two main sections dealing with Jesus’ life and ministry: the historical Jesus, which focuses on Jesus’ earthly life and views him as a model for moral behavior, and Christ as Redeemer, which focuses on Jesus’ work of redemption for the world. With regard to the historical Jesus, it is important to examine the biblical texts, as well as extrabiblical sources, specifically for hints of Jesus’ relationship with animals, as well as the overall life and character of Jesus to see if how he lived and what he taught can guide us in the development of a more positive ethic for animals in general and for research animals in particular. What emerges from examining the historical life of Jesus as far as what we can know (since the biblical text completely omits most of the events of Jesus’ life up to the age of thirty and after that focuses primarily on his religious mission and message) is a mixed picture, with conclusions supporting a foundation for a more positive treatment of animals, as well as a more traditional status quo approach to animals. However, I will argue that the life of Jesus can provide a positive model for the treatment of animals and answer possible objections to my position. The limited biography of Jesus that we have in the Gospels does not contain numerous references to animals in general, but the Gospels still contain some positive hints about the role of animals in the life of Jesus. Jesus grew up in a time and place where animals were integral to daily life, and therefore he would have come into regular contact with them, so it is not surprising that he utilized examples from the animal kingdom to illustrate his religious teaching. He most likely would have inherited the Jewish tradition of treating ani-

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mals humanely.33 Many injunctions in the Old Testament regard the importance of treating animals well, as, for example, the fact that Sabbath rest was commanded for both humans and animals. The humane injunctions in the Hebrew Bible certainly did not eliminate the use of animals in Hebrew society, nor did it forestall some abuses of animals, as least by some individuals. However, the emphasis still seemed to be that even if animals could legitimately be utilized by humans in various settings, a mark of religious people was practicing kindness and abstaining from cruelty toward animals. In Jesus’ own teaching on Sabbath observance, he challenged the legalism of some of the religious leaders of his day by suggesting that one had a duty to help an injured animal on the Sabbath, even though one was not technically supposed to do any work. At the very beginning of his life and ministry, animals were believed to be present. Although the biblical text makes no mention of animals present at his birth, apocryphal literature suggests that animals were indeed present at the manger. His baptism by John the Baptist was sealed by a dove (Matt. 3:16–17). In his Sermon on the Mount teaching, in which Jesus tried to emphasize the concern of God for human beings, he used the example of birds, who, though certainly not worth more than humans, had their needs taken care of by God (Matt. 6:25–26). One of the titles used to refer to Jesus was the Good Shepherd, and Jesus often used the shepherd as an example to demonstrate God’s love and concern for humans. The sheep know the voice of the shepherd, the good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep, and the shepherd will leave behind the ninety-nine sheep in his care in order to seek the one sheep who was lost and rejoice greatly on finding that sheep (John 10:7–18). Jesus also challenged the sacrificial system of his day when he entered the temple, overturned the tables of the money changers, and drove out all those who exploited people in their attempts to worship God, which was partly done through the use of animal sacrifices (John 2:13–17). It is important to note, though, that Jesus’ principal concern would probably not have been the animals themselves as much as the perversion of worship that was taking place. In addition to the biblical text, some of the apocryphal literature, such as the Gospel of Pseudo-Matthew and the Infancy Gospel of Thomas, provide other stories, particularly of Jesus’ miracles, some in childhood, with regard to animals. Because their reliability is less substantial than that of the Gospels, they cannot be of much help with regard to a historical reconstruction of Jesus’ life. However, they at least attest to the fact that legends grew up around Jesus regarding his unique relationship with and ministry to animals.34 In addition, the character and virtue of Jesus can also aid us in the development of a model for the treatment of animals, since his life is considered to be a model for Christians. During his earthly sojourn, Jesus’ demonstration of the virtues of love of, compassion for, and service to others can certainly provide a foundation for a more positive ethic toward animals. While directed specifically toward people, it seems that these qualities can certainly extend toward the multitudes of animals, particularly in science laboratories, some of whom are in desperate need of compassion. In addition, while Jesus did not specifically offer a teaching on ethics for the treatment of animals, he certainly was

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a radical in that he clearly challenged some of the prevailing historical and cultural definitions of his time, particularly with regard to those toward whom justice and mercy should extend. Jesus accepted and included among his followers those typically denigrated or rejected by the society of his time, such as women and the poor. While Jesus, then, was not actually a vocal advocate for animals, it is certainly possible to argue that Jesus’ ministry of challenging the conventions and status quo practices in his own time can provide a model for Christians to do the same for comparable issues of injustice today. We do not even need to go so far as to say that, if Jesus lived today, he would be an animal activist, but it does not strain credulity to argue for that possibility. But even if that would not be the case, Christian ministry today can certainly extend toward animals if they are part of the masses in need of advocacy. Jesus was vocal in speaking up on behalf of those in his society who had no real voice themselves. While some of those same groups of people continue to be disadvantaged in our own society and therefore still require special attention, so, too, as I have argued previously, it is a forced dichotomy to have to choose ministry to people or ministry to animals. We can adopt a both-and approach, based on the character demonstrated by Jesus in his earthly life. There are at least two ways in which one can argue against viewing Jesus as having anything positive to contribute with regard to the treatment of animals. The first is by pointing out some of the negative references in the biblical text, and the second is by challenging the extrapolation of Jesus’ teachings about justice and mercy to animals. With regard to the first, it can be pointed out that whereas Jesus was certainly a radical with regard to many issues in his society, he did not single out animals for special attention. In fact, the text indicates that in his eating habits, Jesus was not a vegetarian.35 Rather, he specifically eats the Passover meal with his disciples more than once, and his meals at the houses of at least the rich would have included meat on other occasions. In addition, not only did Jesus eat fish with his disciples in one of his post-Resurrection appearances (Luke 24:36–43) but also included among his miracles his disciples’ catch of a great number of fish. He used a coin in the mouth of a fish to demonstrate the importance of obeying earthly laws, in this case with regard to paying taxes (Matt. 17:27). It can also be argued that Jesus participated in many of the feasts in Jerusalem, which would certainly have involved animal sacrifices, and yet there is no record of Jesus opposing this practice, which seems odd if indeed he was so concerned for animals. Finally, the miracle whereby Jesus exorcised demons and sent them into a herd of pigs, who then rushed off a cliff and drowned (Matt. 8:28–34), seems to indicate that, rather than Jesus having concern for animals, he may have even had a positive disregard for them. It seems to follow, then, that not only does it contradict the biblical text to try to present Jesus as an advocate for animals but also Jesus’ ministry to and concern for humans in need was directed toward humans for a reason—because they are the ones toward whom Jesus believed ministry should extend. In that case, to extrapolate his teachings to animals violates not just Jesus’ actual teaching but even the spirit of Jesus’ teaching. In some ways, it is difficult to challenge these objections, particularly those

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with regard to the biblical text. As was acknowledged earlier, the stories of Jesus and animals certainly do present a mixed scenario, so that it is difficult to argue that there is a unilateral approach in the text to this issue. In addition, because the Gospels are presenting a biography of Jesus, as with all biographies, many stories and details are left out. The Gospel writers were primarily concerned with presenting Jesus’ salvific teaching, and therefore it is not surprising that only a few references to animals are included. Of course, this does not mean that we can make a strong argument from silence either, since arguments from silence can go both ways. Jesus obviously was a product of his time, as we all are, and so it is not surprising that he would have participated in the practices of his day, some of which may even have involved harm to animals, and it is highly speculative to even suggest that Jesus would do differently if he lived today. However, these objections can principally be responded to by saying that Christian thought and life need not be fully grounded on the historical reconstruction of the life of Jesus. Aside from the problem of using the biblical text as the only source for Christian ethics, there is the additional problem at the outset of the impossibility of even fully engaging in such a reconstruction of Jesus’ life. Thus, it seems more important than trying to apply in too literal a way the actual attitudes, teachings, and actions of Jesus to focus more on Jesus’ general teaching and, most especially, the spirit of his teaching. Therefore, it seems more helpful in regarding Jesus as a resource for Christian ethics that we not slavishly try to apply living in our society precisely as Jesus did in his, but that we rather attempt to inculcate the virtues Jesus manifested and apply them to the concrete historical situations in which we find ourselves. There are obviously many issues in the contemporary period about which Jesus had nothing to say but to which we certainly still feel that the life and teaching of Jesus can make a contribution. Although they have been a minority in the Christian tradition, particular individuals who used Jesus as a model for their lives have extended their compassion and mercy toward animals, and thus it is not a stretch to believe that Jesus can provide such a model for people today. To the extent that experimental animals are in need of justice and mercy, particularly in research laboratories, then to that extent can the model of Jesus’ love and compassion motivate at least those individuals with a particular concern for animals.

Christ as Redeemer If the idea is controversial that Jesus’ life can aid us in the development of an ethic toward animals, then the idea that Jesus’ death and resurrection are somehow significant for animals as well is an even more controversial notion. Although in Christian theology salvation has typically been understood as the unique province of humans, and although Jesus’ life is certainly more helpful to us than Jesus’ death in terms of an ethics for animals, I will argue, without pushing it too strongly, that it is at least within the realm of possibility that salvation is cosmic rather than only human centered, and thus Jesus’ death, and particularly his resurrection, has implications for animals as well.36 I will

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first examine briefly how Christianity understands salvation and then draw some implications for animals. The distinction between the historical Jesus and Christ as Redeemer is an important one, especially in relatively recent Christian theology. The historicity of Jesus’ life and death is undisputed, even for those who are not Christians, and many even from outside Christianity have found in Jesus a powerful example of a virtuous life.37 However, it is what Christians believe about Jesus’ death and resurrection that elevates his status above that of any other mortal.38 In particular, redemption through the death and resurrection of Jesus is the Christian answer to sin. As was discussed earlier, sin is responsible for the disordered state in which we find the world, but sin has particularly affected the relationship between God and humans. Unlike some other world religions that believe people can attain their own salvation solely or primarily through their own efforts, Christianity has typically taught that human effort is insufficient (with some saying that human nature is completely depraved, and others simply that it is deprived), and so a radical action on God’s part was necessary, in particular the resurrection of Jesus. This radical action, called the atonement (of which there are several theories), is believed by Christians to effect the reconciliation of sinful humankind with God. Thus, Jesus’ death and resurrection have had several redemptive effects, including the restoration of the relationship of human beings with God in the present, the empowering of humans to overcome sin in their lives and thus live a moral life, and an ultimate reunion with God, for at least those who believe, in some kind of heavenly paradise at the conclusion of their earthly sojourn. The last benefit can be more accurately understood as the fullness of redemption. There are obviously significant limitations that must be acknowledged at the outset with suggesting that Jesus’ death and resurrection have implications for animals. With regard to reconciling animals with God in the present, it can be objected that since animals are amoral creatures, incapable of either virtue or vice, they are incapable of sin and subsequently are not in need of being restored in their relationship to God, as are humans. Subsequently, since animals are incapable of moral choice, the notion of moral growth also makes little sense with regard to animals. In addition, many do not believe that animals have souls, and therefore talk of the fullness of redemption, particularly with regard to an afterlife, is completely illogical. Although I will address the third objection in the section on animal souls, it is not necessary to defend against the other two points in order to make an argument that the work of Jesus still has implications for animals. What, then, are some of the implications of the work of Christ as Redeemer for animals? First, the Bible itself suggests some kind of cosmic redemption, in which all of creation is involved. In particular, the book of Romans talks about the groaning of all creation as it awaits its redemption (8:22–23), and the book of Isaiah foreshadows a time when the lion will lie down with the lamb, the latter verse typically cited to indicate that God’s ultimate purpose for animals is not one of predation and violence but one of peace and harmony. Although the idea of the cosmic redemption of Christ (with the phrase “cosmic Christ” some-

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times used) is a relatively new idea, it seems logical that if all of creation has been disordered by sin, then all of creation is in need of restoration. If the work of Christ effects this salvation for humans, then why cannot it extend to animals? Although some Christians still believe that faith in Jesus is necessary for salvation, many others believe (especially in light of the ecumenical movement) that what Jesus did had cosmic effects for all people, regardless of whether people believe this to be the case (others believe that Jesus is only one of many paths to God). If actual faith in Jesus’ work is not necessary to effect salvation for people, then it is certainly not necessary for animals. Second, while the idea of moral growth has no direct relevance for animals, it certainly should have indirect relevance, with some positive repercussions for the animal kingdom. If the death and resurrection of Jesus have effected the possibility of conversion, and hence moral growth and change in humans, then this change should somehow be reflected in a better attitude toward the rest of creation, so that exploitation is not the ruling motif. Third, the Christian understanding of the fullness of redemption reminds us that there is more to existence than the world in which we find ourselves, such that in a sense this is not the best of all possible worlds, but there is such an ideal in the eschaton.39 With regard to animal experimentation, the implications of Christ as Redeemer are that this is an issue where change can certainly take place. To the extent that humans are willing to move beyond their own agendas, mixed motives, and general selfishness, through the work and model of Jesus, to this extent will the practice of experimentation and the plight of laboratory animals, as well as that of all other animals, be significantly improved.

Eschatology Biblical Eschatology To gain an understanding of Christian eschatology and its implication for animals, it is important to examine the biblical text and see how it relates to other doctrines already covered. The Christian doctrine of eschatology typically is understood as having to do with end times, or last things. Christian eschatology ultimately points to the idea of some kind of fullness of redemption, to the reality of an existence beyond this earthly one. Although theologians differ with regard to how this redemption should be conceptualized—whether it should be regarded primarily as a future and ultimately different kind of life than this one, and to what extent this new life can be at least partially inaugurated and realized in our time—it is foundational to Christian theology that the earthly sojourn as we experience it is not all there is to reality and that there is hope for something better in the future. According to the biblical understanding, there is both an individual and a cosmic aspect to eschatology. The individual aspect has to do with the destiny of the individual human and is related to what happens to individuals after death, with an emphasis on concepts such as heaven, hell, and even purgatory. Too often in the past, the Christian tradition has emphasized only this individ-

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ual aspect, to the neglect of the cosmic. The cosmic aspect of eschatology reminds us that all creation will share in the newness of life and existence after this life. Therefore, animals are a part of this creation, and so animals, too, will share in this eternal life. There is ample biblical evidence to support this notion of cosmic redemption, some of which has already been mentioned in the doctrines discussed in this chapter. Although this redemption has typically been considered restricted to humans, the biblical evidence does not support this idea. The biblical account of creation provides us with a vision of an ideal world whose original peace and harmony was disturbed by human sin. This Fall has negatively affected not only humans but also the rest of creation, in particular animals. Sin itself cannot be understood only in an individual sense, because it also has a cosmic and social dimension. However, this fallen state of nature is not the final word in Christian theology, and Jesus’ death and resurrection has been understood to effect a reconciliation between God and all of creation. This reconciliation, typically understood as redemption, includes restoration not just in the present but in the future as well, which anticipates some kind of reunion with God for all of God’s creation. To the extent that all of creation is fallen, then, it seems clear that all of creation is in need of restoration. To the extent that the destiny of all creation is interrelated and similarly affected both by the effects of sin and by the love of God, then all creation will be restored. Thus, all creation will ultimately share in the new life, in the new heaven and the new earth.40 This social and cosmic understanding of future life thus responds to the argument that creatures cannot have eternal life because they are not able to perform moral actions deserving of eternal life. Too often in the past, from a narrow perspective, too many Christians have seen the afterlife as what humans deserve because of their good deeds in the world, and thereby animals have often been excluded because they were believed to be incapable of moral virtue. However, the cosmic aspect of eschatology reminds us that eternal life is primarily God’s gift and God intends to give it to all of creation, including animals. Of course, the question can be raised as to whether a line should be drawn anywhere in the created order with regard to this cosmic dimension. For example, some might consider it absurd to include insects as part of the new creation. While I specifically address sentient animals in this project, I would argue that if redemption is actually cosmic, then it necessarily encompasses all of creation, including insects. If all of creation is loved by God and will ultimately be somehow restored by God, why is it so absurd to include all of creation within this realm?

Immortality Some in the Christian tradition, influenced by Greek philosophy and not by the biblical understanding, have understood eternal life on the basis of immortality. The principle of immortality in the human person is the soul. Thus, they argue that animals, because they do not have a rational or spiritual soul,

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are not able to have immortality and eternal life. Three generic responses can be made to this argument. The first and most important argument is that immortality and an immortal soul are not the necessary basis for eternal life, as the biblical evidence proves. Instead, the fullness of redemption is a gift of God that is provided freely on the basis of God’s love for and desire to restore all of creation. Thus, it is not possession of an individual soul that is the most important consideration in the Christian understanding of redemption, but the gift of God achieved through the reconciling work of Jesus’ death and particularly his resurrection. This redemption is primarily a cosmic one, affecting the whole created order, and so the possession of an individual soul is not even necessary for an understanding of the fullness of redemption. If redemption is ultimately the gift of God and is cosmic in scope, then there is also no need for all creation to earn eternal life through good deeds, which the possession of a soul might presuppose. Second, it is possible to argue that animals indeed do have souls.41 Obviously, it is not possible to demonstrably prove that animals have souls, and it is not even necessary to do so. However, for those who maintain that humans have souls, it does not seem a far stretch to assume the existence of animal souls as well. Some in the Christian tradition have typically assumed that animals lack the kind of souls possessed by humans and thereby use this as a reason to exempt them from the fullness of redemption. The principal reason offered for the lack of animal souls is their lack of rationality. This linking of rationality and soul possession is probably the strongest theological reason against the notion that animals possess souls, but it is certainly not the only one. The most obvious response to this argument is to challenge the idea that there is a necessary connection between rationality and soul possession. It is possible instead to maintain, as Aristotle did, that humans and nonhumans have different kinds of souls42 and therefore that the kind of soul one has does not determine one’s ultimate fate as much as does the mere existence of some kind of soul. In addition, the existence of marginal humans also undermines the necessary connection between these two concepts, because the Christian tradition has not typically exempted from immortality human beings who do not have rationality or who have it to a lesser degree than do other humans. Finally, even if rationality and soul possession are necessarily linked, I have already argued in an earlier chapter that rationality, like other cognitive criteria, lies on a spectrum, such that at least some animals do possess rationality, even if not to the same extent as normal adult humans. Obviously, though, the strongest argument against those addressing the question of whether animals have souls is to respond that the possession of an individual soul, as evidenced by the biblical record, is not necessary for the fullness of redemption. A third response to the argument that animals do not have souls, and even to the notion in general that animals do not experience the fullness of redemption, is that there are still implications for the treatment of experimental animals. As C. S. Lewis has argued, the possibility that animals may not have souls and thereby not experience redemption as do humans does not decrease

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our responsibility to experimental animals but increases our responsibility to them.43 If indeed it is possible that this earthly existence is the only existence they will know, and to the extent that we know or suspect that this life will predominantly be full of pain and suffering or at least deprivation of significant benefits, then it seems that we do have an increased burden to ensure that the short life they do have is not solely comprised of pain and suffering, but that we do what we can to actively enhance their well-being.

Further Consequences of Eschatology The Christian doctrine of eschatology ultimately points to the reality of an existence beyond this earthly one. There are two implications of the Christian view of redemption for animals in general and for experimental animals in particular. The first has to do with the Christian view toward death. Our culture in particular seems to be a death-defying one, not so much that death is denied as much as we will make every effort possible to thwart its ultimate advance. In the realm of medical technology, we continue to seek to make progress against all manner of human sickness and disease, with the pursuit of a longer life span (sometimes regardless of the quality of that life) often seeming to be the ultimate goal. To do this, we seem willing to make questionable ethical advances, or at least proceed in areas where the ethical questions and implications have not even been fully addressed, such as cloning and xenotransplantation, to name just two. Whereas we tend to live in ultimate fear and dread of death (both that of our own and that of others as well), the Christian perspective is quite different. While Christianity is certainly a life-affirming faith, it does not view death as the ultimate enemy. In fact, the voluntary martyrdom of many in the Christian tradition, as well as numerous biblical texts, supports the idea that, if not that death is to be welcomed, then certainly it is not to be feared. This does not militate against a normal human fear of the unknown but simply demonstrates that death is the dreaded enemy only when one has no hope of anything after that death. To the extent that death signals only the end of one kind of existence in return for another kind of existence, the allout effort to eradicate the sources leading to that death may not need to be so extensive. With regard to animal experimentation, this does not mean that we should not continue the fight against sickness and disease, since even if death is the ultimate end point for all of us, there may be much that we can do to alleviate the earthly pain and suffering of both humans and animals. However, it does call into question the extent to which we do utilize animals, such that even minimal human medical benefit can justify often harmful animal experimentation. Second, to the extent that earthly life is full of suffering, and because all of creation has its ultimate source in God, it makes sense that all of creation, including experimental animals, can one day be restored as well. The Christian understanding of redemption includes the notion of recompense for suffering. Although it has often been used far too glibly in the past to pacify oppressed peoples (such as slaves) with hopes of a better life, the Christian view of re-

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demption is a reminder that there is a glorious reality to which the sufferings of the present cannot be compared. It offers hope to those who suffer for reasons beyond their understanding. If humans often cannot understand the reasons for their suffering, then we can certainly expect that animals have not the vaguest notion. To the extent that some laboratory animals are doomed to a life of pain and suffering, the hope that there may indeed be something more for them after their short and miserable earthly lives can at least provide hope for those humans particularly interested in the welfare of animals, as well as attest to a view of divine justice that includes animals within its scope. In addition to recompense for suffering, though, redemption ultimately contains within it the idea of the restoration of all creation to its Creator. If all of creation originates in God, then it makes sense to suggest that all of creation will ultimately return to God as well. If we believe that this redemption, or the inauguration of the kingdom of God, can happen at least to a limited extent even now, then we have a moral responsibility to do what we can to help achieve this ideal. Humans are not alone in having been affected by the presence of sin in creation, but because we have moral freedom in a way that animals probably do not, we have an obligation to reduce the suffering of both humans and animals to the extent to which we are able. The reality of living in the tension between the “already” and the “not yet” assumes that the vision of the latter is predominantly what drives us in the pursuit of the ultimate vision, which we now can only conceive of in our minds. To the extent that laboratory animals suffer in their brief earthly sojourn, to this extent do humans have an obligation to minimize this suffering, and to this extent is the idea of divine recompense for their suffering within the realm of both logic and possibility.

Conclusion While Christian theology may not have any dramatically new insights into the treatment of animals, it is helpful in two ways: by providing a theological undergirding for at least some of the arguments made in previous chapters and by providing Christians with a theological framework within their own tradition for considering the issue of animal experimentation.44 It seems that more work needs to be done with regard to a Christian theology for animals, but what has already been examined can address at least some of the more significant issues.45 The doctrine of creation demonstrates that God’s covenantal relationship with and continuing providential care of animals, exercised through human dominion, should be understood as benevolent stewardship rather than as autocratic despotism. Although human sin, both personal and social, is partially responsible for the existence of pain and suffering for some experimental animals, this sin can be overcome in Christian individuals and in society by a focus on the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. Finally, the Christian eschatological hope suggests that this earthly life is but a temporary sojourn and a precursor of the ultimate glory that is to come. But as was argued earlier, even if animals are excluded from this heavenly paradise, however it is

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understood, this simply puts a greater burden on us to ensure their benevolent treatment in this life. The most important argument Christian theology supports, though, is that the purpose of animals is much more than simply their instrumental value to humans. However, in spite of the positive contribution of Christian theology, it is a reality in our disordered world that the well-being of humans and animals are often at odds with one another, such that we must often choose one over the other. The next chapter will therefore offer a burden/ benefit analysis by means of which the competing interests of humans and laboratory animals can be adjudicated.

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6 Burden/Benefit Analysis

As I mentioned in the first chapter, there are three possible positions with regard to experimentation: approval of all experimentation, abolition of all experimentation, and permissibility of some experimentation. Most want to allow for some experimentation, although there are very significant differences of opinion as to what should be permitted.1 All those advocating coming under this third, very broad, umbrella employ a burden/benefit analysis.2 My thesis is that the benefits humans experience as a result of experimentation are not sufficient to justify most experiments done on animals. Thus, the burdens to animals cannot ordinarily be justified on the grounds of benefits to humans, and therefore experimentation should be greatly restricted in comparison with its present practice. Great human benefit can at times come from animal experimentation, but there are limits on achieving this good, and very restrictive experimentation will not necessarily eliminate some future benefits for humans. This thesis is grounded on the arguments I made in earlier chapters, in particular that animals have mental states and are sentient, that animals have rights (so that human rights cannot always automatically trump animal rights), and that animals have intrinsic value in the sight of God. In this chapter, I will proceed as follows. In the first two sections, I will define burdens and benefits, present the positions of those who disagree with my position on both the burden and the benefit sides, and respond to those arguments. In the third section, I will provide guidelines for casuistry, and in the fourth section apply these guidelines to specific types of experiments. In the last section, I will offer some concluding remarks.

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Arguments from the Burden Side It is important at the outset to define what precisely is meant by “burdens” with regard to experimentation. “Burdens” can be defined as the harms, pains, sufferings, or deprivations experienced as a result of the experimentation. It is clear that in animal experimentation, animals are the ones who bear the brunt of the burdens. The first and most important burden caused to animals is that many (although certainly not all) experiments cause pain and suffering to animals. For this reason, the most basic right that animals should have is freedom from unnecessary pain and suffering, although what would be considered necessary can be determined only in the context of a burden/benefit analysis. Pain can occur in three ways, as I discussed in chapter 2: whether directly through the study of the phenomenon of pain itself, indirectly and incidentally in the course of the experiment itself, and/or through routine medical procedures or problems specifically related to husbandry conditions. Even though the degree and duration of pain may vary considerably, there is no question that many laboratory animals are subjected to pain in the course of their usually brief lives. In addition, many experimental animals also suffer considerably, often due to husbandry conditions or exposure to long-term pain. When animals spend their entire lives as experimental subjects, in conditions less optimal than they would live in if they were not experimental animals, then we can certainly talk about the animals’ lives as often being significantly impoverished. Thus, although burdens usually focus on pain and suffering, they can include deprivations as well, which often cause suffering. Suffering is especially a burden for those animals who are more cognitively advanced. This suffering is partly the result of thwarted desires and is an infringement on the limited autonomy of animals, many of whom certainly would not consent to the conditions under which they must live in laboratories. Animals are also burdened by a denial of some of the fundamental moral rights they have, most especially freedom from unnecessary pain and suffering, but also having their liberty so restricted, having their lives unnecessarily shortened, not being able to engage in speciesspecific behavior, and not being treated with respect as individuals. Although we live in a world beset by sin, it is incumbent upon humans to relieve the burdens placed on other sentient creatures whenever possible, especially in light of God’s love and concern for them. Finally, an additional burden for animals is that most experiments result in their premature deaths, often well before their lives would have ended under more natural conditions, either due to the necessity of continuing the research begun in the experiment when the animal was still alive (through dissection), because the animal is so ill that he cannot live a normal life anymore, or sometimes simply because there is no further use for him and subsequently no real interest or incentive in finding him a home beyond the laboratory. In addition, this death is not always as humane as it could be, so that the expe-

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rience of death sometimes becomes simply another form of pain and suffering for the animal. While the primary burdens in experiments are to animals, there are three possible burdens for humans as well. First, experiments can desensitize the researcher to pain and suffering in others. While there is not a necessary relationship between involvement in experimentation and insensitivity on the part of the researcher, there is at least cause for concern, and thus it is certainly a minor, if not a major, burden of experimentation.3 After all, we often give scientists permission to do to laboratory animals what we would label and judge as cruel if people did the same to their pets. Second, money is diverted from preventive medicine to finding cures for diseases such as cancer, stroke, and heart disease, which are often a result of humans’ poor lifestyle choices. Third, spending on alternatives is minimized when the available funds are primarily utilized on live animals, which also means that humans may not be getting the best care that we can because of the problems associated with animal models. Obviously, not all agree with the extent of burdens experienced by animals in experiments, and therefore it is important to consider the arguments of those who disagree with my position. Especially for those in the “troubled middle,” a burden/benefit analysis of experimentation with regard to animals generally assumes that pain and suffering are undesirable, that animals can experience at least pain, that we can make some kind of rough comparison of animal pain with human pain,4 that the pain of animals is very real to them, and that there must be a weighing of this pain against the benefits. However, even for those who agree with all of these premises, there are significant differences of opinion as to where to draw the line for experimentation. Those who disagree with my thesis do not give as much value to animals as I do, so that animal burdens are subsequently not given as much serious consideration, primarily for four reasons. First, despite an acknowledgment that animals can experience pain, it is not considered as important as human pain, so that when it comes down to a weighing of animal and human pain, human pain is given precedence in most cases. Second, they may deny animal suffering, minimize it, or not give it enough importance. As was mentioned in chapter 3, the question of animal suffering is much more controversial than that of animal pain, so the word “suffering” is usually not used, and the assumption is made that as long as animals are not subjected to pain, there is nothing wrong with experimentation. Even for those who may acknowledge negative animal states, such as stress or anxiety, these states are not generally the focus of attention in evaluating the negative impact of particular experiments on animals. Third, they believe that virtually any animal interest can be overridden by any human interest or, to put it in terms of rights, that human rights must always take precedence over animal rights (even if they are acknowledged) in conflict cases. There are some exceptions, such as cosmetics testing on animals, which many would argue should be outlawed because of the comparatively insignificant

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human interests it addresses. However, in general, whenever a burden/benefit analysis is undertaken by those supporting all or even most experiments, animal burdens are generally not the focus of the discussion, but rather the benefits to humans. In fact, one of the problems with the way in which arguments for animal experiments are usually made is that there is no real attempt to weigh the burdens and benefits; rather, the benefits to humans are simply declared or assumed de facto, so as to justify most experiments on animals. Finally, as was discussed in chapter 5, many maintain that humans have dominion over animals, so we can justify their use if the benefits to humans are deemed great enough, because animals primarily have instrumental rather than intrinsic value. The response to these arguments regarding burdens will take the form of some general observations. First, most of these arguments have already been responded to in previous chapters, in which I argued that animals can experience pain and suffering, that animals have rights that should not automatically be trumped by human rights or interests, and that theological dominion should be interpreted in a more benign manner than it has been in the past. This is not to say that all those who utilize animals in experiments believe that animals have no value and are mere tools to be used in whatever ways humans desire (although there may be a minority who feel this way), but they tend not to regard animals as valuable, or valued, in their own right.5 Second, we must recognize that, when weighing burdens and benefits, we are talking about definite burdens versus possible benefits.6 This is a very important consideration. Therefore, it seems that more weight should be put on the burdens rather than on the benefits, at least at the outset, since the burdens are certain whereas the benefits are simply possible or intended. The arguments of those allowing for more permissive experimentation tend to focus almost exclusively on the benefits to humans, and therefore it is important to emphasize the specific burdens to animals. Third, we cannot talk about burdens and benefits in the abstract but rather of degrees of burdens and benefits. If burdens and benefits are specific and concrete (as opposed to general and theoretical), then we must make these more specific kinds of distinctions. We must be able to accurately determine the degree of burdens experienced versus the degree of benefits expected in order to engage in a more accurate assessment. In a later section, I will develop guidelines that will enable us to distinguish among both burdens and benefits that can be determined to be minimal, moderate, serious, or very grave. Fourth, although radical speciesism, as was discussed in chapter 3, maintains that species membership is all that matters and so we should give preference to humans in conflict situations with animals, I have argued for qualified speciesism, in which species membership is morally relevant but other significant criteria must be correlated as well.

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Arguments from the Benefit Side It has already been noted that most of those arguing for the status quo with regard to experimentation tend to focus on the benefits for humans, rather than on the burdens to animals. It is thus important to define “benefits,” to present the arguments from benefits of those who disagree with my position, and then to provide a rebuttal to these arguments. Benefits with regard to experimentation can refer to any advance in medical knowledge or practice, for either humans or animals, that serves to provide one or more of the following: improvements in lifestyle or convenience; better medical and surgical techniques; advances in knowledge of psychology, behavior, or physiology; eradication and treatment of diseases; and contributory factors toward a longer life span. The principal argument of those arguing for the status quo in experimentation is primarily that of necessity, although it is supported in a number of different ways. Simply put, the argument from necessity maintains that animal experimentation is considered necessary to help in the battle against disease and premature death and in providing general improvements in life, such that the ends can usually justify the means. In essence, the argument from necessity maintains that the results cannot be achieved in any other manner. The kinds of benefits generally used to justify the argument from necessity are human benefit, animal benefit, and advancement in knowledge.7 The argument from human benefit is the strongest justification for experimentation, and it has both a backward- and a forward-looking component; that is, the advances made in the past provide the justification for continued experimentation in the future. The backward-looking argument generally proceeds by resorting to specific past examples of what is believed to have been achieved through experimentation. Experimentation is often credited with an impact on virtually every major medical advance for humans.8 Experiments have resulted in the elimination or management of certain diseases and have contributed to increased longevity for humans. Specific medical advances for humans typically cited include the development of antibiotic drugs, vaccines for many serious and infectious diseases (such as diphtheria, tetanus, rabies, whooping cough, tuberculosis, polio, measles, mumps, and rubella), organ transplantation, open-heart surgery and replacement valves, treatments for kidney failure,9 treatment of physiological diseases such as diabetes and epilepsy, surgical procedures, and correction of congenital heart defects.10 In addition, it is frequently noted that forty-one Nobel prizes have been awarded to scientists whose research depended at least in part on animal experimentation.11 The benefit to animals is often added as providing additional incentive for experiments: that not only do humans benefit from experiments but also animals do, because the same procedures and treatments used in humans can be used in animals as well,12 even though virtually all experiments are specifically undertaken with the intention of applying the results to humans.13 In addition to this backward-looking argument, a forward-looking argu-

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ment is also used to justify continued experimentation. Results of experimentation have not only advanced human and animal life and well-being in the past but also are likely and necessary to provide subsequent and additional improvements in the future if we continue to experiment on animals.14 Strong statements are often made in this regard. Scientists sometimes claim that it would be immoral not to continue with animal research, and dire predictions are often made about medical advances that will not be achieved if experimentation is either eliminated or severely curtailed.15 The advancement of knowledge is often provided as an additional human benefit to basic as opposed to applied research (where the results are more tangible). Those arguing from this perspective sometimes seem to assume that the quest for knowledge is not only a basic good but also virtually a right in and of itself.16 Obviously, the argument goes, it is unrealistic for the public to believe that every single experiment undertaken can be done only if it immediately results in a tangible benefit. Some experiments, while not yielding concrete benefits at the moment, provide the foundation upon which future experiments may build and eventually lead to a significant benefit. This is simply to say that it is probably unlikely that one experiment will help us discover the cure for cancer, for example. All scientific knowledge builds on the work of predecessors, so it may not be fair to judge each experiment individually by such stringent criteria as whether it will certainly (which is impossible to know) lead to concrete benefits for humans.17 In addition, sometimes going in a wrong direction can ultimately lead us in the right direction, which we may never have discovered if not for the wrong turn in the road. There is certainly validity to some of these arguments. Experimentation has resulted in medical advances for both humans and animals, whether through design or serendipitously, and future experimentation is likely to continue to yield results that may not be obtainable in any other manner. However, any actual benefits gained cannot obfuscate deeper concerns, and I would like to respond to these arguments by way of two overarching observations, each of which can be supported in several ways: there is an exaggeration of the benefits that will be lost, and a good end does not justify a bad means. Although animal experimentation has resulted in some knowledge that we may not have been able to gain in other ways, the benefits gained have at times been exaggerated. First, animal studies have often been misleading in the past because animals are simply not the best models for human disease. Although there are considerable similarities between humans and animals, particularly with regard to mental states and sentiency, this does not eliminate the problem that each species is also unique, and what works in one species may not, and often does not, work in another species. Thus, there is a problem of species differentiation and transferability.18 The same studies on different species often yield empirically diverse results. For example, of the nineteen chemicals believed to cause cancer when ingested by humans, only seven caused cancer in mice and rats, using the standards set by the National Cancer Institute. A review by the U.S. General Accounting Office discovered that 198 of the 209 new drugs marketed between 1976 and 1985 had serious risks associated with

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them in 52 percent of the cases, risks that were not predicted by animal tests.19 In addition, the following substances have resulted in different reactions in various animal species, especially in comparison with their effects on humans: penicillin is poisonous to guinea pigs, strychnine is safe for guinea pigs, arsenic is safe for sheep, and aspirin is toxic to some species (it even causes fetal abnormalities in rats).20 There are numerous other examples in the literature of animal experiments for which it was concluded that for some of these reasons animal models may not be the best models for humans, at least not in all circumstances.21 In addition, many diseases are artificially induced in animals, and they are not particularly helpful in understanding the naturally occurring diseases in both humans and animals.22 Many experimental protocols also inflict pain, suffering, and stress, which may affect the results.23 In fact, animal studies have not only been misleading sometimes with regard to human health but also even downright dangerous at times. The most commonly cited example is that of thalidomide, which had proven safe in animal studies but caused severe deformities in human fetuses when taken during pregnancy. Some proponents of experimentation maintain that the thalidomide case is a good example of insufficient animal testing (that if it had been tried on even more species, these negative results would have shown up), but in any case, the drug was allowed on the market because of the animal studies undertaken at that point in time, and one cannot know in advance when that kind of serious mistake could happen again. It is even likely that the preoccupation with animal experiments may be part of the problem with the lack of success in the fight against certain diseases, such as the war on cancer, initiated in 1971.24 In fact, a cure for cancer has been found for mice but not for humans.25 We also do not know what advances could have been or will be achieved without the use of animals, which implies that some of the claims about the importance of past animal testing may be inflated. Some specific medical advances achieved without the use of animals are the isolation of the AIDS virus, development of x-rays, and discovery of the relationship between chemical exposures and birth defects, to name just a few.26 It is also possible that past or future benefits could be achieved in other ways, in particular through the use of clinical investigations in humans. In fact, some advances in knowledge have come about through the use of humans as subjects,27 both in clinical trials and by using cadavers. What about the increased use of humans as a way to reduce animal experimentation? Of course, this raises its own set of significant ethical questions, most especially with that of consent, particularly with regard to vulnerable populations (such as the poor, developmentally delayed, imprisoned, and children). However, there must be some experimentation now undertaken with animal subjects that could easily be done on humans (psychological experiments are an obvious example), although we must obviously proceed very carefully in the utilization of humans. In addition, as I discussed in chapter 3 regarding the 3Rs, particularly the one of replacement, we need to put more money and effort into not only utilizing more fruitfully the replacement techniques we already have at our disposal (such as human cadav-

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ers, in vitro tests, computer and math models, CAM test, use of nonsentient animals) but also trying assiduously to develop additional alternatives, so that we may be able to gain the same benefits with considerably less experimentation. With ever increasing advances in computer technology, using computers seems an especially worthwhile avenue to explore. Moreover, public health measures, such as improvements in diet and sanitation, have probably done more to decrease mortality than has the development of vaccines.28 Many diseases we are trying hard to find cures for with animals are largely lifestyle related and thus somewhat preventable.29 It is a common and valid criticism that Western medicine is more focused on cure than on prevention. If much of the money and energy that is currently put into experimentation were instead diverted both to educate people on lifestyle decisions that affect health and to improve the living conditions for all humans, this would prove significantly beneficial to humans and thereby decrease our reliance on animal experimentation. The argument from animal benefit has some problems as well, primarily because the experimental animals themselves are not the direct beneficiaries of these benefits. This is not always the case with humans who volunteer for experiments either but is sometimes the case (e.g., AIDS patients who are willing to try an experimental drug). However, with humans we (ideally) have their informed consent; further, humans are in a position to determine whether they are willing to take the risks associated with experimental treatments in a way that animals are not. Thus, we can question whether animals, if given the choice, would consent to living as experimental subjects, under sometimes distressing conditions, on the grounds that it will help their conspecifics or members of other species. Since most experiments are designed and undertaken to enhance human well-being, the fact that animals have sometimes benefited is fundamentally serendipitous. Certainly, if there were never any benefits for animals, the justification for experimentation would not be considerably lessened. Thus, the argument from animal benefits sounds disingenuous, almost an afterthought. Although animals can and certainly have benefited from experimentation, it would be fair to say that virtually all experimentation is undertaken with a view toward improving human life and health. Even if it is granted that significant benefits have been achieved in the past, this does not commit us to continued experimentation at the same level for the future.30 Very restrictive experimentation will not completely eliminate some future benefits for humans and animals. While my proposal would severely restrict experimentation, I am not advocating complete abolition of experimentation, and therefore some experiments would be permitted, as I will develop in the following sections. The second broad way to respond to arguments from those who support the experimental status quo is to maintain that a good end does not justify a bad means. In contrast to act or preference utilitarianism, which looks to consequences as the single mitigating concern in assessing moral actions, many ethicists maintain that some actions are wrong in and of themselves, regardless

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of the consequences. Although utilitarians and nonutilitarians may come to some of the same conclusions on many issues, including many of the restrictions that should be placed on experimentation, one stark difference is some of the experiments that a utilitarian ethic would allow. Many who engage in a burden/benefit analysis, even if they are not utilitarians, tend to make judgments about experimentation according to the ends that are expected to be achieved, such that a good end often seems to justify virtually any means. My position is that just because benefit results does not make the means necessary, or even good. There are many things in life that may have a good end that we should not attempt to achieve precisely because of the bad means necessary to achieve this end, or at least we should consider alternative means to achieve the same end. Many examples illustrate this notion that a good end cannot justify a bad means. For example, it has long been part of the just war tradition that it is wrong to specifically target civilians, even if it means a quicker end to war and certain military victory. Some would argue that capital punishment is too severe a means to punish some criminals, even if it means that they will never again be able to perpetrate their crimes. We would not justify doing experiments on humans against their will, especially if they were certain to cause them harm, even if the benefits would be great for other humans. Finally, the classic example often used in opposition to utilitarian reasoning is that if a riot was going on and the civil authorities had the wrong man in custody, it would not be justifiable to punish him, even if it meant that the riots would cease. Thus, we should not do something inherently morally wrong simply because there is a possibility or even a likelihood of it resulting in a beneficial outcome. This is another way of saying that there are limits on achieving the good and that there are many things in life we should not attempt to do because of the bad means involved. I maintain that some of the practices within animal experimentation can be considered these bad means that are often justified by a good end. A consequence of believing that there are limits on the means to achieve good ends by experimentation is that human benefit is going to suffer somewhat by more restricted experimentation. There may not be cures for certain diseases, there may be some increased pain and suffering for humans and animals as a result of diminished medical advances, and attempts to increase longevity may be curtailed. Although I argued previously that some of the advances made through experimentation might be achieved with fewer animal experiments, particularly by focusing on the use of alternatives, my position is that even if we cannot achieve these ends with other means, we cannot justify all of the burdens animals bear in experimentation. Also, there are limits on the way in which we pursue human knowledge. Do scientists have an absolute right to engage in any kind of experimentation (and this would include excruciatingly painful experimentation) just to advance scientific knowledge, even theoretical knowledge?31 The absolute right to knowledge could justify the use of animals for any kind of bizarre experiment

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or at the cost of extreme suffering for sentient creatures. All recognize that the privacy rights of people put limits on how researchers can acquire knowledge of human beings. Before I provide guidelines for casuistry, some general comments are in order about weighing burdens and benefits. First, there seems to be an unquestioned assumption by scientists (and probably by many laypeople as well) that human health and life are the ultimate end and good in life. This has already been argued against from a theological position in the previous chapter, but there are even nontheological reasons to question the notion that longer human life is always a good. One of the ways to challenge this argument is to ask what the price might be for humans with increased longevity in human life. This raises the issue of quality versus quantity of life. The human life span has increased greatly in the past century, and it is likely to increase in the future. Unfortunately, however, ways to address the additional medical, financial, and social problems brought about by increased age have not kept pace with this life span advance, and it becomes legitimate to ask whether there might not be a point at which increased longevity is an increased burden rather than a benefit. If life expectancy increases to ninety but the last ten years are miserable, with many of these individuals coming down with Alzheimer’s disease or other debilitating illnesses, for example, then this is not necessarily better than people living only to seventy-five in reasonably good health. Second, scientists need to make stronger cases for their positions without simply resorting to a laundry list of past benefits achieved if they are to address the issue of experimentation with the attention it deserves and with the complexity it warrants.32 As one philosopher has astutely observed: “Doubtless we live, in part, under necessity, but we give that goddess more honour than she deserves.”33 Third, it is not fair for one group to bear all or most of the burdens and the other to gain all or most of the benefits. Although animals themselves have benefited to a certain extent from experimentation, it is indisputable that they are the ones most adversely affected, and, as I noted previously, the experimental animals are not themselves usually the direct beneficiaries of the experiments. Fourth, if the benefits can be arrived at in a less burdensome way, then we should do so. It is not sufficient simply to say that there are no realistic alternatives to animals; instead, serious efforts should be made to determine how we can minimize the burdens on animals. Fifth, both burdens and benefits cannot be vague but should be specific enough to demonstrate the expected and likely burdens to the animals, as well as the expected and likely benefits to humans. They both must be concrete, which would thereby enable them to be of some practical use in assessing particular experiments. Thus, we need to assess the likelihood of achieving helpful benefits from experiments in order to justify particular burdens. An extreme view would be that, for the purposes of an experiment to be legitimate, we must be able to predict in advance that it will certainly result in the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of disease or ill health in humans or animals. In fact, some opposed to all experimentation often argue in this way. However, this position is unrealistic because it is impossible to always accurately predict in advance pos-

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sible benefits, and therefore this approach sets the standard unnecessarily high, although it would logically follow that this standard would eliminate virtually all animal experimentation. I am arguing for a more moderate view, which suggests that all that is needed is to assert that the benefits are expected or intended, based on some kind of objective evidence since we cannot predict with certainty.34 Thus, we must determine the likelihood that a particular experiment will result in benefits—benefits sufficient to offset animal burdens. The benefits cannot simply be unsubstantiated wishful thinking but based on scientific evidence pointing in the direction of this likelihood. Therefore, the burden of proof should be on the experimenter to make the case for permissible experiments as opposed to being on those who want to restrict them. However, even when this burden of proof can be met, further factors must be considered. Even if benefits are expected, possible, intended, likely, or even certain, this is not sufficient to justify an experiment in and of itself.

Guidelines for Casuistry A burden/benefit analysis requires guidelines or principles to govern specific cases. To arrive at these guidelines, in this section I will proceed with some brief comments about guidelines in general, delineate different degrees of benefits and burdens, and then outline guidelines that can be used in a casuistry for experimentation. In the next section, I will then apply these guidelines to specific hypothetical experiments in order to discriminate between acceptable and unacceptable types of experiments. With regard to guidelines in general, it is important to point out that, as with rights, there will be gray areas. This is simply another way of saying that these guidelines should not be viewed as rules that must be legalistically applied. Rather, guidelines by their nature must be somewhat flexible. These guidelines are also broader than simply utilizing a pain or invasiveness scale. Although this kind of scale would be helpful perhaps at the outset in delineating boundaries beyond which we would not want to go with regard to pain in animals, it would not be helpful in addressing issues of suffering, rights, and theological considerations regarding the nature of animals. Therefore, these guidelines are proposed as a means by which we can take into account the significant factors that have already been discussed with regard to the nature and treatment of experimental animals. These guidelines assume that we have a prima facie responsibility not to cause animals unnecessary pain and suffering, and this section is my attempt to specify what is meant by “unnecessary,” since there may be times when infliction of pain and suffering can be justified. As I discussed in chapter 3, animals are believed to experience pain—to have the physiological mechanisms to experience pain sensations. Suffering, however, which is more of a mental state, may be more of a problem for more cognitively advanced animals. For that reason, a general principle before even getting to the guidelines is that, as I discussed under the 3Rs as replacement,

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when considering experiments that involve not only pain but also suffering (or only suffering), the presumption would be in favor of the more intelligent animals so that, all things being equal, it is worse to confine a monkey to a small cage than a rodent. However, the same restrictions would apply with regard to pain: where pain experience is similar, we may not decide that it is worse to cause pain to a chimpanzee than to a dog. In addition, while it has been argued that death as the automatic end point for all animals seems tragic, the presumption against a premature death should be especially strong in the cases of cognitively advanced animals, such as dolphins and primates. Benefits have already been defined with regard to experimentation as any advance in medical knowledge or practice, either for humans or animals, and they include the general advances mentioned previously, such as improvements in lifestyle or convenience; better medical and surgical techniques; advances in knowledge of psychology, behavior, or physiology; education and treatment of diseases; and contributory factors toward a longer life span. Although experiments can benefit animals as well as humans, benefits should predominantly be understood as positively affecting humans. However, we cannot talk simply about benefits in the abstract but need to specify different levels of benefits. Hence, we need to talk about minimal, moderate, serious, and very grave benefits. Minimal benefits are those that do not make important contributions to advancement in human life or health but do increase our knowledge in practical ways regarding less significant features of life, particularly greater lifestyle convenience. Minimal benefits include additional convenience items or more improved consumer products on the market, knowledge gained simply to satisfy curiosity that has no serious application to health issues, and knowledge gained that demonstrates or confirms what we already know. The following general kinds of experiments illustrate examples of these minimal benefits: studies done with the intention of providing additional nonessential consumer products, such as a new oven cleaner or improved shampoo; frog dissections done in high school biology classes; school science projects; studying how long rats can swim continuously before they drown; and studies designed to illustrate the connection between cigarette smoking and cancer. In this and other examples of experiments exemplifying particular benefits, I am by no means necessarily approving these experiments; I am simply showing what the benefits would be. Moderate benefits are those that make important contributions to improve the quality of human life and health in the areas of both basic and applied knowledge but that would not necessarily contribute much to serious health issues. Examples of moderate benefits would be improved drugs to deal with minor ailments, new and better methods of birth control, improved surgical techniques, understanding of psychological processes in humans, and knowledge gained with regard to healthy lifestyle practices, such as diet and exercise. Examples of experiments that would provide moderate benefits include testing a new aspirin for headaches or a new birth control method, using cats in surgery for veterinary students to practice nonessential surgical techniques,

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utilizing dogs in learned helplessness experiments, and exposing rats to anxiety-producing situations to see how they cope with their anxiety. Serious benefits are those that make significant and substantial contributions to the health, length, and quality of human life, not necessarily in the form of cures, but as a result of which pain and suffering would be greatly reduced. Examples of serious benefits would be new drugs to treat more serious illnesses for which current drug therapies are insufficient or problematic, either due to side effects or the inability to treat the underlying symptoms; development of better prosthetic devices; advances in transplantation techniques; and advances in the treatment of other serious illnesses not specifically or only caused by lifestyle decisions. Examples of experiments potentially yielding serious benefits are studies done to try to develop better medication for the treatment of schizophrenia, operating on pigs with the intention of utilizing their valves for victims of heart disease, and creating animals with tumors to better understand the progress of and treatments for cancer. Very grave benefits can lead to very important or very significant improvements in health and the quality and quantity of human life, particularly cures for serious illnesses for which none exists and for which the continued lack of a cure would otherwise be likely to lead to extreme pain and suffering and untimely deaths. Examples of very grave benefits would include studies designed to find cures for diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and AIDS, especially those that require deliberately infecting an otherwise healthy experimental animal with the disease as opposed to studying it in animals who may naturally have developed the disease in question. Examples of experiments that could result in very grave benefits are infecting chimpanzees with the HIV virus to see if they develop AIDS, with the intention of trying to find a cure; and inducing cancer in mice so that different potential remedies could be tried. Burdens have already been described with reference to experimentation as harms, pains, sufferings, or deprivations, and they should be understood as primarily negatively affecting animals. Burdens include infliction of pain and suffering, denial or restriction of rights, denial of intrinsic value as creatures of God, and an unnecessarily premature death. A rule of thumb that has already been argued for is that where there is good reason to believe that a particular animal species can experience pain and suffering, their use should be subject to the most stringent guidelines, and where evidence is more ambivalent, we should proceed very cautiously. Burdens thus can be understood as the denial of the most basic freedom of animals—that is, freedom from unnecessary pain and suffering—as well as the additional rights already discussed, such as the freedom to not have their liberty so restricted, to not have their lives unnecessarily shortened, to engage in species-specific behavior, and to be treated with respect as individuals. Burdens can also be distinguished by reference to the categories of minimal, moderate, serious, and very grave. Minimal burdens are those that cause only minimal pain or suffering and that do not deny animals’ basic rights. Minimal burdens involve no significant imposition on the animals’ lifestyles and include keeping animals, even if for the duration of their lives, in a situation or environment comparable with that

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of pets, and in which only routine medical procedures were administered by trained people that caused no or limited short-term pain and suffering. Examples of minimal burdens would include studying wild lions in Africa to understand mating rituals, observing chimpanzees already in captivity in an outdoor sanctuary to explore expressions and patterns of dominance and submission, and experiments designed to explore medical conditions whose only really invasive practice is routine medical procedures such as taking blood and giving injections. Moderate burdens are those that would have a deleterious impact on an animal’s well-being and thereby would result in some short-term pain and suffering or in a partial or temporary restriction of animal rights. Moderate burdens violate the rights of animals temporarily without long-term or significant imposition of pain and suffering. Moderate burdens generally have to do with housing conditions and could include individual housing of social animals, restricted liberty such as living in small cages or enclosures, and denial of other species-specific behavior. Moderate burdens would include keeping animals in housing that restricted their rights and administering the following procedures: minimal burden procedures (such as taking blood and giving injections) carried out by inexperienced people, infliction of short-term minimal pain without pain relief, infliction of long-term pain with pain relief, and shortterm deprivation of basic necessities of life, such as food, water, and sleep. The key issue with moderate burdens is that this kind of housing, as well as the experiments themselves, would be temporary, so that the animals ideally would not be killed but either be adopted out after the experiment or returned to an owner who volunteered him. Death of the animal in these cases should be a last resort and obviously done as painlessly as possible. Examples of experiments causing moderate burdens would be performing surgery on cats kept in individual cages with pain relief and restricting food intake for pigeons kept in small cages to see how learning was affected by food deprivation. Serious burdens are those that would have a significant impact on an animal’s well-being because of extended or long-term pain and suffering, with a significant and permanent restriction of animal rights, and with death as the automatic end point, whether performed humanely or not. Thus, serious burdens would include violating the basic rights of animals with regard to husbandry conditions, in particular by denying them the following: engagement in species-specific behavior, opportunity for liberty, contact with conspecifics for social animals, and a noncaged environment for a long period. Serious burdens can include some of the same experiments done in moderate burden experiments but with systematic violation of animals’ rights and conditions, including long-term and significant pain and suffering. Examples of serious burdens would be taking endangered species from the wild, particularly primates, and caging them, regardless of the purpose of the experiment (both because of the suffering and death of the many animals involved in the transport process, as well as the diminished capacity for a happy life for those animals eventually utilized in experiments); being kept as experimental subjects by those who cannot or do not care for them properly, such that the impov-

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erished treatment results in significant suffering or pain not necessarily the result of the research design; and subjecting animals, particularly more cognitively advanced ones, especially to psychological but also to medical experiments that cause significant and long-lasting pain and suffering. Experiments that cause serious burdens always involve significant restriction or denial of animal rights, with the attendant suffering, and could include the following: capturing chimpanzees from the wild and confining them for life to individual cages in order to perform any number of experiments that could cause pain through the actual procedures, but especially suffering as a result of the husbandry conditions; utilizing dolphins in military procedures; forcing rats to become addicted to heroin; and inducing cardiovascular disease in pigs. Very grave burdens would cause very significant harm to the actual experimental animals during their lives, with death as the automatic end point. Very grave burdens would include the following procedures, whether or not the animals were kept in inadequate husbandry conditions and even if the experiments were only short-term and temporary: long-term deprivation of the basic necessities of life, such as food, water, and sleep; use of restraining devices for many hours or days on end; and infliction of long-term and chronic pain and suffering with little or no pain relief. Specific examples that would involve very grave burdens include sleep deprivation studies in which cats are forced to stay awake for many days through having their brains stimulated with electrodes whenever they fall asleep, restraining squirrels in devices for numerous hours a day to study their brain activity, and utilizing dogs in radiation, burn, drumming, or shock therapy experiments with little or no relief. To assess which experiments would be permissible and which would not be, it is necessary to develop guidelines that would offset the benefits and burdens in such a way as to determine which benefits can justify which burdens. Obviously, as I discussed earlier, these guidelines can be only general and must remain somewhat flexible. It is impossible to cover all possible contingencies that could arise with regard to specific experiments, and thus it is difficult to make these discriminations with regard to all features of an experiment. Although many who address the issue of animal experimentation do not engage in such a careful attempt at a burden/benefit analysis, I want to demonstrate here that important distinctions in experiments can and should be made, with regard to both benefits and burdens. To engage in a burden/benefit analysis, I propose several guidelines, and the next section will apply these guidelines to specific cases. First, very grave benefits can justify both minimal and moderate burdens. Because very grave benefits include very important or very significant improvements in the quality and length of human life, it does not seem especially burdensome to expect animals to bear minimal or moderate burdens. When for humans the benefits could include cures for deadly diseases commonly linked to both significant pain and suffering, as well as early death, it does not seem problematic to utilize animals for such gains, as long as the burdens are not too severe. In the case of minimal burdens, animals would not experience any significant impact on their rights or any invasive procedures, and in the case of moderate

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burdens, although the animals’ rights are restricted or denied and they can be subjected to short-term pain, suffering, or deprivations, it is only temporary, and the animals will ultimately happily live out the remainder of their lives. Second, serious benefits can also justify minimal or moderate burdens. Although not as important as very grave benefits, serious benefits for humans include contributions toward a significant decrease in human pain and suffering, often dealing with serious illnesses not currently capable of helpful treatment. Imposing minimal or moderate burdens on animals, whose well-being would not be sufficiently adversely affected and certainly not for an extended period of time, does not seem excessive in light of the significant health gains for humans. Third, moderate benefits can justify minimal burdens. Since moderate benefits for humans include important contributions primarily to the quality of human life but with no specific impact on serious health concerns, it seems that only minimal burdens can justify such benefits and that no greater burdens should be placed on animals. Thus, even placing moderate burdens on animals for moderate benefits seems excessive because the cost in pain and suffering to animals would be too high to offset the relatively conservative gains for humans. Fourth, minimal benefits cannot justify any burden. Since minimal benefits are mostly in the area of basic knowledge and often demonstrate the obvious, exposing animals to even minimal burdens seems excessive because their well-being is still compromised, although not in any significant way. What cannot be justified by these guidelines is the imposition of any serious or very grave burdens on animals, no matter what the intended outcome is for humans, since the cost in animal pain, suffering, and death is too high. Often in discussions of experimentation, these are precisely the kinds of experiments that are used as the paradigm cases, such that virtually any treatment of animals is permissible if it would result in either serious or very grave benefits for humans. However, my position is that experiments that go beyond a certain point in terms of negatively affecting animals should not be undertaken, regardless of the benefits expected, even if this means that there will be no cures for certain diseases, a cessation of a longer life span, and some increased pain and suffering for both humans and animals, especially since we are talking about certain burdens for animals and intended benefits for humans. It is particularly in this area that many others might have significant disagreements, but my basic problem with both serious and very grave burdens on animals is that they are too excessive to be mitigated by any returns for humans. One of the difficult areas to incorporate into these guidelines is how to treat more cognitively advanced animals. To reiterate and emphasize what I argued for earlier, more cognitively advanced animals are probably capable of greater suffering than are other animals, and therefore, whenever it is possible to choose to use a less cognitively advanced animal for an experiment, scientists should be obligated to do so. Of course, it is extremely difficult to know where to draw the line, but the use of obviously highly intelligent animals such as

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primates and dolphins should be subject to greater restriction, particularly in experiments that would might seriously compromise their mental well-being.

Application of Guidelines to Experiments To use these guidelines in assessing experiments, they must be applied to specific types of experiments. In chapter 1, three categories of experiments were identified: education, testing, and research. Each of these categories includes within it specific types of experiments. Examples of experiments that would be permitted by each of the guidelines will be examined within each category. However, because it is often easier to determine which experiments would be disallowed within each category than to describe those that would be allowed, examples of excluded experiments will be included as well. Educational experiments refer to the use of animals in educational institutions at any level. With regard to very grave benefits justifying minimal burdens, it is difficult to envision such an experiment within this or even any other category, because it is unlikely that a major cure for humans could be discovered primarily by observing animals. An example of an experiment in which very grave benefits justify moderate burdens would be one in which veterinary students deprived rats of food for a short period of time to ascertain the effects of diet on heart disease, with the expectation that the rat would live out the remainder of his life outside the laboratory. With regard to serious benefits that justify minimal burdens, an example would be one in which medical students observed chimpanzees already known to have diabetes in a sanctuary setting to gain insights into how diet affects their blood sugar, with the only invasive procedure being the routine taking of blood by those properly trained to do so. An example of an experiment in which serious benefits could justify moderate burdens might be medical doctors utilizing cats kept in individual cages who are submitted to short-term painful procedures that create anxiety in the animals in order to better understand situations that provoke anxiety in humans. An educational experiment allowing for moderate benefits with minimal burdens would be psychiatrists observing chimpanzees in a sanctuary setting to understand how group dynamics contribute to depression. As I have already argued, any experiments that would yield information of minimal benefit for humans would be disallowed. In addition, other examples of experiments that would not be allowed under these guidelines within education would be most experiments done by children in school science fairs, unless we could ascertain that the animal was receiving good care and was not subject to invasive procedures by inexperienced hands; harmful experiments done by medical students simply to satisfy human curiosity; frog dissection experiments in high school biology classes for which the point is simply to see how frogs are anatomically structured; and any experiments in school settings that subjected animals to long-term pain and suffering without relief for any reason.

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Testing includes any experiments in which substances are administered first to animals to determine their toxicity or benefit to humans. It is frequently referred to as toxicity testing. Examples of product testing include drugs (often through use of the LD50 test or the Draize test), cosmetics, chemical household products, and pesticides. Testing drugs could fall under the category of either drugs or research but, for the sake of examples, will be considered within this category. It is difficult to envision a testing experiment that could result in very grave benefits from minimal burdens, but an example of an experiment in which very grave benefits could justify moderate burdens might be studying the effects of drugs in the treatment of cancer in cats who already have cancer. An experiment in which serious benefits could justify minimal burdens might be the administration of a drug believed to be comparatively harmless to a group of dogs temporarily housed together to study its effects on depression. An experiment in which serious benefits could justify moderate burdens would be administering experimental drugs to a group of hamsters housed individually for the potential treatment of Alzheimer’s disease in humans. An experiment in which moderate benefits could justify minimal burdens would be administering a potentially new birth control pill to chimpanzees in sanctuaries to determine if and how it affected their fertility both by observing their behavior and by relatively minor invasive procedures, such as testing their urine to determine pregnancy. Any testing experiments that could yield information of minimal benefit for humans would be disallowed. Other examples of experiments that would not be permitted under these guidelines include forcing mice to stay awake for days on end, primarily through the use of shock therapy, in order to better understand sleeping disorders in humans and with the intention of developing a drug to help deal with this problem; force-feeding oven cleaner to a group of dogs to determine its toxicity level so that we might have one more oven cleaner on the market; applying a new shampoo product directly into the eyes of immobilized rabbits so that the animals develop painful ulcerations in order that we might have a new shampoo on the market; deliberately inflicting chimpanzees taken from the wild with the AIDS virus to test potential drug therapies for the disease; subjecting octopuses to long-term pain without pain relief to see how they deal with pain; and addicting rats to cocaine to see if they would prefer drugs to food, if given a choice. Research has two components: basic and applied research. The former is an attempt to study for the sake of knowledge to better understand how biological systems function, and the latter has practical ramifications that can be ascertained once the experiment is ended and the specific goal to improve the life and health of humans and animals. Research includes a broad range of experiments, including medical research, development and deployment of weapons, space research, agricultural research, ethology, behavioral and psychological research, and learning experiments. Again, it is difficult to envision a very grave benefit justifying a minimal burden, but an example might be observing a group of animals in a sanctuary setting who had developed tumors to determine how we might proceed with a cure for cancer. An example of an experiment in which very grave benefits could justify moderate burdens might

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be utilizing pigs for a heart transplant procedure that was expected to cause them only short-term discomfort, after which they would be left to live out their normal lives if in good enough health to do so. An experiment in which serious benefits would justify minimal burdens might be attaching temporary prosthetic devices to chimpanzees (without first disfiguring them) in a sanctuary setting to see how well they could manage with them, with the intention of trying to significantly improve the quality of prosthetic devices for humans. An experiment in which serious benefits could justify moderate burdens would be engaging in short-term deprivations of basic life necessities in guinea pigs to study their impact upon diet and its effect on the development of diabetes. An experiment in which moderate benefits could justify minimal burdens might be utilizing rats in mazes to better understand how learning takes place. Any testing experiments that could yield information of minimal benefit for humans would be disallowed. Examples of other research experiments that would not be permitted under these guidelines include burn and radiation experiments on any species of animal; sending monkeys into space in restraining devices from which they cannot move; the head trauma experiment on baboons, in which a huge weight came crashing down on their heads so experimenters could better understand how impact negatively affects brain function; and using dolphins to help in military expeditions by carrying explosives attached to their bodies.

Conclusion The primary reason it is easier to develop examples of experiments that would be disallowed than to list permitted experiments is that the developed guidelines are meant to greatly restrict animal experimentation. Most of the experimentation currently undertaken would probably be prohibited by these standards, and only truly benign experimentation would be allowed. However, just as we expect humans to bear the burdens at times of experimentation, it can be argued that animals can assume some burdens in experiments as well. But these burdens should not be excessive. Because animals are sentient, have mental states, possess rights, are valued creatures in the sight of God, and cannot verbally consent, there must be greater restrictions on their use than those that exist in experimentation at the present time. Obviously, some will disagree with my conclusions, in terms of how I have set up the categories of minimal, moderate, serious, and very grave and in particular with the fact that these guidelines would allow for so little experimentation. One way I would respond to those who disagree is not to argue so much on the basis of the actual guidelines I have established, even though I think they are very good and flow naturally from the arguments made in previous chapters, but with a challenge to establish their own guidelines that could be applied to concrete experiments. One of my principal contentions is that experimentation is traditionally justified by a simple appeal to human benefit, without exploring or fleshing out what that means, and also that pro-

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experimentation arguments tend to ignore or seriously minimize the extent of the burdens to animals. It is my hope that the guidelines presented in this chapter, if not actually followed, would provoke other thoughtful experiments in the direction of concretely weighing burdens and benefits in experimentation, keeping in mind the often negative impact on animals.

Conclusion

Guidelines for casuistry such as I proposed in the previous chapter obviously cannot cover every situation, and they may seem difficult to enforce or even idealistic. However, even if that is the case, the purpose of ideals is to move us beyond where we are to a point where we would like to be. In terms of experimentation, the end result of all of the proposals outlined in previous chapters is an attempt to move us in the general direction of these guidelines, which would result in more humane experimentation. Even if these guidelines were never adopted, though, I would recommend that those especially who argue in favor of largely unrestricted experimentation would engage in establishing guidelines that truly weigh animal burdens against human benefits. In addition to these guidelines, though, there are some incremental steps I previously proposed that could ultimately move us forward in the direction of a true weighing of benefits and burdens, in order to greatly reduce the burdens on animals in experimentation. Thus, I would like to offer an interim ethic that would greatly restrict experimentation by taking seriously the burdens to animals. I have basically two concrete proposals with regard to an interim ethic that might lead up to the kind of burden/benefit analysis I am recommending. First, an interim ethic, as I proposed in chapter 3, should at the very least focus on the restrictions and standards that already exist in the form of legislation and guidelines, while working toward a more restrictive approach to experimentation. These existing guidelines and laws need to be enforced, and severe penalties administered for any violations. Some good legislation already protects experimental animals, but if the rules are disregarded or if people are not censured for their violations, then the legislation

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is virtually useless. Two specific examples illustrate this point. The USDA is currently entrusted with inspecting facilities and with following up on and reprimanding those guilty of violations, but it often does not do so. Allowing the continued functioning of laboratories that are violating the guidelines already in place for humane treatment of experimental animals will ensure that violation of such guidelines will continue. Humane euthanasia is another aspect of experimentation for which clear guidelines exist, but if some scientists do not follow these guidelines, then animal pain and suffering at the point of death will continue to be a reality for at least some animals. The second concrete proposal for an interim ethic requires a modification of some of the existing guidelines and legislation, some of which I have already presented. They can be summarized briefly under six categories: the search for alternatives, financial incentives, specific changes to current legislation, the use of pet keeping as a model, the practice of temporarily volunteering pets as research models, and attempts to ascertain the animal’s perspective. First, the exploration of alternatives to the use of animals should be more assiduously pursued and rewarded. There is a need to reduce both the number of experiments and the number of animals used in experiments. Fortunately, great strides are being made in the development of alternatives, but there still remains a strong bias in favor of animal models. There is a need to replace animal models whenever possible, particularly by utilizing nonsentient animals instead of sentient animals whenever possible, but also through the use of nonanimal models, including the possibility of increased use of humans. There is also a need to refine experiments such that animal pain and suffering are minimized whenever possible, including the use of pain medication, humane destruction of animals, and allowing institutional animal care and use committees (IACUCs) greater discretion when it comes to refining research protocols. Second, financial incentives need to be greater to increase the likelihood that more humane experimentation will take place. There need to be financial incentives to find alternatives to animal models for experiments. Some research funding should be funneled to the USDA to provide the personnel to carry out the department’s responsibilities in overseeing much of the experimentation. More money should be diverted to preventive medicine, especially for illnesses believed to result from poor lifestyle choices. Some research funding should go toward the development of better husbandry conditions for animals, such as larger cages or pens. In addition, cost should not the principal factor in the development and deployment of humane euthanasia methods. Third, some of the legislation needs to be modified. The Animal Welfare Act and Public Health Service (PHS) policy should be combined into one law for consistency. In particular, animals not typically covered by these laws should be protected. For example, the Animal Welfare Act currently excludes rats, mice, birds, and all invertebrates, and the PHS policy includes all vertebrates but excludes invertebrates. The ideal combined legislation should include protection for all vertebrates, as well as for all invertebrates believed capable of

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experiencing pain, such as the cephalopods. Thus, legal protection should be extended to all experimental animals believed to be capable of experiencing pain and suffering. Animals should be provided with legal rights and protection, so that their legal status is upgraded from mere property. Treatment of animals in experiments for which there is no federal funding (such as in private laboratories or in school settings) should be subject to the same conditions as those for which federal funds are provided. In addition, there should be consistency between what is permissible in private ownership of pets and in scientific settings; thus, one should not be able to do to an animal in a laboratory something that would be against the law if done by a private citizen. Husbandry conditions should be significantly improved, especially with regard to speciesspecific requirements. Finally, the power of IACUCs should be strengthened, so that their evaluations of experiments become more than simply a rubberstamping process. Fourth, pet keeping should be the model for experimentation, since it would underscore the reality that animals have intrinsic rather than only instrumental value. Although it could be argued that pet keeping is a very good example of an instrumental use of animals, my contention is that pet keeping under the best of circumstances, while including the idea of an instrumental use of animals, also appreciates the intrinsic value of animals. In the chapter on rights, I argued that experimental animals can be used for human purposes at times (instrumental value), but that what will likely safeguard their wellbeing and protect them from excessive harm is the position that they have value, worth, and integrity in and of themselves (intrinsic value), which places constraints on what we can do to them. Therefore, we should treat animals as ends in themselves and not only as a means to an end, and in comparison with most practices involving animals, pet keeping seems to be the best model for this, assuming, of course, that the human owner is kindly disposed toward his animal. In practical terms, pet-keeping behavior would include the naming of experimental animals (whenever this is feasible), the expectation that experimenters treat experimental animals as they would their own pets (not exposing animals to pain and suffering that they would be unwilling to expose their own animals to), adopting out research animals as pets, greater mobility for animals in laboratories, and an avoidance of premature death whenever possible. Fifth, we could institute a policy by which people could temporarily volunteer their pets for use in medical experiments. Obviously, not all individuals would be so willing, and not all kinds of experiments would lend themselves to such a limited use, but it could be a solution in some cases. This policy would allow for the fact that people relinquishing their pets are individuals who have the animals’ best interests at heart (ideally) and would also grant that, just as humans need to be willing to volunteer at times in the fight against disease, so can animals. The logistics of instituting a policy like this may seem insurmountable, and it might be difficult to persuade individuals to let their pets be used in such situations. However, it could help to reduce the long-term pain and suffering to which many experimental animals are subject. Pet own-

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ers could be persuaded by appealing to the similarities between their own pets and those traditionally experimented upon. Again, this would not be the ultimate solution, but it should at least be considered. Sixth, we need to continue to seek the animal’s perspective regarding her treatment, primarily through the use of preference tests and incorporating the results into improved husbandry conditions. While animals cannot communicate with us in our language, they do have other ways of making themselves understood. If a small change on our part could contribute to a significant benefit for them, it does not seem a large price to pay. When addressing the issues of whether and to what extent animal experimentation should be permitted, we must ultimately return to the original question of how to reconcile the values of the good of science, human advancement, and concern for all sentient beings. This project has been an attempt to reconcile these values, although admittedly with an emphasis on concern for all sentient beings, particularly nonhuman animals, since they bear the brunt of the burdens of experiments and their concerns are generally minimized in most discussions on experimentation. I have argued for a more restrictive approach to experimentation that need not completely eliminate future benefits to humans. My proposal for restricting animal experimentation includes the following basic steps to minimize the burdens on animals without greatly increasing the burdens on humans. First, there must be adherence to the guidelines and laws already in place to protect experimental animals, with censure for those guilty of violations. Second, we need to move in the direction of further restrictions and modifications of the laws and guidelines that already exist. Third, we need to continue to raise philosophical and theological questions with regard to the nature of animals in such a way that we simply do not accept arguments based on questionable assumptions, such as animal mental states are completely different from human mental states, animals cannot suffer, animals do not have and should not have rights, and animals need to be viewed primarily in terms of their instrumental value for humans. Fourth, we need to move in the direction of creating guidelines for a genuine burden/ benefit analysis, which will move beyond merely listing human benefits and truly respect animals as not just human instruments but as the creatures of intrinsic value they are.

Notes

introduction 1. Both the terms “animal” and “animal experimentation” will be defined more precisely in the following chapter. 2. The extremists on both sides are in the minority; most of those involved in the discussion on and practice of animal experimentation find themselves in what has been called “the troubled middle”; see Strachan Donnelley, “Introduction. The Troubled Middle In Medias Res,” in “Animals, Science, and Ethics,” ed. Strachan Donnelley and Kathleen Nolan, special supplement, Hastings Center Report, May–June 1990, 1–32, in which they attempt to work out a position that allows for more humane experimentation. 3. As recently as 1969, there were no articles found in The Philosopher’s Index, whereas there were more than forty entries in 1985; see James A. Nelson, “Recent Studies in Animal Ethics,” American Philosophical Quarterly 22, no. 1 (January 1985): 13. Not only do the number of articles continue to grow but also there is a steady stream of books written on the subject, and entire journals are now devoted to the treatment of animals. 4. For a history of vivisection and the antivivisectionist movement, see Nicolaas A. Rupke, ed., Vivisection in Historical Perspective (London: Routledge, 1987); Coral Lansbury, The Old Brown Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivisection in Edwardian England (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); and E. Westacott, A Century of Vivisection and Anti-Vivisection (Ashingdon, UK: C. W. Daniel Company, 1949). For an excellent reader of selections on the ethical treatment of animals by well-known writers from ancient Greece to the contemporary period, see Paul A. B. Clarke and Andrew Linzey, eds., Political Theory and Animal Rights (London: Pluto Press, 1990). 5. For a particularly helpful and thorough collection of essays on the history of human-animal relationships, see Aubrey Manning and James Serpell, eds., Animals and Human Society: Changing Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994); and Tim Ingold, ed., What Is an Animal? One World Archaeology Series (London: Routledge, 1994).

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6. For three somewhat different conceptualizations, see Andrew Linzey, “Animal Rights,” in Dictionary of Ethics, Theology and Society, ed. Paul Barry Clarke and Andrew Linzey (London: Routledge, 1996); Tom Regan, “Treatment of Animals,” in Encyclopedia of Ethics, vol. 1 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1992); and Louis P. Pojman, “Animal Rights, Egalitarianism, and Nihilism,” in Ethical Issues in Contemporary Society, ed. John Howie and George Schedler (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1995). 7. Steve F. Sapontzis, “The Evolution of Animals in Moral Philosophy,” Between the Species 3, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 65. 8. In contrast, Eastern culture has generally viewed humans as being within rather than above nature; see Rod Preece and Lorna Chamberlain, Animal Welfare and Human Value (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993), 5–7. 9. Ibid. 10. Andreas-Holger Maehle and Ulrich Trohler, “Animal Experimentation from Antiquity to the End of the Eighteenth Century: Attitudes and Arguments,” in Vivisection in Historical Perspective, ed. Nicolaas A. Rupke (London: Routledge, 1987), 15. 11. James C. Whorton, “Animal Research: Historical Aspects,” Encyclopedia of Bioethics, rev. ed., 5 vols. (New York: Simon & Schuster, Macmillan, 1995). 12. Ruth Ellen Bulger, “Use of Animals in Experimental Research: A Scientist’s Perspective,” in The Ethical Dimensions of the Biological Sciences, ed. Ruth Ellen Bulger, Elizabeth Heitman, and Stanley Joel Reiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 187. 13. Whorton, “Animal Research: Historical Aspects.” 14. Preece and Chamberlain, Animal Welfare and Human Values, 9; see also Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). 15. A fuller discussion of the two creation accounts in Genesis and their implications for the treatment of animals can be found in chapter 5. A particularly good discussion of these accounts can be found in Theodore Hiebert, The Yahwist’s Landscape: Nature and Religion in Early Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 16. Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 32. 17. Maehle and Trohler, “Animal Experimentation,” 17. 18. For an interesting account of this phenomenon, see E. P. Evans, The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals: The Lost History of Europe’s Animal Trials (1906; repr., Boston: Faber and Faber, 1988); and chapter 3 of Gerald Carson, Man, Beasts and Gods: A History of Cruelty and Kindness to Animals (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972). For a detailed account of the attitudes to animals during the Middle Ages, see Joyce E. Salisbury, The Beast Within: Animals in the Middle Ages (New York: Routledge, 1994). 19. Ibid., 38. Another writer made the following observation: “It is surely not an accident that the practice of vivisecting animals—nailing them to boards and then dissecting them while still alive—was begun by followers of Descartes at Port Royal” (Sapontzis, “Evolution of Animals in Moral Philosophy,” 63). 20. It is interesting that England continues to be in the forefront on the issue of humane treatment of animals. For histories of the animal protection movement, see Lawrence Finsen and Susan Finsen, The Animal Rights Movement in America: From Compassion to Respect, Social Movements Past and Present Series (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994); and James M. Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin, The Animal Rights Crusade: The Growth of a Moral Protest (New York: Free Press, 1992).

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21. For an interesting history of this phenomenon, see Lansbury, Old Brown Dog. 22. Carson, Men, Beasts, and Gods, 47–54. 23. Andrew N. Rowan, Of Mice, Models, & Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal Research (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 49. 24. Susan E. Lederer, “The Controversy over Animal Experimentation in America, 1880–1914,” in Vivisection in Historical Perspective, ed. Nicolaas A. Rupke (London: Routledge, 1987), 237–238. 25. Carson, Men, Beasts, and God, 96–98. 26. Rowan, Of Mice, Models, & Men, 49. 27. Ibid. 28. Jack H. Botting and Adrian R. Morrison, “Animal Research Is Vital to Medicine,” Scientific American 276, no. 2 (February 1997): 83–84. A critique of science’s claim that human health has been advanced by animal experimentation can be found in C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000). 29. For a fuller discussion of these movements and the concept of animal rights, see Gary Francione, “Animal Rights: An Incremental Approach,” in Animal Rights: The Changing Debate, ed. Robert Garner (New York: New York University Press, 1996); see also two works by Steven M. Wise: Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2000) and Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002). 30. Because of their often strong opposition to many contemporary practices involving animals, including and perhaps especially animal experimentation, a number of writers have studied the animal rights movement to better understand this phenomenon and to attempt to create a profile of the typical animal activist. This profile has been quite consistent throughout the studies: animal activists tend to be highly educated, predominantly female, white, middle to upper middle class, socially active in other political causes, and generally vegetarians opposed also to hunting, wearing fur, and most animal experimentation. For some interesting works on the subject, see Harold A. Herzog Jr., “ ‘The Movement Is My Life’: The Psychology of Animal Rights Activism,” Journal of Social Issues 49, no. 1 (1993): 103–119; Wesley V. Jamison and William M. Lunch, “Rights of Animals, Perceptions of Science, and Political Activism: Profile of American Animal Rights Activists,” Science, Technology, & Human Values 17, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 438–458; Richard J. Traystman, “Commentary: The Goal of Animal Welfare, Animal ‘Rights,’ and Antivivisectionist Groups in the United States,” Journal of Neurosurgical Anesthesiology 2, no. 3 (September 1990): 153–158; and Richard P. Vance, “An Introduction to the Philosophical Presuppositions of the Animal Liberation/Rights Movement,” Journal of the American Medical Association 268, no. 13 (October 7, 1992): 1715–1719. The latter two are especially interesting in that their purpose is to raise the consciousness of the medical community about the goals of the animal rights groups in an effort to force them to view these groups as serious opponents. For histories on the animal protection movement, see Finsen and Finsen, Animal Rights Movement in America; and Jasper and Nelkin, Animal Rights Crusade. 31. Jasper and Nelkin, Animal Rights Crusade, 3. 32. Ibid., 90. Singer has continued to write extensively on the ethical treatment of animals; one of his more recent works is Ethics into Action: Henry Spira and the Animal Rights Movement (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), where he provides a biography of one of the most famous American animal activists of the twentieth century, partly with the hope of demonstrating to others how they, too, can become activists.

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33. For a book of essays devoted to critiquing the work of Peter Singer, see Dale Jamieson, ed., Singer and His Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 34. Madhusree Mukerjee, “Trends in Animal Research,” Scientific American 276, no. 2 (February 1997): 88. 35. It is apparent from reading the history of opposition to animal experimentation that the arguments have actually changed very little; the only exception is that of the discussion of alternatives to animals; see Andrew N. Rowan and Franklin M. Loew, with Joan C. Weer, The Animal Research Controversy, Center for Animals and Public Policy (North Grafton, MA: Tufts University School of Veterinary Medicine, 1995), 1. 36. A separate chapter will not be devoted to utilitarianism because many of the same arguments used in this theory are utilized in the burden/benefit analysis. 37. For a comprehensive social contract view that excludes animals from the moral community, see Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, reprint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 38. For a helpful introduction to feminist approaches, see Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donavan, eds., Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995.)

chapter 1 1. Although many countries conduct animal experimentation, this book will focus on animal experimentation in the United States only. 2. Rosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 17. 3. Michael Allen Fox, The Case for Animal Experimentation: An Evolutionary and Ethical Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 3. For a fuller discussion on the issue of how to define an “animal,” see Tim Ingold, ed., What Is an Animal? One World Archaeology Series (London: Routledge, 1988, 1994); and Paul Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapter 5. 4. For a helpful chart, see Christoph A. Reinhardt, ed., Alternatives to Animal Testing: New Ways in Biomedical Sciences, Trends and Progress (Weinheim, Germany: VCH Publishers, 1994), 38. The source for this chart is the Office of Technology Assessment. 5. Margaret Rose and David Adams, “Evidence for Pain and Suffering in Other Animals,” in Animal Experimentation: The Consensus Changes, ed. Gill Langley (New York: Chapman and Hall, 1989). See also David DeGrazia and Andrew Rowan, “Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety in Animals and Humans,” Theoretical Medicine 12, no. 3 (S 1991): 193–211; and Jane A. Smith and Kenneth M. Boyd, eds., Lives in the Balance: The Ethics of Using Animals in Biomedical Research, Report of a Working Party of the Institute of Medical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 66. 6. The distinction commonly made between vertebrates and invertebrates exists largely due to the lack of a central nervous system in invertebrates. However, the octopus and the squid have large nerve clusters and, based on clinical observation, are believed by many to experience pain. This distinction accounts for the often-quoted place where Singer would draw the line, namely, somewhere between a shrimp and an oyster. The issue of animal pain will be discussed more fully in chapter 3. 7. The issue of cognition will be more fully explored in chapter 2. 8. In the following chapter, we will see that in the consideration of alternatives

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to the use of animals in experiments, other “models” are suggested (e.g., computer models, mathematical models). 9. Some of the benefits of animal experimentation also help animals, although the expressed purpose for most experiments is their potential benefit for humans. A more detailed analysis of the burdens and benefits of animal experimentation will be addressed in chapter 6. 10. Edward C. Melby Jr., “Overview of the State of the Art in Development and Utilization of Animal Models in the U.S.A.,” in Animal Models: Assessing the Scope of Their Use in Biomedical Research, ed. Junichi Kawamata and Edward C. Melby Jr. (New York: Alan R. Liss, 1987), 1. 11. Marie Fox, “Animal Rights and Wrongs: Medical Ethics and the Killing of NonHuman Animals,” in Death Rites: Law and Ethics at the End of Life, ed. Robert Lee and Derek Morgan (London: Routledge, 1994), 133. 12. However, the term “anti-vivisection” is often used by organizations opposed to animal experimentation, probably partly because of the pejorative sense that the term “vivisection” conjures up (e.g., The New England Anti-Vivisection Society). 13. In much of the animal rights literature, basic research often comes under harsher criticism than applied research, since the results of the former seem more intangible, and much needless suffering of animals may occur without any perceived direct benefit to human beings. However, many scientists maintain that basic research is germane to the scientific enterprise and that one cannot necessarily know in advance which experimental results will ultimately be helpful. The book by the National Research Council entitled Use of Laboratory Animals in Biomedical and Behavioral Research (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988) states this position well: “It is important to emphasize that there is no way to predict in advance what will and will not be productive research. What is important to recognize is that at the time it is undertaken, competent research has the potential to be productive” (48). 14. F. Barbara Orlans, In the Name of Science: Issues in Responsible Animal Experimentation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 39. 15. There does not appear to be the same legal mandate in the case of cosmetic testing, since many cosmetic companies have now abandoned animal tests and often advertise their products as “cruelty-free.” 16. For further discussion on toxicity tests in general, and on the LD50 and Draize eye irritancy tests in particular, see chapters 13–17 of Andrew N. Rowan, Of Mice, Models, & Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal Research (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984); and James M. Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin, The Animal Rights Crusade: The Growth of a Moral Protest (New York: Free Press, 1992), 105–109. For a discussion of alternatives to toxicity testing, see Orlans, In the Name of Science, 153– 168. 17. For a critique particularly of the use of animals in testing with regard to human health, see Alix Fano, Lethal Laws: Animal Testing, Human Health and Environmental Policy (London: Zed Books, 1997); and C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Specious Science: How Genetics and Evolution Reveal Why Medical Research on Animals Harms Humans (New York: Continuum, 2002), particularly chapter 4. 18. Although some criticize the use of animals in education in general, the case of dissection in high school biology classes is a particularly controversial issue that has been widely written about from both moral and legal standpoints; see especially Alan D. Bowd, “Dissection as an Instructional Technique in Secondary Science: Choice and Alternatives,” Society and Animals 1, no. 1 (1993): 83–89; Gary L. Francione and Anna E. Charlton, Vivisection and Dissection in the Classroom: A Guide to

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Conscientious Objection (Jenkintown, PA: American Anti-Vivisection Society, 1992); and Jonathan Balcombe, “Education by Extermination,” Animals’ Agenda 14, no. 5 (September–October 1994): 22–25. 19. New types of animal experimentation that have recently emerged do not necessarily fit into the three traditional categories: xenotransplantation (the use of animal organs in humans) and the creation of transgenic animals (injecting some of the genetic material from one animal species into another). For a good discussion on the issue of transgenic experiments, see Strachan Donnelley, Charles R. McCarthy, and Rivers Singleton Jr., “The Brave New World of Animal Technology,” special supplement, Hastings Center Report 24, no. 1 (January–February 1994): S1–S31; and Evelyn Pluhar, “On the Genetic Manipulation of Animals,” Between the Species 1, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 511–546. For an excellent discussion on genetic engineering of animals, see Bernard E. Rollin, The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 20. National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 22–23. 21. Greek and Greek, Specious Science, 31. 22. C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000), 83. 23. Greek and Greek, Specious Science, 30. 24. Greek and Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese, 86. 25. Greek and Greek, Specious Science, 131. 26. It is well known that the statistics on animal use in the United States are unreliable, and it is important to note that though some of the articles assessing this problem are a bit dated, the problem continues to the present; see Andrew N. Rowan and Franklin M. Loew, with Joan C. Weer, The Animal Research Controversy, Center for Animals and Public Policy (North Grafton, MA: Tufts University School of Veterinary Medicine, 1995), i. The problem with statistics has to do with data collection. Barbara F. Orlans provides a very helpful analysis of this problem in her article, “Data on Animal Experimentation in the United States: What They Do and Do Not Show,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 37, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 217–231. She concludes that the official data on the use of laboratory animals is deficient in important respects, and she calls for substantial reforms. 27. National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 2. However, there has been a steady increase in the number of research facilities and sites; see Orlans, In the Name of Science, 67. 28. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 66. 29. Lawrence Finsen and Susan Finsen, The Animal Rights Movement in America: From Compassion to Respect, Social Movements Past and Present Series (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 268. Two authors estimate that up to 100 million mice and rats are used each year; see Greek and Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese, 92. 30. National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 2. 31. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 62. 32. National Research Council, Laboratory Animal Management: Rodents (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996), 17. 33. National Research Council, Laboratory Animal Management: Dogs (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994), 4. 34. National Research Council, Laboratory Animal Management: Rodents, 17–20. 35. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 70–72. For example, animals traditionally kept as pets (e.g., dogs, cats, horses), those admired for their intelligence or beauty (e.g., primates, dolphins), or those with beguiling characteristics (e.g., deer, seals) often are

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replaced with less favored species, such as rodents, pigs, and ferrets; if the more favored species are utilized in experiments, they usually have a better chance of receiving more humane treatment. 36. The term “pound animal” is generally used to refer to animals that can be obtained from two different kinds of facilities: pounds, which are generally established by local ordinance to hold lost, abandoned, or stray animals for a short, specified period of time until their owners can claim them or new homes can be found for them; and shelters, which are primarily established facilities; see National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 64. Orlans notes that this distinction has become blurred over time; see In the Name of Science, 210. 37. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 211. 38. It has been estimated, for example, that for every animal captured in the wild that actually is utilized in an experiment, another five to ten die in the trapping and transport process; see Deborah Blum, The Monkey Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 250. 39. The issue of the use of pound animals is widely discussed in both the scientific and animal rights literature. The key issue at stake is that most states allow selling unwanted pound animals to research labs (it is estimated that in most pounds or shelters, 90 percent of the animals eventually have to be put to sleep if not placed in homes; see National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 64). Those in favor of selling pound animals to research laboratories argue that only one animal rather than two will have to die; that it is cheaper than purposely breeding animals; and that sometimes not knowing the genetic background of the animal is more helpful for the experiment. Those against selling pound animals argue that this practice undermines the concept of a shelter or pound as a sanctuary for lost or abandoned animals; that they will suffer more as a result of being experimented on rather than simply being put to sleep; that former pets are ill suited to life in a lab; and that knowing about this practice may discourage people from turning animals in to shelters and pounds. For further discussion of this issue, see Andrew Rowan, Of Mice, Models, & Men, chapter 10, and Orlans, In the Name of Science, 209–220. 40. The topic of animal law has become a very serious one in recent years, with many law schools now offering courses. In 1995, the journal Animal Law came into existence, and it is now published annually. In the past few years, it has an entire section in each issue devoted specifically to legislation with regard to animals. For some books dealing with animals and the law, see two by Steven M. Wise: Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002), and Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2000); see also Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995). 41. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 51. 42. Richard Crawford, “A Review of the Animal Welfare Enforcement Report Data 1973 through 1995,” Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter 7, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 2. This act was originally entitled the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act of 1966, but its name was changed to the Animal Welfare Act with its first amendment; see National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 49. 43. Esther F. Dukes, “The Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act: Will It Ensure That the Policy of the Animal Welfare Act Becomes a Reality?” Saint Louis University Law Journal 31, no. 3 (September 1987): 520–521. 44. Crawford, “Review,” 2. 45. National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 50.

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46. Crawford, “Review,” 41. 47. National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 50. 48. Dukes, “Improved Standards,” 522. 49. Crawford, “Review,” 2–3. 50. Dukes, “Improved Standards,” 523. 51. Crawford, “Review,” 7. 52. Dukes, “Improved Standards,” 523. 53. Crawford, “Review,” 9. Considerable discussion has taken place within the scientific community as to what psychological enhancement for nonhuman primates actually means, since even among primates there are significant differences. However, it usually refers to social grouping (for those primates who naturally live in groups), maintaining them in some kind of open habitat rather than in cages, and the presence of tools or toys to play with in order to relieve boredom. 54. Issues related to pain and legislation will be addressed in more detail in chapter 3. 55. The PHS policy also requires an institutional animal care and use committee (IACUC) for each institution. The person on an IACUC not affiliated with the institution is supposed to represent the general public. The IACUC is required to perform inspections twice a year and is also responsible for reviewing procedures on animals involving pain; see National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 52. For a comprehensive guideline for the proper establishment and maintenance of an IACUC, see M. Lawrence Podolsky and Victor S. Lukas, eds., The Care and Feeding of an IACUC: The Organization and Management of an Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1999). For a discussion on some of the controversies regarding IACUCs, see Lawrence Finsen, “Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees: A New Set of Clothes for the Emperor?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13 (May 1988): 145–158. 56. Dukes, “Improved Standards,” 523–524. 57. National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 53. 58. Dukes, “Improved Standards,” 524. 59. Crawford, “Review,” 8–9. 60. Animal Law, no. 8 (2002), “2001 Legislative Review,” 259–288. 61. Animal Law, no. 9 (2003), “2002 Legislative Review,” 331–356. 62. National Research Council, Laboratory Animal Management: Rodents, 1. 63. Orlans, “Data on Animal Experimentation,” 222. 64. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996. 65. National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 53–54. 66. Other books that contain specific information and suggestions on adequate and humane animal husbandry issues (some of which have previously been mentioned) include: Laboratory Animal Management: Dogs; Laboratory Animal Management: Rodents; Nutrient Requirements of Laboratory Animals, 4th rev. ed. (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995); Recognition and Alleviation of Pain and Distress in Laboratory Animals (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992); and Use of Laboratory Animals in Biomedical and Behavioral Research (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988). A good nongovernmental resource is Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel, eds., Care, Husbandry and Well-Being: An Overview by Species, vol. 2 of The Experimental Animal in Biomedical Research (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1995). 67. Judith Hampson, “Legislation and the Changing Consensus,” in Animal Experimentation: The Consensus Changes, ed. Gill Langley (New York: Chapman and Hall,

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1989), 221. She contrasts this with the system in the United Kingdom, which is more centrally controlled. 68. It is beyond the scope of this book to address the controversy surrounding animal legislation; for further discussion of some of the perceived deficiencies, see Charles R. McCarthy, “Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals?” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 3, no. 3 (September 1993): 293–302; Wendell Stephenson, “Deficiencies in the National Institute of Health’s Guidelines for the Care and Protection of Laboratory Animals,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18, no. 8 (August 1993): 375–388; Orlans, “Data on Animal Experimentation in the United States”; George E. Brown Jr., “30 Years of the Animal Welfare Act,” Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter 8, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 1–2, 23; and Bonnie Burtain, “Future Development of USDA Standards for Animals under the Authorities of the Animal Welfare Act,” Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter 5, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 14–15. Perhaps the most important issue of concern to many is that the Animal Welfare Act still excludes from protection rats, mice, and birds in all research, as well as farm animals in certain kinds of research, although all of these animals are protected by the PHS policy. An animal protection group, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, brought a legal case in 1990 against the USDA, requesting that they protect these excluded animal groups. As a result, the USDA had to reconsider its exclusionary policy, for which they claimed cost as the principal factor, but the USDA has appealed; see Orlans, In the Name of Science, 59–60. The decision was ultimately overturned in favor of the USDA, because the court argued that the Animal Legal Defense Fund had no standing in court. 69. The Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter is published by the National Agricultural Library, and provides general information on animal welfare, including current legislative efforts. 70. National Research Council, Use of Laboratory Animals, 56. 71. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 169–173. 72. Ibid., 257.

chapter 2 1. Roger Paden, “Deconstructing Speciesism: The Domain Specific Character of Moral Judgments,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 7, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 61. 2. For an excellent and comprehensive philosophical discussion on this topic, see Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); and David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 3. See Tom Beauchamp, “The Moral Standing of Animals in Medical Research,” Law, Medicine & Health Care 20, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Summer 1992): 7–16. In this article, he maintains that differences of opinion on the morality of animal experimentation are specifically a result of differences in views on moral standing. 4. The next chapter will address the question of animal pain and suffering. 5. Of course, this is not an exhaustive listing of the proposed criteria over the centuries. Others include temporal awareness, awareness of complex issues, ability to deliberate, culture (Steve F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987], 131), progressive improvement, ability to form concepts, a sense of beauty, conscience (Denise Radner and Michael Radner, Animal Consciousness [Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989], 125), and soul, moral virtue, long-

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range planning, and adaptation. In an attempt to point out how absurd some of the criteria have been, Keith Thomas notes that humans have been described by Aristotle as the political animal, by Thomas Willis as the laughing animal, by Benjamin Franklin as the tool-making animal, by Edmund Burke as the religious animal, and by James Boswell as the cooking animal; see Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 31. 6. James Rachels, in his book Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), argues that evolutionary theory has serious implications for the ethical treatment of animals; see also Niall Shanks, Animals and Science: A Guide to the Debates (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2002), chapter 6. 7. Donald R. Griffin, Foreword to Interpretation, Intentionality, and Communication, vol. 1 of Interpretation and Explanation in the Study of Animal Behavior, A Westview Special Study, ed. Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), xiv. 8. For a good discussion of the similarities between some of the great apes and humans, see Paul Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapter 4. These similarities are the basis of what has been called “the great ape project,” the goal of which is get nonhuman great apes admitted into the moral sphere by granting them rights; see Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, eds., The Great Ape Project: Equality beyond Humanity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). 9. The question of hierarchy will be addressed later in the chapter. 10. Chapter 5 will address religious arguments related to the treatment of animals. 11. For a fuller discussion on behaviorism during this time period, see Howard Gardner, The Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1985), chapter 2; see also Marc Bekoff and Colin Allen, eds., Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) for a broader discussion, especially chapters 1–4. 12. In his book Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, in arguing against creationist accounts of origins, Darwin stated: “On the view that species are only strongly marked and permanent varieties, and that each species first existed as a variety, we can see why it is that no line of demarcation can be drawn between species, commonly supposed to have been produced by special acts of creation, and varieties which are acknowledged to have been produced by secondary laws” (Great Books of the Western World, 49, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 234. 13. Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955). 14. The problem of other minds is an important one in philosophy; a good discussion of it can be found in Daniel C. Dennett, Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness (New York: Basic Books, 1996). 15. Donald R. Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, rev. ed. (New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1981), 118; see also his book Animal Minds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 16. Colin G. Beer, “From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Ethology,” in Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals, ed. Carolyn A. Ristau (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991), 20. 17. For a fuller account of the field of cognitive ethology, see Mark Bekoff, Colin Allen, and Gordon M. Burghardt, eds., The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical

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Perspectives on Animal Cognition, a Bradford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). 18. Griffin, Animal Minds, viii. 19. David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 85. 20. However, some have noted methodological problems even in studying animals in the wild. First, simply observing animals in their habitat can affect their behavior, if they somehow sense they are being watched. Second, it is difficult to study animals in the wild, and therefore animals must often be trapped, marked, and released back into their environment. Sometimes the tracking devices that have been used have adversely affected the animal’s well-being; e.g., particular colors of bands on zebra finches affected reproductive success; see Dale Jamieson and Marc Bekoff, “Afterword: Ethics and the Study of Animal Cognition,” in Readings in Animal Cognition, ed. Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 361– 362. 21. Ibid. 22. Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2000), 122–123. 23. The next chapter will address mental states in relation to pain. 24. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 97–98. For a more recent discussion of the concept of consciousness, see Anthony R. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999); Wise, Rattling the Cage, where Damasio’s work on consciousness is cited with reference to legal issues; Bekoff and Allen, Species of Mind, chapter 8; and Dennett, Kinds of Minds. 25. Radner and Radner, Animal Consciousness, 8. See the rest of this book for a fuller discussion of Descartes’ view of consciousness. 26. Ibid., 117. 27. John Hummer, “Human and Animal Intelligence: A Question of Degree and Responsibility,” Between the Species 1, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 29. 28. Griffin, Animal Minds, 13; see also Rosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 42–43. 29. The philosopher David DeGrazia defines it as follows: “a conscious experience is one such that there is something that it is like to be in it. If an experience feels like something, it is conscious” (Taking Animals Seriously, 115). The cognitive ethologist Donald Griffin offers this more expansive definition: “thinking about objects and events. The content of conscious experience may ordinarily be limited to what the animal perceives at the moment of its immediate situation, but sometimes its awareness probably includes memories of past perceptions, or anticipation of future events. . . . A conscious organism must ordinarily experience some feeling about whatever engages its attention” (Animal Minds, 3). 30. Griffin, Question of Animal Awareness, 30–32. 31. Hummer, “Human and Animal Intelligence,” 34–35. 32. Donald R. Griffin, “Progress toward a Cognitive Ethology,” in Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals, ed. Carolyn A. Ristau (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991), 12. 33. Ibid., 82. 34. Charles Birch and Lukas Vischer, Living with the Animals: The Community of God’s Creatures (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1997), 39. 35. Griffin, Animal Minds, 27.

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36. Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals, 63. 37. Birch and Vischer, Living with the Animals, 39. 38. Radner and Radner, Animal Consciousness, 121. 39. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 105. 40. Shanks, Animals and Science, chapter 10. 41. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 28. 42. Peter Carruthers argues this way in his book Language, Thought and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 43. Griffin, Animal Minds, 27. 44. The dances of bees are the ruling metaphor in Jonathan Bennett’s book Rationality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), in which he argues that although these dances may provide evidence of some kind of intelligence and language, they do not provide evidence of rationality. Although my work is not addressing insects, it is significant that if this kind of consciousness may exist this low on the phylogenetic scale, then a case can be made for consciousness in more complex species as well. For more recent discussions on bee cognition, see Steven M. Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002), chapter 5; and James L. Gould, “Can Honey Bees Create Cognitive Maps? in The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition, ed. Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen, and Gordon M. Burghardt, a Bradford Book (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 41–45. 45. Helmut F. Kaplan, “Do Animals Have Souls?” Between the Species 7, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 139–143. 46. Alison Jolly, “Conscious Chimpanzees? A Review of Recent Literature,” in Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals, ed. Carolyn A. Ristau (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991), 235. 47. All of the previous examples come from Griffin, Animal Minds. He has individual chapters devoted to each of the main categories (e.g., communication, tool use) and provides numerous examples within each of behavior that he believes provides evidence of consciousness. 48. Two people who hold this position are the philosophers Peter Carruthers and Peter Harrison. Because the possession of consciousness is integrally tied up with the ability to experience pain and suffering, their views will be considered in the next chapter. 49. A similar kind of distinction has been made by ethologist Donald Griffin, by dividing consciousness into the perceptual and the reflective, which generally seems to correspond with the distinction commonly made between the terms “consciousness” and “self-consciousness” (Animal Minds, 10–11). Another analysis of types of awareness divides it into three types: bodily self-awareness (awareness of one’s own body as distinct from other things), social awareness (awareness of one’s social relations in one’s social group), and introspective awareness (awareness of one’s own mental states). All of these types are found in different degrees, although introspective awareness may be a higher level than the other two (DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 181–182). However, it seems that this conceptual scheme can fit into that which divides consciousness into two types, with the first two belonging to consciousness and the third belonging to self-consciousness. 50. Peter Singer, “Animals and the Value of Life,” in Matters of Life and Death, ed. Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), 241.

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51. See Griffin, Animal Minds, especially chapter 10. 52. Jolly, “Conscious Chimpanzees,” 238–246. 53. Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth, “Truth and Deception in Animal Communication,” in Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals, ed. Carolyn A. Ristau (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991). 54. Jolly, “Conscious Chimpanzees,” 233.55. Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals, 65. More recently, some have maintained that dolphins have this ability as well. 56. For an examination of the mind of a specific bonobo, see Sue SavageRumbaugh and Roger Lewin, Kanzi: The Ape at the Brink of Human Mind (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994); and for a discussion of animal minds, see Marc D. Hauser, Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000). 57. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 174. 58. Regan, Case for Animal Rights, 30. 59. The issue of those humans lacking the cognitive capacities of normal adult humans will be addressed later in this chapter. 60. Mary Midgley, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature, rev. ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 44. 61. James C. Anderson, “Species Equality and the Foundations of Moral Theory,” Environmental Values 2, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 358–359. 62. Rationality, 5. 63. Rachels, Created from Animals, 140. 64. Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Humans Need the Virtues (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 96. 65. A more detailed analysis of language will take place later. 66. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals, 29. 67. Bennett, Rationality, 46. 68. Beauchamp, “Moral Standing of Animals,” 11. 69. Birch and Vischer, Living with the Animals, 41. 70. Major C. W. Hume, Man and Beast (London: Universities Federation for Animal Welfare, 1962), 96. 71. Koyeli Ghosh-Dastidar, “The Morality of Animals,” Indian Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (October 1989): 420. 72. Adam Drozdek in his book Moral Dimensions of Man in the Age of Computers (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995) has argued that man [sic], rather than being a rational being, is primarily a moral being, and that although cognition is important for moral reasoning, love is the primary affection which makes people persons. For a discussion on the idea of multiple intelligences, see Gardner, Mind’s New Science; two of Donald Griffin’s works: Animal Minds and The Question of Animal Awareness; and the works of Marc Bekoff, in particular the edited works Species of Mind and The Cognitive Animal, as well as Minding Animals: Awareness, Emotions, and Heart (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 73. Midgley, Beast and Man, 157. 74. Marc Bekoff, “Deep Ethology and Responsible Science,” The Animals’ Agenda (July–August 1998): 20–21; see also Marc Bekoff, “Resisting Speciesism and Expanding the Community of Equals,” BioScience 48, no. 18 (August 1998): 640. 75. The origin of this term is not certain, although it may have been coined by the philosopher Jan Narveson. This is the term typically used in the literature to refer to those humans who do not have the cognitive capacities of normal adult humans. This concept will be discussed more fully later in this chapter; for a useful discussion

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of this, see Evelyn Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995). For the sake of consistency, I will use this expression in this book, although I have serious reservations about its use, due to its negative connotations and because it suggests that humans who do not measure up to “normal” humans are somehow borderline humans and perhaps not really humans at all. This is a moral judgment that I do not want to make. Other terms sometimes used are even less flattering, such as “mental defectives.” The philosopher Stephen R. L. Clark makes the same observation; see “Utility, Rights and the Domestic Virtues: Or What’s Wrong with Raymond?” Between the Species 4, no. 4 (Fall 1988): 239. 76. Griffin, “Progress toward a Cognitive Ethology,” 9. 77. Rachels, Created from Animals, 141. 78. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 129–140. 79. Rosemary Rodd, “Evolutionary Ethics and the Status of Non-Human Animals,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 13, no. 1 (1996): 70. 80. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 153–154. 81. Jack Weir, “Radical Translation and Animals: An Argument from the Principle of Humanity,” Southwest Philosophy Review 11, no. 1 (January 1995): 31–32. 82. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 158. 83. Peter Smith, “On Animal Beliefs,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 20, no. 4 (Winter 1982): 503. 84. The philosopher R. G. Frey argues in this way. 85. Stephen P. Stich, “Do Animals Have Beliefs?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57, no. 1 (March 1979): 16–27. 86. Rachels, Created from Animals, 141–143. 87. Richard Routley, “Alleged Problems in Attributing Beliefs, and Intentionality, to Animals,” Inquiry 24, no. 4 (December 1981): 387. 88. For a fuller discussion on autonomy, see Wise, Rattling the Cage. 89. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 208. 90. One psychiatrist attempted to restore dignity to humans, which he believed had been lost due to increased attention to animals, by arguing that the tremendous difference of kind between humans and animals is evidenced by the possession of five attributes that made humans distinct: conceptual thought (including language, symbolism, anticipation, and imagination, with language being primary), capacity for technology, wide range of emotions, ability to make genetic changes, and freedom from instinctual fixation; see Willard Gaylin, “In Defense of the Dignity of Being Human: Five Attributes Beyond Autonomy,” The Hastings Center Report (August 1984): 18–22. 91. Michael Allen Fox, “Animal Liberation: A Critique,” Ethics 88, no. 2 (January 1978): 112. 92. Lawrence Haworth, “Rights, Wrongs, and Animals,” Ethics 88, no. 2 (January 1978): 104. 93. For this reason, philosopher David DeGrazia does not think that it is a morally useful criteria (Taking Animals Seriously, 210, footnote 118). 94. Singer, “Animals and the Value of Life,” 225. 95. Mary Midgley, “Persons and Non-Persons,” in In Defence of Animals, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 56. 96. Singer, “Animals and the Value of Life,” 235. 97. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals, 108. 98. Singer, “Animals and the Value of Life,” 240.

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99. For more detailed discussion on the issue of personhood, see Midgley, “Persons and Non-Persons”; James W. Walters, What Is a Person: An Ethical Exploration (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997); Warren, Moral Status, chapter 4; Steve F. Sapontzis, “A Critique of Personhood,” Ethics 91, no. 4 (July 1981): 607–618; and Justin Leiber, Can Animals and Machines Be Persons? A Dialogue by Justin Leiber (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985). 100. Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Why Animals Don’t Speak,” Faith and Philosophy 4, no. 4 (October 1987): 463–485. 101. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 183. 102. Midgley, Beast and Man, 322. 103. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 183. 104. Some cognitive ethologists argue this way; see Radner and Radner, Animal Consciousness, 171. 105. John Heil, “Speechless Brutes,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42, no. 3 (March 1982): 403. 106. For a detailed discussion on the cognitive understanding of language, see Peter Carruthers and Jill Boucher, eds., Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Carruthers, Language, Thought and Consciousness. 107. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 29–30. 108. Heil, “Speechless Brutes,” 406. 109. Griffin, Question of Animal Awareness, 81. 110. For an interesting summary of the intelligence of dolphins, see MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, chapter 4. 111. James L. Gould and Carol Grant Gould, The Animal Mind (New York: Scientific American Library, 1994), 170. 112. Radner and Radner, Animal Consciousness, 151–157. 113. Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals, 89–90. 114. Griffin, Question of Animal Awareness, 67. 115. Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals, 90–97. 116. Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, Kanzi, 39. For a fuller discussion of the Lana project, see chapter 7 of this book. 117. Ibid., 182. 118. There are many good works with regard to apes learning human language; see especially Roger Fouts, with Stephen Tunkel Mills, Next of Kin: My Conversations with Chimpanzees (New York: Avon Books, 1997), which details the life of Washoe, who is a chimpanzee and the first “talking” nonhuman, whom Fouts worked with for more than thirty years; Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, Kanzi, on the language studies on this famous bonobo; and the work done with orangutans and gorillas in Sue Taylor Parker, Robert W. Mitchell, and H. Lyn Miles, eds., The Mentalities of Gorillas and Orangutans: Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). In addition, the work of Louis Hermann with bottle-nosed dolphins suggest that dolphins can learn words and syntax by virtue of a “dolphinized” gestural language, distantly related to sign language; see Wise, Drawing the Line, chapter 8. 119. Wise, Drawing the Line, chapter 11. KERA has two very interesting nature programs focusing on Koko, including “A Conversation with Koko,” and “Inside the Animal Mind” (Part I on animal emotions, and Part II on animal intelligence). 120. Fouts, Next of Kin. 121. Griffin, Question of Animal Awareness, 68–71.

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122. R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 97–98. 123. This phenomenon is so named because at the turn of the twentieth century a horse named Hans was exhibited in Berlin by his trainer and owner, who sincerely believed his animal to be capable of doing arithmetic. Whenever problems were presented to him in the many public appearances to which the owner brought his horse, Hans would always tap out the correct number on the floor with his hoof or shake his head the correct number of times. It was eventually discovered that Hans was responding to inadvertent cueing by those watching him perform. 124. KERA Nature program, Inside the Animal Mind, Part II: Inside Animal Intelligence. 125. Radner and Radner, Animal Consciousness, 158–159. 126. Mary Midgley, The Ethical Primate: Humans, Freedom and Morality (London: Routledge, 1994), 174. 127. Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals, 99. 128. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and Susan McCarthy, When Elephants Weep: The Emotional Lives of Animals (New York: Delacorte Press, 1995), 218. 129. Routley, “Alleged Problems,” 407–408. 130. Stephen R. L. Clark, Animals and Their Moral Standing (London: Routledge, 1997), 145. 131. Midgley, Beast and Man, 234. In addition, some have argued that it makes no sense to talk about animals lacking a language, at least in our cognitive understanding of it, because one cannot lack what is not normal for one. Thus, the inability of primates to speak human language is not a defect but is normal for their species; see Gene Namkoong and Tom Regan, “The Question Is Not, ‘Can They Talk?’ ” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13, no. 2 (May 1988): 215. 132. Marian Stamp Dawkins, Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare (London: Chapman and Hall, 1980), 91. 133. Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals, 211. 134. In his book Dependent Rational Animals, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that what unites humans and animals is our dependent animal nature. All of us must at times be dependent on others, as, for example, when we are sick, and we need to recognize that dependency is part of our nature, that in a sense, although he does not use this phrase, we are all “marginal humans” at various points in our lives. 135. The term “speciesism” was originally coined by Richard Ryder and popularized by Peter Singer in his book, Animal Liberation, new rev. ed (New York: Avon Books, 1990), of which an earlier version came out in 1975. 136. For an interesting comparison of human and animal slavery, see Marjorie Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery, 3rd ed. (New York: Mirror Books, 1996). 137. Mark Bernstein, “Speciesism and Loyalty,” Behavior and Philosophy 19, no. 1 (Spring–Summer 1991): 43. 138. Carl Cohen, in his famous article in favor of research on animals, states that he is a speciesist, not only because speciesism is plausible but also because to not make morally relevant distinctions among species is almost certain to lead people to be misled in regard to their true obligations; see “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research,” New England Journal of Medicine 315, no. 14 (October 2, 1986): 865–870. 139. Bernstein, “Speciesism and Loyalty,” 49. 140. Singer, Animal Liberation, 2.

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141. The issue of pain will be discussed more fully in the next chapter but is introduced here simply to highlight how speciesist arguments can work with regard to animal experimentation. 142. It is important to note, though, that there is no one agreed-on definition of speciesism, and what this discussion is attempting to do is to lay out its basic ideas; for a fuller discussion on different understandings of this concept, see Waldau, Specter of Speciesism; and Pluhar, Beyond Prejudice. 143. The concept of the image of God will be discussed more fully in chapter 5. 144. Of course, it is also possible to argue the reverse; that marginal humans can be subjected to the same kind of experimentation as animals. The philosopher R. G. Frey argues along these lines, at least that it would be the next logical step. 145. C. S. Lewis, “Vivisection,” in God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1970), 227. 146. Some have argued that drawing the boundary line between humans and animals is not the best place to draw it; rather, it should be drawn between primates and all other animals; see Cavalieri and Singer, eds., Great Ape Project. 147. Peter Singer argues in this way. 148. One author has made the observation that if earth were colonized by a species more powerful than human beings, they, too, could set up criteria for ranking. If, for example, this species was more like a cat and determined that the ability to see in near-darkness was the determining factor for moral consideration, then humans would be excluded because they lack this ability (Spiegel, Dreaded Comparison, 23). It is worth noting in passing that there are many thought experiments in the literature on the possibility of an alien species and the grounds on which they can be compared with humans. They are almost always presented as having superior intelligence, which is then justification for our not treating them as we do animals. 149. Midgley, Beast and Man, 203–207. 150. Chapter 5 in Waldau, Specter of Speciesism, has a very interesting discussion on this topic. 151. Griffin, Question of Animal Awareness, 26. 152. Hummer, “Human and Animal Intelligence,” 36. 153. Peter Singer facetiously notes: “Why should we not say that we are the only beings in the universe that have intrinsic value? Our fellow humans are unlikely to reject the accolades we so generously bestow upon them, and the other species to whom we deny the honor are unable to object” (“Animals and the Value of Life,” 232). 154. The observation made by Mary Midgley is worth noting: “Is it better to be a wolf than a polar bear, a jackdaw than a wandering albatross, or a human being than any of them? Well, we are inclined to say, it is certainly more interesting. But for whom? There is surely one answer: it depends on who you are in the first place. What test have the lives of these creatures failed? The answer, though embarrassing, seems simple—they have failed to become more like ours. If man wants to set up a contest in resembling himself and award himself the prize, no one will quarrel with him. But what does it mean? All he can do by these roundabout methods is perhaps to assert a value-judgment about what matters most in human life” (Beast and Man, 163–164). 155. Ibid., 206. 156. For a challenge particularly to the notion that only humans have culture,

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see Richard W. Wrangham et al., eds., Chimpanzee Cultures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 157. Peter Singer, “Animal Liberation,” in Animal Rights: The Changing Debate, ed. Robert Garner (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 8.

chapter 3 1. The issue of animal death in terms of if and how death harms animals is related to, but separate from, the problem of pain. There is an especially close relationship in animal experimentation, since most animals are put to death at the conclusion of the experiment. The subject of animal death will be dealt with briefly in subsequent chapters and also at the conclusion of this chapter in the discussion on euthanasia. 2. Rebecca Dresser, “Assessing Harm and Justification in Animal Research: Federal Policy Opens the Laboratory Door,” Rutgers Law Review 40, no. 3 (Spring 1988): 744. The National Research Council, in their Recognition and Alleviation of Pain and Distress in Laboratory Animals (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992), comes to a similar conclusion: “There is a lack of agreement of the meaning of such terms as comfort, well-being, discomfort, stress, fear, anxiety, pain, and distress” (3). However, they go on to say later: “There should seldom be a question about the possibility that a laboratory animal is in pain” (33). 3. The American Veterinary Association defines “pain” as “an unpleasant emotional experience perceived as arising from a specific region of the body and associated with actual or potential tissue damage”; see F. Barbara Orlans, In the Name of Science: Issues in Responsible Animal Experimentation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 129. 4. Jane A. Smith and Kenneth M. Boyd, eds., Lives in the Balance: The Ethics of Using Animals in Biomedical Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 58–66. See also National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 32. 5. David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 106–107. 6. Andrew N. Rowan and Franklin M. Loew, with Joan C. Weer, The Animal Research Controversy, Center for Animals and Public Policy (North Grafton, MA: Tufts University School of Veterinary Medicine, 1995), 75. 7. Ibid., 141. However, while a minority opinion, some do believe it possible or even likely that insects feel pain. 8. R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 34. 9. Margaret Rose and David Adams, “Evidence for Pain and Suffering in Other Animals,” in Animal Experimentation: The Consensus Changes, ed. Gill Langley (New York: Chapman and Hall, 1989), 48–49. Thus, the cephalopods have been included in my definition of “animal” for the purpose of this project precisely because it is likely that they do experience pain. 10. Smith and Boyd, Lives in the Balance, 59–62. 11. Rowan and Loew, Animal Research Controversy, 76. 12. Frey, Interests and Rights, 34. 13. Bernard E. Rollin has an excellent overview of the history of the concept of consciousness in science with regard to animals in The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science, expanded ed. (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1998). He also has a recent interesting text on casuistry; see An Introduction

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to Veterinary Medical Ethics: Theory and Cases (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1999). 14. Ralph L. Kitchell and Michael J. Guinan, “The Nature of Pain in Animals,” in A Survey of Scientific and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol. 1 of The Experimental Animal in Biomedical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1990), 187. See also vol. 2 of this same work, Care, Husbandry, and Well-Being: An Overview by Species (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1995), for a consideration of pain experience in individual species. 15. David DeGrazia and Andrew Rowan, “Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety in Animals and Humans,” Theoretical Medicine 12, no. 3 (S 1991): 197. 16. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 6. 17. DeGrazia and Rowan, “Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety,” 198. 18. Kitchell and Guinan, “Nature of Pain in Animals,” 187. 19. Joseph S. Spinelli, “Preventing Suffering in Laboratory Animals,” in A Survey of Scientific and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol. 1 of The Experimental Animal in Biomedical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1990), 233. 20. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 35–36. 21. Eugene M. Wright Jr. and Judith F. Woodson, “Clinical Assessment of Pain in Laboratory Animals,” in A Survey of Scientific and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol. 1 of The Experimental Animal in Biomedical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1990), 209. 22. Ibid., 210–211. 23. Dresser, “Assessing Harm,” 744. 24. Seymour Levine argues that whereas for most of the twentieth century stress was viewed strictly in a physiological way, it cannot be adequately understood without reference to cognitive states; see his “Stress and Cognition in Laboratory Animals,” in A Survey of Scientific and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol. 1 of The Experimental Animal in Biomedical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1990), 173–184. 25. DeGrazia and Rowan, “Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety,” 141. 26. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 7. 27. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 131. 28. Ibid., 141. 29. For example, evidence suggests that octopuses may experience anxiety (Smith and Boyd, Lives in the Balance, 73). 30. Bernard E. Rollin, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 191. Rollin’s revised version of this text focuses more on the history of and reasons for the reluctance of science to attribute consciousness to animals (expanded ed., Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1998). 31. DeGrazia and Rowan, “Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety,” 202–203; see also Smith and Boyd, Lives in the Balance, 71. 32. Levine, “Stress and Cognition,” 175. 33. The National Research Council defines “stress” as “the effect produced by external (i.e., physical or environmental) events or internal (i.e., physiological or psychological) factors, referred to as stressors, which induce an alteration in an animal’s biological equilibrium” (Recognition and Alleviation, 3). 34. Ibid., 17. 35. Ibid., 46.

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36. For example, one of the criticisms of zoos (and also research laboratories) is that the environments of some caged animals are so stress-free that they lead to maladaptive behaviors such as excessive pacing or mutilation, due to boredom. 37. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 93. 38. Smith and Boyd, Lives in the Balance, 70. 39. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 4–5. 40. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 36. 41. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 93–94. 42. The American Veterinary Association defines “suffering” as “an unpleasant emotional response usually associated with pain and distress; it is an inability to adapt or cope that causes mental anguish” (Orlans, In the Name of Science, 38). 43. Marian Stamp Dawkins, Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare (London: Chapman and Hall, 1980), 55. 44. DeGrazia and Rowan, “Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety,” 199. Tom Regan notes that the question is not simply can we cause animals pain, but rather, “Can we cause them pain so intense and long lasting as to make them suffer? That is a central moral question . . .”; see The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 96. 45. The recognition of suffering has been linked to the sensitivity of the one observing it (Orlans, In the Name of Science, 144). 46. In spite of the reluctance of some to attribute suffering to animals, there are some abnormal behaviors that almost everyone agrees are signs of severe suffering, such as when it results in actual physical damage (e.g., tail biting in pigs) or death (e.g., hens suffocating due to mass hysteria) (Dawkins, Animal Suffering, 77–78). 47. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 130. 48. Andrew N. Rowan, Of Mice, Models, & Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal Research (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 84–85. 49. One example is that which was amended in one of the revisions of the Animal Welfare Act—the requirement that primates be furnished with environments that contribute to their psychological well-being, such as the presence of playthings or caging with other members of their species. 50. Bernard Rollin suggests that “standards of care, husbandry and use of all laboratory animals should be based on what makes an animal happy, not merely on avoiding pain and distress” (Unheeded Cry, 1989, 2); see also the 1998 edition, 201– 203. 51. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 7. 52. Jerod M. Loeb et al., “Human vs. Animal Rights,” in Animal Rights and Welfare, ed. Jeanne Williams, Reference Shelf series (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1991), 73. 53. A couple of writers have challenged this traditional interpretation of Descartes. John Cottingham argues that Descartes may have been misinterpreted on his theory of the animal-machine and that he may not have been a strict dualist, concluding, “At the end of the day, Descartes may not have been completely consistent, but at least he was not altogether beastly to the beasts”; see “A Brute to the Brutes? Descartes’ Treatment of Animals,” Philosophy 53, no. 206 (October 1978): 559. 54. Discourse, selected and translated by Norman Kemp Smith, in The Modern Library of the World’s Greatest Books: Descartes Philosophical Writings (New York: Modern Library, 1958), 127–128. 55. Rowan and Loew, Animal Research Controversy, 76. 56. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 82.

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57. Marian Stamp Dawkins, “The Scientific Basis for Assessing Suffering in Animals,” in In Defence of Animals, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 27. 58. Rollin, Unheeded Cry, 1989, 27. 59. Patrick Bateson, “Assessment of Pain in Animals,” in Ethics in Research on Animal Behaviour, ed. Marian Stamp Dawkins and Morris Gosling (Academic Press, 1991), 23. 60. Rosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 42–44. 61. For a more detailed discussion on how animals experience pain, see Kitchell and Guinan, “Nature of Pain in Animals.” On the basis of physiological similarities, they conclude that it is likely that animals have subjective experiences of pain as well. 62. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 128–129. 63. DeGrazia and Rowan, “Pain, Suffering, and Anxiety,” 197. 64. Dallas Pratt, Alternatives to Pain in Experiments on Animals (New York: Argus Archives, 1980), 12. 65. Peter Singer makes the following observation: “The experimenter who forces rats to choose between starvation and electric shock to see if they develop ulcers (which they do) does so because the rat has a nervous system very similar to a human being’s, and presumably feels electric shock in a similar way”; see Animal Liberation, new rev. ed. (New York: Avon Books, 1990), 40. 66. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 147–151. However, one entomologist has argued that because he thinks it likely that insects feel pain, it is ethically mandatory to anesthetize them prior to potentially painful treatment in the laboratory and to minimize their harm in other ways; see Jeffrey A. Lockwood, “Not to Harm a Fly: Our Ethical Obligations to Insects,” Between the Species 4, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 204–211. 67. Singer, Animal Liberation, 14. 68. Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 39. 69. Some of the important differences between vocalizations of animals in pain versus humans are that animal vocalizations tend to be repeated rather than just momentary, that they may be at frequencies above human hearing, and that lack of vocalization does not necessarily mean lack of pain (National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 34–35). 70. Wright and Woodson, “Clinical Assessment,” 213. 71. Bateson, “Assessment of Pain,” 18–20. 72. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 36. 73. Rose and Adams, “Evidence for Pain and Suffering in Other Animals,” 63– 64. 74. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 33. 75. Peter Carruthers and Peter Harrison are two philosophers who both hold to this view and have written on the subject; it is their views that will be examined here. They have been referred to as neo-Cartesians; see Evelyn Pluhar, “Arguing Away Suffering: The Neo-Cartesian Revival,” Between the Species 9, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 27–41, because although they do not fully embrace Descartes’ mind-body dualism, they come to similar conclusions regarding the treatment of animals. 76. Peter Carruthers, “Brute Experience,” Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 6 (June 1989): 259. 77. Ibid., 261–264. 78. Peter Harrison, “Theodicy and Animal Pain,” Philosophy 64, no. 247 (January 1989): 83–84.

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79. Peter Harrison, “Do Animals Feel Pain?” Philosophy 66, no. 255 (January 1991): 26. 80. Harrison, “Theodicy and Animal Pain,” 91. 81. Harrison, “Do Animals Feel Pain?” 32. 82. Harrison, “Theodicy and Animal Pain,” 86–87. 83. Carruthers, “Brute Experience,” 268–169; see also Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice, reprint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 167–169. 84. Harrison, “Do Animals Feel Pain?” 39–40. 85. Rollin, Unheeded Cry, 1998. 86. One of the problems is assessing pain in animal experiments has to do with data collection. Though the USDA requires that institutions receiving funding report the degree of pain in experiments by the use of pain categories (those causing no pain and distress, those causing pain and distress relieved by drugs, and those causing pain and distress not relieved by drugs), they have never provided institutional guidelines on how to apply these categories. In addition, rats and mice are not included, so that the statistics available exclude most of the research animals used; see Franklin M. Loew, “Animals in Research,” in Birth to Death: Science and Bioethics, ed. David C. Thomasma and Thomasine Kushner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 303. For problems with statistics on assessing animal pain and distress, see also Andrew N. Rowan, “The Use of Animals in Experimentation: An Examination of the ‘Technical’ Arguments Used to Criticize the Practice,” in Animal Rights: The Changing Debate, ed. Robert Garner (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 1–32. 87. There are numerous sources to which one can turn for an account of some of these experiments, including descriptions of the experiment and results obtained. Details about experiments can be discovered as a result of the Freedom of Information Act, and some are printed in journals in the field. Some writers in the popular literature have summarized some of the more gruesome experiments; see Singer, Animal Liberation, chapter 2; Geoffrey Cowley et al., “Of Pain and Progress,” in Animal Rights and Welfare, ed. Jeanne Williams (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1991); and Richard D. Ryder, Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research (London: Davis-Poynter, 1975), chapters 3 and 4. Some of the animal rights literature also provides reports, photographs, and (occasionally) videos on particular experiments. 88. Kathy Snow Guillermo, Monkey Business: The Disturbing Case That Launched the Animal Rights Movement (Washington, DC: National Press Books, 1993). 89. For a discussion of the importance of research on pain, see Manfred Zimmerman, “Ethical Considerations in Relation to Pain in Animal Experimentation,” Acta Physiologica Scandanavica 128 (1986): 221–233. Suppl. no. 554. 90. Rollin, Unheeded Cry, 1989, 115. 91. Tom Regan, “Ill-Gotten Gains,” in Health Care Ethics: An Introduction, ed. Donald VanDeVeer and Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 242–243. 92. Lynda Birke, “Better Homes for Laboratory Animals,” New Scientist 3 (December 1988): 52. 93. Franc¸oise Wemelsfelder, “Boredom and Laboratory Animal Welfare,” in A Survey of Scientific and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol. 1 of The Experimental Animal in Biomedical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1990), 254.

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94. Birke, “Better Homes,” 50. 95. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between animal well-being and environmental considerations, see Spinelli, “Preventing Suffering,” 231–242. 96. Dawkins, “Scientific Basis,” 31. 97. There are several authors who have emphasized this approach: Marian Dawkins, whose work will be considered in this section and later in the discussion on preference tests; sociologist Arnold Arluke, who has conducted numerous studies on the attitude of laboratory workers toward research animals (see his article, “The Significance of Seeking the Animal’s Perspective,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 [March 1990]: 13–14); and David G. Porter, “Ethical Scores for Animal Experiments,” in Nature 356 (March 12, 1992): 101–102. 98. Dawkins, “Scientific Basis,” 29–30. 99. Dawkins, Animal Suffering, 62. 100. Dawkins, “Scientific Basis,” 33. 101. Dawkins, Animal Suffering, 76–77. 102. Marian Stamp Dawkins, “From an Animal’s Point of View: Motivation, Fitness, and Animal Welfare,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (March 1990): 3. 103. Dawkins, Animal Suffering, 50–51. 104. Ibid., 98–104. 105. Dawkins, “From an Animal’s Point of View,” 4. 106. See especially articles by J. A. Gray (“In Defense of Speciesism”) and Dale Jamieson (“Science and Subjective Feelings”) in Marian Stamp Dawkins, “From an Animal’s Point of View: Motivation, Fitness, and Animal Welfare,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (March 1990): 1–61. 107. The origin of the 3Rs is a relatively recent development, which began with the publication of a book by two practicing scientists: W.M.S. Russell and R. L. Burch, The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique, special edition (1959; reprint, St. Albans, UK: Universities Federation for Animal Welfare). This book is considered a classic in the field and forms the foundation for the contemporary debate on alternatives. The book was originally written primarily with vertebrates in mind and focused on the situation in England at that time. For a more detailed discussion of the development of this concept, see Andrew N. Rowan, “Looking Back 33 Years to Russell and Burch: The Development of the Concept of the Three Rs (Alternatives),” in Alternatives to Animal Testing: New Ways in the Biomedical Sciences, Trends and Progress, ed. Christoph A. Reinhardt (Weinheim, Germany: VCH Publishers, 1994), 1–11. In addition, this book also contains a number of other essays on the 3Rs, including its history and the discussion of specific alternatives. 108. Loew, “Animals in Research,” 308. 109. Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals, 51. 110. Russell and Burch, Principles of Humane Experimental Technique, 64. This was originally understood to mean the replacement of vertebrates with either invertebrates or with vertebrates not past the halfway point in their gestation (123). 111. Smith and Boyd, Lives in the Balance, 131. 112. Ibid., 125–126. 113. One example of such an organization is FRAME (Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical Experimentation), located in Britain and founded in 1969. However, even in the United States, funding is available from certain organizations for the purpose of supporting research into the development of alternatives through several sources: NIH, Office of Technology Assessment, and in-house funding by government, industrial, and private research laboratories (Orlans, In the Name of Science,

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77–81). In addition, the First World Congress on Alternatives and Animal Use in the Life Sciences was held in Baltimore in 1993; see Paul Cotton, “Animals and Science Benefit from ‘Replace, Reduce, Refine’ Effort,” Journal of American Medical Association 270, no. 24 (December 22–29, 1993): 2905–2907. 114. Smith and Boyd have argued that the two requirements necessary for an alternative to animals to be seriously considered is that it must not be more immoral than the use of animals, and it must produce results at least as satisfactory (Lives in the Balance, 20). 115. For a thorough recent discussion of alternatives to animals, see the two books by C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000), chapter 6; and Specious Science: How Genetics and Evolution Reveal Why Medical Research on Animals Harms Humans (New York: Continuum, 2002), chapter 8. 116. Other important issues for the use of human volunteers are the method of recruitment, means and methods of financial compensation, and establishing acceptable levels of harm (Smith and Boyd, Lives in the Balance, 134). 117. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 75. 118. Smith and Boyd, Lives in the Balance, 74. 119. Sir William Paton argues thus in his classic book, Man and Mouse: Animals in Medical Research, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 120. Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals, 51. 121. Sidney Gendin, “The Use of Animals in Science,” in Animal Sacrifices: Religious Perspectives on the Use of Animals in Science, ed. Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 35. 122. However, it is significant that a number of schools of veterinary medicine have done away with the use of animals in their teaching curriculum. 123. Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals, 165–169. 124. Leslie Melville Brown, Cruelty to Animals: The Moral Debt (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 1988), 144. 125. Greek and Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese, chapter 5. They quote a cynic’s comment, “The rat is an animal which, when injected, produces a paper” (79). 126. Although independent, the Society for Animal Protective Legislation was established in 1955 and registered under the Federal Lobbying Act. Their purpose is to foster the passage of laws needed to protect animals. The journal Animal Law follows the progress of this legislation in their annual issues. 127. The National Agricultural Library publishes a quarterly newsletter, The Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter, which provides current information on animal welfare to investigators and technicians. 128. Esther F. Dukes, “The Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act: Will It Ensure that the Policy of the Animal Welfare Act Becomes a Reality?” Saint Louis University Law Journal 31, no. 3 (September 1987): 524. 129. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 1. 130. For a detailed discussion about the problems of legislation in protecting animals, see Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995). Two additional helpful resources are Steven M. Wise’s books, Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002); and Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2000). 131. Dresser, “Assessing Harm,” 743. However, a recent volume is an attempt to provide some correct guidelines; see M. Lawrence Podolsky and Victos S. Lukas, eds.,

notes to pages 78–82

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The Care and Feeding of an IACUC: The Organization and Management of an Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1999). 132. This is true for the National Research Council’s Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996), which, although intended to protect animals, is actually not meant to interfere with research design; see Nedim C. Buyukmihci, “The Use of Nonhuman Animals in Research,” Law Library Journal 82, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 353–354. 133. F. Barbara Orlans, “Animal Pain Scales in Public Policy,” ATLA 18 (November 1990): 81–90. 134. Ernest D. Prentice, David A. Crouse, and Michael D. Mann, “Scientific Merit Review: The Role of the IACUC,” ILAR News 34, nos. 1–2 (Winter/Spring 1992): 15–19; see also Lawrence Finsen, “Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees: A New Set of Clothes for the Emperor?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13 (May 1988): 145–148. 135. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law, 204–206. 136. Dukes, “Improved Standards,” 531–532, 541. 137. F. Barbara Orlans, “Data on Animal Experimentation in the United States: What They Do and Do Not Show,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 37, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 222. 138. Orlans, “Animal Pain Scales,” 41–45. 139. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 86. 140. This information was taken from a chart in A. F. Fraser, “An Analysis of Suffering,” in A Survey of Scientific and Ethical Issues for Investigators, vol. 1 of The Experimental Animal in Biomedical Research, ed. Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1990), 227. For another example of a similar pain scale, organized somewhat differently, see Orlans, In the Name of Science, 87. 141. Orlans, In the Name of Science, 126. 142. Ibid., 86. 143. Rowan and Loew, Animal Research Controversy, 20–21. 144. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 57. 145. Andreas-Holger Maehle and Ulrich Trohler, “Animal Experimentation from Antiquity to the End of the Eighteenth Century: Attitudes and Arguments,” in Vivisection in Historical Perspective, ed. Nicolaas A. Rupke (London: Routledge, 1987), 15. 146. Bernard E. Rollin, “Pain, Paradox, and Value,” Bioethics 3, no. 3 (1989): 211. See also Rollin, Unheeded Cry, 1998, chapters 5 and 6. 147. Mary T. Phillips, “Savages, Drunks, and Lab Animals: The Researcher’s Perception of Pain,” Society and Animals 1, no. 1 (1993): 68–77. In this regard, it is interesting that the National Research guidelines in Recognition and Alleviation warn researchers to guard against anthropomorphizing pain perception, since there are many differences between humans and animals (41). 148. Paul Flecknell, “Assessment and Alleviation of Post-Operative Pain,” Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter 8, nos. 3–4 (Winter 1997–1998): 8. 149. Dawkins, Animal Suffering, 91. 150. Ibid., 87–91. 151. Arluke, “Significance of Seeking the Animal’s Perspective.” 152. Anne Marie DeLuca, “Environmental Enrichment: Does It Reduce Barbering in Mice?” Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter 8, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 7–8. 153. Birke, “Better Homes,” 55. 154. Dawkins, Animal Suffering, 96–97.

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155. Recognition and Alleviation, 102. 156. For an example of the assessment of euthanasia methods for different species, see the charts in National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 107 and 113. The edited volume by Bernard E. Rollin and M. Lynne Kessel also provides descriptions for the most humane methods of euthanasia for individual species in each of the chapters (Care, Husbandry, and Well-Being). 157. Larry Carbone, “Adoption of Research Animals,” Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter 7, nos. 3–4 (Winter 1996–1997), 1–2, 9–10. 158. National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation, 103–105. 159. For an interesting discussion of the ritualistic association of this term, see Michael E. Lynch, “Sacrifice and the Transformation of the Animal Body into a Scientific Object: Laboratory Culture and Ritual Practice in the Neurosciences,” Social Studies of Science 18, no. 2 (May 1988): 265–289. 160. For further discussion on this issue, see Carbone, “Adoption of Research Animals.”

chapter 4 1. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 268. This book is the most extensive and systematic philosophical treatment of animal rights. He has written a more recent work as well; see Defending Animal Rights (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001). However, there were books written much earlier than this, raising some of the same questions; see especially Henry S. Salt, Animals’ Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress (1892, reprint, Clarks Summit, PA: Society for Animal Rights, 1980). 2. Since the terms “moral rights” and “natural rights” are virtually synonymous, they will be used interchangeably in this chapter. 3. Introduction,” in Animal Sacrifices: Religious Perspectives on the Use of Animals in Science, ed. Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 23. 4. Andrew Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals (New York: Crossroad, 1987), 97. 5. Interests with regard to animals have been addressed in a variety of ways in the literature. Interests are typically understood as welfare or well-being. Because rights potentially can endow a creature with greater protection than simply the protection of interests will do, it is preferable to focus on rights rather than on interests. For several helpful works addressing interests, see Steve F. Sapontzis, “The Moral Significance of Interests,” Environmental Ethics 4, no. 4 (Winter 1982): 345–358; David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and the works of utilitarians R. G. Frey and Peter Singer. 6. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, new rev. ed. (New York: Avon Books, 1990), 8. 7. A doctor who is opposed to animal rights asks rhetorically if animals should have the right to vote and to have equal pay for equal work; see Richard J. Traystman, “Commentary: The Goal of Animal Welfare, Animal ‘Rights,’ and Antivivisectionist Groups in the United States,” Journal of Neurosurgical Anesthesiology 2, no. 3 (Sept. 1990): 153–158. Another author points to the absurdity of following this line of reasoning: “Translating these [rights] for nonhumans, one arrives at the ridiculous notion of dogs having a right to bark, cats having the right to pray, and cows having the right to elect political representatives”; see Helena Silverstein, Unleashing Rights: Law,

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Meaning, and the Animal Rights Movement (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1986), 234. 8. Silverstein, Unleashing Rights, 108. 9. Steven M. Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002), 9–22. 10. “Defenders of animal rights are often unclear in their own minds, as well as in the presentation of their case to the public, whether they are endorsing moral or legal rights for animals or indeed both”; see Michael Allen Fox, The Case for Animal Experimentation: An Evolutionary and Ethical Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 51. 11. The discussion of the rights being given by God will be addressed more fully in chapter 5. 12. These criteria will be discussed later. 13. Steven M. Wise, quoting Wesley Hohfeld, a professor at Yale Law School during World War II; see Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2000), 53. 14. Ibid., 47. 15. “The fact that animals are the intended beneficiaries of protective legislation, however, does not yet prove that they have legal rights; and indeed the prevailing view of Anglo-American jurisprudence has been that animals do not, indeed cannot, have rights”; see Joel Feinberg, “Human Duties and Animal Rights,” in On the Fifth Day: Animal Rights & Human Ethics, ed. Robert Knowles Morris and Michael W. Fox (Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1978), 49. See also Jerrold Tannenbaum, “Animals and the Law: Property, Cruelty, Rights,” in Humans and Other Animals, ed. Arien Mack (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1995), 125–193. 16. For an excellent discussion of animal status under the law, see Gary L. Francione’s Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995); and Wise, Rattling the Cage. 17. “To satisfy the standing requirement, plaintiffs seeking relief in federal court must show that they have suffered a concrete, actual injury caused by the alleged legal violation”; see David R. Schmahmann and Lori J. Polacheck, “The Case against Rights for Animals,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 22, no. 4 (Summer 1995), 774. They go on in the same article to note: “State courts have similarly held that animal rights activists possess no personal legal interest in the use of animals in experimentation and thus are not proper parties entitled to sue under state animal cruelty statutes” (777). 18. Silverstein, Unleashing Rights, 143. 19. There are some who, although they would support legal rights, are very skeptical about their effecting any real change for animals: “once one considers how they [legal rights] would work in a real social context it becomes clear that granting animals formal legal rights is unlikely to effect any real change in their position, just as granting women, blacks, children and other oppressed groups rights has not led to equal treatment”; see Marie Fox, “Animal Rights and Wrongs: Medical Ethics and the Killing of Non-Human Animals,” in Death Rites: Law and Ethics at the End of Life, ed. Robert Lee and Derek Morgan (London: Routledge, 1994), 153. 20. Feinberg, “Human Duties and Animal Rights,” 59. 21. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law, 95. 22. Defending Animal Rights, 24. 23. Peter Singer defines it in this way in his book Animal Liberation, 8–9.

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24. James Rachels, “Do Animals Have a Right to Life?” in Ethics and Animals, ed. Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1983). 25. Regan, Case for Animal Rights, 81. 26. Ted Benton points out that this was Marx’s observation; see “Animal Rights: An Eco-Socialist View,” in Animal Rights: The Changing Debate, ed. Robert Garner (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 33. 27. Silverstein, Unleashing Rights, 95. 28. For a good discussion on the notion of problems with essentialist definition, see Paul Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 29. What is meant here are documents such as the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and The Declaration toward a Global Ethic. 30. Steve F. Sapontzis observes regarding the slippery-slope argument: “In actual practice, ridiculous consequences do not discredit the basic principles of moral reform; rather, such consequences lead to a more subtle and practical understanding of those principles, an understanding that eliminates the ridiculous consequences”; see Morals, Reason, and Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 75. 31. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 227. 32. Evelyn Pluhar, “Must an Opponent of Animal Rights Also Be an Opponent of Human Rights?” Inquiry 24/2 (June 1981): 230. 33. For an excellent discussion on what equal consideration means, see DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 39–46. For Singer, equal consideration for animals means giving equal moral weight to relevantly similar interests, which does not mean that those with relevantly similar interests are equal or that they must be treated equally; see Singer, Animal Liberation, 2. 34. Herbert Landsell, “Laboratory Animals Need Only Humane Treatment: Animal ‘Rights’ May Debase Human Rights,” International Journal of Neuroscience 42 (1988): 169–178. Tom Regan, on the other hand, argues that the animal rights movement is part of the human rights movement, since the theory that rationally grounds the rights of animals also does so for humans (Case for Animal Rights, 24). 35. Julian McAllister Groves, Hearts and Minds: The Controversy over Laboratory Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 71. 36. For a short helpful discussion on this issue, see Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals, 140–156. 37. Carl Cohen argues: “this much is clear about rights in general: they are in every case claims, or potential claims, within a community of agents. Rights arise, and can be intelligibly defended, only among beings who actually do, or can, make moral claims against one another. Whatever else rights may be, therefore, they are necessarily human; their possessors are persons, human beings”; see “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Ethics,” New England Journal of Medicine 315, no. 14 (Oct. 2, 1986): 865. 38. For an excellent article containing arguments for and challenges to the traditional reasons for the attribution of rights to animals, see Richard A. Watson, “SelfConsciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature,” Environmental Ethics 1, no. 2 (Summer 1979): 99–129. He uses reciprocity as his framework for an analysis of morality. For another good short discussion of reciprocity, see Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, and Animals, 139–144. 39. However, some philosophers do believe that animals are moral patients; see

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DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously, 199, and Mary Midgley, The Ethical Primate: Humans, Freedom and Morality (London: Routledge, 1994), 134. 40. This is the basic thesis and argument of his book, Rattling the Cage. In his Drawing the Line, he expands the discussion to include an examination of other animal minds as well. 41. Waldau, Specter of Speciesism. 42. Singer, Animal Liberation, 174. 43. Regan, Case for Animal Rights, 121. 44. Ibid., 382–388; see also his Defending Animal Rights, 43. For another defense of complete abolition of experimentation, see Susan Finsen, “Sinking the Research Lifeboat,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13, no. 2 (May 1988): 197–212; and Fox, “Animal Rights and Wrongs.” 45. Steve F. Sapontzis, “Animal Rights and Biomedical Research,” Journal of Value Inquiry 26, no. 1 (January 1992): 73–86. 46. Mike Radford, “Partial Protection: Animal Welfare and the Law,” in Animal Rights: The Changing Debate, ed. Robert Garner (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 69. 47. Stephen R. L. Clark makes the following observation: “We discriminate amongst them not for realistic reasons, but for symbolic needs. Those who mourn a dead rabbit are utterly indifferent to a dead mouse; those who would not kick a dog readily support the torture of the equally intelligent pig. These discriminations may sometimes reveal a [sic] total indifference to animals . . .”; see The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 120–121. 48. The following discussion will focus on the general nature of these rights, but the practical restrictions placed upon the existence of these rights will be more fully discussed in chapter 6, when I undertake a burden/benefit analysis. 49. Others have attempted to delineate specific rights for animals as well. For an example of a general animal bill of rights adopted at a protest march in 1990, the draft of which was adopted by more than forty national organizations, see Silverstein, Unleashing Rights, 64. For an example of a bill of rights specifically for experimental animals, see Michael W. Fox, Inhumane Society: The American Way of Exploiting Animals (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 68–70. 50. James Rachels argues that animals have at least a prima facie right to liberty because animals have an interest in being free; see “Why Animals Have a Right to Liberty,” in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, 2nd ed., ed. Tom Regan and Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976, 1989). 51. Larry Carbone, “Adoption of Research Animals,” Animal Welfare Information Center Newsletter 7, nos. 3–4 (Winter 1996/1997): 1–2, 9–10. 52. I have never seen this suggestion in the literature, and, notwithstanding the problems of implementation, I think that it does have some merit. 53. Jane Goodall currently devotes much of her time in trying to make this a reality for nonhuman primates. 54. With regard to animal experimentation in the foreseeable future, Bernard E. Rollin argues that: “it should be conducted in such a way as to maximize the animal’s potential for living its life according to its nature or telos, and certain fundamental rights should be preserved as far as possible, given the logic of research, regardless of consideration of cost”; see Animal Rights and Human Morality (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1981), 94; see also his work, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1998), 196–204. 55. Ted Benton notes the difficulty of rights in changing motivation: “In general,

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a rights-based strategy for defending individuals against abuse encounters what is sometimes called the problem of motivation: rights are unlikely to be effective in practice unless those who have the power to abuse them are already benevolently disposed to their bearers”; see Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice (London: Verso, 1993), 94. 56. Rosemary Rodd points out the danger in biology of encouraging people to overcome their natural sympathy for animals: “Human beings are incomparably the most dangerous species of animal which has yet inhabited this planet, and any factor tending to produce individuals with desensitized inhibitions may perhaps pose an incalculable threat to us all”; see Biology, Ethics, and Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 186. 57. Rosemary Rodd also argues that humans, including those in the animal rights movement, should be willing to serve as subjects in experiments that may not cause lasting harm (Ibid., 149–150). 58. Arnold Arluke, a sociologist who has undertaken research to better understand the point of view of those who conduct or assist with research on animals, observes that there are two views of scientists toward laboratory animals: that animals are viewed as pets and that animals are considered devoid of unique personality or animate nature. The former view is rarer and typically occurs if the animal is known for a while, if the people are genuinely interested in animals, and if the animal resembles a pet, either psychologically or behaviorally. However, the latter is the more prevalent view: “They are considered tools, models, data, material, or supplies. They are batched, numbered, used, and dispatched in a disassembly process reminiscent of the mechanical and routine work of factory mass production”; see “The Significance of Seeking the Animal’s Perspective,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (March 1990): 13. He concludes that understanding suffering from the animal’s perspective could elevate their status (14).

chapter 5 1. For two works arguing that the Christian tradition has primarily been negative, see Charles Birch, “Christian Obligation for the Liberation of Nature,” in Liberating Life: Contemporary Approaches to Ecological Theology, ed. Charles Birch, William Eakin, and Jay McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991); and Andrew Linzey, “Introduction: Is Christianity Irredeemably Speciesist?” in Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998). Other works tracing the history of the treatment of animals include John Passmore, “The Treatment of Animals,” Journal of the History of Ideas 36, no. 2 (April–May 1975): 195–218; and the important work by Major C. W. Hume, The Status of Animals in the Christian Religion (London: Universities Federation for Animal Welfare, 1957). For an article on how our cultural attitudes toward animals have been reinforced by the Christian tradition, see L. Shannon Jung, “Animals in Christian Perspective: Strangers, Friends, or Kin?” in Good News for Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being, Ecology and Justice Series, ed. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993). For an overview of the Christian tradition with regard to the environment in particular, see Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford Ruether, eds., Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). 2. Some especially noteworthy books are Charles Birch and Lukas Vischer, Living

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with the Animals: The Community of God’s Creatures (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1997); Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); Pinches and McDaniel, Good News for Animals?; Jay McDaniel, Of God and Pelicans: A Theology of Reverence for Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989); and Stephen H. Webb, On God and Dogs: A Christian Theology of Compassion for Animals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). Andrew Linzey has probably written most extensively on animals from a classical Christian perspective, and some of his works include Animal Gospel (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1998); Animal Theology (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994); and Christianity and the Rights of Animals (New York: Crossroad, 1987). He has also coauthored and edited several volumes, in addition to having written numerous articles. It is also worth mentioning that a few Catholic theologians are trying to formulate a more positive theology for animals from within their tradition; see especially John Berkman, “Is the Consistent Ethic of Life Consistent without a Concern for Animals?” in Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998); and two of James Gaffney’s essays: “Can Catholic Morality be Good for Animals?” in Linzey and Yamamoto, Animals on the Agenda, and “The Relevance of Animal Experimentation to Roman Catholic Ethical Methodology” in Animal Sacrifices: Religious Perspectives on the Use of Animals in Science, ed. Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986). 3. In a survey published by a sociologist from Fordham University regarding animal experimentation, the groups giving the lowest rating to animals and the highest approval to animal experimentation were farmers, hunters, and the clergy; see Madhusree Mukerjee, “Trends in Animal Research,” Scientific American 276, no. 2 (February 1997): 88. Paul Waldau argues that the treatment of and attitudes toward animals in both the Christian and Buddhist tradition are not monolithic; see The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 4. For an excellent book examining the relationship between religion and science, see Ian G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, vol. 1 of the Gifford Lecture Series 1989–1991 (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990). This topic has become a very popular one in recent years, with entire organizations devoted to its study, as well as a plethora of other books also recently published. Mary Midgley’s works on this topic are especially worth noting: Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears (London: Methuen, 1995), and Science as Salvation: A Modern Myth and Its Meaning (London: Routledge, 1992). 5. For an especially interesting discussion of the second creation account and how it can provide a fuller (and more positive) understanding of the biblical text with regard to the treatment of animals, see Theodore Hiebert, The Yahwist’s Landscape: Nature and Religion in Early Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). He argues that there has been too narrow a concentration on the first creation account (22– 23). 6. The word nephesh has been translated in various ways but can be subsumed under the general category of that which makes people and animals animated living beings, including personality, individuality, desire, life, mood, feeling, and soul. “The use of the word in relation to animals suggests that the Israelites recognized that animals have thoughts, feelings, emotions, desires and self-awareness similar to those of humans”; see Richard Alan Young, Is God a Vegetarian? Christianity, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights (Chicago: Open Court, 1991), 24. For a more recent discussion on

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Christianity and vegetarianism, see Stephen H. Webb, Good Eating (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001). 7. The Wesleyan quadrilateral was actually established by Albert Outler rather than by John Wesley. 8. Process theology in particular can greatly contribute to the notion that God is intimately concerned about the suffering of all of God’s creatures because in contrast to classical Christianity’s typically static view of God, the process view of God is that of a creative participant in the cosmic community who is omni-passable rather than impassable and thus is affected by the suffering of the world, including animals. Jay McDaniel argues that God is so empathetic “that God is in the skin of each sparrow, each pelican, and each sentient creature, suffering its sufferings and enjoying its joys with it” (Of God and Pelicans, 24). Of course, it is possible to argue for such an empathetic God from within the classical Christian tradition as well. 9. For a broader understanding of the biblical concept of covenant, see Robert Murray, The Cosmic Covenant: Biblical Themes of Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation (London: Sheed and Ward, 1992). 10. The establishment of the covenant is found in Genesis 9:8–12: “Then God said to Noah and to his sons with him, ‘Behold, I establish my covenant with you and your descendants after you, and with every living creature that is with you, the birds, the cattle, and every beast of the earth with you, as many as came out of the ark. I establish my covenant with you, that never again shall all flesh be cut off by the waters of a flood, and never again shall there be a flood to destroy the earth.’ And God said, ‘This is the sign of the covenant which I make between me and you and every living creature that is with you, for all generations . . . ’ ” (Revised Standard Version [RSV]). 11. The book of Jonah concludes with God chastising Jonah for his anger at the people of Nineveh having repented, by saying, “And should I not pity Nineveh, that great city, in which there are more than a hundred and twenty thousand persons who do not know their right hand from their left, and also much cattle?” (Jonah 4:11, RSV). 12. Hiebert, Yahwist’s Landscape. 13. Andrew Linzey says explicitly, “God is the source of all rights, and indeed the whole debate about animals is precisely about the rights of the Creator. . . . Animal rights language conceptualizes what is objectively owed the Creator of animals. From a theological perspective, rights are not something awarded, granted, won or lost but something recognized. To recognize animal rights is to recognize the intrinsic value of God-given life”; see “The Theological Basis of Animal Rights,” The Christian Century 108, no. 28 (Oct. 5, 1991): 908–909. 14. Linzey, Animal Theology, 3–27. 15. Although the argument should not be made too strongly, it is possible to argue that all of creation in a sense is made in the image of God, insofar as that creation reflects God’s glory and goodness. However, there have been numerous interpretations of what it means to be created in the image of God, restricting it to humans, including rationality, spiritual nature, responsibility, personal existence, relation of humans to God, and dominion of humans over other creatures (Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, 205–206). 16. The Jewish tradition, for example, has held that the human speech faculty is the significant difference between humans and animals; see Basil Herring, “Speaking of Man and Beast,” Judaism 28, no. 2 (Spring 1979): 170. 17. Stanley Hauerwas and John Berkman argue that what the image of God re-

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fers to is the unique purpose that humans have; see “The Chief End of all Flesh,” Theology Today 49, no. 2 (July 1992): 196–208. 18. The issue of animal souls will be addressed in the eschatology section. 19. Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 20. The issue of sin will be addressed more fully in the next section. 21. For a comprehensive treatment on the issue of stewardship with regard to creation, see Hessel and Ruether, Christianity and Ecology. 22. “. . . ‘to name’ in the biblical sense certainly involved the power to distinguish and describe but, at the same time, it also expresses a profound relationship and kinship”; see Andrew Linzey and Dan Cohn-Sherbok, After Noah: Animals and the Liberation of Theology (Herndon, VA: Mowbrey, 1997), 21. On the importance of naming animals, philosopher Stephen R. L. Clark makes this observation: “Animals, like human beings, are identified as individuals in being attended to, in being irreplaceable for good or ill. In that sense even Alexander Beetle is an individual: not that there is or would have been a beetle of that name without the human act of naming, but that—once named and attended to, he is more than ‘just an animal,’ more than a replaceable part. Does that naming make a difference to him? Who knows? It makes a difference to dogs and horses”; see Animals and Their Moral Standing (London: Routledge, 1997), 143. 23. C. S. Lewis makes an interesting comment about the moral burden especially upon Christian vivisectors: “If on grounds of our real, divinely ordained, superiority a Christian pathologist thinks that it is right to vivisect, and does so with scrupulous care to avoid the least dram or scruple of unnecessary pain, in trembling awe at the responsibility which he assumes, and with a vivid sense of the high mode in which human life must be lived if it is to justify the sacrifices made for it, then (whether we agree with him or not) we can respect this point of view. But of course the vast majority of vivisectors have no such theological background”; see “Vivisection,” in God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1970), 220. C. S. Lewis has addressed the issue of animal experimentation and animal pain in some of his other works as well, most especially The Problem of Pain (New York: Macmillan Company, 1945). 24. Not all would agree that animal sacrifices were a result of sin, but it certainly can be considered a possibility because of the fact that animal sacrifice was engaged in subsequent to the Fall and the expulsion from the garden. 25. See Hiebert, Yahwist’s Landscape, for a fuller discussion. 26. For a good nonbiblical discussion of the motives often driving scientists in research, see C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000), chapter 5. 27. Andrew Linzey provides an interesting discussion of this in his article, “Liberation Theology and the Oppression of Animals,” Scottish Journal of Theology 46, no. 4 (1993): 507–525. 28. Some examples, particularly in the life of Jesus, will be mentioned in the next section. 29. Two books addressing some of the legends about saints and animals and containing some of the same stories are David N. Bell, Wholly Animals: A Book of Beastly Tales, Cistercian Studies Series (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1992), and Helen Waddell, Beasts and Saints (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1934, 1995). Some of the stories include wild animals be-

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ing tamed, the resurrection of animals, animals doing penance, apocryphal stories about Jesus, animals as object lessons, preaching to animals, and animals worshiping God. 30. What I have in mind here is Reinhold Niebuhr’s notion that group sin is more serious than individual sin, such that groups are not capable of the same kind of unselfishness as are individuals, in addition to the idea that social sin is more than the cumulative sin of individuals. 31. For a discussion of theodicy with regard to animals, see L. Stafford Betty, “Making Sense of Animal Pain: An Environmental Theodicy,” Faith and Philosophy 9, no. 1 (January 1992): 65–82; Frederick Ferre´, “Theodicy and the Status of Animals,” in Contemporary Classics in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Ann Loades and Loyal D. Rue (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1991); C. S. Lewis, Problem of Pain; and Robert Wennberg, “Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil,” Christian Scholar’s Review 21, no. 2 (1991): 120–140. 32. Although this saying is not specifically found in any of Burke’s works, it is typically attributed to him. 33. Richard Bauckman, “Jesus and Animals II: What Did He Practice?” in Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 49. This same author has another essay in the same volume addressing Jesus’ teaching concerning animals (“Jesus and Animals II: What Did He Teach?”). 34. Some of these stories can be found in chapter 4 of Linzey and CohnSherbok, After Noah. 35. Jesus may have been a vegetarian if he had lived among the Essenes, as some scholars suggest he did (Webb, Good Eating, 106–109); see his discussion in chapter 5 of this book on the issue of whether Jesus was a vegetarian. However, the evidence from the biblical text seems to suggest that Jesus ate meat, in contrast to how some animal rights activists would like to use Jesus to support their cause in that way. Richard Alan Young devotes the first chapter in his book Is God a Vegetarian? to a discussion of this issue. See also Ryan Berry, Food for the Gods: Vegetarianism and the World’s Religions (New York: Pythagorean Publishers, 1998). 36. The doctrine of salvation is closely related to that of eschatology, so there will be some overlap with that section, although that section will more fully explore the issue of animal souls, whereas this section will briefly examine the possible implications of Jesus’ death for animals. 37. For example, Gandhi’s pacifism was very much influenced by Jesus’ teaching in the Sermon on the Mount. 38. Ever since the demythologization of Rudolph Bultmann and others who followed him, who attempted to remove the miraculous elements from the biblical texts so as to render them more palatable to modern readers, the notion of the risen Christ has especially taken hold because within this concept is the notion that even if one discounts the literal resurrection of Jesus, the significance of the risen Christ still has meaning for Christians. Obviously, it is well beyond the scope of this project to discuss Christology in detail, so the focus will be on the salvation believed to be achieved in Jesus. 39. The issue of the fullness of redemption with regard to animals will be dealt more specifically in the section on eschatology. 40. Murray, Cosmic Covenant. 41. The question of whether animals have souls has been dealt with specifically in Paul Badham, “Do Animals Have Immortal Souls?” in Animals on the Agenda:

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Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics, ed. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998); Helmut F. Kaplan, “Do Animals Have Souls?” Between the Species 7, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 138–147; and Gary A. Kowalski in The Souls of Animals (Walpole, NH: Stillpoint Publishing, 1991), as well as briefly in other works on animal theology, some of which have been mentioned previously. 42. Aristotle himself did not deny souls to animals but believed that they had different kinds of souls than humans, with plants possessing vegetative souls, animals possessing sensitive souls, but only humans possessing rational souls. 43. C. S. Lewis has made the argument that if animals do not have souls, then we have an even greater burden to provide them with an earthly life as free from pain and suffering as possible: “But the absence of ‘soul’ in that sense makes the infliction of pain upon them not easier but harder to justify. For it means that animals cannot deserve pain, not profit morally by the discipline of pain, not be recompensed by happiness in another life for suffering in this. Thus all the factors which render pain more tolerable or make it less totally evil in the case of human beings will be lacking in the beasts” (“Vivisection,” 225–226). Bernard Rollin makes the same point in “Beasts and Men: The Scope of Moral Concern,” The Modern Schoolman 55 (March 1978): 245. 44. It is interesting to note that a widely acclaimed work by two authors acknowledges the value of a theological perspective, while not sharing it personally themselves: “it is not difficult to imagine a religious perspective in which the common creaturehood of humans and animals is so stressed that all living things are seen as inviolable, and destruction or harm to any living thing, except in absolutely inescapable circumstances, viewed as an offense against the sacred. Secular ecological visions may produce similar results. We can respect such visions without conceding that they can be normative for general thought about the ethics of animal care”; see Jane A. Smith and Kenneth M. Boyd, eds., Lives in the Balance: The Ethics of Using Animals in Biomedical Research, Report of a Working Party of the Institute of Medical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 326. 45. Thus, Andrew Linzey notes: “Theologians have a responsibility in this regard: to articulate a theological understanding in which ‘the animal question’ can be fairly put and answers accessed. What cannot be right is for practitioners—whether they be biblical scholars, historians, systematizers, or ethicists—to carry on their business as though the world of animals was invisible, and as if urgent and thoughtful questions cannot be raised about our theological understanding of the non-human world” (“Introduction: Is Christianity Irredeemably Speciesist?” xx).

chapter 6 1. One of the problems in particular with the first two groups, and even among those in the third group who have strong disagreements with each other, is that they often tend to paint a caricature of the other side; see Andrew N. Rowan and Franklin M. Loew, with Joan C. Weer, The Animal Research Controversy, Center for Animals and Public Policy (North Grafton, MA: Tufts University School of Veterinary Medicine, 1995), 143–145. This chapter is an attempt to seriously weigh the burdens and benefits in experimentation. 2. The philosophical theory of utilitarianism also addresses the issue of experimentation in light of burdens and benefits, although the language used is generally that of utility and the greatest possible good for the greatest number (whether under-

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stood in terms of pain and pleasure or in terms of welfare interests). It is important to note that not all, and certainly not even most, who engage in a burden/benefit analysis of experimentation are utilitarians, even though they utilize consequentialist arguments for this particular issue. It is for this reason that utilitarianism is not the primary focus of this chapter, although the arguments proffered in a burden/benefit analysis of experimentation would be some of the same arguments made by utilitarians. 3. In fact, one professional experimenter himself acknowledged and expressed concern about the very real issue of the blunting of perception of suffering within the medical field: “It is a particular hazard perhaps of the profession of medicine and allied professions, and it is an exceptional doctor or nurse who can keep alive to the full throughout his professional career a lively perception of suffering in his patients”; see G. E. Paget, “The Ethics of Experimentation,” Theology 78 (July 1975): 361. Another scientist concerned with the effects of desensitization argued even more vehemently: “Human beings are incomparably the most dangerous species of animals which has yet inhabited this planet, and any factor tending to produce individuals with desensitized inhibitions may perhaps pose an incalculable threat to us all”; see Rosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 186. 4. What I have in mind here is the kind of rough comparison Peter Singer has talked about. He argues that a slap of a certain force will cause pain in an infant. Now, if a slap of the same force is applied to a horse, it may start but probably would not feel pain, or at least not as much pain as the infant feels. However, we could imagine a slap of comparable force administered to the horse—for example, with a stick—that would cause the same kind of pain in the horse as the slap would in the infant. He then goes on to assert that if we think it wrong to inflict this kind of pain on an infant for no good reason, then it would be equally wrong to inflict the same level of pain on the horse for no good reason; see Animal Liberation, new rev. ed. (New York: Avon Books, 1990), 15. 5. One author notes two different views with regard to animals in experimentation, the former generally held by those in favor of most experimentation, and the latter generally held by those against most or all experimentation. The first view is as follows: “Within certain limits, experimental animals may be regarded as delicate instruments, or as analogous to them, and are to be used efficiently and cared for properly, but no more than that is demanded.” The second view is as follows: “Within certain limits, animals may be regarded as sources of moral claims. These claims arise from their capacity for an independent life, or perhaps from their sentience, but in either case, the moral position of animals is seen as having analogies with that of human beings”; see Cora Diamond, “Experimenting on Animals: A Problem in Ethics,” in Animals in Research: New Perspectives in Animal Experimentation, ed. David Sperlinger (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 1981), 341. 6. Two authors present the conundrum as follows: “Since both the utility and the probability of the benefits of animal experimentation are unknown, and the harm to animals substantial and definite, it is difficult to know how researchers will morally defend their practice”; see Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks, “Util-izing Animals,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1995): 13. 7. Rowan and Loew, Animal Research Controversy, 38–42. 8. For example, one scientist notes the necessary involvement of animals to medical progress in the following way: “Animals have been an indispensable tool— one is tempted to say partner, but tool is more accurate—in biomedical research. Their role has been critical to almost every medical achievement. A biomedical estab-

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lishment without animals would be like an army without infantry, and it may as well be admitted that animals are sometimes the cannon fodder in the battle against disease. People who patriotically cheer on soldiers to political wars should be equally grateful to those who bear the brunt of medical wars. . . . It cannot be emphasized too strongly that virtually all the most important medical advances have involved animal experimentation and would have been impossible without it”; see Thomas E. Malone, “The Moral Imperative for Biomedical Research,” in The Fundamentals of Biomedical Research, ed. Roger J. Porter and Thomas E. Malone (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 20, 22. 9. Jack H. Botting and Adrian M. Morrison, “Animal Research Is Vital to Medicine,” Scientific American 276, no. 2 (February 1997): 83–84. 10. Jerod Loeb et al., “Humans vs. Animal Rights,” in Animal Rights and Welfare, ed. Jeanne Williams (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1991), 72. For other accounts of the benefits to humans due to experimentation, see Robert W. Leader and Dennis Stark, “The Importance of Animals in Biomedical Research,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 30, no. 4 (Summer 1987), 470–485; Bernardine Healy, Antonio C. Novell, et al., National Policy Perspectives, “The Crucial Link between Laboratory Animal Research and Human Health,” Academic Medicine 66, no. 9 (September 1991): 526– 530; iiFAR (incurably ill for Animal Research, 1994–1996 Activity Report); and the various books put out by the National Research Council. 11. Frankie L. Trull, “Animal Research Is Critical to Continued Progress in Human Health,” in Animal Rights and Welfare, ed. Jeanne Williams (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1991), 64. 12. National Research Council, Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996), 4. 13. For contrary evidence regarding these claims for animal models, see both books by C. Ray Greek and Jean Swingle Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York: Continuum, 2000), and Specious Science: How Genetics and Evolution Reveal Why Medical Research on Animals Harms Humans (New York: Continuum, 2002). 14. Spokespeople for the American Medical Association make the following sweeping claims about the importance of the future of experimentation: “The American Medical Association believes that research involving animals is absolutely essential to maintaining and improving the health of people of America and worldwide. . . . The American Medical Association recognizes the moral obligation of investigators to use alternatives to animals whenever possible, and to conduct their research as humanely as possible. However, it is convinced that depriving humans of medical advances by preventing research with animals is philosophically and morally a fundamentally indefensible position. Consequently, the American Medical Association is committed to the preservation of animal research and to the conduct of this research under the most humane conditions possible”; see Loeb et al., “Humans vs. Animal Rights,” 82. For additional equally strong statements, see also Ron Karpati, “ ‘I Am the Enemy,’ ” 84; and Malone, “Moral Imperative for Biomedical Research,” 22. 15. One scientist paints the following bleak picture: “When balancing the pleasures and pains resulting from the use of animals in research, we must not fail to place on the scales the terrible pains that would have resulted, would be suffered now, and would long continue to had animals not been used. Every disease eliminated, everyvaccine developed, every method of pain relief devised, every surgical procedure invented, every prosthetic device implanted—indeed, virtually every modern medical therapy is due, in part or in whole, to experimentation using animals. Nor may we

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ignore, in the balancing process, the predictable gains in human (and animal) wellbeing that are probably achievable in the future but that will not be achieved if the decision is made now to desist from such research or to curtail it”; see Carl Cohen, “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Ethics,” New England Journal of Medicine 314, no. 14 (Oct. 2, 1986): 868. In addition, some cite specific advances that will not be achieved with curtailed experimentation, such as discovery of an effective vaccine against AIDS, clarification of the cause of Alzheimer’s disease, and cures for diabetes and many other diseases (iiFAR 1994–1996 Activity Report). 16. The following is a section from the Animal Research position statement made in 1989 by the deans of the thirteen medical schools that make up the Associated Medical Schools of New York: “AMS pledges to the faculty in our member institutions that we will use every resource in our command to protect and preserve the right of scientists to pursue knowledge for the good of all people. Animal rights activists, no matter how well intentioned, will not be permitted to subvert the established mechanisms for conduct of responsible animal research and erode our obligations to society as physicians and scientists”; see Richard H. Schwarz, “Animal Research: A Position Statement,” in Animal Experimentation: The Moral Issues, Contemporary Issue Series, ed. Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991), 143–144. 17. On the issue of the difficulty of prediction, one author notes: “Some animal research projects have proved to be more important than others, but experience indicates that it is not possible to predict which research is likely to be more important than other research in building our understanding of human and animal biology and disease”; see Franklin M. Loew, “Animals in Research,” in Birth to Death: Science and Bioethics, ed. David C. Thomasma and Thomasine Kushner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 305. 18. Alix Fano argues in her book that this is especially problematic with regard to the area of testing; see Lethal Laws: Animal Testing, Human Health and Environmental Policy (London: Zed Books, 1997). 19. Of course, the argument could also be made the other way around, in that we cannot know how many potentially useful drugs were abandoned because they demonstrated toxicity in animals (what are called in the field as “false negatives”) but may not have done so in humans; see Neal D. Barnard and Stephen R. Kaufman, “Animal Research Is Wasteful and Misleading,” Scientific American 276, no. 2 (February 1997): 81. 20. Deborah G. Mayo, “Against a Justification of Animal Experiments,” in Ethics and Animals, ed. Harlan Miller and William H. Williams (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1983), 349–352. 21. See Greek and Greek, Sacred Cows and Golden Geese and Specious Science; Stephen R. Kaufman, “Does Vivisection Pass the Utilitarian Test?” Public Affairs Quarterly 9, no. 2 (April 1995): 125–137; and two works by Robert D. Sharpe: The Cruel Deception: The Use of Animals in Medical Research (Glasgow, UK: Thorsons Publishing Group, 1988) and Science on Trial: The Human Cost of Animal Experiments (Sheffield, UK: Awareness Publishing, 1994). 22. Mayo, “Against a Justification of Animal Experiments.” 23. Medical Research Modernization Committee, A Critical Look at Animal Research (New York: n.p. [pamphlet], 1990, new ed., 1998), 128. 24. Ibid. 25. Medical Research Modernization Committee, “Mouse Cancer Models Frequently Mislead,” MRMC Report 10, no. 6 (June 1998): 5–7. Another author notes:

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“Moreover, even if animals were crucial in the development of certain procedures or discoveries, there are many other human diseases and scientific questions that have resisted a solution even though millions of animals have been killed in the process”; see Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 170–171. 26. Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine, The Facts about Animal Experimentation [pamphlet]. February 2, 1994, 1–5. 27. Sharpe, Cruel Deception, 144; see also Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine, “Facts about Animal Experimentation,” 2. One article points out: “Perhaps clinicians have not given animal experimentation its due, but certainly they provide reason to doubt that animal experimentation is single-handedly responsible for the successes of modern medicine”; see Hugh LaFollette and Niall Shanks, “Animal Models in Biomedical Research: Some Epistemological Worries,” Public Affairs Quarterly 7, no. 2 (April 1993): 115–116. 28. LaFollette and Shanks, “Animal Models in Biomedical Research,” 113–116. 29. Sharpe, Cruel Deception, 42–68. 30. Tom Regan has called these benefits “ill-gotten gains”; see “Ill-Gotten Gains,” in Health Care Ethics: An Introduction, ed. Donald VanDeVeer and Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986). Marie Fox argues that we have also profited from other things that we no longer believe in continuing: “Undoubtedly it could be argued that in the past men have profited from denying women equal opportunities, and similarly whites in South Africa have profited at the expense of the black majority, but we no longer feel that this justifies male oppression or apartheid” (“Animal Rights and Wrongs: Medical Ethics and the Killing of Non-Human Animals,” in Death Rites: Law and Ethics at the End of Life, ed. Robert Lee and Derek Morgan, (London: Routledge, 1994), 164. 31. This kind of concern conjures up images of the “mad scientist.” Bernard Rollin attempts to dispel this myth with regard to concerns with the genetic engineering of animals; see The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 32. Bernard E. Rollin addresses the importance of scientists engaging in philosophical and even commonsense arguments in The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1998). 33. Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 82. 34. Of course, the question of intentionality is problematic, since individuals are not always completely forthright about or even aware of their own intentions; see Jane A. Smith and Kenneth M. Boyd, eds., Lives in the Balance: The Ethics of Using Animals in Biomedical Research, Report of the Working Party of the Institute of Medical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 31.

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Index

activists, animal, 7, 8, 18, 69, 75, 96 Adam (and Eve), 108–109, 116–117 adoption, of animals, 83, 84, 103 afterlife. See redemption agencies, of U.S. government, 14–15 Alcmaeon, 5 alternatives, to experiments, 8, 58, 75–78, 84, 137, 141, 144, 156 American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), 6 analgesics, 80 anesthesia, 80, 82 animal sacrifice, 109, 121 Animal Welfare Act. See legislation animals definition of, 11–12, 17, 91 distinct from humans, 4 morality in, 114 purpose of, 5 animals, types of amphibians, 11 apes, 23, 31, 34, 45, 47, 100 baboons, 69–70, 153 bacteria, 11 beavers, 32, 50 birds, 11, 17, 18, 29–31, 34, 35, 59, 63, 74, 84, 111, 113, 124, 156

bonobos, 23, 45, 100 cats, 16–17, 37, 47, 52, 71, 83, 104, 148–149, 151–152 cattle, 112 cephalopods, 59, 66, 79, 84, 157 chickens, 76 chimpanzees, 12, 16, 23–24, 31, 45, 47, 71, 100, 102, 146, 148, 149, 151–153 cougars, 52 cuttlefish, 59 dogs, 8, 16–17, 34, 37–38, 60, 71– 72, 75, 83, 100, 104, 111, 146, 149, 152 dolphins, 32, 34, 47, 54, 100, 111, 149, 151, 153 elephants, 52, 100 farm animals, 17 fish, 11, 14, 66, 100, 125 flies, 52 frogs, 16, 151 gerbils, 15 gorillas, 23, 45, 47 guinea pigs, 15–17, 141, 153 hamsters, 15–17, 71, 152 honeybees, 29, 45, 53 horses, 34, 37 insects, 11, 59, 66

216

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animals, types of (continued ) invertebrates, 11, 12, 59, 61–62, 65, 79–80, 91, 156 lions, 148 mammals, 8, 11, 34, 53, 59, 63–64, 66, 100 mice, 15, 17, 18, 34, 84, 111, 113, 140, 152, 156 mollusks, 66 monkeys, 31, 52, 72, 153 nonsentient, 79 octopuses, 12, 34–35, 59, 66, 152 orangutans, 23, 31, 45 oysters, 100 parrots, 45 pigeons, 34, 148 pigs, 37, 60, 125, 149, 153 primates, nonhuman, 11, 12, 16, 17, 32, 42, 71–72, 103–105, 111, 151 rabbits, 13, 16, 17, 100, 152 rats, 8, 15, 17, 18, 37, 71, 84, 104, 111, 113, 140–141, 149, 151–153, 156 reptiles, 11 rodents, 12, 15, 37, 71, 74, 79, 102, 104 seals, 34 sheep, 124, 141 shrimp, 100 single-celled organisms, 67 squid, 12, 59, 66 squirrels, 149 vertebrates, 8, 11, 15, 18, 51, 61–62, 65– 66, 79, 91, 156 warm-blooded, 17 whales, 32, 42, 54, 100 wildlife, 14, 73–75, 102, 148 worms, 75 antivivisection, 6–7 anxiety, 58, 61, 82, 90, 137 Aquinas, Thomas, 5, 115 argument to best explanation, 27 Aristotle, 5, 33 autonomy, 9, 33, 39–40, 43, 49, 54–55, 82, 91–92 awareness. See consciousness

behavior, of animals, 22, 25–37, 68, 71– 73, 104 behaviorism, 23–24, 62, 65, 68, 73 beliefs, in animals, 33, 36–39, 40–43, 52– 55, 67, 92 benefits, of experimentation arguments for, 139–145 casuistry regarding, 145–151 definition of, 139, 146–147 for humans, 138–139 benefits, of experiments, 4, 96, 102 Bennett, Jonathan, 33 Bentham, Jeremy, 56, 68 Bernard, Claude, 6 Bible, 23, 109–110, 118–120 boredom, in animals, 72 burdens, of experiments, 4, 102 to animals, 136–137 casuistry regarding, 145–151 definition of, 136, 147–149 to humans, 137 Burke, Edmund, 122 CAM assay test, 76 casuistry, guidelines for, 135, 145–151, 155 categorical imperative, 87 choice, of species, 15–16 Christ. See Jesus; Christology, doctrine of Christianity, tradition of, 5, 8, 116, 118, 131 and animals, 4, 49–50, 57, 105, 107 and rights, 97 Christology, doctrine of, 107, 123–128 Clever Hans phenomenon, 46–47 cognition. See mentality, of animals cognitivism, anecdotal, 26 comfort, 62–63 communication, in animals, 26–29, 32– 34, 44, 55, 66, 91, 98 community, moral, 88 consciousness, 22–23, 27–29, 32, 36–37, 43, 54, 60–68 and nonconsciousness, 67–68 and self-consciousness, 27, 30–32, 41, 65, 92

index consent, 39, 48–50, 76, 91, 98, 142, 153 conspecifics, 23, 28–29, 31–32, 103–104 covenant, 111–112, 132 creation doctrine of, 107–116, 129, 132 narratives in Bible, 5, 23, 108–110 criteria, for cognition, 30, 37, 43, 50–54, 95 cruelty, to animals, 5, 7, 9, 21, 86, 115, 124 culture, 54, 67 curariform agents, 80 Darwin, Charles, 24, 34 death of animals, 5, 8, 13, 16, 57, 80–83, 88, 92, 103, 118, 136–137, 146, 148 of humans, 82–83, 131 deception, in animals, 26–29, 31, 46 Descartes, Rene´, 6, 27, 69 desensitization, in researchers, 137 desires, in animals, 33, 36–38, 40, 43, 52– 55, 87, 90–91 differences, between humans and animals, 5, 97 dignity, 88 discomfort, 66, 153 diseases, 83, 137, 139, 142 in animals, 103 cures for, 7, 87 induction of, 12 purpose-breeding for, 16 dissection. See vivisection distress, 17, 58, 61–63, 74, 78, 83, 90 dominion, 5, 23, 107–108, 114–116, 118, 121, 132 theological justification for, 5, 23 drugs, 17, 58–62, 69–70, 80–81, 84 duties, to animals, 4, 86, 112–113 education, research in, 13, 77 emotions, 24–29, 59, 65 Enlightenment, 6, 92 Eristratus, 5 eschatology, doctrine of, 107, 128–132

217

essentialism, 93–94 eternal life. See redemption ethics, environmental, 4, 16 ethology and ethologists, 8, 13, 24, 26, 34, 53, 62 euthanasia, 58, 82–83, 156 evil, 57, 114, 122–123 evolution, theory of, 22–25, 31, 64–67, 118 Darwin, 4 differences of degree/kind, 5, 12, 21– 23, 35, 55, 64–67, 91, 97–98, 114 evolutionary continuity, 11–12, 28 survival of fittest, 118 and theism, 110, 112 experiences, subjective, 22–26, 64–65, 75 experimentation, background on, 3–18 duplication of, 77 on humans, 39, 141–142 limitations to, 140–145 types of, 13–14, 69–74, 102 Fall, doctrine of the, 108–109, 115, 117, 129 fear, 61, 82, 90 Federal Drug Administration (FDA), 13 feminism, 9, 120 Francis of Assisi, 107 free will, 5 free will defense, 57 Frey, R. G., 95 funding, for experiments, 69, 75, 78–79, 84, 88, 137, 142, 156–157 Galen, 5 Genesis, biblical book of, 5, 108, 110–111, 116–117 God, 23, 57, 82, 92, 108, 147, 153 and creation, 108–116 and redemption, 128–131 and rights, 112–113 and sentient creatures, 111–113 and sin, 119–123 Gospels, 123–126

218

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Greece, ancient, 5 guidelines, for experimentation. See casuistry, guidelines for Guillermo, Karen Snow, 69 happiness. See pleasure, in animals harm, to animals. See burdens, of experiments Hebrew Bible, 123–124 Helms, Senator Jesse, 18 hierarchy, 5–6, 11–12, 22, 49, 53–55 history, treatment of animals, 4–9, 24 Hume, David, 35 husbandry conditions, 61–63, 70–72, 79– 84, 90, 136, 156, 158 illness. See diseases image of God, 5, 51, 97, 108, 113–114 immortality, 129–131 inferiority, of animals to humans. See superiority instinct, 29, 34, 36, 39, 44, 92, 118 Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC), 78–80, 84, 98, 156 intelligence, of animals, 29, 33–38, 40– 43, 46–47, 49–50 interests, of animals, 21, 41, 51, 86–87, 90, 96–98, 137 intrinsic vs. instrumental value, 4, 86, 87, 92, 104, 107, 112, 133, 157 in vitro, 76–77, 146 in vivo, 76–77 Jesus, 121, 122, 132. See also Christology, doctrine of and animals, 123–126 historical Jesus, 123–126 as Redeemer, 126–128 Jonah, 112 justice, 95, 125–126, 132 Kant, Immanuel, 41–42, 87, 115 killing. See death kindness, to animals, 86, 119, 124 Koko (gorilla), 41–42

language, in animals, 5, 22, 27, 29, 32– 34, 40, 45–55, 97 legislation, 69, 74, 77–79, 84, 89, 104, 119, 155 Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 16–18, 77– 79, 84, 89 for drug testing, 8 enforcement of, 72, 155–156 Helms Amendment, 18 Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act, 17 laws, 6, 8, 11, 14, 16–18, 58 Public Health Service (PHS), 16, 18, 79, 156 Lewis, C. S., 130 liberation theology, 109, 119–121 Magendie, Franc¸ois, 6 marginal humans, 22, 41–43, 49–55, 97– 98 medication. See drugs mentality, of animals, 12, 19, 22–27, 37– 42, 65–67, 89–91, 99 mercy killing. See euthanasia Michael (gorilla), 46 Middle Ages, 5 Mill, John Stuart, 33 models, animals as, 12, 75, 77, 141 moral standing. See status, of animals, moral Morgan’s Canon, 26–27 movements, regarding animals, 6–7 mystics. See saints myths, 109–110 naming, of animals, 105, 108–109, 115– 116 National Agricultural Library, 77 National Institutes of Health (NIH), 14, 18, 75, 77 National Research Council, 18, 60, 71– 72, 82 neobehaviorism, 26 nephesh, 108, 110 nervous system, 11, 23, 28–31, 59, 61, 65– 66, 90

index Noah, 111–112 nociceptors, 59–65, 90 Occam’s Razor, 26 Office of Technology Assistance (OTA), 15 Orlans, Barbara, 66 other minds, 22–25, 64 pain, 8, 14, 23, 50–57, 61–62, 65, 68, 75, 82, 87, 90–92, 96 in animals, 4, 6, 21, 50–55, 99 argument against pain in animals, 66– 68 argument for pain in animals, 63–66, 68–69 and consciousness, 29, 32 definition of, 58–60, 66 husbandry conditions, 70 legislation, 78–79 pain scales, 58, 60, 79–80, 102 painful stimulus, 36–37, 90 perception of, 12, 59, 65–68 relief of, 17, 58, 60, 78–83 solution to animal pain, 68–69 and suffering, 74–83 thresholds, 60, 64 Pasteur, Louis, 6 paternalism, 94 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), 69 personhood, 33, 39–43, 50, 89, 97 pets, 17, 25, 86, 90, 101–105, 113, 156–158 philosophy, 57, 64, 67–68 phylogenetic scale, 31, 37, 65 placebos, 68 planning, by animals, 29 pleasure, in animals, 4, 21, 57, 62 preference tests, 58, 81–82, 84, 87, 104, 158 problem of evil. See theodicy property, animals as, 78, 89, 112, 157 proxy, 98 psychology, experiments in, 26, 35 Public Health Service (PHS). See legislation

219

3 Rs. See alternatives, to experiments Rachels, James, 92 rationality, 5–8, 22, 27, 29, 32–43, 50, 54– 55, 97 redemption, 5, 126–133 reduction. See alternatives, to experiments refinement. See alternatives, to experiments Regan, Tom, 86, 93, 100–101 relationships between God and animals, 110–113 between God and humans, 113–114 between humans and animals, 115–116 replacement. See alternatives, to experiments research, 13, 89, 152–153 researchers. See scientists responsibility, moral, 5 rights, of animals, 4, 7, 88, 89, 91, 95–97, 105 arguments against, 88–89, 96–101 arguments for, 85–92, 101 criteria for, 39, 91, 94, 97–98, 100 definition of, 85–89 enumeration of, 101–105 grounds for, 89–92, 112–113 and humans, 96–97, 105, 137 species-specific rights, 88, 92, 99– 100 of humans, 6, 85–88, 93–94 in general arguments for, 86 in Christian tradition, 97 definition of, 85–86 and duties, 86, 99 enforcing, 94 history of, 89, 95 language of rights, 86–88, 92–96 legal rights, 89–90, 105 moral rights, 89–90, 93, 95, 105 natural rights, 85, 89 negative rights, 101–103 and pain, 87, 91, 94 positive rights, 86, 101, 104–105

220

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rights (continued ) problems with, 85, 92–96 reciprocity, 99 of plants, 95 Rollin, Bernard, 73 Roman Catholicism, 5 Romans, biblical book of, 127 Rome, ancient, 5 saints, 107, 121 salvation, doctrine of, 126–132 Schweitzer, Albert, 107 scientists, 8, 18, 25–26, 44, 63, 67, 69, 74–75, 78–80, 85, 119, 121–123, 137–140, 143–144 self-awareness. See consciousness self-consciousness. See consciousness sensations, 30 sentience. See pain Silver Springs monkey case, 69 similarities, of humans and animals, 28– 33, 36–37, 42, 52, 55, 63–65, 74 sin, doctrine of, 107, 115–123, 127–128, 132 commission vs. omission, 122–123 effects of, 117–118 and liberation theology, 119–121 original sin, 116–119 solutions to, 121–123 Singer, Peter, 7–8, 87, 95–96, 99 slippery-slope argument, 93–94 Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 7 souls, 5, 129–131 speciesism, 49–55, 138 status, of animals, moral, 4, 21, 24, 41– 42, 51–52, 68, 96 stress, 58, 61–62, 71–75, 90, 137 subjective experiences. See experiences, subjective suffering in animals, 4, 8, 13, 31–32, 41, 51–52, 55, 90, 92, 102–105

causes of, 71–74 in experiments, 71–74, 77–79 and husbandry conditions, 71 and legislation, 77–79 and pain, 57–63, 68, 72–84 and rights, 82, 84, 91, 94 superiority among species, 35 of animals, 12 of humans, 4–6, 22–24, 35–36, 51–55, 97, 118 and inferiority, 21–24, 35, 67 Taub, Dr. Edward, 69 telos, 73, 104 testing, on animals, 13, 14, 70, 77–78, 137, 141 thalidomide, 141 theists, 97 theodicy, 111 theories, ethical, 3, 8, 9 thinking. See intelligence tool use, 30, 54 treatment of animals, ethical, 3, 4, 6, 21– 24, 32, 79, 90, 95–97, 101–102, 109, 116, 121 interim ethic, 9, 74–79, 84, 155–158 negative vs. positive, 86, 88 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 15, 16, 17, 156 University of Pennsylvania, 69 utilitarianism, 95–96, 143 veterinarian, 17, 78, 80 vivisection, 12, 83, 103 Waldau, Paul, 100 Washoe, 46 well-being, 62–63, 87, 91–92, 111, 113, 140–142 Wise, Steven, 100 Wittgenstein, 47