The Macmillan-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1957-69

The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence, 1957–1969 Edited by

E. Bruce Geelhoed and Anthony O. Edmonds

The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence, 1957–1969

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The Macmillan– Eisenhower Correspondence, 1957–1969 Edited by

E. Bruce Geelhoed and

Anthony O. Edmonds With the assistance of Michael Davison

Selection, editorial matter and introduction © E. Bruce Geelhoed and Anthony O. Edmonds 2005 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–1293–9 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890–1969. The Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence, 1957–1969 / edited by E. Bruce Geelhoed and Anthony O. Edmonds. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–1293–9 1. Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890–1969 – Correspondence. 2. Macmillan, Harold, 1894 – Correspondence. 3. Presidents – United States – Correspondence. 4. Prime ministers – Great Britain – Correspondence. 5. United States – Foreign relations – Great Britain. 6. Great Britain – Foreign relations – United States. 7. United States – Foreign relations – 1953–1961. 8. United States – Politics and government – 1953–1961. 9. Great Britain – Politics and government – 1945–1964. 10. Cold War. I. Macmillan, Harold, 1894– II. Geelhoed, E. Bruce, 1948– III. Edmonds, Anthony O. IV. Title. E836.A4 2004 941.085’5’092—dc22 [B] 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne.

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Contents Preface

vi

Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction: The Strange Twilight That Was Neither War nor Peace

1

1 1957: Repairing the Special Relationship

16

2 1958: The Policy Dimension of the Macmillan–Eisenhower Relationship

99

3 1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K.

194

4 January 1960–January 1961: Disappointment and Renewal

314

5 Epilogue

398

A Note on Sources

428

Index

430

v

Preface The idea for this book grew out of our experience researching and writing Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, 1957–1961.1 We quickly discovered that our most useful primary source was the voluminous correspondence the two leaders carried on as president and prime minister. Although many of the letters from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Harold Macmillan are published in five volumes of The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, edited by Louis Galambos and Daun van Ee, and some of the letters from Mac to Ike appear in various volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States, they are nowhere collected in one volume. It seemed, then, an appropriate project to gather as much of this correspondence as possible into one collection for the benefit of scholars in the field as well as the occasional general reader with a passion for the letters of leaders. The result of our labors is this volume. Because both sides of almost all of the written and transcribed communications between Eisenhower and Macmillan are housed in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, in one large file, these comprise most of the items that we include in this volume.2 We also found numerous letters in the National Archives of the UK (NA) at Kew and in the Macmillan Papers in Oxford.3 We discuss the locations of various documents in the bibliographical essay at the end of this volume. With the exception of some letters written between the time Eisenhower left the presidency in January 1961 and his death on 28 March 1969, we concentrate on correspondence exchanged while the two men headed their respective governments. We have also tried to assure that what we include are the actual letters sent, not drafts. Finally, we have attempted to transcribe the letters exactly as in the original, despite some inconsistencies in the salutations, closings, punctuations, and word usage employed by both leaders. The reader should not be surprised, therefore, to note these inconsistencies and should ascribe them to the writing styles of Macmillan and Eisenhower, rather than to errors in the text. For the sake of simplicity, we organize the correspondence chronologically. After a concise general introduction, correspondence from 1957, 1958, 1959, and 1960 to 20 January 1961 forms the four main chapters, followed by a brief epilogue consisting of letters written between 1961 and 1969. Each chapter begins with a brief introduction setting the historical context. As for editorial intrusion, we try to follow the wise advice of our fellow historian Peter Boyle, who urges editors of correspondence “to resist the temptation … to give overly detailed background information,” thereby tending “to steal the thunder” of the letters themselves.4 Thus, we do try to identify individuals mentioned in the letters as well as provide brief context when vi

Preface

vii

treaties, messages to other leaders, and specific events of the time appear. But we do our best not to point out the significance of various bits of the documents. Our readers, after all, can read, so we shall leave matters of comprehension up to them. We want to thank a number of people for their assistance in this project. The staff of the Eisenhower Library were invaluable. We especially wish to thank Thomas Branigar, archivist, for his patient, professional help on this project as well as with our earlier study of Eisenhower and Macmillan. We are also grateful for the help of Kathy Struss, photo archivist, as well as Chalsea Millner, Barbara Constable, Deanna Kolling, Linda Smith and Michele Kopfer. The staff of the Modern Political Papers section of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, were very helpful, especially Colin Harris. Equally supportive were members of the staff of the National Archives of the UK, who helped track down some letters which we could find nowhere else. Ball State University assisted in a number of ways. Its Honors College, Center for International Programs, and History Department provided travel funds that helped Anthony Edmonds travel to the United Kingdom to do research at the National Archives there. Two other people, in particular, deserve our special mention. First, Jeni Sumawati organized many of the technical details of this project. As with our previous study, her contributions were indispensable. Second, Meredith McGriff was an invaluable contributor to the organization and word processing of the manuscript. In addition, Juneyeta Gates, History Department Service Center secretary, put in hours typing and formatting, aided by her student assistant Tara Edwards. Taylor Marrow III also assisted us. We also thank the anonymous referees who reviewed our detailed proposal so favorably for Palgrave. We tried to follow their suggestions conscientiously. Special appreciation goes to Peter Boyle, who gave us much good advice both in his own edition of the Churchill–Eisenhower correspondence and via numerous e-mail consultations. But our largest debt is to Michael Davison. The father-in-law of James Hobbs, who received an MA in History at Ball State, Michael, who lives close to Kew, became our valued research assistant, fact-checker, and sleuth, as he uncovered a number of letters that we could not find. He also read the entire manuscript and used his long experience as a newspaperman and book editor to make enormously helpful suggestions. As a virtual co-editor, he deserves our considerable gratitude. Finally, we dedicate The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence, 1957–1969, to our wives, Deborah Geelhoed and Joanne Edmonds, and to our children, Marc and Steven Geelhoed, and Anthony, Daniel, and Sam Edmonds. Thank you for your love and understanding. E. Bruce Geelhoed Anthony O. Edmonds Muncie, Indiana

viii Preface

Notes 1. E. Bruce Geelhoed and Anthony O. Edmonds, Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, 1957–1961 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 2. This is the Ann Whitman File-International Series. Whitman was the private secretary to President Eisenhower throughout his two terms in office. Other letters, from post-presidential years, are found in the Post-Presidential Papers, Principal File, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, and 1969. 3. We are confident that the vast majority of the correspondence that we found in Abilene is also in the National Archives of the UK. Because files there are organized by subject matter rather than by individual, the correspondence is spread out over hundreds of folders. Unfortunately, we did not have the resources to mount an exhaustive search. A random spot check, however, did indicate that what was in the Eisenhower Library was also in the NA. 4. Peter G. Boyle (ed.), The Churchill–Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953–1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), xvi.

Acknowledgments The authors and publisher gratefully acknowledge permission to use the following material: From the Conservative Party Archives, Bodleian Library, Oxford, UK, for permission to quote from interview, Harold Macmillan by Robert Mackenzie, 1972, in “Correspondence with the Party Leader (and ex-leader), Macmillan, 1963–1964.” From the Bodleian Library, Oxford, UK, for permission to reproduce material from the Harold Macmillan Archives.

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Introduction: The Strange Twilight that Was Neither War nor Peace

On 10 January 1957, Harold Macmillan became the prime minister of Great Britain, following the resignation of Anthony Eden on 9 January. Eden had been, in effect, forced from office by a combination of the overwhelming political pressure brought upon him and his government by the Suez crisis, then in its sixth month, as well as his own serious health problems. On the same day, 10 January, Dwight D. Eisenhower, the thirty-fourth president of the United States, wrote a congratulatory message to Macmillan. The tone of Eisenhower’s letter underscored the friendship which existed between the two men, a relationship which originally began during World War II in the North Africa campaign when Eisenhower was the Supreme Allied Commander of the combined British–American troops, and Macmillan was Britain’s Minister Resident in Algiers, the personal representative of Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Eisenhower’s staff. “Dear Harold,” Eisenhower wrote, The purpose of this note is to welcome you to your new headaches. The only real fun you will have is to see just how far you can keep on going with everybody chopping at you with every conceivable kind of weapon. Knowing you so long and well I predict that your journey will be a great one. But you must remember the old adage, “Now abideth faith, hope, and charity – and greater than these is a sense of humor.”1 Eisenhower did not send this personal letter to Macmillan on 10 January, however. Acting upon the advice of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower decided to wait “until the new [British] cabinet is officially installed” before expressing his personal congratulations.2 On 12 January, therefore, Eisenhower sent Macmillan an official message through Winthrop Aldrich, the United States ambassador to the Court of St. James. Eisenhower recalled his association with Macmillan during World War II and acknowledged that Macmillan’s “distinguished career is well known on this side of the Atlantic.”3 On 14 January, Macmillan responded warmly to Eisenhower’s official letter, expressing his gratitude and confirming his intention to pursue a close relationship with the United States.4 1

2 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Macmillan did not receive Eisenhower’s personal message of 10 January until 16 January and then took the occasion to respond more informally to his old friend. “The message which you sent me through Winthrop [Aldrich] was warm enough not to merit the word ‘formal.’ I am therefore the more grateful for your private letter of January 10 which I received today,” Macmillan stated. “I have no illusions about the headaches in store for me, but thirty-three years of parliamentary life have left me pretty tough, without, I hope, atrophying my sense of humour. I shall certainly need it in the years to come.”5 The four letters which Macmillan and Eisenhower exchanged in midJanuary 1957 marked the beginning of an extensive correspondence between the two national leaders which continued until Eisenhower left the presidency on 20 January 1961, and then continued sporadically for the next eight years. In late January and February 1957, the two leaders corresponded frequently in the weeks leading up to their first official meeting at Bermuda between 20 and 24 March 1957. On 24 March, at dinner in the Mid-Ocean Club, Macmillan proposed to “institutionalize” the correspondence as a matter of practice. He convinced Eisenhower that they should write to each other, “perhaps once a week or once a month, firmly and freely on any subject which we thought we should know each other’s view.”6 In that fashion, the Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence became a key element of British–American diplomacy. The Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence ultimately consisted of more than four hundred messages, including letters, telegrams, transcripts of telephone conversations and other communications which the two leaders exchanged. The correspondence contained a unique combination of material, ranging from serious discussions of official policy to purely personal messages such as wishes for good health or the exchange of birthday greetings. Eisenhower’s writing style was businesslike and direct, with an occasional interjection of humor. Macmillan’s writing style was livelier than Eisenhower’s, and he often resorted to historical analogies to justify a particular viewpoint or recommend a course of action. Despite their differences in writing style, however, the correspondence revealed the thinking of two leaders, with global concerns, who were totally absorbed in the national security process. Macmillan and Eisenhower were expert communicators. They both loved to think, loved to write, loved to talk, and loved to confer. As military historian Carlo d’Este has written, “Beneath [Eisenhower’s] calm exterior was a profoundly intense man whose mind never seemed to rest.”7 Similarly, George Hutchinson, author of a short biography of Macmillan, described the prime minister as a man with a “scholarly, reflective, good natured and humane disposition.”8 Eisenhower and Macmillan were ideal as correspondents. Furthermore, Macmillan and Eisenhower had a fascination for the written word and they habitually “put things down” to provide an extensive record of their thoughts, actions, and opinions. They were lifelong diarists; readers

Introduction 3

of their respective diaries have obtained fascinating insights into their approach to political problem-solving.9 Eisenhower and Macmillan also wrote memoirs of the pivotal experiences in their lives, ranging from their careers during World War II to their years as national leaders, and even to the interesting aspects of their personal and family lives.10 In that respect, the lengthy correspondence between the two leaders was another key part of the written record of their views. As the correspondence between the two men unfolded, some discernible trends began to appear which identified the purposes which each man had for his messages. For Macmillan, the correspondence helped to cement his relationship with Eisenhower and to keep Britain at the “top table” as a functioning, effective participant in international relations. Mindful of Eisenhower’s personal popularity in Britain, which extended back to World War II, Macmillan realized that a visibly close relationship with the president would pay political dividends at the time of the next British general election. As a result, Macmillan’s letters to Eisenhower frequently contained references to the importance of “keeping together” in an increasingly perilous world. On 2 January 1958, for example, Macmillan wrote Eisenhower a lengthy letter which was essentially a tour d’horizon of his views on the contemporary world situation. He closed this letter, which included discussions of European security, disarmament, and relations with the Soviet Union, with the words: “The only thing I am sure of is that we must keep together.”11 In this process of “keeping together,” Macmillan envisioned a world guided by a firm partnership between himself and Eisenhower, acting in concert. Eisenhower used his correspondence with Macmillan for a different purpose. Eisenhower’s overriding strategic objective in national security policy was to keep the peace by strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the best guarantor of peace and stability in Western Europe. As the closest ally of the United States, Britain played a crucial part in achieving that objective. In that regard, the British–American relationship functioned almost as an alliance within an alliance during the Macmillan– Eisenhower period. The president’s close friendship with Macmillan enabled him to include the British virtually as de facto participants in the process of formulating American foreign policy. Frequent consultations between Macmillan, Eisenhower, and their respective advisers became common practice in British–American diplomacy during the late 1950s. The correspondence between Macmillan and Eisenhower was an essential part of this process of consultation. As Eisenhower wrote to Macmillan on 5 January 1958, “It is useful for us thus to ‘think out loud’ to each other when, as is too much the case, we cannot sit down and talk to each other.”12 Eisenhower did not express such sentiments to the leaders of any of the other countries allied with the United States. Nor did Macmillan form any relationship with any foreign leader remotely close to his relationship with Eisenhower. Because of their long friendship, Macmillan once

4 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

wrote to Eisenhower, “I feel that our relations … are of another character to those that exist even between statesmen of closely allied countries.”13 Prior to their years as national leaders, the relationship between Dwight David Eisenhower and Maurice Harold Macmillan was influenced by two events: their experience together during the North Africa campaign during World War II in 1943 and the Suez crisis of 1956. Without the intervention of these two events, it is unlikely that Eisenhower and Macmillan, given their vast differences in personal backgrounds and life histories, would have ever formed a diplomatic partnership. For both Eisenhower and Macmillan, World War II was the signature event which catapulted them from relative obscurity to positions of national political prominence. Born in 1890, Dwight D. Eisenhower spent his boyhood in Abilene, Kansas. One of six sons born to David and Ida Stover Eisenhower, he acquired the boyhood nickname, Ike, the name by which he became known throughout his life.14 He left Abilene in 1911 to attend the United States Military Academy at West Point. As a student there, Eisenhower performed acceptably in the classroom but excelled as a football player until a knee injury suffered in a riding accident ended his athletic career after two seasons. He graduated from West Point in 1915 and then began his pursuit of a professional military career. Between 1915 and 1918, Ike remained stateside and was especially disappointed when he failed to receive overseas duty during World War I. While stationed at Fort Sam Houston in Texas in 1916, Eisenhower met and began the courtship of Mamie Geneva Doud of Denver, Colorado. Mamie returned Ike’s affections, and the couple were married in 1916. Their first child, Doud Dwight, nicknamed “Icky,” was born in 1917 but died tragically from scarlet fever at age three. In 1922, Mamie gave birth to the couple’s second son, John Sheldon Doud Eisenhower.15 During the 1920s and 1930s, Eisenhower handled a number of routine assignments in the Army, both in the United States and abroad. Most notably, he served with General Douglas MacArthur when President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent MacArthur to the Philippines to train the Filipino army. MacArthur was impressed with the thorough, dependable, and imaginative work which Eisenhower performed. “Eisenhower is the best officer in the Army,” MacArthur said. “When the next war comes, he should go right to the top.”16 MacArthur’s prediction about Eisenhower’s talents proved accurate. After the United States entered World War II, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall summoned Ike to Washington and placed him in the Pacific and Far Eastern department of the War Plans division. Although Marshall’s action represented a definite step ahead in Eisenhower’s career, Ike feared that, once again, he would spend wartime stateside in another staff position and miss out on a command and combat assignment. In June, 1942, however, Marshall selected Eisenhower to command the combined British and

Introduction 5

American force in the European Theater of Operations (ETOs). Chosen ahead of 366 senior officers, Eisenhower had become the Supreme Allied Commander. He had reached the pinnacle of command authority.17 Harold Macmillan’s path to national and international prominence was considerably different from Eisenhower’s. Born in London on 10 February 1894, Harold was the third son of Maurice and Helen Artie Tarleton Belles (Hill) Macmillan. Maurice Macmillan and Helen (Nellie) Belles were married in 1884 after having met earlier in Paris where Nellie was studying music and sculpture. Born in the United States in Indiana in 1856, Nellie Macmillan’s life story was fascinating, especially for a young woman in the late nineteenth century. The daughter of Joshua Belles, a prominent physician in a small Indiana town named Spencer, Nellie married an Indianapolis man named John Bayliss ( Jack) Hill in 1874, but her husband died suddenly, only six months into the marriage. Nellie then convinced her father to send her to Paris to pursue further study in music and art, and there she met and fell in love with Maurice Macmillan, a successful publishing executive with the House of Macmillan. After their marriage, the Macmillans took up residence at 52 Cadogan Place in London, the birthplace of their three sons, Daniel, Arthur, and Harold. Harold Macmillan received the systematic education typical of a member of a privileged British family. He attended Eton and Balliol College, Oxford. When Britain entered World War I, Macmillan was posted to the Scottish Grenadier Guards and compiled a distinguished combat record as an officer during the Great War. Wounded five times, near death on at least two occasions and afflicted with the effects of his wartime injuries for the rest of his life, Macmillan nevertheless survived World War I and promised himself that he would “make decent use of the life that had been spared.”18 In 1919, after World War I, Macmillan became the aide-de-camp to the Governor General of Canada, the Duke of Devonshire. In Canada, he met Dorothy Cavendish, the third daughter of the Governor General, and the two began a courtship. Macmillan and Dorothy Cavendish were married in 1920, and their marriage subsequently produced four children. Harold Macmillan’s political career began in the 1920s when he was elected to the House of Commons, as a member of the Conservative Party, for the constituency of Stockton-on-Tees, an industrial community in northeast England. He served until 1929, when he lost an election, but was elected once again to the House of Commons in 1931 for the same constituency. During the 1930s, Macmillan developed a reputation as an interventionist in economic policy and a member of the anti-appeasement faction of the Conservative Party. He developed an admiration for Winston Churchill, a political leader who embodied the decisiveness, sense of destiny, and discernment which Macmillan valued. Macmillan did not particularly impress Churchill, however, although Macmillan was appointed to some minor posts in the Churchill Government after 1940.

6 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

In 1942, Churchill essentially created a new diplomatic post for Macmillan, Minister Resident to the Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) in Algiers. Churchill expected Macmillan to act as his personal representative to Eisenhower, and to Eisenhower’s staff, in the same fashion that Robert Murphy, an American Foreign Service officer, functioned as President Roosevelt’s representative to Ike. In his memoir, Diplomat Among Warriors, Murphy recounted Macmillan’s entry onto the diplomatic scene. “Macmillan was not a career diplomat, nor did he bring to Algiers any exceptional knowledge of French or African affairs,” Murphy wrote. “What he did bring was exceptional common sense and knowledge of British politics.”19 Murphy also recorded that Macmillan’s appointment as his representative to Eisenhower made sense to Churchill because, like the prime minister, “Macmillan had an American mother.”20 Macmillan’s status within the organization of AFHQ was ambiguous, however. Churchill expected Macmillan to be his responsibility; Eisenhower thought Macmillan should function as a member of AFHQ and report to him. Moreover, by the time that Eisenhower and Macmillan met for the first time, on 1 January 1943, at the Hotel St. Georges in Algiers, Ike had become increasingly frustrated with the political pressures associated with commanding an Allied military effort. Much of the initial Allied success in North Africa had been possible because of some expedient political arrangements made between the Americans and the Vichyite French military in North Africa. Especially troublesome to some observers was Eisenhower’s agreement that the collaborationist French Admiral François Darlan could remain in control of French forces in North Africa. Not surprisingly, when Eisenhower and Macmillan met for the first time, the overburdened Supreme Commander expected nothing more than a routine visit. Macmillan got Ike’s attention, however, by informing him that his mother was an American from a small town in the Midwest. By virtue of his mother’s family, Macmillan said, he was “a Hoosier.”21 The revelation that Macmillan had small-town roots in the United States caused Eisenhower to relax perceptibly, and the conversation proceeded along friendly lines. Eisenhower even complained to Macmillan that his liberal critics, the “long-haired, starry-eyed guys,” both in the United States and Great Britain, had been too critical of the “deal” with Admiral Darlan.22 In that fashion, the first meeting between Eisenhower and Macmillan ended amicably, and Ike appeared pleased that Macmillan was in the theater. Two weeks later, Eisenhower and Macmillan had another encounter when Macmillan attended the conference in Casablanca between Churchill and Roosevelt. Perhaps overdramatically, Macmillan described the Casablanca conference as a meeting of the Emperor of the West, Roosevelt, with the Emperor of the East, Churchill.23 One morning, Roosevelt sent for Macmillan, with whom he had been modestly acquainted in the past. In the

Introduction 7

presence of Eisenhower and Churchill, Roosevelt exclaimed when Macmillan entered the room, “Hallo, Harold. It is fine to see you, fine.”24 After the meeting, Eisenhower confronted Macmillan, asking why he had never mentioned his relationship with Roosevelt. Macmillan explained that he had a modest acquaintance with Roosevelt, but Eisenhower appeared perplexed that anyone who knew the president of the United States would not have said so previously. Nevertheless, as Alexander Macmillan, a grandson of Harold, later explained, Ike appreciated the fact that Macmillan had not used his casual knowledge of Roosevelt as a source of personal aggrandizement. “This [meeting] was something of a breakthrough. Ike now began to look at my grandfather as more than simply a somewhat effete Englishman.”25 By the time of the Allied victory over the Germans in North Africa in May 1943, Macmillan had acquired Eisenhower’s confidence and had become a contributing member of the British–American team. Macmillan’s experience in North Africa, and indeed with the Americans throughout World War II, significantly increased his self-confidence as a politician. He also developed a lasting respect and admiration for Eisenhower, both personally and as a leader. As Macmillan later told an interviewer, his relationship with Eisenhower in World War II was “a pure piece of luck. I made really a friendship with the President, with the General. He liked me, we got on, and I think I could help him over some things. At any rate, he felt so; he had complete confidence in me … although we didn’t always agree. I could say anything to him and he’d answer it and we never quarreled.”26 After World War II, Eisenhower and Macmillan returned to their respective countries. Macmillan lost his seat in the House of Commons in the general election of 1945. Within three weeks of his defeat, however, he regained a seat in Parliament by winning a by-election for the constituency of Bromley in Kent, a seat which he held until 1964.27 He moved steadily upward in positions of responsibility in the governments of Winston Churchill, who returned to the premiership after the Conservative Party’s victory in 1951, and Churchill’s successor, Anthony Eden, who became prime minister in 1955. By 1956, Macmillan had risen to become chancellor of the exchequer in the Eden government, the second highest position in the cabinet. Eisenhower returned to the United States where he succeeded General George C. Marshall as Army Chief of Staff after Marshall’s retirement. In 1948, Ike asked for a leave of absence from the Army to accept the presidency of Columbia University. He spent eighteen months at Columbia but then returned to active duty in 1949 as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then, in 1951, as the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), the head of military forces for the recently created NATO alliance. In the spring of 1952, Eisenhower returned to the United States to seek the Republican presidential nomination. He won the nomination, narrowly defeating Senator Robert A. Taft at the GOP convention in Chicago in July,

8 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

and then won the general election in November by a landslide against Governor Adlai Stevenson, his Democratic opponent. In 1956, Eisenhower once again defeated Stevenson in the presidential election, this time by a larger margin than in 1952.28 During most of Ike’s first term, he dealt indirectly with Macmillan. But on 26 July 1956, the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser precipitated an international crisis by nationalizing the Suez Canal. The drama of the Suez crisis, which was to last for the next six months, served eventually to bring Eisenhower and Macmillan together as national leaders. Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal threatened the commercial interests of both Britain and France, as well as the strategic interests of Israel, which believed that Nasser was being emboldened to attempt further aggressive action against the Jewish state. From the outset of the crisis, the British and French wanted to re-establish international control of the Canal, if necessary by the use of force. The United States wished to resolve the crisis diplomatically, if at all possible. Within the councils of the British Government, Macmillan was initially one of the strongest voices in support of military action against Nasser and also one of the most frustrated by the unwillingness of the Eisenhower Administration to support this position. In late September 1956, Macmillan visited the United States to receive an honorary doctorate from Indiana University, and he used the occasion to warn about the threat which Nasser presented to the West. On 22 September, Macmillan told an audience in Indianapolis that Nasser “must be stopped. If he gets away with his violations [of] treaties and contracts, Egypt will fall more and more under the communist influence. There is much more to this than a disagreement over the Suez Canal.”29 During the same visit, Macmillan also discussed the Suez crisis with Eisenhower and members of the Administration between 23 and 25 September. The results of these meetings were inconclusive, at best, however, and the positions of the two countries remained unchanged. Britain wanted to “get [Nasser] down.” The United States counseled patience and diplomacy. Finally, on 23 October, in a secret meeting in Sèvres, France, the British, French, and Israelis agreed on a plan to undertake military action against Egypt, retake the Suez Canal, and depose the Nasser regime.30 The military campaign began on 29 October, with an Israeli attack on Egypt. The British and French, on cue, demanded an end to the hostilities, ostensibly to protect the Canal, and when Nasser refused, they entered the conflict against Egypt. Confronted with the violence in the Middle East, the United States took the matter to the United Nations, opposing the action taken by the British, French, and Israelis. “[There] can be no law – if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us – and another for our friends,” Eisenhower stated at the time.31 While the fighting raged on, the United States worked in the United Nations for a ceasefire resolution, which

Introduction 9

passed on 4 November. By this point, Eisenhower had become exceedingly apprehensive about the prospect of intervention by the Soviet Union in the Suez crisis, an action which might lead to a broader conflict. To force the British and French to accept the UN’s ceasefire resolution, the Administration applied immense economic pressure. In the face of the pressure, Macmillan reversed his hard-line position and advised Prime Minister Anthony Eden to accept the American demands.32 Facing opposition to his policy from the Eisenhower Administration, from his political opponents in the Labour Party in Great Britain, and even within his own Cabinet, Eden was forced to endure a painful political humiliation. Compounding his political health was his increasingly precarious physical health, and on 9 January 1957, Eden submitted his resignation as prime minister to Queen Elizabeth II.33 The next day, Macmillan emerged as the choice of the Cabinet to succeed Eden as prime minister. Commenting on the surprising reaction to the choice of Macmillan as prime minister, when many political observers in Britain expected the Cabinet to select Richard Austen (Rab) Butler, the deputy leader of the Conservative Party, Winthrop Aldrich, the American ambassador, believed that Macmillan was the logical choice because “he was the person best fitted to deal with President Eisenhower because of the close association they had in Africa during the war.”34 Beginning in January 1957, therefore, and continuing for the next four years, Macmillan and Eisenhower maintained their regular correspondence. At this juncture, however, it is important to acknowledge that the Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence had its precedents in view of the fact that Eisenhower also corresponded directly with Macmillan’s two predecessors, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden. The correspondence between Eisenhower and Churchill, and then between Eisenhower and Eden, has been expertly chronicled by British historian Peter D. Boyle in his outstanding editions, The Churchill–Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953–1955, and The Eden–Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955–1957.35 As Boyle’s studies illustrate, Churchill, Eden and Eisenhower used their correspondence to maintain their rapport as national leaders. For Macmillan and Eisenhower, however, Winston Churchill, and not Anthony Eden, was the central figure. In the 1930s, Macmillan belonged to the Conservative Party’s anti-appeasement faction, “firmly aligned with Churchill and his little band of conservative supporters in the House of Commons.”36 Then, during World War II, of course, Churchill had given Macmillan his first major political opportunity when he named him Minister Resident in Algiers. Finally, Churchill named Macmillan to a succession of Cabinet posts, including minister of housing and secretary of state for defence, when the Conservative Party returned to power in 1951. These high-ranking posts enabled Macmillan to expand both his experience and his political credentials sufficiently to assume the posts of foreign secretary and chancellor of the exchequer after Eden became prime minister in 1955.

10 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Eisenhower’s relationship with Winston Churchill also extended back to World War II. Despite moments of extreme tension and occasional discord, Ike and Churchill developed a magnificent friendship during the war, and Churchill became an Eisenhower supporter when many members of the British Imperial Staff were openly skeptical about Ike’s military abilities. As James C. Humes has written, “Churchill was an early enthusiast of Eisenhower, and he dismissed the appraisal of those generals such as Alan Brooke and Bernard Montgomery who considered Eisenhower ‘a desk man’ because he had no command experience in the field.”37 In November 1952, Eisenhower won his first presidential victory, but surprisingly, Churchill was not especially pleased with Ike’s election because of his suspicions about the Republican Party’s position on many foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, shortly after New Year’s Day in 1953, Churchill traveled to the United States to meet personally with Eisenhower.38 One month later, on 2 February 1953, Eisenhower initiated the correspondence with Churchill which lasted until Churchill left office in 1955.39 In the case of the Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence, however, the record shows that Macmillan initiated the practice. In fact, Churchill’s correspondence with Ike may have prompted Macmillan’s desire to pursue a similar exchange of letters with the president. For example, Macmillan began each letter to Eisenhower with the Churchillian salutation of “My dear friend,” instead of “Dear Mr. President” or “Dear President Eisenhower” or another more official salutation. For his part, Eisenhower was equally informal, saluting Churchill as “Dear Winston” and Macmillan as “Dear Harold” in the fashion that he greeted anyone with whom he was personally familiar. Eisenhower also closed his letters to Churchill with the words, “With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike,” the same closing which he used (generally) in his correspondence with Macmillan. Departing somewhat from the Churchill pattern, however, Macmillan adopted Eisenhower’s closing remarks when signing off his letters. More importantly, the correspondence with Eisenhower served a definite purpose for both Churchill and Macmillan. As early as 11 March 1953, shortly after the death of Joseph Stalin, Churchill proposed the concept of a “summit meeting” with the leaders of the Soviet Union.40 While not specifically objecting to the idea of a summit meeting with the Soviet leadership, Eisenhower expressed his reservations about the timing of such an event.41 It soon became clear that, on the American side, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was the most determined opponent of a summit meeting, and Eisenhower was not inclined to provoke resistance from Dulles. Nevertheless, Eisenhower did agree to a summit meeting between 15 and 22 July, 1955, at Geneva, Switzerland, a conference which included the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. At this conference, Eisenhower introduced his Open Skies plan, proposing that each country allow unarmed surveillance flights as a means of insurance against

Introduction 11

a possible surprise attack. The Soviets rejected the Open Skies proposal, however, as well as the views of the British, French, and the Americans on the future of divided Germany. But this first summit conference led temporarily to an easing of tensions between the world’s major ideological rivals, and the “Spirit of Geneva” represented a welcome interlude in the tense international situation. The failure of the conference to lead to any lasting agreements made both Eisenhower and Dulles suspicious of the efficacy of any future summit meeting, however.42 Like Churchill, Macmillan was a strong believer in both personal diplomacy and summitry. As can be seen in the Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence, Macmillan avidly pushed Eisenhower in the direction of a summit conference with the leaders of the Soviet Union. His efforts usually encountered resistance, however, until after the death of John Foster Dulles in May 1959. With Dulles’s absence from the councils of the administration, Eisenhower became more open to pursuing direct contact with the Soviets. Finally, the Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence is a record of two men who firmly believed in the efficacy of an Anglo-American partnership that would exercise world leadership. Macmillan’s appreciation of a strong partnership with the United States may be traced, at least in part, to the influence of his mother and her tutelage about American life and politics. Macmillan spoke about the effects of his British–American ancestry in September 1956, when he received his honorary doctorate from Indiana University. “My mother taught me that the future of the world depends on the alliance, the co-operation of our two great countries,” he told an audience in Indianapolis. Also, in his address at Indiana University, Macmillan explained how his ancestry enabled him to understand the common bond which existed between Great Britain and the United States. “The two countries to which I owe, from my double family tradition, an equal loyalty – Britain and the United States – have been partners in two great struggles [World War I and World War II]. In both these conflicts, two countries whose histories before held much of bitterness and misunderstanding were united in a deep and lasting loyalty. We had the same purposes and the same ideals.”43 Harold Macmillan’s understanding of American life and politics was conditioned, to an extent, by his mother’s experience of growing up in the conservative, isolationist Midwest. Because of Nellie, Macmillan developed a more complete understanding of American foreign policy, as it was influenced by attitudes in the heartland as well as in the national power centers of New York and Washington. Perhaps because of his mother’s influence, Macmillan, more than most British political leaders, knew the limits of what American leaders could deliver in terms of international affairs. “My grandfather was the one British politician who knew what it was like to stand in the middle of a cornfield in Indiana,” Alexander Macmillan recalled.44

12 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Dwight D. Eisenhower held an affection for Britain similar to that which Macmillan held for the United States. Of course, much of Ike’s respect and admiration for Britain stemmed from his experience during World War II as Supreme Allied Commander and more specifically, his longtime friendship with Winston Churchill. His attachment to Britain had grown so strong, over the years, that he even went so far as to write to Macmillan, on 28 April 1957, that “I follow reports of your government’s activities and progress almost as closely as I do our own.”45 Personal feelings aside, though, Eisenhower’s belief in the efficacy of a strong Anglo-American alliance was equally as fervent as Macmillan’s. In the words of Andrew Goodpaster, one of Eisenhower’s closest advisers, Ike had a “visceral” belief in the importance of the Anglo-American alliance, and he considered it essential to international stability.46 The Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence, then, reveals the details of the diplomatic partnership which the two leaders implemented. This partnership, unique in that it was implemented on the basis of a previous friendship, stressed three elements: the maintenance of a close, personal friendship between the two national leaders; regular consultations between the national security officials in each country as they affected the major diplomatic issues of the period; and cooperation on defense policy. In fact, the correspondence between Macmillan and Eisenhower also provided a basis for the establishment of close working relationships between British and American policymakers at the Cabinet and ambassadorial levels, including such individuals as John Foster Dulles, Christian Herter, Thomas Gates, and John Hay Whitney on the American side, and Selwyn Lloyd, Duncan Sandys, Harold Watkinson, and Harold Caccia on the British side. Because of the intimacy and candor made possible by their friendship, Macmillan and Eisenhower put their stamp on the foreign policy of the late 1950s, a period poignantly described by Macmillan as that “strange twilight that is neither war nor peace.”47 The correspondence between Eisenhower and Macmillan, therefore, detailed the thinking of the two leading statesmen of the western alliance as they wrestled with the serious issues of the Cold War, including the arms race with the Soviet Union, the future of a divided Germany, great power rivalry in the Middle East, and the elusive pursuit of détente and disarmament. In dealing with these momentous issues, Eisenhower and Macmillan frequently disagreed as to philosophy and tactics. They held differing views on the utility of summitry as a tool of diplomacy; their views conflicted as to the correct policy in the Middle East; and they approached the situation in divided Berlin from different perspectives. Nevertheless, in personal terms, they worked together extremely well and, in the process, preserved the Anglo-American alliance at a critical period in the history of international relations.

Introduction 13

Notes 1. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 10 January 1957, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 22, “Harold Macmillan,” folder 7. Hereafter cited as EL, WFIS, and box. Box 22 contains folders which include letters exchanged between Macmillan and Eisenhower for the period from 10 January 1957 to 24 May 1957. 2. John Foster Dulles to Eisenhower, 11 January 1957, EL, WFIS, Box 22. 3. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 12 January 1957, EL, WFIS, Box 22. 4. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 14 January 1957, EL, WFIS, Box 22. 5. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 16 January 1957, EL, WFIS, Box 22. 6. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm: 1956–1959 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 258. 7. Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: a Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 307. 8. George Hutchinson, The Last Edwardian at No. 10 (London: Quartet Books, 1980), 52. 9. See Robert Ferrell (ed.), The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981); Harold Macmillan, War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984), and Peter Catterall (ed.), The Macmillan Diaries: The Cabinet Years, 1950–1957 (London: Macmillan, 2003). 10. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948); Mandate for Change: White House Years, 1953–1956 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963); Waging Peace: White House Years, 1956–1961 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965); At Ease: Stories I Tell To Friends (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967). For Harold Macmillan, see Macmillan’s memoirs, Winds of Change, 1914–1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), The Blast of War, 1939–1945 (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), Tides of Fortune, 1945–1955 (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), Riding the Storm, 1956–1959 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), Pointing the Way, 1959–1961 (London: Macmillan, 1972), and At the End of the Day (London: Macmillan, 1973). 11. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 2 January 1958, EL, WFIS, Box 23, “MacmillanPresident,” Dec. 1, 1957–May 30, 1958, folder 2. Box 23 contains files which include letters exchanged between Macmillan and Eisenhower for three separate time periods, 23 May 1957–30 November 1957, 23–25 October 1957, and 1 December 1957– 23 May 1958. 12. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 5 January 1958, EL, WFIS, Box 23. 13. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 5 May 1959, EL, WFIS, Box 25(a), “Macmillan, 3/23/59–6/30/59,” folder 2. Box 25(a) contains folders which include letters exchanged between Macmillan and Eisenhower for two separate time periods, 23 March 1959–30 June 1959, and 1 July 1959–31 December 1959. 14. See Eisenhower, At Ease, 31–8, for a profile of the family. Ike had two older brothers, Arthur and Edgar, and three younger brothers, Roy, Earl, and Milton. Another brother, Paul, died in infancy. See also D’Este, Eisenhower, 30, 33. 15. Dwight and Mamie Eisenhower were grief-stricken over the death of Icky. See D’Este, Eisenhower, 156. In D’Este’s biography, he spells Doud Dwight’s nickname, “Ikky.” In At Ease, Eisenhower gave the nickname as “Icky,” the spelling which we use. 16. David Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: the American People in Depression and War, 1930–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 688. 17. See D’Este, Eisenhower, 284–303, for an explanation of Eisenhower’s rapid rise to command authority as well as his fears about the possibility that he might once again be overlooked for a command assignment.

14 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence 18. Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee, “Staying in the Game: Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role,” in Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee (eds), Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 158. 19. Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964), 163–4. 20. Ibid. 21. Macmillan, The Blast of War, 173. 22. Ibid., 174. 23. Ibid., 194. See also Rick Atkinson, An Army At Dawn (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 270. 24. Macmillan, The Blast of War, 195. 25. Alexander Macmillan, interview with Bruce Geelhoed, 8 May 1987. See also Macmillan, The Blast of War, 195, and Geelhoed and Edmonds, Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, xxii. 26. Harold Macmillan, interview with Robert McKenzie, British Broadcasting Corporation, regarding his book, Pointing the Way, 1972, Conservative Central Office Papers, Correspondence with the Party Leader (and ex-leader), Macmillan, 1963–64, 20/8/6, 14, Bodleian Library, Oxford, UK. See also Geelhoed and Edmonds, Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, xxii. 27. Alistair Horne, Macmillan, Vol. I: 1894–1956 (London: Macmillan, 1988), 286–7. 28. See Steve Neal, Harry and Ike: the Partnership That Remade the Postwar World (New York: Scribner’s, 2001), 124–203, for a helpful discussion of Eisenhower’s life between 1945 and 1952. 29. Lester M. Hunt, “Nasser Called World Peril,” Indianapolis Star, 23 September 1956, 1, 16. 30. For a brief discussion of this highly complicated international crisis, see Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 79–92. 31. Ibid., 85–6. 32. Robert Rhodes James, “Harold Macmillan: an Introduction,” in Aldous and Lee (eds), Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role, 3. 33. Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden (New York: McGraw Hill, 1986), 595–6. 34. Winthrop Aldrich, “The Suez Crisis: A Footnote to History,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 45, no. 3 (April 1967), 548. 35. Peter G. Boyle (ed.), The Churchill–Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953–1955 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). Peter G. Boyle (ed), The Eden–Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955–1957 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming). 36. Hutchinson, The Last Edwardian, 29. 37. James C. Humes, Eisenhower and Churchill: the Partnership that Saved the World (Roseville, CA: Prime Publishing Company, a division of Random House, 2001), 167–8. 38. Ibid., 210, 235–7. 39. Boyle (ed), Churchill–Eisenhower Correspondence, 1. 40. Churchill to Eisenhower, March 11, 1953, ibid., 31. 41. Eisenhower to Churchill, March 11, 1953, ibid., 31–2. 42. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol. II: the President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 261–7. 43. Address by Harold Macmillan at a Special Convocation, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 22 September 1956, Indiana University Library.

Introduction 15 44. Alexander Macmillan, interview. 45. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 28 April 1957, EL, WFIS, Box 22. 46. Andrew J. Goodpaster, interview with Bruce Geelhoed, 13 June 1996, Washington, DC. 47. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 25 December 1957, EL, WFIS, Box 23.

1 1957: Repairing the Special Relationship

In 1957, Harold Macmillan and Dwight D. Eisenhower set out to repair the strained relationship between Great Britain and the United States that had resulted from the lengthy Suez crisis of 1956. The restoration of closer ties between Britain and the United States was a high-stakes exercise for both leaders, although considerably higher for Macmillan than for Eisenhower. Upon taking office in mid-January, Macmillan faced a host of serious problems. The Suez crisis had dealt a setback to the British economy; Britain needed to adjust its international commitments in line with the increasingly scarce resources which it could afford for defense; and morale within the Conservative Party was dangerously low. Perhaps most important for Macmillan and the future of his government, Britain’s relationship with the United States cried out for immediate attention.1 At the same time, Macmillan realized that he could not afford, politically, to improve relations with the United States by pursuing a purely American agenda. After the Suez crisis, one of Macmillan’s major goals in foreign policy was to orchestrate Britain’s return to the diplomatic “top table.” Achieving that goal was impossible if Macmillan came to be perceived in Britain as terminally subservient to the United States. As Macmillan wrote to his friend Robert Menzies, the prime minister of Australia, on 18 March 1957, “How right you are in saying that good friends ought to try to sort out their disagreements without letting them come to quarrels. I believe that we should get back to this with the United States but only if we are quite frank.”2 Therefore, Macmillan adopted an ingenious tactic in dealing with the United States. As Henry Kissinger has written, Macmillan “decided to embed British policy in American policy by skillfully handling relations with Washington. He readily conceded center stage to Washington while seeking to shape the drama from behind the curtain.”3 For Dwight D. Eisenhower, the restoration of closer ties with Great Britain also became a priority in the aftermath of the Suez crisis. Like Macmillan, Eisenhower was a political realist who understood that the attainment of his foreign policy goals – keeping the peace in Western Europe, containing the 16

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 17

communist threat in Europe and Asia, strengthening the NATO alliance, and restraining the growth of the arms race – required an effective diplomatic partnership with Britain. Writing to Winston Churchill on 27 November 1956, Ike spoke of his disappointment that the Suez crisis created a circumstance in which “I and my old friends have met problem concerning which we do not see eye to eye. I shall never be happy until our old time closeness has been restored.”4 Eisenhower welcomed the prospect of working with Macmillan, a man with whom he sensed a greater commonality of interests than he had enjoyed with Anthony Eden, Macmillan’s immediate predecessor.5 In Harold Macmillan, Eisenhower had a friend, “a straight, fine man and, so far as I am concerned, the outstanding one of the British I served with during the war.”6 It was not surprising, then, that Ike made the first step toward harmonizing Anglo-American relations when he wrote to Macmillan on 24 January, suggesting that they “have an early meeting.”7 Eisenhower and Macmillan established their diplomatic partnership in 1957 on the basis of agreements reached at three official meetings: the Bermuda Conference of 20–4 March; the Washington Conference of 23–5 October; and the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) between 17 and 19 December. Each of these meetings involved serious discussions between Eisenhower, Macmillan, and their various foreign policy advisers on the critical issues of the time, ranging from the correct policy toward the Soviet Union, to great power rivalry in the Middle East, to strengthening the NATO alliance. The first of these major conferences, the Bermuda meeting, occurred between 20 and 24 March 1957. Deferring to Macmillan, Ike suggested Bermuda as the setting for the conference. “The real breakthrough [in repairing the special relationship] came when Ike agreed to meet my grandfather on British soil,” Alexander Macmillan recalled. “He appreciated that very much; it showed that the wartime relationship [between Macmillan and Eisenhower] was still strong. That was a very big gesture by the American president at that point in time.”8 The Bermuda Conference occurred against the backdrop of the persistent suspicions which still existed between the two countries caused by the Suez crisis and its aftermath. Initially, Macmillan took the rhetorical offensive in his discussions with Eisenhower, held at the Mid-Ocean Club. According to Macmillan, the British felt “badly let down” by the Americans and their refusal to support Britain in the effort to remove Nasser from power.9 Macmillan compared Nasser to Benito Mussolini, who “started, in a way, as an Italian patriot” but “ended as Hitler’s stooge.”10 According to Macmillan, it was up to the British and the Americans to “get [Nasser] down – sooner or later.”11 Eisenhower and his advisers, chiefly Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, disagreed with Macmillan’s assessment of the problems in the Middle East. Since the Suez crisis, American foreign policy had shifted in the direction of support for King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia as a possible counterweight to

18 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Nasser’s influence in the region. Eisenhower and Dulles firmly opposed Macmillan’s suggestion of renewing the effort to undermine the Nasser regime. “Foster and I found it difficult to talk constructively with our British colleagues because of the blinding bitterness they felt toward Nasser,” Eisenhower recalled.12 As a result, the British and the Americans were unable to settle upon a common approach to the problems in the Middle East. On the issue of defense co-operation, however, both sides reached some rapid agreements. For reasons of economy, Macmillan wanted to reduce defense spending while, at the same time, maintaining Britain’s influence in world politics. Eisenhower wanted to extend America’s nuclear capability to Europe and thereby strengthen NATO’s military power. For Macmillan, the solution to his defense problem involved the addition of American missiles to the British nuclear deterrent. At Bermuda, Eisenhower and Macmillan agreed to grant to Britain 60 Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) as these weapons became available. Another year was to pass before the missiles began to be deployed, but the fact that both countries had entered into this strategic partnership in missile technology represented a significant milestone in the history of NATO.13 More important than the agreements and disagreements encountered by both sides at Bermuda was the fact was that Eisenhower and Macmillan managed to establish a strong personal rapport. Eisenhower “talked very freely to me – just exactly as in the old days [during World War II],” Macmillan wrote in his diary.14 For his part Eisenhower also considered the meetings highly successful, “aided in part, by the fact that Harold and I were old comrades.”15 The best evidence of the rekindling of the Eisenhower–Macmillan relationship was their agreement to begin a regular correspondence.16 By initiating this correspondence, and then obtaining Eisenhower’s agreement to it, Macmillan managed to insert himself into the foreign policy deliberations of the Eisenhower Administration – a considerable achievement by itself and an indication that Ike was willing to include the British in the major decisions which were about to be taken. Thus began the official Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence, and, as 1957 unfolded, the two leaders exchanged communications on a wide variety of matters, including their policy toward the Middle East, domestic politics in both Britain and the United States, and, occasionally, discussions of trade issues involving both countries. Following the Bermuda Conference, during the spring and summer of 1957, both the United States and Britain continued to watch events in the Middle East closely. However, potentially difficult situations in Jordan in April and in Oman in July and August were handled primarily by the British. In fact, with regard to an effort by rebels to unseat Britain’s ally, the Sultan of Muscat, Macmillan preferred to act unilaterally in support of Britain’s interests, and he even became somewhat chagrined when Secretary Dulles tried to intervene in the affair.17

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 19

By the end of the summer, however, the attention of the British and Americans turned to Syria where it appeared that pressure from both Nasser and the Soviet Union was transforming that country into a pro-Soviet satellite capable of undermining the pro-western governments of Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. The Eisenhower Administration and the Macmillan Government created a Syria Working Group, comprised of officials from both countries, to monitor their interests in the region. Through a combination of high-profile diplomatic visits to Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, combined with increased military assistance to these countries, the British and Americans had managed to defuse much of the worrisome situation in Syria by the end of September.18 In fact, some have recently argued that Macmillan and Eisenhower went to dangerous extremes in dealing with the perceived threat of the Soviet penetration of Syria. British researcher Matthew Jones has uncovered in the private papers of Duncan Sandys, minister of defence in the first Macmillan Government, a plan developed jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States and MI6 in Great Britain to destabilize the government of Syria in the autumn of 1957. The plan envisioned covert operations directed against the government of Syria, followed by an invasion by its pro-western neighbors Jordan and Iraq. In fact, so Jones has revealed, the plan was so secret that Macmillan refused to discuss it with Britain’s military leadership, since the chiefs might be inclined “to chatter” about it. The underlying purpose behind this activity was the effort by the British and Americans to remove three Syrians – Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, head of Syrian military intelligence; Afif al-Bizri, chief of the Syrian general staff; and Khalid Bakdash, leader of the Syrian Communist Party – from positions of authority and influence. However, this effort at “regime change” in Syria ultimately foundered on the reluctance of the governments of Jordan and Iraq to undertake military action against their neighbor.19 Both the United States and Great Britain soon faced another threat from the Soviets, however. On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union launched its Sputnik satellite into earth orbit, thereby shattering the widespread impression of American technological superiority. At this point the Eisenhower Administration came under widespread criticism from its political opposition and from the US press for allowing the Soviets to be the first nation to explore the frontiers of outer space. On 9 October, Eisenhower held a news conference in the course of which he sought to reassure the public about the strength of American technology, but the public still remained skeptical.20 Macmillan sensed Eisenhower’s vulnerability on Sputnik and saw an opportunity to strengthen Britain’s relationship with the administration. “What are we going to do about these Russians?” Macmillan inquired in a letter to Eisenhower on 10 October. “This artificial satellite has brought it home to us what a formidable people they are and what a menace they present to the free world.”21

20 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

When Eisenhower and Macmillan met in Washington between 23 and 25 October, the spectre of Soviet domination of outer space influenced the discussions in the same fashion as the Suez crisis had affected the Bermuda Conference in March. This time, however, the British and Americans were already disposed to treat each other well, the improvement in their attitudes helped considerably by the successful visit by Queen Elizabeth II to the United States earlier in the month. At the Washington Conference, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and their advisers agreed upon a “Declaration of Common Purpose,” in which each side recognized the interdependent nature of their relationship in confronting the communist threat. In practical terms, the Declaration of Common Purpose meant that Eisenhower assured Macmillan of his intention to seek Congressional approval for a revision of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, thereby opening the way for more sharing of information about nuclear weapons research with the British. The British and Americans also agreed to establish joint committees which were engaged in intelligence, military planning, and nuclear weapons development.22 One unintended consequence of the Washington Conference was the opportunity which Eisenhower and Macmillan had for discussions with Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian diplomat who was the Secretary-General of NATO. On 24 October, Macmillan proposed to make the forthcoming meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris a meeting of the heads of government, instead of the customary meetings consisting of consultations among cabinet-level officials. Initially skeptical about the idea, Spaak changed his mind when Eisenhower agreed to Macmillan’s suggestion and indicated a willingness to attend the NAC meeting in December. On 25 November, Ike’s plans to attend the NAC meeting were jeopardized when he suffered a slight stroke while eating lunch at his desk in the Oval Office. Ordered to bed immediately by his family and physicians, Ike was observed closely to see if his condition worsened. For the next week, Eisenhower experienced difficulty in identifying and pronouncing words correctly, and his close advisers began to wonder whether the president would regain sufficient strength to serve out his second term. When Macmillan learned of Eisenhower’s stroke, he immediately wrote to the president to express his concern. “Dear Friend, I have just heard the news of your illness,” Macmillan wrote. “I am indeed distressed and hope that you will make a very rapid recovery. Pray take care of yourself, for you are very precious to us all. We will do our best to carry on the good work that we began in Washington.”23 Within a week of suffering the stroke, Eisenhower had rallied sufficiently to return to his duties as president. On 30 November, he wrote to Macmillan, warmly thanking him for his expression of concern.24 Then, on 4 December, Ike wrote to Macmillan once again, confirming his intention to attend the NAC meeting in two weeks. Despite appeals not to undertake an arduous European trip, Eisenhower made it a personal challenge to attend the

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 21

meetings and thereby prove to himself that he was still able to discharge his presidential responsibilities.25 The main subject of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council involved the forward deployment of American IRBMs to NATO and the creation of a so-called atomic stockpile.26 On 19 December, the NATO Council approved the Norstad Plan, named after General Lauris Norstad, USAF, who served as SACEUR at the time. This plan called for a three-step process of strengthening NATO’s military capability, primarily through the introduction of American nuclear weaponry. In that fashion, NATO took a major step toward modernizing its military capability. As Macmillan said after the conference, “There is no division between NATO countries who approve the NATO rockets and those who disapprove, at least on ethical grounds.”27 By the end of 1957, Macmillan could view with satisfaction his efforts to re-establish a working diplomatic partnership with the United States. He had participated in three successful conferences with Eisenhower; he had obtained an agreement for the introduction of American IRBMs to Britain, thereby strengthening its independent nuclear deterrent while saving the British taxpayers enormous sums of money; and Britain was once again recognized as a major player in international relations. Just as important, he clearly had gained the trust and confidence of Dwight D. Eisenhower. After the NAC meeting, Ike wrote a complimentary letter to Macmillan, a message which conveyed his admiration. “Never have I experienced any greater degree of satisfaction in such conferences than in talks with you,” Eisenhower said. “Always your approach to any difficult task seems to be based on fact, logic, readiness to consider other viewpoints, and … a neverfailing friendliness.”28 Not that there were no payoffs for Eisenhower in the reconstituted relationship with the British under Macmillan’s leadership. With Macmillan in office, Eisenhower was back in his familiar position as the acknowledged “supreme commander,” in the diplomatic sense, of the world’s most important alliance. He was familiar with the important personalities, both military and diplomatic, on each side, and he was able to exercise the type of policy co-ordination that he relished. The situation was almost like that of Algiers in 1943 where Eisenhower orchestrated, directed, and co-ordinated a joint American–British effort. Having Macmillan in power placed Eisenhower in the comfortable position where American policy set the agenda for action and the British adapted accordingly. The tremendous military strength which the United States had built up during Eisenhower’s first term insured that America would dominate the Anglo-American alliance in the late 1950s and that the partnership would not be one of equals. Nevertheless, Eisenhower and Macmillan successfully placed a consultative process back into the relationship between both countries and laid the foundation for a more intimate co-ordination of policy which unfolded in the next three years.

22 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Notes 1. Alistair Horne, Macmillan, Vol. II: 1957–1986 (London: Macmillan, 1989), 15–16. 2. Harold Macmillan to Robert Menzies, 18 March 1957, The National Archives of the UK (NA): PRO, PREM 11/1836. 3. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 594–5. 4. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 680–1. See also Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 141. 5. Michael Foot, “Eisenhower and the British,” in Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose (eds), Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 53–4. 6. Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (New York: The Linden Press – Simon and Schuster, 1981), 425–6. 7. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 121–2; see also Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 240–1. 8. Alexander Macmillan, interview. 9. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 251–4. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. Harold Wilson, a leading member of the Labour Party, accused Macmillan of being “first in, first out” of Suez. See Alistair Horne, Macmillan, Vol I: 1894–1956 (London: Macmillan, 1988), 441. In his book, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 101, Nigel J. Ashton described Macmillan as “first in, first out” as chancellor but then “first back in” once he became prime minister. 12. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 122–5. 13. Horne, Macmillan, II, 27; Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 405. 14. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 250. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, of the type which Macmillan and Eisenhower discussed at Bermuda, were land-based with a range of 1,000 to 1,500 miles. 15. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 124–5. 16. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 258. 17. Ibid., 272. See also Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser, 123–4. 18. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser, 127–9. 19. Ben Fenton, “Macmillan backed Syria assassination plot,” The Guardian, 27 September 2003; www.guardian.co.uk. 20. Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century (New York: Walker, 2001), 119. 21. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 10 October 1957, EL, WFIS, Box 23. 22. Horne, Macmillan, II, 55–7. 23. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 26 November 1957, EL, WFIS, Box 23. 24. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 30 November 1957, EL, WFIS, Box 23. 25. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 4 December 1957, EL, WFIS, Box 23. See also Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 227. 26. Robert J. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960. Vol. IV: History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington: Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), 510–11. 27. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 338. 28. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 27 December 1957, PM’s Personal Telegrams, Macmillan Papers, c. 340, Bodleian Library, Oxford, UK.

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 23

1 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN January 10, 1957 Dear Harold: This morning, upon learning of your designation by Her Majesty as the new Prime Minister, I sent you a formal message of congratulations, the kind that is approved even by State Departments. The purpose of this note is to welcome you to your new headaches. Of course you have had your share in the past, but I assure you that the new ones will be to the old like a broken leg is to a scratched finger. The only real fun you will have is to see just how far you can keep on going with everybody chopping at you with every conceivable kind of weapon. Knowing you so long and well I predict that your journey will be a great one. But you must remember the old adage, “Now abideth faith, hope and charity – and greater than these is a sense of humor.” With warm regard, As ever, D.E.

2 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN January 12, 1957 I send my warmest congratulations to you on becoming Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Your distinguished career is well known on this side of the Atlantic, and has earned our widespread respect. My own warm admiration stems, as you know, from our association in North Africa and through the succeeding years. For me that association has been as agreeable as it has been productive. I feel confident you will bring to your new task the same vision, determination and sympathetic understanding you have shown in the past. For myself, and for the people of the United States, let me wish you every success in carrying out the great responsibilities which now devolve upon you as Prime Minister. Dwight D. Eisenhower

24 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

3 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 14, 1957 My dear Friend, Thank you for your kind message. I too have warm and vivid memories of the time when we worked together in North Africa, and of our association since then. You know how much importance I attach to the friendship between the peoples of Britain and the United States, not least because of my own personal links with your country. I look forward to working with you once again to further this friendship. With all good wishes, Harold Macmillan

4 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 16, 1957 Dear Friend, The message which you sent me through Winthrop [Aldrich] was warm enough not to merit the word “formal”. I am therefore the more grateful for your private letter of January 10 which I received today. I have no illusions about the headaches in store for me, but thirty-three years of parliamentary life have left me pretty tough, without, I hope, atrophying my sense of humour. I shall certainly need it in the months to come. With my sincerest good wishes, Yours ever Harold

5 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 23, 19571 My dear Friend, I was indeed glad to get the message which you sent to me through Winthrop last night and am very happy to agree to your suggestion that we

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 25

should meet together to talk over the whole range of our common problems. I was specially pleased at your proposal that we might meet in Bermuda, which I readily accept. This would have the great advantage that we should both be free to give our whole time to the talks without other pre-occupations. Your idea that you should see Monsieur Mollet2 separately and beforehand seems admirable. The date you suggested for our meeting appears at first sight to be about right. But may I reflect a little on this and other details and send you a considered reply in a few days time? With kind regards and all good wishes. Yours ever Harold 1

2

This letter was Macmillan’s response to a private message, circulated through diplomatic circles, from Eisenhower, suggesting a meeting between the two leaders and their foreign policy advisers. Macmillan interpreted Eisenhower’s letter as a gesture toward improving the strained relations between the United States and Great Britain after the Suez crisis. See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 240–1, and United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–57. Vol. XXVII: Western Europe and Canada. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 682. Guy Mollet was the premier of France.

6 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 25, 1957 My Dear Friend– I must tell you again how much encouragement I have got from your suggestion of a meeting so early in my tenure of my new responsibilities. I am so glad you like Bermuda. We shall there be unencumbered by speeches, dinners and all the rest of the paraphernalia of official visits. It will be fine to revive the atmosphere of the talks we had in old days before these immense burdens had descended on you, and now, to a lesser extent, on me. The dates you suggest will suit me very well – March 21st to 24th. This should give us at least two days, and perhaps nearly three, for discussion. We shall have to settle the range of subjects to be discussed. We might exchange a list of headings. I do not expect that either of us will want too many papers: what we want to do is to go over the canvas with a broad brush. But I certainly see this as an opportunity for joint decisions on broad issues of policy. The smaller and more intimate we can keep the party the more progress I think we shall make.

26 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

I hope you will feel able to make an early announcement. On the whole it seems to me that it would be best for you to announce simultaneously M. Mollet’s visit to Washington and our meeting in Bermuda. Will you let me know how all this strikes you and when you think it will be possible to make an announcement? There are a good many arrangements to be made, and I should like to get my people to work on them. Yours ever Harold

7 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 7, 1957 I am very glad to know that the place and date of our meeting are now finally settled. I feel sure that British people all over the world will deeply appreciate the gesture that you have made. As soon as the public announcement is out we will get on with the physical arrangements. I have been thinking about the agenda. It is very easy to construct a long list of subjects but we could hardly hope to get through it in three days if we are to reach useful conclusions. I have been wondering whether it might be divided into two. The first part could consist of items on which preliminary discussion could at once begin in Washington between the State Department and the Embassy with a view to presenting findings and recommendations for our approval at Bermuda. The second part would contain the big issues which we must tackle ourselves. I hope you will think this is the right sort of approach. If so, perhaps you will send a message to Harold Caccia, who will then discuss details with the State Department on those lines.1 Yours ever, Harold Macmillan

1

Harold Caccia was the British ambassador to the United States at the time. He assumed his post in November 1956 and became a key figure in British–American diplomacy during this period, serving as a conduit for messages between Macmillan and Eisenhower and also a participant in frequent consultations with both Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles.

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 27

8 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 10, 1957 I am glad that all the arrangements for the announcement of our meeting are now tied up. I should like you to know that since my last message to you I have heard from the Prime Minister of Canada that he would also like to have a talk with me at about that time. I have therefore suggested to him that he should come down to Bermuda on the afternoon of March 25, after your departure, for talks that evening and the next day. If Mr. [Louis] St. Laurent agrees to this suggestion I propose to announce it in the House of Commons at the same time as I inform the House of our meeting.1 1

Louis St. Laurent was the prime minister of Canada.

9 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 22, 1957 I feel I must send you my thoughts on the present critical situation. British public opinion is very much concerned over the latest developments. There is a very strong feeling among all parties that the settlement should be a fair one. You paid tribute to your British and French friends and allies “for the immense contribution which they made to world order” by their action in withdrawing their forces. But you went on to say that “this put other nations of the world under heavy obligation to see to it that these two nations do not suffer by reason of their compliance”.1 It is very true that we have taken great risks, both as regards the clearance of the Canal, a proper interim system and a final agreement. Of course we want the Israeli forces to be withdrawn so that all the efforts of the world can be directed to forcing Nasser to a reasonable settlement of the Canal in the short and in the long term. On the other hand, public opinion here will not allow us to do what they think is inequitable. In the case of Israel, most people here would think it reasonable that they should withdraw their forces from Gaza and Aqaba if there were a clear understanding that Egypt will not be allowed to continue to break international law or the Armistice Agreements.2 So far as Gaza is concerned,

28 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

this can best be guaranteed by the United Nations forces moving in immediately, and it should not be impossible to devise some arrangements for the civil administration. So far as the Gulf of Aqaba is concerned, which is vital to the life of Israel, it is not unnatural that the Israelis should be hesitant, since Egypt has been in default over the resolutions dealing with Israeli shipping in the Canal for many years without any real action being taken against her. As you suggested, I have strongly advised the Israel Government to make a move and not to be intransigeant. Of course I do not yet know the result. But I cannot believe that it is impossible to devise a formula which would enable them to act in accordance with the general interest. Broadly speaking it is simply a question of getting these two operations regarded as part of a single whole – in other words a combined operation. This can either be done by a suitable resolution of the United Nations or by a strengthening of your guarantee of the Aqaba Straits, to which other countries might well adhere, or perhaps by both methods. We are certainly willing to follow your lead. I hear that efforts are being made by several countries, and notably by Canada, to draft a resolution which would cover all these points. If their efforts are successful we shall give such a resolution all the support in our power, and I sincerely hope that you also will feel able to do so. I am sure that the attitude of the United States will be decisive. Harold Macmillan 1

2

Eisenhower gave a televised address on 20 February in which he urged the Israelis to accelerate their withdrawal from territories occupied during the fighting in the Suez crisis. Macmillan wanted Eisenhower to take a stronger position relative to Nasser and not to focus so much attention on the withdrawal of Israeli, British, and French forces. Gaza and Aqaba refer to two areas controlled by Israel following the acceptance of the UN ceasefire in the Middle East in 1956. For Macmillan’s extensive discussion of this problem, see Riding the Storm, 217–18.

10 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 23, 1957 Dear Harold: Thank you for your note. As I read it, I am impressed by a feeling that we are not far apart in our thinking. Certainly Foster [Dulles] and I have struggled to be fair and have done our utmost to assure the Israeli of the things

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 29

we would do and the support we would give as soon as they agreed to the major proposition of withdrawal. Of course any prediction as to the details of future United Nations action is largely guess work. I agree that as of this moment, a simple condemnation of Israel and vote of sanctions would be wrong. I think that a single Resolution could properly combine both withdrawal orders and important assurances to Israel along the lines of my address. But I suspect that things have gone far enough that no Resolution can command the required votes unless it also includes some intimation of consequences to Israel if she refuses to comply. We are anxious, in this as in all other important matters, that you and ourselves should stand together. I devoutly hope that we can work this one out. With warm regards, As ever

11 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 5, 1957 Dear Friend, When we first spoke on the telephone this evening I was not fully up to date on the position about our force reductions and I am therefore sending you this telegram because I do not wish you to be under any misapprehension, although I know that the Foreign Secretary has asked our Ambassador to explain our difficulties to Foster. I am up against a rigid time-table. I have to approve a Defence White Paper before I leave for Bermuda. The Budget must be prepared for early April. Therefore it is absolutely essential for us to know where we stand before Bermuda. Also we fear that if we now go slow in N.A.T.O. we shall give the impression that we are not serious and the whole operation may go sour on us. I fear therefore that we must press ahead and try to bring the N.A.T.O. discussions to a close at the end of this week or early next. We have made a great effort to meet General [Lauris] Norstad’s views by agreeing that only a half of our proposed reductions shall take place during the financial year, 1957/58, and that the second half will take place during the financial year, 1958/59.1 We have further agreed that of the 1957/58 reductions a major part will take place in the first quarter of 1958 rather than the last quarter of 1957. Norstad seems satisfied and by extending our reductions over a longer period I hope that we have done a lot to diminish the risks which you fear.

30 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

I earnestly hope that in these circumstances it will be possible for the United States Government at least not to query our proposals. I am sure that this will make all the difference to our chances of getting a quick and satisfactory conclusion on which our whole economy depends. We can only be good N.A.T.O. partners if we are financially sound. I shall, of course, be happy to discuss the implications of all this with you in Bermuda but in the meantime I must ask for your sympathy and help. Warm regards, Harold Macmillan 1

General Lauris Norstad was the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) at this time. The SACEUR was sometimes referred to as the NATO commander because of his authority over the combined air, land, and naval forces of the NATO alliance in Europe.

12 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 11, 1957 Dear Harold: In order to get two or three days in the sun, which the doctors advise me to do to get rid of my persistent cough, I am thinking of taking a sea voyage to Bermuda, starting three or four days ahead of time so as to proceed leisurely on a circuitous route leading through the warmer regions to the south of us. Would it cause you any inconvenience? It would mean that I would land at the seaport instead of the airfield, and I should like to know whether this would mean any considerable change in your plans. I would, of course, land at the same hour previously proposed for arrival by air. I would be grateful for an early reply. With warm regard.

13 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 11, 1957 My dear Friend, Your proposal to go by sea to Bermuda is of course entirely agreeable to me. I trust that a few days at sea will cure the cough. The minor adjustments

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 31

in the plans for your reception can be easily made without any inconvenience. I look forward very much to meeting you in a few days’ time. With warm regards, Harold Macmillan

14 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 22, 1957 Dear Mr. President We have been talking this afternoon about the need to adjust some of the load on the economy of the United Kingdom so as to make the best use of our resources. One of the ways in which the United Kingdom balance of payments can be strengthened is by the sale of British armaments to other countries. I understand that the Germans are at present contemplating buying our Centurion tanks, which are generally acknowledged to be a superlative weapon.1 It would be a great help to me if you could take an opportunity of encouraging the Germans to make this purchase from us, and so keep our productive capacity employed in winning foreign exchange. Yours sincerely Harold Macmillan 1

The Centurion was a tank manufactured by the British for its own defense forces as well as integration into the NATO defense structure. The Centurion was developed near the end of World War II and subsequently used in conflicts ranging from the Korean War to the Persian Gulf War.

15 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 22, 1957 Dear Mr. President At our talk this morning, you asked me to let you have notes on one or two of the subjects we mentioned. I now send you notes on the

32 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

following subjects: I. II. III. IV.

AQUATONE.1 Tripartite Alerts Procedure Nuclear Weapons for R.A.F. bombers Nuclear bomb release gear for R.A.F. bombers Yours very sincerely Harold Macmillan

I. AQUATONE At an earlier stage the United Kingdom Government felt unable to agree that bases in the United Kingdom should be used for operational flights for AQUATONE. The United Kingdom Government are now prepared to allow bases in the United Kingdom to be used for operations of this nature, if that would be of advantage to the United States Government.

II. TRIPARTITE ALERTS An effective machinery should be established for the rapid exchange of intelligence between the Governments of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom on any sudden threat of Soviet aggression against the NATO area. For this purpose a meeting between intelligence experts of the three Governments will be held in Washington immediately after the Bermuda Conference.

III. NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR R.A.F. BOMBERS The United Kingdom Government welcome the agreement to co-ordinate the strike plans of the United States and United Kingdom bomber forces, and to store United States nuclear weapons on R.A.F. airfields for release in an emergency. We understand that for the present at least these weapons will be in the kiloton range. The United Kingdom forces could obviously play a much more effective part in joint strikes if the United States weapons made available to them in emergency were in the megaton range, and it is suggested that this possibility might be examined at the appropriate time.

IV. NUCLEAR BOMB RELEASE GEAR FOR R.A.F. BOMBERS As part of the arrangements for making it possible for United Kingdom bombers to drop United States nuclear weapons in an emergency, R.A.F. Canberra bombers have been fitted with special release slips made in the

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 33

United States. Although this work has been treated with the utmost secrecy, Canberras with these fitments are now coming into squadron service, and the danger of a leakage of this news or of speculation is inevitably growing.2 The United Kingdom Government would prefer to forestall the risk of a leakage by making a public statement on the following lines: “The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom announced today that a programme directed towards adapting certain R.A.F. aircraft to carry United States atomic weapons is under way and is nearing completion. The programme has been undertaken under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and provides for aircraft modifications and the training of loading and delivery crews.” It is suggested that the possibility of releasing this news should now be re-examined. 1

2

AQUATONE refers to British participation in the development of the supersecret American aircraft, the U-2, which was used for aerial surveillance of the Soviet Union. At Bermuda, Macmillan indicated a willingness to resume British participation in AQUATONE after its suspension by the government of Anthony Eden. The Canberra was the British long-range bomber.

16 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN Bermuda, March 23, 1957 I have your memorandum dated March twenty-second to which there are four attachments dealing with the subjects of: I. II. III. IV.

AQUATONE Tripartite Alert Procedure Nuclear Weapons for R.A.F. bombers Nuclear bomb release gear for R.A.F. bombers

The first two items mentioned in the attachments are completely satisfactory to the United States Government, and I should like to add that we are pleased that you found your way clear to allow United Kingdom bases to be used for AQUATONE if it should at some time become necessary.

34 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

With respect to Item III, “Nuclear Weapons for R.A.F. bombers,” I have a couple of additions to the phraseology submitted, merely to make certain that the meaning of the paper conformed to the requirements of the United States law. The item as revised would read as follows: “The United Kingdom Government welcome the agreement to co-ordinate the strike plans of the United States and United Kingdom bomber forces, and to store United States nuclear weapons on R.A.F. airfields under United States custody for release subject to decision by the President in an emergency. We understand that for the present at least these weapons will be in the kiloton range. The United Kingdom forces could obviously play a much more effective part in joint strikes if the United States weapons made available to them in emergency were in the megaton range, and it is suggested that this possibility might be examined at the appropriate time.” With respect to Item IV, “Nuclear bomb release gear for R.A.F. bombers,” I agree of course that you shall probably have to make some statement in order to prevent speculation in the press that might prove not only inaccurate but damaging. However, as I explained to you verbally, the United States would prefer not to be a party to a public statement which might give rise to demands upon us by other governments where we should not be in a position to meet the requests. Consequently I suggest the possible adequacy of a unilateral statement by yourself or by the British Defense Minister to the effect that Canberras are now being equipped to carry atomic bombs. With warm regard,

17 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 23, 1957 Dear Mr. President You asked me yesterday to let you have a Memorandum about closer cooperation between the member countries of W.E.U. [Western European Union] over research, development and production of armaments.1 Here it is.2 I hope you will give it sympathetic consideration because I believe there is an opening here for constructive work which will help politically to unite Western Europe. Yours very sincerely Harold Macmillan

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 35 1

2

The Western European Union was formed in 1948. It was initially an association of five European countries, France, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, that wished to promote improved economic and defense relationships with each other. The WEU was expanded in 1955 to include the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Italy. Both Eisenhower and Macmillan supported the economic goals of the WEU but wished to safeguard information of a defense nature, involving strategic co-operation between the United States and Britain on nuclear weapons from the European members of the WEU The lengthy memorandum that Macmillan enclosed with this letter essentially stipulated that Great Britain proposed to cooperate with the WEU in areas of conventional forces but not in the nuclear realm.

18 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN Bermuda March 24, 1957 Dear Harold Before the American delegation assembles its cumbersome entourage and heads for Washington, I want to tell you once again what a great personal pleasure it has been to see you and to renew the ties of friendship that have bound us for so many years. These days here have been for me profitable and, because of our old and warm association, exceedingly pleasant. On behalf of the party with me, I want also to express the appreciation of all of us for the courtesies extended to us here. Everyone has been most thoughtful and kind, and my staff and the members of the State Department join me in thanks to each person who has contributed to our comfort. And, as always, it has been relaxing and pleasant to have even a few days on this delightful island. In this note, I shall not attempt to mention the official part of our talks – all that can come later. It has been wonderful to see you again. With the warm gratitude of each member of the American delegation, and personal regard to yourself, As ever DE

36 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

19 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER Bermuda March 24, 19571 My dear Friend– This is just a hurried line to thank you for your letter. It has touched me deeply – and given me great encouragement. Yours ever Harold Macmillan 1

Macmillan wrote this letter in longhand to Eisenhower.

20 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 25, 1957 Dear Harold The memorandum you gave me concerning cooperation within the Western European Union on research and development of armaments is being studied in the Defense Department and in the State Department. I have asked them to develop their views quickly, and I am hoping that you can have our reaction at an early date. With warm regard, As ever D.E.

21 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 25, 1957 Dear Harold Again I want to tell you of my warm thanks for the glass bowl that you had made to commemorate our recently concluded Bermuda Conference. It will serve to remind me most pleasantly of the informal and, to me, highly

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 37

profitable talks we had in the best possible surroundings. I am more than grateful for your thoughtfulness. Our flight back was comfortable and did not bother me in the slightest, but this morning the Washington weather is again exceedingly disagreeable. With my appreciation and best wishes to the members of the British Delegation who were with you in Bermuda and, as always, warm personal regard to yourself. As ever Ike

22 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 26, 1957 Dear Harold: Will you please have someone get for you immediately Drew Middleton’s article in Tuesday’s New York Times.1 The publication of this item disturbs me mightily, and of course I do not know what individual is responsible. Nevertheless, this leak creates doubt in my mind that we can talk frankly to each other in confidence on matters of import to us both. The publicizing and emphasizing of our intelligence ties makes it harder to maintain them, and perhaps the projected [Sir Patrick] Dean visit should be postponed a little.2 What do you think? Dwight D. Eisenhower

1

2

Drew Middleton was a respected reporter for the New York Times who specialized in military affairs and defense policy. At this time, he was the author of two books, The Defense of Western Europe (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952) and Our Share of Night: A Personal Narrative of the War Years (New York: Viking, 1946). Sir Patrick Dean, referred to in Eisenhower’s message, was an official in the British Foreign Office who advised both Selwyn Lloyd and Harold Macmillan. During the Bermuda Conference, Dean met in Washington with Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s staff secretary and de facto adviser on political and military issues. Letter, Andrew J. Goodpaster to Bruce Geelhoed, 2 July 2002, in editors’ possession.

38 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

23 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 26, 1957 Dear Harold I enclose herewith a copy of the article to which I referred today in my cable, sent to you at Bermuda. I likewise send a copy of that cable. The part of the article that disturbs me so deeply appears in the first two columns. Here is practically a verbatim account of the detailed incidents and events surrounding the elimination of the words “intelligence and planning” from the draft of the communiqué. The writer, of course, did not know the background that led to the original suggestion, that is, your thought that Canada, yourselves and ourselves should coordinate our efforts to detect any hostile move on the part of the Russians in periods of tension. Of course the writer himself proves that he did not have the good of either your country or ours in mind in writing the article because he gives the logical reason for its elimination in the two sentences “The announcement was eliminated from the final draft of the document by Secretary of State Dulles. It is understood Mr. Dulles felt this evidence of a more intimate British–United States relationship would offend other allies of the United States, notably France.” In other words, he cared nothing for the soundness of the national reasons, only for a story. This article came out this morning, after Foster and I had held a meeting with our Congressional leaders last evening in which we outlined the general character of our talks, carefully avoiding, however, operational or planning details which could, if publicized, cause embarrassment to either or both of us. Nevertheless we made the truthful assertion that no “secret agreements” were arrived at. This morning some of them may be wondering! I am sure, of course, that you share my disappointment at such an occurrence, with its implication that even the members of such friendly governments as yours and ours cannot talk frankly and freely with one another without the danger of serious leaks to the public press. I earnestly hope that both of us may be successful in preventing things like this in the future so that there may be no interruption of the close communion and coordination that we consider so important to our future security and welfare. With warm personal regard, As ever, DE

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 39

24 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER Mar. 27, 1957 Dear Mr. President, Your message about the article in the New York Times was handed to me just as I boarded my aircraft to leave Bermuda. I have not yet seen the article, but such enquiries as I was able to make during my flight seem to show that any leak did not come from British sources. I am going into the matter fully, and you will no doubt also be having enquiries made. I will write to you again as soon as possible. Yours ever, Harold

25 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 29, 1957 Dear Harold I have noted with great interest your decision to release Archbishop Makarios.1 I know that this entailed great difficulty for you. I earnestly hope that his release will bring about a substantial improvement in the atmosphere relating to Cyprus, with greater prospects for a satisfactory settlement of this problem. I want you to know that we will do all we can to encourage others concerned to approach the matter in a constructive and conciliatory manner so that the opportunities afforded by this action on your part will not be lost. With kind regard, Sincerely, D.E. 1

Archbishop Makarios was the leader of the Greek Cypriots in Cyprus. Since his years as foreign secretary in the Eden Government, Macmillan had wrestled with the problem of Cyprus and, particularly, how to preserve Britain’s strategic interest in the island while putting an end to the terrorism directed against the British and the internecine violence between the Greek and Turkish factions in Cyprus. Eisenhower and Macmillan had discussed the British difficulties in Cyprus at their meetings at Bermuda. In releasing Makarios, Macmillan was pursuing a course favored by the United States.

40 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

26 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 29, 1957 Dear Mr. President, I have now seen Middleton’s article in the New York Times of March 26. I deplore particularly the reference to the drafting of the communiqué. You will remember that we were as anxious as you were that nothing should be said publicly to suggest that special bi-lateral machinery was being set up for intelligence and planning. I have made very full enquiries about this. I find that, although Middleton’s article is dated March 25 (Monday), mention of secret agreements and joint planning machinery was current among press correspondents in Bermuda on the previous Saturday evening and Sunday. My public relations people were approached by correspondents about these points after you had all left for Washington. I am satisfied that they were careful to avoid corroborating them in any way. Indeed they did all they could to deny them. Selwyn did see Middleton and another United States correspondent for an off-the-record talk on Sunday afternoon, but he tells me that he stuck closely to the words (of which he had a full note) used by Foster in his admirable talk to British correspondents earlier in the day. Much of course of the article could be based on intelligent guess-work. For it was known that our officials had worked together before the Conference on the preparation of joint documents and so on, and equally our common desire to re-establish the relationship of our war-time co-operation became evident in the course of our meetings. But I fear that some additional information seems to have leaked out. All I can say is that I can find nothing to suggest that this was the fault of any member of the United Kingdom delegation. I should add that, when we learned that this story was current, we took steps to warn our press people in Washington to deny it and we have done our best to get responsible newspapers here to publish corrective material. I would particularly like you to see the article in today’s Times. I dislike publicity as much as you do. I hate newspapers and am very bad at handling them, and I remember your saying that you never read them. This modern technique of doing everything in public makes our life almost intolerable. For my part, I would certainly be relieved if our meetings in the future could be on a quite different basis – that they should be more personal, with a very limited number of advisers, and with no publicity at all. But I do hope that the embarrassment of this article, will not make us lose faith in the need for us to talk frankly and with confidence to each other.

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 41

Since Dean is already in Washington, I hope that his programme can go ahead as planned. Yours ever, Harold P.S. Anyway, if we write to each other, nobody need read our letters.

27 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 29, 1957 Dear Harold: As I should have told you before, I initiated immediately upon the appearance of the Middleton story the same kind of inquiry here as you did in Bermuda and with the same negative results. I believe with you that we should drop the matter and give our attention to the future, as you suggest in your last paragraph where you say “the embarrassment of this article will not make us lose faith in the need for us to talk frankly and with confidence to each other.” With warm personal regard, As ever, DE

28 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 31, 1957 Dear Friend, Thank you for your letter about Archbishop Makarios. As you say, this was a difficult decision for us and you will have seen that it was not taken without loss to the Government. I do not believe that the Archbishop has changed his views in the Seychelles; he is the Bourbon of Cyprus. But events in the island and in the world are surging past him. [Sir John] Harding has beaten terrorism militarily, and the world now recognises that Cyprus is an international problem.1 I am sure that your aid in persuading all concerned to face reality could be of decisive help. Of course my right-wing assume that we released the

42 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Archbishop at your request, so private pressure by you would be better than public statements. Warm regards, as ever, HAROLD MACMILLAN. 1

Field Marshal Sir John Harding was the governor of Cyprus.

29 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 2, 1957 Dear Harold Thank you for your letter of March twenty-third enclosing a memorandum concerning cooperation within the Western European Union in armaments research, development and production. As I indicated when we discussed this subject at Bermuda, we recognize the political considerations underlying your interest in strengthening WEU, and the economic and military benefits which might be derived from a cooperative effort within WEU with respect to the research, development and production of armaments. I am generally sympathetic to the broad purpose which your Government has in mind. There are of course several important practical considerations which must be taken into account and which I am sure you fully appreciate. These considerations arise from the necessity of maintaining essential safeguards on the security of military information and of protecting the proprietary rights of United States citizens and business concerns with respect to items of military equipment or technical information which might be involved. As I believe the memorandum attached to your letter recognizes, the question of your making available to other WEU countries armaments information containing data restricted by security agreements between the United Kingdom and the United States, or among the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, will in the final analysis have to be looked at on a case-bycase basis. Therefore, I think that the only general statement that can usefully be made at the present time in response to your question (a) is that we will give such case-by-case requests our most prompt and careful consideration. With respect to your question (b), I think it is implicit that, within the arrangements already in effect, including the security agreements, and within the procedure under which our two Governments would examine items which you may wish to release to WEU countries, there would be no prejudice to existing United States–United Kingdom cooperation.

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 43

It is my understanding that NATO would be kept informed of this coordination within WEU and that the arrangements contemplated in your memorandum would be without prejudice to comparable arrangements for exchange of information in the NATO forum. I concur in the suggestion that specific lists of projects which you wish to discuss with us be communicated to the Department of State through normal diplomatic channels. The Departments of State and Defense can then give the matter their attention. With warm regard, As ever DE

30 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 9, 1957 Dear Harold On my way back from Bermuda, I searched my mind for something that I could send to you to commemorate our Conference there, and finally, with complete lack of originality, fell back upon a piece of glass. Soon after this letter reaches you, a Steuben urn will arrive. It brings you once again my warm thanks for your hospitality. With personal regard, As ever DE

31 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 15, 1957 My dear Friend Since we parted in Bermuda you have sent me several letters and I feel I now owe you one. You remember that you said that you would like to hear from me from time to time, not on some specific problem but just about things in general. I am hoping to get a few days holiday at Easter, so I thought I would try to send you a short letter before leaving.

44 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Since I got back I am happy to say that the strikes in the engineering and shipbuilding industries have been called off.1 But the position is not very healthy and there are some rather bad forces at work. However, I hope that we can avoid further trouble and that the general atmosphere will improve. To be quite frank, I think there has been a bit of politics mixed up in this. The new Defence paper has gone very well. I have done my best to persuade our friends in NATO that our object is two-fold. It is not simply a matter of saving money, manpower, resources – although you know how important this is for us. I remember my talking to George Humphrey about this in Paris and he agreed that our best contribution was to be solvent as well as militarily strong.2 But I think that if we can get back in a few years time to regular forces – what you would call “the career man”, we shall have a very fine contribution to NATO, far better than we have now with this continual movement in and out, and so many of our trained officers and N.C.O.s [non-commissioned officers] engaged in teaching. We are also fighting the battle of the nuclear deterrent and we are determined to see that our forces shall be armed with the best weapons. Here your help over Corporal for the tactical weapon and over the rockets for the strategic is tremendously appreciated.3 Don’t take any notice of the foolish people who talk about our humiliation because we have drawn upon your generosity and the work of your technicians. All this talk comes from the folk who would like everybody to be humiliated. I do not know whether you have any fellow-travellers still. We have a few here. You used to call them in Algiers “the long haired starry eyed boys”.4 Some of ours are a survival of the old pacifist tradition, and to that extent I respect their opinions; Quakerism for instance is a very honourable creed. But I am afraid that others are rather more sinister and hang about the Soviet Embassy more than I would wish. However, they do not amount to much and we shall be all right on all this. It was a great grief that Bobbety Salisbury5 felt unable to agree to let out Archbishop Makarios. I am bound to say I don’t much like letting him out, and he will be a great nuisance when he gets to Athens, and still more when he comes to London. I expect he will turn up in New York and Washington too. But I don’t quite see how we could have kept him in Seychelles indefinitely, and the break in the EOKA morale seemed a very good moment to throw this fish back in the sea.6 As for the long term solution of Cyprus, we are working hard on this, but it is not easy to find just the right thing to do. However I am quite hopeful that we shall be able to have a definite plan and I would like to write to you about it as soon as I can. In general our economy has survived Suez and the other troubles with extraordinary resilience. We were grateful for all the help we have had in the fuel-oil sphere from the United States. It has been a splendid example of joint planning.

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We have got a good Budget with some remission of taxation, modest but encouraging. We have got good exports and the only thing that worries me is this perpetual battle against the inflationary wage-price spiral. It is one of the penalties of full employment, for it gives tremendous power to the Unions. I know how glad you will be to see that Anthony has stood the operation very well.7 I spoke to him just before it and he seemed in good heart. When I took his job on I knew it would be pretty tricky with lots of hurdles ahead, rather like our Grand National Steeplechase. We have managed to scramble over the first hurdles well enough, but now we are approaching what I call the water jump i.e. the Canal. I do not honestly think that we can make a very glorious showing over this. Indeed we may well fall in; but I think we can pull the horse out all right on the other side, struggle somehow into the saddle, and ride on. This leads me to say how grateful we all are for the really close consultation and co-operation which has been re-established between Foster and his people and Harold Caccia and our Foreign Office. This has worked very well during these rather anxious days. As I told you frankly at Bermuda I think our public realise that they will be rather humiliated over this. The only thing is to tell them the facts, however unpalatable, and to make them realise that if we may have to eat a bit of dirt in the short term, there is still the long term to come. I feel more and more convinced that Nasser and his regime are leading that country and the whole Middle East to disaster and there will be no peace until that system falls. It was the same thing with Mussolini. These people start off with good intentions and mean to help their countries; but after the first few months or years they fall into all the temptations of dictatorship. It makes one realise that our democratic processes, although always tedious and sometimes somewhat absurd, are really the best thing after all. I do hope that you are feeling better and that your cough has gone. What I would like most of all would be if you could pay us a visit here, and have a private holiday in your own home in Scotland. Would this ever be possible? I am pretty well but looking forward to a few days’ rest at Easter. Ever yours Harold Macmillan

1

Negotiations between the government, labor, and management to avert a strike in the industries mentioned by Macmillan reached serious proportions early in 1957. Finally, at the beginning of April, an agreement was reached between the parties which averted a strike. According to Macmillan’s biographer Alistair Horne, Macmillan was so concerned about the effects of labor unrest in Britain that he

46 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

2

3

4

5

6

7

contemplated calling off his visit to Bermuda to meet with Eisenhower. See Horne, Macmillan, II, 65–6. George M. Humphrey was secretary of the treasury in the Eisenhower Administration from 1953 to 1957. The Corporal was an American surface-to-surface missile under the command and control of the United States Army. It had a nuclear capability. Macmillan’s reference to the “long haired starry-eyed boys” was a reminder of his first meeting with Eisenhower on 1 January 1943 in Algiers, during the North African campaign in World War II. Prime Minister Winston Churchill had appointed Macmillan as Minister Resident in North Africa, his personal representative to Eisenhower. In the early stages of the North African campaign, Eisenhower had allowed Admiral François Darlan, the Vichyite collaborationist, to maintain control of French forces in North Africa. Liberal writers and reporters, as well as diplomatic officials, in both the United States and Great Britain, criticized Eisenhower for his treatment of Darlan. In his first conversation with Macmillan, Eisenhower expressed considerable frustration over this criticism. “I don’t know why these long haired starry eyed guys keep gunning for me,” he complained. Macmillan deserved to be complimented for the acuity of his memory in recounting this episode but his comparisons of the left-wing critics of the British–American alliance in the 1950s did not bear much resemblance to the liberal critics of the “Darlan deal” in 1943. See Macmillan, The Blast of War, 173–4. Bobbety Salisbury was Lord Robert Salisbury, leader of the House of Lords, who resigned from Macmillan’s Cabinet when the prime minister released Archbishop Makarios from confinement at British hands in the Seychelles islands. The EOKA was a Cypriot guerrilla organization. The letters stand for the words Ethniki Organosis Kypriot Agoniston, or National Organization of Cypriot Fighters. Anthony Eden, Macmillan’s predecessor as Britain’s prime minister, underwent surgery in Boston on 9 April 1957, a medical procedure which helped restore him to better health.

32 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 15, 1957 Dear Friend Just after I had sent off my letter to you about our affairs here at home, your Ambassador called to see me bringing with him a vast box which I unpacked with mounting excitement. When all the wrappings had been removed, I found a really magnificent vase. My wife joins with me in thanking you for this really splendid memento of our meeting. It will occupy a proud position in our dining-room. Ever yours Harold Macmillan

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 47

33 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 15, 1957 Dear Harold During our conversations at Bermuda, I assured you that we would continue to support in every appropriate way the purchase by Germany of Centurion tanks, which, as you know, is a policy we have long pursued. We have recently received definite indications, following the recent exhaustive military tests of the Centurion, and the US models M-47 and M-48, that a German decision to purchase the model M-48 is probable.1 Such a situation has long been recognized as a possibility, as I pointed out to Anthony Eden in my letter of last September. In the circumstances, if the Germans do request the opportunity to purchase a specific number of our tanks which are clearly available to meet their requirements, it would be extremely difficult to refuse to sell them. A flat refusal to sell these tanks would most certainly expose us to German charges of lack of cooperation in assisting the Germans in meeting their NATO commitments. Pending notification of a firm governmental decision by Germany, we shall continue to avoid urging the purchase of our equipment. Considering your lower price and long-range logistical convenience, it seems to me that the German government may decide to procure all or part of its needs from the United Kingdom. I hope so. With warm regard As ever 1

The American M-48 tank was the most recent tank produced by the United States at the time of this letter. It was first introduced into combat in 1953 during the Korean War but was later used in the Vietnam conflict. As Eisenhower implies in this letter, the M-48 was popular with foreign governments which chose to purchase it for their arsenals.

34 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 26, 1957 My dear Friend, As you will have seen from the press, I received an enormous letter from Bulganin at the end of last week.1 Here is a translation. So far I am only

48 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

sending a more or less formal acknowledgement, and to be quite frank, I am not quite sure what to do next. I would very much value any observations that you might have on what I can do about it. As you know, I am going to Bonn at the end of next week, so I will have a chance of talking this over with Chancellor [Konrad] Adenauer before I send a substantive reply.2 I am sending him a copy of Bulganin’s letter, and I am also asking for the views of Monsieur Mollet, the French Prime Minister. Since it seems that I have been singled out for this honour I feel a considerable responsibility about it all. It is not quite clear yet what hand the Russians are playing and what cards we should play ourselves. We are trying to puzzle it out, but you know me well enough to realise that I would not act without the closest consultation with my friends. Yours ever Harold Macmillan P.S. You may get a letter of your own from Bulganin; in which case I hope you will let me know. 1

2

Nikolai Bulganin was chairman of the Council of Ministers in the Soviet Union. He wrote a lengthy letter to Macmillan on 20 April 1957 where he advocated unilateral disarmament and a host of other proposals. Konrad Adenauer was the chancellor of West Germany.

35 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 27, 1957 Dear Mr. President Thank you for your letter about co-operation within the Western European Union in research, development and the production of armaments. I am glad to have your sympathy and support for what we are trying to do. We are very conscious of the practical considerations mentioned in the third paragraph of your letter and shall continue to be most careful to safeguard the security of military information and to protect proprietary rights. We have already sent to the State Department through Sir Harold Caccia a list of items which we should like to put forward for discussion. We shall, of course, be very glad to supply such further information as your experts may need. I hope however that it will not be necessary to become involved in too much detail. It is our intention to keep NATO informed of anything we do in W.E.U. and these arrangements will be without prejudice to comparable arrangements in NATO.

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 49

I am grateful for your assurances that individual cases will be promptly dealt with and that our proposals for co-operation in W.E.U. will not prejudice in any way the existing co-operation between the United States and the United Kingdom. Yours very sincerely Harold Macmillan

36 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN Augusta, Georgia April 28, 1957 Dear Harold Your letter of some ten days ago was filled with interest for me. I follow reports of your government’s activities and progress almost as intensely as I do our own. As you know, I have agreed that you were wise in making important technical changes in the character of your military forces; my only fear was that populations at large, particularly in Europe, would erroneously regard some of the consequences as indicative of British loss of interest in NATO and find in it an excuse for doing less, themselves, in the anti-Communistic effort. So far as the Canal is concerned, I agree with you that there is in sight no completely satisfactory solution. From the beginning that has seemed to me to be an ill-starred affair, and I did my very best to keep it from developing as it did. But we have done everything, as we agreed at Bermuda, to obtain the best possible “interim” agreement. If, in the Mid-East, one could completely separate the problems of the Canal from the age-old Israel–Arab dispute and deal with each of these individually, I am certain that we could reach a satisfactory arrangement in the lesser one, and make considerable progress toward improving the chronic one. To believe that such might happen soon is, of course, nothing but wishful thinking. In spite of this, I remain confident that we shall eventually secure a fairly satisfactory Canal agreement, if we can live with some patience with the interim arrangement. To look forward with confidence to such a result it is necessary that we improve and solidify the Western position – specifically yours and ours – in the whole Mid East area. Right now the young King of Jordan seems to be waging a gallant fight to eject subversive elements from his government and country.1 Of course

50 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

whatever support he gets from the West must be carefully handled because he could be ruined if his enemies falsely spread abroad the charge that he is acting as a puppet. He seems to be a courageous young man and I am sure that if he succeeds in establishing a stable government in that country, completely independent of Communistic domination, the position of the West will be immeasurably strengthened. Incidentally, I’ve often wondered why Western propaganda does not refer, constantly to our Mid East enemies in terms that are truthfully descriptive, that is, as puppets of the Kremlin. In Syria, there is another internal struggle for power. If, in both of these countries, the spirit of freedom and independence could be successful, we should have a very great start on solving, in accordance with right and justice, the problems that plague us in the region. I know that Foster is working closely with Harold Caccia and your Foreign Office people in all these matters. The Vice President’s recent trip to most of the North African countries proved to be very informative.2 He found a great reservoir of good will toward the West, but he concluded that a modest amount of technical and economic aid was badly needed in each of the countries visited. He feels that if the West does not find ways of supplying some of this help, these countries will be forced to turn to the Soviets. That would be tragic. The Vice President is convinced that we have a need for a better relationship between the French and some of the North African regions and that we must help achieve this relationship without hurting the interests of either. This will mean walking a tight rope, but, again, I think we can pull through if we work together – and do not expect the impossible. It seems clear that several of these countries are growing fearful of Egypt’s influence among their populations and are searching for ways and means to combat that influence which, they rightly believe, is inspired by the Soviets. I share your disappointment that Lord Salisbury resigned because of the release of Makarios. While I think that the latter is far from a statesman and can probably stir up quite a bit of mischief, still I think that Britain, as a great country, is in better position in the matter than she was with him as a prisoner. Certainly you have taken away from demagogues one of their chief arguments against you. I have heard that one of our ambitious governors has invited the Archbishop to come to this country.3 One is frequently tempted to ask “How stupid can you get?” To conclude – I hope that Lord Salisbury comes back into the fold. I am delighted that Anthony is successfully through his operation. Foster had asked to see him in Boston on his own and my behalf. But apparently he is forbidden to have visitors before he leaves for Canada. Please write to me whenever the spirit moves you. I am sending this from Georgia, where I am spending a few days. I should like to call it a vacation,

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 51

but I am frequently reminded that a man cannot take vacation from his own thoughts. With warm regard, As ever DE

1 2

3

The “young King of Jordan” to whom Eisenhower referred was King Hussein. Vice President Richard M. Nixon made a journey to Africa which lasted from 28 February to 21 March 1957. He visited the nations of Ghana, Liberia, Ethiopia, Morocco, Uganda, Libya, Tunisia, and the Sudan. He also made a visit to Italy on this journey. Averell Harriman, the governor of New York, extended the invitation to Archbiship Makarios to visit his state. See Louis Galambos and Daun van Ee (eds), The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The Presidency: Keeping the Peace. XVIII (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 169. This volume of the Eisenhower Papers also includes numerous letters written by Eisenhower to Macmillan in the period from 23 February 1957 to 6 January 1958.

37 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 10, 1957 Dear Harold I have read with the greatest interest your letter of April twenty-sixth and its voluminous enclosure containing Bulganin’s views on a wide variety of subjects. I fully understand your feeling that you bear a considerable responsibility in framing a substantive reply and appreciate your thoughtfulness in giving me an opportunity to comment. The letter seems to me to combine several purposes in a skillful manner. Obviously it is a part of the current Soviet effort to stir up issues which will tend to lead people to forget, if not forgive, their actions in Hungary. They would probably like their foreign relations to resume the earlier lines resulting from the liberalizing aspects laid down at the Party Congress last year. The conciliatory tone is well adapted to carry out this purpose. They would of course like to put the Western alliance in the awkward position of appearing to reject genuine efforts to improve the situation. Second, there is the clear effort to establish a special position in relation to the United Kingdom, such as they periodically seek with the United States. The references to trade, the favorable comments on force reduction and on Britain’s position generally are all calculated to have this effect.

52 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

There may, however, be a third aspect. In the context of their other recent actions in the Disarmament Committee and elsewhere, the letter seems to betray a genuine concern about the nuclear situation.1 There is reason to believe that they probably are worried by the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons around their borders, the coming of ballistic missiles, the possibility of German and other forces having nuclear weapons, and the recognition of the inherent instability in the satellites and East Germany. In addition there are signs that the burden of their military forces is weighing heavily on them. Thus there may be a chance that they are thinking in serious terms about ways in which some of these trends might be dealt with or revised. Their first effort is naturally the negative one reflected in the notes to Denmark, Norway and Germany, and the other propaganda moves. And their note to you, while less threatening, does not suggest any immediate readiness to make major concessions in order to obtain relief from the concerns they may have. I suggest that it might be helpful if your reply took account of these various themes in the Soviet note. Perhaps it could include a reasoned explanation of the British and Western point of view on the principal issues raised in his letter. Of course it should correct some of the misstatements and allegations in the letter but could, perhaps, avoid the tone of a purely debating reply. It might point out the avenues for real progress toward correcting the present situation. Specifically, in regard to the Middle East, you might recall that in the talks with Bulganin and [Nikita] Khrushchev in London the United Kingdom made very clear its vital interest in the Middle East and that the Soviets had nonetheless gone ahead to stir up trouble and create friction in ways not compatible with the sweet friendliness they now profess.2 Similarly in regard to control of nuclear weapons, you might point out the persistent Soviet refusal to talk seriously about methods of control and safeguards. Also I urge you consider whether it is not essential to stress the consequences of Soviet refusal to unify Germany and to relax their control of the satellites. Surely, this is the most explosive situation of all. Finally, I think it worth while to point out that the West is united in its basic policies and for collective security and that efforts to split off one or another country are not the fruitful way to improve conditions. In short, it seems to me that over all the reply could usefully give the impression that the West is prepared to talk seriously of resolving the existing sources of tension and instability whenever the Soviets are ready to consider seriously the revisions of their policy which this would entail. We are not asking for unconditional surrender or the sacrifice of legitimate Soviet interests and we share their concern regarding the nuclear problem and some of the areas of instability. But they will have to raise their bid if progress is to be made. A few more detailed suggestions are in the enclosed memorandum prepared by the State Department.3

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Again, let me express my appreciation to you for giving me this opportunity to comment on your letter from Bulganin. Foster and I stand at your disposal in case we can be of further assistance to you in this matter. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

2

3

The reference to the Disarmament Committee involved the Disarmament Subcommittee of the United Nations Commission on Disarmament, then at work in the UN. Nikita Khrushchev was the chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. By this point, it was clear that he, rather than Bulganin, was the most powerful leader in the Soviet hierarchy. The memorandum prepared by the State Department, entitled “SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE BULGANIN LETTER,” contained eight points which dealt with various topics including disarmament, European security, the Middle East, and international trade.

38 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 17, 1957 My dear Friend, I am very grateful for your reply of May 10 about the Bulganin letter. Now that our bomb has gone off, and our debate has gone off – both satisfactorily from the Government’s point of view – I must get down to the job of working out the best answer.1 Your many comments will be of the greatest help. You will easily realise that the decision to allow our ships to use the Suez Canal again was by no means easy to carry through. As I said in Bermuda, it would be wrong to pretend that this unsatisfactory interim arrangement is a good one. I have tried to make it clear that we accept the terms of the Egyptian unilateral declaration only under protest and with the reservation of all our rights. Now we have to work for a satisfactory permanent arrangement for the Canal and for a solution of the wider Middle East question. But I hope to write further to you about all this a little later on. Yours ever sincerely, Harold Macmillan 1

Macmillan’s reference to “our bomb has gone off” involved the British Government’s successful test of its hydrogen bomb at Christmas Island on 15 May 1957.

54 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

39 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 17, 1957 My dear Friend– I thought that you might like to have the enclosed copy of a letter that I have sent to Dr. Adenauer, following the recent visit which Selwyn and I made to Bonn.1 As regards the tanks, I fear that the Germans may have reached a final decision to buy M.48s. I know how keen the professional military people are on their own weapons, but in fact these decisions are of first political importance for us and the rest of Europe. Both for the sake of European co-operation, and in order to lessen the need for dollar end-item aid, it is most desirable that some of these defence requirements should be supplied by Britain. I think you would probably agree with this. I thought you would like to see my letter to Dr. Adenauer, since this emphasises that these considerations apply particularly to aircraft, and to radar and missiles. Ever yours Harold Macmillan 1

Macmillan and Selwyn Lloyd visited Adenauer in Bonn, the capital of West Germany, on 7–8 May 1957. See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 291–5.

40 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 17, 1957 Dear Harold: Foster has just been talking to me about the China trade situation and the message which he is sending to Selwyn Lloyd in reply to Selwyn’s memorandum which he gave to Jock Whitney on the evening of May 13th.1 Our military advisers are strongly of the opinion that many of the items which you would take off the China list will in fact appreciably help the Chinese Communists to build up the military potential which threatens us in this area and which we have the primary responsibility to resist. Our Congress, although less well informed on the technical details, feels strongly on this issue. As Foster is saying to Selwyn we do not feel confident that increasing the list will really help your trade very much. May it not mean

1957: Repairing the Special Relationship 55

merely that China’s trade with you will consist of the more strategic rather than the less strategic items? We are, however, giving some new discretion to our representatives in Paris and hope very much that you will try to meet us as it would be unfortunate in many respects if we should split publicly on this issue. Faithfully yours, 1

John Hay (Jock) Whitney, publisher of the New York Herald Tribune, succeeded Winthrop Aldrich as the American ambassador to the United Kingdom in February 1957. Lloyd had explained that the British could not support the American position on the retention of certain controls in trade with Communist Bloc countries, including the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XVIII, 204–5.

41 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 21, 1957 Dear Friend, I have thought a great deal about your message to me of the 18th of May.1 Of course I always want to work in the closest harmony with you. But this Chinese business has become almost as much an obsession with us as it appears to be with your Congress. Quite between ourselves as old friends I do not think there is much in it. You say that if we get what we want the Chinese will only switch their trade from one item to another. That may very likely prove true but traders never think like that. Each individual firm and industry believes that it can increase its own sales, and of course in our country, which only lives by exports, this is quite an important factor. If there is any chance of a compromise that gives us the substance of what we want and you something to argue with Congress, then of course we will accept it. You will say that this is not much of a compromise, but that is the way of the world. Frankly I would much rather have an agreement with you than a disagreement. But if, as I assume, we cannot get a compromise of this kind, I am very sorry to tell you that I shall have to stick to the line shared by that large number of countries, including the great majority in Europe, who want to bring the Russian and Chinese List together. I feel that this is not really a great issue compared to the immense problems that you and I have to face. It is just a matter of handling our people. It is very hard to persuade the English that the Chinese are more dangerous than the Russians but I realise that the reverse is the case with your people.

56 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

I feel sure that it may be better to get this difference settled rather than let it go on and poison our relations. We have so many problems much more important than this which we have got to face together. As ever, Harold 1

Refers to Eisenhower’s letter of May 17.

42 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 24, 1957 Dear Harold I have been trying to follow in a general way negotiations going on between the several countries on the Russian–Chinese trade differential. As an individual I agree with you that there is very little of profit in the matter either for your country or for any other. Commercially, it affects this nation not at all, for the simple reason that we have a total embargo on Chinese trade. However, many of our people think that the free nations could make a terrific psychological blunder in this matter and possibly even lose all the areas of the Southeast that have strong Chinese minorities. We understand your predicament and even though we may be compelled, in the final result, to differ sharply in our official positions, I think that each of our Governments should strive to prevent the possible popular conclusion in its own country that we are committed to going “separate ways.” Regarding the German tank purchase, I am extremely disappointed if that Government has finally decided on our Model 48. This is not merely because I know of your great need for exports; mine is a more military conviction based upon experience in World War II. The free world simply must have more than one major source of ordnance supply. Peacetime sales and purchases should reflect this need. I should like to see more countries arming themselves with their own or your hardware instead of ours. There is one top secret subject that we mentioned at Bermuda which I raise here once more, so that there can be no misunderstanding of our attitude. It involves the possibility of an American visit by the Queen and her husband. I merely want to make certain that you realize that nothing could give me greater satisfaction both personally and officially – a satisfaction

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that I know would be shared by the Government and our people. Please understand that I am by no means pressing you for an immediate reaction of any kind. But I do feel that there must be no incorrect interpretation about our feelings in the matter. With warm personal regard, As ever DE

43 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 29, 1957 Many thanks for your letter of May 24. I will write to you a little later about some of the other points you mentioned, but I should reply at once about the Russian–Chinese trade question. I am very glad that you understand our special difficulty about this matter. As you realise, the commercial interests of our two countries in this are not at all alike. We live by exports – and by exports alone. So I feel that we cannot any longer maintain the existing differential between Russian and Chinese trade and we shall be making a statement to this effect in Parliament tomorrow. The Russian List is an extensive one, covering over 250 items, and so trade with China will still be severely limited. Indeed we believe that a common list will prove to be the right way of maintaining a viable system of control over trade with Communist countries. Most of the other countries concerned seem to think that what we propose is common sense. Of course, we shall stress that we mean to continue co-operating with you and our allies in controlling trade with both the Soviet Bloc and China in the interests of our mutual security. I trust that this will be made clear also in the United States. There is no division of view on this and we shall emphasise this again. I agree that we must try to play down this difference of view between us and do all we can to prevent the misconception that we have different policies on strategic controls, or on the great issues that lie beneath all this. I will write to you as soon as I can about the other points you mentioned. All good wishes, Harold

58 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

44 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 3, 1957 Dear Harold: Harold Caccia has been kind enough to pass to me the text of the reply you proposed to send to Bulganin’s letter of April 20th. I have read the text with great interest and find myself in general agreement with its content. I assume, as Harold suggests, that since Bulganin’s references to the Middle East will be answered by our replies to the Soviet notes of April 19 to the three governments, you will not be able to send the letter until tripartite agreement on the replies has been reached. I think you have presented matters very skillfully in the present draft. I note that you have made your statement of policy on the China trade affair. While there was some unfavorable comment here in the States, both political and editorial, I am relieved to note that it has not caused the furor that could have taken place. I have heard nothing yet of the reaction in the South East Asian countries. With warm regard, As ever

45 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 3, 1957 My dear Friend, I feel I must send you my thoughts about the new turn in the discussions on disarmament. These have dragged along from month to month, and year to year, with very little progress – though all the free countries of the world long for some advance which would relieve their burdens, if they could be sure that it would not jeopardise their liberty and indeed their survival. If the memorandum which [Harold] Stassen has given to the Russians is a real effort to get a move forward, we should naturally welcome its purpose.1 But it is not clear to me whether it should be regarded as an informal paper put forward as might be assumed from what is said in its second paragraph as a basis for bilateral discussions between the United States and Soviet Delegations or whether it represents the considered proposals of the United States Government. Nor am I quite sure whether it is meant to lead to serious negotiation or whether it is designed primarily as a move in the interminable negotiations in the sub-committee. I hope you may be able to tell

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me that this does not represent a firm negotiating position of the United States Government. For I must frankly say that, if it does, I shall be disappointed to think that we could not have had some talk or communication about it among ourselves in the first instance. This is, after all, the greatest issue that faces the civilised world; it is one on which the freedom and survival of our island may depend: and, as we correspond on so many questions very freely, I would have hoped that we could have examined together the possible consequences of these proposals before they were put forward. I would not be straight with you if I tried to disguise a certain feeling of distress that we were not told in advance that this document was to be given to the Russians. And I am afraid that some of our partners in N.A.T.O. will have the same feelings, especially as Stassen spoke to them fully on this question only three or four days ago without disclosing what he was proposing to do. However, this is now done and like you, I never think it worthwhile to job back in these affairs. The real problem is what we do next. I understand that Stassen will not table any proposals in the Disarmament Subcommittee until he has some reaction from the Russians.1 I fear however that the contents of his paper will leak out – either because the Russians will publish them or because some of our friends in N.A.T.O. will make their substance known after the meeting of the [United Nations Security] Council on Wednesday. In that event, we shall have to take a public position about them. These proposals raise some tremendous difficulties for us and for our European friends. A cynical critic might say that, at the end of the process which they envisage two great nuclear powers would remain: the United Kingdom would be prevented from developing the nuclear strength which she is just beginning to acquire: and all the other countries of Europe would have signed away their right to defend themselves with these weapons for the rest of time, whatever changes may take place in the political conditions of the world. I am sure this cannot be your intention. It would involve a tremendous sacrifice for us, after we have put so much effort into our researches and, having made a success with our experiments, are now ready to go forward with production. Nor must we forget the French to whom the final surrender of any nuclear future would be very galling. We must also consider what the German reactions are likely to be. Of course, the Russians may reject this new plan “in toto.” But I doubt whether they will do this. Their usual habit, once they have got a document, is to deal with it like a dog with a bone. They never surrender any bit of it which is in any way to their advantage. It is I think more likely that they will give it partial support. Indeed, there are great gains in it for them, especially as the conditions for inspection and control which they have always particularly disliked, have now been relaxed to a point at which evasion would be easy.

60 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

You will, I am sure, realise that if the Russians react favourably to any proposals involving an early cut off date for the production of fissile material for military purposes, the effect upon the British weapons programme and our capacity to defend ourselves will be most serious. In the talks which took place in Washington at the end of January between the Minister of Defence and Commander [Allan H. P.] Noble on our side, and Mr. Dulles and Mr. Stassen on yours, this danger was recognized and it was agreed that in such circumstances the development by the United Kingdom of nuclear weapon resources adequate to her needs should not be prejudiced.2 I feel that the time has now arrived for a full discussion of this problem. If you agree, perhaps you will let me know who you would wish to take part on your side, so that I may send an appropriate team from here. I attach the greatest importance to this and hope that you will agree to this being put in hand without delay. There are many other points in this with which I won’t bother you now, but I felt it right to let you know at once how important we feel this move may prove to be and what immense issues and decisions it involves for all the countries, not least my own. I do hope that we will be able to keep in the closest touch in these developments. Harold Macmillan

1

2

The reference to Harold Stassen, Eisenhower’s arms control negotiator, reflects the fact that Stassen had responded to an offer put forward by Valerin Zorin, the Soviet Union’s chief arms negotiator, without discussing the offer first with the British and the French. Commander Allan H.P. Noble was the British representative to the United Nations Sub-committee on Disarmament.

46 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 4, 1957 Dear Harold: I have just received your cable of June third and to say the least I am astonished and chagrined to learn of the developments you describe. I have not even seen the final edited paper to which you refer, but I can assure you that there is no agreed-upon American position which is to be interpreted as a basis of negotiation with the Soviets.

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When Governor Stassen was here a number of meetings were held to fix upon clauses in a possible future agreement that would be acceptable to us provided they were satisfactory to our Allies and provided also that the entire negotiations took place in the certainty that adequate inspectional systems would be devised and established. I am particularly distressed to hear that the Russians saw even such a tentative sort of paper prior to full consultation with you and the French Government. The practice of the Western Powers has been, as you undoubtedly know, to discuss such views among themselves before presenting them to the Soviets. I assure you that the cooperative spirit so obviously present at the Bermuda Conference is something that I regard as of the greatest value between our two countries and I shall do my best to preserve it and to live by it. I might add that everybody here deplores this occurrence as deeply as I do. Foster will take steps to make certain that the correct status of the paper is understood by all and to insure that in the future our coordination with you will be as complete as we can make it. Unquestionably your Foreign Office will be hearing from Foster very soon in greater detail than I can employ in this cable. With warm regard, DE1 1 Eisenhower attached the following message to Dulles at the bottom of the letter, prior to its being sent. “If you think it better not to send even a tentative reply, please hold this up until evening when I will talk to you, but I am anxious that Harold know as quickly as possible that we did try to act in the spirit of our agreements at Bermuda,” Ike wrote. He clearly did not want Stassen’s mistaken judgment to affect his relations with Macmillan.

47 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 5, 1957 I have now had an opportunity for further consultation with Her Majesty The Queen about the possibility that she might visit Washington this autumn. The Queen has intimated that if you were now to send her an invitation for October she would be very pleased to accept. Naturally if The Queen crosses the Atlantic she will wish to visit Canada. St. Laurent has in fact suggested that The Queen should open the 23rd Canadian Parliament on October 14 and she is prepared to accept.

62 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Her provisional programme would be to arrive in Ottawa by air on October 12, and to open Parliament on October 14. The State Department tell us that state visits to Washington normally last three days and I know that there is a strong desire that Her Majesty should visit Jamestown at the time of the 350th anniversary celebrations. Perhaps this could be best fitted in on October 16 between her leaving Ottawa and her arrival in Washington. In any case, I have given Whitney our suggestions for an outline timetable. I would be glad if you would let me know if you like this plan. It would help us if you would send the formal invitation to The Queen, presumably by telegram, through your Ambassador. As soon as I receive your informal agreement I will tell St. Laurent so that he can then also send his formal invitation. When the two formal invitations have arrived an announcement of the two visits could then be made simultaneously in Washington, Ottawa and London as soon as possible. If all this is agreeable to you we can consult together about the form and timing of the announcement. Meanwhile, I am sure you will agree that it is most important that no premature leak should occur.

I.

LENGTH OF VISIT (a) It is understood that State visits to Washington normally last three days. (b) There have been a number of requests that The Queen should visit Jamestown. (c) Her Majesty has never visited New York and would like to do so. (d) Five or six days would be the maximum that The Queen would be able to spend in the United States on this occasion.

II.

DATES OF VISIT (a) The Canadian visit ends on the evening of October 15. (b) The Yorktown Celebrations begin on October 17 and end on October 19. Since they centre on the Anniversary of Yorktown, it would be more appropriate for the visit to take place on October 16. (c) It might therefore be convenient for The Queen to begin her visit at Jamestown on October 16, arriving by air at Langley Base from Ottawa. (d) In that case, the Washington visit might be from the evening of October 16 to midday, Saturday, October 19. (e) Probably a Sunday would not be a good day on which to visit New York. October 20 could therefore be a day of rest. (f) The visit to New York might take place on Monday, October 21, The Queen leaving that evening by air for the United Kingdom.

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III. COMMENT (a) The dates and other details set out above are suggestions except that it would be very difficult to extend The Queen’s stay. (b) The Queen proposes to travel to and from the United Kingdom by air and would probably travel by air during the visit. (c) The detailed programme will have to be worked out as soon as possible. This would normally be done by the Commonwealth Ambassadors in Washington working with the White House.

48 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 8, 1957 Dear Harold: I have just returned to my desk after a brief sea voyage and I find your message in regard to the visit of Queen Elizabeth to this country. I am so pleased to learn that she will be able to come, and I need hardly tell you how much we are looking forward to welcoming her here. As you suggested, I am sending the formal invitation by telegram for delivery at the Palace by Ambassador Whitney. It should reach the Queen shortly after you receive this message. The dates you propose for the visit (October 16–21) are entirely satisfactory but I can not hide my disappointment over its shortness. All of us had sincerely hoped that Her Majesty could stay for as long as ten days. With a visit of such duration it might have been possible for Her Majesty to make a tour of the West, which I think would give her as much pleasure as it would the Americans in that part of the country. Nevertheless, I appreciate the heavy demands upon the Queen’s time and will not press you any further on this score. Regarding the public announcement of the visit, our releases usually take the following form: INNER QUOTE The President of the United States announced today that Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II, has accepted the President’s invitation to visit the United States. Her Majesty, accompanied by the Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, will begin her visit at Jamestown, Virginia, on October 16, followed by a three-day visit to Washington. END INNER QUOTE

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I look upon the visit of Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip as a very significant event in Anglo-American relations and realize that it affords an excellent opportunity to demonstrate to all peoples the close and natural ties which exist between our two countries. Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower

49 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 12, 1957 My dear Friend, I think it is perhaps time that I should write you a few words on general matters, as I promised to do. I am happy to see that the divergence of policy between us about China trade does not seem to have stirred up much trouble either in Congress or in the Press. It was certainly very helpful of you to speak as you did for I am sure it has done a lot to keep things quiet. In this secular struggle between the Communist and the free world there is a continual change of tempo and the spotlight seems to come now in one place, now in another. Some years ago it was all on the Far East, and then it changed to the Middle East. Now I feel that the Russians may be a little bit uncertain of what to do next. They are certainly very conscious of the harm which their brutality in Poland and Hungary has done. It is for this reason I think that they are so anxious to find some kind of cover of respectability, either by visits or letters, or in your case by television programmes. But of course the real test is disarmament. On this I was very grateful to you for your reply to my last letter. Very soon I shall be writing to you again on this for it is time, I think, that we gave it a lot of careful thought. The Russians will try to play us off one against the other and we must not allow this to happen. I must tell you very frankly that I was terribly disappointed at the decision reached on the wool textile tariff. Of course, I realise the pressures of some of your industrial interests. But we have to fight very hard for our exports, because we cannot live without them, and when one of our trades really makes a good show it is pretty disheartening to be cut down in this rough way. I do not know whether this decision is perpetual or whether it could be reversed in due course. It makes me feel very pessimistic about the growth of liberal concepts in the world. If countries with

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enormous surpluses and vast wealth resort to protection how can we expect countries in difficulties like Britain and France to move toward the freeing of trade. This leads me to the position about Europe. The fall of the French Government is a setback, but I am hoping that a good government will soon be formed.1 We have thought it wise not to press the negotiations for the European Free Trade Area too hard until the Rome agreements have been ratified.2 I do not want to see a repetition of what happened over E.D.C. I and my colleagues are very strongly in favour of this whole European concept, and we would like to see the six ratify the Rome agreements and then move on firmly towards working out the plans for the larger area. I am sure we shall have support from Germany over this. The French have a lot of difficulties but we may have to treat many of them as exceptional cases. The important thing is not to let us all slide back into insularity and protectionism just because of the pressure of this or that industry. We are having plenty of this at home and so are all the other Governments in their own countries but we must resist if we are to make progress. Although we have quite a lot of political problems abroad, I really feel that things are settling down and becoming more normal. I am so delighted that everything has been arranged about The Queen’s visit. It will surely do a lot of good. We like our new Ambassador very much3 and I find it a great help to talk with him on things at large. I was disturbed by the alarmist reports of your indisposition, and am very glad to hear that you are recovered and back at work.4 Yours ever Harold Macmillan 1

2

3 4

The government of French premier Guy Mollet fell on 21 May 1957, owing largely to the unpopularity of its policy regarding the situation in Algeria. French governments had refused to ratify a treaty for the European Defense Community (EDC), established in 1950, which allowed for a partial rearmament of West Germany. There was agreement between Britain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, and Portugal for a commercial agreement, called the European Free Trade Area, where tariff barriers were lowered for trade between these nations. The members of the EFTA became known as “the 7,” or sometimes “the outer 7.” On 25 March 1957, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg established the European Economic Community [EEC], which became known as the European Common Market. The members of the EEC were sometimes referred to as “the 6.” Macmillan’s reference is to Ambassador John Hay Whitney. Eisenhower had an attack of indigestion on 10 June, which necessitated the cancellation of his appointments for the day. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of

66 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence DDE, XVIII, 248. The illness must not have been serious. Eisenhower kept a full schedule of appointments on both 9 June and 11 June.

50 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 16, 1957 Dear Harold: I think now that we have removed the possibility that any more “flaps” can occur in disarmament negotiations, we can look forward to a bit smoother sailing in this particular business. We have worked very hard to find a position in the disarmament area that is as liberal and broad-gauged as elementary considerations of security would permit. Frankly, many of our people are getting exceedingly weary of carrying the national and international costs of some of the programs in which we are now engaged. Any real progress toward a disarmament plan – one which could be accepted with confidence by the free world – would probably be of greater relative relief to us than to any of our friends. This is because in so many cases we are not only meeting our own costs but trying to help others. I mention this only to show that we fully agree with your observation that “the real test is disarmament.” Of course I can understand your disappointment about the restrictions that we finally had to put on the import of wool textiles. I must explain, however, one phase of the problem that our friends should clearly understand. This Administration stands firmly and squarely for liberalized and greater flow of trade among the nations of the free world. We have fought long and earnestly for acceptance of this doctrine in this country and, in executing the law, have time and again declined to listen to the special pleas of specialized industries in this country in order to promote the general concept of reciprocity and freer trade. But while doing this we can never forget that the Congress has granted authority to the Executive for making reciprocal trade treaties only on a temporary basis. Once in a while there arises a case that has such great popular appeal that to decline flatly to give any of the relief contemplated by the law could easily result in a return of this country to its former high protection policy. It is the task of deciding between these immediate and long-term damages to our friends – and to ourselves – that is difficult. I and some of my trusted

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associates spend many hours of hard study on such questions. If I should approve every recommendation made to me by the Federal Tariff Commission – a body whose responsibility it is to see that justice is done to American industry – the total effect over the past four and a half years would have been almost catastrophic, and we would be totally defeated in the effort to promote trade. So I beg of you that you try to understand the situation. I shall continue to fight as hard as I know how for the concept of freer and greater trade. But sometimes I am impelled, on such a wide front as that on which I operate, to beat a local and – I hope – temporary retreat. I read with interest your letter to the Chancellor. In spite of the German staff’s decision that our M-48 had some characteristics that they preferred over your Centurion, I still think they made a mistake in their failure to adopt your tank for their forces. Actually I understand the number is not large – it could be possible that they are buying a relatively small number merely in order to have prototypes for their own later production. I thoroughly enjoy and appreciate your letters. With warm regard, As ever

51 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 21, 1957 My dear Friend, I was very glad to get your message of June 5, and was much reassured by it. I am happy to tell you that the co-operation between our representatives in this matter of disarmament seems fully re-established.1 As I said in my message, we must think only of the future. A great deal of progress has been made towards reaching an agreed Western position and I am hopeful that, when all the governments concerned have approved what is to be proposed, we shall be able to present a joint proposal to the Russians. We cannot disguise from ourselves that the Russians have gained a point in their game by their ostensible conversion to the idea of a controlled suspension of nuclear tests, and that makes it very important that in our reply we should take up a position to which we can hold solidly. There is a great deal of pressure about this matter in my country and I see that it is mounting in yours. But the issues are so tremendous that I feel we must at all costs stand together. I cannot, however, hide from you that

68 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

the United Kingdom is in a particularly difficult position, because we were late starters in this affair. Selwyn has had long conversations with Harold Stassen, and I have also talked over with him the technical problems with which the disarmament proposals face us here, and about which I am still very much concerned. I am sure that he fully realises and would wish to safeguard our position. Foster has sent me a message on your behalf about the suggestion in my letter that our experts might meet to discuss the problems with which the United Kingdom would be faced if the Russians were to react favourably to the disarmament proposals. I have replied to him saying that I fully understand the considerations which lead him to think that the time has not yet come for these talks. We cannot tell how quickly, or towards what result, the disarmament position will develop, and it is on that that the timing of such discussions must depend. I hope that if necessary you would allow me to take advantage of something you said to me in Bermuda, and come over myself for an informal visit when we could have a general talk about the whole position. Yours ever, Harold. 1

Actually a reference to Eisenhower’s letter dated June 4.

52 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 24, 1957 My dear friend, Foster has told me of the talk which he had with you about my suggestion that we might need to meet to discuss the Disarmament situation. I have also had the chance of a talk with Harold Caccia who arrived here this morning. You may well be right in thinking that there is no real prospect of any early agreement with the Russians; and until we can see how things are moving, both in the [United Nations] Sub-Committee and in the development of public opinion, I would not wish to press my suggestion. All the same, I cannot help feeling that there may be a sudden change in the situation which would call for quick personal consultation between us. Our Parliament reassembles tomorrow, and I have today considered with my colleagues how we could associate ourselves with the action which the

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United States Delegation wish to take in the Sub-Committee. As I have explained to you already, this must involve great risks for us. It might well prejudice not only our military nuclear programme, but the whole basis of our new defence policy. An early suspension of tests, and the cut off of the production of fissile material for military purposes, would prejudice both the development of our know-how and the accumulation of the supplies of the material we need. It is, however, my understanding that if an agreement were concluded on this basis you would be ready, as part of the programme under which a Disarmament Treaty would be presented to Congress, to do your best to make it possible for our deficiencies to be met. Of course, we should have to agree between ourselves in a reasonable manner on the extent of those deficiencies. This was contemplated in the February letters. I am sure that you will understand that I would never advise Parliament to ratify a disarmament agreement which did not leave it open to us to put ourselves in position, either by this or by some other means, to have nuclear weapons resources adequate to our needs. On this understanding we are prepared to join in putting forward on behalf of the Western Powers proposals on the lines which Selwyn has discussed with Stassen. I hope that you will not mind, but I thought it best to ask Selwyn to discuss the whole matter of this message with Harold Stassen, who I understand brought [ Julius] Holmes1 with him. Yours ever, Harold Macmillan 1

Julius Holmes was an officer in the State Department sent by John Foster Dulles to work in Stassen’s office.

53 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 24, 1957 Dear Harold: Very shortly I understand you are to be approached, probably through Sir Harold Caccia, regarding the possibility of your giving the commencement address to the graduating class of DePauw University next summer. (I am told that your grandfather was the first graduate of the DePauw Medical School).1

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At any rate, this note is merely to express the hope that the invitation appeals to you. Of course you know that you would be a most welcome visitor to America if you decide you can accept. With warm regard, As ever, Ike E. 1

Macmillan’s grandfather was Joshua Reid Belles, a graduate of the Indiana Medical College. It is unclear if this college ever had an association with DePauw University, which is located in Greencastle, Indiana.

54 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 26, 1957 Dear Harold: I am delighted that you are prepared to join with us in putting forward in the Disarmament Subcommittee the proposals which Harold Stassen has been discussing with you and our French and Canadian colleagues in London. We hope that this will pave the way for rapid progress in the Subcommittee. Your concern about the possible effect on your nuclear position of the putting into effect of a program such as we propose is fully understood. I am, of course, happy to reaffirm the agreement which was reached in the exchange of letters between Harold Stassen and Commander Noble last February and March.1 Your willingness to go along with our proposals in this respect will, I hope, be a significant step looking to increasing world security. Certainly, it will show the world our good intentions. Whether or not the Soviets will respond by accepting either the basic concept, or an adequate inspection system to support it, is, I fear, quite problematic. But we shall see. As ever, Ike E 1

In this correspondence between Stassen and Commander Allen H.P. Noble, the British representative to the United Nations Commission on Disarmament, the United States gave its assurance that its proposals would not damage Britain’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XVIII, 278–9.

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55 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 28, 1957 My dear Friend Thank you so much for your message of June 25 about the idea of my delivering the commencement address at DePauw University next summer. This sounds most attractive, and I hope very much that I shall be able to do so: nevertheless you will realise that it is difficult for me to give a firm undertaking at this distance in time. You may rest assured however that if I possibly can, I will do so. I am particularly attracted by the idea which I gather you have already mentioned to Caccia that this might furnish the opportunity for an informal meeting between us, without all the trappings which attended our last talks in Bermuda. Yours very sincerely, Harold Macmillan

56 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 18, 1957 Dear Friend Since I wrote to you on June 28 about the proposal that I should deliver the Commencement Address at DePauw University next summer, I have had a formal invitation from the University’s President. In my reply, I have explained that although I hope to come, it is not easy for me to make definite commitments nearly a year in advance. I have therefore asked if I might accept the invitation in principle now, and make more definite arrangements later on. As you know, I hope very much that in the event I shall not be prevented from visiting DePauw, and that my presence in the United States will give me an opportunity for the informal meeting with you which you proposed. Yours ever Harold Macmillan

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57 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 19, 1957 Dear Friend: I have been meaning to send you a letter about our general situation, but in the last weeks of the Session, as you can imagine, I am pretty heavily pressed. We hope to get Parliament up early in August and I will try to give you a picture of things as I see them when I have a little more time to compose my thoughts. Meanwhile I am sorry to have to trouble you about rather a difficult matter which is causing us some anxiety. As you know, in accordance with our policy of developing our colonies into self-governing and independent states within the Commonwealth we have dealt with Ghana; Malaya follows in August. Now we are taking the first stages for the West Indian Federation, in which I know many Americans have taken a great interest for a long time. This development is going pretty well and I think it is going to be a real success. Their chief trouble is to find a capital for the Federal State. They can’t have it in Jamaica, although, or really because it is so much the largest unit – 50% of the whole population of the proposed Federation. So everyone has agreed that it should be in Trinidad. The trouble is that the place they want to use in Trinidad is the site, or part of the site, of your naval base at Chaguaramas. We have got the representatives of these different islands over here now and they are really concerned about it. These politicians are not very easy to handle and I think it would be very embarrassing to us both if they insisted on visiting Washington and trying to discuss the question personally with you. With a good deal of difficulty we have persuaded them to retreat considerably from their original claims and we have been able to reach agreement in principle over a proposal for a joint commission to discuss possible solutions. As I understand it, it would be a commission representing the British government, as still responsible, the West Indies and your own people. I believe this is agreeable to you; at least I hope so; and now the only point of trouble is really one of presentation more than substance. Very strong political feelings have been raised in the West Indies and I am anxious that there may be a breakdown unless we can agree on the terms of reference along the lines of our delegation’s proposal of July 18. I very much hope you will be able to authorise your delegation to meet with ours and that the terms of reference proposed will be acceptable to you. I am sending these in a separate telegram to our Ambassador to make sure that there is no mistake. I really feel rather guilty in troubling you about this matter, but all this “liquidation of colonialism” is going

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so well that I would be sorry if there were any hitch, especially in the Caribbean. All kind regards, Yours ever, Harold

58 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 20, 1957 Dear Harold: I have your letter which was delivered to me this morning July 20, 1957 regarding the location of the future West Indian capital. Of course, as you say, the United States Government and its people are vitally interested in furthering the legitimate aspirations of the people of the West Indies with whom we have a particularly neighborly interest. As you are fully aware it is basic policy with us never to force ourselves into a place where we are not wanted or to remain when we are not welcome. Accordingly, if your government or the British West Indies Federation after careful consideration finally conclude that you definitely wish us to leave Chaguaramas, we would of course do so. However, such a move in my opinion would be most unwise in view of our continuing common defense requirements for a major naval operating base in the Gulf of Parla. Let me make these points clear: Chaguaramas Station is the only facility in that part of the Caribbean adequately equipped to safeguard our common defense interests. I assume [Louis] Mountbatten has let you know of the strategic considerations.1 The base represents a replacement cost of some one hundred million dollars. Our large investment was predicated on a ninety-nine year lease. I would doubt that the Federation could finance relocation or that we could meet the cost of relocating the facility at a time when we have to curtail our defense expenditures generally. Also the fact that this problem was forced upon us by the British West Indies Federation would undoubtedly affect the attitude of the Congress toward it. We also have to keep in mind the recommendations of the Inter-American Defense Board which includes the nineteen Latin-American nations. That Board has expressed its concern lest the United States deactivate the base. We realize that from the domestic standpoint within the West Indies itself, a statement such as you propose would be most helpful to the West Indies

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Federation and the present representatives in London but, in our opinion, it goes much too far. We are prepared to join in a commission composed of technical experts of the British West Indies, the United Kingdom and the United States to investigate all aspects of the British West Indies requests for assistance in making Chaguaramas available taking into full account military and economic considerations. We would not, however, want to do so under terms of reference which virtually commit us to make the move. We would hope to be able to satisfy your government and that of the Federation that such a move is inadvisable from the standpoint of each of us. I hope that your government will do its best to obtain acceptance by the representatives of the British West Indies of a commission whose range of exploration will be wide but which will not start out committed to one or another solution. As ever, D.E. 1

Admiral Louis Mountbatten was the First Sea Lord at the time. Mountbatten was also a personal friend of Eisenhower’s from the days of World War II. Hence, Ike was understandably familiar in his reference to him.

59 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 20, 1957 Dear Friend, Thank you very much for your reply about the capital of the West Indian Federation. I do appreciate your understanding of the aspirations of these Islands, and of course I realize the special importance of your naval base in Trinidad. After getting your message I told my people to try to work towards an arrangement which would allow this difficult question to be examined as dispassionately as possible. I have just heard reports of today’s meeting to the effect that the terms of reference suggested by your people have been approved by the West Indians subject only to a few minor drafting changes, which I hope will be acceptable in Washington. This will be a real advance, and I am grateful for your help. You will have heard through Harold Caccia and by now read also in the press of the trouble which has blown up in Oman and will be familiar with events which led up to the re-establishing of the Sultan’s authority in

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Oman two years ago.1 In this part of the world it is always difficult to know how to act for the best but we believe that the Sultan is a true friend to the West and is doing his best for his people. But his own forces are weak, partly because he and his predecessors have relied on us to protect him against outside aggression. There is, I believe, no doubt that the present insurrection has been organised and armed from outside. The Sultan has appealed to us to help him and the obligations of friendship seem to us to demand that we should not desert him in times of trouble. Moreover, there must be a risk that if the troubles in Muscat are not contained and disposed of as soon as possible, they may spread. I hope that it will be possible to restore the Sultan’s authority quickly, by dealing, with the help of limited air support from us, a speedy blow at the confidence and prestige of the rebel leaders. I will make sure that your people are kept in close touch with developments. I am of course well aware that Nasser is encouraging this trouble and probably hopes to use this occasion to make difficulties for both of us. I am afraid there can also be no doubt that the Saudis are involved. As you know, we have recently put forward a plan for encouraging better relations between the Sultan and King Saud. This plan still seems to us to offer the best chance of improving the situation in that part of the world, but there is little change of persuading the Sultan to adopt it while he feels that attempts are being made to detach part of his territory from him. We shall try to implicate the Saudis as little as possible in public discussion of these events, and to keep the door open for the realisation of our plan for better relations. I know that in all this I can count upon your sympathy. All kind regards, Yours ever, Harold. 1

Macmillan’s reference to the “trouble which has blown up in Oman” referred to British intervention in that country to prevent the success of a rebellion, supported by Nasser, against the Sultan of Muscat. A special concern, however, was that the rebels also received support from nearby Saudi Arabia, the country which the United States hoped to use as a counter to Nasser’s influence in the Middle East.

60 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 24, 1957 Dear Harold: I share your satisfaction in knowing that the Trinidad discussions have been put into channels that should bring out all the important factors applying to the case.

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We are, of course, sympathetic with your efforts to bring about a better understanding in the Mid East, particularly between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.1 I assume that this is just the latest incident of the old Buraimi trouble and I hope that however the matter is settled, you will achieve a better and firmer relationship with King Saud himself.2 I cannot help but believe that if we handle things correctly, he will be our best counterbalance to Nasser’s influence in the region. In this connection we have heard that disturbing rumors are current in London to the effect that the present troubles in the Sultan’s area have been brought about by the efforts of our major oil companies to damage the British oil possessions in that region. Certainly I do not have to assure you that such rumors are completely false. If we were willing to tolerate this kind of thing we would never have been so ready to do our best to help solve the oil problems that were generated for you by the Suez crisis of last fall. The reason that such rumors are disturbing, however, is that too great a readiness on our part to criticize each other for whatever troubles we may encounter in our dealings with other nations cannot possibly have anything but a harmful effect on our common problems in the world. I do not suggest that there is anything you can do about this matter, but I call it to your attention merely as something that should be in my opinion of continued concern to us on both sides of the Atlantic. I am quite certain that if you should address DePauw University next spring you and I can find a chance for an informal chat. I certainly would consider it a great privilege to have such an opportunity. With warm regard, As ever, D.E. 1

2

In his response, Eisenhower once again voiced his support of King Saud of Saudi Arabia as his preferred choice to counter the influence of Nasser in the Middle East. For a brief discussion of this episode, see Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 270–7. Eisenhower’s reference to “the old Buraimi trouble” involved the Buraimi oasis in Oman, believed to hold vast reserves of oil. The British, who controlled the oasis through their support of the Sultan of Muscat, clashed repeatedly in the early 1950s with the Saudis, who believed that they should control the area.

61 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 25, 1957 Dear Harold: In order to renew our contacts with our delegation in London and to make certain that in the highest echelons our thinking along disarmament is well

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coordinated, I have asked Foster Dulles to come to London at the beginning of the week for a brief visit.1 As you know, Foster has my complete confidence and I am hopeful that his visit there will prove fruitful in keeping us marching together. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike E. 1

The continuing concerns about disarmament led Eisenhower to send Secretary of State Dulles to London for consultations, an action hardly welcomed by Macmillan.

62 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 26, 1957 Dear Friend, Thank you for your message, which I have just received. Of course I am delighted that Foster should come here and there could be no reason why he should not do so for a meeting of a United Nations Sub-Committee. At the same time your Ambassador will have told you that I feel some concern lest the ill-disposed here might wrongly interpret Foster’s visit, particularly in view of present events in the Middle East. I should therefore have liked, had there been time, to have agreed with you on a joint statement about Foster’s visit which would have made it clear that we had consulted together about it. In the event this was not possible, but I think that the press guidance which we were able to put out here will have set the visit in its true perspective.1 I look forward very much to an opportunity for some talk with Foster during his stay, although this last week of our Parliamentary session will be a busy time for us. With warm regards, Harold Macmillan 1

Macmillan’s letter to Ike did not totally convey the frustration which he felt over Dulles’s latest trip to London and his apparent intention to become involved in the crisis in Oman. As Macmillan wrote in his diary on 27 July, “I was very anxious about what might be read into [the visit by Dulles], and rather annoyed at the abrupt way it was all done. However, … I think the public will accept that he is coming here to talk about disarmament (which will be good) and not about Muscat (which would be very bad).” See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 272.

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63 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 27, 1957 Dear Harold: I am sorry if our hurriedly formed arrangements for Foster to come to London to make sure of coordinated thinking between ourselves and the American Delegation should have caused you the slightest embarrassment. Foster is now in Canada so it was not easy to develop a feasible plan for the purpose we had in mind. But as quickly as we could make the decision by telephoning between here and Ottawa, I sent you what I thought to be an appropriate cable. I feel confident that the press guidance which you so promptly gave in London, and such statements as Foster may make upon leaving Ottawa or arriving in London will help to keep the reasons for Foster’s trip in proper perspective without embarrassment to you. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

64 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 17, 1957 Dear Friend, I have just heard that Foster is unfortunately away during this troublesome situation which is developing about Oman and the forthcoming United Nations Security Council debate. Although there is still time after Foster gets back on Monday for a decision to be taken by your Government to vote against inscribing this matter on the Agenda, I hope that you will not mind my asking you yourself in the meantime to have a look at the message Selwyn has sent Foster. I would not worry you except for this one reason. We have done such a lot together during the past few months to get things right between us that it would really be tragic if they go wrong again. Yours ever, Harold

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65 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 17, 1957 Dear Harold: I have your message regarding Oman and it is receiving my urgent study. As you no doubt know through Harold Caccia and [Ponsby] Crosthwaite the view of my staff here is that abstention on the vote [in the United Nations] to inscribe would best serve our common interest and achieve the practical result you wish.1 After his return to Washington I will discuss this with Foster, to whom Selwyn has sent a note on the same subject and then communicate with you further. I appreciate not only the time factor involved but of course the larger consideration you mentioned. Warm regards, D.E. 1

Ponsby Moore Crosthwaite was the British representative to the United Nations. Both the United States and Great Britain were opposed to having the situation in Oman debated in the United Nations. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XVIII, 378–9.

66 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 18, 1957 Many thanks for your prompt reply about Oman. You will of course realise that anything which may make the Sultan of Muscat feel that doubts are being cast on the essential unity of Muscat and Oman will make it almost impossible to get him to accept the idea of a meeting with King Saud. Both of us, I think, believe that direct negotiations between them is the thing to work for. Harold Macmillan

67 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 19, 1957 Dear Harold: This supplements my message to you of the 17th. Foster is now back and although both of us are deeply engaged today in relation to the Mutual

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Security legislation we did have lunch together and he had a talk with Harold Caccia. It looks as though if you want quick action which will result in the non-inscription of the matter the best we can do, consistently with our prior practice and lack of knowledge of the complicated local facts here, would be abstain. This is as good as a negative vote from the standpoint of keeping the matter off the agenda and I do not think you need to worry about the outcome. If you want to have the matter discussed and deal with the “Treaty of Sib” and such matters sufficiently to make a clear public case against there being an inscribable issue, then we might feel that we could vote positively against inscription.1 This would of course depend somewhat upon the character of the presentation that was made. But we assume that you have a good case in this respect. You may well decide that it is better not to have the argument and to get the matter quickly behind us so that we can work together on some constructive developments. I know you would rather have us vote from the outset and immediately against inscription. However, I think that we can recognize that the common goals which we have cannot always be best achieved by our necessarily always taking a uniform public position. As you know, both personally and officially, Foster and I want always to be on the same slot with you but we think that all things considered the above is the best solution we can figure out at the moment. Sincerely, DDE 1

The “Treaty of Sib” to which Eisenhower referred was an agreement in 1920 between the rival political and religious factions in Oman, an agreement brokered by the British and which provided for autonomy within Oman for various tribal groups. See Miriam Joyce, The Sultanate of Oman (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 77–8 and Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XVIII, 380.

68 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 26, 1957 Dear Harold For some days a continuing intention of mine to send you a note has been defeated by preoccupations of a legislative character, brought about by the fact that we approach the end of a Congressional session with a great many controversial questions under debate.

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The most serious of these, from the free world viewpoint, involves our mutual aid program. Although I have brought every possible personal influence to bear, the Congress, motivated by a belief that our people are getting weary of very high taxes and convinced that most of our citizens do not understand the aims and purposes of mutual security, has consistently refused to allow the amounts needed. I hope the situation can be partially corrected in the Senate, but in any event we are going to be hard pushed this year to carry on all the activities which the Administration believes to be in the best interests of the free world, including ourselves. Meanwhile, as you will know from Foster’s messages, we are preoccupied by what is happening in Syria.1 It is encouraging that all of Syria’s neighbors, including all of the Moslem neighbors, seem fully aware of the dangers which growing Communist influence in Syria poses for them. I believe it important that this Moslem opposition be demonstrated in all appropriate forms. We expect to keep in touch with you and your people as this problem develops. Recently I saw in a dispatch a statement by Selwyn Lloyd that certain British agencies believed we had been responsible for inducing the Germans to buy American rather than British tanks. As I have assured you previously – indeed as I assured Anthony, when he was Prime Minister, and the German Chancellor – our government did not want this business. Frankly I dislike the prospect of the bulk of the free world being dependent, in the event of an emergency, upon the United States as their arsenal for material replacement, repair and maintenance. I would far rather that the free world could develop several dependable sources for this kind of supply. Indeed, I believe that each country should, at the very least, develop its own capacity for producing ammunition and spare parts. Otherwise such universal dependence among the non-industrial nations upon a single source will be bound to create serious, if not catastrophic difficulties, should we ever be faced with a general war. Consequently my advocacy of German purchase of Centurions was not entirely altruistic. It merely conforms to my idea of common sense in the business of free world cooperation against emergency. I am under the impression that you enjoyed a holiday. I hope so, and I assure you that I wish I were able to be away from my desk during these days. I now have some belief that Congress may adjourn by the end of this week, after which I would hope to spend several weeks in Newport, only an hour and a half from Washington by air. I trust that you and your lady thoroughly enjoyed your break from normal routine. With warm personal regard, As ever DE P.S.: Just this minute I am told that six beautiful grouse have arrived as a gift from the Duke of Devonshire, sent at your direction. Not only do I thank

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you for thinking of me – it is a great satisfaction now to know that you have had an enjoyable holiday. 1

The British and the Americans were concerned about a Soviet effort to penetrate the government of Syria in the late summer of 1957. The British and the Americans engaged in an extensive behind-the-scenes diplomatic effort to reassure Syria’s neighbors, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey, that the United States and Britain supported them against any pressure brought by Syria. For a brief discussion of the British role in the Syrian crisis of 1957, see Nigel J. Ashton, “Macmillan and the Middle East,” in Aldous and Lee (eds), Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role, 47–51. For an explanation of the covert plan developed jointly by the British and American intelligence services to destabilize the government of Syria at this time, see Fenton, “Macmillan backed Syria assassination plot,” Guardian Unlimited, 27 September 2003.

69 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 30, 1957 Dear Mr. President: The bearer of this letter is my Principal Private Secretary whom I have sent to Washington for reasons which are known to you.1 It also gives me an opportunity of thanking you very much for your last message and for the many other acts of friendship. It is a great source of happiness to me to feel that we are so close together in these difficult times. Yours very sincerely, Harold Macmillan 1

Sir Frederick Bishop was Macmillan’s Principal Private Secretary. In his memoirs, Riding the Storm, Macmillan does not mention his reasons for sending Bishop to Washington, apparently for conferences with Eisenhower and perhaps Dulles. One can only speculate as to the nature of the visit, but considering the world situation at the time, Bishop may have gone to Washington to discuss the problems in the Middle East.

70 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 21, 19571 Dear Friend, I have been thinking over the disarmament tangle especially in relation to some of the other problems which we are trying to deal with together.

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I think Foster said in one of his messages to me that he was wondering whether we could not balance a tough line in the Middle East with a more flexible attitude elsewhere. I have read what you said expressing your deep disappointment at the Russian attitude on disarmament. Everyone in this country feels the same; and for the first time for many months even the “long-haired, starry-eyed boys” seem to think that Russia is wrong. I have never known Left and near-Left opinion so critical of them or so understanding of us. In these circumstances, I am wondering whether we could not make a new gesture especially upon the aspect which most worries ordinary folk – that is the nuclear. You and we are the two nuclear Powers of the free world. You are very much the big brother, but we are now making quite a show of our own. Could we not together say that in spite of the Russian intransigence and immobility we were prepared voluntarily to make a start? We could revert to or develop a previous idea that we had about those explosions. First, we would undertake to declare them beforehand and register them with the United Nations or some other body. Second, we would undertake to limit our explosions during the next two years unilaterally whether the Russians agreed or not. Third, that the limit of our explosions would be such as would create an amount of radiation etc. which would not exceed a specified figure (to be agreed between us in advance). If you think there is something in this idea, I will ask Selwyn Lloyd who is in New York to pursue it immediately with Foster. The technical details could then be discussed by our experts. It seems to me that if your country and mine made a voluntary declaration of this sort (which incidentally would cost us very little), it might be a good thing to do so soon. It would retain the initiative for us and get the Russians in a bad posture from the propaganda point of view. A more constructive aspect would be that if at some time the Russians wanted to be more reasonable they could conform to this plan or at least talk to us about a joint plan. I was naturally sorry that you felt it unwise for me to come over to consult with you. But no doubt your judgment was right. It is at any rate a great happiness for me to feel we are working so closely together on all these problems. I want especially to tell you how generous and helpful Foster has been. It has made me very happy for these burdens are so much easier to carry if one has understanding partners and comrades. With warmest regards, Harold 1

This letter may have been written by Macmillan on 18 September but was recorded as delivered to the White House on 21 September. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XVIII, 456.

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71 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 23, 1957 Dear Harold: I have your letter on disarmament – dated the 21st I think. I spoke briefly to Foster about it when I was in Washington this morning. I am going back to Newport this afternoon and he in the meantime will speak to Lewis Strauss.1 We have, together, already moved quite a distance in the direction that you suggest and perhaps by putting it all together, and putting it in a fresh package with some little addition, it could be made into what would catch the popular imagination. I shall be in touch with you later after I get a further report of the talk between Foster and Lewis Strauss. I share your happiness over our close working relations with reference to the Middle East. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike 1

Admiral Lewis Strauss was the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission throughout much of the Eisenhower presidency. A hard-liner, he usually associated himself with the leadership of the Defense Department on matters of arms control and disarmament.

72 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 7, 1957 Dear Friend– As one gets older birthdays become less a matter for congratulation, but I still feel that they are an occasion for sending messages of friendship. I need not tell you how much I have valued the friendship between us and how much I wish you the conventional “Many Happy Returns” of your birthday. I am sorry that The Queen will not have reached the United States on October 14 for I feel that if Her visit had coincided with your birthday it would have made the day especially memorable for you. But I rejoice to feel

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that The Queen’s visit, so symbolic of the close friendship between our two countries, is to take place so soon after your personal celebration. Yours ever Harold Macmillan

73 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 8, 1957 I am sure you will have been giving deep thought to the implications of recent news from the Soviet Union.1 To my mind it shows clearly that the Russians have advanced much further than we had thought in the field of inter-continental ballistic missiles and that their achievements in association with their successful firings of large thermo-nuclear devices will enable them, in a very short space of time, to offer a direct nuclear threat to the whole of the free world. Their success has no doubt been achieved by the creation and concentration of tremendous technological resources under the single direction that their form of government makes possible. These resources may not be larger in total than those available to the West, but the free nations, and in particular the United States of America and the United Kingdom, who command the bulk of the free world’s military and scientific effort, have so far very largely gone their own separate ways. The only way that I can see in which we can increase our efforts quickly and restore the position is to return to that close integration of our efforts which brought us such striking success during the war. There is no difference in our aims and aspirations. Should we not join our paths to achieve them? If we are to achieve this purpose we must work together in the fields of greatest importance. While the greater part of the effort on the western side is in your country, we have large teams at work and I believe that in partnership with you we could make a very real contribution. Moreover, if a working partnership could be established between us, it could be extended to embrace the resources of the Commonwealth and our NATO allies. While complete integration might be the ultimate goal, I believe that the first effort at concentration ought to take place in those fields which will determine our security in the next decade. If you agree with this assessment, might not full scale integration in the fields of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, anti-missile defences, and anti-submarine weapons be the appropriate starting point? What I have in mind is not more extensive collaboration on parallel programmes, but a joint programme under common

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direction, utilizing to the maximum our joint resources and perhaps including a contribution from other NATO Powers, and some of the Commonwealth countries. I should much like to know what you think of these ideas. If you consider that they should be pursued I should be happy to meet you for a fuller discussion. 1

Macmillan’s reference to “recent news from the Soviet Union” was to the launching of the Sputnik satellite on 4 October 1957 and the furor which resulted from this scientific and technological achievement.

74 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 10, 1957 Dear Friend, Thank you for your letter of September 24 about Disarmament. We have been going further into the possibility of working out some formula which might strike the imagination of ordinary people. It is not easy. I had a long talk with Lewis Strauss yesterday and went into it fairly fully. He has offered to pass on our thoughts to Foster. The immediate problem is whether anything specific should be said in the General Assembly debate and no doubt Foster and Selwyn Lloyd will go into this when the latter is in Washington with The Queen next week. Meanwhile, what are we going to do about these Russians? I have been giving a great deal of thought to this in the last few days. I wish I could talk to you about it but I will try to set out my thoughts in this message. This artificial satellite has brought it home to us what formidable people they are and what a menace they present to the free world. Their resources and knowledge and their system of government will enable them to keep up the pressure for a very long time to come – perhaps two or three generations. After that we must hope that the Communistic ideology will be spent and that their people will revert gradually to ordinary human behaviour. Is the free world really equipped to meet this challenge? We have N.A.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O. and so on for military defence.1 Even in this field I fear lest organisations of this kind will lose their vitality and fail to answer to the reality of the situation. Yet it is certain that no country can do the job alone. When we were all rich we could all afford – for reasons of prestige and all sorts of other reasons – to go our own ways and to try to be self-sufficient. But none of us can now afford the waste of effort and duplication that this involves. The Russian challenge is on every front military, political, economic and ideological. The free world has tremendous resources to meet this challenge

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if it acts together; but these resources must not be dissipated. Has not the time come when we could go further towards pooling our efforts and decide how best to use them for our common good. I believe that if your country and ours could join together to guide and direct the efforts of the free world we can build up something that may not defeat the Russians, but will wear them out and force them to defeat themselves. One example of this pooling of resources springs obviously to mind. It is of course in such things as nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, anti-missile defences and anti-submarine weapons. By far the greater part of the resources and the effort on the Western side is in your country. But we have large teams at work and I believe that in partnership with you we could make a very real contribution. May this not be the moment to make a start here? But I am thinking equally of other fields. How can we counter the Russians in the economic field where they use their position as a socialist state for buying commodities above market prices for making barter deals and so on. We had “economic warfare” in the war. We may need it in the cold war. The same applies to counterpropaganda of all kinds. I have been tremendously impressed by the work our people have been doing together on the Syrian problem. Here is quiet efficient business-like cooperation such as has not existed since the war.2 I believe that here we have the key to a great new venture. I would like to see this sort of cooperation continued with a view to our working out together the role of the free countries in the struggle against Communist Russia. Each of the countries of the free world has its contribution to make – it may be military or scientific or economic or political. Surely these resources if purposefully directed will succeed where uncoordinated effort is bound to fail. I know that what I am saying is very general and abstract; and when there is time to think it through I will send you another message. But do let me know how you feel about this. It is the most important problem of our time and I feel sure that some bold new approach is needed. Yours very sincerely, Harold Macmillan. 1

2

SEATO refers to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, established in 1954. The initial members were France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, and the United States. The purpose of SEATO was to prevent the nations of Indochina (Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia) from falling under Communist domination. Macmillan’s reference here was to the work of the Syria Working Group, a task force of British and American officials, set up at the Bermuda Conference. In the summer and fall of 1957, the Syria Working Group had used a variety of diplomatic measures to prevent Syria, believed to be influenced by Nasser, from undermining the governments of its neighbors, Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey. See Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser, 130–2.

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75 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 11, 1957 Dear Harold: I hasten to send this immediate reply to your challenging letter, pending the time we can give you a further answer as a result of pondering the many important questions you raise. As you know, I have long been an earnest advocate of closer ties between our two countries. I believe that the nations of the free world cannot possibly carry the burdens and sacrifices necessary in the preservation of free systems of government unless they can have the confidence that those to whom they look for world leadership are bound together by common convictions, purposes and principles. I believe that all countries that fear themselves threatened by Communism or any other form of dictatorship look primarily to your country and to ours for the leadership they need. I think, therefore, that it is necessary not only that the highest officials of our two countries are close together in these matters, but that this understanding and agreement should, to the greatest possible measure, extend to our two people and indeed to as many more as we can reach. In one of the suggestions you make, we have already done some preliminary thinking. I refer to the Russian activities in pre-emptive buying. Existing legislation gives us no scope in this field. However, I hope that before long our staffs here will have some clear opinions on this matter, and certainly we will be more than happy to try to coordinate with your people these and other tentative conclusions. With warm personal regard, As ever,

76 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 15, 1957 Dear Harold: I completely agree that birthday anniversaries are getting harder and harder to accept. But I confess that, perhaps as a direct result of my increasing years, I seem to derive even more pleasure than formerly in the good wishes of my friends. At any rate, I assure you of my deep appreciation of your kind note.

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Washington – and, indeed, all the United States – is working itself up to a great pitch of excitement in anticipation of the visit of the Queen and Prince Phillip. I might add that the White House has not in the slightest escaped the prevalent mood! With warm regard, As ever, Ike P.S.: I keep torturing my imagination to discover ways and means whereby we could occasionally meet together, without creating the necessity for a communique or embarrassment for either of us in other countries.

77 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 16, 1957 Dear Friend, I have been thinking further about the questions which I raised in my last message to you, on which you sent me a preliminary reply on October 11, and I have now heard from Selwyn Lloyd of the long talk which he had with Foster yesterday afternoon. I agree with you that the best possible thing would be for us to meet and talk over the general situation and see whether we cannot together initiate some new approach to all these interconnected problems – military, economic, and political. It is more and more clear that we have to organise the free world as a whole in the struggle against communism. It is only by co-ordinating our efforts and those of our friends all over the world that we can hope to stem the tide and win over the waverers. If we could meet, we might be able to reach some general conclusions and draw up a joint directive to our staffs to enable work to be continued on specified tasks. I was very glad to hear from Selwyn that your thoughts are also turning in this direction. If we are to meet, we should do so as soon as possible – for you have Congress and I have Parliament – and if we could meet while Selwyn is still in Washington, he and Foster could follow through some of the points discussed between us. How is my visit to be explained? I have thought carefully about the possibility of some pretext like a lecture or a university degree, but these affairs are usually fixed some months beforehand and I fear that any such cover would be pretty transparent. I think it would be much better to be quite frank and issue a statement to the effect that we have both felt the time had come to take up again the personal talks which we began in Bermuda. I have

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had a shot at a draft of the sort of statement which we might issue, here and in Washington and I attach a copy. I could leave here on the night of Tuesday, 22nd October, which would allow me to meet The Queen on Her return to London, and arrive in Washington in the afternoon of Wednesday, the 23rd. I would have to leave you not later than the night of Sunday, the 27th. Will you let me know whether you could manage a meeting between those dates? It would be necessary for me to obtain The Queen’s approval and as soon as I hear from you I will arrange to seek Her consent. This of course can be done in Washington. In order to reduce any impression that this is an emergency meeting, it occurs to me that we might say, either in the formal announcement or informally to the press, that I had hoped to be able to come to Washington on my way back from Australia in February but I had felt on reflection that this would involve my missing a further period of the Parliamentary session and that it would be better to make this visit now before Parliament reassembles.

78 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 25, 1957 Dear Mr. President: I cannot leave Washington without sending you a few hurried words to express my gratitude to you. It has been of tremendous value for me to have had these quiet unofficial talks with you and Foster.1 Although at one time we both thought it very difficult to arrange such a meeting it somehow seems to have gone off without causing any undue trouble or alarm. I hope that this means that we may be able to have further meetings with the same informality. Of course if the NATO plan comes off and you are able to come to England in the course of it it will be another chance for at least a short talk. However, this is not really my purpose in writing. What I want to say, but find it difficult to express, is the sense of inspiration which these last few days have given me and, I think, all our associates. The whole spirit of our talks together at the top seems to have spread right through all our colleagues and assistants. We have got a pretty difficult job, but it is fine to feel that we are setting about it with such confidence in each other. We have got to spread that confidence through all our efforts all over the world, and I am very grateful for the theme which you developed

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that our two countries are working together not to rule or to impose our will, but to serve. Yours very sincerely Harold Macmillan 1

Macmillan refers to his talks with Eisenhower between 23 and 25 October 1957 where the British and Americans agreed on the “Declaration of Common Purpose” and cooperation in the realm of defense strategy.

79 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 29, 1957 The note you wrote to me just before you left Washington expressed in words far better than any I have at my command the feeling of gratification I have that our two countries are increasingly good partners – in the eyes of the world as well as in the reality that always existed despite our misunderstandings. There never has been any doubt in my mind that in an emergency we would, as we have done before, find ourselves shoulder to shoulder. But it is reassuring to know that in the more difficult job of waging the peace we are, all of us, again working toward a common goal. I, too, am certain that our pledge of confidence in each other will be reflected in a lessening of tensions among all the nations of the free world. It does seem as if that bugaboo of suspicion of bilateral talks has been at least diluted, and for that, too, I am delighted. I hope that you will keep in close touch with me. I value our correspondence, as I do our friendship. With warm regard

80 HAROLD CACCIA TO EISENHOWER October 31, 1957 My dear Mr. President, The Prime Minister has sent me an urgent message asking me to take up with you the possibility of a visit by yourself and Mrs. Eisenhower to the United Kingdom in connection with your attendance at the December

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meeting of the NATO Council. He has discussed this with The Queen, and I am to tell you that if you are able to come, The Queen would be pleased to extend a formal invitation immediately. Subject to your own engagements, the visit could take place either before or after the NATO meeting. The Prime Minster thought that you might consider the latter would be preferable. Before the meeting there is a lot of work to be done, and there is also the consideration that we do not wish to appear to be “ganging up” on other NATO members. On the assumption that the NATO meeting will last for some two or three days, the Prime Minister would suggest that you might consider coming to London in the afternoon or evening of December 18. As regards the duration of any visit, the Prime Minister wants me to say that your own wishes would be decisive, but in case you would not yourself wish to spend too long outside the United States, he had been thinking in terms of about two days for the visit to the United Kingdom. The Queen would naturally wish you and Mrs. Eisenhower to be her guests at Buckingham Palace. The programme would of course be for arrangement, but would include a State Banquet and Reception on the night of your arrival. The Prime Minister has asked me to say that you would give great pleasure if you would accept an invitation to the Guild Hall of the City of London, of which you are an Honorary Freeman. If it were thought desirable, provision could be made in the programme for one or two working meetings. If you would be able to accept an invitation for such a visit, the Prime Minister thought that the question might arise, how it should be described. It occurred to him that it might suit you best if it were called an “official visit”. If so, there would certainly be no objection on his side. Alternatively, if it were more convenient for you, he would be quite content for it simply to be called “a visit”. The Prime Minister has asked me to ascertain your wishes, and I am of course at your disposal if you would wish to see me or want me to convey a reply. Yours sincerely, Harold Caccia

81 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER November 2, 19571 Dear Friend, I was so very sorry to learn on Saturday that there is some doubt about Mrs. Eisenhower’s health if she were to undertake a journey across the

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Atlantic. I do hope so much that the check-up which I am told Mrs. Eisenhower is having on November 4th will show any misgivings to be quite unfounded, for I know that The Queen is much looking forward to seeing you both in December.1 I need hardly say how much I too hope that you and Mrs. Eisenhower will be able to come here in December. I feel that your visit to N.A.T.O. will provide an opportunity for you to visit this country without causing difficulties with other friendly countries, and that such a good moment is unlikely to recur. Naturally, we should be enormously pleased if Mrs. Eisenhower could come as well, but I hope that you will not altogether exclude the possibility of coming on from Paris by yourself, if unfortunately you would not otherwise be able to come at all in the near future. Warm regards, Harold 1

Through Secretary Dulles, who had discussed Caccia’s message with Eisenhower, and also from Ambassador Caccia, Macmillan had learned that Mamie Eisenhower’s recent health problems prevented a visit to Europe. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XVIII, 542.

82 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN November 4, 1957 Dear Harold: Please inform Her Majesty that I am most deeply appreciative of her gracious thought that, provided we might be able to accept, she would issue to Mrs. Eisenhower and me an invitation to visit the United Kingdom at the conclusion of the NATO meeting. I must regretfully inform you of my belief that an invitation should not be issued for reasons that are largely personal, but nevertheless, I believe, very important. The doctors deem it inadvisable for Mrs. Eisenhower now to undertake a trip that would be as arduous as would two trans-oceanic journeys within a period of five or six days. They believe that her present satisfactory rate of progress toward her accustomed health and vigor would receive a definite setback and one that could be very damaging to her general nervous system; whereas if she does nothing more than routine over the next several months, they are sure she will continue her rapid improvement. It seems to me a State visit would lose much of its appeal to the ordinary person and could not fail to lose in sentimental value unless I were

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accompanied by my wife in making a visit to The Queen. Consequently, I think that for me individually to stop for a day or two in London could not by any means be considered as adequately fulfilling the desirable objectives of a State visit. Therefore I believe it would be better to defer the matter in the hope that before the end of this Administration Mrs. Eisenhower and I could find an opportunity to come to your country, even if it might require on our part a brief visit to other major countries in the NATO region. I realize that if I were able to accept your present suggestion, we could make the proposed visit without the implied need for going elsewhere and with the minimum of travel complications. Consequently I am doubly grateful to you for this consideration of our convenience and time. But in view of Mrs. Eisenhower’s situation, I have given you my full thought on the matter. And I should add not only a repetition of my gratitude for the Queen’s hospitable gesture but my sincere hope that at some later date my wife and I can make the trip. If possible, please convey our greetings and best wishes to Her Majesty and to Prince Philip. With warm regard, As ever Dear Harold: I was about to send you the attached when your further note of November 4 came in. I truly believe that my viewpoint about the value of these visits has considerable validity and that we should look for a later opportunity when the two of us can come together to return the Queen’s visit. I have asked Foster to agree with Caccia on some statement for press background. Sincerely, DE

83 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER November 4, 1957 Dear Friend, I was indeed sorry to learn today from your messages that Mrs. Eisenhower is not fit to stand the journey across the Atlantic. Of course, her health must be a paramount consideration for you, and although I am sorry that you do not feel able to come alone, I fully understand how you feel. I shall explain the position to The Queen this evening, and I am sure that Her Majesty,

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while much regretting that you will not be coming at this time, will entirely accept the position. Please convey my good wishes to Mrs. Eisenhower and say how much I regret that her health is not yet good enough to support trans-Atlantic flights. I am sending a message to Foster about press guidance. Warm regards, Harold

84 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER November 26, 1957 Dear Friend, I have just heard the news of your illness. I am indeed distressed, and hope that you will make a very rapid and complete recovery. Pray take care of yourself, for you are very precious to us all. We will do our best to carry on the work that we began in Washington.1 All good wishes, Harold Macmillan 1

On 25 November 1957, Eisenhower suffered a slight stroke while he was eating his lunch at his desk in the Oval Office. Although there were serious apprehensions raised within the Administration about the president’s future health prospects, Eisenhower’s condition improved dramatically in the next month. Macmillan was quick to send Eisenhower his best wishes.

85 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN November 30, 1957 Dear Harold: I cannot tell you how much I appreciate your message of the twenty-sixth. Fortunately I seem to have made better progress than the doctors originally anticipated, and at the moment Mamie and I are enjoying a quiet Gettysburg weekend.

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It is gratifying to know that you and my able associates here are carrying on the programs that we discussed when you were here. I shall want to write you personally as soon as possible, but meantime again my thanks for your cable and, as always, my warm personal regard. Ike

86 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN December 4, 1957 Dear Harold, My recovery from my sudden illness of ten days ago has apparently been steady and rapid. The earliest symptoms of my indisposition were sufficiently slight that the doctors did not class the difficulty as a “stroke.” However, I did suffer a marked “word confusion,” with, also, some loss of memory of words alone.1 In all other respects, I was not aware of any physical impairment, and within twenty-four hours I began to improve. While I still speak a bit more slowly and will occasionally mispronounce a word, I am sure that the doctors are most optimistic of my complete recovery. All this means, as of this moment, that I am planning to be at the NATO meeting in mid-month. It is possible that I will try to avoid any lengthy public addresses, but otherwise I see no reason for curtailing my normal activity. All this I have told you in some detail so that you will not overstress whatever remaining difficulty that I may have when I see you. We have been having a series of meetings preparing programs for the coming session of Congress, starting in early January. With these out of the way, Foster and I will be right busy in preparatory work for the NATO meeting. I believe that the first meeting is to be Monday noon. In order that I may have a reasonable period of rest after my transatlantic trip, I may plan on reaching Paris about Saturday noon. I might use this interval not only for some rest and additional briefing, but I should like also, if possible, to take a short visit to SHAPE just to see how my old headquarters has prospered.2 It would be fun to see the place once more. Looking forward to seeing you in Paris, and with my warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

After consulting with his doctors, Eisenhower agreed to attend the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris in mid-December 1957. Eisenhower viewed his

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2

attendance at this meeting as a “drastic personal test” as to whether he still had the necessary physical and mental stamina to discharge the duties of the presidency. See Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 227–35. The initials SHAPE stand for Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, whose headquarters was located outside of Paris. Eisenhower was referring to his period as the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe in the early 1950s.

87 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER December 9, 1957 Dear Friend, I was delighted to get your message. This is good news indeed. I will be in Paris Saturday morning, and have provisionally booked lunch with Foster that day. I very much look forward to seeing you, and I hope that it may be possible for us to have some talk before the main meetings begin on Monday. Warm regards, Harold.

88 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER December 25, 1957 My dear Friend, This is just a message to send you all my best wishes for Christmas and for the coming year. It was a great joy to see you in Paris and talk again with you. I must congratulate you on the wonderful way in which you carried through the whole affair. There is no doubt that your presence had a tremendous effect and the decision taken at our Washington meeting was proved right. My impression of our NATO colleagues was that they were thoughtful and anxious, but by no means lacking in courage or determination. In the new situation the more active part we can make them play, the better it will be. Having been to many NATO discussions, I felt this one had more life and reality in it than some I have attended. I have just read your address to the nation, which has been well reported in our press. If I may say so, it strikes just the right note. I am brooding over what we are to do next, and will send you a message before I leave for my tour of the Commonwealth, which starts on January 7. I shall broadcast to our people on Saturday the 4th.

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As in war, so in this strange twilight that is neither quite war nor peace, much depends on morale and making people feel that peace is not just a state of things that comes about naturally like a fine summer day, but something that we have got to work and strive for. All good wishes

89 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN December 26, 1957 Dear Harold: One of the nicest Christmas presents I had yesterday was your warm message of greetings and good wishes. As you would know, I have been much preoccupied since my return from Paris, not only in preparing my part of Foster’s and my joint report to the American people, but with public and private Christmas chores. I thoroughly agree with your appraisal that the NATO meeting was a definite plus for the free world. Added to that is my conviction that your stellar performance was one thing that accounted for such successes as we achieved. For a number of years I have had, in one capacity or another, occasions to confer seriously with individuals or governments other than American. Never have I experienced any greater degree of satisfaction in such conferences than in talks with you. Always your approach to any difficult task seems to be based upon fact, logic, readiness to consider opposing viewpoints, and what seems to be a never-failing friendliness. I shall be very interested in your speech of the fourth, as well as in the message that you promise me before you start on your Commonwealth tour. Like you, I am concerned with what we should next do; by no means can we sit still. To do so would make certain of deterioration. Instead we must make certain that NATO becomes constantly a stronger, more confident and more peaceful organization – something that will come about only as all our partners, and most particularly as we two, everlastingly stay on the job. Especially I was pleased to learn that we are getting additional task forces to keep after the business of concerting our viewpoints in particular situations, the latest one being Indonesia.1 With my warmest wishes for the holiday season and a successful New Year, 1

As noted by Galambos and van Ee, the reference to the situation in Indonesia was deleted from the final version of this message. See Papers of DDE, XVIII, 626.

2 1958: The Policy Dimension of the Macmillan–Eisenhower Relationship

For Harold Macmillan and Dwight D. Eisenhower, the dynamics of British– American relations were considerably different in 1958 than they had been in 1957. The two leaders had spent much of 1957 in a lengthy fence-mending exercise, and their meetings at Bermuda in March, at Washington in October, and then at Paris in December had solidified their diplomatic partnership and overcome much of the tension that had existed between Britain and the United States in the aftermath of the Suez crisis. As 1958 began, Macmillan and Eisenhower faced a different set of domestic challenges, however. For Macmillan, Britain’s entry into the group of nations which possessed nuclear weapons, combined with its partnership with the United States in the strategic realm, led to increased anxiety within Great Britain that the British might be drawn into any nuclear war involving the United States and the Soviet Union. In February 1958, anti-nuclear activists in Britain formed the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), an organization which advocated an end to the arms race through the destruction of nuclear arsenals, an end to nuclear testing, and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe. For domestic political reasons, Macmillan kept a wary eye on anti-nuclear sentiment in Britain and, more specifically, on whether the opposition Labour Party intended to exploit these feelings as a political issue against the Conservatives.1 For Dwight D. Eisenhower, domestic politics pulled him in a different direction. After the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik in October 1957, Ike faced mounting pressures to increase the federal commitment both to missile technology and to national defense. The launching of Sputnik in October was followed by the revelation, within the government, of the secret Gaither Commission report in the winter of 1957–58. The Gaither report advocated an increase in the defense budget considerably beyond its current level of $38 billion in addition to an expansion of the commitments to missile technology and satellites.2 So while Macmillan’s political 99

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opposition opposed any future large-scale commitments to defense and nuclear weapons, Eisenhower’s critics attempted to pull him in the opposite direction. Macmillan’s solution for slowing the arms race, reducing tensions between East and West, and taking some momentum from his political opposition was the pursuit of a summit conference involving the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Since the mid-1950s, disarmament negotiations between the four nations had occurred within the province of the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament. These negotiations had produced few substantive results. Macmillan wanted to rescue disarmament negotiations from the United Nations and place them instead at the level of the heads of government. Macmillan envisioned an international environment where the summit conference “would become an annual event, looked forward to not with undue optimism, but accepted as the way the world was to be governed, replacing, in effect, the Security Council and the General Assembly [of the United Nations] which had completely failed to dominate any great issue, and leading to a gradual détente and agreement on more and more points.”3 Eisenhower was skeptical about the effectiveness of summit conferences, however, because the first of the postwar summits, at Geneva in July 1955, had yielded few positive results. While Macmillan believed that the process of summitry, “a series of meetings, each one leading on to the next,”4 served a useful purpose, Eisenhower believed that summit meetings which failed to provide tangible results in the form of verifiable agreements could only deteriorate into propaganda victories for the Soviets. By the beginning of 1958, both Macmillan and Eisenhower held conflicting views on the utility of summitry as an approach to international diplomacy. Beyond the twin issues of disarmament and summitry in 1958, Macmillan and Eisenhower were forced to deal with four separate diplomatic crises. The first threat to international stability occurred in the Middle East in July, when a military coup in Iraq threatened pro-western governments in Lebanon and Jordan. In mid-July, Eisenhower responded to the violence in the region by sending a contingent of several thousand American troops to Lebanon to support the government of Camille Chamoun. At the same time, the British intervened in Jordan to reinforce their support for the government of King Hussein. Then, in September, another situation flared up in East Asia, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) threatened the security of the Republic of China (ROC) by shelling the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Formosa Straits belonging to the ROC. Although each side in this dispute charged the other with acts of provocation, the United States needed to support the ROC, its ally, against the threat from the PRC. Through some unusual but shrewd and highly effective diplomacy, Eisenhower managed to resolve the crisis before it became a regional military conflict.

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At the same time as the Formosa Straits crisis in East Asia, Macmillan was once again forced to turn his attention to the problems in Cyprus. Renewed strife on Cyprus necessitated a visit to the region by Macmillan and another intensive round of negotiations with the governments of Greece and Turkey. While Macmillan’s intervention in August failed to produce a satisfactory resolution to the dispute in Cyprus, it managed to set a framework for a more successful round of negotiations which began early in 1959. Then, in November, Nikita Khrushchev provoked the most serious crisis of 1958 by demanding that the United States, Great Britain, and France agree to terminate the four-power status of occupation which existed in Berlin. Perhaps emboldened by the scientific achievements of Soviet technology and by the problems encountered by the United States and Great Britain in the Middle East and in Asia, Khrushchev chose to intensify the Cold War at a particularly delicate time with the hope of advancing the position of the Soviet Union in international affairs. Khrushchev’s behavior symbolized the tensions which existed throughout 1958, “the Year of International Crisis” in the words of Macmillan’s biographer Alistair Horne.5 Macmillan set out his thoughts for 1958 in a lengthy letter, dated 2 January, which he sent to Eisenhower. In this letter, Macmillan ranged broadly over a host of issues, from nuclear weapons development, disarmament and arms control, to the buildup of conventional forces in Europe. He conspicuously returned to the theme of unity between himself and Eisenhower, and between Great Britain and the United States.6 In this letter, Macmillan extolled the virtues of military strength and the need for firmness in dealing with the Soviet Union, but he also advocated the pursuit of a new approach to reducing the tensions of the Cold War. Perhaps reflecting his sensitivity to anti-nuclear sentiment in Britain and throughout Europe, he encouraged Ike to adopt a more conciliatory tone internationally. He then proposed that a meeting of the various foreign ministers might be more successful in breaking the deadlock on arms control than the disarmament group then operating under the United Nations. Progress at the level of the foreign ministers, Macmillan argued, might create an opportunity for his prized objective, a summit meeting involving the heads of government.7 Eisenhower carefully read Macmillan’s letter, underlining several passages that captured his interest. Ike’s jottings can be seen throughout the letter, indicating points intended for discussion with John Foster Dulles. Then Eisenhower prepared a lengthy memorandum for Dulles, in which he made a specific mention of his skepticism about the value of a summit meeting with the Soviets.8 On 5 January, Eisenhower responded to Macmillan’s letter and commented extensively on the prime minister’s thoughts regarding disarmament but specifically refused to mention Macmillan’s initiative for a possible summit meeting.9 Throughout the winter and spring of 1958, Macmillan and Eisenhower continued to joust rhetorically about the advisability of a summit meeting

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with the Russians. But like Macmillan, Ike also had domestic political considerations on his mind. The Republicans faced a difficult challenge in the upcoming Congressional elections in November, and Eisenhower (and Dulles) did not wish to hand the Soviets any propaganda victories, resulting from another disappointing summit conference, before Americans voted in the autumn.10 Still, Macmillan continued to press his case for a summit meeting. Between 9 and 11 June, Macmillan and Eisenhower met for another set of bilateral meetings when Macmillan combined a speaking engagement at DePauw University in Indiana on 8 June with a series of meetings with Eisenhower and Dulles in Washington. On 10 June, Macmillan publicly emphasized his belief in a summit meeting when he gave a commencement address at Johns Hopkins University in nearby Baltimore. Dr Milton S. Eisenhower, Ike’s youngest brother and the president of Johns Hopkins, had issued Macmillan an invitation (through the president) to attend the commencement, deliver a short address, and then receive an honorary doctoral degree. In his remarks, Macmillan told the graduating class, “Naturally I do not believe that at a Summit, or at any other meeting, five or six men can in four days bridge the immense chasm [between them]. It would be folly to suppose so,” he said. “But, if conditions are favorable, and if the will is there, they might first make a little progress here, and then a little there, and so bring us out of a condition of stalemate into one of negotiation.”11 At the same time as Macmillan and Eisenhower were sparring over the issue of a summit conference, some slight movement occurred in the disarmament negotiations. In March, both sides showed some willingness to compromise over their positions. The Soviets announced a unilateral suspension of their nuclear tests and called upon the United States and Britain to do likewise. Under considerable pressure from world public opinion, Macmillan and Eisenhower responded to the Soviet offer by calling for a meeting of western and Soviet-bloc nations in Geneva to produce an inspection regimen acceptable to the respective sides. A group of 15 scientists drawn from both sides met in Geneva in July and issued a report outlining the considerations involved in a ban on atmospheric testing as well as an inspection and detection regimen for underground testing. After the Geneva negotiators issued their report, Eisenhower announced a one-year moratorium on nuclear tests, provided that the Soviets reciprocated. The Russians refused to agree, however, citing differences over the number of non-Soviet inspectors to be allowed into their country. Deadlocked on the matter of detection and inspection, the two sides once again slid back into a negotiating stalemate.12 In 1958, Macmillan reckoned that he devoted more than half of his working time to the problems and challenges of the international situation.13 From July to December, Eisenhower and Macmillan dealt with a rapid-fire set of international crises: the outbreak of violence in the Middle East in July,

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renewed strife in Cyprus in August, the Formosa Straits crisis in August and September, and, in November, Khrushchev’s demand for solving the Berlin dispute within a six-month timetable. The post-Suez problems in the Middle East generated considerable discussion between Macmillan, Eisenhower, and their advisers during their meetings between 9 and 11 June. The major concern involved maintaining the stability of the pro-western governments in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia that were under considerable pressure from the propaganda directed at them by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and his supporters throughout the region. The possibility that Nasser, in turn, might be acting as a client for Soviet interests in the Middle East created serious anxiety in both Washington and London. Within a month of the Macmillan–Eisenhower meetings in Washington, British and American policy received a severe jolt. On 13 July Iraqi military leader Abdul Karim Kassem staged a revolt against the government and the reigning royal family. Kassem’s forces stormed the royal palace in Baghdad, killing King Faisal II and Crown Prince Abdullah. Nuri as-Said, the prime minister, managed to escape on 13 July but was apprehended the next day by Kassem’s forces and murdered.14 Kassem was obviously pro-Nasser, but the extent to which he was acting on Nasser’s behalf was unclear. Nasser’s propagandists in Cairo did, however, begin broadcasting a call for Nasser supporters throughout the Middle East to take action against the region’s ruling families. To the British, Nasser’s words meant the destabilization of Jordan and King Hussein. To the United States, Nasser appeared to be threatening the House of Saud as well as the pro-western government of Camille Chamoun in Lebanon. Eisenhower spent 14 July responding to the crisis. Following the coup in Iraq, Chamoun issued an immediate request for American military intervention in Lebanon. Eisenhower then met with his military, diplomatic, and political advisers, as well as with the leaders of Congress. Following these consultations, Ike authorized General Nathan F. Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to order the Sixth Fleet and a Marine contingent to Lebanon.15 Harold Macmillan also spent much of 14 July following the crisis in the Middle East. During the violence on 13 July, the mob which had killed the members of the royal family had also attacked the British Embassy in Baghdad and murdered one British diplomat. The British ambassador in Iraq, and members of his staff, fled to safety in a nearby hotel.16 On the afternoon of 14 July (late evening in London), Eisenhower and Macmillan discussed the crisis during a telephone conversation. Ike informed the prime minister of his decision to intervene in Lebanon. For Macmillan, the news from the president was disappointing: not only were the Americans going to intervene in Lebanon, but they also intended to “go it alone” and to confine their activity solely to Lebanon. Macmillan

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envisioned a more ambitious undertaking, a combined British–American enterprise designed to overthrow Nasser. “You are doing a Suez on me,” Macmillan told Ike.17 Nevertheless, in his conversation with Macmillan, Eisenhower reemphasized his lack of willingness to expand any military operation beyond Lebanon, at least for the moment. Macmillan mildly protested but Eisenhower refused to alter his position. On 15 July, Eisenhower informed Congress and the American people that American forces were to intervene in Lebanon. The landings occurred as scheduled and, before the day was over, American and Lebanese forces patrolled the streets of Beirut to maintain calm in the city. In the next two weeks, the United States landed an impressive military force in Lebanon, including Marine forces traveling with the Sixth Fleet, and Army units sent from Germany, armed with Honest John rockets which possessed a nuclear capability.18 The American intervention also had its important political and diplomatic dimensions. On 15 July, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge introduced a resolution in the United Nations calling for an international peace-keeping force to take over in Lebanon once the situation was stabilized. Then, on 16 July, Eisenhower dispatched Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to Lebanon as his emissary. In addition to the potential threat from anti-western elements in the Middle East, the situation in Lebanon was complicated by Chamoun’s unwillingness to forego a second presidential term – an action which provoked conflict between the Maronite Christians (Chamoun’s supporters) and the Muslim element in the country. Eisenhower wanted Murphy to obtain Chamoun’s promise not to seek re-election and, having obtained such a pledge, to assure the competing religious factions in the country that the United States would use its good offices to assure a fair election for Chamoun’s successor. Between 17 and 30 July, Murphy met with the leaders of Lebanon’s Muslim and Christian factions, reassuring them that the United States wanted a peaceful resolution to the domestic strife in Lebanon. Murphy managed to obtain such a pledge from Chamoun and then, at the end of July, left Lebanon to confer with Arab leaders in other countries, including with King Hussein in Jordan, General Kassem in Iraq, and even with Nasser in Egypt.19 The British also played a role in the crisis, primarily by their intervention in support of King Hussein in Jordan after the King requested British intervention on 16 July. At 11 p.m. that evening, Macmillan convened his Cabinet and his military chiefs to discuss a response to Hussein. The meeting lasted until 3 a.m. on 17 July when a decision was finally reached in favor of assisting King Hussein. Correspondingly, the British ordered a contingent of 2,700 paratroopers to fly from Cyprus to seize the airport in Amman and otherwise lend support to King Hussein. The British intervention in Jordan caused Macmillan a great deal of anxiety, but he nevertheless had not given up on the goal of expanding the

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conflict to oust Nasser. On 17 July, Macmillan continued to coax the president, saying, “Now that we have started on this difficult road, I do not see how we can withdraw until we have somehow returned stability and strength, in at least some areas in the Middle East.”20 In responding to Macmillan on 18 July, however, Eisenhower expressed his support for the British decision to intervene in Jordan but promised only logistical help for their mission.21 In the several tense days which followed, the British position in Jordan was highly precarious, and Macmillan grew frustrated with Eisenhower’s unwillingness to commit the United States to a larger military role. According to Alistair Horne, the Americans had decided “to leave Jordan exclusively to the British and only support them if they got in trouble.”22 Nevertheless, the aims of both the British and the Americans were largely achieved in the interventions in Lebanon and Jordan. The United States and Great Britain had defended their friends in the region and had served a powerful warning to their adversaries – including Nasser – that they would act in support of their interests. By the end of September, American and British troops had begun their departures from Lebanon and Jordan. By 25 October, American troops had completed their withdrawal from Lebanon and British troops had withdrawn from Jordan by 2 November.23 After the Middle East crisis of 1958, Eisenhower and Macmillan wrote each other separate letters, designed to smooth over any differences they may have had in July.24 Then, in conversations at Camp David in March 1959, both Eisenhower and Macmillan were still expressing their relief that the British and American interventions in the Middle East had not resulted in a major international crisis. Macmillan noted that the exercise had been “a risky performance and that we had been lucky to get out as well as we did.” Ike agreed, noting that “it had been the kind of intervention which had not left a nasty after-taste.”25 While Eisenhower and Macmillan were dealing with the interventions in Lebanon and Jordan, another disquieting situation developed in East Asia. On 23 August, the People’s Republic of China began the bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, two islands off-shore of Formosa and the Republic of China in Taiwan. The question that confronted Eisenhower, and to a lesser extent Macmillan, was whether the Chinese communists were taking advantage of the problems in the Middle East to mount an invasion of these islands and thereby provoke a confrontation with the ROC. According to its policy, the United States was pledged to defend the ROC from attack by the communists. If the United States chose to defend the ROC by attacking the PRC, would that, in turn, precipitate a war with the Soviet Union, presumed to be allied with the PRC? After the shelling began on 23 August, Eisenhower’s public statements counseled restraint. On 25 August, he informed the Cabinet that the United States would not publicize the dispute but it would reassure the ROC of its

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support in the event of an invasion. On 27 August, the PRC intensified the rhetoric by threatening an armed invasion of Quemoy and Matsu, to be followed by an invasion of Taiwan.26 The increasingly bellicose language of the Chinese communists resulted in some hardening of the Administration’s position, especially by Secretary of State Dulles and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both Dulles and General Nathan Twining foresaw the prospect of an American attack upon the PRC, using low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, if the communists followed through with an invasion of Taiwan.27 Macmillan was apprehensive about the turn of events in East Asia for two reasons. First, he did not want the situation to spiral out of control, resulting in a nuclear war between the United States and the PRC, or worse, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Second, Macmillan was concerned about the future of British interests in Hong Kong in the event of a regional war in Asia. At the Washington Conference in October 1957, Macmillan had received a highly secret pledge from Eisenhower that the United States would support British interests in Hong Kong if the British refused to support the admission of the PRC to the United Nations.28 The security of Hong Kong might be jeopardized if a wider war in Asia were to break out. With these concerns in mind, Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower on 3 September, cautioning the president that British public opinion on the East Asian issue may differ considerably from public opinion in America. Should military action occur, Macmillan warned, he would have “to try to steer public opinion here at very short notice.”29 On 4 September, Dulles met with Eisenhower in Newport, Rhode Island, where Ike was vacationing. Although unwilling to reduce the American commitment to Taiwan, neither was Eisenhower willing to threaten a nuclear attack upon the Chinese mainland. Following his meeting with Eisenhower, Dulles responded to Macmillan, but not in the cautious vein of his meeting with Ike. Macmillan was not pleased with the ominous tone of the letter from Dulles, especially since the secretary of state held out the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used against the PRC if it invaded Taiwan.30 Dulles’s pessimistic assessment of the situation in Asia prompted an immediate response from Macmillan on 5 September. He emphasized that British public opinion would not support American military action against China, at least over the matter of the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. He explained to Dulles how the various members of the British Commonwealth (especially those in Asia) viewed the crisis. Macmillan then expressed his support for a suggestion which Dulles had made on 4 September to Lord Samuel Hood, of the British Embassy, for a demilitarization of Quemoy and Matsu that would lead to negotiations through the United Nations, as a way of

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resolving the crisis. Above all, Macmillan indicated, he wanted to avoid the possibility that the crisis in East Asia might “be the prelude to a third world war.”31 On 6 September, Eisenhower responded to Macmillan in language that was more reassuring.32 At this point, however, Dulles’s suggestion to Lord Hood about a possible demilitarization of Quemoy and Matsu had created some positive movement in the diplomatic sphere. By 15 September, arrangements had been made between the United States and the PRC to commence negotiations in Poland to resolve the dispute.33 While agreement was not immediately forthcoming, by the end of September Dulles was able to announce a withdrawal of Nationalist Chinese from Quemoy and Matsu, thereby removing a major source of contention in the dispute. One month later, the crisis had passed, leaving Macmillan bewildered by the behavior of the PRC in fomenting the “puzzle” of the crisis in the first place.34 Regardless, the patient diplomacy of the Eisenhower Administration, with some helpful suggestions from the sidelines by the British, had enabled the allies to prevent a “Munich of the East” in 1958.35 At the same time that the Americans were dealing with the problems in East Asia, Macmillan was forced, yet again, to concern himself with the issue of Cyprus. In August, violence had once more broken out between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island, and Cypriot terrorists had killed two British soldiers. Macmillan immediately scheduled a visit to the region where he met with Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis in Athens and Turkish Prime Minister Menderes in Ankara. He then moved on to Cyprus where he enjoyed a visit to his former military unit, the Grenadier Guards. In August, Macmillan introduced the outline of the negotiating positions which he hoped would resolve the Cyprus issue.36 By the end of September, with sporadic violence still occurring in Cyprus, Macmillan remained pessimistic about finding a solution to this problem. On 24 September, he wrote to Eisenhower, explaining the results of his discussions with the parties in the conflict in August and how he expected events to play out.37 However, it was not until the following February that Macmillan and the British Government were to reach a satisfactory resolution to the problems in Cyprus. The most serious of the international crises of 1958 began in November when Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev chose to increase tensions by raising the issue of divided Berlin. On 10 November, he told a large audience of Polish and Russian Communist dignitaries at the Sports Palace in Moscow that the western powers had violated their postwar agreements over the future of Germany. Khrushchev then called upon the United States, Great Britain, and France to end their occupation of West Berlin.38 Furthermore, Khrushchev indicated that the Soviet Union intended to negotiate a separate treaty with the German Democratic Republic (East

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Germany), in effect giving the East German government authority over the access routes to Berlin. If Khrushchev followed through with his plan, the western powers would be forced to negotiate arrangements with East Germany, a country which they did not recognize diplomatically, in order to maintain their rights in Berlin. Khrushchev’s speech on 10 November was interpreted in the West as a tactic designed to push the United States, Great Britain, and France out of Berlin. In Washington, Eisenhower indicated that the United States expected to maintain its rights in Berlin and support its West German ally. Otherwise, caution was once again the watchword.39 On 27 November, however, Khrushchev raised the level of tension even higher by sending a diplomatic note to the United States, Great Britain, and France, demanding that West Berlin be turned into a neutral city with its access controlled by East Germany. In effect, Khrushchev’s action on 27 November constituted an ultimatum: the West had six months to reach an agreement or the Soviet Union intended to sign a separate treaty with East Germany and give the East Germans control of the access routes to Berlin.40 Clearly, the issuance of the six-month deadline held out the prospect of an armed confrontation between the western powers and the Soviet Union, if a settlement could not be reached. Historian William Taubman has succinctly summarized the West’s dilemma. “If the West didn’t recognize East Germany,” Taubman wrote in his biography of Khrushchev, “Moscow would give Walter Ulbricht [the leader of East Germany] control over access to Berlin, thus abrogating Western rights established in the postwar Potsdam accords. If the Western powers tried forcibly to prevent East Germany from carrying out its new duties, Moscow would fight to defend its ally.”41 The Berlin crisis gave a new urgency to the problems of the Cold War. Khrushchev’s behavior over the Berlin dispute forced both Eisenhower and Macmillan to deal with him on personal terms. While Khrushchev’s motivations for provoking the Berlin crisis remained somewhat unclear at the time, his actions nevertheless prompted Macmillan, early in 1959, and then Eisenhower, later in 1959, to pursue direct negotiations with him in order to ascertain the direction of Soviet foreign policy in Europe. Thus, the events of 1958 revealed the extent to which Eisenhower, Macmillan, and to a lesser extent Foster Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd, had personalized British–American diplomacy. During the crises in the Middle East in July and in East Asia in September, Eisenhower and Macmillan stayed in direct contact, virtually on a daily basis. In fact, throughout 1958, the two leaders regularly exchanged their views on the major international issues of the time, especially summitry and disarmament. While Macmillan was unable, at least in 1958, to alter the basic direction of American policy, neither did Eisenhower and Dulles formulate their approach to international

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problems without consulting Macmillan and considering the British perspective. In less than two years, Macmillan had achieved the notable feat of orchestrating Britain’s return to the diplomatic “top table,” using the relationship with the United States as his primary instrument. As Nigel Ashton has written, Macmillan viewed the revival of the Anglo-American relationship as a means of achieving British foreign policy objectives, not simply “as an end in itself.”42 By the end of 1958, Macmillan had positioned himself to make a more forceful demonstration of British foreign policy objectives upon the international scene.

Notes 1. Richard Aldous, “A Family Affair: the Art of Personal Diplomacy,” in Aldous and Lee (eds), Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role, 18. 2. Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 434–5. 3. Harold Macmillan, interview with Robert McKenzie, 14–15, CCO Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford. 4. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 102–3. 5. Horne, Macmillan, II, 92–113. 6. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 2 January 1958, EL, WFIS, Box 23. Macmillan actually wrote the letter on 1 January 1958, but it is recorded in the Eisenhower Library as occurring on 2 January since it was received at the White House on that date. See also United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–60 Vol. VII, Part 1, Western European Security and Integration, Canada (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), 794–9. 7. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 2 January 1958. 8. Eisenhower to John Foster Dulles, Memorandum of Letter of Prime Minister Macmillan Dated 1/2/58, 3 January 1958, EL, WFIS, Box 23. 9. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 5 January 1958, EL, WFIS, Box 23. 10. Dulles to American Embassy, London, 4 March 1958, 1–2, EL, WFIS, Box 23. 11. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 495. 12. Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line: the Eisenhower Era, 1952–1961 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975), 208–9; Watson, Into the Missile Age, 699–700. 13. Horne, Macmillan, II, 91–2. 14. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 510. 15. Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 469–70. 16. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 510–11. 17. Ibid., 512. See also Nigel J. Ashton, “Macmillan and the Middle East,” in Aldous and Lee (eds), Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role, 50–2. Fortunately for the historical record, there were two note-takers, one British and one American, recording this conversation. The American version is documented as “Report of Telephone Call Between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan,” 14 July 1958, 5:43 p.m., 1–2, EL, WFIS, Box 24, “Macmillan, President, 6/1/58–9/30/58,” folder 1. The Whitman File, International Series, Box 24 includes letters

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18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

exchanged between Macmillan and Eisenhower for two distinct time periods, 1 June 1958–30 September 1958, and 1 October 1958–20 March 1959. Macmillan’s comment to Eisenhower, “You are doing a Suez on me,” was not recorded by either note-taker. The comment is contained, however, in Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 512. The British transcript of the conversation is documented in “Conversation Between the President and Prime Minister, 10:30 p.m., July 14, 1958,” The National Archives of the UK (NA): PRO, PREM 11/2387. Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 472; Watson, Into the Missile Age, 211–19. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 408. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 17 July 1958, 1–2, EL, WFIS, Box 24. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 18 July 1958, EL, WFIS, Box 24. Horne, Macmillan, II, 97. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 217. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 7 November 1958, EL, WFIS, Box 24. See also Eisenhower to Macmillan, 2 November 1958, EL,WFIS, Box 24. Memorandum of Conversation, “Middle East,” Camp David, 22 March 1959, 2 p.m., 3–4, EL, WFIS, Box 24, “Macmillan Visit, March 20–22, 1959,” folder 2. Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 81–2. Ibid. Horne, Macmillan, II, 56. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 3 September 1958, EL,WFIS, Box 24. John Foster Dulles to Macmillan, 4 September 1958, EL, WFIS, Box 24, “Macmillan, President, 6/1/58–9/30/58,” folder 4. Macmillan to John Foster Dulles, 5 September 1958, The National Archives of the UK (NA): PRO, PREM 11/2300. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 6 September 1958, EL, WFIS, Box 24. Craig, Destroying the Village, 86–7. Horne, Macmillan, II, 104–6. Macmillan to Dulles, 5 September 1958. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 680–9; Horne, Macmillan, II, 99–104. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 24 September 1958, EL, WFIS, Box 24. The historiography of the Berlin Crisis between 1958 and 1963 is vast. For a brief, helpful account, the reader may wish to examine Craig, Destroying the Village, 90–107, and William Taubman, Khrushchev: the Man and His Era (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 396–411. See also Kissinger, Diplomacy, 568–75. Taubman, Khrushchev, 397; Craig, Destroying the Village, 90–2; Kissinger, Diplomacy, 570–1. Geelhoed and Edmonds, Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, 61. Taubman, Khrushchev, 396–7. Ashton, “Macmillan and the Middle East,” in Aldous and Lee (eds), Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role, 46.

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90 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 2, 1958 As I promised, I have spent the few days of this Christmas holiday in brooding over the problem of how to handle the Russians, and at the same time – what is equally important – how to rally the maximum support we can in the free world as well as in the uncommitted countries. There are two aspects – procedure and substance. Here are some very general ideas on both, which Selwyn and I have talked over. Up to now we have always proceeded in the disarmament discussions with a feeling in the back of our minds that the Russians would never really agree. In other words, they have unfortunately turned out to be largely propaganda exercises and not genuine negotiations on their part. We must, however, recognise and indeed hope that the Russians, for various reasons, may now or in the future be ready to conclude an agreement. We ought therefore to look again at what we might be willing to accept. If you and I agree on a policy, I think we ought to be able to sell it to the rest of our allies. One course is to say that we stand on the four Power partial disarmament proposals, as set out by Stassen and Selwyn and the others last summer. The Russians always refuse any advance we make, and then take it as a starting point for their next claim. We might decide to show up this technique and stand firmly on our proposals. We may, on the other hand, be prepared to go further than the four Power proposals, although using them as a basis. In a sense, that is what we did in the Paris communiqué, when we said that we would consider other proposals, whatever their source. We might indicate our disappointment that the four Power proposals were not accepted, but repeat that we were quite willing to discuss modifications of them or new ideas on the same general theme. But in addition to this we must also have a view about the so called policy of disengagement, for this is obviously an idea which is being much canvassed in both our countries. Although Foster has kindly told Harold Caccia in confidence what Adenauer said to him, I am still a little uncertain as to where Adenauer really stands. I feel that he would agree that it should be for SACEUR’s decision as to where I.R.B.M.s should be placed, but would hope, or at least accept, that in fact they would not be placed on his own territory. To exclude Western Germany as such would raise obvious political difficulties. On the other hand, the acceptance of the Polish proposal to exclude nuclear weapons from Western Germany in return for a similar exclusion in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia offers certain advantages. For example, the three Communist countries concerned are more than twice the size of West Germany, and the introduction of inspection into this large area would be an obvious asset. From the standpoint of rocket attack,

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the distance to the East of England (where your strategic bomber bases and ours are situated) is about 450 miles from East Germany, whereas the nearest point in Russia is about 900 miles. I know that this would lead to the problem of tactical atomic weapons. I think it would be difficult to refuse these to forces in West Germany under N.A.T.O. Command. Nevertheless, is there not perhaps a balance of advantage for us in some measure of disengagement, remembering always that if this were agreed, we would have secured a considerable degree of effective inspection? We must, however, remember that we might be drawn into the wider problem of demilitarisation or neutralisation. Of course, Adenauer has already offered that East Germany should be demilitarised if it were reunited with West Germany. We must surely work out an agreed policy for our two countries on all these issues. This is important not only from the point of view of any initiative with the Russians; it is important that we should carry all the N.A.T.O. countries, especially Germany, with us in anything we propose. Now I come to another question – nuclear tests. The Russians will undoubtedly press their proposal for the abolition of tests as a start. This, of course, attracts world public opinion. The Russians will also agree to inspection for this purpose, because they can do this without any of the disadvantages that would follow a whole system of inspection and control applied either to the manufacture of weapons or of fissile material. The tests inspectors would live in a desert and not range around the factories. What are we to say in reply? I think we shall be forced to a view. I must be quite frank and say that from my own government’s point of view, we could not accept the abolition or suspension of tests in the present state of our knowledge. But if you thought that you had really got as far as you wanted (leaving out the refinements which scientists and military technicians will always want) and if you were prepared, after a revision of the Atomic Energy Act, to make your knowledge available to us, our position would be different.1 If, on this basis, you would accept the abolition or suspension of tests (and at least get some kind of inspection as a result and therefore the thin end of a wedge towards something better) we would accept this. But it would have to be after an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act and knowing that we would get the advantage of your knowledge. Whatever the technical disadvantages of stopping tests, and they may be very great, we would at least improve the chances of stopping the nightmare of all the other countries coming along with their tests, and therefore, in fact, prevent them from becoming nuclear powers. This leads me to the next point. There are suggestions that we ought to aim at total nuclear disarmament. I think there would be great dangers if this idea were canvassed. It may perhaps be the purpose of the Russians to achieve total nuclear disarmament leaving themselves with the immense superiority of numbers and the great advances they have made in conventional weapons. They have built up a fleet of surface ships and submarines

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and large numbers of bombers which they are still continuing to construct. My feeling is that while we might contemplate agreements about the stationing of these weapons, or their limitation in numbers, or a cut-off of any future production of fissile material for weapons purposes or even perhaps any future production of weapons (all this under proper inspection and control), the total abolition of all stocks of nuclear weapons would be very dangerous unless it was accompanied by a reduction of conventional arms far beyond anything we have so far envisaged – in other words, to levels adequate for internal security purposes only. After all, we have kept the peace – or rather your great power has done so – for ten years; first, because of your superiority, and now because of the more or less equal balance of forces on both sides. The Russians know this and know they cannot gain from war, and so now pose as a peaceful power. If the deterrent power of nuclear retaliation were abolished, might not the balance be fatally thrown out, leaving the European countries to be absorbed one by one into the Communist orbit, as Hitler did before the war with Austria and Czechoslovakia? I think we ought to clear our minds about these fundamental problems, because we are now approaching a point when it may not be possible to rely any longer on throwing the blame upon the Russians for the breakdown of negotiations. I find it, for instance, rather embarrassing that they have proposed the abolition of tests with – in theory at least – control and inspection; that they have, through the Polish proposals, proposed the nuclear demilitarisation of large areas of Europe with – also in theory – control and inspection. There may now at last be some real hope of breaking the deadlock. We cannot as yet tell. But I am sure that we ought to enter the next round of discussions with the intention of reaching agreement if the Russian approach is genuine, or of exposing their insincerity if it is not. When you and Foster said in Paris that an attack on one is an attack on all, that was a very far-reaching statement. Its implications are hardly yet understood. But I would frankly fear a situation in which the Russians kept great armies and a huge submarine fleet easily mobilised and the West was deprived of our real defence, the nuclear deterrent. You know as well as I do that neither the new world, nor the old, could permanently keep arms of a conventional kind to meet this kind of attack, without the destruction of our way of life and of our economies. As to procedure, my own feeling is that we should be flexible. The only thing I would very much dislike is a special meeting of the Assembly of the United Nations because they would be sure to carry a lot of foolish separate resolutions, any of which we might be willing to agree to if they were part of a whole, but none of which would, by themselves, be in our interests, e.g. the prohibition of nuclear tests. Nor would we be able in that forum to get any really effective system of inspection and control, since the Assembly would accept the most airy and woolly promises.

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But if the Russians will not co-operate in the new disarmament commission of the United Nations, we ought to renew our offer to talk direct. We should repeat the offer that the Foreign Ministers will meet the Russian Foreign Minister for general discussions to try to “break the deadlock”. We could also add that, if real business is to be done, a preliminary meeting of the Ambassadors of all the countries who were to take part should be held to try to settle the agenda. I think in the circumstances, we might conceivably agree that this meeting should take place in Moscow, for there may be more of us than of them. Now comes the question, which Foreign Ministers? United States certainly; United Kingdom and France, presumably. Canada might well prefer to drop out at this stage though we should of course, have to ask [John] Diefenbaker for the confirmation of this.2 That might also make it easier for Italy not to demand representation. If we had three or four on our side, I am rather attracted by the idea of letting them have any three or four they like. The difficulty is that they would no doubt include China which, I assume, you would not like. A way round this might be to have a tacit understanding with the Soviets that the Ministers would be drawn from N.A.T.O. and Warsaw Pact countries respectively, but would not be regarded as “representing each Pact”.3 If West Germany came with us, the West Germans would have to be asked if they would like to come at the risk of a member of the East German Government coming too. If they preferred not to face this, then West Germany would not come in our team, but would be in close touch throughout, behind the scenes. If our two governments could reach clear and agreed views on all these subjects, I myself would not shrink from what is called a summit meeting, at the right moment. The world seems to expect it. But we must insist on the necessary preparation, both on the diplomatic and Foreign Minister levels. But I would not like us to enter any of these talks without having a very clear picture of exactly what we want. What this comes to is, are we prepared from a moral and political point of view to say: disarmament, to be fair and honest, must keep the balance? The present balance now at least prevents war. Do not let us have the kind of disarmament that may encourage war. In other words, are we ready to stand firm on partial disarmament, conventional and unconventional? Would we face total nuclear disarmament? Or would the world be safer if there was a certain amount of nuclear arms, although limited and controlled, in the possession of both sides, combined with a thinning out of military positions, together with widespread ground and air inspection? How it will end up, I do not know, except this: that until we have reached some clear picture we cannot really play our hand confidently. We must, of course, produce an interim reply to Bulganin to keep things quiet. We can play the first round or two on the basis we reached at N.A.T.O., but we cannot play it through unless we know exactly what we want or are prepared to accept. I apologise for this long message. As you will see, I have posed a lot of questions. It is always easy to do this. I do not want you to deduce from

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the way I have put them that I have formed a view about any of the answers. The only thing I am sure of is that we must keep together. 1

2 3

At the Washington Conference, 23–5 October 1957, the Eisenhower Administration pledged to seek a revision of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, sometimes referred to as the McMahon Act after its sponsor Sen. Brien McMahon, D-Connecticut. Such a revision would make it possible for American scientists to share a greater degree of information about nuclear weapons developments with their British counterparts. Eisenhower considered the revision of the McMahon Act one of his legislative priorities, believing that the United States had reneged on a wartime agreement with the British to share such information. Andrew J. Goodpaster interview. John Diefenbaker was the prime minister of Canada. Established in 1954 following the creation of NATO, the Warsaw Pact was a military alliance of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe, especially the Democratic Republic of Germany (East Germany).

91 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN January 5, 1958 Dear Harold: I thank you for your letter of January 2 with its intimate insight into your thinking about the problems with which the Soviets confront us. It is indeed useful for us thus to “think out loud” to each other when, as is too much the case, we cannot sit down and chat together.1 I do not have time before your departure to make a full and considered reply in the exact terms of your letter. But it happens that Foster and I had during the New Year period been thinking hard about these problems in terms of replying to Mr. Bulganin’s letter.2 Yesterday Foster gave Harold Caccia, for transmission privately to you and Selwyn, the full, although still tentative, text of what I have in mind to say. This covers in large part the same field as does your letter and will in that sense serve to give you our thinking about the subject matter of your own letter. There is one other point which you particularly emphasize, that is whether, if nuclear tests are suspended, we can give you all of the information which we will have garnered from our tests. The answer to that is that we shall seek from the Congress broad discretionary authority to do that. I hope we shall get it; but that is by no means certain. Until Foster read me the message he received this morning from Harold Caccia, I was somewhat disturbed by the passage in your broadcast of yesterday which suggested making a fresh start with the Russians by negotiating a pact of non-aggression. We would, I think, have very considerable

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difficulty with that. Already leading Foreign Relations Committee Senators, Republican and Democratic, have questioned the wisdom of this approach and there would be grave doubt that we could get Senate ratification. It is widely felt that if the Soviet word is dependable we already have a nonaggression pact in the United Nations Charter provision against the use of force. If their word is not dependable, why do we seem to accept it as such by repeating the same words over? Will not this create a false sense of security and be used in some quarters as an excuse for reducing our security efforts? One immediate reaction from an important quarter here is that if Western Europe thinks that a non-aggression pact with the Soviets has value, then we can pull out our United States forces there. No doubt this passage in your broadcast has been overemphasized by our press and radio commentators and too much separated from the context. I am glad, however, to have your assurances that the suggestion does not represent any revision of your thinking on the Russian problem and that otherwise you would have consulted with me first. If you could do anything to shift the emphasis it would, from our standpoint at least, be helpful and in the interest, as you put it, of making sure that we “keep together”. I send you best wishes for a successful trip to the East and shall look forward with great interest to learning the impressions you derive. As you doubtless know, Foster is going to the Baghdad Pact meeting later this month. This is responsive to Selwyn’s strong urging and will I hope be helpful in indicating our support of and interest in the Pact, even though, for what still seem to be good reasons, we are not formal members. Faithfully yours, D.E. 1

2

Prior to responding to Macmillan, Eisenhower prepared an extensive memorandum for Dulles, outlining his views on the prime minister’s suggestions. See Eisenhower to John Foster Dulles, Memorandum on Letter of Prime Minister Macmillan dated 1/2/58, January 3, 1958, EL, WFIS, Box 23. This memorandum is published in its entirety in Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XVIII, 632–6. Bulganin wrote a lengthy letter to Eisenhower on 10 December 1957, advocating the exclusion of all nuclear weapons from both East Germany and West Germany.

92 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 6, 1958 My dear Friend, Very many thanks for your letter of yesterday. It is a great help to us to have your thinking, and to have had over the weekend the text of your draft

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reply to Bulganin.1 We had been working on a shorter draft for our own reply but there is nothing inconsistent in the lines on which we each of us had been working. We have a few comments on your draft and these we have given to Harold Caccia. I am sorry you were disturbed by the first reports of my broadcast on Saturday. The reference to a non-aggression pact has been high-lighted by the press in a way which I certainly did not intend and which the context does not support. I am sure there is no real difference between your thought and mine on this; if I were not, I would of course certainly have got in touch with you before the broadcast. Yours ever, Harold. 1

Macmillan discusses his correspondence with Bulganin in Riding the Storm, 387–8.

93 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN January 6, 1958 Dear Harold: Your note was most gratifying to Foster and me because of the similarity in your and our views on the Bulganin letter and because it has reassured us on the real meaning of one passage in your Saturday speech. We have been most interested in your weekend political preoccupations. You have had your share of tough breaks, and I am filled with admiration for your handling of them. I hope your trip will be a great success.

94 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 2, 1958 I was very glad to hear yesterday of your successful launching of an Earth Satellite.1 Many congratulations on this fine achievement. Harold Macmillan. 1

Macmillan was referring to the successful launch of Explorer I on 31 January 1958.

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95 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 4, 1958 Dear Harold: Thank you for your message regarding the launching of the satellite. I trust that through the data that is transmitted back to earth we shall be able to make available to all countries information of great scientific value. Though I am sure your trip is strenuous, I do hope you are finding it interesting and profitable. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

96 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 6, 1958 Dear Harold: I understand that the tenth is your birthday anniversary and that you will then still be in Australia. I hope you have a fine celebration. This note brings you my warmest felicitations and best wishes for many more years of health and happiness and continued service to your country. With personal regard, As ever, Ike

97 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 11, 1958 Dear Friend, Thank you so much for your message which I received here in Canberra. It was kind of you to remember my birthday: I must say I always try to forget it. We have had a good tour here and are off for home tonight. Yours ever, Harold.

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98 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 15, 1958 Dear Harold: Now that you have returned from your Commonwealth tour there are two matters about which I feel I should write you. I am happy that during your trip you have taken opportunities to promote our mutually held views on both these subjects. The first of these relates to the substance of your very helpful discussions with members of the New Zealand Government as well as your public statements during your visit there. I much appreciate your kind references to me and my efforts but more especially I am pleased that you took this opportunity to exchange with members of that government certain views regarding the Far East that you and I share. I feel sure that your observations will go far toward correcting some misapprehensions. I am also glad that during your visit to Australia and more recently in your reply to Bulganin’s second letter you have emphasized your belief – and mine – that unless most careful preparations precede a summit meeting such a conference would end in failure. In this regard I feel that the Soviets may have overplayed their hand especially with Khrushchev’s Minsk speech and Bulganin’s latest letter to me.1 Public opinion here, as well as the attitude of some of our legislative leaders, appears to be hardening against our being rushed precipitately into a summit meeting without that insistence on preparation that would carry some hope of its success. My impression is that a similar modification of earlier attitudes may be taking place among thoughtful people elsewhere. We shall continue to point out the need for that degree of preparatory work that will permit us to participate in a top-level meeting once we have full knowledge of what we shall talk about, how we shall treat those topics, and, to the extent of our foresight, where our discussions may lead us. With your help I believe we shall be able to hold the line despite the efforts of the Soviet leaders to exploit those understandable hopes for peace for which even an ill-prepared summit meeting would seem to hold promise. I believe that all our efforts should now be directed toward laying the best possible foundation on which a summit conference may be based. Preliminary conversations with the Soviets at the diplomatic level might well be initiated soon as a step toward determining those areas in which some substantial results might be achieved. Along this path I think we can

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proceed in sufficiently ordered manner toward a truly promising summit meeting. As ever, 1

Nikita Khrushchev’s speech at Minsk on 22 January 1958 extolled the virtues of Soviet military capability while also proposing an immediate summit with Eisenhower to discuss disarmament. Bulganin sent his letter to Eisenhower on 1 February 1958.

99 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 16, 1958 My dear Friend, I was very glad to learn, on returning from my tour of the Commonwealth, that the negotiations which have been going on for a good time between our people for an agreement for stationing intermediate range ballistic missiles in the United Kingdom are about to come to a satisfactory conclusion. We hope that the final details can be settled in time for the agreement to be published in this coming week.1 This will be a subject of the most intense interest in this country and every word in the terms of the agreement will be scrutinized both in Parliament and in the country. I want to secure the greatest possible measure of support for the agreement among our people here, and I am therefore writing to explain certain political difficulties which we have about one or two points. First, it is very important to reassure our people that the actual operation of these weapons will be handled by British forces. It would therefore be a great help if paragraph 4 of the draft memorandum of agreement could read as follows:– “4. The missiles will be manned and operated by the United Kingdom personnel, which will be trained by the United States Government for the purposes of this project at the earliest feasible date.” Second, paragraph 7 of the draft memorandum of agreement will, in its present wording, lead some people to think that the missiles will be launched automatically if any of our allies is attacked. I know that this impression is not justified by a careful study of this paragraph, but I feel that we must revise it to make the position absolutely plain. This could be done

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by wording the paragraph as follows:– “7. The decision to launch these missiles will be a matter for joint decision by the two governments. Any such joint decision will be made in the light of the circumstances at the time and having regard to the undertaking the two governments have assumed, in article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.” Of course, I would explain if asked to do so in Parliament precisely what our undertaking under article V means, but I do not see any object in provoking unnecessary discussion. Third, the word “indefinitely” in paragraph 10 of the present draft of the memorandum of agreement has political danger here, since this would give ammunition to our critics. I would like to revise this paragraph as follows:– “10. This Agreement shall be subject to revision by agreement between the two governments and shall remain in force for not less than five years from the date of the agreement but may thereafter be terminated by either government upon six months’ notice”. I do hope that you and Foster will feel able to agree to revise on these lines. We want to get the best possible reception for this important development in the defence of the free world. I understand that your people have suggested that if these missiles are installed before the British personnel who are to operate them have completed their training, they should be manned by United States personnel in the interval. This situation may or may not arise. If it does, we can deal with it quietly between ourselves. But when the agreement is published, it is important (as I have pointed out above) that we should be able to say that the missiles will be operated by British personnel, and that nothing to the contrary should be said on either side of the Atlantic. The impression that these new bases would be manned and operated by your people instead of our own would unfortunately arouse intense criticism. I realise that this is quite illogical in the light of the present sphere of United States strategic bombers. Nevertheless it is a fact and I trust that it can be ensured that no suggestion of this sort is made. If anything were to be said, either by one of our officials or yours, in a press conference or elsewhere, about United States personnel operating the missiles to begin with, there would be hell to pay. When I have caught up with immediate problems I hope to send you a few thoughts from my recent tour. It was arduous but extremely interesting and even exciting. Yours ever, Harold Macmillan 1

The agreement between the United States and Great Britain for the deployment of the Thor missiles was scheduled for implementation on 22 February 1958. For discussion, see John Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations, 1939–1984 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984), 90, 96, 108–11.

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100 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 20, 1958 Dear Friend, I was very grateful for your letter which awaited me on my return. I have delayed my answer for a day or two in order to be able to reply after opening our Foreign Affairs Debate which began today (February 19). I tried in my speech in the House of Commons yesterday to set out as objectively as possible the position in the great struggle which divides the world. I hoped that by doing this I might turn the eyes of our people away from the comparatively minor problems which vex us from time to time, to the great issues on the solution of which our future hangs. But I trust you will agree with what I said and with the balance which I tried to strike between robustness and conciliation. I think that my remarks were quite in line with what you had been saying particularly in your latest letter to Bulganin which, if I may say so, was I thought admirably argued. I believe that if we take a sober and dispassionate approach public opinion not only in our own countries but also in the uncommitted areas will be consolidated in our favour. At the same time there is an expectation all over the world that a summit meeting should take place. In our country and in the Commonwealth this is very strongly held, although all sensible people accept the view that there should be proper preparation. The question now arises, what should be the next step. One way would be to propose a definite date, let us say either late July or August, subject of course to the preparatory work being done sincerely. That has the advantage that it would give us the initiative, but perhaps the disadvantage that the Russians would stall on the preparatory work. On the other hand, as they seem to make so many new suggestions all the time, I think it would be difficult for them to take this line. The other way would be to hold off the definite date for the moment and make precise proposals for meetings of Ambassadors to discuss the preliminary steps, or possibly to combine the two: that is to say, propose a date for the beginning of the preparatory talks, with a view to holding the summit meeting in the late summer if proper progress was made. I would very much like to have your views on this. Meanwhile I shall say nothing even though I shall be much pressed. One advantage of the late summer is that, as you know, I have two invitations to the United States, one for May 31 at the Citadel in Charleston and the other for June 8 at De Pauw. If I were to accept both of these, and if you thought it a good idea, I might meet quite informally with you and Foster in Washington between the two engagements. This would give us an opportunity of discussing together both tactics and strategy.

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I have been immensely heartened by my Commonwealth tour and come back full of confidence. I expected a warm welcome in Australia and New Zealand but my expectations were exceeded. Furthermore, I was astonished by the warmth of goodwill in the Asian Commonwealth countries and fortified by their profound adherence to the principles of democratic Government, I believe that there is no doubt where India and Ceylon and Pakistan really stand in the world struggle; Communist materialism and dictatorship has little fundamental appeal to them. This of course is one of the main reasons why we should try to keep the initiative in this matter of a summit meeting. Yours ever, Harold Macmillan.

101 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 22, 1958 Dear Harold: By now you will have heard through your Embassy here in Washington of our agreement to the proposals in your message of February 16 for modifications of language in the IRBM agreement. I understand your problem on the question of manning the missiles, and we shall do our best to see to it that no statements from our side refer to the possibility of interim manning of initial IRBMs by United States personnel. There is already press speculation on this point but publication of the agreement may well reduce this, especially in view of the statement in the agreement that missiles will be manned by United Kingdom personnel. I know we are agreed that it is in our common interest to achieve the earliest possible deployment of IRBMs in the United Kingdom. Because of the time factor in training British personnel, our military believe if we are, in fact, to achieve the earliest possible deployment, it will be necessary for United States personnel to man initially the IRBM squadron scheduled for deployment to the United Kingdom this year. However, I concur with your thought that we can deal with details of this matter later in the year. I would, at the same time, point out that this question of manning is largely a technicality, since your Government and ours would have joint operational control, as they do on SAC bomber bases in the United Kingdom, regardless of whether the equipment is manned by United Kingdom or United States personnel. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

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102 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 26, 1958 Dear Harold I have your recent cable, including the suggestion that we should meet informally here in Washington. I enthusiastically concur. You indicated that if you should accept the two invitations already extended, you would be in the States between May thirty-first and June eight. My own interest is in the latter date. If you could come back from De Pauw to be in Washington on the ninth, I would keep that day free for our meeting. I have President Heuss here on the dates June fourth to sixth inclusive, and some tentative engagements which may become quite important in the earlier part of that week.1 Do you think we could agree on the ninth? If you find that date satisfactory, Foster and I will make it a fixed engagement on our calendars. If the ninth would be too late for you, I am sure that we could work out a schedule for the second. From the reports I have received you got by splendidly with your speech of the other day. I am delighted. I hope that your presentation may cool off some of the burning but completely unjustified, opinions that an unprepared “Summit” meeting could do the free world any good. I think we should fully expect the opposite result. On the other hand, once the NATO nations are agreed among themselves as to what our positions on various matters should be, we could fix a date for preparatory work to be initiated with the Russians. We would further agree with the Soviets that when that preparatory work had received the approval of ourselves and our NATO allies, we would be ready to fix a definite date for a formal “Heads of Government” meeting. But I am quite certain that any attempt to fix a date for the latter meeting merely on the Soviet promise to perform honestly in the preparatory work would result in dismal failure. I am looking forward to seeing you in June. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

Theodor Heuss was the president of West Germany.

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103 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 28, 1958 Dear Friend, Thank you very much for your letter of February 22 about the I.R.B.M. Agreement. I am most grateful to you for having met all our points so promptly and with such understanding. I was also grateful for the prompt clarification of the remarks made by Colonel [Harry] Zink which was issued in time to enable us to rebut charges of bad faith made during our Defence Debate here on February 27.1 As a result of your help, I think that the I.R.B.M. agreement has been on the whole well received here, although we shall of course continue to be attacked about it by the Left Wing. It has been a great help to us to be able to stick to our statement on manning contained in the Agreement. If, as I hope, we meet before the end of the summer, you and I can take stock of the situation as it has by then developed in both the technical and political field. Meanwhile, it is important that nothing should be said beyond the terms of the agreement. With warm regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan 1

In a speech, Colonel Zink, a commander of the 672nd Strategic Missile Squad in the UK, claimed to have “full operational control” of the American IRBMs deployed in Britain, a statement which understandably created controversy in Britain since the British public believed that control of these missiles would be on a joint basis between the two countries. See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 474–5, and Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations, 1939–1984, 96; and “Two Missile Commanders Show Models of Weapons,” New York Times, 4 March 1958.

104 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 4, 1958 Dear Friend, I have just received your letter of February 26, for which I am most grateful. All being well, I will keep my appointment with you on June 9. I am so glad you like the idea.

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Quite a lot has happened in the few days since you wrote your letter. I have seen the Soviet note to you and their curiously different note to the French. For once we are left out of this Russian correspondence. I do not know why, but I am not at all jealous! Meanwhile, Foster has very kindly sent us the text of the draft of a reply which I believe is to be discussed in NATO tomorrow. The arguments are certainly irrefutable. All the same, I am wondering whether it quite meets the mood in Europe. All these notes and replies will have to be published soon, and I am anxious that people should not be confused. The Russians have rather cleverly seemed to yield on the point of the Foreign Secretaries’ Meeting. Could you not therefore include in your answer something on these lines: ii(i) We are glad that the Russians accept a meeting of Foreign Secretaries though we think it should be six, not thirty. That is, American, British, French on the Western side; Russians plus any two of their allies on the Eastern. i(ii) The purpose of the Foreign Secretaries’ Meeting should be to agree on the procedure of the conference and to recommend to their principals the composition, place and date. They should also be instructed to agree an Agenda. But since it is obvious that a Summit Meeting cannot last more than a very short time (the President’s position as Head of State and Head of Government makes this doubly impossible, and other Heads of Government cannot be away indefinitely) it is obvious that the best thing to do would be to fix the Agenda in such a way as to give the best hope of a definite result. In other words this means agreement on a priority list without necessarily excluding other topics, should time permit. (iii) If this is done, it is clear that the Foreign Secretaries cannot be “strictly limited to the organisational side of the preparation of a meeting at the Summit”. They must discuss the substance of the items proposed. Their purpose would not be to reach agreement on them, for which they are not authorised, but to discover from the positions taken what items ought to be given priority. (iv) If the Russians agree, and the other countries concerned agree, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers might easily take place in the middle of May (this would be after the NATO meeting). I venture to send you this frank opinion. I do not think that on any point of substance there is any difference between us. It is just a matter of presentation. If we got the Agenda prepared in this way, it would meet our main point about the prospect of a Summit Conference proving useful. Of course, many of Foster’s telling points could well be included within the framework of a reply on these lines.

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At the NATO Meeting which is at present arranged for tomorrow, our representative will not express these views until we know your mind. It would of course be possible, if you agree, to postpone or adjourn the NATO Meeting for a day or two. Yours ever, Harold Macmillan

105 HAROLD CACCIA TO EISENHOWER March 4, 1958 Dear Mr. President, I have been asked to send you the attached amendment to paragraph 4 (i) of the Prime Minister’s message which was delivered to you today. The Prime Minister has also asked me to say that he will be communicating further on the timing and manner of the announcement about his proposed meeting with you in June. Meanwhile, he of course understands that nothing should be said about it until the arrangements for an announcement have been settled between you and him. Yours sincerely, Harold Caccia Paragraph 4 (i): “We are glad that the Russians accept a meeting of Foreign Secretaries though we think it should be six or eight and not 30. That is American, British, French and possibly Italian on the Western side; Russians plus any two or three of their allies on the Eastern.”

106 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 4, 1958 Dear Harold: I understand that while both of our governments desire to retain the three-mile limit of territorial sea for security reasons and in accordance with their traditional views on freedom of the seas, both governments are agreed that some concession is necessary in order to prevent the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea from approving by a two-thirds majority a twelve-mile, or even broader, territorial sea.1 The United States

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view that no (repeat no) concession involving recognition of a territorial sea of more than three miles can be accepted is based squarely upon the security interests of the United States and the entire free world. Accordingly, I am gravely concerned at word that your Cabinet is unable to accept a Canadian compromise proposal retaining the three-mile territorial sea, but permitting a contiguous zone of an additional nine miles in which the coastal state would have exclusive control over fishing, because of the proposal’s impact upon fishing interests and communities in the UK. The U.S. supports the Canadian proposal. The British alternative as we understand it is a six-mile territorial sea qualified by other nations’ right of overflight of aircraft and of innocent passage of warship without notification as respects the outer three miles. My advisors are unanimous to the effect that the British alternative, even as qualified, is seriously in derogation of free world security interests. The US military authorities feel strongly that they cannot accept any extension of the territorial sea beyond three miles in view of their heavy, world-wide responsibilities for the defense of the free world. This would, for example, afford Soviet submarines, in time of war, an important covered way through neutral waters that they do not now possess. It is the view of the US Delegation to the Conference, shared in Washington, that any retreat from the three-mile limit, such as is involved in the British alternate proposal, will result in Conference approval of a twelvemile territorial sea with serious damage to our security position vis-à-vis the Sino-Soviet block. The stakes are so great that, I suggest, neither of us should permit commercial considerations to control. I would be deeply appreciative if you and your Cabinet would reconsider your position on this point, if necessary, after urgent consultation between our respective military authorities. As ever, 1

Eisenhower refers to a conference sponsored by the United Nations relating to limitations on territorial waters which involved international law. The conference, known as the Law of the Sea meeting, began in Geneva on 22 February 1958.

107 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 4, 1958 Dear Harold: I have your note of the fourth [of March]. In view of the time factor, Foster and I had a talk, after which he called Caccia into his office to explain our views. So I assume that no further reply of substance is required.

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As you know, I am convinced that any Summit meeting would be damaging to the free world cause unless some real agreement can be made with the Russians, one in which we can have confidence. This is why I believe so much in adequate preparation. As you point out, however, if prior agreements are going to be made on the items of the agenda, with a view to giving hope of positive results, it is clear that there has to be an analysis of the substance of these items in order that joint determination of their suitability can be made. With warm regard, As ever,

108 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 6, 1958 Dear Friend, Many thanks for your message of March 5. I have now seen the comments on my message to you of March 3, for which I am very grateful. Foster has also sent me the revised text of the proposed reply to the Russians.1 I think we are close together as regards the substance of our thoughts, and your own statement at your Press Conference today seems to me very helpful. Your phrase “the United States would never close the door to possible Summit talks” is exactly in tune with the hopes of ordinary folk. May I also say how much I like your words “really decent preparation that would appeal to reasonable men”: this sums it up in a single phrase. Since the Foreign Secretary is away, I am sending a separate message to Foster to thank him for his co-operation. With warm regards, As ever, Harold

1

The reference here is to a reply from Dulles to the Soviets on 7 March to a letter from Bulganin on 3 March, outlining the conditions which the Soviets considered acceptable for a prospective summit meeting. See Louis Galambos and Daun van Ee (eds), The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The Presidency: Keeping the Peace. XIX (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 757–8. Volume XIX of the Eisenhower Papers includes letters written by Eisenhower to Macmillan for the period from 15 February 1958 to 12 February 1959.

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109 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 8, 1958 Dear Friend, Many thanks for your message of March 4 received through Whitney about the Law of the Sea. We are absolutely at one with you in trying to maintain three miles as the accepted limit, for fisheries as well as for other purposes. The leader of our delegation has already spoken strongly in committee in support of this principle. He has made no suggestion of compromise, and I hope that both our delegation and yours will continue to adhere completely to this line. As you say, however, some concession will probably be necessary, and I am considering with my colleagues the advice we have received from our Delegation at Geneva on the best way of handling this problem. I can assure you that we are as concerned about the security aspects as you. The problem for us is complicated by the probability that we stand to lose out whatever the outcome of the conference, either economically or strategically or, worse still, both. You ask that commercial considerations should not be permitted to control. It is not merely a matter of commerce, but of the livelihood of a large number of the people of this country. Arrangements which denied to our nationals our traditional fishing grounds on the high seas, as a general extension of fishery limits to twelve miles would do, would put in jeopardy the very existence of the most modern part of our fishing fleet, worth 150 million dollars or more, which is of great strategic importance to us in terms of both men and ships. It would also cause hardship and distress in areas where other employment is hard to find; and it would adversely affect our national balance of payments. We have to give great weight to this economic aspect, but we have given no less weight to the strategic and other considerations you mention. I will let you have our further views soon, but meanwhile let us both go on fighting as hard as we can for three miles without strings attached. With warm regard, Yours ever, Harold

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110 HAROLD CACCIA TO EISENHOWER March 10, 1958 Dear Mr. President, The Prime Minister has now asked me to approach you about what should be said on the subject of his proposed visit to the United States in June and when. He has had a further letter from Dr. Russell Humbert [president] of DePauw University, and must send him a definite answer. Once he has done this, it will of course be impossible to conceal the fact that he is coming to the United States in June, and his suggestion therefore is that the text of an announcement should be agreed which could be published towards the end of this week. With this in mind, the Prime Minister has asked me to send you the enclosed draft which he has prepared, and to enquire whether this would be agreeable to you. He realises of course that it is important that there should be no leak until the text and the exact time of release have been agreed. When the announcement has been settled, the Prime Minister intends to write to Dr. Russell Humbert formally accepting to go to DePauw, and to General Mark Clark regretting that he will be unable to go to The Citadel on May 31.1 From a separate letter from Dr. Russell Humbert, I have heard that the main part of the Commencement ceremonies only starts at 6.30 p.m. on the evening of Sunday, June 8. Since it might be difficult for the Prime Minister to get back to Washington in time for discussions early on Monday, June 9, may I also ask whether it would be possible for the meetings to start on the afternoon of Monday, June 9 and to continue on Tuesday, June 10, rather than trying to complete them in a single day on June 9? Yours sincerely, Harold Caccia

DRAFT OF PRESS RELEASE The Prime Minister was invited in July, 1957 to receive an Honorary Degree and to make the Commencement Address at DePauw University, Indiana on June 8, 1958. Mr. Macmillan accepted this invitation in principle then, and he has now confirmed that, as far as can be seen at present, he will be able to attend the Commencement ceremonies at DePauw University on June 8. The Prime Minister has personal connections with DePauw, since his grandfather was the University’s first Medical Graduate.

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During his visit to the United States, the Prime Minister will spend a few days in Washington. At the invitation of the President, Mr. Macmillan will take this opportunity of having general discussions with the President and the United States Secretary of State. 1

General Mark Clark was, at the time, superintendent of The Citadel, a military college located in South Carolina. Clark was a distinguished military leader who commanded troops in North Africa and in the Mediterranean during World War II and was also the commander of United Nations troops in Korea in 1952–1953. He was a longtime friend and military colleague of Eisenhower.

111 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 12, 1958 Dear Friend, As promised in my message of March 8 about the Law of the Sea, my colleagues and I have now reviewed the whole situation covered by both the strategic considerations and the fishery considerations which as you know are of such a vital national importance to us. We have had the benefit of the latest advice from the leader of our delegation to the Conference. The conclusion we have reached is that at this stage of the Conference’s proceedings it would be premature and even dangerous for any compromise to be put forward or discussed. We believe that there may be quite a measure of support for a three-mile limit for all purposes which we are agreed would be the ideal solution, and it would be a mistake to throw this away, as would undoubtedly happen if a compromise were suggested before the necessity really arose. We also consider that mentioning a 12-mile (or any other) limit for fisheries would open the danger of getting this figure accepted for other purposes. Our delegation is therefore being instructed not to put forward any compromise proposal for the time being and I hope you will agree that yours should do likewise. For the present I am sure that the best tactics are to press hard for the retention of a three-mile limit and to explore the possibility of adopting such fishery conservation measures as would take some steam out of the demand for wider fishery or territorial limits. I hope that both our delegations will keep in the closest touch with these objectives in view. As ever, HAROLD.

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112 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 14, 1958 Dear Harold: Our initial position at Geneva has been the same as your own – to support the three-mile limit without qualification, until it becomes clear that it will not be accepted. While we are fully appreciative of the difficult decision that is to be made at Geneva, we are convinced that unless we are prepared to give vigorous support to a compromise proposal enlarging the coastal states’ rights over nearby fisheries, we probably will not be able to halt the mounting momentum for Conference approval of a twelve-mile territorial sea. We are also convinced that fishery conservation measures alone will not solve the problem. Some concession in the nature of a special rights fishery zone for the coastal states is necessary and a nine-mile zone is the minimum likely to gain acceptance. This is the Canadian compromise proposal. I am impressed by the statement in your message about the timing of the different steps that may become necessary during the proceedings of the Conference. My own feeling is, based upon the urgent advice of the United States delegation, that we have now reached the stage where inflexibility can damage us. It seems to me, therefore, that within the next few days we shall be faced with the choice between three miles of sovereignty plus nine additional miles of fisheries control, or Conference approval of a twelve-mile limit which we find wholly inadequate for strategic reasons. You should also note that the Canadian compromise proposal involves control over a contiguous fisheries zone by the coastal state, and does not necessarily involve the exclusion of all other nations. In Latin and South American waters, our fishing interests, as a modus vivendi, have negotiated licenses which permit them to fish without molestation within coastal areas claimed by those states and even up to the shore. If the Canadian compromise proposal is adopted and your government so desires, the United States would be prepared to exert its good offices in an effort to assist the United Kingdom to obtain similar arrangements in areas of concern to your government. With warm regard, As ever,

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113 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 17, 1958 Dear Friend, Selwyn Lloyd has just returned and told me of the useful talks which Foster and he have had together at Manila on many subjects. In spite of the strain that these gatherings cause to Foreign Ministers they are certainly very useful in giving opportunities for consultations without too much public attention being called to them. I was very glad to hear that they had been able to discuss again Middle Eastern problems as well as Far Eastern ones. Both Iraq and Saudi Arabia are unsettled. Indonesia is certainly very worrying and it is hard to see what will happen next. A great deal will depend upon the next few days and whether the dissidents can continue their resistance. Anyway it is satisfactory that our people have worked so well together. It was also very useful to have Pineau there who has learned a lot in the last two or three years and is fundamentally a moderate and sensible man.1 I have heard that Mollet is also exercising a good influence regarding North African questions. We must try and keep the French along the right lines if it is possible to do so. We both know from experience how sensitive they are and how difficult to guide. Now about the Summit. I think so far we are in quite a good posture but we always have to keep ahead of the Russians and not fall into any of their traps. I am sure you and Foster both recognise the danger of the Russians trying to run out and putting all the blame on us. Some of Khrushchev’s recent speeches make me feel that he may be preparing for this or at any rate keeping this open as a fall-back position. On the other hand he may be willing to bargain about the agenda. If we were to drop “Satellite States” I think he would very likely accept “European Security and Germany” as a heading. What I am anxious about is that we should come forward as soon as possible with a constructive proposal that will put the burden firmly back on the Russians and be understood to do so. Selwyn will send to Foster against his return a suggested statement of the Western position which we are trying to work out. I think the vital points are the following: that there ought to be a meeting if there is reasonable hope of agreement, even a limited one; and if there is also proper discussion of the main problems whether agreement is likely or not. For myself I think now that it will be best to use the Ambassadors to start the work and that when they have made some progress there should be the meeting of Foreign Ministers. Since the Foreign Ministers’ meeting was our original proposal at NATO which the Russians first refused and now seem to accept I feel we cannot go back upon it. After all it is a bit of a climb-down for the Russians who I suppose refused the

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Foreign Ministers meeting because they knew Foster would be too strong for them. But I quite agree that it would be best to start with the diplomatic exchanges. This way we get serious work done and yet maintain our original position. We should of course make it clear that neither the Ambassadors in their first examination nor the Foreign Ministers at a later examination are supposed to reach decisions or agreement on substance. What they have to do is to prepare this two-fold agenda, first, the subjects where we might make some progress, however small, and secondly, the subjects which must be seriously discussed if a Summit meeting is to be worthy of the name. I think it is important that we should get this statement out as soon as we can for once we have got a position we have something to guide us in all future negotiations. We shall of course have to discuss it in NATO but I should have thought this could be done in the course of this week. Warm regards, HAROLD 1

Christian Pineau was the recently appointed foreign minister of France.

114 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 17, 1958 Dear Harold: I was glad to get your letter which I received today, discussing the Summit and other matters. Foster, who is due back in Washington tomorrow evening, has been giving a lot of thought to the next moves on the Summit problem since talking with Selwyn and Pineau. I would therefore like to discuss the matter with him before giving you a full reply. With warm regard, As ever,

115 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 27, 1958 Dear Friend, Harold Caccia has been explaining to Foster our extreme interest in the progress of the amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. As you will know, the

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help we can count on from you under the amended act will largely determine the position we are able to take up on nuclear tests and nuclear disarmament in talks with the Russians. This means that it is of the greatest importance to us to make our arrangements with you at the earliest possible date and have them ratified before Congress adjourns this summer. I note that Foster is hopeful about the early passage of the amendments to the Act but fears some difficulty in getting through the bilateral agreement with us in time. I am most encouraged by Foster’s suggestion to Harold Caccia that we should try to speed things up by starting work on drafting the bilateral agreement as soon as this can safely be done without risk of upsetting Congress, but on the assumption that the amendments will be approved as they stand. If, as Foster suggests, there could be a draft for discussion between us when we meet on June 9, this would obviously be a tremendous help. Another factor in all this is the possibility, which I know is exercising your people considerably, that the Russians may announce some unilateral suspension of tests, or of manufacture of nuclear weapons, or both. If there is any truth at all in these stories I am sure that the Russian idea is to avoid control. But we must not overlook the possibility that the stories have been put about for our benefit and are one of the traps I referred to in my last message to tempt us to give up some of our positions in advance of Summit talks and, therefore, without any quid pro quo. Will you let me know what you think about this? If there is to be suspension of tests it is essential that there should be verification. We should therefore keep this subject for negotiation at the Summit and not be drawn into proceeding by unilateral declarations. Our position has been to link suspension with the cut-off but Caccia tells me that he heard from Foster that he is thinking of weakening the link somewhat by asking only for commitment to discuss the cut-off. It may be that we shall have to go as far as this, but I think it essential to retain at least that much connexion with the cut-off or we shall have no card of re-entry for any further round on disarmament. I would very much value your thoughts on all this. With warm regards, Yours ever, Harold Macmillan

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116 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 28, 1958 Dear Harold: I have not replied earlier to your letter of March 17 about a “Summit” meeting because the subject has been under such active, almost hourly, consideration between Foster and Harold Caccia that I knew you were aware that your point of view was being actively and sympathetically considered by us. Foster has just told me about the NATO meeting yesterday and I gather that aside from drafting questions you and we and our NATO partners are in agreement to take a step along the general lines which you wanted us to pursue. There is a problem about Italy. The Soviets have suggested the participation of Italy – with many others – and the Italians have taken hold of this very vigorously and are pressing us. I do not think we can deny them a role without injuring the prospects of our Italian friends in the forthcoming elections. On the other hand, it seems to me that the initial approach pattern ought to be the same as the last, namely, the three of us to the Soviet Union. I do feel, however, that this matter of composition is of the utmost importance and that we ought not in this respect to pay a costly political price for a ticket to the Summit – particularly since no one has yet suggested any really worthwhile result that might come out of that meeting. I also have your letter of March 27. We gave very serious thought to anticipating a possible Soviet move on suspension of testing by a statement of our own. I would, of course, have gotten in touch with you had we felt disposed to take this course. However, after weighing all of the factors, including your own problem, we concluded that it was on the whole best to do nothing at the moment. I do feel, however, that we are being pushed into a rather difficult position from the standpoint of world opinion and that we shall have to alter somewhat the four-power proposals in this respect. But of course we would not do so without full consultation with you. I hope that the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act can be put through in time to get our relationship in this respect on a new basis before the end of this Congress. I think, however, that Foster has told Harold Caccia that Congress is very sensitive to our now conducting negotiations on the assumption that the Act will be amended. I hope, however, in any event, that matters will move fast enough in Congress so that we could deal with this between us, when you are here in June. With warm regard, As ever,

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117 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 3, 1958 Dear Harold: This letter is a personal one. If it presents to you any problem whatsoever it is unintentional, because in the suggestion I shall describe you will have complete freedom of decision without any slightest possibility of embarrassment to yourself. About forty miles away, in the City of Baltimore, is one of our very fine universities, Johns Hopkins University. Its President is my youngest brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, a distinguished educator.1 He and his Trustees are very anxious to invite you to come over to the University on Tuesday, June tenth, to receive an Honorary Degree from them and to make a commencement talk. The hour of their ceremony is apparently set up at, I think, 10:30 in the morning. However, I am informed that it could be as easily moved to something on the order of 2:30 in the afternoon. Because of my sentimental attachment to the institution and, of course, to my brother, I would volunteer to go along with you for the visit, if you should so desire, and if you should decide to accept the invitation. My idea would be for us to take a helicopter from the White House grounds directly to the University grounds (a trip of some twenty to thirty minutes), attend the ceremony, and return here at once. My own “shot gun” opinion is that you will feel too rushed and your time will be too crowded to make room for this additional chore. But I do know that the University and my brother would be most highly honored if you should find it possible to accept. I repeat that this letter must not under any circumstances occasion you the slightest hesitation in making any reply that you choose. At any event it does not pose any question having to do with the Summit, nuclear tests, or outer space! With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

Milton Stover Eisenhower was Ike’s youngest brother, the sixth son in the family. He had previously been president of Kansas State University before becoming president of Johns Hopkins University in 1956.

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118 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 10, 1958 Dear Friend I was glad to get your personal letter about Johns Hopkins. I have heard what a fine place it is and should much like to go there, particularly as your brother, whom I think I have never met, is President. I would certainly be prepared to give a commencement talk, if that is what they would like. As you know, I will have just given one at DePauw, so perhaps Johns Hopkins would not expect me to give a very long talk. The only thing which would make me hesitate is that we shall in any case have all too short a time for our talks together. If we take the morning off to go to Johns Hopkins, we shall be cutting our time even further. I wonder, therefore, if we could make up for the loss of the Tuesday morning by continuing our talks on the Wednesday morning, June 11? As you know, I have now accepted an invitation to go to Canada after I leave you. This means that I could stop over in Washington until the afternoon of Wednesday. The only other complication is that I know that Harold Caccia is planning a small luncheon for me on Tuesday, June 10, and I should not like to disappoint him. But I think from your letter that we ought to be able to get back from Johns Hopkins by about 1.0 p.m. If these points are satisfactory to you, I should very much like to accept the invitation to go to Johns Hopkins on the morning of Tuesday, June 10, in time for their ceremony at 10.30. Of course, it would be splendid if you were able to go too, and the offer of your helicopter sounds very attractive. I hope very much that this will be possible. Perhaps you could let Harold Caccia know how you would like the announcement about John Hopkins to be made, so that we can arrange for a similar announcement to be made here at the same time. With all the problems on hand now, I look forward very keenly to our talk together and to seeing you again. With warm regards, Yours ever Harold

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119 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 14, 1958 Dear Harold, I have your letter agreeing to a visit to Johns Hopkins, making there a short commencement address. I think my brother is probably writing to you at the same time, and I am quite certain that he will assure you that the brevity of your talk will not diminish its value from the standpoint of the University. I have asked Foster to get in touch with Caccia about the timing of the announcement. I think this should be done at a reasonably early date so as to avoid any leak. We should plan to go together in a helicopter, arriving back here on the White House lawn no later than one o’clock. If we can be about ten minutes ahead of that time, you will not have even a few minutes’ delay at your luncheon at the Embassy. Actually I think we can possibly be here even earlier than that. It was very nice of you to pick up my suggestion and act so quickly and favorably. Of course it will be quite satisfactory for you to stay through the morning of the eleventh; we do not want to deprive ourselves of the necessary time to talk over the things that are important to us both. With warm regard, As ever,

120 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 18, 1958 Dear Friend During my tour in the Far East I was very conscious of the defence problems of the area. On the whole, I think we are not doing too badly there. I am glad that the recent SEATO Council Meeting went off so well. It has helped, I am sure, to consolidate our alliance more firmly. It seemed to me, however, while I was out there, that there was one gap in our approach to the defence problems of the area. I felt very strongly that there was need for the four countries which are in a position to deploy

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effective defence forces in the area (namely, our two countries together with Australia and New Zealand) to undertake, on a basis of complete frankness, some joint consideration of defence policy in South East Asia. We must not, of course, do anything that might weaken SEATO. We must therefore avoid anything that would look like forming an inner circle of SEATO Powers. At the same time I think you will agree that we cannot honestly put all our cards on the table in the SEATO forum. And, if there is to be any effective military planning for that area, it must be done, unobtrusively, by the four Powers which alone can deploy effective forces in the area. I should therefore like to suggest that without setting up any new machinery or institutions we should have frank and full discussions on what our forces are doing and can do in South East Asia. These discussions should be quite informal, and we should have to make sure that they were held so unobtrusively as to attract no attention. If you feel able to agree to this suggestion, I will ask Harold Caccia, as a first step, to take the matter up with the State Department and the Pentagon in order to find out their ideas as to where and how the discussions should take place, and what subjects could most usefully be studied. Ever yours sincerely, Harold Macmillan

121 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 24, 1958 Dear Friend: Recent developments have convinced us more than ever that, if it ever became necessary to launch the Western nuclear retaliation to a Soviet attack, we could not risk any delay in ordering the strategic nuclear forces into action if they were to be successful. We have accordingly been considering the procedural steps which would be needed in this country to ensure that, if need arose, the decision to launch the nuclear retaliatory forces stationed here could be taken quickly. Although our considerations have been limited specifically to a Soviet attack on the United Kingdom, you would no doubt be involved with us from the beginning. Any Soviet attack on us would almost certainly coincide with a simultaneous attack either on United States bases elsewhere or, with increasing likelihood as time passes, on the United States mainland. In addition, there is the question of Strategic Air Command units here, and the American and British forces under operational command of SACEUR stationed in the United Kingdom.

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I am sure you will agree that it is essential that the procedural arrangements in the two countries leading up to the decision to launch the nuclear retaliation should be fully in line. I should like to suggest, therefore, that talks should be held in Washington shortly to make sure that we have a fully agreed and understood procedure for dealing with this vital question. If you agree to this proposal, perhaps you could nominate someone on your side who would be responsible for the talks. I should like to nominate, as our representative, Sir Patrick Dean, the Chairman of our Joint Intelligence Committee. He is known to you and, if you agreed, could come over to see your people at a mutually convenient time. He would be accompanied by experts to deal with the technical questions. As regards timing, I am inclined to think that a meeting should take place as soon as both sides are ready; and I would suggest perhaps the end of May, if this was convenient for your representatives. We think that this subject should be discussed on a broad basis to include both action to be taken on an intelligence alert and action to be taken on warning of an impending attack. We should be glad to let your representative know, in advance of the talks, through our Embassy in Washington, the lines on which we have been thinking. The question of nuclear retaliation certainly has wider implications (e.g. in respect of the other N.A.T.O. countries); but we feel, and I hope you will agree, that, if we were to discuss it between ourselves in the first instance, this would provide a basis for discussing the wider N.A.T.O. problem later. Yours ever Harold Macmillan

122 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 24, 1958 Dear Harold: I have your letter of April eighteenth, suggesting, as I understand it, military planning by the two of us plus Australia and New Zealand with reference to Southeast Asia. I certainly see no objection to this provided it can be done, as you say, unobtrusively and in a way which will not run the risk of undermining SEATO and alienating the Asian members. However, it does seem to me that before there can be any very useful military talks, there is need for political discussion. I think this perhaps should occur in the first instance between our two countries. I wonder whether this

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could not be one of the matters we talk about when you are to be here in early June? The rebellion in Sumatra seems to have flattened out so that the problem there, while certainly as grave as ever, does not have the same time factor that seemed at one time to be the case.1 If you want Caccia to have some talks with Foster about this before you come over, I would see no objection. However, I must repeat my opinion that four-power military planning, in advance of political decisions by them, would incur more risk than advantage. Incidentally, Foster has the impression, derived from the SEATO meeting, that Prime Minister [Walter] Nash of New Zealand is much less disposed than was his predecessor to vigorous action that could have military implications.2 With warm regard, As ever, 1

2

The rebellion in Sumatra referred to a CIA-sponsored insurgency against the existing government of President Achmed Sukarno. After an American pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, was lost on 18 May 1958, the CIA became fearful of greater involvement and, shortly thereafter, terminated its involvement in the rebellion. See Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies ( Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1999), 249–51. This citation refers to the paperback edition of Ike’s Spies. The first edition was published by Doubleday, 1981. Walter Nash was the prime minister of New Zealand. His predecessor was Keith Holyoake.

123 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 25, 1958 Dear Friend, Now that the Security Council debate is over I hope you will not mind me reminding you of a talk we had in Paris about troubles in which we both get involved owing to so many soldiers making so many speeches. All this, of course, is a development since the last war – in the old days it would have been unheard of. We all have our burdens to carry in this respect and I have often been much embarrassed by our dear friend Monty’s lectures.1 In addition to this problem there is also the whole difficulty about statements by serving officers, often made in a laudable attempt to justify their task to the public, but equally often having the opposite effect. In the present situation of the verbosity of the world about the hydrogen bomb, this can be very dangerous. We have had recent experience of General [Thomas]

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Power’s statement at NATO about 24 hour patrols,2 followed by Colonel Zink – and although he was repudiated immediately, the harm was not altogether undone. Then we had the report of Mr. Bartholomew of the United Press after his visit to Strategic Air Command, about what is called the “Safe Plan”. Everything that these people have said was very comforting to me because I am glad to know how great your state of readiness is. One cannot fail to be impressed by the precautions which are taken for our safety, while at the same time maintaining the deterrent. Nevertheless, it is very difficult without breaches of security to give absolutely full information to the press, and a little knowledge can be very dangerous. There is a further difficulty that many of the people, at any rate in this country, who are briefed, do not wish to be reassured but merely want material for making trouble. I am therefore sure that it is really better to give as little information as possible about all the detailed arrangements of Strategic Air Command. I now understand that the Commander of Strategic Air Command may be proposing to take a party of about forty U.S. journalists round the world next month in order to see how his Command operates. As part of their programme the journalists would visit England, and would no doubt file stories about what goes on here. This in turn will make the British Press annoyed that they have not had similar facilities. I must say that I feel all these probings and ferretings, however good their intention, will do harm and make our task more difficult. I realise that if this tour of journalists has really been arranged it may be hard to call it off now, but I should be grateful if you would see what can be done. I know that you will explain to Strategic Air Command that my concern in this is not to obstruct their well-meant efforts but to help them carry out their task. With warm regards, As ever, HAROLD 1

2

Macmillan’s reference to “Monty’s lectures” involved the occasional tendency of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery to make public criticisms of American foreign policy, as well as of Eisenhower personally. General Thomas Power, USAF, was the commander of the Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC). A vigorous proponent of strategic air power, Power was an advocate of maintaining a permanent fleet of B-52s on airborne alert.

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124 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 30, 1958 Dear Harold: I have your letter of the 24th. I quite agree with your suggestion that our two governments study how to concert actions under the circumstances that you envision. We will be ready to name our representative in a day or so. I suggest that this whole matter be done on a most secret basis. With warm regard, As ever, IKE

125 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 6, 1958 Dear Friend, You will, of course, be aware of the agitation here about flights over this country by American aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. I am glad to say that so far we have been able to hold the position without detriment to our mutual interests, but pressure continues and I feel that if I am to be able to defend these interests properly I must have adequate information on which to base my judgment of the right line to take. I am not so concerned about the assessment of the results of an accident involving a nuclear weapon since I understand that our experts have had a full discussion of this and reached agreement. I am however rather concerned at our absence of knowledge of the number of flights of your aircraft into, out of or over this country carrying nuclear weapons or material and the conditions on which those flights are made. When, last year, you agreed that we could fly components for our Christmas Island trials over your country, we were, in my view quite properly, required to comply with certain conditions that were imposed for the safety of the United States.1 Broadly speaking we have to satisfy your authorities as to our safety procedures in transit and to provide advance notification of the flight plans of each individual flight, with a statement of the general nature of the cargo, and to make arrangements so that immediate information about the detailed nature of the cargo could be furnished to your airbases in the event of an accident.

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This is just the kind of information and assurance about your flights over this country which I now lack. The reason is easy enough to understand and springs from the way in which arrangements for your aircraft to be here were first made in the days of the Berlin Airlift. But the domestic interest in these matters has grown since then and I feel I ought to ask you to provide the British authorities with the same sort of information about future flights of your aircraft into, out of or over this country when they are carrying nuclear weapons or their components. Of course, I do not want to embarrass you, by asking for details of weapon design which are banned by your present law, but our own experience shows that it is possible to avoid this and yet comply with your own safety conditions. Such information would naturally be restricted here to the few officials who would need to know. Yours ever, Harold Macmillan 1

The Christmas Island trials were Britain’s explosion of its first thermonuclear device on 15 May 1957.

126 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 8, 1958 Dear Harold: I have your note of May sixth. I recognize your problem and I am quite certain that we can meet your requirements. All the Departments concerned are instantly going into procedures and techniques that would be necessary so that we can make certain that the effort is put on a practical basis. We should have specific suggestions very soon. As ever, Ike

127 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 15, 1958 Dear Friend, Thank you for your letter of April 24 about the defence problems of SouthEast Asia.

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I readily accept your point about the need for political discussion before military planning is undertaken, and I agree that it would be useful if this were one of the subjects for discussion between us when we meet in June. Yours ever sincerely, Harold Macmillan

128 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 29, 1958 Dear Friend, I was naturally very pleased to read to-day that the Joint Atomic Energy Commission of Congress has now approved the amendment to the McMahon Act. I know how much we owe to you and Foster for all that you have done, and I am deeply grateful. If I understand the provisions of the amendment rightly, we shall have a race against time if a bi-lateral agreement which would benefit the U.K. is to be successfully concluded before Congress rises. I gather that the latest date on which such an agreement could safely be laid before Congress would be July 1st. As you know, we have fully accepted the view that it would have been dangerous to have held discussions between us about nuclear weapon information until the present stage. I trust, however, that the way is now open for our experts and yours to begin substantive discussion urgently. I would indeed hope that our experts could get ahead with their work so as to be able to report to you and to me while I am in Washington. I would even hope that it might be possible for us to agree in principle on the general content of a bi-lateral agreement before I leave Washington. I would of course be prepared to send over a team of experts immediately I hear that you would be willing for them to begin work. With warmest regards, Yours ever, Harold Macmillan

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129 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 30, 1958 Dear Harold: I have received your letter of today’s date. I believe we will be in a position to go over the situation with [Edwin] Plowden when he arrives next Wednesday and that very shortly thereafter we can decide on the dispatch of the balance of your team of experts to complete the negotiations.1 It is difficult to foretell whether these discussions by the experts can in fact progress quickly enough so that you and I will be able to come to some agreement in principle when we meet, but we will make every effort to do so. You realize however that there may be very real limitations arising from our legislative processes since the Congress has not yet acted on the Committee report, which itself is not yet available. In addition, the technical nature of the discussions may take a short time. I am fully conscious of the time factor and we are moving with all possible speed. In view of the Congressional situation I feel it is important that no publicity should be given to the fact that even preliminary discussions are under way. With warm regard, As ever, 1

Eisenhower refers to Macmillan’s letter of 29 May. Sir Edwin Plowden was the chairman of the British Atomic Energy Authority. Following the Washington Conference in October 1957, he served on a joint British–American committee with Lewis Strauss, director of the Atomic Energy Commission, which dealt with nuclear collaboration.

130 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 1, 1958 Dear Friend, I have been brooding for some time about the economic and financial position in the free world, and I venture now to send you some thoughts in the hope that we might have a talk about these problems when we meet. I think that you and Foster have always consistently felt that our military defences, however strong, against communism would never be sufficient by themselves. Indeed, the more the communists see that they will not get anywhere by military aggression, the more they will turn to other methods – diplomatic pressure, subversion and of course economic infiltration. We

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cannot altogether complain about the last. Indeed it should be the field in which we would want to meet, and defeat, the communist challenge. Believing in the virtues of the democratic way of life, we ought to be able to show the rest of the world, including in the end the communist countries themselves, that democracy can give the best results. Conversely, a defeat for the West on the economic front would provide the communists with as valuable and conclusive a victory as any they could win by military means. By this I mean that there are many countries, either actively aligned with the West or “uncommitted” or “neutral”, whose will to resist would be fatally weakened if they became subject to great economic distress, with severe unemployment and the like. Then there are others whose choice will be determined, or at least influenced, by the extent to which the West will help them in their development plans to increase their standard of living and prosperity. Clearly the most favourable economic climate for us to meet the communist threat is that of a steadily expanding level of world trade, in which the underdeveloped countries would feel that the future would hold increasing opportunity for them. It is easy to propound this simple fact. I have been wondering how we could work out some imaginative initiative which would demonstrate our concern for the prosperity of the free world and confirm our recognition of the principle of interdependence in the civil field equally with the military. I recall that in our last talks in Washington and at the N.A.T.O. meeting in Paris, we were worried lest this concept of cooperation in the free world was getting too much emphasis on the military side. I know that you and your colleagues have been giving much thought to your own economic problems, especially as to the duration and depth of the so-called recession. Curiously, the first effect here of the pause in American business is favourable, since we benefit from the decline in the fall in commodity prices which follows any reduction of United States demand. Some of the primary producing countries are already in difficulties and these are likely to increase. And the secondary effects are bound to be adverse for us all – perhaps soon. Naturally, we are confident that the American economy will go forward again, both in the short and in the long run. Ours may be all the healthier, I believe, for the pause we have imposed in the effort to halt the inflation. But stability at a comparatively low level of activity cannot be the political answer to the economic problems of the free world. We certainly must all go forward again – but steadily, and as far as possible having regard to the economic stability of our friends and of the uncommitted countries. It would be a great thing, I suggest, when your economy is about to go forward again, and when ours is likely to follow suit, if we could show the rest of the free world that we care for their interests too.

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I hope that this does not sound like a suggestion that the United States should again step up its economic help. I really do not mean that. What we should all do is to make a better use of the resources that can be made available – which is what we are trying to do in our military planning. There are two main questions. One is how to organise and control the economic aid which can be given, especially to the underdeveloped countries; to supervise how this is shared out, so that those countries can plan ahead without extravagance. The other is how to make sure that enough financial credit is provided for a steady expansion of trade. It would be a tragedy if the productive capacity of the free world was held back simply because we had failed to provide the financial machinery. Work and production are the best defences against communist subversion. Of course, the sterling system is at present an indispensable part of the world credit system and is playing a particularly important part in the maintenance of world trade. With its present surplus, the United Kingdom ought to be able to take a fair share this year in helping with this problem of international liquidity. In other words it will be a buffer for the rest of the sterling area, so that they will be less likely to be drawn into a decline in world business. I have, as yet, no precise proposals to put before you. But I feel, instinctively, that in the period which lies ahead the struggle against communism will shift more and more into the economic field. So long as we maintain the alliances and do not lower our guard, they cannot launch a hot war. But the cold war in all its forms will grow in intensity. Anyway, the real purpose of this rather rambling letter is to ask for your thoughts on the possibility of attracting the interest (and therefore the allegiance) of the free world to some positive and helpful demonstration of interdependence in economic matters, to match the military alliances we have already made. With warm regards, Yours ever, Harold

131 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 10, 1958 Dear Friend At our meeting yesterday afternoon I promised to send you a note of some minor defects in our existing arrangements for military co-operation. If these can be corrected, it would help us to achieve maximum common effort in the defence field.

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I should also like to take this opportunity of mentioning again the question of information about flights of United States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and material over the United Kingdom. You will remember that I wrote to you about this on May 6. I hope that it will soon be possible for your people to adopt procedures which will make this information available to us, perhaps through Service channels in London. Yours very sincerely, Harold Macmillan

132 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 11, 1958 My Dear Friend As I leave for Ottawa I must write to tell you how much I have valued the opportunity of seeing you and talking with you again during these last few days. I always find our conversations so refreshing and invigorating. You know how much your friendship means to me. I hope that it will not be long before we can find an opportunity for meeting again. Yours ever Harold Macmillan

133 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 11, 1958 Dear Harold: Your letter of May sixth suggested that the procedure for the conduct of United States air operations over the United Kingdom which involve hazardous cargo be standardized with U.S. requirements for similar U.K. operations over U.S. territory. I have been informed that the technical safety conferences between representatives of our countries have been quite successful in establishing a mutual understanding of our respective safety rules and procedures while conducting air operations involving hazardous cargoes. The standardization of procedures seems to fall beyond the intended scope of the safety conferences. There was some discussion of the individual countries procedures in this forum. We might, with additional instructions to our conferees, utilize the channels and contacts that have been established

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for conferences on the standardization of the flight procedures and your requirements for information. In the previous conferences, the United States representatives were the Cmdr, 3rd Air Force; Cmdr, 7th Air Division and representatives from the U.S. Embassy, London. If you agree, I will make the necessary arrangements for the above United States representatives to re-establish contact with your designated representatives to determine what additional operational information you feel the United Kingdom requires to make consistent the United States–United Kingdom procedures involving the transport of hazardous cargo. With warm regard, As ever

134 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 12, 1958 Dear Harold: Quite naturally I am highly pleased that you found your visit interesting and informative. Frankly it was the kind of international meeting, especially between ourselves, that I prize so highly. It is the kind that, for these past five years, I’ve hoped might become routine. But my frequently-presented arguments about the value of agenda-less visits have always been met by objections from others, from both sides of the water, who seem so plainly to see the risks and difficulties. I share the hope with you that we may find a way of repeating this experience. With respect to your note of June tenth to which you attached a memorandum of specific observations or suggestions, I have already written to you about the plan for concerting the programs of our two governments in the matter of carrying nuclear weapons. As far as the other specific points you mention – Exchange Officers, Security Clearance for British Controlled Firms, and Scientific and Defense Cooperation – I shall have these matters examined with a view to sending along to you the available information. Trusting you have a pleasant journey home – and with warm regard, As ever

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135 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 26, 1958 I hesitate to trouble you on this point but I have been keeping in touch with the negotiations on the new Atomic Energy Agreement and I am told that, although all the points at issue have been settled, some disagreement has arisen between our negotiators over some words which your experts now wish to add to the preamble. These words would link the arrangements for exchange of defence information for our common security with the exchange of information in the civil field to which different considerations apply. It is true that the words would appear only in the preamble and not in the operative clauses of the Agreement but, at the same time, I feel that it is not at all appropriate that they should be included in a defence agreement at all. I do hope that you will agree with me over this. We must not let the whole idea for which we have been working together get bogged down on this point. As you know, time is now very short and I should be most grateful if you could look at this yourself.

136 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 1, 1958 I hear with regret that the Atomic Energy Commission have insisted on retaining in the preamble to the Anglo-American Atomic Bilateral Agreement the additional paragraph which refers to cooperation in both military and civil areas. I was grateful to you for your recommendation to the Commission that they should not insist upon this additional paragraph. As, however, it has now been included in the Agreement, I think it right that I should put on record my understanding of its meaning – namely, that in the civil field our cooperation will continue to be governed by our existing Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy.

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137 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 3, 1958 Dear Harold: Yesterday I took satisfaction in signing into law the Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. I was gratified to be in a position this morning to authorize the Secretary of State to sign the bilateral agreement between our governments which our representatives have successfully negotiated. We have acted at once to get this agreement before the Congress. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

138 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 4, 1958 My dear Friend Thank you for your letter of June 11. I greatly appreciate your willingness to make arrangements to provide me with the additional information I need about certain of your air operations over this country. I am happy to fall in with your suggestion that we should use the same forum as dealt with safety procedures. On our side the membership would be much as before, with representatives from the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and Air Ministry; but we should not on this occasion include representatives from the Home Office and other Departments who were particularly concerned with safety procedures. I suggest that further details might be settled between your Embassy here and the Foreign Office. Yours very sincerely, Harold Macmillan

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139 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 7, 1958 My dear Friend, Now that the Atomic Agreement between us has been signed I must tell you how grateful I am for the help you have given us over this right from the beginning. I am particularly grateful that you saw our difficulties over the preamble about which I telegraphed you last week. I trust that Congress will enable the Agreement to become effective. This Agreement will be regarded as a further symbol of the partnership which we both want for co-operation between the countries of the free world. With warm regards, Yours ever, Harold Macmillan

140 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 10, 1958 1. You will remember speaking to me in Washington about our undertaking to keep our forces in Germany at the level of 55,000 during 1959 on condition that a way was found in NATO of bridging the financial gap between the cost of 55,000 and that of 45,000. You asked that we should reconsider our decision to reduce the level to 45,000 if this condition were not met. 2. I have now discussed this whole question with my colleagues. We understand the political importance which you rightly attach to the maintenance of a substantial British force on the continent. We too regard this as very important. Nor do we wish to cause dissension within the Alliance or to make General Norstad’s task more difficult. But we have always regarded this condition on which we would be prepared to keep the level at 55,000 in 1959 as part and parcel of the three-year agreement. We calculated as nearly as we could how much we could afford in foreign exchange for our troops in Germany over the three years and we did not feel that in 1959 we could make a contribution out of our own pocket greater than such as would together with the German contribution pay for more than 45,000 in view of our other obligations under the agreement. 3. Meanwhile plans have to be made. If it had not been for your request that we should reconsider our position we would have been applying this month

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to the W.E.U. for their acquiescence in reductions being started at the beginning of 1959. In deference to your request however we are ready to delay this application until the 1st of October. This will give further time for the exploration of methods of bridging the gap. If it could be bridged the problem would not arise for we would then keep our forces at 55,000 throughout 1959. There would then be no question of our going to W.E.U. during the next twelve months. I feel that our European allies have not yet understood the advantages to them of all regular British forces. Our ultimate purpose is to have 45,000 all regular troops in Germany. That will be a very powerful force and to be compared favourably with a much larger force of non regular troops. 4. I suggest that if you agree our two representatives on the NATO Council should be authorised to discuss and work out together a possible solution to this problem of the financial gap.

141 REPORT OF TELEPHONE CALL BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN1 July 14, 1958, at 5:43 P.M. The President said first: “You have all the news and intelligence on Iraq and know how it exacerbates the Lebanon situation. President [Camille] Chamoun2 has asked us both to go in. We have decided to implement the plan (for your very secret information). As I understand it, the contingent of yours is about 3,700, and it is apparently in the lift that gets in somewhere toward the rear of the procession.” The Prime Minster: Yes, that’s right. The President: It is just possible that in view of the Jordan situation that I understand has been put in your lap, you may want to hold those people a little bit in reserve as the situation develops in Lebanon. I just wanted to say that if there is that much modification in the military plan if you thought it wise to make it you could do that unilaterally. The Prime Minister: Yes, but the thought is this: if we do this thing with the Lebanese it is only really part of a much larger operation, because we shall be driven to take the thing as a whole, and I want to feel that if we treat it as a whole it looks like a showdown. The President: Of course, you must understand that so far as we are concerned, as of this moment we can’t talk about anything happening elsewhere. I agree with you that the situation must contemplate more than that.

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The Prime Minister: Yes, I agree the situation is going to be hard. It will start off all the row with the pipelines, with the bigger things, but this will stand right up to them. If this thing is done, which I think is very noble, dear friend, it will set off a lot of things throughout the whole area. I’m all for that as long as we regard it as an operation that has got to be carried through. The President: Now just a minute so that there is no misunderstanding. Are you of the belief that unless we have made up our minds in advance to carry this thing on through to the Persian Gulf, that we had better not go in in the first place? The Prime Minister: I don’t think that, but I think that we have got to see it together, dear friend. There is no good in being in that place and sitting there a few months and the whole rest being in flames. As soon as we start we have to face it – we have probably got to do a lot of things. The President: Well, now, I will tell you of course I would not want to go further. Today we tried to project in our discussions here (I and with the legislative leaders) the development of the situation, and they could take many forms. If we are now planning the initiation of a big operation that could run all the way through Syria and Iraq, we are far beyond anything I have the power to do constitutionally. We have had quite some trouble justifying to our own leaders what we intend to do. The Prime Minister: Yes. What is your time-table? The President: Right now. It would take – I don’t know the exact time that they will get there on account of the orders and hours, but I would not want to give any information over an open wire. The Prime Minister: Of course. Now, are you going to speak to the country? The President: Yes. This is very secret. We are calling an emergency session of the Security Council for tomorrow morning. I will broadcast after that Council does something. The Prime Minister: Tomorrow? The President: Well, probably. The Prime Minister: Well, now, we have had a request from the two little chaps – the one is gone and the other is there, the king – The President: We did not know what the final reports were The Prime Minister: I know there is little news. The second is going along for the other. We have got a sort of request from him saying that are we going to do. I feel, my dear friend, that if you set off this great show, which I think is fine, you can’t confine it to what you say publicly, but in fact all the trouble will blitz through on destroyers, oil fields, pipelines. Taking on Turks and getting things back. We should be ruined. I am for it. I don’t want you to say that now to me, but so long as I understand we are in this together. We are doing this together.

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The President: My own idea would be this. If this situation develops where our whole national interests are abandoned and destroyed, I have to go before the Congress and ask for authority to act. We can understand and agree on that much. And that is exactly what you say, except I have to say it in my guarded terms. The Prime Minister: You see, we shall have a terrible reaction. Do you want us to come with you or do you want to do it alone? The President: At this moment, not knowing now under the new situation where your people may be needed, I think they should be alerted and then whatever happens, we will do it that way. The Prime Minister: We must support the whole thing in public and all that. It is the whole that matters. That is what we have to deal with. The President: Of course, as of this moment that has been – we don’t know what is going to happen and I think it would be very bad for you and me to talk over an open wire to discuss the great possibilities. The Prime Minister: What is your timing? Is it now seven o’clock? The President: No, it is six o’clock here. The Prime Minister: What have you got to do about speaking? The President: No, not tonight. This is very secret. The Prime Minister: I will send you a good message by wire, and you will get it in an hour or two. There are many things I can’t say over the wire. The President: Yes, do that. Tell the Ambassador here to get a copy of it instantly to the Secretary of State. The Prime Minster: I will write something out and get it to you in an hour. I will send it to Foster. The President: Now, on the rest of it, we will talk about these possibilities and what we have to be prepared to do. I realize we are opening a Pandora’s Box here, but if we don’t open it, I think it is disastrous. The Prime Minister: Yes, I quite agree with you. What I mean is the old box when it is opened does a lot of harm. I am all for it. The President: You’d better send a message laying out your thoughts on it. The Prime Minister: I will send you a message on those lines where I can speak more clearly. Then the President turned to the Secretary [of State], at the conclusion of the phone call, and said he talked about destruction of oil lines, then we are really at war, then what do we do? He (Macmillan) says we can’t sit down in Lebanon and do nothing, while the British are taking the hard knocks all over the area trying to get this thing straight. (And the President added he agreed with Macmillan.) But, the President continued, he tried to tell Macmillan that he, the President, cannot make a decision such as

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this. We have now to justify our immediate action, which is that we did honor commitments. The President repeated that Macmillan would send a cable immediately which he said would be through in an hour. 1

2

The notes for this transcript were recorded at the White House by an American record-keeper. It will be noted that the American and the British transcripts of the same conversation (see below) differ slightly. Camille Chamoun was the embattled president of Lebanon.

142 CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 10:30 P.M. July 14, 19581 President: You have got all the intelligence on Iraq and you know of course how that exacerbates the situation in Lebanon. You know that President Chamoun has asked us both in. Prime Minister: Yes, I know that. President: We have decided to implement the plan. As I understand it, the contingent of your forces is about 3700 and it is apparently somewhere towards the rear of the procession. Now it is just possible that in view of the Iraq situation, which I understand has been put in your lap, that you may want to hold those people in reserve, depending on developments in the Lebanon. If that involves modification in the military plan, you could do that unilaterally. Prime Minister: The point is this. If you do this thing in the Lebanon, it is really only part of a much larger operation, because we shall be driven to take the thing as a whole. I want to feel that we both regard it as a whole. It looks like a showdown. President: So far as we are concerned we cannot undertake anything beyond Lebanon. The situation elsewhere is going to be much more complicated. Prime Minister: We have to think of the danger to the pipelines and losses we shall suffer. There is no point in running these risks unless we are going to do the whole thing together. They are all tied up together now, and if this thing is done (which I think is very noble of you) in the Lebanon, – all the same it will set off a whole series of things throughout the whole area. The operation once started will have to be carried through to the end. President: Let us make sure there is no misunderstanding. Are you of the belief that unless we have made up our minds to carry this thing on to the Persian Gulf, that we had better not start in the first place?

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Prime Minister: It is no good you being left in that place and sitting there a few months, and the whole of the rest of the area being in flames. We have got to face it that we shall have to do the whole thing. President: Today we tried to project in our discussions here – we had some with the Legislative leaders – we tried to project the development of the situation as it may take place. If we are at the beginning, and are planning just the initiative of a big operation, which could run all the way through Syria and Iraq, we are thinking of decisions which are far far beyond anything which I have the power to do constitutionally. Prime Minister: What are you going to do? Are you going to speak to the country or something? President: We have an emergency meeting of the Security Council for tomorrow morning. I will broadcast just after the Council. Prime Minister: Tomorrow? President: Very possibly. Prime Minister: We have had a request from one of the two little chaps – one is gone and the other is there – we do not really know the final reports, but the second one is going on alone.2 We have this request. His being deputy gives him a legal right over the whole. What are we going to do? I feel only this, my dear Friend, that if you set off this great show, which I think is the right course, you cannot confine it to one place. It is likely that the trouble will destroy the oil fields and the pipelines and all the rest of it, and will blaze right through. We shall have to go through with it. We may well be ruined. It’s not much fun getting nothing back. But I am all for it, if we are determined to see it through. President: I have to ask for authority to act. Prime Minister: As long as you and I understand that we are all in it together. President: It is true that our whole national history depends on how the situation develops. We can understand and agree on that much. That is exactly what you say. Prime Minister: There may be terrible reactions to your operation. Would you rather do it alone? President: I think your people should be alerted. Prime Minister: We have done that. Of course, in any case we would support the whole thing in public, and all that. I do not want – I have seen these things go wrong – I don’t want to be left sitting in this 2½ d place. It is worth nothing in itself. What really matters is the whole problem which we have somehow got to deal with. President: We don’t know what is going to happen. I am not going to say or make any announcement tonight.

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Prime Minister: I will send you a message tonight, and a copy to the Secretary. President: We will think about the possibilities of what we are prepared to do. I realize that we are opening Pandora’s box. We don’t know what’s at the bottom of it. Prime Minister: I quite agree with you. Absolutely. But the old box may do us a lot of harm. I am all for it if we go through with the whole thing. I will send you a message tonight in which I can explain more clearly. 1 2

The transcript of this conversation was recorded by a note-taker in London. The “two little chaps” to whom Macmillan refers were Chamoun and King Hussein. See Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 273 and Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 471.

143 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 14, 1958 LEBANON I was very glad to hear your voice on the telephone tonight, and I hope you understood what I was trying to say in spite of the difficulties of talking on the open line. I am sure you are right in feeling that the situation in the Middle East generally, justifies and indeed demands, urgent action. Intervention in the Lebanon in response to Chamoun’s request is certainly made much more necessary by what has happened in Iraq. No doubt you will justify it in the United Nations and to the world in general as action against interference both from Egypt and from Syria against the independence of another state. We shall certainly give you full support in any action you decide to take. What I was trying to say on the telephone was that the action you contemplate must necessarily have great repercussions. It will set off a lot of trouble. The installations at Tripoli cannot be immediately protected, and will probably be destroyed, and all the pipelines through Syria will be cut. There may also be attacks on other oil installations throughout the whole area, all of which will inflict great loss upon the international companies and particularly upon us who depend on sterling oil. I have talked this over with my colleagues and we are quite prepared to face these risks if it is part of a determination between us both to face the issues and be prepared to protect Jordan with the hope of restoring the situation in Iraq. With regard to the Persian Gulf which you mentioned, we have already taken preliminary steps and I hope we shall be able to handle this ourselves. Of course

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I understand your difficulties with Congress and there is also the United Nations which will have to be handled. I also understand that you must seek the necessary authority step by step. But what I would like to feel is that it is our joint intention, not merely to be content with rescuing Lebanon (not very important in itself) but to face the wider issues together. Now with regard to the Lebanon expedition. I think you are right in feeling that our 3,700 men should be held in reserve: they may very soon be needed elsewhere. We will of course give the fullest public support here and in the United Nations and through all our friends in the Commonwealth and in friendly countries with whom we have influence. I want you to feel that we are completely with you in this enterprise. If you decide that you do not want us for the Beirut expedition, will you please let us know at once? One minor point. It occurs to me that it might be wiser for you to inform the Canadians yourselves. It also, I think, might be wise for you to inform India. We would of course send our own message to these two countries and to the other Commonwealth countries. Harold Macmillan To sum up. I should like to feel that you agree with me that in the new situation the Lebanon cannot be looked at by itself. Indeed if these events had not happened in Iraq we would probably be carrying on the policy on which we were working together up till today; that is to hope for a political settlement in the Lebanon and a gradual quietening down of the situation. Now Lebanon is only part of a much wider crisis. But, if you decide to go into the Lebanon realising all that is involved, we will give you every support. I am sending you a separate message about Jordan. Harold Macmillan

144 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 14, 1958 JORDAN I have just read a telegram saying that the King of Jordan has specifically asked for an assurance both from your Government and from ours, that we will come to his assistance militarily if he thinks this necessary to preserve the integrity and independence of Jordan. I very much hope that you will agree that we ought both to give this assurance at once. But I think it would be to our advantage not to let the situation drift, as it has done in the Lebanon. We ought, in my opinion, to urge the King to make his request at

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once, since if our military support is to be effective and have a real impact upon the whole situation in the Middle East, it will have to be given promptly. Moreover, we ought to act before disorder develops, and while we can be sure that the airfields are in friendly hands. If we are asked to send British forces, we should use for this purpose the forces now ear-marked for the Lebanon. It would help us to know what forces you would be able to make available. Here again, we should have to deal with the United Nations, and all the public presentation, on the same lines as for the Lebanon. There has been an attempt to subvert the Jordanian Army and the revolution in Iraq is clearly fostered and supported from Cairo. I should be grateful to have your views urgently. I hope you will feel with me that this action is the necessary complement to what is proposed for the Lebanon. Harold Macmillan

145 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 16, 1958 My dear Friend, I must congratulate you on the great success which your action in the Lebanon has so far had. I admire very much the way in which you and Foster have presented and justified this to the world and in the United Nations. As far as our information goes, the military movements have been smooth and effective. When I speak in Parliament tonight, I shall, of course, make it clear that your action has our full support. I feel sure that, whatever the uncertainties and dangers ahead, the only chance of surmounting them lies in our two countries keeping firmly in step. In response to Foster’s suggestion the Foreign Secretary is flying over to-night so that we can decide together how best to plan our course. With warm regards, Yours ever, Harold Macmillan

146 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 18, 1958 Events moved so quickly yesterday that I had no time to communicate with you, but it was immensely heartening to have two conversations with Foster.

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I only wish that it had been possible to defer the decision about Jordan until after the Foreign Secretary had had his talks in Washington. Clearly this is a situation in which we ought ideally to have had a proper joint long-term plan before embarking on any operations. And of course, as Foster rightly said in his message, it is not really Jordan but Iraq which is the real problem. Furthermore I very much dislike from the military point of view the sort of operation to which we are now committed in Jordan, where our troops will have no port, no heavy arms, and no real mobility. Without your help our logistic support passing over a country at least nominally neutral would be tenuous. If the gamble with the Jordan army does not come off, our troops will indeed be in a difficult position. Despite these difficulties I believe that you agreed with me that in the face of King Hussein’s appeal and the plots which we knew would otherwise be sprung in Jordan today, it seemed to us even more dangerous to do nothing than to try the operation on which we are now engaged. My great consolation is that we are together in these two operations in Lebanon and Jordan. We must at all costs not be divided now when we have been forced to play for such high stakes. I am sure that Foster and Selwyn will be able to work out together a joint plan for the future. Now that we have started on this difficult road, I do not see how we can withdraw until we have somehow restored stability and strength, in at least some areas of the Middle East. If we hesitate now, we shall indeed get the worst of all worlds, but what we do will require the most searching and careful weighing. I am certainly not despondent. I refuse to believe that our close and intimate cooperation together will not in the end produce the results for which we both hope. With warm regards, as ever, Harold Macmillan

147 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 18, 19581 Dear Harold: Your cable of July 18 has just now reached me. Foster and Selwyn have had useful talks and I believe that our thinking on common problem is identical. Our operations seem to be satisfactorily coordinated. I recognize that your decision as regards Jordan was a very close and difficult one. We have of course fully supported your decision. What the immediate future will bring we cannot tell. We can however face it together with the consciousness, I believe, that we have responded in a

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manner befitting our traditions. Whatever happens in Iraq and other parts of the area, we must, I think, not only try to bolster up the loyalties and the military and economic strength of Lebanon and Jordan, we must also, and this seems to me even more important, see that the Persian Gulf area stays within the Western orbit. The Kuwait – Dhahran – Abadan areas become extremely important and Turkey and Iran have become more important. We shall seek ways to help them be sturdy allies, first in quality and second in quantity, insofar as that quantity can be usefully provided and maintained. Pakistan is important but the fears of India compel some caution in the extent of giving more military help there. One factor that has helped create for us the serious Mid East problem has been the Western inability to counteract or effectively neutralize the Nasser propaganda in that region. Of course, we cannot match his extreme positions. We cannot, like the Russians, support anti-Israel propaganda nor can we, like the Russians, support programs for confiscating the oil properties and the like. These are themes which appeal to the Arab masses and seem to win for Nasser the enthusiastic, even idolatrous, support of the largely illiterate populations in the region. We shall, however, have to try to do a better propaganda job than we have done up until now. Particularly we should be able to do so in regions where the particular theme of extreme Pan-Arabism and anti-Israelism does not carry much weight, and where more emphasis can be put upon nationalism which, in fact, Soviet Communism tries to destroy. Of course, the foundation for all that we do is understanding here at home. We are struggling hard these days to overcome the reluctance of Congress to appropriate money for information programs and mutual security costs and economic development of the less developed nations. The problems are immense and we are not free of danger. We can, I think, however, recognize that the danger is not because of what we have done. What we have done has made apparent and overt a danger that was always there. Let us together face these dangers with such wisdom as the Lord gave to bring about a more prosperous and peaceful world. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XIX, 993–6, for Elsenhower’s preliminary draft of his response to Macmillan’s cable of 18 July. To the chagrin of the White House, Ike’s draft was revised considerably by the State Department before it was sent to Macmillan.

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148 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 19, 1958 Dear Harold: I have your message of July 10, regarding our discussion, when you were in Washington, of the level of British forces in Germany. I am in agreement with your suggestion that our two representatives on the NATO Council should be authorized to discuss the problem of the financial gap and to see whether a solution to the problem can be found. Accordingly, Foster is sending appropriate instructions to Ambassador Burgess,1 asking him to concert with Sir Frank Roberts.2 Naturally I would wish any such discussions to be without prejudice to the basic question we discussed when you were here. If it should develop that no way can be found within NATO to bridge the financial gap, I would still very much hope that you and your colleagues would find it possible to reconsider your decision to reduce the level of British forces in Germany. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1 2

The reference here is to W. Randolph Burgess, chief of the US mission to NATO. The British diplomat Sir Frank K. Roberts was Britain’s permanent representative to NATO.

149 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 22, 1958 Dear Friend, As you may know, since we responded to King Hussein’s appeal last Wednesday we have flown something just over 2,000 British troops into Jordan. They have settled down well and their presence has helped to stabilise the position and prevent Jordan going the same way as Iraq. Both our Representatives in Jordan have now been told by the Prime Minister that if we are to continue to hold the position against the threat of subversion it is essential to increase the forces on the ground. The Prime Minister has appealed for this. It is clear that unless reinforcements are sent there is a real danger that a coup [emphasis Macmillan’s] may take place

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under our very noses. I believe that this is a moment of crisis for Jordan and for our whole Middle East policy. What is needed is less military than political reinforcement. For this I believe the essential thing is that you should send in some American troops to be alongside ours on the ground. Not only would this increase the military strength of the forces in Jordan, but it will have an extremely favourable political effect, since it will be a visible proof of our support for Jordan’s independence. At the same time we must face the problem of supply. Our troops in Jordan have supplies of food and oil for approximately 12 days together with ammunition for a few days’ local operations. We have been building up these stocks as fast as we can to a level where we should have some margin for ordinary consumption and for emergencies. As you know, however, all our supplies have to be brought in by aircraft which have to overfly Israel. We are having great difficulty with [David] Ben Gurion about this and he himself is in political difficulties with his colleagues and the Opposition.1 At the moment, we are continuing to fly our supplies in since we have not yet been formally asked to stop, but we are really dependent on Ben Gurion’s goodwill and his ability to carry his people with him. I have sent him personal messages, which I hope will help him in his difficulties. Meantime, the Israelis have cut down the time during which overflying is permitted to nine hours out of the twenty-four, nearly all of which are during the night. We are urgently exploring alternative supply routes, including Akaba, but there are difficulties about these which will take time to overcome.2 When we first went into Jordan we had our eyes open. We did so relying on the moral support, which you have freely given us, and upon your promise to give us logistic aid. We have already asked Foster [Dulles] if you could take over the air lift from us and fly in essential supplies in American aircraft. I am sure that the Israelis would raise much less political objection to your aircraft overflying them, and your Globemasters are so much bigger than any of our aircraft that the job could be done with far fewer sorties. To sum up, I think we have reached a turning point in Jordan. If we are to hold the position, the forces on the ground should be fortified by the visible presence of your troops. We must also ensure the safety of their supplies, and both for political and logistic reasons I am sure that you are in a much better position to do this than we are. I do hope that you will be able to do this. It would be disastrous for both you and us if we were forced to withdraw before some settlement has been ensured which will preserve the independence of Jordan. With warm regards, Yours sincerely, Harold Macmillan

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2

David Ben Gurion was the prime minister of Israel. On 21 July, Ben Gurion sent a message to Macmillan complaining that the British were abusing their overflight privileges. See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 523–4. Akaba was also spelled as Aqaba.

150 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 23, 1958 Dear Harold: I received yesterday your message about Jordan. Taking up first the matter of supply, we are quite ready in principle to help out further in this respect. I understand that we are flying POL1 from Lebanon to Jordan, overflying Israel close to the Syria border. The Israelis acquiesce in this but do not like it. We have told them that we think this need will be over by this week and that an adequate substitute can be found in Aqaba where, I believe, intensive work is being done to improve the facilities and communication route with Amman. We would be willing to use our Globemasters to assist you in flying supplies from Cyprus to your forces in Jordan.2 As you say, a smaller number of these larger planes could do the job you are doing. However, we would have to seek and find some accommodation with Israel. Foster has already talked with their Embassy here about the matter, and we hope to get a reply by tomorrow. I am convinced that whatever be the immediate outcome, we cannot look upon these overflights of Israel as a permanent solution. We must concentrate upon getting what is needed into Aqaba, preferably by commercial vessels because of Arab sensitiveness about non-Arab naval vessels in the Gulf. Then we must quietly create better ways to get the cargoes to the Amman area. The introduction of our ground forces raises much more difficult problems. Our public opinion and Congress would, I know, be extremely averse to seeing us take this further step. We believe, as you indicate, that your forces there already stabilize the position and we hope that it will continue thus, until through the UN or otherwise you are able, logically, to lay down this burden. As ever, Ike 1 2

POL is petroleum, oil, and lubricants. The Globemaster was a cargo transport aircraft which the United States put at Britain’s disposal. By 8 August, the Globemasters were being flown direct from Cyprus to Amman for supply purposes. See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 525.

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151 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 24, 1958 Dear Friend, Thank you for your message of July 23 about the Jordan problem. I understand the difficulties which you mention. I am very grateful about the Globemasters. I have asked our planners to work with yours on this as quickly as possible. I am looking forward very much to seeing Foster on Saturday night or Sunday morning. With warm regards, Yours ever, Harold Macmillan

152 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 30, 1958 Dear Harold: You will recall that on June 26th you sent me word concerning certain language that you desired eliminated from the draft text of the proposed agreement for military atomic cooperation and, although this was wording which had been used in the report prepared in this connection by Sir Edwin Plowden and Sir Frederick Brundrett1 for your side and by Lewis Strauss and Donald Quarles2 for ours, we dropped the clause which was objectionable to you. You may be interested to have the reasoning of our people in this connection. They believe it is possible that your Atomic Energy Authority has knowledge in the generation of atomic power by means of gas-cooled reactors which is not transmitted to us. Our planned expenditures might be different if we had all pertinent information on this type of reactor on which your people have specialized. In view of the fact that we are exchanging information on nearly every other aspect of atomic energy, it does not seem reasonable that we devote money and talent which might be saved or, at any rate, more wisely spent if the exchange of information is as broad as feasible. I am assured that we transmit to you freely all of our information on the generation of electricity by atomic power. I understand that there may be some patent or royalty difficulties in this area but, with good will on both sides, I am hopeful that they can be resolved.

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The second point deals with the military usefulness of plutonium generated in atomic power reactors. It is widely believed that unless the uranium fuel elements in which plutonium is made are exposed only briefly and are frequently replaced with fresh fuel, that the plutonium is not of weapons grade. When the new military agreement becomes effective, our people will be in a position to tell yours that you can save considerable sums relative to your present costs of atomic power by leaving the fuel in the reactors for longer periods and nevertheless produce plutonium suitable for weapons. Thus, there will be a direct financial benefit to your civilian power program which will stem from the new military agreement. This is why in the draft of the agreement the principle of “interdependence” in the military and civilian areas was mentioned. With warm regard, As ever, D.E. 1

2

Sir Frederick Brundrett was involved with Sir Edwin Plowden on the joint collaboration with the United States on nuclear weapons. Donald Quarles was the deputy secretary of defense at the time. Prior to holding this post, he was assistant secretary of defense for research and development and also secretary of the air force.

153 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 5, 1958 Dear Friend, I am told that the Atomic Bilateral has been brought into force today by an exchange of letters. I just want to write to say how glad I am that it has been possible to make this big move forward on the road to interdependence. We are all grateful for your leadership. With warm regards, Harold

154 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 19, 1958 Dear Harold: I just heard of Foster’s talk with Selwyn concerning making a unilateral statement about cessation of testing provided the Protocol at Geneva is

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signed in a completely satisfactory form. In view of some doubts expressed by Selwyn to Foster, I want to assure you that it is our purpose to be as completely generous with your government in the matter of passing information as the law will permit. I am sure you will understand the need for something being done promptly in the event that the Geneva protocol is signed as expected. With warm regards, D.E.

155 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 20, 1958 My dear Friend, I am greatly obliged to you for your letter of August 19 in which you gave me the assurance that it is your purpose to be as completely generous with us in the matter of passing information “as the law will permit”. I gladly accept this assurance and I need hardly say that I have every confidence that you are determined to do your utmost for us. I am sure you will recognise that in this I have a very heavy responsibility. During the past twelve years, we have made immense efforts to develop the nuclear weapons capacity which would enable us to play an effective part in the defence of the free world. We have made good progress and the tests that we are about to hold will take us a further step towards the solution of the two problems of invulnerability and reduction of weight which we must achieve. If our earlier work is not to be wasted, we must have the answers to those two problems. If you can provide us with the information you already have or will obtain in the future, then I can agree to suspension of tests, which I feel really means abandonment, with a clear conscience. Can I be assured that “the law will permit” you to give us this information if we are prevented from getting it ourselves? If you tell me that I am justified in making that assumption, I can rest assured that the essential defence interests of my country are sufficiently safeguarded. I am sending you a separate message on the political considerations which seem to me to arise on the timing and nature of any public statement on the results of the Geneva Conference. With warm regards, Yours ever, Harold Macmillan.

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156 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 20, 1958 My Dear Friend, My first reaction to your proposed statement was one of grave concern.1 I will not pretend that I was not influenced to some extent by the technical side of the problem, to which I have referred. My concern on that account has now been dispelled. But I should like to make it plain to you that I was influenced almost as much by the political consideration which I set out in my second message. Two factors, in particular, weighed heavily with me. First, I thought it would be a profound mistake to concede suspension without securing Russian acceptance of an international control system. Secondly, I was seriously apprehensive about de Gaulle’s reaction. On both these points I have been reassured by your messages of today. On the first, I think that Foster’s new draft is a great improvement. Though, even now, I am not sure whether the Russians will accept a truly international system of control. If they should take the line that each country should man the control posts within its own territory, we shall not have achieved our essential purpose. I hope we shall both keep a careful eye on this. On the second, I would feel happier if I knew what de Gaulle himself was thinking. But I am relieved to know that [Maurice] Couve [de Murville],2 at any rate, seems to be taking this quite quietly. I think that I must send the General a personal message about this just before the announcement is made. Perhaps you would consider whether you could do so too. Finally, I note your anxiety about the state of world opinion. I had thought that a statement on the lines originally proposed might seem to be a little precipitate and that there was time for us to proceed in a more deliberate way. This is after all a pretty serious step and it did not seem unreasonable that we should spend a little more time in considering it. But I do understand, especially in view of what you say in the second paragraph of your message, that you think it important to proceed more quickly in order to recover the initiative with world opinion; and, as you will have seen from the separate message which I have sent to Foster, we are prepared to go along with you in this and to make a parallel statement in support of yours. With warm regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan 1

2

Macmillan was referring to a proposed American statement regarding nuclear testing which had been discussed between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Secretary Lloyd. Maurice Couve de Murville was the foreign minister of France.

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157 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 20, 1958 Dear Harold: This cable replies to your first message, the one referring to certain technical matters. Foster is just now leaving for New York and during the trip will give to Selwyn his conclusions on the political side of the matter for immediate cabling to you. His cable will quote our statement as it has been revised, including such important points as timing. My personal comment about the political side is merely that the week’s experience at the General Assembly clearly shows that much of the world opinion is shifting, if not toward the Soviets, at least away from the West because of our alleged intransigence about all aspects of nuclear testing and so on. I feel that the publication of the report of the technical experts at Geneva may mark an opportunity for us to regain some of this world opinion. If we are to do so, I think we cannot wait for some weeks or days during which time Russian propaganda would make it appear that we are being forced into a position that finally might become untenable. Now with respect to the two questions of reduction of weight and invulnerability, under the law I am permitted to convey to you any information needed so long as that information will not endanger our security. The law requires that I make a certification to this effect. Since our joint purpose is to make certain that the weapons we both manufacture are for use by the free world in our common defense there will be no difficulty in my making the necessary certificate for this type of exchange. I understand that British and American technicians are having their first meeting on next Wednesday morning at which time there will be some agreement as to the kinds of information in which both sides wish to delve. Out of that meeting will come to me further suggestions as to the certificates that I need to make. Incidentally, we do not see how we could establish and stand by a limit of 25 kilos for bomb testing. The findings of tests are not sufficiently exact to make this a feasible condition. I think this gives you the technical assurance you need. I want further to say with respect to the whole matter that we are not trying to push you either politically or technically into an isolated or indefensible position. No matter what the exact language of the statement, which I think we will make no later than Saturday morning, we would hope that you could associate yourselves with it if you so desire. But in any event, we will do our best to make certain that our own action does not embarrass you.

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When you have both the messages to which I refer, I hope that you will reply as soon as you can because we do believe we are up against one of those moments that we regard as psychologically correct. With warm regard, As ever, Dwight D. Eisenhower

158 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 20, 1958 My dear Friend, I promised a second message on the political considerations about the statement which you are thinking of making when the report of the Geneva Conference appears. I fully agree that we must make some public response to that report. But I doubt whether it justifies us in going as fast as you propose in the draft statement which Foster gave to Selwyn in New York. It is true that the report will demonstrate the theoretical possibility of controlling a suspension of tests, and we ought to welcome it on that account. But we cannot yet say that we can see our way through the practical difficulties of putting this theoretical system into operation. There is an enormous prize to win. Both you and I have always felt that through the Geneva meeting we might move towards the establishment on Soviet territory of some system of international control. Even though that system might be unsatisfactory and inefficient, it would at least have gained us a foothold which we could exploit. If we now suspend all tests, the Russians may well think that they have got substantially what they want without having to pay any price for it. What I mean by this is that they might refuse to agree to any genuine international control, calculating that the West would never be able to resume the tests which they had voluntarily suspended. If we felt that we must make some forward move on tests at the present time, I would much prefer to see it limited to those tests which we know can be detected by existing national systems – say, everything above 25 kilotons. A proposal on those lines would be consistent with our past insistence on linking suspension to control, and would also go a long way to meeting public criticism of tests on grounds of injury to health, since it would eliminate all tests which release fission products into the stratosphere. A limited suspension of this kind would also make things much easier for the French. I am seriously troubled about their attitude. I feel that after all

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our difficulties with de Gaulle over recent events, while he is still suspicious of our intentions towards him, it would be a serious mistake to force the French Government into a position of dissociating itself from our proposals. The trouble which we are having with them already at Geneva shows how suspicious they are on this question. We really must consult them fully and give them time to come to a conclusion. But de Gaulle will be in Africa for at least a week from now. I do feel strongly that the whole economic future of Europe, and perhaps its political future too, may be jeopardized if we allow the French to feel isolated or roughly treated over this question. For myself, I should much prefer that any statement we may agree to make in future policy in relation to nuclear tests should be related, not to the end of the Geneva Conference, but to the opening of the General Assembly. We shall all be under acute pressure there to make some forward move with a view to getting the maximum benefit from it in the Assembly. If we play this card sooner we shall be bound to be asked for more when the Assembly meets. Finally, I ought to tell you that the test series which we have just announced will not in fact be completed, at earliest, until the middle of October. May I ask you, my dear Friend, to take these points into account. They seem to me to merit serious consideration. This is a very important decision. I agree with you absolutely as to your purpose, but I am anxious that we should make no mistake as to method and timing. With warm regards, Yours ever, Harold Macmillan

159 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 21, 1958 My dear Friend, I have written directly to Foster about the text and timing of your proposed announcement. But I want, in addition, to reply to your personal message of yesterday. First, on the technical matters, may I say at once that I am very glad to have your assurance that you can and will give us the information needed including the two points to which I referred specifically. I am completely satisfied with that assurance and most grateful to you for it. I have never for one moment doubted the sincerity of your desire to help us to play an effective part in maintaining the nuclear deterent, on which the peace of the world at present depends. But this business has had a long and chequered history, and

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I know you will understand my anxiety that there should be no possible room for misunderstanding between us at this last stage. As I told you in my message of yesterday, I feel a heavy sense of responsibility over this, and I thought it was my duty to make sure that there was clear and explicit understanding between us. I am greatly relieved by what you have now said to me. I am sending you a separate message about the political question as a whole. With warm regards, as ever, Harold Macmillan

160 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 31, 1958 Dear Friend, I want to let you know how delighted I was to read your exchange of letters with the Secretary of the Treasury. You know from the talks which I had with you what importance I attach to the role which the International Bank and International Monetary Fund can play in the vital spheres of economic development and national stability, and we shall certainly give much thought to your interesting ideas about an International Development Agency. The initiative which you have taken will give great encouragement to the free world. With warm regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan

161 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 2, 1958 Dear Friend: The recent expert conference at Geneva on suspending nuclear tests was clearly an outstanding success. This has been underlined by Krushchev’s willingness to open substantive talks with us on the subject on October 31. I feel that a great deal of the credit for this success should go your scientists led by Doctor James B. Fisk.1 Under his leadership the whole Western team worked in harmony and effectively. I think that Doctor Fisk is to be commended for the way he managed the Russians, who, I am told, were

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proficient and pertinacious on both technical and political matters. Sir William Penney described Doctor Fisk’s performance as magnificent.2 If it is in order I would be glad if you would convey my personal thanks to him. With warm regards, 1

2

Dr James B. Fisk was appointed by Eisenhower to be a member of the proposed Geneva conference on the detection of atmospheric tests. At the time of appointment, Fisk was an executive vice president with Bell Telephone Laboratories. See Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954–1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 215–16. Sir William Penney was a nuclear scientist who was the leading figure in the development of Britain’s nuclear weapons program.

162 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 3, 1958 Dear Friend, I see that you are going to discuss with Foster tomorrow this new trouble which has loomed up in the Far East.1 In these two years since I have been Prime Minister you and I have faced a good deal of worry, and you know how happy I am that we have always faced our troubles together. Although in the past we have taken rather a different view about the legal and practical considerations concerning the off-shore Islands, my overriding concern is that our countries should not be divided or appear to be divided. Of course the Chinese may be bluffing over the Islands just as their revived propaganda about Hong Kong may be mere talk. All the same, I feel that I may have to try to steer public opinion here at very short notice and, if the worst should happen, in critical circumstances. I should therefore very much value a private message from you or Foster giving me some indication of the way your minds are working. With warm regards As ever, Harold 1

In early September, a crisis was unfolding in East Asia when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began shelling the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, thereby threatening the security of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Macmillan was concerned about the possible implications of a military conflict between the PRC and the United States.

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163 JOHN FOSTER DULLES TO MACMILLAN September 4, 19581 Dear Harold: The President asked me to thank you for your letter to him of September 3 with reference to the Far East and to reply to it, as you suggested. I dictate this reply en route to Washington after seeing the President at Newport. You will by now have received through normal channels the statement which the President authorized me to make at Newport following conference with him. That statement in itself goes a considerable distance in answering your letter. However, I should like to add some further thoughts which the President wanted me to convey to you in strict confidence. It is no doubt regrettable that so much should now seem to hang upon two small islands such as Quemoy and Matsu which are so close to the China mainland that they are not readily defensible. We have in the past made serious efforts to bring about disengagement of the Chinese Nationalists from these islands. We have, however, never pushed these efforts to the point of attempted coercion because we have come up against realization of the hard fact that the ability to keep Formosa in friendly hands has not been separable from the National Government holding on to these islands. If we forced their surrender, or if we allowed the Chinese Communists to force their surrender, there would, we estimate, be a rapid deterioration of the situation on Formosa. We have had a very careful study of the situation made by our intelligence community, by the State Department officials, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they are unanimous to the effect that if Quemoy were lost either through assault or surrender, this would have a serious impact upon the authority and military capacity of the present government in Formosa; that it would be exposed to subversive and military action which would probably bring about a government which would eventually advocate union with Communist China; that if this occurred it would seriously jeopardize the anti-Communist barrier, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam; that other governments in Southeast Asia such as those of Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma would probably come fully under Communist influence; that Japan with its great industrial potential would probably fall within the Sino-Soviet orbit, and Australia and New Zealand would become strategically isolated. For example, I have, only today, received a cable from our Ambassador to Vietnam which indicated that opinion there was that if the United States abandoned the offshore islands “confidence in the United States would be

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shaken, the entire psychological alignment in Asia would alter in favor of Communism, and Peiping’s prestige would reach new heights”. It was in the light of all this that the President authorized the statement which I made today. It does not involve any final commitment but does go far to indicate that the President would probably act if there were an effort to take Quemoy and Matsu which was beyond the capacity of the Chinese Nationalists to resist. This capacity is by no means negligible. There are 80,000 of the best Chinese Nationalist forces in Quemoy. We are helping them logistically, with equipment and with convoying on the high seas, i.e., up to within 3 miles of Quemoy. They and their artillery are well dug in and to take them would be quite an operation, particularly if there were no aerial bombardments. So far the Communists have refrained from using their air bases to bombard the offshore islands, perhaps desiring to avoid retaliatory action against these bases which might in turn involve their retaliating against Formosa bases and thus surely bringing us in. Or perhaps they may merely be holding back for an unpleasant surprise. There is also a question as to whether if we did intervene we could do so effectively without at least some use of atomic weapons; we hope no more than small air bursts without [radioactive] fallout. That is of course an unpleasant prospect but one I think we must face up to because our entire military establishment assumes more and more that the use of nuclear weapons will become normal in the event of hostilities. If this is not to be the case, then we face a very grave situation indeed in the face of the massive manpower of the Sino-Soviet bloc. I must admit that we are not entirely happy about the world situation. It seems that the Sino-Soviet strategy is designed to put strains upon us at many separate places and our various commitments to NATO, in Korea, to individual allies, are spreading our forces too thin for comfort – certainly unless atomic weapons are to be used. The JCS feel that this spreading of our strength is an integral part of the Communist strategy. They also express anxiety over what the JCS, in a report which the President considered at Newport, called “the apparent apathy or lack of information or understanding on the part of the United States public and allies and the world at large”. The President hopes that the statement which he authorized me to make will help to some degree in this respect. We have also, as you say, reported on the situation to the North Atlantic Council and also to SEATO Ambassadors in Washington. The President and I hope very much that you will, as you suggest, be able to steer your public opinion so that if the worst should happen we would be together. Anything different would be a catastrophe for both of us. We continue to believe that the firm position we are taking will deter reckless Communist aggression. But we also recognize that Khrushchev and Mao

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Tse-Tung can be reckless and may miscalculate, and that therefore our position does involve serious risks. But as we said in relation to the Middle East situation, it is a case where while acting strongly involves serious risks, these risks seem less serious than the risks of inaction. Faithfully yours, John Foster Dulles 1

This letter is included in the edition, even though it is not a letter between Macmillan and Eisenhower. We believe the fact that Dulles sent the letter to Macmillan at Eisenhower’s request, justifies its inclusion. Moreover, the language of the letter reveals the close working relationship which existed between Macmillan and Dulles (and vice versa) as well as between Macmillan and Eisenhower. Furthermore, as an explication of the belief which Eisenhower and Dulles held in “the domino theory” as it related to the threat of Communism in Asia, this letter has few equals.

164 MACMILLAN TO JOHN FOSTER DULLES September 5, 19581 Dear Foster, I am most grateful for your full and informative message. I will try to reciprocate, not to reach conclusions, but to help to clear my own mind. From your analysis, it is obvious that you do not feel that as things now are, the position in Quemoy and Matsu can be abandoned without endangering the strategic balance in the Far East which is vital for the defence of the whole Free World. At the same time, you do not hide from yourself or from me that we may be on the edge of operations which could be the prelude to a third world war. As in all these cases, the risks of action and inaction have to be weighed against each other. In estimating these risks, however, I think I must be frank and give you my best thoughts about the present state of opinion in the countries that I know best, and for which, as the leading nation in the Commonwealth, we have a special responsibility. The new Commonwealth countries – India, Malaya, Ceylon, Ghana and etc., will of course be against any action. I do not attach overwhelming importance to that, because they are always neutralist, but they have a considerable influence on Asiatic opinion at least. So far as Pakistan is concerned, I should think they would hope that the Chinese would not risk war, but would like to see some kind of settlement. In any case, they are not, I am afraid, very strong, either politically, economically, or in general influence.

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Now for the old Commonwealth countries. You know the Canadian position well yourself, but I feel sure that they will be cautious at the best. Australia, which is normally robust, will have anxieties about this area. On the one hand, they will be fearful of trouble which might involve them. On the other, they will no doubt be impressed by your analysis of what may happen if the Communists get away with it. Unfortunately, they are just approaching an election. New Zealand, also a robust little country, under Nash’s leadership will tend to favour words rather than actions. South Africa will keep aloof. As for this country, as I warned you in my first message, public opinion will not be easy to steer. We are on record in 1955 as having said that Formosa and the off-shore islands were in different juridical categories, and Churchill took the line that “a war to keep the coastal islands for Chiang would not be defensible here”. This of course was in a private letter to the President but represented fairly the instinctive reaction of the man in the street.2 I feel I should let you have this analysis of opinion because these are important factors in the problem. For if we have to face war, we also know from experience that even in the more tolerable contests of the past, something like unanimity of peoples is the only basis on which they can be induced to hold fast under its hardships. Having said all this, which is not an attempt to do anything but set out the facts as objectively as I can, I agree with you that a Communist triumph by force, or even by the threat of force, might perhaps prove a Munich for the East. What then are we to do? There is of course the possibility that after the President’s statement, the Chinese Communists will avoid direct assault and try, at any rate in the first place, to make the position of the islands intolerable by ground bombardment and by blockade. I imagine their 12-mile Declaration is intended to give some legal cover to the latter, and it might well be that you could enable the defenders to withstand blockade by action that did not in itself lead to anything like the operations envisaged in your message. This would only follow, presumably, if you had to attack the air bases. But a sort of half-war could not continue indefinitely; there would be the risk at any moment of its enlarging itself in the way that you envisage, perhaps even, as you suggest, the use of atomic weapons. In this difficult position ought we to seek some means of solution, or at least a better public posture, such as we have had to fall back on in other parts of the world? Is there anything to be done through the Security Council or through the [General] Assembly? I can see that it would be no good using this machinery unless we had a plan, or unless somebody had a plan. In any case, since the Assembly is about to meet, what line are you going to take there, and how are we best to play our part? In your conversations with Lord [Samuel] Hood, which he has reported to me, you made

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some reference to the demilitarisation of the islands if the Communists can be got to consider that either permanently or temporarily. It seems to me that this idea might at any rate give a good public position, whether they accept or not, and would serve, if properly handled, to strengthen us where we are weakest – in the public opinion of all those countries upon which we normally rely. Would it be a good idea, either now or in a few days’ time, to launch this suggestion, in the hope that it would be a point round which anti-Communist and even in the long run neutral opinion might rally? I am chiefly concerned about rallying robust anti-Communists, the friends we normally rely on; but it is also useful if moderate neutrals can be won over. Since this thought of yours offers the only line of approach that I can think of, I would be very grateful if you would let me have your thoughts upon how it might be elaborated. I do not see that such a proposal, properly handled, need destroy the value of your firm declarations on which, probably, the best hope lies – that is, that the Communists, whether Chinese or Russian, will shrink from pressing the issue. It would only do so if this suggestion appeared to our enemies to be a sign of divergence between us. But if it is one which you could either welcome or accept in principle, then this difficulty would be avoided. Demilitarisation can be, as I say, put forward publicly. If so, there are different ways in which it could be done: either in the Security Council or in a public statement by the British Government, or by some friendly but uncommitted Government. Alternatively, we could approach the Russians privately. It is possible that the Russians have privately agreed with the Chinese only to press the issue to a certain point and not to the point of war. In that case, they will have no serious anxieties; but it may be that they are themselves uncertain what will happen, and such a proposal then might be one by which, in one form or another, they would be attracted and press upon their allies. I can hardly believe that they and the Chinese have agreed to want a war. That would be contrary to the general Russian attitude. But, of course, they may think that they can frighten you out of it by the weakness of your allies. It is that that I am determined to avoid if I can. It is in that spirit that I am sending you my personal appreciation of certain factors and the only positive proposal that seems at all practicable. With warm regards, Yours ever, Harold. 1

Even though this letter was exchanged between Macmillan and Dulles, rather than between Macmillan and Eisenhower, we believe that it should be included for reasons explained in notes for the previous letter. The source for the letter is Macmillan

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2

to John Foster Dulles, 5 September 1958, The National Archives of the UK (NA), PRO, PREM 11/2300. Churchill expressed these sentiments to Eisenhower in a letter, 15 February 1955. See Boyle (ed.), The Churchill–Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953–1955, 192–3.

165 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 6, 1958 Dear Harold: I am in Washington today and have read the message which you sent to Foster in reply to the analysis of the Formosa situation which he dispatched at my request. I am delighted that in the basic elements of this situation, as in so many others, we stand together. One major factor which is not readily understood by those not in direct touch with the situation is Chiang’s [Kai-Shek] temperament and purposes. Any proposal that seems to him to imply retreat from his position as head of the only legitimate Chinese Government, any thought of abandoning a single foot of his defense perimeter, is automatically rejected.1 Indeed, such rejection is so emphatic as to imply that if coercive efforts should be made to override his objection, that would end his capacity to retain Formosa in friendly hands. Foster will shortly be communicating with you again in greater detail, but I wanted first of all to let you know my appreciation for your helpful exchange of information with us and also to recall this one point which stubbornly stands in the way of what many would consider the reasonable solution. Since your message and since I have been in Washington, Chou En-lai has made his statement about resuming negotiations in the interest of peace.2 I hope this means that the immediate crisis will become less acute, at least temporarily. We have just issued a statement on our willingness to resume the Ambassadorial talks. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

2

Chiang Kai-Shek was the president of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Forced to flee China in 1949 following the communist takeover of the country, Chiang was the de facto president for life of the ROC. Chou En-lai [Zhou Enlai] was the premier of the PRC. His proposal to re-open negotiations was an important first step in helping to defuse the tension in East Asia.

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166 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 24, 1958 Dear Friend, I know you have many worries at present and you will know how much I am thinking of you. I wish sincerely that the problem of Cyprus was not one of them. It of course concerns us very deeply. We have, as you know, striven for a long time to reach agreement with the people of the Island and with the Greeks and Turks. It has unfortunately been made absolutely clear that we cannot find an agreed final solution at present. Before that can happen violence in Cyprus must cease and all concerned must have a breathing space. During that breathing space, we must try to make progress with representative government while safeguarding the rights of all parties. That is the basis of the policy which I announced in June and, as was made clear after my visits to Ankara and Athens in August, we still feel that in its broad lines it is the only possible course at present. We intend to put it into effect as far as we can step by step and quietly. The Turks have accepted it and with Turkey’s key position that is of great importance. We hope that as the plan goes forward the Greek Cypriots will also realise the value to them of going along with it. It is quite unreal for them to object to the presence of a Turkish representative. Turkey’s interest cannot be denied and this single man will be there to represent that interest directly instead of leaving the Turkish Government to make representations through diplomatic channels. There is no comparision here with the implications of partition of the Island or even of installing a Turkish base there. I am sure you will agree that we cannot abandon what we have already secured, withdraw our offer which the Turks have accepted in good faith and throw everything back into confusion again. I am sure too that the implementation of our plan would be the wish of the vast majority of Cypriots if they could freely express their feelings. Meanwhile I am grateful to you for having suggested that the Turks should try to ease the Greek position by appointing as their representative the existing Consul-General. I very much hope that they will agree to this. Of course the Greek Government have worked themselves up into a great emotion against the plan although I made many important concessions to their point of view after seeing them in August. I fear the truth is that they are not strong enough to accept any policy. The only hope is that in due course they will acquiesce. After all the plan does offer the Greek Cypriot population a permanent built-in majority in the local administration if they are willing to accept it. I am sorry to bother you but thought I ought to let you know my thoughts over this question with which you have been so helpful. Yours ever, HAROLD.

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167 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 26, 1958 Dear Harold, Enclosed is a fairly formal reply to your note of June tenth concerning the Exchange of Officers, Security Clearance for British Controlled Firms, and Scientific and Defense Cooperation. All of these points were referred to the Department of Defense for resolving the difficulties. I trust that the attached will be completely satisfactory to you. Incidentally, I don’t think I reported to you how grateful Dr. James B. Fisk was for your note commending his performance at the Geneva Technical Talks. In a recent letter he says, “It was a great privilege to serve with such a powerful team of Western scientists this summer. I respectfully commend to you this entire dedicated group, and to the Prime Minister, his outstanding scientist-statesmen, Sir William Penney, and Sir William’s able colleagues.” With warm regard, As ever, Ike Dear Harold: In my letter of June twelfth I referred to several specific points which you had raised in your note of June tenth concerning the Exchange of Officers, Security Clearance for British Controlled Firms, and Scientific and Defense Cooperation. I indicated in my letter that I would send you additional information after appropriate review of these activities had been undertaken. I have now been advised by the Department of Defense that satisfactory progress is taking place in each of these areas. The most serious difficulties which you have been experiencing should shortly be resolved as a result of the recent amendments to our atomic energy legislation, and the exchanges permitted under our Agreement of Cooperation with which you are familiar. Specifically, with respect to the Exchange of Officers, the Chief of each military Service has been requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate action to review the program in the light of the new legislative action where only marginal improvement or deterioration has been noted by your representatives here. I am confident that this review will result in improvement in this program which is so important to our mutual defense effort. Improvement may come slowly because of the problem of control and access to the information exchanged as required by the agreement. As we now see it, it will be necessary for your Government to advise your exchange officers of all pertinent restricted data, prior to their assignment here, and we likewise will have to notify our appropriate echelons of that which we

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have received and transmitted, in order to permit a full exchange at this level. Subject to the working out of such details it is to be hoped that the exchange officer program would go more smoothly. With respect to the problem of Security Clearance for British Controlled Firms, progress toward a revision of the industrial security regulations of the Department of Defense to permit appropriate security clearance has advanced since your visit, but a number of technical problems remain to be resolved and I have asked that the matter be expedited. You may be assured that the problem is receiving urgent consideration in the Department of Defense. Finally, US–UK–Canada scientific defense cooperation has progressively improved following the coming into force of the US–UK agreement for cooperation on the use of atomic energy. Appropriate procedures and functions for establishing the Combined Policy Committee, which you and I agreed to last fall in principle, are currently under way between our two Governments. I have requested that every effort be made to speed the activities of the working groups of the various subcommittees to assure early recommendations for strengthening the cooperation contemplated. I trust that this information will be satisfactory evidence of our desire to expedite resolution of the difficulties in these areas which have caused you understandable concern. Sincerely, Dwight Eisenhower

168 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 1, 1958 Dear Harold: Thank you for your message about Cyprus which Harold Caccia gave to me on September twenty-fourth. I am grateful to you for giving me your thoughts on the way you intend to proceed on this difficult matter. Much has happened since your letter arrived. Just after receiving it, the news came of Mr. [Paul-Henri] Spaak’s trip to Athens and his proposal for a conference. In fact I have delayed replying to your letter until we could have some better idea of what might come of that proposal. Foster has been in close touch with Selwyn and with Harold Caccia on these new developments and we have appreciated their receptiveness to suggestions we have made from time to time. I have made clear to the Greeks that they need a sense of

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proportion in this matter and should not sacrifice their ancient heritage of democracy, and their new bonds in NATO. At the moment there seems a chance that a basis for further discussions between your Government and Greece and Turkey can be found. We most assuredly hope that this much can be accomplished and have stated in the North Atlantic Council our willingness to help in whatever way may be appropriate. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

169 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 7, 1958 My dear Friend Once again I write to wish you many happy returns of October 14. It is now nearly sixteen years since you and I first met and I cannot tell you how much I value our friendship. We have done a lot together in war and peace. I rejoice that relations between the United States and Great Britain have never been closer or happier than they are today. This letter comes with every good wish for the future to you and yours. Yours ever, Harold

170 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 13, 1958 I am more than grateful for your note of good wishes on my birthday anniversary. You remind me that sixteen crowded years have past since our first meeting. The friendship that has grown between us since that day has never meant more to me than now; it is solid and substantial and warm – as is, I too believe – the relationship that exists between the peoples of our two countries. With personal regard,

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171 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 24, 1958 Dear Friend: In your letter of June 11, you agreed that there should be further discussion between our people and your Air Force representatives here about the information we were requesting on nuclear weapons carried in your aircraft over this country. I have now sent the agreed memorandum resulting from these meetings entitled “Summary of Procedures agreed between the United States Air Force and the Air Ministry for Advance Notification of Flights by United States Air Force aircraft over the United Kingdom with Nuclear Weapons or RadioActive Material,” which became effective September 15. I think this memorandum should provide a satisfactory basis for future co-operation and I am most grateful to you for making these arrangements possible. Yours ever, HM

172 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 27, 1958 Dear Friend, I am afraid that the Greeks have been very weak about Cyprus. As I understand it, there was a very close vote in the Greek Cabinet and they were finally swung against the idea of an immediate conference by the opposition of Makarios. The Archbishop in his turn had been frightened by the extremists who had attacked his recent utterances. All this is very regrettable, but the Foreign Secretary and I were luckily able to see Spaak today, as he had an engagement to make a speech in this country. We discussed the whole question with him very frankly and we agreed that the right course was to let the Greeks simmer for a period. In their hearts, most of the Greek Government realise that their attitude is indefensible; if we run after them now it will only consolidate them; but if we do nothing, their self-doubting will take effect. All I think that we should do is to make it quite clear that nothing on our part has prevented the conference. Accordingly I propose in my speech on the opening of the new session of Parliament tomorrow to give a paraphrase of the Spaak proposals which will show that we were prepared for a frank discussion of the Cyprus question including possible long-term solutions. I think that on Wednesday Spaak will

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arrange for publication of the basic document and of his covering letter. This will at least ensure that that Greeks cannot re-open everything again when the time comes for them to decide that they would like a conference after all. Although all this is disappointing, I am not unduly depressed. We have, after all, made great progress in the last few months and the Greeks have at least dropped all their talk about leaving N.A.T.O. The Greek Government is fundamentally weak and, at the moment, over-influenced by Makarios; we shall try to bring them along slowly. I am sure that you will help in this. With warm regards, As always, HAROLD.

173 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 31, 1958 Dear Harold: Thank you for your note of October 24, 1958, concerning the recent meetings between representatives of the USAF and the RAF. I am glad you believe, as we do, that the agreed memorandum resulting from these meetings is an acceptable basis for future cooperation. With warm regard, As ever, D.E.

174 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 31, 1958 Dear Harold: Thank you for your message of October twenty-seventh about the setback to the effort to get a conference about Cyprus under way. I can readily understand your disappointment at the sudden decision of the Greek Government not to participate in a conference, especially in light of the long and painstaking discussions in the North Atlantic Council and the considerable efforts at compromise which your Government has made in the course of these discussions. We too were greatly disappointed by the Greek Government’s decision, and we have made our disappointment known to the Greeks.

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We share your belief that there is probably little advantage to be gained in pressing the Greeks further at this time to attend a conference, and we also share your hope that a conference may yet be possible. In spite of our disappointment with the Greeks, we believe that it is very important to keep open the door to further NATO talks on Cyprus. To this end we hope that it will be possible to avoid any action by NATO which could create the impression that NATO is opposed to Greece on this issue. Within recent weeks, we have noticed a healthier and less suspicious attitude on the part of the Greek Government toward the idea of NATO consultation with regard to Cyprus. This new attitude should, in our opinion, be encouraged, since it holds forth the possibility of eventual further productive talks under the aegis of NATO. I admire your refusal to be disheartened by recent Cyprus developments and your determination to continue to work toward a settlement of this vastly difficult problem. For our part, we always shall be ready to help whenever and however we appropriately can. With warm regards, As ever, IKE

175 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN November 3, 1958 Dear Harold: Now that the missions of the British forces in Jordan and the American forces in Lebanon have come to a close, I think that your country and mine can take deep satisfaction in the successful accomplishment of undertakings of wide and historic significance. Without firing a shot in anger, and in close and friendly collaboration with the local authorities, our forces have achieved what they were sent to Lebanon and Jordan to do, at the request of the respective Governments. They have preserved the independence of these two small countries against aggressive subversive forces directed from outside. Our action has proved to the world, and especially to the smaller nations, that we stand by our pledges and that we have the courage to carry out our solemn undertakings, regardless of the threats made against us. No matter what political developments may in the future take place in Lebanon or Jordan, the effect of our actions will remain valid. I consider this development of the highest significance to the Free World. If we had not acted as we did, the determination of the smaller nations to stand firm against the forces of aggression would have

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been gravely undermined, with all this would have meant for the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom. We can also take special satisfaction in the complete understanding and splendid cooperation which was evident between our two governments in these undertakings. Both of us are, of course, dedicated to promoting the health and vigor of this spirit, but it is good to feel that in a difficult situation it was effectively applied. I wanted to let you know what a source of high personal gratification all this has been to me. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

176 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER November 7, 1958 My dear Friend I felt that I must write a word to you to say how much I am thinking about you and your many problems. You can rest assured that the affection which we all have for you in this country is in no way dependent upon the political fortunes of the Republican Party.1 You are fortunate in having spent most of your life as a soldier. I, alas, have been for 35 years a politician. The ups and downs of politics are very strange and sometimes very bitter. But when one looks at them as a whole one realises that democracy is a strange animal and that all one can hope to do is to do our best. In my first constituency, in Tees-side, I fought six elections – I lost three and won three. I remember very well that when one lost one was apt to say how tiresome and foolish all this business of counting noses was: when one won, of course, one felt convinced of the soundness of public opinion. The truth is that those who have reached positions like yours rest secure in their own sense of having done their duty. I remember well Churchill’s feelings in 1945 when he was rejected by a people who had only survived through his leadership. I also remember my admiration for the way in which he accepted the facts and overcame them. If I may say so I think your position is not unlike his at that time. It was the Party that dragged Churchill down and not the opposite. Your record and reputation will remain untarnished by temporary reverses.2 Ever yours Harold

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2

Even though Macmillan sympathized with Eisenhower’s political misfortunes, the result of heavy Republican losses in the Congressional Elections, he was concerned about the effects which Ike’s diminished political authority might have on his ability to conduct foreign policy. On 11 November, Macmillan received a lengthy memorandum from Harold Caccia, warning the prime minister about the possibility of increased Congressional interference in foreign affairs and the negative effects which flowed from the perception that Ike granted Dulles too much latitude in policy-making. See Harold Caccia to Macmillan, 11 November 1958, The National Archives of the UK (NA): PRO, PREM 11/2574. Fortunately for both Macmillan and Eisenhower, the last two years of Ike’s presidency were a creative period for both men as they continued to wrestle with the problems of the Cold War. Macmillan’s reference was to the victory by the Labour Party in Britain’s general election on 5 July 1945 (although the results were not announced until 26 July) which swept Churchill out of office.

177 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER November 7, 1958 Dear Friend, I was very happy to receive your message of November 3 about our operations in Jordan and the Lebanon. I agree with you that our action achieved important results with valuable implications for the future in the Middle East. Despite hostile criticism at the time we took our difficult decisions in July, I am sure that thinking people all over the world now realise the contribution which our action made to stability. Throughout the operations I was personally greatly fortified by the knowledge that we and the United States were moving in complete harmony of purpose. I am hopeful of satisfactory future developments in the Lebanon. In Jordan, we have certainly produced a situation of internal stability which, to put it no higher, gives the Jordanians the chance, by their own efforts and with our joint continued help and sympathy, to maintain their independence. I have no doubt that there are further difficulties and troubles to be faced, but so long as your country and mine continue to act together in spirit and in deed, as we have over the last months, I am sure we can deal successfully with any eventuality. I send my warm personal thanks for your message and for the co-operation that you and the United States Government have shown over our actions in the Middle East. With warm regards, As ever, Harold

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178 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN November 11, 1958 Dear Harold Thank you for your personal note of the seventh. I was, to be sure, disappointed by the overall showing of the Republican Party in our recent elections.1 Fortunately I have never considered myself an expert politician (I am certain a great many people would emphatically agree that I am not), and I can view the matter at least with some detachment. One thing bothers me. It is the seeming desire of the people of our country to depend more and more upon government – they do not seem to understand that more governmental assistance inevitably means more governmental control. I have not done well in my efforts to point out the dangers to all of us inherent in these trends – particularly for our children and grandchildren. The faults of the Republican Party are many and have been made obvious. One of them is our readiness to believe the charges that we are hopelessly divided among ourselves. We are called “liberal” Republicans and “conservative” Republicans. Scarcely anyone can give me a definition of either term! But falling for this charge, we weaken ourselves with internal strife. The opposition, though representing the extremes of the political spectrum, can always unite for the election battle. If I could devote myself exclusively to a political job, I’d like to take on the one of reorganizing and revitalizing the Party. But in my present post I conceive my duty to be some what broader than that of a mere politician – even though I profoundly believe in a two-party system, and believe that my Party is much the better of the two for the nation. Again, my deep appreciation of your thoughtfulness in writing, and, as always, my warm personal regard, As ever Ike 1

The Republican Party suffered considerable losses in the mid-term elections in 1958, losing 47 seats in the House of Representatives and 13 seats in the Senate.

3 1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K.

On 27 January 1959, Harold Macmillan wrote Dwight Eisenhower a rather petulant letter, complaining about a decision to award a turbine contract for an American dam project to an American rather than a British firm. What is most remarkable about this letter is the almost apocalyptic language the prime minister used to voice his displeasure: “What really worries me about this turbine contract is the injury that so small a thing can do to the cause that you and I have so much at heart of Anglo-American co-operation and understanding and the liberalism and interdependence with which your name will always be associated.”1 Such was the power of the Cold War paradigm in 1959 that it could turn what should have been a routine matter into a rhetorical ploy by Macmillan to try to wheedle a contract out of his good friend.2 Thus, at the heart of the correspondence between the two leaders in 1959 were relations with the Soviet Union. Continuing at the forefront were the ongoing negotiations over disarmament, focusing on nuclear weapons testing. But even more pressing was the new problem of Berlin after Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s November 1958 ultimatum, in which, in essence, he demanded that the US, UK, and France accept Berlin as a neutral city, giving up their rights there as guaranteed after World War II. And underlying almost all their correspondence was the tug of war between Mac and Ike over the ideal and reality of a summit meeting between the heads of state of the major powers. Macmillan consistently argued for such a grand meeting, while Eisenhower hesitated, fearing a Soviet propaganda victory unless there had been substantial progress at the foreign ministers’ level toward solving difficulties between the Soviets and the West. We can analyze much of the Macmillan–Eisenhower relationship in 1959 by looking at a series of key visits and meetings that dominated that year and most of the correspondence between the two leaders. In a sense 1959 began in late January when Macmillan informed US officials that he would visit the Soviet Union in February. The year ended with a meeting of the leaders of the Western Big Three (the US, the UK, and France) in mid-December 194

1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K. 195

to select a site and discuss an agenda for a summit meeting with Khrushchev in mid-1960. In between, Macmillan visited the United States in March, Eisenhower traveled to London (as well as Paris and Bonn) in August, and Khrushchev came to the United States in September. By the end of 1959, with the prospect of a summit meeting, at least some of the tensions that marked the early days of the year had dissipated. As 1959 began, Macmillan was deeply concerned about the Berlin problem. He seemed particularly worried that the United States might overreact to Khrushchev’s moves. As early as 5 January, he wrote in his diary that he “felt sure … that we must not overplay our hand” in regard to Berlin. However, he worried that “the Americans are so far not quite agreed.”3 Two days later, he confided in his diary the need to draft some sort of message to Foster Dulles “to undo some of the confusion which has taken place in Washington.”4 Ever the believer in personal diplomacy among friends, Macmillan concluded on 18 January that he needed to “talk with Dulles and the President,” a “method,” he noted, that had “worked very well for the past two years.”5 In that environment, Macmillan engineered an invitation to visit the Soviet Union at the end of February, ostensibly to ascertain Soviet intentions on arms control and the future of Germany. Macmillan’s desire for a visit to Moscow was also no doubt driven by domestic political concerns and the necessity to improve the Conservative Party’s political fortunes before the next election. In 1958, he had proposed to his Cabinet a visit to Russia and was turned down. The whole enterprise seemed politically risky at the time. By 1959, however, with a general election looming, the party’s leaders needed to go along with Macmillan’s move and risk the consequences. Indeed, according to historian Richard Aldous, “Domestic considerations were at the forefront of Macmillan’s mind” when he re-hatched the idea of a Russian trip.6 Macmillan’s effort was carried out in great secrecy: few British knew of his efforts, and, once he received the invitation, he did not inform the Americans until late January. This was a solo mission on Macmillan’s part, perhaps conditioned by Eisenhower’s earlier unwillingness to bring the British into full partnership during the Lebanon crisis. Not surprisingly, the Eisenhower Administration was unenthusiastic about the prospect of Macmillan’s visit to the Soviet Union and believed that dangers lurked when the British and Americans did not coordinate their policies on the Soviet Union. The prime minister “can call there … but he can’t speak for us,” Ike told British ambassador Harold Caccia. Macmillan’s resort to independent action after the rhetoric of “staying together” made Eisenhower secretly hope that the British might return to London “with their tails between their legs.”7 Dulles was convinced that Macmillan’s motives were purely political. “Macmillan faces an election, probably in the fall, and wanted to be the hero who finds a way out of the Cold War dilemma,” he told Ike.8

196 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Wanting to get a clearer idea of what Macmillan was up to, Secretary of State Dulles went to London on 4 February for consultations. Before Dulles arrived, Macmillan confided to his diary that he felt “rather depressed and frustrated. U.S.A. no ‘give’ at all on the great world issues, and no ideas.”9 In fact, Dulles said he did “not want major military moves into Berlin.” Macmillan decided that “Ike [had] overrule[d] the Pentagon” and included in a dinner conversation with Dulles the observation that “above all we must not slip into the 1914 position – mobilisation sliding into war.”10 As a bonus, Dulles said, “quite firmly,” that “a summit conference, to which the president might come, ought not be excluded [from future talks],” thus coming closer to the prime minister’s central diplomatic objective.11 When Dulles left London, the British leader was reassured about the American position on Berlin. Macmillan’s trip to the Soviet Union can certainly be seen as a success in one key respect: In spite of being browbeaten and insulted by Khrushchev (now referred to by Mac and Ike as “Mr. K.”), Macmillan was able to extract from the Soviet leader a withdrawal of the Berlin deadline, at least temporarily.12 As Khrushchev put it, “There is no time limit.”13 Moreover, Macmillan was able to interpret Khrushchev’s behavior to Ike and the other Western heads of state. And, of course, there were domestic political payoffs. Given the British public’s concerns about the tensions in Berlin and the threat of nuclear weapons, Macmillan used his trip to identify the Conservative Party with hopes for a peaceful settlement of problems.14 A few weeks after the Russian trip, Macmillan met with Eisenhower in Washington from 19 to 22 March. These consultations also led to an important step in the tortuous process leading toward a summit meeting and reduction of tensions. Ike and Mac confirmed their agreement that there should be a meeting of foreign ministers to discuss the Berlin issue, agreed on its design, and accepted in principle the idea of a meeting by heads of government at the summit.15 In a sense, the language of the agreement revealed a compromise between the views of Eisenhower and Macmillan, and neither side was totally pleased with the outcome. The British believed that the Americans were dragging their feet on a possible meeting with the Soviets while the Americans believed that the British were in too much of a hurry to make concessions to the Russians. When the foreign ministers, who began meeting in Geneva on 11 May, failed to make any progress, plans for a summit also seemed stalled. Eisenhower refused to budge from his “no progress, no summit” stand, in spite of prodding from Macmillan. But the president had not given up on the idea of a summit and in July “jump-started the negotiating climate” by deciding to extend an invitation to Khrushchev to meet with him in the United States, but still contingent on some progress in the foreign ministers’ meetings.16 He also proposed that he visit the Soviet Union at some point. He did not consult Macmillan on this move, echoing the prime minister’s secrecy about his visit to the USSR in February.

1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K. 197

Robert Murphy met with Soviet Deputy Premier Frol Kozlov in New York on 12 July and made the offer of the Khrushchev visit – without mentioning Eisenhower’s preconditions. On 22 July, Khrushchev announced his willingness to come to Washington for a ten-day visit, a longer period than Eisenhower had anticipated. The fact that Khrushchev was coming without making any prior concessions irritated the president, but, in his own words, he “would have to pay the penalty” and follow through on the invitation.17 In London, the news of Khrushchev’s visit to Washington created considerable apprehension. As he later told British journalist Robert McKenzie Macmillan thought that Eisenhower’s offer to Khrushchev was an example of “stupidity, naivete, and incompetence.”18 He confirmed that he was “very upset because it gave the impression that the Americans were going to do a direct deal, one great vast country with the other, the great Eastern colossus with the great Western colossus, over our heads.”19 As he wrote to Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, by extending the invitation, Eisenhower had seemed “to substitute jollification for discussion.”20 After considerable grousing, however, Macmillan accepted the inevitable, even congratulating Eisenhower that his “announcement about Khrushchev’s visit and your return visit has had a very good press” in Britain.21 Between 27 and 30 August, Eisenhower visited London for another round of talks with Macmillan, but this time there was an important difference. A British general election was in the offing, and conflicts between Eisenhower and Macmillan over Germany, disarmament, and arms control notwithstanding, the prime minister wanted to bring Ike to Britain during the runup to the election. The visit also served Eisenhower’s purposes, apart from politics. He reinforced British support for his meeting with Khrushchev and the preservation of his options as the leader of the NATO alliance when it came to negotiating with the Russians. As John Hay Whitney, the American Ambassador to Great Britain, cabled to Secretary of State Herter after Ike’s departure, “Personal impact of President was enormous … President was acclaimed in manner exceeding that accorded any other foreign leader in peace-time years. Normally undemonstrative British people turned out in force to greet President everywhere along the way. He left them with image of vigorous, active, and healthy President, sincerely dedicated to search for peace and willing to lead his country along untried but promising paths in the quest.”22 Eisenhower’s return to the United States from his European trip left him with two major diplomatic events left in 1959: Nikita S. Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in September, and the Western Summit in Paris between 18 and 20 December. The impending summit meeting between the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France lay at the heart of each of these meetings, and Eisenhower clearly viewed them as an opportunity to ease some of the tensions of the Cold War.

198 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Nikita S. Khrushchev arrived on 15 September, the first head of state of the Soviet Union to visit the United States. His visit lasted until 27 September and was divided into three parts: two days of talks in Washington with Eisenhower and some formal dinners between 15 and 17 September; a nationwide tour between 18 and 26 September which featured an address by Khrushchev before the United Nations on 18 September where he made an appeal for total disarmament (without inspection or verification, of course); and, finally, two days of talks between Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Camp David. The Camp David talks were notable for the frank discussions between Eisenhower and Khrushchev about the issues which divided the two countries. Although the talks occurred “in a generally dispassionate, objective, and calm tone,” initially the results of the meetings showed that little in the form of substantive agreements was achieved. Regarding Berlin, Khrushchev essentially confirmed that the Soviets wanted to solve the problem through negotiation and denied any intention of taking unilateral action in Germany. Eisenhower staked out the American position: he would have to resign before he could accept any time limit for United States withdrawal from Berlin. According to the notes of the meeting, “The President made it clear that a summit meeting could not take place so long as the threat of duress in Berlin remained.”23 Eisenhower’s firmness had an effect on Khrushchev. On the final day of consultations, the Soviet leader made an absolutely crucial concession when he dropped his ultimatum on the Berlin issue. (Khrushchev did ask that Ike wait 48 hours to make the concession public so that the premier could explain his actions to his people in Moscow.) The way was then cleared for both to agree to hold a summit meeting, tentatively scheduled for the following May. Eisenhower saw at least some progress on the Berlin issue, enough to confirm his commitment to a summit, and Khrushchev was able to remove the West German dispute as an obstacle to further negotiations.24 Finally, the two leaders agreed to postpone Ike’s visit to the Soviet Union until after the summit conference in Paris in May 1960. Interestingly, Eisenhower was disappointed with his apparent inability to establish anything resembling a rapport with Khrushchev. As John S.D. Eisenhower has written, the so-called “Spirit of Camp David,” a term invented by the American media to describe the Soviet leader’s visit, was a “piece of fiction … useful for [Khrushchev’s] purposes but … hardly shared by any of us in the White House.”25 Khrushchev presented a contrary view, however, and believed that he and Eisenhower hit it off splendidly. When he returned to the USSR, he spoke of Ike as a wise “statesman” who had “the absolute confidence of his people.” He immediately began preparing for Eisenhower’s trip to the USSR in 1960, deciding that since no golf course existed in the USSR, he would have “one built for his guest.”26

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Eisenhower and Macmillan met for the final time in 1959 at the Western Summit in Paris between 18 and 21 December 1959. The main purpose of the meeting was to agree on an agenda for the summit meeting with Khrushchev as well as to select the location. A certain irony seems to have been missed by the statesmen involved – Eisenhower, Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer – that the major prospective agenda item – Berlin – was at one time the business of the foreign ministers and that their lack of progress on them should have prompted an end to talk about a summit. By this point, however, Eisenhower had moved away from his earlier skepticism on the matter, agreeing with Macmillan’s position. When the subject turned to a discussion of disarmament as an agenda item, Eisenhower made a statement which must have startled his western colleagues. According to the notes of the meeting, Ike explained that he had changed his thinking about disarmament in recent months. At one time, when the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, discussions about disarmament focused on the destruction of nuclear stockpiles. But now, Eisenhower argued, the emphasis should be on inspection and control of nuclear weapons testing, rather than the abolition of weapons. The summit meeting might provide an opportunity to make a step in that direction.27 The four leaders then turned to a discussion of the time and place for the meeting. First, as to place, Macmillan initially proposed Paris as a site. President de Gaulle then inquired as the best time for the meeting. Adenauer suggested Geneva as a possible location, a logical suggestion in view of the fact that Switzerland was a neutral country, Geneva was the site of the 1955 summit, and “the facilities were available there.”28 Macmillan then mentioned his idea of a series of summits, “rotating between the capitals; Paris, Washington, and London.” And eventually even Moscow. To Macmillan’s surprise, Eisenhower said “that this could be so.”29 Macmillan opposed the choice of Geneva as the site for a summit, since “negotiations there had never been successful and it would be good to break the curse on Geneva, where nothing ever seemed to go right.”30 De Gaulle agreed; the city was too crowded, and Khrushchev could hardly be expected to like Geneva with its Calvinist history.31 When Macmillan suggested Paris, the others concurred. This final major meeting of the year ended on a note of real optimism. For both Eisenhower and Macmillan, 1959 had been a historic year. Eisenhower had gradually become more flexible in his approach to the Soviets after the death of John Foster Dulles in May. More inclined to work outside of the strictures which Dulles’s behavior had prescribed, Eisenhower also sensed that time was running out on his presidency. In private conversations with him as early as in their meeting in March 1959, Macmillan sensed that Ike was preparing to diverge from the views of his advisers on the issue of disarmament. With Dulles gone from the Administration, a

200 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

visible change emerged in the flexibility of Eisenhower’s position. His invitation to Khrushchev in the summer of 1959 confirmed that change. For Macmillan, 1959 had been a year of triumph. He had gambled on his initiative with Khrushchev, and it had paid off, both in diplomatic terms and in its domestic political benefit. If 1957–58 had been a period when Macmillan had successfully cemented his relationship with Eisenhower according to the philosophy of “collective action,” 1959 was the year when he began to chart a more flexible, independent course and to envision the heady prospect of serving as a mediator between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, the death of Dulles also created an opportunity for Macmillan to play a greater role in Anglo-American diplomacy. As Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee have written, “Macmillan’s illusions of British grandeur were at their most transparent in early 1959. With the chief playmaker of western strategy, John Foster Dulles, fatally ill, Macmillan set out to fill the vacuum in American foreign policy and take East-West relations into his capable hands.”32 Without question, Macmillan had taken the lead in the advocacy of the summit meeting between heads of government. His persistence, however, was not the result of any overall master strategy. He had, after all, pushed for a summit to be scheduled at different times, in different places, in 1959 before he, Eisenhower, de Gaulle, and Adenauer had finally settled on Paris in May 1960 as the appropriate setting. Perhaps Eisenhower also believed that a fundamental shift in the tensions of the Cold War was occurring. Certainly, according to his biographer Stephen Ambrose, “Eisenhower on New Year’s eve could look back on 1959 with satisfaction.”33 For both Eisenhower and Macmillan, the summit conference in Paris would provide the report card on the effectiveness of their diplomacy.

Notes 1. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 27 January 1959, EL, WFIS, Box 24. 2. In the end, Macmillan did not get the Greers Dam decision overturned, but he did learn from Ike on 10 February 1959, that a British firm had been awarded the contract for a 500,000-kilowatt generator for a Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) project. See Macmillan to Eisenhower, 10 February 1959, ibid. 3. Harold Macmillan, “Typescript Diary,” 5 January 1959, Macmillan Papers, c. 20/1. 4. Ibid., 7 January 1959. 5. Ibid., 18 January 1959. 6. Richard Aldous, “ ‘A Family Affair’: Macmillan and the Art of Personal Diplomacy,” in Aldous and Lee (eds), Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role, 18. 7. Ibid., 19. 8. Ibid., 18. According to historian John Gearson, at one point Macmillan believed that if the visit to the USSR “won the Tories the forthcoming election, [it] would at least have achieved something.” See John P. S. Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 64.

1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K. 201 9. Harold Macmillan, “Typescript Diary,” 31 January 1959, Macmillan Papers, c. 20/1. 10. Ibid., 4 February 1959. 11. Ibid., 5 February 1959. 12. As an example of his bad behavior, Khrushchev refused to accompany Macmillan on part of the visit, claiming to have a toothache. He later bragged to a Soviet diplomat that he “had f———d [Macmillan] with a telephone pole.” See Taubman, Khrushchev, 412. 13. Ibid., 411. At various times during the next several months, he became more, then less recalcitrant. According to William Taubman in his magisterial biography of the Soviet leader, Khrushchev was bluffing over Berlin. The “ultimatum was a way of getting Eisenhower to the table” (ibid., 403). Macmillan believed that one of Khrushchev’s main motives in all his foreign policy decisions was his “desire to become ‘respectable’ and a member of the Heads of Government club.” As Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower, “He would like to feel himself recognized as an equal by you and the United States.” See Macmillan to Eisenhower, 21 July 1959, EL, WFIS, Box 25(a). 14. Perhaps one should not be overly cynical about Macmillan’s motivations and intentions about going to Moscow, and too clinical in addressing its significance to the diplomatic setting. As British ambassador Sir Patrick Reilly explained: “[What] was remarkable was the truly dramatic effect that HM’s obvious sincerity, and his hatred of war, his memories of 1914–1918, had in defusing what was undoubtedly a dangerous situation over Berlin. I think that was Macmillan’s great contribution with the Russians, and undoubtedly had its effect over the negotiations with Berlin later on.” See Horne, Macmillan, II, 128–9. 15. Eisenhower still insisted that a summit depended on the foreign ministers making “some progress,” although he and Secretary of State Herter had agreed earlier that about the best they could expect from that meeting was “that they would define areas of agreement and particularly the points of disagreement which the Heads of Government would have to negotiate.” See “Staff Notes,” 14 March 1959, 1–2, EL, WFIS, Box 24. 16. Geelhoed and Edmonds, Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, 1957–1961, 81. 17. Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 535. Political scientist Campbell Craig speculates that Ike did not make clear to Murphy that progress on the Berlin issue was a precondition to an invitation or that the two engineered a bit of “theater” so that Ike could claim that he was forced to do something he wanted to do anyway. See Craig, Destroying the Village, 105. In his interview with Bruce Geelhoed, Andrew Goodpaster explained that Murphy just made a mistake. 18. Harold Macmillan, interview with Robert McKenzie, 11. 19. Macmillan later revised his opinion of Eisenhower’s motivation in extending the invitation to Khrushchev, saying that it “was [that] dear Ike just asked because he suddenly thought it would be a nice thing to invite him to have a look around” (ibid.). 20. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 82. Macmillan did tell Menzies that if this “rather odd diplomacy” succeeded, Macmillan would “give this plan a warm and hearty welcome as a follow-up to my visit to Moscow last February.” Here Macmillan seems to be taking some of the credit for whatever success the Khrushchev visit might have, seeing his own trip to Moscow as a helpful precedent. He also told Menzies that the Soviet leader’s visit would at least temporarily reduce tension since no doubt “the Russians can hardly take any unilateral action at Berlin while Mr. K is surf bathing in Florida” (ibid.).

202 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence 21. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 4 August 1959, EL, WFIS, Box 25(a). 22. John Hay Whitney to Secretary of State, 8 September 1959, 2–3, EL, PP, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 3, “London: August 27–Sept. 3, 1959.” 23. “Memorandum – President Eisenhower’s Talks with Chairman Khrushchev at Camp David, 30 September 1959,” EL, WFIS, Box 25(a). 24. Eisenhower concluded that Khrushchev had realized “that he had a bear by the tail on the Berlin issue.” His decision to remove any time limit for settlement of the Berlin problem was his way of finding “a way out with reasonable dignity.” See Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 448. 25. John S.D. Eisenhower, Strictly Personal (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), 263. 26. Taubman, Khrushchev, 440, 441. He even agreed that Eisenhower could use Air Force One while in the Soviet Union, much to the horror of the KGB, which feared the plane would take photographs of Soviet transportation facilities. As William Taubman notes, “They were right. High resolution cameras were soon being built into the belly of Air Force One” (ibid., 441). 27. EL, PP, Office of the Staff Secretary, Box 10, “International Meetings and Trips,” Chronology of Heads of Government, Paris, December 18, 1959, Record of a Meeting at the Elysee, 19 December 1959, 5. 28. Ibid., 10–11. 29. Ibid., 11. 30. Ibid. 31. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 102. Indeed, de Gaulle specifically castigated Geneva because it was the city “of this Mr. Calvin,” which meant that “it is not very gay” (ibid., 103). 32. Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee, “Staying in the Game: Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role,” in Aldous and Lee (eds), Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role, 152–3. For a different take on the idea of Macmillan’s “capable hands,” see Gearson, Macmillan and the Berlin Wall, passim. Gearson argues that Macmillan’s attempts to play an independent role were based on “the illusions of a great but declining power [that] increasingly came into conflict with the realities of alliance politics,” 56. 33. Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 553.

1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K. 203

179 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 1, 1959 My dear Friend, Among all the other crucial issues we are faced with these days is the nuclear tests conference at Geneva. I have been convinced for some time that we should be wise to drop our condition that an agreement to stop nuclear tests should be subject to satisfactory progress towards real disarmament. This point was put by Caccia to Foster some time ago and Selwyn sent him a message on November 25 setting out our arguments. They discussed it again in Paris on December 16. After the first four weeks of stalemate at Geneva, there has been a move forward. The conference is now able to discuss controls and get down to drafting a treaty. But despite what they say, the Russians are still trying to get out of having an effective control system on their territory. They have cleverly disguised their position by making what they claim to be concessions, resulting in agreement on the first four Articles in a draft Treaty. We know that these Articles are meaningless without a proper control organization. But the Russians are now in a better position to fool the world into believing that it is we who are preventing agreement by insisting that discontinuance of tests should be conditional on satisfactory progress towards real disarmament. How should we prevent this? I think the answer is that we should now drop our link with real disarmament all the more because the link is a vague formula, impossible to define precisely. We have a lot to gain by doing so, and in my opinion, nothing of any real value to lose. It would make it obvious to all the world that, if the Russians then refused an agreement on controlled discontinuance of tests, it would be because they would not accept a genuine control system on their own territory, despite their professed acceptance of the recommendations of the previous Geneva Experts’ conference. And if, on the other hand, by dropping our conditions we oblige the Russians to make an agreement on the controlled suspension of tests, we should get an even more substantial gain. We should get a proper control system in the Soviet Union. I think all our advisers agree on the importance of this. It would certainly make it difficult for the Russians to refuse a control system later on for other forms of disarmament. In effect, it would safeguard what had been contained in our dropped condition. There is another point. If, by insisting on this condition, we lose the chance of getting a controlled discontinuance of tests, there could eventually be an alarming increase in the number of nuclear powers. This would work to our disadvantage.

204 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

In conclusion, I think we have everything to gain and nothing to lose by adopting the course which I advocate. If our two Governments make this decision I think it would have a most favourable effect on world opinion and probably also on the negotiations at Geneva. We should need to consider how and when our decision should be made known. It might be best done at Geneva by our two delegates there, preferably at a stage in the Conference when we might get a reciprocal concession from the Russians. This need not inhibit us from making clear to the world the size of the concession we are making in order to secure an agreement. With warm regards, As ever, Harold

180 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN January 3, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you very much for your cable and for the expression of your views. This is a matter to which my associates and I have been giving consideration over a period of many weeks, but up to this moment have thought it wiser to insist upon the interdependency of the two subjects. We are immediately starting an intensive review of the whole matter and you will hear from me within, say a week. Hope this will be satisfactory. As ever, D.E.

181 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN January 12, 1959 Dear Harold: I have now had an opportunity to think about your letter on our position in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations and to discuss it with some of my advisors. We have considered the course of the negotiations to date as well as the points you set forth and we are prepared to drop our insistence that any agreement we may reach with the Russians have in it an explicit requirement that cessation of nuclear tests depend on disarmament progress. I agree with

1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K. 205

you that to a certain extent this link is an academic one since, as you point out, the central issue is whether we now have an opportunity to get the Russians to accept a real control system. Certainly, if the Russians were to accept the kind of controls which we both believe are necessary, this very fact would mean that one of the principal bars to future progress in disarmament would have been removed. This is a point we might well make in explaining our attitude on this question. Although, on the basis of the progress to date, it seems to me that the prospects are not bright that the Russians will accept an effective control organization in the current negotiations, I agree that our public position would be much better if we remove as a point of contention the issue of the link to disarmament, which the Russians may use as a screen to evade accepting responsibility for failure in the negotiations or to evade facing up to the control problem. I believe that we can propose in the negotiations that we accept as a principle that the ban on weapons tests would be indefinite in duration. The arrangement, we believe, should include schedules for the construction and operation of the control system. Withdrawal from or suspension of the treaty would be possible if on annual review it were found that the control system was not being installed on schedule or not being operated properly. If desirable, we will agree to the first annual review being held two years after the treaty enters into force; thereafter, the review automatically would be on an annual basis. Obstruction or violation of the agreement itself would, of course, be cause for withdrawal. I believe that it would be unwise to give this change in position any undue publicity by making it the subject of a public announcement at this time. However, I believe that we should in the negotiations exploit our flexibility on this question in every way possible to put pressure on the other side to make concessions. I have requested Foster to discuss with your people how best to put forward this position in the negotiations. As ever, Ike

182 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER [January 13, 1959]1 My dear Friend, I am most grateful to you for your message to me about the decision you have taken to drop the link with real disarmament in the Geneva Nuclear Test negotiations.

206 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

I am sure that as a result our position in these negotiations will be much improved. Our delegations in Geneva will now have the opportunity of testing Russian intentions and sincerity about the establishment of a control system on their territory. With warm regards, As ever, Harold 1

This letter is undated. It was received at the White House on 14 January. See EL, WFIS, Box 24.

183 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 27, 1959 Dear Friend, I expect you are as much worried about the Greers Dam turbine contract as I am. Representations have been made in the normal way by Harold Caccia to Foster and also to Jock Whitney by our trade people. I am not going to argue the pros and cons because I know so well how difficult these questions are. What really worries me about this turbine contract is the injury that so small a thing can do to the cause that you and I have so much at heart of Anglo-American co-operation and understanding and the liberalism and interdependence with which your name will always be associated. I do not know whether it is too late or whether your machinery allows some re-opening of the question. If so I can only tell you that it would do a great deal of good if the decision could be reversed. In any case, I personally will do everything I can to reduce the impact of this upon our folk here rather than exaggerate it. You can rely on me for this. But of course it would be very much more effective if the decision could be reconsidered. With warm regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan

184 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN January 27, 1959 Dear Harold: Respecting your note, I am sure you have correctly assumed I knew nothing about the Greers Dam Turbine contract until the decision affecting it had been effected.

1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K. 207

The reason given to me for the decision was that in this country we are getting woefully short of companies that have the kind of heavy machinery that must be used in the production of this large equipment. Our Defense Mobilization people believe that we should have for safety’s sake three or four widely separated facilities where this kind of work can be done. It was this conviction of theirs that led to a decision that national security considerations required the awarding of the contract to the American firm. So far as I know there is no feasible method by which the decision could be set aside and the matter reviewed. However, on the chance that there is any remaining possibility in this regard, I am having the whole record of the case re-examined. Should there be any change in the situation as I now understand it, I shall inform you promptly. I regret that my response must be so negative, but at this moment I see no alternative. With warm regard. As ever, D.E.

185 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 4, 1959 Dear Harold: I have had a complete review of the record involving the turbine contract. For your own confidential information this does not necessarily create a precedent. I find that there is no possibility of taking any further action in this instance, but you may be sure that all of us will be very careful about these things. With warm regard, Ike E.

186 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 10, 1959 Dear Friend, I was grateful for your message about the Greer’s Ferry Dam turbine contract, which Jock Whitney brought me. Of course I understand the difficulties of dealing with one particular case. The incident has had a very sad effect here because it has worried those who are the most enthusiastic supporters of AngloAmerican co-operation. However, there is no more to be said about it now.

208 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Now I am very glad to see that the Tennessee Valley Authority’s 500,000 kilowatt turbo-generator contract has been awarded to C.A. Parsons and Company of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. This is just the sort of development I hoped for. With warm regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan

187 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 10, 1959 Dear Friend, I was sorry to see from the papers this morning that Foster has to go into hospital again. Although he was only here for a short time, the Foreign Secretary and I had very good talks with him. It was good to know how closely our thoughts are developing on the immense problems with which we shall have to grapple in the coming months. My thoughts are with you and him. With kind regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan

188 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 10, 1959 Dear Harold: Many thanks for your message about Foster. I am sending a copy to him in the hospital and I know he will appreciate deeply, as do I, your interest and concern. We are very hopeful that the operation will not prove too serious, and that his convalescent period will not be too much prolonged. Last evening Foster reported to me verbally the substance of his talks with you and Selwyn Lloyd. He too felt that your conversations were very satisfactory. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike

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189 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 12, 1959 Dear Harold: Press reports indicate that Turkey and Greece have settled their differences over Cyprus in a spirit of friendliness and conciliation. I realize that this cannot be finalized until you have approved, but if and when you do I should like to send both Menderes and Karamanlis a congratulatory telegram.1 My idea is to point out to each that the solution of the problem in this fashion cannot fail to be beneficial to the strength and vigor of the whole NATO alliance. Can you let me know whether this matter has been sufficiently finalized that you believe a congratulatory message from me would be in order. Of course I am saying nothing here about the hard work you have done for so many long months to bring this matter to some kind of a decent solution. I cannot tell whether or not it is completely satisfactory to you, but I have so assumed because of your frequent statements to me that “Anything Turkey and Greece will mutually agree on will be acceptable to us so long as our own requirements are met.” With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

Adnan Menderes was prime minister of Turkey. Constantin Karamanlis was prime minister of Greece.

190 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 13, 1959 My dear Friend, Thank you so much for your message about Cyprus and for your characteristically generous reference to our work in what certainly seems to be a promising situation. I hope very much that the present talks will lead to an agreement which will protect the strategic interests of the alliance in the island while also satisfying the aspirations of the Cypriots. I think in fact that we are nearly home, although I still find it hard to believe. But of course there are a lot of details, some of them very important, which have still to be worked out, and

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I should be grateful if you would send no message of congratulation to anybody until I send you a further message. I hope this may be in three or four days. With warm regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan

191 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 19, 1959 Dear Friend, I expect that by now you will have heard the excellent result of the Cyprus conference. The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey and I have today initialled agreements for a final settlement for the Cyprus problem and our agreements have been endorsed by the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The details of the agreements are being published on Monday when Mr. Karamanlis and Mr. Menderes will have had time to explain them to their own people. Broadly speaking, however, the agreements provide for an independent Republic of Cyprus with the British bases under our sovereignty and with a constitution over which the Greeks and Turks will each have a negative control, the arrangements to be guaranteed by international treaty between the three Governments and the new Republic. This is indeed a satisfactory outcome and represents the culmination of all our hopes. It is more than I could have believed possible a few months ago. I know how pleased you will be, as I am, at this result and I know too that you have been working quietly to promote the counsels of sanity which have prevailed. But the purpose of this message is simply to say that I feel that the moment has now come for you to send those messages of congratulation to the Greek and the Turkish Prime Ministers which you had in your mind to despatch. Mr. Karamanlis leaves London tomorrow morning but Mr. Menderes, whom I saw today and who is still shocked by his extraordinary escape, will probably have to stay on for a few days more until he has recovered.1 With warm regards, As ever, Harold 1

On 17 February Menderes escaped serious injury when his plane crashed upon arrival in London. See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 694–5.

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192 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 19, 1959 Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Just at this moment I have received notice of the conclusion of an agreement between your Government and the Greek and Turkish Governments and the representative of the Cypriot people concerning the future status of Cyprus. Though I am now visiting in Mexico, I feel impelled to send you instantly my sincere felicitations. I know what your personal leadership has meant to the efforts to bring about a peaceful and equitable solution, and I share your satisfaction that the foundation has now been established for a settlement acceptable to the Cypriot people which at the same time contributes to the closer cooperation of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Please convey also to Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, and Governor Foot my admiration for the contribution which they have made in making this agreement possible.1 With warm regard, Dwight D. Eisenhower 1

These references are to Alan Lennox-Boyd, British Colonial Secretary, and Sir Hugh Foot, Governor of Cyprus.

193 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 20, 1959 Dear Harold: It is possible that poor communications between Acapulco and Washington could have created a slight misunderstanding. If it did, I trust that no damage resulted. Last evening I had a message notifying me of the Cyprus solution and with the added notation that the “ban is now off.” This I took to mean that your telegram telling me that I might send congratulatory messages had already arrived. However, it was actually noon today before I had your very welcome communication. If, therefore, I was a few hours early with my messages I am sorry, and I assure you that it was not intentional. Again I express to you my congratulations and rejoice with you that your patience, skill and understanding, which have had so much to do with this successful outcome, have been thus rewarded.

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Last evening I saw Anthony Eden at dinner. He appeared in good condition and assured me that he felt much better than for a long time. I understand that he is returning to Britain the latter part of this month. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

194 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 20, 1959 My dear Friend, Before I leave for Moscow, I want to tell you once again how much importance I attach to the conference at Geneva on nuclear tests, and how much I hope it may prove possible for us to reach an agreement on this subject with the Russians. Any agreement is bound to include certain disadvantages and risks. The main disadvantage, of course, is the handicap an agreement would impose on our ability to improve the nuclear deterrent. The main risk is that the Russians would find some means of evading the agreement, which we could not do. You and I both know how serious this disadvantage and this risk would be. What we have to do, it seems to me, is to judge and balance up whether the advantages an agreement might bring to us would outweigh the disadvantage and risk it would entail. I will not make any attempt in this message to estimate the disadvantage and the risk. But I do want to tell you that I am very deeply impressed by the advantages which an agreement might bring us. I think it would do three things, each of which would be very important. It would reduce tension. It would hinder the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. And it would provide a pilot scheme and a precedent for controls in other fields. How much would all this be worth to us? I want to tell you that I myself sincerely believe it would be worth the extra risk involved in our accepting something less than perfect control. Perfect control is in any case almost impossible in theory and quite impossible in practice. It seems to me that if we can create a control system which involves a sufficient degree of risk to a potential violator that he cannot get away undetected with a violation of the agreement, then we shall have done enough to justify our accepting the disadvantages and risks involved. This seemed to be Foster’s view when he was with us two weeks ago. I have the impression the Russians still want an agreement. The most likely explanation seems to me to be that they are concerned about the spread of

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nuclear weapons to other countries and they dislike the mounting cost of these nuclear programmes. So do both of us; and to that extent we have a common interest with the Russians. Whatever be their motive, I feel we still have some prospect of reaching agreement with them, provided they drop some of their present demands and provided we insist only on such a degree of inspection and control as is necessary. While we must certainly press them to go further than they have so far shown themselves ready to go, I think we must remember that they have already come some way towards accepting foreign control, further indeed I think than either you or I would have expected a year ago. The French have a saying that the better is the enemy of the good; I think it applies to our present position in relation to this conference. Do not think for one moment that I am ready to compromise on essentials. I agree entirely that we cannot accept the present Soviet position under which they would retain a veto over the crucial operations of the control system, in particular the despatch of inspection teams. On this, and on the related question of a veto over findings of a violation of the agreement, our people put some ideas to your people in Washington last week. They were designed to build into the agreement an automatic right for us (and the Russians) to have inspections. But as clearly neither of us will be physically able to inspect every unidentified event, we felt it would be necessary to agree on some annual upper limit of inspections. I am sorry to say your people have expressed a good many reservations about this plan. They seem to have thought of it as a concession to the Russians. I regard it as just the opposite, because its purpose is, while protecting all our essential requirements, to nail them down on the veto, and to make their position in asking for a veto still more untenable. I have no doubt this conference will be mentioned while I am in Moscow. You can rely on me to press Khrushchev hard about the veto. With warm regards, As ever, Harold

195 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 22, 1959 Dear Friend, The Foreign Secretary and I have already had a number of discussions with Khruschev. These have all so far been informal, and with Mikoyan and Gromyko only in attendance.1 The talks have been after and during meals with normal accompaniment of vodka, caviare and so on. Today we have

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spent with them in the country. Most of the conversation has been of the nature of friendly courtesies, but they have said quite interesting things. I will send you a report tomorrow after we have had our first formal meeting. I am still not without hope that we may probe into their minds a bit, and get some information which may be useful to all of us. With warm regards, Yours ever, Harold Macmillan 1

Anastas Mikoyan and Andrei Gromyko were high-ranking members of the Soviet hierarchy. Mikoyan was first deputy premier, and Gromyko was foreign secretary.

196 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 23, 1959 I promised to send you a further message today giving you my impressions. Although I have only been here 48 hours some of these are already quite clear. From the way in which Khrushchev talked to me throughout yesterday when we were out in the country it was borne in on me that in spite of their great new power and wealth the Russians are still obsessed by a sense of insecurity. The old bogey of encirclement has not yet been laid. Like a poor man who has suddenly made a fortune they feel uneasy in their new situation and they are resentful and nervous of their neighbours. Whenever Khrushchev mentioned the Germans it was possible to sense his hatred and distrust of them. I believe that these feelings of apprehension are just as real as are their misconceptions about Western policy. Khrushchev treated me to a diatribe about mistakes which the West had made in the past and about evil intentions which it had nurtured toward Russia. He said that we had made a wrong assessment of the situation after Stalin’s death. We had counted on internal difficulties to enable us to extract concessions. We had even thought “Liberalism” might appear in Russia. We had tried to impose conditions and had followed slogans of containment, roll-back, and liberation. Such concessions could not be wrung out of the Soviet Union. He did not accuse us of actually wanting war but said that we had created an atmosphere of war. On Germany and Berlin I detected no signs that there was any weakening in their purpose. Khrushchev said that there was no room for manoeuvre or retreat from the position they had put forward. He repeated all the usual logic-chopping arguments in support of his proposals for a free city and for

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a peace treaty with the two sides of Germany. He said that they insisted on this position “because they saw no other way out”. Berlin, reunification, peace treaty, European security were different questions. Some were more ripe for settlement than others. But in our reply of January 10 we had tried to bring them all together. He distrusted our proposals which looked to him like an attempt to draw the Soviet Government into a labyrinth of negotiation which might last for 9 or 10 years. I tried to explain why it was impossible for us to accept their proposals. I said that if the Soviet position was altogether inflexible as Khrushchev had indicated the situation was very serious indeed. For the next day or so I propose to leave it at that and to turn discussion to other topics. We have made a start on disarmament on which they seem ready to be a little more forthcoming. They are at least prepared to discuss in practical terms questions now at issue at a nuclear tests conference. Their attitude is dominated by their conviction that we shall exploit inspection for purposes of acquiring military intelligence; but even so they are open to argument on procedures of control.

197 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 23, 1959 Dear Harold: While I accept and appreciate your statement that you have gone to Moscow to talk rather than to negotiate, I still believe that I should reply briefly to your cabled message of February 20th. I agree with the points you make about the importance of the negotiations in Geneva and the advantages which would come to us from a sound agreement. I agree also that construction of a perfect system, capable of detecting explosions of every type or location, is impossible in practice. However, I am firmly convinced that it would be folly for us to relax our position respecting the right of mutual and effective inspection. Certainly we cannot tolerate vetoes over any part of an agreed inspectional process. I concur that an agreement with the USSR on nuclear testing will establish a precedent for controls in other fields. This point concerns me very much. It reinforces the need to continue to press the USSR for a satisfactory agreement on fundamentals before moving to other issues. The important points are the methods by which the right of inspection is provided for. We must be careful that the staffing pattern of the control posts is not such as to interfere with the integrity of the collection and transmission of data. We must be sure that the voting procedures do not legalize obstruction of the operations

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of the control system. I am sure that you will agree with me that on these points we must be absolutely firm. Our concern about your proposal for setting an annual upper limit on inspections is that it would get us into negotiations on numbers without agreement on the basic elements of inspection and control. Further, there would be an ever-increasing pressure on us, once we accepted the upper limits principle, to go lower and lower until there would no longer be an acceptable level of deterrence. Therefore, I believe we should contemplate no proposals of this type until and unless the important points I have described above are satisfactorily settled. Thank you very much for your short note dispatched after you had your first talk with your friends. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike

198 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 24, 1959 Thank you for your message of February 23 about the nuclear test conference. I am much encouraged by your agreement with what I said about the importance of the Geneva negotiations and the advantages of a sound agreement. I am sorry that you see difficulties about my idea for obliging the Soviet Union to drop its veto proposal by setting an annual upper limit on inspections. I see the force of your argument: but I do still sincerely believe that this may be the best way round the difficulty, and is one which could protect our essential interests. I feel that I have put forward my idea in an extremely tentative and noncommittal fashion to Mr. Khruschev. I had done so before I received your message in the course of a conversation during which Khruschev’s attitude and reaction seemed to me to justify an exploratory approach of this kind. Khruschev had admitted that there was logic in the objection we had strongly put that, given his insistence on vetoing the despatch of inspection teams, no one could be sure whether underground tests were continuing or not. I then said that the possibility had occurred to me that an upper limit might be put on the number of inspections provided the veto on complaints and on despatch of teams was eliminated. I made it clear that I was merely throwing out the idea and not making a proposal even on behalf of my own Government. Khruschev when he had understood what I was driving at

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seemed to like the idea and said it sounded like a sincere attempt to avoid securing advantage to either side. He said he would think about it further. He clearly understood that there was no room for a veto in the idea. I made it very clear indeed that unless some agreed means could be found of ensuring that inspection teams could in fact be sent out there could be no agreement at Geneva. I should add that Khruschev in the course of discussing this possibility said he supposed that under it inspection teams could only go to areas where instruments had indicated a disturbance requiring investigation. I said this would be so. Before we got to this point Khruschev had said two things. In the first place he had revealed intense suspicion of all Western plans for inspection as amounting to nothing but spying. He made this view of his very clear indeed when we had some talk on surprise attack; but he also stated that he regarded the Western purpose in asking for mobile inspection teams to investigate suspected nuclear explosions as exclusively designed to permit ground inspection throughout the Soviet Union in order to locate missile bases. Secondly, he had shown what I judged to be genuine concern about the dangers of further Powers acquiring nuclear weapons, and had agreed that if we could reach an agreement on stopping the tests, it would go a long way to prevent such a spread. At one point he used language which, if true, implied that the Soviet Union has neither given, nor wants to give, nuclear weapons or information to the Chinese.

199 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 24, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you very much for the message giving your impressions after fortyeight hours in Moscow. I have no doubt that the conclusions presented in your first paragraph are quite accurate. We are of course aware of Khruschev’s apparent rigidity with respect to the Soviet attitude toward Berlin and Germany. This morning, February twentyfourth, we received cabled extracts from the statement that he made today in Moscow that are seemingly even more belligerent and unyielding than those he has made in the past.1 Presumably the conversations which you and he are carrying on should be producing a better atmosphere in which the West and the East can negotiate. By Khruschev’s own words he has no apparent interest in such a development.

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For example, he is quoted this morning as saying that if the West should attempt to maintain contact with Berlin either by ground or by air, that such an attempt would be considered a “threat of war.” To attempt to draw any conclusion as to his basic purpose in such statements would be nothing more than an exercise in speculation. However, it seems that he is intensifying his effort to create division within the Western group and thus to weaken our resolution. In effect he is saying, “We are destroying the Western rights in Germany and in Berlin, and if you make any attempt to defend those rights you are guilty of aggression and warlike acts.” Tomorrow morning I shall probably have some searching questions put to me by the press respecting the latest statement of Khrushchev, and the rigidity of the line he is taking. I shall say as little as possible, particularly during the duration of your visit. However, I believe I should reiterate that the West is a unit in its determination to defend its rights and to carry out its responsibilities respecting Berlin, and that, while we are completely ready to negotiate where there is any possible negotiable ground, we are not going to be divided or defeated by threats. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

On 16 February, Khrushchev had given a two-hour speech condemning the Western position on Berlin and demanding that a summit conference be convened. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XIX, 1372.

200 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 25, 1959 Dear Harold: We have become so accustomed to the rudeness of the people in the Kremlin that I suppose that Khrushchev’s speech of yesterday, made at a time when you were a guest in his country, should give us little reason for astonishment. Nevertheless this latest instance of deliberately bad deportment seems to me an affront to the whole free world. In my prior messages to you I have not meant to imply that we are lacking in a readiness to be flexible in the effort to negotiate a reasonable agreement at Geneva. I think the West has proved that readiness by the concessions already made. With respect to our objection about limiting inspection by fixing a maximum number of trips permitted to teams, my only point was that I have always been somewhat fearful of getting into the numbers racket.

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One thought that occurred to us here is that on this matter of trips there might be proposed some commitment that useless or unnecessarily repetitive trips would not be countenanced. Since the group decision would be controlling, this matter would be no more subject to veto than would a group decision to make an inspection. In other words, one member could not, on his own, compel a trip to a suspected incident. This is, of course, no more than just thinking aloud. I put it down merely to indicate our interest in the search for anything that is workable and in which we can have confidence, but at the same time that should answer any legitimate fears of the Soviets that the whole inspectional process could be turned into a wholesale seeking for military intelligence. I know that you are working hard and earnestly in a very difficult situation. I think of you every day. At the very least the impressions you bring back will be fresh and even if, because of the intransigence of the Soviets, you accomplish nothing of greater importance than this, I feel that the trip will prove to be worth while. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike

201 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 26, 1959 Dear Friend, Thank you very much for your message of February 24. You have just about summed up what Khruschev is in effect saying to us. In fact I used very much the same words when I was telling him today what I thought his attitude amounted to. I think that I had a pretty useful conversation from our point of view and that it left him disappointed. I would not respond to his pleas that I should advance some fresh proposals for Germany and Berlin. I stuck to the point that nothing that he could do would extinguish our rights of access to Berlin and our determination to do our duty by staying there. I said that it was he who was threatening us with war and not the other way round and that this kind of thing did not square with his professed desire to settle our differences by negotiation. The two positions taken up by each side were not reconcilable. Since it was no use his thinking that he could force us to abandon our rights and our duties, he must make up his mind to negotiate with us in a sensible way. As to the level and agenda of negotiations I was not going to

220 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

argue about that with him in Moscow. He must answer our Note of February 16 and we would then consult with our allies. Atmosphere has been very cool since his speech of yesterday. I have told him Doctor Adenauer whom he had insulted was my friend and that I hardly believed that he would think well of me if I did not stand by my friend. I said that precisely because the situation which lay ahead was so dangerous I must make it absolutely clear to him that the British Government would stand by and cooperate with their allies. Almost the only point on which we found ourselves in agreement today is that the situation might in fact become extremely serious. I do not pretend that I have shaken his resolve any more than he has shaken ours. On the contrary all indications are that he means to go ahead with his plan for turning over approaches to Berlin to D.D.R. and for making a peace treaty with them.1 But at least I hope that my language may have had some good effect in making him realise the strength of our determination and what is involved. It is on this rather dark note that I am now leaving for a four day journey around Russia. I thought that you would like to have my latest news before I set off. With warm regards, As ever, Harold 1

DDR is the abbreviation for deutsche demokratische republik (German Democratic Republic, in English), the official German name for East Germany.

202 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 2, 19591 I got back this morning from a four day tour to Kiev and Leningrad. We are meeting the Russians again this afternoon, and have a very full programme for our final 24 hours. 2. The Russians have been showing us a fairer face since the scowl they directed at us last Wednesday. Khrushchev has recovered from his toothache – he even sent me a message in Leningrad to say so. Mikoyan (who on Wednesday told us he probably would not be able to come to meet us in Leningrad) did, in fact, turn up there with Gromyko and great efforts were made there by the Russians to restore a cordial atmosphere. 3. All this seemed to me to be satisfactory, not so much in itself as in providing some evidence that Khrushchev thinks he went too far in the speech

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he made last Tuesday and in the rather rough treatment he tried to give us the following day. I think the attitude we tried to maintain of firmness allied with forbearance has paid a dividend. We shall go on maintaining it. 4. At Leningrad Gromyko gave Selwyn an advance copy of a Note the Russians are sending in reply to the last Western Note. Formal copies of it have been handed this morning to our Embassy here and to yours. There is a lot of the usual tiresome stuff at the beginning of this Note, but I think the last paragraphs are well worth careful study. While I certainly intend to eschew all optimism, I do feel that the proposals the Russians now make can perhaps legitimately be regarded as a bit of an advance on their previous position. 5. I hope your people will study this note carefully, and, if I may say so, I hope too that you will ensure that they refrain from any hasty or too hostile reaction. With warm regards, As ever, Harold 1

Sent as a telegram from Moscow with instructions to send it to Washington. Source is PREM 11/2650.

203 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 2, 1959 Dear Harold: Following your return to London, I hasten to felicitate you on the firmness of your presentation respecting Western rights in the Berlin situation. At the very least you demonstrated to the world that strength does not depend upon discourtesy, a great contrast to the provocative attitude and statements of Khruschev during your visit there. Thank you very much for the care you took to inform us on a day by day basis of your Russian experience. I assume that you are now going to visit both Bonn and Paris. I assure you once again that you will be most welcome if you find it desirable to come to Washington. We could have a most informal meeting, without any social engagements, and should have a day or two of good talks while you are here. I am quite sure that nothing is so important as to have our ideas and plans concerted among the four of us, so far as possible, with the complete NATO group. Certain elements of the situation constantly change so it is extremely important that our agreements and our plans are in accord therewith.

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Do let me know as soon as convenient whether you can come and approximate timing. With warm regard, As ever, IKE P.S. Just as I was finished dictating this note, I had yours that was written apparently the first thing Monday morning. I was delighted to note the change in Khruschev’s tone and assure you that I will pay very great attention to the final paragraph of your message.

204 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 4, 1959 Dear Friend, On my return to London, I was most encouraged to get your letter of March 2. I would of course very much like to come. The opportunity of a few days’ private and informal talks with you would be very valuable indeed. I feel that it would be a mistake to change plans that were made some time ago for me to go to Paris on March 9 and 10, and to Bonn on March 12 and 13. I know that the President of Eire is paying you an official visit at the beginning of the following week. What would suit me best would be to arrive in Washington on Wednesday morning, March 18, and spend that day quietly with our Ambassador and have some rest, then I would be ready to begin our talks on the Thursday. Would this sort of plan fit in with your arrangements? I will of course do all I can to alter it to suit you. I would propose to be accompanied by the Foreign Secretary. This afternoon, I have made a statement about my visit to the Soviet Union to the House of Commons. The main point was the fact that the Russians now agree that they must negotiate over the Berlin and German questions, and that there has been a retreat from their ultimatum attitude. This will give us a little more time to concert our ideas. As you say, it is of the utmost importance that the policies of the four powers, and of the whole of NATO, should now be firmly aligned. I look forward to giving you a personal account of my conversations very soon. With warm regard, As ever, Harold Macmillan

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205 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 4, 1959 Dear Harold: I am a bit embarrassed because of the fact that I shall have the President of Ireland here in Washington from the 17th through the 19th, King Hussein on the 24th. I suspect you would not want your visit to overlap with either of these. Would it suit your convenience to arrive here the afternoon of the 19th and start our talks on Friday afternoon, continuing on Saturday, with perhaps a carryover to Sunday. Of course if your schedule is so rigid that you feel you should follow the plan you suggest, we shall of course go ahead on that basis. While my other visitor might feel it a discourtesy, I think the matter could be explained if necessary. With warm regard, As ever,

206 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 5, 1959 During an informal talk which Selwyn and I had in Moscow with Khrushchev and Mikoyan some points emerged which are of technical interest from the intelligence angle. 1. Khrushchev, speaking with apparent sincerity, said that the Soviet Union was more interested in megaton weapons than in kiloton or smaller types. He said that the production of the latter was extremely expensive in fissile material and was more than the Soviet Union could afford. Moreover, he did not think they would need the smaller weapons, for he did not believe in the concept of local wars using only tactical nuclear weapons. He considered that, if war started, the larger type of weapon would be used. The Soviet Union were therefore stockpiling megaton weapons. 2. Later in the same conversation Khrushchev said that the stock-pile of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union has now reached a point where they might already have “more than enough”. Military experts could estimate the number of weapons needed to deal with a given area; and, as he said, “If you had that number you needed no more”. Therefore they had greatly reduced their investment in the production of fissile material. It was very expensive to produce and they no longer needed so large an output.

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3. Khrushchev also said that they could already fire intermediate range ballistic missiles from mobile platforms. The rockets covering targets in Europe, North Africa and Asia no longer needed stationary sites. He added that they were pretty near the point of being able to fire intercontinental ballistic missiles also from mobile platforms. 4. Khrushchev several times indicated that he did not want nuclear weapons or the information for making them to spread beyond the three countries which had these weapons at present. And at one moment he seemed to suggest that he would not want to pass on weapons or information to the Chinese. We have discussed these points with our experts. Their detailed comments are summarised in a further message which I have asked Harold Caccia to give to you with this one. You will see that what Khrushchev said is not inconsistent with the evidence already available to us.1 I think it would be most useful if you would show the comments of our experts to your technical people. We could perhaps then discuss the whole matter when I come to Washington in the light of their observations. With warm regard, As ever, Harold Macmillan 1

This document consisted of comments by British nuclear weapons experts who believed that Khrushchev might well have been truthful about Soviet de-emphasis of smaller nuclear weapons. Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, disagreed, as did a number of other experts including Dulles’s British counterpart. See Louis Galambos and Daun van Ee (eds), The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The Presidency: Keeping the Peace. XX (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 1396–7. Volume XX contains letters written from Eisenhower to Macmillan for the period from 2 March 1959 to 23 July 1960.

207 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 5, 1959 Dear Harold: I have just received your technical message and will have it studied as you suggest. I am grateful for your promptness in passing the information along to us. As ever, Ike

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208 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 5, 19591 Dear Friend, Thank you for your letter of March 4 about your arrangements. I would certainly like to fit in our talks between the visits of the President of Eire and King Hussein. This would mean that we would have the Friday, Saturday and (as I think would be necessary) the Sunday for talks. On this basis, I would plan to go first to Ottawa for a talk with the Prime Minister of Canada. I shall suggest to him that I visit him on Wednesday the 18th and stay in Ottawa that night. I would then come down to Washington in the course of Thursday, and be ready for talks with you on Friday as you suggest. If this is agreeable to you, I suggest that an announcement about my visit should be released as soon as possible. I must, of course, clear the Canadian end first. The form and timing of the announcement could perhaps best be co-ordinated through our Embassy in Washington. With warm regard, As ever, Harold Macmillan 1

Accompanying this message was a statement that would be made about Macmillan’s upcoming visit to Washington. See Harold Caccia to Eisenhower, March 5, 1959, EL, WFIS, Box 24, “10/1/58–3/20/59,” folder 3.

209 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 5, 1959 Dear Harold: Agree to your plan. Timing and details will be worked out with Embassy. Will be expecting you on nineteenth. With warm regard, As ever, IKE

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210 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 5, 1959 Dear Harold: About forty-five or fifty miles outside of Washington I have a recreational spot called Camp David. It is an ideal retreat, and while it has no recreational facilities in winter weather (except for a movie room), it is very comfortable, with all the conveniences. If the idea appeals to you at all, I would suggest that you, Selwyn, your Ambassador, your secretary or other individual or individuals you would like, and we go up there about Friday noon, coming back at our leisure some time on Sunday. Incidentally, there would be no difficulty about bringing up other individuals – technical experts, etc., if we needed them. The helicopter trip is only thirty minutes. The advantage of such a plan would be that we would lose no time in going or coming, or in any kind of social engagement. We would be free to talk and to rest. All the above is a suggestion only. We will go along with whatever you feel would be most convenient to yourself. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

211 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 9, 1959 Dear Harold: I look forward to meeting with you on March 20 to hear first-hand your impression from your trip to the Soviet Union and to discuss what we must do on important issues in the coming months. On one matter I want to give you our views immediately since postponement of decision, even until your arrival here, will increase our difficulties. This matter is the Geneva test suspension negotiations. We are convinced that the present phase of these negotiations should be recessed at an early date. If we do so, we will be in a position to state openly to the world at large the principle which is essential to a sound and acceptable agreement, an effective international control system not subject to veto or obstruction. If we do not recess, soon we will almost certainly be drawn

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into prolonged inconclusive discussions which will confuse and obscure the basic issues without making real progress. It has, of course, been indispensable to test, as we have done, the possibilities of shift in the Soviet position. However, the Soviet reception of your informal suggestions to Khrushchev, as indicated by their negotiating line on the veto in Geneva in the past few days, appears to be that they interpret your ideas as signs of Western readiness to compromise on the veto rather than as you intended them. Our purpose in these negotiations is to reach an agreement on sound principles which will be a good precedent for further disarmament agreements in the establishment of effective international control. Stopping nuclear tests is of secondary importance – these tests, indeed, are already temporarily suspended and Foster has discussed with you our tentative thought that this reciprocal forbearance might (at least for atmospheric tests) be continued indefinitely if a test ban agreement proves unobtainable. If we go on, without a pause to highlight the principles involved, we will be faced with widespread expectation that there will be compromises on these principles of international control for the sake of stopping tests, and the increasing complexity of the debate will make it increasingly difficult to stand on principle. I should add frankly that we would welcome such a pause also in order to enable us to clarify our thinking on some aspects of the control system itself. We have had our best experts working on the problems of identifying underground explosions and high altitude explosions and their studies are being brought to completion this week. Their conclusions will require careful assessment as to their implications for the control system agreed upon last summer by the experts from both sides. I feel that a recess well before the end of this month will not interfere with progress toward negotiations with the Soviets on other outstanding issues. I also hope that you will agree that a recess will actually assist in our objective of reaching a sound agreement. We do not want a sharp or complete break and it would be important to handle a recess in such manner as to make this clear. We have in mind a recess, by agreement if possible, to enable delegates to report back to their governments. We would, of course, make clear our intention to continue to withhold nuclear testing under the terms announced in my statements of August 22 and November 7. I would envisage letters from each of us to Khrushchev explaining our approach to the negotiations and our continuing desire to devise an effective international control system. We would be disposed to welcome discussion of the status of the negotiations in the United Nations Disarmament Commission since we believe that even if there were no formal resolutions the principles which we have insisted on would receive general endorsement by the members of the United Nations. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike

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212 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 11, 1959 Dear Friend, Many thanks for your message about the tests and the possibility of recessing the Geneva Conference. I am studying this, and hope to send you an answer shortly. We had two days in Paris and are off to Bonn tomorrow. Over the weekend I will send you my feeling about these two visits. Meanwhile I found de Gaulle quite mellow and friendly. I had a talk with him alone both before and after lunch when I spoke firmly about NATO and especially the Fleet.1 I hope that what I said will have some effect. It is clear that his own Ministers and Officials do not understand what he is at. I fear that he does not really understand the modern concepts of integration and interdependence. He is fundamentally an Eighteenth Century figure, and therefore the problem of dealing with him is largely a psychological one – as you and I know well. De Gaulle gave me a full account of his discussions with Adenauer about Berlin and the European problem. But it will be interesting to get Adenauer’s version. We found in Paris general agreement as to the way in which we should handle this difficult situation, and I hope to find similar agreement in Bonn. Anyway, I shall be seeing you very soon, and it is always easier to talk than to write telegrams. Yours ever, Harold Macmillan 1

French President Charles de Gaulle insisted that the French navy should have the same freedom as the United States Sixth Fleet in terms of its flexibility. On 6 March, de Gaulle announced that, in a time of war, France would assume control of its naval forces in the Mediterranean. See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 637–8 and Watson, Into the Missile Age, 571.

213 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 11, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you very much for your informative note after your Paris meeting. The only disagreement that I would have with your description as Eighteenth Century is that I place the period in the “Early Nineteenth.”

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From what you said I feel there must be some hope of getting a little better expression of intention with respect to De Gaulle’s participation in NATO and the use of his Fleet. I am eagerly looking forward to your arrival, and I only wish that I could take you to a sunny climate rather than to ask you to endure some more of the winter weather that you have encountered during your many travels. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

214 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 13, 1959 Dear Friend, I promised to send you an answer as soon as possible to your message of March 9 about the Nuclear Tests Conference. I have thought over your suggestion carefully. While I would prefer the Conference to carry on with its work, I am prepared to agree that it might recess for a while. I entirely support your view that it must not be a sharp or complete break, and in arranging for any recess I feel we must take great care to ensure that it is not misinterpreted by the public (and is incapable of being misrepresented by the Russians) as revealing a desire on the part of our two Governments to break off negotiations. I think we both feel that if we can get agreement with the Russians at Geneva on acceptable conditions it would be of real advantage to us all. I think that in order to prevent our purposes from being misunderstood the recess should occur at a time when it would seem natural. Easter would provide such an occasion, and this suggests a break from March 26. However, I would like to suggest instead that we should aim at a recess from March 20. This would not strain too much the use of Easter as the occasion, but would have the advantage that I should not yet be back from my visit to you. Thus the Russians would have no reason to expect before the recess a formal proposal on the lines of the idea which as I told you in my message of February 24 I had discussed very tentatively and non-committally with Khrushchev, for they must know that I shall want to discuss it with you. A recess beginning only just before Easter and after I am back from Washington would be more awkward. I suggest therefore that we plan for a recess of three weeks starting from March 20. I think it is most important that at the time of recess we should

230 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

announce the date of re-assembly, although we might have it in mind to considerably reduce the tempo of the negotiations when they start again. The case would then be an exact parallel to the Christmas recess, when as you remember no anxiety was expressed in any quarter that we might be working for a break. No doubt you are aware of articles now appearing in the press and suggesting that the Western powers do not want an agreement at Geneva. If we were to recess without a date for re-assembly this speculation would inevitably increase, and we should find ourselves in a bad public position. We do not want people to draw a parallel with the Surprise Attack Conference, which recessed before Christmas without setting a time for its re-assembly; I think the public concludes that the Conference has not died. Your delegation in Geneva has no doubt reported to you that the Russians there have been making tentative enquiries about the possibilities of a recess. So far our delegation has not had similar enquiries. But I conclude that it might be possible for a recess to be arranged by the three delegations at Geneva. I think this would be a better way to arrange it than by our writing to Khrushchev, because I fear that if we did so he would seize the opportunity to publish a propaganda reply misrepresenting our proposal. I agree with you that we could profit by a recess to make plain to the world at large the principle which is essential to a sound and acceptable agreement: “an effective international control system not subject to veto or obstruction”, as you rightly put it. But I doubt whether it would be wise to have the status of the negotiations discussed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. As our Embassy has told your officials, we are not sure that neutral nations will be so easily convinced of the rightness of the whole of our present position as it stands on the record of the Conference. At any rate, even if we were to secure a favourable verdict in the Disarmament Commission I do not see how that would help us at Geneva. I think it would on the contrary be likely to make the Russians more difficult and obstinate. Finally, I must mention a point in your letter with which I do not altogether agree. I do not think that the tentative suggestions which I made to Khrushchev have led the Russians at Geneva to show any sign that they think we are weakening on the idea of the veto or on the question of controls. I made it clear that we could not accept a veto on the despatch of inspection teams, and that my ideas were designed to do away with the veto on inspection. We attach the utmost importance to control in disarmament matters, and I think that the suggestions I made on inspections do not in any way compromise the principles for further disarmament agreements. I agree that our suspension of testing should be maintained during the recess. But perhaps the point need not be made to the Russians unless they ask.

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I look forward to having your comments soon. If we are to secure a recess from March 20 we shall need to send instructions to our delegations in Geneva promptly.1 With warm regards, As ever, Harold 1

In reading Macmillan’s letter, Eisenhower underlined, for emphasis, where Macmillan stated in the third-to-last paragraph, “Finally, I must mention a point in your letter with which I do not altogether agree. I do not think that the tentative suggestions which I made to Khrushchev have led the Russians at Geneva to show any sign that they think we are weakening on the idea of the veto or on the question of controls.”

215 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 14, 1959 Dear Harold: I agree with the date of March 20 which you suggest in your message of March 13 for a temporary recess in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. I would suggest that we try to set a date of April 13 for reconvening. We will send immediate instructions to our delegation to work out with your people a joint approach to the Russians. Your visit to Washington and the subsequent breathing spell will give us an opportunity to work out our plans for the future of the negotiations. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike

216 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 23, 1959 Dear Friend, Before I leave I feel I must write to thank you for one of the most successful conferences that we have ever had. Apart from the very happy and friendly surroundings in which you enabled us to live and work, I feel that

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we reached very wise decisions all the more agreeable because they were from a sense of common purpose and understanding. Nobody can tell just how things will work out, but I feel that on the great European questions we are now absolutely at one on procedure and have a very wide measure of agreement on substance. There are still a number of problems to be settled before we can agree on our final point of view, but there are good arrangements in train for this work to be done. Apart from the questions of Europe I thought our talks about the Middle East were very useful and I am glad to feel that we are very close together upon these problems. On the atomic tests we are clearly faced with difficult technical problems. But there may be occasions when we have to take a broad decision for the world interest. To my mind everything turns on the degree of inspection and control that we can get out of the Russians. If this can be made to work it may well be worth abandoning some technical advantages. There is one other set of questions, however, which are in a different category. They rest on your decision and that of your Government. I was grateful for what you told me in explaining your difficulties about imports into the United States. I recognise also that the total value of British exports to you has risen year by year and is still rising. At the same time, there is a growing feeling in our country that whenever we do particularly well with anything we are at risk. If our woollen textiles are so good and so acceptable to a very advanced economic society like yours, the market they could obtain would be much larger if they were not arbitrarily restricted. In the same way, our specialised production of high class electrical products, especially turbines and large generating equipment, is something of which we are very proud. If therefore you should decide that this class of imports into the United States is to be excluded, it would be a serious blow to our relations. Nobody in Britain would understand the plea of national security. Protectionism is very good at finding all kinds of cloaks to disguise itself, but it remains the same underneath. I do very much hope therefore that you will not mind my saying that I regard these particular issues as of special importance at the moment. You and I have done so much to spread the concept of interdependence that I would be sorry if there was a set-back now.1 Pray forgive me for writing so frankly. Once more I write to thank you for a wonderful three days as your guest. Yours ever, Harold 1

Here Macmillan is referring to American import restrictions on British woolen textiles and large electrical products like turbine engines.

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217 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 25, 1959 Dear Friend, Before leaving Washington I sent you a letter of thanks, but it was mixed up with a good deal of business. This is just to say how really grateful I am to you for your kindness and understanding. Our talks and drives together were a great comfort to me. You, of course, have perhaps the heaviest burden in the world to bear and I too have my share. It is certainly to me a source of strength to feel that we are so close together and have such confidence in each other. All good wishes, Yours ever, Harold

218 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 27, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you for the note that was delivered to me within a half hour after you left on your return flight to London. I am glad that you and the members of your party liked – despite the cold weather – the informal Camp David atmosphere; for my part I too felt that the absence of protocol and social “appearances” enabled us to discuss our problems more frankly and more thoroughly than would have been possible in Washington. Those of us in our government who are charged with the responsibility for international relations have not been insensible to the problem you pose in your final substantive paragraph. Acting on my request, priority is now being given to a thorough study of the entire matter. I understand your position thoroughly, as I hope you do the pressures that the advocates of trade restrictions are able to assert in this country. This note is necessarily brief, since I am in Gettysburg for a little rest over this Easter holiday. I shall write to you later at length. Again let me tell you what a real pleasure it was to have you as my guest. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

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219 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 4, 1959 Dear Harold: One of the most heartening aspects of our talks here was the accord we found in our strong convictions as to the importance of the negotiations in Geneva for the controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests. These talks offer the one early possibility for a first step toward enforceable disarmament and toward control over the future development and spread of modern means of destruction. I have been giving further thought to what we might do to revitalize these negotiations. I believe it is important to give a note of hope to the talks. We cannot achieve this merely by resuming interminable wranglings over the veto and the composition of inspection teams. If that is what faces our negotiators then I think there will be increasing discouragement in our own countries and throughout the world. What we might do is make clear immediately that these important differences in approach need not be a bar to putting into effect promptly the elements of a control system which are not in dispute – control posts and agreed aircraft flights, together with the banning of the atmospheric tests which these elements can adequately monitor. As fast as the political and technical problems of monitoring underground and outer space tests are worked out, an initial agreement would, of course, be broadened to include these also. What I propose is the very opposite of an ultimatum. We would make clear by our statements and actions that we are prepared and determined to continue negotiating a comprehensive test suspension agreement. We would simply be offering a way to get started promptly in a limited area of agreement, if the Soviets remain adamant on the veto. Indeed, between us, I think that advancing such a reasonable alternative course of action may be the only effective way to test the real Soviet position on the veto. The Soviets are no doubt considering their own moves. We should act when talks resume on April 13, if we are to retain leadership and to take action to restore a sense of purpose and hope in the negotiations. Our representatives might make carefully prepared statements at the opening session in Geneva on April 13, recapitulating the progress and difficulties in the negotiations, and pointing out the possibility of action to capitalize immediately on the areas of agreement already reached or in prospect. Simultaneously letters from you and me to Premier Khrushchev, perhaps along the lines of the enclosed draft, might be delivered in Moscow endorsing the approach. In order that our suggestion might not seem to be advanced as a propagandistic gesture, it might be made privately and released publicly only after sufficient time for a Soviet response – unless, of course, a premature leak forces our hand.1

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These thoughts are being discussed here with Selwyn and your Embassy. Because I believe we have an opportunity to give a new and sounder impulse to these negotiations, I wanted to bring them to your attention directly and to hear your views. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

Eisenhower’s draft, included with the letter to Macmillan, urged the Soviet premier to agree to phase in nuclear test bans by agreeing to halt atmospheric tests. This would de-couple this easily verifiable ban from the troublesome issue of on-site inspections for underground nuclear tests. See draft letter, Eisenhower to Khrushchev, EL, WFIS, Box 25(a).

220 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 6, 1959 My Dear Friend, Thank you very much for your message of April 4 about the nuclear tests negotiations. I have not yet had time to study this fully but at first sight your proposals seem to me to constitute a most constructive approach to our present problem. I will send you another message on these as soon as I have seen Selwyn and consulted with my experts. With warm regards, As ever, HAROLD

221 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 8, 1959 My dear Friend, I have now been able to give further thought to your message of April 4 about the Nuclear Tests Conference and to discuss the position with Selwyn. You have certainly put forward a most fruitful and constructive idea. We are all very grateful. I am sure that this line of approach is the best we can

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devise at the present time. As I understand it your plan is based on two principles. First, that if the Russians change their present position in the manner indicated in your draft message to Khrushchev, then we are prepared to agree to a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests, in spite of the risk that the Russians may in fact be able to carry out certain tests which the system could not identify as such. Second, if the Russians do not so change their position, then we shift our ground and offer instead a ban on tests only in the atmosphere, and I presume under the water. Am I right also in thinking that the upper limit of the atmosphere for this purpose would be defined as 50 kilometres above the earth, because I understand that this is the height up to which the Geneva experts’ system is regarded as being effective; or have you some higher limit in mind? (If I am right would not the last sentence but one of your draft to Khrushchev need modification?) We would also make it clear that negotiations could and should continue without interruption to explore, as you put it in your draft to Khrushchev, the political and technical problems involved in extending the agreement as quickly as possible to cover all nuclear weapons tests. I agree that such an offer is reasonable, is in accord with present scientific possibilities and goes some way to meet the public disappointment and criticism which any abandonment of our original more ambitious objective is bound to entail. But I would like you to give serious consideration to the possibility of improving the offer in one respect. I fear the Russians will be very disinclined to reach any agreement falling short of a complete ban on all tests. They will argue for a complete ban on grounds of general principle and say that anything short of it would be unsatisfactory and unfair. Could we not therefore at the same time announce that we will be prepared, provided they are likewise, to refrain for a period from the entry into force of the initial agreement from conducting tests underground and above 50 kilometres? This moratorium would be a voluntary arrangement outside any formal agreement – thus preserving the important principle that the agreement itself should only commit us to steps which we know can be controlled. Our hope would be that during this moratorium period scientific advances would enable us to agree with the Russians on a ban extended to cover further explosions though maybe even then some underground tests could not be covered and would have to be exempt. The moratorium should not exclude the possibility of conducting experimental nuclear explosions underground jointly with the Russians or under international control, to obtain necessary data for developing a control system. I am convinced there is a reasonable prospect that scientific advances will enable us to move further before long. I suggest that the period of moratorium should be either one or two years. Of course I realise that during this period of one or two years we should be bound by our voluntary abstention, while the Russians might carry out

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experiments undetected. Against that – first, we do not know whether the Russians are in fact doing underground tests; second, even if we got your first alternative – which is what we originally aimed at – it would take well over a year to install the control system, during all of which time the Russians could cheat if they wished to; and third, this risk is inherent in the present moratorium which has been in force since the Geneva Conference began. So I do not really think that we should lose very much and we might make a considerable impact upon public opinion. Combining your plan with my suggestion we would be offering a permanent end to atmospheric explosions up to 50 kilometres and in addition give a temporary exclusion of higher and underground tests, while we are seeking some effective scientific control. This would much relieve people’s minds. There could be nothing fairer than such an offer, and it is also possible that the Russians would accept it. I should be very grateful if you could let me have your views as soon as possible about this addition to your plan, the main idea of which I like very much. With warm regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan

222 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 9, 1959 Dear Harold: I have just received your comments on my message to you concerning the Geneva Nuclear Test Conference. As you will have recognized, my message was mainly an attempt to reduce to writing the tentative agreements that you and I reached during our personal talks at the time of the meeting at Camp David. In accordance with my understanding of what we agreed during our talks, I suggested in my message (a) that we should reopen the Geneva Conference with a re-statement of the nuclear test problem and our hopes to secure some kind of an agreement that would not be encumbered by the possibility of veto; and ( b) that if the Soviets could not at this time agree to an effective control system we should seek an agreement to cease atmospheric tests with only limited control posts. In addition you and I agreed that if we encountered failure even in this limited effort we would nevertheless continue for an unstated

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period our voluntary abstention from any testing that would further pollute the atmosphere. In your reply you put forward as an additional proposal the idea that all three nations should informally bind themselves to abstain from every kind of test for a given period even without any agreed control system whatever and, should the Soviets refuse to be a party to such a tripartite statement, we would on our side nevertheless announce our readiness to abstain for one or two years. While time does not permit an exhaustive study and final conclusion on your new suggestion, frankly, Harold, I think that for us to announce such an intention would weaken our position seriously. While such a moratorium would have a considerable propaganda impact, I fear that, once we committed ourselves to do this, the pressure would be on us to continue to withhold testing even if there was no progress in negotiations for extension of the quite limited controls applicable to an atmospheric test suspension. What we want of course is to put pressure on the Soviets to agree to extend controls in order to get tests brought to a halt; I believe this can best be done if we do not reduce our bargaining power in this voluntary way. It seems to me that, since we have suspended tests for the time being (and the Soviet Union has never felt it necessary to make a similar explicit renunciation), our public posture is not vulnerable. If we are challenged as to our long-range plans we can simply point out that we are now testing and that it is up to the Soviet Union to demonstrate its intentions in serious negotiation for an atmospheric test ban rather than for us, without any quid pro quo, to answer for the indefinite future. We will not of course want to assert any specific intention to resume underground or high altitude testing. Incidentally I shall have to ask the State Department to give you the figure our experts use in measuring the upper limit of the earth’s atmosphere. I hope that you will agree to go ahead with the proposal I have sent you, when the talks resume on April 13th, without committing ourselves at that time on our long-range testing plans. I think that we will miss a unique opportunity to take a new lead in these negotiations if we are not ready to act then. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike

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223 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 10, 1959 My dear Friend, I have just received your message. I am afraid you have misunderstood my proposal. If you will look at the sixth [actually fourth] paragraph of my message you will see that I proposed that you and we should refrain from underground and high altitude tests provided the Russians agreed to do so too. Of course their agreement would be an essential part of my proposal. There would therefore be two kinds of arrangement. There would be a formal legal agreement by which all three nuclear Powers would undertake to abandon altogether and for all time atmospheric tests up to 50 kilometres. This agreement would be and could be effectively policed. In addition there would be a short term undertaking for a year or two years that all three Powers – I repeat all three Powers – would abandon temporarily underground and high altitude tests. It would be known that this short term undertaking could not be policed but every effort would be made during the period of one or two years, whichever it might be, to work out a policing system so that the first type of agreement could be extended later to include as much more as could be policed. By this means we would maintain the important principle that a permanent and formal agreement should cover only the area that can be policed. I hope this is clear to you and I still hope you will consider this a useful adjunct to your first proposal. I would ask you to think about doing this, which I believe would increase its public effect and its prospects of acceptance at very little cost to ourselves. But if you do not agree, I am ready to go along with your first proposal as it stands. I must however warn you now that if as I rather fear the Russians refuse to agree to stop atmospheric tests only, then I may feel obliged to ask you once again to consider my addition. If you feel you must now stick to your original plan, then as I have already said, I will not now press you further. But in that event I think it would be better that you only and not I also should deliver a detailed message to Khrushchev on Monday. I should be perfectly ready to send a brief message saying that you have told me of your plan and that I support it; and of course our Delegation at Geneva would give it full support at the Conference. With regard to the original proposal I note that the atmosphere for the purposes of this agreement is taken at 50 kilometres and your letter to Mr. Khrushchev will be amended accordingly.

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In any case, whichever way you decide, I am very glad to know that you still feel that you and we at any rate should continue for an unstated period our voluntary abstention from any testing that would further pollute the atmosphere. With warm regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan

224 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 11, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you for your prompt reply to my message. You are quite right in your assumption that I did not fully understand your added suggestion. In view of the shortness of time, I think it would be wisest for us now to proceed with the original plan. I shall send on Monday a message to Khrushchev along the lines of the one I sent you on April 4th. If, on reconsideration, you wish to send a similar detailed message, I will be delighted. If not, I appreciate your offer to send a briefer message and to give the full support of your Delegation at Geneva. While my hesitancy respecting your proposal arose in part from a misunderstanding, I was also reluctant to enter, even for a short period, into a mutual undertaking with the Soviet Union to abandon underground and high altitude tests without defined or agreed monitoring arrangements. I feared that such a temporary undertaking would not increase prospects of subsequent achievement of a safeguarded agreement banning all tests but rather would have the reverse effect. Nevertheless should the Soviets turn down the inspected atmospheric ban which we are now proposing, I would of course be delighted to consider again with you the addendum which you have suggested. We are studying the whole thing urgently to be ready to talk to you about it. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

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225 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 11, 1959 My dear Friend, Thank you for answering my message of April 10 so quickly. I do appreciate the force of the arguments you still bring forward against my proposal. But I am glad to hear you will be ready to consider it again if the Russians turn down the proposal you originally made. I am therefore ready to go along with your original proposal and to give it our full support. I enclose the draft of a message to Khrushchev which I will instruct our Ambassador in Moscow to deliver on Monday about the time the Conference in Geneva convenes.1 I have not had much time to consider this draft, and may wish to make some minor changes in it.2 With warm regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan 1

2

The British ambassador to the Soviet Union, residing in Moscow, was Sir Patrick Reilly. This message echoed Eisenhower’s earlier draft, proposing at minimum an agreement to halt atmospheric testing, with the hope that a comprehensive agreement could be reached.

226 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 11, 1959 Dear Harold: Thanks very much for your message. I am glad we have reached agreement on the way to start this next stage. We will of course stay in close touch with you as we see how the discussions develop. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

242 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

227 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 21, 1959 My dear Friend, Since this is my first message to you since Foster’s resignation of the post he has held with such conspicuous courage I feel I must tell you how deeply I sympathise with you. It must be at once a great loss and a great grief to you. I was interested to hear that the Vice President is soon to visit the Soviet Union. I am sure that he will have as interesting a time as I did, and it will certainly be useful to know what his impressions are. If there was a chance of his stopping here on his way back we should of course be very glad to see him. Meanwhile I am sure that you will be interested to know that at the end of last week I received a long personal message from Khrushchev. The background to this is that when I was in Moscow I tried as you know to direct Khrushchev’s ambitions away from ideas of military adventure to a more pacific policy. As part of this idea I expressed the hope that he might feel it possible to send me messages if there were ever any particular point of difficulty to be resolved. On April 8 the Soviet Ambassador came to see me to give me an album of photographs taken during my visit to the Soviet Union. Malik took the opportunity to ask me straight out whether progress at a Foreign Ministers’ meeting was a condition of the Summit.1 I said that in these matters atmosphere was perhaps even more important than practical results. While we did not expect that the Foreign Ministers would reach full agreement we hoped that they would nevertheless make useful progress. I added that I had never concealed my desire for a Summit meeting and that the Ambassador should not think that the other Heads of Government with whom I had talked were adverse to such a meeting. The Ambassador then went on to ask about the venue for the Summit and the way in which it might be conducted. I said that various places had been suggested and that while Geneva was usually thought of there was much to be said for San Francisco; I personally hoped that the meetings would be small and intimate and that the first Summit meeting might lead on to others. As I say Khrushchev’s message was very long. I do not myself feel that he is likely to publish it at any rate at the moment. Part of his object is no doubt to drive a wedge between us and our allies; but I think that there is also perhaps some element of genuineness in it. For this reason I do not wish to discourage Khrushchev from sending future messages which may be of value to us all. I am sending you a summary of the message as an enclosure. From the summary you will see that there was nothing very new in what Khrushchev said, but I do think that it revealed something of his mind.

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Quite naturally Khrushchev has tried to press his own interpretation of my attitude further than is warranted, but I conclude that he has both some expectation that a war might develop in Europe and also a healthy fear of such a possibility and especially of United States power. At the same time he seems genuinely anxious for a Summit meeting or indeed series of meetings, and I conclude that he will perhaps try to make the Foreign Ministers’ meeting at least a moderate success. All this I feel may serve our purposes well. There is also an obvious piece of wedge driving in the suggestion of a non aggression pact which would involve our agreeing to keep your bases here only for a limited period. I believe that you know that this sort of tactic will not succeed at least so long as I am Prime Minister. I shall be very interested to have your views. At the same time I am very anxious to preserve the proprieties in these matters and I should therefore be grateful if you would keep knowledge of this communication strictly to the minimum possible group. I have not so far revealed that Malik came to see me nor has it been noticed by the press. I am however informing de Gaulle and Adenauer of the gist of the message on a strictly personal basis. With warm regard, As ever, HAROLD MACMILLAN 1

Jacob Malik was the Soviet Ambassador to Britain at this time. Macmillan discusses Khrushchev’s message of 14 April 1959 in Riding the Storm, 652.

228 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 22, 1959 Dear Harold: I just received your recent cable with its attachment. I appreciate the sentiments you express about Foster and his illness, and I hope you will agree with me that Herter was the only logical appointment to be made to fill the vacancy created by Foster’s necessary resignation. He will fit in admirably. I am grateful for your thoughtfulness in acquainting me promptly as to the contents of Khrushchev’s long message to you. I shall carefully observe your caution as to its confidential character. Respecting your personal note, I agree with what you have to say about atmosphere being sometimes possibly more important than practical results. However, atmosphere achieves true importance only if it seeps down to populations under conditions where there is confidence in its performance. Some four years ago the world talked a great deal about the “Spirit of

244 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Geneva.” This expression reflected the hope that because of Geneva the international atmosphere had become less tense and that some progress could be realized in solving outstanding problems between the West and the East. At that time both Foster and I pointed out in nation-wide broadcasts that the value of the conference would be measured only by our later ability to make effective and enforceable agreements. As you know, that hope disappeared within a matter of sixty days. Disappointment was widespread.1 A good atmosphere is much to be desired but it can be sustained only by solid accomplishment. Turning to the “Summary of Message,” I can accept Khrushchev’s suggestion that we should set aside, at any Summit meeting, considerable time for frank and informal discussions among participants. Further, provided there becomes evident on the Soviet side a sincere purpose of conciliation and fruitful negotiation, I share his view that Summit meetings could become somewhat less formal and more periodically scheduled. I am rather skeptical about his remark that “If, on the other hand, progress at the Foreign Ministers’ Conference is unsatisfactory, a meetings of Heads of Government will be all the more necessary.” In this statement he apparently rejects every Allied conclusion that if the Foreign Ministers can make no progress whatsoever, then it becomes futile and rather ridiculous to consider a Summit meeting. I hope that he does not believe that either you as the representative of Britain or I as the representative of America can be bulldozed into coming to meet him with our hats in hand. I am sure that others would feel the same. I note also his assertion that certain American officials are trying to prepare our people psychologically for war. He slyly hints to our Allies that we in the United States are engaged in an attempt to engender a war in which European countries would be engaged, while America stood aside. This is the kind of statement that, to my mind, evidences his lack of sincerity and presages an intention to use a Summit meeting for propaganda purposes only. Regarding the statement that he says President Truman made at the beginning of the war, I should point out that Mr. Truman was at that time a little known Senator. Moreover I seriously doubt that he ever made any such statement.2 As to Khrushchev’s accusation that Mr. [Neil H.] McElroy and Admiral [Arleigh A.] Burke are guilty of military boastfulness and the twisting of facts, I think there is no need to make any reply.3 In American thought, both governmental and popular, there is no feeling that our country could ever be spared any of the suffering that would come to other countries with which we were allied, in the event that we were all plunged into the tragedy of war. In fact, Khrushchev knows that his statement on this point is completely false and is patently another of his “wedge-driving” attempts. Finally, may I observe that non-aggression pacts were signed by all members of the United Nations when they agreed to adhere to the Charter. A new

1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K. 245

pact, whether bi-lateral or multi-lateral, would seem to be redundant as far as substance is concerned. It could have no value except possibly in the psychological field or in propaganda. I thank you again for the cooperative spirit in which your message was sent. I am certain we must do everything in our power to concert our positions in advance of any meeting with the Soviets, whether it be technical, at the Foreign Ministers level, or at the Summit. No doubt Herter will be communicating to Selwyn Lloyd in some greater detail – particularly on such matters as possible participation by other countries and so on. To conclude, I want to assure you that I have no rigidly fixed conclusion that Khrushchev is devoid of sincerity in his talk about readiness to negotiate and in his professed fear of Allied intentions, particularly those of the United States. To the contrary, no one is more anxious than I to make an agreement with the USSR in which each side can be assured of compliance by the other. Even if such an agreement were one of only minor or technical significance, it might still be valuable as a stepping stone. I am glad that you find in the Khrushchev memorandum some ground for believing that he may be partially sincere. If he proves himself to be so, then the world will be the gainer. With warm regard, As ever, 1

2

3

This is a reference to the Geneva Summit Conference held in July 1955 with Eisenhower, Premier Bulganin and First Secretary Khrushchev (USSR), Prime Minister Eden (Britain), and Premier Faure (France). In spite of an aura of optimism after the conference, Eisenhower was disappointed that no concrete accomplishments came out of the meeting. The Soviet leader claimed that during World War II, then-Senator Harry Truman had wanted the US to “back the weaker side to ensure maximum casualties.” See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1455. Neil H. McElroy was secretary of defense from November 1957 to November 1959. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke was Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from 1955 to 1961 and also a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the period.

229 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 29, 1959 My dear Friend, I hope that you do not feel that my tentative proposal about a limited number of inspections as a possible solution to the Russian fears of espionage has

246 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

got us into trouble. I myself feel that it may well prove to be the best way out. Anyway there is this advantage in Khrushchev’s reply to both of us – that he comes down firmly in favour of your first choice – that is a comprehensive agreement abolishing all tests of all kinds by land, sea, air and upper atmosphere with adequate control provisions. You and I have always thought that if we could get this it would be the best. The Foreign Secretary spoke very well on this whole matter in the debate yesterday and I will see that the State Department gets a full record of what he said. If we could get the Russians to accept a reasonable solution on the veto we might narrow the issue down to the single question how many spot checks there should be in any given year. In theory, of course, there might be a thousand tremors capable of being the result of a nuclear test; but in practice the number of inspection teams that we could send out effectively would be relatively small. One a week would be quite an undertaking. Even one a fortnight might be difficult. Without prejudging the number however, it would be very good if we could get everything else tied up in the draft treaty by the Geneva Conference and leave over for decisions only the actual number of free options. In “everything else” I include technical discussion of all the relevant facts bearing on the underground problem which we could subsequently publish to expose the Russians if they propose an unreasonably low limit of inspections. I can conceive that we ourselves might make the final deal about the number at a Summit. But that would be a much easier form of negotiation if all the other complications of the treaty had been settled and only the number remained to be filled in. It would not face you and me with an interminable scientific and technical wrangle. What do you think of this as an objective? Of course we have the ultimate fall-back position that you and I discussed – that our two countries should simply state our decision no longer to pollute the earth by fall-out. We clearly cannot go on indefinitely with the risks to human health. But I would much prefer to get the comprehensive agreement because even a limited number of inspections would be a great value to us and would make a start with the principle of inspection on which so much else depends. As ever, Harold Macmillan

230 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 29, 1959 My dear Friend, I was astonished to read, in the Press this morning, the extraordinary observations which Monty had made during his television interview. Not

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only were they in bad taste, but they could do nothing but harm in both our countries. I very much regret them.1 With warm regard, As ever, Harold 1

The reference here is to remarks on a television broadcast that Eisenhower’s military skills were suspect. A critic of Eisenhower since World War II, Montgomery had published his memoirs late in 1958, challenging Eisenhower’s strategy as Supreme Allied Commander in World War II. Monty’s remark in April was a reminder that he intended to keep his feud with Ike alive. See Bernard Montgomery, Memoirs (London: Collins, 1958); Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 499–501, 540–1; Norman Gelb, Ike and Monty (New York: Morrow, 1994), 440–2. According to Ambrose, “No one” made Eisenhower “so furious” as Montgomery when he attacked his military skills and military judgment. See Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 499.

231 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 1, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you very much for your note deploring the conduct of your publicity-seeking traveler to Moscow. I can assure you that, so far as I am concerned, neither you and I, nor our two countries, are going to be divided and troubled by the chatterings of a very small magpie.1 As I remarked at a recent press conference, the British press has already taken care of his “diplomatic” mission to Moscow. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

Montgomery was the magpie.

232 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 5, 1959 Dear Friend As I have already told you, Mr. Khrushchev sent me the other day a long and very revealing letter to which, after a good deal of thought, I sent a reply.1 It appears that the Russians, unlike the Anglo-Saxons, do not like

248 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

short letters and might have taken offence at a concise reply. I therefore tried to make my answer in the same prolix vein. I have a strong feeling myself that private correspondence should remain private. In that spirit, I have, for example, never shown your letters to me even to my own colleagues, except from time to time the Foreign Secretary. And although I felt it right between Allies to inform you as well as de Gaulle and Adenauer of the general content of the Khrushchev correspondence, I have not even mentioned its existence to the Cabinet here. The more I think about it, however, the more I feel that our relations, based as they are upon such a very long friendship, are of another character to those that normally exist even between statesmen of such closely allied countries. Of course, if I had been at Camp David, I should long ago have simply handed you the two letters to read for your interest, and then return to me. Although I cannot hand these letters to you in this personal way myself, I want still to do it as best I can. I am therefore asking Harold Caccia (who has not himself seen the correspondence) to deliver to you a sealed packet containing it to read. When you have read it, perhaps you would hand it back to him. With the other Allies, Adenauer and de Gaulle, I do not intend to do more than I have already done – that is to inform them in very general terms about the correspondence. I told the Russians that I was doing this but, of course, I shall not tell them that I am sending you the full letter and I hope that you will keep this a complete secret between us. What is interesting about this letter of Mr. Khrushchev’s is not so much what it says but what it reveals of the strange mixture which these people are – clever, naïve, inexperienced, sensitive, suspicious of everybody else, and yet cynical themselves. All the same I think this is a line which it might be useful for me to keep open. All good wishes. Yours ever, Harold 1

In his letter to Khrushchev, Macmillan reaffirmed his belief in the efficacy of face-to-face meetings among heads of state as a way to bridge the gulf between adversaries and tried to lay further groundwork for a summit conference. He also declined to enter into a non-aggression pact with the USSR. See Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 653–4.

233 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 5, 1959 In my letter of April twenty-second I did not respond to your kind suggestion that Dick Nixon stop over in London on his return from his proposed trip to Moscow next July.1

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In planning for his trip to Moscow we have been attracted by the idea of using one of our new jet transport airplanes in order to make the trip as rapidly as possible. We think that this might have a very good psychological effect, in the minds of not only the Soviet leaders and people but also the world public in general. It may be possible to make this trip non-stop in each direction, although a fuel stop might be required. Given this and the many activities which are in prospect in international affairs in the next few months, together with the possibility that Congress will still be in session at the end of July, I am afraid that it is not really feasible at this time to plan for him to visit London. I shall, however, keep your suggestion in mind. Should the situation change, we shall let you know. With warm regard, As ever, 1

Vice President Richard Nixon’s trip to the Soviet Union in July 1959 resulted in the famous “kitchen debate” with Premier Nikita Khrushchev. See Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), 253–314; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Vol. I (New York: Warner, 1978), 258–63; Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913–1962 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 523–5.

234 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 5, 19591 Dear Harold: I have your cable taking up again the question of limiting the number of on-site inspections to be made in the systems for preventing nuclear explosions. In a press conference April 29 I pointed out that the United States has by no means taken a rigid position in the matter of limiting the number of on-site inspections, noting that your original proposal in this line was based on the assumption that the Russians would agree to modify their intransigent attitude on the veto, both as it affects the composition of inspectional teams and the opportunity for inspection itself. This of course is the meat in the coconut. I understand that the Soviet delegation in Geneva has now indicated readiness to drop the veto in the Control Commission on dispatch of inspection teams. It is not clear, however, how far they are prepared to go along with the other essential requirements, both political and technical, to permit really effective inspection. I cannot find anything in Khrushchev’s several messages that clearly indicates his readiness to modify sufficiently his position on these critical veto

250 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

questions to provide the basis for any immediate move on our part.2 Moreover, in his April twenty-third letter to me he said that there would be only a “few” of such inspections. This word “few” is very flexible. However, should the veto points be settled to our satisfaction, I agree that we should have to study this particular problem with the utmost seriousness, and attempt to concert a position in the matter. While we would have to take account of the difficulties in practice of mounting inspection teams in establishing a number, I believe the most important consideration will be the point you make well in your draft message to Khrushchev – i.e., “the scientific basis which must underly our determination of the number of inspections adequate to deter any party to the agreement from seeking to carry out a clandestine test.” A lot of scientific and technical work and conclusions would be involved by our experts but assuming these can be solved, we could ourselves argue about the exact numbers. How are we going to get a definite commitment from Khrushchev that he will abandon the veto throughout operation of the control system? There is the rub. With warm regard, As ever, 1

2

The source for this letter is Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1468–70. An earlier draft of this letter may be found in Eisenhower to Macmillan, 30 April 1959, AWF-IS, Box 25(a). The Soviets had indicated that they would drop their demand for the right to veto the dispatch of inspection teams if a quota for inspections were agreed to. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1465.

235 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 5, 1959 Dear Harold: You are, I am sure, fully aware of the current discussions in NATO of requests by the Soviet Union for credits to finance the purchase of plants and equipment. I should, however, like to emphasize my personal concern with this problem. I have been particularly disturbed to hear about the differences between our representatives concerning the extension of credits to the Soviet Union at this time. I realize, of course, the vital importance of foreign trade to the United Kingdom and I realize that we have not always seen eye to eye on economic counter measures with respect to the Soviet Union. On

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the other hand, at this time, just before we enter into crucial negotiations, I believe strongly that we should attempt to resolve all significant differences which could act as sources of division between us.1 My understanding is that the Soviet request to the United Kingdom includes the extension of credit on the order of 50 million pounds per year for a period of five years. This, because of its magnitude and its duration, really involves a net transfer of resources, and bears no relationship to short term, self-liquidating credits which are essential to normal trade relations, and which we support. The Soviets have approached a number of NATO countries, including the U.S., and the aggregate of plants and equipment which they could purchase with these medium and long term credits, if granted, would seem to be quite substantial. These resources the Soviets need for the furtherance of their Seven Year Plan which is, as we well know, a vital element in the long range strategy of the Soviet leaders. Khrushchev is deeply committed to the success of this Seven Year Plan, but the magnitude of the undertaking is placing inexorable pressure on Soviet resources which of themselves are inadequate to insure its success, particularly in certain key sectors. In the Soviet economy, military requirements are currently in strong competition with the prosecution of the Plan. Since Western credits would to some extent relieve this pressure, it seems to me that the granting of them would weaken any Soviet incentive to divert resources from military to economic industry. This easing of Soviet economic pressure internally would, of course, permit the Soviets to step up their economic activities in underdeveloped countries. At the same time, the abilities of the West to advance resources to these same areas whose political and economic orientation is a major issue of our time, could likewise be adversely affected. Another important consequence of large scale credits to the Soviet Union would be a strengthening of the Soviet ability to disrupt world markets for basic commodities. It is difficult to see how the Soviet Union would repay any substantial credits except by the sale of basic products – agricultural, forestry and mineral – which many underdeveloped and Commonwealth countries must export. This could put great strains on our goal of liberalizing free world trade, which I know is so close to your heart. Certain political factors with regard to this matter also concern me, particularly at this time. As I have mentioned, these credits will tend to lessen the pressures resulting from the conflict between military/atomic requirements on the one hand and requirements of the Seven Year Plan on the other. If the Soviets have achieved agreements for long-term and extensive credits while negotiations on other vital matters are in progress, it would seem to me that the Soviet incentive to reach agreement on these other kinds of negotiations would be reduced. Moreover, the possibility cannot be overlooked that any unilateral action by one of us in this direction might well give the Soviets the impression that the West is not united in its determination to be firm in the face of threats to its vital security interests in Central Europe.

252 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Finally, I am concerned over the probability of increased difficulty in this country of obtaining public and Congressional support for our Mutual Security Program and related policies if an extension of long-term credit to the USSR were paralleled by an expansion of Soviet economic penetration of less developed countries. I realize that these credits might bring some additional profits to Western producers from Soviet purchases to be financed by credits; furthermore, I understand the hope that this increased trade might lead to an easing of political tensions. However, I feel that this hope is largely illusory and that any increase of East–West trade should be on a legitimate quid pro quo basis. As you know, the policies of the United States preclude the extension to the Soviets of any governmental credits whatsoever, or of private credits exceeding a six months period. To me these reasons seem compelling, but I attach great importance to your views. I earnestly hope that our two Governments and other members of the NATO can agree on a common policy which will recognize the principle that substantial financial support of this nature for the designs of the Soviet rulers would be inimical to our common purpose. It should be made clear at the same time that agreement on this principle will not modify in any way the policies on which we have previously reached accord with respect to the desirability of legitimate two-way trade of peaceful commodities with the Soviet Bloc. If, on the other hand, it is not possible to have a complete meeting of minds at this time, it would seem advantageous to defer any final decision on this matter until after the Foreign Ministers’ Conference and a Summit Conference, should the latter take place. In view of the urgency of this matter, I would welcome your comments and I would hope that it might have your immediate attention. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

According to Galambos and van Ee, the British government was more disposed to extend such credits than the US. Indeed, it saw its willingness to limit credits to five years as a concession to the Americans but “would not go beyond that.” See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1470.

236 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 7, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you very much for your Top Secret and Personal letter of May fifth. I am handling it exactly as you suggested; I have made no copy of any kind

1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K. 253

and I am sending back the two attachments through the British Embassy in a sealed envelope. Your recent summarization of the Khrushchev message had already given me a quite clear understanding of the entire document; but of course I do appreciate your anxiety to make sure that you and I personally remain as close on these matters as we possibly can. I should like to say also that I am in complete agreement with your answer. It is courteous but firm. Winston [Churchill] has just concluded a visit to me which, in spite of the obvious difficulties he has because of his age, was most satisfying. He has gone to the Embassy for today and will return to Britain on Saturday. With warm regard, As ever,

237 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 8, 1959 Dear Friend, Thank you very much for your message of May 5 and for sending me the advance text of your latest reply to Khrushchev on the subject of nuclear explosions. I am very glad that you have taken the position that you have in answering Khrushchev, and I am sure that your reply will put us in a very good position. Of course the Russians may now refuse to discuss the various scientific questions; if so, it seems to me they will be in a very weak position. Our representatives at Geneva can continue to probe the Russians on this point as well as on the abandonment of the veto throughout the operation of the control system. With warm regard, As ever, Harold

238 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 12, 1959 Dear Friend I have your message about our forthcoming Trade Talks with the Russians. I am anxious that there should be no misunderstanding.

254 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

The Russians take the line that they do not need long-term credit from other Governments, and that they would be too proud to ask for it. At the same time, they give the impression that if there is to be a substantial increase in trade then it might be an advantage to offer them credit. It is the usual somewhat oriental attitude! We have no intention of giving them long-term credit or loans on a Government to Government basis. As you know we have many calls upon the limited amounts that we can invest or lend abroad. We have commitments to help the Commonwealth, including the Colonies, and other foreign countries, and to make our contributions to the various international schemes. (A new one, the International Development Association, is under discussion now.) We would however like to increase our trade with Russia on an ordinary commercial basis. Perhaps I had better set out what our present practice is. If business firms wish to accept contracts from the Russians, they can of course do so, and they can give them credit, providing their own finance if they have sufficient free resources for the purpose. And provided, of course that the items in question are not on the strategic embargo list. Alternatively, they can borrow from the Banks; and the Banks are free to lend money to finance such contracts, relying on their own estimate of the creditworthiness of their customer and on the prospect of payment from the Russians. In addition, we have a Government agency, established many years ago, called the Export Credits Guarantee Department. This has the function, if asked by business firms, of insuring a high percentage, but not the total, of any given credit risk. The Department looks at each case on its merits – and by merits I mean strictly commercial merits – and fixes a premium in the light of its own judgment of the risk of default. It takes into account the length of credit, and, as a matter of principle, will not insure the risk if the credit extends for more than five years after the date of shipment. Indeed, it will only consider a period of anything like that if the contract is for major capital goods. I am sure you will understand that for a country which lives upon its exports such facilities are absolutely vital, and a substantial amount of our world export trade in capital goods is covered by a combination of these methods. I understand that many if not most other countries have similar arrangements. In any extension of trade with the Russians, we shall adhere to this established commercial practice. We shall of course retain all our anti-dumping powers, and you may perhaps remember an example of their effectiveness in connection with aluminium some months ago. It is difficult to give any estimate of how much extra trade we may be able to do, on the basis that I have described, as a result of the negotiations which are just about to start. It may of course be that the Russians will ask for a large loan from us. If so, we shall refuse and the negotiations will not amount to very much. On the other hand, an increase in trade on the normal basis

1959: Mac, Ike, and Mr. K. 255

would be a good thing. If I may say so, your phrase “the desirability of two-way trade of peaceful commodities with the Soviet bloc” covers just what we now do and what we would like to develop. I think that this kind of contact helps to create more normal conditions between the two parts of the world. We know that the Russians are trying to increase the consumer goods which they make available to their people. I hope that we can provide them with some of the plant and machinery they need for this purpose. On the whole, the more they do this, the better it will be, for if the people become more comfortable and their living standards rise they may become in the long run more agreeable. I hope I have made clear what we now do and how we propose to go on doing it. In any case I can assure you that what we now propose will be within these limits and for that reason I am frankly not hopeful of achieving anything very dramatic. Yours ever Harold

239 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 14, 1959 Dear Friend, You will recall that during our talks at Camp David we agreed that a potentially dangerous situation might arise in Iraq, Kuwait, and Iran. Since my return the situation in Iraq has, I think you will agree, given cause for much anxiety. Our Chiefs of Staff here are engaged in reviewing our plans to meet a threat to Kuwait from Iraq, should such a threat suddenly arise.1 Hitherto joint work in London between your planners and ours has been confined to a general study of the problem. Whilst this is helpful in providing an exchange of views, I think that the possible Iraqi threat to Kuwait is of such consequence to us all that perhaps the time has now come to take a step forward and to initiate joint planning on the lines of the plan we prepared for the Lebanon (operation “Blue Bat”).2 This would of course be without any commitment, but I do feel that it would be advisable to have at least an outline plan in readiness. I have asked Selwyn to discuss this with Chris Herter in Geneva. With warm regards, As ever, Harold

256 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence 1

2

Iraq had withdrawn from the Baghdad Pact in March 1959 and had been making threatening noises, claiming sovereignty over neighboring Kuwait. For an extremely detailed account of the complicated debates over Anglo-American policy towards Iraq, in 1959, see Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser, especially Chapter 13. Operation Blue Bat was the joint British–American contingency plan for intervention in Lebanon in 1958. The plan was never put into effect, however, primarily due to Eisenhower’s rapid intervention there in mid-July 1958.

240 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 15, 1959 Dear Harold: I have spoken both to our State and Defense Departments about your cable suggesting renewal of staff planning in accordance with the continuing agreement that we reached at Bermuda some few years back. They assure me that they will take the necessary steps so that this planning can go forward. Concerning your letter about your Trade Mission, it is clear that your proposed program is far less ambitious than perhaps we had thought and does not constitute a menace to the solidarity of the NATO Alliance. I shall be interested to learn about the results obtained by the Mission. I have given a copy of your letter on this subject to the State Department. Thank you very much for the completeness of your exposition. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

241 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 25, 1959 My dear Friend, This is just to send you my deepest sympathy about Foster. I know what a sad blow his death is to you – none the less grievous because it was expected.1 Witsh warm regard, as ever HAROLD 1

Former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles died from cancer on 24 May 1959.

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242 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 25, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you so much for your message of sympathy about Foster. You know, of course, how much I valued his wisdom, his experience and not at all least, his friendship. I know that Mrs. Dulles and the members of the family are gratified that Selwyn finds it possible to come to Washington for the funeral. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

243 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 2, 1959 My dear Friend, While the tortuous diplomatic dance is being played at Geneva, I was delighted to read the account of your talk with the three Foreign Ministers in Washington for Foster’s funeral.1 If I may say so, I thought that you struck just the note that was needed to encourage the Russians to move. I have every hope that in fact they will soon make at least such progress as would enable us to try a summit with a clear conscience. I do not think that very much is required, but perhaps an agreed formulation of our two positions would suffice, plus a statement of any points at which they might be reconciled.2 After all this would in itself be a useful document to work on. Although he tells me that he misses Foster very much, as indeed we all do, and Herter would I am sure be the first to agree, I am delighted to learn from Selwyn what good relations he has established with your new Secretary of State. I am sure that they will work increasingly closely together. Incidentally, I need hardly tell you that the suggestion in The Times on June 1, that I was in some way dissatisfied with Selwyn, and contemplating making a change was a complete fabrication.3 On the contrary I think that he is doing very well and has increased his stature. It is annoying that The

258 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Times should have printed this rumour, but at least their article assumed five more years of Conservative Government here. I still hope that we shall meet in the summer. With warm regard, As ever, Harold 1

2

3

Macmillan is referring to a Record of Conversation between Eisenhower, Christian Herter, Andrei Gromyko, Couve de Murville, and Selwyn Lloyd on 28 May 1959, The National Archives of the UK (NA): PRO, PREM 11/2871. Eisenhower urged the Soviets to help narrow the distance between the USSR and the US on the Berlin issue and on disarmament. According to Herter, Eisenhower also said he would be “willing to go anywhere at any time to talk with anyone,” but that a summit meeting without some hope of progress “would be a hoax on the hopes of mankind.” See also Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1,500. Eisenhower underlined the following sentences for emphasis. “I do not think that very much is required, but perhaps an agreed formulation of our two positions would suffice, plus a statement of any points at which they might be reconciled. After all this would in itself be a useful document to work on.” Macmillan refers to an article published in The Times of London on 1 June, speculating that Macmillan intended to replace Selwyn Lloyd as foreign secretary.

244 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 3, 1959 Dear Harold: I am glad that you have given Selwyn such firm support. Before your cable arrived I had sent to Herter a message telling him that I thought Selwyn had developed well in his post and that in my opinion he was doing a fine job. I think your statement should neutralize any damage done to his prestige by the TIMES article of June first. This morning I shall be in a press conference and I shall undoubtedly be questioned closely about any discernible progress at Geneva and therefore the possibility of a Summit Conference. As you know, I adhere to my position that a Summit meeting based on nothing more than wishful thinking would be a disaster. The world would interpret such a move as being a virtual surrender, while Soviet prestige would be enhanced. On the other hand, we agreed in our conversations at Camp David that we could afford to make a rather liberal definition of progress. While I find nothing wrong with the final sentence of the first paragraph of your June second cable, I think that we must include something recognizable as a specific accomplishment. For example there might be included in your formula something of this sort: “Since the Geneva Conference is partially a

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result of the crisis of Berlin, created by the Soviet Union, there must be an agreement confirming the continuing status of Berlin pending the reunification of Germany.” I do not see how any of us can with self-respect go to a Summit meeting unless such a statement has been issued by the Soviets or an agreement to this effect has been consummated. While I shall not try to give at my press conference a list of the things that would spell real progress at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, we might hope for a widening of contacts between the two sides of the Iron Curtain, particularly in the fields of press exchanges, books and travel by private citizens. Other ways in which progress might be achieved would be by some firm agreement for initial steps in banning of particular tests and control thereof. I repeat that the production by the Foreign Ministers of a reasonable paper for us to work on at a Summit Conference, together with the assurance that there will be no further attempts to restrict our rights and privileges with respect to Berlin, constitute the very minimum that would justify a Summit meeting. These are not new ideas; so far as I know, all of us are agreed on them. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

245 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 14, 1959 My dear Friend, I have just heard the news about imports of heavy electrical equipment, and I feel I must send you a short message to say how pleased I am. I am sure it will do a tremendous lot of good. With warm regard, Yours ever, HAROLD

246 CACCIA TO EISENHOWER June 16, 1959 Dear Mr. President, I enclose a message from the Prime Minister. He had asked me to deliver it to you personally as soon as possible, but as it arrived over luncheon I thought that the quickest arrangement might be to send it ahead to the

260 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

White House and to ask if you would be good enough to see me later in the day, if you can. In delivering this message, the Prime Minister asked me to explain that he had for some time been considering what initiative we might take. He had in fact done most of the draft before he heard about your message to Mr. Khrushchev, which he understands went off today.1 The Prime Minister of course hopes that that message may produce good results. On the other hand, it is also possible that Mr. Khrushchev may counter by proposing a meeting of Heads of Government. It therefore seems to him that it would be essential for the West to have a fall-back position, which his suggestion might perhaps provide. Yours Sincerely, Harold Caccia TEXT OF MESSAGE Dear Friend, Selwyn has told me of your message to Khrushchev. I hope that it will be salutary and that the Foreign Ministers may be able to bring their meeting to a close with agreement on a Summit Meeting. This, however, is the favourable view, and the discussions so far give small grounds for optimism. It is at least as likely that we shall find, after the next few days, that the Foreign Ministers can make no further progress on Berlin and are reaching a deadlock. What will happen then? Mr. Khrushchev may at once make a public declaration that, as the Foreign Ministers have failed to reach any agreement, the Summit Meeting should be held without delay. Indeed, it is likely that he will publicly propose a date and place for such a meeting. We shall then find that we are, in effect, summoned publicly to a Summit by Mr. Khrushchev – in circumstances in which we shall find it equally difficult to justify to public opinion either an acceptance or a refusal. This will present us with a very embarrassing dilemma. We must, I think, avoid that situation. We could do so if we forestalled Mr. Khrushchev by ourselves proposing that the Heads of the four Governments should meet to consider the situation arising from the deadlock in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. What I have in mind is, not that we should have the formal Summit Meeting which has been envisaged, with a throng of official advisers, and assessors from the two Germanies, and arguments about the Poles, the Czechs and the Italians, or even with an elaborate agenda; but that the Heads of the four Governments should meet informally (with their Foreign Ministers and a minimum of advisers) to talk over the situation and try to find a way through the difficulties. If we want an agreement – and surely we do – this, I am convinced, is the way to do business with Mr. Khrushchev. The Foreign Ministers cannot go on much longer at Geneva; and, if in the next few days deadlock on Berlin appears to be inevitable, I believe that the wisest course would be to suggest as a next step a meeting of the kind

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indicated above. If you were prepared to suggest this yourself, and to invite the other three to come to meet you in the United States, this would make a great impact and I am sure that your initiative would be widely welcomed and regarded as eminently justified. But, if for any reason you do not wish to take this initiative yourself at this stage, I would be willing to make the first move and to suggest a meeting in London – or, if there were a general preference for meeting on neutral ground, at Geneva or at any other suitable place. We must be prepared for the possibility of a breakdown at Geneva; and I feel most strongly that, if this happens, we must be ready to make a fresh move and to do so without any delay. We have managed to maintain our public position so far but if after a breakdown we allow the initiative to pass to the other side our public position may rapidly deteriorate. Certainly in this country – and I believe in the free world generally – public opinion will expect the Western leaders to do something. It seems to me that an initiative either by you or by me is the least that we could do. I feel that this may be an important turning-point in this long struggle, and I want to be sure that the free world by its clear demonstration of nobility and idealism is recognised as acting rightly, thus bringing the greatest influence on the uncommitted nations and on moderate opinion generally. All except the first paragraph of this message was drafted before I knew of your message to Khrushchev. No doubt your answer will depend upon the answer you get from him but I thought it right to let you have my thoughts. Since, alas, we cannot talk it over as at Camp David, this sort of message seems the only way. With warm regard, As ever, HAROLD 1

Eisenhower sent Khrushchev a note on 15 June 1959, in which he blamed the Soviets for the lack of progress over the issue of Berlin at the meeting of foreign ministers in Geneva. He said that Soviet intransigence had created “an impossible situation for the United States in that it implies the convocation of a Summit Meeting without any prior progress of any kind.” See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1526.

247 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 16, 1959 Dear Harold: I shall probably want to write you further as soon as we know Khrushchev’s reaction to my letter of June 15. As you probably know, it was

262 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

a most urgent suggestion to him to reconsider the Soviet position at Geneva, which has in fact retrogressed in recent days, and to live up to his own pledge to us last March that the Soviet Government would do everything possible to make a positive contribution to the work of the Foreign Ministers Conference. As to his reaction to my message I am not particularly sanguine but I also do not believe that we have yet necessarily reached an impasse. As respects the question of a Summit meeting, I reiterated to Khrushchev the formula that we agreed to at Camp David last spring and made it clear that such a meeting “would certainly have to take place in an atmosphere in which neither side was posing a threat to the other, and on the basis of such preparatory work by our Foreign Ministers as could give us reason to believe that the Heads of Government would be able to reach agreement on significant subjects.” From this statement I could not and, in my opinion, should not retreat. One reason for this conviction is that if I should agree, in the absence of the stated prerequisites, to go to a summit meeting, such a reversal on my part at this time would seriously impair any influence that I might hope to exercise with Khrushchev. Moreover it would be interpreted here as a dangerous exhibition of weakness, as indeed I would interpret it myself. Frankly, it seems to me that any encounter of the three Western Heads of Government with Khrushchev would, in fact, be a summit meeting. I think the public would see no difference between an informal and a more formal gathering and I can’t see what advantage there would be in the “informal” formula for us. As you say, we would certainly want our Foreign Ministers. They would want at least a few selected advisers. Adding the clerical housekeeping and security personnel, we would willy-nilly have a full-fledged Summit conference on our hands with world attention focused on it. The presence of a thousand representatives of the press would be frosting on the cake. I fully agree that public opinion is a factor of the greatest importance and realize that you have some particular difficulties in this respect. However, I do believe that should Khrushchev face us with a call for a Summit meeting, we are not necessarily limited to a yes or no answer. I think, for example, that we would be in good posture to demand that the Foreign Ministers Conference be resumed after a few weeks recess. Possibly in some way or another we might find an opportunity to impress upon him personally the seriousness with which we regard failure to bring about a resumption of that conference. For instance, if Khrushchev should decide to replace Koslov in visiting the Soviet Exhibit in New York later this month, I would be ready, assuming no objection on the part of our allies, to meet with him in an effort to get the Foreign Ministers Meeting back on the tracks.1 While such an occurrence would seem most unlikely, yet it is the kind of thing that could be done without presenting the picture of a “summit” meeting. It would indeed represent only a fortuitous circumstance of which advantage could be taken.

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The essential element is of course the continued unity of the West. Above all this applies with special force to our two governments. I am therefore letting Chris Herter know that I believe the Western Foreign Ministers should take no initiative to break up the conference finally but, if necessary, should seek a recess of a few weeks during which we could develop an agreed allied position as to our next moves. I hope you might make similar suggestions to Selwyn. As I said in the beginning of this letter, I shall want to write to you further as soon as we hear from Khrushchev. Meanwhile, I should be glad to have your reactions to the foregoing. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

The Koslov (Kozlov) to whom Eisenhower refers was the Soviet deputy premier Frol Kozlov.

248 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 17, 1959 Dear Friend, I was very grateful for your prompt reply to my message. As you say, there is still a chance that the Russians may move as a result of your message, and we had better wait for Khrushchev’s reply. I was grateful for the summary of your message to him, and I hope that you will be able to send me an account of his reply. Of course, I suppose we may read it all in the Russian newspapers. If there is no move in Geneva I agree with you that the best thing would be to go for a short adjournment of the Foreign Ministers. I was pleased that you suggested this, and I have instructed Selwyn to agree this with Chris Herter if it becomes apparent that no other progress can be made. I should think that, in view of the journeys which the French seem to be making, the adjournment may have to be until mid-July. Pending Khrushchev’s reply and more news from Geneva I will think over your other proposals and let you have my thoughts when we see a little clearer where we are. Thank you again for answering so promptly and discussing all these difficult questions so frankly with Harold Caccia. With warm regard, As ever, Harold

264 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

249 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 17, 1959 1

Dear Mr. Dillon: In answer to the latest from the Prime Minister, the President would like the following message sent back to him: “Dear Harold: “I think that for the moment at least we are doing all that humans can do – and must hope for the best. As ever, DE” 1

C. Douglas Dillon served in the US State Department as under secretary of state for economic affairs at this time. The note to Dillon was sent from Ann Whitman.

250 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 18, 1959 Dear Harold: There is coming to you a most secret package, to be delivered personally by Ambassador Whitney. There is no need to return this material – instead, I would prefer that you simply destroy it when you have read it.1 With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

The package contained the recent exchanges of messages between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. The message came as part of a memorandum from Eisenhower to Herter. See Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State, 15 June 1959.

251 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 19, 1959 Dear Harold: As you will see, Khrushchev’s reply was not responsive to the points made in my letter.1 Worse still, it was an artfully deceptive effort to reduce the fundamental differences which have been exposed at Geneva to one or two fictitious issues. Moreover, Khrushchev has now come out publicly with

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pretty much the same line in his speech today before the East German communist leaders in Moscow. Now that we have a recess we will have to see where we stand and consult together as respects our next moves. I am of course anxious to talk with Chris Herter about this and shall do so as soon as he returns. I assume you will be doing the same with Selwyn after which we will be in touch again. I must say that my current feeling is that I can be just as firm and just as patient and just as persistent as Khrushchev and this, I am sure, is true of all of us. With warm regards, As ever, Ike 1

Eisenhower received Khrushchev’s response on 17 June. In his memoirs, Ike notes that he found “little basis for optimism” in the note, especially the Soviet argument that the foreign ministers had made progress by “defining the differences between us.” See Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 403.

252 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 22, 1959 Dear Friend– The Ambassador has handed me the package containing the texts of your correspondence with Khrushchev. I was very interested to see these. Thank you for sending them. I have shown them to Selwyn Lloyd and to no one else, and I have sent the texts back to the Ambassador. I believe that although Khrushchev was unwilling to admit it, your message in fact had a considerable effect on him. As soon as Selwyn Lloyd and I have had opportunity for full discussion about Geneva I will send you our thoughts. Again many thanks. With warm regard, Yours ever Harold

253 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 23, 1959 Dear Friend, I have been trying during the last day or two to take stock of the Geneva position. It is not very easy to follow developments there from a distance.

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I am now much clearer in my own mind after hearing Selwyn’s explanation of the developments during the last few days before the conference recessed. I was very glad to learn how closely Chris Herter and he have been working together throughout. I thought that Herter’s general exposition of our case upon his return to Washington was admirable. We shall never know for certain why on June 10 Khrushchev appeared to revert to the method of ultimatum and repeated it in his speech of the 19th. Gromyko’s latest paper of June 19 is obscure.1 Read in conjunction with Khrushchev’s speech it could still contain a concealed ultimatum insofar as it implies that the Western presence in Berlin is only tolerated on sufferance, and by reason of an interim agreement, and might cease to have any justification at the end of the interim period or when a peace treaty had been signed with East Germany. I think, however, that it is meant to be slightly more accommodating towards us. This may well be a sort of clumsy response to your initiative with Khrushchev. I believe he was in fact impressed by what you said, and made an effort at least to appear to meet your conditions for a Summit. His intemperate speech may, on this hypothesis, have been a tactical move to cover his retreat. The question now is, what are we to do next. I have read Selwyn’s messages to Chris Herter, and agree with them. It seems to me that we have some fundamental questions to consider. Are we likely to get a settlement of the Berlin question now, which we can expect to last until “the reunification of Germany”? I do not think myself that there is any chance of the Soviet Government actually underwriting our occupation rights. In any case, the Russians have many physical and geographical advantages where Berlin is concerned, and could always exert economic and other pressures which it would be difficult to pin-point. [Willy] Brandt, for example, told Selwyn that if there were 200,000 unemployed in West Berlin, the high morale there would rapidly disappear.2 I wonder therefore whether there is not a good deal to be said for aiming now at some interim settlement which will be relatively easier for the Russians to accept and which they will be likely to honour. This at any rate would gain us substantial time. A settlement of this kind must, of course, be such that at the end of the interim period we are no worse off than at the beginning, in the sense that there must then be a new negotiation about all the topics in dispute. Moreover, it would have to be such that, while the new negotiation was on, no unilateral action would be taken by the Soviet. The Russians must not therefore be able to point to any phrases in an interim agreement which imply that at the end of the period we should have less justification for keeping our troops in Berlin than we had at the beginning. We must not expressly or impliedly seem to set a term to our position in Berlin. The interim settlement must be a pause – though a prolonged pause – in the negotiations. If the idea of an interim arrangement were accepted in principle, there would of course be argument about its duration. But this, not being a matter

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of principle, ought to be capable of negotiation. We ought also to be able to negotiate without much trouble a final formula about the use of West Berlin for propaganda or subversion, the exclusion of atomic weapons and the level of troops. The main difficulty about an interim settlement is whether we can devise some means by which contact between the two sets of German representatives can be arranged under acceptable conditions. If we could find an appropriate form for such contact, I doubt if we have anything to fear from the substance of the discussions. I should have thought there were quite a lot of subjects on which the West Germans could well take the offensive, e.g. religious freedom, free press, exchange of information, human rights and all the rest. Perhaps I can add some general thoughts. We must maintain a public posture in which we can rally our people to resist a Russian attempt to impose their will by force. All the same, it would not be easy to persuade the British people that it was their duty to go to war in defence of West Berlin. After all, in my lifetime we have been dealt two nearly mortal blows by the Germans. People in this country will think it paradoxical, to use a mild term, to have to prepare for an even more horrible war in order to defend the liberties of people who have tried to destroy us twice in this century. Nevertheless, there is a double strain of idealism and realism in these islands to which I believe I could successfully appeal if we had first demonstrated that we have made every endeavour to put forward practical solutions, and that the Russians were unwilling to accept any fair proposition. The corollary to this is that we and our allies should do and should be seen to do what ordinary people would think reasonable. For instance, it would not seem reasonable to ordinary people that West Germans who profess to desire closer contacts and reunification with the East Germans should refuse absolutely to discuss these matters in any forum with the East Germans. I wish of course that we could meet and talk. It is so difficult to put on paper all that one feels. I hope therefore that you will not mind my sending you these frank thoughts. Do tell me what you think. With warm regards, As ever, Harold. 1

2

According to William Taubman, Khrushchev’s most recent biographer, the Soviet leader did bounce to and fro on the Berlin issue, from fist-shaking brusqueness to conciliatory words of compromise and delay. In fact, on 7 June 1959, he had declared that the “international situation was not at an impasse” and that the Berlin problem could probably be solved at a summit meeting. On the 24th he went so far as to say that if no agreement were reached at the summit, he “would be more than glad to meet more than once with the heads of Western governments.” See Taubman, Khrushchev, 413. Willy Brandt was the mayor of West Berlin at this time.

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254 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 27, 1959 Dear Harold: I was glad to have your letter assessing the situation at the close of the present phase of the Foreign Ministers Conference and suggesting a line which we might take when the Conference resumes on July 13. We too have been considering where we go from here. We are working very hard on the issues which the Conference has developed. Chris will be in touch with Selwyn on the thoughts which the latter has conveyed to him. I hope that we may be able to work out a concerted position in time to consult with the French and the Germans before July 13th. The issues are so large and the time so short that this may not be possible. However, we shall do our best. I agree with you, of course, that our tactical position in Berlin is indeed weak in that the Russians have many physical and geographical advantages. Their opportunity to exert economic pressure against the Western part of the city is obvious. Because Chris is, as I say, communicating to Selwyn our current thinking for an ad interim arrangement, I think it would be futile for me to try to get into details at this point. I can only say that I have studied his paper and agree generally with it. Yesterday Mamie and I spent the day with The Queen and Prince Philip. The Prime Minister of Canada was of course present. I noted with some interest that he repeated what I believe has been an earlier suggestion of his – that Quebec might be a nice place to hold a summit meeting if one should ever become practical. I merely replied that the place would be most convenient from my viewpoint, but the location and time made very little difference to me. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

255 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 29, 1959 Dear Friend, I was glad indeed to get your message of June 27. I am naturally very worried because the time is so short, and I feel that the decisions we have to

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take are very grave. History will never forgive us if we do it wrong, and as you know so much of it rests on you and me. This is the burden we must carry. I will await of course Chris Herter’s paper which we hope to get in a day or two. After that I will send you another message. I saw some pictures of you and The Queen. You both looked very happy. With warm regard, As ever, Harold

256 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 21, 1959 Dear Friend, Soon after I had paid my own visit to Moscow it was suggested that the Vice-President might like to have one or two comments from me which might be useful to him during his visit to the Soviet Union. I have delayed offering these comments until now in case the development of Geneva suggested any particular thoughts. In fact, however, the negotiations there seem to be going ahead fairly steadily, if rather slowly. There is not much time if we are to get an agreement on Berlin this summer. Fortunately Chris Herter and Selwyn Lloyd are working closely together and I am still optimistic about the outcome. I imagine that you will be giving the Vice-President a pretty full briefing to enable him to deal with any arguments that Khrushchev may advance about Geneva. On more general topics I would only suggest one or two general concepts which you may like to suggest to the Vice-President if you think them sensible. The first is that while it would be rash to assume that Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders have abandoned their aims of world conquest, the development of modern weapons makes aggression a dangerous, and indeed suicidal method. Probably the Soviet leaders would like to move into an era of “competitive co-existence”. This has obvious dangers for us in that it may release many resources in the Soviet Union for penetration of the under-developed countries (Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America). At the same time insofar as such an attitude reduces the danger of war, and particularly of war by miscalculation, we should welcome it. And in any economic and philosophical struggle we should have confidence that the West will win. Secondly, Khrushchev personally has set great store by international relations. I suppose that he says to himself that Lenin built the Party and Stalin created the empire; what am I going to do?

270 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

While one cannot say this to him directly, it may be possible to guide his thoughts towards devoting his energies to building up the economy of the Soviet Union. His hope would be that this would eventually put the Soviet Union in a commanding position. Our hope must be that with increasing wealth and opportunities the Soviet people will come to ask themselves those fundamental questions about the purpose of human life, which free men have always asked throughout history. Bound up with this is Khrushchev’s desire to become “respectable” and a member of the Heads of Government Club. Above all, I think, he would like to feel himself recognised as an equal by you and by the United States. Finally, with all his desire for respectability and his managerial interest in building up the Soviet economy Khrushchev is intensely suspicious of the West, very quick to take offence and extremely naive about the world. In conversation I found that Khrushchev was very quick to resent plain speaking which could in any way be construed as a threat. The only way to get a point across was either by heavy handed badinage or by serious and conciliatory conversation on a high philosophical note. His distortions of history are quite shameless and sometimes very annoying. I am afraid that these are rather general reflections, but as I say I should be very glad if you thought it useful to pass them on to the Vice-President. I am sure that his journey to the Soviet Union can do great good, particularly if it encourages Khrushchev to take some further steps towards at least a reasonable settlement of the Berlin question this summer. As you know I believe that it would do Khrushchev good to meet the Western Heads of Government, and from what Chris Herter has said to Selwyn I believe that you also think that this would be worth trying. With warm regard, as ever, Harold.

257 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 22, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you so much for sending me, for the benefit of the Vice President, some of your impressions concerning Mr. Khrushchev. Dick came in to pay a farewell call on me a little while ago, before departing for Moscow, and he read your memorandum. I am certain he will express his personal appreciation to you at the first opportunity.

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From the tone of your message, I would conclude that you are much more hopeful than I am of any worthwhile result at Geneva. Unless there is an abrupt reversal in the Soviet attitude, it would appear to me that the accomplishment will be zero, or even a minus. I think that the only bright spot in the exercise has been the solidarity of the West on basic issues. As you know, I have been quite ready to interpret progress in a most liberal fashion. So long as we could have the assurance of complete respect of our rights in Berlin and there could be agreed any kind of program that could be presented by the Foreign Ministers to Heads of Government for study and discussion, our own minimum criteria for the holding of such a meeting would be realized. Unless there is at least this much justification for a Summit, it is still my conviction that such a meeting would be a fraud on our peoples and a great diplomatic blunder. I know that there has been some argument that the less the progress at the Foreign Ministers level, the more necessary a Summit meeting becomes. I am quite clear in my mind that such a feeling is not shared by the bulk of our people. This may sound to you overly pessimistic. But you know that I have very much wanted to participate in a meeting in which there was even the slightest promise of a successful outcome. No one would be more thankful than I if my evaluation of the final Geneva outcome should be demonstrated wrong. But I am trying to be realistic, based on what we know of Khrushchev and his henchmen. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

258 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 24, 1959 My Dear Friend: Many thanks for your message of July 22. I find the news coming out of Geneva extremely complicated and very confusing with all the different meetings in private and public sessions. I cannot conceal from you my deepening anxiety as time slips by. It does seem to me vital to keep the initiative. However, I am seeing Selwyn on Saturday, and I hope then to be able to see more clearly where we are. With warm regard, As ever Harold.

272 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

259 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 27, 1959 Dear Friend, As regards the date which you might propose for the Summit, I must tell you quite frankly that any date which might involve it going on after about September 10 would cause me great embarrassment. As the Summit can hardly last more than about a week or ten days the dates of September 1–10 would be just all right. But as we know so well, dates always slip, and I should therefore be happier if you could suggest say August 25 as the date of a Summit in your initial proposal.1 With warm regard, As ever, Harold 1

Macmillan’s thoughts were obviously centered on the prospect of a British general election in October 1959 and the necessity of making final campaign preparations during the month of September.

260 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 27, 1959 Dear Friend, I fully understand and share your anxiety about the maintenance of our rights in Berlin unimpaired by any interim agreement. In our agreeing to a moratorium it must be clearly understood that at the end of the period fixed our rights have not been affected and we return to a position of negotiation with our rights as they are now. Nor of course must either side take any unilateral action during the moratorium. In a word, my concept of the moratorium is like a period that sometimes elapses between the acts of a play – “X” years pass. And when the curtain rises again, the negotiation is resumed with us all, including the Russians, in the same position as we are today. As I understand the latest exchanges in Geneva, that is the position which Gromyko is now accepting. If the formula of the Western proposal of June 16 is taken as a basis, that should be good enough for us. This I think could be called progress, certainly when we compare it first with the ultimatum of November 27, 1958, and secondly with the Soviet proposals of June 10 and 19. In fact, the discussions at Geneva have been useful and have served to

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narrow the differences and to provide the outline of at least an agreement for a moratorium over Berlin. Now for the length of the moratorium. What I suppose we want is a period of at least 2½ years which would take us over the next German elections. It is a matter of judgment whether we are likely to get such a period at the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting or whether it would be better to leave it for the Heads of Governments. The question is at which meeting the better bargain can be made. On the question of nuclear armaments in Berlin and the rights of military and civilian access during the moratorium, the Foreign Secretaries are already within a measurable distance of agreement. The level of our forces in Berlin is a very important point with regard to which we must remember the morale of the West Berliners. I feel this is a matter which can only be finally resolved at a meeting of the Heads of Governments. That leaves the question of how to discuss the whole German problem during the moratorium. The Russians’ first position was to insist on an allGerman committee. Ours was a Four Power Commission. I believe that this is also a matter which could be left for discussion at the meeting of Heads of Governments, with a probability of some satisfactory intermediate formula being found. The Foreign Secretaries have worked now for something like eight weeks, and I fear that if they go on talking much more things may begin to go backward rather than forward. So I hope you will feel that we should now proceed to tell the Foreign Ministers to prepare for a Summit on the basis of the progress already made. That being so, I have been extremely interested in what Chris told Selwyn of your approach to Koslov and Khrushchev’s reply. You certainly gained a great deal out of this because although he is making these rather hostile noises publicly, he is obviously anxious to visit the United States and to talk with you. The question which Chris has discussed with Selwyn is what should be the next step. Having regard to your plans and my preoccupations, the opening date for a Summit must either be during the last days of August or at the latest September 1 or postponed until some time to suit you at the end of October or the beginning of November. There are two difficulties about the later date. First, it involves the Russians being willing to wait as long as that, and secondly, if Mr. Khrushchev’s visit to the United States takes place it would be difficult to avoid discussions of substance on the matters outstanding. You would probably find this embarrassing. It might cause considerable suspicion on the part of the French and Germans, nor would my public position be very easy to explain. I therefore would much prefer the earlier date. This involves our bringing the Foreign Ministers Meeting to a very rapid conclusion. That still leaves the question of procedure.

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As I understand it you now owe Khrushchev an answer to his message about your invitation. I would suggest that in view of all these considerations you should in your reply couple the idea of his visit to the United States with a proposal for a formal Summit meeting in Washington or Quebec, towards the end of August. To give a choice of place might be easier for de Gaulle. At the same time as you issue this invitation you might issue similar invitations to a Summit to de Gaulle and myself, and inform Adenauer of what you were doing. I assume that there would be no fixed agenda for the Summit but after dealing with these German questions, we could perhaps pass on to other questions, for instance, in what forum a substantive discussion on disarmament might best take place. At the same time as asking de Gaulle and me to come to a Summit you might suggest a Western Summit including Adenauer to meet in Paris a week or ten days before. If Khrushchev and I were to accept this plan I do not see how de Gaulle could stand out in view of your most generous suggestion of coming to Paris beforehand. With warm regard, As ever, Harold

261 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 28, 1959 Dear Harold: As you know, the British Overseas Airways Corporation’s application to fly between Hong Kong and San Francisco via Tokyo is now before me. Although I suppose I will have to approve this application, I believe you should know personally of my concerns in the matter. In 1946 the United States, without objection from the United Kingdom, unilaterally added Tokyo to its San Francisco–Hong Kong route across the Pacific. In 1957 the United Kingdom took similar action, describing it as “merely a balancing up process.” All of my experts are agreed, however, that a balance did not result and that, in fact, the economic value to the United Kingdom of the Tokyo addition is many times the value of its counterpart to the United States. But because a subordinate of this government assumed much more authority than he had, the United Kingdom’s notification of its addition of Tokyo was not considered at the policy level and, as a consequence, the Bermuda

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Agreement procedures for questioning that addition were not invoked by the United States. It appears that, in all probability, the excess of authority I have referred to was assumed because the United Kingdom’s required notice of the proposed addition was conveyed to the United States in a personal and highly informal letter, addressed to the individual I have mentioned and signed by one equally subordinate in your government. This unfortunate history has probably tied my hands in a practical sense, but I am frank to confess that the prospect of placing my stamp of approval on so unequal a result makes me most uncomfortable. My other principal concern is that, mindful of the imbalance I have described, I find it difficult to understand why the United Kingdom has so strongly resisted arrangements regarding route changes which the United States has earnestly requested. Admittedly, these changes could result in some diversion of traffic from British carriers but BOAC service between Tokyo and San Francisco would have a similar effect on United States carriers. Although I am concerned by these matters, I am also certain that they can be resolved to the satisfaction of both countries. Surely it is possible for our two governments to consider these problems and to reach a true balance of our common interests. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

262 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 29, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you for your letters of July twenty-seventh to which I have given careful thought. In the first place, I am inclined to agree with you that we may have reached the point where little good can come from continuing the talks at Geneva much longer. I would propose that we aim at bringing them to a conclusion about the middle of next week. In any event, Chris will have to leave about then to prepare for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States which convenes at Santiago, Chile, on August twelfth to consider the explosive situation in the Caribbean.1 The problem then is what next? The answer seems to me to depend on whether or not Gromyko will accept our position of June sixteenth on our rights in Berlin with provision for a reasonable moratorium period of at least

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two and one-half years. If he does so, I would agree that the minimal requirement for progress had been met and that the way would be open for the Foreign Ministers to agree on arrangements for a Summit. Indeed, they could even pass the final decision on the length of the moratorium to the Heads of Government. Unfortunately, my interpretation of what has happened so far at Geneva is that there has been no agreement by Gromyko on our rights formula but only a certain clarification of positions and a sharpening of the issues. This view, I may say, is fully shared by Chris, and he informs me that he has made this very clear to Selwyn. Therefore, barring a last-minute shift by Gromyko, which I do not entirely exclude, we are faced with an awkward situation where our minimum hope for progress has not been met. To go immediately to a Summit under these conditions would run the grave risk of spectacular failure or unthinkable capitulation. It was with this in mind that I have been in communication with Khrushchev about a visit to the United States. It seems to me that this would be a logical next step. A ten-day tour by Khrushchev through the United States might be most helpful in giving him a better picture of our strength and of our way of life, and would certainly take the crisis edge off the Berlin situation. If, as I expect would be the case, I were to follow this up with a much briefer visit to Moscow, the stage might be set for further progress at the Foreign Ministers’ level which could then lead to a Summit. As you remember, one of the tasks assigned the Foreign Ministers was to arrange the date and place for a Summit Meeting once they had made adequate progress on substantive issues. I think we must stick to this arrangement. A sudden announcement of an “invitation” by me to a Summit would inevitably lend an additional air of crisis to the Meeting, the very thing we must strive to avoid if we are to achieve any worthwhile results at such a gathering. Khrushchev has expressed the desire to rest during August so I would envision his visit here taking place in mid-September with my return visit to Moscow to be later arranged. That would open the way toward a Summit some time in November or early December. I recognize of course that Adenauer and to a lesser extent de Gaulle might have some concern about such an exchange of visits. Therefore, I would propose to come to London or Paris for a Western Summit some time before Khrushchev’s arrival here. This would also give me a long overdue opportunity to talk out some of our problems with de Gaulle. I would think that such a schedule would fully meet your preoccupations for the next three months. It would take the edge off the crisis and enhance the prospect of useful talks at the Summit. I realize of course that there is a chance that Gromyko may suddenly give us what we want at Geneva. I had hoped that my exchanges with Khrushchev would lead to just this result. He must realize that his reception here would be far better if there had been at least a minimum of progress at

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Geneva. If we do have this helpful development, I would still think it desirable to adhere to my proposal to hold the Summit Meeting in November, preferably in Quebec. This would enable me to talk with Khrushchev in the meantime and to do whatever I can to assure that his attitude during a Summit Meeting is based on maximum understanding of our Western attitudes, power, and resources. I don’t want to overestimate the value of my conversations with and the impact on him of an exposure to the people and facts of life in this country. Nevertheless, I cannot help but believe that the effect might be considerable and it might promote the very result at the Summit which you and I are so eager to achieve. This would be in line with your thinking, as I remember it, incident to your own visit to Moscow. Apart from the substantive considerations, there remains the risk of leakage. I would hope that this matter could be held most securely for a few days to permit determination of the Russian attitude at Geneva. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

The crisis Ike refers to involves Fidel Castro’s actions in Cuba. The Organization of American States (OAS), created in 1948, is an association designed to encourage military, social, and cultural cooperation among nations in the Americas, all of which are members save for Cuba, which was excluded in 1962.

263 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 30, 1959 Dear Friend, I was glad to get your message of July 29. I agree that the talks at Geneva must be brought to a conclusion within the next days. The latest reports from there suggest that there is now a chance of making some further last-minute progress. Gromyko seems to be showing signs of wanting to do business. I hope we shall not discourage him. After all, we are not at this stage aiming at more than an interim settlement on Berlin. And, if we are asking for a moratorium, we cannot expect that our rights should be guaranteed beyond the end of the renewed negotiations. That surely is what a moratorium means. We may therefore get within the next few days a conclusion at Geneva which you could regard as progress. On further reflection however I agree with you that even if that happens it would not be wise to try to proceed at once to a Summit meeting. A later date would now be more convenient for us all.

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Therefore I am in broad agreement with the timetable which you now have in mind:– (1) A Western Summit before the end of August; (2) Khrushchev’s visit to you and your return visits during September and October; and (3) A full Summit meeting in November. Quebec would suit me very well. I am very happy to know that in your journeys you will be able to include a visit to us. I am not sure whether it will be necessary to interpose a further meeting of Foreign Ministers between (2) and (3). If the Foreign Ministers make substantial progress over the next few days they may be able to take up, before they recess, their duty of discussing arrangements for a Summit meeting. Indeed, it may be difficult for us to decline to do so if Gromyko raises the question; for, as you yourself say, it was one of the tasks remitted to them. They may themselves be able to recommend a date in November. On the other hand, if this is not possible the time and place could be arranged during Khrushchev’s visit to you. In any case it does not seem likely that there will be much further progress which the Foreign Ministers could make at an adjourned meeting in the autumn before a Summit. I hope therefore that we can get agreement between all the Western Powers on the following programme for further negotiation in the coming months:– (1) We should aim to secure that the Geneva meeting is recessed next week either with a Summit fixed or on a basis which will enable us to claim that some progress has been made and that we can look forward to further negotiations. (2) We should hold a Western Summit in Paris before the end of August, at which the Heads of the Western Governments would review the results of the Geneva meeting. (3) This would be followed by a period of personal contacts between yourself and Khrushchev during which exploratory discussions would continue. (4) As a result of all these preparations, a full Summit before the end of the year, not in an atmosphere of crisis, but with a prospect of success based on these intermediate stages of negotiation and discussion. I do not believe that we can present a firm Western position to public opinion unless we can say that the process of negotiation will continue over the coming months and culminate in a Summit meeting before the end of the year. Certainly for opinion here it is of first importance that we should make it plain as quickly as we can that there will be a Western Summit before the end of August and that a full Summit will follow later in the year.

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I hear that de Gaulle is doubtful about the need to hold a Western Summit before Khrushchev’s visit to you. I do not understand why he is taking this view. For my part I should welcome the opportunity for consultation before you see Khrushchev and I think it very important that this should take place. It really is essential that the Western Governments should be able to take stock of the position and clear their lines before Khrushchev’s visit. Moreover, I know that you also want to talk to de Gaulle about other matters and I am sure that this is most important and urgent. I hope therefore that you will feel able to press de Gaulle very strongly to fall in with your plan for a Western Summit in Paris in August. In the last resort, if he proves obdurate, I would prefer to hold a Western Summit in London with France represented by [Michel] Debré rather than defer it until after Khrushchev’s visit.1 I believe that you and I are pretty well at one on a plan for continued negotiations in the months ahead. There is, I think, only one real difference between us. You are reluctant to say now that there will be a Summit meeting, through I believe that you recognise that it is in fact inevitable. I, on the other hand, should like to get it settled and announced now that there will be such a meeting before the end of the year. This is not because I want a Summit for its own sake. I have never wanted that. What I have wanted is a settlement, and I have always believed that a settlement could only be reached by negotiation between Heads of Government. Nothing that has happened at Geneva has made me revise this opinion. Indeed it has confirmed me in the view that if we are to reach a settlement we must do so at a Summit Meeting. With warm regards, As ever, Harold 1

Michel Debré was French prime minister under President de Gaulle from 1959 to 1962.

264 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 1, 1959 Dear Friend, Thank you for your letter of July 28 about B.O.A.C.’s Tokio permit. I am glad that you feel that the application should be approved. This is quite a complicated affair and I do not suppose that you will expect me to deal with it in detail. I have of course been given a great mass of material but the only point I would like to make is that this is the first

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time since the Bermuda Agreement that we have added a significant foreign route whereas you, I believe, have added a number. However, I do not think that you and I ought to deal with one another on a matter of this sort on the basis of argument and counter argument. We are both anxious that the Bermuda Agreement should work smoothly. Let us see how it all works out and then keep in continuous touch. With warm regard, As ever, Harold

265 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 1, 1959 Dear Harold, I have received another message from Khrushchev confirming our agreement for an exchange of personal visits.1 I now expect there will be simultaneous announcements in Washington and Moscow about this early next week, probably on Monday, August third. I am also communicating the substance of these arrangements to de Gaulle and Adenauer, adding the suggestion that if they consider it useful I would be glad to come over for a Western Summit toward the end of August. I am suggesting in addition to de Gaulle that I might pay him an individual visit in Paris on August 27. That is the 15th Anniversary of my meeting with him incident to the liberation of Paris. Since de Gaulle apparently has misgivings about a Western Summit, it is my thought that if agreeable to you I could come to London immediately after seeing de Gaulle for the Western Summit, or in any event to meet with you and Adenauer. With warm regards, As ever, Ike 1

In the message the Soviet leader stated that problems confronting the foreign ministers were so great that a summit meeting of heads of government was “even more urgent.” Quoted in Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1614–15.

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266 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 2, 1959 Dear Friend, I was indeed delighted to get your message of August 1. I need hardly tell you how warmly we will welcome you in London. Of course, if de Gaulle behaves properly, I am very ready to go to Paris. Meanwhile, I have heard that you are likely to announce the Khrushchev visit at 10.30 a.m. on Monday morning, August 3. I shall put out a statement at the same time warmly welcoming your initiative. It would be a great help if you saw your way to stating, at the same time as the announcement of the Khrushchev visit, that you are proposing to come to Europe at the end of the month to see your Western Allies. There has been a good deal of talk about this already in the press, but a proper statement would have a great effect on western public opinion. We have just finished our Parliamentary Session here, tired but in good heart. It is fine to feel that we shall soon be meeting again. All good wishes, As ever, Harold.

267 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 4, 1959 Dear Friend: Your announcement about Khrushchev’s visit and your return visit has had a very good press here. I immediately issued a welcoming statement and I think that altogether we are now in good posture. Your readiness to come to visit us has had a very big effect. I very much hope you will be able to come to London from, say, Friday, August 28 until Tuesday, September 1. I understand that it is likely that these dates will suit you whether you go to Paris before or after, but of course if they do not you have only to propose an alternative. If you agree this in principle, we will work out a programme which will be agreeable to you. In order to get over the difficulty with Adenauer, I am proposing to ask him to come here on, say, Monday, August 31 and to stay until September 2 or 3. I will explain that the final dates depend on your

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convenience. Thus his visit will overlap with yours. This will save you from the need for going to Bonn and I hope please the Chancellor and give you an opportunity of seeing him. I need hardly say how much I look forward to a chance of talking with you again. With warm regard, As ever, Harold.

268 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 6, 1959 Dear Friend: The announcement that The Queen is going to have a baby will be made tomorrow at 12 noon our time and I am sure will give you great pleasure as it will to all of us. Naturally I have been very anxious about Her during these early months owing to her strenuous tour, and I am thankful that She has got through the first part of this critical period. She has now gone to Balmoral to rest quietly until about the middle of October. I saw The Queen before She left for Scotland and She was very much interested in the plans which I told Her you were making for a series of visits to different countries later in the year. She will, of course, be back in London by then and would hope that it might be possible for you at that time to pay a State visit when She would welcome you to Buckingham Palace as Her guest. At the same time the people of this country would regard this as the opportunity to pay their formal tribute to you both as President and as a former commander of their forces. The normal period for the state visit itself is three days. It would rest on you whether you would wish to stay longer. Perhaps we could talk about this when I see you at the end of this month. I do not know what you feel about the business visit in August but so far as our talks are concerned I hope we could repeat the same kind of arrangements which worked so well at Camp David. Perhaps for some of the visit at any rate you could come to Chequers where we could have talks with the minimum of publicity. I quite understand that no definite dates can be fixed until you have heard from President de Gaulle but as soon as this is fixed we will work out a programme and submit it to you. One last point. I do not know whether you wish to make a flying visit to Balmoral if The

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Queen felt well enough. I should be grateful if you could let me have your thoughts privately before I make any suggestion to Her. With warm regard, As ever, Harold.

269 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 7, 1959 Dear Harold: Quite naturally my wife and I are delighted with the news about The Queen. If you find it possible we should like for you to extend to Her our felicitations, as well as assurances of continued respect and devotion. I fully concur with your idea about the character of the visit we should have together when I get to London. I think Chequers would be fine. During my visit I should like to have an informal get-together, if time permits, with some of my old war time friends, possibly through a dinner that Jock Whitney could arrange at the Embassy. If this would be possible at all, it would have to be a very hastily arranged affair since business could always intervene and I would not want to cancel out something already arranged. Nevertheless I would hope that you and people like Alanbrooke, [Charles] Portal, [Arthur] Tedder, [Harold] Alexander, [Francis] de Guingand, [Miles] Dempsey and a dozen or so more might be able to attend.1 Of course I would want to invite Winston but would not expect him to attend unless he felt up to such an evening. I would hope we could fit something together on very short notice. NEW SUBJECT.

My planning for the exact dates that I shall be in Britain is upset this morning by the receipt of a message from Adenauer. He seems to think that my request for him to come to London implies an intention on my part to consider Germany as a second class nation. Frankly I have tried hard to arrange things so that I could not possibly hurt the feelings or be guilty of any slight to an ally. So, I am a bit annoyed. Of course your own readiness to understand some of my problems and difficulties and to meet me either in France or in Britain has been perfect. You know how grateful I am. After some correspondence with General de Gaulle, he expressed his very keen delight that I could come to Paris on September second. He suggests that I stay in Paris through September fourth. But I’d like to leave by the evening of the third. I must return here no later than the fourth or fifth. To reassure Adenauer I may have to pay him a short visit and then come back to you in London. Geographically it would be more logical to come first to you, but

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what I am trying to do is save the maximum amount of time for my visit to Britain. By going first to Bonn I may be able to keep that visit to a matter of twelve hours. Tentatively I am thinking of suggesting that I spend Thursday, the twenty-seventh, with him, then come to Britain on the twenty-eighth. Regarding the possibility of a trip to Balmoral to pay my respects to The Queen, I am completely at her and your disposal. We could work out a day somewhere along the line where I could fly up to Scotland and stay a few hours with The Queen and The Prince and come back to London. Or I might land first at Prestwick and then go on to Bonn. Another solution might be that I stop a second time in your country on my return from Paris and visit Balmoral and from there take off for the States. Finally if The Queen should prefer to postpone my visit to a later time, I would understand completely. I hope that she will think only of her own convenience and health. With warm regard, As ever, Ike. 1

One wonders if, by inviting all of these notables, Ike was not hoping to get them all together one more time for a discussion to refute Monty’s criticism. By this time, Churchill was obviously in failing health, but he attended the dinner nevertheless. Interestingly enough, Eisenhower wanted to insure that Montgomery also received an invitation to the dinner. “So far as Monty is concerned, I have instructed the Ambassador to include him on the guest list because I am not going to appear before the British public as one who is overly concerned with biased opinion,” Ike wrote to Freddie de Guingand on 18 August 1959. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1634–5. Montgomery attended the dinner but, as Norman Gelb wrote, relations between the two were “cool” and “brief.” See Gelb, Ike and Monty, 443.

270 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 8, 1959 Dear Friend, Many thanks for your message. I cannot tell you how much I am looking forward to your visit. We will of course do anything that suits you as regards dates and as soon as we know definitely what you would like I will send

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you a message about a possible programme including the dinner with your old friends. I will also think further about The Queen and let you know my feeling as soon as possible. Of course I shall pass on the messages from you and Mrs. Eisenhower. I know The Queen will be delighted with them. As to the Germans I have today received a message from Adenaeur in reply to my invitation to come to London.1 As I do not speak German, I find it rather obscure even in its translation. However, I am sending you privately the text in English translation because it may help you in deciding what to do. If you decide to go to Bonn it will be very generous of you and might be the best solution; but if you feel you cannot and wish to press the Chancellor to come to London we would be quite agreeable. Until you have decided what you want to do I will not reply to Adenauer’s message. With warm regard, As ever, Harold 1

Adenauer expressed “some disappointment” that Eisenhower had not initially planned to come to Bonn. The president then added a quick visit to West Germany to his itinerary. See Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 83.

271 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 10, 1959 Dear Friend: I am glad that you have decided to go to Bonn. Of course we ought to have had a Western Summit with us all in Paris and save you all this journeying; but there it is and you have been very generous. I am asking our people to get in touch with your Embassy here and shall be sending you various proposals. I assume that you will be leaving Bonn either Thursday after dinner, the 27th, or Friday morning, the 28th. Now may I be very frank with you as I always am. I am sure The Queen would like you very much to go to Balmoral for a day. It is true that She is supposed to be now having a sort of rest cure, but you would not expect any formality. The truth is, however, that She has set her heart on your making a State Visit here as part of the longer journey which you are to undertake in October. She wants to have you, and Mrs. Eisenhower if possible, as Her guests at Buckingham Palace with all the traditional ceremony. She will be quite able to do this and I know She feels very anxious that you should

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not finish your 8 years’ Presidency without Her being able to receive you as Her own and the nation’s guest. There would also be other engagements probably including the Guildhall, which you will remember from the time when you were given the Freedom of the City of London after the war. All this is very important from Her point of view and if I may say so, from that of our people, for we always think of you in a double capacity: As the Head of the greatest nation of the world with which we have not only so many historic and traditional ties but have been in friendly alliance for so many years and also as the man to whom we entrusted in two theatres the most powerful forces we have raised in our history by sea and land and air, and who proved so worthy of that confidence. I say all this because I feel it deeply. If making an informal visit to Balmoral would make it difficult for you, having regard to all the other countries that would like a visit from you, to pay a formal visit later in the year, then the Queen and I would much prefer the formal visit. But if you think that our position justifies first what one might call a kind of business visit that you are making now to see me, de Gaulle and Adenauer, and then later a State Visit to the Sovereign and the nation, and if you feel that an informal visit to Balmoral this time would not put difficulties in your way accepting a formal invitation, then I think it would be very nice for you to go and She would be very happy to welcome you. There should be time, for you are having several days with us. In that case we could work out various alternatives either at the beginning or end of your visit. In any case I think you would need to change aeroplanes in order to land at the small airfield which is the nearest to Balmoral. I hope, my dear Friend, that you do not mind me sending this message to you which is as frank as it would be if I were speaking to you. Our Queen and people really do want to have you here and do the full honours that they can, and I must leave it to you to say whether from the point of view of your relations with other countries a short visit to Balmoral this time would be a bar to the full visit later or not. As soon as I get your reply we will suggest various programmes. I would suggest that the last night, Tuesday September 1, might be best for Jock Whitney’s dinner for your old friends. I am sure that Winston would be delighted to be asked but I think that in fact he will still be yachting somewhere in the Mediterranean. Alas, some of the friends of those days are getting very old. With warm regard, As ever, Harold

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272 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 10, 1959 Dear Harold: Your message very clearly evidences your deep understanding of some of the problems that, because of my position, beset me whenever I contemplate a visit outside of this country. I am truly grateful that you have written in the fashion that you did. It is exactly what I should expect from such an old and valued friend. I am more than flattered by the hope that you and The Queen have expressed that my wife and I can make a State visit to your country sometime later this fall. I assure you that our own desire has been no less keen than yours, but of course there are certain obvious obstacles to be overcome. Some of these I should like to talk over with you when we meet later this month. But no matter how important these difficulties may prove to be, I assure you that they will not be made more so by any informal visit that I may be privileged to make upon The Queen and Prince Philip. This was one of the reasons that I was determined to schedule my stay in Britain at somewhat greater length than pure business would demand. Additionally, of course, I plan that one day out of the five will be without engagements or work of any kind. Since I am already scheduling a meeting with the Chancellor in his Capital, the day that I had planned to give to him in London can now be my own. As you know, I expect to reach London in the evening of the 27th, and from that time on I will be quite available for making the journey to Balmoral according to any schedule that you may think desirable. I should think if we planned to use one day for the purpose this should provide the time to make the round trip as well as to have a few hours at Balmoral. Nothing could please me more than to make such a visit provided that you have no fear that I should occasion any unnecessary fatigue to the Queen. Another thing: I cannot tell you how much I am looking forward to revisiting some of the scenes that came to mean so much to me in your great country, and even more how hopeful I am of having a real opportunity to see and talk with some of the fine friends with whom I then lived and worked. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

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273 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 11, 1959 Dear Friend, Many thanks for your very kind letter. I fully understand your difficulties and agree that we could discuss the future when we meet. My feeling is that it would be better for you to go to Balmoral at the beginning of your visit and I suggest that you should fly there on August 28, stay the night and come back on Saturday, August 29 direct to Chequers. I am arranging for my people here to give your Embassy some suggestions about the rest of the time. We will not work too hard at Chequers and take time off for some agreeable diversions as well. With warm regard, As ever, Harold

274 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 11, 1959 Dear Harold: I agree about the timing of my visit to Balmoral but I think you should consider carefully the possible desirability of a return to London that day. I could always come down from London to Chequers at whatever time you want me. It seems to me that a stay of more than two hours might under the circumstances impose a little bit more of a burden on Her Majesty than either you or I would want. This suggestion is by no means a rigid one; I am ready to conform to anything you think best. With warm regard, As ever, IKE

275 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 12, 1959 Dear Friend, Your message about Balmoral is characteristically generous and thoughtful but in fact I know that The Queen would not feel it right for you to visit

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her at Balmoral and not stay the night. The visit will be quite relaxed and informal and The Queen does not feel in the least that she would find this too much for her. On the contrary she is looking forward to having you. In any case I really think that the journey to and from Balmoral would be very disagreeable if you made it on one day and after you have flown the Atlantic and done a day’s visit in Bonn. As you perhaps know, the nearest airfield to Balmoral is at Aberdeen which is an hour and a half’s drive by car from Balmoral itself. As it is not a very large airport I am told you could not take your Boeing up there and even in the Viscount which I should like to put at your disposal the air journey would take some two hours. So you would have seven hours travelling in one day if you were only to stay at Balmoral for a short time. I hope therefore that you will agree that the best course is to fly up to Balmoral on Friday, August 28, probably in the morning, stay the night and come back on Saturday, August 29, to an airfield which is only about half an hour by road from Chequers. This should give us plenty of time for talks together. With warm regard, As ever, Harold.

276 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 13, 1959 Dear Harold: The overnight stop at Balmoral is perfectly satisfactory to me and we can consider it settled. I will be in touch with you later regarding further details of the trip. With warm regard. As ever IKE

277 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 18, 1959 Dear Friend, I am sending you herewith a letter which I received from Mr. Khrushchev while I was away in Yorkshire. I am also sending the short reply which I sent, and his answer.1

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This is a strange communication and we must talk about it when we meet. Meanwhile I think it most important to keep this correspondence very secret. As you will see from the subsequent exchange with Khrushchev I have been very careful to observe the proprieties and only have Khrushchev’s permission to show the letter to you. I should therefore be grateful if you would only show it to Mr. Herter and your most intimate advisers. You will see that Mr. Khrushchev has confirmed that he considered his letter confidential. I am not at present going to show this correspondence to General de Gaulle or Dr. Adenauer and I should not in any case think it right to do so without getting Khrushchev’s permission. As you will be here next week we can talk about the whole situation. Meanwhile I do not propose to send Khrushchev any further reply. With warm regard, Yours ever, Harold. 1

We were unable to locate these exchanges. Macmillan refers to them in his memoirs, saying that Khrushchev was looking forward to his meeting with Eisenhower “with pleasure.” However, the Soviet premier remained recalcitrant on the Berlin issue as he pushed for a peace treaty which would mean “that you [Western allies] would lose your right to occupy West Berlin.” See Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 84.

278 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN London, September 1, 1959 You and I have had many memorable meetings but none, so far as I am concerned, has been more fruitful or more enjoyable than this one I am now reluctantly concluding. By virtue of your American mother, you can rightfully claim a kind of dual citizenship; but I sometimes feel a right to be an adopted son of Great Britain. Certainly I feel completely at home here, and the welcome given to me by you – and by so many of the wonderful people of this Island – has warmed and touched my heart beyond any words at my command. It seems inadequate to say “thank you” for the courtesies, the kindnesses, and the attention to details to assure my comfort and pleasure. I know that essentially all of the direction for the trip emanated from you; I can only say that everything has been perfect.

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Won’t you please convey to the fine members of your staff my warm gratitude for the assistance they gave so willingly and freely to me and to the members of the party traveling with me? With deepest thanks and warm personal regard,

279 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 3, 1959 Dear Friend, The letters by tradition exchanged at the end of visits by foreign Statesmen sometimes tend to become formal and stereotyped. But your letter to me did not belong to this routine convention any more than your visit was an ordinary one. I am sure that you cannot fail to have been impressed by the genuine warmth and friendship of the welcome which you had in this country from so many millions of the people. Of course in a way this was a tribute to you as President of the United States, our great ally and friend and the firm rock of the Alliance; yet it was a real personal triumph for you. I rejoice at it with all my heart. The British people have long ago adopted you and your visit here was just the occasion for them to show this. I am only glad that the chances of fortune have enabled me to lead Her Majesty’s Government at this time and to be the spokesman of the feelings of the whole country. Your visit not only gave us all the greatest pleasure and satisfaction; it also gave a new reality to the friendship and alliance of our two countries. I for one shall never forget this truly historic visit. Yours ever Harold

280 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN En Route Scotland September 4, 1959 From my airplane just over London I sent you greetings. My visit with General de Gaulle was interesting and instructive and I believe of real value to the whole alliance. I shall later give you a more detailed report. My meeting with Mr. [Antonio] Segni was helpful, I think.1 I plan to remain at Culzean until Monday.

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Give my best to your associates in the government and, of course, warm regard to yourself. When you seen The Queen and The Prince this weekend, please convey to them my respectful and affectionate regard. As ever, Ike 1

Antonio Segni was vice president of the Italian Council of Ministers.

281 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 5, 1959. Dear Friend Your visit to France seems by all accounts in the Press to have been a considerable success and another personal triumph for you. I shall be interested to hear how you got on with President de Gaulle but certainly the French Press seem to have had favourable guidance. Although I sent some thoughts about Mr. Khrushchev to you in advance of Vice-President Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union, I thought it might be useful if I let you see the enclosed memorandum which I have prepared and which gives a short character sketch of Mr. Khrushchev. Yours ever Harold Mr. Khrushchev’s Character and Motives In the first place, while Khrushchev is undoubtedly a clever and calculating politician whose intellectual formation has been entirely in a Communist form, he is more like a human being than Stalin ever was. While, therefore, the general trend of his policy will be more or less dictated by Communist ideas, there is a good deal of room for personal prejudices and ideas to influence things from day to day. For example, Khrushchev’s “toothache” during the Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow was probably partly a calculated attempt to influence Mr. Macmillan, based on a false estimate of Western reactions to his tactics, but also partly genuine pique at some remarks made by the Prime Minister. Khrushchev may have interpreted the Prime Minister’s remarks about Khrushchev’s creating a “dangerous situation” in Berlin as being a sort of threat. Secondly, Khrushchev’s basic philosophy is being influenced both by the increasing development of the Soviet Union and by the dangers of nuclear war. He does not want to give up the long-term aims of the Communist Party but he is being forced to realise that the means by which these can be

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achieved are altering and that the character of the struggle with Capitalism must be quite different from what Marx, Lenin and even Stalin believed. Finally, as the memories of revolution and civil war die away, Khrushchev is anxious less to be regarded as the odd man out in international affairs and more as the responsible leader of a great bloc of countries. This means that he must be more law-abiding and must try to make his policy more consistent, and at least apparently more responsible. Here the idea of “peace” to which the Russians pay so much attention in their propaganda has had a deep effect not only on the masses to whom it was directed, but also on its leaders. On the whole this is a not unhopeful analysis. There seems at least to be a chance of bringing the Russians along. At the same time Khrushchev’s personal touchiness, which is also almost a national characteristic of Soviet men, may even so lead to tiresome scenes. If these occur they must be accepted with calm, but it would be better to try to avoid them. During his visit to the United States Khrushchev will probably be on his best behaviour; he is coming as Head of State and he is bringing his family with him, both of which are good signs. He will probably not be offensive to the President and as the Western position is now so well known he is unlikely to interpret any restatement of it over Berlin as being a threat. The only thing which might cause an awkward scene would be Khrushchev’s possible reaction if he got the impression that the President had decided definitely against a comprehensive agreement on tests. It would seem important to play this matter as gently and slowly as possible.

282 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN Culzean Castle, September 5, 1959 Dear Harold Thank you so much for the note that Jock Whitney brought to me yesterday when we both arrived at Culzean Castle. (I shall return this the same way). You express far better than can I the unique and friendly character of this latest of our conferences, a character that I am certain was engendered not so much by the warm welcome of the English people – heartwarming as it was, but by the close friendship between the two of us that seemingly grows stronger every time we meet. This part of Scotland has never been lovelier. The weather is absolutely perfect. Unfortunately I see that my golf score of yesterday was published in the press, so you will know that my game was certainly not on a par with the weather and the surroundings. But it is delightful to be here, and today

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I was joined by two of my friends from the States. With Jock we will have the best possible weekend before I have to go back to wrestling with the Congress and numerous other frustrating duties. I shall be pulling for you in the weeks ahead, as I am sure you know.1 Once again, my deepest gratitude to you and your associates, and my warm personal regard to yourself. As ever, Ike 1

Based on this closing comment to Macmillan – that “I shall be pulling for you in the weeks ahead, as I am sure you know” – we may presume that Macmillan discussed the upcoming British general election at some point in his conversations with Eisenhower. Macmillan makes no mention of such a conversation in his memoirs. But, according to Macmillan’s biographer, Alistair Horne, the prime minister realized that a visit by the president would be helpful to his election plans. Horne, Macmillan, II, 147.

283 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 11, 1959 Dear Harold: My talks with General de Gaulle went very well, I believe. The discussions were completely friendly and open, and it seems to me that we each succeeded in putting across to the other exactly what we had in mind, although the time available was so short that I was obliged to leave one or two items to be covered in a written communication to him. As anticipated, the question of Algeria, and of U.S. support for France on this issue, was uppermost in his mind. I made it clear that we wanted to support our French friends and hoped they would take a course which would make this possible. His thought is that when the rebellion is over, Algeria will be able to make its choice as to whether to remain completely French, to have a certain degree of autonomy, or to have complete independence. He will make a public statement on this within the next few days, and seemed confident that it will be one both you and I could support. We discussed very frankly the difficulties that are ahead in the United Nations. The French do not wish to discuss Algeria in the UN, holding that this is an internal affair. We pointed out that someone should speak for France, and make a good presentation of what France has done for Algeria in the economic, social and other spheres. If this is done early there will be time to round up other delegations. We are hopeful that his public statement will give the basis we need.

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It is clear that he has given a great deal of thought and attention to the problems in Africa, believing that the countries there should sooner or later be able to decide their own future. He said that France has started this process within the French Community, with members deciding of their own free will whether to work in common with France on matters of defense, foreign affairs and economic activity. He noted that Guinea alone has chosen to be independent, but still wants, and is receiving, French help. He expressed a great deal of concern over the threat of communism in the area, and the efforts of the Soviet bloc to “buy” their way into various countries through extending aid to them. (Incidentally, he said flatly that Sekou Touré is a Communist.)1 We discussed my suggestions regarding aid to underdeveloped countries primarily. Of course he, again, is concerned most with the French Community. I believe he will agree that it is vital for the Western countries to work together. Our discussions regarding tri-partite consultations were relatively brief, ending in clear agreement on the idea of conferring informally among ourselves regarding matters that lie beyond NATO. I mentioned that ad hoc staff committees could be established, but that I thought it unwise to establish institutions of a formal or permanent character, and he agreed. He expressed himself as heartily in favor of the North Atlantic alliance, which he felt should be maintained and developed. He raised several questions, all well known, in a very restrained fashion. He questioned the integration of forces as taking from the people a sense of responsibility for their defense, and losing the impetus of patriotism. On this I simply pointed out the necessity of integrated control for effective military operations in the present era, and some of the difficulties that would be inescapable in a coalition of purely national forces – not only for effective combat, but also in failing to provide a basis for the presence of U.S. forces in Europe. Both with him, and in my brief remarks at NATO and SHAPE, I stressed the need to develop a dedication to Western ideas, extending beyond the traditional national patriotism of the past. He seemed to be satisfied with our discussion regarding the decision to use atomic weapons. I made the point, as we had discussed at Chequers, that unless the situation were one of surprise attack, with bombers overhead, we would of course never unleash the use of nuclear weapons without consulting our principal allies. With respect to atomic weapons, General de Gaulle said that France will continue to develop its own. I explained the difficulties deriving from our legislation to him, and he seemed quite aware of them. He did not press for more liberal action on our part, and said he is not asking for anything in this regard. Finally, with respect to German questions and the visit of Khrushchev and a possible summit meeting, I found a close identity of views. On Berlin we reached complete agreement to remain entirely firm on the principle of not abandoning Berlin but to examine with flexibility such changes as might be

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possible in the present arrangements. He showed no concern regarding the Khrushchev visit – but no optimism, either. He did not think a summit meeting would be helpful unless some constructive result might be anticipated. He felt that some advance assurance of this is essential. All in all, I believe the visit and the discussions were of real value in demonstrating that we are joined in common purposes. Incidentally, I think General de Gaulle was highly pleased that the ceremonies he had arranged succeeded in showing me such courtesy and so warm a welcome. I was encouraged to find him confident, cooperative, and clearly in command of the affairs of his government. Thanks very much for the character sketch of Mr. Khrushchev that you sent, and for your ideas as to the line I might take in discussions with him. I am grateful for all the help I can get.2 1 2

Touré was president of Guinea from 1958 to 1984. The last paragraph of the letter – “Thanks very much for the character sketch of Mr. Khrushchev that you sent, and for your ideas as to the line I might take in discussions with him. I am grateful for all the help I can get” – was added to the letter by General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s Staff Secretary.

284 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 16, 1959 Dear Friend, I am most grateful for your message of September 11 about your talks with General de Gaulle. Your visit to Paris was evidently a great success. I feel sure that your journey to Europe has had the effect of strengthening the unity of the West. Of course, no member of a democratic alliance thinks exactly like every other member on every point. But your journey will have made people realize that any differences ought to be reconciled in view of the great issues at stake. By all accounts the French people gave you a most enthusiastic reception. I was confident that they would because I have never believed the tales of French hostility. What you tell me about General de Gaulle’s attitude towards the Algerian and African problems supports my belief that he has a fundamentally liberal outlook and that we must do all we can to help him. I am very glad that you encouraged him to have his representatives speak in defence of the French case in the United Nations. But, as you say, we must wait for his public statement before we can decide our tactics in the United Nations.

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What you told me about the General’s attitude towards N.A.T.O. interested but did not surprise me. Although he may have what seem to us to be rather old-fashioned ideas on such matters as the integration of forces I do not doubt his attachment to the alliance as such. If your visit has put him into a more relaxed frame of mind, we may perhaps meet with rather fewer difficulties from the French in the future on the day-to-day affairs of N.A.T.O. Of course we are ready, like you, to take part in informal tripartite consultations with the French on any matters which lie beyond N.A.T.O. in which the three of us can be said to have a particular interest. Since these may include military matters I quite agree that the consultations might from time to time be between military experts, always provided that no new formal institutions are created. After all, our Governments are free to have private discussions with what other Governments they choose, on an informal basis. The General can hardly have hoped that you would be more generous than you were on the point about the decision to use atomic weapons. I did not expect, any more than I believe you did, that he would press you for help with France’s own programme of development at this stage. But this is a problem which remains to be faced. You must surely feel very encouraged by your journey to Europe. As you know your visit to this country gave the greatest pleasure not only to my colleagues and myself but to the whole British people. We all of us send you our best wishes for the success of your discussions with Mr. Khrushchev. Yours ever, Harold.

285 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 24, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you for your letter of September sixteenth. Since I wrote to you on the eleventh an event has, of course, occurred which is of capital importance – the de Gaulle announcement of the Algerian program.1 While we still have not had time to make a detailed analysis of this complex plan, and it is apparent immediately that there will be difficulties involved (as is inevitable in a matter of this delicacy), you have possibly noted that I publicly stated it is a program which deserves our support. Secretary Herter also

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made a statement on behalf of our UN delegation in an effort to be helpful to the de Gaulle program. I have seen the supporting statement of the Foreign Office in London and the favorable London press reaction to the de Gaulle plan which matches the generally favorable attitude of our own press. I believe that you and ourselves should keep in the closest possible touch on this whole Algerian problem and specifically with reference to the tactical problems which are bound to arise in the UNGA [United Nations General Assembly] debate on the subject, where we wish to avoid a repetition of the situation which developed last year when French sensibilities became injured. With regard to the difficulties which we have encountered in achieving our NATO objectives, I have written General de Gaulle a letter, in which I outlined my views on the principal outstanding issues, such as the French Mediterranean Fleet, the questions of stockpiling atomic weapons, and the broader concept of integrated defense in the NATO area. All of these views are of course well known to you. I feel sure my letter will be read sympathetically by General de Gaulle even if he does not agree fully. I hope it may be useful in convincing him that in our NATO defense concepts, we are merely trying to achieve the maximum security for us all. On the subject of tripartite consultations, we will probably be moving ahead shortly, since you indicate in your letter of September sixteenth that you are willing to participate in informal talks on matters of interest outside the NATO area, on the understanding of course that no new institutions are created. It is our understanding that the French wish talks to begin, perhaps in the first instance on Moroccan and Tunisian subjects, and our people will be in touch with yours on this subject. Finally, I want to thank you again for your kind words about my trip to Europe from which I derived the greatest pleasure and which was, I hope, useful. I shall soon be in touch with you again to tell you about the substance of the current visit of Chairman Khrushchev to the United States. What a pity we cannot talk to him without an interpreter. I have a feeling that if each of us could talk to him, alone, in a common language, we could do better. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

President de Gaulle had recently agreed to the principle of a self-determination referendum in Algeria. In 1960, anti-independence French colons would launch an unsuccessful rebellion against the 5th Republic. In a referendum, finally held in 1962, Algerians voted overwhelmingly for independence.

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286 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 28, 1959 Dear Friend, Thank you so much for your letter of September 24. I agree that de Gaulle’s statement on Algeria is of capital importance and I am very glad that you and Chris Herter have felt able to give it your public support. Given the immense difficulties it is of course impossible to be certain that de Gaulle’s programme will provide a solution for Algeria. But I certainly see no alternative and the consequences of failure could be extremely serious, not only for France and North Africa, but for the whole Western cause. It is for this reason that I regard the forthcoming United Nations debate on Algeria as so important. It will be the first expression of international opinion and as such could have great influence on the future course of events. The best outcome would of course be a resolution which would endorse de Gaulle’s Plan. This may be too much to hope for but I am sure that we must try to get the Assembly, if not to endorse the Plan, at any rate to do nothing which will jeopardize its chances of success. I welcome your suggestion that our delegations in New York should keep in the closest touch. I believe that if we can both take a clear and concerted line in consultation with the French we should be able to ensure a satisfactory outcome from this year’s assembly debate. I am glad that you have written to de Gaulle about N.A.T.O. I am sure that he will be inclined to listen carefully to what you have to say to him on these problems. Finally, I would like to say how glad I was to read the communiqué issued after your talks with Mr. Khrushchev. If I may say so, you handled him splendidly and I do hope that his occasional outbursts did not give you too much trouble. With warm regards, As ever, Harold.

287 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 28, 1959 My dear Mr. President, I feel I must send you my warm congratulations. Your visits to three European capitals in recent weeks have been an immense contribution to

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the understanding between the Western Allies. You have now crowned this work by the successful outcome of your talks with Mr. Khrushchev at Camp David. Although many difficulties remain the whole world will feel encouraged by the general agreement of all the Great Powers to move along the path of discussion and negotiation. I hope we may meet again soon to carry on our work. All good wishes, Harold Macmillan

288 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 29, 1959 Dear Harold: Thank you very much for your two notes. Only time will tell whether congratulations are in order. The most I can say at this moment is that the meeting with Mr. Khrushchev did not end up on the truly sour note that it well could have. I believe he is sincere in his desire for helping arrange a program of disarmament. He talked to me at great length about costs in armaments and the sacrifices that their manufacture demands of citizens everywhere. Moreover, I believe he is genuine in his anxiety that there should be no general war. It was difficult for him to get off his initially rigid position respecting Berlin, but he finally did it in the proposal of a sentence to the effect that “negotiations should not be prolonged indefinitely, but no time limit is fixed upon them.” The one place where he has taken a very strong position, with no deviation, is respecting China. He likens Chiang Kai-shek to a rebellious general fighting against his own proper government. In other words, he is a traitor and a brigand and the whole China–Formosa dispute is an “internal matter.” He apparently sees no connection whatsoever between a divided Germany and a divided China. In all cases he urges that we have peaceful negotiations to settle our international affairs, except as to China – in this affair he says that China has a right to “complete its revolution.” On this matter I merely told him that our views were diametrically opposed on every point and there was little use of his arguing the matter. However, after reflecting on some of his extraordinary statements about China, I sent him a letter which, though friendly in tone, should leave him no doubt as to the firmness of our attitude in supporting the Nationalist Chinese.1 After all, forty-two nations have recognized that country.

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I have not heard further from General de Gaulle, although I sent him a very friendly letter respecting NATO affairs.2 While I don’t assume for a moment that this will settle these matters, I do think our approval of his enlightened approach to the Algeria question will do something to make him see things in a broader light. Incidentally, my personal conferences with him were interesting and even enjoyable. If I get any positive reaction from any quarter respecting my recent conference, I shall keep you advised. With warm regard, As ever, 1

2

Eisenhower sent the letter to Khrushchev also on 29 September. He urged the Russian leader to support the same “peaceful solution” of problems between the two Chinas as he had supported for the two Germanys. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1679. For Eisenhower’s letter of 21 September 1959 to de Gaulle, see ibid., 1667–9.

289 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 30, 1959 Dear Harold: The enclosed memorandum describes in greater detail than my letter of yesterday the course taken by the talks with Mr. Khrushchev at Camp David last week end.1 In conjunction with the final communiqué and the reports of my press conference, it gives a rather complete picture of the nature of the conversations. The range of our talks turned out to be quite limited – simply because of the amount of time we spent on Berlin. From the outset, I tried to make clear to Mr. Khrushchev my conviction that there would be no profit in detailed discussions of other matters while the Berlin problem remained in its present unsatisfactory situation. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

In this memorandum Eisenhower stressed that a summit could not take place so long as “the threat of duress in Berlin remained.” The memo also noted that the talks between the two leaders had “removed many of the objections to a summit conference.” Khrushchev also agreed orally that when negotiations over Berlin were resumed, there would be “no fixed time limit to them,” effectively dealing with the issue of “duress.” EL, WFIS, Box 25(a).

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290 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 1, 1959 Dear Friend, Many thanks for your interesting letter of September 29 about Mr. Khrushchev. Thank you also for your further letter of September 30, enclosing a detailed memorandum of your talks with him. I am very grateful to you for giving me such a full account. I think you are unduly modest about what you achieved with a pretty difficult customer, but as you say, we shall see. I am sure that the important thing is to keep the initiative and now that we have got it as the result of our efforts, we must not let it pass to the other side. I feel that the single most important point that you gained was Khrushchev’s agreement to remove the element of threat from the Berlin situation. It is very good that he stuck to his word and confirmed this change of position after he got back to Moscow. I take it from what Chris Herter said to SEATO on September 29 that you would agree that this advance by the Russians had cleared the way to the Summit. Personally I believe that this ought to take place soon, and without another meeting of Foreign Ministers. An early Summit, proposed by you, would keep the initiative with the West and prevent the Russians going back to the position of threat. Furthermore I feel that the Russians will be more likely to be accommodating at the Summit if your visit is still to come. Finally, I imagine that you would be glad if further progress on Berlin proved possible before you go to Moscow. We have tried already the system of preparation by Foreign Ministers. Now we might perhaps try at the Summit, either to reach a solution for ourselves or at least to help the Foreign Secretaries along. For all these reasons I should feel happiest if we could now agree to go for a Summit some time this year – perhaps at the end of November. The Russians would of course agree if you suggested this, and I would hope that de Gaulle (and Adenauer) would not be too reluctant. In the normal way I should have been content to pursue this plan with you and the other allies through the diplomatic channels, but I must admit that it would be helpful to me if, on or before October 6, we could announce a definite plan for a Summit this year.1 Do you think that there is any chance of getting the Allies to accept such a proposition in time? If not, would you have any objection to my saying, probably on October 6, that as a result of the progress made with Khrushchev, you agreed that a Summit this year was desirable and that we were consulting about a suitable date?

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I am sorry to bother you with this on your well-deserved holiday; but you will, I know, understand. I was very sorry to hear too about your cold, and I am sure that the warm air of California is an excellent plan. With warm regard, As ever, Harold. 1

Macmillan appeared to have wanted an announcement for a summit before the British general election on 8 October 1959.

291 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 2, 19591 Dear Harold: I appreciate greatly your letter of October 1 containing your comments on the visit of Mr. Khrushchev. As you have correctly inferred in your public statements I feel that the way toward a Summit has now been cleared. However, no specific times for the holding of a Summit were discussed with Mr. Khrushchev nor was there any discussion as to whether such a meeting should be asked for by any individual State. It is my own feeling that the time and the place should be arranged by diplomatic negotiation leading to a simultaneous announcement from the four capitals rather than that the initiative should be taken by myself. This procedure will of course take some time because of the necessity of concerting our positions. However, I can see no possible objection to your pursuing the lines that you have already taken with respect to the strong possibility of a Summit meeting as long as no specific agreement is indicated. With warm regard, As ever Ike 1

The source for this letter is EL, Ann Whitman File, Dulles–Herter series, Box 12, folder 2.

292 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 9, 1959 Dear Harold: You will recall that in my account to you of my conversations with Khrushchev at Camp David I said that I had made it clear to him that as far

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as a Summit conference was concerned I could make no commitments without prior consultation with the others concerned. Accordingly I should like very much to learn your present thoughts with respect to Mr. Khrushchev’s proposal that a Summit meeting be held before I visit the Soviet Union in the Spring. I am also writing in this same vein to President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer. As a result of my discussions with Mr. Khrushchev at Camp David I now have, as I indicated to you earlier, fewer objections to a Summit conference. The appearance of threat and duress in negotiating on the Berlin problem has in my opinion now been sufficiently altered that I, for my part, would feel able to meet jointly in such a conference with the Soviet Chairman. Although Mr. Khrushchev certainly did not modify any of the substantive positions of the Soviet Government regarding Berlin, German reunification, disarmament or other major international questions during our talks, there was sufficient indication of a change of tone to lead me to believe that further exploration would now be desirable. Indeed I believe we would be assuming a heavy responsibility if we now refused to meet him at the Summit. I know you will agree with me that in such a meeting we on our side must clearly be united regarding the limits which our national interests place upon us. There is a possibility that we will find ourselves under severe pressure to accept proposals dangerous to our interests under the threat of a total breakdown of negotiations. This is a pressure under which we were placed at Geneva. I have no doubt about the West’s ability to resist it. If it proves that no acceptable agreements can be worked out at the Summit, however, I now believe we will be better able to win world support of Western positions than if we refused to meet at all. Knowing that you feel that a Summit meeting should be held, we must therefore now consider the complicated question of a timetable which will permit the preliminary inter-allied consultation clearly required. I feel that there would be some advantage to a Summit meeting in December, which, if agreements in principle are reached, would make it possible to hold more detailed negotiations at the Foreign Minister or expert level before the Spring. If a meeting is held in December it would have to precede the NATO Ministerial Meeting scheduled for December 15, and therefore should probably commence near the beginning of the month. I believe that we should meet with our French and German colleagues before a Summit meeting. For my part, I should be delighted to act as host to a pre-Summit meeting in the United States with our Western colleagues but would be prepared to go to Europe before the conference with the Soviets depending on the site selected for that conference and on what seems to be the most convenient arrangements for the others.

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I await with the greatest interest your views on these questions, including possible sites for our meetings. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

293 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 9, 1959 Dear Harold: I have just heard the results of yesterday’s elections.1 I want to tell you how much I look forward to the continuation of that spirit of close friendship and cooperation which has made our association so rewarding in the past. I have every confidence that our continued dedication to commonly shared principles will make the bonds between Britain and the United States even stronger in the cause of justice and peace. For myself and on behalf of the people of the United States I wish you and your associates every good fortune in carrying out the heavy responsibilities which lie ahead. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

Macmillan’s Conservative Party increased its parliamentary majority over the Labour Party from 67 to 107. See Horne, Macmillan, II, 152.

294 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 10, 1959 Dear Friend– Thank you very much for your kind message about our Elections. Of course I am very pleased by this result. What gives me particular pleasure is the knowledge that I shall now be able to continue to work with you in all

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the negotiations and problems which face us. You know how much I believe that the alliance between our two countries is the foundation of peace. I think that this letter will reach you just about the date of your birthday, and so perhaps it would be appropriate for me to send you again my best wishes and many happy returns of the day. You can indeed look back with pride on all that you have done this year, and I firmly believe that the year to come will be even better. Yours ever Harold Macmillan

295 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 12, 1959 Dear Friend, Thank you for your message of October 9 explaining your thoughts on a Summit Meeting and asking for my views. As you know I have always favoured a Summit Meeting with Mr. Khrushchev at the earliest practicable moment. It seems to me important that we should maintain the momentum achieved by the personal talks which we have both already had with him. I am therefore entirely in agreement with your suggestion that such a meeting might take place at the beginning of December at a time and place to be mutually agreed. As regards the place, there seem to me to be two possible alternatives – Geneva and Quebec. Quebec is considerably nearer for you. It would undoubtedly greatly please the Canadians, and I too would very much like a meeting there. The arguments for Geneva are that administratively it is probably more convenient, since all the necessary facilities exist there. I think it is also probable that de Gaulle would prefer the meeting to be held in Europe. I myself certainly do not hold firm views about the place, and will accept whatever is the general wish. I also agree that we should have a meeting with de Gaulle and Adenauer before the meeting with Mr. Khrushchev. I suggest that this Western Summit Meeting should take place immediately before the main meeting, and that the place should be fixed in relation to the place agreed for the meeting with Mr. Khrushchev. Thus Paris might be suitable if Geneva were accepted, and Washington if Quebec were chosen. As part of this process it might be desirable for the Western Foreign Ministers to meet a day or two before the Heads of Government if some preparatory work by them were to be deemed necessary.

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As regards the Agenda of the conference, I agree that, generally speaking, we shall have to confine ourselves to trying to reach agreements in principle, leaving specific agreements to be worked out subsequently in more detailed negotiations at other levels. On the other hand it does seem to me that we should certainly leave open the possibility of setting a specific agreement at the summit on at least one of the subjects under discussion. If we confine ourselves solely to the issuing of guidance to our Foreign Ministers we surely run the risk of discrediting the whole concept of Summit meetings and possibly of undoing the good work which you have done on Mr. Khrushchev in persuading him to withdraw his Berlin ultimatum. For these reasons I think that we ought to keep in mind the possibility of concluding an interim agreement on Berlin at the Summit meeting. Selwyn is sending instructions to Harold Caccia to discuss this in more detail with Chris Herter. With warm regards, as ever, HAROLD

296 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 16, 1959 Dear Harold: I am glad to have your prompt reply of October 12 on the question of a Summit meeting. I think our views are essentially not far apart. My own feeling is that we owe it to the free world and to ourselves to take every opportunity to explore further the attitude of the Soviets. However, I feel strongly that we cannot do this until we know that we have a concerted point of view among ourselves. President de Gaulle, in responding to my letter to him on my talks with the Soviet Chairman, has already expressed to me some of his views on a prospective Summit meeting. He is plainly lukewarm to the idea of holding one at all, and certainly has no wish to see a meeting take place as early as December. Chancellor Adenauer has indicated to me that early December would be acceptable provided the necessary concerting of our positions is possible in advance. As suggested above, this really is my view, too. One reason that I regard an early meeting with you, General de Gaulle and the Chancellor desirable is the fact that I am not at all sure that my evaluation and yours of the possibility of agreeing on a modus vivendi on Berlin with the Soviets at a Summit meeting are the same. It seems to me that when the Foreign Ministers adjourned their sessions at Geneva in August there was still a wide gulf between us and the Russians. I quite agree that the elements

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of an agreement and the position of the two sides were clearly revealed. On some of the less important elements of our positions there was a varying measure of agreement. But on the vital question of where we would stand with respect to our rights at the end of the period we made no progress at all in spite of heroic efforts by the Western ministers. I do not think we should underestimate the difficulties with which we are likely to be confronted when we take up this thorny subject again in a formal negotiation. Another point on which we must reach agreement among ourselves revolves around the problem of dealing with suggestions that the Summit meeting should include representation of countries other than the four which met at Geneva in 1955. Since the subject of disarmament is almost certain to come up, the other side will very likely propose the admission of other participants in our meeting, citing the precedent of our acceptance of the Committee of Ten for Disarmament. The Soviets can in any event be expected to raise the question of East German participation. I think we must make every effort to keep the meeting on a Four Power basis as we did at the Summit conference in Geneva in 1955. Both the question of what we would talk about at a Summit meeting and the possible differences as to its desirability, composition and dates indicate to me that we of the West must get together at the Heads of Government level at the earliest possible moment. I have reviewed my own schedule and find that with some readjustment I could free myself for the purpose for a few days at the end of this month. Paris would seem to me the logical place to meet in light of the difficulty which General de Gaulle would presumably find in visiting either London or Washington in advance of his state visits. For my part Paris would be entirely acceptable. I would envisage such a meeting as involving no ceremonies, no social affairs, and devoted purely to business. I should welcome your views on all of these matters. We seem to be in basic agreement already on the main questions and with the pressure of time under which we are laboring I have asked Chris to take this matter up at once with Harold Caccia and with Ambassador [Wilhelm] Grewe and Ambassador [Herve] Alphand as well.1 If you agree in principle, I think we can leave the arrangements to be worked out by them through diplomatic channels. On the strictly personal side may I thank you for your letter of October 10 which reached me just before I went out to Kansas for a ceremony in connection with the ground breaking of the Eisenhower Library there. I am more than grateful for your good wishes for my anniversary and I hope with you that together we shall be able to do even more in the next twelve months toward the goals we both so earnestly seek. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

Wilhelm Georg Grewe was West German ambassador to the United States from 1957 to 1962. H. E. Herve Alphand was the French ambassador to the United States from 1956 to 1965.

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297 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 18, 1959 Dear Friend, Thank you for your message of October 16. I warmly support your suggestion that there should be a meeting of Western Heads of Government at the earliest possible moment. I also welcome your generosity in agreeing to come to Europe again so soon. I will fit in with any plans which may be agreeable to the others. It would, in fact, suit me well to hold the meeting from October 30 to November 1. In this case I would probably travel myself to Paris on the evening of Thursday, October 29. If, on the other hand, working through the weekend is not convenient, I will also be very ready to meet from November 2 to 4. But on the whole I would prefer the earlier date. With regard to the agenda, I agree that we should discuss the matters raised in your message upon which we will send our thoughts shortly. I believe that Chris Herter told Harold Caccia that you might also wish to raise matters of domestic interest to the Western Alliance – for example, reappraisal of Western defence and economic policies and current NATO problems. I agree that discussions on those matters might also be of value. I should like to add how sorry I was to hear of the death of General Marshall.1 His services to the free world both in peace and in war were outstanding and his name will not be forgotten in this country. Yours ever, Harold Macmillan 1

General of the Army George C. Marshall died in Washington on 16 October 1959, aged 78.

298 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 21, 1959 Dear Friend, I expect you were as dissatisfied as I was by de Gaulle’s reply.1 However, you know him well and I expect that you can bring him round again this time as you used to in the old days.2 Meanwhile, Selwyn is sending a detailed message to Chris with our ideas.

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I do hope your cold will soon be better, and I am glad that you have got away for a few days. With warm regard, As ever, Harold. 1

2

De Gaulle sent a letter to Eisenhower on 20 October 1959, in which the French leader expressed considerable pessimism about the usefulness of a summit meeting. He wondered “what a summit meeting at this time could accomplish besides highlighting a fundamental disagreement between East and West or surrendering more or less to Soviet claims in Berlin.” Quoted in Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1707. Macmillan’s reference to the “old days” dealt with Eisenhower’s relationship with de Gaulle during World War II.

299 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 22, 1959 Dear Harold: In my latest letter to General de Gaulle I did not mention an East–West meeting. I merely pointed out what I thought to be the great advantages of a Western summit.1 It is quite clear that he is hopeful of postponing any direct contact with Mr. Khrushchev pending what he calls clear evidence of a changed Soviet attitude. Apparently such a change of attitude will be evidenced by a “correct” Soviet vote in the UN about Algeria. However, I have no theory covering his reasons for believing that a Western conference would be a mistake. We shall have to wait and see what his answer is to my most recent letter. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

In fact, in his 21 October letter to de Gaulle, Eisenhower eloquently and forcefully chided the French leader for his doubts about a summit meeting: “But to show a readiness to negotiate is not to demonstrate weakness,” he stated. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1706.

300 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER November 25, 1959 Dear Friend, I have now seen, as I expect you have also, the draft programme for our meeting in Paris suggested by the French. In general I think that the programme suggested is sensible.1

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I should, however, very much hope that we might be able to have some private talk together during these few days. It seems to me that there are two possibilities. We could either dine together one evening – probably Saturday, December 19 or Sunday, December 20 – or we could meet in Paris on the morning of Sunday, December 20 while de Gaulle and Adenauer are having their private talk at Rambouillet. I have really no preference between these two possibilities and will fit in with whatever you think best. I envy you your Far Eastern tour. I am sure that it will be both interesting and of value. With warm regard, As ever, Harold 1

We were unable to locate a copy of this document.

301 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN November 28, 1959 Dear Harold: Will it be convenient for you to have breakfast with me at the American Embassy Residence in Paris on Sunday morning December 20? I am afraid that it will have to be as early as 8:00 o’clock in order that we may be free for our remaining duties that morning. With warm regard, as ever, Ike

302 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER November 29, 1959 Dear Friend, Thank you so much for your message. Your plan for a breakfast session on December 20 sounds excellent. I shall be there. With warm regard, As ever, HAROLD.

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303 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER December 3, 1959 Dear Friend, Many thanks for your message. I think it would be best if the party consisted of the four of us – you and me, Chris and Selwyn. If the two of us wanted a little talk together no doubt we could arrange this during the morning. Anyway, don’t let us have other advisers. With warm regard, As ever, Harold

304 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN December 3, 19591 Dear Harold. Okay. As ever. Ike 1

This message was handwritten to Macmillan.

305 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER December 20, 1959 My Dear Friend, It was so good of you to send me the lovely camera from the Polaroid Land Company. I am happy to accept this as a symbol of the friendship between our two countries. With many thanks, Ever yours, Harold.

306 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER December 23, 1959 Dear Friend This is to send you all my best wishes for Christmas and the New Year. It was fine to see you in Paris and to have such good talks. I do hope you are not too tired by your terrific and really epoch-making tour. Yours ever Harold.

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307 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN December 23, 1959 Dear Harold: I think our conferences in Paris were fruitful but nothing was so gratifying as my talks with you. As we look to the future I am sure that more and more we must be concerned with our common purpose and effort. While I have sent the normal Christmas card to Her Majesty and Prince Philip, I do hope that at the first opportunity you will assure her of the warmth of my greeting to her and her husband. With best wishes for a fine holiday season for you and your lady and personal regard, As ever, Ike

308 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER December 28, 1959 My dear Friend Thank you very much for your letter, written on Christmas Eve. I could not say how much I agree with you about the value of our talks together.1 Mr. Khrushchev’s objection to the dates which we suggested is tiresome, but I have no doubt that we shall find a mutually convenient time.2 I passed on to the The Queen and Prince Philip the kind message for them which you asked me to convey. The Queen has told me that she was delighted to get this personal message, and has asked me to mention to you how pleased she was by your good wishes, which she warmly reciprocates. Yours ever Harold Macmillan 1 2

Most likely, Macmillan is referring to Eisenhower’s letter of 23 December. Khrushchev accepted the official invitation to a summit meeting extended by the Western heads of government in a letter to Ike on 25 December 1959. However, the proposed date, 27 April–1 May 1960, was unacceptable to the Soviet leader, in part because it conflicted with May Day. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1779.

4 January 1960–January 1961: Disappointment and Renewal

The year 1960 opened with a glimmer of hope for a positive change in the international situation. Largely the result of the initiative of an enthusiastic Prime Minister Macmillan and an initially reluctant President Eisenhower, the Western alliance was poised to enter into meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union for the first time in the Cold War. The success of these negotiations, of course, depended upon the willingness of Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership to entertain the prospect of acceptable solutions to the issues which divided East and West. In 1959, in talks with Macmillan in Moscow in February, at the “kitchen debate” in Moscow with Vice President Richard Nixon in July, and finally with Eisenhower at Camp David in September, Khrushchev appeared open to a dialogue with the West. Khrushchev’s behavior, while welcomed in the West, had not resulted in any fundamental change in Soviet policy, however. The Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain remained divided on the issues of arms control and disarmament, and they had not narrowed their differences appreciably on the Berlin problem, a crisis that had essentially been manufactured by Khrushchev, in part to wangle an invitation to a summit. Yet the major result of the numerous meetings between Macmillan, Eisenhower, and Khrushchev in 1959 was the understanding that a meeting of the heads of government was necessary to address these issues. The three leaders had at least some hope for an historic breakthrough on nuclear testing and perhaps even the basis for resolving the dispute over Berlin. But the initial optimism for the conference ended abruptly when the Soviets shot down an American reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers on 1 May. The US had been conducting overflights of the Soviet Union since 1956 with the U-2 reconnaissance plane. With the summit approaching, however, Eisenhower had grown increasingly apprehensive about the U-2 program, fearing that the loss of an aircraft or capture of a pilot could result in a major international incident. “If one of these things is shot down, this thing is going to be on my head. I’m going to catch hell. The world will be in a 314

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mess,” Ike had remarked during the early years of the program.1 Nonetheless, when he found himself under pressure to approve additional flights to make a final determination about the extent of Soviet missile development, he authorized a window for the flights, with a terminal date of 2 May 1960, the last date possible for any U-2 flight prior to the summit conference.2 Then on 1 May a strange diplomatic dance began. When it learned that a U-2 flight was missing, the Administration released its standard cover story that “a weather research plane” had been lost on a mission near Turkey.3 Khrushchev knew that the plane had been shot down. When he revealed that information a few days later, the Administration stuck to the cover story, which was later blown apart when the Soviet leader produced the pilot of the plane. According to William Taubman, Khrushchev assumed that “Eisenhower was not responsible, that rogue elements in the military and CIA were,” but he wanted to toy with the president to make up for “all the years of humiliation.” He concluded that Eisenhower would apologize and that the summit would then go on with Khrushchev in the driver’s seat.4 On 8 May, however, Eisenhower did admit that he knew about the U-2 flights (although not the Powers one specifically) and justified them as “necessary to prevent surprise attacks.”5 He reaffirmed his responsibility in a May 11 press conference. Eisenhower’s acceptance of responsibility for the U-2 flights was exactly what Harold Macmillan did not want to hear. Macmillan believed that Khrushchev might have accepted “silence or some formal disclaimer from Eisenhower,” but Ike’s admission of responsibility led to a stiffening of the Soviet position, in Macmillan’s estimation.6 In fact, the Soviet Premier wavered. He was “horrified” that Eisenhower had approved the flights, according to journalist Priscilla Johnson, but at the same time he said he wanted to help get “the international situation back on a normal track.” To Johnson, he seemed to be “having a dialogue with himself” about going to Paris.7 According to Sergei Khrushchev, son of the Soviet Premier, however, Khrushchev suddenly reversed course while flying to Paris and decided to torpedo the summit, primarily by making a set of essentially non-negotiable demands of Eisenhower. Sergei quoted his father: “I thought we had to set conditions, an ultimatum to the United States of America: they must apologize for insulting our country by sending over a spy plane. We must demand that the president of the United States retract his statement that they have the right to send intelligence flights over our territory … By the time we arrived in Paris we had complete approval of our new [position.]”8 Although Macmillan retained a faint hope of saving the conference, Eisenhower and French president Charles de Gaulle recognized the stark reality of the situation; unless Eisenhower publicly issued an apology, thereby humiliating himself, the United States government, and his

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Administration, the summit was finished. This the president was unwilling to do. On 19 May, the four leaders left Paris, never to meet again.9 Back in London, Macmillan had difficulty hiding his sense of defeat. As he later recalled: Everything went wrong. [It was] not a great blow to de Gaulle, who didn’t think much of the Summit. I don’t think [it was] really a great blow to Eisenhower except to his prestige, because he didn’t hope for much of it. But to me who had made this plan, especially the continuation of a new methodology by which the world might look toward peace, I am bound to say it was the most tragic moment of my life.10 As for Eisenhower, with time running out on his presidency, he had made a bold personal move for peace by inviting Khrushchev to the United States and then agreeing to the summit. At the time, he saw the possibility of some progress until the “stupid U-2 mess” came and ruined the entire effort.11 And yet, Macmillan may have been correct in his observation that Eisenhower held only modest expectations for results at the Summit Conference in Paris. Unhappily, the four leaders never got a chance to renew their efforts toward détente. In spite of the summit debacle, Eisenhower and Macmillan continued to consult for the rest of Eisenhower’s term on a series of difficult situations as the rivalry between the great powers turned in a different direction. In July the Soviets shot down an American RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft, capturing its two pilots, and for a moment it looked as though the world was about to witness another U-2 crisis. Other problems also began appearing around the world in the summer of 1960. President de Gaulle continued to insist on the need for tripartite consultations among France, the US, and the UK, perhaps growing partly out of his envy of the close relationship between Ike and Mac. In July and August, the Eisenhower Administration and the Macmillan Government grew concerned about Russian meddling in the civil war in the mineral-rich African nation of the Congo. The communist-led insurrection in Southeast Asia had also intensified, particularly in the small country of Laos. By the end of 1960, the violence in Laos concerned Eisenhower the most of all of these “succession of little events.” However, three areas of concern were most important for the two leaders: defense co-operation, the problem of Cuba, and Premier Khrushchev’s appearance at the UN in September 1960. Most crucially, the collapse of the Summit Conference in Paris, and the tensions in the international environment which followed it, led the Eisenhower Administration and the Macmillan Government back onto some familiar territory: a resumption of the co-operation on defense policy which had characterized the previous three years. In 1960, however, the area of co-operation involved the development of the fleet ballistic missile system

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(FBM) by the United States, culminating in the deployment of the Polaris class nuclear submarine program in 1959–1960 and the subsequent agreement by the Macmillan Government to provide berthing facilities for Polaris submarines in Scotland. By the time Eisenhower left office in 1961, these agreements had been completed, and the Americans had achieved their objective of securing a base, in the most friendly of hands, within the range of the Soviet Union, and the British had achieved their objective of acquiring advanced American missile technology and integrating it within British forces to strengthen Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent. The joint United States–United Kingdom agreement on the Polaris missile system satisfied several major defense objectives of both countries, but it nevertheless wound a tortuous negotiating path before the United States and Britain concluded their agreement. The two leaders reached an impasse over where the submarines would be berthed. Americans wanted them stationed at Gare Loch on the Firth of Clyde, while domestic opposition pushed Macmillan to propose a location further from major cities, which the Americans objected to. With the matter dangerously deadlocked, the British and the Americans spent the summer months trying to resolve their differences. By 27 September, when Eisenhower and Macmillan conferred in New York during the session of the United Nations, the two sides had selected a third location, Holy Loch, near Gare Loch, as the site for the Polaris facility.12 There was also considerable controversy over issues of command and control. Given domestic considerations, Macmillan wanted the maximum amount of latitude in assuring the British people that the Americans could not provoke a nuclear exchange independent of consultation with the British. Eventually, both sides agreed on language which stipulated that no decision to launch the Polaris missiles by the Americans would be made “without the fullest possible previous consultation.”13 Macmillan also spent considerable energy calming the fears of members of Parliament. When Labour MP Arthur Skeffington expressed concern that the berthing of Polaris submarines in Scotland might increase the possibility of nuclear war, Macmillan countered, “The provision of facilities in this country to our American allies increases the deterrent effect of the West’s forces and thereby decreases the likelihood of war.”14 Judith Hart, one of Skeffington’s Labour colleagues, was more concerned about issues of command and control. When she indicated her fear that the Americans might launch missiles without prior consultations with the British government, Macmillan calmly replied, “I am perfectly content to rely on our general understandings with the Americans on these matters.”15 Eisenhower and Macmillan also discussed the worsening situation in Cuba. In Eisenhower’s view, the revolution led by Fidel Castro had become a threat to the United States, as the Cuban leader became increasingly antiAmerican and drew closer to the Soviet Union. Thus, the president was

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determined to isolate Castro economically and to encourage anti-Castro sentiment in Cuba. Deferring to Eisenhower, Macmillan wrote that “you must clearly play the hand in this affair and we will certainly help you in any way we can.”16 But what, exactly, was the way in which the Eisenhower Administration could expect assistance from the British? Macmillan stated that the British would support American efforts in the United Nations to isolate Castro economically. Eisenhower could definitely expect British support in efforts to restrict the shipment of arms into Cuba. In other areas, however, support was not forthcoming. Eisenhower wanted Macmillan to use his power to prevent British and other foreign tankers from transporting Soviet oil to Cuba. Macmillan argued that there was little he could do in this area: “I’m afraid the problem of tankers for the carriage of Soviet oil to Cuba is not easy. There is a considerable excess of tanker tonnage in the world at present, and much of it is in the hands of owners whom we cannot influence or even advise.”17 Macmillan found no simple course to follow regarding the problem of Castro. “I know, and fully sympathize with, your purpose – the unseating of Castro and his replacement by a more suitable regime – but I am not very clear how you really mean to achieve this aim,” Macmillan wrote.18 Obviously, the British were as unwilling, under Macmillan’s leadership, to risk their status and credibility in the world community for American interests in the Caribbean as the Americans were to risk their status and credibility for British interests in the Middle East. What, then, was to be the American policy in dealing with Castro? Although Eisenhower did not completely discount the possibility of some kind of popular discontent with the Castro regime, the United States faced a long and difficult task in trying to build on anti-Castro sentiments in Cuba, given the growing strength of the regime. Having said that he ruled out even the suggestion of military intervention against Castro, Eisenhower confessed to Macmillan that economic pressure was about the only recourse which the Americans had. “I wish to stress that we shall also be substantially increasing our efforts on the positive side by way of economic, financial, and technical assistance to the countries of Latin America,” Eisenhower wrote.19 “As we have so often said to the Cubans to no avail, we recognized the need for major changes, revolution if you will, in the Cuban social and economic structure, and were and are prepared, if asked, to assist Cuba and anyone of the other countries in bringing about needed improvements carried out legally and responsibly under democratic regimes. Although we must make sure of the ultimate achievement of our aim, I fully agree that our course is fraught with difficulties and dangers.”20 There was a final contretemps with Premier Khrushchev as well. The Russian leader came to the US in September to attend a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly specially called to consider the explosive situation in the Congo and also to admit new members to the organization.

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The United States Government, through diplomatic channels, forbade Khrushchev and his delegation from traveling outside of New York City without receiving permission from the police.21 Khrushchev interpreted these orders as another attempt by Eisenhower to humiliate him. A more charitable view is that the United States Government wanted to insure that Khrushchev did not become the victim of any foul play should he travel outside the city. Regardless, these restrictions annoyed Khrushchev, and he responded by embracing Fidel Castro publicly in a noted photo opportunity at Castro’s hotel in Harlem. Eisenhower and Khrushchev both spoke at the United Nations. At the opening session on 22 September, Eisenhower spoke to the delegates and asked for support of the UN’s efforts to restore stability to the Congo. On 23 September, Khrushchev gave a passionate anti-colonial speech, castigating both Eisenhower and especially Dag Hammarskjold, the secretary general of the UN, who had opposed the Soviets on the Congolese issue.22 On 29 September, it was Macmillan’s turn to address the General Assembly. In his speech, which was a far-ranging commentary on the contemporary world situation, Macmillan emphasized the way Britain had helped many of its former African colonies begin making the transition to independence and self-rule.23 During the speech, Khrushchev repeatedly interrupted and shouted at the podium, demanding to be heard. Then, in the most celebrated incident of the session, the Soviet leader removed his shoe and began pounding it on his desk. Macmillan responded to this outburst by saying simply, “Mr. President, perhaps we could have a translation, I could not quite follow.” Macmillan’s humor and “unflappability” (the operative word at the time) served as an effective rhetorical counterpoint to Khrushchev’s obstreperousness and became the single most remembered speech of the session.24 On 2 October, Eisenhower, Macmillan, and their advisers met for the last time in Eisenhower’s presidency. Given Khrushchev’s behavior at the UN, the British and American leaders wondered if the Soviet Premier was bent on destroying that organization in the same fashion that he had broken up the Summit Conference in Paris. Khrushchev’s views had no flexibility: not on disarmament, Berlin, or relations with non-aligned countries.25 Prior to returning to Britain, however, Macmillan met briefly with Khrushchev on 4 October, finding him more subdued but still unwilling to engage in substantive negotiations. Macmillan and Eisenhower recognized the obvious: there would be no further movement toward détente while Eisenhower was president.26 After the conclusion of the UN meetings, Dwight D. Eisenhower realized that the end of his diplomatic partnership with Harold Macmillan was approaching rapidly. On 14 October, he wrote to Macmillan that “while in some ways I will be glad to set down the burden of this office on January twentieth next, I will miss the great satisfaction I have had from our close

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relationship which will of course lose its official nature.”27 On 8 November 1960, John F. Kennedy defeated Richard M. Nixon in the closest presidential election in American history. Two days after the election, Macmillan wrote to his friend of almost twenty years: I feel I must write a few words to you on a purely personal basis at this time. The election of a new president has brought home to me the situation which of course I knew must come, that the period of our close cooperation together in many fields is drawing to an end. When I look back on the first time we met in the Hotel St. George, nearly 20 years ago, I realise how long this friendship has been. I know that nothing will ever impair its strength or its usefulness to our two countries.28 A long and productive official partnership had come to an end.

Notes 1. David Wise and Thomas Ross, The U-2 Affair (New York: Random House, 1962), 154. 2. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies, 283. Despite his misgivings, Eisenhower still wanted the valuable information which the U-2 was providing about Soviet missile development. Since the inception of the flights, the Soviets had protested diplomatically but they lacked the military capability, at least until mid-1960, to shoot down a U-2. But both intelligence and defense officials were growing increasingly concerned that advances in the Soviet Union’s surface-to-air (SAM) missile capability might soon make the U-2 overflights too dangerous. It was necessary to get as much information as possible before the Soviets were able to shoot down a U-2. See also Richard Bissell, Reflections of a Cold Warrior (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 122–3. 3. Michael Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 38–9. 4. Taubman, Khrushchev, 446. 5. Ibid., 458. 6. Horne, Macmillan, II, 226–7. 7. Taubman, Khrushchev, 459. 8. Sergei N. Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 388. 9. Anastas Mikoyan was highly critical of Khrushchev’s behavior toward Eisenhower: “[Khrushchev] simply spat on everyone. He was guilty of delaying the onset of détente for fifteen years.” Clearly, the Premier’s behavior was erratic. Reporting to Warsaw Pact envoys on the failed summit, he crowed, “[Eisenhower] tried so hard he took a shit instead. And that, dear comrades, is what you can report to your governments.” See Taubman, Khrushchev, 466, 468. 10. Macmillan, interview with Robert McKenzie, 14–15. 11. Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 580.

1960–1: Disappointment and Renewal 321 12. For a more extended discussion of the Polaris issue, see Geelhoed and Edmonds, Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, 142–9. 13. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 569. 14. Harold Macmillan to Arthur Skeffington, MP, 1 November 1960, Macmillan Papers, c. 330. 15. Harold Macmillan to Judith Hart, MP, 13 November 1960, ibid. During discussions of the Polaris issue, Eisenhower also agreed that Great Britain would be able to purchase American Skybolt missiles, assuming they proved effective. In fact, during the Kennedy Administration Skybolt was cancelled, but Macmillan was able to purchase Polaris submarines from the US on favorable terms. See Horne, Macmillan II, 442. 16. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 25 July 1960, EL, WFIS, Box 25(b). Box 25(b) includes letters exchanged between Eisenhower and Macmillan for the periods 1 January 1960–4 August 1960, and 4 August 1960–20 January 1961. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 8 August 1960, EL, WFIS, Box 25(b). 20. Ibid. Macmillan apparently was not privy to the Eisenhower Administration’s covert operations plan directed at Cuba, which included the creation of a paramilitary force of Cuban refugees to be trained by the CIA for a possible invasion of the island. See Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 583–4. 21. Khrushchev, Creation of a Superpower, 409. 22. Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 589–90. 23. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 275–9. 24. Ibid., 279; Horne, Macmillan, II, 278–9. 25. “Memorandum of Conference with the President, 2 October 1960 (dated 6 October 1960),” EL, WFIS, Box 25(b). 26. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 278–9. 27. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 14 October 1960, EL, WFIS, Box 25(b). 28. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 10 November 1960, EL, WFIS, Box 25(b). For an assessment of the nature and impact of the Eisenhower–Macmillan relationship, see Geelhoed and Edmonds, Eisenhower, Macmillan and Allied Unity, 151–7.

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309 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN January 4, 1960 Dear Harold: Best wishes for a pleasant African journey.1 The trip is timely indeed in view of the important role Africa is likely to play during the coming decade. With warm regard, As ever, IKE 1

Macmillan made a six-week visit to Africa in early 1960. It was on this trip that he gave his famous “wind of change” speech in South Africa. See Horne, Macmillan, II, 186–98.

310 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 5, 1960 Dear Friend, Thank you so much for your message about Africa. I am off this evening. It will not be an easy trip, but I am sure it must be undertaken. If it would interest you, I will let you have my impressions when I get back. Of course, I shall be in telegraphic touch throughout, and can easily be reached. There is another matter that I should perhaps mention before I leave. I think that when you were here in the summer Anthony talked to you about his book. Serialisation of this is likely to begin in The Times towards the end of this month.1 This is likely to revive some of the old controversies and I dare say we shall have a bit of trouble here. I shall of course do my best to damp things down and no doubt you will do the same, if there is much interest in the United States. My own feeling is that we should leave history to the historians; you and I have quite enough trouble with the present and future without going back over the past. With warm regard, As ever, HAROLD. 1

Macmillan refers to the forthcoming publication of Anthony Eden’s memoirs, Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), where Eden discussed the Suez crisis and the American role in it. In a covering note, Ambassador Caccia advised Eisenhower that Macmillan’s message was “of a particularly personal character and that he hoped that you would treat it as if he were talking to you alone in the room”. EL, WFIS, Box 25(b).

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311 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 12, 1960 Dear Harold: On your return to England, I want you to know that I have been enormously impressed with the great skill with which you carried out your tour of Africa. I am certain that in your visits to each of the countries and territories you have made significant contributions toward the resolution of many critical issues. Very frankly, I was especially struck by your masterful address in Capetown, and your analysis of the forces of nationalism in Africa.1 Please accept my belated birthday greetings and best wishes. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike 1

Here, Eisenhower compliments Macmillan on his “wind of change” speech in South Africa where he outlined a course for national independence in the former colonial states of Africa. See also Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 116–77.

312 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 16, 1960 Dear Friend, Thank you so much for your kind message which I found awaiting me on my return. It has been a very strenuous tour but an extremely interesting one. The problems of Africa are not easy, particularly where the races are mixed, but we must have courage and vision. With warm regard, As ever, Harold.

313 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 17, 1960 Dear Friend, On my return home I have been trying to pick up the threads of the various international problems and I thought that it might be helpful if

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I sent you a few thoughts about the world position as it seems to me coming back as it were fresh to them. I am worried about the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. We must certainly keep these going and maintain the negotiation in being. I am still studying what has been happening there, and particularly the Soviet reaction to your proposals. As you know I feel very deeply what a frightful responsibility you and I have to prevent the spread of these weapons and I am sure that we must really not lose the chance of calling a halt. In this connexion I saw a report about what you said at your Press Conference. This is a very difficult question, especially now that the French have let off their bomb. Have you any particular line of action in mind? I have also been looking into the matter which we discussed at Rambouillet, namely the idea for some secret tripartite machinery in London. There seems to have been a lot of correspondence, especially about what we should discuss, and Couve de Murville now talks about at least the “spirit” of de Gaulle’s Memorandum of 1958.1 My concept had been that these tripartite talks would be our way of dealing with the memorandum, and I had thought that the agenda for particular meetings of the group of officials would form itself as we went along. My own preference would be to get away from arguments about the memorandum and what it did or did not mean and try to concentrate on practical discussion of questions of current interest, however wide these might be. As in fact the three of us seem likely to meet pretty often, the officials in this secret group could do a good job doing preparatory and follow-up work. Selwyn is writing to Chris about this. While I was in Africa, de Gaulle sent me an invitation to go and spend two days with him quietly in the country before Khrushchev goes to France. I think I had better accept this and propose to do so for March 5 and 6. This will give me an opportunity to explore his mind. I should be very grateful for your thoughts on these problems and any others which de Gaulle is likely to raise. I am having a lot of trouble about Cyprus. These people are very difficult to deal with but we shall not give up. There are plenty of other problems, in particular the defence question and the deterrent is quite difficult. I hope to make some progress with our own ideas in the course of the next week or so. Then it might be useful to have some discussion together of these problems before the N.A.T.O. Defence Ministers meet at the end of March. With warm regard, As ever, Harold 1

De Gaulle had sent a letter to Eisenhower on 17 September 1958 criticizing the NATO alliance and pondering France’s role in it. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1830.

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314 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 18, 19601 Dear Harold: Of course I share your concern about the nuclear test negotiations. We are now studying the latest Russian proposal. As to my own suggestion, the scheme was one on which we had been working for a long time and we felt it would stand any kind of critical examination as long as the analysis was fairly made. I am very much afraid that the Soviets are back at the old game of disarming by “pronouncement.” The fact that they imply that only a very limited number of on-site inspections would be permitted is seemingly throwing a road block in the way of real progress. In my view anything that might be done by the United Nations would have to be limited to the atmospheric tests. It could scarcely command the scientific facilities and capacity to enter into the detection of underground and outerspace tests. Respecting the matter we discussed at Rambouillet, I am quite astonished at the atmosphere of formality with which the French seem to view the matter and the difficulties they see of putting the simple plan into action. You will recall that General de Gaulle wanted to have some way of conducting three-way consultations on any subject of common interest. I suggested that we might have one or two junior but capable staff officers from each country keeping abreast of the questions that might call for such consultation and that when the occasion so demanded, conferees at higher level could get into the picture. But such consultations would always be so conducted as to avoid even the appearance of venturing unjustifiably into the affairs of others. When our conversation took place, I thought that General de Gaulle was in complete accord and seemed to agree that the scheme could be set afoot without fanfare and without trouble. Just where it jumped the track I do not know. I quite agree with your statement that we should get away from the arguments about the memorandum and what it did or did not mean, and try to concentrate on practical discussions of current interest. I am glad that you accepted General de Gaulle’s invitation to meet with him for a couple of days at some spot in the country. It appears from my informal reports that the negotiations looking toward the clarification of command structures in NATO show signs of improvement. It would be good to get that problem out of the way. I am not clear as to your exact meaning in referring to the “defense question and the deterrent”. In our own case the measures we are taking seem to us to be sound and though the circumstances of an upcoming Presidential campaign have stimulated a lot of demagogic shrieks and cries of alarm, the

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fact is that our defenses and our deterrent are not only strong but grow more powerful day by day.2 On the other hand I am very much worried that the Congress will again cut back on the amounts we can devote to military assistance to our allies. If they do, I think the Western powers will be faced with a very difficult situation. In my family and, indeed, I think in all Washington, we are examining news bulletins every hour, on the hour, in our anxiety to learn that the new member has joined the Queen’s family. I do most sincerely pray that all goes well. It is good to have you back in London where we can get in touch whenever we choose. With warm regard, As ever, IKE 1 2

The source for this letter is PREM 11/2997. Ike refers here to claims by Democrats that a missile gap favoring the Soviets had developed between the US and the USSR. Eisenhower was correct in his implication that the US was well ahead of the Soviets in missile development.

315 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 14, 1960 Dear Friend I hope you have now recovered from what must have been a most terribly wearying trip in South America.1 I found my African tour very interesting but most tiring. We have many problems in that Continent but I think we are approaching them in the right way. I have just come back from a short visit to de Gaulle. We were able to talk alone without any of the paraphernalia of advisers, experts, Ambassadors and the rest. He was relaxed and rather philosophical but nevertheless quite firm in his ideas about the part that France should play in Europe. His main themes remain unchanged. I do not know if you have read the third volume of his book; it is wonderfully written and gives a picture of his rather mystical thinking on these great matters.2 I think he is disappointed that nothing much has followed from our discussions at Rambouillet about tripartite talks, but he accepts the fact that they are really going to take place because of all the meetings round and about the Summit. We shall have our meeting on the way up and, no doubt, on the way down. His own approach to things makes him prefer a talk with the heads rather than an elaborate machinery, and I think he accepted that

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a new piece of mechanism was undesirable. At the same time I think he would like what he called a very small continuing method of carrying further any discussions that we three might have, even if only to name the subjects for the next discussion. This could easily be done by the Ambassadors, without any special staff. For my part, I think that sometimes these discussions on everything leave us all a little vague and it might be better at such a meeting to have one or two matters only on which we could concentrate. The news came through while we were there of Mr. K.’s illness and much speculation followed. The French have put themselves out a great deal to make this tour a success but there have been some arguments about particular items, and this may account for Mr. K.’s action. Or, what is not improbable, he caught a chill after returning from Indonesia.3 I do not think in the long run that de Gaulle’s feeling as to how we should handle the Russians on the East/West issue differs much from our own, but his main anxiety is about German morale. He wants to confront Mr. K. with the question “do you really want to make a détente or not? If you do, you must not annoy us about Berlin and the rest.” But of course the obvious answer has to be this – that it takes two to make a détente. Here lies our problem. I look forward to seeing you in May. It would be nice to know how you get on with Adenauer. I always remember that meeting with the four of us in the Elysee last December. It is a great comfort to me that we have all been able to agree on a disarmament position and I want to thank you for the helpfulness that Mr. [Cyrus] Eaton has shown throughout, which we have much appreciated.4 I only hope we can make progress on the Geneva Conference. You know how deeply I feel our duty to the world. With warm regard, Yours ever Harold Macmillan 1

2

3

4

Eisenhower made a goodwill trip to South America early in 1960. This trip followed his visit to Europe for the Western Summit in December 1959. The reference here is to Volume III of De Gaulle’s War Memoirs (New York: Viking Press, 1960). The specific nature of Khrushchev’s illness is unclear. In his biography, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, 353–4, Sergei Khrushchev mentions his father’s active travel schedule, including a visit to France early in 1960, but makes no mention of any illness. Likewise, Taubman discusses Khrushchev’s trip to Indonesia and his meetings with De Gaulle at this time but does not indicate any illness. See Taubman, Khrushchev: the Man and His Era, 451–3. Cyrus Eaton was a Canadian-American industrialist and Russophile who had a number of contacts inside the Kremlin and was deeply committed to arms control. When he won the Lenin Prize in 1960, he became anathema to most American conservatives.

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316 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 15, 1960 Many congratulations on the splendid scientific and technological achievement represented by the successful launch of Pioneer V.1 I was delighted to hear this excellent news. 1

Pioneer V, launched on 11 March 1960, was an American spacecraft designed to provide the first mapping of the interplanetary magnetic field.

317 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 18, 1960 Dear Harold: Thank you very much for your letter. Frankly, no prior tour of mine in the past fifteen years has been so tiring as the one I completed in South America. The combination of dust, crowded days and summer heat persuaded me that I am not as young as I was when we were together in Algiers. I have not read General De Gaulle’s memoirs – but I shall make an effort to get the third volume of which you speak. It has been a source of amazement to me that he seems to be unable to fathom the methods by which our three governments could easily keep in close touch on main issues. I explained to him how you and ourselves used both normal diplomatic exchanges, personal communications and, in acute cases, ad hoc committees to keep together. I think that the difficulty may lie in his memory of the British–American “Combined Chiefs of Staff” of World War II days, and his resentment that the French staffs were not integrated into that body. In any event, I have always made it clear that I was ready to do anything reasonable to maintain contacts and mutual understandings among us three; I adhere to this policy. But I think I made it also clear to him that it was impractical to have frequent “Heads of Government” Conferences and yet, as you say, he seems to prefer this kind of approach to any on our common problems. The Chancellor and I got along famously. While I had been informed, a day or so in advance of our meeting, that he had expressed a great deal of uneasiness to friends in New York concerning Western firmness in preserving our rights in Berlin, he did not raise this question with me. I conversationally reassured him on the point, as I have often done before, and he seemed pleased that I had mentioned the matter. He did not show any

1960–1: Disappointment and Renewal 329

concern about it. A day or so later, the Chancellor went to a dinner with Secretary Herter and I hear that some misunderstandings arose which seemed to annoy him. I do not believe, however, that the points of difference involved fundamentals. All of us – including Mr. K. – seem in accord on one subject: the need for progress in controlled disarmament. We seem to be as far apart, as between East and West, as we possibly can be, on the procedures for attaining the objective. I would derive tremendous satisfaction out of seeing some specific practical step agreed upon at the Summit, and initiated as soon as practicable. Such an accomplishment would be tangible evidence of some real progress in a knotty problem that has engaged your effort and mine for a number of years. It would be a ray of light in a world that is bound to be weary of the tensions brought about by mutual suspicion, distrust and arms races. Strangely, I never lose my conviction that sooner or later in some fashion or other, we shall bring about some rift in the clouds. But at the same time I must confess at times to a great feeling of impatience. I forgot to say that the Chancellor is very much preoccupied with the 1961 elections in his country. He made a point of saying that even the opposition agrees with him that all of us, and particularly, all of Germany, must be adamant concerning the allied occupational rights in Berlin. Any seeming weakening of this position would, he believes, have a most damaging effect on his party’s position next year. When we finally get together, maybe we will have an opportunity to compare notes on these journeys that we have been making here and there about the world. With warm regard,

318 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 21, 1960 Record of conversation between Prime Minister and President Eisenhower at 3:15 p.m. P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President

Mr. President, is that you? How are you Harold? Look, I just wanted to have a word with you about this new move at Geneva.1 Yes. I think it is pretty good. Well, as a matter of fact we are studying it right at this minute.

330 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

P.M. President

P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President

P.M. President P.M. President

P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M.

It is a very big prize if we can win it you know, because you would then go down as the man in history who put an end to all this. Well, I tell you Harold, the one legal point we will have to find out is whether I have any authority to do anything beyond my term of office. Yes. In the meantime, we are looking at the thing very sympathetically and it looks like we have made a little mileage. Oh yes, quite a lot. Because I think we could get the moratorium for three years, or something like that. Well, as I say, legally we are not sure whether I can do anything beyond next January you see. Yes, you mean you couldn’t get it through in time. Well, the moratorium would not go to Congress, it would be an executive agreement, and I am going to be the executive for only the next 10 months, 10 months yesterday. Yes, I see, you have to look at that. We could get it all in the Treaty couldn’t we? In a Treaty? Perhaps we could get it in a Treaty, we hadn’t thought of that. That only has to go to the Senate doesn’t it? You see, you haven’t much time for ratification because ratification here would have to be done by the 1st of July, or certainly by the 15th because of these damned Conventions where you nominate the President. It would be wonderful if it could be tied up by you. I want you to do this job. It doesn’t matter who does it, if we can make some progress this way I don’t care so much who does it. Is there any chance of our talking over this. You will be talking it over with your people this week. That’s right. If it would be any use I wish we could meet and have a talk. I will check up. I will talk to Chris about it. What are you doing this week-end? Sunday night I have to make a speech, but apart from that I don’t remember. I would slip over and see you, if you liked, on Saturday or Sunday. We could have a game of golf and a little talk. Well, you can’t have a game of golf here, you have to go South somewhere. Perhaps we could go to the Camp or somewhere – or the Farm?2 I am at your service, I feel this is so important I would like to have a talk with you.

1960–1: Disappointment and Renewal 331

President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M.

1

2

How are you going to be fixed up this next week? I will put everything off to see you. Right – I will have a check with Chris and will send you back a message this evening. Ring me on this: it works very well this telephone. Yes, fine. It is a cable channel you know. It is very good. We could have a talk tomorrow or tonight. I will send you a message on the cable. I will make myself free. I could slip over Friday, spend Saturday and Sunday with you and then come back. I will have a look at my calendar and then call you back. Yes. It is fine to hear your voice. You had a wonderful time in South America.

The “move” Macmillan refers to was a Soviet proposal at Geneva to accept the banning of all nuclear tests that could be monitored if such a ban were linked to “a moratorium of small tests during a period further research.” The Eisenhower Administration was divided but encouraging. In part because of the upcoming US election and the U-2 incident in May, no real progress was made on this issue until 1963, when a test ban was signed by the US, USSR, and Britain. See Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 185. Macmillan refers here to Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, and the Farm, meaning Eisenhower’s home at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

Conversation between the Prime Minister and President Eisenhower at 7.30 p.m. on Monday, March 21, 1960 P.M. President

P.M. President

P.M. President

P.M. President P.M. President

Hullo. Say Harold, I had Herter in and we talked this thing over. He has just now got the translation – the official translation – and after that we have sent back a number of questions. There seems to be a lot of fuzzy spots in the proposal and we’re asking certain questions so we can get a definite answer. Yes. But I think before we make a particular date to meet – until those fellows maybe – can’t get that answer back tomorrow. It’s likely to come say, sometime Wednesday afternoon. That’ll be fine O.K. Needless to say I’d like to see you but you see, unless we get the thing on some sort of definite basis, it will seem to be rather pawing the air you know. Somewhere about Saturday, or next week. Yes. I think it would be a little bit better for the beginning of the week. Beginning of next week. Yes. Where could we meet my dear friend? I’ve got to make a speech Sunday night.

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P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. 1

Where could we meet? Oh, we could come here or we could go over to Camp David. Or go to the farm. Or go to the farm. Or go to the Camp. Yes. We don’t want a lot of people milling around. We want just you and me. You aren’t bringing Selwyn with you, I suppose? No, I don’t think I would. O.K. Well, I want to make it very quiet – just you and me. We’d say we were talking about Summitry. Yes. All right. I’ll let you know by Wednesday if that’ll be all right. I think this is a great occasion if we can only get it straight. Don’t you? Yes. Good. Nice to hear your voice. You had a great time in South America? Yes. We’ve got to talk together about our travels. Were you very tired? When I came back this last time, I was worse than I’ve ever been. I was absolutely worn out after mine. I would like to see you again. We’ll have to be Mr. and Mrs. Gulliver and talk it over.1 That’s right. Goodbye.

Eisenhower refers to Gulliver’s Travels by Jonathan Swift.

Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and President Eisenhower at 4.00 p.m. on Wednesday, March 23, 19601 P.M. President

P.M. President P.M.

President P.M.

Hello, This is the President. Say, for me, I can clear out both Monday and Tuesday, except for one two-hour period. So you can come over and be here Monday morning. If I got there Sunday night. Well, I don’t know about that. But I can do it Monday and Tuesday except for a two-hour period on Tuesday morning. That’s all right, but I mean, we could have a talk. I’d like to have a talk because I think it is such a big subject. Are you getting on all right. Yes. Are you getting on with your thoughts?

1960–1: Disappointment and Renewal 333

President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M.

President P.M.

President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. President P.M. 1

Yes, I’ve been studying it. As a matter of fact I’ve got lots of stuff over here to show you when you come. Yes. I tell you, the only thing that these people want, of course, is primarily a promise forever and ever to just talk on you know … Yes. We shall have to have a time limit on that but I think that they are … they sound like they want to negotiate. It looks to me like it. That’s right. Well now, I think it would be best to be said that I’d come to talk to you about this straight, frankly – not the Summit, because that will upset the other fellows. Make it that I will say I have come to talk about this problem, straight out, tell the truth. Would not that be best? Well, I’d not thought about the cover. I don’t want to do anything that upsets the others. I was thinking, if we start talking about disarmament – we can talk about testing for you and I are the only ones in it. It does not worry the Germans or the French. They won’t play. Yes, you can say we are talking about disarmament. You would set aside Monday and Tuesday for me. So, I tell you … I would not say anything about the reason, say before tomorrow. Oh, no, no: we can do that by telegram. It would give us a chance to see if there is advantage to any other kind of cover story. There’s time to think about that, because I would not break it till – tomorrow is Thursday – till Saturday. O.K. Fine It will be grand to see you. How are you? Oh, I’m pretty good. Tell you what we’ll do. We’ll make it, say 6 o’clock in the evening, and I will operate at 12 o’clock. 6 o’clock our time, 12 o’clock your time. What are we, five or six hours? Five hours, yes. You do it at five in the evening your time and I will do it at twelve. At noon on Saturday Yes, Saturday. Looking forward to seeing you. Well, it will be grand to see you. Very good of you. Thank you.

The source for these three conversations is PREM 11/2990.

334 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

319 MEMORANDUM, EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN Camp David, March 29, 1960.1 A. Skybolt – In a desire to be of assistance in improving and extending the effective life of the V-Bomber force, the US, subject only to US priorities, is prepared to provide Skybolt missiles – minus warheads – to the UK on a reimbursable basis in 1965 or thereafter. Since Skybolt is still in the early stages of development, this offer is necessarily dependent on the successful and timely completion of its development program. Sales will be without any conditions as to use other than those contained in the Mutual Security military sales agreements. B. Polaris – As the UK is aware, the US is offering at the current NATO Defense Ministers meeting to make mobile Polaris missiles – minus warheads – available from US production to NATO countries in order to meet SACEUR’s requirements for MRBMs. The US is also offering to assist joint European production of Polaris if our preference for US production proves unacceptable. It does not appear appropriate to consider a bilateral understanding on Polaris until the problem of SACEUR’s MRBM requirements has been satisfactorily disposed of in NATO. C. Scottish Ports – We welcome the assurance that, in the same spirit of cooperation, the UK would be agreeable in principle to making the necessary arrangements for US Polaris tenders in Scottish ports. Annex A SKYBOLT Memorandum of Understanding The United States Secretary of Defense and the Minister of Defense of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland express their determination that the two countries shall cooperate in the development of the Skybolt missile to permit it to be adopted both by the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force. Mr. [Thomas] Gates affirms the intention of the United States Government to make every reasonable effort to ensure the successful and timely completion of Skybolt development and the compatibility of the missile with Royal Air Force Mark II V-bombers; and agrees that Her Majesty’s Government should have full access to all the necessary information on the project.2 Mr. [Harold] Watkinson states that if the missile is successfully developed and is compatible with Mark II V-bombers Her Majesty’s Government intends to place an order with the United States Government for about one hundred missiles and their associated equipment.3 The warheads would be provided by Her Majesty’s Government.

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Mr. Gates reaffirms on behalf of the Government of the United States the sale of the Skybolt missile, minus warhead, to Her Majesty’s Government shall be as outlined by President Eisenhower in his memorandum to Prime Minister Macmillan on 29 March 1960, as amended. Mr. Gates welcomes Mr. Watkinson’s offer to provide the services of selected scientific staff to maintain liaison with the U.S. development agency and to cooperate in the development program. Mr. Gates and Mr. Watkinson authorize their staffs to proceed with the negotiation of a technical and financial agreement in accordance with the foregoing. 1 2

3

The source for this document is EL, Staff Secretary Records, International Series. Thomas Gates became the United States secretary of defense in December, 1959 and served until the end of Eisenhower’s presidency. Harold Watkinson became the British minister of defence in 1960, succeeding Duncan Sandys.

320 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER Camp David, March 29, 1960 I was so grateful for what you told me today about our decision against a fixed-site rocket and in favor of mobility. I am sure this was the right decision, but I was very heartened to hear you with all your experience confirm my view. I was also grateful to you for expressing your willingness to help us when the time comes by enabling us to purchase supplies of Skybolt without the warheads or to acquire in addition or substitution a mobile MRBM system in the light of such decisions as may be reached in the discussions under way in NATO. As you know either I or the Minister of Defence must make an announcement about Blue Streak before April 13 and I was glad to have your confirmation that the following form of words would cause you no difficulties:1 “The effectiveness of the V-Bomber force will remain unimpaired for several years to come. The need for a replacement for Blue Streak is not, therefore, immediately urgent, nor is it possible at the moment to say with certainty which of several possible alternatives or combinations of alternatives would be technically the most suitable. The Prime Minister, after discussion with the President, understands that the U.S. Government will in any case be favorably disposed to the purchase by the U.K. at the appropriate time of supplies of a suitable air-borne vehicle for the delivery of a British warhead. We shall also be considering the acquisition of a mobile MRBM

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system. Discussions are at present under way in NATO on this question and our decision will be taken in the light of the outcome of these discussions.” 1

Blue Streak was a British MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) under development since the mid-1950s. The program was cancelled in April 1960, mainly because it was not mobile and would therefore be easily subject to Soviet pre-emptive strikes.

321 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 30, 1960 Dear Harold For your personal information only, I am attaching a passage taken from a message I received from Mr. Khrushchev some time ago.1 This passage deals with the Russian attitude toward West Germany, a subject of which you and I have talked so much. While we have no way of determining the sincerity of the statement, it seems to me obvious that this is the line he will take in any negotiations. Consequently, I thought it better to give you the exact language of his statement rather than to be content with the general tenor as I expressed it verbally to you. With warm regard, As ever, IKE 1

In this passage, Khrushchev voiced his fears that West Germany was actually posing a military threat, in violation of postwar agreements. He urged Ike to join the USSR in preventing the rise of a German threat. The Soviet leader particularly deplored any hint of stationing nuclear weapons in West Germany. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1880.

322 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 31, 1960 Dear Friend I find it hard to express in the form of a letter how much I valued our talks over the last few days and how grateful I am to you for all your kindness and hospitality. Camp David is a marvellous place and ideally suited to the kind of practical talks which we have had. Looking back on it I am astonished at how much ground we covered. I believe that this last meeting has been one of the most fruitful which we have had together and I am so much comforted to feel that our thoughts are in line on so many subjects. In particular I am sure that the nuclear tests declaration has marked a real step forward.

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I was also most grateful and very interested in the document which you gave me for my personal information. It is most important to have these indications of the line which Mr. Khrushchev may take. Thank you again very much for your invitation and for your hospitality at Camp David. Please remember me to Mrs. Eisenhower whom I was very glad to see again. Yours ever Harold Macmillan

323 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 5, 1960 Dear Harold: Pursuant to our conversations here in Washington the other day concerning the procedures to be followed at the Summit Meeting, with particular regard to the size of those meetings, I think it might be well if this question were clarified in advance with Chairman Khrushchev. I propose therefore to send a letter to him along the lines of the enclosure to this letter if you and General de Gaulle agree that this is desirable.1 There is a further matter which I think it might be well for us to take up through diplomatic channels with Chairman Khrushchev which derives from my own constitutional responsibilities. This has to do with reaching preliminary agreement on the probable duration of the Summit Meetings. If you agree I should like to have it made clear to him that the length of time I can be absent from this country is limited – in the present instance I must consider the fact that I plan to leave early in June for my visit to the Soviet Union as well as the probable early adjournment of Congress this year. I propose to have our Ambassador at Moscow suggest to Chairman Khrushchev that we should agree the Paris meetings should end by the close of the week of May 16. I am communicating to General de Gaulle in the same sense and should be grateful for an early indication of your reaction to both of the foregoing suggestions. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike 1

In the draft, Ike stressed his antipathy toward large meetings with many advisers and said that the relatively intimate meetings should be discussions rather than formal negotiations. EL, WFIS, Box 25(b).

338 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

324 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 8, 1960 My Dear Friend Thank you very much for your letter of April 5 with which you enclosed a draft letter to Mr. Khrushchev about how to conduct the Summit. As you know from our talks at Camp David, our ideas are very much in line on this. The great thing is to avoid a repetition of the enormous meetings which were held at Geneva last time, and to get down to meetings of a manageable size where discussion and negotiation can really take place. I think that it is difficult at this stage to be very precise about the exact arrangements for the Summit, although I quite understand your feeling that it should not last more than six days. I certainly agree that we ought to have some meetings of the Heads of Government only and that our general plan might be for the heads to meet in the mornings and the advisers to have meetings in the afternoons. Whether we shall want the Foreign Ministers with us will I imagine depend rather on how the Conference proceeds. I would hope that any Plenary Session at the beginning of the Conference could be limited to purely formal matters, including perhaps a speech by President de Gaulle as the host. I think that we should try to avoid giving the Russians an opportunity for a propaganda speech at the opening of the Conference. As regards the restricted meetings of Heads of Government, with or without Foreign Ministers, I feel that it would be better if the interpretation could be organised centrally, probably from a box; interpretation could then be either consecutive or simultaneous as we preferred, and the great advantage would be that we could know that all of us were having the same translation. I am not sure that President de Gaulle agrees about this and he may prefer whispered interpretation. The second point is that I am sure that there ought to be adequate records of a meeting of this sort with the Russians, and I would therefore suggest that each Head of Government should be accompanied by one Private Secretary or note taker. Their task would, of course, be made much easier by a central arrangement for interpretation. I have discussed your letter briefly with President de Gaulle and he seems to be in general agreement with the line which you advocate and with which I so much agree. We both feel, however, that there would be something to be said for the three Foreign Ministers, who are after all meeting in Washington next week, having a word together about the arrangements and perhaps reaching agreement on the draft of a letter which you would then send to Khrushchev as the host at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. I am rather in

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favour of this plan myself, because de Gaulle will, after all, be host at the Summit and it would, I think, be wiser for him to be closely associated with any letter which you send to Khrushchev on this subject. With warm regard, As ever, Harold Macmillan

325 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 30, 1960 Dear Harold: In my talks with President de Gaulle, we agreed on arrangements for our meetings at Paris consistent with the suggestions which you outlined in your letter to me of April 8. As you are aware, the details of these arrangements were also discussed between Secretary Herter and Foreign Ministers Lloyd and Couve de Murville, who I understand will again review this matter during their meetings at Istanbul. If at all possible, we hope to dispense with an opening plenary session and to aim at holding our first Summit meeting at the Elysée Palace on Monday, May 16 at 10:00 a.m. It is our expectation that this would be a short meeting, lasting perhaps an hour, restricted to the Heads of Government and devoted primarily to a discussion of procedural matters if that can be arranged. Immediately thereafter we would be joined by our Foreign Ministers. We hope that subsequent meetings would take place each day at the same time and place and that we would be joined in these restricted meetings by our Foreign Ministers and two officials from each delegation who would be responsible for interpretation and note taking. The question of interpretation which you raised in your letter was discussed between Secretary Herter, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and Lord Hood of your Embassy here. I understand that a report on this subject has been forwarded to London by your Embassy. President de Gaulle, in his role as host, plans to write to Mr. Khrushchev outlining our proposals for Summit arrangements. I am reassured by our various exchanges that we are going into the Summit conference with substantial unity on our basic Western positions. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike

340 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

326 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 18, 1960 That we did not succeed in our hopes to bring the world a little greater assurance of the peace that must somehow be achieved is the unhappy fact that we must accept. Certainly you did everything that you possibly could to bring about a degree of civilized behavior in the arrogant and intransigent man from Moscow; no one could have tried harder. I applaud your efforts; no one could have done more. As we have said in our meetings, we shall have to make a reappraisal of the facts of today’s world. I shall be in touch with you, I know, within the near future. Meantime, my thanks and warm personal regard.

327 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 20, 1960 Dear Friend, Thank you so much for your letter which cheered me up a great deal. It was typically generous of you to send it. Of course all this is very depressing, but I am now pretty sure, looking back on the course of the Paris meeting, that Khrushchev had determined before he arrived to break it up. I cannot tell you how much I admired the magnanimity and restraint with which you acted throughout those trying few days. I shall have an opportunity of saying something of what I feel in the House of Commons today.1 As to the future, no one can tell which way it will go. But certainly our experiences in Paris make it all the more important to strengthen our Western alliance. I am sure that what you said at our last tri-partite meeting will have a lasting effect. Yours ever, Harold Macmillan 1

Macmillan thought that his explanation of the summit failure was well received by the Commons. When he entered the House, he “got a good cheer.” His statement about Paris “was received in silence, but with muffled applause at the end.” See Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 215.

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328 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 24, 1960 Dear Harold: I have just received your cable of May twentieth. I enthusiastically endorse your observation that you and I should remain as closely together as is humanly possible. When your message reached me, I was just dictating one to you concerning two newspaper stories, disturbing to me, that came out of London, one written by a man named Cook, the other by Middleton, both Americans. While the stories do not deal with the same phases of post-Paris events, both do refer to some fancied rift between you and me or between our respective associates and assistants.1 As you know, there is no slightest foundation for any such stories so far as Chris Herter and I are concerned. Moreover, in spite of the fact that one of the stories reports that some of the Americans who were left in Paris after the departure of Chris and myself voiced criticism of you and your efforts to bring about a Summit meeting, I cannot believe there is any foundation of fact for the story. All the people working around me and with me heard me time and again refer to the ideal association between you and myself and, indeed, between the both of us and General de Gaulle. Moreover, you and I agreed long ago that a Summit meeting was advisable, particularly after Mr. K. removed his alleged ultimatum on Berlin. Another item refers to a conclusion that your reception of Mr. K. on Sunday afternoon was ill-advised because by doing so you indicated or created a rift between our two delegations. Of course nothing could be more ridiculous. I was anxious for you to receive the man to see whether his afternoon story would be the same as the one he gave to General de Gaulle in the morning. Of course I know that you do not take such stories as these too seriously. I have respected your judgment and valued your friendship for more than seventeen years, and I want to assure you that my confidence in you is higher, if possible, than ever before. After leaving Paris I spoke publicly both in Lisbon and in Washington and in both instances took occasion to point out that one good result of the failure of the conference was to bring the allies closer together. I referred especially to the splendid spirit that animated the three of us at all our meetings. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike 1

The two articles to which Eisenhower refers were by Don Cook, “Summit Casualty – Macmillan,” New York Herald Tribune, 23 May 1960; and by Drew Middleton, “West’s Future Aims: Macmillan’s Summit Role,” New York Times, 24 May 1960.

342 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

329 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER May 25, 1960 My dear Friend Since our discussion in Paris with President de Gaulle about improving cooperation between our three Governments we here have been thinking about the methods to use. The United States, France and the United Kingdom have between them an overwhelming responsibility for the wise direction of Western alliances. We are also, as powers victorious in the last War, in a special position with regard to Germany. On the other hand, we do not want unduly to offend our various other allies by seeming ostentatiously to exclude them from our deliberations. I expect that you and President de Gaulle will have ideas on all this, and I suggest that the Foreign Ministers should discuss the problem when they meet in Washington early next week. Meanwhile I thought it might be helpful to send to you and to President de Gaulle the enclosed memorandum which attempts to explore some of the possibilities as regards mechanics for consultation between us.1 I feel that by moving along the lines of this memorandum we should be able to develop better between us a common attitude towards the great global problems, upon our handling of which the peace of the world and the security of the West so much depend. Yours ever, Harold Macmillan 1

The title of the memorandum that Macmillan enclosed with the letter was “Mechanics of Tripartite Consultations.” Essentially, the memorandum suggested a more formalized process of consultation between the United States, Great Britain and France, beginning at the level of the foreign ministers.

330 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 2, 1960 Dear Friend Selwyn has told me of his good talk with you and of the kind things that you said. I have been waiting to thank you for your letter of May 24 until after we had had our debate here. In fact, as you probably saw, everything went off very quietly and the Opposition behaved pretty well. Everyone seems quite calm, and I am glad to read that de Gaulle too has spoken so sensibly.

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Of course I did not take the Cook–Middleton story seriously. Poor Jock Whitney was worried about it, but I wrote to him at once to say that I quite understood that it was just a journalist’s statement. But it was very good of you to send me such a generous letter and to speak so warmly. You know how much I value your friendship and I think that our sort of close feeling for each other is the kind of thing which grows stronger with the years. Yours ever Harold Macmillan

331 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 4, 1960 Dear Harold: I want to thank you for the thoughtful memorandum on improving tripartite consultation which you sent me with your letter of May 25. In accordance with your suggestion the three Foreign Ministers met here in Washington and had a profound and, I believe, useful discussion of ways and means to improve the consultative process. As you pointed out, we have had a series of tripartite meetings in recent years but these have not always been as efficiently organized as they might have been. This we hope to improve in the future. During the June first discussions here Chris Herter suggested that Livie Merchant, who has global responsibilities within the State Department, be charged with keeping in touch with his opposite numbers in the French and British Foreign Offices.1 The three could prepare agenda and discussion papers for future meetings and could assure both system and continuity in our tripartite consultations without, however, creating an official secretariat or other apparatus which might lead sensitive members of the alliance such as Italy or Canada to believe that an “inner directorate” had been created. This proposal sounds eminently sensible to me. It is essentially that which you proposed in your memorandum. I believe that our consultations should concentrate on those areas where the Three Powers have special responsibilities and on global questions in which the Three have unique interests. I believe that we should also continue to develop consultation in NATO, paralleling progress toward more effective tripartite consultation. I agree with you that we must be most circumspect about our tripartite meetings in order to avoid upsetting unnecessarily other Governments, both our allies and those newly-emergent countries, especially in Africa, who look with suspicion on consultation among the Western powers on African

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matters. We cannot, on the other hand, maintain such a tight secrecy that our motives and actions are suspected. This seems especially true in NATO. We have therefore suggested that a means be worked out to keep other NATO members generally informed of our conversations. From our talks should emerge a means by which we can have more regular and better organized consultation among the three of us on political problems facing the Free World. We cannot, however, be sure that we have satisfied General de Gaulle’s desires. This was hinted at by the French Foreign Minister when he said that the problem of military coordination is a matter for future discussion. The memorandum which General de Gaulle promised to send us should give us a further insight into his thinking and I am sure we will want to consult about how to reply to it after it is received. In essence, I believe that we have moved somewhat along the path towards a greater harmonization of our policies. It seems to me essential to continue this effort. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike 1

Livingston Merchant was an experienced Foreign Service diplomat who held a number of different position during the Eisenhower years. At this time, he was Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.

332 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 10, 1960 Dear Harold: I have learned that you may be considering a visit to some of the Latin American countries later on this year. I hope that you will decide to go. To my mind such a trip should be of great value in demonstrating your interest in the countries of that continent, and it could very well help us in our dealings with them, too. With warm personal regard, As ever Ike

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333 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 12, 1960 Dear Friend, Many thanks for your message. My plans are rather uncertain, but I had thought of trying to get to South America in the course of the winter. Your message to me is of great encouragement to make the effort. With kind regards, As ever, Harold

334 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 15, 1960 Dear Friend, I have now had a full report from the Minister of Defence about the discussions which he and Gates have had about Skybolt, and the general understanding they have reached.1 I am very glad to know that this has worked out so well. I think we ought now to embody their general understanding in a more precise agreement, including detailed arrangements for the development of this weapon. You know how important it is that it should be compatible with the requirements both of your Strategic Air Command and of our own Bomber Command. I am asking our Ambassador to take this up with your people as soon as possible and am sending out suitable experts to advise him. As regards Polaris, as I told you at Camp David, I shall do my best about a suitable arrangement for the use of Scottish ports. You will realize that this is a pretty big decision for us to take. It will raise political difficulties for us in view of all the pressures and cross-currents of public opinion here. I must, therefore, put it to my Cabinet colleagues which I propose to do early next week when Parliament reassembles. I hope it will be possible for us to make a mutually satisfactory arrangement. I will send you a further message as soon as I have the authority of the Cabinet. All the best wishes for your visit to the Far East. With warm regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan

346 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence 1

Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates and British Minister of Defence Harold Watkinson had met in early June and had agreed “that the United States would make every effort to complete development of the air-launched Skybolt ballistic missile by 1965.” At that point the British would be able to purchase around 100 of the new weapons. In addition, they agreed that Great Britain would purchase two Polaris submarines if the US Congress approved. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1990.

335 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN Seoul June 20, 1960 Dear Harold: Thank you for your letter of June 15. I, too, am pleased that the talks between your Minister of Defense and Secretary Gates results in general understanding of the program for mutual cooperation in Skybolt. I feel confident that the details can be worked out to meet the requirements of both bomber command and our own strategic air command. I fully appreciate the political difficulties confronting you and your colleagues regarding provision of facilities for our Polaris submarines in the Clyde. Nevertheless, I do hope that you will find it possible to proceed this year with the arrangement upon which we reached an agreement in principle at Camp David, and I will look forward to hearing from you on the outcome of your cabinet consideration. With warm personal regard, As ever, IKE

336 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 24, 1960 Dear Friend, I have now been able to discuss with my Cabinet colleagues how we can best arrange for facilities for Polaris submarines in Scotland. I am glad to be able to tell you that the Cabinet have accepted this plan as a substantial reinforcement of the deterrent forces of the West. We shall do all we can to assist you in this enterprise, and we hope that its success will further strengthen the partnership between our two countries and the whole Western Alliance.

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At the same time, I am sure you realise that this proposal must cause serious political controversy in our country at this time. There are here, and we have to face it, difficult cross-currents of opinion on the nuclear problem and opposition is kept alive by all kinds of forces, some of them traditional, such as the true pacifists, and some of them less worthy. Ours is a small and densely populated island and we already provide facilities for a substantial share of the strategic striking force of the West. Our people are inevitably conscious that this duty of providing the advance base exposes them to special risks. This means that we must be able to present this project in a way which will command public support. I think we can only secure this if the following points are met. 2.1 First, as regards location. When we talked about this at Camp David, though the record is in terms of “Scottish ports” you had the Gareloch in mind. Since then I have gone into this very carefully and I am convinced that it would be a serious mistake from your point of view as well as ours, to use the Clyde for this purpose. It is true that it has, ready-made, some of the shore facilities and amenities you need; but its proximity to Glasgow is from every other point of view a very serious disadvantage. It would surely be a mistake to put down what will become a major nuclear target so near to the third largest and the most overcrowded city in this country. As soon as the announcement was made, [Rodion] Malinovsky would threaten to aim his rockets at Glasgow and there would be not only the usual agitation of the defeatists and the pacifists but also genuine apprehension among ordinary folk.2 But a more immediate difficulty is that a city of this size inevitably contains large numbers of people who would be quick to take the opportunity of making physical demonstrations against us both. Security problems would certainly be much greater here than in some less populated area. 3. For these reasons I believe that Loch Linnhe would be a far better location. Our technical experts have looked at it and they are satisfied that it would meet all the main operational requirements. From a security point of view, a robust population of three or four thousand highlanders at Fort William is much more to my taste than the rather mixed population in the cosmopolitan city of Glasgow. One of the reasons why your bomber bases have worked so well is that they have been mainly in rural areas where they attract less attention and the population is steadier. Of course I know that later on you will have to have buildings and schools and shops and all the rest of it, and I recognise that it will take longer to provide these at Loch Linnhe. But it would help a great deal if we could get over first the arrival of the tender and the dock with the minimum of fuss. After all, your men, like ours, are well accustomed to foreign stations and their occasional temporary discomforts. 4. Secondly, I think it is important that this should be seen to be a joint enterprise designed to strengthen the deterrent forces of the West. We must run the affair as a partnership. I cannot define the nature or extent of our participation – beyond offering you these facilities – until we have had

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longer to consider whether we should adopt Polaris ourselves. But I think it must be made publicly clear from the outset that we shall have an option to come in ourselves on the operation of Polaris submarines. In other words, we give you the facilities for the floating dock and the tender and we get in return the option of buying from you and/or building submarines so that we can make in the years to come a contribution to the Western deterrent as effective as our bomber force now is. 5. Thirdly, there is the question of control. It will not be necessary for me to explain to the public the whole of the procedure. But I am conscious that I cannot honestly represent to Parliament that the reconfirmed Attlee/Truman agreement will apply to these submarines in the same way as it applies to the bombers. We have a firm understanding that your bombers would not undertake operational missions from British bases without our prior agreement. With the submarines, all that has been suggested so far is that they should not, without our consent, fire their missiles from within our territorial waters. I am wondering whether this could for presentational purposes be extended to something like a hundred miles. But, in the main, I shall have to rely on our general understanding. There is one other point. I presume that your Polaris fleet will be under the operational control of Admiral [Robert] Dennison.3 It would be a great help if I were able to say that the British Vice-Admiral who is already attached to him in his NATO capacity would represent us in this matter – in the first instance because we are providing these facilities in Scotland, and later on, if we have them, because we shall be operating Polaris submarines of our own. If at any time we have our own Polaris vessels, we should of course desire that they should be operated jointly with yours; and it would help me if I could look forward to this in any statement which I have to make now. 6. Finally, there is the question of the European MRBM. We understand Norstad’s views but all this is much complicated at the present by the French position, and we do not know whether this project will ultimately take effective shape or not. I do feel, however, that if it does, what we might do in the way of Polaris in the future as well as what we are trying to with Skybolt puts a pretty heavy strain on our resources, and we could hardly make much of a separate contribution to the European system. But if we go in for Polaris, we might make our contribution through that. 7. If you can let me know that you agree in principle with what I have said in this message I will instruct our Ambassador in Washington to let you have a draft of a Memorandum of Understanding which would cover all the points and a draft of an early public announcement. At a later stage, I think it will be necessary for us to send over a technical mission to discuss detailed arrangements about the supply of information about the Polaris submarine and its missiles. We should, of course, be ready to make the warheads ourselves. There is also the question of training. We should certainly want your help in training crews before we were anywhere near taking delivery of the

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first of our submarines. All this would have to be tied up with a technical and financial agreement at a later stage. With warm regard, As ever, Harold Macmillan 1 2 3

There is no number 1 in this letter. Rodion Malinovsky was minister of defense for the USSR from 1957 to 1967. Admiral Robert L. Dennison was Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, from 1960 to 1963.

337 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 27, 1960 Dear Friend, You will now have seen the letters which President de Gaulle sent to both of us on June 10 about Tripartite consultation.1 You suggested in your letter of June 4 that we should consult together before replying. It is satisfactory to see that General de Gaulle is in broad agreement with the procedure for political consultation suggested in my memorandum of May 25, as elaborated at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Washington on June 2. At the official level this would mean that each of our three governments appointed an official to deal with these matters, e.g. identify subjects for discussion, and prepare the papers and agendas for the Foreign Ministers’ meetings; they would correspond with each other on Tripartite matters, constituting, so to speak, a very informal secretariat. We had in mind someone of the rank of Counsellor, but I gather that Chris Herter was thinking in terms of someone more senior and suggested Mr. Merchant on your side. If we accept this we should nominate Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar2 and the French would presumably propose the Permanent Head of the Quai D’Orsay or else perhaps the official whom they call the “Directeur Politique”. This is probably what de Gaulle means by what he says in the fourth paragraph of his letter to me of June 10. We are quite prepared to agree to such an arrangement. It would also be understood that the Foreign Secretaries would take advantage of any opportunities presented by meetings of international organisations to have some unobtrusive discussions among themselves on Tripartite subjects. In addition it would no doubt be desirable for the Heads of Government to meet from time to time, but such meetings will have to be arranged ad hoc. All we need to do now is to decide in principle that they are desirable from time to time.

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Perhaps not unexpectedly, General de Gaulle in the second part of his letter reverts to the proposals in his original memorandum of September 1958 for closer military co-operation. This of course, is a much more difficult proposition and I should be interested to have your views. With warm regards, As ever, Harold. 1

2

Eisenhower responded to de Gaulle’s letter of 10 June on 18 June. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 1979–80. In 1960, Millar was British Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

338 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 30, 1960 Dear Harold: Thank you very much for your letter of June 24, 1960, wherein you offer to do all you can to assist us in our POLARIS submarine enterprise, but at the same time point out some serious political considerations which must necessarily be taken into account. Although I had not realized that there were such considerations when we discussed the matter at Camp David, I must of course recognize that they do exist for you. In any case, we now have a better understanding of the problems which could arise from our joint participation in a missile submarine program at this time, and much appreciate the consideration which you have given to our request. We readily agree with you that insofar as your given reasons are concerned, Loch Linnhe would be a better location for the POLARIS submarine tender and drydock than the Clyde. Other factors important to our ballistic missile submarine needs, however, compel us reluctantly to decline your offer of Loch Linnhe. These reasons would include the need for greater shore facilities for logistical support, more immediate access to open seas and international waters, and the need for comparative ease and safety of navigation. Furthermore, and quite aside from these operational considerations, the other points raised in your letter would present difficulties for us. In line with considerations discussed between Mr. Watkinson and Mr. Gates on June 6, the U. S. Navy has now made plans to keep the drydock in the United States for another year, and to delay deployment of the tender until other arrangements can be made. This would include the possibility of basing them in the United States. I was glad that Mr. Watkinson and Mr. Gates had such a satisfactory discussion concerning SKYBOLT and POLARIS MRBM’s. I hope that we can

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both continue to seek an effective solution to the NATO MRBM program which we consider of great importance. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike

339 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 30, 1960 Dear Harold: The ideas set forth in your letter of June 27 about our future tripartite political consultations are quite satisfactory to us. Your original suggestions and the discussion held here in Washington on June 1 appear to provide a means by which the tripartite meetings of our foreign ministers can be made more useful. I assume that their next meeting will take place this fall in New York in connection with the United Nations General Assembly. The arrangements for this meeting would, in accordance with the suggestion we have all approved, be made by Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Mr. Merchant and by whomever the French select for this task. While this arrangement should improve our tripartite political consultation, it does not meet General de Gaulle’s desire to see such consultation paralleled by strategic discussions by military representatives along the lines he proposed in his original memorandum. In his letter to you of June 10, of which he sent me a copy, General de Gaulle suggested that our military representatives in the Standing Group could hold talks outside the regular deliberations of that body. In my reply I expressed to him my doubts as to the practicability of using any part of the NATO mechanism for strategic consultations, believing that our Allies would object. I am sure that this would be the case, as it would be difficult to keep secret such consultations and the very fact that our representatives to the Standing Group were meeting separately to discuss global strategic matters would lead other members of the alliance to believe that we had, in fact, established some sort of inner directorate. This impression we must avoid. It does seem, however, that we must find some way to cope with this aspect of General de Gaulle’s thinking. It might be possible, for instance, to have talks here in Washington by appropriate military representatives. You and the French might delegate this responsibility to a senior military officer assigned to Washington. The French might, in such case, select their representative to the Standing Group. We, on the other hand, could select an appropriate general officer who has no connection with the Standing Group

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itself. These talks, of course, would have to be conducted along previouslyagreed guidelines, but I am sure that we could work this out. In this connection, I would like to recall that a year ago we did hold tripartite talks on Africa under the chairmanship of Robert Murphy. At these talks military representatives were present. Both you and the French were represented by your members of the Standing Group. At those talks the French requested separate and continuing military talks. After a period of consideration we agreed to do this, selected an appropriate officer to head up our side, and informed the French we were ready. They have never responded to this offer. I think, nevertheless, that we could re-new this offer and I would propose so doing in my reply to General de Gaulle. This may not be the organized strategic planning on a global scale, including the question of the use of nuclear weapons anywhere, which he appears to want. It is, however, a definite move forward in the field of military consultation which may in the end strengthen our alliance. It will, of course, have to be carefully and discreetly conducted. I will ask the State Department to discuss this matter more fully with your Embassy here with the hope that we can work out promptly a common position which we can communicate to General de Gaulle. With warm personal regard, As ever, Dwight D. Eisenhower

340 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 2, 1960 Dear Friend, Thank you for your message about Polaris. I am sorry you feel that Loch Linnhe will not do, in spite of its obvious advantages, from many points of view, over the crowded area of the Clyde. However, I do see the technical advantages of the Gareloch and if this is the really vital point for you, I will have the question re-opened. It would be very sad if such a valuable strategic plan had to be abandoned. Moreover, I would be much distressed if you thought that there had been any misunderstanding on location at Camp David. You will remember that with regard to the question of control with the possibility of our obtaining the Polaris submarine, of which you gave me a model, for our Navy, we did not go into any detail. Please let me have your thoughts frankly on all this. It is a great pity we cannot meet to talk it over. I have been thinking a lot about our new troubles with Castro. Chris and Selwyn are I know in close touch about this, but do let me know if there is

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anything you think we should do. We will try to help you in any way we can over what might develop into a really serious Russian threat.1 One thing at any rate has gone well. It looks as if Cyprus is settled and I am really grateful for your help on this all through.2 With warm regard, As ever, Harold Macmillan 1

2

In this letter Macmillan introduced the subject of the difficulties which the United States was having with the Castro regime in Cuba. Like Eisenhower, Macmillan viewed the Cuban situation as a problem caused by Castro’s increasingly close relationship with the Soviet Union. On 7 July 1960, Greek and Turkish Cypriots reached an accord on their respective division of responsibilities in a new government for Cyprus. The British House of Commons passed a bill granting independence to Cyprus on 29 July.

341 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 9, 1960 Dear Harold: I have been giving considerable thought to the handling of the nuclear detonations in the seismic research program. This program is essential if we are to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing of the kind you and I proposed on March 29, and if the moratorium which we are prepared to agree to is to provide us answers on the underground detection problem. We have explored here, and with your people, various ways of dealing with the safeguards for these nuclear detonations. One possibility is a pool approach whereby devices of the U.K., the U.S., and the USSR would be used on a reciprocal basis. Another approach would be an offer by the United States to open its seismic research devices to inspection by representatives of the U.K. and the USSR. Either approach would, as you know, require Congressional authorization. With respect to the first proposal it is probable that the Soviets will reject it inasmuch as they have already stated that they have no intention of using nuclear explosions in seismic research. In spite of this I feel it is important that we put the pool idea forward as a proposal. It will be another evidence of our desire to find a cooperative solution. A further reason that I believe it is desirable to put this forward is the strong feeling expressed by certain members of the Congress that a safeguards arrangement should be reciprocal. Having made this proposal, we would then be in a better position to obtain Congressional support for the second course of action. I have

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concluded that we should not put forward this proposal accompanied by any sort of warning of possible unilateral action in the event of Soviet rejection. If the Soviets reject the pool proposal in spite of our best persuasion, we plan to offer open devices used in the United States seismic research program for examination by the United Kingdom and the USSR. This proposal would also be put forward without a warning of possible unilateral action in event of Soviet rejection. Implementation of this proposal would of course be subject to Congressional action which I could request in August if the Soviets show any likelihood of accepting. However, should the Soviets reject this reasonable proposal or should they delay their response for an unreasonable period it would be our intention to announce that we are proceeding with the U.S. seismic research program and that we intend to invite United Nations or other international observation of these experiments. If this proposal does not satisfy the Soviets I doubt there is anything we can devise which would, and under those circumstances I believe our action in going ahead would be widely understood and supported. As for timing, it is our objective to put forward these proposals and be prepared in the event of Soviet rejection or undue delay to make the above mentioned announcement sometime during August. To protect our negotiating position we are limiting knowledge of the second proposal and our future intentions to the smallest possible group. With warm personal regard, As ever, Dwight D. Eisenhower

342 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 11, 1960 Dear Harold: The expression in your last letter of sympathy and support with respect to the Cuban problem was especially heartwarming. It was a great comfort to know you were with us at a time when difficult decisions had to be made and we found ourselves forced, by the course Castro has elected to follow, to engage ourselves and our prestige more directly and publicly than heretofore to resolving this challenge to our security and vital interests. Because the Cuban problem so profoundly affects not only the security of the United States but is also related to the security of the Free World as a whole, it might be well to review the dimension of the problem as we see it. Since Castro took over Cuba a year and a half ago, our policy toward Cuba can be divided roughly in three phases. The first phase might be called the

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testing phase. Although the known radical and anti-American background of the Castro brothers, and especially their previous involvement in Communist-front causes, gave cause for deep skepticism, the evidence was not altogether conclusive and it could not be foretold how these youthful leaders would react under the sobering responsibilities and opportunities which were theirs. More importantly, at that time there were with Castro’s Government Cubans of ability and moderation who had joined with Castro in pledging that Cuba would have a democratic, elected government, that it would respect Cuba’s international obligations and that, within that framework, it would carry out certain reforms which, in principle, we could all agree were not only popular but needed in Cuba. There was thus some chance that this moderate, experienced and democratic element would check the extremists and this chance had to be tested not only for our own satisfaction but because the great popularity which Castro then enjoyed throughout this Hemisphere and the world gave us no alternative but to give him his chance. Our first actions, therefore, were directed to give Castro every chance to establish a reasonable relationship with us. At first gesture, we extended quick recognition and I immediately appointed a new Ambassador to Cuba who was singularly well regarded by Cubans and Latin Americans and who could have established a fruitful relationship with Castro if anyone could. When Castro came to the United States under private auspices in April of last year, he was not only well received by the public and the press, but our own Governmental contacts with him were then calculated to make cooperation possible if he had any disposition for it. We sharply curbed all inclination to retort and strike back at his early diatribes against us, leaving the way open to him to climb off of this line and get down to the serious business of running the affairs of his country responsibly. Before the first six months had ended, it was clear Castro had failed this test and by Fall I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion, as a basis for our Government’s actions, that there was no reasonable chance that Castro and his lieutenants would cooperate in finding a reasonable modus vivendi with us. The story of the cancellation of elections, of the ascendancy of the Communist oriented group and purge of the moderates, of the executions and the hounding of all anti-Communists, of the abortive Cuban-supported efforts to overthrow various Caribbean governments, and of the shrill anti-American diatribes is too well known to require details. We were directly affected when Castro, choosing the Agrarian Reform Law version advanced by the extremists, authorized the expropriation of extensive American properties without acceptable provision for compensation. When this was implemented, it turned out that not even these unsatisfactory conditions were observed but our people’s properties were seized without even a pretense of observing the Castro regime’s own laws; so far as I know the promised bonds have not even been printed. This naturally aroused widespread disillusionment and indignation in this country but, in the longer view, it was perhaps not so serious

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and irrevocable as the increase of Communist influence in Cuba. With the moderates gone and the Prime Minister equating anti-Communism with treason to his revolution, our intelligence increasingly indicated that the Communists began permeating Cuba’s life and government. The Communist Party was the only party allowed to operate, its members infiltrating every key government and military department. I imagine that Cuba today is the only country outside the Bloc whose security chief is a communist. Despite these developments, it was not feasible for us immediately to take a hard line towards Castro. The second phase of our policy towards him, which acquired the popular misnomer of “policy of restraint,” has covered roughly the last year. Its primary objective and effect was to make clear to the Cuban people and to the world that the deteriorated situation was of Castro’s making, not of ours. We are deeply committed, especially in this Hemisphere, to the policy of non-intervention, and our standing in the world is probably due more than to any other single factor to the instinctive realization of all peoples that, while we offer aid and leadership, we respect the rights of weaker nations and do not seek to impose our will upon them. We could simply not afford to appear the bully. In this, of course, we realized that our own sources of information as to what was actually happening in Cuba were vastly superior to those available to the public, especially in the Latin American Republics, and that Castro continued to enjoy an undeserved degree of popular hero-worship. It took time and effort on our part for the process of disillusionment in other countries to catch up with the process here. The third, and more active phase, of our policy is the one on which we are now embarking. The critical element is the degree to which Cuba has been handed over to the Soviet Union as an instrument with which to undermine our position in Latin America and the world. The Soviets, at first, showed some measure of caution as to the degree of their commitment to Castro. The Latin American Communist Party leaders were instructed at the Soviet Party Congress in Moscow last year to give full support to Castro, but Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership did not commit themselves openly to Castro until Mikoyan’s visit last January, a year after Castro came to power. The trade and credit agreements reached then exposed fully the intent of Castro, despite Cuba’s formal commitments under the Rio Treaty and the Charter of the Organization of American States, to orient itself toward the Soviet Union.1 It is interesting to speculate about the degree to which the Communists are committed to Castro in the context of the current Soviet–Communist Chinese ideological struggle. We have noted that the Bloc leaders and the Communist theoretical publications have gone out of their way to endorse Castro while largely ignoring of late other positive neutralists. Khrushchev chose, perhaps significantly enough, the Indian Parliament this Spring to endorse Castro. He singled out the Cuban Revolution again at his press conference in Paris at the close of the Summit. It would appear that the Communists see in Castro

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a reconciliation of Khrushchev’s views on peaceful co-existence and the Chinese Communists more aggressive line. In distinction to other neutralist leaders, Castro fully incorporates the Communists in his regime, carries out a precipitant revolution against the existing social order, and is far more internationalist in his pretensions to spread his revolution to surrounding countries than the usual type of nationalist whom the Communist court. If the Communists could find other leaders who met Khrushchev’s standards of “peaceful coexistence” and Mao’s of a Communist revolutionary we would be in very serious trouble indeed. I have been told that Mikoyan, on returning to Moscow from Cuba, was exuberantly rejuvenated, finding that what was going on in the youthful and disorganized Cuban Revolution brought him back to the early days of the Russian Revolution. As it appears to us, the Castro Government is now fully committed to the Bloc. We cannot prudently follow policies looking to a reform of Castro’s attitude and we must rely, frankly, on creating conditions in which democratically minded and Western-oriented Cubans can assert themselves and regain control of the island’s policies and destinies. We fully recognize, of course, that the pre-Castro regimes of Cuba are discredited and have lost their appeal. Moreover, any solution to the Cuban problem must hold out to the Cuban people the promise of democratic government and reform without the extremism of the present government, which has mortgaged itself to the Soviets and to how far the Soviet leadership is willing to go to support it. It is encouraging, in this respect, that ever increasing numbers of the moderates who are committed to reform have left Castro and are organizing an embryonic resistance movement. Although it is still too early to hope that the Cubans themselves will set matters right, it would, of course, be preferable that they do so rather than force us and the other American Republics to take more drastic action. As we enter this new phase, our primary objective is to establish conditions which will bring home to the Cuban people the cost of Castro’s policies and of his Soviet orientation and also to establish a climate in which those who recognize the necessity of eventually beneficial relations between Cuba and the United States can assert themselves. This objective underlays the action which I took this week in eliminating all but a fraction of the Cuban sugar quota for the balance of this year, although there are, of course, ample economic reasons why the United States should not rely heavily as a source of supply for an important commodity on a country whose government has made clear its intent to orient itself towards the Communist Bloc. Nor, in the fact of Castro’s hostility, ties with communism, and treatment of our property and other rights could we justify in effect subsidizing his revolution with the premium price we pay for Cuban sugar. I anticipate that, as the situation unfolds, we shall be obliged to take further economic measures which will have the effect of impressing on the Cuban people the cost of this communist orientation. We hope, naturally, that these measures will not be

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so drastic or irreversible that they will permanently impair the basic mutuality of interests of Cuba and this country. We also look to some form of action in the Organization of American States. This has been and remains a most difficult problem. By now, the Governments of most of the other Latin American Republics seem to be recognizing that Castro and the degree to which his movement has become an instrument of the communists represents a very real threat to them. Yet they remain reluctant to step forward on the issue, in great part because of concern about provoking leftist and deluded elements in their countries but also because, unable to exact decisive pressure themselves and preoccupied with domestic problems, they have little eagerness to side with us against a sister Latin American country. Nevertheless, especially if a solution can be found to the emotionally-charged problem of the Dominican Republic, whose regime is universally hated in Latin America, there is room for hope that we will get some support in facing up to the Castro dictatorship. In the immediate future there are a number of problems in which your help could be most useful. The most important of these, perhaps, concerns the United Nations. It is highly probable that Cuba, recognizing its lack of support among American Republics, will attempt to by-pass the Organization of American States and present to the Security Council or to this Fall’s General Assembly some sort of charge against us and that they will receive Soviet support. We should be well prepared for this, and shall rely heavily on your cooperation. You will recall that when Guatemala made a complaint in 1954 (although the cases have more dissimilarities than similarities) there were some divergencies between our two governments. We have always held that, under the Charter, we were obligated in the first instance to seek bilateral settlement and go to the Organization of American States, before the United Nations considered the case. Another and more immediate problem concerns tankers. As you know, Castro’s insistence on displacing Free World petroleum with Soviet oil led to the taking over of British and American refineries, despite the fact that the companies concerned had in effect previously extended substantial credits to finance continued petroleum exports to Cuba. It appears that the Castro Government now has a commitment from the USSR to supply the oil, but that the latter is having substantial difficulties in finding tankers to move it on this long haul. We think that there is every reason discreetly to discourage the use of Free World tankers to bring Soviet oil to refineries which have been taken from our companies and yours and, more importantly, that a petroleum shortage in Cuba would not only raise questions there about Castro’s capabilities but also crystallize doubts about the reliability of the USSR. Your help, not only with respect to British tankers, but in influencing other tanker-owning countries would be invaluable. We are also reviewing our arms export and war materiel policies with a view to tightening them up. We have been deeply grateful for the cooperation of

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your government in the past in this field, all the more so because we realize fully the difficulties which a restrictive policy has caused. However, I am deeply concerned about the quantities of arms which the Castro Government has on hand as a result of the imports which have been made to add to what was taken over from the previous government. There is not only the threat that this increasing stockpile, which may include items being supplied by the Bloc, will be used in movements against other Latin American Governments but the danger that indiscriminate issue of arms and equipment when the Castro Government is threatened or falls will result in civil war or chaos. This would confront us with a most difficult problem. We shall notify your government very shortly of the details of our arms policy, and would be grateful if it were possible for you to take parallel action and help us to obtain the concurrence of NATO and other supplying companies. Before signing this long – although I think necessary – exposition of our Cuban policy, I should like to reiterate my full endorsement of the trip I understand you are contemplating making to Latin America later this year. In relation to the Cuban problem, I can scarcely think of anything more useful than the very fact of your presence and evident interest in Latin America to impress on the leaders there that what is involved in Cuba is a challenge to the unity and security of the Free World, not just a quarrel on property on economic questions between us and Cuba. With warm regard, As ever, 1

The Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) was signed by 22 American nations in 1947. A NATO-like agreement, it provided for mutual assistance in case of a military attack.

343 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 12, 1960 Dear Friend, You will see that I answered a number of questions in the House of Commons this afternoon about the use of the United States bases in this country in connexion with reconnaissance flights. The Soviet Government’s note stating that they had shot down your RB 47 over Soviet territorial waters had caused some excitement here, but your statement denying that the aircraft was at any time over Soviet waters or land reached me just before the questions were asked in the House and I did not find it too difficult to

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deal with the matter. I did, however, think it right to tell the House that I was taking up with you the question whether there could be any modification or improvement in the working arrangements we have between us about the use of bases. In this connexion we have sent a message to Caccia suggesting that your and our intelligence authorities should conduct a joint review about the system and conditions under which these fights are conducted. This is particularly important if the Russians are now going to adopt a policy of shooting down any aircraft, wherever it may be, on the ground that it is conducting reconnaissance or is in an area from which they prefer to exclude foreign aircraft. We have also suggested that when the intelligence authorities have discussed the whole question, the results should be looked at from the political angle. I am sure you agree that this is a wise precaution in the circumstances, and that our respective authorities should undertake this review as soon as possible. I think I might add that during this afternoon’s proceedings the House of Commons as a whole showed that the RB 47 incident had increased rather than diminished the sense of solidarity between us. The concern that was shown was directed to ensuring that our arrangements for consultation were effective. When I was defending the principle of our alliance I felt that I was speaking for the great majority of members on both sides of the House. With warm regard, As ever, Harold Macmillan.

344 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 13, 1960 My dear Friend, Thank you for your letter of July 9 about nuclear detonations in the Seismic Research Programme. I feel the course of action you propose gives us in the circumstances the best prospect of overcoming this obstacle in the negotiations. I agree with you that your first proposal, namely a pool approach whereby devices of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom should be used on a reciprocal basis, has little prospect of acceptance by the Russians. But I am prepared to accept that, in the light of the attitude of Congress, you are obliged to put it forward; and therefore of course I concurred in this being done. Since you agreed not to accompany this proposal

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by any sort of warning of possible United States unilateral action, I felt that the risks to the negotiations which might have been involved had this proposal been put forward in its original form were reduced. But I feel sure it will not be long before you have to move on to your second proposal. I am glad you are ready to ask Congress for the authority you will need to put it into effect. Under your second proposal the Russians should have ample assurance that any nuclear explosions in the Research Programme are not concealed tests and I think it would be very difficult for them to refuse such a proposal. At any rate, we shall instruct our delegation to give you whole-hearted support when this proposal comes to be put forward. You say that if the Russians reject your second proposal you intend after a reasonable period to announce your intention of going on with your Research Programme by unilateral decision. I hope circumstances will not in fact bring you to this course and I trust that if they do move in that direction we shall first be able to consult together again about what to do. We cannot conceal from ourselves that this would be a most serious decision in the eyes of the world. On the assumption that the Russians will not accept your first proposal and that you will be brought to the second, which would involve going to Congress in August, I realised the need to act soon in Geneva. We therefore agreed to your delegation taking action in the Conference on July 12. I note what you say about the need to restrict knowledge of your second proposal to the smallest possible circle and we are taking great care to restrict the knowledge. With warm regards, As Ever, Harold

345 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 15, 1960 Dear Harold: Thank you for your prompt response to my message about facilities for our POLARIS submarines. Please be assured that there was no misunderstanding at Camp David on the question of location. I mentioned only Scottish ports; all of our technical problems concerning specific locations have been handled on other intergovernmental levels. Our Navy still insists that Loch Linnhe won’t do from a technical standpoint and I therefore am happy to accept your offer to reconsider the question. Indeed, this has become a matter of some urgency, as we need

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a firm basis now for locating the submarine tender this fall either in the Gareloch or elsewhere. Although our Navy is keeping the drydock in the U.S. this year, we would expect to locate it in the Gareloch next spring if you find Gareloch can be used for the tender. You were also kind enough to ask for a frank expression of my views on the other questions you have raised. First, on the question of control, we agree that our POLARIS missiles would not be launched within your territorial waters without your consent. To extend any form of dual control beyond territorial waters would, however, present us with a number of problems, some of which I believe might be of concern to you as well. For example, the one hundred-mile proposal could form a most difficult precedent with respect to the utilization of weapons in other waters, such as the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. We are of course prepared to work out such coordinating measures as may be necessary. As you know, we believe that a successful MRBM program is of importance to NATO. A bilateral arrangement with the U.K. on POLARIS missiles outside the NATO framework could jeopardize favorable consideration of the NATO MRBM program. For this reason, I heartily support the initial discussions of our respective Defense Ministers along the lines that the acquisition of POLARIS submarine missile systems by the U.K. should constitute a British contribution to the NATO MRBM program. Such a procedure would avoid serious NATO repercussions and also meet your need for a cooperative POLARIS submarine undertaking. The prospect of such a British contribution to the NATO MRBM program it seems to me should be discussed in NATO before it is revealed publicly. I am sure that we can later reach agreement on the handling of this matter. I was glad to have your expression of support with regard to Cuba, and have written you separately on this most serious situation. We have followed with interest recent developments in the Cyprus negotiations and were gratified to learn of their successful conclusion. This seems to me a high tribute to the long and patient effort you have devoted to this difficult problem. With warm personal regard, As ever, IKE

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346 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 15, 1960 Dear Harold: The King and Queen of Thailand recently visited us. They made a very charming couple and the Queen in particular is very shy and retiring. I had planned at a much earlier date than this to ask your help in allaying her fear that she might make unwitting mistakes in the capitals of Europe but I allowed the matter to slip my mind. I am sure that whatever you can do to make her feel easy, particularly regarding matters of protocol and official deportment, would add much to the visit. When you have the opportunity won’t you please convey my warm greetings to Her Majesty the Queen and, of course, Prince Philip. With all the best to yourself, As ever, Ike

347 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 18, 1960 My dear Friend, I am enclosing with this letter a copy of the formal note to the Soviet Government in reply to their note of July 11 about the RB-47.1 I am also enclosing a copy of a personal letter to Mr. Khrushchev. Both of these are being delivered in Moscow on July 19 and I propose to publish them at 3:30 p.m. BST that day. You will see that while the note is a formal rejection of the Soviet protest, I have attempted in my letter to make some counter-attack on Mr. Khrushchev. I hope you will think that this is wise. I felt that we should not only attempt to answer his individual Notes in detail but should also draw the attention of the world to the dangerous tendency presented by the Soviet attitude since the Summit Meeting. I thought that a general rebuttal of the present Soviet propaganda campaign set out in a moderate way may have some effect upon world opinion. With warm regard, As ever, HAROLD

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On 1 July 1960, the Soviet Union shot down an American reconnaissance plane (RB-47) over the Barents Sea north of the Soviet Union. Although Eisenhower could prove that the aircraft was not over Soviet territory, to do so would reveal sensitive electronic intelligence information. Ultimately the UN Security Council would turn down a Soviet attempt to condemn the US for alleged violation of USSR airspace. The Soviets also sent a protest note to Macmillan on the issue since the plane had taken off from a British airfield. Macmillan responded with a strongly worded rejection in which he condemned Khrushchev “for his actions in breaking up the May summit [and] in leaving the Geneva disarmament conference just as the United States was to present new proposals. I simply do not understand what your purpose is.” In his letter to Eisenhower on 18 July, Macmillan included the text of his rebuke to Khrushchev, which he was to make on 19 July. Macmillan’s letter to Khrushchev on 19 July 1960 may be found in EL, WFIS, Box 25(b). See also Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XX, 2015, and Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 238–41. Ironically, while the UN debate was going on, an American C-47 did inadvertently violate Soviet air space, but the Russians were unable to shoot it down. Biographer Stephen Ambrose referred to this as illustrating “a bit of Ike’s luck.” See Ambrose, Eisenhower, II, 586.

348 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 19, 1960 Dear Harold: I appreciated hearing from you regarding your remarks in the House of Commons about our use of bases in Great Britain. I thought you handled this matter very well indeed. I am particularly happy to have you say that the RB 47 incident has increased the sense of solidarity between us. I can understand, however, there may be some public concern in your country whether our arrangements for consultation are effective and that you felt it necessary to state you were taking up with me the question whether there should be any modification or improvement in our working arrangements. I am entirely in agreement that it is useful to review our existing working arrangements. I trust you will agree, however, that in any public statements we should make it clear that these talks are not in any sense negotiations, nor is their purpose to consider major modifications of our present satisfactory operating procedures. It is clear that we are up against a ruthless Soviet campaign against our free world bases, which would be aided by any suggestion we are weakening in the face of Khrushchev’s threats. I understand your Embassy and Chris Herter’s people are presently considering arrangements to get the discussions under way in Washington in the near future. With warm regard, As ever

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349 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 20, 1960 Dear Friend Thank you so much for your letter about the King and Queen of Thailand. I saw them last night and thought that they seemed very pleased with their reception here. They both spoke most warmly of their time in the United States. I will certainly bear in mind the point about the Queen being shy and retiring, and we shall do what we can to help her along. At the Dinner for the Thais I took the opportunity of conveying your message to The Queen and to Prince Philip who were very glad to have it and asked me to send their warm good wishes back. Yours ever Harold Macmillan

350 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 22, 1960 My dear Friend, Some of our recent messages have crossed and I have been looking them through this week to make sure that I am not in default. Alas, the frequency of our communications is to some extent the mark of the deterioration of world affairs, for wherever we look, there seem new problems pressing on us. Let me first tell you how deeply interested I was by your long letter about Cuba and Castro. I am sending you a separate detailed answer. Castro is really the very Devil. He is your Nasser, and of course with Cuba sitting right at your doorstep the strategic implications are even more important than the economic. I fully understand and share your apprehensions. Do let me know if there is any particular point where we are in a position to help, without embarking on measures which are only suitable in times of emergency. The tankers, for instance, we can only control by taking powers similar to those we take in wartime. However, I feel sure Castro has to be got rid of, but it is a tricky operation for you to contrive and I only hope you will succeed. As I told you I am still trying to plan a visit to South America but I fear it may not be now until next summer. I have to try and go to Malaya, Singapore and other similar places in the Commonwealth which I have not visited properly up to now. Now I come to your message about de Gaulle and so forth. As far as I see it, our people are fixing up with yours the right kind of line. It seems to me

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that what we must do is neither to disappoint the French nor to lead them up the garden path. We want broad strategic discussions but we do not want to upset NATO. This is a delicate but not impossible balance. I am waiting to see how our consultations go before answering de Gaulle myself, and of course I shall rely much upon your guidance. As regards the Russians and all the row they are making about RB-47 and so forth, our country is fairly steady. You have been very loyal to us and I hope that you feel that I have been the same to you. I have certainly not allowed myself to be forced into saying a single critical word about our alliance and friendship. I defended the basic agreement, for it is on that that we stand, and as you rightly say, the Russians are now trying to make a great propaganda against the whole concept of American bases overseas. If they get away with this we have lost the game. I therefore thought it wise to make a little sop to critics by suggesting that working arrangements under the basic agreement are always capable of improvement; and so they are. As the years go by and conditions change, it is important to bring these arrangements up to date. It is very important for our public to be reassured about the efficiency of what we do. I am sure they are perfectly content that we ought to do it together. In this connexion I suppose you are as much troubled as I am by all the things which people say. It seems to me that the military talk almost more now than politicians. It is the frightful glare of publicity which turns the heat on us all the time, and I want to avoid incidents or misunderstandings. Mr. Khrushchev has not yet sent me a reply to my letter. I have no doubt it will be a stinker when it comes. On the whole, however, I think it has done a bit of good to put the ball into his court, which I tried to do in a way at once firm and courteous. This is a very busy period for us when we are finishing up the Session and dealing with a mass of accumulated problems as well as reconstructing the Government. So pray forgive me for not answering your last message about Polaris more quickly. I will send you our thoughts as soon as I can. With kind regard, As ever, Harold

351 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 23, 1960 Dear Harold: I was grateful to receive your letter of July 18 enclosing a copy of your note and your personal letter to Mr. Khrushchev about the RB 47 incident.

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I thought the tone of the note was fine and your letter was excellent. I feel you were entirely correct to make some sort of counter-attack, particularly about the dangerous trend of Soviet policy since the Summit Meeting. With warm regard, As ever, Dwight D. Eisenhower

352 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 25, 1960 Dear Friend, This is the more detailed reply to your letter about the Cuban problem. I need hardly say that we fully share your concern at the way in which Castro has allowed his country to become ever more open to communist and Soviet influence. British material interests in Cuba are of course not on anything like the same scale as yours although we have always had a valuable export trade with Cuba. We have recently been obliged to protest strongly against the illegal take-over of the Shell refinery there – and I fear we have to face a severe deterioration of our trade relations. Of course, we have a direct political interest in the smooth development towards independence of the British West Indies. We are therefore deeply concerned at the introduction into the area of what is rapidly becoming a quasi-communist satellite state. For these reasons, and above all because of the obvious menace which a communist controlled Cuba would represent to the security of the Western hemisphere and so to the whole free world, I was very much interested to learn your views on how this problem should be handled. As I think you know, we too had hopes, at an earlier stage, that Castro would succeed in carrying out the intention, which he himself sometimes expressed, of preventing Cuba from falling into Communist hands. We are now inclined to agree with the view expressed in your letter that Castro and his Government are now so fully committed to the course they have chosen that the only hope for an improvement in the position must lie in the replacement of his régime. But it is not easy to see how this can be done. We have been encouraged to see the signs of a growing opposition to Castro’s policies, both inside Cuba and in Latin America as a whole. Of course, this is only in an embryonic stage. All the same, it is significant that among some of the very classes which were principally responsible for bringing Castro into power there should now be so deep a disillusionment

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over the way in which he has deviated from the principles of his own revolution. We had hoped therefore that if this feeling was allowed to develop undisturbed by outside pressures, there was a fair prospect of it eventually growing to such great proportions that with the encouragement of the United States and the other member countries of the Organisation of American States, it might have led to the downfall of the Castro Government and its replacement by something less dangerous. It is true that in waiting unduly long there was a risk of the communists so effectively consolidating their position that they would be even harder to dislodge than was already the case. On the other hand Castro’s spendthrift economic policy, his continued denial of the ordinary freedoms, and his refusal to allow the peasants to own the confiscated land all seemed likely to lead to great internal dissatisfaction. For these reasons, we watched with admiration the patience with which you were for many months prepared to endure the great provocations which faced you in Cuba. We were also aware that as you make clear in your letter, any departure on your part from a policy of non-intervention would be widely misunderstood. This would be especially the case in Latin America and the Caribbean, where, however clearly your devotion to this policy may be appreciated elsewhere, suspicions of your intentions have persisted as a result of the very size and proximity of your great country, and of recollections of some aspects of United States policy during the past century. These suspicions are of course actively fostered by the agents of the communists – and by those of Castro himself. Of course we fully understand that in view of the very rapid deterioration of the position which has taken place since Mikoyan’s visit you should now have seriously to consider the possibility of hastening the process of disintegration in Cuba. I must confess to some doubts as to the success of the new policy. Although better off than many Latin American peoples, the mass of Cubans are poor and accustomed to hardship. Having tasted the flavour of revolution they are likely, so it seems to me, seriously to react against a deterioration in the conditions of their life only if they can be confident that this is in no way the work of “counter-revolutionaries” or of the United States Government against which they have been encouraged to feel so much resentment. There does seem to be some danger that if, as a result of the measures which you have taken, or may take in the coming months, conditions of economic hardship are created, many Cubans who might otherwise have gradually drifted into opposition to Castro will instead be inclined to regard him – and themselves – as martyrs. Alternatively, if the impact of these measures is mitigated by a great effort on the part of the Soviet bloc, we can be sure that in their propaganda the communists in Cuba will make full use of the opportunities which this will give them. Furthermore, everything that I hear of the state of feeling in the other Latin American countries confirms the importance of avoiding any action which

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might create the impression that the United States was actively intervening in Cuba and arouse all sorts of latent suspicions. I hope you won’t think from what I have said that we disagree with the fundamental principle underlying your policy. On the contrary, we fully agree that everything possible must be done to bring home to the Cuban people the dangers into which Castro is leading them, and to create conditions suitable for the growth of an opposition capable of replacing his régime. It may be that the steps you are taking will have this result and I very much hope that they will. But I cannot help wondering whether, if there were a good chance of further important defections taking place and of it becoming known in Cuba that an increasingly powerful movement was growing up in and outside the country, bent on restoring the revolution to its intended course, it might not be wiser to let the yeast rise of its own accord. Or at least for them to be very unobtrusively supported from the United States. However, you must clearly play the hand in this affair and we will certainly help you in any way we can. In the United Nations we have already given you our full support in ensuring that the Cuban complaint was diverted into the Organisation of American States in the first place. We will gladly continue to give support of this kind. Similarly I entirely endorse your view that the present situation calls for a continuation, and perhaps a tightening up, of the existing restrictions on the export of arms to the countries in the Caribbean area. We shall be glad to join you in your efforts to secure the acceptance of this policy by other arms supplying countries whom we are able to influence. But I’m afraid the problem of tankers for the carriage of Soviet oil to Cuba is not easy. There is a considerable excess of tanker tonnage in the world at present, and much of it is in the hands of owners whom we cannot influence or even advise. I am told that it would not be possible in the way you propose so effectively to curtail the supply of oil to Cuba as to cause any really serious dislocation there. We – and you – would then be in the position of incurring the maximum odium with the Cubans and perhaps encouraging them to turn still further to the Russians without achieving the aim which you have in mind. As I told you in my message of July 22 we have no legal power to compel tanker owners not to carry oil to Cuba. It would, however, make it easier for us to help if we had a rather clearer understanding of your actual intentions. I know, and fully sympathize with, your purpose – the unseating of Castro and his replacement by a more suitable régime – but I am not very clear how you really mean to achieve this aim. After all, we have been through it all ourselves and know the difficulties and dangers. Meanwhile, it is good to know that our officials are in close touch on all the details. Yours ever, Harold

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353 CHRISTIAN HERTER TO MACMILLAN July 29, 19601 Dear Harold: The President, who is now in Denver, has asked me to extend to you his warm thanks for your very thoughtful and helpful letter with respect to Cuba. He will shortly be sending you a more substantive reply but, in the meanwhile, he wanted you to know how grateful he is to you for your considerateness in writing him so fully. May I just add a line to assure you that we will be keeping in very close touch with you on all projected developments. With warm personal regards, Signed: Chris 1

Since Eisenhower requested Herter to reply to Macmillan’s letter of 25 July, we felt it appropriate to include this letter in the edition. It may be found in EL, WFIS, Box 25(b). The letter indicates that Herter, like John Foster Dulles, was on a first-name basis with Macmillan.

354 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 30, 1960 Dear Friend, In my message of 22nd July I promised to let you have further thoughts about POLARIS as soon as possible. I have now discussed this further with the Cabinet. I am glad to be able to tell you that they all agree with me that our first aim – going back to the talks you and I had together at Camp David in March – should be to help you with the POLARIS facilities you would like to have in Scottish waters. They fully realise the importance of this project to the strength of the West, and for the peace and security of the world. In my first message to you I explained the political and psychological difficulties which there were about the Clyde. However, since you attach such importance to this location, we are sure that our technical people can work out some suitable position in the Clyde area which will be agreeable to you. I understand that you are now likely not to want to have your tender over here until the early months of next year. Nevertheless preparations for its arrival (such as moorings) would no doubt have to be put in hand during

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the late autumn and these would become generally known. We shall therefore have to make some statement before then and we must consider carefully what we should say. My colleagues feel that in present circumstances we are bound to have a considerable problem in presenting this project in such a way as to get the fullest support for it in this country. One thing about which it will be essential to satisfy people here at that point is the question of control. I see your difficulties about the proposal which I originally made about 100 miles, but I was encouraged by what you said in your letter of 22nd July about working out “such co-ordinating measures as may be necessary”. While I realise that dual control may not be practical, we ought to be able to work out some suitable procedure, which would allow us to meet the anxieties of people here on that point. As regards the suggestion I previously made of an option, I realise that you see difficulties about this. We have looked again at the timing and we have now decided that, even if you were willing, we could not hope to have POLARIS submarines in operation until considerably nearer 1970, for technical and financial reasons. So the question of the relation between our POLARIS submarines and the NATO MRBM project does not arise. The letter will be discussed on its merits in NATO. As regards meeting our own requirements for POLARIS submarines, I have some fresh ideas which need not be part of the announcement. All that we should need to say publicly is that we are continuing and developing the technical contacts between our two navies, so that if at a later time we want to build or buy POLARIS submarines, the necessary preparatory work would have been done. Since there is a lot of detail about this complicated question, I have asked Harold Caccia to explain what I have in mind. I suggest that he should immediately discuss with your people the whole matter, including the question of control. With warm regard, As ever,

355 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 1, 1960 Dear Harold: Thank you for your letter of July 22 which further reassures me of our common understanding of the several problems which we have been discussing. With particular reference to our joint consultations with de Gaulle, I have finally settled on a further reply to his letter of June 10, which I am assured reflects Selwyn Lloyd’s comments to Chris Herter and your views as reported during the close consultation with your Embassy here. I will be

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sending my letter out within the next several days, but am enclosing an advance copy for you. I have also just received from your Embassy the draft of your own letter to de Gaulle and believe that it is very good. One point, however, troubles me somewhat. I would hope that you would agree to deleting the last sentence in the first paragraph, or perhaps changing it to reflect the fact that we both have the same attitude on strategic questions. I wonder if you might not also like to note in the second sentence of the same paragraph that you had felt free to seek my views in as much as de Gaulle told you he had sent me a copy of his letter to you.1 With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike 1

The relevant sections of the first paragraph of Macmillan’s draft read, “I have not sent you a full answer sooner because I thought it was only sensible to see what President Eisenhower thought about the strategic aspect before giving you my views. The points which you raised about discussion of the strategic questions and organisation of such discussions seem to me to be matters on which the United States attitude would be of special importance.” See EL, WFIS, Box 25(b). Macmillan did alter the wording, omitting the second sentence. See Louis Galambos and Daun van Ee (eds), The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The Presidency: Keeping the Peace. XXI (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 2027–8. Volume XXI of the Eisenhower Papers, edited by Galambos and van Ee, includes letters written from Eisenhower to Macmillan for the period from 1 August 1960 to 31 December 1960.

356 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 4, 1960 Dear Harold: Many thanks for your helpful message of July 30 with further regard to POLARIS. I am delighted that you have been able to reconsider the matter of facilities in Scottish waters and that your people feel they can work out some suitable position in the Clyde area. I fully understand your problem in presenting this project in such a way as to get the fullest public support for it in your country. I therefore agree with your suggestion that our people should proceed immediately to discuss the matter here in Washington, and I am asking that either Chris Herter or Under Secretary Merchant get together with Harold Caccia at an early date for further detailed conversations on this important subject. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

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357 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 4, 1960 Dear Friend, Thank you for your letter of August 1. I was very glad to have your comments. I am asking Harold Caccia to let you have the final version of my letter to de Gaulle. You will see that this takes account of the points you made. Your message of August 2 to de Gaulle seemed to me to strike just the right note. With warm regards, Yours ever, Harold.

358 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 8, 1960 Dear Harold: Since my return from Denver I have discussed more fully your letter concerning the Cuban problem which Chris kindly acknowledged for me at my request. It is indeed most gratifying and reassuring that we are in general agreement in our analysis and estimate that the Castro regime is fully committed to a course inimical to our mutual interests in the area and that the only hope for an improvement in the situation must lie in its replacement. As you have so accurately pictured, the great majority of the liberal middle-class elements in Cuba, which were primarily responsible for Castro’s accession to power, have now withdrawn their support and many have fled the country to engage in open opposition to the Castro regime. From these very people who are the most knowledgeable as to the internal political situation we have received the unanimous view that the Castro regime’s police control and Communist terror tactics have thoroughly intimidated the politically articulate Cubans, and that left undisturbed, the regime will increase its domination to the point that internal opposition is unlikely ever to attain sufficient strength and resolution to overthrow Castro. Scarcely a day passes that opposition leaders do not stress to us their view that with the clear promise of support from the U.S.S.R. and Red China, time is now working for Castro. In the short run I doubt that this is true; Castro’s open bid for a satellite role has had the effect of thoroughly alarming most of the Governments in this Hemisphere and, hopefully, has disposed many of them to support pressures and efforts to bring about a change of regime in Cuba. Yet their foundations too often rest uneasily on outmoded societies ripe for change, and to make such changes in an evolutionary manner is the responsibility of any wise government. Should Castro manage to survive for

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another year or more, these nations run the risk of being overtaken by revolution with conditions such as those now existing in Cuba. This kind of change, when it brings Communism in its wake, is intolerable from the standpoint of our national interest and that of the liberal democratic Christian tradition which we all share. You ask quite understandably how we really mean to achieve our aim of unseating Castro and replacing him by a more suitable regime. Depending somewhat on the results of the forthcoming Council of Foreign Ministers in San Jose, Costa Rica on August sixteenth, we expect to move ahead with further economic measures designed to bring pressure on the Cuban economy. To be sure, this will cause some Cubans to rally to Castro’s support, but the great mass of Cubans, who were completely apathetic toward Castro and Batista before January first, 1959, are still chiefly concerned with their own individual well-being. We are now receiving more and more reports of a return to that earlier apathy on the part of the campesinos, particularly as they discover that most of the promises have been empty ones and that often they are worse off than before.1 Moreover, although relatively poor and accustomed to hardship by our standards, by Latin American standards Cubans have had one of the highest levels of living in the area and far higher than comparable classes in the Middle and Far East. A recently returned long-time resident among the country people remarked, “The average Cuban sugar worker wants to receive his earnings in cash and go to the store, buy a white guayabera, white shoes, a bottle of rum and go to dance; not be paid in script redeemable at a government (people’s) store where only work clothing and rice and beans are to be had and a lecture by a Government official is the only entertainment offered.”2 I do not underestimate the strength of the fanatic minority still dedicated to Castro nor conceive of any broad support for the abandonment of all of the measures taken by his regime. On the other hand, we have ample evidence to suggest that even among the masses there is as of now no deep unquestioning commitment to his revolution. Moreover, the Government’s virulent anti-United States campaign until now has had singularly little effect despite its control and utilization of all the public information media in the country. The recent spontaneous gesture of protest by the Congregation at the Cathedral in Habana which shouted “Cuba, Yes; Communism, No” has been followed by a pastoral letter read on August 7 in all the Catholic churches on the island in which the communist influence now evident in the present Cuban regime is strongly condemned. Reports of growing opposition among students to the seizure of the University of Habana by a Communist-led minority is another hopeful sign. We must emphasize that the world struggle is not Communism against capitalism; it is dictatorship against freedom. The Cuban development is one manifestation of this truth.

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We are steadily intensifying our counter-propaganda efforts in the other countries of the Hemisphere. We shall emphasize to the OAS and to the UN whenever the occasion may arise the extent to which communism has assumed control in Cuba. We shall seek and use every possible opportunity short of outright intervention which might bring pressure to bear on Castro. In line with this latter point we have sought informally by various means not only to discourage and prevent the chartering of tankers with some degree of success, but have also discouraged the shipment of lubricants, spare parts, catalysts and other needed items to the extent that, although by no means certain, we feel the seizure of the refineries may yet cause serious difficulties for the Cuban economy. Needless to say, such help as you can continue to give in this effort will be most welcome. You will have learned that over the week end Castro announced the seizure of the bulk of the remaining private American investment in Cuba. This action was not unexpected as the legal façade on which it is based is the Nationalization Law of July 6, 1960, which was the subject of a formal protest by this Government on July 16. Nevertheless it is indicative of the extremes to which the Castro Government is prepared to go, and is further clear indication of its intentions to accept satellite status in the communist bloc. You will also have noted Castro’s presumed effort to drive a wedge between us by his failure to nationalize the Shell property at the same time he nationalized the American oil properties.3 We shall be reviewing possible courses of action responsive to this latest unjustifiable action while we await the results of the San Jose meeting. In closing, I wish to stress that we shall also be substantially increasing our efforts on the positive side by way of economic, financial and technical assistance to the countries of Latin America. As we have so often said to the Cubans to no avail, we recognized the need for major changes, revolution if you will, in the Cuban social and economic structure, and were and are prepared, if asked, to assist Cuba and any one of the other countries in bringing about needed improvements carried out legally and responsibly under democratic regimes. Although we must make sure of the ultimate achievement of our aim, I fully agree that our course is fraught with difficulties and dangers. Your cooperation and support are therefore especially appreciated. With warm regard, As ever, IKE 1

2 3

Campesinos may be defined as the uneducated rural population of Cuba. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XXI, 2042. Ibid. A guayabera was a lightweight Cuban jacket. Castro’s seizure of a Shell refinery occurred in July 1960. See Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 181.

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359 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 11, 1960 My dear friend, You will remember your letter to me of July 9 about the nuclear tests conference and my reply of July 13. Meanwhile your first proposal on safeguards has been put forward in the conference, and it was turned down by the Russians on August 2. But though the Russians did not accept it, I thought their rejection of it was made in a way which might have been a good deal worse, and indicated that, even though they declined to provide nuclear devices for the research programme at present because they did not themselves intend to conduct any nuclear explosions, they would be ready for reciprocal safeguards to be applied to their own devices if ever they should conduct nuclear explosions for research. I understand that [Semyom] Tsarapkin has since said even more clearly that such is the Soviet position.1 Meanwhile time is passing and the session of Congress from which you told me you would need approval for any proposal in this field, has only a few weeks more to run. I am concerned at the situation. In your message of July 9 you told me of a second proposal you planned to put forward if the Russians rejected your first one. And in my reply I told you I thought this second proposal was a good one and promised you our whole-hearted support when the time came for it to be put forward. Do you intend now to put it forward? I very much hope so. You will remember the concern I expressed in my letter of July 13 at the possibility of your deciding, should the Russians reject your second proposal, to go on with your research programme by unilateral decision. My concern on this point has certainly not grown less. I should be very grateful if you could let me know soon what you now plan to do. With warm regards, As ever, Harold. 1

Semyom Tsarapkin was the head of the Soviet delegation to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Testing, which convened in Geneva in October 1958. It recessed in December 1960 and resumed in 1961.

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360 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 13, 1960 My dear Friend, I was very glad to hear from Harold Caccia this morning that you thought it might be useful if Merchant, [John] McCone and others came over here early next week to talk about nuclear tests.1 I am sure this would be a good idea and I hope they will come as soon as possible. Our people are making the arrangements through Harold Caccia. As Chris Herter suggested to Harold Caccia, this will enable Merchant to bring me your latest thoughts on other matters. In particular there is de Gaulle’s suggestion for a tripartite meeting in September. I had no idea beforehand that de Gaulle was going to make this proposal which indeed came as a complete surprise to me. However he did send me a copy of his message to you together with a strong appeal that I should urge you to accept his plan. As you know I am much in favour of these tripartite meetings from time to time, if only because there are so many things in your affairs and ours on which de Gaulle can be difficult, and these meetings can sometimes help to bring him along. You and I know, from old experience, how difficult he can be in one mood and yet how accommodating in another. So from that point of view I am not altogether displeased at de Gaulle’s having made this suggestion and having asked for my support. I think his main anxiety is to set a precedent for these meetings while you are still in office. But of course there are obvious difficulties about timing and about the public explanation which we could give for the meeting. We have to think of the reactions on our other allies and also on the Russians. So I am glad that you are not sending an answer at once. No doubt Merchant will let us know your thinking about this. Meanwhile I have sent an interim reply to de Gaulle pointing out some of the complications. Harold Caccia has given Herter an account of our talks in Bonn. On the whole I was very satisfied with them. For whatever reason, Adenauer seems now to be in a mood to explore seriously the possibilities of some accommodation between the economic groups which have formed themselves in Europe. As you know, I have feared that unless such an agreement could be reached in the near future the economic divisions would deepen and would inevitably bring political consequences. We are a long way from finding any solution, but at least the Germans seem to have developed the political will which is the first essential if an understanding is to be reached. I can only hope that the French will, sooner or later, do the same. With warm regard, As ever, HAROLD.

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John McCone was the successor to Lewis Strauss as the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

361 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 26, 1960 Dear Harold: The questions raised in your letter of August 11 were so important that I wanted you to hear our views first hand. McCone and Merchant have reported to me on their conversations with you and your people and it appears that a good mutual understanding was reached. In the present situation here, it would have been folly to seek Congressional approval at this time for our fallback position on the safeguarding of nuclear detonations in our seismic research program. This problem is one to which we shall have to return and on which we shall then need to consult further with you. Now that there is a recess in the Geneva negotiations, we shall be working closely with you in the planning for the resumption of negotiations on September twenty-seventh. The gap between us and the Soviets on many crucial issues is a very wide one but we shall bend our best efforts to making sure that our positions are sound, and to persuading the Soviets to take reasonable positions which might make possible further progress. With warm personal regard, As ever, Ike

362 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER August 27, 1960 Dear Friend, Jock Whitney brought me a copy of your proposed reply to General de Gaulle’s letter of August 9, together with your covering note saying that you would like me to look at it before it was sent to the General and send you urgently any comments that I might have. May I first say how delighted I am with the first three paragraphs of your letter, especially the third. It will be fine if you can come over to see us in

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December. All your friends here, and they are legion, will make you very welcome. It will also be a chance for a good talk. With regard to the arguments set out in the main part of your letter, it seems to me that you are quite right in sending a full expression of your point of view, if only in the hope that it will draw something a little more concrete out of the General. He is apt to be rather obscure; it is difficult to be quite sure what exactly it is that he proposes. So if you can draw him into producing the memorandum setting out his views in a precise way, it will be a good thing. After all, he promised you this both at Rambouillet in December last year and in Paris in May of this year. All these alliances may require adjustment from time to time. What is essential is that the spirit should remain. You will remember that de Gaulle sent me a copy of his letter to you of August 9, so perhaps you would send me a copy of the final text of your reply and tell de Gaulle that you are doing so. I think de Gaulle would expect this. With warm regards, As ever,

363 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 2, 1960 My Dear Friend, Thank you very much for sending me a copy of your last letter to de Gaulle which I thought very good and well calculated to draw him out. I thought that I had better send the General an answer too and I enclose a copy of what I said. My remarks in the third paragraph of course refer to your constitutional position and not to your personal one.1 I thought it as well to make this point with de Gaulle so as to encourage him to look favourably on the suggestion in the third paragraph of your message to him which, as you know, I liked very much. With warm regard, As ever, Harold 1

In his 1 September 1960 letter to de Gaulle, Macmillan said that some might feel that Ike would lack some authority if there were a tripartite meeting among the three leaders after the US elections. To the contrary, Macmillan argued that the value of such a meeting would not be altered by the election, concluding instead that “the important thing is to set as much of a pattern [of tripartite meetings] for the new Administration as we can.” EL, WFIS, Box 25(b).

380 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

364 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 8, 1960 Dear Harold: I have received your two recent notes, and thank you for them. Within recent days, I have heard several reports that General de Gaulle continues to deplore the failure, as he sees it, of our three countries to intervene together in the Congo crisis and lay down a pattern of behavior to be followed by the Congolese.1 I am sure you must be as puzzled as I am to see how this last purpose could have been achieved. It will be interesting to learn what his reaction is to the long letter I sent him recently. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

Eisenhower refers to the extremely complex situation in the Congo, a former Belgian colony in central Africa, recently granted independence. The struggle among three Congolese leaders – Joseph Kasavubu, Patrice Lumumba, and Joseph Mobutu – greatly vexed Western leaders.

365 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 9, 1960 My dear Friend: Thank you very much for your letter. Like you, I do not see how we could have organised the Congo as de Gaulle suggests. In fact, the United Nations are doing their best and I am sure that we must continue to support them as the best chance of keeping the Russians out. I have not had any detailed reaction from de Gaulle to your letter, but I have had a short letter from him thanking me for mine of September 1, of which I sent you a copy, and saying that in view of the fact that a meeting in September is not agreeable to you, and that I do not see real difficulty in contemplating a later meeting, there is nothing to be done but to put the meeting off as we suggest. He does not refer to the memorandum for which you and I both asked. With warm regard, As ever, Harold Macmillan

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366 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 15, 1960 My dear Friend, I was grateful for your message about the General Assembly of the United Nations which Harold Caccia passed to me over the telephone last night.1 I quite understand that you felt it necessary in the light of recent developments to attend the General Assembly yourself. I thought it would be best in order to damp down speculation to issue a press statement in London last night saying that I would decide in the light of the developing situation whether to go to New York to take part in the discussions. It will be difficult for us to decide on a definite plan of action until we see how Khrushchev proposes to play the hand. There are of course procedural complications, the outcome of which it is not possible to foretell. It is difficult to say therefore at what stage it would be best for me and other Western Heads of Government to come to New York. Naturally I will be a little swayed by what other Prime Ministers do, especially my Commonwealth colleagues. If, as I think probable, Mr. [Jawaharlal] Nehru and Dr. [Kwame] Nkrumah decide to go and if Mr. Diefenbaker and possibly Mr. Menzies go also I think it would be impossible for me not to join them.2 As I see things at present I do not think this would be until the second week of the Assembly, and perhaps even later. One problem that will have to be faced is this. If Khrushchev and I are both in New York together he will no doubt ask for a private meeting. How would American opinion view this? I want to ponder over these matters a little longer. I would be grateful for any further thoughts that you can send me. With kind regards, As ever, Harold Macmillan 1

2

We were unable to find any written record of this conversation. It no doubt dealt with deciding the appropriate Anglo-American response to Premier Khrushchev’s decision to lead the Soviet UN delegation during an upcoming discussion of the Congo crisis. Jawaharlal Nehru was prime minister of India, and Kwame Nkrumah was president of Ghana.

382 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

367 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 20, 1960 Dear Harold: I am most appreciative of your understanding letter of September 15. I have thought over the important questions you raise and discussed them at some length with Chris and Lord [Alec Douglas-]Home yesterday.1 As you say it is difficult to determine specific tactics until we see how Khrushchev proposes to act and also until we are able to assess the atmosphere at the General Assembly. I am convinced that it is essential for our two delegations to concert closely and to be prepared to move very quickly. Although it seems preferable to defer any public announcement or firm decision on timing for the moment, I now believe your attendance at the General Assembly would be a real service to the West. I am impressed also by the desirability, in the meantime, of having some outstanding Western leader answer Khrushchev and his satellites relatively early in the proceedings. Mr. Menzies would be superb in such a role and I hope you might be able to persuade him to attend, preferably at an early date. I realize the problems you would face should Khrushchev request a meeting with you in New York. His behavior in New York may prove the best guide to your answer. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

Alec Douglas-Home replaced Selwyn Lloyd as British Foreign Secretary in June 1960.

368 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 22, 1960 Dear Friend, I was very glad to receive your message of September 20 and to hear about the discussions which you and Chris Herter had with Alec Home. I am very glad to learn that you now believe that it would, on balance, be an advantage if I were to attend the General Assembly. I have discussed this with the Cabinet this morning and have now come to the firm conclusion that I ought to go. I have therefore decided to leave London sometime on Sunday, September 25, and will arrive in New York late that night. Since I do not think that it would be right to appear to let my decision depend on

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whatever Khrushchev may say in his speech on Friday, I propose to make an announcement about my plan at 9 o’clock our time tonight. I shall be sending messages to my Commonwealth colleagues, and will of course do my best to persuade Bob Menzies to go. I also hope that Mr. Diefenbaker will find it possible to speak himself on the Monday. Needless to say I am delighted to take the opportunity of a discussion with you in New York on Tuesday morning. As you say, whether I have a meeting with Khrushchev must depend on the way things go. It will be difficult either way, but I appreciate your understanding of the position about this. With warm regards, As ever, HAROLD

369 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 22, 1960 Dear Harold: I am delighted to know that you are coming to the General Assembly meeting, and I hope with you that Prime Ministers Menzies and Diefenbaker will join you. While I shall be here at the Waldorf Monday afternoon, my program is fairly full. We could, if you wish, arrange a short greeting. But I suggest that, if it is convenient to you, we have breakfast together on Tuesday morning, at eight o’clock, when we shall have as much time as we need. With warm regard, As ever, Ike.

370 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 23, 1960 My Dear Friend, Thank you for your message about the General Assembly. I have now learned that Diefenbaker is speaking on the Monday and I have sent a message to Bob Menzies urging him to come a little later in the week but I have as yet had no reply.

384 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

I would be very glad to have breakfast with you on Tuesday morning at 8 o’clock at the Waldorf and am looking forward to a good talk. My warmest congratulations on your speech which seems to have made a profound impression. With warm regards, As ever, Harold.

371 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 29, 1960 I was extremely sad to hear the great loss which you have both suffered.1 Harold Macmillan 1

This brief telegram from Macmillan was an expression of sympathy to President and Mrs Eisenhower on the death of Mrs Eisenhower’s mother, Elivera Doud, on 28 September.

372 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 29, 1960 Dear Harold Thank you very much for your message. Mamie will be most appreciative of your sympathy, as am I. I have just had a report from Chris Herter concerning your talk this morning before the General Assembly; he says it was very fine in every respect. Congratulations. I look forward to seeing you and Bob Menzies Sunday or Monday. Ike

373 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 7, 1960 Dear Friend Now that I have got back to the United Kingdom I feel that I must write to you to express again my gratitude for all the hospitality and kindness

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which I received in the United States. I think that the authorities and people of New York showed extraordinary forbearance and goodwill to the invasion of Heads of State and Government which they have had to suffer over the last few weeks. I so much enjoyed the opportunity of seeing you again and of having such good talks. On the whole I have come back here feeling that my visit was worthwhile. I think that between us the Western Heads of Government have made a pretty effective response to Mr. Khrushchev and that, on the whole, the West is ahead on points. In particular I think that his dramatic method, effective enough at first, has begun to bore the so-called uncommitted countries.1 As you know, my own impression is that Khrushchev is not intending to take any violent action in the near future and that his rhetoric is a cover for inactivity. One of the best things that happened in New York was our discussion about the possibility of your coming here in December. I hope so much that we can bring this off. Meanwhile, thank you again for the hospitality which I received. Ever yours, Harold Macmillan 1

Macmillan here alludes to Khrushchev’s shoe-pounding incident during the UN debate.

374 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 12, 1960 Dear Friend This is just to send you my very warm best wishes for your birthday and for many happy returns of the day. When I sent you a similar message this time last year, we had just had our Elections here and I was able to say how pleased I was that their result enabled me to go on working with you. Now you have your Elections impending in the United States, and this letter is therefore for me rather sad because it is the last that I shall be able to send you while you occupy the greatest position in the world. But whatever official positions we may either of us hold, our friendship will, I know, remain as strong as ever. Yours ever, Harold.

386 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

375 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 14, 1960 Dear Harold I appreciated your letter of October seventh and am gratified that you found your arrangements and your reception in New York agreeable. For me, as always, it was a keen personal pleasure to see you again, and I think our talks were highly useful. Your coming to New York, along with Mr. Menzies and Mr. Diefenbaker, was a strong contribution to the solid front which the West presented to Mr. Khrushchev’s attacks. Your speech before the General Assembly made a strong impression on the people of this country. Yesterday I received your touching note of October twelfth sending greetings on my birthday. Since this is the date, I must say that I don’t feel much older. While in some ways I will be glad to set down the burdens of this office on January twentieth next, I will miss the great satisfaction I have had from our close relationship which will of course lose its official nature. I look forward to future meetings – at times, I trust, under somewhat more relaxed conditions. In the meantime, I will keep the possibility of getting together in December very much in mind. With warm regard, As ever, Ike

376 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 25, 1960 Dear Friend, I have been disturbed to hear that there is some talk of the possibility that you might reconsider your Skybolt programme in view of the high costs of development and the reinstatement of the B70 in the U.S.A.F. programme.1 You will remember that we cancelled our Blue Streak Rocket and our further steps of Blue Steel development on the understanding that (so long as it proved technically feasible) Skybolt would be available for our V-Bomber Force.2 We are therefore relying very heavily on you in this. I hope you will be able to reassure me. With warm regard, As ever, Harold.

1960–1: Disappointment and Renewal 387 1

2

The B-70 was a US experimental long-range bomber under development in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Macmillan continued to assume that the American Skybolt would replace the British Blue Streak and Blue Steel missile programs. See Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations, 97–8, and Watson, Into the Missile Age, 563–4.

377 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 25, 1960 Dear Friend, As you know, I intend (in accordance with our talk in New York) to make an announcement about the Polaris base in Scotland in my speech in the House of Commons on Tuesday, November 1. I have sent your people the draft text of the sort of thing which I propose to say: it is on the lines which I showed you in New York. I shall not say anything about control either inside the three-mile limit or outside but if pressed on this shall rely on the general understanding and cooperation between us. I gather that you would prefer this as it will avoid difficulties with other nations. There is only one point that has not been finally settled in the consultations that have been going on. Your people would have liked me to say something which would put this agreement in a NATO context. This agreement will of course be a support to NATO and I shall say so, but I think it would be a mistake from my point of view to get it mixed up at this stage with the talk that has been going on in our Press about a NATO M.R.B.M. project, and about which there has been much speculation. It would not be helpful if I were drawn prematurely into discussion of this in the course of debate. For the moment I am therefore sure that it will be best for me to defend this agreement primarily as an extension of the facilities we have already given to you over many years on an Anglo-American basis but which in fact serve the whole alliance. I have no doubt that the wider value of the new facilities will emerge in debate. With warm regard, As ever, Harold.

388 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

378 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 27, 19601 Dear Harold: I am delighted that agreement has been reached on the project for berthing facilities for our Polaris tender in the Clyde area. I deeply appreciate your splendid cooperation in making a tender site available at Holy Loch which our Navy considers most satisfactory for their purpose. With reference to the launching of missiles from US Polaris submarines, I give you the following assurance, which of course is not intended to be used publicly. In the event of an emergency, such as increased tension or threat of war, the US will take every possible step to consult with Britain and other Allies. This reaffirms the assurance I gave Foreign Secretary Eden on March 9, 1953. Again, may I express my gratification for your important contribution to the future success of our Polaris submarine program, which is so important to the security of the NATO alliance and the Free World generally. Your efforts in this regard reflect the understanding and close working relationships between our two countries which we both consider so essential to perpetuate. I agree entirely with the view expressed in your letter of October 25 that it is undesirable to allow this project to become linked with the public discussion of a NATO MRBM force. During the course of the debate, I believe it would be useful for you to take an opportunity to say this agreement will be a support to NATO. You could then go on to say that there is no connection between this project and the premature speculative stories which have appeared in the press about a possible NATO MRBM program. However, if you prefer to omit mention of NATO in your original announcements, we would fully support your decision. I plan to issue a brief statement confirming your announcement. We will give your Embassy a copy of the proposed text. Regarding your letter of October 25 on Skybolt I will furnish you a response shortly. With warm personal regard, Sincerely, Ike 1

In the copy of this letter in the Eisenhower Library, the second paragraph is excised. We use the complete version found in PREM 11/2941.

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379 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER October 28, 1960 Dear Friend, Thank you very much for your message of October 27 about the Polaris facilities. In my speech I am bringing in NATO, and I propose also to use the following phrase which I assume will be alright with you: “As regards control, we shall continue to rely on the close cooperation and understanding which exists between us and the United States in all these defence matters and which the President has recently reaffirmed.” The reason why I have decided to say something of this sort in my speech is that, as you will no doubt have read, there are considerable difficulties in the Labour Party about defence policy. The sensible views seem to be gaining ground, and the more I can help them the better.1 With warm regard, As ever, Harold. 1

The Labour Party was divided on the issue of a British independent nuclear deterrent, with some members calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, while others criticized the Tory government for wasting money on projects like Blue Streak. Macmillan was pleased that the division enabled the Conservatives “to escape from what might be legitimate censure.” See Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 254.

380 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 29, 1960 Dear Harold: Concerning your message regarding the statement you propose to make in the House of Commons about close cooperation it seems completely satisfactory to me. As ever, IKE

390 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

381 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 31, 1960 Dear Harold: Replying to your letter of October 25 with regard to SKYBOLT, I believe we fully appreciate your concern with the prospects for the continued development of this weapon system. I can at least assure you that we are still proceeding with the project as outlined in my Camp David memorandum to you of March 29, the Gates–Watkinson memorandum of June 6, and the subsequent technical and financial agreement of September 27.1 I am still hopeful of seeing you later this year, at which meeting we could discuss the matter further. In any event, our people will continue to keep yours informed on any problems relating to SKYBOLT and we would similarly appreciate your people keeping ours advised from time to time on the place this project occupies in your plans. With warm regard, Sincerely, Ike 1

The technical and financial agreement was between representatives of the US Air Force and the British Ministry of Aviation, based on understandings between Eisenhower and Macmillan. The agreements affirmed that Skybolt “was still in the research and development stage.” See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XXI, 2147.

382 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER November 10, 1960 Dear Friend, I feel I must write a few words to you on a purely personal basis at this time. The election of a new President has brought home to me the situation which of course I knew must come, that the period of our close co-operation together in so many fields is drawing to an end. When I look back on the first time we met in the Hotel St. George, nearly 20 years ago, I realise how long this friendship has been. I know that nothing will ever impair its strength or its usefulness to our two countries.

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As a soldier you had under your command the largest forces that Britain has ever put into action by air, sea, or land: as President you have done everything to maintain the close friendship of our two countries. I think you must have realised when you drove from London Airport last year what the British people feel about you. I can only assure you that I will try my best to keep our Governments and our countries on the same course. But I cannot of course ever hope to have anything to replace the sort of relations that we have had. Yours ever Harold Macmillan

383 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER December 9, 1960 Dear Friend, I was very shocked to hear this morning that Chris Herter has told Harold Caccia that you have decided to vote in favour of the Afro-Asian resolution on Colonialism now before the United Nations Assembly.1 I really must ask you to think about this again. In speaking to the Ambassador, Chris himself described the declaration as a nauseating document. It is quite true that he added that your Representative proposed to comment adversely on each paragraph on very much the same lines as we propose to do. I therefore do not see how you get credit in voting for a resolution as a whole, each part of which you have condemned. We are making a tremendous effort by our colonial policy to get peaceful development in Africa and to keep communism out. This vote on behalf of the American people, if it is given, will have a most discouraging effect upon all our people here and overseas who are working so hard for progress. Do let us stand together, at least on a decision to abstain, and thus dissociate ourselves from a resolution which has no connection with reality. With warm regard, As ever, Harold Macmillan. 1

This refers to United Nations Resolution 1541, which called for a rapid end to colonization in all of its manifestations, including trust territories. Macmillan feared that the instability created by too rapid de-colonization might provide fertile ground for communist mischief.

392 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

384 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN December 10, 1960 Dear Harold: As a result of the review which I mentioned in my message yesterday, you will be glad to know that our final decision, though a most difficult one, is to abstain on the Afro-Asian resolution on Colonialism. We are instructing our representative to make a statement explaining our vote, which will make clear that while the wording of certain paragraphs makes it impossible for us to vote in favor of the resolution, we do support the general principles the sponsors had in mind. With warm regard, As ever, IKE

385 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER December 12, 1960 Dear Friend, I was so glad to get your message of December 11 telling me your final decision to abstain on the Afro-Asian resolution on Colonialism. I am sure this is right. It will be a great help to us and I am most grateful. With warm regard, As ever, Harold. P.S. I am sending this from Chequers, where we always think about your visit, which has become historic. This weekend has been quite interesting – three African leaders from Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, and European leaders of those countries, as well as Sir Roy Welensky.1 So you see, we are really trying. H.M. 1

Welensky, a Rhodesian politician, was prime minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1956 to 1963.

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386 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER December 30, 1960 My dear Friend, I am much disturbed at the trouble that we are both getting into over Laos.1 For the first time for many years it seems that our policies, although of the same strategic purpose, have been a little divergent on tactics. This we must surely remedy as soon as we can. As I see it there are two things that ought to be done in order to strengthen our joint position vis-à-vis not only the Communist Powers who send us legalistic Notes, but especially vis-à-vis the moderate and uncommitted countries who are watching what is happening. The first would be somehow to persuade Phouma to resign. You will no doubt agree on this because you have always been sceptical as to Phouma’s value, and anyway he has now left the country and can serve most usefully by resigning his office whatever might be the ultimate arrangements made. Secondly, there is the question as to how we can strengthen and solidify in the eyes of the world Boun Oum’s claim to be the proper government. Surely this can be done by his getting Parliamentary approval according to the rules of the Constitution. I am told that there should be no difficulty about this, for the Parliament is in the habit of supporting the government of the hour. Nevertheless, it would have a considerable advantage if the same processes which legitimised Phouma’s government are carried out in the case of Boun Oum’s and the present Constitutional set-up maintained. If there were any danger of the Parliament turning nasty, that would be another thing. But I am told that this should be within our power to handle. Forgive me for this simple approach, but I am so worried about there being any divergence of method between us. I have purposely left out of this message the question of the International Commission. That we should perhaps consider later and separately. I am sure we both agree that the first step is to get established a proper legitimate government. With warm regard, As ever, Harold. 1

The situation in Laos in late 1960 was almost indecipherably complicated. Three factions – the Communist-led Pathet Lao under Kong-Le, the neutralists surrounding Prince Souvanna Phouma, and anti-communist forces led by Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan – competed for power. On 16 December 1960, Prime Minister Phouma, who had headed a coalition government, fled the country, and on the 16th a pro-western government under Oum was installed. The Pathet Lao continued its rebellion. The “International Commission” was the International Control Commission, established in the Geneva Accords (1954). It was supposed to monitor the process of de-colonization in French Indo-China.

394 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

387 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN December 31, 1960 Dear Harold: Your cable on the Laotian situation puzzles me because of your statement that we have been following diverging lines of effort. Certainly we agree with you that Phouma should resign, and it has been my understanding that some representatives of your government were undertaking to bring this about. At the same time we have been bringing to bear all the influence we can muster to get parliamentary approval of Boun Oum’s claim to recognition as the head of the constitutional government. He has seemed resistant. Conversations with the State Department confirm that my understanding, as indicated above, is also theirs. So far as the question of the International Commission is concerned, I have understood that Boun Oum and his associates have been firmly, up until this moment, opposed to its return to Laos. In any event, it would be difficult for me to see how the International Commission could be helpful to us and to our side before Boun Oum’s position had been certified as legal by his Parliament. This morning it appears quite likely that this whole matter has been overtaken by events. Fragmentary reports are to the effect that the North Vietminh are invading Laos to help the Pathet Lao and that Chinese troops may have been parachuted into the area.1 These reports, if true, put the whole matter on a much more urgent basis than heretofore. For my part I cannot see any course other than supporting the King and Boun Oum and their government with every immediately available resource, in the meantime continuing efforts to make clear the legitimacy of the Boun Oum position.2 I heartily agree with all you say about the need for unity, and you know how earnest have been my efforts to achieve it in all our relations. Indeed a vital factor in my decision in the troublesome question of voting for or abstention in the matter of the Asia-African resolution was that in such a welter of conflicting considerations the need for us standing together was of the utmost importance. I feel that all of us who see the dangers in a Laotian invasion should immediately make our intentions to oppose the move clear to each other and before the world and each of us move rapidly to do his part so that our essential unity cannot be questioned. Happy New Year! With warm regard, Ike 1

Here Eisenhower conflates “North Vietnamese” and “Vietminh.” The Vietminh was the political/military organization that fought against the French in Vietnam from

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2

1946 to 1954. “North Vietnamese” was the American term for the communist government and military forces north of the 17th parallel in Vietnam. North Vietnam referred to itself as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The king referred to was Sri Savang Vatthana, the titular head of Laos from 1959 to 1975.

388 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN January 2, 1961 Dear Harold: I am deeply concerned over the irresolute attitude of the French with respect to the Laotian situation, and I wanted to send you for your entirely private knowledge a copy of the personal message I am sending General de Gaulle today.1 With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1 In the note Eisenhower asked de Gaulle to join with him in condemning Soviet and North Vietnamese military support for the communist Pathet Lao rebels in Laos as part of an attempt to make Laos part of the Soviet bloc. See Galambos and van Ee (eds), Papers of DDE, XXI, 2223–34.

389 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 10, 1961 Dear Friend, I was very grateful for your messages about Laos. I have not answered them before because our people have been in day to day touch in this difficult situation. I am glad to feel that Chris and Alec are still working so closely together to find the right answer to our problems. With warm regard, As ever, Harold Macmillan.

396 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

390 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 13, 1961 My Dear Friend, Dorothy and I gave a Dinner Party last night for Jock and Betsy, who have been such wonderful Ambassadors and will be so much missed here.1 As I proposed your health I realised with sadness that this was probably the last time that I would raise my glass to you as President of the United States. I felt then that I must write to you to express something of what I would have liked to say and I am asking Jock to take this letter back with him to Washington. As I think over the history of our collaboration which has now lasted some eighteen years, and especially of the last four years, one thing stands out. Whether we agreed or disagreed on particular policies we had I think a deep unity of purpose and, I like to feel, a frank and honest appreciation of each other’s good faith. It has certainly been an enormous help to me to know that we had these relations of complete confidence. This was something which one does not, alas, often find between Heads of Government even of allied countries; personal friendship and trust cannot be manufactured, they just grow. So it is not surprising that this ending of an official connection with an old friend causes me so much regret. But for you the position is very different. You can look back on a life of great public service during which you commanded the largest forces ever put in the field by your country and mine and welded together a varied coalition with unrivalled skill to the eternal benefit of freedom and of all mankind. And then after the war you fashioned the central alliance of the West which has so far preserved the peace without surrendering liberty. During the last eight years you have held the greatest position which any American citizen can hold and which has become the most powerful office in the world. This is not the place to write of the achievements and successes of your last eight years but my own view is that perhaps the greatest of them all was your triumph in maintaining your own integrity and character unsullied by the corruptions of power. Now that you are leaving public office my only consolation is that perhaps you will find more time to come to visit your friends across the Atlantic and especially in this country. You know how deeply welcome you would always be. Meanwhile, this letter is just to let you know that an old friend has not forgotten and is still deeply grateful for all that you have done. Yours ever, H.M. 1

The reference here is to Ambasssador John Hay Whitney and his wife, Betsy Cushing Whitney. Betsy Cushing Whitney was the daughter of Harvey Cushing, a prominent physician in New York.

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391 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN January 19, 1961 Dear Harold: I must confess I have begun several letters to you to bid you a personal and official farewell. The last letter I received from you, written on January thirteenth and brought to me by Jock Whitney, touched me so deeply that I feel I must revise my efforts a fourth time. As I leave office, I take with me certain disappointments, the major one of which has been our inability to break down the intransigence and aggressiveness with which the Soviet Union faces the world. My feelings on the subject of disarmament and the necessity for the prevention of war are well known, of course, to you. But on the brighter side, I take with me many happy memories which I know will brighten the future. One of the greatest of these is the satisfaction stemming from the close relationship which has existed between us from the dramatic days of World War II up to the present. I thank you for making this possible, and I feel more at ease knowing you are still at the helm of our oldest and most trusted ally. On the strictly personal side, I would like to thank you for your participation in the program which our television people put on a week or so ago as a tribute to me.1 I know that my retirement to private life will have no effect on our long and rich friendship, and every opportunity which I may have to see you I shall consider a great privilege. With affectionate regard from Mamie and me to Dorothy and you. As ever, Ike 1

The reference is to “Tribute to a Hero,” a televised broadcast on the NBC network, which was shown on 10 January 1961. An account of the program may be found in the New York Times, 11 January 1961, 95.

Epilogue

Dwight D. Eisenhower left office on 20 January 1961, thereby ending his official relationship with Harold Macmillan. Ike retired to his beloved Gettysburg while Macmillan remained prime minister until 18 October 1963, when he resigned from office after undergoing painful prostate surgery. During the 1960s, Eisenhower and Macmillan saw each other only twice, an ironic circumstance for two leaders who had spent so much time together between 1957 and 1961. Eisenhower visited Macmillan in London in August 1962 during a trip to Europe that also included a visit to Sweden. Macmillan visited Eisenhower in January 1968 at the former president’s winter residence in Palm Desert, California. The two friends did maintain a sporadic correspondence, however, from 5 February 1961 until 17 February 1969, a month before Eisenhower’s death on 28 March 1969. The decade of the 1960s saw the realization of at least some of the Macmillan–Eisenhower plans for easing the tensions of the Cold War. The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and implicit western acceptance of it effectively signaled that the Soviets “were willing to live with West Berlin as long it was isolated and did not drain East Germany,” in the words of historians Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley.1 Moreover, the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty signed by the US, UK, and USSR brought at least a partial end to these tests, long a goal of Anglo-American diplomacy.2 Of course, Cold War tensions still remained. The Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, whose initial planning occurred during the Eisenhower Administration, was an embarrrassing failure, while the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. Although the Laotian tangle was tentatively resolved in 1962, the US became increasingly enmeshed in Vietnam. The dream of peace seemed as elusive as ever. To be sure, Ike and Mac did touch on international issues, including the situations in Laos and Berlin, in their later correspondence. When discussing such matters, both men tended to revert to the positions that they had held during their years in office, and the letters reflected some of their previous disagreements. Over time, however, their letters tended to focus more on 398

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personal interests and less on matters of state – especially after Macmillan left the premiership in 1963. For example, Eisenhower conscientiously remembered to send annual birthday greetings to Macmillan and also expressed his concern whenever Macmillan encountered a personal or family difficulty, such as when he entered the hospital for his prostate surgery in October 1963 and also when Lady Dorothy Macmillan died suddenly on 22 May 1966.3 These personal interests also included comments about each leader’s pursuit of their ambitious writing programs. During the 1960s, and in Macmillan’s case, into the early 1970s, Eisenhower and Macmillan wrote their political memoirs and left a written record of their years in office.4 To carry out his writing, Eisenhower worked from an office in a house granted to him by the president of Gettysburg College where he benefited from the literary collaboration of his son, John, as well as several others who were involved in organizing his papers and official records.5 Macmillan began writing his memoirs on 4 August 1964, usually working from the family’s publishing offices in London, where a large collection of his official documents and personal records were assembled.6 In connection with their writing careers, one of the most interesting exchanges in the Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence occurred on 15 July 1965 when Ike broached the idea of a joint writing project. “I have had [heard?] vague rumors to the effect that you had, after leaving government, rejoined your publishing firm,” Ike wrote. “Whether or not you are active in this kind of work I do not know, but it strikes me that if you and I could remember and put down on paper all the things that we experienced– together – during the past 20 years it would make quite a story.”7 Macmillan sent an immediate reply to Eisenhower, quietly passing over Ike’s suggestion that they collaborate on a book project. “I have taken the chairmanship of my family companies, which gives me about two days’ work a week,” Macmillan wrote. “The rest of my time I spend in trying to compose my memoirs. You know from your experience of authorship how difficult this is – at least I find it so.”8 So, a joint Macmillan–Eisenhower book never materialized, but one cannot resist the wish that these two formidable Cold Warriors might have found the time and energy to collaborate on a volume of personal history. Unlike Eisenhower, however, Macmillan spent much of his retirement in expanded professional pursuits. He assumed a greater responsibility for the fortunes of his family’s publishing business and also maintained his close association with Oxford University, where he had been elected chancellor in 1960. Macmillan relished the rich intellectual environment at Oxford, which he believed offered “the best education in the world in the most beautiful city in the world.”9 In retirement, Macmillan continued to be a recognized and respected influence in Britain. In February 1984, Queen Elizabeth II honored him with

400 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

an earldom on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday, and the former prime minister entered the British House of Lords as the Earl of Stockton.10 Of course, advancing years inevitably brought illness and increasing feebleness to both Eisenhower and Macmillan. In 1965, Eisenhower suffered his first major heart attack since leaving office, and in 1966 he underwent painful gall bladder surgery. More heart attacks followed in 1967 and 1968, which eventually required a final hospitalization at Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington. In the 1980s, Macmillan suffered from the afflictions of pleurisy and shingles, and, most tragically, the progressive loss of his vision. On 29 December 1986, he passed away at Birch Grove, the Macmillan family estate in Sussex.11 Despite their health problems, the two former leaders continued to believe in the critical importance of the Anglo-American alliance. This belief was never illustrated more poignantly than in January and February 1969, when they exchanged their final set of letters. The circumstances leading up to this exchange occurred when Eisenhower read a column entitled, “Death Of An Alliance,” written by journalist Stewart Alsop in the January 6 issue of Newsweek. Alsop speculated that Britain’s Labor government, led by Prime Minister Harold Wilson, had deliberately insulted the incoming Nixon Administration by appointing John Freeman as its next ambassador to the United States. In the past Freeman had written some highly critical articles about the new president for Britain’s New Statesman, especially regarding Nixon’s behavior after he lost the race for governor of California in 1962. Alsop contended that Freeman’s appointment signaled an intention on the part of Wilson’s Government to avoid a close working relationship with the Nixon Administration.12 On 10 January Eisenhower wrote to Macmillan, asking him to “put this incident in a better light for me. You know of my biding faith in, and admiration for the British people. I just cannot accept the conclusion that the ‘special relationship’ between our two peoples is now to end.”13 On 15 January Macmillan replied, admitting to “much sorrow” about Alsop’s article but, in the next breath, adding that “I do not think the situation as bad as it appears on the surface.”14 Macmillan then gave a lengthy explanation about the circumstances in British party politics that led to Freeman’s appointment. He acknowledged that, at one time, Freeman “held all the views which are attributed to him by Alsop [but] that is a long time ago and I am told [that the] experience of real life has taught him a lot.”15 Macmillan reassured Ike that “[sometimes] we shall have governments that will be foolish but the tradition between our peoples remain[s] unshaken.”16 Eisenhower’s reply came one month later, on 17 February 1969. Writing from Walter Reed, Ike told Macmillan, “Your letter of 15 January did much to allay my fears as to the possible effects of Freeman’s appointment as Ambassador to our country. I note that you thought that real life may have done something to knock off his rough edges; so possibly we won’t be as bad

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off as it first appeared.”17 To the end of Ike’s life, Eisenhower and Macmillan were still measuring the depth and durability of the “special relationship.” Just as importantly, Macmillan and Eisenhower developed a greater appreciation for their friendship during their years out of office. Admittedly, throughout the late 1950s, Macmillan occasionally believed that Ike was a weak president, too easily influenced by John Foster Dulles and too inclined to view the Cold War in traditional terms. But Macmillan never departed from his personal admiration for Eisenhower, and for the qualities of leadership that he demonstrated as early as the North African campaign in 1943. Speaking to television interviewer Mitchell Krauss in New York, on 16 January 1968, Macmillan contended that no other man [except Eisenhower] could have commanded the expedition that carried on the Mediterranean campaign. [The British and American] force was an integrated force; it wasn’t a force fighting side by side under two separate commanders and [in] that supreme task only a man of the quality and generosity and absolutely – absolute integrity that Ike, as we all called him, commanded – that, to me is the immense gift and of that, any man might be well proud.18 In the same vein, during his second term, Eisenhower was occasionally frustrated by Macmillan’s policy views and his thinly disguised, periodic attempts to use him for his own domestic political benefit. In his public comments, however, Ike always spoke of his personal affection for Macmillan and respect for him as a political leader. Writing to Richard Douro of the Yorkshire Post prior to a public lecture by Macmillan in October 1967, Ike said, I am delighted to know that my old and good friend Harold Macmillan is to speak soon at your literary luncheon. I sincerely wish I could be present. His advice to me and his recommendations to his own government [during World War II] were always well considered, concise and frank to the point of bluntness. I have been privileged to count him, for a quarter of a century, as a splendid representative of his countrymen, a wise leader of a great people, and a valued and staunch friend.19 To the end, the Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence exemplified the strong relationship that existed between the two leaders who maintained the most significant diplomatic partnership of the Cold War.

Notes 1. Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, 8th rev. ed (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 179.

402 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence 2. Eisenhower was concerned that the treaty left too much room for possible cheating by the Soviets but nonetheless supported it. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 10 September 1963, National Archives of the UK (NA): PRO, PREM 11/4573; Eisenhower to Macmillan, 10 September 1963, EL, Post Presidential Papers (hereinafter PPP), 1963 Principal File, Box 54, “Ma,” folder 2. 3. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 12 October 1963, EL, PPP, 1963 Principal File, Box 54; Eisenhower to Macmillan, 24 May 1966 (letter telegram), EL, PPP, 1966 Principal File, Box 38, “Ma,” folder 2. 4. Eisenhower’s memoirs include two volumes: White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956, and Waging Peace, 1956–1961. He also published his insightful autobiography, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends, during his post-presidential retirement. Macmillan’s political memoirs included the six volumes: Winds of Change, 1914–1939; The Blast of War, 1939–1945; Tides of Fortune, 1945–1955; Riding the Storm, 1956–1959; Pointing the Way, 1959–1961; and At the End of the Day, 1961–1963. During his retirement, Macmillan also published two other books, The Past Masters: Of Politics and Politicians (New York: Harper and Row, 1975) and War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean, January 1943–May 1945 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984). 5. John S.D. Eisenhower, Strictly Personal, 304–12. 6. Horne, Macmillan, II, 593–6. 7. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 15 July 1965, EL, PPP, 1965 Principal File, Box 37, “M,” folder 2. See also Horne, Macmillan, II, 588–9. 8. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 15 July 1965, EL, PPP, 1965 Principal File, Box 37. See also Horne, Macmillan, II, 588–9. 9. Horne, Macmillan, II, 598. 10. Ibid., 621–2. 11. Ibid., 630. 12. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 10 January 1969, EL, PPP, 1969 Principal File, Box 12, “M.” In this letter, Eisenhower sent Macmillan a “tear sheet” from Stewart Alsop’s article, “Death Of An Alliance,” that appeared in Newsweek ( January 6, 1969), 60. 13. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 10 January 1965. 14. Macmillan to Eisenhower, 15 January 1969, EL, PPP, 1969 Principal File, Box 12. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Eisenhower to Macmillan, 17 February 1969, EL, PPP, 1969 Principal File, Box 12. 18. Sigurd S. Larmon to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 26 January 1968, EL, PPP, 1968 Principal File, Box 33, “M.” In this letter Larmon enclosed the relevant pages from a transcript of Macmillan’s televised interview with Krauss. Larmon also wrote, “I suggest that you show this to Mamie.” Eisenhower showed it to his wife with the note, “Mamie – please see Sig’s last sentence.” At the top of the letter was Mamie’s response, “Noted, MDE.” Obviously, the Eisenhower household was run with crisp military efficiency. 19. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard Douro, 12 October 1967, EL, PPP, 1967 Principal File, Box 34, “M.”

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392 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 5, 1961 Dear Harold: Although I think I tried, in my last few hours at the White House, to express – inadequately of course – my lasting appreciation of your final message to me, as President, this note is simply to tell you how much that communication has meant to me in the intervening days. The newspapers imply that you and your Lady will be here in the early part of April.1 I do hope that a good relationship will be developed between you and the new President. Personally, of course, I should like very much to see you, but as of now I doubt that I shall be on the East coast; our present plan is to remain in California until the mid or latter part of April. But if that arrangement changes, perhaps we can indeed meet on the basis of our old friendship. Not at all incidentally, this note brings to you my warm felicitations and good wishes on your birthday anniversary. I hope that you will have good health and much happiness and success in the years to come. With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1

In fact, Macmillan and Kennedy met on 26 March in Key West, Florida, a meeting called urgently by Kennedy to discuss the worsening situation in Laos. See Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 238–9; Nigel J. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Cold War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 36–7; and Horne, Macmillan, II, 292–4. After the meeting in Key West, Macmillan went to Washington for talks with Kennedy between 4 and 8 April.

393 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER March 29, 1961 Dear Friend, As you know, I am coming to the United States for a few days in early April. I hear to my regret that you are unlikely to be in or near Washington at that time. I will try to give you a ring on the telephone because I should not like to come to your side of the Atlantic without having a word with you. We still look forward to seeing you at your Scottish home before too long. Dorothy sends her regards to Mamie. As ever, Harold Macmillan

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394 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 2, 1961 Dear Harold: Thank you for your cordial note. Welcome back to the United States. I genuinely regret that it will not be possible to see you this trip as I shall not come East until April seventeenth. Look forward to talking with you on the telephone whenever it is convenient for you to call me this week. Mamie joins in sending our best to you and Dorothy. Dwight Eisenhower

395 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER April 9, 1961 Dear Ike It was very good to hear your voice over the telephone on Friday.1 I was very sorry that we could not meet. As you will have seen from the Communique, we have had good talks and covered a lot of ground. We discussed a lot of problems, but we naturally spent a good deal of time on Laos. I know you feel very strongly that we must keep Laos out of communist hands. So do I. So, I know, does the new President. But I need not tell you what a bad country this is for military operations. Indeed, I doubt whether we could save the situation by military action; and I am sure that, even if we could, the cost in men and money would be absurdly high, to say nothing of the difficulties of Asian opinion. I am sure, therefore, that we ought to go all out for a political settlement, if we can get one; and I believe that by political action we have a chance to make the country a neutral pad between Thailand and the Communists. As I understand it, President Kennedy is under considerable pressure about “appeasement” in Laos. I quite see why this should be so: we have not forgotten the lessons of history. I should however be very sorry if our two countries became involved in an open-ended commitment on this dangerous and unprofitable terrain. So I would hope that in anything which you felt it necessary to say about Laos you would not encourage those who think that a military solution in Laos is the only way of stopping the Communists in that area.2

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I was so sorry to hear about Mamie.3 Dorothy and I send our love and hope so much that she will be recovered soon. When she is, can we hope that you will both come to recuperate at Culzean? As ever, H. M. 1

2

3

Given the discussion in their previous letters, Macmillan must have telephoned Eisenhower after his meetings with Kennedy. Neither Macmillan nor Eisenhower makes any mention of the conversation in their memoirs, however. A useful discussion of the talks between Macmillan and Kennedy about the problems in Laos may be found in Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Cold War, 38–9. We were unable to discover the particular nature of Mamie Eisenhower’s illness.

396 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN April 18, 1961 Dear Harold, Thank you for your letter brought to me by your Consul in Los Angeles. There can be few thinking people who would question the wisdom of establishing Laos as an effective neutral barrier between Thailand and the Communists. The question is not, however, entirely one of wisdom of purpose; it is, in addition, one of practical accomplishment and confidence in the durability of any agreement. You correctly point out that the country presents dismaying obstacles to military operations and that, in any event, the West should first go full out in seeking a solution by political means. Any military action, anywhere, is a human tragedy – and I agree that Asian opinion would be adversely affected if a war should break out in Laos. The only way that public opinion in that region could be more disastrously affected would be for the West to shut its eyes and supinely allow the Communists, now or later, to take over the country. In such circumstances the end of freedom in Asia could indeed be in sight. So, I’d counsel the utmost energy in seeking a fair and effective agreement, but at the same time making certain that the Communists understand clearly the consequences of breaking it by them would be of the gravest character. Indeed, any agreement between the West and the Communists, on any subject, should always be, if possible, self-enforcing. We know that their word is worthless. It is this danger – one that history teaches us we must not ignore – which compels the forces of freedom to stand firm both morally and militarily, in

406 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

seeking and supporting the sanctity of the agreements that may be reached. A neutrality arrangement for Laos must not serve as a cloak for the communizing of the area. I was grateful for the chance to talk to you on the phone. I’m sorry that we could not have had the opportunity for a personal visit. But, on the whole, I felt that so soon after my leaving office, and because of the well known friendship between you and me – and between the two of us with the Chancellor and other prominent European leaders – it would be wise for me at this moment to be neither seen nor heard. Today is my first full day at my office in Gettysburg; I shall be in this region rather steadily until mid-summer. Both Mamie and I send our love to Dorothy and, of course, our very best to you. As ever, Your devoted friend Ike

397 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 1, 1961 Dear Harold By the press I see that you are having a bit of a holiday and note that in our newspapers there is repeated, from one of your own, a criticism of your readiness to leave London during a time of crisis.1 I applaud your wisdom and your indifference to such a specious type of criticism. Of course I am far away from the intimate official associations that we used to have. I miss them, and often wish that I could again have the opportunity to “talk things over” with you. In any event I wish you every success. I know that in the basic issue the West stands firm in the knowledge that any failure to do so would be fatal. Please convey my greetings to your Lady, and when you get a chance, please remember me to old friends like Winston, Selwyn and so many others that we both knew.2 With warm regard, As ever, Ike 1 2

Ike here refers to Khrushchev’s decision to construct the Berlin Wall. The reference is to Winston Churchill, of course, and also to Selwyn Lloyd.

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398 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 6, 1961 My dear Ike, I was so glad to get your letter with your message of encouragement about my holiday. It is very tiresome when people criticise their leaders for occasionally taking some relaxation but I comfort myself with the reflection that the electorate would be much more critical if tired men made bad decisions. But of course the fact that I went away for a holiday does not mean that I am unworried. The facts of life about Berlin have not changed since we discussed them so often. They remain as hard to adjust to. I often think of the plan which you had at the end of the war for not restoring Berlin where it was and wish that it had been accepted.1 But we have to deal with the situation as it is and, as you say, the West must remain united in this crisis and try to keep, as Dr. Adenauer said the other day, “warm hearts and cool heads”. Please send my warm good wishes to Mamie. Dorothy is still in Scotland or I know she would want to join with me in messages to you both. Yours ever, H.M. 1

Macmillan’s comment about Eisenhower’s plan at the end of World War II, “for not restoring Berlin where it was,” is confusing. He may have been referring to Eisenhower’s comment to President Truman at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 that the American occupation of Berlin should be handled by the State Department, with the Army in an adjunct role. See Neal, Harry and Ike, 40–1.

1962 399 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER February 13, 1962 Dear Ike Thank you so much for sending me a telegram on my birthday.1 I am not sure that it is an occasion for congratulation, but it cannot be ignored and I was very touched that you should have thought of telegraphing. I, too, wish that we could meet and talk as we used to do, but we must live in hopes. Dorothy joins me in sending warm good wishes to you and Mamie. Yours ever Harold Macmillan 1

We were unable to locate this document.

408 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

400 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 28, 1962 Dear Harold: Jock Whitney was kind enough to ask me to a small stag dinner in your honor when you reach New York at the end of April. I tried every possible way to make arrangements so I could attend. My difficulty stems largely out of Mamie’s passionate hatred of airplanes and her deep unhappiness whenever I enter one, even though she herself never accompanies me. Bowing to her wishes in this regard, there is no way that I can get to New York from my present abode in California and back in time to meet the requirements of an unbreakable engagement of long standing in the central part of the United States. That engagement is the dedication of the Library in which will be housed the Presidential papers of my Administration and will take place on the 100th anniversary of my mother’s birth. I make this laborious explanation solely because of my great hope that you will not interpret my absence as any evidence of indifference; on the contrary nothing could give me greater delight than to have an evening of conversation with you. Incidentally, if you could have only forty-eight hours more in the United States, I might be bold enough to ask the President for a jet airplane to bring you out here to have one day in this delightful climate and ideal golfing conditions. But Jock told me that your stay in our country would be brief indeed and your time completely occupied. Please convey my warm greetings to your Lady, and of course, all the best to yourself. As ever Ike

401 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN June 13, 1962 Dear Harold, I am planning, with my wife and a party totaling about eight or nine, which will include two of my friends and two of my grandchildren, to pass through Britain, both coming and going, to keep an engagement in Stockholm, Sweden with a convention of international educators. Since Mamie had long

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ago decided that, when I left official life, she would no longer take airplane flights with me, my transoceanic trip will have to be by ship. We expect to reach Southampton on about July 24 on the S.S. France. From there we will take the train to London and under present plans stay at the Savoy Hotel about two days. Returning from Stockholm, and after some brief stops on the Continent, I think we should reach London sometime around August 8 or 9, and will, hopefully, catch a train for Scotland immediately upon arrival. We hope to stay at Culzean Castle, which is not far from Prestwick, three or four days and thereafter would like to stop in Dublin for a matter of a day or two before embarking, about August 17, for the return trip to the United States. I tell you all of this first because I don’t want you to be astonished if you should happen to see my name in the papers. I shall be traveling purely as a private citizen, representing only myself. I shall, if you happen to be in London and convenient to you, seek an opportunity to call upon you but I do not want to be a burden of any kind on you or any of your associates; indeed, I shall be carrying a minimum of apparel and would not have available anything more formal than a simple black tie outfit. By no means may you interrupt any holiday because of our presence. While you are well aware of the feelings of respect and friendship that Mamie and I bear toward the Queen and her husband, I would merely ask you to use your own judgment as to whether she should be informed of our visit, so that she will not think us disrespectful. Needless to say, I am quite excited about seeing again the country and some of my friends that mean so much to me but by no means want to be a burden of any kind to them. With warm regard, as ever, Ike

402 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN Ayrshire August 18, 1962 Dear Harold To you and Lady Dorothy, Mrs. Eisenhower and I send our warmest thanks for a very delightful dinner at Admiralty House. It was not only an honor but a joy to be with you. Our visit in your great country was, as always, a heartwarming experience and one we shall long remember. With assurances of great respect and esteem,

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1963 403 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 7, 1963 Dear Harold, Once again I am delighted to have the opportunity of sending to you my warm birthday greetings and congratulations. I hope you are enjoying the best of health and happiness and will continue to do so during the years ahead. Happy Birthday! As ever,

404 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 19, 1963 Dear Harold: Under current plans I expect to make a brief visit – actually of hours only– to Portsmouth sometime in early August. My schedule will not permit me to come to London or to go to any spot in your country other than the headquarters area that I occupied during the D-day period, 1944. I shall, in addition, spend two or three days in the Normandy beachhead area but, again, I shall not go to Paris or any other part of France. My total time in France and Southern England will be about five days. The reason for sending this is merely to give the above bit of personal news; I would not like for you to have to learn from some enterprising newsman that I had visited even for a moment your country without a personal note from me. So, when you receive this, please do not make any attempt to answer; throw it in a convenient wastebasket. I hope local magistrates where I might spend a few hours will understand my situation as well as I am sure you do. You know, of course, how deeply distressed I have been by some of the publicized and so undeserved difficulties that have plagued you for the past several months.1 I cannot tell you how deeply is my conviction that you have been not only a dedicated leader of your people but a skillful one as well.

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Won’t you please convey to Dorothy fond greetings from Mamie and me and, of course, as always, I send you my very best. Sincerely, Ike E. 1

Ike’s reference to the “publicized and so undeserved difficulties” encountered by Macmillan undoubtedly meant the scandal involving John Profumo, the British secretary of state for war, and his intimate relationship with Christine Keeler, a young woman who was also acquainted with Stephen Ward, a British osteopath. Ward’s friendship with Yevgeny Ivanov, the Soviet Union’s naval attaché in Britain, turned the situation into an explosive scandal. The furor that resulted over the Profumo scandal almost brought down the Macmillan Government during the spring and summer of 1963. See Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 437–52 and Horne, Macmillan, II, 476–97. Keeler’s account of these events is in her autobiography (written with Douglas Thompson), The Truth at Last (London: Pan Macmillan, 2001, 2002).

405 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 26, 1963 Dear Ike, I am terribly sorry that I am going to miss you during your short visit to England. It is very sad, for I should dearly have loved a talk with you as in old days. The Test Ban Treaty – which I was able to announce to the House of Commons last night, has made an immense impression here.1 It has given a great uplift – not because our people are soft (you know that, having commanded our armies and watched our country in times of terrible strain and stress) – no, like your people ours are idealists. We must strive towards an ideal and that can only be today Peace and Justice. I remember so well how we went on with the unofficial moratorium, year after year. I remember too your firm decision at Camp David, in spite of a lot of pressure, not to be the first to break it. I am sure America gained in prestige and lost little in the technical struggle. So it will be again. In trying to get the support of your successor for the policies we began, I felt I was pursuing a consistent and an honourable cause. I do hope you will feel that this Treaty – covering the area it does – is in the real interest of America and her allies. Your opinion and your words may be decisive. Please forgive me for taking advantage of a very old friendship, which began in the battle area 20 years

412 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

ago. But I feel more deeply about this than about any great issue in my lifetime. Best wishes to you all. Your sincere friend, Harold Macmillan 1

The treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain on 25 July 1963. It went into effect on 11 October. See Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 479–85.

406 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN September 10, 1963 Dear Harold: Due to a number of causes following my return from Europe I have not been able to give a full reply to your fine letter, handed to me just as I embarked on the QUEEN ELIZABETH for Normandy. As you may know by this time, I came to the conclusion that approval of the Test Ban Treaty, on balance, was desirable. However, it was not too easy a decision because of the record of the Soviets for taking advantage of the West in every possible way, and never hesitating to break any agreement, written or verbal. One thing that bothered me about the paper was the phrase, “or other explosions” which meant to me that these would be for other than test purposes. In other words, it appeared that any nation, yours or ours, would be prohibited from use of whatever weapons it felt necessary in defending an attack on its vital interests. I have been assured that this point was taken care of; I am told that there can be no doubt of the right of any sovereign nation to use its own judgment in a contingency such as this. One of my difficulties in reaching an answer was that the conditions under which the treaty of 1963 has been drawn up are quite different from those in which my Administration decided, unilaterally, to abstain from testing for a period in the hope that the Soviet Union would do likewise. According to all of my scientific advisors in 1958, the United States was well ahead of the Soviets in all phases of the nuclear sciences, and a moratorium – provided both of us observed it – was to the advantage of the West. However, as we now know, the Soviets had no intention of abandoning tests at the time. To the contrary, they worked at high speed in order to put on a greater series of tests than ever before, and as a result of their actions some of our scientists believe that in particular fields (one of which is known to be in high yield weapons of 100 megaton range), the Soviets are ahead of us. Consequently, these particular scientists feel that a ban will keep the West in an inferior position for the simple reason that we know we will keep to our agreement – we don’t know what the other fellow will do.

Epilogue 413

These days I am, of course, a private citizen but I am scarcely allowed to act as one. My own political Party is rather leaderless because our 1960 nominee (Nixon) was defeated. This unfortunate development has resulted in making me a sort of “Father Confessor,” or at least a constant advisor of various individuals and segments of the Party. This along with the terrible problem of trying to write a book on the Presidency, invitations for appearances from educational and public service institutions all over the country and so forth has made my life a busier one, personally, than it ever has been before.1 I did not want to write until I could give you a rather complete story of my own decision and of some of the later conferences I have had with others respecting it. I did not want to impose upon your time to send you several communications on the subject. I trust I am not guilty of inappropriate partisanship in hoping for you a resounding approval of your years of work and leadership by your countrymen.2 As a devoted friend I would like to see you take things easier; but in your position as one of the Free World’s foremost leaders I do not see how you can be spared. Mamie joins me in affectionate greetings to Dorothy and, of course, the very best to yourself. As ever, Ike E. 1

2

The reference to a “book on the presidency” is to the first volume of Eisenhower’s presidential memoirs, Mandate for Change: White House Years, 1953–1956, which was released later in 1963. This comment reflects Eisenhower’s belief that Macmillan intended to lead the Conservative Party at the next British general election. At this time, however, Macmillan was undecided as to whether to continue as leader of the Conservative Party through the next general election, or to leave the premiership before the election. See Horne, Macmillan, II, 528–40.

407 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER September 14, 1963 Dear Ike I am most grateful for your letter. It was fine to get it. As you can imagine I am getting rather tired, and from what I can see of your life one works just as hard when one is out of office as when one is in. With all good wishes, Yours ever, Harold

414 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

408 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN October 12, 19631 Am distressed to learn that you have had to enter the hospital.2 Mamie joins me in the hope that you will quickly be restored to your accustomed health and vigor. Warm regard, Ike Eisenhower 1

2

A note attached to this message revealed that it was dictated by John S.D. Eisenhower prior to transmittal to Macmillan. See Eisenhower Library, PostPresidential Papers, 1963 Principal File, Box 54, “Ma,” folder 2. On 10 October, Macmillan had surgery in King Edward VII’s Hospital to relieve the pain caused by a benign enlargement of the prostate gland. Facing a lengthy recuperation, he decided to relinquish the premiership. On 18 October, in a meeting with Queen Elizabeth II at the hospital, Macmillan submitted his letter of resignation as prime minister. See Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 501–5, 515–19.

1964 409 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 6, 1964 May the years ahead be filled with only good things for you and yours. Congratulations and Happy Birthday! With warm personal regard,

1965 410 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 5, 1965 My warm felicitations on your anniversary. May the years ahead be filled with good health and happiness for you.

Epilogue 415

I truly regret that we did not have an opportunity for a visit during my recent hasty journey to London on the sad occasion of Sir Winston’s funeral.1 It would have been a real pleasure for me to have had some time with you. Again, Happy Birthday and many more of them. 1

Sir Winston Churchill passed away on 24 January 1965, and his funeral was held in London on 30 January 1965.

411 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN July 15, 1965 A young Englishman visited my office yesterday morning and gave me your home address. I immediately determined to regain contact with an old friend whom I had known so well both in war and peace. I have had vague rumors to the effect that you had, after leaving government, rejoined your publishing firm. Whether or not you are active in this kind of work I do not know, but it strikes me that if you and I could remember and put down on paper all the things that we experienced – together – during the past 20 years it would make quite a story. For my part that story would be one of considerable personal satisfaction for the simple reason that I always found you thoughtful, cooperative, and friendly. I think if your hand were still guiding the British ship of state both your people and ours would have a feeling of relief. By no means in starting this note did I intend to get involved in nostalgia; rather my purpose is merely to inquire about you and Dorothy and to express the profound hope that both of you are enjoying a full measure of health and happiness. On our side, Mamie and I still spend the summer months here in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, but go to Southern California for the bitter winter weather. Both of us are in reasonable health and this next week expect to go into northern Wisconsin to spend ten days away from the heat that now seems to be settling upon us. It seems to me that in Britain when one finishes a career in a governmental responsibility, particularly executive responsibility, he is free to do what he pleases and is normally left alone. My own experience in this regard is not a particularly happy one. My own party is without a recognized leader and I am bombarded frequently with demands of all kinds for advice, counsel, and help. Time and patience will not permit me to answer all these things favorably.

416 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

The second volume of my book, THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS will be coming out in the fall, while periodically I write an article for the “Reader’s Digest.”1 My farming activities here in Gettysburg are interesting and in many cases enjoyable, but they are far from a financial success. I have to work and write in order to pay the debts I incur in animal breeding. Should the spirit move you and you have the time, let me have a word from you. With affectionate greetings to your lady, and of course, all the very best to yourself. 1

Eisenhower’s reference is to Waging Peace: White House Years, 1956–1961, which was released in 1965. His articles for Reader’s Digest, during retirement, included “Spending into Trouble” (July 1963), 60–8; “An Epidemic of Friendship” (November 1963), 132–8; “Let’s Be Honest with Ourselves” (December 1963), 61–8; “Policies I Believe Will Strengthen This Country” ( July 1964), 102–8; “What Is Leadership?” ( June 1965), 45–54; and “America’s Place in the World” (October 1965), 75–81.

412 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER July 15, 1965 Dear Ike I was so delighted to get your letter of July 15th. It is a great sorrow to me that we are not able to meet. I had hoped to have a talk with you when you were over for the funeral, but, alas, there was no time. My life here now is quiet and uneventful. I have taken the chairmanship of my family companies, which gives me about two days’ work a week. The rest of my time I spend in trying to compose my memoirs. You know from your considerable experience of authorship how difficult this is – at least, I find it so. I have finished the first draft of my first volume, which takes me to 1939, the outbreak of the Second World War. I am by way of doing two more volumes, so this will keep me occupied for some years, if I live to complete them.1 Dorothy is well and very active in local affairs, and my large family is reasonably flourishing. We had a sad loss in the death of one of my grandsons at the age of 19.2 I am glad to hear that you and Mamie are going South for the winter. If all goes well, I have a plan to come to the United States next spring. In that case, I shall not hesitate to invite myself to come and see you. You are quite right about farming. It is great fun, but amateur farming, or gentleman farming, is very seldom profitable – at least that is our experience here. But it is a bore having to be mixed up in politics. Fortunately, I have

Epilogue 417

no public work to do of this kind and a limited amount of private work. Naturally, people consult me, but they never take my advice, so I give it without much sense of responsibility. Yes, indeed, we managed things much better in our time! At least it is nice to think so. I am horrified at the state into which Europe has been allowed to drift. I think we ought to have been able, between us, to stop that. With kind regards to Mamie and my best greetings and affection, Yours ever Harold Macmillan 1

2

The first volume of Macmillan’s memoirs, Winds of Change, 1914–1939, was published in 1966. The other volumes of Macmillan’s political memoirs were published rapidly thereafter, including The Blast of War, 1939–1945 (1968), Tides of Fortune, 1945–1955 (1969), Riding the Storm, 1956–1959 (1971), Pointing the Way, 1959–1961 (1972), and At the End of the Day, 1961–1963 (1973). The reference here is to Joshua Macmillan, the second son of Macmillan’s son, Maurice, and his wife Katie.

1966 413 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 5, 1966 Many happy returns of the day. I trust that the years yet to come will be filled with good health, prosperity and happiness for you and your loved ones. With warm personal regard,

414 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER 15th February 1966. Dear Ike Many thanks for your letter. It was indeed kind of you to write for my birthday. All good wishes to you and Mamie, Yours ever Harold

418 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

415 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN May 24, 1966 Dear Harold: It was with great sadness that Mamie and I learned of the death of your wife.1 Words are inadequate at a time like this but we wanted you to know that our thoughts and our prayers are with you. Ike E. 1

Lady Dorothy Macmillan died from a massive heart attack at Birch Grove, the family home in Sussex, on 22 May 1966. For an account of her final illness, see Horne, Macmillan, II, 585–6.

416 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER 6th June 1966. Dear Ike I am most grateful to you for your very kind telegram of sympathy. As you say, nothing can fill the terrible gap that has opened. I feel quite lost after these long years of our journey together, but I am comforted by the messages that reach me from every part of the world and from high and low alike. You both knew her and her quality. I want to thank you, my dear old friend, for your thought. Yours ever Harold Macmillan

417 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER 15th December 1966. My Dear Friend I was so sorry to see in the papers that you were to have an operation. Actually I had the same one some ten or twelve years ago and found myself better after it.1 I do hope you will make a full and complete recovery.

Epilogue 419

Now that I am writing Volume II of my memoirs, which covers the second war, I have been thinking a great deal about you and all our time at Algiers.2 Yours ever, Harold Macmillan 1

2

In December 1966, Eisenhower had gall bladder surgery at Walter Reed Army Hospital. See Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 846. Macmillan’s gall bladder surgery occurred on 8 July 1953. See Catterall (ed.), Macmillan Diaries, 1950–1957, 243–5. The reference here is to Macmillan’s The Blast of War, 1939–1945, published in 1968.

418 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN December 29, 1966 Thank you very much for your nice note of the fifteenth. While my operation was completely successful and without complications it seems to be normal, at my age, to get over the resulting soreness very “slowly.” I am delighted that you are getting on with your Memoirs and I shall eagerly await the publication of your next volume.

1967 419 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 7, 1967 A very Happy Birthday and many, many more of them. I trust that all is well with you and you will continue to enjoy good health and happiness. With my warm personal greetings and best wishes,

420 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER 21st February 1967 Dear Ike How very kind of you to think of me on my birthday. I was very touched by your thought.

420 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

Is there any chance of your coming over to this country during the summer? If so, do not fail to let me know and we could, perhaps, meet. Yours ever Harold Macmillan

421 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER 14th August 1967. Dear Ike I was indeed sorry to see that you have had to go to hospital again but I am relieved to learn from the latest news that you are making good progress.1 I am going to be in Washington staying at the British Embassy from the 13th or the 14th January until the 28th [1968]. I shall be delivering a speech at the Columbia University and one in Los Angeles. If there is any chance of seeing you it would be wonderful. With all good wishes to you and all your family, Yours ever Harold Macmillan 1

The reference here, most likely, is to an attack of gasteroenteritis that led to Eisenhower’s hospitalization in the summer of 1967. See Lester David and Irene David, Ike and Mamie (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1981), 243–4.

422 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN August 18, 1967 I am delighted to know that you are going to be in California from January twenty-fourth until the twenty-eighth next year. Mamie and I plan to go to that area sometime about the first of December and we live on the desert, only about 2½ hours by car from Los Angeles. We would be delighted to have you come out and see the winter desert and stay with us a day or so. Alternately I could make arrangements to run up to Los Angeles and visit you for a morning or something of that sort. Because I suspect that you will be quite busy I shall leave the decision up to you as to where and how we should meet. I assure you that I am anxious to have a visit with you.

Epilogue 421

My telephone number on the desert is area code 714 and the number itself, Fireside 6-8181. I am truly excited about the prospect of seeing you again. With affectionate regard,

423 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER 31st August 1967 Dear Ike Of course it would be marvellous to motor out and see you. In principle perhaps I could arrange this for Saturday, January 27th. I sail from Los Angeles for Sydney the following day and I believe the boat leaves during the evening. Anyway I have every hope that this plan will be feasible. This would be much more fun than meeting you with a lot of other people in Washington. Yours ever, Harold.

424 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER November 9, 1967 15 members of the North African Economic Board Meeting in London under my chairmanship send to their supreme commander their warmest greetings on this twenty-fifth anniversary of the landings in North Africa and their very best wishes for a quick recovery.1 Harold Macmillan 1

The nature of Eisenhower’s illness in November 1967 is unclear. He was ill, however, later the next month after he and Mamie had settled in California for the winter. See John Eisenhower, Strictly Personal, 328–9.

425 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN November 15, 1967 Dear Harold– I most deeply appreciate the greetings from the members of the North African Economic Board on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the allied landing in North Africa. On the same evening a few of us met in Washington to celebrate the same anniversary there. In our conversation you were one of the principal figures.

422 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

The meeting was arranged by Admiral Jerry Wright, together with Bob Murphy.1 Also present were the British Ambassador and a number of American and British military men and foreign service officers. All of us had you and your associates very much in mind. While I no longer bounce back from an illness as rapidly and fully as I did in earlier years, I am still feeling very well and am planning to go with Mamie to California for the winter, as is customary with us. I am looking forward to a possible meeting with you in January on the West Coast. With personal regard, As ever, Ike 1

The reference is to Admiral Jerauld Wright, commander of naval forces for the NATO alliance between 1954 and 1960, and Robert Murphy, Eisenhower’s diplomatic troubleshooter in World War II and also during his presidency. For a study of Wright’s naval career, see David M. Key, Jr., Admiral Jerauld Wright: Warrior Among Diplomats (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 2001). For Murphy, see Diplomat Among Warriors.

1968 426 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER January 31, 1968 Dear Ike: This is just a line to thank you for your kindness to me and my grandson last week. It was a tremendous pleasure for me to see you both again and to find you so well and cheerful.1 Old age is miserable – but old friendships help to make it memorable. We are now on our way to Australia, where I have a pretty full programme – and then home. All good wishes and sincere thanks from your old friend. Harold Macmillan 1

Macmillan and his grandson, Alexander (presently the Earl of Stockton), visited Los Angeles between 24 and 28 January 1968 where the former prime minister addressed the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on 25 January. He visited with Eisenhower at Palm Springs on 27 January. EL, Post-Presidential Papers, 1968 Principal File, Box 1, “Ap 1 (Accepted).”

Epilogue 423

427 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN February 6, 1968 Dear Harold Happy birthday and many, many more. Mrs. Eisenhower joins me in felicitations to you on this special occasion. We were delighted to be able to visit with you and your grandson here on the desert and hope you had a pleasant trip home. With warm personal regard, As ever

428 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER 5th March 1968 Dear Ike Many thanks for your letter of February 6th which I received on my return home. It was indeed delightful to see you a few weeks ago and to find you in such good form. All good wishes to you both, Yours ever Harold

429 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN March 29, 1968 Dr. John E. Wickman, Director of the Eisenhower Presidential Library, will be writing you shortly. He will be in the United Kingdom in May at the invitation of the National Trust for Scotland, assisting them with their work at Culzean Castle. During his trip he is also collecting material for the Presidential Library in the United States, a portion of which is devoted to the history of the Second World War and the post war years. For these reasons,

424 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

he is especially interested in interviewing you for the Library’s oral history program. I would be most grateful if you would consent to see him. With warm regard,

430 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER June 20, 1968 I am so sorry to see of your illness and wish you a speedy recovery from your old friend.1 Harold Macmillan 1

Eisenhower suffered another heart attack in April 1968 and was hospitalized briefly in California before being moved to Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington. See John Eisenhower, Strictly Personal, 328–9. Macmillan may have been referring to Ike’s latest hospitalization.

1969 431 MACMILLAN TO MAMIE EISENHOWER 2nd January, 1969 Dear Mamie, I received a most beautiful Christmas card from you all. I was delighted to get it. The picture of Gettysburg in the spring is really lovely. I do hope that things are going better. Since I hear no news about Ike, I assume this is good news.1 But I know how great must be your anxieties and I would like once more to assure you of the affectionate sympathy of an old friend. Yours ever Harold Macmillan 1

Eisenhower remained hospitalized at Walter Reed during the winter months of 1968–69, his condition having stabilized slightly in the latter part of 1968. Mamie Eisenhower, however, was suffering from a serious respiratory ailment at the time when she received this letter from Macmillan. See John Eisenhower, Strictly Personal, 333.

Epilogue 425

432 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN Walter Reed Hospital January 10, 1969 I enclose a tear sheet from a weekly magazine published in Washington called Newsweek. The writer of the article, Stewart Alsop, is considered a notch above his brother [Joseph Alsop] and is normally quite accurate; however, if what he has to say is true as to the facts about the appointment of Mr. Freeman, and about that individual’s passed record of being “AntiAmerican,” I am indeed saddened.1 I wonder whether you could put this incident in a better light for me. You know of my biding faith in, and my admiration for the British people. I just cannot accept the conclusion that the “special relationship” between our two peoples is now to end. With warm personal regard, 1

Joseph Alsop, also a prominent political columnist in Washington, was the brother of Stewart Alsop. See Robert W. Merry, Taking on the World: Joseph and Stewart Alsop, Guardians of the American Century (New York: Viking, 1996). A frequent critic of the Eisenhower Administration in the late 1950s, Joseph Alsop had helped to popularize the so-called “missile gap” during the presidential campaign of 1960. See Joseph Alsop (with Adam Platt), “I’ve Seen the Best of It” (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 413–15.

433 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER 15th January 1969 Dear Ike I have just received your letter of the 10th January. I, too, had seen Alsop’s article and read it with much sorrow. As you know, from experience, I have always been very unwilling to criticise a British Government when I was in Opposition and I am still more reluctant now that I am retired. But between you and me there can be nothing except absolute confidence. I do not think the situation as bad as it appears on the surface. The truth is that we have now, in Britain, a Government of very clever people – far cleverer than I or my Government – who are at the same time curiously stupid. It is a paradox that you and I have often observed with these left-wing Socialists and dreamers.

426 The Macmillan–Eisenhower Correspondence

What in fact happened about the Embassy matter is this. They decided, with some courage, to send Christopher Soames to Paris.1 This was a very good appointment on every ground. Christopher, himself, is able, reliable and absolutely devoted to the causes which we have all worked for. He was one of the best negotiators when we were trying to get into the Common Market and he is a keen European. His wife, Mary Churchill, has all of the charm of her mother and will be an excellent Ambassadress. The French were delighted and although he will not be able to achieve much for the European idea until De Gaulle leaves, I think it was a good gesture to send him now. Having appointed a Tory politician the way they think is this. We must now send a Government politician or ex-politician. They looked round and found ready to hand Freeman. I have known Freeman for a good many years and always admired his ability. I think also that he is a sincere man but he got tired of politics, perhaps because of his sincerity, and has been for some time British High Commissioner in Delhi where, I am told, he has done very well. When he was writing in the ‘New Statesman’ which is, as you know, a paper of left-wing intellectuals, he held all the views which are attributed to him by Alsop. But that is a long time ago and I am told, as often happens with these people, experience of real life has taught him a lot. In fact some of the Socialists here have objected to his appointment on the ground that he has now turned definitely to the right. Of course it is very unfortunate that he should have written this stuff about Nixon and it was incredibly stupid of the British Government before they knew the result of your election. This does not excuse what has happened but I feel sure this is the true explanation. Of course it is all very sad but I do not think that it is in itself a disaster. I am very hopeful that, in two years time, we shall have a Government of which Alec Douglas-Home will be Foreign Secretary or at any rate play an important role. I am sure then that my old friends will turn back to the policy which I have tried to support all my life and of which Churchill was the great expositor. Whatever Britain’s commitments to the Commonwealth and I hope in due course in Europe nothing should change or really make any change to the old relationship. Sometimes we shall have Governments that will be foolish but the tradition between our peoples remain unshaken. I was very struck in my little trip last year to America to find how graciously I was welcomed not only by many old friends but by the listeners to television and by a lot of young people who knew very little about me. I can only pray that I shall live to see the old relationship wholly reestablished. I do hope that you are getting better and I must tell you how much all your friends have thought about you in recent months. Yours ever Harold Macmillan 1

Soames was a son-in-law of Sir Winston and Clementine Churchill.

Epilogue 427

434 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN Walter Reed Hospital February 10, 1969 Happy Birthday! Mrs. Eisenhower joins me in felicitations to you on this special occasion. With warm personal regard,

435 MACMILLAN TO EISENHOWER 10th February 1969 Dear Ike, Your message reached me today. How kind of you to remember me! Yours ever, Harold

436 EISENHOWER TO MACMILLAN Walter Reed Hospital February 17, 1969 Dear Harold, Your letter of 15 January did much to allay my fears as to the possible effects of Freeman’s appointment as Ambassador to our country. Indeed, I got quite a chuckle out of your description of how the minds of your labor [party] leaders work. They simply add the balance to a Tory politician with the appointment of a real left-winger. I note that you thought that real life may have done something to knock off his rough edges; so possibly we won’t be as bad off as it first appeared. With warm personal regard, as ever Ike P.S. I’m told you have a personal appointment with President Nixon. I wish I could have attended him on that particular visit. D.E.

A Note on Sources The correspondence between Harold Macmillan and Dwight D. Eisenhower may be found in archival collections and also in several published sources. The most extensive collections of letters are found at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, and at the National Archives of the UK (NA): PRO, Kew, Surrey. In addition, many of the letters housed in these collections have been selectively published in books and editions that deal either with the Eisenhower presidency or the Macmillan premiership. At the Eisenhower Library, copies of the correspondence between the two leaders during the second term of the Eisenhower presidency are contained in the Ann Whitman File, International Series, Boxes 22, 23, 24, 25(a), and 25(b). As mentioned previously, Box 22 contains a file, “Harold Macmillan,” (7 folders) with correspondence covering the period between January 10, 1957 and May 24, 1957. Box 23 contains three files: “Macmillan, October 23–25, 1957” (3 folders); “Macmillan, President, May 29, 1957–November 30, 1957” (6 folders); and “Macmillan–President, December 1957–May 30, 1958” (6 folders). Box 24 contains two files relating to the correspondence, “Macmillan–President 6/1/58 to 9/30/58” (8 folders); and “Macmillan, October 1, 1958–March 20, 1959” (6 folders). In Box 25(a) are found two files, “Macmillan, March 23, 1959–June 30, 1959” (6 folders); and “Macmillan 7/1/59 to 12/31/59” (7 folders). Finally, Box 25(b) contains two files relating to the correspondence, “Macmillan, Harold, Jan. 1 to August 4, 1960” (7 folders); and “Macmillan, Harold 8/1/60 to 1/20/61” (6 folders). In the National Archives of the UK (NA): PRO, the letters between Macmillan and Eisenhower are collected in the Prime Minister’s Papers, PREM 11. Some letters may also be found in the Harold Macmillan Papers at the Bodleian Library, Oxford, UK. Researchers who are interested in the correspondence between Macmillan and Eisenhower between 1961 and 1969 may examine Eisenhower’s PostPresidential Papers, the Principal File, for each year. These materials include the 1961 Principal File, Box 13, “Harold Macmillan”; the 1962 Principal File, Box 38, “Ma”; the 1963 Principal File, Box 54, “Ma,” folder 2; the 1964 Principal File, Box 44, “Ma,” folder 2; the 1965 Principal File, Box 37, “M,” folder 2; the 1966 Principal File, Box 38, “Ma,” folder 2; and Box 20, “TR Trips-Walter Reed Operation Dec 1966,” folder 1; the 1967 Principal File, Box 34, “M”; Box 3, “Ap 3 Appointments Tentative”; and Box 13, “Me Messages”; the 1968 Principal File, Box 33, “M,” Box 1, “Ap 1 (Accepted)”; and “TR Walter Reed–con’t”; and the 1969 Principal File, Box 12, “M,” and Box 5, “PL1 (Complaints).”

428

A Note on Sources 429

The most helpful published source is The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volumes XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, and XXI, edited by Louis Galambos and Daun van Ee. These volumes contain most of the letters written by Eisenhower to Macmillan between 1957 and 1960. Almost as important, in their footnotes to Eisenhower’s letters, the editors also list the key points of Macmillan’s responses and their source in the PREM collections. For specific reference, the reader may find the letter from Eisenhower to Macmillan, 10 January 1957, in Volume XVII (1996). Volume XVIII (2001) includes letters from Eisenhower to Macmillan from February 23, 1957 to January 6, 1958. Volume XIX (2001) contains Eisenhower’s letters from February 15, 1958 to February 12, 1959. In Volume XX (2001), letters for the period from March 2, 1959 to July 23, 1960 are included. Volume XXI (2001) contains the Eisenhower letters written from August 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960. Other published sources for the Macmillan–Eisenhower correspondence are the numerous volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–57, and Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, compiled by the United States Department of State and published by the United States Government Printing Office. For 1955–57, see Volume IV: Western European Security and Integration (1986); Volume IX: Foreign Economic Policy; Foreign Information Program (1987); Volume X: Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy (1989); Volume XII: Near East: Jordan–Yemen (1988); Volume XX: Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy (1989); Volume XXIV: Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean (1989); and Volume XXVII: Western Europe and Canada (1992). For 1958–60, see Volume II: United Nations and General International Matters (1991); Volume III: National Security Policy: Arms Control and Disarmament (1996); Volume VI: Cuba (1991); Volume VII, part 1: Western European Security and Integration: Canada (1993); Volume VII, part 2: Western Europe (1993); Volume VIII: Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959 (1993); Volume IX: Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960: Germany, Austria (1993); Volume X, part 1: Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union, Cyprus (1993); and Volume XI: Lebanon and Jordan (1993). Finally, both Harold Macmillan and Dwight D. Eisenhower occasionally referred to their correspondence in their respective published memoirs. For Macmillan, the reader should examine Riding the Storm, 1956–1959; Pointing the Way, 1959–1961; and At the End of the Day, 1961–1963. For Eisenhower, the relevant memoir is Waging Peace, 1956–1961.

Index Page numbers in italics refer to actual correspondence. Adenauer, Chancellor Konrad 48, 54, 112, 199, 228, 243, 274, 280 correspondence with Macmillan 285 meeting with Eisenhower (1960) 329 Africa 294–6 Macmillan’s visit 322 Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy 153 al-Bizri, Afif 19 Alanbrooke, Field Marshal 10, 283–4 Aldrich, Winthrop 1, 9, 24 Alexander, Lord 283–4 Algeria 294–9 self-determination referendum 298 Allied Forces Headquarters 6 Alphand, H E Herve 308 Alsop, Joseph 425 Alsop, Stewart 400, 425 Anglo-American Atomic Bilateral Agreement 153 Aqaba 166–8 AQUATONE 32–4 Archbishop Makarios 39, 41, 44, 50, 188 Armistice Agreements 28 arms race 99–100 Atomic Bilateral 170 Atomic Energy Act 20, 112, 115 amendments 135–6, 138, 154 Atomic Energy Agreement 153 Atomic Energy Authority 169 Atomic Energy Commission 84, 153 atomic power 169 Australia 180 Baghdad Embassy attack 103 Baghdad Pact 116, 256 Bakdash, Khalid 19 Balmoral 283–6, 288–9 Belgian Congo 318–19, 380–1 Belles, Joshua Reid 5, 70 Ben Gurion, David 167 Berlin dispute 101, 103, 107–8, 195–6, 198, 214–20, 228, 259, 266, 268, 273, 277, 302, 304

Berlin Wall 398, 406 Bermuda Conference (1957) 2, 17, 25–6, 30–1, 36, 43 Bishop, Sir Frederick 82 Blue Steel missiles 386 Blue Streak missiles 335–6, 386 Boyle, Peter D 9 Brandt, Willy 266 British Atomic Energy Authority 148 British Overseas Airways Corporation 274–5, 279 British West Indies Federation 73 Brundrett, Sir Frederick 169 Bulganin, Nikolai 47–8, 51–2, 58, 114 Buraimi oasis 76 Burgess, W Randolph 166 Burke, Admiral Arleigh A 244 Burma 178 Butler, Richard Austen (Rab) 9 Caccia, Harold 12, 26, 45, 48, 50, 58, 68–9, 74, 79–80, 111, 186, 377 Cambodia 178 Camp David meeting (1959) 226, 233, 255, 258 Camp David meeting (1960) 334, 337–8 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) 99 Casablanca conference 6 Castro, Fidel 277, 317–19, 354–9, 365–9 centurion tanks, purchase by Germany 31, 47, 56, 67, 81 Ceylon 180 Chaguaramas Station 73 Chamoun, President Camille 100, 103–4, 156–61 Chequers meeting (1959) 282–3, 288 Chiang Kai-Shek 181, 300 China 300 Formosa Straits crisis 100–1, 103, 105–6, 177, 181, 300 Quemoy and Matsu crisis 176–81 trade embargo 54–7, 64

430

Index Chou En-lai 183 Christmas Island tests 53, 146 Churchill, Mary 426 Churchill, Winston 5, 9, 284, 406 correspondence with Eisenhower 9–10, 17 death 415 visit to Eisenhower 253 Clark, General Mark 132 Cold War 12, 101, 108, 398 Combined Policy Committee 186 Committee of Ten for Disarmament 308 Commonwealth 72 attitude to Far East crisis 180 Cook, Don 341–3 Couve de Murville, Maurice 172, 324, 339 Crosthwaite, Ponsby Moore 79 Cuba 317–19, 354–9, 365–9, 373–5 Agrarian Reform Law 355 Culzean Castle 291, 293–4, 409 Cyprus 39, 41, 44, 101, 103, 107, 184, 186–9, 209–11, 324, 353 de Gaulle, President Charles 172, 175, 199, 228, 243, 274, 279–80, 307–8, 338–9, 349–50 correspondence with Eisenhower 283–4, 309–11, 377–9, 379 statement on Algeria 294–9 talks with Eisenhower 292, 294–7 de Guingand, Sir Francis 283–4 de-colonization 391–2 Dean, Sir Patrick 37, 41, 142 Debré, Michel 279 Declaration of Common Purpose 20 Dempsey, Miles 283 Dennison, Admiral Robert L 349 DePauw University (1958) 69, 71, 76, 102, 124, 131–2 d’Este, Carlo 2 Diefenbaker, John 114, 381, 383 Dillon, C Douglas 264 disarmament 58, 66, 68, 82, 84, 86, 111–12, 203–4, 325 Disarmament Committee 52, 59 Disarmament Subcommittee 59, 70 Disarmament Treaty 69 Doud, Elivera, death of 384 Douglas-Home, Alec 382, 426

431

Dulles, Allen 37, 224 Dulles, John Foster 1, 11–12, 17, 28, 54, 60, 68, 77, 101, 163, 196, 200 death 256–7 illness 208 relationship with Macmillan 179–80 resignation 242 talks with Selwyn Lloyd 135 Eaton, Cyrus 327 economic climate 149–50 Eden, Anthony 7, 17, 50, 212 correspondence with Eisenhower 9 Full Circle 322 ill health 45 resignation 1, 9 Eisenhower, David 4 Eisenhower, Doud Dwight 4 Eisenhower, Dr Milton S 102, 138 Eisenhower, Dwight D becomes president 1 Bonn visit 285–6 correspondence with Churchill 9–10, 17 with de Gaulle 283–4, 309–11, 377, 379 with Eden 9 death 398, 401 early life 4–5 end of presidency 396–7 meetings with John Foster Dulles 106 with Queen Elizabeth II 268 State visit to UK 281–3, 285–7, 290–4 suffers stroke 20, 95–6 support for Resolution 1541 391–2 talks with de Gaulle 339, 341–2 with Khrushchev 197–8, 281–2, 300–5 visits France (1959) 292, 294–7 South America (1960) 326–8 Soviet Union (1959) 276 Sweden 408–9 UK 91–4 Eisenhower, Ida Stover 4 Eisenhower, John Sheldon 4 Eisenhower, Mamie Geneva Doud 4 ill health 92–5

432 Index EOKA 44 European Defense Community 65 European Economic Community 65 European Free Trade Area 65 European Theater of Operation 5 Exchange of Officers 185–6 expansion of trade 150 Explorer I launch 117 Export Credits Guarantee Department 254 Far East 177–83 fishing limits 127–8, 130, 132–3 Fisk, Dr James B 176–7, 185 Foot, Sir Hugh 211 Foreign Ministers Conference 262, 268, 273, 302 Foreign Secretaries’ Meeting 126–7 Formosa Straits crisis 100–1, 103, 105–6, 177–83, 300 France Eisenhower’s visit 291–2, 294–7 fall of government 65 navy 228 nuclear testing 172–5 Freeman, John 400 Gaither Commission report 99 Gareloch 317, 347–8, 353, 362 Gates, Thomas 12, 334–5, 345–6, 350 Gaza 28 General Election (1959) 305–6 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea 127–8, 130–1, 133–4 Geneva nuclear test negotiations 123, 171, 173, 176, 203–4, 212, 226–7, 229–31, 234–40, 258, 271, 324, 331, 361 Geneva summit conference (1955) 10–11, 243–4 Germany allied forces in 155–6, 166 Berlin dispute 101, 103, 107–8, 195–6, 198, 214–20, 228, 259, 266, 268, 273, 276, 301, 304 purchase of Centurion tanks 31, 47, 56, 67, 81 reunification 304 Ghana 180 Globemaster planes 167–8

Goodpaster, General Andrew J 37, 296 Greece 187–9, 209–11 Greers Dam turbine contract 205–7 Grewe, Wilhelm Georg 308 Gromyko, Andrei 213, 220–1, 266, 272, 275–7 Gulf of Aqaba 28 Hammarskjöld, Dag 319 Harding, Sir John 41 Harriman, Averell 50 Hart, Judith 317 Heads of Government Club 270 Herter, Christian 12, 243, 255–7, 263, 266, 299, 302, 309, 339–41, 344, 352, 377, 382, 391 high altitude nuclear testing 236–41 Holmes, Julius 69 Holy Loch 317, 388 Holyoake, Keith 143 Hong Kong 106, 177 Hood, Lord Samuel 106, 181, 339 Hoosiers 6 Humbert, Dr Russell 131 Humphrey, George 44, 46 Hutchinson, George 2 Hydrogen bomb tests 53, 146 India 180 Indonesia 98, 135, 143, 178, 327 Inter-American Defense Board 73 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) 18, 111, 120, 124, 224 International Bank 175 International Development Agency 175 International Development Association 254 International Monetary Fund 175 Iran 165, 255 Iraq 135, 165, 255 military coup 100, 103 IRBM see intermediate-range ballistic missiles IRBM Agreement 125 Ireland, President of 223, 225 Israel 27–8, 49 British planes overflying 166–8 Ivanov, Yevgeny 411

Index Japan 178 Johns Hopkins University (1958) 102, 138–40 Jones, Matthew 19 Jordan British intervention 49, 100, 104, 162–5, 166, 190–1 possible coup 166 Karamanlis, Constantin 107, 209–10 Kasavubu, Joseph 380 Kassem, Abdul Karim 103 Keeler, Christine 411 Kennedy, John F 320, 403–4 Khrushchev, Nikita 52, 101 attitude towards West Germany 336 Berlin dispute 101, 103, 107–8, 195–6, 198, 214–20, 259, 266, 268, 273, 276, 301, 304 character and motives 292–3 correspondence with Macmillan 242–5, 247–50, 289–90 illness 327 Minsk speech 119–20 nuclear disarmament talks 213–17 opposition to Summit Conference 260–5, 340–1 talks with Eisenhower 197–8, 281–2, 300–5 with Macmillan 213–19 United Nations General Assembly 383, 386 visit to United States (1959) 197–8, 281–2, 300–5, 318–19 see also Soviet Union Khrushchev, Sergei 315 King Hussein of Jordan 49, 100, 104, 162, 166, 223 King Saud 76 King Sri Savang Vatthana 394–5 “kitchen debate” 249 Kong-Le 393 Korea 178 Koslov, Frol 197, 263 Kuwait 165, 255 Laos 178, 316, 393–4, 404–6 Lebanon Operation “Blue Bat” 255–6

433

US intervention 103–4, 156–63, 190–1 Lennox-Boyd, Alan 211 Lloyd, Selwyn 12, 54, 68, 83, 86, 89, 164, 255, 257–8, 265, 339, 343, 406 talks with John Foster Dulles 135 Loch Linnhe 350, 352, 361 Lodge, Henry Cabot 104 “long-haired, starry-eyed boys” 46, 83 Lumumba, Patrice 380 M-47 tanks 47 M-48 tanks 47, 56, 67 MacArthur, General Douglas 4 McCone, John 377–8 McElroy, Neil H 244 McMahon Act 115, 147 McMahon, Senator Brien 115 Macmillan, Alexander 7, 11, 17, 422 Macmillan, Dorothy Cavendish 5, 399 death of 418 Macmillan, Harold Anglo-American ancestry 5, 11 becomes Prime Minister 1, 23 Commonwealth tour 118–20, 123 correspondence with Adenauer 285 with Khrushchev 242–5, 247–50, 289–90 death 400 early life 5–6 resignation 414 talks with de Gaulle 228, 342–3 with Khruschev 213–20 visits Africa (1960) 322–3 Australia (1958) 118 DePauw University (1958) 69, 71, 76, 102, 124, 131–2 France (1960) 324 Johns Hopkins University (1958) 102, 139–40 Ottawa (1958) 151 South America (1960) 345, 365 Soviet Union (1959) 195–6 Washington (1958) 131–2, 140 “Wind of change” speech 323 Macmillan, Helen Artie Tarleton Belles 5

434 Index Macmillan, Joshua 414–15 Macmillan, Maurice 5 Malaya 178, 180 Malik, Jacob 243 Malinovsky, Rodion 347 Marshall, General George C 4, 7, 309 Matsu Island 177–83 Mechanics of Tripartite Consultations 342 medium-range ballistic missiles 335–6, 351, 362, 371–2, 387 Menderes, Adnan 107, 209–10 Menzies, Robert 16, 197, 381–3, 384, 386 Merchant, Livingston 344, 351, 378 Mid-Ocean Club meeting see Bermuda Conference Middle East 27–8, 49, 64, 83, 100, 102–4, 164 see also Suez crisis; and individual countries Middleton, Drew New York Times article 1957 37–41 New York Times article 1960 341–3 Mikoyan, Anastas 213, 220 military cooperation 150–1 Millar, Sir Frederick Hoyer 349, 351 Mobutu, Joseph 378 Mollet, Guy 25, 48, 65 Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard Law 10, 143–4, 247 Mountbatten, Admiral Louis 74 MRBM see medium-range ballistic missiles Murphy, Robert 104, 197, 352, 422 Diplomat Among Warriors 6 Mutual Security Program 252 Nash, Walter 143 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 8, 75, 103, 165 NATO 3, 44, 59, 86, 96, 114, 124, 166, 295, 297 extension of power 18 Ministerial Meeting 304 MRBM force 387–9 talks on Cyprus 190 NATO Council 92 Nehru, Jawaharlal 381 New Zealand 181 Nixon, Richard M 292, 314, 320, 413 visit to Africa 50

visit to Soviet Union 248 Nkrumah, Kwame 381 Noble, Commander Allan H P 60, 70 non-aggression pact 115, 244 Norstad, General Lauris 21, 29 Norstad Plan 21 North African Economic Board 421 North Atlantic Council 17, 20–1, 179 North Atlantic Treaty 121 North Atlantic Treaty Organization see NATO North Vietnam 394 Nosavan, General Phoumi 391 nuclear bomb release gear 32–4 nuclear retaliation 141–2 nuclear test ban 330–1 Nuclear Test Conference see Geneva nuclear test negotiations nuclear testing 112, 146, 172–3, 176, 203–4, 232 high altitude 102, 236–41 nuclear weapons 32–4, 85, 146–8, 169–71, 188, 223–4 air operations over UK 145–6, 151–3 inspections 215–17, 250 stockpiling 298 Oman 74, 76, 78–9 Open Skies proposal 10–11 Operation “Blue Bat” 255–6 Organization of American States 275, 277, 358 Pakistan 165 Pathet Lao 393–4 Penney, Sir William 177, 185 Persian Gulf 163–4 Philippines 178 Pineau, Christian 135 Pioneer V launch 328 Plowden, Sir Edwin 148, 169 plutonium 170 Polaris nuclear submarines 317, 334, 346–51, 352, 361, 370–2, 387–9 Portal, Sir Charles 283 Power, General Thomas 143–4 Prince Boun Oum 393–4 Prince Souvanna Phouma 393 Profumo, John 411

Index Quarles, Donald 169 Queen Elizabeth II meeting with Eisenhower 268 opening of Canadian Parliament 61–2 pregnancy 282–3 State visit of Eisenhower 281–3, 285–7, 290–1 US visit 56, 61–4, 84–6, 89 Quemoy Island 177–83 RAF nuclear bomb release gear 32–4 nuclear weapons 32–4 Rambouillet 311, 324–5, 326, 379 RB-47 reconnaissance plane 363–4, 366 Reilly, Sir Patrick 241 Rhodesia 393 Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) 359 Roberts, Sir Frank 166 Roosevelt, President Franklin D 4 Royal Air Force 335 Russia see Soviet Union SACEUR 7, 111, 141, 334 Safe Plan 144 St Laurent, Louis 27, 61 Salisbury, Lord Robert 44, 50 Sandys, Duncan 12, 19, 60, 335 Sarraj, Abd al-Hamid 19 Saudi Arabia 134 Scientific and Defense Cooperation 185 SEATO 86, 143, 179, 302 Council Meeting (1958) 140 Security Clearance for British Controlled Firms 185–6 Segni, Antonio 292 seismic research 354 SHAPE 97, 295 Sino-Soviet bloc 178 Skeffington, Arthur 317 Skybolt missiles 334–5, 345–6, 351, 386–7, 390 Soames, Christopher 426 South Africa 181 South America 355–9 Macmillan’s visit (1960) 345

435

South-East Asia 98, 134, 142–3, 146–7 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization see SEATO Soviet Union 194 Chinese trade 57 disarmament 82–3, 203–4, 212–13 intervention in Suez crisis 9 Macmillan’s visit (1959) 195–6 nuclear test proposals 112 nuclear weapons 85 nuclear weapons inspections 215–17 RB-47 incident 363–4, 366 Seven Year Plan 251 Sputnik launch 19, 86, 99 stockpiling of megaton weapons 223–4 summit meeting with 10 trade talks with 253–5 U-2 flights over 314–16 Spaak, Paul-Henri 20, 186, 188 Spirit of Camp David 198 Sputnik satellite 19, 86, 99 Stassen, Harold 58–61, 68–70 Stevenson, Adlai 8 Strategic Air Command 143–4 Strauss, Admiral Lewis 84, 86, 169 Suez Canal 49, 53 Suez crisis 4, 8, 16 Soviet Union intervention 9 Sukarno, President Achmed 143 Sultan of Muscat and Oman 75–6, 79 Sumatra 142–3 Summit Conference (1955) 10 Summit Conference (1958) 124, 126, 129, 135, 258, 260–2, 272 Summit Conference (1959–60) 258, 260–2, 272, 277–8, 302–8, 315–17, 338–9 Supreme Allied Commander Europe see SACEUR Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe see SHAPE Surprise Attack Conference 230 Syria 19, 50, 81 Syria Working Group 19, 87 Taubman, William 267, 315 Tedder, Arthur 283–4 territorial waters 128, 130, 132–3

436 Index Test Ban Treaty 411–12 Thailand 178 The Citadel, Charleston 122, 132 Thor missiles 121 Touré, Sekou 295–6 trade 54–7, 64, 206, 208, 250–1, 253–5 Treaty of Sib 80 Tripartite Alerts Procedure 32–4 tripartite talks 324, 328, 343–4, 349–50, 377 Truman, President Harry 244 Tsarapkin, Semyom 376 turbine contract 194 Turkey 165, 184, 209–10 Twining, General Nathan F 103, 106 U-2 crisis 314–16, 331 United Nations Khrushchev’s speech to 319 Resolution 1541 391–2 United Nations Disarmament Commission 227, 230 United Nations General Assembly 100, 173, 298, 381–2, 383, 384 United Nations Security Council 59, 100, 157 United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament 100 United States Explorer I launch 117 import restrictions 232 intervention in Lebanon 103–4 Joint Atomic Energy Commission 147 Khrushchev’s visits 198, 281–2, 300–5, 318–19 Pioneer V launch 328

Republican Party 191–2 seismic research program 360–1 U-2 flights 314–16

353–4,

V-Bombers 335–6 Vietminh 394 Vietnam 178 Ward, Stephen 411 Warsaw Pact 114 Washington Conference (1957) 17, 20, 106, 115 Washington meeting (1958) 131–2, 140 Watkinson, Harold 12, 335, 346, 350 Welensky, Sir Roy 392 Western Alliance 309 Western European Union 34, 36, 156 supply of armaments 42, 48 Western Heads of Government meeting 309 Western Summit (Paris, 1959) 199, 278, 280 Whitman, Ann Cook 264 Whitney, Betsy Cushing 396 Whitney, John Hay 12, 54, 62, 65, 130, 197, 206, 264, 283, 293, 378, 396 Wickman, John E 421–2 Wilson, Harold 400 wool textile tariff 64, 66 World War I 5 World War II 1, 3–4 Wright, Admiral Jerauld 422 Zink, Colonel Harry Zorin, Valerin 6

125, 144