The Metaphysics of Meaning Preface

Preface

In the following passage, Kripke expresses a tension felt by many philosophers : . . . I find myself tom between two conflicting feelings - a ' ' Chomskyan feeling that deep regularities in natural language must be discoverable by an appropriate combination of formal , ' intuitive techniques , and a contrary (late) Witt empirical , and ' ' ' ' feeling that many' of the' deep structures , logical gensteinian ' ' forms , ' underlying semantics and onto logical commitments , etc., which philosophers have claimed to discover by such techniques are Luftgebliude.1 When we consider what is sacrificed in resolving this conflict either way , we can see that Kripke is posing a dilemma of the utmost significance for contemporary philosophy . Chomsky appeals to our scientific side. As citizens of this century , we can hardly doubt that natural languages are a fit subject of scientific the Chomsky an approach , in broad outline study , and nowadays " " 2 , is virtually synonymous with scientific linguistics . This approach holds out the prospect of theories that reveal deep principles about the structure of particular natural languages and of language in general , the precision of formalization that has been of such importance to the development of logic and mathematics , the security of having scientific methodology available to us in the study of language, and , finally , interdisciplinary connections that promise new insights into logical form and into some of the higher cognitive functions of the human mind . The late Wittgenstein appeals to our philosophical side. As philosophers in this century , we can hardly think that empirical science will solve the philosophical problems with which Frege, Russell, Wittgen stein , and their descendants have struggled , and the Wittgensteinian approach seems to provide the only account of why empirical discoveries in psychology and the brain sciences do not come to grips with

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those problems . Moreover , when Chomsky an linguistics itself is looked at philosophically , as it has been from time to time , it seems clear that those problems remain despite the considerable scientific progress that has been made in linguistics proper . It is even quite plausible to think that the problems become worse for being obscured by philosophically unilluminating "formalisms and technicalities . Furthermore " " " , linguistic theories , with deep structures , logical forms , " " and all the semantics other paraphernalia of the , underlying seem to be refurbishments Chomsky' an approach , in major respects of Frege s semantics and Wittgenstein 's early philosophy which , despite the technical sophistication , embody their central metaphysical assumptions . The Chomsky an approach thus seems to reflect a failure to have learned the lessons of the Wittgensteinian critique of metaphysics in PhilosophicalInvestigations. In contrast , the late Witt genstein , whether or not he succeeded in dissolving philosophical problems or was even on the right track , at least engages them in a deep enough way to make it clear that philosophical progress requires subsequent philosophers to work through his investigations of them . Philosophers , faced with the choice between the two sides of their nature , behave in very different ways . Some find it easy to make the choice, but they do not , I believe, fully appreciate the sacrifice they are making , or perhaps they mistakenly think that some rapprochement can be found between the Chomsky an and the (late) Wittgen steinian approach es. Many philosophers feel themselves tom , and vacillate . Most choose either the Chomsky an approach or the (late) Wittgensteinian , but feel they have lost something , and continue to recognize advantages in the other approach . In another context , Frank Ramsey once wrote : Evidently , however , none of these arguments are really decisive, and the position is extremely unsatisfactory to anyone with real curiosity about such a fundamental question . In such cases it is a heuristic maxim that the truth lies not in one of the two disputed views but in some third possibility which has not yet been thought of , which we can only discover by rejecting something assumed as obvious by both the disputants .3 I believe that Ramsey's maxim is sound in the present context , too. In this book , I argue that the truth lies not in either the Chomsky an or the Wittgensteinian view but in a " third possibility " that emerges " " only when something assumed as obvious by both the disputants is rejected. Thus , I argue that the dilemma is a false one: it is unnecessary to sacrifice either an appropriately scientific approach to nat -

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ural language or an appropriately philosophical approach to the problems of philosophy . The unsatisfactory alternatives to which the dilemma limits us seem to be the only alternatives we have because of an assumption which restricts our options . This assumption , which seems obvious to Chomskyans and (late) Wittgensteinians , as well as to most of contemporary Anglo -American philosophy , and which , for this reason, goes largely unnoticed , is that the proper approach to natural language is naturalistic . Later, particularly in chapter 7, I shall say more precisely what I think naturalism is. Here I need only say that , as I am using the term , naturalism covers a wide variety of views all of which , in one way or another , claim that natural history , broadly construed to include our natural history , contains all the facts there are. In standard philo sophical terminology , naturalism is a monism which claims that everything that exists in the world is a natural phenomenon in the sense of having a place in the causal nexus of spatio -temporal objects and events. Chomsky has frequently expressed this naturalistic outlook " with respect to language; for example, he writes : . . . mentally represented grammar and UG [universal grammar ] are real objects, part of the physical world . . . . Statements about particular grammars or about UG are true or false statements about steady states attained or the initial state (assumed fixed for the species), each of which is a definite real-world object, situated in space-time and entering into causal relations ." 4 Wittgenstein expresses his naturalistic outlook in various places, for example, in his claim that what we should say " about mathematical proof is that this is simply what we do. This is use and custom among us, or a fact of our natural historys Questioning naturalism opens up the possibility of going between the horns of the dilemma . In the course of this book I shall argue that we should give up a naturalistic conception of language . I try to show that this is not as hard as it might at first seem nowadays , because the arguments for a naturalistic conception of language turn out not to hold up , and , independently , there are good reasons against adopting such a conception . I shall also present a non naturalistic account of language which provides a way out of the dilemma , enabling us to enjoy both the scientific advantages of the Chomsky an approach and the philosophical relevance of the (late) Wittgensteinian approach . The issues here go deeper than the study of language . With the linguistic focus of philosophy in this century , the naturalistic conception of language led straightforwardly to a naturalistic conception of philosophy itself . The fundamental issue with which the present work is concerned is the metaphilosophical question of the adequacy

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of the naturalistic picture of language and of philosophy which emerged in the course of the so-called linguistic turn . Wittgenstein , Chomsky , Quine , Goodman , Davidson , Putnam , and their followers have made naturalism the dominant philosophy of our time . Though one certainly sees, here and there , philosophers who have broken ranks , or perhaps were never in ranks , that is, philosophers who take a genuinely non -naturalist - i .e., realist- view of properties and relations , even those philosophers adopt such a view of properties and relations in the context of work on particular problems in the philosophy of language, logic , and mathematics . There has not yet been a comprehensive philosophical examination of the reemergence of naturalism in the twentieth century and the special forms it has taken . What is lacking is a rationale , suitable for the present philosophical situation , which can provide the foundations for appeals to non -natural objects in philosophy . The current influence of naturalism is so strong that it is worthwhile reminding ourselves that naturalism was not always as widely accepted in this century as it is today . Earlier, the philosophy of logic and mathematics , under Frege's influence , and ethics, under G. E. Moore 's, had a distinctively non -naturalistic cast. The subsequent success of naturalism in these areas depended on particular arguments about meaning and language, given primarily by Wittgenstein and Quine . Their arguments led twentieth -century Anglo -American philosophy into naturalism , and , accordingly , only a successful critique of those arguments can permit us to find a way out . In this book I have tried to give such a critique . The critique is a two - part affair . In the first part I concentrate on the architects of contemporary naturalism , Wittgenstein and Quine , examining their arguments in a detailed , systematic, and comprehensive manner . I believe I have shown that their arguments are inadequate to support naturalism . In the second part of the critique I try to identify the underlying problem in the naturalist position . On my account , the problem arises from the paradoxical use of philosophical means to establish a position on which such means would not exist. However , I do not claim to have accomplished everything necessary in order to establish non -naturalism . Indeed , the present book is only a prolegomenon to a future non -naturalism : its aims are limited to vindication and exploration . I have already said enough about vindication : successhere should be measured by the effectiveness of the critique of the Chomsky an , late Wittgensteinian , and Quinean approach es, together with the formulation of arguments for an alternative non -naturalist approach that sacrifices neither the advantages of scientific investigation into lan -

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' as Wittgenstein s insights into the problems guage nor 'such things ' ' with Frege s, Russell s, and his own early position . The book sex ploratory aim concerns the metaphilosophical question of the scope of naturalism and non -naturalism . That naturalism does not extend to sciences like linguistics , logic , and mathematics will , I hope , be clear from the main line of argument . But what can be said about areas like ethics and metaphysics , where things are more obscure than they are in the formal sciences? Godel , apparently , was prepared to take realism even as far as the 6 ology . However , to make a philosophically convincing case, one has to carry out an investigation to determine whether , for unclear cases like ethics and metaphysics , there actually is a route from a non naturalistic treatment of logic and mathematics to such a treatment of those other disciplines . The question of how far the realist view in logic and mathematics can be extended- that is, how general a conception of realism we can have - is answered satisfactorily only by . painstakingly charting the philosophical terrain ' From this perspective , the present book s concern with language puts it in an ideal position to begin charting the terrain . Linguistics has many strong similarities to logic and mathematics ; for example, linguistics seems to be a formal science, to have necessary truths (i.e., truths expressed in analytic sentences) in its domain , and to justify its laws on the basis of intuition . Furthermore , a formulation of the realist position for linguistics already exists.7 Thus , the question of whether the realist view can be extended to areas like ethics should become easier to deal with if we already have an example of how the view can be extended to an area prima facie closer to logic and mathematics , but not too close. The example can tell us what relations must obtain if realism is to be taken to cover this area despite the respects in which the area differs from logic and mathematics , e.g ., the fact that proof plays a much smaller role . It may even enable us to infer the conditions for extension to another area, even though it may be very hard to determine whether those conditions are met in particular cases.

Acknowledgments

I want to thank the students in my courses at the CUNY Graduate Center over the last several years for making examination of the issues dealt with in this book a stimulating and enjoyable experience. Also , I want to express my gratitude to a number of people with whom I have had helpful discussion or communication in the course of the writing . It is a pleasure to thank Rogers Albritton , Jawad Azzouni , George Bealer, Alan Berger, Ned Block, Martin Brown , William Fisk, Paul Horwich , Mark Johnston, Peter Lupu , Sidney Morgenbesser, Yuji Nishiyama , Gary Ostertag , Charles Parsons, David Pitt , Paul Postal, David Rosenthal, Stephen Schiffer, Robert Tragesser, Peter Unger , Virginia Valian , Hao Wang, Stephen Yalowitz , and Palle Yourgrau . Special thanks go to Leigh Cauman and David Pitt . My debt to them is great . Leigh did an excellent job of copy editing . She also contributed to the clarity of the exposition and made an inherently tedious and worrisome stage of production pleasant and free of care. David helped me prepare the manuscript for submission , checked proofs with me, and compiled the index . David not only performed these duties skillfully , but his suggestions and questions led to many improvements in both style and content . The intelligence and good humor of both Leigh and David made my production tasks tolerable and , quite often , fun . I hope they know how fortunate I feel to have had their assistance. Finally , thanks to the people at the MIT Press - Betty Stanton , Helen Osborne , Joanna Poole, Brooke Stevens, and Sandra Minkkinen - for their efficiency and cheerfulness throughout .