The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation (Southampton studies in international policy)

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation Wyn Q. Bowen

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

Southampton Studies in International Policy Published in association with the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton General Editor: Dilys M. Hill Other academic members of the editorial board: Ralph Beddard, John Oldfield, Kendrick Oliver, John Simpson This series was established in 1986 to encourage the publication of multi-disciplinary studies of those public policies with significant international components or implications. Areas of special interest include arms control and defence policies, environmental policies, human rights, maritime and space issues, Third World development questions and the European Union. Selected titles: David H. Dunn THE POLITICS OF THREAT Minutemen Vulnerability in American National Security Policy Tony Evans US HEGEMONY AND THE PROJECT OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS Paul S. Herrnson and Dilys M. Hill (editors) THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY The First Term, 1992–96 Dilys M. Hill, Raymond A. Moore and Phil Williams (editors) THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY An Incomplete Revolution? Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams (editors) THE BUSH PRESIDENCY Triumphs and Adversities Mark F. Imber THE USA, ILO, UNESCO AND IAEA Politicization and Withdrawal in the Specialized Agencies Joanna Spear CARTER AND ARMS SALES Antonio Varsori (editor) EUROPE, 1945–1990s The End of an Era? Southampton Studies in International Policy Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71493–8 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation Wyn Q. Bowen Lecturer Department of War Studies King’s College London

Foreword by Lawrence Freedman

in association with THE MOUNTBATTEN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

First published in Great Britain 2000 by

MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0–333–75454–9 First published in the United States of America 2000 by ST. MARTIN’S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 0–312–22618–7 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bowen, Wyn Q. The politics of ballistic missile nonproliferation / Wyn Q. Bowen. p. cm. — (Southampton studies in international policy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–312–22618–7 1. Nuclear nonproliferation—Political aspects—United States. 2. Ballistic missiles—Government policy—United States. I. Title. II. Series. JZ5675.B69 1999 327.1'747'0973—dc21 99–16201 CIP © Wyn Q. Bowen 2000 Foreword © Lawrence Freedman 2000 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. 10 09

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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To my Mother and Father

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Contents Foreword Acknowledgements Abbreviations Introduction

Part I

Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the American Response, 1950–89

viii x xi 1

11

Chapter 1 Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950–89

13

Chapter 2 The Pre-1989 Evolution of US Missile Nonproliferation Policy

28

Part II

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation, 1989–93

Chapter 3 The Bush Administration and the Missile Technology Control Regime

51 53

Chapter 4 Congress and Missile Nonproliferation

100

Chapter 5 Beyond the MTCR: Negotiating the Adherence of Non-regime Suppliers to Nonproliferation Norms

131

Conclusion Notes Select Bibliography Index

170 180 237 264

Foreword From the start of the nuclear age in 1945, with stunning demonstrations of the destructive power of individual weapons, the international community has wrestled with the problem of how to prevent any further use. A large part of this effort was inevitably geared to the burgeoning arsenal of the big powers, although its impact was slight. It proved difficult to prevent growth in the size of the inventories and improvements in the qualities of the systems. The only relief was that a relationship of mutual deterrence developed. Both the United States and the Soviet Union understood that they could not escape dire consequences if they initiated nuclear war. From the late 1950s attention began to focus on the problem of proliferation. The more nuclear powers, the greater the risk of weapons being used in anger. International efforts to exert some control here were more successful, culminating in the 1970 nonproliferation treaty. Although a number of countries escape the net – there are now seven declared nuclear powers and a couple undeclared – this is far lower than many gloomy predictions, and still the weapons have not been used in anger. Part of the nuclear proliferation debate was always the issue of delivery. It was one thing to acquire mighty weapons, but how were they to get to their targets? Missiles always seemed the optimum solution, but the technology here was also extremely demanding – especially over long ranges. From the 1960s, attempts to limit indigenous programmes or prevent transfers of missiles to would-be nuclear powers began to be part of the wider proliferation debate. By the time the Cold War ended, missile proliferation had come to be seen as a problem in its own right. It was obviously some comfort if missiles were not carrying nuclear warheads, but chemical warheads offered a viable, and much cheaper, alternative. Even with high explosives the psychological impact of missile attack remained profound. This was brought home to Western countries during the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraqi attacks using SCUD missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia seemed to produce a level of anxiety quite disproportionate to their destructive yield. The technology of missile defence seemed inadequate to cope with a sustained offensive attack. Because of this, the question of the control of missile technology moved high up the

Foreword

ix

international agenda. There was in place an informal agreement to control the supply of pertinent technologies as well as completed missiles known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which had been negotiated during the 1980s as an adjunct to nuclear nonproliferation efforts. After the Gulf War, the MTCR was given high priority by the United States and its allies, and this resulted in a much tougher and effective regime. Wyn Bowen tells the story of how the administration of President George Bush became increasingly conscious of this issue and moved to handle it. He demonstrates with great clarity the nature of the political problem this effort posed – both internally and internationally. Internally it was necessary to prevent those who spoke for the interests of technology exporters to insist on procedures and standards that were so lax that few items were contained. Internationally it was necessary to persuade allies that they needed to demonstrate a far greater commitment, and restrain their more enthusiastic exporters, and also to persuade former enemies, such as the Soviet Union/Russia and China, that it was in their interest to prevent the spread of strategic missiles. This account provides a valuable case study of American policymaking, and in particular the interaction between different government agencies, as well as a guide to the difficult issues raised by any attempt to control military-relevant high technology. Wyn Bowen also demonstrates the limits of the MTCR, while acknowledging those areas where it did make a difference. As with most nonproliferation efforts, the best that can probably be said about the MTCR is that without it, the situation could well have been worse. King’s College London May 1999

Lawrence Freedman

Acknowledgements There are numerous people I want to thank for their help in the research and preparation of this book. To begin with, I cannot adequately acknowledge my debt to Stuart Croft of the University of Birmingham. Throughout this work he has been an unfailing source of inspiration, wisdom and prescient advice. It was a rewarding experience to be one of his research students and it is a pleasure to record my profound thanks. In addition, I owe special thanks to the following people: Adrian Randall and the University of Birmingham School of Social Sciences for funding the initial three years of this research; this also enabled me to visit Phil Williams of the Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, where I spent a profitable five months in 1994; this in turn was the base for several visits to Washington, DC, to meet and interview various individuals with either knowledge of or direct experience with the issues considered in this book; Bill Potter, Amy Sands, Clay Moltz and Tim McCarthy of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, California, where I enjoyed working from August 1995 to July 1997; there I had access to an extraordinarily extensive range of data. I also thank and acknowledge assistance provided by the following: Seth Carus, William Clements, Stephen J. Hadley, Steven Hildreth, Tim Hoyt, Aaron Karp, Ronald Lehman, James R. Lilley, Tom Mahnken, Joan McEntee, Ed McGaffigen, Benoit Morel, Janne E. Nolan, Randy Rydell, General Brent Scowcroft, Captain Lawrence Sequist, Robert Shuey, Abe Shulsky, Joe Smalldone, Henry Sokolski, Richard Speier, Scott Tollefson, Vann Van Diepen, and Mingquan Zhu. For their help in the final stages of preparation, I also thank Emma Bailey and Andrew Dorman. Finally, I thank my parents for their constant encouragement and support

Abbreviations ACDA AECA ARMSCOR ASLV ATBM AWG BAW BMWi BXA CATT CBW CCL CDT CFE CGWIC CIA CMC CNES COBAE COCOM COSTIND CPMIEC CRS CTA DFAR DSAA DTC DTP DTSA EAA EAR EC EMBRATEL EPCI

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Arms Export Control Act Armaments Corporation of South Africa Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle anti-tactical ballistic missile Foreign Trade and Payment Act (West Germany) Federal Export Licensing Office (West Germany) Ministry of Economics (West Germany) Bureau of Export Administration Conventional Arms Transfer Talks chemical and biological weapons Commodity Control List Center for Defense Trade Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty China Great Wall Industries Corporation Central Intelligence Agency Central Military Commission (China) French Department of Space Brazilian Commission for Space Activities Committee for Coordinating Multilateral Export Controls Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence (China) China Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation Congressional Research Service Aerospace Technical Center (Brazil) Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Defense Security Assistance Agency Office of Defense Trade Controls Office of Defense Trade Policy Defense Technology Security Administration Export Administration Act Export Administration Regulations European Community Brazilian Telecommunications Company Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative

xii

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

ESA FBIS FMS FY G-7 GAO GCC GPALS GSLV IAEA ICBM IDF INF IRBM ISA ISP ISRO ITAR JCS LEO MBB MDD MECB MFN MIC MTAG MTCR MTEC MTOPS NBC NDAA NIS NNPA NPT NSA NSC NSD NSDD NSDM NSG OEE

European Space Agency Foreign Broadcast Information Service foreign military sales financial year Group of Seven industrialised nations General Accounting Office Gulf Co-operation Council Global Protection Against Limited Strikes Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle International Atomic Energy Agency intercontinental-range ballistic missile Israel Defense Force Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty intermediate-range ballistic missile International security affairs International security policy Indian Space Research Organisation International Traffic in Arms Regulations Joint Chiefs of Staff low-earth orbit Messerschmidt Boelkow-Blohm McDonnell Douglas Complete Brazilian Space Mission Most Favored Nation Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Israel) Missile Trade Analysis Group Missile Technology Control Regime Missile Technology Export Control Group million theoretical operations per second nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons National Defense Authorization Act Newly Independent States Nuclear Nonproliferation Act Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty National Security Advisor National Security Council National Security Directive National Security Decision Directive National Security Decision Memorandum Nuclear Suppliers Group Office of Export Enforcement

Abbreviations

OEL OMC OTA PCC PD PLA PM PRC PSLV SAM SDI SDIO SIPRI SLBM SLV SNEC START SUPARCO TBM TDG UAV UN UNSCOM US USML VLS WMD

xiii

Office of Export Licensing Office of Munitions Control Office of Technology Assessment Policy Coordinating Committee Presidential Directive People’s Liberation Army Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs People’s Republic of China Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle surface-to-air missile Strategic Defense Initiative Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Stockholm International Peace Research Institute submarine-launched ballistic missile satellite launch vehicle Subgroup on Nuclear Export Controls Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/Treaty Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (Pakistan) tactical ballistic missile Trade Development Group unmanned aerial vehicle United Nations United Nations Special Commission in Iraq United States US Munitions List Veiculo Lancador de Satellites weapons of mass destruction

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Introduction The proliferation of ballistic missiles in the developing world rose dramatically in significance as an issue on the American security agenda during the Presidency of George Bush, 1989–93.1 This occurred for several reasons, none more notable than Iraq’s use of SCUDderived missiles against US forces and allies in the Gulf War of 1991. During the conflict, Baghdad launched a number of these missiles at targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Although one SCUD-derivative killed 28 US servicemen in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, these missiles had little military utility because they were highly inaccurate and only armed with conventional warheads. More importantly, however, Iraq attempted to achieve a politico-strategic effect by launching the missiles against Israeli cities. The objective was to draw Israel into the war in the hope of weakening the cohesion and strength of the American-led coalition which included several Arab contingents. If this strategy had succeeded, these contingents would probably have withdrawn on the grounds of not wanting to fight alongside Israel against a fellow Arab country, thus weakening the UN-mandated coalition charged with evicting Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion of August 1990. Iraq’s missile attacks illustrated how even relatively inaccurate, conventionally armed tactical ballistic missiles could potentially be used to constrain America’s flexibility in using military power in support of national security interests overseas.2 The attacks also provided a timely insight into how the threat or actual use of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could complicate future power projection at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict.3 Indeed, the United States drew several lessons from the Gulf War experience in this area. At the strategic level, for example, it became apparent that future regional aggressors might use or threaten to use WMD-tipped missiles with the aim of convincing outside powers that the financial and potential human costs of intervening would be too great. Moreover, similar to Iraq’s use of missiles against civilian targets in Israel, regional aggressors might use or threaten to use WMD-tipped missiles to undermine the cohesiveness of multinational coalitions. Finally, at the operational and tactical levels, military planning might be complicated considerably if

2

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

an aggressor used ballistic missiles to target key military facilities vulnerable to WMD attack such as airfields, ports and personnel and equipment concentrations.4 The increased urgency accorded by the United States to missile proliferation was not simply a result of the Gulf War and the lessons derived from this. The end of the Cold War and increasing levels of ballistic missile proliferation also contributed to this increase. In the first place, the end of US–Soviet antagonism and the subsequent dissolution of the USSR resulted in the demise of the global Soviet nuclear and conventional military threat to the United States. The strategic environment which emerged simultaneously was characterised by the regional nature of threats to US forces, allies and other security interests.5 As a direct result, several developing countries in strategically important regions such as the Middle East took on much greater significance in US security planning. Indeed, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was a good example of how regional aggressors could directly threaten America’s national security interests in the post-Cold War world. In the second instance, increased missile proliferation was typified, among other things, by India’s successful test launch of the projected 2,500 km-range Agni missile, North Korea’s development of the 1,000 km-range No-Dong-1 and its export of SCUD-B and C missiles to Iran and Syria, Israel’s collaboration with South Africa on the development of a medium-range rocket, and China’s transfer of M-11 missile technology to Pakistan. In short, the interaction of the end of the Cold War with increasing levels of proliferation and Iraq’s use of SCUD-derivatives in 1991 raised dramatically the significance of missile proliferation as an issue of American security concern between 1989 and 1993. Consequently, the Bush administration and the United States Congress accorded a high priority over this period to strengthening American and international arrangements for stemming missile proliferation through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

US missile nonproliferation policy This book examines the political, bureaucratic and systemic issues that interacted during the Bush Presidency to determine the outcome of efforts by certain elements of the executive branch, and several Congressmen, to promote US objectives vis-à-vis the MTCR over competing commercial and other foreign policy interests. The MTCR was negotiated by the Reagan administration with

Introduction

3

America’s G-7 allies between 1983 and 1987 in an attempt to restrain the spread of nuclear-capable missiles. The regime was not an international agreement or a treaty, like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but an informal and voluntary arrangement consisting of a set of identical national policies designed to restrict the spread of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as the associated components and manufacturing technology. The MTCR was officially announced in April 1987. By late 1988, however, several problems had become apparent regarding the current and likely future effectiveness of the regime as a mechanism for constraining proliferation.6 Several developments drew attention to the most serious of these problems. First, it became apparent that several member states were not effectively enforcing the regime’s guidelines. In the winter of 1987–88, this problem was highlighted by revelations about Argentina’s programme to develop the 800–960 km-range Condor II missile.7 This project relied heavily on foreign technology and expertise supplied primarily by West European firms, despite several of their governments’ membership in the MTCR. The second problem was the fact the regime did not address the missile proliferation activities of the Soviet Union and China. Moscow had dominated the arms trade in complete ballistic missile systems during the 1970s and 1980s with its transfers of tactical ballistic missiles to the developing world, primarily to Arab countries in the Middle East. Moreover, in March 1988 it was revealed that China had entered the missile suppliers market by exporting intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) to Saudi Arabia.8 It also emerged that China had developed the 600 km-range M-9 and the 280 km-range M-11 ballistic missiles for export purposes. Both of these countries viewed the MTCR as directed against their economic and security interests because they were not included in the negotiations that resulted in the regime. More importantly, the viability of the MTCR as a mechanism for constraining missile proliferation was cast into doubt because it failed to address the world’s foremost missile supplying countries. Finally, it became evident in 1988 that the US government itself was experiencing problems regarding the implementation of American policy in conjunction with the MTCR. These difficulties focused primarily on the State Department and its role as the co-ordinator of MTCR issues ‘among the involved US agencies’.9 An official from the Department of Defense, for example, said inter-agency meetings did not help the Pentagon implement the MTCR because they tended to

4

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

focus on ‘philosophical rather than case discussions’. Moreover, officials from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency thought the meetings had a ‘mixed record in deciding issues’.10 By the end of the Reagan administration, then, it was evident that although ballistic missile proliferation was causing increased concern in the United States, domestic and international mechanisms for addressing the problem were flawed and in need of attention. The Bush administration and Congress subsequently acted to redress these flaws between January 1989 and January 1993.

The politics of missile nonproliferation, 1989–93 The book begins with two chapters that examine the pre-1989 proliferation of ballistic missiles in the developing world and the American nonproliferation response, respectively. Together, they provide the necessary context for the subsequent analysis of US missile nonproliferation from 1989 to 1993. To begin with, consideration is given to the nature of the missile proliferation problem that confronted the Bush administration and the 101st Congress in January 1989. Attention is focused on how several developing countries acquired ballistic missile systems or the associated components, production technology and technical expertise from the early 1950s until the late 1980s. Ballistic missiles are shown to have proliferated via two mechanisms. The first involved the arms trade in complete missile systems from those countries capable of producing them to those incapable of doing so. The reasons why the United States, the Soviet Union and China transferred complete systems to numerous developing countries are examined. The second mechanism involved the spread of missile development and manufacturing capabilities. In large part, this was made possible through the acquisition from abroad of missile components, production technology and technical assistance from a limited number of primarily industrialised countries. Several strategies were adopted to do this, including dedicated missile development, missile modification, reverse-engineering and the diversion of satellite launch and sounding rocket technology and expertise from the civilian sector. As missile proliferation came to be viewed with increasing concern in Washington during the 1980s, it was the dependence of developing countries on acquiring this technology and technical knowledge from overseas that drove the Reagan administration to negotiate the MTCR. After examining the nature of the problem, Chapter 2 examines the

Introduction

5

evolution of US policy in response prior to 1989. Although American concern with missile proliferation can be traced back much further, it was not until the early 1980s that Washington adopted a policy which sought explicitly to prevent developing countries from acquiring these missiles and the associated production technology. This was prompted by a convergence between an increased awareness of missile proliferation and the continued spread of nuclear weapons technology in the developing world. Specifically, the United States became concerned with the potential role that ballistic missiles could play as delivery systems for nuclear weapons in regions such as the Middle East, and how this might affect regional stability and America’s security and foreign policy interests. This chapter traces American concern back to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and the Israeli– Egyptian missile race that emerged in the early to mid-1960s. Attention is then turned to the Nixon and Ford administrations and the decision to provide Israel with the Lance battlefield missile system, despite a 12-year lull in American ballistic missile transfers to the developing world. Consideration is then given to the Carter administration’s gradual categorisation of ballistic missiles as the most destabilising type of nuclear weapon delivery system proliferating in the developing world. The principal focus of the chapter, however, is on examining the evolution of US policy during the Reagan administration and its negotiation of the MTCR between 1983 and 1987. The regime’s guidelines are examined along with its coverage of civilian as well as military rocket technology. The chapter concludes by identifying several problems with this mechanism for addressing missile proliferation that emerged in 1987 and 1988. These threatened the regime’s future viability and included the failure of MTCR members to consistently interpret and enforce the regime’s guidelines, its failure to address the proliferation activities of the Soviet Union and China, and the emergence of bureaucratic and systemic problems regarding the implementation of US missile nonproliferation policy in Washington. After providing the necessary historical background, Part II of the book examines in detail how certain elements within the executive branch, and several Congressmen, attempted to rectify these problems between January 1989 and January 1993. Initially, the reaction of the Bush administration to America’s radically altered threat environment through its formulation and implementation of US policy in conjunction with the MTCR is examined in Chapter 3. In the first instance, consideration is given to the administration’s response between January 1989 and January 1991. This included a review of America’s

6

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

missile nonproliferation policy as part of the administration’s overall strategic review. The review took account of improving relations between Washington and Moscow and accorded more significance to responding to non-Soviet regional threats. In part, this resulted in the establishment of interagency forums for dealing with the formulation and implementation of missile nonproliferation policy and the accordance of more resources for dealing with missile proliferation issues at the Commerce, Defense and State Departments. Despite these reforms, the chapter demonstrates that systemic problems plagued the administration’s implementation of US missile nonproliferation policy in 1989 and 1990. These were symptomatic of America’s rapidly changing security environment and focused on the need to reform the export control system as it was being focused away from restricting strategic trade with the Soviet bloc, towards preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD. Several failures of the Commerce Department’s procedure for processing export licence requests for dual-use items with potential missile applications illustrated these problems. These were exacerbated by bureaucratic differences between several of the executive agencies involved in implementing US policy in conjunction with the MTCR. Although the administration acted to resolve these systemic and bureaucratic problems through its Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), it only did so after an interagency dispute over the desirability of imposing enhanced unilateral export controls on missile, and chemical and biological weapons (CBW) technologies. Bureaucratic differences between the State and Defense Departments over the treatment of export requests for space launch technology created further problems for the administration. The administration was also confronted by multilateral implementation problems. In 1989, it became increasingly apparent that several of the regime’s West European partners were not enforcing and interpreting the guidelines consistently and effectively. These problems centred on the need to institutionalise the MTCR in the rapidly changing international system, but also on the need to reform the export systems and attitudes of several regime members. These systems and attitudes tended to favour export promotion over control and reflected a lack of political will to prevent lucrative transfers of technology and assistance at a time when East–West tensions were rapidly disappearing, and the emerging threat posed by proliferation had still to be appreciated fully. Moreover, the French government adopted a liberal attitude regarding the export of space launch technology to states in the developing world. This clashed with the administration’s

Introduction

7

policy of tightly restricting such trade. Consideration is given to how the administration approached these problems, for example, through institutionalising the MTCR by establishing a system of regular plenary and technical meetings to discuss and resolve common problems and issues related to the implementation of the regime’s guidelines. The administration also pressured and assisted both Germany and Italy to reform their respective export control systems. In addition, the French government was persuaded not to approve the transfer of rocket engines to Brazil’s space launch programme because of its potential contribution to the proliferation of missile technology. Following the 1991 Gulf War, the administration increased the priority it accorded to missile nonproliferation. This focused on implementing the EPCI and encouraging America’s allies to adopt similar controls. Despite Iraq’s missile attacks, domestic implementation of the EPCI was marred by the interaction of other foreign policy interests in 1991 and 1992. However, it was at the international level that the administration proved most effective in renegotiating the MTCR during its final two years in office. By January 1993, the administration had succeeded in updating and revising the MTCR equipment and technology annex and expanding the regime’s guidelines to cover missiles capable of delivering all WMD to better reflect the evolving international security environment. The way in which Congress brought its influence to bear on the implementation of US missile nonproliferation policy is examined in Chapter 4. Several Representatives and Senators sought to influence US policy in this area, in part because Congress was denied the opportunity to oversee the negotiation and ratification of the regime as an executive branch initiative during the 1980s. The rise of Congressional concern prior to the Gulf War was reflected in several hearings held to consider the spread of missile capabilities and US missile nonproliferation policy. It was also typified by the large number of bills introduced to rectify perceived shortcomings in US policy. The most notable sought to require the President to impose mandatory sanctions against American and foreign persons participating knowingly in activities prohibited by the MTCR. These proposals were inspired by a perceived need to obtain stricter interpretation and implementation of the guidelines by regime members, countries outside the regime and certain elements within the Washington bureaucracy. Common to all these proposals was the desire of the Bush administration to prevent the enactment of measures it deemed would interfere unduly with the President’s

8

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

foreign policy prerogative and flexibility. Despite the administration’s opposition to such measures, President Bush signed the Congressionally inspired Section 17 of the NDAA for 1991 into law in November 1990. For the first time, this ‘set’ American policy in the field of missile nonproliferation and incorporated a sanctions provision that required the President to punish American and foreign persons who participate knowingly in missile proliferation.11 The amendment was enacted despite opposition from the White House. Indeed, along with other developments in November 1990, it highlighted a wider trend in executive-legislative branch relations during the Bush administration. This involved the administration’s attempt to routinely undermine Congress’s role in the foreign policy process. Among other methods, this was evident in the President’s approach of declaring certain legislative provisions to be unconstitutional upon signing them into law. President Bush also used his veto to defeat legislation he perceived would undermine the President’s foreign policy powers. The chapter concludes by considering the attempts of several Congressmen, in 1991 and 1992, to tie the future of China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status to its missile proliferation, human rights and trade records. The Bush administration’s efforts to solicit nonproliferation pledges from several non-MTCR missile technology suppliers are considered in the final chapter. It concentrates primarily on the administration’s efforts to obtain missile nonproliferation commitments from China, Israel and the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia). Prior to November 1990, this approach appeared to prove relatively successful with the Soviet Union because of the role ‘New Thinking’ played in Moscow’s foreign policy over this period. However, the administration’s missile dialogue with Beijing deteriorated rapidly following the violent crackdown on the Chinese pro-democracy movement in June 1989. In 1991 and 1992, the administration is shown to have adopted a primarily negative incentive strategy to solicit nonproliferation pledges from China, Israel and Russia, and to stop North Korea from trading in missile technology. In large measure, this approach involved tying progress in the missile nonproliferation field with progress on other issues in Washington’s bilateral relations with these countries. Moreover, it involved the use and threatened use of sanctions against proliferating entities in non-regime countries under the new missile sanctions authority. The partial success of this approach with certain countries, but its total failure with others, stemmed

Introduction

9

directly from the nature of the administration’s specific relationship with each of the individual countries in question. In the Middle East, the administration gained an Israeli commitment to adhere to the MTCR because it threatened to impose sanctions on proliferating entities in that country and to curtail America’s defence-related business with other Israeli firms. Although the administration successfully pressured Beijing to provide the United States with a written pledge that it would observe MTCR guidelines, the Chinese adopted such an ambiguous stance on this issue that the Bush administration never really knew where it stood with China. Moreover, the administration’s dialogue with Moscow deteriorated from late 1990 onwards because of a Russian deal to provide rocket engines and the associated production technology to India. The administration subsequently linked the successful entry of Russia into the commercial satellite launch market, and its participation in the international space station, to the resolution of the Indian rocket technology issue in a manner consistent with US policy. Chapter 5 also examines the administration’s complete failure to address North Korea’s dire missile proliferation record. Indeed, this is shown to have illustrated a significant weakness in US policy because of its inability to prevent so-called ‘rogue’ proliferators – with which it had no diplomatic or other ties – from proliferating in missile and WMD technology and assistance. Indeed, North Korea remained the only country in the world that was prepared to export complete ballistic missile systems in violation of the MTCR when the Bush administration left office in January 1993. Somewhat paradoxically, this highlighted the relative success of the administration’s policy in conjunction with the MTCR because it appeared to have successfully pressured China and Russia to refrain from exporting complete ballistic missile systems by that time. In the conclusion, it is contended that the Bush administration’s efforts to promote the goal of missile nonproliferation were influenced by the interaction of four principal factors; the initial lack of commitment of several American allies to an effective system of multilateral missile technology export controls, the process of bureaucratic bargaining between the agencies responsible for implementing US policy in conjunction with the MTCR, the proactive role played by Congress in the missile nonproliferation field, and the regime’s failure to adequately address the missile proliferation activities of several major missile technology supplying countries, including China, Israel, North Korea and Russia.

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Part I Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the American Response, 1950–89

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1 Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950–89

This chapter examines the nature of the missile proliferation problem that confronted the Bush administration and Congress in January 1989. Attention is focused on how several developing countries acquired complete ballistic missile systems and/or the associated components, production technology and technical expertise from a limited number of primarily industrialised countries from the early 1950s to the late 1980s. The chapter complements Chapter 2, which examines the evolution of American missile nonproliferation policy prior to 1989. As missile proliferation came to be viewed with increasing concern in Washington from the early 1980s onwards, it was the dependence of developing countries on acquiring foreign assistance and technology that drove the Reagan administration to negotiate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to check the spread of nuclear-capable missiles. The first section examines Soviet, Chinese and American transfers of complete systems prior to the late 1980s and focuses on the reasons behind these transfers. The second section then considers the spread of ballistic missile development and manufacturing capabilities. Primarily, this was made possible through the acquisition from abroad of missile components, technical expertise, and production facilities and equipment. Several strategies were pursued to do this, including dedicated missile efforts involving the indigenous development and importation of the necessary components, manufacturing technology and expertise. Other strategies included the modification of missile systems acquired previously via the arms trade to alter or enhance performance parameters, and the reverse-engineering of imported missiles to produce indigenous versions of foreign-designed systems. Finally, several countries diverted satellite launch and sounding

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The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

rocket technology and expertise from the civilian sector to the development and manufacture of ballistic missiles. This was possible because of the similarity of much of the technology and technical knowledge used in the production of both ballistic missiles and civilian rockets. It becomes apparent from the examples used in this section that most countries did not confine themselves to a single acquisition strategy.

Soviet, Chinese and American missile transfers, 1959–89 For a mixture of their own political, strategic and economic reasons, China, the Soviet Union and the United States all transferred complete systems to several countries in the developing world prior to 1989. The United States Although the United States adopted a policy that sought explicitly to restrict the spread of ballistic missiles and the related technology in the early 1980s, several developing countries acquired American-made systems between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s. These transfers involved relatively limited systems and took place in the context of the American policy of containing the political and physical expansion of Communist influence in the developing world. In 1959, the United States transferred 37-km-range Honest John rocket systems to Greece and south Korea, and in 1961 to Turkey and Taiwan.1 The policy of containment had dictated a rapid expansion in the size of American major weapon transfers to allied or treaty-bound states located on the periphery of the Communist Bloc during the 1950s.2 Between 1950 and 1958, the value of these transfers rose from $51 million in 1950 to $256 million in 1955 and $633 million in 1958.3 The majority of this was provided as military assistance to countries in America’s forward defence areas.4 The major recipients included Greece, Turkey, Iran, South Korea and Taiwan.5 In 1974, the United States transferred 130-km-range Lance ballistic missiles to Israel. This transfer constituted a major element of Israel’s emergency arms development and procurement programme after the Arab–Israeli War of October 1973, and reflected a responsibility on behalf of the US government to ensure the adequate defence of a regional ally in the face of several hostile Arab neighbours. Moreover, Israel’s Arab neighbours were receiving the military backing and support of the Soviet Union. By 1974, Egypt, Syria and Libya had

Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950–89

15

acquired 280 km-range SCUD-B missiles from the Soviet Union. The Lance transfer took place, therefore, in the context of America’s competition with the Soviet Union for influence in the developing world. American support for Israel was reflected in other transfers of sophisticated military equipment during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Between 1969 and 1975, the United States transferred F-4E Phantom fighter aircraft to Israel, and F-15A Eagle fighter aircraft between 1976 and 1982.6 From 1974 to 1989 the United States did not transfer any complete ballistic missile systems to the developing world. The Soviet Union Soviet missile transfers in the 1960s and 1970s were also driven by politico-strategic incentives stemming from Moscow’s antagonistic Cold War relationship with Washington. These transfers occurred as part of the overall expansion of Moscow’s arms transfer policy over this period designed to promote Soviet influence in strategically significant regions of the developing world. In the Middle East, Moscow’s customer base was broadened to include Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria. This quest for influence was illustrated in 1971 when Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin pledged his country’s support for the Arab states and said he would do ‘all possible to strengthen the Arab armed forces’ in their struggle against Israel.7 Moscow subsequently transferred numerous sophisticated weapon systems to these countries, including MiG-23 and TU-23 aircraft, T-62 and T-64 main battle tanks (MBT), 40–70 km-range FROG rocket systems and SCUD-B ballistic missiles. Egypt received the FROG-7 in 1971 and later the SCUD-B in September and October 1973 in the run up to the Arab–Israeli War of that year.8 The Soviet Union also transferred the FROG-7 to Syria in 1973 and the SCUD-B in 1974.9 From the mid-1970s, Moscow’s arms transfers came to be motivated increasingly by a financial incentive. This stemmed from the emergence of hard currency trade deficits in the Soviet Union during the early to mid-1970s and resulted in Moscow’s increased demands for its arms payments in hard cash.10 This contributed to why ‘some of the largest arms sales’ during the 1970s were between the Soviet Union and the oil rich Arab nations of the Middle East and North Africa.11 In 1974, Libya sealed an arms deal with the Soviet Union that included MiG-23 and Tu-23 aircraft, the T-62 MBT, surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and the SCUD-B.12 In 1975, Iraq ordered SCUD-B missiles and launchers and received them in 1976 as part of a $4 billion arms package which also included the T-64 MBT.13 The financial incentive was

16

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

reflected in the overall scale of Soviet weapons transfers to the developing world during the 1970s. Prior to 1970, Soviet military deals with the developing world totalled less than $1 billion per year. This figure rose to between $2 and $3 billion per year between 1970 and 1978.14 Moreover, the Soviet demand for hard currency payments resulted in greater customer demand for more sophisticated systems, including ballistic missiles.15 Not wanting to lose such strategically and economically important customers, Moscow supplied greater quantities of advanced weapons to the Arab states, including larger quantities of the SCUD-B in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In total, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and South Yemen acquired the SCUD-B directly from the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, Syria, North Yemen, South Yemen and possibly Libya acquired the more accurate 70 kmrange SS-21 ballistic missile in the mid- to late 1980s. In the late 1980s, Moscow supplied hundreds of SCUD-B missiles to the Soviet-installed Communist government in Afghanistan.16 China China hit the missile proliferation headlines with a bang in 1988. In March of that year it was revealed Beijing had transferred several DF3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) to Saudi Arabia sometime between 1986 and 1988.17 Three months later it was reported that China had also been discussing the sale of the 600-kmrange M-9 ballistic missile with Syria.18 The most significant aspect of China’s negotiations with both Saudi Arabia and Syria was Beijing’s financial incentive to export these missiles. Prior to the late 1980s, China had transferred weaponry to revolutionary regimes and buffer states in the developing world, such as North Vietnam, North Korea and Pakistan.19 The emphasis of China’s arms transfer policy began to alter in the late 1970s, however, when Beijing began to export weapons on an increasingly non-ideological and non-strategic basis. Subsequently, Beijing began to export weapons to a much broader customer base. This departure in policy was the direct result of Deng Xiaoping’s four modernisations pronouncement following China’s emergence from the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s. A major element of this pronouncement was Deng’s assertion that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) should be modernised to promote China’s position as a future world power. Beijing’s lack of resources and its limited military research and development capabilities resulted in the decision to increase China’s arms exports to fund PLA modernisation. In the early 1980s, this led to the

Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950–89

17

establishment of several defence industrial enterprises in China to compete against one another, and with foreign companies, for a share of the international arms market. The net result was the rise of China to become the fifth largest weapon supplier to the developing world between 1982 and 1989, with China transferring more than $13 billion worth of arms over this period.20 The quality of China’s arms exports also increased during the 1980s. Beijing began exporting types of weapons that it had previously made unavailable to states in the developing world, including SAMs, anti-ship missiles, jet strike aircraft, submarines and ballistic missiles. During the Iran–Iraq War between 1980 and 1988, China was one of the most significant weapon suppliers to both belligerents.21 It was within this context that China emerged as a significant ballistic missile supplier.22 The DF-3 sale was significant for two reasons. First, it signalled China’s entry into the ballistic missile suppliers market. Second, it gave Saudi Arabia the longest-range ballistic missile outside of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Although the actual range of the systems transferred was considered to be approximately 2,700–2,800 km, it is difficult to be precise about the exact range because the missiles were withdrawn from Chinese service as nuclear delivery systems and were subject to modification before being exported as non-nuclear delivery vehicles.23 Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia acquired the capability to strike targets throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Western India, Afghanistan and southern parts of the Soviet Union. Thus, the DF-3 transfer was of great strategic significance in both the Middle East and beyond. Riyadh paid an estimated $3–3.5 billion for the estimated 36 DF-3s it received from China.24 Although China’s principal motive to sell missiles to Saudi Arabia was economic, it could be argued there was also a subtle politico-strategic motivation. This involved Beijing’s desire to gain diplomatic recognition from Saudi Arabia at the expense of Taiwan, which the Kingdom had recognised as the legitimate government of China since the 1950s. By gaining Saudi Arabia’s recognition, Beijing would also have been able to spread its influence in the Middle East at the expense of American and Soviet influence. Indeed, China established numerous channels and contacts with Saudi Arabia during the 1980s to promote relations between the two countries. This was done through trade, investment, contacts relating to Islamic religious matters, diplomacy behind closed doors and, in this instance, the IRBM sale.25 China was given the opportunity to sell IRBM to Saudi Arabia

18

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

because of Riyadh’s arms supply diversification policy which the Kingdom initiated in the late 1970s.26 This policy was pursued with the goal of avoiding overdependence on a single arms supplier, the United States.27 During the 1980s, Saudi Arabia acquired arms from the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, and Germany, and also attempted to set up a Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) defence industry in 1985.28 Moreover, Riyadh turned to China because of a realisation that it would have been impossible to acquire such a capability from the United States, its traditional arms supplier. Washington had turned down a Saudi request for the Lance system in 1985.29 Moreover, pro-Israeli sentiment in the US Congress had frustrated American–Saudi Arabian arms deals in the years preceding the DF-3 deal. Confronted by an American Congress reluctant to supply sophisticated weaponry, Saudi Arabia’s diversification policy bore fruit because Riyadh turned to the United Kingdom in 1985 and acquired Tornado and Hawk aircraft, and subsequently negotiated the acquisition of IRBM from China. By proving the effectiveness of this diversification policy, Saudi Arabia also illustrated its independence from the United States. The acquisition was a victory, therefore, against Iranian accusations of Saudi Arabia’s subservience to Washington, thereby reinforcing the Kingdom’s credibility as a major power in the Middle East. Reports in June 1988 that China was discussing the sale of the M-9 with Syria were significant for two reasons.30 First, Syria had received FROG, SCUD-B and SS-21 missiles from the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s. However, Moscow had reportedly turned down a Syrian request for the 500 km-range SS-23 in 1987. This failure to acquire the SS-23 led Syria to initiate negotiations with China with the objective of acquiring the nuclear-capable M-9. Syria’s negotiations were also significant because, unlike the DF-3, China had initially developed the M-9 for export purposes. Work on the missile began in 1984 and was the result of China’s weapons export drive of the late 1970s and early 1980s.31 Beijing’s financial incentive to export missiles was underlined further in 1988 when China unveiled the 280 km-range M-11 ballistic missile.32 According to Hua Di, China began to develop the M-11 for export purposes in 1985.33

Indigenous missile development, 1950–89 Several developing countries attempted to manufacture their own ballistic missiles prior to the late 1980s. Common to all of these

Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950–89

19

efforts was their dependence, at one time or another and to varying degrees, on importing certain key components, production technologies and the relevant technical expertise.34 Indeed, Aaron Karp asserted that ‘no regional actor has deployed operational ballistic missiles or space launch systems without relying on foreign technology’.35 Prior to the late 1980s, this was available primarily from a limited group of industrialised states, including France, Italy, Japan, West Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. As a result of this dependence on foreign technology and assistance, Karp asserted that ‘no third world missile or space launch vehicle program can be considered totally indigenous’.36 The significance of this lack of totally indigenous programmes cannot be overstated because it was this dependence on foreign technology that became the principal focus of American missile nonproliferation efforts in the 1980s. Ballistic missile development Before a country can produce a ‘functional ballistic missile’37 it must acquire or develop a suitable technical and industrial base, acquire or produce numerous sophisticated components and then ‘integrate these components into a system that will deliver a warhead to a distant target’. To do this, a country needs access to engineers and technicians with the necessary expertise to design, manufacture and operate several ‘key sub-systems’.38 These sub-systems incorporate relatively advanced technology which, when combined together successfully, imbue the ballistic missile with its unique characteristics. Core sub-systems include propulsion systems, guidance and control systems, and re-entry vehicles. A missile’s propulsion system is based either on solid or liquid propellants and provides the missile with its thrust; liquid propellant missiles are more difficult to transport and launch because they need to be fuelled prior to launch. Guidance and control systems determine a missile’s accuracy by directing the rocket’s thrust, while re-entry vehicles protect the warhead on re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere and must be able to withstand the stress and heat generated during this final portion of the flight. Thus, a successful ballistic missile programme will demand technical expertise in ‘rocketry, advanced materials development and processing, microelectronics, computer engineering and software development, precision machining, aeronautics, and other fields’.39 The longer the range and the more accurate a ballistic missile, the greater the technical expertise and sophistication of the manufactur-

20

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

ing process required to develop and produce such a system. For example, to produce a missile with a range of approximately 1,000 km or more, a country will need to produce larger propulsion systems to gain the higher velocities required for longer ranges. Moreover, a country will need to design a missile with more than one stage and to ensure its structure, as well as the composites and alloys with which the missile is built, can withstand the ‘large forces caused by their greater launch weight and stresses in the atmosphere’.40 To produce a missile with a greater accuracy than the SCUD-B, which has a circular error probable (CEP) of approximately 1,000 m, a country will need to master certain advanced guidance technologies.41 Advanced guidance technologies include those associated with inertial navigation systems, the production of which requires ‘precision machining, the ability to facilitate advanced materials, and access to computers used by the accelerometers, gyroscopes, and associated sub-components needed for accurate warhead delivery’.42 The longer the range of a ballistic missile, the more important its guidance and control systems are because of the ‘guidance errors’ that accumulate over longer flight distances.43 However, if a missile is armed with a nuclear weapon then accuracy diminishes in importance because of the huge destructive power of even a small nuclear warhead, in comparison to a highexplosive warhead. Beyond development and production, the incorporation of ballistic missiles into a country’s overall military strategy will require additional investment of time and resources in the construction of a suitable infrastructure to facilitate their successful operation. This will include the production of transporter erector launchers (TELs) or the construction of underground silos. In addition, missile operators and technicians will need to be trained. In extreme cases, the incorporation of ballistic missiles into a country’s overall military strategy may demand a major reorganisation of the armed forces. With this in mind, ballistic missiles are best described not as single weapons but as sophisticated weapon systems.44 Considering the complexity of the processes outlined above, the remainder of this section examines the various ways through which developing countries attempted to indigenously develop and produce ballistic missiles prior to the late 1980s. An emphasis is placed on highlighting the dependence of these countries on acquiring technology and assistance from abroad because of its relevance to US nonproliferation efforts during the 1980s.

Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950–89

21

Dedicated missile development Many countries pursued dedicated missile programmes prior to 1989. These efforts involved importing and developing domestically the necessary components, manufacturing technology and know-how. For example, Israel began conducting rocket research in the 1950s. However, it was not until the 1960s that Israel’s missile programme had made significant progress as a result of the infusion of French assistance and technology. In 1963, Israel paid the French firm Marcel Dassault $100 million for assistance to develop and produce 25 medium-range missiles.45 The resultant system was based on an original French surface-to-surface missile design,46 and subsequently became known as Jericho to American intelligence.47 The solid fuel Jericho was reported to have a range of between 450 and 564 km, a payload capacity of 1,000–1,500 kg, and it incorporated a strap-down inertial guidance system.48 The nuclear-capable Jericho was first test-fired in 1968.49 After the Yom Kippur War, Israel began developing an improved version of the Jericho missile. While Jericho-1 was based on French designs, Jericho-2 incorporated improved guidance and propulsion systems to enhance the missile’s accuracy and extend its range. This was reportedly made possible through the acquisition of American technology embargoed by the State Department’s Office of Munitions Control that was transferred illegally to Israel.50 The Jericho-2 had a projected range of up to 1,450 km and was test fired for the first time in 1987. Egypt demonstrated its potential missile production capability as early as 1962 by launching four single stage rockets.51 The largest, the Al Kahir (the Conqueror), had a projected range of 400 miles. While the rockets were assembled in Egypt, the components originated in West Germany and Spain. Moreover, technical assistance for the project also originated in West Germany.52 Egypt reportedly used a small quantity of its Al Zafir (the Victory) missiles against Israel during the 1967 Arab–Israeli War.53 Egypt later began developing the 80 kmrange Sakr-80 missile with assistance from the French company SNPE during the 1980s. The Sakr-80 was unveiled in 1987 after Egypt had invested $100 million in research and development.54 Libya’s attempts to build ballistic missiles were notable because of their reliance on West German technology and assistance. In 1979, the West German commercial entity OTRAG established operations in Libya and began developing an ostensibly civilian rocket with a

22

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

reported range of 300–500 km in the surface-to-surface mode.55 It is widely believed Libya provided financial inducements for OTRAG to conduct research and development in that country.56 Despite OTRAG claims to be a space launch entity, it left Libya in August 1981 following pressure from the West German government. This pressure coincided with Israeli reports that Syria had signed a contract with OTRAG for the development of 300 km and 2,000 km missiles.57 In 1986, it was reported that British firms had supplied Libya with ‘key components’ (including guidance systems and rocket motors) for ballistic missiles that West German electronics firms had been building in Libya. Moreover, it was reported that production machinery for Libya’s missile programme had been purchased in Italy, France and West Germany.58 In 1988, Libya was later accused of secretly developing an approximately 490 km-range missile with West German assistance.59 Iran claimed in 1985 that it had developed the technology to produce its own ballistic missiles.60 The speaker of the Iranian parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, claimed Iran had ‘solved’ problems such as developing control systems and manufacturing special alloys by learning a great deal about missile manufacture from repairing the missiles it had acquired previously from overseas.61 However, it is widely believed China provided a great deal of assistance to the Iranian missile programme in the 1980s. For example, Iran began developing the 130 km-range Iran-130 ballistic missile during the 1980s with Chinese technology and assistance.62 Iran’s 45 km-range Oghab missile, first test-fired in 1987, was also based on Chinese design and production assistance.63 In South East Asia, Taiwan began developing ballistic missiles in the 1970s. In 1976, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that Taipei had initiated its missile programme in 1973 with the objective of producing a 960-km-range ballistic missile.64 Taiwan’s first test of an domestically produced system occurred in 1978 and involved a missile with a range of approximately 100 km known as the Ching Feng (Green Bee).65 It was revealed subsequently that Ching Feng’s resemblance to the American Lance was a result of Israel’s retransfer of Lance technology and designs to Taiwan.66 Modification and reverse engineering As a result of the ‘difficulties inherent in indigenous ballistic missile development’, the modification of missile systems acquired from abroad was a strategy pursued by several countries because it

Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950–89

23

presented a less complex and demanding option.67 During the 1980s, India used engine technology from the Soviet-designed SA-2 SAM to develop the 150-km-range Prithvi (Earth) and projected 2,500 kmrange Agni (Fire) ballistic missiles.68 In the late 1970s, South Korea modified two missile systems that it had acquired from the United States during the 1960s. Seoul modified the Nike Hercules SAM by converting it into a surface-to-surface missile. This resulted in South Korea’s production and testing of 180 km-range and 220–250 kmrange versions of a tactical ballistic missile.69 The first of these missiles was tested in a surface-to-surface role in 1978.70 South Korea also modified Honest John rockets to improve their accuracy during the mid- to late 1970s.71 It was reported in 1978 that South Korea had also purchased manufacturing plant and equipment from the rocket propulsion division of the US firm Lockheed.72 Perhaps the most famous example of missile modification involved Iraq. During the mid- to late 1980s, Iraq extended the range of the Soviet-supplied SCUD-B in order to be capable of striking the Iranian capital Tehran.73 Iraq successfully tested a 650 km-range version of the SCUD-B known as the Al-Hussein in August 1987 and subsequently fired 160 of these missiles at Tehran between 29 February and 18 April 1988. Iraq tested an 850 km-range version known as the Al Abbas in April 1988. To increase the range of the SCUD-B, Iraq extended the fuselage, reduced the warhead size and added more fuel. This was made possible by importing technical assistance from abroad. According to a report published by the US Congressional Research Service in October 1988, the countries where this assistance probably originated included Argentina, Brazil, China, East Germany, Egypt and West Germany. In particular, concern focused on possible Argentinean and Brazilian assistance because Iraq was suspected of having partially funded these countries’ missile programmes in the mid-1980s.74 Finally, North Korea reverse-engineered the SCUD-B missile during the 1980s. Pyongyang reportedly acquired several of these missiles from Egypt during the 1970s in return for North Korea’s military and political assistance to the latter during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.75 Pyongyang’s subsequent reverse-engineering of this system proved so successful by the late 1980s that North Korea had established the capability to mass-produce its own version of the SCUD-B. Indeed, North Korea sold some domestically-produced SCUD-B missiles to Iran as part of a $500 million deal in 1987 and 1988.76 Moreover, Pyongyang was suspected to have helped construct ballistic missile manufacturing facilities in both Egypt and Iran during the 1980s.77 Because of

24

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

Pyongyang’s international isolation and its resultant lack of trade with other countries, North Korea’s primary incentive to export missile systems and the related manufacturing technology was economic.78 Civilian rocketry Several countries supplemented their missile programmes with technology and technical assistance diverted from the civilian rocket sector. The technology, components and expertise used in the development and production of ballistic missiles are closely related ‘in design and performance’ to that used for space launch vehicles (SLV) and sounding rockets;79 SLV are used to launch satellites, while sounding rockets are used to conduct meteorological experiments. A RAND report prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during the Bush Administration asserted that SLV ‘are actually ballistic missiles used in a surface-to-space mode to send payloads from the surface to earth orbit’.80 Indeed, the United States, the Soviet Union and China have all used ballistic missiles as SLV.81 Conversely, it is possible to convert SLV into ballistic missiles by adding re-entry vehicles and the appropriate guidance and control packages.82 Over the period in question, three developing countries stood out because of their diversion of civilian rocket technology and know-how to the development of ballistic missiles. In July 1961, Israel launched the Shavit II multistage rocket 50 miles into the ionosphere.83 Although the Israeli government described the vehicle as a sounding rocket designed for meteorological measurement purposes, the event took on greater significance than a purely scientific experiment could be expected to generate.84 An article in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz was quoted as stating, ‘one does not have to be a military expert to understand that a country capable of sending a rocket 50 miles into the ionosphere is capable of sending one far greater distances over the surface of the earth’.85 From the late 1960s, Israel’s efforts in the space launch field evolved simultaneously with the Jericho programme. These efforts culminated in the launch of Israel’s first satellite in September 1988 on board the solid-fuel Shavit SLV.86 Similar to the Jericho programme, Israel’s space launch programme also benefited from an infusion of French assistance in the 1960s.87 This assistance underlined the link between Israel’s missile and space launch programmes. Further evidence of this link emerged in the late 1980s when it was reported the Shavit was a derivative of the Jericho II.88 India began developing sounding rockets in 1967. The director of

Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950–89

25

the Centre for Indian Space Research, Dr Atma Ram, claimed India’s ‘concentration on space and rocket technology would unfold immense potentialities in the field of defence and telecommunications’.89 Thirteen years later India had progressed far enough in its civilian rocket programme to become the first developing country, and sixth country ever, to orbit a satellite using an indigenously developed rocket, the SLV-3.90 The director of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) alluded to the dual-use nature of space launch technology following the launch when he said, ‘any country which can place a satellite in orbit can develop an intermediate-range ballistic missile’. The connotations of this statement were put into perspective in an article in the International Herald Tribune which noted that China had put its first satellite into orbit in 1970 and by 1980 possessed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability.91 Further aspersions were cast on the motives behind the Indian space programme when it was revealed that Soviet and American SLV had been commercially available to launch satellites at a much lower cost compared to the investment India must have made to domestically develop a satellite booster.92 The Guardian newspaper suggested it was ‘idle to pretend’ India had spent ‘many billions of pounds on a space rocket merely to launch weather satellites and devices to map mineral deposits’.93 After the SLV-3 launch in 1980, India drew up plans to develop a series of three increasingly capable satellite launchers. In the early 1980s, India began work on the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) which was designed to have a greater boost capacity and an improved guidance system. It was planned the ASLV would be followed by the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) capable of placing remote-sensing satellites into orbit using two solid and two liquid propellant stages, and six SLV-3 first stage rocket boosters. The PSLV was to be the forerunner to the Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). This rocket would give India the equivalent of an intercontinental ballistic missile capability if fired in a surface-to-surface mode. Development of the GSLV was to involve the incorporation of a cryogenic stage to produce increased thrust but with a reduced overall size.94 India would not have progressed very far in the space launch field without importing dual-use technology and assistance from numerous entities in West Germany, France, the United States and the Soviet Union.95 The United States National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) provided India with unclassified data on the

26

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

American Scout rocket in 1965.96 Entities in France and West Germany provided dual-use equipment and expertise of direct relevance to the manufacture of ballistic missiles, particularly medium-range missiles.97 During the 1970s and 1980s, India acquired Viking liquid-fuel engine technology from the French space agency CNES. Moreover, the German Aerospace Research Establishment in Bonn sold India data on guidance systems and composite materials.98 During the early to mid-1980s, India began developing the Agni IRBM which incorporated two stages – a solid-fuel first stage and a liquid-fuel second stage – with a projected range of approximately 2,500 km.99 According to one report, the missile’s propulsion systems were based on the SLV-3.100 Further evidence of the connection between the SLV-3 and Agni lay in the contribution of West German assistance to both programmes. In addition to providing dual-use technology and technical expertise to India’s SLV programme, West German firms reportedly provided the Agni nose cones and engine nozzles.101 West German firms also reportedly helped Indian scientists to develop the microprocessors and software that formed the basis of the Agni guidance system.102 Brazil began developing ballistic missiles during the 1980s. In doing so, Brazil utilised the experience it developed through its extensive civilian rocket development activities of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. In particular, through developing the Sonda series (I, II, III, IV) of experimental sounding rockets. As a direct result of these efforts, Brazil accumulated extensive expertise in rocket design, electronics and solid propellants.103 This expertise was provided in the form of assistance from Canada, NASA, the European Space Agency (ESA), the Soviet Union and China. The United States had actually provided Brazil with sounding rockets in the 1960s.104 During the mid-1980s, the Brazilian entities Orbita and Avibras began developing two series of ballistic missiles.105 Between 1986 and 1989, Orbita was involved in developing the tactical MB/EE-150 missile with a projected range of 150 km. Orbita also developed plans for three longer-range missiles, including the 350 km-range MB/EE-350, the 600 km-range MB/EE-600 and the 1,000 km-range MB/EE-1000. These missiles were to be based on technology derived from the Sonda series. During the mid- to late 1980s, Avibras designed and began developing the 300 km-range SS-300 and the 1,000 kmrange SS-1000 ballistic missiles. These missiles were to be based on Sonda technology and to incorporate domestically produced inertial guidance systems.106

Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950–89

27

Brazil’s missile programme was of particular concern because of the country’s history of selling sophisticated weaponry without strict end-use guarantees or restrictions on the eligibility of the purchasing state. For example, Brazil exported millions of dollars worth of weaponry to both Iran and Iraq during their war between 1980 and 1988.107 It has even been claimed Iraq invested in the SS-300 missile project during the 1980s.108

Conclusion By outlining the processes through which ballistic missiles proliferated prior to 1989, this chapter sought to illustrate the dependence of developing countries on importing either the systems themselves or the critical components, production technologies and assistance necessary for domestic development and manufacture. As missile proliferation came to be viewed with increasing concern in Washington during the 1980s, it was this dependence that influenced the Reagan administration to negotiate the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) with America’s G-7 allies as an attempt to check the spread of nuclear-capable missiles. Chapter 2 proceeds by considering in detail the evolution of US missile nonproliferation policy prior to the inauguration of George Bush as 41st President of the United States in January 1989.

2 The Pre-1989 Evolution of US Missile Nonproliferation Policy

Although the United States began demonstrating concern over ballistic missile proliferation in the 1960s, it was not until the early 1980s that Washington adopted a policy that sought explicitly to prevent developing countries from acquiring these missiles and the associated production capabilities. This policy was prompted by the interaction of increased missile proliferation with a growing awareness of the continued spread of nuclear weapons technology in the developing world. Specifically, the United States became concerned about the potential role that ballistic missiles could play as delivery systems for nuclear weapons in regions such as the Middle East, and how this might affect regional stability and America’s security and foreign policy interests. This chapter considers the pre-1989 evolution of US missile nonproliferation policy prior to the Bush administration. It illustrates why missile proliferation rose to become an issue of security concern during the late 1970s and 1980s and how the US government responded to this phenomenon. To begin with, consideration is given to the pre-1981 evolution of US policy and is divided into three subsections. Each corresponds to a distinct chronological period, the first of which considers the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ concern with the Israeli–Egyptian missile race that emerged in the early 1960s. Attention is then turned to the Nixon and Ford administrations and the decision to provide Israel with the Lance battlefield missile system, despite a twelve-year lull in American ballistic missile transfers to the developing world. Finally, consideration is given to the Carter administration’s gradual categorisation of ballistic missiles as the most destabilising type of nuclear weapon delivery system proliferating in the developing world.

Pre-1989 Evolution of US Policy

29

The second part of the chapter examines the evolution of US policy during the Reagan Administration. Consideration is given to the negotiation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) with America’s G-7 partners between 1983 and 1987 in an attempt to restrict the spread of nuclear capable missiles through a multilateral policy of technology denial. The MTCR guidelines are considered, including their coverage of civilian rocket technology, as well as the legislative basis of the regime under US law. The section concludes with an examination of several problems that became apparent with this approach for dealing with missile proliferation in 1987 and 1988. It was these problems the Bush administration and the 101st Congress were subsequently forced to address as the issue of missile proliferation came to be viewed with increasing concern in the United States as the global Soviet nuclear and conventional military threat waned and eventually disappeared.

Origins of American policy, 1961–81 The Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 1961–69 The United States first demonstrated concern over missile proliferation in the developing world during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This focused on the missile race that developed between Egypt and Israel in the early 1960s. Although Egypt began developing missiles during the 1950s, in response to its defeat by Israel in the war of 1948–1949, these initial attempts proved unsuccessful.1 By 1962, however, Egypt had made sufficient progress to launch four single stage rockets.2 In July 1962, the Economist magazine predicted that Egypt’s rocket programme was ‘bound to add impetus to the expensive and potentially dangerous arms race between Israel and the Arabs, and between Arabs themselves’.3 Indeed, Israel had launched an ostensibly civilian multistage rocket in 1961.4 Although this rocket was described officially as a sounding rocket, the event took on much greater significance than a purely scientific experiment could be expected to generate because of the potential military applications of the technology involved. Israel subsequently paid Marcel Dassault of France to jointly develop and manufacture 25 medium-range missiles,5 which became known as ‘Jericho’.6 According to Seymour Hersh, American intelligence quickly realised that it was ‘only a matter of time, and money, before Israel developed a missile system capable of delivering nuclear warheads’.7 This concern was fuelled by strategic analysts in the Kennedy admin-

30

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

istration who considered the guidance system to be so unstable and inaccurate that only one type of warhead made sense in terms of deploying on such a system; a nuclear warhead.8 This threat was underlined by Israel’s parallel programme to develop a nuclear weapon. The role that French technology and assistance played in both Israel’s civilian nuclear and rocket programmes hinted further at the suspected link between Israel’s nuclear weapon and missile efforts.9 American concern also focused on the Egyptian rocket programme. In May 1964, the State Department instructed its embassy in Cairo to inform President Nasser that his country’s missile programme was pushing its arms rivalry with Israel to ‘new and dangerous levels’. The embassy was told to inform Nasser that the United States was concerned the missile race might ‘inexorably escalate’ destabilising further the situation in the Middle East.10 In the latter half of 1964, the Johnson administration asked Egypt to participate in an arms control agreement or an understanding with Israel to limit their missile production. Nasser’s reaction to this request was reported to be ‘cordial’ but ‘sensitive’.11 Indicative of this increased concern over missile proliferation was the lack of any American transfers of ballistic missiles to the developing world between 1961 and 1974. This was despite Soviet transfers of FROG and SCUD-B missiles to several Arab states in the Middle East over the same period. Moscow transferred the 70 km-range FROG-7 to Egypt in 196812 and the 280 km-range SCUD-B in 1973.13 Syria received the FROG-7 in 1973 and fired approximately 25 of these against Israel during the October War of that year. Damascus acquired the SCUD-B in 1974 and later became ‘the leading importer of Sovietmade ballistic missiles’ in the developing world.14 In 1974, Libya sealed an arms deal with Moscow, which included SCUD-B missiles.15 The Nixon and Ford administrations, 1969–77 Despite America’s reluctance to export ballistic missiles during the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States transferred Lance missiles to Israel in 1974 as part of that country’s post-1973 War emergency arms development and procurement programme. The transfer was consistent with the American strategy of containing Soviet influence in the Middle East because Israel’s Arab neighbours were receiving the political and military backing of the Soviet Union. By transferring the Lance system, the United States was able politically to turn down an Israeli request for the Pershing-1A missile. In

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contrast to the 130 km-range Lance, the Pershing had a range of 740 km.16 According to Israeli sources, Pershing was requested primarily for ‘internal psychological reasons’ to meet public demands for Israel to acquire a system capable of countering the Soviet SCUD missiles ‘in the hands of Egypt, Syria and Libya’. Israeli officials claimed Pershing would give Israel the capability to strike ‘the major Arab capitals from sites on Israeli territory’, thereby deterring ‘future Arab aggression’.17 Although the United States declined Israel’s Pershing request on the grounds it would have been too destabilising, certain elements of the Ford administration favoured the transfer. In 1975, the State Department provided Israel with assurances that America was ‘resolved to continue to maintain Israel’s defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft’. The department even agreed to an early meeting with the Israelis ‘to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missile with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response’.18 According to one press report in October 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tried to acquire a ‘limited number of Pershings with conventional warheads’ for Israel in an attempt to get the country ‘to sign an interim peace agreement with Egypt’.19 However, State had acted without consulting the Department of Defense. When the Pentagon was informed, it fought the request on the grounds it would exacerbate unnecessarily the arms race in the Middle East.20 Pentagon concern was based primarily on the Pershing’s utility as a nuclear delivery system.21 Indeed, Pershing would have improved significantly Israel’s military capabilities vis-à-vis its Arab neighbours. According to Aaron Karp, ‘the payload capacity, relatively accurate guidance, longer range and simplified count-down procedure’ of the Pershing 1A would have introduced to the Middle East a ballistic missile ‘far superior to anything transferred in the past’. Indeed, Pershing could have been adapted to carry ‘almost any nation’s nuclear device’.22 By attempting to secure Pershing for Israel, the State Department illustrated a willingness to pursue short-term diplomatic advantage without giving sufficient consideration to the longer-term politicostrategic consequences.23 According to Anthony Sampson, Henry Kissinger often used arms sales as bribes in pursuit of the ‘quick fix’ and shuttle diplomacy.24 Moreover, this attempt to provide Israel with Pershing was a logical offshoot of the arms sales policy pursued by the Nixon and Ford administrations. In 1969, the ‘Nixon Doctrine’

32

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

supplanted the relatively restrained arms transfer policy of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. In doing so, the United States embarked on a ‘more permissive’ approach towards the sale of weaponry to American allies in the developing world.25 The rationale behind this policy lay originally with the need to extricate US troops from South East Asia because of growing American casualties in the Vietnam War.26 With a greater emphasis on arms sales, the Nixon administration sought to provide America’s allies with the means to defend themselves against external communist aggression.27 This policy subsequently encouraged the build-up of weaponry in the exact regions where it was ‘most likely to be used’ against these allies.28 American concern with missile proliferation intensified during the final year of the Ford administration. According to Martin Navias, this became apparent at the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in 1976. It was here the United States began emphasising the need for anxieties over nuclear proliferation to be accompanied with concerns over the spread of nuclear-capable delivery systems. Indeed, an emphasis was placed on the need to distinguish between the transfer of weapon delivery systems and other conventional arms.29 The American delegate actually ‘singled out long-range missiles and manned-aircraft with long-range strike roles for conventional arms control purposes’, because of their ability to cause ‘large scale damage to population centres’. The US representative emphasised the need for the major arms supplying nations to exercise restraint in transferring these types of delivery systems. Moreover, the US delegate encouraged those countries that received weaponry via the arms trade to forgo the acquisition of specific types of sophisticated delivery systems if they had yet to be introduced in their region.30 It was not until the late 1970s, however, that the US government began to specifically identify ballistic missiles as the most destabilising type of weapon delivery system that was proliferating. This coincided with a growing awareness of the spread of nuclear weapons technology and the Carter administration’s commitment to arms control, nuclear non-proliferation and arms transfer restraint.31 The Carter administration, 1977–81 When Jimmy Carter campaigned for the Presidency in 1976, he spoke of his aversion to the ‘almost completely unrestricted’ nature of America’s arms sales during the Nixon and Ford administrations.32 This repugnance was directed at an arms sales policy that resulted in

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a 150 per cent rise in the number of completed American arms deliveries between 1968 and 1977.33 Carter’s opposition to previous policy resulted in the announcement of a new conventional arms transfer initiative in May 1977. Carter’s Presidential Directive/NSC 13 perceived a ‘special responsibility’ on behalf of the US government to lead the effort to constrain the international arms trade.34 In contrast to the previous two administrations, PD-13 identified arms transfers as ‘exceptional’ and not general ‘foreign policy implements’; one that should be used only when it could be shown to be clearly in the US national interest.35 The new directive called upon the United States to encourage restraint among recipient nations, and to initiate negotiations with ‘other major suppliers of arms’ with the objective of restraining arms transfers in general.36 This mandate resulted in the administration’s Conventional Arms Transfer Talks (CATT) with the Soviet Union between December 1978 and December 1979.37 Although the superpowers achieved little that was tangible during the CATT, they identified a need to limit the trade in certain types of delivery system. During the talks, and within the Carter administration as a whole, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) sponsored the notion of distinguishing between the trade in certain types of delivery system. The agency also lobbied for linking concerns over nuclear proliferation with concerns over the spread of certain delivery systems. Specifically, ACDA emphasised the need to control the spread of those delivery systems that would not ‘create too much controversy if global restrictions were placed upon them’.38 Long-range ballistic missiles were placed at the top of this list of ‘weapons of ill repute’39 because they were deemed to award ‘a clear advantage in a pre-emptive strike’ situation.40 Although the talks eventually broke down because of waning Soviet interest and a lack of bureaucratic consensus within the Carter administration, the CATT came close to what has been described as ‘a workable agreement to restrain transfers of long-range missiles’. It was in this realm the Superpowers were reported to have found themselves in ‘a rare area of consensus’.41 Growing awareness of missile proliferation during the late 1970s was not just stimulated by Soviet transfers to Arab countries in the Middle East. It intensified primarily because of revelations about the progress several countries had made in developing their own longrange ballistic missiles. The domestic missile efforts of five countries caused most of this concern in the late 1970s and early 1980s; Israel,

34

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

Libya, South Korea, Taiwan and India. This concern was exacerbated because each of these countries was simultaneously pursuing civilian and suspected military nuclear programmes. Following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Israel began developing an improved version of the Jericho missile. The Jericho-2 incorporated superior guidance and propulsion systems to improve accuracy and extend range. This technology was acquired from the United States, despite its embargo by the State Department’s Office of Munitions Control (OMC).42 Suspicions over Israel’s nuclear-missile aspirations intensified in 1979 when an American intelligence satellite detected what might have been a nuclear test in the southern Indian Ocean.43 Intelligence and nonproliferation experts from the Carter Administration concluded the ‘test’ had been a joint Israeli–South African venture.44 According to ACDA, American concern focused on South Africa during the late 1970s because Pretoria had been developing an unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment facility and it had not made a ‘binding commitment’ to refrain from developing nuclear munitions.45 It subsequently emerged in 1989 that Israel and South Africa were collaborating in the joint development of a medium-range ballistic missile. In 1979, the West German firm OTRAG set up operations in Libya and began developing an ostensibly civilian rocket with a reported range of between 300 and 500 km in a surface-to-surface mode.46 Concern with Libya’s missile programme coincided with the Soviet Union’s agreement to provide Libya with a nuclear research reactor and assistance.47 According to ACDA, certain statements by Libyan officials during the late 1970s had ‘given rise to concern over Libya’s intentions’ in the nuclear development field.48 This was despite Libya being a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). In Asia, Taiwan initiated a missile programme in the 1970s. Taipei’s first missile test in 1978 was the 100 km-range Ching Feng (Green Bee).49 This test confirmed Taipei’s technical capability to produce a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile because Taiwan was reported to have acquired the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons by 1974.50 Under economic and political pressure from the United States, however, Taipei terminated its nuclear programme in 1977.51 Also in Asia, South Korea converted Nike Hercules surface-to-air missiles (SAM) into 180 km-range and 220–250 km-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), and modified Honest John rocket systems by improving their accuracy.52 Of most significance, however, was India’s launch of a satellite in 1980 on board a domestically developed space

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launch vehicle (SLV).53 When considered with India’s explosion of a ‘peaceful’ atomic device in 1974, the SLV-3 gave New Delhi the potential to produce a nuclear-tipped intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). By the early 1980s, the aggregate effect of these programmes resulted in the rise of American concern with the spread of ballistic missile manufacturing capabilities in the developing world. These indigenous programmes had been made possible by the acquisition of components, technical know-how and manufacturing technology from a limited group of primarily industrialised countries. On more than one occasion, these programmes benefited from the diversion of technology and know-how from the civil rocket sector; India’s success in the space launch field would have been impossible without the acquisition of dual-use technology and extensive technical assistance from France, the United States, the Soviet Union and West Germany;54 West German assistance and technology was essential to Libya’s missile programme in the late 1970s and early 1980s; Israel’s Jericho programme benefited from French technology and expertise during the 1960s and from US technology in the 1970s; in Taiwan, Ching Feng’s resemblance to the American Lance system resulted from Israel’s retransfer of Lance technology and designs.55 South Korea also acquired significant quantities of US-origin missile production technology. Indeed, the United States pressured South Korea into an agreement in 1979 that restricted Seoul’s missile development programme. Under the agreement, South Korea was limited to developing missiles with ranges no greater than 180 km and it was prohibited from acquiring missile components and technology from third parties.56 In response to these trends, ACDA sponsored a research project towards the end of the Carter administration with the objective of determining the nature of the missile proliferation problem.57 Among other things, the study set out to establish the connection between space launch and ballistic missile technology. The study confirmed what had been feared, ‘US technology (in the form of products or know-how) with direct applicability to missile production could indeed be purchased component by component, ostensibly for civilian purposes, through normal commercial export licensing procedures’.58 Although most of the work into what needed to be done to constrain missile proliferation had been completed by the end of the Carter administration, US missile nonproliferation policy did not take

36

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

real shape until after the Reagan administration took office in January 1981.59

The Reagan administration, 1981–89 The Reagan administration’s first move in the nonproliferation field was to release its nuclear nonproliferation policy in July 1981. This instructed the Secretary of State, and other responsible agencies, to ‘give priority attention to efforts to reduce proliferation risks, to enhance the international non-proliferation regime and, consistent with US security interests, to re-establish a leadership role for the United States in international nuclear affairs’.60 In addition, the administration initiated a review to consider the spread of nuclearcapable missiles and the related manufacturing capabilities with the objective of identifying methods through which this could be restricted. The result of this review was National Security Decision Directive Number 70 (NSDD-70) of 30 November 1982 titled, ‘Nuclear Capable Missile Technology Transfer Policy’. NSDD-70 stated that the increasing proliferation of nuclear-capable missile technology ‘could provoke regional instability or ultimately threaten the United States or its allies’. Thus, the directive made it US policy to ‘hinder the proliferation of foreign military missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons’. To this end, NSDD-70 instructed the relevant executive agencies of the US government to implement methods through which the spread of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles could be restrained. The directive instructed that civilian rocket technology be controlled on an equal basis and the US government was directed to work with other missile technology supplier nations in ‘limiting the export of strategic missile related hardware and technology’. NSDD-70 permitted case-by-case exemptions from this policy for US ‘friends and allies’ so long as such transfers were accompanied by ‘appropriate non-transfer assurances’ and a ‘Presidential approval’ that they were consistent with American foreign policy and national security objectives. 61 NSDD-70 officially expanded US nuclear nonproliferation policy to include the imperative of restricting the proliferation of nuclearcapable unmanned delivery systems. In doing so, ballistic and cruise missiles, as opposed to jet strike aircraft, were singled out as the most destabilising means of nuclear weapon delivery that were proliferating in the developing world. Indeed, as concern with missile proliferation intensified during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States

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continued to transfer nuclear-capable aircraft to several developing countries. For example, between 1978 and 1983 the United States transferred nuclear-capable F-16A aircraft to Egypt, Israel, South Korea, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.62 The missile technology control regime In line with NSDD-70, the Reagan administration initiated bilateral talks with its G-7 partners – Canada, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany and the United Kingdom – in the winter of 1982–1983. These countries were selected because they were American allies as well as missile technology suppliers. The first group meeting was held in June 1983 to discuss the standardisation of the members’ missile technology export controls.63 By March 1985, a consensus had been reached on controlling the spread of nuclear-capable missile systems and the related technology. This included agreement on the need to control dual-use technology, in addition to military missile technology. The G-7 states also agreed in March 1985 to commence interim implementation of missile export restrictions. By December 1986, the participants had reached ‘full convergent views’ on the content of the regime’s guidelines.64 During the negotiations, the American delegation consisted of officials from the Commerce, Defense and State Departments. These representatives were selected for specific skills reflecting their organisational affiliation. Officials from the Pentagon were included for their expertise in identifying the technologies that could be used to develop and produce nuclear-capable missiles. Commerce officials were included because of their ability to incorporate such information in control lists that were functional from an administrative point of view. Officials from the State Department conducted the actual negotiations and dealt with broader foreign policy issues, such as the implications of denying dual-use rocket technology to countries with a legitimate need for such technology.65 Despite the virtually interchangeable nature of ballistic missile and SLV technology, the treatment of export requests for space launch technology proved to be a contentious issue during the negotiations. The issue of circumscribing the availability of such technology caused problems for several reasons. First, the members would have to broaden their export controls to include dual-use items and not simply munitions. By restricting access to space launch technology, the member states would also run the risk of damaging their relations with countries in the developing world. Moreover, controls on civil-

38

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

ian rocket technology threatened to damage legitimate co-operative space ventures between member and non-member states. By agreeing to control the transfer of space launch technology, however, the G-7 countries accepted that the most important element of space co-operation was the satellite itself and not the launch technology.66 The end result of the negotiations was the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) announced simultaneously by the member states on 16 April 1987.67 The MTCR was not an international agreement or a treaty, but a voluntary arrangement between seven countries. Specifically, the arrangement consisted of a ‘set of identical national policies’ designed to limit the risk of nuclear proliferation by controlling the transfer of equipment and technology that could contribute to the development and production of nuclear-capable unmanned delivery systems.68 The participants had agreed to common guidelines and to a common annex of items to be controlled.69 In doing so, the G-7 countries sought to prevent any of the participants from gaining a commercial advantage over other members.70 The MTCR was similar to the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) because both sought an informal harmonisation of national export control policies. COCOM was developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) states and Japan during the Cold War as a set of comprehensive technology export controls to restrict the transfer of military goods, nuclear technologies and dual-use technologies to the Warsaw Pact states and close allies of the Soviet Union. To preserve ‘the West’s lead in critical defense sectors’, COCOM was designed to ‘slow the diffusion of advanced military technology’ to these destinations. Like the MTCR, the United States and its allies negotiated COCOM in secret and agreed to common lists of sensitive items to be controlled.71 Under the MTCR, a nuclear-capable missile was defined as one capable of delivering a 500kg or greater payload to a distance of 300km or more. These parameters corresponded to the perceived minimum weight of an unsophisticated nuclear warhead, and to the ‘strategic distances in the most compact theaters where nuclear-armed missiles might be used’.72 These distances were in reference to the Middle East where proliferation had risen to become an issue of major concern since the early 1970s. Moreover, the challenge of determining the specific dimensions of a nuclear-capable missile had been exacerbated by the need to avoid jeopardising the legitimate missile needs of developing countries; unlike nuclear, chemical and biologi-

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cal technology, missile technology has legitimate military as well as civilian applications.73 Although the MTCR was not designed to limit the civilian application of rocket technology for peaceful purposes, the regime recognised that space launch vehicles were ‘virtually interchangeable with ballistic missiles’. When the United States announced the MTCR in April 1987, an official from the Reagan administration quoted President John F. Kennedy to demonstrate the connection between ballistic missile and space launch technology. When asked what he thought the difference was between the Atlas rocket that put John Glenn into orbit and an Atlas rocket armed with a nuclear warhead and aimed at the Soviet Union, Kennedy was reported to reply, ‘attitude’.74 Accordingly, the regime was designed to control the transfer of civilian as well as military rocket technology. American policy under the MTCR was to encourage ‘international co-operation in the peaceful use of modern technology, including in the field of space’, but at the same time acknowledging such encouragement ‘must be given in ways that are fully consistent with the non-proliferation policies of the US Government’.75 The historical precedent for controlling space launch technology in the United States was National Security Decision Memorandum Number 187 (NSDM-187) of 30 August 1972. NSDM-187 had codified American ‘hesitancy to export SLV technology’ with the aim of strengthening the commercial position of NASA and the American aerospace industry against foreign competition. To avoid penalising countries wanting to launch satellites for civilian purposes, the United States decided to ‘offer its launch services to other countries at cost [price]’. Although NSDM-187 appeared to be motivated primarily by economic security interests, it is not known whether the memorandum had a military security dimension. Despite this uncertainty, NSDM-187 did establish a process for reviewing export requests for space launch technology on a case-by-case basis, an approach later adopted by the MTCR.76 The regime’s annex of controlled items included equipment and technology directly ‘relevant to missile development, production and operation’.77 Design and production technologies associated with any annex item were subject to the same controls. All transfers of annex items were to be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking several factors into account. These included nuclear proliferation concerns, the capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programmes of the recipient state, the significance of the transfer to the potential

40

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

development of nuclear delivery systems other than manned aircraft, assessment of the end-use of transfers, and the applicability of multilateral agreements. In addition, the regime placed a special emphasis on controlling missile transfers to ‘projects of concern’.78 The technical annex of controlled items was divided into two categories. Category I consisted of a short list of very sensitive items that could contribute to rapid missile proliferation if exported. Item 1 (Category I) consisted of complete missile systems capable of delivering at least 500 kg over a range of 300 km or more. These systems included ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missiles, and target and reconnaissance drones. Item 1 also included the production facilities specially designed for these systems. Item 2 (Category I) consisted of complete sub-systems for Category I systems.79 These sub-systems included individual rocket stages, reentry vehicles, solid- or liquid-fuel engines, guidance sets, thrust vector controls and warhead safing, arming, fusing and firing mechanisms.80 If a sub-system from Item 2 was incorporated into a complete missile system not controlled under Item 1, the system was to be treated as a Category I item unless the sub-system could not be separated, removed or duplicated. All export requests for Category I items were to be treated with a ‘strong presumption of denial’. On the rare occasion that such items were allowed to be exported, such transfers were to be the subject of ‘extraordinary precaution’ and ‘binding international assurances’ from the recipient government were to be sought to guarantee peaceful end-use.81 In such instances, the supplier and not just the recipient government was to be responsible for ensuring legitimate end-uses. The transfer of production facilities for any Category I item was completely forbidden.82 Category II controls were designed to restrict those countries that could not acquire complete missile systems, production facilities or major components from overseas. The Category II list consisted of ‘dual-use’ items (Items 3–18) such as propulsion components, propellants, structural materials, testing equipment and facilities, flight instruments, inertial navigation equipment, missile computers and reduced observable technology and materials; all of which could be used in the indigenous production of nuclear-capable missile systems.83 Export requests for these items were to be treated less sensitively than for those in Category I. Their export was at the discretion of the partner governments on a case-by-case basis, so long as the end-use was acceptable. However, transfers were to be permitted only if government-to-government assurances could be obtained to guarantee the

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41

technology would not be utilised in the production of missiles banned under the regime.84 To promote the effective implementation of the guidelines, the US government agreed to exchange relevant information with other member states when ‘necessary and appropriate’.85 Legislative authority for implementing the MTCR in the United States fell under two separate statutes; the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Export Administration Act (EAA). Under the AECA of 1976, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) gave the State Department’s Office of Munitions Control (OMC) the authority to vet requests for weapon exports in conjunction with the Munitions List.86 Following the announcement of the MTCR, OMC was given responsibility to implement the regime’s guidelines regarding export requests for missile-related munitions items included on the Munitions List. These items were included in Category I of the annex. Under the EAA of 1979 (as amended in 1985) the US Commerce Department controlled the export of technology for reasons of national security, foreign policy and short supply. In the foreign policy category, the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) exercised jurisdiction over export requests for dual-use items including chemical precursors, biological agents and other items that could contribute to weapons development.87 BXA vetted dual-use export license requests in conjunction with the Commodity Control List (CCL). In July 1987, Commerce was given responsibility for enforcing the MTCR guidelines regarding export requests for dual-use items that could contribute to nuclear-capable missile development and production. Although dualuse items were found primarily in Category II of the annex, Commerce was also given the authority to regulate the export of certain dual-use pieces of industrial production equipment in Category I.88 Because the MTCR was an informal arrangement initiated by the executive branch, Congress was not given the opportunity to oversee the negotiations or to ratify the regime. However, Congress had not been oblivious to the issue of missile proliferation. Indeed, Congress had been informed by the Reagan administration prior to April 1987 that the MTCR was under negotiation.89 However, it is difficult to identify exactly when Congress became interested because, unlike Congressional interest in nuclear proliferation, there was no single ‘event’ like India’s atomic test of 1974 that brought the issue to centre stage.90 India’s nuclear test resulted in the Congressionally inspired Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (NPA) of 1978.91 Despite this lack of a key event in the missile field, Congressional concern had intensified sufficiently by April 1986 for Senator Dan Quayle to release a

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The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

Congressional Research Service (CRS) report that detailed the spread of missile technology in the developing world.92 The report, Ballistic Missile Proliferation Potential in the Third World, detailed the missile development programmes of Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Korea and Taiwan, and reviewed the existing missile arsenals of Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria.93 From this moment, Congress began to play an active role in moulding and supporting US missile nonproliferation efforts. In December 1987, Congress reacted to the announcement of the MTCR by formally expressing its concern – in the National Defense Authorization Act for 1988 and 1989 – that the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles posed a threat to international peace and security. Congress also expressed support for the MTCR, the desire that all countries would adhere to the guidelines, and an expectation that the responsible executive agencies would implement the regime fully and effectively. Moreover, the Department of Defense was required to submit a report to Congress by February 1988, to identify its functional responsibilities vis-à-vis MTCR implementation. In addition, the Pentagon was asked to describe the number and skills of the personnel currently available to perform these functions in the department.94 As the Pentagon had no official enforcement function in the export control process, Congress wanted to clarify the department’s role in relation to the MTCR.95 The MTCR publicly confirmed in April 1987 that Washington viewed the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles as a greater threat to regional stability and US security than the spread of any other type of delivery vehicle. This had been implicit in US policy since at least the mid-1970s. On 16 April, an official from the Reagan administration said the ‘speed and surprise’ that can be achieved with missiles was ‘far greater than that achievable with manned aircraft’, and therefore constituted a more potent form of nuclear delivery vehicle. However, it was claimed that there was ‘no feasible way to introduce controls comparable in effectiveness to those of the MTCR into the world aircraft market’. It was argued this market had existed for decades with ‘an annual trade in the tens of billions of dollars’.96 Indeed, this was reflected in the Reagan administration’s transfer of nuclear-capable aircraft to several developing countries during the 1980s. For example: between 1982 and 1986 the United States transferred nuclear-capable F-16A fighter/strike aircraft to Egypt and Pakistan, and F-16C aircraft to South Korea.97

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Initial problems with the MTCR Soon after the MTCR was announced in April 1987, several problems emerged with this new approach for restraining the spread of nuclearcapable missiles. First, it became apparent certain member states were not interpreting and enforcing the guidelines consistently and effectively. This situation was exacerbated by the informal and voluntary nature of the regime. Some analysts and Congressmen contended that it was the absence of a regulatory mechanism – like the International Atomic Energy Agency in the nuclear nonproliferation field – that resulted in this inconsistency and ineffectiveness. What these assessments failed to address, however, was the fact the regime had been negotiated secretly as a voluntary arrangement. As a result, the establishment of such an intrusive enforcement agency would not have been a desirable and realistic option in the negotiations. Moreover, the member states retained a greater degree of flexibility in interpreting and enforcing the guidelines in the absence of such an agency. In the winter of 1987–88, the enforcement problem was highlighted by revelations about Argentina’s programme to develop the 800–960 km-range Condor II ballistic missile. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Argentina had begun developing the short-range Condor I with a range of approximately 100–150 km.98 The Condor I was produced from the first stage (of two) of Argentina’s Alacran sounding rocket.99 Argentina reportedly initiated the project in response to external security concerns vis-à-vis Chile and later its defeat in the Falklands War of 1982.100Argentina subsequently began developing the Condor II in 1984 and by the late 1980s this project ‘came to symbolise’ the problem of missile proliferation.101 This symbolism arose from the project’s reliance on foreign technology and expertise including ostensibly civilian rocket technology. This assistance had been provided by numerous West European firms despite several of their governments’ membership in the MTCR. According to a report published by the Congressional Research Service in 1988, the project received inertial guidance systems from a French firm, West German firms supplied launchers as well as design, integration and simulation assistance, an Italian firm supplied propulsion technology, a Swedish firm supplied warhead-fusing technology, and a Swiss firm provided the management expertise.102 Less than eight months after the announcement of the MTCR, it was apparent that several of the regime’s member governments were not effectively enforcing the regime’s guidelines. It also became apparent the membership was not cast wide enough because states such as Sweden and Switzerland had legally transferred

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The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

technology and assistance to Argentina. The situation was complicated further by the involvement of Egypt and Iraq. In July 1988, American intelligence revealed the ultimate goal of the Condor II project was to provide Iraq and Egypt with 200 missiles each. The project was referred to in Egypt and Iraq as the Badr-2000.103 While Iraq was involved in a war with Iran and wanted the capability to launch missiles against Tehran, Egyptian collaboration was widely viewed as a reaction to Israel’s medium-range missile development efforts during this period.104 The second problem involved the regime’s failure to address the missile proliferation activities of the Soviet Union and China. Despite the Soviet Union’s domination of the ballistic missile suppliers’ market in the 1970s and 1980s, the Reagan administration had not asked Moscow to participate in the negotiations that resulted in the MTCR. The official explanation was the administration had deemed its best course of action to be to negotiate the regime with its closest allies, with the intention of asking other countries to join at a later date.105 This decision was supposedly dictated by the complexity of such negotiations. A more probable explanation, however, would be the US perception that Moscow would not have been interested in, and would have been hostile towards, such negotiations. The Soviet Union had reaped significant economic and political rewards from its ballistic missile exports in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, the negotiations were initiated prior to 1985 during a period of major hostility in the US–Soviet relationship. Thus, the international atmosphere at this time was not conducive to US–Soviet co-operation in this area. Paradoxically, the Soviet Union’s omission from the MTCR coincided with Moscow’s increased awareness of the potential security implications posed by missile proliferation. In mid-1987, Israel tested its projected 500–900 km-range Jericho-2 missile. In Moscow’s eyes, the Jericho-2 threatened to give Israel the capability to hit civilian and military targets in southern parts of the Soviet Union. According to one Radio Moscow broadcast, the Soviet leadership was worried that an Israeli missile could threaten economic and strategic centres such as oilfields in Baku and Soviet naval bases on the Black Sea. During the same broadcast, it was also hinted Moscow would be forced to proceed with both defensive and political steps if this missile project continued.106 Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of DF-3 IRBM from China and Iraq’s indigenous modification of Scud missiles to extend their range were other manifestations of this growing threat. Soviet concern appeared to be reflected in a new restraint in Moscow’s attitude towards export-

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ing ballistic missiles. In 1987, the Soviet Union refused to transfer the 500 km-range SS-23 to Syria and the 900 km-range SS-12 to Libya.107 This restraint contributed to the decision by certain developing countries to indigenously develop their own ballistic missiles. It also contributed to China’s emergence as a missile supplier.108 The failure of the MTCR to address China’s proliferation activities became a very significant issue in March 1988, when it was revealed that Beijing had sold DF-3 IRBM to Saudi Arabia.109 In June, the State Department subsequently revealed China was discussing the sale of the 600 km-range M-9 missile with Syria. The State Department also revealed Iran had held preliminary discussions with Beijing on its potential acquisition of ballistic missiles.110 The omission of the Soviet Union and China from the MTCR called into question the viability of the new regime as a means to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles because it failed to address the world’s two biggest suppliers of complete missile systems. However, the MTCR was originally conceived as a discriminatory regime in that responsible behaviour was required in order for states to join. Neither Moscow nor Beijing fitted into this category in the late 1980s. As a result, both Moscow and Beijing perceived the MTCR as discriminating against their economic and security interests. In short, they saw themselves as targets of, and not potential partners with, the new regime. The initial American response The Reagan administration and Congress attempted to redress these problems in several ways. In the autumn of 1987, the American and British governments confirmed that the Italian firm SNIA-BPD had supplied missile technology to Argentina, thereby violating Italy’s membership in the MTCR. In response, the Reagan administration embargoed the sale of American-origin technology to the company. Under American pressure, the Italian government subsequently redressed SNIA’s technology transfer indiscretions early in 1988 and the administration responded by lifting its embargo on the company.111 The MTCR members subsequently held their first ever policy group meeting in September 1988. At the meeting in Rome, an emphasis was placed on the need to restrain the Condor II project, despite the fact Argentina claimed the rocket was designed for launching satellites. The participants also discussed Brazil’s Sonda rocket programme and Israel’s Jericho-2 missile.112 Outside the MTCR, the administration

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The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

engaged the Soviet Union and China in separate dialogues in an attempt to gain their adherence to the MTCR guidelines. Both of these dialogues were hindered by perceptions in Moscow and Beijing that the regime discriminated directly against their economic and security interests. During talks in July 1987, the administration provided Moscow with information on the MTCR and expressed hope the Soviet Union and other non-regime suppliers would adhere to the guidelines.113 Despite being aware of and understanding the issue, Moscow viewed the MTCR with great suspicion. The regime was perceived to be directed against the Soviet Union and discriminatory because it excluded so many countries and included only the G-7 allies. According to William Potter and Adam Stulberg, Moscow viewed the objectives and procedures of the regime as similar to those of COCOM, and thought Washington had created the MTCR to promote a missile technology supplier cartel and to hinder global technology cooperation.114 Moreover, Moscow was concerned with the regime’s lack of internal restrictions on technology transfer and that, if the Soviet Union joined, it would not be allowed to benefit because it would remain the subject of COCOM restrictions.115 The Soviets criticised the informal nature of the MTCR, claimed the payload and range parameters were set too high, and viewed the regime as potentially contributing to the development of indigenous missile systems because it did not address the indigenous missile development efforts of countries like Israel.116 According to Aaron Karp, some foreign observers claimed Moscow wanted to avoid pressure on its right to export SS-21, FROG, and SCUD missiles, despite the fact these systems came under the regime’s range limits. Moreover, Karp asserted that Moscow wanted western support for its launch services in return for MTCR adherence and for China to observe the same restrictions.117 Despite Moscow’s distaste for the MTCR, rapidly improving US–Soviet relations resulted in the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. This prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union from possessing nuclear missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 km.118 The United States and the Soviet Union were also proscribed from transferring such missiles to third parties. This arms control agreement designed to address the vertical missile proliferation spawned the first US–Soviet bilateral achievement in the horizontal missile nonproliferation field.119 At the superpower summit of May and June 1988, the United States and the Soviet Union subsequently held bilateral talks to discuss missile prolif-

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eration.120 American and Soviet officials later held their first discussions on the means through which to restrain ballistic missile proliferation in September 1988.121 In December, these discussions were followed by a second round of talks. Yet at the end of the Reagan administration, the Soviet Union still remained overtly hostile towards the MTCR. In 1988, the administration initiated a diplomatic effort to stop China from selling ballistic missiles. In July, Secretary of State George Shultz travelled to Beijing and expressed the administration’s concern over China’s missile proliferation activities in the Middle East.122 Shultz requested in-depth discussions between the United States and China on this issue.123 In September, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci travelled to Beijing to express concern.124 After talking with the Chinese leadership, Carlucci said he was satisfied that in future China would behave responsibly in its missile sales. His statement was reportedly based on a Chinese guarantee and a three-point statement outlining China’s arms sales guidelines: it would never sell nuclear weapons; it would never interfere in the internal affairs of a state that bought Chinese weapons; and its arms sales always took place to contribute to peace and stability.125 Indeed, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian defended the missile deal with Saudi Arabia on the grounds it was ‘conducive to the stability of the situation in Saudi Arabia in particular, and to the Middle East in general’.126 Following the revelation that Saudi Arabia had acquired Chinese IRBMs, Congressional interest in missile nonproliferation soared. In April 1988, the administration was forced to delay a formal notification to Congress of a proposal to sell $450 million worth of arms to Saudi Arabia after George Shultz received a letter from a bipartisan group of 187 Representatives and 59 Senators opposing the sale of military equipment to the Kingdom because of its missile acquisition.127 Congressional pressure also contributed to Saudi Arabia’s decision in 1988 to sign the NPT to quell fears that it wanted to arm its new missiles with nuclear warheads.128 In addition, a ‘sense of the Senate’ resolution was passed by 97–0 in July, which called on the United States to reassess its relations with Beijing and to re-examine arms and technology transfers to China if it failed to alter its arms sales policies, particularly in the Middle East.129 The resolution drew attention to intelligence and media reports that indicated China was preparing to sell ballistic missiles to Syria, Iran, Libya, and Pakistan.130 The resolution stressed that ‘China should immediately halt the sale of ballistic missiles and other offensive

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The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

weapons to all nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf, either directly or through third party transfers’.131 Most notable, however, was Congressional enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for 1989 in September 1988. A section of this act proscribed the US government from selling defence articles to any nation that had acquired IRBM manufactured by China, unless the President certified it did not have nuclear, biological or chemical warheads for those missiles.132 The Reagan administration’s bilateral efforts to engage non-MTCR states were not confined to China and the Soviet Union. In December 1988, the State Department revealed it was examining the feasibility of initiating separate talks with Egypt and Israel to restrain their missile proliferation activities. Initially, these talks were planned to be restricted to the consideration of limited steps, such as advance notification of missile tests. Officials from the State Department hoped success in this sphere would persuade other countries in the Middle East to limit their missile proliferation activities.133

Conclusion By January 1989, several problems were evident with US policy for restraining the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles through the MTCR. Several of the member states were not enforcing the regime’s guidelines consistently and effectively. Moreover, the MTCR did not address the missile proliferation activities of the Soviet Union and China, the world’s biggest exporters of complete missile systems. It also became evident in 1988 that the US government itself was experiencing internal problems regarding the implementation of American policy in conjunction with the regime. These problems focused primarily on the State Department and its role as the co-ordinator of MTCR issues ‘among the involved US agencies’.134 Prior to February 1989, the State Department chaired bi-weekly meetings to co-ordinate various MTCR issues between the relevant executive agencies. However, several officials from ACDA and the Departments of Commerce and Defense later voiced their dissatisfaction with this process. An official from the Commerce Department said although the meetings were good for communicating information between agencies, substantive decisions were never reached. In January 1989, a Pentagon official said ‘he had been attempting for 2 years [without success] to have Commerce control rocket propellant batch mixers under the MTCR’.135

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The remainder of this book examines how the Bush administration and Congress subsequently attempted to rectify these problems between January 1989 and January 1993. Specifically, it considers the political, bureaucratic and systemic issues that interacted to determine the outcome of these efforts in a rapidly changing strategic environment.

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Part II The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation, 1989–93

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3 The Bush Administration and the Missile Technology Control Regime

George Bush won the American Presidential Election at the end of a year during which several events focused US attention on the issue of ballistic missile proliferation. In March 1988, it was revealed China had transferred intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) to Saudi Arabia. This coincided with the unprecedented use of ballistic missiles by Iran and Iraq during their ‘War of the Cities’ between February and April. In addition, it became apparent the MTCR was experiencing serious teething troubles involving the inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of the guidelines by the member states. Problems also became apparent between the agencies responsible for implementing US policy in conjunction with the regime. These centred on the principal roles of the State and Commerce Departments in the missile technology export licensing process. This was the situation inherited by President Bush in January 1989. Over the next four years, his administration accorded greater importance to the goal of missile nonproliferation as the global Soviet nuclear and conventional military threat to US national security waned and eventually disappeared. Concurrently, a new paradigm of security concerns emerged, characterised in part by the growing threat posed to America’s forces, allies and other regional interests by the increasing availability of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC) and ballistic missiles to a now wider range of states. Iraq’s use of modified SCUD missiles against American forces and allies in 1991 was a potent sign of this relatively new and growing threat. Moreover, missile technology continued to proliferate at a rapid rate between 1989 and 1993. China continued to transfer missile components to several states in the developing world. It emerged that Israel and South Africa had been collaborating on the development of a

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The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

medium-range missile system and North Korea had been developing the medium-range Nodong-1 missile. India also tested its mediumrange Agni missile. By the end of the administration, the issue of missile proliferation had risen to a position on the American security agenda that was higher than at any other time in the past. This chapter considers the Bush administration’s reaction to this radically altered threat environment through its formulation and implementation of US policy in conjunction with the MTCR between January 1989 and January 1993. The chapter begins by considering the administration’s initial response between January 1989 and January 1991. In early 1989, the White House initiated a re-evaluation of American missile nonproliferation policy as part of the administration’s overall strategic review. The review took account of improving relations between Washington and Moscow and accorded a greater significance to responding to non-Soviet regional threats to American security interests. In part, this re-evaluation resulted in the establishment of interagency forums for dealing with the formulation and implementation of missile nonproliferation policy. This reflected the perceived growing threat posed to American forces, allies and other regional interests by the proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities. The State, Commerce and Defense Departments also began devoting more resources to dealing with the threat posed by missile proliferation. Despite these reforms and reorganisations, systemic problems plagued the administration’s implementation of US policy in conjunction with the MTCR in 1989 and 1990. These problems were symptomatic of America’s rapidly changing security environment. They centred specifically on the need to reform the US export control system as it was being focused away from restricting strategic trade with the Soviet bloc, towards preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD in the developing world. These problems were illustrated by several failures of the Commerce Department’s procedure for processing export licence requests for dual-use items with potential ballistic missile applications. Bureaucratic differences between several of the executive agencies involved in implementing US policy in conjunction with the MTCR exacerbated these difficulties. Although the administration acted to resolve these systemic and bureaucratic problems through its Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), it only did so following an interagency dispute over the desirability of imposing enhanced unilateral export controls on missile, and chemical and biological weapons (CBW) technologies.

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Bureaucratic differences between the State and Defense Departments over the treatment of export requests for space launch technology created further problems for the administration. Again, this issue was resolved after protracted debate. At the international level, it became increasingly apparent in 1989 and 1990 that several of the regime’s West European member states were not enforcing or interpreting the regime’s guidelines consistently and effectively. These problems again centred on the need to reform the MTCR in the rapidly changing international system, as well as the export systems and attitudes of several of the regime’s members. These systems and attitudes tended to favour export promotion over export control, and reflected a lack of political will to prevent lucrative transfers of technology and assistance at a time when East–West tensions were rapidly disappearing, and the threat posed by proliferation had still to be appreciated fully. Moreover, the French government had adopted a liberal attitude regarding the export of space launch technology to states in the developing world. This clashed with the administration’s stated policy of tightly restricting such trade. The administration approached these problems in numerous ways. It set about institutionalising the MTCR by establishing a system of regular plenary and technical meetings to discuss and resolve common problems and issues related to the implementation of the regime’s guidelines. The administration also pressured and assisted both Germany and Italy to reform their respective export control systems. Additional European countries were encouraged to join the regime in order to limit the risk that missile technology might be exported from, or transhipped through, these countries to missile projects of concern in the developing world. The administration also persuaded the French government not to approve the transfer of rocket engines to Brazil’s space launch programme because of its potential contribution to the proliferation of missile technology. By early 1991, therefore, the administration had implemented some major reforms of both domestic and multilateral export control arrangements in response to the new post-Cold War strategic environment. The chapter then proceeds by considering the period between January 1991 and January 1993. Following Iraq’s use of ballistic missiles against American allies and forces during the 1991 Gulf War, the administration increased further the priority it accorded to missile nonproliferation. This focused on implementing the EPCI and encouraging America’s allies to adopt similar controls. Despite Iraq’s missile attacks domestic implementation of the EPCI was marred by

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the interaction of other foreign policy interests in 1991 and 1992. This resulted in the publication of an incomplete list of missile projects and countries of concern conceived originally to help American exporters avoid exporting MTCR-controlled technology to entities of proliferation concern. However, it was at the international level that the administration proved most effective in institutionalising and updating the MTCR during its final two years in office. By January 1993, the administration had succeeded in persuading its fellow MTCR partners to revise the regime’s annex of controlled technology, and to expand the guidelines to cover missiles capable of delivering all WMD and not just nuclear weapons.

The Bush administration and the MTCR, January 1989– January 1991 Shortly after taking office in January 1989, the Bush administration initiated a review of America’s national security policy. Among other things, this involved reassessing the country’s national defence requirements at a time when East–West relations were continuing to improve, and reviewing the US position in arms control negotiations such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).1 The issue of nonproliferation also featured because of the rising incidence of missile and chemical weapons proliferation and use during the final two years of the Reagan administration. Indeed, George Bush campaigned for the Presidency promising to accord a higher priority to combating proliferation.2 Reviews, reforms and reorganisations The Bush administration responded to the growing proliferation problem by establishing the National Security Council’s (NSC) first ever Policy Co-ordinating Committee (PCC) for Nonproliferation Policy. National Security Decision 10 (NSD 10) established this committee as the principal interagency forum for the development and implementation of US missile and NBC nonproliferation policies.3 The committee was chaired by Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, and included representatives at the Assistant Secretary level from the relevant executive agencies.4 Similar reforms were implemented to enhance interagency co-ordination specifically for missile nonproliferation policy.5 These reforms were designed to take account of criticisms levelled at the way in which the State Department was

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handling its responsibilities for co-ordinating MTCR issues between the relevant agencies. In response to this dissatisfaction, and in line with the administration’s accordance of a higher priority to nonproliferation, the State Department established several interagency groups to co-ordinate the activities of the agencies involved in implementing US policy in conjunction with the regime. In the first place, a subgroup of the PCC on Nonproliferation Policy was established to consider missile nonproliferation policy issues on an ad hoc basis. This group was chaired by the State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, and included representatives from the Commerce Department, the Pentagon and ACDA.6 Two biweekly interagency forums were also established. The Missile Technology Export Control (MTEC) Group was created to standardise procedures for reviewing missile technology export licence applications controlled by the Commerce and State Departments. This was done in an attempt to make the process more systematic and to improve co-ordination between the relevant agencies. MTEC was chaired by the State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) and comprised missile technology experts from the Commerce, Defense, and State departments, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), ACDA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). By late October 1989, this group had reviewed more than 200 export licence requests.7 The Missile Trade Analysis Group (MTAG) was also created. MTAG formalised co-operation between the intelligence community, ACDA, NASA, and the Commerce, Defense, and State departments, for monitoring and analysing the activities of foreign entities regarding ballistic missile and space launch programmes of concern. MTAG was designed to meet on a regular basis to ‘ensure timely and appropriate action on information pertaining to the flow of goods and services into missile testing, development, and production facilities’. This group was given responsibility for co-ordinating démarches, monitoring intelligence and providing ‘a centralized mechanism’ for obtaining clearance for intelligence related to missile proliferation.8 Interagency provisions were complemented by changes within the Commerce, Defense and State Departments. These increased the emphasis accorded to missile nonproliferation in the spring and summer of 1989. The Office of the Secretary for Export Administration in the Commerce Department established a Missile Technology Task Force to co-ordinate the entire gamut of the department’s missile nonproliferation activities between its constituent offices. In addition,

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the Office of Export Licensing’s (OEL) computer was enhanced to enable it to track all missile technology control cases.9 Further changes were implemented at the State and Defense Departments. When Secretary of State Baker began reorganising his agency’s responsibilities for dealing with national security issues in February 1989, he placed an emphasis on enhancing his department’s efforts to combat proliferation. The principal outcome of this reorganisation was the creation of the Office of Weapons Proliferation Policy in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM), and the delegation of the department’s responsibilities for nonproliferation to Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Reginald Bartholomew. Bartholomew became responsible for arms sales and strategic export policy10 and PM’s new office was given responsibility for co-ordinating missile as well as CBW nonproliferation efforts within the State Department.11 According to officials from the State Department interviewed at the time, American efforts to combat proliferation during the Reagan administration had been hampered by the division of responsibilities for combating proliferation between several bureaux within the State Department.12 Reforms were also implemented at the Department of Defense. Prior to the summer of 1989, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy, Jim E. Hinds, had been responsible for conducting the administration’s ‘missile nonproliferation business’ at the Pentagon. Working through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Hinds headed three nonproliferation directorates which acted as ‘policy offices’ for nuclear, missile and chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation, respectively. The complex technical and political nature of the missile proliferation problem necessitated close co-operation between the missile directorate and the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, which included personnel ‘very knowledgeable about the missile proliferation problem and the MTCR’. Indeed, Hinds’s office served as a conduit for information exchange between the policy and acquisition sides of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In addition, Hinds was responsible for ensuring the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) and the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) were familiar with missile proliferation issues, including the MTCR. DSAA was responsible for negotiating and implementing foreign military sales (FMS), while DTSA was the Pentagon’s ‘point of contact’ for approving missile technology export licence applications. According to Hinds, this

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interaction was essential to ensure the people operating the machinery were familiar with the MTCR, and the missile proliferation problem, and automatically referred these issues to his office for the ‘policy implications’ and overall co-ordination. In May 1989, Hinds drew attention to the complexity of implementing the MTCR in testimony to Congress when he said that every week he found ‘some new nook or cranny’ at the Pentagon that had ‘some need to be more involved’ with the issue. He referred specifically to the increasing roles of the military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the field of missile nonproliferation.13 The Pentagon changed the emphasis accorded to missile nonproliferation when its roles and responsibilities for nonproliferation policy were reorganised in the summer of 1989. The administration’s reorganisation of the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy resulted in the creation of the new position of Deputy for Nonproliferation. This deputy was given responsibility for all forms of nonproliferation; missile, nuclear, biological and chemical.14 By creating this position, the Pentagon’s responsibility for missile nonproliferation issues was shifted from the negotiations side of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy – under Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ISP), Stephen J. Hadley – to a position under Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), formerly Henry Rowen (1989–91), and later Ambassador James Lilley (1991–93). In doing so, the Pentagon’s responsibility for dealing with day-to-day MTCR issues was moved from an area primarily involved with arms control matters to an area which focused on non-European regional security issues. The decision to move this responsibility was based on a need to avoid unnecessarily escalating intradepartmental differences between the new office and the ISA regional desks to the Under Secretary level.15 Any such differences could be kept and dealt with in ISA. In contrast to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations, the new position was responsible for a new office and staff dedicated purely to proliferation issues. According to Henry Sokolski, the person installed as Deputy for Nonproliferation, this increase in priority and resources was significant because of department-wide cuts being initiated in the Pentagon at that time.16 By September 1989, the administration had completed a series of departmental and interagency reforms aimed at improving the implementation of US policy in conjunction with the MTCR. Despite these changes, bureaucratic and procedural problems complicated the

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The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

implementation of US policy in line with the MTCR in 1989 and 1990. These problems stemmed primarily from the structure and mechanisms of the missile technology export licensing system and focused on the principal roles of the Commerce and State Departments therein. Dual-use export licensing During the Bush administration, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) was responsible for licensing exports of dual-use items controlled by the MTCR. Prior to 1991, BXA reviewed licence requests for such items by focusing on ‘certain countries’ that were developing nuclear-capable missiles.17 Applications were referred initially to the bureau’s Office of Export Licensing (OEL), where it was determined whether the item(s) in questions were MTCRcontrolled and if they were destined to a ‘missile project of concern’, defined by the intelligence community on an ongoing basis. In-house engineers were consulted to determine whether the items in question could make a ‘significant contribution’ to a missile development programme. In addition, the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) vetted licence applications by consulting secret and unclassified ‘computerized lists of individuals and firms’ that were ‘of concern to export enforcement officials’. OEE did this when licence applications were first received and immediately prior to any approvals.18 From mid-1989 onwards, Commerce also referred missile technology export licence applications to the State Department for comment and discussed them at MTEC meetings every two weeks.19 If an annex item was destined to a country of concern, but not to a project of concern, and if the export could make a significant contribution to missile development in that country, Commerce asked the State Department to solicit government-to-government assurances to guard against diversion to an unstated end-user or end-use. On some occasions, applications were sent to the Pentagon to be evaluated for reasons of national defence. Under this procedure – established by a presidential directive in 1985 – the Pentagon identified those dual-use technology transfers which needed to be controlled by the MTCR. Once all the information available had been considered, the Office of Technology Policy and Analysis recommended to OEL whether to deny or to approve the licence. All exports of dual-use items included on the MTCR annex required an individual validated licence regardless of their destination. If the department’s engineers determined that an export would make a ‘significant contribution’ to a project of concern,

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the State Department was informed of Commerce’s intention to deny the licence application.20 Revelations about numerous exports of dual-use technology from the United States to Iraq during the late 1980s and in 1990, however, raised questions regarding the Commerce Department’s procedure for vetting export requests for dual-use technology with potential missile applications. Although many of these transfers occurred or were initiated during the Reagan administration, they became public knowledge and caused controversy in the first two years of the Bush administration. Perhaps the most notorious incident came to light when President Bush intervened to prevent the export to Iraq of several American-made furnaces in July 1990. The case in question originated in March 1989 when the New Jersey-based firm CONSARC contacted the Commerce Department to solicit advice on its proposed export of a ‘skull’ furnace, and three related furnaces, to Iraq’s Ministry of Industry and Minerals. The ministry ostensibly wanted the furnaces to conduct ‘materials research and development’, and to manufacture ‘titanium castings to be used for medical prosthetics’. However, the furnaces were also capable of melting titanium for manufacturing missile parts and casting highly enriched uranium for the production of nuclear weapons.21 Indeed, the combined furnaces would reportedly have given Iraq an advanced production capability for manufacturing missile and nuclear weapon parts; CONSARC actually told Commerce the furnaces could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Despite this warning, Commerce decided the furnaces could be sent to Iraq without an export licence because they were not included on its missile proliferation, nuclear proliferation, national security or foreign policy export control lists. Moreover, CONSARC provided Commerce with a statement from the Iraqi end-user which asserted the furnaces would not be used to develop nuclear weapons. The Commerce Department proceeded without consulting the Pentagon or the intelligence community on the national security implications of the transfer. In July 1990, DTSA was informed of the transfer by a former Pentagon official and, in response, US Customs suspended the transfer at the agency’s request.22 A source at Customs later asserted that DTSA was concerned the furnaces would be used in Iraq’s ‘nuclear missile program’. Several Congressmen were informed of the pending transfer and responded by sending a letter to the President asking him to support Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz’s

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The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

assertion that the furnaces were capable of processing metals for missiles and nuclear weapons.23 Under pressure from Congress and the Pentagon, the White House intervened on 19 July by declaring the export required a licence under section 778.3 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Section 778.3 required export licences for all items if the exporter ‘knows’ they will be used to make nuclear weapons.24 Two weeks later the CONSARC issue was overtaken by events when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August. Following the invasion, the administration suspended all export licences to Iraq.25 The CONSARC and several other cases involving the transfer of dual-use technology to Iraq highlighted several problems with the Commerce Department’s procedure for processing export licence requests for dual-use technology with potential missile applications.26 It was apparent that Commerce lacked the legal authority to stop exports of dual-use technology for reasons of missile nonproliferation if an item was not included on the MTCR annex; even if it was included on the Commodity Control List (CCL). Indeed, the General Accounting Office reported in June 1990 that Commerce had not broken any laws by transferring dual-use technology to Iraq.27 This situation demonstrated the need for the MTCR annex to be updated to ensure it included all missile-relevant dual-use technology. In addition, these exports illustrated that the annex could not reasonably include all dual-use technology with potential applications in the missile development field. This was especially the case regarding production technology such as supercomputers. The CONSARC transfer demonstrated that if the equivalent of Section 778.3 had existed in the missile nonproliferation field, then American firms would have been obliged to acquire export licences for ‘all’ items if they knew their products were destined to projects of concern; regardless of whether the items were included on the MTCR annex. Commerce also claimed it would have been unable to stop the CONSARC transfer through any other export control provision because the administration had agreed with its allies to relax COCOM restrictions on strategic trade. This agreement on 1 July 1990 removed the skull furnace from the CCL, thus highlighting the need to ensure that controls on strategic technology were maintained for nonproliferation reasons as COCOM controls were relaxed due to improved East–West relations. In addition, the transfers to Iraq demonstrated the limited roles played by the Department of Defense and the intelligence community in vetting proposed exports of dual-use technology with possible

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missile applications. Henry Sokolski told a Congressional hearing in May 1991 that Defense had become increasingly frustrated during the 1980s with its lack of authority to review export licence requests for dual-use items not included on the missile or other control lists, but which were destined to projects of proliferation concern.28 In the CONSARC case, Commerce did not tell the Pentagon that computer control units and machining lathes were accompanying the furnaces. This knowledge would certainly have made Pentagon analysts suspicious of Iraq’s intentions. Moreover, despite CONSARC’s warning that the furnaces could be used in the development of nuclear weapons, Commerce failed to refer the case to the intelligence and defence agencies until immediately prior to the President’s decision to stop the transfer. When informed of the proposed transfer, US intelligence quickly determined that the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Minerals did not exist and the real destination was Iraq’s Sa’ad-16 missile development complex.29 Moreover, Commerce responded to criticism that it had not referred enough dual-use items to Defense for review, or had ignored its recommendations, by asserting that because the Pentagon had not often escalated its objections to more senior interagency forums, it was justified in not acting on the Pentagon’s ‘informal protestations’.30 The exports to Iraq illustrated the incompatibility of the Commerce Department’s export control and export promotion functions. After the furnace issue was resolved, the President of CONSARC described how Commerce and the US Embassy in Baghdad had encouraged his company to win the contract with Iraq.31 This suggested Commerce had sacrificed its nonproliferation responsibilities in favour of fulfilling its primary organisational goal of promoting American economic competitiveness. The US Embassy’s involvement highlighted an additional factor that contributed to the failure of the licensing process vis-à-vis Iraq, which reflected the administration’s policy of actively courting Baghdad prior to August 1990. This policy originated during the Reagan administration, and was driven by the perceived need to counterbalance the influence of Iran in the Middle East. On 2 October 1989, the Bush administration’s National Security Directive 26 (NSD26) – US Policy Toward the Persian Gulf – asserted that ‘normal relations between the United States and Iraq’ were necessary to serve America’s ‘longer-term interests’ and ‘to promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East’. NSD-26 asserted that the US government ‘should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq’. Although the

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directive referred to the need for Iraq not to proliferate in nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry, and to avoid breaching human rights, it did not mention missile proliferation concerns. Moreover, NSD-26 said the government should ‘pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for US firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy’ after the first Gulf War (1980–88), so long as this did not conflict with Washington’s nonproliferation policy and ‘other significant objectives’. Finally, the directive stated that ‘as a means of developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment’, the government ‘should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance’, such as ‘training courses and medical exchanges, on a case by case basis’.32 Although the exports to Iraq suggested initially that Commerce had been over-zealous in its promotion of trade with Baghdad, several officials from the Commerce Department claimed these exports had been driven by the administration’s overall policy towards Baghdad. This policy resulted in pressure from the State Department to continue and increase trade with Iraq. In 1990, Under Secretary for Trade Administration, Paul Freedenberg, asserted that it had been ‘US policy to continue normal trade with Iraq’, and that State had endeavoured to see this ‘continue and improve’.33 Moreover, Under-Secretary for Export Administration Dennis E. Kloske resigned in 1991 after informing Congress that the administration had ‘ignored warnings about exporting to Iraq’. Kloske said State had actually ‘overruled many of the Commerce Department’s objections to specific export licenses’ in the hope of keeping open the administration’s diplomatic lines to Baghdad.34 The failure of the dual-use licensing process vis-à-vis Iraq reflected the administration’s pre-Gulf War policy tilt towards Baghdad. According to Gary Milhollin, State formulated its position on exports to Iraq by following the administration’s general foreign policy approach of ‘constructively’ engaging Baghdad. Milhollin said this policy gave Saddam Hussein’s regime the benefit of the doubt on most occasions.35 Enhancing proliferation control The administration acted to rectify these licensing problems in 1990 through a ‘series of major initiatives to strengthen export controls’.36 The Pentagon was a major driving force behind these initiatives because of its concern that too much missile and CBW-relevant technology was getting from the United States to projects of concern. The Pentagon established and chaired an interagency committee

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with the Commerce Department with the objective of clarifying all items controlled by the MTCR, including production facilities. Although the regime prohibited completely the export of missile production facilities, the annex did not articulate what was meant by the term ‘production facility’. The committee sought therefore to ‘explicate, clarify, and expand’ what was covered by the regime’s ‘broad categories’.37 According to Henry Sokolski, the CONSARC furnaces would have been caught much earlier if this clarification had already been in place. However, he added that while this case had ‘sensitized everybody’ to the need to tighten export controls, the system did not fail because of the exposure it eventually received. This interagency committee met regularly during 1990 with the goal of updating the MTCR annex and its activities were co-ordinated with other regime members.38 On 16 November 1990, the administration issued Executive Order 12735 which declared a national emergency regarding the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW).39 The order directed the Secretaries of Commerce and State to use their existing authorities to control exports they determined could help foreign countries acquire the capability to ‘produce, stock-pile, deliver, or use chemical and biological weapons’. In doing so, reference was made to the national security and foreign policy dangers posed by the continued spread of CBW, and the need for effective unilateral and multilateral export controls in this area. The administration deemed this as particularly important because of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and Saddam Hussein’s threats to use chemical weapons.40 The order also stated that a system of enhanced export controls must be adopted to target ‘projects and countries of concern’ and this should be supplemented by effective multilateral controls.41 The order stated that by January 1991 new interagency procedures must be established to ensure the Commerce Department’s dual-use technology export licensing process became more ‘predictable and timely’. By the same date, the Secretary of State was to have initiated negotiations to ensure that supercomputer export controls were implemented on a multilateral basis.42 The administration’s strategy to enhance export controls resulted most notably in the announcement of three nonproliferation-related initiatives on 13 December 1990. Each initiative was implemented in line with Executive Order 12735. Under the first, the dual-use licensing system was standardised and clarified to speed up decisions and make it more predictable. White House Press Secretary Fitzwater said

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the President had decided that American exporters were entitled ‘to prompt review of export license applications’. The administration emphasised these alterations would not detract from the government’s ‘determination to weigh cautiously license applications’ that raised ‘potential nonproliferation or broader national security concerns’.43 For example, a provision was established to ensure that every agency had the right to escalate licensing decisions within the executive branch if they did not agree with them, or if they felt they had not received an adequate hearing. This provision was designed so that contentious licensing issues were not decided upon by a single agency and, after being overruled, individual staffers did not consider their only option was to leak sensitive intelligence material to the press or Congress. Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Richard Clarke said this new system would allow for all relevant expertise to be brought to bear on export licensing decisions, with an escalation procedure if individuals were unhappy with the outcome.44 Under the new escalation mechanism, any applications that remained outstanding because of interagency disagreement had to be considered by a political Advisory Committee on Export Policy not more than 100 days after the initial processing. The mechanism was designed to take account of security concerns, at the same time as giving exporters the responsiveness they desired from their government in processing export licence requests.45 The administration also announced a decision to approve several licences for the export of supercomputers to Brazil, India and China. While these exports had ‘presented complicated and far-reaching policy issues’, Fitzwater said the President had approved the applications because safeguard programmes had been included to ensure civilian end-use of the items in question.46 For example, under pressure from the Commerce and State Departments, the White House approved an export licence for IBM to export two pieces of computer equipment to Embraer, a Brazilian aircraft manufacturer. Embraer wanted the equipment to upgrade its computers into a supercomputer, which it claimed would be used for modelling air flow around aircraft wings and nose cones. Because of the nature of this technology, a possibility existed that Embraer, and Brazil’s Aerospace Technical Center (CTA), would use the supercomputer to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Supercomputers can be used to simulate effects such as the thrust produced by rocket engines and the heat and pressure inflicted on re-entry vehicles as they re-enter the atmosphere. Brazil’s technology-supplier relationship with Baghdad

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also raised the possibility that the results from such experiments would find their way to countries such as Iraq. The decision to allow this export to proceed was an example therefore of how the administration allowed diplomatic and economic considerations to prevail over national security concerns. This reflected the administration’s desire to maintain Brazil’s support for the international embargo imposed on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait. Indeed, the decision to proceed with all of these supercomputer exports was taken despite the Commerce Department’s regulations for dealing with export requests for supercomputers to non-COCOM states. These regulations required recipient countries to have ‘good nonproliferation credentials’, to be NPT signatories, to have all of their facilities subjected to international inspection, and to have a nuclear trade agreement with the United States. Although Brazil did not meet these criteria, the Defense, State, and Energy departments, and the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Controls (SNEC), agreed to a supercomputer safeguard plan that was drawn up by IBM as a condition of the sale.47 The third and most important initiative was the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). The EPCI contained four provisions that affected missile technology export licensing in the United States. First, licences were required for ‘any export destined for a publicly listed company, ministry, project, or other entity’ that was engaged in ‘activities of proliferation concern’. Second, export licences had to be obtained if an exporter ‘knew’, or was told by the government, that a ‘proposed export may be destined to a project of proliferation concern’. This added a regulation similar to Section 778.3 of the EAR – for exports to nuclear weapons projects – for all exports to missile and CBW projects of concern. Third, the initiative provided for the establishment of two ‘control lists’ to supplement current missile and CBW nonproliferation regulations. The first list was to include dual-use equipment and technology associated with missiles and CBW, while the second was to include countries to which such equipment and technology was to be controlled. Finally, the EPCI provided for civil and criminal penalties to be imposed on American citizens who ‘knowingly’ participate in activities that promote the spread of missile technology and chemical weapons; similar provisions were already in place for punishing those citizens involved in activities related to nuclear and biological weapons proliferation.48 Henry Sokolski said the EPCI gave the Pentagon the authority to consider cases that previously it had been unable to review.49 Indeed,

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as the EPCI was being formulated in 1990, the Pentagon began to receive more missile technology export cases for review from the Commerce Department. In early 1991, Sokolski told a Congressional hearing that the Pentagon had reviewed just short of 100 missile technology cases from Commerce during the previous 12 months. According to Sokolski, this marked a significant change in attitude on behalf of the Commerce Department because the number of cases referred to DTSA depended on what BXA chose to send for interagency review.50 The Deputy for Nonproliferation also claimed the initiative was a recognition by the agencies involved in the licensing process that greater co-ordination and collaboration was necessary because of the complexity of the proliferation problem.51 Sokolski said this coordination was essential because the system involved several agencies with very different mandates and outlooks, and tensions and discussions were the natural result of such a system.52 The White House announced the EPCI by saying it was the result of an interagency study that had recommended the implementation of several measures to ensure that missile technology and CBW did not fall into ‘the wrong hands’.53 However, the White House failed to mention the controversy the initiative’s unilateral nature had sparked within the administration and US industry. The ultimate decision to implement the EPCI was taken by General Brent Scowcroft – President Bush’s National Security Advisor (NSA) – on 10 December. Scowcroft’s intervention illustrated the contentious nature of the initiative because the agencies involved had been unable to resolve their differences at a lower level.54 The negotiation of the EPCI was most notable because of the Commerce Department’s opposition to instituting missile and CBW versions of the ‘catch-all’ requirement already in place for items destined to nuclear weapons projects.55 Commerce was concerned the adoption of such controls on a unilateral basis would jeopardise the commercial competitiveness of American firms because their foreign counterparts would not be subject to similar restraints. This concern reflected the department’s principal function of export promotion as opposed to export control and its institutional aversion to policies and initiatives that threatened to decrease the ability of American companies to trade freely. One administration official said the controls would ‘hurt American competitiveness because other countries would continue to ship items controlled by the US initiative’.56 To take account of these concerns, the White House announced that it planned to seek ‘the widest and earliest multilateral concurrence in

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these measures’ because the co-operation of other supplier states was essential to the success of an effective export control system.57 Several administration officials subsequently called for other countries to implement similar controls. Shortly after the EPCI was announced, Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher said the United States would seek the ‘maximum cooperation’ of other states to implement equivalent controls.58 Moreover, the Director of State’s Office of Defense Trade Controls in PM, Charles Duelfer, said the initiative formed the basis for the United States to encourage its allies and other states to adopt comparable controls. In doing so, he warned of the dangers of pursuing unilateral controls because such a policy could increase the market share of foreign competitors at the expense of American firms.59 Beyond these licensing problems and reforms, the administration’s implementation of US policy in conjunction with the MTCR was affected by differences between the Defense and State Departments. This divergence stemmed from the State Department’s responsibility for licensing the export of munitions items controlled by the regime. Space launch technology Prior to 8 January 1990, the State Department’s Office of Munitions Control (OMC) was responsible for granting or denying export licences for munitions items listed on the MTCR annex. On 8 January, OMC was renamed the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) to reflect the organisation’s growing responsibility for the trade in defence-related articles in general and not just munitions.60 DTC was responsible for determining whether proposed exports of munitions items listed on the annex were destined to any country that might be developing a nuclear-capable missile, or if there was a risk these items could be diverted to a third country for the development of such a missile. DTC referred licence applications for review to DTSA, the Pentagon’s Office for Nonproliferation Policy, and ACDA. The office also referred licences to other executive agencies when and where appropriate.61 Approximately 80–90 per cent of all MTCR-related export licence requests during the Bush administration were for munitions items controlled by the State Department.62 If an item was not destined to a country that might be developing a nuclear-capable missile, and there was no risk of diversion, the licence could be issued without action. The administration’s review of US nonproliferation policy increased the number of officers working in DTC. As well as State Department officials, US Army, Navy and Air Force officers and

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Customs officials were incorporated into DTC to integrate the munition licensing process as thoroughly as possible. According to Richard Clarke, these officers helped to make an initial cull before licences were referred to the Pentagon for review.63 This system appeared to fail, however, when an export licence was issued for a Chicago firm to import 18 Brazilian rocket casings, heat treat them and re-export them back for incorporation into Brazil’s VLS (veiculo lancador de satellites) space launch vehicle (SLV).64 The Brazilian casings needed treatment so they could withstand the stress of launching.65 Although this service was not listed on the MTCR annex, it required an export licence because it was included on the US Munitions List, as part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The State department granted the licence in October 1989 without notifying or referring the application to any other agency. The Pentagon did not become aware of the transfer until Brazil presented its approved export licence to US Customs officials at the end of May 1990; eight months after the licence had been issued. The Pentagon demanded the licence be suspended because of concern the transfer was inconsistent with the administration’s policy of restricting the export of SLV technology to foreign countries; especially to countries like Brazil with a budding missile programme and a well-established arms- and technology-supplier relationship with Iraq. The State Department defended its decision, however, by claiming the heat treatment process was perfectly consistent with US policy. This divergence of opinion highlighted a significant difference between the State and Defense Departments in their respective approaches towards controlling the trade in SLV technology for reasons of nonproliferation. According to State Department officials, the licence was granted because the application did not include provisions to resell any USorigin hardware or technology prohibited by American law or policy, including the MTCR. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticoMilitary Affairs, Elizabeth Verville, told a Congressional panel in September 1990 that the licence was ‘perfectly consistent with US policy’.66 In the same hearing, Charles Duelfer said the responsible licensing officer had judged the heat treatment process did not meet MTCR criteria and so did not need to be referred for interagency review.67 If the casings had been judged to meet MTCR criteria, Duelfer claimed the Pentagon and other interagency players would have had the opportunity to review the application. In defence of the decision to approve the licence, he said the interagency group could

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not possibly review every conceivable export request for possible MTCR violations and the casings would not have been considered by this group anyway. The Pentagon’s Henry Sokolski disagreed. He claimed the group in question considered all sorts of items, including many items that had to be approved because they did not exceed MTCR parameters.68 In addition, Sokolski said the licence for the heat treatment process should have been referred for interagency review as a ‘defense service’ under ITAR.69 Moreover, he said that because the treated rocket casings constituted finished rocket motors, and because the United States had consistently opposed Brazil’s SLV programme, State’s actions were inconsistent with the administration’s missile nonproliferation policy, regardless of whether the heat treatment service was covered by the regime or otherwise.70 According to Sokolski, the Pentagon backed current administration policy on SLV technology exports, which strived ‘to hinder the spread of nuclearcapable missile systems, including ostensibly civilian SLV programs’. The deputy for nonproliferation said this meant that US missile technology controls treated SLV technology as restrictively as they did ballistic missile technology. He justified this policy on the grounds that an SLV was ‘virtually interchangeable’ with a ballistic missile and because it was impossible to safeguard such technology.71 In support of this policy, he said the United States provided space launch services to those nations that wanted to launch their own satellites. In October 1990, Sokolski said this policy had recently been reaffirmed by the administration because it was ‘well-grounded in the MTCR’ and ‘in technical reality’.72 Elizabeth Verville claimed that although the State Department fully supported ‘the present policy regarding [the transfer of space launch technology to] foreign SLV programmes’, US policy did ‘not categorically prohibit assistance’ to foreign space projects, and the MTCR was ‘not designed to impede’ national space programmes.73 In addition, she asserted that it was only US policy to prevent exports that could make a ‘material contribution’ to ballistic missile development. According to Verville, this restrictive policy towards the export of space launch technology remained in force despite the strain it put on America’s relations with states such as Brazil and India, and the fact other MTCR members did not adhere to it ‘in as pure a form’ as Washington.74 The suspension of the licence for its belated review was not the end of the story. Although the State Department immediately informed the Brazilian Embassy in Washington after the licence had been

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suspended, the Chicago-based Lindberg Engineering, which was due to perform the heat treatment process, was not informed for another 10 days. By that time, seven of the casings had been treated. This failure to inform the company put the administration in an exceedingly embarrassing and sensitive position regarding the issue over whether it should allow the casings to return to Brazil. Verville used several arguments in favour of returning all of the rocket casings. First, Brazil had acted in good faith by applying for a licence and no procedural or factual irregularities had been involved. Second, the administration did not have the legal authority to seize the Brazilian government’s property without proper compensation. Third, the State Department did not want to ‘create a serious problem in bilateral relations with Brazil’, especially when Washington was urging Brasilia to abide by the sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. Fourth, the deal only involved enough casings for the construction of one SLV and these would be expended when the rocket was launched. Fifth, the licence did not permit the transfer of any US technology or equipment to South America. Finally, Verville claimed that there was ‘no evidence’ of a risk that the casings would be transferred or diverted to any country in the developing world, ‘in particular Iraq’.75 This final reason contradicted evidence that pointed to a direct link between Brazil’s missile and space launch development efforts, and the role that Brazilian technology and assistance had played in Iraq’s missile development efforts. Brazil had begun developing its Sonda series (1, 2, 3, and 4) of sounding rockets with American assistance in the 1960s. In 1979, the Complete Brazilian Space Mission (MECB) was established to realise three objectives; the design, development and construction of indigenous satellites; the design, development and construction of a space launch vehicle to launch these satellites (the VLS); and the construction of a site from which to launch the VLS. As the Brazilian space programme proceeded during the 1980s, suspicions arose over the programme’s true intent. The major role of the Ministry of Aeronautics’s Aerospace Technical Center (CTA) – which was responsible for developing and constructing the VLS – suggested the Brazilian military might have alternative reasons for pursuing a space launcher. Moreover, the Brazilian Commission for Space Activities (COBAE) – responsible for overseeing and running the MECB – was chaired by the chief of the General Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces. Further suspicions were aroused when the Brazilian firms Orbita and Avibras began developing two separate series of ballistic missiles

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(MB/EE and SS) derived primarily from Sonda sounding rocket technology. Although many of these missiles probably never progressed past the design stage, it was widely reported that during the 1980s Brazil was developing several missiles with ranges of between 150 and 1,000 km.76 In 1986, the Armed Forces Joint Command assumed responsibility for co-ordinating all missile development and production in Brazil.77 Brazil’s missile aspirations were driven partially by Argentina’s simultaneous programme to develop the medium-range Condor II missile. These regional developments acquired a global proliferation context because of Brazil’s profitable export of sophisticated weaponry and other sensitive materials, including missile technology and knowhow, to Iraq and possibly Libya and Iran during the 1980s. In the late 1980s and in 1990, numerous reports highlighted the role of several Brazilian individuals and entities in assisting Iraq in its missile aspirations. It was widely reported that between mid-1989 and October 1990 twenty or more Brazilian aerospace engineers, led by retired head of the CTA General Hugo de Olivieri Piva, helped Iraq extend the range of its Soviet-supplied Scud-B missiles.78 Other reports claimed Avibras helped Baghdad extend the range of these missiles.79 American intelligence sources were even reported to have claimed that Iraq shipped a Scud missile to Brazil in early 1987, where Iraqi and Brazilian engineers devised a method to double its range.80 Indeed, Brazil’s rocket-supplier relationship with Baghdad had begun in 1984 when Iraq started receiving Astros II battlefield rocket systems – also derived from Sonda-1 technology – to use in its war against Iran. In October 1989, it was reported that Libya had offered Brazil a $2 billion arms co-operation package in exchange for expertise for its missile project.81 In the interests of promoting cordial relations with Brazil, and despite that country’s dubious nonproliferation record, the White House allowed the seven treated casings to return. However, the licence for treating the remaining 11 was revoked. This decision was taken at the highest levels in the administration and reflected the White House’s desire to establish a compromise between America’s diplomatic and national security interests. The suspension of the licence for the remaining casings reflected Pentagon concerns that this type of situation should not occur again. The incident had highlighted a major bureaucratic difference between State and Defense over the treatment of requests to export space launch technology. In October 1990, Henry Sokolski summed

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up the situation when he said the two agencies had ‘very different views’ about the significance of exporting this type of technology. In doing so, he drew a parallel to the CONSARC incident which had highlighted the different roles and concerns of the Defense and Commerce departments.82 Despite the evidence regarding Brazil’s missile proliferation activities, and the administration’s policy of prohibiting US firms from aiding space launch programmes in the developing world, Elizabeth Verville continued to defend the State Department’s position once the issue had been resolved. She defended the decision to return the treated casings on the grounds that Brazil’s newly elected administration of President Collor had asserted it would no longer permit the export of ballistic missiles and related technology. Moreover, Verville claimed the complete revocation of the original licence would have weakened the position of people such as President Collor in Brazil, who favoured nonproliferation and wanted to improve relations with Washington. The Assistant Secretary of State also claimed the incident had not been a mistake and it had not ‘compromised US efforts in proliferation control’. Indeed, she said the administration’s policy had ‘evolved’ because the heat treatment issue had not been considered previously.83 Senator Jeff Bingaman was far less tactful in his analysis of the incident when he said that it had been a bureaucratic ‘process problem’ in which the State Department thought the casings were not controlled, while the Department of Defense believed they were. The senator went even further and asserted that the two agencies differed completely on whether the United States should aid Brazil in its SLV and ICBM programmes.84 In response to Pentagon and Congressional concern that the incident had weakened the MTCR – because Washington appeared not to have lived up to the standards it demanded from the other members – the administration informed its partners that its policy of restraint regarding the export of SLV technology had not changed.85 On 24 December 1990, the State Department also released an unclassified ‘non-paper’ which reviewed the administration’s policy towards the spread of missile and space launch technology. The State Department said all future licensing for the heat treatment of rocket casings in the United States had been revoked. Moreover, the department said the administration’s missile nonproliferation policy had not changed as a result of the Brazilian transfer and it continued to emphasise restraint in exporting both missile and space launch technology. According to the non-paper, this stance was legitimised by Iraq’s claim to have demonstrated an SLV capability and Baghdad’s subsequent statement

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that it now had the capability to develop a 2,000 km-range ballistic missile.86 The Pentagon’s Nonproliferation Policy Office responded by commissioning a report from the RAND Corporation to explore the ‘cost-effectiveness of indigenously developing space launch vehicles (SLV)’. This analysis was motivated by the perception that SLV development was ‘usually given as the rationale for ballistic missile development’.87 The report’s audience was intended to be ‘missile nonproliferation policy analysts and planners in the United States and other countries, as well as foreign governments’ that were ‘pursuing or planning to pursue space launch programs’.88 When the RAND report was subsequently released to the public it concluded that in order to slow missile proliferation, the United States and other countries should not assist emerging launch programmes such as Brazil’s. The report gave two principal reasons for not exporting space launch technology to such countries. First, the report claimed it was not possible to safeguard space launch programmes against the transfer of technology to ballistic missile development. Second, the Brazilian launch programme was used as a case study to illustrate the ‘miserable’ economics of attempting to develop a viable space launch capability. In doing so, it was asserted that countries such as Brazil would not be able to recoup their development costs from the space launch business. This reflected a concern that such countries could then be tempted to sell their space launch technology to recover lost capital. By denying technology and assistance to emerging launch programmes, therefore, the United States and other countries would not be denying such countries the opportunity to make considerable profits.89 The administration’s pre-Gulf War implementation of policy in conjunction with the MTCR was complicated further by problems in Europe. These included poor enforcement of the guidelines by several of the West European member governments, and French differences with the administration over whether exports of space launch technology should be permitted. It also became apparent that if the MTCR was to be truly effective its membership would need to be expanded to include additional European states.90 Europe’s ‘industrial mercenaries’ By the end of the Reagan administration, it was already apparent that the United States and several of its MTCR partners were interpreting and enforcing the regime’s guidelines differently. These problems

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persisted into the Bush administration. When Seth Carus testified before Congress on the issue of missile proliferation in July 1989, he spoke of ‘evidence that companies and individuals from France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany’ were participating in activities designed to evade their respective country’s MTCR commitments. He also spoke about the apparent ‘unwillingness’ of some of the MTCR signatory governments to take seriously their commitments.91 Carus’s testimony appeared to be supported by a wealth of evidence regarding the roles of numerous European entities in supplying technology and assistance to missile projects of concern. According to a Congressional Research Service report in 1989, West German firms had supplied missile launchers, as well as design, integration and simulation assistance to Argentina’s Condor II programme. Moreover, an Italian firm was reported to have supplied rocket propulsion technology, while a French company provided inertial navigation systems.92 In February 1989, Representative Howard Berman identified some of the entities involved with Argentina when he introduced a bill to Congress designed to strengthen the MTCR (see Chapter 4). According to Berman, these included West Germany’s ‘largest aerospace firm’, Messerschimdt Boelkow-Blohm (MBB), and Italy’s SNIA-BPD, a subsidiary of Fiat.93 Indeed, SNIA-BPD only ended its involvement in the Condor project when the Pentagon threatened to terminate contracts with the firm if it failed to do so. In addition, press reports in Europe asserted that a Japanese firm had provided rocket fuel to the Condor project.94 It also emerged in 1989 and 1990 that numerous entities from several European countries had exported equipment and technology to Iraqi facilities involved in the production of two SCUD derivative missiles; the 650 km-range Al Hussein, and the 850 km-range Al Abbas.95 According to a report released in 1990, the Swedish firm Bofors sold missile launchers to Iraq and the French companies SAGEM and SNPE (with Italy’s SNIA) provided inertial guidance systems and solid rocket fuel, respectively. In addition, the report said the Trade Development Group (TDG), a London-based Iraqi front company, purchased missile technology for Baghdad, while Britain’s Matrix Churchill supplied missile-related machine tools and precision lathes. Moreover, the Austrian firms Consultco, and Hutter and Schrantz, were reported to have provided Iraq with design plans and blueprints, and ‘blow-out’ walls, for its Sa’ad 16 missile facility, respectively. In Spain, International Trade Consulting SA was reported to have served as a middleman for Baghdad’s acquisition of missile tech-

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nology.96 Elsewhere, it was reported that West Germany’s Globe-Sat had exported ‘vital rocket valve components to Libya’. These parts were reportedly destined to Libya’s project to develop a 300–450 milerange ballistic missile potentially capable of delivering chemical and nuclear warheads.97 According to Seth Carus, ‘a French company’ may also have been aiding India to manufacture strap-on booster rockets, ‘of the type used in the Agni missile’.98 Both the Condor and Sa’ad 16 projects received Western missile technology and assistance through a series of European-based front companies.99 These entities were created in order to allow certain companies to circumvent their own country’s export controls by indirectly selling technology and assistance to foreign missile projects.100 For example, Consen, a Swiss-based consulting group established a web of front companies throughout Europe to procure sophisticated technology and assistance for missile programmes in Iraq and other countries.101 Consen was believed to have organised the construction of missile production facilities in Egypt and Romania as well.102 The activity referred to above was allowed to occur for a number of reasons. In the first place it was apparent that several entities in nonMTCR states in Western Europe were supplying or transhipping technology to missile projects of concern. This situation highlighted the need to expand the regime’s membership in Europe. In particular, to include all of the European Community’s (EC) member states before the 1992 deadline for removing all internal trade barriers between them. This activity was also driven by the sheer determination of numerous commercial entities to benefit financially from indirectly supplying technology and expertise to missile projects through networks of front companies. Janne Nolan described these entities as ‘industrial mercenaries’ that had come to ‘compete with, if not almost replace, government-sponsored technical assistance for the production of weapons’ in the developing world.103 This quest for financial gain was facilitated by the lax enforcement of MTCR guidelines by several of the regime’s West European members. This laxity was fed by trade policies and mechanisms that favoured export promotion over export control, highlighting a lack of political will to prevent lucrative transfers of technology and assistance at a time when East–West tensions, and export controls, were being relaxed and the threat posed by proliferation had still to be fully appreciated. According to Alexander Kelle, for example, the West German political leadership’s preference for export promotion over export control was reflected by ‘loopholes and weaknesses’ in the

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country’s export control system.104 These problems were initially brought to light in 1987 and 1988 following revelations that West German companies had exported nuclear fuel to facilities in Pakistan and Libya, and had contributed significantly to the construction of a poison gas plant at Rabta, Libya.105 These transfers had been facilitated by the bureaucratic subordination of West Germany’s Federal Export Licensing Office to the Ministry of Economics. Similar to BXA in the United States, the office was responsible for export promotion as well as export controls. This conflicting dual mandate was exacerbated because the leadership of the Federal Exporting Licensing Office only assigned ‘a marginal importance to controlling sensitive exports’. According to Kelle, the relationship between the government officials responsible for issuing/denying export licences in Germany, and those entities applying for those licences in early 1989, ‘could best be described as a symbiosis aimed at furthering export promotion rather than export control’.106 In one instance, it was reported that the West German firm Projecta was granted a government export clearance certificate permitting the company to sell ‘mechanical and electrical equipment, and control, measurement, and testing devices for research, development and training’ to Sa’ad 16.107 Projecta was reportedly one of the prime contractors to Sa’ad 16, supplying the facility with missile-related test equipment, computer programmes and machine tools.108 Other weaknesses in the West German export control system included the War Weapons Control Act, which only provided for the control of weapons and not the associated components or technical know-how.109 Moreover, the West German government, similar to the Italian government, did not have the legal authority to prohibit its citizens from providing assistance to foreign missile projects.110 Beyond these enforcement problems, the administration was confronted by a conceptual difference with the French government regarding the interpretation of MTCR guidelines. This divergence stemmed from the original negotiation of the MTCR as a means to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Moreover, the regime’s informal nature meant participants could legitimately interpret the guidelines as only applying to countries of nuclear proliferation concern. This situation resulted in differences between the procedures of some participants for reviewing export licences for items included in the MTCR annex. The Bush administration espoused a broad interpretation of the regime’s guidelines which supported enforcement of the 300 km and

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500 kg parameters regardless of whether potential recipients were suspected of possessing, or developing, a nuclear capability. Under the April 1987 guidelines, the MTCR was designed to restrict the spread of nuclear-capable unmanned delivery systems. Because of the rising incidence of chemical weapons proliferation and use in the 1980s, however, the administration wanted to restrict the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering all types of WMD. Thus, it enforced the payload and range parameters on transfers to all countries. In May 1989, Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, said the administration’s interpretation had been supported by the use of chemical weapons by both belligerents in the Iran–Iraq War and by Iraq against its Kurdish population. International awareness of the spread of chemical weapons had also increased during the late 1980s following revelations that European companies had contributed to the construction of a poison gas plant in Libya. In response to these developments, Holmes said the administration had begun talking to its partners about modifying the regime’s coverage to include missiles capable of delivering chemical as well as nuclear warheads.111 In contrast, the French government took the position that MTCR controls only applied to countries of nuclear proliferation concern. The French government believed countries should be allowed to receive MTCR-controlled items, or at least be considered for this, so long as they did not possess or were not developing nuclear weapons, and they did not intend to transfer the items to a third country for use in a nuclear delivery system.112 Probably the best example of this interpretation problem involved a proposed French transfer of space launch technology to Brazil in 1989. In July 1989, the French entity Arianespace announced it was in the process of negotiating a contract to launch two Brazilian satellites.113 Along with two other French firms, SNECMA and SAGEM, Arianespace reportedly sweetened its negotiating position by proposing to supply liquid-fuel engines to the Brazilian space programme. In addition, Arianespace was reported to have proposed providing the necessary training and technology for Brazil to indigenously manufacture Viking rocket motors.114 Although the technology was supposedly destined to Brazil’s civilian space programme, the proposed transfer triggered concern in Washington because of that country’s parallel effort to develop ballistic missiles, potentially for export purposes. The administration deemed there was a significant risk that any such technology transferred to Brazil could be diverted

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to the development of its MB/EE and SS series of ballistic missiles. The existence of a clandestine nuclear programme in Brazil also raised the possibility the technology could have been intended for the eventual development of a long-range nuclear-tipped missile. Again, Brazil’s lucrative arms-supplier relationship with states such as Iran, Iraq and Libya suggested the technology could even get diverted to a third country for missile development purposes. It should be noted that the American firm McDonnell Douglas (MDD) – which was also competing for the Brazilian launch contract – played an instrumental role in drawing the administration’s attention to the proliferation implications of the French deal. MDD circulated information on the proposed deal to several Congressmen and officials at the Pentagon with the aim of generating pressure on the administration to object on nonproliferation grounds.115 Interestingly, MDD reportedly sweetened its own bid for the launch contract by offering to arrange for Brazilian personnel to work on the space shuttle programme and to finance the training of two Brazilian engineers on American rocket propulsion technology.116 The apparent willingness of the Mitterrand regime to allow the deal to proceed underlined a difference between the United States and France regarding the interpretation of MTCR guidelines. The French government adopted the position that it was perfectly reasonable for MTCR members to transfer rocket technology to seemingly legitimate space programmes. In doing so, France failed to draw, or chose to ignore, the connection between Brazil’s civilian and military rocket programmes. However, the Franco-Brazilian deal was exactly the type of transfer the Bush administration wanted to prevent and had helped to persuade the Reagan administration to negotiate the MTCR in the first place. The deal also threatened to undermine the regime’s policy of ‘no undercut’ because the French government demonstrated a willingness to permit the transfer of MTCR-controlled technology for short-term economic gain, despite the restraint of other regime partners driven by longer-term proliferation concerns. This FrancoAmerican divergence drove Jeff Bingaman to tell his Senate colleagues in October 1989 that the MTCR would become ‘a dead letter’ if the French transfer proceeded.117 Institutionalising and enhancing the MTCR In conjunction with its efforts to improve MTCR implementation in Washington, the administration embarked upon a major initiative to address the regime’s problems on the other side of the Atlantic. In

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1989, the administration set about expanding the regime’s membership in Europe. Vice President Dan Quayle spoke of the need to include all of the remaining EC states by the end of 1992, when the community’s internal trade barriers were scheduled for removal.118 The administration was concerned that unless all of the EC countries joined the regime, the community’s MTCR participants might not be able to prevent exports of missile technology to the community’s non-regime members. From these non-regime countries, missile technology might then be transferred to projects of concern in the developing world. In December, the administration subsequently secured the agreement of its partners to initiate this recruitment effort at the regime’s second plenary meeting in London.119 Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain all subsequently joined the MTCR between November 1989 and December 1990.120 The Danish case was a good example of this process. Denmark announced its membership of the MTCR in November 1990. The Danish government said its decision to join was based on the increasing proliferation of missile technology; a phenomenon which it said had been highlighted by the Gulf crisis. Although Denmark was not a major source of missile technology, the Danish government was concerned that it might become a major transhipment point for such items.121 The Bush administration played an important role in convincing Denmark to accede to the MTCR. In early September, the Danish government asked the administration to send an expert witness to strengthen its case against a company that wanted to export ‘high purity graphite cylinders’ to Libya’s Al-Fatah missile project. The Pentagon responded by sending Air Force Major Dennis Vincent, from the Office of Nonproliferation Policy. On the basis of Vincent’s testimony, the case was ‘appealed to the Danish Supreme Court’ and a legal precedent was set which asserted that exports of dual-use items could be denied by the government, ‘even if they have civilian applications’. Henry Sokolski later told a Congressional hearing that the items involved had originated in West Germany and that Bonn also played a critical role in stopping the export.122 This case exemplified the type of incident the administration wanted to prevent by expanding MTCR membership to include all EC countries. Following Denmark’s accession, the Danish Ministry of Justice was made responsible for licensing Category I items, while the Chamber of Commerce and Industry became responsible for licensing Category II items in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice.123 The administration also began institutionalising the regime by

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increasing co-ordination and co-operation between the members through the establishment of a system of regular plenary and technical meetings to address common issues and problems. This effort was initiated in the face of some reluctance on the part of some of the other participants. For example, one administration official described the plenary meeting in London as characterised by the regime’s lack of institutionalisation, ‘even to the point of some reluctance’ to hold technical meetings or to establish a technical group to discuss annex issues and problems.124 Despite this reluctance, the US delegation persuaded its partners to begin holding meetings at regular intervals.125 Indeed, the regime’s third plenary meeting was held just six months later in Ottawa, Canada.126 The administration campaigned successfully in Ottawa to get the members to conduct an evaluation of the annex to ensure that it included all relevant missile-related goods and technologies.127 In order to ensure the annex was kept ‘up-to-date and current’,128 a technical working group was established with the objective of strengthening and updating the annex. At Ottawa, the member states examined each other’s missile technology control lists and concluded they were not controlling the same items on a consistent basis.129 Thus, it was apparent the member states needed to clarify details of the annex so that all participants agreed on exactly what was controlled by the regime; including what constituted ‘production facilities’, a term not defined in the original guidelines. Indeed, the US inter-agency group chaired by the Pentagon to consider annex reform met regularly in 1990 to formulate a list of missile-related goods and technologies the United States wanted all members to control on a consistent basis.130 The administration also distributed the US Commerce Department’s list of missile projects of concern. By doing this, the administration sought to strengthen multilateral missile export controls by getting all the participants to control trade to the same destinations of concern. Multilateral adherence to this list was also seen as essential to avoid putting US firms at a competitive disadvantage.131 In conjunction with the relaxation of East–West technology controls, the administration obtained the agreement of the members to continue controlling technology for reasons of missile nonproliferation as items were dropped from the COCOM control list.132 Finally, the member states agreed that the exchange of information and opinions in Ottawa had been very useful, and that future meetings of the MTCR Technical Working Group should be organised through a permanent contact

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point.133 The MTCR Secretariat subsequently took up its duties in Paris in August 1990.134 At the bilateral level, the Bush administration pressured and assisted both West Germany and Italy to improve their enforcement of MTCR guidelines. In October 1989, Richard Clarke told a Congressional hearing the administration had co-operated extensively with the governments of Italy and West Germany to restrict exports from entities within these countries to Argentina’s Condor-II programme. Indeed, Clarke said the administration was particularly pleased with the Italian government’s co-operation on this issue.135 For example, nine former SNIA employees were charged in Italy, in July 1989, for their roles in illegally supplying the Condor project with technology and assistance through front companies in several European countries.136 The Italian government subsequently enacted new legislation to improve its weapons-related export controls in July 1990.137 The administration co-operated closely with the West German government to improve its enforcement of MTCR controls. According to Clarke, the administration provided West Germany with ‘help and advice’ to develop a series of effective export controls supported by a system of rigorous enforcement capabilities.138 Two pieces of legislation were affected by these reforms: the War Weapons Control Act, which regulated foreign trade in ‘war weapons’; and the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, which regulated the trade in arms and dual-use goods.139 In short, West Germany’s missile controls were strengthened in several notable ways in 1989 and 1990. First, German nationals were required to obtain licences before they could work on foreign missile or other armaments projects. Second, Country List H was established to include all those sensitive countries that were to be subject to nonproliferation export controls, following the relaxation of COCOM controls on the Communist bloc.140 Third, penalties for violating missile and NBC nonproliferation controls were stiffened to discourage proliferant activity. Finally, the ‘transit of goods through the territory of the Federal Republic for the Iraqi Project of a longrange weapon’ was prohibited.141 According to DTC director Charles Duelfer, these export control reforms gave West Germany ‘among the toughest export control laws in the world’.142 The administration initiated a diplomatic dialogue to encourage Paris to implement a broad interpretation of the MTCR guidelines, especially regarding the export of space launch technology to states in the developing world. The State Department initiated this dialogue during the Paris Economic Summit of July 1989. During the summit,

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the French government was reported to have pulled back from approving Arianespace’s transfer of rocket technology to Brazil because of the strength of American protests.143 A State Department delegation was also sent to protest the proposed transfer at the French embassy in Washington in the summer of 1989.144 By October, it had become apparent that François Mitterrand’s government was close to allowing Arianespace to proceed with the transfer, despite the administration’s efforts to kill the deal. The French government’s position became apparent when it was reported that Arianespace’s Director-General for International affairs, Klaus Iserland, was in Brazil to conclude arrangements for the transfer if the French company was chosen to fulfil the Brazilian satellite launching contract.145 In early October, officials from the State Department claimed Mitterrand intervened to allow the transfer to proceed because of concerns Arianespace might lose the $60 million launch contract if rocket technology was not included.146 The Bush administration responded by sending several officials to France in order to convey American opposition to the transfer of space launch technology to projects in the developing world. In contrast to the low-level representations made during the summer, the State Department sent higher-level delegations to Paris in the autumn of 1989. On separate occasions Assistant Secretary Verville and Under-Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew visited France. Moreover, a representation from the Pentagon visited the French Ministry of Defence (MoD) to encourage the Mitterrand regime to prevent the deal from proceeding. The MoD was approached specifically in order to underline the potential future military implications for France and its allies if such rocket technology transfers were permitted to take place. Basically, citing the potential contribution of the transfer to the spread of long-range ballistic missiles against which American and allied missile defence systems would be virtually powerless.147 The French government responded to the administration’s representations by stating that safeguards would be placed on the Viking technology to ensure it was used for peaceful purposes.148 A French Embassy spokesperson in Washington claimed the technology would be shipped in stages so transfers could be curtailed if evidence emerged that Brazil was putting it to improper uses.149 The French government appeared to be on the defensive on 8 October when it announced a final decision had yet to be made on whether to allow the deal to proceed. The French government also asserted that any

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final contract would have to be submitted to the appropriate authorities to ensure it did not violate export restrictions on the trade in sensitive technology.150 Although the administration did not receive a ‘definitive answer’ either way from the French government after these representations, Assistant Secretary of State Clarke subsequently told a Congressional committee that French rocket technology had not been transferred to Brazil by July 1990.151 This was despite the fact that the Brazilian Telecommunications Company (EMBRATEL) had awarded the satellite launch contract to Arianespace in November 1989, seven months earlier.152 Clarke was confident enough to suggest that it seemed the French government had taken into account the administration’s ‘protests, dialogue, and discussion’.153 Despite significant systemic and bureaucratic problems, the Bush administration was relatively successful in enhancing the implementation of the MTCR in Washington and Europe during its first two years in office. In Washington, this success was attributable in part to the Pentagon’s tenacity in campaigning for stricter implementation of US policy in conjunction with the MTCR. This tenacity was fed by the Department of Defense’s organisational raison d’être to ensure the physical wellbeing of the United States, its forces and overseas interests. On more than one occasion, the White House sided with the Pentagon in resolving contentious policy issues that could not be rectified at a lower level. Moreover, the Pentagon’s proactive role was reflected in the establishment of its own unique set of controls to enhance US nonproliferation policy in 1990. The Pentagon’s Defense Federal Acquisitions Regulations (DFAR) were designed to provide incentives to contractors that did business with the Department of Defense to monitor their own export activities. Under DFAR, any American or foreign firm that did business with Defense, or bid on Pentagon contracts, risked being debarred or suspended if it violated its own country’s proliferation-related export controls. The rationale behind DFAR was to encourage industry to assume more responsibility for their actions by controlling exports that could contribute to the proliferation of ballistic missile, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technology.154 Outside Washington, the administration successfully began to institutionalise the MTCR in 1989 and 1990 and persuaded the French government to refrain from providing rocket engine technology to the Brazilian space launch programme. In this respect, the administration’s reorganisation of the State and Defence Departments’ resources

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and responsibilities for implementing nonproliferation policy appeared to have begun to pay dividends by late 1990. Iraq’s missile attacks against American forces and allies during the Gulf War in early 1991 increased the emphasis accorded by the administration to the issue of missile nonproliferation. Following the war, the administration continued to institutionalise and enhance the MTCR by negotiating the expansion of the regime’s parameters to encompass missiles capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons, and not just nuclear weapons. The administration also implemented the EPCI, but only after further interagency debate regarding the content of Supplement 6 to Part 778 of the EAR. This chapter proceeds by examining the administration’s implementation of US policy in conjunction with the MTCR during its final two years in office.

The Bush administration and the MTCR, January 1991– January 1993 Shortly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President Bush called for the international community to redouble its efforts ‘to stem the spread’ of NBC, and the associated proliferation of ‘the ballistic missiles that can rain destruction on distant peoples’.155 Prior to the Gulf crisis, however, the United States and its allies had considered the proliferation of ballistic missiles to be a ‘serious yet manageable problem’.156 This supposition was challenged during the 1991 Gulf War by Iraq’s SCUD derivative missile attacks against civilian targets in Israel and civilian and military targets in Saudi Arabia, including American forces. Baghdad launched approximately 85 Scud derivatives during the conflict. In one instance, an Iraqi missile killed 28 American servicemen in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Because of their poor accuracy Iraq used its missiles primarily as terror weapons against Israeli urban targets. These attacks illustrated therefore the direct threat ballistic missile proliferation posed to American forces and allies. They also illustrated how ballistic missiles could potentially be used to restrict US power projection options in future crises. Moreover, America’s experience in the Gulf also raised the question of whether the United States would have been able to build its coalition if Iraq had possessed longer range missiles capable of threatening countries beyond Israel and Saudi Arabia. The cumulative effect of these missile attacks influenced the devel-

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opment of policy in two notable directions. First, the attacks demonstrated the need to devise new strategies for dealing with the aftereffects of missile proliferation. During the war, the US Army and the Israel Defense Force (IDF) deployed Patriot anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBM) in an attempt to intercept Iraqi missiles.157 This policy demonstrated both the political and military value of possessing defences designed to counter the threatened and actual use of ballistic missiles. In line with this policy, President Bush informed Congress during his State of the Union address on 29 January 1991 that he was reorienting the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to provide protection from ‘limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source’.158 The administration’s concept of a global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) was designed to provide the entire United States, its allies and forces with protection against limited missile strikes resulting from deliberate, accidental, or unauthorised attacks from the Soviet Union or the developing world.159 On 15 February, Bush promoted this policy change during a speech to employees at the Raytheon Missile Systems – the manufacturer of the Patriot – plant in Massachusetts. The President asserted that the number of countries acquiring the capability to build and deliver ‘missiles of mass destruction’ was on the increase. He also claimed that many of these missiles would in future be ‘superior to Scuds’, and more difficult to defend against because of their capability to fly greater distances in shorter periods of time.160 The need to begin thinking about how to respond to the after-effects of proliferation had been recognised by the Pentagon in 1989 when the Proliferation Countermeasures Working Group was established. This group was created to consider and promote military countermeasures in response to proliferation that could not be prevented. According to Henry Sokolski, this group focused initially on gauging the future ballistic missile threat to American interests.161 Iraq’s missile attacks also increased the urgency accorded by the administration to nonproliferation. The administration implemented the EPCI and negotiated the expansion and update of the MTCR annex. In recognition of the growing threat posed by the proliferation of CBW, the administration also negotiated the expansion of the regime to encompass missiles capable of delivering all WMD, and not just nuclear weapons. Despite these achievements, the effective implementation of US policy in conjunction with the MTCR continued to be undermined by the interaction of competing foreign policy interests during the final two years of the Bush Presidency.

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Missile projects, countries and regions of concern In conjunction with the EPCI of December 1991, BXA expanded foreign policy export controls in support of US missile and CBW nonproliferation policies by publishing an ‘interim rule’ in the Federal Register on 15 August 1991. According to the bureau, the new provisions had been formulated in consultation with the State Department and other executive agencies, and after considering 75 public comments received on the proposed rule it had published in the Federal Register on 13 March.162 The new rule affected the implementation of US missile nonproliferation policy in several ways. First, BXA was given the authority to deny licences for exports that already required a licence under the EAR, ‘for any reasons other than short supply, where the export could be destined for the design, development, production, or use of missiles’, or to ‘a facility engaged in such activities’.163 Second, foreign policy controls were imposed on exports ‘to specified regions, countries, and destinations’ when the exporter knew they would be used in the ‘design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of missiles’, or they were ‘destined to a listed project’. The rule stated that a list of missile projects would be added as Supplement 6 to Part 778 of the EAR once it had been finalised.164 In March, the proposed rule had included a background information section in which the term ‘know’ had been specifically defined. Of the 12 comments received on this definition, however, 10 believed it was too vague and was better left undefined. BXA heeded these comments by omitting a definition of ‘know’. In doing so, the bureau asserted that exporters could obtain adequate guidance from existing case law and judicial interpretation.165 Third, BXA was given the authority to inform exporters at any time that they required a validated licence for a specific export or reexport transaction, or for exports or re-exports ‘to a specific end-user or end-use’, if there was an ‘unacceptable risk’ such shipments would be used in the design, development, production, stockpiling or use of missiles. Finally, the participation of ‘US persons’ in foreign missile projects was restricted.166 American individuals and entities were prohibited from knowingly exporting or re-exporting, ‘to specified destinations’ listed in Supplement 6, any ‘commodities, software, or technical data, regardless of origin or use, in the design, development, production, stockpiling or use’ of missiles. US persons were also prohibited from performing ‘any contract, service, or employment’ without a validated licence if they knew this would assist such activi-

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ties ‘in or by a country where a project listed in Supplement 6 was located’.167 The term US persons included foreign branches of companies organised in the United States. Similar to the formulation of the EPCI in 1990, the implementation of the initiative was also delayed by interagency debate. The point of contention this time was the content of Supplement 6, which was not published in the Federal Register until 16 June 1992 after a delay of more than 12 months.168 In conjunction with the EPCI, Supplement 6 was to establish a list of regions, countries and projects of missile proliferation concern for which validated licences were required if US exporters knew their goods were destined to these locations. When the list was eventually published, acting Under-Secretary for Export Administration Joan McEntee described it as a major step forward in the fight against proliferation.169 However, the list was conspicuous because of its lack of detail in certain areas and the omission of several prominent countries and projects of concern. Gary Milhollin and Gerard White claimed the formulation of the list divided the administration between those officials responsible for preventing proliferation and those whose job it was to maintain friendly relations with the countries named on the list; namely, the State Department’s country desk officers.170 It should be noted that during interagency consultations with the Commerce Department, desk officers at State were concerned that if the names of countries friendly with the United States were included then this could damage Washington’s relations with these countries. The CIA also expressed concern over the content of the list. The intelligence community was concerned that the safety of its sources might be jeopardised if the identities of specific missile proliferators were released.171 According to one administration official, the list ‘went back and forth’ between the agencies for over 12 months before the country desks eventually won through.172 This victory came at the expense of missile nonproliferation because the final draft was watered down to avoid offending certain countries in the Middle East. The end result was what has been described as a ‘hybrid countryregion’ list.173 Although an earlier draft of the list was reported to have included 38 specific missile projects, only 21 were incorporated in the published list.174 The original draft had made ‘specific mention’ of missile projects located in both Israel and Egypt, but these were omitted in the final draft.175 Indeed, the list did not include any specific countries or projects of concern in the Middle East – a region rife with ballistic missile proliferation – but identified Brazil, India,

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Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and South Africa as countries of missile proliferation concern. Moreover, the list identified several specific missile projects in these countries. Supplement 6 included India’s Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles and all of its space launch projects. However, the list omitted Israel’s medium-range Jericho II missile and Shavit SLV programmes, Libya’s medium-range Al-Fatah missile programme and Egyptian and Syrian projects to develop short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.176 According to Milhollin and White, the final draft of Supplement 6 was a ‘better guide to Washington lobbying’ than it was a guide to aid US exporters in identifying countries and projects of concern in the developing world. Specifically, they argued that the list reflected the influence of the Israeli lobby – one of the most powerful special interests represented in Washington – which had successfully lobbied the administration to refrain from publishing the names of its missile and SLV programmes.177 This omission also necessitated the administration’s exclusion of all the Arab ballistic missile projects in the Middle East on diplomatic grounds. By omitting these countries and their missile projects, the administration failed to highlight the direct link that was known to exist between a number of these efforts and several missile projects elsewhere. For example, the list included South Africa’s surface-to-surface missile and SLV projects which Pretoria was developing in conjunction with Israel. The list also included North Korea’s SCUD development project which was directly related to Syria’s short-range missile project. Moreover, China’s M-series of missiles were included. Beijing was known to be providing Syria with this type of missile technology for the development of medium-range ballistic missiles.178 The shortcomings of the list were highlighted when Bill Clements, director of BXA’s Office of Technology and Policy Analysis, said that US exporters should use Supplement 6 as a country control list. Clements said that when American companies wanted to export items to end users located in a country listed in Supplement 6, they should look for warning signs that indicated potential diversion of the items to proscribed missile end-uses.179 However, most US exporters favoured full and detailed lists to identify exactly which facilities they needed to be wary about exporting to. Such lists would probably have speeded up the export licensing process, and would have limited the detrimental effect of these controls on the competitiveness of American firms. This was because exporters could have implemented the ‘know’ requirement by simply screening potential customers by

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referring to names and addresses contained on the list. The list was also criticised for including data that was already in the public domain and was not very specific.180 Exporters were in favour of more detailed lists because they wanted to avoid situations in which they had negotiated a deal with a foreign buyer, only to be informed they could not proceed because the recipient was named on a classified list.181 Eight commenters on the proposed changes to the EAR had ‘supported the addition of supplements to identify specific facilities or entities involved in missile technology or chemical and biological weapons activities’.182 By failing to provide a comprehensive list of countries, projects, and facilities of concern, the administration effectively weakened its own enhanced missile nonproliferation initiative. This incident again illustrated the interaction of competing American foreign policy interests. Specifically, the relegation of the administration’s missile nonproliferation goals in favour of maintaining cordial relations with Israel. Despite these problems, the Bush administration conducted a successful campaign to update the MTCR during its final two years in office. The administration focused on the accomplishment of three principal objectives. First, to encourage its partners to adopt EPCI-type controls. This policy was driven by a perception the initiative would only be truly effective if implemented on a multilateral basis. In addition, it was based on the need to avoid unnecessarily jeopardising the economic competitiveness of US industry through the adoption of unilateral controls. Second, the administration sought to update and expand the MTCR annex to reflect technological developments and past omissions. Finally, the administration wanted to take account of the increased proliferation of CBW, and to rectify regime interpretation problems, by expanding the MTCR guidelines to cover missiles capable of delivering all WMD and not just nuclear weapons. The administration pursued these objectives through a series of technical and plenary meetings between January 1991 and January 1993. Updating the MTCR In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the administration placed an emphasis on getting its allies to implement controls comparable to the EPCI. On 7 March, the administration announced it was increasing its efforts to restrain proliferation by implementing the EPCI, but emphasised it could not ‘do the job alone’. This statement reflected the administration’s desire to satisfy both national security and economic concerns. On the national security side, the adminis-

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tration assumed the initiative would only be effective if it was implemented on a multilateral basis, because of the widespread foreign availability of the technology involved. In doing so, the administration initiated a vigorous campaign to get its allies to strengthen their export controls in line with the EPCI. The White House announced that it would do this by capitalising on the ‘growing international consensus’ against weapons proliferation that had grown out of the Gulf crisis.183 The administration also wanted to ensure that it did not unnecessarily jeopardise the commercial competitiveness of US firms vis-à-vis their foreign counterparts. When BXA published the EPCI’s proposed changes to the EAR on 13 March, it was the initiative’s unilateral nature that generated the most controversy.184 This was seen in the ‘public comments’ BXA requested on the new provisions. Twentythree of the 75 comments claimed the new licensing procedure would damage the competitiveness of American firms in relation to their foreign counterparts, and that unilateral controls would not work because of the widespread foreign availability of the controlled items. Moreover, 14 commenters suggested that because of this widespread availability, the only realistic approach was to impose the controls on a multilateral basis. Three commenters even suggested the administration set a deadline for the establishment of multilateral controls and if this was not realised then unilateral controls should be lifted.185 Although BXA did not act on these concerns, it did announce that periodic reviews of the EPCI would be conducted, in part to evaluate the imposition of similar controls by other countries. The administration’s strategy of capitalising on the international consensus against proliferation that grew out of the Gulf War began to produce results in mid-March, during technical and plenary meetings of the MTCR members in Tokyo. Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Koji Watanabe said the urgency of addressing the proliferation issue was underlined by the fact Iraq had been launching Scud missiles against friendly and peaceful countries only a matter of days previously. A Canadian official also said the participants were under pressure to act quickly because of events in the Persian Gulf.186 Through bilateral contacts in Tokyo, the administration began campaigning to persuade the other participating governments to adopt export control measures comparable to those of the EPCI.187 By outlining these regulations, and distributing lists of missile projects to which US exports were generally denied, the administration sought to establish greater uniformity between each member states’ licensing

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procedures for MTCR-controlled items.188 The administration and its partners made substantial progress towards harmonising their controls and implementation procedures in other areas during the meetings in Tokyo. The review of the regime’s annex – which the administration had initiated in 1990 – began to produce results when the participants agreed to revise the annex and to add items to seven sections.189 The items in question were primarily dual-use and located in Category II of the annex. Because the original annex had been formulated during the mid1980s, these revisions were necessary to take account of technological advances. By updating the dual-use section, the participants also sought to ensure that firms were provided with a more specific and thorough list of items which they knew had to be treated more sensitively.190 Because the entire annex was not reviewed in Japan, an additional technical meeting was held in May to complete the job. This meeting of technical experts in Paris was organised to ensure the new annex was ready for adoption in October, when the MTCR partners were scheduled to convene for their fifth plenary. In late May, the administration and its COCOM partners met in Paris to ‘implement a new system of export controls for dual-use goods and technologies with significant military applications’, to account for the ‘rapidly changing international political and military environment’.191 The COCOM countries agreed to make a ‘50 per cent reduction in existing export controls to a “Core List” of military strategic technologies and goods’. This list included only the ‘most critical goods and technologies’ essential to the maintenance of the then current significant gaps between Western- and Soviet-based weapon systems that had been illustrated during the Gulf War. In recognition of the growing proliferation threat, however, the members agreed that individual countries would continue controlling goods and technologies dropped from the COCOM list that ‘could contribute to the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the missiles to deliver them’.192 The MTCR plenary in Washington was consequential for two principal reasons. First, the member states adopted the updated and revised equipment and technology annex that had been negotiated during the technical meetings in Japan and France.193 The new annex differed from its predecessor in several notable ways. Notes were appended to many of the items to include definitions and/or further clarifications of technical parameters. A new terminology section was also added to clarify several terms that were used throughout the new annex to offer a more accurate description of the extent to which

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particular items were designed specifically for missile applications. These terms included ‘specially designed’, ‘designed’, ‘modified’, and ‘usable in’. Two new item sections were also added to the annex. Item 17 included ‘materials, devices, and specially designed software for reduced observables’, while item 18 included ‘devices for use in protecting rocket systems and unmanned aerial vehicles against nuclear effects’.194 The second highlight was an agreement by the member states to expand the regime’s scope to cover missiles capable of delivering all WMD, and not just nuclear weapons. Once again, this agreement reflected technical developments that had taken place since the mid1980s. It also recognised the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of non-nuclear WMD in the developing world.195 From January 1989, the Bush administration had become increasingly aware of the need to expand the regime’s coverage because of interpretation problems regarding the original guidelines and the continued spread of chemical and biological weapons technology. Although the participants in Washington agreed on the desirability of covering all WMD, they did not formulate a list of extra items that would need to be included to put this into effect. The partners again acknowledged that the addition of new members would strengthen the effectiveness of the regime. In addition, a special set of criteria was reportedly established to assess the suitability of prospective new members. This was designed to evaluate an applicant’s commitment to nonproliferation and its ability to implement the regime’s guidelines effectively.196 A country’s commitment to nonproliferation could be gauged by whether it was an NPT signatory, while the ability to implement the MTCR effectively was based on the possession of an effective system of national export controls and laws. This second criterion mirrored past problems that plagued the effective enforcement of the regime’s guidelines by several of the West European partners prior to the Gulf War. Following the Washington plenary, a technical meeting was convened in April 1992 to consider how the regime should be modified to cover delivery systems capable of carrying chemical and biological warheads. Further criteria were developed to determine whether imports were ‘intended’ for peaceful or weapons applications.197 The members subsequently agreed to these new guidelines at the sixth plenary meeting in Oslo, in late June and early July 1992.198 Under US pressure, the members also agreed to establish a set of retransfer controls on all shipments of MTCR-controlled equipment

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and technology. Under-Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Joan McEntee referred to these retransfer licensing requirements as a victory for the administration and American exporters.199 On 7 January 1993, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announced that the revised guidelines had been officially adopted by the MTCR members. He said this revision confirmed and tightened existing MTCR policy. According to Boucher, there was now a ‘strong presumption’ to deny all transfers of missile equipment, technology, or materials if they were ‘judged to be intended to carry any WMD, not just nuclear weapons’.200 The focus of the MTCR thus became the ‘intention’ of potential recipients regardless of the range and payload of the missile systems in question. This intention was to be judged on the basis of the most credible information available. To facilitate the implementation of the new guidelines Item 19 was added to the annex. This included complete rockets and UAV not covered in item 1 but which had a range of at least 300 km. It was designed to cover missiles capable of delivering chemical and biological warheads weighing less than 500 kg. In January 1993, ‘informed government sources’ were reported as saying the new guidelines would probably only tangibly affect US munitions controls and dual-use controls might not be affected at all. Indeed, in late January 1993 it was reported that BXA was waiting until DTC had implemented its revisions to the Munitions List before determining whether additional dual-use items needed to be added to the Commerce Control List.201

Conclusion There can be little doubt the Bush administration played a pivotal role in institutionalising the MTCR at both domestic and international level between January 1989 and January 1993. In doing so, US missile nonproliferation policy and the MTCR were reoriented to reflect the emerging post-Cold War security environment. At the international level, the administration was instrumental in reorganising the MTCR to take account of the growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missile and CBW capabilities, as East–West tensions waned and eventually disappeared. In addition, the regime’s annex was updated to reflect technological developments and its coverage was expanded to include missiles capable of delivering all WMD and not just nuclear weapons. The administration was also primarily responsible for institutionalising the MTCR through the establishment of a

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system of regular technical and plenary meetings to discuss regimerelated issues. Moreover, it campaigned successfully to expand the regime’s membership. By January 1993, membership had increased to 22 from the original seven countries at the beginning of the Bush Presidency. All the new members were like-minded Western countries that shared Washington’s desire to curb the destabilising spread of ballistic missiles in the developing world. During the last two years of the administration, Austria, Greece, Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland joined the regime.202 These new memberships ensured that all EC countries had joined the MTCR by the end of 1992. In Washington, the administration acted to enhance the US export control system to reflect America’s emerging post-Cold War security environment. This was characterised by the waning global Soviet nuclear and conventional military threat to the United States, and the growing danger posed to American forces, allies and other regional interests by the spread of ballistic missiles and WMD in regions such as the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula and the Indian Subcontinent. In 1989, the administration established the first ever PCC for nonproliferation policy and created several other interagency groups to deal specifically with implementing US policy in conjunction with the MTCR. Greater manpower and other resources were also devoted at the Commerce, Defense and State Departments. Most notably, the administration’s EPCI enhanced the export control system to take account of the growing threat posed by missile and chemical weapons proliferation. The EPCI legally obliged American exporters to obtain licences for ‘any’ items if they knew, or were informed by the government, that these might be destined to a project of proliferation concern. The administration encouraged its MTCR allies to adopt comparable controls. However, this brief summary of the administration’s achievements underplays the controversy these reforms generated within the US government and with some of America’s MTCR partners. In large measure, these obstacles resulted from the alteration of America’s security paradigm and the administration’s need to implement policy reforms to take account of changed global realities. America’s emerging security paradigm was characterised by the regional as opposed to global nature of threats to America’s forces, allies and other security interests. In particular, it was characterised by the increasing threat posed by regional aggressors armed with WMD and the missiles capable of delivering them.

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At the international level, the administration helped persuade other MTCR members about the desirability of holding regular plenary and technical meetings to discuss regime-related issues. Prior to 1989, several members had been reluctant to do so. Officials from PM and the Office for Nonproliferation Policy also played roles in persuading the French government to implement a stricter policy for controlling the export of space launch technology to non-regime countries. These efforts were successful because France refrained from exporting rocket engines and the associated manufacturing technology to Brazil in 1989. In July 1992, the French government later told India that it could not supply that country with rocket technology until New Delhi joined the MTCR.203 France had argued previously that the regime should not prevent transfers of space launch technology to what it perceived as peaceful space launch projects. However, this view clashed with the administration’s stated policy of prohibiting exports of space launch technology to countries outside the MTCR. West Germany and Italy were also pressured and assisted to improve their export control systems following revelations about both countries’ lax enforcement of MTCR guidelines. This laxity was fed by trade policies and mechanisms in both countries that favoured export promotion over export control. These highlighted a lack of political will to prevent lucrative transfers of technology and assistance at a time when East–West tensions and export controls were being relaxed, and the threat posed by proliferation had still to be fully appreciated. Domestically, the controversy generated by these reforms focused primarily on the principal roles, and dual mandates, of the State and Commerce Departments in the missile technology licensing process. While Commerce was in charge of controlling the export of dual-use items, it was also responsible for promoting exports and the commercial well-being of the United States. In addition to controlling the export of munitions items, State was responsible for promoting the entire gamut of America’s foreign policy interests and relations. On several occasions, these dual mandates interacted to jeopardise the effective implementation of missile nonproliferation policy. On other occasions, the Pentagon successfully campaigned to resolve contentious issues in favour of the administration’s missile nonproliferation objectives, and at the expense of commercial and other foreign policy interests. Commerce initially opposed the EPCI because its unilateral nature was deemed to pose too great a threat to the commercial competitiveness of US firms as America’s foreign counterparts would not be subject to the same controls. After great

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interagency debate, the decision to proceed with the initiative was taken at the highest levels of government. Moreover, State and Defense clashed over the administration’s treatment of export requests for space launch technology to ostensibly peaceful programmes in the developing world. While State deemed the importation of rocket casings from Brazil into the United States for heat treatment as consistent with administration policy, the Pentagon opposed it because of the risk that these casings would be diverted on their return to South America. Brazil’s strategic technology- and weapons-supplier relationship with countries such as Iran and Iraq was deemed to make the country too great a proliferation risk to receive such rocket technology. Moreover, Brazil also had a history of diverting civilian rocketry to the development of ballistic missiles. This issue was partially resolved in the Pentagon’s favour. However, on several occasions the administration sacrificed its missile nonproliferation objectives to promote other foreign policy interests. In doing so, diplomatic and commercial considerations were allowed to prevail over national security concerns. When Supplement 6 to Part 778 of the EAR was published in mid-1992, its effectiveness was decreased significantly because State succumbed to pressure to omit the names of Israeli missile and SLV programmes from the list. The list was weakened further because the administration was forced to omit the names of missile programmes in Arab countries for related diplomatic reasons. The list had been conceived originally to help American firms identify those foreign entities they should be wary of selling MTCR-controlled items to. Moreover, under pressure from the State Department, the administration deemed it appropriate to reexport seven rocket casings back to Brazil despite that country’s dubious nonproliferation record. In doing so, State claimed the complete revocation of the original export licence would have severely damaged US–Brazilian relations, and would have weakened the position of individuals such as President Collor in that country who favoured nonproliferation. Under pressure from the Commerce and State departments, the administration also decided to allow the export of a previously controlled supercomputer to Brazil in December 1990. The decision to proceed with this transfer was justified on the grounds it would help maintain Brazil’s support for the international embargo imposed on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. On numerous occasions the Bush administration chose to sacrifice its missile nonproliferation goals in order to realise other foreign

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policy objectives. This occurred primarily because of the executive branch’s inability to consider nonproliferation issues in isolation from other foreign policy and commercial issues. Indeed, this situation contributed to Congress’s enactment of a missile sanctions authority in November 1990. This required the US government to impose sanctions automatically on American and foreign entities that participated in missile proliferation activities. The executive branch’s inability to treat missile nonproliferation issues in isolation contributed to the Bush administration’s opposition to this new authority. The administration fought the measure by citing the need to maintain flexibility in US foreign policy and to balance competing national interests against one another. However, strong bipartisan support for missile nonproliferation initiatives on the Hill made it possible for Congress to enact a punitive sanctions law without getting caught up with the wider commercial and other foreign policy considerations involved. Although the administration opposed the new law, it used the new sanctions authority as part of a carrot-and-stick strategy to solicit nonproliferation commitments from several non-regime suppliers of missile technology in 1991 and 1992. Chapter 4 proceeds by considering the role played by Congress in overseeing and formulating US policy in conjunction with the MTCR between January 1989 and January 1993, in particular its passage of a missile sanctions law. Chapter 5 then examines how the Bush administration attempted to solicit missile nonproliferation pledges from several non-regime suppliers of missile technology.

4 Congress and Missile Nonproliferation

The enactment of Section 17 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for financial year 1991 signalled the culmination of a three-year process during which Congressional concern with missile proliferation increased sharply. Congressional concern had been fed by the increasing vulnerability of US forces and allies to a growing number of states in possession of such capabilities, and was exacerbated by a perception the MTCR was ridden with flaws. The most prominent of these flaws was deemed to be the regime’s lack of an international enforcement agency, and each member state’s responsibility for implementing their commitments through their own national authorities. This situation was deemed to have resulted in the failure of several West European governments to properly enforce the MTCR guidelines and contributed to several high-profile cases of missile proliferation in South America and the Middle East. Congressional concern over the effectiveness of the MTCR was fuelled by the legislature’s lack of an opportunity to oversee the negotiation and ratification of the regime during the 1980s because it was a purely executive branch initiative. This chapter examines the rationale that drove several Congressmen to influence the implementation of US missile nonproliferation policy between 1989 and 1993. The administration’s intolerance for dealing with Congress in most areas of foreign policy is illustrated to have been a defining factor in these attempts. The chapter begins by considering the rapid rise of Congressional concern with missile proliferation prior to the Gulf War in early 1991. This increased awareness was reflected in several hearings held to consider the spread of missile capabilities and the appropriate American response in 1989 and the first half of 1990. It was also typified by the large number of

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bills introduced in the 101st Congress which were designed to rectify perceived shortcomings in US missile nonproliferation policy. Several of these legislative proposals aimed to punish Beijing for its proliferation indiscretions, and to penalise those countries which received missile technology from China. Other bills sought to strengthen US export controls over those items that could be used to develop, manufacture or deliver chemical and biological weapons (CBW). However, the most notable bills were those which sought to require the President to impose mandatory sanctions against American and foreign persons that participate knowingly in activities prohibited by the MTCR. These were inspired by a perceived need to obtain stricter interpretation and implementation of the MTCR guidelines by regime member states, states outside the MTCR and certain elements of the US bureaucracy. Common to all these proposals was the administration’s desire to prevent the enactment of any measure it deemed would interfere unduly with the President’s foreign policy prerogative and flexibility. Despite the administration’s opposition to such measures, President Bush signed the Congressionally inspired Section 17 of the NDAA for 1991 into law on 5 November 1990. Section 17 ‘set’ US policy in the field of missile nonproliferation and incorporated a sanctions provision requiring the President to punish American and foreign persons that participate knowingly in activities related to missile proliferation.1 The amendment was enacted despite opposition from the White House and highlighted a wider trend in executive–legislative branch relations during the Bush Presidency. This involved the administration’s attempt to routinely undermine Congress’s role in the foreign policy process, for example, by declaring certain legislative provisions to be unconstitutional when signing them into law. President Bush also used his veto to defeat legislation he believed would undermine his foreign policy powers. On some occasions, the administration issued executive orders instead to address the subject-matter under consideration. The final section examines the last two years of the Bush Presidency. During this period, the administration was required to apply Congressionally mandated missile sanctions on several foreign commercial and governmental entities: in South Africa, North Korea, China, Russia, India, Iran, Syria, and Pakistan. Because the manner in which the administration used this new law is considered in Chapter Five, this section focuses instead on Congress’s attempts to address China’s poor missile proliferation record. Several Congressmen attempted to tie the future of China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN)

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trading status to its missile proliferation record in 1991 and 1992. However, despite the successful passage of two bills with this provision through Congress in 1992, these attempts failed because they did not conform to the Bush administration’s policy of maintaining a ‘comprehensive engagement’ of China. This policy involved keeping China engaged on all aspects of its behaviour that caused concern in the US; proliferation, human rights, and unfair trade practices. The administration believed the best way to influence China’s behaviour in a manner consistent with America’s interests and international norms was by remaining ‘engaged’ with Beijing.

Congress and missile nonproliferation, January 1989– January 1991 Congress played a key role in sustaining American interest in the issue of missile nonproliferation prior to the Gulf crisis.2 In large measure, this resulted from Representative Howard Berman’s introduction, in February 1989, of the ‘Missile Technology Control Act of 1989’.3 This bill included provisions for mandatory sanctions to be imposed on persons that participate in activities prohibited by the MTCR. The proposed penalties included prohibiting such persons from contracting with the US government and denying them US export licences.4 The bill also encouraged the administration to ‘negotiate a more coordinated and efficient arrangement’ to address the spread of missile technology.5 The rationale behind the proposal was the perceived need to improve the interpretation and implementation of MTCR guidelines by the member states. Berman introduced his bill by citing evidence of extensive European transfers of technology and assistance to Argentina’s medium-range Condor II missile project. European involvement was reported to have included West Germany’s Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB), Italy’s SNIA-BPD and an unnamed French company. Each reportedly provided missile components and expertise to the Condor project, despite their respective governments’ membership in the MTCR. Berman blamed this proliferation on the regime’s lack of an international organisation to monitor exports and the resultant situation where each member state was responsible for ensuring its own export controls were enforced in conjunction with the regime. Berman’s bill sought to rectify this situation by requiring the President to impose sanctions on persons who participated in such ‘reckless business practices’.6

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Congressional interest increased in May when two Senate hearings considered the issue of missile proliferation. In addition to initiating oversight of White House policy in this area, these hearings raised public awareness of this relatively new and growing threat. The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs addressed the related issues of Nuclear and Missile Proliferation.7 Before this committee the Director of Central Intelligence, William Webster, made his now well-known prediction that by the year 2000 ‘at least 15 developing countries would be producing their own ballistic missiles’.8 The Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology of the Senate Armed Services Committee considered the issue of Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Third World.9 Under the chairmanship of Senator Jeff Bingaman, key representatives from the Commerce, Defense and State Departments, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) presented the administration’s policy to constrain missile proliferation. Shortly after the hearing, Bingaman introduced his own bill designed to strengthen US policy in this area. The ‘Missile Control Act of 1989’ called upon the Secretaries of State and Defense to punish American and foreign entities if they transferred missile technology in violation of MTCR guidelines. The bill proposed to refuse US government contracts to any American or foreign entity that violated the MTCR, and required the Secretary of State to report annually to Congress on missile technology transfers between non-regime adherents.10 To improve US interagency co-ordination for missile technology export licensing, Bingaman’s proposal required the Commerce Department to refer all export licence applications for MTCR annex items to the Secretaries of State and Defense upon request. The bill made an exception for missile items destined to regime adherents and NATO states.11 The collective concerns of Berman and Bingaman were reflected subsequently in the ‘Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers Act of 1989’. Section 407 of this act directed the executive branch to explore several possibilities in the area of missile nonproliferation. In recognition of the increasing threat posed by the spread of CBW, Section 407 gave the Under-Secretary of State for Coordinating Security Assistance Policy responsibility for co-ordinating all diplomatic efforts ‘to obtain the agreement of all appropriate countries to a missile technology control regime’ which encompassed missiles capable of delivering all weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Moreover, the Under-Secretary was given responsibility for co-ordinating strategies within the US to restrict the export of technologies

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that could be used to manufacture such missiles. The Secretary of State was also required to submit a report to Congress to describe the administration’s strategy for dealing with missile proliferation. The secretary was asked specifically to identify the steps being taken to ensure adequate resources continued to be allotted for missile nonproliferation purposes. The secretary was also instructed to ‘discuss’ how the MTCR could be strengthened, and how incentives and ‘threats of sanctions’ could be used to ‘win the co-operation of more nations’ in preventing missile proliferation.12 Congressional concern continued to increase in July. Under the chairmanship of Representative Sam Gejdenson on 12 July, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs deliberated the issue of missile proliferation and the Need for Controls.13 Several non-governmental experts and officials from the executive branch presented evidence regarding the nature of the growing missile threat, and the policies the US was pursuing to address this. Berman again drew attention to the involvement of several West European firms in the export of prohibited technology to missile programmes in the developing world. This trade had apparently continued ‘long after’ the creation of the MTCR. Berman also spoke of allegations that equipment from the US had been transferred to a proscribed missile facility in Iraq.14 Berman presented his testimony exactly two weeks before the House unanimously approved his ‘Missile Technology Control Act of 1989’, as an amendment to the defence authorisation bill for FY 1990 and 1991.15 Senators Al Gore and John McCain responded by introducing the ‘Gore–McCain Missile Proliferation Control Act’ as a parallel measure to Berman’s in the Senate.16 Although this proposal was ‘essentially the same’ as Berman’s, it incorporated an additional sanctions provision, which would have prohibited imports into the US from foreign persons that violate the MTCR. The Gore–McCain bill also proposed punishing ‘less developed’ states or entities if they participated in the development or deployment of ‘destabilizing MTCR items of mass destruction’.17 The two senators promoted their co-sponsored bill on the Senate floor on 4 August. In response to what he referred to as ‘inquiries’ from ‘businesses, business associations and embassies’, Senator Gore said the bill would restrain and inhibit ‘only a form of trade already declared off limits by the governments adhering to the MTCR’. He argued the legislation would not restrain trade and merely provided the President with ‘some very effective tools’ to support existing US policy. Gore also responded to concerns regarding the bill’s potential extraterritorial implications by asserting that if an

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MTCR government issued a licence based on ‘honest information’, the US government could not impose sanctions against the firm in question; ‘no matter how much’ it disagreed with the ‘judgement call’ made by the other member state. He also criticised the bureaucracy in Washington for obstructing and delaying action in this area, despite the administration’s recognition of the urgency of the need to address the missile threat.18 Senator McCain defended the bill by asserting that it would close a ‘critical gap’ in the present regime. He said the gap would be closed by providing for sanctions to punish states not participating in the MTCR and by making it clear the US would not allow other MTCR member states to ‘exploit the flexibility’ of the regime by selling equipment and technology US firms were prohibited from trading in. McCain asserted the bill sent a ‘clear message to Western Europe, the PRC, Argentina and a host of other states that they cannot profit’ in areas where American firms cannot compete.19 Senate consideration of the Bingaman and Gore–McCain bills was complicated initially by jurisdictional problems. Three Senate committees originally claimed responsibility for the proposals; the Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, which oversees export controls. This problem was rectified eventually by Senator Sam Nunn, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Nunn advised the Senators not to introduce their bills as amendments to the defence authorisation bill, but to have them ‘follow the regular procedure of being marked-up’ by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Nunn told the Senate on 4 August that the defence authorisation bill was not the right ‘vehicle’ for this type of legislation and he regretted the House decision to place such a ‘major piece of legislation’ on it. Nunn also told the Senate he was recommending the House conferees to ‘recede to the Senate and drop the Berman amendment’ to the bill ‘without prejudice to its merits’. He then requested that the House–Foreign Affairs Committee be given opportunity to consider the legislation ‘in a regular manner’, with an eventual House–Senate conference committee deliberation of the bill involving members from both foreign affairs committees.20 Senator Berman’s amendment was subsequently struck down during the House–Senate conference committee review of the defence authorisation bill in the summer/autumn of 1989.21 Senator Nunn’s actions also paved the way for hearings before the House and Senate foreign affairs committees to consider the missile proposals. The Bush administration and Congress subsequently

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clashed during these hearings on the issue of whether or not legislation was needed to strengthen US missile nonproliferation policy. Indeed, the New York Times reported on 1 November that a ‘clash’ had erupted over the way in which ‘to halt the spread of missiles’.22 Congress versus the Bush administration The House Committee on Foreign Affairs held its second hearing on missile proliferation and the Need for Controls on 30 October.23 Unlike the first session in July, the issue of legislative–executive branch relations featured prominently. In particular, the desirability of enacting a missile sanctions law was the major topic of debate between the administration and Congressman Berman. The next day, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations considered the National Security Implications of Missile Proliferation.24 On this occasion, the administration was confronted by Senators Bingaman, Gore and McCain on its position vis-à-vis a missile sanctions authority. Berman presented the case in favour of his bill by referring to a perceived ‘laxity’ with which several MTCR states applied themselves to constraining the proliferation of missile capabilities. This was despite what he described as the obvious threat ballistic missiles posed to American and allied interests in the Middle East and Europe. Berman cited Libya’s 1986 Scud missile attack against an American coastguard facility in Italy, and the future vulnerability of US military assets to missile attacks in the Middle East and Europe, as examples of this growing threat. Bearing this in mind, he described as ‘seriously disturbing’ the ‘tolerance’ of several MTCR governments for the continued trade in missile technology. This problem was again identified as originating in the lack of an international organisation to monitor missile technology exports, and each member state’s responsibility for implementing its own missile export controls.25 On this occasion, Berman expanded on the West German firm MBB’s missile technology exports, which reportedly continued well after the official announcement of the MTCR in April 1987. Indeed, the Congressman asserted this activity had continued ‘years’ after the G-7 states had begun informally observing the regime’s guidelines in 1985. Berman also cited Iraq’s chemical weapon attacks during the first Gulf War, Libya’s capability to produce such weaponry, and the potential coupling of these weapons with ballistic missiles, as a testament to such companies’ participation in ‘an impending catastrophe’. The only reasonable response to these shortcomings, Berman claimed, was for the US government to take the lead by inserting ‘some teeth’ in the

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international effort to curb missile proliferation. He promoted his ‘Missile Technology Control Act of 1989’ as the means through which to start doing this. The last version of Berman’s bill included two types of sanctions to punish proliferators; denying them US export licences and US government contracts. By denying government contracts to missile proliferators, Berman proposed forcing companies to ‘forgo’ their business with the US government if they continued to participate in such activities. This provision was not meant to constitute an ‘affront’ to America’s security partners because it applied equally to US and non-MTCR companies. However, Berman did assert the bill was designed to influence positively the ‘proliferation-driven corporate planning of missile manufacturers’.26 Senators Gore, McCain and Bingaman presented their bills to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator McCain also referred to his co-sponsored bill’s relevance to constraining proliferation in general. In doing so, he identified the need to create the right ‘mix of barriers’ the US needed to meet the challenge of proliferation. He referred specifically to the bill’s complementary nature to Senator Pell’s and Senator Dole’s proposals to enact similar controls to constrain the spread of CBW, and to existing controls in the nuclear nonproliferation field.27 McCain asserted that all these aspects of the proliferation process were interrelated because any state’s acquisition of a weapon system invariably pressured others to respond.28 Senator Gore also spoke of the need to control the spread of ballistic missile technology capable of delivering all WMD and not just nuclear warheads.29 In contrast to his colleague, Gore focused on highlighting the bill’s specific provisions, particularly those modifications made since July. The bill had been altered to address several grievances the administration had with the original version. For example, to avoid alienating those MTCR states that were concerned with the potential extraterritorial nature of the proposal, all references to the MTCR were dropped.30 The revised Gore–McCain bill was reintroduced subsequently on 2 November. This new version excluded two provisions from the original; the provision to punish proliferators by prohibiting imports from them into the US and that which required all missile-related export licence applications not covered by the Munitions List to be reviewed by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense.31 Senator Bingaman’s testimony cast parallels between Congress’s efforts to strengthen missile nonproliferation arrangements and its efforts to bolster US nuclear nonproliferation policy in the 1970s.

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Congressional pressure in the 1970s had resulted in the enactment of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978. Although Bingaman described the NNPA as reliant on ‘multilateral efforts’ to ‘prevent military uses’ of nuclear materials, he claimed its real strength lay in tighter US export controls and the threat of unilateral American sanctions against persons who did not adhere to nuclear nonproliferation norms.32 Bingaman cast the parallels further when he identified the similarity of the Bush administration’s opposition to the missile bills in 1989, to the opposition that existed towards the NNPA in the 1970s.33 Bingaman proceeded by mentioning the two problems his bill proposed to rectify. In the first place, Bingaman said MTCR implementation problems were pervasive within the Bush administration. These problems were perceived to lie with the principal roles of the Commerce and State Departments in the missile technology export licensing process. Two examples were quoted to illustrate his argument. The first was the apparent willingness of both the Commerce and State Departments to approve the export of a hybrid digital computer to Iraq’s Sa’ad 16 missile development centre; this transfer was later blocked by the National Security Council (NSC). A second case involved an NSC intervention to block the sale to India of a re-entry vehicle heat and vibration (shake-and-bake) simulator. Prior to this intervention, the Commerce Department asserted it lacked the authority to deny such a licence. The item was then placed on the munitions list under the State Department’s jurisdiction, where several officials had also been prepared to proceed with the transfer in the interest of maintaining favourable relations with New Delhi. Bingaman’s bill proposed to rectify these problems by giving the Pentagon a statutory role in the missile technology export licensing process, in order to balance the respective pro-trade and pro-foreign relations emphases of the Commerce and State Departments.34 Bingaman also spoke of disagreements between member states over whether or not the regime restricted the transfer of technology destined to space launch programmes. He referred specifically to the French proposal to transfer rocket technology to Brazil. If this transfer was allowed to proceed, Berman claimed, it would call into question the entire effectiveness of the MTCR.35 The Senator had already referred to this issue in Congress on 7 October. In doing so, he described the proposed French transfer as a ‘matter of grave concern’ which was ‘clearly prohibited’ by the MTCR, and said this case proved ‘fundamental differences’ over regime interpretation existed between

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the US and at least one of its allies.36 Bingaman’s bill sought to encourage stricter interpretation of the MTCR by giving the executive branch an ‘appropriate’ set of sanctions to punish US and foreign proliferators; these sanctions would be calibrated to the type of MTCR violation.37 In both hearings, the same four officials presented the Bush administration’s position on the proposed bills. The officials included Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy at the Department of Defense, James LeMunyon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration at the Commerce Department, and Norman Wulf, Deputy Assistant Director for Nuclear Weapons and Control at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Their collective testimony revolved around several reasons why a missile sanctions law should not be enacted. Richard Clarke presented a typical State Department view of the proposals by highlighting the negative impact a unilateral sanctions authority could have on America’s foreign relations. He argued that a non-discriminatory sanctions law would jeopardise international cooperation because the MTCR was a voluntary agreement and its main strength was its basis on ‘diplomatic consultation and information exchange’. Clarke asserted the imposition of non-discriminatory sanctions against foreign companies or countries would be against ‘the spirit of the regime and would “hinder” rather than enhance’ America’s ability ‘to respond to the challenge of missile nonproliferation’. Clarke cited four main reasons why the proposals would ‘seriously weaken the MTCR’. First, it was argued the proposals would jeopardise information sharing between member states. Clarke asserted that if a member state wanted to consult the US government on an issue pertaining to the proliferation activities of its companies, it ‘would be unlikely to do so’ if the result was to invite sanctions against them. He also implied that the MTCR partners might feel compelled to find a company’s activities to be legal just to avoid sanctions. Second, Clarke argued that a law which triggered automatic sanctions would ‘complicate’ US efforts to expand the membership of the regime; a goal deemed essential by the White House and Congress. Third, Clarke predicted mandatory sanctions would make it impossible for the President to ‘differentiate between serious violations’ and ‘relatively minor infractions’ of the MTCR. In defence of this argument, he said the executive branch had already achieved success through ‘diplomatic pressure and persuasion’ in its missile nonproliferation efforts. Clarke argued that if an ‘inflexible’ sanctions law had existed previ-

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ously, this type of activity might not have been permitted. He asserted therefore that such a law would jeopardise the President’s flexibility to determine the actions best suited to produce the desired results. Clarke also emphasised that missile nonproliferation was only one element of US foreign policy, and the President was obliged to balance competing interests before deciding on a particular course of action. Finally, he said additional legislation was not necessary because sufficient authority already existed to do ‘what needs to be done’. Clarke referred specifically to provisions in the AECA and the EAA for imposing civil, criminal and administrative penalties on missile proliferators. Moreover, he said the State Department already possessed the power to punish persons involved in the manufacture of long-range missiles by denying them export licences for items controlled by the AECA.38 Although the Pentagon’s Henry Sokolski acknowledged that a sanctions authority, in conjunction with other means, might prove useful in constraining missile proliferation, he said there would be a problem regarding ‘how and when’ it would be used. The Deputy for Nonproliferation said the Pentagon and the administration were concerned the proposals would complicate an already difficult agenda by instituting an automatic sanctions authority. Sokolski justified this concern by referring to several US policy goals that would be jeopardised by an automatic and ‘relatively public and restrictive’ sanctions law. The primary focus of this policy was identified to be the need to ‘isolate specific missile programs’ of concern and ‘to get their sponsors and host governments to reconsider and even halt their activities’. Sokolski said this goal needed to be pursued while ‘maintaining good relations’ with friendly countries important to US security, and by avoiding the imposition of sanctions that would ‘seriously jeopardize’ other American interests. To avoid complicating this agenda, he argued the US government should use its ‘existing authority’ to punish missile proliferators rather than enacting new legislation to do so. Despite arguing against the proposals, Sokolski advocated modifying the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFAR) to encourage greater ‘responsibility’ on behalf of the foreign firms that did business with the Pentagon. Under existing regulations, Defense was required to ensure its contractors acted ‘responsibly’. However, this requirement was not tied ‘explicitly’ to a company’s compliance with export controls. Sokolski said the Pentagon was considering the alteration of this policy so that a ‘responsibility’ requirement was tied explicitly to a defence contractor’s compliance with such controls. He suggested that US and foreign companies should be debarred or suspended from

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doing business with the Pentagon if they do not comply with their own government’s laws for ‘implementing missile-related export controls’. The Deputy for Nonproliferation also expressed his hope that foreign firms would be encouraged to ensure the compliance of their subsidiary companies to their own country’s export control laws.39 During the 30 October hearing, Representative Berman claimed Sokolski’s testimony had ‘in a sense’ contradicted the evidence presented by his colleagues because they had suggested ‘these things don’t work’.40 The Commerce Department’s James LeMunyon reiterated the arguments of both Clarke and Sokolski. He claimed Commerce already possessed the authority to punish MTCR violators through the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and that his department was working with other departments to enhance the effectiveness of the MTCR on a multilateral basis. In this respect, the Deputy Assistant Secretary claimed the new legislation would hinder efforts to prevent proliferation. LeMunyon highlighted two additional concerns that reflected the Commerce Department’s mandate. First, Commerce was concerned that a mandatory sanctions law would jeopardise America’s economic security if a violating entity was the sole supplier of items currently used in the US defence industrial base. Second, Commerce was worried that sanctions imposed on states involved in developing missiles might totally prohibit the transfer of high-technology items to ‘legitimate commercial end users’ in those states. Indeed, LeMunyon asserted that sanctions would not stop projects of concern and would have a detrimental effect on US foreign policy. Moreover, he claimed ‘innocent’ American exporters would be the only people punished by such a law, because legitimate end-users would approach firms in other countries for their aircraft, computer and other hightechnology requirements.41 Norman Wulf was the final official to testify. The representative from ACDA repeated the concerns of his three colleagues, and added one more reason for opposing the bill. Wulf asserted the proposals would make it difficult to secure the agreement of the other regime members when the US wanted to add new items to the MTCR annex. He argued that any attempt to do so would be viewed as exposing the other members’ companies to an even greater risk of incurring US sanctions. Wulf also reiterated the point that nonproliferation was not the sole objective of US foreign policy, and other issues such as defence co-operation needed to be taken into account.42 The administration’s case against the proposals can be summarised

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in three principal arguments. First, the administration predicted the proposals would jeopardise the President’s flexibility in implementing foreign policy because they required the White House to automatically impose sanctions against foreign missile proliferators. It was argued this would detract from the President’s ability to effectively balance other policies and interests in America’s foreign relations with countries of proliferation concern. Second, the administration predicted that a unilateral authority would jeopardise international co-operation and information sharing within the regime, as well as problematising its future expansion. Third, the administration claimed the necessary authority to do ‘what needs to be done’ already existed in the EAA and the AECA. Although these arguments were indicative of the executive branch’s natural reaction against the legislature’s attempts to dictate how US foreign policy should be conducted, they also represented the Bush Presidency’s foreign policy style. This style emphasised the President’s prerogative in the conduct of foreign relations and incorporated an intolerance for Congressional attempts to enact legislation which affected this privilege. Despite the initial choice of the defence authorisation bill as the legislative vehicle for the missile proposals, the legislation enacted on 29 November did not include any major missile-related provisions.43 The act merely required the Pentagon to submit a report to Congress identifying the department’s manpower requirements for implementing US export controls vis-à-vis the MTCR; this reflected Congressional concern the Pentagon was not adequately involved in the missile export licensing process. The act also extended the deadline for the report that had been requested from the Pentagon by Congress in Public Law 101-189, in December 1987.44 The sanctions proposals were not the only missile-relevant bills introduced in the 101st Congress. Two other types were introduced. Although these did not propose to punish all MTCR violations, they required sanctions to be imposed for specific instances of missile proliferation. The first set of bills were designed to punish China for transferring missile technology overseas, and to punish those countries receiving such shipments from Beijing. Senators Jesse Helms, Herb Kohl, and Claiborne Pell, and Representatives Kastenmeier and Dante Fascell, introduced China-specific bills in 1989. The first was introduced by Jesse Helms on 25 January. The ‘Prevention of Missile Transfers to the Middle East Act’ called for the termination of American assistance to China’s aerospace programme unless the

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President could determine Beijing had not supplied any missiles to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya or Saudi Arabia during the previous year. This bill also required China to provide the US with reliable assurances that no such transfers were planned for the future.45 The second bill was Representative Dante Fascell’s ‘International Cooperation Act of 1989’. Title 17 of this bill asserted that the US was permitted to sell military equipment to those countries in the Middle East that had acquired Chinese IRBMs only if the President certified they did not possess nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads.46 Fascell’s proposal also prohibited all US military exports to China unless the President certified that American defence items had not been used in aircraft or missiles that Beijing had exported to Iran, Syria, or Libya. This prohibition was also to apply if the President was unable to certify that Beijing had not transferred chemical weapons, or nuclear equipment, to these countries.47 The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Claiborne Pell, introduced the ‘International Security and Development Act of 1989’. This proposed denying the sale of, or the issuance of licences under the AECA for, any items on the Munitions List to China. The President was permitted to waive this provision if it was determined that US defence articles or technology had not been incorporated in certain missiles, or aircraft, which Beijing had exported to Iran, Iraq, Libya or Syria in violation of the AECA. The same prohibition was to apply if the President certified that China had transferred chemicals, and nuclear weapon-related equipment or materials, to these countries.48 The third type of bill was designed to address the spread of biological and/or chemical weapons. In doing so, they included provisions to constrain the proliferation of delivery systems capable of carrying such weapons; missiles with suitable warheads and aircraft. Senators Robert Dole, Claiborne Pell, and Herb Kohl, and Representatives Kastenmeier, Porter and Fascell introduced bills of this type in 1989. Porter’s ‘Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Act’ required the Commerce Department to issue the necessary regulations, licences and orders, to control the export of equipment, materials and technology that could be used in the manufacture or use of CBW.49 Porter’s bill was deferred subsequently to Fascell’s ‘Chemical and Biological Weapons Warfare Elimination Act’.50 Dole’s ‘Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act’ proposed denying licences for CBW-related products if there was reason to believe such items would be used by a ‘listed’ country to produce or to deliver CBW.51 Pell’s ‘Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act’

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proposed to control the export of CBW-related defence items and dual-use technology through the AECA and the EAA respectively.52 All these CBW-related bills proposed imposing sanctions on foreign persons who contributed to a country’s efforts to acquire goods and technology for manufacturing or delivering CBW. Fascell’s bill proposed to deny US procurement contracts to such persons and to prohibit imports into the US from them.53 Dole’s sanctions included prohibiting the US government from contracting with violators; he also proposed to ban imports from such entities into the US.54 Pell’s bill directed the President to impose sanctions against foreign persons if it was determined they had contributed knowingly to the proliferation of CBW.55 Congress attempted to influence the formulation and implementation of US policy in other ways prior to the Gulf War. On 22 May 1990, President Bush signed the ‘Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989’. This required the President to fine and/or imprison anyone who ‘knowingly develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains, or possesses any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon, or knowingly assists a foreign state or organization to do so’.56 The act defined a delivery system as ‘any apparatus, equipment, device, or means of delivery’ that was designed specifically to deliver or disseminate a biological agent, toxin, or vector.57 When President Bush signed the act, he saluted ‘the bipartisan consensus in Congress’ regarding the need to impose criminal penalties on persons who use, or contribute to the spread, of biological weapons. Bush said his administration shared the goal of ‘destroying forever the evil shadow’ biological weapons ‘have cast around the world’.58 However, in contrast to the other biological weapons-related bills, and the missile sanctions proposals, the new act contained few provisions that dictated how the President should implement policy in this area. Furthermore, the administration evidently perceived the act as not threatening the President’s foreign policy flexibility because it did not envision the imposition of mandatory unilateral American sanctions against foreign proliferators.59 Congress held further hearings in 1990 to consider the spread of unconventional weapons capabilities and the US nonproliferation response. In May and July, a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee considered the issue of Proliferation and Arms Control. Officials from the Bush administration again outlined their policies for constraining proliferation in general and the spread of missile technology in particular.60 Moreover, Congress played an

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important role in highlighting the failure of US and international efforts to prevent Iraq from acquiring technology for its mediumrange ballistic missile and WMD programmes. Less than two months before Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the deployment of US forces to protect Saudi Arabia, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations considered American policy towards Baghdad in the areas of Human Rights, Weapons Proliferation, and International Law.61 Baghdad’s extensive and successful efforts to acquire missile technology from abroad featured prominently during the hearing, especially because this had been facilitated in part by weak missile technology export controls in the US. In one instance, it was reported that Commerce had approved export licences for the transfer of oscilloscopes to Baghdad. These items were described by one non-governmental expert during the hearing as ideal for use in the development, testing and maintenance of the guidance systems required for long-range ballistic missiles.62 These revelations about the perceived failure of US missile technology controls coincided with several disturbing developments in Iraq. In December 1989, US officials confirmed that Iraq had supposedly testlaunched a satellite launch vehicle (SLV). This threatened to give Baghdad the capability to develop an approximately 2,000 km-range ballistic missile.63 American intelligence subsequently reported in March 1990 that Iraq had built launchers within range of Tel Aviv and Damascus for its Al Hussein SCUD derivative. American intelligence viewed this deployment as a warning from Baghdad for Israel to refrain from attacking chemical and nuclear weapons facilities.64 Further suspicions regarding Iraq’s missile programme were made public in April 1990 when the Bush administration revealed that Baghdad had been attempting to acquire a test site for a long-range missile outside the Persian Gulf. Suspicion focused primarily on Mauritania and its possible offer of a test site to Iraq on the Atlantic coast of West Africa. The strategic implications of these technical developments were made even more serious by Iraq’s growing belligerence towards Israel and the US in the first half of 1990. At a meeting with other Arab leaders in May, Saddam Hussein asserted that if Israel used WMD against Iraq, Baghdad would respond in kind. This followed Saddam Hussein’s claim in April that Iraq had developed a binary chemical weapons capability and would use it to ‘burn half of Israel’ if Tel Aviv attacked Iraq with nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Iraqi leader verbally attacked the US during the Arab summit and blamed Washington for Israel’s aggression against the Palestinian people.65

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Baghdad’s long-range missile development underlined the apparent failure of US and international efforts to constrain the spread of ballistic missile capabilities. These developments strengthened Representative Berman’s arguments in favour of enacting legislation to set the terms and conditions for executing US missile nonproliferation policy. Indeed, it was Baghdad’s increasing belligerence towards Israel and the US in 1990, capped by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in early August, which provided the decisive impetus for Berman to campaign successfully for the enactment of his missile sanctions proposal. Missile technology controls Shortly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Berman appended his missile proposal to the defence authorisation bill for FY 1991. The invasion bolstered his position for two reasons. First, the administration’s decision to deploy troops to protect Saudi Arabia brought US forces within range of Baghdad’s SCUD derivative missiles, that could potentially have been armed with chemical warheads. Second, Iraq had extended the range of these Soviet-supplied missiles using technology imported from the US and several West European nations, despite their governments’ membership of the MTCR. Thus, the time was ripe for Berman to lobby for the enactment of his proposal to rectify perceived shortcomings in US and international arrangements for constraining missile proliferation. In an atmosphere of pending hostilities with Iraq on 19 September, Berman promoted his amendment on the House floor. In doing so, he spoke of the need to constrain the spread of ballistic missiles because their speed, ability to carry WMD, and the inability to recall them, posed a ‘unique threat to world stability’. Berman asserted that Iraq’s possession of these systems constituted ‘probably the single most destabilizing factor in the on-going Gulf crisis’. In reference to the failure of the MTCR to constrain such proliferation, he also spoke of the almost daily evasion of the regime’s guidelines by firms in several Western states. He even claimed the company most responsible for supplying Iraq’s missile programme also did millions of dollars worth of business with the US government. Berman said this type of behaviour ‘was simply unacceptable’ and such companies should be denied the privilege of doing business with the US government. He also said these companies should be denied export licences to acquire advanced technology from the US.66 The House of Representatives passed the authorisation bill with Berman’s amendment later the same day, by a

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margin of 265 to 155 votes. The Senate subsequently considered and passed the measure on 25 September.67 Although the administration had opposed the amendment, President Bush strengthened Berman’s position in a speech to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 1 October. The President appealed at the UN for the international community to ‘redouble’ its efforts to stem the spread of ballistic missiles ‘that can rain destruction upon distant peoples’. The President also spoke of a ‘new partnership of nations’ that transcended the Cold War, that was ‘based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations; a partnership united by principle, and the rule of law and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment’. According to Bush, this new partnership would work towards the goal of increasing democracy, prosperity and peace and reducing arms.68 Berman’s amendment envisioned the United States adopting a leadership role in this co-operative post-Cold War world by strengthening international missile nonproliferation arrangements. The President signed the defence authorisation bill on 5 November 1990.69 Section 17 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991 was titled ‘Missile Technology Controls’ and divided into four sections. Each section stipulated a specific manner in which the executive branch was required to conduct US missile nonproliferation policy. Section 1701 identified the objectives of US missile nonproliferation policy. Sections 1702 and 1703 amended the Export Administration Act (EAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) to include sanctions to punish American and foreign persons who participate knowingly in activities related to missile proliferation. The acts were also modified to improve interagency co-ordination between the Commerce, Defense and State Departments in the missile technology licensing process.70 Finally, section 1704 required the President to submit a semi-annual report to Congress detailing the previous six months’ missile proliferation developments and describing the administration’s actions taken to constrain this. Section 1701 made it US policy to take ‘all appropriate measures’ to strengthen American and existing multilateral export controls ‘to prohibit the flow of materials, equipment, and technology that would assist countries in acquiring the ability to produce or acquire missiles that can deliver weapons of mass destruction’. In response to past interpretation problems, the executive branch was directed to ‘improve enforcement’ and ‘to seek a common and stricter interpreta-

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tion’ of MTCR principles. The administration was also directed to expand the regime’s membership. Finally, Section 1701 required that information sharing between the relevant US agencies and the regime’s members be enhanced.71 Section 1702 codified the principal role of the Secretary of State for conducting negotiations with other states on issues pertaining to missile nonproliferation. This role was to be performed in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other relevant agency/ department heads. Within the MTCR, these negotiations covered issues such as regime coverage and implementation. Beyond the regime, the secretary was instructed to treat all missile exports to nonMTCR states in the same manner as those to regime adherents, if an agreement could be reached with them on missile technology export restrictions.72 Sections 1702 and 1703 amended the EAA and the AECA respectively to establish set licensing procedures for all missile technology export requests for items controlled by the MTCR. The EAA was modified to require the Secretary of Commerce, in conjunction with other relevant department heads, to establish and maintain a list of all dualuse goods and technology included on the MTCR annex, as part of the Commodity Control List; ‘validated licences’ were required for the export to ‘any country’ of the goods and technology included on this list. Validated licences were also required for exporting ‘any goods or technology’ the exporter knew were destined to a project or facility in a non-MTCR country for the design, development, or manufacture of missiles. In general, the secretary was instructed to deny such licences if the ultimate recipient was a facility in a non-MTCR country, and if the destination was a facility designed for missile development and manufacture. Section 1702 also established procedures to ensure the Secretary of Commerce could not approve export licences to a country of ‘missile proliferation concern’ until the Secretaries of Defense and State had been consulted. To facilitate this, the Secretary of State was instructed to maintain a classified list which identified ‘countries of concern’. If the Secretary of Defense disagreed with the Commerce Department’s approval of an export licence, the matter was to be referred to the President for resolution. Section 1703 amended the AECA to require the Secretary of State, in consultation with other relevant department heads, to establish and maintain a list of all items on the MTCR annex not controlled under the EAA, as part of the Munitions List. The Secretary of State was only permitted to approve export licences for items on this list if the Secretary of Defense had no

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objections. Both sections enhanced provisions for sharing missilerelated information between the US intelligence community and the appropriate government agencies.73 The EAA and the AECA were amended to include mandatory sanctions which the President was required to impose on American and foreign ‘persons’ who participate ‘knowingly’ in activities related to the proliferation of items controlled by the MTCR.74 Sanctions were to be imposed on all US persons who knowingly exported, transferred or were otherwise engaged in the trade of MTCR annex items in violation of the amended EAA and AECA. Outside the United States, sanctions were to be imposed on foreign persons if they knowingly exported, transferred, or had otherwise engaged in the trade of MTCR-controlled items that contributed to the design, development or production of missiles in a country that was not a regime adherent. American and foreign persons were also to be punished if they conspired or attempted to engage in such activity, or facilitated the export, transfer, or trade of such materials by any other person.75 The types of sanctions the President was required to impose were determined by the nature of the proscribed activity; Category I violations were to be punished with greater severity than Category II violations. The President was directed to punish Americans who committed Category II violations of the EAA by denying them all US export licences for missile equipment and technology controlled by the amended act. Americans who committed Category I violations were to be refused ‘all licences’ for items controlled by the EAA. Outside the United States, the President was directed to deny foreign persons licences to acquire missile equipment or technology controlled under the act if they committed a Category II violation of the EAA. Foreign persons who violated controls for Category I items were to be denied licences for all items controlled under the act. Moreover, if a foreign person contributed substantially ‘to the design, development, or production of missiles’ in a non-MTCR country, the President was required to prohibit all imports from that person into the United States. All EAA sanctions were to be imposed for two years.76 Under the AECA, any American who committed a Category II violation was to be denied all US government contracts for missile equipment and technology. They were also to be prohibited from acquiring licences to export any items of missile equipment or technology controlled by the AECA. If an American committed a Category I violation of the AECA, they were to be denied all US government contracts and US export licences and agreements for items contained

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on the Munitions List. If a foreign person knowingly committed a Category II violation of the AECA, they were to be denied all US government contracts involving missile equipment and technology, and all US export licences for the transfer of such items. If a foreign person committed a Category I infringement of the AECA, they were to be denied all US government contracts and export licences for all items on the Munitions List. Furthermore, if a foreign person contributed substantially to the design, development or production of missiles in a non-MTCR state, the President was directed to ban all imports from that person into the US. AECA sanctions were also to be imposed for two years.77 Although the administration had opposed the enactment of Section 17, President Bush’s ability to strike it from the defence authorisation act was circumscribed for two reasons. First, Iraq’s aggression and the decision to deploy US forces to the Persian Gulf made it essential for the administration to enact the authorisation bill itself as quickly as possible. Second, the vulnerability of US forces and allies to Iraq’s SCUD derivatives raised the issue of missile proliferation to a position on America’s security agenda that was higher than at any other time in the past. In an attempt to allay the administration’s concerns, Section 17 incorporated several provisions affecting the circumstances in which sanctions could be imposed. This involved the incorporation of Presidential waivers and other exceptions to be employed under specific conditions. The collective goal of these provisions was threefold; to preserve the President’s foreign policy flexibility, to protect America’s economic security interests, and to sustain international co-operation in missile nonproliferation. The President was prohibited from imposing sanctions in several circumstances. First, if another MTCR adherent had authorised the export, transfer or trading activity in question. This provision was included in response to administration concerns regarding the possible extraterritorial nature of the amendment. This exception was not to stand if the activity in question occurred through fraud or misrepresentation. Second, the President was forbidden from imposing sanctions against foreign persons if this threatened to jeopardise US procurement of essential defence articles or services. Moreover, sanctions could not be imposed if the export, transfer or activity in question occurred ‘to’ an MTCR state. Presidential waivers were permitted in two instances. First, if the sanctions pertained to an entity that provided a service essential to US national security. Second, if the target of the sanctions was the sole supplier of that

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product or service, or if the need for that product or service could not be met quickly enough through enhancing manufacturing processes and technological developments in the US. If the President chose to waive sanctions against foreign persons for reasons of national security, Congress was to be informed of the rationale and circumstances behind the decision.78 Despite this attempt to allay the administration’s anxieties, President Bush reacted negatively to Section 17 when he signed the NDAA on 5 November. The President spoke of his concern over those provisions he perceived detracted from the President’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy, including negotiations with other countries. In reference to Section 1702, the President wrote in his signing statement of concern it would be ‘construed as requiring the Secretary of State to negotiate with foreign countries regarding the export of certain goods and technology’. Indeed, the President asserted that he construed this section ‘to be precatory rather than mandatory’.79 In doing so, he used a tool that has been described as clearly ‘outside the constitutional process’. Moreover, his attack on the provision’s constitutional authority was in reaction to what has been described as a generally supportive section of the act.80 Section 1702 merely sought to give the Secretary of State responsibility for negotiating agreements on missile nonproliferation with other countries. For example, it permitted the State Department to treat non-MTCR states like regime members if they could reach an agreement with the US on missile nonproliferation controls.81 The President’s signing statement was indicative of his administration’s response to Congressional attempts to initiate legislation that would affect foreign policy. In addition to signing statements, Bush utilised the more traditional Presidential veto to defeat Congressionally inspired legislation. In some instances, Bush even vetoed legislation and issued an executive order instead to address the subject-matter in question. One such example was the ‘Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990’ sent to the White House for the President’s signature on 6 November.82 The Omnibus bill included several missile-relevant provisions. First, the bill contained a section titled the ‘Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1990’, which included provisions for improved export controls for and sanctions against the acquisition, use or stockpiling of CBW. Second, the EAA and the AECA were amended to include Representative Berman’s provision which required the President to impose sanctions on persons who violate the MTCR.

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Third, the act urged that American companies be denied the right ‘to export goods and technology (chemical weapons and missile technology) to China’, unless Beijing provided adequate assurances these items would not be retransferred to third countries. The Omnibus bill also prohibited the export of American satellites for launching on Chinese space rockets. Fourth, the act imposed sanctions against Iraq because of its ‘long-standing violations of international law’. Finally, the act re-authorised the EAA.83 When the EAA had expired on 30 September, the administration issued Executive Order 12730 to extend the authorities and controls contained in the act. In doing so, President Bush said it was his ‘intention to terminate the executive order upon the enactment into law of a bill re-authorising the authorities contained in the EAA’.84 Despite this commitment, Bush pocket-vetoed the ‘Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990’ on 16 November.85 The administration had opposed the act on several grounds. It was asserted that a missile sanctions law had already been enacted and sanctions had already been imposed on Iraq. The administration also claimed the act would interfere ‘unduly’ with the President’s ‘constitutional responsibilities for carrying out foreign policy’.86 Moreover, President Bush claimed the act would undermine co-operation between the US and its partners in the international effort to constrain the proliferation of CBW. Similar to its opposition to the missile section of the NDAA for 1991, the administration opposed the Omnibus Act because it would have imposed ‘rigid’ sanctions against foreign proliferators. The White House argued such a sanctions law might ‘provoke friendly countries’ which were ‘essential’ to America’s efforts to ‘resist Iraqi aggression’. In support of his veto, Bush referred specifically to the lessons of Operation Desert Shield that had supposedly taught the United States about the need to secure multilateral support for such initiatives. In summarising the reasons why he was rejecting the act, Bush also asserted it would hamper US efforts to prevent the spread of WMD and to relax export restrictions on the legitimate sale of dual-use goods to ‘acceptable users’.87 In a manner indicative of his strategy for conducting foreign policy beyond the purview of Congress, Bush announced instead he was taking a series of steps ‘under existing authorities to ensure that mutually shared objectives are met in a timely and effective manner’.88 On 16 November, Bush declared a national emergency regarding the proliferation of CBW through Executive Order 12735.89 The President said the order included the same sanctions contained in the Omnibus

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Bill and even established additional CBW export controls. He also claimed the order went further in some respects because it established a set of clear and ‘stringent sanctions’, at the same time as ‘encouraging negotiations with US friends and allies’. The executive order directed the Secretaries of Commerce and State to use their existing authorities to control exports that would assist foreign countries to acquire ‘the capability to produce, stockpile, deliver, or use chemical or biological weapons’.90 It also directed both secretaries to use their existing authorities, under Executive Order 12730 and the AECA, respectively, to prohibit exports that would help foreign CBW programmes. Moreover, the Secretary of State was instructed to pursue negotiations with other states to adopt effective and comparable CBW measures, and to achieve a comprehensive global convention to prohibit the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The order established a sanctions authority to punish foreign countries and persons who proliferated in such goods and technology. The Commerce Department was given the authority to impose sanctions against foreign persons who knowingly or materially contribute to the efforts of certain foreign countries to use, develop, stockpile or otherwise acquire CBW; the sanctions included denying US government contracts and prohibiting imports into the US. To preserve the President’s foreign policy flexibility, however, the Secretary of State was given the authority to waive or terminate sanctions if reliable evidence existed that the violator had ceased the prohibited activity. The Secretary of State was also given the authority to impose sanctions against foreign countries if they develop, produce, stockpile, prepare to use, or use, CBW in violation of international law. These sanctions included; denying foreign assistance, opposing Multilateral Development Bank assistance, denying credit or other financial assistance, prohibiting US arms sales, denying national security-sensitive goods and technology, and other export and import restrictions. The Secretary of State was authorised to lift sanctions when it was perceived to be in the foreign or national security interests of the United States.91 In support of Executive Order 12735, White House Press Secretary Fitzwater subsequently announced the administration’s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) on 13 December. Fitzwater claimed the initiative supplemented existing measures in the nuclear and biological fields.92

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Congress and missile nonproliferation, January 1991– January 1993 Iraq’s missile attacks against American forces and allies precipitated an unprecedented level of Congressional concern with the issue of proliferation. More proliferation-related hearings were held and legislation introduced in the 102nd Congress than at any other time previously.93 Indeed, the Congressional Research Service reported in July that over 80 pieces of legislation with proliferation-related provisions awaited consideration in the House and Senate.94 Approximately 22 of these proposals contained missile-related provisions.95 Numerous hearings were also held in 1991 and 1992 to consider past, present and future US arms transfer and nonproliferation policies. Shortly after the cessation of hostilities, the House Committee on Ways and Means considered the past and future Administration and Enforcement of US Export Control Programs.96 The Director of Central Intelligence, Robert M. Gates, later presented the intelligence community’s assessment of Weapons Proliferation in the New World Order.97 In March 1992, the Joint Economic Committee of Congress subsequently addressed the issue of the Arms Trade and Nonproliferation in the Middle East.98 These were just three of the dozens of hearings held to consider the multivariate aspects of the proliferation phenomena between March 1991 and January 1993. By the end of the Bush administration, this heightened awareness had resulted in the enactment of at least three additional laws that affected the implementation of US missile nonproliferation policy.99 In contrast to Section 17 of the NDAA for 1991, these requirements were relatively modest in nature. The ‘Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1992 and 1993’ of 28 October 1991, contained two relevant provisions. The ‘Foreign Policy Provisions’ section incorporated a reporting requirement on China’s weapons proliferation, human rights and trade practices. The President was required to submit a report to the appropriate Congressional committees which detailed Beijing’s past and potential transfers of its M-Series of ballistic missiles, and the associated technology and assistance, to states in the Middle East and South Asia; the report was also required to include a description of China’s position vis-à-vis adopting MTCR guidelines.100 The section titled ‘Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991’ made it US policy to promote international agreements that prohibit the transfer of missiles capable of carrying chemical and biological weapons.101 The section directed the President to use the authority of

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the AECA to control the spread of defence articles and services that could contribute to CBW proliferation. Furthermore, the Secretary of Commerce was instructed to establish a list of goods and technology that could contribute substantially to the efforts of a foreign government or group to develop, produce, stockpile or deliver CBW; individual validated licences were needed to export any of these items. The President was instructed to impose sanctions against persons that participated in, or had contributed to, the development, stockpiling, delivery or use of CBW.102 The second statute was contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1992 and 1993 enacted on 5 December 1991. Section 1097 of the Act required the President to submit an annual report to Congress detailing all transfers of weapons, technology, or materials that could be used to ‘deliver, manufacture, or weaponize nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons . . . to any country other than a country referred to in subsection’.103 Each report was to detail all transfers of MTCR equipment and technology the Secretary of Defense believed might be used for delivering WMD in any country. The reports were also required to describe the status of missile programmes in these countries and to explain US policy regarding the transfer of MTCR equipment or technology to foreign missile programmes, including space launch ventures.104 The final statute was the ‘National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993’, enacted on 23 October 1992. This contained two proliferationrelated sections; the ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1992’ and Howard Berman’s ‘Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992’. Berman’s section required the President to impose sanctions and controls ‘with respect to Iran, Iraq, and those nations and persons who assist them in acquiring’ WMD, in conjunction with those US statutes regarding the nonproliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.105 Beyond these hearings and legislation, the administration imposed sanctions on several foreign commercial and government entities in 1991 and 1992 in conjunction with the new Congressionally inspired missile sanctions law. Entities in China, India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa and Syria were punished for participating knowingly in activities prohibited by the MTCR.106 Although Chapter 5 considers in detail the circumstances in which the administration applied these sanctions, one instance illustrates how the administration’s preferred strategy for dealing with China’s proliferation activities diverged from the policy advocated by several

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Congressmen. In June 1991, the Bush administration imposed Category II sanctions on the China Great Wall Industry Corporation, the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation and Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission. They were punished because the State Department determined they had ‘engaged in’ activities related to the transfer of M-11 missile technology from China to Pakistan. The sanctions included denying these entities all US export licences and government contracts for items covered by the MTCR annex for a period of two years.107 Within eight months, however, the administration had lifted sanctions from the two Chinese entities by asserting that it was ‘essential to the national security’ of the United States.108 The decision to lift the sanctions reflected a fundamental difference of opinion with several members of Congress over the best policy for constraining Beijing’s missile technology transfers. Throughout the duration of the Bush administration, the White House espoused a policy of maintaining a ‘comprehensive’ engagement of China. This policy involved engaging Beijing on all aspects of its behaviour which caused concern in the US; proliferation, human rights and unfair trade practices.109 By remaining engaged with Beijing, the administration hoped to modify China’s policy in these areas in a manner consistent with American interests and international norms. President Bush explained the rationale behind this approach in a speech at Yale University in May 1991. Bush claimed the best way to promote political and economic reform in China was for the US to remain actively engaged with Beijing on all issues.110 In reference to China’s missile technology transfers, the President said he advocated a policy that urged Beijing to exercise restraint in its weapons exports and which banned the transfer of US technology and equipment to those Chinese entities that violated missile nonproliferation norms. Bush asserted his administration ensured it was acting as ‘a catalyst for positive change’ in China because it pursued these separate policies and did not favour linking Beijing’s deeds in one area to the overall conduct of US policy. Although the President confessed that compelling arguments existed for ‘cutting ties’ with and ‘isolating’ Beijing, he said such a policy was ‘not wise’. He argued instead that the policy best suited to exporting freedom and democracy to China, and changing its behaviour, was one which kept Beijing’s MFN status intact, and encouraged the cultivation of contacts with the Chinese people at all levels.111 Although Congress shared White House concern over China’s

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conduct in these areas, a difference of opinion existed regarding the best method for rectifying Beijing’s behaviour. In contrast to the policy of engagement, several Congressmen advocated a harsher approach.112 This divergence of opinion became most evident during the final eighteen months of the Bush Presidency. On 17 April 1991, Senator Biden addressed the Senate on the issue of China as the ‘Rogue Elephant’ of weapons proliferation. In reference to the administration’s so-called ‘China syndrome’, Biden argued that the White House refused to accept that Chinese diplomats were ‘perfectly willing’ to tell the United States one thing while Chinese arms merchants went ahead and did another. He referred specifically to the administration’s meeting with the Chinese leadership in March 1991, after which Assistant Secretary of State Solomon reported that Beijing had said it would ‘honor the parameters of the MTCR’. Biden said China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated the very same day that those countries which were not members of the MTCR should not be obliged to adopt the regime’s guidelines.113 In light of this perceived failure of US diplomacy, Biden recommended retaliating against China with the ‘clear and unequivocal message’ of denying Beijing its MFN status.114 Several hearings were held in 1991 to consider American policy towards China. The issue of tieing Beijing’s MFN status to its performance in other areas such as nonproliferation featured prominently. In May, several subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee deliberated the issue of the Most Favored Nation Status for the People’s Republic of China.115 The same committee again considered the Renewal of MFN Status for the People’s Republic of China in June 1991.116 On three occasions in June, the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations considered current policy issues in Sino-American Relations.117 Beyond this oversight role, Congress attempted to formulate US missile nonproliferation policy towards China. By July 1991, several bills had been introduced which proposed to tie the future of China’s MFN status to its proliferation, human rights and trade records.118 Indeed, the House and Senate subsequently passed two pieces of legislation in 1992 that made China’s MFN status dependent upon the improvement of its missile nonproliferation record; the ‘United States–China Act of 1991’ (HR 2212) and the ‘United States–China Act of 1992’ (HR 5318).119 Both bills were later vetoed by the White House because they did not conform with the administration’s policy towards China. The

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White House vetoed HR 2212 on 2 March by referring to ‘recent agreements’ the administration had garnered from China to ‘abide by the MTCR guidelines’, to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), to protect American intellectual property rights, and to discuss US human rights concerns in China. The President claimed progress had only been possible because of his administration’s policy of maintaining a comprehensive engagement of China on ‘several separate fronts’. It was argued this policy had encouraged Beijing to ‘act responsibly without leaving any doubts about the consequence of Chinese misdeeds’. Perhaps more significantly, Bush claimed HR 2212 would have severely handicapped US business in China by punishing American workers and destroying American jobs. The President also said that placing conditions on the renewal of China’s MFN status would undermine the position of Western-oriented, reformist elements in China, thereby bolstering opposition to economic reform and democracy.120 The White House subsequently informed Congress on 2 June 1992 that it was extending China’s MFN status for an additional 12 months. In doing so, the President emphasised the need to avoid isolating Beijing if the US wanted to continue influencing China. Bush again cited China’s declaration to adhere to the MTCR as an example of how his policy of engagement had worked to positively influence Beijing’s nonproliferation policy.121 In a similar manner to HR 2212, the Bush administration also vetoed the ‘United States–China Act of 1992’ on 28 September 1992. The President said the bill’s attachment of ‘broad conditions to China’s MFN renewal’ would detract from, as opposed to contribute to, the advancement of US goals, including missile nonproliferation.122 It should be noted that the administration’s dialogue with China on missile nonproliferation is considered in much greater detail in Chapter 5.

Conclusion Congress strengthened American missile nonproliferation efforts in two principal ways during the Bush administration. First, it conducted oversight of the administration’s missile nonproliferation policy. This was accomplished primarily through committee hearings in the House and Senate, in which representatives from the executive branch were called upon to justify and defend the administration’s policies for restricting the spread of ballistic missiles in the developing world. During these hearings, numerous administration officials provided

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insight into the missile proliferation threat and the nature of the US and multilateral nonproliferation response. On several occasions, these hearings cast valuable light on the issues causing controversy between the various executive agencies responsible for implementing US policy in conjunction with the MTCR. This focused primarily on the need to balance America’s commercial, national security and other foreign policy interests when implementing nonproliferation policy. In addition, several Congressmen introduced bills designed to rectify perceived shortcomings in US policy. Congress’s lack of an opportunity to oversee and ratify the negotiation of the MTCR in the 1980s contributed to why these Congressmen sought to enact legislation in this area. Indeed, many Senators and Representatives viewed the MTCR as a regime beset with flaws because it had no international agency to ensure its guidelines were enforced consistently by each of the member states. Another problem was perceived to be the lack any procedure to punish entities that chose to export controlled technology, profiting from the restraint shown by others. The most notable bills sought to require the President to impose mandatory sanctions against American and foreign persons who participated knowingly in activities that contributed to missile proliferation. These were inspired by the need to obtain stricter interpretation and enforcement of the MTCR guidelines by several of the regime’s members in Western Europe and to encourage non-regime countries to abide by the guidelines. A missile sanctions authority was perceived as the best way to insert ‘teeth’ into the regime by providing for penalties to be imposed on American or foreign persons, companies or any other entities that participated in prohibited activities. Enactment of a missile sanctions law in November 1990 was by far Congress’s greatest contribution to the pursuit of US missile nonproliferation objectives over the period in question. Strong bipartisan support for missile nonproliferation initiatives made it possible for Congress to enact this punitive sanctions law without getting too caught up with the wider commercial and foreign policy considerations the administration was forced to address. Indeed, the inability of the executive branch to treat missile nonproliferation in isolation contributed to the Bush administration’s opposition to the new law. Despite this opposition, the administration imposed or threatened to impose sanctions on several entities in non-MTCR countries in 1991 and 1992. This was done as part of an approach to solicit nonproliferation pledges from several notable countries of missile proliferation concern, including China, Russia and Israel. Chapter 5 proceeds by

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examining the administration’s attempts to persuade these countries to adhere to global missile nonproliferation norms between January 1989 and January 1993, in part by imposing or threatening to impose missile sanctions.

5 Beyond the MTCR: Negotiating the Adherence of Non-regime Suppliers to Nonproliferation Norms

While the preceding chapters examined why and how domestic American arrangements for implementing the MTCR were enhanced, and how other member states were encouraged to improve enforcement of its guidelines, this chapter considers how the Bush administration attempted to solicit nonproliferation commitments from several non-regime suppliers of ballistic missile technology. Specifically, consideration is given to the administration’s bilateral attempts to gain the adherence of China, Israel and the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia) to the MTCR guidelines. In part, this involved the threatened and actual use of penalties under the new missile sanctions law in an attempt to gain commitments to missile nonproliferation norms. While this contributed somewhat to the administration’s dialogues with China, Israel and Russia, the imposition of sanctions against North Korean entities for their missile proliferation activities is illustrated to have had little chance of succeeding. This was because Pyongyang was already isolated internationally and subject to a comprehensive American embargo.

Beyond the MTCR, January 1989–January 1991 The Soviet Union When the Bush administration took office in January 1989, the Soviet Union remained highly sceptical about the MTCR. The regime was perceived as inherently discriminatory and directed against the Soviet Union, along the same lines as the Co-ordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls. This opposition was most apparent in the Soviet Union’s suggestion of ways to make the MTCR more effec-

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tive and non-discriminatory, as well as its proposal of alternative approaches to address missile proliferation.1 In May 1989, the Novosti newspaper reported that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Karpov favoured lowering the regime’s range and payload parameters to 150 km and 200 kg, respectively.2 Moreover, Karpov suggested the regime should be replaced with a new organisation based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which would constrain missile proliferation but promote peaceful uses of outer space at the same time.3 This IAEA-type organisation would have been supervised by the UN and included countries like India and Brazil because they possessed indigenous space launch and missile programmes.4 This coolness towards the MTCR, and Moscow’s proposal of alternatives, reflected in part the influence of the Soviet military industrial complex which wanted to continue freely exporting tactical ballistic missiles. As a direct result of Moscow’s long history of exporting missile technology, the administration assigned a high priority to engaging the Soviet Union on the issue of missile nonproliferation. Moscow’s opposition to the MTCR, however, meant the administration was initially unsure of what the basis for US–Soviet co-operation could or should be. Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, told the Senate Committee on Armed Services in May 1989 that although Moscow was unwilling to join the MTCR, it shared America’s concern with missile proliferation.5 At the opening of the Vienna negotiations on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in March 1989, for example, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had referred to the threat posed by the spread of ballistic missiles with ranges of 2,500 km in the Middle East and South West Asia; the same type of missile the superpowers had agreed to dismantle under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987.6 Shevardnadze’s remarks were direct references to Israel’s Jericho-2 missile programme, Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of DF-3 IRBM from China and India’s Agni IRBM programme.7 Holmes also told the Armed Services Committee that it would be very difficult to persuade Moscow to join the MTCR as it existed at that time.8 In July 1989 Vincent DeCain, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, subsequently told a Congressional hearing that the administration accorded great importance to obtaining an understanding with Moscow on a ‘common basis for controlling missile proliferation’, so long as this did not undermine the MTCR and other nonproliferation policies the

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United States pursued with its allies.9 Despite Moscow’s scepticism towards the MTCR, the administration appeared to make significant progress with the Soviet Union in 1989 and the first half of 1990. Although this was facilitated through intensive diplomacy by the State Department, it was driven primarily by ‘New Thinking’ in Soviet foreign and defence policy championed by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and Shevardnadze at the Foreign Ministry. This policy emphasised the importance of the Soviet Union being seen as a co-operative and reliable actor on the international stage. According to William Potter and Adam Stulberg, the new approach was based on certain assumptions regarding the nature of international politics in the modern world including; the concepts of mutual security and complex interdependence, the de-ideolisation of Soviet foreign policy, flexibility and compromise in negotiations, and the unwinnability of nuclear war. Potter and Stulberg argued this approach involved increased Soviet concern with the negative impact of the arms trade on international stability, which resulted in Moscow’s promotion of efforts to enhance regional and global stability, to reduce the chance of nuclear conflict, and to limit the international trade in weaponry.10 ‘New Thinking’ also resulted in the Foreign Ministry’s apparent willingness to co-operate with the United States on issues related to missile nonproliferation. Indeed, from the beginning of 1989 through the first half of 1990, the influence of the Foreign Ministry grew at the expense of ‘hard-line opponents of the MTCR’ in Moscow. These opponents included officials from the defence industry, the Ministry of Defence, and the State Commission for Military Industries (VPK).11 At a meeting with Shevardnadze and other Soviet officials in May 1989, the administration initiated its missile nonproliferation dialogue when Secretary of State James Baker discussed the possibility of the Soviet Union joining the MTCR.12 According to the UnderSecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew, the American delegation sought ‘to do some greater consciousness raising’ regarding the weight the administration wanted to give the issues of missile and chemical weapons proliferation on the US–Soviet agenda. Bartholomew said the administration’s specific objective was to obtain ‘fully reciprocal, shared, common assessments’ of the missile problem. This was deemed particularly important because Moscow knew a great deal more than Washington about certain missile projects because of its past supplier relationships with several proliferating countries.13

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According to Bartholomew, Moscow was ready to recognise that it had a vested interest in the issue because of its geographical location to the regions in which missile proliferation was becoming a serious problem.14 The administration brought up the issue again during the December 1989 superpower summit in Malta. During the summit, President Bush proposed several issues for future discussion. These included accelerating the START process, completing the Soviet Union’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status by their next major summit, and signing the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 1990. In addition, the President proposed that Moscow join the international missile nonproliferation effort by adhering to the limits developed by the United States and its allies in the MTCR.15 This proposal set in motion a series of meetings over the next six months culminating in the joint US–Soviet statement on nonproliferation of June 1990. While some of these talks took place in the context of Baker–Shevardnadze ministerial meetings, others involved periodic gatherings at the expert level.16 In February 1990, Baker and Shevardnadze met in Moscow to prepare for the US–Soviet summit scheduled for June. A broad range of issues were discussed including the American and Soviet positions on arms control and disarmament. In addition, they noted recent consultations between their experts on the issues of missile technology control and chemical and nuclear nonproliferation. The experts had agreed to draw up a document for the American and Soviet leaders to consider which would form the basis of bilateral co-operation between the two countries in all areas of nonproliferation.17 According to Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Richard Clarke, the Soviets agreed during the ministerial to adhere to the MTCR guidelines. The two sides also discussed Moscow’s potential membership in the regime.18 The February meeting appeared to signal a fundamental change in the Soviet attitude towards compliance with the MTCR.19 Despite this change of heart, Moscow attached a condition to its adherence. The Soviets insisted on the right to continue transferring SCUD-B missiles to Afghanistan until a political solution was reached to the situation in that country.20 Clarke later told Congress that, in defence of Moscow’s position on Afghanistan, the MTCR had been written in such a way that missile sales were permitted to take place between the original partners who were bound by defensive arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty. However, he reassured Congress that

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Moscow had been told full membership in the MTCR would be dependent on its resolution of the Afghan missile issue.21 In March, the Soviet Union asked the administration if it could join the MTCR de jure as it had already begun adhering to the regime’s guidelines de facto. Although the administration’s response was favourable, the State Department informed Moscow that Washington could not take this decision unilaterally and it would have to be taken collectively by the regime’s entire membership. According to Clarke, the administration told Moscow the issue would be brought up at the next MTCR plenary in July 1990.22 After six months of discussions, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement on nonproliferation at the end of their Washington summit on 4 June 1990. Both countries declared their commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, the missiles capable of carrying such weapons, and certain other missiles and missile technology subject to the controls of the MTCR. In doing so, both countries committed themselves to working together, and with other members of the international community, towards developing concrete measures to restrain such proliferation. In the missile field, they reaffirmed their support for MTCR objectives and their intent to examine regional approaches to reduce the threat posed by missile proliferation. In addition, they expressed their intention to continue their dialogues with other countries on missile nonproliferation. The joint communiqué said the United States and the Soviet Union were taking steps to constrain missile proliferation on a global basis including export controls and other domestic approaches. In addition, it was noted that Washington and Moscow had established a system to facilitate the bilateral exchange of information regarding these controls and procedures.23 In early July, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Elizabeth Verville travelled to Moscow to discuss MTCR procedures with Soviet officials.24 Later in the month, Richard Clarke told Congress that the Soviet Union appeared to be serious about constraining missile proliferation. This was deemed an important development because of Moscow’s past history of exporting SCUD-B and other missiles to numerous countries in the developing world. Clarke emphasised the significance of the joint communiqué because the issue was a ‘relatively new element’ in Moscow’s bilateral dialogue with the United States.25 In July, however, the MTCR member states delayed the decision on whether to allow the Soviet Union to join the regime. The decision

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was put off until the next plenary session scheduled for Tokyo at the end of 1990.26 Despite this delay, improved US–Soviet relations were typified by Moscow’s unprecedented step of issuing a joint statement with the United States to condemn Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. In addition, Moscow severed its arms supplies to Baghdad and was reported to have provided intelligence on its military capabilities, including SCUD-B missiles, to the Bush administration.27 Indeed, Moscow did not exercise its traditional Cold War policy of attempting to block American-initiated United Nations Security Council Resolutions vis-à-vis the sanctioning and subsequent physical removal of Iraq from Kuwait. This constituted an unprecedented level of cooperation between the former adversaries. By the autumn of 1990, Gorbachev’s policy of ‘New Thinking’ appeared to have resulted in Moscow dropping its opposition to the MTCR and its commitment to work with the United States in the area of missile nonproliferation. However, although the MTCR member states were scheduled to decide on whether to admit the Soviet Union during the Tokyo Plenary in late 1990, this meeting was postponed until March 1991 because of the crisis triggered by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.28 Moreover, despite the progress which appeared to have been made with the Soviet Union on its adherence to the MTCR, doubt was cast in November 1990 over Moscow’s commitment to missile nonproliferation. This became apparent when the Bush administration learned that Glavkosmos, the marketing agency for the Soviet rocket and space sector, had negotiated a contract to supply the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) with cryogenic rocket engines as well as the related manufacturing technology and knowhow. Under the contract, Glavkosmos was scheduled to deliver the first engines in late 1994, or early 1995, for India’s Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV).29 VPK reportedly authorised Glavkosmos to proceed with negotiations shortly after the joint statement on nonproliferation issued by Bush and Gorbachev at the Washington Summit in June. Indeed, officials from VPK have since been described as having ‘openly denounced the MTCR’ and done their utmost ‘to compromise’ attempts by the Soviet Union to come closer to its conditions’.30 For the ISRO deal to proceed, however, the permission of the Export Control Commission – comprising senior officials from several departments – was required before it could proceed. Prior to December 1990, this had proved difficult given the Foreign Ministry’s concerns about the likely negative American reaction to a decision to proceed.

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According to Alexander Pikayev et al., the resignation of Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister in December simplified the commission’s adoption of the deal. As a result of Shevardnadze’s departure, the head of Glavkosmos, Alexander Dunayev, was able to take advantage of this bureaucratic opening to push through the contract. His position was strengthened by the deteriorating political and economic situation in the Soviet Union during late 1990 and early 1991. In part, this had resulted in a lack of centrally available funds for financing the Soviet space sector; thus, raising the significance of exports to the Soviet rocket industry and the defence sector as a whole.31 Indeed, various reports about the ISRO deal placed its value at between $200 and $600 million.32 From late 1990, the Glavkosmos–ISRO deal became a highly contentious issue in US–Soviet (and subsequently Russian) relations. Indeed, it was the main reason why Washington’s missile nonproliferation dialogue with Moscow rapidly deteriorated from November 1990. The Bush administration viewed the deal as a Category I violation of the MTCR, breaking Moscow’s commitment to adhere to the MTCR guidelines. In December 1990, the US Embassy in Moscow responded by sending a ‘non-paper’ to the Soviet government in which it was asked to reconsider the deal.33 The People’s Republic of China US–China relations had progressed by 1989 to the point where both countries shared several common interests. According to Weguang Shao, these included the need to counterbalance the Soviet Union’s nuclear and conventional military power and to preserve a balanced strategic and economic environment in East Asia. Shao said Washington and Beijing had come to agree on the desirability of a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question and that China should play an active role in the UN Security Council.34 Moreover, the relationship had evolved to the extent that trade between the two countries was growing rapidly and the United States was selling weapons to China.35 This relatively cordial state of affairs was reflected in President Bush’s reply to a question from the official Chinese news agency Xinhua on 6 February. Asked what he thought about the state of US–China relations, the President said despite their obvious differences the two countries had a ‘strong’ relationship. He added that his impending trip to China would be a way to talk further ‘about common objectives’ and to ‘hammer out’ differences on specific issues, such as trade and nonproliferation.36 The President

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subsequently visited Beijing and discussed American missile proliferation concerns with the Chinese leadership, among other things.37 Moreover, the White House announced on 13 April that China and Saudi Arabia had convinced the administration that Saudi Arabia’s Chinese-made missiles would not be fitted with nuclear warheads.38 The relative cordiality in US–China relations was shattered in June 1989 following the violent crackdown by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. The Bush administration reacted to the violence and reprisals meted out by the Chinese authorities by imposing sanctions on China. On 5 June, all government-to-government military sales and commercial weapons exports to China were stopped and all exchanges involving American and Chinese military leaders were suspended.39 On 20 June, all high-level US government exchanges with Chinese officials were suspended and America’s representatives at international financial institutions were instructed to seek to defer decisions on new loans to China.40 In imposing these sanctions, however, the administration emphasised that China remained a very important country which the United States hoped to engage in a productive relationship.41 This view influenced the evolution of the administration’s overall policy towards, and missile nonproliferation dialogue with, Beijing over the next three and a half years. This approach favoured ‘engaging’ China instead of punishing Beijing by imposing broad economic and diplomatic sanctions such as revoking Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status with the United States.42 The policy was predicated on a belief that if Beijing’s commercial ties and communication with the world’s democracies were jeopardised by the imposition of broad sanctions, the position of market-oriented reformers in China would be weakened. Thus, continued trade with and investment in China were favoured in order to promote economic and political reform in that country. It was argued that if the United States punished China severely, then more conservative and hardline elements in the Chinese leadership would be given an excuse to deteriorate Beijing’s relationship with Washington, and to blame China’s economic problems on the United States. By remaining engaged, the administration sought to preserve its leverage on Beijing, at the same time as using selective means to address specific issues of concern in their bilateral relationship.43 Despite the administration’s decision to refrain from imposing broad punitive measures, China viewed the sanctions as a violation of

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its September 1988 agreement with the Reagan administration to behave ‘responsibly’ in its missile sales. China subsequently resumed its negotiations to sell the M-9 to Syria.44 In an attempt to stop this sale from proceeding, and to keep Beijing engaged, President Bush sent his National Security Advisor (NSA), General Brent Scowcroft, and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to China on 10 and 11 December 1989. Scowcroft and Eagleburger raised several issues of concern in China. These included the need for an early end to martial law, increased tolerance for political dissent, a return to normal contact with western embassies and the halting of China’s medium-range missile sales.45 In the missile field, the Chinese gave Scowcroft general assurances they would refrain from selling medium-range missiles to countries in the Middle East or the M-9 to Syria.46 President Bush told a press conference on 11 December that he was pleased to note the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s statement that no more missiles would be sold to the Middle East. Bush described this statement as a ‘very sound development’ vindicating the administration’s decision for Scowcroft to visit Beijing and avoid completely isolating China.47 Within a matter of days, the administration appeared to reward China’s missile nonproliferation assurances by lifting some of the sanctions imposed in June. On 19 December, prohibitions on the Import-Export Bank’s financing of trade with China and its ability to extend loans to the country were waived. Moreover, the administration gave the go-ahead for three American communications satellites to be launched on board Chinese SLV.48 According to Tammy Halevy, it was no coincidence this go-ahead occurred shortly after Scowcroft’s visit. Halevy said China’s desire to enter the satellite launch market was an issue Beijing had brought up with the United States on several previous occasions. Thus, it seemed the administration rewarded Beijing for providing assurances on missile nonproliferation by granting China access to the satellite launch market.49 According to Weguang Shao, the administration hoped that by the time Congress returned from its recess after the Christmas break, sufficient progress would have been made for the legislators not to demand further punitive actions against China. Indeed, martial law was terminated in China on 10 January 1990.50 Shortly after the Scowcroft trip, a spokesman from the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed China had always acted ‘responsibly’ regarding the sale of medium-range missiles. Apart from Saudi Arabia, the spokesman said China had not and did not intend to sell medium-

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range missiles to countries in the Middle East. Moreover, the spokesman made a specific reference to the M-9 as a short-range system. These remarks highlighted a potential flaw in the administration’s dialogue with China because the delegation in Beijing had not discussed the actual definition of what constituted short- and medium-range missiles.51 China classified medium-range missiles as capable of between 1,000 and 3,000 km and viewed missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km as short-range.52 Bates Gill argued that in Chinese eyes this approach justified exports of 600 km-range M-9 and 280 km-range M-11 missiles because they were viewed as shortrange.53 Despite this problem, the administration remained confident throughout most of 1990 that China had cancelled the M-9 deal with Syria. This was reflected in the administration’s continued normalisation of relations with China. On 24 May 1990, White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater announced that China’s MFN status had been extended for another 12 months. This was justified on the grounds that emigration from China had continued at respectable levels over the preceding year. The President also determined that revoking MFN would damage American interests. It was claimed MFN gave millions of Chinese people and thousands of enterprises a stake in Beijing’s marketoriented reforms. Moreover, China was identified as America’s 10th largest trading partner with trade between the countries totalling $18 billion in 1989. Fitzwater added that MFN renewal did not mean the United States had re-established normal relations with Beijing because this would require China to make major improvements in its human rights record and to reinstate reforms.54 In addition, the President emphasised that MFN renewal was ‘not a reward’ to China.55 China’s assurances to act ‘responsibly’ in its missile sales were subsequently cast into doubt in December 1990. This occurred as a result of reports that China was continuing to market missiles in the Middle East. The CIA, for example, reportedly revealed that Syria had ordered 30 mobile M-9 launchers and an unspecified number of missiles in a deal worth $285 million.56 Israel Israel was another significant country of missile proliferation concern from which the administration sought a nonproliferation commitment. The administration was concerned specifically about Israel’s provision of ballistic missile technology to South Africa. This first became apparent in January 1989 when the administration received

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what has been described as a ‘reliable intelligence report’ that Israel was assisting Pretoria in its programme to develop a medium-range missile. The State Department responded through its ambassador in Israel who delivered a series of official protests to the Israeli government.57 In addition, a senior official from the State Department brought the issue up with a visiting Israeli delegation in Washington.58 The Israelis denied involvement with the South Africans in the missile field. Further evidence came to light in June 1989 when an American satellite photographed what appeared to be preparations for an imminent missile test at South Africa’s Overberg Test Range (OTB). The photographs suggested the site was configured in the same way as that used by Israel to launch its Shavit SLV, a modified version of its Jericho-2 ballistic missile. On 5 July, what South Africa described as a ‘booster rocket’ was launched from OTB and travelled approximately 1,450 km south over the ocean. Following the test, it was reported the rocket had been a modified version of the Jericho-2.59 However, both Israel and South Africa denied any collaboration had taken place. The South African Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence said they had no knowledge of such co-operation, while the Israeli Ministry of Defence said the reports were ‘totally untrue’ and ‘completely unfounded’. Officials from the Israeli Ministry of Defence cited the Israeli cabinet’s decision of March 1987 to sever co-operative military ties with the white South African government.60 According to a 1990 United Nations report on South Africa’s missile programme, Pretoria had several possible motivations for developing a medium-range missile capability; export potential, promotion of bilateral relations with Israel by offering OTB as a less restrictive and more secret test site, keeping South Africa’s military options open given the relative decline of its armed forces, and developing an offensive delivery system capable of penetrating air defences.61 Israel’s reported motivation to supply missile technology was the acquisition from South Africa of uranium for its nuclear weapon programme.62 In addition, Israel may have been motivated by the possibility of gaining access to a discrete test site from which to test missiles. In October 1989, the Bush administration confirmed the ‘booster rocket’ had been a Jericho-2 despite the Israeli government’s denials.63 The confirmation was reported by NBC News which said American satellite imagery had shown the rocket’s plume to closely resemble that of the Jericho. This was perceived as concrete evidence of Israel’s involvement in South Africa’s programme to develop a medium-range

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missile.64 Indeed, Aaron Karp said little evidence existed to suggest Pretoria would have been capable of developing this type of missile without major technical assistance from abroad.65 Yet a South African defence spokesman again denied Israeli–South African co-operation, and Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha claimed he had no knowledge of such co-operation.66 The Pentagon’s Deputy for Nonproliferation, Henry Sokolski, later told a Congressional committee that reports of Israeli–South African co-operation were viewed with great seriousness at the highest levels in the Department of Defense. He added that the Pentagon had discussed these reports with the Israeli Ministry of Defense at the highest levels.67 Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticoMilitary Affairs, Richard Clarke, told the same committee the situation illustrated how the US government could have little direct influence through export controls on some occasions because certain countries [such as Israel] had indigenous missile development capabilities. Clarke referred to the similar situation that existed with North Korea, where Pyongyang was capable of domestically producing missiles and marketing them in the Middle East. He added that because Israeli–South African co-operation was at the government-to-government level, it would be very difficult to stop.68 In November 1990, the issue of Israeli-South African missile co-operation returned to centre stage when Pretoria test-fired another ‘booster rocket’.69

Beyond the MTCR, January 1991–January 1993 Despite its opposition to the enactment of a mandatory missile sanctions authority, the administration’s efforts to gain the adherence of significant non-regime suppliers to the MTCR guidelines were strengthened when the law took effect in 1991. In the case of China, Israel and the Soviet Union (subsequently Russia), the administration used the new law as part of a carrot-and-stick strategy designed to solicit missile nonproliferation commitments from these countries. This involved tying development on missile nonproliferation issues with progress in other areas of America’s bilateral relations with these countries. Missile sanctions authority The State Department began implementing the new sanctions law in 1991. The Missile Trade Analysis Group (MTAG) was given the responsibility of identifying the activities of American and foreign entities that were subject to sanctions. In April 1991, Richard Clarke told the

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Joint Economic Committee of Congress that MTAG was vetting a large quantity of information regarding the potentially sanctionable activities of several entities, but its analyses had yet to be completed. According to Clarke, the process of gathering sufficient evidence to prove that sanctionable activities had taken place was very timeconsuming.70 In June, the Secretary of Commerce was given the authority to determine whether American persons had violated the EAA as amended by the NDAA for 1991. Moreover, the Pentagon was given the authority to deny certain US government contracts to American and foreign missile proliferating entities. The Secretary of State was required to inform Congress and the Secretary of the Treasury if it decided to waive sanctions for any reason.71 The administration used the sanctions authority on several occasions in 1991 and 1992 to punish foreign entities for participating in missile proliferation activities. By late September 1992, sanctions had been imposed on entities in several non-MTCR countries including; ARMSCOR of South Africa, the Changgwang Credit Corporation and the Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation of North Korea, the China Great Wall Industry Corporation and the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, Glavkosmos of Russia, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), the Syrian Scientific Research Centre and the Syrian Ministry of Defence, the Iranian Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs Logistics, and Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO). Although these sanctions were imposed by the Department of State, the Commerce Department participated in the implementation process because they involved denying certain export licences to the entities in question.72 By imposing sanctions, the administration sought not just to punish specific entities, but to deter future illicit activities by foreign governments as well as foreign and domestic companies. Israel The administration used the threat of sanctions and the loss of defence co-operation with the United States in an attempt to persuade Israel to stop co-operating with South Africa and to adhere to the MTCR. Simultaneously, the administration imposed sanctions on a South African entity for participating in missile proliferation activities and lobbied the government in Pretoria to terminate its missile and space launch programmes. On 27 September 1991, the State Department announced that the

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Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) had engaged in missile proliferation activities that required the imposition of sanctions.73 Two-year Category I sanctions were imposed because the activity in question involved the transfer of complete missile systems or subsystems listed in the MTCR annex; licences were to be denied for exports of US-controlled items to ARMSCOR, US government contracts with ARMSCOR were to be prohibited, and imports from ARMSCOR into the United States were to be denied. When the sanctions were announced in the Federal Register on 15 October, State said it would discuss the issue with the South African government, together with the measures Pretoria could implement to address American concerns.74 Basically, the administration wanted South Africa to terminate its missile and SLV programmes. Although the State Department and ARMSCOR declined to comment on the specific activity in question, it evidently involved Israel’s transfer of rocket technology. In South African defence circles, it was believed the United States had used nonproliferation as an excuse to reduce the competitiveness of the country’s arms producers. Prior to the sanctions, ARMSCOR Executive Chairman Johan van Vuurgan had accused the permanent members of the Security Council of attempting to create an exclusive arms supplier cartel. In addition, the South African government reacted negatively because the sanctions departed from the current trend in its relationship with the United States at that time, which had been towards lifting apartheid trade controls.75 Despite the fact South Africa must have received missile technology from another country in order to be sanctioned, and Israel’s implication in the country’s rocket programme, the administration did not impose comparable penalties on any Israeli entities. It is widely believed these sanctions were waived in an attempt to induce Israeli compliance with the MTCR.76 This approach appeared to work on 31 December 1991 when Israel began adhering to the regime’s guidelines by adopting controls on the export of missiles and components that could be used to develop weapon delivery platforms capable of carrying 500 kg or heavier payloads to a range of 300 km or more.77 Originally, the Israeli government informed the Bush administration that it would adhere to the guidelines by the end of 1992.78 Reportedly this was because Israel wanted to complete its business with South Africa and an additional deal with China.79 Israel was reported to be helping Beijing improve the guidance systems for its long-range missiles.80 However, the administration appeared to

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persuade Israel to begin adhering earlier by waiving the missile sanctions and threatening to reduce Israel’s defence-related business with the United States.81 If sanctions had been imposed, certain Israeli entities would have been prohibited from importing items from the United States that required export licences. The uniqueness of the US–Israeli relationship – in which the former provided the latter with assistance and technology to maintain its qualitative military edge over its larger and more numerous Arab neighbours82 – meant these sanctions and prohibitions would have seriously jeopardised Israel’s future security. Moreover, American financing and involvement in several joint defence projects with Israel, such as the Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) programme, would have been affected.83 In May 1991, the administration had concluded a memorandum of understanding with Israel in which the latter agreed not to export technology developed for the Arrow without American permission. In return, the administration agreed to fund 75 per cent of the programme. The administration wanted tighter controls on Arrow technology because of Israel’s past transfers of missile technology to China and South Africa.84 In addition, the administration threatened to curtail its ‘lucrative business’ with Israel’s defence contractors if the Israeli government did not curtail its collaboration with Pretoria.85 According to Secretary of State James Baker, the waiver was not intended to encourage Israel to participate in the Madrid Peace Talks, despite the fact these took place shortly after its announcement to adhere to the MTCR.86 Although no sanctions were imposed on Israel, the State Department announced on 4 December that a foreign corporation or government had exported MTCR-controlled technologies. According to the Arms Sales Monitor, this notice was probably the administration’s formal notification of Israel’s participation in South Africa’s missile programme.87 After imposing sanctions on ARMSCOR, the administration subsequently engaged the South African government in a dialogue on missile nonproliferation. The South African government’s initial position was very clear; it wanted to keep the space launch programme so it could eventually offer a low-orbit satellite launch service. However, the Bush administration’s position was equally clear; it wanted Pretoria to terminate the programme because it was perceived to constitute too much of a proliferation risk. In February 1992, anonymous South African security sources said the administration was pressurising Pretoria to cancel its launch programme on proliferation grounds.88 This pressure was exerted during meetings with the South

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African government to encourage Pretoria to join the MTCR and to stop producing rockets.89 In doing so, the United States confronted Pretoria with the poor economics of developing a commercially viable SLV when the launch market was already dominated by proven and effective rockets.90 Although the administration applied pressure on Pretoria throughout 1992, the South African launch programme continued regardless. In a move designed to give South Africa’s space launch efforts more legitimacy, the commercial firm Denel (Pty) Ltd. was given responsibility for the programme.91 Denel was established in April 1992 by regrouping most of ARMSCOR’s subsidiaries.92 In October, Public Enterprises Minister Dawie de Villiers claimed there was foreign interest in establishing a co-operative venture with South Africa to provide a low-orbit satellite launch service.93 Russia The administration’s dialogue with Moscow deteriorated rapidly following the Glavkosmos agreement to sell rocket technology to ISRO. This was because the American and Russian views of the transaction differed markedly. The rationale behind Moscow’s position was twofold. First, it was argued the engines and manufacturing technology were destined to a civilian space launch project and would only be used for launching satellites into geo-stationary orbits. Lev Kiselev, chief designer for Russia’s Salyut Design Office, said the agreement stipulated the engines and rocket could not be used for military purposes and that Glavkosmos could suspend the deal if the civilian nature of India’s launch programme was cast into doubt.94 ISRO wanted the engines to launch communications satellites on board its planned GSLV which was scheduled to become operational in 1997–98.95 In the second instance, Moscow argued the engines did not have any military potential because they were powered by nonstorable liquid-hydrogen fuel and liquid-oxygen oxidiser.96 As these propellants need to be kept at very low temperatures, it was claimed the engines would take too long to prepare for launch and, thus, would not be suitable for military applications.97 The Bush administration viewed the deal as a clear-cut violation of the MTCR and of Moscow’s commitment to adhere to the guidelines. This was because the deal involved the transfer of cryogenic rocket engines – which constituted complete rocket subsystems under Category I – to a country with an undeclared nuclear capability and a history of diverting space launch technology to develop ballistic missiles. Moreover, the deal was seen as particularly worrisome

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because it involved the transfer of production technology for these engines; the transfer of production equipment for Category I systems was prohibited completely by the MTCR. The administration was not concerned just with the deal’s potential contribution to India’s missile programme but with the precedent that might be set if it proceeded.98 The administration communicated the above concerns through a series of non-papers to the Soviet Union in 1991. The possible consequences for the Soviet Union if the deal proceeded, including the potential imposition of penalties under the new missile sanctions authority, were also communicated. The Soviets responded with their own non-papers defending their position on the ISRO deal.99 In October 1991, an MTCR delegation of representatives from Canada, France, Japan and the United States met Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov to underline the member states’ concerns about the deal. The delegation asserted the deal was not consistent with Moscow’s commitment to adhere to the MTCR. However, Karpov defended Moscow’s position and emphasised that the Soviet Union was not a member in the regime when the decision was taken to go ahead with the deal.100 According to Alexander Pikayev et al., the subsequent dissolution of the USSR on 25 December 1991 did not alter Moscow’s position on the ISRO deal.101 However, the Russian government did inform the State Department that it had reaffirmed the Soviet Union’s 1990 commitment to adhere to the MTCR.102 In response, the administration increased pressure on Moscow to cancel the deal. On 14 February 1992, Secretary of State James Baker warned Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kosyrev that the deal would interfere with US–Russian co-operation in space projects and could result in trade sanctions on the entities involved. Baker repeated this warning to Kosyrev on 6 March, and on 23 March he met Russian Ambassador Vladimir Lukin to demand the contract be terminated.103 Between February and late April, Baker warned senior Russian officials on at least three occasions that if the sale proceeded it would prompt a sharp response from the United States. India was given similar warnings.104 While Moscow publicly viewed the contract as consistent with its commitment to adhere to the MTCR, controversy surrounded the deal within the Russian Federation. This involved the Foreign Ministry, which opposed the deal under pressure from the State Department, and those entities that stood to gain from the sale, including the Committee on Foreign Economic Relations, created to ‘function as an appendage’ of the Foreign Ministry, and the State Committee on

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Defence Industries;105 when Glavkosmos transferred to Russian control in 1992 it was incorporated into the State Committee on Defence Industries following the dissolution of VPK.106 Officials from the Committee on Foreign Economic Relations complained that Russia’s foreign policy should be dictated by domestic economic interests and not external pressures.107 The committee’s position was strengthened by Russia’s dire economic situation and the related need to generate hard currency.108 Russia’s armed forces and the military–industrial complex, which favoured arms sales, also disagreed with the Foreign Ministry’s stance. This situation was exacerbated by the nature of the Russian economy which was overly militarised and dependent on arms sales for generating capital. Indeed, the strength of Russia’s military–industrial complex was demonstrated in March 1992 when the government began reforming the arms export process to promote foreign military sales. This resulted in the removal of the Committee on Foreign Economic Relations from the Foreign Ministry and its renaming as the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. The defence sector and the armed forces had been dissatisfied with the subordination of the Committee to the Foreign Ministry. In May 1992, a Presidential decree subsequently ended the Foreign Ministry’s exclusive control of foreign military sales. Its role simply became monitoring the compliance of Russian arms sales with Moscow’s international interests and obligations.109 The ministry’s pro-American stance of opposing the ISRO deal on nonproliferation grounds, at the expense of the ailing Russian economy, undoubtedly contributed to this reform process. Indeed, numerous officials depicted the Bush administration’s opposition to the deal as part of a policy designed to push Russian firms out of an international market dominated by the United States. Glavkosmos Chief Alexander Dunayev accused the administration of using missile nonproliferation controls to force Russian firms out of the Indian space technology market.110 Moreover, he justified the deal on the grounds that Russia was not a member in the MTCR and was not bound by its guidelines.111 The director of the Committee on Foreign Economic Relations, Petr Olegovich Aven, also complained that pressure from the State Department on the Foreign Ministry was a political move aimed at forcing Russian space technology out of third country markets.112 There was also concern in Moscow regarding the regime’s potential obstruction of co-operation between countries for the peaceful use of outer space. This was because much of the infrastructure vital to Russia’s space launch programme was located on the territory of three

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other former Soviet republics; Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus all inherited sizeable portions of the Soviet space launch infrastructure. Thus, Moscow viewed the continued development of Russia’s space launch programme as dependent on unrestricted co-operation with the other former Soviet republics.113 The Indian government accused the Bush administration of opposing the deal to protect America’s commercial space interests.114 This accusation reflected India’s long-standing contempt for the MTCR, which it viewed as a Western cartel designed to retain the dominance of the United States in the space launch market.115 The administration was perceived as seeking to maintain a monopoly in providing commercial space launch and satellite communication services.116 One of India’s chief criticisms of the MTCR was its lack of commitment by the existing missile powers to move towards total disarmament, similar to Article VI of the NPT. New Delhi also criticised the regime because it allowed the missile powers to modernise and develop more capable missile systems such as submarinelaunched ballistic missiles and advanced cruise missiles.117 On 5 May 1992, the Russian government announced the deal would proceed.118 President Yeltsin did not block the technology transfer because its proponents had successfully drummed up support in criticism of America’s attempts to stop the deal. At the time Yeltsin was in the process of persuading parliament to pass a set of severe economic reforms and to reject efforts to curtail the Presidency’s broad-ranging powers. In order to avoid losing support on these issues, and not wanting to appear weak in the face of external pressures, the Russian President allowed the deal to proceed.119 In an attempt to convince the Bush administration the deal did not violate the MTCR, Moscow called for an international examination of the deal.120 A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said the review would prove the deal did not ‘undermine the MTCR in any way’.121 Moreover, Alexander Dunayev said such an examination would determine whether the deal was admissible under the regime.122 Despite the offer of an international inspection, the State Department announced on 11 May 1992 that, after unsuccessful discussions with the Indian and Russian governments, the United States had imposed sanctions on Glavkosmos and ISRO. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said that because the two entities had refused to terminate the deal, it had been obliged to impose Category I sanctions for a period of two years. These sanctions included banning the export of all US-licensed goods to Glavkosmos and ISRO, prohibiting any

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imports from them into the United States, and banning all US government contracts with both entities. Boucher said the State Department would continue discussing this issue with both governments and the President could waive the sanctions if a satisfactory outcome was reached.123 Although ISRO officials rejected the administration’s assertion that its launch programme was linked with India’s missile development efforts, officials from the State Department claimed there was no doubt that technology used in this programme was also used to develop ballistic missiles, and vice versa. According to unnamed US government sources, India’s SLV-3 launch vehicle and the projected 2,500 km-range Agni missile incorporated identical technology.124 The Russian and Indian reactions were predictably ferocious. On 12 May, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Relations, Sergei Glaziev, wrote an article in Rossiiskie Vesti in which he claimed the deal did not violate the MTCR. According to Glaziev, the sanctions were designed to help American firms gain access to the Indian market.125 He also claimed that a group of Russian experts had determined the deal did not violate the regime. Glaziev added that an American delegation sent to Moscow to assess the proposal had consisted of diplomats and ‘not experts’ in the field.126 Dunayev claimed the sanctions were designed to replace Russian with American companies in the Indian space market.127 In addition, a Glavkosmos spokesman said the agency had formulated the contract in consultation with MTCR provisions, and India had assured the agency throughout the negotiations that the technology would only be used for peaceful purposes.128 Interestingly, the sanctions imposed on Glavkosmos were largely symbolic in nature because the agency was only one of several Russian entities with a stake in the ISRO deal. Other entities, including NPO Khrunichev and the Salyut Design Bureau, were not affected by this punitive American action.129 Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao described the sanctions as unilateral and ridiculous. He added that they would not significantly affect India’s space programme.130 Rao said the sanctions were designed to prevent India becoming a significant element in the international launch market.131 He also criticised the MTCR by describing its guidelines as arbitrary and ill-defined.132 Again, it was claimed the engines had no practical military use and that India had decided to buy this technology because indigenous development would take too long.133 In an act that appeared to be in response to the sanctions, ISRO

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launched a 106 kg scientific satellite using its Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) on 20 May 1992. However, Prime Minister Rao claimed it was not intended as such.134 India subsequently test launched the Agni IRBM for the second time on 29 May. New Delhi defended the Agni test by referring to the rocket as a ‘technology demonstrator’ and by arguing India needed to deter a pre-emptive Chinese attack and to persuade Pakistan from attempting to acquire ballistic missiles.135 Moscow responded by saying it hoped the rocket would be used for peaceful purposes only.136 Furthermore, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman announced on 13 June the deal would proceed unless an examination by international experts vetoed it. In a statement that cast light on the controversy sparked by the deal within Russia itself, the spokesman said the foreign ministry had originally opposed the deal on the grounds it would disturb the West.137 Throughout the remainder of 1992, the administration linked Moscow’s adherence with missile nonproliferation norms to progress in negotiations to let Russia participate in the international space station project and to gain access to the commercial launch market.138 This approach was based on the assumption that the long-term economic benefits of entering the commercial launch market, and the prestige of participating in the space station, would far outweigh the desire of Russia’s space companies to sell space launch technology to countries with questionable proliferation records for short-term financial gain.139 Indeed, Moscow’s desire to earn hard currency in the satellite launch market arguably put the administration in a strong position to demand nonproliferation commitments from Russia. During the Bush–Yeltsin summit of 16–18 June 1992, American and Russian officials agreed to initiate negotiations to determine the rules under which Russian firms could enter the commercial satellite launch market. The United States had previously restricted the transfer of American-built satellites to Russia because of national security and trade concerns. One of the administration’s principal concerns during the negotiations was the need to ensure that Russia would not undercut Western firms by offering much cheaper launch services.140 At the summit, the administration agreed to permit Russian firms to put in bids for a contract to launch an American-made Inmarsat-3 communications satellite. This opportunity was made contingent on Russia adopting strict missile technology export controls, as well as Moscow agreeing not to undercut those prices expected in the commercial satellite launch sector.141 Vice-President Dan Quayle underlined the administration’s desire to

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link missile nonproliferation issues with co-operative space efforts during the opening ceremony of the World Space Congress on 31 August 1992. The Vice-President said any countries wishing to cooperate with the United States in space must ‘comply with nonproliferation treaties and norms’. He added it would be impossible for the United States to ‘trust or work with nations unwilling to meet treaty obligations meant to ensure global stability’. Although Quayle appeared to refer directly to the administration’s dialogue with Moscow, anonymous officials said his remarks did not pose an immediate threat to increasing US–Russian space co-operation, despite the imposition of sanctions on Glavkosmos and ISRO. One State Department official claimed the United States did ‘not require adherence to the MTCR as an explicit condition to co-operation in space’ and that the Vice-President had not been referring to any specific issue.142 These remarks reflected the State Department’s desire to avoid angering Moscow over an issue that had precipitated probably the first major post-Cold War crisis in US–Russian relations. Moreover, the director of the Commerce Department’s Office of Space Commerce, James Frelk, argued that prohibiting all space co-operation was the wrong way to persuade Russia to adhere to the MTCR.143 According to Alexander Pikayev et al., US Under-Secretary of State Frank Wisner drafted the basis of a compromise agreement between the United States and Russia regarding the ISRO deal towards the end of 1992. The suggested compromise involved the United States agreeing not to object to the transfer of two cryogenic engines so long as the production technology was not shipped. At the time, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov reportedly suggested the compromise might work.144 As the Bush administration was preparing to leave office in January 1993, however, the Russian government informed Washington that the ISRO deal was to proceed as planned. In a move that appeared designed to quell nonproliferation worries, Moscow subsequently issued its own set of missile technology export control guidelines and control lists.145 In April 1992, the Russian government had issued a decree calling for the establishment of export controls and control lists in this area.146 According to Charles Peterson, however, the controls set out in January 1993 were designed to justify ISRO-type deals because in ‘exceptional cases’ Russian entities were permitted to export production facilities designed or intended for the development of complete missile systems or other items contained in Category I.147 Moreover, the guidelines did not cover all WMD-capable unmanned delivery

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systems to reflect the expanded coverage of the MTCR. Peterson said this was because Russia’s tactical missile producers were marketing several tactical missiles with ranges of less than 300 km, and payload capacities of less than 500 kg. If the WMD-capable rule had been applied, these companies would have found it difficult to justify the sale of such systems.148 Moreover, Russia’s missile technology controls did not include an ‘across-the-board strong presumption to deny’ exports of Category I items. This was in contrast to MTCR treatment of export requests for such items, and reflected what Igor Khripunov described as a ‘delicate compromise’ between export control proponents and supporters of more liberal access to markets in the developing world.149 The People’s Republic of China The US–China dialogue deteriorated significantly in 1991 because of Beijing’s transfer of M-11 technology to Pakistan and its continued negotiations with Syria over the M-9. In March, US intelligence learned that M-11 launchers had arrived in Pakistan and that China was continuing to negotiate the transfer of M-9 missiles with Syria.150 According to an anonymous American official, Syria had purchased the missiles in early 1991 but had yet to receive them.151 Other reports claimed the CIA knew China had made, or planned to make, deliveries of either M-9 or M-11 missiles to Syria, Iran and Pakistan.152 The State Department responded to these reports by sending Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon to Beijing in mid-March 1991.153 On his return, Solomon said the Chinese leadership had indicated they would honour the MTCR parameters.154 On the very same day, however, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said those countries that did not attend the March MTCR plenary in Japan ‘should not be called upon to assume corresponding obligations to an agreement reached among some other countries’.155 Within a matter of hours, then, the Chinese government had offered two radically different views on Beijing’s attitude towards observing MTCR guidelines. Richard Clarke attempted to explain China’s position to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on 23 April. He said because the Chinese leadership had claimed it would adhere to the ‘international guidelines on missile technology controls and exports’, the administration took this to mean the MTCR because it was the only set of such guidelines in existence. In defence of China’s proliferation record, Clarke added that none of the prospective M-9 deals with Libya, Syria, Iraq or Iran reported in the press had transpired, although he admitted

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they may have been discussed. Clarke added that the administration had not seen any clear-cut evidence of a missile technology transaction that violated the MTCR.156 In reference to Qian Qichen’s remarks that countries not participating in the MTCR should not be called upon to adhere to its†guidelines, Clarke said that although the Chinese leadership said publicly that it had no obligation to the regime, Beijing privately reassured the administration that it intended to observe, or take into account, the guidelines.157 On 30 April, however, the White House responded to evidence that Chinese entities had participated in missile proliferation activities by announcing the President had not approved a licence for the export of American satellite components for incorporation into China’s Dong Fang Hong-3 (DFH-3) communications satellite. White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said the administration was currently holding discussions with the Chinese government with the aim of obtaining a commitment to observe the MTCR guidelines. Fitzwater added that the Chinese government had said it would act prudently and responsibly in its sale of missile technology. He added that the administration would discuss the activities of these entities with the Chinese government in the near future.158 Almost immediately, the administration sent Under Secretary of State Robert M. Kimmitt to Beijing. Kimmitt’s trip in May 1991 was organised in response to Qian Qichen’s assertion that China should not be called on to adhere to the MTCR guidelines because it was not a member in the regime.159 In China, Kimmitt was informed that missiles had indeed been sold to Pakistan, but these fell below the 300 km-range limit and had yet to be delivered. The administration countered this argument by claiming the M-11’s 800 kg payload capacity, which exceeded the 500 kg limit of the MTCR, could be reduced to extend the missile’s range over 300 km, without sacrificing its nuclear capability.160 In response, the administration announced on 27 May that it was going to impose certain constraints on high-technology trade with China because of the activities of certain entities regarding the transfer of missile (M-11) technology to other countries. The administration said the constraints would include curbs on the sale of high-performance computers to China, maintaining restrictions that proscribed the export of US technology for satellites destined for launch on board Chinese rockets, and measures to punish the Chinese entities whose activities had contributed to missile proliferation.161 The administration used this announcement of constraints on high-

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technology trade to justify its policy of remaining engaged with China. Just two days later, China’s MFN status was renewed for an additional 12 months.162 President Bush had promoted the case for extension during a speech at Yale University on 27 May. The President rejected the notion that MFN should be revoked, or that major conditions should be attached to its renewal, to encourage Beijing to improve its nonproliferation, human rights, and trade records. Bush said MFN was not a favour to China but constituted the ordinary basis of America’s trade relations with countries around the globe. He also referred to the role that MFN status played in bringing outside influence to bear on China and he denounced the idea that punishing and hurting China was the best way to promote human rights and privatisation in that country. The President said that morality was the best reason for renewing MFN status and it was right to export the ‘ideals of freedom and democracy to China’ and to ‘encourage Chinese students to come to the United States and for talented American students to go to China’. Bush said it was wrong to isolate China if the United States wanted to influence the country. He added that the moral basis of American foreign policy required his administration to remain engaged with Beijing, as well as the rest of the world.163 Instead of isolating China by not renewing MFN, the administration imposed limited and selective sanctions as part of a strategy to persuade Beijing to observe the MTCR guidelines. In part, this involved using the new Congressionally inspired sanctions authority. On 16 June, the White House announced it had implemented the constraints on high-technology trade with China.164 Category II sanctions were imposed on the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) and the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Commission (CPMIEC) because of evidence they had transferred M-11 missile technology to Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO). The two-year sanctions, which were also imposed on SUPARCO, included the denial of US export licences for the transfer of annex items to these entities, as well as the denial of US government contracts for such items with them.165 Because of the threat missile proliferation posed to regional stability, and Beijing’s contribution to this phenomenon, the administration announced that it had limited its approval of licences for the export to China of computers capable of performing 41 MTOPS (million theoretical operations per second) or more. The White House announced that computers of this type could only be exported after an ‘extensive review’ determined such transfers would not pose a

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threat to American national security. The administration informed the other COCOM and MTCR states of this decision. Finally, the export to China of American satellites and the associated components and technology was suspended under Section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act FY 1990–91. The administration said the President could waive these restrictions if he was able to inform Congress that it was in the national interest to do so. In addition, the President had determined that China’s missile proliferation activities made it ‘inappropriate’ for the administration to approve further export licences for commercial satellite launches in that country.166 In announcing these sanctions, the administration stated that its concerns over China’s missile proliferation activity had been conveyed to Beijing. The administration also announced that Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew was scheduled to discuss the issue with the Chinese leadership in Beijing between 17 and 19 June.167 The imposition of restrictions on high-technology satellite trade with China, the imposition of missile sanctions on CPMIEC and CGWIC, the renewal of MFN status, and the timing of Bartholomew’s trip, were evidently intended to encourage Beijing to live up to its previous commitments to observe the MTCR guidelines. Indeed, the administration made it fairly clear the sanctions would be lifted if Beijing could convince the United States its missile proliferation concerns had been addressed and that it intended to adhere to the MTCR. Bartholomew informed the Chinese leadership of the administration’s continued concern with the planned sales to Pakistan and Syria. On his return to Washington, he warned that China may be close to selling M-9 missiles to Damascus and M-11s to Pakistan. Bartholomew said he had warned the Chinese that the United States would be forced to take retaliatory measures if these sales went through.168 Specifically, he told the leadership in Beijing that any political or financial benefit China might accrue from exporting these missiles would be eclipsed by the negative American reaction, and the consequent deterioration of relations between the two countries.169 Despite the largely negative atmosphere of Bartholomew’s trip, the Under Secretary was informed in Beijing that China was considering adherence to the MTCR and signing the NPT.170 In June 1991, Secretary of State Baker warned China that any missile transfers would have ‘profound consequences’ for Beijing’s bilateral relationship with the United States.171 Tammy Halevy argued that two issues influenced the development

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of the administration’s missile nonproliferation policy toward China from mid-1991 onwards. First, Beijing’s confirmation that it had supplied missile technology to Pakistan, despite pledging not to do so, increased Congressional pressure on the administration to link the extension of MFN status to China’s missile proliferation activities. Second, an influential article published in the journal International Security in the spring of 1991 argued that ‘the gap between word and deed of the Chinese government’ on missile nonproliferation stemmed from internal divisions within China.172 The article by John Lewis, Hua Di and Xue Litai questioned the administration’s policy for getting China to observe the MTCR guidelines.173 The authors argued that American policy had failed because of a misperception that a ‘rigidly unified hierarchy’ dominated ‘all party and state affairs’ in China, including the weapons export process. According to the authors, it was the ‘fragmented structure’ of China’s politico-military system that determined how the country’s weapons import/export entities functioned on a daily basis.174 These government-sponsored firms came under the jurisdiction of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest authority of China’s armed forces and defence industry. CMC directed the activity of the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND), which administered China’s missile industry, among other functions.175 The weapons export firms themselves were either operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and/or were dominated by networks of close relations affiliated through family ties to the ruling State Council.176 These entities enjoyed a remarkable degree of autonomy and influence in their promotion of weapon sales. The PLA was motivated to sell missiles and other weapons in order to generate hard currency for defence modernisation and to increase its domestic and international influence.177 The family networks that dominated firms such as Poly Technologies were motivated to maximise profits because a great deal of the revenue generated from arms sales was retained by these firms.178 Poly Technologies was authorised to sell Chinese armaments, including short- to medium-range ballistic missiles.179 Indeed, it was Poly Technologies that negotiated the sale of IRBMs to China in 1987, earning approximately $2 billion in the process.180 According to Tim McCarthy, Poly Technologies functioned as a defense trading company affiliated with the PLA General Staff as opposed to the missile industry itself.181 China’s other principal weapons exporting firm was the New Era Corporation, which was operated directly by COSTIND. Much of China’s missile sales activity involved an affiliate

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of New Era, CPMIEC,182 which was sanctioned by the administration in June 1991. McCarthy said CPMIEC functioned as China’s trading company in charge of missile and missile technology sales, and it was believed to have the power to negotiate sales for virtually all missile systems and technologies, except strategic delivery systems.183 Because of their ‘isolation’ within China’s ‘compartmentalized’ politico-military system, these firms operated independently and could often strike arms deals without the knowledge or consent of the central political leadership.184 By talking and protesting to officials in the Foreign Ministry, it seemed the State Department was engaging the wrong people if it wanted to stop these firms from exporting missile technology, and to obtain a Chinese commitment to adhere to the MTCR. This situation was reflected in the State Department’s successful solicitation of several missile nonproliferation commitments from the Foreign Ministry, only for evidence to emerge subsequently that missile technology continued to be exported regardless; this is not to say the ministry purposefully misled the administration, but reflected the ability of officials in the Foreign Ministry to speak authoritatively only for themselves, and not for the weapons export firms.185 The situation also highlighted a bureaucratic disagreement between the Foreign Ministry and the PLA. The ministry reportedly favoured sacrificing the revenue from missile sales to retain the country’s trading status with the United States and to enhance China’s international image.186 This position reflected the ministry’s lack of a financial stake in the country’s arms sales and its desire to promote a favourable atmosphere for US–China relations.187 On the other hand, the PLA had a large financial interest in selling missiles and the associated technology because it needed the revenue to fund defence modernisation.188 Thus, the PLA had little to gain and much to lose from observing the MTCR guidelines.189 This bureaucratic analysis contributed to the future evolution of US policy towards China in this field. Indeed, the study recommended a policy of targeted sanctions with certain rewards/incentives to induce co-operation.190 The Chinese leadership’s concern about losing trade with the United States, and its desire to promote the country’s global standing in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, also influenced the evolution of the US–China dialogue on missile nonproliferation in 1991 and 1992. First, the leadership was worried the administration’s trade sanctions would jeopardise the country’s economic growth and development. Second, the Chinese leadership wanted to resume contacts

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with high-level American officials and to normalise relations with the United States in order to enhance China’s legitimacy and international standing. These desires were reflected in a speech by China’s ambassador to Washington, Zhu Qizhen, before the National Press Club in June 1991. Zhu talked about the importance of the US–China relationship and referred specifically to Beijing’s willingness to consider the possibility of conducting bilateral and multilateral discussions with MTCR members.191 The Bush administration’s desire to obtain China’s adherence to the MTCR resulted in the decision to send Secretary of State James Baker to Beijing in November 1991. Between 15 and 17 November, Baker conducted the first visit by a high-ranking American official to China since June 1989. Baker met Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, President Yang Shangkun, Prime Minister Li Peng, and Party Chief Jiang Zemin. Baker received a verbal commitment from the Chinese leadership that M-9 missiles would not be exported to Syria and that M-11 missiles would not be exported to Pakistan or any other country. The Chinese also agreed to observe the MTCR guidelines. In return, Beijing wanted the administration to lift the sanctions it had imposed on the two entities that had been implicated in missile proliferation activities.192 China’s adherence to the regime was made conditional, therefore, on the removal of these sanctions. On 22 December, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announced that the United States would only lift the missile sanctions if Beijing adopted measures to guard against missile proliferation.193 On 31 January 1992, President Bush subsequently met with Chinese Premier Li Peng in New York. During the meeting, Li Peng promised to provide the administration with a written letter pledging Beijing’s adherence to the MTCR. Secretary of State Baker said the administration would lift the sanctions if China followed through on this promise.194 By engaging China’s top political echelon, the administration appeared to have heeded the advice of Lewis, Hua and Xue, who asserted that only top party officials such as Deng Xioping and Jiang Zemin had the authority to stop China’s missile sales.195 On 1 February 1992, Qian Qichen confirmed in writing China’s decision to adhere to the MTCR guidelines.196 Once the State Department received this written pledge, the administration began to reward China for this new commitment to missile nonproliferation. Initially, this involved waiving the missile sanctions imposed on the two Chinese entities. Moreover, the administration renewed Beijing’s MFN status, dropped sanctions on the export of satellite components to China and vetoed two acts passed by Congress, which incorporated

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conditions on MFN renewal, including an improved missile nonproliferation record. On 21 February, State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutweiler announced the missile sanctions were to be removed in response to China’s written pledge.197 On 24 February, Baker told a House subcommittee this written commitment would be an important and substantial step forward if Beijing followed through on it. He added that China’s pledge covered the transfer of M-9 and M-11 missile systems. In support of the administration’s decision to lift the sanctions, Baker said they would be imposed again if China continued to proliferate.198 On 26 February, the State Department announced that sanctions had been waived on grounds of national security.199 On 2 March, President Bush returned the United States–China Act of 1991 to Congress without his approval by arguing it was not consistent with America’s economic and foreign policy interests. The act had proposed establishing additional conditions on the renewal of China’s MFN status, including more co-operation on arms control issues, an improved human rights record and reduced trade barriers. The administration justified its action by citing several agreements reached recently with China including its decision to abide by the MTCR, to accede to the NPT by April 1992, to protect American intellectual property rights and to discuss US human rights concerns. According to the President, these agreements were clear examples of the success of his administration’s policy of engagement. This emphasised targeting specific issues of concern in the US–China relationship with the appropriate policy instruments to obtain the desired results. The administration claimed this approach would have been jeopardised by making MFN contingent upon specific developments other than that provided for by the Jackson–Vanik amendment.200 On 1 June, the administration renewed China’s MFN status by saying Beijing had continued to allow Chinese citizens who qualify for an American immigrant visa to depart freely. It was claimed that isolating Beijing was the wrong policy if the United States wanted to influence China. In addition, it was argued bilateral diplomacy had achieved positive results, including China’s adherence to the MTCR and its accession to the NPT, without withdrawing MFN status.201 In September, the administration notified Congress it was in the national interest to waive restrictions on exports to China of satellites and Munitions List articles for the APSAT, AsiaSat-2, Intelsat VIIA, STARSAT, Afrisat, and Dong Fang Hang-3 projects.202 The waiver allowed $650 million worth of American shipments to proceed to

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China. The administration began considering this waiver in late March after China’s declaration that it would adhere to the MTCR. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher promised the waiver would reduce America’s trade deficit with China and generate jobs in the United States; a theme that ran through the entire 1992 Presidential election campaign.203 On 28 September, President Bush returned the United States–China Act of 1992 to the House without approving it. This had sought to place additional conditions on the renewal of China’s MFN status. Although the President said he shared the goals of the legislation, he added that it would not increase progress between the United States and China in the fields of nonproliferation, human rights and free trade. Again, he emphasised the best approach was to remain engaged and to use multiple focused measures to solicit results in areas such as arms control. The President added that MFN renewal should not be viewed as signalling business as usual with Beijing, because this could only happen if China took measures to resolve its differences with the United States. On the MTCR specifically, the White House noted that China’s behaviour had remained consistent with the regime and the administration was continuing to monitor Beijing’s weapons exports. President Bush said he was willing and able to impose sanctions on China again if the need arose.204 Generally improved US–China relations were reflected in specific missile nonproliferation developments in 1992. In April and May, a delegation of American technical experts led by the State Department, including officials from the Pentagon, travelled to China to discuss MTCR technical parameters, requirements and operational procedures.205 In October, it was reported the Chinese Defense Ministry was scheduled to establish a new office to deal with arms transactions. The office was designed to be responsible for weapons exports and imports, as well as to satisfy international demands that China was abiding by its MTCR and NPT commitments.206 Moreover, US Commerce Under Secretary Joan McEntee announced in December that China had agreed to negotiate a deal to allow the United States to conduct spot checks to ensure that American-origin technology was not being diverted for missile development purposes or other suspect uses.207 Despite these positive developments, US intelligence claimed in November that China had shipped approximately 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan in violation of its commitment to adhere to the MTCR.208 As early as January 1992, US intelligence was reportedly convinced the

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administration would be forced to re-impose sanctions on Chinese entities if they were waived.209 In a Defense News article in March, Chong-Pin Lin claimed China would follow through with its preNovember 1991 missile deals for two reasons. First, they constituted a valuable source of hard currency. Second, the Chinese control structure made it difficult for the highest levels of government to control the weapon export corporations.210 Moreover, Chinese officials claimed the contract for these missiles was concluded well before China agreed to adhere to the MTCR and so it was not covered by the agreement.211 China was also reluctant to be seen to be losing prestige by submitting to American pressure to stop these sales. In early April, US Ambassador to China Stapleton Roy had warned Beijing that its pledge to abide by the MTCR did not imply a ‘grandfather clause’ and that its transfers of M-11 and M-9 missiles to Pakistan and Syria, respectively, would not be allowed.212 In November and December 1992, the State Department subsequently began investigating reports that China had delivered 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan in violation of its written pledge to adhere to the MTCR.213 North Korea While the administration successfully solicited at least some missile nonproliferation commitments from China, Israel and Russia, its attempts to bring North Korea into line through the imposition of sanctions proved futile. This was because of Pyongyang’s international isolation and America’s comprehensive trade embargo on the country. Indeed, North Korea had become the world’s biggest missile proliferator by the end of the Bush administration. During the 1980s, Pyongyang reverse-engineered and manufactured its own version of the Soviet-designed 300 km-range SCUD-B missile. By the early 1990s, the country was mass-producing the SCUD-B and a 500 km-range variant called the SCUD-C, as well as developing the 1,000 km-range No-dong-1. North Korea’s SCUD-B and C missiles posed a direct threat to South Korea and American forces located in that country. The No-dong-1 also threatened to bring Japan and American forces based in South Korea into North Korea’s range sometime in the future. Pyongyang’s parallel nuclear weapon programme raised the possibility that in future this missile could be armed with a nuclear warhead. In November 1991, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney expressed concern over Pyongyang’s nuclear programme during a visit to Japan. Cheney said the prospect of a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons and a missile delivery system was one of

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the most ‘dangerous and destabilising imaginable’.214 The administration was equally concerned with North Korea’s potential export of these missiles and the associated production technology and equipment. In 1991 and 1992, evidence emerged that North Korea was selling and delivering complete SCUD-B and C missile systems to Iran and Syria. According to one report, Iran bought 120 SCUD-B and C missiles.215 Another report claimed that more than 24 SCUD-C missiles were shipped to Syria in March 1991.216 Moreover, CIA Director Robert Gates claimed in January 1992 that North Korea was close to making the Nodong-1 available for export.217 Richard Clarke subsequently told a Congressional committee in March 1992 that Pyongyang was willing to sell not just complete missile systems but also the equipment and technology to allow other countries to build their own missiles.218 It had been reported in January 1992 that, in addition to providing SCUD-C, North Korea was providing either missile production or final assembly assistance to Iran.219 Following the enactment of the missile sanctions authority in November 1990, it was only a matter of time before the administration imposed sanctions on the entities in North Korea responsible for this proliferation. However, Pyongyang’s international isolation and the comprehensive US embargo on the country raised the question of whether sanctions would have any effect at all on moderating North Korea’s missile sales? Indeed, Pyongyang’s missile sales were driven by its isolation and the related need to secure hard currency and fuel supplies. According to one report, Iran provided North Korea with 20,000 barrels of oil per day in return for SCUD missiles and missile guidance systems.220 On 6 March 1992, the State Department imposed two-year Category I sanctions on North Korea’s Changgwan Credit Corporation and Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation, and Iran’s Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics. The sanctions included denying licences for the export to these entities of all items controlled by the United States, denying all US government contracts with these entities, and prohibiting all imports from them into the United States.221 Because North Korea was a non-market economy, its sanctions applied to the entire government. On 23 June, Category I sanctions were subsequently imposed on the same two North Korean entities and Syria’s Ministry of Defence and the Syrian Scientific Research Centre (Centre d’Études et Recherches Scientifique).222 The sanctions were identical to those imposed in March. State Department officials gave little away on the exact reasons for punishing the North

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Korean and Syrian entities beyond the fact it was mandated by US law.223 Although the official notices that announced these sanctions in the Federal Register did not mention the specific items transferred, the shipments evidently involved SCUD-C missiles and the associated production technology and equipment. In July 1992, Reginald Bartholomew drew attention to the growing significance of North Korea as a missile supplier in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Bartholomew said the country was ‘emerging more and more as a major supplier of missiles’.224 The saliency of this point was underlined by ensuing events in 1992. In July, American intelligence confirmed that North Korea had delivered SCUD-C missiles and production equipment to Syria through Iran in a deal worth $100 million. The deal with Syria was also reported to involve building liquid and solid missile propellant plants in that country.225 In October, it was reported that as many as 100 SCUD missiles had left North Korea en route for Iran with half the cargo destined to be shipped overland to Syria.226 The fact that North Korea continued exporting missile technology after sanctions were imposed demonstrated the administration’s inability to stop so-called ‘rogue’ nations from proliferating because of their isolation within the international community. Bureaucratic problems and the missile sanctions authority Finally, problems emerged in mid-1992 over the scope of missile proliferation sanctions to be imposed under Section 17 of the NDAA for 1991. These problems became apparent when several US exporters requested clarifications from the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) on the scope of sanctions to be imposed on ISRO and Glavkosmos.227 In large measure, the problems stemmed from confusion generated by the interaction of the new sanctions law with the Bush administration’s EPCI, which added Supplement 6 to Part 778 of the EAR. Under the EPCI, exporters were required to obtain a validated licence for any items they ‘knew’ were destined for a missile end use in a Supplement 6 listed country. The EPCI expanded the notion of ‘controlled items’ to include general licence items destined for missile end-uses.228 According to an unnamed BXA official, once an entity in such a country was named in a State Department missile sanctions notice, American firms were presumed to ‘know’ of an entity’s involvement in proscribed activities.229 This situation led to confusion over whether the sanctions should apply only to items that

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required a validated licence, or to validated and general licence commodities. This confusion was exacerbated by the Commerce Department’s failure to publish guidelines to aid the export community in this area. In contrast to the export sanctions provision, the import and government contracting sanctions were straightforward to understand and implement.230 The interaction of these two provisions resulted in co-ordination problems between Commerce and State because the latter reviewed all MTCR-related licence applications. State held the view that sanctions applied to both general and validated licence items (‘all’). According to unnamed Commerce Department officials, however, the original intent of Section 17 was to allow general licence items with no missile applications to be exported to sanctioned entities. In September, Commerce and State were reported to have resolved this problem by determining that only validated and not general export licence applications were to be affected by sanctions. Prior to this decision, exporters had been unclear whether the sanctions applied to the shipment of general licence commodities to sanctioned entities.231 It was also determined that although exporters were required to obtain validated licences for ‘all’ shipments they knew were destined to an end-user in a Supplement 6 country engaged in missile proliferation activities, general licence items could be shipped to sanctioned entities not located in such countries. Glavkosmos was an example of such an entity. Commerce and State also agreed to review licence applications for exports of general licence items to sanctioned entities in Supplement 6 countries on a case-by-case basis. If it was determined the item would make a ‘material contribution’ to a missile project, these exports would be denied. This approach took account of industry concerns that sanctioned entities which also engaged in legitimate commercial activities requiring general licence items would not be punished unduly. According to one unnamed US government official, ISRO was an example of a sanctioned entity that relied heavily on American goods to maintain its satellite programme.232 The imposition of sanctions on ISRO was controversial in the United States because the organisation was India’s sole manufacturer of remotesensing and communications satellites, and imported millions of dollars worth of satellite technology from the United States every year. According to one estimate, approximately 80 per cent of the equipment used by ISRO originated in the United States.233 Indeed, ISRO Chairman UR Rao claimed the sanctions would cost American firms $50 million a year in satellite component sales.234 It was also

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predicted that American firms stood to lose this lucrative business to European space companies that were not bound by unilateral US sanctions.235 William Krist of the American Electronic Association complained that American firms would be forced to end their legitimate trade with ISRO to companies from abroad.236 Disagreement over the implementation of the new law re-emerged in November when ‘confidential Bush administration sources’ revealed that Commerce and State had reopened talks on the scope of the sanctions to be imposed under Section 17. State interpreted the term ‘controlled items’ to cover all general licence items subject to the ‘know’ requirement. In doing so, State refused to apply the concept of ‘material contribution’ to the licence applications it received from Commerce. State pursued a policy therefore which denied ‘all’ export licence applications to entities that violated Section 17 of the NDAA of 1991. Anonymous officials from the Commerce Department claimed this was against the original intent of Section 17 because it was designed to allow general licence items with no missile applications to be exported to sanctioned entities. The officials cited a letter from Representative Howard Berman and Senator John McCain – two of the sponsors of the legislation – in which they said they did not support denying export licences to sanctioned entities when there was no evidence the controlled items had missile applications. Indeed, the administration and industry groups had agreed in November 1990 that missile export sanctions under Section 17 should only apply to items that required individual validated licences. The State Department responded by claiming it was virtually impossible to establish Congressional intent in the legislation. In late November 1992, it was reported that Commerce and State had reached an impasse in their negotiations.237

Conclusion The Bush administration expended a great deal of time and effort in its attempts to solicit nonproliferation commitments from key nonMTCR suppliers of ballistic missile technology. Specifically, it employed a mixture of negative and positive incentives in an attempt to solicit nonproliferation pledges from China, Israel and Russia. This approach involved linking progress in the missile nonproliferation field with progress on other issues in Washington’s bilateral relations with these countries. From mid-1991 onwards, this involved the use and threatened use of sanctions against missile proliferating entities

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in non-regime countries. The partial success of this approach with some countries, but its total failure with others, stemmed directly from the nature of the administration’s bilateral relationship with each of the countries in question. In the Middle East, the administration gained an Israeli commitment to adhere to the MTCR primarily because it threatened to impose sanctions on those Israeli entities involved in transferring missile technology to South Africa. The administration also threatened to curtail America’s defence-related business with firms in Israel. The unique nature of the US–Israeli strategic relationship meant Israel risked sacrificing its military edge vis-à-vis its Arab neighbours if it did not adhere to the guidelines. Although the administration failed to persuade the South African government to terminate its space launch programme on nonproliferation grounds, Pretoria did terminate this project six months into the Clinton administration. The South African government gave two reasons for its decision. First, the need to allay international missile proliferation concerns and to open the way for South Africa’s membership in the MTCR. This promised to increase the country’s access to sensitive dual use and weapons-related materials. Second, the South African government determined that developing an SLV was not economically viable. Denel said that in comparison to existing launchers in the commercial market, the manufacture of satellite boosters in South Africa ‘would not be the most economical option’.238 The company had conducted its own investigation into the commercial viability of a South African SLV to determine if it was possible to profit in the launch market. Denel concluded that membership in the MTCR could play an important role in boosting South Africa’s space co-operation with other countries, including Denel’s production of low-orbit satellites.239 In 1992, the Bush administration had confronted South Africa with the exact same reasons for terminating its launch programme. Several other important factors probably contributed to Pretoria’s decision. These included Pretoria’s unilateral decision to dismantle several nuclear weapons that South Africa had developed during the 1980s and its decision to sign the NPT. In addition, South Africa’s security problems were reduced following its withdrawal from Angola and the resolution of the Namibia issue.240 All of these issues were ultimately influenced by the ongoing process of political reform in South Africa, under which the Apartheid system was gradually being dismantled. Although the administration successfully pressured Beijing to provide the United States with a written pledge that it would observe

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the MTCR guidelines, the Chinese stance on this issue was so ambiguous that Washington never really knew where it stood with China. This unsatisfactory situation stemmed from the recurring gap between word and deed in China’s approach towards missile nonproliferation. The gap appeared to be a result of China’s fragmented politico-military system and the ability of Chinese weapons export/import entities to function with relative impunity. This was exacerbated by the Chinese leadership’s disagreement with the administration’s claims that the M-11 exceeded MTCR parameters. The administration claimed that if the M-11 warhead was reduced in size, the range could be increased to over 300 km, but still retaining its capability to deliver a payload of more than 500 kg. Indeed, after ‘a close examination of a growing body of evidence over several months’ regarding China’s transfer of M-11 technology to Pakistan, the Clinton administration subsequently imposed Category II missile sanctions on several Chinese and Pakistani entities on 25 August 1993.241 The decision to proceed with the M-11 deal demonstrated China’s perception that all deals concluded before February 1992 were not subject to its written commitment to adhere to the MTCR. The administration’s dialogue with Moscow appeared surprisingly successful throughout 1989 and most of 1990. However, it deteriorated from November 1990 because of the Glavkosmos deal to provide rocket engines and the associated production technology to ISRO. The administration viewed the deal as a violation of the Soviet, and subsequently Russian, commitment to adhere to the MTCR. In 1992, the administration imposed sanctions on the Russian and Indian entities and linked the successful entry of Russia into the commercial launch market, and its participation in the international space station, to the resolution of the ISRO issue in a manner consistent with US policy. This negative incentive strategy failed to persuade Russia to change its position on the ISRO deal prior to the Bush administration’s departure from office in January 1993. When the Clinton administration subsequently took office, it changed the tack of the US dialogue with Moscow by increasing the emphasis on positive incentives. In doing so, the Clinton administration struck a compromise with Moscow. This was based upon a Russian agreement not to transfer engine production technology to ISRO and the prospect of very profitable and extensive space co-operation between the United States and Russia if Moscow accepted international missile nonproliferation standards.242 This strategy paid off in July 1993 when the Russian government agreed to scale back the ISRO deal by agreeing not to

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transfer production technology.243 This paved the way for Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin’s written agreement with US Vice-President Al Gore on 2 September 1993, in which Russia agreed to abide by the MTCR guidelines. On the same day, the two countries signed an agreement providing for Russia’s entry into the commercial satellite launch market.244 As noted earlier, the seeds of this compromise appeared to have been sown by the Bush administration’s Under-Secretary of State Wisner in late 1992.245 Finally, the Bush administration’s failure to address North Korea’s dire proliferation record illustrated a significant weakness in US policy. This involved the inability of the United States to prevent ‘rogue’ nations – with which Washington had no diplomatic or other ties – from proliferating in missile and WMD technology and knowhow. Indeed, when the administration left office in January 1993, North Korea remained the only country that was prepared at that time to export complete ballistic missile systems in violation of the MTCR.

Conclusion During the Bush administration, the American export control system was refocused away from controlling the transfer of sensitive goods and technology to the Communist bloc towards controlling the spread of WMD- and ballistic missile-related components, technology and technical knowledge in the developing world. A particular emphasis was placed on strengthening controls on items that could contribute to missile and chemical weapons proliferation. In the missile field, this focused on rectifying problems that had become apparent with US policy for restricting proliferation through the MTCR. These problems included the lax enforcement of the guidelines by several member states, bureaucratic and systemic problems in Washington regarding the implementation of US policy in conjunction with the MTCR, and the regime’s failure to address the proliferation activities of certain non-regime suppliers of missile technology. In part, these problems reflected the origins of the MTCR as a product of a US policy designed to address a Cold War problem; American and Soviet competition for influence in the developing world had initiated and sustained the missile proliferation phenomenon from the 1950s until the late 1980s. Moreover, the United States began negotiating the MTCR with its G-7 industrialised allies in the early 1980s, a period characterised by President Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’ speech and his announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), both of which were directed against the Soviet Union. When the Cold War began to thaw during the late 1980s, and America’s strategic environment altered accordingly, it was only natural the MTCR would need to be modified accordingly. There can be little doubt the Bush administration accorded a high priority to the goal of missile nonproliferation at both the domestic and international levels. The administration’s implementation of policy in pursuit of this goal was influenced by the interaction of four principal factors; the initial lack of commitment of several American allies to an effective system of multilateral missile technology export controls; the process of bureaucratic bargaining between the agencies responsible for implementing US policy in conjunction with the MTCR; the proactive role played by Congress in the missile nonproliferation field; and the failure of the MTCR to address the

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proliferation-related activities of several non-regime missile technology suppliers. How successful, then, was the Bush administration in addressing these factors in its effort to promote the goal of missile nonproliferation in reaction to America’s rapidly altering strategic environment? When the Bush administration inherited the MTCR in January 1989, the regime was plagued with problems. These were most evident in the lax enforcement and interpretation of the guidelines by several MTCR member states in Western Europe. Over the following four years, the administration successfully pressured and assisted several of its fellow members to take their commitments more seriously and to improve their enforcement of the guidelines. In addition, the MTCR was successfully institutionalised and enhanced to reflect the emerging post-Cold War strategic environment. The administration played a pivotal role in institutionalising the MTCR by persuading other members about the desirability of holding regular plenary and technical meetings to discuss regime-related issues. Prior to 1989, several member states had been reluctant to do so. Moreover, the administration persuaded the French government to implement a stricter policy for controlling the export of space launch technology in line with administration policy in this area. This resulted in the French decision to stop exports of engine technology to Brazil and India, two countries known to divert technology and know-how from the civilian rocket sector to the development of ballistic missiles. West Germany and Italy were also pressured and assisted to improve their export control systems and to improve their implementation of the MTCR following revelations about both countries’ lax enforcement of the guidelines. This had contributed to several high-profile cases of missile proliferation in South America and the Middle East, including exports of technology and assistance to Argentina and Iraq. Perhaps the best example of how the administration’s strategy to enhance the MTCR began to produce results was Argentina’s decision in 1990 to terminate the Condor II project. This occurred as a result of the administration-inspired embargo placed on the transfer of sensitive technology to Argentina by the MTCR states and diplomatic pressure from Washington. For the same reasons, the MTCR embargo on Brazil’s space launch programme succeeded by 1992 in restricting considerably the country’s access to the technology needed to complete the VLS satellite launcher.1 When the administration took office early in 1989, the growing threat posed by CBW proliferation meant the MTCR coverage of only

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nuclear-capable missile systems had become outdated because it did not reflect the emerging strategic environment. By the end of the Bush Presidency, the administration had successfully directed the modification of the regime to take account of the growing threat posed by the proliferation of CBW capabilities. In doing so, the regime’s coverage was expanded to include missiles capable of delivering all WMD and not just nuclear weapons. In addition, the administration campaigned successfully to expand the regime’s membership. By January 1993, membership had increased to 22 from the original seven countries at the beginning of the Bush Presidency. All the new members were countries that shared Washington’s desire to curb the destabilising spread of ballistic missiles in the developing world. By pressuring for an expanded membership, the administration succeeded in establishing the concept of a missile nonproliferation norm. Through diplomatic activity at the bilateral and multilateral levels, therefore, the Bush administration successfully overcame a significant degree of inertia and resistance to change in Europe to redress many of the flaws in the MTCR derived from the regime’s informal nature. Without the leadership demonstrated by the Bush administration, the MTCR could well have remained a relatively weak and ineffective regime because no other country possessed either the influence or the inclination to enhance the regime at this critical juncture in its history. Domestically, the administration’s commitment to missile nonproliferation was evident in its establishment of several interagency groups to deal specifically with implementing US policy in conjunction with the MTCR. The administration also devoted greater manpower and other resources at the Commerce, Defense and State Departments towards the realisation of America’s responsibilities as an MTCR member. Despite these enhancements, however, the process of bureaucratic bargaining between the agencies responsible for implementing US export controls frequently reduced the administration’s ability to remain focused solely on America’s changing strategic environment in its implementation of US policy in conjunction with the MTCR. Although the administration’s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) reformed the US export control system to account for the growing threat posed by missile and chemical weapons proliferation, the Pentagon had to fight to get the initiative approved in the face of opposition from the Commerce Department. Commerce

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opposed the initiative because its unilateral nature was deemed to pose too great a threat to the commercial competitiveness of US firms as their foreign counterparts would not be subject to the same controls. After interagency debate, the decision to proceed with the EPCI – one of the administration’s top nonproliferation achievements – was taken by President Bush’s NSA, Brent Scowcroft, who sided with the Pentagon. Although Commerce delayed the initiative for several months, the eventual implementation of the EPCI was due primarily to the persistence of the Pentagon in promoting military security concerns over commercial interests in the implementation of US nonproliferation policy. The Department of Defense also clashed with the State Department over the administration’s treatment of export requests for space launch technology to ostensibly peaceful programmes in the developing world. While State deemed the importation of rocket casings from Brazil into the United States for heat treatment as consistent with administration policy, the Pentagon opposed it because of the risk these casings would be diverted to missile development on their return to South America. Again, this issue was resolved in the Pentagon’s favour at the highest levels of the administration. However, under pressure from the State Department, seven casings were re-exported back to Brazil despite that country’s dubious nonproliferation record. In doing so, State claimed the complete revocation of the original export license would have severely damaged US–Brazilian relations and would have weakened the position of President Collor, who favoured nonproliferation and wanted to improve relations with Washington. By allowing these casings to return, the administration turned a blind eye to Brazil’s strategic technology and weapons supplier relationship with countries like Iran, Iraq and Libya, as well as to its history of diverting civilian rocketry to ballistic missile development. Interestingly, just nine months into the Clinton administration US policy changed regarding the SLV issue. In September 1993 US policy became to support ‘prudent expansion’ of the MTCR to incorporate additional countries that ‘subscribe to international nonproliferation standards, enforce effective export controls and abandon offensive ballistic missile programs’ (emphasis added).2 Thus, prospective members were not required to give up their civilian rocket programmes in order to join the regime. Basically, the new policy encouraged countries to commit themselves to the missile nonproliferation norm and the MTCR by forfeiting their offensive long-range

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missile programmes. In exchange, they kept their right to develop civilian rockets, in part by acquiring the necessary components, technology and assistance from other members. This new approach proved very controversial because it contradicted previous US policy in this area. Prior to September 1993, the United States had adopted a general presumption to deny exports of all MTCR-controlled items, even to fellow regime members.3 This was based on the fact that much of the technology used in the development and manufacture of SLV is virtually identical to that used for ballistic missiles. Some argued the 1993 policy change turned the MTCR into a ‘missile supermarket’ where potential members were enticed to join up in order to make bigger rockets. When Argentina joined the MTCR in 1993 it did not retain some form of SLV because the US policy change had yet to be announced. Brazil, however, was permitted to retain its VLS space launcher project when it joined in 1995.4 Brazil became eligible to join because it had abandoned its offensive missile programmes, adhered to nonproliferation norms and enacted export control legislation. Thus, Brazil became eligible to import space launch technology from other MTCR members to develop a rocket that was once a primary target of the regime. It should be noted the 1993 policy change was not motivated simply by the need to encourage certain countries to join the MTCR and to adhere to the nonproliferation norm, but also to promote the competitiveness of American firms by loosening controls on the trade in space launch technology.5 Under pressure from the Commerce and State Departments, the Bush administration also allowed the export of a previously controlled supercomputer to Brazil. The decision to proceed was justified on the grounds it would help maintain Brazil’s support for the international embargo imposed on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait. The US firm involved also stood to benefit substantially from the sale of this supercomputer. Indeed, the administration approved similar licences for the export of supercomputers to India and China, two other countries with poor proliferation records. Moreover, when the administration published Supplement 6 to Part 778 of the Export Administration Regulations in mid-1992, the effectiveness of the EPCI was decreased because State succumbed to external pressure to omit the names of Israeli missile and SLV programmes from this list of controlled destinations. It was weakened further because the administration was forced to omit the names of missile programmes in Arab countries for diplomatic reasons. The list had been conceived originally to help identify those foreign entities that American firms

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should be wary of selling sensitive technology to. The administration had a mixed record, therefore, in resolving interagency differences over missile technology export controls in favour of nonproliferation. This demonstrated the administration’s inability to treat missile nonproliferation issues in isolation because of the executive branch’s need to balance other foreign policy and commercial interests in its execution of US national security policy. This was not a problem peculiar to the Bush administration but was a result of the way in which US export controls were organised. This problem lay with the dual mandates of the two departments with statutory authority in the export licensing process. Although Commerce was responsible for licensing exports of dual-use technology, its principal function was the promotion of the economic wellbeing of the United States. In addition, the State Department’s raison d’être of promoting America’s foreign relations with other countries frequently clashed with its responsibility for licensing the export of munitions items. Moreover, while the Pentagon’s responsibility for maintaining the physical wellbeing of the United States and its national security interests meant it was uniquely qualified to assess the potential contribution of exports to missile projects of concern, the department only occupied an advisory role in the export control process. The domestic problems experienced by the administration in implementing US policy in conjunction with the MTCR resulted primarily, therefore, from the process of bureaucratic bargaining between these three departments, each of which sought to maximise its own unique organisational goals. It should be noted that if the Pentagon’s Office for Nonproliferation Policy had not been created in 1989, then military security concerns might not have been as successfully projected into the missile technology licensing process as they were during the Bush administration. Without this office, for example, sufficient support might not have been mustered within the administration to push through the EPCI in December 1990. The administration’s dealings with Congress focused primarily on its unsuccessful attempt to prevent the enactment of a missile sanctions law in November 1990. This required the President to impose sanctions automatically on entities that participated in missile proliferation activities. Several Congressmen had supported this new authority because they perceived the MTCR to be flawed because it was an informal arrangement with no international agency to ensure the guidelines were enforced consistently by each member state. An additional problem was seen to be the regime’s lack of a mechanism

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to punish entities that chose to export MTCR-controlled technology by profiting from the restraint shown by others. This weakness was illustrated by the failure of several MTCR members to enforce the guidelines effectively and bureaucratic implementation problems in Washington. A missile sanctions law was seen by Congress as a way to give ‘teeth’ to the regime by providing for mandatory penalties to be imposed on persons, companies or other entities that participated in MTCR-proscribed activities. Enactment of this authority signalled the culmination of a four-year period during which Congress became increasingly active in the missile nonproliferation field. While this mirrored the rise of missile proliferation as an American security concern, Congress was also eager to stamp its authority on an executive branch initiative it had been denied the opportunity to oversee the negotiation of, and to ratify, during the 1980s. The administration’s opposition to the law was based primarily on the administration’s desire to maintain the President’s prerogative and flexibility in foreign policy making, as opposed to any serious doubts regarding the merits of the new authority. By opposing the law, the administration allowed its preoccupation with preserving the President’s pre-eminence in the foreign policy process to delay the enactment of what turned out to be an effective missile nonproliferation tool. Bipartisan support for missile nonproliferation initiatives on the Hill allowed Congress to enact the punitive sanctions measure. Indeed, the sanctions authority was, and has remained, Congress’s biggest contribution in this field and its enactment significantly strengthened US missile nonproliferation policy. Ironically, the administration used the new authority to relatively good effect on several occasions, in 1991 and 1992, as part of its effort to solicit missile nonproliferation pledges from several non-MTCR suppliers of missile technology. The final factor that influenced the administration’s implementation of US missile nonproliferation policy was the failure of the MTCR to address the activities of several major missile technology supplying countries. The administration sought to rectify this failure by attempting to solicit missile nonproliferation commitments from China, Israel and the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia). The outcome of these efforts was determined by the prevailing state of the administration’s bilateral relations with each of these countries over the period in question. The administration capitalised successfully on the unique nature of the US–Israeli relationship to gain a commitment from Israel that it

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would adhere to the MTCR. The administration gained this by threatening to impose sanctions on those Israeli entities involved in transferring missile technology to South Africa and by threatening to curtail America’s defence-related business with firms in Israel. In doing so, the administration attempted to persuade the Israeli government it risked sacrificing its access to advanced defence technology from the United States, and therefore its military edge vis-à-vis its Arab neighbours, if it failed to adhere to MTCR guidelines. The administration’s dialogue with China deteriorated markedly following the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989 and the subsequent worsening of US–Chinese relations. However, the administration’s policy of remaining engaged with Beijing, and using selective sanctions to target specific aspects of China’s behaviour that caused concern in Washington eventually proved successful in February 1992. This occurred when the administration secured a written pledge from China to observe the MTCR guidelines. Despite this seeming success, the Chinese stance on this issue proved so ambiguous that the administration was never really sure where it stood with Beijing in this area. This stemmed from the recurring gap between word and deed in China’s approach towards missile nonproliferation, which resulted from China’s fragmented politico-military system and the ability of Chinese weapons export/import entities – that were responsible for selling missile technology – to function with relative impunity. New thinking in Soviet foreign policy appeared to result in the Bush administration making considerable progress with Moscow in the missile nonproliferation field from 1989 through the first half of 1990. This was because the administration secured a Soviet pledge to adhere to the MTCR. This dialogue deteriorated in 1991 and 1992, however, because of Moscow’s refusal to terminate a contract with the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) to supply cryogenic rocket engines and the related production technology. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the administration subsequently linked the entry of Russia into the commercial launch market, and its participation in the international space station, to the resolution of the ISRO issue in a manner consistent with US policy. This primarily negative incentive strategy did not produce any results during the remainder of the Bush administration. In part, this was because of the strength of Russia’s military industrial complex which did not want to jeopardise its freedom to earn hard currency by exporting rocket technology at a time of increasing economic hardship. The ultimately

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unsatisfactory nature of the administration’s missile nonproliferation dialogues with China and Russia stemmed primarily, therefore, from domestic bureaucratic politics in both countries largely beyond the administration’s control. Perhaps the greatest weakness of US missile nonproliferation policy involved the inability to dissuade so-called ‘rogue’ proliferators – with which Washington had few or no diplomatic ties – such as North Korea and Iran from proliferating in missile and WMD technology and assistance. Despite the administration’s imposition of missile sanctions on several entities in North Korea, Iran and Syria these countries continued to proliferate in ballistic missile technology regardless. This situation demonstrated the limits of the administration’s supply-side approach to restricting missile proliferation through the MTCR, because it failed to address the demand side of the problem in regions such as East Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent. Indeed, it was not until the MTCR Plenary Meeting of October 1995 – three years into the Clinton administration – that the United States and its partners began to discuss regional approaches for stemming the spread of WMD-capable missiles. In sum, the Bush administration’s efforts to advance the goal of missile nonproliferation proved relatively successful, despite occasional bureaucratic problems in Washington and the administration’s initial inability to consider the Congressionally inspired missile sanctions law by its obvious merits. A brief summary of the administration’s achievements in this field by January 1993 serves as testimony to this relative success. The coverage of the MTCR had been expanded to cover missiles capable of delivering all WMD in order to better reflect the international security environment, the regime’s technical annex had been updated to reflect technological developments, MTCR membership had been trebled from seven to 22, and the members were meeting to discuss issues and problems on a much more regular basis than they were in 1988. Furthermore, the Condor II project, which came to symbolise the issue of missile proliferation in the late 1980s, was terminated by the Argentine government in 1990 and Brazil’s SLV and missiles programmes had reached a standstill by the end of 1992; although Brazil was subsequently allowed to retain the VLS launch project when it joined the MTCR in 1995 following the Clinton administration’s policy change regarding MTCR membership criteria in September 1993. In addition, the EPCI had reformed the US export control system to account for the decline and eventual disappearance of the global Soviet threat and the rise of the

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regional proliferation challenge. Finally, despite the ultimately unsatisfactory nature of the administration’s dialogue with China and Russia, it appeared to have succeeded in getting Moscow and Beijing to stop exporting complete ballistic missile systems banned under the MTCR. Indeed, by January 1993, North Korea was the only country openly prepared to export complete ballistic missile systems in violation of the regime.

Notes Introduction: Ballistic Missile Proliferation 1 A succinct definition of a ballistic missile was offered by Aaron Karp in his 1996 book: Ballistic Missile Proliferation: any ‘unmanned, actively guided, rocket-propelled vehicle that can be fired ground-to-ground along a ballistic (or parabolic) trajectory’. Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 4. A basic ballistic missile travels through three principal phases of flight. During the initial ‘boost’ phase, the missile is powered to a predetermined position at which propulsion is terminated. The missile then travels under momentum from the powered phase and subsequently falls back to Earth following a ballistic trajectory under the effects of gravity. The final portion of the flight involves the missile’s re-entry into the atmosphere. As a result of the above characteristics, the ballistic missile possesses certain unique capabilities as a weapon delivery system, including the ability to deliver ordnance over long ranges relative to other means of delivery such as the jet strike aircraft. Moreover, ballistic missiles are almost assured of penetrating defences because their great speed of delivery makes them very difficult to defend against. These capabilities have imbued ballistic missiles with a seemingly formidable air and contributed to why the five declared nuclear powers selected them as their principal nuclear weapon delivery vehicle of choice. Bearing this in mind, numerous developing countries have been traditionally motivated to pursue a ballistic missile capability for a mixture of two principal reasons. First, to acquire military power, prestige and deterrent value within a regional context, especially if the country in question is also pursuing a nuclear weapon capability. Second, similar to nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles have been perceived to be synonymous with the possession of advanced industrial, technical and military capabilities, thereby conferring prestige on a country by confirming its modernisation to potential enemies, regional rivals and industrialised mentor nations. The above information was derived in part from the following sources: A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World’, in SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 289. J. E. Nolan and A. Wheelon, ‘Third World Ballistic Missiles’, Scientific American, August 1990, p. 35. 2 D. R. Israel, Defending Against the Tactical Ballistic Missile Threat (Washington, DC: Strategic Defense Initiative Office, US Department of Defense, 15 February 1993), p. 3. 3 Although their mechanisms and destructive effect differ markedly, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons are collectively referred to as WMD. Admittedly, mass destruction is a relative term because even low-technology conventional weapons can injure and kill on a massive

Notes

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5

6

7

8 9

181

scale. However, NBC weapons have been singled out for particular concern for several reasons; they compress the amount of time and effort needed to kill on a large scale; they are indiscriminate in nature, particularly against civilians; they are compact relative to their destructive effect; and they can be delivered more easily than conventional weapons with comparable effects. Thus, a single WMD is potentially capable of doing damage equivalent to hundreds if not thousands of conventional weapons. Moreover, because of their killing mechanisms and their potentially uncontrollable consequences, the use of WMD is widely deemed to be morally unacceptable. The above information was derived in part from: Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, August 1993) pp. 2–3, 46. These examples of how the use or threatened use of WMD could complicate US power projection were derived from a RAND report commissioned by the US Air Force. B. G. Chow, G. S. Jones, I. Lachow, J. Stillion, D. Wilkening, and H. Lee, Air Force Operations in a Chemical and Biological Environment (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998), pp. 5–6. In the spring of 1988, the growing significance of non-Soviet threats to US security interests – such as those posed by proliferation – became apparent when defence planners from the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of Defense began recommending that America’s military strategy should put ‘greater emphasis on regional planning’. Although the Pentagon’s Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1988–1989 continued to identify a potential nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union as the most significant threat to American national security, it highlighted the ongoing process of reform within the Soviet Union. This had entailed a reduced Soviet presence in Eastern Europe and the consequent diminished likelihood of Soviet aggression against Western Europe. Moreover, the plan identified non-Soviet indigenously caused conflicts as posing the most likely future threat to America’s security interests. L. S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force 1988–1992, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, July 1993), p. 1. These problems stemmed primarily from the regime’s Cold War origins. The MTCR was a product of an American policy designed to address a Cold War problem. American and Soviet competition for influence in the developing world had initiated and sustained the missile proliferation phenomenon since the 1950s. Moreover, the United States began negotiating the regime with its G-7 industrialised allies in the early 1980s, a period characterised by President Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’ speech and his announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, both of which were directed against the Soviet Union. A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World’, in SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 327. OPR (Riyadh), 19 March 1988, FBI Service FBIS-NES-88-054, 21 March 1988, ‘Statement on the Purchase of Chinese-made Missiles’. United States General Accounting Office, Arms Control: US Efforts to

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Control the Transfer of Nuclear-Capable Missile Technology (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, June 1990), p. 2. 10 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 11 S. R. Bowman, R. F. Grimmett, R. D. Shuey and Z. Davis, Weapons Proliferation and Conventional Arms Transfers: The Outlook in Mid-1992, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 31 December 1992), p. 20.

1 Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950–89 1 A. Karp, The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East (New York: Institute for East–West Security Studies, 1990), pp. 382–90. 2 The term ‘major weapon system’ is used to refer to aircraft, naval vessels, armoured vehicles and missiles. See the use of this term in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books), p. 13. 3 Figures are in $US at constant 1968 prices. Ibid., pp. 52–3. 4 Ibid. 5 Collective Defense Treaties (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 10 April 1967), p. 94. 6 M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 169–277. 7 ‘Mr Eban Evasive over Missiles’, The Times, 9 October 1971. 8 A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World’, in SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 294. 9 Ibid., p. 306. 10 W. C. Potter and A. Stulberg, ‘The Soviet Union and the Spread of Ballistic Missiles’, Survival, November/December 1990, Vol. 32, No. 6, p. 544. 11 A. J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 79. 12 Ibid., p.74. 13 Middle East Markets, 17 September 1976. 14 Pierre, Global Politics of Arms Sales, p. 74. 15 Ibid. 16 Between the late 1960s and the late 1970s, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Kuwait and South Yemen acquired versions (4, 5, 7) of the 50–70 kmrange FROG rocket system. Information on the exact dates and volume of Soviet missile transfers to the developing world were taken from the following sources: A. F. Manfredi, R. D. Shuey, R. M. Preece, R. G. Sutter, and W. H. Donnelly, Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 24 April 1986). ‘Missile Proliferation in the Third World’, in Strategic Survey 1988–1989 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, spring 1989), pp. 14–25. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Developing World’, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1988, ACDA

Notes

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18

19 20 21

22

23

24 25

26

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Publication 131 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, June 1989), pp. 17–20. A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’, in SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) pp. 369–391. R. Schmidt, United States Export Control Policy and the Missile Technology Control Regime, paper delivered to the fall 1989 class on the conduct of American Foreign Policy, RAND Graduate School, January 1990; M. Navias, Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World, Adelphi Paper 252 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1990) pp. 20–31. Potter and Stulberg, ‘The Soviet Union and the Spread of Ballistic Missiles’. S. W. Carus, Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conflict (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991). See: J. M. Goshko and D. Oberdorfer, ‘Saudis Buy Chinese Missiles Capable of Covering Mideast’, Washington Post, 18 March 1988, p. 1. D. B. Ottaway, ‘Saudis Hid Acquisition of Missiles’, Washington Post, 29 March 1988, p. 1. N. Cook, ‘Ironies of Saudi’s IRBM Purchase’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2 April 1988, p. 627. Information on these negotiations was taken from S. A. Kan and R. Shuey, Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress, CRS Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 10 February 1994), pp. 3–4. R. A. Bitzinger, Chinese Arms Production and Sales to the Third World (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1991), p. 3. Ibid., p. 5. See: D. Silverberg, ‘Iran–Iraq War Gives a Boost in Effort to Enter the World’s Weapons Market’, Defense News, 13 June 1988, p. 24. R. G. Sutter, Chinese Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf: A Fact Sheet, CRS Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 5 April 1988). I. A. Hijazi, ‘Arab Lands Said to Be Turning to China for Arms’, New York Times, 24 June 1988, p. A3. See: ‘Birth of an Arms Salesman’, The Economist, 17 November 1984. B. Furlong, ‘China’s New Arms Export Policy’, International Defense Review, December 1984, p. 1795. D. Sneider, ‘China’s Arms Bazaar: Peking Pushes Sales in Pursuit of Hard Currency’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 December 1986, p. 23. J. W. Lewis, Hua Di, Xue Litai, ‘Beijing’s Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma’, International Security, spring 1991, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 87–109. R. A. Bitzinger, ‘Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World’, International Security, fall 1992, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 84–111. Following the revelation that Saudi Arabia had acquired DF-3 missiles from China, Riyadh denied it intended to fit nuclear warheads on these missiles. Saudi Arabia moved quickly to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) after March 1988. See: J. M. Goshko, ‘Saudis Will Forswear Nuclear Weapons’, International Herald Tribune, 27 April 1988. Kan and Shuey, Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation, p. 3. Y. Scichor, East Wind over Arabia: Origins and Implications of the Sino-Saudi Missile Deal (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley Center for Chinese Studies, 1989), pp. 18–25. For information on the motives of developing countries to diversify their arms supply sources see: United States Arms Control and Disarmament

184

27 28 29 30 31

32 33

34 35 36 37

38

39

40 41

42 43 44

45 46 47

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation Agency, ‘Diversification of Arms Sources by Third World Nations’, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, October 1990), pp. 25–9. Y. Ibrahim, ‘Saudis Will Look to All for Arms’, International Herald Tribune, 28 July 1988. P. L. Young, ‘Saudi Arabian Missile Acquisition: A New Stage in the Gulf Conflict’, Asian Defence Journal, July 1988, pp. 30–8. A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’ (1989), p. 290. M. R. Gordon, ‘Syria Is Studying New Missile Deal’, New York Times, 22 June 1988. J. W. Wilson and Hua Di, ‘China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals’, International Security, fall 1992, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 34–6. Kan and Shuey, Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation, p. 4. Hua Di, ‘China’s Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation’, in W. C. Potter and H. W. Jencks (eds), The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers’ Network (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 167. A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World’, International Security, winter 1984/5, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 181. A. Karp, ‘The Maturation of Ballistic Missile Proliferation’, in Potter and Jencks, Missile Bazaar, p. 10. Karp ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World’, p. 181. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, December 1993), p. 211. R. D. Shuey, W. W. Lenhart, R. A. Snyder, W. H. Donnelly, J. E. Mielke, and J. D. Moteff, Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 3 October 1988, updated 9 February 1989), p. 14. Ibid. See also: J. E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 32–8. The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Report of the Proliferation Study Team, commissioned by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) (United States Department of Defense, February 1993), p. 8. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies, pp. 226–7. CEP is a measurement of missile accuracy and refers to the diameter of a circle within which half the missiles launched at a target will probably land. Nolan, Trappings, p. 33. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies, p. 227. ‘The Trends in the Arms Trade with the Third World’, in SIPRI Yearbook 1978: World Armaments and Disarmament (London: Taylor and Francis, 1978), p. 238. S. M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel, America and the Bomb (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), p. 120. F. Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (London: I.B. Taurus and Co. Ltd, 1989), p. 22. Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 125.

Notes 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67 68

69 70

71

72

73

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Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, pp. 56–7. Karp, The United States and the Soviet Union, pp. 386–7. Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, p. 57. ‘Egypt’s V-2’, The Economist, 8 July 1962. ‘Egypt Plans Satellite Launch Vehicle Within Year’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9 September 1963. Karp, The United States and the Soviet Union, p. 390. See: Carus, Ballistic Missiles, p. 23. Karp ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’ (1989), p. 294. ‘Libyans Get Nuclear Missile System’, Guardian, 21 March 1981. See: ‘Rocket Fired by Libya’, Daily Telegraph, 7 March 1981. J. Vinocur, ‘Launching of Suborbital Rocket in Libya by West Germany’, International Herald Tribune, 13 March 1981. D. Fairhill, ‘Missile Fears Denied’, Guardian, 1 June 1981. ‘West German Rocket Firm Quits Libya’, Daily Telegraph, 30 December 1981. P. Clough, ‘British Link Alleged in Libyan Missile Deal’, Independent, 23 December 1986. Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, pp. 61–2. J. Allan, ‘Iranians Say They Have Fired Their Own Missiles at Iraq’, Daily Telegraph, 18 June 1985. Rafsanjani interview for Japanese television. IRNA (Tehran), 16 June 1985, in Survey of World Broadcasts (SWB), 18 June 1985. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’ (1989), p. 298. Karp, The United States and the Soviet Union, p. 385. ‘Register of Indigenous and Licensed Production of Major Weapons in Third World Countries’, Appendix 6E, SIPRI Yearbook 1976: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 239. Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, p. 83. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’ (1989), p. 307. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, p. 8. Following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq also used Soviet-designed SA-2 technology in the development of short-range ballistic missiles. See: A. George, ‘UN Uncovers Secret Iraqi Ballistic Missile Project’, Flight International, 3–9 January 1996, p. 17. Arms Trade Registers: The Arms Trade with the Third World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1975), pp. 12–15. A. F. Manfredi, R. D. Shuey, R. M. Preece, and R. G. Sutter, Ballistic Missile Proliferation Potential of Non-Major Military Powers, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 6 August 1987), p. 41. See: Nolan, Trappings, pp. 48–52. ‘New Missile’, Guardian, 6 October 1978. ‘A New Korean Missile’, Armies and Weapons, November 1978. ‘Seoul Tests Missile’, Financial Times, 27 September 1978. ‘Register of Indigenous Major Weapons in Development or Production in Third World Countries’, Appendix 7B, in SIPRI 1978: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 203. See: ‘New Iraqi Missile Can Hit Tehran’, Guardian, 5 August 1987. ‘Gulf: Iraq Modifies Soviet Missiles to Extend Range to Tehran’, Radio Free Europe

186

74 75 76

77 78

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

97 98 99 100 101 102 103

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation (RFE), 2 March 1988. ‘Iraq Tests Longer Range Missile’, Financial Times, 26 April 1988. Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, pp. 52–3. Potter and Stulberg, ‘Soviet Union’, p. 550. See: Karp, ‘Maturation’, p. 11. A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’, in SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 318. Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, p. 79. See: P. Adams, ‘Brazil Surveys Export Market for Domestic Ballistic Missiles’, Defense News, 24 August 1987, p. 4. United States Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Foundations of Military Strength (Washington, DC: 1991), p. 62. Nolan, Trappings, p. 40. B. Chow, Emerging National Space Launch Programs: Economics and Safeguards (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1993), p. 2. Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, p. 11. T. Mahnken, ‘Why Third World Space Systems Matter’, Orbis (Fall 1991), p. 565. ‘Israel Sends a Rocket into Space’, The Times, 6 July 1961. ‘Military Uses for Israel’s Rocket: No Immediate Production’, The Times, 7 July 1961. Quoted in ibid. ‘Satellite Launch Caps Israel’s Research Effort’, Defense News, 26 September 1988, p. 15. ‘Neighbours Look On in Distrust’, The Times, 6 July 1961. Carus, Ballistic Missiles, p. 24. ‘Concentration on Rocket Technology Urged’, Statesman Weekly, 21 October 1987. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World’, p. 181. S. Auerbach, ‘India Orbits Its First Satellite’, International Herald Tribune, 19 July 1980. P. Niesewand, ‘Space Technology Will Not Be Used Militarily’, Guardian, 26 July 1980. Ibid. Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, p. 184. Nolan, Trappings, p. 41. A. A. Pikayev, L. S. Spector, E. V. Kirichenko, and R. Gibson, Russia, the US and the Missile Technology Control Regime, Adelphi Paper 317 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1998), p. 18. Nolan, Trappings, p. 43. ‘US Sanctions Imposed: India Deal with Russia Still On’, Space News, 24 May 1992, p. 14. Nolan, Trappings, p. 43. Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, p. 71. Nolan, Trappings, p. 43. Ibid., p. 45. Office of Technology Assessment, Global Arms Trade: Commerce in Advanced Military Technology and Weapons (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, June 1991), p. 149.

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104 A. F. Manfredi, R. D. Shuey, R. M. Preece, and R. G. Sutter, Ballistic Missile Proliferation Potential of Non-Major Military Powers, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 7 August 1987), p. 19. 105 Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, pp. 88–9. 106 Ibid., p. 89. 107 R. Schmidt, ‘United States Export Control Policy and the Missile Technology Control Regime’, paper delivered to the fall 1989 class on the Conduct of American Foreign Policy, RAND Graduate School (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 1990), p. 14. 108 Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’ (1989), p. 299.

2 The Pre-1989 Evolution of US Missile Nonproliferation Policy 1 M. Brzoska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World (London: Taylor and Francis, 1986, p. 117. 2 Ibid. 3 ‘Egypt’s V-2’, The Economist, 8 July 1962. 4 ‘Israel Sends a Rocket into Space’, The Times, 6 July 1961. 5 S. M. Hersh, The Samson Option (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1991), p. 120. 6 Ibid., p. 125. 7 Ibid., p. 104. 8 In comparison to conventional munitions, nuclear weapons have a large lethal radius and do not need to be delivered with as much accuracy. Unlike chemical and biological weapons, which require specific atmospheric conditions to be effective, nuclear weapons do not. 9 ‘Neighbours Look On with Distrust’, The Times, 6 July 1961. 10 ‘US Department of State requests that the US Embassy in the United Arab Republic convince Gamal Abdel Nasser that the surface-to-surface missile program being pursued by the United Arab Republic is creating a dangerous arms race’, Top Secret Cable, Number 5592, 2pp, from George W. Ball, US Department of State, Washington, DC, to the US Embassy, Egypt, 29 May 1964. 11 ‘John T. McCloy reports on his meeting with Gamal Abdel Nasser regarding arms control agreement to limit the production of surface-to-surface missiles and states that Nasser agreed to continue discussions with US Ambassador to the UAR’, Top Secret Cable, Number 1064, 1p, from Lucius D. Battle, to US Department of State, Washington, DC, 28 September 1964. 12 W. C. Potter and A. Stulberg, ‘The Soviet Union and the Spread of Ballistic Missiles’, Survival, November/December 1990, Vol. 32, No. 6, p. 544. 13 A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World’, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 294. 14 Ibid., p. 306. 15 A. J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 74.

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16 A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’, in SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 387. 17 ‘Israel Seeks Pre-emptive Strike Capability’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 27 October 1975. 18 Assurances from United States Government to Israel, US Department of State, Washington, DC, released by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 October 1975. Also see: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the United States, US Department of State, Washington, DC, 1 September 1975, released by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3 October 1975. 19 ‘Israel Seeks Pre-emptive Strike Capability’. 20 Pierre, Global Politics., p. 46. 21 A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World’, International Security, winter 1984/5, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 176. 22 Ibid. 23 Pierre, Global Politics, p. 46. 24 A. Sampson, The Arms Bazaar: From Lebanon to Lockheed (New York: Viking Press, 1977), p. 243. 25 T. Ohlson, Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 81. 26 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, pp. 242–3. 27 American allies in the developing world were also encouraged to ‘build their own defence industries, largely through co-production contracts’, under which the United States transferred weapon production technology to allies states such as Israel, Taiwan, and South Korea. J. E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 20. 28 Sampson, The Arms Bazaar, p. 243. 29 M. Navias, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, Adelphi Paper 252 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, summer 1990), p. 49. 30 Ibid. 31 Between 1977 and 1981, the Carter Administration was involved in numerous arms control initiatives: SALT II; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks (CATT); the Antisatellite Weapon (ASAT) talks; talks on the clarification of certain aspects of the ABM treaty; and talks relating to an international nuclear fuel cycle revaluation programme. 32 Pierre, Global Politics, p. 45. 33 Ibid., p. 46. 34 Ohlson, Arms Transfer Limitations, p. 85. See also: Presidential Directive/NSC-13 (PD-13), Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (Washington, DC: The White House, 13 May 1977), pp. 1–3. 35 Ibid., p. 1. Countries exempt from this policy were: the NATO states, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the American security commitment to Israel. Ibid., p. 2. 36 SIPRI Yearbook 1980: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 121.

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37 ‘Conventional Arms Transfers and the Indian Ocean’, statement by the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Leslie Gelb), US Department of State, before a special panel of the House Armed Services Committee, 3 October 1978, in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1978 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, October 1978), p. 595. ‘US Arms Transfers’, statement by President Carter, 29 November 1978, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, December 1978, in United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1978 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, October 1980), pp. 691–2. ‘Multilateral Discussions on Conventional Arms Transfers’, report by Secretary of State Vance to the Congress, 28 December 1979, in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1979 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, June 1982), pp. 828–34. US–Soviet Progress in Conventional Arms Talks, address by Assistant Director of ACDA for Weapons Evaluation and Control, Barry Blechman, before the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 21 May 1979 (London, US Embassy press releases). 38 Navias, Ballistic Missiles, p. 50. 39 Ibid. 40 ‘The US–Soviet Conventional Arms Transfer Negotiations’, in A. L. George, P. J. Farley, and A. Dallin, US–Soviet Security Co-operation: Achievements, Failures and Lessons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 515. 41 Karp, ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World’, p. 195. 42 R. D. Shuey, W. W. Lenhart, R. A. Snyder, W. H. Donnelly, J. E. Mielke, and J. D. Moteff, Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 3 October 1988, updated 9 February 1989), p. 57. 43 Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 271. 44 Ibid. 45 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control 1980 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, August 1981), p. 27. 46 ‘Libyans Get Nuclear Missile System’, Guardian, 21 March 1981. 47 F. Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (London: I.B.Taurus and Co. Ltd, 1989), p. 98. 48 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control 1980, p. 27. 49 Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, p. 83. 50 Taiwan initiated a nuclear weapons programme in the late 1960s in response to China’s atomic capability. In later years, however, these efforts ‘increasingly became a hedge against’ the potential ‘erosion of US security ties’ with Taiwan. L. A. Dunn, Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 56. 51 Ibid., pp. 56–7. 52 ‘New Missile’, Guardian, 6 October 1978. ‘A New Korean Missile’, Armies and Weapons, November 1978. ‘Seoul Tests Missile’, Financial Times, 27 September 1978.

190 53 54 55 56

57

58 59 60

61

62 63 64 65 66

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation Karp, ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World’, p. 181. Nolan, Trappings, p. 41. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’ (1989), p. 307. Son Ki-yong, Korea Times (Seoul), 26 September 1995, pp. 1–2, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-EAS-95-186), 26 September 1995, ‘US Rejects South Request to Annul Missile Ban’. The project was conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) under the stewardship of M. Eisenstein, who subsequently published the first major article on ballistic missile proliferation in the developing world. Personal interview with a former US Government official. See also: M. Eisenstein, ‘Third World Missiles and Nuclear Proliferation’, Washington Quarterly, summer 1982, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 112–15. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control 1980, p. 25. Personal interview with a former US Government official. ‘Statement on United States Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy’, 16 July 1981, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan 1981, January 20–December 31 1981 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 630–1. At the UN General Assembly’s Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982, President Reagan spoke of the need to avert ‘the threat of nuclear disaster’ that hung over the world. In doing so, he identified his administration’s commitment to retrain more effectively the horizontal proliferation of nuclear munitions. Reagan also cited his administration’s efforts to engage the Soviet Union in bilateral negotiations to reduce their respective nuclear missile inventories. He referred to his administration’s proposal of February 1982 to negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Union to eliminate both states’ intermediate-range nuclear missiles. ‘Remarks in New York City before the United Nations General Assembly’s Special Session on Disarmament’, 17 June 1982, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan 1982, January 1 to December 31, 1982 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), pp. 784–9. Nuclear Capable Missile Technology Transfer Policy, National Security Decision Directive Number 70 (Washington, DC: The White House, 30 November 1982). National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) were used during the Reagan administration to ‘promulgate Presidential decisions implementing national policy and objectives in all areas involving national security’. National Security Study Directives (NSSD) were used to ‘direct that studies be undertaken involving national security policy and objectives’. National Security Council Directives, National Security Decision Directive Number 1 (Washington, DC: National Security Council, 25 February 1981). Information taken from SIPRI Yearbooks 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984 (London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis). D. A. Ozga, ‘A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (winter 1994), p. 74. Ibid. Personal interview with a former US Government official. Ibid.

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67 J. H. Cushman, ‘7 Nations Agree to Limit Export of Big Rockets’, New York Times, 17 April 1987, p. A1. J. H. Cushman, ‘Tightening the Reins in Ballistic Missile Race’, New York Times, 19 April 1987, p. E2. 68 ‘Missile Technology Control Regime’, Department of State Press Briefing (extract), 16 April 1987, in Current Documents (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 75. 69 ‘Non-proliferation Agreement with Allies’, White House Statement, 16 April 1987, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 20 April 1987). 70 ‘Post-Cold War Agreements, 1987–1991’, in R. D. Burns (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament III (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), pp. 1474–80. 71 K. R. Krause, ‘Controlling the Arms Trade since 1945’, in R. D. Burns (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament II (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), pp. 1033–4. 72 Current Documents, p. 75. 73 Personal interview with former US Government official. 74 Current Documents, p.75. 75 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 76 Karp, ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,’ p. 177. 77 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The Missile Technology Control Regime: Fact Sheet (Washington, DC, 17 May 1993), p. 1. 78 Current Documents, p. 76. 79 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Missile Technology Control Regime, p. 1. 80 Burns, Encyclopedia III, p. 1475. 81 Personal interview with a former US Government official. 82 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Missile Technology Control Regime, p. 1. 83 Current Documents, p. 76. 84 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Missile Technology Control Regime, p. 2. 85 Burns, Encyclopedia, p. 1474. 86 Balancing the National Interest: US National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Competition, Panel on the Impact of National Security Controls on International Technology Transfer, Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1987), p. 73. 87 The Commerce Department created BXA in 1987 in an attempt to separate the department’s export control and trade/export promotion functions. J. Heinz, United States Strategic Trade: An Export Control System for the 1990s (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1991), p. 20. 88 Prior to 1987 and the creation of missile technology controls under the EAA, the United States had ‘no basis to deny, on grounds of missile proliferation’ the export of dual-use missile-related items to free world countries engaged in missile development. However, the United States had controlled those items included under the MTCR under its national security control provisions; meaning that transfers of these items to the Soviet bloc were already controlled. Testimony of James M. LeMunyon,

192

89 90 91

92

93

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96 97

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation Deputy Assistant for Export Administration, US Department of Commerce, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and International Economic Policy and Trade on 30 October 1989. Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls (Missile Technology Control Regime), Hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and International Economic Policy and Trade, 30 October 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 168–78. Personal interview with former Congressional staffer. Ibid. The NPA replaced the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 to become the principal authority for nuclear nonproliferation export controls in the United States. Quayle released the report during a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee organised to consider the emerging tactical ballistic missile threat in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. D. Quayle, ‘Missile Woes’, Washington Post, 14 July 1987, p. 15. A. F. Manfredi, R. D. Shuey, R. M. Preece, R. G. Sutter, and W. H. Donnelly, Ballistic Missile Proliferation Potential in the Third World, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 24 April 1986). This report was updated subsequently in 1987 and 1988. ‘Title IX: Matters Relating to Arms Control, Section 901: Missile Technology Control Regime, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989’, Public Law 100–180, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 4 December 1987, in United States Statutes at Large 1987 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 1134–5. Within the Department of Defense, the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) was responsible for compiling and updating the ‘Military Critical Technologies List’ (MCTL). Unlike the Commodity Control List and the Munitions List, the MCTL was not a control document but a technical reference document that consisted of munitions and certain dual-use items. By administering the MCTL, DTSA had primary responsibility for reviewing export licences at the Pentagon. Although the Pentagon had no official enforcement authority within the US export control process, DTSA played a consultative role in the US missile technology export review process. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, p. 80. Information taken from: ‘Table 7B: Register of the trade in major conventional weapons with industrialised and third world countries: 1983’, SIPRI Yearbook 1984: World Armaments and Disarmament (London: Taylor and Francis, 1984), p. 236. ‘Table 11B: Register of the trade in major conventional weapons with industrialised and third world countries: 1984’, SIPRI Yearbook 1985: World Armaments and Disarmament (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), p. 411. ‘Table 17B: Register of the trade in major conventional weapons with industrialised and third world countries: 1985’, SIPRI Yearbook 1986: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford

Notes

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99 100 101

102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

110 111 112

113 114 115 116 117

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University Press, 1986), p. 393. ‘Table 7B: Register of the trade in major conventional weapons with industrialised and third world countries: 1986’, SIPRI Yearbook 1987: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 254. Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation, pp. 52–3. A. Terry and M. L. Avignolo, ‘Port Stanley in Range of New Missile’, Sunday Times, 15 July 1984. S. D. Tollefson, ‘El Condor Pasa: The Demise of Argentina’s Ballistic Missile Program’, in W. C. Potter and H. W. Jencks (eds), The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers’ Network (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 256. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’ (1989), p. 291. Terry and Avignolo, ‘Port Stanley’, p. 256. A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World’, in SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 327. Shuey et al., Missile Proliferation. ‘Behind the Condor Carbon-Carbon Smuggling Case’, US News and World Report, 25 July 1988, p. 38. M. H. Kagan, ‘Iraq’s Case: The International Missile Trade and Proliferation’, in Potter and Jencks, Missile Bazaar, p. 183. Current Documents, p. 79. T. L. Friedman, ‘Soviets Caution Israel against a New Missile’, New York Times, 29 July 1987, p. A10. Navias, Ballistic Missiles, p. 21. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’ (1990), p. 389. Potter and Stulberg, ‘Soviet Union’, p. 549. OPR (Riyadh), 19 March 19 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-NES-88-054), 21 March 1988, ‘Statement on the Purchase of Chinese-Made Missiles’. M. R. Gordon, ‘Syria Is Studying New Missile Deal’, New York Times, 22 June 1988. Ozga, ‘Chronology’, p. 74. D. Oberdorfer, ‘US Seeks to Curb Argentine Missile Project’, Washington Post, September 1988, p. A6. ‘Condor II: Argentina’s Mission’, Atlantic News, 30 September 1988. Ozga, ‘Chronology’, p. 74. Moscow Reporting Assignments: US/USSR Bilaterals, 28–30 July 1987, Plenary Meeting-I, US Department of State, Washington, DC, p. 3. Potter and Stulberg, ‘Soviet Union’, p. 547. ‘Iraq Heavy Missile Launch Definitely Not Condor 2’, Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, 29 January–4 February 1990, p. 1. Potter and Stulberg, ‘Soviet Union’, p. 547. A. Karp, The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East (New York: Institute for East–West Studies, 1990), p. 27. The INF Treaty prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of between 1,000 and 5,500 km (‘intermediate-range’) and those with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km (‘shorter-range’). Burns (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament III, pp. 1271–86.

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119 J. W. Young, Cold War and Detente 1941–1991 (London: Longman, 1993), pp. 190–1. 120 Arms Control Reporter, 31 May–2 June 1988 (602.B.147/1988). 121 M. R. Gordon, ‘US and Soviets Discuss Curbing Missile Exports’, New York Times, 27 September 1988, p. A1. 122 Transcript of Press Conference held by Secretary of State George P. Shultz at the Shangri-La Hotel, Beijing, July 15, 1988. Cable sent from the US Embassy in Beijing to the US Department of State, Washington, DC, 15 July 1988. 123 ‘Shultz, in China, Urges Talks on Curbing Spread of Missiles’, Washington Post, 15 July 1988, p. A15. ‘Chinese Missiles Sold in MidEast Worrying Shultz’, New York Times, 16 July 1988, p. A1. 124 T. Luard, ‘American Defence Chief Aims to Curb Peking Rocket Sales’, Daily Telegraph, 6 September 1988. ‘China Snubs US Over MidEast Arms Sales’, Financial Times, 7 September 1988. 125 Arms Control Reporter, 6–7 September 1988 (602.B.152/1988). 126 ‘Beijing Defends Sale of Missiles to Saudis’, Washington Post, 7 April 1988, p. A17. 127 L. Barber, ‘Congress Forces Delay in $450 Million Saudi Arms Deal’, Financial Times, 27 April 1988. 128 Saudi Arabia also came under great pressure to sign the NPT from the Reagan administration and Israel. E. Sciolino, ‘Saudis Will Join Treaty on A-Arms’, New York Times, 26 April 1988. 129 ‘Dole Resolution on Chinese Arms Sales’, in Cable sent from the State Department to the US Embassy in Beijing, July 1988, State Department, Washington, DC, p. 1. 130 Ibid., p. 2. 131 Ibid. 132 ‘Title XIII: Foreign Relations Matters, Section 1307: Restriction on Sale of Defense Articles to Certain Nations, National Defense Authorisation Act, Fiscal Year 1989’, Public Law 100-456, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 29 September 1988, in United States Statutes at Large 1988 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 2062. 133 M. R. Gordon, ‘US Urges Talks on Missiles in MidEast’, New York Times, 27 December 1988, p. 3. ‘US Presses MidEast Missile Talks’, Washington Post, 28 December 1988, p. 15. 134 United States General Accounting Office, Arms Control:US Efforts to Control the Transfer of Nuclear-Capable Missile Technology (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, June 1990), p. 2. 135 Ibid., pp. 7–8.

3 The Bush Administration and the Missile Technology Control Regime 1 Testimony of Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 May 1989. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Third World, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology, Committee on

Notes

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4

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Armed Services, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 2 May 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 31. M. R. Gordon, ‘State Department Weighs Plan for Arms Control Focus’, New York Times, 9 February 1989, p. A13. List of Additional Policy Co-ordinating Committees approved by the President in NSD 10 and in addition to those set forth in NSD 1, National Security Council, Washington, DC, 1989. On 17 April, NSD 1 established the organisation of the NSC system to enable President Bush to execute his responsibilities in the area of national security. In doing so, three subgroups were created to support the administration’s NSC system. The Principals Committee (NSC/PC) was the senior interagency forum for the consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/PC reviewed, co-ordinated and monitored the development and implementation of national security policy. Members included the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman), the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Chief of Staff to the President. Arrangements were made for other participants to be included as the issues to be discussed dictated. The Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) was the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for the consideration of policy issues affecting national security. It reviewed and monitored the work of the NSC interagency process and made recommendations regarding the development and implementation of national security policy. Members included the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman), the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, the UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Vice-Chairman of the JCS. Policy Co-ordinating Committees (NSC/PCC) were established as the principal interagency forums for the development and implementation of national security policy in several regional and functional areas. Members included representatives at the Assistant Secretary level from each of the executive agencies with members on the NSC/DC. Depending on the subject under consideration, the NSC/PCCs were chaired by an Assistant Secretary from either the Pentagon, State, Treasury, Intelligence or the NSC. National Security Decision 1: National Security Council Organization, National Security Council, Washington, DC, 17 April 1989, pp. 1–3. For a brief analysis of the NSC system during the Bush administration see A. A. Jordan, W. J. Taylor Jr, L. Korb, American National Security: Policy and Process, 4th edn (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 215–17. Testimony of Reginald Bartholomew, Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 18 May 1989. Nuclear and Missile Proliferation, hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 18 May 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 32. Chapter 3 described briefly the central roles of the State and Commerce

196

6

7

8 9

10 11

12

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation Departments in the missile technology export licensing process. Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the State Department’s Office of Munitions Control (OMC) was responsible for processing export licence requests for munitions items listed on the MTCR annex. OMC was renamed the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) in January 1990. The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) vetted requests for dual-use items list on the annex under the authority of the Export Administration Act (EAA). Although officials from the agencies involved in this group told the General Accounting Office – some time between June 1989 and June 1990 – they would rather hold regular meetings with a prearranged agenda, this remained the situation as of December 1989. United States General Accounting Office, Arms Control: US Efforts to Control the Transfer of Nuclear-Capable Missile Technology (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, June 1990), p. 8. Testimony of Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 31 October 1989. National Security Implications of Missile Proliferation, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 31 October 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 49. See also, Finding Common Ground: US Export Controls in a Changing Global Environment, Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of US National Security Export Controls, Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), p. 8. United States General Accounting Office, Arms Control, p. 8. National Security Implications of Missile Proliferation, p. 85. United States General Accounting Office, Arms Control, p. 8. Testimony of James L. LeMunyon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, US Department of Commerce, before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and International Economic Policy and Trade, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 30 October 1989. Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls (Missile Technology Control Regime), Hearing before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and International Economic Policy and Trade, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 12 July and 30 October 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 169. Gordon, ‘State Department Weighs Plan’, p. A13. Testimony of Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security, and Science, and International Economic Policy and Trade, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 30 October 1989. Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls, p. 139. These changes were also part of a wider effort to reorganise the management of the State Department by expanding the role of the agency’s under secretaries. Gordon, ‘State Department Weighs Plan’, p. A13.

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13 Testimony of Jim E. Hinds, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy, before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 May 1989. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Third World, pp. 32–3. 14 As part of the reorganisation of the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, a new emphasis was placed on economic issues, Soviet and East European Affairs, competitive strategies and nonproliferation. D. Silverberg, ‘DOD Policy Changes Emphasize Economic, Eastern Bloc Issues’, Defense News, 6 November 1989, p. 4. 15 Personal interview with a former US Government official. 16 Testimony of Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 30 October 1989. Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls, p. 149. 17 During the Bush administration, BXA was the Federal Government’s regulatory agency responsible for licensing dual-use exports for reasons of national security, foreign policy (including missile nonproliferation) and short supply. The agency’s Office of Export Enhancement (OEE) was responsible for preventing illegal exports of dual-use goods and technology. This responsibility included reviewing licence applications and subsequently denying or returning them without action if there were enforcement concerns. OEE also conducted pre-licence checks to verify the legitimacy of the end-user(s) and directed post-shipment checks to ensure goods reached the named end-user. Moreover, OEE contacted and informed (outreach) the American business community about the EAA and the EAR, and solicited their compliance with US export controls. The OEE was also responsible for investigating potential violations of the EAA and the EAR, and helped to convict violators. See the statements of Frank W. Deliberti, Director of the Office for Export Enforcement (OEE), Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce, and Kenneth A. Cutshaw, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Export Enforcement, Bureau of Export Administration, US Department of Commerce, submitted to the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 18 April and 1 May 1991. Administration and Enforcement of US Export Control Programs, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Serial 102–72 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 217, 487. 18 United States General Accounting Office, Arms Control, p. 5. According to the General Accounting Office, the Commerce Department’s list contained limited information on potential missile diversions. Indeed, the Director of the Office of Export Intelligence (renamed the Office of Enforcement Support) said in May 1989 that BXA had received from the State Department around 500 names associated with missile technology concerns. According to the director, however, only 100 had been entered into the computer because it had a limited capacity. Ibid. 19 Ibid., pp. 1, 4.

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20 Of all MTCR-related export licence applications, the State Department received approximately 80–90 per cent. Commerce received 10–20 per cent. Ibid., p. 5. 21 Bureau of Export Administration, United States Department of Commerce, ‘CONSARC Chronology’, 7 September 1990, submitted to the hearings on Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, hearings before the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security, Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990 and 23 April 1991. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, hearings before the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security, Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 21 September 1990 and 23 April 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 58–60. 22 The former Pentagon official had been informed of the transfer by a media source. Strengthening the Export Licensing System, Report of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Report 102–137, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 2 July 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 18. 23 ‘Commerce Department Urged Sale to Iraq’, Washington Post, 13 September 1990, p. A36. 24 Strengthening the Export Licensing System, p. 18. 25 ‘CONSARC Chronology’, in Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, p. 60. 26 Another example involved the Commerce Department’s approval of an export licence for $2 million worth of quartz crystals to Iraq’s ‘Salah al Din Establishment’ and the ‘Iraq Trading Company’. The crystals were ostensibly destined for incorporation into a ground-based radar system and were included on the US missile technology control list under commodity classification number 1587. The Commerce Department approved the transfer in January 1988 and determined that the items were not restricted by the MTCR, or for reasons of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons nonproliferation. In doing so, Commerce did not refer the application to any other agency. The department also approved the transfer to Salah al Din of ‘frequency synthesizers’ to ‘calibrate, adjust, and test surveillance radars’, most probably for incorporation into radar for nuclear-capable missile ground support. Another example of the failing dual-use export licensing process was when the Commerce Department granted a licence to Struthers Dunn, Inc. in 1989. This involved the transfer of electrical equipment to Iraq which could have had missile flight-testing applications. Indeed, Struthers Dunn even informed the Commerce Department that the equipment included ‘timedelay relay systems’ capable of performing at an altitude of 350,000 feet; ideal for missile experimentation. Strengthening the Export Licensing System, pp. 21–4. On 1 March 1991, the Commerce Department published a list of the licence applications which it approved for the export of dual-use equipment to Iraq between 1985 and 1990. BXA Facts: Fact Sheet on Export Licensing for Iraq (Washington, DC: Bureau of Export Administration, United States Department of Commerce, March 1991).

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28

29

30 31 32 33 34

35

36

199

For an appraisal of this list and a comprehensive account of dual-use exports to Iraq between 1985 and 1990 see, G. Milhollin, Licensing Mass Destruction: US Exports to Iraq: 1985–1990 (Washington, DC: Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, June 1991). United States General Accounting Office, Arms Control. The Commerce Department could only have stopped these exports to Iraq for one of four reasons: if the item in question could potentially have been diverted to the Soviet bloc or to other proscribed destinations, if a proposed export violated US nuclear nonproliferation policy, if a proposed export violated US missile, chemical, or biological technology controls, or if it violated other US foreign policy controls, regarding such things as human rights. Baghdad was removed from the US terrorist list in 1982. BXA Facts, p. 2. Testimony of Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Non-proliferation Policy, Department of Defense, before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee of Ways and Means, 1 May, 1991. Administration and Enforcement of United States Export Control Programs, p. 42. M. Wines, ‘US Seeks to Block an Export to Iraq’, New York Times, 15 July 1990, p. 3. In November 1986, the Reagan administration’s Deputy UnderSecretary of Defense for Trade Security Policy wrote a letter to the Commerce Department’s Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration to inform him of intelligence linking Sa’ad-16 with Iraq’s ballistic missile development programme. United States General Accounting Office, Arms Control, p. 19. Moreover, the Commerce Department had received a letter from the director of the ‘Sa’ad General Establishment’ in February 1985 which described the complex as including four laboratories for testing ‘starting material and fuel mixtures’ and two for developing ‘control systems and navigation equipment’. Strengthening the Export Licensing System, pp. 19–20. Ibid., p. 25. Ibid., p. 21. G. Bush, US Policy toward the Persian Gulf, National Security Directive 26, National Security Council, Washington, DC, 2 October 1989, p. 2. ‘American Sales to Iraq Totalled $1.5 Billion’, Washington Post, 1 November 1990, p. 1. C. H. Farnsworth, ‘Military Exports to Iraq Come under Scrutiny’, New York Times, 25 June 1991, p. A11. In mid-1991, the Commerce Department’s Inspector-General initiated an internal investigation into charges that agency officials had modified documents associated with the export of dual-use technology to Iraq. The documents had reportedly been altered to make them appear ‘less incriminating when examined by a Congressional committee’. Ibid. Testimony of Gary Milhollin, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, p. 28. Testimony of James M. LeMunyon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, Department of Commerce, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 23 April 1991. Ibid., p. 113.

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37 Testimony of Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Non-proliferation Policy, Department of Defense, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 9 October 1991. Proliferation and Regional Security in the 1990s, hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 9 October 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 34. 38 Ibid., pp. 34–5. 39 ‘Executive Order 12735’, 16 November 1990, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation, in Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1993: Current Legislation and Related Executive Orders, II, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States House of Representative, United States Senate (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 1359–62. The administration’s review was complicated initially in late September 1990 by the expiration of the Export Administration Act (EAA), and its related system of controls, including those applicable to dual-use missile technology export licensing. On 30 September, however, the White House issued an executive order which continued in effect all rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Commerce, and all administrative actions such as export licensing under the authority of the EAA, as amended. The administration asserted that foreign entities would have been given ‘unrestricted access’ to American commercial products, technology, and technical data if it had not acted to continue the act’s authorities; thus posing an ‘unusual and extraordinary threat’ to national security, foreign policy, and economic objectives that were ‘critical to the United States’. The controls that would have lapsed included; national security controls, foreign policy controls on missile, chemical and biological weapons technology, nuclear nonproliferation controls, and short-supply controls. G. Bush, ‘Message to the Congress on the Continuation of Export Control Regulations’, 30 September 1990, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, Book 2, 1 July–31 December 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 1325–6. 40 G. Bush, ‘Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Declaration of a National Emergency Concerning Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation’, 16 November 1990. Ibid., pp. 1618–19. 41 G. Bush, ‘Memorandum of Disapproval for the Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990’, 16 November 1990. Ibid., pp. 1619–21. 42 Ibid., p. 1620. 43 ‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the President’s Export Control Initiatives’, 13 December 1990. Ibid., pp. 1794–5. 44 Testimony of Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticoMilitary Affairs, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 23 April 1990. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, pp. 145, 148. 45 Testimony of James LeMunyon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, Department of Commerce, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 23 April 1991. Ibid., p. 148. 46 ‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the President’s Export Control

Notes

47 48

49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

58

59

60

61 62

201

Initiatives’, 13 December 1990. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, pp. 1794–5. Strengthening the Export Licensing System, pp. 31–2. Fact Sheet on Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 13 December 1990), pp. 1–2. Testimony of Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Non-proliferation Policy, Department of Defense, before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 18 April 1991. Administration and Enforcement of US Export Control Programs, pp. 22, 42. Ibid., pp. 25–6. Ibid., pp. 22, 42. Ibid., p. 22. Fact Sheet on Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, p. 1. D. Silverberg, ‘US Arms Proliferation Proposal Will Rise or Fall on World Support’, Defense News, 17 December 1990, pp. 4, 36. Personal interview with a former US Government official. Silverberg, ‘US Arms’, pp. 4, 36. Fact Sheet on Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, p. 2. The EPCI also directed that ‘world-wide export controls’ be adopted on 50 precursors for chemical weapons and urged all states manufacturing such chemicals to implement similar controls. Prior to the EPCI, the United States had controlled the 50 precursor chemicals to Iran, Iraq, Libya and embargoed states. World-wide controls had only been in place on 11 precursors in line with the Australia Group’s controls. BXA Facts: Nonproliferation Export Control Initiatives, (Washington, DC: Bureau of Export Administration, Office of Public Affairs, Department of Commerce). Export controls were also required for proposed exports of ‘potentially chemical-weapon-related industrial facilities, and related designs and technology’. Fact Sheet on Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, p. 1. For a brief appraisal of the EPCI, see J. R. Harvey, C. Binkley, A. Block, and R. Burke, A Common Sense Guide to High Technology Export Controls (Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, March 1995), pp. 57–9. ‘United States Imposes Export Controls on Chemical Agents and Equipment’, United States Department of Commerce News, Office of the Secretary of Commerce, Department of Commerce, Washington, DC, 3 July 1991, pp. 1–2. Question to Charles Duelfer, Director of the Office of Defense Trade Controls, Department of State, before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee of Ways and Means, 1 May 1991. Administration and Enforcement of United States Export Control Programs, p. 577. The Office for Defense Trade Policy (DTP) was responsible for setting guidelines for the department’s defence trade policy. S. D. Tollefson, ‘Brazilian Arms Transfers, Ballistic Missiles and Foreign Policy: The Search for Autonomy’ (Ph.D, Johns Hopkins University, 1991), p. 409. United States General Accounting Office, Arms Control, pp. 1, 4. Ibid., p. 5.

202

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63 Testimony of Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticoMilitary Affairs, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 23 April 1991. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, p. 76. 64 J. R. Smith, ‘State Department Says It Regrets Aid to Brazil on Missiles’, Washington Post, 22 September 1990, p. A22. 65 Brazil began developing the Sonda series of sounding rockets (SR) with American assistance during the 1960s. It was not until 1979, however, that the Brazilian Complete Space Mission (MECB) was established. Among MECB objectives was the design, development and construction of the VLS to deploy indigenously produced satellites to low earth orbits (LEO). The VLS was to be derived from technology developed for the Sonda rocket series and launched from a specially designed centre at Alcantara, in the northern state of Maranhao. W. Bowen and A. Koch, ‘Non-proliferation Is Embraced by Brazil’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1996, pp. 283–7. 66 Testimony of Elizabeth Verville, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, p. 45. 67 Testimony of Charles Duelfer, Director of the Defense Trade Control Center, Department of State, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990. Ibid., p. 49. 68 Testimony of Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Nonproliferation, Department of Defense, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990. Ibid., p. 52. 69 Testimony of Henry Sokolski before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 9 October 1990. Proliferation and Regional Security in the 1990s, p. 81. 70 Testimony of Henry Sokolski before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, p. 52. 71 Testimony of Henry Sokolski before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 9 October 1990. Proliferation and Regional Security in the 1990s, p. 31. 72 Ibid., p. 80. 73 Testimony of Elizabeth Verville, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, p. 52. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid., p. 44. 76 Orbita Sistemas Aerospaciais SA was developing the MB/EE series, including; the 150 km-range 500 kg-capable MB/EE-150, the 350 km-range 500 kg-capable MB/EE-350, the 600 km-range up to 500 kg-capable MB/EE600, and the 1,000 km-range up to 500 kg-capable MB/EE-1000. Orbita was created in 1987 to co-ordinate Brazil’s missile programme but subsequently went bankrupt in the early 1990s. Avibras was developing the SS series of missiles, including; the 150 km-range SS-150; the 300 km-range 1,000 kg- capable SS-300, the 600 km-range 500 kg-capable SS-600, and

Notes

77 78

79 80 81

82

83

84

85 86 87

88

89 90

203

the 1,000 km-range up to 1,000 kg-capable SS-1000. The above information was derived from: B. Chow, Emerging Space Launch Programs: Economics and Safeguards (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993). Bowen and Koch, ‘Nonproliferation’, pp. 283–7. Ibid. G. Milhollin and D. Dantzic, ‘Must the US Give Brazil and Iraq the Bomb?’, New York Times, 29 July 1990, p. 19. ‘Sanctions Cost Brazil Key Trade Partner’, Washington Post, 28 August 1990, p. A21. T. Kamm, ‘Brazilians Arms Experts Said to Upgrade Iraq’s Missiles’, Wall Street Journal, 30 August 1990, p. A5. ‘Twenty Brazilians Working on Iraqi Military Project’, O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo), 17 August 1990, p. 10, in Nuclear Developments, 14 September 1990, p. 1. Strengthening the Export Licensing System, p. 28. ‘Iraq’, in SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 298. Sunday Correspondent (London), 15 October 1989, in Nuclear Developments, FBIS, 6 November 1989, pp. 19–20, ‘UK Paper on FRG Assistance for Libyan Missile’. Testimony of Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, Department of Defense, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990. Arms Trade and Non-proliferation, p. 48. Testimony of Elizabeth Verville, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990. Ibid., pp. 44–5. Statement of Senator Jeff Bingaman before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990. Ibid., pp. 50–1. E. Wemple, ‘Fighting an Uphill Battle: Missile Technology Export Controls’, Export Control News, 25 October 1990, p. 10. US Heat Treatment of Brazilian Rocket Casings, United States Department of State, Washington, DC, 24 December 1990. Written response to a question posed to Henry Sokolski, hearing before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 9 October 1990. Proliferation and Regional Security in the 1990s, p. 84. The office also commissioned a study to consider the ‘critical system options of foreign missile force structures’ such as missile numbers, accuracy and warheads. The office had previously commissioned a classified study by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to provide estimates of the development process and technical characteristics of foreign missile systems. Ibid. B. Chow, Emerging National Space Launch Programs: Economics and Safeguards (Santa Monica: RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 1993), p. iii. Ibid., pp. 1–67. The Commerce Department’s dual-use technology licensing problems and the State Department’s failure to effectively implement the administration’s SLV policy illustrated an additional problem. This involved the gathering of intelligence related to missile proliferation. For example, no

204

91

92

93

94

95 96

97 98 99 100 101

102 103

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation American agency in the 1980s had ‘systematically gathered or analysed information on the reliability of Iraqi end-users’, or if someone did ‘the information did not get into the hands of the licensing agencies’. Although the DOD claimed it had told Commerce during the 1980s about Iraqi end-users, this information was sent informally and detailed records were not kept. Moreover, according to an investigation by the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, a CIA official claimed the agency ‘was not systematically collecting intelligence on Iraqi end-users until the fall of 1990’. Strengthening the Export Licensing System, p. 32. Testimony of W. Seth Carus, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, before the subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and International Economic Policy and Trade, 12 July 1989. Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls, pp. 106–7. R. D. Shuey, W. W. Lenhart, R. A. Snyder, W. H. Donnelly, J. E. Mielke, and J. D. Moteff, Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 3 October 1988, updated 9 February 1989). ‘Missile Technology Control Act of 1989, Howard L. Berman’, Congressional Record, Vol. 135, No. 14 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 9 February 1989), pp. E354–5. Testimony of W. Seth Carus, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and International Economic Policy and Trade, 12 July 1989. Missile Proliferation: the Need for Controls (1990), pp. 106–7. D. B. Ottaway, ‘US Firms Helped Iraq Gain Ability to Make Missiles, Officials Say,’ Washington Post, 3 May 1989, p. A19. K. R. Timmerman, The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons to Iraq and Libya, special report sponsored by the Simon Wisenthal Center, 1990, pp. 1–54. M. Farr and A. Philips, Sunday Correspondent, 15 October 1989, p. 3, FBIS (JPRS-TAC-89-035), 20 October 1989, pp. 10–11. Testimony of W. Seth Carus, in Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls, pp. 106–107. Timmerman, Poison Gas, pp. 1–54. Testimony of W. Seth Carus, in Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls, pp. 106–7. Consen was reported to have owned several of these front companies outright; the Monaco-based Consen SAM and Consen Investment SAM, the Swiss-based Condor Projekt AB, IFAT Corporation Ltd, Consen SA, and Desentec AG, the Austrian firms Delta Consult GmbH and Delta System GmbH, Jersey’s (UK) Transtechno Ltd, and West Germany’s GPA and PBG. Ibid. Testimony of W. Seth Carus, in Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls, pp. 106–7. Testimony of Janne E. Nolan, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, before the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 13 March 1992. Arms Trade and Non-proliferation in the Middle East, hearing before the

Notes

104 105 106 107

108 109 110

111

112 113

114

115

116 117

118 119

205

Subcommittee on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2, March 13, 1992 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 32. A. Kelle, ‘Germany’, in H. Muller (ed.), Nuclear Export Controls in Europe (Brussels: European InterUniversity Press, 1995), pp. 77, 83. Ibid., p. 77. Ibid., pp. 94–5. Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 12 June 1989, pp. 70–86, in Nuclear Developments, FBIS, 14 July 1989, pp. 30–6, ‘Government Said Involved in Technology Transfer’. Timmerman, Poison Gas, pp. 1–54. Kelle, ‘Germany’, p. 90. As of June 1990, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom did not possess laws to prevent their nationals from working on foreign missile projects, although the United States and France did. United States General Accounting Office, Arms Control, pp. 17–18. Testimony of Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 2 May 1989. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Third World, pp. 23–5. Ibid. ‘Arianespace markets the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Ariane space launcher’, Paris Domestic Service (Paris), 17 July 1989, in FBIS (JPRS-TAC89-030), 26 July 1989, ‘Negotiations with France to Buy Ariane Rocket Engine Technology’. ESA uses Viking motors in its Ariane rockets to place satellites into low earth orbits (LEO). D. Silverberg, ‘French Proposal May Violate Pact on Proliferation’, Defense News, 17 July 1989, pp. 4, 52. McDonnell Douglas had access to the terms of the French proposal because Brazilian procurement law insisted that all interested parties had access to the bids made by other firms. Ibid. M. R. Gordon, ‘US Tries to Stop Brazil’s Missile Technology Deal’, New York Times, 19 October 1989, p. A6. Statement by Senator Jeff Bingaman on the floor of the Senate, 7 October 1989. ‘French Technology Transfer to Brazil in Violation of the MTCR’, Congressional Record, Vol. 135, No. 134 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 7 October 1989), pp. S12992–5. D. A. Ozga, ‘A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime’, Non-proliferation Review (winter 1994), Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 75. Testimony of Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticoMilitary Affairs, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, 11 July 1990. Proliferation and Arms Control, hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, 17 May and 11 July 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 151. ‘MTCR List to Be Revised’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 March 1991, p. 470. A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’, SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World

206

120 121 122

123 124

125 126

127

128

129

130 131 132

133 134 135

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 369–391. Ozga, ‘Chronology’, p. 77. Ibid. Answer to a question posed to Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Non-proliferation Policy, Department of Defense, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 9 October 1990. Proliferation and Regional Security in the 1990s, p. 85. Ozga, ‘Chronology’, p. 77. Testimony of Elizabeth Verville, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, p. 42. ‘MTCR List to Be Revised’, p. 470. Karp ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’, pp. 369–91. The week before the Ottawa gathering, the administration was instrumental in getting the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialised states (the original seven MTCR members) to highlight the important contribution of multilateral missile nonproliferation efforts to stemming the spread of ballistic missile technology. For example, the Houston Summit’s communiqué on transnational issues emphasised the need to deal with the related threats of ballistic missile and WMD proliferation. The communiqué also noted the contribution of the MTCR to the G-7’s efforts to control the spread of missile capabilities. ‘Houston Economic Summit Statement on Transnational Issues’, 10 July 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, pp. 981–2. The Ottawa plenary was attended for the first time by representatives from Belgium and Luxembourg, which acceded in July 1989. Ozga, ‘Chronology’, p. 77. Testimony of Elizabeth Verville, 21 September 1990, in Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, p. 39. Verville led the American delegation to the third MTCR plenary in Ottawa. Testimony of James LeMunyon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, Department of Commerce, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990. Ibid., pp. 38–9. Testimony of Henry Sokolski, 21 September 1990. Ibid., pp. 41–2. Testimony of James LeMunyon, 21 September 1990. Ibid., pp. 32–3. Answer to a question posed to Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 21 September 1990 and 23 April 1991. Ibid., p. 215. ‘Canada Hosts MTCR Meeting’, Disarmament Bulletin, No. 14 (fall 1990), p. 27. Ozga, ‘Chronology’, p. 77. Testimony of Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticoMilitary Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 11 July 1990. Proliferation and Arms Control, hearings before the Subcommittee on

Notes

136

137

138

139

140

141 142

143 144 145

146

147 148

207

Arms Control, International Security and Science, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 19 May and 11 July 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 151. Capriani, L’Unità (Milan), 30 July 1989, in FBIS (FBIS-WEU-89-151), 8 August 1989, p. 6, ‘Charges Filed in Missile Parts Sales to Argentina’. J. Wyles, ‘Fiat Link Suspected in Condor Missile Probe’, Financial Times, 31 July 1989, p. 2. ‘Law No. 185, 9 July 1990’, New Provisions Governing the Export, Import, and Transit of Armaments, Italian government document. A. Politi, ‘Italy’, in Muller, Nuclear Export Controls, pp. 107–20. Testimony of Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticoMilitary Affairs, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 23 April 1991. Arms Trade and Non-proliferation, p. 78. It should be noted these reforms were not driven solely by missile proliferation concerns. The reforms were instigated originally by revelations that West German entities and individuals had helped construct a chemical weapons facility in Libya. Kelle, ‘Germany’, pp. 77–105. Country List H included the following counties: Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Bahrain; Brazil; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Chile; China; Comores; Cuba; Cyprus; Djibouti; Egypt; Ethiopia; Guyana; India; Iran; Iraq; Israel; Jordan; Korea (Republic of); Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of); Kuwait; Laos; Lebanon; Libya; Mauritania; Monaco; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Niger; Oman; Pakistan; Qatar; Romania; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Somalia; South Africa; Syria; Taiwan; Tanzania; United Arab Emirates; Vanuatu; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe. Tightening of the Foreign Trade and Payments Controls since the Beginning of 1989, V132 48 03 00 15, West German government document, Bonn, 26 November 1990, pp. 13–14. Ibid., pp. 1–14. Answer to a question posed to Charles Duelfer, Deputy for Defense Trade to the Assistant Secretary, and Director of the Center for Defense Trade, before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 18 April and 1 May 1991. Administration and Enforcement of United States Export Control Programs, pp. 568–9. R. K. Ackerman, ‘French Rocket Technology Transfer’, Associated Press, Congressional Record (5 October 1989), p. S12992. Testimony of Richard Clarke, 11 July 1990. Proliferation and Arms Control, p. 204. ‘Arianespace Assures Liquid Fuel Technology’, Gazeta Mercantil (São Paulo), 23–25 September 1989, p. 16, in Nuclear Developments, FBIS, 29 November 1989, p. 5. Le Quotidien de Paris (Paris), 7–8 October 1989, p. 14, in Nuclear Developments, FBIS, 26 October 1989, p. 45, ‘Ministry States Policy’. See also Congressional Record (5 October 1989), p. S12992. R. Sinai, ‘US Protests French Plan to Give Brazil Rocket Motor’, non-cited article submitted to the Congressional Record (5 October 1989), p. S12993. Personal interview with a former US Government official. Congressional Record (5 October 1989), p. S12992-3.

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149 Gordon ‘State Department Weighs Plan’, p. A6. 150 Le Quotidien de Paris, 26 October 1989, p. 45. 151 Testimony of Richard Clarke, 11 July 1990. Proliferation and Arms Control, p. 204. 152 O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo), 5 November 1989, p. 9, in Nuclear Developments, FBIS, 29 November 1989, p. 15, ‘Arianespace Wins Bidding on Brasilsat Launches’. According to other reports in 1989, a French company was also negotiating the transfer of cryogenic rocket engine technology to India’s SLV programme. The French company was reportedly asking for $212 million for the technology, which was approximately five times the Indian Space Research Organisation’s (ISRO) annual budget. Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), 9 November 1989, in Nuclear Developments, FBIS, 29 November 1989, p. 27, ‘France Offers Engine for Satellite Launch Vehicle’. 153 Testimony of Richard Clarke, 11 July 1990. Proliferation and Arms Control, p. 204. 154 Testimony of Henry Sokolski, 23 April 1991. Arms Trade and Non-proliferation, p. 171. 155 G. Bush, ‘Address before the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, New York’, 1 October 1990. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, p. 421. 156 S. A. Hildreth, Theater Missile Defense: Issues for the 103rd Congress, CRS Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 31 March 1994), p. 1. 157 In April 1990, US intelligence revealed that Iraq had been building stationary launchers for its Al Hussein missiles within range of Tel Aviv. According to US intelligence, the most likely explanation for this was to discourage a pre-emptive Israeli attack on Iraq’s chemical and/or nuclear weapons installations. M. R. Gordon, ‘Iraq Said to Build Launchers for its 400 Mile Missiles’, New York Times, 30 March 1990. In the run up to the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein also threatened to ‘scorch half of Israel’ with chemical weapons if it attempted to destroy Iraq’s nuclear facilities. W. Safire, ‘Beware the Condor’, New York Times, 29 June 1990, p. A25. In October 1990, the administration subsequently sent two Patriot airdefence units to Israel to upgrade its air defences. The White House said this transfer was made primarily because of the ‘increased threat from ballistic missiles in the Iraqi inventory’. Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on US Emergency Assistance for Israel, 1 October 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, p. 1334. 158 ‘Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union’, 29 January 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1991, 1 January–30 June 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 74–80. ‘Statement on the Strategic Defense Initiative’, 22 March 1991. Ibid., pp. 302–3. 159 Following the announcement of GPALS, the Pentagon explained the United States had been reviewing the implications of the dramatic international changes that had occurred since the late 1980s and concluded the SDI reorientation was a necessary step in America’s reaction to an

Notes

160

161

162

163

164

165 166

209

altered strategic environment. The likelihood of a deliberate Soviet strategic missile strike had greatly receded, yet the chance of aggression from the developing world in the form of a ballistic missile attack had increased due to high levels of missile proliferation during the 1980s. The Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) subsequently approved a Mission Needs Statement in early 1992 to guide the theatre missile defence efforts of the armed services. This translated into three basic missile defence goals; preventing theatre ballistic missiles from being launched at American forces and allies using offensive military capabilities, intercepting and defending incoming ballistic missiles in flight using active defences, and reducing the effect of ballistic missile attacks, if active defences failed, through passive defences. S. A. Hildreth, Theater Missile Defense: Issues for the 103rd Congress, CRS Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 31 March 1994), p. 1. W. Q. Bowen and D. H. Dunn, American Security Policy in the 1990s: Beyond Containment (Aldershot and Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996), pp. 128–31. G. Bush, ‘Remarks to Raytheon Missile Systems Plant Employees in Andover, Massachusetts’, 15 February 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1991, pp. 148–50. In his last speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1992, President Bush again underlined the importance of such policies when he said that even as the international community worked to ‘prevent proliferation’, it also had to be ‘realistic’ and guard against proliferation that had ‘already taken place’. G. Bush, ‘Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City’, 21 September 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1992–93, 1 August 1992–20 January 1993 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 1598–603. The group included representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the department’s policy and acquisition offices, the three services and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO). Testimony of Henry Sokolski, 11 July 1990. Proliferation and Arms Control, p. 172. Imposition and Expansion of Foreign Policy Controls, Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce, Washington, DC. Federal Register, Vol. 56, No. 158 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 15 August 1991), p. 40494. Ibid., p. 40498. The term missile was defined as ‘rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms (kg) payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers (km)’. Ibid. Ibid., p. 40495. A similar list of destinations – Supplement 5 to Part 778 of the EAR – for chemical and biological nonproliferation reasons already existed. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 40495, 40500. The term ‘US person’ included: individuals who were citizens or permanent resident aliens of the United States, any

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‘juridical person organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including foreign branches’, and any person in the United States. Ibid. 167 When a US person was informed by BXA, these prohibitions applied to any destination. Ibid. 168 Supplement No. 6: Missile Technology Destinations Location

Project

Brazil

Sonda III, Sonda IV, SS-300, SS-1000, MB/EE Series Missile, VLS Space Launch Vehicle M Series Missiles, CSS-2 Agni, Prithvi, SLV-3 Satellite Launch Vehicle, Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), Geostationary Launch Vehicle (GSLV). Surface-to-Surface Missile Project, Scud Development Project

China India

Iran Middle East North Korea Pakistan South Africa

No-Dong 1, SCUD Development Project Hatf Series Missiles Surface-to-Surface Missile Project, Space Launch Vehicle

Although Supplement 6 listed several Brazilian missile and rocket projects, BXA added a note that Brazil had made several important commitments to nonproliferation in the preceding 12 months. In September 1991, Brazil signed the Mendoza Declaration with Argentina and Chile, which prohibits them from developing, producing, stockpiling or using chemical weapons. In December 1991, Brazil signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On the missile side, Brazil had also expressed an interest to join the MTCR and a team representing the regime visited Brazil in April 1992. Moreover, the Brazilians had announced their decision to transfer control of their space launch programme to a civilian-controlled space agency. Finally, Brazil had begun work on drafting a legal basis for implementing a domestic export control system. Supplement 6 to Part 778 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), ‘Expansion of Foreign Policy Controls; Missile Technology Destinations’, Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce, Washington, DC. Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 116 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 16 June 1992), pp. 26773–4. 169 ‘BXA Publishes Long-awaited Missile List’, Export Control News, 30 June 1992, pp. 15–17. 170 G. Milhollin and G. White, Missiles Too Dangerous to Name, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Washington, DC, August 1992, p. 3. G. Milhollin and G. White, ‘Winking at Proliferation: Why Are US Firms Still Able to Aid the Mideast Missile Race?’, Washington Post, 16 August 1992, p. C2. ‘Wisconsin Project Bashes Missile Controls’, Export Control News, 27 August 1992, p. 4.

Notes 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184

185 186 187

188 189 190

191

192 193 194 195 196 197

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Export Control News, 30 June 1990, p. 16. Milhollin and White, Missiles Too Dangerous, p. 3. Export Control News, 30 June 1991, p. 16. Milhollin and White, Missiles Too Dangerous, p. 1. Export Control News, 30 June 1990, p. 16. Federal Register, 16 June 1992, pp. 26773–4. Milhollin and White, Missiles Too Dangerous, p. 3. Ibid., p. 2. Export Control News, 30 June 1992, p. 17. Ibid., p. 16. Milhollin and White, Missiles Too Dangerous, p. 3. Federal Register, 15 August 1991, p. 40495. ‘White House Statement on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 7 March 1991. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1991, p. 223. On 13 March, BXA published a ‘proposed rule’ in the Federal Register that expanded foreign policy controls to support the administration’s missile and CBW nonproliferation policies in line with the EPCI, and Executive Order 12735 of 16 November 1990. Federal Register, Vol. 56 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 13 March 1991), p. 10765; 15 August 1991, pp. 40494–502. Ibid., 15 August 1991, pp. 40495–6. ‘Missile Proliferation Chronology’, Arms Control Reporter, June 1991, pp. 706.B.55–706.E4. G. Bush, ‘Message to the Congress Regarding Reporting on the National emergency with Respect to Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation’, 21 June 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1991, pp. 706–7. Testimony of James LeMunyon, 23 April 1991. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, pp. 114–15. Ibid., p. 109. ‘MTCR List to Be Revised’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 March 1991, p. 470. ‘MTCR Partners Meet in Tokyo’, Disarmament Bulletin (spring 1991), p. 10. ‘London Economic Summit Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and Nuclear, Biological, and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation’, 16 July 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1991, 1 July–31 December 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 890–2. Export Controls for Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington, DC, 24 May 1991. The COCOM countries included all NATO members (except Iceland), plus Australia and Japan. Ibid. ‘Israel Accepts MTCR Guidelines’, Arms Control Today (November 1991), p. 20. Ozga, ‘Chronology’, pp. 80–1. ‘MTCR Partners Meet in Washington’, Disarmament Bulletin, No. 18 (winter 1991), p. 13. Ibid. Ozga, ‘Chronology’, p. 83.

212

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198 Missile Technology Control Regime, Oslo Plenary Meeting, 29 June–2 July 1992, press release, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, Norway, 2 July 1992. G. Bush, ‘Message to Congress on the National Emergency with Respect to Export Control Regulations’, 25 September 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush 1992–1993, pp. 1650–4. ‘Missile Technology Control Regime Press Releases for the Oslo Plenary Meeting, 29 June–2 July 1992’, PPNN Newsbrief (autumn 1991), p. 15. ‘MTCR Meets, Expands Membership’, Arms Control Today (July/September 1992), p. 33. 199 Export Control News, 30 July 1992, pp. 5–6. 200 Reuters, 7 January 1993, in Executive News Service, 8 January 1993, ‘Controls over Missile Sales Said Expanded’. See also United Press International, 1 January 1993, in Executive News Service, 8 January 1993, ‘New Restrictions on Missile Sales’. ‘Missile Technology Controls Expanded’, International Defense Review (February 1993), p. 90. J. B. Wolfstahl, ‘MTCR Members Agree on New Export Restrictions’, Arms Control Today (January/February 1993), p. 22. 201 ‘US Broadens Missile Controls’, Export Control News, (28 January 1993), pp. 2–3. 202 Ozga, ‘Chronology’, p. 71. 203 Statesman (Calcutta), 18 July 1992, p. 1, in Proliferation Issues, FBIS, 1 September 1992, p. 17, ‘French Technology Transfer Position Viewed’.

4 Congress and Missile Nonproliferation 1 S. R. Bowman, R. F. Grimmett, R. D. Shuey, and Z. Davis, Weapons Proliferation and Conventional Arms Transfers: The Outlook in Mid-1992, CRS Report for Congress, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 31 December 1992), p. 20. 2 Personal interview with a former Congressional staffer. 3 ‘Representative Howard L. Berman: Missile Technology Control Act of 1989’, Congressional Record, Vol. 135, No. 14, 101st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 9 February 1989), pp. E354–5. 4 ‘HR 963, Representative Berman, et al.’, 9 February 1989, Foreign Affairs; Ways and Means; Government Operations, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions, 1989, Vol. 2 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1989), p. E120. 5 Congressional Record, 9 February 1989, pp. E354–5. 6 Ibid. 7 Nuclear and Missile Proliferation, hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 18 May 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990). 8 Testimony of CIA Director William Webster before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 18 May 1989. Ibid., p. 12. 9 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Third World, hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 1st

Notes

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11

12

13

14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21

22 23 24

25 26 27

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Session, 2 May 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990). Congressional Record, Volume 135, 101st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 4 August 1989), p. S10231. Senator Bingaman co-sponsored S.1227 with Senators Gore, McCain, Mitchell, Nunn, Glenn, Pell, Bradley, Deconcini, Lieberman, Conrad, Lugar, Kennedy, Boren, Durenberger, Biden, Kerry, Matsunaga, Dodd and Wirth. S.1227, Senator Bingaman et al., 22 June 1989, Foreign Relations, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions, 1989, Vol. 1 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1989), p. A246. ‘Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers, Urgent Supplementals, and Correcting Enrollment Errors Act of 1989’, Public Law 101-45, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 30 June 1989, United States Statutes at Large 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 1–1040. Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls (Missile Technology Control Regime), hearing before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and on International Economic Policy and Trade, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 12 July and 30 October 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990). Ibid., p. 43. D. Silverberg, ‘MTCR Proposals Expected to Ignite Friction in Congress, among Allies’, Defense News, 4 September 1989, pp. 31–2. S.1421, Senator Gore et al., 27 July 1989, Foreign Relations. CRS Bill Digest 1989, I, p. A293. ‘Gore–McCain Missile and Proliferation Control Act’, Congressional Record, Vol. 135, 101st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 4 August 1989), pp. S10229–32. Ibid., p. S10229. Ibid., p. S.10230. Ibid., p. S10231. R. Shuey, US Legislative Responses to Missile Proliferation, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, 13 April 1990, p. 9. M. R. Gordon, ‘Clash Erupts on Ways to Halt Spread of Missiles’, New York Times, 1 November 1989, p. A10. Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls. National Security Implications of Missile Proliferation, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 31 October 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990). Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls, pp. 129–30. Ibid., p. 131. Statement of John McCain before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 31 October 1989. National Security Implications of Missile Proliferation, pp. 2–3.

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28 Ibid., p. 4. 29 Statement of Albert Gore Jr before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 31 October 1989. Ibid., p. 23. 30 Ibid., p. 27. 31 S.1830 was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 2 November. ‘Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, by Mr Gore (for himself and Mr McCain)’, Congressional Record, Vol. 135, 101st Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2 November 1989), pp. S14600–8. 32 Statement of Senator Jeff Bingaman before the Senate Committee on Foreign relations, 31 October 1989. National Security Implications of Missile Proliferation, p. 36. 33 Ibid., p. 37. 34 Ibid., p. 38. 35 Ibid., p. 37. 36 ‘French Technology Transfer to Brazil in Violation of the MTCR’, Congressional Record, Vol. 135, Number 134, 101st Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 7 October 1989), pp. S12993–5. 37 Statement of Jeff Bingaman before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 31 October 1989. National Security Implications of Missile Proliferation, p. 40. 38 Testimony of Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticoMilitary Affairs, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 31 October 1989. Ibid., pp. 46–55. 39 Testimony of Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, International Affairs, Department of Defense, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 October 1991. Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls, pp. 149–64. 40 Statement of Representative Howard Berman before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 October 1991. Ibid., p. 195. 41 Testimony of James LeMunyon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, Department of Commerce, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 31 October 1989. National Security Implications of Missile Proliferation, pp. 165–78. 42 Testimony of Norman A. Wulf, Deputy Assistant Director, Nuclear and Weapons Control, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 October 1989. Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls, pp. 179–88. 43 Shortly after the hearings, Senator John Heinz introduced the ‘Missile Equipment and Technology Control Act of 1989’, the last bill of its type introduced in the 101st Congress. Heinz’s concern with missile proliferation had increased because of a 1988 co-authored report by General Brent Scowcroft, President Bush’s National Security Advisor. The report claimed the US military needed to start planning to face regional threats to American interests from the developing world, and not just the Soviet Union. Heinz cited Libya’s 1986 Scud missile attack on Lampedusa as an example of such threats. He also referred to the growing ability of several developing states to arm their ballistic missiles with chemical weapons. In

Notes

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46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

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reference to the MTCR, Heinz criticised the regime as having immediately become an ‘inadequate’ instrument because it was voluntary and lacked an enforcement authority. He also said ‘one could argue that there are, in reality, seven different MTCRs’, because each member state is responsible for implementing the regime’s guidelines through their own national authorities. Heinz’s ‘Missile Equipment and Technology Control Act of 1989’ proposed to amend the EAA by requiring the President to impose sanctions on foreign entities that attempted to export, import, or obtain missile equipment or technology, in violation of the MTCR. He argued that such a law would encourage all of the regime’s members to enforce a single set of ‘consistent laws’. The bill also called for better co-ordination and implementation of missile technology controls in the US, in recognition of several recent instances of interagency difficulty in this area. For example, he proposed creating a ‘missile tech czar’ or office to formulate, co-ordinate, and implement the administration’s missile nonproliferation policy. Heinz co-sponsored S.1924 with Senators Murkowski, Conrad and Lieberman. Congressional Record, Vol. 135, 101st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 19 November 1989), pp. S16224–5. See also: S.1924, Senator Heinz et al., 11 November 1989, Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, CRS Bill Digest, 1989, I, pp. A420–1. ‘National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1990 and 1991’, Public Law 101–89, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 29 November 1989, United States Statutes at Large 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 1041–2098. S.208, Senator Helms, 25 January 1989, Foreign Relations, CRS Bill Digest I, pp. A41–2. In the autumn, Senator Helms also appended a Chinaspecific missile proliferation amendment to the ‘Investment in Freedom and Democracy Act of 1989’. This amendment called for the termination of US assistance to any Chinese missile programme until the President could determine that Beijing was not providing missiles or the related technology to Iran, Iraq, Libya or Syria and provided assurances it had no plans to do so. Shuey, US Legislative Responses, p. 11. See also S.1582, Senator Simon et al., Foreign Relations, CRS Bill Digest 1989, I, p. A345. HR 2655, Representative Fascell et al., 15 June 1989, Foreign Affairs, CRS Bill Digest II, pp. E380–91. R. Shuey, US Legislation Responses, p. 9. S.1347, Senator Pell, 18 July 1989, Foreign Relations, CRS Bill Digest 1989, II, pp. 202–7, A268–73. HR 2426, Representative Porter et al., 18 May 1989, Foreign Affairs. Ibid., p. E337. HR 3033, Representative Fascell et al., 27 July 1989, Foreign Affairs; Ways and Means; Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. Ibid., p. E475. S.8, Senator Dole et al., 25 January 1989, Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Ibid., p. A5. S.195, Senator Pell et al., 25 January 1989, Foreign Relations. Ibid., pp. 147–8, A34. HR 3033, Representative Fascell et al. Ibid., p. E475. S.8, Senator Dole et al., Ibid. I, p. A5.

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55 S.195, Senator Pell. Ibid., pp. 147–8, A34. Pell’s bill was reported subsequently to the Senate (Senate Report 101–66) from the Committee on Foreign Relations and was ‘placed on the legislative calender under General Orders’. See Shuey, US Legislative Responses, p. 10. 56 ‘Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989’, Public Law 101–298, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 22 May 1990, United States Statutes at Large 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 104STAT.201–104STAT.203. 57 Ibid. A vector was defined as ‘a living organism capable of carrying a biological agent or toxin to a host’. 58 G. Bush, ‘Statement on Signing the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989’, 22 May 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, 1 January–30 June 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 702. 59 Public Law 101-298, p. 104-STAT-203. The act was the product of two related proposals introduced in 1989; Senator Kohl’s ‘Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989’ and Representative Kastenmeier’s ‘Biological Weapons Act of 1989’. These proposed amending the US Federal Criminal Code to impose criminal penalties on anyone who knowingly develops, manufactures, stockpiles, transfers, acquires or possesses any biological agent, toxin or delivery system for use as a weapon of mass destruction or aids a foreign state or organisation to do so. Neither bill sought to impose sanctions against foreign persons proliferating in these technologies. They did not, therefore, raise the issue of extraterritoriality and did not threaten to jeopardise the conduct of America’s foreign relations. Kohl’s bill was introduced on 16 May 1989 and was reported with amendments from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on 16 November. The Senate passed S.993 on 21 November. Representative Kastenmeier introduced HR 237 on 3 January 1989. The House Committee on the Judiciary later requested an executive comment on HR 237 from the Defense, Justice and State Departments and ACDA. On 8 May 1990, Kastenmeier’s bill was eventually passed by the House of Representatives. House proceedings for HR 237 were subsequently terminated and S.993 was enacted instead. S.993, Senator Kohl et al., 16 May 1989, Judiciary. CRS Bill Digest, I, p. 182, A195. HR 237, Representative Kastenmeier et al., 3 January, Judiciary, CRS Bill Digest 1989, II, p. E44. 60 Proliferation and Arms Control, hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 17 May and 11 July 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991). 61 United States Policy toward Iraq: Human Rights, Weapons Proliferation, and International Law, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 15 June 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990). 62 Testimony of Professor Gary Milhollin before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 15 June 1990. Ibid., pp. 78–9. 63 C. Murphy and D. B. Ottaway, ‘Iraq Has Tested Satellite Rocket, US Confirms’, Washington Post, 9 December 1989, p. A1.

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64 M. R. Gordon, ‘Iraq Said to Build Launchers for Its 400 Mile Missiles’, New York Times, 30 March 1990. 65 A. Cowell, ‘Iraq Takes Harsh Line at Meeting’, New York Times, 29 May 1990, p. 3. 66 ‘National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991’, Congressional Record, Vol. 136, No. 116, 101st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 19 September 1990), pp. H7839–40. Berman co-sponsored his amendment with Representatives Gejdenson, Kasich and Solomon. 67 ‘National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991’, Public Law 101–510, approved 5 November 1990, HR 4739, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions 1990, Vol. 1 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1990), pp. 229–44. 68 G. Bush, ‘Address before the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York’, 1 October 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, 1 July–31 December 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 1332. 69 CRS Bill Digest 1990, I, p. 244. 70 The EAA expired on 30 September 1990. On the same day President Bush issued an executive order to continue its authorities for national security, foreign policy, nuclear nonproliferation and short-supply export controls. ‘Message to the Congress on the Continuation of Export Control Regulations’, 30 September 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, pp. 1325–6. 71 ‘Title XVII: Missile Technology Controls, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991’, Public Law 101–510, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 5 November 1990, United States Statute at Large 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 1389–2352. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. The term ‘person’ referred to a ‘natural person, as well as a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, any other non-governmental entity, organization or group, and any governmental entity operating as a business enterprise, and any successor of such entity’. In circumstances where it ‘may be possible to identify a specific governmental entity’, the term was to refer to ‘all activities of that government relating to the development or production of any missile equipment or technology’. Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 ‘Precatory’ – expressing a wish. G. Bush, ‘Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991’, 5 November 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1990, pp. 1556–7. 80 C. Tiefer, The Semi-Sovereign Presidency: The Bush Administration’s Strategy for Governing without Congress (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 48–9. 81 Public Law 101-510, pp. 1389–2352.

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82 HR 4653, Representative Gejdensen et al., 26 April 1990, Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990, CRS Bill Digest 1990, I, pp. 949–52. 83 Ibid., pp. 950–1. 84 ‘Message to the Congress on the Continuation of Export Regulations’, 30 September 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1990, pp. 1325–6. 85 After an enrolled bill is sent to the White House, the President has ten days (excluding Sundays) to sign or veto it. If the President takes no action during this ten-day period, and Congress is in session, the bill becomes law automatically without the President’s signature. However, if the final adjournment of a session of Congress occurs prior to the termination of this ten-day period, and the President fails to sign the bill, the measure dies as a ‘pocket veto’. W. J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 3rd edn (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1989), pp. 256–7. 86 ‘Memorandum of Disapproval for the Omnibus Export Administration Act of 1990’, 16 November 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1990, pp. 1619–21. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid., p. 1621. 89 ‘Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation, Executive Order 12735’, 16 November 1990, Legislation on Foreign Relations through 1993: Current Legislation and Related Executive Orders July 1994, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 1359–62. 90 ‘Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Declaration of a National Emergency Concerning Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation’, 16 November 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, p. 1618. 91 Current Legislation and Related Executive Orders 1994, pp. 1659–62. 92 ‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the President’s Export Control Initiatives’, 13 December 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, pp. 1794–5. 93 Arms Sales Monitor, Nos 9–10 (November/December 1991), Federation of American Scientists, compiled by Lora Lumpe and Ann Walsh, p. 1. 94 Weapons Nonproliferation Policy and Legislation: 102nd Congress, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 3 July 1991, updated 5 May 1992), pp. 5–24. 95 Ibid., pp. 95–101. 96 Administration and Enforcement of United States Export Control Programs, hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 18 April, 1 May 1991, Serial 102-72 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992). 97 Weapons Proliferation in the New World Order, hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 15 January 1992 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992). 98 Arms Trade and Nonproliferation in the Middle East, Subcommittee on

Notes

99 100

101 102 103

104 105

106

107

108

109

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Technology and National Security, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2, 23 March 1992 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993). Weapons Nonproliferation Policy and Legislation: 102nd Congress (5 May 1992), pp. 95–101. ‘Title III: Miscellaneous Foreign Policy Provisions, Part A: Foreign Policy Provisions, Section 303: Reports concerning China, Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993’, Public Law 102–138, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 28 October 1991, United States Statutes at Large 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 105.STAT.708–9. Ibid., p. 105.STAT.723. Ibid., pp. 105.STAT.722–35. ‘Section 1097: Annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993’, Public Law 102-90, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 5 December 1991, United States Statutes at Large 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 105.STAT.1489–91. Ibid., p. 105.STAT.1490. ‘Title XV: Non-proliferation’, and ‘Title XVI: Iran–Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992’, ‘National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993’, Public Law 102–484, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 23 October 1992, United States Statutes at Large 1992 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 106.STAT.2567–75. The administration did not punish any firms in regime member states prior to January 1993. This was despite the new authority’s partial basis upon the need to gain better implementation by the regime’s participants. ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions against Chinese and Pakistani Entities’, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, 8 July 1991, Federal Register, Vol. 56, No. 137 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 17 July 1991), p. 32601. ‘Waiver of Missile Technology Sanctions on Foreign Persons’, 26 February 1992, Office of the Under-Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 67 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 7 April 1992). ‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on United States Sanctions Against the Chinese Government’, 20 June 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1989, 20 January–30 June 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 764. Beyond transferring IRBM to Saudi Arabia and M-11 missile technology to Pakistan, China’s disturbing human rights record was the cause of great concern in the US. This manifested itself most notably in Beijing’s crushing of the Tiananmen Square demonstration in June 1989. In reaction to Tiananmen, the President directed that all high-level exchanges of US government officials with China be suspended because of the ‘wave of violence and reprisals by the Chinese authorities against those who have called for democracy’. The administration also suspended US military

220

110

111 112

113

114 115

116

117

118 119

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation exchanges with China. China also had a poor record in the sphere of free and fair trade with the US; among other things, this involved Beijing’s failure to protect US intellectual property rights and its imposition of high tariffs on US imports. G. Bush, ‘Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut’, 27 May 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1991, 1 January–30 June 30 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 565–8. Ibid., pp. 566–7. In the missile field, the Bush administration favoured a policy of conducting diplomacy at all levels in an attempt to gain China’s adherence to international nonproliferation norms. In December 1989, for example, President Bush’s National Security Advisor (NSA), Brent Scowcroft, made a secret trip to Beijing. Scowcroft reportedly obtained a ‘general promise’ from the Chinese that they would refrain from transferring mediumrange missiles to countries in the Middle East. The Chinese also reportedly assured the NSA they had no plans to sell M-9 missiles to Syria. B. W. Nelan, ‘For Sale: Tools of Destruction’, Time, 22 April 1991. After a March 1991 visit to China, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon said the administration had obtained similar assurances from Beijing and that China claimed it would honour MTCR guidelines. J. L. Tyson, ‘China Will Ignore United States Pressure to Stop Selling Missiles’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 March 1991. The administration’s strategy for dealing with Beijing’s missile proliferation activities is considered in much greater detail in Chapter 5. ‘China: Rogue Elephant on Weapons Proliferation’, Congressional Record, Vol. 137, No. 56, 102nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 17 April 1991), pp. S4518–21. Ibid., p. S4519. Most Favored Nation Status for the People’s Republic of China, joint hearing before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations, Asian and Pacific Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 29 May 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992). Renewal of MFN Status for the People’s Republic of China, hearing and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, on H. Con. Res. 174, 26 June 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991). Sino-American Relations: Current Policy Issues, hearings before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 102 Congress, 1st Session, 13, 25 and 27 June 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991). Weapons Nonproliferation Policy and Legislation: 102nd Congress (5 May 1992), pp. 95–101. R. G. Sutter, Congress and the Crisis in US–China Policy 1991, CRS Report

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for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 11 March 1992), p. 23. 120 ‘Message to the House of Representatives Returning without Approval the United States–China Act of 1991’, 2 March 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1992–93, 1 January–31 July 1992 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 363. See also ‘United States–China Act: Veto’, Congressional Record, Vol. 138, No. 39, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 18 March 1992), pp. S3816–37. ‘Conference Report on HR 2212, United States–China Act of 1991’, Congressional Record, Vol. 137, No. 177, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 26 November 1991), pp. H11416–33. 121 ‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Continuation of China’s MostFavored Nation Trade Status’, 2 June 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1992–93, pp. 881–2. 122 ‘Message to the House of Representatives Returning without Approval the United States–China Act of 1992’, 28 September 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1992–93, 1 August 1992–20 January 1993 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 1689–90.

5 Beyond the MTCR 1 According to William Potter and Adam Stulberg, a January 1989 article in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs monthly publication, Vestnik, claimed there was a chance the Soviet Union would join the MTCR. W. C. Potter and A. Stulberg, ‘The Soviet Union and the Spread of Ballistic Missiles’, Survival, Vol. 32, No. 6, November/December 1990, p. 548. 2 ‘Iraq Heavy Missile Launch Definitely Not Condor 2’, Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, 29 January–4 February 1990, p. 1. 3 A. Karp, The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East (New York: Institute for East–West Studies, 1990), p. 29. 4 Potter and Stulberg, ‘The Soviet Union’, p. 548. 5 Testimony of Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 May 1989. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Third World, hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 2 May 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 30. 6 Karp, The United States and the Soviet Union, p. 29. 7 T. L. Friedman, ‘Spread of Missiles Is Seen as a Soviet Worry in Middle East’, New York Times, 24 March 1989, p. A2. Both the projected 1,450-km-range Jericho II and the approximately 2,700-km-range DF-3 placed southern parts of the Soviet Union within reach of Israel and Saudi Arabia, respectively. Beyond the threat such

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The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation missiles posed to Soviet territory, Potter and Stulberg identified several other reasons why Moscow might potentially perceive missile proliferation as threatening its security interests. These included the exacerbation of regional tensions, the escalation of regional arms races, increased chances that WMD might actually get used, higher chance of surprise attacks, increased unpredictability in regional conflicts, reduction in the superpowers’ control of regional conflicts, and alterations in the global balance of armed forces. Potter and Stulberg, ‘The Soviet Union’, p. 546. Testimony of Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 May 1989. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Third World, hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 2 May 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 30. Testimony of Vincent F. DeCain, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 12 July 1989. Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls (Missile Technology Control Regime), hearing before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 12 July and 30 October 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 45. Potter and Stulberg, ‘The Soviet Union’, p. 545. A. A. Pikayev, L. S. Spector, E. V. Kirichenko, and R. Gibson, Russia, the US and the Missile Technology Control Regime, Adelphi Paper 317 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), pp. 15–16. D. B. Ottaway, ‘Missile Spread Again a Topic for US–Soviet Talks: Baker to Seek Moscow’s Help in Halting Proliferation of Ballistic Weapons in Third World’, Washington Post, 7 May 1989, p. A32. Testimony of Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew, Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 18 May 1989. Nuclear and Missile Proliferation, Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 18 May 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 39. Ibid. Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior 1988–1990: Gorbachev– Reagan–Bush Meetings at the Summit, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Studies Series on Foreign Affairs Issues, Volume III (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, April 1991), pp. 236–8. This study was prepared by the Senior Specialists Section, Office of Research Coordination, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Testimony of Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticoMilitary Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International

Notes

17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26

27 28 29

30 31 32 33 34

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Security, and Science of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 11 July 1990. Proliferation and Arms Control, hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 17 May and 11 July 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 151–2. Joint Soviet–American Statement, TASS, Moscow, 10 February 1990. Testimony of Richard Clarke, 11 July 1990. Proliferation and Arms Control, p. 203. ‘Soviets to Adhere to MTCR Limits Except in Afghanistan’, Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, 26 February 1990, p. 2. Ibid. Testimony of Richard Clarke, 11 July 1990. Proliferation and Arms Control, pp. 219–20. Ibid., p. 203. ‘Soviet–United States Joint Statement on Nonproliferation’, 4 June 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, 1 January–30 June 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 768–71. Testimony of Richard Clarke, 11 July 1990. Proliferation and Arms Control, p. 203. Ibid., pp. 151–2. C. C. Peterson, ‘Moscow, Washington, and the Missile Technology Control Regime’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 16, No. 2, August 1995, p. 50. M. R. Gordon, ‘Bush Said to Question Soviets on Supplying Missiles to Iraq’, New York Times, 17 November 1990, p. A4. Peterson, ‘Moscow, Washington’, p. 50. Although ISRO had initially begun to develop its own cryogenic engines, New Delhi concluded that it would take too long and turned to foreign suppliers instead. Although America’s General Dynamics and France’s Societé Européenne de Propulsion both submitted similar bids of $500 million for the contract, they were constrained by their respective governments’ membership in the MTCR. A. Lawler, ‘US Sanctions Target Indian, Russian Programs’, Space News, 11–17 May 1992, pp. 1, 28. Izvestiya (Moscow), 20 May 1992, p. 5, in Proliferation Issues, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 27 May 1992, pp. 17–18, ‘Glavkosmos Ignored Warning’. The French firm submitted two draft bids to India in October 1989, but the French government intervened to prevent the company from proceeding under pressure from the Bush administration. Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow), 18 April 1992, p. 5, in Proliferation Issues, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 14 May 1992, pp. 32–3, ‘US Opposes Russian Rocket Sale to India’. Pikayev et al., Russia, the US, p. 16. Ibid., pp. 23–4. Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., p. 24. Weguang Shao, ‘China’s Relations with the Superpowers: Strategic Shifts

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and Implications’, Survival, March/April 1990, Vol. 32, No. 2, p. 167. 35 V. A. Auger, Human Rights and Trade: The Clinton Administration and China, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Publications, Georgetown University, 1995), p. 1. 36 G. Bush, ‘Written Response to Questions Submitted by Xinhua News Agency of China’, 16 February 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1989, 20 January–30 June 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 127–31. 37 T. Halevy, ‘Chinese Compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime’, National Security Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 19. 38 Riyadh assured the administration it would not fit the missiles with chemical warheads either. Indeed, the White House determined there was no credible evidence to suggest Saudi Arabia possessed nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and the US government was not aware of the existence of any production facilities for chemical munitions and warfare agents, or biological warfare agents, in the Kingdom. ‘White House Statement on Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia’, 14 April 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1989. 39 The administration also instructed that a ‘sympathetic review’ be given to requests by Chinese students to extend their stay in the United States, and that other aspects of the bilateral relationship should be reviewed. K. Dumbaugh, China: Current US Sanctions, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 8 February 1994). 40 Ibid. 41 ‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on US Sanctions against the Chinese Government’, 20 June 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1989, p. 764. 42 Testimony of William Rope, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of States for Politico-Military Affairs, US Department of States, before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 8 May 1992. H.R. 4803: The Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1992, hearing before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 8 May 1992, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 174–176. Under the Jackson–Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, MFN status can only be extended for periods of 12 months by Presidential waiver if it is determined that China allows free and unrestricted emigration. The President must determine that extension of MFN will enhance the goals of Jackson–Vanik. However, Congress can override this waiver to deny MFN if it passes a joint resolution. This is also subject to Presidential waiver. Auger, Human Rights and Trade, p. 1. 43 S. Kan, China’s Military: Roles and Implications for United States Policy toward China, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 3 October 1991), pp. 23–4. 44 Halevy, ‘Chinese Compliance’, p. 19. 45 Weguang Shao, ‘China’s Relations’, pp. 163–4.

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46 T. V. McCarthy, A Chronology of PRC Missile Trade and Developments, International Missile Proliferation Project, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 12 February 1992, p. 12. See also Weguang Shao, ‘China’s Relations’, pp. 163–4. B. W. Nelan, ‘China: For Sale: Tools of Destruction’, Time, 22 April 1991. 47 ‘Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Newspaper Editors’, 11 December 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1989, 1 July–31 December 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 1683. On 25 January 1990, Bush again told a press conference that China had given his administration ‘certain assurances’ on its missile sales, and this was a direct result of Scowcroft’s trip. ‘Remarks and a Question-andAnswer Session at a Luncheon for Newspaper Publishers’, 25 January 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, 1 January–30 June 1990, p. 102. 48 Weguang Shao, ‘China’s Relations’, pp. 163–4. The three licences for the satellite launches were issued under the waiver provision of a previous law, Public Law 101-162. Dumbaugh, China, p. 1. 49 Halevy, ‘Chinese Compliance’, p. 19. 50 Weguang Shao, ‘China’s Relations’, pp. 163–4. 51 J. W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, ‘Beijing’s Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma’, International Security (spring 1991), Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 97. 52 Long-range missiles were defined as those which could travel between 3,000 and 8,000 km and ICBMs as those capable of flying more than 8,000 km. Strategic missiles had to be capable of more than 10,000 km. Ibid. 53 R. B. Gill, The Challenge of Chinese Arms Proliferation: United States Policy for the 1990s (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 31 August 1993), pp. 45–6. 54 ‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Renewal of Most-Favored Nation Trading Status for China’, 24 May 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1990, 1 January–30 June 30 1990, pp. 715–16. In 1989, approximately 17,000 Chinese nationals obtained American visas to emigrate from the mainland, primarily for family reunification. Ibid. 55 ‘The President’s Press Conference’, 24 May 1990. Ibid., p. 708. 56 McCarthy, Chronology, p. 14. 57 South Africa’s Nuclear-Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability, United Nations General Assembly, New York, 19 October 1990, 45th Session, Agenda Item 94, A/45/571, pp. 1–64. 58 R. J. Smith, ‘US Knew of Israel–South Africa Missile Deal’, Washington Post, 27 October 1989, pp. A1, A27. 59 South Africa’s Nuclear-Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability. 60 Ibid., pp. 29–30. 61 Ibid., p. 30. 62 ‘Israeli–South African Missile Cooperation’, Arms Control Today, November 1989, p. 30.

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63 A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’, in SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 332–3. 64 Arms Control Today (November 1989), p. 30. 65 Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’ (1991), pp. 332–3. 66 SAPA (Johannesburg), 27 October 1989, in FBIS (FBIS-AFR-89-208), 30 October 1989, ‘Pik Botha Denies Israeli Missile Links’. 67 Testimony of Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, Department of Defense, before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and International Economic Policy and Trade, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 30 October 1989. Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls (1990), p. 150. 68 Testimony of Richard Clarke before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and International Economic Policy and Trade, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 30 October 1989. Ibid., p. 186. 69 Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’ (1991), pp. 332–3. 70 In line with the administration’s executive order of 16 November 1991, a CBW sanctions working group was also established to assess intelligence and to identify potentially sanctionable CBW activity. Testimony of Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 23 April 1991. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, hearings before the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security, Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 21 September 1990 and 23 April 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 58–60. 71 ‘Memorandum on the Delegation of Authority Regarding Missile Technology Proliferation’, 25 June 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1991, 1 January–30 June 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 725–6. 72 ‘Message to the Congress Reporting on the National Emergency with Respect to Export Control Regulations’, 25 September 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1992–93, 1 August 1992–20 January 1993 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 1652. 73 ARMSCOR was the State supplier of armaments to the South African Defence Force. 74 ‘Missile Proliferation and ARMSCOR’, Department of State, Office of the Secretary, Politico-Military Affairs, Federal Register, Vol. 56, No. 199 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 15 October 1991), pp. 51734–5. 75 D. Beresford, ‘US Ban Deals Blow to South African Arms Maker’, Guardian, 17 October 1991, p. 11. South Africa stood to make a great deal of money on the international arms market because most of its weapons had been tried and tested during its war with Angola. 76 S. Labaton, ‘Baker Defends Waiver of Sanctions against Israel on Missile’, New York Times, 28 October 1991, p. A12.

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77 The Israeli Defence Ministry, in conjunction with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC), was made responsible for controlling dual-use items which could be used in the development or production of missiles. The Security Assistance and Defense Export Department in the MoD was made responsible for implementing the new controls. Moreover, a special inter-departmental committee was set up in the MoD to identify and monitor MTCR items in the export control process. A joint MoD–MIC was also established to coordinate the control of dual-use items. Statement on Israel’s Adherence to the MTCR, Spokesman of the Ministry of Defence, State of Israel, 24 December 1991. Israel had originally announced on 3 October that it would impose its own controls on the transfer of missile technology. ‘Israel, Pressed by US, Puts Limits on Its Export of Missiles’, Washington Post, 4 October 1991, p. A21. 78 J. Wolfstahl, ‘Israel Accepts MTCR Guidelines’, Arms Control Today, November 1991, p. 20. 79 ‘Israel, Pressed by US, Puts Limits on Its Export of Missiles’, p. A21. 80 ‘Israel Agrees to Lift Missile Data Transfers’, Los Angeles Times, 4 October 1991, p. A4. 81 Washington Post, 4 October 1991, p. A21. 82 G. Kemp, ‘Proliferation on the Subcontinent: Possibilities for US–Indian Cooperation’, in The United States and India in the Post-Soviet World, Proceedings of the Third Indo-US Strategic Symposium held in Washington, DC, co-sponsored by the National Defense University, Washington, DC, and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India, 1993. 83 J. Wolfstahl, ‘Israel Accepts’, p. 20. 84 ‘US Seeks Tighter Controls in Arrow Program’, Defense News, 13 May 1991. ‘US, Israel Settle Arrow Dispute’, Defense News, 20 May 1991, p. 4. 85 D. B. Ottaway and R. J. Smith, ‘US Knew of Israel–South Africa Missile Deal’, Washington Post, 17 October 1989, p. A1. 86 Wolfstahl, ‘Israel Accepts’, p. 20. 87 L. Lumpe, with A. Walsh, Arms Sales Monitor, Nos 9–10, November/December 1991, p. 3. 88 Cape Times, 14 February 1992, p. 5, in FBIS (FBIS-AFR-92-032), 18 February 1992, pp. 15–16. 89 ‘Space Research Myth Cloaks Nuclear Missile Development’, Southscan, 18 September 1992, p. 268. 90 Personal interview with a former US Government official. 91 In July, Jacob van Wyk, Chairman of the Somchem subsidiary of Denel, said that a three-stage South African rocket had been tested on three occasions. ‘Space Research Myth’, p. 268. 92 The Denel Group: Denel Corporate Profile, Denel (Pty) Ltd, PO Box 8322, Hennopsmeer, 0046, Republic of South Africa, p. 1 93 Reuters, 12 October 1992, in Executive News Service, 13 October 1992, ‘Foreign Interest In South African Space Project’. 94 Interfax (Moscow), 8 May 1992, in Proliferation Issues, FBIS, 20 May 1992, pp. 11–12, ‘Dunayev: ‘Real Trade War Is On’. 95 A. Lawler, ‘India’s Plan to Buy Russian Stage Draws US Protests’, Space News, 27 April–3 May 1992, p. 36.

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96 Pikayev et al., Russia, the US, pp. 24–5. On 23 April, the Indian Prime Minister said India had originally planned to produce its own cryogenic engines within eight years, but had decided to contract with Glavkosmos for the technology to achieve a production capability in five years. The Prime Minister added that in 1990 General Dynamics had offered India engines, but not the production technology, and Arianespace also made an offer. The Hindu, 2 May 1992, p. 7. 97 All India Radio Network (New Delhi), 13 May 1992, in Proliferation Issues, FBIS, 20 May 1992, p. 14, ‘Actions Termed “Malicious”’. According to D. Revelle, cryogenic technology was used in early ICBMs such as America’s Atlas and the Soviet SS-9 missiles. D. Revelle, ‘US Muscle Misses Mark’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp. 10–11, 44. 98 This anxiety over the precedent that might be set was well illustrated following the dissolution of the Soviet Union when CIA Director Robert Gates warned the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in January 1992 about the future possibility of SLV and space launch services located in the former Soviet Union being offered for sale to other countries. ‘Gates Fears Soviet Brain Drain’, Washington Post, 16 January 1992, p. A22. 99 Pikayev et al., Russia, the US, p. 27. 100 Ibid., pp. 29–30. 101 Ibid., pp. 30–1. 102 Testimony of Under-Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 February 1992. ‘Bartholomew on Russian Arms Control’, Arms Sales Monitor, Nos 11–12, January/February 1992, p. 4. 103 Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow), 18 April 1992, p. 5; in Proliferation Issues (FBIS), 14 May 1992, pp. 32–3, ‘US Opposes Russian Rocket Sale to India’. 104 Lawler, ‘India’s Plan to Buy Russian Stage’, p. 36. 105 C. C. Peterson, ‘Moscow’s New Arms Bazaar’, Orbis, Spring 1994, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 280. 106 Pikayev et al., Russia, the US, pp. 30–1. 107 Peterson ‘Moscow’s New Arms Bazaar’, p. 280. 108 Ibid., p. 277. 109 Ibid., p. 280. In April 1992, Russian Presidential Decree No. 288 established the interagency Russian Federation Export Control Commission, which included 13 departments and agencies. I. Khripunov, ‘Nonproliferation Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union’, in K. C. Bailey (ed), The Director’s Series on Proliferation, (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 7 June 1993), p. 13. 110 Reuters, 8 May 1992, in Executive News Service, 8 May 1992, ‘Russian Space Company Attacks US over Rocket Sales.’ 111 A. Lawler, ‘US Sanctions Target Indian, Russian Programs’, Space News, 11–17 May 1992, pp. 1, 28. 112 Peterson, ‘Moscow’s New Arms Bazaar’, p. 280. 113 V. Mizin (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), B. Dhuzhnevsy (Executive Director, Committee for Critical Technologies and Nonproliferation), Y. Sharov (First Secretary, Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Yaderny Kontrol: Obozreniye Po Problemam Oruzhiya Massovogo Unichtozheniya V

Notes

114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123

124 125 126

127 128 129 130 131 132

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Rossi I Novykh Nezavisimykh Gosudarstvakh, March 1995, No. 3, pp. 12–17, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-UST-95-044), 1 November 1995, ‘Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in Russia, United States, and Ukraine’. Lawler, ‘US Sanctions’, pp. 1, 28. B. Chellaney, ‘An Indian Critique of US Export Controls’, Orbis, summer 1994, Vol. 38, No. 3, p. 443. Ibid., p. 444. Ibid., pp. 443–4. ‘Moscow Affirms It Will Deliver Key Rocket Technology to India’, New York Times, 7 May 1992, p. A7. Pikayev et al., Russia, the US, p. 35. ‘Moscow Asks Mediation on Big Rocket Sale’, Washington Times, 6 May 1992, p. A2. ‘Russia Insists on International Probe’, The Hindu, 16 May 1992, p. 12. Interfax (Moscow), 8 May 1992, in Proliferation Issues, FBIS, 20 May 1992, pp. 11–12, ‘Dunayev: ‘Real Trade War Is On’. Russian Sale of Rocket Engines to India, Statement by Richard Boucher, Deputy Spokesman, Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, US Department of State, Washington, DC, 11 May 1992. A. Lawler, ‘US Sanctions Imposed; Indian Deal with Russia Still On’, Space News, 18–24 May 1992, p. 14. ‘Rocket Deal “Does Not Violate MTCR”’, The Hindu, 23 May 1992, p. 9. Rossiyskiye Vesti (Moscow), 8 May 1992, p. 3, in Proliferation Issues, FBIS, 20 May 1992, pp. 10–11, ‘Economic Motivations Underlined’. Glaziev headed the Russian delegation that met with American representatives in Moscow to discuss the possibility of American sanctions. ‘Rocket Deal “Does Not Violate MTCR”’. ‘USA Cuts Space Trade with India and CIS’, Flight International, 20 May 1992, p. 6. Reuters, 13 May 1992, Nonproliferation Network News, 13 May 1992, ‘Russia Calls US Sanctions over Rocket Deal Unfair’. Pikayev et al., Russia, the US, pp. 36–7. All India Radio (New Delhi), 13 May 1992, in Proliferation Issues, FBIS, 20 May 1992, p. 14, ‘India Calls Blacklisting “Ridiculous”’. ‘India Says US Space Export Ban a Commercial Decision’, Financial Times, 14 May 1992, p. 4. On 18 July, the French Government reportedly told ISRO it could not provide it with rocket technology until India joined the MTCR. According to the head of International Affairs in the French Department of Space (CNES), General Blondeau, this prohibition concerned launch technology and France would welcome discussions on satellite manufacturing. Statesman (Calcutta), 18 July 1992, p. 1, in Proliferation Issues, FBIS, 1 September 1992, p. 17, ‘French Technology Transfer Position Viewed’. On 28 September, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao arrived in France for three days of talks to discuss issues including the ISRO contract with Glavkosmos. Reuter, 29 September 1992, in Executive News Service, 29 September 1992, ‘Indian Prime Minister Starts French Visit’. On 12 October, anonymous sources claimed Rao had visited France to

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137 138

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The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation discuss the possibility of buying French cryogenic engines. The trip may also have been designed to obtain France’s official position on the MTCR and NPT, given the allusion of several French leaders to a so-called ‘independent option’. The Hindu (Madras), 12 October 1992, p. 8, in Proliferation Issues, FBIS, 13 November 1992, pp. 12–14, ‘Commentary Previews US Talks’. ‘We Will Develop Technology: ISRO Chief’, The Hindu, 23 May 1992, p. 5. ‘India Succeeds with Third ASLV Launch Attempt’, Space News, 25 May 1992, p. 6. S. Coll, ‘India Tests Controversial Missile: Rocket Is Capable of Carrying a Nuclear Payload’, Washington Post, 30 May 1992, p. A3. Moreover, China detonated its largest ever nuclear device on 21 May while India’s President was on a goodwill visit to that country. The explosion underlined the principal reason why India wanted to develop and deploy the projected 2,500 km-range Agni missile; so long as China possessed long-range nuclear-tipped missiles, India felt compelled to match these capabilities by developing a missile capable of striking deep into Chinese territory. This situation formed the basis of India’s refusal to sign the NPT and to join the MTCR because New Delhi perceived them as preserving the missile and nuclear capabilities of those countries that already possessed them. ‘Indian Missile Diplomacy’, The Economist, 6 June 1992, p. 80. Reuters, 3 June 1992, in Executive News Service, 3 June 1992, ‘Moscow Concerned Over India’s Missile Test’. ‘Launches Highlight Indian Missile Programs’, Arms Control Today, June 1992, p. 30. ‘Rocket Deal as Scheduled: Russia’, The Hindu, 13 June 1992, p. 4. China had concluded a similar space launch agreement with the United States in 1988. Under the agreement, China was permitted to launch nine geo-stationary payloads before 31 December 1994. V. L. Zaborsky, Ukraine’s Niche in the US Launch Market: Will Kiev’s Hopes Come True? (Athens, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, 1996), p. 5. J. C. Baker, Nonproliferation Incentives for Aerospace Industries: Implications for Ukraine’s Missile and Space Technology Industry, May 1996, paper presented at the Workshop on Nonproliferation Strategies for Aerospace Industries, Kiev, Ukraine, 23 May 1996. The workshop was co-sponsored by the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Ukraine and the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London. A. Lawler, ‘US–Russian Launch Trade Talks Set’, Space News, 22 June–5 July 1992, pp. 3, 29. Pikayev et al., Russia, the US, p. 39. A. Lawler, ‘Quayle Warns against Sharing Technology’, Space News, 7–13 September 1992, pp. 4, 20. ‘Quayle Warns against Sharing Technology’, Defense News, 7 September 1992, pp. 4, 20. Pikayev et al., Russia, the US, pp. 40–1. Russian Counterparts to the MTCR Guidelines as Issued on January 27, 1993 and November 19, 1993, United States Department of State, Washington, DC, 1994.

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146 Pikayev et al., Russia, the US, pp. 35–6. 147 Peterson ‘Moscow, Washington’, pp. 52–3. See also Mizin et al., Yaderny Kontrol, pp. 12–17. 148 Peterson, ‘Moscow, Washington’, pp. 52–3. 149 Khripunov, ‘Nonproliferation Export Controls’, p. 14. 150 B. W. Nelan, ‘China: For Sale: Tools of Destruction’, Time, 22 April 1991. 151 McCarthy, Chronology, p. 15. 152 B. Gertz, ‘China Helps Algeria Develop Nuclear Weapons’, Washington Times, 11 April 1991. 153 McCarthy, Chronology, p. 15. 154 ‘China Will Ignore US Pressure to Stop Selling Missiles’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 March 1991, p. 6. 155 ‘Senator Joe Biden, China: Rogue Elephant on Weapons Proliferation’, Congressional Record, Vol. 137, No. 56, 102nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 17 April 1991), p. S.4519. 156 Testimony of Richard Clarke, 23 April 1991. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, p. 103. 157 Ibid., p. 104. 158 Because American satellites, and their associated components and technologies, are included on the United States Munitions List (USML), they require licences for export to controlled destinations such as China. Moreover, under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act FY 1990–91, the United States government is prohibited to licence such items to China unless the President determines it to be in the national interest. Fitzwater said that because of the administration’s proliferation concerns vis-à-vis certain Chinese entities, it would have been inappropriate to waive the legislative prohibition on supplying components to the DFH-3. Although the administration did not waive legislative restrictions for the DFH-3 satellite project, they were waived for exports to the AUSSAT and FREJA satellites that were scheduled to be launched on Chinese SLVs. Australia’s AUSSAT satellite programme was designed to provide a much needed communications service for this American ally, while Sweden’s small FREJA scientific satellite was designed to conduct peaceful atmospheric experiments for researchers in the United States, Sweden, Germany, and Finland. ‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Restrictions on US Satellite Component Exports to China’, 30 April 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1991, 1 January–30 June 1991, p. 446. 159 ‘As US–China Relations Deteriorate Bush Sends Envoy on Salvage Mission’, Wall Street Journal, 1 May 1991, p. A10. 160 ‘Bush Sends High Ranking Officials to PRC Amid Deteriorating Relations’, Asian Wall Street Journal, 29 April 1991, pp. 1, 14. ‘Bush Seeks to Keep China Trade Status’, Washington Post, 16 May 1991, pp. A1, A35. For specifications on Pakistan’s ballistic missiles see: ‘Artillery Rocket, Ballistic Missile, Sounding Rocket, and Space Launch Capabilities of Selected Countries’, Nonproliferation Review (spring–summer 1996), Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 162–5. 161 ‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Constraints on Trade with

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166 167 168 169 170

171 172 173 174 175

176 177 178 179 180

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation China’, 16 June 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1991, 1 January–30 June, p. 673. ‘Presidential Determination No.911-36: Memorandum on Trade with China’, 29 May 1991. Ibid., p. 578. ‘Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut’, 27 May 1991. Ibid., p. 567. ‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Constraints on Trade with China’, 16 June 1991, Ibid., p. 673. ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions against Chinese and Pakistani Entities’, Federal Register, 17 July 1991, Vol. 56, No. 137, p. 32601. Fact Sheet: China Trade, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington, DC, 16 June 1991, pp. 1–2. Ibid., pp. 1–2. However, this decision did not affect the Freja and AUSSAT satellites. Ibid. ‘China “Considering” Signing Nuclear Pact’, Washington Post, 19 June 1991, p. A22. Halevy, ‘Chinese Compliance’, p. 21. ‘US Visit to China Falls Short of Goal on Issue of Arms’, Wall Street Journal, 6 June 1991, p. A11. ‘China Weighs Signing Two Pacts’, New York Times, 19 June 1991, p. A6. ‘Nonproliferation Roundup: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back’, Arms Control Today, July/August 1991, pp. 25–6, 31. ‘Baker Warns Chinese on Arms’, Washington Times, 13 June 1991, pp. A1, A10. Halevy, ‘Chinese Compliance’, p. 22. Lewis et al., ‘Beijing’s Defense Establishment’, p. 87. Ibid., p. 92. Testimony of Timothy V. McCarthy, Senior Research Associate, Program for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, submitted for the record at a hearing before the Subcommittees on Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment, International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, and Asia and the Pacific, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 20 May 1993. Future of United States–China Policy, joint hearings before the Subcommittees on Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment, International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, and Asia and the Pacific, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 20 May 1993 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 170–171. ‘China’s Weapons Mafia’, Washington Post, 28 October 1991, pp. 2–3. Lewis et al., ‘Beijing’s Defense Establishment’, p. 105. Ibid., p. 96. Washington Post, 28 October 1991, pp. 2–3. Lewis et al.,‘Beijing’s Defense Establishment’, p. 92. Washington Post, 28 October 1991, pp. 2–3. See also the testimony of Timothy V. McCarthy, submitted for the record at a hearing before the Subcommittees on Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment, International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, and Asia and the Pacific, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 20 May 1993. Future of United States–China Policy, pp. 170–1.

Notes

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181 Testimony of Timothy V. McCarthy. 182 Lewis et al., ‘Beijing’s Defense Establishment’, p. 92. 183 Testimony of Timothy V. McCarthy. Future of United States–China Policy, pp. 170–1. 184 Lewis et al., ‘Beijing’s Defense Establishment’, p. 96. See also D. Elliott, M. Liu, K. Huns, and C. S. Lee, ‘Psst! Wanna Buy a Missile’, Newsweek, 6 September 1993, p. 20. 185 Lewis et al., ‘Beijing’s Defense Establishment’, p. 98. 186 T. L. Friedman, ‘Baker’s China Trip Fails to Produce Pledge on Rights’, New York Times, 18 November 1991, pp. A1, A5. See also Washington Post, 28 October 1991, pp. 2–3. 187 The ministry had objected to the DF-3 sale to Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the dispute was reported to have eventually gone all the way to Deng Xiaping, who permitted it to proceed after he learned the deal was worth $2 billion. Lewis et al., ‘Beijing’s Defense Establishment’, pp. 98–9. 188 New York Times, 18 November 1991, pp. A1, A5. 189 Lewis et al., ‘Beijing’s Defense Establishment’, p. 105. 190 Ibid., p. 104. 191 Halevy, ‘China’s Compliance’, pp. 21–2. 192 New York Times, 18 November 1991, pp. A1, A5. 193 ‘China May Be Able to Get US Missile Technology’, Wall Street Journal, 23 December 1991, p. A6. 194 ‘Bush Meets with Li Peng’, Washington Times, 1 February 1992, pp. A1, A5. 195 Lewis et al., ‘Beijing’s Defense Establishment’, p. 98. 196 Lifting of Missile Sanctions, statement by Margaret Tutweiler, Office of the Assistant Secretary, United States Department of State, Washington, DC, 21 February 1992. 197 Halevy, ‘China’s Compliance’, pp. 24–5. See also ‘Message to the Congress Reporting on the National Emergency with Respect to Export Controls’, 31 March 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1992–93, 1 January–31 July 1992 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 518–20. 198 Testimony of US Secretary of States James Baker before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 24 February 1992. ‘China and the MTCR’, Arms Sales Monitor, No. 11–12, January/February 1992, p. 6. 199 ‘Waiver of Missile Technology Proliferation Sanctions on Foreign Persons’, Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 67 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 7 April 1992), p. 768. 200 ‘Message to the House of Representatives Returning without Approval the US–China Act of 1991’, 2 March 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1992, p. 363. 201 ‘Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Continuation of China’s Most Favored Nation Trade Status’, 2 June 1992. Ibid., pp. 881–2. 202 ‘Message to the Congress on Trade with China’, 11 September 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1992–93, 1 July 1992–20 January 1993 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 1546.

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203 ‘Bush Allows Satellite Shipments’, Export Control News, September 1992, p. 4. 204 ‘Message to the House of Representatives Returning without Approval the US–China Act of 1992’, 28 September 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush 1992–93, pp. 1689–90. 205 ‘China Reported Seeking Missile Deal with Iran’, Los Angeles Times, 3 April 1992, p. A6. 206 South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 2 October 1992, p. 13, in Proliferation Issues, FBIS, 9 October 1992, p. 1, ‘New Office to Handle Arms Transactions’. 207 J. B. Wolfstahl, ‘Suspected Chinese Missile Sale Overshadows US Trade Visit’, Arms Control Today, December 1992, p. 22. 208 J. Mann, ‘China Said to Sell Pakistan Dangerous New Missiles’, Los Angeles Times, 4 December 1992, pp. A1, A18. 209 ‘US Set to Drop Sanctions if China Obeys Missile Pact’, Washington Times, 30 January 1992, pp. A1, A9. 210 ‘West Worries China Will Sell Missiles’, Defense News, 16 March 1992, pp. 1, 45. 211 Mann, ‘China Said to Sell’, pp. A1, A18. 212 P. Lewis, ‘US Prods China on MTCR’, Defense News, 6 April 1992, pp. 3, 44. 213 Wolfstahl, ‘Suspected Chinese Missile Sale’, p. 22. 214 U. Naoaki, ‘N. Korean Threat Brings Measured US, Japan Reply’, Defense News, 21 December 1991, p. 4. 215 ‘Iran Builds Its Strength’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 February 1992, pp. 158–9. 216 ‘China, N. Korea Secretly Deliver Missiles to Mideast via Cyprus’, Washington Times, 2 July 1991, p. A4. For more information on these Scud transfers to Iran and Syria see: ‘Iran’s Ongoing Arm-Buying Binge’, Washington Times, 4 June 1992, p. G3. ‘Iranian Arms Buildup Concerns US’, Defense News, 2 March 1992, p. 29. ‘Libya May Buy North Korean Missiles’, Washington Times, 4 June 1991, p. 4. 217 E. Sciolino, ‘US Tracks a Korean Ship Taking a Missile to Syria’, New York Times, 21 February 1991, p. A9. 218 Testimony of Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for PoliticoMilitary Affairs, US Department of State, before the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 13 March 1992. Arms Trade and Nonproliferation in the Middle East, hearing before the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Part 2, March 13, 1992, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 89. 219 ‘Syria, Iran Want to Buy China’s M-9’, Flight International, 22 January 1992, p. 18. 220 ‘A Lonely State of Defiance’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 August 1992, pp. 26–7. 221 ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions against North Korean and Iranian Entities’, Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 67 (Washington, DC:

Notes

222

223 224

225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239

240 241

235

United States Government Printing Office, 7 April 1992), pp. 11767–8. The ‘Helms Amendment’ to the AECA enacted by the 102nd Congress ‘requires that missile proliferation sanctions under the AECA in the case of countries with non-market economies’, excluding the former Warsaw Pact States, ‘be applied to all activities of the government relating to the development or production of missile equipment and technology, space systems or equipment, military aircraft, and electronics’. R. Shuey and S. A. Kan, Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress, CRS Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 12 February 1996). ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions against North Korean and Syrian Entities’, Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 130 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 7 July 1992), pp. 29924–5. ‘State Imposes Sanctions on North Korean, Syrian Entities, Export Control News, 30 July 1992, pp. 6–8. Testimony of Reginald Bartholomew, Under-Secretary of State for Science, International Security and Arms Control, before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, and Europe and the Middle East, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1991. L. Lumpe, ‘North Korean Scuds to Syria Confirmed’, Arms Sales Monitor, No. 6, mid-July/August 1991, p. 2. ‘Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles’, Washington Times, 16 July 1992, p. A3. ‘Washington Whispers: On Its Way’, US News and World Report, 9 November 1992, p. 30. ‘Scope of Missile Sanctions Order Confuses Exporters’, Export Control News, 30 June 1992, p. 17. ‘State, Commerce Debate Missile Controls’, Export Control News, 27 November 1992. ‘State Imposes Missile Sanctions on North Korean, Syrian Entities’, Export Control News, 30 July 1992, pp. 6–8. ‘State, Commerce Debate’. ‘Commerce, State Resolve Missile Control Controversy’, Export Control News, 29 September 1992, p. 5. ‘State Imposes Missile Sanctions’, pp. 6–8. ‘India Aims for Polar Launcher’, Flight International, 3 June 1992, p. 20. D. Revelle, ‘US Muscle Misses Mark’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp. 10–11, 44. A. Lawler, ‘US Sanctions Imposed; Indian Deal with Russia Still On’, Space News, 18–24 May 1992, p. 14. Revelle, ‘US Muscle’, pp. 10–11, 44. ‘State, Commerce Debate’. Reuters, 30 June 1993, in Executive News Service, 30 June 1993, ‘South Africa Abandons Independent Program’. R. F. Botha, Space Industry in South Africa, New York, Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, Press Release No. 22/93, 30 June 1993. A. Karp, ‘Ballistic Missile Proliferation’ (1991), pp. 332–3. China/Pakistan: M-11 Missile Sanctions, Statement by State Department

236

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The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation Spokesman Michael McCurry, Office of the Spokesman, United States Department of State, Washington, DC, 25 August 1991. Pikayev et al., Russia, the US, p. 43. The Clinton compromise is examined in great detail on pp. 45–59. A. Lawler, ‘Russians OK Missile Export Control’, Space News, 6 September 1993, p. 6. P. Vanichkin, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 2 September 1993, in Foreign Broadcast and Information Service (FBIS-SOV-93-169), 2 September 1993, ‘Signs Space, Missile Agreements’. Pikayev et al., Russia, the US, p. 41.

Conclusion 1 2

3 4

5

See W. Q. Bowen, ‘Brazil’s Accession to the MTCR’, Nonproliferation Review (spring–summer 1996), Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 87. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Controls (Washington, DC: The White House, 27 September 1993). J. B. Wolfstahl, ‘President Clinton Unveils New Nonproliferation Export Policies’, Arms Control Today 23, November 1993, p. 22. US Department of State, Missile Technology Control Regime Holds Plenary in Bonn (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 12 October 1995). ‘MTCR Expands’, Arms Sales Monitor, 5 December 1995, p. 4. P. Finnegan, ‘Clinton Export Plan Draws Fire’, Defense News, 10 October 1993, pp. 1, 36.

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15 October 1991 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), pp. 51734–5. ‘Waiver of Missile Technology Proliferation Sanctions on Foreign Persons’, Office of the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs, US Department of State, 26 February 1992, in Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 67, 7 April 1992 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), p. 11768. ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against North Korean and Iranian Entities’, Bureau of Politico Military Affairs, US Department of State, 6 March 1992, in Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 67, 7 April 1992 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), pp. 11767–8. ‘Supplement 6 to Part 778 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), Expansion of Foreign Policy Controls; Missile Technology Destinations’, Bureau of Export Administration, US Department of Commerce, 16 June 1992, in Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 116, 16 June 1992 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), pp. 26773–4. ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions on North Korean and Syrian Entities’, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, US Department of State, 23 June 1992, in Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 130, 7 July 1992 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), pp. 29924–5. United States Senate Committee hearings and reports Peaceful Nuclear Exports and Weapons Proliferation: A Compendium, prepared by the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, April 1975, 94th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1975). Relationship Between Congress and the Executive in the Formulation and Implementation of Foreign Policy, hearings before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 25 and 31 July, 26 September 1984 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1985). Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Third World, hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 2 May 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1989). Nuclear and Missile Proliferation, hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 18 May 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990). National Security Implications of Missile Proliferation, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 31 October 1989 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990). United States Policy Towards Iraq: Human Rights, Weapons Proliferation, and International Law, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 15 June 1990 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990). Proliferation and Regional Security in the 1990s, hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 9

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‘Senator Joe Biden – China: Rogue Elephant on Weapons Proliferation’, Congressional Record, 17 April 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), pp. S4518–21. ‘Report on US Export Controls – Message from the President of the United States’, Congressional Record, 17 October 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), pp. H8050–1. ‘Conference Report on HR 2212, United States–China Act of 1991’, Congressional Record, 26 November 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), pp. H11416–33. ‘United States–China Act – Veto’, Congressional Record, 18 March 1992, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office), pp. S3816–37. Congressional Research Service Bill Digest: Digest of General Bills and Resolutions S.8, Senator Dole, et al., 25 January 1989, Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions 1989, Vol. 1 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress), p. A5. S.208, Senator Helms, 25 January 1989, Foreign Relations, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions 1989, Vol. 1 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress), pp. A41–2. S.195, Senator Pell, et al., 25 January 1989, Foreign Relations, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions 1989, Vol. 1 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress), pp. 147–8, A34. S.993, Senator Kohl, et al., 16 May 1989, Judiciary, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions 1989, Vol. 1 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress), pp. 182, A195. S.1227, Senator Bingaman, et al., 22 June 1989, Foreign Relations, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions 1989, Vol. 1 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress), p. A246. S.1421, Senator Gore, et al., 27 July 1989, Foreign Relations, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions 1989, Vol. 1 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress), p. A293. S.3033, Representative Fascell, et al., 27 July 1989, Foreign Affairs; Ways and Means; Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions 1989, Vol. 2 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress), p. E475. S.1347, Senator Pell, 18 July 1989, Foreign Relations, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions 1989, Vol. 2 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress), pp. 202–7, A268–73. S.1582, Senator Simon, et al., 6 September 1989, Foreign Relations, CRS Bill Digest: Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions 1989, Vol. 1 of 2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress), p. A345.

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Z. S. Davis, Nonproliferation Regimes: Policies to Control the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons and Missiles, 18 February 1993. S. A. Hildreth, Theater Missile Defense Policy, Missions and Programs: Current Status, 10 June 1993. R. F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World 1985–1992, 19 July 1993. R. P. Cronin, Pakistan Aid Cutoff: US Nonproliferation and Foreign Policy Considerations, 10 February 1994. S. A. Kan and R. Shuey, Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress, 10 February 1994. S. A. Hildreth, Theater Missile Defense: Issues for the 103rd Congress, 31 March 1994. K. Dumbaugh, China: Current US Sanctions, 8 February 1994. Z. S. Davis, S. R. Bowman, R. D. Shuey and T. W. Galdi, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status, 27 April 1995. D. E. Rennack, China: US Economic Sanctions, 11 April 1996. R. Shuey and S. A. Kan, Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress, 12 February 1996. United States General Accounting Office Export Licensing: Commerce–Defense Review of Applications to Certain Free World Nations (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, September 1986). Arms Exports: Licensing Reviews for Exporting Items Can Be Improved (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, September 1987). Export Controls: Assessment of Commerce Department’s Report on Missile Technology Controls (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, May 1988). National Security: The Use of Presidential Directives to Make and Implement US Policy (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, December 1988). Foreign Technologies: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Track Developments (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, June 1989). Export Controls: Assessment of Commerce Department Foreign Policy Reports to Congress (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, September 1989). Arms Control: US Efforts to Control the Transfer of Nuclear-Capable Missile Technology (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, June 1990). Export Controls: Multilateral Efforts to Improve Enforcement (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, May 1992). Foreign Affairs Issues (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, December 1992). National Security Issues (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, December 1992). Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and Current Issues (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, July 1993).

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INDEX Advisory Committee on Export Policy, 66 Aerospace Technical Center, Brazil, 66, 72–3 Afghanistan, 16, 17, 134–135 Agni missile, 2, 23, 26, 54, 77, 90, 132, 150–51 Al Abbas missile, 23, 76 Al Hussein missile, 23, 76, 115 Alacran sounding rocket, 43 Al-Fatah missile project, 81, 90 Apartheid, 144, 167 Arab–Israeli War 1967, 21 Arab–Israeli War 1973, 14–15, 21, 34 Argentina Alacran sounding rocket, 43 Condor I missile, 43 Condor II missile, 3, 43–5, 73, 76–7, 83, 102, 171 Iraq, 23 Membership in MTCR, 174 Arianespace, 79, 84–85 Armaments Corporation of South Africa, 143–6 Armed Forces Joint Command, Brazil, 73 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Deputy Assistant Director for Nuclear Weapons and Control, 109, 111 Carter administration, 33–35 interagency procedures (preFebruary 1989), 48 missile sanctions proposal, 103, 111 Missile Trade Analysis Group, 57 space launch technology export licensing, 69 Arms Export Control Act, 41, 110, 112–14, 117–21, 123, 125 arms trade, 3–4, 13, 15–16, 18 Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile, 145

Astros II battlefield rocket system, 73 Atlas rocket, 39 Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle, 25, 151 Avibras, 26, 72–73 Badr-2000 project, 44 Baker, James, Secretary of State, 58, 133, 145, 147, 156, 159–160 ballistic missile development dedicated missile development, 21–22 modification and reverse engineering, 22–24 diversion of civilian rocketry, 24–27 ballistic missiles see specific missile names Bartholomew, Reginald, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, 56, 58, 84, 133–4, 156, 164 Bills Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act, 113 Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1990, 121 Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, 124 Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-proliferation Act, 113 Chemical and Biological Weapons Warfare Elimination Act, 113 Defence Authorisation Bill for FY 1991, 116 Gore–McCain Missile Proliferation Control Act, 104 International Cooperation Act of 1989, 113 Missile Control Act of 1989, 103

Index Missile Technology Control Act of 1989, 102, 104, 107 Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990, 121–2 Prevention of Missile Transfers to the Middle East Act, 112 United States–China Act of 1991, 127, 160–1 United States–China Act of 1992, 127–8 Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, 114 Boucher, Richard, State Department Spokesman, 95, 149, 150, 159, 161 Brazil Aerospace Technical Center, 66, 72, 73 Armed Forces Joint Command, 73 Astros II rocket system, 73 Avibras, 26, 72, 73 Brazilian Commission for Space Activities, 72 Brazilian Telecommunications Company, 85 Complete Brazilian Space Mission, 72 Embraer, 66 import of rocket technology from France, 79–80, 84–85, 97, 108, 173 imports from the United States, 66–67 Iran, 27 Iraq, 23, 27 MB/EE series of missiles, 26, 80 membership in MTCR, 178 Orbita, 26, 72 President, 74, 98, 173 rocket casing treatment in United States, 70–75, 98 Sonda series of sounding rockets, 26, 45, 72–73 SS series of missiles, 26–27 Supplement 6 to Part 778 of the Export Administration Regulations, 89 Veiculo Lancador de Satellites (VLS) rocket, 70, 72, 171, 174, 178

265

Bureau of Export Administration, Commerce Department, 41, 60, 68, 78, 88, 92, 164 Bush administration Chinese dialogue, 137–140, 153–162 Engagement Policy, 102, 126–127, 138, 160 Israeli dialogue, 140–146 relationship with Congress, 101, 102, 121, 124, 175, 176 Russian dialogue, 146–153 South African dialogue, 143–146 Soviet dialogue, 131–137, 146–147, 168 Bush, George, President of the United States Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, 114 Bush–Yeltsin Summit June 1992, 151 China, 137, 139, 155 missile sanctions law, 121–122 National Defense Authorization Act for 1991, 121–2 National Security Policy Review 1989, 56 State of the Union Address 1991, 87 Superpower Summit December 1989, 134 Superpower Summit June 1990, 135–6 Superpower Summit May–June 1988, 47 United Nations speeches, 86, 117 United States–China Act of 1991, 160 United States–China Act of 1992, 161 Canada, 26, 37, 82, 92, 147 Carter administration Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 33–4 Conventional Arms Transfer Talks, 33 nuclear test (possible) in Indian Ocean, 34

266

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

Presidential Directive 13, 33 research project into missile proliferation, 35 catch-all controls, 68 Category I, Missile Technology Control Regime, 40–1, 81, 119, 120, 137, 144, 146–7, 149, 152–3, 163 Category II, Missile Technology Control Regime, 40–1, 81, 119–20, 126, 155 Central Intelligence Agency, 89, 140, 153 Central Military Commission, China, 157 Centre for Indian Space Research, 25 chemical and biological weapons (CBW), 6, 38, 50, 48, 54, 64–65, 67–8, 85–6, 88, 91, 93–5, 101, 107, 113–14, 122–5, 171 Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act, 113 Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1990, 121 Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, 124 Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-proliferation Act, 113 Chemical and Biological Weapons Warfare Elimination Act, 113 chemical weapons 65, 77, 79, 96, 106, 133, 135, 170, 172 Chile, 43 China Ambassador to the United States, 162 arms transfers prior to 1989, 16–18 Brazil, 26 Bush administration dialogue and MTCR, 137–40, 153–62 Central Military Commission, 157 Chief of the Chinese Communist Party, 159 China Great Wall Industry Corporation, 126, 143, 155–6 China Precision Machinery Import–Export Commission,

126, 143, 155–6, 158 Chinese Ambassador to the United States, 159 Chinese Premier, 159 Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence, 157 Congressional reaction to DF-3 sale, 47–8 Congress and China-specific bills, 112–3, 122 Defense Ministry, 161 Engagement Policy, 102, 126–7, 138, 160 Foreign Minister, 47, 127, 153–4, 159 Foreign Ministry, 139, 158 ICBM development, 25 Iran, 22 Iraq, 23 Israel, 144–5 Most Favored Nation trading status, 8, 101–2, 126–8, 138, 140, 155–7, 160–1 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 128 Pakistan and M-11, 126, 168, 153–7, 159–60, 162 People’s Liberation Army, 16, 138, 157–8 Poly Technologies, 157 Reagan administration dialogue, 47–8 Saudi Arabia and DF-3 missile transfer, 17–18, 44–5, 132 State Council, 157 supercomputers, 66 Syria and M-9, 18, 45, 47, 90, 139–40, 153, 156, 159–60, 162 Tiananmen Square, 138, 158 United States–China Act of 1991, 127, 160–61 United States–China Act of 1992, 127–8 US sanctions, 125–6, 143, 168 Ching Feng (Green Bee) missile, 22, 34 Clarke, Richard, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military

Index Affairs, 66, 70, 83, 85, 109–10, 134–5, 142–3, 153–4, 163 Clements, Bill, Director of the Office of Technology and Policy Analysis, Bureau of Export Administration, Commerce Department, 90 Clinton administration Brazil, 173–4 Bureau of Export Administration (BXA), 41, 60, 68, 78, 88, 92, 164 Cold War, 2, 15, 38, 117, 136 Collor, Brazilian President, 74, 98, 173 Commerce Department Commerce Secretary, 69 criteria for new MTCR members, 173–4 Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, 109, 111 Director of the Office of Space Commerce, 152 Director of the Office of Technology and Policy Analysis, BXA, 90 dual-use export licensing, 6, 41, 48–9, 60–6, 74, 103, 108, 123, 125, 172–5 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, 67–9, 88–9, 172–5 exports to Iraq, 61–4, 115 interagency coordination, 57, 117–18 missile sanctions law, 111, 143, 165–6 Missile Technology Task Force, 57 Negotiation of MTCR, 37 Office of Export Enforcement, 60 Office of Export Licensing, 58, 60 Office of Space Commerce, 152 Office of Technology Policy and Analysis, 60 Office of the Secretary for Export Administration, 57 projects of concern list, 82 regional approaches to missile proliferation, 178 Russia, 169

267

South Africa, 167 Under Secretary for Export Administration, 64, 89, 95 Under Secretary for Trade Administration, 64 Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, 32 Commodity Control List, 41, 62, 118 Communist bloc, 14, 83, 170 Complete Brazilian Space Mission, 72 Condor I missile, 43 Condor II missile, 3, 43–5, 73, 76–7, 83, 102, 171 Congress Brazil, 80 China, 125–128 Chinese missile sales pre-1989, 47–8 Congressional Research Service, 23, 42–3, 76, 124 enactment of missile sanctions law, 116–21, 166, 176, 178 initial reaction to MTCR, 41–2 Joint Economic Committee of Congress, 124, 143, 153 missile nonproliferation, 100–30 relationship with Bush administration, 101–2, 121–4, 175–6 Saudi Arabian acquisition of DF-3 missiles, 47–8 space launch technology export licensing, 74 see also Bills; House of Representatives; Senate; Statutes CONSARC, 61, 63, 65, 74 Containment Policy, 14, 30 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, 132, 134 Conventional Arms Transfer Talks, 33 Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, 38, 46, 67, 82–3, 93, 131, 156 Cruise missiles, 3, 36, 40 cryogenic rocket engines, 136, 146 Customs dual-use export licensing, 61 Office of Defense Trade Controls, 70

268

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

Dassault, 29 Defence Authorisation Bill for FY 1991, 116 Defense Department Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 59 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, 58–9 Assistant Secretary of Defence for Negotiations Policy, 58–9 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations, 85, 110 Defense Intelligence Agency, 57 Defense Security Assistance Agency, 58 Defense Technology Security Administration, 58, 61, 68–9 departmental reforms, 58–9 Deputy for Nonproliferation, 59, 63, 65, 67–8, 71, 73, 81, 87, 109–11, 142 dual-use export licensing, 60–7 dual-use exports to Iraq, 60–4 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, 67–8, 97 institutionalising and reforming the MTCR, 80–5 interagency procedures, 48, 117–18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 59 missile sanctions law, 109–11 Missile Technology Export Control Group, 57 Missile Trade Analysis Group, 57 negotiation of MTCR, 37 Office for Nonproliferation Policy, 69, 75, 81, 97, 175 Office of the Secretary of Defense, 58 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, 58 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 59 Proliferation Countermeasures Working Group, 87 Secretary of Defense, 47, 162 space launch technology export licensing, 69–71, 73–75 Strategic Defense Initiative, 87

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 24, 61 Under Secretary of State for Coordinating Security Assistance Policy, 103 US Air Force, 69 US Army, 69 US Navy, 69 Vincent, Dennis, 8 Wolfowitz, Paul, 61 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations, 85, 110 Defense Security Assistance Agency, Defense Department, 58 Defense Technology Security Administration, Defense Department, 58, 61, 68–9 DF-3 missile, 16–18, 44–5, 132 Di, Hua, 18, 157, 159 Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers Act of 1989, 103 Dong Fang Hong-3 (DFH-3) communications satellite, 154, 160 dual-use export licensing, 6, 41, 48–9, 60–6, 74, 103, 108, 118, 123, 125, 172–5 dual-use technology, 35, 37–8, 40–1, 65 Duelfer, Charles, Director of the Office of Defense Trade Controls, State Department, 69–70, 83 Dunayev, Alexander, Chief of Glavkosmos, Russia, 137, 148–9 Egypt, 5, 14–16, 21, 23, 28–31, 37, 42, 44, 48, 50, 77, 89–90 Energy Department, 67 Engagement Policy, 138, 160 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, 6–7, 54–5, 67–9, 87–9, 91–2, 96–7, 123, 164, 172, 174–5, 178 European Community, 77, 81, 96 European Space Agency, 26 Executive Order 12730, 122–3 Executive Order 12735, 65, 122–3

Index Export Administration Act, 41, 110, 112, 114, 117–19, 121–22, 143 Export Administration Regulations, 62, 67, 86, 88, 90–2, 98, 111, 164–5 Export Control Commission, Russia, 136 export licensing see dual-use export licensing; space launch technology export licensing F-15A aircraft, 15 F-16 aircraft, 31, 37, 42 F-4E aircraft. 15 Falklands War, 43 Federal Export Licensing Office, West Germany, 78 Fitzwater, Marlin, White House Spokesman, 65–6, 123, 140, 154 Ford administration, 30–2 Foreign Military Sales, 58 Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1990–1, 156 Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1992 and 1993, 124 Foreign Trade and Payments Act, West Germany, 83 France Arianespace, 79, 84–85 Assistance to Condor II project, 43, 102 India, 25–6, 77, 97, 171 interpretation of MTCR guidelines, 78–80, 83–5, 97, 171 Iraq, 76 Israel, 21, 24, 30, 35 Ministry of Defense, 84 MTCR Secretariat, 83 negotiation of the MTCR, 37 rocket technology exports to Brazil, 78–80, 83–5, 108, 171 space launch technology exports, 55, 75 State Department dialogue, 83–5 FROG rocket, 15, 28, 30, 46 Gates, Robert, Director of Central Intelligence, 124, 163

269

Gejdenson, Sam, Representative, 104 General Accounting Office, 62 Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle, 25, 136, 146 German Aerospace Research Establishment, 26 Glavkosmos, 36, 137, 143, 146, 148–9, 150, 152, 164–5, 168 Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, 87 Gorbachev, Mikhail, Soviet Premier, 133, 136 Gore, Al Senator, 104–107 Gore–McCain Missile Proliferation Control Act, 104 Vice President of the United States, 169 Greece, 14, 96 Group of Seven Industrialised States (G-7), 3, 15, 27, 29, 37–8, 46, 106 Gulf Co-operation Council, 18 Gulf Crisis (1990–91), 81, 86, 92, 102, 116, 120, 136 Gulf War (1991), 1, 7, 53, 55, 86, 92–4, 100, 114 Honest John rocket, 14, 23, 34 House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 104–6, 114, 127, 164 Committee on Ways and Means, 124 Representative Howard Berman, 76, 102–8, 111, 116–17, 121, 125, 166 Representative Sam Gejdenson, 104 Representative Kastenmeier, 112–13 IBM, 66–7 Import-Export Bank, 139 India Agni missile, 2, 23, 26, 54, 77, 90, 98, 132, 150–1 Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle, 25, 151 Centre for Indian Space Research, 25

270

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organisation, 165 Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle, 25, 136, 146 Indian Space Research Organisation, 25, 136–7, 143, 146–50, 152, 164–6, 168, 177 France, 98 Glavkosmos deal, 136–7, 146–52 nuclear test, 41 Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle, 25 Prime Minister, 150–1 Prithvi misile, 23, 90 Russia, 146–52 shake-and-bake simulator, 108 SLV-3 rocket, 25, 26, 35, 150 space launch programme, 24–6, 34–5, 132, 165 supercomputer, 66 US sanctions, 101, 125, 147, 149–50 indigenous missile development, 18–27 intelligence community Central Intelligence Agency, 89, 140, 153 Chinese transfers, 47, 140 Director of Central Intelligence, 103, 124, 163 Interagency procedures, 199 Iraq, 63, 73, 115 Export Administration Regulations, 89 North Korea, 164 Pakistan and M-11 missiles, 153 Intelsat, 160 interagency groups Missile Technology Export Control Group, 57, 60 Missile Trade Analysis Group, 57, 142, 143 NSC Policy Co-ordinating Committee for Nonproliferation Policy, 56 Subgroup on Nuclear Export Controls, 67 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 46, 132 International Atomic Energy Agency, 43, 132

International Cooperation Act of 1989, 113 International Security and Development Act of 1989, 113 International Space Station, 151 International Trade Consulting SA, 76 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 41, 70 Iran Brazil, 27, 73, 80, 98 China, 45, 47, 153 Export Administration Regulations, 90 Iran-130 missile, 22 Iran–Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, 125 Iran–Iraq War (1980–8), 27, 44, 79, 106 Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics, 143, 163 North Korea, 163–4 Oghab rocket, 22 US sanctions, 101, 113, 163–4 War of the Cities, 53 Iraq Al Abbas missile, 23, 76 Al Hussein missile, 76, 115 Badr-2000 project, 44 Brazil, 70, 72, 73, 80, 98, 173 Condor II project, 44 chemical weapons, 106 dual-use imports from United States, 61–4, 115 Iran–Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, 125 Iran–Iraq War (1980–8), 17, 27, 44, 79, 106 missile attacks in 1991, 1–2, 55, 124 missile modification, 23 Sa’ad missile development centre, 16, 76–8, 108 Saddam Hussein, 1, 64–5, 115 Soviet Union, 15 War of the Cities, 53 Israel Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile, 145

Index Bush administration dialogue, 131, 140–6, 167 China, 144–5 Egypt–Israel rocket race, 28–30 Export Administration Regulations, 89–90, 174 F-16 aircraft, 37 Jericho-1 missile, 21, 24, 29 Jericho-2 missile, 34–5, 44, 90, 132, 141 Lance transfer from United States, 30–1 Ministry of Defense, 141–2 nuclear test (possible) in Indian Ocean, 34 Pershing request, 30–1 Reagan administration dialogue, 48 retransfer of Lance technology to Taiwan, 22 Shavit rocket, 24, 90, 141 South African cooperation, 140–6 US arms transfers, 15 US sanctions waiver, 144 Italy, 7, 19, 22, 37, 43, 45, 102, 106 Jackson–Vanik Amendment, 160 Japan, 19, 37–8, 76, 93, 136, 147, 153, 162 Johnson administration, 29–30, 32 Joint Economic Committee of Congress, 124, 143, 153 Karp, Aaron, 19, 31, 46, 142 Karpov, Victor, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister 147, 132 Kelle, Alexander, 77–8 Kennedy administration, 29–30, 32 Kennedy, John, President of the United States, 39 Korean Peninsula, 96 Kuwait, 1, 65, 67, 72, 86, 98, 115–16, 136, 174 Lance missile, 5, 14–16, 18, 21–2, 28, 30–1, 34–5, 42, 45, 48 legislation, see Statutes and Bills legislative–executive branch relations; see Congress

271

Libya, 73, 77–80, 90, 106, 113, 153, 173 Lockheed, 23 M-9 missile, 3, 16, 18, 45, 139–40, 153, 156, 159–60, 162 M-11 missile, 2–3, 126, 140, 153–4, 159–60, 162, 168 Madrid Peace Talks, 145 Matrix-Churchill, 76 Mauritania, 115 MB/EE series of missiles, 26, 80 McDonnell Douglas, 80 Messerschmidt–Boelkow–Blohm, 76, 102, 106 Middle East, 2–3, 5, 9, 15, 17–18, 28, 30–1, 33, 38, 47–8, 89–90, 96, 100, 106, 113, 124, 132, 139–40, 142, 167, 171 MiG-23 aircraft, 15 Missile Control Act of 1989, 103 missile defence, 84, 87 missile sanctions law see Sanctions Missile Technology Control Act of 1989, 102, 104, 107 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex, 38–41, 65, 69–70, 78, 82, 87, 91, 93, 111, 118, 126, 144 Argentinian membership, 174 Brazilian membership, 174 Category I, 40 Category II, 40–1 China, 153–62, 167–8 Clinton administration and new criteria for MTCR membership, 173–4 coverage of weapons of mass destruction, 94–5 guidelines, 78, 80, 83, 91, 94, 97, 142, 157 initial Congressional reaction, 40–2 initial problems, 43–5 institutionalisation and reform, 80–6 Israel, 143–6 legislative authority in United States, 41

272

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

membership expansion, 81, 96 Negotiations, 37–42 regional approaches to missile proliferation, 178 Russia, 146–53 Secretariat, 83 similarity to Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, 38 South Africa, 167 Soviet Union, 131–7 Technical Working Group, 82 updating, 91–5 West European members, 75–80 Missile Technology Export Control Group, 57, 60 Missile Technology Task Force, 57 Missile Trade Analysis Group, 57, 142–3 Mitterrand, François, President of France, 80, 84 Most Favored Nation trading status China, 8, 101–2, 126–8, 138, 140, 155–7, 160–1 Soviet Union, 134 Munitions List, 41, 107, 108, 113, 118, 120 Namibia, 167 Nasser, Egyptian President, 30, 50 National Aeronautical and Space Administration, 25, 39, 57 National Defense Authorization Act for 1988–89, 42 National Defense Authorization Act for 1991, 8, 100–1, 117–9, 121–2, 143, 164–6 National Defense Authorization Act for 1992 and 1993, 125 National Defense Authorization Act for 1993, 125 National Press Club, 159 National Security Council, 108 Policy Co-ordinating Committee for Nonproliferation Policy, 56 National Security Decision 10, 56 National Security Decision Directive70 36–37 National Security Decision

Memorandum 187, 39 National Security Directive-26, 63 National Security Policy Review 1989, 56 Netherlands, 81 New Thinking, 8, 133, 136 Nike Hercules missile, 23, 34 Nixon administration, 30–32 Nixon Doctrine, 31 Nodong-1 missile, 2, 54, 162–3 North Africa, 15, 17 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 38, 134 North Korea Changgwang Credit Corporation, 143, 163 Export Administration Regulations, 90 failure to stop North Korean proliferation, 169 Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation, 143, 163 reverse engineering of SCUD missile, 23–4 SCUD missile production and exports, 162–3 US sanctions, 101, 125, 131, 162–3, 178 Norway, 94, 96 nuclear-capable missiles, 13, 27, 38 Nuclear Nonproliferation International Atomic Energy Agency, 43, 132 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, 41, 108 Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 36, 107 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 3, 34, 47, 94, 128, 149, 156, 160, 167 nuclear weapons, 5, 13, 17–18, 20–1, 27–43, 45–8, 50, 69, 77, 79, 85–6, 93, 113, 135, 138, 141, 146, 162 Office for Nonproliferation Policy, Defense Department, 69, 75, 97, 175

Index Office of Defense Trade Controls, State Department, 69–70, 95 Office of Export Licensing, Commerce Department, 58, 60 Office of Munitions Control, State Department, 21, 34, 41, 69 Oghab rocket, 22 Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990, 121–2 Operation Desert Shield, 122 Orbita, 26, 72 OTRAG, 21–2, 34 Overberg Test Range, 141 Pakistan China and M-11, 126, 168, 153–7, 159–60, 162 Export Administration Regulations, 90 F-16 aircraft, 37, 42 Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission, 126, 143, 155 US sanctions, 101, 125–6 Palestinians, 115 Paris Economic Summit July 1989, 83 Patriot missile, 87 People’s Liberation Army, China, 16, 138, 157–8 Pershing-1A missile, 30 Persian Gulf, 115 Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle, 25 Policy Co-ordinating Committee for Nonproliferation Policy, 56 Poly Technologies, China, 157 Presidential Directive on Defense Department in dual-use export licensing, 60 Presidential Directive/NSC-13, 33 Presidential veto, 121 Presidential waivers, 120–1, 144 Prevention of Missile Transfers to the Middle East Act, 112 Prithvi missile, 23, 90 Projecta, 78 Proliferation Countermeasures Working Group, US Defense Department, 87 Public Law 101–189, 112

273

Qichen, Qian, Chinese Foreign Minister, 127, 153–4, 159 Quayle, Dan Senator, 41 Vice President of the United States, 81, 151–2 Rabta, 78 RAND Corporation, 24, 75 Raytheon Missile Systems, 87 Reagan administration China, 139 Evil Empire speech, 170 MTCR problems, 75 National Security Decision Memorandum-187, 39 National Security Decision Directive-70, 36–7 negotiation of MTCR, 37–49 nuclear nonproliferation policy, 36–7 space launch technology controls, 80 reverse engineering, 4, 13, 22–3 Romania, 77 Russia Ambassador to the United States, 147 Bush administration dialogue, 146–53 Committee on Foreign Economic Relations, 147–8 Chief Designer, Salyut Design Bureau, 146 Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Relations, 150 Deputy Foreign Minister, 152 Foreign Affairs Minister, 147 Foreign Ministry, 147–9, 151 Glavkosmos, 137, 148–9 India, 146–52 Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, 148 President, 149 Prime Minister, 169 State Commission for Military Industries, 133, 136 State Committee on Defence Industries, 148

274

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

US sanctions, 101, 125, 149–50 SA-2 missile, 23 Saddam Hussein, 1, 64–5, 115 SAGEM, 76, 79 Sakr-80 rocket, 21 Salyut Design Bureau, Russia, 150 Sa’ad missile development centre, 16, 76–8, 108 Sampson, Anthony, 31 sanctions Chinese, 125–6, 138–9, 143, 155, 168 enactment of missile sanctions law, 116–121 Indian, 101, 125, 147, 149–50 Iranian, 101, 113, 163–4 Israeli-waived, 144 Missile sanctions authority, 142–143 North Korean, 101, 125, 131, 162–164, 178 Pakistani, 101, 125–6, 155 South African, 101, 125, 143–6 Russian, 101, 125, 149–150 Syrian, 163–4 satellite launch technology, see space launch technology Saudi Arabia, 1, 3, 16–18, 37, 44–5, 47, 53, 86, 113, 115, 132, 138–9 Scout rocket, 26 Scowcroft, Brent, National Security Advisor, 68, 139, 173 SCUD missile, 1–2, 15–16, 18, 20, 23, 30–1, 46, 53, 73, 76, 86, 90, 92, 106, 116–16, 120, 134–6, 162–4 Senate Committee on Armed Services, 103, 105, 132 Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 105 Committee on Foreign Relations, 195–7, 115, 127 Committee on Governmental Affairs, 103 Senator Joseph Biden, 127 Senator Jeff Bingaman, 74, 80, 103, 105–9 Senator Robert Dole, 107, 113–14

Senator Dante Fascell, 112–14 Senator Jesse Helms, 112 Senator Herb Kohl, 112–13 Senator John McCain, 104–7, 166 Senator Sam Nunn, 105 Senator Claibourne Pell, 107, 112–14 sense of the Senate resolution, 47 shake-and-bake simulator, 108 Shavit rocket, 24, 90, 141 Shevardnadze, Eduard, Soviet Foreign Minister, 132–133, 137 Shultz, George, Secretary of State, 47 SLV-3 rpocket, 25–6, 35, 150 SNECMA, 79 SNIA-BPD, 45, 76, 83, 102 SNPE, 21, 76 Sokolski, Henry, Deputy for Nonproliferation, Defense Department, 109–11, 59, 63, 65, 67–8, 71, 73, 81, 87, 142 Sonda series of sounding rockets, 26, 45, 72–3 South Africa Armaments Corporation of South Africa, 143–6 Bush administration dialogue, 143–6 Denel (Pty) Ltd, 146, 167 Israeli cooperation, 53, 90, 140–6 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 142 nuclear test (possible) in Indian Ocean, 34 Overberg Test Range, 141 Public Enterprises Minister, 146 US sanctions, 101, 125, 143–6 space launch programme, 167 South Asia, 124 South-East Asia, 22 South Korea, 14, 23, 34–5, 37, 42, 162 South-West Asia, 132 South Yemen, 16, 28 Soviet Union Bush administration dialogue, 131–7, 146–7, 168 Conventional Arms Transfer Talks, 33

Index Foreign Minister, 132, 133, 137 Foreign Ministry, 133 Karpov, Victor, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister 147, 132 Ministry of Defence, 133 initial reaction to MTCR, 44–8 missile transfers 1959–89, 15–16, 30, 46 Prime Minister, 15 Premier, 133, 136 space launch technology export licensing, 69–71, 73–5 role in missile development, 19, 22, 24–7 MTCR negotiations, 36–43 space shuttle programme, 80 Spain, 21, 76, 81 SS-1000 missile, 26 SS-12 missile, 45 SS-21 missile, 46 SS-23 missile, 18, 45 SS-300 missile, 26, 27 STARSAT, 160 State Department Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, 66, 70, 79, 83, 85, 109–10, 132, 134–5, 142–3, 153–4, 163 China, 45, 126, 153, 158–62 departmental reforms, 58 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, 132 Deputy Secretary of State, 139 dialogue with France, 83–5 Director of the Office of Defense Trade Controls, 69–70, 83 Egypt talks, 48 Egyptian Embassy, 48 Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, 67–8 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 41, 70 Israel, 48, 141, 143–5 missile sanctions authority, 164–6 missile sanctions law, 109–10 Munitions List, 41, 107–8, 113, 118, 120 Negotiation of MTCR, 37 North Korea, 163–4

275

Office of Defense Trade Controls, 69–70, 95 Office of Munitions Control, 21, 34, 41, 69 Office of Weapons Proliferation Policy, Bureau of PoliticoMilitary Affairs, 58 Pershing and Israel, 31 Russian, 149–50, 152 Secretary of State, 31, 58, 47, 133, 145, 147, 156, 159, 160 South Africa, 143–5 Soviet Union, 133–5 Space launch technology export licensing, 69–75 Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, 56, 58, 84, 133, 134, 156, 164 State of the Union Address 1991, 87 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 22 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/Treaty, 56, 134 Strategic Defense Initiative, 87 Subcontinent, 96 Subgroup on Nuclear Export Controls, 67 supercomputers, 66 Superpower Summit December 1989, 134 Superpower Summit June 1990, 135, 136 Superpower Summit May–June, 1988, 47 Supreme Court, Denmark, 81 Sweden, 43, 76, 96 Switzerland, 43, 77, 96 Syria China and M-9, 18, 45, 47, 90, 139–40, 153, 156, 159, 160, 162 Ministry of Defence, 143, 163 Syrian Scientific Research Centre, 143, 163 US sanctions, 101, 125, 163–4 Taiwan, 14, 17, 22, 34–5, 42, 137 Tiananmen Square, 138, 158 Tornado aircraft, 18

276

The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

Trade Development Group, 76 transhipment, 55 Treasury Department, 143 Tu-23 aircraft, 15 Turkey, 14, 17 Ukraine, 149 United Kingdom, 18–19, 37, 45, 76 United Nations, 1 General Assembly, 117 Report on South Africa’s missile programme, 141 Security Council, 17, 136–7, 144 United States–China Act of 1991, 127, 160, 161 United States–China Act of 1992, 127, 128 US Air Force, 69 US Army, 69 US Embassy in Moscow, 137 US Navy, 69 US–Soviet Joint Communiqué June 1990, 135 Veiculo Lancador de Satellites (VLS) rocket, 70, 72, 171–4 Vietnam War, 32 Viking engine, 26, 79, 84

War of the Cities, 53 War Weapons Control Act, West Germany, 78, 83 Warsaw Pact, 38 Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1992, 125 weapons of mass destruction, 1, 6, 7, 9, 10, 87, 91, 94, 103, 107, 115–16, 122, 125, 152, 169–70, 172, 178 West Germany, 7, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 34, 35, 37, 43, 55, 76, 77, 78, 81, 83, 97, 102, 106 Western Europe, 3, 6, 43, 55, 75, 77, 94, 100, 105, 116, 172 White, Gerard, 89, 90 White House, 65–6, 85, 92, 101, 103, 109, 121–3, 126–7, 140, 154–5, 161 World Space Congress, 152 Xiaoping, Deng, 16, 159 Yeltsin, Boris, President of the Russian Federation, 149 Zemin, Jiang, Chief of the Chinese Communist Party, 159