The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns Andrey Vavilov
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns Andrey Vavilov
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns Andrey Vavilov
© Andrey Vavilov 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–24893–9
hardback
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
Contents List of Figures, Tables, and Boxes
vii
Acknowledgements
xi
Introduction
1
1 The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s
11
Introduction
11
1.1 The Soviet debt
12
1.2 The Russian debt: beginning of management
25
1.3 External debt and macroeconomic policy
40
2 The Domestic Financial System and Inflation
50
Introduction
50
2.1 The origination of financial markets
51
2.2 Macroeconomic stabilization and public debt
69
2.3 The fragile banking system
78
3 Virtual Economy and Fiscal Crisis
87
Introduction
87
3.1 Virtual economy
88
3.2 Fiscal crisis
100
4 The Risks of Domestic Debt Expansion
121
Introduction
121
4.1 Dynamics of public debt in 1995–98
122
4.2 Domination of short-term debt
128
4.3 Opening the domestic debt market
132
Appendix A4.1
140
Appendix A4.2
142
5 The Causes of the Russian Financial Crisis of 1998 Introduction
144 144
v
vi
Contents
5.1 A brief history of the Russian crisis
145
5.2 The fundamental factors of the crisis
151
5.3 The Central Bank policy
157
6 The Debt Crisis and Default
164
Introduction
164
6.1 Failure to normalize the state budget
164
6.2 Belated debt management
167
6.3 17 August – the debt default
171
6.4 A post-crisis inflation trade-off
178
Appendix A6.1: A model of banks supporting devaluation
182
7 Recovery After the Crisis
187
Introduction
187
7.1 The results of the ruble devaluation
187
7.2 Fiscal discipline, consolidation and the end of financial chaos
194
7.3 The debt burden easing after the default
203
7.4 Conclusion
207
Appendix A7.1: Restructuring of obligations to the London Club
209
8 Yet Another Crisis, 2008–2009
213
Introduction
213
8.1 Two crises: how much in common?
214
8.2 Anti-crisis policy
226
8.3 Impact of the crisis
233
8.4 What is next?
235
Notes
237
References
256
Index
262
List of Figures, Tables and Boxes Figures
I.1
The real oil price, 1979–2008 ($/barrel)
1.1
The Soviet external debt and the oil price, 1970–93
14
1.2
Russia’s external debt payments and debt increase in the 1990s ($ billion)
38
Inflation rate and the consolidated budget deficits in the 1990s
43
IMF credits to the Russian government in 1992–98 ($ billion)
44
2.1
The CPI inflation and the nominal exchange rate in 1992
52
2.2
Refinance rate and inflation in 1992–94 (per cent per month)
57
2.3
Inflation and the ruble-to-dollar exchange rate in 1993–95
59
2.4
Foreign currency exchange regimes and inflation, 1995–97
73
3.1
Dynamics of arrears in 1992–98 (per cent of GDP)
89
3.2
One-dimensional model of transition
94
3.3
Two-dimensional model of transition
96
3.4
Federal tax arrears and tax revenue in cash (percentage of GDP)
104
4.1
Domestic debt in 1994–97 in GKO-OFZ (trillion rubles)
124
4.2
Dynamic of real debt in market instruments (trillion rubles, base December 1993)
125
4.3
Real annual GKO-OFZ yields (per cent)
127
4.4
The ratio of gross debt expenditure to budget revenue
127
5.1
The timeline of main crisis events
146
5.2
Real GKO yields and real ruble effective exchange rate in 1995–98
152
Oil price and RTS index
156
1.3 1.4
5.3
vii
4
viii
List of Figures, Tables and Boxes
5.4
Fundamental causes of the Russian crisis
157
5.5
The refinancing rate and the average GKO-OFZ yield in 1997–98 (per cent per year)
161
Official foreign currency reserves and net domestic assets ($ billion)
162
6.1
The nominal ruble exchange rate in 1998–99 (rubles/$)
179
6.2
Monthly inflation and the ruble devaluation in 1998–99
180
5.6
A6.1 Zero-devaluation equilibrium
185
A6.2 Two equilibria under dollarization
185
7.1
The dynamics of exports and imports of Russian goods ($ billion)
189
7.2
The price of oil ($/barrel)
189
7.3
Trends in GDP and industrial production (billion rubles)
192
7.4
The dynamics of compensation and productivity, 1997 = 100
193
7.5
UES OF RUSSIA income structure (per cent)
195
7.6
Money supply and reserve requirement movements
201
7.7
Banking assets and equity movements (percentage of GDP)
202
7.8
Corporate loans and government bonds (percentage of assets)
202
The dynamics of returns of government bonds in 1996–2001 (per cent per annum)
204
8.1
Russian Stock Market vs. MCSI World, 2000–2009 (in logs)
221
8.2
Budget surplus/deficit in Russia, 2005–2009 (per cent of GDP)
228
7.9
Tables 1.1
Oil production by the USSR in 1988–91 (million tonnes)
16
1.2
Nominal wage growth and consolidated state budget deficit in the USSR in the period of Perestroika, 1985–91
17
The number of banks in the USSR in 1988–90 (end of period)
18
Russian external debt ($ billion, end of period)
36
1.3 1.4
List of Figures, Tables and Boxes ix
1.5
Dynamic and structure of new Russian debt in the 1990s ($ billion, end of period)
37
1.6
Sovereign debts owed to the Russian Federation by the end of 1991 ($ billion)
38
1.7
Russian Eurobond issues in the 1990s
48
2.1
Annual growth rates of nominal and real macroeconomic indicators in 1992–97 (per cent)
53
Russian domestic debt in securities in 1993–96 (end of year, percentage of GDP)
68
2.2 2.3
Characteristics of domestic public debt in securities in 1994–98
75
2.4
Federal budget of Russia in 1995–98 (percentage of GDP)
77
2.5
Russian banking system under market transformations
80
3.1
Size and structure of arrears in the first quarter of 1998
90
3.2
Tax revenues of consolidated budget in 1992–98 (per cent of GDP)
103
3.3
Federal budget 1993–97 as approved and executed, three items: total spending, total income, budget deficit (IMF definition) all as a percentage of GDP
107
3.4
Results of the ‘loans-for-shares’ deal
115
4.1
Russian public debt in the 1990s
123
4.2
Russian external debt in the middle of 1990s ($ billion)
124
4.3
Domestic debt of the federal government (end of period, percentage of GDP)
125
Share of foreign currency bank credits (per cent, beginning of period)
137
5.1
Indicators of monetary policy in 1996–1998 (end of period)
159
6.1
Federal budget performance in the first half year in 1997 and 1998 (percentage of GDP)
165
6.2
Value of maturing GKO and OFZs, June–December 1998
168
6.3
Growth rates of monetary policy indicators after August 1998 (per cent)
180
7.1
The rate of growth of industrial production (per cent)
192
7.2
Cash and non-cash payment transactions between large companies
194
4.4
x
List of Figures, Tables and Boxes
7.3
The share of payment offsetting (per cent)
196
7.4
The dynamics of tax revenues in the consolidated budget (per cent)
197
7.5
Sources of financing of the budget deficit
198
7.6
The debt burden on the Russian economy before and after the crisis (per cent)
204
A7.1 Initial data (per cent)
210
Boxes 1.1
The ‘Noga Saga’
23
1.2
The US Debt and Alexander Hamilton
28
1.3
The Problem of Mutual Debts Evaluation
34
2.1
Financial Pyramid MMM
61
2.2
The Voucher Privatization in Russia
64
3.1
Peculiarities of the Budget Process in Russia
108
3.2
Incentive Games in the Virtual Economy
113
6.1
A Calendar Effect of Vacations as a Predictor of Crises in Russia
173
6.2
The Argentine Debt Default and Swaps
175
7.1
Measures to Tackle the Crisis
200
8.1
Spurious Russian Market: All Shades of Grey
221
Acknowledgements Many colleagues have provided comments and suggestions for improving this book. A special thanks goes to Georgiy Trofimov, who provided invaluable assistance in improving the book’s content. Also I would like to thank Alexey Pomanskiy, Galina Kovalishina and Vladimir Kreyndel of the Institute for Financial Studies and Dr Barry W. Ickes of the Penn State University for their participation in the discussions and extremely helpful comments. Andrey Vavilov
xi
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Introduction
Great social revolutions are inspired by big ideas, implemented by enthusiasts of these ideas, fostered by big finance, and may be spontaneously affected by unforeseen eventualities. To some extent this is true with regard to the Russian capitalist revolution that began in 1991 and continued throughout the final decade of the twentieth century. It was a materialization of the basic idea to transform radically the decaying communist system into a modern market economy that would be able to survive and develop in the post-industrial world. The idea was not new at that time because the unprecedented economic transformations had already been occurring in Eastern European and some developing countries and had proved to be pretty successful in many cases. The processes of economic liberalization began around the world in the 1980s and led to tectonic changes that would have certainly affected the former Soviet Union. Fortunately, the last Soviet leaders, headed by Mikhail Gorbachev, were prudent enough to reject any new radical communist experiments and even tried to modernize, albeit unsuccessfully, the communist system. The author of this book is part of a generation of young economists brought up under the intellectual influence of the liberal ideas of that epoch. Twenty years ago all of us were very enthusiastic about the beginning of radical market reforms in Russia. Some got a lucky and rare chance to implement these big ideas in practice when the new post-communist Russia was born as a sovereign state in 1991. This book presents a participant’s observations and thoughts in hindsight about the revolutionary events that occurred during the last decade of the past century. The book presents a history of Russian finances that played a very important role in the Russia’s transition from communism to capitalism. Usually financial issues remain in the shadow of historical 1
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
events or personalities. They are typically neglected by historians who are reluctant to pay much attention to the dull matters of debts and credits. But in the case of Russia these issues were paramount because the attempts at economic transformation were very closely interrelated with the resolution of a cornerstone problem of public debt. This problem arose in the late 1980s and mirrored the serious economic troubles of the Soviet Union that were hidden for many years by official statistics. The excess and rapid build up of external debt obligations by the USSR alongside ineffective attempts to introduce semi-market reforms eventually caused the Soviet debt crisis and led to the insolvency of the state. There is no coincidence in the fact that the bankruptcy of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 occurred simultaneously with its disintegration. The history of the Soviet debt crisis and default is a story of the agony and death of the Soviet Empire. The subsequent history of new Russian debt origination, accumulation, and a new crisis, which is the principal subject of this book, is essentially a more intriguing story of the successes and failures behind Russia’s transition to markets. Market reforms started in Russia in the aftermath of the Soviet bankruptcy and in a political situation of considerable complexity. The new Russian government headed by Yegor Gaidar was formed by the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, at the peak of his charisma, as a team to conduct some radical economic reforms. Being widely perceived as a team of ‘whipping boys’, it had to fulfill three concrete tasks. First, the government of reformers had to undertake urgent measures to pull the country out of a deep economic crisis and to prevent a widespread social catastrophe. Second, it had to launch the great capitalist revolution in Russia, something that the previous liberal reformers in tsarist Russia (the predecessor of the USSR), such as Peter Stolypin, had failed to accomplish eighty years earlier. Third, the government of post-Soviet young reformers had to solve the Soviet debt problem in a civilized manner. These three tasks were mutually interrelated. The economic crisis could be resolved only on the basis of a market that was yet to be created. In introducing its reforms the Russian government needed political support from the governments of developed countries that were official creditors of the Soviet Union. At the same time the success of reforms was the only way for the Russian government to become eventually solvent so that it could pay back Soviet debts. The solution of the debt problem was, thus, a necessary condition for overcoming the economic crisis under which the Russian Federation was born as a new political entity.
Introduction 3
Negotiations around the Soviet debt restructuring, hence, became the key strategic issue for the Russian authorities. The recognition and restructuring of this debt made possible a civilized solution of the sovereign debt problem, for the first time since the Bolshevik revolution and Russia’s sovereign debt default in 1917. Russia assumed responsibility for the Soviet Union’ foreign debt in full, although this implied a very high additional financial burden for the newly created state. But, on the other hand, the debt assumption opened new options for Russia to enter the global capital markets several years later. Another strategic reason for the Soviet debt assumption was maintaining the status of a nuclear superpower (infirm but still alive) that Russia inherited from the USSR as its legal successor. Of course, leaving these strategic considerations aside, a more rational choice might have been instead to issue new debt at the beginning of the transition to facilitate this process and to smooth out household consumption. Successful reforms would, after all, lead to higher future incomes, so it would be sensible to finance some of the painful reforms from richer future generations. But as the successor to the bankrupted Soviet Union, the Russian Federation could not borrow any more before the resolution of the Soviet debt problem. This vicious circle made the whole situation relating to the external financing of Russian reforms very difficult. Another problem was that the Russian economy proved to be heavily exposed to fluctuations in the price of oil. ‘Her majesty, the oil price’ dictated the course of the most important events in Russia’s history of the last four decades, since the large Siberian stocks of oil were opened for exploitation. Figure I.1 depicts the dynamic of the real oil price for the thirty-year period 1979–2008. The price jump at the beginning of the 1980s ensured large export revenues but weakened the Soviet rulers’ incentives to make reforms. The first attempts to modernize the socialist system were initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev after the dramatic drop in the oil price in 1986 which turned out to be strong enough to cause the Soviet economy to fall first into crisis and then to collapse. The attempt to introduce semi-market reforms was in fact a ‘false start’, but the Soviet Union received huge volumes of foreign credits, as a seemingly upward price reversal manifested in 1989–90 (as seen in Figure I.1). But when the true market reforms started in 1992, the oil price began to fall again. A period of radical market transformations in the period 1992–99 thus coincided with a period of very low oil prices. Its drop fostered the initiation of radical reforms in Russia but at the same time made it very difficult to implement these reforms. As seen from Figure I.1, the minimal level of the oil price was reached in 1998,
4
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
79 981 983 985 987 989 991 993 995 997 999 001 003 005 007 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
19
Figure I.1 The real oil price, 1979–2008 ($/barrel) Source: The Federal Reserve System, the International Energy Agency.
a year of the Russian financial collapse that had a shocking effect on the global financial system. Although the Russian government agreed to assume the debt obligations of the Soviet Union in 1992, it was able to reduce the debt burden temporarily as a result of its negotiations with the clubs of foreign creditors and G7 governments. Russia received a seven-year breathing space to bring about its capitalist revolution. This book contains a participant’s personal view, with hindsight, of the political and economic processes in Russia that, being coupled with very unfavourable oil price movements during that period, led this revolution to the financial crisis and a new debt default in 1998. This book focuses on the problems and obstacles to the reform of the Russian economy with a special emphasis on state debt policy. This was the field of my personal activity as a member of the first and second cabinets that implemented radical reforms. When the state debt policy was designed initially, my colleagues and I shared the optimism that the debt burden would be eroded by economic growth that would be generated sooner or later by the market economy. We overemphasized the word ‘sooner’ and underestimated the difficulties that Russia would have faced in the transition to the market economy. One could not foresee the size of the forthcoming economic decline in the 1990s that was devastating for the Russian economy.1
Introduction 5
It was completely disorganized at the very beginning of market reforms, and, as I have mentioned, the main task of the reforming team was to prevent a catastrophe, rather than to transform deliberately the economy into a well-designed model. Of course, a programme of reforms had been prepared according to the standard logic of economic liberalizations and approved by international experts. But the programme could not envisage all the scenarios of transition and, in particular, it ignored a number of important features that were specific to the Russian economy. There was no theory of the transition to the market applicable to any country (since there was no reason to elaborate such a theory earlier). The experience of East European countries, on which the Russian reformers placed too much initial reliance, turned out to be not particularly useful. For reasons that I will discuss in this book, the economic transformation in Russia differed drastically from any earlier experience of other countries. It had often happened in Russian history that policy measures designed initially as benevolent, turned out to have unforeseen consequences. The post-communist reforms were a good illustration of this regularity, and reformers in Russia faced an immense gap between desires and possibilities. They could not prevent, for example, huge budget deficits and persistent three-digit annual inflation, the widespread non-payment crisis, the chronic fiscal crisis, a huge polarization of incomes and horrifying poverty, and the rise of extremely sharp social problems. The market economy institutions developed slowly, while important structural reforms were incomplete and inconsistent or delayed indefinitely. The economy suffered from a lack of transparency in nearly every sphere, and this made it difficult to attract foreign investment in the production sector. The rule of law, respect for ownership rights, the creation of a good investment climate, and the building of a trustworthy reputation by the state, remained empty slogans that were used for political demagogy and manipulations. One crucial difference is that Russia had experienced the planned economy for a much longer time and in greater depth than the East European post-communist countries. Three generations of Russians did not know about the market economy, while people familiar with capitalism were still alive in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other countries, where old traditions of individual activity and responsibility had not been forgotten completely. Even though the Russians were unaware of capitalism, many of them were enthusiastic about new opportunities for self-actualization and enrichment that appeared as
6
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
the reforms began. Unfortunately, very soon these hopes turned out to be vain for the majority of people that could not find their place in the new environment and reach success. But their failure to adapt to emerging markets was not their fault because this environment was very chaotic. In my opinion, the unintentional results of Russia’s market transition were caused not by people’s mentality, but rather by the burdensome legacy from the Soviet era. The Russian economy inherited a huge monetary overhang, implying that the economic liberalization had to begin from a tremendous inflation outburst. This was a shock for both domestic producers and households. The inherited economic structure was inefficient – due to arbitrary administrative decisions adopted previously in the command economy – and needed to be transformed dramatically. But the costs to the Russian economy of such structural adjustments were extremely high. On the one hand, the majority of domestic producers were used to the paternalism of the state and could not survive in the market – their cost structures were just not viable. On the other hand, the state could not permit the majority of enterprises be closed at one instant.2 It would be hardly possible to build a new economy on ruins of the old one in the absence of new investment and knowledge. An acceptable strategy was therefore to search for compromises that were, of course, in conflict with the radical approach that the reformers had initially tried to implement. Thus, the Russian government was trying to pursue conflicting goals and, at the same time, was faced by severe political constraints. The most serious problem was that the state had to maintain its social expenditures and obligations which were too high for an economy in deep distress. In relative terms these obligations were similar to those typical for the developed European economies. The state also continued to support inefficient production enterprises. The burdensome Soviet legacy, the unfavourable terms of trade, and the excess state obligations made inevitable huge budget deficits and emission of money or debt. As is made clear by from the title of this book, the public debt policy of Russia in the 1990s is the main theme of our analysis. I try to understand the dualistic features of the debt in the Russian transition. Even though the external Soviet debt was a burden for the economy, its assumption furthered the integration of Russia into the global financial system. As a result of the resolution of the debt problem, Russia received sovereign ratings in 1996 and entered the Eurobond market. The external debt that Russia committed to service and pay back was a discipline
Introduction 7
device for economic policy making at home. The Russian financial system was dependent on external debt, but this circumstance deterred pro-inflationary political forces and compensated for the lack of political support to market reforms. In particular, the International Monetary Fund had some political influence on domestic financial policy and thereby contributed to the macroeconomic stabilization of 1995–96. This stabilization was a hard-won victory because inflation was reduced at the cost of creating a whole set of new macroeconomic and financial risks. The monetization of budget deficits that had been the policy of ‘choice’ was replaced by domestic debt issues which were ruble-denominated, short-term, and high-yield. This kind of stabilization was a compromise solution justified by the absence of any other scheme to combat inflation, by the lack of credibility of state policy, and by the chronic fiscal crisis. There was also some optimism that somehow growth would accelerate enough so that the debt dynamics would not worsen (a sufficiently optimistic scenario always exists to justify any policy ex ante). The growth in domestic debt, however, created additional refinancing risks and increased the threat of a budget crisis in the near term as a result of the high costs of debt service. In contrast to the external debt which was managed in cooperation with the international financial organizations, the domestic debt was under the full discretion of national authorities and was therefore a source of many risks. On the one hand, the opening up of the domestic debt market was a breakthrough in the organization of securities exchange in Russia. It contributed to the emergence and development of domestic financial markets on a modern basis. The Russian Ministry of Finance that took control of this process was the main generator of financial development during that period. On the other hand, an opportunity to cover budget deficits by borrowing in rubles had perverse effects on the incentives of policy makers. Domestic debt was viewed as an unlimited and easy source of funds for the state budget, and the problem of a sustained budget deficit seemed to be solved easily. This political myopia manifested itself sharply during the second presidential election campaign in 1996 when the domestic debt was used to finance additional largescale expenditures of the state budget. A comprehensive fiscal reform was delayed, although, in my view, it could hardly have been implemented during the 1990s. The obstacles to such reform were fundamental, and this was a deep-rooted problem which was also a consequence of the Soviet legacy. The government formally abolished subsidies to privatized production enterprises but continued to support them implicitly. As a result, the government
8
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
was heavily involved in the economy-wide non-payment crisis, and a significant part of the state’s financial flows relied increasingly on barter schemes and monetary surrogates. This was the most essential feature of the Russian fiscal crisis that the authorities could not deal with. The risks of domestic debt proliferation were aggravated after the opening of the domestic debt market for non-residents in 1996. This was a good idea in principle, but its realization essentially neglected the fragility of the domestic financial system. Financial liberalization prompted hot money inflows that made it urgent to improve risk management by the state. On the contrary, the ruble exchange rate regime and the scheme of hedging of non-residents’ ruble holdings introduced by the Russian Central Bank led to outrageous currency risk mismanagement. The extreme weakness of the Russian banking system was another fundamental factor of Russia’s financial fragility. Domestic financial markets could not eliminate or diversify away the excess financial risks. Though the Russian government entered the Eurobond market in 1996, it did not manage to rationalize its public debt structure. The authorities misused the new opportunities opened by financial liberalization and only aggravated all kinds of financial risks. The financial crisis of 1998 with its sharp ruble devaluation and the default on domestic debt was the culminating point of this reckless policy. A large part of this book is devoted to a description of the Russian financial crisis. I consider this to be a cornerstone event in recent Russian history which resulted from many previous mistakes and omissions and which has had a major impact on the subsequent economic and political development of the country. The genesis of this crisis is traced back to the previous Soviet debt default, and then through the period of market transformation in 1992–97. I pay special attention to the fundamental factors that the Russian authorities could have had very little impact on even if they had acted prudently in all circumstances. I also emphasize the key policy mistakes, first of all, the lack of risk management and debt management, and the failures of monetary policy.3 The Russian capitalist revolution began with the radical economic liberalization in January 1992 and was finished with the radical resolution of the financial crisis in August 1998. Was this attempt to build Russian capitalism in several years a failure? I think not. The Great French Revolution of 1789–94 was in my view not a failure, although it flooded France with blood and eventually brought Napoleon Bonaparte to power. Even more so, the Russian capitalist revolution was not a failure. Russia avoided a civil war and the blood that would be associated with
Introduction 9
it, as a possible scenario in the early 1990s. The government of reformers prevented famine and social cataclysms that were very well familiar to Russia in its previous history of the twentieth century. The economic transformations that were very hard to implement in Russia and that were indeed several times on the brink of failure, ultimately bore fruit. It turned out that after the crisis of 1998 Russian people were living in a country that was quite different to the one it had been a decade earlier. The market economy has been created, and as a result of this Russia experienced spectacular economic growth in the period 2000–08. Of course, it was driven by even more spectacular oil price growth, but even this type of quasi-exogenous economic growth would have been impossible in the command economy. This was the first occasion, after many decades of dominating economic absurdity, that market forces had been in action and benefited the majority of the population. Most important is that Russia today has a perspective of further development which the communist system did not have in principle. The civilized solution of the external debt problem in the 1990s stimulated the economic integration of Russia with the developed world. Many new developments occurred, including the creation of a legal basis for markets, the market economy infrastructure and institutions, the modern systems of learning for professional market participants. All of these building blocks of the modern market economy demonstrated the ability to work and develop after the crisis. It is worth noting that in the 1990s economic policy making was a much harder task than it is today. The problems that policy makers faced in the 1990s were, in my view, much more difficult than those to be encountered today, even despite the global crisis that is seriously affecting the Russian economy. If, for example, the oil price was $25 per barrel in the first half of 1998 instead of $10 per barrel, Russia could, most likely, have avoided default. If, on the contrary, the oil price had fallen in 2008 to $25 per barrel, it would be a catastrophe for the Russian economy and financial system despite tremendous financial reserves accumulated by the state in the current decade.4 Financial management in the low-oil-price regime required much greater effort, professionalism, smarts, and enthusiasm of policy makers than is required when oil prices are very high. The current generation of policy makers has been spoiled by such prices and firmly shielded from the bad surprises by the huge financial reserves of the state. I am not sure that under tougher circumstances this generation would be able to act as selflessly as our generation did.
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
The book attempts to make this experience comprehensible, being based on both a description of recent Russian history and some personal reminiscences about the transition to the market. Nevertheless, it is neither a historical book, nor a political memoir; rather, it is an attempt to provide an assessment of economic policy in hindsight. I have tried to make such an assessment both from the view of an insider – a policy maker involved in making macroeconomic policy – and from the view of an outside observer of the course of events. During the historical period described in this book I occupied both roles. I was an insider during the ‘breakthrough period’ of the capitalist revolution 1992–97 and became an outsider a year before the financial crisis of 1998. Needless to say, there is no shortage of studies of this crisis, so the question may be asked: why is another one needed? Many of these studies were completed just after the 1998 default and thus lack some historical perspective. Moreover, many of these studies are most focused on casting blame. This book, on the other hand, offers a more comprehensive picture with the advantage of perspective gained from the decade since the crisis. And rather than search for who to blame, this book focuses on the key aspect of debt management as the central theme to understanding the crisis. The grim decennial anniversary of 2008 provided another reason to write this book, as the deterioration of understanding of the real causes of Russian crisis demonstrated by both domestic and international public became apparent. The book is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides an account of external debt management in Russia in the 1990s which created a basis for integration into the world economy. Chapter 2 examines the interaction of the newly established financial markets and banking system, and also the link to the inflation-taming policy. Chapter 3 characterizes the specific concept of the virtual economy in the application to the problem of budget arrears and, more broadly, to the problem of the chronic fiscal crisis. Chapter 4 presents a road map to understand the development of public debt management in Russia. Chapter 5 contains a thorough account of the causes of the devastating Russian financial crisis of 1998. Next, Chapter 6 provides a description of how the crisis actually unfolded, and Chapter 7 explains how Russia recovered from the consequences of the crisis. Finally, Chapter 8 compares the situation and development in Russia during the current world crisis with the responses to the previous crisis.
1 The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s
Introduction Russian external debt has played a very important role in its recent history. At the beginning of the 1990s the Soviet Union found itself in a severe debt crisis that caused the bankruptcy of the state and the collapse of its planned economy. To a large extent the external debt crisis was caused by strategic mistakes made by the Soviet authorities over the course of the previous two decades. This crisis dictated the course of economic development of Russia in the 1990s and the current decade. The debt burden was unbearable for the country in deep distress, and a rescheduling of debt was inevitable as the only possible and civilized way to solve the problem. When the market reforms began in 1992, the external debt became the subject of comprehensive negotiations with western governments. The process was aimed, above all, at achieving support for market reforms in the new Russia. It was the first time in Russian history that top officials had negotiated with foreign partners about the key issues concerning development of the national economy. Negotiations on debt restructuring continued for several years and brought significant results in 1996. They allowed the Russian Federation to define its status as a legal successor of the Soviet Union. Russia remained a superpower, in particular, because it voluntarily assumed all of the obligations of the former USSR. As a byproduct of successful debt negotiations, Russia received sovereign credit ratings that opened the doors to the world of global finances. This chapter concerns the issues of external debt management of the 1990s that, in my view, provided a foundation for Russia’s integration with the world economy and for the creation of modern market institutions at home. The theme is of particular interest to me because of 11
12
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
my personal involvement in resolving the debt problems. During five years, in 1992–97, I participated in the negotiations with the Paris and London Clubs of creditors, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, regular G7 ministers’ meetings and so on. I was lucky to get acquainted with famous economists like Stanley Fischer, Lawrence Summers, Michel Camdessus, Robert Rubin and many others that were involved in the process. They sympathized with Russia and its reforms and put in a lot of effort to assist Russian authorities with building new market institutions. My contacts with such persons were very useful and provided a good opportunity of getting good advices and learning much about the ways of economic and financial policy making. As a key Russian policy maker in the 1990s, I was seeking to introduce a new style of work for the financial authorities based on the open economy ideology and giving a priority to market instruments. Negotiations about external debt were the first steps in the organization of public debt management and the creation of financial markets at home. Debt servicing was an effective discipline device for the fiscal and monetary authorities, for whom the IMF was an economic supervisor for several years. For various reasons discussed in subsequent chapters of this book, the economic performance of the past decade was controversial. But there is no doubt that the economic and financial system of modern Russia was created in those years on absolutely new principles.
1.1 The Soviet debt For many years the Soviet government had no foreign debt burden. All obligations of the Russian Empire to foreign countries were repudiated immediately following the socialist revolution of 1917.1 Subsequently, under the regime of ‘classical socialism’, there was no need for external borrowing. The Soviet economy was close to autarkic and, presumably, self-sufficient in terms of the development of its domestic resource base. Foreign trade and currency flows were insignificant and subject to centralized government control. The dominant feature of this economy was a permanent shortage with hidden inflation and budget deficits. For several decades, the Soviet authorities could use various direct and indirect channels to extract incomes and property from citizens for the needs of the state and had no need to secure external funds. The predecessors of Mikhail Gorbachev were not inclined to take international financial obligations that would imply any kind of dependence from foreign governments or international financial organizations.2
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 13
1.1.1 Petrodollars and the foreign debt For this reason, the USSR had virtually no foreign debts until the second half of the 1970s. Foreign trade was balanced since the government made import purchases in strict correspondence with concurrent export revenues. But the ‘mature socialism’ of the 1970s became a period of rapid growth in consumption, both public and private, not least in connection with the discovery of new colossal oil and gas fields in West Siberia in the 1960s. World oil prices were at high levels that allowed the planning authorities to import large amounts of equipment and consumer goods. The arms race and the inherent inefficiency of the planned economy placed obstacles in the way of the rapid increase in living standards for the mass of the population. But being obliged to fulfill at least some of the populist promises and slogans concerning the welfare of citizens (for example, an abstract ‘communism’ to be built by 1980 or a more concrete ‘separate apartment for every family’ after the same year), the authorities began to borrow abroad. They based on optimistic expectation of further oil price increase in the long term after a series of hikes in oil prices in the middle of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. As a result, the external debt increased more than 15 times, from $1.8 billion to $29 billion, in the 15 years from 1971 to 1985. At that time the Soviet Union was considered by foreign creditors to be a first-class borrower (corresponding to AAA sovereign credit ratings). This reputation was gained by the centralized control over export revenues and currency flows and the tradition of stern financial discipline maintained over many years. But the expectations of increasing oil prices proved wrong, as became obvious in the middle of the 1980s, after the dramatic fall in the world oil price, shown in Figure 1.1. The state revenue from raw materials exports also declined, but the economy remained technologically dependent on imported goods. Production decisions in the planned economy were based on fixed natural proportions that were typically irrelevant and non-responsive to changes in relative prices. The living standards of Soviet citizens did indeed improve in the 1970s, and their new consumer habits made it almost impossible to introduce drastic restrictions on consumption imports (the ‘mature socialism’ leaders were reluctant to reduce consumption levels). In addition, financial decisions under the planned economy were predetermined entirely by detailed natural plans adopted by the Central Planning Committee (Gosplan). The latter followed a bureaucratic routine of one-year planning that had nothing to do with sophisticated matters of intertemporal choice under uncertainty. A new convenient
14
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns 120
35
100
30 25
80
20
60
15
40
10
20
5
0
0
70
19
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
80
19
External debt, $ billion
19
82
84
19
19
86
19
88
90
19
92
19
US crude oil price, $/barrel
Figure 1.1 The Soviet external debt and the oil price, 1970–93 Sources: Russian Ministry of Finance, Energy Information Administration USA.
way of solving the problem of chronic shortages through external financial sources of imports was discovered, but the underlying risks were ignored completely. Thus, as a result of the rigidities of the planned economy, the desire of the population for higher living standards, and the myopia of financial decision makers, the Soviet Union chose to embark on large-scale borrowings, and the external public debt had reached about $32 billion by the mid-1980s. Western banks were eager to provide loans that were considered to be riskless, especially against expected cash flows of oil and natural gas export revenues. But the true external debt burden of the Soviet economy was unknown because of statistical data imperfections resulting from price distortions in the planned economy and the peculiarities of national accounting in the USSR. The indirect estimates of Soviet GDP were typically upward-biased, implying that the estimates of debtto-GDP ratio were downwards biased, as Boris Kheifetz (2002, p. 113) pointed out, although, admittedly, any estimates of Soviet GDP and the economy potential on the PPP basis could hardly be correct. In addition, both official and commercial lenders of the Soviet Union disregarded the underlying systemic and political risks and neglected the possibility of sovereign debt default. Actually, the centralized planned system could have collapsed as early as the end of the 1970s, if the new stocks of energy resources in West Siberia had not been discovered and utilized. This ‘manna from heaven’ gifted 15 years of life to the socialist system, while the generous external debt financing of the 1980s helped to continue its agony for several more years.
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 15
1.1.2 The debt addiction The tendency of debt accumulation changed as the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union was modified in the second half of the 1980s. At this time Mikhail Gorbachev was engaged in the policy of Perestroika – an attempt to modernize socialism that ultimately failed but led to a dramatic increase in budget expenses. For instance, the ‘economy acceleration’ programme, proposed by the Nikolai Ryzhkov government in 1986, was based on the idea of large-scale centralized investment in the machinery industries. Additional state funds were required to deal with the extraordinary consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986 and the Spitak earthquake in 1987. The resolution of numerous social and ethnic conflicts that emerged after 1987 also required considerable government expenditure. The anti-alcohol campaign launched in the same year undermined an important source of tax revenues since the official sales of alcohol were essentially reduced (and, as a result, the illegal production of surrogate alcohol increased sharply). The Soviet leaders could easily increase overseas borrowing, thanks to the sympathies of the western political leaders for Mikhail Gorbachev and the democratic tendencies in the USSR under his governance. But as it turned out, the political sympathies to Perestroika resulted in the doubling of the Soviet sovereign debt during in the five-year period 1986–90, from $31.4 to $62.5 billion (see Figure 1.1). These new borrowings were financed both by the governments and the private banks of developed countries. In our view, two fundamental factors were decisive in bringing about the expansion of the state’s uncontrolled external debt. First, the world oil price nearly halved in 1986–87, from US$25 to US$13 per barrel (Figure 1.1), and oil production in the USSR fell during the subsequent four years by 17.4 per cent, as seen in Table 1.1. At the same time the productivity of the existing oil fields was decreasing, while the opening of new fields became more costly. The fixed investment required for the creation of new oil capacities increased on average by 80 per cent over the period 1986–90, while total investment in oil industry grew by only 28 per cent in the same period (Gaidar 2006, p. 287). This led to a dramatic reduction in the level of exports and state budget revenues. In 1988 the total volume of Soviet exports reduced by 46 per cent as compared to the plan target level (Gaidar, 2006, p. 264). The export of oil halved in 1990–91, from 124 to 61 million tonnes. By the beginning of the 1990s the state’s falling oil revenues were spent
16
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
Table 1.1 Oil production by the USSR in 1988–91 (million tonnes) Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
Oil production % of change
624.3 0.0
607.2 ⫺2.7
570.0 ⫺6.1
515.8 ⫺9.5
Source: Gaidar (2006, p. 281).
primarily to service Russia’s external debt (Gaidar, 2006, p. 264). Despite the decline in the level of imports, the foreign trade deficit increased twice during the three years of Perestroika 1986–88, and tenfold during the 12-year period 1976–88. Second, the reduction of exports coincided with the awkward attempts to transform the system of centralized planning undertaken since 1987. The communist authorities tried to return to the semimarket reforms that were introduced in the 1960s but ended for ideological reasons in the 1970s. During that period (the ‘golden era’ of mature socialism) the Soviet economy did not face a problem of shortages that was as severe as it became in the middle of the 1980s. The time for experiments in the style of Yugoslavia or Hungary had been missed because of the macroeconomic imbalances accumulated during the two decades. An attempt to introduce some elements of the Chinese model into the Soviet economy was also unsuccessful: the majority of the population had been accustomed the paternalism of the state and did not have strong incentives to pursue individual activities. The key problem with making semi-market reforms was that the partial weakening of administrative control was in conflict with the partial freedom given to state enterprises in 1987. The price structure was subjected to extreme distortions because of state controls, and prices typically did not convey true information about the level of market demand.3 Another serious problem was the wrong managerial incentives of state enterprises. They benefited from the removal of administrative pressure and the newly emerged opportunities for choice by increasing, initially, the nominal wages of employees at the expense of the state in a financial irresponsible manner. As Anders Åslund (1995, p. 48) remarked, ‘The paramount problem was that wages rose more than twice as fast as they had previously. As a consequence, enterprise taxes declined and the budget deficit expanded’ (see Table 1.2). The managers of state-owned firms tried to ‘sit on two chairs’ by selling outputs and inventories at market prices while purchasing intermediates at fixed prices through channels of administrative supply.4 New cooperatives
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 17
Table 1.2 Nominal wage growth and consolidated state budget deficit in the USSR in the period of Perestroika, 1985–91 Year Nominal wage growth (%) Budget deficit (% of GDP)
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
⫺
2.9
3.7
8.3
9.4
14.2
70.0
1.8
5.7
6.4
9.2
8.6
4.1
21.6
Source: Åslund (1995, pp. 47–8).
that appeared as a result of the law adopted in 1988 typically served as a bridge between the planned system and the new market segments of the economy. State enterprises established affiliated cooperatives and could effectively exploit the deficiencies of both systems. This kind of behaviour was a typical product of Gorbachev’s partial reforms that gave rise to rapid inflation under total shortage that were mutually reinforcing. The velocity of money was increasing with shortages, while precautionary purchases of storable goods were spurred by accelerating inflation. Nominal wage increase was a consequence of the partial freedom granted to enterprises and was eventually financed by the state. It hence generated budget deficits, as Table 1.2 demonstrates, that resulted in the type of open and uncontrolled inflation which had previously been hidden by shortages of goods. In part, inflation was accelerated through the mediation of commercial banks that began to emerge in 1988 from branches of the state monopoly bank Gosbank or as new financial institutions. By the beginning of the 1990s the number of commercial banks had grown rapidly, as seen in Table 1.3, but without adequate professional learning to banking by bank managers and under very weak regulation.5 The authorities, nevertheless, believed that the new banking sector would become a locomotive of the market economy and desired to give it the ‘green light’. But the true goals and services of early commercial banks were very far from these optimistic hopes. Banks broke a distinction between cash and non-cash money that had been a cornerstone of monetary control in the command economy. Wages to workers were paid in cash (nalichnyye), while payments between enterprises were made in non-cash (beznalichnyye). This system allowed the monetary authority to balance, in principle, aggregate wage payments with aggregate consumer demand and, thus, to maintain control over consumer price inflation. But commercial banks had the opportunity to transform the non-cash accounts of enterprises into cash and, in fact, were established in many cases simply for this purpose. These
18
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
Table 1.3 The number of banks in the USSR in 1988–90 (end of period) Year The number of banks
1988
1989
1990
43
224
1357
Source: Gaidar (2006, p. 278).
operations were widespread and masked under credit supply to the real sector. As a result, the monetary authority began to lose control over cash in circulation that it had been able, more or less effectively, to exercise previously. Gosbank tried to avoid the monetary loosening generated by the new banking sector and to constrain its overly rapid expansion using administrative measures. But this contradicted the Soviet law on banking adopted in 1988 which was based on lax regulatory rules and, in particular, weak capital requirements. This law aimed to facilitate new entry in banking and, in my view, was too liberal for the economy that made only first steps in transition to the market. Under these circumstances the state could not prevent the partial loss of foreign currency control and allocation that occurred in the late 1980s. Before Gorbachev’s attempts to introduce market reforms, the export revenues of all Soviet enterprises were transferred to the government. It allocated foreign currency to industrial and trade ministries that purchased producer and consumer goods abroad. When new cooperatives and private commercial banks appeared in 1988, the currency regulation weakened considerably. But even this bounded financial independence of enterprises, commercial banks, and regional powers caused the destruction of centralized financial controls and a dramatic reduction in the level of export revenues that had during earlier periods accumulated at the centre. The loopholes in financial legislation provided banks with an opportunity to generate cash flows, resulting in the uncontrollable growth of fiat money in the economy. In this situation the permission of foreign currency circulation led to the emergency of the foreign currency ‘black holes’. As a result, by the end of 1991 the newborn foreign currency market of Russia was engulfed in a profound crisis. At the same time the geography of external borrowing by the state was widening noticeably beyond the traditional loans obtained from developed countries. The new official creditors were now represented by the oil-producing and new industrial economies such as Kuwait,
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 19
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and South Korea. A large amount of the new Soviet debt was also created through the help of the former socialist countries, including Comecon countries,6 Yugoslavia, and China. The latter case deserves attention. The original debts of the USSR to the Comecon countries amounted to $24 billion, roughly one-third of total Soviet foreign debt by the end of the 1980s. The emergence of these obligations provides a good illustration of the workings of some loopholes in the poorly managed system of currency controls. The new rules allowed joint enterprises to convert the ruble revenues from imports into the so-called ‘transferable rubles’. Initially, these rubles were used as pure accounting units in trade between the USSR and the Comecon countries and were not supposed to be a means of exchange. It is important to note that under the command economy these countries, typically, exchanged the lower-quality goods they produced for oil and gas imported from the USSR (they exported higher-quality goods to western countries in exchange for superior imports). Trade with the socialist economies of East Europe was of no benefit to the Soviet economy – it exchanged severely underpriced basic resources for overpriced manufacturing of inferior quality. This trade was, to a large extent, constructed for artificial political reasons and shrank by around 80 per cent after the introduction of foreign trade liberalization in 1991–92. But earlier, during Gorbachev’s reforms, imports from the Comecon countries were increasing because of highly profitable re-export to the USSR of trade items such as computers and office equipment.7 In addition, because of the weakened financial regulations, many trading firms applied schemes based on false import contracts with no delivery of goods used to withdraw cash from bank accounts. Under such circumstances the Soviet authorities made a mistake by giving the transferable rubles an artificial status of hard currency with a fixed one-to-one exchange rate with the dollar. The Soviet financial system thereby insured the currency and inflation risks of trading operations with the lower-quality trade partners of the Soviet Union. Adverse managerial incentives could be one of the factors behind such ‘generosity’ on the part of the state, although a more likely reason lay in the widespread incompetence of the financial decision makers in the planned economy. Obligations in transferable rubles were presented for payment after the Comecon fell apart8 and thus increased the sovereign debt of Russia. As a posterior expertise of the Comecon and other Soviet debts by the Russian Ministry of Finance revealed in 1992, its considerable part originated due to poorly designed experiments by the Soviet government in making semi-market reforms.9
20
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
Generally, by the end of the 1980s, the planned system in the Soviet Union had been de facto destroyed. It had moved from the inefficient but somewhat ordered and viable routines of short-term planning to the chaotic ‘spur of the moment’ style of decision making. The main task of the authorities became the urgent closing of numerous financial gaps. Commands were given to obtain any credits on any terms, and the issues of alternative costs were not discussed. 1.1.3 The first debt crisis onset The first difficulties in debt servicing were manifested in 1989 when domestic borrowers began suspending payments for import contracts. Although the government still continued to service external debt, trade credits were not repaid in time by Vneshekonombank that emerged from a department of Gosbank specialized in foreign payments operations related both to trade and the state debt management (this bank later received the status of a government agency for external debt management). The state was a recipient of all foreign credits, and the suspension of payments in trade was a negative signal, raising the issue of state credibility. The majority of foreign banks stopped providing loans to the Soviet government for both import purchases and foreign debt refinancing. The banks required additional official guarantees and suggested that they should resort to the governments of developed countries to make new borrowing (Gaidar 2006, p. 267). The latter conditioned the granting of new credits on domestic and foreign policy issues, including the need for radical market reforms in the USSR and concessions in disarmament and Soviet control over East Europe. These strategic issues became a subject of debt negotiations with the foreign governments that took the role of ‘creditors of last resort’ for the bankrupting Soviet Empire. The Soviet authorities were neither prepared to begin the radical market reforms, nor had they any consistent strategy to solve the urgent problems of foreign payments. They recognized the seriousness of the problem, but this circumstance aggravated the situation in relation to external debt. In July 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev hinted publicly about the need to restructure the state’s external debts, and this was perceived by creditors and financial markets as an additional negative signal (Gaidar 2006, p. 268). Taking into account the long tradition of deep secrecy in Soviet policy making, an official recognition of severe problems with foreign debt was seen as clear evidence of very big troubles. The fundamental cause of the foreign debt crisis that began in 1990 was the chronic economic crisis of the centralized planned economy.
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 21
Although it was hidden under official statistics, it clearly manifested from the middle of the 1980s through strengthening shortages and rising black market prices. The bust occurred in 1990, when the Soviet GDP declined by 4 per cent. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the last quarter of 1991, the chronic economic crisis was transformed into a full-scale economic disaster. The fall in industrial production in 1991 was catastrophic – 21 per cent, with GDP falling by 11 per cent. The ruble inflation was accelerating: nominal household incomes increased in that year by 300 per cent, although the CPI growth rate was ‘only’ 160 per cent since retail prices were still under state control. The money overhang ran alongside the debt overhang. In two preceding years, 1990–91, the volume of external debt increased by 26 per cent – by $8.6 billion in 1990 and $12.4 billion in 1991. To a large extent, the total financial collapse was a byproduct of the total collapse of the state. In this situation the external debt default was inevitable, as a result of the balance of payments crisis and the huge state budget deficit. A large fraction of budget incomes had to be spent on debt servicing and high interest payments (under annual interest rates of 8 per cent on average). The complete fulfillment of debt obligations would require $15–17 billion per year or roughly 40–50 per cent of expected budget incomes. But the latter continued to be squeezed because of the disorganization in finance, and the economy approached a situation of debt overhang. The main trouble for the monetary authorities was the loss of control over export revenue flows and the absence of a legal foreign currency market. The Soviet government had no other choice but to continue external borrowing at an increasing pace. But now the main task was not to solve numerous current problems in the governance of the centralized economy, but rather to evade the total economic and financial collapse. The situation became extremely dangerous because of the threat of social unrest in many cities. The market economy mechanisms were only emerging (the ‘invisible hand’ was either absent or too weak as yet to fulfill its work), while the administrative system of consumer goods production and allocation had been destroyed completely. The delivery of food was a supreme policy issue: the threat of famine became real during that period, especially in the larger cities. Russian history had provided an important lesson: the abovementioned revolution of 1917 was triggered initially by short interruptions of food delivery to Petrograd, at that time the capital of Russia. Similarly, at the beginning of the 1990s the opportunity to borrow abroad became, essentially, a matter of national survival. With the free access to foreign markets
22
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
for goods that Russia was enjoying by that time, the crucial issue was fundraising to make the necessary purchases of foodstuffs. Under many credit agreements signed in the crisis period of 1990–91, direct deliveries of goods were carried out, of which about 80 per cent was grain. Naturally, creditors who did not receive current payments refused to carry out their obligations with regard to the supply of goods. Since the problem of foodstuffs was perceived at that moment as being highly urgent, obligations to the USA, the main supplier of grain and cheap food,10 were met in full. According to the USA’s Jones’s Act,11 the delivery of goods by credit line to another country had to be suspended if interest payments were not made in a timely fashion. Such a priority of payments that the Russian government adhered to left practically nothing for its official creditors in Western Europe, principally Germany. The latter held 45 per cent of Russian debt under the Paris Club agreement,12 but had strong political motivations – the unification of the state and the withdrawal of Soviet troops – for making generous concessions in negotiations around Soviet debts to German government, firms and banks. Commercial credits to the Soviet government were linked to contracted imports and financed by the first-class banks abroad due to the guarantees provided by the Soviet government. For instance, in 1991 65 per cent of such loans provided by German banks and 80 per cent of those by English banks were guaranteed by the German and UK governments, respectively (Kheifetz 2002, p. 139). The Soviet government also provided guarantees to foreign banks supplying non-commercial loans that supposedly had to cover the balance of payments deficits. Unlike commercial loans, these were not monitored by the foreign banks and remained under the discretion of the Soviet authorities. In fact, many of these credits were misused and disappeared in the period of the Soviet Union disintegration, 1990–91. Note that commercial credits to the USSR allowed many western firms to make some large-scale clearances of excessive inventories. Quality controls on behalf of the Soviet customs service were practically absent. Not surprisingly, a large fraction of imported goods were of low quality and overpriced. Foreign producers used exclusive opportunities to make extra profits without essential risks. Trading firms engaged in this kind of business made widespread use of opportunities to make extremely profitable arbitrage on price gaps. As was mentioned previously, the domestic prices of tradable goods in the Soviet economy were many times below the world level. In addition to all these opportunities for a ‘free lunch’ a large number of fraudulent deals were contracted under provisions that gave the
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 23
right to counterparties of the Soviet Ministry of Finance to conduct accounting. The former abused their opportunities to artificially build up financial claims that were presented later to the Russian government. One of the best-known examples of such dubious business is the notorious ‘Noga case’ originated in 1990 and whose repercussions still reverberate in Russia (Box 1.1). This case became a symbol of disorder in commercial and financial relations between the Soviet/Russian authorities and international business at a period of dramatic political and economic transformations.13
BOX 1.1 The ‘Noga Saga’ The Swiss firm Noga (Noga d’Importation et d’Exportation SA) headed by Nessim Gaon was engaged in international trade and financial operations. At the beginning of the market reforms in Russia Gaon tried to establish a long-term partnership between the new Russian government that came to power in 1990 and the Swiss banks. Gaon organized a syndicated credit line worth $420 million to finance the subsidizing of Russian agriculture programme Urojai-90 (Harvest-90) and also imports of foods, electronics, construction materials, chemicals, and so on, in exchange for oil products. This deal was essentially a non-transparent barter scheme relying on non-market relative prices. As was typical for such contracts, imported goods to Russia were overpriced, while oil products exported by Russia were severely underpriced. The expected profit rates of trading firms for such deals were normally hundreds of per cent per annum in dollar terms. Although Russia delivered its oil products in advance, imports by Noga were in many cases delayed or not delivered at all. For this reason the Russian government decided to reject the continuation of the deal. This was in the Summer of 1992 when many similar barter agreements inherited from the USSR were cancelled or renegotiated on a market basis. Importantly, from the middle of 1992 the Russian government began to apply the market exchange rate of the ruble in all export and import operations implying the need for the renegotiation of barter contracts. However, the specific problem with Noga lay not only in the very vague contractual terms, but also in the absence of any interbank agreement (Vneshekonombank did not participate initially in this deal as a financial intermediary). The Russian government thus assumed the full financial responsibility for the deal, implying a possible loss of sovereign immunity.
24
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
I had to cope with the Noga deal in my work in the Russian Ministry of Finance. Nessim Gaon claimed $800 million as compensation for the lost opportunities. Such a large amount of Russia’s engagement with one small firm aroused my suspicion and I decided to check the Noga claims carefully. Since bank documentation was not available for us, an international audit company was hired by the Ministry of Finance to check the legal validity of these claims. As independent auditing confirmed, Russia did not have debts to Noga because it delivered oil products in advance of contracted imports, and by the beginning of 1993 Noga was actually a net debtor of the Russian government. In 1994 Noga applied to the Stockholm arbitrage which recognized only $23 million of its claims. Meanwhile Russia revealed counter-claims to Noga worth $30 million that were also verified by the international trial. As a result, by the beginning of 1997 Noga and the Russian Ministry of Finance were close to settlement and mutual debts offset. But just at this moment I resigned the Ministry of Finance office. Unfortunately, my successors could not complete this deal at the very final stage because of the lack of experience and incentives. They were merely engaged in the domestic policy issues such as the division of national property among the oligarchs (to be discussed below in Chapter 3). If the Russian authorities had completed the Noga deal in a timely fashion, it would not have had serious consequences. For three years Gaon did not protest the arbitrage decisions because the Russian counter-claims were well-founded. But in 2000, as it became clear that Russia had suspended its actions indefinitely, Gaon renewed his legal proceedings. This time Noga gained for the simple reason that no Russian official found time to defend Russia’s interests in the international trial. To enforce the Russian government to pay, overseas Russian assets were seized on several occasions, as, for instance, the sailing research ship Sedov in Brest, France in 2000, and the foreign bank accounts of 70 Russian organizations. Similarly, in order to evade the arrest, Russian military aircraft had to leave France 2001. A collection of 54 Russian paintings from the Pushkin Museum, Moscow being exhibited in Switzerland in 2005 were also seized and later returned to Russia after the great scandal. Noga even threatened to arrest the Russian president’s airplane. In 2006 the debts of Noga to the western banks were purchased by an intermediary, but in 2008 Noga began to make new financial claims against the Russian government. It appears likely that the Noga Saga will go on!
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 25
Meanwhile the official financial reserves were dwindling. Foreign currency reserves fell from $15.3 billion in 1988 to $7.6 billion at the beginning of 1991. The state sold the official stock of gold: $2.7 billion in 1990 and $3.8 billion in 1991. Ultimately, this stock dwindled away to nearly nothing: in January 2002 only 200 tonnes remained. The date of the first debt default in the history of new Russia is 19 November 1991, when Vneshekonombank ceased its payments without any official announcement. The obligations of this bank were transformed later into the sovereign debt of Russia which grew by $4 billion (corresponding to unpaid trade contracts) and by nearly $8 billion (corresponding to blocked accounts). The status of Vneshekonombank as a government agency (similar to the status of Fanny Mac and Freddie Mae in the USA) guaranteed, formally, sovereign immunity. Nevertheless, the ending of payments to commercial creditors of the state was, de facto, the state default. To protect the Soviet foreign assets inherited by Russia from the claims of foreign creditors, a state-owned Vneshtorgbank was established as a bridge-bank with no debts. In addition to recognition of the Soviet debts, Vneshekonombank issued special instruments, quasiEurobonds, in the period 1988–90 worth about $3 billion that were not traded in the open market. Foreign currency long-term bonds of a nominal amount of about $13 billion were issued by Vneshekonombank in 1993 and 1996 to securitize its obligations. These bonds (OVGVZ) fell into the category of domestic debt papers since the major part of initial creditors were domestic firms and organizations.
1.2 The Russian debt: beginning of management By the end of 1991 the USSR had thus become bankrupt and disappeared as a political entity. The Russian Federation, its successor, automatically found itself in a state of external debt default. In a literal sense the defaulted Soviet debt turned out to be an ‘original sin’ of the newly born state. The ‘expiation’ of this sin became an urgent problem of the Russian Ministry of Finance after the beginning of radical market reforms in January 1992. At this time the volume of Soviet foreign debt amounted to $85 billion. Its rapid growth at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s resulted from the crisis of the planned economy and a series of chaotic and wrong decisions adopted to postpone the economic collapse and prevent the bankruptcy of the state. These decisions were essentially ineffective and served only to aggravate the problem of excess debt burden in the economy. The Soviet external debt inherited
26
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
by New Russia consisted, first, of $38.5 billion owed by the USSR to the Paris Club of official creditors, second, of $22.5 billion debt to foreign commercial banks – members of the London Club of private creditors, and, third, of about $24 billion recognized as debts to the former Comecon and other socialist countries. Because of the chaotic borrowing decisions taken during the late Soviet period, the proportion of short-term debt with a maturity of two years or less in the overall volume of debt was quite high – nearly 20 per cent. The fulfillment of the initial payment schedule had to be carried out in the first half of the 1990s, but this was above the country’s financial capabilities. For instance, foreign debt service and interest payments during the three-year period 1992–94 were $18 billion per annum on average, according to the initial schedule. This was twice as high as the actual external debt service in the second half of the 1980s which had been $8.5 billion per annum on average. 1.2.1 Strategic choices Such an extra debt burden would be unbearable for any economy in deep economic and political distress. During that period a fall in Russian export revenue continued, undermining the state budget. It was clear that in the economic situation in which New Russia found itself the accumulated external debt obligations could not be repaid. Strategic decisions on this subject had to be adopted by the new Russian government, and the alternatives for making the strategic choice were fairly clear. (A) Russia takes full or partial responsibility. The original accord between the former Soviet republics – the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries – provided for joint responsibility for foreign debts and the proportionate distribution of foreign assets. The shares of republics in debt-assets were supposed to be corresponding to their fractions in foreign trade, output and population size. The share of the Russian Federation, calculated as 61.3 per cent, was fixed in the initial agreement on debt recognition and servicing, proposed by the finance ministers of G7 and signed on 4 December 1991 in Moscow. But this agreement turned out to be ineffective from the very beginning. Despite joint responsibility for Soviet debts recognized formally by all participants, only the Russian Federation agreed to make payments. The reason was that the principle of joint responsibility meant that if one side rejected to pay, others took its obligation. All the CIS countries but Russia preferred to be free-riders and the latter had to take the role of a sole legal successor of the USSR with respect to all debts and assets. Of course, these countries did not decline to take responsibility for debt
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 27
service directly. Instead, their representatives simply demonstrated their unwillingness to take any debt obligations in the process of multilateral negotiations on the Soviet debt with the Paris and London clubs. In fact, the former Soviet republics were reluctant to deal with these Clubs, as soon as the issue of debt payments was touched on in negotiations. For example, I remember Boris Sobolev, then deputy finance minister of Ukraine, who was very enthusiastic in expressing his opinion in general discussions of sharing responsibility for the Soviet debt among all CIS countries. Yet usually he disappeared or at best pretended not to be concerned with the issue each time it came to the necessity for Ukraine to repay its debts. In addition, it would be hard to implement any joint responsibility agreement. It was absolutely unclear how to divide between the republics’ debts owed to different countries and of different terms, priorities and other quality characteristics. The question of the benefits and costs of transferring the Soviet Union’s debts and assets to Russia virtually did not arise at that time (although it was actively debated later in political and economic circles). It is important to note that Russia accepted full responsibility for debts on its own, with no hard pressure by creditors and G7 governments. As a result, it became the only counterparty of the creditors: from April 1993 it established a bilateral framework for negotiations with the Paris Club. Obviously, the exclusion of other former Soviet republics from negotiations greatly simplified the process of searching for a mutually beneficial and comprehensive agreement on Soviet debts. (B) Russia claims forgiveness of debt or takes tough commitments. Another dilemma was to restructure the whole debt or to try to agree with creditors about partial forgiveness. The Russian government chose the first strategy, although the experience of forgiveness of Polish foreign debts (touched on in what follows) could justify the second strategy. However, most of the Russian reformers were optimistic about the expected effects of shock therapy in Russia. They believed that comprehensive economic liberalization and tight monetary policy would bear fruit within a year or two. The subsequent beginning of sustainable levels of growth would provide an automatic reduction of the debt burden. Unfortunately, this scenario did not materialize, mostly because of the anti-reformist political pressure in Russia and the specificity of the inherited economic structure.14 The true burden of the external debt on the Russian economy was undervalued by the reformers. They did not anticipate that the market transformations would be so painful and the contraction of the economy would be so deep and long. Nevertheless, if the strategy of
28
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
writing-off debts was chosen, other CIS countries would require the renegotiation on shares in Soviet foreign assets. If Russia’s debt burden was relaxed, its sovereign rights on foreign assets should be reduced correspondingly, but the criteria of such correspondence were vague. The choice of debt forgiveness would also imply a very different framework for negotiations of Russia with G7 governments, international financial organizations, and creditors’ clubs. The partial forgiveness of debts would leave less chance of improving sovereign credit ratings and obtaining access to the world’s capital markets. Russia would face more obstacles in the new borrowing in the 1990s. As turned out several years later, the access to foreign liquidity turned out to be important in the macroeconomic situation of the 1990s. There were also global policy issues that motivated the decision to repay all debts: the status of Russia as a successor of the USSR and a potential superpower, the perspective of membership in the G8, the relations with other international institutions, and some others. It is notable that the very fact that the external debt problem emerged as the Russian Federation appeared as a new sovereign entity suggests an interesting analogy with the early history of the USA (Box 1.2). In 1992 Russia’s post-Soviet political system was not as much influenced by its strategic choice on debt, but Russia’s international status and internal economic policy certainly were.
BOX 1.2 The US Debt and Alexander Hamilton Following the Revolutionary War of 1775–82 the debt burden was unsustainable for the North American states. The new Constitution adopted in 1787 shifted power to the federal government which assumed the debt obligations of states in exchange for the right to collect taxes (import duties and alcohol excises), introduced the ‘hard’ bimetallic dollar in species, and rejected from the possibility of inflating or defaulting on the debt. By taking these measures the federal government committed to debt funding through current and future taxes. This firm solution of the debt problem not only improved the credibility of government obligations and stabilized domestic prices, but also shaped the political system of the newborn United States. It was a tribute to the efforts of Alexander Hamilton. He was a brilliant person. At the age of 21, he had been a captain in the Revolutionary War and became an aide of George Washington.
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 29
After the war Hamilton made a political career as a prominent advocate of the federalist Constitution. During his tenure as treasury secretary in the first government of the United States in 1790–95 Hamilton completely reorganized American finances and established new institutions to facilitate pro-competitive financial, trade, and industrial policies. This activity contributed to the sustainable and impressive growth of the US economy that began in the 1790s. The key task solved by Hamilton as a treasury secretary was the reduction of the public debt burden through well-organized debt management. The first federal government inherited huge public debt amounted to $75 million – or roughly 32 per cent of aggregate output in 1790. Financial resources were not enough to service this debt in full, partly because the US economy of the post-war 1780s suffered from a stagnation of trade and a dearth of liquidity. Hamilton, nevertheless, insisted on paying off all of the wartime obligations – some $11.7 million – to European creditors, mainly through new borrowing abroad. A strong commitment to disciplined foreign debt service attracted new foreign loans (to a large extent from Holland) that fuelled private and public investment growth at home and even made it possible to fund the purchase of Louisiana in 1804 (Wright 2008, p. 131). But the domestic debt remained in sheer disarray: it consisted of various kinds of Revolutionary War certificates issued by the Continental Congress worth $40.4 million and also of states’ obligations to a total of $25 million. The markets for these instruments were thin, desultory, non-transparent, and of low liquidity. The new federal government issued new bonds of higher quality and liquidity, but at notably lower interest rates which were to be exchanged on the market basis for the old ones. This debt swap was very successful: it reduced domestic debt service, benefited debt-holders because of improved debt servicing, and encouraged the development of home markets for government and corporate securities, foreign exchange, commercial papers, and private insurance. Hamilton was a master of the art of political compromise. He suggested to his political opponents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (both from Virginia) that the American capital should be moved to the Potomac in exchange for their support in the Congress for his programme of redeeming the public debt in full. Jefferson and Madison insisted initially on the redemption at face value only
30
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
for the initial holders of war certificates, that is, the soldiers of the Revolutionary War, and not to pay in full to other debt-holders who could buy their certificates very cheaply. Hamilton, however, cared about the federal state’s reputation as a reliable borrower. This political deal established the federal financial system and ensured that Hamilton’s other plans would be approved by the Congress. To implement the state’s financial policy Hamilton also founded the National Bank of the United States with the federal state’s stake 20 per cent and the Sinking Fund. These institutions became prototypes of the modern central banks and debt management agencies. They supported trade in debt instruments through open market operations, smoothed the tax revenues of the federal government, and provided liquidity to the financial system. The National Bank became a lender of last resort when prevented the propagation of financial crisis after the stock market crash and the liquidity shocks of early 1792 (Wright 2008, p. 157). The Sinking Fund used excess tax incomes to support the domestic debt market, thus making it cheaper to carry out new borrowing abroad. The sound and systemic financial policy favoured the US economic growth and led to a substantial reduction of the public debt burden from 32 per cent of GDP in 1790 to 15 per cent in 1800, and 6 per cent in 1810. Alexander Hamilton’s political career ended tragically in July 1804. He was killed in a duel with vice-president Aaron Burr, demagogue, populist, and scandal-monger. Hamilton had deliberately fired his shot away from Burr, following his moral and religious principles (as clear from his last letter written the night before the duel). As an architect of public finances in the United States, Hamilton formulated the basic principles of public debt management, including, for instance, the distinction between funded and unfunded debt: ‘The proper funding of the present debt will render it a national blessing. … The creation of debt should always be accompanied with the means of extinguishment’ (Wright 2008, p. 134). He believed that there existed a tipping point beyond which the expansion of national debt would be economically and politically deleterious: ‘Where this critical point is cannot be pronounced; but it is impossible to believe that there is not such a point’ (Wright, 2008, p. 142).
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 31
The Russian Federation had to take full responsibility for the Soviet debt as a condition of maintaining its geopolitical status. Another issue was building a good reputation as a sovereign borrower as a precondition for the creation by the state of sound guarantees of property rights for foreign investors. A good attitude of foreign investors to Russia was, in turn, viewed as a prerequisite for the successful transition to the market and sustainable economic growth. The new Russian government wanted to distance itself from any kind of the Bolsheviks’ solution of the sovereign debt problem that had occurred seventy years before.15 But this choice was in a sense paradoxical because, from a purely economic point of view, market transition would require new borrowing at the very beginning to make it easier to overcome an inevitable economic decline. For many reasons the market reforms in Russia turned out to have devastating effects on the economy which fell almost by half during the 1990s. The main factor behind this catastrophic fall of production was the extremely distorted Russian economy structure (discussed further in Chapter 3), the absence of market institutions, the lack of market economy knowledge and habits among the Russian population, the socio-political tensions and instability, and the local civil conflicts of the 1990s. The key external factor that was also unfavourable for Russia was the fall in the oil price during this decade, below the initial expectations based on a long-term trend. In hindsight, Russia should have borrowed more as it began its transition to market, but, in my view, it would hardly have been possible to use additional external funds in an efficient manner. Optimal borrowing by a state should always be constrained by the ability of state officials to make competent and efficient decisions. This issue was – and still is – the key limiting factor for the creative activity of the Russian government. 1.2.2 Negotiations… The USSR did not have relations with the Paris and London Clubs of creditors, and neither did it carry on talks with the G7 members about the insolvency problems. Soviet borrowings were based on bilateral agreements until the external debt default and the country collapse happened in 1991. From 1992 these Clubs, the G7 ministers of finance and central bankers, and the international financial organizations became the main counterparties of the Russian government in its external economic relations. The procedure of multilateral talks was initiated by the Russian authorities who were seeking to find a compromise solution but lacked significant experience in these kinds of negotiations. The difficulty was not only in the total volume of debt that Russia
32
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
had inherited, but in a huge number (many thousands) of specific and knotted accounting problems requiring thorough expertise. But the key and most urgent problem in 1992–93 was insolvency: Russia was unable to make even interest payments on the main part of Soviet debts, because the average interest rate 7–8 per cent per annum was too high for the state budget. The principal debt could be restructured according to the standard rules, but the rescheduling of interest payments required special agreements based on regular meetings with their creditors. For this reason every three months, the delegation of the Russian Federation held talks with the Paris Club members in Paris. It attempted to explain the essential meaning of cardinal transformations taking place in Russia and to demonstrate its insolvency and the actual needs in additional external funds. In the hope that the debt crisis would be resolved in the future, the creditors announced at every meeting that they granted the Russian Federation another three-month respite, while the Russian Federation pledged to do all it could to repay the debt most fully and correctly. Political support of this process was reached on G7 annual meetings. Then the Russian programme of economic reforms and debt restructuring received approval from the IMF and quarterly negotiations with the Paris and London Clubs took place. This was not only a formal routine: the Russian delegation had to demonstrate that the government would have really been able to obtain opportunities to repay debts in the future. We had to present a programme of economic reforms to be realized. Admittedly, during this period Russia made significant advances in reforming the economy in a number of directions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was the main arbiter and provided expertise on the programmes. The G7 also adopted the package of financial aid for every year. In my view, these relationships with international institutions were fruitful and mutually beneficial. Developed countries requirements on the pace of liberal reforms coincided with our own view on strategy of reforming the economy. Negotiations with the London Club of creditors headed by Deutsche Bank usually took place in Frankfurt. In discussing the terms of restructuring debts to this Club, questions arose in relation to the legal responsibility of the debtor. Creditors insisted that the debts be recognized as sovereign obligations of the Russian Federation, which would equate them to Eurobonds, and Russia, quite reasonably, refused to comply. Following nearly two years of negotiations, a legal solution was finally found – the Russian Federation did not sacrifice
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 33
its immunity. Incidentally, after the 1998 financial crisis (discussed in what follows), this status provided legal grounds to interpret the suspension of payments on the London Club debt as a decision made by Vneshekonombank, rather than the Russian Federation. Before the reaching of the comprehensive agreement, payments were made more or less evenly to all official and commercial creditors with the exception of the previously mentioned preferential foodstuff credits received from the USA. The debt to the Paris Club also had a certain priority relative to the London Club obligations for the simple reason that the former represented official creditors and negotiations with its members had occurred at an earlier stage. A certain political pressure exerted by these members also had some effect, resulting in the division of annual payments between the Paris and London Clubs as 2:1 in favour of the former, albeit the basic proportion of debt obligations was roughly 5:4. Admittedly, the process of debt servicing by Russia was not chaotic during this period. For example, decisions on which external debts should be repaid were adopted regularly by the Ministry of Finance. Each month I summoned to my office Yuri Poletayev, the head of Vneshtorgbank, who brought a draft of the current debt service schedule. Since he shared a typical banker’s opinion that every debtor should be treated equally, payments in his version of the schedule were rationed evenly among countries-creditors. Priorities among these countries were unimportant for him, and on each occasion I had to select a priority among countries myself by taking into account, for example, the abovementioned Jones’s Act. In a way, the Russian Ministry of Finance, as a key economic decision maker, replaced the Soviet Gosplan, and I bore responsibility for issues such as foodstuff imports from the USA to Russia. Some issues discussed at the regular Paris Club meetings were very controversial and required a search for compromise. The Paris Club turned out to be involved in setting complex issues of mutual debts recognition between Russia and the former Comecon members and other allies of the USSR (Box 1.3). Another difficult problem was that the exchange rate of the transferable ruble was set at the non-market value. Nobody could suggest any definite and satisfactory solution to the problem of the Soviet ruble exchange rate determination from the retrospective of several decades. The essence of a compromise was that Russia gained in terms of a higher valuation of its foreign credits to the former allies, but lost due to a higher value of debt owed to the former Comecon countries (worth $24 billion). As a result, the net financial position of the Russian Federation improved, but the actual debt burden increased by several billion dollars.
34
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
BOX 1.3 The Problem of Mutual Debts Evaluation The Soviet Union exported food, equipment, chemicals, raw materials, and defence technology worth many billions of dollars to allied countries. In many cases these exports were politically motivated and accepted by the ruling regimes in these countries as a form of friendly support, a kind of gift for their loyalty to Moscow. But there was no formal recognition by the Soviet Union that these exports were really gifts to the loyal regimes. The problem was that such trade relations were based primarily on informal personal promises underlying contracts worth hundreds of million of dollars. Typically, barter exchange between the USSR and the allies was not confirmed through formal trade and credit agreements, and even lacked any proper legal and bank documentation. In some cases the only documents confirming multi-million bilateral deals were protocols of bilateral negotiations and written orders by the chairman of a Council of Ministers or a foreign trade minister. These orders were of the highest command power in the planned economy, but lacked sufficient legal power to constitute any formal recognition of debt obligations to the Soviet Union following its collapse. Not surprisingly, some countries-debtors were reluctant to recognize the existence of sovereign debt in respect of any such trade. The Eastern European countries also had debts for physical assets such as oil and gas transportation infrastructure built by the Soviet Union in these countries. In contrast to many kinds of barter imports from the Comecon countries, these assets were really valuable and, more importantly, durable. Oil and gas pipelines are still in use, being the backbone of the energy infrastructure of the entire region. Yet the former Comecon countries tried to use the lack of legal implementation in bilateral contracts to renege on their debt repayment or even debt acknowledgement to Russia as a legal successor of the Soviet Union. They actively questioned the fidelity of credit arrangements and have managed to make their doubts clear to the Paris Club. The key problem for the Paris Club negotiations that occurred in the 1990s in relation to these mutual debts was that the Soviet investments were made in barter exchange at non-market prices. Typically, physical assets built by the USSR were priced in Soviet rubles and were strongly undervalued in dollar terms. On the other
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 35
hand, the use of the transferable ruble fixed at a one-to-one rate to the dollar led to a strong overvaluation of imports to the USSR. All of its former trading partners benefited from making claims to Russia for their imports according to the nominal contract terms, except for Germany. Germany wrote off the major part of the former East Germany’s claims as a gesture of goodwill for the reunification. But Poland, Hungary, and several other countries, however, stood firm on the debt issue and discussed any variants of rescheduling only reluctantly. Russia, in turn, claimed recognition of the former USSR allies’ debts at least on the basis of the book value of physical investments (although this was far below any fair valuation). It was still very difficult to present these claims because even when credit agreements existed, they were created by Vneshekonombank afterwards. It had fulfilled thorough work to restore and put order in debt claims by Russia on the basis of available contracting documents of the Soviet government. One matter of controversy was the difference in methodology of accounting that implied huge differences in debt assessments by Russia and the Paris Club members. The evaluation of foreign debts to Russia varied much more than the estimates of the Russian debts that were better documented and, hence, much easier for posterior assessment. At the end of 1991 the Russian Ministry of Finance estimated the total nominal value of inherited sovereign debts to the USSR at $145.2 billion. The IMF/Paris Club’s estimate was only around half this figure, $73.4 billion, since it was based on the downward-biased assessments of countries-debtors.
Another source of controversy was to be found in the indefinite status of short-term commercial loans that remained for a while on the balance sheets of the former Soviet enterprises and banks. The claimants had changed in many cases, and the volume of accumulated debts and penalties on interest and principal payments were questionable. Western banks insisted on the recognition of all Soviet commercial loans as official Russian debt, and the estimates of this debt varied between $4 and $12 billion. The controversy lay in the accounting methods that were applied by the Ministry of Finance and the foreign creditors. The issue of commercial loans determination remained unresolved until the restructuring and securitization of London Club debts in 2001.
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
1.2.3 … and their results (A) External debt was rescheduled. As a result of negotiations the Russian Federation, as the legal successor to the Soviet Union, had to pay only $1.7 billion in 1992 and $2.5 billion in 1993, or 13.5 per cent of its initial debt payment obligations. Russia thus received breathing space for several years during its transition to a market economy. Afterwards, the annual debt payments were increasing, but not as rapidly as was prescribed under the initial schedule. On average, the amount of annual external debt payments did not exceed 25 per cent of the initial schedule in 1992–99. The residual debt burden was thereby shifted to the next decade, and the authorities received carte blanche to stabilize the economy and introduce their market reforms. Table 1.4 demonstrates the dynamics of inherited Soviet debt, new Russian debt, and the total external debt service costs in the 1990s. The external debt burden was in fact not so hard: it did not exceed 0.7 per cent of GDP on average until the financial crisis of 1998. Clearly the easing of the debt burden was a very important precondition for the Russian economy’s transition to a market economy, and this issue was one of the key points in our negotiations. Initially only current payments were rescheduled on an annual basis. In parallel to these more or less routine procedures, the preparation of a comprehensive agreement with the Paris Club members was proceeding through lengthy bilateral negotiations with governments-members. The agreement in relation to the Paris Club debt restructuring was signed in April 1996 and covered 82 per cent of total external government debt, amounting by that time to around $38 billion. It concerned the debt service falling due between January 1996 and March 1999 and embraced virtually all the debts rescheduled in the previous agreements. The average period to maturity of restructured debt obligations was in excess of 20 years. Another comprehensive agreement with the London
Table 1.4 Russian external debt ($ billion, end of period) Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
The USSR debt 104.9 The Russian debt 2.8 Debt service costs, 0.7 % of GDP
103.7 8.6 0.3
108.6 11.3 0.5
103.0 17.4 0.9
100.8 27.7 0.9
97.8 35.6 0.7
95.0 53.9 1.2
Source: Russian Ministry of Finance.
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 37
Club of banks on a 23-year debt repayment of $33 billion was signed in December 1997. The principal debt of $22 billion was restructured as debt instruments called PRINs, while the unpaid interest capitalized had to be discharged through the issuing of another instrument, called IANs. As a result of these agreements, Russia obtained a five-year grace period, and, most importantly, the period for the major payments of Soviet debt were shifted to the next decade. (B) Important channels of external financing were created. Subsequently, operations with Soviet debt were limited to a series of successive restructuring measures. But the need for external financial resources remained, and Russia had to continue borrowing (Table 1.5). Initially, two kinds of loans were used: first, those from international financial organizations – the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; second, official credits on bilateral basis to finance imports of foodstuffs and equipment. However, as early as 1993 Russia had virtually stopped buying foodstuffs through the use of these credits; the annual volume of machinery and equipment purchases financed with such loans fell to $0.5–1 billion. In connection with this, the government external debt policy focused solely on the loans from the IMF and the World Bank. (C) Russia achieved the status of a creditor nation. As a result of the recognition and evaluation of the Soviet credits to former allies and other countries, the Paris Club recognized Russia as a creditor nation. This enhanced opportunities to manage Russia’s foreign assets, although some of these were either illiquid or very low in value. This
Table 1.5 Dynamic and structure of new Russian debt in the 1990s ($ billion, end of period) Years Total debt IFO* Paris Club London Club Eurobonds OVGVZ** CBR***
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
8.6 3.5 5.0 0.1
11.3 5.4 5.9 0
17.4 11.4 6.0 0
27.7 15.3 7.8 0.1 1.0 3.5
35.6 18.7 7.6 1.3 4.5 3.5
53.9 22.2 9.7 0.2 16.0 3.5 2.3
54.5 19.4 9.5 0.11 15.6 3.5 6.4
Sources: Russian Ministry of Finance, Kheifetz 2002, p. 95. * International financial organizations: IMF, WB, EBRR; ** New Vneshekonombank foreign currency bonds issues were added in 1996 to external debt; *** Currency credits to the government for external debt repayment after 1998.
38
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns 25 20 15 10 5 0 ⫺5
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
⫺10 ⫺15 Debt payments
Debt increase
Figure 1.2 Russia’s external debt payments and debt increase in the 1990s ($ billion) Source: Russian Ministry of Finance.
Table 1.6 Sovereign debts owed to the Russian Federation by the end of 1991 ($ billion) Country
Cuba
Mongolia
Vietnam
India
Syria
Others
Volume
28.3
17.8
16.8
16.3
11.7
54.3
Source: Kheifetz (2002, p. 153).
problem concerned primarily the sovereign debts of underdeveloped former Soviet allies (given in Table 1.6 according to the assessment by the Russian authorities). The total number of sovereign debtors to Russia exceeded 50 countries, of which 13 owed 88 per cent of total debt, and the five countries mentioned in Table 1.6. owed 63 per cent of debt. The sovereign debts of countries like Ethiopia and Sudan were quoted at 1–2 cents per dollars, and debts of Afghanistan, Mali, Somali and Kampuchea had zero price (Kheifetz, 2001, p. 154). The membership of Russia in the Paris Club simplified negotiations and agreements with other members of the Club on the basis of standard mechanisms for debt negotiations. The procedures of settlement with debtors were initialized and a large spectrum of foreign assets was involved in the sphere of market exchange. This would be problematic on a bilateral basis, because in some cases the extent of debts to Russia were questioned by countries-debtors (Box 1.3), and the settlement
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 39
process required the use of international facilities. One has to acknowledge the importance of Russia’s decision to join this Paris Club in solving all of these problems. Absent the official creditor status, even the miserable repayment after the end of the process of rescheduling would be impossible. More importantly, Russia got a chance to become a global creditor nation in the next decade, when huge official foreign reserves of more than half a trillion dollars were accumulated and the National Sovereign Fund was created in 2007. (D) Russia received acceptable sovereign ratings. The external debts restructuring allowed the world’s leading credit rating agencies to give Russia sovereign credit ratings in October 1996. The new ratings were stable and firmly belonged to BB category: BB⫺ by Standard & Poor’s, Ba2 by Moody’s, and BB⫹ by Fitch IBCA. These assessments were based on the recognition of moderate country risks that were acceptable for financial investors operating in the emerging markets. One immediate consequence of rating conferment was the first successful issue of Russian Eurobonds in November 1996. The federal government received a valuable opportunity for public debt management using international market instruments. Moreover, the leading Russian banks could also achieve credit ratings and begin borrowing from abroad. Local governments of some advanced Russia’s regions and the largest cities also entered the foreign financial markets by issuing Eurobonds. These developments marked the de facto financial integration of the Russian economy with the global financial system. In hindsight it seems surprising how difficult it was to persuade the Russian authorities of the need to secure sovereign credit ratings for Russia. When I initiated this idea, it received support from the prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and leading economic reformer Anatoly Chubais. For a long time, however, the latter could not understand why indeed Russia needed sovereign ratings, and I had to explain to him the potential benefits for the Russian economy. The top officials were not very enthusiastic at being involved in the rating process and, especially, of having personal conversations with the rating agencies representatives. I remember the case when a Fitch IBCA expert posed Viktor Chernomyrdin a ‘delicate’ question: ‘What will happen with Russia if Boris Yeltsin dies?’ This was just before Yeltsin’s heart operation in 1996, and the question was quite a reasonable one. Viktor Chernomyrdin answered correctly that in such circumstances policy making would proceed according to the Russian Constitution, but following this interview he was angry at me for a while. Russia’s top officials became aware of the importance of sovereign credit ratings a bit later, when Russia began to receive foreign investments.
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
(E) Institutions of debt management were established. These institutions are of central importance for any modern system of government finance. They could not emerge in a planned economy that was largely isolated from the world’s financial markets. Debt management based on market principles was an effective disciplining device. Obeying international rules required a certain transparency and responsibility on the part of the Russian authorities, thus introducing some order in the process of decision making. Cooperation with the world’s financial organizations and institutions allowed the authorities to improve the methodology of macroeconomic and statistical analysis, to use modern techniques, expertise and consultations. These processes had a positive effect on the domestic financial policy making framework and stimulated the creation and development of a comprehensive debt management system. Finally, the beginning of Russia’s integration with the international financial community acted as a catalyst for the development of domestic financial markets.
1.3 External debt and macroeconomic policy Debt policy in the USSR and Russia was shaped largely by the force of circumstances, above all political ones. The Soviet authorities were forced to build up external debt because they were unable to balance the budget and avoid the rapid monetization of the budget deficit. The Soviet debt crisis and the external debt default became inevitable because of the fall in the world oil price and foreign trade deficits, the failure of semi-market reforms, and the loss of financial control by the state. Its bankruptcy left no other choice for Russia but to launch radical market reforms in 1992. These reforms began with an acknowledgement of the external debt obligations of the Soviet Union. When Poland, at that time the benchmark case for Russia, had begun its reforms two and half years earlier, it received essential support from the world’s financial institutions. In particular, foreign debts were forgiven, and the stabilization fund to defend the zloty was created.16 Partly for this reason Polish shock therapy was successful and bore fruit within two years. As was mentioned above, the decision by Russia to take all Soviet debts instead of claiming debt forgiveness was justified by strategic and political motives. In a sense, it shaped the pattern of financial development of Russia during the 1990s. 1.3.1 External debt as a disciplinary device Initially, the Russian reformers thought that economic liberalization would stimulate economic growth that would – sooner or later – reduce
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 41
the initial debt burden. The idea was to restructure the external debt and repay it when the economy switched to the regime of steady growth. The optimistic beliefs that this would occur in two–three years, as had happened in Poland, turned out to be wrong.17 The Russian economy began to grow after only seven years, after the financial crisis of 1998, because of the devaluation of the ruble and the upsurge in oil prices. Instead, the market transformations caused a reduction of nearly onehalf in Russian GDP,18 implying that the external debt burden on the economy increased more than twice (because of Russia’s new debts). This burden per se was an obstacle to attract foreign investment and stimulate domestic private investment. One could judge a posteriori that the economy was being pushed artificially into a new debt trap. Not surprisingly, the decision in relation to debt acknowledgement was criticized by many opponents of the market reforms in Russia. One positive side of all these troubles was that the Russian financial authorities had no choice other than to negotiate with foreign creditors on the restructuring of the Soviet debt. They received thereby a strong stimulus to continue their market reforms despite the resistance of various lobbying groups at home. The key intermediary role in these negotiations was played by the International Monetary Fund. The Russian Federation became a member of the Fund on 1 July 1992 and just over a month later, on 5 August 1992, received the first credit line worth $1 billion. One has to admit that the Fund acted quickly taking into account the extreme need of Russia in external financing. As was mentioned above, although Russia inherited the whole of the Soviet debt, it could not service it during the first years of reforms. Each time a decision to postpone debt payments was adopted it was made contingent on the IMF’s approval of reforms and efforts by authorities to stabilize the economy. The agreement with the IMF of these annual programmes was a basic requirement for making regular agreements with its official and private creditors. This routine made it possible to eventually establish a full-scale restructuring of debts to the Paris and London clubs. The external debt was thus not only a burdensome Soviet legacy. At the beginning of the 1990s it was a strategic tool for reorganizing the macroeconomic policy framework on a market basis and with a strong priority being given to long-term financial planning. The Soviet-style financial managers were unfamiliar with this approach because they were trained on the administrative methods of control and the dominance of short-term planning in the natural form which finance was
42
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
subordinated to. The adoption of the new approach to financial management required effort and time. From the very beginning financial policy making had to be adapted to an open rather than a closed economy, which essentially the Soviet planned system had been for many decades. The emphasis in this work was made on the balance of payments calculations as a basic tool for financial planning. At the beginning of reforms the staff at the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) did not have enough professional experience as a result of their earlier activity in Soviet Gosbank, and the Russian Ministry of Finance staff had to rely on its own efforts and also on the assistance of the IMF’s staff in Moscow. Utilizing various balance of payments scenarios my colleagues and I made projections of the current account and evaluated the needs for external financing over the next few years. Analytical work of this sort could reveal Russia’s actual needs in new borrowing and was very important for our negotiations on debt restructuring with the creditors’ clubs. To improve the capacity of the Russian staff, the IMF organized regular training courses which were very effective. Our colleagues from the Ministry of Finance and the CBR very quickly learned about international accounting standards and other modern techniques. In addition, a new generation of high-skilled analysts became trained on modern ground in Russia. When I organized the Economic Expert Group in the Ministry of Finance in 1994, it was initially headed by highly qualified foreign experts in macroeconomics. But soon it became possible to invite talented Russian graduates from NES (The New Economic School, Moscow) which was established on the basis of CEMI (The Central Economic-Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences) in 1992, and where students with a very good mathematical background were taught by professors from western universities. Up to the present day NES is the most advanced economic school in Russia. For example, Arkadiy Dvorkovitch graduated from this school and was the head of the Economic Expert Group for several years. Today he is the chief economic adviser to the Russian president Dmitriy Medvedev. Foreign debt servicing was so important in this period that it formed a framework for fiscal and monetary policy making. Our work on debt policy was conducted in close cooperation with the IMF and made it possible to tame the inflationary demands of various interest groups. It is important to note that the Russian government was (and still is) politically heterogeneous. At that time it included both the liberal ‘financial’ block and the conservative ‘industrial’ block that resisted reforms and put pro-inflationary pressure on the government. In effect, the IMF was able to influence the budget process and monetary policy and provided thereby support to the financial block (initially the Ministry of Finance)
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 43
in its political confrontations with the industrial block. For this reason in the 1990s the external financing was an important inflation-deterring factor that had a substantial influence on the conduct of domestic economic policy. The most important effect was the conditionality of the IMF loans on the annual programmes of macroeconomic and structural reforms and, importantly, on the actual results of these reforms. At the beginning of our negotiations on debt restructuring and new loans provision these effects were negligible, since the attempts of Russian authorities to curb inflation in the period 1992–94 had been half-hearted. Nevertheless, the inflation rate was reduced from 25 per cent a month at the end of 1992 to 1.5 per cent a month by the end of 1995 (we will discuss the Russian macroeconomic stabilization in Chapter 2). Importantly, the style and preferences of monetary and fiscal authorities were changing, and the contribution of the IMF to improving monetary and fiscal discipline during these years was very significant. External debt agreements effectively constrained the opportunities of the Central Bank to inflate, which was the main macroeconomic problem until 1995–96. In addition, the foreign debt served as a commitment device through the increased expected costs of inflation surprises. This ultimately made the Russian authorities less inclined to resort to budget monetization or ruble devaluation as macroeconomic policy tools.
30
1400
25
1200 1000
20
800 15 600 10
400
5
200
0
0 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Consolidated budget deficit, % of GDP
CPI annual growth, %
Figure 1.3 Inflation rate and the consolidated budget deficits in the 1990s Source: Goskomstat, the Russian Ministry of Finance.
44
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
It should be emphasized that in the 1990s the IMF had the tools to have a strategic effect on the economic policy course in Russia. As a result of the relatively small size of the Russian economy and the lack of financial resources of the state,19 even hundreds of million of dollars were enough to close the serious budget gaps. The total amount of IMF credits disbursed to Russia in the 1990s was $20.5 billion (15.6 billion SDR, the IMF currency unit); the flow of annual payments is depicted in Figure 1.4. These credits were either short- or medium-term in nature, with typical durations of either 2–3 or 5–7 years, but were not subject to restructuring. Financial support by the IMF was significant and constituted nearly 36 per cent of the total Russian debt accumulated in the 1990s (as should also be clear from Table 1.5). The IMF had therefore enough power to implement a ‘carrot-and stick’ approach to policy. Sometimes it did indeed work as a stick: for example, Russia was granted only 68 per cent of a total credit line amounting to $30 billion. The ‘stick’ was also applied strictly to Russian policy makers at the height of the financial crisis of 1998, as will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this book. The IMF loans were most effective as a tool to support the attempts to achieve macroeconomic stabilization. The first credit tranche to Russia of 1992 and the so-called ‘system transformation’ credit lines of 1993–94 were designed to prevent a new unfolding of an inflation spiral. A stand-by $6.3 billion credit line was approved in April 1995 to implement a full-scale stabilization programme. This credit line was
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Figure 1.4 IMF credits to the Russian government in 1992–98 ($ billion) Source: Russian Ministry of Finance.
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 45
supposed to finance the federal budget deficit and served as a financial reserve for the case of the balance of payments deterioration. The results of the stand-by programme were very successful: Russia made notable progress in suppressing inflation (as will be shown in Chapter 2). A tight monetary policy framework was created through the monthly monitoring by the IMF and the fruitful integration of efforts by the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank. But the next credit line granted by the Extended Fund Facilities agreement in March 1996 turned out controversial, as, for instance, Stanley Fischer (2001) later recognized. The political situation after Boris Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996 was very uncertain and fragile, because of his illness and the weakness, and as a result of the extreme populism of the State Duma (the Lower House of Russian Parliament established in December 1993). The fiscal policy relaxed in 1996–97 making macroeconomic stabilization to a large extent meaningless. The IMF’s position was precautious, but it took the risk and decided to give a chance to a new command of ‘young reformers’ that occupied the government positions in 1997, even though it failed ultimately. In general, the influence of the IMF credits on domestic policy making was a positive one. But in my view, the Fund’s main contribution was in the transfer of qualifications, professionalism, methodology and the experience of macroeconomic stabilizations and liberal reforms. The IMF mission in Russia facilitated the spread of international standards of accounting, assisted in methodology of the budget process rationalization, provided regular high-level analysis of macroeconomic situations and expertise about the key problems faced by the economic authorities. On the one hand, the IMF’s assistance was enormously helpful in defence of the Ministry of Finance’s position in our negotiations with the Paris Club or G7 meetings. On the other hand, the pressure exerted by external financing and the IMF position constrained the pro-inflation activity of political populists and crowds of lobbyists like the so-called ‘red directors’ – the influential top managers of the industrial ‘dinosaurs’, as the large, inefficient Soviet-style enterprises were called. Unfortunately, the IMF was also heavily involved in domestic policy issues, including, for example, the complex problems of reforming natural monopolies. Structural reforms of this kind were very hard to implement and were in fact far beyond the competence of the Fund. This activity diverted efforts thus unwittingly furthering the influence of anti-reform interest groups on economic policy. The ordinary IMF staff members usually spent months in Russia and put a lot of effort into understanding in some depth the specificity of Russian transition
46
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
before making practical recommendations to the Russian authorities. This thorough and useful work contrasted with the activity of some top officials from the creditor countries who visited Moscow or participated in the Paris Club negotiations. In my view, their vision of the Russian economy lacked proper comprehension and was sometimes superficial, probably, because they did not have much time to go deep into details. Instead they preferred to repeat like a mantra the common sense assertions from elementary textbooks that the state budget should be balanced, the Central Bank should not inflate, the government should service its debt, and so on. For example, the key message by Jean-Claude Trichet, at that time a highranking official in the Paris Club, was that Russia had to service its debts completely, according to the initial schedule. This was in 1992, when Russia simply did not have enough foreign reserves to make full payments, and the Russian delegation did not want to take unrealizable commitments. But in Trichet’s view, the Russians disagreed with his requirement simply because they did not understand elementary matters such as the difference between interest and principal. Many times and for many hours my colleagues and I listened patiently to lectures on basic economics but, nevertheless, maintained our position. This was our main task in negotiations on external debt, and our ‘teachers’ were sometimes dissatisfied about their communications with such ‘slow-learning students’. Sometimes the Fund made simple mistakes because of their overreliance on the application of abstract theoretical principles. Of course, some textbook recommendations, such as price liberalization, were relatively successful, but some did not work at all. Two of the Fund’s suggestions had negative consequences for the Russian economy and deserve a mention. The first was the strong recommendation in 1992 that the former Soviet republics should unify their currencies. This idea was based on the optimal currency zone theory underlying European monetary integration, and on historical examples such as the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. However, the political and economic situation in the CIS countries was very different. The Russian Ministry of Finance tried to raise objections against the Fund’s recommendation to unify currencies. As a compromise solution, it was decided to create the so-called ‘ruble zone’. The CIS countries had already established their own currencies, but, as members of the ruble zone, claimed provision of technical credits from the Russian Central Bank to meet credit expansion by their own national Central Banks. Because of the free-rider motive, the ruble zone was easily transformed into an ‘inflationary currency zone’ where all countries-recipients of technical credits benefited
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 47
from inflating at the expense of Russia. Actually, the latter subsidized the former Soviet republics by sharing seigniorage income. This system was abolished in August 1993, but for a whole year the technical credits were a channel of cross-country inflation spillover to Russia. The second questionable IMF recommendation was to abolish oil export tariffs in 1995 in order to eliminate trade barriers and tax distortions. This measure resulted in a drastic reduction of budget revenues at a time when a fiscal crisis had become the key issue for Russian authorities. The export of oil and gas is inelastic and limited by pipeline capacity, and the effects of export tax reduction on the supply were weak. Commodity export taxation is market distorting, but it was desirable as a second-best solution. It could effectively substitute for the rent taxation that was essentially ignored in the 1990s, because of the lobbying activities of the major oil-producing companies.20 The IMF unwittingly supported them by pressuring the government against oil export taxation. The government conceded but had to restore it in a couple of years. In the next decade the commodity export taxes became an important mean of oil rent collection by the state and a source of the federal budget surpluses. 1.3.2 Market-based debt management The external debt negotiations of the 1990s brought about some elementary order in the financial policy of Russia and created the prerequisites for systematic debt management by the state. The main problem was that the government still lacked standard market tools and had to initiate the development of a modern domestic financial system. A broader vision on active debt management was that it could be a framework for organization of a modern-style system of government finance. As the negotiations with creditors were close to the successful finale, a search for the solution to this problem became the main strategic task for the Ministry of Finance and for me as a deputy minister responsible for financial policy making. The next concrete step after rescheduling the Soviet debts and obtaining the sovereign ratings in 1996 was to organize external debt management on a long-term basis with the use of liquid and transparent market instruments. A starting point for the fulfillment of this task was the first Eurobond issue at the end of that year with a nominal volume of $1 billion. This was a pilot project implemented very successfully and perceived by the financial community in Russia and abroad as a real breakthrough. Nobody expected the initial bond price be so high, 100.5 per cent under a coupon rate of 9.25 per cent, as demonstrated in Table 1.7.
48
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
By comparison, at that time the real returns on domestic government papers were above 30 per cent per annum. The Eurobond yields exceeded interest rates on the IMF loans by two or three basis points, but the former did not require non-market negotiations and reflected positive public anticipations of economic performance in Russia. The subsequent three issues of Eurobonds in 1997 were also successful, with the third one issued at a higher coupon rate – 10 per cent – because of the beginning of the Asian crisis in June 1997. The total volume of these three issues was not so big, roughly $4.5 billion. But, in my view, the Eurobond market entry should have launched a long-term programme of Russian debt securitization and the creation of debt management based on market instruments. The main issue of public debt management to be put forward was the optimization of the volume of debt, maturity and currency structure, and risk profile. This should become the principal subject of financial policy. New debt issues had to be used to smooth tax distortions over time. For example, the tax burden on the Russian economy had to be increased dramatically in 1995–96 in order to sustain the macroeconomic stabilization (Fischer 2000). This would require a radical fiscal reform that it would have been virtually impossible to implement at this time. A new debt issue could mitigate the additional fiscal burden or compensate for the absence or failure of fiscal reform. As is known from the theory of optimal dynamic taxation,21 the debt structure matters under uncertainty related to primary budget incomes,
Table 1.7 Russian Eurobond issues in the 1990s Date of issue 21.11.96 13.03.97 19.06.97 24.03.98 30.04.98 10.06.98 24.06.98 24.07.98 24.07.98
Date of Duration, redemption years 27.11.01 25.03.04 26.06.07 31.03.05 21.04.03 10.06.03 24.06.28 24.07.05 24.07.18
5 7 10 7 5 5 30 7 20
Volume, billion $1 2 DM $2** 1.25DM 750IL*** $1.25 $2.5 $2.97 $3.47
Coupon Spread, Initial rate, % base points* price, % 9.25 9 10 9.375 9 11.75 12.75 8.75 11
345 370 365 475 435 650 753 940 940
101.3 101.8 99.2 101.4 99.7 98.8 98.4 73.8 73.9
Sources: The Russian Ministry of Finance; Kheifetz (2002). * Yield spread to government papers of the corresponding country and similar duration. ** The additional tranche $400 million was issued on 23.10.97. *** Italian lire.
The External Debt Crisis of the 1990s 49
expenditures, and the costs of debt servicing. In the 1990s the Russian financial authorities had to cope with a variety of currency, interest rate and rollover risks. When the fraction of short-term debt became too high and the potential threat of debt runs became a greater problem, the government had to focus on the term structure and try to lengthen radically the time to the maturity of obligations. Because of the limited demand of investors for ruble instruments, the available solution was the further extension of Eurobond issues in the second half of the 1990s. As will be shown further below, the government had this option at the beginning of 1997, but focused instead on hopeless attempts to increase duration of the ruble debt papers. When the Russian government entered the international financial markets, the portfolio of its obligations was exposed to systemic risks (described below in Chapter 4) that should also be dealt with actively. In my view, the measures of early crisis prevention, which were discussed intensively after the Asian and Russian crises of 1997–98, could have been installed into the system of debt risk management as an operating block related to rare or tail risk events. In the middle of the 1990s the Russian financial system became much too exposed to the external risks due to domestic debt expansion and capital inflows. The worst crisis scenarios were ignored by the monetary authorities, but one such scenario did emerge in 1998. The establishment of effective debt management based on a bundle of market instruments and financial engineering was supposed to be my urgent task as deputy Minister of Finance in the pre-crisis year 1997. Unfortunately, the creation of this system was blocked for a year, after I left the Ministry in March 1997. The active policy of debt management was reanimated only in Summer 1998, when the threat of financial catastrophe became obvious to the Russian authorities. The whole year was lost and the tardy attempts to govern the currency risks and change the term structure of debt proved to be awkward and unsuccessful. A large-scale securitization of commercial debts was postponed for several years and realized only under the London Club debts restructuring in 2000.
2 The Domestic Financial System and Inflation
Introduction In addition to the external debt obligations, Russia inherited from the USSR a huge money overhang caused by the hidden budget deficits accumulated over many years. This overhang transformed hidden inflation (manifested in chronic shortages, long queues, and price growth in the non-official segments of the economy) into explicit price growth and yielded a tremendous outburst of inflation, once prices were liberalized in January 1992. The Russian reformers applied shock therapy based on the Polish experience of economic liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization. They intended to tighten monetary policy to suppress inflation by means of a nominal anchor and then to create conditions for stable economic growth. This programme worked effectively in the East European economies where macroeconomic stabilizations normally required two or three years. Unfortunately, the attempt to curb postliberalization inflation in Russia was very short, and, because of the strong pro-inflatonary political pressure, the authorities began the monetization of huge budget deficits. The result of monetary expansion was real money squeezing that generated the problem of non-payments, an incurable disease of the Russian economy in the 1990s. As will be shown in this chapter, the Russian financial markets that originated in conditions of high inflation were chaotic and unregulated with neither an appropriate legal base, nor adequate market institutions and infrastructure. Ordinary people were, nevertheless, enthusiastic about searching for new financial investment opportunities, partially because high inflation eroded savings in rubles. But, as a rule, they had no experience and knowledge about underlying risks and incurred high losses from unfortunate financial investment. The authorities did not 50
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 51
pay enough attention to organization of informational support and warning of population about fraudulent financial schemes. In this situation the urgent task was the creation of civilized financial markets that began with the launch of the domestic debt market in 1993. It was a real breakthrough that made possible the introduction of modern technology in financial exchange. Opening of the market for government securities, without doubt, made a significant positive contribution to the development of the Russian financial system (but was made later a scapegoat for the Russia’s financial troubles of 1998). The banking system proved to be dominant over the emerging domestic financial markets. It grew very rapidly under high inflation, but remained inherently very weak. The most dangerous aspect of the banking system’s fragility was its symbiosis with government finance that ensured high levels of profits. Bank managers typically ignored the essential risks and were typically unprepared to reversals in external factors. Banking practice was designed to exploit high inflation and could not adjust to abrupt changes in the monetary policy regime. The first banking crisis, which occurred as a result of the macroeconomic stabilization of 1995, was an early warning of future financial disasters, but did not lead to essential improvements in the quality of the Russian banking system.
2.1 The origination of financial markets The radical market transformation of the Russian economy began on 2 January 1992 with the radical liberalization of domestic and foreign trade. The first team of reformers was headed by Yegor Gaidar who was the acting prime minister at the time. The programme of reforms was based on a package of measures designed to be implemented over a period of two–three years. Price liberalization was the first step in the ‘shock therapy’ programme tested earlier in Poland. The second step, as initially designed, was to conduct a policy of monetary stabilization. The government attempted to impose money control in the first quarter of 1992 which continued until May of that year. This was a short period of relatively tight monetary and fiscal policy required to curb price growth after price liberalization. If consistent, this strategy would be able to suppress inflation within several months. Unfortunately, essential corrections to the initial programme had already been put in place just six months after the launch of reforms. The shock therapy policy in Russia failed at the very beginning, because of the strong political resistance and an economic structure that was not suited to radical reforms.
52
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
2.1.1 Inflation spiral The CPI jumped by 250 per cent in January 1992 as a result of the monetary overhang accumulated under the previous Soviet financial system and continued to grow at double-digit monthly rates subsequently. Price liberalization embraced all goods apart from energy resources, grain, and the main foodstuffs. The regulated prices were increased between three and five times in 1992 (domestic oil and gas prices more than six times), but still remained some two or three times below the world levels. The initial price shock was very strong, but it could have been temporary, as is shown by the reduction of the inflation rate in the first half of 1992 (Figure 2.1). However, in June 1992 the Central Bank of Russia weakened money control and began its expansion of credit. The average monthly growth rate of money supply M2 was 11 per cent in January–May but had increased to 27 per cent a month in June–December 1992. The CBR thus abolished the monetary stabilization programme which was part and parcel of the policy of economic liberalization. The initial explosion of inflation was an inevitable but temporary consequence of monetary overhang, but the Central Bank chose to switch to a highinflation regime. At the same time it abolished multiple non-market exchange rates and unified the exchange rate that became convertible
45
700
40
600
35
500
30 25
400
20
300
15
200
10
100
0
0
Fe
b92 M ar -9 2 Ap r-9 2 M ay -9 2 Ju n92 Ju l-9 2 Au g92 Se p92 O ct -9 2 N ov -9 2 D ec -9 2 Ja n93
5
Monthly inflation,% per month Nominal ruble exchange rate, rubles to dollar Figure 2.1 The CPI inflation and the nominal exchange rate in 1992 Sources: The Central Bank of Russia; Goskomstat.
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 53
on current account. The CBR adopted a regime of managed floating: there was no reason to apply nominal anchor in any form under high inflation. Figure 2.1 illustrates the close correspondence between the ruble exchange rate depreciation and inflation acceleration in the second half of this year. Since June 1992 the official exchange rate of the ruble had been determined on the market basis at Moscow Currency Exchange (MICEX) under the provision of compulsory sales of 50 per cent of export revenues used for currency interventions. The inflationary policy adopted by the CBR was simplistic in the sense that it consisted essentially of two kinds of decisions: first, on the volume of credits to the state and the economy (through the monetization of the state budget deficit and non-budget transfers) and, second, on the ruble-todollar official exchange rate determination.1 In July 1992 the newly appointed chairman of the CBR, Viktor Gerashchenko, announced a radical decision to support the production sector of the economy with massive centralized credits. Gerashchenko was the last head of Soviet Gosbank and had a great deal of experience about the technical issues of banking. But he ignored some important macroeconomic issues and suggested an inflationary way of solving sharp financial problems that Russian enterprises faced as a result of price liberalization. Very soon the monetary authority slid into an inflation spiral: once it began to inflate, it found it difficult to stop. As a result, the regime of three-digit annual inflation persisted during the first half of the 1990s, as demonstrated in Table 2.1. There were several key reasons for the CBR’s initiation of the inflation spiral: the rescue of productive enterprises, the poor system of payments, social tensions and political constraints, and the attempts by
Table 2.1 Annual growth rates of nominal and real macroeconomic indicators in 1992–97 (per cent) Year M2 CPI The dollar-to-ruble exchange rate Real M2 Real ruble exchange rate GDP
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
668 1260 162
509 940 198
300 315 189
128 131 28.9
45 21.8 19.8
29 11 7.2
– 44 419
– 41 249
–3.6 43.6
–1.3 79.2
19 1.7
16.2 3.5
–12.7
–4.1
–3.6
1.4
–14.5
–8.7
Sources: CBR, Goskomstat, the author’s calculation.
54
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
the Russian authorities to prevent the disintegration of the post-Soviet ‘economic space’. In my view the rescue of enterprises was the main reason for the credit expansion that began in June 1992. The price liberalization and the opening up to foreign trade caused relative price changes, revealing that many domestic producers were unprofitable and were incapable of surviving under strong market pressures. The working capital of enterprises was dramatically reduced by the inflation shock, and most of them had no facilities to deal with high inflation. Many became indebted and could not obtain short-term credits from commercial banks. The latter typically declined to supply credits to the real sector because of the increased credit risks and the lack of information about borrowers’ assets. In this situation banks reasonably preferred to channel the ruble liquidity to foreign currency speculation that guaranteed high profits. Enterprises faced a sharp credit crunch, and the CBR tried to cope with it through further credit expansion and by using administrative measures. For instance, it obliged commercial banks to open credit lines to debtor industrial enterprises that were equivalent to one-third of total inter-enterprise debt (or 6 per cent of annual GDP as it stood on 1 July 1992). In addition, the working capital of distressed enterprises was indexed and financed through the issuing of extra money. In 1992 the total magnitude of this indexation was equivalent to 5.6 per cent of annual GDP. The inflationary monetary policy was ineffective for many reasons and, partially, because of the bottleneck effects of the new payments system. Settlement in the Soviet economy was centralized and occurred simultaneously for all firms regardless of their profitability because netting of mutual debts was covered by Gosbank. The new system was mediated by independent banks but it was underdeveloped and too sluggish for the regime of high inflation. In the absence of financial reserves interbank settlements had to occur sequentially (each transaction had to be settled before the next one in line is executed) with long time lags (Ickes and Ryterman 1992, p. 342). Electronic correspondence did not exist at that time and banks used the public mail to send paper documentation. The Central Bank created a network of 1,400 cashsettlement centres, but this led to spread of banks’ scarce financial reserves over various centres (Ickes and Ryterman, 1992, p. 343). The Central Bank also enforced the introduction of correspondent accounts to facilitate the interbank transfer of payments but with little effect on the speed of settlement. The problem was that banks benefited from high inflation and had strong incentives to delay payments for weeks
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 55
or even months. For this reason many transactions occurred beyond the banking system in cash or through barter. To some extent the so-called ‘grey’ sector of the Russian economy relying on cash and barter transactions flourished in the 1990s because of this problem. The payments system found itself in gridlock: monetary expansion accelerated inflation which in turn caused a non-payment crisis in the economy. It began in 1992 and continued for nearly a decade (we will discuss this in the next chapter). But at the beginning of the high-inflation period non-payments were usually associated with sharp shortages of cash. The credit expansion outstripped the cash supply by the Central Bank, while printing new banknotes of higher denomination required some time. This problem was technical in its nature but had dangerous social consequences. Enterprises could not pay wages in cash to workers thus strengthening political pressure by red directors to further monetary expansion. The problem of cash shortages aggravated by the end of 1992 because huge flows of ruble cash were transferred to other former Soviet republics. Though they introduced national currencies in June 1992, the ruble still remained the main method of payment. The idea of currency union was still valid and the ruble zone was supported by the abovementioned technical credits supplied to the CIS countries by the CBR. This was a large-scale seigniorage sharing justified by the desire to prevent the economic disintegration of the former USSR and to maintain traditional trade links between former Soviet enterprises located in different republics. The ruble currency zone was subsidized through the CBR’s credits at 9.3 per cent of Russian GDP in 1992, according to the IMF estimate2 (Åslund 1995, p. 126). In fact, the support of traditional trading links with the CIS countries through technical credits was the form of indirect support of Russian enterprises that supplied goods to these countries. The Soviet economy was low-monetized because money did not play the crucial role. On the contrary, the demonetization of the Russian economy was caused by the nominal monetary expansion, although the issue of money holding became crucial for economic agents. Largescale centralized credits to the economies of Russia and CIS countries were designed primarily to offset the losses of Russian enterprises caused by the initial inflation shock. But inflationary policy had the opposite effect through its further eroding of domestic producers’ financial assets. Table 2.1 demonstrates that the real money stock in the Russian economy contracted by 44 per cent in 1992 and 41 per cent in 1993 – that is, by two-thirds in just two years. Clearly, the real effects of accelerated
56
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
inflation on the demonetization of the economy and domestic production were catastrophic. Through a policy of money creation the Central Bank attempted to support domestic producers in the seemingly easiest way but actually substantially worsened their financial position.3 As a result, the monetary authority fell into a trap when the continuation of inflationary financing of the economy was required to prevent the entire collapse of production. 2.1.2 Failure to combat inflation The Soviet economy had collapsed in part because it had been heavily subsidized by the state, and also because of its excessive social obligations. The transition to market did not reduce this legacy of Russia but created the additional quasi-fiscal burden to support the non-competitive industries. The inflationary redistribution of income to which the authorities resorted was non-transparent, extremely distorting and outrageously inefficient. The scale of state subsidies to the economy in transition threatened the course of market transformations and eventually made the whole idea of market reforms in Russia meaningless. According to the IMF data, in 1992 the total volume of budget and quasi-budget subsidies was 29 per cent of GDP, and the volume of centralized credits to enterprises was 23 per cent of GDP (Vasiliev et al. 2003). The inflationary subsidization of the economy generated seigniorage of tremendous size estimated by Oding and Vasiliev (2003) as 43 per cent of GDP in 1992 (while the magnitude of national income redistribution was 76 per cent of GDP).4 Such a big volume of seigniorage obtained in the first year of market reforms reflects the effect of nonbudget financial operations of the government and, more importantly, the low elasticity of money demand with respect to expected inflation that was the case after price liberalization. Economic agents were typically unprepared to adapt rapidly to a high-inflation regime (from the previously dominant regime of permanent shortages) and could not anticipate adequately the true losses from inflation. They therefore held excessive nominal ruble balances instead of converting all financial wealth into dollars as a reliable way of defending it from inflation. Monetary expansion that began in Summer 1992 had detrimental financial consequences and extremely distorting real effects. The centralized credits were supplied to the government and the industries at significantly negative real interest rates. The interest payments by enterprises were thus heavily subsidized by the government which, in turn, received seigniorage income from the Central Bank. Figure 2.2 depicts the inflation rate and the Central Bank refinance rate which is
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 57 30 25 20 15 10 5
Ap
r-9
2 Ju l-9 2 O ct -9 2 Ja n93 Ap r-9 3 Ju l-9 3 O ct -9 3 Ja n94 Ap r-9 4 Ju l-9 4 O ct -9 4 Ja n95
0
Monthly inflation
Refinancing rate per month
Figure 2.2 Refinance rate and inflation in 1992–94 (per cent per month) Sources: CBR, Goskomstat.
a non-working policy indicator that sometimes considerably exceeded the actual CBR lending rates. As an example, the refinance rate was 80 per cent per annum (5 per cent per month) between August 1992 and May 1993, while the CPI inflation rate during this period was nearly 800 per cent per annum (or 20 per cent per month on average as seen from Figure 2.2). Typically, only a minor part of inflation was covered by lending rates. The uncontrolled reallocation of financial resources at negative interest rates reinforced rent-seeking behaviour in different forms, mainly as a struggle for a share of the ‘pie’ of state funds. Among the most notorious examples were agriculture and import subsidies, the provision of goods to Arctic territories, and credits to facilitate the conversion of the militaryindustrial complex enterprises. In many such cases the government had no possibilities to control the way in which the money was used by beneficiaries that could easily misappropriate the state funds. Typically, the winners in this struggle for the state financial pie were the managers of large enterprises, industrial vested interests, and politically influential regional authorities. The social sectors (education, science, culture, utilities and others) were surely the losers, as along with the wide groups of population that relied on the state budget (civil servants, pensioners, students, teachers, scientists, military men and so on) or were incapable of adapting quickly to the new rules of the game that were obscure to the majority of population at the beginning of the reforms.
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
By the end of 1992 it became clear to the Russian reformers that they faced substantial obstacles in their fight against inflation. Yegor Gaidar and his team were forced to resign in December 1992 because of the severe anti-reformist political pressure exerted by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation (the legislative power inherited from the USSR and dissolved in October 1993). The new prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, was an experienced Soviet top manager, the former minister of the gas industry and the founder of Gazprom. Unlike many of his colleagues he was able to learn and adjust policy making to market reforms.5 Being a master of compromises, and an essential feature of the Russian political framework, Chernomyrdin managed to remain prime minister for a record period – for more than five years in the period 1992–98. This period, called ‘Chernomyrdin’s epoch’, was a paradoxical time of revolutionary changes in the Russian economy and society occurring under a moderate-conservative political regime. The macroeconomic situation was very difficult in 1993 because of a political confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the populist Supreme Soviet, at that time the two centres of political power. This conflict of powers was conditioned by the controversies in the old constitution of the Russian Federation that had been inherited from Soviet times and exploited by politically ambitious populists. The situation of political power indeterminacy contributed to the rapid escalation of social and other obligations by the state. The Central Bank continued to inflate with the excuse of providing urgent help to domestic producers but also being involved in the political struggle on the side of the Supreme Soviet. The CBR financed 64 per cent of the federal budget deficit in 1993, as compared to only 35–40 per cent in 1992 (Sinelnikov and Trofimov 1998c, p. 210). In this situation the Ministry of Finance made an attempt to bring about some financial stabilization by taking the initiative of tightening fiscal policy. It restricted control over budget expenditures and abolished some items – for instance, import subsidies to enterprises. A monetary programme that was adopted initially in March 1993 was essentially an agreement between the fiscal and monetary authorities, approved by the IMF, on tightening control over budget expenses and money supply. The Central Bank, nevertheless, continued to inflate regardless of the adopted monetary programme commitments. The attempt to achieve macroeconomic stabilization in 1993 was unsuccessful, essentially because of the Central Bank’s involvement in political confrontations and its alliance with the pro-inflationary political forces. These forces had taken shape after the failure of shock
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 59
therapy and became sufficiently strong to organize political resistance to market reforms. Therefore the actions of the monetary authority were controversial. In the second half of 1993 the CBR raised the refinance rates on several occasions (see Figure 2.2), but continued the rapid accumulation of net domestic assets. The attempt at monetary reform announced in July 1993 was designed as a surprise exchange of old ruble banknotes for new ones to stop the cash inflows of rubles from the CIS countries. This measure buried the ruble zone but provoked panic among the Russian population who disposed of the rubles. A combination of foreign trade liberalization and fiscal tightening with an inflationary monetary policy was a new shock to the real economy. The abolition of centralized imports improved Russia’s current account, but inflation caused a very strong real appreciation of the ruble, 3.5 times during 1993, as seen from Table 2.1. The reason was a temporary nominal exchange rate stabilization that occurred while inflation remained in monthly double digits, as evident from Figure 2.3. This situation was very painful for domestic producers of tradables that had to compete with importers. The new wave of monetary expansion aggravated the problem of inter-enterprise non-payments that undermined the tax base, thus ‘sowing’ the seeds for a chronic fiscal crisis in the 1990s. Notably,
30
4500 4000
25
3500
20
3000 2500
15
2000
10
1500 1000
5
500 0 M
Ja
n93 ar -9 M 3 ay -9 Ju 3 l-9 Se 3 p9 N 3 ov -9 Ja 3 n9 M 4 ar -9 M 4 ay -9 Ju 4 l-9 Se 4 p9 N 4 ov -9 Ja 4 n95
0
Monthly inflation, % per month Nominal exchange rate, rubles to dollar Figure 2.3 Inflation and the ruble-to-dollar exchange rate in 1993–95 Sources: CBR, Goskomstat.
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
the basic reason for the fiscal woes of the Russian economy was that the production sector rather than the household sector was (and still remains today) the primary source of tax revenues of the government. The former is politically dominant too, and is favoured by the state in an inefficient way. In spite of all of these inconsistencies, the attempts to tighten fiscal policy by the Ministry of Finance were at least partially successful. The federal budget deficit was reduced to 4.8 per cent of GDP in the first half of 1993 – this was, in fact, quite a moderate level for a high-inflation economy. The fiscal authority tried to resist the monetary expansion by the CBR and also the strong political pressure exerted by the legislative power. For instance, in the second half of 1993 it voted for the revision of the state budget with a colossal budget deficit of 22 per cent of GDP. The inconsistency of macroeconomic policy was the fundamental problem for the Russian economy in the 1990s. As we will see below, the configuration of monetary and fiscal policies changed radically over the course of a couple of years, after the next attempt at stabilization in 1995. But the authorities then changed their roles: the Central Bank stopped inflating while the Ministry of Finance was forced to relax its fiscal policy and increase budget deficits. 2.1.3 Financial landscape In 1993 there was a dramatic increase in the real rates of return to ruble assets. The reason was that, as we have noted, the nominal ruble exchange rate stabilized for the five-month period in April–August, while monthly inflation rates remained above 20 per cent. During the whole year the ruble appreciated 3.5 times in real terms (see Table 2.1). Foreign currency speculation became unprofitable for a while, pushing up demand for the ruble assets that could at least partially compensate for losses through inflation. Another reason for this change of attitude was the resolution of a very dangerous political crisis caused by the struggle between the President and the State Duma. It continued for several months and turned into a dramatic civil conflict in October 1993. This crisis ended with adoption of a new constitution that endowed President with the main power. Russia got a new political system and a two-year period of political stability. But the majority of ruble instruments supplied at that time to the market were very poor in quality. The most striking example was the segment of financial pyramids that emerged in 1993 because of the lack of legislation and the low level of financial knowledge among the Russian population. Several financial companies organized large-scale
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 61
Ponzi games with self-quotations and real returns of more than 15–20 per cent per week. These companies, the most famous and aggressive one of which was MMM, used the mass media and involved many millions of people in financial gambling. The comprehensive law on securities had not yet been adopted, and the government had no effective legislative tools to prevent the spread of pyramids. I myself tried several times to signal to policy makers and the general public that this was an extremely dangerous process that threatened social and political stability. Only in August 1994, when the MMM founder was officially accused of disobeying the tax law, did this pyramid crash (see Box 2.1). Millions of people incurred losses, but the number of pyramid victims would have been much larger if the MMM and similar schemes had not been eliminated.
BOX 2.1 Financial Pyramid MMM The MMM pyramid was founded by Sergey Mavrodi, a mathematician, who had been engaged in computer imports. It was based on the selfquotation principle with share prices doubling every month and real returns of 16–17 per cent a week. On 1 February 1994 MMM made the first issue of one million ‘shares’. An aggressive large-scale advertising campaign through TV and retail trading was organized, ensuring the widespread public distribution of information and a high demand for these assets. Transaction costs were negligible because the shares were payable to the bearer and could circulate without registration (MMM even refused to quote the registered shares). The scheme became very popular since many people believed Mavrodi’s propaganda. To bring an end to this activity the Ministry of Finance as a financial regulator forbade the second issue of MMM shares. To obviate this restriction, Mavrodi issued certificates on shares, the so-called MMM tickets, since this was not restricted by any rules. There was no formal cause to stop the pyramid’s activity, and many other pyramids emerged, involving more and more people. It seemed that most of the top politicians and state officials in Russia ignored this activity and the possible perils for the economy and society. As was hinted at in the mass media, some of them were, possibly, involved in the scheme. In any case, they did not want to take personal responsibility for the possible consequences of the bubble crash and preferred to stay aside.
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
The cabinet members, nevertheless, became very anxious since the growth of MMM and other pyramids seriously threatened social stability. Being obliged to cope with this problem, I decided that the best solution would be to take immediately the radical measures and pierce this and other bubbles. In the attack against pyramid-makers I used their main weapon, the mass media, and made several public interviews persuading people to get rid of the MMM papers as soon as possible. I also organized a press conference in the Ministry of Finance in the middle of June 1994, to which Sergey Mavrodi was invited. He did not attend, thus demonstrating his unwillingness to disclose information and his reluctance to open discussions. The last opportunity was to accuse Mavrodi of disobeying the tax law which was a fair charge. He was arrested, and the MMM head office was stormed by the special police force. On 4 August 1994 the pyramid crashed: its shares dropped more than 100 times during the day. Mavrodi did not feel embarrassed and promised investors to compensate their losses by organizing a new Ponzi game with a fourfold price growth per month this time. People believed him again despite the crash and many even stood in long lines to use the chance and buy the new and old issues of MMM papers ‘very cheaply’. The end of MMM was very sad for 10–15 million shareholders who lost money and tragic for 50 people who committed suicide. Many investors anticipated extremely high real returns with no risks and sold all their wealth, including apartments, to buy the MMM shares. Sergey Mavrodi blamed the Ministry of Finance for all of the problems and even began an election campaign for the State Duma, running under the banner of being a ‘defender of shareholders’ rights’. During the campaign Mavrodi issued new tickets with a nominal value of 20 rubles (less than 1 US cent) and spread them free among voters. Following his election he never made any appearance in the Duma. Rather, he moved to the USA where he established a new pyramid called ‘Stock Generation’ that operated through the Internet. At that time this scheme was innovative, and the US Security Exchange Commission (SEC) had the same problem as the Russian Ministry of Finance: Mavrodi did not obey formally the American laws and represented this scheme simply as Internet gambling. But he cheated hundreds of thousands of people in USA, Great Britain, Canada and other countries. By appealing to the circuit court the SEC won, and Stock Generation was closed down. Mavrodi had to return to Russia, where he was accused of fraudulence and arrested. He and his company became a symbol of Russian financial jungles of the first half of the 1990s.
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 63
It is noteworthy that similar financial games in other countries caused political and social catastrophes – as occurred, for example, in Albania in 1996–97. The scale of Albanian pyramids was unprecedented relative to the size of the economy: the nominal value of the pyramid liabilities reached almost half of the country’s GDP. About two-thirds of Albanian citizens invested and became losers. When the schemes collapsed, the mass riots caused the fall of the government. The country descended into anarchy and a near civil war in which nearly 2,000 people were killed (Jarvis, 2000). The recent crash of the Madoff pyramid in the USA was not as politically explosive against a background of the global financial crisis, but it did demonstrate that large-scale Ponzi schemes can be operated over a very long period even on very well-developed financial markets. The Madoff case resulted in $17 billion of losses being incurred by three million investors (with a total of $50 billion involved in the scheme). The main reason why this pyramid survived for nearly 30 years was that the annual yields were stable and quite moderate, 10–15 per cent, and therefore did not arouse suspicion. Bernard Madoff, one of the founders of NASDAQ, had a very good reputation which was used to make his business non-transparent. Returning to the Russian financial markets at the beginning of the 1990s, it should be noted that investment risks were also high for another financial instrument that was very popular at that period – privatization vouchers. These were options that gave people the right to participate in a large-scale non-money privatization that was conducted in the period 1992–94. The strategic goal of the reformers was to privatize the economy and the immediate task of the privatization program was to arrange the rapid distribution of nearly 30 per cent of state property in production assets free of charge to all Russian citizens. The scheme was implemented by Anatoly Chubais, at that time the chief of the Federal Property Management Committee. On the one hand, every citizen was endowed formally with an equal share in privatized property and received a voucher entitling her or him with this right. In October 1992 roughly 151 million vouchers were issued at a nominal price of 10 thousand rubles, or $25 according to the current ruble exchange rate (see Box 2.2). The nominal voucher price was derived from the valuation of Soviet production assets conducted in 1990, totalling 4.3 trillion rubles or $4.3 billion according to the ruble exchange rate in the middle of 1993. At the same time, each privatized enterprise had to offer at least 29 per cent of its shares in voucher auctions. The shares were exchanged for vouchers according to a proportion of shares and vouchers supplied to the auction.
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
BOX 2.2 The Voucher Privatization in Russia The key idea of the non-money privatization was to allocate each Russian citizen an equal share of state property and then to allow them to exchange these shares for equities in specific enterprises. The proportions of exchange were supposed to be defined on the market base but in a peculiar way, irrespective of any money pricing of the underlying production assets. The nominal valuation of each voucher – at 10 thousand rubles or $25 – was an arbitrary and populist decision pushed forward by the Supreme Soviet (a political predecessor of the State Duma) that supported the idea of involving large groups of the population in voucher exchange. The valuation of national property though vouchers led to a severe undervaluation of production assets in money terms, especially for the tradable goods sectors. Enterprises subject to privatization could select among three models of privatization regarding 71 per cent of shares that were not supplied to voucher auctions and could be partially distributed among employees. The first model allowed 25 per cent of non-voting shares to be acquired free of charge by employees; the second model allowed the same for 51 per cent of the voting shares; the third model permitted the purchase by managers of 20 per cent voting shares at very low fixed prices. The first model was selected by 24 per cent of the privatized enterprises and the second one by 75 per cent. The second model was the most popular because its greatest beneficiaries were corporate insiders. The third model was selected by only 1 per cent of enterprises since it required formal agreements between managers and employees and was costly for the former. After corporate managers and employees had received their shares, outside investors could exchange their vouchers for the residual 29 per cent through non-money auctions. Transaction and information fixed costs were usually too high for the majority of ordinary citizens to participate in these auctions. As a rule, people did not understand the whole meaning of the large-scale privatization scheme and did not account for the expected costs and benefits of investment. Because of the relatively large fixed costs, the whole deal proved to be profitable only for the holders of large stocks of vouchers who were initially endowed with big volumes of capital that the absolute majority of Russian people did not have.
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 65
For this reason 62 million, nearly half of the 126 million Russian citizens that had received cheap vouchers, sold them to financial intermediaries. Another 26 million lost their vouchers by investing them in fraudulent companies that typically mimicked mutual funds and eventually went bankrupt. The remaining 38 million was represented by corporate employees and outside investors who received roughly one-third of national property. But within this group ordinary workers obtained only negligible amounts, because corporate managers usually forced them to sell their shares cheaply. Thus, as a result of the voucher privatization, a significant part of valuable production assets was eventually divided between corporate managers and a minority of active outside investors who benefited most of all from this privatization. Significantly, the new owners of these enterprises were not burdened with foreign commercial loans that had been made earlier. These loans had been guaranteed by the Soviet state and were eventually added to the external debt recognized by Russia. Vouchers did not provide ownership to the mass of the Russian population, as it was promised initially by the organizers of the voucher privatization. Instead, privatized property was typically concentrated in hands of ‘red directors’ and only rarely fell into the hands of outside investors. The state did not rid itself of the burden of subsidizing the production sector since ineffective privatized enterprises were subsidized implicitly (as will be shown in Chapter 3). In my view, this privatization was justified simply by the political motives of keeping the balance of interests in the society and preventing dangerous social and political tensions that could have arisen in the event of an abrupt reallocation of ownership rights. These processes occurred subsequently, but more spontaneously, locally and gradually. The year and a half between the issue of vouchers and the conducting of auctions (mostly in the first half of 1994) was a period during which vouchers could be traded. There was no organized exchange at the time, but the over-the-counter market for vouchers was very active. In a sense, this was a prototype of the stock market that emerged for the first time since the total nationalization of enterprises following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The voucher market was represented by speculators and investors. The former benefited from short-term price fluctuations and ignored the fundamental value of vouchers in terms
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
of underlying shares, while the latter accumulated vouchers simply in order to take part in the auctions and acquire the shares. When the trade in vouchers began in October 1992, they were priced according to a nominal value of $25. Within six months the market price had dropped to $4–5 because many average Russians had very little faith in the system and disposed of these vouchers. Subsequently, the voucher price was rising steadily, reaching $20–25 by the end of the period of non-money privatization. Speculation on the upward trend turned out to be a highly profitable and low-risk business that guaranteed annual dollar returns of up to 400–500 per cent. The risks for outside investors were both different in nature and much higher than the risks for enterprise managers that purchased vouchers from their workers. The outside investment risks were characterized by the extremely high variation in auction share prices across regions (for example, Gazprom auction price varied between 50 and 2,000 shares per voucher). For many Russians financial pyramids and vouchers were the first experience of the emerging domestic financial markets. The financial landscape of Russia was also represented outwardly by flourishing commercial banks. In 1993 they substantially increased the supply of shortterm ruble deposits with interest rates that were high enough to cover inflation. The main risk in holding ruble deposits was insufficient information about the situation of banks (credit risks) and the lack of trust in commercial banks. People remembered the last Soviet monetary reform of 1991 that had made instant losers of millions of deposit-holders of the State Saving Bank, Sberbank. However, because of the lack of financial markets and instruments (apart from pyramids and vouchers) many potential investors had no choice but to hold their money in banks. We will consider some issues of the early Russian banking development at the end of this chapter. 2.1.4 Opening of GKO trade The growth of financial pyramids in 1993–94 demonstrated an urgent need for the creation of civilized financial markets in Russia. For seven decades citizens were not engaged in financial activity in the true meaning of this notion, and the culture of investment under uncertainty had yet to be developed. People could continue to learn on their own experience only if the civilized markets were opened and the modern intermediary institutions were established. The federal authorities thus had to build a large-scale centralized system of financial trade. The Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank began to fulfill this work by organizing the domestic debt market.
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 67
This was the best choice because the government had to replace the money emission as the main source of budget deficit financing. As a result of the high inflation the government was unable to borrow long-term in rubles. A new financial instrument GKO (Gosudarstvennye Kaznacheiskie Obligatzii, the State Treasury Notes), zero-coupon three-month government bill, was a version of the US treasury bills. The first issue of GKO occurred on 18 May 1993 on the Moscow Interbank Market for Currency Exchange (MICEX). The introduction of this instrument allowed the fiscal and monetary authorities to achieve three goals. First, the extent of federal budget deficit monetization and, correspondingly, the volume of direct Central Bank credits to the government could be reduced. Second, a very important and convenient tool was created for control over the money supply through open market operations. Third, the financial system received a new liquid, high-quality instrument with minimal technical and information risks (at the end there was a big credit risk produced by the wrong macroeconomic policy, not by the instrument per se). The creation of this financial product was the result of a year-long collaboration of the Russian fiscal and monetary authorities with the best financial market experts from the USA. Note that after the debt default in August 1998 (discussed in Chapter 6 of this book) the very notion of GKO became notorious for those who were unfamiliar with details of the origination of domestic financial markets. The launching of the trade in GKO meant not only the opening of a new financial market, but also the creation of an innovative financial infrastructure. The introduction of GKO was a real breakthrough in the technology of financial trading based on the essentially new microstructure organized at MICEX. It included continuous two-side auctions, electronic trade and settlement, the automatic clearing of orders, and remote trading. The system of trade permitted a complete cycle of transaction, including registration and the depositing of securities. This led to relatively low transaction costs, transparency and a negligible risk of non-payments. Noteworthy, the rapid time for transactions was a very unusual feature for a Russian economy that had historically suffered from a problem relating to arrears. A typical transaction required weeks or even months because of the delays in payments. Under conditions of two-digit monthly inflation this was a very important advantage of the GKO market since it eliminated the inflation risks of trade. As a result of these innovations and advantages, the GKO market became very popular among participants on the financial markets. A liquid and transparent secondary GKO market created a wide range
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of new investment opportunities. Trade volumes increased exponentially in 1993–95, because of high demand for investment. The issue of domestic debt provided true financial assets to a public that was starved of investment opportunities and had almost lost trust in the financial markets as a result of the fallout from a number of fraudulent schemes. Because of its highly liquid nature, the GKO served as collateral for credits and contributed to the development of Russian banking. The Ministry of Finance gradually increased the duration and diversity of debt market instruments: a 6-month GKO was issued in 1994 and a fixed-coupon one-year OFZ (Obligatsii Federalnogo Zaima, the Federal Debt Obligations) was first issued in June 1995. Meanwhile, the number of debt issuers widened: in a couple of years the domestic debt market already included the segment of regional and corporate obligations. The GKO trade also stimulated the development of the stock market (after the adoption of the law on securities in 1995) and generated a spectrum of derivatives such as GKO futures and REPO contracts. Unfortunately, at that time the corporate paper market was too thin and risky for mass household investment. In September 1995 the ruble-denominated state saving coupon bonds OGSZ (Obligatsii Federalnogo Sberegatelnogo Zaima) were issued and circulated in traditional paper form. They were linked to the GKO-OFZ market and allowed households to invest in government papers as an alternative to ruble deposits in banks. In spite of all these innovations, the Russian financial system still lacked a diversity of instrument opportunities. The latter were limited because insecure property rights discouraged investment in the real sector of domestic economy, while capital controls prohibited investment in foreign assets. In respect of domestic debt, the main problem for the government was high real interest rates under short maturities that implied a high debt burden for the budget over both the short and medium term. Initial 3-month GKO issues were supplemented with
Table 2.2 of GDP)
Russian domestic debt in securities in 1993–96 (end of year, percentage
Years
1993
1994
1995
1996
GKO OFZ OVVZ Securitized CBR credits Total debt in securities
0.11 0 5.7 0 5.8
1.7 0 4.4 3.1 9.2
4.0 0.7 2.2 1.5 8.4
9.0 1.5 2.7 1.3 14.5
Sources: OECD Economic Survey, Russian Federation, 1997, p. 82.
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 69
the 6-month treasury notes and one-year bonds without any serious problems. But as a result of high inflation, uncertainty, and the lack of credibility, a further lengthening of the GKO-OFZ duration required excessive interest payments. Efforts and time were also required for inflation to be suppressed and stabilized at predictable and moderate annual rates.
2.2 Macroeconomic stabilization and public debt At the same time that the GKO market was opened, the political and economic situation in Russia became unfavourable for accelerating market reforms. In December 1993 Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his ultranationalist party won the parliamentary election by making populist promises. Fiscal policy tightening in the second half of 1993 was, perhaps, one of the reasons for that routing of the democratic forces. Partly for this reason, Chernomyrdin’s government preferred not to take risks and tried to conduct a policy of ‘moderate’ inflation in 1994. This policy proved to be expansionary in both the fiscal and monetary spheres, and the macroeconomic stabilization was postponed for a year. As a result of the increasing pressure by the industrial and agriculture lobbyists, the Central Bank enhanced credits to the government. It made especially large money injections into the budget and the real economy in Summer 1994. Among the main (and most notorious) channels for this budget ‘drainage’ were the previously mentioned programme involving delivery of goods to Arctic territories, agricultural subsidies, and also tax and tariff preferences for the special interest groups closely linked to big businesses and privileged associations (for example, sportsmen and the Afghan war veterans). In 1994 the Central Bank focused on exchange rate control and allowed the gradual nominal appreciation of dollar to ruble with a stable rate of 1–1.5 per cent per week. The goal of this simple policy rule was that there should be a stabilization of the real ruble exchange rate. This policy failed because inflation followed the money supply rather than the nominal exchange rate and increased by 314 per cent in 1994. Inflation moved far ahead of the exchange rate (Table 2.1) and, as a result, the ruble appreciated in real terms by 43.6 per cent with no stabilization effect on inflation and real output. The inflation rate in the first half of 1994 was lower than expected, as seen in Figure 2.3, and the inflation problem was given much less priority.6 There was a loosening of fiscal and monetary policy, and by the end of the year inflation had begun to accelerate. In the fourth
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quarter it had reached 462 per cent in annual terms, whereas it had only been 98 per cent in the third quarter. As it turned out, the real economic situation in 1994 was catastrophic: GDP fell by 12.7 per cent and industrial output by 21 per cent. To some extent, this drop in production was caused by the lagged effect of the tightening of fiscal policy and the structural changes in the economy that occurred in 1993. Nevertheless, the signs of deepening crisis became evident in the second half of 1994, and the system of macroeconomic governance proved absolutely helpless in all respects. 2.2.1 Monetary tightening The main reason for this failure was that monetary policy had been inflationary during the previous years of reforms. Persistent threedigit inflation was one of the key obstacles to economic stabilization and growth. The Russian authorities had to make the ultimate choice between two alternatives: to cease collaboration with the IMF and negotiations with the Paris and London Clubs on the restructuring of external debt, or to make an attempt to achieve radical financial stabilization. The first option would mean the failure of reforms and, possibly, the return to one or another form of command economy. Under some pressure from the IMF the second alternative was chosen. An important decision to put an end to inflationary financing of the state budget was taken at the special cabinet meeting that took place on 9 October 1994 at Viktor Chernomyrdin’s dacha in Sochi. Coincidentally, two days after, on the so-called ‘Black Tuesday’ of 11 October the dollar-to-ruble exchange rate jumped by 39 per cent, from 2,833 to 3,926 rubles/$, causing panic purchases of dollars among the population.7 The following day the status quo on the foreign exchange was restored when the exchange rate recovered, but the heads of both the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank lost their posts.8 This episode is curious because the drastic ruble devaluation and possible currency crisis were not prevented, but were abolished ex post after the tough administrative measures. In fact, the Central Bank would have benefited from a pre-emptive ruble devaluation in preparing the stabilization attempt. The devaluation surprise could increase demand for the rubles and allow the accumulation of sufficient foreign reserves to fix the exchange rate subsequently over a sufficiently long period of time. Actually, the ruble devaluation was postponed until the official launch of monetary stabilization in the first quarter of 1995 (the official government and CBR announcement took place on 9 March).
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 71
The CBR began tightening the money supply without making any announcement in the last quarter of 1994, soon after Black Tuesday. Initially, it had a very low level of foreign reserves and had to cope with the persistent expectations of devaluation following the events of ‘Black Tuesday’. Under such circumstances the CBR allowed a gradual ruble devaluation as seen in Figure 2.4. During the first quarter of 1995 the nominal exchange rate of the ruble depreciated by 28 per cent (equivalently, the ruble-to-dollar rate increased by 38 per cent, from 3,550 to 4,900 rubles/$). During this period the CBR followed a risky policy with the ruble exchange rate because of the small amount of official currency reserves it held. These would be exhausted under a coordinated speculative attack of banks on the ruble. The situation was similar to what occurred three years before, in July 1992, when the ruble exchange rate was allowed to float for the first time and the ruble fell to a third of its earlier level against the dollar. As I remember, the public mood was generally pessimistic after ‘Black Tuesday’. The chiefs of both the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance were dismissed, and top officials were typically reluctant to take responsibility for firm actions. It was a feeling of a new catastrophe coming with no chance of preventing the economic collapse that would have meant the entire failure of market reforms in Russia. The situation of 1991 could repeat, but now with much more dangerous consequences for the country. Meanwhile the course of domestic and foreign policy of Boris Yeltsin had changed, as the first war in Chechnya began in December 1994. As a result, Yeltsin lost the political support of Russian liberals who found themselves in longstanding opposition to the ‘ruling regime’. The attitude of western politicians to Russia also worsened, and new international financial aid was under question. It was, nevertheless, necessary to do our best to undertake a new attempt at macroeconomic stabilization. Tatyana Paramonova, who became the acting chairman of the Central Bank after Victor Gerashchenko’s resignation, worked hard and thoroughly, literally days and nights, on the 1995 monetary programme. Meanwhile I began negotiations with the IMF on a stand-by credit to support the new stabilization attempt. In spite of the seeming hopelessness of the whole situation, we joined our efforts to elaborate every detail in the new monetary agreement. The fiscal and monetary authorities coordinated their actions to impose control over the money supply and to reduce the state budget deficit. These measures had been partly realized in advance, before the stand-by credit was approved by the IMF in February 1995. It is important to emphasize that this success resulted from the efficient collaboration by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance.
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Fortunately, by the end of the first quarter of 1995 the CBR had averted the crisis despite the depletion of the official reserves to just $0.8 billion. Foreign currency speculators also perhaps lacked sufficient ruble liquidity due to the pre-emptive tightening of the money supply, and could not repeat their attacks. Furthermore, the demand for ruble liquidity usually increases by the end of each quarter for making regular tax payments and other purposes, thus forcing banks to sell dollars. The sharp devaluation of the ruble was avoided, and the monetary stabilization programme of 1995 had been started successfully. The goal of this programme was to reduce the federal budget deficit from 11 per cent in 1994 to 6 per cent in 1995, and the M2 growth rate from 195 per cent to 65 per cent (Oding and Vasiliev 2003). The target inflation level was set at 1 per cent per month. As I have mentioned, the programme was supported by the $6 billion IMF stand-by credit line to enforce the anti-inflationary policy. Each month the Central Bank imposed tight controls over the net domestic assets monitored by the IMF. The fiscal policy was also tightened and contributed to the combating of inflation. The federal budget deficit was reduced to 4.6 per cent of GDP in 1995 as a result of the dramatic reduction of expenditures, from 22 to 15 per cent of GDP9 (Oding and Vasiliev 2003). The deficit was financed through borrowings on the domestic papers market and external credits. Despite all these drastic measures annual inflation remained high in 1995, 131.3 per cent, because of the inertia of inflation expectations and a lack of credibility regarding the shift towards an anti-inflationary monetary policy. After the failures of previous attempts to curb inflation, some time was required for the Central Bank to gain the reputation of being a prudential policy maker. In addition, the money supply grew rapidly because of the accumulation of foreign official reserves. By the end of 1995 the level of gross reserves stood at $17 billion, while net reserves were $6 billion (29 per cent of the monetary base). Monthly inflation was 4.2 per cent in December 1995, and the target level of 1 per cent was reached within a year. In 1995 a new Central Bank law was adopted which confirmed the institutional basis of the monetary authority’s new status as an inflation-fighter. This declared the formal independence of the monetary authority from the government and prohibited the direct crediting of the government. 2.2.2 Currency corridor To eliminate the persistency of inflation expectations, the nominal anchor was introduced on 5 July 1995 as an exchange rate corridor set
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 73
in the range 4,300–4,900 rubles/$. This was quite a flexible nominal anchor regime set initially for one quarter and then extended to the end of the year. On 1 January 1996 the currency band shifted upward to 4,550–5,150 rubles/$ where it remained for around half a year, as is plotted in Figure 2.4. The introduction of the currency corridor had a strong stabilizing effect on the foreign exchange. In fact, it stopped the speculative purchases of rubles and prevented the ruble from further nominal revaluation. The reason was that the gradual ruble devaluation during the first quarter of 1995 was combined with the tightening of monetary policy as a result of the sales of official reserves and a dramatic reduction in the level of the emission of inflationary money. As a result, the demand for the ruble assets increased quite strongly causing a reversal of the ruble exchange rate movement in the second quarter of 1995 (Figure 2.4). The stabilizing ‘honeymoon’ effect of the corridor on foreign currency speculation was clearly evident. The lower and upper bounds of the exchange rate eliminated incentives to speculate both against the dollar and the ruble, and the Central Bank significantly reduced foreign currency interventions. At first glance, this was a remarkable result, providing a lift for monetary policy making, but the Central Bank now faced a new problem. A considerable interest rate disparity 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 ⫺2
7000 6500 6000 5500 5000 4500 4000 3500
Ju l-9 O 5 ct -9 5 Ja n96 Ap r-9 6 Ju l-9 6 O ct -9 6 Ja n97 Ap r-9 7 Ju l-9 O 7 ct -9 7 Ja n98
-9
5
Ap r
Ja n
-9 5
3000
Exchange rate, roubles to dollar Corridor – upper bound
Corridor – lower bound Inflation rate, % per month
Figure 2.4 Foreign currency exchange regimes and inflation, 1995–97 Sources: CBR, Goskomstat.
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
between the ruble and the dollar financial instruments (estimated as 80–100 per cent per annum in the middle of 1995) persisted as a result of the exchange rate regime and expectations of high inflation. Such a disparity caused dramatic financial portfolio restructurings that meant, in the case of Russia, intensive dedollarization and an inflow of speculative money into the expanding government paper market. The interest disparity was not eliminated for two reasons. First, the GKO supply grew faster than GKO demand which also increased as a result of the quasi-fixed exchange rate regime eliminating currency risk for investors. Second, the CBR had to sterilize official currency purchases to prevent excess growth of the money supply, implying the need for a further tightening of monetary policy. The fruits of macroeconomic stabilization were reaped in 1996 when the inflation rate fell to 21.8 per cent per annum. This was quite a good result by international standards, albeit reached at the cost of a real ruble appreciation of 79 per cent in 1995 (Table 2.1). Suppressing inflationary expectations and overcoming inflation inertia in the Russian economy were not straightforward tasks. Monthly inflation rates remained high until the beginning of 1996, and it took nearly a year for adjustment of the price behaviour of producers. The monetary authority had little room for manoeuvre, because of its credibility problem and the lack of available monetary instruments to control money supply. For these reasons, and due to the dedollarization of the economy, a significant real appreciation of the domestic currency was inevitable. The key problem was the irreversibility of the ruble appreciation caused by the hysteresis effect: having once been made expensive, the ruble had to remain so for several years. The main task for the Central Bank at that time was to build a reputation for prudential monetary policy making, and the costs of reversal would be too high. The ruble could not be devalued again without returning to the inflationary regime that would mean the failure of the crucial stabilization attempt of 1995 and entailing high political and economic costs. Moreover, as we will see below, the nominal anchor – even in the flexible form of a currency corridor – was not consistent with the loose fiscal policy. As a compromise solution, the monetary authority introduced a sliding corridor on 1 July 1996. The basic idea was to stabilize the real exchange rate and eliminate the excess external risks for home producers. The sliding corridor as depicted in Figure 2.4 ensured the rate of ruble devaluation 12.4 per cent rate over a period of 18 months, between 1 July 1996 and 1 January 1998 (averaged out from 17.7 per cent per annum in the second half of 1996, and 7.3 per cent per annum
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 75
during 1997). The annualized CPI inflation rate during this period was 11 per cent, implying the real ruble devaluation by 0.8 per cent in annual terms. Thus, the goal of the real exchange rate stabilization was reached. This was regarded by many as the regime switch from the nominal anchor of 1995–96 to inflation targeting based on standard monetary tools. Significantly, as Figure 2.4 demonstrates, the nominal exchange rate under the sliding corridor was closer to the lower bound, indicating upward pressure on the ruble. Actually, the post-stabilization currency exchange rate policy of the Central Bank was supporting the dollar rather than the ruble (we will return to this issue in Chapter 5). 2.2.3 Domestic debt expansion The policy tightening of 1995 entailed an intensive issuing of domestic public debt. In a sense, the monetary expansion of the inflationary period 1992–94 was now replaced by debt expansion. The effect of monetary tightening on the real ruble appreciation was aggravated by government debt expansion. For the same reasons the real GKO-OFZ yields and debt service expenditures increased substantially after 1995 (Table 2.3). In fact, the domestic debt expansion was not as substantial in 1995. As follows from Table 2.2, the volume of GKO-OFZ increased by 3 per cent of GDP in 1995. The federal budget deficit financing was 4.7 per cent of GDP in 1995, consisting of 3.2 per cent financed by domestic debt issues and 1.5 per cent financed by external sources, principally the IMF loans (Mau et al. 1998, p. 266). The excessive increase in public debt in 1995 can be estimated as around 1–1.3 per cent of GDP, not sufficient to threaten macroeconomic stability.
Table 2.3 Characteristics of domestic public debt in securities in 1994–98 Years
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998*
Average yield, %** Average real yield, %*** Average duration, days, by the end of period Debt service expenditures, % of GDP
295 25 50
168 13 90
80 48 150
25 13 235
38 28 292
2.6
2.3
4.7
3.6
4.0#
Sources: Russian Ministry of Finance, CBR, Batkibekov et al. (2003, p. 40, 83); * first half of the year, ** primary GKO-OFZ market annual rate, *** the same rate deflated with the CPI inflation rate for corresponding period, # for the whole year.
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
Such a scale of public debt expansion cannot be called abnormal given that the stabilization attempt of 1995 was quite successful. But the emphasis should be made on debt structure management based on the market instruments. Table 2.3 demonstrates that the average duration increased several times after 1994, but that it still remained too short by the end of the 1990s. The lengthening of the duration required significant increases of yields to maturity, because of inflation and risk premium. An alternative solution would have been to increase the average duration of public debt to between five and seven years through the issuing of more Eurobonds. This would mean the partial replacement of GKO-OFZ by higher-quality, longer-term, and less costly instruments. As we have mentioned, Russia made substantial progress in external debt negotiations that could have permitted a solution of the government’s debt management problem, both external and domestic. Unfortunately, after the success of 1995 the widespread attitude of many politicians to domestic debt was as if it was a new inexhaustible source of budget deficit financing. Note that after the default of the GKO in 1998, the public mood became diametrically opposite, and the state’s debt policy became the subject of unjustified criticism. The government was often blamed for crowding out real investment and pyramiding domestic debt in the period since 1995. But at that time debt expansion was the only possible alternative to monetization and high inflation caused by the budget deficits. As was shown by the three years preceding macroeconomic stabilization, high inflation gave no hope for investment growth in the real sector of the economy. The role of ‘money vacuum cleaner’ attributed to GKO in 1995–96 had been played earlier by the foreign currency market. In effect, the public blamed the instrument instead of the policy. In addition, as will be shown in Chapter 4, the domestic debt dynamic was actually far from what is usually regarded as the financial pyramid. Admittedly, the expansion of public debt was a necessary precondition and a consequence of macroeconomic stabilization. The radical changes in the money supply regime were made over the course of several months, in spite of the fiscal imbalances and the increased costs of debt servicing. The government had to continue fiscal policy tightening in order to balance the budget, but further expenditure cuts would hardly be possible. On the contrary, the federal budget expenditures and deficit increased in 1996 for political reasons (presidential election and post-election political indeterminacy), prompting the domestic debt expansion at a higher pace. As Table 2.4 demonstrates, both expenditure and deficit grew by 3.7 percentage points of GDP, from 18.4 to 22.1 per cent of GDP, and
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 77
Table 2.4 Federal budget of Russia in 1995–98 (percentage of GDP) Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
Revenue Expenditure Deficit Primary deficit Inflation
12.8 18.4 4.6 2.6 131.4
13.8 22.1 8.3 2.5 21.8
12.5 19.5 7.0 2.2 11.0
10.8 15.7 4.9 1.0 84.4
Sources: Russian Ministry of Finance.
from 4.6 to 8.3 per cent of GDP, respectively. The outstanding domestic debt rose by 6.1 percentage points of GDP, from 8.4 to 14.5 per cent of GDP, while debt service expenditure doubled, from 2.3 to 4.7 per cent of GDP, as seen from Tables 2.2 and 2.3. As witnessed by these figures, fiscal expansion in 1996 was driven mainly by the upsurge in the costs of debt servicing. This should not come as any surprise, given that the real yield on domestic debt papers increased nearly four times, from 13 to 48 per cent per annum, as shown in Table 2.3. Thus, a policy of fighting inflation with tight monetary policy was followed by a policy of fiscal expansion, raising the issue of ‘unpleasant monetarist arithmetic’ suggested by Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace (1981). This arithmetic is convincing: sustained fiscal expansion overwhelms an anti-inflationary monetary policy. Then the initial money base contraction leads inevitably to the money base expansion in the future. A simple monetarist model grounded on the quantity theory of money predicts that under such a policy mixture inflation can only be delayed.10 The ‘monetarist arithmetic’ argument is surely applicable to the case of Russia during the second half of the 1990s. As Table 2.4 shows, a powerful inflationary splash occurred in 1998 (because of the financial crisis dealt with in what follows). Fiscal policy tightening required radical fiscal reform. But the Russian government had no opportunities to increase the levels of tax collection or to reduce state expenditures within one or two years. Increasing nominal tax rates would not help either since it would induce the majority of enterprises to apply a variety of tax evasion schemes or shift activities into the ‘grey’ sector. Instead, radical and comprehensive tax and budget reforms were required for the systemic solution of the fiscal problems. The government did not have time for the preparation and implementation of such reforms because 1995–96 were the years of parliamentary and presidential elections.11 Social tensions were strengthening in the pre-election periods, constraining the government’s attempts to
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rationalize the system of budget expenditures. The most dangerous outcome could be the communist revenge that could cause political and economic chaos.12 In this situation domestic debt issues could compensate for the costs of disinflation and allow the postponement of the fiscal reform. The strategy of the government was to leave the status quo in the fiscal sphere until the presidential election and then, in the case of Boris Yeltsin’s success, to try to cope with the fiscal crisis. From the ex ante view, this was a rational political choice, provided that external conditions remained stable for several years.
2.3 The fragile banking system The banking system played a central role in the genesis of Russian finance and financial meltdowns of the 1990s. In the Russian market economy commercial banks were the first institutions to emerge, appearing alongside the cooperatives and small private business, as a result of the introduction of Gorbachev’s timid reforms that began in 1988. From the beginning of the radical market reforms in 1992, the banking system demonstrated impressive growth, but largely fueled by inflation and state budget incomes. Initially, this system was supposed to fulfill three functions: to be a network for a reliable payments system, to be a financial intermediary in the allocation of financial resources at home and in relations with foreign economies, and to provide finances for long-term investment projects in the domestic real sector. In the latter respect banks were supposed to replace the system of centralized planning. Theoretically, banks had to replace the administrative system in organizing effective monitoring and control over managers of enterprises in the interests of creditors. By providing an efficient allocation of resources banks could, in principle, become locomotives in the processes of modernizing the Russian economy. In reality none of the mentioned functions was fulfilled satisfactorily by the banking system. Its evolution under market transition of the Russian economy could hardly be predicted by any theory of banking. 2.3.1 Inflationary growth of banks The weakness of the Russian banking sector was (and remains) one of the main factors in the country’s financial fragility, although the rapid development of this sector in the 1990s veiled its inherent defects. The ‘hothouse’ conditions were created for the major domestic banks by the lack of competition with foreign banks, low entry costs, and easy inflationary incomes generated by the lax monetary policy.
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 79
On the one hand, the specificity of Russian banking in the 1990s was that banks typically were not financial intermediaries in any true sense and could more accurately be labelled semi-banks. Small and medium-sized banks were established to attract funds for their owners that invested it, first of all, in their own businesses. Semi-banks or ‘pocket banks’ were also established by large industrial enterprises as local financial mediators fulfilling specific financial services. These provided financial consolidation among associated members and access to short-term bank credits on preferential terms. Ownership and control over pocket banks could also accelerate payments in the interests of bank founders, as many enterprise directors explained in interviews (Ickes and Ryterman 1992, p. 340). Of course, these kinds of financial service, being useful for some individuals and enterprises, could not compensate for the absence of true banking activity of which the entire economy was in dire need. Because of the lack of norms of regulation and prudential behaviour, bank owners and shareholders typically had privileges in the allocation of credits implying inefficiencies of financial investment and risk mismanagement. Having been established solely to raise funds and close thereafter, many pyramid-like banks left the outside creditors and depositors cheated. Excessive risk taking and fraudulence were widespread during the early 1990s because entry into the banking system was very easy and the formal capital requirements were very low. Prudential barriers to entry in banking would have improved positive selection and eliminated such risks by individual investors. On the other hand, the state monopoly – Sberbank – dominated in the retail deposit market and accumulated up to 75–80 per cent of total household savings held in banks. The main reason was that Sberbank inherited from Soviet Gosbank a pervasive network of retail savings banks covering every region of the country. Another reason was the existence of implicit state guarantees to this bank as a state monopoly in retail banking that many people (especially old-aged) trusted in spite of the sad experience of the past and low value of these guarantees.13 Sberbank was not the only successor of the socialist financial system. At this time around 30 per cent of the Russian banks in the list of the top 100 had been established as aresult of the spinning off of specialized departments from the Soviet-era Gosbank (for example, Agroprombank, Promstroibank, Vneschtorgbank). The management of these banks typically lacked competence for financial decision making, but this deficiency was compensated to some extent by the lack of competition in domestic banking. The former state banks had an advantage over other
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commercial banks because they inherited a banking infrastructure. Banks that had emerged since the end of 1980s did not bear a large burden of unworkable or poorly collateralized loans to the real sector. Since the federal government and Vnescheconombank, as its debt agency, had taken on the external debt obligations of the Soviet Union, the new banking system did not need to write off many bad debts that had originated before the beginning of the reforms. Paradoxically, the Russian banking system appeared to be flourishing in the first half of the 1990s despite the demonetization of the economy. As we saw in Table 2.1, the real stock of money fell by two-thirds in 1992–93, implying that the money created by banks was also squeezed. Table 2.5 illustrates the development of Russian banking in the same period according to bank balances data. Although total bank assets were shrinking in real terms because of the impact of inflation, banking was still a very profitable business during this period. High inflation granted banks a free lunch from their control over money flows. Another reason was that banks hid their active participation in the foreign currency cash turnover required for the needs of tax evasion, capital flight, the shadow economy activity, money-washing and other semi-legal or illegal spheres of business. In addition, the banks’ top managers placed a particular emphasis on the outward attributes of success by spending a lot of money on luxury office buildings, exclusive cars, bodyguards, overheads and other items of wasteful expenditure. An impression of the successful development of banking was strengthened by its stark contrast with the deeply depressed sectors of the economy. Under high inflation the banking sector was in a privileged position that allowed it to obtain high profits from several sources: (i) The interest Table 2.5 Russian banking system under market transformations Year
1992
Number of banks 1,713 Real refinance rate ⫺12.2 (% per annum) Central Bank credits to 15 banks (% of GDP) Total assets of the banking 88 system (% of GDP) Total bank credits to the 33.6 non-financial sector (% of GDP)
1993
1994
1995
1996
2019 ⫺6.9
2517 4.4
2295 7.6
2030 6.5
5.1
2.4
1.1
0.6
54
56
36
36
20.4
19.6
12
10.4
Sources: OECD Economic Survey: Russian Federation (1997, p. 104); Yasin (2002, p. 374).
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 81
rate gap (the difference between lending and deposit rate) persisted irrespective of the sign of the real interest rate (the refinancing rate of the CBR was negative in 1992–93, as seen from Table 2.5 and Figure 2.2).14 Banks provided short-term loans to highly profitable spheres of business with rapid turnover like foreign trade. (ii) Authorized banks received centralized credits from the government and the Central Bank which was to be channelled to enterprises. They also serviced budget payments and, being at the origination of money flows, artificially delayed the terms of these payments using money free for short-term credit or speculation. (iii) Foreign currency speculation was a source of guaranteed profits for all banks until 1995, when the currency corridor was introduced. In some periods they could earn up to 70–80 per cent of total profits through foreign currency speculation (Doronin and Zakharov 1998, p. 526). In fact it was the preferential access of banks to money flows that endowed them with opportunities to speculate against the ruble. In our view, these sources of bank profits were indeed very significant under periods of high inflation, but this could not be reflected in bank balances due to bookkeeping tricks commonly used to minimize the taxation of profits. In the period of monetary tightening and the introduction of the currency regime the Central Bank’s inflationary credits were reduced and the discount window was suddenly closed for banks. The interbank credit market developed very rapidly and replaced the CBR credits as a source of short-term refinancing and redistribution of liquidity among banks. At the same time the GKO market replaced the foreign currency exchange as the main source of banks’ profits. Henceforth, the largest banks began also to attract international credits that were relatively cheap under the stable exchange rate regime. In general, the Russian banking system relied on various external financial sources of easy money that were abundant in the 1990s. Bank managers did not develop adequate expertise in risk assessment or the monitoring of borrowers. The returns on short-term credits and financial speculation covered major risks. Being vulnerable to these risks, the banking system, as a rule, did not provide long-term investments to the real sector. In 1997 the fraction of bank loans to non-financial enterprises was 31 per cent of bank assets in Russia.15 But the overwhelming part of these loans, 96 per cent of nominal value, was short-term with a maturity of less than one year. The largest banks played an active part in the privatization and redistribution of large parts of the former state property. But in this activity banks acted as short-term speculators rather than long-term investors
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
or creditors. The lack of long-term credit supply by banks was complemented by the lack of long-term credit demand by production firms. The long-term investment projects in the real sectors were typically not initiated in the 1990s due to high inflation and unprotected property rights. It is notable that the absence of long-term contractual relationships between banks and firms had a positive consequence. It mitigated the negative effects of the 1998 financial crisis on the production sector of the economy. The crash of the largest private banks was not as catastrophic for this sector as would have been the case if the bankrupted financial intermediaries had been more heavily engaged in production activity. 2.3.2 The first banking crisis of 1995 Macroeconomic stabilization caused the first crisis of the Russian banking system in Summer 1995. Some banks did not believe in the success of the new stabilization attempt and held portfolios of assets and liabilities that were inappropriate for the new situation. They did not reduce their long positions in dollars and continued to supply ruble deposits at high interest rates. When the dollar exchange rate began to fall in Spring 1995 and the currency corridor was introduced, their losses became too high. Monetary tightening led to liquidity deficits and forced many banks to borrow in the interbank credit market. The credit risks became very high since these very same banks reduced their holdings of non-interest-bearing reserves at the Central Bank to compensate for the loss of profit opportunities. This kind of reckless behaviour was soon punished by the interbank market. Some banks suspended payments, immediately provoking the spread of non-payments chains across the whole banking system. The credibility problem in the bank community arose immediately, causing a severe liquidity crisis.16 The interbank lending rates increased several times (from 70–80 to 300–350 per cent per annum), while the daily turnover was reduced ten times. The interbank market divided into small segments with tiny trading operations. Finally it collapsed on 23 August when an accidental technical fault caused the complete suspension of operations. The banking system suffered a substantial shortage of liquidity, and the Central Bank operated very effectively to make necessary liquidity injections to troubled banks. It purchased the GKO from some banks and sold to others. Nevertheless, several big banks were bankrupted by this crisis and the total number of banks reduced by 10 per cent in 1996, as seen from Table 2.5, although the banking system as a whole was restored quite quickly after the crisis.
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 83
This was the first turmoil of the Russian financial system and it should have been instructive for the monetary authorities. First, it revealed that the banking system was inherently fragile, although it did not appear to be so in an environment of high inflation and wide-ranging profit opportunities. Second, it showed that liquidity crises required immediate intervention, and the Central Bank did indeed demonstrate competence and acquire considerable experience of the workings of the system. Third, the banking crisis of 1995 revealed serious problems in the areas of bank regulation and supervision. The Central Bank tried to introduce a new system of prudential regulation in 1996, but this did not achieve great success. New departments were created (for instance, OPERU-2) to improve control over the licensing and practices of banks. A thorough analysis of bank balances revealed that there were a considerable number of insolvent banks. Their proportion of the total assets of the banking system increased from 3 per cent in 1996 to 24 per cent in 1997, indicating serious problems in banking and providing a guide for the monetary authority to deal with these problems. This valuable information was not used effectively to improve the regulation of banks until the second bank crisis in 1998 led to large-scale exits and selection in banking. The new norms of capital adequacy and reserve requirements were intended to reduce credit and systemic risks. A long list of instructions for prudential regulation was written, but the best practices were hard to implement in the case of Russian banking. Bank owners and managers usually did not have a complete understanding of the nature and the threats of systemic risks – they refused to adopt prudential regulation in any form. Even if they did understand, they did not find the adoption of prudential risk management to be in their self-interest. As a result, attempts to improve the quality of banking did not have considerable influence on its susceptibility to risks. Another reason for this failure was that the expansion of domestic debt substituted inflation as a source of high profits that again concealed the need for risk management. During this period bank regulation appeared neither urgent nor even relevant. 2.3.3 Public debt and banks Both the banking system and the state’s financial system had emerged under the regime of inflation generated by high budget deficits and they acted as complementary to one another. In many aspects of its operation the state’s financial system had to rely on the banking system. The flows of tax payments, subsidies and centralized credits were intermediated
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
by banks. The largest and most advanced banks were authorized to service budget payments until the State Treasury was established in 1998. Expansion of domestic debt after macroeconomic stabilization of 1995 occurred with dominating participation of banks that were the main suppliers of liquidity to the government. As a result, banks became the dominant holders of government papers. For example, by the end of 1996 the share of government papers in assets reached 56 per cent for Sberbank, the largest saving bank, and 40 per cent for SBS-Agro, the second saving bank at that time (Doronin and Zakharov 1998, p. 521). It can be said without exaggeration that at this time the banking system formed an important functional block in the government finance. Banks, in turn, benefited enormously from their close collaboration with the government. They obtained huge profits from credits provided by the CBR during the period of high inflation, and a large portion of inflation tax was received by banks (this is estimated, for example, at around 10 per cent of GDP in the period of high inflation, according to Astapovich 2003). The banking system gained as a result of the absence of competition with foreign banks that were subject to strong restrictions in respect of opening branches in Russia. Comfortable conditions were also guaranteed by the excessively high cost of the servicing of domestic debt. Government papers were the main liquid ruble asset for banks bearing high returns and, simultaneously, serving collateral for getting credits at home and abroad. Under such conditions the managers of banks typically had low incentives to care about risks. The top Russian banks authorized for servicing the budget payments had privileges to issue their own short-term bills guaranteed by the government. The latter also provided selectively guarantees to the so-called ‘system shaping’ banks for loans to production enterprises and budget recipients, thus subsidizing implicitly both creditors and borrowers. The first banking crisis of 1995 made urgent the issue of introduction of a deposit insurance system. It had to embrace a large fraction of ‘true’ (non-pocket) banks able to meet the standard requirements of prudential regulation. This system could, on the one hand, reduce systemic risks of bank runs and, on the other hand, provide incentives for management to improve the quality of banking. Unfortunately, the legislative initiative on deposit insurance faced very strong lobbying from vested interests that led to a delay of several years. Clearly if this system was introduced the state monopoly Sberbank would lose its monopoly position in the retail deposits market. In the absence of negative external shocks, both the state’s financial system and the banking system benefited from the symbiosis.
The Domestic Financial System and Inflation 85
The problem lay in the fragility of this system. It worked pretty well when the economy was closed from capital inflows, and the ruble interest rates were sufficiently high. As it transpired, the tandem of banks and state finance was viable only under favourable external conditions, but proved to be highly vulnerable to shocks caused by the excessive mobility of short-term foreign capital. Both government finance and banks were subject to systemic risks magnified by their symbiosis. On the one hand, a fall in the prices of government securities would have a negative effect on bank liquidity, depreciate collateral and cause a bank panic. The interbank market as a source of liquidity for banks was based on government papers serving as collateral and was, for this reason, very much susceptible to credit risks. On the other hand, the insufficient liquidity held by banks sharply narrowed the opportunities for the government to refinance debt obligations, since banks were the principal suppliers of money for the federal budget. Such a vicious circle of risks magnified the crisis outcome of 1998. As a result, the financial system created in Russia was highly vulnerable to all kinds of risks. Its weak diversification, in terms of institutions, participants and instruments, increased the vulnerability of the economy to systemic risks both in general for financial markets and specifically for banks (as in the domino effects). As an institution of financial intermediation, the banking system was overexposed to such risks. The probability of such shocks in Russia was relatively high due to the insufficient confidence of the population in the banking system and the lack of deposit insurance. The financial markets were thin and highly volatile and could not provide an efficient allocation of property rights. As I have discussed in this chapter, for a number of reasons (high inflation in 1992–95, underdeveloped financial markets, insecure property rights), banks occupied a dominant position in the Russian financial system.17 The absence of full-fledged financial intermediary was the main problem underlying its inefficiency and fragility. In spite of its dominating role, the banking system in the 1990s was unable to provide large-scale transformations of savings into investment. Neither was it prepared for survival in the global financial system or even to compete with foreign banks at home, if the latter received free access to Russian markets. The motivation of bank managers did not differ essentially from the motivation of managers of privatized production enterprises. As in the real sector, political economy was in work: the ‘system-shaping’ banks received large portions of state financial resources, along with industrial dinosaurs. The owners and managers of
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these banks had substantial political ambitions but lacked a sufficient level of expertise in banking. They became especially influential following the second presidential election of 1996 and actively engaged in lobbying activities to secure access to cheap money resources and other privileges. Even after the 1995 bank crisis, which was the first alarm signal, the gauging of credit, currency, liquidity and other risks remained of secondary importance for the majority of commercial banks. Not surprisingly, the Russian banking system proved unable to sustain the shocks of the world financial crisis of 1997 and threatened to spread these shocks to the other sectors of the economy.
3 Virtual Economy and Fiscal Crisis
Introduction High inflation was suppressed, but Russia still faced persistently high fiscal deficits that led to an increasing debt burden. The financial policy of the government remained unsustainable, while the fiscal problems turned out to be much more complex than monetary tightening. The next step after macroeconomic stabilization was the implementation of a package of structural reforms in the fiscal sphere, financial and banking systems, natural monopolies, property rights institutions and so on. All of these reforms were very difficult to implement, time-consuming, and required strong political will and enormous efforts on the part of the authorities. The IMF approved the Extended Fund Facilities program of structural reforms to be implemented in the three-year period 1996–98. But from the very beginning it was on the brink of failure, first of all, because of the presidential election campaign in Russia that began at the end of 1995. The policy cycle was unfavourable to fiscal reform, which was most urgent, and led to a dramatic reduction in the level of tax revenues that made it impossible to undertake fiscal tightening. Taking into account the overwhelming need to support Boris Yeltsin, the IMF relaxed its position and permitted fiscal deficits above the targeted levels. This concession was politically motivated but it directly contradicted the logic of macroeconomic stabilization. But as one could expect, the standard logic of market transformations sometimes did not work in the case of Russia. The underlying problems aly not only in politics, but were essentially microeconomic in nature and were rooted deeply in the command economy distortions that had prevailed for many decades. The inability and unwillingness of the Russian 87
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authorities to solve their fiscal problems can be explained by the extent of the structural problems inherited by the Russian economy. We base the analysis in this chapter on the concept of virtual economy introduced in the earlier work of Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes (1998, 2002). We agree with their key inference that during this period the essential parts of the Russian economy were not making progress towards market reforms, but were in reality actively moving away from the market. Directors of the former Soviet enterprises secured full control over production assets as a result of the large-scale privatization conducted in 1992–94. They discovered an easy way to survive under market pressure by using non-payments that spread initially because of the high inflation. The problem of non-payments might seem, at first glance, very specific but it turned out to be central to the Russian economy in the second half of the 1990s. The repeated attempts of the government to combat arrears were ineffective because it pursued an inconsistent policy towards the virtual economy. The state preferred to protect rather than to stimulate the restructuring of industries and allowed the non-market segments of the economy to survive and expand. As a result, through its own actions the government produced a severe problem of budget arrears that were underlying the fiscal crisis. This problem could not be remedied until the financial collapse of 1998. In our opinion, this line of reasoning captures the essential features of the Russian economy’s transition to a market system and sheds light on the nature of its fiscal troubles.
3.1 Virtual economy The chronic non-payment crisis began with the launch of reforms and persisted throughout the entire period of the transition to a market economy. As was demonstrated the Russian experience of market reforms, a major part of the economy could operate virtually without using money as a means of transactions. Firms purchased inputs, employed workers, and produced and delivered goods to other firms and to the government without paying or receiving any money. The government, in turn, managed to perform similar functions in their relations with taxpayers, providers of goods and services, and budget recipients. At first glance, these situations were absurd, but this was one of the realities of the Russian economy in the eight years from 1992 to 1999. Moreover, the case of overall non-payments had not been predicted by advocates and designers of market reforms. It became a surprise for many of them and a very serious challenge for Russian policy makers.
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The key questions for scholars of the economy in transition related to the meaning of the emerging market economy without money, and the possible ways in which this economy could evolve. Although insightful theoretical ideas had been suggested (some are referred to below), this problem remained unsolved practically until the financial crisis of 1998 occurred and provided a kind of ultimate solution to this and other problems of the Russian economy. 3.1.1 The non-payment problem The first splash of arrears occurred in 1992 and then, after the temporary effect of inter-enterprise arrears netting, continued to grow dramatically, reaching 38 per cent of GDP by the middle of 1998. Arrears were widespread in the markets for production inputs, labour, short-term bank credits and in relations of enterprises with the state budget. At the beginning of reforms the inter-enterprise arrears were dominating, but in the second half of the decade the budget arrears and non-money payments played the key role. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the dynamic of various kinds of arrears, and Table 3.1 presents their size and structure by the first quarter of 1998. Inter-enterprise arrears were pervasive and nearly all sectors of the economy were enmeshed in this web of mutual indebtedness. The consumer market was an exception and remained an ‘arrears-free zone’ 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5
Fe
bJu 92 l-9 D 2 ec -9 M 2 ay -9 3 O ct -9 M 3 ar Au 94 g94 Ja n95 Ju n N -95 ov -9 Ap 5 r-9 6 Se p9 Fe 6 bJu 97 lD 97 ec -9 7 M ay -9 8
0
Inter-enterprise arrears Total arrears
Tax arrears Wage arrears
Figure 3.1 Dynamics of arrears in 1992–98 (per cent of GDP) Sources: Goskomstat, Russian Ministry of Finance, Federal Tax Service.
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Table 3.1 Size and structure of arrears in the first quarter of 1998 Type of arrears
Interenterprise arrears
Size, % of GDP* Share of total, %
15.9 43.7
Tax arrears Wage arrears Arrears to banks
15.4 42.2
2.9 8.0
2.2 6.1
Sources: Goskomstat; Alexeev (1998). *GDP in 1997.
because consumer goods and services could be purchased only for cash. Foreign trade was another such zone because export and import deals required payments in hard currency. The rest of the economy, including the public sector, adapted to making transactions without money. The arrears crisis emerged spontaneously as a sequence of several waves of non-payments among industrial enterprises. The first one was triggered by the price liberalization shock in 1992. High inflation rates caused the contraction of the real money supply and entailed liquidity shortages (which replaced persistent shortages of goods under the command economy). The working capital of firms shrank in real terms and could not be restored quickly because of the short-term credit rationing. Banks reduced the credit supply to the real sector because of the increased uncertainty of inflation and credit risks. Instead, firms that could not borrow from banks used their suppliers of intermediate inputs as implicit creditors. Production firms were thus forced to absorb a significant fraction of the credit risks within the economy. Because of the lack of liquidity, firms downstream delayed payments to firms upstream which then had to do the same, thereby causing a vicious cycle of arrears. Delays in receiving payments during high inflation further eroded the working capital of firms. The banking system contributed to the spreading waves of non-payments since, as was mentioned previously, it benefited from artificial delays of payments. In a way, the credit crunch was a natural response of the infant financial system to the outburst of inflation. For this reason at the beginning of the transition few observers saw any substantial problem with regard to inter-enterprise arrears in the Russian economy.1 The East European countries faced the same problem during their period of market transition, but overcame it in two–three years as inflation was suppressed. On the contrary, the crisis of non-payments in Russia turned out to be more persistent and aggravated just as inflation was being subjected to suppression.2 The Russian authorities were faced with a range of economic, social and political problems related to the arrears crisis. However, the focus
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of mass media and political debates was given merely to wage arrears which indicated tough relations in the emerging labour market. Managers of enterprises faced semi-hard budget shortages with respect to wage payment in cash. But they often delayed it on grounds of cash shortages thus leaving workers without salaries for many months.3 Not surprisingly, the problem of wage arrears became one of the most sensitive political issues and was used by various political groups and opposition parties for political manipulations and blackmailing the government. However, wage arrears did not cascade (in contrast to inter-enterprise arrears), and their scale was not as great. As can be seen from Figure 3.1, accumulated wage arrears remained in the range 0.3–1.0 per cent of GDP in 1993–95 and 1.0–2.2 per cent of GDP in 1996–97. 3.1.2 Failure to fight arrears As has been mentioned above, the non-payment crisis was triggered initially by money overhang and inflation that destroyed the system of inter-enterprise settlements. Firms faced not only the substantial drop of demand caused by the economy opening and tight competition with imports, but also the sharp lack of finance for purchasing traditional inputs. They did not stop production and continued instead to deliver goods to habitual users disregarding their insolvency. As a result, in the first half of 1992 industries accumulated non-payments worth 3.2 trillion rubles (or 17.7 per cent of annual GDP). Under high inflation this debt burden would be diminished automatically. But arrears continued to build up as the result of liquidity constraints and because of the limited access to bank credits. As a response to this tendency, the Central Bank tried to solve the problem of non-payments through the adoption of a dual strategy described in detail by Barry Ickes and Randi Ryterman (1993). The first measure was a comprehensive mutual clearing of inter-enterprise arrears through the netting of all debts accumulated prior to 1 July 1992. The clearing procedure was aimed at eliminating gross debts, while the residual net debts and new flows of arrears were subject to easy credits aimed at bailing out indebted firms. As a result of this measure, the amount of arrears fell to around one-seventh of its earlier amount – from 3.2 to 0.4 trillion rubles (2.2 per cent of GDP). But this success was temporary since the substantial reduction of financial assets made enterprises even more liquidity-constrained. Liquidation of net debts required significant credit emission in the second half of 1992 that was the main source of increasing inflation.
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The second CBR initiative was to introduce strict financial discipline by imposing pre-payment requirements. This requirement could only work if enterprises possessed sufficient working capital. But at this time such conditions were not fulfilled, and the regulation had serious negative consequences. Being too stringent, this regulation had negative effects on enterprises that lacked working capital and could not secure short-term bank credits to pay in advance. Production, especially of highly processed goods, often required a large variety of intermediate inputs and a long time period, and was hardly possible without external financing. One way out of this situation was the adherence of enterprise directors to traditional relationships and links that allowed parties to obviate the pre-payment requirement. The Russian tradition of mutual responsibility4 made possible inter-firm coordination on the non-money exchange that protected both sides from ceasing operations. Such a strategic response on the tightening of financial constraints had very important consequences for the whole economy. The two radical measures adopted by the monetary authority would have been more effective in a situation in which financial markets and institutions were relatively developed in order to provide liquidity to firms and to prevent the onset of a credit crunch. The Russian authorities had not yet acquired an anti-inflationary reputation and had to demonstrate its firm adherence to the announced goals of macroeconomic stabilization. Otherwise the introduction of tough disciplinary measures for non-payers, like the 0.5 per cent per-day penalty attached to incur new arrears, would not be credible.5 Moreover, the tough measures had negative consequences because required additional centralized credits to cover new huge losses of financially distressed firms. The authorities could not make macroeconomic policy commitments in accordance with the attempts to tighten regulation on the micro level. As it turned out, in Summer 1992 Gaidar’s government had very serious disagreements with the new leadership of the Central Bank about the strategy with regard to reforms. In this situation any macroeconomic policy aimed at stabilizing the price level in the economy would be simply inconsistent. Admittedly, both authorities faced strong political constraints, and policy tightening would cause a catastrophic increase of unemployment that would be too dangerous, given the extremely unstable political situation in 1992–93. But the CBR revealed a strong preference towards the protection of domestic producers – even at the expense of making inflation close to hyperinflation. As we have shown in the previous chapter, the inflationary policy shift in the
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second half of 1992 undermined the stabilization programme and unfolded the inflation spiral. The failure to impose payment discipline and hard budget constraints eroded the incentives of firms’ managers. The failure to stabilize the economy implied a loss of credibility that, in our view, was not restored even after the successful macroeconomic stabilization of 1995–96. More importantly, the state lost strategic leadership in making reforms: it became a follower in the game with big enterprises since it was forced to adopt the rules of a non-payment game established initially by firms. The attempts of the Central Bank to cope with arrears demonstrated the helplessness of monetary policy in this respect. On the one hand, attempts to prevent a new build-up of non-payments through centralized credits caused excessive money supply and contributed to inflation acceleration that had the same contractionary effects on the credit supply as the initial inflationary shock of price liberalization.6 On the other hand, the tightening of monetary policy in 1995–96 also caused a reduction of liquidity supply and contributed to a aggravation of the arrears crisis. Because of its microeconomic nature, the latter could be only partially attributed to the impact of a constrained supply of liquidity. 3.1.3 Emergence of the virtual economy Arrears were a symptom of the inherent deficiencies of the post-Soviet economic system rather than just a financial disease triggered by inflationary shock and aggravated by inconsistent macro policies. The basic problem for Russia’s transition was the inherited irrational and deeply distorted economic structure. It had been formed during 60 years of centralized planning by arbitrary administrative decisions and prices that were inconsistent with market valuation of goods and resources. Richard Ericson offered a very clear formulation of the essence of structural disproportions inherited by Russia: A structure of production – location, capital, employment, materials and energy use, etc. – had been created, without any regard for economic opportunity costs, in an environment free of economic valuation and only subject to consistency in arbitrary measured economic units … The basic factors were seriously undervalued (land was free and capital-in-place virtually so), raw materials and natural resources were undervalued, highly processed goods – in particular investment products and services – were seriously overvalued … Non-market prices hided inefficiencies, tremendous waste, exaggerating both net outputs and net income produced. (Ericson 1999, pp. 2, 6)
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The Russian economic structure at the beginning of the transition period was predetermined by incorrect relative prices, the systemic misallocation of resources and non-market links between enterprises. It had been insulated from the world economy and had essential disadvantages in the production of non-basic goods. It was overloaded by the militaryindustrial complex, and suffered from a geographical misallocation of production and many other structural defects. There were many obstacles to the economic structural adjustments in the 1990s. The markets for factors did not exist; labour was generally geographically immobile; much production capital was tied up in obsolete equipment, and new investment could not begin because of the high level of uncertainty.7 The main form of economic restructuring was through the reorganization of horizontal links between firms, entry and exit, and restructuring within firms. As the transition to the market began, the deep structural distortions were manifested at the firm level. A firm that had produced goods perceived as high value under the regime of permanent shortage could end up as loss-making or even value-destroying in the period of market transition. The case of negative value-added was possible if the market price of traditional output fell too low to cover the cost of intermediate inputs, once the economy was liberalized.8 Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes (2002) suggested a general measure of firm inefficiency called distance to the market and denoted d. A high d corresponds to a value-destroying firm and a low d to a viable firm. The distribution of a population of firms over d for a deeply distorted economy in transition is characterized by a much larger mean and skewness as compared to the well-functioning economies, as shown in Figure 3.2. A common
0
⫺ d
Figure 3.2 One-dimensional model of transition
d
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story of transition was about the movement of the economy to market through the entry of new firms closer to market, the exit of old firms far from market and the reduction of the distance for firms surviving through restructuring. The corresponding shift of the distance distribution would bring about reduction of mean and skewness, as plotted in the figure. The threshold point d¯ denotes a critical distance such that firms in the tail d > d¯ are unable to survive. The common view on transition turned out to be in sharp conflict with the reality of the Russian economy in the 1990s. The assumption that firm viability could be ensured only through investment in reduction of d ignored the peculiar phenomena of widespread arrears and the survival of inefficient producers. The Gaddy–Ickes theory relied on an alternative ‘two-dimensional’ model of transition based on relational capital as a substitute to firm’s closeness to market. The relational capital denoted r is a non-tangible asset that the firms’ managers in the command economy had built up for various informal transactions like bargaining games for plan orders and resources and development of personal links with counterparties and authorities. The relational capital passed through Gorbachev’s semi-market reforms and even increased in value when the administrative system collapsed, because of the lack of both centralized planning and market discipline. Informal relations were essential for maintaining horizontal links and exchange in the destroyed economy. Precisely because this was, to a large extent, person-specific, the relational capital was easily privatized by firm directors that sought to earn all rents on assets under control, provided that the enterprises survived in the emerging market environment. The issue of survival under transition became crucial for directors. Returns on investment in restructuring were very risky and constrained by managerial competence insufficient for operating in the market environment and tied to firm-specific and obsolete technologies. The investment of resources and spending of efforts in relational capital was an alternative to restructuring. In many cases it was preferable because of the increasing returns to scale (the establishment of new relations required fixed costs). Figure 3.3 depicts two-dimensional transition with the population of firms marked by dots in the plane with coordinate axes corresponding to distance to market and relational capital. Arrows show the investment choice by firms between the two strategies of survival: through the reduction of distance to market or the build-up of relational capital. The viability constraint is line VC, above which in order to survive firms are either close to market or rich in relational capital. On the one hand, the reduction of distance to market is not
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0
VC
d
Figure 3.3 Two-dimensional model of transition
necessary for a firm to adapt to the liberalization of the economy if they have enough relational capital. On the other hand, the relational capital, as an alternative to market closeness, would be useless for firms’ viability if the virtual economy did not emerge, and the onedimensional model portrayed in Figure 3.3 would be valid. The privatization of relational capital was reinforced by the abovementioned non-money (voucher) privatization conducted in 1992–93. Its main goals were to reduce the burden of the state obligations to former state-owned firms and to provide strong incentives to firm restructuring. The state relinquished control over two-thirds of national production assets of which 60–70 per cent fell under the direct or indirect control of enterprise directors (see Box 2.2). Indirect control was ensured through the voting shares of employees who were typically loyal to directors and of affiliated outside companies that received shares at voucher auctions. The effect on incentives turned out to be negligible because firm directors had already obtained widespread opportunities for control and informal ownership rights. This was the case of privatization by and for insiders. It contributed to the virtual economy by legitimizing informal relationships and through the conservation of the status quo in the ownership structure that had existed since the beginning of reforms. Instead of the creation of strong incentives to restructuring, privatization by insiders created additional obstacles to movement to market. The absence of an effective bankruptcy mechanism and the widespread presence of soft budget constraints allowed a large number of non-profitable firms to survive.
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The fraction of loss-making producers increased noticeably during the 1990s, for instance, from 23 in 1994 to 47 per cent in 1997 for manufacturing industries, construction and transport. To some extent, this tendency can be attributed to the tax-avoidance motive but, evidently, a large mass of inefficient producers was given an opportunity to survive without restructuring. 3.1.4 Survival in the quasi-market enclave The shocks caused by the liberalization of the economy and its opening up to foreign trade revealed deep structural distortions and caused radical changes in relative prices.9 Structural transformations and a reallocation of resources were necessary, but these processes were mitigated by the policies and the state that sought to bail out domestic producers. They suffered increased pressure of competition with imports and growth of domestic prices for the basic goods. The latter were regulated, and the government tried to keep control over convergence of the basic prices to the world level. Nevertheless, the initial energy price jump was very high: for instance, the gas price grew 4–5 times in dollar terms in 1993.10 The new energy prices turned out very high as compared to the level that pre-existed in the planned system (but were still very low when compared to the world levels: roughly eight times lower for gas, four times lower for oil, and six times for electric energy). The abrupt relative price shock was immense for an economy that lacked mobility of factors of production. Domestic producers had been insulated from global price shocks for many decades and had never before suffered such drastic resource price changes at home (not to mention that they had never had to respond to prices in the command economy). Adjustment to the basic price shocks at the firm level occurred in terms of the managerial efforts choice outlined above. The strategic choices faced by directors were to invest either in relational capital or restructuring. There were three main modes of strategic behaviour, according to the two-dimensional model of transition. Some firms tried not to accept arrears and required pre-payment, thereby selecting the strategy of moving to market. Others, with smaller relational capital and larger distance to the market, almost halted production activity and turned out to be non-viable. The third group of enterprises formed the core of the virtual economy and continued to produce by making losses hidden by widespread non-payments. The latter case allowed adjustment without restructuring and the survival of firms based on the maintenance of the soft budget constraints grounded on non-payments. The mechanism was the following. First,
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the effective price of the basic resources and intermediate inputs in the virtual economy was much lower than in the market economy. This was because of the rapid inflationary depreciation of debts receivable built up on mutual arrears and of probable defaults on these debts (the effective price of inputs was near zero in the cases of bad debts). Second, non-payments made the financial position of firms in the virtual economy non-transparent. Unprofitable firms protected themselves from going bankrupt by making obscure valuation of assets and liabilities. As Ickes and Ryterman remark (2003, p. 233), ‘When enterprises provide credit to trading partners of unknown viability, they discover that they can obscure their own viability.’ The non-transparency of financial flows also widened opportunities for tax avoidance and shadow-economy activity. Third, parties that invested in relational capital instead of restructuring received mutual benefits from their partnership. Upstream suppliers accept non-payments as a means of preserving the market niche, while downstream purchasers received a reliable source of easy financing. The former incurred losses from high inflation in the bilateral relationship, but in the virtual economy as a whole inflationary losses and the gains of parties were, to a large extent, netted. As there was a reduction of inflation in Russia, the total volume of implicit borrowing through non-payments increased, providing clear evidence of the non-monetary nature of this phenomenon. By building up relational capital and accepting/issuing arrears firms could become members of the network of non-market survivors. Due to the wide spread of arrears, a quasi-market enclave emerged, large enough to shape the essential features of the economy as a whole. It provided an opportunity to mitigate the pressures of growing energy prices and competing imports on firm-members that could continue production in ways that were wasteful of resources. Gaddy and Ickes (1998) labelled this collective activity ‘mutual survival behaviors’. The large-scale privatization simplified the self-organization of a critical mass of enterprises endowed with sufficiently large volumes of relational capital into this enclave. It became the core of the virtual economy designed for the mutual survival of firms-participants with inferior technology without restructuring.11 The essential feature of the virtual economy is a network or informational externality implying that the return on relational capital is increasing in line with the total number of firms in this economy. The network of arrears was created through coordination among firms that involved mutual arrears and the quasi-market exchange of goods under low effective prices of the basic resources. The virtual economy operated
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through the misuse of these resources and implicit subsidizing by the state and the state-owned natural monopolies through control over the domestic prices of oil, gas and energy (the explicit subsidies were formally abolished because of the pressure from the IMF). The network externality of the virtual economy was grounded in the mechanism of strategic complementarity between owners of relational capital. This implied the possibility of an inefficiency trap, a stable Pareto-inferior equilibrium with a large proportion of non-payments in firms’ revenues (which was exactly the case for the Russian economy). Allocative inefficiencies were caused by tremendously distorted effective prices of resources and intermediate inputs. The virtual economy was based on the non-market valuation of output through ‘personalized’ effective prices formed by non-payments. These prices did not convey relevant information on demand and supply and, as a result, the economy did not utilize alternative opportunities that would be useful under restructuring. Information asymmetries concerning the true value of assets and liabilities of firms were aggravated by non-payments that impeded investment in production capital. It is notable that the existence of a large exporting energy-resource sector in the Russian economy was the necessary precondition for emergence of the virtual economy. On the one hand, this sector produced valuable tradables that were exchanged for consumption imports. The latter were purchased by households as a reward for labour inputs in the virtual economy, among other inputs. On the other hand, the energy sector ultimately covered the losses of domestic intermediate and final goods providers. Although domestic oil and gas prices increased several times after price liberalization, the effective prices paid by manufacturers remained low due to non-payments. The low effective prices of basic resources and intermediate inputs allowed domestic manufactures to survive in the consumer goods market with transactions in cash and for world prices. Otherwise competition with imports would be unbearable because of the abrupt increase of the energy prices that coincided with the dramatic real ruble appreciation in 1993 and afterwards. Similar to the voucher privatization for insiders that maintained informal ownership rights, the virtual economy tended to maintain the traditional structure of effective relative prices and thereby ensured the artificial viability of inefficient domestic producers. Non-payments were not the only mechanism for their self-organization on the quasi-market base. Another important form was barter exchange and the circulation of surrogate papers veksels of a promissory notes type, both widespread in the second half of the 1990s.12
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The share of barter in the inter-enterprise operations in manufacturing increased from 26 per cent in 1995 to 40 per cent in the middle of 1997. Barter operations as well as the issuance of veksels usually did not pass through firms’ bank accounts. They could be hidden from the fiscal authorities, although since 1994 the latter repeatedly and with little success tried to tax these operations. Although the basic reason for the origin of the barter system was tax evasion, it also became the essential part of the virtual economy. As Ickes and Ryterman (1992, p. 357) recognized, ‘it is difficult to disentangle the tax-avoidance motive for using barter from the payments-problems motive’. Barter operations relied primarily on the circulation of standard goods, including some tradable commodities which were the most convenient means of nonmoney exchange. Usually, these goods had distinct market valuation, were storable and highly liquid – they included, for instance, construction materials, fuel, alcohol, and foodstuffs. Self-organization of large domestic producers on the quasi-market basis also took place through the establishment of financial-industrial groups and holdings. In a manner similar to non-payment nets, vertical and horizontal integration was aimed at creating market niches, the easing of access to financial funds, and quasi-market pricing that ultimately distorted the rewards to factors and the allocation of resources. The arrears crisis revealed a set of fundamental problems relating to the economy in transition: structural rigidities inherited from the planned economy, improper managerial incentives under imperfect property rights, underdeveloped financial markets and the credit market failure, incredible policy commitments and the impact of political uncertainty on the transition to the market. The inconsistent policy of the state, relying on various forms of explicit and implicit subsidizing, eroded incentives for moving to market even for potentially viable firms.
3.2 Fiscal crisis The virtual economy theory of transition is helpful for understanding Russia’s fiscal problems among which the key one was the reduction of tax revenue in cash which was replaced with non-money tax payments by means of so-called money surrogates. This theory clarifies the nature of the Russian fiscal crisis manifested from the very beginning of market reforms and aggravated after macroeconomic stabilization. In our view, the government was to a large extent involved in the non-market mechanisms of the virtual economy. To a large extent the fiscal crisis was a fundamental consequence of the problems that the economy,
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with its deeply distorted structure and wrong managerial incentives, could not obviate. 3.2.1 The nature of tax problems A new tax system was created at the very beginning of market reforms. The value-added tax (VAT), the payroll (pension and social) taxes, import duties and excises were imposed already in the first quarter of 1992. The new tax system was a basis for government finance in the modern market economy. The ability of the government to organize collection of taxes under total disorganization and chaos in 1992–93 was, without doubt, one of the most successful results of Gaidar’s cabinet. The new Russian tax system was based on the two pillars, the profit tax with a nominal rate of 32 per cent and the value-added taxes with a nominal rate of 28 per cent. The main burden of taxation was carried by the production sector of the economy because of the relatively low costs of tax collection. The income tax regime for households that ensured only around 10 per cent of consolidated budget revenue came from the very low incomes of population.13 As a result, the tax burden on producers was extremely high in nominal terms. The marginal rate of enterprise taxes (VAT, profit, payroll-social and turnover) exceeded 90 per cent. Only for the two main taxes, profit and VAT, was the marginal rate 60 per cent, given that the firm was not making a loss. But the enterprise taxes base was in many cases fictional because prices were distorted by the state policy to protect the virtual economy. The tax obligations of enterprises that were de facto loss-making or value-destroying were fictional as well.14 Not surprisingly, the effective tax burden was well below the nominal one and was very unevenly distributed across taxpayers. The actual tax burden was at its highest at the beginning of the reforms, despite the chaotic situation and political messes. The consolidated budget revenue was 28.8 per cent of GDP in 1992 and was notably decreasing subsequently, as seen from Table 3.2 below. The high nominal burden compensated for the imperfections of tax collection and narrow tax incidence which was the key problem. To a large extent, the state budget revenues on all levels were relying on the taxation of large former stateowned companies. They had long ‘financial histories’, were relatively transparent for fiscal monitoring and control, and could be taxed at lower costs. In addition, the Soviet-style directors of these firms were typically compliant – through inertia – to the long-standing tradition of obeying financial discipline (in the command economy deviations from the centralized financial plan were severely punishable). For a period
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they continued to adhere to formal fiscal rules, and the fiscal authorities benefited from such restrained tax-avoidance behaviour. New businesses that flourished after the economic liberalization could find easier ways to avoid taxes. New practices were developed as a reaction to the excessive tax burden, and new enterprises gained experience in applying a spectrum of instruments for the so-called ‘tax optimization’ (by using transfer prices, fictive transactions and by establishing daughter enterprises and short-lived or fictional firms to minimize the VAT and profit taxes, by applying fictive life-insurance schemes to reduce the payroll taxes, and so on). Illegal collusion between taxpayers and the tax authorities was also widespread. Of course, tax administration was unsatisfactory in terms of the excessive costs of fiscal monitoring, verification and control for taxpayers. The tax authorities imposed long delays in VAT offsets on intermediate inputs. Under a regime of high inflation this was de facto additional taxation that transformed VAT into a kind of turnover tax, adding to the highly distorting effect of the regular turnover taxes. With time, a wide range of tax privileges and exemptions appeared because of lobbying activity and because of the influence of vested interests who had connections in the power ministries and the State Duma. All of these adverse ‘innovations’ resulted from the political compromises between the government and the opposition and aggravated the uneven tax burden on producers. Leaving aside these deficiencies, the tax system, nevertheless, was operational and ensured the enlarged government budget revenue at an average rate of 32–35 per cent of GDP which would be quite acceptable for many developed economies. Unfortunately, the trend of tax collection in the 1990s was negative. Table 3.2 presents the consolidated and enlarged government state budgets. Tax revenue for the latter diminished from 38.1 per cent of GDP in 1992 to 29.9 per cent of GDP in 1996. The key factor was the reduction of revenues on profit tax, VAT and foreign trade duties, as seen from Table 3.2 (foreign trade duties fell because of the abolition of export tariffs in 1995 mentioned above and import tariff privileges that made widespread tax avoidance possible). Although budget revenues increased for excises, property and some other taxes, the total tax revenue was falling substantially. The ineffectiveness of tax administration was usually blamed for this tendency. Firstly, privatized enterprises learned from new businesses to apply various legal, semi-legal and illegal schemes to reduce their tax burden. Secondly, in many cases tax avoidance became the guiding principle for firms-suppliers that accepted debts receivable and/or used
Virtual Economy and Fiscal Crisis 103 Table 3.2 Tax revenues of consolidated budget in 1992–98 (per cent of GDP) Taxes
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Income Profit Value-added Excises Foreign trade duties Others* Consolidated budget revenue Payroll Enlarged government budget revenue
2.3 8.3 10.5 1.1 3.7 2.2 28.8
2.6 9.8 6.6 1.0 4.0 2.0 25.9
2.9 8.0 6.1 1.2 3.1 3.7 25.0
2.3 7.4 6.0 1.5 1.5 3.9 22.8
2.6 4.4 6.5 2.4 1.0 4.8 21.5
2.9 4.0 6.6 2.4 1.1 5.5 23.8
2.6 3.6 5.8 2.4 1.4 4.2 21.7
9.3 38.1
10.0 35.9
9.8 34.7
8.5 32.4
8.4 29.9
9.0 32.8
9.4 31.1
Sources: Yasin (2002, p. 347); Institute for Economy in Transition. * property, rental, turnover and other taxes.
barter operations. They could resort to the virtual economy to disguise part of their activity from the fiscal authorities.15 As we see it, however, the crucial factor in the fall of tax revenues was the growth in the level of tax arrears. Federal tax arrears increased from 1.8 per cent of GDP in 1994 to 8.7 per cent of GDP in 1996, while federal tax collection in cash decreased from 7.8 per cent of GDP to 4.3 per cent of GDP. The system of tax administration was naturally designed for money-based transactions and could not be redesigned easily for taxation under the conditions of non-money exchange. Clearly, this system was not very successful but, taking into account the scale of the virtual economy, the formal routines and procedures of tax collection could not play the key role in the dramatic fall in tax revenue. Tax arrears resulted from the accumulation of unsettled taxpayers’ obligations to the fiscal authorities and firms’ decisions to postpone payments to the budget once the accounts were settled.16 The cash-based accounting used in Russia (inherited from the Soviet command system) created additional incentives to accumulate arrears,17 and diminished the pressure of tax discipline on enterprises. Taxable base as well as tax arrears would be much larger under the alternative accrual-based system, implying origination of tax obligations outstanding after delivery of goods and services. In this case tax obligations by an upstream firm would arise irregardless of whether or not cash revenue was received from a downstream firm. This would automatically cause accumulation of tax arrears by the former if the latter does not pay. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the dynamics of the accumulated tax arrears and the size of tax collection in cash for the federal budget. The presence
104
The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns 14 12 10 8 6 4 2
M
Ja n
-9
4 ay -9 Se 4 p9 Ja 4 n9 M 5 ay -9 Se 5 p9 Ja 5 n9 M 6 ay -9 Se 6 p9 Ja 6 n9 M 7 ay -9 Se 7 p9 Ja 7 n98
0
Federal tax collection in cash
Federal tax arrears
Figure 3.4 Federal tax arrears and tax revenue in cash (percentage of GDP) Sources: Goskomstat, Ministry of Finance, State Tax Service.
of annual cycles in the growth of tax arrears is evident: they fell at the end of each year as a result of the tax offsets applied by the fiscal authorities. These were tax credits issued as payment for goods and services delivered by firms that reduced their tax obligations. This way of netting debts did not solve the problem of arrears to the budget since the outstanding taxes of enterprises were not settled – they were reduced only temporarily – but the state obligations were increasing. As seen from Figure 3.4, the tendencies of rapid accumulation of arrears and decline of payments in cash were prevailing. The fiscal authorities fell into a vicious cycle. On the one hand, the multiplication of arrears caused contraction of tax base in cash. On the other hand, reduction of government incomes left budget recipients18 unable to pay to providers of goods and services prompting the proliferation of tax offsets, which then circulated as a kind of quasi-money. The fiscal crisis was thus unfolding through the networks of the virtual economy underlying non-payments. By this reason any improvements of tax administration would be, in our view, ineffective. In fighting the tax arrears the government applied many times the ‘carrot-and-stick’ policy measures. As an example of ‘carrot’ one can point out the reductions of the VAT rate in 1993 and the profit tax rate in 1994. The idea was to obtain the Laffer-curve effect of increased levels of tax collection, but this did not work out in practice. Firms in the virtual economy did
Virtual Economy and Fiscal Crisis 105
not get enough incentives for paying all taxes in cash (this would mean adoption of the alternative strategy of survival and would be an irreversible decision; moreover, disclosure of ‘true’ booking to the tax authorities was irreversible and risky as well: once detected as capable of paying taxes in cash firms would have been treated this way by tax authorities subsequently). Another ‘carrot’ was the Minfin decision in March 1994 on redemption of government and tax arrears through mutual offsets. Tax amnesties that freed non-payers from fees and penalties19 as well as the attempts to restructure the principal debts of enterprises did not help either. Enterprises continued making new tax arrears since they expected the state to forgive them again. As an example of a ‘stick’ one can point to the series of decisions taken in Spring 1994 to take control over the bank accounts of enterprises and block them or withdraw money in the case of overly large tax arrears.20 For persistent non-payers special accounts were introduced in 1995 under the control of tax authorities with discretion to withdraw all funds. These tough measures forced enterprises subject to this regulation to reduce legal turnover and increase non-payments and barter. Though high penalties and penalizing interest rates on tax arrears had been imposed, they only increased tax indebtedness but did not change the tax behaviour of firms. By the second quarter of 1998 the total volume of penalties and interest fees on non-payers was 261 billion denominated rubles (10.5 per cent of GDP in 1997) and was above the principal by 36 per cent. In fact, the rapid accumulation of penalties aggravated the problem of tax arrears by increasing the probability and the scale of new debt forgiveness by the state. In principle, persistent tax debtors could be bankrupted by the fiscal authorities, but the bankruptcy law did not give priority to the state as a creditor. In addition, the expected social costs that the state had to incur in each case of bankruptcy exceeded the volume of tax arrears by a significant amount, leaving aside the problem of social tensions that could be caused by large-scale bankruptcies. Thus, just like the vain attempts to use monetary policy against interenterprise arrears in 1992–93, neither carrot nor stick provided a solution to the problem of tax arrears. As we have seen above, both loosening and tightening the money supply to fight arrears had negative consequences. Both the fiscal and monetary policy tools were clearly inadequate because the government could not increase market pressure and impose effective regulation on the virtual economy. Radical tax reform was actively debated after the macroeconomic stabilization of 1995–96. But even if adopted, it would hardly be successful because of the
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
presence of the large and rapidly expanding quasi-market segment of the economy. Another reason for delaying tax reform was political uncertainty in the period of the presidential election in the first half of 1996. Both the abrupt decline of tax revenues and the strong increase in the level of tax arrears occurred at the end of 1995 when communists and their allies won the State Duma election in December 1995, indicating the negative attitude of wide groups of citizens to market reforms. This was the worst political situation since the sharp civil conflict in October 1993. The probability of Boris Yeltsin being re-elected was extremely low. According to surveys of public opinion, only a small percentage of voters (between 6 and 8 per cent) would support Yeltsin if election took place at the end of 1995 or the beginning of 1996. It appeared to many that he had absolutely no chance to win his second presidential campaign. In this situation the decision not to pay taxes was the rational choice taken by many of the directors of former state-owned firms. Since the destiny of the market reforms (let alone the liberal-type government) was uncertain in the event of a communist victory, there was no need to obey the rules and fulfill the financial obligations. All of the debts of enterprises might be written off by the populists if they rose to power. Or these debts might be eroded by inflation because of the high probability of total nationalization and chaos in the economy. Some red directors who supported communists desired this outcome and therefore had a political motive for participating in this sort of tax sabotage. The aggravation of the fiscal crisis could benefit the opposition by undermining the main ‘administrative resource’ of Yeltsin’s team. Directors not engaged in the political struggle had to do the same in order to avoid the competitive disadvantage and thereby contributed to the spread of tax arrears (Sinelnikov and Trofimov 1997, pp. 141–2). 3.2.2 The state in the virtual economy As was shown in the previous chapter, the high levels of inflation were suppressed by the tightening of monetary policy in 1995. It was based on a nominal anchor and imposed the high costs of the real ruble appreciation and the real exchange rate increase. The commitment to tight monetary policy was not supported by fiscal policy measures, and the initial success of macroeconomic stabilization proved to be problematic. With regarding to fiscal policy, while non-interest budget expenditures were cut, there was no improvement in the level of tax collection. The tight monetary policy eliminated the resort to inflationary financing. Regular tax collection fell dramatically, and domestic debt
Virtual Economy and Fiscal Crisis 107
had already expanded too much while the debt service expenditures had grown, reaching 4.7 per cent of GDP in 1996 (compared with 2.5 per cent fixed in the annual budget). Fiscal deficits increased from 5.6 of GDP in 1995 to 7.7 per cent in 1996. The level of federal budget tax revenue (including tax offsets) stood at 11.2 per cent of GDP, which was 2.4 per cent of GDP below the level targeted in the budget law on 1996, while cash revenue (excluding tax offsets) was only 9.2 per cent of GDP. Table 3.3 demonstrates that the government systematically failed to fulfill annual budgets regarding tax collection and deficits. Obviously, such a dramatic worsening in the level of fiscal performance did not contribute to macroeconomic stabilization. As was mentioned above, the decisive factor in this worsening situation was political uncertainty. The continuation of market reforms relied entirely on Boris Yeltsin’s re-election as president. At first the IMF tried to pressure the government but relaxed its position because of the extraordinary political situation. The Extended Fund Facilities credit designed for support of the state budget reorganization and other structural reforms was neither abolished nor sustained despite the breach of the agreement with the IMF in terms of the key items of tax collection and budget deficit. As a compromise between forgiving as a result of political circumstances and maintaining the discipline, the IMF reduced this credit from the initially approved amount of $6 billion to $3.6 billion. The gap of $2.4 billion was made up by the new official non-tight credits granted by the French and German governments. This situation with financial support weakened the IMF reputation for toughness among Russian politicians who began to regard it as willing to compromise (and also as being politically constrained by the notion that ‘Russia is too nuclear to fail’). Unfortunately, the situation in the fiscal sphere did not improve after Yeltsin’s victory in June 1996. Yeltsin suffered from heart disease soon Table 3.3 Federal budget 1993–97 as approved and executed, three items: total spending, total income, budget deficit (IMF definition) all as a percentage of GDP 1993
Revenues Expenditures Deficit
1994
1995
1996
1997
Exec- Law uted
Exec- Law uted
Exec- Law uted
Exec- Sequ- Executed ester uted
14.9 20.6 –5.8
14.1 24.0 –5.6
12.0 17.6 –5.6
11.2 18.9 –7.7
20.4 31.8 –3.7
13.8 17.5 –3.7
14.6 18.9 –4.3
12.0 17.9 –6.0
Sources: Ministry of Finance; Charles Wyplosz and Nadezhda Ivanova (1998, p. 5).
11.0 17.8 –6.8
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after his re-election and this made him unable to fulfill presidential duties until the Spring of 1997. The newly appointed members of the government had insufficient political influence and competence to solve the mounting fiscal problems. In the event, in addition to all these troubles of the Russian policy cycle, the state budget was overloaded with spending obligations that had become unbearably large for a economy in transition (see Box 3.1). Under high rates of inflation the government had little concern about this issue. The expenditure items were fixed in the budget in nominal terms and were automatically reduced by intervening inflation. The Ministry of Finance usually underestimated inflation in its projections (only once, in the first half of 1994, when the abovementioned disinflation surprise took place, this proved troublesome for the government). When inflation was suppressed, the government could not resort to automatic reductions of the real budget expenses. Instead, it began to use politically and socially painful procedures of budget sequestering which, however, did not eliminate but rather postponed the state obligations to future periods.
BOX 3.1 Peculiarities of the Budget Process in Russia ‘Unrealistic’ annual budgets were adopted in the 1990s because of the informational and political constraints, and severe incentive problems. On the one hand, populists and lobbyists in the State Duma promoted the approval of excessive expenditure items without any guaranteed increases of budget revenues. The government had to give in, being aware of the probable lack of revenue and the difficulty of execution, in order to adopt the budget as it was and to have some rule of law in fiscal policy (in 1992–94 the budgets were adopted by the Duma too late, by the middle of each year). On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance lacked information about the true needs of the budget sectors and relied essentially on data relating to the actual spending of previous years. The elaboration of annual budget proposals was similar to games of bureaucratic bargaining for plans and resources under the command economy (in this respect the Ministry of Finance replaced the Central Planning Committee of the former USSR). The total volume of financial orders submitted by budget recipients essentially exceeded the expected budget revenue, and the Ministry of Finance applied a routine
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procedure of rationing. Budget recipients anticipated cuts in orders and had strong incentives to increase their budget proposals above the real needs. The problem of the optimization of state budget expenses was put forward as a prior task of the government only a year after the presidential election, in 1997.
As a result, the disease of arrears that had spread initially among the industrial enterprises began to infect the fiscal authorities. Excess budget expenditures were either postponed or financed through issues of money offsets, a type of promissory note to be redeemed at some undefined future date. The so-called ‘Treasury Obligations’ (Kaznacheiskie Obligatsii, KO) were issued just after the disinflation surprise, on 9 August 1994 and were used for payments to enterprises. Because of the strong IMF pressure, the government abolished KO at the beginning of 1996, but expanded the issue of tax offsets that partially replaced tax revenues in cash.21 For example, in the critical pre-election situation of April 1996 around two-thirds of tax revenues were obtained in tax offsets (by July 1996 this fraction had been reduced to half, although this was still too high). The state was also issuing other money offsets to regulate the debts and credits of enterprises owed to and from the budget. As in the case of mutual inter-enterprise arrears discussed above, it was impossible to eliminate arrears between the budget and the economy sectors only by means of credit emission. Nevertheless, the surrogate instruments (money surrogates) became very attractive for the Russian financial authorities. Tax offsets allowed the Ministry of Finance to close numerous financial gaps that emerged under the tight money policy, tax arrears, and excessive budget expenditures. The fiscal authority found a convenient way to solve current problems especially acute in the election campaign, Firms providing goods and services to the state accepted surrogate payments because of overpriced contracts. The surrogate payments could be used for tax payments or transformed into liquidity in the secondary markets that emerged simultaneously with the expansion of the short-term ruble debt GKO-OFZ. The issuing of surrogate instruments aggravated disorder and was detrimental to the state’s finances. Normally, a government debt issue leads to an increase of the tax burden or to refinancing through the issuing of new debt in the future. In the case of tax arrears and offsets the government could face a heavier increase in its future tax burden22 or, alternatively, a need for refinancing through new issues of tax
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
offsets in return for the redemption of the old ones. The latter case would lead to a tax crisis and an inevitable default on surrogate-based debt. In addition, building debt policy on surrogates meant the emission of personalized debt obligations and the creation of firm-specific financial products. Being based on non-transparent transactions, such a policy was similar to the use of tax exemptions and implicit subsidies to the virtual economy. The issue of money surrogates forced the government to make inefficient decisions in terms of the procurement and selection of investment projects. In many cases companies preferred to have tax debts and accepting payments in the form of tax offsets irrespective of their productive efficiency. The emission of surrogate instruments also had inflationary consequences. At first glance, their volume was not large when compared to the money aggregates, only 12–15 per cent of the M2 volume. But, according to Gresham’s law, the money surrogates had a much higher velocity and tended to crowd out true money from transactions between enterprises and the state budget. The circulation of these instruments did not affect the CPI index directly, since consumer goods could be purchased only for cash. However, because of the multiplicative effects, the surrogates increased total financial disorder in the economy – thus making the outburst of inflation a likely future outcome. It is important to understand that the use of the money surrogates was mutually beneficial for the individual participants. The budget recipients gained from the state transfer in any form, although they had to sell tax or money offsets at a high discount. Financial intermediaries received a premium for liquidity provision to the budget recipients and claimed redemption of surrogate papers from the government. Such transactions generated an additional interest burden that had been unforeseen in the state budget and increased the total volume of shortterm debt obligations. The authorized banks also provided direct shortterm loans to the budget recipients under government guarantees. All of these activities were non-transparent and had much in common with the chaotic building-up of Soviet external debt obligations prior to the first debt crisis (discussed in the first chapter of this book). But the key problem was that the state was becoming increasingly involved in the virtual economy. Arrears and tax offsets generated by the government induced the multiplication of arrears and widened the vicious circle of non-payments. Attempts to combat arrears were too late and inconsistent: restrictive measures contradicted the issuing of new instruments. For instance, the government of ‘young reformers’ appointed by Boris Yeltsin after his re-election declared the strong
Virtual Economy and Fiscal Crisis 111
intention of struggling with surrogates, but instead continued emissions at even larger volumes of money offsets (Yasin 2002, p. 263).23 The situation did not improve after the re-election: the total federal tax revenue (cash and non-cash) was only 70–80 per cent of budgeted levels in 1996–97, making it inevitable that the state would accumulate new unfulfilled obligations and arrears. Moreover, the share of federal tax payments in cash was only 60–70 per cent of tax revenue, indicating the involvement of the government in unfolding the spiral of nonpayments. Playing games with the virtual economy caused a further widening of fiscal gaps and contributed to the fiscal crisis.24 The government would be unable to support the virtual economy during the whole decade without the so-called ‘three fat boys’: Gazprom, the Unified Electric Systems (UES), and the Railway Ministry. They had been transformed from the Soviet ministries; the latter two remained under governmental control, while the state’s stake in Gazprom was only 40 per cent. In effect, Gazprom was now under the control of its top managers – the government had to negotiate with them rather than giving them orders. This was unsurprising since the main architect in the creation of Gazprom was prime minister Victor Chernomyrdin who had been the minister of the gas industry during the Soviet period and who had transformed this ministry into Gazprom at the beginning of the market reforms. Unlike the other natural monopolies, Gazprom was (and nowadays still is) the biggest exporting company in Russia controlling the gas pipeline networks and providing the largest inflow of foreign currency revenues for the economy and the state budget. By these reasons Gazprom was in the previous decade a ‘state in the state’ and possessed great autonomy from the government. As pillars of the virtual economy, the natural monopolies fulfilled the role of ‘budget donors’ of last resort. They were explicitly subsidizing the quasi-market sector through a policy of low prices and non-payments. For instance, the fraction of non-cash revenues was especially high in the case of UES: sometimes it exceeded 95 per cent of the company’s total revenue. In the Soviet economy electric power was extremely cheap or free, and that is why the so-called ‘strategic consumers’, such as the Ministry of Defence, tried to maintain this tradition by disregarding the UES bills. All of the natural monopolies were net creditors of the budget, because their own tax arrears were several times below the arrears of the state. Support for the state budget meant an implicit subsidy of the virtual economy which the state sought to support. The natural monopolies, nevertheless, benefited from these provisions. They gained from the monopoly pricing and the effective price
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
discrimination among consumers using non-payments under their control. Although energy, gas and rail transport prices were formally regulated by the state, the annual price increases were initialized and given formal justification by the natural monopolies themselves. The government had to be a follower in the strategic price-setting game with these companies. It tried in vain and on many occasions to curb the growth of the prices charged by the natural monopolies. For instance, the ‘young reformers’ repeatedly used the mass media to criticize their management for charging ‘artificially high prices’. Several presidential and government decrees were issued to limit the growth of energy prices or, at least, to tie them to current CPI inflation rates. Since the levels of non-payments by energy consumers were also increasing, the direct impact of effective energy prices on inflation was not so large. But the growth in energy prices also had an indirect effect on growth, through signalling to downstream producers an expected economy-wide price increase. This mechanism of inflationary expectations coordination drove the so-called ‘cost inflation’ that was often claimed to be the main source of price growth after the macroeconomic stabilization.25 The government was strongly dependent on the natural monopolies as the budget donors and for this reason it was not inclined to implement anti-monopoly measures. The restructuring of Gazprom and UES only remained a popular theme of political and public debates (the suggested programmes for their reforming were unworkable and very far from being adopted or implemented). The state, however, was not completely powerless to affect the behaviour of natural monopolies. It possessed the potentially effective tools of control such as the licensing of exports (by Gazprom) and the neglecting of non-transparent dubious schemes adopted in the financial management of these companies. However, because of the political weaknesses of Yeltsin’s regime, the state could not use every available opportunity to impose binding incentive constraints on the natural monopolies. From the theoretical point of view, situations of this kind can be described in terms of incentive games between the state and the natural monopolies (see Box 3.2). In a Pareto-inferior equilibrium with arrears or barter the energy-exporting monopoly and the state are implicitly subsidizing the quasi-market sector of inefficient producers. The monopoly chooses the effective/barter energy price at home in accordance with the willingness of the state to protect the virtual economy from restructuring. The robustness of arrears/barter equilibrium allows the virtual economy to sustain monetary tightening, the formal elimination of state subsidies to enterprises, the world growth in energy
Virtual Economy and Fiscal Crisis 113
BOX 3.2 Incentive Games in the Virtual Economy The Ericson–Ickes (2001) model of the Virtual Economy captures the most essential features of the Russian economy of the 1990s outlined in this subsection. There are two production sectors in the model: the first is the gas-producing natural monopoly (Gazprom) generating export revenue and supplying gas at home, and the second is the manufacturing sector subject to restructuring or implicit protection by the state. Manufacturing firms are heterogeneous, having different energy-input coefficients, and Gazprom can discriminate between efficient and inefficient enterprises by engaging selectively in barter operations. The government chooses incentive parameters affecting the choice of the monopoly, the survival rate of manufacturing enterprises and the revenues at the disposal of the state. The barter equilibrium is shown to be robust in the sense that firms gaining from barter would refuse to restructure even if the barter ‘price’ of energy is sufficiently high. Without the option of virtual economy barter, all manufacturing firms would choose socially efficient restructuring. The model demonstrates that only substantial changes in the government policy trade-off (support of inefficient producers versus costly restructuring) can draw the firms out of the barter equilibrium.
prices, and various shifts of policy-related parameters (reflecting, for example, the attempts of the government to implement or imitate the structural reforms). To the extent that the fiscal crisis in Russia was a consequence of a robust non-money equilibrium with arrears or barter, the government had few opportunities to fight this crisis using the standard methods of macroeconomic governance. However, the IMF relied on conventional wisdom and suggested using these methods for Russia simply because they had been tested in some other emerging markets. 3.2.3 Making the oligarchs: the loans-for-shares deal The Russian government had to invent permanently non-standard ways to solve its recurrent problems. At the end of 1995 the key policy was to raise additional money to support Yeltsin’s forthcoming presidential campaign. He could offer voters very little evidence of progress during his first period in office. The market economy was not yet up and
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running and the overwhelming majority of ordinary people still suffered from the high costs of transition. The main contribution to households’ welfare was the reduction of inflation and the stabilization of the ruble’s exchange rate. The ruble appreciation made middle-class people wealthier and prompted a notable increase of consumption and imports. Those who could make savings gained from investment in ruble-denominated assets such as deposits in commercial banks and government savings bonds, which yielded astronomical real returns. But the majority of population had no savings at all. The suppression of inflation was not sufficient to compensate for the extremely low level of real wages and hidden unemployment, tremendous income inequality, and numerous social problems. The urgent task of the federal budget was to further the positive results and shift the attitude of potential voters in favour of the ruling political regime. As we have shown above, the government was hard-pressed in the fiscal sphere and relied on injections of additional revenue which could be viewed as political contributions. A ‘breakthrough’ idea was suggested by Vladimir Potanin and supported by Anatoly Chubais in the Spring of 1995. Potanin was the head of Oneximbank which had very rapidly (one can say miraculously) become one Russia’s top five banks. It was one of the creditors of Norilsk Nickel, ‘the pearl of the North’, a world-class non-ferrous and precious metal company with annual sales exceeding $2.5 billion. Potanin proposed taking management of this company in exchange for a loan supplied to the government to finance a budget gap in part. He organized a consortium of bankers to lobby the government officials. As collateral, the syndicate required controlling shares of the leading Russian export companies that had been excluded from the earlier voucher privatization. Formally, this loan was supposed to be redeemed after the presidential election, but in the event the government was unable to repay the debt the lenders seized the copllateral. In effect, it was a scheme of money privatization and it became known as the notorious ‘loans-for-shares’ deal. In addition to Potanin, the initial consortium of bankers included Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Alexander Smolensky, and some other rich people who became oligarchs after Yeltsin’s re-election. It was the first time that some of Russia’s largest financial players agreed about coordinated strategic actions and committed themselves to the division of national property. The initial offer to the government was a loan totalling $1.8 billion in exchange for the trust management of Norilsk Nickel and several leading oil-producing companies such as Yukos, Sidanko, Lukoil, and also the natural monopolies UES and Svyazinvest (however, these
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last two were later excluded from the deal). Though the total amount of the loan was hundreds of times below the fair value of the collateral, the scheme was approved by the Russian government on 31 August 1995. The crucial role in the government’s adoption of this deal was the political support by Anatoly Chubais, at that time the first deputy premier. His approval was viewed as a guarantee of the scheme’s fairness and openness and helped to alleviate the doubts about this deal that had arisen in the international financial community. These doubts turned out to be reasonable, since the lenders were permitted to organize the auctions of collateral themselves and, hence, received carte blanche to completely exclude any competition. These auctions were conducted in November–December 1995 and, in contrast to the voucher privatization auctions, occurred without alternative bidders. I myself was aware of proposals from some foreign companies that exceeded the starting prices by ten times but were rejected by the organizers of auctions for technical reasons. Most of the potential competitors understood that they had no chance of winning and did not even try to participate in the auctions. The gap between the initial and final price typically did not exceed a few percentage points, indicating the identity of the seller and the buyer in each case. The results of the loans-for-shares auctions are presented in Table 3.4.26 In order to demonstrate its transparency, competitiveness, and fairness the government made a public announcement of the deal. Instead, the
Table 3.4 Results of the ‘loans-for-shares’ deal Company
Date of The stake Starting Final price Actual winner auction purchased price ($ million) (%) ($ million)
Norilsk Nickel Yukos Sidanko Sibneft
17 Nov. 8 Dec. 7 Dec. 28 Dec.
51 45 51 51
170 150 125 100
170.1 159 130 100.3
Lukoil Surgutneftegaz
7 Nov. 3 Nov.
5 40
140 66.7
141 88.9
Novolipetzky 7 Dec. Metal Company Others* —
15
30
31
Oneximbank Menatep Oneximbank Oil Finance Company Lukoil Surgutneftegaz, Oneximbank Oneximbank
—
—
66
—
Source: Author’s data. * Oil-producing company Nafta-Moskva, metallurgical company Mechel and three shipping lines.
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
world could watch the outrageous examples of how property was typically reallocated, showing Russian crony capitalism in action. The total amount of the loan obtained by the government through the auctions was only half of the initial consortium’s offer. As can be seen from Table 3.4, the total state revenue was only $0.9 billion or 1.9 per cent of the federal budget revenue (0.2 per cent of GDP) in 1996. These funds could hardly ensure Yeltsin’s victory, but were eventually rewarded with the most attractive piece of national property. It became clear for everyone not involved in the ‘loans-for-shares’ deal that it was absolutely unfair and unreasonable from a national welfare point of view. At first glance ‘privatization for and by oligarchs’ was even more irrational in terms of economic policy objectives and benefits of the state than the ‘privatization for and by corporate insiders’ completed two and half years earlier. But despite the obvious absurdity of the proposal, this scandalous deal was driven by strong politically motivations. The first question arising in connection with this deal is why did Anatoly Chubais, at that time the leading economic reformer in the government, decide to support the loans-for-shares offer? It was clearly in conflict with the principles of openness, competitiveness, and fairness declared by the government and to which he personally, as a liberal economist, was an adherent. The budget crisis and the IMF pressure on the government to reduce the budget deficit were strong enough, but could hardly be a decisive argument, since the addition of one or two billion dollars of revenue could have little impact on the whole situation. In fact, Chubais tried to think and act in a strategic manner, and the most important issue for him was the creation of a class of big owners who would be able to affect strategic policy making in Russia. The oligarchic regime of power created as a result of the loans-for-shares deal in 1996 was supposed to become a framework for a future political system. The ‘loan programme’ was a convenient label that disguised what was essentially a privatization for oligarchs of the Russian ‘crown jewels’ at symbolic prices. In addition, the loans-for-shares deal could be used as a sort of poison pill in the event of Yeltsin’s defeat because it would have deprived any new government of a large chunk of state property. Finally, the loan-for-shares deal was thought to impair the position of ‘red directors’ and eventually to undermine their political influence. The second question is: why did Boris Yeltsin and his circle agree so quickly to the oligarchs’ offer? They did not think strategically like Chubais and were not responsible for raising the state’s budget revenue. In my view, the main motive for their adoption of the offer was a sort
Virtual Economy and Fiscal Crisis 117
of panic about the possibilities of a communist victory. The ruling elite needed political support at any price regardless of the long-term political consequences. But the true role of oligarchs in giving financial support to Yeltsin’s presidential campaign was very much exaggerated after the election by mass media under their control. They claimed that risk-taking justified the extremely low valuations given to state property prior to the re-election of Yeltsin. In fact, the loans the oligarchs supplied to the government were not exposed to a great risk of default in the case of Yeltsin’s defeat. A leftist government that would take power could abolish the loans-for-shares deal and leave the oligarchs without tremendous gains. But, acting pragmatically, this government would not necessary try to default selectively on public debt for purely ideological or political motives. The loans-for-shares credit to the state made only a small financial contribution to the election campaign. This was equal to roughly only one-tenth of funds raised by Yeltsin’s team for the same purposes through alternative sources. No collateral was required for other credits to the government, and the abovementioned budget transfers to regions ensured for Yeltsin the vital support of the regional authorities. The most important potential political support for Yeltsin would leave primarily for the regional authorities that had a lot of autonomy from the federal powers under his rule. The outcome of the election depended largely on the political preferences of these regional governors. The main problem was that at the very beginning of the presidential campaign the vast majority of the governors supported communists and their allies, and the most pressing task was somehow to reverse their leftist preferences. Yeltsin mobilized all of the reserves of the federal budget and beyond to secure the regional authorities’ loyalty. I am sure that the federal social transfers rather than the mythical support of ‘big bankers’ made essential changes in the course of election. The financial contribution by oligarchs to Yeltsin’s success was part of the mythology they built for themselves after the election. Of course, the aggressive support of Yeltsin’s campaign by the mass media and, especially, by the national TV channels played a significant role in the dramatic change of political preferences among the Russian population during the first half of 1996. But there was no need whatsoever to organize the loans-for-shares deal to ensure this support. For example, the ORT channel, the most popular station in Russia, was controlled by Boris Berezovsky who was in alliance with the Yeltsin family and became a member of the Potanin–Khodorkovsky coalition at the very end of the giveaway process. Russia’s two main media magnates
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of the 1990s, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, could have been rewarded for their loyalty to Yeltsin at a much lower cost. The third question relating to the loans-for-shares deal is: why did the Russian government not redeem the debt to oligarchs following the election of Yeltsin? As stated above, the fraction – 1.9 per cent of the federal budget revenue – was not so great as to warrant giving oligarchs state property worth many hundreds of billions of dollars. If the government had possessed the political will, it would have faced no obstacles to the repayment of the loans and keeping the collateralized shares even after the termination of the contract on 31 August 1996. The initial terms of the contract could be renegotiated, and this date could be postponed without giving rise to any serious criticism among the world’s financial community, because the unfairness and the cronyist nature of the deal were evident to everyone. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Russia entered the world financial markets in the Autumn of 1996 and could easily borrow abroad $0.9 billion plus interest. My answer is that by the end of Yeltsin’s re-election campaign the political system of Russia had been already captured by oligarchs.27 The virtual economy was thus supplemented with the virtual political system. The Russian term for this was semibankirshina, which means, literally, the power of seven bankers.28 In my opinion, the oligarchic rule in 1997 was extremely inefficient in all respects. The main negative factors were the illness of Yeltsin after the election, the total political mess, and the failure of the ‘young reformers’ to modernize the virtual economy and to ensure macroeconomic stability. Almost a year and a half after the election saw very little progress in terms of reforms in public finance and other spheres. All of these failures contributed to the Russian financial collapse in 1998. This policy capture implied the creation of a new political system. Together with the most valuable chunks of national property the oligarchs also secured political power. They began to consider the federal state as a privatized corporation in which they had invested money ($0.9 billion) and from which they naturally expected to get returns. After this time top state officials were viewed as managers of this ‘corporation’ and were supposed to serve their new owners and to forget about national welfare goals that they had originally appointed to fulfill. For me it was astonishing how the entire political system had been transformed in just a few months from the time of the re-election. As the first deputy minister of finance, I tried repeatedly to defend the federal budget from the burdensome pressure exerted by the ‘system-shaping’ oligarchic banks. For this reason I criticized the ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme from
Virtual Economy and Fiscal Crisis 119
its very beginning for obvious reasons of outrageous financial inefficiency. Nevertheless, after Yeltsin’s re-election I received a personal offer from Boris Berezovsky, at that time the grey cardinal near the king’s family, to become a member of his team as a condition of my staying in office. I could not accept this offer which meant fulfilling the work for the new oligarchic regime of power. I strongly believed – and still believe – that a top state official has to serve the goals of national welfare rather than the interest groups that sometimes capture politics. Because of my tough position I became the subject of a hysterical and dirty campaign in the mass media that was controlled by the oligarchs. Duels in modern times are not permitted, and there is no place for heroism in the spirit of Alexander Hamilton (see Box 1.2). The only possible response to the insinuations in the mass media was my decision to resign at the beginning of 1997. But even being aware of the cronyist nature of the ‘loans-for shares’ deal, I could not envisage all of its politico-economic implications for Russia. The very essence of the state changed dramatically, and the subsequent evolution of the Russian policy system had little influence on its essentials. Although bureaucrats forced the oligarchs from power after Yeltsin’s resignation at the end of 1999, they became in turn the true masters of the ‘corporation’ and operated primarily in their own interests. This attitude to power became a social norm. In a way all of the radical policy shifts that occurred in Russia after Yeltsin’s rule can be viewed as being consequences of the unsuccessful attempt to create a class of oligarchs in Russia. Unfortunately, most of the Russian liberal reformers offered an a posteriori justification of the loans-for-shares deal as a ‘necessary pact’ to ensure that the communists did not take control of the Kremlin in 1996. The reformers have not recognized that it was their great mistake, and this is very sad. If even liberal economists in Russia supported and tried to justify the model of crony capitalism, then bureaucrats could feel absolutely free in the radical revision of their functions. The very spirit and the essentials of the market reforms proved to be lost simply because of the $0.9 billion of additional revenue the federal budget received in 1996. In my view, this mistake was made unintentionally since the reformers could not foresee the negative long-term consequences of this pact for the economy and the political system of Russia. I concur with Crystia Freeland’s (2000, p. 170) observations of the deal: That ‘necessary pact’ turned out to be a Faustian bargain. The young reformers defeated the Communists, but they lost their souls in the
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
process. They had come to power as democrats; to stay there, they created a shadowy, unelected cabal. They had come to power to create a fair, equitable, law-abiding market economy; to keep it, they sponsored one of the world’s sleaziest insider deals. Ultimately, loansfor-shares destroyed the young reformers: it cost them their ideals, their reputations, and eventually their jobs. Worse yet, ultimately, it scotched any short-term hopes there still were for the emergence of healthy, prosperous Russian capitalism. Instead, Russia’s market economy is now corrupt, distorted, and inefficient, and loans-forshares is both the cause and symbol of its malaise. The rule of oligarchs in 1996–97 led to an exacerbation of the internal struggle for political power and new pieces of the yet undivided state property pie. The most striking example was the privatization of Svyazinvest, a telecommunication holding, in 1997. This was the first occasion on which the government had made an attempt to design a privatization auction in the standard way to maximize the budget revenue. It obtained $1.7 billion for 25 per cent of shares, which was an extremely large volume in comparison with ‘money auctions’ (being, for example, ten times higher than the Norilsk Nickel auction revenue). This and some other attempts of the ‘young reformers’ to distance themselves from the oligarchic control provoked the informational war against the government. The key TV channels and other mass media under their control became a very effective weapon in the ‘cold civil war’ the oligarchs tried to unleash. In what follows we will return to this issue in our discussion of the mechanisms underlying the Russian financial crisis.
4 The Risks of Domestic Debt Expansion
Introduction As we have seen, the anti-inflationary monetary policy pursued in 1995–96 succeeded in reducing the level of inflation. A stabilization of inflationary expectations occurred in the second half of 1995 thanks to monetary policy tightening and the nominal anchor regime. But this stabilizing effect was not enough to reduce the real interest rates that soared due to constrained liquidity supply, the expansion in government debt, and the banking crisis of Summer 1995. From early 1996, the factor of political uncertainty sharply raised the risk premium in yields of domestic financial instruments. In this respect macroeconomic stabilization was not completely successful. The tightening of monetary policy was not supported by a reduction of the budget deficit – in fact, the deficit increased in 1996. For a number of reasons, including the 1996 presidential elections, political instability, and the struggle between oligarchic groups in 1997, the tax and budget reforms did not take place under Yeltsin’s second period of rule. The chronic budget crisis entered a phase of tension which, to some extent, was a consequence of macroeconomic stabilization. Additional budget funds had to be obtained because of the urgent need to finance social expenditures (mostly pensions and wages in the budget sectors). The government was engaged in creation of money surrogates escalating thereby the problem of non-payments that had become the main trouble for the whole Russian economy. The dramatic increase in the cost of debt servicing in 1996 was accompanied by new fiscal problems. The election race, together with a considerable decline in tax discipline, led to a rapid growth in the level of the domestic debt. The tax behaviour of enterprises worsened 121
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substantially, not only because of the political uncertainty, but also as a result of the evident tendency of the money surrogates to become the prevalent means of payments. The inability of the government to boost taxes in cash and to find an effective systemic solution to the fiscal crisis resulted in domestic debt expansion. Debt replaced inflation but, in turn, was posing a threat to macroeconomic stability. As we shall see in this chapter, the main problem was not the rate of debt accumulation per se. In fact, in real terms the volume of debt was tending to stabilize. The main problem lay in the composition of public debt which was overwhelmingly short-term and therefore strongly exposed to the risks of refinancing. Additional risks were created after the opening of the financial market because of the unsuccessful exchange rate risks management scheme applied by the monetary authorities. The short-term gains from this scheme for the domestic financial system were doubtful, but it made a substantial contribution to its vulnerability to external risks.
4.1 Dynamics of public debt in 1995–98 Thanks to debt financing, the authorities delayed inflation for several years, but could not eliminate the basic inflationary background. Debt expansion replaced the monetization of budget deficits, and the ultimate success of macroeconomic stabilization was conditioned on the conduct of radical and systemic fiscal reforms. But these reforms were delayed, creating the threat of sliding into a regime characterized by a higher inflation regime. The primary budget deficits in 1995–97 under conditions of monetary tightening, fiscal crisis, and political uncertainty led to a dramatic increase of debt service costs. The position of state finance was becoming increasingly fraught, with danger of a debt crisis and default. The government was forced to play a risky fiscal policy game using financial markets and the banking system. 4.1.1 A paradox of debt stabilization Surprisingly, despite the fiscal woes of Russia that led to the increasing of debt in the absence of economic growth, the total public debt remained stable in real terms. As seen from Table 4.1, government debt stood at around 50 per cent of GDP during the three-year period 1995–97. The paradox is that while the primary deficit was permanently high (around 2.5 per cent of GDP on average), economic growth was negative on average, and debt service costs were large (around 4.5 per cent of GDP on average), the level of total debt did not grow in real terms.
The Risks of Domestic Debt Expansion 123 Table 4.1 Russian public debt in the 1990s Year
1995 1996 1997 1998
Primary Interest payments Government debt Real GDP deficit growth % of GDP % of $ billions % of GDP (% of GDP) (%) revenues 2.2 2.5 2.4 1.3
3.6 5.9 4.6 4.6
28 47 38 43
170 201 218 242
50 48 50 77
– 4.0 –3.4 0.9 – 4.9
Source: Kharas et al. (2001, p. 14).
It was near 50 per cent of GDP in the period 1995–97 – a level considered acceptable by international standards for the emerging market economies. The explanation suggested, for instance, by Kharas et al. (2001) and Ickes (2007) is that the artificial real ruble appreciation entailed by the nominal anchor (by 85 per cent during the three years 1995–97) masked the true burden of external debt accumulation. The drastic increase of total state debt to 77 per cent of GDP in 1998, as seen from in Table 4.1, was caused by the debt crisis and the real ruble depreciation (which are the matter of our discussion in the following chapters). The real exchange rate appreciation in the period 1995–97 was not the result of fundamental changes, but rather a response to previous overshooting. This real ruble appreciation was therefore susceptible to external shocks, and created a problem of hidden external debt burden. Meanwhile, the former Soviet debt had been rescheduled by the end of 1997, reducing the threat to financial stability, at least until the end of the decade. As we have shown in Chapter 1, successful debt restructuring allowed the Russian government to remove the main burden of external debt servicing for a period of six or seven years into the future and, thus, to postpone the essential increase of the debt payments until 1999. The new sovereign debt of the Russian Federation did indeed grow rapidly in the middle of the 1990s – from $11.3 billion at the end of 1994 to $35.6 billion at the end of 1997 (Table 4.2). The main contribution in this new build-up of external debt was the result of the IMF–WB’s financial support of macroeconomic policy which cost $13.7 billion. The Russian Eurobond issues amounted only to $5.5 billion before the financial crisis of 1998. Even though the new external debt of the Russian Federation was growing in the 1990s, it was not so large as to play a decisive role in the deterioration of the state finances. The roots of the Russian debt crisis of
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
Table 4.2 Russian external debt in the middle of 1990s ($ billion)
Total external debt Soviet debt New Russian debt Multilateral creditors* Eurobonds Other
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
127.5 116.2 11.3 5.4 0.0 5.9
128.0 110.6 17.4 11.4 0.0 6.0
136.1 108.4 27.7 15.3 1.0 11.4
158.1 99.0 35.6 18.7 4.5 12.4
155.0 102.7 55.4 26.0 16.0 13.2
Sources: Russian Ministry of Finance; Vnesheconombank; Citibank. * Includes IMF disbursements to the CBR.
500 450
GKO
OFZ
400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1994
1995
1996
1997
Figure 4.1 Domestic debt in 1994–97 in GKO-OFZ (trillion rubles) Source: Russian Ministry of Finance.
1998 are usually seen in the tendency of domestic debt accumulation to accelerate in the period 1995–97 (see Figure 4.1). A popular accusation against the government was that it relied on excessive debt financing to combat inflation. Many people even accused the government of running a Ponzi scheme à la MMM and other pyramids against which the government had been struggling in earlier periods. The problem was that these people suffered a sort of money illusion. Domestic debt did indeed initially grow fast in real terms because of the small base effect, but it had begun to stabilize by the beginning of the financial crisis of 1998. This was also the case for total public debt, as can be seen in Table 4.1. It is also clear from Table 4.3 that the growth of domestic debt
The Risks of Domestic Debt Expansion 125 Table 4.3 Domestic debt of the federal government (end of period, percentage of GDP)
Total debt GKO OFZ Debt to the CBR Securitized credits Other
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
18.9 1.7 0.0 9.60 3.1 0.0
12.73 4.27 0.70 3.96 1.95 1.85
18.07 9.49 1.56 2.78 1.37 2.87
21.8 11.0 6.59 0.0 1.17 3.05
21.79 0.62 11.32 0.0 1.05 2.13
Source: Ministry of Finance, Citibank.
140 GKO-OFZ
GKO-OFZ-Eurobonds
120 100 80 60 40 20
94 r-9 4 Ju l-9 O 4 ct -9 4 Ja n95 Ap r-9 Ju 5 l-9 O 5 ct -9 5 Ja n9 Ap 6 r-9 Ju 6 l-9 6 O ct -9 6 Ja n9 Ap 7 r-9 Ju 7 l-9 O 7 ct -9 Ja 7 n98 Ap r-9 8 Ap
n-
ec D
Ja
-9
4
0
Figure 4.2 Dynamic of real debt in market instruments (trillion rubles, base December 1993) Sources: Russian Ministry of Finance, Goskomstat.
in short-term market instruments, such as GKO, as a share of GDP was 151 in 1995, 122 in 1996, and 16 per cent in 1997. Figure 4.2 depicts the dynamics of the real debt volume in GKOOFZ deflated to the March 1993 CPI level. The upper part of the graph records the total debt outstanding in market instruments, including new Eurobonds issues that originated at the end of 1996. The strong tendency of real debt stabilization is evident. The jump in the volume of debt occurred on 15 March 1997 and relates to the securitization of CBR credits to Ministry of Finance into long-term fixed-rate bonds OFZFR with maturities of between four and 16 years.1 The Eurobond issues,
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The Russian Public Debt and Financial Meltdowns
obviously, did not change the entire picture. The reduction in the absolute volume of debt in the last few months before the August 1998 default is explained by the extraordinary anti-crisis measures undertaken by the government and described in further detail in Chapter 6. The evidence presented in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2 suggests that the domestic debt stabilization occurred regardless of the real ruble appreciation. Two questions arise in connection with this evidence. First, why did domestic debt begin to stabilize? Secondly, if this debt was beginning to stabilize by the beginning of 1998, why did the debt crisis occur in that year? 4.1.2 Did the government play pyramid with debt? As was mentioned, the data in Figure 4.2 contrast with the popular view of Russian domestic debt as a financial pyramid. This was a key argument made against the attempt to bring about macroeconomic stabilization based on replacing inflation through the expansion of debt. Critics made repeated comparisons of the Russian government’s debt policy with financial bubbles that emerged in the period of wild financial markets in 1993–94 (and described above in Chapter 2). In addition to money illusion, this view was based on the observation that the government had to refinance its short-term debt by making new issues rather than by making repayments from the federal budget surpluses (that did not exist). But the fact that the government rolls over its debt does not necessarily imply a pyramid. In Appendix A4.1 I suggest a parsimonious test of whether outstanding debt dynamic is better described by a logistic or exponential curve. The latter case is strongly rejected for the domestic debt expansion period 1993–98 consistently with the evidence on real debt stabilization. The key reason for the tendency of debt stabilization was the drastic reduction in real interest rates after the resolution of political uncertainty in Summer 1996, and the opening of domestic financial markets discussed in what follows. The real interest rate dramatically declined because of Yeltsin’s victory in June 1996, even though the debt volume was already fairly large. This is made clear in Figure 4.3, which shows that the dramatic fall in the real GKO-OFZ yield occurred after the dramatic jump of a similar size in the second quarter of that year when the political uncertainty had been at its peak. As a result of the decline in government paper yields, the cost of debt servicing ceased its dramatic growth and there was a degree of stabilization of the volume of debt. This, however, did not eliminate the
The Risks of Domestic Debt Expansion 127 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20
n98
-9 7
Ja
7 l-9
O ct
r-9 7
Ju
Ap