The
Science of Culture
A
STUDY OF MAN AND CIVILIZATION
B)>
GROVE
Leslie A.
PRESS, INC.
White
^.
NEW YORK
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The
Science of Culture
A
STUDY OF MAN AND CIVILIZATION
B)>
GROVE
Leslie A.
PRESS, INC.
White
^.
NEW YORK
This edition
is
published by arrangement with
Farrar, Straus
Copyright
©
and Cudahy
1949 by Leslie A.
White
Tenth Printing
MANUFACTURED
IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONTENTS
AUTHOR'S NOTE PREF ACE PART 1 SCIENCE AND SYMBOLS Introduction I.
II.
III.
Science
2
Sciencing
is
The Symbol:
3
the Origin and Basis of
Human
Behavior
22
On
40
the Use of Tools by Primates
Mind is Minding V. The Expansion of
IV.
PART
49 the Scope of Science
120
VI. Culturological
Human
vs.
Psychological Interpretations of
Behavior
121
VII. Cultural Determinants of VIII. Genius:
Its
IX. Ikhnaton:
Mind
146
Causes and Incidence
The Great Man
vs.
190
the Culture Process
X. The Locus of Mathematical Reality
The
Definition and Prohibition of Incest
XII. Man's Control over Civilization:
An
233 282 303
Anthropocentric
Illusion
PART
55
MAN AND CULTURE
II
Introduction
XI.
xi
xvii
330 III
ENERGY AND CIVILIZATION
Introduction
362
XIII. Energy and the Evolution of Culture vU
363
CONTENTS viii
PART
IV
CULTUROLOGY
XIV. The Science
of Culture
Chapter References BibHography Index
397 4^ '^^5
4^
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The
author wishes to thank the following publishers for per-
mission to quote from their publications:
Appleton-Century-Crofts,
The Study
oi
Inc., for excerpts
Man, New York,
from Ralph Linton,
1936.
Cambridge University Press (England), for excerpts from G. H. Hardy, A Mathematician's Apology, Cambridge, 1941. Geo. E. G. Catlin,
for excerpts
from Emile Durkheim, The
Rules oi Sociologies] Method, University of Chicago Press, 1938.
The
University of Chicago Press, for excerpts from
World and Man, H. H. Newman,
of the
ed.,
The Nature Marc
Chicago, 1926;
Ruffer, Studies in the Palaeopathology of Egypt, R. L. ed.,
Woodie,
Chicago, 1921; and from Geo. Steindorff and K. C. Seele,
When
Egypt Ruled the East, Chicago, 1942.
Thomas
Y. Crowell Co., for excerpts from Clark Wissler,
New
and Culture,
Crown I See
It,
Publishers, for excerpts
from A. Einstein, The World As
copyright 1934 by Covici-Friede,
Doubleday and Co., Story of
My
Life,
Man
York, 1923.
New
Inc., for excerpts
New
York,
from Helen
Keller,
The
York, 1903.
Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd., for excerpts from Arthur Weigall^
The
Life and
Times of Akhnaton, London, 1923. ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
X
Harper and Brothers, for an excerpt from Thomas Wolfe, You Can't
Go Home
Again, copyright
The Sun
Dial Press, 1942,
New
York. Henrj- Holt and Co., Inc., for an excerpt from John Dewey,
New
ReconstTuction in Philosophy, Wissler,
An
York, 1920; and from Clark
Introduction to Social Anthropology,
New York,
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., for excerpts from A. A. Moret,
and Egyptian
New
Civilization,
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Trends,
New
New
New New
W. W.
Wm.
I.
Thomas,
York, 1937; and from Recent Social
Co., for excerpts from E. A. Hooton,
Up From
York, 1931; F. H. Giddings, Principles of Sociology,
York, 1896; A.
History,
from
York, 1933.
The Macmillan the Ape,
The Nile
York, 1927.
Inc., for excerpts
New
Piimitive Behavior,
1929.
M.
Schlesinger,
New
Viewpoints in American
for
an excerpt from Erwin
York, 1922.
Norton and Co.,
Schrodinger, Science and the
Inc.,
Human Temperament, New
York,
1935-
The
Science Press, for excerpts from H. Poincare, Foundations
oi Science,
New
York and Garrison, 1913.
Charles Scribner's Sons, for excerpts from James H. Breasted,
A History of Egypt, Simon and phies,
New
revised edition.
New
York, 1909.
Schuster, Inc., for an excerpt from Living Philoso-
York, 1931.
Stechert-Hafner, Inc., for excerpts from E. T. Bell,
The Queen
of the Sciences, Baltimore, 1931.
The Viking Social Change,
Press,
Inc.,
New York,
for excerpts
1922.
from
Wm.
F. Ogburn,
AUTHOR'S NOTE
Oome
time ago Mr. Arthur Orrmont, formerly a student
at the University of
Farrar, Straus
of
mine
Michigan,
now on
the editorial
staff
and Company, suggested that certain
of
articles
that have appeared in various journals might well be
re-
printed in a single volume. This book has grown out of his suggestion. in
more 1.
The
previously published articles that reappear here
or less modified form are as follows:
"Science
is
Sciencing,"
(Philosophy of Science, Vol.
5,
pp. 369-389, 1938). 2.
"Mind
is
(The
Minding,"
Monthly, Vol. 48,
Scientific
pp. 169-171, 1939). 3.
"The Symbol: The Origin and
(Philosophy of Science, Vol. 4.
"On
7,
Basis of
Human
Behavior,"
pp. 451-463, 1940).
the Use of Tools by Primates,"
(Journal of
Com-
parative Psychology, Vol. 34, pp. 369-374, 1942). 5. "The Expansion of the Scope of Science," (Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, Vol. 37, pp. 181-210, 1947).
6.
"The Locus
of Mathematical Reality:
An
Anthropological
Footnote," (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 14, pp. 289-303, 1947)7.
"Culturological
vs.
Psychological Interpretations of
Human
Behavior," (American Sociological Review, Vol. 12, pp. 686-698,
1947)8.
"Man's Control over
lusion,"
(The
Scientific
Civilization:
An
Anthropocentric
Monthly, Vol. 66, pp. 235-247, 1948). Xi
Il-
AUTHOR'S NOTE
jjji
9.
"Ikhnaton:
The Great Man
the
vs.
Culture Process,"
(Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 68, pp. 91-114,
1948). 10.
"The
Definition and
Prohibition
of
(American
Incest,"
Anthropologist, Vol. 50, pp. 416-435, 1948).
"Education: America's Magic," which appeared in School and Society (Vol. 61, pp. 353-354, 1945) has been incorporated in the
An An
chapter "Man's Control over Civilization: Illusion."
Material from "Atomic Energy:
Anthropocentric Anthropological
Appraisal" and "Energy and the Development of Civilization" has been incorporated in the chapter "Energy and the Evolution of Culture."
"Atomic Energy:
An
Anthropological Appraisal"
was read before the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Philadelphia
was never published
in a journal *
on December
28, 1945. It
but was printed in
its
entirety
some newspapers, including: The Baltimore Sun, December 29, 1945; The Milwaukee Journal, January 10, 1946; and The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 13, 1946. "Energy and or large part in
the Development of Civilization" was a radio address delivered over the Columbia Broadcasting System in
February
16,
New
York City on
1947, on a program sponsored by the United States
Rubber Company.
It
was subsequently published with a
series of
* The curious reader will find interesting comment on this talk by Dr. E. U. Condon, Director, National Bureau of Standards, in an address to the winners of a science scholarship contest in Science News Letter, March 16, 1946; Science, April 5, 1946; and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago, March 15, 1946. Dr. Condon, in effect, advises the young men and women to have nothing to do with prophets of "fatalism" (i.e., determinism in human affairs) such as I. He quotes the Holy Scriptures, and concludes with an inspiring passage from Elizabeth Barrett Browning. See, also, a reply to Dr. Condon by M. F. Ashley Montagu in Science, May 3, 1946, in which he tells of a resolution, proposed by himself, seconded by Margaret Mead, and adopted by the American Anthropological Association, pledging anthropologists to work with other scientists to make "appropriate inherent in atomic use." social inventions" to "guard against the dangers No report on progress toward such inventions has appeared as yet. .
.
.
AUTHOR'S NOTE on science
talks
(New May,
The
in
York, 1947).
It
Warren Weaver,
Scientists Speak,
was
editor
by Technocracy Digest,
also reprinted
The Great
1947, and
am
I
xiii
Lakes Technocrat, May-June, 1947.
grateful to the editors of the journals in
which
my
articles
originally appeared for their kind permission to reprint them here.
Two
some time
of the articles republished here were reprinted
ago in ETC., a Review of General Semantics: "The Symbol" (Vol.
pp. 229-237, 1944), and
1,
pp. 86-88, 1943-44).
Dr.
of
Wm.
'The Symbol" was
Knickerbocker
S.
"Mind
Century English, which he edited
and
is
Minding" (Vol.
1,
rewritten at the request
published
(New
Twentieth
in
York, 1946).
A
number of the articles republished in this volume evoked comment when they originally appeared. "Mind is Minding" brought forth a harsh criticism from Professor Jared Sparkes
Moore
(Scientific
Monthly, Vol.
replied briefly {ihid., pp. 365-66).
"The Expansion
which
to
365, 1940)
50, p.
of Science" was reviewed at length in a sympathetic article
Professor A. L. Kroeber, "White's
Anthropologist, Vol. briefly in
1948).
Man, by
And
it
50,
View
pp. 405-415,
Professor
received brief
J.
I
of the Scope
by
of Culture" (American
1948).
It
was reviewed
L. Myres (Vol. 48, p. 11, January,
comment
in Science (Vol. 106, p. 84,
1947) from Mr. Alden A. Potter. "Man's Control over Civilization"
drew
a
entitled
reply
"Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos" from Harold H. Steinour in
Monthly (Vol. 66, pp. 447-48, 1948). Mr. Steinour argues that it would be a good thing to believe that the human Scientific
will it is,
is
free even
though
at least to a degree.
Egyptologist, Professor for venturing "to
although
I
am
it
were not.
He
believes, however, that
And "Ikhnaton" moved
Wm.
a distinguished
F. Edgerton, to criticize
me
severely
oppose the opinions of competent scholars"
unable to
read
inscriptions
in
the
Egyptian
language (Journal of the American Oriental Society, December, 1948).
AUTHOR'S NOTE
xJY
To
the above
have added the following chapters, volume: "Cultural Determinants of
of articles
list
I
expressly
for
this
Mind;" "Genius:
Its
Causes and Incidence;" "Energy and the
written
Evolution of Culture;" "The Science of Culture."
"Energy and the Evolution of Culture" was written in its entirety for this volume although based upon the thesis of an earlier article by the same title published in the American Anthropologist,
Vol. 45, pp.
335-356,
Material from
1943.
"Cultural
Determinants of Mind" was used for a paper, "The Individual the Culture Process," presented in the symposium on
and
"Human
Individuality" at the Centennial meeting of the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington,
D. C, on September
An
14, 1948.
in Science, Vol. 108, pp. 585-86,
abstract of this paper appeared
Nov.
26, 1948.
Since each of the articles reprinted here was originally written to stand on
own
its
feet
and by
itself,
and overlapping among them when a
number
of
them
republication
among them
We
how
I
phenomena;
it
have
to a
will operate.
tried to
is
some duplication Thus,
or, a
description of the science
In preparing these articles for
reduce duplication and overlapping
minimum, but perhaps too much still remains. will keep in mind the fact that, with a few
hope the reader
exceptions, each chapter was
originally
and will be correspondingly indulgent. that
there
are placed together.
contain a definition, or a characterization, of
culture as an order of of culture and
all
some
repetition
relatively novel
is
an independent
We
often very desirable, especially
theme— such
article
might add, however,
as the science of
when
a
culture— is being
treated.
The
articles as originally
other respects also.
We
and have cut out passages transferred material
which the
published have undergone revision in
have added new material in some places in others. In
from one
original articles
some
instances
article to another.
The
have undergone alteration
we have extent to
varies;
some
AUTHOR'S NOTE
xv
have changed considerably, others very ever,
httle. In every case,
much
the premises and point of view, as well as
how-
of the
formulation and presentation, of the original articles have
mained
substantially the same.
am
I
re-
many
greatly indebted to
persons for sympathetic
me
encouragement and assistance tendered
interest,,
in the labors repre-
sented by the material in the present volume, written during a period of I
am
more than
nor adequately convey of those
all
who
I
am
my
expression of thanks of which
sense of gratitude.
have, in one
pages that follow.
whom
No
a decade.
my
capable could encompass the magnitude of
I
would
way
Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes.
a
I
name here
or another, contributed to the
I
have received
warm
friendship of
My colleague,
has kindly and patiently read almost over a decade and
I
however, to mention a few to
like,
especially indebted,
and encouragement from
Nor can
obligation
Professor all
of
much many
inspiration years with
Volney H.
my
Jones,
manuscripts for
have profited greatly from his wise and sym-
pathetic counsel. Professor R. L. Wilder, of the
Department of
Mathematics, University of Michigan, kindly read "The Locus of
Mathematical Reality"
in
many
manuscript and offered
helpful
suggestions. I
believe, however, that
students in
my
my
greatest obligation
is
courses during the last fifteen years
to the
upon
many
whom
I
have, so to speak, "tried out" the ideas set forth in this book.
They
numerous to mention here
are too
hope, therefore, that they will accept
my
singly
this
and by name.
gratitude and affection, both for their interest
tive criticism
and
for their patience
I
simple statement of
and construc-
and forbearance.
In planning the arrangement of this volume, Mr. John Farrar
and
his son, Curtis Farrar,
My wife has script,
have
assisted
with valuable suggestions.
helped enormously in the preparation of the manu-
not to mention the years of encouragement and loyal
support during which time the articles were conceived and written.
AUTHOR'S NOTE XVI
I
cannot find words to express the
to her.
full
sense of
my ^
Leslie A. Universit)' of
Ann
Michigan
Arbor, Michigan
obligation ,_.
White
PREFACE
a
rulture
became
differentiated as soon as
human
since the earliest days of
it
appeared. Ever
history local
groups of
people have been distinguished from one another by
and costume,
ferences in speech, custom, belief,
We
was worn.
may
least there
man has always been aware own group apart from others.
say that, in a sense,
culture conscious.
dif-
any
believe, also, that
of those differences that set his
Thus we might
in so far as
mankind has always been
And, ever since the time of Herodotus
at
have been attempts to account for cultural variations
among mankind. Some in terms of
thinkers accounted for cultural differences
environmental influence; one kind of habitat would
produce one type of culture, another habitat
a
different type.
Others were inclined to attribute cultural variation to innate
mental or temperamental times the
new
differences.
sciences of sociology
and
In
comparatively recent
social
psychology worked
out general principles of a science of social behavior, but these
were assumed to be
common
account for cultural differences interaction
is
mankind and so could not among tribes and nations. Social
to
all
a universal process; conflict, co-operation, accom-
modation, the four wishes, for cultural uniformities,
etc.,
are worldwide; they
might account
but not differences. True, these sciences
did not address themselves to the problem of cultural variation;
they were limited almost entirely to the framework of one culture.
Western
civilization.
But when one turned xvii
to the question of
PREFACE
xviii
cultural differences
among
peoples,
it
was found that sociology
social psychology had virtually nothing to offer. Apart from theories of environmental determinism which con-
and
and
sidered merely the relationship between habitat
culture, all
t\pes of interpretation prior to the emergence of anthropology
thought of
as a science
man and culture together; no one conits human carriers. With the advance
sidered culture apart from of science, however,
came
of events, as a distinct order of
class
is
and
manifestation
direct
that culture
realized
flows freely
phenomena.
is
"human
of
nature."
within the stream of culture
ceremony,
cultural elements
is
itself;
of
One came culture
and
that a language, custom, belief,
processes. In short,
may be
analysis
and interpretation,
it
was discovered that
from the standpoint of
considered,
as a
scientific
thing sui generis, as a class of
events and processes that behaves in terms of
own
its
principles
and laws and which consequently can be explained only its
own elements and
Culture
processes.
may
sidered as a self-contained, self-determined process;
be explained only
in
terms of
in terms
thus be con-
one that can
itself.
This profound discovery and advance in science was the anthropology:
who
it
lie
the product of antecedent and concomitant
culture
of
be
to
generation to another
from one race or habitat to another.
eventually to understand that the determinants
tool or
came
It
continuum, a stream of events, that
a
down through time from one
laterally
was seen
It
not merely a reflex response to habitat, nor a simple
that culture
and
a recognition of culture as a distinct
was the anthropologists,
as
lot of
Kroeber has
said,
"discovered culture." In contrast with the sister sciences of
social
found
psychology and sociology, itself in
the-
new
such things was in fact a large part of position to note that, in variation
is
science of anthropology
the very midst of cultural differences; concern with
many
its
objective. It
instances at least,
associated with a uniformity of
Thus, among North American Indian
tribes
was
marked
in a
cultural
human physical type. who were of a highly
PREFACE
xix
uniform physical type, there was nevertheless a great variety of types. A biological constant could not account for a
cultural
cultural variable.
The
anthropologist was able to see also that,
whereas a certain type of habitat would condition the form and content of a culture,
it
did not determine them.
for example, did not necessarily
snug dwellings. As a matter of
mean
An
arctic climate,
and
tailored fur clothing
fact, a great variety of cultures are
compatible with any given type of environment,
as a
comparative
survey of regions or the archeological record of a single area over a long period of time will show.
to free themselves
Thus anthropologists were
able
from the old interpretative biases— that culture
was determined by habitat or by "human nature"— and to discover the culturological determination of culture.
The
great English anthropologist, E. B. Tylor, seems to have
been the
first
clearly to grasp this
new
conception. In the
in succinct fashion the culturological
first
he formulated point of view and outlined
chapter of his great work. Primitive Culture (1871
),
the scope of the science of culture. Tylor was followed by Durk-
many others in the developnew science. But progress has not been steady and Of late there has been a falling away from the culturo-
heim, Kroeber, Lowie, Wissler, and
ment
of this
continuous.
logical point of
culture as such,
view and objectives. Instead of interpretation of
many American
anthropologists in recent years
have turned to the overt reactions of
human
organisms and to the
deep subconscious forces that underlie these reactions. Thus, many
men and women
anthropologists,
who
are by training and tradition
best qualified to study culture, have abandoned in psychology or psychiatry for
technical training intuition.
and with but
They have
it
for adventures
which they have had little
little
equipment save
or
a
no
ready
sold their culturological birthright for a mess
of psychiatric pottage.
And who larly
is
to study culture
the culturologists?
if
not the anthropologists, particu-
We have witnessed a definite regression in
anthropology in America in recent years. But
it
will
not
last.
PREFACE
XX Sooner or
later the
advance in science begun with Tylor
will
be
resumed. As Kroeber has indicated in a recent article, fashions
and fads come and go eddies on the surface
in science, is
but underneath the currents and
the deep strong flow of scientific progress.
"Personalit}'," says Kroeber, "is the slogan of the vices like 'ink-blot tests'
gadget
.
.
.
moment
.
.
.
De-
have some of the outward qualities of a
we
[and] as a nation
love gadgets ... In a decade or
two Rohrschachs may have been displaced
as stimuli of fashion
response by their successor of the day." In the chapters that follow its
several aspects: the origin
we
treat
the Science of Culture in
and nature of
of the scientific interpretation of culture of this
new
cholog}^
and
culture, the
and an
emergence
historical sketch
venture, the fundamental distinction between psyculturolog}^, and, finally, a
few demonstrations of the
point of view and techniques of culturological interpretation.
PART
I
SCIENCE AND SYMBOLS
Introduction
e preface our treatise on the Science of Culture with an on science in general, "Science is Sciencing." Science
essay is
a
body of
technique
this
other is
not
class.
it is
phenomena
But
is
it
any
as to
science of culture, or the science of psychology,
not as mature as astronomy or physics; neither
old.
And
a technique of interpretation.
as applicable to cultural
is
The
data;
is
it
nearly as
fallacious or chauvinistic to assert that "physics
science, but psychology or culturology
not."
is
One
is
a
can science in
any sector of experience.
"The Symbol" we lay bare the mechanism that has brought culture, as a new and distinct order of phenomena, into being. We discover culture as a new field of scientific exploration and interpretation. "On the Use of Tools by Primates" attempts to show In
why man
has a continuous, cumulative, and progressive material
culture whereas the anthropoid apes,
who
are able to
make
tools
and who use them with great skill and versatility, do not. The is, again, the Symbol. "Mind is Minding" breaks with the
answer
old-fashioned view which regarded
and
sees
it
mind
as a thing, as
an entity,
merely as a process of reacting to external stimuli. This
helps to clarify the relationship between
man
as
organism and the
extrasomatic cultural tradition to which he reacts as he does to his natural habitat.
In
"The Expansion
of the Scope of Science,"
course of the conquest of science of ever terrain of
human
tronomv, then
experience,
first
terrestrial physical
sectors of biological
we
trace the
more and more
of the
of the heavenly bodies in as-
phenomena, then the various
phenomena, and,
finally,
the realm of culture.
we
In tracing the course of the advance and progress of science
come
face to face with
its
predecessor and
of anthropomorphism, anthropocentrism,
rival:
the philosophy
and Free Will. As sub-
sequent chapters will bring out clearly and emphatically, this
is
the philosophy that science has had to contend every inch of the
way.
And
it
is
this age-old
have to oppose until
it is
and primitive philosophy that we
at last eradicated, root
and branch.
still
CHAPTER ONE SCIENCE
"Science
is
a kind of
is
5<•cience
SCIENCING
IS
human
behavior."
not merely a collection of facts and formulas.
is
may be
appropriately used as a verb: one sciences,
with experience according to certain assumptions and techniques. Science
The
experience.
be used
as a verb;
science and art assist
may and
man live.
art
is
is
art.
one may
And
this
art as well as
from opposite
particulars in terms of universals:
mass of Negro ticulars:
may appropriately science. The purpose of
word, too,
slaves.
i.e.,
to
environment in order that he
But although working toward the same it
deals
with certain
one: to render experience intelligible,
to adjust himself to his
approach
i.e.,
one of two basic ways of dealing with
is
other
It
The word
pre-eminently a way of dealing with experience.
goal, science
directions. Science deals with
Uncle
Tom
disappears in the
Art deals with universals in terms of par-
the whole gamut of Negro slavery confronts us in the
person of Uncle
Tom. Art and
science thus grasp a
common
by opposite but inseparable poles. To use the word science as a noun is not, however, without
experience, or reality,
justification. etc.,
The words
chemistry, physiology, history, sociology,
are both legitimate
rived from distinctions
two
sources.
and
On
useful.
the one
As categories they
are de-
hand, they reflect analytical
which may be made within the
field
of reality:
erosion, respiration, hysteria, voting, etc., are phases or segments
3
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
4
of experience which find their reflections in the categories geol-
psychology, and political science, respectively.
physiology-,
og\^
the other hand, division of labor in society, essential in
On
modern
times, also finds
categories.
that
This
is
its
reflection in the same, or similar,
a fact often ignored. Psychology
is
pational groups just as truly as distinctions itself.
a category
is
a reflection of the division of society into disparate occuit
which may be made
"Psychology
is
what
is
in experience ("subject matter")
ps)rcho]ogists
bearing the label 'psychologist') do," "psycholog}^
is
an expression of analytical
is
(i.e.,
a guild of workers
as valid a definirion as
the study of mind, or behavior."
The one
is
an
expression of social reality; the other derives from the nature of
the subject matter of the study.
This dual nature of the categories becomes manifest in the
re-
current protest against the partition of science into "watertight"
compartments, in the impossibility of telling whether a given study
is
historical,
sociological, or psychological.
Does the
story of
John Brown's "insurrection" belong to psychology, sociology, economics, political science, or history? Obviously and equally to each.
Nor can the
distinction
between inanimate, biologic and
cultural withstand the categorizing process
When
which
is
implicit in
Harlow Shapley
studies the
responses of ants to varying quantities of heat reaching
them from
the division of labor in society.
the sun,^ is
is
he an astronomer or an entomologist? Obviously, he
contributing to an understanding of insects as well as
stars; this
thermodynamic process has both entomologic and astronomic aspects. Dr. A. E. Douglass,
an astronomer at the University of
Arizona, has, by working out a correlation between rainfall and
growth of
most
trees in the
Southwest, provided archeologists with the
precise technique for dating prehistoric remains
panied by written records that has yet been devised.^ In
an "astronomer" has become an archeologist 1
unaccomthis case
via climatology
References are grouped by chapters and appear on pp. 416-424.
and
SCIENCE
IS
SCIENCING
5
botany. Conventionally, however, "an astronomer"
is
any
mem-
ber of a certain group, formal or informal, of scientific workers
produced by the
even though he may con-
social division of labor,
tribute to an understanding of insects, the growth of forests,
and
the sequence of Indian cultures, as well as to our knowledge of
heavenly bodies. Logically, astronomy
the scientific interpreta-
is
tion of the behavior of celestial bodies regardless of the professional label
a
number
who makes
borne by the one
The custom
it.
of viewing "science" as a vast terrain divided into
of "fields" each tilled
by
its
own
guild has a certain justification in utility
appropriately
tends to obscure the nature of science as a
and
reality
men
alike.
way
it
of interpreting
to spread confusion in the ranks of scientists
The
named
and convenience. But and
lay-
use of the word science as a noun not only leads
to jurisdictional disputes— does the study of juvenile delinquency
belong to sociology or to psychology, the study of geology or to biology?—but to such questions is
sociology a science?
with some of
its
There
is
to
fossils
history a science?
tendency to identify "science"
techniques. For example, one can perform ex-
periments in chemistry and
make
omy. Chemistry and astronomy is
a
as, is
accurate predictions in astron-
are "sciences." Experimentation
exceedingly limited in sociology and predictions in history are
seldom more than guesses. Therefore, the tendency
is
to say,
"history and sociology are not sciences." Despite the fact that
much
of geology
culture, there
deny
is
is
this status to
Then
a
more
historical
than certain studies of
a willingness to call the
human
one "a science" but to
the other.
distinction
is
made between
the physical
sciences
(frequently called by the flattering term "the exact sciences")
the "social sciences." Implicit in this distinction that a
and
the assumption
fundamental difference obtains between the nature of
physical reality to, if
is
indeed
it
and human
social reality.
This assumption leads
does not include by implication, the further
as-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
5
human
sumption that the data of
being essentially
society,
differ-
really not ent from the data of physics ("the exact sciences"), are are sciences susceptible to scientific treatment, hence the social really
not sciences at
The same
all; *
they are not and cannot be "scientific."
made, although with
observations are
with reference to biology: "Biology
but more
is
only confusing; they are unwarranted.
comprise the
The
basic assumptions
scientific
way
the
This means that we must cease viewing science
number
wholly
human-
the biological and the physical.
social, or cultural, as well as to
divisible into a
and
interpreting
of
reality are applicable equally to all of its phases, to
is
emphasis,
than physics,
than sociology." These assumptions are not
scientific
techniques which
less
less scientific
as
an entity which
of qualitatively different parts:
some
some quasi-scientific, and must cease identifying science
scientific (the "exact sciences"),
some only
pseudo-scientific.
with one or another of
We must,
in short,
its
We
techniques, such as experimentation.
view science
as a
way
of behaving, as a
interpreting reality, rather than as an entity in
itself, as
a
way
of
segment
of that reality.
Science distinguishes living, sentient beings on the one hand,
and an external world independent of sentient organisms on the other.** Reality in this context consists of the organisms' interaction with the external world.
one or
as a
many.
It
As such
may be thought
component
parts.
On
may be
regarded as a
of as the totality of the inter-
action, or experience, of the organism; or, its
it
it
may be
analyzed into
the perceptual level reality
is
analyzed
into sense impressions— odors, tastes, colors, sounds, etc.
conceptual level
it is
mathematical symbols, etc.,
etc.
the
Matter, energy, time, space, motion,
are conceptual devices with
*"...!
On
analyzed with symbolic instruments— words,
which we analyze
reality
and
in
—
think that social science is like a '\^'elsh rabbit not really a rabHooton, in Apes, Men, and Morons, p. 62.
bit at all." E. A.
**
"The
the basis of
an external world independent of the perceiving subject natural science." Einstein, 1934, p. 60.
belief in all
is
SCIENCE
SCIENCING
IS
7
we make our adjustments
terms of which
to
it.
Matter, energy,
time, motion, and so on, are not therefore discrete entities, but aspects or phases of a
reality. We may also analyze the we can experience it, into equivalent which we may call events. Experience
common
totality of reality, insofar as
component is
parts, or "units,"
therefore conceived by us
and on the other
"Whole and is
on the one hand
an
infinite
parts"
means
as
number
as a one, as a totality,
of parts, or events.
relationships. "Relationship," too,
another conceptual device, a symbolic instrument, with the aid
of which
we
means
which we
of
render experience intelligible to a degree, and by effect
our adjustments to our environment.
Events are related to each other. But how?
"Every event that happens in the world space-co-ordinates
x,
y,
z
is
determined by the
and the time-co-ordinate
fundamental relationship, or "interval," between events space-time.
t," is
^
The
one of
Whereas formerly space and time were thought
of as
properties of the external world independent of each other, they are
now
seen to be merely aspects of the basic and primary prop-
erty, space-time.
time which
I
To
quote Minkowski: "The views of space and
wish to lay before you have sprung from the
experimental physics, and therein cal.
Henceforth space by
itself,
lies their
and time by
in
an independent
modern thought,
reality." *
Thus
as a four-dimensional
of reality in which events are manifested
They are radidoomed to union of the two
itself,
fade into mere shadows, and only a kind of will preserve
soil of
strength.
are
reality confronts us,
continuum; the process is
a temporal-spatial (or
temporal-formal) one.
is
Thus the primary and fundamental relationship between temporal-formal. But by purely logical analysis, we may
events distin-
guish the temporal aspect of the process from the spatial; although inseparable in actuality,
we may occupy ourselves with either to Thus we may distinguish three kinds
the exclusion of the other.
of processes, one primary, the temporal-formal,
and two secondary
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
3 and
temporal on the one hand and the
derivative, the
formal, on the other. In the
first
spatial, or
category we would deal with
intervals. In events as being related to one another by space-time (or relainterval the consider the other two we would in the one interval the tionship) in its temporal aspect only; and in the other
would be
dealt with in
its spatial,
Scicncing must adapt
must be
so shaped
and
effectively and render
itself to
its
or formal, aspect alone.
the structure of
techniques so ordered as to grasp reality
This means, therefore,
intelligible to us.
it
reality; its tools
have three ways of sciencing: one which grasps the space-time property of reality in its entirety, and two subsidiary and derivative ways, each of which deals with one of the two asthat
we
shall
pects of this property,
viz.,
space and time. All of "science" or
sciencing will be found to be assignable to one or another of these three categories; there
is
no way
of sciencing apart
from these
three.
"History"
is
way
that
of sciencing in
which events are dealt
with in terms of their temporal relationships alone. Each event unique.
Lincoln
The one is
thing that history never does
assassinated only once.
To be
is
one another
other than temporal. This must of necessity be true since of relationships are equally attributes of a "histor)'-ing"
we
arbitrarily select for
them-
sure, the events
selves that constitute history are related to
is
to repeat itself:
common
in
ways
all
kinds
reality.
But
in
our consideration the con-
nective tissue of time, and just as arbitrarily ignore the relationship of space.*
This process of reducing concrete experience to tions, or, to
put
it
more
precisely, the act of substituting concepts,
"free inventions of the
*
To be
sure, those
relationships
who
human
intellect"
(to
borrow Einstein's
bear the label "historian" concern themselves with
they wish to know where Lincoln was when. "The temporal process" would probably be a
other than
assassinated as well as
artificial abstrac-
temporal:
better term for our purpose here than "history."
SCIENCE
SCIENCING
IS
9
phrase), for the concrete experiences of the senses,^
unavoidable,
it is
and
common
property
reality; it is a
cultural orders of
phenomena.
Stars,
customs and institutions, each have their respective
and anthropology are therefore, in part at There is no antagonism nor even
history
be
co-extensive
the solar system, the
least,
ences."
it
is
indihis-
Astronomy, physics, geology, biology, psychology, sociology,
tories.
we
only-
to the inanimate, biological,
and animals, species and
earth, rivers, lead, granite, plants
viduals,
not
the very essence of sciencing.
"History," or the temporal aspect of experience,
with
is
and
science: history
is
historical
distinction
"sci-
between
simply one way of sciencing whether
we refuse to accept this conclusion "An astronomer is a scientist when non-temporal, repetitive process, but when
in geology or sociology. If
are forced to
he deals
with
its
a
alternative:
he concerns himself with
a chronological
history of the solar system, e.g.
)
he
Events are related to each other reality in
terms of
is
sequence of events (the
no longer
spatially,
a scientist."
and we may deal with
spatial, or formal, relationships, ignoring
the
aspect time. Spatial relationships
between events may be regarded
as either
constant or variable. Events, or material objects, whose mutual spatial relationships are regarded as constant, constitute a structure.
This property
is
characteristic of all phases of reality. In the inani-
mate, biologic and cultural levels as
atoms, molecules,
it
manifests
itself in
such forms
constellations, planets, orbits, strata,
stars,
the elements; in skeletons, bones, muscles, organs, bodies, limbs;
grammars, constitutions.
in families, clans, societies,
spatial relationships uniting a jects,
number
are regarded as variable, then
property likewise manifests
itself
on
When
the
of events, or material ob-
we
speak of function. This
all levels
of reality in atomic,
molecular, meteorological, astronomic behavior; in physiological
and psychological
processes;
cultural processes.
Thus the
gist,
zoologist,
botanist,
and on the supra-biological
level, in
physicist, chemist, astronomer, geolo-
physiologist,
psychologist,
sociologist.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
10
linguist, cultural anthropologist, etc., are all
spatial or fomial
*
(non-temporal) aspect of
concerned with the reality, in its struc-
tural or functional aspects, or both.
We come now
to the third kind of relationship, or process: the
temporal-spatial. This
is
the two preceding processes, but
like
from each. As we have already noted,
different
relationships are always intrinsic in
any phase of
The
reality.
any
three kinds of
temporal process (or "history")
is
a
arrangement of events according to the principle time.
selective
Spatial relationships,
though actually existent
disregarded: in the history of thought
it
Newton cogitates under an apple tree or when
all
series of actual events, in
dealing with spatial relationships,
is
in these events, are
immaterial whether
in his bath. Similarly,
i.e.,
with structure and
function, the time relationships which are inseparable from these
events in objective reality are here divorced by logical analysis:
the stmcture of the
the rusting of iron,
crystal,
cowardice, secret societies,
may be
respiration,
studied without reference to
clocks or calendars.
But
in the temporal-spatial process
both temporal and
relationships are simultaneously significant.
And
it is
time and space— "up from the South at break of day Sheridan twenty miles away." to
know not
fought them.
and
zoologist
t
relationships.
+ = + s
The
.
and
and the ethnologist are interested
and culture
traits as
in
well as their history.
are examples of a simultaneous interest in both temporal
spatial relationships.
spatial
.
.
conventional historian wishes
only that Napoleon fought battles, but where he
The
the distribution of species
These
The
spatial
not a case of
t
s.
But they are not examples of temporal-
Hydrogen
temporal-spatial process
* Structure
+ oxygen = hydrogen
But hydrogen x oxygen =: water (H2O); is
-|-
t
oxygen;
x
s
=
ts.
not, then, equivalent to a space
and function are not confined to the realm of metric space.
Structure or form
is a characteristic of such non-spatial systems as language, music, kinship systems, social organization, poetry, and so on.
SCIENCE
SCIENCING
IS
and time organization
phenomena;
of
of these
measured
indicate
in feet indicates
its
And, using the same
thickness of
age measured in
animal species
principle, the anthropologist has
been
instances, to reconstruct the history of a tool,
custom, or institution by inference from
And,
movement
one
involved,
are
may
age: the wider the distribution the greater the age.
its
many
instances in
Thus the
years. Similarly, the distribution of a plant or
tion.®
many
relations
spatial
significant only in terms of the other.
a geologic stratum
in
sum
not the
of interest to note in passing that in
is
which both temporal and is
it is
but their product.
factors It
IT
of course, our clocks
myth,
geographic distribu-
measure time by a repetitive
mechanism through
of a
But the temporal-formal process
its
able,
space. is
more than
a concern with
temporal and formal relationships taken either alone or each in terms of the other.
It
one
is
in
which both time and space, or
form, are significant, a process in which both are integrated into a single, undifferentiated event.
The
temporal-formal process
mental process.
It is
is
an evolutionary, or develop-
distinguished from the temporal process on
the one hand and the formal process on the other. Like the others, this process
realms of stellar
is
inherent in
reality,
experience and
all
is
manifest in
inanimate, biological, and cultural.
all
Thus we have
and cosmic evolution, biological evolution and cultural
evolution. This process differs from the temporal and formal processes in that in the evolutionary process,
integrally
involved,
they
are
temporal-alteration-of-forms. will
make each one more
The
temporal process
process
that
unique;
it
is
A
unique, each
is
non-repetitive.
is
In the sequence or
(and temporal only), each event
only one
movement
Evolution
comparison of these three processes
occurs only once. Tlie
only once, there
time and space are both
inseparable.
distinct. is
temporal
fused,
Rocky Mountains
Wiirm
are
glaciation, each raindrop
of every living creature
is
is
formed is
distinguished
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
12
from every other movement,* John Brown each meeting of the women's sewing circle spatial, or functional, process,
is
is
executed only once, a
unique event.
being non-temporal,
is
The
repetitive;
mountain systems may be formed repeatedly, ice-age may follow ice-age, raindrops fall again and again, water freezes, ice thaws and water freezes again, metal may be melted and remelted, monkeys sneeze,
and
men
executed, prices rise and
die, insurrectionists are
rise again, societies
and clubs are organized
in every age.
evolutionary process, being in part temporal in character, non-repetitive;** a reptile
decomposes only once;
becomes
stars
a
mammal
is
fall
The also
only once; radium
"die" only once.***
Growth
is
also a
may be. Actually they usually are not, for the reason that such distincexcept in rare instances such as the real or imagined kick of Mrs. O'Lean's cow that started the great Chicago fire, or the honking of the geese who "saved Rome" have no significance for us as ordinary human beings. But for a philosophy of science the sneeze of an anonymous monkey in the depths of a jungle is as significant as illustrating the uniqueness of each event * It
—
tions
—
temporal series as is the birth of Christ or the death of Caesar. ** Actually, this may depend upon one's point of view, or more accurately, upon the temporal scope of one's vision. To us, the cosmic process seems to be evolutionary in character: the universe is expanding (it may be assumed), or matter is being transmuted into energy. The process seems to be temporalformal in character: non-repetitive and irreversible. But this appearance may be an illusion due to the temporal limits of our observation. Were the period longer, sufficiently longer, the cosmic process might reveal itself as a repetitive one: an era of contraction might follow expansion, and so on, in an endless series of pulsations; matter may be transmuted into energy and re-congealed into matter, an endless vibration of a cosmic pendulum. So, to a creature that, compared with us, had an infinitcsimally brief span of observation, the repetiti\'e and rhythmic character of respiration or the heart beat or the rusting of iron would appear to be evolutionary in character, for seeing only a minute part of the process, neither the beginning nor the end, he would observe only a temporal alteration of form, and might declare it to be a non-repetitive process. And he would be correct too, for the process which he observes is non-repetitivc just as the dying star and the decomposing radium represent non-repetiti\e processes to us. Thus, whether a process be labelled repetitive or e\olutionary depends upon the unit of measurement. Any repetitive process is made up of a sequence of events which in themselves are non-repetitive. Conversely, any repetitive process is but a segment of a larger one which is in a
cvolutionarv in character.
*** One must not confuse duplication with lepetition: there may be transimammal in many different phyla. These are duplications,
tions from reptile to
not repetitions.
SCIENCE
IS
SCIENCING
13
temporal-spatial process; the term, however, individuals
rather than
one
process:
to
classes.
a
is
non-repetitive
once— second childhood
a child only
is
usually applied to
is
Growth
is
always a
novelty.
Even
at the cost of repetition,
it
might be
well, for the sake
of clarity, to re-emphasize the nature of the distinctions just made.
Actually, each event has a four-dimensional character
and has
its
Thus the raincosmic evolution, and we may
place in a four-dimensional, space-time continuum.
drop
is
an event in the process of
view
it
as such.
But we may
also
view
it
in other contexts: in a
purely temporal context, or in a wholly non-temporal context (in
which we consider only the tween the raindrop, the
alteration in spatial relationships be-
earth, the clouds, etc.).
These contexts
own making. They are arbitrarily selected points of view from which we regard and consider reality; they are the forms, the channels, so to speak, within which we
are, of course, devices of
our
science.
The
formal process
is
beef; beef
may become hay
and opposite processes
decomposes; hay becomes
again; revolt
and reaction are
in society; prices rise
temporal order of events remains immutable;
Only
in
Water
reversible as well as repetitive.
freezes, ice thaws; iron rusts, iron oxide
and it
fall, etc.
cyclical
But the
cannot be reversed.
Through the Looking Glass do Queens scream before
they prick their fingers, or Alices pass the cake before they cut it.
The
evolutionary process, being temporal as well as formal,
The mammals do not
likewise irreversible.
nated,
knighthood was
in
do not reabsorb energy once ema-
return to reptilianism, the days
historic process
a child
and the evolutionary process are
alike in
is
i.e.,
But, whereas the historic process
Historically Eli
is
"make
an impossible request.
being temporal in character,
tionary process
when
me
flower can never return,
again just for tonight"
The
stars
is
formal as well:
non-repetitive
and
irreversible.
is
merely temporal, the evolu-
it is
a temporal-sequence-of-forms.
Whitney and the invention
of the cotton gin are
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
14
inseparable events in a chronological sequence.
But had Whitney
died in his cradle the evolutionary process expressed in technology would have produced a machine for ginning cotton. Similarly,
although Lincoln slaves
bound
is
to the emancipation of
historically
and Darwin to the formulation of
certain biological prin-
ciples, the processes of politico-economic evolution would have achic\ed the one without Lincoln just as evolution of thought
\\ould have produced the other without Darwin. of the calculus,
The
invention
which took place almost simultaneously, and indeNewton and Leibnitz, was the logi-
pendently, in the activities of cal expression of a
gence of
a
developmental process,
new mathematical form from
i.e.,
it
was the emer-
previous forms. Just as
the invention of the calculus was not dependent upon either
ton or Leibnitz alone, so
it
New-
was not necessarily dependent upon
them both; it would have occurred eventually if both Newton and Leibnitz had died in infancy. The development of mathematics, like the
development of technology or medicine,
is
an
new forms grow out of preceding forms. whose person and labors a new form is to appear, and when and where it is to appear is a matter that belongs to the context
evolutionary process:*
But
in
history alone.
From
the point of view of the evolutionary process
every histoncal event
We dict
may who
is
an accident and in a sense unpredictable.
predict that a cure for cancer will will
make the
discovery and
be found, but
when
is
to pre-
impossible.
That
the nations of Europe will be embroiled again in a great war in the not distant future
as safe a prediction as
is
one could make;
the development of technological, economic, political, and military forces
makes another war
inevitable.
But who
that will set oif the conflagration, and
archduke or is
official will
be
utterly impossible to say.
shot,
The
will strike
the spark
when and where— what
when, where, and by
passing of a
star,
whom— it
drawing out from
the sun a gigantic filament from which the planets of our solar *
Einstein
and
Infcld
have called
Physics, not the History of Physics,
it is
their
recent
book The Evolution of
significant to note.
SCIENCE
IS
SCIENCING
system were formed, historic process in
if
15 a fact,
which
is
specific
an historic
and
fact;
place in a purely temporal context. But this
the process
is
an
unique events take
severally
is
quite a different
process from that of cosmic or galactic evolution as exemplified, for instance,
by the equi-partition of energy, or the transmutation
of matter into energy, the dying of a star. Similarly, in the biologic
realm, the narrative of the specific wanderings over the face of
the earth, the struggles, intermixture, vicissitudes,
man
various species and races of
is
etc.,
of the
quite a different story from the
account of the evolutionary development.
So
far,
we have spoken
of the inorganic, organic,
ganic realms, or levels, of reality as
if
taken for granted. For the sake of completeness and ever, a
The
few words on distinctions
between these
levels, or strata, of reality are
for science.
The phenomena
three levels do not differ from each other in that one
of these
composed
is
of one kind of basic substance, another of a different kind. differ in
be assumed to be made up of various manifestations of
which
They
the manner in which their component parts are organ-
ized into patterns or forms, respectively. Basically
in
how-
clarity,
this subject are desirable.
and are fundamental
valid,
and superor-
these distinctions could be
realit\'
reality confronts us.
common
a
are
due
There
stuff;
all reality
may
differences in
to differences in the forms
are classes, or kinds, of forms
amid the infinite range of specific variation. Physical, biological, and cultural are labels for three qualitatively different and scientifically significant classes of
The
physical category
forms of
is
reality.
composed
of non-living
phenomena
or
The cultural category, made up of events that are dependent the human species, namely, the ability
systems; the biological, of living organisms. or order, of
upon
phenomena
is
a faculty peculiar to
to use symbols. tools, utensils,
These events are the
ideas,
beliefs,
languages,
customs, sentiments, and institutions that
the civilization— or culture, to use the anthropological
make up term— of
any people, regardless of time, place, or degree of development.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
16 Culture
passed
is
down from one
generation to another,
by one tribe from another.
be borrowed freely act with one another
in
Its
or, it
may
elements inter-
accordance with principles of their own.
Culture thus constitutes a supra-biological, or extra-somatic, class shall analyze this order of of events, a process suf generis.
We
phenomena
at
some length
on The Sym-
in the following chapter
bol
Even a
casual inspection of our three categories reveals the fact
that biological and cultural
phenomena
are but particular kinds
of organization of events in the inanimate,
and the biological and
physical categories, respectively. Thus, a plant or an animal
is
form of organization of carbon, oxygen, calcium,
a peculiar
but etc.
phenomenon (human beings) and inanimate phenomena organized in a special manner. Thus events on tlie biologic level (for levels, or Likewise a cultural
is
but a manifestation of biologi-
cal
what these categories are in reality) can be dealt with terms of inanimate phenomena: a plant or animal is so much
strata, are
in
carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen;
be
frozen, transformed
event— a man taking
by
it
and so on.
a rock,
fall as
be dealt with
and manual, and these,
upon which the oath
in terms of acoustics, mechanics, physical
is
may
Similarly, a cultural
a Christian oath of office— may
in terms of his gestures, vocal
gether with the book
has weight, will
fire,
in turn, to-
taken, can
be treated
and chemical properties
of the Bible, and so on.
But the
fact that the
course the
first,
ones, below
minimize
it
phenomena
of one category (except of
the inanimate) can be "reduced" to the one, or
does not destroy the categories themselves, nor even
their distinctness. Meteors, bullets, pterodactyls, birds,
squirrels, fish, bats, bees,
and airplanes
"fly"
through the
air.
A
physicist could deal with each as a material body, in terms of mass,
momentum,
acceleration, atmospheric resistance,
sidered merely as material bodies the fact that
others inanimate, distinction
is
is
of course irrelevant.
and so on. Con-
some
are animate,
But merely because
not significant to the physicist does not
mean
this
that
SCIENCE it is
SCIENCING
IS
17
not meaningful in other sectors of science.
On
the contrary,
organizations of events cannot be fully understood unless they are interpreted
upon the
level of their organization. It
course, that bees, bullets,
molecules, and this fact
is
is
a fact, of
and bats are composed of atoms and not without significance. But
we cannot
appreciate the difference between bees and bullets on the one
hand
or between bees
and bats on the other on the
basis of physi-
cal organization alone. Living organisms constitute a distinct order
of material systems
and they must be interpreted
as such. Cultural
systems are composed of psycho-physical events, but
we cannot
comprehend such a thing as taking an oath of ofEce and distinguish
it
from use of a formula to make beer merely by knowing
made up
of neuro-sensory-muscular reactions and that composed of molecular and atomic particles and processes. However illuminating it may be to reduce systems of one level to the events of the level below it— and this is unquestionably valuable— each order of events, each kind of system, must
that each
is
these in turn are
be comprehended on
its
own
level also.
/
Thus we see that we have three qualitatively distinct levels or strata of phenomena: the cultural, which is characterized by the symbol; the biological, characterized by the
cell;
and the
physical,
characterized by the atom, proton, electron, wave, or whatever
other unit, or units, the physicist decides upon.
There are, however, instances in which our ends are not served by maintaining the distinctions between these three levels. may wish to inquire into the relationship between one level and
We
another. Inquiries of this sort are, needless to say, as legitimate and potentially profitable as any other.
into the relationship
Thus bio-chemistry
between the inanimate and the
inquiries are directed to the relationship
and
cultural levels.
for example. his father,
is
A
inquires
living. Similar
between the biological
Take the Oedipus complex
of psychoanalysis,
boy's love for his mother, hatred or hostility toward
of course a reaction of his organism.
But these
atti-
tudes are functions of the culture in which he was born, also. His
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
18
culture not only channels the expression of these emotions but
The
plays a part in their evocation as well.
be the same
his parents will not
boy toward
attitude of a
in a patriarchal society as in
one that recognizes both
matrilincally organized, or in
one
lines of
descent equally. Thus the Oedipus or Elcctra complex, as well as other examples of
all
human behavior— i.e., human
behavior as
distinguished from non-human, or sub-human, behavior; there
human about
nothing peculiarly
a sneeze, e.g.— are
made up
is
of
elements drawn from two different categories: the biological and the cultural.
The formula
Studies of
soil
for
Human
X Cultural stimuli -^
erosion
may
human
behavior
is:
Human
organism
behavior. inquire into the relationship between
such things as farming or grazing methods, the lumber industry, prices of building materials,
frequency of
winds, and legislation. plant or animal pests
and
natural
rainfall,
reforestation; the quantity
and
The search may involve
artificial
and
drainage structures;
for a material that will destroy
between
relationships
all
three
commodities, the biological organisms and the
levels: the price of
chemicals capable of killing them.
Here
again,
whether we deal with
categories, or levels, of
reality in
phenomena, or
terms of distinct
in terms of relationships
between them, depends upon our purposes and ends. Both approaches are equally legitimate and potentially profitable. In summary,
which cut
we
see that
we have two
classifications of reality
across each other at right angles: the
structure (the atom, the
cell,
one has
to
do with
the symbol), the other has to
do
with process (temporal, formal, and temporal-formal). This gives us nine categories in which
may be
logically
all reality
and
all
and consistently divided
manners of sciencing as
indicated in the
diagram on the opposite page.
On
the inanimate level
(such as they are or
may
we have cosmic and
galactic histories
be), the history of our solar system, the
history of the earth or of a continent, a
mountain chain, a
river,
or even a snowflake, encompassed within the purely temporal con-
SCIENCE text. In
and
IS
SCIENONG
19
we have the non-temporal and functional aspects of astronomy,
the formal-functional context
repetitive,
structural
geology, chemistry, and physics.
And
in the primary category, the
temporal-formal one, of which the other two are but aspects,
have cosmic, galactic,
stellar,'^
and
solar evolution,
composition of radio-active substances.
we
and the de-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
20 category,
we have
evolution of biologic forms in general, of genera,
The growth
species, varieties in particular.
of an individual also
comes within this category.
human
Biography, the history of a instances,
with both the biologic
as dealing
be regarded
human
cultural levels since our interest in a if
ever, divorced
most and the
individual, should, in
from the culture
individual
which he has
in
ing. Similarly with significant individuals in the
his
is
seldom,
human
be-
sub-human animal
cow that started the Chicago fire, the goose Rome, the wolf who suckled Romulus and Remus, Man
or plant world: the that saved o'
War, the hemlock
because
On
it
that killed Socrates, each
enters the context of
the cultural level
we have
human
is
significant only
cultural history.
culture history; a consideration of
nations, reigns, tribes, institutions, tools, ideas, beliefs, etc., in
we have
the temporal context. In the formal-functional context,
the studies of "social morphology" in sociology, cultural anthropology',
schools
and
and the other of
cultural
"social sciences."
The
so-called Functionalist
anthropology— Radcliffe-Brown, Malinowski
their respective students
and co-workers— and the "Chicago
school" of sociolog}', as exemplified by Robert E. Park and E.
W.
Burgess and their students, belong here. In the basic category, that of evolution of culture,
we have
at present virtually nothing.
After a vigorous and bitter struggle the philosophy of evolution
conquered on the biological it
field,
but, after a few brief advances
has been routed from the cultural level.
bert Spencer, E. B. Tylor, and Lewis
A
few giants
H. Morgan,
like
in the
Her-
"boom"
days of evolutionism in the second half of the nineteenth century
were able to occupy the cultural evolutionists regained the field
the turn of the century.
committed
made
field for a
and have held
To be
sure both
time. it
cultural anthropologists— and
anti-
successfully since
Morgan and Spencer
errors in the use of their philosophy,
in the use of a tool does
But the
but a mistake
not render the tool worthless. But
many
sociologists— have repudiated
the philosophy of evolutionism along with the errors of some evo-
SCIENCE
SCIENCING
IS
lutionists: they
21
have poured the baby out with the bath. But the
on the
victory of the anti-evolutionists social science matures,
As
rary.
philosophy, that reality
way on the
its
mate
is
cultural level
is
only tempo-
the basic concept of science and
temporal-formal in character, will win
cultural level as
it
has upon the biologic and inani-
levels.
be noted, of course, that the conventional names for "the sciences" do not readily fit our system of categories. But this is It will
quite understandable: the terms physics, zoology, sociology,
have come into use
been more or long before
it
less accidental.
The
grown, and
etc.,
growth has
this
concepts time and space existed
was discovered that time and space are but aspects
of a third thing for
which there
But the
space-time.
as science has
no more adequate a name than
is
fact that the
names
of "the sciences"
do not
correspond to our nine categories in no way invalidates the cate-
The
gories.
rately
gauged by
own
its
cal
maturity of science in any its
it
develops
terminology. This has taken place extensively in the physi-
and the
it
can be rather accu-
vocabulary: as "a science" matures
biological
sciences.
intelligence, race, society, are
that
field
is
now
likely they will give
And
such words
being found so
way soon
to a
instinct,
as
difficult to
more
use
effective ter-
minology.
For the chemistiy,
scientific etc.,
will
worker such terms
as
psychology, botany,
no doubt continue to be useful and
factory except in so far as further division of labor
and
satis-
specializa-
make new terms necessary. But for the thinker, for the philosopher of science, new technical terms are needed. I shall tion should
not presume to supply names for our nine categories. But, since they represent a
realistic
and
likely that as these categories
logical analysis of the field,
it
seems
obtrude themselves more and more
into systematic thinking, they will eventually receive names.
CHAPTER TWO THE SYMBOL: The Oriain and Basis of
"In the Word was the Beginning Culture."
1n
July,
All
human
Man
the beginning of
the basic unit of
cell is
are beginning to realize is
.
commemorate the hundredth
the discovery that the
the symbol
.
Behavior
and of
1939, a celebration was held at Leland Stanford
University to
Today we
.
Human
the basic unit of
all
anniversary of all
living tissue.
and to appreciate the
human
fact that
behavior and civilization.
behavior originates in the use of symbols.
It
was the
symbol which transformed our anthropoid ancestors into
and made them human. All are perpetuated, only
civilizations
by the use of symbols.
transforms an infant of
Homo
men
have been generated, and It is
sapiens into a
the symbol which
human
being; deaf
mutes who grow up without the use of symbols are not human beings. All
human
use of symbols.
behavior
is
behavior consists
Human
human
behavior
behavior.
is
of,
or
is
dependent upon, the
symbolic behavior; symbolic
The symbol
is
the
universe of
humanity. II
The "there
is
great Danvin declared in The Descent of Man that no fundamental difference between man and the higher
22
THE SYMBOL
mammals them
23
in their
mental
the difference between
faculties," that
consists "solely in his [man's] almost infinitely larger
most
of associating together the
power
sounds and ideas
diversified
.
.
.
the m_ental powers of higher animals do not differ in kind, though greatly in degree, 18;
3,
from the corresponding powers of man" (Chs.
emphasis ours).
This view of comparative mentality today. Thus, F.
H. Hankins,
"in spite of his large brain,
mental
man has any these human su-
him ...
All of
merely relative or differences of degree." Professor
Ralph Linton, an anthropologist, writes
men and
*'The differences between
respects are enormous, but they
to have so
much
in
The Study
animals in
seem
to
of
Man:
these [behavior] in quantity
animal behavior can be
common," Linton
in
all
be differences
"Human and
rather than in quality."
shown
scholars
sociologist, states that
cannot be said that
it
that are peculiar to
traits
periorities are
many
held by
is
prominent
a
observes, "that the
gap [between them] ceases to be of great importance." Dr. Alexander Goldenweiser, likewise an anthropologist, believes that "In point of sheer psychology,
mind
man
as such,
is
after all
no more
than a talented animal" and that "the difference between the mentality here displayed [by a horse and a chimpanzee] and that
man
of
is
merely one of degree."
That there behavior of sible that
are
^
numerous and impressive
man and
that of ape
chimpanzees and
is
fairly
gorillas in
similarities
obvious;
between the
it is
quite pos-
zoos have noted and appre-
ciated them. Fairly apparent, too, are man's behavioral similarities
to
many
define, all
other kinds of animals. Almost as obvious, but not easy to
is
a difference in
other living creatures.
parent to the
which he
is
behavior which distinguishes I
say 'obvious' because
common man
familiar
that the
do not and cannot
the world in which he, as a
human
for a dog, horse, bird, or even
of the
meaning of the
it
is
man from quite ap-
non-human animals wdth enter,
and participate
being, lives. It
is
in,
impossible
an ape, to have any understanding
sign of the cross to a Christian, or of the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
24 fact that black (white ing.
No
among
the Chinese)
chimpanzee or laboratory
between Holy water and Tuesday,
No
or sin.
3,
the color of mourn-
distilled water, or grasp
man
animal save
from
a cross cousin
from an uncle, or
is
can appreciate the difference
rat
the meaning of
can distinguish a cousin
a parallel cousin.
Only man
can commit the crime of incest or adultery; only he can remember the Sabbath and keep
it
Holy.
It
is
not, as
we
well know, that the
lower animals can do these things but to a lesser degree than ourselves;
they cannot perform these acts of appreciation and
tinction at
It
all.
is,
as Descartes said
brutes have less Reason than all."
dis-
long ago, "not only that the
man, but that they have none
at
2
But when the scholar attempts to define the mental difference between man and other animals he sometimes encounters difficulties which he cannot surmount and, therefore, ends up by saying that the difference
is
man
merely one of degree:
mind, "larger power of association," wider range of
We have a Anton ments
J.
good example of
this in
the distinguished physiologist,
Carlson. After taking note of "man's present achieve-
in science, in the arts (including oratory), in political
social institutions,"
tempted
common man man has
to conclude that in these capacities, at least,
a qualitative superiority over other scientist.
mammals." But,
since, as
man and
cannot explain
it,
he
other animals, since as a physiologist he
refuses to
admit it—
".
.
.
the physiologist
does not accept the great development of articulate speech in
something qualitatively new;
some day we may
find
lipoid, phosphatid, or will
a
Professor Carlson cannot define this qualitative differ-
ence between
as
and
and noting "at the same time the apparent
paucity of such behavior in other animals," he, as a "is
has a bigger
activities, etc.
explain
it,
.
."
—and
some new "building
man
suggests helplessly that
stone," an "additional
potassium ion," in the
human
brain which
and concludes by saying that the difference beman and that of non-man is "probably only
tween the mind of
one of degree."
.
^
THE symbol"
The is
25
we
thesis that
shall
advance and defend here
mind
a fundamental difference between the
mind gree.
of non-man. This difference
And
is
least to the science of
uses symbols;
no other creature
to symbol or
it
does.
that there
the
one of kind, not one of de-
the gap between the two types
portance— at
is
man and
of
of the greatest im-
is
comparative behavior.
An
organism has the
Man
ability
does not; there are no intermediate stages.
Ill
A which
symbol may be defined
is
bestowed upon
cause a symbol
it
as a
thing the value or meaning of
by those who use
may have any kind
it.
I
say 'thing' be-
of physical form;
it
may have
the form of a material object, a color, a sound, an odor, a motion of an object, a taste.
The meaning,
or value, of a symbol
from or determined by properties color appropriate to color; purple rulers of
not intrinsic in
no instance derived
royalty;
form: the
or any other
among
the
Manchu
was yellow. The meaning of the word "see"
it
its
in
mourning may be yellow, green,
need not be the color of
China
is
intrinsic in its physical
is
phonetic (or pictorial) properties. "Biting one's
someone might mean anything. The meanings of symbols are derived from and determined by the organisms who use them; meaning is bestowed by human organisms upon physical things or events which thereupon become symbols. Symbols "have
thumb
at" *
their signification," to use trary imposition of
All symbols
men."
must have
John Locke's phrase, "from the
arbi-
*
a physical
form otherwise they could not
enter our experience. This statement
is
valid regardless
of our
theory of experiencing. Even the exponents of "Extra-Sensory
Perception"
who have
challenged Locke's dictum that "the knowl-
edge of the existence of any other thing [besides ourselves and
God] we can have only by *
"Do you
bite your
thumb
sensation,"
at us, sir?"
^
have been obliged to work
—Romeo and
Jnliet,
Act
I,
Sc. i.
1]
u
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
26
with physical rather than ethereal forms. But the meaning of a symbol cannot be discovered by mere sensory examination of its physical form.
One cannot
equation what
it
tell
by looking
at
an x in an algebraic
stands for; one cannot ascertain with the ears
compound gold he much how
alone the symbolic value of the phonetic tell
merely by weighing a pig
for;
one cannot
si;
one cannot
will
exchange
from the wave length of a color whether
tell
it
stands for courage or cowardice, "stop" or "go"; nor can one dis-
amount
cover the spirit in a fetish by any
examination.
The meaning
of a
of physical or chemical
symbol can be grasped only by
non-sensory, symbolic means.
The
When
nature of symbolic experience the Spaniards
first
may be
easily illustrated.
encountered the Aztecs, neither oould
speak the language of the other.
How
could the Indians discover
the meaning of santo, or the significance of the crucifix?
could the Spaniards learn the meaning of
Tlaloc? These meanings and values could not be
communicated
by sensory experience of physical properties alone. The will
not
finest ears
you whether santo means "holy" or "hungry."
tell
How
or appreciate
calli,
The we
keenest senses cannot capture the value of holy water. Yet, as
know, the Spaniards and the Aztecs did discover each other's
all
meanings and appreciate each other's values. But not with sensory means. Each was able to enter the world of the other only by virtue of a faculty for
But a thing which
in
one context
is
a
symbol
not a symbol but a sign. Thus, a word
text,
one
which we have no better name than symhoh
is
concerned with the distinction between
is
physical form. This distinction
value
upon
value
is
a
is,
in another con-
symbol only when
its
meaning and
its
must be made when one bestows
when a previously bestowed time; it may be made at other
a sound-combination or
discovered for the
first
times for certain purposes. But after value has been bestowed
upon, or discovered use, with
5'y'^^ou
v^
its
in, a
word,
physical form.
S^linU
its
meaning becomes
The word then
identified, in
functions as a sign,
THE SYMBOL
27
meaning
rather than as a symbol. Its
is
then grasped with the
senses.
We define a
sign as a physical thing or event
some other thing
to indicate
be inherent
or event.
form and
in its physical
whose function
The meaning
its
of a sign
is
may
context, as in the case of
the height of a column of mercury in a thermometer as an indication of temperature, or the return of robins in the spring. Or, the
meaning
of a sign
may be merely
identified with
physical form
its
as in the case of a hurricane signal or a quarantine
meaning
either case, the
The
means. text)
and
fact that a thing
a sign
(in
may be
of the sign
may be both
But
flag.
in
ascertained by sensory a
symbol
(in
one con-
another context) has led to confusion and
misunderstanding.
Thus Darwin lower animals as everyone
(Ch. It
Ill, is
is
"That which distinguishes man from the
says:
not the understanding of articulate sounds, for
knows, dogs understand
The Descent
of
many words and
sentences,"
Man).
perfectly true, of course, that dogs, apes, horses, birds,
perhaps creatures even lower in the evolutionary taught to respond in a specific way to a vocal
Gua, the infant chimpanzee
scale,
command.
^
But
it
Words
human
does not follow that no difference exists between
the meaning of "words and sentences" to a dog.
Little
in the Kelloggs' experiment, was, for
a time, "considerably superior to the child in responding to
words."
and
can be
are both signs
man and
to an ape or
and symbols to man; they are merely
signs to a dog. Let us analyze the situation of vocal stimulus
and
response.
A dog may be taught to roll A man may be taught to stop
command "Roll over!'* command "Halt!" The fact
over at the at the
that a dog can be taught to roll over in Chinese, or that
taught to "go fetch" at the the same
is
true for a
invariable relationship
and
command
man) shows between
a specific reaction to
it.
"roll
over" (and, of course,
that there
a particular
The dog
he can be
or the
is
no necessary and
sound combination
man
can be taught
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
28
manner
to respond in a certain
to
any
arbitrarily selected
nation of sounds, for example, a group
On
coined for the occasion.
number and
may become
evocable by a given
the origin of the relationship between
vocal stimulus and response i.e.,
combi-
syllables,
the other hand, any one of a great
variety of responses
stimulus. I'hus, so far as
tionship,
nonsense
of
is
concerned, the nature of the
the meaning of the stimulus,
rela-
not determined by
is
properties intrinsic in the stimulus.
But, once the relationship has been established between vocal stimulus and response, the meaning of the stimulus becomes identified with the sounds; sic
it is
then as
in the sounds themselves. Thus,
meaning
as 'hilt' or 'malt,'
if
the meaning were intrindoes not have the same
'halt'
and these stimuli are distinguished from
one another with the auditory mechanism. A dog may be conditioned to respond in a certain way to a sound of a given wave length. Sufficiently alter the pitch of the sound will cease to
become
and the response
be forthcoming. The meaning of the stimulus has
identified with
its
physical form;
its
value
is
appreciated
with the senses.
Thus
in sign behavior
between
a stimulus
and
we
see that in establishing a relationship
a response the properties intrinsic in the
stimulus do not determine the nature of the response. But, after
the relationship has been established the meaning of the stimulus is
as
if it
were inherent
difference
in its physical
sponse of terminating self-locomotion. or
man
to stop at any vocal
relationship has
response, the
meaning
physical form and far
we have
is,
we have
difference
does not
make any
evoke the
re-
care to choose or devise.
been established between sound and
of the stimulus
becomes
identified with
its
therefore, perceivable with the senses.
discovered no difference between the dog and
the man; they appear to be exactly alike. as
It
select to
We may teach a dog, horse,
command we
But once the
So
form.
what phonetic combination we
gone. But
we have not
between dog and
man
is
And
told the
so they are as far
whole story
yet.
No
discoverable so far as learning
THE SYMBOL
29
to respond appropriately to a vocal stimulus
must not
A
ence.
let
porpoise
The man
is
is
not yet a
he can and does phy an vocal stimulus
and cannot play an vocal stimulus.
other creatures— in that
all
what value the and the dog cannot. The dog does not
active role in determining
to have,
is
differ-
fish.
from the dog— and
differs
we
concerned. But
an impressive similarity conceal an important
active part in determining the value of the
Whether he
to roll over or go fetch at a given
is
stimulus, or whether the stimulus for roll over be one combination
of sounds or another
nothing
else.
He
may
so.
in a
it
and can do
command
sound of
just as
But
a bell.
a creator: let x equal
does equal three pounds of coal;
let
house of worship indicate respect and
This creative faculty, that of
bestowing value upon things,
trarily
of a vocal
and thus becomes
three pounds of coal and
becomes
meaning
learn to respond to the
plays an active role
removal of the hat
which the dog has nothing
a matter in
plays a purely passive role
learns the
his salivary glands
man
is
He
whatever to "say."
and
freely, actively,
it
arbi-
one of the most common-
is
place as well as the most important characteristic of man. Children
employ
it
freely in their play: "Let's
pretend that this rock
is
a
wolf."
The
difference
between the behavior of
that the lower animals
may
then,
is
quire
new meanings, but they cannot
Only man can do like a person
who
this.
To
man and
receive
new
create
other animals ac-
and bestow them.
use a crude analogy, lower animals are
has only the receiving apparatus for wireless
messages: he can receive messages but cannot send them.
do both. And
may
values,
this difference
is
Man
one of kind, not of degree:
can
a crea-
ture can either "arbitrarily impose signification," can either create
and bestow stages.
told
values,
This difference
William James
very important." All alone.
or he cannot. There are no
may
appear
slight, but, as a
in discussing differences
human
intermediate
carpenter once
between men,
existence depends
upon
it
"It's
and
it
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
30
The
confusion regarding the nature of words and their
cance to
men
and the lower animals from a
It arises, first of all,
failure to distinguish
between the two
The
quite different contexts in which words function.
"The meaning "The meaning
signifi-
not hard to understand.
is
of a
word cannot be grasped with the
of a
word can be grasped with the
statements, senses,"
senses,"
and
though
contradictory, are nevertheless equally true. In the symbol context
the meaning cannot be perceived with the senses; in the sign context
it
can. This
confusing enough. But the situation has been
is
using the words 'symbol' and
made worse by
'sign' to label,
the different contexts, but one and the same thing; the word.
word
a
is
a
symbol and a
that a vase
may
doU and
a
is
sign,
a
two
different things. It
kana— tw^o
different
not
Thus
like saying
is
things— because
it
function in two contexts, esthetic and commercial.
IV That man mental
unique among animal species with respect to
is
that a fundamental difference of
abilities,
degree— separates man from
all
other animals
kind— not
of
a fact that has
is
long been appreciated, despite Darwin's pronouncement to the contrary.
Long
ago, in his Discouise
no men
out that "there are
so dull
on Method, Descartes pointed and stupid ...
ble of joining together different words ... is
no other animal, however perfect
John Locke, at all in is
too,
them
saw
[i.e.,
is
.
which can do the
power of abstracting
signs."
^
.
.
The
.
not
faculties of brutes
man and
brutes,
do by no means
great British anthropologist, E. B. Tylor, remarked
highest ape ...
A
gulf that divides the lowest savage
young
to have entered the
it/> ^^r\i
is
they have no use of words or any other general
upon "the mental
Jr^
like,"
and that the having of general ideas
an excellency which the
attain to
I
clearly that "the
beasts],
.
that which puts a perfect distinction between
and
y
.
be incapa-
as to
on the other hand, there
mind
child can understand
what
is
from the
not proved
of the cleverest dog, elephant, or ape."
^
THE SYMBOL And, of
31
course, there are
gulf" between
man and
many
today
who
recognize the "mental
other species.
Thus, for over a century we have had, side by in
One
comparative psychology.
from other animals
differ
mental
in
man
other has seen clearly that
abilities
man
unique in at
is
does not
The
except in degree.
no other animal
that he possesses an ability that
two traditions
side,
has declared that
least
has.
one
The
respect,
difficulty
of defining this difference adequately has kept this question open
The
until the present day.
symbol behavior
distinction
between sign behavior and
drawn here may, we hope, contribute
as
solution of this problem once and for
to a
all.
V Very bolic
little
faculty:
"symbolling."
indeed
is
known
we know And very few
of the organic basis of the sym-
next to nothing of the neurology of scientists— anatomists, neurologists or
physical anthropologists— appear to
Some, lem.
in fact,
be interested
The duty and
a prob-
task of giving an account of the neural basis of
symbolling does not, however,
fall
within the province of the
sociologist or the cultural anthropologist.
should scrupulously exclude interests; to
in the subject.
seem to be unaware of the existence of such
introduce
it
it
On
the contrary, he
as irrelevant to his
problems and
would bring only confusion.
It
is
enough
for the sociologist or cultural anthropologist to take the ability to
use symbols, possessed by
he puts
this fact
is
in
man
no way
mist's, inability to describe the
terms. However,
with the
little
it is
The
alone, as given. affected
by
his, or
use to which
even the anato-
symbolic process in neurological
well for the social scientist to be acquainted
that neurologists and anatomists do
structural basis of symbolling.
We,
know about
the
therefore, review briefly the
chief relevant facts here.
The
anatomist has not been able to discover
symbols and apes cannot. So
far as
is
known
why men can
use
the only difference
between the brain of man and the brain of an ape
is
a quantitative
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
32 ".
one:
man
.
.
nections," as A.
new
has no
brain cell con-
remarked. Nor does man,
Carlson has
J.
cells or
kinds of brain
as dis-
from other animals, possess a specialized "symbolso-called speech areas of the brain should not
tinguished
mechanism." The
be
identified
dependent upon,
identified with, or
sounds
not
is
uncommon. Thus,
great organic asset of
him
The
with symbolling.
man
of
L. L. Bernard
lists as .
"the fourth
.
.
an erroneous conception.
alone."
sounds. "It seemingly
is
is
the ability to utter articulate
... his vocal apparatus,
But this is apes have the mechanism necessary
istic
notion that symbolling
character-
The
great
for the production of articulate
well established," write R.
M. and
A.
W.
Yerkes in The Great Apes, "that the motor mechanism of voice in this ape [chimpanzee] is adequate not only to the production of a considerable variety of sounds, but also to definite articulations similar to those of
man." And the physical anthropologist,
E. A. Hooton, asserts that
"all of
the anthropoid apes are vocally
and muscularly equipped so that they could have an language
if
articulate
they possessed the requisite intelligence." Furthermore,
as Descartes
and Locke pointed out long ago, there are birds who
do actually utter articulate sounds, who duplicate the sounds of human speech, but who of course are quite incapable of symbolling. The "speech areas" of the brain are merely areas associated with the muscles of the tongue, with the larynx, etc. But, as we know, symbolling
One may
is
not at
all
confined to the use of these organs.
symbol with any part of the body that he can move at
will.«
To be
sure, the
symbolic faculty was brought into existence by
the natural processes of organic evolution. believe that the focal point,
if
And we may
reasonably
not the locus, of this facultv
the brain, especially the forebrain. Man's brain
is
much
larger
is
in
than
that of an ape, both absolutely and relatively. Tlie brain of the
average adult
human male
is
about 1500
c.c.
in size; brains of
seldom exceed 500 c.c. Relatively, the human brain weighs about i/5oth of the entire body weight, while that of a gorilla
gorillas
THE SYMBOL
33
from i/i5oth to i/20oth part of that weight.^'^ And the is large in man as compared with ape. Now
varies
forebrain especially in
many
we know that quantitative changes give rise to differences. Water is transformed into steam by addi-
situations
qualitative
power and speed
quantities of heat. Additional
tional
taxiing airplane
from the ground and transform
The
tion into flight.
alcohol
difference
the
lift
locomo-
terrestrial
between wood alcohol and grain
a qualitative expression of a quantitative difference in
is
the proportions of carbon and hydrogen. Thus a marked growth in size of the brain in
man may have
brought forth a new kind
of function.
VI All culture (civilization) depends
upon the symbol.
It
was
the exercise of the symbolic faculty that brought culture into ex-
and
istence
the use of symbols that makes the perpetuation
it is
of culture possible. ture,
and
Articulate speech pression.
Let us
Without the symbol
man would be Remove
is
there would be no cul-
merely an animal, not a
human
being.
the most important form of symbolic
ex-
speech from culture and what would remain?
see.
Without
we would have no human social orwe might have, but this form of organization man; it is not per se, human. But we would have
articulate speech
ganization. Families is
not peculiar to
no prohibitions of
incest,
no
rules prescribing
dogamy, polygamy or monogamy. cross cousin
scribed,
How
without
sessed
one
at a time, exist
astic, or military organization;
no
level. Rituals
which prohibit
but permit them
political,
economic,
no codes of etiquette or
science, theology, or literature;
on an ape
parallel cousin pro-
rules
if
pos-
without speech?
Without speech we would have no laws;
a
How could
plural mates possessed simultaneously
en-
could marriage with a
be prescribed, marriage with articulate speech?
exogamy and
ecclesi-
ethics;
no
no games or music, except
and ceremonial paraphernalia would be
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
34
meaningless without articulate speech. Indeed, without articulate speech we would be all but toolless: we would have only the oc-
and
casional
among
the higher apes, for
formed
tool-using
non-progressive
the
To
its
perpetuation
be sure, with
for the
Word
culture. "In the
same ends that
the
into
some form, we
was the beginning" of
cul-
also.
man
his culture
all
ape
the
of
trans-
man, the human being.
In short, without symbolic communication in
would have no
find today
was articulate speech that
it
progressive, cumulative tool-using of
ture—and
we
insignificant use of the tool such as
is still
an animal and
strives
other living creatures strive for: the
all
preservation of the individual and the perpetuation of the race.
In concrete terms these ends are food, shelter from the elements, defense from enemies, health, and offspring. strives for these
led
many
ends just
"no fundamental
difference be-
of other creatures."
But man does
is
man and
man
fact that
other animals do has, no doubt,
as all
to declare that there
The
tween
the behavior of
differ,
not in ends but in means. Man's means are cultural means:
culture
simply the
is
human
man
way of living. And, since upon a faculty possessed by
animal's
these means, culture, are dependent
alone, the ability to use symbols, the difference
behavior of
man and
of
all
other creatures
is
between the
not merely great, but
and fundamental.
basic
VII
The
behavior of
non-symbolic. cries
Man
man
is
of
two
distinct kinds: symbolic
out in pain, shrinks with
fear, "bristles"
on. Non-symbolic behavior of this sort shares
it
and
yawns, stretches, coughs, scratches himself,
is
with anger, and so
not peculiar to man; he
not only with the other primates but with
animal species as well. But
man communicates
with articulate speech, uses amulets, confesses
many
other
with his fellows sins,
makes
laws,
observes codes of etiquette, explains his dreams, classifies his relatives in designated categories,
and so on. This kind of behavior
THE SYMBOL
35
man
is
unique; only
it
consists of, or
is
is
capable of
it; it is
peculiar to
man
because
dependent upon, the use of symbols. The non-
Homo
symbolic behavior of
sapiens
animal; the symbolic behavior
is
is
It is
the symbol which has transformed
to a
human animal. human behavior
Because
is
havior of infra-human species
can learn nothing about
man the man the human being. man from a mere animal
the behavior of
that of
symbol behavior and since the beis
human
non-symbolic,
we
that
it follovi^s
behavior from observations upon
or experiments with the lower animals. Experiments with rats and
They have thrown much light of behavior among mammals or
apes have indeed been illuminating.
upon mechanisms and
processes
the higher vertebrates. But they have contributed nothing to an
understanding of
and
all
species.
know
of
its
And
human
behavior because the symbol mechanism
among
consequences are totally lacking as for neuroses in rats,
that rats can be
made
it is
neurotic.
the lower
of course interesting to
But science probably had
better understanding of psychopathic behavior
among human
a
be-
ings before neuroses were produced experimentally in rats than
they now have of the neuroses of the rats. Our understanding of human neuroses has helped us to understand those of rats; we have, as a matter of fact, interpreted the latter in terms of human pathology. But
I
cannot see where the neurotic laboratory
have served to deepen or enlarge our understanding of
rats
human
be-
havior.
As each
it
was the symbol that made mankind human, so
member
of the species.
A baby
is
not a
it is
human being
begins to symbol. Until the infant begins to talk there
The Ape and
the Child showed. As a matter of
he
nothing
is
to distinguish his behavior qualitatively from that of a very ape, as
with
until
young
fact,
one
of the impressive results of this fascinating experiment by Professor
and Mrs. Kellogg was the demonstration of how of
Homo
sapiens
is
before he begins to talk.
ape-like an infant
The baby boy
ac-
quired exceptional proficiency in climbing in association with the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
36
chimpanzee, and even acquired her "food bark"! The Kelloggs speak of how the httle ape became "humanized" during her sojourn in their home. But what the experiment demonstrated so littie
conclusively was the ape's utter inability to learn to talk or even to
make any progress in this direction— in short, her inability to become "humanized" at all. The infant of the species Homo sapiens becomes human only when and as he exercises his symbol faculty. Only through articuspeech— not necessarily vocal— can he enter the world of hubeings and take part in their affairs. The questions asked earlier may be repeated now. How could a growing child know
late
man
and appreciate such things
as social organization, ethics, etiquette,
ritual, science, religion, art
and games without symbolic communi-
cation?
The answer
is
he could know nothing of
of course that
these things and have no appreciation of them
The
question of "wolf children"
instances in
is
at
all.
relevant here.
A
belief in
which human children have been reared by wolves or
other animals has flourished ever since the
Remus— and
myth
of
Romulus and
long before that time. Despite the fact that accounts
of "wolf children" have been
shown repeatedly
to
be erroneous or
unsupported by adequate evidence ever since Blumenbach covered that
from
his
"Wild Peter" was merely
home
at the instance of a
this deplorable folk-tale
still
a half-witted
dis-
boy ejected
newly acquired stepmother,
flourishes in certain "scientific" circles
But the use to which these lupine wards and "feral men" put by some sociologists and psychologists is a good one,
today. are
namely, to show that a lives
To
is
a
member
world without symbols
of the species is
not a
Homo
human
paraphrase Voltaire, one might say that
if
sapiens
who
being but a brute. wolf children did
not exist "social science" would have to invent them.
Children
who have been
cut off from
human
intercourse for
by blindness and deafness but who have eventually effected communication with their fellows on a symbolic level are ex-
years
ceedingly illuminating.
The
ease of
Helen Keller
is
exceptionally
THE SYMBOL
37
instructive, although
and others
^^
those of Laura Bridgman, Marie Heurtin,
are very valuable also.
Helen Keller was rendered blind and deaf by
illness.
She grew up
as a child
at a very early age
without symbolic contact with
anyone. Descriptions of her at the age of seven, the time at which her teacher, Miss Sullivan, came to her home, disclose no attributes of Helen's behavior at
and unruly
disciplined
Within
a
little
animal.^^
day or so after her
Sullivan taught Helen her
human
She was a headstrong, un-
all.
arrival at
the Keller home, Miss
But week later Helen knew several words but, as Miss Sullivan reports, she had "no idea how to use them or that everything has a name." Within three weeks Helen knew eighteen nouns and three verbs. But she was still on the level of signs; she still had no notion "that everything this
word was merely a
first
sign,
word, spelling
not a symbol.
it
into her hand.
A
has a name."
Helen confused the word
signs for
"mug" and "water"
apparently, both were associated with
made cess.
a
few attempts to
One
arrival,
clear
up
this
drinking.
because,
Miss Sullivan
confusion but without suc-
morning, however, about a month after Miss Sullivan's
the two went out to the
pened then
is
best told in their
pump
own
in the garden.
What
hap-
words:
I made Helen hold her mug under the spout while I pumped. As the cold water gushed forth, filling the mug, I spelled V-a-t-e-r' into Helen's free hand. The word coming so close upon the sensation of cold water rushing over her hand seemed to startle her. She dropped the mug and stood as one transfixed, A new light came into her face. She spelled 'water' several times. Then she dropped on the ground and asked for its name and pointed to the pump and the trellis, and sud-
denly turning round she asked for
she had added thirty
a
new words
my name
... In a few hours
to her vocabulary.
But these words were now more than mere signs as they are to as they had been to Helen up to then. They were sym-
dog and
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
38 boh. Helen had at her for the
first
last
We
new
time to a
Helen describes
ings.
grasped and turned the key that admitted
this
universe: the world of
human
be-
marvellous experience herself:
walked down the path to the well-house, attracted by the
fragrance of the honeysuckle with which
it
was covered. Some-
one was drawing water and my teacher placed my hand under the spout. As the cool stream gushed over one hand she spelled into the other the word water, first slowly, then rapidly. I stood still, my whole attention fixed upon the motion of her fingers. Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness as of something for-
gotten— a
thrill
of returning thought;
and somehow the mystery
was revealed to me. I knew then that 'w-a-t-e-r' meant the wonderful cool something that was flowing over my hand. That living word awakened my soul, gave it light, hope, of language
joy, set it free!
Helen was transformed on the instant by
managed
Sullivan had set
it
with
in this
mechanism and
motion. Helen, on her part, grasped the external world
mechanism that had and
years, sealed in dark
and
Miss
this experience.
to touch Helen's symbol
ears that
and entered
heard not. But
a
new
lain
dormant and
silent isolation
now
she had crossed the boundary
land. Henceforth her progress
"I left the well-house,"
Helen
As we returned
to the
to quiver with
life.
house
would be
rapid.
reports, "eager to learn. Every-
name
thing had a name, and each
inert all these
by eyes that could not see
ever}'
gave birth to a
object which
That was because
I
new sight that had come to me." Helen became humanized rapidly. "I
I
new
thought.
touched seemed
saw everything with the
strange
Helen from day
to day,"
see an
Miss Sullivan wrote
horn hour to hour. Everything must have
a
improvement
in her diary,
name now
in
"almost .
.
.
She
drops the signs and pantomime she used before as soon as she has
words to supply their place expressive each day
.
.
."
.
.
.
We
notice her face grows
more
THE SYMBOL
A
39
more eloquent and convincing account
of the significance of
human mind and
symbols and of the great gulf between the
that
minds without symbols could hardly be imagined.
of
VIII
SummaTy. The
natural
processes
of
biologic
evolution
man alone, a new and distincsymbols. The most important form
brought into existence in man, and tive ability: the ability to use
symbolic expression
of
is
means communication of tion
— tradition— and
articulate ideas;
preservation
speech.
Articulate
communication means
speech
preserva-
means accumulation and
pro-
The emergence of the faculty of symbolling has resulted in genesis of a new order of phenomena: an extra-somatic,
gress.
the
cultural, order. All civilizations are
by, the use of symbols.
A
born
of,
and are perpetuated
culture, or civilization,
is
but a particular
kind of form which the biologic, life-perpetuating particular animal,
Human is
behavior
not human.
The
being only as he
is
is
symbolic behavior;
infant of the genus
if it is
Homo
not symbolic,
becomes
a
it
human
introduced into and participates in that order
phenomena which is culture. And the key means of participation in it is— the symbol. of
activities of a
man, assume.
to this world
and the
CHAPTER THREE THE USE OF TOOLS BY PRIMATES
ON
"Tools X Symbols
IVl an
= Culture."
has often been characterized as "the tool-using ani-
mal," the implication being that no other animal uses tools.
Benjamin Franklin went
man
as
farther,
the tool-malcing animal.
A
it
century
is
and defined
said,*
when everyone
later,
was discussing Darwinism, many learned men were willing to admit that other animals might use tools, but insisted that man alone was able to make them. in his Primeval
distance,"
He
^
lay
made by
of Argyll, for example, argued
between man and the brutes with respect to
no
themselves."
Edward Clodd
^
is
particularly to
left
man the
the question open. Today, thanks
the observations and experiments
chimpanzees by Wolfgang Kohler and reported
tools.
if
among
Danvin, unwilling to go farther than the evidence of
day would permit, wisely
book.
in-
implement
also insisted that
the only tool-maker
tools.
but he
tools,
case whatever do they ever use an
not the only tool-user, he
Primates." his
The Duke
that a great "gulf," a "whole immeasurable
admitted that some of the lower animals use
sisted that "in
"is
Man
made among
in his fascinating
The Mentality of Apes, we know that apes can and do make The evidence on this point is accepted as conclusive by such
Anthologies of quotations and authors without number credit Franklin with The writer has not had time to plough through his Collected Works, but considerable research has failed to discover this statement in Franklin's writings. Someone asked for the reference in Notes and Queries years ago (Vol. 8, 1913), but received no answer, apparently. Did Franklin really say this, or is it merely scholars' folklore? *
this definition.
40
ON
THE USE OF TOOLS BY PRIMATES
W.
students of primates as R.
41
Yerkes, E. A. Hooton, T. C.
Schnierla, and A. L. Kroeber. However,
we
find
still
some
reluc-
tance to admit anthropoids to the category of tool-makers. Thus,
Grahame
the British anthropologist,
From
Clark, in his recent
Savagery to Civilization, asserts that "the understanding use of
and
tools
(p. 7).
their purposive devising
And Wilhelm
is
a characteristic of
kreis school of anthropology,
is
Scientific studies of apes during recent decades
and a
They
versatility in
readily
employ
alone"
unwilling to admit that the lower
primates are able even to use "real tools," let alone
skill
man
Schmidt, the leader of the so-called Kultur-
the use of tools that
sticks as levers;
is
make them.^
have disclosed a
quite remarkable.
they build structures of boxes;
use sticks in digging; and otherwise employ a great variety of materials as tools.
More noteworthy
apes (chimpanzees) have
still,
shown themselves capable of inventing—by a process of understanding and insight— tools, and of accomplishing their manufacture in instances that required the artificial shaping of materials. Sultan,
two
one of the chimpanzees observed by Kohler, combined by inserting the end of one into the hollow end of the
sticks
other, thus
making
combined
of reach. "That the a true tool
enough
a tool long
sticks
to obtain food hitherto out
were perceived and used
as
and not used simply by accident," writes the compara-
tive psychologist Schnierla,
"was indicated by the fact that when
the sticks became separated, the animal straightway reconnected
them
in a
manner
tion together." in this
*
that suggested an understanding of their func-
He
even contrived to put three
manner. Once when the one
stick
sticks together
was too large to be
in-
end of the other. Sultan chewed it down Chimpanzees readily build structures of boxes
serted into the hollow until
and
it
would
crates,
fit.
sometimes four or
five storeys high, in
food originally suspended out of reach.
way
their ability to
modify and
order to obtain
They demonstrate
in this
to rearrange their environment,
to relate one thing to another and to an objective in terms of their physical properties,
which
is
the essence of the tool-process.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
42
The
question naturally
arises, therefore,
a culture, at least a material culture?
why do
Why
it
is
not apes have that tool-using
among apes is not a cumulative and progressive phenomenon as it is among mankind? The limitations upon the use of tools by apes are not imposed, it appears, by anatomical or sensory shortcomings. The senses of apes, with the exception of the sense of statics, are quite as
and
Nor
are apes limited to coarse
and crude implements, or to those
requiring brute strength rather than delicacy.
and straws with
string
from
skill;
hands and
their
keen
wielding material objects as are those of men.
as suitable for
They can handle
they are able deftly to remove
One chimpanzee under
feet.
readily learned to thread a needle. Little
slivers
observation
Gua, the baby chimpan-
more She was more
zee in the Kelloggs' experiment, learned to eat with a spoon readily than did the child skillful
and
and
test,"
effective, too, in
in obtaining
that the limitations physical in character.
.
.
.
who was
trained with her.
her solution of the "suspended cookie
food by means of a hoe. Thus
As Professor
appears
tools
make
observation of the anthropoid apes does not
probable that their tool-using
it
among apes are not E. A. Hooton has expressed it:
upon the use of
abilities are strictly
it
seem
limited by the
conformation of their hands or arms, in spite of the relative coarseness of these members, resulting, no doubt, from the loco-
motor and suspensory uses to which they are put ...
I
do
not believe that the anthropoid apes are manually incapable of most of the ordinary movements in which man employs his hands.^
Professor R. H. Lowie has suggested that the reason for the lack of culture
among
apes
lies in
their inability to transmit their tool
knowledge and experience from one his neighbors imitated
the chimpanzee his trick
who
and they
all
to another
by imitation.
"If
him," says Professor Lowie, speaking of
invents and uses a tool, "if he taught
passed
it
on to
their offspring,
them
chimpanzees
ON
THE USE OF TOOLS BY PRIMATES
43
would be on the highroad to culture. But they do nothing of the ® Professor Lowie seems to be misinformed concerning apes.
sort."
According to such authorities
R.
as
M. and
chimpanzee commonly and with great
Numerous examples are to
be found
of
also in
W.
A,
facility
Yerkes, "the
imitates acts."
^
communication of experience by imitation
W.
The Mentality
Kohler's
of Apes. Apes,
do ape. As E. B. Tylor long ago observed, "the faculty of learning by imitation comes out in the apes in an it
would appear,
human
almost
really
way."
Thus the reason
^
for their lack of a material
culture cannot lie in this direction. It
can hardly be argued that apes have no material culture be-
cause they have no need for one, or because they could derive
advantage or benefit from
it.
hammers, digging
levers,
In the
sticks,
poking
actually used to practical advantage
and daggers be useful
to
them
first
place
by apes.
Why would
etc.,
are
not spears
Would not bags To turn from the
in self-protection?
be useful
to carry or store food or other things?
and
to
no
note that
sticks, missiles,
practical
utilitarian
we must
the esthetic and recreational, and,
noting the fondness of chimpanzees for games, dancing, and personal adornment, a
would not drums,
rattles, necklaces, gorgets,
hundred other similar things bring endless joy and
and
satisfaction
to the simian heart? Indeed, the ape could use and enjoy a culture
quite as well as his
Why,
human
cousin.
then, do apes lack a material culture? It
is
due
to his
"lack of brains," or "lack of intelligence," according to Professor
Hooton.^ This,
in
our opinion,
is
quite correct. But
sufEcient answer. Merely to say "lack of brains"
tells
it
is
not a
us very little
man and ape. men with regard to man is more skillful,
about the difference between the use of tools by
The
essential difference
use of tools
is
not, as
between apes and
we have
versatile,
or even inventive.
ability of
man
cultural
is
As
seen, that
a matter of fact, the inventive
frequently over-rated.
development makes
it
The
archeological record of
clear that until relatively recent
times inventions were decidedly infrequent; thousands of years
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
44
might elapse between the appearance of an awl and the invention of the needle— although all one had to do to effect this advance was to
hole in the blunt end of the awl.
drill a
the steamboat it
was. Yet
is
The
invention of
often regarded as a great achievement and indeed
consisted merely of combining already existing tools—
is
an engine and a boat— of putting one and one together. Chimpanzees are able to do
and ape
lie in
an
this.
Nor does the
ability to imitate, to
rience from one to another, for, as
difference
between
communicate
we have
man
tool-expe-
noted, apes freely
The fundamental difference consists in the fact that the use of tools among men is a cumulative and progressive process whereas among apes it is neither. This is not to say that an individual ape does not make progress in his use of tools nor that he cannot increase his repertory of tool behavior. What we are saying is that apes as species make no progress in tool-using; one generation is no further advanced than its predecessor. With man, of course, it is the reverse: each generation may build upon do
this.
and add
to the tools
and techniques of
precisely this process of accumulation
that has lifted
man from
But our question
is
tally
and
using
still
apes.
is
him
civilization.
unanswered:
Why
does this difference
is
a different kind of activity,
qualitatively different in a psychological sense,
among
It
technology
exist?
among men
Tool-using
in
the level of the brute and carried
through savager}' and barbarism to
between man and ape
predecessors.
its
and progress
Among
apes the use of tools
is
fundamenfrom
tool-
a conceptual
By conceptual we mean the formation by the ape of a configuration of behavior in which he, a tool, and the thing upon which the tool is to be used are functionally related to one another. The ape is able to solve
process as well as a neuro-sensory-muscular one.
his
problem by means of insight and understanding, and
the solution implicitly before he executes
we mean by
conceptual. In the
also conceptual
human
it
overtly.
to effect
This
is
what
species, the tool process
and neuro-sensory-muscular
in character.
But
is
it is
ON
THE USE OF TOOLS BY PRIMATES
more than
this; it
is
symbolic as well.
45
Human
beings express their
concepts in symbolic form. Thus they not only have tools and
concepts of tools, but they have and use words of tools— axe, knife,
hammer,
was the introduction of symbols, word-formed
It
etc.
symbols, into the tool process that transformed anthropoid tool-
human
behavioT into
We
must
tool-behavior.
distinguish
two aspects of the tool-using
process, the
and the extra-organismal, the subjective and the
intra-organismal
overt or explicit.
On
the one hand
we have
the animal's sensory
perception of tools and other material objects in the external
world and his bodily reactions to them.
On
the other hand, are
the inner, neural processes of imagination and insight in which patterns of behavior to be executed overtly are formed. In short,
we have motor
A
the inner, mental aspect of tool-using and the outer,
aspect.
significant characteristic of
ape tool-behavior
discontinuous psychological process. In
the discontinuity of tool-experience
cannot be engaged in wielding tools tool-experience
upon the
is
is,
is
of course, a
all
a
the time. But in the ape,
discontinuous on the subjective side as well as
objective.
"Out
of sight out of
mind"
fairly
pearance of a sick (or dying) animal [chimpanzee] has rest, so
long
as
he
taken out of sight."
is
and some hindsight
foresight
feature of their mental life
in the ape.
is
well char-
"the chief difference
.
.
.
little effect
There
But the
is
some
characteristic
live; this,
according to Kohler,
between anthropoids and even the
most primitive human beings." Spatially
^°
the "extremely narrow limits" of
the temporal world in which they is
it is
the ape's mentality. Kohler observes that the "disap-
acterizes
on the
that
motor aspect necessity; one
overt,
its
^^
The ape
lives in a small world.
confined to the range of his senses; temporally
it is
limited to the
moment, with perhaps an
occasional
dawn
it is
of antici-
pation and a twilight of reminiscence. Thus, tool-experience in
the ape lays
it
is
a series of
down.
When
disconnected episodes.
he
is
He
wields a tool then
confronted by a "tool situation" he sizes
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
46
up the his
situation, formulates a plan, puts
problem, and that
is
the end of
the ape's tool-experience
side,
experience. Tool-using
among
is
into execution, solves
it
On
it.
the inner, subjective
limited to the external and overt
apes
is
thus a discontinuous_psycho-
logical process subjectively as well as objectively;..
With man, using
tool-experience
is
differs
man
is
Overtly,
tool-
must be. But continuous and enduring.
from the apes, and indeed
all
it
other living creatures
he so far as we know, With words man creates a new world, a world of ideas and philosophies. In this world man lives just as truly as in the physical world of his senses. Indeed, man feels that the essential quality in that
A^
quite different.
a discontinuous process as, of course,
subjectively, tool-experience in
Man
is
is
capable of symbolic behavior.
of his existence consists in his occupancy of this world of symbols
and ideas— or, spirit.
manence It
is
well.
as
he sometimes
calls
it,
the world of the mind or
This world of ideas comes to have a continuity and a per-
not
that the external world of the senses can never have.
made up
Temporally
of the present only, but of a past it
is
and a future
as
not a succession of disconnected episodes,
but a continuum extending to infinity in both directions, from
As John Dewey has aptly expressed
eternity to eternity.
Man
it:
from the lower animals because he preserves his With the animals, an experience perishes as it happens, and each new doing or suffering stands alone. But man lives in a world where each occurrence is charged with echoes and reminiscences of what has gone before, where each event is a reminder of other things. Hence he lives not, like the beasts of the field, in a world of merely physical things but in a world of signs and symbols.^^ differs
past experiences
.
.
.
This inner world of ideas to
in
him than the outer world
example of
this in
which
man
dwells seems
of the senses.
We
more
have a
the philosophy of idealism: ideas
real
classic
come
first;
they are the real things; they endure forever; material objects and sensory experiences are merely imperfect and ephemeral manifesta-
ON
THE USE OF TOOLS BY PRIMATES
We
tions of the Ideas.*
47
have essentially the same
idea,
though
perhaps in a more primitive, and also more graphic, form in the Christian conception of the Word: "In the beginning was the Word." The Word is also creative: from the spoken word the world came into being. The Word also became flesh (John, I, 14). Thus, in man's naive philosophies, ideas and words come first. They are "more real" than the things of the senses. They are
enduring and eternal. It
image
such a world as
in
is
To him
a tool
as
is
may be
it
an ape.
to
moment
that exists for the is
It is also
man
which
timeless inner world in
and
man knows and
this that
only:
it
an
man
mind more than
the
like Plato's ideas in is
and using
of grasping
tools
of
idea. It It
lives.
is
is
a part of that
not something
functions in the living past
projected into the unborn future.
experience for
wields tools.
not merely a material object, or even a sensory
God,
The is
tool in eternal.
man's mind,
Hence
tool-
a series of disconnected episodes,
and laying them down
again.
These
overt acts are merely occasional expressions of an ideational experience within
Thus the experience
him
that
difference
is
is
continuous and unbroken.
between ape and man: In the ape,
tool-
a series of discrete episodes; the inner experience
begins and ends with the overt act. In man, tool-experience
is
continuum. Though the overt expression of
dis-
this
connected and episodic, the inner experience flow.
And
it is
is
experience
is
a
an uninterrupted
the symbol, the word-formed idea, that makes this
continuity of experience possible.
When
Professor
of culture
by the
Lowie endeavors to account for the ape's lack and hence to transmit and
inability to imitate,
perpetuate tool-experience, he
though
his
premise
is
on the right track even wrong. For what he is getting at is conis
up in the mind of God" rather than minds of men. But it is not uncommon God; even great philosophers are guilty of this
* Plato thought of these ideas as "laid originating for
man
and functioning
in the
to mistake himself for
cnor occasionally.
really
K
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
48
Kroeber in
tinuity of experience. Similarly, Professor A. L.
dis-
cussing "the inventive but cultureless ape/' suggests that "perhaps
the thing which essentially makes culture missive and preservative elements,
which
factors,
social scientists
precisely those trans-
is
those relational or binding
have indeed occupied themselves
with, but have been inclined to regard as after
all
of secondary
importance in comparison with the dynamic phenjomenon of invention."
^^
Culture without continuity of experience possible.
But what
to culture? It
on the is
it
is
prerequisite
we
find this
among
continuity on the subjective side rather than
is
objective, or overt, that
is
essential.
As we have shown,
it
the symbol, particularly in word form, which provides this
element of continuity it
of course, im-
not the continuity which comes from the com-
is
munication of experience by imitation, for apes. Clearly,
is,
sort of continuity of experience
is
in the tool-experience of
this factor of continuity in
made accumulation and
progress, in
possible. ..A-
Ta
''^"-'^
ft-
,
"MIo-^^ rl v\
'M ^
l-t^^ I ./
^ .
/...
^
1
man. And,
finally,
man's tool-experience that has short,
a material
culture,
CHAPTER FOUR
MIND
MINDING
IS
"We
should have a great many fewer disputes in the world if words for what they are, signs of our ideas only, and not for things Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. in themselves."
were taken
J.
—
he problem of the
occupied
has been
It
ophy, fundamental
Not
in religion.
and
between body and mind has
less
appears no nearer a
the central problem of
Encyclopedia
fundamental, however,
oi
all
philos-
knowledge, in ethics and is
it
for psychology
." .
.
are the opening words of the article
These
dawn of solution now
the
since
scientists
alike in the theory of
for physical science
the
and
many it named
thought, and to
than then.
relation
philosophers
Religion
and
"Body and Mind"
Ethics
by James
in
Lewis
Mclntyre, Anderson lecturer in comparative psychology to the University of Aberdeen. Hundreds of books and thousands of lectures
lem.
and
How
mind have
How
are
some
of
century.
articles
is it
a
have been devoted to the "mind-body" prob-
possible for the
body?
Which
is
body the
to have a
mind?
How
body and mind articulated the questions which have plagued mankind
And
"to
many
can the
the body or the mind? with each other? These are
reality,
for
many a now
they appear no nearer to solution
than then."
Why
has
the "solution"
not been reached?
difficulty?
49
Where
is
the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
50 It
is
the thesis of this essay that the "solution" has not been
reached because the problem paradoxes of Zeno.
is
difficulty
a false one, is
one
somewhat
like the
of verbal origin;
it
is
making. By rewording the problem, the "problem"
own
our
The
word mind
appears: use the
as a
of
dis-
verb instead of a noun and no
"problem, fundamental either to the theory of knowledge, ethics,
Mind
psycholog)-, science" or to anything else, remains. ing;
it is
is
mind-
the behaving, reacting, of a living organism as a whole, as
a unit.
Once upon
a time, in a far-off land, a people was concerned
with the problem of Golshok.
No
one knew exactly what Golshok
was, but everyone agreed that he (she or
and that
their existence
upon Golshok. Many
it)
was very important
and welfare depended
of the best minds among
measure
in large
this
people devoted
Golshok. Their lucubrations were
their lives to the study of
corded and their pronouncements carried great weight. decreed that
was to be conducted
all social life
in
accordance with
the principles of Golshok as set forth by the wise men. it
Of
course
was necessary to put people to death occasionally because of
their failure to
comply with these
done by burning them all
re-
was
It
really
was
This was usually
This went on for centuries. But not
alive.
Some were bent upon
people were content.
what Golshok
principles.
—
if
discovering just
anything. But they never got any
farther than words, save for an occasional burning of a rebel.
Finally in plain finish,
some one broke
way out
of the impasse.
He
declared
was nothing but "words, words, words," that the wise
had been chasing nearer
a
language that the whole Golshok business, from start to
now than
men
their tails for centuries, with "the solution
then."
He
declared, moreover, that
if
no
people
upon human principles instead of Golshok principles they would be much better off. Of course the wise men had him burned to death and his ashes scattered to the four winds. But they were too late. The secret
would conduct
their lives
MIND
MINDING
IS
51
was out. The common people went around saying, "There ain't no Golshok." And they hved happily ever after. And so it has been with "Mind." "Mind" is a noun. A noun is a
name
of something. Therefore there
cosmos that "lose"
to
is
it.
mind.*
A
must be something
person has a mind;
Thus "mind," an
created and projected into the cosmos. trying to find
it
as they
for
V'l- Philosophic
Living organisms
The
him
"thing-in-itself,"
was
Then people
set
about
have been searching for Truth, the Good,
and Beauty, these many weary cosmos
a
entity,
in the
possible for
it is
may be
One might
years.
as well search
the
chasing, nothing more.
tail
distinguished from non-living systems.
former appropriate materials from their environments and
incorporate
them
into their
own
structures.
energy from the external world and utilize
and multiply themselves. They they have cellular structure.
We
it
They capture
free
to maintain, extend,
grow, and reproduce; and
eat,
may
distinguish
two
classes of
motions, or reactions, of living organisms, intra-organismic and extra-organismic. In the former class
we have
the relationships of
part to part and of part to whole. In the latter, relationship of the organism as a is
whole
we have
the
to the external world. It
the reactions of the organism as a whole, as a coherent unit, to
the external world that
we may
call
mind, or minding.
This commits us to such statements Similarly, a
We
paramecium, a
as
"an oyster has a mind."
radish, a lichen, etc.,
"have minds."
It
"The uninvented the word heat," says Henri Poincar^ in The Value of Science, "devoted many generations to error. Heat has been treated as a substance simply because it was designated by a substantive [noun]." Substances have weight. But when it was finally discovered that a body weighed no more when hot, i.e., when it "contained much heat," than when cold, i.e., contained little heat, the logical conclusion that heat is not a substance was not drawn. On the contrary, so much at the mercy of words is man that he continued to think of heat as a substance, but he concluded that there must be weightless substances. It took a long time to realize that heat is not a thing *
have
a parallel situation in the history of physical theory.
known man who
but a doing.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
52
may sound
But
ridiculous to say that a radish "has a mind."
does not sound ridiculous at
all
to say that a radish minds,
organism to
its
external world. So
reacts as a living
mercy of words that even so
at the
slight a
change
much as
it
i.e.,
are
we
one from
noun-use to verb-use makes the whole world look different. Mind, or minding,
thus co-extcnsive with
is
life. It is
the extra-organismal
aspect of that class of motions peculiar to material systems of cellular structure.*
To
return to our starting point:
have a body? The solution:
mind
what is
is
mind?
How
can a mind
minding, the reacting of an
organism as a whole, as a coherent unit (as distinguished from the reacting of parts of the organism with reference to other
Mind
parts). is
is
a function of the body.
The
the entire organism functioning as a unit.
cutting
is
"organ" of the mind
Mind
is
to
body
as
to a knife.**
But Alexander merely cut the Gordian knot; he did not untie it. Neither have we "solved" the mind-body problem, for in the form it is
in
which
it
has plagued the reflecting portion of mankind,
But we have disposed of it. We have not proved, be proved, that there is no cosmic entity, mind, which
insoluble.
nor can
it
has an existence independent of bodies.
the "fundamental reality"
*
is
We have not proved
that
not mind, of which bodies are but
The
Dictionary of Psychology, H. C. Warren, ed., defines mind as "the an organism by means of which it responds as an integrated, dynamic system to external forces." ** Since the above was written, I have learned that a Chinese philosopher. Fan Chen, of the fifth century A.D., said the same thing and in almost the same words: "The body is the material basis of the spirit, and the spirit is only the functioning of the body. The spirit is to the body what sharpness is to a sharp knife. have never known the existence of sharpness after destruction of the knife. How can we admit the survival of the spirit when the body is gone?" Quoted by Hu Shih in the symposium Living Philosophies, (New York, 1931), pp. 243-44.
sum
total of those activities of
We
any attempt to make the soul a thing or entity." "function of the organism," as "a class of motions,"
Aristotle, too, "rejected
Instead he treated (Brett,
1929)
it
as a
p. 707.
^
MIND
MINDING
IS
53
material expressions. So far as
know, there
I
proof for the non-existence of Santa Claus. often, not by disproving propositions but
no convincing
is
Mankind
progresses,
by outgrowing them.
The "Mind-Body" problem is of one piece with the VitalismMechanism controversy. No one has ever "disproved" the theory of Vitalism, but scientists, and many philosophers, are agreed that the time has come when it should be ignored as obsolete, outgrown and, above
Mechanism It
that
is
barren and
all, sterile.
It
is
not that the philosophy of
True (with a capital T) and that of Vitalism False. Mechanism has been fruitful, productive; Vitalism is
sterile.
Vitalism as "a view
those which have led to
all
exactly opposite to
is
the scientific piogTcss that has been
made," declares Professor H. H. Newman.^ Biologists have "clung to the materialistic or mechanistic explanation of
life,
simply be-
was the only way in which progress could be made" ^ (emphases ours), declares the distinguished paleobiologist. Pro-
cause
it
fessor
Ermine C. Case, As T. H. Huxley long ago made
clear,
itself it is of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit, or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter; matter may be regarded as a form of thought,
In
thought
may be
regarded as a property of matter
.
.
.
But with
a view to the progress of science, the materialistic terminology is
in every
the other ualistic
way to be phenomena
terminology
is
preferred.
For
connects thought with
it
of the universe
.
.
.
whereas the
spirit-
and leads to nothing but
utterly barren,
obscurity and confusion of ideas.
Thus the importance
as well as the tools of thought.
others, to fertile fields.
mind
is
reality,"
Words
of terminology.
And
so,
Some lead us into blind alleys; we have not "proved" that
while
not some cosmic entity, or proved that
we have shown
are the channels
that this view
best and confusing and paralyzing at
its
is
not the "real
it is
barren and sterile at
worst.
The
its
opposite view,
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
54 that
mind
is
minding, or behavior, that mind
bondage of a body, releases us from the verbal ing metaphysics, and will bear fruit.
sets us free to
is
a function of
sterile
sow and reap
and
m
the
a paralyz-
a field that
CHAPTER FIVE THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE "Anyone who
acquainted with the history of science will admit that all ages, meant, and now more than ever means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human ." thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity T. H. Huxley, its
is
progress has, in
.
The
—
.
Physical Basis of Lite.
hen JK>
we
survey the history of science
we
see at a glance
that progress has not been equal and uniform on
Advance has been more rapid others. Greater progress has
some
in
been made
in
all
fronts.
quarters than in
astronomy and physics
more advanced, as a science, than older and more mature than socicannot be neatly marked with a birth of each science ology. The precise date, of course; there has been overlapping, and growth has been simultaneous among many, if not all, of them. Nevertheless, it is clear that some sciences are older and more mature than in biology; physiology
is
psychology; and psychology
is
than others. Since there of a science and
two
its
factors as one.
is
a close correspondence
degree of development,
We
may
appeared
earlier
sciences;
the
we may
and degrees of maturity.
say that the physical sciences
and have developed farther than the
biological
treat these
thus arrange the sciences in a scale
in the order of their respective ages
Generalizing broadly,
between the age
we may
sciences
took
form
developed farther than the social sciences. 55
The
earlier
biological
and
have
question naturally
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
56 "Social" Sciences
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE sciences."
The whole
hypothesis
is
57
fundamentally
false (p. 144;
see, also, pp. 190-193). I
am
not sure that
Throughout
this essay
fully
I
he
understand Spencer's argument.
exhibits science as the accumulating
product of a many-sided psychological process. But with the possible exception of
an allusion to "social science" in ancient times,
he does not show, nor does he attempt to show, that the physical sciences have not matured earlier than the biological sciences, and these in turn earlier than the social sciences.
A
decade
later in
"The
Classification of the Sciences" (1864),
Spencer again returns to the subject, and again opposes Comte's
But he ends up with an order
hierarchy.
Ward
essentially like Comte's.
Comte and Spencer at this point in his Dynamic Sociology. When, however, he repeated the observation in "The Place of Sociology among the Sciences," he received a sharp letter from Spencer who again insists upon his distinctness from Comte. Ward made effective reply to Spencer Lester F.
noted the similarity of
and published both
Pure Sociology.
letters in
Ward
again points
out that despite his vigorous opposition to Comte, Spencer adopts the
Comtean
order of the sciences. In
"The
of the
Filiation
Wash-
Sciences," a paper read before the Philosophical Society of
ington in 1896,
Ward
Spencer's, in parallel
mentally It
exhibited the two systems, Comte's and
columns
for comparison.
They
are funda-
alike.
would probably be unfair
to say that Spencer's opposition to
Comte's hierarchy was due wholly to a jealous claim to inde-
pendence and
originality
on Spencer's
part,
although
it is
difficult
to escape the conclusion that jealousy played a part in the controversy. It does appear that
somewhat
Spencer viewed the problem from a
different angle than
slightly different premise.
conclusion nevertheless, and willful stubbornness
Comte, that he
started
from a
But he ends up with much the same it is
hard not to believe that
on Spencer's part that kept him from
it
was
recog-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
58 nizing his similarity to
Comte
pointing out such
as well as
dif-
ferences as did exist.
We
then,
find,
that both
sciences in essentially
the same
Comte and Spencer
present the
order, the physical sciences
coming
the social sciences. first, the biological sciences next, and finally Spencer points out that physical phenomena must precede biological
before
phenomena— that there nmst be atoms and molecules we can have living cells and organisms— and that social
systems must rest upon a biological basis. But he does not explain scientific interpretation of physical phenomena should pre-
why
cede interpretation of biological events, or biological forms should
come before
why
interpretation of
interpretation of social phe-
nomena. Auguste Comte, however, does precisely this. He explains the order of development of the sciences. Let us turn now to his theory.
Comte's conception of the hierarchy of the sciences
differs
somewhat from ours. He does not begin with the events of history, with dates and sequences, and with varying degrees of development among the sciences, and then proceed to consider what interpretation might be given to these facts. Rather, he begins with the nature of the sciences, as he conceives it, and with what he assumes other. It
The
to
be their necessary
a "rational order" to
is
logical relationships
"hierarchy" of the sciences
Comte
is
arrived at
(p. 43).
He
one to an-
by deduction.
observes, however,
that his "classification agrees in the main, with the history of science; the first
more general and simple
and advancing best
in
human
sciences actually occurring
and being followed by 43y. Thus, the general
history,
the more complex and restricted,"
(p.
picture of the development of the sciences/ as seen essentially the
same
as ours;
and have developed farther than the biological latter
have developed
earlier
by Comte
is
the physical sciences appeared earlier sciences, as the
and progressed farther than the
social
sciences.
Comte
explains
this
chronological
order and
these varying
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
The
degrees of development in this way:
59
physical sciences deal
with more simple and universal phenomena than the biological the biological sciences deal with more universal and
sciences;
simple phenomena than the social sciences. Since biological phe-
nomena
are
made up of chemical and physical events, come into being until the sciences of
of biology cannot
and physics have been developed.
nomena
consist
or
of,
and these
responses,
expressions
upon
since social
phe-
psychological
of,
physiological processes, a
cannot be achieved until the underlying
of sociology
science
the
are
in turn rest
Similarly,
a science
chemistry
sciences of psychology
He
and physiology have been developed.
says: .
.
.
every science
is
[rooted] in the
one which precedes
it
.
.
.
... no science can be effectually pursued without the preparation of a competent knowledge of the anterior sciences (p. 398)
We
must begin then with the it depends (p. 48). study of the most general or simple phenomena, going on
on which
successively to the
more
particular or complex. This
must be
the most methodical way, for this order of generality or simplicity fixes
while
it
the degree of
facility in
the study of phenomena,
determines the necessary connection of the sciences by
the successive dependence of their phenomena (p. 44).
We
seem
to
have here three closely related propositions:
that sciences higher in the hierarchy deal with
phenomena than
first,
more "complex"
sciences lower in the scale; secondly, that dif-
ferences in degree of complexity have determined the order of
emergence and degree of maturity of the that
one cannot
pursue" a
"effectually
sciences;
science
and
thirdly,
"without the
preparation of a competent knowledge of the anterior sciences on
which
it
depends."
unsound or
We believe
In one sense, psychological
more complex than those in turn,
that these propositions are either
definitely misleading. Let us
may be
examine them
in turn.
phenomena may be regarded
as
of physiology, as physiological events,
considered
more complex than chemical and
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
60
By "complex" in these contexts we would mean more classes, or kinds, of factors." Thus, a psycho-
physical events.
"possessing
can,
by
as perceiving,
such
logical event,
approaching and grasping food,
be reduced
analysis,
logical
physiological, chemical,
to
dnd physical processes: smelling or seeing the food and the various physiological responses which find overt expression in approaching and seizing
and the physiological processes may be broken
it;
into chemical reactions and physical events. In this sense,
down phenomena
the
of
one science may be
than those of another.
one
science "rests
While cally, it
And
in this sense, also,
is
is
only one class of
appear to include two classes the
possibility
and philosophi-
From the standpoint of phenomena to be con-
Even in biochemistry, which might of phenomena, we really have only
sidered in any given situation.
class;
one may say that
perfectly true logically
beside the point scientifically.
the scientist, there
one
be more "complex"
upon" another.
the foregoing
is
said to
of
referring
biochemical
events
to
chemistry on the one hand and to biology on the other in no
way negates the phenomena. Let nomena and the
integrity of biochemical events as biochemical
us illustrate the distinctness of levels of pheintegrity of the class of events corresponding to
each level with an example: I
He
give
my
broker an order to buy one hundred shares of stock.
telegraphs the order to the exchange in
found and the transaction completed. classes
of
whole and
phenomena involved in
its
entire extent
in
We
this
New may
York, a
transaction
and depth.
seller is
distinguish
many
taken as a
First there are the
psychological motives for buying and selling: desire, anticipation of gain, fear of loss, excitement of risk-taking, etc. are physiological digestion, etc.
processes:
And we
into chemical reactions.
discharges in physical
my
factors.
the condition
of
my
Underneath thyroid,
my
can analyze the physiological processes
Atomic motion,
electrical
tensions
and
nervous system, and so on, give us a class of
But, for an understanding of the transfer of
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
61
the stock as an event oi huying-and-seUing, as a social event, the scientist
need not and does not concern himself with
kinds, or levels, of processes at
with
ail
phenomena
of the interrelated
To do
given situation.
time a sparrow
falls.
all
of these
scientist never grapples
that confront
him
in a
would be to embrace the cosmos every
so
This
The
all.
undesirable as well as impossible.
is
The
must always abstract a certain segment of reality, a class of phenomena, from all others, and deal with it as if
scientist
certain it
existed
by
independent of the
itself,
rest.*
Similarly the physiologist abstracts certain processes
and regards them
totality of reality
as
from the
a closed system.
Thus,
the argument that the sciences higher in the hierarchy are more
complex— i.e., on lower
consist of
levels
is
more
irrelevant
classes of
phenomena— than
those
from the standpoint of science,
one class at a time anyway. phenomena, such as the purchase-and-sale of may be treated as a single, homogeneous, class of events
since the scientist deals with only
Socio-psychological stock,
despite the fact that physiological, chemical, electrical, and physical
processes underlie
differ
it.
In this respect psychology does not
from physics.
Sociologists
and
anthropologists
cultural
are
accustomed to
account for the meagerness of their accomplishments,
as
compared
with physicists or physiologists, by declaring that the phenomena with which they deal are so
much more complex than
the phe-
nomena confronting the physicist or biologist.** They seldom explain what they mean by "complexity," and more rarely do they attempt to prove that complexity of phenomena must mean meagerness of scientific achievement. They merely assume, in the first
*
place, that everyone
"In
all scientific
knows what
procedure
we
is
meant by complexity, and,
begin by marking out a certain region or To this we must confine our atten-
subject as the field of our investigations.
tion, leaving the rest of the universe out of account
till
we have completed
the investigation in which we are engaged," Clerk Maxwell, (1892), p. 11. ** "The facts of society are far more complex than those of physics, hence no laws have hitherto been discovered," Lowie, (1940), p. 384.
— THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
62 in the second place, they
assume without argument that com-
means difEculty. Wc regard their reasoning as unsound. arc no more complex in the sense of "difficult phenomena Social to treat scientifically" than physical or physiological phenomena.
plexity
The
social scientist's plea of
"complexity"
usually an attempt,
is
unconscious no doubt, to conceal his helplessness.
The
difference
not in complexity of phenomena but in knowing what youi
lies
The
problem
is
and how to attack
problem
is
and how to go about solving
And
does not.
it.
the reason for this
is
knows what
physicist it;
his
the social scientist
and
that the point of view
the techniques of science have been growing and maturing in the physical domain for centuries, whereas they were introduced into
A
the social realm only yesterday. year like a skyscraper. Indeed,
science cannot be built in a
cannot be built at
it
all;
it
must
grow, and this requires time.
We ver)'
have already seen that the purchase-and-sale of stock
simple
affair;
to the ground.
is
no more complex than an apple
is
And, what
stock markets than nations
it
is
more,
we do about
really a very
is
we probably know more about
gravitation.
A
war between two
simple thing at bottom: two nations,
and B, want the same thing— a
a
falling
fertile river valley,
an
oil
A
field,
a foreign market, a seaport— and both are determined to have it.
This
is
no more complex than the rusting of
ing of water. As a matter of fact,
formation of ice or a snowflake.
simpler— simple
in
iron or the freez-
may be simpler than the And it appears to be much it
the sense of ease of scientific explanation
than matricide, masochism, or dementia praecox, events upon a lower level (psychological) than a war between nations (sociological level).
speech)
lower
much
We
understand symbol behavior
better
on the psychological
level
(e.g.,
articulate
than upon the
We know more about the psychology of physiology. We understand the physiology
level of neurology.
jealousy
than
its
of intoxication better than
its
chemistry, and the chemistry of
the glands better than their physics.
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
As
a matter of fact,
one could make
a
63
good case
for the exact
opposite of the proposition that social scientists sometimes use to rationalize their shortcomings,
phenomena and the
rather than decrease as is
and say that the complexity of
difficulty of scientific interpretation increase
we descend
What
the scale of the sciences.
And
simpler than the purchase-and-sale of a share of stock?
what
is
more complex than
a ray of light?
light yet.
hundred and
Newton
sixteen years have passed since the great
do not know how to describe
Two
we
died and
One might
well argue
we approach "ultimate reality" in physics the complexity of phenomena increases and the difficulties of scientific explanation become greater. that as
Complexity size.
An atom
is is
a quality of a as
complex
phenomenon, not
a
measure of
complex
as a pebble, a cell as
its
as a
Nor is complexity a function of the level on which the phenomena are found except in the sense of resolving a class of events into sub-classes as we have already noted. Complexity and cow.
smiplicity obtain
on
all
levels alike.
So much
for the concept
of "complexity."
The
third proposition, namely,
Comte's contention that one
cannot "effectually pursue a science" until he has a "competent
knowledge of the anterior sciences," has been taken care of well in our treatment of the
first
two propositions.
Who
fairly
would
wish to argue that one cannot explain a transaction on the stock
exchange until he had mastered physics and chemistry— or even the rudiments of those sciences? As out,
we
often understand a
than upon a lower. Doris
We
is
we have
phenomenon
previously pointed
better
jealous of Jane;
on
Tom
a higher level
hates his father.
understand these events quite well psychologically;
almost nothing about them on the physiological far as
we
would add
can
see,
little
if
level.
we know And, so
anything that the physiologist might
And
anything to our understanding.
"chemistry," or "physics," of jealousy
more than
a
tell is
us
the
metaphor?
^
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
We
reject, therefore,
would
Comte's contention that prepara-
tion in sciences lower in the hierarchy must precede effective work in sciences higher in the scale. Since we have rejected Comte's premise that varying degrees of complexity have determined the filiation of
order of
the sciences, and since
term
in complexity only in so far as this
kinds of
we
phenomena
which
into
we admit
can be analyzed,
situation
a
differences
the number- of
refers to
have, in effect, rejected Comte's rationalization of his hier-
archy almost in toto. In place of Comte's explanation of the order in which the various sciences have emerged and matured, we
venture to propose the following theory.
Every living organism
strives to evaluate
the various items in
its
environment, to discover which are beneficial, which injurious, so that advantage
may be
derived from the one and injury from
the latter avoided. In addition to the sensory means employed in this
evaluating process by other animals,
symbols.
He
words— "fire
man employs
verbal
not only translates the evaluations of his senses into is
values between
sharp"— but he
hot," "thorns are
posits relational
one thing and another. Thus he declares that the
hoot of the owl presages death, a
man
falling star
means good
luck,
body of
ideas
creates a philosophy, a
etc.
In this manner,
and
beliefs expressed in verbal form,
which he employs
as a
means
of adjustment to the world he lives in.
From
our standpoint of analysis and classification, there have
been, and logically can be, only two major types of philosophy:
one
in
human In the
which the external world ego; the other in first
type,
man
with like
spirits
who
interpreted in terms of the
explained in terms of
itself.
in terms of his own made alive and peopled men do. They have desires
and interpreting
The whole world feel
is
it is
unconsciously projects himself into the ex-
ternal world, describing
psychic processes.
which
and behave
men, show preferences
is
as
it
thus
for certain foods
susceptible to jealousy and flattery; they fight
and drink; they are
and make
"^
love.
One
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE spirit
65
earth, another brings rain, a third sends
makes the
brings forth crops.
The
game
or
gods favor or oppose certain types of eco-
nomic and pohtical systems, and aid the armies of their chosen nations. Thus man creates the world in his own image. This is the philosophy of supernaturalism of animism and anthropo:
morphism. In the second type of philosophy, the
phenomena
of nature are
explained in terms of themselves, in terms of the events of nature.
Thus, rain
because other meteorologic phenomena precede
falls
and accompany
rainfall; a fossil
is
merely a link in a chain of
paleontologic events. Explanation in this type of philosophy consists
of a recitation of relevant events; scientific explanation
condensed description. This
Between these two major of philosophy,
Comte
lies
is
is
thus
the philosophy of naturalism.
types, in the process of
development
an intermediate, or transitional type, which
has called "metaphysical." This
may be
illustrated
by such
statements as "fossils were produced by stone-making forces;"
"opium puts one
to sleep because of
its
dormative powers," "cattle
graze together because of a gregarious instinct." * This kind of interpretation partakes of both of the major types of philosophy. It
eschews animism, and points to the external world for
planations. Tlius
it
says that fossils are
its
ex-
produced by stone-making
forces— i.e., by natural phenomena that exist and function in the realm of nature— not by gods with minds like ours. But, the explanatory device, "stone-making forces,"
is
merely a part of our
formula created ad hoCy and projected into the
selves, a verbal
external world. Functionally,
it
We
is
like the
concept
"spirit,"
and
* occasionally find this kind of explanatory device used in cultural anthropology even today. Thus, Lowie says that "owing to the separatism of the natives, no large population was ever anciently brought under a common head" in Polynesia, (1940, p. 293). RadclifFe-Brown says that certain institutions "are the results of the action of sociological principles," (1930-31, p. 429). Franz Boas finds certain cultural phenomena "due to a classificatory tendency," (1940, p. 323). Herskovits tells us that "the essential democracy of the Plains Indian life inhibited the development of economically .
privileged classes
.
.
."
.
.
(1940, p. 393).
^
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
hence has
with
affinity
philosophy
anthropomorphic
the
of
animism.
human
In the beginning of
history,
man's philosophies were
wholly animistic; he
diffused his psyche throughout the cosmos;
he confused the
with the not-self at almost every point.* As
self
culture advanced philosophy grew
philosophy was
and matured.
and
outgrown
Little
the
by
little
naturalistic
the animistic philosophy developed. But progress in philosophic interpretation
was not uniform
in all fields of experience,
The
sectors than others.
distinction between the
self— i.e., explanation of natural events rather than
was greater in some
it
phenomena
in terms of the
human
and the not-
self
in terms of natural
ego disguised
gods
as
and spirits— was made first in the realm of celestial phenomena. This was followed by the distinction in the field of terrestrial
phenomena. Then
physical
it
that order.
distinction
in the biological field-
and psychological phenomena, and
in anatomical, physiological,
The
was made
between the
achieved in astronomy and physics before
ogy and psychology because the former than in the
nomena
of astronomy as
significant
Man
latter.
gradually
experience, that
all
was
And of
it
it
was are
human
not-self
was made
easier of
and physics
determinants
processes of physiology
it
and the
self
in
was
in physiol-
accomplishment in
easier because the phe-
more remote and
less
than are the
behavior
and psychology.
learned,
through
ages
of
things do not affect his
observation life
equally.
things are immediate and exert a powerful influence others are remote and affect his
life
but
little. It is
and
Some
upon him;
significant to
* "To the Omaha nothing is without life: the rock Hves, so do the cloud, the tree, the animal. He projects his own consciousness upon all things, and ascribes to them experiences and characteristics with which he is familiar;
in common between all creatures and all natural something he conceives of as akin to his own conscious being," Alice C. Fletcher, "Wakonda," in Handbook of American Indians, Part 2, (Bulletin 30, Bureau of American Ethnology, Washington, 1910).
there
forms,
to
is
.
.
him something
.
this
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE note that systematic observation of the
stars
dJ
was begun under the
behef that they exert a powerful influence upon man's daily Vestiges of this belief are
preserved in the names of the days
still
of the week: Sun's day, Saturn's day, etc.
ancient belief
still
But
make
flourishes to
ness enterprise even today.
And enough
"^
mankind accumulated experience and compared one
as
his life
topography,
than such
phenomena
terrestrial
influence
less
as those of climate,
and fauna. At the same time, systematic observa-
flora
and
tion of planets
stars revealed regularities
fostered description in
and an order that
terms of natural law rather than divine
Thus astronomy was
price.
of this
astrology a profitable busi-
thing with another, he discovered that stars exert
upon
life.
lost to
animism,
won
ca-
for naturalism.**
As observation was continued and experience accumulated, was discovered fluential
as
man
that, intimate as
it
is
upon
his
life,
is
it
with his habitat, and
in-
yet another class
of
there
is
determinants of behavior even more immediate and significant: the
human
body.
The man,
the ox, the snake, and the bird
all
dwell in the same environmental setting, but they behave very differently. flies,
The
deer
is
swift,
because they have
the squirrel climbs
appreciation of this fact was the
Anatomy developed of the easier
body
is
arms and
legs
than
dawn
its
An
of the science of anatomy.
functioning, but because
between one's
self
between one's
processes.
The
house
which the true
in
the bird
before physiology, not because the structure
"simpler" than
to distinguish
trees,
different kinds of bodily structure.
body, unsophisticated self dwells.
self
and one'
it
is
and one's
(one's ^go) s
man feels, is but a The ego and the
glandular shell,
the
body, he
* According to Timt Magazine for March 25, 1946, p. 23, there were 25,000 practicing astrologers in the United States at that time; the five leading astrological periodicals had a combined circulation of nearly one million; and one of the leading astrological manuals sold at least 1,000,000 copies of its
1945 issue for $1 per copy. ** See Henri Poincare's fine essay on astronomy, the mother of science, in T\it Value oi Science, Ch. VI.
^
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
feels, are
respect"
may
different things.*
two is
no way
in
both
lose
The
self that
he regards
in "self-
by the amputation of a limb. One teeth, and even his eyes, but his "self"
affected
legs, his
remains untouched and unscathed.** But when glands flow hot in anger or in love, naive man does not distinguish them from his ego;
he
identifies the process
with himself.
matures before psychology:
Similarly, the science of physiology it is
easier to distinguish
between the
self
and the
not-self
dealing with physiological processes than with mental
We
observe that a hungry
man
another.
is
The
effects of
behaves one way, a
work and
well-filled
rest are obvious. Disposition
influenced by digestion. Profound changes in behavior can be
by drugs and
effected
there
is
a point
a citadel that
lives— his real
"human
is
self,
spirit"
liquor.
But, unsophisticated
beyond which outside
which they cannot is
man
when
phenomena.
cross.
forces
man
feels,
cannot go, boundaries
Deep within him,
naive
man
believes,
impregnable, a sanctuary inviolable. Here he essential
his
or Will
is
free,
character,
his
very soul.
The
he thinks, subject to no laws
natural or physical.
He
to regard the self as
an object, as an event in the world of nature.
The
distinction
his grasp It
sees himself as subject only;
between
self
he
is
unable
not-self at this point lies
beyond
when man became able many events in a world of
to look
and
and comprehension.
was a great day for science
upon mental
processes as so
nature,
when, to use William James' apt phrase, minds could be studied "as objects, in a world of other objects." The distinction between subject and object was made.
But the
fight for naturalism has
not
* It is not merely "unsophisticated man" who is sure that "mind" and "body" arc two different things. Descartes, certainly one of the greatest minds of modern times, maintains that "it is certain that I, [that is, "my mind, by which I am what I am"], is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it," Meditations, No. VI. ** ". and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any other part is cut off, I am conscious that nothing has been taken from my mind," idem. .
.
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE been wholly won in
many
circles,
yet.
Mental
life
matured plexity,
find the reason for the order in
self
nomena which
and the
and the extent
and the
powerful
ability of
easily
it
is
mankind
race has
and
determinants
distinguish
which
way
discovered
the
human
which are the
less significant as
behavior than the winds, rain,
terrestrial physics,
through
of knowing.
the science of astronomy appears
earlier
frost,
and
and matures
geology and geography. Anatomical
determinants being more remote and processes,
human
between the
insignificant
heavenly bodies, being more remote and
than
deals with phe-
where phenomena are intimate and powerful
The human
determinants of
com-
to distinguish be-
when one to
difficult
experience; there was no a priori
logical
which they have
not-self in various sectors of experience.
made most
is
not-self
determinants.
faster
which the sciences to
play an insignificant role as determinants of
behavior. Conversely,
terrain,
spirit"
to consist, not in varying degrees of universality or
This distinction
The
human
still walk hand in hand and anthropologies even today.
their appearance
but in the varying
tween the
self
called "the
and the soul and mind
in psychologies, sociologies,
Thus we have made
is still
69
less influential
than physio-
the science of anatomy precedes physiology.
Physiology comes before psychology for the same reason.
may conclude our argument by formulating development: Science emerges
first
We
the following law of
and matures
fastest in fields
where the determinants of human behavior are weakest and most remote; conversely, science appears latest and matures slowest in those portions of our experience where the most intimate and
powerful determinants of our behavior are found.
Auguste Comte recognizes
this
law when he observes:
most general and simple phenomena are the furthest removed from Man's ordinary sphere, and must [it would be better to say "can," L.A.W.] thereby be studied in a calmer and more rational frame of mind than those in which he is more nearly implicated; and It is
worthy of remark
in this place that the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
70
new ground
this constitutes a
for the corresponding sciences
being developed more rapidly (p. 44). In explaining the "hierarchy of the sciences," however,
"new ground" merely based upon "the argument the while speaks of this
But
in
universal
and complex"
opposed to the special again.
incidentally
is
and
Comte
in passing,
and the simple
as
emphasized again and
Comte
other portions of Positive Philosophy,
takes
pains to point out repeatedly that the obstacles which oppose the
growth of
science are the theological
social
and metaphysical
philosophies which must be driven from the field of social phe-
nomena
we
before a genuine social science can be achieved. Although
reject
sciences,
Comte's own explanation of the order of
filiation of
the
we
his
theory
of
and indeed have,
could,
applied
the three stages in the development of philosophy to the solution of this problem.
What we
the "theological"
(supernaturalistic)
lodged and driven
first,
pretations of physical
and
last
have done, in
and to the
and
effect,
to
to the greatest extent,
phenomena, next from least
is
show that
philosophy has been
from
dis-
inter-
biological studies,
extent from explanations of
human
behavior. And, with the rejection of the theological philosophy
and the decline of the metaphysical, there has been a growth and spread, pari passu, of the naturalistic, scientific philosophy.
what we observe
is
a trend in philosophy
Thus,
from the theological
through the metaphysical to the positivistic— from
the super-
naturalistic to the naturalistic, or scientific— sweeping across the
experience from the physical through the biological to
field of
the
social.
Comte had
his hierarchy,
But
so concerned
solution
We
is
may
all
all
and indeed, is
of the materials for this explanation of it is
implicit in the Positive Philosophy.
he with another rationalization that the true
but obscured entirely.
illustrate the
development and the sequence of the
sciences in the accompanying diagram. In the center of the circle is
man, surrounded by events which influence
his
behavior in
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
some
varying degrees,
71
some remote. From
intimate,
this
point
of view, the advance of science has been more in the nature of
expansion of scope than of growth or development.
The cosmos
hes everywhere about man. Science, a particular way of dealing
PHYSICS CHElMlSTRy
^t^ATOMy pVAYSlOLOGy
^syCHOLOGy e^oClOLOCy
PHYSICAL /SCIENCES
physical science;
.BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
with experience, appeared
first
in interpretations of a particular
portion of our
field of experience,
phenomena
most remote and
human
are
behavior.
From
there
its
namely, in astronomy, where
insignificant as determinants of
techniques have spread and ex-
tended to other segments of experience. As science advances and expands, the anthropomorphic philosophy of animism recedes and
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
72
contracts; as the concepts of natural law
and determinism gain
ground, the philosophy of free will retreats. clusion
is,
of course, to have the
whole
field of
The logical conhuman experience
embraced by the philosophy of science rather than that of animism. It is interesting, in this connection, to recall the words of the eminent Polish sociologist,
many
Ludwig Gumplowicz, written
years ago:
natural science has successfully demonstrated that even
Modern
the 'human mind'
domain
of social
is
subject to physical laws
phenomena unchangeable
.
.
.
But
in the
natural laws have
been completely demonstrated. Between 'mental' phenomena subject to the laws of matter and the social world strode the conception of human freedom to distract and not
confuse. It seemed to order and control social relations accord-
ing to
its
own
choice. In the
domain
of mental
phenomena
.
.
.
monistic natural science has in part demonstrated the un-
conditioned sway of natural laws
.
.
.
Dualism
[i.e.,
driven from this domain, has retired to the
will],
social
phenomena, whence
must he
it
law
vs. free
domain
dislodged,^
oi
(emphasis
ours).
We
find the
scientist,
same view expressed by the great French
Emile Durkheim,
in
The Rules
of Sociological
social
Method:
Since the law of causality has been verified in the other realms
and since it has progressively extended its authority from the physicochemical world to the biological, and from the
of nature,
latter to the psychological,
we
are justified in claiming that
equally true of the social world; and
it is
it is
possible to add today
on the basis of this postulate There was a time when sentiments the things of the physical world opposed with equal
that the researches undertaken
tend to confirm relating to
it
(p. 141).
energy the establishment of the physical sciences, because they, too,
had a
religious or
moral character.
We
believe, therefore,
that this prejudice, pursued from one science to the next, will finally disappear also
from
its
last retreat, sociology,
free field for the true scientific endeavor (p. 34).
leaving a
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE
OF SCIENCE
73
According to Comte, Spencer, and others since their day, sociology
is
stage of
mean
the
development. In terms of our theory,
its
when
that
the logical chain of science, the
last link in
astronomical,
geological,
this
final
would
chemical,
physical,
anatomical, physiological, and psychological determinants of hu-
man more
behavior had been dealt with there would remain but one class of
determinants: the sociological. But are
accept this conclusion?
We
do not believe it and immature. There
human
behavior that
is.
is
lie
ogy and, for the most
On
the contrary,
still
another
we
we
class
find
it
call,
final?
inadequate
of determinants of
outside and beyond the scope of psychol-
part, sociology.
These
are the traditional
customs, institutions, tools, philosophies, languages,
we
willing to
adequate and
this classification
Is
collectively, culture. Cultural
supra-, psychological determinants of
super-psychological in the sense that
phenomena
human it
is
etc.,
which
are super-, or
behavior.
They
are
beyond the scope of
psychology to account for them. Psychology cannot explain,
e.g.,
why one people has clans (behaves "clanwise") while another does not; why one people eats with knives and forks, another with chopsticks; why a people prohibits marriage between parallel cousins but requires marriage between cross cousins; why a tribe practices plurals
by
polyandry,
observes
affixation, uses
the
money,
mother-in-law
etc.
taboo,
forms
Culture as culture can be
explained only in terms of culture. But let us return to the history of science and
observe
its
expansion beyond the horizons of
individual psychology.
For a long time, and individual psychology.
The
until
recent decades, psychology was
anatomical and physiological psychol-
ogists had, of necessity, to take the individual as their province.
The same was
true of the introspectionists
and
associationists. In
the early years, the subject matter of psychology was "mind,"
and the mind was something that "went on" organism.
It
in the individual
was to be studied in terms of anatomical structure
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
74
and physiological processes, and by direct observation through intros^DCction. In any event, psychology was the study of mind,
and the mind was an
But be
to
individualistic
as the scientific
recognized
phenomenon.
study of man's behavior advanced,
that
there
are
came
it
determinants
important
of
behavior lying outside and beyond the individual which, however, profoundly influence his conduct. With the appreciation of
undertook to grapple with these super-individual
this fact, science
determinants and to bring them within the scope of scientific interpretation.
Professional psychologists were, however, slow to appreciate the significance of super-individual determinants of
Consequently science organized
its
human
under another banner,
forces
so to speak, to undertake this necessary task. This
was Sociology.* Sociology
came
behavior.
new movement
into being as an organized attempt
of science to deal with super-individual determinants of behavior.
These determinants were
Consequently,
social in nature.
sociol-
ogy became the science of society. Early sociologists distinguished
from psychology on the ground that the
their science
was
latter
limited to the individual whereas theirs was devoted to the group.
As F. H. Giddings put .
.
.
psychology
sociology
.
.
phenomena Psychology is
[is]
it:
the study of the
the investigation of the
.
of is
minds
in
.
.
.
individual
more
association with
special
mind
.
.
.
;
and complex
one another
.
.
.
the science of the association of ideas. Sociology
the science of the association of minds.^
Psychology bestirred
itself
meanwhile and gradually extended
its
scope to include super-individual determinants. William James displayed a fine appreciation of social factors in behavior in the * "Precisely because the currents of
thought ran too exclusively to analysis terms of the single human being, Sociology arose as a discipline for the study of the collective life of man. In the early years it was considered as properly beginning at the point where Psychologj^ left off," E. E. Eubank, The Concepts of Sociology, (1932), p. 90.
and explanations
in
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
"The Consciousness
chapter
75
of Self" in his Principles of Psychoh
ogy (1890). In 1904, at the Congress of Arts and Sciences at
McKeen
Louis, James
St.
he was "not convinced
Cattell stated that
that psychology should be limited to the study of consciousness as such."
And
same Congress, J. M. Baldwin predicted that the future will be social to the core." In 1908,
at the
"the psychology of
William McDougall published first
work bearing
his Social Psychology.
this title written
by
pened that E. A. Ross's Social Psychology, the this title
by a
sociologist,
first
was published in the same
Although psychology was able
to
expand
work bearing year.^
horizons sufficiently
its
to take cognizance of group factors in behavior,
anchored to the individual
This was the
a psychologist. It so hap-
it still
as the object of its studies.
remained
Thus G.
Stout and C. A. Mace, in their article "Psychology"
F.
the
in
Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th ed.), declare that psychology
And
the "science of individual experience."
even maintain that social psychology individual.
Thus
F.
after all a study of the
is
H. Allport defines
is
other psychologists
social
psychology as "the
science which studies the behavior of the individual" in so far as his behavior all
is
related to that of other individuals. "Psychology in
branches," he argues,
its
Similarly, Professor
"is
a
science of the individual."
Margaret Floy Washburn declares that
psychology deals with individuals." Social psychology, she is
"that branch of psychology which deals with the
affected
by and manifested
is
as
with other minds."
in relations
R. H. Gault, social psychology
mind
"all
says, it is
To
but "an aspect of the psychol-
ogy of the individual." Thus psychology was able to reach out and at least take
cognizance of social factors in behavior. But
firmly anchored to the individual as
was unable to free posed of
many
itself
it
was so
object of study that
it
and envisage a psychological system com-
individuals instead of only one, a social organism
as well as a biological one.
much
its
This
field
was
left
therefore pretty
to the sociologists.*
Sociology
embarked upon
its
career
with high hopes
and
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
76
enthusiasm. Psychology had long devoted
human
aspect of
Now
behavior.
to the individual
itself
sociology was to deal with the
group aspect. Give sociology time to mature, many thought, and the science of human behavior would be complete, for with the individual and collective aspects of behavior taken care of,
what
and
early
else
was there?
1900's
it
To many
appeared, as
it
sociologists of the late 1890's
Comte many
had to
at last the "hierarchy" of the sciences
decades
earlier,
that
was complete, that sociology
was to be the crown or capstone of the great edifice that was science. But these hopes and aspirations have not been realized. Sociology has not sciences.
and
On
become the head
the contrary,
many
of an impressive hierarchy of
scholars,
both within sociology
outside, raise the question. Is sociology' a science at all?
ever accomplishments sociology does have to tainly has failed to fulfill the
credit,
its
hopes and expectations of
and subsequent generations of
sociologists.
The
Whatit
cer-
Comte we
reasons,
believe, are as follows:
Beyond the horizon individual
of individual psychology lie not only super-
psychological
determinants
of
behavior,
psychological determinants as well. Sociology devoted interpretation of super-individual
minants of behavior, and
in so
(i.e.,
to
social psychology.
recognize super-psychological
it
(i.e.,
failed to
cultural)
determinants, and thus failed to complete the science of
behavior by becoming a science of culture short, sociology
making
it
plete.
(i.e.,
the study of the collective aspect of behavior as well as
and thus
left
it
failed to create or
the science of
human
become
a science
behavior incom-
Another science beyond the horizon of sociology
mained
to
human
culturology). In
merely rounded out the science of psychology by
of the individual aspect. But of culture
the
social) psychological deter-
doing became
But, with few and relatively insignificant exceptions, distinguish and
but superitself to
be
realized,
re-
namely the science of culture (culturology).
Before proceeding further super-psychological
still
let us see precisely
(cultural)
what
this class of
determinants of behavior consists
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE of,
77
and what the nature and scope of a science of culture would
be.
We may illustrate with the following example: a number of Navaho Indians were spending the night in a large house near their reservation when a party of other Navahos approached. Word of their approach was passed through the house whereupon a
number
men
of
quickly left by the back door and windows:
were
their mothers-in-law
must not meet them
in
the approaching group and
face to face.
How
is
they
be
their behavior to
explained? Clearly there
is
a psychological reason for their behavior,
and
there are both individual and social aspects to their response.
Each
individual was influenced by his
experiences which
it
fellow Navahos.
fluenced by his
The
deal with both aspects, the individual
nomenon. He throw much
own organism and
and the
social, of this
light
upon the matter. But there
He
neighbors, the Hopi, do not.
why one
No amount
tribe has this
is
a
point beyond
their
close
of psychologizing will
custom while another does not.
psychologist does not always realize this. Sometimes he de-
clares that the institution feel
phe-
cannot explain why the
Navahos observe the mother-in-law taboo whereas
The
in-
psychologist can properly
can inquire into their feelings, ideas, and so on, and
which the psychologist cannot go:
explain
the
had undergone. And each individual was
and act
exists
because the people think and
in a certain way; that the institution
crystallization of certain psychological processes.
He
is
merely the
fails
to realize
that it is the other way around: the people feel, think and act the way they do because they possess— or, more accurately, are
possessed
by— a
not explain
certain custom. Manifestly, the psychologist can-
why
the Indian organism in the
Navaho
tribe
behaves
as to
produce the mother-in-law taboo while the
Indian organism in
the Hopi tribe does not behave in that
in such a
manner.
way
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
78 If,
therefore, psychology
cannot explain why one tribe has a
custom while another people does not, what science can? The answer is, the Science of Culture. A custom or institution is the product of the action and interaction of other customs and certain
institutions.
The
mother-in-law taboo would have to be explained
in terms of other
division of labor,
customs— those
mode
stitutions—culture
is
of subsistence,
traits in
phenomena. As such,
it
of marriage, residence, sexual
and so on. Customs and
general— constitute
may be
in-
a distinct class of
treated as a closed system. Culture
a thing sui generis; culture as culture can
be explained only in
terms of culture.* Let us illustrate with a few other examples.
Psychology cannot explain
why
agglutinative while that of another
the language of one people inflective.
is
This linguistic
is
dif-
ference must be explained in terms of language, not in terms of
mental processes or emotional cannot explain why
states. Likewise,
a people practices
why
polyandry or monogamy;
it
the psychologist
polygyny
than
rather
resorts to legal trial rather
than
to ordeals or covert black magic in the case of personal injury;
why
or
it
fights over
money and
debts instead of practicing com-
munism.
Thus we
see that over
psychological factor in
which tural.
is
and above the individual and
human
not psychological at
behavior, there
all.
It
is
is
social
another factor
super-psychological or cul-
In addition to the individual organic
component
in
human
behavior and over and above the social factor which comes from the interaction of individuals, there tional
customs,
institutions,
things,** these culture of any person living.
traits,
They
is
tools,
the influence of the tradiphilosophies,
etc.
These
have an existence prior to the birth
exist outside the
human
organism; they
*
"Culture is a thing sui generis which can be explained only in terms of (Lowie, 1917), p. 66. ** Dnrkheim calls "social facts" (i.e., culture traits) things (choses). "The
itself,"
proposition which states that social facts are to be treated as things," "at the very basis of our method," (1938 p. xliii).
lies
he
says,
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE act
upon him from the outside
can be transferred another.
as
79
meteorologic forces do.* Culture
without migration, from one people to culture of any people at any given time is the
The
freely,
product of antecedent cultural forces, and consequently
The
explained only in cultural terms.
England tic
in
1949
processes
is
to
be explained
and events,
courts of law,
to be
New
in terms of antecedent linguis-
just as the
Mormonism,
is
English language of
relativity,
automobile, paper currency,
and
jazz
music are to be
ex-
plained in terms of their respective cultural antecedents.
We see,
then, that in addition to the psychological factor, indi-
human behavior there is an important suprapsychological factor. The importance of this factor has only recently come to be recognized and appreciated. Everything that we do as human beings, individually and collectively, is profoundly influenced by our culture. Our food habits, marital customs, ideas vidual
and
social, in
of right and wrong, canons of beauty, mortuary practices, our
philosophies and religions, in short, the whole is
culturally determined.
terms of the way
we
And,
think, feel
gamut
of our lives,
from explaining our culture in
far
and
act,
we
can explain
much
of
our thought, feelings and behavior in terms of our culture. This
is
not to say that there
ogy in the modern science of
is
no further function
human
behavior. It will be noted
above that we have said that "much," not can be explained culturally. There of course. But
posed.
its
The day
institutions
is
scope
is
is
for psychol-
still
"all," of
our behavior
a place for psychology,
not as extensive as was formerly sup-
of facile psychological explanations of customs
and
done. In the future, culture will have to be ex-
plained culturologically. But within any given cultural situation
the operation of the psychological factors will served and interpreted. For example, given
still
have to be ob-
Navaho
culture,
how
* "Collective tendencies [i.e., culture traits] have an existence of their own; they also act upon the individual they are forces as real as cosmic forces .," translated from Durkheim, Le Suicide, p. 348. from the outside .
.
.
.
.
/ THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
80 will Indian organisms
factor constant while
we
behave? In short,
we
can hold the cultural
study the variable psychological factor.
Returning again to the history of science, we note that sociology was the new form taken by science in the extension of its scope
embrace super-individual determinants of behavior. Sociology became, for the most part, social psychology, and socml psychology plums, or honest is of course psychology, just as ripe plums are to
men, men. But minants,
beyond the scope of individual
in going
sociology
encountered
super-psychological
deter-
(cultural)
determinants as well as super-individual psychological factors. But instead of dealing with cultural determinants level,
i.e.,
culturologically, sociology
socio-psychological level
upon
and attempted
to interpret
of "social process," or "interaction." Sociologists
most part action
to realize that there
among human
beings as
is
no such thing
human
behaving in terms of symbols) that
To
their
is
beings
them
in
terms
for the
failed
as social inter-
(i.e.,
as
organisms
not culturally determined.
say that social interaction produces matrilineal clans
patrilineal clans there does
own
brought them down to the
not make sense.
To
say that
here,
one kind
of process of interaction produces matrilineal, another kind of
process patrilineal, clans
is
to put the cart before the horse. It
the type of clan, the culture
trait,
social interaction; matrilineal clans will
action,
clans
patrilineal
another.
is
that determines the form of
And
produce one type of clans,
as
culture
intertraits,
cannot be accounted for in terms of individual psychological processes— hopes,
desires,
fears,
etc.— or in terms of an abstract
process of social interaction but in terms of other culture
traits,
such as customary division of labor between the sexes, which in turn
is
closely related to the
stances and
means
mode
of subsistence
and the circum-
of defense against enemies; such as rules of
marriage, place of residence of the married couple, and so on.
And
so
it is
Whether
it
with social interaction everywhere in
be
in the family, clan or lineage,
human
society.
household or neigh-
borhood, guild, lodge, church, market place or what not, the
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
81
concrete processes of interaction that actually obtain in any given case have been determined,
i.e.,
given form and content, by the
culture that possesses the people, the culture that existed before
they were born and into which they were introduced at birth,
and which has given form and content time.
The attempt
to their behavior since that
of sociologists to explain culture in terms of
"social process" or "interaction" failed as of course
it
must.
A
and cannot give a and function of customs and in-
sociological interpretation of culture does not
account of the origin
scientific
stitutions;
it
merely conceals
sociological nature.
ogy in
its
Thus we
their
see that
march of expansion,
it
supra-psychological,
when
supra-
science created sociol-
rounded out the science of
psychology, but failed to achieve a science of culture. Let us
examine more
The
fully the preceding propositions in turn.
behavior of every living organism presents two aspects:
inner and outer.* There are processes and relationships which take place vdthin the organism; these
Then
we may
call
intra-organismal.
there are reactions and relationships between the organism
and the external world; these may be designated extra-organismal.
We may
define physiology as the scientific observation and inter-
pretation of intra-organismal processes and relationships; psychology, as the study of the extra-organismal aspect of behavior.**
Now
behavior presents two aspects, individual and and consequently can be studied from these two stand-
extra-organismal collective,
points. In other words, social psychology. tific
But both
can have individual psychology and are, of course,
psychology— the
scien-
observation and interpretation of extra-organismal reactions.
There *
we
is
no such thing
as
an individual apart from the group, and
"All relations or actions between one part of ...
[a
material system]
and
another are called Internal relations or actions. Those between the whole or any part of the system, and bodies not included in the system, are called External relations or actions," Clerk Maxwell, (1892), p. 11-12. ** Herbert Spencer, too, distinguished physiology from psychology in terms of "internal relations" and "external relations," "The Classification of the Sciences," Table III.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
82
no
indqjcndent of individuals. Individual and society
collectivity
are but
two poles of the same phenomenon: extra-organismal
re-
actions of biological organisms.
When
sociology took form as a distinct discipline
we
cated, as
v^as dedi-
it
have seen, to the study of the collective aspect of
became
behavior. It thus
Because the psychol-
social psychology.
ogy of that day was individualistic in character and outlook, the infant sociology took pains to distinguish itself from that science.
W.
Professor F.
Blackmar,
chairman of the session on Soci-
as
ology at the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences, protested against having sociology classified with the "mental sciences"
the program for the meeting. Notwithstanding sociologists
have
Thus
Lester
Ward
is,
for the
on
numerous
the subject matter of sociology
testified that
"mental phenomena" and that sociology social psychology.
all this,
most
is
part,
speaks of "that collective
psychology which constitutes so nearly the whole of sociology."
Giddings declares that "society
mental .
.
.
activity
common
.
.
.
social life
mental
activity
[is
... .
.
."
ologists
came
is
a
a
as a
phenomenon
mode
of the
of
mind
Accordingly, he regards soci-
ology as "a psychological science."
mentally society
be regarded]
to is
Hobhouse
psychological
says that "funda-
structure."
to recognize that "social
American
life is essentially
soci-
psychical,"
according to Gottfried Salomon. At the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences, C. A. Ellwood, speaking as chairman of the section
on
social psychology, refers to this science as "this
important part of sociology." Albion
W.
Small once defined
most soci-
ology as "the science of the social process," but he also states that the interpretation of the social process
Thus, sociology and same.
To
clared that
And
"social
psychology."
psychology appear to be one and the
Giddings "societal psychology
thing as sociology."
Thus
social
is
is
substantially the
same
quite recently L. L. Bernard has de-
"modern sociology becomes
largely social psychology,"
"
sociology turns out to be social psychology, and social
psychology
is
psychology, according to the testimony of sociolo-
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE gists
well as
as
83
by our own definitions, E. A, Ross, the first book entitled Social Psychology, defined
sociologist to write a
psychology as a subdivision of "general psychology."
social
more
recently R.
M. Maclver
a branch of psychology."
sociology is
is
And
observes that "social psychology
We
is
note therefore that in so far as
the study of social interaction, social process,
etc., it
merely a psychological science. But what of the study of super-
psychological determinants of behavior?
Where
does sociology
stand with reference to interpretation of cultural phenomena?
Sociology was a quarter of a century old,
the concept of culture entered into
its
if
"
not more, before
thinking to any appreciable
By degrees, however, the concept of culture— or, at least, term— has become more common, and even popular. But, with
"extent.
the
few and
relatively insignificant exceptions, sociologists
been able to
rise
have not
to a culturological point of view; they
have
not been able to envisage a science of culture as distinct from a science of society.
To most
sociologists
culture
is
merely behavior, a particular
kind of behavior, perhaps, but the reactions and interactions of
human
organisms, nevertheless.
"culture consists of "culture
is all
.
.
.
Thus Kimball Young says that To Read Bain,
learned behavior patterns."
behavior mediated by social symbols ...
all
culture
Ogburn and Nimkoff say that culture is "behavior transmitted by learning." Ellwood defines culture as "behavior patterns socially acquired and socially transmitted by means of symbols." ^ There is also a tendency among sociologists to regard culture patterns are resident in the organisms of persons."
as
merely a by-product of social interaction. Thus, E. R. Groves
is a product of human association." Kimball Young thinks of culture as "a precipitate of man's social life." * To many sociologists, "cultural" has become merely another
states that "culture
word
for "social,"
Robert
S.
Lynd,
for
example, speaks of "the
individual in our culture," "leaders of the culture," etc. As Jessie Bernard shrewdly observed many years ago, " 'culture' bids well
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
84 to supersede 'society'
vocabulary."
The
'cultural/ 'social/ in the sociologist's
and
^
inability of sociologists to conceive of culture as a supra-
psychological order, distinct from the process of "social interaction/'
is
German
well exemplified by the eminent
sociologist,
Georg Simmel. When one considers, he says, "the development and character of language, morals, church, law, political and social organization," the conception that they constitute "a structure of
independent
by
which leads
reality,
virtue of peculiar forces, independent of
ponents" seems "inevitable." Simmel culture. Its
which
is
itself.
psychology
is
so plain that
is
That culture has an existence
determined by
the conception
individual
all its
own
its
"inevitable."
laws,
Yet,
it
com-
of
compels its
also so plain as to
is
mired
so
and
here face to face with
is
independence of individuals
recognition by
peculiar laws
life after
its
own make
individualistic
in
Simmel, and so blinded by an obsolete metaphysics,
that he cannot accept the conclusion to which his observations
he stubbornly
and reasoning "inevitably" lead him.
"It
maintains, "that in the
only individuals exist." Even
last analysis
is
certain,"
society exists only "in mental attitudes or psychological occur-
rences within the
minds
And
of individuals."
culture, apart
material things, consists of "spiritual structures
.
.
.
from
[which] have
their existence only in personal minds.
Every attempt to think of
them
.
outside of persons
The
is
a mysticism
,
^<>
/'
conception of a science of culture held by
sociologists
is
expressed by Dorothy P. Gary in
many American her essay "The
Developing Study of Culture:" "A science of culture
up only when the
analysis
standpoint that culture
and consisting of
of culture
itself is
collective
is
will
be built
approached from the
a social process growing out of
human
behavior."
a science of culture will be realized only
when
it
"
In other words,
becomes
a science
of social process, of collective behavior, rather than a science of culture.
Th. Abel considers the question of
a science of culture
in his essay, "Is a Cultural Sociology Possible?"
and comes to the
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE conclusion that
it
not.
is
To
Abel, sociology
"inter-human behavior" of which culture
There have been,
be
to
85
is
who have
sure, sociologists
human
preciation of the role of culture in
the study of
is
but an aspect. a fine ap-
behavior. Professor C.
A. Ellwood, for example, declares that "it is impossible to understand human society without understanding human culture; for the social behavior of group."
But he,
man
...
is
thinks
too,
behavior rather than as a
dominated by the culture of
of
culture
must be the method
development of culture F.
Ogburn took
human
interpretation,
historical
of psychological analysis
essentially a learning process,"
is
his collaborator,
Change. But,
we have
as
human
who
another sociologist
is
.
the
William
so far as to declare that "the study of culture its
growth,
its
spread and
stitutes the study of sociology."
Willey and Melville
But
in
an
its
behavior.
He
much
has gone
—the processes
of
perpetuation— con-
earlier article written
Herskovits (an anthropologist),
J.
he and
has done
to bring his science to an appreciation of culture.
and
.
.
just seen,
Nimkoff, think of culture as
Malcolm M. Willey
origin
human
product of the
a
a culturological point of view, to a certain extent
at least, in his Social
its
his
(organic)
class of supra-psychologic, superorganic,
phenomena. To Ellwood, "all culture is mind [which means that] back of all therefore,
as
we
by are
must not be assumed, of course, that culture is a metaphysical entity which operates of itself. It is, rather, a generic term that covers an amazing number of types of behavior." ^^ told that "it
Thus we
see that sociologists think of culture as behavior, as
social process or interaction, as a factor in
a by-product of
human
human
to the level of viewing culture as a distinct
supra-psychological,
generis with
of society surprising.
its
own
supra-social
Being
cannot
a science of culture.
sociologists, they are
devoted to the study of society, of
by
if
ever, rise
and separate
phenomena;
laws. In short, they
and envisage
behavior, or as
behavior. But they seldom,
a
as rise
This
class of
process
sui
above a science
is
definition
not, however,
and tradition
social interaction.
It is
not
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
$6
when they
surprising, therefore, to find that
culture they translate
it
There is not a single sociologist that (Durkheim excepted) who has a clear conception of science of culture would be and who has devoted himself
idiom of
social interaction.
we know
of
what
a
are confronted with
into the only language they know: the
to the advancement of such a science.
A
few
sociologists have, however,
been
R.
M. Maclver
is
exposed to
sufficiently
the culturological point of view to be disturbed by
Professor
it.
concerned with the "disturbing effect" which
"the impact of anthropology" has had upon sociology: the "cultural approach,"
he
fessor Robert
Lynd
S.
without a focus." Pro-
says, "leaves sociology
issues a clear
warning against the error of
"viewing culture as a self-contained force, operating by inner laws of
its
own."
He
lists
"four distinct advantages" which
human
gained from treating culture as
culture ("basically impersonal things"). Culture,
not "enamel
its
may be
behavior instead of as
he
argues, does
fingernails, or vote, or believe in capitalism,
but
people do." L. L. Bernard, too, argues against a science of culture,
denying that culture
is
a thing suf generis.
He
likewise thinks of
culture as "the impact of an intelligent organism
environment," in other words,
.
.
.
upon
the reactions of the
as
its
human
organism. ^^
Thus, among sociologists we find a recognition of cultural phenomena and an appreciation of the role of culture in human behavior. But we find virtually no conception of a science of culture among them, no appreciation of the fact that cultural phenomena constitute a separate and distinct order; that cultural elements act and react upon each other according to laws of their such can be explained only in terms of cul-
own; that culture
as
ture; that culture
not only can be studied apart from the psycho-
logical reactions of
action," but that
science
is
it
human
organisms, apart from "social inter-
must be
so studied; in fine, that a special
required to study and interpret this special class of
phenomena, and that
this science
is
not a science of psychology.
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
87
individual or social, or a science of society or "social interaction,"
but a supra-psychological science of culture: culturology.
With the creation of Sociology the boundaries of science were extended to embrace super-individual determinants of behavior. But, being but a science of group behavior, of collective psychological determinants, Sociology
was unable to grasp and interpret
super-psychological determinants. Science was, therefore, obliged
once again to advance time
it
its
frontiers
a
new
science.
This
was culturology.
was the anthropologists who,
It
by creating
observed,
"discovered culture,"
as Professor
^*
and
A. L. Kroeber has
has been within the
it
province of anthropology that the science of culture has had most of
its
The eminent
growth.
Burnett Tylor, was the in
an
explicit
and
first
British
self-conscious
we know,
ture:"
We
we know,
too, so far as it
was the
title
do not mean to
to formulate
manner, the point of view, the
purpose, principles and scope, of a science of culture. first,
Edward
anthropologist,
person, so far as
He
was the
to use the phrase "science of cul-
of Chapter
assert that
I
of Primitive Culture (1871).
Tylor was the
first
to take a cul-
turological point of view or to produce a culturological work;
there were, of course, others before Tylor or lesser extent.
so far as
and describe the new
define
To
But
we
who
did this to a greater
are aware, Tylor
was the
first
to
science.
begin with, Tylor gave us what has probably been the most
satisfactory definition of culture that
cently. "Culture," ture, "is that
he
says in the
we have
ever had until
re^
opening words of Primitive Cul-
complex whole which includes knowledge,
belief, art,
morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits ac-
quired by
man
clear that this
human traits
The
as a
new
member
of society." Secondly, Tylor
science will take as
its
makes
it
object of study, not
behavior, nor social process or interaction, but culture
themselves as a separate and distinct
class of
phenomena.
study "not of tribes and nations, but the condition of knowl-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
S8 edge, religion,
he
art,
custom, and the like
sets for his science.
He
proposes
among them"
first
is
the task
to classify culture traits
into categories such as weapons, myths, rites, social customs, etc.,
and then to "make out their distribution in geography and history and the relations which exist among them." It is the relations between culture traits, relations historic, geographic, and functional, that
beings
Tylor
concerned with, not relations between
human
"social interaction")."
(i.e.,
The
is
next noteworthy attempt to establish a science of culture
was that of Emile Durkheim.* In a great deal of his work, but The Rules oi Sociological Method— above all in the
especially in
Preface to the second edition of this
the premises and
to formulate
work— Durkheim endeavored
principles
phraseology was unfortunate, however, since
concealed his true thought.** In the
first
of it
culturology.
His
rather effectively
place he calls his science
"sociology" rather than a "science of culture" as Tylor did, and he lacks the terminology to distinguish cultural.
He
social
and the
designates the class of traditional super-psychologic
symbolic phenomena which
we
call
"culture" by such terms as
which has not only obscured
consciousness,"
"collective
between the
his
thought but has brought upon him the charge of mysticism. But
one who can reach
to
his
thought and meaning through the
facade of inappropriate terminology,
Durkheim
is
interaction,"
*
it
will
be quite apparent that
talking about culture rather than "society" or "social
and that he
is
trying to establish a science of culture.
Having previously stated that the founding of the science of culture was work of anthropology the question arises. Was not Durkheim a
primarily the
Durkheim called his science "sociology." nature and content was very different from the works of most sociologists. As Bernard has put it, "the Durkheim school generally has been closer to anthrop>ology than to sociology," (article "Social Psychology," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, p. 154). ** See the opening words of Durkheim 's Preface to the second edition of The Rules for his own statement about how he was misunderstood by his sociologist? It
But
it
is
colleagues.
is
of course a fact that
also true that
its
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
Durkheim .
.
.
when he
speaking of culture
is
89
says:
ways of acting or thinking have a
collective
the individuals who, at every
moment
These ways of thinking and acting
exist in
reality outside
conform to
of time,
their
own
immense
Collective representations are the result of an
it.
right.
co-
operation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as well; to
make them,
a multitude of
minds have
associated,
united and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and knowledge.^*
Durkheim
no doubt that he
leaves
concerned with what
is
anthropologists such as Tylor, Kroeber and Lowie have called culture even though
he uses the term
"society." "It
is
not true,"
composed of individuals only; it also includes material objects which play an essential role in the comhe
says,
mon
"that society
is
(emphasis ours).
life,"
"houses, buildings of
autonomous
all
Among
independent of individuals
realities,
munication and transportation, used in industry
.
.
That Durkheim action")
We
is
made
.
.
.
.
.
.
lists
become
lines of
com-
instruments and machines
." ^^ is
interested in the behavior of culture traits
than the behavior of
rather
these material objects he
kinds which, once constructed,
human
organisms
("social
inter-
by the following:
clear
by comparison of mythical themes, popular legends, traditions, and languages, the manner in which social representations [i.e., culture traits] adhere to and repel one another, how they fuse or separate from one another.^® need to
Since culture
which repel
traits
act
investigate,
is
be studied with reference to the ways in
to
and
react
upon one another— "adhere
one another"— it follows that culture
is
to
to
and
be explained in
terms of culture: Society
[i.e.,
culture]
iar characteristics
.
.
is .
a reality sui generis;
The
it
has
its
determining cause of a
[culture trait] should be sought
among
own
pecul-
social fact
the social facts [culture
^
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE preceding
traits]
it
.
.
We must seek the explanation
the nature of society [culture]
life [culture] in
A
.
of social
itself.^^
few sociologists have been able to see that Durlcheim traits and their behavior rather than
ing about culture
is
talk-
human
organisms and their interactions, but most of his successors have either tried to reduce his culturology to the social psychology of interaction or have dismissed
it
as
"mysticism." Despite misunder-
standing, however, Durkheim's influence has been considerable, and he will eventually come to be recognized as one of the
founders of the science of culture.
Durkheim the
In the works of Tylor and
good
off to a field
science of culture got
in the nineteenth century. But progress in this
start
A
has been rather meager in recent decades.
amount of work
considerable
of a culturological nature has been produced by
American and European anthropologists. But
little
advance in the
development of the theory of such a science has been made.
There
been considerable opposition to the cultur-
has, in fact,
and numerous
ological point of view,
from the
level attained
signs point to regression
by Tylor and Durkheim.
Professor A. L. Kroeber has undertaken to formulate the philos-
ophy of
a science of culture
following essays:
Psychology,"
on
several occasions, notably in the
"The Superorganic," "The
"On
Possibility of a Social
the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exem-
by Changes in Fashion," "Sub-Human Cultural Begin-
plified
nings," "So-Called Social Science," and, finally in his recent
huge
work. Configurations oi Culture Growth. Like Comte, Kroeber is
concerned with the "hierarchy of the sciences."
cultural
tion,"
phenomena from
he
says, "is
mental exercise."
psychological
He
distinguishes
phenomena.
"Civiliza-
not mental action but a body or stream of
He
distinguishes the psychological
tural in the instance of
from the
cul-
Darwin's formulation of the theory of
natural selection: the "reactions in Darwin's nervous system at the
moment when
the thought of natural selection flashed upon him,"
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
'^l
are contrasted with "the relation of doctrines such as that of natural
selection
nomena." In cern
itself,
other concepts and
to
social
[cultural]
phe-
Kroeber envisages a science which would con-
short,
not with psychological events, but with the actions and
reactions of superorganic (cultural) phenomena.^" In speaking of
the reaction of one concept on another, Kroeber
Durkheim was when he spoke sentations [culture
traits]
is
thinking as
way in which "social repreand repel one another, how
of the
adhere to
they fuse or separate from one another." Culture, as a class of supra-psychic— or superorganic, to use
term— phenomena constitutes a distinct order of reality, in Kroeber's conception. "The superorganic or super-psychic that we call civilization [culture] appears to have an existence, an Kroeber's
.
and
order,
a causality as objective
and
as
the sub-psychic or inorganic," he says.
determinable
He
as
.
.
those of
also thinks of culture
explanation of cultural
phenomena," which means that "the first phenomena must be in cultural terms," ^^
Professor Kroeber
not able to hold consistently to the culture-
as a "closed system of
logical
point
of
is
view,
however.
culturological explanations can
He
be only
appears
think
to
historical;
that
"Anthropology
belongs in the group of the historical sciences," he says. Generalizations dealing with non-temporal aspects of cultural
would, he reasons, belong to psychology, as title
He
of one of his essays,
is
"The
is
phenomena
indicated by the
Possibility of a Social Psychology."
not quite able to conceive of scientific laws of culture
Instead,
he speaks of laws which underlie
"the laws of psychology."
culture,
itself.
and these are
^-
Kroeber has pointed out in "The Possibility of a Social Psychology" "the
defect" of the term "sociology":
fatal
distinguish the cultural from the social.
remedy
this
its
But he does
failure to little
to
shortcoming, since in the same essay where the defect
of "sociology"
is
exposed, he suggests that the science of cul-
ture be called "cultural mechanics," "social psychology," and even ^'sociology." If only
he could have
crystallized his
thought in a
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
92
"culturology"! In a later essay, he does use the phrase
new term:
And he
"science of culture," however.
standing of the direction that science "It does look as
when he observes: would be more concerned
the future science
if
with culture than with society." Professor Robert H.
Lowie
a keen under-
displays
taking
is
"
gives us a clear expression of the
To
culturological point of view in his various writings.
constitutes
distinct
a
which requires hundred
last
.
he
phenomena
interpretation.
"During the
...
he
ture," as
recent essay.
for
to
is
The
increasingly clear
domain.
demands
This distinct science
calls it in a
become
a distinct
culture] a thing sui generis that distinct science."
its
writes, "it has
represents
.
.
him, culture
supra-psychological
a special science for
years,"
that culture
of
class
We
have
[in
investigation a
its
be a "science
of cul-
science of culture
to
is
be distinguished sharply from a science of mental phenomena:
"We
cannot reduce cultural to psychological phenomena
Culture
.
.
.
can be explained only in terms of
heim and Kroeber, Lowie react
upon each
.
.
Like Durk-
sees that culture traits as such act
and
other: "culture thus appears as a closed system."
the business of the ethnologist [culturologist] to
It is therefore
show how one other culture
itself."
.
cultural element
He
traits.
ship terminology
is
is
determined by, or influences,
how
shows, for example,
a type of kin-
determined by rules of marriage and descent.^*
Clark Wissler, likewise an anthropologist, takes the culturological
point of view in
concept
r
in
[as]
anthropological
scientific
much
research."
explanation of the
pology, the study of the
In
fact,
human
of his work.
He
regards the "culture
one of the most recent and important achievements
way
He
distinguishes
psychology,
the
way people behave, from anthroculture
traits,
or cultures, behave.
he advocates the study of "culture
as
independent of
beings." Like Tylor, Wissler states that the task of the
anthropologist
is
ture
study their distribution over the earth, and above
all
traits], to
to "describe
and
classify these inventions
the gross outlines of their history." Wissler
is
[cul-
interested in the
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE evolution of culture, the history of specific
and
in relationships obtaining
"follow out their careers
maintains,
and
laws,"
between
it
93
traits
traits.
and complexes,
he
"All cultures,"
according to discoverable
the anthropologist's business to discover and to
is
formulate these laws.^'
Wissler does not, however, fully appreciate the extent to which the culturological point of view can be applied. Instead of trying to explain such traits as the couvade and incest prohibitions in
terms of the interaction of other culture
He would
to the psychologist.^®
ture to an unwarranted
much
traits,
he turns them over
thus restrict the science of cul-
and unfortunate degree, and deprive
it
of
opportunity for achievement. But this blind spot does not
lessen the merit of his culturological
work
in other areas of inter-
pretation.
and understanding concerning the expansion and of the direction which this expansion
Wissler's insight
of the scope of science is
shown
taking are
in the following passage:
was an easy step from the realization of the individual Such a consciousness of ourto the conception of society selves functioning as a group is coincident with the rise of and whereas a century or more ago men were sociology
Thus,
it
.
.
.
.
.
.
thinking in terms of the individual, they came during the last half
century to see themselves in society.
fact that for a long
ism,
he
failed
such a thing
time
It is
was so intent upon
then
a curious
his individual-
and that to But we have seen how
to sense the existence of society,
as culture
our people are
man
just
culture ... So while
was
totally blind.
becoming conscious of the existence of
we have attained social consciousness we are just now groping our way.'^ .
.
.
into culture consciousness
Professor G. P. cal point of
hard
J.
Murdock
Stern also touches
his article,
has a fine exposition of the culturologi-
view in his essay, "The Science of Culture." Dr. Bern-
upon
it
in
an illuminating manner in
"Concerning the Distinction between the Social and
the Cultural."
It
would be
interesting to note expressions of the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
94
culturological point of view in the works of other
space were at our disposal. But
we
men
if
sufficient
have cited enough to show that
been
progress in the direction of a science of culture has
some made
since the days of Tylor
and Durkheim.
But the new science has encountered considerable opposition as well as support.
extension of the point of view of science to
the realm of
institutions has aroused the opposition
The human
resentment of
champions of the older philosophy of
Durkheim has expressed
and
free will.
As
it:
breaks out each time a new science is founded ... on more than one point, the natural sciences themselves found an obstacle in faith. But it is especially when man became an object of science that the resistance became fierce. The believer, indeed, cannot but find repugnant the idea that
The same antagonism
man
is
be studied
to
and moral
as a natural being,
facts as facts of nature. It
is
analogous to others,
well
known how
these
under the different forms they have taken, have hindered the development of psychology and sociology
collective sentiments,
[culturology].^^
Opposition to a science of culture scientists,
however.
tain sociologists,
ogy
among
We have
and there
is
is
not confined to non-
already noted the opposition of cer-
considerable opposition to culturol-
anthropologists themselves.
in "The Superorganic" (1917), to formulate the culturological point of view and to advocate a
Kroeber's early attempt,
science of culture was
Edward
met with speedy and
spirited opposition.
Sapir, in a skillfully argued essay entitled
a Super-Organic?" tried to
We Need
"Do
show that no such concept, and conse-
quently no special science, was needed. Alexander Goldenweiser,. also in a reply to Kroeber's essay
opposed ture," It
is
"The
Superorganic," likewise
a super-psychological science of culture.
"The
life
he argues elsewhere, "belongs to the psychological
in the
minds of men
in society
thropologist, are students of
life.
Life
.
.
is
.
The
of cullevel.
historian, the an-
psychology."
^*
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE It
seems
likely that
95
Franz Boas had Kroeber
in
mind when he
wrote, "It seems hardly necessary to consider culture a mystic entity that exists outside the society of
and moves by its own force." Like Lynd, Boas would insist that "cultures do not enamel their fingernails but that people do." individual carriers
its
that
Ruth Benedict,
too, can see
nothing but mysticism in Kroeber's
attempt to formulate a science of culture sui generis.
selves in mystical phraseology
in a force cess."
as a class of
phenomena
She speaks of those who "have often expressed them-
he
calls
.
.
.
like
Kroeber they have called
the superorganic to account for the cultural pro-
Being unable to understand or to appreciate
supra-psychological
a science of
phenomena, Boas and Benedict simply brand
the idea "mystical" and reject
it.
The
inability of
Boas to
rise
above
the level of psychological interpretation and to grasp a culturological point of
view
is
clearly set forth in a significant passage
Benedict. "It has never been sufficiently realized," she writes,
by
"how
consistently throughout his life Boas defined the task of ethnology as the
study of 'man's mental
life,'
'fundamental psychic attitudes
of cultural groups,' 'man's subjective worlds/ "
^°
Father Wilhelm Schmidt defines ethnology as "a science of the
mind."
The
^^
reaction against the culturological point of view in Ameri-
can anthropology in recent years has gone so following
summary
far as to receive
expression in the words of David Bidney:
tendency to hypostatize culture and to conceive dental, super-organic, or super-psychic force
that culture
is
a force that
may make and
the major "cultural fallacies" of our day. fallacy,"
to
be
specific,
he
tells
us.^^
.
.
it .
develop It
is
as a transcen-
the assumption itself" is
it
one of
the "culturalistic
Dr. Bidney
fails
preciate the direction that science has been taking for
a century, that
the
"The
to ap-
more than
has been moving upward from the individual
psychologic level to the social psychologic, and from there to the super-psychologic, or culturologic, level.
He
feels
only the impact
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
96
of the current reaction against this trend and consequently does more than serve as the passive medium of its expression.
Many
anthropologists are
still
unable to
sociological, or socio-psychological,
rise
no
above the
level of a
human
behavior.
conception of
Thus Radcliffe-Brown ridicules the notion that two cultures can react upon each other, or that a culture can exert an influence, or produce an effect, upon an individual human being. Culture, to Radcliffe-Brown, tastic to
is
imagine
.
merely "an abstraction," and he finds .
.
"fan-
it
two abstractions coming into contact and
by an act of generation producing a third abstraction." The idea that a culture can "act upon an individual" is, to Radcliffe-Brown, "as absurd as to hold a quadratic equation capable of
a murder." In theoretical outlook Radcliffe-Brown sociologist;
He
he
is
You cannot have
ence of societies
merely a
incapable of envisaging a science of culture.*
asks: "Is a science of culture possible?
agree.
committing is
is
Boas says
possible
and
this
is
it
he
a science of culture." But,
is
not.
I
says, a sci-
the proper goal of the
social anthropologist.^^
Radcliffe-Brown confuses the issue very effectively by calling culture an abstraction.
are culture traits.
Why
call
them
ab-
any more than the bark of a dog or the quack of a duck?
stractions
The
Words
fact that
words have a symbolic significance
as well as auditory
and physical properties does not make them "abstractions," any
more than the this
sexual significance of the
mating
call
of frogs
an abstraction. Polygynous households are culture
why
call
But
one husband and three wives an abstraction any more
than one atomic nucleus and three electrons? or ceremonial forms be called abstractions any or molecular forms? * It
makes
traits.
A
wild horse
an interesting and noteworthy
is
Why
should social
more than
not an abstraction.
cellular
Why
call
fact, however, that although RadcHffeable to appreciate the concept of a science of culture and hence has repudiated and rejected such a concept, he has employed it effectively in some of his work. His "Social Organization of Australian Tribes" is a good example of a culturological interpretation of super-psychological is
Brown has not been
phenomena.
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
97
a domesticated horse (a culture trait) one? Culture traits are very real
things:*
objects,
acts,
can be and are experienced for calling
As
them
forms, sentiments and ideas which
as real things.
for culture's ability to "act
man who
able to find a
There
no more reason
is
abstractions than anything else in our experience.
is
upon an
individual,"
it is
remark-
so often identified with Durlcheim
arguing this question in the negative.
It
was one of Durkheim's
chief theses that culture traits have an existence prior to
and inde-
pendent of the individual human organism, and that these
man from
impinge upon behavior.
And
it is,
of course, obvious that this
birth— and even before— culture ments,
traits in
is
From
the case.
the form of ideas, senti-
and material objects act upon the human organism
acts,
and cause
traits
the outside and profoundly affect his
to behave in this
it
way and
that.
And
it
is
not as
"absurd" as Radcliffe-Brown would have us think to "hold a quadratic equation
[i.e.,
mitting a murder,"
A
an idea or
set of ideas] capable of
com-
may so another human
culture trait in the form of an idea
human organism as to cause it to This is in fact a very common thing in
stimulate the
kill
being.
cases of witchcraft,
the killing of one or both of twins at birth, and tural situations.
A
many
other cul-
culture trait in the form of a sentiment-charged
idea will cause a Japanese general to disembowel himself in atone-
ment
for disgrace or failure, or
an occidental
brains with a pistol. It would, of course,
was the person, the
human
in the examples just cited.
—and it
this
is
officer to
be
silly
to argue that
it
Of
course
it
was the
human
being.
But
the point at issue in a scientific analysis of behavior-
was the culture
trait,
ing, of the homicides.
commit
his
organism, that actually does the killing
not the
human
being, that was the determi-
nant of the behavior, and hence was the cause, or
blow out
hara-kiri
The human
scientifically speak-
organism does not
kill
witches
because of any inherent property or tendency.
* Recall Durkheim's emphasis upon the prof>osition that social facts arc things (choses). This proposition was "at the very basis of . . . [his] method,"
(The Rules,
p. xliii).
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
98
As a matter of fact, self-destruction runs counter to powerful and deep-seated organic tendencies. But, under the powerful stimulation of cultural traits, acting upon the organism from the outside,
the
human
being can be brought to homicide or
hara-kiri.
These acts are the organic responses to cultural stimuli, and in scientific phraseology, it traits are
is
quite proper to say that the culture
the causes, the killings the results.
stimuli are applied, different results will
we
see that far
tion,
i.e.,
If different cultural
be forthcoming. Thus,
from being absurd to think of a "quadratic equa-
a culture trait in the
ting a murder," or a suicide,
form of an idea-sentiment, commit-
it is
and
realistic
scientifically valid to
think in precisely this way.* Professor A. Irving Hallowell, too, emphasizes a point of view
which would
rule out a supra-psychologic science of culture. After
quoting with approval Sidney's characterization of the culturologipoint of view as a
cal
fallacy,
he
says:
Although anthropologists often speak of the "movements" of culture or the "meeting" of cultural traits or complexes, this manner of speaking must be understood as an economical mode of abstract speech. In a literal sense cultures never have met nor will ever meet. What is meant is that peoples meet and that, as a result of the processes of social interaction, accultura-
mode
one or both peoples dynamic centers of this process of interaction ... it is hard to see how culture— an abstract summation of the mode of life of a people— can exert tion—modifications in the
—may
an influence except *
We
of life of
take place. Individuals are the
do not
as
it
is
a
definable constituent of the
assert that the culturological point of
in Radcliffe-Brown's work.
It
is.
view
is
As we have already noted,
nowhere it
implicit
permeates his
When
fine study, "The Social Organization of Australian Tribes." he distinguishes "social anthropology" from psychology in "The Methods of Eth-
nology and Social Anthropology," p. 133, he gives expression to the culturological point of view. What we have claimed here is that Radcliffe-Brown has explicitly and specifically opposed the theory of a science of culture. This is demonstrated by his own utterances. The fact that he not infrequently docs culturology in no
way
invalidates this charge.
Even
to square their behavior with their articulate theory.
scientists
sometimes
fail
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
human
activities of
In the
99
individuals in interaction with each other.
last analysis it
is
individuals
who respond
to
and influence
one another,^* (emphasis ours).
We
see here only the social
marked
psychologist, with, however, a
individualistic bias. Hallowell thinks of culture only as
the reactions of biological organisms. traits as
turns his back
Oi
The
interaction of culture
such seems utterly unrealistic to him. Hence he resolutely
upon
course culture
a science of culture.
traits
could do nothing were
thought otherwise?
Certainly
it
not Tylor,
a false realism to argue that culture traits
each other immediately and directly.
upon and
acts directly
we know
religious beliefs
other culture
is
a culture trait. It
sexes,
customs of residence, food habits,
modern American
traits:
harness and carriage manufacture, the steel
industries,
road building, urban development, road
To be
etc.
these cultural events could not have taken place had
human
organisms. But
traits
introducing these organisms into of the
symphony
it
sure,
not been
our account of the influence of the
is
automobile upon other culture
ment
many
culture directly affected
houses and tourist camps, consolidated schools,
for
But upon
of.
react
and ceremonies, and so on. The introduction of
the automobile in
and rubber
hoe
do not
influences other culture traits such as divi-
between the
sion of labor
A
human
ask, has ever
Durkheim, Kroeber,
Lowie, Wissler, or any other culturologist that it is
not for
And who, we might
beings; they could not even exist.
it?
made any more realistic by Not one whit. The develop-
or non-Euclidean geometry could not have
taken place without the respiratory and digestive processes of composers and mathematicians.
But
to inject these physiologic proc-
esses into a scientific explanation of these cultural processes
On
would
not add
a single thing to our understanding of them.
trary, it
would only confuse because of their irrelevance. Thus we no existence, and hence can
the con-
see that, although culture traits have
do nothing without the agency
of
human
beings,
we can
treat
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
TOO
them
scientifically as if
we have shown,
as
ence of one
trait
they had an independent existence. In
upon another can be solved most
human organism from
eliminating the
fact,
the problem of the direct and immediate influeffectively
by
our consideration entirely.
Far from being unrealistic— or fantastic or absurd, in the words of Radcliffe-Brown— it is a common procedure in science. The physicist
may
treat falling bodies as
if
they
vacuum; or
in a perfect
fell
imagine an airplane passing without friction through the atmosis so naive as to protest that such things
phere. But no physicist
simply don't occur;
goes without saying that they do not. Every
it
knows that the most effective— if not the only— way to and propositions necessary to explain physi-
physicist
arrive at the formulas cal
phenomena
is
to substitute ideal situations for real ones.*
only way, for example, to arrive at a
law of
imagine them falling through a perfect
falling bodies
vacuum—a
The is
to
situation that
does not and cannot exist on this earth.
knows
Similarly the culturologist
do not go walking about
like
full
well that culture traits
disembodied souls interacting with
each other. But he realizes that he can explain cultural as cultural
phenomena only when he
them
treats
as
phenomena
ii
they had a
life of their own, quite apart from the glands, nerves, muscles, etc.,
of
human
is
not that
defend
it.
scholars in
decades.
The
organisms. it is
It
should be necessary to
it
neither revolutionary nor novel. As a matter of fact,
is
many
We
remarkable thing about this argument
revolutionary, but that
fields
have been making culturological studies for
have had studies of Indo-European and other lan-
guages on a purely linguistic,
i.e.,
non-biological, level.
We
have
had studies of the evolution of currency, the effect of telescopes upon theological beliefs; the influence of the industrial revolution * Physics, says
world
the distinguished physicist,
in place of that given to us
so-called
physical world
certain extent
it
is
image;
arbitrary. It
it is
.
Planck, "substitutes a new The other world is the .
.
intellectual
structure.
To
a
model or idealization created in every measurement and to facilitate
a kind of
order to avoid the inaccuracy inherent in The Philosophy oi Fhysics,
exact definition,"
Max
by the senses. is merely an
(New
York, 1936), p. 53.
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
upon
political institutions; the
101
development of Greek tragedy, non-
Euclidean geometry, Gothic architecture, and parliamentary government; the relationship between taxi dance halls and prostitu-
and the divorce
tion, delicatessens
rate;
money
spent on medical
schools and death rates for contagious diseases,
etc., etc.
All of
and their solutions are culturothat none of these situations could exist
these are culturological problems logical.
were
it
Need one insist not for human organisms?
could not. But
human
it
is
It is
obvious of course that they
equally obvious that the introduction of
organisms into a consideration of these problems
only not necessary,
it
is
irrelevant
and confusing.
traditional habit of thinking anthropomorphically
It
is
which
still
to "social science" that keeps one from seeing that in the culture system, that
is
it
is
is
not
only the clings
man-
the cultural, rather than the organic, factor
the determinant of the events within this system.
We see then that the culturological point of view, procedure and objective are not new. Actually, scholars in philology, musicology,
philosophy, mathematics, political science, economics, literature, art,
have been making culturological studies for
ment
in
support of a science of culture
is
necessary
cause the theoretical position taken today by sociologists
and anthropologists opposes
Our argunow only be-
years.
many psychologists, new science so
this
vigorously.
^Tje reaction against the culturological point of view has gone
even farther than has been indicated above. Proceeding from the
view that culture argued that
is
"an abstraction," some anthropologists have
intangible and imperceptible and end
it is
tioning the very existence and reality of culture
itself.
up by quesThus Ralph
Linton observes:
Any
investigator of culture is at once confronted with the problem of its reality. Do cultures actually exist, ? Culture ... is intangible and cannot be directly apprehended even by individuals who participate in it ... If it [culture] can be said .
to exist at
all
." .
.
.
.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
102
Herskovits regards culture as "intangible," but grants to culture ^^
patterns "the reality of any abstraction,"
mean. Thus culture if
made
is
whatever
And
virtually to disappear.
this
may
obviously
culture does not exist there can be no science of culture.
Vigorous opposition to
comes from Earnest
a science of culture
Albert Hooton. Whereas anthropologists like Boas, Goldenvi^eiser, Sapir and others have essentially a psychological point of view, Professor Hooton's outlook
To him
man's behavior," he argues, is
on a
is
the study of culture
is
"is a
still
lower
level:
the biological.
but a branch of biology. "Since function of his organism
...
it
within the province of the physical anthropologist to survey also
the cultural and psychological symptoms of the well-being or
human
being of the
Lynd
animal." Just as
ill-
deplores the "artificial"
Hooton bewail the
separation of culture from people, so does
attempt to disjoint culture from the blood, bone, and muscle of the
human
organism.
"My
only quarrel with the ethnologist and
with the social anthropologist," he abstract social
animal from
phenomena and
man
says,
"is
that they willfully
divorce man's activities as a social
[He deplores] the old way of consider-
himself.
ing social institutions completely apart from the
human
which produce them,
propagated and
former
as if the
evolved independently, like parasites Professor
Hooton can
see
what
lived, died,
upon
human
their
animals
hosts."
culturologists are trying to do,
but
being unable to appreciate anything beyond the horizon of biology,
he regards
their objective as a great mistake.
"We
have been
misled," he bemoans, "into the imbecilic assumption that culture,
an inanimate thing consisting of humanly manipulated matter and disembodied that
all
man
ideas, evolves
has to do
has even gone so gest that "it
is
far,
is
by
ever
onward and upward, and and
ride."
Hooton
in his anti-culturological attitude, as to sug-
possibly
more
social anthropologist to study less,
itself
to grease the wheels
profitable for the sociologist
monkeys [who
L.A.W.] than savages." Needless
and the
are, of course, culture-
to say, Professor
Hooton's
unfortunate attitude toward a science of culture in no way de-
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE from the excellence of
tracts
103
his contributions in other fields.^'
W. M.
Professor C.
Hart, too, deplores the separation of the cultural (or the social, for that matter) from the biological.^^
Thus we
see that although
some
made
progress has been
in the
direction of realizing a science of culture in recent decades, there is
also considerable opposition to
it.
Some,
like Boas, are simply
not able to grasp the concept of a special science devoted to a distinct and independent class of super-psychological determinants
Lynd and Hooton,
of behavior. Others, like
see
what
are trying to do, but are convinced that they are
wrong— track.
a dangerously
As years
a matter of fact, anthropology has actually regressed in recent
from the
levels attained
teenth century.
We
by Tylor and Durkheim
science. strata,
We
one
in the nine-
have, of course, an objective criterion
measure of advance and regression
may view
in
and
the expansion of the scope of
the stages of this expansion as a series of
upon another, the older strata on the bottom, the Thus at one time we see the science of the behavior
laid
newer on top. of
culturologists
on the wrong—
man on
the anatomical and physiological
level.
Subsequently
science has advanced to the individual psychological level, then to
the socio-psychological, and finally to the culturological,
Thus by at
any given time to
this
level.
view and objectives of anthropology
referring the point of
developmental
series,
we
can gauge
its
condition of advancement or regression.
Measured by
this yardstick,
anthropology has regressed consider-
ably, especially since 1930.^® Science attained the culturological level in anthropology.
ment and
This
is
anthropology's distinctive achieve-
mission: to formulate and develop a science of culture.
Tylor and Durkheim formulated such a science. Kroeber, Lowie, Wissler, and others have carried
it
forward. But
many
students
bearing the professional label of "anthropologist" have been unable to ascend to the culturological level and to grasp the concept
of a supra-psychological science of cultural phenomena. Being
unable to do
this,
they have opposed the culturological point of
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
104 view.
We
how
have already seen
Benedict opposed
it.
Culture, Goldenweiser argues, "belongs to
level. It is in
the psychological
Boas, Sapir, Goldenweiser and
the minds of men." Sapir, apart
We
get some notion from linguistics, was primarily a psychologist. from the culturological of how far the anthropology of today is position of former years from the following statement
by one of
our younger anthropologists, Dr. John Gillin:
One
of the greatest recent advances [in anthropological theory]
the realization by anthropologists that culture
is
logical
It is rather ironical that
appears should have been
"Some Unfinished
"unfinished business"
The
the development of a science of culture. is
phenomenon"
a "psychological
regression to a lower level in the
More mate
M.
recently Professor
reality of culture
Not only it
a psycho-
the article in which this observation
entitled
The
Cultural Anthropology."
ture
is
phenomenon.''"
is
J.
Business of
is,
of course,
realization that cul-
not an advance but a
is
development of science.
Herskovits
tells
us that "the ulti-
psychological." *
has anthropology regressed to the psychological level;
has tended to go even below the collective psychological level
and come to
rest
upon the
analysis of culture,"
level of individual psychology.
Goldenweiser argues,
leads back to the individual mind."
ture"
meant "the
life
To
"if fully
Boas the "working of
of the individual as controlled
the effect of the individual upon culture.
The
and
acts
is
and dreams and
cul-
by culture and
causal conditions of
cultural happenings lie always in the interaction
vidual and society." "It
"An
carried out,
between
indi-
always the individual that really thinks revolts," Sapir maintained. Sapir's "ap-
Why
* "Tlie Processes of Cultural Change," p. 163. one should locate the "ultimate reality" of culture in psychological processes is not clear. If one reduces culture to the psychological level why not reduce psychological events to the physiological level, and these to the anatomical and these in turn to the chemical and physical levels if one is concerned with ultimates.
—
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
105
proach to the problem was always through the individual," accord-
Ruth Benedict. Hallowell
ing to it
who respond
individuals
is
asserts that "in the last analysis
to
and influence one another."
Linton takes the position that "culture
.
.
.
only in the
exists
minds of the individuals who compose a society. It derives all its qualities from their personalities and the interaction of these personalities."
*^
In line with this emphasis upon the individual,
most popular trend
in
"Depth psychology,"
of personality.
we
note that the
American anthropology today
is
the study
ink-blot tests, psychiatry, etc.,
are almost de rigueur these days for the up-to-date anthropologist.
Thus we
see that
psychologists.
much
of anthropology today has regressed
below that of most
to a level even
And
in
some
sociologists
and some
social
of Hooton's work, anthropological
theory has regressed even lower and has reached the biological level.
His interpretation of
germ plasm and
his
social disorders in
advocacy of
social
terms of inferior
reform through biological
purges are expressions of this point of view.*^ In a recent work, Kroeber has once again given expression to the
am
culturological point of view: "I
non being
cultural, the explanation
cultural terms
one very I
shall
studies
far in
not
fall
.
.
.
convinced that, the phenome-
must
first
of
all
be made
in
psychological explanations have not got any-
reducing the phenomena of history to order, and
back on them."
and ink-blot
tests,
*^
But
in these days of personality
Kroeber stands almost alone.
How
is
anthropology's regression from culturology to psychology and psychiatry to
be explained?
Long ago Tylor remarked upon the repugnance with which otherwise enlightened persons will regard a science of culture.
many educated minds," he sumptuous and repulsive is
part
wrote, "there seems something pre-
in the
view that the history of mankind
and parcel of the history of nature, that our thoughts,
and actions accord with laws
"To
as definite as those
wills,
which govern the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
106
motion of waves, the combination of acids and ** growth of plants and animals."
noted that the old anthropocentric philosophy which still dominates our thinking about man and his
Durkheim, of free will,
and the
bases,
too,
behavior, generates vigorous opposition to a science of culture.
He
wrote:
Numerous and
.
.
pleases
.
survivals
of the anthropocentric bias
still
remain
here as elsewhere, they bar the way to renounce the unlimited power over the social
to science. It dis-
man
order he has so long attributed to himself; and on the other
hand,
it
seems to him
that,
if
he
collective forces really exist,
submit to them without being able to modify them. This makes him inclined to deny their existence. In vain have repeated experiences taught him that this omnipois
necessarily obliged to
tence, the illusion of
which he complacently
entertains, has
always been a cause of weakness in him; that his power over things really began only
when he
recognized that they have a
nature of their own, and resigned himself to learning this nature
from them. Rejected by
all
other sciences, this deplorable prej-
udice stubbornly maintains
Nothing and this
is
sociology
[culturology].
from
it,
efforts.*^
recently A. L. Kroeber has observed that a science of
culture will have to win
human
in
to liberate our science
the principal purpose of our
is
And more
itself
more urgent than
its
way
against the older philosophy of
free will:
Our minds
instinctively resist the
first
shock of the recognition
of a thing [cultural determinism] so intimately
and yet so
woven
into us
above and so utterly uncontrollable by our wills. feel driven to deny its reality, to deny even the validity of dealing with it as an entity; just as men at large have long and far
We
bitterly resented admitting the existence of purely
forces
and system
in the realm that underlies
makes possible the existence of our nature.*®
and
automatic carries
and
personalities: the realm of
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
These quotations do not merely science and "natural" science.
107
distinguish
They
between "social"
between the philosophy of determinism and the philosophy of free will that still permeates much of the thinking of today.* Social science had
won
its
way
to the philosophy of
of the i88o's and '90's: "If law
is
also distinguish
determinism in the anthropology
anywhere
it is
everywhere/' said
Tylor.
We find that anthropology has We have exponents of free will in
regressed at this point, too.
anthropology today, and this
philosophy seems to be growing in strength and adherents. Dr.
Mead believes that "man should democratically of his own destiny and build himself a world that in." " Much of her book, And Keep Your Powder
Margaret control to live
take is
fit
Dry,
permeated with the philosophy of Free Will. Dr. John R. Swanton closes his essay "Are Wars Inevitable?" with the assur-
is
ance that
do
"all that
is
needed
[to
terminate warfare]
Ralph Linton espouses the philosophy
so."
is
the will to
of free will
and
the theory of social change through education in his lecture to "Potential Contributions of Cultural Anthro-
teachers entitled
pology to Teacher Education." "I believe," he
none
are will
of our current problems
put their minds to them and
them
and able
willing
to
do
says, "that there
which cannot be solved it is
this (p.
9) ...
If
make
he can control
the future of his society, not in detail but in gross.
On
people
the educator can
establish a particular value system in his pupils
*
if
the educator's task to
By the
feeling
North Whitehead makes the following penetrating based on mechanism, is conjoined with an the world of men and of the higher animals as being
this point Alfred
observation:
"A
scientific realism,
unwavering belief
in
composed of self-determining organisms. This radical inconsistency at the basis of modern thought accounts for much that is half-hearted and wavering in our civilization. It would be going too far to say that it distracts thought. It enfeebles it, by reason of the inconsistency lurking in the background," {Science and the Modern World, p. 94, emphasis ours).
Much by
of anthropological thought
a belief in
man
tions will show.
is
—
—
not to say crippled today organism" as the following quota-
enfeebled
as a "self-determining
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
108
which he estabhshes toward war, or toward unhmited accumulation of wealth, or toward social justice he can deflect culture change
undesirable directions
or
desirable
in
society that genuinely believes in
(p.
and the educator can do more than anyone
justice
16)
...
A
can get social
justice
social
else to estab-
•"
bchcf (p. 17) Professor Linton makes the control of culture change
lish this
.
.
seem
very simple. Teachers, guided of course by a little coaching from the cultural anthropologist, will direct the course of social change as the)' please, "in desirable or undesirable directions," simply
by
and
insur-
ing the proper "feeling" toward social problems so that
when
establishing the proper "value systems" in their pupils
they grow up they will be "willing and able to put their minds to these problems" and by so doing solve them. This view
reminiscent of
we
"If
what the
clergy have
been
but purpose in our hearts
will
.
is
.
Or, as politicians,
."
"If the democracies
columnists, and rhetoricians put
it:
loving nations, the churches, the
women,
faintly
telling us for centuries:
etc., etc.)
(peace-
of the world
." To which one would only take a firm stand against war might add: "If New England had a sub-tropical climate they .
.
could grow grapefruit," or
made
"if frogs
grew fur the world might be
safe for chinchillas."
But the
we have
crassest expression of the doctrine of
seen recently
to
is
American Anthropologist:
Here we
own
"The Concept
cultural destiny
and
is
the ends he would achieve," (p. 541).
We
*
—
Free Will that
in a recent article in the
of
Cultural
Crisis."
by Dr. David Bidney that "man, under God,*
are told
controls his
be found
believe that
it
is
not at
to inquire of Dr. Bidney,
all
facetious
choose and realize
free to
With
—above
the re-introduction
all
"Whose God?" The God
for
an anthropologist
of the Christians or
God of the Jews? Of the Catholics or of the Protestants? The God of Mary Baker Eddv, Madame Blavatsky, or of Pius IX? Of Gandhi or of Winston Churchill? Of William Jennings Bryan or of Robert Andrews Millikan not to mention the Gods of millions upon millions of Mohammedans, the
—
Hindus, Buddhists and others.
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
God
of
105
into ethnological theory, Bidney sets a
new low
in the
present trend toward regression.*
We have, however, merely exhibited of culture
the opposition to a science
and demonstrated the occurrence of
not explained
it.
To
another essay, but
we have undertake such an explanation would require
we might
suggest here that the regression
are witnessing in social science in general
pology in particular that pervades
is
regression;
and
we
in cultural anthro-
but one aspect of a reactionary tendency
Western
civilization
The
today.
nineteenth cen-
tury was one of expansion and growth of our social system as well
our technology;
as
it
was an era of progress.
With
the end of the
period of colonization of backward lands and peoples in Asia and Africa, social
and the disappearance of the
system reached the limits of
its
frontier in America, our
capacity for growth.
unemployment, over-production and glutted markets, only by periodic
An
World Wars,
obsolete social system
is
Mass
relieved
are the indexes of this condition. striving to
maintain
itself
against
technological imperatives for change. Although there have been
some gains— the destruction of the feudal houses of Romanoff, Hapsburg and Hohenzollern— the status quo has had, on the whole, the better of
it
in the struggle.
The powers
victorious in
the war just ended are dedicated to the status quo ante bellum, to the preservation of the old system of capitalism, empire
imperialism.
Our whole
life is
and
pervaded, therefore, by reactionary
* Kroeber charitably grants
see
why he
Bidney his God, remarking that he does not should be concerned with the use of God, by Bidney or Toynbee,
in their interpretations of culture "until
it is
evident that their attitude affects
the results of their studies" (1948, p. 413). But how could it be otherwise than to affect their interpretations? And do we not already know what this effect will be? The use of "God" as an explanatory device is hardly original with Bidney and Toynbee. Have we not had centuries and centuries of this kind of interpretation? And has not the development of science been, to a very great extent, an attempt to outgrow and get away from such sterile and mystical concepts as "God" as explanatory devices? It is worth pointing out as a relevant fact in this connection that Bidney was not trained in anthropology but in philosophy, where, presumably, there is still a place and a use for "God" as an explanatory concept.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
no
purposes and ideals and to a great extent dominated by them. victors of World War II will probably effect a continuation
The
of this political
and philosophic atmosphere for some time to
come. It is
therefore not surprising to discover reactionary and re-
gressive tendencies in present-day anthropology.* It
and
evolutionist iate future
ology
is
is
anti-culturological.
not bright. But
the youngest
tion reached the
all
member
end of
its
The
is
both
anti-
science
outlook for the immed-
young and
is still
of the family.
rope. Culture
is
Nor
cultur-
has social evolu-
but a million years old
and we have some twenty million years ahead of us— unless, of course, the techniques of destruction develop to the point of
extermination.
The way
of life that
eventually be discarded and cultural
and
science.
A
those
who know
And
to maintain" will
with the advance of
go advance in philosophy and
social evolution will
science of culture will
in the past will
"we fought
forgotten.
come
eventually.
Meanwhile,
what course the evolution of culture has taken
know how
best to serve the cause of science in
the future.
Summary: he
Man
an animal, and like
is
control over his environment so that
Man
his kind perpetuated.
life
But
is
man
can be
is
made
peculiarly
human:
secure and
of adjustment
neuro-sensory-muscular-
in addition to these purely
has a technique that
language
other living beings
has the same means
and control that other animals have: glandular, etc.
all
adapt himself to his habitat, to exercise some
strives to live: to
animal means, he
articulate speech.
With
constructs philosophies in which the whole cosmos
evaluated and interpreted. In terms of these philosophies, *
Note
carefully that
it is
sense assert or imply psychiatric studies are
the
human
personnel,
certain tendencies in ethnological theory that
we
This characterization docs not in any that the men and women who bear the professional and who are primarily concerned with psychological or themselves reactionary. It is the trend in theory, not that we are concerned with here.
characterize as reactionary label "anthropologist"
man
and
regressive.
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE adjustment to and control over his environment.
effects his
function of philosophy
The istic
111
philosophies of
first
The
bottom a biological one. mankind were animistic, supernatural
at
is
and anthropomorphic. The external world was explained, not
in terms of
its
own
properties but in terms of
human
psychological
terms of spiritual beings with minds like our own.
in
.forces,
This primitive type of philosophy, although emotionally was, of course, ineffective practically, as a
means
satisfying,
of understanding
and controlling the external world. Gradually, after hundreds of thousands of years, a
philosophy was developed. terms of
its
own
jected from the
It
new
type of
interpreted the external world in
properties instead of terms of wish
human mind. Free
will
and
will pro-
and caprice gave way to
determinism and natural law. But this transition in point of view was not effected throughout the whole range of philosophy at once.
On
the contrary
began
it
in certain areas of experience
spread from there to others. It got a foothold of the heavens
first
and
in the study
and spread from there to other physical phe-
nomena. Then
it
conquering
the anatomical, next the physiological, and finally
first
the psychological the
new
And
invaded the realm of biological phenomena,
levels.
always, as the
vanced,
From
the psychology of the individual,
interpretation was extended to the psychology of society.
it
new
naturalistic philosophy
of science ad-
pushed out and displaced the old philosophy of
free
will.
The
order in which the various realms of nature were invaded
and subdued by the new philosophy was determined by the following law: Scientific interpretation will appear Erst and grow fastest in those areas
where the determinants of human behavior
and least significant. Since the primitive philosupon a projection of the human psyche into the external world, upon a confusion of the self with the not-self, the new philosophy would begin first and flourish best where the are the weakest
ophy
rested
identification of the self with the external world
was weakest.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
112
namely, in relation to the heavenly bodies and other inanimate
phenomena were next brought within the
Biological
objects.
new
scope of the
interpretation,
and eventually
social behavior.
But sociology, the science of society, was not the end of the road of science as
Comte and many others determinants of human
one more
class of
with, the
most intimate and powerful
psychologists found
beyond an
it
movement
will
and
this
means
it
until
it
hard
of "social
not stop in
of expansion, until
potentialities to the utmost,
Just as
have sociologists found
But science cannot and
its
culture.
beyond the horizon
to envisage a science of culture
march, in
all:
envisage a collective psychology
difficult to
individualistic one, so
interaction."
of
supposed. There was
behavior to be dealt
its
onward
has fulfilled it
its
has embraced
and subdued the whole realm of human experience.
The
science of culture
of science.
Many
civilization lay in the
he chooses of
how "we"
is
the next item of business on the agenda
of our "best
his
minds"
still
talk as
if
the fate of
hands of man, to be wrecked or saved
own
free will.
Many
are
still
as
prattling about
are going to construct the post-war world, nursing, in
Durkheim's phrase, the
illusion
of omnipotence.
There
is,
as
Tylor, Durkheim, Kroeber and a few others have pointed out, a powerful
And
trols us.
laws.
and
we
and sometimes
not "we"
it is
who
bitter
antagonism to the view that
control our culture but that our culture con-
our culture grows and changes according to
As we outgrow our primitive and
set
have a
flattering
less
we
live,
conception of ourselves, perhaps,
but a greater capacity for rational and effective so today,
own
infantile notion of mastery
about to learn the nature of the culture in which we
will
And
its
living.
witness one of the most critical and dramatic
episodes in the long and exciting history of science. Advancing
over the charred bones of hapless astronomers, put to death in a frantic
attempt to stem the tide of the new philosophy, science
has gone on to
new
conquests. After a bitter battle over Dar-
winism, science has securely held the
field of biology.
Psychology
THE .EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE has at
last
made
it
113
possible to regard "minds" as objects,
sociology has illuminated the laws of social interaction.
and
now
It
remains to discover the principles of a million years of culture
growth and to formulate the laws of
this
development.
has been done, science will have captured the
stronghold of the old philosophy;
it
When
last
remaining
have reached
will
this
its
final
boundary.
As these pages were going
P.S.
to press
made
I
a discovery too
important to pass by without mention here, namely, two
signifi-
cant essays by a distinguished German chemist and Nobel laureate, Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932), entitled "The System of the Sciences," and "Principles of the
Theory of Education," addresses
prepared for the inauguration of Rice Institute of Houston, Texas,
and published
in English translation in the
phlet, Vol.
No.
In
II,
"The System
sciences
on
3,
Rice Institute Pam-
November, 1915.
of the Sciences," Ostwald classifies the several
a logical basis, arranging
by the degree of generality or
them
in
an order determined
particularity of their basic concepts.
All sciences are classified into three groups:
the sciences of
(1)
order— logic and various forms of mathematics;
(
2
)
the energetical
sciences— mechanics, physics, and chemistry; and
the bio-
(3)
which he subdivides into physiology, psychology,
logical sciences
and culturology. The sciences
of order are the simplest as well as
the most general in the application of their concepts; the biological sciences are the
The
logical
most complex
as well as the
most
particular.
arrangement of the sciences represents
order of development, according to Ostwald.
We
also their
"cannot
fail,"
he says, "to recognize that an absolutely definite sequence can be
shown
in
which the various
and have developed into arose
and were developed
liability of
the
first,"
human mind
have appeared
scientific disciplines
their first florescence
in
.
.
.
the simplest
and "in proportion
as
the
re-
mental operations was developed,
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
114 the more complicated and diversified
of experience were
fields
gradually submitted to science" (pp. 118, 120).
Ostwald's ''hierarchy" of the sciences
Comte and Spencer of the sequence of
in all
fundamental
development
much
is
thus like those of
is
respects,
and
his theory
the same as theirs: the
physical sciences were developed before the biological sciences
because they were simpler; the sociological, or culturological, sciences were developed last because they are the most complex. Like Comte, Ostwald says that "a sure mastery of at least the
fundamental principles of for
sary presupposition
problems"
We
still
all
the
the sciences ... scientific
is
therefore a neces-
(p. 169).
prefer our
own
interpretation of the sequence in
the various sciences have developed. factor
is
mastery of culturological
not irrelevant, but
it
The
which
simplicity-complexity
we
secondary in importance,
is
believe, to the varying roles that physical, physiological, psychological,
and
human
behavior.
cultural
A
phenomena fellow
smile, repelled
by a scowl,
physiological,
anatomical,
human
being
logically
chemical,
who
complex,
is
i.e.,
attracted
analyzable into
and physical
human
by a
events.
But
cultural behavior to
be
simple as physical phenomena, to consist of stimulus and
re-
experientially as
is
play in the determination of
we
feel the events of
sponse, attraction and repulsion.
One wonders what Ostwald's phrase "in proportion as the reliability of the human mind in mental operations was developed" might mean? Does he mean that the native mental ability of man increased? This can hardly have been appreciable within a period
means that man's techniques of interpretation of experience were improved, might this not well be that he learned to distinguish the self from the of time as brief as the history of science. If he
not-self in a series It is significant
human mind nomena, then
is
of sectors of experience?
to note in Ostwald's essay
not "naturally attracted"
to biological.
On
on pedagogy that the first
to physical phe-
the contrary, he finds that "it
is
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
much
easier ... to
awaken an
and plants than
interest in animals
and physical experiments
in minerals
115
.
.
zoology and botany
,
can be taught with success at an age when systematic physics or ," chemistry could not be taught (pp. 204-05). Ostwald speaks .
.
of this as "a certain antithesis," a "seeming contradiction,"
accounts for
more
closely
and by noting that plants and animals resemble man than do inanimate phenomena. Thus the anthropo-
it
morphic, anthropocentric factor insinuates discussion after
all.
Man
himself; but, for this very reason,
less
is
into Ostwald's
itself
interested in himself
is
and things
like
them
able to understand
than things and events more remote because of the greater
difS-
culty of disengaging himself, his ego, from the external world in
the case of things close
At the top
of "the
and
to,
like, himself.
pyramid of the sciences," Ostwald places—
culturology, the science of civilization or culture, the science that
has as
its
subject matter "those facts
and relationships which have
developed in man, in contradistinction to
which form that which we
(p. 167). This science, he says,
proper
name
"is
of scx:io]ogy" (p. 167).
other animals, and
all
specifically call
human
civilization"
usually designated
And
by the im-
here Ostwald, a chemist,
demonstrates that he has seen clearly what virtually no ologist has
been able to grasp, namely, that
extra-somatic tradition that or interaction;
this
is
significant
culture as an
here— not
social process
and what many a cultural anthropologist has
to realize, namely, that
—that
is
it is
significant rather
a specific kind of
than
soci-
is
it
how many
failed
behavior— symbolic individuals exhibit
kind of behavior. Let us deal with each of these points in
turn.
To be
the sociologist the social process, social interaction,
all
and end
all
of
human
the confines of this concept.
behavior;
He
the social process beings.
He
itself as
the
he cannot escape from
cannot grasp the idea of an
external, extra-somatic class of things called culture that
man
is
determine
well as the behavior of individual hu-
can only translate culture into the coinage and
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
116
currency of social process; culture thus becomes a mere aspect or a by-product of social interaction.
But Ostwald that
far
is
shrewder and wiser than
it is
human
distinctive characteristic of the olog)' has
man
this.
He
sees clearly
not social process but civilization or culture that
been used, he
species.
says, to designate
the
is
The term
soci-
the science peculiar to
because of
the fact that man,
.
.
.
even in the very early stages of his
development, has unquestionably been a social being, so that, for
much
socially
of
the greater part, specifically
to be the culture of groups
itself
and busying themselves
human
however,
culture,
nomenon; and
it
is,
in
common. This
is
relatively
a
special nature
secondary phe-
have been, and can in the future be, acThus, socializing mankind is this field; indeed, it
most important, but not the most I
shown
a single individual.
an important phenomenon in one.
culture has
moreover, not entirely general, for certain
cultural performances
complished by
human
of people living together
chaiacteiistic
proposed, therefore, a long while ago to
is one of the and universal
call
question the science of civilization, or culturology
the
field in
(Kulturol-
ogie) (p. 167). It
is
culture,
not society, that
is
the distinctive feature of man.
Therefore, the scientific study of this feature should be called cuJtnroIogy rather than sociology.
Many
cultural anthropologists
take the position that an act
limited to a single individual cannot properly be called culture,
but when more than one person is involved it may be so called. Thus, the number of expressions or manifestations of an event is regarded as a distinctive feature of culture. Ostwald exposes this fallacy also. It
is
that determines
Ostwald
not the number of manifestations of an event
its
cultural character;
says that the event
distinction to
all
it is
the quality of the event.
must be peculiar
other animals." This quality
terminology, the symbol. Thus, an event
is
to is,
man
"in contra-
to use our
own
cultural because
it
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
117
upon symbolling, not upon how it. As Ostwald observes, "Certain performances have been, and can in the future be, accom-
occurs in a context dependent
many human cultural
organisms produce
plished by a single individual" single
atom
Likewise, still
be
of copper in the
(p.
167).
cosmos
it
If
there were only a
would
still
be copper.
there were only one expression of symbolling,
if
it
would
cultural.
It is a bit
discouraging to discover that a chemist has been able
to see certain things in the sciences of of a century ago than
today. But
it is
many
man more
sociologists
clearly a third
and anthropologists can
gratifying indeed to discover, outside the anthro-
Durkheim and champion of the
pological tradition of Tylor,
others, such a dis-
tinguished and substantial
science of culture,
and one who
calls it
by
its
proper name: culturology.
PART
II
MAN AND CULTURE
Introduction
K
uman
different
behavior
compound made up
a
is
elements:
two quite
of
biological— neuro-sensory-muscular-
a
and
glandular-etcetera— factor,
a
supra-biological,
human
somatic cultural factor. But, in interpretations of
extra-
behavior
these two factors have been fused and confused for decades or
even ages.
And
they
are. It
still
is still
as a simple and direct expression of it
in terms of psychological
common
"human
to regard culture
nature" or to explain
mechanisms such
as frustration, re-
jection of the father, or the traumatic experiences of bottle feed-
ing in infancy.
On
the other hand, there
a very general failure
is
to recognize the operation of cultural determinants of try to
make
culture,
clear the
We
mind.
fundamental distinction between mind and
between psychology and culturology.
In this connection
human
affairs
Causes
and
we examine
the role of the Great
Man
both generally and analytically in "Genius:
Incidence,"
and
and
specifically
illustratively
in Its
in
"Ikhnaton."
"The Locus
of Mathematical Reality"
and "The Definition
and Prohibition of Incest" provide demonstrations of the technique of culturological interpretation of two major sectors of
human
experience, the intellectual and the social.
Finally,
"Man's Control over Civilization"
critically
a conspicuous expression of the primitive, but respectable, philosophy of anthropocentrism.
Will and Omnipotence
still
hangs
The
it.
Man
examines
popular and
illusion of
like a pall over
attempt to define the relationship between Process and to evaluate his role in
still
much
Free
of our
and the Culture
CHAPTER
SIX
CULTUROLOGICAL
VS.
INTERPRETATIONS OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL
HUMAN
BEHAVIOR "Social facts are not simply the development of psychic facts; the latter are in large part merely the continuation of the former inside people's
minds. This proposition is extremely important, for the opposite point of view inclines the sociologist at every instant to take the cause for the effect and vice versa. For example, if, as often happens, one sees in the organization of the family the logically necessary expression of human sentiments inherent in every mind, the true order of facts is reversed. On the contrary, it is the social organization of the relationships of kinship which has determined the respective sentiments of Every time that a social phenomenon is parents and children directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is false." Emile Durkheim.i .
.
.
—
±1 uman single
behavior
compound up
of
is
not as simple as
homogeneous substance like
water or table
two separate and
the fact that water
composed
man
Human
behavior
one
we can
It is
is
not a
is
made
biological, the
of
two
distinct elements,
apparent to the observer.
On
oxygen
the contrary, hu-
behavior appears to be a simple, homogeneous
water does. that
is
It
not obvious, however, any more than
is
is
salt.
seems.
it
copper or gold, but a
distinct elements, the
other cultural. This
and hydrogen,
like
stuff, just as
only through analysis of one kind or another
discover the true structure and composition of
behavior or of chemical compounds.
knowledge that we can come
to
And
it is
an understanding of
121
human
only through such either.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
122
Human
behavior constitutes a class of events and as such
is
distinguished from other classes, or kinds, of behavior such as simian, reptilian, plant, cellular, atomic, molecular, stellar, galactic,
Human
etc.
behavior
is
Homo
confined to the genus
co-extensive with man's actions
and man-animal behavior are not
but
it is
not
human behavior synonymous. As we have already and
reactions:
which
seen, only that portion of man's behavior
consists of or
depends upon symbolling may properly be called human; the (^
rest
is
We
merely animal behavior.
have already seen also that the
exercise of the
symbol
into existence that
somatic. These ings,
works of
is,
faculty,
human
brought a
species has,
class
by the
phenomena
of
in a real sense, supra-biological
or extra-
are the languages, beliefs, customs, tools, dwell-
art, etc.,
that collectively
we
call culture.
They
are
supra-biological in the sense that they are transmitted by the
mechanisms of
social heredity; they are extra-somatic in the sense
that they have an existence independent of any individual organ-
ism and act upon
it
from the outside
do. Every individual of the
environment
he
is
human
as well as a natural one.
And
is
meteorologic forces
born into a cultural
the culture into which
born embraces him and conditions his behavior.
We
see then that any given specimen of
made up
of
two
distinct factors proceeding
independent sources.
On
the one hand
of bones, muscles, nerves, glands, is
just as
species
is
human
behavior
the organism, composed
and sense organs. This organism
a single coherent unit, a system, with definite properties of
own.
On
organism
the other hand is
born. There
is is,
is
from separate and
its
the cultural tradition into which the of course,
no necessary
relation be-
tween the infant organism and the particular type of culture into
which
it is
born. It could have been born into one cultural
dition as well as another, into Tibetan as well as
Eskimoan ior,
culture. But,
ever)'thing
baby
is
tra-
American or
from the standpoint of subsequent behav-
depends upon the type of culture into which the
introduced by birth.
If
he
is
born into one culture he will
CULTUROLOGICAL think, feel
and
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
VS.
one way;
act in
if
into another, his behavior will
be correspondingly different. Human behavior ways and everywhere, made up of these two dynamic organization of that
is
ture
is
Conversely,
if
him
man
adapted to
different.
profound
little
man and
consequently bears a
genus or species. As a system
cul-
rather than to apes, ants, or elephants. it
As Clarence Day has shown
his culture
is,
in his deceptively
book, This Simian World, a civilization built by
super-ants or super-cows
of super-simians. There
would be very is
different
from the culture
then a close relationship between
But the relationship
culture.
the
and sense organs
man's organism were not what
would be
and
as a
al-
ingredients:
cultural tradition.
Culture has been produced by close relationship to
therefore,
is,
nerves, glands, muscles
man, and the extra-somatic
123
is
man
general rather than specific.
This or that culture cannot be explained by appealing to man's structure or nature,
may be its own
however varied we may conceive
regarded as a thing sui generis, with a laws.
Given
But we
life
of
it.
its
Culture
own and
shall return to this later.
a certain type of organism, a certain type of behavior
will follow.
But
in the
human
species this type
is
very broad and
The relationship between man and culture seems close only when we contrast man with other animals. The picture is quite otherwise when we confine our observations to the human species. Within this category, what relationship can we discover between organism and type of culture? The answer is "None",— none, that is, of a functional contains infinite variation within
itself.
nature; there are only chance, historical associations.
example, no functional relationship between type and language or dialect. Negroes or Chinese.
The same
whether
be form of family,
it
The human tall
species
will
is
may
racial
There
is,
for
or physical
speak Bantu, French,
hold true of any other aspect of culture, ethics, music, or
economics.
of course varied, not uniform.
There are
peoples and short peoples; round heads and long heads; black,
yellow,
and white
skins; straight,
wavy, and kinky hair; thick
lips,
— THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
124
long noses, blue eyes, "slant" eyes, relatively large so on. It structural
are
mav be assumed that variation. Thus it is
some innate psychological
livers,
and
functional variation accompanies
reasonable to suppose that there
differences
among
the various races
mankind. But one must not be misled by appearances. The differences among races which are most easily observed are conof
fined to superficial physical features such as color of skin, color
and shape of
shape of nose, and so on. In basic
hair, size of lip,
features, such as the nervous, glandular,
and muscular systems,
blood, bones, and sense organs, they are impressively uniform.
From be
to
From
among men appear when compared with their similarities. human behavior, too, all evidence points
a biological standpoint, the differences insignificant indeed
the standpoint of
to an utter insignificance of biological factors as
compared with
culture in any consideration of behavior variations.* of fact, is
due
it
cannot be shown that any variation of
As
human
a
matter
behavior
to variation of a biological nature. In other words, in the
whole range and scope of human behavior, differences of custom or tradition can
nowhere be correlated
in a functional sense
with
differences of physical structure.
In
a
consideration
peoples, therefore, a variable. This
is
of
the
we may
differences
regard
man
of
behavior between
as a constant, culture as
to say that the differences in behavior that
we observe between Chinese and
Russians, between Eskimos
and
Hottentots, Mongoloid and Caucasoid, savage and civilized man, are
due to
their respective cultures
rather than to biological
anatomical, physiological, or psychological— differences between
them.
The whole
matter of interpretation of
human
behavior
thus put in quite a different light from the one in which
quently viewed. Instead of explaining cultural differences peoples by saying that one
We
among
energetic, vivacious, Dionysian,
and
are speaking here, as elsewhere in this chapter, of human behavior the mass, in terms of societies, tribes or nations, not of individual or-
*
in
is
is
it is fre-
ganisms.
CULTUROLOGICAL VS. PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS creative,
and
whereas another
prosaic,
we now
125
phlegmatic, taciturn, unimaginative
is
see that the differences of behavior of various
among the cultural traditions that stimulate them respectively. Thus we explain the behavior of peoples in terms of their cultures; but we do not and cannot ex-
peoples are due to the differences
plain their cultures in terms of the respective "psychologies" of
The
the peoples.
"psychologies" are psychosomatic ex-
specific
pressions of the cultures, not their causes.
The
must be
cultures
explained in terms of culture; culturologically rather than psychologically.
explanations
Psychological
among
popular,
says: "It
lying
all
obvious that
is
marriage prohibitions
emotions and
reactions."
there
if
and
prevalent
still
among laymen. Thus,
exogamy, the English anthropologist, B.
in a discussion of
man,
however
are
social scientists as well as
Selig-
any general law under-
is
must be founded on human
it
Hitler's "rapid rise to power, the spread
^
him
of his ideas to other countries, and the fanatical devotion to of thousands
upon thousands
one of the most progressive and —all
shows,"
this
Donovan
Professor
University,
"how deep
in all of us.
many and Japan ." own hearts ,
.
must David
Literature
And
security.
Caroline
Hopkins
Johns
not in Germany alone
when
that
be carried on
it
still
^
Lilienthal,
is
at
the craving for authority, for certitude,
Which means
Energy Commission,
"What
is
and moral
for intellectual
but
English
in
intelligent nations of the world
Raymond Dexter Havens,
says
of
men, women, and children
of
the war
is
minds— and
in their
in Ger-
and
chairman of the U.
quoted by Time Magazine
goes on in people's
won
in America,
S.
in
our
Atomic
as saying that
hearts— is more
important in determining the fateful future than what goes on
and production centers" (February
in laboratories
24),
And
"To me,
the English ethnologist, the late as to
most students of the
study of society psychology."
*
is
W.
16,
1948, p.
H. R. Rivers,
subject, the final
said:
aim of the
the explanation of social behavior in terms of
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
126 addition
In
nomena
to
interpretations
of
specific
of
cultural
we have numerous
socio-
institution of private property
"explained"— and justified— by arguing that
often
phe-
psychological
and of particular
institutions
phenomena. Thus, the
cultural
explanations
general
these
in psychological terms,
it
is
simply
is
human nature. There is a natural desire, it is said, to own your own home, your own fields and herds, and to possess the products of your own labor. If it were not for private property, the argument
would be no incentive
continues, there
and con-
to effort
sequently no progress. Plausible as this theory
ethnographic
fact.
There
may sound, it is not in accord with many societies in which there is no
are
private property in the resources of nature at
they are free and accessible to
members
all
all;
on the contrary,
make little
note
private property in food, clothing, tools,
more than
history so
far.
nature than
munal
a fiction.
man's economic
in
is
But
Communism by
life for
this, too, is
and so on,
and ornaments
has been the dominant
human
the greater part of
far
no more an expression of human
feudalism or capitalism. Peoples do not have com-
or private systems of property because they
human
want them or
nature to prefer one to the other. In a very
because
it is
realistic
sense they do not "have
tures
Customs
of the society.
of hospitality, exchange of gifts, ease of borrowing,
them"
at
all;
rather, it
the cul-
is
which possess the people who have been born into them.
and behavior toward property are
Attitudes, sentiments,
mined by the type Similar
of
economic system into which one
may be made
observations
is
deter-
born.
concerning competition,
rivalry,
and leadership. The basic principle of the socio-economic
life of
many
peoples
is
mutual
groups could have held their
crude
tools,
primitive
in difficult situations
and with
weapons, and techniques
been based upon
by custom
own
this principle.
to share his
kill
doubtful
if
aid.
The
It
if
is
their social life
had not
individual hunter was obliged
with others. Indeed, in some instances
he received the smallest portion
of
all.
Prestige, social approval.
CULTUROLOGICAL
VS.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
And he
moral codes provided the incentive. to a portion of the
must
or herds
The
leader
in turn
was entitled
of other hunters. Tlie produce of the field
likewise be shared. is
Among
always.
kill
127
often a necessary and an honored person, but not
our Pueblo Indians, a "leader"
likely
is
to
be
regarded as an obnoxious person, and may, in extreme cases, be done away with on a charge of sorcery. The ideal Pueblo Indian is
not the go-getter, the leader, but a quiet unobtrusive person does not provoke community discord. And psychologists who
who
have sought to subject Pueblo Indian children to competitive have found that their project failed when the children
tests
learned the purpose of the others so that they might
Far from trying to outdo the
come home triumphant
to admiring
the children carefully refrained from doing their best
parents, lest
tests.
they humiliate or embarrass their fellows, and in so doing
bring odium upon themselves.
The
institution
outcome
of
of slavery has often been interpreted as the
man's inherent tendencies to commit aggressions
upon others— of "man's inhumanity to man." An eminent psychologist, Wm. McDougall, once went so far as to postulate a high degree of an instinct of submission to account for the prevalence of
Negro
among
African peoples
chattel slavery.
We
know,
however, that the institution of slavery has not been universal by
any means. As a matter of until
relatively recent
lithic
at
least;
fact, it
did not
make
its
times— since the beginning
appearance
of the
the hundreds of thousands of years of
Neo-
human
went before had no slavery. And many peoples of modern the world have had no slaves. Are we to assume that the
history that
instinct
of
aggression— or
of
submission— was
developed during the early eras of
human
not
history, or
sufficiently
among some
of the peoples of recent times, to find overt expression in a in
human If
traffic
chattels?
the origin of the institution of slavery has been interpreted
psychologically, so has
its
extinction.
A
growing consciousness of
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
128
human
an appreciation of the essential dignity of
rights,
(whatever that
man
or the rising spirit of Christianity have
is),
all
been invoked to explain the decline of this institution. One scholar, writing in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, has
movement
asserted that "the
came
the institution spirit of slavery.
do not
tions
against slavery
democracy, etc."
result of the rising spirit of
.
^
.
was
,
largely the
By the same
token,
into being as a consequence of the rising
Obviously, psychological and spiritual interpreta-
tell
much
us very
Why
actually.
have aggressive—
or submissive— tendencies resulted in a certain type of social institution
the
among some
peoples but not
democracy asserted
spirit of
among
Why
others?
one time, the
itself at
has
spirit of
slavery at another?
A
culturological explanation of slavery
readily intelligible. Slavery as
only
when the master can
ing the slave. This
is
an institution
The
institution
and endure
will exist
derive profit and advantage
possible only
when
produce considerably more than existence.
makes the
it
efficiency of production
requires is
by
group
a family
for
its
is
exploit-
able to
continued
of course determined
by
the degree of technological development. Slavery did not exist
during the hundreds of thousands of years before Neolithic times
because culture had not developed sufficiently to for a producer to
make
would be no point— even savages enslaving another
if
if
it
slavery in early periods of
among
But when
human
possible
were possible— in one tribe of
the latter required
all
that they were
able to produce in order to subsist. Consequently,
world,
it
be more than self-supporting. There certainly
human
history, nor, in
we the
no modern find
peoples on low levels of technological development.
in the course of cultural evolution the productivity of
labor was sufficiently increased by technological progress
so as to
make
exploitation profitable
stitution of slavery
came
and advantageous, the
into being. Correspondingly,
when
in-
cul-
ture—particularly the technological culture— had reached a certain
point where
it
could no longer be operated efficiently by a
human
CULTUROLOGICAL
VS.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
129
then the institution of slavery became extinct. Slavery
chattel,
died out, not because someone discovered the essential dignity of man, or because of a rising spirit of Christianity or Democracy,
but because,
as
Lewis H. Morgan put
long ago, a freeman
it
better "property-making machine" than a slave.^ trial
Modern
is
a
indus-
technologies could not be operated by ignorant, illiterate
human
chattels. Also, the slave
owner
suffered a handicap
which
does not affect the employer of free labor: the slave owner had to
made money out of them or not; he had a substantial investment in them and he must safeguard this investment. The employer of free labor, however, feed and care for his slaves whether he
under no such obligation to
is
diminish he can lay
up
off
some
his establishment entirely
relief,
his
If
profits
they cease, he can close
if
without assuming responsibility
his employees; they can shift for
public
employees.
his
workers;
for
themselves— go hungry, go on
or resort to begging or to theft. Thus, at a certain
stage of cultural development, slavery
comes into being
as a con-
sequence of the resources and imperatives of the cultural system.
At
a
subsequent and higher stage of cultural development, the
institution
becomes extinct because
it
is
no longer compatible
with the resources and exigencies of the socio-cultural system.
War that
is
is
a
tremendously impressive expression of
human
behavior
often "explained" psychologically. In addition to the Great
Men who make
wars at their
own
sweet
will,
we find more Time Maga-
generalized psychological explanations. According to
zine (Aug. 23, 1948), a UN-sponsored International Congress on Mental Health, attended by "2,000 of the world's foremost psychiatrists
and psychologists," gave forth such interpretations of
the cause of war as the following: guilt
which causes you
creates a sense of guilt.
to
Wars
are caused
do something
Thus the
violent,
by
a sense of
which
repetition of wars
is
in turn
explained
Another psychologist attributed wars to upon sexual impulses which causes frustration which
as well as their origin.
restraint
causes people to
become
aggressive. Still another
thought that
'
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
130 people have been
made
and violent by corporeal
aggressive
punishment during childhood. Professor
Gordon
W.
Allport, a psychologist at Harvard, quotes
with approval a passage from the preamble of the charter of
UNESCO:
men
"Since wars begin in the minds of
it
is
in the
that the defences of peace must be constructed."
minds of men Monsignor Fulton slightly different
J.
waged
of the conflicts
Sheen expresses the same view inside our
in the world that does not
of military enthusiasm
assume
first
and
orientalist,
people were, however, sequently Egypt was
eminence.
War
own
souls, for
happen
nothing happens
inside a soul."
®
a line of able rulers enabled
for several centuries
an eminent
an imperial position,"
to
The common
people," and con-
naturally peaceful
"a.
burst
according to
^
the late James H. Breasted.
"A
Egypt
not able to retain her position of pre-
has no "rational cause," said Franz Boas;
it is
"mental attitude," the "emotional value of an idea."
to a
only
in
words: "World wars are nothing but projections
^°
due An-
other anthropologist, Ralph Linton, finds that the Plains Indians did not fight for hunting grounds or other tangible advantages,
but rather because they were "warlike." ".
.
men
.
it is
a
commonplace
that
men
like
*
war
have proved that they prefer war with
William James
"modern man
tells us, in
To Ruth .
.
all
of glory of his ancestors
.
its
"The Moral Equivalent
inherits all the innate pugnacity .
.
Our
Benedict
Over and over
.
suffering."
of
and
War," all
^^
that
the love
ancestors have bred pugnacity
* "Superficially it might appear that the roving life of a Plains Indian tribe and the frequent contacts with other groups which this entailed would be likely to focus interest on war, but it need not have done so if the Plains Indians in general had not been warlike. After all, there was enough food and other natural resources in the Plains to take care of a much larger population than the area supported, and these tribes were not driven into war by economic needs," The Study oi Man, p. 461.
Professor Lowie, too, thinks that the Plains Indians fought "just for fun": the "Plains Indians fought not for territorial aggrandizement nor for the victor's spoils, but above all because fighting was a game worth while because of the social recognition it brought when played according to the rules/'
Primitive Society, p. 3156.
CULTUROLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
VS.
into our
bone and marrow, and thousands
breed
out of us
it
"You
future:
But
can't
man by
is
.
The
.
.
And
strong as ever."
131
of years of peace won't
miUtary instincts and ideals are
as
the layman sums up his estimate of the
do away with war;
it's
human
just
nature."
nature so pugnacious and militant?
Compared
with other animal orders, the Carnivores for example, the
mates are a rather timid
The
lot.
Pri-
"innate pugnacity" of which
James speaks is often conspicuously lacking in the human species. Warfare is virtually non-existent among many primitive tribes.
And
in
testants
man
to
many
where fighting does take
instances
and
so that their "military instincts
cised to the full.
Instead, they resort to
victims before they have a chance to slaughter helpless sleeping victims
"love of glory" of most peoples.
among
does take place
more
is
it
out
man
be
exer-
ideals" can
ambush,
vocal than military— as
is
their
killing
defend themselves.
To
quite sufficient to feed the
And when
and open
free
primitive peoples, their pugnacity
primates. Often the fight ends
And
place, the con-
do not meet each other face to face and slug
among
usually the case
when
the
first
conflict is
often
the lower
blood
is
drawn.
modern nations pugnacity has been "bred so weakly in our bones and marrow" that every nation has to resort to conin
scription.
And
despite such stinging epithets as "draft dodger,"
the number of
men who
glory of war
considerable.
for fighting
or in
man it
is
and
killing
is
Thus
it
would appear that the
not over-riding in primates
lust
in general
in particular.
But even
why
is
prefer the degradation of prison to the
if
it
were,
it
would
tell
us very
whom
fought and when, with
little
about war,
and over what.
To
attempt to explain war by appeal to an innate pugnacity would
be
like explaining Egyptian, Gothic,
and Mayan architecture by
citing the physical properties of stone; or like explaining the industrial
revolution by invoking an inventive tendency in the
mind.
A
culturological interpretation of
us something of significance.
Wars
war
are fought
will,
human
however,
between
tell
societies.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
132
between sociocultural systems, between tribes and nations. It is the culture of any given situation that determines whether warfare shall be engaged in or not, and if so how, with whom and cultural settings, warfare
non-existent; the
for what. In
some
mode
as culturally defined has no place for
of life
there
situations
is
it.
In other
only occasional skirmishing between tribes.
is
at stake, we can expect The same holds true for grazing lands and for fertile valleys when culture has reached the level of animal husbandr\^ and agriculture. It may sound absurd and superfluous to
Where
hunting or fishing grounds are
rich
militar}^ contests.
say that peoples will not fight over grazing lands, fertile valleys,
and iron deposits, foreign markets, oil reserves and uranium mines until culture has advanced to such levels of development as coal
domestication of animals, cultivation of plants, steam and internal
combustion engines, world listens to those easily get
who
talk
trade,
and uranium
piles.
But
if
one
about man's "innate pugnacity" he might
the impression that this was sufficient to account for
ever\'thing.
Warfare Its
is
a struggle
explanation
is
between
social organisms,
therefore social or cultural, not psychological.
We could never understand why the United War II— or motives of tasteful
not individuals.
States entered
war— by an inquiry into the men and women. One man wanted to any other
World
psychological quit his dis-
job as bank clerk, another wanted adventure, a third
sought release from an unbearable domestic situation, another
wanted like,
to see
of France,
Samoa, or China are
another wanted to wear a uniform, another fought for God,
for Country,
went
what the women
to
and the
New
Deal, and so on.
Of
course,
most men
war because they were obliged to— or accept the degra-
dation of imprisonment or worse. docile serfs
To
picture the multitudes of
and peasants of ancient Egypt, pre-Columbian Peru,
China, or Czarist Russia going to war because of an ''innate pugnacity and a love of glory" (James), or as Benedict says be-
CULTUROLOGICAL cause
"men
war"
like
innermost
it
grotesque.
is
hke sheep. And
to the slaughter
love of glory"
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
VS.
came
to
They were if
them from
133
forced to go, driven
any were animated by "the propagandists, not from their
selves.
we
Again, supposing innate pugnacity to
been taken
grant merely for the sake of argument an
men:
Whom
will they fight? If a poll
had
among Americans
in 1939 to discover the objects of
likely that
England would have received more
their hostility,
it is
votes than any other nation with the possible exception of Russia.
Yet we entered the war on the Russia was fighting "gallant
side of these
little
When
two nations.
Finland" in 1939-40 our pug-
nacious instincts were leveled squarely at the Kremlin.
The
non-
Germany in 1939 aroused our the Germans invaded Russia in
aggression pact between Russia and
indignation and anger. But after
1941, the orientation of our instincts changed. Soviet Russia a stout
champion
We
then found in
of democracy.
Psychological explanations are not only irrelevant here, they are pathetic.
The
psychological orientations were the result of the
intercourse of nations, not the cause. at low ebb November, 1941. An
was
in the military
formed
blood and glory
United States
spirit
Harbor
mass of conscripts into a
would make more sense
breeds the martial
lust for
in the
international event at Pearl
a listless, disgruntled
fighting force. It
The
camps
to say that
it is
in
trans-
spirited
war that
than to argue that pugnacious instincts
cause wars.
To be sure, there would be no wars if human organisms with their hungers and —to
fight
War
illusion.
plain
it
them. But to explain warfare is
a cultural
in cultural terms,
in
peoplehopes and inertia
there were no fears,
terms of psychology
phenomenon, and we can not only but
we
is
ex-
can account for the presence or
absence of the pugnacious "instinct," the love of glory, or the loathing of slaughter, in cultural terms also.
come,
if
it
ever does, not because
we
shall
World peace
will
have bred out the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
134
pugnacious instinct, or sublimated it in mass athletic contests,* but because cultural development, social evolution, will have reached the ultimate conclusion of the age-old process of merging smaller social groups into larger ones, eventually forming a single political organization that will
whole human
phenomenon
I'he
embrace the entire planet and the
race.
of race prejudice
and
inter-racial
antagonisms
is frequently regarded and explained as primarily a psychological phenomenon. Since the phenomenon is manifested in acts and
attitudes of individual
human
organisms
frequently taken for
it is
granted that the problem of race prejudice and inter-racial antag-
onisms
is
and
tion,
psychological from the standpoint of scientific explanapsychiatric
these:
come
has
Psychoanalysis
The Jew
from
point
the
with
for\\'ard
view
of
therapy.
interpretations
such as
of
identified with the law-giving, super-ego form-
is
ing father, and also wdth the unrepentant parricide.
Jew
is
not really a person but
a
myth: he
is
The hated
"castrated" and
feminine and yet exceedingly dangerous and over-sexed, a symbol at
once of the
id
and of the super-ego. The Negro, according to
one psychoanalytic father,
whom
interpretation, represents the nocturnal, sexual
the son wishes to castrate— hence the castrative
aspects of lynching. Anti-Negro man-hunts resemble the hunting
of animals in groups, both
phenomena being
banding together of the sons against the primal
derived from the father.
These observations may or may not adequately characterize the experience of an individual psyche
who
is
sociocultural process of racial antagonisms. realistically describe
participating in the
But even
if
they do
the individual experience, they do not ex-
phenomenon at all. sociocultural phenomenon
too frequently assumed
plain the social
It
that a
has been explained
is ail
when one
* Even as recently as the summer of 1948, more than one psychologist solemnly suggested that international athletic contests, such as the Olympic games then in progress, might serve to prevent wars by working off aggressive tendencies in a peaceful manner.
CULTUROLOGICAL VS. PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
135
has isolated and defined the psychological experiences of an individual within that sociocultural context. Thus, it is said, men may identify the
Negro with the
father, their rival,
and then proceed and attitudes
to give these inner feelings overt expression in acts
of hostility toward the Negro.
What
these attempts at psychological interpretations
do, of course,
is
to explain
why
it
fail
to
Negro represents
that the
is
the nocturnal father in some societies but not in others;
why
antagonisms are directed primarily toward one minority group
why racial The fallacy
rather than another; in
some
situations.
sociocultural
phenomena
antagonisms are lacking altogether of psychological interpretations of
consists in the assumption that the sub-
psychological experience correlated with the institution
jective
has brought the institution into existence.
—or came
It
is
as
if
one discovered
to believe— that riding in an airplane was the realiza-
tion of sexually motivated dreams of flying; or that flying in
air-
planes gave one a sense of power and mastery, and concluded therefore that the airplane, as an element of culture, had been
explained by citing sexual dreams and a will to power.
We do not
deny or minimize the subjective psychological experiences of the individual at all— although
we would
like
psychoanalytic interpretations supported with a fication.
These experiences are
some of the little more veriBut, we would
to see
of course real.
argue, they are functions of sociocultural situations; not the causes
of them. Individual psychological experience has been evoked by
the social
phenomenon
power and mastery
is
of race antagonism just as the thrill of
evoked by the airplane;
it
is
not the sub-
jective experience that produces the antagonism or the airplane.
There are non-psychoanalytic psychological interpretations of racial
antagonisms,
also.
The
"frustration-aggression" hypothesis
has been called upon to explain inter-racial conflicts. is
frustrated
and becomes aggressive
as a
A
people
consequence, choosing
perhaps a minority group upon which to vent the aggressive impulse.
But here
again, the great variety
and range of
inter-racial
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
136
conflicts and antagonisms is not illuminated very much by merely pronouncing the magic couplet "frustration and aggression."
One
of the weakest of psychological explanations of race preju-
we
dice with which late
are acquainted
Franz Boas. The prejudice, he
tially
human mind
to identify
^^
founded essento
it
"is
not
him
the tendency of
which
class to
and antagonism
clear although Boas assures us that
merge the
to ascribe to
how
Just
an individual with "the
racial prejudice
he belongs" produces
is
.
he belongs, and
the characteristics of his class."
the
.
human mind
... on the tendency of the
individual in the class to which all
that given once by the
is
said, ".
is
not quite
difficult to
under-
human mind.
stand" in the light of this tendency of the
Psychological interpretations of race prejudice and inter-racial
antagonisms are misleading and unsound because these problems are sociological
and
rather than
cultural
psychological.
As we
have pointed out, a description of subjective psychological experience correlated with an institution does not constitute an ex-
The
planation of the institution.
function of the institution, not
must be explained
We do
experience of the ego
institution
not wish to undertake an exhaustive culturological
if
a
culturologically.
pretation of race prejudice at this point. ever, that
And, the
cause.
its
is
investigation
and
analysis
We
would
inter-
suggest,
how-
were carried out along the
come to a much deeper and more this phenomenon than any amount of
following lines one would realistic
explanation of
psychological or psychoanalytic inquiry can produce: Race prejudice and racial antagonisms are likely to appear in sociocultural situations in
which
the possession frontier),
of
(
i
)
one group
desirable
for jobs or other
lands
competing with another
is
(e.g.,
the American
for
Indian
economic advantages; (2) where a
minority group endeavors to preserve
its
own
cultural group within a larger population; effort of the larger society to assimilate it in
integrity as a socio-
where
it
resists
the
an attempt to achieve
CULTUROLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
VS.
Minority groups which attempt thus
a high degree of integration.
own
to maintain their
137
integrity,
not only on the cultural plane
larger
by means of endogamy, are opposing the attempts of the society to achieve integration through assimilation, and are
likely
consequently to become the object of hostility and ag-
but
also
from the
gression
larger
society— which
incidentally
reinforce the efforts of the minority group to maintain
and so on
in a vicious circle. (3) Hostility
crisis,
often an effective
is
emergency or
of unifying a nation. In times of national therefore, a nation
solidarity
by fomenting
trick— or
against
a
may attempt hostility
to achieve inner unity
and
toward a foreign power— an old
group
minority
to
toward a foreign power
or toward a minority group within a society
means
tends
its integrity,
within
gates— also
its
an
old trick.
We
turn
commonly
now from
culturological problems
that have been
attacked with psychological techniques to one that has
seldom been so approached, namely, the question of matrilineal
and
patrilineal lineages
or clans. Offhand,
we cannot
cite
any
attempts to explain these sociocultural phenomena in psychological terms, to say, for
example, that one people had matrilineal
clans because of identification with the
mother imago, whereas
another people were organized into exogamous patrilineal lineages
because of narcissistic impulses or what not. Such psychological interpretations
we have
would however be no more misplaced than those
just cited.
Why would
one people identify
mother, another with the father? This issue; it
is
the psychological interpretation merely
does not answer
it.
The
itself
with the
precisely the question at raises
the question,
paucity or absence of psychological in-
terpretations of unilateral organization
is
probably due however to
lack of interest in clans rather than a realization of the irrelevance of psychological interpretation.
Our argument concerning to his
the relationship of
extra-somatic cultural
somewhat
as
follows:
The
man
the organism
environment may be summarized musical
behavior
of
peoples— the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
138
Viennese of 1798, the black folk of Harlem, 1940, the English before 1066, the Italians at the time of Palestrina, the Nigerians, ,
'
Bantus, Chinese, Pueblo Indians, and Yakuts— varies.
How
are
these variations to be explained? Certainly not in terms of biological differences.
anatomy and
Everything that
physiolog}^ will lend
we know about comparative
no support whatever
to a belief
that Chinese music has one form and style because of certain characters
biological
Chinese whereas the peculiar
of the
logical traits of the Bantus,
respective musical types.
On
the contrary, our knowledge of neuro-
sensorj^-muscular systems supports the proposition that
be considered behavior
is
a biological constant so far as his
concerned.
bio-
Indians, or Negroes produce their
We observe
human
man may
(symbolic)
that musical styles vary within
a society during the course of time without discovering any cor-
And
relative biological variation whatever. style of
of course the musical
one people may be adopted by another: Swing Low, Sweet
Dahomey
or
Cameroon. Thus we see
that we cannot explain these variations of we may represent by Mi, Mo, M3, M4 human organism, O. Variables cannot be
musical behavior, which
Chniiot did not originate in
.
.
.
Mn,
in
terms of the
explained in terms of a
constant.
How counted
then can these differences in musical behavior be acfor?
They
are to be explained in terms of different musical
traditions or cultures, Ci, C2, C3,
argument
in a series of formulas.
OxC^Hv
C4
.
.
.
On. Let us set forth our
CULTUROLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
VS.
139
human organism; and Ci, C2, C3, C4, for types of musical culture. The musical behavior in any particular instance is, of course, a compound made up of two distinct elements, the actions of nerves, glands, muscles, sense organs, etc., of man on actions of the
the one hand (O), and the external, extra-somatic cultural tradition
(C) on the other. Since, however, the human organism
appears as a constant factor in eliminate
Thus we
entirely
it
strike
from
out the
O
>Mi > M3 >M, > M4
Cs C, As the musical
The
cultural
tradition
behavior
is
true of musical
is
varies,
so will
the musical
simply the response of the organism
to a particular set of cultural stimuli.
What
we may
and rewrite our equations thus: Ci C,
behavior vary.
of our equations
all
a consideration of variations of behavior.
M
behavior
is
is
a function of
true also
C.
of linguistic
behavior, or monetary, mathematical, architectural, philosophic,
religious— in short, of any kind of
human
to the following formula:
organism
man
which we
human
behavior.
behavior
is
We come then
the response of the
to a class of external, extra-somatic, symbolic stimuli culture. Variations of
call
human
behavior are func-
tions of a cultural variable, not of a biological constant.
behavior as
we
find
it
Human
amongst the various peoples of the world
is
to be explained therefore in terms of their respective cultures
rather
than
by
appeal
to
"human
nature"
or
psychological
tendencies.
human behavior we to account for
If
are
Culture
is
is
to
be explained
in terms of culture,
how
culture?
an organization of
behavior), objects (tools; things
phenomena— acts made with tools),
(patterns of ideas (belief.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
140
knowledge), and sentiments (attitudes, "values" ) —that is dependent upon the use of symbols. Culture began when man as an articulate,
symbol-using primate, began. Because of
character,
which has
speech, culture
is
its
easily
most important expression in articulate readily transmitted from one human elements are readily transmitted
its
becomes a continuum;
flows
it
from one generation to another and
The
another.
culture process
enter the stream from time ture process
is
symbolic
and
organism to another. Since culture
its
laterally
also
is
to time
down through
from one people to
swell the total.
the sense that
progressive in
new elements The cul-
cumulative;
and
the ages
it
moves toward
greater control over the forces of nature, toward greater security
of life for man. Culture
is,
therefore, a symbolic, continuous,
cumulative, and progressive process.
means
All of this
that culture has, in a very real sense, an
made
extra-somatic character. Although
human
ganisms of a life of
own.
its
by the laws
of
possible only by the or-
beings, once in existence
Its
behavior
human
and under way
determined by
is
organisms.
The
own
its
has
it
laws, not
culture process
to
is
be
explained in terms of the science of culture, of culturology, not in terms of psychology. a
A it
Let us
illustrate these propositions
with
simple example.
symbolic language would, of course, have no existence were
human
not for
under way
organisms. But once the linguistic process gets
proceeds along
it
its
own
lines, in
own
terms of
The
principles
and
process
composed of phonetic elements. These
is
in accordance with
its
laws.
its
own
linguistic
interact with
one another forming various kinds of combinations and patterns
— phonetic, quires
syntactic, grammatical, lexical, etc.
The language
ac-
form and structure and uniformities of behavior. In other
words,
it
develops certain principles upon which
terms of which
Now
this
it
it
rests
and
in
functions.
language has an extra-somatic, non-biological, non-
psychological character. It had an existence prior to the birth of
CULTUROLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
VS.
any individual speaking
comes
it
it;
to each person
upon the human organism
141
from the out-
and equips it with specific hnguistic patterns of behavior. Languages are transmitted from one generation or one people to another just as tools side. It seizes
or ornaments are.
The
study of language
not biology or psychology. Although
and are therefore
tion of
it.
We
find
therefore, philology,
is,
human
requisite to the linguistic process they as such,
at birth
organisms are pre-
do not form a part of
no reference
to nerves,
interpreta-
glands,
and sense
organs in a manual on English grammar; no hopes, instincts or reflexes in a treatise
Language may be treated generis. Philology
is
as
it
and
irrelevant to the study
fears, desires,
on the Indo-European languages.
a closed
system, as a process sui
a subdivision of culturology, not of biology
or psychology.
What
is
true of language will hold for every other logically
distinguishable
is
a
portion
of
ideological— and for
social,
the
its
own
principles
duce the human organism into tions
is
process— technological,
culture as a whole. Culture
continuum of interacting elements
of interaction has
(traits),
and
its
and
own
is
false.
this process
laws.
To
intro-
a consideration of cultural varia-
therefore not only irrelevant but wrong;
premise that ture.
culture
human
it
involves a
Culture must be explained in terms of
cul-
may seem, "the proper study be not Man, after all, but Culture.
Thus, paradoxical though
it
mankind" turns out to The most realistic and scientifically adequate interpretation of culture is one that proceeds as if human beings did not exist.* This is really not as radical or as novel as it may seem at first of
glance.
As we have noted
in a preceding chapter, scholars
been making culturological studies
for decades, studies in
institutions, philosophies, or technologies are
have
which
treated as classes
* "Hence it is both possible and permissible to study the history of a folkway, or the evolution of culture in general, without reference to individuals or their organic and ni-ntal characteristics," (Geo. P. Murdock, "The
Science of Culture," p. 206).
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
142
to philological investigations
geometry,
currency,
phenomena. Thus,
non-biological
of extra-somatic,
we have
mentary government, the
the
clan, jurisprudence, etc.
studies as the effect of the automobile
addition
studies of the evolution of
astronomy,
architecture,
in
upon the
plow,
We
parlia-
have such
family, the divorce
mating customs, the small town country schools, the rubber industry, the blacksmith's trade, street-sweeping, tourist camps, rate,
etc.;
upon
and medical
religious
and microscopes
or the influence of telescopes
national parks,
art of interpretation
is
beliefs, etc.
therefore not
Culturology as a practical
new
or revolutionary by any
means.
Nor
is
a formulation of the philosophy of the science of culture
a recent achievement. As
pressed as early as
we have
1871 in the
already seen,
first
it
was well
ex-
chapter of E. B. Tylor's
'The Science made explicit in much of Durkheim's writings, Les Rdghs de la Methode Sociologique (1895). And
Primitive Culture, significantly entitled, by the way, of Culture." It was particularly it
has been developed in American anthropology by A. L. Kroeber,
R. H. Lowie, Clark Wissler, George P. Murdock, and others. Despite the respectable age of this point of view and notwithstanding the fact that logical studies
many
quarters.
chologists
the basis upon which countless culturo-
have already been made in philology, economics,
sociology, history, in
it is
and
and anthropology,
As we noted
sociologists hold
it is still
ignored or opposed
in a previous chapter, to a point of
many
psy-
view that either
obscures the science of culture or actually and specifically opposes it.
And, despite the
the anthropologists
fact that
who
as a distinct class of
there are
many
it
was, as Kroeber has remarked,^^
"discovered culture" and recognized
phenomena,
anthropologists
it
as a separate order of reality,
who have been
quite unable to
grasp clearly the conception of a supra-psychological, supra-sociological science of culture
and so have opposed
it
with more or
less
vigor.
Opposition to the science of culture expresses
itself variously,
iCULTUROLOGICAL
VS.
but one theme runs This
it.
is
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
the objection that
it is
does not enamel
its
not
all
of
who do
fingernails, vote, or believe in capitalism
people do." This observation realism as well as
that
if
not culture but people
Again to quote Lynd's pointed and apt phrase, "Culture
things.
tific
through most
fairly consistently
143
it
is
human
is
common
beings that
no doubt meant sense.
mark
but
to express scien-
Anyone can
see for himself
and drop them into
ballots
a box.
"Realism" of is
this sort
not realism at
all
is
simply pathetic. As a matter of
man
a chain of events except in terms of
Oi
course
culture
is
it
it is
people
as
the prime mover.
their fingernails; of course
not a disembodied soul going
he sure,
will; to
who enamel
people
is
fact, it
but anthropocentrism, an inability to interpret
who wind
way
its
clocks,
mobiles, build skyscrapers. But the question
of
its
own
sweet
manufacture autois
not the simple
one of who does what from the layman's point of view. The question is. How are the events that the layman observes to he
The layman
explained from the scientist's point oi view?
one people drinking cow's milk, avoiding mothers-in-law,
sees
practic-
ing polygyny and inhumation, and forming plurals by affixation.
He
notes that another group loathes milk, associates freely with
mothers-in-law, practices
by reduplication.
plurals
monogamy and
Now
the question
the milk— the people or the culture?"
who The
question
and
tasty beverage while
cremation, and forms
"Who
drinks
culturologist
knows
is
The
not
does the drinking quite as well as his "realistic" opponents.
To
"Why
is,
does one people prize milk as a nutritious
another regards
it
with loathing?"
the culturologist the reasoning that says that one people
drinks milk because "they like
"they loathe
one people
it," is senseless; it
like,
it,"
another does not because
explains nothing at
another loathe, milk? This
is
all.
Why
does
what we want
to
know. And the psychologist cannot give us the answer. Nor can
he
tell
practice
us
why
a people does or does not avoid mothers-in-law,
monogamy, inhumation, the couvade,
or circumcision;
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
144
use chopsticks, forks, the pentatonic scale, hats, or microscopes; form plurals by affixation— or any of the other thousands of cus-
toms known to ethnography. culturologist explains the behavior of a people
The
ing out that
it
by point-
merely the response of a particular type of
is
primate organism to a particular set of stimuli.
And he
explains
culture along the lines indicated earlier in this chapter. Thus,
while the culturologist
who "enamel
is
quite willing to admit that
their fingernails" or drink milk,
out that whether they do or not selves
is
he
determinants, for
between constants and
and independent
desires to point
is
a quest for
effect relationships, for distinctions
variables, distinctions
variables.
people
determined not by them-
but by their culture. Scientific explanation cause and
it is
The
culturologist
culture does not and cannot exist without
between dependent is
well aware that
human
beings.
Need
said that there could be no plural forms of nouns, no geomeno dynamos, no pinochle, if there were no human beings? And certainly there could be no mother-in-law taboos if there it
be
try,
were no women! But,
as
the culturologist demonstrates, culture
may be treated as if it had a life of its own, quite apart from human organisms, just as the physicist may treat a falling body as a there were no atmospheric friction. The behavior of peoples is
explained as their response to their respective cultures.
not mystical at
human
to treat culture as
beings, as Boas, Benedict
more than if
all
it is
if
it
It is
were independent of
and others have claimed, any
mystical for the physicist to treat falling bodies as
there were no friction. It
is
simply the application of the point
of view and the techniques of science, long familiar in physics, to
the realm of culture.
should not be necessary to point out that the thesis here
It
much less a belittling, of The position of this science is as honorable as it is seWhat we have done is to distinguish between psychological
set forth
is
not in any sense a criticism,
psychology. cure.
and
culturological interpretations of behavior and^ further, to
dem-
CULTUROLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
VS.
onstrate that certain problems are to be solved with logical rather
behavior
is
culturo-
than with psychological techniques. Since
composed
psychological,
ponding
145
two kinds
of
and the extra-somatic
classes of
cultural, there are
problems. In the one,
factor constant while
we
human
of ingredients, the biological, or
we hold
two
corres-
the biological
study the cultural variable; in the other
we hold the cultural factor constant and study the reactions human organisms to it. The existence of the institution of trial
class
of
by
jury,
for example,
cannot be accounted for psychologically;
the explanation must be culturological. But to understand the
function of this institution in the lives of their psychological reactions to
may
it.
One and
men we must
study
the same set of events
therefore be referred to either context, the psychological or
the culturological. Psychology and culturology deal therefore with biological
same
and extra-somatic aspects
set of events.
interpretation of
Both
human
to avoid confusion, to of each.
respectively of
one and the
sciences are essential to a comprehensive
behavior. It
know and
is
necessary, however, in order
respect the proper boundaries
CHAPTER SEVEN
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND "When I fulfil my obligations as brother, husband, or citizen, when I execute my contracts, I perform duties which are defined, externally to myself and my acts, in law and in custom. Even if they conform to my own sentiments and I feel their reality subjectively, such reality is still objective, for I did not create them; I merely inherited them through my Similarly, the church-member finds the beliefs and education. practices of his religious life ready-made at birth; their existence prior to Here, then, are his own implies their existence outside of himself. ways of acting, thinking, and feeling that present the noteworthy property of existing outside the individual consciousness. "These types of conduct or thought are not only external to the individual but are, moreover, endowed with coercive power, by virtue of .
,
.
.
.
.
which they impose themselves upon him, independent of his individual ." Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method.
will
.
.
—
K
uman
behavior
two separate and and
On
cultural.
as
is,
we have
just seen, a
distinct kind of elements:
the one hand
we have
compound
of
psychosomatic
a certain type of
primate organism, man; on the other, a traditional organization of tools, ideas, beliefs,
The
behavior of
his non-symbolic,
action
of
tradition.
the
customs, attitudes,
man
as a
that
we
call culture.
distinguished from
primate behavior— is an expression of the inter-
human organism and
Human
etc.,
human being— as
behavior
is,
the extra-somatic cultural
therefore, a function of culture as
well as of a biological organism. In the preceding chapter
examined the relationship between length.
We endeavored
to
show
man and
culture at
we
some
that psychological interpretations
of cultures— of institutions, customs, attitudes, etc.— which have 146
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND been, and
147
unsound; that cultures cannot be explained psychologically but only culturologically. In the present chapter we shall continue our inquiry into the relationship still
are, so popular, are
between man and
culture,
but
this
time our focus
will
be upon the
human organism rather than upon the external cultural tradition. If we cannot explain cultures psychologically, and, if human behavior
a
is
product of culture as well
sense organs,
as of nerves, glands, muscles,
perhaps some of the phenomena
etc.,
commonly
regarded as psychological are actually culturally determined.
on the one hand, there has been
If,
tendency to regard
a widespread
cultures as psychologically determined, perhaps there has
been a
corresponding failure to recognize cultural determinants of mind.
The
point of view and habit of thought that sees in a custom or
institution merely the expression ability,
is
of an
likely also to think of the
innate desire, need or
"mind"
man
of
as
something
innate in his organism, biologically determined. Just as culture naively thought to
nature," so
is
the
be a simple and
direct expression of
"human mind" thought
to
is
"human
be a simple and
direct expression of the neuro-sensory-glandular-etcetera organiza-
man.
tion of
This view
is,
however, an
illusion.
Just as scientific analysis
discovers a non-anthropomorphic, culturological determination of culture,
and demonstrates the
tions of cultures, so does attributes of "the
it
irrelevance of psychological explanafind that
human mind"
many
are not to
of the elements or
be explained
of the action of nerves, brains, glands, sense organs,
terms of culture. This does not
human organism
mean
but in
that the reactions of the
to cultural elements in the external world are
not "psychological" or "mental"; they in the
in terms
etc.,
minding of man
as a
human
are. It
simply means that
being there are non-psycho-
i.e., extra-somatic cultural, determinants. The "human mind" is the reacting of the human organism to external stimuli; mind is minding here as elsewhere. But this reacting, this minding, varies. The Hottentot mind, or minding, is not the same
somatic,
— THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
148 as
The "human mind"-hun?an And its variations are functions
Eskimo, or English, minding.
minding— is
obviously a variable.
the psychoof variations of the cultural factor rather than of constant, l^he whole a as regarded be somatic factor, which may
concept of "the
human mind"
is
thus thrown into a
new
light
and perspective.
"mind"
In other animal species, the
a function of the bodily
is
of
structure, of a particular organization
nerves,
glands,
sense
from that
Thus the mind of the gorilla differs mind of a bear differs from that of a case, the minds are functions of their each In cat or a squirrel. respective bodily structures, differences of mind are correlated organs, muscles, etc.
of the chimpanzee; the
with differences of bodily structure. In the case of the human species, however, this is not the case. The mind (minding) of the
Chinese
not like the mind of the Sicilians or the Hopi Indians.
is
But here the
mind
differences of
bodily structure
may be
of races or other groups, this
Differences of
are not
due to
differences of
from the standpoint of the human behavior
for,
mind among
considered as a constant.
different ethnic
human Thus we have
groups of
beings are due to differences of cultural tradition.
and fundamental difference between the determination of mental variation among sub-human species and mental variation within the human species. For the sub-human species the
a radical
formula
is:
Vm
=
f
(Vb)— variations
variations of bodily structure. is:
Vn,
=
f
(Vc)— variations
of
mind
are
of
functions
For the human species the formula
of
human minding
are functions of
the extra-somatic tradition called culture.
human
In the realm of
behavior
we
are concerned of course
with organisms: organizations of bones, muscles, glands, nerves, sense organs, and so on.
And
these organisms react to external
stimuli, cultural as well as otherwise.
human organism. the human mind in any
the reacting of the specific
content of
The human mind is But we now see that
still
the
particular expression
speaking here of peoples rather than of individuals— is determined
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
149
by the extra-somatic factor of culture rather than by the neurologic, sensory, glandular,
muscular,
etc.,
constitution of the
human
organism. In other words, the Chinese mind, the French, Zulu, 'or
Comanche mind,
havior,
as a particular organization
human
we
beings,
psychosomatic
factors.
human mind,"
is
significant,
among it
types of the is
human mind due
to
in
human mind,
an
such
the cultural determinant that
not the psychosomatic.
attributes are not
minding
And, furthermore, we learn that
Eskimo, Zulu, or English,
survey of the
therefore, in the
discover cultural determinants as well as
explanation of differences as
bej
In the category "the of
human
of
explainable in cultural terms, not biological.
is
A
comparative, ethnographic
leads to a realization that
many
an inborn "human nature" at
of
its
all,
as
was formerly supposed, but to differences of external cultural stimulation.
One
most popular formulas of interpretation of human that of "human nature." People behave as they do,
of the
behavior
is
have the
institutions, beliefs, attitudes,
games,
etc.,
that surround
human nature." And, incidentally, most people— however much they may be willing to admit their ignorance in other respects— usually feel that they "understand human nature." The human mind and organism are so constituted, according to this view, as to make certain kinds of response simply and directly forthcoming. One has only to know human nature them, because
"it
is
to understand society
development.
one takes
The
for
and culture and to predict
The fallacy or illusion here is, "human nature" is not natural
their course of
of course, that at all
but
what
cultural.
tendencies, emphases, and content that one sees in the overt
behavior of
human
beings are often not due to innate biological
determination— though such determinations do of course existbut to the stimulation of external cultural elements. Much of what is commonly called "human nature" is merely culture
thrown against a screen of nerves, glands, sense organs, muscles, have a particularly fine example of this illusion, this mis-
etc.
We
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
150
taking of culture for nature, in a passage from
Thomas Wolfe's
You Can't Go Home Again:* For what
is
man?
unable to support itself on its rubbery legs, befouled with its excrement, that howls and laughs by turns, cries for the moon but hushes when it gets its mother's teat; First, a
child,
a sleeper, cater, guzzler, howler, laugher, idiot, a little tender thing all
its toe;
into
fires, a
blubbered with
and a chewer of its spit,
a reacher
beloved fool.
After that, a boy, hoarse and loud before his companions, but afraid of the dark; will beat the weaker and avoid the stronger; worships strength and savagery, loves tales of wai and murder, and violence done to others; joins gangs and hates to be alone; makes heroes out of soldiers, sailors, prize fighters, football players, cowboys, gunmen, and detectives; would rather die than not out-try and out-dare his companions, wants to beat them and always to win, shows his muscle and demands that it be felt, boasts of his victories and will never own defeat Then the youth: goes after girls, is foul behind their backs among the drugstore boys, hints at a hundred seductions, but gets pimples on his face; begins to think about his clothes, becomes a fop, greases his hair, smokes cigarettes with a dissipated air, reads novels, and writes poetry on the sly. He sees the world now as a pair of legs and breasts; he knows hate, love, and jealousy; he is cowardly and foolish, he cannot endure to be alone; he lives in a crowd, thinks with the crowd, is afraid to be marked off from his fellows by an eccentricity. He joins clubs and is afraid of ridicule; he is bored and unhappy and wretched most of the time. Tliere is a great cavity in him, he is dull. Then the man: he is busy, he is full of plans and reasons, he has work. He gets children, buys and sells small packets of everlasting earth, intrigues against his rivals, is exultant when he cheats them. He wastes his little three score years and ten in
*
New
York.
Harper and
The Sun
Brother*;.
Dial Press, pp. 432-37.
Quoted by permission of
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
151
spendthrift and inglorious living; from his cradle to his grave he scarcely sees the sun or moon or stars; he is unconscious of
the immortal sea and earth; he talks of the future and he wastes comes. If he is lucky, he saves money. At the end his
it as it
him
purse buys
fat
him where
flunkeys to carry
shanks no
his
longer can; he consumes rich food and golden wine that his
wretched stomach has no hunger
upon the scenery
weary and
his
for;
lifeless
which in youth his heart was panting. Then the slow death, prolonged by costly doctors, and finally the graduate undertakers, the perfumed carrion, the suave ushers with palms outspread to leftwards, the fast motor hearses, and the earth again. eyes look out
To true
many, no doubt, Wolfe's characterization of man
and
This
apt.
is
would disagree and he
of strange lands for
what man say,
this sort of being."
is
really
"No, man
they
is,
both
is
Others, perhaps,
feel.
not as Wolfe depicts him;
is
Each view may seem
plausible; each can
be supported with evidence. And, however much Wolfe's characterization of man may differ from that of another, both may
method
agree that the
man
oi interpretation
is
You
sound.
place
before you; you study him, analyze him, and then report
your findings. Plausible and reasonable
but an
illusion.
The Wolfes
as
may seem,
this
are not describing
Man
at
all,
it
is
but
Culture.
This
is
not quibbling in any way.
found, and important. the way the
The
What Wolfe
human organism
distinction
describes as
is
Man
real, prois
merely
responds to a certain set of cultural
stimuli. In another kind of culture the
organism would respond
quite differently. His characterization of
man would
be applicable
to the
certainly not
Zuni Pueblo Indians nor to the Pygmies of
the Congo, the aborigines of Australia, or the peasant folk of
Mexico. And,
man's
as a
matter of
"real nature" that
least that
man
is
a being
he
is
who
fact,
he
all
describing.
but says that
Does
could "see the sun,
and be conscious of the immortal
sea
it
is
not
he not suggest at
moon and
and earth" were
it
stars
not for
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
152
him
the culture which holds
in
its
and compels him
grip
his precious life selling real estate, cheating rivals?
scribing a culture in terms of
"human
nature" or "culture"
it is
Wolfe
de-
is
upon the human organism. make, one might ask, whether
effects
its
But v^hat difference does
to waste
the cause so long as
man actually What dif-
performs the acts and must suffer their consequences? ference does
it
make whether
a gangster
murders a cashier and
robs a bank because he was born and reared in a certain type of culture or because he was "by nature" murderous, vicious, and
The
rapacious?
cashier
and
the police are hot
are
what they
human
dead
it
in either case, the
gangster's
makes
all
so,
money
gone,
True enough; things
the difference in the world it
is
or whether his behavior was determined
culture, the kind of social system,
living in. All the difference, that
to provide
trail.
did the killing and the robbing because
nature to do
by the type of be
But
are.
man
whether the
is
on the
is,
he happened to
to the scientist
an adequate explanation of the behavior.
who wishes And a great
deal of difference to the layman, too, because of the implications
inherent in the two alternatives: cultures constantly changing in fact; but fined,
is
change
human
may change— they
are
nature, biologically de-
constant— it has undergone no appreciable
virtually
in the last 30,000 years at least.
Wolfe's description of
man
is
a
philosophy of behavior, an
It may be much evidence, but the premises are wrong for and much confusion and error flow inevitably from them.
explanatory device.
It
is
based on certain premises.
supported by all that,
Let us consider a few areas of behavior. Take food habits for example.
Man
is
one but
loathed by one people
his
may be
tastes
vary enormously.
a delicacy to another.
A
food
Many Chinese
cannot bear the thought of eating cheese, whereas most Europeans are very fond of it, and the choicest cheeses are often those with an odor of putrefaction or ordure. Neither do the
Chinese
like
milk— even Grade A. Some
tribes will
not eat chicken
or eggs. Others will eat eggs but prefer rotten eggs to fresh ones.
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
The
choicest porterhouse steak has no charms for the Hindu,
nor baked
ham
worms and
to others
or pork chops for the Jew.
but
insects as food
The Navajos human flesh
will is
not eat
fish.
aversions
many
is
human upon
organism.
it
On
human
practice
do not
to
name The
What then can we attribute What a people likes or
vary.
the contrary, the preferences and
from the outside.
another matter; it
peoples;
would be hard indeed
It
human organism by
aversions are produced within the
Is
eating of
some
not determined by the innate attractions and repulsions
is
of the
is
as dehcacies.
The
nature?" Virtually nothing.
loathes
acting
them
not eat dogs.
regarded everywhere as food.
and loathings likewise
"human
peoples eat
We will
the feast supreme.
it is
We have an aversion for
regarded with extreme revulsion by
an edible substance that to
153
we
Why
shall turn to
a culture
cultures vary in this respect later on.
it
nature to kiss a loved one?
were, then the
If it
But it is not. There are peoples who Some rub noses. Others merely sniff the back children. And in some societies a parent or elder
would be
universal.
kiss at all.
of the neck of
relative will spit in the face of a child; saliva
a magical substance
Among some greetings
and
this act
is
peoples adult males kiss each other.
men
between
casus mountains.
They
in
here regarded as
therefore a sort of blessing.
is
one of the
I
once witnessed
isolated valleys of the
Cau-
kissed each other fervently, pushing aside
a thick growth of whiskers to reach the lips. Other peoples re-
gard kissing
among
nature enter this picture?
It
does not enter at
toward kissing
as well as its practice
desires of the
human
organism.
is
If this
differ.
You
Human is
it is
The
attitude
were
so, kissing
as the
behavior
organism
is
uni-
not the case. Behavior varies because cultures
will do, or taboo,
what your culture
calls for.
behavior varies widely at other points. Sexual jealousy
so powerful
that
is
all.
human
does
not determined by innate
would be uniform throughout the world form. But this
Where
adult males as unmanly.
and so poignant
a simple
and
in
some
societies that to
direct expression of
human
doubt
nature might
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
154
of a
rival. If
may
peers
do
a
man
kills
him go
the "seducer" of his wife, a jury of his
scot free;
it
we
they observe. Yet,
this,
where
let
natural" for a lover to be jealous
It is "just
seem almost absurd.
was only natural that he should
among
stand jealousy
And
Dr.
reports that the Samoans simply cannot under-
Mead
Margaret
Eskimo,
find societies, like the
wives are loaned to guests as a part of hospitality.
and find our sentiments
lovers,
in
this
respect incredible or preposterous.
In
some groups premarital
mitted to
sexual intercourse
is
not only per-
but the practice forms an integral part of the Out of these intimacies come an acquaint-
girls
routine of courtship.
and an understanding that make
ance, a sympathy,
for
an endur-
may be subjected to chastity them. The unmarried mother
ing marriage. In other groups, brides tests is
and
killed
they
if
some
stigmatized in
fail
to pass
societies,
taken for granted in others. At-
titude toward homosexuality varies likewise; in
a
mark
of
accepted.
shame and degradation,
Some
intermediate,
and woman.
some
societies recognize
some groups
recognized and
in others
it is
and give
status to a third, or
sex— the berdache, transvestite— in addition
A man
societies;
must avoid
to
man
his mother-in-law assiduously in
he must not speak to her or allow himself
presence. In other tribes, a
it is
man must have no
in her
social intercourse
sister. Some peoples regard polygamy with aversion, even To marry one's deceased wife's unmarried sister is a crime
with his horror.
in
some
societies,
a sacred obligation in others.* In none of these
*".... in modern England marriage with a deceased wife's sister became equivalent to incest and the thought of such marriage was defined as 'psychic incest.' Around the year 1850, when Lord Russell's bill for the .
.
.
.
.
.
repeal of the law against such marriages was being debated, countless sermons
were preached and thousands of pamphlets and
letters
were printed protesting
against repeal:
"'It would be difEcult (says Lccky) to overstate the extravagance of language employed. One gentleman (Lord Hatherley), who had been Lord Chancellor of England, more than once declared that if marriage with a deceased wife's sister ever became legal "the decadence of England was in.
evitable,"
and that
.
for
.
his
part he
would rather see 300,000 Frenchmen
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND instances can
we
155
explain custom or institution in terms of the
innate desires, sentiments, and aversions of the people concerned. It
not one set of sentiments and desires that produces monog-
is
polygamy
amy
here, another set
it is
the institution that determines the sentiments and behavior.
you are born into
If
a
is
the other way around;
polygamous culture you
and behave polygamously.
New
there. It
England culture you
If,
think, feel
will
however, you are born into a Puritan
will look
upon polygamy with marked
disapproval.
There are
other aspects or expressions of the
still
human mind
thought to be determined by innate psycho-
that were once
biological factors but
which we now recognize
as
being largely
determined by culture. Take the Oedipus complex for example.
was once thought that a boy's
It
his love for his
hostility
toward his father and
mother were simply expressions of
nature. But, as Malinowski
tudes vary with type of family organization. In
husband
is
his biological
and others have shown, these
some
societies the
not the head of the family, the disciplinarian.
mother's brother
who
takes this role,
and the father
the kindly, indulgent friend and companion.
The
toward father and mother are not the same here archal household
known
to Freud. Polygynous
It is
is
it
is
the
sister rather
attitude of boys as in the patri-
and polyandrous
The
cul-
who becomes
the
definition of incest,
and
than the mother
primary object of incestuous desire.
the
merely
households produce other orientations of attitude. In some tures
atti-
consequently one's attitude toward sexual union with cross or parallel, first
or second, cousins, varies with the culture as
we
shall see later on.
coasts,' " (Wm. I. Thomas, Primitive Behavior, pp. 196-97). Contrast this with the command, in Deuteronomy (XXV: 5-12) that a man shall marry his deceased brother's wife. Should he refuse, the woman shall disgrace him publicly, taking off his sandal "in the presence of the elders and spit in his face." Note, also, that Onan was killed by the Lord for . avoiding his duty to his deceased brother's widow (Genesis XXXVIII: 6-n).
landed on the British
.
.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
156
One's conscience personal and
is
often thought to be the most intimate,
private characteristic of one's ego.
Here
if
anywhere
wholly one's own, a private
one ought to find something that is and unique possession. To an ordinary individual the conscience seems to be a mechanism, an inborn ability, to distinguish between right and wrong, just as he possesses a mechanism for distinguishing up from down, the vertical from the horizontal. Except, per-
more intimate
haps, that conscience seems deeper within one, a
part of one's make-up, than semi-circular canals. After
all,
these
canals are merely a mechanical device, whereas a conscience is an integral part of one's self, one's ego. Yet, for all the conviction
that immediate experience carries,
And
illusion.
Our
instance.
down,
is
this
is
exactly
and has no
it is
science
the present
in
cultural
forces
upon the
up and
built into our psychosomatic
from
origin or significance apart
conscience has a sociocultural origin; individual
be tricked by
still
sense of balance, our distinction between
indeed a private faculty;
structure
we can
what has happened
it is
it.
But our
the operation of supraorganism. Con-
individual
merely our experience and our awareness of the opera-
is
tion of certain sociocultural forces
upon
us.
Right and wrong are
matters of sociocultural genesis; they are originated by social systems, not by individual biological organisms. Behavior that
is
or thought to be harmful, to the general welfare
is
injurious,
wrong; behavior that promotes the general welfare desires inherent in its
own
demands
interests.
is
good.
The
an individual organism are exercised to serve Society,
in
order to protect
of the individual as well as to serve
itself
its
own
from the interests,
must influence or control the behavior of its component members. It must encourage good behavior and discourage the bad. It does this by first defining the good and the bad specifically, and secondly, by identifying each good or had with a powerful emotion, positive or negative, so that
the individual
is
motivated to
perform good deeds and to refrain from committing bad ones. So effective
is
this socio-psychologic
mechanism that
society not only
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
157
succeeds in enlisting individuals in the cause of general welfare
but actually causes them to work against their own interests-
own
even to the point of sacrificing their
A
the general welfare.
mechanism is
made
lives for others or for
part of the effectiveness
consists in the illusion that surrounds
to feel that
it is
he
who
is
making
and
his decisions
in
is
social
perfectly "free" in
is
the tribe or group speaking to him from within. conscience," says Radcliffe-Brown, "is vidual of the sanctions of the society."
and moves within an
this
the individual
choosing courses of action. Actually,
small voice of conscience
still
of
making the decision and taking
the proper action, and, moreover, that he
of course, this
it:
magnetic
ethical
social forces, culturally defined,
.
.
^
.
but the voice of
"What
is
called
the reflex in the indi-
The human organism field,
lives
so to speak. Certain
impinge upon the organism and
move it this way and that, toward the good, away from the bad. The organism experiences these forces though he may mistake their source.
He
calls this
experience conscience. His behavior
analogous to a pilotless aircraft controlled by radio. directed this
way and
pulses are received
motors, rudders,
anism
that
by impulses external to
The it.
etc.
This receiving and behavior-controlling mech-
is
a cultural variable rather than a psychoso-
is
made apparent
of course by a consideration of
the great variation of definition of rights and wrongs various cultures of the world.
be wrong
in another.
What
in another.
and conduct
in
is
right in
among the
one culture may
This follows from the fact that an act that
promote the general welfare it
is
These im-
analogous to conscience.
is
matic constant
injure
is
by a mechanism and are then transmitted to
That conscience
will
plane
Thus we
in
one
set of circumstances
may
find great variety of ethical definition
the face of a
common and
uniform
human
organism, and must conclude therefore that the determination of right and
wrong
is
social
and
cultural rather than individual
and psychological. But the interpretation of conscience, rather than custom and mores, in terms of social and cultural forces
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
158
once more that the individual
serves to demonstrate
makes him.
culture
He
contents. Conscience
the instrument, the vehicle, of ethical
It is well,
here as elsewhere, to distinguish
from horse.
cart
The
unconscious also
logically as
is
concept that
a
is
the
defined culturo-
from
name
a
psycho-
given to a
determinants of behavior inherent in the organism, or at
class of least,
may be
well as psychologically. Considered
logical point of view, "the unconscious"
having their locus in the organism as a consequence of the
experiences
whose
or
his
the utensil; the culture supplies the
is
is
conduct, not the cause.
what
is
another
has undergone, of which the person
it
determinants of
ordinary individual
has little or
not aware
he does not appreciate. But there is also human behavior of which the
significance
class of
is
may be— and
no appreciation of
usually is— unaware, or at least
their significance.
These are
extra-
somatic cultural determinants. In a general and broad sense, the
whole realm of culture constitutes "an unconscious" laymen and culture
for
many
and an appreciation of
beyond the ken of
lie
To
those
who
for
most
The concept of in the life of man
social scientists as well.
all
its
significance
but the most
believe that
man makes
scientifically sophisticated.
his culture
and controls
its
course of change, the field of cultural forces and determinants
may be
said to constitute
an unconscious— an extra-somatic un-
conscious.
The
unconscious character of the operation of culture in the
lives of
men
many particular instances ago we distinguished the The determinants of ethical
can be demonstrated in
as well as in a general way.
A moment
unconscious factor in ethical behavior.
behavior— why,
for example,
one should not play cards on Sunday
—lie in the external cultural tradition.
The
individual, however,
unaware of either the source or the purpose of the taboo, locates it
in his inner self: his conscience
is
but the screen upon which
the unconscious factors of society and culture project themselves. Incest
is
defined and prohibited in order to effect exogamous
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
may be
unions so that mutual aid
made more
and significance of these conscious.
To
fostered and, consequently, life
members
secure for the
159
of society.
cultural factors
the individual, incest
but a few are un-
simply a sin or crime that
is
inherently and absolutely wrong.
is
Or, take the rules of etiquette:
A man
not permitted to wear earrings or to use these restrictions a
But of the existence
all
in a certain society
is
The purpose
of
lipstick.
to define classes of individuals within society:
is
man, woman, priest, etc., is an individual who behaves positively manner and who must refrain from certain kinds of
in a certain
By means
acts.
tions,
of these definitions, prescriptions,
each individual
classes are thereby
made
is
to
conform to
kept intact. Thus, order
and prohibiand the
his class
achieved in society,
is
order both structurally and functionally. And, to conduct
must have
its life
But the individual seldom has any appreciation of the source and purpose of these rules; efiFectively a society
he
apt to regard them,
is
and
if
right, or as capricious
order.
he thinks about them
and
irrational.
at
as natural
all,
Another example of the
cultural unconscious.
The church integration
is
an organ of
and regulation. In
just as does the State
social control; it this respect
aggression from without.
war machine;
foreign foes. It interests at
must
home. This
a
mechanism of
has political functions
(see p. 242). It operates to preserve the
integrity of society against disintegration
nation's
it
is
it
It
is
thus an important factor in a
mobilizes the citizenry to fight against
also strive to it
from within and against
harmonize conflicting
does frequently by
telling the
the oppressed to be patient, to be satisfied with their resort to violence, etc.* In these
ways the Church
class
poor and
lot,
not to
the State
like
man and the artisan to carry out honestly equitable agreements freely entered into; never to injure the property, nor to outrage the person, of an employer; never to resort to violence ." (Pope in defending their own cause, nor to engage in riot or disorder * "Religion teaches the laboring
and
fairly
all
.
Leo XII's Encyclical on Condition of Labor, May Catholic Year Book Anno Domini, 1928), p. 540.
15,
1891,
.
The O&cial
:
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
1^
exercises political functions that are essential to the life of the
Yet how many members of a congregation or of the
society.
clergy have
rituals,
parapher-
and dogma that occupy them?
nalia, theolog}^
The
the
this aspect of
any awareness of
determinants of our form of the family
deep within
lie so
our cultural unconscious that even social science has yet no
adequate answer to the question p. 335).
why we
prohibit polygamy (see
Chinese, according to Kroeber, were long unaware
The
that their language had tones. "This apparently simple and fun-
damental discovery," he
says,
"was not made until two thousand
years after they possessed writing, scholars."
-
And
and a thousand
they might not have
made
it
"the learning of Sanskrit for religious purposes phonetically self-conscious." Like the rustic
prose
his life
all
without realizing
it,
after they
had
even then had not .
.
.
made them
who had been
talking
the peoples of the Western
world, too, have long been unconscious of
much
of the structure
and processes of Indo-European languages. Thus,
in addition to
the determinants of behavior that
within the tissues of our ness, there
is
another
own
class of
lie
deep
organisms, below the level of aware-
determinants of which
we
are equally
unconscious: forces and factors within the extra-somatic cultural tradition.
The
science of culture
is
endeavoring to discover, define
and explain these unconscious
cultural factors as psychoanalysis
has undertaken to explore and
make known the
unconscious.*
We
may
illustrate these
intra-organismal
two realms of the uncon-
scious in the following diagram
* Kroeber has a fine appreciation of the unconscious character of cultural determinants of human behavior as the section "Unconscious Factors in Language and Culture" in his Anthropology (1923) makes clear. But despite certain examples which he cites and which show quite clearly that the locus of the unconscious is in the culture process, he locates it "in the mind." Thus he says: "It is difficult to say where the creative and imitative impulses of fashion come from; which, inasmuch as the impulses obviously reside somewhere in human minds, means that they spring from the unconscious portions of the mind" (p. 127).
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
161
Human Behavior
Human
behavior
is
a function of the biological
one hand, and of the extra-somatic
on the
other.
The
individual
is
organism on the
cultural tradition or process,
more
some
or less aware of
of the
determinants of his behavior in each categorj^, the cultural and the biological. But of others he
quite unaw^are, or has no ade-
is
quate appreciation of the role they play as determinants of his
These
behavior.
and the
The vidual
are the realms of the unconscious: the biological
cultural.
nature of the relationship between the
mind
of the indi-
human organism on the one hand and the external cultural on the other may be illuminated by a critical examination
tradition
of a certain thesis widely held in recent logical
circles
asserts that
the United States. Briefly stated, this thesis
in
man
and current anthropo-
has created culture, that culture
the accumu-
is
lated product of the creative acts of countless individuals, that the
individual
is
the fons et oiigo of
that the culture process
is
to
all
cultural elements, and, finally,
be explained
in terms of the indi-
vidual.
Thus Ralph Linton foundation of
all
v^Tites: ".
social
and
.
.
the individual
cultural
organized groups of individuals, and cultures analysis,
.
phenomena. are,
.
.
lies at
the
Societies are in
the last
nothing more than the organized and repetitive responses
of a society's members. For this reason the individual starting point for
any investigation of the
is
the logical
larger configuration" *
fHE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
162 (emphasis ours). "If
we had
the knowledge and the patience to
analyze a culture retrospectively," says Goldenweiser, "every
ment
of
it
would be found
creative act of
an individual mind. There
source for culture to
Edward
its is,
come from ... An
fully carried out, leads
ours),
had
to have
ele-
beginning in the
no other
of course,
analysis oi culture,
back to the individual mind"
if
(emphasis
*
Sapir asserts that the "currency [of "any cultural
element"] in a single community
is
... an instance of diffusion
that has radiated out, at last analysis, from a single individual."
Ruth Benedict which
declares that
in the last analysis
Where
else
of a man,
could any
woman
is
trait
"no
civilization has in
any element
it
not the contribution of an individual.
come from
or a child?"
except from the behavior
Clark Wissler said that "the
^
ventive process resides in individual organisms; so far as it is
the individual organism."
a function of
"it is
the individual
who
is
•
^
Linton
in-
we know,
asserts that
responsible, in the last analysis, for all
additions to culture"® (emphasis ours). Hallowell finds the con-
ception of cultural influence unrealistic; "In the last analysis,"
he
"it
says,
is
individuals
who
respond to and influence one
another."* Both Goldenweiser and Malinowski place the individual "at the beginning and the end" of the sociocultural process.^"
And,
we
finally,
cite Sapir's categorical
dictum: "It
is
always
the individual that really thinks and acts and dreams and volts." *
re-
"
The import
of the foregoing
"is responsible" for culture
clear. It is
is
change;
it is
the individual
the individual
who
who
really
does things; every cultural element has
its
beginning in the creative
act of an individual mind,
It
would appear from our
etc.,
etc.
quotations that their authors feel that they are expressing a fun-
damental proposition and point of view. Nearly the phrase "in the
all
of
them use
last analysis" in setting forth their position.
Their premises seem to appear to them so simple and so •
Wc
recall at this
that in the
realistic
point Georg Simmcl's emphatic assertion: "It is certain only individuals exist/' (emphasis wun); see p. 84.
last analysis
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND as to
be
163
"Every cultural element originates in
virtually axiomatic:
mind of an individual— of a man, woman, or child. Where else couid it come from?" Culture is pictured as a great structure built the
by countless individuals,
much
as
a
coral
reef
produced by
is
myriads of marine organisms during the course of time. And, as the coral reef is explained in terms of the activities of marine
may be explained by human mind."
organisms, so culture of the individual
citing the "creative acts
This view seems plausible enough: as a matter of
fact, it
appears
Anyone can see for himself that it is man, human individuals, who chop down trees, build houses, pass laws, write sonnets, worship gods, etc. But we have become a bit to
be
virtually self-evident.
wary of the self-evident and the obvious: anyone can see for himself
that
it
is
to Copernicus,
Obvious and is
made by
the sun, not the earth, that moves. But, thanks
we now know self-evident
we
may appear
individuals
means of explaining of fact,
regard
better.
though the proposition that culture
we must
to be,
cultural processes or traditions. as
it
Man
plaining the world he lives in by attributing
nature to the action of
it
as a
As a matter
an expression of the primitive and pre-
philosophy of anthropomorphism.
scientific
reject
some mind,
his
own
its
has been exexistence
and
or a god's, for ages
on
end. William James accounted for machines, instruments, and institutions
individual sign."
^2
by asserting that they "were head, of which
To Newton
"this
flashes of genius in
the outer environment
an
showed no
most beautiful cosmos could only pro-
ceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being."
" To
Plato, the material world
mind
was but the expres-
God." "Let there be light," said Yahweh, "and there was light." In the mythology of ancient Egypt, everything came from the thinking and willing of the sion of "ideas in the
of
great artificer deity, Ptah.^*
Among
Indians, Tsityostinako, or
Thought-Woman, brought
pass
by
acts of
thought and
will.^*
our preliterate Keresan Pueblo
And
things to
today, in line with this
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
164
ancient and primitive philosophic tradition,
we
are told that cul-
ture has issued from the mind of man— of men, women, and children—and therefore if we are to understand culture and explain its
content and course of change,
we must do
so in terms of the
individual. It
is
obvious, of course, that culture has emanated from the
human
organisms of
would be no
culture.
human
beings: without the
We recognize also
human
obtains between culture as a whole and the
or their, entirety; the general character of culture of the biological properties of the
comes
species there
that a generic relationship
human
is
species in
its,
an expression
when
species. But,
to an explanation of any particular culture— and
all
it
the
cultures of the world are particular, specific cultures— or to an
explanation of the process of culture change in general, a consideration of the
vidual aspects,
human
organism, either in
irrelevant.
is
The
its
collective or indi-
culture process
is
not explain-
able in terms of races, physical types, or of individual minds. It to
be explained
process
is
to
in
terms of culture
itself.
is
In short, the culture
be explained culturologically rather than biologically
or psychologically.
Thus we do not account
for differences
between Chinese and
Swedish culture by appeal to the physical, somatological, and innate psychological differences between the Chinese and the
Swedish peoples. traditions,
no
We
know
of
specific feature of
no differences between
cultural
the culture process, that can be
explained in terms of innate biological properties, physical or
mental.
On
of Chinese
the other hand,
we can
and Swedish peoples
explain the
as biological
human
behavior
organisms in terms
of their respective cultures.
The
proposition just enunciated
social sciences today.
tions of culture.
We
But the
is
generally accepted in the
no longer subscribe
to racial explana-
thesis that the sociocultural process is
explainable in terms of individuals rests
upon the same premise,
namely, that biological factors are relevant to interpretations of
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND the culture process. Thus, is
admitted that the biological factor
extraneous to an interpretation of the culture process
taken in
contend, its
it is
165
collective
its
(i.e.,
not only relevant
it is
We
individual aspect.
single individual organism
many but fundamental when aspect, but,
racial)
when
scholars
taken in
regard this reasoning as unsound; a is
an interpretation of
as irrelevant to
the culture process as a group of individuals. It might be well at this point to draw a distinction between two fundamentally different propositions. The individual him-
self is
he
is
not irrelevant to the actual culture process.
an integral and
one sense
in
do indeed enamel
viduals
a
the contrary,
to an explanation oi the culture process.
individual
We
Indi-
it.
and believe
their fingernails, vote,
Lynd has observed. But the
capitalism as
On
fundamental part of
is
in
irrelevant
cannot explain the
culture trait or process of enameling nails in terms of innate
We
desire, will, or caprice.
can however explain the behavior of
The may be re-
the individual in terms of the culture that embraces him. individual, the average, typical individual of a group,
garded as a constant so cerned.
The
far as
Crow
typical
human, symbolic behavior
Indian organism
may be
regarded as
biologically equivalent to the typical English, Zulu, or
organism so
far as his capacities
The
havior are concerned.
ceptance of a
racial
it
is
is
is
beac-
human behavior and culture. between the human organism on the
is
cultural tradition
on the other,
the variable, the biological factor the con-
the cultural factor that determines the variations in
the resulting behavior.
organism
Eskimo
human
determinant of
In the process of interaction
the cultural factor
inclinations for
alternative to this proposition
one hand and the extra-somatic stant;
and
con-
is
The human
behavior of the individual
therefore a function of his culture.
The
individual
becomes then the locus of the culture process and the vehicle of its
expression.
Thus we
individuality to
chology.
arrive at a culturological conception of
add to those of anatomy, physiology, and psy-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
166 Since the earliest days of
human
species has
vironment of
human
history every
been introduced
beliefs,
member
of the
at birth into a cultural en-
customs, instruments, expressions of
topography,
etc., as well as a natural habitat of climate,
fauna. This cultural environment
is
art,
and
flora
a continuum, a tradition;
descends lineally from one generation to another, and
it
it
may
from one people to another. Culture is an whose function is to make life secure and mechanism elaborate laterally
diffuse
continuous for groups of functions, culture
and put
tem
to work. Culture
it
in a
human
beings. In order to perform these
must harness energy is,
one form or another
in
therefore, a
thermodynamic
mechanical sense. Culture grows in
ideological,
sociological,
all
its
sys-
aspects-
and technological— when and
the
as
amount of energy harnessed per capita per year is increased, and as the means of expending this energy are improved. Culture is thus a dynamic system capable of growth. is
a
stream
beliefs,
of
interacting
A
cultural tradition
elements— of instruments,
customs, etc. In this interactive process, each element
impinges upon others and process
cultural
is
may become axes give
is
in turn acted
upon by them. The and
a competitive one; instruments, customs,
beliefs
obsolete and be eliminated from the stream: stone
way
to metal ones; science replaces
tribe
and clan become obsolete
tion
and the
myth^nd
magic;
at a certain stage of social evolu-
state takes their place.
New
elements are incor-
porated into the cultural stream from time to time: metals, the wheel, beliefs consequent upon the use of the microscope, enter the cultural tradition at certain stages of
New
its
etc.,
development.
combinations and syntheses of cultural elements
—
i.e.,
in-
ventions and discoveries— are continually being formed in this interactive process: the invention of the steam engine, the "dis-
covery" of the Periodic System of the elements, the formulation of the laws of thermodynamics, etc., are
syntheses of cultural elements.
A
new combinations
cultural tradition
a dynamic system (powered by natural forces which
is
it
or
therefore
harnesses)
— CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND that behaves and grows in terms of It
may
on
therefore be explained
terms rather than
with
chemistry or physics.
It
167
own principles and laws. own level, in culturological
its
its
the concepts
may be
of
psychology,
biology,
regarded as a system sui generis.
In relation to the process of culture change and growth the biological factor of irrelevant to
man may be
regarded as a constant and hence
an explanation of the culture process. Relative to an
explanation of the difference between the culture of the Swedes
and that of the Chinese or Zulus, the
factor— such
biological
things as skin, hair, or eye color, stature, innate abilities, etc.
may,
we have
as
noted, be regarded as irrelevant. It
is
irrelevant
an explanation of the differences between the culture of
also to
England
in a.d.
1200 and that of
a.d. 1900.
We see,
then, that to
the problem of interpretation of the culture process, the biological factor of
man
turologically,
irrelevant.
is
The
culture process
is
explainable cul-
not biologically or psychologically.
now consider the individual in relation to the As we have noted, every individual is born into a
Let us process.
that existed prior to his birth. This culture seizes birth
and
as
culture
culture
upon him
at
he grows and matures equips him with language,
customs, beliefs, instruments,
etc.
In short,
it is
culture that pro-
him with the form and content of his behavior as a human being. Thus, Crow Indian behavior is the response of the organism Homo sapiens to a particular organization of stimuli that we call "Crow culture." Similarly, American, Eskimo, and Zulu behaviors are the responses of the same kind of organism to other vides
cultural traditions.
The
individual in each case
is
merely an
or-
ganization of cultural forces and elements that have impinged
upon him from the outside and which
find their overt expression
through him. So conceived, the individual
is
but the expression of
a supra-biological cultural tradition in somatic form.
We
turn
now
to the role of the individual in the process of
culture growth,
and
last analysis," it
is
specifically to the propositions that, "in the
the individual
who
"is
responsible for
all
addi-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
168 tions to culture"; that "every culture
element
to the creative act of an individual
mind"; that
individual
who
the individual
sure culture
composed
But the
it
is
always the
"the logical starting point for any investigation
is
and
it.
It is
we have
just
asserting that the individual
is
we
species
call individuals.
quoted are doing more than to
and
give utterance to these obvious
human
true also that the
of discrete physical entities that
scholars that
culture.
dependent upon the human species and
is
could not exist without is
be traced back
to
dreams, and revolts; and that
really thinks, acts,
of the larger configurations" such as society
To be
is
trite
commonplaces. They are
prime mover,
a
the cause, culture the effect; that
a determinant;
the individual
that
he
is
who
"is
responsible" for change in the culture process; and that,
must
lie
in a consideration of the individual.
proposition that is
is
an explanation of "the larger configuration" of
therefore,
ture
it
we
reject— and reverse:
it is
And
this
it is
the individual
explained in terms of his culture, not the other
cul-
who
way around.
Let us consider inventions and discoveries, or any significant
advance in the
arts, science,
or philosophy.
the achievements of certain individuals
To
not to explain them.
Newton and
Leibnitz
biographically but process.
did?
Why
We
made
is
is
say that they are
merely to locate them,
say that the calculus was invented
does not explain them as events in a culture
it
know
this too as well as
when and where what
they
particular person
the invention or discovery. Merely to say "the individual"
no answer
by
to identify these events historically or
did these events take place
wish to
To
to this question.
Nor
is
is
such a reply improved by limit-
ing the individuals to persons of exceptional native ability. There
were individuals of
Bronze Age and,
this category in
in
the Middle Ages and in the
the time of Newton, they were sprinkled
through the populations of Tibet, Bechuanaland, and the Andean Highlands. Why was not the calculus invented at other times and in other lands?
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
An
169
invention, discovery, or other significant cultural advance
an event
in a culture process. It
is
a
new combination
of elements in the interactive stream of culture. It
is
or synthesis is
the out-
come of antecedent and concomitant cultural forces and elements. The Laws of Motion, formulated by Newton, were the synthesis of cultural elements historically identified with the persons of
Kepler, Brahe, Galileo, and others.
The
mulation took place where and when stances
of
culture
it
occurrence of their
for-
did because the circum-
growth and history brought together the
elements requisite to this synthesis at a particular time and place.
We
can trace the growth of these elements through time and
place.
Thus we
culturologically.
explain the occurrence of this significant event
And, moreover, we explain the behavior
of
New-
ton by showing that the formulation of these laws was the
We know we make in-
response of his organism to certain cultural stimuli. virtually
nothing about his nervous system
directly;
concerning it on the basis of the effect of cultural upon him. In short, we know his mentality only through culture. But Newton was also much concerned with theology
ferences stimuli his
and
Biblical interpretation,
that
he was born into
as well as a scientific
a
which again
is
explained by the fact
powerful theological "gravitational field"
one and that he
he did the other. In another age or devoted himself to such things
felt
the "pull" of the one as
culture,
designing
as
Newton would have
fish traps,
or the elaboration of a theory of totemism.
hepatoscopy,
But when
a certain
concatenation of cultural forces and elements occurs at a given
time and place they
will
become
synthesized in the neuro-sensory-
muscular-etc, system of one individual or another.
Nothing demonstrates more process and
its
clearly the nature of the culture
expression in significant episodes of cultural ad-
vance, and at the
same time the
an explanation of
this process,
irrelevance of the individual to
than the phenomena of multiple
and simultaneous, but independent, inventions and discoveries. Time after time, in the history of science, mathematics and tecb-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
170
nology, an important invention or discovery has been
anywhere from two pendently.*
To
to
explain
persons
ten
phenomena
of
this
sort
"coincidence," "fortuitous clusterings of genius,"
growing and converging
etc., as
William
is
lines
of cultural development reach a
certain point, fusion
and synthesis
advancing on a wide
front, these syntheses will find
will take place. If culture
vention or discovery
is
is
two or more
independent and approximately simultaneous expressions.
and
inde-
by invoking
empty and sterile. A culturological however, readily makes them intelligible: when
James and others have done, interpretation,
made by
simultaneously and
The
in-
explained therefore in terms of a growing
interactive culture process; the individual inventors or dis-
* The following instances of multiple, simultaneous but independent inF. Ogburn ventions or discoveries are taken from the list compiled by and published in his Social Change, pp. 90-102. Examples could be multiplied almost indefinitely. Theory of planetary perturbations: Lagrange, 1808; Laplace, 1808.
Wm.
Discovery of planet Neptune: Adams, 1845; Leverrier, 1845. Discovery of sun spots: Galileo, 1611; Fabricus, 1611; Scheiner, 1611; and Harriott, 1611.
measurement of parallax of star: Bessel, 1838; Struve, 1838; Hender1838. Introduction of decimal point: Biirgi, 1592; Pitiscus, 1608-12; Kepler, 1616; and Napier, 1616-17. Discovery of oxygen: Scheele, 1774; Priestley, 1774. The Periodic Law: De Chancourtois, 1864, Newlands, 1864; Lothar Meyer, 1864. Law of Periodicity: L. Meyer, 1869, Mendeleeff, i86g. Telescope: Lippershey, 1608; Delia Porta, 1558; Digges, 1571; Johannides, Metius, 1608; Drebbel, Fontana, Janssen, 1608; and Galileo, 1609. Law of Conservation of Energy: Mayer, 1843; Joule, 1847; Helmholz, 1847; Colding, 1847; and Thomson, 1847. First
son,
Telegraph: Henry, 1831; Morse, 1837; Cooke- Wheatstone, 1837; and Stein1837. Cellular basis of both animal and vegetable tissue: claimed by Schwann, Henle, Turpin, Dumortier, Purkinje, Muller, and Valentin, all at about the
heil,
same time: 1839. Solution Spallanzani,
of the problem
and Davy,
all in
of respiration:
by
Priestley,
Scheele,
Lavoisier,
1777.
Sulphuric ether as an anaesthetic: Long, 1842; Robinson, 1846; Listen, 1846; Morton, 1846; and Jackson, 1846. Self-exciting dynamo: claimed by Hjorth, 1866-67; Varley, 1866-67; Siemens, 1866-67; Wheatstone, 1866-67; Ladd, 1866; Wilde, 1863-67.
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
171
and the
vehicles of expression of this
coverers are merely the loci process.
To
now
return
vidual
who
dictum that
to Sapir's
really thinks
and
acts
"it
always the indi-
is
and dreams and
it
inverts
If
it.
he had
said
it is
This
revolts."
human
statement does not merely distort the picture of
behavior;
always the individual that sleeps
and yawns and hears and breathes, we would
offer
no objection,
for these activities are functions of individual organisms; there
is
no communal or group mechanism of yawning or breathing. But to say
it is
ing, feeling
the individual
who
and acting
misleading to say the
premise that as
is
is
unwarranted.
does such things
An
as
human
least; it
think-
implies a
individual can independently
"^
an organism, yawn, sleep, and breathe.* But no one can think,
and
act
feel as a
human
being as an independent, autonomous
organism; he can do so only as a part of a sociocultural system.
A
question of technical terminology
argued that the words think,
feel,
is
involved here.
dream,
It
may be
are properly ap-
etc.,
,
^-^q
plicable to neuro-sensory-muscular-etcetera systems only. If this
ruling
be accepted, then
it
is
always the
But
it
was not to
true of course that
it is
individual organism that thinks, feels,
and
set forth this tautology that Sapir took
acts.
such pains and emphasis
of expression. It
was his purpose to present the individual as a
prime mover,
an initiator and determinant of a process.
it is
as
this proposition that
We
may indeed
we
And
reject.
and acting are / functions of individual biological organisms. There is no comsay
that
thinking,
feeling,
munal nervous system, no group brain, of course. But, human thinking, feeling, and acting cannot be accounted for in terms although functions of an individual and autonof course, by cultural forces. It is interesting to note that Sapir, who has insisted so vehemently upon the autonomy of the individual in thinking, feeling and acting, should have taken pains, in another connection, to point out that breathing may function within and be modified by a sociocultural process ("The Unconscious Patterning of Behavior in Society," in The Unconscious, E. S. Dummer, ed.. New York, 1927), *
Yawning, breathing,
etc.,
omous organism, may be modified,
pp. 117-18.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
172 of biological organisms,
by saying that the individual does these
things. Spitting, yawning, scratching, etc., are intelligible as functions of individual organisms.
But believing
in ghosts,
dreaming
of the Blessed Virgin, avoiding one's mother-in-law, scalping a vanquished foe, as events or processes, cannot be made mtelligible
merely by saying that
human
In
it
the individual
is
who
does these things.
and acting the individual is merely cultural elements. But we cannot explain
thinking, feeling,
responding to stimuli, to
the form and content of the response merely by citing the bioorganism that does the responding. Whether a person
logical
believes that a fever has of a taboo
is
a matter that
the individual organism
organism
been caused by bacteria or the violation is
who
not
made
intelligible
''always does"
by invoking
The
the believing.
the same in both cases.
is
Thus we
where we have designated
are left in the position
certain psycho-biological processes "thinking," "feeling," or "act-
but where
ing,"
we cannot
by considering them
who
individual
significance.
explain these processes at
as individual
phenomena.
"It
is
merely
all
always the
thinks, etc.," tells us, therefore, nothing of
What
does the individual think, and
why
any
does he
what we want to know, and the conception of the individual as a prime mover, as an initiator or determinant of the culture process, as one who "is responsible" think thus and so? This
is
for all culture change, etc., will not give us the answer.
contrary,
The
will effectively obscure or conceal
it
events or processes that
ing, feeling,
symbolic
and acting"
level,
we
a matter of fact, sociocultural processes.
tems.
We
and
they are on the human,
Note
that
They are, as we have said
and processes are functions of sociocultural
sys-
have not said that "thinking," "feeling," and "acting"
are sociocultural processes.
we
the
technically designate "think-
are, in so far as
functions of sociocultural systems.
that these events
On
it.
An
label an event "thinking"
event
we
to that kind of context only.
is
what
refer
it
it
is— an event.
When
to a neurologic context
But the very same event that
is
— CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND and thus
called "thinking" also
173
may
referred to a neurologic context
be referred to another context, a sociocultural context. Thus,
believing in witches or bacteria as the cause of an illness
an
is
event or process that can be referred to a psychologic context or to a culturologic context;
may be
it
considered as a function of a
nervous system or of a sociocultural system. But, although perfectly true that
a nervous system, as
an event,
it
is
we can have no belief in witches apart from we learn virtually nothing about such a belief
act, or process
from a consideration of
neurologic
its
aspect.
A
an event or process
belief in witches or bacteria as
is
to
be
explained in sociocultural terms rather than with neurologic con-
The
cepts.
believing
cultural stimulus.
not by
itself
but by
serves as stimulus
the response of a
is
But what the organism
is
its
culture.
And
human
organism to a
believes
is
determined
the cultural element that
not to be explained in terms of individual
neurologic processes but in terms of other cultural elements and processes.
Thus
to say that believing in witches or bacteria
something that an individual does
is
is
empty tautology
either an
"believing" being by definition an individual biological affair
or
it
implies a premise that
vidual
who
initiates
is
namely, that
false,
and determines the
nothing to do with the origin of the
belief.
belief;
tradition of his people before he was born. it; it
came
to
him from the
growth of antecedent ideas and the Old Stone Age.
The
A
outside.
it
it
individual
was
in the cultural
He
we can
belief in bacteria also
cultural elements, of concepts, microscopes, etc.
had
did not originate
belief in witches
beliefs that
the indi-
is
The
is
is
the out-
trace
back to
a synthesis of
Thus, the
specific
act or process of believing that witches or bacteria cause illness
has been determined not by an individual organism at a sociocultural system.
The
event
is
all
but by
something that the culture
has done to the individual rather than the other way around. it
If
be argued that some time, somewhere, there must have been a
single individual
who was
the
first
person in history to believe
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
174 that illness
caused by bacteria rather than by witches,
is
be pointed out that this event, too, that have
tural elements
cumambient
come
is
it
must
merely a synthesis of cul-
from
to the individual
his cir-
cultural tradition.
take this view of the relationship between the individual
To
and the culture process
not to regard the former,
is
The
as a purely passive thing.
as
an organism,
individual does not receive cultural
material from the outside in a purely passive way, like a cup into
which coffee
is
poured, nor does
perfect mirror does an image.
it
reflect
this material like a
The human organism
is
a
dynamic
system. It not only receives cultural elements from the outside, acts
upon them.
it
by virtue of the action of the neuro-sensory-
It is
upon cultural elements that they are made to act and react upon one another, to form new combinations and syntheses. We do not therefore minimize the dynamic
glandular-etcetera system
nature of the individual as an active as well as a reactive organism.
We
are merely saying that a consideration of the
dynamic
character of this organism does not help us to explain the form
and content of
reactions
its
and responses. The organism does the
reacting, of course. But, in
of
its
tural
reactions
is
human
behavior, the specific nature
determined not by the organism but by
Neither does our point of view regard
On
the contrary,
we
recognize
identical biologically. Since
expression
will
biological structure.
that
human
expression of the culture process, tural
cul-
elements serving as stimuli.
all
individuals as alike.
no two individuals are
organisms are the mediums of
it
follows that variations of cul-
be produced by
But not
all
variations
of
individual
variations of expression of the
culture process are due to individual biological variation by any
means. cultural
The
culture process
is
itself
elements— no two axes or
inherently variable.
fetiches,
two
no two expressions of
sentiment or attitude— are identically alike either. variation of expression
No
of the culture process
to variation of cultural stimuli. Furthermore,
is
it is
Some
of the
due therefore a striking
and
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND significant fact that, within a fairly
175
uniform cultural environment,
the most diverse physical types— the
tall and the short, fat and and energetic, endomorphs and ectomorphs, etc.— react in a highly uniform manner in such respects as language and
thin, lazy
dialect, attitudes, beliefs,
food habits,
rituals of social intercourse,
and so on. Thus a consideration of individual tion only serves to
make
clearer
of the cultural factor in the determination of
The
the
behavior.
and
The
government.
government
want
expression in one of our theories of
full
premise of democracy as a theory of
basic
that the people rule.
is
certain things
and consider and polls.
as a prime mover, as a First and determinant of the sociocultural
initiator
process, finds free
the
human
conception of the individual
Cause, as
viduals
biological varia-
and more emphatic the dominance
finally
The men put
That
and oppose
make
others; they reflect,
by
weigh
which they express at
a decision
into office
the citizenry as indi-
is,
this process,
having received
the mandates of the electorate, set about to do the people's
Thus, we have, according to
from lowliest individual
this view, a cause
and
effect
citizen to the highest executive. It
who
is
will.
sequence
always the
votes, etc., to paraphrase Sapir.
This picture of the
political
process
is
distortion as
a gross
was the general proposition about the individual always thinking, acting, and revolting. The theory of democracy as outlined above is
a fiction,
an
illusion.
And, of course,
pocentric premise that
be
this or that,
A by its
and
it is
democratic nation
it
is
it is
man who,
based upon the anthro-
like
God,
is
a social organism. Its life
mechanism of integration and control that formal aspects and the "political machine" in a
tionalized
or at least
says let there
done.
extra-legal
aspect.
its
is
relations with other nations.
regulated
non-institu-
This mechanism co-
ordinates the various segments and processes of the
and negotiates
is
the State in
is
The
life
body
politic,
of the nation
thus regulated and controlled by a relatively small segment.
The
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
176 electorate
is
permitted to say "yes" or "no" with reference to a
number
of candidates
and
whom,
of
whom
they have had no hand in choosing,
most
for the
part, they
The
have never heard.
"choices" of the voters are and can be httle
if
anything more than
responses to outside cultural stimulation— i.e., campaign propa-
ganda and "news" selected and disseminated by agencies over. which "the people" have no control. To be sure, it is always the individual who drops his pasteboard in the ballot box or pulls the lever on the voting machine. But what can he do but respond
upon him from the
to sociocultural influences that play
The
picture of free will and choice
political
magnetic
fields,
the sociocultural forces vary and fluctu-
drawing a preponderance of voter iron
pole or another, or leaving of equal intensity. It voting, like thinking,
is
political
filings
toward one
them evenly divided between
"always the individual
is
organism. But one can
vidual.
outside?
an illusion.* Certain regions
go Democratic or Republican. In other regions, other
always
ate,
is
who
currents
votes" because
by definition a function of an individual
come
no adequate understanding
to
of the
governmental process by a consideration of the indi-
We can, however, illuminate the behavior of the individual
by interpreting
it
as
an event
a sociocultural process. The.-
in
voter reacts, responds to cultural stimuli
way
or that; he does not rule.
the
nation
mechanism
by the is
relatively
facilitated,
The
which move him
this
administration and control of
small
integrative
and regulative
however, by the popular illusion that the
* Any response of the human organism is the resultant of countless antecedent and concomitant events that we may term "causes." The human organism is constantly organizing and synthesizing these causative factors on the one hand, and expressing the resultant behavior overtly on the other. When causative factors for and against a given course of action are evenly
balanced, we call this "indecision": "I can't make up my mind whether to play golf or to mow the lawn." When one set of causative factors outweighs another, we call it "choice" or "decision": I decide to play golf. "Free will and choice" is merely the way in which we experience tliis preponderance of
one
factor or set of factors over another.
we can and Free WilL experience
belieye that
it
is
our
Not realizing what lies back own doing and hence call it
of this
choice
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND people
As long
rule.
governing,
i.e.,
as the electorate believes that
it
does the
members are unaware of the genesis impinge upon them individually from
long as
as
177
its
of the social forces that
the outside, just so long will the actual governing mechanism
have a freer hand. And,
democracy
illusion of
also
if
misfortune overtakes the nation, the
blame upon the people, which
lays the
is
an advantage to the actual governing mechanism.
To
say,
however,
that
anthropocentric illusion
premise
this
of
democracy
is
an
not to deny significance to the electoral
is
process by any means. Illusions are as real as anything else and
may be
quite as significant. Voting
certain types of social organisms
Nations
like
individuals
necessity of choosing
forces relevant to
a process
(nations)
occasionally
between
by means of which
conduct their
lives.
confronted with the
alternatives;
shall
follow this
it
means of measuring the factors or the choice between alternative courses of action.
course or that? Voting
The
are
is
role of voting in the
is
a
democratic body politic might be likened
to the determination of a choice in an individual: shall he eat or
sleep or follow some other course of action? A wise choice would depend upon an assessment of the needs and resources of the individual. So it is with nations: should a nation do this or that?
A wise
choice will depend upon a
and force of the various
realistic appraisal of
factors involved.
The
can be an attempt to weigh and to measure these election may serve merely to measure the
exerted by the government by citizenry of the nation. In
means
preponderance of one given situation.
A
of these factors.
make
tie It
A
factors.
Or, an
effect of the influence
of propaganda
any event, an election
device, a yardstick or barometer.
the weight
electoral process
is
a
upon the measuring
majority vote indicates the
factor, or set of factors, over
another in a
vote indicates an equivalence of magnitude
goes without saying that a nation that can
these measurements only at fixed times and intervals
unable to derive
be unable
to
full
make
a measurement, take a reading, at a
is
may time when
advantage from the electoral process.
It
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
178
one
urgently needed.
is
And on
the other hand,
it
may be
quired to go through the cumbersome and expensive taking a reading— holding a national election— when
re-
ritual
of
none
is
needed.
democracies work under the illusion that the people rule,
If
the "dictatorship of the proletariat" illusion,
is
probably an even greater
assuming of course that a considerable number of people
do actually take
formula at
this
face value.
its
A
dictatorship
is
more highly integrated form of government than a democracy and consequently the political mechanism of integration and a
control
segment of the
a smaller
is
organism than
social
is
the
corresponding mechanism in a democracy. Hence, "the people"
do even
less ruling in a dictatorship
torship
without disguise
than in a democracy.
may however be more
A
dicta-
responsive to
popular will than the de hcto governing mechanism in a democracy,
because in the former case, the dictator will obviously be
held responsible for errors or shortcomings of the government;
but
if
them
"the people rule" responsibility must rest ultimately upon rather than
upon the
"the people"
—a
rule;
not
"chosen people."
years has
shown how
of the proletariat"
is
mechanism. But a
actual governing
"dictatorship of the proletariat"
is
a delusion.
It,
too, declares that
the people, but only a particular class
all
The
course of social evolution in recent
unrealistic this slogan
both a
logical
and a
is.
"The
dictatorship
sociological contradic-
tion of terms.
"It
is
always the individual
to explain
profound
Revolutionist lutionist?
is
is
a psycho-biological
futile.
by
its
(Sapir).
But
change by pointing to a
What
as well "explain" a
the puff of smoke issuing from vulsions were caused
really revolts"
political or social
as naive as it
One might
who
muzzle.
revolutionists,
produced the Revo-
shotgun by pointing to
and
If great if
social
con-
a revolutionist
phenomenon, then we ought
to find
is
them
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
179
distributed uniformly throughout the
human
species in time
and
place like other biological events such as the birth of twins.
we do no
not; there are great areas
revolutionists appear at
But and long periods of time when
all.
In cultures that have attained a high degree of integration
a stable equilibrium such as those of find
no reformers or
revolutionists at
many
we
primitive peoples,
People are
all.
and
satisfied
desire only to continue life undisturbed. In cultures
and
which con-
we find reThe human organisms
tain disharmonious or conflicting elements, however,
formers, revolutionists and reactionaries. are the
same
in
an inborn desire
both
cases.
for radical
from the soap-box.
A
Revolutions are not the product of
change expressed in
revolutionist
a
is
fiery
declamations
human organism
that
is
held and wielded by certain cultural elements and forces that are
moving
in the direction of
profound change. Arkwright, Newton,
Darwin, Jefferson, Lobachewsky, Lenin, Watt, were revolutionists as
well as those nameless
biological
media
lurgy, writing,
men and women who
served as the
for such cultural advances as agriculture, metal-
and coinage. By the same token, a reactionary
is
a
person held firmly in the "magnetic field" of cultural elements
about to be vanquished or rendered obsolete
And
interaction of the culture process. is
one who
feels
in the competitive
the reformer or "Liberal"
the pull of both sets of forces, those striving to
preserve the obsolete, and those struggling to destroy the old in order to create the new.
They
deplore the
tem and urge reforms. But, held
fast
evils of
by both
the old
sets
sys-
of forces,
they can neither relinquish the past nor give themselves up to
They wish to keep the old system but without its inherent defects. They desire the new but without the trauma of birth. They lie becalmed midway between the poles of the magnet. They have neither a positive nor a negative revolutionary advance.
charge; they are the
One might
human
neutrons of the culture process.
think that in dreaming,
if
anywhere, one might find
— THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
180
an activity that "the individual always really does" in the Sapirean manner. Here as in thinking, dreaming is a word that labels a neuro-sensory-glandular-etcetera process; there
is
no group mechan-
ism that dreams. But what the individual dreams is determined in part by his culture— and to a greater extent than is commonly supposed. As the scientific interpretation of dreams matures,
and more
determinants
cultural
from forms of
are disclosed:
social organization, the family
rivalries in quests of
recognition and power,
and kinship groups,
etc., all
of
which are
cultural system to another.
defined and vary from one
culturally
more
tensions arising
cultures visions become standardized. Among Plains North America the vision by means of which a youth acquired "power" was a stereotype: a spirit would appear to the youth, address him as "son," tell him that he had heard his pleas
In
some
tribes of
for help, that spirit
Then
the
do something— to hunt,
kill
he was going to adopt and aid him,
would give the youth power
to
in battle, control weather, or heal the
enemies
show him how
in a song,
to paint his face
etc.
sick— instruct him
and how
to
make and
use a medicine-bundle, impose a taboo upon him, and depart. Similarly saints
and mystics of Europe used to have stereotyped
dreams or visions of Christ or the Blessed Virgin. As Tylor once remarked, "The South African
who
believes in a
God
with a
crooked leg sees him with a crooked leg in dreams and visions."
There
indeed very
is
vision experience.
little
much of our dream and Tylor: "Want of originality
individuality in
Again to quote
seems one of the most remarkable features in the visions of mystics
become
.
.
.
When
a fixed
image
tradition], of course
shape."
^®
It
is
the devil with horns, hoofs and in the popular
men saw him
mind
[i.e.,
tail
had once
in the cultural
[in visions] in this
conventional
always the individual that does the dreaming
which merely defines the word
in neurologic terms.
culture that gives the
dream much of
well as providing the
initial
its
stimulus in
But
the
it is
form and content
many
instances.
as
The
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND event or process that
we
label
181
"dreaming"
is,
like the events called
"thinking," "feeling," and "acting," a function of a system in
which the individual
but a component part: a sociocultural
is
system.
Thus, the whole concept of the individual, the individual organism, is profoundly altered by culturological inter-
'
human
pretation. Instead of regarding the individual as a First Cause, as a
prime mover,
is
responsible for
him
as a
as the initiator
and determinant of the culture acts of mind,* as one who
one who creates culture by
process, as
all
component
additions to culture, part,
and
a tiny
and
etc.,
etc.,
we now
part at that, of a vast sociocultural system that embraces
numerable individuals
We see culture as
remote past
as well.
elements— of language,
toms, and attitudes— that flows
utensils,
down through
beliefs,
man
at
cus-
time. Culture was
man—by
countless
could not continue without them. But,
not need to consider
—in an
a vast continuum, a stream
tools,
of course brought into existence by it
in-
any one time and extends back into the
at
of cultural
individuals— and
see
relatively insignificant
human we do
all— as a species, race or individual
explanation of culture change. For purposes of scientific
interpretation, the culture process generis; culture
is
may be
sociocultural system,
and from the standpoint of an
tion of this system, the individual
makes the
regarded as a thing sui
explainable in terms of culture. In this great
is
interpreta-
(i) a catalytic agent that
interactive culture process possible,
and (2)
a
medium
of expression of the culture process.
* In a recent publication
in an Indian's
mind the
we
find a fine
idea of a dance
.
example of this: "There is present This idea influences his body .
.
The result of this behavioral activity is ." (W. W. Taylor, A Study oi Archeology, of the dance American Anthropological Association, 1948), pp. 101-102. The
so that he behaves in a certain vvav.
the pattern
Memoir
69, that culture consists
.
.
view of "ideas American ethnology today.
in
the
mind"
is
still
widely held in
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
182
The
conception of the individual does not and
cultiirological
cannot deprive psychology of anything that properly belongs to dynamic, active it. The individual, as a biological organism, is a
and This
and may be studied and interpreted
reactive system
as such.
the business of the neuro-anatomist, the physiologist, the
is
psychologist, etc., not of the student of culture.
language
may be
turologically, in
The
fact that
interpreted philologically, or culture treated cul-
no way prevents one from interpreting biological
organisms psychologically.
The
question at issue
of course,
is,
how
preted, psychologically or culturologically? individual as the creator offers a
t}'pe
is
be
culture to
The
inter-
conception of the
and determinant of the culture process
of interpretation that
we
find unacceptable. It
is
anthropomorphic as well as irrelevantly psychologic. It
is
not, however, as
Copernicus;
we
we were
if
deploring a Ptolemy before
deploring a continuation of the
are, so to speak,
Ptolemaic tradition generations after Copernicus. the articulation of the individual ture process was
best an
of the individual
of thought,
is
Polish sociologist,
man
is
is
who
he cannot think ought
later analysis
from
else
the supposition that thinks but his social
it."
^'^
the
error of
thinks
community
his brain necessitate."
his co-workers, too, is
man
And .
.
.
.
.
.
than what the influences of his social
environment concentrating upon
one hand, culture
The thought
Gumplowicz, argued that "the great
himself
Durkheim and
his nature realized.
the primary result and the thought
is
won by
individualistic psychology
not
the cul-
said that the individual "is nothing, at
of society, social thought,
is
human organism with
only through spoken intercourse in society does he
become conscious
it
nature of
recognized and pointed out decades ago by
Adolph Bastian when he idiot;
The
showed
clearly
^*
Emile
how, on the
an extra-somatic tradition that can be ex-
own interactive elements and processes and how. on the other hand, the individual organism is influenced. plained in terms of
its
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
183
form and content, by the action of the external culture upon him. And, in more recent times in America, the his behavior given
work of Wissler, Kroeber, Lowie, and others has continued the tradition of a culturological interpretation of culture. dies hard. The death is especially slow when anthropomorphism is mistaken for the soundest realism, as it is by those who actually see people, individual men and women, voting, enameling their fingernails, building ships,
But anthropomorphism
and
difficult
inventing machines, writing sonnets, composing symphonies, etc.
"Where
else,"
they ask, "could
new
come from
cultural elements
but from the creative act of some individual human
mind— from
a man, woman, or child?"
A
culturological conception of the individual
logical interpretation of
is
mind, of human minding.
the use of the words mind, thinking, feeling, tional psychological sense: that
is,
also a culturo-
We
still
retain
etc., in their tradi-
they designate biologic— neuro-
sensory-glandular-etcetera— processes. But
we
we canhuman thinking and feeling in terms of individual organisms. The individual does the thinking and feeling— by definition. But, as we not by any means give a
full
account of these acts of
have previously noted, what he thinks and
by himself but by the
realize that
feels
sociocultural system into
of birth has placed him.
A
is
determined not
which the accident
sociocultural system
is
a vast network
of relations, of interactions of concept, tools, customs, beliefs, etc.
Thus, a belief
is an organization of beliefs and grown up in conjunction with activities of medicine, offense and defense, and subsistence, carried on by means of certain technologic tools and implements. The beliefs and attitudes of witchcraft find expression in turn in certain
in
witchcraft
attitudes that has
and paraphernalia. The culture complex called ''witchcraft" is therefore something that is to be explained culturologically. It is found in some cultures but not in others. When it rituals
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
184
from one culture to another. The culture complex has to be explained, therefore, in terms of cultural elements and exists, it varies
cultural processes.
born into a sociocultural system that contains the complex called witchcmft, will behave in a certain way; he
An
will
He
individual,
think, feel,
and act
as
culture directs
his
will suspect certain persons of
will take certain precautions to safeguard
he
will
and
prescribes.
the black art and fear them; he himself from them; and
occupy himself with the detection, punishment or eradica-
tion of witches,
all
in a
manner
meaning could be attached individual
who
prescribed
by
his culture.
to the assertion that "it
is
What
always the
and contends with, witches?"
believes in, fears,
Simply that the individual organism responds to certain cultural elements as external stimuli. But of his believing, fearing,
we
are able to give an account
and contending, not by a consideration
of the individual but of the organization of cultural elements, the
system, that determines his believing, fearing, etc.
cultural
would be more
realistic to say that his
It
thinking and feeling are
things that the culture does to the individual than to say that
they are things that he does.
and behaving
as a
human
The
being
individual's thinking, feeling,
is
merely his participation in a
sociocultural process. His thinking, feeling
and overt behavior are
expressions of a system of culture, of a cultural process, through
medium of his organism. And so it is with the human mind
the
as a
whole. Minding
is
merely the individual biologic aspect of a sociocultural process.
The minding in its form and content The individual mind is a function embraces
it.
What
are determined not culture.
The
is
determined by the culture.
of the cultural system that
it does, what it believes, thinks and feels, by the individual but by the circumambient
individual
human mind
can be
only by a consideration of the culture of which
made it is
intelligible
but a
reflex.
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
185
But we cannot explain the culture in terms of the individual mind; cultural systems can only be explained in cultural terms.
The problem of distinguishing determinants that confronts the human behavior is paralleled by a like problem in
student of
biology: does the determination of a multi-cellular system
the individual
or
cells,
is
the behavior of the individual
Many
function of the organism, or system, as a whole?
argue that the system individual
is
just as
cell,
lie
cell
students of
that society and culture are determined
by
ander B. Novicoff quotes L. V. Heilbrun,
human
An
in the
behavior
individuals.
a
biologists
determined by properties inherent
many
in
insist
Thus, Alex-
Outline oi General
Physiology, pp. 3-4 (Philadelphia, 1943), to the effect that "the
ultimate mechanism responsible for any form of vital activity lies
inherent in an individual cell" (emphasis ours). But Novicoff,
work of Coghill, Lashley, Goldstein and others, argues that the behavior of the cell is determined by its position within the system. Thus, "if ectoderm cells which normally form belly
citing the
skin were
removed from
mouth
over the
into salamander structures— of the
and not
belly skin."
Similarly,
during
mouth; they would form teeth
^®
would not everyone admit that
its first
year of
life
And would
not
a
baby transplanted
a Swedish family and community would learn Chinese rather than
from
to a Chinese cultural milieu
Swedish?
embryo and transplanted
a salamander
organizer of a frog embryo, they would develop
this
baby acquire
his other patterns of
behavior, sentiments, and attitudes from the sociocultural system to which he
had been transplanted? What, indeed, could be
plainer than the fact that the individual in his behavior as a hu-
man
from mere primate or animal,
being, as distinguished
function of the sociocultural system of which he
is
a part?
is
a
*
As we have already indicated by quotations from Bastian and * "Before Clerk Maxwell," Einstein writes, "people conceived of physical After Maxwell they conceived physical ... as material points.
reality
reality as represented
.
.
.
by continuous
fields
.
.
."
(1934, p- 65). Before, or
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
186
Gumplowicz, many
scholars
of a generation
or so ago clearly
human
understood the relationship between the individual
ism and culture. They realized
—the minding
of
full
an individual organism— was
Some
sociocultural system.
is
it
Gumplowicz,
not the individual
thinks, feels, etc., but his society or culture. Others, like
heim, spoke of a
''collective consciousness."
"group mind" emerged and
a
criticized
who
free themselves
could not under-
stand cultural systems and their role as determinants of
no
they asked, can society think,
collective sensorium,
and
a
no group
brain.
mind" school meant, of of an individual's mind ganisms."
they
who
What
is
said,
inappropriate to
form and content
determined by his culture, that
through the media of individual however, was
is
profound insight
those of the "group
course, was that "the
themselves
What
but the group
a
human there
term— "group mind"— was used
designate a culturological process.
express
feel, etc.;
understanding were defeated by
realistic
terminology: a psychological
tures
Thus,
of
This concept was
and rejected by those who could not
How,
who
Durk-
Thus the concept
crystallized.
from an anthropocentric point of view, and behavior.
mind
a function of a
of them, therefore, like
expressed this fact by saying that
organ-
well that the individual
"it is
culor-
not the individual
thinks." This was rejected not only as false
psychologically but as mystical as well.
Another defect of the "group mind"
theorists
was that they
did not properly locate and define the supra-individual deteroutside of, the science of culture,
we may
cultural reality as a series of material points,
say, students i.e.,
conceive of
human
individuals. After, or within,
the science of culture, human reality is seen to consist of a network of sociocultural relations, with the individual a function of the system as a whole. Karl Marx saw this clearly over a hundred years ago when he wrote, in the
"The essence of man is no abstraction inherent each separate individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social lehtions" (emphasis ours). As the science of culture grows and extends its influence among students of human behavior, this view, this understanding, will become Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach: in
commonplace.
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND minant
They
of minding.
located
187
Group and
in the group.
it
in-
dividual are of course complementary terms; one can be interpreted
A
in terms of the other.
to a
number
group mind could therefore be reduced
minds and, by so doing, the force and
of individual
mind" concept would be
significance of "the group
The "group mind" that
school was perfectly sound in
not the individual
it is
lost.
who
its
assertion
determines the form and content
of his minding. But, lacking the concept of culture, they erred in Jocating the supra-individual determinant in the group. It
the group, but culture that
is
culture cannot be explained
groups— their
contrary,
in
structures
terms of individuals.
minds are wrong today to
culture just as individual it
thinks as
it
was formerly to say that
Thinking
is
the
the advance
as
name made in
havior by the "group error
saw
was not
On
the
form and content.
in their
say that it is
it
culture that
is
the group that thinks.
of a neurologic process and
none
the scientific interpretation of
mind" school was
in going too far
clearly the
not
and processes— are functions of
Technically
is
is
the determinant. And, unlike group,
but
in
real
other.
But
human
be-
and important. Their
not going
far
enough. They
inadequacy of an individual psychological
pretation.
But science had not advanced
to elevate
them above the
enough
far
inter-
at that
time
sociological level to that of culturology.
Today, thanks to the expansion of the scope of science, we have the concept of culture.
We appreciate
culture as an
autonomous process
interpretation.
We
the necessity of regarding
for the
purpose of
realize that cultural systems
scientific
can be explained
And we underhuman organism— either as a
only in terms of culturological principles and laws. stand the relationship between the
species, race, or individual— and culture. In
standing,
the
interpretation
old-fashioned of
culture
as
"is
this
under-
anthropomorphic
something that
"creative acts of the individual mind," that
who
view of
psychologistic,
it
is is
produced
by
the individual
always responsible for additions to culture," that "it
is
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
188 always the individual
who
really thinks
and
acts," etc.,
is
definitely
We
more than suspect out of place in modern ethnological theory. that this emphasis upon individualism has been outgrown in psychology, that social psychology of the present day would regard this
conception of the individual as a creator of culture as being
as unrealistic as
today
we
do. Its perpetuation in anthropological circles
therefore to be deplored
is
all
the more.
between
If a growing understanding of the relationship
man
and culture means, on the one hand, a decline of the anthropocentric view of man as the creator of culture, it fosters, on the other hand, an appreciation of the role of culture in the minding
man. The human mind is no longer merely an individual biophenomenon. Nor is a "group mind" a proper definition of the situation. It is a question of individual organism on the one hand and an extra-somatic cultural tradition or system on of
logical
the other. Whereas in the case of the lower animals, or in the non-symbolic,
non-human behavior
vidual biological organism
is
human
individual's behavior, in the case of
man mind,
Homo
of
the organism as such
is
sapiens, the indi-
determinant of the
significant as a
behavior, of the hu-
not significant;
it
is
not
stature, skin color, cephalic index, cortical activity, or glandular
secretion that determines
whether
a
person will speak Chinese,
believe in witches, have an aversion for milk, or regard cows as sacred.
These things are determined by one's human mind, therefore, calls
standing of the
culture. for
An
under-
an appreciation
of the role of cultural factors as determinants of thinking, feel-
ing and acting.
The mind
stand the
of the individual— the average, typical,
own culture has made mind one must understand culture as
normal individual— is
as its
it.
To
well;
under-
human
"mental processes" are but the psychosomatic form of expression of an extra-somatic culture process.
ing
be
must therefore be sure,
factor
within a single and
may be
The
student of
human mindTo
culturologist as well as psychologist. fairly
uniform culture, the cultural
regarded as approximately a constant. But, even
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND here,
it
would be
well, first of
and, secondly, to realize that
and just
that, as
all,
it is
189 to
be aware of
this constant,
cultural in nature
and
genesis,
from the standpoint of the individual organism,
external
and foreign to
processes of meteorology.
it
as
are
the
elements
it
is
and
CHAPTER EIGHT GENIUS:
ITS
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
"Geniuses are the indicators of the realization of coherent pattern ." A. L. Kroeber, Configurations of Culgrowths of cultural value .
—
.
Growth.
ture
1 he
many
so
been discussed
significance of the genius in history has
times in the
last seventy-five years
that
one should
not go over the vi'ell-trodden ground again without a special warrant for doing
so.
The
expansion of the scope of science in
and the recent development of the science of culture and offered as our excuse for embark-
general
in particular are here cited
ing once again
upon
Briefly stated, the historical events to
great
men
this perennial debate.
problem
this: are
is
be explained
men
social
and
of genius, or are
explainable in terms of social processes and historical
trends? Or, do both, the great
man and
bine to produce the event or trend, and
Most
epoch-making
in terms of
those
of
championed
who have
either the great
so in
if
wrestled with
man
com-
his social matrix,
what proportions? problem have
this
or society as the motive force,
as the cause, the other being regarded as the effect;
few have been
willing to give equal, or even approximately equal, weight to each factor.
Let
it
be
said at
once that
we have no
"impartial" and of taking the latter course.
the great
man
is
intention of being
We are convinced
that
best understood as an effect or manifestation
rather than as a prime mover.
technique for demonstrating
And we
this,
190
believe
we have
or at least a refinement
a
new upon
GENIUS:
ITS
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
191
techniques employed for this purpose in the past. But before introduce our technique,
let
we
us turn briefly to the history of this
problem. of course, long been the fashion to interpret great events
It has,
as the
work
of great
have boasted that,
men. From the time of the Pharaohs, rulers and accomplishments, and before
of their deeds
no doubt,
tribal chieftains
made
similar claims. Bards
troubadors once sang of the exploits of heroes, and
have tended to write in the same vein: History
historians
record of the deeds of Great
from the
Men, good and
bad.
political events of history to great
When we
works of
and
modern
art,
is
a
turn
new
philosophies or religions, significant discoveries in science, and
epoch-making inventions, we find the same type of interpretation: these advances and achievements are the work of geniuses, of like
men
Michelangelo, Kant, Beethoven, Newton, and Edison.
In 1869 a distinguished British F.R.S., gave formal
man
of science, Francis Gal ton,
and authoritative expression to the Great
Man
theory in his Hereditary Genius. Great events and great periods
he argued, are due
in history,
period, the
genius will
and
may
to
men
despite any opposition or handicap that social conditions
felt
place in his way. Galton compares the United States with
England rigid in
to demonstrate this point.
America, he reasons, and
England. Yet, he
says,
there are
present
it
will assert itself
Galton carried
and
his reasoning
therefore easier for
social
on the
contrary, there are
we may assume find expression still
one to
status there than in
no more men of genius per
million in America than in England;
Therefore, he concludes,
Class distinctions are less
it is
overcome the disadvantages of low
less.
of genius; the greater the
more numerous the men of genius. A man of true assuredly come to the fore and make himself known
that
if
genius
is
and recognition.^
further. Since the correlation
ability and fame is so close, we can evaluate and by counting the men of genius per thousand or million. Proceeding on this basis, Galton finds that the Athenians
between inborn
compare
races
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
192
of the time of Pericles were two grades higher than the Enghsh,
who in turn were two grades higher than the African Negro.^ The scientific prestige of Galton and the scholarly character of his work did much no doubt to confirm many in their belief not only that civilization has been the work of geniuses but that cermore richly endowed than others. In short, Galton
tain races are
provided a simple, scholarly, "scientific"— it was supported with
with which one could explain
statistics!— and authoritative theory
the histories of nations and the development of civilization.
One
of the
first
modern
of
scholars to challenge the Great
theory was Herbert Spencer. In
portant social events by invoking genius or Great
the Great
Man
make
can
Man
of Sociology (1873)
argument against the interpretation of im-
a cogent
he offered
The Study
society,
he
Men. Before must make
insisted, society
him. Not only does Spencer indicate the nature and extent of society's
influence
brands the Great popular alike
in
upon every
Man
among
individual,
great
and
he
small,
theory as a form of anthropomorphism
savage tribes and civilized societies.^
William James took sharp and and vigorous issue with Spencer an address, "Great Men, Great Thoughts and the Environ-
ment," published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1880. Great events
and epochs
of Great Men, he insists. A may be produced by a single, or at most But for a great epoch many are required. "For
in history are the
work
single important event
a few, geniuses. a
community
life,"
he
says,
to get vibrating through
"many
geniuses
cession are required. This
coming together and
why
is
and through with
great epochs are so rare— why
the sudden bloom of a Greece, an early
Rome,
such a mystery. Blow must follow blow so occur in the intervals. descent,
Then
its
a Renaissance,
fast that
no cooling can
internal
inertia
movement have
long after
passed away.
often hear surprise expressed that in these high tides of affairs
is
the mass of the nation grows incan-
and may continue to glow by pure
the originators of
active
in rapid suc-
not only the people should be
filled
We
human
with stronger
life.
GENIUS:
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
ITS
193
but that individual geniuses should seem so exceptionally abundant. This mystery is just about as deep as the time-honored
conundrum
why
by great towns." * James admits that the great man's environment may condition as to
great rivers flow
his behavior or affect the
consequences of his behavior, but he
denies emphatically that the social environment can produce him. "If anything
man's
humanly
is
certain,"
he
can remake
that the great
insists, "it is
society, properly so called, does
not make him before he
^
it."
This point of view so adroitly expressed by James widely held today. Every great event
one or
may
a
is
few outstanding individuals. The
rest in a single pair of
hands.
It
World War V-E day we have
person, and since
tried
for having
fined to the
Many
man
thing a few
and hanged a number is
this
view con-
even to statesmen in high places.
and men of science subscribe
scholars
whole nation
common
brought the war about. Nor
in the street or
of course,
had been caused by one
II
men
fate of a
was a
years ago to hear that
of
is,
regarded as the work of
to
it
also.
Thus
prominent American anthropologist, Edgar Lee Hewett, has
a
re-
cently attributed almost every great historical epoch, from Xerxes to
Hitler,
individual:
to
the genius, pathologic or otherwise, of a single
all
great "irruptions" of history have been "one
man
Hooton speaks of "men like Hitler and Mussolini [who] impose their evil will upon stupid and suggestible masses." Lawrence K. Frank says that "as long as we are at the affairs,"
he
says.
E. A.
mercy of the warped, distorted prestige
...
at
who seek power and we are helpless." The
personalities
whatever cost to others,
distinguished physicist, Robert A. Millikan, can see
which science can prevent the destruction of wickedness or
folly:
"I see
being able to turn some
no prospect," he
new
no way by
civilization says,
by man's
"of our ever
type of ray upon a dictator
filled
with lust of power and conquest and thus transform him into a humanitarian." In a different context, Goldenweiser says that history
"abounds in examples of periods of precipitated change
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
194
due
the emergence of
to
.
.
dominant
.
Franz
personalities."
Boas speaks of African "Negro rulers whose genius for organization has enabled
them
to establish flourishing empires." Clark Wissler
supposes that "long ago
.
.
there arose a genius for empire
.
building which set a pattern" that endured for thousands of years.
And Ralph vidual
Linton more conservatively admits that the "indi-
dominated and shaped by
is
not obliterated by
is
it.
Under
can even change and mold
environment but he
his social
favorable conditions," he says, "he
it." ®
A
man
great
could therefore
presumably work great change.
Thus we have two opposing
views.
On
the one hand, great
events or great epochs of history, important advances in philos-
ophy,
and
art,
science, are interpreted as the
ceptionally gifted persons.
genius
by
the other,
it
to advance reasons If,
argument,
we
and marshall evidence
we
therefore,
if
not produced
shall
in support of
are to extricate ourselves
ex-
argued that the
is
conditioned by his social environment
is
Both views seem plausible and tenable. Each side
it.
tion.
On
handiwork of
from
is
its
able posi-
this circular
have either to rephrase the problem or apply
new and better techniques
to
its
solution. Let us see
what can
be done. Galton and James make the interpretation of history seem simple and easy: Great events and epochs are the work of of genius; is
if
lacking.
an era
Why
is
uneventful or mediocre
it
is
men
because genius
has Sardinia fallen far below Sicily in greatness
and distinction when
"all
the material advantages are in favor
of Sardinia?" James asks. His ready answer: "Simply because individuals were born there with patriotism to inflame their
countrymen with national
a thirst for independent
But to
if
He
for?
ability
no
enough
pride, ambition,
and
^
great epochs are caused
be accounted
satisfying.
life."
and
by geniuses, how are geniuses
James' answer to this question
says in effect that
we cannot
is
hardly
explain their origin
and incidence. "The causes of production of great men," he
says.
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
GENIUS:
ITS
"lie in a
sphere wholly inaccessible to the social philosopher.
must simply accept geniuses spontaneous variations."
It
195
as data, just as
the "invisible
is
He
Darwin accepts his and unimaginable
play of forces of growth within the nervous system which, responsibly to the environment, to function in a certain way."
makes the brain
And,
ir-
peculiarly apt
an individual genius
just as
appears spontaneously, so do they cluster "fortuitously around a given epoch making
great" or they are "fortuitously absent
it
from certain places and times." This theory
an eminent
may seem
scientist
*
plausible, especially since
and philosopher. But and
their clustering
epochs are governed by the
historical
stars.
comes from
it
much
One might
the explanations astrology has to offer? birth of individual geniuses
is it
better than
say that the
about certain
James' theory
course superior to that of astrology both because
it is less
is
of
mystical
The astrologist really offers an explanation though a false one: human events are controlled by stars. But is James' answer, "chance," really an explanation? Or
and because
is
it
explains
a device to conceal
it
that there that the
The
less.
ignorance and helplessness, a declaration
and can be no better answer? Or
is
phenomena
scientist
is
in question are
not likely to be
indeed
satisfied
is
it
v^dth
it
statistically
and thus
James shows no interest
in
a
chance to
relate
statistical
phenomena; he is "an invisible and unimaginable play of
nature?
"chance" as an
answer to his queries— unless, of course, he can see deal with
an assertion
statistical in
how he
can
scientific law.
consideration of these
content to leave the matter on the basis of forces,"
and upon spon-
taneous and fortuitous events.*
Galton does not
tends to be hereditary, he reasons, *
A more
upon sheer chance. Genius and therefore when a genius
rely so squarely
recent writer resorts to the fortuitous appearance of genius to The Reverend H. Harrington, writing in the
explain great historic events.
Encyclopaedia Britannica ("Roman Catholic Church," 14th ed.), says that the Protestant revolt was "almost fortuitous. Genius defies all laws, and the greatest Protestant leader [Luther]
had genius."
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
196
because he has had exceptionally gifted forebears. Certain conditions cause an increase in the number or proportion of geniuses; others bring about a decrease. If Athens was once
appears
it
is
was because certain conditions brought it about; too, was due to certain if she fell from her former high state, that, circumstances. Galton thus does not content himself, as James rich in geniuses
it
does, with the assertion that presence or absence of genius at certain times
of the rise
and places
and
fall
is
purely fortuitous. But his explanation
of Athens in terms of racial ability
not very
is
convincing. As the distinguished sociologist, C. H. Cooley, pointed
out long ago in a well reasoned criticism of Galton, "both the rise and the decline of the race are ascribed to the same cause,
namely immigration. Certainly, then, some reason should be given for supposing that there was a radical change in the character of the immigration: but no such reason
With
persons and their environment, genius,
that
obstacles the
like
we have
already noted that Galton
murder, will
no matter what
out,
environment may oppose. James admits that
environment may insists,
affect a genius, that
it
may
is
true,"
public fermentations awaken and adopt torpid times
social
help or hinder him.
the significant factor in this environment
another genius or geniuses! "It
more
^
regard to the relationship between exceptionally gifted
believes
But, he
given."
is
he
writes,
many
would have had no chance
is
merely
"that great
geniuses, to work.
who
But
.
in .
.
must be an exceptional concourse of genius about a time make the fermentation begin at all." If, on the other hand, a
there to
social setting
is
not hospitable to a particular genius,
"some previous genius of a different munity away from the sphere of his Voltaire,
strain has
it is
because
warped the com-
possible effectiveness. After
no Peter the Hermit." Thus, according to James, the
thing that fosters or frustrates a
man
of genius
is
not simply an
environment, but another, or other, geniuses. Whether, therefore, genius finds expression and bears fruit or remains unrecognized
and unknown, the cause
is
always "genius."
We
thus have a
GENIUS:
ITS
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
197
ready and easy explanation of history and social movements: the
presence or absence of genius. But, unfortunately, says }ames,
we cannot
predict genius; that
a matter of the "invisible
is
and
The
unimaginable play of forces within the nervous system."
utmost that sociology can ever predict, he argues,
show the way,
genius of a certain sort
"
follow."
Science
not likely to be
is
if
a
be sure to
society will
satisfied
that
"is
with reasoning and
conclusions such as these.
We do not propose to go over the old vidual
indi-
conundrum about the egg or the chicken. Indeed, as we have seen,
vs. society; it is
the priority of the Great
much
argument of
familiar
Man
too
like the old
Society debate has been put in precisely this
vs.
man
form, with Spencer contending that before the great
can
must make him, whereas James insists that the genius must come first. Obviously, some men are distinguished markedly from others, and their lives and deeds are especially significant. Obvious also is the influence of society upon excepaffect society, society
tionally gifted persons.
comprise a whole.
If this
Society controversy that each factor is
to
this
is
we
a
were
made up
is
all
there
is
new
The growth and
But
it
society
this
upon
his effect
conditions the
What that he
is is
not
is
vs.
and say all
there
expansion of science has
science that has a great deal to say on this
life
man
society. Sociology
of the
of genius
shows
how
exceptionally gifted person.
Culturology explains both the great relationship
Man
at that
point, namely, culturology. Psychology presents the
and demonstrates
and parts
of parts,
to the Great
should have to leave
a function of the other.
problem.
brought forth
A whole
man and
society
and the
between them.
genius?
The
debate of decades has
made
it
quite clear
not identical with a neuro-sensory-glandular-etc. system
of exceptionally high quality.
On
the one hand,
we do
not
know
that every outstanding individual possesses an exceptionally fine neuro-sensory-glandular-etc. system.
On
the other hand,
we do
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
198
not
that undistinguished persons have only mediocre or
know
We
inferior systems.
are not warranted, therefore, in equating
"genius" with "superior organism": the person of distinction, while
Nor may we
superior organism. in
G
O
which
a superior organism, S, the social environment,
is
the resulting genius, because, as
both that
O
G = O, in which G represents O stands for his biologically use the equation O X S = G,
a function of
is
must write our equation
we have
S and that S
thus:
O
R
X
seen,
is
it
a function of
= G.
Here
and
can be argued
O
O.
We
will stand
merely for an individual biological organism, not necessarily one of superior quality,
G
for genius,
and
R
for a factor
which we
have yet to define.
How do we can
recognize a genius?
we know
But is
is
his deeds, of course.
he has an exceptionally
that
glandular-etc. system? to say this
By
By
his
But how
neuro-sensory-
deeds, say Galton, James, et
al.
to admit that his innate biological superiority
merely an inference based upon observation of his overt be-
havior,
and
also to
insist
that the exceptional features of this
behavior cannot be explained in any other
them
nerves, glands, senses, etc., or
rule out
all
way than by
by
direct examination of his
by psychological
is
not to
as another, or that
from a sow's insist
beings.
would
then the case of the champions of genius as prime
movers would receive substantial support. But
not
tests that
factors not genetically acquired, instead of postulating
inferentially,
done. This
attributing
one could demonstrate the
to superior brains, glands, etc. If
biological superiority of the genius
it
fine
say, of course, that
it
impossible to
is
tell
the sciences of
ear. All of
this has
one organism
never been is
as
man
will freely grant, if
human
upon, the biological inequality of individual
Nor would anyone,
I
suppose, maintain that one cannot
distinguish an idiot or imbecile from
by observations of of instances.
But
their
this
is
good
a biological silk purse
behavior— at
a far cry
one of superior intelligence least in a
high percentage
from the assertion that
plays a distinguished role in social life
if
a
man
he must have superior
GENIUS:
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
ITS
germ plasm whereas
if
he
mediocre or inferior plasm.
199
undistinguished
is
We
he must have
are not content to derive our
biology by inference, and, secondly,
we
can explain distinction
iix
other terms than superior nerves and glands.
But
to invoke "society" as Spencer
and countless others since
1872 have done to account for distinction is
is
but an organization of individuals, and so
affecting another, the ordinary
man
not enough. Society
we have one
person
jostling his brother while the
genius fosters or discourages genius, as James has argued. Society
and individual are simply two
aspects, opposite
but inseparable
same phenomenon; we can "explain" each one in the other. Thus we go around in circles, chasing our tails,
poles, of the
terms of
getting nowhere.
The
science of culture liberates us from this dilemma. It provides
we can explain both human beings, both
us with techniques with which individual.
and
The
collectively,
behavior of is
a
on the other:
biological factor,
and
determined by their biological make-up on the
one hand, and by culture,
society
individually
C
body of extra-somatic phenomena
O
X
C
>B, in
which
O
called
stands for the
for the extra-somatic, supra-biological factor
of culture, and B, the resultant behavior.*
Individual
and
human
beings differ biologically from one another
differences in their behavior
part to their anatomical
and
may
legitimately
be ascribed in
physiological differences.
Human
beings vary as groups, too; one race, stock, or physical type,
may
be distinguished from another. But, so far as we know, none of the differences of behavior between peoples— races, tribes, nations
—can be attributed to their biological differences. The biological factor may conceivably contribute something to the variation of
—
* Both organism and culture and consequently the behavior resulting from are of course affected by the natural enthe interaction of these two factors vironment. But in the problem which confronts us now we are concerned only with the relationship between man and culture. The environmental factor may therefore legitimately be considered a constant and as such be omitted
from our consideration.
—
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
200 behavior, but this contribution
is
so small in
comparison with the
influence of the cultural factor that it may be regarded as negligible. In short, the differences of behavior from one people to
another are culturally, not biologically, determined. In a consideration of behavioral differences among peoples therefore we may regard the biological factor as a constant and hence eliminate
from our
We
calculations.
it
may, then, rewrite our formula for the
behavior of any people with reference to the behavior of others >B, culture produces, or determines, behavior; as follows:
C
the behavior of a
B
= f{C):
behavior
people is
determined by
is
its
Or,
culture.
a function of culture. Variations in be-
among peoples are functions of variations in culture: Vb = f(Vc). The relationship between the human biological factor in the mass and the extra-somatic cultural factor is thus made clear. havior
Where
does one people have one form of society whereas another
has a different form? difference because, as factor
this picture?
then does society enter
Why
is
The psychologist cannot we have just seen, the
one tvpe of
is
psycho-biological
social process take place in
the cause?
Culture
is,
is
The answer is, as we have seen
an
Why
equally inadequate.
one case whereas
find a different type of interaction? This
tion at issue; "social process" is
this
a constant. "Social process," or "social interaction," the
basic concept of the sociologist,
we
account for
effect,
is
in
does
another
precisely the ques-
not a cause.
What
then
of course, culture. repeatedly, a class of extra-somatic,
phenomena. They have an existence prior to the birth of every individual. They are external to him and act upon him from the outside. They are traditional; they are passed down from one generation to another, and they may be borrowed, latersupra-biological
ally,
from one's contemporaries and neighbors. Culture consists
of beliefs,
customs, institutions, tools, utensils,
hold of the organisms of
shape them
this
way and
etc.,
which
lay
Homo sapiens at birth and mold and that. A people has one form of social
organization rather than another because as biological organisms
GENIUS:
ITS
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
they react and respond to different stimuli.
But how
are
we
201
sets of cultural
to explain culture?
to circular reasoning here.
We
We
elements as
need not
do not explain culture
resort
terms
in
of "social process" and "social process" again in terms of culture, as the sociologist
is
wont
Nor do we
to do.
explain individual
personality in terms of culture and then turn around and explain
culture in terms of personality, as
many
minded anthropologists
psychologically
and
social psychologists
do.
We
explain culture
in terms of culture.
To many, no
doubt, this will seem like no explanation at
In an earlier day
it
may have seemed empty
all.
to explain the be-
havior of stars and planets in terms of stars and planets instead of the will
and whim of
spiritual beings.
But the explanation of
events in non-animistic and non-anthropomorphic terms
and
well established in the physical retain
more than
biological sciences.
now
is
We
still
a vestige of anthropomorphism in the social
sciences.
To
explain
culture
terms
in
new
of
culture
is
merely
syntheses,
and
is
a
a linguistic
Matrilineal
combination of certain cultural elements;
lineal organization, a synthesis of other elements.
relationship
say
react
Thus a change in the process of fomiing plurals is phenomenon, not a psychological or sociological one. organization
to
upon one another, form eliminate some elements as obsolete, and so on.
that cultural elements act
patri-
We discover the
between the manufacture of automobiles and the
use of buggies directly, and so on. In short, culture
may be
inter-
preted culturologically rather than sociologically or psychologically.
More than
that, there are
many problems
that can be solved only
by culturological techniques, psychological and pretations being illusory or irrelevant. Let us
sociological inter-
now
return to the
problem of genius.
We shall be defined
begin with a statement of premises: as a
person
who
is
i.
A
genius will
regarded as a genius; there
is
no
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
202 point in saying that
many
a genius
is
born, lives and dies unrecog-
One may well say that many a person of very superior endowment lives and dies without full realization of his
nized.
native
and without achieving recognition or fame. But
potentialities
purposes of our inquiry
we
for
who
will confine ourselves to persons
have been regarded as geniuses. 2. The distribution of native ability, from those of very low capacity on the one end of the curve to the exceptionally gifted on the other, has been uniform
We
throughout time, at least within the species Homo sapiens. have no reason for believing that more or less idiots or persons of exceptional ability were born per 100,000 in one age than another.
3.
The
average and range of native abilities
among
various races of the world are at least approximately the for
all.
Degree of cultural development
native ability,
is,
of course,
the
same
no index of
and the testimony of comparative anatomy, physi-
ology and psychology will support this proposition. Let us turn
now
to
Why
some of the specific problems of genius. do geniuses cluster about certain epochs of
history instead
of being uniformly distributed through time? James says that is
"fortuitous," pure chance.
just the opposite.
One
But the laws of probability
cannot
tell
which woman
to an exceptionally gifted child or to twins. probability
tell
us
how many
pairs of twins
tell
will give birth
But the laws of
we may
expect in
we
every 100,000 births, or per year in a given population, and
may assume
that the number, or proportion, of idiots or babies
of exceptional
constant. It justifies
it
us
is
endowments born
likewise
will
precisely the factor of
be
definite
and
chance and probability that
our assumption of a uniform distribution of exceptionally
gifted persons in a large population over a considerable period of
time.
How,
then, can
we
explain the fact— for
it
is
a
fact— that
geniuses are not distributed uniformly in time and place but cluster
A
do
about certain epochs and regions?
culturological interpretation
makes
does not grow or change at uniform
this quite clear.
rates;
Culture
there are periods of
GENIUS:
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
ITS
A
203
and periods of stagnation and even
intense activity
may
retrogression.
change or progress for a long period and then suddenly burst forth with vigorous activity and growth. culture
An
exhibit
little
invention or discovery such as metallurgy, agriculture, the
domestication of animals, the keystone arch, the alphabet, microscope, steam engine, etc.,
and
may
inaugurate an era of rapid change
progress.
But
work of genius? The answer is of by genius you mean "someone who makes a discovery or invention." But this is just reasoning in
are not inventions the
course "Yes," significant
if
a circle. Merely because a person makes a great discovery or in-
vention
does not follow that he
it
possessed of exceptionally
is
endowment, and much all others who have no
mean
he
great natural
less
superior to
great achievement to their
it
an empty redundancy since genius
is
that
is
"genius" to explain the invention
credit. Therefore, to appeal to
or discovery
does
is
here defined
and the appeal to exceptionally great native unwarranted or at least misleading.
in terms of the event,
endowment
is
According to our premises we must assume that there were in
England
in Neolithic times
with as
much
James Watt possessed. Yet no one would claim that such could have invented the steam engine. This recognition of the fact that there
is
more
is
may
be.
An
invention or discovery
is
a
man
of course but a
to an invention or dis-
covery than germ plasm or brain tissue, no matter
they
men
natural ability as
how
a cultural,
i.e.,
excellent
an
extra-
somatic, supra-biological, affair as well as a psychological act.
invention
is
a
system there
new is
An
synthesis of cultural elements.* In any cultural
constant interaction
They
among
its
constituent ele-
upon one another, changing and modifying one another, forming new combinations and syntheses. Certain traits or elements become obsolete and are ments: culture
traits.
act
and
react
not an accidental mutation of the germ plasm, but a which the inventor is heir by tradition only," (V. Gordon Childe, Man Makes Himself, p. 19). * ''An invention
new
is
synthesis of the accumulated experience to
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
204 eliminated from the stream.
New
elements are introduced from
the outside from time to time.
Thus, in
this interactive process, axes are fitted
eyes are put into awls
and they become needles,
tempering material
dried then fired;
is
by
jur)',
clay
first
is
added; the wheel
sun-
adapted
is
become synthesized
to the ceramic art; certain customs clan, trial
with handles,
into the
primogeniture, or parliamentary government; in
philosophy and science old concepts are synthesized into new formulations, the work of Galileo, Kepler and Brahe is synthesized into laws of
copper,
motion and gravitation
etc., are
in the
hands of Newton;
coal,
introduced into the stream of culture. Discoveries
of course occur by chance, as in the case of the association
may
and a photographic plate in the laboratory of Rontgen. But to be significant, the chance must have the proper
of pitchblende
soil,
a suitable cultural context.
An
invention or discovery
is
a synthesis of already existing cul-
elements, or the assimilation
tural
cultural system.
The
of a
new element
invention of the steamboat
a
is
lation
The steam
and
synthesis.
of an age-old process of cultural
We
can trace
it
back through
mechanical, metallurgical, and ideological, to the
The
boat, too,
is
a
good example
of the former; the origin of metallurgy, of the latter.
engine was the outcome
into
accumu-
many
lines,
Old Stone Age.
the outgrowth of an interactive and synthesizing
culture process that
we
can trace back to antiquity.
of the steamboat was, therefore, simply a
streams of cultural development.
With
The
invention
merging of these two
regard to the origin of
agriculture, metallurgy, non-Euclidean geometry, the
germ theory
of disease, etc., each of these was the organized expression of an
accumulation of cultural experience. Just as the discoveries of Pasteur would have been impossible in the time of Charlemagne, so was agriculture impossible in the days of
invention and discovery
is
Cro-Magnon. Every
but a synthesis of the cultural accumu-
lations of the past with the experiences of the present.
Two
significant conclusions
can
now be drawn:
(i)
No
inven-
GENIUS:
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
ITS
205
tion or discovery can take place until the accumulation of culture
has provided the elements— the materials and ideas— necessary for the synthesis, and,
When
(2)
the requisite materials have
been made available by the process of cultural growth or
and given normal conditions of or discovery
The
first
is
bound
diffusion,
cultural interaction, the invention
to take place.
be accepted more Almost everyone would admit that the
of these propositions will probably
readily than the second.
steam engine could not have been invented in the Paleolithic
many
Age. But
persons, resenting a determinism that they fear
but do not understand,
gin, this
will
demand,
"How
can you prove that
would have invented the steam engine, the cotton etc., if Watt, Whitney, etc., had not done so?" Of course cannot be proved, in one sense at least. Neither can one
someone
else
summer of 1973, or even that the sun will rise tomorrow. But we can adduce so much evidence in support of our claim as to make its validity seem prove that
virtually
it
will rain in Detroit in
conclusive.
Take
inventions and discoveries
for
made
the
example the matter of multiple simultaneously but independently.
Kroeber discussed the significance of such phenomena in "The Superorganic" (1917). Five years later Ogburn and lished a long
an
list
article significantly entitled
burn published
Thomas pub-
of simultaneous but independent inventions in
"Are Inventions Inevitable?" Og-
this list later in Social
voluminous and impressive. Time
Change. The evidence
after time,
is
two or more men,
working quite independently, have made the same invention or discovery. In 1843, the
Law
of Conservation of
Energy was formu-
by Mayer. In 1847, it was formulated by four other men, Joule, Helmholz, Colding, and Thomson, working independently of one another and, of course, Mayer. The discovery and
lated
recognition of the cellular basis of both animal and plant tissue
was made (or claimed) by no
less
than seven
men (Schwann,
Henle, Turpin, Dumortier, Purkinje, Muller, and Valentin) and all in
the same, or very approximately the same, year: 1839.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
206
Now
the question
number
of
Why
is,
men working
in each of these instances did a
independently make a notable
discovery or invention at almost exactly the
we
same time?
scientific
How
to explain the fact that a great generalization like the
are
Law
of
Conservation of Energ)- or a great discovery like the cellular basis of
life,
which had
lain
capabilities of everyone before
beyond the
suddenly and almost overnight was achieved by not one
this time,
whole handful? that these achievements were the say would William James work of genius and that the appearance of a man of genius is individual or two, but by a
fortuitous.
But
the appearance of a single genius
if
is
a
chance
occurrence, "the unlikeliness of the concourse of genius about a
time
is
far greater."
Yet we have many such "concourses": any-
where from two to seven or more persons achieving independently the same important result. This places a heavy burden upon the theory of probability, a burden that of the ages of the
men
at the
increased
is
when we think
time of their noteworthy achieve-
ment. Thus, in a single year a number of geniuses of v^dely varying ages
light their
all
lamps
had no other explanation "chance" one wonders feeble gesture
by
at
same time! Even
at the
all
for
this
why anyone would want
calling
it
if
we
phenomenon than to dignify this
a scientific explanation.
Culturological theory provides a simple explanation of this
markable "coincidence." The
Law
re-
of Conservation of Energy was
simply the synthesis of already existing concepts, each of which, in turn,
was the outgrowth and synthesis of
synthesis of cultural elements requires
two
earlier experience.
A
things: the elements in
question and a process of interaction. Cultural interaction
is
always
going on in any cultural system, although the rate of interaction
may
vary.
A
requisite for
given synthesis cannot take place until the elements it
are available, obviously. But,
present, the process of cultural interaction synthesis.
Uranium
The
situation
235. If
is
something
the mass of metal
is
when the elements are is bound to effect the
like the chain reaction in belov^^
a certain size a chain
GENIUS: reaction is
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
ITS is
impossible.
But when
reached, the chain reaction
207
a certain
size— the
elements requisite to the formulation of the
that
it
made
was achieved not once but
The phenomena
Law
size"—
of Conservation
when they became
of Energy were not available. But,
the interactive culture process
"critical
inevitable. Prior to 1843-47, the
is
available
their synthesis so "inevitable"
five times.*
and simultaneous, but independent, inventions and discoveries thus have an important bearing upon the question of genius and the Great Man. As we have already noted, we are justified in assuming that the birth of men of exceptional ability
of
is
multiple
uniform within a large population
fairly
Western Europe for example. To assume that there was no one in Europe with sufficient mental ability to formulate
like that of
the
Law
but that
in
1823-27, or in 1833-37,
1843 one such person appeared only to be followed
in
by four more
The
chance.
Energy
of Conservation of
in
47,
is
to put a severe strain
upon the laws of makes very
culturological interpretation, however,
modest assumptions.
It
assumes that the cultural elements
quisite for the synthesis that
the
is
Law
on hand and available otherwise the synthesis no one however able or intelligent can build without
The
re-
must be could not be made;
of Conservation
materials.
culturologist assumes further that these materials did not
suddenly spring into being out of nothing, but that they had antecedents, that they grew out of previous cultural situations. This, too,
is
no instance
and modest assumption. We know of which something has come from nothing, in cul-
a reasonable in
tural systems or in those of
any other kind; one thing grows out
of another. In short, the culturologist merely assumes the exist-
ence of a culture process, the existence of such things as languages, beliefs,
tools,
customs,
etc.,
metabiological continuum,
that
i.e.,
constitute
an extra-somatic,
they are passed
down from one
* ". there is a good deal of evidence to indicate that the accumulation or giowth of culture reaches a stage where certain inventions if not inevitable ." (Ogbum, Social Change, p. 343). are certainly to a high degree probable .
.
.
.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
208
generation to another by mechanisms of social heredity.
ments of tool
upon
belief, belief
new combinations
In this interactive process
formed,
The
ele-
upon one another: tool upon tool, upon custom, custom upon custom, etc.
this process interact
elements are
of
syntheses achieved. It goes without saying that a
new
given synthesis cannot be achieved until the requisite elements for the synthesis are available: the
steam engine could not have
been invented in the Neolithic age. perhaps, that
when
It is
not quite so obvious,
the elements necessary for a given synthesis
are present in a process of interaction that the synthesis will take place.
The
lay
going on of ally,
image of
rebels at this notion of a deterministic process
and
effecting inventions
and
so to speak,
as the
was
mind
itself,
inevitably.
One who
could
Man say,
discoveries automatic-
"Let there be light and there
Let there be a law of conservation of energy and
light."
there will be such a law.
culture process that not only determines tent but the behavior of
But the evidence it
may
be.
man
its
When
becomes
course and con-
however
flattering
and
the culture process has reached a point
where an invention or discovery becomes or discovery
own
as well.
against such a view,
is
a law must some impersonal
But the formulation of such
be man's doing, he fondly believes, not that of
consoling
think of himself
likes to
still
inevitable.
temperate and unwarranted, but
possible, that invention
This language this
may seem inwe are not
only because
is
yet accustomed to thinking of the culture process in terms of natural law;
we
least in the
realm of
human
or discovery
becomes
inevitable at the
possible
happen.
is
still
think of
it
as operating to
free will.
It is significant to
one would argue that
some extent
at
say that an invention
same time that it becomes will happen when it will note that we do not recoil from or
merely a way of saying that
object to this point of view
To
when we
"it" could rain
it
consider the weather. if
No
the various factors and
conditions necessary were not present and in conjunction. Neither
would one want
to argue that rain could fail to fall
if
all
the
GENIUS:
ITS
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
factors necessary for precipitation
209
were present and in conjunction.
Nor would many be inclined to call this fatalism. We simply say that when certain conditions are present precipitation occurs; when these factors or conditions are not present precipitation does not take place.
And
so it is with inventions and discoveries: when certain facand conditions are present and in conjunction an invention
tors
or discovery takes place;
when they
are not present, the invention
or discovery does not occur. Let us glance at
more
of the evidence.
The discovery of sun spots was made independently by at least four men in a single year: by Galileo, Fabricus, Scheiner, and Harriott, in 1611, The parallax of a star was first measured by Bessel, Struve, and Henderson, working independently, in 1838. Oxygen was discovered independently by Scheele and Priestly in
The
1774,
invention of the self-exciting
dynamo was claimed by
Hjorth, Varley, Siemens, Wheatstone, and Ladd in 1866-67, and
by Wilde between 1863-67. The solution of the problem of ration was
Spallanzani,
made independently by and Davy,
Priestly,
in a single year:
telescope and the thermometer each
is
respi-
Scheele, Lavoisier,
1777. Invention of the
claimed by eight or nine
persons independently and at approximately the same time. ''Even
human beings, The great work of Mendel in genetics lay unnoticed for many years. But when it was eventually re-discovered, it was done not by one man the south pole, never before trodden by the foot of
was
at last reached twice in
one summer"
^^
(Kroeber).
but by three— deVries, Correns, and Tschermak— and in year,
1900.
One
could go on indefinitely.
When
interactive culture process reaches a certain point,
a single
the growing,
an invention or
discovery takes place.
The
simultaneity of multiple inventions or discoveries
is
some-
times striking and remarkable. Accusations of plagiarism are not infrequent; bitter rivalries are
waged over
priorities.
"The
right to
the monopoly of the manufacture of the telephone," says Kroeber,
"was long
in litigation; the ultimate decision rested
on an
interval
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
210
between the recording of concurrent descriptions by Alexander Bell and Elisha Gray" ^- (emphasis ours). "But an invention or discover)^ could not occur without a person of hours
make it, and that person must be a genius/' * we are told with some impatience or exasperation. Of course; an invention or disto
covery cannot take place without the activity of a
human
being.
This goes without saying; culture does not and cannot exist without human beings. But, we add nothing to an explanation oi this culture process by including
man
in
our calculations. Conjugations
human
of verbs could not take place without
we need
to introduce
organisms, but do
metabolism and respiration into philological
would not have replaced horses on American farms unless man had been there to effect the change. But in a statement of the relationship between tractors and horses, the science? Tractors
human organism may be— and But what about
genius.^
should
be— completely
disregarded.
Granting that inventions and discoveries
are cultural events, does not a great event require a great
man?
Could an epoch-making invention or discovery take place without the action of a person of exceptional natural endowment?
The
culturologist, like the biologist,
feet, liver, brain, etc.,
may be
larger or smaller than another's;
one
set of glands, nerves, or sense organs
i.e.,
more
vidual
sure: all
Now
efficiently or effectively,
human
abilities;
some
men if
beings differ in
human orOne person's
assumes that
ganisms vary both qualitatively and quantitatively.
may
function better,
than another. In short, indi-
their
natural
are superior to others.
Of one
endowments and we may be
thing
are not equal.
superior,
mediocre, and inferior minds are exposed
equally and uniformly to the influence of a given cultural tradition,
we must conclude that significant inventions and discoveries will be made by the superior, rather than by the average or inferior, * "Origination,
when
of a superior mind," ciology, p. 221,
New
it is more than chance accident, is alwsys the product (E. B. Router and C. Hart, Introduction to SoYork, 1933, empliasis ours).
W.
GENIUS:
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
ITS
minds. Just
as lightning will seek
culture process effect
But the best brains extant in society.
its
211
the best conductor, so will the
syntheses in the best brains available.
available are not necessarily the best brains
A
given cultural tradition does not affect
all
brains in a given society equally. Illiteracy cuts off a portion of the
population from certain cultural influences. In Newton's day the vast majority of
Englishmen were
the great and
illiterate;
their flame in Newton lay beyond the Had Newton been reared a swineherd
traditions that kindled
horizon of most men.
instead of going to Cambridge, the law of gravitation
been formulated by someone
But does not the were synthesized
At
last
vital
would have
else.
fact that the laws of
motion and the calculus
Newton's brain prove that he was a genius?
in
we have come
to the crucial point: are
we
to define a
genius psychologically or culturologically? Is is
a genius a person of exceptional native
he an individual
in
whose
endowment?
*
Or,
neuro-sensory-glandular-etc. system
an important synthesis of cultural events has taken place?
To assume
who
made a significant achievewe have seen, merely an inference. Can we discover outstanding natural endowment apart from distinguished achievement? Our experience with intelligence tests gives us little assurance on this score. To be sure, we can grade persons in terms of intelligence quotients. But many a ment
that a person
has
has superior native ability
person with a high I.Q. notable achievement. ability unaffected
to discover
by
lives
Tests
is,
and
dies undistinguished
social or cultural influences are
tells
us in
Men
down
go
will
tests as to
in
not likely history as
Mathematics that the
of
great mathematical physicist, Henri Poincare,
showing on the Binet
by any
endeavor to measure native
that
men and women who
"geniuses." E. T. Bell
as
made such
a poor
warrant the rating of imbecile.^'
W.
* B. Pillsbury and L. A. Pennington define a genius as "a person of less than one percent of very marked ability ... an I.Q. of 140 or above ." {Handbook oi General Psychology, p. 327). the population .
.
.
.
.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
2,2
manv men in whom great cultural syntheses have mav wdl have been organisms of exceptional natural
To be
sure,
taken place interaction of cultural endoN^-ment as well as the neural loci of the if other factors are elements. This is of course to be expected:
will take place in a constant, the significant cultural synthesis other factors are course, of But. s\-stem of superior qualit>-.
nervous
upon the culturonot constant. \\*e are therefore thrown back organism a signifilogical definition of genius: A person in whose He may have occurred. has s>-nthesis of cultural elements cant
superior brains or he
may
He may have
not.
been a person of
ver>-
average natural endowment, but with superlative education and training or exceptional opportunit}-, or both.
A
consideration of
manv
significant inventions
and
discoveries
does not lead to the conclusion that great abiht>-, native or acquired,
is
On
alwavs necessar)-.
the contrar;-,
many seem
to need
onlv mediocre talents at best. WTiat intelligence was required to invent the steamboat? Is great intelligence required to put one
and one—a boat and an engine— together? i\n ape can do this. James Watt is listed as a genius in many a treatise on this subject. It
even misleading to say that he '"invented" the steam engine.
is
He
—Hero set
many
merelv added a httle to the achievements of
(c. 150 b.c), Battista della Porta (i6ci),
(1665),
Thomas
et
al—before him. The
was merelv carried further in the person of in the organisms of
much
many
men
(169S), Desgauliers, Papin, Nei^--
Saver}-
comen, Cawles% Smeaton,
other
Edward Somercultural process
^\"att as
others since his day.
it
Does
has been it
require
intelligence to discover satelHtes of Jupiter or sun spots
when you have life if
a telescope?
Or
vou have a microscope?
bacteria
and the
.\ telescopic
cellular basis of
or microscopic lens
a piece of glass that changes the course of light passing through Glass
is
it.
the product of an age-old culture process going back to the
burning of brick
mud
is
before that.
in Eg\-pt
and
to sun-dried brick
and daubing
\s-itb
GENIUS:
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
ITS
Isotopes
—elements
hanng
chemical properties, but
213
the same atomic number, the same
different atomic
weights—were discovered
earlv in the present centun.-. In 1906, Bolb^-ood of
an element, ionium, from pitchblende.
It
Yale isolated
was exactly
like
thorium
except in atomic weight. Three kinds of l^d, each with an atomic y. J. Thomson found two kinds Soddy and Kasimir Fajans (working independently, be it noted; advanced an h}-pothesis b)- which these different forms might be explained, Thomson and F. W. Aston in England and K. T. Bainbridge in the United States
own, were found,
weight of
its
(weights
of neon. Frederick
)
examined the whole The%- found that of h-
series of
elements in a search for isotopes.
manv elements
drogen— i.cc
—
S
ha\-e isotopes.
instead of i.c
The atomic weight
— indicated the existence of an
isotope of this element but neither .\ston nor Bainbridge c-ould isolate
it
v.-ith
the mass spectrometer. Harold C. Ure\' thought
by evaporation of Hquid hydrowould e\-aporate more the hea\y form in the residue.
that separation might be effected gen. It was
assumed that the
freelv, lea\'ing a
light isotope
concentration of
As Professor Selig Hecht teUs the
stor%-
in his recent book,
Explaim'ng the Atom, "Ure\- interested F. G. Brickweddie at the
Bureau of Standards, who proceeded to make a gallon of hquid h\drogen. Bricb;\eddie then allowed the hquid to e\-aporate slowly until all left,
but a gram
(Ki
which he shipped
of an ounce) of hquid hydrogen
specimen and the
M. Murphy
isolated the hea^-y
mass spectrometer, Ure\- and G. isotope,
and "for
a\^-arded the
Xovi-
we
this exciting discover^-." sa^'S
Nobel
prize in
1934"
Hecht,
'"Urey.- v.-as
"-'
ha\ e no desire to minimize the importance of this dis-
covei}- as a scientific achie\-ement.
And we
certainly
behttle Dr. Urea's nati\-e and inborn abilities. But, to ask. \\*as intelligence of a
A\~hat precisely did \^-as
was
to Ure\-." \^'"ith this
it
do not M^ish to we would like
high order required for this discovery?
invohe?
No new
theory of atomic structure
advanced; on the contran.-. Ure\" had the heritage of genera-
tions of workeis at his disposal. Ure\- did not discoN-er isotopes;
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
214
they had been found experimentally and explained theoretically bv others. Isotopes of many elements had been isolated and before Urey. Techniques of isolation had been
identified
veloped by Thomson, Aston, Bainbridge, and invent the mass spectrometer;
it
is
hydrogen or even manage isotope would
that a light original;
it
had been
What
tive results.
He
of Dr. Urey.
ner\'es, glands,
tube
in-
did not provide the
The
gradual evaporation.
diffuse faster than a
idea
heavy one was not
out experimentally by Aston with posi-
tried
then did Urey contribute?
we are not minimizing the inborn capaHe may have a superlatively fine organization of
heavy hydrogen, and we sion explicit
We have,
and sense organs.
now wish
and unequivocal:
very ordinary intelligence.
As
though perhaps not
make
removing a
as
this
we
much
implied conclu-
believe that
stain
pickles— requires as
jar of
as
it
to
could have been achieved by a
a matter of fact,
household problem— such
opening a recalcitrant
however, implied that
was not essential to the isolation of
intelligence of a high order
a
de-
did not
let us repeat,
Again, cities
its
He
a descendant of the
vented by Heinrich Geissler about 1862. liquid
others.
from a
much
many
dress or
ingenuity,
technical information— which
is
a
matter of education, not native ability— as that required in the isolation of
give
him
him
excellent technical training, put
laboratory,
how
part,
heavy hydrogen. Take a person of average intelligence,
and assuming some
could he help but
interest
make some
in a well-equipped
and enthusiasm on
significant discovery?
his
One
cannot adventure very long with an electron microscope or a cyclotron without stumbling bling
upon" very aptly
science. fevv
is
The
There
built
is
many
significant advances in
reason that superlatively great advances in science are
not because "genius"
must be
upon something new. And "stum-
characterizes
is
upon, or grow out
rare of, a
but because great syntheses multitude of minor ones.
another property or aspect of culture that has an im-
portant and
significant
bearing upon
the problem
of genius,
GENIUS:
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
ITS
namely, pattern. Nowhere glomeration of
215
mere aggregation or
culture a
is
ag-
culture elements are always organized into
traits;
systems. Every culture has a certain degree of integration, of unity;
upon
rests
it
a certain basis,
and
ing of
is
organized along certain lines
may be
or principles. Thus, a culture
organized around the hunt-
reindeer breeding, the cultivation of rice, or
seal,
facturing and trade. Military activity also factor in the organization cultural system a terns,
phy
number
and
life
manu-
may be an important
of a culture.
Within any given
we may
of sub-systems, which
call pat-
can be distinguished. Painting, music, mythology, philoso-
or science, mechanics, industrial crafts, the medical arts,
and
on are such patterns.
so
A or
'
culture pattern in this sense
traits,
by
is
a cluster of cultural elements,
organized upon the basis of a certain premise and directed
a certain principle of development.
A
tion
phenomena
may be developed
will rest
upon
realistically.
certain direction.
The
assumption and
The mechanical and
it
/^
may attempt
Or, symbolic representa-
in a certain direction.
a certain basic
S^
pattern of painting or
bead-work may be based upon geometric forms or to depict natural
I
art of divination
will
develop in a
industrial arts, science,
and
philosophy, too, will be organized as patterns and will develop as such.
Now
a pattern,
development, has tions.
When
ment
is
trying to
draw
you can go no point;
The
specific potentialities
To
illustrate
a circle.
also inherent limita-
When
with a simple example: a perfect circle has
You
further. Realistic representation of natural objects
and symbolic representation,
art of divination
too,
seems to have
a certain its
limits.
based upon the assumption that the future
liver
may be developed
considerably, as the
Babylonian clay models, with various sections marked
indicate.
are
been achieved
and sculpture cannot be developed beyond
can be read in the little
and
these limits have been reached no further develop-
possible.
in painting
having a given premise, and certain principles of
But hepatoscopy has
its
limits.
The development
off,
of
'
'^
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
215
geometry upon the basis of the axioms of Euclid had hmits that
were inherent
A
in the system or pattern.
certain musical pattern
culmination or fulfillment apparently in the works of Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven. Gothic art as a pattern was inherently limited. Ptolemy carried the development of a certain
reached
its
astronomic system about as far as was possible. All culdevelopment takes place within organized forms, or patterns.
t)'pe of
tural
Kroeber has pointed out repeatedly in Configurations o£ Culture Growth, when a pattern has reached the limits of its potentialities no further development is possible. The alternatives
Now,
as
then are slavish repetition of old patterns or the revolutionary overthrow of the old and the formation of new patterns. In some
we
instances, such as in ancient Egypt, less repetition
we
of old forms; or,
find
monotonous and end-
see a nation like the
United
from ancient Greece or the
States adopting architectural styles
Middle Ages. But the history of culture abounds, of course, in examples of the growth, culmination or fulfillment of patterns and of their replacement by new patterns. New, non-Euclidean systems of geometry are constructed. industrial
and
esthetic arts.
New
New
forms emerge in the
patterns are constructed
on new
premises in philosophy and science.
This phenomenon of culture pattern has an important bearing
upon the problem of labor of countless centuries.
genius.
persons
But the pattern
the work of
a
The development of a pattern is the and of many generations or even
finds
its
culmination,
its
fulfillment, in
men— the Newtons, Darwins, Bachs, Men working both before and after the
few
vens, Kants, etc.
fulfillment of the pattern have less, usually
winning distinction. The
men whose
much
less,
Beetho-
time of
chance of
accident of birth has placed
them somewhere along the slope of the pyramid of the developing fame Bach or a Beethoven born a century or two earlier would have been a mere contributor to a pattern of development rather than the vehicle
pattern have no chance to win the sort of achievement and
given to those whose births place
them
at the peak.
A
GENIUS: of
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
ITS
217
culmination. But a pattern of thought, long in the process
its
of development, will receive
its
fulfillment in the lives
and work
of a few persons.
Men
women who come
and
pattern also have
little
after the culmination of a culture
chance of winning distinction— except
wreckers of the old and perhaps as builders of the new. of growth in physical theory reached of
Newton. So
death that
finished
its
pattern
culmination in the work
and complete was
this pattern at
held physicists and astronomers within
it
A
as
over two hundred years. As Lagrange once remarked,
its
Newton's forms for
Newton was
not only the greatest genius that ever lived but the most fortunate as well, "for
we cannot
to establish."
^^
one's self with no It
is
There
more than once a system of the world in the wake of Newton was to find
more worlds
plain, then,
minants of genius. flow.
find
To be born
to conquer.
that culture patterns are significant deter-
The
culture process
is
not an even and uniform
are initial stages of development, periods of steady
growth, peaks of culmination, plateaus of continuity and repetition, revolutionary upheavals
gration,
and innovations, disruption,
disinte-
and decline. Whether an individual of exceptional natural
endowment
achieves the distinction of genius or not depends
therefore very
much upon
the accidental time of his birth. Should
chance place him somewhere along the slope of a developing pattern his chances of distinction will be relatively slight. Or,
should be born after
his chances for distinguished
he
achievement and fame would also
be meager. But should he chance to be born
at the
time and place
where streams of culture are converging and fusing into a
and complete
if
the culmination has been reached and passed,
synthesis, then his chances will
be
final
relatively great.*
* Even so, there is apt to be room for but one genius only. It was Darwin, not Wallace, who won recognition and fame became the capstone of the edifice even though the latter had worked out the same theory and at the
—
same time.
—
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
2T8
To become
a genius
necessary to be born at precisely the
it is
right time.
The
which an individual
cultural milieu into
thrust at birth
is
do with the likelihood of his achieving recogniculture tion as a genius. If he is born and reared in a frontier quick and a keen eye where a where life is hard and hazardous,
much
also has
to
where hard drinking and harder fighting are manly virtues, and where a square dance to a squeaky fiddle achieve fame as a is the highest form of art, he is not likely to trigger finger are prized,
He may
poet, composer, sculptor, philosopher, or scientist.
may
superb natural endowment, he
excel
possess
others in tracking a
all
bear, roping a steer, or in "calling" a dance, but the accolade of "genius" is not accorded to primacy in these fields. Should, however, an individual be born into a cultural milieu in which a rich and vigorous tradition of music, painting, science or philosophy
flourished,
he could
become
readily
a genius
natural ability, or a distinguished person
if
of exceptional
if
of a
little
more than
average talent. As Cooley observed, in his critique of Galton, "it as difficult for
our countr}^ Parisian to
sons."
be
^®
1897] ^^
[in
become
a
become
good
a
We
now come
soil
and
as
it
is
for
a
for similar rea-
incidence of genius are thus seen to
functions of the cultural setting.
upon the
good painter
base-ball player,
The production and
or not depends
is
an American brought up in the western part of
Whether
a genius
and climate of the
is
realized
cultural habitat.
to another interesting point: namely, the rela-
tionship between the rate of cultural advance and the factor of
human
ability.
Here we have, on the one hand,
a supra-biological
process: the evolution of culture, a temporal-formal sequence of
extra-somatic events.
On
the other,
muscular-glandular-etc. process.
The
we have the
neuro-sensory-
culture process can, as
have seen, be studied, analyzed, and explained in terms of independently of the course that
man
human
organism. This does not
we
itself,
mean
of
has "nothing to do" with the culture process; in
GENIUS:
ITS
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
219
one sense he has everything to do with and makes
culture into existence
does not follow from this that
it.
without taking the
is
man who
we must reckon with
organism in an analysis of culture change. process
It
brings
continuity possible. But
its
To
the
it
human
interpret the culture
human organism
into
account
is
merely to regard the biological factor in the man-culture equation as a constant. But,
how would this
problem
suppose the biological factor were not constant,
examine
variations affect the culture process? Let us
its
in
terms of the magnitude of
abilities only,
not their
qualitative variations.
Let us consider populations of 100,000,000 persons each. Let us
assume
Then
also that ability all
if
members
is
distributed normally rather than skewed.
of society are stimulated equally by their
through invention and
culture, the rate of cultural advance,
covery, will increase
the range of ability
dis-
(1) the average ability is increased, or (2) extended in the direction of superior minds,
if
is
other factors remaining constant. In other words, factor of mental ability
increased, either
is
if
the biological
by an elevation
of the
average or by an extension of the range, the rate of cultural ad-
vance
will increase.
The
acceleration will of course
be
greater
if
both average and range are increased instead of one only. This
means
that the probability of an invention or discovery taking
place at a certain time will vary as the average or range of mental ability of the
Thus,
—a
population
varies,
other factors remaining constant.
in a given cultural situation a certain
invention or discovery
steam engine, the alphabet, the cellular basis of life— would be
more
likely to
occur in a population with a high average of
intel-
ligence than a low one, in a society with a high "ceiling" than in
one with
a
low one.
We see then
that a relationship can
be established between the
extra-somatic cultural tradition and the biological factor of mental ability
which we can express thus:
for the cultural tradition, ability,
and P
B
C
X B
= P, in which C stands
for the biological factor of
mental
for the probability of a certain invention or dis-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
220
The
covery taking place.
probability
increased
is
either
if
C
or
B
remains constant. But— and is increased while the other factor not widely appreciated— one and point, here is a very interesting
any actual
in
historical situation, the factor of
mental
virtually constant for a considerable period of time. factor, however, may, and in
many
cases will, not
ability is
The
be
cultural
a constant.,
In the cumulative, interactive stream of culture, the likelihood of a given invention or discovery increases
day by day.
With
the
and the growth of theory, certain syntheses if the mental ability requisite to a given Thus, are bound to occur. invention or discovery is not present at a given time, the growth accumulation of
facts
and advance of the culture process
will
bring the possibility of
the neurological synthesis within the range of the capacities of the population eventually. This
means that
men
if
of great ability
are not available, the advancing culture process will in time bring
the possibility of a significant invention or discovery within the
men
range of
much many
with
no doubt occurred
less ability.
Incidents of this sort have
We
times in the past.
believe
we
are
warranted, on the basis of our premises and analysis, in making
the assertion that
all
of the great discoveries or inventions that
have ever occurred could have been achieved v^athout one single "genius,"
i.e.,
without the aid of anyone above the present average
of intelligence. In short, that our civilization could
achieved by a race whose to our average. It
maximum
intelligence
would merely have taken
have been
was equivalent
longer, that
is
all,
longer for the cultural process to reach the point where syntheses
become
possible to
human nervous systems. we have good reasons
Actually, however, factor of
the
last
mental
ability has
remained
hundred thousand years or
fairly
so.
for believing that the
constant throughout
At any
rate,
we have no
evidence of a significant increase in mental ability during this time.* *
There
is
some evidence, however, that would point to a decline in the Western Europe during the Christian era. At least.
level of intelligence in
GENIUS:
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
ITS
221
Further consideration of our formula,
minate other aspects of culture history
Ogburn and and
C X B = P,
also.
will
illu-
As Morgan, Kroeber,
others have repeatedly noted, significant inventions
were few and
discoveries
far
between
in the
remote
was not due to a lack of persons of high mental
past.
ability
This
but to a
meagerness of cultural materials and resources. As the stream of culture grows through accumulation, assimilation
and
synthesis,
the rate of cultural advance increases. Thus, inventions and coveries
were
much more numerous and
dis-
frequent in the great
urban, metallurgical and literate cultures of 5,000 to 2,000 b.c.
than in the period 90,000 to 87,000
B.C.,
and they are much more
frequent today than in any earlier time. Since invention and
dis-
covery are functions of cultural milieus as well as of mental ability,
men
of exceptional intelligence were relatively
more important and
significant in the days of savagery than of
it
that
follows
civilization.
Because the cultural resources were more meager, the
difficulty of invention
appear, the
was
greater.
Thus, paradoxical though
Old Stone Age might be
called the
may
of Genius, or
time because the role of
Intelligence, rather than the present
native ability was relatively
Age
it
more important.* The foundations of
Darwin and Lyell cite the large scale and long continued extermination of independent minds and courageous spirits by the Holy Inquisition, as evidence of deterioration.
Speaking of the Inquisition Darwin wrote: "In Spain alone some of the men those who doubted and questioned, and without doubting there can be no progress were eliminated during three centuries at the rate of a thousand a year. The evil which the CathoHc Church has thus effected is ."{The Descent of Man, Ch. III). Lyell observes that "the incalculable institutions of a country may be so framed that individuals possessing moderate or even inferior abilities may have the best chance of surviving. Thus the Holy Inquisition may for centuries carefully select from the thinking and may doom them by thoupart of the population all men of genius sands to destruction, so as effectually to lower the general standard of intelligence," (Principles of Geology, Vol. II, New York, 1883), p. 495. * The conclusion reached here is exactly opposite to a view widely held today, not only by laymen but by eminent anthropologists as well. Thus the late Edward Sapir wrote: "As the social units grow larger and larger, the
best
—
—
.
.
.
.
.
.
probabilities of the occurrence of striking vastly.
Hence
it
is
.
.
and
influential personalities
that the determining influence of individuals
is
grow more
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
222
civilization— the rudiments of meehanics, the ceramic, textile, metallurgical arts, the origin of agriculture
and the domestication
of animals, the invention of the plow, the wheel, the calendar
the alphabet,
As
etc.,
civilization
and
etc.— were laid by anonymous
and
men and women.
advances inventions and discoveries become easier
to make.* If
inventions and discoveries— in short, cultural
advance— are where
to be explained in terms of an interactive cultural process,
demonstrated in the higher than in the lower levels of culture" (1919, 443). This view ignores the epoch-making inventions of remote times and tends to recognize only the known and named heroes of recent and literate easily p.
times. It is interesting to note, however, that the early American anthropologist, Lewis H. Morgan, had a more realistic understanding of the developmental culture process. "Human progress, from first to last," he wrote, "has been in a ratio not rigorously but essentially geometrical. This is plain on the face of the facts; and it could not, theoretically, have occurred in any other way. Everi' item oi absolute knowledge gained became a factor in further acquisitions, until the present complexity of knowledge was attained. Consequently, while progress was slowest in time in the first period, and most rapid in the last, the relative amount may have been greatest in the first, when the achievements of either period are considered in their relations to the sum. It may be suggested, as not improbable of ultimate recognition, that the progress of mankind in the period of savagery, in its relations to the sum of human progress, was greater in degree than it was afterwards in the three sub-periods of barbarism; and that the progress made in the whole period of barbarism was, in like manner, greater in degree than it has been since in the entire period of civilization" (Ancient Society, p. 38). This was written, it should be noted, about 1875. * In northeastern South America the Indians cultivated manioc which in some regions was the staple article of diet. There are two kinds of manioc: bitter and sweet. The bitterness of the former is due to the presence of hydrocyanic acid, a deadly poison. In some regions, because of depradations of ants, only the bitter manioc can be grown. The Indians discovered a way to remove the poisonous element by leaching the meal ground from the roots. After the acid has been volatilized, dissolved and expressed, the meal is both edible and nutritious. How the aborigines discovered that this could be done and how they perfected this technique is a matter of wonder. Ignorant of chemistr}', knowing that initially the plant was deadly, and with minds full of magic, myth, and superstition, one wonders how they ever accomplished so difficult a feat. Perhaps if we had a complete record of the discovery it might, and probably would, seem simpler. Even so, we may, I think, regard it as one of the most difficult, though not of course the greatest, inventions
in history.
GENIUS:
ITS
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
impinges upon
223
new combinaand syntheses, then we ought to find instances of rapid cultural change and growth in localities or regions where a high trait
trait,
effecting modifications,
tions
degree of social and cultural interaction takes place. This
what we do
find.
culture areas than rural areas.
The
regions. It
is
is more rapid on the periphery, more rapid
Culture change
rate of culture
change
significant to note,
is
both
just
in the center of
in urban than in
relatively
in the
is
slow in isolated
New
and the Old
Worlds, that the regions of most rapid culture growth were located on or near narrow land bridges connecting continental land masses: Mexico, Middle America, and the Andean highlands on the one hand, and the "Fertile Crescent"— Egypt and Mesopo-
tamia—on the logical,
other.
Thus we can
establish a geographic, or topo-
determinant of innovation in the culture process: the rate
of invention and discovery will tend to be high where the con-
formation of the land and the distribution of
its
masses foster a
high degree of social and cultural interaction.
A
few moments ago we were assuming, for the purpose of our
discussion, that
all
members
of a population were exposed equally
to the same cultural influences. This situation tends to prevail on
low
levels of cultural
development where
into classes does not exist. cultures, however, this
is
stratification of society
In advanced and socially stratified
not the case. All Egyptians during the
dynastic period were certainly not influenced equally by Egyptian culture.
The
majority were
serfs,
slaves,
or laborers on public
works. As such they lived in and were affected by a very different
stratum of culture than the priests and rulers and their close associates. Similarly in
England
in the seventeenth century most'
of the people were wholly illiterate
and hence cut
part of the cultural tradition accessible to
off
from a large
Newton. And
United States today although most of the population are
in the literate,
they are not directly and effectively stimulated by cultural elements in strata where significant inventions, discoveries and other ad-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
224 varices are
zations:
made.
(i)
differentiated
As and
We
may
therefore
make the
culture advances, society stratified.
(2) This
following generali-
becomes
means
increasingly
that a progressively
diminishing portion of the population is embraced by the cultural take tradition in which significant inventions and discoveries place. (3)
This small professional
class
contains only a portion of
the exceptionally gifted individuals of society; others are engaged in non-professional occupations. (4) Consequently, significant inventions and discoveries are
made by
a progressively diminish-
ing proportion of the exceptionally gifted individuals. In other
words, as culture advances and society becomes
and more
differentiated structurally
fewer becomes the relative in
whose systems
as before,
we
number
more and more
specialized functionally, the
of exceptionally gifted persons
significant cultural syntheses take place. Here,
reach the conclusion that as culture advances, the
role of exceptional ability diminishes in significance.
The
decrease in relative importance of the biological factor in
the process of invention, discovery, and cultural advance
demonstrated in
still
another quarter. Franklin
made
may be
a notable
achievement with meager and simple apparatus: a key and a
Nowadavs,
colossal
and
costly
equipment— a 200-inch
a 100-ton cyclotron— is needed for research in
who
shall use
many
kite.
telescope, fields.
But
the giant machines of astronomy and physics?
Is
the man of exceptional natural endowment more likely to use them than one with less ability? Not unless he has had the re-
And
certainly the average
more today with
a cyclotron than a
quisite training; brains are not
individual can contribute
enough.
highly gifted person with only a kite and a key. In relationship to
the kite and key, Franklin was
more important than
a person
same natural endowment would be in relationship to the telescope at Mt. Palomar or to a giant cyclotron. As the techno
of the
logical factor increases in
magnitude the importance oi the bio
logical factor decreases relatively.
The
role of the gifted individual in cultural
advance
is
diminish-
GENIUS:
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
ITS
ing in importance in
becoming
still
225
another sector. Research
socialized, so to speak, or institutionalized.
is
rapidly
Of
course,
no one ever worked and achieved great things in actual isolation.
Newton had
the products of predecessors at his disposal and he
used to exchange ideas with contemporaries, obtain measurements
and other data from them. But today research is becoming more and more an organized co-operative enterprise. Great laboratories and research teams are replacing the individual entrepreneur in science and technology. The development of the atomic bombin which dozens of highly trained idea men and hundreds of skilled technicians
co-operated— is of course a dramatic, but highly
significant, indication of the trend of
and
less significant;
The Great Man
the times.
the community of scientific
is becoming and technological workers more and more
less
As the eminent
so.
Wilhelm Ostwald, observed many years ago, mankind present is in a state of development in which progress "at depends much less upon the leadership of distinguished individuals than upon the collective labor of all workers." ^' It is not
German
scientist,
the soloist that counts so still
public and press
have and feed an appetite for primadonnas— it
symphonic
We (i)
much today— although
natural
the whole
orchestra.
now in Although we are
is
draw some
a position to freely
final
admit that individuals
endowments, we have no
reliable
way
conclusions:
differ
recognizing "geniuses" save through their achievements.
be
justified in believing that exceptional
of the achievement of a
warranted to say that
all
Bach or
men
a
in
their
of discovering or
inborn ability
Newton. But
it
We
may
lies
back
would be un-
of lesser achievement were propor-
tionally inferior in natural ability.
On
the other hand,
we have
good reason to believe that significant syntheses of culture traits may and do take place in organisms of unexceptional quality. Therefore,
"genius"
is
we must conclude inferential
that a psychological definition of
and misleading. The
culturological defini-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
226 tion
a genius
realistic:
is
a
is
human organism
which an im-
in
portant synthesis of cultural elements has taken place. But the culturological definition does
more than merely correspond with
the facts more closely than does the psychological conception; it calls attention to the more significant of the two factors involved in great inventions cultural.
The
and
discoveries, namely, the biological
than that one organism
cannot
tell reliably
which
is is
will actually
The why and when
Milton."
which
in
tell
many
instances.
quite as
psy-
achieve great things or die a "mute, inglorious
culturological
interpretation
a genius will appear;
might be noted
It
But the
it
whether ihe superior organ-
it
however
makes
tells how, what the eleand how it all
clear
ments and processes are that produce a genius, comes about.
more
superior to another, even though
chological interpretation cannot
ism
and the
psychological conception of genius can say no
much about
also that the culturologist
knows
the neuroanatomy of genius as the psy-
chologist does, namely, virtually nothing.
Conclusion
2.
mental
factor of innate
creased since
seems
In the operation of the man-culture process, the
man
ability
at least reasonable to
conclusion— that
may
have, and probably has, in-
acquired the faculty of articulate speech.
Homo
suppose— although hardly
It
a foregone
sapiens has a higher native intelligence
than that possessed by Pithecanthropus eiectus. Thus in the manculture equation over a period of a million years,
some absolute
increase in
we may assume
magnitude of the biological
But, during the last hundred, or even the last
fifty
factor.
thousand
years,
we have no evidence of an appreciable increase in mental ability. The great bulk of cultural development however has taken place during this time. Since a significant invention or discovery
is
a
function of organism and culture, working together, the role of
the former, and consequently of the exceptionally
endowed
indi-
vidual, has diminished relative to the cultural factor as culture
has developed and advanced. This in
magnitude of the
cultural factor,
is
due not only
to the increase
both absolutely and
relatively.
GENIUS:
ITS
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
227
but also to the fact that differentiation of formation of classes each with
own
its
social structure,
the
function, has cut off an
number of organisms of exceptional natural endowment from the possibility of important achievement: the illiterate increasing
how
peasant cannot invent the calculus no matter
may be. The rate
cerebral cortex
Conclusion
of occurrence of inventions
3.
coveries at any given time
excellent his
is
tion of exceptionally gifted
and
dis-
determined not only by the propor-
men and women
in the population
but by the number of elements in the cultural continuum and the velocity of their interaction.
But the acceleration
growth noted at various periods in
be explained, not by an increase
human
in rate of culture
culture history
is
to
in the general level of intelligence
or by an increase in the proportion of highly gifted individuals,
but in terms of an increase in the number of culture elements or
an increase in the velocity of their interaction, or both. The greater the
number
of
traits,
or the greater the velocity of their inter-
action, or both, the greater the
number
of cultural syntheses-
inventions and discoveries— other factors remaining constant.
Much
of our discussion thus far has dealt with outstanding
achievement in science, philosophy or the
dependent upon cultural materials ability.
But how
the Great
Man
is
it
at
hand
with history and
arts
where success
is
upon native events? Does not
as well as
political
turn the tide one way or another by sheer force
of his personality?
Would
the history of Europe between 1798
and 1815 have been what it was had it not been for Napoleon? Did not Julius Caesar change the whole course of European history?
Would
been
different, asks Sapir,
We
readily
not the administration of law in
had
*
We
New
Orleans have
not been for a certain Corsican?
admit that Caesar, Napoleon and Ghengis Khan
and many others have been
common
it
significant factors * in the course of
say "significant factors in the course of history" rather than use the phrase "changed the course of history." The latter phrase is an-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
228 history.
But we
are not at
all
willing to accept the inferences that
people wish to draw from
many
To
this premise.
grant that a
certain individual has been outstanding in a sequence of his-
events
torical
supreme tory
is,
many
to
brought about only by grant. as
An
way
minister on his
changed.
his
His-
they reason, and great changes can be
men
A
profoundly as a genius.
is
genius,
his
of
enormous
This we do not
ability.
imbecile can affect the course of history as readily
drunken s\\itchman history
of
ability, his force of character, his colossal greatness.
made by men,
is
proof
scholars,
fails
and
half-wit tampers with a switch, or a
to close
it;
a train
to a treaty conference
Had Lenin and
is
is
wrecked, a prime
The
killed.
his colleagues
been
from Switzerland to Russia
course of killed
by
1917 the profoundly might have been revolution Bolshevik of the outcome different. Had Lincoln lived five years longer the Reconstruction a train wreck en route
in the it
in
South would probably have taken a different course. But actor, John Wilkes Booth, who "changed the
was the obscure
course" of history.
More than
this: it
need not be even a half-wit
who
deflects the
course of history; any accident from any cause can accomplish this.
A
rat
might infect a Tsar with typhus,
circuit a
down
power
a plane.
a squirrel
might
short-
line, a pig derail a train, or a stroke of lightning
Had
a certain
swarthy swain at a village
Corsican
festival,
girl
not chanced to meet a
the genetic combination that
became Napoleon would not have taken place. And a thousand and one more circumstances of sheer chance occurred between his cradle and his coronation. One recalls the statement that had Cleopatra's nose been but a half-inch longer the whole course of
Roman and
Eg\q3tian history
would have been
different.
And
thropomorphic in outlook, and it assumes moreover a course of events which a man can change from the outside if he be "great" enough. It docs not make sense to say that a thundershower "changes the course of the weather." The thundershower is an integral part of the meteorological process. Neither does the Great Man "change the course of history" from the outside; he is an integral part of it.
—
GENIUS:
ITS
Darwin
tells
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
us in his autobiographic sketch that Captain Fitz-
who was "an
Roy,
nomist
J.
229
ardent disciple" of the mystic and physiog-
K. Lavater, almost refused to allow Darwin to join the
expedition of the Beagle because he did not like the shape of
Darwin's nose!
with
my
"He doubted," wrote Darwin, "whether any one
nose could possess sufficient energy and determination
for the voyage."
Had
Fitz-Roy's phrenology prevailed, the whole
course of the history of science would have been different. As the
rhyme about the chain of events set in motion by the loss of a horseshoe nail makes clear, great consequences may flow from occurrences otherwise trivial and insignificant. To have affected the course of history is, therefore, no proof of genius or colossal ability. The half-wit whose blunder kills Caesar is as significant nursery
historically as
government or
Caesar himself. political
natural ability; societies
To be
sure, the
head of a great
movement may be a person of enormous and social movements often select superior
instruments to work with. But chance and circumstance often put a mediocrity in the seat of the mighty, just as chance and accident
may throw him down or destroy him. The significance of the Great Man in by
As we have pointed out elsewhere,^^ many anthropologists
are quite unable to
make
process, or "history,"
which
is
been obscured
between a temporal process and a temporal-formal
precisely,
process.
history has
between history and evolution, or more
a failure to distinguish
unique.
is
simple distinction.
The
We separate these events, by conceptual
from their matrix of the or evolutionist, process
form are equally
this
is
temporal
a chronological series of events each of
totality of events.
a series of events in
significant:
The
analysis,
temporal-formal,
which both time and
one form grows out of another in
time.
The
temporal process
is
have predicted that Booth would his pistol
by chance and is thereno one, for example, could Lincoln— or whether or not
characterized
fore unpredictable to a high degree:
would have missed
fire
kill
when he
pulled the trigger.
The
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
230 temporal-formal process however
is
determinative: prediction
is
possible to a high degree. In the decomposition of a radioactive substance one stage determines the next and the course and rate of change can
be predicted. In
short,
we can
predict the course of
evolution but not of history.
The tion
significance of the distinction
and
nicely in
organic."
its
relevance to the Great
between history and evolu-
Man
in history
is
brought out
the debate between Kroeber and Sapir on the "super^^
Kroeber argues that had Darwin died in infancy the
advance and course of development of biological theory would
much
have been ing
if
the same as
has been. Sapir counters by ask-
it
the administration of law in
the same today had
wholly
it
New
Orleans would have been
not been for Napoleon. Both disputants are
justified in their claims.
Unfortunately, however, they are
talking about two different things. One is dealing with a deterministic developmental process, the other with the fortuitous
course of history. In the evolutionist process, the individual
Kroeber maintains and
as the
phenomena
of multiple
is,
as
and simul-
taneous but independent discoveries and inventions clearly demonrelatively insignificant.
strate,
occurrences that significant.
But
is
it
history,
But, in the succession of chance
the individual
does not follow at
all
may be enormously
that he
is
therefore a
The goose who saved than many an emperor who
"genius" or a person of exceptional ability.
Rome was more significant ruled
historically
it.
We
have gone a long way since William James debated the
question of genius with Herbert Spencer, John Fiske, and Grant Allen, terious
to
The
many
begun
causes
and incidence of genius no longer seem
and unpredictable
as
mys-
they did to James and as they have
others since his time.
in James' day, has
ligible a
as
The
science of culture, hardly
been able to illuminate and render
whole area of human experience that
lies
intel-
beyond the
GENIUS:
ITS
CAUSES AND INCIDENCE
horizon of the psychologist.
231
The problem
of genius
now
is
fairly
well understood.
There
is,
as
we have
pointed out, no point in defining genius
psychologically at least so far as culture history
Many
is
concerned.
a person of exceptional natural ability never achieves
dis-
and fame. And, on the other hand, many men of distinguished achievement have been individuals of no more than tinction
high average or even mediocre native
To assume
ability.
achievement must mean high native
significant
ability
is
that
an un-
warranted inference.
Assuming that mental ability is distributed uniformly among mankind, throughout time, place, and race— and this assumption is supported by evidence from paleontology, neuroanatomy, and psychology— we may
virtually
rule
out the biological, or psy-
and incidence of alone. would grant
chological, factor in a consideration of the causes
genius,
and work with the
cultural factor
We
of course that other hctois being constant, superior natural as a genius
endowment
is
than one of lesser
more
the individual of
likely to achieve recognition
ability.
But other
factors are
not
constant; they are so variable, in fact, that a favorably situated
may have much more chance of becoming a "genius" than one of vastly superior native endowment but in a disadvantageous position culturally. All we can say then individual of meager ability
is
that in the Jong run, not in any particular instance, the genius
more
likely to
is
be one of superior than of average native ability. achieves recognition as a genius— is a person
A genius— one who in
whom
a significant synthesis of cultural elements has taken
place. In other words,
ber of elements
is
he
is
a function of his culture. If the
small, the current slow,
and streams
num-
isolated,
geniuses will be few and far between. If the cultural tradition rich
and
varied, the current quick
and the
is
rate of interaction rapid,
geniuses will be frequent and abundant. Genius occurs readily at
peaks of cultural development, rarely on the slopes or plateaus.
One
soil
or climate will foster and bring forth genius, another
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
232
The
will not.
abundant" "about
in the
deep
as
rivers flow
as
cart before the
is
human
"high tides of
He
is
affairs"
conundrum
the time honored
by great towns."
of the mystery
geniuses "seem so exceptionally
why
"mystety" of
is
as
James said
as to
why
great
quite right so far as the depth
concerned but, unfortunately, he has put the rivers. It is not
horse— or the towns before the
the abundance of "geniuses" that produces "the high tides of human affairs" (i.e., periods of florescence in cultural develop-
ment), but the other way around: tural
And
genius.
the great periods of cul-
it is
their flower
development that find
and expression
men
in
of
development are to be explained
the eras of great
culturologically, not psychologically.
And
as for attributing
course of history,"
complish is
it
"genius" to
we have
just as well. It
is
cumstances
To
it is
constellation of events.
may
deflect
its
being strategically situated in a
And
the least of things or
cir-
course.
explain culture history psychologically
on mvstcH',
the
not high or low levels of ability that
significant in such contexts;
moving
men who have "changed
seen that an idiot or a goose can ac-
of course to lean
is
to appeal to chance, to invoke "that invisible
and un-
imaginable play of forces within the nervous system," to account for significant events
and
eras.
The "utmost
ology can ever predict," says James, "
is
that
the way, society will be sure to follow." ever,
the student of socia genius
if
The
by working upon the supra-psychological,
level of culture,
makes
it
by explaining culture
intelligible.
And
.
.
show how-
supra-sociological
in terms of culture, really
in explaining culture
causes and incidence of genius as well.
.
culturologist,
he explains the
CHAPTER NINE
IKHNATON: The Great Man
The Culture Process
vs.
"Lawgivers, statesmen, religious leaders, discoverers, inventors, therefore only seem to shape civilization. The deep-seated, blind, and intricate forces that shape culture, also mold the so-called creative leaders of society as essentially as they mold the mass of humanity. Progress, so far as it can objectively be considered as such, is something that makes itself. do not make it." A. L. Kroeber.^
—
We
I
E.very living organism itself.
confronted by a world external to
is
This external world
organism and
is
is
in a very real sense alien to the
often inimical to
One must come
it.
terms with one's environment, however, in order to
To
adjust to environment
is
to control
it
to a degree, at least
from the standpoint of the organism; adjustment passive. Success in
adjustment means
to
live, to survive.
survival,
and
is
never wholly
survival
means
mastery, mastery of organism over external world. It is
but a step from
this position to
species, that the external
of
God
seeds, the
or of
man. The
and emotions projected from the
ideas
come
first,
they are the original
prime movers. As they are thrust forth from the mind
they take form as edifices, rituals
And
human
world and the events that take place there
are but the realization of ideas
mind
the belief, in the
stars
and
and
planets, animals
institutions. In the
the Idea finds expression in the 233
and
plants, tools
and
beginning was the Idea.
Word, and
the
Word
be-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
234
comes not only
flesh
is
and sky and
The
light.
all
external
but a projection of the mind of God.
This view of the cosmos and find
14), but earth
I,
be Light and there was
creation. Let there
world
(John
reality
world-wide. In Egypt
is
we
expressed in the conception of the god Ptah. In his early
it
davs Ptah was the patron of architects and craftsmen. But event-
he became the supreme mind from which
ually
"The world and
derived:
is
things were
all
existed as thought in his
it
his thoughts, like his plans for buildings
mind; and art,
that
all
in
and works of
needed but to be expressed in spoken words to take concrete
fomi
^
as material realities."
As
it
with gods, so
is
with men, according to the neuro-
it is
As the gods
s\Tnbolic tropism of the race called folk-thought. create
and move
shape
theirs.
thought and words, so do
their worlds with
With
men
incantation and ritual, with verbal formula and
acts,
and sometimes merely by the concentration of mind and
will,
they can
make the
rain to
in the heavens, heal the
grow, regulate their safely to the
But
Land
mode
of the
fall,
of
life,
ture,
last,
find their
way
not only the external world, the world of nature, that
it is
and
and, at
Dead.
thus under man's control. His
falls
change the course of the sun
smite their enemies, cause crops to
sick,
his history are
they not obviously
own
world, his society, his cul-
even more subject to his
made by him, and
it
is
will, for are
not plain that they
and wish? So runs the
are merely the expressions of his thought
tropism of folk-thought.
But
Some
On
all
men
are not equal, even
are better
shamans than
higher cultural levels
we
on the
level of primitive society.
others; they have
find chiefs
and
more "power."
priests;
and emperors, popes and potentates. The god Ptah
then kings
in the persons
of artists, scientists, lawgivers, rulers, generals, prophets,
ventors spews out tions,
new ways
relatively
new
of
tools
life.
and
devices,
Cultural advance
few gifted individuals.
And
as
new codes and is
and
in-
institu-
but the work of a
culture advances, the
IKHNATON
235
exceptional person increases in stature; great cultures can be built
Men. Like Yahweh who made the light merely by calling for it, the Great Men make society and history by exercising their inherent genius. Thus the verbal tropism. only by Great
II
In Egypt in the fourteenth century before the Christian
some remarkable events took place. Monotheism came to the fore and waged war on the old polytheism. All gods were abolished save one, and he was made Lord of all. Temples were closed, era
and revenues confiscated.
their priests driven out, their lands
new
change in
art
aspect, and,
A
The government was reorganized. A marked occurred. The whole regime of Eg}'pt changed its
was
capital
built.
has been claimed, the events which took place
it
then have profoundly affected our
come about? What caused foundations and extended
this its
lives today.
How
did
all
this
upheaval that shook Eg}^t to
influence even to us today?
One
its
of
the answers has been: Ikhnaton. This genius, through his vision
and of
and through sheer
nation at his feet. At
Needless to
upon
so
new philosophy and a new way and determination transformed the so we have been told.
caught a glimpse of a
insight,
life,
say,
will
least,
not
all
students of Eg}'ptian history have relied
simple an explanation. There are many, especially in
recent years,
who have
a live appreciation of the significance of
cultural forces in the historic process.
work
We shall
take note of their
later.
Social science
is
frequently absolved from
who
its
sins of sterility
and impotence by sympathetic
friends
scientist in the social field does
not have laboratories at his com-
mand
like the physicist
and hence cannot be expected to pro-
duce theories that can withstand the administer.
But
this
point out that the
exoneration
is
tests these
fallacious
techniques can
and misleading.
It is
true of course that the social scientist does not have laboratories— like the physicist.
But he does have
laboratories in another,
and
in
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
236 a vety real, sense. History
social
with the equivalent of the laboratories of the physicist. human organism respond to polyandry, to mothers-
scientist
How
and ethnography provide the
does the
money, spectroscopes, holy water, governmental regulation of prices; how will men live in desert, tundra, or jungle; what will be the effect of technological advance on social life and philos-
in-law, ,
ophy? Answers to these and thousands of similar questions may
be obtained by studies of the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions under which man has lived on this planet during the last million years. If the social scientist could set up his experiments
the physicist or rat psychologist does,
as
to imagine a requirement that
some
it
would be
difficult
has not been met by some
science
is
knowing how to use the resources at its disposal. Ancient Egypt is an excellent laboratory in which the scientist off
tribe,
some time and place. The meager yield of social not due to lack of laboratories but rather from not
culture, at
can
from
its
many
test
theories. It
was quite
isolated,
social
being cut
neighbors by deserts, mountains, and the sea. It was
therefore relatively undisturbed
by outside influence.
We
have a
good record, both archeologic and documentary, of history and cultural development of Egypt for tens of centuries. The land was richly endowed— as contrasted, let us say, with Australia
fairly
—and
we
so
can observe the growth of culture from a
fairly
primitive level to one of the greatest civilizations of the ancient
world. Here size
we have
and against
work.
We
a
on
a stage of
adequate
a culture process at
can take note of the materials employed, the resources
both natural and
We can
laid out before us,
background of millenia,
cultural.
trace the
all
follow the changes one by one.
development step by
factor influenced others.
can do about
We can
We can
step.
We can see how one
count and evaluate. In short,
that a physical scientist can
—except repeat the experiment. ing ground in which to test
We
many
do
we
in his laboratory
have, then, in Egypt a prov-
theories of social science.
We may distinguish two main types of historical interpretations:
IKHNATON
237
the psychological and the culturological. Especially prominent in the psychological interpretation
the
is
explanation
of historic
events in terms of the personalities of outstanding individuals,
but
"temperaments" of peoples or
resorts also to the
it
even to such things
"the
as
spirit of
the times."
The
races,
and
culturological
type of interpretation explains history in terms of cultural forces
and processes,
terms of the behavior, not of the
in
human
psyche,
but of technologies, institutions, and philosophies. Let us then go to our laboratory and use
it
which
to evaluate the theories
undertake to explain the great philosophic and political events that took place during the
life
of Ikhnaton.
We shall
examine
first
the psychological interpretation. Ill
The
great religious
Egypt about 1380
b.c.
and
political revolution
which gripped
has been pictured as the work of one man:
Ikhnaton. "Until Ikhnaton," says Breasted, "the history of the
world had been but the
been but drops of water first
in the great current.
And,
individual in history."
says Breasted,
plished this revolution by imposing his his
own mind, upon
own
Ikhnaton was the Ikhnaton accom-
born in
ideas, ideas
the external world: "Consciously and deh'ber-
by intellectual process he gained
ately,
men had
irresistible drift of tradition. All
his
and then
position,
placed himself squarely in the face of tradition and swept aside"
But
^
it
(emphasis ours).
ideas alone
were not enough;
will
power and energy were
required too. Ikhnaton possessed these qualities also,
we
are told.
He
"He
possessed unlimited personal force of character."
fully
convinced that he might entirely recast the world of religion,
thought,
art,
and
life
by the invincible purpose he held
thing bears the stamp of his individuality.
must have been court
officials
irresistibly
swayed by
blindly followed their
word which he spoke they
his
The men
unbending
.
about him
will
young king, and
listened attentively."
Every-
.
.
"was
.
.
.
The
to every
H. R. Hall
in-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
238
Egyptian history in terms of the waxing and waning of intelligence which reached its "acme under the supremely terprets
intelligent" Ikhnaton. "His reign
was the
age of the rule
earliest
of ideas, inespective of the condition and willingness of the people" (Breasted). The revolution of Ikhnaton "can only be
ascribed to the individual genius
Alexandre
(Gardiner).
[Ikhnaton] was the events."
Moret
man who
asserts
that
turned aside the natural course of
*
E. A. Wallis Budge, Ikhnaton was
To
man" "Amenophis IV
of a very exceptional
"a.
religious fanatic, in-
and obstinate, but earnest and sincere." No one, man would have been so blind to half-insane he says, "but a facts as to attempt to overthrow Amen and his worship." James Baikie saw him as a man with a "remorselessly clear mind," but tolerant, arrogant
exceedingly intolerant. "Seeing clearly," he writes, "that the uni-
god meant monotheism, he saw also that with his devotion to truth there could be no room for tolerance of
versality of his rigid
the easy-going old cults of the other gods." In short, the great
upheaval in Egypt was brought about by a man's passion for truth and his devotion to logic. Geo. Steindorff
and K. C. Seele
regard Ikhnaton as "probably the most fascinating personality
ever sat
on the throne of the pharaohs."
He
had
who
"mystic?!
a
temperament" and "an extraordinarily single-minded character. When once "embarked on a purpose he held to it with tenacity and
carried
cism."
it
D.
}.
through unwaveringly with nothing short of fanatiS.
Pendlebury
Ikhnaton was "the
first
who
Breasted's
rejects
individual in history," regards him, never-
theless, as
an "extraordinary' character," the
we know,
the
first
man
view that
with ideas oi his
"first rebel
own
.
.
." ^
.
.
.
whom
(emphasis
ours).
Ikhnaton revolutionized not only theology but are told.
The new
era in painting
art as well,
and sculpture that
is
we
associated
with his reign was initiated and directed by Ikhnaton himself: "It
is
evident that the artists of Ikhnaton's court were taught by
IKHNATON him
to
239
make the
chisel
and the brush
the story of what they
tell
Breasted believes that the remarkable
actually saw."
Aton "was probably written by the king
himself."
hymn
to
^
So remarkable a person does Ikhnaton appear to some observers that they cannot believe him to be a normal man. "Ikhnaton pursued his aims with
fatuous
[such]
fanaticism" that Breasted feels that "there
abnormal
in
this
an
is
and
feveri<3h
something hectic and
man, suggesting
extraordinary
may even have been
blindness
a
mind which
diseased." Weigall believes that Ikhnaton
was
epileptic, subject to hallucinations.^
There
is
of course
some evidence
Ikhnaton was abnormal. In the
to support the theory that
art of
the day, which
be characterized by naturalism and realism, he
is
said to
not infrequently
is
depicted as misshapen and abnormal.
"The King preaches the from the
living
return to nature, makes the artist
taken (specimens have been found), to tures are correctly reproduced
.
.
.
make
The
sure that his fea-
sculptors faithfully re-
produce the prominent lower jaw and the long, bulging
when
work
model, and allows a plaster cast of his face to be
skull,
even
these deformities have been further aggravated by disease."
In his later years, Ikhnaton
is
depicted, according to Moret, as
"rounded and effeminate— a hermaphrodite 'jreasts,
wide
hips,
figure,
with prominent
and thighs too much curved, which makes one
suspect a morbid nature, with
Some
*
writers have
some
pathological flaw."
^
attempted to account for the remarkable and
unusual character of Ikhnaton in terms of race as well
as of psy-
chology; they have maintained that he was not a full-blooded
Egyptian. Thus, Weigall reminds us that "it must always be
membered This
much
that the king had
helped
him
to
stand
out
re-
foreign blood in his veins."
amongst
the
"superstitious
Egyptians [who were] ever lacking in originality." Moret, too,
comments on "the mixture plicated
of Aryan blood
by the Syrian descent of Tii"
ground.^'*
.
.
.
further com-
in Ikhnaton's racial back-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
240 Here, then, period.
we have an
explanation of Egyptian history for this
phenomenal person appears on the
A
scene, a
man
with so
much genius and power of will as to go beyond the boundaries of the normal, and by himself to transform the religion, social organization, to
and the
be tested
in
Here we have a theory
art of a great nation.
our "laboratory."
IV Before turning to our laboratory proper, namely, the culture history of Eg^-pt as
we know
documentary
the evolution of culture in like that of ancient
Man talk.
began
He
it
through archeological research and
studies, let us consider briefly
Egypt
what we know about
general and the nature of
societies
in particular.
his career as
an anthropoid
was distinguished from
all
who was
just learning to
other animal species by the
faculty of articulate speech. It was this faculty
which transformed
the discontinuous, non-accumulative, non-progressive process of tool-using
among
the anthropoids into a continuous, cumulative
and progressive process
human
in the
species. Articulate
speech
transformed, also, the social organization of this gifted primate,
and by the inauguration of co-operation
as a
way
of life
and
security, opened the door to virtually unlimited social evolution.
And,
finally,
language and speech
made
it
possible for
man
to ac-
cumulate experience and knowledge in a form that made easy transmission and
maximum
As we have already which
use possible.
seen,
articulate speech
is
it
was the
ability to use
symbols
— of
the most important and characteristic
form of expression— that made the origin and subsequent growth of culture possible.
But symbols did not provide the motive power
for cultural advance. This could only
in the sense in
which the
come from
energy, energy
physicist uses this term. All life
is
a
matter of energy transformations. Organisms enable themselves to live
by capturing
incorporating
it
free energy
into their
own
from non-living systems and by living systems. Culture
is
man's
IKHNATON
241
means
peculiar
'in order to
as
ways of
and
and of putting
of harnessing energy
it
work
to
make human hfe secure. Culture grows and develops harnessing more energy per capita per year are found
the means of making the expenditure of this energy more
as
are
effective
Animal husbandry,
improved.
water
agriculture,
power, and the use of fuels in engines, together with countless inventions and improvements of tools and mechanical devices,
mark the growth
of culture as
it is
by technological
carried forward
advance.
The
evolution of society
or tribal, and
civil
is
marked by two
or national.
The
tribe
great stages: primitive
and clan are
of primitive society (although the clan
istics
the political state characterizes
versal);
society
based upon kinship
is
ties;
civil
is
society.
civil
society
The
and territorial distinctions. Primitive homogeneous structurally; civil society, more
transition
from primitive to
uni-
Primitive
upon property
relationships relatively
character-
by no means
society
was
diversified.*
was brought about
civil society
by technological advance, culture,
cation
specifically, by the development of agrisupplemented— though not everywhere—by the domesti-
of
animals.
The
maturation
of
the
agricultural
arts
produced the following chain of sequences: increased food supply, increase in population, increase in population density
of political groupings, diversion of
ducing to specialized distribution of goods,
arts
and
human new
crafts, a
money and
and
in size
labor from food-pro-
type of exchange and
markets, economic classes, and
so on.
The of
civil
differentiation of structure, the specialization of function,
society required a special
* See Lewis
mechanism
to co-ordinate the
H. Morgan, Ancient Society, (New York, 1877), p. 6, for the statement of this thesis. Of this distinction A. R. Radchffe-Brown writes: "Indeed we may agree with Morgan that the passage from lower forms of civihzation to higher forms such as our own was essentially a passage from society based on kinship to the state based on political organization," "Some Problems of Bantu Sociology," (Bantu Studies, October, 1922), pp. 40-41. classic
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
242
and
various segments
Such an integrative mechanism i.e., a mechanism having "State-Church/' was the
was produced.
It
temporal and
ecclesiastical aspects.
The
and to integrate them into
classes of society
effective whole.
a coherent and
function of the state-church
to preserve the integrity of
is
and against destruction
society against dissolution from within
from outside
mechanism
forces. In other words, this integrative
must co-ordinate the various elements of society— occupational groups, social strata and classes— and relate them to one another harmoniously, on the one hand, and on the other, the life of the must be made secure against the aggression of its neighmechanism has a variety of forms. Church king, may be distinct or they may be one, and state, priest and structurally. And, of course, there are many degrees of overlapping or distinction. But everywhere in civil society—whether it be society
bors. This integrative
among
the
India, or
Maya
China
or Inca of the
presents these find
World, or
find this
and
integration,
two
in ancient
it
Old— we
in the
co-ordination,
of
New
fundamental mechanism
regulation.
aspects: temporal
Mesopotamia,
in
and
And
it
ecclesiastical.
always
Thus we
Egypt.
But one further observation before we turn to the culture history of Eg}'pt itself: In civil societies where the temporal and ecclesiastical aspects of the integrative mechanism are structurally distinct there
comes
is
always rivalry, a rivalry which not infrequently be-
a bitter struggle for
Both church and state the same function so
power. This
is
not surprising, of course.
are engaged in the far as
same
tasks,
the social organism
is
namely, integration, co-ordination, regulation. As Roosevelt once shrewdly observed: "That
we
call
government
is
human
both have concerned,
Franklin D.
agency which
seeking through social and economic
means
the same goal which the churches are seeking through social and spiritual
has
its
result
means."
own is
" The
basis for rivalry
"vested interest"; each
often a bitter struggle.
tries
We
is
therefore plain.
to increase
its
power.
Each
The
think offhand of the contest
IKHNATON
243
between Henry VIII of England and the the Church
pean
State struggle throughout
We
history.
priests
from
vs.
Thomas
recall
and churches and the
state in
Roman many
Church, and of
centuries of Euro-
Jefferson's diatribes against the
not only to separate church America, but to render the former powerless. efforts,
We
recall that Pius
IX
in his so-called Syllabus of Errors "claimed the
complete independence of the Church from state control; upheld the necessity of a continuance of the temporal power of the
Roman The
See."
Roman Church on
position of the
set forth
by Reverend H. Harrington
"Christendom authority
is
is
one
society,
and
paramount because of
greater importance of
and temporal
its
been well
in that society the spiritual
and the
greater dignity,
far
work. In any difEculties between spiritual
rulers the spiritual
treason to Christ they
its
this issue has
as follows:
may
must be the
judges, for without
not permit anything earthly however
important to interfere with the work of salvation.
If
therefore
the rulers of the church, even mistakenly, judge that this work
hampered by some temporal
policy, loyal Christians
by the decision." ^^ There are numerous examples church
Innocent
III
annulled the
Magna
must abide
of political action taken
in direct opposition to the state.
To mention
Charta; Innocent
the Treaty of Westphalia null and void; Pius
is
by the
but a few:
X pronounced
IX condemned the
Austrian constitution of 1868; until 1904, Catholics in Italy were prohibited by the
Church from taking
part in any parliamentary
election.
we have witnessed a bitter struggle between church and state. The issue has, of course, been couched in religious terms. But everyone who understands the situation knows that it is a question of who is to rule Mexico, the ultraIn Mexico in recent years
montane
clerical
politicians
or the temporal, national political
machine. Finally,
we may note
the case of Russia. Under the Czars
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
244
state worked hand in hand. The church held vast and other properties and received a grant of milhons of
church and estates
rubles from the state treasury every year.
came
to
power they
functions. It
is
was
Russia.
the Bolsheviks
once stripped the church of
at
significant to note that
there any great
When
outcry against
Under the Czars
not until
"reh'gious
done
persecution"
freedom hardly
religious
pohtical
its
this v^as
existed.
in
There
were periodic pogroms in which thousands of persons of an alien faith were done to death. Under the Soviets there was more religious freedom— freedom for all faiths, freedom to believe and
one pleased— than there ever had been under the then the great outcry from the clergy— Catholic,
to worship as
old regime.
Why
Protestant,
and Jewish
alike?
The answer
is
plain: the political
functions of the church had been done away with and their sources of income virtually shut off.*
The
Bolsheviki had tried to abolish
the ecclesiastical arm of the integrative mechanism of the society. It
is
been brought back to Russia
in recent years
again as an integrative mechanism.
titular
head
of
the
and established once
The church
powerful unifying thing in Soviet
Benjamin,
new
interesting to note, however, that the church has
civil
life,"
Russian
today
is
"the most
the Metropolitan
Orthodox church
America, said recently while on his way to Moscow.
It
is
in
interest-
ing to note that "Godless, anti-religious, Marxist" Russia conforms to the pattern
mechanism, the
common
to
all
nationalist states: the integrative
central nervous system, has
its spiritual, as
well as
temporal, side.
its
V Let us turn
now
to the culture history of
the relationship between
church
and
state,
Egypt and trace priest
and
king,
through the centuries. *
iivc
a tour of Soviet Russia in 1929, I visited open churches of many But, as a member of the clergy once complained to me: can't
During
faiths.
on Jcopeks!"
"We
I
IKHNATON
245
In the Old
Kingdom (2800-2250
Pharaoh, playing the leading .
,
.
role.
b.c.) we find the To quote Breasted:
state,
the
there arose at the beginning of the nation's history a state
which the Pharaoh played the supreme role. was he alone who worshipped the gods; in fact, however, he was of necessity represented in each of the many temples of the land by a high priest.^^ form of
In
religion, in
theor}', therefore, it
The
various temples
and
their respective priesthoods
were sup-
ported by the produce from their endowments in land and by contributions from the royal revenues.
It
was the business of
addition to their religious and ceremonial duties, to
priests, in
administer these lands and to collect revenue from
which they
A
lived.
few centuries
Feudal Age,
somewhat there was
we
later,
during the Middle Kingdom, or the
find that although the temples
in size, "the official cult still
But the
them upon
no large
had increased
was not materially
altered,
basis for a rise to
power
existed in their possession of lands
of the priesthoods
which were under
had long
their control
and whose produce was appropriated by them. In addition
to this
they received frequent contributions from the royal treasury.
temples were, of course, not subject to taxation. fore,
in
a
and
class of priests." ^^
favorable position
to
They
increase their wealth
accumulation and expansion, and to grow in
The
were, there-
through
power
as
Ahmose
I,
political
their wealth accumulated.
Under the Empire,
who completed
First Period
(beginning with
the expulsion of the Hyksos about 1546 B.C.), the
priesthoods had grown to considerable power and affluence. Says Breasted:
As a natural consequence of the great wealth of the temples under the Empire, the priesthood becomes a profession, no longer merely an incidental office held by a layman, as in the Old and Middle Kingdoms. As the priests increase in numbers
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
246
they gain more and more political power; while the growing wealth of the temples demands for its proper administration a veritable
kno\\n
army
of temple officials of
all
sorts,
who were
un-
to the old days of simplicity.^^
Not only were the temples becoming wealthier and the hoods more powerful, they were becoming unified as well:
priest-
Heretofore the priests of the various sanctuaries had never been united by any official ties, but existed only in individual and entirely separated communities without interrelation. All these priestly bodies were now united in a great sacerdotal organization embracing the whole land. The head of the state temple at Thebes, the High Priest of Amon, was the supreme head of this greater body also and his power was thereby increased far beyond that of his older rivals
Thus we organized.
find the priesthoods
They
.
.
.^^
becoming wealthy, powerful, and
are approaching the
time when they
to threaten the supremacy of the Pharaoh himself, as
We
get
some notion
of the growing political
will
we
be able
shall see.
power of the
priesthoods from an incident that occurred during the feud of the
Thutmosids. During the declining years of Thutmose sons,
I,
one of
born to the King by an obscure concubine, Thutmose
his III,
was put upon the throne "by a highly dramatic coup d'etat" of the priests of
Amon
and
struggles for the throne
and
his half-brother
his half-sister wife,
Originally
part.
in
the temple of that god. In the
which followed, between Thutmose
Thutmose
II,
and between Thutmose
III
III
and
Hatshepsut, the priests played an important
Icept
in
the
background
by Thutmose
III,
Hatshepsut was eventually elevated to a position of supremacy by a group the most powerful member of which was Hapuseneb, who
was both High Priest of person
all
Amon
and
vizier.
"He
thus united in his
the power of the administrative government with that
of the strong priestly party."
"
These events took place about
a century before the
time of
IKHNATON
247
Ikhnaton. During the reign of
one of the High
ton,
Amenhotep III, the father of IkhnaAmon, Ptahmose by name, was
Priests of
one of the two grand viziers of the kingdom. Another held the ofEce of chief treasurer. During this reign also the priests of
also
Amon
acquired some,
duced
in the
if
not complete control over the gold pro-
Sudan. In the use of
spells
used in mortuary
(hike), the priests "were provided with a
wealth and influence which they did not
means
rites
of acquiring
to utilize to the
fail
^®
utmost."
Thus we observe the growing power held the most important
king himself.
To
They
of the priesthoods.
offices in the realm next to that of the
have been chief treasurer of the kingdom must
have placed great power
in the
hands of the High
Priests of
Amon,
power that was augmented by control over the gold supply from the Sudanese mines. These priests could make and unmake kings. They had but one more step to take: to seize the throne
a
for
themselves. Breasted believes
made some attempt
evidently
lay so heavily
who was not
a vizier
that "it
hood
.
on the
is .
.
High
Ikhnaton's
hand that
he had succeeded Ptahmose by
Priest of
Amon." And Peet
not impossible that the increased power of the
was a circumstance which precipitated,
if
it
Amenhotep IV was
feels
priest-
did not
actually cause, the religious revolution of Ikhnaton." It was this stage that
"had
father
to shake off the priestly
sceptre, for
a
that
upon
thrust at birth.^^
VI Amenhotep IV was born about 1409 Amenhotep III and his Queen Tiy. Estimates time he ascended the throne
from nine to twenty-four according to those
who
years.
the son
of
of his age at the
coregent with his father vary
For the
first
years of his reign,
believe he ascended to the throne as a
child, the affairs of state
intents
as
b.c,
were managed by
and purposes, Ti ruled Egypt
his
mother. "To
all
for several years after her
husband's death," according to Wallis Budge, "and the boy king
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
248
did for a time at least what his mother told him." Glanville also believes that "Tiy clearly controlled him to some extent until he
Thebes." Although Amenhotep
left
did not die until about
III
the tenth year of Ikhnaton's reign, he was in bad health during this period and seems to have had little to do with the govern-
ment.
The
fact that his
name was
in the sixth year of Ikhnaton's reign
chiselled out of inscriptions
would seem
to support this
view.^°
Very early in the reign of Amenhotep IV the worship of a supreme god, Aton, was inaugurated. Aton was none other than the old sun-god, Re, in a new role. Other gods were tolerated for a while, but with the growing resentment of the priesthoods, that of
particularly capital,
Amon, Amenhotep IV built a new cityname to Ikhnaton,*
Akhetaten, for his god, changed his
closed the temples of the other gods, dispossessed the priesthoods,
confiscated their lands
work
set to
to establish
regime, both religious and political. All this had taken
new
his
and revenues, and
place by the sixth year of his reign.
Ikhnaton's reign was
Not on
full of troubles as
may
well be imagined.
only did he have a bitter struggle with powerful priesthoods
his hands,
tradesmen, peasants,
To be
whom
but by closing the temples he incurred the resent-
opposition of numerous other classes as well, such as
ment and
artisans,
who had
sure,
actors,
scribes,
as
even
a vested occupational interest in the old order.
he was
or no time for
for their loyalty
v^ath a revolution at
affairs
and support.
home, Ikhnaton had
Eg\'pt's vassals in Asia, the Hittites in particular
defiant
and
up becoming
aggressive. In the twelfth year of his reign, Ikhnaton's
Amenhotep, "Amon
is
satisfied"
(Peet)
gives
way
well with the Aten, or Disk" (Pendlebury, Peet), or
Aton" (Steindorff and Seele); the old god change of names. to
little
abroad. As a consequence, revolts flared
among
*
and
shepherds
the Heretic King had a group of loyal followers,
he rewarded handsomely
Occupied
and
gives
to Ikhnaton, "It is is Beneficial
"He way
Who
to the
new
in this
IKHNATON
249
mother, Tiy,
time she
who
resided in Thebes, visited Akhetaten, at
may have urged
a moderation of policy at
which
action against the revolting vassals
and compromise with Ikhnaton making a feeble
home, perhaps even
the priests of Aton. At any
rate,
we
find
a
gesture against the rebels abroad and initiating conciliatory meas-
home. Smenkhkara, the "beloved" of Ikhnaton and now
ures at
coregent with him, was sent to Thebes to effect a reconciliation
now broke out in the own household. Although Ikhnaton seems to have been
with the priests of Amon.^^ But dissension king's
willing to compromise, Nefertiti, his wife, was not.
she
fell
retired
into disgrace, or was estranged
with some powerful followers to the north end of the
where she built a palace disintegrating at
home and
political structure
city
was
Akhetaten; Smenkhkara, the
b.c. at
same time
in
Thebes. Tutankhaten, a
By now the priestly party was The new king soon realized that he
nine, ascended the throne.
growing rapidly in strength.
could stay on the throne only
if
he "came to terms with the
porters of the traditional faith,"
abandon
He
rate,
abroad,
coregent, died at almost the
to
The
for herself.
Ikhnaton died about 1369
boy of
At any
from her husband, and
his capital at
i.e.,
the
priests.
He
sup-
was obliged
Akhetaten and move his court to Thebes.
was compelled to abandon the heresy of Ikhnaton and to
"acknowledge himself
officially as
Accordingly, he changed his in Life
father
is
Amun." for
an adherent of
all
.
.
Amun,"
of his devotion to "his
He "made
the gods, fashioning their statues of pure
d/am-gold, restoring their sanctuaries
triumph of the
tells
of his benefactions to his priests.
perpetual endowments, investing
the daily service,
.
Tutankhamun, "Beautiful
to
In a manifesto he
Amun" and
monuments
name
.
.
.
providing them with
them with
divine offerings for
and supplying their provisions on earth."
priests
was
^^
The
virtually complete.
Tutankhamun reigned but nine years and was followed by Eye, a member of Ikhnaton's court. He too lasted but a short time.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
250
Egypt was now
in a state of anarchy.
Even Thebes became
a prey
to plundering bands. Thus ended the Eighteenth Dynasty. Out of this chaos and confusion law and order eventually
emerged organized around a man who had been an important figure in Egj^^tian government for years. This man was Harmhab. He had been commander in chief of the army under Ikhnaton
and Tutankhamun, and as deputy of the king he had attained a position in the empire second only to the king himself. Despite this fact, however, Harmhab was never converted to the Aton religion. He did not go to Akhetaten with his king but remained in
Memphis where he had
his residence.
"He remained
loyal to
the old gods especially to the patron divinity of his native city
was thus acceptable to the priests of Amon. that of the army which was already under and With their backing his control he ascended the throne. The ceremony of installation
and to Amun,"
was
^^
in fact carried
He
out by the priests of
new
Amon
themselves.^*
he
sister of Nefertiti,
but Alexander Scharff says that
position
Some
by marrying the
wTiters assert that
legalized his
it "is
certain"
that this was not the case, that this assumption was born of an error of translation.^^
i
Having come into power with prising to see
Harmhab busying
by Tutankhamun. As was
in
priestly
set
it
is
not
sur-
himself with the restoration begun
a matter of fact, as
working order he
backing
soon as his government
about energetically to restore the
temples and their priesthoods to their former condition of wealth
and power:
He
restored the temples
Nubia.
He
shaped
all
from the pools of the Delta marshes to
their images in
number more than
before,
which he made ... He raised up their temples; he fashioned a hundred images with all their bodies correct and with all splendid costly stones. He sought the precincts of the gods which were in the districts in this land; he furnished them as they had been since the time of increasing the beauty in that
IKHNATON the
first
251 beginning.
He
established
for
them
daily
offerings
every day. All the vessels of their temples were wrought of
and gold. He equipped them with priests and with ritual and with the choicest of the army. He transferred to them lands and cattle, supplied with all equipment.^^ silver
priests
Harmhab attempted
to obliterate
all
traces of the era of heresy.
He
had the names of Ikhnaton, Tutankhamun, and Eye hacked from the monuments and his own put in their place. He conhimself the direct successor to
sidered
Ikhnaton and
Amenhotep
had At Thebes, Harmhab razed the temple
III,
as
if
never existed.
his followers
materials to enlarge the temple of
of
Amon.
Aton and used the
Aton's temple at Ak-
hetaten was likewise despoiled to obtain building materials. Ikhnaton's
tombs effort
"tomb was wrecked and
its reliefs
chiselled out; while the
of his nobles there were violated in the
was made to annihilate
and when
in legal procedure
all it
same way. Every man;
trace of the reign of such a
was necessary to
cite
documents
or enactments from his reign he was designated as 'that criminal of Akhetaton'."
The
under Harmhab
is
the priest of
"How
prosperity
and power of the priesthoods
well indicated
by the words of Neferhotep,
Amon:
\
him who knows the gifts: of that god (Amon), the king of gods. Wise is he who knows him, favoured is he who serves him, there is protection for him who bountiful are the possessions of
follows him."
^7
Neferhotep "was at the
moment
receiving the
richest tokens of the king's favour."
As Breasted
observes, the triumph of
Amon
was
now
complete.
VII
We
may now
follow the course of the relationship between
church and state in Egypt for a few more centuries.
The Nineteenth Dynasty began with Asia, followed
by campaigns in
Israel
wars of reconquest in
and against the Libyans.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
252
With
the death of Merenptah, son of Ramesses
II,
the land
fell
again into virtual anarchy from which it emerged in 1200 b.c. under Scthnakt, founder of the Twentieth Dynasty. Sethnakt came to the throne backed by the priesthoods, "these wealthiest and most powerful communities in Egypt." Ramesses III, Seth-
was completely
nakt's successor,
in the grip of the priests.
The and
temples, says Breasted, "were fast becoming a grave political
economic menace." But Ramesses could do naught else but pour the wealth of the royal house into the sacred coffers with the most lavish liberality.^^
We
get a fair notion of the wealth
hoods of the time of Ramesses
III
and power of the
inventory in the Papyrus Harris which covers almost
priest-
from an
(1198-1167 b.c.)
all
of the
temples of Egypt: they possessed over one hundred and seven thousand slaves; ... in all likelihood one person in every fifty was a slave of .
.
.
some temple. The temples thus owned two percent
we
population. In lands
of the
find the sacred endovraients amount-
ing to nearly three quarters of a million acres, that is, nearly one seventh, or over fourteen and a half percent of the cultivable land of the country
head of
.
.
eight vessels,
cattle;
.
some
.
.
their
fifty
.
They owned
combined
nearly a half million
fleets
numbered eighty
three workshops and shipyards
.
.
.
owned in all one hundred we remember that all this vast
while in Syria, Kush and Egypt they
and
sixty
some
far
re\'enues *
This
than ten thousand square miles and
it will
was entirely exempt from be seen that the economic equilibrium of the
was endangered.^^
Among as by
less
five or six million inhabitants
taxation * state
When
nine towns.
property in a land of
the priesthoods, that of the god of the richest and most powerful of
all.
Amon
stood out
Their estates and
were second only to those of the king. "The
may be an
overstatement; see Edgerton, 1947, p. 157.
political
IKHNATON
253
power wielded by
a
community
vast wealth/' says Breasted, "was
who
of priests
from now on
controlled such
a force
Pharaoh could ignore. Without compromising with tinually conciliating
Sometimes the
no Pharaoh could have ruled long." ^° treasury stood empty while the temples
it,
royal
were loaded down with wealth.
We
read of
workmen during the
reign of Ramesses III starving as they labored
works until
it
which no and con-
on some public
in desperation they gather before the ofEce of their
master demanding their rations of grain. "Thus while the poor in the employ of the state were starving at the door of an empty the
treasury,
plenty."
store-houses
At the coronation
the
gods
were
groaning
of Ramesses IV, a "detailed
...
benefactions conferred large
of
with
^^
of
list
all
and small temple of the land" was published. "In
manner the new king contrived
the
on each and every
[by Ramesses III]
this
to confirm the clergy in their
holdings of property and to gain their influential good will for
own
his .
.
reign
... As the
authority of the state grew weaker
Amun
the power and prestige of
.
proportionately.
All
and
his priesthood
important public and private
expanded
affairs
were
regulated and decided either by the priesthood or by an oracle
which operated ... puts
it,
the imperial temple
in
.
.
."
As Breasted
"the state was rapidly moving toward a condition in which
be religious and sacerdotal, and the aspower by the High Priest of Amon but a very
chief function should
its
sumption of
royal
natural and easy transition." It
was not long until
this transition did
the reign of Ramesses XI, a
high priest of
Amon
and commander
at
^^
man named
indeed take place. In
Hrihor was appointed
Karnak. Next he became viceroy of Nubia
in chief of the army.
He now
A little later he
vizierate of
Upper Egypt.
control
the highest spiritual, military, and
the
all
state. It
"had united under civil
assumed the his personal
functions of
was but a single step more to put aside the impotent
Ramesses XI and ascend the throne
in his place.
By
this act of
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
254
usurpation (1085 B.C.), the secular state of the pharaonic empire was ushered to its grave and an ecclesiastical state was erected in its
which the chief god of Thebes exercised the authority ^^ The triumph of the through the medium of his priesthood."
place, in
priests
was
now
complete.
VIII
No
matter
how
he had
his intellect
and indomitable
his setting in a great nation, in a rich
and we may assume that have
Ikhnaton might have been,
individualistic
no matter how enormous
so profoundly
it
his wdll,
and mature
affected his life as
he
supposed to
is
changed the world about him. Let
fore, turn to an examination of the relationship
culture,
us, there-
between Ikhnaton
and the culture history of Egypt. It
is
which mark the reign
plain at the outset that the events
of Ikhnaton are not novel by any means. Far from
merely part of a process that had been going on before Ikhnaton was
age-old
culture process receives
pression during the lifetime is
nothing original in
it
rivalry between king and priest. more emphatic and dramatic exof Ikhnaton, no doubt, but there
whatever.
Religious philosophy in Eg}q3t had been of
monotheism
they are
for centuries
bom, namely, the philosophic trend toward
monotheism and the Tliis
it;
for centuries before
moving
in the direction
Ikhnaton was born.
We
find
in religious philosophy a reflection of the real world; the theology
mode Good Shepherd God as a Great
of a people will echo a dominant note in their terrestrial of
life.
and
A
pastoral culture
his flock;
find
its
image
in a
an era of cathedral building sees
Architect; an age of
down moral
may
debits
commerce
and
credits;
finds
Him
with a ledger, jotting
emphasis upon the profit system
and the high-pressure salesmanship that
is
required to
make
it
function, picture Jesus as a super-salesman; * and, in an age of *
The Man Nobody Knows, wherein Jesus is pictured good fellow, the perfect image of a 'go-getter' from the
See Bruce Barton,
as "a joyous, ripping
IKHNATON
255
God
science,
Scientist
god of law and order" (Millikan),
a
"is
moving about
in his
cosmic laboratory,
his
a
Great
experiments
to perform.*
In ancient Egypt, theological thinking was, as Breasted has
and
so well said, "brought into close
conditions,"
political
numerous little
a
^*
many
deities,
kingdoms. As the
In of
the very early period,
which were
were
Egypt progressed,
as national deities.
As the nation
integrated under the rule of a powerful
was a tendency for one god to become supreme.
single head, there
The ascendancy
there
local gods, or patrons of
political unification of
few of the greater gods emerged
became more and more
sensitive relationship with
of Re, the sun-god,
became marked during the
Fifth Dynasty and by the rise of the Twelfth Dynasty his su-
premacy was unquestioned. Other priesthoods,
.
.
.
desirous of securing for their own, perhaps purely local
deity, a share of the sun-god's glory, gradually discovered that
form and name of Re; and some of them found practical expression in the god's name. Thus, for example, the priests of Sobk, a crocodile god, who had no connection with the sun-god in the beginning, now called him Sobk-Re. In like manner, Amon, hitherto an obscure local god of Thebes, who had attained some prominence by the political rise of the city, was from now on a
their
god was but
went
so far that their theologizing
a
solar god, and was commonly called by his priest Amon-Re. There were in this movement the beginnings of a tendency toward a pantheistic solar monotheism, which we shall yet trace
to
its
remarkable culmination.^^
The concept
of
Maat was developed from the
designation of
personal qualities, or something practiced by individuals, to someJazztown Rotary Club," (Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, II, one vol. ed., New York, 1930), p. 729. * Cf. Living Philosophies (New York, 1931), p. 44. Millikan's god seems to bear a considerable likeness physicist.
to a
certain
American Nobel prize-winner
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
256
method
thing of national dimensions— a "spirit and
guidance and control of
human
affairs
.
.
universal values,
and
suffused with moral
.
conviction. Tliere was thus created for the
of a national
time a realm of
first
in conceiving the divine ruler of
such a realm
^^ the Egyptians were moving on the road towards monotheism." But the conception of a supreme deity whose rule extended to
the farthest reaches of the earth and embraced peoples was impossible so long fined to the Nile valley. In the
only Eg}q3t, and in the
guard at her all
frontiers,
hymns
Pyramid Age the sun-god ruled
of the day
we
find
him standing
"where he builds the gates which
outsiders from entering his inviolable domain." It
after Egypt's conquests
lands and
all
power remained con-
as Egypt's
otherwise
is
abroad and the era of empire.
restrain
Then
the
supreme god of Egypt became the Lord of the Universe. As Breasted has so succinctly put it: "Monotheism is but imperialism in religion."
^''
Thus we
on end before the reign of
see that for centuries
Ikhnaton, religious philosophy in Egypt had been developing in the direction of monotheism as the political unification and im-
expansion of Egypt proceeded. And, as
perial
the rivalry between church and already old before
What
and
it
Ikhnaton originate?
The
last logical step
gods but Aton. As Breasted
ment
priest
already seen,
and king, was
The answer must
be,
trend toward monotheism was already
was not until the
naton took the
we have
between
Amenhotep IV was born.
then did
"Virtually nothing." there,
state,
latter years of his reign that Ikh-
and attempted to abolish
says, "this
all
other
whole monotheistic move-
the culmination of the ancient recognition of a moral
is
order by the Egyptian thinkers of the Pyramid
Age and
their
creation of a realm of universal ethical values." Aton, the Disk
god, was of sufficient importance during the reign of Ikhnaton's father to have a temple erected in his
"the
name of the new deity, in his name of Shu who is
full
rejoices
honor
at Thebes.
'Re-Horus-of-the-Horizon
the Disk'
is
Even
who
to be ascribed not
IKHNATON to
257
Akhenaten but to
some
his father or even to
earlier king."
Indeed, the "most striking fact" pertaining to the various names
new
of the
embody
deity "is that they
a distinct attempt at con-
tinuity with the sun worship of past ages."
The Hymn
which was composed by Ikhnaton himself, according of
many
authors (who, however,
modern heads
addresses of
may know
full
to Aton,
to the belief
well that the
of state are frequently written
architects of
hymn
Amenhotep
to the sun-god
hymn
naton's
latter] are
ideas are
III,
which was
to the disk
not at
all
he
.
.
.
writes, "a.
;
by
Two
others), was remarkable but unoriginal, according to Peet.
had already dedicated
a
very close anticipation of Ikh-
the ideas
.
.
[expressed in the
.
new, nor indeed are the phrases in which these
embodied." Nor was Ikhnaton the
of his rivals from public
monuments;
this
first
to erase the
names
was done freely in the
feud of the Thutmosids.^^
The
struggle with the priesthoods
We
ascended the throne.
Amon
held powerful
was
also acute
when Ikhnaton
have already seen that the
offices
under
his
threatening the security of the throne.
father,
And
priests of
Amenhotep
III,
Breasted says of them:
They were rich and powerful when Ikhnaton ascended the throne. "They had installed Thutmose III as king, and could they have supplanted with one of their own tools the young dreamer [Ikhnaton]
who now
so at the
first
held the throne they would of course have done
opportunity." Moret, too, sees the drastic steps
taken by Ikhnaton as an attempt to "break the power of the priests of
With it
Amon
lest
mind
in
priests, is
was a new philosophy germinating
and temples— especially when
Would
was not new? a bold
it
of an adolescent genius that precipitated the
against the priests
was
^^
the throne in danger of being captured by the
necessary to assume that
in the
it
they should dethrone the kings."
and
self-defense,
in
it
this
move
philosophy
not be more reasonable to assume that
by the temporal government self-preservation? To close the temples and
drastic step taken
confiscate their lands
and revenues would be a doubly
effective
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
258
move:
political
that
it
would strengthen the throne
weakened
it
It
its rivals.
as
same time
note that
it
who succeeded
not a priesthood of the new god Aton
was
to the
Anion. Ikhnaton was himself the First Prophet of Aton,
estates of
and
at the
significant to
is
such assumed control of the vast wealth of his god. "This
appropriation of the property of the temples," observes Moret,
"shows us what lay beneath the
and
political objects of
first
time that struggles for
religious revolution, the '^^
the rupture."
It
economic
was probably not the
power were carried on in not been the last. The
terrestrial
of celestial ideolog\'; it certainly has
terms
break between Ikhnaton and the priests was therefore but the
culmination
centuries
of
palace and temple. drastic
move was
With
necessar\^
ence. For the temporal
of
and competition between
rivalry
the growing power of the priests a if
the king was to retain his independ-
government
it
was do or
die.
The maturing
philosophy of monotheism provided an excellent pretext and a
weapon. But
was merely the means employed;
it
it
was not the
cause.
The
position taken
increased
on
this
issue
is
rather
.
.
.
was a circumstance which
did not actually cause, the religious revolution
if it
of Ikhnaton"*^
he
writers
already seen, Peet believes that "the
power of the priesthood
precipitated,
ever,
by some
we have
curious. Thus, as
(emphasis ours).
says that
it is
On
the very next page, how-
"only an inference" to explain the revolu-
and king. Yet he accepts Ikhnaton's "peculiar genius"~about which we know absolutely nothtion as a struggle
between
priests
ing directly— as one of the causes of the revolution! In anothet essay, also,
Peet discounts the political aspect of the revolution
and portrays Ikhnaton
as a theologian.'*-
He
explains the failure of
Ikhnaton's revolution in terms of a conflict of philosophies rather
than
as a clash of political forces.*^
fail?
Why
could
it
But why did the Aton
not win out over older beliefs? This
thing that Pcct's theory does not explain. Wallis
Ikhnaton
failed
Budge
religion is
some-
says that
"because his religion did not appeal to the tradi-
iKHNATON tion
and
259
religious instincts
and
susceptibilities [whatever they are,
L.A.W.] that already existed among the Egyptians." this
begging the very question at issue?
religion fail to appeal to the Egyptians?
revolution failed because the is
merely to say that
because
it
it
new
failed. It
is
Why
To
**
But
is
not'
did Ikhnaton's
say that a theological
creed could win no converts like saying that a fire
went out
quit burning.
Thus we
see that those
who
interpret the revolution of Iknaton's
reign as a philosophical, or theological, affair account for political
events in terms of rival philosophies, but they do not explain the philosophies.
Our
theory does both.
tween Ikhnaton and the
It explains
the struggle be-
terms of the structure of
priests in
civil
societies and the function of the State-Church as an integrative
and regulative mechanism. And
explains the philosophies as
it
instruments used by priests and king in this struggle.
ophy of Ikhnaton
failed
The
philos-
because the political and economic power
of the priesthoods was greater than that of the Pharaoh's party.
In this connection
we may
consider the close relationship be-
tween Queen Hatshepsut and Senenmut. Steindorff and Seele
wonder what it was that caused Hatshepsut to heap honors and favors upon this man. The "manner [in which] he forged the bonds which brought him in close relations with his royal mistress
...
a closed page of history"
is
may be
theor)^
*^
they say.
We
suggest that our
illuminating here also. Hatshepsut was not only a
usurper, she was a
woman and
as
such should not ascend the
throne of god-men. Senenmut "had in early youth entered service in the
temple of
occupied a
and successful priestly
throne.
Amun
series of
at
Karnak and before long had successively
important posts." In short, he was an adroit
priestly politician
party.
and
a powerful
Hatshepsut needed help to
Senenmut brought
seize
member
of the
and hold the
to her side the aid of a powerful priest-
hood. Hatshepsut richly rewarded him for his support. In the light of our theory, the relationship
obscure at
all
but rather obvious.
between them does not seem
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
260 Priests
and
Icings serve their
everv' other class in society.
own
When
respective interests— as do.es
their interests diverge they fight
each other, as in the case of Ikhnaton or Henry VIII. When, however, each can serve his own interest by helping the other, they will co-operate, as in the case of Hatshepsut and Senenmut.
IX
What
part did Ikhnaton himself play in the stirring events
we have
of his reign? As that this
young
olution and carried will.
But what
already seen,
is
In the
but inference?
us
What
do we know
may be
directly
reasonably inferred
facts?
first
place,
if
we
take Elliot Smith's estimate of his age
upon an examination
at the time of his death, based
posed
tell
forward by his zeal and his indomitable
it
this
about Ikhnaton's actions and what
from knoun
numerous authors
genius, virtually single-handed, initiated this rev-
skeletal remains,
of his sup-
Ikhnaton was but a boy of nine, or at
the most thirteen, when he ascended the throne. The "revolution" would have been well under way, therefore, when he was fifteen or nineteen. It has seemed so incredible that a youth could have
accomplished
all this
that, as Professor
"despite the precocity of youth in the east,"
Peet has observed, "archaeologists one and
fought shy of accepting so great an improbability." fore put pressure
naton's age.
He
upon
Elliot
did increase
Smith to it
at
They
all
there-
raise his estimate of Ikh-
from twenty-six to
was not prepared to go further"
^^
that time.
thirty
More
but "he recently,
however, he has been persuaded that Ikhnaton suffered from Dystocia, "one of the principal
symptoms
of the bones to knit properly
.
of age."
*^
The
archeologists
.
.
of
which
is
the failure
ossification ceases to
may now have Ikhnaton
be
a test
as old as
they wish!
The view
that Ikhnaton
must have been more than
a
boy
during the early years of his reign because tremendously important events took place at that time
is
a curious
one
to take.
Must
IKHNATON the
life
261
of a great nation stand
boy kings grow up? It
hamun was but Newberry
a
believes
still,
must
history
mark
time, until
rather generally admitted that Tutank-
is
boy of nine when he ascended the throne. that Ay "must have been the dominating
personality in Egypt's political affairs" at this time. Steindorff
and
Seele assume that the boy king was "completely under the control
upon Tutankhamun must have kept him faithful to the new religion while she lived. If we can have a boy king, with actual rule by others, in the case of Tutankhamun, why not with Ikhnaton? In this connection we may recall that Louis XIII of France of Eye," and Pendlebury believes that Nefertiti's influence
ascended the throne at the age of nine years, Louis five.
Peter the Great came to the throne
Charles XII of Sweden, at the ripe old age of In speaking of Hatshepsut, Breasted takes a powerful group of nobles and
with her
as a
means
officials
of serving their
took
therefore tained."
*^
when he was
ten;
fifteen.*® it
for granted that
own
interests.
lives of these
He points men were
and the dominance of Hatshepsut; they
good care that her position should be main-
This sounds reasonable and
we know about
thing
at only
supported her and worked
out that "the fortunes and probably the identified with the success
XIV
ruling
cliques
is
in accord
everywhere,
Caesar to Hitler, Stalin, or Franklin Roosevelt.
with every-
from
Julius
One man may be
the titular head of the government. But without the aid and
support of a powerful group of fellow politicians no one, be he king, pope, president, or dictator, can stay in office very long.
There
is
evidence of such a group surrounding young Ikhnaton.
Breasted remarks that, idealist and dreamer though he was, "Ikh-
naton understood enough of the old policy of the Pharaohs to
he must hold his party by practical rewards." Numerous show Ikhnaton rewarding his followers with gold and honors for their allegiance. Ramose, the Vizier, is shown "loaded
know
that
reliefs
by the Pharaohs,
with
gifts
One
relief
as
shows Ikhnaton,
though
his wife
in
reward for his allegiance."
and daughter showering gold
THE SCIENCE OF
262
CULT-i/RE
upon Meryra, who had become High Priest of Aton, "on some occasion when he had been particularly successful in collecting the ." "Abundant are the rewards/' yearly dues of the temple Meryra cries upon being installed as High Priest, "which the .
Aton knows
to give
when
.
his heart
pleased."
is
And
another one
of Ikhnaton's lieutenants says with disarming frankness:
prosperous
is
he who hears thy teaching
of life!"
To anyone who
All this sounds strangely familiar.
with the political machines of American
cities
"How
^°
and
is
familiar
states, or to
one who knows anything about the organization and conduct of ruling cliques anywhere in the world, with their community of interests and rewards for "faithful service" and support, this picture of ancient
Egypt
no mystery. Whether
will present
naton was a dominant figure or only a figure-head In either case
we have
a
is
Ikh-
immaterial.
dominant, ruling clique. They possess
the power, they control the wealth, and they share the spoils. It
is
an old familiar pattern. Breasted and Weigall try to put a
religious
and philosophic complexion upon
this tight little political
machine that ruled and exploited Egypt, Weigall comments upon the rewards bestowed
upon those who were
to grasp the lofty concepts taught
speaks of the "nucleus of
politics
shows so
clearly
through
both are obliged to admit that
enough
by Ikhnaton, and Breasted
men who
aspects of the king's teaching."
intelligent
really appreciated the ideal
But the anatomy of machine its
many
ideological vestments that
of Ikhnaton's followers were
probably more concerned with the very earthly desire for riches
and honors than with
a lofty view of the cosmos.^^
X Every
effort has
been made to
extoll
the originality and
uniqueness of Ikhnaton and to emphasize his importance as an
He is but a boy when he ascends the throne, and only an adolescent when the "revolution" gets well under way. "Still, when one calls to mind the individual in the culture history of Egypt.
IKhNATON
263
who stir an audience at an may credit a boy of eighteen a new city" and the founding of
infant prodigies, the child preachers early age/' Weigall writes, "one
or nineteen with the planning of a
new
religion.
Weigall does not
child prodigies; perhaps
cite
any
specific
examples of
he was thinking of the boy Jesus teaching
the elders. ^2 Ikhnaton's anatomical and psychological peculiarities have been
used to support the conception of him as a phenomenon
men. "His
skull
was misshapen/' Weigall
have been subject to occasional epileptic
must have had
hallucinations, also.
epileptic— Mohammed
and
epileptic
and had hallucinations,
a most unusual
phenomenon— at
If, it
fits."
Some
Napoleon,
leaders often have hallucinations.
tells us,
He
great
thinks the king
men
have been
example.
for
among
"and he must
Religious
therefore, Ikhnaton was an would indicate that he was
least so
it
was reasoned, ap-
parently.^^
But what
basis
is
there for Weigall's suppositions? Neither
epilepsy nor hallucinations can be inferred from the sculptures
and
know
of
There
mummy
of Ikhnaton,
and we
no evidence of these traits from contemporary is, however, some evidence that indicates or
at least
some
respects,
reliefs
nor from the supposed
strongly suggests that Ikhnaton was pathological in
but
this
evidence
is
records.
confused, self-contradictory at points, and
certainly inconclusive.
The
statues
and
as "a stripling of
reliefs,
medium
according to Moret, depict Ikhnaton height, with slender bones
and
delicate
modelling" at the time of his ascension to the throne. Later, however, he "became rounded and effeminate— a hermaphrodite figure with
prominent
breasts,
wide hips and thighs too much
curved, which makes one suspect a morbid nature, with pathological flaw." Sir
Marc A. Ruffer
some
speaks of "the pathological
obesity" of Ikhnaton, although his face, neck and legs were thin.
"Where
the king
is
says this author, "his
represented distributing collars of gold,"
abdomen
actually hangs over the edge of
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
264 the balcony, a most
realistic
piece of portraiture." But in balcony
scenes reproduced in Breasted's
A
History of Egypt (Fig. 139)
and Moret, The Nile and Egyptian Civilization (Fig. 63), and in other works, he is shown as a very slender man indeed. Gardiner says "the portraits represent him with ... a deformed emaciated body"
(emphasis ours). Thus, the evidence of rep-
resentations in art
is
When we Ikhnaton, tions that
inconsistent and inconclusive.^*
turn to the
we find we are
mummy
supposed by some to be that of
the picture so confused and inclined to give
up
full
in despair
that for the present at least the evidence
is
of contradic-
and conclude
insufficient to warrant
a definitive verdict of any kind. Weigall says that "there can be
no doubt
mummy
that the
found
in the
tomb
of
Queen Tiy was
who
that of Akhnaton." Elliot Smith, the British anatomist
amined the
skeletal
ex-
remains believed that "we have the most posi-
tive evidence that these
bones are the remains of Khouniatonou
[Ikhnaton]." Other scholars, however, have, on the basis of searches since the skeleton in question was found,
come
re-
deny
to
or to doubt that the bones are those of Ikhnaton. Thus, Kurt
Sethe
convinced that certain evidence "proves" that the body
is
cannot have been that of the heretic king: "For us that the
body cannot
coffin
found a resting place."
it
in
expressed his conviction that naton; he thinks
it
is
it is
sufficient
any case be that of the king in whose
A decade later, R. Engelbach the mummy was not that of Ikh-
the remains of Smenkhkara. Derry shares
Engelbach's view in this matter. Peet has expressed his doubt.
And it is
Pendlebury says that "there his
[i.e.,
is
every reason to suppose that
Smenkhkara's] skeleton, found in the cache of
Ty at Thebes, which has so The age at time of death
of the person
consideration has been the subject of
Smith
originally estimated
twenty-six years. But, as
Queen
long passed for that of Akhenaten."
whose skeleton
much
is
^^
under
debate, also. Elliot
the age at death at twenty-four to
we have
seen, archeologists
unvtdlling to accept this estimate since
it
were very
would have made
Ikh-
IKHNATON
265
naton but a boy when he became king and hence would have
been too young to do
Under
all
that
he was supposed
to have done.
considerable pressure from the archeologists, Elliot Smith
reconsidered. signs of
known
as
He came
to the conclusion that the
Dystocia adiposo-genitalis.
"One
bones showed
by physicians,"
rare disorder, only recently recognized
"a.
of the effects of this
condition/' he says, "is to delay the process of the consolidation
of the bones." Therefore, he concludes, the person in question
may have been
as old as thirty or
his death. But,
he cannot
him
to
be those of a
resist
man who
even
time of
thirty-six at the
adding, the bones
appear to
still
died in his early twenties! Professor
Derry believes that the bones indicate an age of not more than twenty-three years. Regarding the pathology of the individual, there
contradiction as well as confusion. Elliot Smith,
is flat
was the
first
to
who
examine the skeleton, was convinced that he had
had hydrocephalus. A. R. Ferguson, Professor of Pathology in the Cairo School of Medicine, who also examined the cranium, declared, according to Elliot Smith, that "the signs of hydro-
cephalus were unquestionable." Derry, after further restoration of
it,
who examined
the cranium
declared that "the conformation of
whom
the skull does not support the statement that the person to it
belonged suffered from hydrocephalus ...
reverse of the shape produced
It is
indeed the very
by hydrocephalus,"
^®
(emphasis
ours).
In view of the evidence and conflicting testimony,
we would be justified in drawing the We do not know whose skeleton was
we
believe
following conclusions:
i.
is
some-
what uncertain but probably not more than twenty-five
years;
and
3.
The
clinical diagnosis
is
found;
2.
Its
age
inconclusive.
XI Attempt has ness
also
been made to account
for Ikhnaton's great-
by claiming that he was of foreign extraction. Weigall says must always be remembered that the king had much
that "it
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
266
foreign blood in his veins." Ruffer suggests that "his pecuhar genius may have been due to the foreign blood in his veins."
Numerous
authors believe that Ikhnaton's mother, Tiy, was not
an Eg}'ptian, although Breasted says that "there is not a particle " of evidence to prove her of foreign birth, as is so often claimed." Elliot Smith finds evidence of non-Egyptian ancestry in the facial skeleton.
The
between Ikhnaton and
differences
differences,
his father
they are
for
racial.
more than individual Amenothes Ill's face is cast in the Egyptian mould; but are "far
case of Kliouniatonou, the jaw clearly It
demonstrated
in the
form of
would not be surprising
have "foreign blood in
typically
is
at all
his veins."
its if
Armenoid, a
in the
most
fact
ascending ramus."
^^
Ikhnaton should prove to
We
know
that a
number
of
Egyptian kings before Ikhnaton had wives from Asia. But what is the significance of this foreign blood or the Armenoid jaw so far as intelligence or character,
are concerned?
The answer
monotheism or
political reform,
can only be: precisely nothing.
XII
How
then are the striking events which took place in Egypt
We
can choose bebetween 1375 and 1358 b.c. to be explained? and psychological is tween two types of interpretation: the one
anthropomorphic; the other
culturological.
is
What
are
their
relative merits?
We
have already seen that what took place during Ikhnaton's
reign was but a continuation
that had been going
on
and
a culmination of cultural trends
King"
for centuries before the "Heretic
was born. Philosophic development toward monotheism was already well advanced before Ikhnaton's birth. The rivalry between the throne and the temple, the struggle between priest and king for power, that,
this
was already hoary with age in 1386 sort of competition
where the temporal and tegrative
mechanism
is
b.c.
a characteristic of
ecclesiastical aspects of
More than all
nations
the central
are structurally differentiated.
We
in-
observe
IKHNATON these
267 trends
cultural
Ikhnaton's death. ecclesiastical fail it
continuing in Egypt for centuries after
The attempt
component
of the throne to eliminate the
of the integrative
mechanism
failed, as
must; the ecclesiastic aspect of social integration and regu-
lation has not yet
been eliminated from any nation so
far, as
the
Union makes emThe contest between church and state in Egypt
re-establishment of the church in the Soviet phatically clear.
continued after Ikhnaton's death with the priests growing in
power
as they
had
The theology of but we can trace this
in the reigns before his time.
monotheism collapsed
for the time being
current of thought in the centuries following Ikhnaton. In short,
the stirring events of Ikhnaton's reign can be accounted for as a part of a great process of cultural change
we
complexes and
classes of cultural
economic— which
and development. And
It is composed of elements— philosophic, political,
can explain this process in terms of
itself.
continually act and react
producing changes of
and new alignments.
all sorts,
We
upon one another,
new combinations and
can explain
this
syntheses,
culture process
in
way that we can account for the changes brought about in American culture by the introduction of the automobile. We do not need to call upon great men or upon psychological forces to make them intelligible. ancient Egypt in exactly the same
What
does the anthropomorphic, psychological— the Great
Man
—interpretation have to offer? In the
first
place,
we must
ask,
What
could a man, a
human
organism, of exceptional quality and ability have done in this or any situation
except to
respond to it— to work with the
materials at hand, to try to cope with the problems confronting
him; in short, to context?
A man
fit
of
himself to the culture process that superior
make-up might have made
is
his
neuro-sensory-glandular-muscular
a better,
i.e.,
more
effective,
response
than one of inferior brains and physique, but the pattern of the response would have been substantially the same because
it
would
have been determined by the same cultural situation. Further-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
268 more, the difference between another
is
sHght indeed
tlie
mentality of one
of an age-old cultural process. So that even
organism
if
Ikhnaton were an
of exceptionally fine quality, this fact
suffice to explain
man and
against the background
when measured
would not
at all
the events of his reign.
But we do not know that Ikhnaton was an organism of superior quality. On the contrary, virtually all that we know about him indicates that
Why,
he was a diseased and hence an
inferior organism.
then, has historian after historian explained this period
of Eg^'ptian history
by pointing to the
colossal genius of this
man?
The answer seems old, primitive,
to
be
that, as
we
indicated at the outset, the
anthropomorphic type of thinking that has been
many hundreds
so popular for so
of thousands of years has not
yet been outgrown. Science, and especially social science,
too young to have
any great extent.
make
its
made
And
itself felt in historical
the science of culture
still
so
new
proper designation, "culturology," sound outlandish.
pathetic thing about Great
man
they leave the great explanation of
What
is
is
fossils:
Man
interpretations of history
unexplained.
It
is
like the
is
The that
produced by "stone-making forces."
Breasted, Weigall,
Moret and others have done is and then to explain events
the culture process by citing various is
as to
medieval
create a personality for Ikhnaton
image of Ikhnaton
still
interpretation to
traits
of this personality.
to in
The
created by inference: great events took place
during his reign, therefore a great mind and will must have
brought them about; the struggle with the priesthoods was bitter
and prolonged, therefore Ikhnaton was a
and perseverance; a new era young king was original and
in art
man
of determination
was inaugurated, therefore the
creative.
He must
have had "foreign
olood in his veins" because his ideas were so novel.
been older than
his
He must
have
supposed skeletal remains indicate because
one so young could not have accomplished so much, and so on. may cite a particularly striking example of this. Sir Marc A.
We
:
IKHNATON
who made a study of and who consequently was Ruffer,
the paleopathology of ancient Egypt, intimately acquainted with the evi-
dence indicating Ikhnaton's abnormality, nevertheless argues
as
follows
"...
monarch who founds a monotheistic religion in the teeth of the opposition of a most powerful priesthood, who builds a new town where he worships his god away from old associations a
and among congenial surroundings, who endows that new town with beautiful temples,
who
who
perhaps composed the magnificent
be considered
new form of art, and hymn to Aton, cannot
patronizes a
lacking in energy, or as a degenerate, or an
as
effeminate person."
^^
Thus, certain
are not permitted for a
moment
facts
indicating pathology
to interfere with a cherished illu-
sion of historical interpretation. Surely the mastery of
realism could go
no
myth over
further.
Sometimes these psychological interpretations contradict each
Thus
other.
Sir
Marc
cites
Ikhnaton's "pathological obesity" as a
"The ex"may have been
possible reason for the loss of Egypt's Asiatic empire.
treme corpulency of the king," he responsible for his politics. disliked physical exertion,
he
On
account of his obesity he probably
may have been the reason why to war when the outlying But when he surveys the great achieve-
and
this
persistently refused to lead his
provinces were threatened."
vvnrites,
army
ments of the Eighteenth Dynasty, he "tireless
as
energy" that characterized
Ahmose!
The
fact
is
character. It
that
is
we know
and
is
very
virtually
nowhere
little
his
Ikhnaton
as
well
asserts that this
asserted
indeed about Ikhnaton as
Amenhotep is
his personality III
and
was Ikhnaton's
merely an assumption:
on any Eg}'ptian inscription." Concern-
ing the ancestry of other intimates of titi,
impressed with the
nothing about
usually said that
but Newberry
father,
is
rulers,
*^°
a political figure
"This
its
Ikhnaton— his
wife, Nefer-
"beloved" coregent Smenkhkara, and his son-in-law and
successor,
Tutankhamun— "nothing whatever
is
definitely
known"
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
270
(Newberry). His age at the time of his accession has been much debated and is still uncertain. Evidence concerning his health
and physical condition
is
so varied as to
be
virtually worthless.
We
We do not know why he became estranged from his wife. do not know how he met his death, whether from natural causes we do not know where he was we do not have adequate information of
or by violence. And, finally, to rest. If, therefore, sort,
we
data on
Ikhnaton as a king, a political institution,
this
could
expect to have any reliable information pertaining to his per-
sonality
and character? Indeed, do we have any
this subject?
That Ikhnaton
actually lived
not questioned, and he must
is
and
be inferred or deduced from the
a character.
But these cannot
political history of
Egypt. There
and
char-
whom we have
a vast
sharp disagreement today concerning the personality
D. Roosevelt, about
acter of the late Franklin
amount
of factual data obtained
might be
said of Lenin, Hitler,
political figure of recent times.
by
direct observation.
The same
Wilson, or any other outstanding
What
then can
we hope
to
know
or understand of this remote Egyptian king as a person?
students without details
number
give us the
about him, and they do
it
an exhaustive psychiatric
with confidence and assurance.
upon the
report of
analysis.
extent to which the personality and character of Ikhnaton
have been created ad hoc by scholars to explain the Egjptian culture history
is
sometimes remarkable.
impression that Weigall could not have
had he been
a
facts
of
gets the
his hero better
of Amenhotep Ill's household at the time and had associated with him daily until his
death. Weigall describes
thoughts wandered in
him fair
as
"...
a quiet, studious boy,
whose
places, searching for that happiness
had denied to him. His nature was young heart overflowed with love. He delighted, it
his physical condition
gentle; his
known
One
member
of Ikhnaton's birth
which
Yet
most intimate and personal
Indeed, they give the impression of drawing
The
on
facts at all
^^
therefore have had a personality
is
how
laid
IKHNATON
271 to walk in the gardens of the palace, to hear the
would seem,
birds singing, to watch the fish in the lake, to smell the flowers,
to follow butterflies, to
warm
Only where one knows
his small
so little can
bones in the sunshine."
^^
one write so much; the
absence of facts gives the imagination free rein.
Thus
Great
in the
Man
interpretation of history the
facts of the culture process are explained
known by
psychology, the
the unknown.
known
by the pseudo-facts of
A
worse error of reason-
ing would be hard to find— within or outside the field of scholarship.
XIII
To be history
of
many have were the
sure,
not
Ikhnaton's
all
students of Egypt have interpreted the
reign
in
anthropomorphic fashion;
this
seen clearly that these political and theological events
logical expression of a cultural historical process.
matter of
As a
Breasted himself describes and documents this
fact.
process very well indeed as our quotations from his works show.
But he seems
to
have given
chiatric explanation.
relatively little
weight to cultural
compared with biographic and
historical interpretation as
Let us turn
now
briefly to those
psy-
who have
emphasized, or at least have called specific attention
to,
the
process of culture history in their interpretations of Ikhnaton.
*'Up to a few years ago," writes T. E. Peet, "it was customary
movement was a product of the brain now know to be incorrect ... it [is] the movement not merely the personal
to believe that this entire of Ikhnaton
now
.
.
.
This we
necessary to see in
influence of an original genius, but also the inevitable product of ^^
the conditions of the time."
James Baikie writes: "It
is
not the sudden break with it is
evident, therefore, that
all
often represented as being;
native
soil,
Atenism was
the religious past of Egypt which
and could be traced
.
.
.
as far
thing in the history of the land."
^*
[it]
back
had as
its
roots deep in
you can trace any-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
272
John Pendlebury declares that Ikhnaton was not ''the first individual in history^ as has been claimed/' and points out that
"we know
actually
less
about him personally than about
many
of
his predecessors." Also, he not only recognizes the antecedents of the new religion but suggests Minoan inspiration for the new
Akhetaten which has so often been attributed to the genius of Ikhnaton himself. This "startling change ... in the spirit and outlook of Eg}TDtian art/' he says, "can only be attributed to a
art at
sudden intensification of Minoan influence/' occasioned by the destruction of Knosscs and the collapse of the Minoan empire.
H. Frankfort believes that the art of Ikhnaton may have derived some inspiration from the works of the reign of Thutmosis.^^
We
also find a live appreciation of the role of cultural forces
in history in the writings of Steindorff S.
R. K. Glanville, and others.
ever, as
we have
pointed out
Many
earlier,
and
Seele, P. E.
Newberry,
how-
of these students do,
invoke the peculiar
traits
of
Ikhnaton's personality as a means of accounting for the remarkable events of his reign.
XIV What we have man who
great
now
said
about Ikhnaton so
far
would apply
any
to
has been invoked to explain historical events.
We
wish to turn to aspects of the scholars' image of the Heretic
King that
When
are peculiar to him.
Breasted, Weigall and others create a
phenomenal person
to explain remarkable historical events they are, as
following a tradition that has flourished since the
But they had an added reason This It
we have
seen,
Old Stone Age.
for their exaltation of Ikhnaton.
is to be found in the religious outlook of these authors. would appear from their discussion of Ikhnaton's role
in
philosophic evolution that Breasted and Weigall believe that there
He
is
is
a
God, that there
is
only one God, and
an English-speaking, Protestant deity.
sume also— their assumptions
it
would seem.
They appear
are implicit rather than
to as-
explicit,
IKHNATON as
273
so frequently the case in philosophic or scientific discussions,
is
and the more basic the premise the more
likely it is to remain unexplicit— that mankind as a whole has been moving slowly
toward a realization that there
God and one
only one
is
true
faith— the one taught by Jesus Christ. As culture advanced, mankind came closer and closer to a recognition of the one true
and
to sense the precepts that
God
were eventually to be expounded
by His Son.
Now,
some reason which these authors do not make clear, God— the one and only God, our God, the English-speaking, for
Protestant
God— decided
about 1400
and
to reveal himself to this Egyptian king
Ikhnaton caught the
B.C.
whole
thereafter devoted his
attempt to establish the true not ready for
it.
Or, perhaps
was not
failed all
The
lost.
But he
God
Himself too soon. But though
was
failed.
by
it,
zeal, to
an
fired
with passionate
life,
faith.
vision,
The people were
miscalculated and revealed
adventure in monotheism
this
precious truth had been let out
truth cannot and will not die. It was
and
somehow communicated
to
the Hebrews who, after some centuries of incubation, were to bring
it
Such see
forth again in the person of Jesus Christ. is
to support
is
it.
Weigall believes that Ikhnaton was "the
God man
revealed himself
^^
Osiris
Ptah, Set, and Horus.
it
.
.
.
For the
the real meaning of God, as
comprehended." the
God who
was
now
our theory about Breasted and Weigall. Let us
what there
first
first
man
to
whom
time in the history of
we now understand
it,
had been
was but a mythological being. So were
Even Amon-Re was but
a superstition.
But
revealed himself to Ikhnaton was genuine; this time
real.
Ikhnaton was, according to Breasted, a "God-intoxicated man,
whose mind responded with marvellous
ment
to the visible evidences of
ecstatic in his sense of the
light
.
.
.
While
God
sensitiveness
about him.
and
He
discern-
was
fairly
beauty of the eternal and universal
to the traditional
Pharaoh the
state
god was
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
274
who
only the triumphant conqueror,
drove them
saw
in
crushed
peoples and
all
tribute-laden before the Pharaoh's chariot, Ikhnaton
him the beneficent
father of
all
men.
It
was the
first
time
in history that a discerning eye has caught this great universal truth,"
®^
(emphasis ours).
Ikhnaton devoted himself with "feverish fanaricism" to spreading the true faith, "fully convinced that he might enrirely recast
the world of religion."''^ After Ikhnaton had caught the vision of the true
came impatient with the paganism
God
God he
be-
of his fellow countrymen:
and having be the riddle of life, there was no place in his mind for aught but an open, fearless adoration of Akhnaton was the sworn enemy of the tablethe creator turners of his day, and the tricks of priestcraft were anathema to his pure mind (Weigall).^^ Boldly he looked to solved
what he deemed .
.
.
as a child to its father;
to
.
With
a revolution at
home on
his
hands
it is
.
.
not surprising that
the king did not have sufficient means to protect Egyptian pos-
But our authors have another explanation
sessions abroad.
for
Egypt's loss of empire at the close of the Eighteenth Dynasty. It
was because
(
i
)
Ikhnaton was too engrossed in his new philosophy
to concern himself with politics,
opposed to brute
and (2)
like Christ,
he was
force:
"Instead of gathering the army so sadly needed in Naharin,
Amenhotcp IV immersed himself
heart and soul in the thought of
the time, and the philosophizing theology of the priests was of
more importance
to
him than
all
the provinces of Asia
...
It
shows the astonishing leniency of Ikhnaton in a manner which
would indicate that he was opposed to measures of force" (Breasted). So he sat "singing hymns to the Disk at Tell elAmarna while the vast empire bequeathed to him by his fathers" went to pieces.^" Weigall
tells
us that Egypt lost her empire because
Ikhnaton's principles to fight.
He
"had the power to
it
let
was against loose
upon
IKHNATON
275
Asia an army which would silence
insult
all
such a step consistent with his principles
.
.
but
not find
[he] did
Akhnaton
.
definitely
refused to do battle believing that a resort to arms was an offence to
God
.
.
.
like that greater
Pharaoh suffered
Agony
a very
were leading him to the
The image
Teacher 1300 years as he realized that
of Ikhnaton created by Breasted
one whose mission
indeed "the
first
human
life"
is
now
ours.
.
"The
.
.
mankind.
like Jesus
first
a
moment
the
...
faith of the patriarchs
One might
believe that Almighty
Syria or Palestine before the time of Christ"
(
the lineal
is
is
God had more
though more momentarily, interpreted there than ever
call
a prophet
Akhnaton
revealed himself to Egypt, and had been
Both Breasted and Weigall
He was
expression of the true
ancestor of the Christian faith; but the creed of isolated prototype.
.
(Breasted)."
authors see in Ikhnaton the
faith that
.
and Weigall bears is no doubt proper
to bring the true faith to
prophet of history
both of nature and of
Our
is
.
his principles
loss of all his dearest possessions." ^^
a considerable likeness to that of Jesus Christ, as to
later
He
its
for
clearly,
was in
Weigall ).^^
attention to similarities between
Egyptian hymns to Aton and Psalms of the Hebrews. Breasted
Book of Proverbs Amenemope; that
points out that about "a chapter and a half of the is is,
largely
the
drawn verbatim from the
Hebrew
Egyptian."
version
The
is
of
practically a literal translation
from the
"teachings of the Egyptian sages exerted a pro-
found influence on Hebrew effected lodgment first
Wisdom
religious thinking and,
in Palestine, they
stage in their long transition
having thus
had advanced through the
from Egypt to us of the modern
world." *
* Breasted, The Dawn of Conscience, p. 22. Baikie admits that the resemblance between the Egj'ptian hymn and the Hebrew Psalter 104 is "indeed sufficiently striking" but sees "no need to imagine that there was borrowing on the part of the later author" {The Amarna Age, p. 321). W. O. E. Oesterly, on the other hand, feels that the evidence of historical connection is "convincing" ("Egypt and Israel," pp. 244-45, in The Legacy of Egypt, S. R. K. Glanville, ed.).
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
276
Thus Ikhnaton
is
not merely the Great
Man who
moves and
shapes the culture history of Egypt; he becomes the instrument of Divine Purpose. Through him did God first reveal himself to man.
But the time was not yet
paganism and idolatry were
ripe;
still
too strongly entrenched. So the revelation was handed on, perhaps from Joseph to Moses, down the ages until He who came to re-
deem
us all was born. Breasted was once enrolled in a Protestant theological school.
It
is
probable that Weigall was a Protestant,
way
interest, therefore, to note the
church regards like
this
a
some
of
is
Roman
Catholic
him. "With the single exception of Amenhotep IV," says the
scheme
"who allowed himself
to reform the Egyptian religion,
just rulers." ^*
But, after
all,
no
approve of a temporal ruler
likely to
out
also. It
which the
"God-intoxicated man." Plainly, they do not
Catholic Encyclopedia,
and
in
priests,
and confiscates
be drawn into
to
all its
kings were wise
hierarchy
ecclesiastical
who
their wealth.
is
closes temples, drives
The
other Pharaohs,
however, those who, according to this Catholic authority were
...
to the erec-
richly
endowed"—
"great builders, and devoted their vast resources tion of magnificent temples
.
.
.
which they
these rulers he finds were "wise and just." It will be noted, too, that this writer says that Ikhnaton "allowed himself to be
into" the
the
scheme to reform Egyptian
movement
drawn
religion; in other words, that
against the priesthoods was a political device of
temporal politicians to safeguard or enhance their power. Catholic scholars
do not take
himself
first
much
stock in the theory that
to an Egyptian.
may have been
or
God
revealed
scout the notion that Moses
influenced by the teachings of Ikhnaton:
"Although Moses, learned Eg\'ptians,
They as
he was
may have been indebted
two external features
in
the wisdom of the
to an Egyptian
in his organization of
he was, thanks to the Divine
model
for
one
Divine worship,
inspiration, entirely original in the
establishment of the Jewish priesthood, which
is
based on the
unique idea of Jahweh's covenant with the Chosen People."
^^
IKHNATON
277
The author much too
is
temporal or
of the article "Egypt" in the
sophisticated
ecclesiastical to believe that it
natural vision
and
was Ikhnaton's super-
animated him, 'The
religious zeal that
Amenhotep IV," he
of
CathoHc Encyclopedia
the ways of politicians whether
in
effort
writes, "to introduce the cult of his only
god, Aton, was perhaps not prompted exclusively by a religious ideal, as
is
generally supposed."
monotheism
in
He
believes the long trend toward
Egypt "must have been encouraged by the Phar-
aohs in their capacity rather of political than of religious rulers ^^
of the nation."
Jewish scholars, too, reject the idea that Moses
may have been
They admit that the "concept of Divine Unity has appeared among other religious and philosophic groups," but insist that "Hebrew monotheism is unique." * If Ikhnaton was indeed the means of the first revelation of God to man, it was apparently, as we have suggested, the Protestant deity who made himself known. influenced by Ikhnaton.
XV The drama
of Ikhnaton
and monotheism
Mann world
uses Joseph in sick
and
Egypt
in turmoil.
is
and
for the artist as well as for the historian
excellent material scientist.
as the vehicle for his
Amenhotep
was the pharaoh of Egypt during the
III,
Thomas
message to a
the father of Ikhnaton,
earlier part of Joseph's life,
according to Harry Slochower's interpretation of Mann's novel.^^ Potiphar, the eunuch husband of
Mut, was
Aton movement; Mut, with the party *
Abraham Shusterman, "Monotheism,"
pedia, Vol.
VII (New York, 1942),
p.
in
624.
of
allied
Amon. The symbolism
The It
with the growing
Universal Jewish Encyclobe recalled that James
will
Baikie was unwilling to admit that Hebrew psalmists may have drawn upon Egyptian hymns. Now Baikie was a clergyman. Thus it would appear that all are unwilling to clerical scholars Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish alike
—
—
admit any connection between their own religious faith and tradition and another; historical connections are not in keeping with divine revelation. Their bias, springing from vested interest, is of course understandable; but it in hardly conducive to sound scholarship.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
278 of Mut's longing for Joseph
Joseph's rejection of
and her attempt
Mut and
his
subsequent
but does not concern us here. Ikhnaton
to
fate,
seduce him, intriguing
is
may have been
the phar-
aoh before \^•hom Joseph was brought after he had interpreted his fellow-prisoners' dreams.
him
but describes Pharao
is
dreamy
does not identify
him by name,
seventeen. This hypersensitive and tender youth, a
searcher of a
Mann
as follows:
God,
like Joseph's forefathers,
religion of love, has
and enamoured of
ascended the throne during the
time of Joseph's imprisonment. He is an anticipating, a premature Christian, the mythical prototype of those, who are on the right way, but not the right ones for that way.^^
We can
only conclude that this pharaoh was indeed Ikhnaton.
Like Breasted and Weigall,
Mann
sees in
him the instrument
of
God's revelation to man. But, because he "was not the right one for that way," it remained for the Jews to keep the vision alive until the
coming
of the Messiah, our Christ.
Sigmund Freud, too, has been captured by the engrossing theme of Ikhnaton, Moses, and monotheism.^^ He assumes that Moses was an Egyptian— mose is an ending of many Egyptian proper names— and a devout follower of Ikhnaton. Frustrated in his desire and attempt to monotheize the Egyptians, Moses determined to give the new theology to the Hebrews then in Egypt. In this way the philosophy of Ikhnaton was perpetuated.
XVI "Until Ikhnaton the history of the world had been but the irresistible drift of tradition. All
men had been but
in the great current" (Breasted).
must conclude that of culture
Our
and that
inquiry has
reign were
but
history all
shown
is still
men
are
Now
drops of water
that our study
is
done we
the irresistible flow of the stream
but chips floating on that stream.
conclusively that the events of Ikhnaton's
links in a chain that
extended for centuries before
IKHNATON
279
and after his lifetime. The Hnks were more striking or emphatic no doubt, but Hnks, nevertheless. We can come to no other conclusion than that the general trend of events would have been the same had Ikhnaton been but a sack of sawdust.
The Great Man
theory of historical interpretation
is,
however,
one of compelling power and appeal:
A man
Caesar
pire, Christ
born, and for ages after
is
we have
a
Roman Em-
born, and millions of minds so grow and cleave
is
he
confounded with virtue and the possible is the lengthened shadow of one man; as Monachism of the Hermit Antony; the Reformation, of Luther; Quakerism, of Fox; Methodism, of Wesley; Abolition, to his genius that
of a man.
An
...
of Clarkson
is
institution
history resolves itself very easily into the
all
biography of a few stout and earnest persons (Emerson, Essay
on
Self
Rehance).
Thus wrote the man who provided the with the verbal conception
is
reflexes called
still
Great Man. But
He is
popular. History
how
either taken for granted or
defies all laws
.
.
many
America
The
years.
"explained" by citing the
said to
accounted
be
for?
inexplicable.
He
isn't.
"Genius
."
The Great Man pomorphism.
is
is
Man
the Great
is
intelligentsia of
"thought" for so
theory
It pictures
is,
of course, the quintessence of anthro-
man,
God, a
like
first
cause, a
prime
mover: "Let there be light and there was light ... an institution is
but the lengthened shadow of one man."
Man
ever creates
himself in God's image.
The Ikhnaton we meet is
in the sober studies of the scholars'
a sheer fictional character,
berry Finn. tain
and
conflicts
no more
real
We know nothing about
direct.
And
at every point
with evidence,
it is
him
as a person that
where the Great
Man
is
cer-
theory
the evidence that must give way.
the ossification of bones indicates a
have done what the Great
pen
than Hamlet or Huckle-
Man
man who
did, a
If
died too young to
way must be found
to
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
280
delay the process of ossification. If an empire is lost, it is because the Great Man is morally opposed to the use of force; or he is too fat
lazy to lead his army. If a
and
becomes a dynamo of
city
all
determines British foreign policy. it
nothing but the
no
is
from
different
invented by the Pueblo Indians to "ex-
plain" the spirals of dust in the hot desert
who Men, whether
is
the political, social, military and
philosophic events of his day. As such he
Whiriwind Old Man,
Man
built the Great
is
This Ikhnaton
energ}'.
composite personification of
new
And
air,
so
or the John Bull
it is
with
Great
all
be a Paul Bunyan of the folk or a George
Wash-
ington of historians. goes without saying that
It
Some
abilities.
But
more than
takes
it
Great Man.
Perhaps
respect or another.
we
ment forces
be
make
to
and
a
Men
in their talents
man
say
and glands exceptional
is
said to
more than exceptional
Man
one
endow-
is
required also.
No
one can
without a play, a stage, and an audience. Con-
of mediocre talents
is
in
a
than
have been
natural
may become Great
at the focal
but the neural
if
chance
point of a tremendously
significant historical event. In the process of cultural
Great
rather
Great Man; a certain concatenation of cultural
and circumstance place him a
and
make
to
have been pathological for example,
historical circumstances
a great actor
versely, a
should
Mohammed,
epileptic. It takes, then,
an
differ
superior brains
some Great
for
superior,
men
are silk purses biologically; others are sows' ears.
development,
medium through which an
im-
portant synthesis of culture elements takes place. Darwin, Newton,
Beethoven, and Edison were
men
of this type. Tliey were the
neurological loci of important cultural events.
may have been
superior organisms.
To be
sure, they
But had they been reared
as
swineherds. Greatness would not have found them. In history, in political
and
social
movements, the Great
Man
is
that ana-
tomical part of a social organism that functions as a directive, regulative
or
integrative
chance, or both together,
mechanism.
Ability— or
may have put him
epilepsy— or
in this position.
The
IKHNATON Great
Man
281 is
an instrument employed by a nation or a movement
its functions. Torn from his context, the Great Napoleon, a Kaiser sawing wood, the mutilated corpse of Mussolini, a Big Name in a "War Crimes Trial"— is
in the exercise of
Man— an
exiled
human flesh. The measure of a Great Man in the life of nations can be taken when we see how independent of him the behavior of a nation is. The behavior of the social organism that is Russia has remained but an insignificant hunk of
constant for decades and even centuries: expansion toward the east,
tropismatic gropings toward warm-water ports, penetration
of the Balkans, Pan-Slavism. in the driver's seat
Whether
a
Czar or a Commissar
immaterial; the great organism goes
is
its
sits
own
way unalterably. The same observations may be made in the case of Germany. Whether the Great Man be Wilhelm, Bismarck, or Hitler, the organism that was Germany followed a constant and uniform course: Drang nach Oesten, lebensraum, colonies, commercial rivalry.
The
reasons for this uniformity of national be-
havior are of course plain: the land, the people
the resources of the land or
who grow upon
lack of them,
its
its
it,
position with
reference to other nations, the trade routes of the world, etc.
These remain
relatively constant
and consequently the behavior
of the social organism remains constant. Great ogies
do more to obscure these fundamental
them. The Great
Man
alization, of the social
is
facts
Men
and
Ideol-
than to explain
the instrument, the Ideology, the ration-
organism
international jungle of nations.
as it struggles for survival in the
CHAPTER TEN THE LOCUS OF MATHEMATICAL REALITY
"He's [the Red King's] dreaming now," said Tweedledee: "and what he's dreaming about?" Alice said, "Nobody can guess that." "Why, about you.'" Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands triumphantly. "And if he left off dreaming about you, where do you suppose you'd be?"
do vou think
"Where
I
am now,
of course," said Alice.
retorted contemptuously. "You'd you're only a sort of thing in his dream!"
"Not you!" Tweedledee where.
Why,
"If that there
out
—bang! —
be no-
King was to wake," added Tweedledum, "you'd go
just like a candle."
"I shouldn't!" Alice exclaimed indignantly. "Besides, sort of thing in his
dream, what are you,
I
should
like to
if
I'm only a
know?"
"Ditto," said Tweedledum. "Ditto, ditto!" cried Tweedledee. He shouted this so loud that Alice couldn't help saying "HushI if you make so much noise." no use your talking about waking him," said Tweedledum, "when you're only one of the things in his dream. You know
You'll be waking him, I'm afraid,
"Well,
it's
very well you're not real." "I
am
real!" said Alice,
"You won't make
and began to
cry.
yourself a bit realler
by crying," Tweedledee
re-
marked: "there's nothing to cry about."
—
—
"If I wasn't real," Alice said half laughing through her tears, it all seemed so ridiculous "I shouldn't be able to cry." "I hope you don't suppose those are real tears?" Tweedledum interrupted in a tone of great contempt. Lewis Carroll Through the Looking Glass
—
D
o mathematical truths reside in the external world, there
to be discovered by man, or are they man-made inventions? Does mathematical reality have an existence and a validity 282
THE LOCUS OF MATHEMATICAL REALITY
human
independent of the the
human
is
it
merely a function of
nervous system?
Opinion has been and
Mary
species or
283
still
is
divided on this question. Mrs.
Somerville (1780-1872), an Englishwoman v^ho
men
corresponded with such
W.
Lussac,
as Sir
knew
or
John Herschel, Laplace, Gay
Whewell, John Stuart Mill, Baron von Humboldt, and De Candolle, and who was herself a
Cuvier,
Faraday,
scholar of distinction,* expressed a view widely held
when
she
said:
"Nothing has afforded
me
so convincing a proof of the unity
of the Deity as these purely mental conceptions of numerical and
mathematical science which have been by slow degrees vouch-
man, and
safed to
are
now
Differential Calculus,
of which
from
it
superseded by the Higher Algebra,
existed in that sublimely omniscient
all
Mind
^
eternity."
Lest
than
must have
granted in these latter times by the
still
be thought that Mrs. Somerville was more theological
scientific in
her outlook,
let it
be noted that she was de-
nounced, by name and in public, from the pulpit by Dean Cock-
burn of York Cathedral In
America,
scholar
(the
for her support of science.^
Edward Everett
first
(1794-1865),
American to win
a
a
distinguished
doctorate at Gottingen),
reflected the enlightened view of his day
when he
declared:
we contemplate absolute truths mind before the morning stars sang continue to exist there when the last of
"In the pure mathematics
which existed together,
in the divine
and which
will
their radiant host shall have fallen
In our
own
day, a
from heaven."
^
prominent British mathematician, G. H.
Hardy, has expressed the same view with, however, more technicality than rhetorical flourish, in *
A
Mathematician's Apology:
She wrote the following works, some of which went into several editions: oi the Heavens, 1831 (which was, it seems, a popularization of the Mecanique Celeste of Laplace); The Connection of the Physical Sciences, 1858; Molecular and Microscopic Science, 1869; Physical Geography,
The Mechanism
1870.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
284
"I believe that mathematical reality lies outside us,
our function
which we
to discover or observe
is
prove,
and that the theorems
it,
and which we describe grandiloquently
Taking the opposite view we find the distinguished
W.
Bridgman, asserting that
"it is
our
as
*
* 'creations' are simply our notes of our observations."
P.
and that
physicist,
the merest truism, evident
once to unsophisticated observation, that mathematics is a human invention." ^ Edward Kasner and James Newman state that
at
truths have
"we have overcome the notion that mathematical
own minds.
existence independent and apart from our
It is
strange to us that such a notion could ever have existed."
From
a psychological
latter
conception
valid.
There
realities
is
is
^
and anthropological point of view,
the only one that
is
scientifically
an
even
this
sound and
no more reason to believe that mathematical
have an existence independent of the
to believe that mythological realities can
from man. The square root of minus one
human mind than
have their being apart is
real.
So were
Wotan
and Osiris. So are the gods and spirits that primitive peoples believe in today.
things real?, but,
The question at issue, however, is not. Are these Where is the locus of their reality? It is a mis-
take to identify reality with the external world only.
more real than an hallucination. Our concern here, however, is not mathematical pose to do
is
reality as
is
one view of
What we
pro-
phenomenon of mathematical bemake clear, on the one hand, why the
to present the
havior in such a belief in the
to establish
sound, the other illusory.
Nothing
way
as to
independent existence of mathematical truths has
seemed so plausible and convincing
for so
many
centuries, and,
* The mathematician is not, of course, the only one who is inclined to believe that his creations are discoveries of things in the external world. The theoretical physicist, too, entertains this belief. "To him who is a discoverer in this field," Einstein obsen'es, "the products of his imagination appear so
necessary and natural that he regards them, and would like to have
them
regarded by others, not as creations of thought but as given realities," ("On the Method of Theoretical Physics," in The World as I See It, p. 30).
THE LOCUS OF MATHEMATICAL REALITY
on the
other, to
show
that
of
all
285
mathematics
is
nothing more
than a particular kind of primate behavior.
Many
persons would unhesitatingly subscribe to the proposition
must
that "mathematical reality us."
Are these not the only
lie
either within us, or outside
As Descartes once
possibilities?
reasoned in discussing the existence of God,
we can have unless there
be somewhere, either in us or out of
which comprises,
though
"it
impossible
is
the idea or representation of anything whatever,
in reality
."
,
may
reasoning
this
.
^
an original
us,
(emphasis ours). Yet,
appear to be,
it
is,
in
irresistible
our present
The
problem, fallacious or at least treacherously misleading.
fol-
lowing propositions, though apparently precisely opposed to each
one
other, are equally valid;
is
the other:
as true as
"Mathe-
i.
matical truths have an existence and a validity independent of the
human mind," and phrased as they
mind"
2.
"Mathematical truths have no existence or
from the human mind." Actually, these propositions,
validity apart
are, are
misleading because the term "the
used in two different senses. In the
is
first
statement, "the
human mind" refers to the individual organism; in the to the human species. Thus both propositions can be, and Mathematical truths
are, true.
which the individual
second, actually
exist in the cultural tradition into
born, and so enter his
is
But apart from
outside.
human
mind from the
cultural tradition, mathematical concepts
have neither existence nor meaning, and of course, cultural
tradi-
tion has
no existence apart from the human
realities
thus have an existence independent of the individual
species.
Mathematical
mind, but are wholly dependent upon the mind of the
species.
Or, to put the matter in anthropological terminology:
mathe-
matics in
human
entirety,
its
its
"truths" and
culture, nothing more.
ture which already existed
Culture
traits
its
"realities,"
Every individual
and which
is
is
is
a part of
born into a
cul-
independent of him.
have an existence outside of the individual mind
and independent of
it.
The
individual obtains his culture
by
learn-
ing the customs, beliefs, techniques of his group. But culture
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
286
and can have, no existence apart from the human Mathematics, therefore—hke language, institutions, tools, the arts, etc.— is the cumulative product of ages of endeavor of the
itself
has,
species.
human species. The great French make
to
this clear.
mentars^
Forms
ological
Method
its
savant Emile
He
discussed
Durkheim was one
of the Religious Life. especially
he
And
first
The
Ele-
The Rules
in
of Soci-
set forth the nature of culture
human mind. Others, relationship between man and
too,
relationship to the
discussed the
of the
in the early pages of
it
and
have of course
culture,
but Durk-
heim's formulations are especially appropriate for our present cussion and
we
upon him
shall call
to speak for us
dis-
from time to
time.^
Mathematics herits
from
its
is,
of course, a part of culture. Every people in-
predecessors, or contemporary neighbors, along with
ways of cooking, marrying, worshipping, calculating, in fact, a
and whatever
else
tens,
cardinal
ways of counting, is,
form of behavior: the responses of a particular kind of
primate organism to a set of stimuli. fives,
etc.,
mathematics does. Mathematics
Whether
twelves or twenties; whether
numbers beyond
5,
or possesses
a people counts
by
no words for the most modern and has
it
highly developed mathematical conceptions, their mathematical
behavior
is
determined
by the mathematical
which
culture
possesses them.
We
can see
now how
the belief that mathematical truths and
human mind
flourished.
They
They
enter
the individual mind, as Durkheim says, from the outside.
They
realities lie
do
lie
outside the
outside the
impinge upon
mind
his organism, again
cosmic forces do.
is
secreted, like bile;
tot boys
and
it is
is
so.
can
see,
and
just as
by observing him-
Mathematics
something drunk,
grow up and behave, mathematically
in obedience to
Durkheim,
to quote
Any mathematician
self as well as others, that this
that
arose
of each individual organism.
is
not something
like wine.
Hotten-
as well as otherwise,
in conformity with the mathematical
and
THE LOCUS OF AAATHEMATICAL REALITY
287
EngHsh or American youths do the There is not one iota of ana-
other
traits in their culture.
same
in their respective cultures.
tomical or psychological evidence to indicate that there are any significant innate, biological
racial
matical or any other kind of
human
Newton been
own
behavior
is
concerned.
Had
reared in Hottentot culture
he would have calcuG. H. Hardy, who know, through well as from the observation of others,
Men
lated like a Hottentot. their
differences so far as mathe-
experience as
like
that mathematical concepts enter their minds from the outside,
conclude understandably— but erroneously— that they have their
and locus
origin
the external world, independent of man.
in
Erroneous, because the alternative to "outside the the individual mind, that
is,
human mind,"
not "the external world, inde-
is
pendent of man," but culture, the body of traditional thought and behavior of the
human
species.
Culture frequently plays
We
ing.
tricks
upon
us and distorts our think-
tend to find in culture direct expressions of
"human
nature" on the one hand and of the external world on the other.
Thus each people
is
beliefs are direct
and
"human
disposed to believe that
its
man's nature.
faithful expressions of
nature," they think, to practice
own customs and
monogamy,
to
It is
be jealous
of one's wife, to bury the dead, drink milk, to appear in public
only
when
clad, to call
your mother's brother's children "cousin,"
to enjoy exclusive right to the fruit of your
happen
to
us that there of
the
toil,
etc.,
they
if
have these particular customs. But ethnography the widest divergence of custom
is
world:
there
are
polyandry, lend wives as a
peoples
mark
who
among
loathe
milk,
of hospitality, regard
tells
the peoples practice
inhumation
with horror, appear in public without clothing and without shame, call their
who
mother's brother's children "son" and "daughter," and
freely place all or the greater portion of the
toil at
the disposal of their fellows. There
that can be said to express Similarly
it
"human"
is
produce of their
no custom or
belief
nature more than any other.
has been thought that certain conceptions of the
^
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
288
were so simple and fundamental that they immediately and faithfully expressed its structure and nature. One is inclined to think that yellow, blue, and green are features of the external world
which any normal person would distinguish until
external world
he learns that the Creek and Natchez Indians did not distinguish yellow from green; they had but one term for both. Similarly,
many
the Choctaw, Tunica, the Keresan Pueblo Indians and other peoples
make no
terminological distinction between blue
and green.
The
great
Newton was deceived by
his culture, too.
for granted that the concept of absolute space directly
diately corresponded to
he thought, the
To be
took
it
and imme-
something in the external world; space,
something that has an existence independent of
is
human mind,
concept space
He
is
"I
do not frame hypotheses," he
But the
said.
a creation of the intellect, as are other concepts.
Newton himself did not create the hypothesis of came to him from the outside, as Durkheim puts it. But although it impinges upon the organism
sure,
absolute space. It properly
comme
Jes ioTces
cosmiques,
it
has a different source:
not
it is
the cosmos but man's culture.
For centuries
it
was thought that the theorems of Euclid were
merely conceptual photographs, so to speak, of the external world; that they
had a
validity quite
independent of the
human mind;
that there was something necessary and inevitable about them.
The
invention of non-Euclidean geometries by Lobatchewsky,
Riemann and
others has dispelled this view entirely. It
is
now
clear that concepts such as space, straight line, plane, etc., are
no more necessary and inevitable
as a
consequence of the
ture of the external world than are the concepts green
—or
struc-
and yellow
the relationship term with which you designate your mother's
brother, for that matter.
To
quote Einstein again:
"We come now
to the question:
necessary, respectively in
what
is
a priori certain or
geometry (doctrine of space)
or
its
THE LOCUS OF MATHEMATICAL REALITY foundations? Formerly
we thought
289
everything; nowadays
—nothing, Aheady the distance-concept
logically
is
there need be no things that correspond to
mately."
it,
we
think
arbitrary;
even approxi-
^°
Kasner and
Newman
say that "non-Euclidean geometry
proof
is
man's own handiwork, subject only to the limitations imposed by the laws of thought." ^^
...
that mathematics
is
Far from having an existence and a validity apart from the
human species, all mathematical concepts are "free inventions of the human intellect," to use a phrase with which Einstein characterizes the concepts
and fundamental principles of
because mathematical and
scientific
physics.
But
concepts have always entered
mind from the outside, everyone until recently has concluded that they came from the external world instead of from man-made culture. But the concept of culture, as a scieneach individual
tific
concept,
The
is
but a recent invention
cultural
itself.
nature of our scientific concepts and beliefs
by the Nobel prize winning
clearly recognized
physicist,
is
Erwin
Schrodinger, in the following passage:
"Whence molecules
is
arises
the v^ddespread belief that the behavior of
determined by absolute
viction that the contrary
is
causality,
whence the con-
unthinkable? Simply from the custoniy
inherited through thousands of years, of thinking causally,
which
makes the idea of undetermined events, of absolute, primary casualness,
seem
complete
nonsense,
a
logical
absurdity," ^*
(Schrodinger's emphases). Similarly,
are a
Henri Poincare
mere "conventions,"
priori
tions
.
We
.
i.e.,
axioms of geometry
asserts that the
customs: they "are neither synthetic
judgments nor experimental
facts.
They
are conven-
." ^^
turn
now
to another aspect of mathematics that
is
illu-
minated by the concept of culture. Heinrich Hertz, the discoverer of wireless waves, once said:
"One cannot
escape
the
feeling
that
these
mathematical
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
290
formulas have an independent existence and an intelligence of their own, that they are wiser than we are, wiser even than their discoverers
[sic],
put into them."
that
we
get
more out
them than was
of
originally
^*
Here again we encounter the notion that mathematical formulas have an existence "of their own," (i.e., independent of the human species), and that they are "discovered," rather than man-made.
The
concept of culture
clarifies
the entire situation. Mathematical
formulas, like other aspects of culture, do have in a sense an
"independent existence and intelligence of their own." The English language has, in a sense, "an independent existence of its
own." Not independent of the human species, of course, but independent of any individual or group of individuals, race or nation. It has, in a sense, an "intelligence of its own." That is, it behaves, grows and changes in accordance with principles which are inherent in the language itself, not in the human mind. As man self-conscious of language,
becomes
and
the science of philology
as
matures, the principles of linguistic behavior are discovered and its
laws formulated.
So
it
is
real sense
with mathematical and scientific concepts. In a very they have a
life of their
culture, of cultural tradition.
own. This
the
life is
As Durkheim expresses
it:
life
of
"Col-
ways of acting and thinking have a reality outside the individuals who, at every moment of time, conform to it. These
lective
ways of thinking and acting
be quite possible
exist in their
money,
right."
^^ It
would
and adequately the evolu-
to describe completely
tion of mathematics, physics,
own
architecture, axes, plows,
language, or any other aspect of culture without ever alluding to the
human
species or
the most effective as
if
the
human
way
any portion of
race did not exist.
iVenient to refer to the nation that
man who
it.
As
a matter of fact,
to study culture scientifically
To be first
sure
coined
it
is
to proceed
is
often con-
money
invented the calculus or the cotton gin. But
necessary, nor, strictly speaking, relevant.
The
or to the it is
not
phonetic shifts in
THE LOCUS OF AAATHEMATICAL REALITY Indo-European
291
summarized by Grimm's law have
as
to
do
solely
with linguistic phenomena, with sounds and their permutations, combinations and interactions. They can be dealt with adequately
without any reference to the anatomical, physiological, or psychological characteristics of the primate organisms who produced
them. a life [they]
And
with mathematics and physics. Concepts have of their own. Again to quote Durkheim, "when once born, so
it is
obey laws
all
their
own. They
other, unite, divide themselves
culture
other
interact
traits,
syntheses and combinations.
may form ciated
attract each other, repel each
and multiply with
Two
each
.
,
other,
associated with
others. Certain ideas of electrical
grow from the "Faraday
new
forming
coming together The laws of motion asso-
new concept or synthesis. with Newton were syntheses of concepts and
Ideas, like
or three ideas
a
Galileo, Kepler
." ^^
phenomena
stage," so to speak, to those of Clerk
Maxwell, H. Hertz, Marconi, and modern radar. "The application of
Newton's mechanics to continuously distributed masses
led," says Einstein, "inevitably to the discovery partial differential equations,
which
and application of
in their turn first provided the
language for the laws of the field-theory" (emphasis ours).
The
theory of relativity was, as Einstein observes, "no revolutionary act,
but the natural continuation of a line that can be traced
through centuries."
More
Maxwell and Lorentz led relativity." ^^ is
Thus we
immediately, inevitably
to
see not only that
"the
theory of
Clerk
the special theory of
any given thought-system
an outgrowth of previous experience, but that certain ideas
lead
inevitably
machine,
belief,
to
new concepts and new
outgrowth of previous culture
traits.
An
nature of culture makes clear, therefore,
Any
systems.
philosophy, custom or institution
is
tool,
but the
understanding of the
why Hertz
felt
that
"mathematical formulas have an independent existence and an intelligence of their
own."
His feeling that "we get more out of them than was originally
put into them,"
arises
from the
fact that in the interaction of
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
292
new
culture traits
syntheses are formed which were not antici-
pated by "their discoverers," or which contained impHcations
made them
that were not seen or appreciated until further growth
more
Sometimes novel features of a newly formed
explicit.
synthesis are not seen even
tem the
many
of
in whose nervous sysThus Jacques Hadamard tells us
by the person
synthesis took place.
occasions in which he failed utterly to see things that
"ought to have struck
he
stances in which
.
.
.
[him] blind."
failed to see
He
numerous
cites
in-
"obvious and immediate con-
sequences of the ideas contained" in the work upon which he was engaged, leaving
them
be "discovered" by others
to
later.^^
contradiction between the view held by Hertz,
The
Hardy and
others that mathematical truths are discovered rather than
made
is
man-
thus resolved by the concept of culture. They are both;
they are discovered but they are also man-made.
product of the mind of the
human
species.
They
are the
But they are en-
countered or discovered by each individual in the mathematical culture in which
he grows up. The process of mathematical
we have
pointed out, one of interaction of matheupon one another. This process requires, of course, a basis in the brains of men, just as a telephone conversation requires wires, receivers, transmitters, etc. But we do not
growth
is,
as
matical elements
need to take the brains of
men
into account in an explanation of
we have to when we wish to ex-
mathematical growth and invention any more than take the telephone wires into consideration plain the conversation
numerous inventions
of
it
carries.
Proof of this
lies
in
the fact
(or "discoveries") in mathematics
made
simultaneously by two or more persons working independently.*
*
The
following data are taken from a long and varied list published in by F. Ogburn (New York, 1923), pp. 90-102, in which simultaneous inventions and discoveries in the fields of chemistry, physics,
Social Change,
Wm.
biology, mechanical invention, etc., as well as in mathematics, are listed. Law of inverse squares: Newton, 1666; Halley, 1684.
Introduction of decimal point: Pitiscus, 1616-17.
1608-12; Kepler,
1616; Napier,
THE LOCUS OF MATHEMATICAL REALITY If
293
these discoveries really were caused, or determined, by indi-
we would have
vidual minds,
On
to explain
them
as coincidences.
the basis of the laws of chance these numerous and repeated
coincidences would be nothing short
explanation
culturological
The whole
once.
of
Each
individual
is
culture
shape and mould each person's
and
direction.
Mathematics
the total culture.
It acts
is,
upon
at
embraced by
customs and institutions. These
of beliefs,
tools,
is
clear
born into a pre-existing
organization traits
situation
population of a certain region
a type of culture.
But the
miraculous.
makes the whole
of course,
life,
give
it
content
one of the streams
individuals in varying degree,
in
and
they respond according to their constitutions. Mathematics
is
the psychosomatic response to the mathematical culture.
But we have already noted that within the body of matheis action and reaction among the various elements. Concept reacts upon concept; ideas mix, fuse, form new syntheses. This process goes on throughout the whole extent of culture although more rapidly and intensively in some regions matical culture there
(usually the center) than in others (the periphery).
process of interaction
new to
this
certain point,
syntheses * are formed of themselves. These syntheses are,
be
The
and development reaches a
When
sure,
real
events and have location in
places are of course the brains of
process has been going
time and place.
men. Since the
on rather uniformly over
a
cultural
wide area and
Logarithms: Burgi, 1620; Napier-Briggs, 1614. Calculus: Newton, 1671; Leibnitz, 1676. Principle of least squares: Gauss, i8og; Legendre, 1806. A treatment of vectors without the use of co-ordinate systems: Hamilton, 1843; Grassman, 1843; and others, 1843. Contraction hypothesis: H. A. Lorentz, 1895; Fitzgerald, 1895. The double theta functions: Gopel, 1847; Rosenhain, 1847. Geometry with axiom contradictory to Euclid's parallel axiom: chevsky, 1836-40; Bolyai, 1826-33; Gauss, 1829. The rectification of the semi-cubal parabola:
Lobat-
Van Heuraet, 1659; Neil, 1657; Fermat, 1657-59. The geometric law of duality: Oncelet, 1838; Gergone, 1838. * Hadamard entitles one chapter of his book "Discovery as a Synthesis."
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
294
new
population, the
synthesis takes place simultaneously in
a
number of brains at once. Because we are habitually anthropocentric in our thinking we tend to say that these men made these discoveries. And in a sense, a biological sense, they did. But if we wish to explain the discovery as an event in the growth of mathematics we must rule the individual out completely. From this standpoint, the individual did not make the discovery was something that happened to him. He was merely the place where the lightning struck. A simultaneous "discovery" by three men working "independently" simply means that culat
all.
It
tural-mathematical lightning can and does strike in
one
invention or discovery, the individual
is
merely the neural locus
which the advance occurs. Man's brain
in
more than
place at a time. In the process of cultural growth, through
is
merely a catalytic
agent, so to speak, in the culture process. This process cannot exist
independently of neural
nervous system
is
tissue,
but the function of man's
merely to make possible the interactive process
to effect syntheses of cultural elements.
and
To be
sure individuals differ just as catalytic agents, lightning
One person, one set of brains, medium for the growth of mathematical culture than another. One man's nervous system may be a better catalyst for the culture process than that of another. The matheconductors or other media do.
may be
a better
matical cultural process of brains than another
therefore
is
as
its
more
medium
likely to select
of expression.
one
But
it
set is
easy to exaggerate the role of superior brains in cultural advance. It
not merely superiority of brains that counts. There must be a
is
juxtaposition of brains with a specific cultural tradition. If the
proper cultural elements are lacking, superior brains will be of
no
avail.
There were brains
as
good
as
Newton's
in
10,000 years before the birth of Christ, at the time of the conquest, that
or any other
we know about
the neuroanatomy of
period
fossil
of English
history.
England
Norman
Everything
man, the prehistory of England, and
Homo
sapiens will support this statement.
THE LOCUS OF MATHEMATICAL REALITY
There were brains
good
as
But the
in Darkest Africa.
Newton's
as
295 in aboriginal
America or
calculus was not invented in these
other times and places because the requisite cultural elements
were lacking. Contrariwise, when the cultural elements are present, the discovery or invention becomes so inevitable that it takes place independently in two or three nervous systems at once.
Had Newton been
reared as a sheep herder, the mathematical
culture of
England would have found other brains
achieve
new
its
synthesis.
another's, just as larger.
But
his
One
hearing
may be more
just as a "brilliant" general
is
better than
acute or his feet
one whose armies are
mathematical or otherwise,
victorious, so a genius,
which to
in
may be
man's brains
is
a person in
whose nervous system an important cultural synthesis takes place; he is the neural locus of an epochal event in culture history. The nature of the culture process and its relation to the minds of
men
is
well illustrated by the history of the theor}' of evolu-
tion in biology.
wdth Darwin. of
reactions
As
We
is
well
find
it
many
known, in
one form or another before
others
this theory did
not originate in the neural
Danvin was born:
Buffon,
Lamarck, Erasmus Darwin, and others. As a matter of virtually all of the ideas
which together we
be found in the writings of
J.
call
Darwinism
fact,
are to
C. Prichard, an English physician
and anthropologist (1786-1848). These various concepts were interacting upon each other and upon current theological beliefs, competing, struggling, being modified, combined, resynthesized, etc., for
decades.
ment was
The time
finally
came,
i.e.,
the stage of develop-
reached, where the theological system broke
down and
the rising tide of scientific interpretation inundated the land.
Here again the new synthesis of concepts found expression simultaneously in the nervous systems of two
men working
inde-
pendently of each other: A. R. Wallace and Charles Darwin.
The
event had to take place
infancy, the culture process
medium
of expression.
when
it did. If Darwin had died in would have found another neural
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
296 This
illustration
especially interesting because
is
own
vivid account, in Darwin's
we have
a
words, of the way in which the
synthesis of ideas took place:
"In October 1838," Darwin wrote in his autobiographic sketch, "that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I
happened
amusement 'Malthus on
to read for
and
Population,'
being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everyM'here goes on from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants,
at
it
once struck
me
that under these
cir-
cumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved, and
The
unfavourable ones to be destroyed. the fomiation of a
new
theory by which to work
This read
is
species. .
.
."
result of this
Here then
J
had
would be
at last got a
(emphasis ours).
an exceedingly interesting revelation. At the time he
Mai thus, Darwin's mind was
filled
with various
ideas,
(i.e.,
he had been moulded, shaped, animated and equipped by the cultural milieu into which he happened to have been born and reared— a significant aspect of which was independent means; had he been obliged to earn his living in a "counting house" we might have had "Hudsonism" today instead of Darwinism).
These
ideas reacted
upon one another, competing,
eliminating,
strengthening, combining. Into this situation was introduced, hy
chance, a peculiar combination of cultural elements (ideas) which bears the
name of Malthus. Instantly a reaction took place, a new formed— "here at last he had a theory by which
synthesis was
to work." Darwin's nervous system was merely the place
where
came together and formed a new synthesis. happened to Darwin rather than something
these cultural elements
was something that
It
he
did.
This account of invention in the
field of
biology
calls to
mind
the well-known incident of mathematical invention described so
by Henri Poincare.
vividly
on a problem but without ".
.
.
contrary to
my
One
evening, after working very hard
success,
custom,
I
he
writes:
drank black coffee and could
THE LOCUS OF AAATHEMATICAL REALITY not sleep. Ideas rose in crowds; next morning
them
felt
I
making
interlocked, so to speak,
297 collide until pairs
By the
a stable combination.
had established the existence of a class of Fuchsian functions ... I had only to write out the results, which took but a few hours." ^^ I
Poincare further illustrates the process of culture change and
growth in
subjective
its
imaginative analogy.
something
He
aspect by means
neural)
(i.e.,
of
an
imagines mathematical ideas as being
"the hooked atoms of Epicurus. During complete
like
repose of the mind, these atoms are motionless, they are, so to
hooked
speak,
mental
No
to the wall."
activity,
combinations are formed. But in
even unconscious
activity, certain of
"are detached from the wall and put in motion. every direction through space .
.
.
Then
tions."
^°
is
.
.
like the
They
flash in
molecules of a gas
mutual impacts may produce new combina-
their
This
.
the atoms
merely a description of the subjective aspect of
the culture process which the anthropologist would describe objectively
(i.e.,
without reference to nervous systems).
say that in cultural systems, traits of various kinds act
He would and
react
upon one another, eliminating some, reinforcing others, forming new combinations and syntheses. The significant thing about the loci of inventions and discoveries from the anthropologist's standpoint
is
not quality of brains, but relative position within
the culture area: inventions and discoveries are to take place at culture centers, at places deal of cultural interaction, than
much more
where there
on the periphery,
in
is
likely
a great
remote or
isolated regions.
The dominating upon the it is
individual
influence of the external cultural
mind
is
sometimes
seldom recognized for what
it
really
felt
is.
tradition
very distinctly, but
Thus, Goethe declared
that:
"All productivity of the highest kind, every important conception, every discovery, every great thought which bears fruit,
...
is
in
no one's
control,
and
is
beyond every earthly power.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
298
Such things are as
be regarded
to
pure divine products."
The
as
unexpected
gifts
from above,
-^
brothers Goncourt speak of "an
will, a sort of compulsion to write,
unknown
force, a superior
which commands the work
and guides the pen; so much so that at times the book which comes forth from your hands seems not to have been born of ." " And George Eliot declared that "in all yourself at all .
.
her writings which she considered her best, there was a 'not herself which took possession of her and made her feel 'her own personality to be merely the instrument through which the spirit
acted/ "
To be
^^
"something outside one's
sure, there is a
a force, that lays hold of one and compels
But there
is
him
to
self,"
nothing mysterious or mystical about
something unearthly or divine the great tradition of culture
powerful embrace.
When,
it.
Goethe suggested. It that holds each one of as
as if in a river,
we
a power,
do thus and It is is
so.
not
simply
us in
are caught
up
its
in
a current or rapids of culture change, or swept into the vortex
we can do naught but give ourselves wholly Then indeed do we feel a spirit and a power within us that we know full well is not our own. But we know whence it comes of cultural synthesis, to
it.
and what
human
its
nature
is.
culture, flowing
carrying us
upon
its
It
is
down
the great and cumulative stream of to us
from
sources in antiquity,
its
bosom, nourishing and sustaining
us, using,
but yet preserving rather than consuming, us for the culture and the generations yet to come.
If
mathematical ideas enter the mind of the individual mathe-
matician from the outside, from the stream of culture into which
he was born and
reared, the question arises,
general,
and mathematical culture
the
place?
It
first
How
did
it
arise
in
where did culture in
particular,
and acquire
its
come from
in
content?
goes without saying, of course, that mathematics did not
originate with Euclid
and Pythagoras— or even with the thinkers
THE LOCUS OF AAATHEMATICAL REALITY
299
Egypt and Mesopotamia. Mathematics is a development of thought that had its beginning with the origin of man of ancient
and culture
a million years or so ago.
To be
was made during hundreds of thousands of
sure, little progress
years. Still,
we
find in
mathematics today systems and concepts that were developed by primitive and preliterate peoples of the Stone Ages, survivals of
which
are to
be found among savage
tribes today.
The
system
of counting by tens arose from using the fingers of both hands.
The
A
pebbles.
To
Maya
vigesimal system of the
use of toes as well as fingers.
be
straight line
sure, the first
To
astronomers grew out of the
calculate
is
to
count with
mathematical ideas to
exist
into being by the nervous systems of individual
They
not been for the in symbolic
beings.*
Had
it
ability to give these ideas overt expression
form and to communicate them from one person to
another so that
new
were brought
human
were, however, exceedingly simple and rudimentary.
human
calculi,
was a stretched linen cord, and so on.
new combinations would be formed, and
these
syntheses passed on from one generation to another in a
continuous process of interaction and accumulation, the species
human
would have made no mathematical progress beyond
initial stage.
This statement
is
its
supported by our studies of anthro-
* The question of the extent to which the form and content of mathematical thought are determined by the structure of the human mind, i.e., by the neuro-sensory-muscular-etcetera system of man, is interesting and relevant but one into which we shall not go at length here. Obviously the structure of
human organism conditions all of man's experience, mathematical and With regard to such things as "inherent and necessary laws of thought," however, it may be remarked that normal children and many primithe
otherwise.
nothing wrong with the notion that a body can be in two same time not to mention the objection that is raised to the phrase "at the same time" by the theory of relativity; 3=1 in some philosophies; an animal need not be either a mammal, A, or a non-mammal, not-A; it may be a monotreme, like the duckbill who lays eggs reptilian fashion but who suckles its young; etc. Whatever the influence of the structure and processes of the human organism upon the "laws of thought or logic" may be, it must, of course, find expression in one cultural form or another; any neurological imperative will therefore always be conditioned by tive peoples find
different places at the
convention.
—
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
300
They
poid apes.
are exceedingly intelligent
and
versatile.
They
have a fine appreciation of geometric forms, solve problems by imagination and insight, and possess not a little originality. But they
cannot express
overt symbolic form.
their
They cannot communicate
another except by gestures,
Hence
ideas cannot react
systems to produce
neuro-sensory-muscular
i.e.,
by
their ideas to
signs rather than
upon one another within
Nor can
syntheses.
nev^'
concepts
in
one
symbols.
their nervous
these ideas be trans-
mitted from one generation to another in a cumulative manner. Consequently, one generation of apes begins where the preceding generation began. There
Thanks
is
neither accumulation nor progress.
to articulate speech, the
Ideas are cast into symbolic form
human
species fares better.
and given overt expression.
Communication is thus made easy and versatile. Ideas now impinge upon nervous systems from the outside. These ideas react upon one another within these nervous systems. Some eliminated; others strengthened.
new to
syntheses achieved.
someone
else,
communicated
of mathematical ideas has
creative range of the individual
matical progress
cultural tiadition. is
made by
From
human
this
gone
nervous
sys-
time on, mathe-
the interaction of ideas already in
existence rather than by the creation of
new
concepts by the
nervous system alone. Ages before writing was invented,
individuals in
all
cultures were
dependent upon the mathematical
ideas present in their respective cultures.
behavior of an Apache Indian
is
by the mathematical
same was true
Neanderthal
for
man and
Mesopotamia and Greece.
modern Thus we
Thus, the mathematical
the response that he makes to
stimuli provided
Eg}q3t,
in turn
transmitted to the next generation. In a relatively
tem unaided hy
human
are
combinations are formed,
These advances are
short time, the accumulation
beyond the
New
It
ideas in his culture.
The
the inhabitants of ancient is
true for individuals of
nations today.
see that mathematical ideas were produced originally by the human nervous system when man first became a human
THE LOCUS OF MATHEMATICAL REALITY
301
being a million years ago. These concepts were exceedingly rudimentary, and the human nen'ous system, unaided by culture, could never have gone beyond them regardless of
many
hov^^
generations lived and died. It was the formation of a cultural that made progress possible. The communication of from person to person, the transmission of concepts from
tradition
ideas
one generation stimulated
nervous
new
action formed
minds
to another, placed in the
their
systems)
men
of
(i.e.,
which through
ideas
inter-
syntheses which were passed on in turn to
others.
We return now, in conclusion, to some of the observations of G. H. Hardy, to show that his conception of mathematical reality and mathematical behavior is consistent with the theory we have
of culture that
by
presented here and
is,
in fact, explained
it.
"I believe that mathematical reality lies outside us," If
by
''us"
he means "us mathematicians
They do
right.
lie
culture into which
But he
we
also
"physical reality," tures
.
What
.
.
[of]
then
that "there
is
is
he
says.
he
is
quite
outside each one of us; they are a part of the
mathematical truth ours).
individually,"
^^
are born.
is
part
Hardy
of
reality," ^^
"mathematical
distinguishes
and
feels that "in
objective
some
sense,
(emphasis
reality"
from
"pure geometries are not
insists that
pic-
the spatio-temporal reality of the physical world." the nature of mathematical reality? Hardy declares
no
agreement
sort of
on
~^
maticians or philosophers"
.
this
.
.
among Our
point.
either mathe-
interpretation
provides the solution. Mathematics does have objective reality.
And
this reality, as
world. But there
is
Hardy
insists, is
not the
no mystery about
sort of reality possessed
by
it.
reality of the physical
Its reality is cultural:
the
a code of etiquette, traffic regulations,
the rules of baseball, the English language or rules of grammar.
Thus we reality.
We
see
that there
is
no mystery about mathematical
need not search for mathematical "truths"
in the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
302
is
Mathematics
or in the structure of the Universe.
mind
divine
a kind of primate behavior as languages, musical systems
penal codes
and
Mathematical concepts are man-made just as traffic rules, and bird cages are man-made. But this
are.
ethical values,
does not invalidate the belief that mathematical propositions lie outside us and have an objective reality. They do lie outside us.
They
existed before
in the
world about
^•idual. i.e.,
The
we were
us.
But
born. As
we grow up we
them
locus of mathematical reality
is
cultural
tradition,
the continuum of symbolic behavior. This theory illuminates
phenomenon
also the
Ideas interact with
of novelty
and progress
If
men
the owners of these nervous
systems are aware of what has taken place they
Hadamard
in mathematics.
in the nervous systems of
one another
and thus form new syntheses.
as
find
this objectivity exists only for the indi-
call it
invention
does, or "creation," to use Poincare's term. If they
do not understand what has happened, they call it a "discovery" and belie\'e they have found something in the external world. Mathematical concepts are independent of the individual mind but
lie
wholly within the mind of the species,
Mathematical invention and
discover}^ are
i.e.,
culture.
merelv two aspects of
an event that takes place simultaneously in the cultural tradition
and
in
culture
one or more human nervous systems. Of these two is
evolution
the
more
significant;
lie
here.
Tlie
catalyst that
makes the
factors,
the determinants of mathematical
human
nen'ous system
cultural process possible.
is
merely the
CHAPTER ELEVEN
AND PROHIBITION
THE DEFINITION OF INCEST
"Again and again before
plainly
must have had between
in the world's history, savage tribes
minds the simple
their
marrying-out and being killed out
.
.
."
alternative
practical
—E. B. Tylor
i
man.
7,:. he subject of incest has a strange fascination for
He
was preoccupied with
We
art of writing.
of
ogies
countless
it
long before he developed the
find incestuous episodes in the mythol-
peoples.
And
in
advanced
from
cultures,
Sophocles to Eugene O'Neill, incest has been one of the most
popular of
all literary
continue to find
be reckoned
it
themes.
ever fresh
Men
one of man's major
as
seem never to
tire of it
interests in life.
Yet, despite this intense and perennial concern, that incest
is
but
have been obliged to declare that
it is
little all
but
and absorbing. Incest must indeed
understood even today.
it
Men
is
a fact
of science
too often to admit that they are baffled and
too mysterious, too obscure, to yield to rational
interpretation, at least for the present.
One
of the
more common explanations of the universal prois that it is instinctive. Thus Robert H. Lowie
hibition of incest
once
accepted
stinctive." it is
^
To
"Hobhouse's
view
that
the
sentiment
"explain" an element of behavior by saying that
"instinctive" contributes little to our understanding of
a rule.
in-
is
Sometimes
it
it
as
merely conceals our ignorance with a verbal
curtain of pseudo-knowledge. incest are "instinctive"
is
To
say that prohibitions
against
of course to declare that there 303
is
a
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
304 natural, inborn
and innate
close relatives.
But
enact
strict
feeling of revulsion toward unions with
were the
this
if
prevent them?
laws to
why should
case,
Why
societies
should they legislate
against something that everyone already wishes passionately to
avoid?
Do
not, as a matter of fact, the stringent
and worldwide
and powerful desire
prohibitions indicate a universal
for sexual
unions with one's relatives? Clinical evidence points in the same direction,
"Freud has shown
but conclusively," writes Golden-
all
weiser, "that incestuous tendencies represent one of the most
deeply rooted impulses of the individual."
There are further objections to the marriage with a
societies regard
others do not. Are
we
to
tribe to tribe? Certainly
first
when we
some
societies
it
theory.
Some
instinct varies
consider our
own
from
legal defini-
state to state, to claim that a
biological instinct can recognize state
grotesque. In
instinct
cousin as incestuous while
assume that the
which vary from
tions of incest,
^
is
boundary
lines
is
somewhat
incestuous to marry a parallel
cousin (a child of your father's brother or your mother's sister)
but
it
cross
is
cousin
brother).
and may even be mandatory, to marry a
permissible, (a
We
either; in fact,
child
of your father's
sister
how "instinct" we cannot see how instinct cannot see
cousin from a parallel cousin. It
is
or your mother's
can account for
this,
can distinguish a cross
usually incestuous to marry a
clansman even though no genealogical connection whatever can
be discovered with him, whereas marriage with another clan
may be
not help us at it
all,
a close relative in
permissible. Plainly, the instinct theory does
and
it is
not easy to find a scientist to defend
today.*
* In
1932, Professor Lowie abandoned the instinct theory of incest proBut he comes no closer to an explanation than to observe that "the aversion to incest is, therefore, best regarded as a primeval cultural adaptation" (Lowic, 1933) p. 67. In one of his most recent works. An Introduction to Cultural Anthiopohg}' (2nd ed., New York, 1940) he again discusses incest but goes no further than to suggest that "the horror of incest is not inborn,
THE DEFINITION
AND
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
305
Another theory, championed generations ago by Lewis H. * and others, and not without defenders today, is that
Morgan
incest was defined
and prohibited because inbreeding causes
logical degeneration.
evident, but
it is
This theory
wrong
for all that. In the
first
bio-
seem
so plausible as to
is
self-
place, inbreeding
as such does not cause degeneration; the testimony of biologists
To be
conclusive on this point.
is
inheritance of
brother and
good or bad.
If
sister are inferior it is
stock,
inferior
traits,
sure, inbreeding intensifies the
the offspring of a union of
because the parents were of
not because they were brother and
superior traits as well as inferior ones can
be
But
sister.
intensified
by
in-
breeding, and plant and animal breeders frequently resort to this
device to improve their strains. If the children of brother-sister or father-daughter unions in our
own
minded
it
or otherwise inferior
viduals are
are normal
more
likely to
is
society are frequently feeble-
because feeble-minded
indi-
break the powerful incest taboo than
men and women and hence more
likely
to beget
degenerate offspring. But in societies where brother-sister marriages are permitted or required, at least within the ruling family, as in ancient
find excellence. Cleopatra riages
we may
Egypt, aboriginal Hawaii and Incaic Peru,
was the offspring of brother-sister mar-
continued through several generations and she was "not
...
only handsome, vigorous, intellectual, but also prolific perfect a specimen of the
age or
a
class of society."
human
race as
^
But there is still another objection means of accounting for the origin
A
number
of
to the degeneration theory as of prohibitions against incest.
competent ethnographers have claimed that
tribes are quite ignorant of
certain
the nature of the biological process
of reproduction, specifically, that they are
unaware of the
relation-
ship between sexual intercourse and pregnancy. Or, they believe that coitus of
it.^
is
as
could be found in any
may
prerequisite to pregnancy but not the cause
Malinowski, for example, claims that the Trobriand
Is-
landers denied that copulation has anything to do with pregnancy,
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
306
among human
not only well."
among
beings but
This thesis of ignorance of the
the lower animals as
facts of life
among
primitive
peoples has been challenged by other ethnologists, and
prepared to adjudicate the dispute. But
it
may be
that such ignorance should not be ver)' surprising.
I
am
not
pointed out
Once
a fact
becomes well known there is a tendency to regard it as self-evident. But the relationship between coitus and pregnancy, a condition that would not be discovered until weeks or even a few months later, is
anything but obvious. Furthermore, pregnancy does not
always follow intercourse. for explaining so especially, in
many
And knowing
things, the
primitive man's penchant
phenomena
of life
and death
terms of supernatural forces or agents,
we should
who do
not under-
not be surprised to find some tribes even today stand the physiology of paternity.
At any
rate, there
must have been a time at which such undermembers of the human race.
standing was not possessed by any
We have
no reason to believe that apes have any appreciation of
these facts, and
There
it.
it
must have taken man
are reasons, however, as
we
a long time to acquire
shall
show
later on,
for
believing that incest taboos appeared in the very earliest stage
human
of
social evolution, in all probability prior to
standing of paternity.
The
an under-
reason for the prohibition of inbreed-
ing could not therefore have been a desire to prevent deterioration of stock
if
the connection between copulation and the birth of
children w^ere not understood.
This thesis receives additional support from a consideration of the kinship systems of primitive peoples. In these systems a per-
son
calls
many
of his collateral relatives "brother"
and
"sister,"
namely, his parallel cousins of several degrees for example, and the children
mother's and father's parallel cousins, also of
of his
several degrees.
Marriage between individuals
"brother" and "sister"
is
strictly
who
call
each other
prohibited by the incest taboo,
even though they be cousins of the third or fourth degree. But marriage with a
first
cross-cousin
may be permitted and
often
THE DEFINITION
Now
required.
is
AND
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
307
may not understand
these people
the biology
and pregnancy, but they know which woman bore
of conception
we see that the marriage rules disregard the degree of biological relationship so far as preventing inbreeding is each child. Thus
concerned; they cousin
who
may
prohibit marriage with a fourth parallel
called "brother" or "sister," but permit or require
is
marriage with a
first
cross-cousin
who
is
called "cousin." Obviously,
the kinship terms express sociological rather than biological lationships.
Obvious
the pattern of social
also ties
is
rather than those of blood.
But suppose that inbreeding did produce
we
re-
the fact that the incest taboos follow
inferior offspring, are
to suppose that ignorant, magic-ridden savages could have
established this correlation without rather refined statistical tech-
niques?
How
could they have isolated the factor of inbreeding
from numerous others such
mother and
infant, etc.,
as
genetics,
nutrition,
illnesses
without some sort of medical
of
criteria
and measurements— even though crude— and v^ithout even the rudiments of Finally,
if
statistics?
we should
grant that inbreeding does produce de-
generacy, and that primitive peoples were able to recognize this fact,
why
did they prohibit marriage with a parallel cousin while
allowing or even requiring union with a cross-cousin? Both are equally close biologically. Or,
why was
prohibited even though the blood
not be established
genealogically
memory, while marriage with though he was a close blood theory
is
as
weak
as
tie
marriage with a clansman
was so remote that
with
the
data
it
could
available
to
a non-clansman was permitted even relative? Obviously, the
the instinct hypothesis although
degeneracy it
may be
more engaging intellectually. Sigmund Freud's theory is ingenious and appealing— in a dramatic sort of way at least. Proceeding from Darwin's conjectures concerning the primal social state of man, based upon what was then known about anthropoid apes, and utilizing Smith's studies of totemism and
sacrifice,
W.
Robertson
Freud developed the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
308
following thesis: in the earliest stage of lived in small groups each of
human
male, the Father. This individual monopolized
people
society,
which was dominated by
a powerful
females in the
all
group, daughters as well as mothers. As the young males grew
and became sexually mature, the father drove them from sharing his females with him.
Totem and Tahoo, "the
day," says Freud in
"One
them away
up
to keep
expelled
brothers joined forces, slew and ate the father, and thus put an
end
to the father horde.
Together they dared and accomplished
what would have remained impossible they did not divide their father's they had planned.
Now
gressiveness disappeared,
that
and
for
them
singly."
women among
he was dead
their love
and
^
But
themselves as
their hatred
and
ag-
him came give him in
respect for
to the fore. As a consequence, they determined to
death the submission and obedience they had refused in
life.
They made therefore a solemn pact to touch none of their father's women and to seek mates elsewhere. This pledge was passed on from one generation to the next:
do with the
women
*
You must have nothing to i.e., of your own
of your father's household,
group, but must seek other mates. In this
way the
incest taboo
exogamy came into being. This part of Totem and Taboo is great drama and not without value as an interpretation of powerful psychological forces, just as Hamlet
and the
is
drama
great
would
institution of
still
in the
same
sense.
be inadequate even
if
But
as
ethnology, Freud's theory
much were verifiable. It does the many and varied forms of
this
not even attempt to account for incest prohibition. It is
not our purpose here to survey and criticize
theories that have
been advanced
in the past to
all
of the
many
account for the
* In another work, Contributions to the Theory of Sex, Freud suggests, if he does not say so outright, that the incest taboo became incorporated into the germ plasm and was consequently transmitted by means of biological
heredity:
"The
incest barrier probably belongs to the historical acquisitions of
moral taboos, it must be fixed in through organic heredity," (Freud, 1938) p. 617.
humanity and,
like other
many
individuals
AND
THE DEFINITION
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
and prohibition of
definition
notice two others before
we
We
incest.
309
may, however,
briefly
leave the subject, namely, those of
E. Westermarck and Emile Durkheim.
Westermarck's
mous
thesis that "the
fundamental cause of the exoga-
prohibitions seems to be the remarkable absence of erotic
between persons
feelings
living very closely together
hood, leading to a positive feeling of aversion
thought
of,"
and would
^
not in accord with the
is
still
be inadequate
annihilate sexual desire, and
if
if
it
it
from
when the
facts in
the
first
child-
act
is
place
were. Propinquity does not
did there would be no need
for stringent prohibitions. Secondly, incest taboos are frequently
in force
between persons not
Durkheim attempts
living in close association.
to explain the prohibition of incest as a
part of his general theory of totemism." tively,
To
Durkheim reasoned,
that blood
shed the blood of one's
sin or crime. Since
course, a
own
is
The
all
knew
intui-
a vital fluid or principle.
totemic group would be a great
blood would be shed in the
man must eschew
savage
women
of his
initial act
own
of inter-
totem. Thus the
taboo against incest and rules of exogamy came into being. This theory are
is
wholly inadequate ethnologically. Taboos against incest
much more
widespread than totemism; the former are uni-
versal, the latter
far
is
from being
even attempt to explain the
and prohibition of
many
And
so.
diverse forms of the definition
incest.
In view of repeated attempts and as for the origin of definitions of incest
prohibition,
is
it
many
and of
failures to
account
rules regulating
its
any wonder that many scholars, surveying de-
cades of fruitless theories, have
come
the theory does not
to feel that the
problem
become discouraged and have is
still
too difficult to yield to
scientific interpretation?
In the same work in which he presented his theory, but some pages
earlier,
Freud
said: "Still, in the end,
one
is
compelled to
subscribe to Frazer's resigned statement, namely, that
we do not
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
310
know
the origin of incest dread and do not even
guess at
know how
to
" « it.
Professor Ralph Linton treats of the subject as follows:
The
which
causes
technically
known
understood.
Since
such
underlie
on
limitations
incest regulations, are very
as
regulations
these
are
marriage,
imperfectly
universal
of
occur-
rence, it seems safe to assume that their causes are everywhere present, but biological factors can be ruled out at once. Neither are Close inbreeding is not necessarily injurious .
.
.
purely social explanations of incest regulations altogether
facton^ since the forms which
...
extremely varied
It
satis-
assume are seems possible that there are certain these regulations
psychological factors involved, but these can hardly be strong
enough or constant enough
to account for the institutionaliza-
tion of incest regulations
.
from a combination of
.
all
.
They have probably
originated
.^^
these factors
.
,
In other words, somewhere in the man-culture situation
the causes of incest regulations, but where they are and
how
lie
why and
they are exercised are matters too obscure for description or
explanation.
The
late
Alexander Goldenweiser, a prominent disciple of Franz
Boas, never discovered the secret of the prohibition of incest. In
Early Civih'zation he spoke of certain taboos that "are everywhere reinforced by the so-called 'horror of incest,' an emotional reaction
somewhat mysterious
of
origin."
pology, his last major work,
Fifteen years later in Anthro-
he could go no
farther than to repeat
these identical words.^^
The
sociologists
have
little to offer.
Kimball Young, for example,
disavows instinct as the source of incest prohibitions, but he
*
Totem and Taboo,
origin of
217. Frazer's statement was: "Thus the ultimate it the law of incest since exogamy was devised remains a problem nearly as dark as ever," {Totemism p.
exogamy and with
to prevent incest
—
and Exogamy, Vol.
I,
p.
165).
—
THE DEFINITION
AND
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
311
advances no further explanation than to assert that "the taboo is and expected result arising from the very nature
a rather constant
of the social interaction between parents
the children themselves" i^— which explanation at
is
and children and among
virtually equivalent to
no
all.
Dr. Clark Wissler, one of the foremost anthropologists of our day, observes: ".
.
.
so far as
we can
see,
the only facts sufficiently well estab-
lished to serve as a starting point are that anti-incest responses of
some kind universal,
These
among mankind. As to why these no nearer a solution than before." ^*
are universal
we
are
are
are discouraging words indeed. "Anti-incest responses"
help us no more than "an instinctive horror" of incest. But in the phrase "we are no nearer a solution
may
[now]
than before,"
way out of the dilemma. Perhaps theorists have been on the wrong track. Science has found on the wrong track countless times during its relatively find a clue to a
career so
far.
So many,
ments of science
in fact, that
consist,
many
itself
brief
of the important achieve-
new
not in the discovery of some
fact
or principle, but in erecting signs which read "Blind alley.
not enter!" Phrenology was one of these blind has been explored,
it
how
can one
we
these
alleys.
But
Do
until
know whether a passage is new world? Once it has
a blind alley or a corridor leading to a
been found to be a blind
however, other scientists need
alley,
not and should not waste their time exploring
we
are confronted
by blind
alleys in
and exogamy that we have that
"we
are
us to think
no nearer a
again. Perhaps
surveyed. Wissler's admission
solution [now] than before"
would lead
so.
Fortunately
we
lost his bearings
We
just
it
the various theories of incest
do not need
are not in the situation of a mariner
who
has
and who must
try to recover his true course.
new
path in the hope of finding an
to seek a
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
312
.
The
adequate solution of the problem of incest. already been found, and that long ago.
Confusion
solution has
in this field of ethnological theory has
circumstances such as
we have
been due to
just described. Theorists
who have
sought biological or psychological explanations of incest taboos have been on the wrong track; they have only led us into blind
Those who have sought a culturological explanation have succeeded fully and well. The culturological point of view is
alleys.
younger and sociological.
less
widely
Although
it
known than the was
psychological or even
simply and adequately by
set forth
the great English anthropologist, E. B. Tylor, as early as 1871, in
the ,
first
chapter of Primitive Culture— which was significantly
enough entitled 'The Science of Culture"— it has not become widely
known
or appreciated
cultural anthropologists.
new
among
There
social scientists,
even
some who recognize
are
among the
in
science of culture only a mystical, fatalistic metaphysic that
should be shunned like the Devil. So habituated to psychological interpretations are
many
human
students of
behavior that they
are unable to rise to the level of culturological interpretation.
Thus, Goldenweiser looked to psychology for ethnological tion:
"It
seems hardly
to
fair
doubt that psychoanalysis
salva-
will
ultimately furnish a satisfactory psychological interpretation this
incest'." ^^
'horror of
Wm.
Professor
F.
Ogburn
of
observes
that:
"Incest taboos and marriage regulations
may be
described historically and culturally, yet there
is
quite fully
something de-
cidedly strange about incest and about marriage prohibitions.
One's curiosity * Social
is
Change,
culturology cannot
not
satisfied
p. 175. tell
What
us all that
by the cultural
Professor
we want
facts."
*
Ogburn means apparently is that know about incest. This is true; also. But one must insist upon a
to
psychology must be enlisted in the inquiry sharp and clear distinction between the psychological problem and culturological problem. Psychology cannot account for the origin or the form of the .prohibitions; only culturology can do this. But for an understanding of the way the human primate organism behaves thinks, feels, and acts within, or with reference to, one of these cultural forms, we must go to psychology.
—
—
AND
THE DEFINITION
And
even
men
like
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
313
Lowie and Wissler, who have done
excellent
•work along culturological lines in other areas, have relapsed to
when confronted with
the psychological level incest.
Thus Lowie once declared
that "it
is
the problem of
not the function of
the ethnologist but of the biologist and psychologist to explain I
why man is
has so deep-rooted a horror of incest."
inclined to turn over
psychologist, leaving to
And
Wissler
problems of cultural origins to the
the anthropologist the study of
science of culture has, as
we have
traits
careers. ^^
have been launched upon their cultural
after they
The
all
^'^
already indicated, long
ago given us an adequate explanation of incest prohibitions. find
it
set forth
published in 1888:
ment
of
We
simply and succinctly in an essay by E. B. Tylor
"On
Institutions,
a
Method
of Investigating the Develop-
Applied to the Laws of Marriage and
Descent." "Exogamy," he wrote, "enabling a growing tribe tol
keep
compact by constant unions between
itself
clans, enables
it
to
its
spreading
overmatch any number of small intermarrying
groups, isolated and helpless. Again and again history, savage tribes
must have had
in
the world's
plainly before their
minds
the simple practical alternative between marrying-out and being killed out"
The
(p.
origin of incest taboos greatly antedates clan organization,
but a sure clue to an understanding of incest prohibitions and
exogamy
is
given by Tylor nevertheless: primitive people were
confronted with a choice between "marrying-out and being killed
The argument may be set forth as follows: Man, like all other animal species, is engaged in a struggle for existence. Co-operation, mutual aid, may become valuable means of carrying on this struggle at many points. A number of individuals working together can do many things more cfEciently and effectively than the same individuals working singly. And a
out."
co-operative group can do certain things that lone individuals can-
not do at vidual
all.
Mutual
and group.
\
,^^A
267).
aid
makes
One might
life
more
secure for both indi-
expect, therefore, that in the struggle
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
314
co-operation and to secure
Among
would be made
survival every effort
and
for security
to foster
benefits.
its
the lower primates there
is
co-operation.
little
To be
sure, in very simple operations one ape may co-ordinate his efforts with those of another. But their co-operation is limited and rudimentary because the means of communication are crude and
communication. Monkeys and apes
limited; co-operation requires
can communicate with one another by means of signs— vocal utterances or gestures—but the range of ideas that can be com-
municated
this
in
way
very narrow indeed.
is
speech can make extensive and
and
this
is
lacking
among
versatile
Only
articulate
exchange of ideas possible,
anthropoids. Such a simple form of
co-operation as "you go around the house that
way while I go is beyond the
around the other way, meeting you on the far side,"
With
reach of the great apes.
the advent of articulate speech,
however, the possibilities of communication became virtually unlimited.
We
in general
can readily see
and
One might
for incest
significance for social organization
its
and exogamy
in particular.
from some psychologists, the
get the impression
Freudians especially, perhaps, that the incestuous wish
somehow
instinctive, that
sexual desires
among
is
itself
a person "just naturally" focuses his
upon a relative rather than upon a non-relative, and, upon the closer rather than the remoter degrees
relatives,
of consanguinity. This view
is
quite as unwarranted as the theory
of an "instinctive horror" of incest; an inclination toward sexual
union with close
relatives
is
no more
regulations devised to prevent
well as food hunger. individuals as stances.
He
he does
And he
it.
A
fixes
his food
instinctive than the social
child has sexual hunger as
his sex
hunger upon certain
hunger upon certain edible sub-
finds sexual satisfaction in persons close to
him
be-
cause they are close to him, not because they are his relatives.
To be
sure, they
but that
is
may be
close to
him because they
are his relatives,
another matter. As a consequence of proximity and
satisfaction the child fixates his sexual desires
upon
his
immediate
AND
THE DEFINITION
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
and
associates, his parents
his sibhngs, just as
315
he
fixates his
food
He
thus
hungers upon familiar foods that have given satisfaction.
comes
to
have definite orientations and firm attachments in the
realm of sex
the
as in
about incestuous
field of nutrition.
desire;
it
There
is
thus no mystery
merely the formation and
is
fixation,
of definite channels of experience and satisfaction.
|
We find therefore, even in sub-human primate families, a strong one
inclination toward inbreeding;
strives to
faction from a close associate. This tendency
human
society.
way
life
of
But here
it
is
makes
possible.
life
is
made more
mutual aid
\
most
fully
the
have the best chance to survive.
will
may become
co-operation
crisis,
a matter of
life
or
death. In providing food and maintaining an effective defense against foreign foes, co-operation
becomes all-important.
But would primordial man be obliged to construct a co-operative organization for subsistence and defense from the very beginning, or could he build upon a foundation already in existence? it be social or biological, we new growing out of, or based upon, the old. And such was the case here; the new co-operative organization for food and defense was built upon a structure already present:
In the evolutionary process, whether
almost always find the
the family. After
virtually
all,
or another, and the
everyone belonged to one family
identification of the co-operative group with
the sex-based family would
would be shared by
all.
mean
When,
that the benefits of mutual aid therefore, certain species of an-
thropoids acquired articulate speech and became
human
beings, a
new
element, an economic factor, was introduced into an institu-
tion
which had up
now
to
between male and female.
economic
in a rather
'
secure thereby.
factors being constant, the tribe that exploits
In times of
In the basic
and defense against enemies, co-operation
becomes important because possibilities of
satis-
carried over into
incompatible with the co-operative
is
that articulate speech
activities of subsistence,
Other
obtain sexual
rested solely
We
are,
upon
sexual attraction
of course, using the term
broad sense here to include safety
as well
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
316 as
subsistence.
now become
family had
The human primate
corporation with nutritive and protective functions
and incidentally reproductive functions.
sexual
more secure
as a
And
family would be correspondingly limited in
operation
members
mutual
The problem was now
benefits.
its
advantageous within family groups,
is
families as well?
was made
consequence.
a regime of co-operation confined to the
But
life
a
well as
as
why
of a
If
co-
not between
to extend the scope of
aid.
In the primate order, as
we have
seen, the social relationships
between mates, parents and children, and among siblings antedates articulate speech and co-operation. They are strong as well as primary. And, just as the earliest co-operative group was built
upon these
social ties, so
would
a subsequent extension of
At
aid have to reckon with them. agains.t
this
point
we run
the tendency to mate with an intimate associate. Co-
operation between families cannot be established child;
mutual squarely
and brother,
sister.
A
way must be found
and prohibition of
overcome
this
way was found
centripetal tendency with a centrifugal force. This in the definition
parent marries
if
to
incest. If persons
were
for-
bidden to marry their parents or siblings they would be compelled to
marry into some other family group— or remain
is
contrary to the nature of primates.
The
was found to unite families with one another, and a
as
human
difficult to
affair
was launched upon to establish strong
families, social evolution could
which
its
way
social evolution
career.
It
would be
exaggerate the significance of this step. Unless
way had been found between
celibate,
leap was taken; a
and enduring
some
social ties
have gone no farther on
human level than among the anthropoids. With the definition and prohibition of incest,
the
r
hmilies became
units in the co-operative process as well as individuals. Marriages
I
1
came
to
be contracts
Llargcr groups.
The
first
between
ship and choice of mates for
it
families, later
between even
much of his initiative in courtwas now a group affair. Among
individual lost
THE DEFINITION
many
AND
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
primitive peoples a youth
his bride before marriage; in
her. Children
may be
riage,
And
not even be acquainted with
cases
he may not even have seen
betrothed in childhood or infancy— or even
To be
before they are born.
become acquainted
may
some
sure, there are tribes
own
our
society today a marriage
is
is
"But
I
am
there nevertheless.
still
tween families to a very considerable extent. expostulated,
where one can
or even intimate with his spouse before mar-
but the group character of the contract in
317
an alliance be-
Many
a
man
has
marrying her, not her family!" only to
discover his lack of realism later.
The
widespread institutions of levirate and sororate are explain-
able by this theory also. In the levirate a
wives of his deceased brother.
the
unwed
sister of his
When
a
man marries the man customarily
deceased wife the practice
In both cases the group character of marriage
group of consanguinei supplies a
member
is
is
wife or marries
called sororate.
manifest.
a spouse. If the spouse dies, the relatives of the deceased
supply another to take his or her place. families
Each
of the other group with
The
alliance
must
between
important and must be continued; even death cannot
is
part them.
The
equally widespread institutions of bride-price and
dowry
likewise find their significance in the prohibition of incest to
between family groups. The
establish co-operation
necessitates marriage
between family groups. But
it
incest taboo
cannot guar-
antee a continuation of the mutual aid arrangement thus established.
This
devices for
is where bride-price and dowry come in: they are making permanent the marriage tie that the prohi-
bition of incest has established.
When
a family or a group of
relatives has received articles of value as bride-price or
distribute
them
the marriage
tie
as a rule
among
be broken or
their various
dissolved, they
dowry, they
members. Should
may have
the wealth received at the time of the marriage. This certain to relatives
be the case
if it
to return is
almost
can be shown that the spouse whose
were the recipients of the bride-price or dowry was at
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
318 fault.
It very
often happens that the relatives are reluctant to
return the wealth
consumed they
if
will
indeed they
still
have
it.
have to dig into their
If it
own
has already been pockets. It
already be earmarked for the marriage of one of their
own
may
group.
In any event, the return of dowry or bride-price would be an in-
convenience or a deprivation. Consequently they are likely to take a keen interest in the marriage and to try to prevent their relative from doing anything to disrupt
own
it.
According to our theory the prohibition of incest has at bottom
.
an economic motivation— not that primitive peoples were aware of I
this motive,
however, for they were not. Rules of exogamy origin-
ated as crystallizations of processes of a social system rather than
products of individual psyches. Inbreeding was prohibited and
as I
marriage between groups was
maximum
the '
we
made compulsory
in order to obtain
benefits of co-operation. If this theory
be sound,
should find marriage and the family in primitive society wear-
ing a definite economic aspect. This
is,
in fact, precisely
what we
j
do
Let us turn for summary statements to two leading au-
find.
thorities in social anthropology. Professor
Robert H. Lowie writes
as follows:
Marriage, as
we cannot
too often or too vehemently
insist, is
only to a limited extent based on sexual considerations.
primary motive, so is
A
precisely the
Kai
[of
New
far as the individual
founding of a
The
mates are concerned,
self-sufficient
economic aggregate.
Guinea] does not marry because of desires he
can readily gratify outside of wedlock without assuming any responsibilities;
he marries because he needs a
woman
pots and to cook his meals, to manufacture nets and plantations, in return for
game and
And
fish
to
make
weed
his
which he provides the household with
and builds the dwelling.^^
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown makes similar observations con-
cerning the aborigines of Australia:
THE DEFINITION
The
AND
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
important function of the family
and the
man
that
provides for the based on the coand wife, the former providing the flesh food is
feeding and bringing up of the children. operation of
319 it
It is
latter the vegetable food, so that quite apart
question of children a
man
without a wife
is
from the
in an unsatis-
factory position since he has no one to supply him regularly with vegetable food, to provide his firewood, and so on. This economic aspect of the family is a most important one ... I
believe that in the
of marriage,
i.e.,
importance
than
minds of the
its
natives themselves this aspect
relation to subsistence,
the fact
that
is
man and
of greatly
wife
are
more sexual
partners .^^
Turning
to the colonial period in
America we find the economic
character of the family equally pronounced. According to Professor
Wm.
F.
Ogburn:
In colonial times in America the family was a very important
Not infrequently it produced subconsumed, with the exception of such things as metal tools, utensils, salt and certain luxuries. The home was, in short, a factory. Civilization was based on a domestic system of production of which the family was the economic
organization.
stantially all
that
it
center.
The economic power of the family produced certain corresponding social conditions. In marrying, a man sought not only a mate and companion but a business partner.* Husband and wife each had specialized skills and contributed definite services to the partnership. Children were regarded, as the laws
We
* recall Benjamin Franklin's account of his proposal to marry a girl providing her parents would give him "as much money with their daughter as would pay off my remaining debt for the printing-house." He even suggested that they "mortgage their house in the loan-office" if they did not have the cash on hand. The parents, however, thought the printing business a poor risk and declined to give both money and girl. "Therefore," says Frankhn, "I was forbidden the house, and the daughter shut up," (Auto-
biography, Pocket Books, Inc.,
New
York, 1940), p. 78.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
320
of the time showed, not only as objects of affection but as productive agents. The age of marriage, the birth rate and
the attitude toward divorce were
all
affected
by the
fact that
home was an economic institution. Divorce or separation not only broke a personal relationship but a business one as
the
well.2°
And
own society today, the economic basis of marriage family is made clear by suits for breach of promise and
in
and the
our
alienation of affections in
which the law takes a very
materialistic,
even monetary, view of love and romance.* Suits for non-support, alimony, property settlements upon divorce, the financial obligations between parents and children, and so on, exhibit further the economic function of the family. Marriage for many women today means a greater economic return for unskilled labor than could
be obtained in any other occupation. It is interesting to note, in
according to popular
this connection, that
belief, "attributes
theless declares that "the motivating force of
fundamentally economic."
The
notion that marriage
society
is
is
an institution brought into being
means
of satisfying their sex hunger
naive and anthropocentric. Marriage does provide an avenue of
sexual exercise .
human
^^
to provide individuals with a i~is
Freud who,
everything to sex," never-
sire that
*
and
satisfaction, to
be
sure.
produced the institution. Rather,
But it
it
was not sexual de-
was the exigencies of
One
court ruling observes that "the gist of the action for ahenation of is the loss of consortium. 'This is a property right growing out of the marriage relation' . . ." (Supreme Court of Connecticut, Case of Maggay vs. Nikitko, 1933), quoted by Anthony M. Turano, "The Racket of Stolen affections
Love," (American Mercury, Vol. 33, p. 295, November, 1934). Another legal statement says that "the law generally takes the rather worldly view that marriage is a 'valuable' consideration; a thing not only possessing value, but one the value of which may be estimated in money, and therefore, in a sense, marriage engagements are regarded as business transactions, entered into with a view, in part, at least, to pecuniary advantage," (Ruling Case Law, Vol. 4, p. 143), quoted by Anthony M. Turano, "Breach of Promise: Still a Racket," (American Mercury, Vol. 32, p. 40, May, 1934).
THE DEFINITION
AND
a social system that
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
was striving to make
321
use of
full
resources
its
an institution, finds
for co-operative endeavor. Marriage, as
its
explanation in terms of sociocultural process rather than individual psychology. In primitive society there was frequently ample means
And
of sexual exercise outside of wedlock.
own
in our
society the
great extent of prostitution, the high incidence of venereal disease as
an index of promiscuity,
other evidence, show that
as well as
the exercise of sexual functions
not confined to one's
is
spouse by any means. As a matter of
ideally considered
Nor
monogamy
the scope of one's sexual activity. Indeed,
restricts
is
is
own
marriage very often
fact,
the next thing to celibacy.
love the basis of marriage and
the family, however
No
culture could afford
fondly this notion
may be
to use such a fickle
and ephemeral sentiment
of an important institution.
cherished.
Love
is
as love as the basis
here today but
it
may be
gone tomorrow. But economic needs are with us always. Absence of love is not sufficient grounds for divorce. Indeed, one may despise and loathe, hate and fear, one's
mate and
to obtain a divorce. Until very recently at least
still
one
be unable
state in the
Union would grant no divorce at all. And certain religious faiths take the same position. Marriage and the family are society's first and fundamental way of making provision for the economic needs of the individual.
And
of incest that initiated his
But These
was the definition and prohibition
it
whole course of
to return to the definitions vary, as
we saw
variations are to
at the outset,
be explained
under which co-operation will require
another set
is
in
social
development.
and prohibitions themselves. from culture
to culture.
The
terms of the specific circumstances
to take place.
One
set of circumstances
one definition of incest and one form of marriage; customs. The habitat and the
will require different
technological
adjustment to
it,
the
mode
of subsistence,
cir-
cumstances of defense and offense, division of labor between the sexes, and degree of cultural development, are factors which condition the definition of incest
and the formulation of
rules to
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
322 prohibit
No
it.
known
people
modern
to
customarily
science
child. Brother-sister marriage
permits marriage between parent and has been permitted in certain cultures such as those of ancient Egypt, Hawaii, and Peru under the Incas, but in each instance it
was
restricted to the ruling household.
Lowie and Fortune
or "royal incest" as
was
it
incest"
"sanctioned
"Sanctioned incest"
this
was not incest
Nor
call it respectively."
Kimball Young's phrase."
use
to
But
of course a contradiction of terms; incest
is
by definition something criminal and prohibited. These marriages between siblings of royal families were not only not pro-
is
hibited, they
the
were required. They are examples of endogamy, as
prohibition
exogamy. Solidarity society,
source of strength and
a
is
co-operation
as
endogamy promotes
marriages
brother-sister
of
is
a
are
examples
of
effective action in
way of achieving security. And exogamy fosters size and strength
solidarity as
of mutual aid groups.
In view of the fact that a sure clue to the reason of the origin of prohibitions of incest was set forth by Tylor as early as 1888, it
is
rather remarkable that
sociologists
who
who
today
we
should find anthropologists and
juggle with
"anti-incest responses"
and
look to psychoanalysis for ultimate understanding. As a
matter of
we The
fact,
Augustine in
find the reasons for
City oi
God
(Bk.
exogamy
set forth
XV), more
by Saint
than 1400 years
before Tylor.
"For
it is
very reasonable and just/' Augustine says, "that
among whom concord
honorable and useful, should be bound
is
together by various relationships, and that one
himself sustain ships should
many
relationships,
be distributed among
to bind together the greatest 'Father'
When,
and
man
man
should not
but that the various several,
number
'father-in-law' are
therefore, a
men,
relation-
and should thus serve
in the
same
social interests.
the names of two relationships.
has one person for his father, another for
his father-in-law, friendship extends itself to a larger
number."
AND
THE DEFINITION
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
He comments upon "So too Eve her children
.
Adam
the fact that
father-in-law to his sons
323
was both father and
and daughters:
was both mother and mother-in-law to while had there been two women, one the
his wife .
.
mother, the other the mother-in-law, the family affection would
have had a wider
Then
field.
the
sister herself
by becoming
a wife
sustained in her single person two relationships which, had they
been distributed among individuals, one being other being wife, the family
number
sister,
would have embraced
tie
and ana greater
of persons."
Saint Augustine does not, in
these passages at least,
make
which would accrue to consequence of exogamy. But he makes it quite
explicit the advantages in security of life
the group as a
community
clear that
of social interest
and "greater numbers of
persons" in the group are the reasons for the prohibition of incest. If
an understanding of incest and exogamy
philosophy as Saint Augustine and
why
science as Tylor, so
little
understood
is it
as
early
that the subject
among
scholars
as old in social
is
in anthropological still
is
today?
so obscure
We
and
have already
suggested the answer: a preference for psychological rather than culturological explanations.
habit in
human
thought.
chology—of wish,
Anthropomorphism
To
is
an inveterate
explain institutions in terms of psy-
desire, aversion, imagination, fear,
human
been popular. Explanations of
etc.— has long
behavior in terms of psy-
chological determinants preceded therefore explanations in terms of cultural determinants.
But
culturological problems cannot
be
solved by psychology. Preoccupation with psychological explanations has not only kept it
has prevented
many
scholars
from finding the answer;
them from recognizing the
been reached by the science of culture. The such
As a
scientific explanation it
as
and meaningless. The
is
is
not only inadequate;
sociologist's
fixation
it
has
sociological explana-
Kimball Young's "social interaction,"
tion,
when
solution
upon
no it
is
"social
better.
empty inter-
action" keeps him, too, from appreciating a scientific interpreta-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
324
phenomena. Even men who
tion of culture as a distinct class of
have made notable contributions to culturology, such as Kroeber, Lowie, and Wissler, have failed to appreciate the full significance of Tylor's early discussion of exogamy.
remarkable and revealing. Tylor's
printed
Development
essay,
The
following incident
A. L. Kroeber and T. T. Waterman
"On
Method
the
the
Investigating
of
Book
of Institutions/' in their Source
is
re-
in Anthro-
pology in 1920. But in a subsequent edition, they cut the article down apparently to conserve space, and omitted this highly significant passage!
Important contributions to science are sometimes their time," that
made
"before
before the general level of scientific advance
is,
has reached a point where widespread appreciation becomes pos-
There was
sible.
Darwin; most
if
really very little that
not
all
But the broad frcnt
before.
thought had not advanced general acceptance
of this
problem of
An
incest.
was novel
and
of the ideas
facts
in the
work of
had been presented
of the cultural process of biologic
1859 to make a
sufficiently prior to
point of view possible. So
it is
with the
adequate explanation has been extant for
decades. But, because the problem
is
a culturological one, and
because the science of culture
so
young and
is still
even today are able to grasp and appreciate
an understanding of incest and
understanding
problems
will
as well as that of a
prohibitions
is
few scholars
is
still
this
become commonplace.
a considerable
this
understanding
and confusion of many
number who do understand
Thus Reo Fortune states that: "A separation of affinal relationship
from
scholars,
incest taboos.
consanguineous
relationship assures a wider recognition of social obligation,
Any
very
host of other supra-psychological
do not wish to minimize the extent of
today. Despite the ignorance
there
so
nature and scope,
As culturology develops and matures, however,
limited.
We
its
its
.
.
.
incestuous alliance between two persons within a single con-
AND
THE DEFINITION
sanguineous group
is
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
in so far a
325
withdrawal of their consanguineous
group from the aUiance and so endangers the group's
survival." ^*
Malinowski, too, has illuminated the problem of incest taboos. Instead of emphasizing, however, the positive values that would
accrue from alliances formed as a consequence of compulsory
exogamy, he dwells upon the disruption and discord that the un~ restricted exercise of sexual appetites
would introduce into
^
a small (
group of writes,
relatives or close associates.
sexual impulse,"
general a very upsetting and
in
"is
"The
socially
he
disruptive
cannot enter into a previously existing sentiment without producing a revolutionary change in it. Sexual interest is force,
[it]
incompatible with any
therefore
family
relationship,
whether
parental or between brothers and sisters ... If erotic passion were
allowed to invade the precincts of the
home
it
would not merely
and competitive elements and disorganize the would also subvert the most fundamental bonds of
establish jealousies
family but
it
kinship on which the further development of is
based ...
A
stable family;
all social relations
which allowed incest could not develop a would therefore be deprived of the strongest
society it
foundations for kinship, and this in a primitive community would
mean absence
of social order."
B. Z. Seligman expresses
^s
somewhat
views— as well
as
others that are less discerning. John Gillin has a fine statement
on
similar
the origin and function of incest taboos tucked away in a footnote in a
monograph on the Barama River
Raymond
Caribs.
Firth
presents an illuminating "sociological" analysis of the problem in
We,
the Tikopia.
Wm.
I.
Thomas
sees clearly the reasons for pro-
hibitions of incest: "the horror of incest derivation."
And
is
thus plainly of social
^^
Freud, apart from his drama of patricide, comes close to an
The
understanding of incest taboos and exogamy. hibition,"
he
says,
"had ...
need does not unite men; nothing
left for
it
"incest pro-
a strong practical foundation. Sexual
separates
them
.
.
.
Thus
there was
the brothers [after they had killed their father],
i
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
326 if
they wanted to live together, but to erect the incest pro-'
hibition."
In another work he observes that: of this [incest] barrier
"The observance
above
is
all
a
demand
of
which must guard against the absorption by the family of those interests which it needs for the production of higher social units. Society, therefore, uses all means to loosen cultural society,
ties in
those family
The
every individual."
cultural function,
^s
not the genesis, of incest taboos and
if
be very clearly seen and appreciated
of rules of
exogamy seems
here. It
interesting to note, too, that
is
to
Freud holds substantially
the same view of the relationship between restrictions upon sexual gratification
One
this essay.
contents
is
nunciation privation'
and
social evolution that has
been
themes of Civilization and
of the principal
"the extent to which civilization gratifications
instinctual
of
dominates the whole
human
beings."
He
a larger
number
of
.
is .
.
Its Dis-
up on
built
This
re-
'cultural
field of social relations
between
sees that "the first result of culture
was that
human
common";
beings could live together in
that "one of culture's principal endeavors
women
set forth earlier in
together in larger units."
^^
is
to
cement men and
Thus, although he proceeds
from different premises, Freud comes to
essentially the
same con-
clusion as ours.
There
then,
is,
exogamy extant
understanding
considerable
of
incest
and
in the literature today. Yet, in a comparatively
recent review of the whole problem a prominent anthropologist,
John M. Cooper, has concluded that "the desire to multiply the social bonds [has] in all probability not been [an] important factor" in the origin of incest prohibitions.
an understanding of the problem factors"
which he
and intimate
is
How
far
he
is
from
indicated by the two "chief
"(a) sex callousness, resulting from early
cites:
association
.
.
.
;
(b) the distinctly social purpose
of preserving standards of sex decency within the family and kinship circle."
^°
The
first
factor
incest rather than callousness.
is
contrary to fact; intimacy fosters
The second
explains nothing at
THE DEFINITION all:
what
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
are standards of sex decency,
tribe to tribe,
The
AND
and why
is
it
why do
culturological theory of incest receives support
our own,
as
is
punishment seldom exceeds ten
The
common;
quite years
reason for this difference
families
is
ties
were more important than
developed cultures.
The
not
the
our society
in
is
often
far to seek. In
between individuals they
are
in
highly
small mutual aid group was a tremen-
dously important social unit in the struggle for security. survival of the
than in
Among
imprisonment and
primitive societies, personal and kinship
and
of incest
societies
Freud, Fortune and others have observed.
former the penalty of death
less.
from a com-
The crime
punished with greater severity in primitive
much
they vary from
necessary to preserve them?
parison of primitive cultures with our own. is
327
The
very
group depended to a considerable extent upon
al-
formed by exogamy. In advanced cultures the situation is different. Society is no longer based upon kinship ties, but upon liances
property relationships and state has replaced the tribe
territorial
and
clan.
distinctions.
The
political
Occupational groups and
become important bases of social life. The importance of exogamy is thus much diminished and the penalties for incest become less severe. It is not to be expected, however, that restrictions upon inbreeding will ever be removed economic organization
entirely.
Kinship
is
portant,
feature
of
remain so
still
an important, though
relatively less im-
our social organization and will probably
indefinitely.
fore continue to
our
also
Rules of exogamy and endogamy will there-
be needed to regulate and order
this aspect of
social life.
In the various interpretations, both sound and unsound, of the definition
and prohibition of incest we have
a neat
example of a
contrast between psychological explanations on the one culturological
explanations on the other.
does not yield to psychological solution.
hand and
The problem
On
simply
the contrary, the
evidence, both clinical and ethnographic, indicates that the desire
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
328
form sexual unions with an intimate associate is both powerful and widespread. Indeed, Freud opines that "the prohibition against incestuous object-choice [was] perhaps the most maimto
ing
wound
... on the
ever inflicted
erotic life of
man."
^^
Psy-
cholog}' discloses an "incestuous wish" therefore, not a motive for readily, however, to culits prevention. The problem yields very
interpretation.
turological
groups in the
—that
Man,
an animal
as
human
lives
in
by the culture of the group sentiments, tools, techniques, and bedependent upon the use of symbols and
species are determined
by the
is,
species,
between individuals
as well as individually. Relationships
ideas,
havior patterns, that are
which are handed down from one generation to another by means of this same faculty. These culture traits constitute a continuum,
new
a stream of interacting elements. In this interacting process,
some traits become obsolete and drop out of the stream, some new ones enter it. The stream of culture thus flows, changes, grows and develops in combinations and
syntheses
are
own.
accordance with laws of
its
actions of the organism
man
formed,
Human
behavior— in the mass, or of
a typical
fore culturally determined.
A
cow's
milk,
avoids
behavior
is
member
of a
mothers-in-law,
stimuli
or grasshoppers,
etc.,
re-
Human
group— is
there-
people has an aversion to drinking believes
that
exercise
motes health, practices divination or vaccination,
worms
but the
to this stream of culture.
eats
roasted
because their culture contains
that evoke such responses.
These
traits
pro-
trait-
cannot be
ac-
counted for psychologically.
And
so
it is
psychology
we
From human animal tends to unite sexually him. The institution of exogamy is not
with the definition and prohibition of incest. learn that the
with someone close to
only not explained by citing this tendency;
it
is
contrary to
it.
But when we turn to the cultures that determine the relations between members of a group and regulate their social intercourse
we
readily find the reason for the definition of incest
origin of exogamy.
The
struggle for existence
is
and the
as vigorous in
AND
THE DEFINITION
human
the
group
PROHIBITION OF INCEST
species as elsewhere. Life
well as individual,
as
makes co-operation society. Incest
possible,
is
329
made more
secure, for
by co-operation. Articulate speech extensive, and varied in human
was defined and exogamous
rules
were formulated
make co-operation compulsory and extensive, to the life be made more secure. These institutions were created
in order to
end that by
social
tems.
not by neuro-sensory-muscular-glandular
systems,
They were
sys-
syntheses of culture elements formed within the
interactive stream of culture traits. Variations of definition
and
prohibition of incest are due to the great variety of situations. In
one
situation, in
one organization of culture traits— technological,
social, philosophic,
incest
we
and one
etc.— we will find one type of definition of
set of rules of
find another definition
mode
rules. Incest
and exogamy are
people— by the means and circumstances of offense and communication and transportation, customs
thus defined in terms of the
mode
exogamy; in a different situation
and other
of life of a
of subsistence, the
defense, the
means
of
And
the
aspects, technological, sociological,
and
of residence, knowledge, techniques of thought, etc.
mode
of
life,
philosophical,
in all is
its
culturally determined.
CHAPTER TWELVE
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION: An
".
Anthropocentric Illusion
numerous
.
.
here
[in
pleases
survivals of the anthropocentric bias
sociology], as elsewhere, they bar the
man
to renounce the unlimited
way
still
power over the
social order
has so long attributed to himself; and on the other hand,
him
that,
if
collective forces really exist,
he
is
remain and
to science. It dis-
it
he
seems to
necessarily obliged to
submit to them without being able to modify them. This makes him inclined to deny their existence. In vain have repeated experiences taught him that this omnipotence, the illusion of which he complacently entertains, has always been a cause of weakness in him; that his power over things really began only when he recognized that they have a nature of their own, and resigned himself to learning this nature from them. Rejected by all other sciences, this deplorable prejudice stubbornly maintains itself in sociology. Nothing is more urgent than to liberate our science from it, and this is the principal purpose of our Emile Durkheim i efforts," ". it appears like a grandiose dream to think of controlling according
—
.
.
to the will of
burn
man
the course of social evolution
.
.
."
—Wm.
F. Og-
2
-Ihe belief that
man
controls his civilization
and deeply rooted. Customs and chines, science, art,
is
widespread
institutions, tools
and ma-
and philosophy are but man's creations
and are therefore here only
to
do
his bidding. It lies
within man's
power, therefore, to chart his course as he pleases, to mold civilization to his desires
Thus we
find
a
and needs. At
distinguished
James Jeans, assuring us that: 330
least so
British
he fondly
scientist,
believes.
the late Sir
^
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION
331
We
no longer believe that human destiny is a plaything for good and evil, or for the machinations of the Devil. There is nothing to prevent our making the earth a paradise again— except ourselves. The scientific age has dawned, and we spirits,
recognize that of his soul.
man
He
free to navigate
is
on the
himself
the master of his
is
it
fate,
and
controls the course of his ship,
the captain
so, of course,
into fair waters or foul, or even to run
it
rocks.
Mr. Stanley
Field, President of the Field
Museum (now
the
Chicago Natural History Museum), appeals to anthropologists in espousing Free Will:
But
if
we
listen to the anthropologists,
demonstrate that
it
is
who
can
scientifically
not color of skin, or type of hair or
features, or difference of religion, that creates
peoples, but factors for which
man
is
problems between
responsible and which
he
we shall at least come within sight of that better world which we now realize we must achieve if we are not finally to perish as victims of our own can control or change
if
he
will,
then
perversity.*
G. Westgate,
Professor Lewis
us that
tells
man
in
an
article in Scientific
Monthly,
can "take the problem of his future in hand and
solve it":
track The mind that can weigh the infinitely distant stars dig the Panama Canal down the minute carriers of disease can solve its social problems when and if it decides to do .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
so.=
It
would thus seem that the
come
salvation of an earlier era has be-
the social reconstruction of today:
will; if
we
fail it is
we
can achieve
it
if
we
because of our "perversity."
Father Wilhelm Schmidt, the leader of the Kulturkreis school of ethnology,
and
his disciples in
America believe firmly in
free
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
332 will;
indeed,
And
appears to be one of their cardinal principles .«
it
for the most part infused
even V. Gordon Childe, whose work is with the spirit of scientific materialism and determinism, a
book
significantly entitled
in culture ... can
scious
and
be
Man Makes
initiated, controlled, or
choice
deliberate
of
says, in
Himseli, that "changes delayed by the con-
human
their
and
authors
^
executors."
When, however, we culture we begin first
look for examples of man's control over
We
to wonder, then to doubt.
begin our inquiry by asking
two World Wars
if
are evidence of planning or perversity, or
in
will
not
one generation
whether Germany and
Japan were crushed and Soviet Russia made dominant in Eurasia in accordance with a farsighted plan or as a result of blindness
and
folly.
We
During the and
tiny
will
we
century
last
name but
a few.
segments of our culture, such
rational calendar,
and make
more
it
measurements we now
Reform
rational, to devise a
in spelling has
use.
illogical
agglomeration of
But what successes can we point
been
negligible.
We
have succeeded
to a considerable extent but not wholly in eliminating the u
such words as honor. But to do away with silent the b in Iamb,
is
letters,
too big a mountain for us to move.
spellings-and-pronunciations as rough, cough, dough, are
much
too strong to yield to our
great political spelling or a
and
more
and to adopt an ordered system of weights and
measures instead of the cumbersome,
to?
as
the system of weights and measures, to
There have been repeated and heroic attempts
to simplify spelling
folk
modest.
have witnessed attempts to control
relatively insignificant
spelling, the calendar,
much more
with something
start
social
puny
from
such as
And
such
and through
efforts. It usually takes a
upheaval to effect a significant change in
calendrical
system as the French and Bolshevik
made clear. And as for the metric system, it has among the little band of esoterics in science, but
revolutions have
found a place
yards, ounces, rods, pints,
inefficiently— the layman.
and furlongs
still
serve— awkwardly and
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION
We and
begin to wonder.
we
If
333
are not able to perform such tiny
insignificant feats as eliminating the b
how
ing our calendar system,
on a worldwide
social order
from Iamb, or modify-
we hope
can
to construct a
new
scale?
Men
Let us look about us further.
Man
contending with fashions.
and women
perennially
rebels
are forever
against
his
attire. It is
often uncomfortable, injurious to the health at times,
and, some
men
think, the ordinary
coat and tie
is
unesthetic, the
He must wear his He is not permitted
no matter how hot the weather.
wear pink or blue shoes.
to
costume
But what can he do?
formal attire ridiculous.
And
as for
"evening clothes"— he must
submit to them or stay home. Man's vaunted control over tion
is
But
civiliza-
not particularly conspicuous in this sector. if
man
is
woman
helpless,
fashion.
She must submit
or ugly.
To be
fantastic
is
an abject
slave, in
any change, no matter
may not
sure, she
and ugly
to
at the time;
realize that the
the grip of
how
new
fantastic
designs are
"the latest style" can becloud a
woman's judgment. But one has only
browse through an album
to
of old snapshots to realize that beauty, grace,
and charm do not
dominate the course of fashion.
And long.
as for
A
women's
skirts!
First they are short;
then they are
distinguished anthropologist. Professor A. L. Kroeber of
the University of California, has
made
revealing study of the dimensions of siderable period of time.
He
a
very interesting and
women's
dresses over a con-
found that "the basic dimensions of
modern European feminine dress alternate with fair regularity between maxima and minima which in most cases average about fifty years is
apart so that the full-wave length of their periodicity
around a century."
Women creators
^
The rhythms
have nothing to say about
must conform
are regular
it.
Even the
to the curve of change.
and uniform. designers
and
We find no control
man— or woman— here, only an inexorable and impersonal trend. When a maximum point on the curve is reached, the trend
by
is
reversed
and
skirts
lengthen or shorten as the case
may
be,
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
334
Women are helpless; they can do nothing but follow the trend. When the curve ascends they must shorten their dresses; when it descends, they must lengthen them. It a great class of citizens
of their
own
may seem remarkable
point
control the dimensions
who cannot even
themselves into clubs,
skirts will ne\ertheless organize
to administer the affairs of the world.
that
We
shall return to this
later.
undertake to repair an automobile or a radio
Few men would
without some understanding of
its
mechanism.
We
tend more
and more nowadays to leave medicine and surgery to those who know how. Knowledge and skill are required even to make good pies or home brew. But in matters of society and culture everyone feels qualified to analyze, diagnose,
and
prescribe. It
one of the
is
premises of democracy that not only do the people rule, but they
have
the
In matters
effectively.
and
knowledge
requisite
political,
understanding
one man's view
is
do
it
good
as
to as
another's.
When,
ing with which the again to wonder. different flation,
we examine
however,
affairs of
Wc
the knowledge and understand^
the nation are administered
find the
most august
and even contradictory views on such subjects the
function
of
labor
of ignorance, not of
When we
the
leaders,
popularity of crooners, and so on. This
is
ders?
divorce
rate,
in-
the
turn from matters of national proportions, such as
Does
capital
To
we
are not always re-
punishment diminish the number of muraffect the divorce rate?
people keep dogs? They are noisy,
Why
dirty, unhealthful, useless,
say that they are kept because people like
merely to phrase the problem in a different form. "like" raccoons?
amiable.
as
wisdom.
Does the use of alcohol
expensive.
begin
a picture of the anarchy
the cause of inflation, to lesser problems assured.
we
authorities espousing
They
Why
do and
them
is
don't they
are cute, cleanly in their habits,
and very
CONTROL OVER
AAAN'S
CIVILIZATION
335
The fact is, we don't really know very much about the civilizawe live in. Let us take one of the simplest and most ele-
tion
Why
mentary questions imaginable: polygamy? Other
Europe once
We
did, also.
man
does our society prohibit
permit plural mates, and Western
societies
But now we
feel very strongly
about
it.
he takes unto himself more than one wife at one time. His wives may be perfectly satisfied with the arrangement and he may have injured no one. Yet put a
will
we put him one There less
in a prison for years
in gaol.*
Why? Why
if
not have one more wife and
schoolmarm? are,
polygamy
is
to
be
ready
sure,
"wrong,"
answers
"immoral,"
to
these
questions:
"undemocratic,"
etc.
But
practices are not prohibited because they are "wrong"; they are
wrong because they have been prohibited. It is not wrong to buy sell whiskey now; it was while the Eighteenth Amendment was on the books. And as for democracy and equality, we permit and a
man
to
have two yachts
he can
if
afford
them, why not two
wives?
know
I
of no really adequate answer to this question in such
am
literature of social science as I
of fact, the question in a
great
number
is
acquainted with. As a matter
very seldom raised.
of treatises
I
have looked for
written during the last quarter century without finding social scientists of
it
on sociology and anthropology it.
Some
the latter half of the nineteenth century tried
to explain the prohibition of
polygamy but we cannot accept
their conclusions.
The
fact
is
we
are ignorant.
We
do not know the solution to
such an elementary problem as singular or plural mates.
*
We
And
in
which a man was sent to the penitentiary some twelve women without ever bothering with the ritual of
recall a recent instance in
for marrying
divorce. Had he been less honorable or chivalrous and lived with each woman without the formality of marriage, his "crime" would have been much less. This man served society well in a municipal railway system. His numerous
wives pressed no complaint.
him?
Why
did society feel
it
necessary to incarcerate
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
336
we have not reached the point of asking such questions, of answering them. As Archibald McLeish has nothing to say said, "We know all the answers, but we have not yet asked the our day,
questions."
Over
a half-century ago the great
French savant, Emile
Durkheim, commented upon the immaturity of
social science as
follows:
In the present state of the science
what
we
do not even know
really
are the principal social institutions, such as the state, or
We
are is the right of property or contract they depend on which the factors ignorant of completely almost shed even a glimmer of light ; we are scarcely beginning to
the family; what
.
.
.
.
.
.
on some of these points. Yet one has only to glance through the works on sociology to see how rare is the appreciation of this ignorance and these difficulties.*
made
Despite the progress that has been written,
this
since
The Rules was
statement has a certain relevance today.
science of society and civilization
still
is
so
immature
unable to solve such tiny and elementary problems hibition of polygamy,
where
ing requisite to planning a
new world
order?
best tools are
One would
made
are the
new
the
If
as to
be
the pro-
as
knowledge and understand-
social system, to constructing a
not expect a savage craftsman, whose
of chipped
flint,
to design
and build a
loco-
motive.
Let us have a look at
The
thing
first
whether
it
we
this civilization
notice
be technology,
does not have
its
is
man
antiquity.
its
thinks he controls.
There
is
roots in the
remote
past.
made
The
lens of the
200-inch telescope, for example,
is
from the manufacture of faience
in ancient Egypt,
originated pottery,
apparently
as
no part of
it,
institutions, science or philosophy, that
a
of glass. Glass
new
emerged
which
in turn
by-product of burning bricks and
which followed the use of sun-dried
brick, and, earlier.
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION
mud
337
The United Na-
daubs of Neolithic or even Paleolithic huts.
tions can be traced back to primitive tribal councils
and beyond.
Modern mathematics goes back to counting on one's so on. Culture
million
odd
it
and
has continued and developed to the present day.
and progressive
a continuous, cumulative,
is
fingers,
man himself. It had its beginnings a when man first started to use articulate
as old as
years ago
speech, and
Culture
is
Everyone— every
since the very earliest period of
some
culture, a civilization, of
and meager, or
affair.
group— has,
individual, every generation, every
human sort.
been born into a might be simple, crude
history,
It
might be highly developed. But
it
cultures,
all
whatever their respective degrees of development, have technologies (tools, machines), social systems (customs, institutions), beliefs
a
fluenced by
how he he
philosophy, science) and forms of
(lore,
when
that
baby it.
is
As
will believe in,
will
be
in-
a matter of fact, his culture will determine
will think, feel,
will speak,
This means
art.
born into a cultural milieu, he
what
and
act. It will
clothes,
how he
determine what language
he
any,
if
will wear,
will marry, select
what gods he
and prepare
his foods,
and dispose of the dead. What else could one do but react to the culture that surrounds him from birth to death? treat the sick,
No its
people makes
its
own
ancestors or borrows It is easy
ture,
enough
it
culture;
from
man
for
its
and
inherits
to believe that
each generation contributing
controls
it
directs its course
it
ready-made from
neighbors.
its
share,
he has made
his cul-
and that
he who
it is
through the ages. Does he not chip
the arrowheads and stone-axes, build carts and dynamoes, coin
money and spend
it,
elect presidents
symphonies and carve
one cannot always
statues,
rely
and depose
upon the obvious.
It
modern thought where we
man who
compose
was once obvious
that the earth remained stationary while the sun
could see that for himself.
kings,
worship gods and wage war? But
We
are
now
moved; anyone
approaching a point in
are beginning to suspect that
controls culture but the other
it is
way around. The
not
feat of
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
338
Copernicus in dispelling the geocentric illusion over four hundred years ago is being duplicated in our day by the culturologist who is
dissipating the anthropocentric illusion that
man
controls his
culture.
Although
man who
is
it
arrowheads,
chips
composes sym-
etc., we cannot explain culture merely by saying that "man produced it." There is not a single question that we would
phonies,
want
about culture that can be answered by saying
to ask
did thus and so." did;
why
it
We
want
assumed a great
know why
to
"Man
culture developed as
it
variety of forms while preserving at
why the rate of cultural change has accelerated. Wc want to know why some cultures have money and slaves while others do not; why some have trial by jury, others ordeal by magic; why some have kings, others chiefs or presidents; why some use milk, others loathe it; why some the same time a certain uniformity,
pcnnit, others prohibit, polygamy.
"Man wanted them
saying,
that
To
way"
explain
is
all
these things by
of course absurd.
A device
that explains everything explains nothing.
Before entirely
we go in
our
very far efforts
we
discover that
to explain
we must
cultural
disregard
Man may
differences— in short, culture or civilization as a whole.
be regarded
Man color,
is
as a constant so far as cultural
are superficial, as
change
one species and, despite differences of
shape of head,
he
is
lips,
and nose,
is
concerned.
skin, eye,
stature, etc.,
which
and hair after all
highly uniform in such fundamental features
brain, bone, muscle, glands,
and sense organs. And he has
undergone no appreciable evolutionary change during the 50,000 years at least.
man
growth and cultural
We may,
therefore, regard
man
as a
last
constant
both with regard to the races extant today, and with regard to his ancestors
during the
a certain structure
last tens of
Man
has
desires
and
thousands of years.
and certain functions; he has certain
needs. Tlicse are related to culture, of course, but only in a general, not a specific, way. serves the needs of
man
We
may
as a species.
say that culture as a
But
this
whole
does not and cannot
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION
339
all when we try to account for the variations of specific You cannot explain variables by appeal to a constant.
help us at cultures.
You cannot
explain the vast range of cultural variation by invok-
ing man, a biological constant. In England in a.d. 1500 there was
one type of plained in
culture; in Japan, another. Neither culture can
terms of the physical type associated with
underwent change
in
England between
be
Culture
it.
1500 and 1900,
a.d.
ex-
as it
did in Japan. But these changes cannot be explained by pointing to the inhabitants in each case; they did not change. Plainly,
cannot explain cultures
Nor can
in
be explained
cultural differences
ment. Quite apart from the
we
Man.
terms of
in terms of environ-
accounting for differences
difficulty of
in musical styles, forms of writing, codes of etiquette, rules of
marriage, mortuary
terms of environment,
rites, etc., in
discover that even economic, industrial,
and
we soon cannot
social systems
be so explained. The environment of Central Europe so cerned has remained constant for centuries. region, however, has varied enormously. fallacy of explaining the variable If,
then,
we cannot
The
and made
is
culture of the
Here again we
see the
by appeal to a constant.
explain cultures in terms of race or physical
type, or in terms of psychological processes,
environment
far as
and mineral resources are con-
climate, flora, fauna, topography,
equally futile,
how
are they to
and
if
appeal to
be accounted
for
intelligible to us?
There seems
to
be only one answer
—after- one becomes used to
it,
plained in terms of culture. As a continuum.
Each
trait
left
and that
at least. Cultures
we have
fairly plain
must be
traits,
earlier cultural situation.
grown out of
all
is
each stage of
The steam
engine can be traced back to the origins of metallurgy and International cartels have
ex-
already noted, culture
or organization of
development, grows out of an
is
fire.
the processes of ex-
change and distribution since the Old Stone Age and before. Our science, philosophy, religion,
forms. Culture
is
and
art
have developed out of
earlier
a vast stream of tools, utensils, customs, beliefs
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
340
that are constantly interacting with each other, creating new combinations and syntheses. New elements are added constantly to the
stream; obsolete
the cross-section
of
The
drop out.
traits
culture of today
is
but
stream at the present moment, the
this
resultant of the age-old process of interaction, selection, rejection,
and accumulation that has preceded us. And the culture of tomorrow will be but the culture of today plus one more day's growth. The numerical coefficient of today's culture may be said to
be 365,000,000
+
365,000,000
1.
tomorrow:
(i.e.,
a million years of days); that of
The
culture of the present was determined
by
the past and the culture of the future will be but a continuation
makes
of the trend of the present. Thus, in a very real sense culture itseU.
At
least, if
must proceed
as
if
one wishes
made
culture
with the determination of there, of course, to
its
make the
itself,
as
ii
man had
determined.
It rests
upon
must be
existence of the culture process pos-
own
its
he
nothing to do
Man
course or content.
But the nature and behavior of the process
sible.
own
to explain culture scientifically,
principles;
it is
itself
is
self-
governed by
its
laws.
Thus, culture makes
makes
itself.
what he
is,
man what he
same time An Eskimo, Bantu, Tibetan, Swede, or American is
thinks, feels,
and
acts as
is
and
at the
he does, because
his culture
influences— "stimulates"— him in such a way as to evoke these responses.
The Eskimo
or
American has had no part
ducing the culture into which he was thrust at birth. ready there; he could not escape to
and that on
it,
its
own
it;
The
and
all
al-
react
English language, the
institutions,
our
mills,
factories, railroads, telephones, armies, navies, race tracks, halls,
pro-
was
he could do nothing but
terms.
Christian religion, our political
in
It
mines,
dance
the other thousands of things that comprise our
They have weight, mass, and momentum. They cannot be made to disappear by waving a wand, nor can their structure and behavior be altered by an act
civilization are here in existence today.
of will.
We must come to
terms with them as
we
find
them
today.
:
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION
341
x\nd they will be tomorrow what their trend of development in
the past dictates.
We
can only trot along with them, hoping to
keep up.
Man
has long cherished the illusion of omnipotence. It
flattering
and comforting
to his ego. In days
gone by,
man
is
has
believed that he could control the weather; countless primitive
peoples have had rituals for making rain, stilling high winds, or
Many
averting storms.
have had ceremonies by means of which
the course of the sun in the heavens could be "controlled."
With
the advance of science, however, man's faith in his omnipo-
tence has diminished. But he
still
believes that
he can control
his civilization.
The
philosophy of science— of cause and effect relationships,
of determinism— has been firmly established in the study of physical
phenomena.
Psychology
It
is
well entrenched in the biological field, also.
may have demonstrated
the operation of the principle
of cause and effect, of determinism, in mental processes, and
may
have dispelled the notion of free will for the individual. But social science
is
collective
still
free
so
as to permit one to find refuge in a As Professor A. L. Kroeber has recently
immature
will.
observed
I
suspect that the resistance [to the thesis of cultural determin-
ism] goes "back to the
common and
tion that our wills are free.
As
this
deeply implanted assump-
assumption has had to yield
ground elsewhere, it has taken refuge in the collective, social, and historical sphere. Since the chemists, physiologists, and psychologists have unlimbered their artillery, the personal free-
dom
of the will
is
thankless terrain to maintain. Culture they
have not yet attacked; so that becomes a refuge. Whatever the degree to which we have ceased to assert being free agents as individuals, in the social realm we can still claim to shape our destinies. The theologian is piping pretty small, but the social reformer very loud.
We are renouncing the kingdom
of heaven.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
342
but going to establish a near-millenium on earth. Our personal wills may be determined, but by collectivizing them we can still social freedom.^"
have
Primitive
man
could believe that he could control the weather
only because he was meteorolog)'.
And
he knew
ignorant;
today,
it
nothing of
virtually
only our profound and compre-
is
hensive ignorance of the nature of culture that makes
we
for us to believe that
and control
direct
it
possible
As man's knowl-
it.
edge and understanding grew in meteorology, his illusion of power and control dissipated. And as our understanding of culture increases,
our illusion of control will languish and disappear. As
Durkheim once observed, still
Needless to say, this
is
we
"as far as social facts are concerned,
have the mentality of primitives."
"
not the view taken by
many
today
who
look to science for our salvation. Far from expecting belief in
our ability to control to diminish with the advance of social science,
many
people expect just the reverse.
fashion these days to declare that as
advanced
become the
has
only our social sciences were
as the physical sciences,
we now
culture as
if
It
then
we
could control our
control the physical forces of nature.
lowing quotation from a
letter
The
published in Science recently
folis
a
conservative statement of this point of view:
For
if,
by employing the
scientific
method,
understand and control the atom, there that they can in the
human group
same way
behavior ....
ability that social
is
men
can
learn to understand
It is
come
and control
quite within reasonable prob-
science can provide these techniques
for "keeping the peace"]
if it is
to
reasonable likelihood
given anything like the
[i.e.,
amount
of support afforded to physical science in developing the atomic
bomb.^2 In
similar
vein
Professor
Gordon
W.
Allport
of
Harvard
observes that "the United States spent two billion dollars
on the
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION invention of the atomic in spending
means
for
bomb" and
an equivalent sum,
its
control?"
The premise
if
343 asks
"What
necessary,
there absurd
is
on the discovery
of
^^
underlying this view
wars are caused, or at least
made
is
unsound.
possible,
It
assumes that
by ignorance and the
lack of social control that goes with ignorance. It assumes that,
given understanding through generous grants of funds to social
wars could be prevented— the "peace could be kept."
scientists,
The lack of understanding and realism displayed here is pathetic. The instinct of self-preservation of a society that subsidized atom bomb inventors rather than social scientists holding views such as these is a sure one. Wars are not caused by ignorance, nor can "the peace be kept" by the findings of social scientists. Wars are struggles
between
vival, struggles for
earth, for
fe'rtile
social
organisms— called nations— for
sur-
the possession and use of the resources of the
fields; coal, oil,
and iron deposits;
for
uranium
mines; for seaports and waterways; for markets and trade routes;
No amount
for military bases.
of
understanding will alter or
remove the basis of this stmggle, any more than an understanding of the ocean's tides will diminish or terminate their flow.
But the
fallacy of
assuming that we can increase and perfect
our control over civilization through social science egregious
than
essence of
which
we have is"
indicated.
To
call
is
upon
even more
science,
acceptance of the principles of cause and effect
and determinism, to support a philosophy of Free Will, close to the height of absurdity. Verily, Science has
modern magic! The and man
the
belief that
alike ii only
man
can work his will
is
fairly
become the upon nature
he had the light formulas once flourished
in primitive society as magic. It
is still
with us today, but
we now
call it Science.
No amount
of development of the social sciences
would increase
or perfect man's control over civilization by one iota. In the
man-culture system,
man
is
the dependent, culture the inde-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
344 pendent, variable.
by
his culture.
laws.
A
What man
thinlcs, feels,
and does
determined
is
culture behaves in accordance with
And
own
its
would only make
mature development of social science
this fact clear.
The the
philosophy of Free Will and omnipotence of education
field
principals,
(see p.
commencement
of telling the world that
its
rampant in
is
107). "Educators," high school
and others never seem to
orators,
salvation lies in education.
tire
An eminent
anthropologist, the late Clark Wissler, looking at our civilization as
he would
Indians, the
mankind— of
other cultures of
at
—finds that a faith in education and trait of
a characteristic
the Blackfoot
tribes of Africa, or the aborigines of Australia
Bantu
our culture.
its
efficacy to cure all
"The
fact is,"
he
says,
ills
is
"that
No matter what we seek to solve every difficulty by education. inauguration of a new combating of disease, the may the it be, .
public service, the appreciation of
we
of that kind,
popular."
Our
"Our
faith in education has, in
thing
culture
we
call
is
,
reform, or anything
make it universal and fact, become our religion,
look to education to
Dr. Wissler sees
as
art, dress
.
it:
characterized
by an overruling
belief in
education— a kind of mechanism to propitiate the
intent of nature in the manifestation of culture. faith that this formula, or
more happily
some-
fulfilled, is
method,
our
will cause this
Our
implicit
purpose to be
real religion." ^*
Dr. Wissler compares our education formula with the magical formulas of primitive tribes:
We often
find among peoples we choose to call less civilized, a men whom we designate as shamans, medicine men, conjurors, etc. Where such men flourish they are called class of
.
.
.
upon whenever the course of events goes wrong, sickness, famine, love, war, no matter what the nature of the trouble
may
be, and they always proceed in one way: i.e., recite or demonstrate a formula of some kind. They may sing it, they
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION
may dance idea
may merely act it out— no matter, the you go through with the correct formula the
or they
it,
that
is
345
if
forces of nature will right the wrong. ... In every culture formulae are used to propitiate nature in whatever form of gods or powers she is conceived, and cultures differ not in this, .
.
for so far they are
all alike,
but
.
as to
the kinds of formulae into
which they put their faith. Our great formula for bringing about the realization of our leading ideals is education. .
It
is
uate and perfect our culture
The
faith of primitive
medicine
men and
repetition of the
ills
man
better magic.
."
in
and
his formulas
him
that his formulas and rituals were
him
And we who
that
he needed more and
look to education for our "salvation"
are not shaken in our faith by the spectacle of tragedy piled disaster.
To
What we
to exert influence his needs
and
with which
we
upon the
desires.
we
But education
need,
say,
is
man, magic was
primitive
We
upon
more education. a means, available to
external world
and so
mankind,
to shape
it
to
think of education as an instrument
can transform society and mould
is
his
rituals,
they were supposed to prevent or cure. Lack
only convinced
it
.
.
was not shaken by a perpetual
conjurors,
of success did not prove to inefficacious;
.
.
by which we hope to perpet-
a kind of grand over-formula
it
to our will.
not a force or instrument outside of society, but
a process within
it.
social organism.
Education
It
is",
so to speak, a physiologic process of the j
carrying on
its
own
is
a
means employed by
society in
own
objectives.
activities, in striving for its
'
Thus, during peacetime, society educates for peace, but when the nation
is
at war,
it
educates for war. In times of peace, munitions-
makers are "Merchants of Death"; in wartime, "Victory Business." In peacetime.
comes people
it's
He
"Praise the Lord
who
is
the Prince of Peace, but
and pass the ammunition."
control their culture through education;
it
is
Their
when war not
It
is
is
rather
the other way around: education, formal and informal,
is
the
>
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
346
new
process of bringing each
system of culture.
It
generation under the control of a
unrealistic in the extreme, therefore, to
is
think of education reforming society from the outside.
No
one
between education and society better than the great French social scientist, Emile Durkheim:
has stated the relationship
But
this
to attribute to education a
is
power which
it
does not
only the image, the reflection of society. Education and reproduces it in abridged form, but it does society imitates is healthy when the nation itself is in Education not create it. possess. It
is
a healthy state, but, not having the it
power of
becomes corrupted when the nation
milieu as
modification,
self
decays. If the moral
experienced by the teachers themselves
it is
is
corrupt,
fail to be affected by it; how then can they impress upon those whom they train an outlook that differs from the one that they have received? Each generation is brought up by the previous generation and it is necessary therefore to reform the latter if it is to improve the one which follows it. We go around in circles. At long intervals it may well happen that someone may come along whose ideas and aspirations are in
they cannot
\
advance of those of his contemporaries, but the moral constitution of a people is not made over by these isolated individuals. No doubt it pleases us to believe that one eloquent voice
is
sufficient to transform the social fabric as
but, here as elsewhere, something ing.
The
is
if by magic, not produced from noth-
strongest wills cannot create out of nothing forces
which do not
exist,
and
failures in
experience always
come
to
dispel these easy illusions. Besides,
even though a pedagogical system could succeed by an incomprehensible miracle in establishing itself in antagonism to the social system, it would have
no
effect
by reason of
organization state that
not
fail
one wishes
this very is
to
to be influenced
contact with protect
(society)
him
it.
The
for a
antagonism.
If
the collective
maintained from which the moral
combat is derived, then the child canby it from the moment he comes into
artificial milieu of the school can only time and then but feebly. In proportion as
CONTROL OVER
AAAN'S
CIVILIZATION
347
the real world takes greater hold of him, it will destroy the work of the educator. Thus education cannot reform itself unless society itself is reformed. And in order to do that we must go to the causes of the malady from which
The
it suffers.^^
position taken here will of course be vigorously denied
opposed. People do not give up their illusions
Kroeber has put
Our minds
easily.
it:
instinctively resist the
first
shock of the recognition
of a thing [cultural determinism] so intimately
and yet
and As A. L.
woven
into us
We
above and so uncontrollable by our wills. feel driven to deny its reality, to deny even the validity of dealing with it as an entity; just as men at large have long and bitterly so far
resented admitting the existence of purely automatic forces
and system possible
in the realm that underlies
the
existence
our
of
and
and makes
carries
the
personalities:
realm
of
nature.^^
A common determinism
reaction— verbal reflex— to the theory of cultural
is
to
brand
William James branded fatalisms"
the
"fatalistic" or "defeatist."
it
Long ago
"the most pernicious and immoral of
as
philosophy
"the
of
contemporary
sociological
school" that espoused "general laws and predetermined tenden-
and "denied the
cies,"
and Free Will
vital
importance of individual
("I believe in free-will myself,"
he
initiative"
says).^^
And
today another student of philosophy. Dr. David Bidney, writing in the
American Anthropologist, has repeatedly
called the deter-
The when one employs
ministic point of view of culturology "fatalistic."
words
is
significant.
ciple of cause
and
phenomena no one it
to
Why
human is it
Why
is
it
that
effect in the
the prin-
realm of physical and chemical
cries "fatalism,"
cultural
choice of
phenomena
but the instant one applies this
accusation
leaps
forth?
that an admission of our inability to control the weather
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
348
no charge of "defeatism"' whereas this reproach is promptly levelled against anyone who recognizes man's inability brings forth
to control the course of civilization?
The
reason
is
"defeatism," omnipotence. in
When
atoms,
Free Will;
implies
"Fatalism"
plain.
fairly
or tissues behave
cells,
accordance with their nature and properties no one calls it because no one expects freedom of choice and action
fatalistic
But when one asserts that cultural phenomena have a nature of their own and consequently must behave in terms of of them.
their nature, the response
and
of cause
effect
many
but a charge of "fatalism." "To many edu-
the great English anthropologist, E. B. Tylor,
cated minds/'
wrote
not an acceptance of the principle
is
seems something presumptuous and
years ago, "there
mankind
repulsive in the view that the history of
parcel
the
of
nature,
of
history
and actions accord with laws
our
that
We
have combined "a
says Alfred
anywhere
is
it is
of the higher animals as being
inconsistency"
is
^^
(emphasis ours).
He
"much
responsible for
hearted and wavering in our civilization.
It
.
.
.
by reason of the inconsistency lurking
[thought]
and
bases,
"
everywhere."
based on mechanism,"
scientific realism,
self-determining organisms" "radical
law
North Whitehead, with "an unwavering
men and
world of
If
wills,
those which govern the
as definite as
motion of the waves, the combination of acids and the growth of plants ...
and
part
is
thoughts,
belief in the
composed of feels that this
that
half-
is
enfeebles in
.
.
.
the back-
ground." Implicit in the charge of "fatalism"
further notion of refutation.
many minds, would go
if
sibly exist?" is
it is
false as well.
it
and therefore
fatalistic
minism
to call
To brand
false,"
were made
is
the
is,
"Cultural determinism
to is
about the way the reasoning
"How can determmism posimphed but unspoken. "Deter-
explicit.
the question that
unthinkable."
is
and "defeatism" a view "fatalistic"
And
is
so
it
is
to
one possessed by 2
CONTROL OVER
AAAN'S
philosophy of free
CIVILIZATION
We
will.*
349
find this point of view rather well
expressed by Lawrence K. Frank in a recent
"What
article,
is
Social Order?"
Perhaps the major obstacle essentially
we
tradition
defeatist
face today, therefore,
expressed
is
the various
in
this
con-
ceptions of social order described earlier, as above and beyond
human control ... In this situation, therefore, we can and we must find the courage to view social order as that which must be achieved by man himself.^^ all
Of
course
man
can "find the courage" to view social order as
something "that must be achieved by himself." courage to do
however; what
this,
is
required
It is
does not take
ignorance and
man him-
hope. "Must find the courage," "must be achieved by self," is
hardly the language of science.
and rhetoric— of "if
we
No
a type
with which
but purpose in our hearts
will
doubt the
It is, rather,
exhortation
we have long been .
.
to question man's control over the weather,
first
and snow
to claim that the winds will blow, the rain
the
first
fall,
the seasons
familiar:
."
come and
go, in accordance with their
own
rather than in obedience to man's wish and will expressed
and
ritual,
were accused of "fatalism" and "defeatism,"
if,
they were not dealt with more harshly. But, in time,
come
to accept our
conciled
to
it.
If
impotence it
weather because that
in this regard
be argued that is
a
man
and
to
nature in spell
indeed,
we have
become
re-
cannot control the
part of the external world whereas
* Note that we have said possessed by, rather than "believes in." Philosophies possess, hold, animate, guide and direct the articulate, protoplasmic mechanisms that are men. Whether a man an average man, typical of his group "believes in" Christ or Buddha, Genesis or Geology, Determinism or
—
—
Free Will, is not a matter of his own choosing. His philosophy is merely the response of his neuro-sensory-muscular-glandular system to the streams of
upon him from the outside. What is called "phimerely the interaction of these cultural elements within his organism. His "choice" of philosophic beliefs is merely a neurological expres-
cultural stimuli impinging
losophizing"
is
sion of the superior strength of
some
of these extra-somatic cultural forces.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
350
man-made,
culture, being
is
subject to his control,
pointed out that the exact opposite
the case.
is
It
the realm of the external world that man's control
can harness the energies of
rivers, fuels,
is
must be
it
precisely in
is
possible.
He
and atoms because he,
as
of the forces of nature, lies outside their respective systems
one and can therefore act upon them. But man, ism, as a species, is
lies
an animal organ-
as
within the man-culture system, and there he
the dependent, not the independent, variable; his behavior
merely the function of his
and
theoretically
not
culture,
practically, therefore,
it
is
is
determinant. Both
its
man
possible for
to
more control over the weather than over culture, for he can exert some control over the former even now and he may increase this control in the future. But he exerts no control whatever over his culture and theoretically there is no possibility of exert
his ever
The
doing
so.
usual reactions to this manifesto of cultural determinism
are as unwarranted as are the assumptions of Free Will,
from
which, of course, these responses flow. After expostulating on the
theme of "fatalism" and "defeatism" the conventional protest goes on to demand, "What is the use then of our efforts? Why should
we
try to
do anything to improve our
control over our culture?
Why
not just
sit
evolutionary process take care of everything? a science of culture possibly
grasp?
ing
What
good
These questions of
is
we can do about
what the
say.
The
man
is
man
if
we have no
back and
Of what
control
an understanding of culture
lies if
let
the
use could
beyond our
there
is
noth-
it?"
are naive
and betray a lack of understanding
cultural determinist— the culturologist— is trying to
He knows
full
He
man
is
irrelevant to the
well that the contrary
an absolute prerequisite to
could be no culture. that
if
determinist does not assert that
culture process.
that
be to us
lot
realizes
plays in the systen?. that
it,
that without
is
the case;
man
there
very clearly the essential role is
man-and-culture.
What
the
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION culturologist contends is
351
human organism
that in this system the
is
not the determinant; that the behavior of the culture process
cannot be explained of the culture
terms of this organism but only in terms
in
that the growth and changes
itself;
among
Indo-European languages, for example, cannot be accounted
the for
man's nerves, muscles, senses, or organs of speech;
in terms of
or in terms of his hopes, needs, fears, or imagination. Language must be explained in terms of language. But to turn to some of the specific questions with which dis-
determinism
satisfaction with the philosophy of
the
first
place,
we cannot
process take care of
all
the evolutionary
our problems. While
we
live
we must come
just sitting back, incubating a case of
suicide rates
it."
So
is
various
for
is
some
minants are more abundant tions
than of others.
It
determinants vary: hara-kiri
an organism
that, of its
form of motion we
This
in the
is
own
it. is
Even
"doing
suicide; as a matter of fact,
is
is
high; in others
not because suicide deter-
chromosomes of some popula-
due to the
is
are con-
provide excellent indexes of
societies the rate
virtually non-existent.
we
to terms with
dementia praecox,
committing societies
cultural determinism. In
suicide
expressed. In
let
fronted by our culture and
something about
is
back" and
"just sit
fact
that the cultural
something that a culture does to nature, tends to persevere in that
call "Life." It is
we cannot
obvious that
avoid
reacting to our culture.
To assume
that the process of cultural evolution will take care
of everything without effort on our part
is
of course absurd,
and
no part of the determinist's philosophy. Of course we must exert ourselves while we live; we cannot do otherwise. But constitutes
the question evolution?"
through
not
is
It
is
human
nature, the form
beings.
is
does the work, ourselves or cultural
The
question
and content of
culture process, the
The answer
"Who
obvious that the energy
is
expended by or
What
determines the
this expression of
human organism
of course fairly
is.
energy in the
or the extra-somatic culture?
obvious— after a small amount of
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
352
Let us consider two groups of
reflection.
A
and B. Group
human
no currency,
pottery, speaks a Polynesian language, has chiefs but is
non-literate, drinks kava,
and
so on.
greatly concerned with genealogy,
is
Group B mines
and
coal
iron, talks
food from the outside, uses money,
its
Now
the question
is.
Why
A
organisms,
wood, makes no
raises taro, catches fish, carver
is
literate,
Welsh, imports drinks ale, etc.
does each group behave as
does?
it
one group of organisms possesses traits or characteristics—genes, instincts, or psychological tendencies— that cause Is
that
it
them
to drink kava rather than ale? This
the one group of organisms logically. It
It
organism
is
is,
of course, ridiculous;
fundamentally like the other bio-
obvious that each group of organisms behaves as
is
does because each
it
stimuli.
is
is
reacting to a particular set of cultural
obvious also that a consideration of the
is
totally irrelevant to the question.
Why
human
one group
is
stimulated by one set of stimuli rather than by another? This
is
a cultural historical question, not a biological or psychological
one. So, one
not so
is
silly as
to say,
or catch fish? Let our culture do
mines the
And, the
coal,
but what
is
"Why
it."
The
should
we mine
question
is
coal
who
not
the determinant of this behavior?
culturologist points out the obvious: the culture
is
the
determinant.
The
of many sincere, altruistic and conscientious upon being told that it is not they who control their culture and direct its course, is "Why then should we try to do good, to better our lot and that of mankind?" We have answered reaction
people,
\
this question in part already. In the first place
one cannot avoid
trying to do something.
life
to continue with
the
To
name we
it
As long
as
and
he must exert himself. "Trying"
is
willing
is
merely
give to the effort exerted in the process of living.
strive for this or that, therefore,
But what one
one accepts
strives for
and how
is
inseparable from our
his effort
is
expressed
lives. is
de-
termined by his culture. For example, the goal of one people
may be
eternal life in heaven for
which
their terrestrial existence
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION is
but a preparation. below."
*'here
may admit
One
The
group
existence
its
353
goal of another might
may deny and
be the good Hfe
the reality of sickness; another
combat
try to
One
it.
may
group
use charms and incantations; another, clinics and laboratories.
Whatever the is
a matter
But,
goal
and whatever the means employed to reach
it,
determined by the culture of the group.
should be pointed out with emphasis, this
is not a philosophy of defeatism or hopelessness by any means. Least of all does it declare that one's efforts do not count. The fact that
it
stamp out tuberculosis are
one's efforts to in
no way minimizes the
A
saved.
matter what kind or
A
life
congressman has an
letter written to a
how much. A
determined
culturally
effort or the result.
saved
on world
resolution
a life
is
no
effect, too,
affairs
passed by a woman's club has a real function in society, although it
may be a very different one from that imagined by The question we raise is not one of the value
ladies.
Human effort is geologist. And effort
or whether effort has consequences. as
anything in the realm of the
by consequences Living
human
But
this
is
of effort
just as real is
followed
just as effect follows cause in physics or geology.
beings cannot help but exert themselves, and every-
thing they do counts for something in one
from wishing
the good
to
deny or ignore
this,
way
we wish
or another. Far to emphasize
not the question raised by the culturologist, the
tural determinist.
What
he claims
is,
not that
it is
it.
cul-
futile to try
because what one does counts for nought, but that what one does,
done
how he
does
it,
and the end and purpose
culturally determined,
is
group rather than by the free group.
More than
termined or at constitutes the
that,
what
least defined
"good
life"
for
which
it
is
determined by the culture of the
is
will of the individual or of the
a person or group desires
by the for
culture,
any people
not by them. is
is
de-
What
always culturally
defined.
From
the cultural determinist's point of view,
are merely the instruments through
human
beings
which cultures express them-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
354
A physician,
selves.
saving lives each day,
is
an instrument through
which certain cultural forces express themselves; if they were not there, or if they were different, the organism in question would not be practicing medicine or he would practice
The
way.
it
in a different
gangster, evangelist, revolutionist, reformer, policeman,
impoverished beggar, wealthy parasite, teacher, soldier, and sha-
man each
are likewise instruments of cultural action
and expression;
a type of primate organism grasped and wielded by a
is
certain set of culture traits. It
only the inveterate habit of
is
thinking anthropocentrically that makes this point of view seem strange or ridiculous.
But, granting that what turally determined, of if
we do
what use
is it
counts even though
cul-
is
to develop a science of culture
we cannot control civilization or direct
science of pathology in order to
it
combat
its
course?
We
have a
disease, sciences of physics
and chemistry to control the external world. But if we do not control our culture and cannot ever hope to control it, of what use would a science of culture be? to this question
temperature of a
might begin our reply
by asking, of what value is it to know the away? Questions such
star a million light years
as these betray a limited \
We
understanding of science. Science
is
not
primarily a matter of control in the sense of harnessing rivers
with hydroelectric plants or constructing uranium is
a
means
Man is
of adjustment; control
is
piles.
Science
but one aspect of adjustment.
which he must adjust if he Mythology and science are means of
finds himself in a universe to
to continue to live in
it.
adjustment; they are interpretations of the world in terms of
which man behaves. There
is,
of course, a vast difference in terms
of adjustment between a philosophy that interprets stars as a flock of
snow
birds lost in the sky,
and one that measures
their
masses, distances, dimensions, and temperatures. This difference is
a very practical one, too, in terms of the contribution that
philosophy makes to the security of
Our
each
life.
ancestors once thought they could control the weather as
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION contemporary savages even going so
They
do.
still
355 finally
far as to outgrov^ calling
outgrew
this illusion,
new view
the
"fatalistic"
But we do not think a knowledge and an understanding of weather and climate useless. On the contrary, we are devoting more time and money to meteorology now than ever and
"defeatist."
Here again we
before.
but adjust to
more
for
it
and
effective
vantageous
we
if
see the situation in terms of adjustment
We
may not be able to control the weather we must. And knowledge and understanding make
rather than contwh
satisfying adjustments.
then weather prediction
it is
learn to predict
the time and traffic
it.
many
them
if
we
ad-
cannot,
for prediction
fact,
course but
its
we make
are quite accurate:
car
would be
understanding.
cannot control
As a matter of of
freight
fatalities,
reserves,
We
with culture.
And
the next best thing.
is
we must have knowledge and So
It
couJd control the weather. But
loadings,
births,
we can
predictions
all
wheat production, exhaustion of
oil
and many other matters are already within the reach
of limited but nevertheless valuable prediction. If our ability to
predict were greatly increased by the development and maturation of a science of culture the possibilities of a rational, effective,
and humane adjustment between man and culture and between
one If,
cultural
segment and another would be increased accordingly.
for example, a science of culture could
trend of social evolution
is
toward larger
demonstrate that the
political groupings,
then
the chances of making the futile attempt to restore or maintain the independence of small nations would be lessened. trend of cultural evolution enterprise
why
is
If
the
away from private property and
free
strive to perpetuate
them?
If it
could be shown
that international wars will continue as long as independent,
sovereign nations exist, then certain delusions find less nourishment
been evolving
as
matic process so
and support. The
fact
now is
popular would
that culture has
an unconscious, blind, bloody, brutal, far.
It
tropis-
has not yet reached the point where
intelligence, self-consciousness,
and understanding are very con-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
356
Our
spicuous.
ignorance
is
still
deep-rooted and widespread.
We
do not understand even some of the most elementary things— the prohibition of polygamy for example. In short, we are so ignorant that we can still believe that it is we who make our culture and control
its
course.
This ignorance long since
we
is
not surprising however.
It
has not been very
gave up burning witches, cudgelling hysterics to
and other savage practices. Even in technology, which tends to outstrip the social and ideological sectors, we have surpassed the savage at two points— fire-making and the use of
drive out demons,
the
bow and arrow— only
matches are but a
little
within the
more than
last
century or two. Chemical
a century old
and the bow and
arrow was used in bison hunting on the American plains in preference to the best firearms available at the time within the last
hundred
years. It
is
a small portion of
savagery.
only yesterday, culturologically speaking, that
mankind began
For most of
upon wild matter of
to
emerge from a condition of
his career thus far
foods; less than
man
has subsisted wholly
two per cent of human
history, as a
has elapsed since the origin of agriculture. Other
fact,
significant indexes:
some
0.7 per cent of culture history since the
beginning of metallurgy, 0.35% since the first alphabet, 0.033% since Galileo, 0.009% since the publication of Darwin's The Origin of Species, and only 0.002% since William Jennings Bryan
and the Scopes is
trial.
A
mature, urbane, and rational civilization
not to be achieved in a mere million years from the anthropoid
level.
made come about as
should be
It
should
clear that
if
an adequate understanding
a consequence of a science of culture
would not have been "us" who achieved
it
but our culture. In
the interaction of elements in the culture process, those effective in providing
it
traits less
adequate adjustment in terms of under-
standing and control are gradually relinquished and replaced by
more and
effective traits.
spells give
way
Thus, bronze axes replace stone
to laboratories
and
clinics,
and
axes, ikons
finally,
a science
AAAN'S of
CONTROL OVER
human
CIVILIZATION
357
culture begins to challenge the primitive philosophy of
omnipotence and Free Will. The new science to prove
its
will of course
have
superiority over the older view just as astronomy,
chemistry, and medicine have in other sectors of experience.
The
success of science— the philosophy of materialism, of cause
and
effect, of
determinism— in the physical and
biological sectors of
experience encourages us greatly in the belief that this point of
view and these techniques of interpretation will prove effective in the social sphere also.
Our nor
role in this process
as individuals
a
is
modest one. Neither
do we have a choice of
as
groups
roles or of fates.
Swedes
and Yankees
are born into their culture just as Zulus, Tibetans,
are born into theirs.
some to
And
each individual
is
be molded by the particular organization of
that play exists
by
thrust
birth into
particular place in the "magnetic field" of his culture, there
upon him. Thus he may
only in the mind, or
upon him— or
cultural influences
have the belief that typhoid
caused by witches or
is
"into his mind."
bacilli, thrust
He may be endowed
with a belief
in personal immortality, the efficacy of prayer, or the Periodic
Law
of Mindeleyev.
faith to the
He may
be
inspired to preach the only true
heathen in distant lands, or to wear out his
life in
genetics laboratory, or to believe that "only saps work." sure, the response of the
will vary
to cultural stimulation
with the quality of the organism.
purses; others, sows' ears.
goes experiences will
human organism
is
The
Some
will
as a, c, b.
silk
An
a,
b, c,
experience will have one effect
There is room, therefore, for of permutation and combination in the
at fifteen; quite another at
almost infinite variety
be
order in which an organism under-
important, too; the influence of events
not be the same
a
To be
fifty.
experience of individual organisms.
Man
discovers his place in the
with extreme reluctance.
planted in the center, the sun and
heaven, and
men and
cosmos slowly and accepts it his solid earth was
Time was when stars
spread upon the vault of
gods together acted out the drama of
life
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
358
and death. It was all so compact, so familiar, so secure. Then it was that man, like God, could cry "Let there be light" and there was light. Like God, too, man was "omnipotent," if, however,
With
to a lesser degree.
charms, and
different.
is
rituals,
Man
man
enlist the
and even
seasons,
magic formulas,
his
mighty
gods in the service of man.
finds himself
species crawling about
Once
unknown among But
this
all
culture,
life
beginning to understand
this.
Man
is
one
been developed:
and laws of
institutions
tools,
own.
its
culture.
Man
just
is
wholly at the mercy of external forces, astronomic
As a matter of
geologic.
think of
of life has
mass of extra-somatic
this
and philosophies, has a
and
faculty,
other species: articulate speech. As a con-
new way
this, a
how narrow
is
Change the temperature, phere of the earth but a
rather disconcerting to
fact, it is
the margin within which velocity,
little
and
amount would
life
man
lives.
of water, or atmoscease. It
is
a curious,
and from a cosmic viewpoint, momentary, concatenation of cumstances that has his
made
life possible.
dependence upon these outside
Man
his precious his existence
and unique
so
Durkheim
now
it
fact,
be wholly
man
at their
has employed
speech more to deny the facts of
than to improve upon them. But a certain portion
human
race has
upon nature and
And
gift of
cir-
did long rebel against
forces; to
mercy was unendurable. As a matter of
of the
it
now
the child of God, he
an ex-ape. But he has acquired a new
find himself
Now
but one of innumerable animal
insignificant planetary speck, fight-
on an
ing, feeding, breeding, dying.
sequence of
his spells, prayers,
could control the weather, the
is
says,
come at last to make the most
to try to
accept our dependence of
it.
with culture. Belief in our omnipotence has, always been a source of weakness to us. But
we
as
are
we can in time we have to the To give up magic
discovering the true nature of culture and
reconcile ourselves to this extra-somatic order as
astronomic, geologic, and meteorologic orders. and mythology which promised much but yielded nothing— noth-
AAAN'S
CONTROL OVER
CIVILIZATION
359
ing but the soothing comfort of illusion— was a painful experience.
But
receive
to
promises
men
less
and accept
a science
are loathe to lose.
We
understanding of culture will just as these traits
To be
sure,
here, alter
its
and a technology which
but achieves a great deal
is
to reach a goal most
may believe that knowledge and make for a more satisfactory life
have been of value in physics and biology.
understanding culture will not,
as
course or change the "fate" that
it
we have argued has in store for
any more than understanding the weather or the tides will change them. But as long as man remains an inquiring primate he us,
will crave understanding.
provide
him with
it.
And
a
growing Science of Culture
will
PART
III
Introduction
ENERGY AND CIVILIZATION
1n
we have dealt with various aspects now encompass it in its entirety. human culture as a whole is here in-
the preceding chapters
of the culture process.
The development terpreted
upon the
we
demonstration,
of
We
culturological level.
And,
provide, in this Part, a
in addition to further
dynamic interpretation
of culture growth in terms of its most fundamental factor, namely, energy. Cultures are dynamic systems; they require energy for their activation.
The
history of civilization
is
the story of the control
over the forces of nature by cultural means. But the story of
energy control its
may
provide the epitaph of civilization, also. In
infancy or youth, culture achieved control over
fire.
Plants
and
animals were brought within the orbit of cultural control in Neolithic times through the arts of agriculture and animal hus-
bandry. Coal and
became
of age.
oil
the core of matter
even as
dawn
and water power were harnessed, and culture
And now itself
culture has succeeded in penetrating to
and has learned how to create energy,
the Sun, our Father in Heaven, has created
of time.
And
this
advance
S}Tnbolism of an ancient m)i:h, eat of the fruit of every tree in restrial fire
since the
was tolerable, but to create energy by the transforma-
tion of matter
is
fire. Whether it can be The new Prometheus may
to play with celestial
done with impunity remains also
it
may possibly be the last. In the it may indeed be hazardous to the garden. The mastery of ter-
to
be seen.
be the executioner.
1
|i
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE
"The degree
of civilization of any epoch, people, or group of peoples, measured by ability to utilize energy for human advancement or ." needs George Grant MacCurdy, Human Origins ^ "... the history of civilization becomes the history of man's advanc." ing control over energy Wilhelm Ostwald, The Modern Theory is
.
—
.
.
of Energetics
H.aving examined aspects,
—
.
^
we now
the culture process in a
turn to a consideration of
it
number as a
of
its
whole.
As we have already seen, "culture" is the name of a distinct phenomena, namely, those things and events
order, or class, of
that are dependent to the
more
human
upon the
species, that
exercise of a mental ability, peculiar
we have termed
specific, culture consists of material
ornaments, amulets, etc.— acts, in contexts characterized
beliefs,
"symbolling."
objects— tools,
To be
utensils,
and attitudes that function
by symbolling.
It is
an elaborate mecha-
nism, an organization of exosomatic ways and means employed
by a particular animal
and
species,
man,
in the struggle for existence
survival.
One
of the significant attributes of culture
is its
transmissibility
by non-biological means. Culture in all its aspects, material, social, and ideological, is easily and readily transmitted from one individual, one generation, one age, one people, or one region, to another by social mechanisms. Culture social heredity.
We
is,
so to speak, a form of
thus view culture as a continuum, a supra363
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
364
biological, extra-somatic order of things
and events, that flows
through time from one age to the next.
down
We
have seen
also, in
preceding chapters, that since culture
constitutes a distinct order of
phenomena, it can be described and and laws of its own. Cultural
interpreted in terms of principles
We
elements act and react upon one another in their own way. can discover the principles of behavior of various sub-classes of cultural elements
and of
formulate the laws of cultural
We
now propose
and we can
cultural systems as a whole;
phenomena and
systems.
to sketch the evolution of culture
beginning upon an anthropoid level to the present time. regard the of
all
human race— man— as
a one.
We
may
from
its
We may
likewise think
of the various cultures, or cultural traditions, as constituting
a single entity: the culture of mankind.
We
may, therefore, ad-
dress ourselves to the task of tracing the course of the develop-
ment
of this culture
from
Let us return for a structure
its
source to the present day.
moment
to a further consideration of the
and function of the organization of things and processes,
we call culture. Culture is an organized, integrated we may distinguish subdivisions within, or aspects system. For our purpose, we shall distinguish three sub-
the system, that system. But of, this
systems of culture, namely, technological, sociological, and ideological
systems.
The
technological system
material, mechanical, physical,
is
composed
of the
and chemical instruments, together
with the techniques of their use, by means of which man, animal species,
is
articulated with his natural habitat.
as
Here we
an
find
the tools of production, the means of subsistence, the materials of shelter, the instruments of offense
system
is
made up
and defense. The
sociological
of interpersonal relations expressed in patterns
of behavior, collective as well as individual. In this category
we
find social, kinship, economic, ethical, political, military, ecclesiastical,
The
occupational and professional, recreational,
ideological system
is
composed
etc.,
systems.
of ideas, beliefs, knowledge,
exjpressed in articulate speech or other symbolic form.
Mythologies
'
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE and
365
theologies, legend, literature, philosophy, science, folk wis-
dom and common These whole.
sense knowledge,
They
others and
is
make up
this category.
comprise the system of culture
three categories
\
]
by them
affected
in turn.
not equal in
But the influence
The
mutual
interaction
by the
several sub-systems in the culture process as a
is
all
directions.
not equal by any means.
The primary
role
nological system. This
of course, as
we would
it
is,
could not be otherwise.
qu ently
c ulture
as
Man
a whole,
is
as
is
an animal
He must
of this
whole are
played by the techexpect
species,
it
to be;
and conse-
dependent upon the material,
if
he
attained only is
is
his enemies.
to continue to live,
These three things he
and these
rest
and basic
and depend upon
in importance; all
human
life
it.
Social systems are in a very real sense secondary
to technological systems. In fact a social system realistically as
objectives are
by technological means. The technological system
therefore both primary
and culture
Man
be protected from the elements. And
he must defend himself from
must do
a
roles played
mechanical means of adjustment to the natural environment.
must have food.
as
upon the
of course, interrelated; each reacts
are,
the organized effort of
human
and subsidiary
may be
defined
beings in the use
of the instruments of subsistence, offense and defense, and protection.
ship,
A
social
system
is
a function of a technological system.
Childe, "and the tools employed in
says
symbolize a whole economic system."
dependent
variable,
as the latter change, so .
.
.
technology
is
the
in-
by systems
of technology;
do the former. "The bronze axe which
[the stone axe]," again
only a superior implement,
economic and
A
production
the social system the dependent variable.
Social systems are therefore determined
replaces
The
its
it
social structure."
to
quote Childe,
also presupposes a
"is
not
more complex
^
Ideological, or philosophical, systems are organizations of beliefs in
which human experience
finds
its
interpretation.
But experience
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
366
and interpretations thereof are powerfully conditioned by technologies. There is a type of philosophy proper to every type of technology. The interpretation of a system of experience in which a
coup de poing
this
is
a characteristic feature will, as
kind of experience.
coup de
It
must, reflect
it
would not be improper
to speak of a
poiiig type of philosophy as well as of technology.
A
pastoral, agricultural, metallurgical, industrial, or military tech-
nology will each find
its
corresponding expression in philosophy.
type of technology will find expression in the philosophy of
One
totemism, another in astrology or quantum mechanics.
But experience of the external world
is
not
and interpreted
felt
merely at the point of technological articulation;
through the prism of
social systems also.
The
is
filtered
and
features
it
qualities
of social, political, ecclesiastical, economic, military, etc., systems are therefore reflected in philosophies.
We
may view
a cultural system as a series of three horizontal
strata:
the technological layer on the bottom, the philosophical
on the
top, the sociological stratum in between.
These positions
The
express their respective roles in the culture process. logical
system
technologies;
is
basic
and philosophies express technological
flect social systems.
minant of social
The
technological factor
is
of course, that social systems
technologies, or that social
and
re-
therefore the deter-
form of
and society together determine
the content and orientation of philosophy. This
one
forces
a cultural system as a whole. It determines the
systems, and technology
affected
techno-
and primary. Social systems are functions of
is
not to
say,
do not condition the operation of
and technological systems are not
by philosophies. They do and
are.
But to condition
is
thing; to determine, quite another.
We
are now in possession of a key to an understanding of the growth and development of culture: technology. A human being is
The
planet earth
a material body; the cosmos, a material system.
Technology
a material body; the species, a material system. is
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE is
367
the mechanical means of articulation of these two material
man and
systems, static;
cosmos. But these systems are dynamic, not
energy as well as matter
is
involved. Everything— the cosmos,
man, culture— may be described in terms of matter and energy. The Second Law of Thermodynamics tells us that the cosmos as a
whole
breaking
is
namically; matter
is
down
and running down
structurally
becoming
less
dy-
organized and energy more
uniformly diffused. But in a tiny sector of the cosmos, namely in living material systems, the direction is
reversed: matter
more concentrated.
of the cosmic process
becomes more highly organized and energy Life
is
a building
up
process.
But
in order to
run counter to the cosmic current, biological organisms must
draw upon to
work
free energy in non-living systems, capture
in the
maintenance of the
vital
struggle for free energy. Biological evolution
sion of the
it
and put
process. All life is
is
it
a
simply an expres-
thermodynamic process that moves
in a direction
opposite to that specified for the cosmos as a whole by the Second
Law.
It is
ferentiation
a
movement toward of
structure,
greater organization, greater dif-
increased
specialization
of
function,
higher levels of integration, and greater degrees of energy concentration.
From
^^^
a zoological standpoint, culture
is
but a means of carrying \
on the life process of a particular species. Homo sapiens. It is a mechanism for providing man with subsistence, protection, olfense and defense, social regulation, cosmic adjustment, and recreation. But to serve these needs of man energy is required. It becomes the primary function of culture, therefore, to harness and control energy so that it may be put to work in man's service. Culture thus confronts us as an elaborate thermodynamic, mechanical system.
and put
By means
of technological instruments energy
to work. Social
and expressions of
is
harnessed
and philosophic systems are both adjuncts
this technologic process.
culture as a whole therefore rests
upon and
The is
functioning of
determined by the
I
/
\
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
368 of energy harnessed
amount
and by the way
which
in
it
put
is
to work.*
But "the way
which
in
it
put to work" introduces another
is
factor besides energy. Energy by itself significant in cultural systems, energy
is
must
meaningless.
To be
be harnessed, directed,
and controlled. This is of course accomplished by technological means, by means of tools of one kind or another. The efficiency of technological
amount
means
varies;
some
are better than others.
of food, clothing, or other goods
The
produced by the
ex-
penditure of a given amount of energy will be proportional to the efficiency of the technological means with which the energy is
put to work, other factors remaining constant.
We
may
therefore distinguish
situation or system:
(i)
the
three factors
amount
in
any cultural
of energy harnessed per
capita per year; (2) the efficiency of the technological
which energy tude of
is
human
means with
harnessed and put to work; and, (3) the magnineed-serving goods and services produced. Assum-
ing the factor of habitat to be a constant, the degree of cultural
development, measured in terms of amount of serving goods
the
amount
and
services
produced per
capita,
of energy harnessed per capita
is
human
need-
determined by
and by the
efficiency
means with which it is put to work. We may and succinctly with the following formula: > C, in which C represents the degree of cultural deEX T velopment, E the amount of energy harnessed per capita per year, and T, the quality or efficiency of the tools employed in the
of the technological
express this concisely
expenditure of the energy.
We
can
now
formulate the basic law
of cultural evolution: Other factors remaining constant, culture
evolves as the is
amount
of energy harnessed per capita per year
increased, or as the efficiency of the instrumental
*
The
means
oi put-
functioning of any particular culture will of course be conditioned environmental conditions. But in a consideration of culture as a whole, we may average all environments together to form a constant factor which may be excluded from our formula of cultural development.
by
local
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE ting the energy to
work
is
simultaneously of course. cultural
development from
Both
increased.
We
may now
369 factors
may
increase
sketch the history of
this standpoint.
mechanism for harnessing energy, it must find this energy somewhere; it must lay hold of natural forces in some form or other if they are to be put to work in the service of man's needs. The first source of energy exploited by the earliest If
culture
is
a
human organism by human energy and
cultural systems was, of course, the energy of the itself.
by
The
original cultures
this source
man
average adult
horsepower.
were activated
and form alone. The amount of power that an can generate
When women
are considered, the average
and
small, about
is
%oth
children, the sick, aged,
power resources of the
one
of
and feeble
earliest cultural
systems might be reckoned at about K»oth horsepower per capita.
Since the degree of cultural development— the
amount
of
human
need-serving goods and services produced per capita— is proportional to the
amount
of energy harnessed
and put to work per
capita per year, other factors remaining constant, these earliest cultures of
mankind, dependent
energy resources of the crude, as indeed they
human
they were upon the meager
body, were simple, meager, and
No
cultural system, activated
energy alone, can develop very
course be
means
human
had to be.
as
made by
far.
Some
by
progress can of
increasing the efficiency of the technological
of putting energy to work, but there
of cultural advance on
this basis.
We
is
a limit to the extent
can form a
of cultural development within the limits of sources by looking at such
modern
realistic
human
picture
energy
re-
cultures as those of the Tas-
manians, Fuegians, or Andamanese; or the Paleolithic cultures of
Europe. If
culture
is
to
advance beyond the limits of
maximum
tech-
and the energy resources of the human body, it must devise new ways to harness additional amounts of energy by tapping natural resources in some new form. In some prenological efficiency
literate cultural systems, fire,
wind or water was exploited
as
a
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
370
source of energy, but only occasionally and to a very insignificant
The conquest
extent.
but
it
that
was
of fire
was a very early cultural achievement,
not until the invention of a practical
became important
fire
form of energy. Fire was im-
a
as
steam engine
portant in early cultures in cooking, providing warmth, frightening wild beasts, and as a symbol, but not as a form of energy.
In more advanced cultures,
fire
was important or essential in
the ceramic and metallurgical
arts,
but here also
we cannot
it is
not function-
equate, or substitute,
ing as a form of energy:
i.e.,
muscle power
any of these contexts. There
for fire in
however, in which
context,
functions as energy
fire
in
primitive cultures: in hollowing out tree trunks in the facture of dugout
And
power. But,
in
all
modern
canoes.
there all,
Here
may be
a
fire
is
substituted
is
for
one
some manu-
muscle
few more similar uses of
fire.
prior to the invention of the steam engine in
times, cultural systems
made
very
little
use of
fire as
a
form and source of energy which could be substituted for human muscle power. Primitive peoples could float freight
down
a flowing stream,
but until the invention of the water wheel shortly before the era, there was no other way in which moving water could be used as a source of energy for culture building. Wind was not employed as a source of energy until
beginning of the Christian
comparatively recent times, and
it
never has been an important
source of power.
Thus, we see that
fire,
water and wind were utilized as sources
of energy only to a very limited and insignificant extent during
the
first
there tive it:
hundreds of thousands of years of culture history. But
is still
another source of energy that was available to primi-
man, and eventually we
find his cultural systems harnessing
the energy of plants and animals. Plants are, of course, forms and magnitudes of energy. Energy
from the sun stored
up
is
in the
captured by the process of photosynthesis and
form of plant
tissue. All
animal
life is
dependent,
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE in the last analysis, life,
therefore,
is
upon
this solar
371
energy stored up in plants. All
dependent upon photosynthesis.
first men subsisted upon plants and animals as, of course, pre-human ancestors did before them. The earliest culture
The their
systems developed techniques of hunting, fishing, trapping, lecting, gathering, etc., as
means
of exploiting the plant
col-
and animal
But merely appropriating natural resources harnessing and controlling them is quite another.
resources of nature. is
one thing;
After
some 985,000
years of cultural development, certain plants
were brought under the control of domestication and cultivation^
and various animal domestication.
species were brought
The
under control through
energy resources for culture building were
greatly increased as a
consequence of
The
the forces of nature.
plant materials per unit of
this increase in control over
yield of plant food
human
and other useful
labor was greatly increased by
the substitution of plant cultivation for wild plant gathering.
Improved
strains
were developed through selective breeding. Cul-
tivation, fertilization
per unit of
human
and
irrigation served to increase the yield
energy, or labor.
under cultivation, the
cereals
Among
the plants brought
have been especially important.
Tylor has called them "the great moving power of civilization." All of the great civilizations of antiquity were brought into being
by the cultivation of
cereals;
no great culture has ever been
achieved independently of the cultivation of
The
cereals.
domestication of animals, too, increased the energy
re-
sources for culture building as a consequence of the increase in
control over these forms of energy. Their yield in food and other useful animal products per unit of
human
labor was greatly in-
creased by the substitution of domestication for hunting. In a
hunting economy animals had to be
killed before they could
be
used, and when they were consumed more had to be found and killed. its
By means
of domestication a people could subsist
upon
herds and flocks without diminishing their numbers at
all;
they could even be increased. Animals, like plants, were improved
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
372
through selective breeding, and, in addition to supplying milk, meat, wool, and hides, some species could be used as motive power, either to carry burdens or to draw plows or vehicles. The
amount
domestication of animals thus greatly increased the
of
energy under cultural control and available for culture building. A great advance in cultural development would be expected, therefore, as a
consequence of the great increase in the amount
of energy harnessed
and controlled per capita per year by means
of the agricultural and pastoral arts. place.
The
And
this
is
exactly
what took
archeological record bears out our theory fully at this
point. In a few thousand years after the inauguration of the arts
of domestication and cultivation, the great civilizations of antiquit}',
of Egypt,
World,
in
Mesopotamia, India, China, and,
in the
New
Mexico, Middle America, and the Andean Highlands,
came quickly
into being. After hundreds of thousands of years of
relatively slow
and meager development during the Old Stone
Ages, culture suddenly shot forward under the impetus of aug-
mented energy
resources achieved
bandry. Great
cities,
villages, tribes,
and confederacies
cultural Revolution.
Old World,
in
all
nations,
by agriculture and animal hus-
and empires took the place of as a
consequence of the Agri-
Rapid progress was made,
of the arts— industrial, esthetic
especially in the
and
intellectual.
Great engineering projects were undertaken and executed; huge architectural lurgical
arts
edifices
erected.
expanded and
The
ceramic,
flourished.
textile
and metal-
Astronomy, writing, and
mathematics were developed. Beginnings were made in a rational science of medicine. Impressive works of art were produced, in relief,
sculpture,
took place in
all
and even
in painting.
Development and progress
aspects of culture.
But culture did not advance continuously and a
consequence of increased energy resources
indefinitely as
won by
the tech-
niques of agriculture and animal husbandry. After a period of rapid growth, the
plateau.
The
upward curve of progress
levelled off onto a
peaks of cultural development in Egypt, Mesopo-
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE
373
China were reached prior to looo b.c, in some and from that time until the beginning
tamia, India, and
cases considerably earher,
of the Fuel Age, about a.d. 1800, no culture of the surpassed, in any profound levels achieved in the
Old World and comprehensive way, the highest
Bronze Age. This
that there was no progress at
is
not to
from 1,000
all
say, of course,
to a.d. 1789.
b.c.
There were innovations here and there and many refinements of already existing
ing
traits.
them by such
But, taking cultures as wholes, and measur-
yardsticks as size of political unit, size of city,
magnitude of architectural
edifices
of population, production
and accumulation of wealth,
cultures
of
and engineering works, density the
etc.,
Europe between the disintegration of the Roman
Empire and the
rise of
the Power
Age were
in general inferior
to those of the ancient oriental civilizations.
The
reason
why
cultures did not continue indefinitely to advance under the im-
petus of an agricultural and stockraising technology that It
we
shall
is
a matter
consider presently.
appears then that culture had developed about as far as
it
could on an agricultural and animal husbandry basis before the
^beginning of New World
the Christian lagged
era, at least in
the Old World; the
somewhat behind. And
it
is
reasonable to
suppose that culture never would have exceeded the peaks
al-
ready achieved by this time had not some way been devised to harness additional amounts of energy per capita per year by tapping
the forces of nature in a
new
form.
A
way was found, however,
to do this: energy in the form of coal, and, later,
oil
and
gas,
was harnessed by means of steam and internal combustion engines.
By tapping the vast mendous increase in
deposits of coal, oil and natural gas, a tre-
the
amount
of energy available for culture
The consequences of the Fuel much like those of the Agricultural
building was quickly effected.
Revolution were in general
Revolution: an increase in population, larger political units, bigger cities,
an accumulation of wealth, a rapid development of the
arts
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
374
and extensive advance of culture
sciences, in short, a rapid
and
as
a whole.
But, again, after a very rapid
ment began
show some
to
basis, for
we do
the question of a
not believe
can detect signs of a slowing
we
how
the curve of cultural develop-
had already gone
to intimate that culture
Fuel
rise,
signs of levelling off.
it
had;
down
far cultural
We
as far as
do not wish could on a
it
we merely
believe that
of the advance.
But before
development could advance on
Fuel-Agricultural-Animal-Husbandry-Human-Energy basis could
become anything
like
matter of immediate concern, a
a
tre-
mendously significant technological event took place: the energy
For the
resources of atomic nuclei were harnessed.
culture history
harnessed.
No
energy in a form
cultural advance has as yet
new form
utilization of this
power.
And
other than
before
fateful question will
time in
had been
been effected by the
of energy as a source of industrial
becomes
it
first
solar
significant in this respect, another
have to be met and answered, namely, the
consequences of the use of atomic energy in warfare.
Thus we
(
levels to
trace the
development of culture from anthropoid
the present time as a consequence of periodic increases in
amount of energy harnessed per capita per year effected by Itapping new sources of power. There is, however, another tech-
(the
nological factor involved cidentally so far;
which we have merely mentioned
we must now
consider
it
more
fully,
in-
namely^
the role of tools in the culture process.
Energy
is
of course neither created nor annihilated, at least
not within cultural systems;
and
it
is
machines. of
human
it is
merely transformed.
put to work or expended. But
The amount
It
is
harnessed
this requires tools
of energy harnessed
and
may, and the amount
need-serving goods produced per unit of energy does,
depend upon the
efficiency of the tools employed. So far, we have been holding the tool factor constant and varying the energy factor.
We now We get,
of tools.
hold the energy factor constant and vary that then, the following generalization: the degree of
;
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE development
cultural
varies diiecily as the efficiency of the tools
employed, other factors remaining constant. is
engaged
in
375
If,
for example,
.
one
chopping wood, the amount chopped per unit of
energy expended will vary with the efficiency of the axe; the
amount
with the improvement of axes from the Old
will increase
Stone Age, through the Neolithic, Bronze, and Iron ages up to
And
the finest axe of alloyed steel of the present day.
so
it
is
with other instrumental means, such as saws, looms, plows, harnesses, wheeled vehicles, boats, etc. Cultural advance fected, therefore, creases in the
But the there is
amount
tools as well as
is
ef-,
by
in-
of energy harnessed.
cannot be increased indefinitely; beyond which improvement of any given tool
efficiency of a tool
a point
is
by an improvement of
impossible. Thus, a canoe paddle can be too long or too short,
too narrow or too wide, too heavy or too light,
We
etc.
may
therefore both imagine and realize a canoe paddle of such size
and shape
make any alteration of either result Similarly, we may improve bows and
as to
of efficiency.
plows, saws,
etc.,
up
to
as a practical matter,
mated.
No
decades. its
significant
The steam
limits of size
in a decrease
arrows, hoes,
but not beyond a certain point. Perfection,
is
either reached or at least closely approxi-
improvement has been made
in violins in
locomotive has apparently come close to
and speed. To be
sure,
improvements may be
continued for a time by the use of new materials or alloys and
by the application of new mechanical
principles.
But even
so,
the improvement of any tool or machine approaches closely, it
does not reach, a limit.
liners a
We cannot expect locomotives
mile long; they would
fall
apart of their
In the culture process therefore,
we
own
if
or ocean
weight.
find that progress
and
development are effected by the improvement of the mechanical
means with which energy is harnessed and put to work as well as by increasing the amounts of energy employed. But this does not mean that the tool and energy factors are of equal weight and significance.
The
energy factor
is
the primary and basic one;
it
i
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
376 is
the prime mover, the active agent. Tools are merely the means
The
that serve this power.
energy factor
may be
increased indefi-
nitely; the efficiency of the tool only within limits.
amount far: to
cultural
of energy,
the limits of the efficiency of the tools.
have been reached, no further increases
amount
for a lack of increase in
amount
creases in the
Drogress
all
With
a given
development can progress only so
When
these limits
can make up
in efficiency
of energy harnessed.
But
in-
of energy harnessed result in technological
along the line, in the invention of
new
tools
and in
the improvement of old ones should further improvement be possible. We see, therefore, that important though the tool factor
may
be,
it
merely secondary to the primary and basic factor
is
of energy. And, since increases of energy foster tools,
one may
say that
it
is
improvement of
energy that, at bottom, carries the
onward and upward. The general statement
culture process
that,
the environmental factor being constant, the degree of cultural
development
is
proportional to the
per capita per year
is
amount
of energy harnessed
therefore sound and illuminating.
We turn now to a consideration of social systems of cultural development.
must If a
A
be, closely related to
social its
system
is,
as
in the process
we have
seen
it
underlying technological system.
people are nomadic hunters— i.e., use certain technological
instruments in certain ways in order to obtain food,
and other need-serving materials— they
will
system. If they lead a sedentary
feeding
shellfish, or if
maritime
life,
furs, hides,
have one type of
upon
social
rich beds of
they are pastoralists or intensive agriculturalists, or
traders, or industrialists, etc.,
of social systems.
The
the technological means with which
determinant of
social
they will have other types
process of military offense and defense it is
and
exercised also acts as a
organization, sometimes a very powerful
Thus we see that the social system of a people is at bottom determined by the use of the technological means of subsistence and of oflfense and defense. Those social institutions not directly one.
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE
377
related to the technology are related indirectly; they serve to co-
ordinate the various sectors of society with one another and to
them
integrate
The
into a coherent whole.
social systems of primitive peoples vary
tremendously in
detail because the specific circumstances of natural habitat
technology vary. But energy
mon
pre-pastoral, pre-agricultural ) basis
(i.e.,
They
type.
are
all
and
find no highly developed
and
of pastoralists
societies
stages of these technological
human
As
social systems
development of the
agriculturalists
the early
in
developments are likewise
simple, undifferentiated systems. all
a matter of fact
up
relatively
we may
char-
to a certain point in the
agricultural, or farming-and-animal-husbandry,
technology as primitive society: tribes based upon kinship free access to the resources of nature for
differentiation equality.
We
upon the primitive foundation
powered by human energy alone.
of a technology
acterize
human
belong to a com-
specialization of function.
societies
and
and manifest a minimum
relatively small
of structural differentiation
The
systems resting upon a
social
all
and
When,
specialization,
ties,
relatively little social
all,
and a high degree of
social
however, a certain point in the development of
agriculture was reached, a profound change in social systems took place. This
was the
social aspect of
Let us trace the course of
the Agricultural Revolution.
this social revolution in its
main
out-
lines at least.
means of producing more
Agriculture and animal husbandry are
food and other useful materials per unit of ca-n
be obtained by hunting,
culture
is
fishing, or gathering.
combined with stock is
practiced.
Not
energy than
When
agri-
raising the energy resources for
culture building are of course greater than
of plants alone
human
when the
cultivation
only do flocks and herds supply
meat, milk, wool or hides, but their muscle power to carry burdens,
draw plows and
civilizations of the
Old World grew up on the
carts,
and animal husbandry. Since, however,
it
etc.
is
may be
used
All of the great
basis of agriculture
the cultivation of
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
378 cereals that
is
new
the basic factor in the
husbandry technology,
we may
agriculture-and-animal-
for the sake of brevity speak of
"the social consequences of a developing agricultural technology." As the agricultural arts developed and matured, as plants were
improved through selective breeding,
as
new techniques
of cul-
tivation, irrigation, drainage, rotation of crops, fertilization, etc.,
were introduced and improved, the amount of food produced increased. As the food supply was enlarged the population increased. Small tribes grew into large tribes and these into nations and empires; villages grew into towns and towns into
Not only was more food produced by
cities.
agricultural techniques
than by hunting, fishing, and gathering, but more food per capita,
more per unit arts
of
human
labor expended.
developed, the productivity of
creased. It gradually
became
tion to produce food for
And,
human
the agricultural
as
labor in this field in-
possible for a portion of the popula-
all.
This meant that a portion of the
population could be diverted from agriculture and turned into other channels, such as the industrial and esthetic
arts.
As the
agri-
more and more of the population could thus be withdrawn from the fields and put to work at other tasks and occupations. Society thus became divided along occupacultural technology advanced,
tional lines, differentiated structurally
and specialized functionally.
This led to further social developments as
moment. The mere
increase in population
another direction
also.
we
shall
see in a
had important consequences
in
Tribes and clans were organized upon a
basis of kinship ties; social relations
were largely exercised in
this
form. Tliis mechanism worked very well as long as the social units were relatively small; a clan or tribe could
be
effective as a
mechanism of social organization and intercourse as long as its members were not exceedingly numerous, as long as social relations could be personal. But when, under the impetus of a developing and an increasing food supply, clan and huge size, they tended to fall apart of their
agricultural technology tribal units
grew to
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE
own
379
weight. Primitive society tended therefore to disintegrate as a
A new
consequence of sheer increase of numbers. organization was therefore required
if
type of social
chaos was to be averted.
This new organization was found in the State. This was another
consequence of the Agricultural Revolution.
The
developing agricultural technology brought about a pro-
found change
in
economic organization,
In tribal society
also.
production, exchange, and consumption of wealth took place upon a personal, kinship basis; the
economic organization was
identified with the kinship system. This
ganization worked well in a small society with a division of labor
and with
along occupational ferentiated, as a
human
lines.
little differentiation
But
must be
way
society
became
new done
extensively dif-
form the
relations
mone-
we have
a system in
basis of social relations rathei tribal, kinship, society.
preliterate cultural levels there tribal groups.
one another
either in a feudal or a
than the reverse, as was the case in
On
of
type of economic system was
tar}'-market system. In either case, however,
between
minimum
of social structure
of relating classes economically to
devised. This can be
which property
or-
consequence of the increase in productivity of
labor in agriculture, a
required; a
as
virtually
type of economic
Competition
was of course some fighting
for favored
hunting and
fish-
ing grounds or other natural resources, vengeance for real or fancied
magical) injuries, led to a certain
(e.g.,
tribal conflict.
But the
amount
factors necessary for large scale
of inter-
and
sys-
tematic and sustained warfare w^ere lacking. These were supplied,
however,
consequence of the Agricultural Revolution.
as a
A
high
degree of development of the agricultural, metallurgical, ceramic,
and other
arts resulted in
amounts of wealth. natural
A
the production and accumulation of vast
rich nation's possessions together with the
and human resources that made the wealth possible would
constitute a rich prize to any people fare
became
a profitable occupation.
Mesopotamia,
who
could conquer
Thus we
it.
War-
find, especially in
a condition of almost chronic warfare: nations con-
,
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
380 tending with one another of palace
for. rich, fertile river valleys,
new empires rising upon the ruins of old. The social consequences of systematic and with
collaboration
rulers
political
and
class,
which
sometimes
even
become a powerful political force; the reduc-
may
autonomously,
chroijic warfare are
formation of a professional military
significant: the
in
the treasures
and temple, one nation conquering and looting another,
tion of peoples of conquered nations to the status of slavery or
serfdom; and the subordination of the masses at
home
to the im-
peratives of prolonged military conflict. Thus warfare tended
divide society
into
two major
small ruling group
who
organized and directed the
powerfully to relatively
whom
campaigns and to
a
classes:
social
the overwhelming proportion of the
who provided common soldiers,
wealth taken as booty went, and a large class the "sinews of
war"— the
There was often but
etc.
masses at after
home and
peasants, serfs, the difference
little
between the
lot of the
that of the masses of the vanquished nation
conquest and subjugation had been accomplished.
Warfare was not, however, the only means, or
social process,
that operated to divide societies of the post-Agricultural Revolutionary era into a small, wealthy, powerful, ruling class
hand, and a large
The
class of peasants, serfs, or slaves
on the one
on the
other.
peaceful process of commerce, and especially the use of
money, operated
commerce
are
also to bring
means
about the same end. Trade and
of concentrating wealth. In this competitive
process the big merchants grew at the expense of the small ones.
Wealth tended
to gravitate into a
particularly rapid
and the wealthy to
and
few hands.
effective
means
When
interest
richer.
one hundred percent or even more,
as
times, the small borrowers rapidly sink into
the money-lenders.
It
was not
at all
Money
lending
is
a
making the poor poorer rates range from say thirty
of
they did in ancient
economic bondage to
uncommon
in
Greece be-
fore the reforms of Solon or Kleisthenes for a small farmer to sell his children into slavery in order to
pay merely the
interest
on
his
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE
381
loan, let alone the principal. Taxes levied
by the ruling
class
through the mechanism of the state and exorbitant rents levied
upon small tenants by
large landlords also tended to reduce the
masses to a condition of economic bondage and impotence.
Thus we
see that the social, political
and economic
effects of
the technological revolution in agriculture were: the dissolution of the old social system of primitive society, the obsolescence of tribe
and
clan; the division of society into various occupational
groups— guilds ruling class ruling class Civil
two major
and a
division of society
a small, powerful, wealthy,
classes:
governed and exploited by the
large class,
and held in bondage
in
one form or another by them.
upon property relations took the based upon kinship; the State replaced
society based
primitive society clan.
and craftsmen; the
of artisans
horizontally into
The
place of tribe
and
technological revolution in agriculture precipitated and
carried through a revolution in the social, political,
and economic
sectors of culture.
As the amount of energy harnessed and put
work per
by the development of the became more and more differenand increasingly specialized functionally. Con-
to
capita per year was increased
agricultural technology, society tiated structurally
comitant with
was the emergence of
this trend
a special social
mechanism of co-ordination of functions and correlation of structures, a mechanism of integration and regulation. This political mechanism had two aspects, secular and ecclesiastic, sometimes closely related, this special
sometimes
mechanism of
the State-Church.
The
distinct,
but always present.
We
call
co-ordination, integration and regulation
evolution of
civil
society
from the
early
metallurgical era to the present day, passing through a variety
of forms of the state and class relations,
turn to presently.
touched upon If
At
this point
we wish
is
a story that
we
shall
to return to a matter
earlier.
culture evolves
when and
per capita per year increases,
advance indefinitely
as a
as
the
why
amount
of energy harnessed
did not culture continue to
consequence of the technological revolu-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
382
As we have already
tion in agriculture?
contrar}', after attaining certain levels
on a plateau
thereafter continued
seen,
it
On
did not.
the
ceased to advance and
it
until
a
new and powerful
impetus came from the Fuel Revolution. Yet, agriculture as a technological process, as a mechanism of harnessing solar energy, was not developed to its technological limits by any means; it has not even yet reached those limits or even approached them very closely according to agronomists. logical progress in agriculture eventually
Why, slow
then, did techno-
down and
virtually
stop after so rapid a rise?
The answer seems
the relationship between socio-
to lie in
economic system and technological system established by the Agricultural Revolution. As we have noted, every social system rests
upon and
is
determined by a technological system. But every
technological system functions within a social system fore conditioned cultural
by
it.
Revolution
whole
The
it"
the
social
system of
technological
civil
so
as
in culture
society
is
wealth; the former appropriated so large a portion of
would accrue
there-
how it was done. was, as we have seen, divided class. The latter produced the
This
and an exploited
the latter with but
is
process
and to bring further progress
virtually to a standstill.
into a ruling class
and
system created by the Agri-
social
affected
eventually to "contain as a
The
minimum means
of subsistence.
to the producing class
if
it
No
as to leave
advantage
they enlarged their pro-
duction through increased efficiency; the increment would only be appropriated by the ruling class
were not
class.
On
likely to resort to a
the other hand, the ruling
long range plan to improve
the techniques of agricultural production.
than they were obtaining at the
moment
If
they needed more
the need was immediate
and a long range plan would have been of no use. They would therefore resort to greater exactions from the producing class. But in many, if not most, instances, it would seem, the ruling class had ample
for their needs. As a matter of fact, a great deal of evidence indicates that one of the problems they had to contend
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE
383
with was that of overproduction rather than of insufEciency.
Thus we
see, especially in Eg\'pt
but also in Mesopotamia and
elsewhere, the ruling class engaging in "conspicuous waste and con-
sumption" and that on a grand scale. Palaces and temples were loaded with wealth and vast treasures were deposited with the dead in tombs. In addition to this, great public works programspyramids, monuments, temples, tombs and palaces— were continually being built. It
would appear that the ruling
class
was
frequently confronted with the problem of over-production and
the threat of technological tion
among
the lower
unemployment
classes.
or a surplus of popula-
Their great public works programs,
the wholesale disposition of wealth in mortuary customs,
etc.,
enabled them to solve both these problems with one stroke. Thus the social system tended to act as a damper on further increase in technological progress once a certain stage of development
been reached. In addition to the
factors
had
mentioned above, Childe
has pointed out that the social system operated not only to concentrate wealth in the hands of the ruling minority but effectively
prevented the tributed
fruits
among
of technological progress
from being
dis-
the masses of the population. There was, con-
sequently, no chance for the technology of production to expand quantitatively or to improve qualitatively.
We see, then, that the new agricultural technology resulted in a tremendous growth of culture this
advance a
social
in its initial stages.
But
in effecting
system was created that eventually curbed and
contained the technological system in such a way as to bring progress virtually to a stop, despite the fact that the technological limits of agricultural
proximated. culture
We may
development had not been even
closely ap-
reasonably conclude, therefore, that
would never have gone
substantially
human
beyond the peaks
achieved prior to the beginning of the Christian era had not the
amount
of energy harnessed per capita per year been considerably
enlarged by tapping the forces of nature in a
new
form.
/
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
384
of a Fuel Revolution was the culmination and synthesis number of streams of cultural elements that had been in progress
The
of development for
some time
just as the Agricultural
Revolution
And, like was the organized florescence of trends of earlier ages. brought about great social, its predecessor, the Fuel Revolution of greatly augconsequence a as changes political and economic menting the energy resources solar energy in a
new
for culture building
form, this time in coal,
oil
by harnessing
and natural
gas.
As in the case of the Agricultural Revolution, the new fuel technology resulted in a great increase in population. The popula^ tion of
Europe
prior to the
Coal Age grew only from 100,000,000 From 1800 to 1900, however, it
in 1650 to 187,000,000 in 1800.
increased to over 400,000,000.
The
population of England, to cite
the country in which the Industrial Revolution got under
and
which
in
it
way
developed to a very great extent, increased 50 per-
cent between 1700 and 1800. But during the nineteenth century, it
increased 260 percent. In the two centuries prior to 1850, the
populatio nof Japan increased but 41 percent. In the following
1872— about the time
began— however, Urban development was
new technology
powerfully stimulated and acceleiated by the
had been by the developing
technology
agricultural
Bronze Age. The European feudal system— a agricultural production for use
economy—was
and replaced by an urban, parliamentary, for-sale-at-a-profit
differentiated
human
rural,
in
as
the
aristocratic,
rendered obsolete
industrial, production-
economy. Social structure became ever more
and functions more
specialized.
The productivity of Farm populations
labor increased as technology advanced.
decreased relatively and in
Changes occurred basic
years
industrialization
the population increased over 80 percent.
it
fifty
in
some
the
dichotomy— a minority
instances absolutely.
class
structure of society also.
ruling class
The
and the majority of the
population in a position of subordination and exploitation— re-
mained, but the composition of these classes underwent radical change. Industrial lords and financial barons replaced the landed
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE aristocracy of feudalism as the class,
and an urban,
385
dominant element
in the ruling
industrial proletariat took the place of serfs,
peasants, or slaves as the basic element in the subordinate class. Industrial strife took the place of peasant revolts
and
of slaves
Church functioned to maintain
And,
serfs of earlier days.
as a co-ordinative
in a
new
and uprisings
form, the State-
and regulative mechanism
the integrity of society by containing these
class
antagonisms and by mobilizing the resources of society for offense
and defense.
We
may pause
at this point to take note of an interesting
feature of the process of cultural evolution: as culture evolves the
growth
rate oi
growth in than in
is
As we have already seen, the rate of Bronze times was much greater and Eolithic Ages, The Agricultural
accelerated.
late Neolithic
and
the Paleolithic
early
Revolution required but a few thousand years to run
But the Fuel Revolution centuries effected
change
is difficult
radical
its
course.
only a century and a half or two
old at most, and already greater changes have been
by is
is
perhaps than by
it
so rapid
and we are
all
so
to grasp the situation
earlier ages
much and to
in the
put together. midst of
realize the
it
The
that
it
profound and
nature of the revolution, social and political as well as
which we are passing. Twenty-seven years Viewpoints in American History, Professor A. M.
technological, through
ago in
New
Schlesinger compared the culture of the United States of Lincoln's
day with that of Benjamin Franklin's on the one hand, and with the culture of 1922 on the other. life
that
He
remarked that the daily
with which Lincoln was familiar was in most respects like
known
in 1922
to
George Washington and Franklin. But our culture
would have been strange and bewildering
to Lincoln
had
he returned to the American scene:
more than three or four stories high would be new. The plate-glass show windows of the stores, the electric streetBuildings
lighting, the moving-picture theaters, the electric elevators in
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
3g^
stores would be the buildings and especially the big department
things
his
in
The smooth-paved streets and The fast-moving elec-
day unknown.
cement sidewalks would be new to him. tric street-cars and motor vehicles would
fill
him with wonder.
Even a boy on a bicycle would be a curiosity. Entering the White House, someone would have to explain to him such commonplaces of modern life as sanitary plumbing, steam heating, friction matches, telephones, electric lights,
the Victrola,
and even the fountain pen. In Lincoln's day, plumbing was in beginnings, coal-oil lamps and gas-jets were coming into use, and the steel pen had only recently superseded the quill
its
pen.
The
the steel bridge, high-powered locomotives, artificial ice, the cream separator, the tv^dne
steel rail,
refrigerator cars,
binder, the caterpillar tractor,
money
orders, the parcels post,
rural free delivery, the cable, the wireless, gasoline engines, re-
peating
rifles,
hundreds of other inventions
now
in
and
airplanes— these
submarines,
dynamite,
common
use were
all alike
unknown.^
But consider the changes that have taken place— in transportation, medicine, communication, and in technology in general— since Schlesinger wrote in 1922! In warfare perhaps better than in
other areas of our culture, progress
made
World War
is
the dizzying rate of technological
The
dramatically apparent.
looks quaint today, and
techniques introduced for the already obsolete.
One
first
all
some
first
weapons and
of the
time in World
War
II
are
hardly dares to picture the next great mili-
tary conflict; novelties already unveiled
suggest
technology of the
and others only intimated
too vividly the distance that technological progress has
gone since the days of Pearl Harbor.
And behind
the scenes in
the theater of Mars are the great research laboratories and proving grounds, working under forced draft to develop and perfect
new
tools
and techniques
rate of cultural life,"
advance
is
in all phases of
now
our technology.
greater than ever before.
wrotQ the distinguished physicist, Arthur Holly
The "Our
Compton
in
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 1940, "differs from that of
can
life
387
two generations ago more than Ameri-
of that day differed from the civihzed hfe at the
dawn
of
And, since Compton wrote these words, a profound and awful revolution— perhaps the most significant in all written history."
human
*
history— has taken place: the harnessing of atomic energy.
But, even as in the case of the Agricultural Revolution and aftermath, so in the Power
new
fuel technology
cultural advance.
came
The
Age the and
its
system created by the
upon
eventually to act as a brake
price
and technological progress
tion
social
further
profit system stimulated producas
long as the output could find
a market. But, like the socio-economic system of the Bronze Age,
the
new commercialism
tions.
No
of the Fuel era
industrial nation
sufficient to
keep and absorb
industrial profit system
had
its
inherent limita-
had or could have purchasing power its
own
output; the very basis of the
was an excess in value of product over
the cost of production in terms of wages paid to the industrial workers. Export of surplus was therefore essential; or die"
is
a cry of desperation heard
in recent years.
But
as the
"we must export
from more than one nation
For a time new markets could be found abroad.
output of industrial nations increased with advances in
technology, and as non-European nations such as Japan industrialized
and hence competitors
international profit system began to
for
foreign
bog down. The world market
diminished as the industrial output increased.
When
no longer be sold profitably abroad, production
home. Entrepreneurs be sold at a
goods could
w^as curtailed at
are disinclined to produce goods that cannot
profit. Factories, mills
of workers were
became
markets, the
and mines were
closed. Millions
thrown out of employment. Surplus goods were
destroyed, agricultural production reduced.
The
awful plague of
overproduction and unemployment, "star\'ation in the midst of plenty," settled
upon the
land.
The
social
system was strangling
the great technological machine of industry and paralyzing the
body
politic as
a whole.
The
death or war and revolution.
alternatives If
were stagnation and
the social system were able to
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
388
contain the Fuel technology and the commercial rivalries and class conflicts
more
engendered by
the forces
ever,
it,
would become
society
new technology be
the
inherent in
surmount and overcome the
stabilized in a
industrial feudalism. Should,
form of
or less stagnant
restrictions of the price
how-
able to
and
parlia-
mentary system, then culture could advance toward higher levels. There is evidence aplenty that culture, powered by the mighty forces of Fuel technology,
The
is
embarking upon the
phase of the second great Cultural Revolution— the
first
Industrial
Revolution— has run
its
course and
we
revolution.
And,
the past, war
as in
means of profound
political
is
entered
and economic
proving to be an effective
The
change.
system of free and
and commerce
individual enterprise in business
now
are
the second phase, that of social, political
upon
latter course.
The gold standard is merely a memory The parliamentary system of government,
is
now
virtually
extinct.
of an era that
closed.
a device designed
to permit the greatest financial enterprise,
is
freedom
for the
growth of industrial and
practically obsolete also. Private right
is
longer significant chiefly as a means of freedom for growth as
was
in the early days of
commercialism.
It
petitive rivalry, internecine strife, chaos, trations of
own
power without public
is
now
leads toward
and
paralysis.
responsibility
among
no it
com-
Concen-
those
who
or control vast wealth, or in the ranks of organized labor, are
no longer compatible with the degree of unity, integrity and strength that a nation
with
its
rivals in
must have
if
it
is
to
the international arena.
compete
The
successfully
exigencies of na-
tional survival require the subordination of private right to general
and mechanism of civil society, is destined to acquire ever power and to wield more and more control. Social evolumoving inexorably toward higher levels of integration,
welfare, of part to whole. In short, the State, as the integrative
regulative greater tion
is
toward greater concentrations of '
On
evolution can be discerned: \
political
power and
control.
the international level, too, an interesting trend of social
movement toward
ever larger and
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE larger political units.
with
cities,
The
389
Agricultural technology replaced villages
with nations and empires.
tribes
working toward larger
technology also
is
concentrations
of political
power.
The modern Fuel
political groupings, fewer
The
relatively
recent
trend
toward amalgamation can be seen in the unification of Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century. The Treaty of Versailles attempted, with the "Balkanization of Europe," to oppose the age-old trend of social evolution by breaking the continent little pieces.
One
Second World
up into
of the conspicuous and significant aspects of the
War
in
initial
its
the unification of Europe.
A
phase was a movement toward
half-dozen or so
World Powers
engaged in the First World War; only two great powers emerged
from the second. The competition
The
testants are eliminated.
for
power narrows
logical conclusion
is,
con-
as
however, not
simply the domination of the world by a single nation— this would
be but will
stage—but a single
a transitional
political organization that
embrace the entire planet and the whole human
such a denouement
moving But
a
race.
Toward
our mighty Power technology rapidly
is
us.
new and ominous element
ture: nuclear
has recently entered the pic-
atomic energy for military purposes. Here again the
significance of this
new
factor derives
from the
new Once
fact that a
source of energy has been harnessed and in awful form.
more we are upon the threshold of a technological revolution. But the consequences of this new technological advance may possibly differ radically from those of the Agricultural and the
New
technologies in the past have rendered old
social systems obsolete
but they have replaced them with new
Fuel Revolutions.
systems.
The new
nuclear technology however threatens to destroy
civilization itself, or at least to cripple
might require regain
its
it
to such
an extent that
it
a century, a thousand, or ten thousand, years to
present status.
and military men
At
tell us; as
ignorance, with almost
all
least this
is
what eminent
laymen we are
in a child's
scientists
world of
the significant facts kept beyond our
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
390 reach.
destruction of a few score of centers of science
The
Europe and the United
industry in
Western
would
within the realm
would seem
well
is
The hope
not to say probability.
of possibility,
and
about do for
just
civihzation and, authorities assure us that this
and the salvation of mankind and civilizaemergence from the next war of a
of the future therefore, tion
States
to lie in the
victor— not merely a survivor— and one with sufficient power and resources to organize the
whole planet and the entire human
species within a single social system.
We have thus presented a sketch of the evolution of the culture of
mankind from the horizon
present time. It
is
of a species lifting itself
mere animal
status of a
of our
prehuman
forebears to the
a fascinating story of adventure
up by
its
and
cultural bootstraps
new way
to a radically
of
progress;
from the
way
a
life,
destined to win mastery over most other species and to exert a
powerful and extensive control over the natural habitat. of culture elevated the evolutionary process to a
longer was
necessary for the
it
human
new
The
origin
plane.
No
animal to acquire new
powers and techniques through the slow process of biological
now had an
change; he
extra-somatic
and control that could grow one stream of
cultural
the story of
man becomes an
Technology
and
is
rivers, sticks
and
Man
it
to
is
sun, air
and
is
a world of rocks
starlight, of galaxies,
but a particular kind of material
The means
of adjustment
and
survival, are of course technological.
becomes primarily
work
Thus
certain things to maintain his status in a
cosmic material system.
putting
in the progress of each.
account of his culture.
steel, of
atoms and molecules.
and
Moreover, advances in
the hero of our piece. This
body who must do security
freely of itself.
of adjustment
development could diffuse readily to other
might share
traditions so that all
mechanism
a
mechanism
control, of
Culture thus
for harnessing energy
in the service of
man, and,
and of
secondarily, of
channelling and regulating his behavior not directly concerned
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE
391
with subsistence and offense and defense. Social systems are therefore determined by technological systems, and philosophies
and the
arts express
by
refracted
experience as
logical level are capable of growth.
any energy
Thus
defined by technology and
it is
social systems. Cultural systems like those of the bio-
is
That
also the ability to harness
is, the power to capture more and still more of it.
cultural systems, like biological organisms, develop, multiply,
and extend themselves. The sun
is
thermodynamic system operated by activated
all
continue to do so after
it
may
is
still
should survive and
reach
have this
the leading character in our play,
turn out to be a villain instead of the hero.
Technology builds but that civilization,
terrestrial supplies of fissionable fuels
civilization
But technology
even though
At least, solar energy has up to now, and it will
cultural systems of history
been exhausted— if point.
the prime mover; culture, a it.
won
it
may
also destroy.
The
at such great cost in pain
belief
and
and
faith
labor, simply
cannot go down in destruction because such an end would be too
monstrous and
senseless,
is
whimper. The cosmos does
little
what man has done here on tion of the
the
first
but a naive and anthropocentric
know
nor will
this tiny planet.
human race— for come
it
will
long remember
it
The
eventual extinc-
sometime— will not be
time that a species has died out. Nor
will
it
be an event
of very great terrestrial significance.
But man may though
survive the
his culture
is
coming holocaust of
tumbled to the
radioactivity even
level of Neolithic times,
only to begin the long climb over again, this time perhaps by a
somewhat
different route; culture too
experience. itself
with
salvation.
may be
able to profit from
But culture may not destroy or even its
new
powers. Destruction
next test of strength
in
no more
inevitable than
will—be in the
the international
powers of the new technology
may be
wound
may— and
is
Great though the devastation
critically
arena,
the creative
sufficiently great to rise
from the ruins and to enclose the whole world
up
in a single political
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
392
Then and only then will the curse of war be way made free and open for a fuller and richer life.
embrace. the
sketch of the evolution of culture
Our
it
is,
will
lifted
and
be noted,
wholly culturological. It does not resort to race, physical type, intelligence,
moral sense, the dignity of man, the
a
spirit
of
progress or democracy, the individual— genius or otherwise— the rejection of the father, consciousness of kind, a set of instincts or
interaction, a basic personality structure,
social
"drives,"
training in infancy, or breast vs. bottle feeding
toilet
and weaning, to
account for the behavior and growth of this great extra-somatic
We
tradition.
explain
shower or a tornado
is
A
thunder-
explained in terms of antecedent
and con-
in terms of culture itself.
it
comitant meteorological events; a clan or a constitution
accounted for by citing Culture
is,
as
its
we have
is
likewise
and concomitants.
cultural antecedents
pointed out repeatedly, a stream of inter-
upon others and is affected by become obsolete and are eliminthem in return. Some elements ated from the stream; new elements are incorporated into it. acting elements; one trait reacts
New
permutations, combinations, and syntheses are continually
being formed. Whether cultural
we
deal with a restricted portion of the
as
the evolution of mathematics or the
continuum such
genealogy of the steam engine, or whether in
its
we encompass
entirety, the principle of interpretation
is
culture
the same: cul-
ture grows out of culture. In our sketch of the evolution of culture
whole we deal with large categories: technology,
as a
tems, and philosophies.
and
tool factors.
their
break technology
We observe the action
impact upon others, the
systems,
upon
We
and steam-driven
social sys-
into energy
of each class of elements,
effect of
technology upon social
and the influence of economic and
agriculture
down
factories.
political institutions
We
note the role
that war as a culture process has played in the course of political
change. And,
finally,
we
see the fate of civilization delicately
ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE
393
balanced in a scales to be tipped this way or that, we know not how, by the modern miracles of nuclear technology. the newest venture of science. After centuries of cultivation in the fields of astronomy, physics, and chemistry;
Culturology
after
scores
is
of years
of tillage
in
physiology and psychology,
science has at last turned to the most immediate and powerful
human behavior: many failures it was
determinant of man's peated
trials
and
as
cannot be explained psychologically; merely anthropomorphisms in
and must be
of culture
is
young but
full of
the subject of
and upward.
its
promise.
such
culture.
After
interpretations
scientific clothing.
culturological. It is
his
re-
discovered that culture
The
The
are
explanation
science of culture
is
destined to do great things— if only
study will continue
its
age-old course:
onward
PART
IV
CULTUROLOGY
CHAPTER FOURTEEN THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
hundred
"During the
last
culture
represents
it has become increasingly clear that a distinct domain . that demands for ." investigation a distinct science . its R. H. Lowie, Cultural Anthropology; a Science "TTiese specifically human peculiarities which differentiate the race of the homo sapiens from all other species of animals is comprehended in the name culture; therefore the science of specifically human activities ." may be most suitably called culturology Wilhelm Ostwald, Principles oi the Theory oi Education .
.
.
years,
...
.
E.'very
living
adjustment to
duce
its
—
.
its
environment
in order to live
kind. "Understanding"
is
adjustment.
the
We
minimum
and to repro-
name we
give to
one
do not as a rule use
term in speaking of the lower forms of
for example.
.
organism must effect a certain
aspect of this process of this
.
—
.
life,
such as plants
But plants do the same kind of thing— and,
if
any-
more surely— that human beings do in contexts to which we apply the word "understanding." Scientific observations and experiments on apes make it quite clear that their behavior thing,
possesses qualities that
standing"; and
it is
we can
more than
mals share these attributes here alone that
ment
we
also.
only
call
"insight" and "under-
likely that other
But
it is
in the
sub-human mamspecies and
human
find understanding as a process of adjust-
on by symbolic means. In the symbol the process of evolution attained a metasensory mechanism of adjust-
carried
biological
ment. All sub-human species must
effect
their
adjustments in
terms of meanings grasped and interpreted with the senses. 397
But
— THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
398
can go beyond the reach of sense impressions; he can grasp
man
world with symhoh. Thanks to this abihty, he may acquire understandings and effect adjustments on a higher be incomlevel than any other animal. His' understandings may parably richer than those of the highest apes, and he can share
and interpret
them
his
readily with his fellows.
Thus
new
a
and adjustment has come into existence
type of understanding
in the zoological world.
use of the neuro-sensory-symbolic faculty in the process of adjustment finds expression in verbal formulas that we may call beliefs. The sum total of beliefs of a people we term their
The
A
philosophy.
philosophy, therefore,
is
an elaborate mechanism
by means of which a certain kind of animal, man, adjusts himself to the earth beneath him and to the cosmos around him.
A
philosophy
is
of course closely related to other aspects of the
cultural system of
which
it is itself
and to forms of
organization,
art.
a part: to technology, to social
But our concern here
is
with
philosophy as such, as a technique of interpretation, as a way of rendering the world intelligible so that articulation with this
world can be effected to the greatest advantage to man. Philosophy, like culture as a whole, has grown and developed
through
the ages that have elapsed since
all
Philosophy this
is
respect
man began
to symbol.
an instrument devised and used for a purpose. In
it
is
exactly like an axe.
One
philosophy
may be
better— a better instrument of interpretation and adjustment than another,
ment than
just as
one axe may be a better chopping
instru-
another. There has been a progressive development of
philosophies just as there has been development and progress of axes or of culture as a whole.
take to
tell,
The
or at least to exhibit,
preceding chapters under-
some
of the story of this
development.
The first men interpreted things and events in terms of their own psyches. They were not aware of their standpoint of interpretation, however;
that the minds to
on the contrary, they
which the events of
insisted
emphatically
their experience
were
at-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
399
tributed were not their own, but those of spirits, of gods or demons. They were, however, merely the projection of the human
ego into the external world. Thus the whole cosmos, the entire range of experience, was interpreted as the expression of mind
and of
of desire, will
spirit,
animism
and
and purpose. This was the philosophy but above all, of anthro-
supernaturalism,
pomorphism. It
took time for the
human
primate to acquire
and com-
skill
petence in the use of his newly acquired faculty, the symbol.
Hundreds of thousands of years elapsed before any advance was made beyond the original— and self-deceptive— premise that the cosmos was and could be only the expression of an ego like
man
man's. In his philosophies primordial
world in his
own
image.
simply created the
Nor have we outgrown
this
point of
view even today as the prevalence, vigor and respectability of theologies clearly show.
But
after eons of explaining the
world of things and events and plans of supernatural beings,
in terms of the desires, wills
an advance was made to a new of invoking spirits
entities,
essences, principles, etc.,
saying, for example, that fossils
now
said that they
level,
new
a
of premises.
set
and minds to account
Instead
for
events,
were called upon. Instead of
were fashioned by
were formed by "stone-making
a god, it
was
forces," or that
they were "the congelation of lapidific juices." This type of explanation, theless
empty and
senseless as
advance
great
a
interpretation that
over
and that was
may seem animistic,
today, was neversupernaturalistic
had prevailed before. The answers of super-
naturalism were complete and will,
it
the
that; there
final:
God
was nothing
did
it;
it
was God's
left to say. Actually,
of course, these answers told one nothing; they were as
they were better;
final.
what
And, worst of
else
empty
as
they shut the door to anything
could one ask or learn after being told that an
event was but an act of
term— type
all,
God? The metaphysical— to use Comte's
of interpretation at least freed
one from the bondage
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
400
anthropomorphism.
of
were formed by "stone-making
fossils
If
one was, by impHcation, invited to inquire into the nature
forces,"
come into direct contact with the real world— instead of one's own image reflected therein— and to learn something about it as a consequence. The metaphysical of such forces and thus
empty in themselves were nevertheless they opened the way to something better: science.
pro-
explanations though gressive;
We
have not yet outgrown the metaphysical type of
pretation even in social science.
We
still
inter-
find events explained in
terms of "the separatism of the natives," "tendencies of the hu-
man mind," essential
we
are
If
"the principle of the equivalence of brothers," "the
democracy of the Plains
making
tribes," etc.
But
(see p. 65).
progress.
one accepted the invitation implicit
of explanation,
in
if,
one "went
forces" really are,
in the metaphysical type
an endeavor to find out what "stone-making to nature, took the facts into one's
own
hands, and saw for himself" (Agassiz), he would stand a good chance of achieving the point of view and the techniques
of science. At any
out
rate, this
is
a type of interpretation that
and eventually superseded
of
metaphysical
Things and events were no longer explained pose or plan of
spirits,
in
grew
explanations.
terms of the pur-
nor yet as caused by principles or essences;
they were explained in terms of other things and events. Thus, an
earthquake
is
punishment
not merely an expression of divine wrath, an act of for our sins;
nor
"principle of vulcanism." It
is
is
it
merely the expression of a
a geologic event that
is
to
be
ex-
plained in terms of other geologic events.
In science the
human
come
primate has
at last to a realistic
upon the external world to which he must As an explanatory device, animistic, anthropomorphic and supematuralistic philosophies were worse
and
effective grasp
adjust
if
he
is
to survive.
than worthless, for false knowledge all.
One
has only to think of
been put to death
as witches
all
and
the
is
often worse than none at
men and women who have
heretics to get
some notion
of
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
401
the magnitude of the disadvantages imposed by this type of philosophy.
To be
sure, primitive philosophies
tions than explanatory; they sustained
man
had other func-
with
they
illusions,
provided him with courage, comfort, consolation, and confidence, all
of
which had a
But
biological survival value.
techniques, primitive philosophies were a total
as explanatory
loss.
Metaphysical philosophies did not really explain the external world either, but they paved the way for interpretation in the point of view
niques that
we
call "science."
A
a realistic
and with the
profile of
and
effective
intellectual tech-
modern philosophy
closes its genealogy as well as its structure
new, vigorous and growing component of science; an
and
its
nourishment dwindles;
anthropomorphism and giving
way
to a
more
philosophy
is
a
and
mechanism
we
but
this, too,
there.
human
of adjustment of the
man
bottom of
philo-
pointed out in our chapter on
"The
animal to his cosmic setting, then sophic concern. As
its field
growth of
and odds and ends of meta-
virile flora;
physical reasoning here
If
a rather lush
free will in certain sectors,
a
old, primitive
supernaturalism, strong in certain sectors but declining as contracts
dis-
and composition:
is
at the
Expansion of the Scope of Science," we can trace the history and the growth of science from the standpoint of determinants of
human
behavior. Astrology was an attempt to appraise the role
of heavenly bodies in
human science
human
affairs
and to predict the course of
events as determined by the
found
its
first
expression
in
stars.
The philosophy
astronomy because
of
the
heavenly bodies, being the least significant of determinants of
human
behavior, could be dislodged most easily from the anthro-
pomorphic
The
tradition
in
which
self
was confused with
not-self.
point of view and the techniques of science, once established
began to spread to other areas. The course of expansion of the scope of science was determined by in the sector of the celestial,
this law: science will
advance and develop in inverse
ratio to the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
402 significance of
phenomena
Tenestrial physics and mechanics followed cal
sciences
phenomena
human behavior. astronomy. The physi-
as determinants of
took form before the biological because physical are less significant as determinants of
human
behavior
than are biological phenomena. Within the biological realm, anatomy develops first, then physiology and psychology. The point
upon which these three sciences focused was the individual organism. But it came eventually to be realized that there is a class of phenomena outside and beyond the individual that is nevertheless powerful
behavior. Sociology
and
and
significant in the determination of his
social
psychology were the organizations
of scientific techniques to grapple with this class of meta-individual determinants. In the organization of these sciences
it
was
assumed that the categories of determinants of human behavior
had now been exhausted. Astronomy and
terrestrial physics
would
take care of the inanimate determinants; anatomy, physiology,
and psychology would encompass the individual determinants;
and
sociology, the science of society,
would deal with the
supra-
what other determinants were there to
individual determinants:
be reckoned with?
As we have already shown, the assumption of the founders of sociology was far from adequate. differently in the
company
as roosters, dogs, ducks, rat,
dog, or
duck— is
True enough,
of his fellows than
and apes do.
A
man
a
when
sociology of
behaves
alone, just
man— or
ape,
in order, therefore, in addition to a psy-
chology. But to go no further would be to overlook a fundamental difference rat, as
between
we have
pany of
his fellows
individual
and
man and
just noted,
than
we
as
such
other species.
when
alone.
We
A
monkey, dog, or
when
in the
is
social
We can
system of behavior in which the
the focus of attention and interpretation.
distinguish both individual
com-
distinguish therefore
social aspects of this individual's behavior.
go farther and recognize a system
all
behaves differently
and
social systems.
But—and
Thus here
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE to the fundamental difference
we come
being and
all
behavior in it
individual or
its
between
we
other species— whether
social aspects,
its
human
as a
rat,
dog, or ape
whether we regard
social systems, the deter-
We
the biological organism.
is
man
consider
form of individual systems or
in the
minant
403
find
one type of
social
system or behavior in one species of animal, another type in another species; ducks will have one type of social system or behavior, eagles another; lions
kind, herring another, etc.
tems
S
=
functions
are
oi
is
the organism.
is
its
Human
social aspects,
symbolic
level of
behavior, either in
nowhere
is
its
a function of
behavior does not vary as the organism
with the extra-somatic factor of culture.
varies; it varies
behavior
Human
sys-
organisms:
biological
on the
species,
not the case.
average individual or
the lower species, social
respective
their
human
f(0). But in the
behavior, this
one type, bison another; sharks one
Among
B
a function oi culture:
=
Human
i{C). As the culture
varies
so will the behavior.
Thus
it is
not society, or the group, that constitutes the
human
a series of categories of determinants of
the lower species, the group
is
minant
of the behavior of any
human
species,
the group
whether we find
tradition:
is
its
culture.
The
last of
Among
properly regarded as a deter-
one of
itself
members. But
its
in the
determined by the cultural
a guild of artisans, a clan, a
household, or an order of knights in a
upon
behavior.
human
polyandrous
society will
depend
discovery of this class of determinants and
the isolation, in logical analysis, of these extra-somatic cultural
determinants from the biological individual
—has
— in
group aspect
their
been one of the most
significant
science in recent times. This assertion will as
extravagant.
We
are so accustomed
no doubt
to
as well as
advances in strike
some
being regaled with
accounts of the marvels of modern science— meaning physics, chemistry, and
medicine—and so used
science, that to claim that the
to disparagements of social
achievement of the concept of
cul-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
404
significant advances in
one of the most
ture
is
well
seem preposterous to some.
We
modern
may
science
have no desire whatever to
minimize the significance of recent advances in physics, chemistry, genetics, or medicine.
Some
and genetics
in physics
of them, such as
may
in biology,
quantum mechanics
quite properly be called
But such advances have taken place
revolutionary.
in fields that
have been cultivated by science for generations or even centuries.
But with the achievement of the concept of culture a whole new was opened to science. The lack of significant achievement so far in the new science of culture is therefore not an indica-
field
tion of extravagance of claim
on our
our science, the fact that this
new
part.
The
very newness of
sector of experience
covered, isolated and defined only yesterday, in itself there has not yet been time for
discovery of a
new world
that
much accomplishment. is
We
it
far
in
new
this
hard for some to believe that the lowly
is
"social" sciences can ever
match them. This point of view
course understandable in a day tribution of galaxies in the
temperature of field,
the
It is
are so impressed with the achievements of physics
and astronomy that
other
dis-
so significant, not the relative
magnitude or value of achievements won so world.
was
means that
when
science can
map
is
the
of
dis-
cosmos and measure the mass and
stars a million of light years
away, whereas in an-
science has no adequate answer to the question of
the prohibition of polygamy in certain societies. But the lot and destiny of
man on
galaxies, splitting
planet embrace
this
atoms, or discovering a
socio-political-economic
systems— in
which the human species
much
to
short,
And we may
the cultures— within
and breathes and propagates have
do with the future of Man.
realize this. tific
lives
more than measuring new wonder drug. The
We
are just beginning to
look forward to a time
comprehension of such cultural processes
inflation will
ment
be considered quite
when the
as
as significant as
scien-
polygamy and the measure-
of distant stars, the splitting of atoms, or the synthesis of
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE organic compounds.
405
The
may one day rank in importance in the history of science with the hehocentric "discovery" of culture
theory of Copernicus or the discovery of the cellular basis of
all
hving forms.
This
man
is
not to
say, as v^^e
have
tried to
make
clear earlier, that
going to win control over the course of cultural develop-
is
ment through
a scientific comprehension of its structure and any more than we have won control over the sun or distant galaxies by coming to a considerable understanding of
processes,
them. Understanding, process.
The growth
development of
scientific
of science
understanding, is
is
itsdi a cultural
a culture process just as the
a musical style, a type of architecture, or forms
of corporate organization in business are culture processes.
development of understanding culturology alike will
adjustment of the
Profound advances
many to
years for
make
human
in astronomy, in medicine,
possible a
more
in science
make
their
and
realistic
species to the earth
The
and
in
effective
and cosmos.
way
slowly. It took
mankind, even the educated stratum of
society,
accept the heliocentric theory of the solar system and
to
exploit the resources of this point of view. It took considerable
time also for the idea of the biological evolution of
The
its
way
of
the unconscious by psychoanalysis
against older conceptions.
resistance. It
is
met with
to
win
hostility
and
not particularly surprising, therefore, to discover
that the present advance of science into the is
man
discovery and exploration
new
field of
culture
meeting with considerable resistance and opposition.
We
discover a
common
basis for all of these resistances
and
oppositions to the advances of science. Scientific interpretation
non-anthropomorphic,
non-anthropocentric.
theories of Copernicus, Galileo
conception of
man and
to
*s
the
and Darwin proceeded from an
anthropomorphic and anthropocentric istic
Opposition
as well as a supernatural-
the cosmos:
man was
the chief work
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
406
he w^s created in God's image; the world was motionless and in the center of the uni-
of the Creator of
all;
was made for him;
it
interverse; everything revolved about the earth; everything was deterministic, is interpretation preted in terms of man. Scientific
and by
as
such evokes the hostility of
all
who
are activated or directed
a philosophy of Free Will.
The
social
of
sciences
man have been purged
of
super-
naturalism to a very great degree— but not wholly as the existence
and
helm Schmidt, still
Wil-
respectability of the anthropological school of Father
to
mention but one example, proves. But they are
anthropomorphically and anthropocentrically oriented to a
very high degree.
are furthermore animated
They
ophy of Free Will to science of culture
is
thus readily understood.
by the
philos-
Opposition to the
a considerable extent.
An
anthropocentric
point of view cannot, of course, tolerate the thesis that
it
is
culture, not man, that determines the form and content of hu-
man
The
behavior.
philosophy of Free Will cannot accept a
theory of cultural determinism.
To many
and
sociologists
cul-
tural anthropologists the notion that culture constitutes a distinct
order of phenomena, that principles
it
and laws, and
turological terms,
is
is,
ever that their position
that
it
reified
is
them people,
its
own
therefore, explainable only in cul-
a "mystical metaphysics."
Those who oppose the obvious, to
behaves in accordance with
culturological point of view feel
is
thoroughly
that culture could not exist without real
man, and
and blood human beings
flesh
entity called "culture"— who
how-
realistic. It is so plain, so
—not
a
do things; anyone can see
this for himself.
As we have previously rely in science
upon the
tried to
out
human
clear,
one cannot always
"self-evident" features of
observation and reasoning.
Of
common
sense
course culture could not exist with-
beings. Obviously
milk, speak English or
make
men
cast votes,
some other language,
drink or loathe
believe in witches or
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
4O7
make
other causative agents, build ships,
The
anti-culturologists
To
scientific interpretation of things.
prizes milk as a beverage
is
knows
"—that drinks the milk or
also that observation of
Why
well that or
rejects
an event does the
milk, believe in witches or bacteria, etc.?
the behavior of the
loathes or
merely to recognize an event, not to
it. The culturologist knows full human organism— and not "a rarefied
an explanation thereof.
man
say that a
explain
'culture'
war, play pinochle, etc.
confuse the existence of things with a
human organism
it
is
it
as
man,
is
entity
reified
a
called
loathsome. But he
not the same thing as
man prize or loathe the The culturologist explains
in
terms of external, extra-
somatic cultural elements that function as stimuli to evoke the response and give
knows the
it its
human
And
form and content.
also that the culture process
the culturologist
explainable in terms of
is
organism, collectively and individually,
is
itself;
irrelevant—
not to the culture process itself— but to an explanation of the ture process.
We
glandular-etcetera organization that
such things
From
as clans,
is
man
as
though culture had a
an existence of
in interpretations of
codes of law, grammars, philosophies,
the standpoint of an explanation of
proceed
cul-
need not consider the neuro-sensory-muscular-
life of its
own independently
its
human
behavior,
own, even
of the
etc.
as if it
human
we had
species.
Lowie observed long ago, "but sound scientific method"; a procedure, we might add, that is taken for granted in the more mature fields of science such as physics. The "This
is
law of
not mysticism"
as
falling bodies treats
them
as
if
they pass through a perfect
vacuum. Physicists frequently attack and solve problems by considering vehicles that
book
I
read:
"A
rigid
move without body
is
any forces that are applied to to say: "Such do not exist" culturologists
a
A
body
is
friction.
In
one whose shape it."
my is
physics text-
not altered by
But the next sentence goes on
only an ideal conception, for rigid bodies
person with the philosophic outlook of our anti-
would
find these physicists "unrealistic," too.
They
THE SCIENCE OF CULT3K,
408
would
reject
the law of falling bodies because
event that never actually occurs.*
and
vehicles as "mystical"
They would
describes
it
.'
dismiss frictioi.ie^ "abstractions."
reject rigid bodies as
The
point of view of the anti-culturologist simply cannot realize
that
it is
is
precisely because
he works
in this
able to achieve significant results. It
is
way that the
physicist
precisely because the law
of falling bodies does not describe any particular event that
has universal significance and
"The paradox
validity.
now
is
it
fully
Whitehead, "that the utmost abstractions are weapon with which to control our thought of concrete
established/' says
the true fact."
'
The
culturologist proceeds along the
same
lines,
with the same
outlook and the same techniques of interpretation, as the physicist. Cultures can no
without
friction.
pendent of
man
more exist without men than But one may regard culture just as
they were independent actually tion.
were
The
rigid.
the physicist
may
of friction, or deals
These
vehicles can as
if
it
move
were inde-
consider vehicles as
with bodies
as
if
if
they
are effective techniques of interpreta-
whom the sun obviously moves whom falling bodies must pass through an whom frictionless vehicles and rigid bodies do
realism of those to
around the earth, for atmosphere, for
not *
exist;
We
the realism of those
have, in a recent
who
insist that
it
is
people not
work by R. H. Lowie, a good example of the con-
fusion of thought that results from a failure to understand one of the elementary techniques of science due to this attitude of pseudo-realism. In a
consideration of laws of cultural evolution he says that "there are
bound
to
produced by special causes [quotbe so many 'deviations from uniformity ing Lewis H. Morgan]' that a law, if operative, could hardly be discovered by human reason" (Social Organization, p. 53). The significance of Newton's work finds no appreciation here. No two bodies fall alike; the "deviations from uniformity" are as numerous as the falling bodies themselves. Yet the human mind was quite able to discover a principle common to all particular events and to express it in the form of a thoroughly adequate scientific law. Of course, a law of cultural evolution would describe no actual series of events any more than the law of Newton describes any particular falling body. But infinite variety of particulars does not preclude universals; on the contrary, particulars imply and presuppose universaJs. How quaint then to expect a scientific law, a statement of the universal, to describe this and that particular. .
.
.
SCIENCE OF CULTURE
who
ire
etc.,
enamel their nails, loathe milk, form of pseudo-realism that has no place in
vote, speak English,
a pathetic
is
409
science.
"During the
hundred
last
become
years," writes Lowie, "it has
increasingly clear that culture
.
.
.
[is]
domain
a distinct
.
.
,
that
demands for its investigation a distinct science." ^ But what are we to call our new science? We have taken much pains to demonstrate the fundamental difference between a science of culture and the sciences of psychology and sociology; these terms are therefore quite unsuitable. 'Anthropology' also reasons.
The term
used to designate so
is
almost meaningless.
It
is
unsuitable for
many
many
things as to be
includes Physical Anthropology, which in
human paleontology, comparative morphology of human genetics, physiology and psychology, etc. Cul-
turn embraces primates, tural
anthropology
variously conceived as psychology, psycho-
is
analysis, psychiatry, sociology, applied anthropology, history,
would not be facetious
so on. It
and
at all to define anthropology as
the activity that a person, bearing the professional label "anthropologist," engages in.
As
a
matter of
fact,
the late Franz Boas once
suggested that "the whole group of anthropological
may be
evanescent, that they
may be
at
bottom
psychological problems, and that the whole field
phenomena
biological
and
of anthropology
belongs either to the one or to the other of these sciences." Thus,
Boas not only
failed to recognize a science of culture
suggested that anthropology itself "will a
method
that
may be
than a science by
applied by a great
itself."
^
The term
but even
become more and more number of sciences, rather
"anthropology"
is
therefore
quite unsuited to our purpose.
But
is
not the answer to our problem obvious? Does not the
solution lie right before our eyes?
What
else
could one
science of culture but culturology? If a science of
mammalogy,
call
mammals
a is
of music, musicology, of bacteria, bacteriology, etc.,
why should not
a science of culture be culturology?
Our
reasoning
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
410
seems perfectly legitimate and proper, our conclusion sensible and sound. Yet, so conservative, timid, or indifferent are many of the workers in the sciences of
an innovation
as a
new
man
that so radical
and revolutionary
an old familiar word seems pre-
suffix for
some other way.
tentious, absurd, or objectionable in
We
recall
the objections that were raised to Spencer's use of the term "sociology."
As he
tells
us in the introduction to his Principles of
him from using the word
Sociology, his friends tried to dissuade
on the ground that
it
was a "barbarism." Similarly today, some
scholars find that culturology grates harshly
upon
Thus,
their ears.
V. Gordon Childe writes that "the prejudices engendered by Literae Humanioies are too strong to allow [him] to adopt White's term 'culturology'."
*
Similarly
L. Myres, in a review of
J.
Expansion of the Scope of Science," barous name." It
calls
°
appears that those
who condemned
Spencer's use of "soci-
ology" as a "barbarism" did so on etymological grounds: derived from both Latin and Greek. This,
make
"The
"culturology" a "bar-
it
seems,
is
it
is
enough to
a purist's flesh crawl. But, for better or for worse, the trends
and processes of sibilities.
from
living languages
The Anglo-American
foreign
languages— taboo,
have
little
regard for such sen-
language readily absorbs words
shaman,
coyote,
tobacco— and
new words ("kodak") or new forms ("trust-buster") rather Nor does it hesitate to resort to hybridizations and other improvisations upon occasion, such as numerology, thermocouple,
creates easily.
thermopile, automobile,
etc., as
well as sociology. "Television"
one of the most recent offspring of though Professor Childe does not that "such hybrids linguistic progress."
seem
like "culturology"
he remarks
to accord with the general tendency of
H. L. Mencken, the distinguished authority
on the American language,
finds "culturology" a "rather
clumsy
we have
"estab-
word, but nevertheless logical," and he lished the fact that
is
linguistic miscegenation. Al-
it
feels that
ought to be used."
*
We feel as did Spencer
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
411
that "the convenience and suggestiveness of our symbols are of more importance than the legitimacy of their derivation."
We may
call attention, in this
connection, to the fact that the
departments of anthropology at the University of Chicago and at the Chicago Natural History Museum have been using the term
"museology" for some time to designate the
and management.
ganization, equipment,
in the sense of "science of," then
"museum
science"
is
no more
If
museum
art of
"-ology"
museology
a
is
is
or-
interpreted
misnomer,
for
a science than "library science,"
"military science," or "domestic science" are sciences; they are
not sciences.
arts,
If
"museology" can become respectable, why not
"culturology," for which there
is
more
justification
on etymological
grounds?
The
concept of a science of culture
have made
an old one;
clear,
it
but
relatively very little,
and
specific sense in
ago,
and today
it is
in the exact
over a third of a century
being used on at least three continents. of the Sciences," delivered in 1915
(see p. 116), the distinguished
winner,
it,
first
"culturology" has
was employed
it
which we use
"The System
In his address,
as the preceding pages
The term
chapter of Pnmitive Culture in 1871.
been used
is,
goes back at least to Tylor's
Wilhelm Ostwald,
while ago [emphasis ours] to
German chemist and Nobel
said
"I
call
the
prize
proposed, therefore, a long field in
of civilization or culturology (Kulturologie)."
question the science
We have not been
^
able as yet to discover this earlier use, or uses, of this term by him.
Fourteen years after the publication of Ostwald's "The System of the Sciences,"
Read Bain,
a sociologist, speaks of "culturology"
American Sociology, edited by
in a chapter written for
Trends
in
Geo. A. Lundberg and
others.^
The
term
however; he seems to equate "culturology"
is
not wholly
clear,
sense in which he used the
with sociology in one place and with
human
He
between
also speaks of the "close kinship
and culturology." believe, in
"A
ecology in another. social
psychology
used "culturology" in print in 1939, I Problem in Kinship Terminology," ^ although I had I
first
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
412
employed
my
in
it
courses for years prior to this time. Dr.
Cheng
Che-Yu subtitled his Oriental and Occidental Cultures Contrasted, published in Berkeley in 1943, "An Introduction to Cul-
He
turology."
me
has written
he had previously used not
that
only "culturology," but "culturosophy," in publications in Chinese.
Wen
Huang
Professor
National Sun
Shan, of the Institute of Anthropology,
Yat Sen University, Canton, has published a
num-
ber of articles on culturology in Chinese, and he has informed
me
book on culturology now
that he has a
cently seen an advertisement for a
by
turologia,
course, there
}.
book
in progress. I
entitled
have
re-
Epitome de Cul-
Imbelloni, published in Buenos Aires. And, of
may be
other instances that have not
come
to
my
attention.
The Chinese language
is
apparently
innovations as "culturology" than
Chinese
is
wen wha
common Chinese grate
upon the
is
more congenial
to such
English. ''Culturology" in
(culture) hsueh (science of).
Both words are
terms and their combination seems not to
ears of
Chinese scholars or to wound their sen-
sibilities.
But the objections
not wholly philologic by
to "culturology" are
any means. Linguistic objections come readily to the surface; but deep down underneath
views and values that will oppose the
lie
adoption and use of this term even more strongly than will the classicist
nourished in the Literae Humaniores. "Culturology"
specifies a sector of reality
upon the
trespasses
and defines a
prior claims of psychology
does more than trespass, of course; it
makes
it
it
lie
it
sociology. It is,
problems
within the provinces of psychology and soci-
ology as previously supposed, but belong
by— a
and
expropriates as well. Tliat
clear that the solution of certain scientific
does not properly
only
science. In so doing
to— i.e., can be
solved
science of culture. Psychologists and sociologists alike
are loath to admit that there are problems pertaining to the be-
havior of
man
that
lie
outside
their
domains; and they arA
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE inclined to resent
413
and oppose an upstart science that claims them
for itself.
But most of
perhaps, culturology repudiates and rejects a philosophy that has been dear to the hearts of men for ages, and still
and nourishes many
inspires
man. This
all,
the ancient and
is
a social scientist as well as laystill
anthropocentrism and Free Will.
What
culture does this or that! is
not culture that does things;
human feels,
beings. It
and
acts.
is
respectable
"What
culture but an abstraction? It
people, real flesh and blood
it is
who
always the individual
is
Anyone can
see this for himself!
what
to talk of a science of culture;
in
effect operates in
everywhere
How
absurd then
As
is
all
too prevalent
American anthropology today,
Culturology means determinism,
and
and
really thinks,
a distortion of reality!"
the preceding pages have shown, this view
and vigorous
philosophy of
nonsense to say that
else in
tural situation has
also.
The
principle of cause
phenomena
the realm of cultural
our experience of the cosmos.
Any
does
as it
given cul-
been determined by other cultural events.
If
certain cultural factors are operative, a certain result will eventuate.
Contrariwise, certain cultural consummations cannot be realized,
however devoutly they may be wished, unless the to
factors requisite
the consummation are present and operative. This
self-
is
evident in meteorology and geology, but in the interpretation of
human it is
behavior
it
is
still
called "fatalism"
and "defeatism";
or,
regarded as immoral-and-therefore-false.
The
sweet soothing illusion of omnipotence
market and
and shape
a great it
as
cultural destiny
demand.
we and
We can
"Mankind under God
will.
free to
is
still
lay hold of our
choose and
finds a ready
own
destiny
own
controls his
realize the
ends
Educators can control the culture process by "establishing
.
.
/'
cer-
tain value systems in his pupils." Psychologists will "study scientifically
the sources of
remove them,"
,
.
.
[war] in
Social scientists
trolling cultural forces
men's minds and
will
scientifically
perfect formulas for con-
and the mastery of our destiny
if
only the
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
414
them anything like the financial support given the makers of the atomic bomb, etc., etc. Science, it appears, is to become the handmaiden of a species of modern federal
government
will give
magic; the social scientist, to assume the role of a super-shaman. It
and force of
against the weight
is
this
this passion of free will,
premise of anthropocentrism, that a science of culture must
make
way.^°
its
But these non-linguistic objections to "culturology" serve also effectively to emphasize the need for a special term with which to designate our
new
science and to reveal the peculiar fitness of
"culturology" for this purpose. ture
"demands
for
its
The
"distinct
domain" that
investigation a distinct science," as
is
cul-
Lowie
has argued for over two decades. Durkheim, too, saw the "need to
formulate entirely
new concepts
appropriate terminoJogy."
means of concepts made effectively,
science
to
We
.
.
,
[and to express them] in an
think and work in science only by
explicit
in
symbolic form.
To
think
make fundamental distinctions, without which we must have precision tools, exact con-
impossible,
is
cepts."
"Psychology" labels a distinct
class of
phenomena the :
reactions
But it does not distinguish cul-. phenomena from non-cultural, and the interpretation of the
of organisms to external stimuli. tural
interaction of extra-somatic elements in the culture process lies
beyond
its
proper boundaries. "Sociology," too, suffers from the
"fatal defect" of failure to distinguish the cultural
Ostwald and Kroeber pointed out long ago.
as
ture to
its
basic concept of interaction,
from the
social,
It assimilates cul-
making culture an
aspect,
or a by-product, of the social process of interaction whereas the structures
As
and processes of human society are functions of
a matter of fact,
we have
in "sociology" a
culture.
good example of
the confusion of thought that flows from the use of an ambiguous
and equivocal terminology.^^
The term "anthropology" different
has been used to designate so
many
kinds of activities— measuring crania, excavating pot-
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE sherds,
ceremonies,
observing
whole
natives, psychoanalyzing
and crafts— that
arts
415
it
studying
clans,
civilizations,
psychoanalyzing
tracing histories of
now
could not well be restricted
to the
and particular task of interpreting the culture process and that alone. "Cultural anthropology" also has been used to specific
And
designate a great variety of kinds of interpretation.
anthropology"
With
is
virtually indistinguishable
the expansion of the scope of science, a
The
and interpretation of
of phe-
class
nomena was distinguished from the psychological and It was named "culture" by those who discovered and analysis
"social
from "sociology." the social. isolated
it.
this distinct class of events has
been called the science oi culture by numerous anthropologists— Kroeber, Lowie, Murdock, and others— since Tylor
first
coined
the phrase in 1871.
And what is a science of culture but culturology? With this we shall make it plain, to even the least discerning mind,
term
continuum
that the extra-somatic
the same thing at
all
of symbol-borne events
as a class of reactions of
human
not
is
organisms
considered individually or collectively; that the interaction of cultural elements
action, of
we
is
human
not the same thing as the reactions, or
organisms.
We
may seem
to exaggerate
inter-
when
claim that a change in terminology can and will produce a
profound change
in thinking
and point of view. But,
pointed out, until the distinction ture" was
made
clear,
it
as
Poincare
between "heat" and "tempera-
was impossible to think
effectively of
thermal phenomena. "The true discoverer," says Poincare, "will
workman who has patiently built up some of these combinations, but the man who has brought out their relations The invention of a new word will often he sufficient to bring out not be the
.
the relation, and the word will be creative." the significance of "culturology": the
human
This
is,
.
of course,
brings out the relation between
organism, on the one hand, and the extra-somatic
tradition that
and
it
^^
.
defines a
is
culture on the other. It
new
science.
is
creative;
it
establishes
CHAPTER REFERENCES CHAPTER 1.
2.
SCIENCE
1.
IS
SCIENCING
Shapley, 1920, 1924. Douglass, 1929.
3.
Einstein, 1929, p. 107.
4.
Minkowski,
p. 75. Einstein, 1936, p. 350
ff.; 1934, p. 33. Kroeber, 1931. 7. J. Jeans et ah, 1931a; Russell, 1929.
5.
6.
CHAPTER 1.
2.
THE SYMBOL
Hankins, pp. 56, 327; Linton, 1936, pp. 79, 68, 60; Goldenweiser,
1937, p. 39. 2. 3.
4. 5.
Descartes, p. 189. Carlson, pp. 477-79.
Locke, Book III, Ch. 9. ibid.. Book IV, Ch. 11.
Kellogg, p. 289. Locke, Book II, Chs. 11, 10. 8. Tylor, 1881, pp. 54, 123. 9. Carlson, p, 477; Bernard, L. L., 1927a, p. 399; Yerkes, p. 301; Hooton, 1931, p. 167. 10. Hooton, 1931, p. 153. 11. Cf. Thomas, pp. 50-54, 776-777. 12. Keller, 23-24, 303-317, passim. -
6.
7.
CHAPTER
3.
ON THE
1.
Argyll, p. 147.
2. 3.
Clodd, p. 217. Schmidt, 1934, p. 41.
4.
Schnierla, 1948.
5.
6.
USE OF TOOLS BY PRIMATES
Hooton, 1931, pp. 138-39. Lowie, 1929, p. 5.
7. Yerkes, p. 8.
347. Tylor, 1881, p. 51.
9.
Hooton, 1931, pp. 139, 136.
10. Kohler, p. 295. 11. ibid., p. 277.
416
REFERENCES 12.
Dewey,
417 p. i.
13. Kroeber, 1928, p. 340.
CHAPTER
4.
1.
Newman,
2.
Case, p.
3.
Huxley, p. 35.
IS
MINDING
164.
p.
3.
CHAPTER 1.
MIND
5.
Gumplowicz,
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE
p. 74.
Giddings, 1896, pp. 24, 25. 3. Cattell, p. 597; Baldwin, p. 621. 4. Allport, F. H., pp. 12, 4; Washburn, 1946; Gault, 1927. 5. Blackmar, p. 786; Ward, 1903, p. 59; Giddings, 1906, pp. 788, 794 and 1896, Preface; Hobhouse, p. 130; Salomon, p. 140; Ellwood, 1906, p. 859; Small, pp. 35, 622; Giddings, 1932, p. 402; Bernard, L. L., 1927b, 2.
p. 348.
Ross, p. 869; Maclver, 1937, p. vii. p. 19; Bain, 1942, p. 87 and 1929, p. 110; NimkoflF, p. 63; Ellwood, 1944, p. 6. 6.
7.
Young, 1934,
Ogburn and
Groves, p. 23; Groves and Moore, pp. 13-14; Young, 1942, p. 36. Lynd, pp. 72, 186 et passim; Bernard, J., p. 68. 10. Simmel, p. 665; Spykman, p. 27. 11. Gary, p. 182. 12. Ellwood, 1944, pp. 6, 14, 13; Willey, p. 208; Willey and Herskovits, 8.
9.
p. 191. 13. Maclver, 1930, p. 181 and 1934, p. 243; Lynd, pp. 22, 27; Bernard, L. L., 1942, p. 800. 14. Kroeber, 1936, pp. 331, 333. 15. Tylor, 1871, pp. 5, 8. 16. Durkheim, 1938, p. Ivi and 1915, p. 16.
17. 18. 19.
Durkheim, 1897, Durkheim, 1938, Durkheim, 1915,
p. p. p.
354. li.
16 and 1938, pp. 110, 102.
20. Kroeber, 1917, pp. 192, 206. 21. Kroeber, 1919, p. 263 and 1928, p. 325. 22. Kroeber, 1923, p. 325. 23. Kroeber, 1936, pp. 338, 337. 24. Lowie, 1917, pp. 17, 66, 95 and 1936, pp. 301, 307. 25. Wissler, 1923, pp. 99, 247, 363 and 1927, pp. 75, 87. 26. Wissler, 1927, pp. 62-63, 73' ^4-
27. Wissler, 1923, pp. 333-334. 28. Durkheim, 1933, pp. 285-286. 29. Goldenweiser, 1927, pp. 85, 86. 30. Boas, 1928, p. 235; Benedict, 1934, p. 251
and 1943,
p. 31.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
418 31. Schmidt, 1939, p. 7. 32. Bidney, 1944, p- 42. 33. Radcliffe-Brown, 1940, pp. 34. Hallowell, pp. 175, 174.
10-11 and 1937, pp. 21, 71.
35. Linton, 1936, pp. 288-89, 363. 36. Herskovits, 1945, pp- 150, 158.
37. Hooton, 1937, pp. 272, 223; 1939, p. 38. Hart, 1938.
370 and 1943a,
p. 5.
39. Meggers, pp. 195-97. 40. Gillin, 1939, p. 45. 41. Goldenweiser, 1933, p. 59; Boas, 1936, p. 137 and 1932, p. 612; Sapir, 1917, p. 442; Benedict, 1939, p. 467; Hallowell, p. 174; Linton, 1936, p. 464.
42. See, especially, 1937, pp. 16, 154, 269-70, 294-95, 43. Kroeber, 1944, pp. vii, 763. 44. Tylor, 1871, p. 2.
45. Durkheim, 1938, p. Iviii. 46. Kroeber, 1919, p. 263.
47.
Mead,
p. 13.
CHAPTER
6.
CULTUROLOGICAL
INTERPRETATIONS OF 1.
Durkheim, 1893,
2.
Seligman, p. 238. Havens, pp. 21-22.
3.
4.
Rivers, p. 2.
5.
Williams, p. 83.
6.
Morgan,
7. Allport, 8.
9.
10. 11. 12.
13.
p.
p. 390; 1938, p. 104.
p. 22.
Sheen, 1948. Breasted, 1909, pp. 516, 449. Boas, 1945, p. 101. Benedict, 1942, p. 763. Boas, 1945, pp. 77-78. Kroeber, 1936, pp. 331, 333.
7.
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF MIND
1.
Durkheim, 1938, pp.
2.
Kroeber, 1944, p. 224. Linton, 1945, p. 5.
3.
5.
6.
1-2; Radcliffe-Brown,
Goldenweiser, 1933, p. 59. Sapir, 1916, p. 43. Benedict, 1934, p. 253.
7. Wissler, 1927, p. 87. 8.
PSYCHOLOGICAL
505.
G. W.,
CHAPTER
4.
VS.
HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Linton, 1938, p. 248.
9. Hallowell, p. 174.
1934, p. 531.
REFERENCES
4^9
10. Goldenweiser, 1935, p. 75; Malinowski, 1939, p. 964. 11. Sapir, 1917, p. 442. 12. James, 1880. 13.
Newton,
p. 544.
14. Breasted, 1909, p. 357. 15. White, L. A., 1942, p. 82. 16. Tylor, 1871, pp. 306-07.
by Gumplowicz, p. 45, Gumplowicz, pp. 156-57.
17. quoted 18.
19. NovicoflF, pp. 2 10-2 n.
CHAPTER
8.
GENIUS:
Galton, p. 40. Galton, p. 342. 3. Spencer, 1873, p. 28 4. James, 1880, p. 453.
Its
Causes and Incidence
1.
2.
5.
ibid., p.
ff.
449.
Hewett, p. 140; Hooton, 1943b, p. 4; Frank, p. 476; Millikan, p. 214; Goldenweiser, 1922, p. 26; Boas, 1945, p. 76; Wissler, 1923, p. 331; Linton^, 1936, p. 95. 6.
James, 1880, p. 453. ibid., pp. 445, 457, 453. 9. Cooley, p. 346. 10. James, 1880, p. 454. 11. Kroeber, 1917, p. 200. 12. idem. 7. 8.
13. Bell, 1937, p. 532. 14. Hecht, pp. 98-99. 15.
Quoted
in Shapley,
1943, p. 147.
16. Cooley, pp. 352-53.
17. Ostwald, 1910, p. 185. 18. White, L. A., 1945. 19. Kroeber, 1917; Sapir, 1917.
CHAPTER
9.
IKHNATON: The
Great
Man
Vs. the
Culture Process Kroeber, 1944, p. 839; 1923, p. 133. 1909, p. 357. 3. Breasted, 1912, p. 339. 4. Breasted, 1909, p. 362; 1912, p. 342; 1929, p. 78; Weigall, p. 68; Hall, p. 58; Breasted, 1912, p. 342; Gardiner, p. 858; Moret, 1912, p. 45, 5. Budge, pp. 106, 77-78; Baikie, p. 315; Steindorff and Seele, pp. 201,. 80; Pendlebury, p. xiv. 6. Breasted, 1929, pp. 79, 78. 7. Breasted, 1929, p. 80; Weigall, pp. 46, 51, 91. 1.
2. Breasted,
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
420 8.
9.
Moret, 1927, Moret, 1927,
p. 441. p. 319.
10. Weigall, pp. 6g, 70;
Moret, 1927, p. 319.
11. Roosevelt, p. 114. 12. Harrington, p. 413.
13. Breasted, 1909, p. 62. 14. ibid., p. 171.
15. ibid., p. 247. 16. idem. 17. Breasted, 1909, p. 272. 18. Glanville, p. 135; Feet, 1926, pp. 202-03.
19. Breasted, 1909, p. 362; Peet, 1926, pp. 202-03. 20. Budge, p. 76; Glanville, p. 124; Steindorff and Seele, pp. 77-80. 21. Steindorff and Seele, p. 221; Glanville, pp. 134-36. 22. Steindorff
and
Seele, pp. 223-26.
23. ihid., p. 242. 24. Baikie, pp. 426-27. 25. Scharff, p. 144. 26. Breasted, 1909, p. 401. 27. ibid., pp. 402, 403.
28. ihid., pp. 475, 489, 490. 29. ibid., pp. 491-92. 30. ibid., p. 494.
and Seele, p. 254. and Seele, pp. 256, 269; Breasted, 1909, pp. 506-07. 33. Steindorff and Seele, p. 270; cf. Edgerton, p. 153, who alludes to a tiew and different interpretation of Hrihor's role in this political drama. 31. ibid., p. 496; Steindorff 32. Steindorff
34. Breasted, 1909, p. 359. 35. ibid., pp. 170-71. 36.
Breasted, 1933, p. 145.
37. Breasted, 1912, pp. 312, 315. 38. Breasted, 1933, p. 296; Peet, "Akhenaten, Ty, etc.," pp. 93, 96-97, 102; Peet, 1926, p. 205. 39. Breasted, 1909, p. 362; Moret, 1912, p. 45. 40. Moret, 1927, p. 324. 41. Peet, 1926, p. 203.
42. Peet, "Akhenaten, Ty, etc." 43. Peet, 1926, p. 207. 44. Budge, p. 152. 45. ibid., p. 41. 46. Peet, "Akhenaten, Ty, etc.," p. 86; see, also, Derry, p. 115,
and Engel-
bach, p. 99. 47. Peet, "Akhenaten, Ty, etc.," p. 86. 48. Newberry, p. 51; Steindorff 49. Breasted, 1909, p. 272.
and
Seele, p. 223; Pendlebury, p. 29.
50. Breasted, 1909, pp. 367, 399; Weigall, pp. 71, 144, 139.
51. Weigall, p. 71; Breasted, 1909, p. 369.
REFERENCES
42i
52. Weigall, p. 98. 53. ibid., pp. 46, 51, 91. 54. Moret, 1927, p. 319; Ruffer, pp. 168, 170, 336; Gardiner, p. 858. 55. Weigall, p. xvii; Smith, 1912, pp. 51, 54; Sethe, pp. 127-28; Engelbach, 1931; Derry, 1931; Peet, "Akhenaten, Ty, etc."; Pendlebury, p. 9.
56. Smith, 1923, p. 84; 1912, pp. 54-55; Derry, p. 117, 57. Weigall, p. 69; Ruffer, p. 332; Breasted, 1909, p, 329. 58. Smith, 1912, p. 55. 59. Ruffer, pp. 332-333.
60. Ruffer, pp. 170, 333. 61. Newberry, pp. 51, 50; Steindorff and Seele, p. 222. 62. Weigall, p. 52. 63. Peet, 1926, p. 205. 64. Baikie, pp. 304, 311, 313-14. 65. Pendlebury, pp. xiv, 7, 148, 126; Frankfort, p. 29. 66. Weigall, p. io6. 67. Breasted, 1912, p. 334; 1909, p. 377. 68. Breasted, 1929, p. 80; 1912, p. 342.
69. Weigall, p. 175. 70. Breasted, 1909, pp. 356, 385; Peet, "Akhenaten," pp. 106-07. 71. Weigall, pp. 196, 202, 207. 72. Breasted, 1909, p. 377; 1933, p. 296. 73. Weigall, p. 101. 74. Hyvernat, p. 339. 75. Pohle, p. 410. 76. Hyvernat, p. 345. 77. Slochower, p. 46. 78.
Mann, 1942,
p. 13.
79. Freud, 1939.
CHAPTER 1.
10.
THE LOCUS OF MATHEMATICAL REALITY
Somerville, pp. 140-41.
2. Somerville, p. 375; 3.
4. 5.
6. 7.
Quoted by
White, A. D.,
I,
p. 225, ftn.
Bell, 1931, p. 20.
Hardy, 1941, pp. 63-64. Bridgman, p. 60. Kasner and Newman, p. 359. Descartes, Pt. I, Sec. XVIII,
p. 308.
N. Altshiller-Court refers to Durkheim's treatment of this point "Geometry and Experience," (Scientific Monthly, January, 1945). 9. White, L. A., 1943. 8.
in
10. Einstein, 1929. 11. Kasner
and Newman,
p. 359. 143. the Nature of Axioms," in Science and Hypothesis, Poincar^,
12. Schrodinger, 13.
1913.
"On
p.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
422 14. 15. 16.
Quoted by Bell, 1937, p. Durkheim, 1938, p. Ivi. Durkheim, 1915, p. 424;
16.
see, also,
1938, p.
17. Einstein, 1934, pp- 58, 69, 57. 18. Hadamard, p. 50. 19 "Mathematical Creation," in Science
li.
and Method,
in Poincar^, 1913,
20. ibid., p. 393. 21. Quoted by Leuba, p. 240. 22. Goncourt, p. 98. 23. Leuba, p. 241. 24. Hardy, 1941, p. 63. 25. Hardy, 1929, p. 4.
26. Hardy, 1941, pp. 62-63, 65.
CHAPTER 11. THE DEFINITION AND PROHIBITION OF INCEST 1.
Tylor, 1888, p. 267.
Lowie, 1920, p. 15. Goldenweiser, 1937, p. 303. 4. Morgan, pp. 69, 378, 424. 5. Mahaffy, p. 1. 2. 3.
6. Cf. Montagu for discussion of this point as well as for extensive bibliography. 7. Malinowski, 1929a, pp. 153 ff., 3, 171. 8.
Freud, 1931, p. 247.
9.
Westermarck, table of contents Durkheim, 1898, p. 50 ff.
10.
for
Chapter XX,
11. Linton,
1936, pp. 125-26. 1922, p. 242; 1937, p. 303. 13. Young, 1942, p. 406.
12. Goldenweiser,
14. Wissler, 1929, p. 145. 15.
Goldenweiser, 1922, p. 242; 1937, p. 303.
16. Lowie, 1920, p. 15. 17.
Wissler, 1927.
18. Lowie,
1920, pp. 65-66. Radcliffe-Brown, 1930, p. 435. 20. Ogburn, 1933, pp. 661-62. 21. Freud, 1920, p. 269. 19.
22. Lowie, 1940, p. 233; Fortune, 1932, p. 622. 23. Young, 1942, p. 406. 24. Fortune, p. 620. 25. Malinowski, 1931, p. 630; 1929b, p. 407. 26. Scligman, pp. 243-44, ^47, 268-69; Gillin,
ct seq.;
Thomas,
p. 197.
27. Freud, 1931, pp. 250-51.
1936, p. 93; Firth, p. 324
REFERENCES
423
28. Freud, "Contributions to the 29. Freud, 1930, pp. 63, 68, 72. 30. Cooper, p. 20.
Theory of Sex,"
in
1938, pp. 616-17.
31. Freud, 1930, p. 74.
CHAPTER
12.
MAN'S CONTROL OVER CIVILIZATION
2.
Durkheim, 1938, p. Iviii. Ogburn, 1922, p. 346.
3.
Jeans, 1931b, p. 109.
1.
4. Field, p. 9. 5.
6. 7. 8.
9.
Westgate, p. 165. Schmidt, 1939, p.
8; Sieber and Mueller, pp. 119-120. Childe, 1936, p. 19. Kroeber and Richardson, p. 148; Kroeber, 1919.
Durkheim, 1938, p. xlvi. and Richardson, Durkheim, 1915, p. 27.
10. Kroeber 11.
p. 152.
12. Bassett, pp. 25-26. Allport, p. 23. 13. G.
W.
14. Wissler, 1923, p. 8. 15. ibid., pp. 8-10. 16.
Durkheim, 1897, pp. 427-28.
17. Kroeber, 1919, p. 263. 18. James, 1890, p. 2439; 1880, p. 442.
19. Tylor, 1871, pp. 2, 24. 20. Whitehead, p. 94.
21. Frank, p. 475.
CHAPTER 13. ENERGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE MacCurdy,
3.
II, p. 134; Ostwald, 1907, p. 511. Childe, 1936, pp. 7, 9. Schlesinger, pp. 247-48.
4.
Compton,
1.
2.
p. 576.
CHAPTER
14.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
1. Lowie, 1936, p. 301 and 1917, p. 17; Ostwald, 1915b, p. 192; Whitehead, p. 48. 2. Lowie, 1936, p. 301; 1917, p. 17. 3. Boas, 1908, pp. 7, 10. 4. Childe, 1946, p. 251. 5.
Myres, p. 11.
6.
Mencken, personal communication.
7. 8.
Ostwald, 1915a, p. 167; see, also, pp. 168-69; 1915b, pp. 192-94, 205. Bain, 1929, pp. 108, 110-11.
THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE
424 9. White, L. A., 1939, p. 571 10. Bidney, 1946, p. 541; Linton, •
p
.
1941, pp. 9,
16-17;
^
G.
...
W.
...
22. '
Durkheim, 1938, p. 37. 11. Lowie, 1917, p. 17; 1936, PP- 301' 307; Kroeber, 1918, p. 641. 12. Ostwald, 1915a, p. 167; 1915b, p. 192; 13. Poincar6, 1913, p. 371.
.
Allport,
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Develop-
NAME INDEX Case, E. Cattell,
G. W., 130, 342-43, 425 Duke of, 40, 425
Allport, Argyll,
Aristotle, 52 Augustine, Saint, 322-23
Baikie, James, 238, 271,
425
Bain, Read, 83, 411, 425
Baldwin, J. M., 75, 425 Barnes, Harry E., xv Bassett,
Raymond
E., 342,
426
Bastian, Ad., 182 Bell, E. T., 211, 426 Benedict, Ruth, 95, 130-31, 162,
426 Bernard, Jessie, 83, 426 Bernard, L. L., 32, 82, 86, 426 Bidney, David, 95, 108-09, 347,
J.
Darwin, Charles, 14, 27, 40, 229, 296 Day, Clarence, 123 Derry, D. E., 264, 265, 427 Descartes, R., 30, 68, 285,
426 Blackmar, F. W., 82 Boas, P., 65, 95, 104, 136, 194, 409, 426 Breasted,
C,
53, 427 McK., 75, 427 Cheng Che-Yu, 412 Childe, V. Gordon, 203, 332, 365, 410, 427 Clark, Grahame, 41, 427 Clodd, Edw., 40, 427 Compton, A. H., 386-87, 427 Comte, Auguste, 56, 59, 69-70, 427 Condon, E. U., xii Cooley, C. H., 196, 218, 427 Cooper, John M., 326, 427
Abel, Th., 84-85, 425 Allport,F. H.,75,425
H.,
J.
130,
237,
427
Dewey, John, 46, 427 Douglass, A. E., 4, 427 Durkheim, Emile, xix, 72,
238,
239, 245, 247, 251, 253, 255, 256, 257, 261, 266, 273, 274, 275, 426
78, 79, 88-90, 97, 106, 121, 146, 286, 290, 291, 309, 330, 336, 342,
346, 414,
G. S., 52, 426 Bridgman, P. W., 284, 426 Budge, E. A. Wallis, 238, 247,
427
Brett,
Edgerton,
291, 428
258-59, 426 Burgess, E. W., 20
Carlson, A.
J.,
Carroll, Lewis,
24, 32,
Wm.
F., xiii, 252, 427 Einstein, A., 6, 185, 284, 288-89,
George, 298 Ellwood, C. A., 82, 83, 85, 428 Eliot,
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 279 Engelbach, R., 264, 428
426
282 436
NAME INDEX Eubank, E.
437
E.,
Fan Chen, 52
Hertz, H., 289-90, 291 Hewett, E. L., 193, 429
74 283
Everett, Edw.,
Hobhouse, L. T., 82, 430 Hooton, E. A., 6, 32, 41, 42, 43, 105, 193,430 Huang Wen Shan, 412 Huxley, T. H., 53, 55, 430 Hyvernat, Henry, 430
ftn.
Farrar, Curtis, xv
Farrar, John, xv
Field, Stanley, 331, 428 Firth, Raymond, 325, 428
Fletcher, Alice
C, 66
Fortune, Reo, 324-25, 428 Frank, L. K., 193, 349, 428
Imbelloni,
Frankfort, H., 272, 428 Franklin, Benjamin, 40, 319 Freud, S., 277-78, 307-08, 309-10, 320, 325-26, 328, 428
James,
Galton, F., 191-92, 428 Gardiner, Alan H., 238, 264, 428 Gary, Dorothy P., 84, 428 Gault, R. H., 75, 428 Giddings, F. H., 74, 82, 428 Gillin, John, 104, 325, 428-29 Glanville, S. R. K., 248, 429
Goethe, J. W. von, 297-98 Goldenweiser, Alex., 23, 94, 104, 162, 193-94, 310, 312, 429 Goncourt, the brothers, 298, 429
J.,
412
Wm., 29, 68, 74-75, 131, 163, 192-93, 194, 196-97, 347,
430 Jeans, Sir James, 330-31, Jones, Volney H., xv
430
Kasner, Edw., 284, 289, 430 Keller, Helen, 36-39,
Kellogg, 35-36,
430 N. and L.
W. 430
A.,
27,
Wm.
Knickerbocker, S., xiii Kohler, W., 40, 45, 430 Kroeber, A. L., xiii, xviii, xix, xx, 41, 48, 87, 90-92, 105, 106, 109, 160, 190, 230, 233, 333, 341, 347, 430
Groves, E. R., 83, 429
Gumplowicz, Ludwig, 72, 429
182,
I.,
429
W. M., 103, 429 Havens, Raymond D., 125, 429 Hecht, Selig, 213, 429
Hart, C.
429
J.,
65,
217
W., 14
Lilienthal, David, 125
98-99, 105, 162,
Hankins, F. H., 23, 429 Hardy, G. H., 283-84, 301, 429 Harrington, Rev. H., 195, 243,
M.
L.,
Leo XII, Pope, 159 Leuba, J. H., 422, 430
429
Herskovits,
J.
Leibnitz, G.
Hadamard, J., 292, 429 Hall, H. R., 237, 429 Hallowell, A.
Lagrange,
85,
104,
Linton, Ralph, 23, 105, 107-08, 130, 161, 162, 194, 310, 431 Locke, John, 25, 30, 49, 431 Lowie, R. H., xix, 42, 47, 61, 65, 78, 92-93, 130, 303, 304, 318, 397, 407, 408, 409, 414, 431 Lyell, Ch., 221
Lynd, Robt.
S.,
83, 86, 431
MacCurdy, Geo. G., McDougall,
Wm.,
363, 431
75
NAME INDEX
438 Planck,
Maclver, R. M., 83, 86, 431 McLeish, Arch., 336 Mace, C. A., 75 Mahaffy, J. P., 431 Malinowski,
B., 20, 162, 325,
Mann, Thomas,
Plato,
431
277-78, 431
Marx, Karl, 186 Maxwell, J. Clerk, 61, 81, 431 Mead, Margaret, xii, 107, 431 Meggers, Betty J., 431 Mencken, H. L., 410 Millikan, R. A., 193, 431 Minkowski, H., 7, 431 Montagu, M. F. Ashley, xii, 431 Moore, H. E., 83, 429 Moore, Jared Sparkes, xiii
Moret, Alex., 238, 239, 257, 258, 263, 432 Morgan, Lewis H., 20, 129, 241, 305, 432 Murdock, G. P., 93, 141, 432 Myres, J. L., xiii, 410, 432
Max, 100
47
Pohle, Joseph, 432 Poincare, H., 51, 67, 211, 289, 296-97, 415, 432 Potter,
Alden
A.,
xiii
Radcliffe-Brown, A.
R.,
20,
65,
96-98, 157, 241, 318-19, 432-33 Reuter, E. B., 210
W. H. R., 126, 433 Roosevelt, F. D., 242, 433 Ross, E. A., 75, 83, 433 Ruffer, Sir Marc, 263, 266, 269, Rivers,
433 Russell,
H. N., 433
Salomon, G., 82, 433 Sapir, E.,
94, 104-05, 162, 171, 230, 433 Scharff, Alex, 250, 433 Schlesinger, A. M., 385, 435
Schmidt,
Father
Wm.,
41,
95,
33i'433 Newberry, P. E., 261, 432 Newman, H. H., 53, 432
Newman, Newton,
James, 284, 289, 430 Isaac, 14, 163, 217, 288,
432 Nimkoff, Meyer
F., 83, 85, 432 Novicoff, Alex. B., 185, 432
Ogburn, Wm. F., 83, 85, 207, 312,319-20,330,432 Orrmont, Arthur, xi Ostwald, Wilhelm, 113-17, 225,
363,397,411,432 Park, Robert E., 20 Peet, T. E., 247, 258, 260, 271,
432
D. 264, 272, 432
Pendlebury,
}.
S.,
Pennington, L. A., 211 Pillsbury, W. B., 211
238, 261,
Schnierla, T. C., 41,
433
Sehrodinger, E., 289, 433 Seele, K. C, 238, 261, 434 Seligman, B., 125, 325, 433 Sethe, Kurt, 264, 433 Shapley, Harlow, 4, 433 Sheen, Mns. Fulton J., 130, 434 Simmel, G., 84, 162, 434 Slochower, Harry, 277, 434 Small, Albion W., 82, 434
Smith, G.
Elliot, 260, 264, 265, 266, 434 Somerville, Mary, 283, 434 Spencer, Herbert, 20, 56-58, 81,
192, 410,
434
Spykman, N.
J.,
434
Steindorff, G., 238, 261, Steinour, Harold H., xiii
Stern, B.
Stout,
G.
J.,
93,
F.,
434
434
75 Swan ton, John R., 107, 434
NAME INDEX Taylor,
W.W.,
Thomas,
Wm.
439 181 I.,
325,
434
Tylor, E. B., xix, xx, 20, 30, 43, 87-90, 105-06, 107, 180, 303, 313, 348,
371,434
Westermarck, Edw., 309, 434 Westgate, Lewis G., 331, 434 White, A. D., 435 White, Leshe A., 435 Whitehead, A. N., 107, 348, 408,
435 Urey, H., 213-14
Ward,
Wilder, R. L., xv Willey, M. M., 85, 435 Williams, Mary W., 418, 435
Lester F., 57, 82, 434 Warren, H. C, 52 Washburn, M. F., 75, 434 Watt, James, 212 Weaver, Warren, xiii
Wissler, Clark, xix, 92-93, 194, 311, 344, 435 Wolfe, Thomas, 150-51
Weigall, A., 239, 263, 264, 265, 270, 273, 274, 275, 434
435 Young, Kimball, 83, 310-11, 435
Yerkes, R. 43'
M. and
A.
W.,
162,
32, 41,
5
SUBJECT INDEX
and social evolu313-16; among lower primates, 314 Culture, an "abstraction," 96; an-
Co-operation,
Agricultural Revolution, 372 Agriculture, a means of harnessing
energy, 371; crease,
and population
tion,
in-
378
Animism, 66
atomy
Anthropocentrism, 177, 338, 357-
control
58,
fined
406
Anthropology,
and
of,
Anthropomorphism, 65, 106, 183, 234, 406, 413 Apes, imitation among, 42-43; lack culture, 42; mentality of, 23, 43, 45, 212; size of brain, 32-33; 32,
depends dis-
life of its own, 358, 407; importance of concept of, 403-
05; "intangible," 101-02; interpretations of, xvii-xix, 84; nature of, 15-16, 140, 240-41; a "psychological" phenomenon, 104-
tools, 4iff.
05; rate of growth of, 385; rate of growth and mental ability,
Brain, size and weight of, 32-33 Bride-price, 317
reality of questioned, 101; science of, see "Science of culture"
218-22;
Cereals and cultural development,
Culture pattern and achievement, 215-17 Culture process, 166, 181, 328;
371
Chance, and the course of history, 228-29; ^"^ genius, 202 Church, political functions of, 59-60, 242-44; vs. state, 242-
44, 258, 266-67 Class structure, 380, 382-83, 384-
Complexity of phenomena, 61-63 Conscience, nature
87;
has a
35-36; use of
Art, nature of, 3 Astronomy, 4-5 Atomic energy, 389
1
by Tylor,
73, 92, 397, 409; evolution of, 221, 241, 364flF., 390-93; explained in terms of culture, 92, 100, 105, 167, 181, 201, 339, 351, 392; felt as "outside force," 297-98;
409, 41
and speech,
364; belief in man's 234, 33off.; de-
over,
upon symbolling, 15, 33; a tinct class of phenomena,
psychiatry,
105; regression of, 1035., 110;
scope
of,
of,
and individual, i6iff., 183-84; and inventions, 168-70, 292 Culture, and cereals, 371; and dreams, 179-81; and energy, 166, 363ff.; and environment, 339; and genius, 215-18; and
human
156-58
440
behavior, 79, 287, 328,
<
5
SUBJECT INDEX
441
337' 3 ^'5^' ^"<^ human nature, 287; and the individual, 161, 183, 369; and physical type,
124, 138, 164, 167; and race, 124, 138, 164, 167 Cultural determinism, 208, 341,
water, 370, plants and animals, 370, fuels, 373, atomic nucleus,
374 Etiquette,
1
59
Evolution vs. history, 229-30 Evolutionary process, loff.
347' 348 evolution, basic law or,
Exogamy, 318, 322, 327
368, 374-75; and improvement of tools, 375; opposition to, 20
Family, in colonial America, 319-
.
C?iltural
Cultural trends, prediction of, 355 Culturology, and sociology, 80-86; the word, 116, 409-12, 415; see "Science of culture"
20;
economic
basis of, 318-21;
in primitive society,
Fashions
in
dress,
318-19 tyranny
of,
333-34 Fatalism and science of culture, 347-48, 413
Darwinism, a synthesis, 295-96 Democracy, theory of, 178 Determinants of human behavior, 66ff.
Determinism,
in culture process,
341, 347, 348; in culturology, 413; in science, 406 Dictatorship of proletariat, 178 Discoveries; see Inventions and
208,
Fire, role of, in cultural develop-
ment, 370
Food
habits, 153 Free Will, 107-08, 112, 331-32, 341, 344, 347, 406, 413 Fuel Revolution, 373
Genius, of,
chance occurrence and cultural milieu,
igofi.;
202;
Division of labor, 378 Divorce, 321
218; and culture pattern, 21517; and intelligence, 210-14; and invention, 210; nature of,
Dogs, why kept, 334 Domestication of animals, a means
197-98; and neurological locus, 226, 231
discoveries
Geometry, non-Euclidean, 288
of harnessing energy, 371
Dowry, 317 Dreams and
Economic
in ethnological theory, 10809, 413; as explanatory device,
God, culture, 179-81
factor, in marriage
and
family, 315-21 Education, and culture process, 346-47; and magic, 344-45 Egyptian priesthoods, power of, 246-47, 253; wealth of, 245-46, 252-53 Endogamy, 322 Energy, and culture, 363ff.; forms of harnessed by culture: humam organism, 369, fire, wind and
399 Golshok, 50 Great Man, 234; and
i92flF.;
and
culture,
history, 227ff.; inter-
pretation of history, 271, 279-81
"Group mind," 186-87 History, nature of, 8-9; vs. evolution,
229-30
Human behavior,
determinants of, determined by
66ff., 77-79, 147;
culture, 79, 200, 287, 328, 337,
SUBJECT INDEX
442 351-52; nature of, 18, 121-23,
146
Human and
nature, 126, 131, i49ff.;
culture,
Human
vs.
287
non-human behavior,
34-36, 171
Human
.
organism, locus ot culture
process, 226, 231,
Idealism, philosophy of, 46, 233 Ideas, syntheses of, 291, 293,
297
of, 260, 264; alleged foreign blood, 239, 266; art under, 238-39; Catholic view
Ikhnaton, age
276-77; death of, 249; Freud on, 278; God reveals himself to, 273; our ignorance concerning, of,
269-70; innovations of, 256; instrument of Divine Purpose, 276; Jewish view of, 277; loses empire, 269, 274-75; Mann on, 277-78; and Moses, Asiatic
mummy
of,
264; pathology of, 239, 263, 265; alleged personal characteristics, 237-39; vs. the priests,
248, 257-58, 266; reign of, 235; resembles Jesus, 263, 274-75; rewards his followers, 261-62; revolution of, interpreted, 258-
59 Inbreeding, 305-07; primates, 315 Incest,
158-59,
theory
of, 304;
among
303!?.;
taboos,
and
culture
process,
lytic agent, 181, 294; differences,
locus of events, 226, 231, 296; the originator of culture, i6iff.; as prime mover, i6iff., 175, 181; vs. social achievement, 225 Inquisition and mental ability, 221 Intra-,
lower
instinct
and physical deinterpreted
extra-organismal
contexts,
51, 81
Inventions and discoveries, as cultural syntheses, 168-70, 203-04, 292; inevitability of, 205-09; made simultaneously but independently, 169-70, 205-07, 20911, 292-93; tion,
and social stratificaand technology,
223-24;
224 Kinship, 241, 327, 377, 381; sociological vs. biological,
307
Kissing, 153
Language, and the science of ture,
terioration, 305-07
Incest
Individual,
Young, 310-
174, 199, 294; the instrument of culture forces, 298; a neural
293
276-78; supposed
309; Wissler, 311; 11
i6iff., 183-84, 295, 369; a cata-
.
.
^
322-23; Seligman, 325; Thomas, 325; Tylor, 313; Westermarck,
cul-
141; and sensory experi-
ence, 288 Law, of cultural evolution, 368, 374-75; of development of phi-
losophy,
69,
111;
everywhere,
107 by:
Cooper, 326; Durkheim, 309; Firth, 325; Fortune, 324-25; Freud, 307-08, 325-26, 328; Gillin, 325; Goldenweiser, 310; Linton, 310; Lowie, 303-04; Malinowski, 325; Morgan, 305; Ogbum, 312; Saint Augustine,
Laws
of thought, 299 ftn.
Levirate, 317 Liberals, 179
Living vs. non-living systems, 51 Love, marriage and the family, 321
Man, behavior
of, 34; a
constant,
culture a variable, 200, 226, 294,
SUBJECT INDEX
443
338-39; man's control over culture, belief in, 234, 342-43;
and
man
culture, 96-101, 123, 138-
man's place in cos-
39, 164, 167;
mos, 357-58 Marriage, brother-sister, 305, 322; with cousins, 306-07; economic aspect of, 315-21; group aspect of, 317; and love, 321 Mathematics, growth of, 292, 298-
301; origin of, 299;
and
culture,
Mathematical concepts, locus
of,
283, 301-02
and the course of cultural and achievement, 221; and the Inquisition, 221; and rate of culture growth, 218-22; and techability,
history,
Physiology defined, 81 Polygamy, prohibition of, 335 Population, increase of, 378, 384 Prediction of culture change, 355 Primitive society vs. civil society, 241, 377, 381 Profit system,
285-86, 293
Mental
major types, 64; a mechanism of adjustment, 401; and technology, 366 Physical type and culture, 124, 138, 164, 167
226;
Projection
387
self into external world, 84, 86 Psychology, defined, 4, 81; growth of, 73-74; and the individual, 75
of
Psychological
vs.
culturological in-
terpretations, 77-79, 105, 12lff.,
236-37, 266ff., 312, 412
nology, 224-25
Metaphysical interpretations, 65,
400 Mind, minding, 495.; and bodily
man,
23ff.,
man
vs.
sub-
35-36, 44-45;
and
structure, 148; of race,
148-49 Mind-body problem, 491?. Monotheism in Egypt, 254-56
"Mysticism" and
tlie
culture, 88, 95,
407
Natural law and
Race and culture, 124, 138, 164 Race prejudice, explanations of, 134-37 Rats, neuroses of, 35 Realism, pseudo-, 143, 183, Reality, locus of, 284
406
Revolutionists, 178-79
science of
Savagery, recent emergence from,
affairs,
Science, blind alleys of, 311; expansion of scope of, 55ff-, 71,
356
human
72,
401-02; a means of adjustment, 354; the modern magic, 343; na-
107 Naturalism, 65
ture of,
3ff.;
and
reality, 8
Oedipus complex, 155 Omnipotence, illusion of, 341, 413
Science of culture, and anthropo-
Paternity, biological, ignorance of,
Philosophy, development of, 399; as explanatory device, 64, 398;
thered by: Kroeber, 90, Lowie, 92, Wissler, 93; a demonstration of, 392; and determinism, 413; nature of, 99-101, 140-42, 397; opposed by: Benedict, 95,
two
L. L. Bernard, 86, Bidney, 95,
305-06 Personality studies, 105
law of development
of, 69;
morphism, 134-38; begun by: Durkheim, 88, Tylor, 87; fur-
SUBJECT INDEX
444 Boas, 95, Goldenweiser, 94, Hallowell, 98, Hart, 103, Hooton, 102, Lynd, 86, Radcliffe-
Brown, 96-98,
Sapir, 94;
oppo-
Symbol, 22ff.; and culture, 15, 46; and the tool -process, 45ff. Symbols, significance of, 398 Symbolling, neural basis
of,
31-33
sition to, 86, 94ff., 105-06, 143,
406; origin 404; a
76, 87, 142, other sciences,
Technology, key to understanding of culture, 366; and mental ability, 224-25; and population in-
18-19, 59-63;
crease, 378, 384; role of in culture process, 390-93; and phi-
70, 114;
losophy, 366; and social systems,
of, xix,
rival of
412 Sciences, classification of,
and
56;
complexity,
"hierarchy"
of,
56ff.,
levels of, 15, 19, 56;
development
sequence of
Thermodynamics and
63
Scientific interpretation, nature of,
and
Signs
vs.
64-69
not-self,
symbols,
26ff.,
culture, 166,
367-68
Thermodynamics, Second Law and life and culture, 367
407-08 Self
365, 376-85 _
of, 551?.,
of,
Tools, efficiency of in cultural development, 375; and symbols,
300
Slavery, explanations of, 128-29
use
Social evolution, present trends in,
45ff.;
388-89 Social organism, 132, 175, 281 Social psychology, 75, 82 Social science, immaturity of, 336;
apes, 4iff.
of,
406?.;
use of by
Unconscious, somatic and cultural, 158-61
"laboratories" of, 236 Social stratification, 380, 382; inventions, 223-24 Social
systems
and
and
Vitalism-mechanism, 53 Voting, 176-77
technology,
365, 376-85 Society, evolution of, 241 Sociology, beginnings of, 74; and concept of culture, 80-81, 83-
War,
causes of, 343; explanations
_
86;
and
social psychology, 76,
82
Sororate, 317
Space-time, 7 Speech, articulate, and culture,
Western
civilization,
present
trends, 109-10; threatened with
3 3-
34, 240, 300, 314 State-church, the, 242, 381, 385 Supernaturalism, 65
Syllabus of Errors, 243
129-34 Warfare, and social evolution, 380; yesterday and tomorrow, 386 of,
destruction, 389-90 water, as sources of energy,
Wind, 370
"Wolf children," 36 Words, meaning of, 27-30, 37-38; and thought, 51 ftn., 53, 414
^